_________________ 

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(Slip Opinion) Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 1 

Per Curiam 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Nos. 14–1418, 14–1453, 14–1505, 15–35, 15–105, 15–119, and 15–191 

DAVID A. ZUBIK, ET AL., PETITIONERS 

14–1418 v. 

SYLVIA BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.; 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
 

PRIESTS FOR LIFE, ET AL., PETITIONERS 

14–1453 v. 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES, ET AL.; 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
 

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF WASHINGTON, 

ET AL., PETITIONERS 

14–1505 v. 

SYLVIA BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.; 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
 

EAST TEXAS BAPTIST UNIVERSITY, ET AL., 

PETITIONERS 
 

2 ZUBIK v. BURWELL 

Per Curiam 

15–35 v. 

SYLVIA BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.; 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR HOME FOR 

THE AGED, DENVER, COLORADO, ET AL., 

PETITIONERS 

15–105 v. 

SYLVIA BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.; 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

SOUTHERN NAZARENE UNIVERSITY, ET AL., 

PETITIONERS 

15–119 v. 

SYLVIA BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.; AND 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

GENEVA COLLEGE, PETITIONER 

15–191 v. 

SYLVIA BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

[May 16, 2016] 
 

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 3 

Per Curiam

 PER CURIAM. 

Petitioners are primarily nonprofit organizations that

provide health insurance to their employees. Federal 

regulations require petitioners to cover certain contraceptives as part of their health plans, unless petitioners 

submit a form either to their insurer or to the Federal 

Government, stating that they object on religious grounds 

to providing contraceptive coverage. Petitioners allege

that submitting this notice substantially burdens the 

exercise of their religion, in violation of the Religious 

Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 

U. S. C. §2000bb et seq. 

Following oral argument, the Court requested supplemental briefing from the parties addressing “whether 

contraceptive coverage could be provided to petitioners’ 

employees, through petitioners’ insurance companies,

without any such notice from petitioners.” Post, p. ___. 

Both petitioners and the Government now confirm that 

such an option is feasible. Petitioners have clarified that 

their religious exercise is not infringed where they “need 

to do nothing more than contract for a plan that does not

include coverage for some or all forms of contraception,”

even if their employees receive cost-free contraceptive

coverage from the same insurance company. Supplemental Brief for Petitioners 4. The Government has confirmed that the challenged procedures “for employers with 

insured plans could be modified to operate in the manner

posited in the Court’s order while still ensuring that the 

affected women receive contraceptive coverage seamlessly, 

together with the rest of their health coverage.” Supplemental Brief for Respondents 14–15.

In light of the positions asserted by the parties in their

supplemental briefs, the Court vacates the judgments

below and remands to the respective United States Courts

of Appeals for the Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D. C. Circuits.

Given the gravity of the dispute and the substantial clari-
 

4 ZUBIK v. BURWELL 

Per Curiam 

fication and refinement in the positions of the parties, the 

parties on remand should be afforded an opportunity to 

arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates 

petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time

ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans 

“receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.” Id., at 1. We anticipate that the Courts

of Appeals will allow the parties sufficient time to resolve 

any outstanding issues between them. 

The Court finds the foregoing approach more suitable 

than addressing the significantly clarified views of the

parties in the first instance. Although there may still be

areas of disagreement between the parties on issues of

implementation, the importance of those areas of potential 

concern is uncertain, as is the necessity of this Court’s

involvement at this point to resolve them. This Court has 

taken similar action in other cases in the past. See, e.g., 

Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 562 

U. S. 42, 43 (2011) (per curiam) (vacating and remanding 

for the Second Circuit to “address, in the first instance, 

whether to revisit its ruling on sovereign immunity in

light of [a] new factual development, and—if necessary—

proceed to address other questions in the case consistent 

with its sovereign immunity ruling”); Kiyemba v. Obama, 

559 U. S. 131, 132 (2010) (per curiam) (vacating and remanding for the D. C. Circuit to “determine, in the first

instance, what further proceedings in that court or in the 

District Court are necessary and appropriate for the full 

and prompt disposition of the case in light of the new 

developments”); Villarreal v. United States, 572 U. S. ___ 

(2014) (vacating and remanding to the Fifth Circuit “for

further consideration in light of the position asserted by 

the Solicitor General in his brief for the United States”). 

The Court expresses no view on the merits of the cases. 

In particular, the Court does not decide whether petitioners’ religious exercise has been substantially burdened, 
 

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 5 

Per Curiam 

whether the Government has a compelling interest, or 

whether the current regulations are the least restrictive

means of serving that interest. 

Nothing in this opinion, or in the opinions or orders of 

the courts below, is to affect the ability of the Government 

to ensure that women covered by petitioners’ health plans

“obtain, without cost, the full range of FDA approved

contraceptives.” Wheaton College v. Burwell, 573 U. S. 

___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 1). Through this litigation, 

petitioners have made the Government aware of their

view that they meet “the requirements for exemption from

the contraceptive coverage requirement on religious

grounds.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 2). Nothing in this opinion, or in the opinions or orders of the courts below, “precludes the Government from relying on this notice, to the

extent it considers it necessary, to facilitate the provision 

of full contraceptive coverage” going forward. Ibid. Because the Government may rely on this notice, the Government may not impose taxes or penalties on petitioners

for failure to provide the relevant notice.

The judgments of the Courts of Appeals are vacated, and 

the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Nos. 14–1418, 14–1453, 14–1505, 15–35, 15–105, 15–119, and 15–191 

DAVID A. ZUBIK, ET AL., PETITIONERS 

14–1418 v. 

SYLVIA BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.; 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
 

PRIESTS FOR LIFE, ET AL., PETITIONERS 

14–1453 v. 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES, ET AL.; 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
 

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF WASHINGTON, 

ET AL., PETITIONERS 

14–1505 v. 

SYLVIA BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.; 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
 

EAST TEXAS BAPTIST UNIVERSITY, ET AL., 

PETITIONERS 

15–35 v. 

SYLVIA BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.; 
 

2 ZUBIK v. BURWELL 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
 

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR HOME FOR 

THE AGED, DENVER, COLORADO, ET AL., 

PETITIONERS 

15–105 v. 

SYLVIA BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.; 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
 

SOUTHERN NAZARENE UNIVERSITY, ET AL., 

PETITIONERS 

15–119 v. 

SYLVIA BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.; AND 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
 

GENEVA COLLEGE, PETITIONER 

15–191 v. 

SYLVIA BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
 

[May 16, 2016]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG 

joins, concurring. 

I join the Court’s per curiam opinion because it expresses

no view on “the merits of the cases,” “whether petition-
Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

ers’ religious exercise has been substantially burdened,” or 

“whether the current regulations are the least restrictive 

means of serving” a compelling governmental interest. 

Ante, at 4–5. Lower courts, therefore, should not construe 

either today’s per curiam or our order of March 29, 2016, 

as signals of where this Court stands. We have included 

similarly explicit disclaimers in previous orders. See, e.g., 

Wheaton College v. Burwell, 573 U. S. ___ (2014) (“[T]his 

order should not be construed as an expression of the

Court’s views on the merits”). Yet some lower courts have 

ignored those instructions. See, e.g., Sharpe Holdings, 

Inc., v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 801 F. 3d 

927, 944 (CA8 2015) (“[I]n Wheaton College, Little Sisters 

of the Poor, and Zubik, the Supreme Court approved a 

method of notice to HHS that is arguably less onerous

than [existing regulations] yet permits the government to 

further its interests. Although the Court’s orders were not

final rulings on the merits, they at the very least collectively constitute a signal that less restrictive means exist

by which the government may further its interests”). On 

remand in these cases, the Courts of Appeals should not

make the same mistake. 

I also join the Court’s opinion because it allows the 

lower courts to consider only whether existing or modified

regulations could provide seamless contraceptive coverage

“‘to petitioners’ employees, through petitioners’ insurance

companies, without any . . . notice from petitioners.’” 

Ante, at 3. The opinion does not, by contrast, endorse the 

petitioners’ position that the existing regulations substantially burden their religious exercise or that contraceptive

coverage must be provided through a “separate policy,

with a separate enrollment process.” Supp. Brief for

Petitioners 1; Supp. Reply Brief for Petitioners 5. Such 

separate contraceptive-only policies do not currently exist, 

and the Government has laid out a number of legal and 

practical obstacles to their creation. See Supp. Reply Brief 
 

4 ZUBIK v. BURWELL 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

for Respondents 3–4. Requiring standalone contraceptiveonly coverage would leave in limbo all of the women now 

guaranteed seamless preventive-care coverage under the 

Affordable Care Act. And requiring that women affirmatively opt into such coverage would “impose precisely the 

kind of barrier to the delivery of preventive services that 

Congress sought to eliminate.” Id., at 6. 

Today’s opinion does only what it says it does: “afford[s] 

an opportunity” for the parties and Courts of Appeals to

reconsider the parties’ arguments in light of petitioners’

new articulation of their religious objection and the Government’s clarification about what the existing regulations 

accomplish, how they might be amended, and what such

an amendment would sacrifice. Ante, at 4. As enlightened 

by the parties’ new submissions, the Courts of Appeals

remain free to reach the same conclusion or a different one 

on each of the questions presented by these cases.