AND CENTRAL EUROPE 

A STUDY IN CML-MILITARY RELATIONS 
A STUDY IN CML-MILITARY RELATIONS 

by 

Jeffrey Simon 

1996 

Institute For National Strategic Studies 

National Defense University 
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Simon,Jeffrey, 1942- 

NATO enlargement and Central Europe: a study in civil-military relations 

Jeffrey Simon. 

p. cm, 

Includes bibliographical references 

1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Membership. 2. Civil-military relation

-Europe, Central. 3. Europe, Central--Politics and government--1989- I. Tide. 

UA646.3.$547 1996 

355'.031091821-dc21 

96-3923

CI

First Printing, October 1996 
To Katherine 

Adam Lee, Jean Paul, and Tamara 
Acknowledgements 

I would like to acknowledge the assistance and support of numerou

colleagues and friends in Central Europe and NATO who hav

shared their knowledge and advice and read and critiqued portion

of the manuscript. They are too numerous to name, but they kno

who they are and this book could not have been written withou

them. 
Io 

U. 

UI. 

IV. 

V. 

VI. 

VII. 

VIII. 

IX. 

Past as Prologue 

NATO Enlargement: 

Blazing the Trail 

Germany: 

One People, One State, One Army 

Poland: 

Reform by Stages 

Hungary: 

Constitutional Challenge and Reform 

Czechoslovakia: 

From Unity to Federation and Divorce 

The Czech Republic: 

Advancing Toward Democracy 

Slovakia: 

Instability and Special Problems 

Prologue as Future: 

What Central Europe Needs To Do 

1 

7 

35 

49 

137 

191 

213 

253 

289 

Index 315 

x
2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

Tables 

3.1 

4.1 

4.2 

4.3 

4.4 

4.5 

4.6 

5.1 

5.2 

5.3 

6.1 

6.2 

7.1 

7.2 

7.3 

8.1 

8.2 

Figure 

8.1 

xii 

Germany 

Poland 

Hungary 

Czechoslovakia 

The Czech Republic 

Slovakia 

East German Defense Reform, 1989-90 

Polish Defense Reform, 1988-91 

Olszewski Defense Reform, 1992 

Suchocka Defense Reform, 1992 

Pawlak Defense Reform, 1993 

Olesksy Defense Reform, 1995 

Cimoszewicz Defense Reform, 1996 

Hungarian Defense Reform, 1989-90 

Hungarian Defernse Reform, 1992 

Hungarian Defense Reform, 1994 

CSFR Defense Reform, 1989-90 

CSFR Defense Reform, 1991-92 

Baudy's Defense Reform, 1993-94 

Holan Defense Reform, 1994-96 

Vyborny Defense Reform, 1996 

Slovak Defense Reform, 1993 

Slovak Defense Reform, 1994 

Slovakian Parliamentary Elections 

34 

48 

136 

190 

212 

252 

39 

52 

63 

67 

77 

88 

101 

141 

148 

157 

196 

202 

214 

222 

240 

254 

262 

261 
Warsaw Pact nations to enter NATO. The four countries discussed i

this volume Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia----a

have interest in joining the Alliance as well, and all have mad

commitments in varying degrees toward that goal. 

To understand why these nations are striving to meet the criteria fo

inclusion in a NATO enlargement program, and how well they ar

succeeding, one needs an appreciation of the political history of eac

nation since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. In this t~)ok, Jeffre

Simon, one of the most experienced and well informed analysts o

Central European matters, offers just such a history. He begins wit

Poland's extremely complex and difficult struggle toward democrati

government since 1989, reminding us of the violence done to Polis

society and the Polish people earlier this century and illuminating recen

political events that otherwise might seem merely chaotic. Then h

traces the somewhat easier struggles of Hungary and Czechoslovakia

explaining with admirable clarity how those nations advanced alon

parallel but different paths, and why the Czech Republic and SIovaki

have advanced at different paces since the "Velvet Divorce"----th

amicable separation of those two nations. 

This invaluable work--which has been completed with th

cooperation and encouragement of the nations involved---stands as a

authoritative, meticulously documented, and very timely history of th

swift transition from socialist to democratic political principles i

Central Europe in less than a decade. 

ERVIN J. ROKKE 

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force 

President, National Defense University 
A STUDY IN CML-MILITARY RELATIONS 
H istory has forced Central Europe to adjust to politics of th.extreme because it has been a region where states have rarel

conformed with the nations living within their territorial bound

aries. States in the region have merged, disintegrated, disap

peared, and even been moved to different locations. Perhap

because of these experiences, Central European nations hav

demonstrated remarkable resilience and capacity to reasse

national will. 

During the eighteenth century, Germany comprised more tha

350 independent duchies and principalities. By the end of th

Napoleonic era, it comprised roughly the 40 states that were fina

ly unified by Otto yon Bismarck after the Franco-Prussian war i

1871. Following defeat in World War I, the Treaty of Versaill

mandated Germany's loss of the Alsace-Lorraine to Franc

Poznan West Prussia to Poland, the Hultchin district to Czecho

slovakia, and Memel to Lithuania. Danzig became a free city. 

Hitler's attempt to establish the Third Reich led to World W

II and Germany's second catastropic defeat, resulting in the fou

power occupation of Berlin, the loss of much of its eastern territo

ry, and the division of the remainder of Germany into two state

the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Demo

cratic Republic (GDR). 

The German Democratic Republic's brief history was one o

dramatic changes. After the German border was moved 125 mil

westward to make room for the "new" Poland, the GDR emerge
fashion, the former cornerstone of the Warsaw Pact found itself in 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an organization that had 

been for 40 years its "'enemy" object--and even its raison d'etre. 

Germany's reunification exemplifies Central Europe's return to 

historical patterns and NATO's ability to enlarge eastward. 

Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia have also experienced 

historic transformations. Each has thrown off the yoke of 45 years 

of communist party domination and regained national sovereignty. Each is attempting to erect liberal democratic political institutions, establish market economies, guarantee civil and human 

rights, acquire civil control of its military, and join the European 

Union and NATO. All three have successfully negotiated the withdrawal of Soviet (eventually Russian) forces from their soil, contributed to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for 

Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)--structures that provided 

some semblance of economic and political-military order to the 

region--and observed Germany's reunification and the Soviet 

Union's disintegration. 

Poland's history has also been a study in politics of the 

extreme. After experiencing three partitions during the eighteenth 

century, culminating in Poland's total absorption by Prussia, 

Russia, and the Hapsburg Empire, the Polish state disappeared 

from the European stage in 1795. Statehood was not resurrected 

until after World War I, when the Treaty of Versailles established 

the independent Polish Republic from areas controlled by Russia, 

Germany, and Austria. 

Poland's experience with democratic rule was brief; in May 

1926 it ended with Marshall Pilsudski's coup and military dictatorship, which itself ended following the Molotov-Ribbentrop 

pact and the German and Soviet attacks on Poland starting 
gy, y yg

island within the Hapsburg empire, managed to gain a semblance 

of autonomy from Hapsburg rule after the 1867 ausgleich, which 

created the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. As a successor to 

the Danubian Monarchy after World War I, Hungary was considered one of the powers responsible for the war. As a result, the 

Treaty of Trianon greatly reduced Hungary in size by ceding 

Slovakia and Carpato-Ukraine to Czechoslovakia, CroatiaSlavonia to Yugoslavia, Banat to Yugoslavia and Romania, and 

Transylvania to Romania. Hungary's efforts to develop democratic institutions in the interwar period met a fate similar to that of the 

rest of Central Europe, ending in Admiral Horthy's dictatorship. 

During World War II, because Hungary was aligned with the 

Axis powers its Trianon-mandated borders remained unchanged. 

A Communist takeover after the war terminated Hungary's newly 

acquired, and very brief, independence. Hungary's effort to revolt 

in 1956 was thwarted by Soviet invasion and resulted in "temporary" occupation by the Soviet Southern Group of Forces. With its 

revolution in 1989, Hungary, too, has embarked upon a libera

democratic experiment for the third time this century. 

Czechs lost their statehood after the Battle of White Mountain 

in 1620, when they were absorbed under Hapsburg rule. After the 

1867 ausgleich, the Czechs remained under Austrian influence and 

Slovakia under Greater Hungary. Czechoslovakia, also recreated 

after World War I by the Treaty of Versailles, was the only Central 

European state during the inter-war period to maintain democratic 

rulemunder Thomas G. Masaryk and Edvard Benes. Hitler's 

demands for the Sudeten lands at Munich in September 1938 inter

rupted Czechoslovakia's brief 20-year democratic interlude. In 

March 1939, the Third Reich absorbed Czechoslovakia, though 
thwarted by a Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion, resulting in th

"temporary" stationing of the Soviet Central Group of Forces i

the country. The November 1989 Velvet Revolution marke

Czechoslovakia's third twentieth-century effort to establish libera

democratic institutions. 

Framed against this tumultuous background, the revolution

of 1989-90 provide a number of challenges for European security

One of the immediate consequences has been unleashing the aspi

rations of 80 million Central Europeans (16.3 million Eas

Germans, 37.8 million Poles, 15.7 million Czechs and Slovaks, an

10.6 million Hungarians) to "return to Europe." Reflecting thi

popular will, the new Central European governments have adopt

ed policies designed to join West European political, economic

and military institutions: the European Union and NATO. It is cer

tainly in the interests of Europe and the United States that thi

process succeed! 

Another consequence of the 1989 revolutions has been th

unleashing of ethnic instincts and aspirations that had been con

tained for 45 years by Soviet-imposed instruments of order an

control. Likewise, it is in the interests of Europe and the Unite

States that the future of Central Europe does not flow in anti

democratic directions or result in intra- or inter-state conflicts. 

Central Europe faced new challenges during late 1991-1992

when post-World War II state-disintegration extended to Europe

east and south. After the failed 18-19 August 1991 Soviet coup, th

USSR disintegrated. At the end of 1991, Yugoslavia disintegrated

As a result, Europe witnessed the creation of many "new" inde

pendent states: Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia in the Baltic

Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia in th
p

European institutions are, in general, important to Central 

Europe because they legitimize the programs of the political leaders to society. But NATO is especially important because it anchors 

the United States to Europe and provides additional psychologica

security to these states that have been so tossed about by history

NATO, with its tram-Atlantic ties, represents not just an Article 5 

guarantee against aggression but a stabilizing instrument that 

ensures continued statehood. 

The challenge for the United States and Europe now posed by 

the historic processes unleashed by annus mirabilis is not just to 

accommodate the aspirations of 80 million Central Europeans to 

re-establish liberal democratic rule but to ensure that the revolutions succeed. Success is necessary because Central European liberal democracies represent a model--a roadmap--to such nations 

and states as Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia's and the 

USSR's successor states--who also seek a return to Europe. 

Indeed, one might argue that if liberal democratic experiments 

fail in Central Europe in united Germany, Poland, Hungary, the 

Czech Republic, and Slovakia--the likelihood of, and opportunities for those other Eastern or Southeast European states wanting 

to re-enter Europe will become quite bleak, if not impossible. I

such a denouement were to result, then from the vantage point o

the twenty-first century, the revolutions of 1989, rather than representing events of momentous historic proportions, will come to 

symbolize nothing more than a manifestation of the West's ability 

to seize failure from the jaws of Cold War "victory.'" And twenty

first century European history could well be doomed to suffer the 

descent of another dark, grim, and oppressive iron curtain. 
North 

Atlantic 

Ocean 

IRELAND 

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"~"~ :~:~ i~'~ !i ~ i~i,":i~ i ,ii :~ i I~ ' Mediterranean Sea ....... ~: ~!: .... 

SIA 

Source: CIA Ma~O 8023
T he Central European revolutions of 1989 (annus mirabilis) not 

only captured the attention and imagination of the world, but 

they have tested and challenged 5 states in the extreme: Germany, 

Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Republic 

and Slovakia). 

In historical terms, the continuing transformations are much 

more encompassing and complex than the mere disintegration of 

communism. The aftershocks of World War I, which saw the disintegration of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian 

empires, continue to haunt Central European successor states. Not 

only do the 1989-90 Central European revolutions have to deal 

with historical unfinished business, 1 they also test prevailing 

assumptions about democratic control of the military and civilmilitary relations in contemporary liberal democratic polities. And 

most important, the revolutions are likely to provide serious future 

challenges to U.S. and European security. History has been in fastforward over the past 6 years. Already 4 distinct periods have been 

evident since the Central European revolutions of 1989-90. The 

present period is the one that may prove to be the most critical for 

Central Europe's future. 

The first geo-strategic period, which occurred during 1989-90, 

was marked by Central European euphoria resulting from the revolutions themselves, optimism about a "Return to Europe" by joining NATO and the European Community (EC), now the European 

Union (EU). The period witnessed NATO's July 1990 London 

7 
gp, 

also in NATO's enlargement to the Polish border, incorporating th

former GDR in its security guarantee. 

The second period, which stretched from German unificatio

through the end of 1991, witnessed the disintegration of t

Warsaw Pact, withdrawal of Soviet Groups of Forces fro

Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and a failed coup in the Sovi

Union. During 1991 NATO convened North Atlantic Counc

(NAC) ministerial meetings in Copenhagen (June), which san

tioned developing military ties to the east, and in Rom

(November), which resulted in a new Strategic Concept (

replace NATO's policy of Flexible Response) and the creation 

the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to engage t

East. Central Europe's initial euphoria about West Europe

embrace of their "return" turned to more cautious (or realisti

optimism. 

State disintegration marked the third period, which opened 

January 1992 and continued through 1993. The year 1992 w

nessed the disintegration of the Soviet Union, former Yugoslav

and Czechoslovakia--marking the emergence of more than 

new states in Europe. It also witnessed the continued withdraw

of Soviet (now Russian) troops from Germany and Poland 

Central Europe. 

NATO demonstrated its willingness to engage in peacekee

ing operations under either the Conference on Security an

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or United Nations auspices in M

and December 1992, respectively. In June 1993, in Athens, t

NACC expressed its willingness to support the Alliance in U

and/or CSCE-mandated peacekeeping operations. The same pe

od also witnessed Boris Yeltsin's initial support for, and change 
support from the West grew. 

The fourth period opened with NATO's January 1994 Brussels 

Summit, which adopted the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), 

Partnership For Peace (PFP), and committed the Alliance to future 

enlargement. This period saw the last of the Russian troops withdrawn from Germany and Poland. The fourth period also found 

NATO (in Bosnia) involved in its first military operation, with PFP 

members, including Russia, supporting the operation. 

Central and East Europeans, initially skeptical, if not cynical, 

about Western intentions because they perceived the Alliance as 

bending to Russian opposition to their entry in 1993, have decided 

to test NATO to determine whether PFP and CJTF represent a real 

step toward NATO membership. In this regard, and with little 

doubt, the January 1994 Summit marked a watershed for NATO, 

but only time will tell whether the future Alliance will prove to be 

"hollow" or remain relevant to Europe's eastern security 

problems. 

What NATO Has Done 

NATO's responses to developments in the East--first, to the 

former Warsaw Pact members of Central and Eastern Europe, and 

second, to the new states emerging from the disintegrated Soviet 

Union--have been both extraordinary and insufficient. They have 

been extraordinary in that so many new initiatives have been 

taken in such a short period of time; yet they have been insufficient 

in that events have moved at such a fast pace that NATO's 

responses have not kept up with expectations in the region. 

London Declaration, July 1990. Only months after the revolu- 
share thinking and deliberations and to intensify military contac

during the period of historic change, a During the summer, ne

liaison ambassadors from the Warsaw Pact participated in brie

ings at NATO headquarters. 

East German Absorption. East Germany's transformati

from a key Warsaw Pact member in November 1989 to a f

member of NATO on 3 October 1990 was unexpected but rapi

The Soviet position underwent unforeseen and mercurial twists 

the security framework for a united Germany. Mikhail Gorbach

initially refused to accept the Germany-in-NATO framework wh

he met with George Bush on 3 June 1990. Though Gorbach

wanted a neutral unified Germany- his concession to Hein~ut Ko

in July indicated that he really had little choice in the matter. 

reality, the Soviets ceded control when the former GDR failed 

stabilize the domestic situation as a reformed communist state 

November 1989; de facto reunification occurred on 1 July 1990 wi

the economic and monetary union of the two German states. T

Soviets also decoupled political reunification from the securi

issue when they conceded that all-German elections could occ

irrespective of the Four-plus-Two agreement, which was signed 

12 September 1990. 3 

When formal reunification occurred on 3 October 199

Germany's five new eastern Iaender (the former GDR) assumed t

protection of NATO's Article 5--'an armed attack against one.

shall be considered an attack against them all". NATO's enlarg

ment eastward occurred without the need to sign a new protoc

of association as employed upon the accessions of Greece an

Turkey in 1951, Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. 

According to Article 5 of the 12 September 1990 Treaty; follo
Copenhagen NAC, June 1991. On 6-7 June NATO took the 

next step at the Copenhagen NAC session by agreeing to imple

ment a broad set of further initiatives "to intensify...[NATO's

program of military contacts at various levels "s with Central and 

East European (CEE) states. CEE military contacts would be 

intensified with NATO headquarters, SHAPE, and other majo

NATO commands, and NATO would invite CEE military officer

to NATO training facilities for special programs concerning 

civilian oversight of defense. Meetings of experts would be held to 

discuss security policy issues, military strategy and doctrine, arms 

control, and military industrial conversion to civilian purposes

NATO invited CEE experts to participate in NATO's "Third 

Dimension" scientific and environmental programs and to 

exchange views on subjects such as air space management. NATO 

hfformation programs also expanded to the CEE region. 

NAC Ministerial, 21 August 1991. Up until August, NATO 

treated all former Warsaw Pact countries alike. As the August 199

coup attempt in the Soviet Union was occurring, the 21 Augus

NAC ministerial statement differentiated, for the first time, the 

Soviet Union from the other Warsaw Pact countries by suspending 

liaison "pending a clarification in that country." The statement also 

noted: 

We expect the Soviet Union to respect the integrity and 

security of all states in Europe. As a token of solidarity with 

the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, we 

will develop ways of further strengthening our contribution toward the political and economic reform process 

within these countries. Our diplomatic liaison arrange- 
NATO's activities with the Soviet Union and Central and Ea

Europe to include the foUowing: 

• annual meetings with the NAC at ministerial level in wh

would be called the NACC 

• periodic meetings with the NAC at ambassadorial level 

• additional meetings as circumstances warrant 

• regular meetings with NATO subordinate committees, inclu

ing the Political and Economic Committees, and the Milita

Committee and other NATO military authorities. 7 

In addition to creating the NACC, the November 1991 Rom

Summit initiated another major change when it adopted a Ne

Strategic Concept to replace its 1967 strategy of "Flexible Re

ponse." The new strategy moved NATO's military emphasis aw

from massive mobilization toward enhanced crisis manageme

capabilities and peacekeeping operations. It also established t

groundwork for NATO's military transformation. 

North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). 8 On 

December 1991 the foreign ministers of all the "former adve

saries" (including the newly independent Latvia, Lithuania, an

Estonia) met at the inaugural NACC to adopt a "Statement 

Dialogue, Partnership, and Cooperation" that endorsed annu

meetings of the NACC at ministerial level; bimonthly meetings 

the NAC with liaison ambassadors beginning February 1992; add

tional NACC meetings as circumstances warrant; and regul

meetings of the Political, Economic, and Military Committees wi

liaison partners. The purpose of the consultations and cooperati

would be on security and related issues. 

On 26 February, the NACC met at the ambassadorial level 
modern society, dissemination of information, policy planning 

consultations, and air traffic management. 0 

While the NACC had laudable goals and its activities have 

mushroomed, its limitations immediately became apparent. First

the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 and the 

decision to include all its successor states as new NACC member

meant that rather than the originally conceived five non-Sovie

Warsaw Pact members and the USSR, the NACC would includ

more than 20 new members. The immense diversity among NACC 

partners (e.g., between Poland and Uzbekistan) led to Centra

European demands for differentiation and increasing demands fo

membership in the Alliance. In sum, despite well-intended goals

the cooperation partner's demands on the NACC made it quite 

apparent how ill-prepared and limited the organization really was

NATO's recognition of its inadequacy came in January 1994 when 

in lieu of extending membership, the North Atlantic Counci

adopted the Partnership For Peace (PFP) program. 

NATO and NACC as "Out-Of-Area" Peacekeeper 

Oslo NAC/NACC, June 1992. On 4 June 1992, the NAC 

Foreign Ministers session in Oslo agreed "to support on a case-by

case basis in accordance with their own procedures, peacekeepin

activities under the responsibility of CSCE [the Council on 

Security and Cooperation in Europe]. "10 Immediately afterward

NATO moved "out-of-area" and with the Western European Unio

(WEU) dispatched naval units to the Adriatic to enforce the UN 

embargo. Many NACC members saw this as an opportunity t

broaden their cooperation with NATO, so on 5 June the NACC 
noted the Alliance's readiness "to support peacekeeping oper

tions under the authority of the UN Security Council. ''la T

NACC then followed by agreeing that NATO and cooperati

partners would share experience with one another and with oth

CSCE states in the planning and preparation of peacekeepin

missions and would consider possible joint peacekeeping traini

and exercises. The same NACC also approved a 1993 Work Pl

with specific provisions on peacekeeping and created a NACC A

Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, to discuss gener

political and conceptual principles and practical measures f

cooperation. 

Closer cooperation and confidence among NACC partne

became evident in February 1993 when the Military Committ

met for the first time in cooperative session. When NACC defen

ministers met at the end of March 1993, they recognized the impo

tance "of the ability to act in a cooperative framework" in peac

keeping tasks and "ensure(d) that a high priority be given th

work."13 

On 12 April 1993, under authority of UN Resolution 8

NATO started enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosn

Herzegovina. In late April, the Military Committee again met 

cooperation with Chiefs of Defense Staff (CHODs) to discuss t

possibility of NATO inte~'ention in Bosnia should a peaceful sol

tion fail. 

Athens NAC/NACC, June 1993. The 10 June 1993 NAC min

terial communique noted the development of a "common unde

standing on conceptual approaches to peacekeeping [and] enhan

ing of cooperation in this field ''14 with Cooperation Partners. T

11 June 1993 Athe1~s NACC adopted the Ad Hoc Group's detail
doctrinal issues of peacekeeping37 

In short, it is evident that NATO has been quite responsive i

a very brief period of time. But has its responsiveness bee

enough? The CEE countries clearly believe that more than meet

ings alone is necessary, if NATO is to serve an essential role in th

protection of European peace and stability. Particularly as th

NACC has broadened its membership so rapidly, it suffers th

danger of becoming "neutralized" as a credible security institution

And there are uncertainties about what NATO's and NACC

concrete roles in the event of a real crisis will be. These concern

were voiced particularly by the Central European states: Poland

Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia. All have expressed th

desire for a differentiated role within NATO/NACC. They wan

criteria and time-lines to become full members of NATO and hav

agreed to accept responsibilities for NATO's security concerns. 

NATO's January 1994 Brussels Summit: A Watershed

Although it took NATO 24 years to adopt a new Strategic Concep

to replace its Flexible Response strategy, one might argue that wit

the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, Russia

recent efforts to reassert influence over the CIS--and resultin

insecurities in Central Europe--that NATO now needs a "new

Strategic Concept. 

Whether the January 1994 NATO Brussels Summit will prov

to be a such a watershed remains to be seen. The Summit di

attempt to fuse the more flexible force structure packages fo

peacekeeping requirements (the so-called CJTF) with NATO's new 

need to stabilize the east by adopting the PFP program. 

In support of the development of a European Security an

Defense Identity (ESDI) and the strengthening of the Europea
nations outside the Alliance. 

Although the Summit did not accede to Central Europe

desire for immediate membership, the PFP proposal did establi

NATO's long-term commitment to expand, leaving vague both t

criteria and time-lines for enlargement. 19 Operating under t

authority of the NAC, active participation in PFP is seen as a ne

essary (though not sufficient) condition to joining NATO. Partn

states will participate in political and military bodies at NAT

headquarters and in a separate Partnership Coordination C

(PCC) at Mons that will: 

work in concrete ways towards transparency in defense 

budgeting, promoting democratic control of defense 

ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and 

creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such 

fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations. 2o 

While the goals of NATO's CJTF and PFP are explicit and c

be seen as a hedging against possible future problems in the Ea

their implementation would have immediate, probably uninten

ed, and possibly unwanted regional implications, h~itially, PF

had the effect of undermining the following situations: (1) Centr

East Europe's sub-regional cooperation by turning local actors in

competitors; (2) domestic support for the region's democrat

reformers; (3) the region's fragile civil-military relations; and 

sub-regional security by attracting scarce defense resources fro

Central Europe's real defense requirements, al 
(g) ppg, 

European defense ministers (except the Czech Republic, which 

sent First Deputy Defense Minister Jiri Pospisfl) met in Warsaw to 

prepare for the forthcoming meeting with President Clinton. After 

the session, the defense ministers declared that they expected the 

PFP program to open the way to permanent contacts with NATO 

and to lead to full membership in the Alliance. 22 

Poland. Following a 10 January 1994 cabinet session, Polish 

Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski appraised PFP as "too smal

a step in the right direction" and President Lech Walesa warned 

that NATO was committing a "serious error" in bowing to Russian 

objections. Walesa also harshly criticized the Czechs for failing to 

support a coordinated Visegrad strategy toward NATO. 23 Though 

Polish Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk added that he understood 

the West's difficulty to put forward a precise date for integration

he noted, "We expect NATO to come up with clear criteria in the 

short term for NATO membership. ''24 

After the NATO Brussels Summit, President Walesa went to 

Prague for talks with the other Visegrad presidents and Presiden

Clinton (on 12 January). Because the Czech Republic wanted the 

talks conducted on a bilateral basis, Walesa expressed anger with 

the Czech's course of action: "They are making a mistake that wil

cost us all something."25 After the session with President Clinton

Foreign Minister Olechowski noted, "[W]e have many promises

political declarations, but we lack specific prospects. ''26 

Though Poland had initially exhibited reserve, it responded 

rapidly. One of the immediate requirements of the Partnership fo

Peace program was the need to find funding. Defense Ministe
of leaders from Romania and Lithuania whose documents prece

ed Poland's. Pawlak stated that Poland was not really happy wi

PFP, but "[W]e can accept it if we are certain that Poland will ul

mately be able to become a full member. ''as 

Despite its initial reservation, Poland's foreign and defen

ministries in conjunction with Parliament's lower house, the Sej

and upper house, the Senate, committees on defense and forei

affairs worked out a response. 29 On 25 April 1994, Poland becam

the first partner to hand over a presentation document to NAT

outlining the spheres of its intended cooperation with the Allianc

At the 25 May 1994 NATO and PFP defense ministers meeting 

Brussels, Kolodziejczyk continued to voice concern that "som

thing is lacking," that the program fails to define clearly how 

move from partnership to membership.30 

Then on 5 July, Poland became the first partner to sign 

Individual Partnership Program (IPP). In addition to peacekeepi

missions and joint exercises, Poland incorporated addition

amendments to its IPP to include air defense, convergence 

command, control, and communications systems, and democra

control of the armed forces. 31 The 32-page document contained 

specific measures covering training, exercises, and informati

exchanges, which would cost Poland 250 billion zlotys--a signi

cant portion of its defense budget--for 1994. 32 

When President Clinton addressed the Polish Sejm on 7 Ju

1994, he declared that NATO enlargement is "no longer a questi

of whether, but when and how. ''33 Of the $100 million he pledg

in U.S. support of the overall PFP program, Clinton committed $

million (more than 500 billion zlotys) to Poland. 

Polish contacts with NATO then began to mushroom. 
countries were divided into five multi-national companies under 

Polish-American command. 3s 

Polish military contacts with Germany also began to flourish

particularly after 1 Septembr 1994 when the last Russian troop

had departed Germany and Poland. The Bundeswehr sponsored 

special ties with Polish units and exercises in the Polish borde

region. 36 On I September German General Naumann and Polish 

Chief of Staff Wilecki signed a partnership agreement for individ

ual units of the two forces. 37 Also during 1994, the Polish, German

and French defense ministers (the so-called Weimar triangle) often 

met to discuss how to expand cooperation, as and German Genera

Henning yon Ondarza began to act as an adviser to the Pohsh 

defense minister. 30 Culminating the 1994 training year (16-2

September), Polish ground forces, a Danish mechanized platoon

and German air-landing company held a peacekeeping operation

"TATRA-94" in the Krakow Military District. 40 

Hungary. Though Partnership for Peace had not become an 

official NATO policy until 10 January 1994, Csaba Kiss of th

Hungarian defense ministry noted (on 13 January) that defens

officials had been working on Hungary's plan since October 1993

Kiss suggested that PFP would require Hungarian defense plan

ning and spending to be more open and in line with NATO stan

dards, and under more civilian control. He added that Hungarian 

soldiers would participate in future peacekeeping operations, tha

Hungary's air defense and airspace management needed to b

converted to NATO formats (with Identification, Friend or Fo

(IFF) and ground radars overhauled to communicate with NATO 

aircraft), and that two military planners would go to Brussels. 41 
September 1994 on Hungarian soil. The exercise involved 1

British troops and 228 Hungarian soldiers, including its peac

keeping company. 43 One lesson Hungary learned from the exerci

was that differences in staff-level work and linguistic problem

rather than incompatibility of weapons hampered cooperation. 

Because of the shortage of funds, this was the only exerci

Hungary held during 1994; Hungary did not participate in the fir

large-scale PFP exercise "CooPER,~VE BRIDGE-94" in Poland. 4s 

Hungary's fiscal constraints limited its participation. Defen

Minister Kelefi, regretting Hungary's inability to participate in PF

exercises in Poland and the Netherlands, noted the defense mi

istry would need 493 million forints ($4.3 million) for the indivi

ual tasks undertaken in PFP. 46 On 16 November, when t

National Assembly Defense Committee approved the 1995 defen

budget, which would increase to 77.1 billion forints (up 8 billi

from 1994), the increase was more than absorbed by inflation. 

Czech Republic. When NATO introduced Partnership F

Peace, Defense Minister Antonin Baudys announced that all exe

cises undertaken by the Czech Army would be subject to the co

sent of parliament. On 29 April 1994, the Parliament approved t

government proposal to permit short-term military train.ing an

exercises on Czech soil (5,000 foreign troops for up to 21 days) an

for Czech units to participate abroad (700 troops for up to 

days).47 

On 10 March 1994, when Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus sign

the PFP general agreement making the Czech Republic the 11

country to join the program, Defense Minister Baudys noted th

the program "is the maximum possible and the minimu
of 40 soldiers of the Czech 4th Mechanized Regiment participated 

in "COOPERATIVE BRIDGE-94. "s0 The training year concluded with 

the first joint Czech-German military exercise of 400 troops, which 

took place during 7-11 November on both sides of the common 

border, sl 

The new Czech Defense Minister, Wilem Holan, summarized 

the Czech view in reference to NATO membership, "It is possible 

to anticipate that the conditions for NATO membership will be 

clearly defined in the near future---that is, certain standards will be 

drawn up...[adding the warning that] the 'cheap' phase of our deci

sions is coming to an end, and the phase that will cost us something is beginning. "52 

Slovakia. The fundamental orientation of Slovakia is to obtain 

full NATO membership. The starting point for this objective is participation in NATO's NACC and PFP. It signed its Presentation 

Document on 25 May 1994.sa The process of building its defense 

ministry and armed forces from scratch meant a slow start, and fis

cal constraints have limited Slovakia's participation. The interna

political struggle and concomitant government instability made i

an even slower start. 

In addition to small group exchanges, Slovakia participated in 

"COOPERATIVE BPdt~E-94" in Poland and in a military exercise in the 

Netherlands in October. Slovakia's first Defense Minister, Imrich 

Andrejcak, criticized his successor Pavol Kanis' changes to the PFP 

presentation document as too expensive, arguing that the defense 

ministry would be required to spend 4.5 percent of its budget on 

PFP, rather than the one percent originally envisaged. 54 

In sum, although Slovakia evidenced commitment to the PFP
countries had joined the Partnership and 10 IPP's had been signe

the Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons was fully operation

(11 Partners had already appointed liaison officers to the Cell), an

three PFP exercises had been held that Autumn. The Brusse

communique reaffirmed that the Alliance: 

remains open to membership...[and] expects and would 

welcome NATO enlargement that would reach to democratic states to our East. [Accordingly, they made a decision 

to begin an extensive study] to determine how NATO will 

enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership, s5 

The study to determine the principles for NATO enlargement w

to be discussed at the May 1995 NATO meeting in the Netherlan

and would then be presented to the Partners prior to the next NA

meeting in Brussels in the Fall of 1995. 

On 2 December 1994, when the NACC foreign ministe

convened (along with those members who had joined PFP b

were not in NACC), they learned about the NAC decision to ini

ate a study to determine the modaLities for NATO enlargement

Reflecting the general view, Hungarian Foreign Minister Kova

responded that NATO enlargement should be gradual, pr

dictable, and transparent, s7 

Noordwijk NAC/NACC, May 1995. When the NAC met 

Noordwijk, the PFP program had expanded to 26 membe

(having added Austria, Belarus, and Malta since early 199

implementation of IPPs had quickly progressed, 14 countries ha

participated in the first cycle of the Planning and Review Proce

(PARP), the planned number of PFP peacekeeping exercises ha
NACC about the 30 May NAC ministerial session with Russian 

Foreign Minister Kozyrev s9 that had accepted the Russian IPP 

under PFP and produced the document on "Areas for Pursuance 

of a Broad, Enhanced NATO-Russia Dialogue and Cooperation. "~ The NACC also decided to publish the latest report from 

the Political-Military Steering Committee/Ad Hoc Group 

(PMSC/AHG) on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, which noted the 

extensive advances achieved in NATO peacekeeping since 

December 1994 in conceptual approaches and practical cooperation and interoperability in training, logistics, C3, and joint exercises.61 

Study on NATO Enlargement, September 1995. The Study on 

NATO Enlargement was briefed to the Partners in September and 

went a long way to further define the criteria for NATO membership. Chapter 1 openly stated that one purpose of enlargement was 

to encourage and support "democratic reforms, including civihan 

and democratic control over the military. ''62 The Study also made 

clear that it assumes active participation in PFP and expects new 

members to accept all rights and obligations of membership under 

the Washington Treaty. 

Chapter 3 outlined how the NACC and PFP would contribute 

to the enlargement process by developing necessary interoperability: 

PFP will help partners undertake necessary defense 

management reforms as they estabhsh the processes and 

mechanisms necessary to run a democratically controlled 

military organization, in areas such as transparent national 

defense planning, resource allocation and budgeting, 
While new members will not be required to achieve full 

interoprability with NATO before joining the Alliance, they 

will need to meet certain n@nimum standards essential to a 

functioning and credible Alliance. 6a 

In addition to the need for political and military interoper

bility, the study also stressed that new members should conform 

basic principles such as democracy, individual liberty, and the ru

of law; and demonstrate a commitment to economic liberty, soc

justice, and OSCE norms and principles involving ethnic mino

ties and in resolving territorial disputes. New members would al

have to ensure thaf adequate resources are available to assume t

added and considerable financial obligations of joining, and th

they should not "close the door" to later candidate members. 64 

Brussels NAC/NACC, December 1995. On 5 December 199

when the NAC foreign and defense ministers convened 

Brussels, they appointed Javier Solana as the new NATO Secreta

General and prepared for NATO's implementation of the milita

aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement by endorsing t

Implementation Force (IFOR)--JOINT ENDEAVOUR--with participa

ing countries. 6s 

The Final Communique explained that the NAC had be

tasked to provide a report before the Spring ministerial on t

resource and staffing requirements for the Partnership and (

enhance the effectiveness of the NACC), to generate, with t

partners, a more focused approach to cooperation programs, "wi

particular importance to...the development of civil military rel

tions and file democratic control of armed forces and good neig

bor relations. ''6a 
pgpg

and for some Partners to assume the responsibilities of membership. Third, the AUiance would consider the resource and staffing 

implications of enlargement. The NAC also decided that its 

December 1996 Ministerial would assess progress and consider the 

way forward. 67 

The next day, 6 December 1995, Acting Secretary General 

Solana informed the NACC Foreign Ministers about the NAC 

session, accepted offers by numerous NACC/PFP members to 

contribute to the IFOR, received status reports on the new NACC 

Work Plan for 1996-1997, and "stressed the importance of strengthening democratic control of armed forces and developing strong 

civil-military relations. ''68 The trail toward enlargement was clearly opening up. 

Berlin NAC, June 1996. On 3 June 1996, the Berlin NAC 

Communique reaffirmed the Alliance's commitment to open to 

new members, following the three-fold process adopted in 

December 1995. After receiving a report on the ongoing consultations in the individual, intensified dialogues with 15 interested 

countries, the NAC reiterated its desire for Secretary General 

Solana's report to the December 1996 session. 69 When the NACC 

convened on 4 June, its ministers stressed "the necessity of continuing cooperative efforts within the NACC/PFP framework to 

promote positive civil-military relations and to ensure the democratic control of armed forces, as important underpinnings for 

democracy, stability and security in the NACC area. T0 

Criteria for enlargement. While the Alliance has not precisely 

defined the necessary criteria for enlargement, the general standards would include: active participation in NACC and the 

Partnership program, the successful performance of democratic 
though, will be how to define and determine what constitute

"effective" democratic control of the military recognizing that eac

state has its own history, culture, and unique set of institutions. 

T he preceding pages have recorded the key events, decision

and agreements opening the trail for Central European coun

tries to move toward general membership in NATO. The body 

the study that foUows assesses the current state of democratic co

trol of the military and civil-military relations among those Centr

European states frequently referred to as the most likely to jo

NATO first. The study posits the following four (formal and "i

the-spirit o£') conditions as being necessary to determine wheth

a state is exerting "effective" democratic oversight and manag

ment of the military: 

1. A clear division of authority between president and th

govemmlent (prime minister and defense~interior minister) 

Constitutions or through public law. The law should clearly estab

lish who commands and controls the military and promotes mil

tary officers in peacetime, who holds emergency powers in crisi

and who has authority to make the transition to war. Underlinin

these formalities is evidence of the spirit of tolerance and respe

for legitimacy between president and government who may ofte

be from different parties or political persuasion. 

2. Parliamentary oversight of the military through control 

the defense budget. Its role in deploying armed forces in peacetim
need staff expertise and information support to provide adequate 

oversight and liaison with defense and interior ministries to help 

develop bipartisan consensus on defense and security. Shrdlarly 

intelligence oversight committees should provide access to opposition parties. 

3. Peacetime gover~mzent oversight of General Staffs and military commanders through civilian defense ministries. Defense 

ministry management should include preparation of the defense 

budget, access to intelligence, involvement in strategic planning, 

force structure development, arms acquisitions and deployments, 

and military promotions. 

In order to accomplish these objectives, defense ministries 

need "legitimate" civilian defense ministers. Two potential pitfalls 

need to be avoided: First, some defense ministries have become 

politicized because the defense minister and state secretary have 

been of different (majority or minority coalition) political parties. 

Second, some retired military officers who have become "civilian" 

defense ministers have permitted the general staff to coopt the 

defense ministry, rather than providing defense ministry oversight 

of the military. This situation has come about partly because of the 

scarcity of legitimate defense experts--civilian or military--who 

are capable of making the defense and security case to their legislatures and the broader public (though legislative liaison and 

public affairs). 

4. Restoration of military prestige, trustworthiness and 

accountability for the atoned forces to be effective. Having 

emerged from the communist period when the military was 
conduct for professional soldiers and conscript citizens that woul

allow soldiers to disobey orders if they are illegal. 

Military training levels and equipment must also be sufficie

to protect the state. Such sufficiencies require social support and 

predictable stream of material resources (defense budgets) that th

defense ministry can "sell" to the parliament and the broader soc

ety. This sufficiency did not exist in 1996. Most Central Europea

militaries retain only 50-55 percent of their 1988 manpower leve

and 40-45 percent of the defense budgets in real terms. Their read

ness, training, and modernization levels have deteriorated signif

cantly-in some cases raising questions about their capacity t

participate in coalition defense tasks. 

If these are the four conditions that NATO deems necessary fo

effective democratic control of the military, then certain Centra

European states could be viewed as approaching acceptabl

norms, but some would not currently qualify. Though Centra

Europe has already made enormous progress with the assistanc

of the United States and NATO/PFP in developing democrat

control of the military and in achieving more balanced civil-mil

tary relations since the 1989 revolutions, it is abundantly clear tha

continued work remains! 
2. London Declaration On a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance 

(Brussels: NATO Information Service, 5-6 July 1990), Articles 7 and 8. 

3. See Stephen F. Szabo, "Federal Republic of Germany: The 

Bundeswehr," in Jeffrey Simon (ed.), European Security Policy After the 

Revolutions of 1989 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press

1991), pp. 189-206. 

4. Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany, 12 

September 1990. U.S. Senate, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, Treaty 

Document 101-20, S-385-13, p. 6. 

5. Statement Issued By the North Atlantic Council Meeting in 

Ministerial Session, Copenhagen, 6-7 Jm~e 1991 in NATO Commmffques 

1991 (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1992), pp. 22-23. 

6. North Atlantic Council Statement, 21 August 1991 in NATO 

Communiques I991, pp. 24-25. 

7. Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, NATO Press 

Communique S-1(91)86, 8 November 1991, Article 11, pp. 4-5. 

8. For a thorough overview, see Stephen J. Flanagan, "NATO and 

Central and Eastern Europe: From Liaison to Security Partnership," The 

Washington Quarterly (Spring 1992). 

9. "Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation," NATO 

Press Commm~ique M NACC-1 (92)21, 10 March 1992. 

10. "Final Communique issued by the North Atlantic Council in 

Ministerial Session," NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1 (92) 51, 4 June 

1992, p. 4. 

11. "Statement Issued At the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 

Oslo, Norway," NATO Press Communique M-NACC-1 (92)54, 5 June 

1992, p. 2. 

12. "Final Communique issued by the North Atlantic Council in 

Ministerial Session," NATO Press Communique M-NAC-2(92)106, 17 

December 1992, p. 2. 

13. "Statement issued by the Meeting of Defense Ministers," NATO 

Press Communique M DMCP-l(93)28, 29 March 1993, p. 3. 
16. Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Cooperation Cotmcil in 

Ministerial Session," NATO Press Communique M-NACC-1(93)39, 11 

June 1993, p. 1. 

17. "NACC High Level Seminar on Peacekeeping," NATO Press 

Release (93)45, 25 June 1993. 

18. "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government issued by the 

North Atlantic Cotmcil in Brussels, Belgium," NATO Press Communique 

M-1(94)3, 11 January 1994, pp. 2-3. The declaration stressed the develop

ment of separable but not separate capabilities. 

19. NATO's 11 January 1994 Declaration noted: "We expect and wel

come NATO expansion that would reach democratic states to our East, as 

part of an evolutionary process, taking into accoualt political and securi

ty developments in the whole of Europe." Ibid., p. 4. 

20. Ibid., p. 5. 

21. For a discussion of this see m); "Partnership For Peace," Join

Force Quarterly (JFQ), No. 5 (Summer 1994), pp. 36-45. 

22. Warsaw PAP, 7 January' 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-O06 (10 January 1994)

p. 1. 

23. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 6 (11 January 1994), p. 3. 

24. Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk inten, ie~; Paris Le 

Quotidien de Paris, 10 January 1994, p. 14. FBIS-EEU-94-O07 (11 January 

1994), p. 25. 

25. Lech Walesa interMew, Prague Lidove Noviny 10 January 1994

pp. 1,5. FBIS-EEU-94-O08 (12 January 1994), p. 23. 

26. Prague CTK, 12 January 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-010 (14 January 

1994), p. 1. 

27. Warsaw Rzeczpospolita, 19 January 1994, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-94-O12 

(19 January 1994), p. 20. 

28. Antwerp Gazet Van Antwerpen, 3 February 1994, p. 5. FBIS-EEU94-024 (4 February 1994), p. 17. 

29. Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network, 15 February 1994. FBIS-EEU94-032 (16 February 1994), p. 25. 

30. Warsaw PAP, 26 May 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-102 (26 May 1994), p. 15
35. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 173 (12 September 1994), p. 4. 

36. Hamburg DPA, 28 July 1994. FBIS-WEU-94-150 (4 August 1994)

p. 15. 

37. Berlin DDP/ADN, 1 September 1994. FBIS-WEU-94-170 (1 

September 1994), p. 16. 

38. They met in Warsaw in July, and for the fourth time in Bamberg 

in September. 

39. General Henning yon Ondarza interview. Warsaw Gazet

Wyborcza, 9 August 1994, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-94-153 (9 August 1994), pp. 20

21. 

40. Warsaw Polska Zbrojna, 12 September 1994, pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU-94

177 (13 September 1994), p. 19. 

41. Budapest MTI, 13 January 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-010 (14 January 

1994), pp. 9-10. 

42. On 5 December the Hungarian Parliament accepted the IPP by a 

vote of 236 for, and one abstention. 

43. Budapest MTI, 1 September 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-171 (2 Septembe

1994), p. 10. 

44. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview, Magyar Nemzet, 15 

October 1994, p. 7. FBIS EEU-94-201 (18 October 1994), pp. 23-24. 

45. Instead, Hungary sent two observers. 

46. Gyorgy Keleti interview, Budapest Duna TV, 20 November 1994

FBIS-EEU-94-225 (22 November 1994), p. 18. Hungary committed 400 

million forints ($3.5 million) for the PFP program for 1995. OMR/Daily 

Digest, 4 January 1995, pp. 4-5. 

47. FBIS-EEU-94-117 (17 June 1994), p. 13. 

48. Prague CTK, 7 March 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-049 (14 March 1994)

p. 8. 

49. Prague Radiozun~l Radio Network, 29 May 1994. FBIS-EEU-94

104 (31 May 1994), p. 18. 

50. Prague CTK, 3 August 1994. 

51. Prague CTK, 12 October 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-199 (14 Octobe

1994), p. 5. 
54. Prague CTK, 1 June 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-106 (2 June 1994), p. 14. 

55. "Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, 1 December 1994,

Press Communique M-NAC-2(94)116, p. 3 (emphasis added). 

56. "Chairman's Summary of North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 2 

December 1994," Pres Communique M-NACC-2(94)117 (2 December 

1994), p. 1. 

57. Budapest MTI, 2 December 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-233 (5 December 

1994), p. 11. 

58. "Final Commtmique, North Atlantic Council, 30 May 1995," Press 

Communique M-NAC 1(95)48 (30 May 1995), p. 3. ha marked contrast, in 

reference to CJTF, the Communique noted that "more remains to be 

done." Ibid., p. 5. 

59. Chairman's Summary of the North Atlantic Council, 31 May 

1995. Press Communique M-NACC-1(95)49, p. 1. 

60. Building on the NAC's 22 June 1994 agreement with Andre

Kozyrex; the 31 May 1995 three-section document included: (1) Sharing o

information in European political-security matters; (2) political consulta

tions on issues of common concern; and (3) cooperation ha peacekeeping 

through ad hoc 16+1 discussions with the NAC and Political Committee

61. "Report to the Ministers by the Political-Military Steering 

Committee/Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, Meeting o

the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 31 May 1995," NATO Press 

Release M-NACC-1(95)50, pp. 1-3. 

62. Study On NATO Enlargement (Brussels: September 1995), p. 2. 

63. Ibid., p. 13. 

64. Ibid., pp. 22-25. 

65. "Statement On Bosnia-Herzegovina, 5 December 1995," Press 

Communique M-NAC 2(95)119. 

66. "Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, 5 December 1995,

Press Communique M-NAC-2(95)18, p. 5. 

67. Ibid., p. 5. 

68. "Chairman's Sum.mary of North Atlantic Cooperation Comlcil, 6 

December 1995," Press Commtmique M-NACC-2(95)120. 

Nor~ Sea 

' ::::::::::::::::::::::: ~:::.~::::z:::..:: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::: .:.~:.:. 

• Bremen 

-~- Berlin 

Hannovere 

• Essen 

• Cologne 

• t3onn 

(FRG) 

GERMANY 

• Leipzig 

(GDR) 

Dresden • 

Franidurt 

8m Main • 

Nuremburg • 

Munich • 

So4Jrce: CIA Map 802
E ast Germany foUowed a very different path than Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia because external forces predominantly defined the ultimate course of the revolution. In 

Communist East Germany the Socialist Unity Party (SED) lost total 

control of the situation propelling the state toward dissolution. 

The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (and later the USSR, the 

United States, Britain, and France) created the conditions for 

Germany's ultimate reunification within the NATO security 

umbrella. 

Erich Honecker, as party and state leader of the German 

Democratic Republic (GDR) from 1971-1989, was responsible for 

shaping the GDR of the late 1980s. With the help of the Berlin Wall, 

erected in 1961, he set the GDR on a stable course of political and 

economic development. During the 1970s, much of the GDR's 

domestic policy reflected an attempt to raise the standard of living 

(consumer communism) in return for which East Germans were 

expected to accept stricter controls on Western contacts and make 

efforts to neutralize sources of opposition. The end of the GDR's 

self-imposed isolation commenced when Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik 

led to the opening of diplomatic relations with Bonn. Honecker's 

more open foreign policy transformed the GDR from an international outcast to a legitimate member of the international community. 

All of this changed in 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms 

in the Soviet Union and socialist community dramatically altered 

35 
In May 1989, Hungary dismantled its barbed-wire barrier o

the Austrian border, then announced on 10 September that the bor

der would be opened. News of this opening had immediate con

sequences in the GDR. By the end of September more than 45,00

East Germans had made a frenzied exit to the West, 2 demonstrat

ing that the GDR was in desperate need of reform. When th

largest protests since the failed workers' uprising in June 195

spread in East Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig and elsewhere in earl

October, the legitimacy of the regime came into serious question

Several opposition groups formed--the most notable among them 

being the New Forumwbut they needed to overcome their div

sions and to work openly for alternatives. 

The riots kept spreading. On 16 October when 100,000 protest

ers rallied in Leipzig, the SED ousted Erich Honecker. Two day

later Egon Krenz replaced Honecker as head of state, SED Genera

Secretary, and Chairman of the Defense Council. 4 Despite the lead

ership change, the riots continued. Only after 300,000 protester

had marched in Leipzig on 23 October, did one member of the SED 

politburo finally meet (on 26 October) with the New Forum for th

first time. s This concession led to new protests demanding fre

elections, the ouster of the secret police, and the legalization of th

New Forum. 

Although Egon Krenz attempted to associate himself with th

reform by meeting with Gorbachev and Lech Walesa and promis

ing far-reaching change, he could not stem the revolutionary tide

When thousands of East Germans packed the FRG embassy i

Prague to seek asylum, Krenz announced on 3 November 1989 tha

they were free to travel to West Germany. By 8 November, afte

50,000 more East German citizens had crossed the Czechoslova
p

of the 478-member People's Chamber (Volkskammer) elected Hans 

Modrow the new prime minister.0 The SED then issued an "Action 

Program" outlining a number of political reforms, including 

round-table discussions with political parties and the call for free 

elections, which were held on 18 March 1990. 

Uncompleted Defense Reform 

One of East Germany's immediate defense reform requirements was to establish civilian [executive and legislative] com

mand and control over the defense ministry, secret police, and the 

National People's Army (NPA). This control was essential because 

during the revolutionary period--in October and again 

November--the government nearly employed military force 

against the people. Furthermore, because the lines of authority 

were unclear, the NPA was not always under lawful control

Adding immense complication and uncertainty to the situation 

was the enormous (roughly 17-division) Soviet Western Group o

Forces (WGF) troop-presence. 

During the domestic unrest leading to the revolution in Eas

Germany, Defense Minister Heinz Kessler signed Order No

105/89 on 27 September 1989, an order increasing the state of com

bat readiness along the borders, around Berlin, and in Leipzig. lo 

During protest demonstrations in early October, Honecker ordered 

(on 7 October) that rubber truncheons and live ammunition be dis

tributed to the army, to the People's Police, and to State Security 

Police if necessary. 11 Violence was averted only when Egon Krenz

then SED politburo member in charge of security, flew to Leipzig 

(on 9 October) and unilaterally canceled Honecker's order, there
tion relaxed only when moderates prevailed and the GDR government announced the opening of its borders and the Berlin Wall on 

9 November. 13 

Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann has alleged that when for

mer Defense Minister Heinz Kessler ordered the 1st Motorized 

Infantry Division in Potsdam to "close" the wall on 11 November 

1989, the NPA General Staff withdrew the order. 14 Heinz Kessle

rejected Eppelmann's allegation as false. 15 Admiral Theodur 

Hoffmann supported Kessler, noting that discussions "always 

revolved around support for the police in the second line, but 

never around the deployment of the NPA against demonstrators or 

the people. "16 

Despite reports that the readiness level of units of the Sovie

Western Group of Forces had been raised, 17 Soviet Chief of the 

General Staff Moiseyev went out of his way to make clear that the 

WGF remained neutral: "Our military were in no way involved

They were instructed not to intervene in any matters pertaining to 

domestic interrelations in the fraternal countries. Everything tha

is happening there is the sole concern of each individual coun

try."18 

When the People's Chamber replaced WLIli Stoph with Hans 

Modrow as prime minister on 13 November 1989, they also elect

ed Guenter Maleuda, of the small Democratic Farmer's Party, to 

replace Horst Sindermann as People's Chamber president and 

replaced 27 members of the old Parliament. Admiral Theodor 

Hoffmann replaced Heinz Kessler as defense minister on 15 

November, immediately making it clear that: "! am only account

able to my prime minister and to the People's Chamber" (see Table 

3.1 below). 19 
M. Gerlach (12/89) de Maiziere (4/90) 

[ Defense I, 

Council I 

I 

i o 0'eo I I couoc, o' I 

Chamber Ministers 

Elections 

18 March 1990 

I MOND I 

I N A" I Border Guard 

(H. Kessler) T. Hoffmann (11/89); 

R. Eppelmann (4/90)--civilian 

• Accountable to PM and People's Chamber (11/89) 

• Commission for Mil. Reform (11/89) 

National People's Army 

CoS (H.-W. Deim); T. Hoffmann (4/90) 

On 18 November, the People's Chamber confirmed Hans 

Modrow's new 28-member Cabinet, which included 17 

Communists and 11 members from four parties closely allied to 

the SED. The People's Chamber also established special commis

sions to consider constitutional changes, work out a law for demo

cratic elections, and investigate abuses and corruption of forme

Communist officials. The main consideration was to chang

Article 1 of the Constitution--the article that assigned the leading 
officially shifted away from the Communist Party to Prime Min

ister Hans Modrow and his Cabinet. In early December Gregor 

Gysi replaced Egon Krenz as SED secretary and Manfred Gerlach

of the Liberal Democratic Party, became head of state and thus 

head of the Defense Council. al As a result, control over the NPA 

now resided solely with the new Government and Defense 

Minister Theodur Hoffmann. In mid-December the Cabine

announced that it would dissolve the secret police and name a new 

civilian supervisor, directly subordinate to the prime minister, to 

head two new intelligence agencies. 22 

The issue of German unification was broached early. In Eas

Germany free elections were increasingly seen as a prelude to 

some form of national plebiscite for reunification with the FRG. In 

West Germany, on 28 November 1989, Chancellor Helmut Koh

presented a 10-point outline to the FRG Parliament for creating a 

German federation that would eventually lead to the reunification 

of the two German states, aa The Soviet Union issued a harsh cri

tique of the plan describing it as "fraught with dangerous conse

quences [and] bordering on outright diktat. "24 When Eas

Germany's battered Communist Party held its "first" round-table 

discussions on 7 December with new opposition political groups 

led by the New Forum, the SED agreed to adopt a new 

Constitution, hold free elections by 6 May 1990, and seek a formu

la for unifying the two German states. 2s When Kohl and Modrow 

met for the first time on 19 December, they agreed to reopen 

Berlin's Brandenberg Gate, introduce free movement for al

Germans by Christmas, and sign a treaty establishing future forms 

of cooperation. 

During January 1990, it became clear that the Communists had 
convened an emergency session on 21 January 1990. Though SED 

leader Gregor Gysi managed to prevent disbandment, he admitted 

that the SED had been unsuccessful in making the transition from 

Stalinism to democratic socialism. The SED expelled 14 part

leaders, including Krenz.28 

With the SED's collapse, the East German Government als

experienced crisis. Prime Minister Modrow claimed that he coul

maintain stability only if the opposition joined the Communist-le

coalition. On 29 January, the opposition, for its part, agreed to cre

ate a "grand coalition" on the condition that Modrow and all cab

inet members renounce their party affiliation until after the elec

tions (which were moved up to 18 March from 6 May), that th

opposition gain key cabinet posts, and that the round-tabl

approve all legislation. 27 

At the 17 March 1990 Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers session i

Prague, all seven members of the Pact agreed to Germany's righ

to unify, but they disputed the formula for unification. Sovie

Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze ruled against NATO 

membership for a united Germany, but Hungary, Poland, an

Czechoslovakia argued that a united Germany in NATO woul

benefit European stability! 

The 18 March 1990 East German democratic elections to th

400-seat People's Chamber produced a resounding call for quic

reunification and a market economy by electing a coalition of con

servative parties allied with the FRG's ruling Christian Democrats

Of the 24 political parties in the People's Chamber, the conserva

tive three-party Alliance for Germany coalition--comprising th

Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Democratic Awakening, an

German Social Unionmwon 193 seats. The Social Democratic Part
the Constitution (which according to Article 63 required two

thirds majority in the People's Chamber) 3° and hasten unification

De Maiziere named Rainer Eppelmann, a civilian who heade

Democratic Awakening, minister of disarmament and defens

(Eppelmann accepted the position only on condition tha

"disarmament" be in his title), 31 and appointed the former defens

minister, Admiral Theodur Hoffmann, as the new Chief of Staff. 

The drive toward German unification accelerated. On 2

March 1990 the FRG and GDR agreed in principle to draf

economic and monetary union plans by the end of April and t

implement them on 1 July. The strategy was to sign a treaty i

which East Germany would adopt the FRG's tax laws, eliminat

price subsidies for consumer goods, and give Bonn's Bundesban

authority over monetary affairs. 32 De Maiziere's plan for unifica

tion involved invoking Article 29 of the FRG Constitution tha

allowed East Germany's five separate states (laender) to appl

directly to Bonn for admission to the FRG. 33 But this actio

required a change in the GDR Constitution because these state

had been abolished by the Communists, so therefore had to b

recreated. In July the People's Chamber recreated the laender struc

ture to facilitate unification. ~ 

Though Lothar de Maiziere supported a unified German

within the European Community (now Union) and NATO, an

agreed with the FRG position that no NATO troops should be sta

tioned on East German territory, the Soviet Union still differed o

the formula for a united Germany. On 12 April, the People

Chamber voted to approve NATO membership for a unite

Germany, but only if NATO were to change its strategy, as On 

June 1990, when President Mikhail Gorbachev met with Presiden
revision of NATO doctrine. Gorbachev reportedly argued tha

these concessions were "not enough. "36 

Although Gorbachev consistently rejected the German-reunifi

cation-within-NATO formula, his concession to President Helmu

Kohl in July 1990 illustrated that he really had little choice in th

matter. In reality, Soviet control had been ceded in November 1989 

when the GDR failed to stabilize the domestic situation as 

reformed communist state; de facto unification occurred on 1 July 

with the economic and monetary union of the two German states

In addition, the Soviets had to decouple political unification from 

the security issue when they conceded that aU-German election

could occur irrespective of the Two-Plus-Four (the two Germanies

plus the U.S., USSR, U.K., and France) agreement, which wa

signed on 12 September 1990. 37 

On 20 September, the GDR People's Chamber voted 299-80 and 

the FRG Bundestag voted 442-47 to ratify a treaty 38 by which th

GDR would discard its constitution and adopt nearly all the FRG'

laws when official unification occurred on 3 October 1990. When 

the People's Chamber dissolved upon unification, 144 of its 40

members joined the FRG's expanded Bundestag a9 until the new all

German parliamentary elections were held on 2 December 1990

Those elections returned Helmut Kohl to power; Kohl's Christian 

Democratic Union coalition with Hans Dietrich Genscher's Fre

Democrats controlled 392 of the Bundestag's 656 seats. 40 

Armed Forces Reform 

East German armed forces reforms never had a chance to full

develop between the initial riots in October 1989 and unification i

October 1990. The Warsaw Pact's May 1987 so-called defensiv
and the Soviet Union's 12 September 1990 concession to permit 

370,000 total German force within NATO by 1994 (by the Fou

plus-Two agreement). 

The 12 September 1990 Kohl-Gorbachev agreement set th

ground rules for the new military posture and the details of th

Bundeswehr-NPA merger agreement. The all-German armed force

would be reduced to 370,000 by 31 December 1994, when th

Soviet WGF also would have withdrawn from Germany. On 3

June 1991 when Bundeswehr Command East disbanded, the pe

sonnel strength of the Bundeswehr in eastern Germany was 56,00

soldiers. Of the original 32,000 NPA officers in September 199

only 9,500 were still serving in June 1991. Of these, 6,000 wer

granted two-year probationary contracts. Only 2,507 would ult

mately become permanently assigned to the Bundeswehr. 41 

With the 12 September 1990 Treaty, the Soviet Union accepte

East Germany's incorporation into NATO, while the FRG agree

to hold back NATO military presence in the former GDR unt

Russian troops had evacuated the territory in 1994. 42 In additio

according to Article 5: 

(3) Following completion of the withdrawal of the Soviet 

armed forces from the territory of the present German 

Democratic Republic and of Berlin, units of German armed 

forces assigned to military alliance structures in the same 

way as those in the rest of German territory may also be 

stationed in that part of Germany, but without nuclear 

weapon carriers. This does not apply to conventional 

weapon systems which may have other capabilities... 4a 
Notes 

1. Barbara Donovan and Ronald Asmus, "Erich Honecker: The Man 

and His Era," RFER, RAD Background Report/195 (19 October 1989). 

2. On 29 September Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn said 

that the treaty with the GDR on returning refugees would be suspended 

as long as there were East Germans in Hungary who did not want to g

back. 

3. Serge Schrnemann, "Security Forces Storm Protesters in Eas

Germany," The New York Times, 9 October 1989, pp. A1,6. 

4. Serge Schmemann, "East Germany Removes Honecker," The New 

York Times, 19 October 1989, pp. A1,8. 

5. Henry Kamm, "300,000 Reported To March," The New York Times

24 October 1989, p. A14; Serge Schmemann, "A Top East German Meet

Two Leaders of the Opposition," The New York Times, 27 October 1989, pp

A1,11. 

6. For the role of the Council of Ministers, see Chapter 3, Th

Constitution of the German Democratic Republic (Berlin: Intertext), pp. 113

114. 

7. Serge Schmemann, "East Germany's Cabinet Resigns," The New 

York Times, 9 November 1989, pp. A1,12. 

8. Barbara Donovan, "The Berlin Wall Comes Tumbling Down,

RFER, RAD Backgrom~d Report/205 (20 November 1989). 

9. Craig R. Whitney, "Premier Is Chosen," The New York Times, 1

November 1989, pp. A1,11. 

10. Die Welt, 20 December 1990, p. 6. FBIS-WEU-91-013 (18 Januar

1991), pp. 20-21. 
(y ), p

15. East Berlin ADN, 11 July 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-134 (12 July 199

p. 31. 

16. Hamburg DPA, 17 July 1990. 

17. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Soviet Union Raises Readiness of Forces in E

Germany," Washington Post, 8 December 1989, p. 21. 

18. Komsomolskaya, 7 January 1990, p. 1. FBIS-SOV-90-O06 (9 Janua

1990), p. 41. 

19. Theodor Hoffmann hlterview, National-Zeitung, 22 Novemb

1989, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-89-230 (1 December 1989), p. 66. On 25 January 19

Heinz Kessler was arrested for abusing his official powers and using h

office to commit cri.mh~al acts. 

20. Craig R. ~Pnitney, "East German Assembly Accepts Cabinet," T

New York Times, 19 November 1989, p. 1. 

21. Serge Schmemaru~, "East German Out As Chief of State," T

New York Times, 7 December 1989, pp. A1,20. 

22. Craig R. Whitne}; "Berlin Communists Outline Platform," T

Nc~v York Times, 18 December 1989, pp. A1,14. 

23 Ferdinand Protzman, "Kohl Offers An Outline to Crea

Confederation," The New York Times, 29 November 1989, p. A1. 

24. Francis X. Clines, "Kolxl's German Unity Plan Is "Dangerou

Soviets Say," The New York Times, 6 December 1989, p. 19. 

25. Serge Schmemaru~, "Commruxists and Foes Agree To a Free E

German Vote," The New York Times, 8 December 1989, pp. A1,16. 

26. "East German Party Expels 14 Leaders," The Washington Post, 

January 1990, p. 15. 

27. Marc Fisher, "E. Germany Broadens Rule, Moves Up Vote," T

Washington Post, 29 January 1990, p. A1. 

28. East Berlin ADN, 23 March 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-057 (23 Mar

1990), p. 29. 

29. Report On Eastern Europe, 13 April 1990, p. 32. 
g, p, pp,

33. Article 29 (New delimitation of Laender boundaries), Basic Lazo 

For the Federal Republic of Germany (Bomb: Press and hfforrnation Office of 

the Federal Government, 1991), pp. 19-21. 

34. Marc Fisher, "E. Germany Balking At Unity Pace," The 

Washington Post, 23 July 1990, pp. A13,18. 

35. Marc Fisher, "New East German Legislature Asks Forgiveness 

for Holocaust," The Washington Post, 13 April, 1990, pp. A1,21. 

36. Report On Eastern Europe, 15 June 1990, p. 52. 

37. Stephen F. Szabo, "Federal Republic of Germany: The 

Bundeswehr," in Jeffrey Simon (ed.), European Security Policy After the 

Revolutions of 1989 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press

1991), pp. 189-206. 

38. Marc Fisher, "Germalxies Approve Unity Pact," The Washington 

Post, 21 September 1990, p. A18. 

39. Marc Fisher, "Two Germanies Merge Into One," The Washington 

Post, 3 October 1990, pp. A1,28. 

40. The Social Democrats won 239 seats; the East German 

Communists, 17; and Alliance '90, 8 seats. Marc Fisher, "Grateful 

Germans Vote To Keep Kohl," The Washington Post, 3 December 1990, pp

A1,21. 

41. Frederick Zillion, "Unification of Germany's Military Forces," 

PhD Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, December 1995. 

42 This is a point made by Lawrence S. Kaplan, "Historica

Aspects," in Jeffrey Simon (ed.), NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options 

(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), pp. 31-32. 

43. "Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany and a 

Related Agreed Minute," Senate, 101st Congress, Treaty Document 101

20, September 26, 1990. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 1990), p. 6. 
• Szczecin 

~::~i!:~i~'~:,~. Wlelkopolsld 

Gdansk"e ~ -/ 

POLAND 

• Torun 

• Poznan 

• kodz 

-A- Warsaw 

Blalystok • 

• Wroclaw 

Lublln • 

Katowice 

Krakow 

Source: CIA Map 7356
S ince 1989, reform of Poland's 1952 Constitution--gradually 

transforming Poland from a communist to a democratic state-- 

has undergone six stages of development. The process began in 

1988 with an understanding reached between the government and 

the opposition within the framework of round-table talks. The 

Polish United Worker's Party's (PUWP) recognized political and 

trade union pluralism in return for the creation of a powerful new 

office of president. The second stage began with the Communist 

Party's overwhelming defeat during the June 1989 general parliamentary elections, in which only 35 percent of the Sejm seats were 

contested and resulting in the 24 August 1989 election of Tadeusz 

Mazowiecki as Poland's first non-Communist prime minister. The 

third stage commenced with the 9 December 1990 presidential 

elections which brought Lech Walesa to the presidency and the 

appointment of Jan Bielecki as the second non-Communist prime 

minister in January 1991. The fourth stage commenced after the 

full Sejm and Senate democratic elections held on 27 October 1991, 

which resulted in the rule of Jan Olszewski and Hanna Suchocka 

as Poland's third and fourth non-Communist prime ministers. The 

fifth stage started after the Fall 1993 Sejm and Senate elections, 

with the return of the socialists, the appointment of Waldemar 

Pawlak as prime minister, and the constitutional crisis in Poland. 

40 
ple with a rapidly changing threat environment. Before 198

Polish military doctrine viewed the West, specifically NATO, 

the primary threat. Until the 14 November 1990 Polish-Germ

border treaty, Poland viewed Germany as a threat. Then until t

August 1991 failed coup and resulting disintegration of the USS

in December, Poland viewed the Soviet Union as a threat. Sin

1992 Poland has come full-circle; it has successfully developed 

"all-round" defense strategy and signed agreements with its fo

less-stable eastern border states: Russia, Lithuania, Belarus, an

Ukraine. 

Stillborn Defense Reform 

To achieve democratic civil-military relations, Poland mu

establish consensus and law on civilian (president, governmen

and l~arliament) command and control of the defense ministry an

the military, the former Polish People's Army (PPA). Poland

reform has included amending the Constitution to formalize t

round-table agreements to create a new office of the president, 

office that for a long period lacked a constitutional basis. Polan

still must clarify the lines of authority between the president an

government (prime minister and civilian defense minister) and 

the government's control of the military in peace and war. So f

this effort has yet to succeed. 

In addition, the Polish reform had to refurbish the image of t

military and return the armed forces to Polish society. Because 

the extensive use of Polish armed forces in the Warsaw Pact inv

sion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, in suppressing strikers on t

Baltic coast in December 1970, and in planning and implementin
First Stage of Constitutional Reform (1988-June 1989) 

Not unlike the challenge in 1918, Poland's new Solidarity-led 

leadership took on an enormous problem without benefit of an 

established political structure. As Andrzej Korbonski has argued, 

when Poland reappeared after World War I (Poland had disappeared from the map of Europe in 1795), Poland's political leadership inherited empty political traditions. Having been formed 

from three different empires--German, Austro-Hungarian, and 

Russian--and with no more than 60 percent of its population actu

ally Polish, Poland was neither a state nor a nation. The Polish military also played different roles during the inter-war period under 

the Constitutions of 1921 and 1935. 3 

Constitutional problems. Many Poles perceived the system of 

government imposed by the Soviet Union and led by the Polish 

Communist government since World War 1I as contrary to the 

interests of Poland and its citizens. Although the 1952 Constitution 

guaranteed democratic rights, as Norman Davies has noted: "All 

chance of effective democracy was nullified by the extraconstitutional 'leading role' of the Party and its National Front as 

the 'guardian of the state'...the People's 'Democracy' was a legal 

fiction. The reality lay in the Party's dictatorship over the people. ''4 

When Poland began serious reform, it became immediately 

apparent how hopelessly outdated its 1952 Constitution was. For 

example, Chapter 5, entitled "Supreme Organs of State Administration," gave Parliament the power to appoint the Council of 

Ministers--the Prime Minister, vice-premiers, and ministers---but 

did not provide for a president, s Only in April 1989, after two 
Table 4.1 - Polish Defense Reform, 1988-91 

President (Jaruzelski 7/89), 

L. Walesa (12/90) 

PM (W. Rakowski 9/88), 

T. Mazowiecki 8/89, 

J. Bielecki 1/91, 

J. Olszewski 12/91 

LpOffice of 

resident J 

Defense Council 

(4/89) sub Sejm 

Nat. Sec. Council 

(1/91) sub to Pres 

i sEJM,, I I c°°nc"°' 5 SENATE (100) Ministers 

........... " ~ns 

J 6/89 35% Sejm/Sen; 

12/90 President; 

J 10/91 Sejm/Senate 

(F. Siwicki) R Kolodziejczyk (7/90); Jan Parys (12/91) 

2 dep civ MONs; Education (Komorowski) & Int Aft. 

(Onyszkiewicz) 4/90 

• Home Def Comm. (15); Pres, PM, MOI, MON, Finance 

• Sejm Comm. for Defense (20); Legis superv PPA 

• MON Soc. Consult. Council (PPA); inspec pol act. 

• Political Advisory Comm. (PM oversight) 

[• (p)-'~ Polish Armed Forces 

CoS (Jozef Uzycki); Zdzislaw Stelmaszuk (10/90) 
(p) ppy 

Senate was to serve as a higher deliberative body with veto power 

over the Sejm (though a two-thirds vote of the Sejm could override 

the Senate's veto) and, together with the Sejm, to elect the president for a six-year term.7 

Defense Council (KOK). During the Communist period, the 

Polish Defense Council CKOK) had been responsible for shaping 

the general guidelines of Poland's defense capabilities, but Poland 

had a pre-Communist history with such an organ of government. 

After the May 1926 coup, Marshal Pilsudski signed an executive 

order appointing a Committee for the Defense of the State to 

streamline his government. In fact, the ultimate supragovernmental agency to manage Poland's defense against Hitler's 

Germany was the Defense Committee of the Republic (KOR) created by Presidential decree of 12 May 1936. 

Established in 1958 by a Council of Ministers' Resolution and 

accorded increased powers after 1967, the KOK subordinated the 

defense and interior ministries to the PUWp.8 During the Martial 

Law period, the KOK flexed its power as state administrator by 

ordering the militarization of many enterprises and mobilization 

of employees after 13 December 1981. 0 

On 8 April 1989, a Constitutional amendment changed the 

Defense Council's role; it would no longer be a supragovernmental agency, but a collegial state organ, subordinate to the 

Parliament (the 460-seat Sejm and 100-seat Senate), working in the 

area of defense and national security and establishing general 

principles of national defense, including defense doctrine. 1° The 

KOK was now chaired by the President of the Republic, with the 

prime minister, the ministers of defense and foreign affairs as 

deputies. It also included the head of the President's Office, the 
(T)he Superior of the Armed Forces is the President of the 

Polish Republic. The Supreme Commander of the Armed 

Forces...in wartime is appointed by the Sejm. 

In the event of war an appropriate operational grouping 

remaining under national command and acting as part of 

the Combined Armed Forces...of the Warsaw Pact, is isolated from within the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic. 

The authorities of the Polish Republic...retain their influence on decisions affecting the use of that grouping in consonance with national interests, la 

In sum, though this period witnessed a number of amen

ments to the 1952 Constitution resulting from round-table agre

ments, many problems remained. First, since 8 April 1989 Poland

president, not the PUWP secretary, has acted as the de jure Nation

Command Authority (NCA) 13 and chaired the Defense Counc

which became a collegial state organ subordinate to the parli

ment. Though the April 1989 arrangement initially did not chan

the de facto command situation because PUWP leader Wojcie

Jaruzelski became Poland's president, the PUWP's power was cu

tailed on the Defense Council. (De facto control would fina

change in December 1990 with Lech Walesa's election as pre

dent.) Second, since its emergence Solidarity advisers and leade

had little interest in military affairs. Hence, when they joined t

1988-89 round-table deliberations, they had little understanding 

the military. Third, the Martial Law period also helped to co

tribute to another civil-military problem in that it afforded t

middle generation of Polish officers--many who had now becom
Second Stage of Reform (June 1989-December 1990) 

Parliament's revival. The second stage began with the June 

1989 elections, which resulted in a resounding Communist defeat. 

Solidarity won all of the 161 Sejm seats (35 percent) and 99 of the 

100 Senate seats up for election. The PUWP was further humiliated on 19 July when its presidential candidate, Wojciech Jaruzelski, 

received the absolute minimum number of votes in the Parliament 

to be elected. After the appointment of Tadeusz Mazowiecki as 

Poland's first non-Communist prime minister in August, Poland's 

Parliament began to exert greater political influence and authority 

and the Communist Party's disintegration began. 

During December 1989 the new Sejm and Senate created separate constitutional committees to draft new versions of the enO_re 

charter. They also adopted on 29 December 1989 a Bill of Amendments to the Polish Constitution which restored the name 

"Republic of Poland" to the state and replaced the descriptive 

phrase "socialist state" with one describing Poland as a "democratic state." Many provisions of the 1952 Constitution were deleted; among them were those calling for protecting the achievements of socialism, concerning alliances and friendship and cooperation with the USSR, and the leading role of the PUWP. is 

Defense Ministry changes. Concerned about oversight of the 

military, Solldamty sympathizers also created a number of ad hoc 

oversight bodies to remove the Communist Party's influence and 

ensure government control over the defense ministry during 1989- 

1990. First, they created a 15-person Home Defense Committee to 

oversee the defense ministry. Chaired by the president, it included 

the prime minister, the ministers of interior, finance, and defense
national defense (MON) Social Consultative Council, composed o

all the political forces represented in the Sejm. The Council main

tained advisory capacity and inspection authority, and supervise

the social conditions within the military and the program of civi

education.18 

Fourth, on 11 December 1989 the Council of Ministers adopte

a resolution establishing the Political Advisory Committee com

prising seven to nine members of Parliament and a representativ

of the president. Members were appointed by the defense ministe

and subject to recall by the prime minister. The Political Advisor

Committee examined issues and provided opinions and consulta

tions on questions coming within the defense ministry's power. 

was an advisory body without the authority to contradict the hier

archical command of the army. 10 

Finally, on 3 April 1990, Prime Minister Mazowiecki appointe

Bronislaw Komorowski and Janusz Onyszkiewicz--two Solidarit

intellectuals--to become Poland's first civilian deputy defens

ministers, responsible for educational (formerly political) trainin

within the armed forces and international military affairs respec

tively. Though this extremely important reform represente

Poland's first attempt to provide direct civilian oversight over tw

sensitive areas of defense policy, a0 it would take the tw

appointees time to familiarize themselves with the personne

structure, and informal arrangements within the military. 

Between December 1989 and April 1990, Mazowiecki disman

tled the Main Political Administration (MPA) and created 

Central Education Board, which was to depoliticize the military

Deputy Defense Minister Komorowski took over the Centra

Education Board (renamed Department of Education) in Apr
al ties, including those with the Soviet Northern Group of Forces 

(NGF) in Poland, Visegrad neighbors Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the WEU, and NATO. 

Then, on 7 July 1990, Prime Minister Mazowiecki replaced 

Defense Minister Florian Siwicki with Vice-Admiral Piotr 

Kolodziejczyk, an officer rumored to be unsympathetic to the 

USSR. Another important change occurred in October when 

General Zdzislaw Stelmaszuk was appointed Chief of the Genera

Staff. Stelmaszuk was the first Polish officer since World War II to 

hold the post who did not attend a Soviet staff coUege. 21 

Claiming "concern to prevent undesirable public sentimen

[and to] promote democracy, "22 President Jaruzelski, in the second 

year of his six-year term, notified the Sejm in September 1990 tha

he wanted to step down. Jaruzelski asked the Sejm to mandat

presidential elections by universal vote, an act that required a 

change in Poland's Constitution. 

In sum, the second reform period witnessed the disintegration 

of the Communist Party and was marked by efforts of the 

Mazoweiecki government to revitalize what had been a moribund 

Parliament, to grasp the levers of control of the defense ministry 

and begin to think about military reform. 

The Third Reform Stage (December 1990-October 1991) 

Enhanced presidential powers. The third stage in Poland'

reform commenced with the 9 December 1990 presidential elec

tions that brought Solidarity leader Lech Walesa to power. Wales

immediately launched a new phase of reform to strengthen the 

position of the executive by transferring powers from the still pre
nated Senate grew to the point that they broke off all contacts wi

each other. 

With the apparent intention of enhancing the president's ro

in state affairs, Walesa reorganized the presidential staff of 200 in

four secretariats and expanded its political department. 2a He the

announced he would replace the Defense Council (KOK) with 

new organ, the National Security Council (NSC), which the Sej

finally accepted at the end of 1991. 24 The president would be th

Council's chairman, strikingly similar to his role in the KOK, th

prime minister would be his first deputy, and the foreign affai

and defense ministers would act as deputies. In addition, the mi

isters of interior and finance and the head of the president's cha

cellery and office of prime minister were members. 2s To enhan

Walesa's control, the President's Office --rather than the defen

ministry--now financed the NSC. 26 

The 13 February 1991 inaugural NSC session assessed th

security needs of interior and defense and discussed Polish-Sov

relations, focusing on the Soviet troop withdrawal from Poland. 

On 22 May 1991, NSC director Lech Kaczynski noted that Wale

aimed to expand presidential and NSC powers by legislati

means. Walesa sought the powers to appoint a commander in chi

of the Armed Forces in times of war and to deploy Poland's Arme

Forces not just during periods posed by a foreign threat, a8 

Walesa also created a National Security Bureau (BBN) 

replace the Defense Council (KOK) Secretariat. The BBN prepar

analyses and forecasts of Poland's internal and external situatio

as well as new defense doctrine. In effect, the BBN, which emplo

between 75 and 85 people in four departments--military, defen

systems, research, and legal and organizational 20 enhance
Parliamentary tensions. Tensions were also increasingly evident between the President and Sejm and the Sejm and Senate. In 

April 1991, the (Solidarity-dominated) Senate constitutional committee presented its own draft constitution outlining an essentially presidential form of government. In September the 

(Communist-dominated) Sejm committee presented its draft, 

which envisaged a parliamentary system with the President acting 

as an arbiter rather than as a chief executive, zl Increasingly frustrated with the Sejm, which still comprised 65 percent Communist 

membership, President Walesa wanted to acquire a nonCommunist Parliamentary mandate for change and called for Sejm 

elections two and a half years earlier than originally planned! a2 

Though Walesa's efforts initially met resistance, he prevailed and 

Poland held elections on 27 October 1991. 

During the failed coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991 

Poland tested its emergency machinery. Though Walesa saw no 

need to convene the NSC during the crisis, 3a Prime Minister Jan 

Bielecki created a crisis cell to provide accurate information about 

unfolding events, increase cooperation between the government 

and President Walesa, and prepare responses to possible contingencies. 34 Because Poland was the only Central European country 

then still hosting Soviet troops within its borders, it issued a relatively mild censure of the USSR during the crisis. 

Defense Ministry reform. In an effort to expand presidential 

authority in security affairs, in February 1991 Walesa and Bielecki 

announced plans to appoint a civilian defense minister, as as well 

as plans to restructure the defense ministry. They appointed 

Krzysztof Zabinski to set up an inter-ministerial reform commission comprised of four teams to: (1) transform the defense ministry 
organization. 37 

On 11 March 1991, Deputy Defense Minister Onyszkiewic

outlined the defense reform concept to the inter-ministerial com

mission. To convert the ministry into a civilian organ of sta

administration, a civilian minister was needed to head the min

istry aided by three civilian deputy ministers to handle admini

trative matters, leaving the Armed Forces to concentrate on com

bat readiness. Under the new plan, the president would appoin

the military Inspector General/Chief of the General Staff (Chief 

Staff) who would report directly to the defense minister. Th

reform intended that the separate administrative and comman

functions should stabilize the defense ministry because the chief o

staff would not necessarily change with each new government an

each new defense minister. Another intended reform was 

reduce the number of career servicemen employed in the defen

ministry from 3,000 to 1,500-2,000 and redistribute the excess t

military units, thereby increasing the percentage of professiona

in the forces. 38 

The 22 April 1991 session of the inter-ministerial commissio

for reforms agreed that the Polish Chief of Staff--General Inspe

tor of the Armed Forces--would become the supreme command

of the armed forces in wartime. In early June, Chief of Sta

Stelmaszuk announced the new organization of the General Staf

In peacetime, the Polish Chief of Staff would have three deputie

a first deputy for Strategic and Organizational Planning, a deput

for the Inspectorate of Training, and a deputy for the Inspectora

of Logistics. The General Staff consisted of 1,700 people, 1,20

career military and 500 civilians. 30 On 5 July 1991, Wale

announced that he intended to name Defense Minister Pio
within the armed forces and for organizing cooperation with the 

military chaplains' service; (2) a deputy for defense policy and 

planning, responsible for developing defense policy and a longrange concept for developing the Armed Forces to deal with 

Poland's external threats; and (3) a deputy for armaments and military infrastructure, responsible for the defense industry and for 

delivery, repair, and upgrading of weaponry and material. 41 

At the end of the third stage, Walesa and the Sejm where 

locked in a struggle over election procedures for Poland's first 

totally free Parliamentary elections scheduled for October 1991. 

Part of the bitter dispute involved designating the party affiliation 

of candidates; Walesa wanted Parliamentary candidates identified 

by name and party while Sejm Communists objected to party 

identification. On 21 June 1991 the Communist-controlled Sejm 

rejected the Solidarity-dominated Senate's amendments to the 

electoral procedures bill. When Walesa vetoed the Sejm's version, 

the Sejm overturned Walesa's veto. So the Communist-controlled 

Sejm dug in its heels and exerted its influence. 

The legislative-executive confrontation involved the balance of 

power between the Sejm and the president. The Sejm's 46-member 

Extraordinary Constitutional Committee had drafted a new Polish 

Constitution to be considered by the newly elected Parliament. 

Article 49 of this draft considered the Sejm the "supreme organ 

[empowered] to make laws, to appoint other State organs and to 

control their activities. "42 The freely elected Senate draft Constitution supported a presidential form of government. Walesa saw 

the Sejm as an impediment to his power and wanted its members 

removed. 
the 460-seat Sejm. 

The Democratic Union, 62 seats; 

Democratic Left Alliance (SLD--former Communists), 60; 

Catholic Electoral Action, 49; 

Polish Peasant Party (PSL--former allies of Communist~), 48

Confederation for Independent Poland, 46; 

Center Alliance, 44; 

Liberal Democratic Congress, 37; 

Peasant Accord, 28; 

Solidarity Trade Union, 27; 

Polish Friends of Beer Party, 16. 

Eleven parties won one seat each. 4a 

Tensions between President and government. Now totall

elected democratically, the new Parliament's coalition governmen

led by Prime Minister Jan Olszewski brought new legitimate ten

sions between presidential and prime ministerial authority; ten

sions exacerbated by ambiguities resulting from the absence of 

valid Constitution and by the new, fully legitimate but heavil

fragmented and weak coalition government seeking to exercise it

authority (see Table 4.2 below). 

The two draft constitutions were set aside and the new parlia

ment started the drafting process all over again. The crucial diff

culty was in constructing a working majority coalition in a parlia

ment fragmented by 29 different parties to obtain the necessar

two-thirds majority vote of both houses. 

Without a new constitution, Walesa continued to press hi

executive powers to the limit. On 31 December 1991, he publishe
and Senate speakers, the foreign, interior and finance ministers

the Chief of Staff, and one of the secretaries of state in the 

President's chancellery. While the NSC was to consider matters 

Table 4.2 - Olszewski Defense Reform, 1992 

President 

L. Walesa (12/90) 

Office of 

President 

Prime Minister 

J. Olszewski 12/91, 

W. Pawlak (6/92) 

SEJM (460) I Council of 

SENATE (100) I Ministers 

I 

Chief of 

Gen. Staff 

Stelmaszuk 

(10/90) 

Defense Council I 

(4/89) sub Sejm I 

Nat. Sec. Council I 

(1/91) sub to Pres I 

I 

Dep. Min. 

Int. Affairs 

Sikorski 

(2/92) 

Elections 

10/91 Sejm/Senate 

Defense 

Minister 

J. Parys 

(12/91) 

I 

Dep. Min. 

Education 

Szeremiewiew 

(2/92) 
lenging Walesa's authority as constitutional head of the Arme

Forces. In a move apparently not coordinated with the president

on 31 December 1991 Parys announced major defense ministr

house cleaning and reform, adding that he would retire Piot

Kolodziejczyk rather than make him the new Inspector General a

Walesa had earlier announced. 4s In early February, Parys adde

that he would not appoint an Inspector General unless "Parliamen

amend[ed] the Constitution. "46 Parys then dismissed Deput

Defense Minister Komorowski and named Romuald Szeremietie

to replace him. 47 On 11 February, Deputy Defense Ministe

Onyszkiewicz resigned 48 and Jan Parys named Radek Sikorski--

British subject--to replace him. 4g This appoinment was particular

ly disruptive to the military, who feared that Sikorski would lea

secrets to the West. In sum, many military officers were reinforce

in the view that civilians were unfit for directing national defense

and military secrets should be kept from them. 

As 1992 opened, it was clear that presidential authority ove

defense and security affairs was steaming a collision course wit

the government. Taking the offensive in January 1992, BBN direc

tor Jerzy Milewski argued that the president's authority ove

defense and security matters had to be expanded because the pres

ident was constitutionally responsible for these matters. Milewsk

pointed out that, while the civilian defense minister should be con

cerned with running the army, the president needed: 

greater authority at the army command level...during 

peacefime...[to include] the shape of the armed forces, 

whether they are to be divisions or corps, how they are to 

be deployed, and what their combat parameters should 
resignation of the new (and first) civilian defense minister, exacer

bated Polish civil-military relations, and brought the collapse o

the new, though weak, government coalition. The powers of the 

president, prime minister, defense minister, and Parliament stil

need to be clarified; until a valid constitution is adopted, Polish 

defense reform can not be achieved. 

Between 19-24 March 1992 the Sejm deliberated on the way

and means of preparing and adopting a new constitution; they 

finally decided that the Parliament's Constitutional Commissio

would first adopt a constitution which would then be ratified by 

national referendum, sl The arrangement was that over a six

month period the president, the 56 parliamentary members (4

Sejm and 10 Senate) of the Constitutional Committee, or th

Cabinet could submit drafts to the Parliament's Constitutiona

Commission. s2 The draft of the Small Constitution required a two

thirds vote of both houses of the National Parliament, followed by 

a national referendum. 

Unfortunately before the Small Constitution's completion, th

debate on relations between the Sejm and Senate, president and 

prime minister, and Sejm and president erupted into a political cri

sis on 6 April 1992 when Defense Minister Parys alleged that th

president's office had been planning new martial law contingen

cies, sa had illegally intervened in defense ministry affairs, and tha

President Walesa had sought the support of Silesian Militar

District Commander, General Tadeusz Wilecki by offering him 

General Stelmaszuk's position as Chief of Staff in return for sup

porting the military's direct subordination to the President. s4 

On 7 April, Prime Minister Olszewski placed Defense Ministe

Parys on extended leave, and Romuald Szeremietiew became act
and the Olszewski government fell. 

On 5 June 1992, the Sejm voted 273 to 119 for Prime Ministe

Olszewski's resignation and 263 to 149 for Waldemar Pawlak o

the PSL to form a government. When Janusz Onyszkiewic

became acting defense minister, he replaced Radek Sikorski a

deputy defense minister and pledged to "restore good cooperation 

with the presidential office and the foreign ministry. "57 This coop

eration was made evident when Onyszkiewicz and Jerzy Milewsk

announced on 26 June that they would implement the 199

defense ministry reform, which included creating the post o

General Inspector of the Armed Forces. 58 

After a month of failed attempts by Pawlak to form a coalition 

government, Hanna Suchocka became prime minister on 10 July

Suchocka retained Onyszkiewicz as defense minister and 

announced that the defense reform would continue, that the mili

tary command would be separated from the civilian administra

tion, and that the general staff would be streamlined (see Table 4.3 

below), s0 While Onyszkiewicz implemented the defense ministry 

reform recommended by the Zabinski Commission, he noted that

though the civilian defense ministry would employ civilians, in 

the foreseeable future "most employees [would] be military 

personnel, but work as civilians; that is, they [would] have no 

power to issue orders for the armed forces. "60 

Better relations between the president and government were 

reflected on 5 August when President Walesa named Genera

Tadeusz Wilecki as the new Chief of General Staff. 61 Then Wileck

transferred military district commanders to the General Staff and 

appointed trusted colleagues to key posts in all the reorganized 

military districts: Maj. Gen. Tadeusz Bazydlo to the Pomeranian 
itary matters. The defense ministry now had three department

Table 4.3 - Suchocka Defense Reform, 1992 

President 

L. Walesa (12/90) 

Office of ! I SEJM (460) 

President SENATE (100) 

i 

J. Milewski (1/91) I 

i 

I NSC/Nat Def Coun. 

(1/91) sub to Pres. 

I 

Chief of 

Gen. Staff 

T. Wilecki 

(8/92) 

I 

Dep. Min. 

Strategy 

P. Grudzinski 

(9F32) 

i 

Dep. Min. 

Training 

B. Komorowski 

(7/92) 

Prime Minister 

J. Olszewski 12/91, 

W. Pawlak (6/92) 

H. Suchocka (7/92) 

Council of I 

Ministers 

Elections 

10/91 Sejm/Senate 

Defense Minister 

J. Onyszkiewicz 

(6/92) 

I 

I 

Dep. Min. 

Logistics 

J. Kuriata 

(9/92) 
sion, he apparently expected the defense ministry would suppor

the military by seeking funding and more favorable legal regula

tions. When it became clear that the defense ministry would no

become an instrument to serve the needs of the General Staff, mis

understandings and clashes ensued. 

Though for the moment the new government seemed to 

resolve the Olszewski civil military crisis, Onyszkiewicz' prede

cessor Romuald Szeremetiew correctly criticized the 22 Octobe

1992 reform, arguing that the Polish Chief of Staff had "enormou

powers...[adding that the Chief of Staff] has been granted addi

tional powers by the president, so that he can now effectivel

bypass the defense minister in military matters. ''c~ 

Constitutional developments. During this period, signifi

cant advances also occurred on the Constitutional front. On 

August the Sejm mustered a two-thirds vote to adopt a Smal

Constitution that introduced a provisional presidential-parliamen

tary system defining relations between the legislative and execu

tive branches of government. 6s On 10 September, the Senate voted 

not to reject the Small Constitution, and on 17 November 1992

Walesa signed the "Constitutional Act on Mutual Relation

Between the Legislative and the Executive of the Republic o

Poland." 

The so-called Small Constitution voided the often amended 

1952 Stalinist Constitution. The basic law set up a framework 

similar in many respects to the parliamentary model of Germany

although it gave the president many more powers. Elected in 

general elections (Article 29.2), the President has a veto requiring 

two-thirds Sejm vote for override, has the right to approve all top 

military appointments, is the commander of the armed forces, and 
ident cannot recall the government, and the prime minister must 

consult with the president on the choice of foreign, interior, and 

defense ministers. The Cabinet is responsible only to the Sejm, and 

only the Sejm can dismiss it. 67 In sum, Poland's adoption of the 

Small Constitution created new rules for dividing power between 

the legislative and executive, enhanced the powers of the Cabinet, 

and symbolically abrogated the 1952 Constitution. 6a 

When the Small Constitution came into effect on December 8

1992, it was designed as a provisional measure until a full constitution could be written, enacted by the Parliament, and ratified in 

a national referendum. In October 1992, the Sejm and Senate held 

elections to the joint Constitutional Committee of the Parliament 

comprising 46 Sejm deputies and 10 Senators--representing all the 

major parties--to begin work on the constitution. Because of broad 

ideological differences within the committee, its leaders decided 

not to draft a new constitution themselves, but wait six months for 

drafts to be submitted to them. 

Two months later, in December, Walesa submitted to the Sejm 

a draft of a 49-article Bill of Rights and Freedoms to be passed as a 

constitutional law. By the Constitutional Committee's 30 April 

1993 deadline, seven draft constitutions had been submitted. 60 The 

task was to synthesize them into a coherent whole. Unfortunately

before significant progress could be made the Suchocka government lost a parliamentary vote of no confidence. On 28 May

President Walesa dissolved the parliament and empowered the 

government to act as caretaker until new elections could be held

As a result, all constitutional drafts had to be submitted to the new 

Constitutional Committee after the elections that were called fo

on 19 September. 70 
or ministry. The bill envisioned liquidating the KOK and estab

lishing the National Security Council, which would be the presi

dent's advisory body; it also sanctioned the division of the defens

ministry into civil and military departments. The Sejm Defens

Committee was on record as objecting to the National Guard

claiming that it could not control it. 71 The deep-seated issue

though, was that of the president's authority versus the govern

ment's authority to call-up armed forces. 

On 26 March 1993, Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz told the 

Sejm Defense Committee that the restructuring of the Polish Army 

and the General Staff was complete enough that now "We are talk

ing about adjusting the structure of troop deployments to new 

strategic concepts. ''72 Elaborating further, he said the ministry 

planned to redeploy its military forces so that 55 percent (rathe

than 75 percent) would be in western Poland and 45 percent in the 

east by the end of 1995 despite the absence of suitable infrastruc

ture there. 

Onyszkiewicz also noted that during the next few years the 

Polish Army would be restructured along NATO lines and that the 

outdated army-division structure would be replaced by a division

brigade structure. Each division would comprise three brigades-

two of them "empty" (filled only on mobilization) with the third 

fully manned and capable of entering combat within 24 hours

Each brigade would consist of 2,000 to 5,000 men equipped with 

the most modern equipment of Polish manufacture. 7a The pilo

district for the structural reforms was to be the newly-create

Krakow Military District (MD), which would have two assaul

landing brigades; each of the other three MDs would have one 

rapid-response unit. The Krakow MD's Sixth Assault Commando 
grated. Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz noted that adding civilian

to the defense ministry would be slow, that he needed expertise

that the military held most of the defense ministry executive posts

and "there are not many civilian counterpart experts. ''74 Deputy 

Defense Minister for Logistics and Armaments Jan Kuriata set up 

his department, which is responsible for research and develop

ment, arms procurement, and maintenance of infrastructure

rather quickly. Kuriata, though, complained that it was difficult to 

set up this department and separate jurisdictions with the Genera

Staff's Inspectorate for Logistics because "We were creating new 

structures not known to the defense ministry before. ''7s Thus 

began the defense ministry's efforts to acquire planning and man

agement functions in conjunction with the General Staff. 

NATO relations. The basic principles of Poland's defense strategy to achieve membership in NATO were established in the 

document "The Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the 

Republic of Poland" signed in November 1992. 76 Shortly after the 

second meeting of NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Counci

(December 1992), Onyszkiewicz noted that Poland's "participation 

in peacekeeping operations is of fundamental importance fo

bringing military integration closer. ''Tz (Poland has maintained a 

945-soldier peacekeeping battalion in Croatia since March 1992.) In 

a 28 May 1993 interview on Poland's prospects for joining NATO

Onyszkiewicz further noted, "I believe that there are no doubt

about that. The question is only when and what kind of proces

that would be. ''78 

The issue of Poland's joining NATO became a major one when 

Boris Yeltsin visited Warsaw on 25-26 August 1993. The ensuing 

joint declaration agreed that the last Russian troops would leav
NATO, that it was Poland's sovereign decision, and that takin

part in the pan-European integration was not against the Russia

interest. 80 Onyszkiewicz publicly noted that Poland's admission t

NATO "is almost inevitable. "81 Prime Minister Hanna Suchock

added that "[A] decision on membership and a timetable fo

Poland's acceptance ought to be taken at the Winter NATO meet

ing [January 1994 Brussels Summit]...[adding that] if NATO fails t

respond to these caIls...this would be a failure of the effectivenes

of the Western security system. ''aa 

Problems continued, however. On 15 September, Russia

ambassador to Poland Yuri Kashlev told reporters that Russia

stance on Polish membership in NATO had been "oversimplifie

and misunderstood...[that the Russian-Polish joint declaratio

refers to] eventual NATO membership in the larger process o

European integration [and suggested that the Alliance would firs

evolve into CSCE's military arm]. ''83 

In letters to the heads of Western states (France, Germany

United Kingdom, and the United States), Yeltsin expressed anxiet

over plans for NATO's expansion. This led to a great debate with

in the Alliance and to the 21 October meeting of NATO defens

ministers at Travemunde, Germany, where the issue of member

ship was deferred and the "Partnership For Peace" (PFP) program 

endorsed for the forthcoming January 1994 NATO summit

Central Europeans initially interpreted PFP as a NATO effort t

placate Russia, derisively referring to it as a "Policy Fo

Postponement." 

During the October 1993 crisis in Russia, though a Polish inter

agency team was set up, Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz worrie

that "the situation is different now. ''84 He contrasted the 1993 situ
good sense defensively. 8s 

In referring to the forthcoming elections, Onyszkiewicz 

stressed that the Army was apohtical and that every serviceman 

had the right to run in the elections on the ticket of any party s6 but 

outside of areas administered by the Army. a7 As the campaign 

heated up, there were numerous allegations that soldiers violated 

the election rules against campaigning in military units and 

garrisons. When Onyszkiewicz threatened to start disciplinary 

action, the Army backed down. 88 

At the end of the fourth stage, the ambiguity and differences in 

interpretation over command and control that caused the downfal

of Poland's first civilian defense minister and government of Jan 

Olszewski continued to be embedded in the Small Constitution

Although Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz brought new cooperation between the government and president, and began defense 

ministry efforts to establish oversight of the military, his efforts 

were frustrated by the General Staff. 

The Fifth Reform Stage (September 1993-December 1995) 

Poland's fifth reform stage began with the 19 September 1993 

Parliamentary election, which brought a bitter setback for the 

parties that descended from Solidarity and resulted in the return of 

former Communists to power. Of the 460-seat Sejm, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), dominated by former Communists, won 

a clear plurality of 20.5 percent and 171 seats. A former satellite 

party of Communists, the Polish Peasant Alliance (PSL) finished 

second with 15.4 percent and 132 seats. The Democratic Union 

(DU), the party of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Bronislaw Geremek, Jacek 
One of the significant differences in Poland's 1991 and 199

elections was the change in proportional representation. Poland

1991 electoral system, with its low electoral threshold and larg

electoral districts, had produced no fewer than 29 different partie

in the Sejm; none received more than 13 percent of the vote. I

contrast, Poland's new 15 April 1993 electoral law establishe

thresholds of 5 percent for single parties and 8 percent for coal

tions. Hence, the new electoral law succeeded in producing a les

politically fragmented Sejm in 1993, since only six parties or coal

tions managed to win seats. 

Poland's extreme proportional representation did produce 

rapid succession of cabinets; from December 1991 to Septembe

1993 it had 4 premiers and governing coalitions. Protracted par

liamentary infighting and prolonged executive vacancies were th

rule, spelling institutional uncertainty. In contrast, the 1993 elec

tions produced a coalition government of 2 (not 6) parties. But th

new electoral system also facilitated the return of forme

Communists to power and left almost 35 percent of the voter

(mostly right-of-center) with no representation in parliament. 

Constitutional developments. The new electoral system als

further politicized and complicated the constitution-makin

process. Soon after the election, the Parliament formed a new 

Constitutional Committee. It again consisted of 46 deputies and 1

senators, the majority of whom had entered Parliament for the fir

time. At its first meeting, the Committee elected as chairma

Aleksander Kwasniewski, one of the PUWP negotiators during th

round-table talks in February-April 1989 and leader of the pos

Communist SLD. Soon after the Constitutional Committee starte

its work, right-wing leaders questioned its legitimacy and create
organizations to express their opinions. The selection proces

continued through February and the major parties of the righ

announced that they would not participate. On 31 January 

President Walesa proposed that any group of 100,000 citizen

should be able to submit a draft constitution and have a represen

tative on the Constitutional Commission, but without votin

rights. In an unprecedented act, the Sejm rejected Walesa's propos

al (on 18 February) on first reading. Insulted, Walesa left th

Parliament and withdrew his draft constitution and his represen

tative from the Constitutional Committee. Kwasniewski claime

that Walesa's actions marked the opening of the presidentia

campaign. 

To moderate the charged political atmosphere, on 25 March th

Sejm changed the Constitutional Committee's mandate by endors

ing the idea that any group of 500,000 could present a constitu

tional draft and directing the Constitutional Committee to consid

er all seven drafts submitted to the 1989-1991 Parliament. Whe

the Senate accepted these changes in early April, so did th

President. Then Kwasniewski announced his intention to have th

Parliament adopt the Constitution and submit it to public referen

dum by the end of spring 1995, so that the fall 1995 presidentia

elections could be held under the new law. °° 

By 20-21 June 1994 six draft constitutions were presented to th

Constitutional Committee. On 5 September, the "Solidarity" labo

union submitted its own draft signed by nearly one million cit

zens. On 21-23 September the combined Sejm and Senate prelim

narily accepted all seven drafts and sent them to the Constitutiona

Committee, which was to prepare a constitutional debate the

write a unified draft for Parliament's consideration. But problem
ministers of foreign affairs, defense, and interior. The coalition

however, had allowed Walesa to make these appointments on hi

own. Paradoxically, the results of the September 1993 election

namely the reduction in the number of political parties, the tr

umph of the post-Communist parties, the relative weakness of th

center and the elimination of the right wing enabled Walesa t

preserve his strong position. 

When Prime Mil~ster Waldemar Pawlak began building hi

government, the three "presidential" ministries of defense, foreig

affairs and interior were slated to be assigned to candidates loy

to President Walesa. Defense went to Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczy

who had already served as defense minister in Poland's first tw

Sohdarity governments before civilians Jan Parys and Janus

Onyszkiewicz. Upon assuming office, Kolodziejczyk said that h

was a "civilian minister and would...set an example of how a civi

ian minister of national defense should work. ''01 

Kolodziejczyk noted that the most urgent issue for the Sejm 

was the new Law on General Defense Duties, which would resu

in a precise distribution of powers in controlling the state's defens

matters. This law would require drafting provisions concernin

national security and defense in the new Constitution. Th

Universal Military Training Act also needed amending regardin

identifying the government agencies responsibilities and power

identifying emergency powers, resolving the question of establish

ing a National Guard, and developing appropriate legislation fo

modernization of the national defense system, s2 Kolodziejczy

added that before he accepted his present position, Premie

Waldemar Pawlak had committed to back him on this project as 

condition of accepting the job (see Table 4.4 below). 
need to define by law the functioning of the defense ministry and 

Table 4.4 - Pawlak Defense Reform, 1993 

President 

L. Walesa (12/90) 

Prime Minister 

W. Pawlak (9/93) 

I Office of I 

President 

SEJM (460) 

SENATE (100) 

J. Milewski (1/91) 

H. Goryszewski (6/94) 

I NSC/Nat. Sec. Coun. I 

KOK/Nat. Def. Cte. 

I 

Chief of 

Gen. Staff 

T. Wilecki 

(8/92) 

I 

1st Dep. Min. 

Def & Soc Af 

I 

Dep. Min. 

Logistics 

Council of 

Ministers 

Def. Af. Cte I 

(KSORM)-4/94 I 

Elections 

9/93 Sejm/Senate 

Defense Minister 

P. Kolodziejczyk 

(10/93) 

! 

I 

Dep. Min, 

Leg. Rel. 

J. Milewski 

(11/93) 

J. Kuriata 

(9/92) 

D. Waniek 

(4/94) 
caring troops to the east would require "colossal expenses," 

would be better to construct mobile forces. 04 This marked a

apparent shift from his predecessor's policy. 

At a 17 November press conference, Kolodziejczyk announce

three defense ministry changes: (1) Jerzy Milewski, head of th

National Security Bureau, would assume a second hat as fir

deputy defense minister, taking over the tasks of both Grudzins

and Komorowski (ceding the civilian Department of Educatio

back to the military), 9s to "improve cooperation between th

defense ministry and the Office of National Security, as well 

between Belvedere and the government. ''°6 With Milewski holdin

both positions, Kolodziejczyk hoped to avoid duplicate function

in the Army and National Security Office. 07 (2) The size of th

defense ministry would be reduced to make it more efficient. (

Those areas of responsibility that have a bearing on the functio

ing of the armed forces would be transferred to the General Staf

Not only would the General Staff now consist of four inspe

torates: training, logistics, strategic planning, and organiz

tion/mobilization, it would also include special services (intel

gence and counterinteUigence). 08 

Concern about civilian control of the military remaine

evident when Jerzy Milewski defended the changes in the defen

minKstry by claiming they would preserve civilian control over th

armed forces. Milewski argued that the defense ministry was n

ceding control to the General Staff, that the changes were "corre

tions in the organizational structure" designed to more precise

define tasks and reduce the excessively large administration. H

also added that the lack of civilian experts meant that the defen

ministry departments would have to employ the military. °° 
external security and defines the NSC as l~s advisory body in 

security and defense, it does not define how he does this nor how 

the NSC relates to the KOK. in addition, the Law on the £opular 

Defense Obligation continues to include the KOK, a legacy of the 

Communist period. Though the Law states the KOK is the appropriate organ to discuss defense and security, it does not explain 

how this is to occur in practice. 

On 26 November, Walesa then chaired a meeting of the KOK 

which decided to reorganize itself into the NSC to be the highes

organ responsible for defense and security and headed by the president. Once the NSC starts functioning, a government Committee 

for Defense Affairs (KSORM), headed by the prime minister

would be responsible to execute the NSC's decisions. Since this 

change would require legislative changes, including constitutiona

provisions, the KOK asked the government to start the process. 10

But the KOK continued to operate in the absence of constitutiona

provisions for an NSC. 

By the end of January 1994, Kolodziejczyk expressed frustration with "new problems which I can not understand at all ''10

regarding the evolution of security institutions. He argued that the 

Sejm needed to adopt appropriate constitutional and legal provi

sions to define the scope of the president's and prince minister'

authority. Kolodziejczyk believed that it had been earlier agreed 

that the NSC would be the instrument where the president could 

influence the govern_ment's activities in the area of defense and 

that the prime minister should form a Committee of Defens

Affairs (from the government's representatives in the NSC) to sub

re.it proposals to the Council of Ministers and develop legislation 

for the Parliament. In addition, it was necessary to amend the 
terial power was Pawlaks desire to introduce deputy minist

from the Polish Peasant Alliance (PSL) and the Democratic L

Alliance (SLD) to the three presidential ministries. The coalit

government had permitted Walesa to choose the defense minis

but then it saw Kolodziejczyk's expansion of Milewski's duties 

an attempt to prevent the coalition from gaining access and inf

ence in the defense ministryJ °3 

Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk initially threatened to resig

the coalition introduced a political deputy minister in his mi

stry. 104 As pressure increased, he conceded that he was "open 

the coalition's choice of vice minister [but] not a political comm

sar. I need a man who will be well briefed for the job in subst

tive terms. ''los In the end, a compromise was struck. The coalit

put forth Danuta Waniek, an SLD Sejm deputy to be a dep

defense minister with responsibility to be the ministry's liai

with Parliament. 1°6 

Kolodziejczyk's frustration with the Parliament continu

although he had been promised increases in the defense budg

the Parliament decreased defense funding and mandated the mi

stry to spend 300 billion zlotys for Polish Irydia aircraft for 

Army. Preferring to spend the money for Huzar helicopters 

the restructured armed forces, the defense minister explain

"If the defense minister is supposed to bear constitutional resp

sibility for the Armed Forces' readiness....one must not tie 

hands with decisions on where and how money should be sp

because this way one will not succeed in making anything t

would make sense...Under the situation that has emerged, I w

submit a complaint before the Constitutional Tribunal. ''1°7 

Creating a Committee for Defense Affairs (KSORM). Fina
ministry and the Army. 108 

To a closed cabinet session on 4 May, Kolodziejczyk presented 

a document--"Defense Problems and Military Aspects of the 

Polish Republic's Security Policies"--that described plans to create 

a military post of Supreme Commander who would bear constitutional responsibility for strictly military issues such as training, 

mobilization, and operational planning (which was then under the 

defense minister's purview). The document presented two supervision options for consideration: the commander would report 

either to the president or the defense minister. The draft also envisioned creating a National Guard, but subordinate to the defense 

minister and not the president. 1°0 

On 19 May 1994, Prime Minister Pawlak presided over the first 

session of the Council of Ministers Committee for Defense Affairs 

(KSORM) to review Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk's document 

on basic defense problems. First, on the issue of organizational 

changes in the Army, it proposed that the three types of forces-- 

land, naval, and air--would be subordinated to the Chief of Staff, 

whose title would be changed to General Inspector of the Armed 

Forces. He, in turn, would be subordinate to the defense minister. 

This organization would require no changes to the Small 

Constitution. Second, it agreed to set up a crisis group to monitor 

threats to national security. Kolodziejczyk noted that the greatest 

threat to Poland's security was the Russian troop concentration in 

the Kaliningrad salient. Third, Kolodziejczyk presented a report 

that assessed the technical condition of the Army as "dangerous" 

and called for greater budget conunitments. 110 

When the government cabinet began to debate the revisions to 

the military command structure on 24 May, President Walesa 
reach agreement on which governmental body had constitution

authority over the chief of General Staff. 112 

A few days later, Poland's civil-military relations were furth

tarnished when defense ministry spokesman Colonel Wiesl

Rozbicki wrote in Gazeta Wyborcza that Poland should not ha

signed Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) because it weaken

the country and that shifting the Military Information Service (W

[intelligenc~ and counterintelligence]) from the ministry's civili

structures to the General Staff was good, because it was "better f

national security if a civilian minister does not have full inform

tion provided by WSI. ''113 Kolodziejczyk fired Rozbicki. 

The Drawsko Affair. In mid-June 1994 Jerzy Milews

resigned his position as head of the BBN, though he retained h

first deputy defense ministry portfolio, and President Wale

named Henryk Goryszewski to the post. 114 When the KOK met 

22 June, it recommended the document "Fundamental Problems 

the Polish Defense System" to the Council of Ministers. This doc

ment was similar to Kolodziejczyk's earlier document with o

significant exception; it omitted the contentious issue of to who

to subordinate the General Staff.11 s 

Open conflict over civil-military relations erupted between t

president and the government at a 30 September 1994 meeting 

military cadres at Drawsko Pomorskie training grounds. Chief 

Staff Wilecki, who had been offered the chief of staff position wit

out Defense Minister Jan Parys' knowledge in March 1992,

supported President Walesa's position to have the General St

subordinated to the president rather than the defense minister, a

he refused to support the defense minister when President Wale

polled the general officers on Kolodziejczyk's competence. 
the question whether President Walesa asked the generals at 

Drawsko to vote for or against Kolodziejczyk, Wilecki said: "I do 

not think there was a vote." Kolodziejczyk countered: "The president ordered a vote [on the question should the defense minister 

be dismissed]. All hands except two went up. ''11~ Later in a letter

Walesa admitted that after he asked the generals about reforms 

within the army at Drawsko, he decided to make personne

changes and ask Kolodziejczyk to resign. 

In an interview after the incident, former Defense Minister 

Janusz Onyszkiewicz charged that the General Staff supports presidential control. He offered as evidence his own experience (after 

the 1993 elections when parliament had been dissolved) of having 

various orders that he had issued as defense minister "either 

blocked or slowed [by the General Staff]. It was stalling for 

time.'.118 Onyszkiewicz urged the prime minister to reject the idea 

of Kolodziejczyk's possible resignation because it would indicate 

that the armed forces had successfully exerted influence on the 

appointment of the defense minister and thus were politicized. 11

In other words, at Drawsko the Army appropriated the powers of 

Parliament when they voted to recall the minister. 

When Walesa asked Kolodziejczyk to tender his resignation

the defense minister, after talking with Prime Minister Pawlak and 

Sejm Defense Committee members, initially refused. 120 On 12 

October, he explained that the importance of the issue at stake 

(civilian control over the Army) required his standing fast until the 

investigation of the Drawsko case was completed. 121 Allegedly

Kolodziejczyk provided evidence of instances of military insubordination to include: 
in Warsaw to the ministry 

• the exclusion of civilian defense ministry officials from milit

ceremonies in military units. 122 

On 27 October, in the midst of this crisis, Foreign Minis

Andrzej Olechowski resigned over charges that he had broken 

law for receiving subsidiary income. 123 When Pawlak asked 

Constitutional Court for a decision, Olechowski suspended 

resignation. 

At the same time, the KOK approved a bill for submission 

the Sejm that attempted to clarify the conflict. According to the b

the president would exercise authority through the defense min

ter in peacetime on political and administrative matters, b

through the General Staff on command matters in peacetime a

through the commander-in-chief during war. 124 

On 4 November, the Sejm Defense Committee chairman Je

Szmajdzinski announced that the Committee had approved 

report on the Drawsko affair by a vote of 18 to 6--a report critic

ing all of the sides involved in the dispute. It concluded th

despite discrepancies in individual accounts, the generals 

Drawsko had not disobeyed Kolodziejczyk, but they did critic

him and the ministry. Though the report also criticized so

aspects of the functioning of the defense ministry and expres

concern about "autonomy of the military command structures,

did not see sufficient grounds for Kolodziejczyk's resignation

The report criticized President Walesa for "violating civilian a

democratic control over the military, ''126 adding he should exerc

control through the government and the defense minister. Form

Deputy Defense Minister and Sejm deputy Bronislaw Komoro
Kolodziejczyk proposed a list of candidates for military promotion 

(only the defense minister has the right to suggest candidates)

Walesa rejected six of the candidates who were in the civilian 

defense ministry. Finally, on 10 November Walesa, acting on a 

request from Prime Minister Pawlak, dismissed Kolodziejczyk fo

failing to "implement KOK decisions" regarding normalizing the 

situation in the defense ministry, la0 and Jerzy Milewski became 

acting defense minister. Looking back at his experience, Kolodziej

czyk concluded that the Parliament had "very little effectiveness in 

reforming the law. ''130 

On 30. November, the Sejm Defense Committee approved a 

defense budget for 1995 of 51.3 trillion zlotys ($2.4 billion), highe

by 1.7 percent in real terms than the 1994 budget--and the firs

actual increase since 1986. Though 100 billion zlotys were allocat

ed for Partnership For Peace, the committee added 500 billion 

more for implementing the program. 131 

Tension between the president and parliament over budgetary 

issues and the evolving presidential campaign for elections in the 

fall of 1995 became so ~vere that Walesa threatened to dissolve th

Parliament. To head this off, the PSL-SLD coalition sought a truce 

with the president (to get Walesa to accept the budget in exchang

for defense minister appointment) until after the presidential elec

tions, laa However, the 21 December 1994 meeting brought no 

agreement because just before the session Walesa vetoed the law 

on the budget. Feeling betrayed, the coalition then proposed to 

amend the Small Constitution in order to restrict the president'

role in appointing ministers. 1~ With 284 votes, the Sejm over

turned Walesa's veto on wages; Walesa then placed an appeal to 

the Constitutional TribunaD 34 
candidate Longin Pastusiak, who had been a PUWP (Communis

Sejm deputy during the Martial Law period. The coalition th

began to unravel when SLD leader Aleksander Kwasniews

announced on 6 January that it was necessary to restructure t

government because of the ineffectiveness of certain minister

Maneuvering continued when Pawlak met with Walesa on 

January, the president agreed to Olechowski's resignation after a

but refused to accept Pastusiak for defense. Because he felt t

vacancies in these ministries were undermining state stabilit

Walesa threatened to call for the government's resignation. 

On 19 January 1995, Walesa went on the offensive in the Sej

Arguing that "military people should run the military," Wale

supported draft legislation that would give greater power to t

General Staff, reduce the role of the defense ministry, and subord

nate military intelligence to the General Staff2 as The ruling coa

tion and most of the opposition, however, supported a comman

structure in which the General Staff would answer to the civili

defense ministry. 

On the same day, in a Sejm speech, acting Defense Minist

Milewski discussed the need to establish two major defen

requirements: (1) legal regulations for the defense ministry, (2) 

model for drafting annual defense budgets that would encoura

rational planning for Armed Forces development. Milewski th

offered three funding variants: 

• If the Sejm guaranteed 3.5 percent of GDP, the defense minist

could develop a force of 234,000 

• If defense got 3 percent annually, manpower would be reduc

to 200,000 
necessary3 3s Following on Milewski's argument, on 16 February 

1995 the Sejm finally did pass a resolution that defined the role and 

place of the Armed Forces in a democratic state and committed to 

allocate a steady growth of funds to defense so that it could ulti

mately reach a level of 3 percent of GDP. 137 

Pawlak's Fall and the Rise of Jozef Oleksy. Taking Walesa'

threat of dissolution seriously, on 20 January the Sejm passed a 

Constitutional amendment that, in the event of a presidentia

dissolution order, would keep the Parliament in session until afte

new elections. 138 (Poland had already been without a sitting 

Parliament for several months following the 1993 no-confidenc

vote in Hanna Suchocka's government). Walesa responded by 

demanding that Pawlak appoint new defense and foreign minis

ters--warning that he would take "decisive steps to prevent the 

paralysis of government" if the new deadline were not met. 18

Walesa's relentless attack culminated in his claiming he had los

confidence in Pawlak, and in early February the prime ministe

resigned. 

With the Pawlak government collapse, the SLD-PSL coalitio

began efforts to form a new government. The coalition chose an 

SLD leader, Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy to head a new coalitio

government, which adopted a new coalition agreement and 

program on 15 February. When Oleksy met with Walesa on 1

February, however, they failed to reach an agreement on the "pres

idential ministries. ''14° Nor had they agreed even after a fifth meet

ing on 28 February. 

On 1 March, the Sejm formally adopted a resolution of no

confidence in the Pawlak government (285 for, 5 against, and 2

abstentions) and voted Jozef Oleksy prime minister. 141 Negotia
President Walesa formally appointed Oleksy prime minister an

approved the new Cabinet (see Table 4.5 below). Perhaps as 

good-will gesture, he withdrew his constitutional complain

Table 4.5 - Oleksy Defense Reform, 1995 

President 

L. Walesa (12/90) 

Prime Minister 

J. Oleksy (3/95) 

Office of 

President 

SEJM (460) 

SENATE (100) 

H. Goryszewski (6/94) 

NSG/Nat. Sec. Coun. I 

KOK/Nat. Def. Cte. 

i 

Chief of 

Gen. Staff 

T. Wilecki 

(8/92) 

1st Dep Min 

Def & Soc Af 

I 

Dep. Min. 

Logistics 

Council of 

Ministers 

Def. Af. Cte I 

(KSORM) I 

Elections 

9/93 Sejm/Senate 

Defense Minister I 

Z. Okonski 

(3/95) 

I 

I 

Dep. Min. 

Leg. Rel. 

A. Karkoszka 

(6/95) 

J. Kuriata 

(9/92) 

D. Waniek 

(4/94-5/95) 
draw the amendment to the Small Constitution, 144 the Sejm voted 

on 17 March (303 to 11 with 21 abstentions) to overturn Walesa'

veto. Under the new amendment the Sejm would remain in 

session until new elections, but could not alter the Constitution

budget, electoral laws, or adopt legislation entailing major finan

cial commitments.145 

That the fundamental disagreement between the president and 

government had not changed became evident on 20 March when 

President Walesa commented that the Oleksy government "ha

done nothing,"146 and that he would give the government only one 

or two months to solve Poland's problems before he would look 

for his own solutions. On 21 March, Prime Minister Oleksy 

expressed amazement with Walesa's criticism and invited the pres

ident to present his ideas on how to solve Poland's problems. 147 

Inherited Defense Problems. The issue of to whom the 

General Staff should be subordinate--president or defense minis

ter--remained a fundamental problem under Defense Ministe

Okonski. Even though the Sejm commission criticized Walesa fo

events in Drawsko, it remained silent when, after the Drawsko 

affair, Walesa awarded bonuses to the three top generals who had 

participated---Chief of Staff Wilecki, Deputy Chief of Staff Leon 

Komornicki, and Silesian MD commander Zdzislaw Ornatow

ski. 148 When Walesa promoted nine officers to the rank of genera

on 8 May 1995, two of those promoted were participants a

Drawsko---Admiral Romuald Waga and LTG Edmund Bolo

ciuch.140 

Yet, while the top General Staff leaders clearly owed thei

loyalty to President Walesa particularly after the Drawsko affair

the activities of 1994 were apparently taking their toll, making i

more uncertain to whom the professional officer corps owed 
gppp

negatively, and 28 percent (a five-point increase) supported him. I

the same Summer poll, 65 percent supported Prime Ministe

Waldemar PawlakY sl In sum, it appears that the professional mi

itary holds views more critical of the president than the Gener

Staff leadership and that a cleavage might exist within the military

Failure to solve the problem of allegiance of the General Sta

to a specific office in the civilian government only aggravated rel

tions between the defense ministry and General Staff. Only day

after Zbigniew Okonski became defense minister, First Deput

Defense Minister Milewski offered his opinion, "The militar

ought to be an instrument of policy; it cannot itself carry out pol

cy [adding that the autonomy of the military is] dangerous fo

democracy [and could lead to] the deletion of civilian control ove

the military." Milewski added that the Chief of Staff must b

subordinate to democratically chosen civilian political powe

stressing that "the logic of our constitutional solutions indicate

that this ought to be the [defense] minister."152 Milewski als

suggested that there ought to be a rotation of personnel in militar

command posts. 

After his first meeting with General Wilecki, Defense Ministe

Okonski reported that "We agreed that there will be no conflic

and that we will cooperate. ''lsa (Okonski, who had not yet me

with Milewski, would soon create a problem for the ministry.) I

his meeting with Deputy Defense Minister Jan Kuriata, Okonsk

determined that there was no conflict between the civilian an

military personnel (360 strong) in the logistics directorate. H

remained uncertain whether the size of the defense ministry civi

ian sector--smaller than that of the General Staff--should b

further reduced or was just right. But he soon announced that h
mise before talking with the prime minister and members of 

Parliament. Bronislaw Komorowski of the Sejm Defense Committee announced skeptically that he was waiting for details, but that 

if the Chief of Staff "is subordinated in any way to the president, 

there will be no compromise. ''lss 

Presidential-Parliament/Prime Minister Tensions. Walesa 

continued to threaten to dissolve the Parliament "because it does 

not reflect the spirit of the nation, although it is the outcome of 

democratic elections. ''1s6 

When Prime Minister Oleksy decided to attend the 9 May 1995 

World War II victory celebrations in Moscow, Walesa said that 

Oleksy could not represent the state, and that if Oleksy attended 

without Walesa's consent it would violate Articles 28 and 32 of the 

Small Constitution, and that he would indict the prime minister 

before the State TribunaU sz After Oleksy returned from Moscow, 

however, Walesa backed down. ls8 

On 17 May 1995, a "summit" meeting of Walesa, Oleksy

Okonski, Wilecki, and Sejm and Senate Speakers Jozef Zych and 

Adam Struzik declared that defense issues should not be a subject 

of the election campaign. They decided that over the next five 

years the 850 civilian employees of the defense ministry would be 

reduced by 20-25 percent and the 1,260 employees of the General 

Staff by 10-15 percent, is° The "summit" also acknowledged the 16 

February 1995 Sejm Resolution obligation to increase defense 

expenditures over the next two years to 3 percent of GDP. It decided to retain the Military Information Services (WSI) within the 

General Staff, since military counterintelligence was limited to 

protecting the Armed Forces, defense ministry, and arms industry 

plants. 160 
"had reservations" that Glowacki was Kolodziejczyk's man, an

since WSI was part of the General Staff, Glowacki allegedly ha

insight into activities that Okonski lacked. 162 

Okonski wanted to "clean" the ministry, but this woul

require the prime minister's support. On 15 May Deputy Defens

Minister Danuta Waniek announced that she would resign to hea

the campaign committee of SLD presidential candidat

Aleksander Kwasniewski.163 After First Deputy Minister Milewsk

criticized Okonski for saying in a Wprost interview that Polan

was "probably not mature enough to adopt West European model

of commanding Armed Forces, ''1c~ Okonski replaced Milewsk

with Andrzej Karkoszka. 1~ In an interview after being replaced

Milewski candidly noted, "[T]he real possibilities of MON [defens

ministry] cells to monitor the processes going on in the Arme

Forces and to exert influence on them are considerably limited b

the omnipotence of the General Staff. ''166 

Aside from the increasing imbalance in the size of the Genera

Staff versus the defense ministry staff, a number of issues--mili

tary information (intelligence and counterintelligence), personne

policy, financial policy (defense budget and arms acquisitions

and professional military education--continued to challeng

Okonski's authority. 167 First, when former Defense Ministe

Kolodziejczyk had agreed to move the WSI to the General Staff, h

had issued an order in February 1994 to establish a special minis

terial office under his direct supervision to control WSI. The offic

was never established; hence military intelligence and counterin

telligence remained under Chief of Staff Wilecki's control. Anothe

circumvention of the defense minister involved transferring th

powers of the "civilian" Department of Education to the mil.itary i
, pjy

claimed that the General Staff had illegally sold 52 BMP-2 armored 

personnel carriers to an African state without his knowledge. 170 

Third, the General Staff's recently created Economic and Financial 

Board had acquired control of the military budget and had taken 

over a large share of the prerogatives of Deputy Defense Minister 

Kuriata's department. The General Staff decides what and where 

the Armed Services purchase, and on the further development of 

military formations. 171 

All three issues came to a head in mid-June when Kolodziejczyk charged that not until mid-October 1994 had he learned about 

the September sale of the 52 BMPs for $5 million, and then only 

through an "illegal" WSI wiretap. 172 Justice Minister Jerzy Jaskierna announced in response, that as of 19 June, he would personally 

examine all applications for wiretapping operations and that a 

Sejm Commission for secret services would be formed to oversee 

all operations conducted by the WSI and the Interior Ministry's 

Office of State Protection. 173 

On 21 June, Defense Minister Okonski reprimanded Generals 

Julian Lewinski, Warsaw Military District commander, and 

Tadeusz Jauer, General Staff head of Air Defense Forces, for 

making political statements, including criticism of disarmamen

agreements signed by Poland. That Okonski's patience was wearing thin became evident when he admitted that "civilian control in 

Poland is far from being of the best standard. ''174 

In early June, the Sejm Subcommittee rejected Walesa's amendments to the Defense Law that would give the President authority 

to approve defense assumptions, assign tasks to the defense 

minister, and provide the Chief of Staff authority to make al

changes in the General Staff with approval of the president. 17s On 
pg 

responsible during peacetime for all activities of the Armed Force

to include preparing national defense doctrine, conductin

personnel policy related to the armed forces, managing th

finances of national defense, and conducting international agree

ments concerning participation of Polish military contingentsY 7

In a joint press conference with Chief of Staff Wilecki, Defens

Minister Okonski betrayed irritation that his earlier "compromis

solution" had been ignored, but conceded that if the law becam

effective, he "would observe it." Wilecki noted that he was agains

subordinating the WSI directly to the minister because it was "th

eyes and ears of the Armed Forces. ''17v 

Public discussion indicated concern that Military Intelligenc

was not under proper control. Jerzy Szmajdzinski, chairman of th

Sejm Defense Committee, noted that the committee had a "lot o

trouble supervising the operations of [WSI]. ''~?B Prime Ministe

Oleksy concluded that the issue of WSI had still not been "settle

as far as conveying information to the government is concern

ed. ''17° Defense Minister Okonski rather defensively replied tha

he was in control of the ministry and General Staff and that eve

before the 29 June Defense Law subordinated WSI to the defens

minister he "decided on who is to be the next military attache...an

on who is the head and deputy head of WSI. ''18° 

Parliamentary oversight of the defense budget also remaine

an issue. As Szmajdzinski noted, the Sejm's Supreme Chamber o

Control (NIK) was becoming more effective and that, because o

the NIK's work, "the budget of the Armed Forces is becoming mor

and more readable. ''181 In fact, an NIK audit disclosed that th

defense ministry did not always implement its budget properly

that it lost 1.8 billion old zlotys by dismissing employees of th
Minister Oleksy complained in a July interview that he had "stil

not received any project for the restructuring of MON [the 

Ministry of National Defense]. As for the arms trade, I receive 

information only when I demand it and only when a scanda

breaks out. ''1a4 When the General Staff established a new office for 

integration with NATO, concerns arose that the defense ministry 

would lose influence as it had in the past with training and education, secret services, and some personnel issues. When the defense 

ministry lost oversight of training and education to the Genera

Staff, it took on environmental issues. The concern now was tha

the defense ministry's Foreign Affairs Directorate would face the 

same fate. First Deputy Defense Minister Karkoszka, who is direct

ly responsible for foreign affairs, publicly expressed cautious 

concern: "The attaches are formally under my supervision, but 

practice is different. I am trying to change this. ''18s 

Military effectiveness. Military effectiveness was also becom

ing an increasing concern. On 26 July 1995 the fifth military aircraf

crash of the year occurred--the fourth crash of Poland's 100 

Sukhoi Su22s. By the end of August, 2 more aircraft had crashed

Okonski could do little but accept the accident-investigation 

commission's conclusion that the causes were "mistakes made by 

pilots. Instead of thinking about suspending flights, we should 

work out how to Lrnprove training. ''1a6 Little has been done to 

improve safety. To save on fuel, training flights have been cut back

Pilots spend about 60 hours flying each year compared to 150 in 

most West European countries and 250 in the United States. 

Although CFE limits Poland to 460 combat aircraft, since 

aircraft costs are so high, in late November the Polish General Staf

accepted an air force restructuring plan and decided to reduce the 
turing was that the number of resignations of pilots soared; a

many as 104 left the service by the end of November 1995, with a

additional 14 by the end of January 1996.188 

Despite financial problems, Poland is seeking to buy 100 figh

er aircraft since its 220 MIG-21s are aging. Defense Ministr

spokesman Eugeniusz Mleczak has announced that Poland wi

retire 60 aircraft in 1996. To replace them Poland is considering th

U.S. F-16s and F/A-18s, Swedish JAS-39 Gripen, French Mirag

2000, and Russian Su-27s or MIG-29s. A short-term fix wa

announced in December 1995 when Colonel Wieslaw Leszek con

firmed that Poland would exchange 11 Sokol helicopters for 1

Czech Republic MIG-29s to add to its inventory of 12.18° 

Presidential election and politicization of the military. As th

presidential election campaign began to heat up, rumors of a

effort to postpone presidential elections and extend Walesa's term 

for two years caused a stir in Warsaw. Almost immediately

President Walesa claimed that when Prime Minister Oleks

presented Bronislaw Geremek's election postponement idea t

him, he immediately dismissed it. 1°° Any change in the electio

date would require an amendment to the Constitution requiring 

two-thirds majority vote in the Sejm. To quell the rumors, whe

Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych promised on 6 September that election

would be held on 5 and 19 November 1995, he added that thos

candidates who had announced their intention to dissolv

Parliament if elected "demonstrated a lack of respect for the law 

[and] would violate the Constitution. ''1°1 

As might be expected, the armed forces could not avoid polit

cization during the electoral campaign. In the Interior Ministry

Vistula Military units, for example, Admiral Marek Toczek an
g pp, y 

Szczecin garrison meeting, Deputy Chief of Staff General Leon 

Komornicki criticized the current SLD-PSL coalition and previou

Solidarity governments for their policies towards the Armed 

Forces. The Deputy Chief of Staff claimed that only the efforts o

General Wilecki and President Walesa had allowed a raise in offi

cers' salaries, and that if Walesa were re-elected a similar rais

would occur in the future. 194 

On Armed Forces Day (14 August), General W~rlecki publicl

criticized the government for having weakened the Armed Force

by 10 years of low budgets, noting: "IT]he Armed Forces have bee

cut in half, yet modernization has been forgotten."195 Then on 1

August President Walesa vetoed the defense bill which the Sejm 

had initially adopted on 29 June 1995 (and amended on 12 July)-

a bill that made the chief of staff responsible to the civilian defens

minister and not the president. The president wrote Prim

Minister Oleksy that he was alarmed with the small amount o

money allocated to defense, and reminded the prime minister o

the Sejm 16 February 1995 resolution to guarantee an adequat

level to defense. Walesa argued that the government had failed t

implement the provision to allocate 3 percent of GDP to the Arme

Forces by the end of 1997.1°6 

On 31 August, the Sejm Defense Committee rejected as inade

quate Deputy Defense Minister Jan Kuriata's explanation that th

charges against General Komornicki, for his comments at Szczeci

were "unsubstantiated allegations. ''107 A few days later, whe

General Wilecki categorized reports of collecting signatures fo

Walesa as an "isolated incident, "108 Oleksy and presidentia

candidates Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz and Adam Strzembosz crit

icized Wilecki for getting involved in politics, and soon a new 
approve the report and wanting it supplemented, noted: "Hold 

your guns; there is no reason to hurry. This is...a serious investiga

tion that might be decisive for the career of an officer. ''1°0 

Walesa/Wilecki vs Parliament/Government. Picking up on his 

14 August Armed Forces Day speech, General Wilecki expressed 

frustration with the government and parliament for not providing 

resources or enacting laws regarding the health of the Armed 

Forces. a°° On 26 September the Council of Ministers agreed to 

increase defense budget expenditures by three percent in real 

terms per year to the year 2000. a01 This, according to Deputy Prime 

Minister Kolodko, still represented a significant shortfall; the 1995 

defense budget of 2.5 percent of GDP would approximate 2.57 percent in 1996 and not reach the 1997 goal of 3 percent. 2°2 At his 11 

October press conference President Walesa praised Chief of Staff 

Wilecki for his defense of the Army. a0a 

General Wilecki continued his argument on 9 October in 

Polska Zbrojna, "We have stopped halfway;.., a wall of impossibility has appeared before modernization. We started the process 

without almost any capital spending."204 A few days later he 

extended his campaign in Rzeczpospolita, arguing, "IT]he fact that 

the Armed Forces speak openly about their condition does not 

imply that they want to make decisions on their own. ''20s 

Wilecki was also bolstering the General Staff. In late August he 

nominated General Miroslaw Hermaszewski, who had been a 

member of the Military Council for National Salvation during 

martial law, to be inspector general of the Air Force on the Genera

Staff. Again moving onto defense ministry's turf, Wilecki appointed General Jozef Chmiel to be the General Staff's plenipotentiary 

for integration into NATO. 2os When President Walesa nominated 
Wladyslaw Saczonek, Chief of the Operational Training 

Directorate of the General Staff, noted, due to lack of funds, only 

one of four earlier planned projects would be implementedmtha

of establishing an operational battalion. The 1995 IPP draft con

tains more than 260 projects to focus on: command and communi

cations, military organizational structures, combat equipment, the 

Navy, training, and the art of warfare. So far, Saczonek claimed

only 200 billion zlotys of the 500 billion required had been aUocated. 2°8 On 20 April 1995, Poland became the first PFP partner to 

have its defense plan accepted by NATO's Political and Military 

Steering Group (PMSC) for PFP. 

As Poland engaged more actively in NATO programs, its defi

ciency in English language training became obvious. Of the 2,000 

servicemembers who speak English, only half of them have more 

than a rudimentary knowledge of the language. 2°9 It has also 

become apparent how much needs to be done in the area of Civi

Defense. Colonel Janusz Baginski, head of the Polish Civil Defense 

staff, agreeing that Poland had to adopt Western organizationa

models to protect civilians in times of war, admitted "In Poland, no 

one body is responsible. ''21° Command confusion exists not only a

the national level but also at the local level because local govern

ments can only follow instructions issued by the central adminis

tration and they lack financial resources. 

The promise of an increased defense budget for 1996 did no

satisfy the General Staff, so additional funds were allocated fo

medicines for military health care and PFP programs. In addition

the VAT (value-added tax) was preserved for defense acquisitions

and the defense ministry was relieved of the burden of funding 

Government Strategic Programs. Furthermore, as Brig. Gen

Krzysztof Pajewski, chief of the General Staff Economic and 
g 

Minister Okonski, if the defense ministry were to cover this projected cost of 720 billion old zlotys, it "would be ruined. ''ala Hence

funding the battalion would require dipping into the state budget 

reserves. 

The Sixth Reform Stage (December 1995-Present) 

In the first round of the eight-candidate presidential elections 

on 5 November, Aleksander Kwasniewski, former chairman of the 

Constitutional Committee, received 35.11 percent and Lech Walesa 

33.11 percent. 218 Since no candidate received more than 50 percen

of the valid votes, the runoff took place on 19 November 1995. Of 

notable interest were random reports from military units suggesting that more soldiers preferred Kwasniewski to Walesa. a14 In the 

runoff, public opinion polls also suggested that the military 

strongly supported Kwasniewski over Walesa. 21s The polls and 

reports proved accurate: in the second round on 19 November

Kwasniewski won with 51.72 percent of the vote. 216 All three 

"presidential" ministers and National Security Bureau chie

Goryszewski immediately tendered their resignations. Chief of 

Staff Wilecki, however, did not. On 22 December 1995, Oleksy 

appointed Andrzej Karkoszka acting Defense Minister. 

Kwasrfiewski was inaugurated President on 23 December. On 

the same day, in accordance with the Constitution, he took over 

supreme command of the Armed Forces in an evening ceremony 

at the First Warsaw Air Regiment. Addressing the soldiers in the 

presence of Wilecki and Karkoszka, Kwasniewski supported the 

reform and modernization process and promised to seek financia

support for the Army. 217 
p

ing more clearly the spheres of competence for different institutions, and he intended to establish the NSC as the Small 

Constitution envisioned--bringing together outstanding personTable 4.6 - Cimoszewicz Defense Reform, 1996 

President 

A. Kwasniewski (12_/95) 

I Office of I 

President 

SEJM (460) 

SENATE (100) 

J. Milewski (1/96) 

I NSC/Nat. Sec. Coun. I 

KOK/Nat. Def. Cte. 

I 

Chief of 

Gen. Staff 

To Wilecki 

(8/92) 

I 

1st Dep Min 

Def & Soc Af 

A. Karkoszka 

(6/95) 

I 

Dep. Min. 

Armaments 

K.Wegrzyn 

(6/96) 

Prime Minister 

J. Oleksy (3/95) 

W. Cimoszewicz (2/96) 

Council of 

Ministers 

Def. Af. Cte ] 

(KSORM) I 

Elections 

9/93 Sejm/Senate 

Defense Minister 

S. Dobrzanski 

(1/96) 

I 

I I 

Dep. Min. Dep. Min. 

Leg. Rel Econ.& Fin 

A. Zalucki Grabowski 

(1/96) (1/96) 
ed former First Deputy Defense Minister Jerzy Milewski to onc

again head the National Security Bureau. 

Short-lived Tranquility; The Oleksy Crisis. President Wales

had made a startling statement on 12 December, charging: "Ou

post-Communist oligarchy has international connections. We ar

still verifying the documents. ''22° On 19 December, Walesa accuse

Prime Minister Oleksy of having collaborated with foreign intell

gence since 1983. Oleksy called the charge a "dirty provocation. ''22

Oleksy countercharged that when he had asked Minister o

Interior Milczanowski for information about the State Protectio

Office's interest in members of government, the Interior Ministe

had refused to provide the information. After the Militar

Prosecutor's Office began its work, Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych estab

lished a Special Extraordinary Commission to clarify the matter. 22

The crisis progressed beyond President Kwasniewski's inau

guration. On 19 January 1996, the Polish Peasant Party (PSL

handed a declaration to the coalition claiming that PSI, believed

"The present political crisis is a threat to the democrati

order...[and called for] a government reshuffle ''223 and a change i

the prime minister's post. On 26 Januar~ President Kwasniewsk

accepted Oleksy's resignation and on 1 February asked Deput

Sejm Speaker Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz to form a new govern

ment, which was sworn in on 7 February 1996. 

In the end (22 April 1996) the Military Prosecutor closed th

case, concluding that the investigation had established no direc

evidence against Oleksy. 224 Cimoszewicz, prime minister for les

than 90 days, announced his intention to ask the prosecutor to dis

close all the evidence in a White Book and to clarify the circum

stances under which a groundless accusation against the head o
gg

the need for reform--President Kwasniewski (with Head of 

President's Office Danuta Waniek and National Security Bureau 

Director Jerzy Milewski, who both had served as deputy defense 

ministers under Walesa), Prime Minister Cimoszewicz, Defense 

Minister Dobrzanski, and the Parliament. In sum, the people who 

understand that the General Staff is the problem are in the right 

place and agree on what needs to be done. 

Kwasniewski's first actions were consistent with his campaign 

rhetoric. On 8 January 1996, he visited the General Staff to 

announce that he would withdraw from the Constitutional 

Tribunal the 29 June 1995 Law on the Minister of Defense. (This 

was the law that President Walesa had challenged because it subordinated the military prosecutors and courts and General Staff to 

the defense minister, z~6) 

In an interview on 18 January, Defense Minister Dobrzanski 

announced that he had established a commission chaired by First 

Deputy Defense Minister Karkoszka to develop two documents

(1) a Defense Ministry Statute outlining the new structures of the 

ministry; (2) an outline detailing the activities of the defense 

minister, aa7 Dobrzanski noted there would be changes in the 

General Staf£s structure, that he would subordinate the WSI (intel

ligence and counterintelligence) to the defense minister, set up an 

entirely new economic section in the defense ministry to take part 

in acquisitions decisions, and establish a command headquarters 

of the ground troops that would deprive the General Staff of some 

powers. 228 

On 19 January 1996, Defense Minister Dobrzanski appointed 

two newdeputy defense ministers--Andrzej Zalucki for Socia

and Legislative Relations and retired General Tadeusz Grabowsk
py , 

down all General Staff units that duplicated the operations of iden

tical units in the defense ministry, a30 

The spearhead of the "revolution" is a new 13-article Law o

the Defense Ministry (Legal Gazette No. 10, 30 January 1996

which went into effect on 14 February 1996. 231 The Defens

Reform goal is to develop new Defense Ministry structures t

subordinate the General Staff and integrate it into the ministry. T

achieve this goal, the defense reform must remove from th

General Staff many of the powers it had acquired during Presiden

Walesa's five-year rule. 

The defense reform strategy is to wrest control from Wflecki b

empowering the Defense Ministry by restructuring both it and th

General Staff, and to acquire control over armed forces reform b

gaining control of the budget and acquisitions. 

Restructuring the Defense Ministry. Defense Ministe

Dobrzanski's first step would be to re-subordinate the WSI (intel

ligence and counterintelligence) to the defense minister. 23

(Former Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk had moved it to th

General Staff in 1993.) After the new Law on the Office of th

Defense Minister came into effect, in accordance with Article 

(which subordinated the WSI and National Defense Academy t

the defense minister), Dobrzanski dismissed WSI chief Genera

Konstanty Malejczyk on 26 March 1996 as part of "normal rotatio

in top posts, ''2~ and appointed Commodore Kazimierz Glowack

as head of the WSI. Glowaki, as head of counterintelligence, had 

been loyal to Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk during the Drawsk

affair, z34 Dobrzanski's decision raised questions in that he "forgot

to ask the Sejm Committee for Control Over Special Services for an 

opinion. 23s 
had created in 1994. 

Grabowski noted in an interview that between 1998-2000 

spending on staff would be reduced, outlays on infrastructure 

would remain unchanged, and expenditures and equipment main

tenance would increase slightly. Grabowski indicated that earlie

estimates had calculated that technical modernization would reach 

an estimated 14 percent of the defense budget in 2002; with the 

changes outlined, however, he hoped that it should grow to 2

percent by 2002 and 30 percent by 2010. 236 

Dobrzanski also noted that all redundant General Staff unit

were to be dissolved and staffing reduced. This would mean tha

the General Staff's 30 directorates of 1,800 employees, would 

remain larger than the Defense Ministry's by 400. Both were to be 

reduced by approximately 25 percent. 2a7 One General Staff direc

torate that would disappear would be the Territorial Defens

Directorate, which would be transferred to the Defense Polic

Department under First Deputy Minister Karkoszka. a38 

Karkoszka's task was to formulate a concrete plan for Poland'

integration into NATO by 31 March 1996. This integration would 

require changing the defense ministry's system of bookkeepin

and costing, and require an inventory of land and militar

resources--all of which would take three years to complete and 

new 36-person NATO Integration Department to execute. 28

Karkoszka hopes that Poland will have the capacity to respond t

NATO Defense Planning Questionnaires (DPQs) in two-to-thre

years. He also plans to enlarge the ministry's Planning and Review 

Process (PARP) capacity to work more effectively with NATO, and 

his office is attempting to implement NATO standardizatio

agreements (STANAGs). His Standardization Bureau has grow
slow because Jan Kuriata resigned on 12 March 1996. Dobrzansk

did not deny that Kuriata's resignation might be linked to the ear

lier dismissal of Brig. Gen. tIenryk Mika, head of the General Sta

Armaments and Equipment Department for contract tenders fo

Army cross country vehicles, the sale of BMP-2 transporters t

Angola, and irregularities in trade involving ammunition, a4

(Colonel Antoni Grzedzinski had replaced Brig. Gen. Mika o

1 March 1996.) In June 1996, Krzysztof Wegrzyn became deput

defense minister for armaments and infrastructure. 

Further efforts to gain oversight of military acquisitions an

sales were evident when on 11 April, the Sejm Defense Committe

suggested changes in the public tender law. a42 Also Deput

Defense Minister Grabowski heads the new defense ministr

directorate for acquisitions, whose function is to get ministr

control (which has not yet been accomplished) of acquisition

policy from the General Staff. 

Civilian Control of the Armed Forces. Dobrzanski subordi

nated the General Staff Sixth (Organizational) Directorate th

military posts--to his own Command Department. The mos

important component of Dobrzanski's new Comman

Department--which included the General Staff, Air Force, an

Navy--was the creation of a new commander--the Chief of Lan

Forces. Specific responsibilities--such as education, infrastructure

and logistics--will be removed from the General Staff and subor

dinated to the new Land Forces Commander. a43 The same wi

apply to the Air Force/Air Defense, and Navy Commanders. O

28 February Kwasniewski appointed at Dobrzanski's motion 

new Naval Commander, Vice Admiral Ryszard Lukasik. 244 

The goal, in accord with Article 3 (para. 1-2) of the Law on th
tall with Chief of Staff Wilecki...[who] presented concessionary 

suggestions for the reform. ''a46 

Armed Forces Reform through Budget and Acquisitions. On 

20 February 1996, a government meeting was con'cened with Jerzy 

Milewski (BBN), the ministers of Finance and Defense, and other

to develop a Five-Year Plan on Adaptation of the Polish Armed 

Forces, Costs, and Integration with NATO. This plan needed to be 

developed and funded by June 1996 to coincide with Poland'

budget cycle. According to Karkoszka, the need to adapt Polish 

Armed Forces to budget limitations--not vice-ver~lwas meet

ing with great resistance and opposition from many forces

Although, if the new plan is successful, it would mean that restruc

turing the entire military would be necessary (for the third time in 

five years). 247 

President Kwasniewski has rated the drawing up of a five-yea

national defense expenditure plan and the choosing of a strategic 

partner for equipment supplies as the most important issues fo

the Army. a48 In practice this would mean that the 230,000-man 

Polish Force would shrink to 180,000 by the year 2000, and then 

reduce another 20 percent by 2005. 240 

As the defense reform ran into resL~tance, some coalitio

deputies began collecting signatures requiring the Defens

Committee to investigate the General Staff's resistance to th

reforms and to urge President Kwasniewski to recall Genera

Wilecki. When Danuta Waniek of the President's Office noted, "

do not really trust the present Chief of the General Staff," Wileck

retorted: "I do not really like insipid widows. ''2s0 BBN chief Jerz

Milewski joined the dissent by noting that "General Wilecki is no

fulfilling this function as fully as it might be fulfiUed. ''2~1 Presiden
of whom had come from the General Staff. Of the 10 appointed b

Kwasniewski, one was a policeman (Maj. Gen. Janusz Pluta) an

one was Orthodox Military Ordinary, Maj. Gen. Archbishop Saw

four came from the armed forces, and one, Maj. Gen. Kazimie

Madej, from the defense ministry department of social relation

Only three were from the General Staff--General Zbignie

Zalewski, LTG Jaroslaw Bielecki, and Maj. Gen. Stanisla

Stanko.25a 

On 9 May, Andrzej Karkoszka reported on the status of th

reform to a closed session of the Sejm Defense Committe

Presumably having run into obstructions from the General Staf

Karkoszka threatened to resign. Chairman Jerzy Szmajdzins

acknowledged the fact that the work of the reform was delaye

because of the General Staff's protest to proposed solutions, whic

included integrating the General Staff with the defense minist

(e.g., Article 7 of the Defense Law) and dissolving directorates th

deal with supplies for the armed forces which would result in 

"considerable staff reduction. ''2s4 

The reform took two major steps forward in June and Jul

First, on 14 June the Sejm passed (324-1) a Law on State Civ

Service to create a professional, impartial, and politically neutr

civil service. The law is to come into effect on 1 January 1997 an

require two to three years to implement.2s5 (Some concern ha

been expressed, though, in that old Communist nomenklatu

(officials) will likely be assured senior positions in the bureau

cracy.) 

Second, when the Council of Ministers adopted a decree lea

ing to the restructured defense ministry in July 1996, the Gener

Staff was an integral part (one of five directorates) of the defen
the defense ministry is to shrink from 52 to 32, with 20 percen

fewer posts and a reduction of 20-30 positions for generals, leavin

a general officer corps of approximately 120. 2s8 The right-win

Patriotic Camp disagreed with the defense reform establishmen

of three new civilian directorates, preferring to have the Genera

Staff retain command functions and maintain authority over mil

tary education. 2s7 

Air and Air Defense Forces Restructuring. Chief of the A

and Air Defense Forces Maj. Gen. Kazimierz Dziok explained th

restructuring of the forces. In place of the current Air Forces an

National Air Defense Force, two corpsm"North" in Bydgoszcz an

"South" in Wroclow--would be established with a brigade

squadron system replacing the old division-regiment system. Th

53,500-man force contained 22,000 professionals; by 2005 the forc

would have 41,500 men with 20,800 professionals. Between 1996

2005, 1,000 professional positions would have to be eliminated an

instead of Poland's current 352 aircraft, there would be 230. Dzio

noted the continuing major problem of pilots flying only 40-6

hours per year due to fuel shortages and lack of spare parts. 2s8 

The Polish aviation industry includes the manufacture of W-

Sokol helicopters, as well as the PZL-130 Orlik, An-28, and 1-2

Iryda aircraft. Problems with the Iryda trainer were evident whe

two pilots were killed in a crash in January 1996 because of a fault

steering system. General Dziok grounded the aircraft an

demanded it be improved before being used for training, aS0 T

solve the dispute, the Mielec Aviation Plant that produces Iryd

agreed to modernize 11 older aircraft and to supply six new plane

with a modern navigation system, new engines and a remodele

wing by the end of 1997 for Z122 miUion. 2~ 
enough for two helicopter regiments, a82 

Arming these helicopters became a major issue of contentio

The Polish Armed Forces need 5,000 modem guided antitan

missiles, each costing $50,000. Companies competing to supply th

armor-piercing projectile included the Israeli Elbit, whic

produces the Rafael, and U.S. Rockwell, which produces th

Hellfire II. When the KSORM rejected the U.S. bid on 18 April 199

because it was tendered after the deadline, the U.S. Embassy 2

and the Polish government raised questions. In Sejm Defen

Committee questioning, First Deputy Karkoszka admitted, "Th

whole issue...was a mess. ''a64 

On the issue of which fighter aircraft to purchase---the F-16, 2

F/A-18 Hornet, ac~ Mirage 2000, MIG-29, or Swedish JAS-3

Gripen--the Poles decided to coordinate their purchase with th

Czech Republic in order to save on maintenance costs and t

create a common system of air control, a87 On 13 April the Czec

and Polish foreign and defense ministers agreed at Vyskov not t

compete with each other but to coordinate the modernization o

both air forces, ass By the Spring of 1996 it appeared that th

MIG-21s put into retirement would likely be replaced by 40 F-16 

and B models, which would cost $1 billion including the trainin

of pilots, spares, and missiles. 260 

Renewed NATO integration efforts. In March 1996 Polan

developed teams from the foreign affairs and defense ministries t

prepare a NATO discussion paper that contained topics and que

tions in preparation for Poland's dialogue with the 16 NAT

ambassadors regarding membership in NATO. aT° On 4 Apr

Poland began its bilateral dialogue by presenting a 22-page docu

ment that described Poland's expectations and anticipated oblig
April, he praised Poland's document as very constructive and 

positive noting that the decision on when Poland could join NATO 

was "very close. "273 Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati noted in June 

at the Berlin NACC session that Poland would fulfill all the criteria required for NATO membership, including democratic control 

of the military, and stressed that Poland expects a decision on new 

members in 1997. 274 

To learn more about NATO command structures, 10 Polish offi

cers went to Joint NATO Air Forces in Central Europe (AIRCENT) 

in Ramstein, Germany and another 10 to the headquarters of the 

Allied Forces of the Baltic Straits Area in Karup, Denmark from 

February to March 1996. 27s In early May, when German Genera

Hartmut Bagger visited General Wilecki in Poland, the two 

discussed the possibility of establishing an international Danish

German, Polish Corps comprising three divisions after Poland 

becomes a member of NATO. 2~6 

Exercise activity also was robust. In late March Poland hosted 

"BALTIC COOPERATION-96," a PFP exercise for training German

Danish, and Polish staff officers to plan and organize peacekeep

ing missions. 277 In June PFP naval exercise "BALTOPS-96" compris

ing 58 warships from the United States, Canada, Netherlands

Norway, and Poland took place in the Western Baltic. 278 Poland's 

national military exercises also tried to employ NATO standards

"SUMMER 96", which exercised units from the Silesian and Cracow 

MI~, used computer maps with NATO scale, and the 6th Airborne 

Brigade (which is designated to participate in NATO peacekeeping 

operations) used English during the exercise. 27° 

Poland participates in the Bosnian IFOR. The 624 soldiers o

the Polish 16th Airborne Assault Battalion, as part of a Nordic
evident. First, by March 1996, when operations costs skyro

keted to Z72 million, it was unclear where the money would com

from. The defense ministry managed to scrape together Z4

million by cutting expenses on previous purchases. It also decide

to cut the number of recruits by 6,000 to save another Z6 millio

Its largest savings, though, came by cutting many PFP exercis

and programs. 281 

Despite these constraints, Defense Minister Dobrzanski volu

teered to send another battalion to build roads in the form

Yugoslavia "ff funds could be raised abroad, because we cann

find money at home. ''282 In the end, however, there would be n

second battalion to operate with French units because of a shor

age of funds both in Paris and Warsaw. 28a 

Second, problems among the ground forces included a lack 

telephones for soldiers to call home, problems with sanitary faci

ties, bullet-proof vests, and P-64 pistols. 284 When Colon

Wlodzimierz Sasiadek, deputy commander of the Nordic-Poli

brigade, briefed NATO on Poland's IFOR experience, he noted th

many problems that had resulted while preparing for teamwo

arose because Polish and Western radios operated differently. 2

He also requested that NATO disclose a greater number of NAT

standardization agreements (STANAGs) to facilitate Poland

cooperation with the Alliance. Thus far, NATO has made availab

only 850 of the existing agreements. 28s 

Polish public opinion support for NATO remains the highe

among the Central European states. According to a Public Opinio

Research Center poll carried out in late May 1996, 83 perce

(compared to 75 percent in 1994) responded favorably to NAT

membership. Yet, only 23 percent would be willing to reduce oth
zewicz became prime minister, he resigned as chairman of the 

National Assembly's Constitutional Committee. He was replaced 

by Marek Mazurkiewicz of the SLD on 20 February 1996, who 

assured President Kwasniewski that the draft Constitution would 

be ready by the end of June. 20° Prime Minister Cimoszewicz

noting that it was not right that supervision of the secret and intel

ligence services be under the supervision only of the coalition i

parliament, proposed parity representation in the Parliamentar

commission for supervising these components. 2°° In early May

Mazurkiewicz spoke about progress in the draft Constitution, now 

noting that the work might be finished as early as the beginning o

1997 with the holding of a Constitutional referendum. 2°1 Despit

his continued optimism, Solidarity spokesmen called on Poles to 

vote against the draft being developed by the Nationa

Assembly. 202 

Defense Minister Dobrzanski also noted that what was mos

needed in the defense sphere was a Law on Military Duty and 

Defense Obligations. While a draft had been approved by th

Defense Committee of the Council of Ministers, Dobrzanski hoped 

that it would become law by the Fall of 1996. He also noted that 

Law on the State of Emergency and Martial Law was also urgent

ly needed, as were laws on the Military Information Services, th

Military Police, and military discipline. 2°3 

The Constitutional debate embroiled the issues of th

President's emergency powers and command of the armed forces

On 21 May 1996 the president submitted draft amendments to th

Constitutional Committee that related to the armed forces and 

State Protection Committee. The Sejm would have authority t

station Polish forces abroad or allow foreign troops on Polish soi
Sejm must approve the decision within 48 hours, and the period 

Martial Law can only last 90 days. 294 

On 19 June 1996, the Parliamentary Committee adopted t

final article on the draft Constitution. ags The final text will 

voted on at the end of Summer 1996. It will then be forwarded 

the National Assembly for further consideration and a two-thir

majority vote. 

President Kwasniewski wanted opposition leaders, not just t

SLD-PSL coalition, to join the NSC in order to develop a nation

consensus on foreign and security policy issues, including ent

into EU and NATO. Opposition leaders refused to participate 

the NSC. Though the National Assembly Constitutional Comm

tee included a provision accepting an advisory body NSC in t

draft Constitution, it rejected on 5 June a Kwasniewski provisi

for establishing a State Protection Committee, which was an eff

to reactivate a Second Republic (1918-1939) institution that coor

nated state organs in defense and security. 296 

Conclusion 

Poland's civil-military crisis in 1994 resulted from its failure 

delegate authority between the president and government a

from the Sejm Defense (commission and committee's) inability 

exercise effective oversight. It also has demonstrated the inabil

of the civilian defense ministry to manage and exercise oversig

of the military; hence, the chief of staff and General Staff h

remained independent of the defense minister (and governmen

and the heavily politiczed Army enjoys broad popular support. 

Poland has not yet developed a consensus on establishing 
ministry in personnel policy, financial policy, military information 

(intelligence and counterintelligence), professional military educa

tion, and press. 

Poland's military independence has been facilitated, in part, by 

defense ministry instability at the top. Since August 1992 when 

General Wilecki became chief of staff, he has dealt with no les

than six (four plus two acting) defense ministers--Janusz 

Onyszkiewicz, Piotr Kolodziejczyk, Jerzy Milewski (acting)

Zbigniew Okonski, Andrzej Karkoszka (acting), and Stanislaw 

Dobrzanski. Wilecki still remains, and no set periodic rotation 

policy has yet been established. 

Since the passage of the February 1996 Law on the Office of the 

Defense Minister, Poland's attempts to establish responsibility fo

defense ministry management and oversight of the General Staf

can be best judged as admirable in concept and effort, but fina

judgment must be reserved until the dust has settled. In light of the 

evident resistance from General Wilecki and the General Staff (and 

the fact that Wilecki remains in his position), it will take time to 

distinguish merely formal reform from real reform. Even BBN 

director Jerzy Milewski has expressed concern. Noting in a June 

1996 interview, that while a huge, formal step forward had been 

made with the Defense Law, Milewski mused that "practicall

nothing has changed. ''a97 

In this regard, the Sejm's continued limitations require concern

Since the Sejm Defense Committee's creation in 1989-90, it ha

neither developed expert support staff a°8 nor exercised limited 

oversight. In April 1992 the Sejm Special Commission investigat

ing Defense Minister Parys' allegations found them unsubstan

tiated. Then even though the Sejm Defense Commission criticize
criticized the committee's limitations in supervising WSI and h

noted that, though the Sejm's Supreme Chamber of Control h

slightly improved its ability to monitor the defense budget, it w

take years to develop a more effective method in accordance w

developed democratic countries. Although the Sejm Defen

Committee rejected the defense ministry report on politicization 

the forces during the 1995 presidential election, it has not forc

the issue further, almost hoping the issue would go away after t

election. Nor did the Sejm Defense Committee make any cl

move after General Wilecki's 14 August 1995 speech, whi

publicly reprimanded civilian politicians for allocating insuffici

funds to the Army. 

Parliament has exercised some control of the military throu

constrained defense budgets, though it has been limited. Ev

though the Sejm passed a resolution in the Spring of 1995 

increase defense expenditures to three percent of GDP, little h

been done in practice. In addition, the Sejm has demonstrat

little supervision over military administration. For example, it h

not established rules on military rotation and term limitation 

General Staff assignments. It has also failed to reform the law. 

Despite its limitations, the defense ministry has evidenc

significant structural and functional differentiation since 

Zabinski Reform Commission of 1991. In 1992 under Suchocka t

defense ministry created three deputy ministers to deal w

specific issues; education, strategic policy, and infrastructu

Changes again were made in 1993 under Kolodziejczyk with t

functions (military education and intelligence) moving to 

General Staff and a first deputy defense minister for defense a

social affairs position being created, plus the position of deputy 
General Staff. 

Military readiness, as in the rest of Central Europe, require

attention. Problems with readiness have been evident in th

ground, naval, and air and air defense forces. They have also been 

evident in Poland's IFOR unit in Tuzla, Bosnia. The defens

budget increase in 1995 reversed a slide that had been running 

since 1986. Though it now represents a commitment of only 2.

percent of GDP, there is the promise (not yet realized) to increas

this to three percent over time. 

In contrast to the rest of Central Europe, Poland seems to hav

developed governmental national security planning institution

(e.g., KSORM) with the capacity to establish priorities amon

national objectives. Also in marked contrast to Hungary and th

Czech Republic, Polish society holds the military in high esteem. 

It is clear that a constitution, which effectively limits state insti

tutions in existing law, is the necessary condition to establis

proper control of the military in Poland. It is clear that the Polis

military does not yet effectively cooperate with the civilian defens

ministry and that the military is politicized. The new Polis

Constitution must effectively define an apolitical role for the Army

In the end, none of the reform can be achieved until Polan

acquires this new constitution, which is unlikely to occur befor

early 1997. 

So the defense reform concept appears right on the mark

Poland's efforts to empower the defense ministry to provid

accountability to society, limit the functions of the General Staf

and subordinate it to civilian defense ministry authority, and t

reform the armed forces through budget and acquisitions are a

the right objectives. The defense reform demonstrates thathby 
1. For a good discussion, see Les Griggs, "The Polish People's Army

in Jeffrey Simon (ed.), NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization (Washingto

DC: National Defense University, 1988), pp. 363-366. 

2. See Ryszard Kuklinski, "The War Against The Nation Seen Fro

The Inside," Kultura (Paris), No. 4 (April 1987). 

3. Andrzej Korbonski, "Civil-Military Relations In Poland Betwe

the Wars: 1918-1939," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Wint

1988), pp. 173-176. 

4. Norman Davies, God's Playground: A History of Poland, Vol. 2 (Ne

York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 580-581. 

5. Articles 37 & 39, Constitution of the Polish People's Republic, 22 Ju

1952 (Warsaw: 1978), p. 28. 

6. John Tagliabue, "Poland's Senate to Be Resurrected in Electi

Pact," The New York Times, 10 March 1989, pp. A1,9. 

7. Voytek Zubek, "Poland's Party Self-Destructs," Orbis, Vol. 34, No

(Spring 1990), pp. 182 183. 

8. Leslaw Dudek, "On the Defense Doctrine of the Third Republic 

Poland," Polska Zbrojna, 10-12 July 1992, p. III. 

9. Tygodnik Solidarnosc, 16 February 1990, p. 17. FBIS-EEU-90-070 (

April 1990), p. 40. 

10. Gen. Zenon Poznanski interview, Trybuna, 28 March 1990, p. 

JPRS-EER-90-086 (18 June 1990), p. 22. 

11. Polish Army: Facts and Figures (In the Transition Period) (Warsa

Ministry of National Defense, 1991), pp. 9-12. 

12. "Defense Doctrine of the Polish Republic," Zolnierz Wolnosci, 

February 1990, pp. 1-8. ]PRS-EER-90-038 (26 March 1990), p. 30. 

13. Polish Army: Facts and Figures (Warsaw: Ministry of Nation

Defense, 1990), p. 9. 

14. During 1988-89 General Jaruzelski replaced the commanders 
Washington DC). 

17. Polish Army: Facts and Figures, (1990), pp. 11-12. 

18. Defense Minister Florian Siwicki 18 September 1989 speech

Zolnierz Wolnosci, 26 September 1989, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-89-188 (29 

September 1989), p. 50. 

19. Warsaw PAP, 13 December 1989. FBIS-EEU-90-O03 (4 January 

1990), p. 70. 

20. For a discussion of the significance of these appointments, see 

Thomas S. Szayna, The Military in a Post-Communist Poland, RAND, N3309-USDP, 1991, p. 26. 

21. Ibid., pp. 33-34. 

22. John Tagliabue, "Poland's President To Step Down," The New York 

Times, 20 September 1990, p. A8. 

23. Warsaw PAP, 19 January 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-014 (22 January 1991)

p. 32. 

24. Jerzy Milewski interview, Warsaw Glob, 24-26 January 1992, p. 2

JPRS-EER-92-023 (2 March 1992), p. 13. 

25. Warsaw PAP, 24 January 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-016 (24 January 1991)

p. 48. 

26. Warsaw PAP, 3 January 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-O03 (4 January 1991)

p. 18. 

27. Warsaw PAP, 13 February 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-033 (19 February 

1991), p. 38. 

28. Rzeczpospolita, 23 May 1991, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-91-104 (30 May 1991)

p. 16. 

29. Report On Eastern Europe, 22 February 1991, p. 50. 

30. Jacek Merkel address, Polska Zbrojna, 31 January 1991, pp. 1-2

JPRS-EER-91-041 (2 April 1991), pp. 47-48. 

31. East European Constitutional Review, Vol 1, No. 1 (Spring 1992)

p. 2. 

32. Warsaw Domestic Service, 22 February 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-037 (2

February 1991), p. 43. 

33. Warsaw PAP, 20 August 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-162 (21 August 1991)
, y (

February 1991), p. 27. 

37. Report On Eastern Europe, 8 March 1991, p. 50. 

38. Janusz Onyszkiewicz interview, Polska Zbrojna, 26-28 April 199

pp. 1,3. JPRS-EER-91-065 (14 May 1991), p. 43. 

39. Zdzislaw Stelmaszuk interview, Polska Zbrojna, 7-9 June 1991, p

1,5. JPRS-EER-91-104 (15 July 1991), pp. 37-38; 40-41. 

40. Warsaw PAP, 8 July 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-131 (9 July 1991), p. 31. 

41. Stelmaszuk interview, 7-9 June 1991, op. cit., pp. 43-44. 

42. Walter J. Oleszek, "Parliamentary Developments in Poland," CR

Review (August 1991), p. 32. 

43. Warsaw TVP, 31 October 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-212 (1 Novemb

1991), p. 8. 

44. Warsaw PAP, 10 January 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-O09 (14 January 1992

p. 27. 

45. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 3 January 1992, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-92-O06 

January 1992), pp. 24 25. 

46. Warsaw Rzeczpospolita (8-9 February 1992), p. 1. FBIS-EEU-92-0

(12 February 1992), p. 21. 

47. Warsaw TVP, 13 February 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-032 (18 Februa

1992), p. 23. 

48. Warsaw Radio, 12 February 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-030 (13 Februa

1992), p. 11. 

49. Warsaw Radio, 26 February 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-039 (27 Februa

1992), p. 12. 

50. Jerzy Milewski interview, Warsaw Glob, 24-26 January 1992, p. 

]PRS-EER-92-023 (2 March 1992), p. 13. 

51. Warsaw PAP, 24 March 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-059 (26 March 199

p. 14. 

52. Warsaw PAP, 23 April 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-083 (29 April 199

p. 29. 

53. "A New Martial Law?", Nowy Swiat, 9 April 1992, pp. 1,2. Gener

Stelmaszuk later verified the text in an interview. See, Nowy Swiat, 11-
Milewski interview, Rzeczpospolita, 11-12 April 1992, pp. 1,3. ]PRS-EER92-048 (20 April 1992), pp. 38 39. 

55. Warsaw PAP, 25 April 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-082 (28 April 1992), 

p. 2O. 

56. Warsaw PAP, 15 May 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-097 (19 May 1992), p. 10

57. Warsaw PAP, 8 June 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-112 (10 June 1992), p. 26. 

58. Warsaw PAP, 29 June 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-125 (29 June 1992), p. 30

59. Warsaw Third Program Radio, 15 July 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-137 (16 

July 1992), p. 30. 

60. Warsaw TVP, 22 July 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-142 (23 July 1992), p. 21. 

61. Polska Zbrojna, 6 August 1992, pp. 1,2. FBIS-EEU-92-157 (13 

August 1992), p. 24. 

62. Slowo Polskie, 28 September 1992, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-92-198 (13 

October 1992), p. 17. 

63. Warsaw TVP, 22 October 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-206 (23 October 

1992), p. 23. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 206 (26 October 1992), p. 5. On 30 

June 1992 Janusz Onyszkiewicz replaced General Marian Sobolewski 

with Colonel Boleslaw Izydorczyk as head of military intelligence

Warsaw PAP, 30 June 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-127 (1 July 1992), p. 20. For a 

good review of the various reforms of military intelligence, see Warsaw 

PAP, 2 January 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-O01 (4 January 1993), p. 49. 

64. Romuald Szeremetiew, "Terra Incognita," Tygodnik Solidarnosc, 1 

January 1993, p. 4. FBIS EEU-93-010 (15 January 1993), p. 22. 

65. East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Summer 1992)

p. 13. 

66. For Small Constitution text, see Zycie Warszawy, 19 November 

1992. JPRS-EER-93-O09 (28 January 1993), pp. 29-35. 

67. Warsaw PAP, I August 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-149 (3 August 1992)

p. 15. 

68. "A Little Constitution in Poland," East European Constitutional 

Review, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Fall 1992), pp. 12-13. 

69. Warsaw PAP, 30 April 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-083 (3 May 1993), p. 33

70. When the parliament was dissolved in May 1993, the 46-member 
72. Warsaw PAP, 26 March 1993. FBISEEU93059 (30 March 1993

p. 20. 

73. Gazeta Wyborcza, 27-28 March 1993, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-93-060 (

March 1993), p. 20. 

74. Janusz B. Grochowski, "The Military Is Getting Restructured

Polska Zbrojna, 29 March 1993, pp. 1,5. 

75. Deputy Defense Minister Jan Kuriata interview, Polska Zbrojna, 

April 1993, pp. 1-2. Kuriata noted that his department was created fro

the Main Technology Institute and the Old Quartermaster services. Som

of these were integrated into the defense ministry, others dissolv

resulting in a reduction of 450 positions. JPRS-EER-93-053 (10 June 1993

p. 16. An added problem was the scarcity of funds for arms acquisitio

In 1993 the defense ministry had funds for only 10 new tanks fro

Labedy Mechanical Factories. Polska Zbrojna, 5 July 1993, p. 3. JPRS-EER

93-083 (13 August 1993), p. 19. 

76. For a good discussion of its goals, see: Krystian Pitkowsk

"Poland Courts Western Favor," Jane's International Defense Revie

6/1996, p. 34. 

77. Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Trybuna, 31 March 199

p. 1. FBIS-EEU-93-067 (9 April 1993), p. 17. 

78. Janusz Onyszkiewicz interview, Warsaw Radio Zet, 28 May 199

FBIS-EEU-93-105 (3 June 193), p. 20. 

79. Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network, 18 September 1993. FBI

EEU-93-180 (20 September 1993), p. 30. During the previous three year

about 60,000 servicemen and civilians of the Northern Group of Forc

were withdrawn. 

80. Presidential press spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski, Warsaw Rad

Warsawa Network, 26 August 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-165 (27 August 199

p. 24. 

81. Warsaw Radio Warsawa Network, 26 August 1993. FBIS-EEU-9

165 (27 August 1993), p. 23. 

82. Warsaw PAP, 31 August 1993. FBIS-WEU-93-168 (31 August 199

p. 36. 
86. Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz press conference, Warsaw PAP, 12 

July 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-132 (13 July 1993), p. 16. In fact 23 officers and 

two conscripts ran for Sejm and Senate seats. Thirteen officers ran on the 

Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms (BBWR), one officer and one sol

dier for the Coalition for the Republic, two for Democratic Left Alliance

and the rest for Polish Peasant Party and others. Warsaw TVP, 25 Augus

1993. FBIS-EEU-93-164 (26 August 1993), p. 14. 

87. Poznan Wprost, No. 30 (25 July 1993), p. 18. 

88. Warsaw PAP, 13 August 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-156 (16 August 1993)

p. 18; also Zbigniew Skoczylas interview, Gazeta Wyborcza, 13 October 

1994, pp. 10-11. FBIS-EEU-94-200 (17 October 1994), p. 23. 

89. The Union of Labor (UP) won 7.3 percent of the votes and 41 Sejm 

seats. Not counting the German minority with 0.7 percent, which has a 

handful of 4 guaranteed seats, only two other parties exceeded the 5 per

cent threshold and 8 percent for coalitions--the Confederation for an 

Independent Poland (KPN) 5.8 percent and 22 seats and the Non-Party 

Bloc in Support of Reforms (BBWR) 5.4 percent and 16 seats, endorsed by 

Lech Walesa. For an excellent assessment of the election, see Aleksande

Smolar, "The Dissolution of Solidarity," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 

(January 1994), especially pp. 72. 

90. For a good discussion, see Wiktor Osiatynski, "Poland's 

Constitutional Ordeal," East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 

(Spring 1994), pp. 29-38. 

91. Warsaw Rzeczpospolita, 27 October 1993, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-93-207 (2

October 1993), p. 21. 

92. Colonel Stanislaw Koziej of the BBN outlined the defense agenda 

of the new Pawlak government. Polska Zbrojna, 2 September 1993, p. 2. 

93. Polska Zbrojna, 9 November 1993, pp. 1,2. FBIS-EF.U-93-217 (1

November 1993), pp. 20 24; and Kolodziejczyk press conference

Rzeczpospolita, 18 November 1993., pp. 1,2. FBIS-EEU-93-222 (1

November 1993), pp. 25-26. Kolodziejczyk's position on NATO suggested 

continuity with the previous government. He noted: "I am not a skepti

as far as our road to NATO is concerned; I was and I still am a realist. W
96. Warsaw Polska Zbrojna, 18 November 1993, pp. 1,2. FBIS-EEU-9.~ 

227 (29 November 1993), pp. 19-20. 

97. Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk interview, Warsaw TV

Television, 23 January 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-018 (27 January 1994), p. 28. 

98. Poznan Wprost, No. 16 (17 April 1994), p. 34. FBIS-EEU-94-120 (2

June 1994), p. 14. 

99. Warsaw PAP, 17 January 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-014 (21 January 1994

p. 6. 

100. Warsaw PAP, 17 November 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-221 (1

November 1993), p. 15. 

101. Warsaw PAP, 26 November 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-227 (2

November 1993), p. 18. The goal was to amend the Small Constitution t

grant executive, not just advisory, powers to the NSC which woul

replace the KOK. National Security Bureau chief Jerzy Milewski inter

view, Warsaw TVP, 14 February 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-031 (15 Februar

1994), pp. 36-37. 

102. Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk interview, Rzeczpospolita

26 January 1994, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-94-O04 (1 February 1994), p. 25. 

103. Poznan Prost, 13 February 1994, p. 6. JPRS-EER-94-011 (30 Marc

1994), p. 18. 

104. Warsaw TVP, 5 January 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-O05 (7 January 1994

pp. 15-16. 

105. Krakow Czas Krakowski, 5-6 March 1994, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-94-05

(16 March 1994), p. 18. 

106. Warsaw TV Polonia, 25 April 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-082 (28 Apr

1994), p. 32. 

107. Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk, Warsaw TVP, 26 March 1994

FBIS-EEU-94-062 (31 March 1994), p. 9; Warsaw PAP, 15 June 1994. FBIS

EEU-94-116 (16 June 1994), pp. 16-17. 

108. Warsaw Radio Warsawa Network, 12 April 1994. FBIS-EEU-94

071 (13 April 1994), p. 25. 

109. Warsaw Cazeta Wyborcza, 3 May 1994, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-94-088 (

May 1994), p. 27. 
Our Own, Gazeta Wyborcza, 9 June 1994, pp. 12-13. FBIS-F.EU-94-116 (16 

June 1994), p. 16. 

114. Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network, 14 June 1994. FBIS-EEU-94- 

114 (14 June 1994), p. 22. 

115. According to BBN chief Henryk Goryszewski. Warsaw Gazeta 

Wyborcza, 23 June 1994, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-94-122 (24 June 1994), pp. 17-18. 

116. See Zbigniew Skoczylas interview, Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 13 

October 1994, pp. 10-11. FBIS-EEU-94-200 (17 October 1994), p. 22. 

117. Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 11 October 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-197 

(12 October 1994), p. 27; and Warsaw Zycie Warsawy, 12 October 1994, p. 

2. FBIS-EEU-94-198 (13 October 1994), p. 17. 

118. Janusz Onyszkiewicz interview, Warsaw Zycie Warsawy, 6 

October 1994, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-94-195 (7 October 1994), p. 37. 

119. Ibid., p. 38. 

120. Warsaw Radio Warsawa Network, 8 October 1994 and Warsaw 

PAO, 10 October 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-196 (11 October 1994), pp. 21-22. 

121. Warsaw Radio Warsawa Network, 12 October 1994. FBIS-EEU94-197 (12 October 1994), p. 26. 

122. Warsaw Zycie Warszawy, 18 October 1994), p. 2. FBIS-EEU-94- 

201 (18 October 1994), pp. 27-28. 

123. Warsaw PAP, 27 October 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-208 (27 October 

1994), p. 11. 

124. Warsaw PAP, 27 October 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-209 (28 October 

1994), pp. 10-11. 

125. Ibid. 

126. Warsaw PAP, 4 November 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-216 (8 November 

1994), p. 11. 

127. Bronislaw Komorowski interview, Poznan Gazeta Poznanska, 26 

October 1994, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-94-214 (4 November 1994), p. 17. 

128. Warsaw TV Polonia, 7 November 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-216 (8 

November 1994), p. 25. 

129. Warsaw PAP, 10 November 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-218 (10 

November 1994), p. 20. 
238 (12 December 1994), p. 22. 

133. Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 21 December 1994. FBIS-EEU-94

246 (22 December 1994), pp. 21-22; and Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 2

December 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-247 (23 December 1994), p. 19. 

134. Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 23 December 1994. FBIS-EEU-94

248 (27 December 1994), p. 14; and Warsaw Radio Warsawa Network, 2

December 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-249 (28 December 1994), p. 12. 

135. Lech Walesa address to Sejm, Warsaw Radio Warsawa Network

19 January 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-013 (20 January 1995), p. 16. 

136. Jerzy Milewski 19 January Sejm speech, Warsaw Polska Zbrojna

20-22 January 1995, p. 2..FBIS-EEU-95-014 (23 January 1995), pp. 34-36. 

137. Zbigniew Okonski interview, Warsaw Polska Zbrojna, 31 March

2 April 1995, p. 3. 

138. The Senate with 75 votes approved the amendments to the Smal

Constitution on 3 February. There were no abstentions nor votes agains

the amendments. For a good discussion of the speed of the amendmen

process, see East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Sprin

1995), p. 20. 

139. Warsaw Radio Warsawa Network, 30 January 1995. FBIS-EEU

95-020 (31 January 1995), p. 19. 

140. OMRI Daily Digest, 17 February 1995, p. 3. 

141. Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network, 1 March 1995. FBIS-EEU-95

040 (1 March 1995), p. 30. 

142. Warsaw PAP, 7 March 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-045 (8 March 1995)

p. 14. 

143. Warsaw TVP Television, 6 March 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-044 (

March 1995), p. 27. 

144. Warsaw PAP, 7 March 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-045 (8 March 1995

p. 14. 

145. OMRI Daily Digest (20 March 1995), p. 4. 

146. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 20 March 1995. FBIS-EEU

95-054 (21 March 1995), p. 11. 

147. OMRI Daily Digest (22 March 1995), p. 4. 
(8 February 1995), p. 22. 

152. Warsaw PAP, 8 March 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-045 (8 March 1995

p. 21. 

153. Defense Minister Okonski interview, Gazeta Wyborcza, 9 Marc

1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-046 (9 March 1995), p. 19. 

154. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 16 March 1995. FBIS-EEU

95-051 (16 March 1995), 21. 

155. Warsaw Zycie Warszawy, 15 March 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-05

(15 March 1995), p. 27. Two weeks later no details had been revealed

Warsaw Zycie Warszawy, 30 March 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-061 (30 Marc

1995), p. 21. 

156. Lech Walesa interview, Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 2

April 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-076 (20 April 1995), p. 14. 

157. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 10 May 1995. FBIS-EEU

95-090 (10 May 1995), pp. 43-44. 

158. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 12 May 1995. FBIS-EEU

95-093 (15 May 1995), p. 28. 

159. Poznan Wprost, 11 June 1995, pp. 26-28. FBIS-EEU-95-112 (1

June 1995), pp. 52-53. 

160. Warsaw PAP, 17 May 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-096 (18 May 1995

p. 19; RzeczpospoIita, 18 May 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-097 (19 May 1995

p. 18. 

161. Defense Minister Zbigniew Okonski interview, Warsaw Polsk

Zbrojna, 31 March-2 April 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-066 (6 April 1995), p

20. 

162. Warsaw Zycie Warszawy, 30 March 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-06

(30 March 1995), p. 21; and Zycie Warszawy, 7 April 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU

95-068 (10 April 1995), p. 35. Colonel Stefan Janus, the Polish attache t

Germany, became the new WSI head. 

163. Warsaw Zycie Warszawy, 15 May 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-095 (17 Ma

195), p. 30. 

164. OMRI Daily Digest, 9 June 1995, p. 4. 
pp

168. Zycie Warsawy, 10 January 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-O07 (1

January 1995), p. 13. 

169. Poznan Wprost (12 June 1995), pp. 26-28. FBIS-EEU-95-112 (12 

June 1995), pp. 53-54. 

170. Warsaw Third Program Radio Network, 12 June 1995. FBIS-EEU

95-113 (13 June 1995), pp. 36-37. Jerzy Szmajdzinski later claimed that a 

classified document dated 18 October 1994 presented to the Sejm Defense 

Committee supported Kolodziejczk's allegations. The document bear

the minister's initials but noted that the sale "was handled in tune with 

the law but without the minister's knowledge." Warsaw PAP, 21 June 

1995. FBIS-EEU-95-121 (23 June 1995), p. 9. 

171. Poznan Wprost, 11 June 1995, pp. 26-28, op. cit., pp. 53-54. 

172. Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 14 June 195. FBIS-EEU-95-116 (16 

June 1995), pp. 28-29; Polska Zbrojna, 16-18 June 195, pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU

95-117 (19 June 1995), pp. 45-46. According to regulations, if the Genera

Staff withdraws equipment for sale, the matter is taken over by the 

defense ministry Armaments and Infrastructure Department headed by 

Deputy Defense Minister Jan Kuriata, who must inform the defense min

ister. 

173. Warsaw Zycie Warszawy, 19 June 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-118 (20 

June 1995), p. 27. 

174. Warsaw PAP, 21 June 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-120 (22 June 1995)

p. 42. 

175. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 2 June 195, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-107 (

June 1995), p. 55. 

176. Mimeo: "Information on the Act on the Office of the Minister o

National Defense," Delegation of Poland, NATO HQ, Brussels, 10 July 

1995. 

177. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 30 June 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-126 (3

June 1995), p. 40. 

178. Jerzy Szmajdzinski interview, Poznan Wprost, 9 July 1995, p. 27

FBIS-EEU-95-129 (6 July 1995), p. 32. He also noted self-critically tha
y , p(y ), pp

181. Jerzy Szmajdzinski 9 July 1995 interview, op. cir., p. 32. 

182. Warsaw Zycie Warszawy, 18 July 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-138 (19 July 

1995), p. 36. 

183. Jerzy Szmajdinski interview, Warsaw Trybuna, 14-15 August 

1995, p. 8. FBIS-EEU-95-160 (18 August 1995), p. 44. 

184. Prime Minister Oleksy interview, Zycie Warszawy, 22 July 1995

op. cit., p. 45. 

185. Warsaw Zycie Warszawy, 24 July 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-143 (26 

July 1995), p. 50. 

186. London The Times, 9 August 1995, p. 9. 

187. Colonel Zdzislaw Czekierda, GS press spokesman, Warsaw TVP

6 December 1995. FBIS-EEU-955-235 (7 December 1995), pp. 45-46. 

188. BG Jozef Buczynski, Chief of Defense Ministry Cadre 

Department, Polska Zbrojna, 1-3 December 1995, pp. 1,3. FBIS-EEU-95-241 

(15 December 1995), p. 32. 

189. Warsaw PAP, 14 December 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-241 (15 December 

1995), p. 22. 

190. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 13 August 1995. FBIS-EEU

95-156 (14 August 1995), p. 46. 

191. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 6 September 1995. FBIS

EEU-95-173 (7 September 1995), p. 54. 

192. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 August 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95-154 

(11 August 1995), pp. 50-51. 

193. Warsaw TV Polonia Network~ 22 August 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-16

(22 August 1995), p. 40. 

194. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 16 August 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95-15

(17 August 1995), pp. 33-34. 

195. Tadeusz Wilecki 15 August 1995 speech, Warsaw Polska Zbrojna

16 August 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-159 (17 August 1995), p. 35. 

196. "Text" of President Walesa's 22 August 1995 letter to Prime 

Minister Oleksy, Polska Zbrojna, 23 August 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-164 (24 

August 1995), pp. 36-37. 
202. 

October 

203. 

204. 

Zbrojna, 

p. 46. 

205. 

200. Tadeusz Wilecki interview, Warsaw Polityka, 9 September 1995

p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-176 (12 September 1995), pp. 32-33. 

201. Warsaw TVP, 26 September 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-187 (2

September 1995), p. 47. 

Henryk Goryszewski interview, Warsaw Polska Zbrojna, 1

1995, pp. 1,3. FBIS-EEU-95-200 (17 October 1995), p. 51. 

OMRI Daily Digest, 12 October 1995; p. 4. 

General Tadeusz W'flecki, "The Defense Cannot Wait," Polsk

9 october 1995, pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU-95-197 (12 October 1995

General Tadeusz Wilecki, "Are the Armed Forces Agains

Civilian Control?" Rzeczpospolita, 12 October 1995, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-95-19

(16 October 1995), p. 59. 

206. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 26 October 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-20

(27 October 1995), p. 32. 

207. Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 11 November 1995. FBIS-EEU-95

218 (13 November 1995), p. 68. 

208. Warsaw Rzeczpospolita, 2 February 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-023 (

February 1995), p. 9; and Warsaw Polska Zbrojna, 2 February 1995, pp. 1,8

FBIS-EEU-95-042 (3 March 1995), p. 26. 

209. BG Jozef Buczynski, Chief Defense Ministry Cadre Department

Polska Zbrojna, 1-3 December 1995, pp. 1,3. FBIS-EEU-95-241 (1

December 1995), p. 32. 

210. Warsaw Zycie Warszawy, 19 November 1995, p. 5. FBIS-EEU-95

225 (22 November 1995), p. 58. 

211. BG Krzysztof Pajewski interview, Polska Zbrojna, 13 Novembe

1995, pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU-95-224 (21 November 1995), p. 58. 

212. Warsaw Zycie Warszagmy, 1 December 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-23

(4 December 1995), p. 63. 

213. Warsaw PAP, 7 November 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-216 (8 Novembe

1995), p. 45. 

214. Pawel Wronski, "Walesa Does Not Seem to Have the Lead in th
1995), p. 43. 

218. President Aleksander Kwasniewski Inaugural Address, 23 

December 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-247 (26 December 1995), p. 41. 

219. Warsaw TVP Television Second Program, 7 December 1995

FBIS-EEU-95-236 (8 December 1995), p. 41. 

220. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 13 December 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95- 

239 (13 December 1995), p. 43. 

221. Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy Address to the Nation, Warsaw TV 

Polonia Network, 20 December 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-245 (21 December 

1995), p. 34. 

222. Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych speech, Warsaw Polskie Radio, 21 

December 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-246 (22 December 1995), p. 33. 

223. Warsaw PAP, 19 January 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-014 (22 January 

1996), p. 59. 

224. OMR/Daily Report, 23 April 1996, p. 4. 

225. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 22 April 1996. FBIS-EEU96-079 (23 April 1996), p. 51. 

226. Warsaw TV Polonia, 8 January 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-O08 (11 

January 1995), p. 75. 

227. Warsaw Polska Zbrojna, 15 July 1996, pp. 1,3. FBIS-EEU-96-137 (16 

July 1996), pp. 44-46. 

228. Warsaw Rzeczpospolita, 18 January 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-013 

(19 January 1996), pp. 56-57. 

229. The legal basis for the change had begun before Dobrzanski took 

over. In late December 1995 Defense Ministry Legal Department Directo

General Kazimierz Nalaskowski noted the "drafting of a law establishing 

the Agency For Military Property, which will serve to relieve the military 

of superfluous infrastructure." He also added that modern legal founda

tions were being established for the Military Information Service

Warsaw Polska Zbrojna, 28 December 1995, pp. 1,3. FBIS-EEU-96-024 (5 

February 1996), p. 49. 

230. Warsaw Sztandar, 30 January 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-021 (3

January 1996), p. 43. 
1996), p. 57. 

233. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 26 March 1996. FBIS-EEU96-060 (27 March 1996), p. 43. 

234. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 27 March 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-061 

(28 March 1996), p. 39. 

235. Szczecin Glos Szczecinski, 2 April 1996, p. 10. FBIS-EEU-96-079 (23 

April 1996), p. 56. 

236. Warsaw Polska Zbrojna, 9 February 1996, pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU-96- 

035 (21 February 1996), p. 55. 

237. Warsaw 5ztandar, 15 February 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-035 (21 

February 1996), p. 56; Polityka, 2 March 1996, pp. 3-4, 6-7. FBIS-EEU-96- 

045 (6 March 1996), p. 38. 

238. Poznan Wprost, 17 March 1996, pp. 32-33. FBIS-EEU-96-054 (19 

March 1996), p. 60. 

239. Warsaw Polska Zbrojna, 12 March 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96-050 (13 

March 1996), pp. 51 52. 

240. Karkoszka interview, Polska Zbojna, 5 March 1996, pp. 1,4. FBIS

EEU-96-046 (7 March 1996), p. 42. 

241. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 12 March 1996. FBIS-EEU96-049 (12 March 1996), pp. 49-50. General Mika was rumored to be close

ly connected with former Presidential Chancellory Chief Mieczyslaw 

Wachowski and Chief of Staff General Tadeusz W'flecki. Warsaw Zycie 

Warszawy, 8 March 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-048 (11 March 1996), p. 43. 

242. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 12 April 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-073 

(15 April 1996), pp. 47 48. 

243. Warsaw Polityka, 2 March 1996, pp. 3-4, 6-7. FBIS-EEU-96 (6 

March 1996), pp. 40-41. 

244. Warsaw Polska Zbrojna, 29 February 1996, pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU-96- 

042 (1 March 1996), p. 45. 

245. Stanislaw Dobrzanski interview, Warsaw Trybuna, 24-25 

February 1996, pp. 1,7. FBIS-EEU-96-039 (27 February 1996), p. 49. 

246. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 17 May 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-097 (17 

May 1996), p. 55. 
248. Warsaw PAP, 19 April 1996. FBISEEU96078 (22 April 1996), 

p. 34. 

249. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 2 April 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-065 (3 

April 1996), p. 32. 

250. Warsaw Zycie Warszawy, 27-28 April 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-084 

(30 April 1996), pp. 60-61. 

251. Ibid. 

252. Warsaw Polska Zbrojna, 6 May 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-088 (6 

May 1996), p. 40. 

253. Warsaw Polska Zbrojna, 6 May 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-088 (6 

May 1996), pp. 40-41. 

254. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 May 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-093 (13 

May 1996), p. 70. 

255. Warsaw Third Program Radio Network, 14 June 1996. FBIS-EEU96-116 (14 June 1996), p. 48. 

256. Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 9 July 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-133 (10 

July 1996), p. 51. 

257. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 11 July 1996. FBIS-EEU-96- 

135 (12 July 1996), pp. 46-47. 

258. Maj. Gen. Kazimirz Dziok interview, Warsaw Polska Zbrojna, 8 

March 1996, pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU-96-051 (14 March 1996), pp. 46-47. 

259. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 20 February 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96- 

035 (21 February 1996), p. 57. 

260. Warsaw Sztandar, 19 April 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96-078 (22 April 

1996), p. 55. 

261. Warsaw PAP, 19 February 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-035 (21 February 

1996), p. 57. In April 1995, the Swidnik Polish Aircraft Plant, which produces the Sokol, sold 35 helicopters to the Republic of Korea. 

262. Warsaw TVP Television First Program, 13 February 1996. FBIS

EEU-96-031 (14 February 1996), p. 39. 

263. Warsaw Sztandar, 8 May 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-091 (9 May 

1996), pp. 61-62. 

264. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 22 May 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-101 (23 
267. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 8 March 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-047 (

March 1996), p. 44. 

268. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 11 April 1996. FBIS-EEU

96-072 (12 April 1996), p. 2. 

269. Warsaw TVP Television Second Program, 27 April 1996. FBIS

EEU-96-083 (29 April 1996), p. 50. 

270. Warsaw Zycie Warszawy, 22 March 1996, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-96-058 

(25 March 1996), p. 47. 

271. Warsaw PAP, 4 April 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-070 (10 April 1996

p. 23. 

272. First deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka interview

Warsaw PoIska Zbrojna, 16 May 1996, pp. 1,4. FBIS-EEU-96-100 (22 Ma

1996), p. 45. 

273. Warsaw PAP, 18 April 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-080 (24 April 1996

p. 20. 

274. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 5 June 1996. FBIS-EEU-96

109 (5 June 1996), p. 42. 

275. Warsaw Rzeczpospolita, 27 February 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-039 

(27 February 1996), p. 45. 

276. Warsaw Polska Zbrojna, 6 May 1996, pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU-96-089 (

May 1996), p. 41. 

277. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 24 March 1996. FBIS-EEU

96-058 (25 March 1996), p. 47. 

278. Warsaw PAP, 7June 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-112 (10 June 1996), p. 52

279. Warsaw Zycie Warszawy, 11 June 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-114 (1

June 1996), p. 52. 

280. Warsaw Rzeczpospolita, 10-11 January 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-030 

(13 February 1996), p. 53. 

281. Warsaw Zycie Warszawy, 19 April 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-078 (2

April 1996), p. 54. 

282. Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program, 21 March 1996. FBIS-EEU

96-057 (22 March 1996), p. 59. 
286. Warsaw PAP, 24 April 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-084 (30 April 1996)

p. 8. 

287. Warsaw Trybuna, 21 June 1996, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-96-123 (25 June 

1996), p. 46. OMR1 Daily Report, 16 June 1996, p. 4. 

288. Warsaw Polityka (18 May 1996), No. 20, pp. 31-32. FBIS-EEU-96

121 (21 June 1996), p. 38. 

289. Warsaw Rzeczpospolita, 22 February 1996, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-96-038 

(26 February 1996), p. 58. 

290. Bratislava SME, 21 February 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96-041 (29 

February 1996), p. 46. 

291. Warsaw Third Program Radio, 3 May 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-087 (3 

May 1996), p. 23. 

292. Warsaw Zycie Warszawy, 7 May 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-090 (8 

May 1996), p. 54. 

293. Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski interview, Polska Zbrojna

12-14 April 1996, pp. 1,3. FBIS-EEU-96-074 (16 April 1996), p. 54. 

294. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 5-6 June 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-110 (6 

June 1996), p. 58. 

295. Draft Constitution, Warsaw Rzecpospolita, 21 June 1996, pp. I

VIII. FBIS-EEU-96-135-S (12 July 1996), pp. 1-23. 

296. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 7 June 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-111 (7 

June 1996), p. 45. 

297. Jerzy Milewski interview, Warsaw Polityka, 1 June 1996, pp. 17

18. FBIS-EEU-96-110 (6 June 1996), p. 56. 

298. The Sejm Dfense and Security Committee employs two experts 

to provide support and analysis. The Sejm Finance Committee which 

oversees the entire budget employs five staffers. The Senate Foreign 

Affairs Committee has no permanent experts. Personal interviews, 23 

and 24 July 1996. 
Sou roe: ClA M~ ~22
H 'ungary's revolution resembled Poland's six-stage evolution

. ary process more than the revolutions in East Germany and 

Czechoslovakia. It differed from Czechoslovakia in that it lacked 

a politician like Vaclav Havel who had gained the confidence o

society through long years of shared battles. Polish reform was led 

by Lech Walesa and indigenous institutions--the Church and 

Solidarity--from outside the government with the effective coop

eration of a corrupt party apparatus. 1 

In Hungary, with the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party 

(HSWP) influence waning as a result of years of deepening crisi

within the party apparatus and economic degeneration in th

country, Communist reformers inside the system engineere

reform in league with outside opposition. When the previousl

disunited Hungarian opposition reconciled its differences, th

HSWP reform leadership committed itself to make the transition t

a democratic multi-party system. 

A major step toward coming to grips with Hungary'

Communist past occurred on 16 June 1989 when over 100,00

people took part in public funeral services for former [Prim

Minister] Imre Nagy whom the Communists had executed thre

decades earlier. That summer Hungary began to dismantle th

"iron curtain" on its western border and in September opened th

border for East German refugees to travel to the Federal Republi

of Germany. This action sparked the exodus of East Germans to th

13
HSWP led by Imre Pozsgay transformed the discredited HSWP b

changing its name to the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) and 

adopting a progressive program that embraced multi-part

parliamentary democracy, respect for civil hberties, and a mixe

economy. 

Most observers anticipated that the March 1990 parliamentar

elections would radically reduce Communist HSP representatio

and result in a coalition government including a number of oppo

sition parties. In anticipation, Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth, i

an effort to insulate the mihtary from the political change

announced on 1 December 1989 a major defense ministry and 

military reform, which included changing the military command

After the first free parliamentary elections were held in Marc

1990, 2 the two major winners--the Hungarian Democratic Forum 

(MDF) with 165 of the Parliament's 386 seats and Alliance of Fre

Democrats (AFD) with 92 seats formed a pact in late April, and 

new non-Communist government was sworn into power on 2

May 1990. Under terms of the agreement, Jozsef Antall, a membe

of the MDF, became prime minister. The first stage of Hungary'

revolution was completed in August 1990, when Arpad Goncz o

the AFD was named president. 

The second stage of Hungary's revolution commenced as rela

tions between the two major parties deteriorated at the end of 199

and through 1991. Significant MDF-AFD differences develope

over spheres of authority between the prime minister and presi

dent; these were challenged and resolved in the Constitutiona

Court. 

The third stage commenced after the government's successfu

Constitutional Court challenge at the end of 1991. In 1992 a new 
power. The new challenge became the need to write a constitution 

that all the Hungarian electorate would consider legitimate and to 

unify the General Staff with the defense ministry and dvilianize 

the ministry of defense. 

Step-by-Step Defense Reform 

As it was in Poland, the purpose of Hungary's defense reform 

has been to establish democratic [Parliament and government] 

command and control over the defense ministry and Hungarian 

People's Army (now Magyar Honvedseg). The reform also had to 

clarify lines of authority between the president and governmen

[prime minister and civilian defense minister] in peacetime and in 

wartime. It had to establish defense ministry oversight and 

management of the General Staff. Finally, the reform had to 

remove Soviet and the former Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party 

(HSWP) influence from the military establishment to ensure tha

Hungarian military forces were sufficient to guarantee the integri

ty of Hungary, and to return the armed forces to the service o

Hungarian society. 

Under the old system, Hungarian national security policy (a

in Poland) has been formulated by a small group headed by the 

HSWP First Secretary in his capacity as president of the Defense 

Council, and in the HSWP Central Committee by the secretary in 

charge of national defense, with perhaps the addition of the 

commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the defense minister

In July 1989, Prime Minister Nemeth noted that the new nationa

defense policy needed to make clear that Hungary's nationa

armed forces were in the hands of democratic power under appro
lated at the roundtable talks that took place in the spring. Th

Parliament which passed the Constitution in October 1989 was st

dominated by members of the Communist Part}: 

According to constitutional changes in October 1989, Nation

Assembly representatives are elected for four-year terms, and th

president, who is elected by the National Assembly for five year

is commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. 4 Only Parliament 

entitled to make decisions concerning the use of the armed forces

Accordh~g to Article 19 of the Constitution, the National Assemb

has the power to declare the state of war and conclusion of peac

In the event of war, it declares a state of emergency and sets up th

Defense Council. If the National Assembly is unable to conven

the president assumes these powers. 

When so empowered, the Defense Council--chaired by th

presidentS--has authority to deploy armed forces abroad an

within the country. 7 During peacetime, the prime minister, electe

by a majority of the National Assembl3; and the ministers of th

Government "control the operation of the armed forces, the polic

and other organs of policing. ''s 

On 1 December 1989, Hungary's defense reform divided th

defense ministry into two separate entities; a defense minist

subordinate to the prime minister and a Command of th

Hungarian Army (HA) subordinate to the president (see Table 5

below). 9 When the defense reform was announced, the Neme

government's intention was to remove the armed forces, whic

until then were under direct party command, from the direct infl

ence of the future non-Communist government, which wa

expected to exercise power following the then anticipated Marc

1990 multiparty elections. 
Table 5.1 Hungarian Defense Reform, 1989-90 

President (M. Szuros) 

A. Goncz (8/90) 

Defense Council 

(10/89) NA majority 

needed to operate 

(6/90) 2/3 majority 

PM (K. Grosz, M. Nemeth) 

J. Antall (5/90) 

N ONAL I I C°unc of I ASSEMBLY Ministers 

(386) 

Elections 

(3/90) 

I Commander t (9/90) Re-thinking 

HA (12/89) ............. 1 MONDI 

(LTG K. Lorincz) (3/90) (E Karpati) 

I L. Fur (5/90)---civilian 

H(P)A I Hungarian Defenders of the Homeland (2/90) 

Chief of Staff (L. Borsits), J. Deak 
unfortunate result of which was increased tension between th

president and the civilian government. Subordinate to the prim

minister (before elections Miklos Nemeth; Jozsef Antall of th

MDF after) and Council of Ministers is the defense minister (the

Ferenc Karpati; after May 1990 MDF civilian Lajos Fur), who mai

tains a relatively small staff (138 people) and is responsible f

state administration and military policy. After the 1989 defen

reform, the defense ministry dealt more with social and politic

questions, matters which Parliament normally had dealt with. 10 

After the 1989 defense reform, the Army remained subordina

to the President of the Republic (then Matyas Szuros; since Augu

1990 Arpad Goncz of the AFD), and control over the Army w

now exercised by a new (as of March 1990) Commander of th

Hungarian Army (f,t. Gen. Kalman Lorincz) who, as commande

in-chief of the armed forces, supervises actual military tasks. 

Under the defense reform, the president has authority to appoi

generals, la According to Lt. Gen. Laszlo Borsits: 

• The higher military leadership is exercised by the Comrnande

in-Chief, through the General Staff. 

• The troops are directly commanded by the field army corp

staff and the home air defense corps staff. 

• On the operational-tactical level of command the corps, brigad

and battalion staffs perform the task of leadership. 13 

Concerns about control of Hungarian forces during an eme

gency and authority to make the transition to war surfaced in th
control of Hungarian armed forces, subsequent National Assembly Defense Committee sessions were determined to reform the 

military. Sensitivity was evident in discussions about the illegality 

of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, the problems of 

Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party (HSWP) control over the army, 

and Hungary's participation in the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion. 

Bela Biszku, who had been HSWP Central Committee secretary 

between 1962-1978, told the National Assembly's Defense 

Committee on 3 January 1990 that the related command for intervention in 1968 was "most certainly" given to the Hungarian 

defense minister by the Warsaw Pact's Combined Armed Forces 

CinC35 In response, the National Assembly amended the defense 

law during February 1990 so as to grant itself the authority to 

decide on the deployment of armed forces abroad or in Hungary. 16 

After the Defense Committee blamed the HSWP for the illegal 

1968 invasion, it concluded on 2 March 1990 "that party direction 

of the army must in all events be abolished. ''17 

After the March 1990 elections, the governing MDF coalition 

and opposition Alliance of Free Democrats agreed to many significant amendments to the new constitution. The National Assembly 

amended the Constitution on 19 June 1990 to change some of the 

more objectionable provisions of the former Communist government that related to the use of force. For example, Chapter VIII 

"The Armed Forces and Police" now specifically required a twothirds (rather than simple) majority of the National Assembly to 

employ these forces, thereby ensuring parliamentary control over 

them.1 s 

To reform defense intelligence, the Council of Ministers established four offices (two civilian and two military): The National 
Gyaraki and Military Intelligence under Maj. Gen. Janos Kov

are part of the Hungarian Defense Forces, funded through 

defense budget, and overseen by Defense Minister Lajos Fur. 19 

On 14 February 1990, the military security function was tra

ferred to the Hungarian Defense Forces from the Interior Minis

III/IV group command, becoming an independent organizat

commanded by a professional officer. Its functions are to prot

against foreign intelligence activities, prevent insurrections a

danger to military preparedness, provide physical security 

military facilities, and protect persons performing confiden

functions. 2° Both the Military Intelligence Office and the (civili

Information Office have responsibility to operate globally wh

the National Security Office and Military Security Office 

confined to operating only in Hungary. 

Essentially the goal of the general defense reform amounted 

the reassumption of national control of the Hungarian milit

from the Soviet Union. But the defense reform also created n

problems between presidential and governmental authority. Af

Parliament elected Arpad Goncz (AFD) president on 3 Aug

1990, 21 he created a Military Office to liaise with the Command

of the Hungarian Defense Forces. Maj. Gen. Robert Pick w

manages the activities of the office, informs President Goncz 

subjects related to general military policy and military diploma

and acts as the core staff of the commander-in-chief during 

transition period between peace and war.aa 

Although the December 1989 reform was successfully imp

mented, intervening events during 1990--such as parliamenta

elections resulting in 6 parties in Parliament and producing 

prime minister and president from different political parties--a
Fur replaced Ferenc Karpati on 23 May 1990, becoming Hungary's 

first civilian defense minister after four decades of Communist 

rule, 23 by September Fur was expressing concern about limits to 

his authority--apparently feeling that officer training institutes, 

the Institute of Military History, and the management of all 

cultural areas under the military sphere of authority should be 

under his authority. 24 

In other words, although Hungary was the first Central 

European state to have a civilian defense minister, no Hungarian 

civilian exercised the kind of effective oversight or control over 

military matters exercised by civilian Deputy Defense Ministers 

Rasek in Czechoslovakia (since December 1989) and Komorowski 

and Onyszkiewicz in Poland (since April 1990). The defense 

ministry of 138 people 2s dealt mainly with social and pohtical 

questions with which Parliament was concerned. The Commander 

of the Hungarian Army and the armed forces remained separate 

and beyond Defense Minister Fur's purview. 

These problems and political differences soon escalated into 

significant tension in civil-mihtary relations. An October 1990 

transport strike brought these differences to a test. When Fur and 

Prime Minister Antall wanted to call up military transport to break 

the strike, President Goncz, as commander-in-chief, refused and 

threatened a constitutional crisis. Though the prime minister and 

defense minister backed off, Defense Minister Fur noted in an 

interview shortly after this incident that the real issue was the relationship of the defense ministry to the armed forces: 

[O]ne of the important things to settle is the relationship 

between the [defense] ministry and the army commanders. 
authority to command the army and initiated a review of the iss

in the Constitutional Court. 

During the spring of 1991, President Goncz (Alliance of F

Democrats--AFD), Prime Minister Antall, and Defense Minis

Fur (Hungarian Democratic Forum--MDF) continued to vo

differences of opinion over control of the armed forces. Lajos F

argued that the leadership of the army was oversized, that it w

unnecessary for the Hungarian Army Command and the Gene

Staff to function in parallel, and therefore it would be desirable 

adopt a leadership structure consistent with other Europe

democracies. 27 

President Goncz countered, "Attempts are being made 

transform the Army by abolisl~ng the command system, whic

do not agree with ...[adding that] the argument is not yet closed. 

Tension reached such a pitch that Lt. Gen. Kalman Lorin

Commander of the Hungarian Army, submitted his resignation 

President Goncz on 29 March 1991. Though neither Goncz, Ant

nor Fur would accept Lorincz's resignation, ao they recognized t

civil-military issue to be a serious problem and mandated a n

defense reform that was developed at the end of 1991. 

Parliamentary Defense Committee member Bela Kiraly argu

that the president is clearly the commander-in-chief but that 

Constitution places two restrictions on his command. First, 

authorizes the National Assembly to decide on deploying arm

forces within Hungary or abroad. Second, it requires the pri

minister's countersignature regarding every action involv

national defense. Upon the National Assembly's declaration 

war or emergency, presidential authority and responsibil

expand. In sum, Bela Kiraly felt that, although no constitutio
ing problems along the Yugoslav border. The failed Soviet coup in 

August 1991 only partially tested Hungary's defense machinery 

because the last Soviet troops had already left Hungary. (In 

contrast, Poland still had Soviet troops on its soil). When the 

National Security Cabinet met on 19 August to examine the situation, it noted that the borders were calm and concluded that 

Hungary was in no immediate danger. AntaU met with members 

of the six legislative parties, who expressed full unity with the 

approach taken by the Cabinet that Hungary should take a restrained and moderate approach to the affair. 31 Hence, no military 

orders or special measures, which would have required a National 

Assembly vote, were issued. 32 

The second test involved the constant overflights of Yugoslav 

aircraft. Hungary's response also evidenced restraint. Despite the 

fact that no military mobilization measures had been issued and 

heightened alert of Border Guard and Hungarian Armed Forces 

had been handled normally, on 18 September 1991 Chief of Staff 

Maj. Gen. Janos Deak expressed concern to the National Assembly 

Defense Committee that if an emergency arose---for example if 

Hungarian barracks were attackedILt. Gen. Kalman Lorincz 

lacked the authority to react rapidly. Deak argued that while 

Lorincz had mobilization authority, current constitutional stipulations presupposed that the decision either would be obstructed by 

the National Assembly (which requires a two-thirds vote) or 

would be made only very slowly.a3 

Due to these external tests as well as increasing internal 

tensions between President Goncz and Prime Minister Antall, 

Defense Minister Fur in August 1991 sought an unequivocal 

Constitutional Court interpretation concerning peacetime direc- 
In response to the Constitutional Court's decision, at the end 

1991 the defense ministry began a reorganization (see Table 

below) to redress the problems created by the December 19

defense reform. The new 1992 defense reform, which accelera

personnel changes in the defense ministry, had the dual purpose 

subordinating the military command to the defense ministry 

Table 5.2 Hungarian Defense Reform, 1992 

President I I NATIONAL J A. Goncz ASSEMBLY 

(386) 

Prime Minister 

J. Antall 

P. Boross (12/93) 

I 

Defense Minister 

L. Fur 

I 

I HDF Commander I 

Col. Gen. K. Lorincz 

Chief of Staff 

1st Dep. Cdr. 

Lt. Gen. J. Deak 

I 

Administrative 

State Secretary 

Lt. Gen. A. Annus 

R. Joo (3/93) 

L 

I 

Military Affairs 

Maj. Gen. 

I. Keleman 

Political 

State Secretary 

E. Raffey 

L. Szendrei (2/93) 

I I Economic & Budget 

S. Turjan 

Inter. Rel., 

Def. Pol., & PR 

R, Joo 

Z. Pecze (3/93) 
tant mid-management positions with civilians sympathetic to the 

MDF. 

President Goncz remains the commander-in-chief of the armed 

forces with specific duties and responsibilities which though 

defined by the Constitutional Court, remain untested. Different 

Hungarian views continue to exist as to whether the president will 

exert real (as against symbolic) powers during wartime. The 

debate is exacerbated by the untested role of the Defense Council, 

which is chaired by the president, but whose members also include 

the Speaker and leaders of the political parties from the National 

Assembly and the prime minister, the ministers, as well as the 

Commander of the Hungarian Army and the Chief of Staff from 

the Government. 3s Thus the powers of the president may be 

sharply curtailed by the predominance of political opponents on 

the Defense Council. Despite these nagging concerns, the 1992 

defense reform had gone a long way toward solving many problems that resulted from the 1989 defense reform in peacetime. HDF 

Commander Col. Gen. Lorincz remains subordinate to Goncz when 

the president is authorized to exercise emergency powers during 

crisis and war. During peacetime, Defense Minister Fur provides 

direction to Lorincz, who exercises command and control of the 

armed forces. Also subordinate to Fur is a political state secretary 

and an administrative state secretary, who supervises three deputy 

state secretaries. 

By early December 1991, as colleagues to Political State Secretary Erno Raffay and Deputy State Secretary Rudolf Joo, more new 

civilians had been appointed to mid-management positions in the 

defense ministry. Dr. Csaba Hende (MDF) became the ministeria

parliamentary secretary, Dr. Zoltan Bansagi (MDF) headed the 
Constitutional Court on 25 May 1992 to rule on the presiden

scope of authority in firing government officials, an issue th

arose over President Goncz's refusal to countersign Antall's ord

to fire the director of Hungarian Television, Elemer Hankis

Antall asked the Constitutional Court to declare Goncz's obstru

tionism unconstitutional and, indeed, on 8 June 1992, the Court, 

a 7-3 decision, ruled that the President could block the Prim

Minister's appointments and dismissals only if legal procedur

were not followed, the candidates were incompetent, or if--

accepting the government's decisions--Hungarian democra

would be threatened, a7 

In August 1992, a proposed draft national defense bill attemp

ed to eliminate "management duplications" by expanding t

government's management authority. The Parliament (or, in ca

of declared emergency, the Defense Council) would be responsib

for approving the basic principles of national defense, directions 

military development, and the budget. During peacetime, all oth

decisions related to army mobilization, location, leadership, an

training of troops--as well as partial deployment in case of exte

nal threat and until Parliament can decide would come und

government authority. The president would continue to have t

title of commander-in-chief with no authority to command t

Armed Forces. In peacetime his authority would be limited 

approval of defense plans and to appoint and release high-ranki

commanders in accord with the responsible ministe

recommendation, as 

In September 1992, the Constitutional Court approved Defen

Minister Fur's request to fuse the Commander of the Hungari

Army and the Chief of the General Staff in a single position wit
tion), provides a new power for the prime minister or defense 

minister. Under the new law, the government may, in three 

concrete cases (invasion of Hungarian airspace, surprise air attack, 

or surprise invasion), order immediate military action of not more 

than two Army brigades (5,000 troops) without specific agreement 

from the president and without declaration of emergency by 

Parlia-ment. 41 The government, however, is obliged to inform 

Parliament of any such decision. 

The second law dealt with the organization of the border 

guard; it defined the circumstances in which it fell within the jurisdiction of the military (as it had) or the police. The decision was 

significant because of the Yugoslav crisis. If the border guard were 

under the military, ultimate control would lie with Parliament; if 

it were under the police, then it would be under the prime minister, or minister of interior. In the bill, the border guard falls under 

the police (except during a state of war) and is subject to executive 

control. Both laws were enacted as constitutional amendments, by 

an overwhelming parliamentary majority on 7 December 1993. 42 

Armed forces reform. At the end of 1992, Hungarian Defense 

Forces comprised 100,000 compared to its 1989 size of 155,700. The 

number of conscripts declined from 91,900 in 1989 to 51,100

professionals from 30,500 to 22,900 (of which 8,500 were NCOs)

and civilian employees from 33,300 to 26,000. 43 During 1992 

Hungarian Defense Forces were reorganized; army brigades of a 

new type were created and the organizing and forming of mobile 

units began. 44 In addition, a training center for peacekeeping 

forces was designed to train the f~rst Hungarian peacekeeping 

company. 4s 

In the second phase in the Army's development (which would 
rian Defense Forces came from Germany in April 1993, with i

decision to supply spare parts as well as electronic and trainin

aircraft from stocks of the former East German army. 4z Arms als

came from Russia, with its decision to supply 28 MIG-29s 

October-November 1993 to cover $800 million of its $1.6 billio

debt to Hungary. 4a As a compensation, the National Assembl

earmarked 1.1 billion forints to install 113 electronic Identi

Friend or Foe (IFF) systems to the Hungarian Air Force, to b

installed during 1994. 49 

On 23 February 1993, Laszlo Szendrei (a Hungaria

Democratic Forum member of Parliament) replaced Erno Raffa

as political state secretary of defense, s° On 31 March 1993 Rudo

Joo, an MDF civilian, replaced Lt. Gen. Antal Annus as administra

tive state secretary, thus placing the defense ministry's top thre

posts in civilian handsY On 14 April 1993 the National Assembl

unanimously approved Resolution No. 27 concerning the Bas

National Defense Principles of the Hungarian Republic. s2 Als

on 7 December the National Assembly adopted (with 277 deputie

for, 1 vote against, and 1 abstention) a new Defense Law to com

into effect on 1 January 1994 establislfing that civilian service in th

military would be 18 months and military service would be 

months, s3 

When Yeltsin survived the October 1993 coup attempt 

Moscow, Lajos Fur concluded that he survived largely becaus

"the Army, with its neutrality...unambiguously committed itself 

support Yeltsin. ''s4 President Goncz said, "I can promise one thin

I will never give the order to shoot on the Hungarian Parliament

[adding that] the struggle in Russia will lead Hungary to wor

harder than ever for membership in the EU and NATO. ''ss 
On 12 December 1993, Prime Minister AntaU died ending the 

government's legal mandate. The interim government, under 

Interior Minister Peter Boross, initially operated with reduced 

powers until the president nominated Boross to succeed Antall. 

(Failure to appoint a government within 40 days would result in 

new elections called by the president). Parliament ultimately confirmed Boross by a majority vote. 

On 14 January 1994, the Government announced that it would 

merge the defense ministry and the Genral Staff of the Army 

Command in accordance with the 7 December 1993 Defense Law, 

thereby placing the armed forces under civilian control in peacetime and war. This was scheduled to occur when General Kalman 

Lorincz reached the mandatory retirement age of 55 in Februar}: s7 

Lt. Gen. Janos Deak, the Chief of Staff, assumed the post of 

Commander of the Hungarian Army on 1 March and was promoted to colonel general on 15 March. According to Lajos Fur, as of 1 

March 1994, the defense ministry would have three state secretaries: political, administrative, and chief of staff, s8 

Post-Communist Return and a New Constitution 

On 30 June 1993, the Hungarian Cabinet submitted a draft bill 

aimed at modifying the Electoral Law of 1989. It raised the electoral threshold from 4 percent to 5 percent and modified the 

procedure for by-electiol~s. Now all by-elections would be held 

on the same day once every year, excluding general election years. 

Hungary's May 8 and 29, 1994 parliamentary elections (like 

those in Poland in September 1993) brought the Hungarian 

Socialist Party (HSP) back to power; of the 386-seat Parliament, the 
and form a coalition government with the AFD. Thus with 51 p

cent of the popular vote, the HSP-AFD coalition parties had t

necessary two-thirds parliamentary majority to amend t

Constitution. $9 

Hungary's 1994 vote-to-seat disproportionality was remar

ably similar to 1990's and resulted from Hungary's "mixed" el

toral system. Out of the 386 deputies, 176 are chosen in two-rou

(majority and plurality), single-district elections, while up to 1

seats are filled in proportional votes in 20 regional constituenci

At least 58 representatives are chosen from a national compens

tion list. 60 

Similar to Poland, one of the consequences of the Hungari

electoral system is that, while disproportionality magnifies t

strength of the winning parties and enhances governability, it 

wholly ill-suited when it comes to the needs of constitution

politics. The Constitution's amending formula, which allows tw

thirds of the Parliament to revise the Constitution, cannot be left 

it is. Theoretically, the new socialist-liberal (HSP-AFD) coaliti

could unilaterally act under the inherited amending formula 

change the Constitution along with the current two-thirds el

toral law and permanently undermine the chances of the we

opposition. 

Both the electoral law and the Constitution's amending form

la present dangers to Hungary's parliamentary democracy a

constitutional stability. One indication of this danger occurred 

30 September 1994 when all four opposition parties walked o

when voting began on a constitutional amendment to voti

procedures for local elections. But the HSP-AFD coalition, w

two-tt~irds majority, voted to change the Constitution to simpl
less parliamentary tinkering with the Constitution, the new social

ist-liberal coalition is not in a good position to initiate a new phas

of constitution making. First, although it holds 72 percent of th

seats, its 51 percent electoral base is too narrow to establish any

thing but a winner's constitution. Second, neither the HSP (whos

forerunner HSWP imposed a pseudo-constitution on the country

nor the AFD is well-situated to sponsor a new constitution. Bu

Hungary needs to revise its Constitution to deal with the follow

ing problems: it must clarify the role of the president, reduce th

Constitutional Court's powers, and redefine the role of the publi

prosecutor. 

During 1995, Hungary planned to draft and pass a new 

Hungarian Constitution because the coalition parties were com

mitted to this goal. They have formed a 27-member parliamentar

committee (HSP will have 10; AFD 5, and opposition parties 10) t

draft the new document, working under the minister of justice

Though they planned to present the new constitution for popula

ratification by 20 August 1995, when new presidential election

were required, 8a the process took longer than expected and ha

been pushed well into 1997. 

Several items on the constitutional agenda include presidentia

powers, guaranteeing judicial independence by a Nationa

Judiciary Council, redefining the role of the public prosecuto

reforming local government, and trimming the Constitutiona

Court's functions. 63 A new constitutional amending formula wi

propose requiring a second parliamentary session to ratify amend

ments made by a previous one. Finally, a new electoral law wi

propose abolishing the second electoral round, keeping a mixe

system but taking the principle of proportionality into account. 
Parliament should remain unicameral or become bicameral. 

Because the HSP-AFD Socialist-liberal coalition has 72 percen

of the seats and only a two-thirds vote is necessary for ratification

in order to achieve a broad-based consensus, the six parliamentar

parties have agreed to submit the draft to Parliament only if at leas

five of the six parties can agree. Though the intention was t

submit the draft Constitution to Parliament before the end of 199

so as to be in place in 1996, delays have occurred pushing this dat

to 1997. 

Despite the good intentions, consensus apparently has bee

elusive. On 6 June 1996 the Parliament ended a debate on the draf

Constitution. While the ruling coalition want the final text b

December 1996, the opposition parties now just want amendment

to the present Constitution and to postpone the draft until after th

1998 elections. ~ When the Parliament began debating the new 

draft Constitution on 19 June 1996 the greatest divisions involve

the inclusion of social rights provisions, with two parties--th

AFD and Young Democrats--opposed. 8s 

In sum, what had appeared to start out with a clear agenda an

a six-party national consensus has turned into a much longer an

difficult process. Developing a broad-based consensus constitutio

that is not perceived as a victors diktat, may be a more difficu

task than all sides had origniaUy envisioned. 

"From Citizens in Uniform to Generals in Suits" 

When the new government was formed after the election, HS

leader Gyula Horn became prime minister (see Table 5.3 below)

On 24 June the HSP-AFD coalition signed a government agree
Keleti noted, he had walked out on former Defense Minister Fu

"because the conditions prevailing in the ministry made it impos

sible to work normally with the minister and several of hi

employees. "66 After leaving the military, Keleti had been elected t

Parliament twice from an individual electoral district in a 1993 by

election and during 1994. 

Table 5.3 Hungarian Defense Reform, 1994 

President 

A. Goncz 

NATIONAL I Prime Minister 

ASSEMBLY I G. Horn 

(386) I 

........................................................................................ Defense Minister 

Col. (Ret) G. Ke eti 

I I 

I HDF Cdr/CofS ] Administrative 

Col. Gen. J. Deak State Secretary 

Maj. Gen. ICdr. J. Deak CofS S. Nemethl (11/94) (11/94) '1 J. Feher 

I HDF Cdr/CofS 

Lt. Gen. F. Vegh (6/96) 

Press & 

Soc. Rel. 

Maj. Gen. 

Liskai 

Military Affairs 

Lt. Gen. (Ret) 

L. Borsits 

Economic & 

Budget 

M~.Gen. 

Janza 

Political 

State Secretary 

A. Toth 

I. Fodor (11/94) 

Inter. Rel., 

Def. Pol., & PR 

T. Toth 

I. Gyarmati (5/96) 
Karoly Janza deputy administrative state secretaries. Keleti als

appointed Maj. Gen. Csaba Liszkai to supervise press and soci

relations, giving him the rank of deputy state secretary. Militar

officers also took over departmental-level positions. Colonel Pete

Haber, an old colleague of Borsits, became head of the Militar

Department under Borsits; Colonel Nandor Gruber replaced civi

ian economist Sandor Kovacs as head of Defense Econom

Department; and Colonel Istvan Szekeres replaced civilian socio

ogist Laszlo Dobos as head of Department on Social Relations an

Culture. 88 

One civilian, Andras Toth became political state secretary; bu

in November when Toth became head of the prime minister

office, he was replaced by Dr. Istvan Fodor. The only other high

ranking civilian was Tibor Toth (an expert on disarmament fro

the foreign ministry) as one of the three deputy state secretarie

He was replaced by another civilian expert Istvan Gyarmati i

May 1996. 69 

Keleti also began an internal reorganization of the defens

ministry by cutting it from 317 to 287 people. 70 Defense ministr

spokesman Colonel Lajos Erdelyi noted that the reorganizatio

was "an internal affair" adding that, according tO law, the defen~

minister can make such decisions. In response, Imre Mecs, chai

man of the National Assembly's Defense Committee, expresse

concern about "militarization" of the defense ministry and note

that there was not enough "civilian staff. "71 

In an early interview Defense Minister Keleti noted that he wa

sure he would have harmonious relations with the generals an

that he intended to act as a civil politician and not a "forme

colonel." He also indicated that he intended to abolish the govern
meet with him once a month to inform him about the Armys situ

ation and that he also invited Robert Pick, head of the president

military office, to attend all cabinet sessions of the ministry. 73 

Keleti then reorganized the General Staff, providing it wit

more authority in military planning, including intelligence. I

early September 1994, he recommended to the National Assemb

Defense Committee that the defense ministry and Army head

quarters not be merged. 74 As of 1 November Keleti once agaI

divided the two top Army positions when he appointed Lt. Ge

Sandor Nemeth to become Chief of Staff, while retaining Jano

Deak as Commander of the Hungarian Defense Forces. 7s Sinc

Keleti had always been personally and politically close to Nemet

the division of the post served to contain the commander fro

above and below. 

That Keleti's decision to separate the General Staff from th

defense ministry needed to be revisited was stressed by a Briti

study team review of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense 

February 199676 and also by Keleti in April. Keleti declared "W

must put integration on the agenda sooner or later. "77 He the

suggested that the first step might be to leave unfilled the positio

of Commander of the Hungarian Defense Forces and eventually 

eliminate the function, create a new headquarters later in 1996, an

then perhaps by the year 2000 make the headquarters part of th

defense ministry. 

Keleti saw his major concern as retention of professionals 

the Hungarian Defense Forces. Because the Army cannot b

financed from the budget with its current structure, Keleti pr

posed to reduce personnel by retaining professional officers and 

call up fewer conscripts; some 2,000 less in August 1994, wi
forints in 1994, of which 7.2 billion was not covered by revenue

and that efforts by defense managers could only cut 3.5 billion by 

cost-saving means. 81 Maj. Gen. Karoly Janza, Deputy State 

Secretary for Economic and Budgetary Affairs, argued that the 

financial situation was worse than he expected, citing significan

infrastructure expenses of more than one billion forints to main

tain the recently acquired MIG-29s. Janza suggested that reducing 

exercises and conscripts was the only way to reduce the shortfall, s

When the defense minister announced in September that he 

would cut the size of the defense ministry as a cost-saving 

measure, he explained that he would retain the Army Command 

size (of roughly 900) because intermediate command levels were 

to be eliminated and the military zones were to report directly to 

the General Staff. aa The reform would reduce Hungary's fou

military districts to two, resulting in a further reduction of staff. 8

In support of Keleti, retired Colonel Peter Deak added that th

military needed fewer levels of command to eruhance the military'

ability to react rapidl}; make communication more rapid, and to 

create better informed, more independent staffs. Deak also noted 

that rear services organizations were not functioning properly and 

that the General Staff was too big and appeared to duplicate the 

defense ministry. 8s 

On arms acquisitions, Keleti also shifted further from his pre

decessor's policy. After the MIG-29 acquisition from Russia

Defense Minister Lajos Fur had indicated that he also would lik

to get the S-300 missile air defense system in exchange for some o

the remaining $800 million debt. Keleti rejected tl'ds policy; he 

wanted, instead, to acquire BTR-80 armored personnel carriers fo

the Hungarian Army and Border Police and spares for the 2
Keleti also succeeded in his efforts to acquire military spa

parts from the Ukraine in return for Hungarian medicines. 

Finally in March 1996, despite opposition from some members 

the Parliament's Defense Committee, because Defense Minist

Keleti had failed to consult with them beforehand and because 

increasing dependence on Russian arms manufacturers, th

Hungarian Army decided to purchase 100 T-72 tanks from Belar

at a very favorable price. 89 Presumably, the T-72s would be chea

er than modernizing Hungary's T-55s and the Defense Minist

proposed paying for the T-72s with money obtained from selli

real estate. 90 

Defense Minister Keleti also stressed that he wanted to pursu

modernization in the Air Force, particularly radio-technic

modernization (ground-based radar). 91 Keleti was successful 

acquiring 20 Mi-24 combat helicopters from Germany inherit

from the former East German National People's Army. 9z Althou

CFE limits Hungary to 108 helicopters, it maintained only 

Mi-24s. After the German installment, Hungary's invento

increased to less than 59, since some of the German supply we

dismantled and used for spare parts. 93 

Army reform. When Army Commander Janos Deak present

the Army reform concept to the National Assembly in Janua

1995, he noted that the program was motivated by the fact th

budgetary allocations were inadequate to maintain existing mi

tary structures and by the need to modify the Hungarian Arm

Forces for integration with NATO. 94 In sum, the reform was bei

pulled in two directions. 

On 1 March 1995, Prime Minister Gyula Horn announced t

new organization of the top leadership of the Armed Forc
Parliament Defense Committee that the Armed Forces were 

preparing to establish rapid deployment battalions, comprised 

mah~y of professionals and soldiers under contract, and later 

would be developed into brigades. 98 

In accordance with National Assembly Resolution 88/1995 on 

the Direction of the Long and Medium Term Reform of the 

Hungarian Defense and its Personnel Strengthy the defense 

ministry issued a directive on 15 July 1995. In mid-Septembe

Deputy State Secretary Laszlo Borsits briefed the Nationa

Assembly Defense Committee that the Command of the Land 

Forces and the Regional Military Commands would be abolished 

and replaced by a Mechanized Army Corps Command. In addi

tion, an Air Force and Air Defense Corps Command would be se

up and a Central Organizations Command would replace 

Budapest Regional Military Command by the end of 1995. 98 

One result of the military reorganization was the need to form 

brigades that could be deployed quickly; the first to be created was 

the 25th Mechanized Rifle Brigade in Tata. One effect of the reor

ganization was that between 1996-1998, the defense ministry'

19,200 civilian personnel had to be reduced to 7,800 and military 

officers from 14,400 to 9,000. This demobilization would cost 3.2 

billion forints (Ft) in 1996, Ftl.3 billion in 1997, and Ftl.4 billion in 

1998.99 

Colonel General Deak admitted in a November 1995 report to 

the Parliament Defense Committee that the effects of reorgani

zation, downsizing, smaller budgets, and reduced training was 

having an effect upon morale. Deak noted that the professiona

staff was "particularly critical...[that] the officers' salary is not in 

proportion with their responsibility. The army does not have 
summer, it concluded that the armed forces' reform neede

modification because the present ideas could lead to "crisis. "101 

Shrinking Defense Forces. Financial constraints, howeve

were particularly severe. Defense Minister Keleti noted on 8 Mar

1995 that during the previous four years the Hungarian Arme

Forces had consumed their reserves of fuel, spare parts, and clot

ing. Replenishing the reserves had become an urgent priority. A

a result, the Armed Forces had abandoned military exercises abo

the company level, the reserves were not called up in the secon

half of 1994, and air defense missile and air combat exercises h

been "scrapped. "102 To save money airmen flew only 45 to 

hours per year. 103 This paucity of flyh~g hours contributed to t

18 military aircraft accidents in 1994, and others in 1995. l°4 

The 1995 defense budget of 77 billion forints (1.5 percent 

GDP), was burdened further by Ft2.4 billion carried over fro

1994. According to Keleti, the "real value of the Army's budget h

decreased by 58 percent since 1990. 'q0s In order to deal with t

constrained budget, the Defense Ministry had to lay off 3,000 civ

ian employees as of July 1995 and a further 3,000 over the ne

three years. 106 Deputy State Secretary for Defense Lt. Gen. Karo

Janza noted that in 1.996 the defense ministry would need 

billion forints just to function and a further 10-15 billion to laun

the reform process. 1°7 

Fiscal constraints contributed to very different views about t

size of Hungarian armed forces. From a 1989 armed forces streng

(civilian and military) of 155,700, the Hungarian Army had shru

to 93,155 by July 1995, on its way to 81,266 by the end of 1995. T

active military comprised 74,500 (53,400 conscripts) at the end 

1995.1°8 By the end of 1996, military personnel strength wou
Hungarys population. 110 

But these plans are likely to change. In May 1995, retire

General Janos Sebok and member of Parliament offered a ver

different view: "[The] current size of the Hungarian Army could 

safely be reduced by at least 50 percent... I advocate a reductio

of the Army's size to 40,000 men and that the reduction should b

implemented by 1997. ''111 By May 1996 fiscal constraints appeared 

likely to continue to drive manpower levels lower. The Hungarian 

Government's state administration reform plan, which require

further cuts in Government expenses over the next three years

proposes to reduce the Army's peacetime personnel size t

30,000.112 In sum, while it remains ambiguous just how smal

Hungary's defense forces will actually become, it is certain tha

they will become smaller. Also it is clear that their size is not bein

determined by a mid- to long-term strategic plan. 

Civilian control. The issue of civilian control of the Hungarian 

Army surfaced again in the Spring of 1995. Criticizing the de-civil

ianization and deficiencies in the defense ministry, Parliamentar

Defense Committee Chairman Imre Mecs noted: "The executiv

should control military matters, but this is not done with th

necessary effectiveness, so the National Assembly's Defens

Committee has to reinforce its supervision in this domain. ''11

Keleti responded by noting that parliamentary control over th

Army is already strong, but admitted that "we have not reall

managed to establish the defense ministry's civilian basis in th

past four years. At the moment: 40 percent of the ministry's 28

employees are civilians. ''114 

Administrative State Secretary of Defense Jozsef Feher added

(noting that there had been much progress made in establishin
budget planning system, a military defense planning system, a

legal regulations. 

Tamas Wachsler (Young Democrat--FIDESZ) of the Defen

Committee expressed lack of confidence and also complained th

the defense ministry is often unwilling to provide secret inform

tion to the members of the Committee, while Imre Mecs argu

that the authority of the Defense Committee needed to be expan

ed. 116 The obstacles to the proper functioning of the Defen

Committee lie in the lack of expertise of new members and 

professional support staff or advisors on military matters. T

leaves great space for maneuvering of the military, which som

times lacks good will toward Parliament. As Thomas Wachs

noted "unless MPs ask the correct question, they will not get t

answer they are looking for. ''117 As result, they are hardly able 

initiate legislation; usually the Defense Committee follows t

Army's and defense ministry's initiatives. 

When Defense Minister Keleti discussed draft legislation 

the rights and obligations of conscripts and announced in Ap

1996 that at some time in the future conscription would be reduc

from one year to nine months, Imre Mecs of the Defense a

Security Committee announced that this would not occur becau

the country's defense capability needed to be considered and th

such a move would require more money. 118 

Hard on the heels of the controversial T-72 acquisition fro

Belarus, during May 1996 another major issue arose regarding t

Parliament's lack of oversight in the deployment of 8 MIG-29s t

NATO-PFP military exercise in Poland. Apparently the Defen

Ministry Aviation and Air Defense Command and deputy st

secretary failed to check and meet the constitutional conditions 
complained that the "defense ministry was not fully aware of th

Parliament's importance [adding that] the purchase of T-72

should have been coordinated with the Committee in advance

and not presented with a ~dt accompli. 'q2o Some of these differ

ences were worked out in early July with parliamentary approva

of Hungarian troop participation in exercises through 1996. lal 

Although the Defense Committee's oversight of the defens

budget still remains limited, it remains one of the most activ

parliamentary defense committees in Central Europe. It comprise

five subcommittees, with varying degrees of activity and effec

tiveness. First, the Special Investigations subcommittee ha

investigated secret service operations, the MIG-29 deployment t

Poland, defense ministry treaties with foreign governments, and 

contract tenders. Second, the Budgetary subcommittee has hel

hearings on contract tenders for radars, short-range missiles

fighters, and IFOR procurements. Third, a Supervisory subcom

mittee oversees legal implementation of economic and socia

issues. Fourth, a Foreign Affairs subcommittee that has remaine

somewhat inactive. Fifth, an Ombudsman subcommittee to inves

tigate complaints of internal violations322 

Armed Forces Reform. On 27 July 1995, Jozsef Feher expressed 

optimism with progress on the Bilt on the Legal Status of Armed 

Forces professional personnel. He indicated that the long-awaite

bill would be put before Parliament in October and could becom

a legally binding statute hi January 1996. The bill would reconcil

service status and the legal system; it would also provide a flame

work for interest representation within the armed forces, resolv

anomalies of qualifications and promotions, clarify the rights o

professional soldiers, and establish salaries and retirement benefit
finally passed in early May 1996, 4,000 professional soldiers in t

Interest Protection Body (e.g., a form of a soldiers' trade unio

expressed dissatisfaction with the law, claiming that it exclud

them from public life, that they could not even take on depu

posts in the local government, and that the government ke

delaying the deadline for introducing a new army wage table an

pay raise325 Even though the salaries of soldiers had been rais

19.5 percent in January 1996, many soldiers continued to leave t

Army. 126 Jeno Poda (MDF) of the Parliament's Defense Committ

described the "personnel and technical conditions of t

Hungarian Army as tragic, "127 criticizing the fact that more th

one-haLf of the defense ministry budget was spent in Budapest an

that most reductions in personnel had occurred in the provinc

and in combat units. 

"Two-Track" Force Modernization. On 19 September 1995 t

National Assembly unanimously approved two proposals on a

defense to improve radars in two phases (phase one to the ye

1998 would cost Ft20 billion) and low-altitude air defense miss

systems in two phases (15 air defense units to 2000 would co

Ft10-11 billion; 30 air defense units to 2005 would cost Ft20-

billion). 128 According to Keleti, the 1995 staff reduction made 

possible for the Army to implement a Ftl0 billion developme

during 1996 compared to the Ft2 billion spent in 1995.120 

The United States agreed to assist in the modernization 

radars with $6.25 million in the framework of PFP. 13° Af

Westinghouse won the Ftl0 billion contract for the radars, the

were allegations of corruption. The Parliament's Defen

Committee investigated the charges, but had still not made mu

progress by April 1996.131 
1,650 soldiers), the Ftl billion annual savings would help amortiz

the costs of the system. 133 

Aircraft acquisitions would also have an impact upon th

defense budget and force structure. While CFE permits Hungary 

to have 180 combat aircraft, Hungary plans to keep only 70-90 by 

the end of the decade. Decisions were to be made in Decembe

1996 for the purchase of 30 combat aircraft from among Swedish 

JAS-39 Gripens, U.S. F-16s or F-18s, or French Mirage-2000s334 

The issue was further complicated when the Israeli Aircraf

Industries in May 1996 offered to refurbish 28 of Hungary's agin

MIG-21s for less than 10 percent of the cost of buying new air

craft, lss In the end, when the Finance Ministry concluded that no 

deal could be concluded because the money was not available, th

government decided to postpone the decision until mid-1997.136 

Keleti noted that Hungary's modernization was on "two chan

nels." The Air Force and Air Defense modernization would likel

be Western to better fulfill NATO compatibility requirements

Modernization of Land Forces, though, was another matter. Ther

was no NATO standard for tanks and APCs, only for the built-i

electronic and telecommunications systems. Hence Keleti justifie

the acquisition of 100 T-72s (for five percent of the cost of a new 

tank) from Belarus as enhancing Hungarian independence, sinc

T-72 spares are produced in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, and 

Slovakia.137 

General Staff (GS) Rejuvenation. Toward the end of 1995

Keleti noted that the defense ministry was preparing fo

comprehensive leadership changes in the coming year. On 

December 1995 11 generals retired at the mandatory age of 5

years--among them were Administrative State Secretary Maj
Deak and Chief of Staff Nemeth. In accordance with the Parl

ment's decision to reorganize the Hungarian Army, the two po

tions would again be fused as they had been under Defen

Minister Fur. 189 Lt. Gen. Ferenc Vegh, who had been trained at t

U.S. Army War College, became First Deputy Chief of Staff 

December 1995 and assumed command of the new fused positi

of Army Commander/Chief of Staff in May 1996.140 In additio

Maj. Gen. Lajos Fodor, who had also been trained at the U

National War College, became First Deputy Chief of Staff on I Ju

1996. 

General Vegh would be responsible for restructuring and re

ganizing the General Staff with the goal of developing a simp

and more efficient structure and reform the military. The st

would be reorganized with the involvement of civilian exper

scholars, and NATO specialists. 141 In his testimony to the Parl

ment Defense Committee, Vegh noted that an Army of 45,0

would be enough to defend the country. 142 He also openly not

that the Army staff and leadership of troops was "hamstrung 

customs and centralization [which he characterized as] dang

ous." Vegh expressed concern that among the troops "pessimi

reigns supreme" and impatience in that he could "not see clea

whether the generals really want changes to happen. "143 

Ferenc Vegh opened his tenure on 6 June by noting that 

Hungarian Army has no more reserves and could no longer m

its obligations. Vegh noted that the annual cost of the army stru

ture adopted by Parliamentary Resolution 88/1995 should 

Ft143.5 billion; and that the Army was in such bad condit

because it had only been allotted one-half that amount. Therefo

the political decision-makers needed to decide whether they wa
capable of activating under the given circumstances. q 4s In appa

ent agreement, Defense Ministry Deputy State Secretary Istva

Gyarmati admitted that: "Maintaining an Army of 60,000-70,00

will require about twice as much money as the current budget. F

this reason it does not appear realistic. "146 

NATO" Peacekeeping, PFP, and, IFOR. At the end of Marc

1995, Keleti pointed out that training of the first Hungaria

peacekeeping force had been completed and it would be availab

to deploy to Cyprus in the second half of 1995.147 In the Fall, 3

Hungarian troops joined an Austrian peacekeeping unit in Cypru

under the UN. By the Spring of 1996, the Hungarians ha

increased their contribution to the staff to 120.148 

Based upon the PFP exercise experience and military exercis

with NATO states, Parliamentary Defense Committee chairma

Imre Mecs has noted, "We have a long way to go to catch up in th

fields of telecommunication, organization, and cooperatio

including the knowledge of languages. [Nevertheless, he conclu

ed that] the Hungarian Army would be suitable for NAT

membership around 1998. ''149 

During 16-20 October 1995, a German-British-Hungarian PF

exercise (code-named COOPERATIVE LIGHT) was held. The exerci

cost Ft150 million, with Hungary putting up Ft90 million, inclu

ed 1,200 Hungarian and 350 foreign troops, and provide

Hungary with the first opportunity to participate in the plannin

of a NATO exercise. 15° Also during 22-24 July 1996 a 15-natio

search and rescue PFP exercise (CooPERATIVE CHANCE-96) compri

ing 540 foreign and 600 Hungarian soldiers, took place 

Hungary. Hungary covered Ftl00 million of the exercise costs. 15

When the Balkan conflict flared with the Croatian offensi
The United States would pay rent for the Army establishments an

their refurbishment at Kaposvar and Taszar, as well as the costs 

making the Taszar airport NATO-compatible. ls4 Parliame

approved this move on 28 November 1995. Defense Minister Kele

openly expressed his hope that the facilities would remain 

Hungary after the IFOR mission ends--as an "advance" for th

time of "even more intensive contacts with NATO. ''1s5 Sta

Secretary Istvan Fodor added that the U.S. presence had importa

economic benefits for Hungary and facilitated the modernizatio

of the army. ls6 

In addition, on 27 March 1996, the United States signed a

agreement, in line with NATO's SOFA program, that would cov

75 percent of the costs of damage caused while serving 

Hungary, while the Hungarian Defense Ministry would sustain 

percent. 157 Relations between the American (IFOR) and Hung

rian troops at Kaposvar and Taszar remained conflict free, 

though some problems appeared with civilians. Hungaria

employees formed a trade union and complained of unpredictab

work conditions and low wages, ls9 as well as of sexual haras

ment.160 

On 5 December 1995, Parliament passed a separate decision 

send 500 bridge-building troops to Bosnia for one year thoug

with some political opposition from the SmalLholder Party. Cos

estimated at Ftl.5-2.0 billion ultimately limited the Hungari

contingent to 400 troops. 161 The troops left Hungary for Bosnia 

two groups on 30-31 January 1996. In addition, 35 Hungari

policemen went to Bosnia as part of an unarmed UN peacekeepi

mission.1 s2 

In April 1996, Hungary presented its document to NAT
could declare in advance that NATO would not deploy nuclea

weapons on former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members' territory. I

response Jeno Poda of the Parliament's Defense Committee crit

cized Keleti's proposal as damaging and could lead to mistake

interpretations.164 

To facilitate the integration process, a NATO integratio

department headed by Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati was estab

lished in the Hungarian defense ministry on 1 June 1996.16s 

Although Hungarian politicians pursue NATO integration, 

appears that public support is less enthusiastic. In a Publ

Opinion poll conducted in April 1996, 48 percent supported join

ing the European Union, while 18 percent did not feel th

membership was so important. In contrast, when asked abou

NATO only 38 percent supported membership, while 27 percen

had a negative opinion. 166 Internal surveys of the Hungaria

Army also indicated that opinion was divided. Whereas a 199

survey of regular soldiers indicated that 63.5 percent did not se

NATO membership as a good security solution, in 1993 73 percen

believed that NATO was a good solution declining to 66.5 percen

in 1994.167 

Conclusion 

In summary, Hungary has come a long way. The existence of 

constitutional and legal framework has resulted from 

Constitutional Court decisions effectively addressing the problem

caused by the October 1989 Constitution and 1 December 198

Defense Reform. The Court's decisions have been respected, an

they were incorporated in the 1993 National Defense Act and sub
military through budget, approval of the Basic Principles 

National Defense and Defense Bill, and deployment of arm

forces. The Defense Committee has opposition representati

(with six members), and continuity with seven members remai

ing from before the 1994 elections. It includes former Defen

Minister Lajos Fur and two retired generals. In additio

parliamentary members of Parliament can not be members of t

military, thus ensuring civilian controU 68 

The Parliament Defense Committee, though, lacks sta

support and could be more effective. Its limitations have be

most apparent in oversight of the defense budget as manifest 

Defense Minister Keleti's unilateral decision to buy T-72 tan

from Belarus with funds derived from the sale of defense re

estate, and his decision to send MIG-29s to a PFP exercise 

Poland without proper consultation. In other words, t

Parliament was denied the opportunity to deliberate as to wheth

T-72s was the best way to expend public funds and if those fun

could be better directed to other priorities, such as readiness a

training. 

But Hungary still has other tasks to achieve effective civili

oversight of the military--to adopt a new constitution that h

broad-based national consensus and clarifies some outstandi

issues such as the president's wartime authority. Work to re-wr

the Constitution, initially intended to conclude in 1995, is taki

much longer. Guidelines for general debate were published duri

1996, and now passage is expected to be completed some time 

1997. 

Hungary needs an interagency organization (a Nation

Security Council) that could formulate national security poli
In addition, it is necessary to ensure that the Hungaria

Defense Ministry maintains real civilian oversight of the military

The problems and shortcomings in the defense ministry ar

manifold. First, the defense minister is required by parliamentar

regulations to report to Parliament every year on the defense poli

cy and state of the Hungarian Defense Forces. Though such 

report is prepared on a confidential basis, no public report i

presented, which is unfortunate because such a report would b

necessary to build parliamentary and public support for defens

programs. 

Second, the General Staff's separation from the defens

mh-dstry creates problems. The General Staff maintains its ow

chain of command to the Defense Minister; hence, there is a dupli

cation of functions and no formalized means for cross-fertilizatio

between action officers in the General Staff and defense ministry

While personal contacts and communication sometimes exis

between the defense ministry and General Staff there are very few 

horizontal colmnunication levels between the working levels o

the defense ministry and General Staff. 

The fact that most of the positions in the defense ministry ar

filled by military officers does not improve communication wit

the General Staff. Military officers tend to stay in the defens

ministry for long periods, often with no idea of when, or if, the

will rotate to other military positions. The fact that many retire an

stay in defense ministry positions as civilians tends to widen th

gap. This situation can be improved only if military officers ar

routinely rotated into the defense ministry and back to the Genera

Staff. The continued separation of the General Staff and defens

ministry could lead to isolation of the Armed Forces. 
needs to be developed if Hungary becomes a NATO member 

order to develop a Defense Planning Questionnaire. Though t

defense ministry is attempting to develop a modified Plannin

Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Defen

Resource Planning Group is attempting to develop a Defen

Resource Management Model for Hungary, difficulty has result

because in Hungary resource allocations run from top of the hie

archy down, rather than from bottom up. 

Though procurement has been virtually non-existent becau

of fiscal constraints, the defense ministry recently transferred t

Equipment Procurement Branch from the General Staff. But t

defense ministry lacks an Operational Requirements Branch 

assess and compare the technical capabilities of weapons an

systems. 

Fourth, intelligence is collated and prepared in the Hung

rian Defense Forces, thus controlling what the Defense Minist

gets to see, rather than having an outside group act in behalf of t

minister to make that determination. Under present arrangemen

the Defense Minister and defense ministry staff could be deni

some intelligence information. 

Hungary needs to restructure its defense ministry. An integra

ed defense ministry would link the Defense Minister (and h

administrative and policy advisers) directly to the command stru

ture. It could also act to facilitate the flow of defense needs fro

the armed forces to the Government, opening up defense poli

and activities to public scrutiny and accountability. In sum, 

would be more efficient and would provide more effective ove

sight of the Hungarian Defense Forces. 

The defense ministry's problems are burdened by havi
Finally, though the military has evidenced significant reform 

and been restructured to accommodate NATO, force moderniza

tion continues to be greatly restrained by scarce resources. Sinc

the main contact between society and the armed forces is throug

conscripts (roughly 40,000 enlistees annually) and their familie

the conscription experience becomes very important in buildin

social support for defense. If no meaningful training takes plac

and society views conscription as a waste of time, as at presen

then social support is undermined. But if training takes place dur

ing conscription and conscripts feel they have learned somethin

from the experience be it language training or a trade the

social support should be positive. Unfortunately, public opinio

does not hold the Hungarian Defense Forces in high esteem and 

vicious circle prevails. 

Military training and force modernization needs significa

attention and development to meet NATO standards. Hungaria

defense expenditures of 1.4-1.5 percent of GDP remains the lowe

of all its Central European neighbors. It is just not enough, an

reflects the fact that the defense ministry has been unable to deve

op sufficient public understanding of the costs of NATO integra

tion and failed to develop parliamentary support for adequat

defense budget levels. 
gy

economic success in order to be accepted. See, Janos Kis, "Postcommuni

Politics In Hungary," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Summer 1991

pp. 4-5. 

2. For discussion of the election and party positions, see Barnab

Racz, "Political Pluralism in Hungary: the 1990 Elections," Soviet Studie

Vol. 43, No. 1 (1991), pp. 107-136; John R. Hibbing and Samuel 

Patterson, "A Democratic Legislature in the Making: The Histor

Hungarian Elections of 1990," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 24, No. 

(January 1992), pp. 430-454. 

3. Radio Budapest, 1 July 1989, cited in Zoltan D. Baran); "Ea

European Forces In Transitions and Beyond," East European Quarter

Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (March 1992), p. 18. 

4. Heti Vilaggazdasag (28 October 1989), pp. 4-5. FBIS-EER-89-138 

December 1989), p. 6. Also see Section 29.(2) and Article 29/A (1), T

Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, p. 5. 

5. Keith W. Crane, Steven W. Popper, Barbara A. Kliszewski, Civ

Military Relations in a Multiparty Democracy: Report of a RAND Conferen

R-3941-RC (August 1990), p. 25. 

6. Aside from the president, the Defense Cotmcil's membersh

includes the Speaker of the National Assembly, the leaders of the parti

in the National Assembly, the prime minister, the ministers, as well as t

Commander of the Hungarian Army and the Chief-of-Staff. 

7. Article 19, The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, pp. 2-3. 

8. Article 35.(1)h, The Constitution of the Republic of Hungm~y, p. 8

9. Zoltan D. Barany, "Major Reorganization Of Hungary's Milita

Establishment," RFER (7 December 1989). 

10. MG Jozsef Biro interview, Zagreb DANAS, 9 January 1990, pp. 5

59. JPRS-EER-90-045 (4 April 1990), p. 8. 

11. Budapest Domestic Service, 1 December 1989. FBIS-EEU-89-231 

December 1989), pp. 57-58. On I March 1990, further amendments to th

process were discussed and supported by Ferenc Karpati in the Nation
Service. FBIS-EEU-89-201 (19 October 1989), p. 33. 

15. Budapest MTI, 3 January 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-O06 (9 January 199

p. 47. 

16. 20 February 1990 Parliament Defense Committee session amen

ing Defense Law. FBIS-EEU-90-036 (22 February 1990), p. 60. 

17. Budapest Domestic Service 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-043 (5 Mar

1990), p. 41. 

18. Article 40/A (1), The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, p. 

Also see Magyar Kozlony, No. 59, 25 June 1990, pp. 1269-1279. JPRS-EE

90-125 (31 August 1990), especially p. 14. 

19. Gabor Juhasz, "Proposed Rules for Secret Services," H

Vilaggazdasag, 8 February 1992, pp. 76-78. JPRS-EER-92-031 (13 Mar

1992), pp. 21-22. 

20. Interview with Col. Karoly Gyaraki, chief of Military Securi

Office, Magyar Honved, 19 October 1990. JPRS-EER-90-161 (7 Decemb

1990), p. 38. 

21. Goncz had been interim president since May 2, 1990. 

22. Personal interview, 12 April 1991; and Tallozo, No. 35, 31 Augu

1990, pp. 1673-1674. JPRS-EER-90-137 (3 October !990), pp. 24-2

According to Defense State Secretary Erno Raffey the exact authority 

the office is "nowhere...defined...a legal gap [adding] authority should 

defined by Goncz." Tallozo, No. 33, 17 August 1990. Ibid., p. 26. 

23. Hungary had a civilian defense minister before the Communi

takeover; Peter Veres (National Peasant Party) was defe~ase minister 

1946-1947. 

24. Lajos Fur interview Nepszabadsag, 10 September 1990, pp. 1

FBIS-EEU-90-178 (13 September 1990), p. 36. 

25. Review of Parliamental~y Oversight of the Hungarian MOD a

Dennocratic Control of the Hungarian Defense Forces, Study No. 810 (Londo

Ministry of Defence, Directorate of Management and Consultan

Services, February 1996), p. 32. 

26. Lajos Fur interview, Tallozo, No 4 (25 January 1991), pp. 162-16
30. Bela Kiraly, .Military Reform: What Should Be Done? Nepszaba

sag, 13 April 1991, p. 6. JPRS-EER-083 (14 June 1991), pp. 33-34. 

31. Budapest MTI, 19 August 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-161 (20 Augu

1991), p. 21. 

32. Budapest Kossuth Radio, 19 August 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-161 (

August 1991), p. 21. 

33. Maj. Gen. Janos Deak h~terview, Budapest Kossuth Radio, 

September 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-182 (19 September 1991), p. 20. 

34. Magyar Kozlony, No. 103 (26 September 1991), pp. 2,111-3,12

JPRS-EER-01-168 (13 November 1991), pp. 14-16. It also ruled that t

president is obligated to endorse candidates for state positions put fo

ward by the government tmless "the democratic operation of the instit

tion in question is seriously threatened." Ibid. 

35. Article 19/B.(2), The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, p. 3

36. Nepszava, 3 December 1991, p. 5. FBIS-EEU-91-234 (5 Decemb

1991), p. 17. 

37. Budapest MTI, 25 May 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-103 (28 May 1992), 

12. 

38. "National Defense Draft Bill," Heti Vilaggazdasag, 15 August 199

p. 15. JPRS-EER-92-128 (14 September 1992), p. 39. 

39. Budapest Kossuth Radio, 14 September 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-1

(16 September 1992), p. 11. 

40. The Constitutional Court held that powers, which were n

assigned explicitly either to Parliament nor the president, should 

assigned by default to the government. See East European Constitution

Review, Vol. 3, No. I (W'mter 1994), pp. 11-12. 

41. Amendment to the Constitution of the Hungarian Repub

passed by the National Assembly on 7 December 1993. Magyar Kozlo

No. 186, 24 December 1993, pp. 11129-11130. JPRS-EER-94-O09 (16 Mar

1994), p. 87. 

42. Budapest MTI, 7 December 1993. FBIS-EEU~93-236 (10 Decemb

1993), p. 26. 
EEU-93-228 (30 November 1993), p. 30. 

47. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 67 (7 April 1993), p. 4. By March 19

Germany had supplied 150 million DM worth of military supply par

On 9 March Germany agreed to provide supply parts for Hungary's he

copters free of charge. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 48 (10 March 1994), p. 

48. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 2 June 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-1

(3 Jtme 1993), p. 15. 

49. According tO defense ministry spokesman Colonel Lajos Erdel

the equipment would be installed on 28 MIG-29s, nine MIG-23s, 65 MI

21s, and 11 Su-22s. Budapest Neps~bad~g, 27 December 1993, p. 4. FB

EEU-93-O02 (2 January 1994), p. 9. 

50. Budapest MTI, 16 February 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-030 (17 Februa

1993), pp. 18-19. 

51. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 49 (12 March 1993), p. 5. 

52. Budapest MTI, 14 April 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-074 (20 April 1993)

22. For text, see Magyar Kozlony, No. 48 (23 April 1993), pp. 2701-27

]PRS-EER-93-061 (1 July 1993), pp. 28-32. 

53. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 7 December 1993. FBIS-EE

93-234 (8 December 1993), p. 23; and Laszlo Szendrei interview, 

Magyarorszag, 9 December 1993, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-93-239 (15 Decemb

1993), pp. 25-26. 

54. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 4 October 1993. FBIS-EEU-

191 (5 October 1993), p. 22. 

55. Arpad Goncz interview, Amsterdam De Volkskrant, 5 Octob

1993, p. 4. 

56. Budapest Magyar Honved, 8 October 1993, pp. 26-28. JPRS-EER-

128 (10 November 1993), pp. 30-31. 

57. Budapest MTI, 14 January 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-010 (14 Janua

1994), p. 9. 

58. Lajos Fur interview, Pesti Hirlap, 15 January 1994, p. 3. FBIS-EE

94-015 (24 January 1994), p. 24. 
61. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 188 (4 October 1994), pp. 4-5; a

Budapest MTI, 5 October 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-195 (7 October 1994), p. 8

62. Budapest Magyarorszag, 19 August 1994, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-94-178 (

September 1994), p. 11. 

63. Jan Zielonka perceptively observed that one of the reasons w

parliaments and executives have agreed to delegate so much authority 

small groups of jurists is because these courts represent for the new pol

ical elites a guarantee that their constitutional rights will still be prote

ed even if they find themselves on the losing side of political conflicts. S

Jan Zielonka, "New Institutions in the Old East Bloc," Journal 

Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 2 (April 1994), pp. 94-95. 

64. OMR/Daily Report, 7 June 1996, pp. 4-5. 

65. OMRI Daily Digest, 20 Jmle 1996, p. 5. 

66. Defense Minister-designate Gyorgy Keleti interview. Magy

Nemzet, 13 July 1994, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-94-135 (14 July 1994), p. 13. 

67. Colonel Joszef Feher acted as head of the defense ministr

Administrative and Legal Department until 1992 and then as a st

member of the Institute of Military History. 

68. Heti Vilaggazdasa~,, 12 November 1994, pp. 103-104. FBIS-EEU-9

222 (17 November 1994), p. 22. 

69. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 15 May 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-0

(16 May 1996), p. 23. 

70. Keleti noted that the structural reorganization and reduction 

the defense ministry would result in an increase in the percentage of civ

ian employees from 35 to almost 40 percent. Budapest Nepszava, 29 Mar

1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95-061 (30 March 1995), p. 12. 

71. Heti Vilaggazdasag, 12 November 1994, pp. 103-104. FBIS-EEU-9

222 (17 November 1994), pp. 21-22. 

72. Defense Minister-designate Gyorgy Keleti interview. Budap

Nepszabadsag, 30 June 1994, pp.1,4. FBIS-EEU-94-127 (1 July 1994), p. 1

73. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview. Magyar Hirlap, 25 Ju

1994, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-94-144 (27 July 1994), p. 14. 
pp. 45-46. 

77. Defen,~ Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview, Budapest Magy

Nemzet, 20 April 1996, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-96-079 (23 April 1996), p. 22. 

78. During 1995 the number of conscripts was reduced by 5,000. 

February 2,000 fewer conscripts were called up, and in August, 3,0

fewer. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 29 June 1995. FBIS-EE U-95-1

(30 Jtme 1995), p. 21. 

79. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 21 January 1995. FBIS-EEU-9

014 (23 January 1995), p. 27. On 31 January 1995 18,000 soldiers were di

charged from service after having served only 11.5 months. Budape

MTV, 31 January 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-021 (1 February 1995), p. 12. 

80. Budapest MTV, 13 July 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-135 (14 July 1994), 

13; and Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 20 August 1994. FBIS-EEU-9

162 (22 August 1994), p. 15. 

81. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 27 July 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-14

(28 July 1994), p. 8. 

82. Budapest Nepszabadsag, 3 August 1994, pp. 1,4. FBIS-EEU-94-15

(4 August 1994), p. 11. 

83. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview. Nepszabadsag, 

September 1994, p. 6. FBIS-EEU-94-175 (9 September 1994), p. 16. 

84. Budapest MTI, 2 January 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-O01 (3 January 199

p. 9. 

85. Peter Deak, "Armed Forces' Reform," Budapest Figyelo, 

August 1995, pp. 17-18. FBIS-EEU-95-194 (6 October 1995), p. 21. 

86. Groot-Bijgaarden De Standard, 14-15 May 1995, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-9

094 (16 May 1995), pp. 25-26. The border guard was to receive 60 BTR-8

and the Army 40. 

87. Budapest Magyar Hirlap, 7 February 1996, pp. 1,4. FBIS-EEU-9

027 (8 February 1996), p. 17. 

88. Budapest MTV Television Network, 29 August 1994. FBIS-EEU

94-168 (30 August 1994), p. 18. Keleti cleverly proposed to Ukraine th

Hungary would be willing to destroy some of their military vehicles pr
the Parliamentary Defense Committee. It argued that Keleti should apo

ogize to the Parliamentary Defense Committee and the Committee shu

thank the Minister. See, Budapest Magyar Hirlap, 15 April 1996, p. 7. FBI

EEU-96-074 (16 April 1996), p. 19. 

90. Budapest Nepszabadsag, 30 March 1996, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-96-064 

April 1996), p. 20. 

91. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 9 November 1994. FBIS-EE

94-218 (10 November 1994), p. 18. 

92. Budapest MTI, 2 May 1995. FBIS-EEU-9&085 (3 May 1995), p. 

Munich Focus, 19 June 1995, p. 11. In addition, Germany had trained 1

Hungarian soldiers and delivered 300 wagon-loads of military spar

m~d equipment. Ibid. In 1993 Germany also provided 20 L-39 training a

craft free of charge. Budapest MTI, 26 July 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-151 

August 1995), p. 18. 

93. Budapest Nepszabadsag, 9 November 1995, p. 27. FBIS-EEU-95-2

(13 November 1995), p. 27. 

94. Budapest MTI, 6 January 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-O05 (9 January 199

p. 22. 

95. Budapest MTI, 1 March 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-044 (7 March 1995), 

8. Also Gyorgy Keleti interview, Budapest Magyar Honved, 24 Februa

1995, pp. 6-7. FBIS-EEU-95-060 (29 March 1995), pp. 23-24. 

96. Budapest MTI, 22 March 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-057 (24 March 199

p. 8. 

97. Reform of the Araled Forces: 1995-1998-2005 (Budapest: Milxistry 

Defense, 1995), p. 4. 

98. Budapest Magyar Honved, 15 September 1995, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-9

224 (21 November 1995), p. 20. Also see Reform of the Armed Forces: 19

1998-2005, Ibid., pp. 12-13. 

99. Lt. Gen. Sandor Nemeth interview; Budapest Magyar Hirlap

December 1995, p. 9. FBIS-EEU-95-236 (8 December 1995), pp. 14-15. T

number of NCOs would increase from 9,700 to 10,800 and conscri

would decline from 38,000 to 32,400. See, Reform of the Armed Forces: 19
103. Brig. Gen. Attila Kositzky interview, Budapest Magyar Hirlap

December 1995, p. 6. FBIS-EEU-95-239 (13 December 1995), p. 13. 

104. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview; Budapest Nepszava, 

September 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-I83 (21 September 1995), p. 16. 

105. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview, Heti Vilaggazdasag

April 1995, pp. 47-48. FBIS-EEU-95-064 (4 April 1995), p. 25. 

106. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 4 April 1995. FBIS-EEU-9

065 (5 April 1995), p. 30; Defense Minister Keleti interviev,; Nepszava, 

April 1995, p. 12. FBIS-EEU-95-076 (20 April 1995), p. 13. 

107. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 10 May 1995. FBIS-EEU-9

090 (10 May 1995), p. 23. 

108. National Defense '95 (Budapest: Ministry of Defense, 14 Ju

1995), p. 13. 

109. Budapest Magyar Honved, 15 September 1995, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-9

224 (21 November 1995), p. 20. 

110. Budapest Magyar Hirlap, 15 May 1995, p. 6. FBIS-EEU-95-094 (

May 1995), pp. 29-30; Budapest MTI, 27 June 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-126 (

June 1995), p. 7. 

111. Budapest Magyar Hirlap, 4 May 1995, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-95-087 

May 1995), p. 5. 

112. Budapest Nepszabadsag, 8 May 1996, pp. 1,5. FBIS-EU-96-091 

May 1996), pp. 38-39. 

113. Magyar Hirlap, 17 March 1995, p. 8. Cited in Rudolf Joo, T

Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Chaillot Papers 23 (Paris: Institu

for Security Studies, WEU, February 1996), p. 47. 

114. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interviev,; Heti Vilaggazdasag

April 1995, pp. 47-48, op. cit. 

115. Jozsef Feher interview, Budapest Nepszabadsag, 20 May 1995, p

1,8. FBIS-EEU-95-100 (24 May 1995), p. 18. 

116. Budapest Magyar Hirlap, 12 June 1996, p. 9. FBIS-EEU-96-115 (

Jtme 1996), p. 27. 

117. "Behind Declarations: Civil Military Relations in Centr
105 (30 May 1996), pp. 17-18. 

120. Imre Mecs interview, Budapest Magyar Nemzet, 29 June 1996, p

6. FBIS-EEU-96-128 (2 July 1996), p. 15. 

121. Budapest Nepszava, 4 July 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-131 (8 Jul

1996), p. 29. 

122. Thomas Wachsler personal interview, 25 June 1996. 

123. Budapest Magyar Honved, 4 August 1995, p. 6. FBIS-EEU-95-18

(27 September 1995), p. 14. 

124. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 12 April 1996. FBIS-EEU-96

073 (12 April 1996), p. 19. 

125. Budapest Kossuth Radio, 5 May 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-089 (7 Ma

1996), p. 21; Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 16 May 1996. FBIS-EEU

96-096 (16 May 1996), p. 24. 

126. Budapest MTI, 22 April 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-084 (30 April 1996

p. 4. 

127. Budapest Reform, 2 April 1996, p. 29. FBIS-EEU-96-068 (8 Apr

1996), p. 10. 

128. Magyar Nemzet, 31 August 1995, p. 6. FBIS-EEU-95-170 (

September 1995), pp. 16-17; Budapest Kossuth Radio, 19 September 1995

FBIS-EEU-95-182 (20 September 1995), p. 20. Two radars would be set u

on the summits of the Bukk and Mecsek Mountains to detect aircraft a

altitudes between a few hundred meters and 30,000 meters with a rang

of 400-500 kilometers and a digital communications link to pass signal

automatically to the control center and air defense. The new radar use

less energy and would reduce the requirement for a few thousand so

diers. Budapest Magyar Hirlap, 3 October 1995, p. 5. FBIS-EEU-95-193 (

October 1995), p. 24. 

129. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 1 November 1995. FBIS-EEU

95-212 (2 November 1995), p. 9. 

130. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview, 21 September 199

FBIS-EEU-95-184 (22 September 1995), p. 16. 

131. Budapest MTV Television Network, 9 April 1996. FBIS-EEU-96

071 (9 April 1996), p. 15. 
135. OMRI Daily Digest, 17 May 1996, pp. 4-5. 

136. Budapest Neps~badsag, 10 May 1996, p. 5. FBIS-EEU-96-094 (1

May 1996), pp. 21-22; OMRI Daily Report, 31 May 1996, p. 4. 

137. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview, Magyar Nemzet, 2

April 1996, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-96-079 (23 April 1996), p. 20; and Magya

Hirlap, 7 May 1996, p, 10. 

138. Budapest Nepszabadsag, 2 December 1995, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-95-23

(6 December 1995), p. 21. 

139. Defense Minister Keleti interview, Budapest Magyar Hirlap, 2

October 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95-211 (1 November 1995), pp. 18-19. 

140. Budapest Magyar Honved, 8 December 1995, pp. 6-7. FBIS-EU-96

030 (13 February 1996), p. 11. 

141. Budapest MTI, 9 February 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-033 (16 Februar

1996), p. 8. 

142. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 30 May 1996. FBIS-EEU-96

105 (30 May 1996), p. 18. 

143. Maj. Gen. Ferenc Vegh interview; Budapest Nepszava, 11 Ma

1996, pp. 1,8. FBIS-EEU-96-098 (20 May 1996), p. 16. 

144. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 6 June 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-11

(7 June 1996), p. 22. 

145. Ferenc Vegh interview, Budapest Magyar Nemzet, 15 June 1996, p

6. FBIS-EEU-96-118 (18 Jtme 1996), p. 22. 

146. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 8 June 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-11

(10 June 1996), p. 28. 

147. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 31 March 1995. FBIS-EEU-95

063 (3 April 1995), p. 11. Keleti noted that 40 Hungarian soldiers woul

join Austrian peacekeepers in Cyprus. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network

10 May 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-091 (11 May 1995), p. 25. 

148. Budapest MTI, 1 May 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-087 (3 May 1996), p. 1

149. Imre Mecs interview, Budapest Nepszabadsag, 21 January 1995

pp. 1,7. FBIS-EEU-95-015 (24 January 1995), p. 36. On I September 1995 

language training center was scheduled to open in Budapest. Also 12-1

billion forints would be necessary over many years to modernize th
151. Budapest MTI, 7 June 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-114 (12 June 1996

p. 10. 

152. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview, Kossuth Radi

Network, 13 August 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-156 (14 August 1995), p. 1

Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 1 September 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-171 

September 1995), p. 19. 

153. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 18 November 1995. FBI

EEU-95-223 (20 November 1995), p. 20. 

154. Defense MiMster Gyorgy Keleti h~terview, Budapest Neps~va, 

December 1995, pp. 1,3. FBIS-EEU-95-234 (6 December 1995), pp. 17-18

155. Vierma Kurier, 6 May 1996, p. 4. FBIS-EU-96-089 (7 May 1996

p. 21. 

156. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 13 May 1996. FBIS-EEU-9

093 (13 May 1996), p. 25. 

157. Budapest MTI, 27 March 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-064 (2 April 1996

p. 13. 

158. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 9 April 1996. FBIS-EEU-9

070 (10 April 1996), p. 22. 

159. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 3 April 1996. FBIS-EU-96-06

(3 April 1996), p. 8; Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 28 April 199

FBIS-EEU-96-083 (29 April 1996), p. 18. 

160. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 9 May 1996; an

Nepszabadsag, 9 May 1996, p. 20. FBIS-EEU-96-092 (10 May 1996), pp. 1

20. 

161. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 16 December 1995. FBI

EEU-95-244 (20 December 1995), p. 15. 

162. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 29 February 1996. FBIS-EE

96-042 (1 March 1996), p. 14. 

163. Budapest MTI, 18 April 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-080 (24 April 1996

p. 16. 

164. Budapest Uj Magyarorszag, 10 may 1996, pp. 1,3. FBIS-EEU-9

094 (14 May 1996), p. 21. 
168. Review of Parliamentary Oversight of the Hungarian MOD an

Democratic Control of the Hungarian Defence Forces, Study No. 810 (London

Directorate of Management and Consultancy Services, February 1996

p. 14. 

T he movement toward democratic government in Czechos

vakia did not have a powerful set of opposition forces like 

Catholic Church and Solidarity in Poland, or reformers witlxin 

Communist Party in Hungary. Nor did Czechoslovakia experien

by November 1989 a mass popular movement like the one t

toppled the wall and the seemingly immovable Honecker in E

Germany. Despite a lack of these favorable elements--and becau

of population expectations and lack of support for the Commun

Party--Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Revolution" was extrem

swift. Peaceful demonstrations and revolt, which erupted sudde

ly on 17 November 1989, quickly ended the Communist Party 

Czechoslovakia (CPCS)'s dominance, President Gustav Husa

rule, and led to the naming of a federal government dominated 

non-communists on 10 December 1989. 

Within days after the Communist government used secur

troops to suppress a large public demonstration in Prague on 

November, Vaclav Havel united opposition groups to create 

umbrella organization, Civic Forum, to press their demands. Af

five days of strikes, the Communist government led by Pri

Minister Ladislaw Adamec held its first meeting with Civic For

representatives2 Then after only one week of mass demonst

tions, Communist reformer Karel Urbanek replaced Milos Jakes 

CPCS leader on 25 November 1989 and 10 of the 13 members of 

Communist Party presidium resigned, a 
parties to have equal opportunity to participate in free election

and called upon the CPCS to abandon its constitutionally guaran

teed leading role within society. To make relations more precis

between the citizens and state, the program called for a new 

constitution to be adopted by a newly elected legislative assembly

Regarding the economy, the Civic Forum program called for aban

doning existing methods and creating a developed market. 3 

On 29 November, the Federal Assembly voted unanimously t

abolish the constitutionally guaranteed "leading" role of th

Communist Party in government and society. 4 As pressure

continued to deepen between Civic Forum and Premier Adame

over the formation of a new government that would include Civi

Forum representatives, Adamec resigned in frustration on 

December to be replaced by Marian Calfa, a Slovak. 5 When th

new government was finally formed on 9 December, for the firs

time since 1948 the Communists became a minority, holding onl

10 of 21 Cabinet posts. The ministry of interior post was lef

vacant. Slovak dissident Jan Carnogursky, recently released from 

prison, became deputy prime minister and headed a new commis

sion overseeing the secret police. Jiri Dienstbier, a dissident wh

had been imprisoned with Vaclav Havel, became foreign minister

Vaclav Klaus, a Civic Forum strategist, became finance minister. 6 

When President Gustav Husak resigned on 9 December, Civi

Forum and its Slovak counterpart Public Against Violenc

announced that Civic Forum leader, Vaclav Havel, was thei

candidate for president, which according to the Constitution, th

Federal Assembly had to elect within two weeks upon a vacancy. 

On 29 December 1989, the Federal Assembly elected Havel--a dis

tinguished playwright and essayist and one of the spiritual leader
My dear fellow citizens. For the past 40 years on 

this day you have heard my predecessors utter variations on the same theme: 

how our country is prospering... 

Our country is not prospering... 

We have become morally ill... 

I mean all of us, because we all had become 

accustomed to the totalitarian system... 

None of us is merely a victim of it, because all of 

us helped to create it. 

As the supreme commander of the defense 

forces, I intend to guarantee that the defense capability of our state will never again be a pretext to 

thwart courageous peace initiatives... 

People, your government has returned to you! 8 

On 29 March 1990, the Federal Assembly approved the state

name change from Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) to t

Czechoslovak Federal Republic (CSFR). Under Slovak pressure t

name of the state was again changed on 20 April to the Czech a

Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR). Czechoslovakia's free electio

on 8-9 June 1990 resulted in Civic Forum majorities to bo

Parliamentary Houses. In the 150-seat House of the People, t

Civic Forum/Public Against Violence Coalition received 88 sea

the Communist Party, 22; and the Christian Democratic Uni

(CDU), 21. In the 150-seat House of Nations, Civic Forum receiv

82 seats; the Communist Party, 22; and the CDU, 24. 9 Hence, 
The purpose of Czechoslovakias defense reform was to estab

lish federal presidential, governmental and Parliamentar

command and control over the defense ministry and th

Czechoslovak People's Army (CSPA). In addition, the reform 

sought to remove Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCS

influence from and establish civil control over the defense estab

lisl~rnent and armed forces, and to ensure that the forces wer

sufficient to guarantee the integrity and sovereignty of Czecho

slovakia. Finally, the defense reform aimed to restore the arme

forces' prestige in Czechoslovak society. In contrast to Poland

Czech society (like Hungary's) held the military in low esteem 

because the armed forces had: (1) remained passive during th

Munich crisis in 1938, the February 1948 Communist coup, and th

1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia; (2) twice been use

against its citizens in Pilzen in June 1953 and Brno in August 196

during the Communist era; lo and (3) apparently played a role i

supporting counter-revolutionary activities during Novembe

1989. 

Constitutional Development. Czechoslovakia's 1960 Stalinis

Constitution, which replaced the 1948 Ninth-of-May Constitutio

that severely limited the autonomy granted Slovakia, 11 declare

the National Assembly the supreme organ of state power. 1

According to Articles 49 and 50.3 of the 1960 Constitution, th

National Assembly has the power (by vote of three-fifths of th

delegates) to elect the President of the Republic, to amend th

Constitution, 13 and to declare war in case of an attack or in th

fulfilhnent of international treaty obligations. The Constitutio

names the President of the Republic the head of State, and Articl

62 grants him the power to: appoint and promote generals, act a
Slovakia. As a result, on 27 October 1968, a new Constitution

Law of Federation amended 58 of the 1960 Constitution's 1

Articles that mainly concerned Slovak autonomy. The 19

Constitutional Law federalized the government and declared th

Czechoslovak State "two equal fraternal nations. "14 It replaced th

unicameral National Assembly with a bicameral Federal Assemb

(see Table 6.1 below). The two bodies--the Chamber of the Peop

based on proportional representation; and the Chamber of th

Nations, which contained an equal number of Czechs an

Slovaks--shared equal authority. 

Despite the 1968 Constitutional Law of Federation, politic

power remained highly centralized in the hands of the Comm

nist Party after the Warsaw Pact invasion. In addition, furth

constitutional amendments in July 1971 authorized the feder

government to interfere with and invalidate measures of th

national governments. In other words, although the 1968 refor

had remained intact through the 1989-90 revolution, federalism 

reality, remained little more than a facade after the 1971 constit

tional amendments and under unitary Communist Party rul

After the 1989 revolution, the Federal Assembly passed a series 

amendments to address these problems. In December 1990 

passed an act on division of competencies between the tw

republics; and in July 1991 debated a law giving the federal an

republican parliaments the right to declare a referendum on t

form of the state, is 

On 9 January 1991, the Federal Assembly passed a Constit

tional Act which instituted a six-chapter, 44-article, Charter 

Fundamental Rights and Freedoms protecting the individual fro

the State. In addition the new Act amended Article 5 of the 19
Table 6.1 CSFR Defense Reform, 1989-90 

President (G. Husak) PM (L. Adamec) 

V. Havel (1/90) M. Calfa (12/89) 

Office°fthe I I FEDERAL I I C°uncil°f I 

President ASSEMBLY Ministers 

I n 

F 

• Expand emergency 

power (1/91) 

State Defense Council 

changes composition 

(1 2/89) 

I 

M. Vaclavik; M. Vacek (1 2/89); L. Dobrovsky (10/90)--civilian 

• dep civ MOND Education (A. Rasek) (12/89) I OND I • 3 dep civ MONDs; plus CoS (4/91) 

Elections 

(6/90) 

• Central Rehabilitation Committee (6k plus)(12/89) 

• Assoc. of Mil. Renewal (part of Civic Form)-- 

democratize CSPA (12/89) (11 k 4/90) 

• Union of Professional Soldiers (assist renewal) (1/90)-- 

(17k; join "Euromil') (2/91) 

• Free Legion (9/90) 

• Inspectorate General (IG) Parliament oversight (12/90) 

• Restructuring completed (4/91) 

Czechoslovak Army (CSA) (4/90) 

CoS (M. Vacek); A. Slimak (12/90); K. Pezl (4/91) 
ism. ''18 On 24 November Gustav Husak resigned as CPCS leade

and the order was never issued. 19 

In response to the question of subordination, Defense Minist

Vaclavik announced to the Federal Assembly on 29 Novemb

1989, "We identify ourselves, above all, with those who think we

of socialism and who are not misusing emotions to exert pressu

to de-stabilize the political and economic situation in our s

ciety. ''20 Apparently the ambiguity in Vaclavik's statement caus

enough parliamentary concern to name Miroslav Vacek the ne

defense minister on 3 December 1989. When the same Feder

Assembly asked Vacek the same question on 12 December 1989, 

responded: "From the very inception of the Czechoslov

Republic...the CSPA has always been subordinated in accordan

with the Constitution, above all, to the president of the repu

lic...[who] has been the commander-in-chief. I assure yo

esteemed deputies, that the CSPA will not be misused against t

process which is taking place in our Republic. "21 Then on 

December 1989, Prime Minister Calfa appointed Maj. Gen. Anto

Slimak the new Czechoslovak Army (CSA) Chief of Staff. He w

promoted to lieutenant general on 3 May 1990. 

Another civil-military issue was the need to ensure the defen

ministry's control of the military and guarantee that the CS

would remain subordinate to the government. This was a legi

mate concern because of the existence of the then top secret Statu

system that provided the Soviet Union direct access to Czech

slovak armed forces and the fact that most of the CSA officers h

been trained in the USSR. To achieve this end, during t

December 1989 revolution the CSFR changed the composition 

the State Defense Council, which was responsible for exercisi
On 29 December 1989, Civic Forum civilian Antonin Rasek

who had been cashiered from the military in 1969, became deput

defense minister for education and culture with responsibility fo

abolishing the CSPA's political apparatus. In March 1990, outsid

experts proposed that the Federal Assembly create a Genera

Inspectorate of the Czechoslovak Army, independent of th

defense ministry. At first nothing was done because the defens

ministry opposed the concept, claiming that it already had its ow

inspectorate. Later the defense ministry capitulated and accepte

the creation of a General Inspectorate with the proviso that it b

created from the reinforced defense ministry inspectorate. 

During August 1990, new pressures developed to create a rea

Inspector General (IG) chosen by parliament to ensure observatio

of laws and to monitor control of the Army. 23 The reform effo

took on new life on 18 October 1990 when Lubos Dobrovsky, 

civilian, became defense minister. On 6 December 1990, th

Federal Assembly finally enacted the proposal to create a

Inspector General who oversees the armed forces, perform

inspections, and prepares parliamentary reports on implementa

tion of constitutional provisions, expenditures, level of prepared

ness, and implementation of military strategy, a4 

During 1989-1990, the CSFR also established a number of over

sight bodies to ensure military renewal and defense ministr

subordination to state control. First, Civic Forum became domi

nant in an Association of Military Renewal [Vojenska Obrod

(SVO)]---consisting of more than 1,000 former soldiers of the 6,00

who had been discharged from the military after the 196

Communist purges, as SVO was established in December 1989 t

participate in the development of CSFR military doctrine and t
was founded to defend the social welfare of servicemen and 

participate in cadre issues, as Third, in early September 1990 t

founding Congress of the Free Legion [Svoboda Legie] conven

in Prague. In opposition to the Army leadership, the Free Legi

promoted goals of reducing Army enrollment, professionalizi

the force, and 12-month military service. The Free Legion al

demanded Defense Minister Vacek's resignation because of h

role in the November 1989 counterrevolution, a9 (Both the Uni

and Free Legion played less important roles by 1992). 

Concerned about the Army's role during the 17-24 Novemb

1989 revolutionary period, President Havel set up an investigati

commission on 18 September 1990 comprised of two membe

from the Federal Assembly Defense and Security Committee, tw

from SVO, two from the defense ministry Inspectorate, two fro

the President's Office, and one from the Military Office of t

President. ao On 16 October 1990, Havel received the commission

report, which concluded that Vacek and the Army Command h

made preparations--under the code-word OPERATION "VLN

(Wave)--for actions against demonstrators, al The aim of the lat

abandoned operation had been to install army specialists in rad

and television and gain control over broadcasts, ae On the sam

day that Havel received the commission report, he recall

Mh-oslav Vacek, then (on 18 October) named a civilian, Lub

Dobrovsky, defense minister. ~ 

In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, a serious civ

military issue in Czechoslovakia had been the question of secre

of military affairs. Because of previous secret police abuses, mi

tary counterintelligence, which had been under the dual superv

sion of the defense and interior ministries, was transferred as 
Renewal screening. Though the second stage was to be completed 

at the end of 1990, 3s on 1 October Vacek reported to the Federa

Assembly that military counterintelligence was now subordinated 

to him--and that as of I January 1991 an "'army security service

of 40-50 percent of the CSA's 800 military counterintelligenc

members would be in operation. 36 

One of Lubos Dobrovsky's first actions was to suspend th

activity of the military defense intelligence service (on 26 Octobe

1990), placing all 827 employees on coerced "leave." Dobrovsk

did this because he felt Vacek had not been thorough enough sinc

72 percent of the former members of the military counterintel

ligence service subjected to evaluations had been deemed fit fo

further service. In justifying his action, Dobrovsky said, "I believ

that the staff of the former counterintelhgence service ought to b

subjected to screening...identical with those undergone by the staf

of the State Security Corps...[adding that] Even people who passed 

the screening should not work in the military defense intelligenc

service in the future. ''37 Deputy Defense Minister Antonin Rase

added that in the future military defense intelligence would func

tion with only about one-fifth of the present staff and would als

take over military police tasks, including those of the crim

squad. 38 

In December 1990, Dobrovsky was quite forthcoming in hi

views. Following the dissolution of military defense intelligenc

he intended to create a new unit subordinate to the defense minis

ter to "protect the Army against any kind of destructive act on th

part of anyone. "Sg In early December this unit had a staff of 8

people, and was envisaged to grow to 180 (compared to the origi

nal 827 on coerced leave). An all-professional 1,000-man militar
advanced further through the appointment of a civilian defens

minister, the establishment of the Inspector General (IG), organiza

tions such as the SVO and Free Legion, and implementation o

screening laws and campaigns. 

President Havel, in December 1990, sought an expansion of h

emergency authority during periods of serious social unres

natural disasters, and international hlcidents. Havel sought th

state-of-emergency bill because the CSFR Constitution--whic

had been changed after the November 1989 revolution to preven

interference in internal affairs--limited presidential authority an

because of concerns about Saddam Hussein's threats of terrorism 

and the Soviet crackdown in the Baltic. 42 Havel sought powers t

employ the Army, if circumstances warranted, to secure basic foo

stuffs and telecommunications to prevent state collapse. 43 

During the Spring of 1991, the restructuring of th

Czechoslovak federal ministry of defense as the supreme body o

the Army--was completed (see Table 6.2 below). The politic

administration section controlled by Defense Minister Dobrovsk

was separated from the direct command of the troops, led by th

chief of the general staff. Directly subordinate to Dobrovsky was 

secretariat and four organizations--the minister's inspectorat

health administration, personnel administration, and the courts. 

The reformed defense ministry comprised four elements: 

(1) A deputy defense minister for social and humanitarian que

tions, led by a civilian Antonin Rasek, headed directorates o

social management, legal service, higher educational institution

and military institutes for Sociological Research, History of th

Army~ and Culture. 

(2) A deputy defense minister for strategic management and develo
pppy

CSFR's depressed military industry meant higher Slova

unemployment rates, contributing to state tension (and disinteg

ation). 

On 25 April 1991, Balaz announced that he would soon prese

a plan to alleviate the consequences of military industrial unem

ployment, especially in Slovakia. Balaz mentioned the need n

only to involve the Czechoslovak Army (CSA)'s special facilities

the 12,000-employee Military Engineering Works and 28,00

Table 6.2 CSFR Defense Reform, 1991-92 

President I 

V. Havel 

I State Oe'ense I 

Council 

FEDERAL 

ASSEMBLY 

Elections 

(6/92) 

I 

Dep. Min. 

Soc. & Hum. 

A. Rasek 

I. Urban 

/7/92) 

I 

Dep. Min. 

Strategy 

I. Andrejcak 

J. Pospisil 

(7/92) 

Premier 

M. Calfa 

J. Strasky 

(7/92) 

I 

Dep. Min. 

Economics 

I. Balaz 

Defense Minister 

L. Dobrovsky 

I. Andrejcak (7/92) 

I 

I 

Chief of 

Gen. Staff 

Lt. Gen. 

K. Pezl 
(kcs), which the redeployment was expected to cost and whic

the Army does not have. ''47 

(4) The CSA's Chief of General Staff headed the armed force

Czechoslovakia was able to gain control of the General Staff mo

effectively than Hungary and Poland because 6,000 former mil

tary officers who had sympathized with the 1968 Prague Sprin

reform and been cashiered after the Soviet invasion of Czechosl

vakia provided a pool of former military officers who were polit

cally reliable and available for duty. One such officer was Ma

Gen. Karel Pezl, an SVO member and adviser to Lubos Dobrovsk

who replaced Lt. Gen. Anton Slimak as CSA Chief of Staff on 2

April 1991. 4s On 15 May, Pezl noted that his most important task

were to: "[C]hange the whole image of the Czechoslovak Army 

a short period of time and change it from an offensive into a defe

sive army. ''49 Further military shakeups occurred on 1 June 199

when Dobrovsky recalled the deputy commander of the Gener

Staff, commander of the Main Logistical Support Branch, and hea

of the Main Administration of Ground Forces. s0 

During the failed coup in the Soviet Union in August 19

when Czechoslovakia tested its emergency machinery, it (li

Hungary) felt less threatened than Poland because Soviet troop

had already vacated its territory. On 19 August 1991 the feder

interior ministry set up a special security staff, comprisin

representatives from foreign affairs, defense, transport, the feder

intelligence service, and from the republican ministries. The sta

met around the clock, issued orders to carry out certain measur

on the borders, evaluated incoming information, and prepare

proposals for the Defense Council. sl On 20 August the Defen

Council approved measures for the defense of the state, securin
Central European security. During the next six months, the pow

of the federal government began to decline while the two repub

can governments began to assume more and more authority wi

the impending 1 January 1993 split. 

Czechoslovakia's Velvet Divorce 

Constitutional Divorce. When the new Federal Assembly w

elected in June 1990 as a constituent assembly, it created a se

imposed mandate to complete a new constitution within its tw

year term. By far the most contentious issue facing the constituti

drafters was the structure of the federal state and the respecti

competencies of the two member republics. As the 1992 electio

approached, talks stalled while all parties awaited the results 

the elections. On 11 May, well before the 5-6 June 1992 election

Vladimir Meciar, head of the Movement for a Democratic Slovak

told Havel that following a declaration of sovereignty, Slovak

would adopt a new constitution for itself, then hold a referendu

to decide if Slovakia should remain in the federation, s3 

In the elections for the Federal Assembly there was an 

percent turnout in the Czech Republic and 84 percent in Slovak

The 5 percent threshold to win representation allow

Czechoslovakia to avoid the Polish 1991-fragmentation proble

and reduced the number of pohtical parties from more than 20 

6 from each republic to the Federal Assembly, with Vaclav Klau

Civic Democratic Party (ODS) getting 34 percent of the vote in t

Czech Republic and Vladimir Meciar's Movement for Democra

Slovakia (HZDS) getting 34 percent of the vote in Slovakia. s4 O
After meeting with Meciar on 9 June, Klaus noted deep an

fundamental differences in views on the future setup of Czecho

slovakia. "ss Meciar wanted a sovereign Slovak state with weake

links to Prague; Klaus favored a strong federation or split. Aft

two weeks of discussion, Meciar and Klaus agreed to negotiate 

division of Czechoslovakia into two states by 30 September. Whe

the Slovak Parliament convened on 23 June, Meciar pushed it t

declare sovereignty in July and adopt a Slovak Constitution 

August. 56 

On 26 June, the CSFR Prime Minister Marian Calfa an

government resigned to make way for a new interim Cabine

which would have only ten members; five Czechs and fiv

Slovaks. s7 When Jan Strasky (ODS) became the new prime mini

ter instead of Klaus, it was clear that split was imminent; Slovak

took over the ministries of foreign affairs, interior, and defense, 

CSFR President Havel and Vaclav Klaus, leader of the Czech Civ

Democratic Party wanted the next federal defense minister to be 

civilian whereas Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovak

wanted a professional soldier, s9 In the end, Lt. Gen. Imrich Andre

cak, an independent Slovak, became the new CSFR defense mini

ter after going into the reserve. Jiri Pospisil assumed Andrejcak

position as deputy defense minister for strategy, and Anton

Rasek was replaced by Igor Urban as deputy defense minister f

social and humanitarian affairs, s0 

When the Slovak National Council adopted a declaration 

sovereignty with a margin of 113 to 24 (with 10 abstentions an

three deputies absent) on 17 July, 61 Vaclav Havel announced h

would resign as president. Following his resignation on 20 Ju

1992, Jan Strasky, the CSFR prime minister, assumed the pres
Czech and Slovak Republics signed a 21-article Treaty of Goo

Neighborly Relations, Friendship, and Cooperation, whi

contained guarantees on security consultation (Article 5) an

ethnic minority rights (Article 8). ~ Then on 25 November 1992 t

CSFR Federal Assembly approved, by the necessary three-fift

vote, the constitutional bill ending the CSFR. ~ The Constitution

Law On the Termination of the CSFR, which became effecti

immediately, vested powers in the two republics' legislature

governments, and courts. 6s 

New Constitutions 

At the end of July both the Slovak and Czech Nation

Councils began preparations to draft new constitutions. Thou

constitutional development of the CSFR had been remarkab

advanced, the disintegration of the federation would create ne

and different problems for each of the successor states. In som

ways, particularly for Slovakia, both returned to the 1989-90 sta

of development. Still, the advances toward democracy had be

remarkably cooperative and speedy by contrast with other Centr

European states. 
y 

categorically refused to engage in dialogue with opposition groups. 

2. Blaine Harden "Prague Ousts Leaders," The Washington Post, 2

November 1989, pp. A1, A17. 

3. For the Civic Forum Program, see Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, N

1 (Winter 1990), pp. 125-127. 

4. Blaine Harden, "Shame, Regret Pervade Legislature In Prague

The Washington Post, 30 November 1989, p. A54. 

5. Dan Morgan, "Czechoslovak Premier Steps Down," The Washin

ton Post, 8 December 1989, p. A1. 

6. Dan Morgan and Stuart Auerbach, "Czechoslovak Cabin

Installed With Communists In Minority," The Washington Post, 

December 1989, pp. A1, A28. 

7. On 19 December the Federal Assembly extended the deadline b

40 days. Mary Battiata, "Communists Back Havel Candidacy," T

Washington Post, 20 December 1989, p. A27. 

8. Vaclav Havel, "People, Your Government Has Returned to You

Joum~al of Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 99-105. 

9. Prague CTK, 9 June 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-112 (11 June 1990), p. 31. 

10. Stefan Sarvas, "Civil-Military Relations in the Czech Republic

mimeo, p. 6. 

11. The executive branch of the Slovak government was abolish

and its duties assigned to the Presidium of the Slovak National Counc

thus combining executive and legislative functions in a single body. T

federal government National Assembly had the authority to overru

decisions of the Slovak National Council, and central government age

cies too.k over the admilxistration of the Slovak local government. 

12. Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic (11 July 1960) (Pragu

Orbis, 1964). 

13. On 28 December 1989 the Federal Assembly voted to amend t

Constitution to allow the appointment of the 23 new deputies to repla

the 23 hard-line Communists who resigned. On 29 December the Feder
, f y (

Mimeo), pp. 1-2. 

17. CTK, 6 November 1990. 

18. The London Times, 24 November 1989. 

19. Zoltan D. Barany, "East European Armed Forces In Transitio

a_nd Beyond," East European Quarterly, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (March 1992

p. 13. 

20. Prague Domestic Service, 12 December 1989. FBIS-EEU-89-239 (

December 1989), p. 27. 

21. Ibid., p. 28. 

22. Col. Gen. Miroslav Vacek 15 December 1989 interview, Ru

Pravo, 16 December 1989, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-90-O02 (3 January 1990), p. 33

23. Respekt, 14 August 1990, pp. 4-5. JPRS-EER-90-148 (26 Octob

1990), pp. 18-19. 

24. Prague CTK, 6 December 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-238 (11 Decemb

1990), p. 16. 

25. The purge lasted in several waves between 1969 and 1975 and 

estimated to resulted in 6,000 discharged professional soldiers. S

Condoleezza Rice, The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948-19

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 

26. Bratislava Pravda, 29 December 1989, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-90-O02 

January 1990), p. 31. Also, Rude Pravo, 11 January 1990, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-9

010 (16 January 1990), p. 38. 

27. Prague CTK, 20 September 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-185 (24 Septemb

1990), p. 28. 

28. Prague Domestic Service, 19 January 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-018 (

January 1990), p. 35. 

29. Narodna Obroda, 12 September 1990, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-90-185 (

September 1990), p. 28. 

30. Svobodne Slovo, 19 September 1990, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-90-190 

October 1990), p. 23. 

31. Mlada Fronta Dnes, 19 October 1990, pp. 1,2. FBIS-EEU-90-205 (
Free Leg-ions activities. 

34. Col. Gen. Miroslav Vacek interview, 9 February 1990. FBIS-EEU

90-029 (12 February 1990), p. 18. 

35. Prague Svobodne Slovo, 12 July 1990, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-90-139 (19 Jul

1990), p. 17. 

36. Prague CTK, 1 October 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-I93 (4 October 1990

p. 20. 

37. Lubos Dobrovsky interview, Mlada Fronta Dries, 30 October 1990

p. 2. FBIS-EEU-90-215 (6 November 1990), p. 11. 

38. Prague Domestic Service, 28 November 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-230 

(29 November 1990), p. 21. 

39. Lubos Dobrovsky interview, Mlada Fronta Dnes, 13 Decembe

1990, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-90-245 (20 December 1990), p. 23. 

40. Prague CTK, 17 April 1991. JPRS-EER-91-053 (25 April 1991), p. 2

41. Col. Eng. Josef Ocenas h~tervie~; Prace, 24 March 1990, pp. 1, 2

FBIS-EEU-90-064 (3 April 1990), pp. 23-24. 

42. Prague Domestic Service, 22 January 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-O15 (2

January 1991), p. 15. 

43. Vaclav Havel 15 December 1990 intervie,a; Prague Domesti

Service, 16 December 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-242 (17 December 1990), p. 29. 

44. Antonin Rasek interview, Narodna Obroda, 2 April 1991, p. 6. FBIS

EEU-91-066 (5 April 1991), p. 18. 

45. Krasnaya Zvezda, 6 April 1991, p. 2. JPRS-UMA-91-01I (23 Apr

1991), p. 51. 

46. Hospodarske Noviny, 25 April 1991, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-91-085 (2 Ma

1991), p. 9. 

47. Rude Pravo, 25 April 1991, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-91-085 (2 May 1991

p. 9. 

48. Prague CTK, 29 April 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-082 (29 April 1991

p. 14. 

49. Prague CTK, 15 May 1991. JPRS-EER-91-070 (23 May 1991), p. 1
54. FBIS-EEU-92-110 (8 June 1992), pp. 14-18. 

55. Prague CSTK, 9 June 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-111 (9 June 1992), p. 1

56. Prague CSTK, 23 June 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-124 (26 June 1992), p

57. On 16 July 1992 the Federal Assembly approved a "CS

Government Policy Statement" that outlined the new reduced Fede

Government structure and stated how powers would be divested 

National Cotu~cils which were to reach agreements by the end 

September. For text, see Hospodarske Noviny, 22 July 1993, p. 7. FBIS-EE

92-144 (27 July 1992), pp. 10-14. 

58. Vaclav Havel news colfference, Prague Stanice Ceskosloven

Radio, 1 July 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-128 (2 July 1992), p. 8. 

59. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 122 (30 June 1992), p. 4. 

60. Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio, 17 September 1992. FB

EEU-92-182 (18 September 1992), p. 7. 

61. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 136 (20 July 1992), p. 8. 

62. Prague CSTK, 20 July 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-140 (21 July 1992), p. 

63. Treaty text, Hospodarske Noviny, 8 December 1992, p. 8. FBIS-EE

92-240 (14 December 1992), pp. 20-23. 

64. In the Chamber of the People, 92 voted in favor, 16 against, and 

abstained. In the Czech part of the Chamber of Nations, 45 voted in fav

7 against, and 11 abstah~ed. In the Slovak part, 46 voted in favor

against, and 16 abstained. Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio, 

November 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-228 (25 November 1992), p. 4. 

65. Text, Mlada Fronta Dries, 26 November 1992, p. 6. FBIS-EEU-92-2

(2 December 1992), pp. 8-9. 
Q. 

O'J 

O 

N 

O 

"Trv 

W 

a. 

i 

Z 

o 

a. 

o 
T he Czech National Council passed a resolution assumin

responsibility for affairs of the Republic on 19 November 199

and adopted a Constitution on 16 December by vote of 172 to 1

with 10 abstentions. Its Preamble, in contrast to Slovakia

Constitution, emphasizes the civil rather than national aspect o

citizenship. Legislative power is vested in a bicameral parlia

ment--a 200-member Chamber of Deputies with 4-year terms, an

an 81-member Senate elected for 6-year terms (one-third every 

years). Since the Czech Parliament rejected the proposal tha

federal deputies be transferred to the Senate, it remains unoccu

pied through 1996. Constitutional amendments require a three

fifths majority of all deputies of the Chamber of Deputies and of a

members of the Senate present. 1 

The President, as commander-in-chief, is elected by simpl

majority of both chambers of Parliament for a 5-year term. Th

powers of the Czech president, in contrast to those of the stron

CSFR president, are more like the German-model: the presiden

represents symbolic and moral authority. The government is th

supreme executive power. Although the president appoint

members of the government, appointment is at the suggestion o

the prime minister, who determines the government's compositio

(see Table 7.1 below). The president appoints the Constitutiona

Court of 15 judges for 10-year terms with Senate.approval

Constitutional amendments require three-fifths of all deputies

21
dent powers, which on close examination are quite limited, an

Article 63 outlines those powers limited by prime ministeri

Table 7.1 Baudys Defense Reform, 1993-94 

President I 

V. Havel 

State Defense 

Council (ROS) 

CHAMBER 

DEPUTIES 

(20O) 

SENATE 

(81) 

I Premier 

V. Klaus 

Elections 

(6/92) 

Dir. Foreign 

Affairs 

J. Novotny 

A. Baudys (1/93) 

V. Holan (9/94) 

I 

Defense Minister 

I Chief of 

Gen. Staff 

Lt. Gen, K. Pezl 

Maj. Gen. J. Nekvasil 

(6/93) 

1st Deputy 

Defense Minister 

J. Pospisil 

I Dep. Min. [ 

Management 

M. Kalousek 
gency. 

Despite the fact that the State Defense Council (ROS) had 

legal basis in the Czech Constitution, the President's office initia

ly named members anyway. These include the prime ministe

ministers of finance, foreign affairs, defense, interior, industry an

trade, environment, and military officers from the Office of t

President, Government, and General Staff. President Havel not

that: "According to Article 63 of the Constitution, the President h

the right to exercise legal powers which are not expressly defin

in a Constitutional law, ff the law so stipulates. "s In March 1993 t

Govermnent Office for Legislature and Public Administrati

declared that the State Defense Council could not exist as a sta

agency, but that it could act as a consultative body to the pre

dent. 6 As a result, the State Defense Council no longer exists. 

Constitutional politics. In contrast to Slovakia, Czech cons

tutional politics have been relatively calm. This was, in part, due 

the ongoing strength of the ruling Civic Democratic Party (OD

led by Prime Ivlinister Vaclav Klaus, which controlled 105 seats 

the 200-seat Chamber of Deputies. (Deputies from the June 19

Czech National Council were reassigned to the Chamber 

Deputies). The Senate, though, was not filled, because of a diff

ence of opinion as to whether senators from the CSFR Sena

should be coopted to fill the body (failed a vote because it requir

a two-thirds Chamber of Deputies majority), or abohsh the Sena

(which was rejected on March 24, 1993). The Chamber of Deputi

therefore fulfills the duties of the Senate until that body will 

elected (Article 106, Secs. 2-3). 7 

During the first months of 1994 the Senate remained a pohtic

issue. The opposition Social Democrats and the Communis
getters in each district to become senators. Despite these diffe

ences, the ODS-ODA-KDS-KDU coalition remained stable. On 2

September 1994 the Parliament rejected a constitutional amen

ment abolishing the Senate. 

In late January 1995, when the Parliamentary committees d

not approve the draft constitutional law on defense, Defen

Minister Vilem Holan indicated concern and noted that: "[A]t th

moment, opinion on who declares a state of emergency is n

unanimous. ''a President Havel again called on the Czech Parli

ment on 14 March to fill the "holes" in the Czech Constitutio

before they became an issue in the 1996 election campaign an

renewed his call to create the Senate. 9 

On 27 September 1995, after more than 2 years of bitt

disputes, the Parliament finally voted for the electoral law th

includes a method for filling the 81-seat Senate prescribed by th

Constitution. Hence, the Chamber of Deputies will be up f

re-election once the Senate is filled. Senators will be elected for 

year terms by majority (on a 2-year rolling basis). President Have

with Prime Minister Klaus's grudging agreement, announced th

date of the election would be 15-16 November 1996.10 

Defense reform. On 4 January 1993, Antonin Baudys (of th

Christian Democratic Union) became the Czech Republic's fir

defense minister. He immediately announced that no maj

changes had been made in the Army since 198911 and radical step

would be needed to adjust the structure and size of the defen

ministry and Army to meet needs of integration into the Europea

defense system. Defense Minister Baudys also retained form

CSFR Chief of General Staff and Deputy Defense Minister Kar

Pezl in the Czech defense ministry and established a commissio
between the General Staff, which needs to be concerned wit

command, and the civilian defense ministry, which is concerne

with equipment allocation and supply, management of productio

enterprises, and foreign contacts. Also noting that many qualifie

younger officers had been leaving the military, Baudys charge

First Deputy Defense ..Minister Jiri Pospisil to establish a ne

personnel system within the Army. 13 

Baudys envisaged that, with Parliament's participation

"screening" or interviews and tests of aptitude would be necessar

for service in the new Czech Army. Citing examples of past screen

ing failures, Baudys mentioned that former Defense Minist

Miroslav Vacek and Chief of Staff Anton Slimak had destroye

files on the army's preparations in November 1989. TM Neverth

less, on 17 May 1993, the defense ministry issued the order to beg

screening of 28,000 professional soldiers by the end of the yea

Baudys indicated that officers who participated in the purge of th

armed forces after 1968 or in the clampdown on demonstrations 

1989 would be fired. In addition, personnel reductions woul

require 8,000 to 10,000 professionals to leave the armed forces o

retire.15 Though the Parliament's Defense and Security Committe

criticized the process and results, when the screening had bee

completed in the Spring of 1994, it concluded that the majority 

the Army's officers would defend the sovereignty of the Czec

Republic. 16 

On I January 1993, the Czech Republic Army comprise

106,447 (69,488 in the Army and 36,959 in Air Force and A

Defense).17 In his first meeting with the Czech Parliament Defen

and Security Committee, Baudys argued that the army's weapon

needed to be replaced to approach Western standards and note
According to the draft, the Czech ground forces were to b

restructured by the end of 1995. The 28,000-man brigade-based 

Army would be divided into an Expedition Army Force, a 15

brigade Territorial Defense Force, and a Rapid Deploymen

Brigade that would train for specific cooperation with foreig

(specifically NATO) forces, a0 In addition, there would be Air Forc

and Air Defense troops. 

The Czech forces would use different equipment than 

Hungary and Slovakia, which acquired MIG-29s from Russia a

part of their debt consolidation, al The Czechs made a consciou

decision neither to buy M_IG-29s nor to re-equip their Army wit

Russian or Ukrainian equipment. In fact, during 1994 they decid

ed to ground their 10 M_[G-29s, use MIG-23s until 1999, and 

modernize their 36 MIG-21s. a2 To eventually replace its MIG-2

and MIG-23s, the Czech Army also intends to buy 72 Czech-mad

L-159 interceptors to be produced by Aero Vodochody betwee

1998-2004. 28 

On 1 July 1993, Maj. Gen. Jiri Nekvasfl replaced Karel Pezl a

Chief of the General Staff of the Czech Army. In contrast to al

other Central European general staffs, the Czech General Staff had 

been so transformed that Nekvasil could say in a July interview

"There are none of the original principal officers anymore. "aa In a

effort to return the Army to the people, on 19 August 1993 Nekva

sil apologized to the citizens of the Czech Republic for the rol

played by the Army in suppressing demonstrations in Augus

1969. Nekvasil openly conceded that the Army had been used 

against the people by the former Communist Party and that h

would declassify pertinent secret documents on 20 August. as 

During September 1993 when Yeltsin dissolved the Russia
ed, President Havel, Prime Minister Klaus, and Defense Minist

Baudys all went on public record noting that Russia posed n

direct threat to the Czech Republic. 

NATO and Czech Military Reform. With NATO's introdu

tion of Partnership For Peace (PFP), Baudys promised that 

military exercises undertaken by the Czech Army would be subje

to the consent of Parliament because Article 43 of the Cze

Constitution allows for Czech forces to operate outside Czech te

ritory only with consent of both houses of Parliament. Article 

requires foreign troop presence on Czech soft to be approved b

majority of Senate. a;' On 29 April 1994, the Parliament approv

the government proposal to permit short-term military traini

and exercises on Czech soil (5,000 foreign troops for up to 21 day

and for Czech units to participate abroad (700 troops for up to 

days) .28 

On 10 March 1994, Klaus signed the PFP general agreeme

making the Czech Republic the 11th country to join the proje

Though Defense Minister Baudys called the program, "the max

mum possible and the minimum desired, "a9 active Cze

participation immediately ensued. The first joint exercise with 

Western Army under PFP took place 15-25 March 1994 when 

Dutch marines participated with 120 members of the Czech Rap

Deployment Battalion on Czech soil. On 29 May-10 June, 1

French troops participated in exercises in the Czech Republic wi

120 members of a company of the 23rd Czech mechanized batt

ion. a0 During 9-19 September, a platoon of 40 soldiers of the Cze

4th mechanized regiment participated in COOPERATIVE BRIDGE-94 

Poland. al Finally, the first joint Czech-German military exercise 

400 troops took place during 7-11 November on both sides of t
Kc24.55 billion in real terms and remained a constant 2.6 percent of 

GDP. 33 The 1994 defense budget, though, did reorient priorities 

and included new line-item expenditures of Kc800 million for 

creating the Rapid Deployment Force, Kc50 million for restructuring the logistics system, and Kc300 million for modernizing 

communications. 34 The Rapid Deployment Brigade, which was to 

comprise some 3,000 men and become operational on 1 July 1994

represented the model of the Czech Republic's future forces. The 

equipment of this brigade would be compatible with NATO and 

its units will participate in NATO exercises. 

By Spring 1994 the former six-tier organization of the Army 

began merging into three levels---General Staff, army corps, and 

brigades. General Nekvasil noted that the Rapid Deployment 

Brigade would be completed on 30 June 1994, adding that training 

with Dutch soldiers in PFP was useful in developing standards for 

the Brigade. as 

The Air Force also went through significant change; one-third 

of its 400 aircraft--77 combat aircraft (including the 10 MIG-29s), 

20 trainers, 10 transports, and 20 transport helicopters--were put 

out of service. According to Czech Air Force Chief General Pavel 

Strubl, this "shock therapy was necessary because without radically limiting the bloated Air Force, where almost all costs are 

expenditures on the operation of the aging fleet, the Air Force 

would gradually become extinct. ''36 

Even after the United States allowed the purchase of modern 

weapons in 1995--to include the F-16---this feeling continued. In 

the words of Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Air Defense 

Colonel Jaroslav Hudec, "Even if Parliament were to approve a 

budget several times higher...we would never agree to purchase 
j

communications standards, rather than acquiring new tanks or 

jets, remained the first priority, a8 

A New Defense Minister. On 22 September 1994, VLlem Holan 

(Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party-- 

KDU-CSL) succeeded Antonin Baudys as defense minister (see 

Table 7.2 below). Shortly after assuming office, Holan criticized the 

Army screening that occurred under Baudys, claiming that only 60 

people did not pass. 39 He argued that his priorities would be 

military education and to change the structure of the officers corps 

because "there are too many high-ranking officers. "4o After a few 

months in office, Holan identified challenges in two areas. First, he 

continued to see the need to change the personnel management 

system, noting that he had set up a personnel board to establish 

criteria and guidelines for career paths and for mihtary promotion. 

Second, he wanted to break through the "impediments in legislation" and adopt a Law on the Army, a Law on the conditions of 

service, and a new Defense Law. 41 

Intelligence remained another area of concern, particularly 

since the military had been involved in counter-revolutionary 

activity during the revolution. During 1994 the military intelligence group (VZS) had been established by merging the Military 

Defense Intelligence and the Intelligence Services of the General 

Staff (which until 1992 had been directed by their pre-November 

1989 chief General Kozojed). Now directed by former political 

prisoner Radovan Prochazka, the 800 VZS employees--including 

military and air attaches--are subordinate to the Defense Minister 

and in the defense ministry. 42 On 20 April 1995 the Chamber of 

Deputies amended the law and estabhshed a seven-member committee to oversee and control military intelligence. 43 
SENATE 

(81) 

I 

Diro Defense 

Policy 

Col. J. Svabik 

(9/95) 

Elections 

(6/92) 

I 

V. Holan (9/94) 

I 

Defense Minister 

I I 

I Chief of I 1st Dep. 

Gen. Staff I Def. Min. 

Maj. Gen. J. Nekvasil I J. Pospisil 

P. Necas 

(9/95) 

i 

I Dir. Foreign 

Affairs 

J. Novotny 

Dep. Min, 

Management 

M. Kalousek 

Dep. Min. 

Soc/Hlth/ 

Housing 

H. Demlova 

(11/95) 

In mid-December 1994, the government approved a three-pa

document entitled "Military Strategy of the Czech Republic." Th

first section described "political instability in the East" (rea

Russia) and local risks such as the war in Yugoslavia and terro

ism. The second section noted that while the Army must be able 

face danger on its own, a small Army has its limits. Thus, th

Czech Republic seeks membership in alliances, specifically NATO

The third section described the structure of the armed forces--th

the army should be deployed for circular defense, nonpartisa
Acquisition policy. In November 1994 the government also 

adopted an "Acquisition Plan of the Czech Republic Army for 

1995-2005," which projected costs of modernization beginning 

1995 to the year 2005 of 120 billion korunas (Kc) (or $4.4 billion). 

This would include Kc15 billion for small arms and anti-tank 

weapons, Kc33.6 for Air Force acquisitions (to include 72 L-159 

aircraft from Aero Vodochody for Kc15 billion), 46 Kcl0 billion for 

Air Defense spending, and Kcl0 billion for radars and computer 

equipment. 47 

In reference to NATO membership, Defense Minister Holan 

concluded, "It is possible to anticipate that the conditions for 

NATO membership will be clearly defined in the near future--that 

is, certain standards will be drawn up...[adding] the 'cheap' phase 

of our decisions is coming to an end, and the phase that will cost 

us something is beginning. ''48 He further noted, "IT]he new 

system of planning of programming and budgeting makes it possible...not to plan for a single year, but for a 10-year period. "49 The 

1995 defense budget of Kc27 billion represented a decline from 

1994 both in real terms (Kc2.1 billion) and as a percent of GDP 

(from 2.6 to 2.3 percent), s0 Of the Kc4.06 billion of its Kc27 billion 

1995 defense budget, apart from improving the linguistic ability of 

the officer corps, the immediate priority is to acquire a computer 

system that would be capable of communicating with NATO. 51 

While 1995 acquisitions represented 15 percent of the defense budget compared to 7 percent in 1994 (acquisitions of Kc 1.7 billion), 

the longer-term goal is to reach 30 percent for future acquisitions, sa 

The strategy for the Air Force is first to modernize 24 MIG-21s 

to carry through the end of the century then to purchase Czechmade sub-sonic L-159s beginning in 1998. Then, after the year 
ppg 

and early Summer 1995, Maj. Gen. Jiri Nekvasil and Minister 

Holan continued trying to convince the Defense and Security 

Committee to approve plans to modernize the MIG-21 aircraft, s4 

The fundamental issue was whether the $135 million needed to 

modernize the MIG-21s would be better spent repairing decom

missioned aircraft and helicopters, airbases, and barracks, 

purchasing telecommunications equipment, and for language or 

management training. The Air Force Chief, General Pavel Strubl

argued that the modernized MIG-21s would allow struggling 

pilots to fly jet aircraft in preparation for the next generation 

aircraft that the Army could not yet afford, ss 

At the end of July 1995, the defense ministry made plans to 

modernize two fighters as prototypes, then decide whether to 

modernize all 24 MIG-21s. 58 In early September these plans again 

were put on hold when the United States announced that it migh

make F-16 or F-18A aircraft available to the Czech Republic. s7 

Then after U.S. Defense Secretary Perry visited Prague in late 

September, Holan announced that he had suspended plans to 

modernize the MIG-21s until an expert commission could study 

the advantages of purchasing U.S. F-16 aircraft. By the late Fall o

1995 it was also clear that the L-159 purchase was to be re-evaluat

ed in light of the F-16 offer, s8 

In early 1996, a U.S.-Czech commission prepared four options

• lease and purchase used F-16As 

• purchase new aircraft 

• modernize the MIG-21s 

• postpone the decision on modernization for another five 

years, s9 
had agreed (on 13 April) to establish a commission to coordinate 

modernizing hardware and purchasing fighter aircraft, 61 and the 

Czech Army made it clear they were leaning toward F-16s. Under 

the plan, in the first phase starting in 1997 the Army would lease 7 

unmodernized F-16A aircraft to train pilots and ground personne

for Kc2 billion over 5 years. Later the Army would purchase 18 

modenfized F-16A or F-16B fighters for Kc6 billion. Finally, after 

2007 the Army would buy another 18 aircraft. 6a The fact that the 

Czechs had not yet abandoned the goal of incorporating 72 L-159 

Aero aircraft was evident by its guaranteeing Kcl.5 billion for thei

development and in choosing U.S.-Taiwanese (ITEC) F-12 engine

for the aircraft. 6a 

Holan's Defense Reform. In early 1995 when Defense Ministe

Holan outlined his reform goals, he stressed that he wanted to 

draft a career structure for the military, transform professiona

military education, take steps toward NATO, and emphasize 

discipline in the units. 64 These goals were constrained by the 1995 

defense budget of Kc27 billion which represented a decline to 2.3 

percent of GDP. 

Since increasing resources from the state budget for modern

ization was unlikely, Holan sought to achieve maximum saving

and efficiency of management as a source of revenue. So, on 

January 1995, Holan introduced a system of double-entry book

keeping management to coincide with the Army's adoption of the 

Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), to identi

fy waste and shortages. The purpose of PPBS is to allocate an 

untouchable 30 percent of the budget to Army investments fo

modernization. Holan also looked for supplemental state 

resources from outside the defer~e budget to fund the moderniza

tion of barracks and acquiring air defense armaments. 6s 
y y , g, y p

the double-entry bookkeeping system and could state how much 

money was being spent on specific activities. 6z Holan, admitting 

that the introduction of double-entry booking had been slow in the 

Army, nevertheless was able to say, "We won this battle and the 

information systems have worked since February. "68 

Holan also attempted to lower operating costs by decreasing 

the number of professional military personnel by 12,900 and basic 

service soldiers by 21,500 compared with 1994. Though tl~s would 

bring the Armed Forces down to its goal of 65,000 by the end of 

1995 (on 1 January 1996 it comprised 63,346), 60 it would not solve 

the inherited problem of imbalance in the personnel structure, 

frequently characterized as being a ratio of 2,000 lieutenants to 

7,000 colonels. The ratio of Army officers to warrant officers is 

2.2:1. In the mixed (professional/conscript) armies of NATO countries the ratio is 1:3; and in professional armies, as much as 1:7. The 

mix of professional Czech soldiers in mid-1995 was 20,000 officers 

to 8,000 warrants. According to Defense Minister Holan, after the 

year 2000 the Czech Army needs to achieve a reverse ratio--that is, 

10-12,000 officers and 18,000 warrant officers. 7° 

Holan has noted that although the renewal and rejuvenation of 

the command corps was a high priority, overturning the pyramid 

is to be a 10-year program; each year one-tenth of the program 

would be addressed. This would result in very few promotions 

while retirements continued. As an example, Holan claimed that of 

the 130 generals in the Army in November 1989, only 30 were left 

in September 1995, and 25 by the end of the year. 71 

Strengthening the warranted and non-commissioned officers 

corps side of the pyramid, though, was easier said than done. 

Holan admitted that because of the Army's low social prestige, 
, g py y 

months, during which it is difficult to provide quality training

Czech doubts about the army's combat capability are justified. 7

Holan's decision to halt automatic advancements and to require 

postgraduate studies as a condition for further promotion only 

serves to prevent a further intensification of negative tendencies. 

By the Spring of 1996 little had changed. First Deputy Defense 

Minister Petr Necas argued that it was essential to fill the posts o

junior commanders and weapons specialists with longer-servic

professionals, whose duty period lasted 3-to-5 years. Necas argued 

that 14,000 professional junior officers were needed before the 

Czechs could think about any reductions in conscript time from 

the current 12 months to 9 or 10. TM Holan, though, did not rule ou

the possibility of cutting basic military service. 7s 

Lack of adequate training was also manifest in the Air Force

According to General Strubl, over the past 5 years an inadequate 

amount of resources had been set aside for the purchase of spare 

parts and gradually all depot stocks were exhausted. Since the Air 

Force received only 25 percent of the resources that it requested for 

operations, its operating capacity was greatly reduced. According 

to 1995 plans, Czech pilots were to fly 90 hours per year, with 

increases by 10 hours per year so that, over time, pilots would be 

able to fly 140-150 hours per year.T6 

The reality, though, was different. Because of lack of funds fo

spare parts and fuel, pilots were flying only 50 hours per year

When at the end of 1995, flying had to be further curtailed, the 

General Staff obtained Kcs 50 million for fuel by calling of

purchases of office equipment 77 and the Air Force resorted to 

"cannibalism" from mothballed aircraft for spares. 78 All thi

caused Holan to admit for the first time, "If we were to work ou
defense ministry created a new Defense Policy and Strategy 

Section that took over some important powers and activities of the 

General Staff. Directly subordinate to the defense minister, the 

Defense PoLicy and Strategy Section, headed by Colonel Jaroslav 

Svabik, would devise miLitary strategy for the Czech Republic and 

evaluate the risks and requirements for defense. Previously the 

General Staff performed these functions. In addition the new 

section was to influence the Army's organization and deployment 

and coordinate emergency activities with other ministries and 

state bodies. It also included a three-person standardization 

bureau that deals with NATO STANAGs (Standardization 

Agreements) and integration. 81 

Finally, as of 23 November 1995, Holan appointed the first 

woman, former Pardubice Mayor Hana Dem_lova (Christian 

Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party), Deputy Defense 

Minister for Social, Health, and Housing Affairs. 82 (See Table 7.2 

above) One reason for this new directorate originally was the need 

to find adequate housing for 3,000 military officers and their 

families. Another, according to Holan, was a decline in discipline 

and increase in criminality among draftees, and the Army's 

constant affliction of bullying, s3 Discipline problems had 

increased, in part, because military jurisdiction over discipline 

issues had been abolished in the second half of 1994 and because 

many of those released by the lustration of the armed forces had 

been responsible for solving bullying problems in the military. 84 

Pre-election poLitics disrupted defense ministry continuity on 

25 September 1995 with the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) decision 

to replace First Deputy Defense Minister Jiri Pospisil with Petr 

Necas (ODS) because of dissatisfaction with certain things in the 
gg) py 

projects from the defense ministry budget. He also argued that the 

Army command system needed a higher percentage of junior offio 

cers.S6 

One major acquMtion problem had been that Czech Army 

modernization contracts procedures had created public controversy. First, the ..Ministry for Economic Competition halted in midSeptember 1995 the bid for night-vision devices for small arms by 

Pramacon Corporation pending an investigation of the Kc250 

million contract, s~' After the Army appealed the decision and the 

dispute was examined by the appropriate commission, the January 

1996 conclusion was that the Army had erred in the announcement 

of the tender and incorrectly defined the criteria, a8 

Then in the case of the T-72 fire-control system and gearbox 

modernization tenders, Defense Minister Holan's investigation 

team proposed that Deputy Defense Minister Kalousek be disciplined for mistakes made by his subordinates. Holan, though, 

maintained that the controversial results would not be overturned 

and that the Italian firm Offcine Galileo and Israeli firm Nimda 

remained winners of the tenders, s9 Finally; the Parliament's 

Defense and Security Committee on 15 November 1995 recommended halting reconstruction of the T-72s and not modernizing 

the MIG-21s. 9° Though the Parliament recommended halting both 

projects on 19 December 1995, in early April Kalousek confirmed 

that the T-72 modernization was continuing. 91 

The controversy over arms acquisitions led Prime Minister 

Klaus to demand from Defense Minister Holan a report on 

economic management in the ministry. 9a On 17 November Unisys 

won a Kc3.7 billion contract for army computer systems. However, 

Holan agreed with protests from losers who claimed that the com- 
gg y 9

In early March, further accusations appeared that First Deputy 

Defense Minister Necas had attempted to cancel the Unisys 

contract in order to accommodate Electronic Data Systems (EDS)

which had placed second in the competition, in return for a $1 

million commission to the ODS. 9s It later became public that 

Deputy Defense Minister Kalousek (KDU-CSL) recommended that 

Holan cancel the tender and that Petr Necas had no authority in 

the decision-making.96 

In early April, Necas noted that because finance is the basic 

means of civilian control over the armed forces, the defense 

ministry needed a maximum effort to make the Army's economic 

management transparent and that it was "still necessary to do 

many things...that a new mechanism should be drawn up for the 

selection procedures, that key projects should be considered from 

a broader perspective. ''°z In essence, Necas argued that foreign 

political and domestic industrial considerations needed to be 

taken into account, and, therefore, the decision-making circle for 

acquisitions had to be wider than just the defense ministry. 

Holan came to the same conclusion when he argued in Apri

1996 that the Army needed a supra-departmental commission-

Council of National Security--that would, among other things

supervise army tenders. 9a In a May interview, he argued that the 

new government should consider establishing a supreme nationa

defense body---comprised of select ministers and the President-

that would deal with issues that lie partly outside the defense 

ministry, such as developing a national strategy or crisis-manage

ment. Holan also suggested that the Parliamentary Defense and 

Security Committee establish a subcommittee to deal only with 

military issues. 99 
enough to know where the money is going. When they finally 

bring in better accounting techniques, we'd be willing to raise the 

defense budget. "1°° 

Pre-Election Politics and Defense Reform. After a 13 

November meeting of the economic ministers, Prime Minister 

Klaus noted that he did not want to resolve the difficult financial 

situation in the Army by merely increasing the budget, but that he 

"want[ed] a new concept for the Army" with specific cost figures 

by mid-December 1995.101 The concept was to play a fundamental 

influence on the plan for modernizing the Army. 

Defense Minister Holan initially expressed optimism that the 

Army concept "is actually ready and only needs to be complemented into an understandable form. 'q°a The issue of what the 

ultimate size of the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR) should be 

was now re-opened. From 106,447 troops on 1 January 1993, the 

ACR has been in continuous reduction. On I January of 1994 it was 

92,893, in 1995 it fell to 67,702, and in 1996, to 65,000.103 

Holan's new proposal suggested lowering the number of 

troops from 65,000 to a combat core of 50,000,104 decreasing the 

equipment proportionately while still modernizing it, and spending money on more effective training of the reserves. 105 When the 

revised concept was presented to an economic ministerial meeting 

on 2 January 1996, Prime Minister Klaus again rejected it, saying, 

"The draft would have to be written seriously..., if we do not 

begin with a serious analysis.., we can not get off the ground and 

continue further with a meaningful concept. ''1o6 Klaus felt that 

politics was involved, noting that Defense Minister Holan (KDUCSL) had not consulted First Deputy Minister Petr Necas (ODS) on 

the concept, and so he charged the ministry with not functioning 
gpp

initial concept, that an Air Force Concept had been drafted, and 

that work was under way as well on a Ground Forces Concept

The Defense Minister also noted that talks would commence with 

NATO between April and November 1996, and that the results o

those talks would be worked into the concept. 108 He added tha

the Czech Republic's new aircraft acquisition decision would be 

coordinated with Poland. 109 

Holan's political problems with the Prime Minister continued

In April, Klaus again rejected a concept for the development and 

utilization of military districts, arguing that the military districts

size was too large and that the material presented was no

adequately interesting and conceptual. Therefore Klaus tasked 

Holan to submit a completely new and conceptual document. 110 

Electoral politics continued when Holan (KDU-CSL) publdcl

admitted that the General Staff had continuously resisted reducing 

the size of the Army and cutting its operational costs, describing 

Chief of Staff General Nekvasil as one of the exceptions who 

played an enormous role in the changes made, but who wa

isolated in his endeavors to bring the Army closer to NATO stan

dards.Ill The opposition's response was that during the 4 year

the KDU-CSL controlled the defense ministry, it had not managed 

to secure the loyalty of the officer corps for social reform. 11a 

Continued sensitivities about the extent of lustration were 

evident when Defense and Security Committee Deputy Chairman 

Tomas Fejfar (ODS) alleged that at least four General Staff officer

had been in contact with former Defense Minister Genera

Miroslav Vacek--who had been involved in the coverup o

November 1989 counterrevolutionary activities and was connect

ed with the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM)-
NATO and Peacekeeping in Croatia and IFOR. Shortly after 

President Havel addressed SHAPEX-95 participants in Mons, he 

noted in an interview that, although the Czech Army had accomplished much in its internal transformation and adjustment to 

NATO standards, they faced a new challenge: "What should 

change faster is the attitude of the public to the Army and the attitude of the soldiers to themselves. It is necessary that service in the 

Army become an honor, that the citizens view soldiers as people 

who protect our freedoms rather than as parasites. That will 

require a lot more work." 11 s 

NATO's PFP COOPERATIVE CHALLENGE-95 was the largest exercise in the Czech Republic since November 1989. Comprising 679 

soldiers from 14 countries, the exercise was an effort to demonstrate multinational peacekeeping activity under NATO leadership. The exercise cost Kcs 21 million, of which Kc 6.5 million was 

covered by the Czechs. The Czech UNPROFOR peacekeeping 

forces in Croatia started in April 1992 as part of the then 

Czechoslovak unit. After the division of the country, a combined 

Czech-Slovak unit remained for three months. In April 1993 an 

independent Czech unit of 500 soldiers was formed; by 1995, the 

Czech UN Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) com

prised 874 troops. 

Problems were evident in the forces, the majority of which 

were volunteers from the reserves. 116 The Defense Minister's 

allegations of lack of discipline, poor military training, and 

incompetence 117 necessitated the early relief of its commande

LTC Vojtek Seidl. 118 Up until I July 1995, the unit had been 

subordinated to Jaromir Novotny, head of the Defense Ministry 

Foreign Affairs Directorate; after 1 July the unit was subordinated 
were killed and 3 injured in an attack on their observation pos

Despite these losses, the Czech performance was evaluated pos

tively. The UN Command Conference decided to gradually wit

draw Czech troops beginning at the end of October 1995.120 On 

October 1995, 200 troops withdrew from Zagreb to South Bohemi

followed by another 200 troops on 30 October. In the end, the U

owed the Czech Republic $22 million (Kc 600 million) for cos

associated with the UNPROFOR and UNCRO peacekeepin

operations.lal 

With the signing of the Dayton Accord on 1 November 199

the Czech Government expressed preliminary and noncommitt

interest in participating in the Bosnia IFOR, for which they wou

have to sustain the costs. Parliamentary Defense Committee chai

man Vladimir Suman noted that to send a 1,000-man Czech for

might cost Kc2 billion ($70 million), that the money could not b

taken from the defense ministry budget but could come from th

Government's reserves. 12a 

Having learned lessons from their Croatian UNPROFOR

UNCRO experience (where two-thirds of the troops we

reservists), when the Czechs established their 850-man IFO

contingent, they decided to staff one-half of it with reserve office

who were either veterans of UNPROFOR, the Rapid Deployme

Brigade, or the Prostejov elite airborne brigade. 128 Th

Government approved participation in Bosnia IFOR on 2

November 1995, as did the Parliament on 8 December along wi

approval for transit of NATO-led peacekeepers across Czech terr

tory to Bosnia. 

The Czech Army contributed Kc250 million to the missio

Though it was supposed to supply armaments and equipme
the preparation period because of an argument over their salaries. 

By April 1996, complaints could be heard from the field about 

problems with equipment, special hardware, and training for 

clearing mines and distributing humanitarian aid. Of the 90 

trained sappers, only 8 were able to work on mine clearance 

because of equipment problems. 126 Czech contingent commander 

Colonel (later Brigadier General) Jiri Sedivy also noted that the 

representatives of the town of Prijedor (on Bosnia's Serb territory) 

were suspected of having carried out ethnic cleansing and 

remained opposed to IFOR, and that the Czech troops were 

"under stress and tension at the local post; [where the Czechs] 

seize some arms almost every day. 'qa7 By early May, 17 soldiers 

had left the battalion prematurely; some were removed for repeated misbehavior, others left voluntarily because the mission was 

too stressful for them. 1as 

Another IFOR problem related to command. The Czech battalion was incorporated within a Canadian brigade that was subordinated to a British division. Although the Czech battalion had 

detained the most men and seized the most weapons in the sector

the British included Canadians, but would not permit a Czech 

representative, in the British IFOR sector Command in Zagreb. 129 

This apparent unfairness--resulting in part, from the Czechs' lack 

of experience operating in multinational commands--was 

ultimately resolved. 13° 

All these problems contributed to civil-military tensions. One 

Czech General Staff officer noted that Defense Minister Holan 

liked to boast about the unit's successes and give medals and 

watches to the troops, but that the battalion would prefer greater 

concern for its basic needs. He then offered as examples the fact 
uled troop replacements occurred. 182 It has become clear, though

that the deployment of a battalion-strength unit was financial

and physically stressful for the Czech Army. 

NATO membership issues. Though Czech leaders recogniz

that NATO membership will not come cheaply if the Czec

Republic is admitted into the Alliance, they believe membersh

probably will be less costly than if the Czech Republic had to pla

its own defense alone. In 1996 the defense budget was set at Kcs 3

billion, a decline from 2.3 to 2.2 percent of GDP. According to th

Defense Ministry, ff the Czech Republic had to plan its defen

alone, it would have to spend Kc 45 billion annually. 1~ Fir

Deputy Defense ..Minister Necas argued that he was in favor o

increasing the defense budget from the present 2.2 percent "to 2

percent of GDP to be the minimum outlay "13a with the caveat th

the budget would be transparent so the public could know ho

their money was being expended. 

One of the issues that arose in early January 1996 was govern

ment approval of a law prohibiting any kind of nuclear weapon

on the Czech Republic's territory. Since the language in the bi

raised questions about whether this restriction would have 

negative impact on the Czech Republic's ability to join NATO, 1

when the Parliament's Budget Committee approved the law on 2

March, it added an amendment "'unless an international treat

states otherwise. "136 

On 15 March 1996 the Czechs established a special corrunitte

of Foreign and Defense Ministry personnel--%upplemented b

representatives from finance, industry and trade--to coordinate a

activities regarding NATO integration and to produce a "Nation

Plan of Compatibility with NATO. 'q3? This Committee drafte
Czech (like Hungarian) public opinion evidences greater reserve

For the first time in 3 years, Institute for Public Opinion Research 

polls indicated that only 46 percent of the Czech public supported 

(54 percent opposed) NATO membership when linked to the 

purchase of fighter aircraft. Furthermore, only 18 percent supported NATO membership, if it meant deploying nuclear weapons on 

Czech soil. la9 

1996 Elections. When elections were held on 31 May-1 June 

1996, they resulted in uncertainty. W/th 76.4 percent of the elec

torate casting ballots, the ruling coalition only won 99 of the 

Chamber's 200 seats. Vaclav Klaus' Civic Democratic Party (ODS

won 29.6 percent; Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak 

People's Party (KDU-CSL) won 8 percent; and Civic Democratic 

Alliance (ODA) gained 6.3 percent. Milos Zeman led the opposi

tion Social Democrats (CSSD) with 26.4 percent, followed by th

Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) with 10.

percent, and the Republican Party (SRP) with 8 percent. 14° In 

effect, this meant that a weak coalition would rule, that CSSD 

support would be necessary, and that new elections would likel

be convened within a year. 

The ODS, KDU-CSL, and ODA signed a Coalition agreemen

on 27 June that included a policy section reiterating that the Czech 

Govenxment's "key foreign policy objective" is to join NATO and 

EU. 141 On 2 July President Havel accepted the government'

resignation and appointed Vaclav Klaus as prime minister of th

new Czech Government (see Table 7.3 below). On 4 July, when 

Klaus officially introduced KDU-CSL Mi.roslav Vyborny as defens

minister, the prime minister noted the Army's four main tasks: 

• Maximum communication between the Army and societ
tise on defense and security policy. On the positive side, on 4 Jul

former Defense Minister Vilem Holan (KDU-CSL) became chair

man of the Chamber of Deputies (20-member) Foreign Affair

Table 7.3 Vyborny Defense Reform, 1996 

I President 

V. Havel 

CHAMBER 

DEPUTIES 

(2O0) 

SENATE 

(81) 

I 

Premier I 

V. Klaus 

Dir. Defense 

Policy 

Col. J. Svabik 

(9/95) 

Elections 

(6/92) 

I 

M. Vyborny (7/96) 

! 

Defense Minister 

I I I Gen. Staff II's'°e°l I Def. Min. 

Maj. Gen. J. Nekvasil I 

I 

Dir. Foreign 

Affairs 

J. Novotny 

Dep. Min. 

Management 

M. Kalousek 

Dep. Min. 

Soc/Hlth/ 

Housing 

H. Demlova 

(11/95) 
side, only 3 other members of the Defense and Security 

Committee, aside from Necas, remained from the previou

Parliament; and aside from Holan only 2 holdovers remained on 

the Foreign Affairs Committee. 

Although the new Government remains committed to NATO 

integration, the coalition composition may create some complica

tions. Although the 3 coalition parties unconditionally suppor

NATO membership by a vote in Parliament, the Social Democrat

(CSSD) have some qualifications in their policy. Their party plat

form proposes barring permanent stationing of foreign forces and 

nuclear weapons on Czech soil, and they want the decision on 

NATO membership to be made by popular referendum. 14

Considering the weak Czech public support for NATO, this could 

create problems for the new government, particularly should th

issue be linked to the need to increase defense expenditures, which 

according to Necas might need to be 3 percent of GDP (or Kc4

billion compared to the Kc30 billion at present). 1as Necas notes

however, that an independent defense posture would be eve

more expensive. 

Conclusion 

On dealing with democratic control issues, the Czech Republi

still has an unresolved constitutional issue regarding Article 63(c

on emergency powers and the empowerment of the president i

transition to war. The earlier issue of filling the Senate appears t

have been resolved. 

The Parliament Defense and Security Committee, as well as th

Budget and Foreign Affairs committees, execute limited oversigh
rary halt to defense ministry plans to modernize MIG21s. I

February and April 1995 Parliamentary committees were estab

lished to oversee military intelligence (VZS) and the Security an

Information Service (BIS). This provided opposition parties wit

access to intelligence oversight. 

Adhering to Articles 39 and 43 of the Constitution, in Apr

1994 the Parliament approved the Czech Army's participation 

military exercises abroad and for foreign NATO troops to exerci

on Czech soil. In November 1995, the Defense and Securi

Committee recommended halting T-72 and MIG-21 modernizatio

projects and Parliament recommended canceling both projects 

December. In sum, though the Defense and Security Committee

limitations have been highlighted in Defense Minister Holan

suggestion that it create a military affairs subcommittee and 

Vladimir Suman's complaints about lack of transparency 

budget expenditures, the Parliament has been relatively effectiv

in making progress in its oversight and management of the mil

tary. 

Civilian oversight of the Army has been executed by th

Defense Ministry. Also the Finance Ministry has sought compl

ance in the sphere of financial regulations, the Ministry f

Economic Competition in the sphere of state orders, and th

Supreme Control Administration checks how the Army handle

state property and the budget. 

Although the defense ministry has provided evidence of som

politicization in the buildup to the 1996 elections, it has al

demonstrated significant structural differentiation, adaptation

and development in recent years. In 1994 military intelligence wa

subordinated to the defense minister and placed in the defen
Defense Minister signaled the need for improvement in the 

personnel management system and the arrival of politics into the 

defense ministry, particularly in acquisitions policy. Also the 

creation of a new Defense Policy and Strategy Directorate under 

Colonel Jaroslav Svabik signaled the movement of significant 

powers from the General Staff to influence the organization and 

deployment of the Army and to coordinate its emergency activities 

with other ministries. In November 1995 a new Deputy Defense 

Minister for Social, Health, and Housing Affairs position was 

created, in part to deal with social problems in the armed forces 

and a housing shortage of 3,000 units for officers and families. 

Over the same period, the General Staff reacquired some 

powers from the defense n~n_istry. On 1 July 1995, the power of 

command of Czech UNPROFOR-UNCRO and IFOR units was 

moved from the defense ministry Foreign Affairs Directorate 

under Jaromir Novotny to the General Staff Operations Directorate 

under Majo Gen. Kuba. 

Increasingly the Czechs have been discussing the need to 

establish a supra-departmental agency (like a National Security 

Coouncil) to coordinate aspects of Czech national and defense 

policy that transcend one ministry. This need has become apparent 

in such issues as developing a national security strategy, acquisitions policy (e.g., possibly coordinating the aircraft buy with 

Poland), NATO integration, and crisis-management. In March 

1996 they did create an interagency NATO Integration Committee 

to produce a National Plan and coordinate all integration activities. 

Finally, it is clear that the Czech Army remains in a greatly 

weakened state. Its readiness and training levels and morale are 
Parliamentary and Government authorities, but until budgeta

commitments are increased, little improvement can be expected

Bullying of conscripts, who are the Army's major link to Cze

society, still remains in evidence. The Czech Army's image in t

broader society, as in Hungary, remains very low. As Vaclav Hav

has noted publicly, what is needed is not just a change in the w

Czech citizens view the military, but also in the attitude of soldie

themselves. Not only must these changes begin to occur befo

joining NATO, but the Czech Government has some significa

work to do with Czech society on the issue of NATO membershi

Despite these limitations, the Czech Republic has made eno

mous progress on the road to achieving democratic control of t

military. With a weakened coalition government remaining co

mitted to NATO integration, it seems that one of the Cze

Government's most difficult tasks will be to "sell" NATO to Cze

society in order to generate what are likely to be greater nation

obligations and resource requirements for defense. 
Vol. 2, No. 10 (5 March 1993), pp. 53-57. 

2. Ibid., pp. 53-57. 

3. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 17 (27 January 1993), p. 3. 

4. Vojtech Cepl and Mark Gillis, "Czech Republic," East European 

Constitutional Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 66-67. 

5. Prague CTK, 10 March 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-046 (11 March 1993), 

p. 13. 

6. Mlada Fronta Dries, 13 March 1993, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-93-051 (18 March 

1993), p. 12. 

7. Vojtech Cepl and David Fralxklin, "Senate, Anyone?" East European 

Constitutional Review, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 58-60. 

8. Defense Minister Wilem Holan interview. Prague Respekt, No. 6 (6- 

12 February 1995), p. 12. FBIS-EEU-95-030 (14 February 1995), p. 5. 

9. Open Media Research Institute (OMRI) Daily Digest (15 March 1995), 

p. 4. 

10. Prague Pravo, 28 September 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-192 (4 

October 1995), p. 7. 

11. Prague CTK, 7 January 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-O05 (8 January 1993), 

p. 11. 

12. Antonin Baudys interview, Prague Telegraf, 2 February 1993, pp. 

1,3. FBIS-EEU-93-026 (10 February 1993), p. 10. 

13. Antonin Baudys interview, Prague Respekt, No. 4 (30-31 January 

1993), p. 9. 

14. In a March 1993 interview, Defense Minister Baudys argued for 

screening. Prague Telegraf, 23 March 1993, pp. 1,9. FBIS-EEU-93-057 (26 

March 1993), pp. 11-13. 

15. Prague CTK, 17 May 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-096 (20 May 1993), pp. 6- 

7. During 1993, 6,594 individuals left the Army, including 113 NCOs, 

1,856 warrant officers, 4,607 officers, and 18 generals. At the same time, 

1,821 individuals joined the Army, including 438 NCOs who joined 

UNPROFOR. General Jiri Nekvasil press conference, A Report, 22 

February 1994, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-94-084 (2 May 1994), pp. 8-9. 
19. Prague CTK, 29 April 1993. FBISEEU93083 (3 May 1993), p. 1

20. Defense Minister Baudys interview, Lidove Prace, 23 April 1993, 

3. FBIS-EEU-93-079 (27 April 1993), p. 19. Some of the last mechanize

brigades were transformed from divisions by early 1995. During the fir

week of 1995, the 6th and 7th Mechanized Brigades ha Brno an

Kromeriz. The last one, the 8th, was scheduled to start on 1 July 199

rather than the end of the year. Hospodarske Noviny, 4 January 1995, p. 

FBIS-EEU-95-O07 (11 January 1995), p. 5. 

21. In July 1995 the Czechs and Russians agreed to permit Czech com

panies to buy part of Russian enterprises' property for implementin

joint projects to "capitalize" Russia's $ 5 billion debt. Moscow Interfax, 

July 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-I36 (17 July 1995), pp. 13-14. 

22. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 121 (28 June 1994), pp. 4-5. 

23. Prague CTK, 10 July 1994. 

24. Maj. Gen. Jiri Nekvasil interview, A Report, 27 July 1993, pp. 8-9

25. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 12 August 1993, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-93-16

(25 August 1993), p. 14. 

26. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 23 September 1993. FBI

EEU-93-184 (24 September 1993), p. 5. 

27. Prague CTK, 26 January 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-OI8 (27 January 1994

p, 3o 

28. 

29. 

p. 8. 

30. 

104 (31 

31. 

32. 

p. 5. 

FBIS-EEU-94-117 (17 June 1994), p. 13. 

Prague CTK, 7 March 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-049 (14 March 1994

Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 29 May 1994. FBIS-EEU-9

May 1994), p. 18. 

Prague CTK, 3 August 1994. 

Prague CTK, 12 October 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-199 (14 October 1994

33. White Paper: On Defence of the Czech Republic (Prague: Ministry 

Defense, 1995), Figure V/4. 

34. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 5 April 1994. FBIS-EEU-9

065 (5 April 1994), p. 4. 
37. Prague Lidove Noviny, 3 March 1995, p. 16. FBISEEU95045 (8 

March 1995), p. 5. 

38. Prague Post, 14 March 1995, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-95-064 (4 April 1995), 

p. 7. 

39. Though Holan may have had some initial reservations, within a 

few months his assessment had changed. In a December 1994 interview, 

Holan noted: "I believe that the officer corps is loyal. Its members are soldiers through and through." Prague Lidove Noviny, 10 December 1994, p. 

3. FBIS-EEU-94-239 (13 December 1994), p. 4. In fact, in 1990 the Czech 

Armed Forces had 6,500 political instructors. In 1994 it was 2,000, and by 

the spring of 1995 it had declined to 1,600. Mlada Fronta Dnes, 13 February 

1995), p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-032 (16 February 1995), p. 9. 

40. Prague CTK, 10 October 1994. 

41. Defense Minister Vilem Holan interview, Prague Mlada Fronta, 21 

November 1994, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-94-228 (28 November 1994), p. 11. 

42. Jaroslav Spumy, "Czech Intelligence Services," Prague Respel,'t, 

13-19 February 1995, p. 10. FBIS-EEU-95-063 (3 April 1995), p. 6. The 

Czech Republic has two other h~telligence services: (1) The Security and 

Information Service (counterespionage) IBIS] was preceded by the Office 

for the Protection of the Constitution (1990) followed by the Federal 

Security Information Sen, ice (1991) and (2) The Office for Foreign 

Contacts and Information (espionage) [UZSI], was formed in 1991 and 

directly subordinate to the Minister of Interior. 

43. Prague Lidove Novi77y, 22 April 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-079 (25 

April 1995), p. 12. A similar commission was established to oversee the 

Security mad Information Service (BIS) in February. Bratislava Mosty, 28 

February 1995, p. 9. FBIS-EEU-95-077 (21 April 1995), p. 5. 

44. Prague Lidove Noz,iny, 29 December 1994, pp. 1,3. FBIS-EEU-95- 

004 (6 January 1995), pp. 5-6; also Prague Respekt, No. 1 (28 January 1995), 

p. 4. FBIS-EEU-95-O08 (12 January 1995), pp. 7-8. 

45. Vaclav Havel interview. Prague Radiozurnal Network, 29 January 

1995. FBIS-EEU-95-019 (30 January 1995), p. 6. 

46. Rockwell International won the contract for supplying on-board 
EEU94226 (23 November 1994), p. 2. 

49. Prague Hospodarske Noviny, 7 February 1995, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-9

029 (13 February 1995), p. 7. 

50. See Figure V/4, White Paper: On Defence of the Czech Republic, o

cit. 

51. Prague Respekt, 12-18 December 1994, p. 5. FBIS-EEU-94-242 (

December 1994), p. 5. 

52. Deputy Defense Minister Miroslav Kalousek interview. Prag

Rude Pravo, 15 March 1995, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-9&057 (24 March 1995), p. 4

53. Prague Mlada Fronta, 30 November 1994, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-94-23

(13 December 1994), p. 4. 

54. Prague Denni Telegraf, 26 April 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-103 (

May 1995), p. 17; Prague CTK, 8 June 1995. FBIS-EEU-g&112 (12 Jrm

1995), p. 12. 

55. Prague Lidove Noviny, 28 June 1995, p. 5. FBIS-EEU-95-I27 (3 Ju

1995), pp. 6-7. 

56. Prague Malda Fronta Dnes, 24 July 1995, p. 6. FBIS-EEU-95-144 (

July 1995), p. 6. 

57. Prague Denni Telegraf, 2 September 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-173 

September 1995), p. 13. 

58. Brig. Gen. Pavel Strubl interview, Prague Rude Pravo, 26 Octob

1995, pp. 1,4. FBIS-EEU-95-218 (13 November 1995), pp. 14-15. 

59. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 2 February 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EU-96-0

(6 February 1996), p. 5. 

60. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 30 January 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-0

(2 February 1996), p. 7. 

61. Prague Pravo, 16 April 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-075 (17 April 199

p. 7. 

62. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 21 March 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-0

(25 March 1996), p. 5. 

63. Prague Pravo, 9 April 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-070 (10 April 199

p. 18. 

64. Defense Minister Vilem Holan interview, Prague Mlady Svet, 
May 1996), p. 11. 

68. Prague Denni Telegraf, 3 May 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96-089 (7 May 

1996), p. 14. 

69. Armadni Rocenka: 1995 (Praha: Ministerstvo obrany CR, 1996), 

p. 38. 

70. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 22 May 1995. FBIS-EEU-95- 

098 (22 May 1995), p. 6. 

71. Defense Minister Vilem Holan, Mlada Fronta Dnes, 4 September 

1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-173 (7 September 1995), p. 14. 

72. Defense Mh~ister Vilem Holan interview, Denni Telegraf, 11 May 

1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU~96-095 (15 May 1996), p. 17. 

73. Vaclav Smejkal, "Where Are the Four Wheels of the Army 

Headed?" Prague Ekonom (January 1995), pp. 27-32. 

74. Prague Lidove Noviny, 20 April 1996, p. 5. FBIS-EEU-96-079 (23 

April 1996), p. 10. 

75. Prague Denni Telegraf, 20 April 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-080 (24 

April 1996), p. 8. 

76. General Pavel Strubl interview, Hospodarske Noviny, 22 August 

1995, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-95-205 (24 October 1995), pp. 7-8. 

77. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 18 November 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95- 

226 (25 November 1995), p. 3. 

78. Prague Denni Teleraf, 5 December 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-236 (8 

December 1995), p. 9. 

79. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 5 December 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95- 

235 (7 December 1995), p. 5. 

80. Prague Hospodarske Noviny, 28 February 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96 - 

041 (29 February 1996), p. 5. 

81. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 19 September 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95- 

192 (4 October 1995), p. 9. The article also noted that under the new system now the Defense Ministry could decide on its own whether to 

employ secretaries in its offices. Until now, it had to request the Chief of 

the General Staff to appoint them. 
85. Prague CTK, 27 September 1995. 

86. First Deputy Defense Minister Petr Necas interview; Pragu

Lidove Noviny, 27 September 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-196 (11 Octobe

1995), p. 4. 

87. Prague Hospodarske Noviny, 19 September 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-9

218 (13 November 1995), p. 14. 

88. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 27 January 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96-02

(2 February 1996), p. 6. 

89. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 13 October 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95-20

(19 October 1995), p. 14; Mlada Fronta Dnes, 9 November 1995, p. 4. FBI

EEU-95-219 (14 November 1995), pp. 13-15. 

90. Prague Hospodarske Noviny, 16 November 1995, p. 2. 

91. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 8 April 1996. FBIS-EEU-9

070 (10 April 1996), p. 18. 

92. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 1 November 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-9

216 (8 November 1995), p. 14. 

93. Prague CTK, 22 December 1995. FBIS-EEU-96-O01 (2 Januar

1996), pp. 16-17. 

94. Prague CTK, 10 January 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-OlI (17 January 1996

p. 14; Mlada Fronta Dnes, 23 February 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96-041 (2

February 1996), p. 5. 

95. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 2 March 1996, pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU-96-04

(6 March 1996), pp. 6-7. 

96. Prague Lidove Noviny, 14 March 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-053 (

March 1996), p. 8. 

97. First Deputy Defez~e ,Minister Petr Necas h~terview, Pragu

Pravo, 13 April 1996, pp. 1,4. FBIS-EEU-96-075 (17 April 1996), p. 5. 

98. Prague CTA, 16 April 1996 and D¢,~ni Telegraf, 20 April 1996, p. 

FBIS-EEU-96-080 (24 April 1996), p. 8 and 13. 

99. Defense Minister Vilem Holan/J~terview, Prague Denni Telegraf, 

May 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-095 (15 May 1996), p. 17; Prague Tyden (

May 1996), No. 20, pp. 18-20. FBIS-EEU-96-096 (16 May 1996), pp. 10-1

100. Prague Prague Post (5-11 Jtme 1996), No. 23, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-9
(11 January 1996), p. 12. 

104. General Nekvasil in a meeting with Slovak counterpart General 

Tuchyna admitted that there were almost one-tlxird fewer than the 

planned 65,000 soldiers in the Czech forces. OMR/Daily Digest (21 March 

1996), p. 4. 

105. Prague CTK, 19 December 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-247 (26 December 

1995), pp. 6-7. 

106. Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus interview, Prague Lidove Noviny, 5 

January 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-O08 (11 January 1996), pp. 10-11; OMR/ 

Daily Digest (4 January 1996), p. 4. 

107. Prague Lidove Noviny, 19 January 1996, p. 5. FBIS-EEU-96-016 (24 

January 1996), p. 10. 

108. Vilem Holan interview, Prague Lidove Noviny, 11 March 1996, 

p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-050 (13 March 1996), p. 14. 

109. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 9 March 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-049 

(12 March 1996), p. 5. 

110. Prague Denni Telegraf, 11 April 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-072 (12 

April 1996), p. 10. 

111. Prague Mlada Fronta Dries, 23 April 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-081 

(25 April 1996), p. 6. 

112. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 24 April 1996, p. 12. FBIS-EEU-96-082 

(26 April 1996), p. 11. It appears from public opinion polls among Army 

officers, most support the Social Democratic Party (CSSD). Prague Lidove 

Noviny, 13 June 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96-116 (14 June 1996), p. 16. 

113. Prague Denni Telegraf, 30 April 1996, pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU-96-088 (6 

May 1996), p. 6. 

114. Prague Mlada Fronta Dries, 20 June 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-122 

(24 Juice 1996), p. 13. 

115. President Vaclav Havel interview, Mlada Fronta Dries, 29 April 

1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-085 (3 May 1995), p. 11. 

116. Karel Pezl noted that two-thirds of the 1,000-troop UNPROFOR 

unit consisted of reservists. General Karel Pezl interview, Prague Tyden, 

No. 25 (19 June 1995), pp. 32-35. FBIS-EEU-95-125 (29 June 1995), p. 4. 
g, 

EEU-95-203 (20 October 1995), p. 8. 

121. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 16 March 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96-054 

(19 March 1996), p. 4. 

122. Prague CTK, 23 October 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-208 (27 Octobe

1995), p. 16. 

123. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 17 November 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95 

225 (22 November 1995), p. 7. 

124. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 7 December 1995. FBIS

EEU-95-236 (8 December 1995), p. 8. 

125. Prague CTA, 25 January 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-019 (29 January 

19956), pp. 4-5. 

126. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 22 April 1996, p. 8. FBIS-EEU-96-081 

(25 April 1996), pp. 5-6. 

127. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 20 April 1996, p. 9. FBIS-EEU-96-08

(24 April 1996), p. 7. 

128. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 13 May 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-094 

(14 may 1996), p. 10. 

129. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 24 May 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-103 

(28 May 1996), p. 13. 

130. Maj. Gen. Rostislav Kotil, personal interview, 25 July 1996. 

131. Prague Respekt (3-9 June 1996), No. 23, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-96-112 (1

June 1996), p. 17. 

132. Prague Denni Teleg~'af, 8 June 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-I13 (11 Jun

1996), p. 11; Prague Pravo, 4 July, 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-130 (5 July 1996)

p. 7. 

133. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 24 October 1995, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-95

207 (26 October 1995), p. 9. 

134. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 15 March 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96-05

(20 March 1996), p. 4. 

135. Mlada Fronta Dnes, 5 February 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96-026 (

February 1996), p. 8. 
(24 May 1996), p. 6. 

140. Prague Hospodarske Noviny, 4 June 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-110 (6 

June 1996), p. 12. 

141. Prague Pravo, 28 Ju~e 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-129 (3 July 1996), 

pp. 11-17. 

142. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 4 July 1996. FBIS-EEU-96- 

130 (5 July 1996), p. 8. 

143. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 8 July 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-132 (9 

July 1996), p. 10. 

144. Prague Lidove Noviny, 2 July 1996, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-96-130 (5 July 

1996), p. 7. 

145. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 1 July 1996, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-96-129 (3 

July 1996), p. 9. 

146. The Defense and Security Committee staff includes two typists 

and one executive secretary. 

S lovakia is the only Central European state that really had to 

build its institutions from scratch because of its long history as 

part of Chechoslovakia with a government based in Prague. 

The Slovak National Council approved the Slovak Constitution on 1 September 1992 by the necessary three-fifths majority 

(114 of 150). 1 It was signed by Slovak Parliament chairman Ivan 

Gasparovic and Premier Meciar on 3 September. By its introductory words, "We, the Slovak nation," the nine-chapter, 155-article 

Slovak Constitution stresses national rather than civil aspects of 

citizenship2 and outlines the Slovak government. The unicameral 

National Council has 150 delegates elected for four-year terms (see 

Table 8.1 below). The president, elected by three-fifths of the 

deputies, serves for a five-year term and is the national command 

authority. The government--prime minister, deputies, and ministers--is appointed and recalled by the president, who also 

appoints judges to the Constitutional Court for 7-year terms. 3 

In contrast to the Czech Republic, which elected Vaclav Havel 

on the first ballot, it took the Slovaks many weeks and a number of 

ballots to elect Michal Kovac president on 15 February 1993. 

(Alexander Dubcek, the leading presidential candidate had been 

fatally injured in an automobile accident.) Kovac, one of the 

Movement for Democratic Slovakia's (HZDS) co-founders, won 

votes from 106 deputies, and he was inaugurated on 2 March 

1993. 4 

253 
M. Kovac 

I State Defense 

Council/NSC 

COUNCIL 

(15o) 

Elections 

(6/92) I. Andrejcak (3/93) 

P. Kanis (3/94) 

i 

I Defense Minister I 

I 

I I. Urban (1/93) 

Lt. Gen. J. Humaj Maj. Gen. A. Sabol (3/94) 

I l 

I Commander State Secretary I 

of the Army of Defense 

On 16 December 1992, the Slovak National Council had 

approved the creation of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republi

(with about 47,000 troops) and a new defense ministry. The Slova

Constitution binds the armed forces to maintain all treaties and 

agreements made by the Czechoslovak Federal Republic (CSFR)

All Slovaks (including those who had served in the Czechoslovak 

Army) had to swear allegiance to Slovakia by 31 January 1993, i

they wished to serve in the new Slovak Army. 

The first Meciar government (January 1993-March 1994)

Almost immediately, disputes within the governing Movement fo

a Democratic Slovakia dominated constitutional politics. I

January a personal conflict arose between two of the movement'
limits the authority to remove a cabinet member only to the president. But it also suggests that the President ought to so act at the 

request of the prime minister or if the Parliament withdraws its 

confidence. President Kovac, therefore, announced on 10 March 

that he would turn to the Constitutional Court to determine ff he 

was obliged to fire Knazko. When Meciar threatened to resign 

unless Knazko was removed, Kovac removed Knazko without 

waiting for a Court ruling, and he appointed Jozef Moravcik 

foreign minister on 19 March 1993. Ironically, on 2 June 1993 the 

Constitutional Court ruled that, according to Article 116.4 of the 

Constitution, the president has no duty to accept a prime ministerial motion of dismissal of a minister. Though Kovac had already 

fired Knazko, the decision did serve as a final interpretation of the 

vague constitutional article. 

Knazko, stealing away 7 of the HZDS's 74 members in the 150- 

seat National Council, then formed a parliamentary caucus of his 

own--a new Alliance of Slovak Democrats (ADS). On 19 March, 

Ludovit Cernak, Chairman of the Slovak National Party (SNS), 

also bolted the HZDS coalition, allegedly in protest over Imrich 

Andrejcak's appointment as defense minister. As a result, Meciar 

was now in a minority with 66 seats. Throughout June he attempted to create a new alliance with the SNS (which would bring his 

total to 81 seats), but the discussions broke down. The failure of 

coalition talks further threatened early elections. 

Not until 19 October 1993 was Meciar able to form a coalition 

with Ludovit Cernak, leader of the SNS---the new HZDS-SNS 

coalition holding 80 of the 150 parliament seats. After two weeks 

of negotiation, Meciar submitted a list of 7 proposed ministers to 

President Kovac on 5 November, but Kovac accepted the nomina- 
appointed General Imrich Andrejcak, former CSFR defense minister, as Slovakia's new defense minister. At the end of May, the 

government approved a bill that created a National Security 

Council to replace the State Defense Council.S 

The Army's most urgent task was to create an Army of the 

Slovak Republic, which meant redeploying troops, which, in turn, 

required the construction of apartments for officers and families

transformation of the military educational system, and preparation of military doctrine--in short, creation of an Army compatible 

with Western-style military systems. 

Almost a year later, on 1 March 1994, the Slovak government 

approved two key documents: The first, "'Principles of Slovakia's 

National Security" confirmed Parliament's civil control of the military by establishing the Republic's national defense system; the 

second,"Slovak Republic's Defense Doctrine," committed Slovakia to 

international agreements limiting forces and arms, emphasized 

maintaining good neighbor relations, and expressed interest in 

johdng NATO and the WEU. 6 

Ethnic Issues. Disputes with its Hungarian minority had a 

negative impact on Slovakia's international image. In June 1992 

Hungarian deputies to the Slovak National Council had boycotted 

the vote on the new Constitution because they felt it failed to 

protect the rights of ethnic minorities; and in December they had 

cited numerous violations of Hungarian rights in Slovakia, further 

straining relations with neighboring Hungary. By April 1993 

Meciar, wanting to enter the Council of Europe, indicated his 

willingness to amend the Constitution if necessary and set up an 

independent watchdog commission on human rights. In addition, 

Slovakian-Hungarian interstate relations had been frayed over the 
in Komarno to declare a self-governing province in the region 

where a significant Hungarian ethnic minority resided. ~ 

Continuing Political Instability. Despite the tentative 19 

October 1993 coalition agreement, further turmoil characterized 

the last months of 1993 and early 1994. Tension in the HZDS-SNS 

coalition escalated in December when Meciar delivered a highly 

controversial speech behind closed doors to HZDS party followers. He called for early elections (in June 1994) and criticized SNS 

coalition partners. When the speech leaked to the press, it caused 

domestic political turmoil. The months of political wrangling led 

to the creation of a faction--the Alternative of Political Realism 

(APR)--within the HZDS. Backed by Deputy Prime Minister 

Roman Kovac and Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik plus nine 

other deputies, the APR's goal was to form a government coalition 

without Meciar. These efforts resulted in the March 1994 dismissa

of Kovac and Moravcik from the HZDS and their resignation from 

the cabinet. 

As a result Meciar now led a minority government, and he 

began to push for elections in June. Though the Parliament reject

ed the idea as impractical, Meciar began to collect 350,000 signa

tures (under Article 95 of the Constitution) to call a referendum fo

early elections and to dismiss those deputies who had switched 

party affiliation after the last election. President Michal Kovac

deciding that he could not call a referendum on dismissing 

deputies who had changed their party affiliation, in a 9 March 

speech to Parliament criticized Meciar and his government as inef

ficient and incompetent. After two days of stormy debate, Parli

ament toppled the prime minister in a vote of no-confidence on 1

March 1994. 8 On 16 March President Kovac announced tha
in the new state naming Pavol Kanis (of the Party of the 

Democratic Left) the first defense minister with civilian background, (and Maj. Gen. Andrej Sabol as defense state secretary.) 

During the Spring of 1994 one major issue was the need to eliminate tensions between the defense ministry in Bratislava and the 

Army Command in Trencin, tensions that existed in part, because 

the Army Command had been established first, and in part 

because of differing political and military responsibilities between 

the Army Command and the defense ministry.9 

The new Moravcik government initiated significant changes in 

Slovakia's defense and security policy, reworking the draft Slovak 

Republic's Defense Doc~ine, which had been approved in March 

1994, amended on the basis of discussions with the parliamentary 

committee, then approved by the National Council on 30 June 

1994J 0 Defense Minister Kanis noted that the new revised Slovak 

Defense Doctrine placed greater emphasis on Slovakia's developing closer relations with European and transatlantic security structures; it stressed the WEU's Associate Partnership program 11 and 

clearly stated that Slovakia's fundamental orientation was to 

obtain full NATO membership. Participation in NATO's North 

Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership For Peace 

(Slovakia signed its Presentation Document on 25 May 1994) was 

the means to achieve this objective, la Although former Defense 

Minister Imrich Andrejcak was a strong supporter of NATO integration, he criticized Kanis' changes to Slovakia's PFP Presentation 

Document as being too expensive, arguing that the defense 

ministry would now have to spend 4.5 percent of its budget rather 

than the one percent originally envisaged. 13 

Another change was the recognition that creating a separate 
y 

is subordinate to the defense minister but appointed (and recalled) 

by the president at the defense minister's recommendation. 

Then Defense Minister Kanis announced that as of 1 September 1994 both the defense ministry and Army High Command (to 

be renamed the General Staff) would be restructured and signifi

cantly reduced in size to prevent overlap and inefficiency. The new 

defense ministry would have 20 generals and 143 colonels, as 

against 31 and 354; its total work force would be roughly 300. The 

Army Headquarters would reduce from 31 generals and 359 

colonels to a General Staff of 14 generals and 233 colonels; its total 

number of employees would be roughly 400. is The new defense 

ministry, in addition to a Defense Mh~istry Office and Inspectorate

would comprise five sections: Defense Policy and Army Development (Maj. Gen. J. Pancik, replaced in early 1996 by Col. Milan 

Stranava), Logistics (Maj. Gen. Leopold Bilcik), Economic Policy 

(Col. Jozef Zadzora), Foreign Relations (Col. Ludovit Gal), and 

Social and Humanitarian Affairs (Col. Petr Bartak, replaced in 

December 1994 by Col. Milan Stegena). ~6 On 1 September, Col

Gen. Jozef Tuchyna, adviser to the defense minister and former 

interior minister, became the new chief of General Staff, with 

General Humaj as his deputy. 17 

Buildin. g a new Army would be very expensive. During 1994 

Slovakia (like Hungary, but in marked contrast to the Czech 

Republic) had acquired 6 additional Russian MIG-29s (worth $180 

million) as part of the Russian debt to Slovakia to supplement it

original inventory of 10. In a 26 October press conference Chief o

Staff Tuchyna argued that the Slovak Army would need more than 

19 billion Slovak crowns ($600 million) in 1995 (more than twice it

budget of 9.9 billion crowns in 1994) to cover shortfalls of the 
Jan Cmilansky to command the 2nd Army Corps, and Colonel 

Jozef Pivarci to command the 3rd Air Force and Air Defense 

Corps. 20 Defense Minister Pavol Kanis added that it would also be 

necessary to develop a modern system of management and 

corrunand within the headquarters and Slovak Army during 

1995.21 

The new Moravcik-coalition government also attempted to 

moderate outstanding ethnic tensions. The National Council 

passed a bill on women's surnames (Hungarian women would not 

have to add the Slovak suffix "ova" to their last name) in May, and 

another in July requiring bilingual road signs in towns where at 

least 20 percent of the residents are of an ethnic minority in July. 

Preparation for the new elections also required changes in the 

electoral law to prevent debilitating fragmentation (at the time 64 

political parties). The electoral law set a 5 percent threshold for 

political parties; 7 percent for coalitions of 2 or 3 parties; and 10 

percent for coalitions of 4 or more parties. 

When the elections were held on 30 September-1 October 1994, 

seven parties returned to Parliament. Meciar's Movement for a 

Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) in coalition with the Slovak Farmers' 

Party gained the largest number of votes. 22 (See Figure 8.1) 

Before the election, the Moravcik-coalition government with 

Hungarian parties held 85 seats in the 150-seat National Council; 

after the election it had only 68. Therefore President Kovac, who 

had not met with Vladimir Meciar since February 1994, asked 

Meciar (whose HZDS had 61 seats) to try to form a government on 

27 October. aa When Prime Minister Moravcik submitted his resignation to President Kovac on 3 November, Kovac asked him to 

carry on until Meciar could form a new government. But forming 
y 

Movement for a Democratic 

Slovakia(HZDS)/Slovak Agrarian 

Party (Coalition) (Meciar) 

61 34.96 

Common Choice 

(A coalition of 

4 left-wing parties) 

18 10.41 

Hungarian Coalition 17 10.18 

Christian Democrats 17 10.08 

Democratic Union 15 8.57 

(Moravcik) 

Association of Workers (ASW) 13 7.34 

Slovak National Party (SNS) 9 5.40 

a government would prove to be more difficult and time consuming than originally imagined, complicated by Prime Ministerdesignate Meciar's statement that he would announce a new cabinet only after the Parliament had debated the new budget on 

12-13 December 1994. 

Meciar's Return (December 1994-Present). On 11 December

Meciar signed a coalition agreement with the extreme-right Slovak 

National Party (SNS) and the left-wing Association of Slovak 

Workers (ASW). The Slovak Agrarian Party, an HZDS-sateUite

also joined the coalition. Together the four parties held 83 seats o

the 150-seat Parliament. 24 When Meciar announced the new 

government on 13 December, it included Jan Sitek (SNS) as 
Table 8.2 Slovak Defense Reform, 1994 

President NATIONAL I 

M. Kovac COUNCIL 

National Security I 

Counc I I 

Elections 

(10/94) 

I 

Def. Pol. 

& Ar. Dev. 

Maj. Gen. 

Pancik 

I 

Logistics 

Maj. Gen. 

Bilcik 

J. Gajdos 

(12/94) 

I State Secretary I of Defense 

Economic I Policy 

Col. Zadzora 

J. Moravcik (3/94) 

Vo Meciar (12/94) 

I Premier I 

P. Kanis (3/94) 

J. Sitek (12/94) 

I 

Defense Minister 

I I 

Relations Hum. Af. I 

Col. Gal Col. Bartak I 

CofS J. Tuchyna 

Dep. CofS J. Humaj 

! 

I GeneraIStaff I (9/94) 
people) to be cut from 127 to 60, by noting that the National 

Defense Council had a total of only 120 staff members, as In 

February 1995, Meciar again reduced the President's Office budget 

to Sk9.75 million (from Sk12.5 million) rendering it unable to 

provide severance pay to those employees it had released. Jan 

Klepac of the President's Office warned that Meciar was setting a 

Catch-22 "trap" for, if the Office did not pay severance, it would 

violate the labor law and if it did pay severance, it would violate 

the budget law. 26 

Second, Prime Minister Meciar indicated that he would like 

either increased gov.ernmental powers or adoption of a presidential model whereby the citizens would directly elect the president

President Kovac, on the other hand, was opposed to changing the 

Constitution. 

Third, Meciar proposed and the National Council passed a 

so-called jurisdiction law on 10 March 1995 that would endow 

state secretaries with the rights and duties of Cabinet ministers in 

their absence. 27 President Kovac vetoed the bill as not being in 

conformity with the Constitution, but the National Council over

rode his veto on 6 April 1995. 2B 

The Prime Minister argued in the National Council that since 

its creation the Slovak Information Service (SIS) had opposed his 

HZDS party and had shadowed him, that President Kovac was 

cognizant of that fact, and that Parliament should therefore cal

Kovac to task. 29 Jan Findra, head of the President's Office, called 

Meciar's address "a pitiful example of how presumptions and 

disinformation can be confused with incontestable reality o

facts"...[and accused Meciar of] setting up illegal parallel intelli

gence structures aimed at the president as well as others, s° 
Privatization Minister in the first Meciar government--became the 

new SIS director.32 

President Kovac also returned to Parliament a Law on the 

Slovak Information Service that called for creating a Specia

Supervisory Body (OKO) in the National Council because the 

OKO did not include representatives from the opposition to monitor the SIS. The National Council overturned the President's veto 

by a vote of 81 of the 150 deputies. 33 As bound by law, Kovac 

signed the SIS law on 11 April 1995. 

On 5 May 1995, when the National Council heard HZDS 

deputy Igor Urban's report on SIS activities, it declared that there 

was proof the SIS had overstepped the law during the Moravcik 

period and that President Kovac had been continuously informed

Then 80 deputies voted a resolution of no confidence, which 

President Kovac rejected as unconstitutional. ~ 

Events in Slovakia were then influenced--for a time--by the 

1 July 1995, visit of Pope John Paul II to Bratislava. On this occa

sion Kovac and Meciar shook hands, and on 6 July Kovac insisted 

that his handshake had been a sincere effort at reconciliation, but 

that the responsibility remained Meciar's. President Kovac, did

however, express concern about two weaknesses in the Slovak 

Constitution. First, in the event of a government crisis, there is no 

simpler solution but to call new elections, which requires 60 

percent (or 90) of the National Council's deputies. But if 60 percen

cannot be reached, the President does not have the power to call for 

elections. Second, although the President can return bills to the 

National Council, the National Council can override the bill by the 

same number of votes. No higher quorum is necessary as in other 

countries. The result has been an important limitation of presiden- 
g

On 30 August, President Kovac's son, Michal Jr., was abducted 

from Slovakia, roughed up, and taken to Austria where he was 

detained by Austrian authorities on the basis of an internationa

warrant in Germany in connection with an embezzlement case

After a September 4 interview where President Kovac accused 

Prime Minister Meciar and Slovak Information Service (SIS

Director Ivan Lexa of having attempted to initiate criminal proceedings against his son, the Cabinet invited the President to 

attend a special meeting in connection with the interview. When 

Kovac refused, the Government on 19 September called on the 

President to resign. Kovac refused. 

When Major Peter Vacok, a Bratislava Police Departmen

investigator of Michal Kovac Jr.'s abduction, publicly expressed 

suspicion that SIS equipment and certain SIS employees were 

involved, a6 a conflict erupted between the police and the intelli

gence service. Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek was quoted as 

saying that responsibility for adjudicating the conflict should lie 

with the prosecutor general and not with him. 37 

The opposition parties--Democratic Union, Christian 

Democratic Movement, and coalition of Hungarian parties-- 

attempted unsuccessfully to convene an extraordinary session o

the National Council to deal with this conflict between the SIS and 

police. Of the 141 MPs present, 62 voted to convene the session, 69 

voted against, 9 abstained, and one did not vote. 

After British Foreign Minister Malcolm Rifkind expressed con

cern about Slovak political developments to Foreign Ministe

Schenk, the European Union handed Prime Minister Meciar a 

demarche on 25 October expressing-"concern [with] the presen

political and institutional tension existing in the country...and 
gpp

Euro-Atlantic integration were being threatened. 40 

The political feud also carried over into the 1996 budget

President Kovac had declining budgets of Sk 159.9 million in 1994

Sk 121.4 million in 1995, and Sk 99.9 million in 1996. Meciar'

Office of the Government on the other hand received Sk 118.5 mil

lion in 1994, Sk 150.4 million in 1995, and Sk 422.9 million i

1996. 41 This forced President Kovac to reduce his staff from 95 t

65 between 1994 and 1995, and would require another reduction o

10 in 1996. 42 The SIS was another major winner; its budget jumpe

from Sk 516.5 million in 1995 to Sk 759.6 million in 1996. 43 

In early February 1996, former Interior Minister and Christia

Democratic Movement deputy Ladislav Pittner noted that becaus

the opposition was not represented in the Special Supervisor

Body (OKO), he felt the need to turn to the Prime Minister abou

problems with Ivan Lexa and the SIS and have the SIS come unde

the opposition's supervision too. 44 An extraordinary meeting o

the OKO on 20 February ordered Ivan Lexa to submit a writte

report on the recent activity of the SIS. Though Lexa had bee

requested to submit a written report to the OKO in Novembe

1995, he had not yet done so; furthermore, at the February 20 ses

sion, Lexa only responded orally. 4s 

On 27 February, Ivan Lexa filed a libel suit against Presiden

Kovac over assertions in a Vienna court hearing about SIS involve

ment in the kidnapping of his son Michal, Jr. At the same time, 

became public that the SIS had begun an investigation of all th

President's speeches and public pronouncements since 1993. 4

Frustrated with official foot-dragging, Pittner launched a

independent investigation of the Michal Kovac, Jr. abduction

claiming that his evidence pointed to SIS participation. 47 
When SIS Director Ivan Lexa presented his side to the Nationa

CouncilS0 on 22 May, he was booed by the opposition. The nex

day the President's Office issued a statement claiming that because 

Lexa's own report proved that the SIS had gone markedly beyond 

the activities allowed by law and had engaged in illegal activity

Lexa and Interior Minister Hudek should resign. Although the 

National Council did not pass a vote of no confidence on Hudek 

on the same day, S1 some cracks in the coalition began to appear. In 

early June, SNS Chairman Jan Slota had the SNS adopt a resolu

tion that demanded the OKO supervisory body for the SIS be 

expanded to include representatives of the opposition, s2 And in 

early June, Frantisek Gaulieder (HZDS), a member of the OKO

concluded that both Hudek and Lexa should resign, s3 

Politics in the Defense Ministry. Defense Minister Sitek 

believed that it was necessary to amend once again the Law on the 

Army No. 3/93 because of vagueness in the defense minister'

jurisdiction over the General Staff. Though the defense minister i

responsible for the military, his powers to appoint or recall func

tionaries and his links to the General Staff and ability to coordinat

their activities in Trencin remained limited. 

In May 1995, the Cabinet approved an amendment to the Law 

on the Army that stated the Army "is to be guided and it

organization secured "s4 by the defense ministry. On 23 June 199

the Parliament approved the amendment by 76 votes, ss In effec

this transferred the power of appointing and dismissing the Chie

of the General Staff from the President (who remains commander

in-chief with power to declare a state of emergency) to th

government, at the proposal of the defense minister, and th

government would be able to decide about the composition of th
July) the Parliament again voted in favor of amending the law. sz 

Shortly after taking office, Defense Minister Sitek (SNS) noted 

that he planned to create a Domobrana [Home Guard] within th

overall system of Slovakia's strategic defense. To be staffed b

former Army members and remain subordinate to the Chief o

Staff, Sitek noted that the Home Guard: "will be employed for th

protection of strategic objects in case of mobilization. ''s8 Prim

Minister Meciar began to push vigorously to establish the Hom

Guard under his direction, raising some concerns that he migh

use the Home Guard for internal security problems, s9 

As the project moved along, Defense Minister Jan Sitek me

with Norwegian Defense Minister Jorgen Kosmo for assistanc

and operational advice based on the experiences of Norway'

90,000-man Home Guard. s0 Plans emerged to have the first Hom

Guard units operational by the end of 1995. The Home Guard 

would have six mobile brigades and 37 companies comprised o

officers called up serving in the regions (District Militar

Administrations) where they live. 

According to Maj. Gen. Pancik, director of the Defens

Ministry Defense Policy and Army Development Section, durin

peacetime only the organizational cores of the brigades would 

exist with the company commanders being detailed in the regions

Only during emergency would they be called up. The units wer

to be armed with light weapons and limited to defense of th

territory of the region in which they were deployed. 

According to Jan Carnogursky, the Home Guard formatio

was a political concession to the Slovak National Party and th

Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. sl By 1 October 1995, 

Home Guard training center had been created at Zilina to trai
stated in regard to President Kovac, "I do not find anything tha

would support his authority as commander-in-chief of the Slovak 

Armed Forces. "63 Gajdos' statement publicly extended the party

political battlefield of the government against the president to the 

Defense Ministry and to the Army, which had remained publical

ly bipartisan to that point. 

Defense Ministry-General Staff Relations. As in the case o

the Czech Republic, continued restructuring of the defense 

ministry was also necessary to deal with problems of bullyin

conscripts. The defense ministry reorganized its Social and Human 

Affairs section and established a Provision and Development o

Human Resources section that is working to eliminate this prob

lem. By 1 September 1995 a chaplaincy service also was to b

working directly in the units. 64 

According to Colonel Jozef Zadzora of the Defense Ministr

Economic Policy Section, budgetary oversight, as of 1996, does no

yet exist. It is not yet possible to determine how much money i

allocated per soldier, platoon, or company; that "this will be possi

ble only next year...Double-entry bookkeeping will be introduced 

on a trial basis next year, and in 1998 it will probably be introduced 

fully."6S 

Defense Minister Jan Sitek, noting that 23,000 young men had 

refused regular military service, called on the government to adop

some legal measures because "if this continues, there will be n

one to draft.'66 In September 1995 the National Council approved 

a bill on civilian service. Now the defense ministry would organiz

alternate civilian service rather than the Ministry for Labor, Socia

Affairs, and Family. Civilians would exercise without weapons o

uniforms for 24 months, rather than 12 months and could work i
problem facing the defense ministry was the need to secure mor

than 3,000 apartments for career soldiers and civilian employees o

the Army. In fact the major capital spending in the 1996 defens

budget--Sk500 million--is to be spent on housing.60 

According to Defense Minister Sitek, the only acquisition

occurred by redemption of Russian debt. He noted, "We hav

nothing for development programs. We have to look for othe

funds to bring in the Zuzana howitzer, the modernized "£-72 tank

and other projects. ''70 The Slovaks would not modernize the

MIG-21s, but just let them finish their service life. From the sale o

surplus equipment, the Defense Ministry did recover enoug

funds to allocate an extra Sk27 million for apartments. 71 

Armed Forces Reform. The long-term (year 2000) develop

ment of the Slovak Army is to reduce Army personnel to 35,000

The plan would reduce its 10,000 officers by one-half, but increas

its 3,400 warrant officers to 10,000, and its 400 NCOs to 5,000. 7

The rest of the force will comprise conscripts, resulting in 

professional force approaching 55 percent. 

Chief of Staff Tuchyna was candid in his assessment of the 199

training year, specifically noting certain shortfalls: There had bee

"no specific improvements in the quality of the entire system o

command and control.., shortcomings [remained] in relationship

between soldiers in basic service.., regimentation and discipline a

the lowest levels of command, and housing. "73 In April 199

Tuchyna concluded that the major tasks for 1995 would be reorga

nizing regiments into brigades, that as of 15 November the arm

should have 46,667 soldiers, and that reducing basic milita

service from 24 to 12 months had increased demands on the entir

command corps. 74 
pilots assigned to staff would fly 20 hours on a jet and 20 hours on 

a trainer.TS Following the 1993 acquisition of 5 MIG-29s from 

Russia to eliminate debt, in the Fall of 1995 Slovakia announced 

that Russia, in exchange for a portion of its $1 billion debt, would 

provide another 8 MIG-29s, bringing Slovakia's total to 23. 76 

The Army of the Slovak Republic initially requested Sk19.4 

billion for 1995, which would have permitted development 

programs and investment. The second version, which would have 

covered only operating expenses and no investment, was Sk16 

billion. The final approved version earmarked only Sk12.9 billion 

($403 million), did not consider inflation, and represented only a 

survival defense budget. 

Chief of the Economic Policy section of the defense ministry 

Colonel Jozef Zadzora verified that the budget would not permit 

any development programs, z7 As a result, the defense ministry 

began considering the untraditional method of leasing (rather than 

purchasing) a number of 155-mm Zuzana howitzers from ZTS 

[Heavy Machine Tool Enterprises]. As State Secretary for Defense 

Jozef Gajdos noted, "I really do not see any other way because the 

Army has no funds. ''78 

It also became necessary to reconsider whether to extend the 

Slovak UNPROFOR engineer battalion in Yugoslavia, which had 

cost Slovakia almost Skl billion ($31.3 million) through Spring 

1995. 70 In June, defense ministry spokesman Frantisek Kasicky 

announced that Slovakia was not considering enlarging its 606

member UNPROFOR contingent because of such financia

constraints.80 

At the end of the 1995 training year, Tuchyna's assessment o

progress recognized that in the year since the General Staff had 
that the effort to issue a new Slovak Army Code of Service was ye

to be completed, aa On 1 October 1995, the second part of the firs

stage of the ground forces' reorganization was completed. Si

brigades had been set up, two of which are on a permanent stat

of alert. 83 

In assessing plans for the 1996 training year, Chief of Staf

Tuchyna noted that transformation of the Army would continu

and that commanders and staffs would be prepared to participat

in multinational forces and peace operations. He promised als

that a rapid deployment battalion would be introduced. He di

note that the problem of criminality in the forces, though reduced

needed to be analyzed and eventually eliminated. 84 In March 199

the First Higher Academic Course was inaugurated at the Slova

National Uprising Military Academy. The first class of the three

term course was attended by 14 students; brigade commander

MOD functionaries, and staff of military education establish

ments.85 

Efforts to solve many of the Slovak Army's deficiencies wer

made during 1996. During May 1996 the National Council amend

ed the Defense Law so that a member of the Slovak Army servin

in UN peacekeeping operations no longer would have to spen

two to five years in the armed forces. According to Defense an

Security Committee Chairman Imrich Andrejcak, "This was to

long a commitment, which was unsuitable. ''s6 The amendmen

reduced the amount of time to which a soldier must commit. Als

during May, for the first time in five years, training of reserves wa

renewed. During 1996, 2,036 soldiers would be recalled for 12 day

to participate in military exercises. 87 

Observing a three-day exercise of the 2nd Army Corps
Slovak Radio poll, 70.2 percent of the respondents trust the army

compared to 44.8 percent for the Prime Minister (ranking ninth

and 42.9 percent for the Government (12th). 89 

NATO Integration. At the June 1995 meeting of the NACC in 

Brussels, Defense Minister Jan Sitek announced that as of 199

Slovakia would allocate one reinforced mechanized 600-soldie

self-sufficient battalion which would be ready by the end of 1996 

for cooperation with NATO. In addition, he offered 6 MIG-29 

aircraft which would be capable of deployment within 10 days o

request. 90 

The first international military exercise "DETERMINATION-95" to 

take place in Slovakia since independence occurred 6-14 

September 1995 within the Partnership For Peace program

Soldiers from neighboring Austria, Czech Republic, Ukraine

Hungary, Romania and Slovakia participated under command o

Maj. Gen. Emil Vestenicky, who is responsible for setting up the 

professional Rapid Action unit which is garrisoned in Martin.01 

Shortly after the Study on NATO Enlargement was briefed to 

the Slovaks, Jan Slota, Chairman of the coalition's SNS partner

publicly questioned whether Slovakia should join the Allianc

because deployment of NATO nuclear weapons on its soil would 

be targeted against Russia. Slota argued that this would pose 

threat to Slovakia if it accepted this NATO condition and Slovaki

should seek neutrality. 9a This position was also supported by Jan 

Luptak, leader of the Association of Workers of Slovakia. 03 Foreign 

Minister Juraj Schenk, though, retorted that NATO entry was 

consistent goal of the government and that Slota's statements were 

"unfortunate and premature. "04 

At the 5 December 1995 NACC, Foreign Minister Schenk wel
unit would remain under UN, rather than NATO command, a

the costs would be repaid by the UN. 97 According to its comma

der, Colonel Rostislav Smehlik, the transfer of the 593-man Slov

battalion to Eastern Slavonia would be completed by mid-M

1996.9s 

On the basis of a National Council Defense and Secur

Committee initiative, the Government approved a bill that tran

ferred jurisdiction from Parliament to the government, to perm

some troop participation in peacekeeping missions and milita

exercises within and outside the framework of Partnership F

Peace for a maximum period of 30 days. 99 

Despite the 1996 defense budget squeeze, Slovakia's financ

commitment to PFP remained impressive. In 1994, the year P

was announced, Slovakia committed one percent from the defen

budget for the program. This doubled to 2 percent in 1995; a

again doubled to 4 percent in 1996. Colonel Ludovit Gal of t

Defense Ministry Foreign Affairs section noted that during 19

Slovakia would organize "CoOPERATWE DRAGON" on Slovak ter

tory and that Slovakia would participate in 11 other command a

staff exercises.100 

Western concerns about Slovakia's political system continu

to have an impact upon Slovakia's prospects for joining NAT

When the U.S. House of Representatives debated a NATO expa

sion bill that excluded Slovakia, Foreign Ministry State Secreta

Jozef Sestak noted that the "situation is serious. ''1°1 On 30 Ap

1996 when Secretary General Solana visited Bratislava he stress

that NATO is a democratic organization that "associates countr

that respect democratic values, human rights, and differenc

between ethnic minorities. ''102 
December 1995, and 19.2 percent in June 1995. l3 

Ethnic Issues. Ethnic issues also reemerged during 1995

Although the Hungarian-Slovak Treaty on Good Neighborlines

and Cooperation was signed on 19 March 1995, Hungarians rallie

again in late April in Komarno, threatening a civil disobedienc

campaign if the Meciar Cabinet did not drop its plan to introduc

bilingual education (which they saw as a new version of linguisti

imperialism) in southern Slovakia, and if it did not raise subsidie

for ethnic culture3 04 

The 15 November 1995 passage of Slovakia's Law on the Stat

Language 10s with a majority of 108 votes drew a protest from 

Hungary and a threat to raise an objection in international fora

Meciar warned: "If the Hungarian Government and Parliamen

take steps that we consider offensive, this could prolong th

ratification process. However, we will ratify the basic [Hungarian

Slovak] treaty in any case. ''1°6 On 28 November President Kova

signed the law. 

The State Language Law and resulting criticism from 

Hungarians inside Slovakia and the Hungarian Government i

Budapest had an impact on Slovakia's ratification of the Slovak

Hungarian Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Cooperation. O

30 November the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Nationa

Council refused to ratify the agreement because of reservation

concerning the inclusion of EU Parliamentary Assembl

Resolution No. 1201--that all ethnic minorities be granted th

right to autonomous bodies--in the Slovak-Hungarian treaty. 1

On 20 December 1995 the National Council decided to postpon

the debate and ratification to the next session. 108 

In January 1996, OSCE High Commissioner on Nationa
to the Constitutional Court. 

When the Slovak National Party (SNS) altered its opposition 

the Basic Treaty on the condition that the government accept dr

laws on the protection of the Republic, on the state of emergen

as well as changes in local election laws, 110 Prime Minister Mec

publicly noted that he supported their passage and that he expe

ed the Hungarian Treaty to be ratified in March 1996.111 On 

March, 119 deputies in the National Council passed the Trea

with this stipulation: "The Slovak Government fully respects

standards and norms that are based on individual civic rights as 

integral component of universal human rights. ''112 

The domestic cost of passage, though, was great. The contr

versial amendment to the Penal Code, which replaced the Law 

the Protection of the Republic and was passed on 22 March, wou

permit the arrest of people for writing or organizhlg "anti-stat

demonstrations. When the EU expressed concern on 3 April 19

that this Law could harm freedom of expression and other dem

cratic rights, Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk "express

regret over this EU manner of reaction in Slovakia's intern

affairs ,,113 President Michal Kovac refused to sign the controv

sial amendment on 9 April and sent it back to the Nation

Assembly because "the modifications contradict the Constituti

and the Dec]aration of Human Rights. "114 Rather than overridi

the President's veto, on 8 May 1996, Meciar said that the la

would not be debated again by the National Council because 

"wider public discussion" was needed to ensure that the law co

plied with international human rights conventions315 

After the Slovak National Council finally submitted the ba

Slovak-Hungarian Treaty to President Kovac on 2 May, he sign
gpp

president and of the SIS was evident at the sixth HZDS National 

Assembly session in March 1996. Meciar now announced that he 

did not want to change some Constitutional articles, but to revise 

the entire Slovak Constitution opening the question of whether 

Slovakia should have a presidential, parliamentary or chancellor's 

system.117 It appears that Meciar is leading Slovakia down a path 

fraught with dangers not unlike those evident in Poland under 

Walesa. 

Conclusion 

Slovakia's defense reform has been hampered by politica

instability that resulted in three governments and three defense 

ministers in three and one-half years. Slovakia's defense reform 

differs from the other Central European states in that Slovakia had 

to create defense institutions from scratch. Though initially slow in 

starting in the first Meciar government, the Moravcik coalition

government did initiate significant defense and military reforms

which continued under the new Meciar-coalition government. Bu

defense and military reforms have really become subordinate to 

other, more significant issues that ultimately threaten Slovakia'

effort to establish democratic control. 

First, and most prominent, are the prevailing Constitutiona

issues. The Slovak Constitution's stress on nationality versus civi

rights has contributed to problems with Slovakia's Hungarian 

minority. This civil rights issue emerged initially by the Hungarian 

minority boycott of the new Constitution in June 1992 and has 

been manifest in the long tortuous road toward ratification of the 

Good Neighborliness Treaty between Hungary and Slovakia. I
j

Government crisis, it is useful to have the power to call for new 

elections. But the President does not have the power to call for new 

elections unless he can ge t 60 percent (90) of the National Counci

deputies to support him. 

Another major weakness of the Constitution has been th

manner in which the President can return bills to the Nationa

Council, and the way the Council can then continuously overrid

his veto with no higher quorum necessary. In effect, Prim

Minister Meciar has used this deficiency to dismantle th

Constitution by undermining the powers of the President. On

glaring example was the June 1995 amendment that removed th

President's power to appoint and dismiss the Chief of Genera

Staff giving it to the Government. In short, not only has the powe

of the President been thoroughly undermined, but Meciar has now 

raised the issue of perhaps writing an entirely new Constitution. I

sum, the respect for law and tolerance of opposition remains i

defined and poorly developed in Slovakia. 

The National Council has been active, and its Defense an

Security Committee of 12 members has experience and expertise

The Committee is headed by former Defense Minister Imric

Andrejcak (HZDS), and also comprises former Defense Ministe

Pavol Kanis, State Secretary Igor Urban, and Danko, head of th

Office of the Defense Ministry under Andrejcak. The Nationa

Council's Special Supervisory Body (OKO), which oversees an

monitors the Slovak Information Service (SIS), though, does no

include opposition members. This is a fundamental weaknes

especially because of the allegations of HZDS manipulation of th

SIS for political purposes. How the opposition will resolve thi

problem remains unclear. 
that the Command was not workable and would be transformed 

into a General Staff in September 1994. 

Although the Defense Ministry was structured in September 

1994 to include five sections, it has yet to develop a modern system 

of management. Additional restructuring and differentiation was 

necessary to deal with significant social problems, such as the need 

for officers' housing units, problems related to the bullying o

conscripts, and the desire to provide alternate civilian service. In 

1995, for example, 23,000 conscripts refused to serve thus threatening the viability of the forces. 

Concerns about politicization have been evident in the Defense 

Ministry. State Secretary Gajdos (HZDS) competes with Defense 

Minister Sitek (SNS) for influence within the ministry and on 

policy (regarding the role of the Home Guard, NATO, and Russia)

He has publicly questioned the President's capacity as commander-in-chief. 

Transformation of the Army Command to General Staff was 

important and necessary, but its continued presence in Trencin and 

separation from the defense ministry in Bratislava is hampering 

coordination and defense ministry oversight. Though the military 

(as in Poland) enjoys high respect in Slovak society, military readi

ness and modernization have a long way to go to meet NATO stan

dards. Modernization has been non-existent, except for the acqui

sition of MIG-29s in settlement of Russian debt. MIG-21s will be 

used until they reach the end of their service life, but creative 

efforts have been devised to "rent" some equipment from Slovak 

defense industry. Of the Sk13.6 billion 1996 defense budget, the 

major capital expenditure (Sk500 million) will go for military 

housing units. 

Nevertheless, the major stumbling block to Slovakia's candi
ppy y py 
1. Prague CSTK, 1 September 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-171 (2 September 

1992), p. 4. 

2. For example, Article 34.3 exemplifies that what applies to one 

group does not apply to another. According to it, if a nationally homogenous territory is formed, its right of self-determination is constitutionally 

outlawed. See, Pavol Hollander, "The New Slovak Co~xstitution: A 

Critique," East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Fall 1992)

pp. 16-17. 

3. Constitution of the Slovak Republic, Hospodarske Noviny, 8 

September 1992, pp. 15-18. FBIS-EEU-92-179-S (15 September 1992)

pp. 1-16. 

4. Prague CTK, 15 February 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-029 (16 February 

1993), p. 17. 

5. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko, 25 May 1993. FBIS-EEU93-100 (26 May 1993), p. 13. 

6. For text, see Bratislava Informacny Bulletin, No. 35/94, pp. 1-11

FBIS-EEU-94-053 (18 March 1994), pp. 9-13. 

7. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica, 8 January 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-O07 

(11 January 1994), pp. 10-11. 

8. With many deputies absent, and 56 HZDS-SNS coalition members 

abstaining, 78 of 150 supported the ouster. Prague CTK, 11 March 1994

FBIS-EEU-94-049 (14 March 1994), pp. 11-12. 

9. Pavol Kanis 31 March 1994 speech, Trencin. Bratislava Pravda, 2 

April 1994, p. 2. 

10. Defense Doctrine of the Slovak Republic text, Bratislava Slove~ska 

Republika, 11 October 1994, p. 10. FBIS-EEU-94-200 (17 October 1994), p. 8

11. As of 9 May 1994 Slovakia began to participate on the WEU 

Council and working group. 

12. Pavol Kanis 24 May 1994 interview, Bratislava Rozhlasova 

Stanica. FBIS-EEU-94-101 (25 May 1994), p. 6. 

13. Prague CTK, 1 June 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-106 (2 June 1994), p. 14. 

14. Bratislava Pravda, 3 June 1994, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-94-110 (8 June 1994)

p. 12. 
September 1994), p. 14. 

18. Bratislava SME, 27 October 1994, pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU-94-216 (8 

November 1994), p. 18. 

19. Bratislava Pravda, 27 October 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-216 (8 November 

1994), p. 17. 

20. Bratislava Pravda, 2 November 1994, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-94-218 (10 

November 1994), p. 15. 

21. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica, 22 November 1994. FBIS-EEU-94- 

226 (23 November 1994), p. 12. 

22. Bratislava Naro&~a Obroda, 3 October 1994, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-94-193 

(5 October 1994), pp. 10-11. 

23. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica, 27 October 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-209 

(28 October 1994), p. 10. 

24. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica, 11 December 1994. FBIS-EEU-94- 

238 (12 December 1994), p. 11. 

25. Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar interview, Bratislava Rozhlasova 

Stmlica, 30 December 1994. FBIS-EEU-945-O01 (3 January 1995), pp. 9-10

26. Bratislava SME, 23 February 1995, pp. 1,2. FBIS-EEU-9&041 (2 

March 1995), p. 14. 

27. Jozef Gajdos (HZDS) became Defense Ministry State Secretary in 

December 1994 and reflected Meciar's influence in the defense ministry. 

28. Bratislava SME, 25 March 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95-061 (30 March 

1995), p. 9; Open Media Resarch Institute (OMRI) Daily Digest, 7 April 1995

p. 4. 

29. Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar address, Bratislava STV 1, 5 Apri

1995. FBIS-EEU-95-066 (6 April 1995), pp. 9-10. 

30. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica, 6 April 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-067, 7 

April 1995, pp. 8-9. 

31. President Michal Kovac 11 May interview, Bratislava Narodna 

Obroda, 12 May 1995, pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU-95-094 (16 May 1995), p. 12. 

32. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 18 April 1995. FBIS-EEU-95- 

075 (19 April 1995), p. 7. 

33. Bratislava Narodna Obroda, 6 April 1995, pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU-95-069 
September 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-191 (3 October 1995), pp. 9-10. 

37. Ludovit Cernak interview, Bratislava Narodna Obroda, 14 October 

1995, p. 9. FBIS-EEU-95-201 (18 October 1995), p. 14. 

38. For Full Text of 25 October 1995 demarche, see Bratislava Slovenska 

Republika, 8 November 1995, p. 6. FBIS-EEU-95-218 (13 November 1995)

p. 19. 

39. Bratislava SME, 30 October 1995, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-95-211 (1 

November 1995), pp. 11-12. 

40. Jozef Moravcik interview, Bratislava Pravda, 3 November 1995

pp. 1,4. FBIS-EEU-95-216 (8 November 1995), p. 15. 

41. Bratislava Narodna Obroda, 7 November 1995, p. 2. The Czech 

Government showed a reverse pattern. Havel's Office of the President 

received Kc 290 million in 1995, and 307 million in 1996. Klaus's Office of 

the Government operated on a budget of Kc 232 million in 1995 and 

Kc215 million in 1996. FBIS-EEU-95-218 (13 November 1995), p. 25. 

42. Michal Kovac interview, London Financial Times, 20 December 

1995, p. 2. 

43. Bratislava SME, 15 November 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-222 (17 

November 1995), p. 9. 

44. Ladislav Pittner interview, Bratislava SME, 9 February 1996

pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU-96-031 (14 February 1996), p. 8. 

45. Bratislava Narodna Obroda, 27 February 1996, pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU96-041 (29 February 1996), p. 8. 

46. Bratislava SME, 28 February 1996, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-96-043 (4 March 

1996), p. 13. 

47. OMR/Daily Digest, 5 March 1996, p. 4. 

48. Bratislava Narodna Obroda, 15 May 1996, p. 5. FBIS-EEU-96-097 (17 

May 1996), pp. 16-20. 

49. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica, 20 May 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-099 (21 

May 1996), p. 16. 

50. "Report on the Work of the Slovak Information Service," deliv

ered by SIS Director Ivan Lexa. Bratislava Slovenska Republika, 23 May 

1996, pp. 8-9. FBIS-EEU-96-104 (19 May 1996), pp. 12-20. 
54. Prague CTK, 2 May 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-085 (3 May 1995)

pp. 28-29. 

55. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network, 23 June 1995

FBIS-EEU-g&122 (26 Jrme 1995), p. 12. 

56. Though this would not have any immediate impact on Chief o

Staff General Tuchyna, who served as Interior Minister under Meciar and 

is considered to be his ally. Now Meciar could recall Tuchyna if he is eve

unhappy with his performance. 

57. OMRI Daily Digest, 14 July 1995, p. 4. 

58. Vienna Kurier, 27 January 1995, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-95-019 (30 January 

1995), p. 11. 

59. Prague Post, 21 March 1995, p. 4. 

60. Bratislava Pravda, 7 July 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-9&132 (11 July 

1995), p. 11. 

61. Bratislava SME, 24 August 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-166 (28 Augus

1995), p. 17. 

62. Bratislava Slovenska Republika, 29 December 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU

96-002 (3 January 1996), p. 10. 

63. Jozef Gajdos statement, Bratislava Slovenska Republika, 25 Octobe

1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-209 (30 October 1995), p. 10. 

64. Defense .Minister Jan Sitek interview. Bratislava Narodna Obroda

11 February 1995, pp. 1,3; and Bratislava Pravda, 11 February 1995, pp. 1,5

FBIS-EEU-95-034 (21 February 1995), pp. 18-19. 

65. Col. Jozef Zadzora interview, Bratislava Obrana, 16 March 1996, p

6. FBIS-EEU-96-055 (20 March 1996), p. 11. 

66. Bratislava Pravda, 9 August 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-156 (14 

August 1995), p. 13. This was confirmed by Chief of Staff Tuchyna in dis

cussions with Czech Chief of Staff Nekvasil on 19 March 1996. Tuchyn

noted that the Slovak military was "deep under the figure of 47,000 

troops it should have." OMRI Daily Digest (21 March 1996), p. 4. 

67. Col. Jan Dendes intervie~; Bratislava Pravda, 8 January 1996, pp

1,3. FBIS-EEU-96-011 (17 January 1996), p. 19. 

68. Col. Jozef Zadzora interview, Bratislava Obrana, 16 March 1996, p
72. Bratislava Slovenska Republika, 10 March 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95

049 (14 March 1995), p. 23. 

73. Col. Gen. Jozef Tuchyna interview% Bratislava Apologia (January 

1995), pp. 4-6. FBIS-EEU-95-068 (10 April 1995), pp. 19-20. 

74. Col. Gen. Jozef Tuchyna interview, Bratislava Slovenska Republika

27 April 1995, p. 11. FBIS-EEU-95-083 (1 May 1995), pp. 8-10. 

75. Col. Jozef Pivarci interview, Bratislava Slovenska Republika (Obran

Supplement), 14 January 1995, p. 5. FBIS-EEU-95-069 (11 April 1995), p. 10

76. Bratislava Pravda, 29 September 1995, p. 17. FBIS-EEU-95-193 (

October 1995), p. 15. 

77. Bratislava Obrana, 25 March 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-061 (3

March 1995), p. 9. 

78. Bratislava SME, 8 March 1995, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-95-047 (10 Marc

1995), p. 10. 

79. Chief of Staff Jozef Tuchyna, Prague CTK, 27 March 1995. FBIS

EEU-95-062 (31 March 1995), p. 15. 

80. Bratislava SME, 2 Jtme 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95-109 (7 June 1995

p. 7. 

81. Col. Tomas Svec interview, Bratislava Narodna Obroda, 13 Octobe

1995, p. 8. FBIS-EEU-95-200 (17 October 1995), p. 17. 

82. Col. Gen. Jozef Tuchyna interview, Bratislava Pravda, 6 Septembe

1995, pp. 1,4. FBIS-EEU-95-177 (13 September 1995), p. 12. 

83. Bratislava Pravda, 2 October 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-193 (

October 1995), p. 15. 

84. Col. Gen. Jozef Tuchyna interview, Bratislava Rozlxlasova Stanica

16 January 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-011 (17 January 1996), p. 11. 

85. Bratislava Slovenska Republika, 5 March 1996, p. 5. FBIS-EEU-96

046 (7 March 1996), p. 13. 

86. Imrich Andrejcak interview, Bratislava Zmena, No. 22 (29 May-

June 1996), p. 9. FBIS-EEU-96-106 (31 May 1996), p. 13. 

87. Bratislava Pravda, 9 May 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-092 (10 Ma

1996), p. 18. 
September 1995), p. 16. 

92. Bratislava Pravda, 5 October 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-196 (

October 1995), p. 6. 

93. Braitislava Narodna Obroda, 21 October 1995, p. 6. FBIS-EEU-95

206 (25 October 1995), pp. 11. 

94. Bratislava Narodna Obroda, 18 October 1995, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-95-20

(23 October 1995), p. 14. 

95. Bratislava STV 1, 6 December 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-235 (7 Decemb

1995), p. 1 

96. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slove~xsko Network, 14 Decemb

1995. FBIS-EEU-95-241 (15 December 1995), p. 12. 

97. Bratislava SME, 18 December 1995, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-95-243 (

December 1995), p. 8. 

98. Bratislava Narodna Obroda, 17 February 1996, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-96

035 (21 February 1996), p. 9. 

99. Bratislava Pravda, 20 March 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-057 (22 Marc

1996), p. 14. 

100. Bratislava Pravda, 27 March 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-96-062 (2

March 1996), p. 20. 

101. Bratislava SME, 22 April 1996, p. 6. FBIS-EEU-96-079 (23 Apr

1996), p. 12. 

102. Secretary General Javier Solana news conference, Bratislav

Rozhlasova Stanica, 30 April 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-085 (1 May 1996), p. 14

103. Bratislava Slovenska Republika, 21 May 1996, p. 2. FBIS-EU-96-10

(22 May 1996), p. 11. 

104. Statement issued on 22 April 1995 in Komorno, Bratislava Szaba

Ujsag, 3 May 1995, p. 9. FBIS-EEU-95-118 (20 June 1995), pp. 5-6. 

105. For Text, see: Bratislava Pravda, 1 December 1995. FBIS-EEU-95

234 (6 December 1995), p. 9. 

106. Vladimir Meciar interview, Budapest Nepszabadsag, 2

November 1995, pp. 1,3. FBIS-EEU-95-228 (28 November 1995), p. 17. 

107. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network, 30 Novembe
ova Stanica Slovensko Network, 26 January 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-019 (2

January 1996), p. 9. 

112. Bratislava Draft Resolution of the National Council of the Slova

Republic, 26 March 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-060 (27 March 1996), p. 12. 

113. Bratislava Pravda, 6 April 1996, pp. 1,2. FBIS-EEU-96-070 (1

April 1996), p. 19. 

114. President Michal Kovac interview, Budapest Nepszabadsag, 2

April 1996, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-96-080 (24 April 1996), p. 11. 

115. OMR/Daily Digest, 9 May 1996, p. 4. 

116. OMRI Daily Digest, 10 May 1996, p. 5. 

117. Vladirnir Meciar news conference, Bratislava Rozhlasov

Stanica Slovensko Network, 24 March 1996. FBIS-EEU-96-058 (25 Marc

1996), p. 7. 
H 'istory has tested Central European nations and states in th

• extreme. The revolutions of 1989-1990 marked the third tim

in the 20th century alone that Central Europe has embarked on 

"return to Europe." In the 6 years since those revolutions, Centra

Europeans have made enormous progress, but they still hav

much to do. 

NATO has been developing principles for enlarging th

Alliance in accordance with decisions made at NATO's 10-1

January 1994 Brussels Summit on enlargement, implementation o

the Partnership For Peace (PFP) program, 1 December 199

Brussels NAC ministerial, September 1995 Study On NATO 

Enlargement, and June 1996 Berlin NAC ministerial. NATO ha

determined that the necessary conditions for membership wil

include active participation in NACC and PFP, reasonable demon

stration of the successful performance of democratic political insti

tutions, privatized economies, and respect for human rights an

good, neighborly relations. 

In addition, "effective" democratic control of the military, a

well as some minimal military capability, and political compatibil

ity with NATO will be necessary conditions. Although definin

these standards may appear to be difficult because each state ha

its own history, culture, and unique set of institutions, this stud

has postulated the following four (formal and "in the spirit of"

conditions as being necessary for aspiring Alliance members t

28
tary officers in peacetime, who holds emergency powers in cris

and who has authority to initiate the transition to war. Underlini

these formalities is evidence of the spirit of respect and toleran

between president and government (prime minister) who m

often be of different parties or political persuasion. 

2. Parliamentary oversight of the military through control 

the defense budget. Parliament's role in deploying armed forces 

peacetime, emergency, and war must be clear. Underlining the

formalities is the need for the Parliament's Defense and Secur

and Foreign Affairs Committees to provide minority and oppo

tion parties with information (transparency) and allow consul

tion particularly on normal policy issues such as defense budg

and on extraordinary commissions investigating defense/secur

violations. Committees need staff expertise and information 

order to provide adequate oversight and liaison with defense a

interior ministries and to help develop bipartisan consensus 

defense and security. Similarly intelligence oversight committe

should provide access to opposition parties. 

3. Peacetime government oversight of General Staffs a

military commanders through civilian defense ministries. Defen

ministry management should include preparation of the defen

budget, access to intelligence, involvement in strategic plannin

force structure development, arms acquisitions and deploymen

and military promotions. 

In order to accomplish these objectives, defense ministr

need "real" civilian defense ministers. Two potential pitfalls ha

plagued Central European defense ministries: First, some defen

ministries have become politicized because the defense minis

and state secretary have been of different (majority or minor
capable of making the defense and security case to their legisla

tures and broader public (though legislative liaison and publi

affairs). 

4. Restoration of military prestige, trustworthiness, and 

accountability for the armed forces to be effective. Having 

emerged from the communist period when the military was con

trolled by the Soviet High Command through the Warsaw Pac

(and the then top-secret Statute system) and often used as an 

instrument of external or internal oppression, society needs to 

perceive the military as being under effective national control. In 

addition to the necessary institutional and Constitutional arrange

ments, this perception also requires a Legal Framework and Cod

of Conduct for professional soldiers and conscript citizens which 

would allow soldiers to disobey orders if they are illegal. 

Military training levels and equipment must also be sufficien

to protect the state. This goal requires social support and a predic

table stream of material resources (defense budgets) that th

defense ministry can "sell" to the Parliament and the broader soci

ety. Today's (1996) reality is different. Most Central European 

militaries retain only 50-55 percent of their 1988 manpower level

and 38-42 percent of the defense budgets in real terms. In sum

their readiness, training, and modernization levels have deterio

rated significantly, in some cases raising questions about thei

capacity to participate in coalition defense tasks. 

NATO has come to define these four conditions as necessar

for exercising "effective" democratic control of the military. Ove

the past two years, three Central European states--Poland

Hungary, and the Czech Republic--have come closer to meetin

, these standards; one Slovakia--has not. When examining Centra
Germany 

NATO has already enlarged into the area previously known 

the Warsaw Pact. On 3 October 1990, the former Germ

Democratic Republic (GDR) became five "eastern" laender in 

united Germany and part of NATO. 

As a result of the 12 September 1990 Kolxl-Gorbachev agre

ment, ground rules for the new military posture of a unit

Germany were set. The treaty stipulated that the united Bunde

wehr would comprise 370,000 troops in 1994. In return, the Sov

Union accepted the GDR's incorporation into NATO, while t

FRG agreed to hold back military presence in the former GDR un

Russian troops had evacuated the territory in 1994. According 

Article 5 of the Treaty, following the completion of the Soviet (th

Russian) armed forces withdrawal in 1994, German armed forc

uxxits attached to NATO could be stationed in the eastern laende

Since the 175,000-troop East German National People's Arm

disappeared, and the model by which NATO included the form

GDR is not totally applicable to future enlargements, the fact th

NATO accepted conditions for the GDR's inclusion might provi

a precedent in future NATO enlargements. 

Poland 

Efforts to establish democratic control of the military in Pola

has been marked by a six-phase evolutionary process and by t

presence of Soviet (then Russian) troops on Polish soil until 199

In the initial 1988-June 1989 phase of round-table discussio

Poland effectively wrested the National Defense Council (KOK

which controlled the defense and interior ministries, from t
Jozef Pilsudski and 1980-81 martial law eras. 

In the second phase, after the June 1989 elections, Parliamen

began to exert greater moral authority (reformers now controlled 

the Senate; and one-third of the Sejm) and some oversight of the 

military. Ad hoc Solidarity reformers and Parliament established 

oversight groups in the defense ministry. Two Solidarity civilian

(Bronislaw Komorowski and Janusz Onyszkiewicz) became 

deputy defense ministers and began efforts to eliminate the Main 

Political Administration (Communist Party) from the military and 

control contact with foreign states and international institutions (i

part, to ensure that the Soviet Union could no longer command 

Polish armed forces through the Warsaw Pact's top secret Statute 

system). Piotr Kolodziejczyk, an independent-minded admiral

became defense minister in July 1990; General Zdzsislaw 

Stelmaszuk, who never attended a Soviet staff college, became 

Chief of the General Staff. Since President Jaruzelski's moral pres

tige had greatly diminished after the elections, he resigned and 

requested that new presidential elections be held two-and-one-hal

years early. 

The third phase began after Lech Walesa was elected presiden

by popular mandate in December 1990. Power began to shift from 

Parliament (the Sejm still had two-thirds communist membership

to the president. Not only did President Walesa now chair th

KOK, which provided reformers with de facto control of the mili

tary and police, but Walesa exercised oversight of the defens

ministry through the National Security Bureau (BBN). Walesa pu

the BBN under presidential financial control, and expanded hi

authority over the BBN, which developed Poland's militar

doctrine, developed threat analyses, and drafted the reforms t
The October 1991 parliamentary elections marked the four

phase. Though Poland's legislative and executive institutions we

now fully legitimate in democratic political terms, a heavily fra

mented and weak coalition government hampered by the absen

of a Constitution became its Achilles heel. Debates over a ne

Constitution brought tensions and political showdown betwe

the ParLiament (Sejm and Senate) and the president. 

Ambiguity in authority and differences in interpretation ov

command and control of the military caused the downfall 

Poland's first civilian Defense Minister Jan Parys, and then Prim

Minister Jan Olszewski and his government. When the Se

Commission examined Defense Minister Parys" allegations th

President Walesa had been planning martial law contingencies a

offered Silesian Military District commander Tadeusz Wilecki t

position of Chief of Staff for his support, it exonerated the pre

dent. 

Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz (and Prime Minister Han

Suchocka) initially brought new cooperation between the gover

ment and the president and some progress in defense minist

efforts to establish oversight of the military. On 22 October 19

Onyszkiewicz implemented the inter-ministerial Zabinski Co

mission's reform of the defense ministry. The defense minis

now had three departments (strategy, education, and infrastru

bare) and military courts and intelligence were subordinated to t

civilian defense minister. Though Onyszkiewicz attempted to fu

the civilian defense ministry financial and personnel services w

the General Staff, and Deputy Defense Minister Jan Kuria

attempted to set up an independent department to oversee mi

tary infrastructure and acquisition, these efforts were frustrated 
sum, the General Staff effectively maintained autonomy by play

ing off civilian defense ministry oversight against the president. 

Though the so-called Small Constitution (November 1992) wa

a provisional effort to clarify legislative and executive authorit

and define president and government powers, it failed because o

continued ambiguity. Lack of consensus was evident in the seve

Constitutional drafts submitted to the Constitutional Commission

the Sejm Defense Committee's opposition to the president's over

sight of a National Guard, and in differing views of the president'

role in appointing ministers of defense, interior, and foreig

affairs. 

The fifth period began with the post-Communist SLD-PSL

coalition victory in the September 1993 Parliamentary elections

Once again, the absence of a Constitution contributed to lack o

effective civilian oversight of the military and to governmenta

crisis and collapse. The defense ministry's reduced role wa

evident in Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk's early actions. I

November 1993 he reduced the defense ministry staff and restruc

tured the ministry by unifying the strategy and training direc

torates under First Deputy Defense Minister Jerzy Milewski, wh

retained his BBN position, and created a deputy defense ministe

for legislative affairs. He gave the General Staff more authority b

transferring the civilian Department of Education back to th

military, creating a fourth organization/mobilization directorate

and placing intelligence and counterintelligence under it

purview. In the September 1994 Drawsko affair, when the pres

dent undermined the defense minister's authority, the militar

gained greater autonomy. 

As a result of Drawsko, not only did the defense minister hav
dent. Walesa also continued to challenge the defense minister's li

of general officers for promotion and the government's authori

to appoint so-called "presidential ministers," causing the collap

of the Pawlak government. In effect, the government had lo

effective control and oversight over the military: 

Poland's civil-military crisis in 1994 resulted from its failure 

delegate authority between the president and government an

from the Sejm Defense (commission and Committee's) inability 

exercise effective oversight. It also has demonstrated the inabili

of the civilian defense ministry to manage and exercise oversig

of the military; hence the Chief of Staff and General Staff ha

remained independent of the defense minister (and Goverrunen

and the Army had been heavily politicized and continued to enj

broad popular support. 

The sixth phase opened with the inauguration of Preside

Aleksander Kwasniewski (SLD) in December 1995 and the initi

tion of a defense reform "revolution." The passage of the Februa

1996 Law on the Office of the Defense Minister is testimony 

Poland's recognition of its problems; the law established a four

deputy defense minister to deal with finances and the Chief of th

General Staff formally became the State Secretary, a fifth depu

defense minister. The purpose of the "revolution" is to wre

control from the General Staff and subordinate it to the defen

ministry. In sum, the structural differentiation of the ministry h

been impressive, though its practice has remained limited by th

General Staff. 

Clearly Poland is still attempting to develop a consensus o

establishing its defense tenets, to include effective relatio

between military and civilian authorities. The manner in which th
military education, and press. 

Poland's military independence has been facilitated, in part, by 

defense ministry instability at the top. Since August 1992 when 

Wilecki became Chief of the General Staff, he has dealt with no les

than six (four plus two acting) defense ministers--Janusz 

Onyszkiewicz, Piotr Kolodziejczyk, Jerzy Milewski (acting)

Zbigniew Okonski, Andrzej Karkoszka (acting), and Stanislaw 

Dobrzanski. Wilecki still remains, and no set periodic rotation pol

icy has yet been established. 

Poland's attempts to achieve defense ministry managemen

responsibility and oversight of the General Staff can be bes

assessed as admirable in concept and effort, but final judgemen

must be reserved until the dust has settled. In light of the eviden

resistance from General Wilecki and the General Staff (and the fac

that Wilecki remains in his position), it will take time to distinguis

the merely formal from the truly real reform. 

In this regard, the Sejm's continued limitations require concern

Since the Sejm Defense Committee's creation in 1989-90, it has no

yet developed an expert support staff and has exercised onl

limited oversight. The Sejm Special Commission investigatin

Defense Minister Parys' allegations about politics in the Genera

Staff in April 1992 found them unsubstantiated. Though the Sejm 

Defense Commission criticized President Walesa for his actions a

Drawsko in 1994, the generals who refused obedience to their civi

ian leadership remained unpunished. Finally, the Sejm Committe

remained silent when Walesa awarded bonuses in January 1995 t

the three top generals who participated at Drawsko. 

Sejm Committee Chairman Jerzy Szmajdzinski has publicl

noted the committee's limitations in supervising military intell
the defense ministry report on politicization of the forces durin

the 1995 presidential election, it has not forced the issue furthe

almost hoping the issue would go away after the election. Nor di

the Sejm Defense Committee make any clear move after Genera

Wilecki's 14 August 1995 speech, which publicly reprimande

civilian politicians for allocating insufficient funds to the Army. 

Although Parliament has exercised some control of the mil

tary through constrained defense budgets, it has been limited

Even though the Sejm passed a resolution to increase defens

expenditures to 3 percent of GDP 18 months ago, little has bee

done in practice. In addition, the Sejm has demonstrated littl

supervision over military administration. For example, it has no

established rules on periodic rotation of high military officials no

established term limitations for General Staff assignments. 

On the military side, Poland's armed forces have been signif

cantly cut from 405,000 to 234,000. Military readiness, as in the re

of Central Europe, requires attention. Problems with readines

have been evident in the ground forces, navy, and air and a

defense forces. They have also been evident in its IFOR unit i

Tuzla, Bosnia. 

In contrast with budgets in the rest of Central Europe, howev

er, the defense budget increase in 1995 reversed a slide that ha

been evident since 1986. Though it represents a commitment of 2

percent of GDP, there is the apparent (though not yet realized

commitment to increase this to 3 percent over time. Also, Polis

society--in marked contrast to Hungary and the Czech Republic-

holds the military in high esteem. Finally, in contrast to the rest o

Central Europe, Poland has developed inter-governmental nation

al security planning institutions such as KSOFGM with the capacit
end, real reform can not be guaranteed until Poland acquires a new 

constitution, which is unlikely to occur before early 1997. 

Despite this uncertainty, the 1996 defense reform concep

appears right on the mark. Poland's efforts to empower the 

defense ministry to provide accountability to society, limit the 

functions of the General Staff and subordinate it to civilian defens

ministry authority, and reform the armed forces through budge

and acquisitions are all the right objectives. The defense reform 

demonstrates that, compared with only 2 years ago, many Polish 

leaders now understand what needs to be done in order to acquire 

democratic control of the military. One can only hope that they wil

meet with success. 

Hungary 

The October 1989 Constitution, which replaced Hungary'

1949 Constitution, was written by reform communists and estab

lished authority between the president, government, and Nationa

Assembly, which only by majority could declare a state of emer

gency or war. Most important, the Hungarian National Assembly 

amended the Defense Law in February 1990 to assume authority 

(from the Defense Council) to deploy Hungarian armed forces a

home or abroad. This power effectively terminated the Sovie

Statute system, which, as in Poland, had provided the USSR direc

access to Hungarian armed forces. The Hungarian Parliament had 

reassumed national control of Hungary's armed forces. 

Reform Communists, though, promulgated a Defense Reform 

(1 December 1989) that created many problems between presiden

tial and governmental authority. The reform separated the armed 

forces from the defense minister and placed them under the presi
After the March 1990 elections, which resulted in a Fre

Democrat (AFD) president (Arpad Goncz) and Hungaria

Democratic Forum (MDF) government (Jozsef Antall), the new 

Hungarian government had to undo the problems created by th

December 1989 communist legacy. Indeed, most of Hungary

defense reform has involved amending the Constitution (e.g., I

June 1990 it was amended to require a Parliamentary two-third

rather than simple majority to employ armed forces) and/or tes

ing it in the Constitutional Court. 

Civil-military problems arose over the issues of control o

professional military education and military institutes (defens

minister or Army Commander), the use of the armed forces durin

domestic transport strikes (president or defense minister) an

during Yugoslav air-space violations (Parliament or government)

Differences became so tense, that Hungarian Commander Kalma

Lorincz resigned in frustration and the government during 199

sought Constitutional Court decisions on presidential and govern

mental authority over the Hungarian armed forces during peace

time and crisis. 

The Court's decisions in favor of the government led to th

1992 Defense Reform that restructured the defense ministry so th

defense minister could assume oversight of the armed force

military intelligence, and recommend military promotions fo

presidential approval. During 1993 a Defense Law gave Defens

Minister Lajos Fur the authority to fuse the positions of Hungaria

Army Commander with the Chief of the General Staff, and o

7 December Constitutional amendments placed the border guar

under the police in peacetime (hence, under government contro

and gave the government authority to call up to 5,000 troops in a
ministry with MDF civilians, creating a new form of political influ

ence. This created problems after the May 1994 elections whic

returned the post communist Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) i

coalition with the AFD to power by two-thirds majority. Under th

new government, the defense ministry was subordinated to retire

Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, who had been relieved by Fur as defens

ministry spokesman. Keleti now replaced MDF civilians with 

retired or acting military officers, reorganized the defense ministr

and reduced its staff, provided the General Staff more authority i

military planning (to include intelligence), and reversed an earlie

decision to separate the position of Chief of the General Staff from 

Hungarian Army Commander. Keleti's actions raise question

about "effective" civilian defense ministry oversight of the military

On the military side, the armed forces have been significantl

cut from 120,000 to 65,000 and are being restructured for NATO 

integration. But financial resources have greatly constraine

Hungary's armed forces restructuring, modernization, and PFP

exercise participation, and the total forces could decrease to 45,000

50,000. 

But in the greater scheme of things, Hungary has made enor

mous progress. The existence of a constitutional and legal flame

work has resulted from Constitutional Court decisions that hav

effectively addressed the problems caused by the October 198

Constitution and 1 December 1989 Defense Reform; the Court'

decisions have been respected and been incorporated in the 199

National Defense Act and subsequent legislation. 

Continued wrangling over the Constitutional draft since 199

and the delaying of its acceptance could become a source o

concern, as it increasingly appears that the six-party Parliamentar
completed some time in 1997. 

The National Assembly through its 19omember Defens

Committee has been slowly attempting to develop oversight of th

military through the budget, approval of the Basic Principles o

National Defense and Defense Bill, and the deployment of arme

forces. The Defense Committee has opposition representatio

(with six members), and continuity with seven members remain

ing from before the 1994 elections. It now includes former Defens

Minister Fur and two retired generals. In addition, to ensure civi

ian control parliamentary members of Parliament can not b

members of the military: 

The Parliament Defense Committee, though, could be mor

effective and lacks staff support. Its limitations have been mo

apparent in oversight of the defense budget as manifest b

Defense Minister Keleti's unilateral decision to buy T-72 tank

from Belarus with funds derived from the sale of defense rea

estate and decision to send MIG-29s to a PFP exercise in Polan

without proper consultation. 

Hungary needs an interagency organization (e.g., Nationa

Security Council) that could formulate a national security policy

Such a body under the Prime Minister (e.g., similar to KSORM i

Poland) could bring together ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defens

Interior, Finance, and Industry to formulate policy and provid

clear direction to the armed forces. The already existing Nationa

Security Cabinet could form the basis for such a body, but 

permanent supporting staff would need to be created. 

In addition, it is necessary to ensure that the Hungaria

Defense Ministry maintains real civilian oversight of the military

The problems and shortcomings in the defense ministry are man
Second, the General Staffs separation from the defense minis

try creates problems. The General Staff maintains its own chain o

command to the defense minister; hence, there is a duplication o

functions and no formalized means for cross-fertilization betwee

action officers in the General Staff and defense ministry. Whil

personal contacts and communication sometimes exist betwee

the defense ministry and General Staff there are very few horizon

tal communication levels between the working levels of the two 

organizations. 

The fact that most of the positions in the defense ministry ar

filled by military officers does not improve communication with 

the General Staff..Military officers tend to stay in the defens

ministry for long periods, often with no idea of when, or if the

will rotate to other n~ilitary positions. The fact that many retire and 

stay in defense ministry positions as civilians tends to widen th

divide. This situation can be improved only if military officers ar

routinely rotated into the defense ministry and back to the Genera

Staff. 

Third, the defense ministry has yet to implement a mid- and 

long-term planning mechanism, which is presently under devel

opment. This has become highiighted by Hungary's participatio

in PFP, problems faced in restructuring the Hungarian Defens

Forces, and the need to participate and develop a Planning and 

Review Process (PARP). This planning mechanism needs to b

developed if Hungary becomes a NATO member in order to devel

op a Defense Planning Questionnaire. Although the defense minis

try is attempting to develop a modified PPBS system and th

Defense Resource Planning Group is attempting to develop 

Defense Resource Management Model for Hm~gary, difficulty ha
assess and compare the technical capabilities of weapons and 

systems. 

Fourth, intelligence is collated and prepared in the Hungarian 

Defense Forces. They control what the defense minister gets to see

rather than having an outside group acting in behalf of the minis

ter making that determination. Under present arrangements the 

defense minister and defense ministry staff could be denied some 

intelligence information. 

Hungary needs to restructure its defense ministry. An integrat

ed defense ministry links the defense minister (and his adminis

trative and policy advisers) directly to the command structure. I

also can act to facilitate the flow of defense needs from the armed 

forces to the Government, opening up defense policy and activitie

to public scrutiny and accountability. In sum, it is more efficien

and provides more effective oversight of the Armed Forces. 

The defense ministry's problems are burdened by having 

become a "retirement home" for military officers; it has not and i

not yet cultivating civilian specialists--nor is it effectively devel

oping a defense constituency either in Parliament or in Hungarian 

society. These difficulties need to be overcome if Hungary is to 

develop the necessary political-military planning processes in 

order to integrate with NATO. 

Finally, although the military has evidenced significant reform 

and been restructured to accommodate NATO, force modernization continues to be greatly restrained by scarce resources. Sinc

the main contact between society and the armed forces is through 

conscripts (roughly 40,000 enlistees annually) and their families

the conscription experience becomes very important in building 

social support for defense. If no meaningful training takes place 
and a vicious circle prevails. 

Military training and force modernization need significan

attention and development to meet NATO standards. Th

Hungarian defense expenditure of 1.4-1.5 percent of GDP remain

the lowest of all its Central European neighbors. It is just no

enough, and reflects the fact that the defense ministry has bee

unable to develop sufficient public understanding of the costs o

NATO integration and failed to develop Parliamentary support fo

adequate defense budget levels. 

In summary, Parliament has been effective in exerting contro

of the defense budget and deploying Hungarian armed forces. Th

Constitutional Court's decisions have been respected and have le

to major defense reforms allowing the government (prime minis

ter and defense minister) to take control of the military in peace

time and emergency. However, Hungary still needs a constitutio

(that is not a two-thirds majority victor's mandate) to define th

president's wartime powers. Also in light of recent defens

ministry and General Staff changes, Hungary needs to reasser

effective "civilian" defense ministry oversight of the military an

to commit more resources to defense. 

Czechoslovakia 

Both Czech and Slovak successor states benefitted from th

three years of reform in Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia's revolu

tion was swift. By the end of December 1989 the Federal Assembl

had elected Vaclav Havel president. The fact that Havel wielde

national command authority was particularly important fo

Czechoslovakia not only because of the Warsaw Pact's Statut

System, but also because its military, in contrast to Poland an
defense minister. During 1990 Parliament created an Inspecto

General to oversee the defense ministry, and various Civic Forum 

and government oversight bodies were attached to the armed 

forces to screen military cadres and monitor democratization

After a Commission concluded that General Vacek also had been 

involved in OPERATION WAVE, Lubos Dobrovsky became Czecho

slovakia's first civilian defense minister in October. 

When Defense Minister Dobrovsky took over, he demanded 

another screening of cadres and he assumed control of (military 

and interior) intelligence and counterintelligence. During Spring 

1991 the defense ministry was restructured into three directorate

(strategy, economics, and social and human affairs) to strengthen 

civilian oversight, and Karel Pezl, who had been cashiered from 

the armed forces in 1968 and therefore deemed politically reliabl

in 1990, became chief of staff of the armed forces. Widespread 

screening of senior officers then ensued. 

Elections in June 1992 sealed the disintegration of the federa

tion. During the last half of 1992 Czech and Slovak attention 

turned to preparing new constitutions and planning to divide thei

armed forces and property. While both successor states had the 

benefit of three years of Czechoslovak defense reform, each faced 

different problems as 1993 opened. 

Czech Republic 

The Czech Republic has enjoyed political stability and ha

accomplished much in the area of defense reform since indepen

dence. On dealing with democratic control issues, the Czech 

Republic still has an unresolved constitutional issue regarding 

Article 63(c) on emergency powers and the empowerment of the 
The Parliament Defense and Security Committee, as well as th

Budget and Foreign Affairs committees, execute limited oversigh

of the military. The Defense and Security Committee in April 199

approved the "screening" conducted in the military and debate

the Concept of the Czech Army; in November 1994 it requeste

temporarily halting the defense ministry's plans to moderniz

MIG-21s. In February and April 1995, parliamentary committee

were established to oversee military intelligence (VZS) and th

Security and Information Service (BIS). 

Adhering to Articles 39 and 43 of the Constitution, in Apr

1994 the Parliament approved the Czech Army's participation i

military exercises abroad and for foreign, NATO troops to exercis

on Czech soil. In November 1995, the Defense and Securit

Committee recommended halth~g T-72 and MIG-21 modernizatio

projects and Parliament recommended canceling both projects i

December. In sum, though the Defense and Security Committee

limitations have been highlighted in Defense Minister Holan

suggestion that it create a military affairs subcommittee, and i

Vladimir Suman's complaints about lack of transparency in budge

expenditures, the Parliament has been relatively effective i

making progress in its oversight and management of the military

The defense ministry appears to have established "effectiv

control of the military. Antonin Baudys, a civilian, became the fir

Czech defense minister. He initially retained Karel Pezl as Chief o

Staff, who was then succeeded by Jiri Nekvasil, a colonel promo

ed from the ranks. First Deputy Defense Minister Jiri Pospis

attempted to develop a persom~el management system for militar

careers, initiated further "screening" of military cadres (for polit

cal reliability and military competence), and the General Staff ha
demonstrated significant structural differentiation, adaptation

and development. In 1994, military intelligence was subordinated 

to the defense minister and placed in the n~_nistry, and in September Vilem Holan replaced Baudys as minister. In January 1995 the 

defense ministry established a double-entry bookkeeping management system under Deputy Defense Minister Kalousek to coincide 

with the Army's adoption of PPBS to identify waste and shortages

In September 1995, the creation of a new Defense and Strategy 

Policy Directorate, under Colonel Jaroslav Svabik to influence 

organization and deployment of the Army and coordinate its 

emergency activities with other ministries, signaled the movement 

of significant powers from the General Staff. At the same time, the 

General Staff reacquired some powers from the defense ministry

On 1 July 1995, the power of command of Czech UNPROFOR

UNCRO and IFOR units was moved from the defense ministry 

Foreign Affairs Directorate under Jaromir Novotny to the Genera

Staff Operations Directorate under Maj. Gen. Rostislav Kotil. In 

addition, a special interagency committee was established to help 

achieve NATO integration. 

In September 1995, the arrival of Petr Necas as First Deputy 

Defense Minister signaled the need for improvement in the 

personnel management system and arrival of politics into the 

defense ministry, particularly in acquisitions policy. In November 

1995 a new Deputy Defense Minister (Hana Demlova) for Social

Health, and Housing Affairs position was created, in part to dea

with social problems in the armed forces and a housing shortage 

of 3,000 units for officers and families. 

Increasingly, the Czechs have been discussing the need to 

establish a supra-departmental agency (like a National Security 
National Plan and coordinate all integration activities. 

Finally, it is clear that the Czech Army remains in a greatl

weakened state. Its readiness and training levels, and morale

remain low. Its professional officer corps pyramid is greatly out o

balance. Although its flag officer corps has been greatly reduce

from 130 to 24 (compared to 70 in Hungary), its senior officer

greatly exceed its junior officer corps. NCOs and warrant officer

are also in very short supply and very difficult to recruit becaus

of low salaries and the low prestige of the Army. All this is rhetor

ically recognized by the appropriate Parliamentary and Govern

ment authorities, but until budgetary commitments are increased

little improvement can be expected. 

The bullying of conscripts, who are the Army's major link t

Czech society, still remains in evidence. The Czech Army's imag

in the broader society, as in Hungary, remains very low. As Vacla

Havel has noted publicly, what is needed is not just a change in th

way Czech citizens view the military but also in the attitude o

soldiers themselves. Not only must these changes begin to occu

before joining NATO, but the Czech Government has some signi

icant work to do with Czech society on the issue of NAT

membership. 

Despite these limitations, it can be stated that the Czec

Republic has made enormous progress on the road to achievin

democratic control of the military. With a new, weakened coalitio

government remaining committed to NATO integration in 1996, 

seems that one of the Czech Government's most difficult tasks wi

be to "sell" NATO to Czech society in order to generate what ar

likely to be greater national obligations and resource requiremen

for defense. 
Slovakia 

In contrast to the Czech Republic, political instability has char

acterized Slovakia, which is now on its third government in fou

years, and that instability has hampered its more daunting mili

tary tasks and reform efforts. In many ways Slovakia's January 

1993 independence has thrown the country back in time. Slovaki

must build its institutions from scratch--a new defense ministry

an Army command (now general staff), and its armed forces. 

During the first Vladimir Meciar-coalition governmen

(January 1993-March 1994), military reform was hampered by 

government instability and crisis. Nevertheless, it created 

National Security Council, and approved two key documents: th

Principles of National Security, and a Defense Doctrine. 

Military reform efforts were evident during the Joze

Moravcik-coalition government (March-December 1994) whic

named a civilian defense minister (Pavol Kanis) and revise

Slovakia's Defense Doctrine (placing greater stress on NATO inte

gration), changed the Army Command to a General Staff, restruc

tured and reduced the size of the defense ministry and Genera

Staff (to reduce tensions that had developed because the large

Army Command had been formed first), and restructured th

armed forces into corps and brigades. 

The key hope that these initial reform efforts would continu

under the new Meciar coalition government (that emerged from 

the October 1994 elections)--has not come to fruition. Prim

Minister Meciar's campaign to unseat President Kovac ha

contributed to renewed political instability and potential constitu

tional challenges. 
Slovakia one year to ratify the treaty on 26 March 1996, but only 

after major concessions on language law, martial law, and admin

istration were made to the HZDS' Slovak National Party (SNS

coalition partner. That this has aggravated ethnic relations insid

Slovakia and with its external relations with Hungary has been 

clean 

Another weakness of the Constitution is that, in the event of 

government crisis, the president should have the power to call fo

new elections. But the president lacks that power unless he can ge

60 percent (90) of the National Council deputies to support him. 

A further weakness of the Constitution is that it allows the 

National Council to override presidential vetoes with no highe

quorum than in the original vote. Prime Minister Meciar has used 

this loophole to dismantle the Constitution by undermining th

powers of the president by overriding continuously the president'

veto of normal laws One example was the June 1995 amendmen

that removed the president's power to appoint and dismiss th

chief of General Staff giving it to the government. Not only has th

power of the president been thoroughly undermined, but Mecia

has now raised the issue of perhaps writing an entirely new 

constitution. In sum, respect for limits of law and tolerance o

opposition remains ill-defined in Slovakia. 

The National Council has been active and its Defense and 

Security Committee of 12 members has experience and expertise

The Committee is headed by former Defense Minister Imric

Andrejcak (HZDS), and also comprises former Defense Ministe

Pavol Kanis and State Secretary Igor Urban. 

The National Council and its Defense and Security Committe

has approved the Defense Doctrine and fundamental elements o
unclear. 

Defense Ministry reform has made enormous progress for suc

a short period of time. Since the Spring of 1994, tensions existe

between the defense ministry in Bratislava and the Arm

Command in Trencin, because the Army Corrunand had bee

created first partly by the recognition in June that the Comman

was not workable and would be transformed into a General Sta

in September 1994. 

The Defense Ministry was structured in September 1994 

include five sections, but it has yet to develop a modern system 

management. Additional restructuring and differentiation wa

necessary to deal with significant social problems; the need 

3,000 housing units for officers, dealing with problems related 

the bullying of conscripts, and providing alternate civilian sen, ic

In 1995, 23,000 conscripts refused to serve, threatening the viabil

ty of the forces. 

Concerns about politicization, though, have been evident 

the Defense Ministry. State Secretary Gajdos (HZDS) compete

with Defense Minister Sitek (SNS) for influence within the defens

ministry and on policy (regarding the role of the Home Guar

NATO, and Russia), and has publicly questioned the President

capacity as Commander-in-Chief. 

Transformation of the Army Command to General Staff wa

important and necessary, but its continued presence in Trencin an

separation from the defense ministry in Bratislava is hamperin

coordination and defense ministry oversight. Although the mil

tary (as in Poland) enjoys high respect in Slovak society, milita

readiness and modernization have a long way to go to meet NAT

standards. Moderldzation has been non-existent, except for th
Nevertheless, the major stumbling block to Slovakia's candida

cy to NATO arises from questions about the most fundamental cr

terion-the shared democratic values of respect for the rule of law 

and tolerance of ethnic (human) rights. Certainly clarification o

Slovakia's commitment to these principles will be necessary befor

assessing its defense ministry and military institutions for politic

compatibility and military interoperability with NATO. 

The Way Ahead 

As NATO has determined that "effective" democratic control o

the military is a necessary condition for Alliance membership, 

might be concluded that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republi

have made great progress and met the minimal conditions fo

establishing democratic control of the military. They do, though

have significant work to do to make that control "effective" an

ensure the reform process is irreversible. Slovakia has not yet me

minimal standards. 

The common problem of resource scarcity has uniformly limi

ed the development of Central Europe's armed forces moderniza

tion and compatibility with NATO. Also the lack of effectiv

Parliamentary expertise and oversight plagues the region. 

Poland and Hungary (and Slovakia) need new constitutions t

address fundamental civil-military problems that still exis

notably presidential and governmental powers in peacetime an

war must be clarified. Only with this constitutional clarificatio

can real governmental (civilian defense ministry) control of th

military occur in Poland to ensure the "irreversibility" of th

defense ministry "revolution." 
Slovakia has not fulfilled the necessary elements and clearl

has the most work to do. It has been undermining its "flawed

Constitution in ways that raise concerns about what new constitu

tion might be developed. Its Parliament's intelligence oversigh

committee and signs of politicization of defense policy rais

concerns. Although the defense ministry reform has made som

significant progress, coordination with the General Staff is neces

sary. In sum, as long as there remains a lack of tolerance betwee

the president and prime minister, Slovakia's defense reform 

process will remain cloudy. 

Overall, the movements toward democratic government wit

civilian control of the military throughout Central Europe hav

been remarkably--historically--successful despite a variety o

daunting challenges. The attempted coup in Russia, the divisio

of Czechoslavakia, the absorption of East Germany into the FR

(and therefore into NATO) have not thwarted the advance

Economic, labor, political, and ethnic-minority problems hav

complicated and slowed the march in different places but stoppe

it nowhere. The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the blood

conflict that followed has not deterred the advance. That so man

states have emerged so successfully from four decades of politica

domination is without question a triumph of will and a signa

accomplishment to set against the often brutal history of twentiet

century Europe. 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) - 2 

Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)- 13 

Czechoslovakia - 2, 305 

Civic Forum - 192 

Constitution - 194, 306 

Defense reform - 194 

Elections 

1989 - 191-2 

1990- 193 

1992 - 204-6 

Inspector General - 198 

Operation "Vlna" (Wave) - 197, 199, 239,306 

Soviet secret Statute system - 197, 305 

Velvet Divorce - 204 

=Velvet Revolution"- 191, 194 

Czech Republic 

Armed forces restructuring - 220, 226, 227, 231,241-2, 308-9 

Acquisition policy - 223, 229 

Air Force - 220 

Rapid Deployment Brigade - 218 

Planning, Programming and Budgeting Sysytem (PPBS) - 225 

Constitution - 206, 213, 307 

Defense reform - 216, 228, 239, 241 

Elections 

1992-3 - 204-6, 213-4 

1996 - 237, 240 

History - 3, 20, 204 

NATO membership - 236 

NATO participation - 219, 233-25, 239, 307-8 

European Security and Defense Identity - 15 

European Union - 2 
NATO PFP and IFOR - 170 

Non-Communist government elected - 138 

Opens borders to GDR refugees - 137 

Germany 

Bundestag - 43 

Bundeswehr - 44, 292 

Federal Republic of (FRG) - 1, 2, 10, 40, 44 

Democratic Republic (GDR) - 1, 10, 35, 44, 292 

Political parties - 35, 41 

1989 emigrations - 36 

Travel ban lifted - 37 

History - 1,2, 3, 5 

Laender - 2, 10, 42, 292 

Territory lost - 1 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - 2 

Article 5 - 5 

Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) - 9 

Criteria/conditions for enlargement - 25, 26 

History in post-Cold War - 7, 9 

Partnership for Peace (PFP) - 9, 170, 219 

Individual Partnership Plan (IPP) - 18, 22 

Planning and Review Process - 22, 24 

Bosnian IFOR (Implementation Force) - 24, 111, 170 

Study of NATO Enlargement- 23, 25, 273, 289-91 

Poland 

Defense council (KOK) - 53, 84, 58, 69, 78, 79, 84 

The Drawsko Affair - 82 

Elections - 62, 100 

1989 Sejm - 55 

1990 Presidential - 57 

1991 - 59 

1993 - 73-4 

1995 - 85-9, 91, 96, 100 

History - 2, 17, 51,292 

KSORM - 79, 80, 110 
Slovakia 

Armed forces created - 253-4, 256, 259, 268, 312 

Draft/civilian service - 269 

Home Guard - 268 

NATO integration - 273 

Oath of Allegiance - 254 

Reform - 270-3, 277, 279 

Constitution - 206, 253, 278, 311,313 

Elections 

1992 - 204 

1993 - 253 

1994 - 257, 260 

Ethnic issues - 256, 260, 275, 277 

History - 4, 21,204, 253 

Meciar Government 

First - 254, 310 

Second - 261,310 

Moravcik Government - 257-258, 310 

National Council's power to override vetoes - 264, 

Presidential budgets reduced - 266 

Power curtailed - 268-9 

President Kovac's son abducted - 265 

Meciar accused - 265 

SIS involvement - 265-7 

Slovak Information Service (SIS) - 263, 265-266, 312 

Soviet Union 

Collapse - 4, 

Statute System - 57, 197, 291,305 

Warsaw Pact - 2, lO 

Western European Union- 13 

*U.S.G.P.O.:I£96-405-201:40016 
NATO AND CENTRAL EUROPE 

Composed in Palatino type 

Book and Cover designed and edited by Jonathan W. Pierce 

Cover prepared by Juan A. Medrano 
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