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41–795 PDF 2008

NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS REFORM ACT 

OF 2007 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 

CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON

H.R. 3189 

APRIL 15, 2008 

Serial No. 110–96 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

PERRY APELBAUM, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

JERROLD NADLER, New York, Chairman 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

DAVID LACHMANN, Chief of Staff 

PAUL B. TAYLOR, Minority Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

APRIL 15, 2008 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil 

Rights, and Civil Liberties .................................................................................. 1 

The Honorable Trent Franks, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil 

Rights, and Civil Liberties .................................................................................. 3 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. 

Department of Justice 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9 

Ms. Valerie E. Caproni, General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 14 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 16 

Mr. Jameel Jaffer, Director, American Civil Liberties Union’s National Security Project 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 30 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 32 

Mr. Bruce Fein, Chairman of the American Freedon Agenda, former Assistant 

Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 44 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 45 

Mr. Michael J. Woods, former Chief, FBI National Security Law Unit 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 47 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 49 

Mr. David Kris, former Associate Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department 

of Justice 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 91 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 92 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

H.R. 3189, the ‘‘National Security Letters Reform Act of 2007’’ .......................... 132 

(1) 

NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS REFORM ACT 

OF 2007 

TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 2008 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION,

CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:12 p.m., in Room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Jerrold Nadler (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Conyers, Nadler, Wasserman Schultz, 

Ellison, Scott, Watt, and Franks. 

Staff present: David Lachmann, Subcommittee Chief of Staff; 

Robert Reed, Majority Counsel; Carole Angel, Majority Legislative 

Assistant; Caroline Mays, Majority Professional Staff Member; 

Paul B. Taylor, Minority Counsel; and Jennifer Burba, Minority 

Staff Assistant. 

Mr. NADLER. This hearing of the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties will come to order. 

Welcome, everyone. 

Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess, 

which the Chair will do when they call votes on the floor. 

The Chair will recognize himself now for 5 minutes for an opening statement. 

Today’s hearing focuses on the law governing National Security 

Letters, the widespread abuses of the authority given to the FBI 

to issue NSLs is documented in two reports by the Department of 

Justice’s Inspector General, and proposed legislation to address 

these threats to the liberty and privacy of law-abiding Americans. 

A National Security Letter can be issued to a third party, such 

as a health insurance company or an Internet service provider, ordering it to reveal all the information in its possession about you 

and your communications, your transactions or the books you read. 

The third party is prohibited from telling you or anyone else, aside 

from the attorney or those processing the information, about the 

order. 

So, you cannot object to the NSL in court, as you could to a subpoena, because you do not know about it. And the third party may 

have no interest in going to court to protect your rights. 

In fact, we invited many of these third parties here today to testify, but they were gagged from disclosing that they had received 

2 

NSL requests and were chilled from engaging in this important debate, which directly impacts both them and the general public. 

When we debated the reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act a few 

years ago, Congress and the public was not yet aware of the extent 

of the abuses brought about by the FBI’s overuse of NSLs outside 

the bounds of their proper authority. 

Indeed, even the changes made to the NSL provisions by the 

2005 PATRIOT Act Reauthorization Act were, for all practical purposes, meaningless. For example, the court is authorized by the 

2005 amendment to modify or set aside the gag order, if it finds 

there is no reason to believe that disclosure would endanger national security, diplomatic relations or anyone’s life or safety. 

But the court must accept the government’s assertion of such 

harm as conclusive and cannot use its own judgment as to whether, 

in fact, such harm would result. Since the government’s assertion 

is conclusive, there is no room for the court at all, and the provision is meaningless. 

In addition, the burden remains on the recipient of the NSL to 

challenge the order. This would seem to violate the first amendment’s heavy burden of proof against prior restraints of publication. 

When these provisions were first debated, some of us had predicted that the unrestricted authority of the FBI to issue NSLs 

would be abused. Unfortunately, these fears have been realized. 

The I.G.’s audit (INAUDIBLE) the NSLs have been used by the 

FBI to collect and retain private information about American citizens who are not reasonably suspected of being involved in terrorism. 

That is why I have introduced, along with a number of others, 

the bipartisan National Security Letters Reform Act of 2007. This 

legislation will protect Americans against unnecessary and unsupported intrusions into their private lives and, more importantly, 

should prevent abuse of power by the government. We need to fix 

the law to bring it in line with the Constitution, to enhance checks 

and balances, and in doing so, to better protect our national security. 

Already, courts have found parts of the NSL authority to be too 

broad and unconstitutional. The provisions that state the NSL recipients are forbidden from disclosing the demand to the targeted 

individual or to almost anyone else but their attorney, has already 

been struck down as a prior restraint, repugnant to the first 

amendment. Another Federal court found the NSL authority to be 

unconstitutional, because it violates the fourth amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 

The bipartisan bill that I am the lead co-sponsor of would lawfully authorize intelligence agencies to use NSLs with proper safeguards. 

Specifically, it: 

Would restore the standard that the records sought pertain to a 

suspected terrorist or spy; 

Would give an NSL recipient the right to challenge the letter and 

its non-disclosure requirement—a real right to challenge, not one 

in which the government’s assertion is dispositive—to place a time 

3 

limit on the gag order and allow for court-approved extensions of 

that time limit; 

Would provide a course of action to any person aggrieved by the 

illegal provision of records pertaining to that person as the result 

of an NSL issued contrary to law, or of an NSL issued, based on 

the certification made without factual foundation; 

Would give notice to the target of an NSL if the government 

seeks to use the records obtained from the NSL in a subsequent 

proceeding; 

Would give the target an opportunity to receive legal counsel and 

challenge the use of those records in such a subsequent proceeding; 

Would provide for minimization procedures to ensure that information obtained pursuant to an NSL regarding persons that are no 

longer of interest in an authorized investigation is destroyed; and 

Would address the voluntary disclosure of customer communications or records that had been obtained through so-called ‘‘exigent’’ 

letters. 

I do not think it is too much to ask the FBI to follow the Constitution and the rule of law while it goes about its job of protecting 

us. The abuses of power by the DOJ and the FBI show that legislative fixes are needed to check the over-broad and unchecked investigatory power. 

By requiring that NSLs be issued only if the FBI has made a factual, individualized showing that the directive sought to obtain to 

a suspected terrorist or spy, we will help keep our law enforcement 

focused on real threats. 

The time for this over-broad power to be curtailed is now, and 

I am hopeful that we will be successful. The abuses by the DOJ 

and the FBI have proven that these legislative fixes are a necessary check on the investigatory power. 

Just today, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF, disclosed 

that documents obtained by the EFF through a Freedom of Information Act request showed a misuse of the FBI’s National Security 

Letter authority, issued at the direction of FBI headquarters went 

unreported to the Intelligence Oversight Board for almost 3 years. 

Self-policing has proven time and again to be both undemocratic 

and ineffective. It is not enough to mandate that the FBI fix internal management problems and record keeping, because the statute 

itself authorizes the unchecked collection of information of innocent 

Americans. Congress should act now to fix the underlying statutes 

authorizing this unconstitutional and unchecked authority, which 

has led to the abuses revealed in the I.G. report, and to hold those 

responsible for these violations accountable. 

We must have intelligence gathering. We need our safety. But we 

must do our intelligence gathering under constitutional and legal 

checks to protect our privacy and our liberties, as well as our safety. 

I want to welcome our witnesses. I look forward to their testimony. 

I yield back the balance of my time, and I now recognize the distinguished Ranking minority Member of the Committee, the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, for 5 minutes for an opening 

statement. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

4 

Mr. Chairman, the bill that we address today at this hearing, 

H.R. 3189, would, in my sincere judgment, render National Security Letters as ineffective as they were prior to 9/11, and would further squelch the initiation of vital terrorism investigations. By 

changing the standards for such terrorism investigations, the bill 

would preclude many investigations that would otherwise be able 

to go forward, and would do so in a manner directly contrary to the 

findings of two recent Inspector General’s reports and the 9/11 

Commission, which counseled against returning to the investigative 

model that failed before the 9/11 attack. 

H.R. 3189 would also provide the subjects of terrorism investigations with more protections than they enjoy by even ordinary domestic American criminals under the clear Supreme Court precedents, such as the United States v. Miller, that hold that no fourth 

amendment protections apply to business records handed over to a 

third party. 

The FBI has testified as follows: ‘‘National security letters generally permit us to obtain the same sort of documents from third 

party businesses that prosecutors and agents obtain in a criminal 

investigation with grand jury subpoenas. National security letters 

have been instrumental in breaking up cells like the Lackawanna 

Six and the Northern Virginia Jihad, through the use of NSLs, the 

FBI has traced sources of terrorist funding, established telephone 

linkages that resulted in further investigations and arrests, and arrests of suspicious associates with deadly weapons and explosives. 

NSLs also allow the FBI to link terrorists together financially and 

pinpoint cells and operatives by following the money.’’ 

According to the Inspector General’s first report on NSLs, issued 

in March 2007, NSLs were not an effective means of preventing 

terrorist attacks before the 9/11 attacks, because ‘‘prior to the PATRIOT Act, agents could seek National Security Letters for telephone and electronic communication transactional records from 

telephone companies and Internet service providers, records from 

financial institutions and information from credit bureaus, only 

upon demonstrating ‘specific and articulable facts’ giving reason to 

believe that the subject was ‘an agent of a foreign power.’ FBI 

agents told us that this prediction standard limited the utility of 

NSLs as an investigative tool. FBI field and headquarters personnel who have worked with National Security Letters before and 

after the PATRIOT Act believe that their use and effectiveness has 

significantly increased after the PATRIOT Act was enacted.’’ 

FBI headquarters and field personnel told the Inspector General 

that they found National Security Letters to be indispensable for 

‘‘our bread and butter.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, H.R. 3189 would dramatically stem the flow of information throughout the investigative process by effectively precluding their availability before the very first steps can be taken 

down an investigatory trail. 

On the video screens right now, there is a diagram from the Inspector General’s report that shows all of us the investigative process that would be halted, were National Security Letters’ authorizations limited, from requests for FISA warrants to the general intelligence reports to be shared with other agencies. 

5 

The Inspector General report that information derived from National Security Letters ‘‘most often is used for intelligence purposes 

rather than for criminal investigation.’’ Yet H.R. 3189 would impose the failed model based on criminal prosecutions alone that 

failed to prevent the 9/11 attacks. 

As the 9/11 Commission itself concluded, ‘‘The law enforcement 

process is concerned with proving the guilt of persons apprehended 

and charged. It was not designed to ask if the events might be harbingers of worse things to come. Nor did it allow for aggregating 

and analyzing facts to see if they could provide clues to terrorist 

tactics more generally.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, the Inspector General’s report issued in March 

2008 concluded that, while some irregularities remained in the administration of National Security Letters, the FBI had made great 

progress in implementing procedures that will correct errors before 

they are made. So, oversight has been successful. 

And I just want to add, it is commonplace to hear critics of national security programs to quote Benjamin Franklin as saying, ‘‘If 

we surrender our liberties in the name of security, we shall have 

neither.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, those are not Mr. Franklin’s actual words. Accurately quoted, Mr. Franklin’s words are much more revealing. Ben 

Franklin wrote these words. He said, ‘‘Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.’’ 

H.R. 3189 would protect no essential liberties, and it would significantly weaken national security. And I am hoping, Mr. Chairman, that along with several other bills that have been before this 

Committee that seem to protect terrorists more than American citizens, that we can somehow get past this. 

And with that, I yield back. 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman yields back, and I thank the gentleman. 

Without objection, other Members’ opening statements will be included in the record. 

We have two distinguished panels of witnesses today. 

Our first witness is Glenn Fine, the Inspector General for the 

Department of Justice, since December 15, 2000. Mr. Fine has 

worked at the Department of Justice of the Inspector General 

since—or the Inspector General of the Department of Justice— 

since January 1995. Initially, he was special counsel to the I.G. In 

1996, he became the director of the Office of Inspector General, 

Special Investigations and Review Unit. 

Before joining the Office of Inspector General, Mr. Fine was an 

attorney specializing in labor and employment law at a law firm 

in Washington, D.C. Prior to that, from 1986 to 1989, Mr. Fine 

served as assistant U.S. attorney in the Washington, D.C., U.S. Attorney’s Office. 

He holds an A.B. from Harvard College, a B.A. and M.A. degrees 

from Oxford University—I think the first person I have seen with 

two B.A. degrees, an A.B. and a B.A.—and a law degree from Harvard Law School. 

Valerie Caproni has served as the general counsel for the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation since August of 2003. She holds a B.A. 

6 

from Newcomb College at Tulane University and a law degree from 

the University of Georgia. 

Ms. Caproni clerked for the Honorable Phyllis Kravitch, United 

States Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit; was an assistant U.S. attorney in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern 

District of New York; and a general counsel to the New York State 

Urban Development Corporation—a very challenging job. 

She served as Chief of Special Prosecutions and Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section before becoming Chief of 

the Criminal Division in 1994. As chief of the Criminal Division, 

she supervised approximately 100 assistant U.S. attorneys. 

Ms. Caproni remained chief of the Criminal Division until she 

departed in 1998, to become the regional director of the Pacific regional office of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 

I would note with some regret that we did not receive Ms. 

Caproni’s testimony prior to the hearing. We do try to show some 

flexibility to our witnesses in recognition of the fact that their assistance to the Committee is work—but the rule that we should get 

the testimony in advance exists for a reason. Members do read the 

testimony ahead of time to prepare for these hearings. It is especially important, because the witnesses make only a 5-minute 

statement summarizing their written testimony. 

This is not a new issue for the Bureau or for the Administration. 

The Bureau has commented on the I.G.’s findings and provided testimony in the past. I am at a loss to understand why the Bureau 

was unable to provide the testimony in advance. 

In view of the importance of the issue and the importance of Ms. 

Caproni’s testimony, I will allow her to proceed. But I must say 

that the Administration has too often refused to provide this Committee with answers to appropriate questions, documents necessary 

to our work, and in many instances refused to provide a legal basis 

for doing so. 

I do not take this conduct lightly. I hope that Ms. Caproni will 

take back to the Bureau and to the Administration the Committee’s 

frustration with the seeming inability or unwillingness to cooperate 

in our work. 

The rights of all Americans at stake in this matter are great, and 

I do not appreciate the investigation being treated in a cavalier 

manner. 

Without objection, the written statements of the witnesses will 

be made part of the record in their entirety. 

We would ask each of you to summarize your testimony in 5 minutes or less. To help you keep time, there is a timing light at your 

table. When 1 minute remains, the light will switch from green to 

yellow, and then to red when the 5 minutes are up. 

Before we begin, it is customary for the Committee to swear in 

its witnesses. 

If you could please stand and raise your right hand to take the 

oath. 

Do you swear or affirm under penalty of perjury that the testimony you are about to give is true and correct, to the best of your 

knowledge, information and belief? 

Thank you. 

7 

Let the record reflect that the witnesses answered in the affirmative, and you may be seated. 

I will now recognize Mr. Fine for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF GLENN A. FINE, INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE 

OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. FINE. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Franks and Members 

of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify about the 

Office of the Inspector General’s recent reports on the FBI’s use of 

National Security Letters and Section 215 orders. 

Over the last 2 years, the OIG has issued two sets of reports on 

these subjects. Our first two reports, issued in March 2007, found 

widespread and serious misuse of National Security Letters. Last 

month, as required by the PATRIOT Reauthorization Act, we completed two follow-up reports, which assessed the use of National 

Security Letters in 2006, the FBI’s response to our first report and 

the FBI’s use of Section 215 orders. 

First, however, I would like to thank the OIG staff who worked 

on these reports for their outstanding efforts. The three leaders of 

the team—Roslyn Mazer, Mara Lee, and Michael Gulledge—are 

with me here today, and I would like to thank them for their work. 

My written statement details the findings of our two recent reports. In my oral statement today, I will briefly highlight some of 

these findings. 

First, our recent report on National Security Letters, NSLs, concluded that the FBI and the department have made significant 

progress in implementing the recommendations contained in our 

first report and in adopting other corrective actions. We found that 

the FBI has devoted substantial time, energy and resources toward 

seeking to ensure that its field managers and agents understand 

the seriousness of the FBI’s shortcomings and their responsibility 

for correcting these deficiencies. 

Among the actions that the FBI has taken include: developing a 

new data system to facilitate issuance and tracking of NSLs and 

to improve the accuracy of required data in congressional and public reports; issuing numerous guidance memoranda and providing 

mandatory training to FBI employees on the proper use of NSLs; 

and prohibiting the use of exigent letters. 

The FBI also has created a new Office of Integrity and Compliance, modeled after private sector compliance programs. In addition, the department’s National Security Division is conducting reviews to examine whether the FBI is using various intelligence 

techniques, including NSLs, in accordance with applicable laws, 

guidelines and policies. 

Yet, while the FBI and the department have taken positive steps, 

we also concluded that additional work remains to be done. For example, a department working group was directed to examine how 

NSL-derived information is used and retained by the FBI. We concluded that the working group’s initial proposal did not adequately 

address measures to label or tag NSL-derived information or to 

minimize the retention and dissemination of such information. 

Our report also notes that the FBI still needs to address or fully 

implement several other key recommendations, such as reevaluVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:58 Aug 07, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\041508\41795.000 HJUD1 PsN: 41795
8 

ating the reporting structure for the chief division counsel in each 

FBI field office. 

As required by the PATRIOT Reauthorization Act, our recent report also reviewed the FBI’s use of NSLs in 2006, which, it is important to note, is a period before our first NSL report was issued 

in 2007. 

Our recent report found a continued upward trend in the use of 

NSLs, with 49,000 requests in 2006—a 4.7 percent increase from 

the previous year. The percentage of NSL requests that related to 

investigations of U.S. persons also continued to increase, to approximately 60 percent. 

We also examined the FBI’s own reviews of field case files, which 

found a rate of NSL violations, 9.4 percent, that was even higher 

than what we found, 7.5 percent. 

The number of possible intelligence violations identified by the 

field reviews was 640, which is a substantial number. Moreover, in 

2006, the number of violations reported by FBI field offices was significantly higher than the number of reported violations in prior 

years. 

Our recent review also found that 97 percent of the NSLs in 2006 

imposed non-disclosure and confidentiality requirements. 

It is also important to note that the most serious violations involving the use of NSL authorities in 2006 relate to the FBI’s use 

of so-called exigent letters, a practice by which the FBI improperly 

obtained telephone toll billing records from three communication 

service providers without first issuing NSLs. 

The OIG is in the process of completing a separate investigation 

examining the use of these exigent letters, as well as the use of 

‘‘blanket NSLs’’ and other improper requests for telephone records. 

Among other things, our upcoming report will assess the accountability of FBI personnel for these practices. 

As to our follow-up report on Section 215 orders, we found that 

FBI agents continued to encounter processing delays for obtaining 

these orders. The average processing time for such orders was 147 

days. 

We did not identify any illegal use of Section 215 orders in 2006. 

However, our report discusses one case in which the FISA Court 

twice refused to authorize a Section 215 order, because of concerns 

that the investigation was based on protected first amendment activity. However, we found that the FBI subsequently issued NSLs 

to obtain information about the subject based on the same factual 

predicate. 

In conclusion, we believe the FBI has evidenced a commitment 

to correcting the serious problems we found in our first report on 

National Security Letters and has made significant progress in addressing the need to improve compliance in the FBI’s use of NSLs. 

However, the FBI and the department’s corrective measures are 

not yet fully implemented, and we believe it is too early to determine whether these measures will fully eliminate the problems we 

found with the use of these authorities. 

That concludes my prepared statement, and I would be pleased 

to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fine follows:] 

9 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GLENN A. FINE

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Franks, and Subcommittee Members: 

Thank you for inviting me to testify about the Office of the Inspector General’s 

(OIG) recent reports on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) use of national 

security letters (NSL) and Section 215 orders to obtain business records. 

The Patriot Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Reauthorization Act) directed the OIG 

to review the FBI’s use of NSLs and Section 215 orders in two separate time periods. The OIG’s first reports, issued in March 2007, examined the FBI’s use of NSLs 

from 2003 through 2005, and its use of 215 orders from 2002 through 2005. 

As required by the Reauthorization Act, last month the OIG issued two followup reports that examined the use of these authorities in 2006. In addition, our follow-up report on national security letters examined the measures taken or proposed 

by the FBI and the Department of Justice (Department) to address the serious misuse of national security letters that our first NSL report detailed. 

In this written statement, I summarize the findings of the two reports that we 

issued last month. I first discuss the findings regarding the FBI’s and the Department’s corrective actions to address the serious deficiencies we described in last 

year’s NSL report. I then summarize the findings regarding the FBI’s use of NSLs 

in 2006. Finally, I summarize our report on the FBI’s use of Section 215 orders in 

2006. 

I. NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS

To conduct the follow-up review on the FBI’s use of NSLs that we issued last 

month, the OIG interviewed FBI personnel at Headquarters and in FBI field offices, 

and Department personnel in the National Security Division and the Office of the 

Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer. We analyzed more than 18,000 documents, 

including NSL-related guidance and training materials developed by the FBI since 

our first NSL report. OIG personnel also observed the FBI’s new data system designed to manage and track NSLs, and they visited three FBI field offices to assess 

the accuracy of the FBI’s review of NSLs issued by those offices. In particular, the 

OIG re-examined case files that had been reviewed by FBI inspectors and compared 

our findings to the FBI’s findings. We also analyzed data in the FBI’s NSL tracking 

database and examined the Department’s annual public reports and the Department’s semiannual classified reports to Congress to evaluate NSL requests in 2006 

and trends in NSL usage. The following sections summarize the findings in our follow-up report based on this work. 

A. Corrective Actions Implemented or Proposed Since our March 2007 NSL Report 

Our review concluded that the FBI and the Department have made significant 

progress in implementing the recommendations contained in our first NSL report 

and in adopting other corrective actions to address the serious problems we identified in the FBI’s use of NSLs. We also found that the FBI has devoted substantial 

time, energy, and resources toward ensuring that its field managers and agents understand the seriousness of the FBI’s shortcomings in its use of NSLs and their responsibility for correcting these deficiencies. 

Our interviews of senior FBI officials found that the FBI’s leadership is committed 

to correcting the serious deficiencies in the FBI’s use of NSLs identified in our first 

report. In addition, the FBI’s leadership has attempted to reinforce throughout the 

FBI the necessity for adhering to the rules governing the use of NSL authorities. 

We determined that the FBI has taken a variety of actions to address the deficiencies in its use and oversight of NSLs since issuance of our March 2007 report. 

The actions include: 

• Developing a new NSL data system to facilitate issuance and tracking of 

NSLs and improve the accuracy of data on NSL usage in required congressional and public reports; 

• Issuing numerous NSL policies and guidance memoranda and providing mandatory training to FBI employees on the proper use of NSLs; and 

• Prohibiting the use of exigent letters. 

The FBI has also created a new Office of Integrity and Compliance (OIC), modeled 

after private sector compliance programs, to seek to ensure that national security 

investigations and other FBI activities are conducted in a manner consistent with 

appropriate laws, guidelines, regulations, and policies. We believe this office can 

perform a valuable function by providing a process for identifying compliance requirements and risks, assessing existing FBI control mechanisms, and developing 

and implementing better controls to ensure proper use of NSLs. However, we recommend that the FBI consider providing the OIC with a larger permanent staffing 

10 

level so that the OIC can develop the skills, knowledge, and independence to lead 

or directly carry out the critical elements of this new compliance program. 

Our report also noted that the Department’s National Security Division has implemented additional measures to promote better compliance with NSL authorities 

and to address other issues raised by our first report. For example, in 2007 the National Security Division began reviews to examine whether the FBI is using various 

intelligence techniques—including NSLs—in accordance with applicable laws, guidelines, and policies. 

Yet, while the FBI and the Department have taken positive steps to address the 

issues that contributed to the serious misuse of NSL authorities we described in our 

March 2007 report, we concluded that additional work remains to be done. For example, in response to the recommendations in our 2007 NSL report, the Department’s Office of the Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer convened a working 

group to examine how NSL-derived information is used and retained by the FBI, 

with special emphasis on the protection of privacy interests. Our assessment of the 

working group’s initial proposal that was completed in August 2007 but subsequently withdrawn is that the proposal did not adequately address measures to 

label or tag NSL-derived information or to minimize the retention and dissemination of such information. In our recent report, we recommended that the working 

group consider further whether and how to provide additional privacy safeguards 

and measures for minimizing the retention of NSL-derived information. 

In addition, our report notes that the FBI still needs to address or fully implement several of the key recommendations in our March 2007 report. For example, 

we recommended that the FBI address our concern about the reporting chain of 

Chief Division Counsels (CDCs), the chief lawyers in each FBI field office. Based on 

our concerns that some CDCs were reluctant to provide an independent legal review 

of NSLs for fear of second-guessing or antagonizing the Special Agents in Charge 

to whom they report, our recommendation was designed to ensure that CDCs provide close and independent review of NSL requests. While we recognize that the reporting chain of CDCs is an issue that affects many aspects of the CDCs’ role and 

not just their approval of NSLs, we believe the FBI should address and resolve this 

important issue in a timely manner. 

Our report also analyzed three NSL reviews conducted by the FBI following release of our first NSL report in March 2007. One of the FBI reviews examined the 

use of NSLs in a random sample of 10 percent of counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and foreign computer intrusion cyber investigation case files active in FBI 

field offices between 2003 and 2006. The FBI’s 10 percent review confirmed the 

types of deficiencies and possible intelligence violations in the FBI’s use of NSLs 

that we identified in our first report. In fact, the FBI’s statistically valid sample of 

field case files found a rate of NSL violations (9.43 percent) higher than what we 

found (7.5 percent) in the non-statistical sample of NSLs we examined in our first 

report. 

Moreover, when we independently examined the FBI’s 10-percent field review in 

detail, we determined that it did not identify all NSL-related possible intelligence 

violations and therefore does not provide a fully reliable baseline from which to 

measure future FBI compliance with NSL authorities. In addition, because the FBI 

was unable to locate information provided in response to a significant number of 

NSLs chosen for review in its sample, the results of the FBI field review likely understated the rate of possible intelligence violations. 

The FBI’s reviews also confirmed two of the most significant findings in our first 

NSL report. First, the reviews confirmed that the FBI’s use of NSLs resulted in 

many intelligence violations. For example, the FBI’s 10 percent review of field office 

NSLs found at least 640 potential intelligence violations from 2003 through 2006. 

Extrapolating the results of the FBI’s 10 percent statistical sample to the full number of NSLs means that the total number of possible intelligence violations among 

all NSLs issued over the 4-year period could be as high as 6,400. 

Second, the FBI’s reviews confirmed that the FBI’s internal policies requiring reports to FBI Headquarters of possible NSL-related intelligence violations had not 

been effective. For example, less than 2 percent of the possible intelligence violations identified by FBI inspectors in the 2007 field review previously had been reported to FBI Headquarters as required. 

In short, our review of the FBI’s corrective actions concluded that the FBI and 

the Department have evidenced a commitment to correcting the serious problems 

we found in our first NSL report and have made significant progress in addressing 

the need to improve compliance in the FBI’s use of the NSLs. However, because only 

1 year has passed since our first NSL report in March 2007, and because some 

measures are not fully implemented or tested, we believe it is too early to definitively state whether the new systems and controls developed by the FBI and the 

11 

Department will eliminate fully the problems with NSLs that we identified. We believe the FBI must implement all of our recommendations in our first NSL report, 

demonstrate sustained commitment to the steps it has taken and committed to take 

to improve compliance, implement the additional recommendations described in our 

follow-up report, consider additional measures to enhance privacy protections for 

NSL-derived information, and remain vigilant in holding FBI personnel accountable 

for properly using and approving NSLs and for handling responsive records appropriately. 

B. Use of National Security Letters in 2006 

As required by the Patriot Reauthorization Act, we also reviewed the FBI’s use 

of NSLs in 2006. As discussed in our report, under five statutory provisions the FBI 

can use NSLs to obtain records such as toll billing records and subscriber information from communication service providers, transactional records from Internet service providers, bank records from financial institutions, and full or limited consumer 

credit information from credit reporting agencies. The Patriot Act broadened the 

FBI’s authority to use NSLs by lowering the threshold standard for issuing NSLs, 

allowing FBI field office Special Agents in Charge to sign NSLs, and permitting the 

FBI to use NSLs to obtain full credit reports in international terrorism investigations. 

First, it is important to note that the FBI’s use of NSLs in 2006 occurred before 

we issued our first NSL report in March 2007, which identified the serious deficiencies in the FBI’s use of and oversight of NSLs, and before the FBI began to implement its corrective actions. Therefore, not surprisingly, our follow-up report on 

the use of NSLs in 2006 contains findings similar to our March 2007 report regarding deficiencies in the FBI’s use of NSLs. 

Our review of the FBI’s use of NSLs in 2006 found a continued upward trend in 

the use of NSLs, with 49,425 NSL requests issued in 2006, a 4.7 percent increase 

from the previous year. For the 4-year period 2003–2006, the FBI issued more than 

192,000 NSL requests. 

FBI data showed that, on average, approximately one-third of all FBI 

counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber investigations that were open at 

any time during 2006 used NSLs. Our review also found that the percentage of NSL 

requests that related to investigations of U.S. persons (as opposed to non-U.S. persons) continued to increase, rising from about 39 percent of all NSL requests in 

2003 to approximately 60 percent of all NSL requests in 2006. 

Similar to findings in our first report on the effectiveness of NSLs, our follow-up 

report found that FBI personnel continued to believe that NSLs were indispensable 

tools in national security investigations in 2006. They reported that NSLs were used 

to identify the financial dealing of investigative subjects, confirm the identity of subjects, support the use of enhanced intelligence techniques, and establish predication 

for the initiation of preliminary and full counterterrorism and counterintelligence 

investigations. 

As required by the Reauthorization Act, our review also examined whether NSLs 

issued after the effective date of the Reauthorization Act contained the required cerVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:58 Aug 07, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\CONST\041508\41795.000 HJUD1 PsN: 41795

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tifications to impose non-disclosure and confidentially requirements on NSL recipients. In the random sample of NSLs we reviewed, we found that 97 percent of the 

NSLs imposed non-disclosure and confidentiality requirements, and almost all contained the required certifications. We found that a small percentage of the justifications for imposing this requirement were perfunctory and conclusory, and a small 

number of the NSL approval memoranda failed to comply with internal FBI policy. 

We also determined that 17 NSL approval memoranda (5 percent of the random 

sample) contained insufficient explanations to justify imposition of these obligations. 

We also identified eight NSLs in our sample that contained recitals about non-disclosure that were inconsistent with the corresponding approval memoranda, signifying that case agents, their supervisors, and Chief Division Counsels were not careful in reviewing and approving these documents to ensure consistency. In addition 

to these non-compliant NSLs that were part of the random sample, we identified 

eight ‘‘blanket’’ NSLs issued by senior Counterterrorism Division officials in 2006 

that did not contain the required certifications. 

With regard to intelligence violations arising from the use of NSLs in 2006, our 

report’s findings were consistent with the findings in our first report on NSL usage 

from 2003 through 2006 and with the results of the FBI’s 10 percent review of field 

office NSLs, which identified at least 640 potential intelligence violations over the 

4-year period. 

In addition, in our review we determined that FBI personnel self-reported 84 possible intelligence violations involving the use of NSLs in 2006 to FBI Headquarters. 

Of these 84 possible violations, the FBI concluded that 34 needed to be reported to 

the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) in 2006. The 34 matters reported 

to the IOB included errors such as issuing NSLs without proper authorization, improper requests, and unauthorized collection of telephone or Internet e-mail records. 

We found that 20 of these violations were attributable to mistakes made by the FBI, 

while 14 resulted initially from mistakes by recipients of NSLs. 

We found that of the 84 possible intelligence violations identified and reported to 

the FBI Office of the General Counsel in 2006, the FBI received information it was 

not entitled to receive in 14 matters. In one of the matters the FBI requested information it was not entitled to under the applicable NSL statute. In the other 13 matters, the FBI made proper requests but, due initially to third party errors, obtained 

information it was not entitled to receive under the pertinent NSL statutes. 

We noted that the number of possible NSL-related intelligence violations identified by FBI personnel in 2006 was significantly higher than the number of reported 

violations in prior years. From 2003 through 2005, the FBI had self-identified only 

26 possible intelligence violations, of which 19 were reported to the IOB. We believe 

that the increase in 2006 may be explained in large part by the attention that our 

first NSL review, which was ongoing in 2006, focused on these issues and also to 

increased training, guidance, and oversight by the FBI. 

Our follow-up report also noted that a large number of possible intelligence violations were initially attributable to mistakes made by NSL recipients. However, we 

believe the FBI may have compounded these errors by not recognizing the overproductions and using or uploading the inappropriately obtained information. The 

FBI Office of the General Counsel is in the process of determining whether the FBI 

will report these matters to the IOB. 

It is important to note that the most serious violations involving the use of NSL 

authorities in 2006 related to the FBI’s use of exigent letters. Our first NSL report 

generally described this practice by which the FBI improperly obtained telephone 

toll billing records from three communication service providers pursuant to more 

than 700 exigent letters without first issuing NSLs. We found that these exigent 

letters contained inaccurate statements, circumvented the requirements of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act NSL statute, and violated Attorney General 

Guidelines and internal FBI policy. The OIG is in the process of completing a separate investigation examining the use of exigent letters, as well as the use of ‘‘blanket NSLs’’ and other improper requests for telephone records. Among other things, 

our upcoming report will assess the accountability of FBI personnel for these practices. 

Our NSL report also contains 17 additional recommendations to help improve the 

FBI’s use and oversight of this important intelligence tool. These include recommendations that the FBI provide additional guidance and training for FBI agents 

on the proper use of NSLs and on the review, filing, and retention of NSL-derived 

information; reinforce the need for FBI agents and supervisors to determine whether there is adequate justification for imposing non-disclosure and confidentiality requirements on NSL recipients; regularly monitor the preparation and handling of 

NSLs; and provide timely reports of possible intelligence violations to FBI Headquarters. We also recommended that the Department’s working group consider furVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:58 Aug 07, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\CONST\041508\41795.000 HJUD1 PsN: 41795
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ther measures for minimizing the retention of NSL-derived information. In its response to our report, the FBI agreed with all of these recommendations and stated 

that it would implement additional actions to address our findings. 

II. SECTION 215 ORDERS

As also required by the Patriot Reauthorization Act, in a second follow-up report 

issued along with the NSL report the OIG examined the FBI’s use of Section 215 

orders to obtain business records in 2006. Section 215 of the Patriot Act allows the 

FBI to seek an order from the FISA Court to obtain ‘‘any tangible thing,’’ including 

books, records, and other items, from any business, organization, or entity, provided 

the item or items are for an authorized investigation to protect against international 

terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. Examples of the types of business 

records that can be obtained through Section 215 orders include driver’s license 

records, public accommodations records, apartment records, and credit card records. 

The OIG’s first Section 215 report in March 2007 examined the FBI’s use of this 

authority in calendars years 2002 through 2005. Our recent follow-up report examined the FBI’s use of Section 215 authorities in 2006 and, as required by the Patriot 

Reauthorization Act, also assessed the minimization procedures for business records 

that the Attorney General was required to adopt in 2006. 

Our follow-up review found that, similar to the findings in our first report, the 

FBI and the Department’s Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) processed 

FBI requests submitted to the FISA Court for two different kinds of applications 

for Section 215 orders in 2006: ‘‘pure’’ Section 215 applications and ‘‘combination’’ 

Section 215 applications. A ‘‘pure’’ Section 215 application is a term used to refer 

to a Section 215 application for any tangible item, and it is not associated with any 

other FISA authority. A ‘‘combination’’ Section 215 application is a term used to 

refer to a Section 215 request that is added to a FISA application for pen register/ 

trap and trace orders, which identify incoming and outgoing telephone numbers 

called on a particular line. 

In 2006, the FBI and OIPR processed 15 pure Section 215 applications and 32 

combination Section 215 applications that were formally submitted to the FISA 

Court. All 47 applications were approved by the FISA Court. Six additional Section 

215 applications were withdrawn by the FBI before they were formally submitted 

to the FISA Court. 

The OIG’s follow-up report found that FBI agents encountered similar processing 

delays for Section 215 applications as those identified in our previous report. Overall, the average processing time for Section 215 orders in 2006 was 147 days, which 

was similar to the processing time in 2005. However, the FBI and OIPR were able 

to expedite certain Section 215 requests in 2006, and when the FBI identified two 

emergency requests the FBI and OIPR processed both requests quickly. 

Our follow-up report did not identify any illegal use of Section 215 orders in 2006. 

However, we identified two instances in 2006 when the FBI received more information than it had requested in the Section 215 orders. In one of the cases, approximately 2 months passed before the FBI recognized it was receiving additional information that was beyond the scope of the FISA Court order. The FBI reported this 

incident to the IOB, and the additional information was sequestered with the FISA 

Court. 

In the other case, the FBI quickly determined that it had inadvertently received 

information not authorized by the Section 215 order and isolated the records. However, the FBI subsequently concluded that the matter was not reportable to the IOB 

and that the FBI should be able to use the material as if it were ‘‘voluntarily produced’’ because the information was not statutorily protected. We disagreed with the 

FBI’s conclusion, and our report recommended that the FBI develop procedures for 

identifying and handling information that is produced in response to, but outside 

the scope of, a Section 215 order. 

The Reauthorization Act also directed the OIG to identify any ‘‘noteworthy facts 

or circumstances’’ related to the use of Section 215 orders. Our report discussed another case in which the FISA Court twice refused to authorize a Section 215 order 

based on concerns that the investigation was based on protected First Amendment 

activity. The FBI subsequently issued NSLs to obtain information about the subject 

based on the same factual predicate and without a review to ensure the investigation did not violate the subject’s First Amendment rights. We questioned the appropriateness of the FBI’s actions because the NSL statute contains the same First 

Amendment caveat as the Section 215 statute. 

As noted throughout the report, the FBI determined that much of the information 

about this and other cases described in the Section 215 report was classified and 

therefore had to be redacted from the public report. However, the full classified reVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:58 Aug 07, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\CONST\041508\41795.000 HJUD1 PsN: 41795
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port contains the details about this case and other cases, and describes other uses 

of Section 215 authority. The full classified report has been provided to the Department and Congress. 

Finally, as directed by the Reauthorization Act, we examined the interim minimization procedures adopted by the Department in 2006 for Section 215 orders. 

Such procedures are intended to minimize the retention and prohibit the dissemination of non-publicly available information about U.S. persons. We concluded that the 

interim minimization procedures adopted in September 2006 do not provide specific 

guidance for minimization procedures that the Reauthorization Act appears to contemplate. Consequently, our report recommends that the Department develop specific minimization procedures relating to Section 215 orders. 

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, we believe that the FBI has devoted significant time, energy, and resources to ensuring that its employees understand the seriousness of the FBI’s 

shortcomings with respect to use of national security letters and the FBI’s responsibility for correcting these deficiencies. However, the FBI’s and the Department’s corrective measures are not yet fully implemented, and it is too early to determine 

whether these measures will eliminate the problems we found with use of these authorities. Ensuring full compliance with the proper use of these authorities will require continual attention, vigilance, and reinforcement by the FBI, the Department, 

the OIG, and the Congress. 

That concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

Ms. Caproni is recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF VALERIE E. CAPRONI, GENERAL COUNSEL, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Ms. CAPRONI. Good afternoon, Chairman Nadler, Ranking Member Franks and Members of the Committee. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify today concerning National 

Security Letters. 

First, let me apologize to Chairman Nadler for the late submission of my written statement. As you know, as a component of the 

department, my statement has to be cleared by OMB and the Department of Justice before submission, and that took longer than 

expected. But I will certainly take back to the department your 

concerns and your objections to the late submission. 

The Inspector General has now issued two reports regarding the 

FBI’s use of National Security Letters. Although those reports revealed a number of ways in which the FBI fell short of what is expected, today I would like to address three of his findings. 

First, the I.G. found no deliberate or intentional misuse of NSLs, 

although there were clearly failures of internal controls, as well as 

instances in which we had inadequate controls and training. The 

I.G. did not find any evidence of the FBI seeking records without 

a legitimate investigative purpose. 

With the exception of the exigent letter problem that I will come 

back to, the vast majority of errors involved third party errors, that 

is, the recipient of the NSL giving us more information than we 

asked for, or inattention to detail—shortcomings that are not to be 

excused, but which are far different from intentionally obtaining 

records that we are not entitled to. 

Second, the recent I.G. report provides numerous examples of 

cases in which NSLs were critical to investigations of individuals 

who wished to do the United States harm, either through terrorist 

15 

acts or counterintelligence activities. FBI personnel told the I.G. 

that NSLs are critical tools. 

Put in the current vernacular, NSLs are needed to connect the 

dots that the American people and Congress have told us, loudly 

and clearly, that they expect us to connect. 

Finally, the I.G. has acknowledged that the FBI has made substantial strides forward in correcting the lapses previously identified, and we appreciate him acknowledging that. We agree with 

him that it is too early to know for sure whether these actions will 

solve everything. But we fervently hope and believe that, with sustained efforts, the controls, policies, procedures and training that 

we have implemented should eliminate the sorts of errors identified 

by the Inspector General. 

Before I end, I would like to address briefly exigent letters, which 

was, in my view, the single most troubling discovery by the Inspector General. 

As your staffers have been briefed, we are in the process of cleaning up the exigent letter problem, including unraveling the socalled ‘‘blanket NSLs’’ that were mentioned in the I.G.’s recent report. We are looking at every telephone number that appears on a 

so-called blanket NSL or on an exigent letter that we are aware of. 

In some instances we have found that appropriate process has previously been issued. 

In other instances we have found that, although a number appears on an exigent letter or one of the blanket NSLs, we have no 

records at all regarding that telephone number. If we have records 

and no evidence that appropriate legal process has previously been 

issued for the records, we are evaluating whether the number is 

relevant to any investigation currently open. 

If so, a corrective National Security Letter or grand jury subpoena will be issued. But the phone company will be directed to 

give us no further records, since we already have the record. 

If there is no open investigation because of the passage of time 

between getting the records and now—and you will recall that the 

exigent letter problem has been going on for some period of time— 

at that point, we will evaluate whether, at the time we received the 

records, there was a true emergency that would have justified disclosure of those records without legal process under 18 U.S.C. 2702. 

If so, the emergency that existed at that time is documented, and 

the records are retained. 

One example of such a situation would be the emergency that existed, and the phone records that we retained, in the immediate 

wake of the disrupted plot to blow up jetliners as they flew over 

the Atlantic Ocean. 

If there is no currently open investigation, and there was no 

emergency at the time we received the records, the records are removed from our files and destroyed. This has been a laborious, 

time-consuming process. 

And I can assure this Committee that our efforts have been designed to ensure that the FBI does not retain any record that it 

should not have, while maintaining those records that could be a 

dot that needs to be connected, in order to keep the country safe. 

16 

In conclusion, the FBI believes that National Security Letters are 

important tools in our national security arsenal, and we are committed to using them effectively and legally. 

I am happy to answer any questions the Committee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Caproni follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VALERIE E. CAPRONI


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Mr. NADLER. I thank the witnesses, and we will now have a 

round of questioning for the witnesses. 

I will grant myself 5 minutes for questioning. 

I will start with Ms. Caproni. 

Ms. Caproni, you testified that the FBI has done a sufficient job 

of self-reporting and does not need any statutory remedies to address the abuses uncovered by the I.G.’s report. Just today, however, the Electronic Frontier Foundation disclosed that documents 

obtained by the EFF to a Freedom of Information Act request show 

that a misuse of the FBI’s National Security Letter authority— 

issued at the direction of FBI headquarters, not a field office—went 

unreported to the Intelligence Oversight Board for almost 2 years. 

Given that, and the numerous reports of abuse, how is Congress 

and the public supposed to trust that the department is capable of 

self-policing? Don’t we need to restore the trust in our intelligence 

community and checks on our process? And why didn’t anyone formally report this matter to the OIG until February of last year? 

Ms. CAPRONI. The incident that you are referring to that was reflected in documents that the EFF recently released was, first off, 

well before the reforms that we put into place subsequent to the 

I.G.’s March 2007 report. 

Mr. NADLER. Subsequent to what? I am sorry? 

Ms. CAPRONI. The events occurred prior to the actions that we 

have taken following the I.G.’s earlier report. That is, we have put 

into place a number of controls now, that I believe would have first 

resulted in that NSL not being issued. Or second, if it was issued, 

being reported much more promptly. 

In terms of why there was such a delay between the time that 

there was public knowledge of that NSL—and there was public 

knowledge, because it was reported in the press—and March of 

2007, is unclear to me. There was a direction made to report the 

incident. It did not get reported. When we discovered it had not 

been reported, it was directed to be reported, and it then was reported. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Now, both you and the Inspector General have expressed the 

lack of intentional misuse of the NSL authority, all due to improper—I should not say ‘‘improper’’—insufficient training, and so 

forth. But the ‘‘Washington Post’’ has reported that there was at 

least one IOB report of willful and intentional misconduct. 

Does the FBI consider the use of an NSL to seek records beyond 

the scope of this statute at the specific direction of FBI headquarters not deliberate or intentional? 

Ms. CAPRONI. Chairman Nadler, again, I am not quite sure why 

the direction was given to issue an NSL in that case. As I look at 

what I believe they were seeking from the university, an NSL was 

not the appropriate way to go. 

It was unclear to me whether this was simply a 

miscommunication. I find it hard to believe that the intent, since 

we were entitled to the records, and we obtained the records, pursuant to a grand jury subpoena, with the approval of a court. 

This was not an issue of we were seeking records that we were 

not entitled to. An NSL was the wrong tool to use. 

24 

So it is unclear to me why headquarters directed that an NSL 

be used. 

Again, I think my—what I am stressing is, there is no evidence 

of the Bureau using these NSLs to get documents—— 

Mr. NADLER. That they were not—— 

Ms. CAPRONI. They were simply irrelevant to our investigative 

mission. 

Mr. NADLER. Now, you stated that the majority of abuses were 

made by third parties, not by the FBI. 

Now, when a third party gives you too much improper information, what do you do with it? Can you look at it and issue another 

NSL to get that very information or more? And wouldn’t that be 

along the line of using evidence that is the fruit of the poisonous 

tree? 

Ms. CAPRONI. Let me address both issues. 

First let me say that we now have in place policies and procedures that require the case agents to review the returns to make 

sure there is no overproduction. They cannot know whether they 

have got an overproduction unless they actually look at what they 

received. 

If they have received information that is in excess of what the 

NSL has called for, they have to sequester the information. 

They can then make a decision. If what has happened is the provider has provided us 2 extra weeks of bank records—so those 

records are still relevant to the investigation, it would be unusual 

that they would not be relevant—they can issue a new NSL for 

that additional information. 

If it is totally irrelevant—that is, maybe they inadvertently provided us the wrong customer—that information is not relevant to 

the investigation, so it cannot be used in any way, nor can they 

issue another NSL for it. That will be sequestered, and eventually 

be returned to the provider or destroyed. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. 

Ms. CAPRONI. More generally, though, your question about fruit 

of the poisonous tree, I would like to address. 

Fruit of the poisonous tree is a constitutional doctrine that derives from a constitutional violation. It is important to stress that 

these are not constitutional violations. 

These are third party records held by third parties. There is no 

violation of the customer’s fourth amendment rights. When we obtain the records that may be in excess of—— 

Mr. NADLER. But wait a minute. If the third party violated, you 

could very well have a violation of the customer’s fourth amendment rights. 

Ms. CAPRONI. With all due respect, sir, that would not be correct 

under current Supreme Court precedents. 

Mr. NADLER. Because it is not the government doing it directly. 

Ms. CAPRONI. No. It is because the records—the customer, the 

customer’s privacy interests in the records is not constitutionally 

protected. Under existing Supreme Court precedent, once they 

share the information with a third party, the third party is free to 

disclose that information. 

25 

Mr. NADLER. And doesn’t that argue that, in order to protect 

those privacy records, there have got to be some checks on the 

third party? 

Ms. CAPRONI. There are checks on the third party. Congress has 

passed a number of different privacy statutes that provide statutory protection for the documents. 

Mr. NADLER. And given the fact that everything here is secret, 

how are those protections guaranteed or enforced? 

Ms. CAPRONI. The issue of the secrecy versus the protection are 

kind of two separate things. 

Mr. NADLER. Well, but they interact with each other. 

Ms. CAPRONI. The provider is still subject to a statutory requirement that they not release the records without appropriate process. 

That is their obligation. 

Whether they comply, or even if they violate the statute, there 

is not a constitutional violation. There is a statutory violation. 

Mr. NADLER. My time has expired, and I recognize the gentleman 

from Arizona for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Ms. Caproni, you have testified that National Security Letters 

generally permit us to obtain the same sort of documents from 

third party businesses and prosecutors that agents obtain in criminal investigations with grand jury subpoenas, essentially all the 

time. But these are, of course, domestic criminal investigations. 

NSLs have been instrumental in breaking up cells like the 

Lackawanna Six and the Northern Virginia Jihad. Through the use 

of NSLs, the FBI has traced sources of terrorist funding, established telephone linkages that resulted in further investigations 

and arrests, and allow the FBI to link terrorists together financially and pinpoint cells and operatives by following the money. 

In other words, it gives us some dots to connect. It is not just 

a line. We do not just get a few triangles. We get a picture that 

helps us solve or prevent some of these very serious potential acts 

of terrorism against Americans. 

Can you elaborate on what the loss of such a tool would be? And 

perhaps even answer first, are we somehow thwarting the constitutional rights of American citizens here? 

Ms. CAPRONI. Again, absolutely not. These are records that are 

being held by third parties. There is not a fourth amendment constitutional protection for those vis-a-vis the customer of the record. 

In terms of the importance of National Security Letters, they are 

critically important to our ability to do our job. By getting records 

with National Security Letters, things like phone records and bank 

records, those are the basic building blocks of any investigations. 

In a criminal investigation, they are critical. They are there, kind 

of grand jury subpoenas, or, depending on the type of case, with an 

administrative subpoena. 

In the national security context, when we are looking at terrorists, or intelligence officers for spies, where the risk to the country 

is much higher, we use National Security Letters to get the documents. 

But the same underlying need exists, which is to build enough 

information about the person, about the subject of our investigation, to know whether or not this is someone who intends to do us 

26 

harm, and therefore, we need to follow them, figure out who their 

compatriots are, so that we can disrupt and dismantle their organization, or whether in fact they intend no harm, in which case we 

close the investigation and move on. 

Without the ability to get these sorts of records, we will be 

stopped in our tracks before we ever begin. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, you know, many FBI personnel have told us 

that the NSLs are an essential and indispensable intelligence tool. 

And I guess, Ms. Caproni, I do not want to put words in your 

mouth. I mean, from my perspective, this seems that through the 

use of these NSLs, that we are doing everything that we can to get 

at terrorists, while at the same time doing everything we possibly 

can to observe the constitutional rights of anyone in America, 

whether they be citizen or otherwise, that the effort here is to truly 

protect American citizens and to defend ourselves in a preventative 

capacity from being attacked in this country. 

So, I will just ask a couple of basic questions, put it in your 

words. Do you think, once again, that we are thwarting the Constitution here, that somehow we are subjecting people on American 

soil to unconstitutional search and seizure, or somehow thwarting 

their civil rights? 

Ms. CAPRONI. Absolutely not. 

Mr. FRANKS. And yet you are saying to me that this is a vital 

tool in being able to help prevent—identify, prevent and defend 

this country against terrorism? 

Ms. CAPRONI. Absolutely. I do not believe that we could do the 

job that Congress and the American people expect us to do, in 

terms of keeping us safe from terrorism and from spies and those 

who would steal our secrets, without National Security Letters. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Ms. Caproni, I could probably elaborate, but 

I just wish that those basic points could be put forward. Because 

sometimes there is a lot of noise that goes around here and a lot 

of political grandstanding. But the reality is here that the desire 

of this country is to protect its citizens, to protect their constitutional rights. And unfortunately, terrorists have other ideas, and 

they have to be dealt with in ways that we really have little alternative. 

It is about an intelligence gain. If we knew where every terrorist 

was in the world today and what they were up to, the war on terror 

would be over in 2 months. But unfortunately, we do not. 

So, I just thank you for your service to the country and for doing 

everything you can to protect the citizens of this country. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Ms. Caproni, I am sure some of the letters are necessary. Are all 

of these NSLs necessary? 

Ms. CAPRONI. I am sorry. Are all of these—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Are all of them absolutely necessary for the protection of the national security? 

Ms. CAPRONI. Well, I believe they are. I do not think agents issue 

National Security Letters to get records that are not relevant to 

their investigations and needed, in order either to close out a lead, 

you know, to—for us to ascertain that the person does not pose a 

27 

risk to the country, or, in fact, to disclose that the person does pose 

a risk. 

Mr. SCOTT. Now, exactly where is the oversight in all of this? 

Ms. CAPRONI. The oversight comes in a number of different ways. 

First off, there are congressionally mandated juries. And the Inspector General’s reports obviously provided a great deal of oversight. 

Subsequent to the March 2007 report, we have mandated that 

there are—there must be legal review of any NSL before it is 

issued. I think that is one—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Say that again? 

Ms. CAPRONI. Subsequent to the March 2007 Inspector General’s 

report, as a matter of internal policy, the FBI has mandated that 

there must be legal review of any NSL before it is issued. 

Mr. SCOTT. And so, the check and balance is within the same 

agency that is doing the issuing of the NSL? 

See, some of us think check and balance means you check with 

another branch of government. And we have another concept of 

check and balance. You check with your co-workers. And if your coworker says what you are doing is okay, then it is okay. That is 

not what some of us thought really was a check and balance. 

Ms. CAPRONI. If I could just continue on the other controls. 

And might I also say that I think the lawyers in the Bureau, 

many of whom work directly for me, take their responsibility relative to reviewing National Security Letters very seriously. And if 

the material that is laid out in the document supporting the NSL 

does not support the issuance of an NSL, the lawyer will not sign 

off on it. 

Mr. SCOTT. And these are all people who are hired by the same 

attorney general. I mean, it is all within the same agency. 

Ms. CAPRONI. That is correct. 

Mr. SCOTT. So, when that person says, this is what I want, all 

of his employees are checking and balancing themselves. 

Ms. CAPRONI. Again, the director of the FBI has made it very 

clear that he wants to achieve the mission of the FBI, but to 

achieve it lawfully. So, the mission of the employees of the FBI is 

to achieve these goals consistent with the law. 

Mr. SCOTT. But what happens if they—what happens if he decides that he wants to do a little political shenanigan? What happens then? What are the checks and balances? 

Ms. CAPRONI. There is absolutely no evidence that this director 

of the FBI would ever engage in political shenanigans. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Well, you know, the attorney—— 

Ms. CAPRONI. If I could get to the third—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, let me just say this. As part of—when I listen 

to this, we are also listening and trying to get an answer out of the 

Department of Justice as to whether or not U.S. attorneys were 

fired because they did not indict Democrats in time affect the next 

election. And so, we have not had a credible response to that. 

So, sometimes we suspect that there may be some political shenanigans going on. And we are just asking where the checks and 

balances are. 

Ms. CAPRONI. Well again, I would say, Mr. Fine works for the 

Department of Justice, too. And it seems to me he has provided 

28 

very vigorous oversight. So I think, merely because your paycheck 

comes from the Department of Justice does not mean that you are 

not capable or desirous of obeying the law and providing the appropriate legal advice to your client. 

Mr. SCOTT. Under the—— 

Ms. CAPRONI. If I could just—I cannot answer for the Department of Justice in why they are not providing the documents. That 

is not within the scope of my responsibilities. 

But the third element of oversight that I think is important for 

this Committee to recognize is, again, subsequent to the March 

2007 report and subsequent to Congress establishing the National 

Security Division within the Department of Justice, the National 

Security Division has set up an oversight within the National Security Division. 

Those attorneys go out to field offices and do what are called national security reviews. They have access to everything in the file. 

They can go through it from soup to nuts. 

Mr. SCOTT. And this is the same agency, though. They are employed by the same agency. 

Ms. CAPRONI. Well, they are Department of Justice attorneys. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. 

What happened with this—what did the Supreme Court decide 

in—decided it was unconstitutional in September 6, 2007? 

Ms. CAPRONI. I am sorry. Say again? 

Mr. SCOTT. Excuse me. The district court in 2007, what did the 

court strike down, and what is the status of those—— 

Ms. CAPRONI. Is that the Southern District case? 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes. 

Ms. CAPRONI. I do not know the date—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Southern District of New York, yes. 

Ms. CAPRONI. That case is pending on appeal. I believe it has 

been fully briefed in the Second Circuit, but it might not quite be 

fully briefed. So I would anticipate argument in the next few 

months. 

That case did, as Chairman Nadler pointed out, hold that there 

was, even after the PATRIOT Act Reauthorization Act, which 

changed the rules on disclosure and nondisclosure of National Security Letters by the recipient, Judge Marrero found, nonetheless, 

that the new statute continues to be unconstitutional under the 

first amendment. That is what is pending on appeal, is whether, 

in fact, the structures that the Congress passed in the PATRIOT 

Reauthorization Act was constitutional under the first amendment. 

There is also an issue about whether the gag provisions of that 

bill are severable. That is, would Congress prefer there to be no national security statute, that there is not a requirement, or can we 

sever the requirement as being unconstitutional and keep the balance of the statute? 

Those are the two primary issues that are pending on appeal before the Second Circuit. 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

I believe the court, the lower court has decided it was not severable. Correct? 

Ms. CAPRONI. That is correct. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

29 

We thank the witnesses from the first panel. 

We ask that the members of the second panel come forward and 

take their seats. 

And while they are taking their seats, let me perform the introductions. 

Jameel Jaffer is the director of the American Civil Liberties 

Union’s National Security Project. The project litigates civil liberties and human rights cases related to detention, torture, surveillance, censorship and secrecy. Mr. Jaffer’s own litigation docket includes Doe v. Mukasey, a challenge to the FBI’s National Security 

Letter authority. 

Before joining the staff of the ACLU, Mr. Jaffer served as law 

clerk to the Honorable Amelia First, U.S. Court of Appeals to the 

Second Circuit, and then to the Right Honorable Beverly 

McLaughlin, Chief Justice of Canada. He is a graduate of Williams 

College, Cambridge University, and Harvard Law School. 

Bruce Fein needs no introduction, but I will introduce him anyway. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School. He joined the U.S. 

Department of Justice, where he served as assistant director of the 

Office of Legal Policy, legal adviser to the assistant attorney general for antitrust, and the associate deputy attorney general. 

Mr. Fein then was appointed general counsel of the Federal Communications Commission, followed by an appointment as research 

director for the Joint Congressional Committee on Covert Arms 

Sales to Iran. 

Mr. Fein is an adjunct scholar with the American Enterprise Institute, a resident scholar at the Heritage Foundation, a lecturer at 

the Brookings Institution and an adjutant professor at George 

Washington University. 

Michael J. Woods served as chief of the FBI’s National Security 

Law Unit from 1997 to 2002, as counsel to the National Counterintelligence Executive in 2002, and as a Department of Justice 

prosecutor from 1993 to 1997. 

During his time at the FBI, Mr. Woods and the lawyers under 

his supervision were responsible for providing legal advice to 

agents and analysts involved in counterintelligence and 

counterterrorism operations, and for the production and review of 

National Security Letters. Mr. Woods is a graduate of Harvard 

Law School and of Oxford University. 

David Kris is a graduate of Haverford College and Harvard Law 

School. He clerked for Judge Stephen Trott of the Ninth Circuit, 

joined the Department of Justice through its honors program. He 

worked as a prosecutor for 8 years from 1992 to 2000, conducting 

several trials and arguing appeals across the country. 

From 2000 to 2003, he was associate deputy attorney general. In 

that role, his unclassified responsibilities included supervising the 

government’s use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or 

FISA, which has been somewhat in the news lately, representing 

the Justice Department to the National Security Council and in 

other interagency settings, briefing and testifying before Congress 

and assisting the attorney general in conducting oversight of the 

U.S. intelligence community. He is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law Center. 

30 

Without objection, your written statements will be made part of 

the record in their entirety. We would ask each of you to summarize your testimony in 5 minutes or less. 

As a reminder, there is a timing light at your table. When 1 

minute remains, the light will switch from green to yellow, and 

then to red when the 5 minutes are up. 

Before we begin, it is customary for the Committee to swear in 

its witnesses. 

If you would please stand and raise your right hand to take the 

oath. 

Do you swear or affirm under penalty of perjury that the testimony you are about to give is true and correct to the best of your 

knowledge, information and belief? 

Thank you. 

Let the record reflect that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

You may be seated. 

We will now call upon the first witness for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Jaffer? 

TESTIMONY OF JAMEEL JAFFER, DIRECTOR, AMERICAN CIVIL 

LIBERTIES UNION’S NATIONAL SECURITY PROJECT 

Mr. JAFFER. Chairman Nadler, Ranking Member Franks, thank 

you for inviting me to testify today about National Security Letters 

and H.R. 3189, the National Security Letter Reform Act. 

The NSL statutes invest the FBI with sweeping power to collect 

information about innocent people, and they allow the agency to 

impose unconstitutional gag orders on NSL recipients. 

Mr. Nadler’s bill would introduce much needed safeguards for 

civil liberties, while preserving the executive’s ability to collect information about people who actually pose threats. 

I want to highlight two serious problems with the NSL statutes: 

their impact on wholly innocent people and their authorization of 

unconstitutional gag orders. 

The statutes permit the government to obtain records about people who are not known, or even suspected, to have done anything 

wrong. Because of changes made by the PATRIOT Act, the FBI can 

compile vast dossiers about innocent people—dossiers that could include financial information, credit information and even information that is protected by the first amendment. 

The Inspector General’s audits confirm that the FBI is collecting 

information about people two and three times removed from actual 

suspects. Roughly 50,000 NSLs are being issued every year—most 

seeking information about U.S. persons. 

The FBI stresses that NSLs are used only to collect transactional 

or non-content information. But NSLs reach information that is extremely sensitive. 

The FBI can compel an Internet service provider to disclose the 

identities of people who have visited a particular Web site, a list 

of e-mail addresses with which a particular person has corresponded, or even the identity of a person who has posted anonymous speech on a political Web site. 

Privacy concerns aside, Congress must ask whether it serves national security to create vast databases of information about innoVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:58 Aug 07, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\041508\41795.000 HJUD1 PsN: 41795
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cent people. Post-9/11 investigations found that over-collection can 

divert resources away from the most important investigations and 

bury the most important information. 

Mr. Nadler’s bill will protect the privacy of innocent people, while 

at the same time refocusing the government’s antiterrorism resources on actual terror. 

Mr. Nadler’s bill will also address a second problem with the 

NSL statutes. The problem is that each of the NSL statutes allows 

the government to impose gag orders on NSL recipients. These gag 

orders are not subject to prior judicial review; the FBI imposes 

them unilaterally. 

NSL recipients can challenge the gag orders in court, but the judicial review is toothless. It is the FBI that decides whether secrecy 

is necessary, and the courts are required to defer to the FBI’s decision. 

Now, obviously, secrecy is necessary in some national security investigations. But the FBI’s power to impose gag orders should be 

subject to meaningful judicial review. Without that review, the 

power is easily abused. 

The ACLU currently represents someone—I will call him John 

Doe—who was served with an NSL. Doe believes that the NSL was 

illegal, but a gag order bars him from explaining why he holds that 

opinion, or even from disclosing his own identity. For 4 years now, 

Mr. Doe has been prohibited from telling the public why he believes the FBI is abusing its power. And the FBI continues to enforce the gag order today, even though it abandoned its demand for 

records more than a year ago. 

The Chairman’s bill would prevent this sort of abuse. 

This past September, a Federal court struck down one of the 

NSL’s statutes in its entirety. The court held that gag orders must 

be subject to prompt judicial review, and the courts must be permitted to invalidate gag orders that are not narrowly tailored to a 

compelling government interest. As long as the NSL statutes foreclose a sign of judicial review, the statutes are unconstitutional, 

and the government risks losing the NSL authority altogether. 

Mr. Nadler’s bill will align the NSL statutes with the first 

amendment. Gag orders will not be barred under the bill when secrecy is truly necessary, but rather, they will be limited to those 

circumstances. Moreover, the bill will ensure that gag orders are no 

broader than absolutely necessary. 

Absent an actual need for secrecy, an Internet service provider 

should be able to tell the public if it receives an NSL that seeks 

information about thousands of people. And absent an actual need 

for secrecy, a library should be able to tell the public if it receives 

an NSL that seeks information about first amendment activities. 

Mr. Nadler’s bill would protect first amendment rights, while at 

the same time allowing for secrecy where legitimate national security concerns compel it. The ACLU commends Mr. Nadler for introducing the bill. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jaffer follows:] 

32 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMEL JAFFER


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Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

And I now recognize Mr. Fein for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF BRUCE FEIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE AMERICAN 

FREEDON AGENDA, FORMER ASSISTANT DEPUTY ATTORNEY 

GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. FEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. 

I would like to begin with some cardinal principles about the 

United States Constitution and the theory of government itself, 

that I think should inform the relative balance between law enforcement and privacy that is at issue in discussing National Security Letters. 

John Adams remarked that the fuel of the American Revolution 

was James Otis’ protest against King George III’s customs collectors invading every home in search of contraband or otherwise. It 

was a privacy issue that was the heart of the American Revolution. 

And the idea that was descendent was that the right to be left 

alone from government intrusions, as Justice Louis Brandeis explained, is the most cherished amongst civilized people—the right 

to be left alone. It did not mean the government could never intercede—there are obviously problems with many mischievous people 

in the community—but that the government had to make a very 

powerful case to show why that right to be left alone should be disturbed. 

Moreover, the Founding Fathers believed not that government 

should be weak, but that in exerting aggressive powers, there 

should be checks and balances. This is an idea that was explained 

by Justice Robert Jackson in United States v. Johnson. Now, Jackson spoke from some experience. He was the Nuremberg prosecutor. He had seen the Nazis first hand. 

And he explained that, what the police often fail to remember is 

not that the law is against detecting criminals, but that the decisions to make intrusions on privacy need to be checked and supervised by an outside party—there, a judge issuing a judicial warrant—drawing inferences based from a neutral perspective, rather 

than from the perspective, as Justice Jackson put it, the competitive enterprise of seeking to punish and capture criminals. 

That is the background in which we come to approach the National Security Letters. The right to be left alone is cherished. The 

burden is on the government to show why these rights should be 

invaded; and moreover, if so, why there should not be customary 

checks and balances. 

Let me outline what are the ways in which traditionally we try 

to check aggressiveness or needless intrusion on the right to privacy. 

First, with a grand jury, those are citizens who decide whether 

to issue a subpoena for records that are the type that are sought 

in National Security Letters. And the grand jury is overseen by a 

judge, an Article III judge. 

Moreover, as pointed out, typically the subpoena is subject to disclosure in the sunshine. We know, as Louis Brandeis said, sunshine is the best disinfectant. So, that publicity is an additional deterrent to wrongdoing or misuse. 

45 

Now, the National Security Letters fall outside that customary 

framework that balances privacy against law enforcement. There is 

no outside party that reviews the issuance of National Security 

Letters. It is the FBI deciding on its own. Moreover, with the nondisclosure rule, you do not have the sunshine that can act as a deterrent, as well. 

Now, it has been observed correctly, I think, by Congressman 

Franks in the previous exchanges, that certainly, National Security 

Letters, if you look, have they produced useful information? Certainly, they have. 

But the decisive issue, I think, for the Committee is, why 

couldn’t that information have been obtained through a customary 

grand jury proceeding or gathering intelligence under FISA, where 

typically you have a judge decide whether or not there is sufficient 

reason to intrude upon that cherished right to be left alone? 

And I do not think the FBI has been able to explain what it is 

that they got with National Security Letters that they could not 

possibly have gotten, had they used the regular way that the 

Founding Fathers thought was sufficient. 

I think that, when you ask about internal reviews, let us remember FISA. That was a warrantless national security program which 

had internal reviews every 45 days. And mirabile dictu, every 45 

days it was approved. 

These kinds of internal checks do not work. I worked in the Department of Justice. You do not need to have an explicit order in 

the bureaucracy to know which way it will come out. And we have 

seen that in some respects, I think, between the lines, if you read 

John Yoo’s unclassified document relating to what was torture and 

what was not, whether the President had supreme commander-inchief authority to flout any law this body enacted in the name of 

national security. 

And that is what the Founding Fathers understood. If men were 

angels, we would not need separation of powers. But they relied 

upon checks and balances. As President Reagan put it, ‘‘Trust, but 

verify.’’ 

And I think that is the spirit of Congressman Nadler’s bill, and 

I highly support it and commend it. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fein follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRUCE FEIN

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I welcome the opportunity to share my views on H.R. 3189, the National Security 

Letters Reform Act of 2007. I support the bill. It strikes a balance between privacy 

and law enforcement vastly superior to existing law in honoring the charter principles of the American Revolution and the Constitution. 

The Declaration of Independence sets forth the purpose of the United States government: to secure the unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness enjoyed by ever y American citizen. The signature creed of the United States 

has been that individual freedom is the rule. Government intrusions are the exception that can be justified only by clear and substantial community interests. Justice 

Louis D. Brandeis lectured in Olmstead v. United States (1928) that the right to be 

left alone is the most cherished freedom among civilized people. Privacy is not only 

a good in itself; it also nurtures a sense of assertiveness, robust independence, and 

even rebelliousness which are the lifeblood of democracy. The greatest danger to 

freedom is an inert or docile people fearful that the government has access to every 

detail of their private lives. 

46 

In the typical federal criminal investigation, a grand jury composed of ordinary 

citizens, supervised by an independent and neutral federal judge, issues subpoenas 

for records relevant to determining whether an indictment should be voted. The 

prosecutor cannot act as a surrogate for the collective view of the grand jury because 

of the temptation to overreach in a quest for fame, vindictiveness or otherwise. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson captured the idea in Johnson v. United States 

(1948) in addressing the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 

searches and seizures and the customary requirement of a judicial warrant based 

on probable cause: ‘‘Its protection consists in requiring inferences [of crime] be 

drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 

engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’’ 

The recipient of a grand jury demand may move to quash the subpoena as unconstitutional or otherwise in violation of law. The target may also publicize the subpoena to expose possible abuse or overreaching or the need for remedial legislation. 

Sunshine is frequently the best disinfectant. 

Of course, there are exceptions to every rule. The Constitution is not a suicide 

pact. It seems worth noting, however, that the United States Supreme Court has 

refused to carve out a Fourth Amendment exception for murder investigations despite the alarming annual number of murders. (The FBI estimated the murder toll 

in 2006 at more than 17,000, or approximately six times 9/11 fatalities). National 

security letters (NSLs), which deviate sharply from customary law enforcement 

methods, might be justified in principle if there were a substantial showing that espionage or international terrorism crimes were eluding detection because available 

investigatory tools were insufficiently muscular; and, that NSLs would provide the 

necessary muscle to thwart national security crimes. (The Patriot Act’s elimination 

of the wall between intelligence collection and law enforcement makes NSL requests 

indistinguishable from grand jury subpoenas for documents), NSLs should are presumptively disfavored because they may be issued by the government without any 

citizen or judicial supervision and lack the transparency that is a cornerstone deterrent to abuses. 

I do not believe either benchmark for NSLs has ever been satisfied to overcome 

the presumption. Before their enshrinement in the Patriot Act, Congress was not 

presented with a roster of international terrorist incidents that probably would have 

been foiled if NSLs had been available. The 9/11 Commission did not find that the 

terrorist abominations might have been forestalled with NSLs. After years of intensive use, this Committee has not been presented with a list of espionage or international terrorism crimes that were prevented or solved because of NSLs and could 

not have been prevented or solved otherwise. NSLs are the twin of the quest to 

emasculate the individual warrant protection of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act with general warrants rubber stamped after the fact by a FISA judge. 

H.R. 3189 should be supported because it diminishes (although it does not eliminate) the gratuitous encroachments on citizen privacy under the existing laws governing NSLs. There is not a crumb of hard evidence that enactment of the bill 

would cause a single act of planned espionage or international terrorism to go undetected. 

The bill would confine NSLs to investigations where there are specific and 

articulable facts indicating the target is a foreign agent or foreign power. The 

former standard was simple relevancy to an espionage or international terrorism investigation. The bill also saddles NSLs with the same standards of reasonableness 

as would obtain if a grand jury subpoena had been issued in conjunction with an 

espionage or international terrorism investigation. It also places reasonable limits 

on the secrecy of NSLs. The democratic values advanced by transparency cannot be 

overstated. Secret government wars with self-government and deterring misconduct. 

The Constitution does not permit secret detentions and trials of suspected international terrorists even if public knowledge might clue Al Qaeda where its network 

might be vulnerable. Of course, a disclosure of an NSL to assist obstruction or evasion of justice is itself a crime. 

The bill would require minimization procedures to diminish the volume of private 

information unrelated to foreign intelligence or crime in government files. The 

standards for retention, however, are inescapably nebulous, and will easily blunt the 

purpose of minimization as they have regarding FISA. Deterrence of government 

wrongdoing is buttressed by creating a criminal justice suppression remedy for violations and a civil cause of action for the target. Regarding the latter, I would bring 

the suit within the universe of civil rights claims subject to the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Award Act of 1988. The recipients of NSLs have little or no incentive 

to challenge their legality because compliance with an administrative subpoena ordinarily shields the recipient from liability to the target. See e.g., 18 U.S.C. 2703(e). 

47 

Freedom requires a certain level of risk that tyrannies might find unacceptable. 

The risk of international terrorism in China may be less than in the United States, 

but who among us would prefer the former to the latter? We should never forget 

that the revolutionary idea of America was that government exists to secure the 

unalienable individual rights of every citizen period, with no commas, semi-colons 

or question marks. There can be no doubt that NSLs have been fueled by post-9/ 

11 fears. But we should be steeled against capitulation by James Madison’s admonition: ‘‘If Tyranny and Oppression come to this land, it will be in the guise of fighting 

a foreign enemy.’’ 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

I recognize Mr. Woods for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL J. WOODS, FORMER CHIEF, 

FBI NATIONAL SECURITY LAW UNIT 

Mr. WOODS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Franks and Members of the Committee. 

I am very pleased to have been invited to this hearing this afternoon to assist you. 

My interest in this area is really twofold. 

First, I was, as chief of national security law in the FBI prior to 

the PATRIOT Act and shortly thereafter, supervising the lawyers, 

who at that time prepared National Security Letters. I have calculated roughly that 75 to 80 percent of them were prepared within 

10 or 15 feet of my office where I sat. So, I am happy to give the 

Committee the benefit of that experience. 

I was also part of the discussion and part of the process, at least 

in the FBI, of making proposals at the time for the PATRIOT Act. 

And so, I can explain, if the Committee is interested, the background and the change in legal standard. 

But I am also fascinated from an academic perspective since, 

with the idea of transactional information. We all generate enormous amounts of this. And technology and the changes in our society are increasing the amount of that information. And although it 

does not contain the content of private communication, it is revealing a steadily more detailed picture of what we do every day. 

That information—unlike our content, unlike things that we 

have a more direct privacy interest in—resides in the hands of 

third parties in quantities, formats and conditions of which most of 

us remain unaware. The constant expansion in the capacity of storage systems and in the power of search engine technology makes 

this transactional information more permanent—and more easily 

accessible—than ever before. 

So, the question is: Under what circumstances do we want the 

government in its intelligence gathering function to have access to 

that information? How should they use it? How should they store 

it? 

How can their use of it be challenged? How can their acquisition 

of it be challenged? And I am hoping that I can contribute something to the Committee’s discussion of that today. 

It is an enormous challenge. On the one hand, the explosion of 

transactional information has opened a new front in the fight 

against terrorism and foreign intelligence services. Our very sophisticated adversaries have long since learned to conceal their direct communications from us, but now may be detected in their digital footprint. 

48 

After 9/11, transactional information was key to reconstructing 

the terrorists’ operations, and it is probably one of our best hopes, 

one of our most effective means of detecting another imminent attack. 

Yet, this information, as I say, is revealing more than just the 

transaction, just the outside nature. Its quantity and quality are 

raising the amount that it tells us about a subject. 

And so, I believe that the tool that the FBI has to acquire that 

information, though it must be flexible and it must be efficient, and 

it must, as it does now, allow the acquisition of information relevant to an investigation, it needs to be controlled. It needs to have 

effective minimization rules, effective retention rules. 

And beyond the sort of legal effectiveness or legal elegance of 

them, they have to be rules that inspire confidence in the American 

public, confidence that this authority is under control, confidence 

that it is being used correctly. 

My hope is to contribute to that discussion today with the Committee, and I am very happy to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Woods follows:] 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. WOODS


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Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize Mr. Kris for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID KRIS, FORMER ASSOCIATE DEPUTY 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. KRIS. Chairman Nadler and Ranking Member Franks, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify 

today. 

I support new legislation in this area, and I believe that H.R. 

3189 is an excellent vehicle for further discussion leading to reform. And I have submitted a few comments on the bill to your 

staff. 

But I must say that I would go further. I believe that Congress 

should enact a single statute providing for national security subpoenas to replace all of the current NSL provisions. 

And the principal reason for this recommendation is that it 

would streamline and simplify current law, which is both intricate 

and idiosyncratic, to the detriment of both our liberty and our security. 

A single statute would also allow a well considered and global 

resolution of the difficult policy questions that necessarily attend 

the enactment of any national security subpoena or related power. 

Now, I believe any new statute should satisfy 10 essential elements that are discussed in my written submission. But let me just 

outline three of the most important, many of which are in H.R. 

3189 in one form or another. 

First, I think national security subpoenas, like grand jury subpoenas, should be issued by DOJ lawyers. 

Second, the subpoenas should be limited to acquiring certain 

specified types of foreign intelligence or other protective information. 

And third and finally—and this is critically important in my 

view—use of the subpoenas should be governed by rigorous minimization procedures concerning acquisition, retention and dissemination of information. The absence of such procedures in current 

law, I think, is a very notable omission. H.R. 3189 would deal with 

this problem, as well, and I think it is vitally important. 

So, again, I appreciate the invitation to testify, and I look forward to answering any questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kris follows:] 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID KRIS


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Mr. NADLER. Thank you very much. 

We will now have a round of questions, and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes to begin the questioning. 

Let me ask first. We have heard that we should not go back, as 

the bill that I have introduced would do, to a specific and 

articulable fact indicating that somebody is an agent of a foreign 

power, because that would cut off investigations at the outset. I believe someone has testified—maybe Mr. Woods testified to that effect. 

Mr. Fein, why is it safe to do that? 

Mr. FEIN. Well, first of all, it does not cut off the investigation 

at the outset. You can have a grand jury, which has a broader 

mandate, because there are checks. 

And specific and articulable facts are the customary way in 

which we conduct stop and frisk. Those situations where, short of 

probable cause, it is thought that an immediate danger to safety 

required something less than probable cause. 

And there has been no showing that the stop and frisk standard, 

the reasonable and particularized suspicion standard, in that context has proved insufficient to protect the national security. There 

is no reason to think that the same standard applied, when you are 

trying to gather information that is important to the safety of the 

American people, that it should be any less effective. 

Now, it is certainly to be—it is self-evident that, say, if you have 

no restraints on gathering information, then you can gather more 

information, and it is less likely anything will slip through the 

cracks. 

Mr. NADLER. But we do not need a broad fishing expedition. 

Thank you. 

Mr. Woods, would you comment on that? 

Mr. WOODS. Yes. I think the example of a stop and frisk illustrates the difference. Stop and frisk is a physical environment. I 

see someone walking down the street. I am a police officer, and I 

decide to stop that person. I have a target, who is a known individual. 

In the case of National Security Letters, and particularly in the 

intelligence gathering case, that is not the dominant situation. The 

dominant situation is, we have unknown subjects. We have generalized threat information that we need to pin down. 

And when this standard was selected for National Security Letters, it very much reflected the sort of traditional, spy-catching 

counterintelligence that was going on at the time. 

And I think, my own experience was that that did not serve as 

appropriate as we moved into more counterterrorism operations toward—through the end of the 1990’s. And that that is what justified the change—— 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Kris, would you comment on that? 

Mr. KRIS. Well, I guess two things. 

First, the grand jury standard, which has been referred to by 

analogy here, is actually quite broad. And a grand jury is entitled 

to investigate on something far less than reasonable suspicion or 

a specific and articulable fact. It can investigate on any kind of susVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:58 Aug 07, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00114 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\041508\41795.000 HJUD1 PsN: 41795
111 

picion that the law is being broken, or even just to assure itself 

that the law is not being broken. 

Second, my own view is somewhere in between these two positions. I do not necessarily support the reversion to the pre-PATRIOT Act standard. 

But I think it would be useful to focus the information sought by 

the subpoena on the definition of foreign intelligence information in 

FISA, which essentially is information that is either relevant or 

necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against 

these various specified foreign threats. 

Mr. NADLER. Is that so general that you could not apply it to a 

specific case, what you just said? 

Mr. KRIS. No, I think you could—I mean, you could apply that 

standard to a specific case. But the value of it, I think, is that it 

would keep the agents focused on the ultimate goal, which is to 

keep us safe, unmediated by the sort of more nebulous contours of 

their investigation, which may expand in one direction or another. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Fein, courts have ruled that the fourth amendment does not 

protect records held by third parties. 

Do you agree with this? And what is the interest in protecting 

these records, if the fourth aendment does not demand a warrant? 

Mr. FEIN. Well, the fourth amendment protects reasonable expectations of privacy. And whether you agree with the Smith case and 

some of the others, that suggest people do not have any expectation 

of privacy in the phone numbers they dial or in bank records, can 

disagree. But that is the standard they have used. 

They can reverse themselves, based upon the fact that this kind 

of information more and more is able to be utilized to develop a 

footprint, if you will, a signature of someone, that was not a danger 

years ago before you had the Internet. 

Mr. NADLER. So, would you say, in other words, that with, as Mr. 

Woods put it, more and more transactional information being made 

available, simply by the way we live our lives these days, that in 

fact, people, without thinking about it, do expect privacy, where 

perhaps the court—— 

Mr. FEIN. Perhaps they would, yes. 

Mr. NADLER [continuing]. Didn’t think about it before? 

Mr. FEIN. And it is also quite clear, Mr. Chairman, that the Congress is not prohibited by the Constitution from providing greater 

privacy. And soon after some of these decisions on bank records, 

Congress did enact the Right of Financial Privacy Act that went beyond the particular fourth amendment. And I think that is the 

spirit of the United States Constitution. 

The right to be left alone is the rule. The government has to 

make a strong showing for an exception. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Without objection, I am going to ask one more question to Mr. 

Jaffer. 

Can you elaborate on why it is particularly important that the 

gag provision be tailored? Why doesn’t the first amendment—the 

bill tailors the gag provision. It does not eliminate it, but it tailors 

it in various ways. 

112 

And why doesn’t the first amendment allow the government to 

gag an NSL recipient without any court review? Which, in effect, 

is what you have now, because the court review—any court review 

where the court has to take whatever the government says as dispositive, is not a real review, obviously, because it leaves no discretion of the court. 

So, why doesn’t the first amendment allow the government to 

gag an NSL recipient without any court review, when it is a matter 

of national security? 

Mr. JAFFER. Well, a couple of things. Let me speak to it from my 

own experience representing entities or individuals that were 

served with National Security Letters. 

In some cases, the entities that are served with National Security Letters have information about government abuse. They would 

like to disclose that information to the public. They would like to 

disclose it to Congress. 

We represent one client that wanted to disclose information to 

Congress during the PATRIOT Act reauthorization debate, and was 

not permitted to do that. 

So, the gag orders have a very serious effect, not just on the first 

amendment rights of NSL recipients, but on the public access to information about the government’s use of these surveillance authorities. 

But just as a matter of protecting against abuse, it is very important that there be this kind of public oversight. 

And if I could just underscore a distinction that was made by one 

of the other panelists, between the grand jury subpoena context 

and the National Security Letter context, the recipients of grand 

jury subpoenas are ordinarily not foreclosed from disclosing to 

other people that they received a subpoena. And the fact that they 

can disclose that information serves as a kind of check against 

abuse. And that check is missing in the National Security Letter 

context. 

So, it would not make sense just to take the standards that apply 

in the grand jury context and export them wholesale to the National Security Letter context. The contexts are quite different, because there is no check. Exactly. 

Mr. FEIN. If I could just add a footnote, Mr. Chairman. You may 

recall in the Pentagon Papers case, the government unilaterally 

said you cannot—the courts have to suppress any disclosure of the 

Pentagon Papers, because there would be national security danger. 

And the Supreme Court said no. They were published, and the sky 

did not fall. 

Mr. NADLER. Well, that is very true. Thank you. 

With the indulgence of the Committee, I must note that, at a 

hearing of this Subcommittee, I think a week or two ago, on the 

state secrets issue, we had a witness here who testified that, in 

the—who was the brother of the plaintiff in a Supreme Court case 

50 years ago, 55 years ago, that established the state secrets doctrine—that the accident report which the courts upheld as a state 

secret, because they revealed state secrets, she found in the incident a couple of years ago, and declassified, and there were no 

state secrets in it. 

113 

In fact, it was just self-serving on the part of the Administration 

55 years ago to use that excuse. So, we know that that happens. 

Thank you very much. 

I will now recognize the gentleman from Arizona for a very flexible five minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Woods wrote in his testimony that a clear 

goal of counterintelligence is to identify spies and international terrorists. 

If an investigator has specific and articulable facts that a target 

is an international terrorist, then essentially, they have already 

achieved that goal. And I think that was extremely insightful. 

One of the things we have to separate here, in my judgment, in 

Mr. Fein’s case, he has pointed out some things that I respect very 

deeply, that we need to leave our citizens alone. And I believe that. 

But we also have a responsibility to leave them alive. 

And we want to make sure that we separate those things that 

are directly having to do with their privacy, and these things that 

are just kind of—that are not fourth amendment-protected things— 

the information that would give us the ability to identify whether 

someone is a potential terrorist that then we can take to the court 

in the first place. 

Without some of this information, we would not be able to go to 

a judge, because we do not have enough information even to suggest that there is any issue. The police officer cannot go to the 

judge before he takes a blindfold off to look at the neighborhood. 

We have to kind of try to get a little bit commonsense and reasonable here, in my opinion. 

Mr. Woods, in your written testimony, you criticize the idea of returning to the pre-9/11 standard of specific and articulable facts. 

You write that the FBI counterterrorism operations will suffer if 

the FBI cannot expeditiously obtain relevant information in these 

settings, and that you think that the need for the harmonization 

of criminal and national security legal standards for the acquisition 

of transactional information remains as vital now as it was at the 

time of the PATRIOT Act. 

Can you elaborate on that a little bit? You are very articulate, 

and talk to us about that. 

Mr. WOODS. The reasoning behind that is reflected in your question, which is—and I tried to lay out in my testimony, and I have 

laid out in truly mind-numbing, fully annotated detail in my law 

review article attached to it—how these authorities developed. And 

they—the specific and articulable fact standard, as I said, worked 

very well in the traditional counterintelligence environment when 

we often worked from known individuals, intelligence officers that 

we had under surveillance, that we were sort of moving outward 

from. 

It, however, began to run into difficulty in the counterterrorism 

environment, when you are working sort of the other direction, 

from INCOINT threat information, from threats that point you toward perhaps a large number of people that you need to sort 

through and focus very quickly on the people who are going to be 

relevant to the investigation. 

114 

And the problem is, when you address that sort of situation 

under specific and articulable facts, you did not have specific and 

articulable facts with reference to all of the people in that group. 

The information was relevant, but you were short of that standard, 

just as you would be short of the probable cause standard in FISA. 

And so, this is the reason why the FBI came to Congress asking 

for the standard to be made relevant, in my view, the principal reason. 

The second reason was simply the—as has been pointed out in 

other parts of the testimony—to make these authorities roughly 

equivalent to the criminal authorities, recognizing, though, that we 

have to do something. 

And I agree with everyone that has been testifying. We have to 

do something about the secrecy provisions. We have to do something about retention and dissemination. But the general intent 

was to make these authorities roughly equivalent to criminal authorities, and make them appropriate to the threat. 

And I do not think that rolling back to the old standard addresses—neither does it address the problems that were brought up in 

the I.G. reports, nor does it leave us well positioned to address the 

threat in the environment that we are encountering. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, I will try to squeeze one more quick 

question here. 

Mr. Woods, in your written testimony, you also expressed deep 

concerns with the provision in H.R. 3189 that would prevent the 

use of National Security Letter information for intelligence purposes. You wrote that the sections of the bill that address the dissemination of NSL enforcement to law enforcement—information to 

law enforcement—would be a thoroughly unwarranted revival of 

the wall separating intelligence and law enforcement that operated 

to such a crippling effect prior to 9/11. And this is not justified by 

the significant—interests at stake here. 

And I think that is obviously, again, an articulate point of view. 

And I wonder if you could elaborate on that. 

Mr. WOODS. I will try to do so briefly. 

The wall situation was a very complicated one. Mr. Kris and I 

and others could talk about it for hours. 

But the difficulty I have with that provision of 3189, I think it 

mirrors provisions in the FISA statute, which are there for a little 

bit different reason. But when we did have that requirement, when 

we had to track FISA-derived information that might get into law 

enforcement channels, we very quickly got ourselves into a very 

complex situation that had very negative effects on 

counterterrorism operations prior to 9/11. And this is all documented in the 9/11 Commission Report. 

I think proposing to take the same approach now in National Security Letters, which are 10 times, 20 times the number of FISAs, 

is essentially asking for trouble. And we are going down a road 

that was proven to have difficulty. And it is inconsistent with our 

counterterrorism strategy at the moment. 

If we obtain useful information through a National Security Letter, we should be sharing it with law enforcement, with homeland 

security. The idea that we would hold back intelligence reports, trying to figure out if there was National Security Letter information 

115 

in it, that we would slow down the sharing of information among 

Homeland Security and other protective services, State and local 

law enforcement, is not going to help us. 

And so, I think that provision needs to be looked at. And in fact, 

I would advocate taking it out and having—sort of defaulting to the 

dissemination guidelines in the attorney general’s guidelines. That 

would make it far easier to disseminate to those entities. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

I now yield 5 minutes for questioning to the distinguished Chairman of the full Committee, the gentleman from Michigan. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Nadler. Welcome, all witnesses. 

Let us see if during my in-and-out during this hearing, Jaffer for 

the Nadler—and recently added Member to the bill, Conyers—proposal. Fein, for the proposal. Woods, partially for it. Kris, somewhat for it. Is that unfair characterization? Or am I giving you too 

much support for it than you deserve? 

Mr. WOODS. I think the part of it that I do not support may well 

be very significant to the legislation’s author. So, perhaps I am a 

little bit more in the—— 

Mr. CONYERS. I am over-complimentary this afternoon. 

Mr. WOODS. But I certainly support the idea of legislation. 

Mr. CONYERS. How can we get it fixed so that you could go along 

with Nadler, Conyers and the Chairman of the Crime Subcommittee? I mean, what would we have to do to make it, that you 

would say, okay? Tell me. 

Mr. WOODS. I am primarily concerned with the standards. My 

experience with the specific and articulable fact standard showed 

that, to me, to be a very frustrating, clumsy standard, which was 

outmoded by the time I encountered it in the 1990’s. 

So, my principal objection is the standard. And as I said, I think 

the sharing with law enforcement and Homeland Security needs to 

be fixed, as well. 

But certainly, what is—many of the other provisions of the legislation are quite good and the direction we need to go. And I am 

not trying to do—you know, I am certainly not here to defend the 

FBI over the last 3 years and what you saw in the I.G. report. I 

think what is in the legislation addresses that. And so, but there’s 

a lot of it I do support. 

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Fein, how can we help him sleep more comfortably in his bed at night? How can we help Mr. Woods? How can 

we fix this thing up? 

Mr. FEIN. Well, I think what is needed to try to test whether or 

not Mr. Woods’ anxieties are justified is, maybe in executive session, you need people to say we could not have gotten this NSL, 

if there was a specific and articulable facts standard, and to show 

whether that is more a theoretical or a practical problem. 

Because remember, this element, there is a backup here. If you 

want to go just for the relevant standard, which was the situation 

before, have a grand jury do it. Grand juries can investigate, as Mr. 

Kris pointed out, on virtually anything. But you have the check, 

one, it is more in the sunshine, and second, it is an independent 

branch of government that does that. 

116 

And this is the reason why you would want to keep the specific 

and articulable standard in, is because then you create an incentive 

to use more of the checks-and-balances approach than the unilateral approach. That is why the Supreme Court has explained the 

rule is a warrant rather than any exceptions, because you want to 

have an incentive to the police to use the checks and balances 

where at all feasible. 

That is what I would suggest. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Mr. JAFFER. Mr. Conyers, could I add something to that? 

Mr. CONYERS. Of course. 

Mr. JAFFER. I think that the reasonable and articulable grounds 

standard is actually—it is a very low standard. And it just asks the 

FBI to provide some sort of basis for its demand for the records. 

It just asks the FBI to explain to somebody why it needs the 

records it is asking for. 

And I think that if the FBI cannot articulate why it needs the 

records, then there is a very good question about why the FBI 

needs the records, or whether it should be collecting the records in 

the first place. 

Mr. CONYERS. How do you feel about that, Mr. Fein? 

Mr. FEIN. I think that is accurate. And I think there is a similar 

situation that arose in the U.S. Supreme Court, the case out of 

Michigan, U.S. v. U.S. District Court case. I was there at the Department of Justice at the time. It was a claim made by then-Attorney General John Mitchell, that in domestic national security situations, you did not need any judicial warrant, because it was too 

complex to explain national security issues to judges. 

And the court unanimously said, that is nonsense. Maybe the 

reason you cannot articulate a national security dimension is because it is not there. And the court ruled no, if you have some genuine belief that something mischievous is afoot, you should be able 

to articulate it. 

And I think that is exactly applicable to this standard here. 

Mr. CONYERS. Now, Mr. Kris, it is your turn. 

What is the reluctance, the genuine reserve that you hold back 

on the Nadler-Conyers-Scott approach? 

Mr. KRIS. Well, I think I am somewhere in the middle here between these various witnesses. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, that is a good place to start. 

Mr. KRIS. Yes, you know, just consider me the lukewarm water 

inbetween the fire and the ice. 

First, I agree with Mr. Fein that an executive session might be 

helpful here, because I think these kinds of discussions in the abstract can devolve rapidly into angels on the head of a pin. These 

words in a vacuum are very hard to sort of get a feel for. 

I, based on my now substantially outdated operational experience, have some doubts about the specific and articulable facts relating the records to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. 

I am not sure I would go quite as far in opening it up as Mr. 

Woods. 

Again, I think here the standard that ought to apply is the same 

standard, essentially, that applies under FISA. The information 

should be essentially a subset of foreign intelligence information— 

117 

information that is relevant to our ability to protect against these 

threats. I think that is where the agents ought to be focused at all 

times. 

And so, I think that is probably the right way to go. But again, 

I would want to have this discussion where you could really get 

some hard facts and some concrete examples going around. 

Mr. CONYERS. Absolutely. Then you might go from lukewarm to 

warm. Yes. All right. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. Fein, I was intrigued when you said that the judge will decide when you have a warrant. Well, the judge, really, does not 

really decide, because that assumes he has got both sides of the 

forum. It is an ex parte decision. He makes a decision based on 

only one side presented, but I guess that is a decision. 

But let me ask you about checks and balances generally. 

You know, I always thought checks and balances, as I indicated 

to the previous panel, checking with another branch of government. 

What is wrong with checking with just subordinates to see if you 

are doing a good job? 

Mr. FEIN. Like putting the fox in charge of the chicken house. 

The problem is that everyone knows that you are on a team. As 

part of the executive branch, I was. And you are expected to fulfill 

the mission of the team. And there are a thousand ways that are 

undetectable that someone can lose promotions, can be otherwise 

marginalized in their jobs, given the equivalent of a transfer to 

Butte, Montana, if they come up with an opinion that is not liked. 

And that is just what human nature is about. That is why we 

do not let people be judges in their own case. Why do you have the 

executive branch being the judge in its own case here? 

And we know the problems that can be created. You know that, 

because the issues concerning a device, as to the legality of 

waterboarding, now the department takes the position, we told the 

CIA interrogators this was legal. Then, if they follow it, we cannot 

get at them, because we are the final say on this. 

And it is a very incestuous, what I would call an intellectually 

endogamous situation. And that is not the way you get reliable 

judgments. No one is infallible. 

And the situation with regard to a judge ex parte deciding on 

warrants, it is true. He only hears one side, but he does not have 

a benefit like someone in law enforcement, that he gets promoted 

if there is an arrest made or not. 

That is why, even though it is not a perfect system, it is superior 

to the unilateral action. 

Mr. SCOTT. And why is the necessity for an outside check and 

balance even more important in this case, when you have the relevance to an investigation—what is the standard on these NSL— 

what standard are you using? 

Mr. FEIN. Sir, with the current statute it is the relevance to a 

terrorist investigation, which is rather broad. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, you know it covers some stuff that needs to be 

covered. Where is the limitation? 

118 

I mean, you could almost investigate anything using that standard, it seems to me. 

Is there any limitation? I mean, what is terrorist? What is relevant? Whose records? 

Mr. FEIN. Well, I think you are pointing out the elusiveness of 

a relevance standard with regard to terrorism. You can try to connect dots all around the world. It is conceivable that something 

that looks innocuous 99,000 out of 99,001 times maybe turns up 

something, so maybe you are looking for something that is relevant. That is why it is so open-ended. 

And if it is going to be that broad, the way in which we traditionally have a check is through grand jury and then the sunshine aspect after the fact, where abuses could be exposed. 

Mr. SCOTT. Any definition of what a terrorist investigation is? 

Mr. Woods? 

Mr. WOODS. Don’t forget, these National Security Letter statutes 

were intended and make explicit reference to the attorney general 

guidelines, which are now called the guidelines for national security investigations, which define in great detail—unfortunately, 

classified detail—the standards for opening investigations, the definitions applicable to—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, you know, that is kind of—the attorney general 

makes up his own guidelines, and he can investigate what he 

wants. 

I mean, we have in the back of our minds the fact that we have 

not gotten a good answer to the allegations that they fired U.S. attorneys for failing to indict Democrats in time to affect an upcoming election. And these are the people who are writing their little 

guidelines to get at things they want. 

You are getting information on people who are not charged with 

a crime. 

Mr. WOODS. Well, the guidelines are intended to cover the collection of intelligence, which often does involve that. Intelligence officers, for example, working in this country, often go out of their way 

not to commit crimes, but yet, need to be surveilled, terrorist 

cells—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Now, if it is relevant to the investigation, you are getting information on the secrets of people who are not even charged 

with a crime, if you say that information might be relevant to 

somebody else’s criminal activity. 

Mr. WOODS. As you would in a criminal investigation, yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. With a warrant. 

Mr. WOODS. With a National Security Letter, as you would use 

a grand jury subpoena—— 

Mr. SCOTT. A grand jury, you have got two different branches of 

government working at that point. 

Mr. WOODS. In theory. 

Mr. SCOTT. And see, this is why we like a little oversight from 

somebody other than the one doing the chasing. 

Mr. WOODS. I am not disagreeing on the point about oversight. 

I think there does need to be oversight outside the executive 

branch. And we have struggled with this. Congress has struggled 

with this for years in regulating intelligence operations. And it is 

difficult to do that. 

119 

But we do need it ultimately in the statute. I would favor it. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, if just I could comment, Mr. Chairman, that is 

why we have a FISA Court kind of in secret, at least looking over 

the proceedings. That is all ex parte. But at least you have got 

somebody in another branch of government watching what is done 

with these vague standards, and somebody that has the authority 

to put an end to it, if they are going into areas that are more shenanigans than investigation. 

Mr. JAFFER. Mr. Scott, could I just add to that? 

I actually think we have direct—we have direct evidence that judicial oversight in this area would be effective in a way that internal executive branch oversight is not. And I am thinking of the two 

cases that the ACLU brought challenging National Security Letters, one served on a library organization and the other one served 

on a John Doe organization. 

In both of those cases, the FBI served an NSL, and then once we 

brought the challenge, the FBI made the decision, rather than defend the NSL before a judge, to drop the NSL. So, the FBI made 

the decision initially that the information was necessary. But when 

there was the threat of judicial review, the FBI backed down. 

I think that shows that judicial oversight is effective in a way 

that executive branch oversight alone is not. 

Mr. FEIN. Can I also add, Mr. Scott, that the need for an outside 

check of the National Security Letters is greater now than it would 

have been earlier, because Congress, given the status of the claims 

of executive privilege and state secrets, is not and cannot exercise 

oversight, because you repeatedly encounter the claim, ‘‘Can’t show 

you this. Executive privilege.’’ That is why the FISA oversight is 

a joke. 

And if this body cannot, through the customary hearing process 

and oversight, impose a check after the fact, all the more need at 

the outset to have some other branch—here, the third branch of 

government—be involved in some way. 

And I want to underscore, this is not an effort to handcuff investigations. It is saying, be muscular, but do it with checks and balances, because abuse is what happens with unilateral, unchecked 

power. 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time is well expired. We are going 

to have a second round of questioning, however, so he will be able 

to come back to these gentlemen, if he wishes. 

I will now yield myself 5 minutes for further questioning. 

Mr. Woods, I wanted to explore some of the distinctions you were 

drawing. On the one hand, you said that the particular—what was 

that—particularly the articulable fact standard is a two—— 

Mr. WOODS. Significant and articulable fact. 

Mr. NADLER [continuing]. Significant and articulable—whatever 

it is, it is too—specific and articulable facts—it is too specific. So, 

I think it is too difficult. 

Mr. WOODS. Yes. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. On the other hand, the relevance standard, 

especially when you are talking about a preliminary investigation 

where there is basically nothing there, seems to be completely and 

totally open-ended. 

120 

Could you think of some standard that might meet your practical 

problems, that would give us some protections that the relevance 

standard does not? Might we look for some other standard? 

Mr. WOODS. Yes. Sure. I actually think that what Mr. Kris is 

talking about in terms of foreign intelligence information, and by 

importing that language from the FISA, is quite a reasonable requirement. 

Mr. NADLER. What language is that? 

Mr. WOODS. Well, what he is citing is the definition of foreign intelligence information drawn from the FISA statute. And it basically says, this is the kind of information that is relevant—— 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. 

Mr. WOODS [continuing]. To the section of the national—— 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Fein, you look as though—— 

Mr. FEIN. I cannot sustain that. Number one, if you look at the 

definition of national security or foreign intelligence information, it 

includes everything under the sun. The bank reserves in Hong 

Kong, you know, trade flows—that sort of thing. It is very openended. 

And the second thing that is clearly different in FISA is that, 

under the standard before the Protect America Act, and I guess 

which has been expired, you still need probable cause to believe 

that your target was a foreign agent or—— 

Mr. NADLER. Whereas you do not need probable cause here. 

Mr. FEIN [continuing]. Some lone ranger terrorist. 

And there is not any such limitation with regard to the NSL. 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Jaffer, do you think there is any validity, first 

of all, to Mr. Woods’ being upset with the significant and particular 

standard? And if there is, do you think we could come up with 

some other standard without going all the way over to relevancy, 

which seems to be no standard at all? 

Mr. JAFFER. I think that, again, that the reasonable and 

articulable grounds standard is a very low standard. It is not probable cause. It just requires an articulation of a reason why the 

records are necessary. 

And again, I think if the FBI cannot articulate that, it should not 

be collecting the information. 

Mr. NADLER. Very good. 

Mr. JAFFER. I think that the fact that it is issuing 200,000 NSLs 

over a 4-year period shows you how widely that power will be used, 

unless there is a real limit placed on it. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Woods, I want to explore something else you said. You mentioned with respect to a different provision of the bill, that essentially says, if I recall correctly, that you cannot use material—information, I should say—gathered under the foreign intelligence provisions in a prosecution. You separate the law enforcement. You 

said that that was—what we have done pre-9/11 is a real problem. 

My question is the following. The fourth amendment says you 

cannot wiretap or get certain information without a warrant and 

probable cause. Now we come along and say, but wait a minute. 

The fourth amendment was dealing with criminal prosecutions, but 

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we now have a problem with foreign spies, or with terrorists, or 

whatever. 

In order to fight the war against terrorism, or against Soviet 

spies, or whoever, we will have a lower standard that does not 

meet the fourth amendment. But we will not use this for criminal 

prosecutions. We will only use it to protect ourselves. And that is 

how we have FISA and some of the provisions here. 

If you then said, but we certainly cannot use that information, 

that we gathered by a lower standard than the fourth amendment 

standards and the probable cause standard, we cannot use that in 

prosecutions. 

Two questions. One, has that compromised national security, because we can use it in national security investigations? And two, 

even if it did compromise national security, how could we use it in 

criminal prosecutions without violating the fourth amendment by 

definition? 

Mr. WOODS. And your question reveals the reason for it. 

Mr. NADLER. Well, let me just say, because it seems to me we 

have it backwards. That to say that we could not use criminal investigation-derived information for national security would endanger national security. But to say that we cannot use national security information in a criminal prosecution, I do not see how that 

would endanger national security. 

Mr. WOODS. We have to start with FISA, as you sort of laid it 

out. And this prohibition of sharing FISA-derived information freely with criminal prosecution derives from the fact that the standards are different. 

The standards on FISA are actually not lower than the criminal 

standards, they are different. They comply with the fourth amendment, the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment. That 

is the whole, you know, line of court cases that come from (INAUDIBLE). 

But it is not probable cause that a crime has been committed. It 

is probable cause that a person is an agent of a foreign power. 

And so, if you want to construe that as lower, it is very vital, 

then, that that is not sort of fed wholesale into the criminal process. That is why the distinction is there in FISA. 

The difference here is, FISA is dealing with full-blown, fourth 

amendment-protected content. Okay. It is stuff that is surveillance—— 

Mr. NADLER. NSLs, or not. 

Mr. WOODS. NSLs, or not. We are talking—it seems to me that 

one of the problems with the discussion is, you know, the level of 

protection and the complexity of the protection will vary, depending 

on the level of intrusion involved and what is being protected. 

Now, where you have content, the government entering your 

house and searching your papers, the government—— 

Mr. NADLER. Transactional is not as protected as content. 

Mr. WOODS. Correct. And this is, if I could tell you the whole history of National Security Letter legislation, it is kind of the neglected stepchild of FISA. No one paid much attention to it. That 

is why the statute—— 

Mr. NADLER. We are trying to remedy that now. 

122 

Mr. WOODS. And so, there is a lot of work that needs to be done 

to this. But I do not think we need to build it into a replica of FISA 

for us to achieve—— 

Mr. NADLER. But you still did not answer my key question. 

Mr. WOODS. Okay. 

Mr. NADLER. How does saying that information gleaned from National Security Letters, issued under whatever standards they are 

issued, can be used for national security, but cannot be used for 

criminal prosecution? How does that endanger national security? 

Mr. WOODS. Well, for one thing, you need to do something with 

that information—I mean, we need to prosecute the terrorist, or 

the spy, in some situations. So we need to transfer it from the national security environment into the terrorism—sorry—into the 

criminal environment, if there is a prosecution. 

But second, if I, through the use of National Security Letters, develop, say, information about a terrorist threat, and I want to disseminate that to the people who are the first responders, the State 

and local law enforcement, is that dissemination to law enforcement? 

Well, it is, even though it might not—you know, could that information find its way into a criminal prosecution? That is the issue 

that is raised. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Would Mr. Fein and Mr. Jaffer comment on that? 

Mr. FEIN. Number one, at least at present, oftentimes people are 

detained without trial. Just go to Guantanamo Bay. And the President can detain U.S. citizens as enemy combatants, and they never 

have a trial. 

So, the idea that you have to have a trial to do something certainly is not the standard that this Administration employes. 

Secondly, what is it that you can do with that national security 

information? You can thwart the plot. You do not have to have a 

criminal prosecution. It is oftentimes said by this Administration, 

especially, you do not want law enforcement to be backward looking. You want it to be forward looking. 

So, you can foil the plot in ways that do not require—— 

Mr. NADLER. So, you are agreeing that, if you can use that information to foil the plot, then not giving it to law enforcement for 

prosecution is not a problem. 

Mr. FEIN. It does not prevent the safety to the Americans that 

comes from preventing the terrorist act. 

Now, we could call it a problem in the sense that, if you want 

to have and ease their way to publicize how well you are doing in 

criminal prosecutions, that would be useful. And moreover, there 

may be a difficulty, if you thwart a plot and you do not have them 

in prison, that they could then return to that particular fray—— 

So I do not want to say there is no difference. But certainly, the 

main idea that is promoted, that you need the intelligence to prevent the crime, not prosecute it, certainly is not disturbed. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you very much. 

Once again, I have gone over my 5 minutes, and the gentleman 

from Arizona is recognized for a very flexible 5 minutes. 

123 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. You are always 

kind in that regard. I wish we could figure out a way to bring that 

into philosophical terms here. 

Mr. Chairman, I guess, first of all, when we are gathering information that law enforcement—it is just information that is out 

there—I think it is very important to make this distinction. We 

know that, like Pseudofed and some of these other kinds of overthe-counter drugs can be purchased and then used to make other 

kinds of drugs that are very, very dangerous. 

If someone goes into the drugstore, they have a right to have privacy about what kind of drugs they buy. But if they buy 400 boxes 

of Pseudofed, that might cause law enforcement eyebrows to go up. 

And if we make that to where that the law enforcement—before 

he can even gather that information to even look at it—to be something that would go through the standard process of probable 

cause, I mean, we would never get anything done. The policemen 

would have to go around with their eyes closed. 

And I just think it is very important, as someone who believes 

so strongly in the foundational, constitutional principles, to make 

sure that we apply them in the correct way. 

And Mr. Fein, in all due respect, I do not think there are any 

American citizens at Guantanamo. And, you know, we have got to 

be careful how we throw these things around. 

If we apply constitutional rights to terrorists that we fight in the, 

say, the outland of Afghanistan, and we have got to read them 

their rights before we arrest them, that would pretty much do 

away with any ability for us to fight a war on terror. And so, we 

have to be somewhat practical minded here, while in keeping with 

the basic foundations of justice. 

With that said, you know, there was a time when Congress was 

trying to do this in the PATRIOT Act. And when this PATRIOT Act 

was debated in Congress, and they changed the standard for NSLs 

from requiring a government statement of specific and articulable 

facts to one of relevance, they did so after carefully considering the 

FBI supplies of examples from actual operations. 

And even Senator Patrick Leahy, the Democratic Chairman of 

the Senate Judiciary Committee, found that—this is Patrick Leahy 

that said, ‘‘And the FBI has made a clear case that a relevant 

standard is appropriate for counterintelligence and counterintelligence investigations, as well as for criminal investigations.’’ 

Now, Mr. Leahy is not my mentor, so I do not suggest that you 

all go out and follow his perspective in every case, but it should be 

something maybe for the Democrats on the Committee to consider. 

So, with that, let me ask Mr. Kris, if I could. H.R. 3189 provides 

that, ‘‘No information acquired by a National Security Letter shall 

be disclosed for law enforcement purposes unless such disclosure is 

accompanied by a statement that such information, or any information derived therefrom, may only be used in a criminal proceeding 

with the advanced authorization of the attorney general.’’ 

Do you support that provision? And if you do not, why not? 

Mr. KRIS. I mean, first of all, let me just say that that is not a 

prohibition on the use of NSL-derived information in a criminal 

prosecution. I sympathize with what I understand to be the rationale behind that, which is the same as the rationale behind the corVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:58 Aug 07, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00127 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\041508\41795.000 HJUD1 PsN: 41795
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responding language in FISA, which is that you do not want accidental disclosure through localized criminal prosecution of information that reveals a national security investigation, which has to be 

kept secret for longer than might otherwise occur. 

And I am in favor, I think, within the context of these, by definition, national and international investigations of some kind of centralized monitoring, because they are not just local problems the 

way some street crime, for example, is. 

Having said that, given the volume of National Security Letters—some 50,000 a year—it might be a bit steep to ask the attorney general each time to approve the way he does, or she does, in 

respect to FISA applications, where there are only about 2,000 a 

year. 

So, I mean, I sympathize with the idea behind it. I am not sure 

that it would be administrable. And it may be better to get at the 

same issue through minimization procedures, which are also part 

of 3189, and which I do strongly support. 

Mr. FRANKS. The bill would also raise the standard for the government’s access to business records in terrorism investigations by 

requiring that the government show ‘‘specific and articulable facts, 

giving reason to believe that the information or records sought by 

that NSL would pertain to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 

power.’’ 

Mr. KRIS. Yes, as I say, I think I am sort of the lukewarm water 

on that. I have some concerns about that language. And I do think 

that the use of the definition of foreign intelligence information is 

right. 

And I just want to point out, foreign intelligence information has 

two separate subsections. The one that Mr. Fein referred to with 

respect to Hong Kong banking information is in a second and different subsection than the one we have been talking about, which 

is, I think, rather rigorously defined to be information that relates 

to the ability of the United States to protect against sabotage, 

international terrorism, espionage, attack and other array of hostile acts, carried out by foreign powers or agents of foreign powers. 

I mean, this is a standard that has some meat on the bones. And 

I think it would be a reasonable way to go. And it has the advantage—as compared, say, to the current reference to the A.G. Guidelines, which are classified—that it refers to statutory language with 

definitional subsections that are pretty well known and could be 

discussed and debated publicly, at least in the abstract. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, I do not know if there is time for 

Mr. Woods to say a word on that. 

Mr. WOODS. I think the point I would make about sharing with 

law enforcement information—and Mr. Kris makes some excellent 

points on the relationship to FISA. But we have to also consider 

this in the context of our homeland security and counterterrorism 

strategy. 

If I have information, threat information about something that 

would occur in New York City, criminal prosecution is not the first 

thing on my mind. The first thing I want to do is tell the NYPD. 

Now, if I have to worry about, you know, is this piece of paper 

or e-mail that I am sending to the NYPD, does that contain NaVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:58 Aug 07, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\041508\41795.000 HJUD1 PsN: 41795
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tional Security Letter information? If so, do we need to go to the 

attorney general first? 

I would just say, on the basis of practical experience, that backs 

up the system, and you get the situation in which that stuff is not 

disseminated the way I think all of us would want it to be disseminated. 

And I think that is not the intent of the statute, but that is an 

effect. That is what I am concerned about. 

Mr. NADLER. Would the gentleman yield to me for a—— 

Mr. FRANKS. I would. Yes, sir. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Woods, following up on what you were just saying, if you 

have information about a plot in New York, and you want to disseminate that information to the NYPD for helping prevent it, is 

that for law enforcement purposes? 

Mr. WOODS. Well, in one sense it is not. And you would say, well, 

that is not a problem. But our experience with FISA information 

was, if you are disseminating it to a law enforcement organization, 

that is dissemination to law enforcement. 

It is dissemination that, once it is in that organization, it could 

come back in the form of—it could be used in an affidavit somewhere. It could go into the process. So, the position always was 

that, before you give it to the law enforcement organization, you 

have to clear it for law enforcement purposes. 

Mr. NADLER. So, would you be happier if the provision said essentially the same thing, that you cannot disclose it for law enforcement purposes, except for antiterrorism prevention purposes, 

or something like that? 

Mr. WOODS. I think you could craft some language to deal with 

the threat dissemination—the dissemination of threat information, 

that would probably solve this problem. I think that would be a 

very wise thing to consider. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. I yield back, and I thank the gentleman. 

Thank you. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

I think all the witnesses have indicated that the term ‘‘foreign 

intelligence’’ includes fights against terrorism. Mr. Fein has also 

suggested that it includes a lot more than that. 

Let me just ask on terrorism, Mr. Kris, you indicated that terrorism—does it have to be related to a State-supported terrorist? 

Or can you have a free, kind of a loosely organized group of terrorists that are not State supported? Would they be included in all of 

this? 

Mr. KRIS. Yes. Non-state-supported terrorism would be included. 

FISA’s legislative history is pretty clear in saying you could have 

the Larry, Moe and Curly terrorist organization. I mean, three 

guys who are actually engaged in terrorism would be a terrorist 

group. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Now, you indicated two sections. When we talk 

about foreign intelligence for the purpose of National Security Letters, are both sections of the foreign intelligence, the terrorism part 

126 

and the trade deal part, are both of them subject to National Security Letters? 

Mr. KRIS. Well, you mean currently, or what I think should be? 

Mr. SCOTT. Both. 

Mr. KRIS. Well, currently, it depends on—you know, there are 

several different NSL statutes. And it depends on which statute. 

But most of them are focused on international terrorism, most of 

the broad ones. So, they would not include the so-called affirmative 

foreign intelligence, the banking sort, if you want, or the foreign 

trade stuff. 

My own view is—but then there are some statutes that do refer 

to the foreign trade, as long as it does not concern a U.S. person. 

So that basically, what some of the—— 

Mr. SCOTT. But what is concerning, if it is relevant to a foreign 

intelligence investigation, you are getting information relevant to 

that investigation, can you not get information, records pertaining 

to an innocent United States citizen? 

Mr. KRIS. Well, you may, but—— 

Mr. SCOTT. That is what the whole NSL letter is about, isn’t it? 

Mr. KRIS. I may be messing this up by causing more confusion 

than I am resolving. 

But in current law, there is a distinction between this protective 

information, the information you need to fight against terrorism 

and all these other threats, and affirmative foreign intelligence information, the sort you want to get when we are spying on them, 

for example, trying to get trade-related information, or what have 

you. 

And by and large—there are a number of different laws, so I do 

not want to make an absolute blanket statement—by and large, the 

second category of affirmative foreign intelligence information in 

this context has to be information that does not concern a U.S. person. So, it might be, for example—— 

Mr. SCOTT. So, using that section, where you—the trade deal section—— 

Mr. KRIS. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. You cannot get information pertaining to 

an innocent United States citizen. 

Mr. KRIS. Or any, guilty or innocent. 

Mr. SCOTT. With an NSL. 

Mr. KRIS. I mean, at least under the standard that I am talking 

about, I—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Is this should be, or is? 

Mr. KRIS. Well, it is what I propose, yes. And it also has a basis 

in current law. But there are several different provisions of current 

law that have different standards, so I want to be careful—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Is there any provision in present law where you can 

get information, records of an innocent United States citizen, pertaining to an investigation—a trade deal type investigation, foreign 

intelligence—where you can get information on an innocent United 

States citizen? 

Mr. KRIS. I don’t think so, sir, but I mean, I—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Does anybody want to comment? 

Mr. FEIN. I think at least under FISA—now, that is not a national security—— 

127 

Mr. SCOTT. Right. Well, FISA, you have got a judge looking at 

it, which you have some protection. 

Mr. FEIN. Yes. 

Mr. JAFFER. Mr. Scott, could I just jump in on this whole discussion? 

I may be misunderstanding Mr. Kris’ proposal, and if I am, I 

apologize in advance. But if the proposal is simply to replace the 

current—or effectively to replace—the current relevance language 

in the NSL statutes with the language that is in the foreign intelligence definition, which uses the phrase ‘‘relates to,’’ I am not sure 

that actually solves any of the problem that at least the ACLU is 

concerned about. 

It does not solve the problem that the FBI can go on fishing expeditions and collect information about innocent people, many degrees removed from actual suspects. And it does not in itself solve 

the oversight problem, either. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, let me try to get in another question. 

Is there any difference of the information you can get under 

FISA—anything you can get under FISA that you cannot get 

under—with a National Security Letter, or vice versa? 

Mr. JAFFER. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. What can you get—— 

Mr. JAFFER. Well, under FISA you can get all kinds of information. You can get records relating to fourth amendment activity. 

You can get phone calls. You can get the content of phone calls. 

You can get e-mails. 

But National Security Letters, you can get a narrower class of 

information. 

Now, the fact that it is a narrower class does not mean that it 

is a non-sensitive class or a not constitutionally protective class. 

But it is nonetheless a narrower class of information than is available to the FBI through FISA. 

Mr. NADLER. Has the gentleman concluded? 

Mr. SCOTT. Not really. But if you insist, let me ask another question. [Laughter.] 

Mr. NADLER. Without objection. 

Mr. SCOTT. If you find information on an innocent United States 

citizen in one of these investigations, what happens to that information if it turns out not to be relevant to the investigation? 

Do you keep that information? Do you turn it over to—if it turns 

out not to be relevant, can you have a collateral criminal case? 

Mr. JAFFER. I think that the OIG has documented that the information—at least the practice has been—to keep some of that information. That is one of the problems that the Inspector General 

identified. 

Mr. SCOTT. But let me say, if you have got somebody with a terrorist trying to bomb something, and you find out somebody unrelated—that you thought might have been related was unrelated, 

but you tripped over some drug use, can you have a criminal investigation of that drug use? 

And can you backdoor investigate drug use with these NSLs 

using foreign intelligence as a pretext? Can you run a criminal investigation without probable cause, just out of suspicion, not probable cause, then you know he is dirty. And so, let us do a little preVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:58 Aug 07, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00131 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\041508\41795.000 HJUD1 PsN: 41795
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text and call it one of these foreign intelligence investigations, and 

see what we trip over? 

Mr. FEIN. Well, that would seem to me to violate the act, if you 

could ever get inside someone’s head and be able to prove that this 

was a pretense all along. Other than confessions, I doubt whether 

that is something that would ever be detected. Certainly, it is a 

possibility. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, we changed the standard from primary purpose 

to—— 

Mr. FEIN. Significant purpose. 

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. To a significant purpose, which suggests 

that if it is significant, not primary, it invites the question, well, 

what was the primary purpose. And in fact, the attorney general, 

in one answer to the question, blurted out criminal investigation 

without probable cause—he did not say without probable cause, but 

that is what he meant. 

Mr. FEIN. That is exactly what the danger is of lowering the 

standard, is you get the criminal investigation to piggyback on an 

intelligence investigation, and not subject to the same constraints. 

Mr. SCOTT. Without the burdensome requirement of having probable cause before you start delving into people’s personal papers. 

Mr. FEIN. Exactly. 

Mr. WOODS. A criminal investigation can be initiated without 

probable cause. Criminal investigation can obtain materials that 

we have been talking about—transactional materials—without 

probable cause through the use of the grand jury subpoena. 

The requirement of probable cause only attaches when I would 

execute a search warrant or do electronic surveillance in a criminal 

investigation to get to that level. 

The same hierarchy applies in intelligence investigations. You 

know, I would use a National Security Letter, which is not a probable cause instrument, to get transactional information. I would 

use the FISA to conduct a search warrant or use electronic surveillance for these purposes. 

It is very hard—and part of the definition that Mr. Kris has been 

talking about of foreign intelligence information, the purpose of 

that definition is to prevent FISA, the surveillance and search authority, to be used as a subterfuge for criminal investigations. 

So, regardless of whether it is significant purpose or primary 

purpose in FISA, it still has to be for the collection of foreign intelligence. 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, but if it is a significant purpose, but the primary 

purpose is really trying to catch somebody that you knew was 

dirty, but you could not initiate a criminal investigation, because 

you did not have probable cause to start searching his house, but 

can—with an NSL and all of these other things—can do a foreign 

intelligence investigation and backdoor, because you do not have 

the probable cause problem, get subpoenas and warrants to start 

searching somebody’s house. 

Mr. WOODS. But I cannot. I cannot under FISA. I have to convince a judge to get a warrant that I am—that this person is an 

agent of a foreign power. 

129 

Now, if the question is, can I use the NSLs, because that does 

not require a judge, then I—you know, the restraint there—and 

this is something we have already—— 

Mr. NADLER. The time of the gentleman has expired. All time 

has expired. 

I want to thank you, and I want to thank our witnesses for their 

testimony. 

Without objection, Members will have 5 legislative days to submit any additional written questions for the witnesses, which we 

will forward, and ask that you answer as promptly as you can, to 

be made part of the record. 

Without objection, the record will remain open for 5 legislative 

days for the submission of any other additional materials. 

And again, thanking our witnesses, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:16 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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