U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

43–656 PDF 2008

MOVING BEYOND THE FIRST FIVE YEARS: 

SOLVING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY’S MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, 

INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 9, 2008 

Serial No. 110–104 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

AL GREEN, Texas 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

JESSICA HERRERA-FLANIGAN, Staff Director & General Counsel 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PETER T. KING, NEW YORK (Ex Officio) 

JEFF GREENE, Director & Counsel 

BRIAN TURBYFILL, Clerk 

MICHAEL RUSSELL, Senior Counsel 

(II) 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Management, 

Investigations, and Oversight ............................................................................. 1 

The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Alabama, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight ...................................................................................... 2 

WITNESSES

Ms. Elaine C. Duke, Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Department 

of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

Mr. Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice 

Team, Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15 

Mr. Clark Kent Ervin, Director, Homeland Security Program, The Aspen 

Institute: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 22 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 23 

Mr. James Jay Carafano, Senior Research Fellow in Defense and Homeland 

Security, The Heritage Foundation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 25 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 27 

FOR THE RECORD

The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Alabama, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight: 

Chart ..................................................................................................................... 3 

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairman Christopher P. Carney .............................................. 49 

Questions From Ranking Member Mike Rogers ................................................... 58 

(1) 

MOVING BEYOND THE FIRST FIVE YEARS: 

SOLVING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY’S MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES 

Wednesday, April 9, 2008 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND

OVERSIGHT, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Christopher P. Carney 

[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Carney, Clarke, and Rogers. 

Mr. CARNEY. The Subcommittee of Management, Investigations 

and Oversight will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on 

‘‘Moving Beyond the First Five Years: Solving the Department of 

Homeland Security’s Management Challenges.’’ 

After 5 years DHS stands at the proverbial fork in the road. One 

path is the easy way. Keep on wandering forward, never stopping 

to ask whether what you are doing makes sense or whether you 

need to rethink this route. 

This way would lead the Department to move to more wasteful 

contracts, painful congressional hearings, remaining as the butt of 

late night comedian’s jokes, and, God forbid, perhaps another bungled Katrina response. 

This route may well also lead to the breaking up of the Department and result in our preparedness efforts being set back decades. 

The other path requires taking a hard look at what has worked 

over the past 5 years and what has not. It requires setting aside 

pride and emotion, and where necessary, admitting error. It requires respecting those who conduct oversight, not resisting and resenting them. 

This road will be hard and will not lead to instant success. Rather, it will bring slow, incremental improvements. But in 5 years 

there would still be a Department of Homeland Security, and it 

would be much improved from the one that we know today. 

No large organization is perfect, whether in the public or private 

sector. We do not expect perfection, but organizations that are not 

accountable for their failings do not survive. 

So what we ask is for accountability, introspection and gradual 

improvement. Five years from now, we need a Department that has 
2 

embraced the concept of one DHS, while still recognizing the special skills and missions of the individual components. 

We need a Department that has a full seat at the Federal table, 

leading the government in preparing for and, if necessary, responding to the next disaster. We need a Department that has enough 

contracting officers to develop and oversee its major procurements. 

We need a Department that does not rely on expensive contractors to perform the everyday functions that should be carried out 

by government workers. 

The transition to the next Presidential administration is a crucial 

point in the Department’s development. If it is botched, the Department will suffer, and the Nation will suffer. As the committee 

charged with oversight of the DHS, it is our responsibility to ensure that transition planning is on track. 

So, as I said, we are at a fork in the road. I hope DHS chooses 

the tough road, but the one that will make it better and make it 

safer for all Americans. 

Before I close, I want to take a moment to thank all of our witnesses for getting their testimony in on time. Both you and your 

staff’s efforts in this regard are much appreciated, and I hope the 

Department will make this a habit in the future. 

The chair now recognizes the ranking member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, for an opening statement. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all the witnesses for taking the time to be here. 

I know all of you have testified before this committee in the past, 

and we welcome you back. I also want to take this time to congratulate Elaine Duke on her nomination by the president to serve 

as under secretary of management at DHS. 

We appreciate your hard work and look forward to continuing to 

work with you as you work for the American people. 

Today’s hearing continues the work of this subcommittee in the 

109th Congress on overseeing management challenges facing DHS. 

Areas we explored include contracting reforms, procurement staffing levels, employee morale, information security and training 

costs. 

Under Ms. Duke’s leadership as former chief procurement officer, 

DHS made significant improvements in its procurement operations. 

However, I think we can all agree that more procurement staff are 

needed at DHS to ensure that contracts are awarded and managed 

effectively. 

As this hearing focuses on the management challenges facing 

DHS, it is important to keep in mind what Congress can do to help 

the Department in this area. 

First, Congress needs to enact the remaining 9/11 Commission 

recommendations and consolidate jurisdiction over DHS. Currently, 

DHS officials report to 86 committees and subcommittees, resulting 

in conflicting guidance over the Department. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent 

to this chart, reflecting those 86 committees, be inserted in the 

record. 

[The information follows:] 
3 

Mr. CARNEY. Certainly. Without objection, I would like to thank 

the gentleman for inserting this into the record. 

Mr. ROGERS. The second thing that I think we need to do is the 

committee needs to pass an annual DHS authorization bill, as it 

has done each year since the committee was established. To be effective, the authorization bill must be passed before Congress acts 

on the Department’s appropriation bill later this spring. 

Third, Congress must not reorganize DHS in the near future. 

Doing so would provide insufficient time for its organizational 

structure to take hold. The former comptroller general confirmed 

that analysis, testifying that it takes 5 to 7 years for a complex 

merger to work. 

I think all of us would agree that the hard-working folks at DHS 

would benefit from stability in the workplace, consolidated oversight by Congress, and an authorization bill. 
4 

This not only would strengthen DHS, but would also strengthen 

the Nation’s security. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. 

Other members of the subcommittee are reminded that under 

committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the 

record. 

I would like to welcome the panel of our witnesses today. 

Prior to this appointment, Ms. Duke served as the Department’s 

chief procurement officer and the deputy assistant administrator 

for the Transportation Safety Administration. She was recently 

nominated to be the Department’s next under secretary for management. 

Congratulations on that nomination. 

Our second witness is Norm Rabkin, the managing director of 

the Homeland Security and Justice Team at the Government Accountability Office, a position in which he has served since January 

2003. 

Mr. Rabkin is in charge of managing GAO’s reviews of issues related to homeland security, Federal law enforcement, the Federal 

judiciary and Federal funds provided to State and local law enforcement agencies. 

Our third witness is Mr. Clark Kent Ervin, the director of the 

Homeland Security Initiative at the Aspen Institute. Mr. Ervin previously served as the first inspector general of the Department of 

Homeland Security, where he was charged with providing oversight 

of the new Department. 

The fourth witness is Dr. James Carafano, the assistant director 

of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International 

Studies and senior research fellow for the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation. 

Dr. Carafano’s areas of expertise include homeland security and 

counterterrorism. Prior to his current position, Dr. Carafano served 

25 years in the U.S. Army, where he reached the rank of lieutenant 

colonel. 

Thank you for your service to the Nation, sir. 

I thank you for all for being here. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted 

into the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his or her 

statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Ms. Duke. 

STATEMENT OF ELAINE C. DUKE, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY 

FOR MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. DUKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Member Rogers and Members of the subcommittee. 

It is a pleasure to appear before you this afternoon my first time 

as the deputy under secretary of management before this committee. I have been in this position about 5 months, but I have 

spent most of my 25 years of civil service in the procurement profession, most recently as the Department’s chief procurement officer. 

Secretary Chertoff has established five priorities for the Department, the fifth of which is to strengthen and unify DHS operations 
5 

and management. Management’s role enables the Department to 

accomplish the other four mission goals. 

We accomplish this through the management of six chiefs: chief 

financial officer, procurement, human capital, security, administrative and information officers. To that end, our most significant effort is to continue transforming the Department into a unified force 

that protects our country. 

DHS, whose size is that of a Fortune 30 company, has merged 

22 agencies with approximately 208,000 employees. 

My top priority is that the deputy under secretary have essential 

elements in achieving the DHS mission: first, to prepare for the 

Department’s 2009 administration transition; second, to improve 

acquisition and procure; and third, to strengthen the requirements 

process and integrate it into the planning, programming, budget 

and execution system. 

In this, my goal in transition is focusing on three areas, thus ensuring the internal processes are employed, that we have a knowledge management transfer, and that the personnel in the Department have the training, exercises and experience necessary to operate in their new roles. 

On improving acquisition and procurement, the Department is in 

the midst of many critical acquisitions that are vital to the success 

of our mission. That is why the chief procurement officer and I are 

working to institutionalize solid process. To this end, we are working on a joint requirements council and investment review processes that are more robust and complete with the Department. 

We are ensuring that program officers are properly structured 

and staffed with persons with the right skills to ensure we have 

effective management of our programs and oversight of those programs. We are examining best practices to ensure that metrics are 

in place to have properly measured successful performance, cost 

schedule and performance of these programs. 

In 2005 we established the DHS Acquisition Fellows Program, 

which is attracting new talent into entry levels, where we will retain and train them through professional career development. This 

coming June a diverse class of 20 fellows will be graduated. 

Building on its success, we expanded the program to support 83 

intern positions for fiscal year 2008, to a total of 100 in fiscal year 

2009. Our goal is to have 300 interns by the year 2011. 

We exceeded both the administration’s and the Department’s 

goal of 30 percent set-aside for small business in our contracts. We 

awarded about 33 percent of our procurement dollars to small business. Of that, 11.5 percent went to small, minority-owned, women 

businesses. We are proud of these numbers. 

In the human capital area, we are developing a Departmentwide, results-oriented, strategic human capital plan and aggressively building a world-class organization. We have implemented 

the enterprise E-recruitment system at headquarters, and it replaces about 20 hiring systems throughout the Department. We 

will complete the deployment of that Department by January 2011. 

We are also on our way to achieving a hiring target in the front 

line mission-critical occupations. We have a robust veteran outreach program that was launched last year, and nearly one-quarter 
6 

of our DHS workforce are veterans, including 28 percent of our 

managers and supervisors. 

Our mission demands an integrated approach to protect our 

homeland, yet the Department’s legacy facilities are dispersed into 

40 locations and 70 buildings throughout the national capital region. 

Therefore, one of our priorities is to get congressional support to 

the Department and authorizing and appropriating funds for DHS 

consolidation at St. Elizabeth’s West Campus and the efficient realignment of off-campus locations that will reduce the overall future cost inefficiencies. 

I thank you for your leadership and oversight and continued support of the Department and its management programs. I look forward to working with you in shaping the future and success of 

DHS with energy and enthusiasm. I would be pleased to respond 

to your questions. Thank you. 

[The statement of Ms. Duke follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELAINE C. DUKE

APRIL 9, 2008 

THE FUTURE OF DHS MANAGEMENT

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rogers and members of the subcommittee. It’s a pleasure to appear before you today for the first time as the Deputy Under Secretary for Management (DUSM). 

I have been in this position for over 5 months but have spent most of my 25 years 

of public service in the procurement profession, most recently as the Department’s 

Chief Procurement Officer. 

The Deputy Under Secretary for Management position was created as part of the 

Department’s 2009 Administration Transition Planning efforts. By having a senior 

career civil servant in this capacity, rather than a political appointee, the Department can ensure operational continuity during the change in administration. As the 

current Under Secretary for Management, Mr. Paul Schneider, is currently serving 

as the Acting Deputy Secretary, my position holds the authorities of the Under Secretary for Management. 

Our most significant effort is to continue transforming the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) into a unified force that protects our country. DHS, whose size 

is that of a Fortune 30, has merged 22 agencies with approximately 208,000 employees. This effort requires the effective and efficient use of financial and human resources, enabling technology, strong processes and superb management. It is toward 

this effort that I devote my focus, time, and energy. 

Our approach has a common thread through this effort: to ensure that there is 

a comprehensive and integrated strategy throughout the Components with specific 

and measurable goals that support the activities and priorities of the Department. 

On a practical level, we will ensure the success of this effort by having a team that 

possesses the right knowledge, skills and abilities to support the programs, transform disparate operations, and measure progress against metrics and milestones. 

The key elements of our strategy in this effort are to continue: 

• Improving acquisition and procurement throughout the Department; 

• Strengthening the requirements and investment review processes; 

• Acquiring and maintaining human capital; 

• Seeking efficiencies across the enterprise in operations and the use of resources; 

• Making the key management systems, such as financial and human resources, 

world class; and 

• Acquiring the funding and approval for DHS’ consolidation at St. Elizabeths 

West Campus and the efficient realignment of all Department of Homeland Security off-campus locations. 

As the DUSM, I lead the Management Directorate’s efforts through a well-focused, well-developed strategy that: 

• Provides structure to strengthen unified organizational governance and enhance 

department-wide communication, decisionmaking and oversight; 
7 

• Optimizes processes and systems to integrate functional operations and facilitates cross-Component synergies and streamlines coordination to ensure reliable 

and efficient support of mission objectives; • Fosters leadership that adheres to the core values and guiding principles of 

DHS in performing duties, effecting progress and leading with commitment for 

the mission; and • Leverages culture and the benefits of commonalities and differences across 

Components to promote cooperative intra and inter-agency networks and implement best practices. 

The top priorities, which are essential elements to achieving the DHS mission and 

practicing sound stewardship of taxpayers’ money are: • First: Prepare for the Department’s 2009 administration transition; • Second: Improve acquisition and procurement; and • Third: Strengthen the requirements process and integrate it into the Planning, 

Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system. 

My goal on transition is to focus on three areas: Internal Processes, Knowledge 

Management, and Training and Exercises. The Internal Processes initiative will review our Directives for sufficiency, strengthen records management, ensure proper 

succession planning, and improve our processes for incoming and exiting employees. 

The Knowledge Management initiative will produce briefing materials, but more importantly, it will convey to career executives and incoming appointees the requisite 

knowledge to keep the Department running during the Transition. The Training 

and Exercises initiative focuses on training conferences, briefings and exercises in 

order to prepare identified senior level career personnel within each Component who 

are expected to serve in an acting capacity upon the departures of the appointees. 

It is critical that these acting personnel are prepared to be informed decisionmakers 

in the event of a serious incident arising, whether man-made or natural. This initiative also facilitates direct interactions among Federal, State, local and tribal officials 

with homeland security responsibilities. 

The Department of Homeland Security is in the midst of many crucial acquisitions that are vital to its success. That is why the Chief Procurement Officer and 

I are working to strengthen acquisition and procurement by institutionalizing solid 

processes. To this end we are: • Strengthening the requirements and investment review processes by improving 

the joint requirements council and Investment Review Board (IRB) process. We 

are preparing to initiate a new Department-wide requirements process and 

have reinvigorated our investment review process; • Reviewing the major programs and investments to ensure that the requirements are clear, cost estimates are valid, technology risks are properly assessed, 

schedules are realistic, contract vehicles are proper, and the efforts are wellmanaged. We have held one formal IRB with Acting Deputy Secretary Schneider and are projecting to hold one per month. We are also beginning the processes to conduct paper IRBs and IRBs with the DUSM, as well as establishing 

Acquisition Program Baselines (APBs) and authorizing execution to the APB for 

all Level 1 and 2 programs; 

• Building the capability to manage complex efforts by ensuring that program offices are properly structured and staffed with the right people and skills to ensure efficient and effective program management and oversight; 

• Aggressively hire where we have known shortages; and 

• Examining best practice metrics in use by other departments with the intent 

to start implementation this year. 

My focus is to continue transforming the Office of Chief Procurement Officer 

(OCPO) into an Acquisition Office. Often, the terms Procurement and Acquisition 

are incorrectly used interchangeably. Procurement is only one element of acquisition 

management, whereas acquisition expands beyond the ‘‘purchase’’ of an item or 

service to include other important aspects, such as understanding operational and 

life-cycle requirements, formulating concepts of operations, developing sound business strategies, exercising prudent financial management, assessing tradeoffs, and 

managing program risks. Best practice acquisition management is executed by 

teams of professionals who understand and are able to manage the entire life-cycle 

of a major program effort. We are making progress toward this goal. 

The Acquisition Program Management Division (APMD) of OCPO began operations in August 2007. The division was established to provide oversight and support for acquisition programs. To date, APMD has performed Quick Look assessments of 37 Level 1 programs and has overseen Deep Dive reviews of the SBInet 

and Advance Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) programs. APMD has provided advice and 

guidance to a number of programs, particularly in the area of cost benefit analysis. 

Currently, the APMD team is focused on an aggressive Investment & Acquisition 
8 

process re-engineering effort. The effort includes replacing Directive 1400, establishing revised investment and acquisition decision procedures, as well as processes 

for acquisition program baselining, periodic reporting, acquisition of services, and 

other initiatives as they are identified. 

DHS’ $17 billion procurement spend plan provides for the development, fielding 

and support of significant homeland security capabilities. For example, U.S. Coast 

Guard contracts are providing aircraft and ships from the Integrated Deepwater 

System and search and rescue capability from the Rescue 21 program. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) contracts are providing additional capabilities 

via the Electronic Baggage Screening Program. Consistent with the SBI Strategy, 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is developing and fielding the capabilities at and between our Nation’s ports of entry to gain effective control of our borders. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is developing and testing a new type 

of radiation portal monitor, known as the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal, to improve 

the Nation’s defense against the threat of nuclear smuggling. 

Obtaining qualified acquisition professionals at the right time with the right skillset continues to be a challenge for the Department. Competition for these professionals is intense within the Washington, DC area. To resolve our personnel shortages, we are intensifying our human capital planning efforts to minimize skill and 

competency gaps as well as minimize our critical vacancies and reliance on contractors. For example, in response to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 1102 

Contracting Workforce Competency Gap Survey, we developed a training plan that 

spans the next 3 years. This training plan targets the contracting functional area 

within the DHS Acquisition Workforce, but it will also benefit other acquisition career fields including program management and Contracting Officer’s Technical Representatives. We are also currently conducting staffing studies to better define our 

acquisition workforce needs. Currently our workforce includes program managers 

and contract specialists. As part of our human capital planning efforts, we will be 

identifying other required acquisition career fields such as test and evaluation, systems engineering, logistics, and cost estimating. We are aggressively working to ensure that each acquisition position, upon definition, is encumbered by an acquisition 

professional trained and certified at the appropriate level. To this end, we are continuously reviewing and updating our Acquisition Training Program, the underpinning of a good certification program. We are utilizing the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act framework to develop DHS certification standards. We have 

also centralized a number of recruiting activities including issuing Department-wide 

vacancy announcements. Our centralized recruitment efforts to date have focused 

primarily on contracting professionals. Expansion to other acquisition career fields 

will occur as each series is defined and Department-wide needs are identified. This 

initiative supplements our Components’ on-going recruitment efforts with a goal of 

recruiting the best candidates available. 

Our most substantial recruitment activity began in 2005 with the establishment 

of a DHS Acquisition Fellows Program. The goal of the Fellows Program was to attract new talent at the entry level into our acquisition positions, and retain and 

train them through a professional career development program. The Office of Procurement Operations (OPO) and the TSA participated in this program and this coming June, a diverse class of 13 Fellows from TSA and seven Fellows from OPO will 

be graduating. 

Building on the success of the Acquisition Fellows Program, we expanded it into 

the Acquisition Professional Career Program and modeled it to further resemble the 

highly successful Department of Defense program. This year we plan to expand the 

program to support 33 additional intern positions. In fiscal year 2009 we are planning for a total of 100 intern positions to be funded. Our inaugural Acquisition Professional Career Program class began in January 2008 and a second class will begin 

in June 2008. Our goal is to grow this program to 300 positions by fiscal year 2011 

to fill critical acquisition positions. 

A final point that I would like to make regarding the Department’s acquisition 

and procurement practices is that DHS has exceeded both the administration’s goal 

and the Department’s elevated goal of 30 percent for small business prime contracts. 

According to our preliminary assessment, I am happy to report that in fiscal year 

2007, approximately 33 percent of the procurement dollars went to small business 

prime contractors. Of that 33 percent, about 11.5 percent was awarded to small, minority-owned businesses. These preliminary statistics include TSA, which formally 

began adherence to the Small Business Act on October 1, 2006 and is transitioning 

to the Federal Acquisition Regulation for its solicitations issued June 23, 2008 or 

later. We are proud of these numbers and consider them to be evident of our commitment to support small businesses, and to demonstrate our awareness of the role 
9 

that small businesses play in supporting our Nation’s ability to prepare for and respond to terrorist attacks and natural disasters. 

Having just shared the top priorities, I would like now to discuss the key elements 

of Management’s strategy to continue transforming the Department into a unified 

force. 

HUMAN CAPITAL

Human Capital has developed a results-oriented strategic human capital plan and 

is aggressively building a world-class organization by hiring and retaining a talented and diverse workforce. Our operational plan identifies specific activities with 

milestones for integrating workforce planning in human capital operations, improving DHS-wide hiring and retention practices, and leveraging our partnership with 

the DHS Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Office to continually increase diversity 

across DHS. 

We are improving our hiring processes by educating our hiring managers and 

human resource officials on the flexibilities that are currently available as well as 

implementing an enterprise E-recruitment system. 

This new system replaces 20 hiring systems previously used across the Department and consists of three modules: Staffing Acquisition, On-Boarding and Advanced Reporting/Analytics. We plan to deploy this automated, end-to-end hiring 

system in phases, by module across the Department by January 2011. This system: 

• Covers the Federal hiring process and rules from workforce planning to placing 

a new hire at his or her fully equipped work-station; 

• Includes a configurable workflow providing visibility across all key touch-points 

of the hiring work stream to managers, human resources and candidates; and 

• Streamlines an array of administrative processes associated with hiring, assisting DHS in its ability to hire quality candidates more quickly; manage hiring 

activity and workforce trends; and provide integrated data for reporting especially in the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) arena. 

We are well on our way to achieving our hiring targets in our frontline mission 

critical occupations as well. At Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), we 

have already filled over 908 positions this fiscal year. Of those, 598 are key front 

line occupations, and we expect to exceed our hiring goal of 1,096 additional new 

hires in key occupations this year. The Federal Emergency Management Agency 

reached a 95∂ percent staffing level for the first time at the end of fiscal year 2007, 

and is implementing a plan to reach that level again in fiscal year 2008 despite significant increases in approved staffing levels. We plan to have 17,819 Border Patrol 

Agents on board by the end of fiscal year 2008, 18,319 by the end of calendar year 

2008, and over 20,000 by the end of fiscal year 2009. Furthermore, CBP, in partnership with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), has developed 

a plan within the current budget to train all of the new agents in basic academy 

and Spanish language training at the Border Patrol Academy in Artesia, New Mexico. 

By reflecting America’s diversity, our employee workforce will provide the widest 

range of solutions, ideas, and decisions to protect America. We are committed to 

achieving a diverse DHS workforce, including our executive cadre. Nearly one-fifth 

(19.4 percent) of the Department’s employees are Hispanic, and 14.6 percent are African-American. Women compose nearly one-third of our workforce at 32.3 percent. 

Among our executive cadre, 45 percent of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service 

(USCIS) executives are women; nearly 10 percent of TSA’s executives are AfricanAmerican; and 14 percent of executives at ICE are Hispanic, as are 12 percent at 

CBP. 

For example, we have established a formal partnership with the Urban League’s 

Black Executive Exchange Program (BEEP). With managerial support, 150 DHS 

employees volunteered to represent DHS at BEEP-sponsored events at Historically 

Black Colleges and Universities. We are also pursuing similar partnerships with the 

National Association of Hispanic Federal Executives, African American Federal Executive Association, and the Hispanic Scholarship Fund Institute. 

In addition, we plan to expand upon our robust and innovative Veterans Outreach 

program launched last year, which included creation of a one-stop Web page for veterans seeking to continue their service to America by working for DHS, establishment of a Veterans Outreach forum of external stakeholders to advise us on our 

Veterans Outreach initiatives, and delivery of refresher training on Veterans Preference programs for Human Resource and EEO specialists throughout the Department. This year, we plan to establish a DHS Veterans Speakers Cadre composed 

of DHS employees who are veterans to address veterans groups. Nearly one-quarter 

(24.2 percent) of the DHS workforce are veterans, including 28.4 percent of our 
10 

managers and supervisors. In 2007, DHS hired 6,013 veterans, nearly double the 

number hired in 2006 (3,015). DHS currently employs approximately 6,400 disabled 

veterans. 

Both Secretary Chertoff and former Secretary Ridge have led a focused initiative 

to ensure that people with disabilities, including veterans who have been wounded 

serving our country overseas, are offered equal employment opportunities. 

DHS was among the first Federal agencies to participate in the Department of 

Defense’s Operation Warfighter Program. DHS representatives regularly visit Walter Reed Army Medical Center and have provided temporary assignments to over 

40 wounded soldiers and permanent assignments to nine. 

DHS also participates in the Workforce Recruitment Program and other intern 

programs specifically targeting individuals with disabilities. Many of these interns 

have been offered full-time positions upon completion of their internship. We have 

also recently deployed a new training program ‘‘Employment of People with Disabilities: A Roadmap to Success.’’ It describes the Department’s initiatives and identifies 

the tools to make hiring of individuals with disabilities easier for managers. 

Since the establishment of the American Association of People with Disabilities 

IT summer intern program, DHS has been one of the biggest supporters and users. 

DHS normally hires two of the 10 available Government-wide summer interns, and 

has made two permanent hires from this group. 

Although we have achieved a well-balanced workforce, we must do better in ensuring that our leadership ranks reflect the Nation’s diversity. In particular, the 

Secretary, Acting Deputy Secretary, and I are committed to ensuring that the talent 

pool for Senior Executive Service positions is representative of our Nation as a 

whole. To that end, we have taken several very solid steps recently. We have designated our Management Council as DHS’ de facto Diversity Council to provide 

high-level direction, priorities, and support toward enhancing diversity. This Council 

is composed of diverse, top-level representatives from each Component and is 

chaired by me. One of the Council’s first actions will be to benchmark best practices 

in the Department in the area of diversity, approve a Department-wide Diversity 

Strategy, and implement a Diversity Action Plan for fiscal year 2008–2010. Other 

plans include: 

• Conducting a cultural audit to augment employee survey results and baseline 

our diversity profile; 

• Establishing an external Diversity Outreach Forum, whereby interested stakeholders may advise us on our diversity efforts; and 

• Designing and deploying Diversity Management and Diversity Awareness training. 

Additionally, the Department offers a Senior Executive Service Candidate Development Program (SES CDP). The program is similar to other SES CDP offered by 

agencies throughout the Federal Government. The program requirements are outlined by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which also approves each department’s program individually. 

The goal of the program is to prepare candidates to be approved for selection into 

the Senior Executive Service. We currently have two classes: 

• Headquarters runs a Department-wide CDP: 

• 14 participants in 2007; 

• 23 participants in 2008. 

• Additionally, CBP and TSA are planning their own programs under the auspices of our OPM-approved SES CDP, with review by the Chief Learning Officer. Both programs will commence in 2008. 

• The United States Secret Service (USSS) also runs a program that will come 

under the Department-wide CDP umbrella. 

• The CBP, TSA and USSS programs will comply with the provisions of the Department’s OPM-approved CDP while targeting the unique requirements of the 

law enforcement missions. 

The program content and process includes: 

• Initial assessment against OPM’s Executive Core Qualifications (ECQs); 

• Orientation; 

• Residential programs; 

• Coaching and mentoring; 

• Rotational assignment (4 months long); 

• Other developmental activities as required by the outcomes of the initial assessment; and 

• Portfolios submitted to OPM for final approval of SES CDP candidates. 

All together, these programs over time, will ensure the Department has an enterprise-wide SES Candidate Development Program that meets the Department’s suc-
11 

cession planning needs and supports the promotion of a representative and diverse 

workforce into the ranks of the SES. 

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

The 22 agencies that formed DHS brought their financial management issues 

with them. As a result the Department has had substantial challenges to overcome 

in its effort to improve its financial management processes. However, to date, we 

have reduced material weakness component conditions from 25 in 2006 to 16 in 

2007. The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and I are working to make measurable, demonstrable progress in the development and implementation of the following: 

• Appropriate systems and processes that ensure clean audit opinions; 

• Sound internal controls for financial reporting; 

• Timely, accurate, and useful financial data collection for analysis; and 

• Efficient financial management services. 

Success in these areas rests upon a framework of policies, processes, systems, people and accountability. We have efforts underway in each of these areas. For example, the ‘‘Internal Controls Playbook’’ is a corrective action plan that includes Federal Government best practices for financial management. The Playbook was approved by Secretary Chertoff and disseminated throughout the Department. 

Through this Playbook, we are aggressively ensuring that internal audit and control 

systems are in place to help us achieve the mission and execute the Department’s 

strategy. In executing this effort, we work closely with the Office of the Inspector 

General. Because of the importance of this effort, the CFO and I brief the Secretary 

monthly on its status. 

As a result of these efforts, for the second consecutive year, the outcome of the 

independent audit shows significant progress. Our 2007 audit again demonstrates 

that financial management at DHS has improved dramatically. Consider these highlights: 

• We corrected material weakness conditions related to financial management 

and oversight through a strengthened control environment and bolstered oversight functions with the strong support of the Department’s Secretary and 

Under Secretary for Management; 

• TSA received a qualified audit opinion on their fiscal year 2007 Balance Sheet. 

In addition, ICE sustained fiscal year 2006 progress and eliminated all remaining material weakness conditions. CBP and FLETC obtained an unqualified 

opinion on all fiscal year 2007 Financial Statements; 

• We improved the number of organizations that do not contribute to a Department-wide material weakness from four [USSS, Science and Technology, 

FLETC & USCIS] to seven from 2006 to 2007. This now includes CBP, ICE, 

FLETC, USCIS, USSS, US–VISIT, and Science and Technology; 

• We reduced the number of Component conditions that contributed to our fiscal 

year 2007 material weaknesses from 25 to 16; 

• We reduced Department-wide audit disclaimer conditions by 40 percent; 

• Under the Chief Information Officer’s (CIO) leadership, the number of Components contributing to the Department-level information systems security material weakness dropped from six to three; and 

• The Secretary provided the Department’s first-ever assurance statement on the 

design effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting. 

The fiscal year 2007 audit shows our corrective actions are working, and I am particularly encouraged by our efforts to sustain this progress. While significant internal control challenges remain, they are in much more focused areas and we are 

tackling them in a targeted approach. 

The Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation was designated the departmental Performance Improvement Officer. This will bring greater structure, coherence and focus on our performance measurement function, and improve our external 

reporting requirements and accountability within the Department. 

We have developed a strategy to consolidate financial management systems across 

the Department. Our strategy to yield timely and accurate financial data includes 

OMB-compliant accounting lines, the centralization of business processes and robust 

business intelligence tools to ensure that both our leadership and external stakeholders receive actionable, timely and transparent financial information. 

Finally, we are working to ensure the Department’s grant program has the necessary internal controls in place, are adhered to, and that funds to State and local 

first responders are monitored to achieve success with measurable outcomes. 
12 

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

We continue to address matters within information technology management. Utilizing information technology (IT), the Department has established and institutionalized Department-wide business processes and systems to manage information. 

For example, the CIO heads the DHS CIO Council, whose membership includes the 

CIOs from all of DHS’ components. The Council works to standardize business practices where it makes sense in order to improve information sharing. These efforts 

improve Department operations and reduce costs by eliminating duplicative IT systems. 

Particular initiatives that have contributed toward improved information management at reduced costs include the following initiatives: 

• Consolidation of major networks and systems continues; in fiscal year 2007, we 

consolidated 100 percent of DHS Headquarters, CBP, ICE, FLETC and USCIS 

network sites (over 1,780 sites) to a single Multiple Protocol Label Switching 

network allowing DHS transparent monitoring of network performance and activity, prioritization of traffic, vastly improved security posture, and established 

two DHS enterprise-wide data centers to migrate DHS system operations. 

• Established the regulatory framework to ensure the Department CIO has control over Department-wide IT Acquisitions, budgets, and personnel performance. 

In 2007 we aligned in excess of $3.2 billion of IT investment to Department priorities. 

• Implemented a comprehensive Concept of Operations for the DHS Security Operations Center, including: (1) Incident Reporting and tracking Web page, and 

(2) Privacy incident reporting guide, thereby ensuring that the IT systems are 

receiving the highest security assurance. 

LEVERAGING ASSETS AND BUSINESS PROCESSES

One of the founding principles of the Department is to leverage assets and business processes to provide a nimble and efficient operation that can focus on our mission. We have several efforts underway to streamline our business processes and to 

make more efficient use of our assets, especially real estate. 

Significant efforts are already underway to ensure that all necessary Directives 

are updated and implemented prior to the close of this fiscal year. Directives are 

a key component in ensuring consistent application of DHS policy and business 

practices across the Department. 

Records management is vital to ensuring that accurate and reliable information 

is available to DHS decisionmakers. It is an important component of a successful 

transition, and of DHS’ continuity plan. The current records management process 

is largely paper-based and we are currently planning an electronic records management system. In the meantime, we have updated and established schedules for 

records retention and disposal and are rolling out training so that all employees understand their responsibilities for records management. 

We have developed a Department-wide real property asset management plan and 

performance measures to guide decisionmaking for effective and efficient use of real 

estate. We have developed a strategy for collocating appropriate Department activities to enhance mission support and eliminate duplication. One of the first and most 

critical steps of this strategy is the establishment of a permanent consolidated 

Headquarters for DHS. This is one of the Secretary’s top priorities. 

CONSOLIDATED DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY HEADQUARTERS

Our mission demands an integrated approach to protect our Homeland. Yet, the 

Department’s legacy facilities are dispersed in 40 locations and 70 buildings 

throughout the National Capital Region (NCR). This dispersal adversely impacts 

critical communication, coordination, and cooperation across the Department. Moreover, we currently have 40 additional NCR space requests pending with the General 

Services Administration (GSA) that will further exacerbate the problem. An adequately sized and functionally appropriate consolidated Headquarters will be a monumental step in helping the Department meet the strategic imperative of unifying 

DHS operationally, administratively, and culturally, as well as remove the physical 

barriers that impact unity of purpose and effort. 

A consolidated DHS Headquarters also has positive resource implications. GSA 

determined consolidating office space at St. Elizabeth’s will result in a significant 

future cost avoidance, once the project is funded and underway as compared to individually renewing leases. In addition DHS expects to achieve further efficiencies by 

reducing administrative overhead, eliminating redundancies, and sharing common 

campus services. 
13 

The Department also needs to reduce the total number of locations that house 

DHS Components within the NCR to as few as possible in order to reduce overall 

future costs and inefficiencies due to our geographic dispersion. Consolidating NCR 

Headquarters mission support functions that do not relocate to St. Elizabeth’s has 

the potential to achieve comparable cost avoidances. The real estate portfolio is currently planned to be reduced to a manageable number of six to eight locations. 

I request in the strongest terms that Congress support the Department by authorizing and appropriating funding for DHS’ consolidation at St. Elizabeth’s West Campus and the efficient realignment of off-campus locations that will follow in future 

budget years. 

CONCLUSION

Secretary Chertoff has expressed that one of his primary goals for DHS is to 

strengthen DHS core management, policy and operational integration. The other 

four are: 

• Protect our Nation from dangerous people; 

• Protect the Nation from dangerous cargo and things coming into the country; 

• Protect and harden our critical infrastructure; and 

• Strengthen our emergency preparedness and response. 

While my testimony today focuses on the management area, we have made significant progress in each of the other four mission areas as well. As the Department 

enters into its next stage of development to transform into an effective, integrated 

organization, it is important to keep in mind that this process is a marathon, not 

a sprint. We must develop sustainable, long-term processes which will build capabilities. While we certainly realize the importance of timeliness, we want to be 

proactive and forward-looking. To do so, we need to get correct systems in place. 

This takes time, but it is more beneficial, productive, and efficient in the long run. 

We are building for the future. 

Thank you for your leadership and continued support of the Department of Homeland Security and its management programs. I look forward to working together 

with you in shaping the future and success of DHS with energy and enthusiasm. 

Thank you for this opportunity to be here today, and I will be pleased to respond 

to any questions that you may have. 

Mr. CARNEY. I thank you for your testimony. 

I now recognize Mr. Rabkin, to summarize his statement, for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF NORMAN J. RABKIN, MANAGING DIRECTOR, 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEAM, GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. RABKIN. Chairman Carney, Mr. Rogers, I am pleased to be 

here this afternoon to discuss the challenges that DHS faces in 

managing its missions, its finances, its people, its acquisitions, its 

information and its real property. 

My statement summarizes the progress DHS has made in implementing core management functions. Based on our assessments 

and those of the DHS as inspector general over the past 5 years, 

we concluded that DHS has made limited progress in the management of its human capital and information technology resources, 

modest progress in managing its finances and acquisitions, and 

moderate progress in managing its real property assets. 

Let me put this in a couple of different perspectives. First, let’s 

compare DHS’ management status and that of other Federal agencies. This is the latest scorecard from the president’s management 

agenda. The OMB issues this. 

Of the 26 departments and agencies that it lists, only three have 

not achieved what OMB calls success in the five major management categories that it looks at. OMB itself hasn’t, the Department 

of Defense, and DHS. 
14 

Maybe it is not fair to compare DHS to those other agencies. 

After all, it is only 5 years old, and as you mentioned, from our 

study of mergers and acquisitions, we recognize that it generally 

takes at least 5 to 7 years for an organization like DHS to transform itself and operate successfully. 

So the second perspective can be to compare DHS’ progress in its 

management areas to its progress in its mission areas. We have 

concluded that DHS has made more progress in meeting Congress’ 

and the president’s expectations for its primary missions—things 

like maritime and aviation security, immigration enforcement, critical infrastructure protection. 

It is understandable that DHS would devote more focus and 

more energy to these areas than to its management areas. But I 

believe that it is reasonable now to expect DHS to devote comparable focus and comparable energy to solving its management 

challenges. 

Through the end of this year, we will be exploring DHS’ plans 

for meeting its management challenges and the commitment and 

progress it is making to implement those plans, as we consider 

whether the transformation of DHS should remain on our high-risk 

list. 

Here are some of the questions that we will be asking. First, will 

DHS be able to regularly update its strategic plan so that its components and employees, as well as Congress and the American people, can judge its goals and objectives and track its progress? 

Second, will it develop an acquisition system that gives its components autonomy to design and procure new systems, while conforming to Federal Acquisition Regulations and the general principles issued by the chief acquisition officer? 

And will the CAO and the DHS components exercise enough 

oversight to ensure they are getting what they need on time and 

at reasonable prices? 

Third, will DHS improve its financial management functions 

enough to get clean audit opinions and to ensure that it has adequate controls over financial transactions? 

Fourth, will DHS create a human capital environment where 

components have effective workforce plans that are linked to DHS’ 

strategic plan; recruitment, hiring and retention efforts that can 

ensure a topnotch workforce; a credible and valid performance 

management system; and employees who judge DHS as a great 

place to work? 

Finally, will DHS have access to and be able to effectively share 

all the information needed to accomplish its missions? Will it properly safeguard this information? 

As I mentioned, one of the prerequisites for getting off of our 

high-risk list is to demonstrate progress. From our perspective, 

DHS must be able to document its claims of progress and provide 

us that documentation, as well as access to the program officials 

responsible for assuring that progress in a reasonable time. 

Almost a year ago, I testified before this subcommittee about our 

concern with the delays we were experiencing in getting access to 

needed DHS documents and officials. While I have seen sporadic 

examples of improved access, DHS has not yet changed its policies 

and procedures for dealing with us. We are discussing changes 
15 

with DHS management officials. I am hopeful, but so far no 

change. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I will be pleased to 

answer questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Rabkin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NORMAN J. RABKIN

APRIL 9, 2008 

GAO HIGHLIGHTS

Highlights of GAO–08–646T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight, Committee on Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began operations in March 2003 

with missions that include preventing terrorist attacks from occurring within the 

United States, reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism, minimizing damages from 

attacks that occur, and helping the Nation recover from any attacks. GAO has reported that the implementation and transformation of DHS is an enormous management challenge. GAO’s prior work on mergers and acquisitions found that successful 

transformations of large organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take at least 5 to 7 years to achieve. This testimony addresses: (1) The progress made by DHS in implementing its management functions; 

and (2) key issues that have affected the Department’s implementation efforts. This 

testimony is based on GAO’s August 2007 report evaluating DHS’s progress between 

March 2003 and July 2007; selected reports issued since July 2007; and GAO’s institutional knowledge of homeland security and management issues. 

What GAO Recommends 

While this testimony contains no new recommendations, GAO has made over 900 

recommendations to DHS over the past 5 years to strengthen departmental operations. DHS has implemented some of these recommendations and is in the process 

of implementing others. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: PROGRESS MADE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF

MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS, BUT MORE WORK REMAINS

What GAO Found 

Within each of its management areas—acquisition, financial, human capital, information technology, and real property management—DHS has made some 

progress, but has also faced challenges. 

• DHS has recognized the need to improve acquisition outcomes and taken some 

positive steps to organize and assess the acquisition function, but continues to 

lack clear accountability for the outcomes of acquisition dollars spent. The Department also has not fully ensured proper oversight of its contractors providing 

services closely supporting inherently government functions. 

• DHS has designated a Chief Financial Officer and taken actions to prepare corrective action plans for its internal control weaknesses. However, DHS has been 

unable to obtain an unqualified audit opinion of its financial statements, and 

for fiscal year 2007 the independent auditor identified significant deficiencies in 

DHS’s internal control over financial reporting. 

• DHS has taken actions to implement its human capital system by, for example, 

issuing a departmental training plan and human capital operational plan. 

Among other things, DHS still needs to implement a human capital system 

linked to its strategic plan, establish a market-based and more performance-oriented pay system, and seek more routine feedback from employees. 

• DHS has taken actions to develop information technology management controls, 

such as developing an information technology human capital plan and developing policies to ensure the protection of sensitive information. However, DHS 

has not yet fully implemented a comprehensive information security program or 

a process to effectively manage information technology investments. 

• DHS has developed an Asset Management Plan and established performance 

measures consistent with Federal Real Property standards. However, DHS has 

yet to demonstrate full implementation of its Asset Management Plan or full 

use of asset management inventory information. 
16 

1 Examples of non-homeland security functions include Coast Guard search and rescue and 

naturalization services. 2GAO, Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues, GAO–02–957T (Washington, DC: July 17, 2002). 3GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO–03–119 (Washington, DC: January 2003). 4GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and 

Management Functions, GAO–07–454 (Washington, DC: Aug. 17, 2007). 

Various cross-cutting issues have affected DHS’s implementation efforts. For example, DHS has not yet updated its strategic plan and put in place structures to 

help it manage for results. 

Accountability and transparency are critical to effectively implementing DHS’s 

management functions. GAO has experienced delays in obtaining access to needed 

information from DHS, though over the past year, GAO’s access has improved. GAO 

is hopeful that planned revisions to DHS’s guidance for working with GAO will 

streamline our access to documents and officials. 

DHS’s 5-year anniversary provides an opportunity for the Department to review 

how it has matured as an organization. As part of our broad range of work, GAO 

will continue to assess DHS’s progress in addressing high-risk issues. In particular, 

GAO will continue to assess the progress made by the Department in its transformation efforts and whether any progress made is sustainable over the long term. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to 

appear today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to implement its management functions. DHS began operations in March 2003 with missions that include preventing terrorist attacks from occurring within the United 

States, reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism, minimizing damages from attacks 

that occur, and helping the Nation recover from any attacks. The Department has 

initiated and continued the implementation of various policies and programs to address these missions as well as its non-homeland security functions.1 DHS has also 

taken a number of actions designed to integrate its management functions and to 

transform its component agencies into an effective cabinet-level department. Prior 

to the creation of DHS, we testified on whether the reorganization of government 

agencies might better address the Nation’s homeland security needs.2 At that time, 

we identified that the Nation had a unique opportunity to create an effective and 

performance-based organization to strengthen the Nation’s ability to protect its borders and citizens. We noted that the magnitude of the challenges that the new department would face would require substantial time and effort to overcome, and 

that the implementation of the new department would be extremely complex. 

In 2003, we designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as highrisk because it represented an enormous undertaking that would require time to 

achieve in an effective and efficient manner.3 We further identified that the components that became part of the Department already faced a wide array of existing 

challenges, and any failure to effectively carry out its mission would expose the Nation to potentially serious consequences. In designating the implementation and 

transformation of DHS as high-risk, we noted that building an effective department 

would require consistent and sustained leadership from top management to ensure 

the needed transformation of disparate agencies, programs, and missions into an integrated organization. Our prior work on mergers and acquisitions, undertaken before the creation of DHS, found that successful transformations of large organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take at 

least 5 to 7 years to achieve. 

In August 2007, we reported on the progress DHS had made since its inception 

in implementing its management and mission functions.4 We identified specific actions that DHS was to achieve based on legislation, homeland security presidential 

directives, DHS strategic planning documents, and other sources, and reported on 

the progress the Department made in implementing these actions. 

My testimony today addresses: (1) The progress made by DHS in implementing 

its management functions in the areas of acquisition, financial, human capital, information technology, and real property management; and (2) key issues that have 

affected the Department’s implementation efforts. My statement is based on the results of our August 2007 report evaluating the extent to which DHS has achieved 

congressional and administration expectations set out for them in its management 

and mission areas; selected products we issued on DHS since July 2007; and our 

institutional knowledge of homeland security and various government organizational and management issues. For our August 2007 report on DHS progress, we 

conducted our work from September 2006 to July 2007. In April 2008, we updated 

this work with selected reports. We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 
17 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

SUMMARY

DHS has made progress in implementing its management functions in the areas 

of acquisition, financial, human capital, information technology, and real property 

management. However, we have identified challenges remaining in each of these 

areas. • DHS has made some progress in strengthening its acquisition management 

functions. For example, DHS has recognized the need to improve acquisition 

outcomes and taken some positive steps to organize and assess the acquisition 

function, but continues to lack clear accountability for the outcomes of acquisition dollars spent. The Department also has not fully ensured proper oversight 

of its contractors providing services closely supporting inherently government 

functions. • In the area of financial management, although it has designated a Chief Financial Officer and taken steps to prepare corrective action plans for its internal 

control weaknesses, DHS has been unable to obtain an unqualified audit opinion on its financial statements, and for fiscal year 2007, the independent auditor issued a disclaimer on DHS’s financial statements and identified significant 

deficiencies—the majority of which were so serious they qualified as material 

weaknesses—in DHS’s internal control over financial reporting. DHS needs to 

subject all its financial statements to annual audits and correct the identified 

internal control weaknesses. 

• DHS has taken steps to implement its human capital system. For example, in 

July 2005 DHS issued a departmental training plan and in April 2007 issued 

its fiscal year 2007 and 2008 Human Capital Operational Plan. However, DHS 

still needs to implement a human capital system that links to its strategic plan, 

implement more effective processes to recruit and hire employees with needed 

skills, establish a market-based and more performance-oriented pay system, 

seek more routine feedback from employees, and implement its training plan. 

• DHS has undertaken efforts to establish various information technology management controls and capabilities. For example, DHS organized information 

technology management in the Office of the Chief Information Officer, developed an information technology human capital plan that is largely consistent 

with Federal guidance and best practices, and developed policies and procedures 

to ensure the protection of sensitive information. However, DHS has not fully 

implemented a comprehensive information security program. Furthermore, it 

has not yet fully aligned all of its investments with a comprehensive enterprise 

architecture or implemented a process to effectively manage its information 

technology investments. 

• In the area of real property management, DHS has developed an Asset Management Plan, developed a generally complete real property data inventory, submitted this inventory for inclusion in the governmentwide real property database, and established performance measures consistent with Federal Real Property standards. However, in August 2007 we reported that DHS had yet to demonstrate full implementation of its asset management plan and full use of asset 

inventory information and performance measures in management decisionmaking. 

A variety of cross-cutting issues have affected DHS’s efforts to implement its management functions. For example, DHS has not issued an updated strategic plan and 

has not yet fully developed adequate performance measures or put in place structures to help ensure that the agency is managing for results. Accountability and 

transparency are critical to effectively implementing DHS’s management functions. 

We have experienced delays in obtaining access to needed information from DHS 

components, though over the past year, our access has improved in certain areas. 

We are hopeful that planned revisions to its departmental guidance for working 

with us and its Office of Inspector General (IG) will streamline our access to needed 

documents and agency officials. 

BACKGROUND

In July 2002, President Bush issued the National Strategy for Homeland Security. 

The strategy set forth overall objectives to prevent terrorist attacks within the 

United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from attacks that occur. The strategy further identi-
18 

5These 22 agencies, offices, and programs were U.S. Customs Service; U.S. Immigration and 

Naturalization Service; Federal Protective Service; Transportation Security Administration; Federal Law Enforcement Training Center; Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service; Office for 

Domestic Preparedness; Federal Emergency Management Agency; Strategic National Stockpile 

and the National Disaster Medical System; Nuclear Incident Response Team; Domestic Emergency Support Team; National Domestic Preparedness Office; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Countermeasures Program; Environmental Measures Laboratory; National BW Defense Analysis Center; Plum Island Animal Disease Center; Federal Computer Incident Response Center; National Communications System; National Infrastructure Protection Center; 

Energy Security and Assurance Program; Secret Service; and U.S. Coast Guard. 6GAO–07–454. 

fied a plan to strengthen homeland security through the cooperation and partnering 

of Federal, State, local, and private sector organizations on an array of functions. 

It also specified a number of Federal departments, as well as non-Federal organizations, that have important roles in securing the homeland, with DHS having key 

responsibilities in implementing established homeland security mission areas. This 

strategy was updated and reissued in October 2007. 

In November 2002, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was enacted into law, creating DHS. The act defined the Department’s missions to include preventing terrorist attacks within the United States; reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism; 

and minimizing the damages, and assisting in the recovery from, attacks that occur 

within the United States. The act further specified major responsibilities for the Department, including the analysis of information and protection of infrastructure; development of countermeasures against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, and other emerging terrorist threats; securing U.S. borders and transportation systems; and organizing emergency preparedness and response efforts. DHS 

began operations in March 2003. Its establishment represented a fusion of 22 Federal agencies to coordinate and centralize the leadership of many homeland security 

activities under a single department.5

We have evaluated many of DHS’s management functions and programs since the 

Department’s establishment, and have issued over 400 related products. In particular, in August 2007, we reported on the progress DHS had made since its inception in implementing its management and mission functions.6 We also reported on 

broad themes that have underpinned DHS’s implementation efforts, such as agency 

transformation, strategic planning, and risk management. Over the past 5 years, we 

have made over 900 recommendations to DHS on ways to improve operations and 

address key themes, such as to develop performance measures and set milestones 

for key programs and implement internal controls to help ensure program effectiveness. DHS has implemented some of these recommendations, taken actions to address others, and taken other steps to strengthen its mission activities and facilitate 

management integration. 

DHS HAS MADE PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING ITS MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS, BUT HAS

FACED CHALLENGES IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS

DHS has made progress in implementing its management functions in the areas 

of acquisition, financial, human capital, information technology, and real property 

management. Overall, DHS has made more progress in implementing its mission 

functions—border security; immigration enforcement; immigration services; and 

aviation, surface transportation, and maritime security; for example—than its management functions, reflecting an initial focus on implementing efforts to secure the 

homeland. DHS has had to undertake these critical missions while also working to 

transform itself into a fully functioning cabinet department—a difficult undertaking 

for any organization and one that can take, at a minimum, 5 to 7 years to complete 

even under less daunting circumstances. As DHS continues to mature as an organization, we have reported that it will be important that it works to strengthen its 

management areas since the effectiveness of these functions will ultimately impact 

its ability to fulfill its mission to protect the homeland. 

Acquisition Management.—DHS’s acquisition function includes managing and 

overseeing nearly $16 billion in acquisitions to support its broad and complex missions, such as information systems, new technologies, aircraft, ships, and professional services. DHS has recognized the need to improve acquisition outcomes and 

taken some positive steps to organize and assess the acquisition function, but continues to lack clear accountability for the outcomes of acquisition dollars spent. A 

common theme in our work on acquisition management is DHS’s struggle to provide 

adequate support for its mission components and resources for departmentwide 

oversight. DHS has not yet accomplished its goal of integrating the acquisition function across the Department. For example, the structure of DHS’s acquisition func-
19 

7GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Department’s Acquisition Oversight Plan, GAO–07–900 (Washington, DC: June 13, 2007). 8GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Improved Assessment and Oversight Needed to 

Manage Risk of Contracting for Selected Services, GAO–07–990 (Washington, DC: Sept. 17, 

2007). 9GAO, Homeland Security: Successes and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Create an Effective 

Acquisition Organization, GA0–05–179 (Washington, DC: Mar. 29, 2005). 10 A material weakness is a significant deficiency, or a combination of significant deficiencies, 

that result in more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the financial statements will not be prevented or detected. A significant deficiency is a control deficiency, or combination of control deficiencies, that adversely affects the entity’s ability to initiate, authorize, 

record, process, or report financial data reliably in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles such that there is more than a remote likelihood that a misstatement of the entity’s financial statements that is more than inconsequential will not be prevented or detected. 

tion creates ambiguity about who is accountable for acquisition decisions because it 

depends on a system of dual accountability and cooperation and collaboration between the Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) and the component heads. In June 2007, 

DHS officials stated that they were in the process of modifying the lines of business 

management directive, which exempts the Coast Guard and the Secret Service from 

complying, to ensure that no contracting organization is exempt.7 This directive has 

not yet been revised. 

In September 2007, we reported on continued acquisition oversight issues at DHS, 

identifying that the Department has not fully ensured proper oversight of its contractors providing services closely supporting inherently government functions.8 The 

CPO has established a Department-wide program to improve oversight; however, 

DHS has been challenged to provide the appropriate level of oversight and management attention to its service contracting and major investments, and we continue 

to be concerned that the CPO may not have sufficient authority to effectively oversee the Department’s acquisitions. DHS still has not developed clear and transparent policies and processes for all acquisitions. Concerns have been raised about 

how the investment review process has been used to oversee its largest acquisitions, 

and the investment review process in still under revision. We have ongoing work 

reviewing oversight of DHS’s major investments which follows-up on our prior recommendations.9 Regarding the acquisition workforce, our work and the work of the 

DHS IG has found acquisition workforce challenges across the Department; we have 

ongoing work in this area as well. 

Financial Management.—DHS’s financial management efforts include consolidating or integrating component agencies’ financial management systems. DHS has 

made progress in addressing financial management and internal control weaknesses 

and has designated a Chief Financial Officer, but the Department continues to face 

challenges in these areas. However, since its establishment, DHS has been unable 

to obtain an unqualified or ‘‘clean’’ audit opinion on its financial statements. For fiscal year 2007, the independent auditor issued a disclaimer on DHS’s financial statements and identified eight significant deficiencies in DHS’s internal control over financial reporting, seven of which were so serious that they qualified as material 

weaknesses.10 DHS has taken steps to prepare corrective action plans for its internal control weaknesses by, for example, developing and issuing a Department-wide 

strategic plan for the corrective action plan process and holding workshops on corrective action plans. While these are positive steps, DHS and its components have 

not yet fully implemented corrective action plans to address all significant deficiencies—including the material weaknesses—identified by previous financial statement audits. According to DHS officials, the Department has developed goals and 

milestones for addressing these weaknesses in its internal control over financial reporting. Until these weaknesses are resolved, DHS will not be in position to provide 

reliable, timely, and useful financial data to support day-to-day decisionmaking. 

Human Capital Management.—DHS’s key human capital management areas include pay, performance management, classification, labor relations, adverse actions, 

employee appeals, and diversity management. DHS has significant flexibility to design a modern human capital management system, and in October 2004 DHS issued 

its human capital strategic plan. DHS and the Office of Personnel Management 

jointly released the final regulations on DHS’s new human capital system in February 2005. Although DHS intended to implement the new personnel system in the 

summer of 2005, court decisions enjoined the Department from implementing certain labor management portions of the system. DHS has since taken actions to implement its human capital system. In July 2005 DHS issued its first departmental 

training plan, and in April 2007, it issued its fiscal year 2007 and 2008 Human Capital Operational Plan. This plan identifies five Department priorities—hiring and retaining a talented and diverse workforce; creating a DHS-wide culture of perform-
20 

11GAO–07–454. 

ance; creating high-quality learning and development programs for DHS employees; 

implementing a DHS-wide integrated leadership system; and being a model of 

human capital service excellence. DHS has met some of the goals identified in the 

plan, such as developing a hiring model and a communication plan. However, more 

work remains for DHS to fully implement its human capital system. For example, 

DHS has not yet taken steps to fully link its human capital planning to overall 

agency strategic planning nor has it established a market-based and more performance-oriented pay system. DHS has also faced difficulties in developing and implementing effective processes to recruit and hire employees. Although DHS has developed its hiring model and provided it to all components, we reported in August 2007 

that DHS had not yet assessed components’ practices against the model.11 Furthermore, employee morale at DHS has been low, as measured by the results of the 

2006 U.S. Office of Personnel Management Federal Human Capital Survey. DHS 

has taken steps to seek employee feedback and involve them in decisionmaking by, 

for example, expanding its communication strategy and developing an overall strategy for addressing employee concerns reflects in the survey results. In addition, although DHS has developed a Department-level training strategy, it has faced challenges in fully implementing this strategy. 

Information Technology Management.—DHS’s information technology management efforts should include: 

• Developing and using an enterprise architecture, or corporate blueprint, as an 

authoritative frame of reference to guide and constrain system investments; 

• Defining and following a corporate process for informed decision-making by senior leadership about competing information technology investment options; 

• Applying system and software development and acquisition discipline and rigor 

when defining, designing, developing, testing, deploying, and maintaining systems; 

• Establishing a comprehensive, Department-wide information security program 

to protect information and systems; 

• Having sufficient people with the right knowledge, skills, and abilities to execute each of these areas now and in the future; and, 

• Centralizing leadership for extending these disciplines throughout the organization with an empowered Chief Information Officer. 

DHS has undertaken efforts to establish and institutionalize the range of information technology management controls and capabilities noted above that our research 

and past work have shown are fundamental to any organization’s ability to use technology effectively to transform itself and accomplish mission goals. For example, 

DHS has organized roles and responsibilities for information technology management under the Chief Information Officer. DHS has also developed an information 

technology human capital plan that is largely consistent with Federal guidance and 

associated best practices. In particular, we reported that the plan fully addressed 

15 and partially addressed 12 of 27 practices set forth in the Office of Personnel 

Management’s human capital framework. However, we reported that DHS’s overall 

progress in implementing the plan had been limited. With regard to information 

technology investment management, DHS has established a management structure 

to help manage its investments. However, DHS has not always fully implemented 

any of the key practices our information technology investment management framework specifies as being needed to actually control investments. Furthermore, DHS 

has developed an enterprise architecture, but we have reported that major DHS information technology investments have not been fully aligned with DHS’s enterprise 

architecture. In addition, DHS has not fully implemented a comprehensive information security program. While it has taken actions to ensure that its certification and 

accreditation activities are completed, the Department has not shown the extent to 

which it has strengthened incident detection, analysis, and reporting and testing activities. 

Real Property Management.—DHS’s responsibilities for real property management 

are specified in Executive Order 13327, ‘‘Federal Real Property Asset Management,’’ 

and include the establishment of a Senior Real Property Officer, development of an 

asset inventory, and development and implementation of an asset management plan 

and performance measures. In June 2006, the Office of Management and Budget upgraded DHS’s Real Property Asset Management Score from red to yellow after DHS 

developed an Asset Management Plan, developed a generally complete real property 

data inventory, submitted this inventory for inclusion in the governmentwide real 

property inventory database, and established performance measures consistent with 
21 

12The administration’s agency scorecard for real property management was established in fiscal year 2004 to measure each agency’s progress in implementing Executive Order 13327 on 

‘‘Federal Real Property Asset Management.’’ 13GAO–07–454. 14GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO–07–310 (Washington, DC: January 2008). 15GAO–07–454. 16 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–161, Div. E, 121 Stat. 1844, 2042 

(2007) (requiring further that DHS define in a memorandum to its employees the roles and responsibilities of the DHS IG). 

Federal Real Property Council standards.12 DHS also designated a Senior Real 

Property Officer. However, in August 2007 we reported that DHS had yet to demonstrate full implementation of its asset management plan and full use of asset inventory information and performance measures in management decisionmaking.13

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES HAVE HINDERED DHS’S IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS

Our work has identified various cross-cutting issues that have hindered DHS’s 

progress in its management areas. We have reported that while it is important that 

DHS continue to work to strengthen each of its core management functions, it is 

equally important that these key issues be addressed from a comprehensive, Department-wide perspective to help ensure that the Department has the structure and 

processes in place to effectively address the threats and vulnerabilities that face the 

Nation. These issues include agency transformation, strategic planning and results 

management, and accountability and transparency. 

Agency Transformation.—In 2007 we reported that DHS’s implementation and 

transformation remained high-risk because DHS had not yet developed a comprehensive management integration strategy and its management systems and 

functions especially related to acquisition, financial, human capital, and information 

technology management were not yet fully integrated and wholly operational.14 We 

have recommended, among other things, that agencies on the high-risk list produce 

a corrective action plan that defines the root causes of identified problems, identifies 

effective solutions to those problems, and provides for substantially completing corrective measures in the near term. Such a plan should include performance metrics 

and milestones, as well as mechanisms to monitor progress. In March 2008 we received a draft of DHS’s corrective action plan and have provided the Department 

with some initial feedback. We will continue to review the plan and expect to be 

able to provide additional comments on the plan in the near future. 

Strategic Planning and Results Management.—DHS has not always implemented 

effective strategic planning efforts, has not yet issued an updated strategic plan, and 

has not yet fully developed adequate performance measures or put into place structures to help ensure that the agency is managing for results. DHS has developed 

performance goals and measures for some of its programs and reports on these goals 

and measures in its Annual Performance Report. However, some of DHS’s components have not developed adequate outcome-based performance measures or comprehensive plans to monitor, assess, and independently evaluate the effectiveness of 

their plans and performance. Since issuance of our August 2007 report, DHS has 

begun to develop performance goals and measures for some areas in an effort to 

strengthen its ability to measures its progress in key management and mission 

areas. We commend DHS’s efforts to measure its progress in these areas and have 

agreed to work with the Department to provide input to help strengthen established 

measures. 

Accountability and Transparency.—Accountability and transparency are critical to 

the Department effectively integrating its management functions and implementing 

its mission responsibilities. We have reported that it is important that DHS make 

its management and operational decisions transparent enough so that Congress can 

be sure that it is effectively, efficiently, and economically using the billions of dollars 

in funding it receives annually.15 We have encountered delays at DHS in obtaining 

access to needed information, which have impacted our ability to conduct our work 

in a timely manner. Since we highlighted this issue last year to this subcommittee, 

our access to information at DHS has improved. For example, TSA has worked with 

us to improve its process for providing us with access to documentation. DHS also 

provided us with access to its national level preparedness exercise. Moreover, in response to the provision in the DHS Appropriations Act, 2008, that restricts a portion 

of DHS’s funding until DHS certifies and reports that it has revised its guidance 

for working with GAO.16 DHS has provided us with a draft version of its revised 

guidance. We have provided DHS with comments on this draft and look forward to 

continuing to collaborate with the Department. 
22 

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

DHS is now 5 years old, a key milestone for the Department. Since its establishment, DHS has had to undertake actions to secure the border and the transportation sector and defend against, prepare for, and respond to threats and disasters 

while simultaneously working to transform itself into a fully functioning cabinet department. Such a transformation is a difficult undertaking for any organization and 

can take, at a minimum, 5 to 7 years to complete even under less daunting circumstances. 

Nevertheless, DHS’s 5-year anniversary provides an opportunity for the Department to review how it has matured as an organization. As part of our broad range 

of work reviewing DHS management and mission programs, we will continue to assess in the coming months DHS’s progress in addressing high-risk issues. In particular, we will continue to assess the progress made by the Department in its 

transformation and information sharing efforts, and assessing whether any progress 

made is sustainable over the long term. Further, as DHS continues to evolve and 

transform, we will review its progress and performance and provide information to 

Congress and the public on its efforts. 

This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions you and the subcommittee Members may have. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you for your testimony. 

I now recognize Mr. Ervin, to summarize his statement, for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF CLARK KENT ERVIN, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY PROGRAM, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE 

Mr. ERVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Rogers, for inviting me to testify today. 

Certainly, the Department has made some progress in its initial 

5 years in becoming more efficient, more economical and more effective. But no one argue with the proposition that DHS still has 

far to go. 

There are any number of things that can and should be done to 

improve DHS’ organizational managerial performance, but since 

time is limited, let me highlight just a few. 

First, part of the reason the Department has been less than the 

sum of its parts is that key legacy agencies retain considerable autonomy over their own finances, information technology networks, 

and procurement systems. This promotes duplication, a lack of 

interoperability and other inefficiencies, and it works against the 

goal of integrating DHS’ disparate parts into a cohesive whole. 

The Department’s chief procurement officer, chief financial officer, and chief information officer do not control—which is to say, 

have the power to hire, fire, and set the budget of—their counterparts at TSA, FEMA, ICE, CBP, and the Coast Guard. 

Instead, these critical administrative personnel at the component 

level are controlled by their respective component heads. With a 

pen stroke, the new secretary could, and in my judgment, should 

change this. 

Second, controls should be put in place to ensure that no more 

precious contract dollars are wasted. A new secretary should, for 

example, forbid the use by procurement officers of no-bid contracts. 

Such contracts, it seems to me, are never justified. 

Even if procurement officers are certain that only one contractor 

can satisfy particular requirements, there is no harm in opening 

the contract for bid. Perhaps there are other, previously unknown, 

contractors who can supply the good or service equally well and at 

lesser cost. 
23 

Further, there should be incentives built into every contract for 

good performance—which is to say, timeliness, staying within 

budget, and delivering the promised result—and penalties, financial or otherwise, including, under appropriate circumstances, 

criminal prosecution, for consistently poor performance. 

Contractors who consistently miss the mark should be barred for 

a period of time from bidding on new contracts, and to counter the 

corrupting influence of the revolving door, bids from former DHS 

insiders should be disfavored, other things being equal. 

DHS should not allow contractors to determine its contract requirements, as it has done repeatedly. If contractors are allowed to 

tell customers what they want and need, chances are the customer 

will wind up with something it neither wants nor needs. 

Furthermore, while the number of procurement officials has been 

increased, it should be increased still further. While, of course, no 

government agency can ever match private sector salaries, congressional authority should be sought by DHS to pay hefty bonuses and 

to offer other attractive benefits so as to narrow the gap as much 

as possible between private sector procurement experts and DHS 

ones. 

Competent and experienced DHS contracting officers in sufficient 

numbers are, of course, critical to ensuring that contracts are structured and managed in a way that most benefits the taxpayer. 

While the Department has too few employees managing contractors, it has too many contractors essentially managing it. Indeed, 

the job of some contractors at DHS is to oversee other contractors. 

In short, to ensure that the sole interest in mind is that of the 

taxpayer, the Department should have more employees and fewer 

contractors. Contractors should not be performing inherently governmental functions, and no function is more inherently governmental than overseeing other contractors. 

Finally, the new secretary should make a conspicuous point of 

urging all personnel to cooperate fully with the inspector general 

and with the comptroller general with regard to inspections, audits, 

and investigations by those offices, and there should be consequences for personnel who fail to do so, up to and including, 

under appropriate circumstances, termination. 

On a regular basis, but no less frequently than quarterly, the 

new secretary himself or herself should meet with the IG and the 

comptroller general to be personally apprised of important findings 

and to monitor the Department’s progress—or lack thereof—toward 

implementing their respective recommendations. 

The IG and the comptroller general should not be viewed as 

pests or antagonists, but as management consultants, indispensable ones, who are full partners in making the Department operate as efficiently, economically and effectively as possible. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Ervin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CLARK KENT ERVIN

APRIL 9, 2008 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Members for inviting me to testify 

today before the subcommittee on the topic, ‘‘Moving Beyond the First Five Years: 

Solving the Department of Homeland Security’s Management Challenges.’’ 
24 

Certainly, the Department has made some progress in its initial 5 years in becoming more efficient, more economical, and more effective. But, no one would argue 

with the proposition that DHS still has far to go. With a new administration less 

than a year away, now is an appropriate time to consider what the Department’s 

next steps should be on the necessarily long journey toward optimal performance. 

There are any number of things that can and should be done to improve DHS’ 

organizational performance. But, since time is limited, let me highlight only a few. 

First, part of the reason the Department has been less than the sum of its parts 

is that key legacy agencies retain considerable autonomy over their own finances, 

information technology networks, and procurement systems. This promotes duplication, a lack of interoperability and other inefficiencies, and it works against the goal 

of integrating DHS’ disparate parts into a cohesive whole. The Department’s Chief 

Procurement Officer, Chief Financial Officer, and Chief Information Officer do not 

control (i.e., have the power to hire, fire, and set the budget of) their counterparts 

at TSA, FEMA, ICE, CBP, and the Coast Guard. Instead, these critical administrative personnel at the component level are controlled by their respective component 

heads. With a pen stroke, the new Secretary can and should change this. 

Second, controls should be put in place to ensure that no more precious contract 

dollars are wasted. The new Secretary should, for example, forbid the use by procurement officers of no-bid contracts. Such contracts are never justified. Even if procurement officers are certain that only one contractor can satisfy particular requirements, there is no harm in opening the contract for bid. Perhaps there are other, 

previously unknown, contractors who can supply the good or service equally well 

and at lesser cost. Further, there should be incentives built into every contract for 

‘‘good’’ performance (i.e., timeliness, staying within budget, and delivering the promised result), and penalties (financial or otherwise, including, under appropriate circumstances, criminal prosecution) for poor performance. Contractors who consistently miss the mark should be barred for a period of time from bidding on new contracts. To counter the corrupting influence of the ‘‘revolving door,’’ bids from former 

DHS insiders should be disfavored, other things being equal. DHS should not allow 

contractors to determine its contract requirements, as it has done repeatedly. If contractors are allowed to tell customers what they want and need, chances are the 

customer will wind up with something it neither wants nor needs. 

Furthermore, the number of procurement officials should be increased significantly. While no government agency can ever match private sector salaries, congressional authority should be sought by DHS to pay hefty bonuses and to offer other 

attractive benefits so as to narrow the gap as much as possible between private sector procurement experts and DHS ones. Competent and experienced DHS contracting officers in sufficient numbers are critical to ensuring that contracts are 

structured and managed in a way that most benefits the taxpayer. 

While the Department has too few employees managing contractors, it has too 

many contractors essentially managing it. Last spring, the Chairman of the House 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform said that DHS leaders conceded 

to him at a hearing that they had ‘‘no idea’’ how many contractors work for the Department. (That might be a good question to pose to our Department witnesses 

today.) The GAO has chided DHS for contracting out ‘‘inherently governmental’’ 

functions, and no wonder. As The Washington Post put it in an article last October, 

‘‘At the Department of Homeland Security, contract employees help write job descriptions for new headquarters workers. Private contractors also sign letters that 

officially offer employment. And, they meet new hires on the first day of the job. 

About the only thing they do not do is swear-in DHS employees.’’ Indeed, the job 

of some contractors at DHS is to oversee other contractors. In short, to ensure that 

the sole interest in mind is that of the taxpayer, the Department should have more 

employees and fewer contractors. Contractors should not be performing inherently 

governmental functions, and no function is more ‘‘inherently governmental’’ than 

overseeing other contractors. 

Finally, the new Secretary should make a conspicuous point of urging all personnel to cooperate fully with all Inspector General and GAO inspections, audits, 

and investigations, and there should be consequences for personnel who fail to do 

so, up to and including, under appropriate circumstances, termination. On a regular 

basis, but no less frequently than quarterly, the Secretary himself/herself should 

meet with the IG and the Comptroller General to be personally apprised of important findings and to monitor the Department’s progress (or lack thereof) toward implementing their respective recommendations. The IG and the Comptroller General 

should not be viewed as pests or antagonists, but as management consultants, indispensable ones, who are full partners in making the Department operate as effectively, efficiently, and economically as possible. 

Thank you, again, for your invitation today, and I look forward to your questions. 
25 

Mr. CARNEY. I thank you for your testimony. 

I now recognize Dr. Carafano, to summarize his statement, for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES JAY CARAFANO, SENIOR RESEARCH 

FELLOW IN DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. CARAFANO. So the Final Four is over, the right team won— 

but more importantly, I want to talk about the Final Five, which 

is what I think should be a subject for the committee, which are 

the five priorities I think are absolutely essential for moving the 

Department forward. 

Three of them are immediate, short-term things that should be 

run right now, and two of them, I think, are long-term projects in 

which I think that committee could play a significant leadership 

role. 

No. 1, and absolutely I think the most single and vital important 

thing is consolidation of oversight of the Department under the 

Homeland Security Committee. This is often said, but we don’t 

focus often enough on why this is essential. 

It is not that people have to run around and testify before dozens 

of different committees. Homeland security is fundamentally a riskbased process. It is a holistic, strategic process, and that cannot be 

done when you have multiple forces pulling in multiple directions. 

The problem is every committee is going to define risk and define 

priorities to suits its own interests, and you don’t have that holistic 

look. 

The only way—if everything is a priority, if nothing is a priority—until we have consolidation of oversight and responsibility in 

single committees in the House and the Senate, we are never going 

to have the Homeland Security Department function in the manner 

that the Defense Department functions, and that is going to put 

the Nation at risk. 

Second, and I think equally important, is there is an awful lot 

of work to be done in oversight. The authorization bill is absolutely, 

I think, the right instrument to do that. Again, I think that is a 

lesson learned from the Department of Defense. 

I think this committee’s work, for example, on procurement and 

contracting is a perfect example, and an authorization type measure is exactly the kind of vehicle you would use to kind of institute 

the kind of leadership from the Congress that you want in these 

matters. 

I have got a book coming out in September called ‘‘Private Sector, 

Public Works’’, looking at contracting. Primarily the Defense Department in Iraq and Afghanistan, the fundamental conclusion of 

the book is where there are large, significant problems, it is usually 

because the government simply is not a very good customer. 

It is simply when you go to the bench and look at the depth of 

the contracting force, the management tools that they have, they 

are simply not there. So again, an authorization measure I think 

is the absolute best instrument to do that. 

The third—all the debate about Iraq aside—it is time for a strategic pause. DHS has not been through one major organization. It 

has been through three. We had the initial organization, which was 
26 

I think we would all admit now a deeply flawed structure in the 

initial enabling legislation. 

Secretary Chertoff initiated a second major series of reforms, and 

then even before those had fully taken hold, Congress over the last 

18 months has instituted what really constitutes a third great 

wave of reform, so that there is simply far too much turmoil in the 

Department structure to warrant a major reorganization at this 

point. 

I would further argue that, because the Department now has the 

obligation of doing a quadrennial security review, I think that review should be the fundamental tool for the Congress and the Department to dialog on the way forward. 

That review comes out in 2009, and if there is a lesson that we 

could learn from where the QDR, the Quadrennial Defense Review, 

has gone wrong, it is that it shouldn’t be a report that is dumped 

on your desk. 

There should be an ongoing dialog, starting right now, with the 

Department and the committees about understanding that document, what is going to be in it, how you are going to talk about 

it and how you are going to move forward. I think that document 

should really be the basis for the move forward. 

So if there is one overwhelming recommendation I would give 

today, it is how the dialog now about the QSR—make the QSR a 

dialog and a process, and not just a report. 

Very quickly, two long-term projects. I think, No. 1, that the real 

gains are not going to be really made through further—there are 

going to be improvements, reorganization of the Department, but 

we really need to look at the national homeland security enterprise. 

We are working together with the Center for Strategic International Studies, doing a report called ‘‘Homeland Security 3.0.’’ 

We have identified areas where nationally we as a country can and 

should do better. 

While, again, that would be far beyond the purview of this committee, I think this committee can play a real leadership role in the 

national discussion of where we need to go next. We hope to have 

that report done in September, and we would love to come back 

and talk to you about that. 

The last thing I will mention very quickly is, again, the bigger 

bang for the buck is actually going to be outside the Department, 

not just in terms of being part of the national homeland security 

enterprise, but being part of an effective Federal interagency team. 

So many of the areas where we really want substantive improvement, things that are really important, like catastrophic disaster 

response, it is an interagency mission, and I think that will be a 

big part of the dialog in the year ahead. 

Just to finish up, I would say that I don’t think we need to throw 

away the Constitution. I don’t think we need to reorganize the Federal Government to achieve effective interagency operations. 

I think there is a model building through professional development and a combination of education, assignment and accreditation, where we can build the kind of workforce that can provide us 

the integrated solutions that we really want from our Federal Government. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 
27 

[The statement of Mr. Carafano follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES JAY CARAFANO

APRIL 9, 2008 

My name is Dr. James Jay Carafano. I am the Assistant Director of the Kathryn 

and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and a Senior Research 

Fellow for the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The 

Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should 

not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today to discuss 

the subject of this hearing, ‘‘Moving Beyond the First Five Years: Solving the Department of Homeland Security’s Management Challenges.’’ I would like to raise 

with the committee three immediate priorities for Congress to tackle, as well as two 

long-term challenges that should be among the first priorities of the next administration. 

The three immediate priorities are: 

• Consolidating Congressional oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS); 

• Passing homeland security authorization legislation to better structure the Department’s oversight role; and 

• Restraining further major organizational changes within the Department. 

Two long-term projects for Congress and the next administration to undertake 

must include: 

• Establishing the national homeland security enterprise; and 

• Improving Federal interagency operations. 

1. PUT FIRST THINGS FIRST—CONSOLIDATE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Arguably, many of the most significant challenges in effectively managing DHS 

have resulted from disparate and, at times, contradictory direction from Congress. 

This has resulted in a plethora of unrealistic mandates and endless tinkering by 

various congressional committees. Therefore, the first and most productive objective 

should be to address the lack of effective congressional leadership. 

Congress has failed to consolidate jurisdiction of DHS under one committee in 

each chamber as recommended by the 9/11 Commission Report. Homeland Security 

Department officials report to a plethora of committees that offer conflicting and 

competing guidance. Committees continue to tinker with the Department, moving 

offices and adding missions. Committees other than the homeland security committees still retain jurisdiction over major parts of the Department, including the Coast 

Guard. Consolidating jurisdiction in a single committee in each chamber will resolve 

these and other coordination problems. 

2. PASS A HOMELAND SECURITY AUTHORIZATION BILL

Congress not only needs to reform the structure of its oversight but its form as 

well. Next to defense, arguably the most important congressional responsibility is 

ensuring that the Federal Government has the resources and guidance needed to 

fulfill its domestic security role. Congress created the Department of Homeland Security in 2002; however, it has yet to pass a homeland security authorization bill— 

an inexcusable shortfall. 

To its credit, the House Committee on Homeland Security has drafted authorization legislation every year since the Department’s inception, but the measure has 

never been taken up by the Senate. Congress must make it a priority to improve 

and pass DHS authorization legislation. 

The United States is waging a long battle against transnational terrorism. Congress must pay consistent and close attention to homeland security through the authorization process. Passing an annual authorization bill and further consolidating 

jurisdiction over DHS would show that Congress takes its responsibilities seriously. 

Priorities for the authorization measure should be to: 

• Ensure the completion of requirements established in the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002; 

• Complete reforms of the secretariat articulated in the Secretary’s Second Stage 

Review; and 

• Reconsider the plethora of operational mandates imposed on the Department. 

Build a State-Based Regional Response Network.—An authorization bill could well 

begin by addressing fundamental requirements for DHS first established in its ena-
28 

1For more information on setting up DHS regional offices, see The Heritage Foundation and 

The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute Task Force, ‘‘Empowering America: A Proposal for Enhancing Regional Preparedness,’’ Heritage Foundation Special 

Report No. 6, April 7, 2006, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/SR06.cfm; and Jill 

D. Rhodes and James Jay Carafano, ‘‘State and Regional Responses to Disasters: Solving the 

72-Hour Problem’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1962, August 21, 2006, at 

www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/bg1962.cfm#lftn2. 

bling legislation. One area in which Congress could speak is on the lack of DHS follow-through in establishing a cooperative State-based regional response network. 

Such a network is an essential next step in building the kind of national security 

enterprise the Nation needs.1

The rationale for a stronger cooperative regional network based on the States 

rather than Washington is based on the nature of national disaster response. On 

average, the Federal Government needs 72 hours to marshal national resources in 

response to an incident that has surpassed a State’s response capacity. 

Usually, a 72-hour delay is not a problem. State and local governments manage 

most of the responders that arrive immediately at a disaster scene and, in most circumstances, have the critical assets needed to carry themselves through the first 3 

days. This was largely the case even during terrorist attacks, such as the bombing 

of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and both attacks on the 

World Trade Center in New York City. On the other hand, when catastrophic disasters overwhelm State and local governments at the outset, as in the aftermath of 

Hurricane Katrina, the 72-hour buffer disappears, and any delays in a coordinated 

Federal, State, and local response have serious consequences. 

Better planning at a regional level could prevent such shortfalls in disaster response. Such efforts should take the form of State-based regional programs that 

focus on ensuring that States are prepared to sustain themselves and that facilitate 

cooperation among Federal, State, and local efforts. In the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002, Congress mandated that the Department of Homeland Security set up a 

regional structure—though the Department did follow through on this mandate. 

Such a structure that coordinates and collaborates with State-based regional programs could help to close the 72-hour gap. 

State-based regional programs would focus on ensuring that States are prepared 

to sustain themselves. Through regional programs, States could learn the capabilities of their partnering States and quickly tap or merge resources as needed. Most 

recent writing on the development of regional plans, programs, and entities provides 

for a top-down approach in which the Federal Government heads the effort. However, a top-down approach may lead to many of the same problems that have occurred during the past few years, such as the potential marginalization of the States 

by the Federal Government in emergency planning and response and an overall lack 

of situational awareness about particular State nuances. 

Successful regional programs would focus not on Federal structures in each region, but rather on regional emergency management programs and capabilities that 

are developed, coordinated, and managed by the States. Similar small-scale programs that use a regional model, such as the Emergency Management Assistance 

Compact (EMAC), have already proven successful. The regional program developed 

below expands on the idea and focus of EMAC. 

DHS regional offices should be required to strengthen State and local preparedness capabilities; facilitate regional cooperation among governments, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations; and plan and exercise with Federal entities that support regional disaster response. Such offices would enable regions to access and integrate their capabilities quickly and improve preparedness. 

DHS regional offices would have four key missions: 

• Facilitating regional planning, 

• Organizing regional exercises, training, and doctrine and professional development, 

• Helping States and local communities to prepare for catastrophic events, and 

• Coordinating critical infrastructure protection. 

Establish an Under Secretary for Homeland Security.—Chief among the findings 

in the Second Stage Review was the importance of establishing a secretariat with 

the capacity of overseeing the Department’s many activities. One of the most important requirements identified in the review remains unfulfilled—establishing an 

Under Secretary for Policy and Planning. 

Since the Department of Homeland Security was created, many have come to recognize that the agency needs a high-level, high-powered office to develop policies 

that bind the more than 22 Federal entities consolidated within the Department, 

to coordinate with other Federal agencies, and to manage international affairs for 
29 

2For recommendations see, Matt A. Mayer and James Jay Carafano, ‘‘National Disaster Planning Slowed by Inadequate Interagency Process,’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2079, 

October 24, 2007, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg2079.cfm. 3See James Jay Carafano and Matt A. Mayer, ‘‘FEMA and Federalism: Washington Is Moving 

in the Wrong Direction,’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2032, May 8, 2007, at 

www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg2032.cfm; and James Jay Carafano, ‘‘Improving the National Response to Catastrophic Disaster,’’ Heritage Foundation Testimony, September 15, 2005, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/tst091505a.cfm. 

the Department. Congress has yet to authorize an under secretary for the Department to supervise these activities. 

This shortfall is inexcusable. The policy and planning requirements of the Department have proven broad in scope and vital in execution, from managing affairs overseas to attending to the needs of State and local governments and the private sector. 

Particularly important is the imperative of completing comprehensive national disaster planning. Six years after September 11, 2001, the Federal Government still 

lacks a comprehensive regime for planning and preparing for large-scale disasters. 

In part, this shortfall is the product of an inadequate interagency process, the 

means by which Federal agencies organize and cooperate with one another and their 

partners in State and local government and the private sector. Fixing the problem 

will require renewed vigor from the administration in setting clear policy guidelines, 

particularly in implementing a National Exercise Program, emphasizing the priority 

of interagency disaster preparedness for the National Planning Scenarios, and improving professional development.2 Accomplishing these tasks requires the leadership of a homeland security department leader with suitable rank and scope of responsibility. 

Rethink Container Security Mandate.—Finally, Congress should begin to systematically review some of its most impractical mandates. In 2006, Congress mandated 

the Secured Freight Initiative to test the efficacy of inspecting 100 percent of shipping containers coming from overseas for terrorist threats. The current system, set 

by the Container Security Initiative, scans only ‘‘high-risk’’ containers. In 2007, Congress proceeded to mandate 100 percent inspection even before the tests had started. This shortfall should be addressed in authorization legislation. 

Congress should establish an independent, bipartisan commission to study the results of the Secure Freight Initiative and the mandate for 100 percent screening of 

shipping containers and air cargo. This commission should assess the likely threats 

and look into alternatives for securing global supply chains. The commission should 

report its findings after the 2008 Presidential elections. Congress could then return 

to the issue in early 2009 with the politics of the election behind it. Based on the 

results of the commission’s recommendations, Congress should then modify the 100 

percent mandate so that U.S. policy bolsters security and prosperity equally well. 

3. END UNWARRANTED RESTRUCTURING

One of the most troubling practices of Congress has been to periodically impose 

reorganization mandates on DHS. The constant turmoil imposed on the Department 

of Homeland Security has adversely affected operations distracted the leadership, 

and slowed the process of establishing effective processes and procedures. The first 

priority of Congress should be to end unwarranted tinkering. 

Particularly problematic are continuing calls to move the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) out of the Department. Such proposals misread the 

lessons of Katrina and fail to comprehend the true nature of the Federal role in disaster response.3 Moving FEMA out of the Department or any other major restructuring at this time would only further slow the development of the Department as 

an effective organization. At the very least, Congress should impose a moratorium 

on restructuring or rethinking the Department’s roles and missions until after the 

Department delivers and Congress deliberates on the first Quadrennial Security Review. 

Beyond the short-term priorities of consolidating congressional jurisdiction; establishing authorization legislation; and refraining from restructuring the Department, 

Congress should began to look to the long-term demands of homeland security. Here 

there are two areas worthy of attention: (1) Establishing a national homeland security enterprise; and (2) improving interagency operations. 

HOMELAND SECURITY 3.0

For future improvements to homeland security, Congress should look not primarily to the Department or even to the Federal Government. Congress should increasingly turn its attention to the national homeland security enterprise, which includes every level of government, every community, and the private sector. 
30 

Working together with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 

the Heritage Foundation has convened a working group to examine the priorities 

for improving the overall state of homeland security. We have identified five areas 

that require particular attention. They include: 

• Domestic Intelligence.—Six years after 9/11, the United States has yet to fully 

articulate a concept for domestic intelligence that completely addresses 21st 

century threats; the promise of modern technology; and the demands of protecting the rights of our citizens. 

• Human Capital.—At every level of governance and throughout the private sector the Nation needs a corps of individuals with the skills, knowledge, and attributes required to fulfill the complex duties associated with ensuring domestic 

security, facilitating economic growth, and protecting individual liberty. 

• Community Preparedness.—The best preparation for disasters is facilitating a 

culture of preparedness that empowers and enables individuals and communities to take care of themselves during disaster rather than becoming increasingly dependent on Washington for direction and resources. 

• Resiliency.—Critical infrastructure protection has become an increasingly expensive and unsuitable concept for ensuring the continued delivery of goods and 

services in the face of terrorist threats. U.S. policies would be better served by 

moving toward a strategy relying on counterterrorism measures to thwart attacks, while focusing on the resiliency of infrastructure, and the capacity to continue to provide services or quickly recover in the event of a terrorist attack. 

• International Cooperation.—Homeland security is a global mission. From securing the border to protecting global supply chains, virtually every aspect of preventing terrorist attacks has an international dimension that requires the 

United States to work effectively with friends and allies. 

The CSIS-Heritage Foundation task force plans to provide specific recommendations in each of these areas in their report that will be released in September. I look 

forward to the opportunity to brief the Congress on their findings. 

Team Washington.—The very rationale for creating the Department of Homeland 

Security—the imperative of integrating the many agencies and activities that bear 

on domestic security—highlights one of Washington’s greatest enduring shortfalls, 

one that could well be addressed by the next administration. In meeting complex 

challenges that transcend the core competencies of a single department, government 

does a mediocre job in marshalling all the resources required. Washington can do 

better—and homeland security would be good place to start. 

Even after the consolidation of roles and missions in the Department, many of the 

essential tasks undertaken by the Federal homeland security enterprise rest with 

other departments. Ensuring all these agencies work together more effectively 

would be a responsible goal for the transition. 

The Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, Health, State, and Justice, as 

well as the other government agencies that bear responsibility for elements of the 

homeland security enterprise, each have separate and unique capabilities, budgets, 

cultures, operational styles, and congressional oversight committees. They even operate under different laws. Getting them all organized during times of crisis and 

after disasters can be like herding cats. For meeting the dangers of the 21st century, interagency operations will be more important than ever. 

LEAVE THE CONSTITUTION ALONE

The pressing demand for interagency reform does not require that the Federal 

Government be reorganized. There is nothing wrong with the underlying principles 

of American governance. Especially essential are the Constitutional ‘‘checks and balances’’ that divide Federal power between the executive, legislative, and judicial 

branches. This division entails not only sharing responsibility within and among the 

branches of government but ensuring accountability and transparency in the act of 

governing. Shortcutting, circumventing, centralizing, undermining, or obfuscating 

Constitutional responsibilities does not make democratic government work better. 

Respecting the principle of federalism is also imperative. Embodied in the U.S. 

Constitution, the imperatives of limited government and federalism give citizens 

and local communities the greatest role in shaping their own lives. The 10th 

Amendment states that ‘‘powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 

to the people.’’ In matters relating to their communities, local jurisdictions and individuals have the preponderance of authority and autonomy. This makes sense: The 

people closest to the problem are the ones best equipped to find its solution. 
31 

4See James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2008). This work includes a collection of historical 

cases analyzing the effectiveness of interagency operations since World War I. 

REPEATING HISTORY

Washington’s efforts at pulling together routinely fall short for the same reasons. 

For its part, Washington can certainly do better—in large measure simply by improving interagency operations. For in the long history of interagency operations, 

the same problems spring up again and again.4

Reason 1: Government undervalues individuals.—Human capital refers to the 

stock of skills, knowledge, and attributes resident in the workforce. Throughout its 

history, Washington has paid scant attention to recruiting, training, exercising, and 

educating people to conduct interagency operations. Thus, at crucial moments, success or failure often turns on happenstance—whether the right people with the right 

talents just happen to be at the right job. 

Reason 2: Washington lacks the lifeline of a guiding idea.—Doctrine is a body of 

knowledge for guiding joint action. Good doctrine does not tell people what to think, 

but it guides them in how to think—particularly in how to address complex, ambiguous, and unanticipated challenges when time and resources are both hard-pressed. 

Unfortunately, throughout our Nation’s history, government has seldom bothered to 

exercise anything worthy of being called interagency doctrine. The response to 

Katrina offers a case in point. The U.S. Government had the equivalent of a doctrine in the form of the National Response Plan. Unfortunately, it had been signed 

only months before the disaster and was barely practiced and little understood when 

disaster struck. 

Reason 3: Process cannot replace people.—At the highest levels of government, no 

organizational design, institutional procedures, or legislative remedy has proved 

adequate to overcome poor leadership and combative personalities. Presidential 

leadership is particularly crucial to the conduct of interagency operations. During 

the course of history, presidents have had significant flexibility in organizing the 

White House to suit their personal styles. That is all for the best. After all, the purpose of the presidential staff is to help presidents lead, not tell them how to lead. 

Leadership from Congress, especially from the committee chairs, is equally vital. 

There is no way to gerrymander the authorities of the committees to eliminate the 

necessity of competent, bi-partisan leadership that puts the needs of the Nation over 

politics and personal interest. And, in the end, no government reform can replace 

the responsibility of the people to elect officials who can build trust and confidence 

in government, select qualified leaders to run the government, and demonstrate 

courage, character, and competence in crisis. 

MAKING WASHINGTON WORK

Addressing these issues requires a scalpel, not a sledgehammer. It would be a 

mistake to think of interagency operations as a uniform, one-size-fits-all activity requiring uniform, one-size-fits-all reforms. 

The highest rung of the interagency process is that that of making interagency 

policy and strategy. These are the tasks largely accomplished inside the Washington 

beltway by officials from the White House and heads of Federal agencies in cooperation and consultation with Congress. Over the course of modern history, this has 

actually become the strongest component of the interagency process. When it does 

fail, failure can often be traced to people and personalities (inattentive presidents 

or squabbling cabinet officials) more than to process. 

Improving performance at the highest level of interagency activities should properly focus on the qualities and competencies of executive leadership, as well as upon 

getting the best-quality information to the leaders so that they can make the best 

informed decisions. 

Operational activities stand on the second rung of the interagency process. These 

activities comprise the overarching guidance, management, and allocation of resources needed to implement the decisions made in Washington. Arguably, it is at 

this level of government where government’s record is most mixed. 

Outside the Pentagon’s combat command structure (which has staffs to oversee 

military operations in different parts of the world), the U.S. Government has few 

established mechanisms with the capability to oversee complex contingences over a 

wide geographical area either at home or overseas. Processes and organizations are 

usually ad hoc. Some are successful. Others are dismal failures. In the domestic theater, it mistake to rely a rigid Federal structure. Rather, what is required is an effective system of organization based on a cooperative regional structure built around 
32 

5For the genesis and explanation of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms, see James R. Locher III, 

Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (College Station: Texas 

A&M University Press, 2002). 6Proposed reforms are described in James Jay Carafano, ‘‘Missing Pieces in Homeland Security: Interagency Education, Assignments, and Professional Accreditation,’’ Heritage Foundation 

Executive Memorandum No. 1013, October 16, 2006 at www.heritage.org/Research/ 

HomelandSecurity/em1013.cfm. 

the governance of individual States. The regional Department of Homeland Security 

I outlined could significantly aid in facilitating this structure. 

The third component of interagency activities is field activities. That’s where the 

actual works gets done—rescuing people stranded on rooftops, handing out emergency supplies, administering vaccines, and supervising contractors. Here success 

and failure usually turns on whether the government has correctly scaled the solution to fit the problem. 

Inside the United States, State and local governments largely take care of their 

own affairs. When the problems are manageable these approaches work well. On the 

other hand, when the challenges swell beyond the capacity of local leaders to handle, as in the case of the response to Hurricane Katrina, more robust support mechanisms are required. Arguably, what’s most needed at the field level are: (1) better 

doctrine; (2) more substantial investments in human capital (preparing people to do 

to the job before the crisis); and (3) appropriate decisionmaking—instituting the 

right doctrinal response when a crisis arises. 

GOLDWATER-NICHOLS

A generation ago, the U.S. military faced similar professional development challenges in building a cadre of joint leaders—officers competent in leading and executing multi-service operations. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 mandated a solution that required officers to have a mix of joint education, assignments, and 

board accreditation to become eligible for promotion to general officer rank.5

Goldwater-Nichols is widely credited with the successes in joint military operations from Desert Storm to the War on Terrorism. The recipe of education, assignment, and accreditation (EA&A) can be used to develop professionals for other critical interagency national security activities.6

An EA&A program that cuts across all levels of government and the private sector 

must start with professional schools specifically designed to teach interagency skills. 

No suitable institutions exist in Washington, academia, or elsewhere. The government will have to establish them. Although the resident and non-resident programs 

of many university and government schools and training centers can and should 

play a part in interagency education, Washington’s institutions should form the taproot of a national effort with national standards. 

Qualification will also require interagency assignments in which individuals can 

practice and hone their skills. These assignments should be at the ‘‘operational’’ 

level so leaders can learn how to make things happen, not just set policies. Identifying the right organizations and assignments and ensuring that they are filled by 

promising leaders should be a priority. 

Accreditation and congressional involvement are crucial to ensuring that these 

programs succeed and continue. Before leaders are selected for critical (non-politically appointed) positions in national security, they should be accredited by a board 

of professionals in accordance with broad guidelines established by Congress. 

Congress should require the creation of boards that: (1) Establish educational requirements and accredit institutions needed to teach national and homeland security; (2) screen and approve individuals to attend schools and fill interagency assignments; and (3) certify individuals as interagency-qualified leaders. Congress should 

also establish committees in the House and Senate with narrow jurisdictions over 

key education, assignment, and accreditation interagency programs. 

THE CLOCK IS TICKING

In Washington the important is often sacrificed for the urgent. The important, 

like reforming the interagency process, is put off until later, but later never comes. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this and other issues critical to 

transitioning responsibility for homeland security from this administration to the 

next. 

Mr. CARNEY. I thank you. 

I thank all the witnesses for your testimony. 
33 

I will remind each member that you have about 5 minutes to 

question the panel. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

First question is for Mr. Duke. 

Has the DHS transition team completed a transition plan? 

Ms. DUKE. We have an outline, and the plan actually will be 

completed in the fall. But we do have the five components, and we 

are executing transition. We have a succession that is in place. We 

have our training ongoing. We have our team put together. 

We have a matrix team throughout the components, and we had 

our first meeting earlier this week. But there is not a formal written plan at this time. 

Mr. CARNEY. Early fall, mid-fall, late fall? 

Ms. DUKE. Early fall. I would say October. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. Okay. 

Ms. Duke, also the Government Performance and Results Act— 

GPRA—requires every department to draft a 5-year strategic plan 

identifying department goals and strategy. GPRA requires that this 

plan be updated every 3 years, and the last update was in 2004, 

where a year had passed. What is going on? Why are we—— 

Ms. DUKE. We have a draft strategic plan. We are working with 

the Office of Management and Budget. It asked us to add more specific performance measures and outcomes to the plan. 

So we had submitted it, and it was sent back to us about 2 weeks 

ago. They agree with the goals. They agree with the strategies. We 

were just asked to put more concrete measures in that, and that 

should be completed in no more than 2 months. 

Mr. CARNEY. Starting from now. 

Ms. DUKE. From now, yes. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. So we can look for it in June. 

Ms. DUKE. Yes. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. We will look for it in June, certainly. 

Would you agree that it is difficult to chart a course for the Department, if it has not identified the goals it wishes to achieve 5 

years from now, as required by GPRA? 

Ms. DUKE. I do agree with that. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. 

One issue that my subcommittee has followed closely is the Department’s level of cooperation with GAO and the Department of 

Inspector General in particular. We alluded to this here today. 

I am pleased to learn yesterday that at long last the secretary 

has finally signed off on a departmental memorandum regarding 

the IG’s rights and responsibilities. 

I remain, however, disappointed that it took so long to get this 

done—almost 2 years for a 2-page memo—since the IG requested 

it, and fully 1 year since now Deputy Secretary Schneider committed to this subcommittee that it would be completed expeditiously. It makes me wonder if it would have taken 3 years, if it 

was a 3-page memo. 

Another issue is the GAO’s access to information. 

Ms. Duke, would you agree that there is no basis to withhold acquisitions sensitive documents from GAO? 

Ms. DUKE. Yes, I do agree with that. 

Mr. CARNEY. What about so-called draft documents? 
34 

Ms. DUKE. Draft is a little bit more dependent on specific situations, and that is something we are working with the GAO on. On 

some draft documents there is executive privilege, but in general 

in the draft management directive we have, which GAO has already commented on, we are urging people to release the maximum 

sum practical. But I cannot say every draft document should be released. 

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Rabkin, what is your view on this? 

Mr. RABKIN. I agree in principle. I think when you get down to 

draft documents, it is—for that matter when you get down to any 

specific document, I think you have to look at the facts and circumstances. 

I think there is a general culture at the Department that we are 

trying to change about whether, as a matter of default, they ought 

to withhold documents or check out documents before they turn 

them over, or whether, as a matter of default, they ought to provide the information that is requested. 

Obviously, we believe in the latter, and we are trying to work 

with DHS to find a happy medium. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. 

Mr. Rabkin and Ms. Duke, could you make sure that you give me 

an update on where you are in talks to revise the Department’s 

management directive concerning GAO? 

Ms. DUKE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RABKIN. Be very pleased to. 

Mr. CARNEY. All right. 

One more for Mr. Rabkin and Mr. Ervin right now. In light of 

the heightened security represented by periods of administration 

changes, what are the most important actions that DHS can take 

in order to prepare for the impending Presidential period? 

Mr. RABKIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to have 

people in line that will be there during the time the administration 

is changed, and this generally starts toward the end of a presidential administration when political appointees start leaving the 

administration and probably continues over into several months 

into the new administration until other political appointees are 

nominated, confirmed and in place. 

This is perhaps the riskiest time, the most vulnerable time for 

the administration. It is the first time DHS is going through this, 

but other parts of the government have gone through it before. 

Other parts of State and local governments have also. 

I am confident that with the plan that DHS has embarked on 

and with what they have done so far in terms of aligning career 

people behind the political appointees with laying out as much documentation as possible, that it will be successful. But I, too, look 

forward to seeing that plan more specifically. 

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Ervin. 

Mr. ERVIN. I agree with what Mr. Rabkin just said. I think the 

Department and the secretary in particular are to be commended 

for the time and the attention and the focus they have placed so 

far on the transition and on making sure that there are career professionals in place during this time of transition until the new administration’s people are in place and confirmed. 

I think that is absolutely critical. I think personnel is key. 
35 

The only thing I would add to that is I think likewise the issue 

of intelligence is key. I think it is clear to all who follow the issue 

that the Department’s intelligence unit information analysis is 

still—while there has been significant improvement, needless to 

say, since the Department was established, it is still a work in 

progress. 

I would hope that the secretary is working very closely with the 

DNI and with the CIA director to ensure in general, but particularly during this time of transition, which, as you say, is certainly 

a time of heightened threat, that the Department has access to all 

information from intelligence from all across the intelligence community as to threats against the homeland. 

Mr. CARNEY. Yes, we all hope so, too, actually. 

All right, my time has expired. 

I now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ervin, I was listening to your ranking of the top four or five 

issues, and you talked about the entrenchment of the management 

of the legacy agencies being problematic, and I agree. That has historically been a real problem. 

Do you feel like there has been significant movement or improvement over the last 5 years on that front, or really none at all? 

Mr. ERVIN. Well, sir, I think there has been some movement. As 

Ms. Duke noted in her remarks, there are these mechanisms. This 

joint investment council, I believe, is the term. 

There are certain review mechanisms that bring together, as I 

understand it—this was the case when I was there; I think it has 

been improved upon since I left—whereby all of the relevant component heads meet with their nominal superior at the headquarters 

to level to do what can be done to improve coordination Department-wide. 

Needless to say, that is a very good thing. But what I have recommended is that, as I say, these component people actually ultimately work for and be ultimately accountable to their counterparts at the headquarters level. 

Mr. ROGERS. Direct-line authority. 

Mr. ERVIN. That is right. Direct-line authority that could be easily done. I agree with Dr. Carafano that there shouldn’t be wholesale further reorganizations in the Department, but this would be 

very easy to do, and I think it would—— 

Mr. ROGERS. You made the point that with a stroke of a pen the 

secretary could do this. Is that accurate? 

I would also ask Ms. Duke. Is that accurate? Can the secretary, 

with the stroke of a pen, initiate this direct-line authority? 

Ms. DUKE. I believe it would be within his authority to change 

the reporting of the Department. There may be a congressional notification requirement, depending on the extent of the reorganization. But that is a notification requirement, not an approval. 

Mr. ROGERS. How does that happen with information system personnel? 

Ms. DUKE. What we have done is each chief has what we call 

functional authority. They have some authorities over their counterparts in the organizational component, and for each of the 

chiefs, we are strengthening that authority. 
36 

So, for instance, on the chief information officer, he now approves 

all purchase requests over $2.5 million. All the chiefs approve the 

selection of senior counterparts in the components, so we have 

made movement and strengthened those approval—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Why not more movement? Why don’t we have direct 

line authority? What is the resistance? What is the downside to it? 

Ms. DUKE. I believe that the reason that the component heads— 

the TSA, FEMA—their belief is that they need to have all the tools 

within their own organization to be able to execute their mission. 

So there is a concern if TSA doesn’t have its own contracting authority, and it needs to exercise contracts to accomplish its mission, 

that that mission commander, if you will, doesn’t have the total 

toolbox to execute his or her mission. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Carafano, would you agree with that observation? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Well, yes, I think the right answer is the right 

answer. There are a couple of issues that need to be addressed 

here—not to completely disagree with Clark. 

But first of all you have to have a secretary that has the capability of managing these activities. We have to remember when we 

first created the Department, we created this paper-thin veneer of 

a secretariat that really didn’t have the manpower and the muscle 

to actually manage complex activities. 

So until you have pulled that at a level that you are comfortable 

with, your perhaps taking some of these things away, as maybe in 

a wholesale way, would not be a good idea. 

The second point is that a leader is a leader so long as he controls two things: people and resources. When you start to take a 

subordinate to a leader and have him have a direct-line authority 

to a person or higher organization, the leader loses control. 

So I do think it would be a case-by-case basis, where I would 

walk through various different agencies and look at the right balance of centralized control at the secretariat level and things that 

should be kept in the agency. So I wouldn’t make a blanket statement across the entire Department. 

Then the other thing is I would take a kind of crawl-walk-run 

approach to this. I would want to make sure I have got capacity 

in the secretariat to really control that function before I started ripping it out of the Department. 

I think IT is the perfect example. If we had consolidated IT in 

the secretariat when the Department was first created, it would 

have been an absolute disaster. They would have been totally tsunami would with the incredible variety of IT requirements in the 

Department. 

So I think this is one where you really do want to take not a 

sledgehammer approach, but a very deliberative approach to get 

the mission and the leadership up to match your price. It is definitely an issue. 

Again, this is why you need an authorization bill. This is exactly 

the kind of thing that you should deal with in an annual authorization measure, where you can get into the piece parts of individual 

agencies and specific functions and activities and make reasonable 

and intelligent recommendations every year, so it is not coming in 
37 

some kind of, again, tsunami, grand 9/11 bill from Congress—you 

know, do all this stuff. 

But on an annual basis, you can bite these things a piece at a 

time and move the Department kind of in a disciplined way into 

the future. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Ervin, would you like to follow up on that? You 

heard the observations about why going to direct-line authority immediately is not necessarily a good idea. Do you agree with that? 

Are you—— 

Mr. ERVIN. No, sir, I am not persuaded by it. It could be done 

very easily. As Ms. Duke said, there might be congressional notification, either legally required, and even if it isn’t legally required, 

certainly, it would be a good thing as a matter of policy to do, but 

it is something the secretary could do. 

I don’t think that it would have overwhelmed the Department to 

have done it at the beginning. But even if that were true, we are 

5 years after the establishment of the Department, and certainly 

enough time has passed such that it could be done now. 

Until it is done, the Department will, as I say, continue to be less 

than the sum of its parts, and the Department will still be a collection, to some degree, of disparate organizations, each going in its 

own direction. 

It would be a very simple thing that would promote integration 

and, as a consequence, make the Department more effective and efficient economically, it seems to me. 

Mr. ROGERS. I will come back to this when I get my next turn. 

I really think this is an important area. 

I will yield back. 

Ms. CLARKE. Ms. Duke, I wanted to touch upon the issue of diversity. There has been one that has been an issue of concern to 

myself, and certainly to our chairman. 

In your testimony it seemed as though the numbers that you 

have talked about were sort of cherry-picked around the various 

lines of the agencies for your executive cadre. For instance, you cite 

the percentage of Hispanics at ICE and CBP. Then you jump over 

to the number of African Americans in TSA and the women at 

USCIS. 

What are the Department’s overall statistics for minorities in the 

executive cadre? What are the numbers within the office of the secretary executive management and the office of the under secretary 

for management? 

Ms. DUKE. The point in pointing out some of the numbers is we 

believe that the eventual success in our diversity is going to be 

twofold. One, and principally, is the recruiting, getting the right 

people into the Department. Once we have the right people in the 

Department—and those highlight two areas where we have in CBP 

some successes in bringing diversity into the Department. 

The second thing we have to do, then, is have the programs, the 

training, the opportunities for people within the Department to go 

to the senior executive level, if that is what they wish. So we have 

a lot of initiatives going on now. 

We most recently just had our first women’s leadership forum. 

That was about 2 weeks ago, and we had about 150 women in the 
38 

Department come, and it was in-house. So we are looking at those 

opportunities. 

I will submit for the record the exact numbers that you asked 

for, but I do admit that we want to improve our diversity numbers, 

especially among the senior executive service within the Department. That is something that we are focusing. 

Ms. CLARKE. Yes, I think it is important that we sort of establish 

where we are right now as the baseline for where we need to go. 

As hard as it may be to sort of look at it and not actually be where 

we want to be, we have got to know where we are. So I do hope 

that you would forward us that information as soon as you can. 

I would also like to just talk about sustainability. In its early 

years, DHS has relied on contractors to a greater extent than any 

other department. Do you feel that this is sustainable? Also, as you 

look ahead to the future, how do you envision the role of contractors? And are you planning on reducing the Department’s dependence on contractors and using Federal employees to fill more roles? 

Ms. DUKE. I think, Ms. Clarke, the answer is it depends. We are 

looking at this. When we issued our data call for the FAIR Act inventory, the Federal Activities Inventory, to look at what should be 

contract and what should be inherently governmental, we asked 

each component to look at its use of contractors and make sure 

that every activity is properly coded either commercial or inherently governmental. 

One point to make, though, is just because it is commercial does 

not mean we should contract it out. There is an ability to say something is commercial, but it is so important to either the accomplishment of the mission or, in the cases of some discussions with this 

committee, oversight of some key contracts, that we want to keep 

it in the Federal workforce, despite the fact that it could be contracted out. 

So we are undergoing that system-wide review right now with 

the next FAIR Act inventory data call. We do know in some areas 

we are looking at making sure we have the most robust Federals 

to manage the contracts, which is an area we looked at. So in certain areas—for instance, NPPD—we are looking at building the 

Federal workforce to have it surround better and manage the contract workforce. 

Ms. CLARKE. Under Secretary Duke, while we are all very interested also in the long-term goals of the Department, we want to 

take a look at the shorter term. As you enter the transition, what 

would you say are some of the specific goals that you feel cannot 

wait and that the Department must meet before the next administration takes over? 

Ms. DUKE. Well, in terms of the transition goal, the principle is 

making sure that we have clear people in place in all the key areas 

that are there for succession and that they are trained to handle 

the role of their boss, should their boss be gone, due to political resignation. 

That is something we started and we are working on right now. 

We are doing exercises with the No. 2s and No. 3s. That is huge. 

Within management there are a couple of key processes that we 

think we need to have in place. At headquarters we are implementing an electronic records management system. I think that is 
39 

very important to have in place before the change of administration. 

We are continuing the migration of the data centers to make 

sure they have it in place. So we have both the management practices we want to have in place, plus the transition role. 

Ms. CLARKE. My time has expired, but perhaps we will do another round. 

Ranking Member Rogers, do you have some questions? 

Mr. ROGERS. I do. Thank you very much. 

I want to get back to this issue of direct-line authority. I would 

ask Mr. Ervin. 

Do you think we have made successive approximations toward 

that authority that are substantive? You heard Ms. Duke make 

some reference to functional authority. Are those reasonable successive approximations toward where we need to be? I know you 

would like to see it happen right now. 

Mr. ERVIN. Well, sir, there certainly is progress, and it is commendable. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is it reasonable progress? 

Mr. ERVIN. Yes, well, that is difficult to say. I guess I would say 

no, because, as I said earlier, it would be so easy simply to provide 

the direct-line authority. The question that you were asking a 

while ago is a very good one—that is, what is the downside of it? 

I have yet to hear an argument convincing—any argument, really, but certainly haven’t—— 

Mr. ROGERS. You heard an argument about it. But she had an 

argument. 

Mr. ERVIN. Yes. I haven’t heard a convincing argument as to the 

downside of it. This notion that component heads need a full complement of skills and activities within their component in order to 

properly discharge the mission does not persuade me, really. 

There is no reason in theory or in practice why a component 

head could not look to the chief procurement officer at the Department level, the chief information officer, or the chief financial officer, as the case may be, to provide each of those services with regard to his component, or her component. 

As long, as I say, as these counterparts have their own chief financial officers, et cetera, then these components will continue to 

operate in a less optimal fashion. The Department will be less integrated than it should. 

It is certainly important, for example, as Ms. Duke said, that the 

Department be physically consolidated, or as much of the Department as possible. That is another reason why the Department has 

yet to be integrated. 

But similarly, this kind of functional line authority, which costs 

nothing and which can be accomplished instantaneously would 

even more quickly, it seems to me, to conduce to the kind of cohesion that the Department lacks and, because of the transition, the 

Department needs more than ever, because we all agree that this 

is a time of heightened vulnerability and high threat. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Rabkin, I wanted to ask you. You talked about 

moderate successes and limited successes. In looking at the development of the management amongst the 22 legacy agencies—and 

you made reference, as I did, to the 5 to 7 years it takes for these 
40 

mergers to really at a minimum reasonably be stood up as an organization—do you think that we are making reasonable progress 

within the Department toward the ultimate goal of having a cohesive organization? 

Mr. RABKIN. In terms of the mission functions, I think the 

progress has been reasonable. I think that the Department properly put its focus on ensuring the homeland security, aviation security, that border security, the ability of the Coast Guard and FEMA 

to be able to search and rescue and carry out their missions, et 

cetera. 

However, the management side, in my opinion, has been given 

secondary focus and attention. I think it is time now to start— 

through the efforts of oversight, through the efforts of reorganization within, and changes of personnel within the Department—it is 

time to start focusing on that. 

We would like to see something a little more specific in terms of 

a plan about where for each of these areas does the Department 

want to be. When do they expect to get there? What are the steps 

from here to there? Who is going to be responsible for doing it? 

What kinds of resources are needed to get us from point A to point 

B? 

It would be easier to hold them accountable, certainly, but I 

think it will give them a better roadmap, especially as the new administration comes in and has to pick up to the ball to continue 

this progress. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I think that we all would agree that we have 

seen lessons learned and legacy agencies function better together 

over the last few years. That first couple of years was rough, as everybody knows. 

But I guess I am looking for feedback from all of you about 

where we are, if we are making adequate progress. I have constituents complain regularly. I hear on TV people criticize the Department for various problems. But I view it as—and many of you have 

heard me offer this example—a gangly teenager who is still trying 

to get the coordination of his limbs that are growing faster than 

they are used to. 

That is the way I see the Department. But I am asking are you 

seeing the level of maturation at a rate that you think is acceptable, given what happens with other similarly larger mergers? 

Mr. Carafano. 

Mr. CARAFANO. Well, yes, I would say no. I would say the reason 

for that—and in particular I agree with Mr. Rabkin—is we haven’t 

seen adequate advances on the management front. 

Then, again, I would go back. I think the two fundamental reasons for that are the two reasons I mentioned at the beginning. 

One is the lack of coherent oversight from the Congress. When you 

have different parents pulling in different directions, that is a big 

problem. 

The second is, I think, we have gone through again. We have 

gone through three major reorganizations of a very young department, and that has been incredibly disruptive. 

Back to Clark’s point, this notion about well, this would cost us 

nothing. This is a free lunch. Direct-line authority would essen-
41 

tially require another major reorganization of responsibility, and I 

think it would be incredibly disruptive. 

I think that fundamentally here we have to make a distinction 

between departments like Education and Energy and Agriculture, 

which are relatively vanilla across the breadth of the department, 

and departments like Defense and Homeland Security, which are 

very complex departments, very complex, different missionaries, 

different functional responsibilities, and you cannot treat everything the same. 

DOD has had a mix of line and dotted authority for decades, and 

there is a reason for that. I think as the Department matures, I 

think what you will actually see in DHS is something that, again, 

looks like more DOD, that has this combination. 

In some areas you will and should see consolidations of functions 

and activities. I am absolutely supportive of that. I think there are 

too many independent activities within DHS. It is too broad a span 

of control for the deputy of the Department to manage as a chief 

operating officer, which is the model they have adopted. 

I think it is a great model, but the problem is you can’t model 

that many different independent components. So I do think eventually you would want to see less of these. 

But, again, I think some kind of silver bullet management solution—everybody reports to the chief operating officer of this or 

that—I think is inappropriate for a department like this. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

My time is up. I hope we have a third round. 

Ms. CLARKE. Ms. Duke, is there sort of a framework written documentation about how you are going to transition? Is there a plan 

that you are working off of that indicates benchmarks of when you 

want to accomplish what by when? 

Ms. DUKE. We do have an outline of a plan, and I committed to 

the chairman earlier that I will have a formal written plan by October. That is the whole transition strategy. We do have a fiveprong plan on succession order, on training and on knowledge 

transfer, and that is ongoing. 

Ms. CLARKE. That is currently what you are working off of, but 

the filled-in fleshed-out plan itself you don’t have to expect to have 

before October? 

Ms. DUKE. For October. 

Ms. CLARKE. Okay. Is there a way that the committee can receive 

the plan you are currently working off of so that we can have a 

good basis from which to have expectations around the October release? 

Ms. DUKE. Yes, I would be happy to forward that to you. 

Ms. CLARKE. Wonderful. 

I want to go back to the issue of the contractors just briefly. One 

area that you didn’t really address was sustainability. I think the 

American people are very concerned, because, of course, we endeavor in many different areas where we are contracting out, and we 

don’t necessary get what we bargain for. 

Do you feel that the current level of contracting that is engaged 

in in DHS is something that we will have to sustain throughout the 

outgrowth of this agency? Or do you see that diminishing to a cer-
42 

tain degree, once a certain amount of that work is identified as 

work that should be part of a Federal employee workforce? 

Ms. DUKE. I think that will depend on how many new initiatives. 

A lot of our growth has been new initiatives. So if we continue to 

have the level of new initiatives that we have, I think that we 

might see a different look to where the areas are of growth that 

will continue to have growth. 

If there aren’t major initiatives—for instance, on the SBInet program—once we deploy the technology, certainly we are going to reduce the number of contractors and just be in a sustainment mode, 

and we will actually be operating the SBInet system through the 

Federal Border Patrol agents. 

So I think it depends on what area. I do know that in terms of 

sustaining, we are looking at both the effectiveness of contractors 

and the cost in certain areas. Is it more costly to use contractors? 

Or is it less costly to use Federal employees? It actually depends 

on the area. 

The third thing we are looking at that is important is: Are they 

available? Intelligence is an area where it is very, very difficult to 

get Federal employees. So we are looking at how we actually meet 

that mission. 

Ms. CLARKE. I would then just ask you, Ms. Duke, in closing for 

questions to you, the Department’s investment review process— 

Management Directive 1400—has been under a revision for several 

years. 

No. 1, in your view what is the appropriate role for departmentlevel oversight of its management investment? Why have previous 

experts not provided sufficient oversight? 

No. 2, how do you plan to address this issue before the next administration? 

Ms. DUKE. The main reason we are just novices at oversight in 

the investment review board is because the Department started 

with procurement people only. There are about 14 career fields that 

make up an acquisition program. The most key and essential of 

any acquisition program is the program manager. 

When CPO was set up, it had only the procurement people. We 

now have a division of the acquisition people—program managers, 

cost estimators. That goes to sustainability issue. What is it going 

to cost in the long term? We have test and evaluation logisticians. 

So now we actually have the skill sets in CPO—not enough, but 

a few of the right skill sets so we can look at a program. Several 

members of this committee have mentioned if we don’t have a good 

requirement, the rest isn’t good. 

We can go in early in a program, actually not just look at the 

end product, which is the contract, but look at the program documentation, the requirements document, the mission needs statement, the cost estimates, so we can actually do a program review, 

not a procurement review, because the procurement review is at 

the end, and all you can do is really band-aid the problem at that 

point, stop the bleeding. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you. 

My final question is to you, Dr. Carafano. You note that among 

the greatest challenges facing DHS is the congressional oversight 

is conducted by far too many committees. 
43 

As a member of the House committee tasked with the primary 

oversight of the Department, this has been a major frustration in 

that it makes any congressionally mandated reform of the Department exceedingly difficult, as bills are referred to all sorts of committees, and some of which have minimal expertise in homeland security. 

Can you elaborate on your comments? Do you have specific examples of how this has hindered the growth of the Department? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Yes, ma’am. I think the best example, actually— 

and really where these things really need to be discussed with 

them is to look at the authorization bill. 

Every year this committee has been great in drafting the authorization bill. Look at how many measures in that bill get stripped 

off, because other committees say it competes with their jurisdiction. 

That is probably the best example right there of the problem. 

That is why I think these are really solutions that have to go in 

tandem: the consolidation of oversight and the authorization process. One is insufficient without the other, and both are absolutely 

required, if we are going to have the kind of consistent congressional leadership we need for the committee. 

Ms. CLARKE. We are trying to still get a sense of how this could 

hinder the growth of the Department, because we are moving forward now. We are talking about transition. We want to make sure 

that we are as strident as possible. What could you say in that regard? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Well, the clearest answer are the domains that 

really cut across our society. Look at TSA and the Coast Guard— 

probably the best examples. TSA has transportation responsibilities 

across the entire globe, actually. The Coast Guard missions cross 

many different domains in everything to do with water. 

Between the Senate and the House committee, you don’t have 

consolidated oversight of those two in a single department, and 

that is, I think, a clear example where it is really showing. I think 

those are the ones that are absolutely the most important where 

you do have capabilities that cut across the society. 

Again, just to go back to my initial comments, the reason why 

this is so important is unless we are going to change the strategy 

of homeland security in this country—we talked about a risk-based 

strategy. We live in a country with an infinite number of 

vulnerabilities, and if we are going to spend $100 billion taking one 

vulnerability off the table, we are going to have infinity minus one. 

We don’t want to live in a society where we wall us off from the 

rest of the world, and we don’t want to live in a society where we 

take away anybody’s liberties and privacies and freedoms to make 

us safe. 

We want to live in a free and open society, and the only way we 

are going to do that is if we go out there, and we stop the bad guys, 

and if we make hard decisions about where we want to intervene 

in a free society to provide those protections. 

That can only be done in a holistic manner when every committee is saying this is the most important thing that has to get 

done. It is not being put in a holistic context. I think that is a great 

example of where we have really—you know, we have a stated 
44 

strategy, and then we have a congressional oversight process, 

which is specifically designed to prevent you from implementing it. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much. 

Congressman Rogers, our ranking member, mentioned that the 

Homeland Security reminds him of a gangly teenager. I think it reminds me of an infant still learning to focus its eyes. 

Having said that, our Chairman is back, and I would like to suggest to him that our Ranking Member has asked for another round 

of questions, and that is certainly your prerogative, sir. 

Ranking Member Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. 

I would ask Ms. Duke. You heard Mr. Ervin’s reference to the 

need, and my reference to the need, for more procurement officers 

in your former department. Where are you on that front? 

Ms. DUKE. We are up to nearly 1,000 procurement officers. 

Mr. ROGERS. How many do you need? 

Ms. DUKE. Right now, we are authorized to have about 1,250, so 

we are working up that right now, and then we will reassess. That 

is up from about 400 in 2004, so we are making good progress. 

Mr. ROGERS. You also heard Mr. Ervin’s reference to the need for 

bonuses and better pay. Do you find that is a component of recruitment and retention that is a real problem when it comes to procurement officers, or not? 

Ms. DUKE. I think we started a good exit interview program. I 

think that we can use recruitment and retention bonuses, and we 

do use that some. I think that what we are doing well on, according 

to our last employee survey, is people love the mission, and they 

are proud of it. 

I think that what challenges a lot of people is the stress of being 

especially a procurement officer in the Department. In the last 

round of questions, we talked a lot about business versus mission, 

or management versus mission. 

Management doesn’t exist without mission. We exist to serve the 

mission. So I think one of the things we have to overcome, even 

with that organizational change, is make everybody accountable for 

both mission and management. 

So if the culture is that, oh, you are responsible for delivering the 

mission, and management is responsible for adhering to costs and 

good business practices, they would never have the maturity level 

that you want. 

So I think that we will be able to better retain procurement if 

we have a unified buy-in that we are all jointly and severally responsible for meeting the mission, but doing it in a way that appropriately balances risk and appropriate use of good business practices. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Going back to Mr. Ervin’s statement, you made reference to contractors, and in more of a dim light than I view contractors. I think 

that there are certain specialties and special skill sets that we just 

don’t have, and we are not going to be able to have as a department. Or, we are not going to see the Department be able to have 

them, and they have to go to the private sector to draw on those. 

But you made reference to some contractors who have been 

drawing specs for their contracts. I would like to hear about that. 
45 

That is just unacceptable. I would love to know some specific examples of that. 

Mr. ERVIN. Sure. A couple of examples, sir, but first just let me 

say that I am not opposed to contractors ipso facto. I quite agree 

that it depends on the circumstances. There are certain functions 

that certainly only contractors can perform. 

I was just making the larger point that I think has been acknowledged, that DHS uses contractors to a very, very large degree—perhaps to a greater degree than any other agency, certainly, 

its size. I question that. 

To give you a couple of examples, early on in the Department, 

when I was in there in its first year, the Department TSA allowed 

Unisys to define its IT requirements for an IT system. That contract ultimately—I have forgotten what the initial amount was, but 

I think it was just a couple of hundred million dollars—ballooned 

to cost over $1 billion, and I think it is a direct result of the fact 

that TSA at the time did not know what its requirements were and 

left it up to Unisys to tell them what its requirements were. 

There are other examples, certainly, but the latest big example 

is the SBInet contract that Ms. Duke referenced of a year and a 

half ago, a couple of years ago. Then Deputy Secretary Jackson famously said in a meeting to contractors, ‘‘We are going to actually 

ask you to design a system for us and tell us what we need with 

regard’’—— 

Mr. ROGERS. So they asked a number of contractors to make a 

pitch. They didn’t say, ‘‘You draw up a contract.’’ They said, ‘‘You 

make a pitch.’’ 

I am no big fan of SBInet the way it has worked out. Don’t get 

me wrong. But I wasn’t aware that they drew their contract up. 

Mr. ERVIN. Respectfully, sir, it wasn’t just make a pitch. That 

happens all the time. It was—and I can get you the exact quote 

from the deputy secretary—but it was essentially, ‘‘You tell us 

what the requirements are. You design the system for us.’’ 

That is exactly what has been done, and that is a large part of 

the reason why this SBInet contract is as costly as it is and why 

we are still so far off in terms of getting what we need to get to 

protect the border—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Would describe that completely different and say, 

‘‘You tell us how you would design a program that would work,’’ 

and told several vendors that. Then they made their pitch of what 

would work, and DHS selected the one that they thought was the 

most effective. 

Don’t get me wrong. I am not defending the way it has worked 

out, because I don’t think SBInet’s on track the way it should be. 

But I don’t want to see corruption taking place in our contracting, 

and that was my concern with your first statement. 

I have just got a couple of seconds. 

I would ask Ms. Duke—your No. 1 goal in your new role as 

under secretary for management. What do you want to do first and 

foremost? What is the biggest challenge on the management front 

for the department? 

Ms. DUKE. The biggest challenge for me is for transition, and 

that is to sustain the progress we have made so far and making 
46 

sure that we have management factored into decisionmaking so 

they would not backslide in that. 

The second is to make sure we have some of the key management practices in place. I talked about we have to have a records 

management system, we have some staffing issues, so to put that 

infrastructure in place so that when the next administration comes 

in, they could focus on protecting the homeland and don’t have to 

worry about the basics. 

So we have a few key areas in each of the chiefs. But basically, 

it is to sustain the progress we have made and then to continue 

it forward. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, ma’am. 

I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. 

Well, I will go for a little while on it, anyway. We just went into 

recess, so we don’t have worry about being pulled away. 

Ms. DUKE. I am concerned to continue on about the sole source 

contracts. I think it should be the exception, and not the rule. I 

think pretty much everyone agrees to that. 

Would you consider doing a memorandum, probably not to all 

procurement officers, to remind them that sole source contracts 

ought to be the exception, and not the rule? Mr. Rogers rightly 

points out that there are some things that only one contractor can 

do, but I think I agree with Mr. Ervin when we ought to explore. 

It doesn’t hurt. Would you? 

Ms. DUKE. Yes. We could certainly issue a memorandum. 

We just recently did a competition report that was done by the 

chief procurement officer. It is rather lengthy. Basically, we went 

from about 45 percent last year to 60 percent in 2007. So that was 

2006 to 2007, 69 percent. 

Our goal for this year is 68 percent. The Federal-wide average 

is 75 percent, which we are hoping to get to by 2011 at the latest. 

So we really think that when we put all our mission elements 

aside, we can be at least with the Federal average. 

But I would certainly prepare the message reminding people that 

competition is the preferred way. 

Mr. CARNEY. Right. Very good. 

Mr. Ervin, care to comment on that? 

Mr. ERVIN. Well, I certainly cannot disagree that competition is 

the preferred way. But as I said in my statement, and as you reminded us, I really cannot conceive of a circumstance where it 

should not be the case that the Department—any government 

agency—should always seek bids. 

It may well be the case that only one contractor can as a matter 

of fact supply the necessary good or service at a reasonable cost. 

But we don’t know that for sure until we bid out, and so as a matter of good practice, it seems to me that there should always be 

bidding out of contracts, and I think a memo to this effect from 

Secretary Duke would be a good thing. 

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Carafano? Or Dr. Carafano—I am sorry. 

Mr. CARAFANO. There are over a dozen forms of Federal contracts 

under the Federal contract award for a reason. That is because 

they all have different utilities. So I think we are going down the 
47 

road, if we are having a debate about no-bid sole source versus 

competitive contracting. 

The real answer, which the committee has already identified and 

hit the Department on, is to have a qualified contracting workforce 

that knows what they are doing. Oftentimes in DOD, for example, 

when I was doing research on Iraq, of course they went out for a 

sole source no-bid contract, because they were in the middle of a 

war, and they had days to do this. 

The problem was, having once done that contract, 12 months 

later, when the requirement was clearly defined, when it was clearly alternative bidders, rather than go back and re-bid that as a 

competitive contract with an RFP, they just kept doing it sole 

source, because it was just easier, and they were too busy to do 

anything else. 

So the real answer is in the quality and the capacity of the contracting force. People are educated and skilled and motivated to 

their job. They are going to get you the best fee for service, and 

at the end of the day, that is what we really, really want. 

Mr. CARNEY. Or to plan also. 

Mr. CARAFANO. Yes, that would be helpful—and I think especially for DHS. This is, again, a lesson learned with DOD. DOD’s 

greatest sin is they never plan for the capacity of the contracts they 

had to undertake in Iraq, and their contracting force was absolutely and completely overwhelmed. 

We can’t assume that there is not going to be a day when DHS, 

because of some kind of catastrophic situation, has a massive increase in contracting requirements for some unforeseen reason, and 

if you don’t have a plan on how you are going to expand your capacity very rapidly to meet new and unexpected demands—— 

One of the things we know about the bad guys is that they are 

very innovative and creative. Someday somebody is going to figure 

out a way to attack this country that we ain’t never thought of. 

There won’t be a Federal employee to do this, because we never 

thought we might need one for that, and we are going to have to 

go out and find somebody to contract for that. 

They call it in DOD now—the Army calls it—expeditionary contracting. It is the notion of being able to quickly identify people 

with skills, wrap them up, get them out, deploy them and employ 

them. 

That is another issue as well. A lot of places you are going to 

have to send contractors out, so you have to think about paying 

them and sustaining them and everything else. 

So paying a lot of attention to the professional development of 

your procurement work force is, I think—I applaud this committee 

for being so hard over on that, because it is absolutely about employment. But we need to think in terms of both professional development and capacity. 

Again, I hate to be a broken record, but that is why you have 

authorization bills. So every year you go back and you revisit this 

issue, and you say, ‘‘How much progress have we made on this 

vital issue since last year?’’ You have a chance to act again on it. 

Mr. CARNEY. All right. 

Any further questions? Okay. 
48 

Well, I am satisfied. I think we had a great hearing. Frankly, the 

bipartisan talk, and we covered substantive policy issues, which is 

not a bad thing to do once in a while. 

Hearing no further business, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(49) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY OF PENNSYLVANIA FOR ELAINE

C. DUKE, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOME- LAND SECURITY

Question 1. What do you anticipate being the top priorities for the next administration as they take over the management of the Department? 

Answer. In the area of Management, the next administration will be faced with 

the same challenge as the current administration, which is to continue transforming 

the Department of Homeland Security into a unified force that protects our country. 

The Department management must ensure that there is a comprehensive and integrated strategy throughout the components, with specific and measurable goals that 

support the activities DHS priorities. Currently, the Department is focused on the 

following efforts: 

• Improving acquisition and procurement throughout the Department; 

• Strengthening the requirements and investment review processes; 

• Acquiring and maintaining human capital; 

• Seeking efficiencies across the enterprise in operations and the use of resources; 

• Making the key management systems, such as financial and human resources, 

world class; 

• Acquiring the funding and approval for DHS’ consolidation at St. Elizabeths 

Campus and the efficient realignment of all Department of Homeland Security 

off-campus locations. 

These efforts are not administration-specific, but rather reflect the key needs of 

the Department, its employees, and the Nation. These will be the issues facing the 

new administration as they take over the management of the Department; however, 

it is the goal of the DHS transition effort to ready the Department, to the maximum 

extent possible, for this changeover in Presidential administrations. 

Question 2. Please briefly describe the Directorate for Management’s goals for 

2007 and 2008? 

What long-term goals (5 to 10 years) do you have in place for the Department? 

Answer. In 2007, the Management Directorate’s goal was to strengthen and unify 

DHS operations and management. Faced with the challenge of strengthening the 

DHS components to function as a unified Department, DHS must balance centralized, integrated activities across decentralized operations that are distinctly unique. 

In order to meet this challenge, the Department drives operational success by coordinating four critical management objectives: provide structure, optimize processes 

and systems, foster leadership, and leverage culture. 

These four objectives serve as a framework to focus and evaluate operational effectiveness, particularly in delivering services in support of Department-wide initiatives. By applying these objectives to all lines of business throughout the Department, DHS seeks to ensure continuous improvement, quality control, and sound 

business practices. 

1. Provide Structure.—Strengthen unified organizational governance to enhance 

Department-wide communication, decisionmaking and oversight. 

• Develop DHS internal controls 

• Execute oversight 

Organizational structure allocates authority and responsibility, establishes reporting relationships and spans of control, and ensures the flow of communication and 

knowledge. 

In providing structure, we will implement critical internal controls for operations 

and management to ensure consistency and continuity within organizations; realign 

and delegate authorities that will improve the efficiency and delivery of homeland 

security programs for the American public; and issue employee performance plans 

that are results-focused with clear expectations and aligned with Departmental mission priorities. 
50 

Well-structured organizational governance includes a clear chain of command, a 

reduction in vacant oversight positions and compliance with Department-wide management directives and standard operating procedures. 

2. Optimize Processes and Systems.—Integrate functional operations to facilitate 

cross-Component synergies and streamline coordination ensuring reliable and efficient support of mission objectives. • Increase functional integration, information sharing, and operational performance • Decrease administrative costs 

Organizational processes and systems improve interaction between disparate systems, align shared services, and build sustainable infrastructure that enables functional integration and incorporates flexibility for evolving requirements. 

In optimizing processes and systems, we will incorporate stakeholder perspectives 

to ensure collaboration on key decision points; develop internal and external communications plans; and increase coordination of operations that accomplish the Department’s mission priorities. Utilizing information technology systems, we will streamline administrative processes and support communication networks. 

As we advance information sharing capabilities and partnerships, we will share 

information with Federal, State, local, tribal, international, and private sector security partners. 

Effective processes and systems support operational tasks in ways that reduce 

costs, correct material weaknesses and increase the reliability, timeliness, quality, 

and security of operations. 

3. Foster Leadership.—Adhere to the core values and guiding principles of DHS 

in performing duties, effecting progress and leading with commitment for the mission. • Strengthen and maintain existing leadership within the organization • Identify, support, and develop potential leaders 

Organizational leaders inspire vision and goals, foster cooperation, proactively 

overcome impediments, and remain distinguished in their dedication to duty. 

In sustaining leadership we will continue building a 21st century workforce by 

identifying skill gaps, improving hiring and retention programs, clearly defining 

roles and responsibilities, and providing training across the Department. 

We will support the delineation and implementation of the DHS leadership transition planning effort while advancing inter-agency collaboration and cooperation with 

State and local leaders. 

4. Leverage Culture.—Leverage the benefits of commonalities and differences 

across components to promote cooperative intra- and inter-agency networks and implement best practices. • Implement best practices • Provide inter- and intra-agency representation 

Organizational culture results from past strategies, experiences, obstacles, resources, and successes. We will implement best practices and drive unification with 

consideration for the different strengths that each organization and its employees 

may offer the Department. 

In collaborative networks throughout the Department, diverse skill sets will be 

utilized to ensure products and services that regard different ideas, solutions and 

create innovations. Inter-agency collaboration will benefit from DHS employees that 

are knowledgeable of the various DHS efforts, constraints, and concerns and can 

provide a clear and representative perspective. 

In 2008, we are continuing our efforts to enhance DHS operations and management by further developing Department-wide structure, processes and systems, 

leadership, and culture. 

In particular, we will strengthen acquisition management by reducing risk, monitoring program performance, and building a robust acquisition workforce. 

We will strengthen the role of the Chief Information Officer and underscore the 

importance of information technology (IT) security, unified enterprise architecture, 

and an integrated IT investment review process. 

We will unify IT infrastructures by reducing the number of data centers and networks and by deploying a new range of security services. 

We will ensure that all DHS components have improved access to needed data 

and information through information sharing and access to DHS facilities and systems. 

We will enhance operations coordination by establishing a joint planning capability for non-routine, multi-component operations. 

We will strive to consolidate our headquarters facilities. 

Finally, we will incorporate best practices for departmental transition planning in 

order to deliver a strengthened and unified DHS to the next administration. 
51 

Long-Term Goals (5–10 years) 

As the Department develops its management structure and improves cohesion 

across all components, DHS operations will strengthen with more effective means 

for utilizing its resources, including labor, assets, and appropriations. Over the next 

5 years, DHS will have the internal controls and infrastructure to shift its energy 

and focus from unifying legacy operations and overcoming management challenges 

to sustaining a unified Department that benefits from enhanced information sharing 

capabilities and other synergies that enhance performance and achieve goals in support of securing the Homeland. 

By applying the management framework introduced in fiscal year 2007 and 2008, 

DHS management goals will ensure that appropriate structures, processes and systems, leadership, and culture are maintained in support of mission goals. DHS Management will continue to aim for results that administer taxpayer dollars and define 

expectations in ways recognized to be good governance and exemplary of meaningful 

public service. 

In particular, DHS’ management structure will ensure that operational goals are 

aligned with strategic plans, assurance statements for financial and operational controls are authorized by leadership, and Department-wide internal controls and acquisition oversight maintain the integrity of major mission programs. 

In addition, processes and systems will be refined and sustained by consolidating 

disparate managerial tools, including financial applications, human resource training and recruiting mechanisms, and grant management processes in order to increase functional integration, asset efficiency, and Department productivity. 

For example, when the Department began operations in 2003, it was challenged 

to provide timely and compliant financial information from 22 diverse legacy agencies. To accomplish this, the Department developed clear standard business practices from internal control best practices to establish a management control program 

that measures performance and provides accountability for improvement in its published Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting Playbook. In addition to this playbook’s corrective action plans that will enable DHS to overcome outlying financial 

material weaknesses in the next 5 years, the Department couples its documented 

standard operating procedures with a high-level financial management systems 

strategy called the Transformation and Systems Consolidation (TASC). Moving 

TASC ahead will bring a reduction in the number of financial systems across the 

Department and will drive the implementation of a consolidated financial management system. 

The Department will take this phased, multi-faceted approach to addressing 

redundancies and inefficiencies in other operational areas of DHS. For instance, to 

streamline recruitment efforts, the Department will implement an enterprise recruitment/hiring solution that consolidate and modernize current overlaps in Department hiring systems. This e-Recruitment effort will provide flexible 

functionality to meet the needs of our Component organizations and improve operations with automated processes; the elimination of paper-based systems; the creation of an easy-to-use and web-accessible interface for all system users, and implementation of human capital industry best practices. Similarly, homeland security 

grants management, one of DHS’ most critical functions, will obtain enhanced efficiency and increased transparency by consolidating the administration and management of all DHS grants with the Federal Emergency Management Agency. By integrating and innovating processes and systems, the Department is taking advantage 

of existing resources and expertise to streamline services and improve access to critical homeland security funding for State and local governments and organizations. 

Particular to current management challenges and in terms of overcoming potential transition challenges, DHS leadership will strengthen and maintain its operations by identifying, supporting and developing potential leaders through Department-wide recruiting efforts. Maintenance of a robust transition plan and standard 

operating procedures along with management of an interactive web-based training 

application will provide employees with access to both mandatory and individual 

training opportunities that are flexible in terms of access and time and economical 

in terms of cost. 

Last, DHS culture adopted from legacy agencies provides both obstacles and opportunities to overcome present management challenges. The goals implemented in 

fiscal year 2007 and 2008 provide the framework for the Department to identify and 

develop best practices, represent multiple stakeholders and constituents, and share 

information both inter- and intra-Departmentally. These capacities will ensure that 

America is protected from dangerous people, dangerous goods and is prepared for 

dangerous environmental events. Over the next 5 to 10 years, the Department will 

ensure that best practices are disseminated and adopted as standard processes and 
52 

procedures and that DHS functions as a unified Department of many capabilities, 

talents, and resources. 

Question 3. What are the Directorate for Management’s major achievements in 

2007 and 2008? 

Answer. 

2007 Achievements—Under Secretary for Management 

1. Consolidation of Network sites.—Consolidated 100 percent of DHS HQ, CBP, 

ICE, FLETC and USCIS network sites (over 1,780 sites) to a single multiple protocol label switching (MPLS) network allowing DHS transparent monitoring of network performance and activity, prioritization of traffic and vastly improved security 

posture, and established the two DHS data centers to migrate DHS system operations. 

2. Regulatory Framework.—Established the regulatory framework to ensure the 

Department Chief Information Officer had control over Department-wide IT Acquisitions, budgets, and personnel performance, in 2007 we aligned over $3.2 billions of 

IT investment. 

3. Recruitment and Hiring.—DHS improved hiring by providing timely, direct 

interaction with applicants. The Department’s average time to hire was 41 days 

(versus the OPM target of 45 days). This included: • Hiring 4,000∂ Border Patrol Agents, 1,500∂ above target of 2,500 (CBP); • Hiring 2,300∂ Protection Officers, 1,600∂ above target of 646 (CBP); 

• Hiring 11,200∂ Transportation Security Officers, exceeding the target of 10,300 

(TSA); 

• Meeting the target of hiring 412 Immigration Enforcement Agents (ICE). 

4. Safety and Occupational Health Program.—Since fiscal year 2004 the DHS injury rate has been nearly halved to a rate of 9.3 per 100 employees. This is a significant accomplishment for the Nation’s largest law enforcement Department, and is 

a reflection of the strategic direction and leadership provided by the Office of Safety 

and Environmental Programs within the Office of the Chief Administrative Officer. 

5. Energy Management Program.—The DHS Energy Management Program received the President’s award for Leadership in Federal Energy Management. The 

Department has reduced energy usage by 18 percent, or 1.7 trillion BTU. 

6. Consolidated Headquarters Program.—DHS has worked closely with the General Services Administration on the preparation of a Draft Master Plan for the redevelopment of St. Elizabeths West Campus as the DHS Consolidated Headquarters, 

and played an integral role in the development of the St. Elizabeths’ Draft Environmental Impact Statement. 

7. Financial Management.—The Department has dramatically improved its financial management and stewardship of taxpayer dollars. The fiscal year 2007 Annual 

Financial Report, the principal financial statement of accountability for DHS, shows 

achievements in every area of measurement, and that our corrective actions are 

working. The number of organizations with no material weaknesses increased from 

four to seven, system security weaknesses were reduced from six to three, and the 

number of component conditions that contributed to fiscal year 2007 material weaknesses was reduced from 25 to 16. Overall, audit disclaimer conditions were reduced 

by 40 percent. 

8. Congressional Responsiveness.—OCFO improved responsiveness and adherence 

to Congressional deadlines in meeting the arduous demands of Congress. This included the on-time submission of nearly 1,500 Congressional Questions For the 

Record from Appropriations Committee hearings. 

9. Build the DHS Acquisition Workforce.—OCPO made significant progress in the 

recruitment and development of the acquisition workforce which provides critical 

support to the DHS mission. Staffing levels within the Office of Procurement Operations, an organization providing contracting support for all headquarters offices, increased by 29 percent from fiscal year 2006 levels, and made awards totaling over 

$4.4 billion. Various DHS training programs have resulted in the certification of 237 

program mangers since December 2006, a 53 percent increase in the past 11 months 

as well as an increase in the number of certified Contracting Officer’s Technical 

Representatives. 

10. Make Good Business Deals.—DHS’ small business procurement program was 

recognized by the Small Business Administration with a score of ‘‘green’’ on its first 

ever Small Business Scorecard. Out of the 24 Federal agencies that received a rating, DHS was 1 out of only 7 agencies that received a ‘‘green’’ score. OCPO made 

significant progress implementing a new acquisition oversight program. Several special oversight reviews on particular procurement issues have been performed identifying areas of potential improvement for DHS, both at the Component and Department-wide levels. 
53 

11. Competitive Contracting.—Increased from 49 percent of the competition base 

in fiscal year 2006 to 69 percent in fiscal year 2007. 

2008 Achievements—Under Secretary for Management 

1. Financial management policies and process.—Over the past year, nearly 30 new 

CFO policies were written and signed and our Financial Management Policy Manual is expected to be on line this summer. We released the 2008 Internal Controls 

Playbook, published the first ever DHS Highlights Report, launched a new Program 

and Budget Review Process and initiated the first Performance Improvement Officer 

Council. In addition, e-Travel program success helped the Department achieve its 

best E-Gov scorecard in 2 years. 

2. Acquisition Workforce.—Implemented a centrally funded and managed Acquisition Professional Career Program modeled after the highly successful Navy Intern 

Program. This program features three, single-year rotations through various components and provides the participants with all the experience and training they need 

to become journeyman level acquisition professionals. 

3. Competitive contracting.—As of mid-year fiscal year 2008, DHS exceeded its annual goal of 68 percent by 4 percentage points. 

4. Counter-Intelligence Capabilities.—Increased counter-intelligence awareness 

training available to headquarters and components by 5 percent and extended to 

non-HQ components. Reduced vulnerabilities to DHS facilities by bolstering personnel assigned to the Technical Security Counter-Measures Program increasing capacity for critical security sweeps. Increased deployment of training to State and 

local government as well as private-sector personnel handling classified and sensitive information received from the Department. 

5. Consolidated Headquarters.—Worked closely with the General Services Administration (GSA) toward expeditiously bringing the Master Planning, Environmental 

Impact Statement and National Historic Preservation Act Section 106 Consultations 

to a successful conclusion for the DHS Consolidated Headquarters at St. Elizabeths 

Campus. In cooperation with the GSA National Capital Region, a draft prospectus 

was also completed for consolidation of HQ mission support elements within the National Capital Region. 

6. Consolidated Mail Service.—Achieved milestones toward delivery of a Consolidated Remote Delivery Site to provide mail and courier services to DHS Component 

locations in the Washington, DC metropolitan area thereby improving efficiency, 

strengthening accountability and reduce risk to DHS employees by screening for 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive threats. 

7. Workforce Safety.—Continued to achieve significant reductions in departmental 

injury rates, with over 46 percent reductions in total injury and lost time injury 

rates in the first quarter of fiscal year 2008 from fiscal year 2003. 

8. Energy Management.—Received the Presidential Award for Leadership in Federal Energy Management for institutionalizing energy management practices. 

Achieved a 17.1 percent energy reduction relative to the 2003 baseline. This compares with a requirement in 42 U.S.C. 8253(a)(1) to reduce energy consumption by 

4 percent and the goal established by Executive Order 13423 of 6 percent. Additionally, DHS purchased an amount of renewable electricity equal to 4.0 percent of its 

annual consumption. 

9. Veterans Outreach.—Conducted Veterans Preference training for 48 DHS 

Human Capital and Equal Employment Opportunity specialists as part of the Veterans Outreach Strategy while continuing followup training on the Uniform Services 

Employment & Reemployment Rights Act. As a result of this training, we have established a de facto DHS Veterans Outreach Support Team composed of the trainees. This team can be used Department-wide for veterans outreach and hiring activities and can assist each other regardless of component. Veterans compose 24.2 

percent of the Department’s permanent civilian workforce and 28.4 percent of the 

Department’s managers and supervisors. In 2007, DHS doubled the number of veterans hired in 2006; i.e. from 3,015 to 6,013. 

10. Transition Planning.—Developed a transition planning approach for DHS to 

ensure operational continuity before, during and after the 2009 presidential administration transition and change in DHS political leadership. Recognized in for exemplary progress and improvements to breadth of supporting change management efforts. 

Question 4. How many FTEs does DHS currently have? How many actual employees does DHS currently have? How many contract employees does DHS currently 

have? 

How do these numbers relate the Department’s 2007 figures? 

What, if any, changes should we expect to see in these numbers in 2009? 
54 

Answer. Below is the breakdown of FTEs, actual employees and contract employees for 2007, 2008 and 2009: 

2007 

FTEs.—186,804. 

Onboard strength.—182,397. 

Contractor employees.—DHS does not track contractor FTE or onboard strength 

because we often acquire support on a fixed-price basis or based on performance objectives. The number of personnel the contractor employs is not transparent, since 

we are paying for a deliverable or outcome rather than man-hours. In those instances where DHS is acquiring a specific ‘‘level of effort’’ or man-hours, contractors 

may use several employees to accomplish tasks that total the number of man-hours 

in one FTE. While it is not possible to track or provide this information currently, 

we are working with the Chief Procurement Office to address this concern of Congress. 

2008 

Current FTEs.—197,055. 

Current onboard strength.—202,060. 

Contractor employees.—DHS does not track contractor FTE or onboard strength 

because we often acquire support on a fixed-price basis or based on performance objectives. The number of personnel the contractor employs is not transparent, since 

we are paying for a deliverable or outcome rather than man-hours. In those instances where DHS is acquiring a specific ‘‘level of effort’’ or man-hours, contractors 

may use several employees to accomplish tasks that total the number of man-hours 

in one FTE. While it is not possible to track or provide this information currently, 

we are working with the Chief Procurement Office to address this concern of Congress. 

2009 

FTEs (requested).—204,993. 

Question 5. What are the challenges that DHS faces with program office staffing 

and expertise? How have those challenges contributed to issues with major acquisition outcomes, and how do you plan to address them? 

Answer. The challenges experienced by program offices are the availability of 

training, balancing training with primary duties, and building the future workforce. 

A trained and qualified program office staff is able to mitigate the risk encountered 

and therefore improve acquisition outcomes. As the program management certification program becomes more mature and robust, individuals are required to 

squeeze required training amongst other high-priority activities. More is being 

asked of an already overloaded workforce. 

With additional emphasis on training, the Department is attempting to rapidly 

ramp up the training throughput. While DHS has an agreement with the Defense 

Acquisition University (DAU), DAU cannot satisfy the entirety of acquisition training required. Other alternatives, such as contracting for instructors to present the 

curriculum, are being pursued. Providing sufficient training opportunities when required for the workforce will improve performance and reduce program risk. 

The Department is currently working not only to get those trained who are currently assigned as program managers, but also working on developing the future 

workforce. The objective is to have a highly skilled and well-qualified pool of individuals who already have the education, training, experience, and certification prior to 

selection and assignment in these critical acquisition positions. 

To resolve our personnel shortages we are intensifying our human capital planning efforts to ensure we minimize skill and competency gaps, as well as critical 

vacancies. We are currently conducting staffing studies that will help the Department better define its acquisition workforce needs. Our current workforce includes 

program managers and contract specialists. As part of our human capital planning 

efforts, we will identify other required acquisition career fields such as test and 

evaluation, logistics, cost estimation, etc. We are aggressively working to ensure 

that each acquisition position, upon definition, is encumbered by an acquisition professional trained and certified at the appropriate level. We are utilizing the Department of Defense (DoD) Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act framework 

to develop a DHS certification standard. 

DHS is currently testing an existing Air Force program office staffing model for 

possible applicability in determining our program office staffing requirements. The 

model has been utilized by the Air Force for program office staffing requirements 

in the fiscal year 2004–fiscal year 2010 Program Objective Memorandum cycles, and 

the model has been utilized by other DoD agencies as well. Preliminary results in 
55 

DHS indicate the model accurately captures our staffing requirements, although 

more study is needed and is on-going. 

A snapshot of 17 DHS Level I programs from a cross-section of DHS components 

run through the model indicates overall program office staffing to be at approximately 90 percent of requirement. This is consistent with Air Force program office 

staffing. Preliminary functional assessments indicate DHS has more program managers as a percentage against total program office staffing than a typical DoD program. In addition, DHS has fewer contract specialists and financial managers as 

percentages against total program office staffing than a typical DoD program. Preliminary study recommendations are to normalize these percentages more in line 

with DoD programs, although further study and analysis are needed. Additional 

Level I programs are being analyzed, and the results will be presented to the DHS 

Program Management Council for review. 

From December 2006 to the present, our number of certified program managers 

has increased from 449 to 948, and our number of contract specialists has increased 

from 865 to 977. This fiscal year, we received funding for our Acquisition Professional Career Program. This is a developmental program modeled after the highly 

successful DoD program and aims to attract new talent to fill entry-level acquisition 

positions and develop our future acquisition leaders. Our inaugural class began in 

January 2008 with 11 contracting professionals and a second class of approximately 

32 contracting professional will begin in June 2008. In fiscal year 2009, we plan to 

expand the program to other acquisition career fields and expect funding for approximately 83 participants in the program. Our goal is to grow this program to 300 

positions by fiscal year 2011 to fill critical acquisition positions. 

Question 6. The Department’s Investment Review Process (Management Directive 

1400) has been under revision for several years. 

In your view what is the appropriate role for Department-level oversight of its 

major investments and why have previous efforts not provided sufficient oversight? 

How do you plan to address this issue before the next administration? 

Answer. The Department must perform the appropriate oversight of its major acquisition efforts to insure that risks are properly managed, and finite Departmental 

resources (budget, schedule, facilities and personnel) are used to optimal effect. 

However, oversight must be complemented by execution support. Execution support 

includes mentoring by experienced acquisition professionals as well as clear acquisition policies and procedures. 

The current version of Management Directive (MD) 1400 only addresses the Capital Investment acquisition mechanism. Capital Investment is only one of the mechanisms used to acquire DHS capability. Other-than-capital-investment acquisition 

mechanisms (e.g. enterprise services, grants) are frequently used by the Department 

and, in aggregate, have significant impact on the delivery of desired overall Departmental capability. 

The current plan for replacing MD 1400 includes establishing acquisition oversight/execution policies and processes for all of these capability delivery mechanisms. It should be noted here that the Department/components already manage 

these other mechanisms, but as stand-alone mechanisms... not as acquisition 

mechanisms. Clear acquisition policies and processes, for all of the acquisition mechanisms used by the Department, are essential to achieving efficient, economic and 

reliable capability delivery to the Department’s operational user base. 

The Department established the Acquisition Program Management Division 

(APMD) of the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer in August 2007. The division 

was established to improve oversight and execution support for DHS acquisition programs. To date, APMD has performed Quick Look assessments of 37 level 1 programs, has overseen Deep Dive reviews of the SBInet and ASP programs, and restarted the Investment Review process. The division also has provided program execution support (advice and guidance to programs by experienced acquisition professionals) including a process to collaboratively assist programs in strengthening their 

Acquisition Program Baselines (APBs). 

Currently, the APMD team is focused on an aggressive Investment & Acquisition 

process re-engineering effort. That effort includes replacing MD 1400 as described 

above, establishing revised investment and acquisition decision procedures, and establishing a new periodic reporting system. These efforts are scheduled for completion during calendar year 2008. 

Question 7. Currently, DHS is attempting to restructure its financial accounting 

systems in an effort to improve financial management across all components. This 

process is being managed by the Department’s Chief Financial Officer. 

What authority does the DHS CFO have to force the component agencies’ CFOs 

to comply with the Department-wide strategy? 
56 

If the Secretary has made it clear that the DHS CFO has authority, why won’t 

the Department commit to publishing a Management Directive making this clear? 

Answer. The authority of the DHS Chief Financial Officer (CFO) comes from the 

CFO Act of 1991—one of the most comprehensive pieces of financial management 

improvement legislation to date. The act explicitly required that the agency CFO report directly to the agency head on financial management matters and is specifically 

charged with developing and maintaining an integrated agency accounting and financial management system. To avoid fragmented financial management across the 

enterprise, the CFO Act mandates the DHS CFO develop and maintain Department-wide financial management systems that comply with accounting principles 

and requirements, internal control standards, and requirements from oversight bodies. The DHS Financial Accountability Act of 2004 formally designated DHS as an 

agency under the CFO Act, thereby solidifying the abovementioned responsibilities 

of the DHS CFO. 

The Department has a management directive that further emphasizes the CFO 

Act. DHS Management Directive 0005 explicitly names the DHS CFO as the ‘‘line 

of business chief who exercises leadership and authority over Financial Management policy and programs for the entire DHS enterprise.’’ The Directive also requires all DHS component to ‘‘comply with and implement Departmental Management policies and procedures established by the DHS CFO.’’ 

Question 8. Obviously, there will be large contracts awarded by this administration that the next administration will have to honor. Do you anticipate providing 

the next administration with a detailed assessment of these financial expenditures? 

Answer. Yes, we are preparing to provide information regarding contracts with a 

total dollar value in excess of $100 million that are expected to carry over through 

the transition. The Office of the Chief Procurement Officer has already begun tracking those contracts. At this time the U.S. Coast Guard, the Transportation Security 

Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Customs and Border Protection currently have contracts with 

contract values in excess of $100 million that will carry over through the transition. 

Question 9. What are the Department’s overall statistics for minorities in the executive cadre, the Office of the Secretary and Executive Management, and the Office 

of the Under Secretary for Management? 

Response. Please find the attached spreadsheet providing the requested information regarding the Department’s demographics. We note, however, that these snapshot statistics do not reflect the number of applicants for these positions or the applicants’ qualifications. They also do not reveal the percentage of individuals in the 

civilian labor force qualified for those positions. 
57 

SES BY GENDER AND RACE/ETHNICITY—OVERALL 

[Updated Results] 

Agency 

Gender Race/Ethnicity 

Total 

Female Male 

ALL 

OTHER 

ASIAN OR 

PACIFIC 

ISLANDERS 

AMERICAN INDIAN OR 

ALASKAN 

NATIVE 

ASIAN OR 

PACIFIC 

ISLANDER 

BLACK, 

NOT OF 

HISPANIC 

ORIGIN 

HISPANIC 

WHITE, 

NOT OF 

HISPANIC 

ORIGIN 

CBP ..................................... 20 68 0 0 1 4 10 73 88 CIS ...................................... 20 24 0 0 0 1 2 41 44 DNDO ................................. 1 6 0 0 1 0 0 6 7 FEMA .................................. 11 47 0 0 0 4 2 52 58 FLETC ................................ 3 5 0 0 0 1 0 7 8 ICE ...................................... 12 43 0 0 0 1 6 48 55 NPPD .................................. 2 13 0 0 0 0 0 15 15 OIG ..................................... 2 11 0 0 0 1 0 12 13 OS ....................................... 29 100 0 0 0 2 5 122 129 ST ........................................ 6 22 0 0 2 0 0 26 28 TSA ..................................... 30 109 0 1 6 15 5 112 139 USCG .................................. 3 10 0 0 1 2 0 10 13 USSS ................................... 8 41 1 1 0 5 2 40 49 

Total ......................... 147 499 1 2 11 36 32 564 646 
58 

SES BY GENDER AND RACE/ETHNICITY—OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY AND 

EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT 

BLACK, NOT OF 

HISPANIC ORIGIN 

HISPANIC WHITE, NOT OF HISPANIC ORIGIN Total 

Female Male Female Male Female Male 

1 1 0 4 10 37 53 

SES BY GENDER AND RACE/ETHNICITY—UNDER SECRETARY FOR 

MANAGEMENT 

BLACK, NOT OF 

HISPANIC ORIGIN 

HISPANIC WHITE, NOT OF HISPANIC ORIGIN Total 

Female Male Female Male Female Male 

0 0 0 1 10 27 38 

Note.—This data is consistent with the 5/9/08 Blue Report. 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER MIKE ROGERS OF ALABAMA FOR ELAINE C. 

DUKE, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

SECURITY

CENTER FOR DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS

Question 1. The President’s fiscal year 2009 budget allocation for the Center for 

Domestic Preparedness included an unacceptable reduction of 25 percent. The Center for Domestic Preparedness is a key training facility operated by the Department 

of Homeland Security, and is the only weapons of mass destruction (WMD) training 

facility that provides hands-on training to civilian emergency responders which includes the use of live chemical agents. 

For fiscal year 2008, Congress provided $62.5 million for the Center for Domestic 

Preparedness. In addition, the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act of 2007, 

which the President signed into law on August 3, 2007, included language that authorized increases in funding for the Center over a period of 4 years. 

In a February 6, 2008 letter to Secretary Chertoff, I expressed concern about the 

proposed budget reduction at the CDP and asked for a detailed justification for this 

budgetary decision. In his response, he stated: 

‘‘The department believes that the $47 million requested in fiscal year 2009 will 

be sufficient to supports CDP’s requirements and to continue its operations . . .’’. 

Could you explain in detail the rationale for reducing the CDP’s budget by 25 percent? 

Answer. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) fully recognized 

the importance of preparedness training, and particularly the training conducted at 

the Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP). CDP is a key member of the National 

Domestic Preparedness Consortium and the only Federal chartered weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) training facility. 

The CDP budget has undergone continuous review since the facility was transferred to FEMA from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) last year. At the 

same time, FEMA has provided enhanced management in the process of streamlining contracts with vendors and training contractors, as well as providing greater 

oversight of expenditures and stipends. As a result, FEMA believes that CDP will 

be able to meet all program requirements and goals with the President’s $47 million 

request. FEMA is dedicated to continuing to look for ways to effectively manage the 

resources provided to CDP, as well as all other training facilities, to gain the greatest advantages for training partners and the taxpayer. 

The Center for Domestic Preparedness will make adjustments to various contracts 

and support activities to meet the funding level provided in the fiscal year 2009 

budget request. The following listing compares the fiscal year 2008 and the projected fiscal year 2009 budgets by category: 

FY 2008 FY 2009 

Training Support Operations ..................................... $15,587,144 $11,322,518 
59 

FY 2008 FY 2009 

Program Operations and Support ............................. 19,631,856 12,687,234 

M&A Set Aside ........................................................... 1,781,000 1,410,000 

Totals ................................................................ 62,500,000 47,000,000 

OFFICE OF HEALTH AFFAIRS (OHA)

Question 2. Last year the Department established the Office of Health Affairs, 

and within that the Office of Food, Agriculture and Veterinary Defense (FAVD). 

That office is charged with the responsibilities of HSPD–9, Defense of United States 

Agriculture and Food. Despite the importance of this mandate, the office remains 

significantly understaffed and underfunded. The budget is flat at $727,000 and five 

full-time employees. This small workforce is responsible for an ever-expanding mission. 

On July 9, 2007, Chairman Carney and I held a field hearing in Pennsylvania 

on food safety, at which Dr. Tom McGinn, the director of the FAVD, testified to the 

critical food security mission of that office. 

In a Department of over 200,000 employees, is it sensible that only five full-time 

employees are allocated to the safety of our Nation’s food supply? 

Will the office be able to keep its avian influenza contractors on, since I understand their funding runs out later this year? 

What steps are being taken to ensure DHS plays the lead coordinating role if an 

outbreak of avian occurs? 

Should Congress take any legislative action to ensure that other agencies—Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services in particular—recognize 

DHS’ lead coordinating role? 

Answer. 

1. The Department plays a critical role in the defense of our Nation’s food and 

agricultural supply from a wide-range of threats, from naturally occurring diseases 

to man-made threats. The Department has multiple components and programs focusing on these efforts to defend the Nation’s food and agricultural supply, from food 

and agricultural inspections at the border and other points of entry to utilizing intelligence information to monitor food and agricultural threats to providing an effective response to an outbreak of FMD or other food, agricultural or veterinary disease. The FAV Defense division of the Office of Health Affairs (OHA) serves as the Department’s lead for food and agricultural defense, but not as the sole entity involved 

in these critical issues. The FAV Defense division has developed a strategic plan 

which outlines the mission space to accomplish Food Defense and Agricultural Security goals consistent with Department of Homeland Security assignments outlined 

in HSPDs 5–10. FAV Defense enables the Assistant Secretary and Chief Medical Officer to serve as the principal medical advisor to the Secretary, FEMA Administrator, and other departmental leadership for all food, agricultural and veterinary 

defense responsibilities for the Department. This role includes the coordination and 

integration of DHS food, agricultural and veterinary defense activities, leading the 

Department’s responsibilities under HSPD–9, Defense of U.S. Agriculture and Food, 

and serving as the Department’s primary point of contact for Federal, State, local 

and private sector food, agriculture and veterinary defense activities. 

2. FAV Defense Division has five contractors and two Public Health Service officers that are currently funded with Avian Influenza (AI) money. By the end of fiscal 

year 2008, 2 contractors will remain funded into the following fiscal year along with 

the Federal staff. 

3. Depending on the nature and scope of an avian flu outbreak, the Department 

of Homeland Security has been designated by the President of the United States as 

the lead Federal Department to coordinate Federal operations within the United 

States to prepare for, respond to, and recovery from an outbreak of avian flu as directed under HSPD–5, Management of Domestic Incidents, and HSPD–9, Defense of 

the U.S. Agriculture and Food Supply. The U.S. Department of Agriculture is the 

Federal lead for preparing for and responding to animal and zoonotic threat and diseases, such as an outbreak of avian influenza. However, the Department of Homeland Security maintains the overall Federal responsibility for incident management, 

as the HSPD–5 lead, for a major outbreak of pandemic influenza to coordinate and 

integrate response efforts ranging from human and animal health, protecting critical infrastructures and key resources and law enforcement. 

In the event of an outbreak of avian influenza the following steps would be initiated: As with any animal disease, a tiered level of response is the most efficient 
60 

means of managing the incident, as directed through the National Response Framework. The intentional introduction of a foreign animal disease or the progression of 

an event to one of ‘‘catastrophic’’ nature, which exceeds the capability of a single 

agency, requires DHS involvement. Ideally, DHS involvement would begin early in 

the recognition of a foreign animal disease outbreak to ensure an effective and 

seamless transition of response capability between agencies or departments should 

that be necessary. 

4. Legislation clarifying the Department’s lead role in preparing for, responding 

to and recovering from a catastrophic event as designated under HSPD–5, Management of Domestic Incidents, would reaffirm the Department’s mission of coordinating 

and integrating Federal, State and local roles and responsibilities as they relate to 

terrorism or a naturally occurring catastrophic incident. 

CANINES

Question 3a. Deputy Under Secretary Duke, I understand from your predecessor 

Tom Essig, the Department’s Chief Procurement Officer, that his office is undertaking a Department-wide study of canine procurement. He is working to assess the 

Department’s total need for, and acquisition of, working canines across the many 

individual agencies that use them. 

Can you tell me where we stand with this study? 

Answer. At this point, a cursory analysis has been performed largely examining 

economies and demand across DHS components. As a strategically sourced solution, 

it has not yet been advanced to the initiative stage and accepted by the Professional 

Services Family Council. 

Question 3b. Is the analysis being coordinated with the ongoing Department-wide 

assessment of canine utilization by Dr. Tom McGinn and the DHS office of Food, 

Agriculture and Veterinary Defense (FAVD)? 

Answer. FAV Defense Division, through Dr. Tom McGinn’s role as Chief Veterinarian for DHS, has begun identifying DHS Canine Programs with regards to 

health, housing and veterinary medical care of working dogs, and ultimately will 

also include working horses within DHS. 

Question 3c. Given the relatively low staffing levels within FAVD, does that office 

have the staffing level necessary to undertake this and the many other important 

projects its leaders view as requisite for doing their part in securing the homeland? 

Answer. FAV Defense Division has sufficient resources to achieve a defined set 

of deliverables for fiscal year 2008. 

BORDER PATROL RECRUITMENT

Question 4. In a March 25, 2008 Fox News Story, it was reported that the U.S. 

Border Patrol has taken steps to meet a mandate to hire 6,000 new border agents 

by the end of 2008, including: 

• Eliminated the need for a high school diploma or GED for entrance into the 

Border Patrol; 

• Lowered entrance exam passing test grades from 85 percent to 70 percent; 

• Concentrated 4 months of training into 10 weeks; and 

• Raised the entry level age from 37 to 40. 

If you are aware, can you provide an explanation as to why the Border Patrol 

doesn’t require new agents to have at least a high school diploma or GED? 

If you do not have knowledge of Border Patrol hiring procedures, could you please 

submit a detailed explanation for the record on this news report and the Border Patrol recruitment and minimum standards for acceptance? 

Answer. The Border Patrol has, in fact, never had a requirement for a High 

School diploma or GED. It does, however, require that candidates pass a stringent 

pre-employment test (which is challenging even for some college graduates) and 

have appropriate education or experience to qualify for at least a GS–5 civil service 

grade. These pre-employment requirements ensure that the Border Patrol retains 

quality. As a practical matter, however, very few if any Border Patrol agents do not 

have at least a GED, and many agents have taken at least some college courses. 

The Border Patrol did not lower the required test scores from 85 to 70 percent 

correct; 70 percent was and still is the minimum satisfactory score for the test. In 

the past, when hiring was occurring at a slower pace and it was possible to be even 

more selective, this may have resulted in a larger percentage of hires having higher 

scores than today. Nonetheless, the required test score is unchanged, and the test 

and passing score have been validated for predicting which applicants have the 

highest probability of successfully becoming a Border Patrol Agent. Achieving a 

passing score on our test is a significant accomplishment and indicates that an applicant has the capacity to become a good Border Patrol Agent. All applicants must 
61 

still complete rigorous Academy and post-Academy internships, so there are strong 

processes in place to ensure that the Border Patrol maintains quality. 

On October 1, 2007, the United States Border Patrol Academy implemented a new 

55–40 day schedule to train new Border Patrol Agents at the United States Border 

Patrol Academy. Over the last couple of years the Border Patrol Academy has been 

tasked with training the largest influx of new agents in the history of any Federal 

law enforcement training Academy. In order to complete this monumental task, the 

Academy reviewed the current schedule and determined that a better, more efficient 

way of training was possible without diminishing the quality of agents graduating 

from the Academy and reporting to the field. 

The biggest change during the first 55 days is that no Spanish curriculum is presented. When the trainees arrive at the Academy, everyone will complete a Spanish 

language proficiency exam. Based on this exam, the trainees who achieve a certain 

level of proficiency do not have to complete the 40 day add-on Task-Based Spanish 

Language Training program. 

The result of this review is a 55-day schedule that incorporates the traditional 

training found at most law enforcement academies and includes Law/Operations, 

Driver Training, Physical Techniques and Firearms. All the trainees for a particular 

class will enter on duty at the Academy and complete the first 55 days of training 

together. During this period the trainees will complete 433 hours of training over 

a period of 55 days. The Spanish curriculum is separate and will consist of 40 days 

of training, if needed, after the initial 55-day Academy. 

Also, it should be noted that the entry level age was raised to 40 to deepen the 

applicant pool and assist the Border Patrol in meeting its appropriated number of 

Border Patrol agents by the end of 2008. 

EMPLOYEE MORALE

Question 5. Following up on hearings this committee has held in the 109th and 

110th Congress’ on employee morale, could you provide an update on what the Department is doing to bolster morale? 

Is there a mechanism in place for upper level management to hear the thoughts 

and concerns of rank-and-file Department employees to ensure their suggestions are 

being heard? 

Answer. The Department has undertaken numerous initiatives and activities to 

promote employee engagement as described herein: 

Surveys/Analysis/Action Plans 

• From October 26–December 21, 2007, the Department conducted its first survey 

of all permanent DHS employees—more than 140,000—and received responses 

from approximately 65,000 employees. The survey was designed to measure job 

satisfaction and agency performance. We are using the survey findings to sharpen policies and programs for continued improvement, enhance our agency’s performance and the experience of our employees. 

• DHS, at both the Department- and Component-level, continues to engage in action planning activities and quarterly progress monitoring that addresses employee concerns raised in the results of the 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey 

(FHCS) and the 2007 Annual Employee Survey (AES). 

• Data from the 2007 DHS Annual Employee Survey will allow components to 

complete a more in-depth analysis to better understand employee concerns and 

develop/tailor action planning items accordingly. 

• The Survey Engagement Team, made up of DHS Component representatives, 

will continue to share best practices across the Department. 

• The Department is planning to expand DHS-wide focus groups in 2008 to further identify areas for improvement and give voice to concerned employees. 

Continue Rollout of IdeaFactory: 

• The Transportation Security Administration has developed IdeaFactory, a modern version of the employee suggestion program. Employees make suggestions 

online that can then be commented on or improved by fellow employees. The 

suggestions with the most endorsements are then evaluated and adjusted for 

implementation across TSA. Adopted ideas include: 

• It Matters to Mo, a twice-yearly area conference call with Security Operations 

Assistant Administrator Mo McGowan that any employee can dial into; 

• Job Swap, a program that allows officers to ‘‘swap’’ positions; and 

• Walk a Mile in Our Shoes, which gives senior leadership the opportunity to 

experience working at the checkpoint first-hand. 

• IdeaFactory is currently under evaluation for implementation at the U.S. Coast 

Guard and National Preparedness and Protection Directorate (NPPD). Success-
62 

ful implementation within NPPD would provide an implementation platform for 

other Headquarters components. 

Communications 

• Leadership Journal (Secretary’s blog) to which employees can post comments or 

questions. 

• All components have employee newsletters. 

• Customs and Border Protection is implementing an Ombudsman program as an 

informal avenue for addressing employee’s issues/problems related to leadership. 

• To address communications issues CBP is exploring new communication vehicles—‘‘Fireside Chat’’ with Commissioner, etc. to facilitate two-way communication between employees and senior leaders, CBP also conducted 125 focus 

groups with CBP employees to further understand existing communications 

issues. 

• FEMA launched an employee newsletter, incorporated Agency accomplishments 

into intranet page, began a series of executive brown bag lunches, site visits, 

and quarterly all-hands meetings. 

• Continue encouraging senior leaders to host town hall meetings, site visits and 

other events designed to enhance face-to-face communication with employees. 

• Published FHCS and AES data and reports on internal and external Web sites. 

Secretary sent message concerning survey results to all employees with a link 

to survey reports. 

• Provided timely and accurate information to employees using a variety of channels. 

• Continue to highlight DHS success stories on external Web site and internal 

communication channels. 

• Continue to enhance the way in which information is presented on Web sites. 

• Prepared DHS 101 Program with a forum and online course to give DHS-wide 

perspective to all employees and allow for cross-Component leadership interaction. 

• Continue to distribute news releases, fact sheets, promotional materials etc., designed to promote knowledge and understanding of the Department’s priorities 

and initiatives. 

• Continue to implement and update work-life practices such as alternate work 

schedules, telework and Employee Assistance Programs (EAP). 

Continue Rollout of Performance Management Program 

• Continue rollout of the DHS Performance Management Program—includes employee engaged results-focused performance plans that align with organizational 

priorities and provide clear expectations and goals for supervisors and employees. The program is designed to be transparent in order to inspire employee 

trust and acceptance, as well as to increase employee understanding of the relationship between individual employee goals and formally established organizational priorities. Mandatory face-to-face performance reviews between employee 

and supervisor are an integral part of this program, with supervisory goals and 

competencies that are principled, people-centered, highly collaborative, and 

demonstrate stewardship of public resources. 

• Include the Secretary’s goals as corporate goals in all SES Performance Plans. 

• Conducted manager survey to assess status of employee performance plans. 

• Created new awards to focus on and reward excellence in cross-Component cooperation and relationships with external partners. Also modified another 

award to highlight innovations. 

Learning and Development 

• Continue the DHS Fellows Program. This Program gives outstanding GS–13s, 

14s and 15s the opportunity for enterprise-wide leadership training, including 

visits to crucial emergency planning sites and a 2-month rotational assignment 

within the Department. 

• Continue the Speakers Bureau Program to allow DHS employees to hear from 

senior leaders, as well as from experts in fields of interest to employees. 

• Continue deploying the DHScovery Learning Management System and conducting outreach events/activities to increase awareness of DHScovery’s benefits 

to organizational and individual performance. 

• Continue leadership development courses to help develop future leaders and 

teach critical leadership skills to entry and mid-level managers; courses designed to improve opportunities for employee skill development. 
63 

Recruitment/Staffing 

• Continue to monitor the progress of the initiatives designed to close skill and 

human resource gaps for mission critical occupations (e.g., Border Patrol 

Agents, Adjudication Officers and Deportation Officers etc.). • Continue the Career Paths Program to provide a bridge for employees from TSA 

Transportation Security Officer positions into higher graded jobs with Customs 

and Border Protection. • Established the DHS Diversity Council and DHS Diversity Strategy. Continue 

to establish relationships with diversity-based professional organizations and 

continue to pursue and cultivate more relationships for the strategy’s purpose. • Conducted orientation for 110 DHS volunteers for the Black Executive Exchange Program (BEEP) speakers’ cadre ́, who are now participating in BEEP 

events at Historically Black Colleges and Universities. Participated in two 

events to date. 

• Continue to utilize dhs.gov. This Web site is targeted to Veterans as an outreach strategy. 

• Continue to pursue all appropriate efforts to enhance Diversity among the executive cadre ́. 

• Continue to hire qualified applicants through the Presidential Management Fellows (PMF) Program. 

• Continue to hire quality candidates through our Senior Executive Service (SES) 

Candidate Development Program (CDP), thus ensuring we fill our most senior 

level positions within the organization. 

• Established the National Security Internship—an intensive 9-week summer 

program that combines Arabic language, Homeland Security, Intelligence and 

Area Studies, and On-the-Job-Training experience at DHS or FBI Headquarters. This internship program will create a direct career path for the DHS 

with some of America’s best and brightest undergraduate and graduate college 

students who speak or are studying Arabic as well as Homeland Security, Intelligence and Area Studies in college. 

IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE) STAFFING LEVELS

Question 6. In your prepared statement (pp. 6–7), you wrote about doubling the 

number of Border Patrol Agents. While we see an increase of CBP personnel by over 

35 percent in the last few years, Immigrations & Customs Enforcement (ICE), the 

investigative component, has seen a 0 percent increase over that same time. What 

plans does the Department have to ensure investigations are a priority? 

Answer. The Department has requested increases in funding for Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement that support the administration’s Secure Border Initiative 

(SBI), controlling the border and executing a comprehensive interior enforcement 

strategy. In the fiscal year 2009 request, the President requested $5.7 billion for 

ICE. The 2009 request includes resources for 87 Office of Investigations Special 

Agents and 44 positions for the Visa Security Program and the Office of Professional 

Responsibility, as well as increases for detention beds and State and local law enforcement coordination. 

As a result of increased funding over the past several fiscal years, ICE has 

achieved many successes. In fiscal year 2007, for example, ICE’s investigative accomplishments include: 

• Enhanced Immigration Enforcement: Initiated 1,093 worksite enforcement investigative cases, which resulted in 863 criminal arrests (compared to 716 in 

fiscal year 2006) and 4,077 administrative arrests. 

• Increased Compliance Enforcement: ICE implemented a high-intensity compliance enforcement operation to detect, deter, and disrupt terrorist operatives 

who sought to exploit the nonimmigrant process in order to remain illegally in 

the United States. The operation resulted in 249 completed investigations and 

73 arrests. 

• Increased Arms and Strategic Technology Investigations: ICE increased its 

arms and strategic technology investigations, resulting in 186 arrests (compared 

to 144 in fiscal year 2006), 178 indictments, and 115 convictions. 

• Increased Human Smuggling Investigations: ICE initiated 2,528 human smuggling investigative cases which resulted in 1,821 criminal arrests, 1,150 indictments, 1,209 convictions, and seized $16,400,283 in related monetary instruments. 

• Apprehended Sexual Predators of Children: ICE achieved a total of 10,434 

criminal and administrative arrests through Operation Predator. 

• Increased Commercial Fraud and Intellectual Property Rights Investigations: 

ICE initiated 1,275 Commercial Fraud and Intellectual Property Rights inves-
64 

tigative cases, which resulted in 246 criminal arrests, 178 indictments, and 196 

convictions. • Targeted Transnational Gangs: ICE arrested a total of 3,302 gang members and 

associates nationwide. • Furthered Nationwide Document-Fraud Prevention Efforts: ICE initiated 1,309 

fraud investigations, leading to a record 1,531 arrests and 1,178 convictions. • Strengthened Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs): Task Forces 

collectively made 516 criminal arrests, 1,037 administrative arrests, seized over 

49,552 pounds of marijuana, 1,326 pounds of cocaine, 151 pounds of methamphetamine, 135 pounds of heroin, 237 weapons, 12 explosives, and approximately $2.5 million in U.S. currency. 

• Initiated Significant Financial Investigations: ICE initiated 3,069 financial investigations, resulting in 1,394 arrests and 897 convictions. 

• Increased Number of Trade Units: To combat trade-based money laundering, 

ICE now has Trade Transparency Units (TTUs) in place in Colombia, Paraguay, 

Argentina, and Brazil. In fiscal year 2007, ICE TTUs initiated 95 trade-based 

money laundering investigations and generated 36 investigative referrals. 

• Enforcement against Visa Violators: ICE investigators worked to ensure compliance with the Nation’s immigration laws among student and exchange visitors 

and other nonimmigrant visitors to the United States. ICE arrested 1,558 highrisk, non-immigrant status violators. 

• Visa Security Program: ICE expanded overseas deployment to nine visa security 

posts in eight countries and trained more than 40 Special Agents to serve as 

visa security officers. ICE investigations through this program resulted in the 

denial of more than 750 visas and the initiation of more than 140 investigations. 

CONSOLIDATION OF THE DHS HEADQUARTERS AT THE ST. ELIZABETHS CAMPUS

Question 7a. The President’s fiscal year 2009 budget proposal includes $120 million in the DHS account and $346.6 million in the General Services Administration 

(GSA) account for the consolidation of the Coast Guard Headquarters, DHS Headquarters and the executive functions of DHS’ operating components to the St. Elizabeths West Campus. 

Although the President requested funding for fiscal year 2008, unfortunately the 

funding for this important project was stripped from the Omnibus appropriations 

bill in the waning days of the First Session of Congress late last year. 

What was the impact of not receiving fiscal year 2008 appropriations for this 

project? 

Answer. The lack of appropriations has delayed the overall St. Elizabeths development schedule, specifically delaying the Coast Guard Headquarters (Phase 1) completion until fiscal year 2013; Phase 2 until fiscal year 2014; and Phase 3 until fiscal 

year 2016 or later depending on future appropriations. 

Question 7b. Could you please provide an update on where this project now stands 

and how the funds requested in the President’s fiscal year 2009 budget will be used? 

Answer. GSA’s development plan for the St. Elizabeths West Campus is a 3-Phase 

effort. The Department’s planned occupancy and phasing schedule is detailed in the 

DHS National Capital Region Housing Master Plan submitted to the Congress in 

October 2006 and is summarized as follows: 

Phase Component 

1 (a & b) ............ USCG Headquarters. 

2 ........................ DHS HQ, FEMA, National Operations Center. 

3 ........................ ICE, TSA, CBP USSS (Liaison), CIS (Liaison). 

Note ................... A certain amount of infrastructure, shared serves and campus 

support facilities will be constructed with each phase. 

GSA is currently in the process of completing the Final Master Plan, Environmental Impact Statement/Record of Decision and Section 106 consultations under 

the National Historic Preservation Act for the development of St. Elizabeths West 

Campus. GSA and DHS continue to work closely with the NCPC and other regional 

planning agencies/consulting parties on this project and are confident we will reach 

an equitable solution on the Master Plan that meets the Department’s minimum requirement of 4.5 million GSF of office space plus parking while preserving the National Historic Landmark designation and satisfying preservation obligations. GSA 

has also awarded a design contract for the construction of the new USCG Headquarters that has progressed to the design concept stage. GSA is confident in their 
65 

* The image has been retained in committee files. 

ability to bring these processes to a successful conclusion in ample time to meet a 

third quarter fiscal year 2009 contract award for construction. 

Listed below is a detailed breakdown of the DHS fiscal year 2009 Budget Request 

for the St. Elizabeths development. In sum, funds requested for fiscal year 2009 will 

be used to pay for tenant specific expense for the design, construction and infrastructure of Phase (1–a) of the new USCG Headquarters facility at St. Elizabeths 

West Campus (new construction) and are separate from costs attributable to the 

General Services Administration (GSA). Also included in the budget request are 

GSA Fees and DHS Project Team staffing expenses to coordinate the Headquarters 

Consolidation requirements across all the components. Last, the request includes 

funding for Chief Security Officer (CSO) Site Survey activities to monitor contract 

personnel, building materials and equipment to prevent, detect and respond to potential counterintelligence activities during construction. 

The fiscal year 2009 request does not include campus shared services such as 

child care, cafeteria, etc., which will be located in adaptive reuse of historic buildings (Phase 1–b) and will be requested in a future budget year. Phases 2 (DHS HQ, 

FEMA, National Operations Center) and 3 (TSA, CBP, ICE) will also follow in future budget years. 

Question 7c. Do you have an estimate for the total cost for this project and 

timeline for completion? 

Answer. The chart below depicts the current 3-phase development schedule and 

the estimated GSA and DHS costs subject to appropriations.* 

Question 7d. Can you discuss in detail the effect consolidation of DHS facilities 

will have on future costs? 

Answer. The Department’s plan seeks to consolidate the critical mission execution 

functions of leadership, operations coordination, program management and policy at 

the St. Elizabeths Campus in not less than 4.5 million gross square feet of office 

space plus necessary parking and infrastructure. GSA determined through The 

Automated Prospectus System (TAPS) analysis that the consolidation at St. Elizabeths would result in a $743 million present value savings over a 30-year period 

as compared to individually replacing leases without consolidation. This analysis 

was based on receipt of fiscal year 2008 appropriations and will be revised by GSA 

to account for the lack of fiscal year 2008 funding. 

In addition to the direct real estate savings, DHS will be able to achieve further 

savings/cost avoidances at the consolidated headquarters campus through reduction 

of administrative overhead, elimination of redundancies and sharing of common 

campus services. 

The remaining mission support functions will be consolidated down to a manageable number of 6 to 8 locations taking into account unique mission requirements 

and has the opportunity to achieve approximately $420 million present value savings/cost avoidances over a 30-year period through collocation of similar functions, 

elimination of redundancies/increasing shared services and right sizing the real estate portfolio. 

Question 7e. What other benefits will accrue from consolidating facilities at St. 

Elizabeths? 

Answer. DHS’ mission demands an integrated approach to protect our homeland. 

Yet, the Department’s legacy facilities are dispersed in more than 40 locations and 

over 7 million Gross Square Feet (GSQF) of office space throughout the NCR. This 

extreme dispersion of components across the NCR impose significant inefficiencies 

in operations, problems that are magnified considerably at the most important moments—when the Department must act as a nimble and integrated team responding 

to significant natural disasters or terrorist threats. The lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina clearly demonstrated that DHS needs to operate with increased integration in the preparation for and response to threats or natural disasters. A single 

unified headquarters bringing together component leadership, operations coordination, policy and program management is a fundamental management tool necessary 

to support DHS operations and is critical to the Department’s long-term ability to 

effectively perform our mission. 

Consolidating our facilities will increase efficiency, enhance communication, and 

foster a ‘‘one-DHS’’ culture that will optimize Department-wide prevention and response capability. Some of our facilities are not well-suited for mission requirements, and as the Department grows this will just exacerbate the situation. This 

seriously impacts our ability to recruit and retain people, when they have more appealing options in the Federal Government and clearly has a negative impact on 

morale for which we are often criticized. 
66 

* The document has been retained in committee files. 

Question 8. In congressional testimony on February 13, 2008 before the Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, the former Comptroller General of 

the United States, David Walker, indicated that ‘‘more work remains’’ in implementing a performance-based human capital management system (p. 10). 

Could you please describe what incentive programs (competitive salaries, performance-oriented pay system, graduate education reimbursement, etc.) have been instituted to attract and retain top tier talent at the Department? 

Since the departure of Chief Human Capital Officer Marta Perez in January 2008, 

can you update me on the implementation of the Department’s 2009 Human Capital 

Operational Plan? 

Answer. In 2004, the Department put in place a directive providing for additional 

compensation to address employee recruitment and retention incentives. It includes 

provisions for paying recruitment incentives, relocation incentives, and retention incentives and using the superior qualifications and special needs pay-setting authority as well as the repayment of student loans for recruitment and retention. 

During 2007, the Department paid 108 recruitment incentives, totaling $1,274,012; 21 relocation incentives, totaling $406,482; 656 retention incentives, totaling $580,432; and 71 student loan repayments, totaling $554,711. 

The comparable numbers for 2006 were 21 Recruitment Incentives, totaling $279,458; 12 Relocation Incentives, totaling $149,601; 1098 Retention Incentives, totaling $3,350,241; and 17 Student Loan Repayments totaling $161,425. 

There are also two draft directives in the coordination process—a referral bonus policy and a tuition assistance policy. The former would pay employees up to $1,000 

for referring individuals subsequently selected for hard-to-fill positions. The Tuition 

Assistance (TA) policy for employee supplemental Training, Education, and Professional Development allows employees, with their supervisor’s approval, to pursue 

and/or advance their formal academic education. If studies relate to current duties, 

resolve an identified staffing problem and/or are part of a planned, systemic and coordinated agency employee development plan, employees and supervisors will coordinate requests for tuition assistance funds for no more than three college courses 

(9 credit hrs) per semester using their respective organizational program funds. To 

comport with merit systems principles any request that places an employee in a fulltime student status will require a competitive selection process that affords other 

eligible employees equal access and/or opportunity to compete for the program offering. 

In addition, the Department implemented the title 38 pay authorities, under delegation agreement with OPM, to allow recruitment and retention of medical officers 

(physicians) with extensive prior experience. None of the available options; the General Schedule, Senior Executive Service, or the Senior Level or Scientific or Professional pay systems provided sufficient flexibility or salary range to accommodate the 

pay received by the candidates desired for critical medical officer positions in the 

Department. As implemented, the title 38 pay setting authority provides increased 

pay-setting flexibility, allowing the Department to attract candidates with the desired qualifications and experience. 

Since Marta Perez’s departure in January 2008, the Office of the Chief Human 

Capital Officer (OCHCO) continues to track and document goals outlined in the fiscal year 2007–2008 Human Capital Operational Plan. The attached scorecard documents progress toward all goals through fiscal year 2008 second quarter.* A webbased scorecard is available for all DHS employees to access. The website includes 

links to documentation that supports goal completion. 

The OCHCO is initiating human capital planning activities to include development of the fiscal year 2009–2010 human capital operations plan (HCOP). 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER MIKE ROGERS OF ALABAMA FOR CLARK KENT

ERVIN, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRAM, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE

IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE) STAFFING LEVELS

Question 1. Deputy Under Secretary Duke, in your prepared statement (pp. 6–7), 

you wrote about doubling the number of Border Patrol Agents. While we see an increase of CBP personnel by over 35% in the last few years, Immigrations & Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), the investigative component, has seen a 0% increase over that 

same time. What plans does the Department have to ensure investigations are a priority? 

Mr. Ervin, based on your former role at DHS, what are your views regarding the 

staffing levels at ICE? 
67 

Answer. I did not examine staffing levels at ICE during my time as DHS’ Inspector General, as best I can recall. I can say that it was my sense then, and it remains 

my sense now, that ICE, like DHS as a whole, is under-staffed for the myriad functions it is called upon to perform. I regret that I cannot be more helpful. Thank you, 

again, for your query, and I hope to have the pleasure of testifying before you and 

your colleagues in the future. 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER MIKE ROGERS OF ALABAMA FOR JAMES JAY

CARAFANO, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW IN DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY, 

THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

BORDER SECURITY

Question 1. One of the most important issues facing the security of our Nation 

is the immediate need to secure our land borders. 

Dr. Carafano, you have studied this problem extensively. Could you please give 

us your analysis of the problem and your recommendations on how to secure the 

border quickly and cost effectively? 

Answer. The biggest problem at the border is the growing crime, mainly due to 

drug smuggling. Cartels are fighting over control of smuggling corridors, and the violence spreads to border communities in both Mexico and the United States. However, border patrol agents cannot focus on combating drug cartels because they easily hide within the 500,000 people who cross the border illegally each year. 

In order to realistically secure our borders, we must reduce the flow of illegal immigrants. This can be done by providing legal avenues that meet U.S. labor demands, are streamlined, and easy to use. In addition, there must be consistent internal enforcement to deter illegal migration. 

Working with Mexico is a crucial aspect of achieving this goal. The crime occurring at the border hurts them as much as it does us, and collaborating with one 

another benefits us both. 

Increasing the number of border patrol agents, and continue to lengthen the fence 

to deal with the current problem is not cost effective, nor can it be done quickly. 

The government would take several years to properly train the mandated increase 

of CBP agents, and the fence has been an ongoing endeavor for more than a decade. 

Instead, DHS should rely on other outside resources for a quick and temporary 

surge at the border. Contractors, volunteers, and State defense forces could all be 

used in a cost-effective manner at the border. However, once the mass majority of 

migration crossing is done legally, such robust security will not be necessary. 

Æ