Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility: 

Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan 

 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES • COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations

April 2008 

 Committee Print 8 41-409
On the Cover 

Top Left 

A soldier from the Asadabad PRT of the Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force is warmly 

greeted in Manoi, Afghanistan. (U.S. Army photo/ Spc. Harold Fields) 

Top Right 

E-PRT member Captain Trisha Mustaine attends the first meeting of the newly-formed Hawr Rajab Women’s 

Committee in Babil Province, Iraq, on February 7, 2008. (Department of State photo) 

Bottom Left 

Panjshir province Gov. Bahlol Bahij (left) and Brig Gen Bill Hyatt, 455th Air Expeditionary Wing commander, 

perform the ribbon cutting of the Panjshir Provincial Printing Press, May 26, 2007. The people of Panjshir 

worked with the Panjshir PRT to acquire the printing press and renovate the building which houses it. (U.S. 

Air Force photo/ SrA Dilia DeGrego) 

Bottom Right 

An Afghan engineer talks with USAF Captain Paul Frantz during a visit by the Nangarhar PRT to a local metal 

working shop, November 6, 2007. (U.S. Air Force photo/ SSgt Joshua T Jasper) 


AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 3 

HASC OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS STAFF 

LORRY M. FENNER, STAFF LEAD

SUZANNE MCKENNA, PROJECT LEAD

STEVE J. DETERESA

THOMAS HAWLEY

ANDREW HYDE

JOHN E. KRUSE

GREGORY A. MARCHAND

MICHAEL MCERLEAN

MARK PARKER

SASHA ROGERS

ROGER I. ZAKHEIM

AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 5 

It was one of the best experiences of my military career. 

PRT Civil Affairs Officer 

Panjshir Province, Afghanistan 

2006-2007 

This is the best job in the Foreign Service, and I feel that we are contributing 

to this part of Iraq being able to function when CF [coalition forces] leave. 

PRT Team Leader 

Al Anbar Province, Iraq 

2007-2008 

A soldier with the 10th Mountain Division Tactical PSYOPS Team speaks with a group of Afghan children in Afghanistan, 

January 2007. (Air Force Photo/Capt. Gerardo Gonzalez) 

AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 7 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We want to thank our fellow subcommittee members and the subcommittee staff. We 

would also like to thank all of the members of the House Committee on Armed Services and 

the committee staff, particularly: Chairman Skelton and Ranking Member Hunter, and staff 

members Erin Conaton, Bob DeGrasse, Robert Simmons, Paul Oostburg Sanz, Andrew 

Hunter, Michael Casey, Stephanie Sanok, Julie Unmacht, Aileen Alexander, Mark Lewis, 

Loren Dealy, Lara Battles, Christine Lamb, Josh Holly, Linda Burnette, Nancy Warner, 

Rebecca Ross, Cyndi Howard, and Derek Scott. We would also like to thank the House 

Armed Services Subcommittees on Readiness, Military Personnel, and Terrorism, 

Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, as well as their staffs. Finally, we want to thank our 

own military legislative assistants, fellows, and schedulers: Dan Madden, James Lively, Toby 

Watkins, Justin Johnson, Caryll Rice, and Tressa Merola, as well as the rest of the 

subcommittee MLAs for all of their assistance. 

We also want to thank those outside the committee who assisted in this effort, 

including those from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the military 

services, the International Security Assistance Force, the U.S. Agency for International 

Development, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of State, in particular, the 

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, the Office of Provincial 

Affairs, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, and the regional bureaus, who responded to 

our many requests for hearing witnesses, briefings, documents, and travel support, as we 

examined this issue. We also would like to thank the National Guard Bureau, the U.S. Army 

War College, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the Joint Forces 

Staff College, the National Defense University, and the Foreign Service Institute for hosting 

our visits. In addition, we would like to thank the personnel at the 189th Infantry Brigade, the 

XVIII Airborne Corps, and the U.S. Army’s Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations 

Command at Fort Bragg, the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, U.S. Joint Forces 

Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Special Operations 

Command, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the U.S. Army Human 

Resources Command for their support during our visits. We would like to thank the 

Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Research Service, the Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned for their 

invaluable assistance. We particularly thank the men and women in the legislative affairs and 

legislative liaison offices of these organizations, whose work with us throughout this project is 

greatly appreciated. 

We also need to thank many experts, including those from several non-governmental 

organizations, the U.S. Institute of Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

the Center for a New American Security, the Project on National Security Reform, and the 

RAND Corporation. We also would like to thank the students at the Woodrow Wilson School 

of Public and International Affairs for sharing the results of their work on PRTs with us. 

AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 9 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

HASC OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS MEMBERS.................................................................................. 1 

HASC OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS STAFF ........................................................................................ 3 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................................ 7 

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................... 9 

INTRODUCTION: .......................................................................................................................................... 11 

WHAT WE DID: STUDY OBJECTIVES............................................................................................. 12 

BACKGROUND......................................................................................................................... 13 

HOW WE DID IT: STUDY METHODS ............................................................................................. 17 

SO WHAT? MAJOR FINDINGS ......................................................................................................... 18 

OBJECTIVES: WHAT ARE WE TRYING TO DO HERE? .......................................................... 18 

LEADERSHIP: WHO’S IN CHARGE? . ...................................................................................... 20 

FUNDING: WHERE’S THE MONEY? ....................................................................................... 22 

STAFFING: WHO ARE THESE PEOPLE?.................................................................................. 25 

EFFECTIVENESS: WHAT DOES SUCCESS LOOK LIKE?......................................................... 26 

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS: ARE WE ALONE?................................................................... 29 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................................................... 31 

THE TACTICAL/FIELD LEVEL........................................................................................................ 31 

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL............................................................................................................. 38 

POLICY AND GUIDANCE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL .................................................................. 50 

A WORD ABOUT CONGRESS...................................................................................................................... 53 

CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................................ 55 

APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS........................................................................................................................... 57 

APPENDIX B: HEARINGS, BRIEFINGS, INTERVIEWS............................................................................... 59 

APPENDIX C: PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM SURVEYS........................................................... 67 

APPENDIX D: NSPD-44............................................................................................................................. 75 

AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 11 

INTRODUCTION:

OF AGENCY STOVEPIPES AND “STRATEGIC AGILITY”

America will change our approach to help the Iraqi government...We will 

double the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These teams bring 

together military and civilian experts to help local Iraqi communities pursue 

reconciliation, strengthen the moderates, and speed the transition to Iraqi 

self-reliance. And Secretary Rice will soon appoint a reconstruction 

coordinator in Baghdad to ensure better results for economic assistance 

being spent in Iraq. 

President George W. Bush 

Announcing the Iraq Surge 

January 10, 2007 

The Iraqi people quickly realized that something dramatic had happened. 

Those who had worried that America was preparing to abandon them 

instead saw...our troops, along with Provincial Reconstruction Teams that 

include Foreign Service Officers and other skilled public servants, coming in 

to ensure that improved security was followed by improvements in daily life. 

Our military and civilians in Iraq are performing with courage and 

distinction, and they have the gratitude of our whole nation. 

President George W. Bush 

State of the Union Address 

January 28, 2008 

Often, PRTs have been left on their own, with little strategic guidance, 

minimal funding, a lack of staff, and overly restrictive security requirements. 

The arrival of PRTs in Iraq may be too late to be of real value, and their 

presence in Afghanistan may lack critical mass to make a difference. PRTs 

will need to change to in order to fulfill their promise—and too much should 

not be expected of them. 

Frederick Barton 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

HASC Oversight and Investigations Hearing 

September 5, 2007
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 12 

WHAT WE DID: STUDY OBJECTIVES

The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations chose to 

investigate Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) because they are considered to be critical 

to our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The subcommittee used PRTs as a case study of an 

issue that the subcommittee has been interested in – examining in more depth how multiple 

agencies work together, or for that matter, do not work together in the field and in 

Washington, as the third quote above suggests. As we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 

national effort involves more than just military actions, and instead requires integrated efforts 

and the resources of government departments and agencies beyond the Department of 

Defense (the Department, DOD). PRTs illustrate the need for effective, integrated action to 

achieve government-wide “unity of effort” in complex contingency operations. We wanted to 

know how the departments and agencies in Washington give comprehensive and consistent 

guidance to the military services and combatant commanders (COCOMs), as well as how both 

Washington and organizations at agency, service, and COCOM levels support interagency 

operations in the field. After all, mission success will only be ensured if senior leaders 

adequately guide and support the people who the nation has asked to do difficult jobs under 

dangerous and challenging conditions. 

To support the committee’s oversight responsibilities, the subcommittee sought to 

accomplish the following: 

• Understand the Administration’s strategy and plans for the use of PRTs, and how this 

strategy supports larger campaign plans and strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well 

as in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations more 

generally; 

• Delineate the roles of the Department of Defense, other U.S. Government (USG) 

agencies and departments, and coalition allies in PRTs and PRT-like entities; 

• Understand the brigade combat teams’ (BCTs’) and regimental combat teams’ (RCTs’) 

relationships to various kinds of PRTs, including command and control issues; 

• Understand the capabilities of various kinds of PRTs; 

• Review DOD and related interagency assumptions, processes, and metrics used to 

assess the accomplishments of PRTs; 

• Assess the resources invested in PRTs against the returns on those investments; 

• Contribute to congressional oversight of PRTs, Iraq, Afghanistan, and interagency 

operations; 

• Report findings and recommendations to the House Armed Services Committee or 

other committees of jurisdiction for further hearings and legislation; and 

• Present information for public debate, with the hope of improving the Department’s 

approach to organizing, training, and equipping military members for PRTs, and 

optimizing military support to PRTs. 

This report includes only a brief summary of how the subcommittee went about this 

oversight project (more detail can be found at Appendix B). We have focused instead on our 

major findings, and lay out the details of these, with related recommendations, at the tactical 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 13 

level (field operations), the operational level (combatant commands, services, and agencies 

with their policy and guidance responsibilities and their ‘organize, train, and equip’ missions), 

and at the strategic level in Washington. 

The PRT tactical-level concept and the fact that there are approximately 50 such U.S. 

units on the ground reflect a willingness among government agencies to move outside of 

“stovepipes.” However, the subcommittee found many significant issues during the course of 

our study. Although efforts have been made over the last seven years attempting to improve 

interagency coordination and cooperation, the government has not gone far enough or fast 

enough to support the people in the field or accomplish the nation’s mission. The efforts that 

have been made must be assessed to determine whether interagency integration is improving 

or whether a different approach is needed. Many people are working very hard, but processes 

and structures in Washington still resemble what was used in the Cold War rather than what is 

needed to best address our nation’s current and future opportunities and challenges. While 

agency stovepipes still exist, the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan offer lessons we can use at 

every level to increase our “strategic agility”. What our nation needs now is a sense of urgency 

in capturing and applying these lessons. Our recommendations are meant to foster just that. 

BACKGROUND

Provincial Reconstruction Teams vary quite dramatically between Iraq and Afghanistan 

and even between provinces in each theater of operations. Generally though, PRTs are teams 

of civilians and military personnel charged with working in areas of conflict with host-country 

locals and governments below the national level, to build their capacity and their ties to the 

national government. They do have a security mission, but their focus is on civil community 

building and development. While the military mission has been to develop host nations’ 

security forces and to help secure the population, that alone will not bring independence, 

peace, and prosperity. Economic and political advances are needed as well, and this is where 

PRTs are meant to contribute. While part of the PRTs’ mission is labeled reconstruction, in 

some places PRTs must construct anew. In other cases, their mission is not about construction 

or reconstruction, but instead focuses on developing capacity for governance. 

The PRT program, which began in Afghanistan in 2002, continues to evolve.1

 PRTs 

require tactical-level flexibility to respond to prevailing security conditions, the maturity of the 

province, and the geography of the area in which the PRT operates. There are 26 PRTs in 

Afghanistan. The United States leads 12 of these. Other International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) coalition partners lead the remaining 14. ISAF is the NATO-led force operating 

in Afghanistan under a United Nations (UN) mandate.2

 The size and composition of PRTs 

vary. In Afghanistan, U.S.-led PRTs typically consist of 50-100 personnel, of which only 3 or 4 

members are USG civilians or contractors. An Air Force lieutenant colonel or Navy 

commander leads the PRT, but does not command the non-DOD civilians.In addition, PRTs 

 

1 Some view the PRT program as similar to the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) 

program used in Vietnam, and they suggest that there may be lessons from the CORDS experience that are yet to 

be applied. See Phillip Carter, “The Thin Green Line, What the latest violence reveals about the failed U.S. 

strategy in Iraq,” slate.com, October 18, 2006. Accessed August 28, 2007. 2 ISAF Fact Sheet, April 2007. Available at: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_leaflet.pdf. Accessed 

August 27, 2007. 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 14 

have two Army civil affairs teams with four soldiers each. The U.S. model also typically 

includes a military police unit, a psychological operations unit, an explosive ordinance/demining unit, an intelligence team, medics, a force protection unit, and administrative and 

support personnel.3 An Afghan representing the Ministry of Interior may also be part of the 

team.4 These PRTs should include a single representative each from the U.S. Department of 

State (DOS), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture (USDA). However, a June 2006 interagency assessment of PRTs 

reported that not all PRTs had a full civilian complement, and the subcommittee found this 

still to be the case.5 U.S.-led PRTs are usually co-located on a military base with combat 

maneuver units operating in the same area or battlespace. 

In Iraq, there are two types of U.S.-led PRTs: 11 PRTs in a program originally 

inaugurated by Secretary of State Rice in November 2005,6 and 13 additional PRTs that were 

subsequently formed as part of the 

President’s “New Way Forward” in 2007. 

These latter 13 are called “embedded” 

PRTs (e-PRTs) because, unlike the original 

Iraq PRTs, they are embedded in BCTs or 

RCTs. In addition to PRTs, other kinds of 

units do similar work, including Provincial 

Security Teams and Regional 

Reconstruction Teams. Coalition members 

Britain, Italy, and the Republic of Korea 

each lead a PRT. 

In contrast to the Afghanistan 

PRTs, Department of State personnel lead 

the Iraq PRTs. Civilians (including many 

contractors) staff the original PRTs. As in 

Afghanistan, each PRT is different. 

Security for the original PRTs is provided 

by either a contracted Personnel Security Detail or a Military Movement Team provided by a 

nearby unit. The original PRTs may have as many as 100 team members. They can include 

personnel from DOS, USAID, USDA, the Department of Justice, Multi-National Force-Iraq 

(MNF-I), the Gulf Region Division of the Army Corps of Engineers, USAID contractors 

(Research Triangle International), and locally employed Iraqi staff.7 These PRTs are located on 

forward operating bases (FOBs). 

 

3 Robert Perito, The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified, Special 

Report 152, United States Institute of Peace, October 2005, p. 5. 4 Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment, Department of State, Department of 

Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development, June 2006, p. 8. 5 Ibid. 

6 The United States leads 8 of the original 11 PRTs. See, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program Expansion 

in Iraq, SIGIR-07-014, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, July 25, 2007, p. 1. 7 “Action Plan to Build Capacity and Sustainability Within Iraq’s Provincial Governments,” Department of State 

Cable 4045. See also Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, SIGIR-06-034, Office of the Special 

Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, October 29, 2006, p. 1. 

Picture taken after a ribbon-cutting of a micro-hydro electric plant built 

in the Qarghayi District of Laghman Province, Afghanistan, June 2006. 

(Air Force Photo/Capt. Gerardo Gonzalez) 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 15 

A cable from U.S. Embassy Baghdad set the military requirement for the original 

PRTs as follows: “3 officers to serve as deputy team leaders, a major subordinate command 

liaison officer, an engineer, and a civil affairs team consisting of 4-20 personnel.”8 In October 

2006, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) reported that the military 

often filled civilian slots (economic, agricultural, or local government advisers) when there was 

difficulty attracting civilians for assignment.9 SIGIR also reported that the military personnel 

who filled those slots “did not possess the full range of needed skills.”10 

According to Robert Perito of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the U.S. 

Chief of Mission and the MNF-I Commander sent “initial instructions” establishing the Iraq 

PRTs, but there is still no approved doctrine for them. In addition, there are no “agreed 

[upon] objectives, delineation of authority and responsibility between the civilian and military 

personnel plans, or job descriptions.”11 In fact, during the first year of PRT operations in Iraq, 

the Departments of State and Defense could not agree on who would support them or how. 

The two departments signed a Memorandum of Agreement in November 2006 resolving 

these issues. However, according to Perito, the earlier disagreement over security 

arrangements delayed the PRTs’ deployments and limited their effectiveness.12 

The original PRTs in Iraq continue to work at the provincial level, while the new ePRTs embed “directly into the brigade combat teams (BCTs) to deploy into neighborhoods 

and work at the district and municipal level.”13 Of the 13 e-PRTs, 5 of them operate in 

Baghdad, 3 in the outer Baghdad area, 3 in al Anbar, 1 in Wasit, and 1 in North Babil. A 

Department of State Foreign Service Officer (FSO) leads each e-PRT. The FSO and the BCT 

or RCT commander are responsible for developing the e-PRT’s joint action plan. The 

embedded civilians act as an advisory team to the military commander. These advisors round 

out the BCT/RCT, so that the so-called “three D’s” of stabilization operations (defense, 

diplomacy, and development) are represented. USAID provides development officers. The 

FSO and a USAID representative, along with a military contractor who serves as a bilingual 

bicultural advisor, form the “core” of the e-PRT. The core groups for the e-PRTs began 

deploying to Iraq early in 2007. The Department of Defense is providing most of the military 

and civilian personnel for these teams, which were projected to be fully manned by the end of 

December 2007. The Department of State intends to backfill these positions by the end of 

September 2008 with non-DOD civilians.14 The number of PRTs and e-PRTs has changed 

over time. For example, when the President announced the “New Way Forward” in January 

2007, he announced the creation of 10 e-PRTs. When the subcommittee began its review of 

the PRT programs in Afghanistan and Iraq in August 2007, the number of e-PRTs had 

 

8 “Action Plan to Build Capacity and Sustainability Within Iraq’s Provincial Governments,” Department of State 

Cable 4045. 

9 Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, SIGIR-06-034, Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction, October 29, 2006, p. 1. 

10 Ibid, p.15. 11 Robert Perito, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, Special Report 185, United States Institute of Peace, March 

2007, p. 3. 

12 Ibid, p. 8. 

13 Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program Expansion in Iraq, SIGIR-07-014, Office of the Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction, July 25, 2007, p. i. 14 “On-the-record briefing on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq,” Department of State, February 

7, 2007, available at: http://www.reliefewb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EKOI-6Y88FU?OpenDocument. 

Accessed August 29, 2007. 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 16 

increased to 15. As of March 2008, the Department of Defense reported that the number of 

e-PRTs decreased to 13, which may be due to the redeployment of the brigade combat teams 

within which they were embedded. During that same timeframe, the number of PRTs 

increased from 10 to 11. 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams exemplify the type of interagency stability operations 

units deemed by the Administration to be essential to reconstruction and counterinsurgency. 

General Petraeus specifically included e-PRTs in his 10-point counterinsurgency guidance and 

recognized that to fully use military and civilian capabilities, the e-PRT civilians needed to be 

integrated in all aspects of MNF-I operations “from inception through execution.”15 However, 

PRTs and e-PRTs are not subject to a unified or comprehensive plan for stability, security, 

transition, and reconstruction in either Iraq or Afghanistan. The December 7, 2005 National 

Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) established the interagency policy framework 

for preparing, planning for, and conducting stabilization and reconstruction activities. It 

directs the Department of State to lead these USG efforts in close enough coordination with 

the Department of Defense “to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. 

military operations across the spectrum of conflict.” The Secretary of Defense issued guidance 

that the Department should prioritize stabilization and reconstruction activities at a level 

comparable to combat operations in the form of DOD Directive 3000.05, published in 

November 2005. However, earlier this year, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England 

directed the revision of DODD 3000.05. Reportedly, the new directive will incorporate 

stability operations into the Irregular Warfare Roadmap.

16

 

15 David Petraeus, “Multi-National Force – Iraq Counterinsurgency Guidance,” 

http://www.forceaerienne.forces.gc.ca/cfawc/Contemporary_Studies/2007/2007-Jun/2007-06-06_MNFI_COIN_Guidance-Summer_2007_v7_f.asp. Accessed August 29, 2007. 16 “England Commissions Wide-Ranging Irregular Warfare Directive,” InsideDefense.com, February 8, 2008. 

Spc. Ashley N. Stermole, a medic with the Gardez PRT, diagnoses children during a MEDCAP 

mission at the Gardez Orphanage. (Army photo/Sgt. Chuck D. Meseke) 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 17 

HOW WE DID IT: STUDY METHODS17

In pursuing our project over six months, subcommittee members and staff 

participated in 17 congressional and staff delegation trips, including 5 visits to Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams and the U.S. Embassies in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the 

NATO/ISAF headquarters in Afghanistan. Travel within the United States included trips to: 

Central Command, Special Operations Command, and Joint Forces Command Headquarters; 

Fort Bragg, where PRT training is conducted; Fort Campbell, home of the 101st Airborne 

Division, which is replacing the current U.S. headquarters in Afghanistan; and the 

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, National Defense University, and Foreign 

Service Institute. While subcommittee members were only able to visit one non-U.S.-led PRT, 

run by Turkey in Afghanistan, the subcommittee benefited from concurrent research carried 

out by a group at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School. This analysis, comparing 

U.S. and non-U.S. NATO PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, was supported by interviews with 

officials in host nation capitals.18 Finally, staff also met with NATO ISAF personnel in 

Afghanistan and in Washington. 

The subcommittee held eight hearings on this topic, including three specifically on 

interagency integration and national security reform for reconstruction and stabilization 

operations. Among the 30 witnesses at these hearings were the senior administration officials 

responsible for these operations, as well as leading practitioners, scholars and analysts. 

Additionally, members received five briefings, including two panel discussions with former 

PRT members. Subcommittee staff received more than 50 briefings, many by USG personnel, 

and a number of which were with private volunteer and non-governmental organizations 

(NGOs) performing relief and humanitarian assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to 

reviewing USIP’s 2005 survey of PRT members19 and holding informal interviews and 

meetings with PRT members, the Oversight and Investigations staff conducted a formal 

survey of more than 95 current and former PRT members who served within the last 2 years 

(Appendix C). 

Finally, in addition to our work on PRTs, the subcommittee conducted a parallel effort 

on the civilians from DOD and other federal agencies who deploy for PRT and other work in 

the zones of conflict. Since our findings for that investigation go beyond those specifically 

focused on PRTs, we have decided to publish that study separately in order for it to get the 

attention it deserves. That report is titled, Deploying Federal Civilians to the Battlefield: Incentives, 

Benefits, and Medical Care, and will be posted on the committee website. 

 

17 See Appendix B for details. 18 Nima Abbaszadeh et al, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Lessons and Recommendations, Woodrow Wilson School of 

Public & International Affairs, Princeton University, January 2008. 19 USIP Oral History Project on Stability Operations, http://www.usip.org/library/oh/. 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 18 

SO WHAT? MAJOR FINDINGS

While capabilities have developed over time, PRT planning and operations started in an ad

hoc manner and they remain decentralized. The relevant departments have not articulated clear 

objectives for what they want PRTs to do, and they cannot effectively evaluate their 

performance. Additionally, Central Command (CENTCOM), which oversees both theaters of 

operation, has not taken an active role in providing guidance. Major issues that became 

evident during our investigation included mission objectives, leadership, funding, staffing, 

measuring effectiveness, and leveraging partnerships. 

OBJECTIVES: WHAT ARE WE TRYING TO DO HERE? 

The mission has not been clearly defined.

On the issue of civil-military integration, the problems that we are finding are 

that there is really no permanent, predictable method of integrating decisionmaking and resource-sharing. Instead, there is a patchwork quilt of 

memoranda of agreements and FRAGOs [fragmentary orders] and military 

orders and cables that, all together, sort of provide the policy underpinnings 

that are used by PRTs. 

Ginger Cruz 

Deputy Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

HASC Oversight and Investigations Hearing 

September 5, 2007 

Improvisation is not a concept of operations. PRTs really need an agreed 

concept of operations and an agreed organizational structure with a single 

chain of command. 

Robert Perito 

United States Institute of Peace 

HASC Oversight and Investigations Hearing 

October 18, 2007 

There is no clear definition of the PRT mission, no concept of operations or doctrine, 

no standard operating procedures. Perhaps this should not be surprising, given the PRTs’ 

improvised origins, the wide variety of entities with the same name, and their extremely 

different operating environments. Absent a comprehensive strategy from Washington or from 

CENTCOM headquarters, the direction of PRTs has been ad hoc and personality-driven. In 

Afghanistan the draft Afghan National Development Strategy provides a general framework for 

PRT construction efforts. In Iraq, however, there is no clear-cut framework for PRT activities. 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 19 

Despite common problems experienced by PRTs, the effort to develop common solutions or, 

at a minimum, formally and comprehensively share best practices has been uneven. While 

tactical-level flexibility is necessary and good, it is a problem when it is accompanied by a lack 

of clear national-level and theater-level direction. For example, according to the June 2006 

Interagency Assessment of Afghan PRTs conducted by the DOS, DOD, and USAID, a PRT’s 

military and civilian leaders assess the environment in their area and develop strategies to 

achieve the objectives of (1) extending the Afghan central government’s authority; (2) 

improving security; and (3) promoting reconstruction. The guidance gave no further 

instruction regarding essential tasks PRTs were to perform, which the Interagency Assessment 

found gave PRTs “flexibility to adapt to local conditions.” However, they also reported a 

significant downside in that the lack of guidance caused confusion “about what a PRT is, what 

it ought to do, and what its limits should be.”20

Objectives for Iraq may exist in the Joint Campaign Plan (JCP), but the Administration 

has not obliged repeated congressional requests to review the current JCP. Even if it does 

exist, the JCP strategic-level guidance has not been translated into operational-level guidance. 

This was particularly difficult given that the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA), which 

supports PRTs in Iraq, had three directors in its first few months.21 With more provinces 

under Iraqi control, the development of a strategic framework between Iraq and the United 

States, and the December 2008 expiration of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 

1790, which among other things is the legal mandate for Multi-National Force-Iraq, it is more 

important than ever that the PRT mission be clearly defined. In Afghanistan, the Combined 

Joint Task Force-82 (CJTF-82) leaders have designated an element of their organization, called 

the C-9 staff, to give guidance and support to U.S.-led PRTs with some success. Whether this 

will survive transition to the next CJTF remains uncertain. 

PRT members told us they spent significant time compiling reports on their activities 

and the conditions in their area of operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. However, there is no 

systematic method of measuring a PRT’s performance or effectiveness. 

Many of our sources observed that PRT operations have been and continue to be a 

“pick up game.” Again, we commend the PRT members, who often operate in the face of 

danger, performing jobs outside their training or military operational specialty, who, 

nevertheless, have been determined to carry out their mission. Indeed, several PRT members 

told the subcommittee that their work on the PRTs has been some of the most rewarding in 

their careers. 

 

20 Interagency Assessment, pp. 8-9. 

21 From 2005-2007, the National Coordination Team under the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, in the 

Embassy, led the PRT effort. 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 20 

LEADERSHIP: WHO’S IN CHARGE? 

There is a lack of unity of command resulting in a lack of unity of effort. 

Iraqi officials commonly suffer from something we call interlocutor fatigue, 

where a whole parade of U.S. officials—a major, a colonel, a PRT team 

leader, a USAID guide, a contractor who works for USAID—will come in at 

various points and will meet with Iraqi leaders. And so, it is very easy to see 

how Iraqis get extremely confused[,] and how PRTs spend an inordinate 

amount of time trying to coordinate and still fall short because there is too 

much coordination that needs to go on. 

Ginger Cruz 

Deputy Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

HASC Oversight and Investigations Hearing 

September 5, 2007 

Command and control varies with the leadership of the teams and their related 

military commands and civilian supervisors. Essentially, there are multiple chains of 

command: through the military, the Office of Provincial Affairs, the embassies, and 

Washington-based country representatives of the departments and agencies. The PRTs thus 

lack clean lines of authority, and the coordination procedures between civilian and military 

personnel are disjointed and incoherent, which can have the unintended effect of making a 

PRT’s operations personality-driven. In Iraq, U.S.-led PRTs receive operational guidance from 

the Ambassador and Commanding General of MNF-I, but all U.S.-led PRTs notionally report 

to the Chief of Mission. They receive further policy guidance and support from the Office of 

Provincial Affairs, and security and transportation support from MNF-I. In Afghanistan, 

PRTs receive policy guidance from the PRT Executive Steering Committee in Kabul, which is 

co-chaired by the Afghan Minister of the Interior and the ISAF Commander. Each coalition 

country’s PRTs are organized and staffed differently. In any case, the Executive Steering 

Committee’s place in the chain of command, its responsibility, and its authorities appear to be 

weak. Operational issues are addressed by a subordinate PRT Working Group, which also 

includes the United Nations (UN) and relevant embassy representatives. But, U.S.-led PRTs 

receive operational guidance from the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) commander, dualhatted as the Regional Command-East commander. This arrangement effectively grants the 

sitting maneuver force commander the authority to reassign a PRT’s security force to other 

missions. The CJTF commander reports to CENTCOM as well as to the ISAF NATO 

commander. 

The three PRT principals in Afghanistan—the Departments of Defense and State and 

USAID—tend to function as partners, but with the military “commander” acting as the senior 

partner. While this arrangement works well where a spirit of cooperation and unity prevails, 

PRTs will benefit from a more coherent structure that relies less on getting the right 

personalities together at the right place and time. Each agency’s officer in the tri-partite PRT 

leadership reports back through his or her “parent” chain. Civilian leaders also ostensibly 

report directly back to the DOS regional bureaus or the Director of Foreign Assistance (dualhatted as the Administrator of USAID), rather than the State Coordinator for Reconstruction 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 21 

and Stability (S/CRS). At DOD, the regional bureaus within the Office of the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Policy provide strategic guidance for military members and military leaders of 

PRTs instead of that guidance coming from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Stability Operations Capabilities. 

In Iraq, many e-PRTs, chartered to advise the BCT or RCT commander, appear to be 

directed more by the unit with which they are embedded than the civilian leader. On the other 

hand, some e-PRTs reportedly operate with only loose links to their military unit. There is no 

definitive plan for the status of e-PRTs when their BCT or RCT is redeployed, although one is 

reportedly in the works. For DOD personnel filling Department of State billets, the chain of 

command is even less certain. Military reservists and National Guard personnel who 

volunteered to fill civilian billets until September 2008 are serving in uniform rather than as 

civilians. In some units, there are a number of full colonels either equal or superior in rank to 

the military commanders for whom they are working. Iraqis, and some U.S. military 

commanders, will often value uniformed over civilian-clothed U.S. counterparts; they 

mistakenly look to the colonel’s eagles rather than the civilian PRT leaders as the responsible 

authority. If reserve component officers fill civilian billets, and therefore deploy in civilian 

capacity, they should not wear uniforms or rank senior or junior in grade to the civilian 

equivalent for that position. 

To complicate things further, BCTs and RCTs, as well as Embassy staffs, have their 

own governance, rule of law, and development programs that may complement, conflict, or 

duplicate the work of the PRTs. Finally, the subcommittee has been told that the real location 

of direction for PRTs rests with the Policy Coordinating Committee of the National Security 

Council (NSC) for both Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The Pentagon’s chart depicting the organization for the Afghanistan effort shows how 

convoluted organization can be:22

 

22 Department of Defense-led briefing for House Armed Services Committee staff, January 25, 2008. 

Interagency Coordination In-Country Command & Control 

Principals Committee

Deputies Committee

Afghanistan Steering Group

US Embassy Country Team

Interagency country reps 

Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams 

US Ambassador -

NATO 

NATO HQs SHAPE 

JFC BRUNSSUM

CDR ISAF

Other Regional 

Commanders 

US-led PRTs Non-US PRTs 

BCT CDR (RC East)

CJTF-82 CDR (RC 

East) 

CDR CENTCOM

TCN AMBs EU Special 

Rep 

MOF 

RRD 

US Ambassador

Kabul 

SRSG

Minister of 

Interior

NATO SCR 

PRT ESC 

Co-Chairs 

Policy Direction 

National 

Command 

NATO OPCON 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 22 

FUNDING: WHERE’S THE MONEY? 

Funding is not consolidated for stability operations at the provincial and local levels and 

funding streams are extremely confusing.

There must be a better alignment of mission and resources on a PRT level. The 

military supports security sector reform, USAID supports reconstruction and 

development, yet neither have funding mechanisms that are appropriate to do those 

jobs. And this also really confused Afghans and aid agencies who didn't understand 

why the military part of a PRT was building schools and clinics when the local police 

have no uniforms, vehicles or facilities. 

Michelle Parker 

Former PRT Member 

International Affairs Fellow, RAND Corporation 

HASC Oversight and Investigations Hearing 

September 5, 2007 

PRT project funding in both Iraq and Afghanistan relies heavily on the military’s 

Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. This reliance is due in large 

measure to relatively streamlined bureaucratic procedures for project approval. Although 

originally established for purposes such as condolence payments, repair of property damage 

resulting from U.S. military operations, and urgent humanitarian or reconstruction needs, 

CERP money is now employed on a more routine basis to demonstrate goodwill and create a 

favorable local reaction. CERP funds cannot be used, however, for salaries of local 

government officials or the training, equipping, or operating costs of Iraqi or Afghan military 

or other security forces. In Afghanistan, there are reports of BCT commanders taking CERP 

funds meant for PRTs for the larger military unit’s purposes. In addition to CERP money, the 

USAID field officer in the PRT provides access to Local Governance and Community 

Development (LGCD) Program Funds and, in Afghanistan, “Quick Impact Program” funds.23

To the frustration of the PRTs, LGCD funds take longer to access than CERP funds. These 

USAID funds typically go toward small capacity-building endeavors. In Afghanistan, it is 

imperative that funding be timely, particularly to secure it in the fall when supporting 

agricultural efforts. The Department of State recently approved a resource stream for its 

officers on PRTs in Iraq called Quick Reaction Funds (QRF). There is no counterpart to QRF 

in Afghanistan. Some have suggested that the varied restrictions on the uses of these different 

funds coupled with the relative ease of access to the funds can distort project planning. That 

is, projects are chosen based on how funds can be spent and how quickly funds can be 

accessed rather than actual local needs. 

The demand for CERP funding in Afghanistan is rising. Demand for CERP funding 

in Iraq should be decreasing because the capacity for the Iraqi government to fund its own 

governance and economic growth is increasing. If the Government of Iraq spent more of its 

unobligated revenues for reconstruction and development, more CERP money could be 

 

23 USAID/Afghanistan Program Description, http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Program.31a.aspx. Accessed 

August 29, 2007. 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 23 

available for PRTs in Afghanistan. However, in fiscal year 2007, CERP obligations in Iraq 

increased to $879.9 million while decreasing to $206.0 million in Afghanistan. The rationale 

for this trend is unclear, but it could reflect the growing use of CERP funding in support of 

wider counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. 

Other actors (BCTs, RCTs, and agencies represented at the Embassy) have funds to 

apply to programs similar to those the PRTs typically fund, including humanitarian aid, 

governance, rule of law, and development projects. The chart below, provided to the 

subcommittee staff at a DOD, DOS, and USAID joint briefing, highlights the complexity 

facing PRTs as far as funding is concerned, and highlights why national-level coordination is 

needed. PRTs have the greatest access to funding where the circles overlap as between the 

Local Governance Program and the Provincial Reconstruction Development Council funds. 

They have some, but not direct, access to funds where the circles touch. They do not have 

access to the funds where the circles do not touch or overlap. The briefers indicated that this 

chart, identifying all of the various U.S. Government funding sources that have an impact at 

the provincial level, had to be specially created for the briefing. The briefers told staff the 

chart had taken a fair amount of time and consideration to construct because the funds are 

not controlled or coordinated centrally; rather, different agencies control the different funds.24

 

24 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Department of State, and Agency for International 

Development briefings for House Armed Services Committee and House Committee on Foreign Affairs staff, 

January 10-11, 2008. Dollar amounts have been deleted. 

3⁄4 Program funds are controlled by various agencies 

3⁄4 Economic Support Fund (ESF) is the primary program funding source for PRTs 

3⁄4 PRTs serve as a coordination tool to ensure alignment of strategy, minimize duplication, and 

maximize synergy 

Commander’s 

Emergency 

Response 

Fund 

DOD 

ESF 

Local 

Governance 

Program 

USAID 

ESF 

Community 

Stabilization 

Program 

USAID 

Agriculture and 

Private Sector 

Development 

USAID 

ESF 

Community 

Action 

Program 

USAID

Paul Brinkley 

Business 

Transformation 

Agency 

DOD 

Iraqi Relief and 

Reconstruction 

Fund, 

Other 

ESF 

PRDC 

Provincial 

Reconstruction 

Development Council 

– Iraqi 

QRF

 

 = ESF PRDC 

 = QRF 

 

 = Coordination 

 Partner 

USG Funding Sources with Provincial Impact 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 24 

As of August 2007, the United States was spending approximately $20.0 million per 

year per PRT in Afghanistan. The subcommittee could not find this type of data for Iraq. The 

lack of clear cost data, measurable objectives, and a specific PRT strategy limited the 

subcommittee’s goal of assessing the value of U.S. resources invested in PRTs. The U.S. 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) has recommended increased congressional 

oversight of funds used by PRTs, and the subcommittee has requested that GAO produce a 

study of PRT cost data.25

 

25 GAO-07-801, Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, The United 

States Government Accountability Office, May 2007, p. 22. 

Mike Stevens, Baghdad-7 e-PRT agricultural advisor, shakes hands 

with Sayifiyah, Iraq, landowners as he distributes seeds after their third 

farmers union meeting Feb. 28, 2008, at Patrol Base Whitehouse. 

(Army Photo/ Sgt. Kevin Stabinsky)
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 25 

STAFFING: WHO ARE THESE PEOPLE? 

Selection, skill sets (including language and cultural familiarity), and training of PRT 

personnel continue to be problematic.

The cultural barriers between the military, DOS and other civilian agencies 

seem more striking than those between the US and Iraqis to me. We say the 

right things about breaking out of stovepipes, but our comfort level tends to 

put us right back in the mindset, language (each has its own set of acronyms) 

and ways of doing business. 

Sharon Williams 

USDA civilian employee 

Served in Afghanistan & Iraq, 2006-2008 

I certainly can't speak to the DOS side, but DOD, could really make a huge 

contribution if they took the time to properly [staff PRTs] and conduct 

biography reviews to select the appropriate individuals. 

Soldier serving on Iraq PRT 

2007-2008 

Finding qualified individuals with applicable skills and experience poses a significant 

challenge to staffing PRTs. Civilian agencies have not had capacity to surge to fill the 

increased number of PRTs in Iraq or the few civilian PRT positions in Afghanistan, and they 

may not have the rotational base to continue staffing these teams into the future. The 

Department of Defense has provided the vast majority of PRT personnel, including both 

civilian and military members, but it has had challenges providing personnel with appropriate 

skills. In other cases, civilian contractors have been hired to fill gaps. 

Progress toward a long-term solution for a “whole of government” approach to 

stabilization and reconstruction contingencies may lie in the proposed Civilian Stabilization 

Initiative (CSI), led by the DOS Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. This 

initiative would establish active, standby, and reserve corps to provide a civilian rapid response 

capability similar to that of a PRT. Like the military reserve, this civilian reserve would provide 

a pool of personnel with specific skills to deploy to meet the particular requirements of a 

contingency. Currently, the Department of State is not adequately resourced for this initiative, 

and it lacks congressional authorization to establish the civilian reserve corps. The House has 

acted to authorize a civilian reserve corps and passed H.R. 1084, “The Reconstruction and 

Stabilization Civilian Management Act,” but the measure has not been taken up yet in the 

Senate. Within the military, civil affairs skills appear to be the most relevant. However, PRT 

military commanders and personnel have, by and large, not received civil affairs training. 

Beyond staffing challenges, military and civilian training for personnel serving on 

PRTs evolved in an ad hoc manner over time. Two distinct types of training are now used for 

U.S.-led PRTs, depending on whether the PRT will serve in Afghanistan or Iraq. A third type 

of training is conducted at Oberammergau, Germany for coalition-led PRTs in Afghanistan. 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 26 

EFFECTIVENESS: WHAT DOES SUCCESS LOOK LIKE? 

Metrics do not exist for determining if PRTs are succeeding in supporting counterinsurgency or 

stability and reconstruction missions. This also means that we cannot know if PRTs are the 

best approach to use for stability and reconstruction operations.

I would say that there isn't a one-size-fits-all standard series of metrics at this 

point for PRTs in Afghanistan. 

Mitchell Shivers 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Central Asia Affairs 

HASC Oversight and Investigations Hearing 

October 4, 2007

How to evaluate the PRTs and their effectiveness is a difficult issue. We 

don't have a standard set of metrics yet. 

Major General Bobby Wilkes 

Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs for Asia, Joint Staff 

HASC Oversight and Investigations Hearing 

 October 4, 2007 

Without agreed objectives, it's difficult to judge effectiveness. There is need 

for a separate, agreed [upon] set of objectives for PRTs and an agreed [upon] 

set of measurements for measuring their performance. Absent a means of 

determining whether PRTs are effective, it's difficult to determine whether 

alternative mechanisms might better achieve our purposes. 

Robert Perito 

United States Institute of Peace 

HASC Oversight and Investigations Hearing 

October 18, 2007

... in regards [to] how are you going to know you're ultimately successful? 

It's when we close that PRT, PST or e-PRT down because the local people 

are doing the jobs for themselves...But to your point on the metric, the 

ultimate metric is when there's no longer a need for that PRT. 

Mark Kimmitt 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Middle East and South Asian Affairs 

HASC Oversight and Investigations Hearing 

October 4, 2007 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 27 

Neither the Department of Defense nor the Department of State adopted an “ends, 

ways, and means” approach to determine and measure PRTs’ progress and their alignment 

with operational and strategic goals. Nor have they adopted a performance monitoring system 

to provide an assessment tool that can measure the PRTs’ effectiveness and performance and 

their progress in meeting milestones for clearly defined objectives. 

There are no standard metrics by which PRTs are judged. Metrics that have been used 

have not been effective in measuring mission accomplishment or support to a national or 

theater strategy. Some data has been gathered on the location, staffing, resources, and other 

specifics about PRTs, but there is no comprehensive collection of this type of data for all 

PRTs. In addition, some outputs have been measured, such as the amount of funds spent or 

number of schools built, but this output data does not give planners and strategists a true 

sense of PRT impact. We understand that effects are not easily measured and that assessments 

of PRTs will be more subjective than quantitative. Still, decision makers must be able to judge 

the relative merit of actions taken. They must be able to judge effectiveness against a strategy 

in order to adapt plans to changing conditions on the ground. Interagency leaders and those 

who direct the PRT effort must engage in the art of measuring, even if one can argue that such 

a science does not exist. Instead, the departments and agencies are left with a variety of 

unofficial, anecdotal measures—from the ability of local and provincial governments to obtain 

and obligate funds, to the number of projects completed in an area, to levels of violence, to 

whether or not local nationals wave at U.S. personnel when they drive through a 

neighborhood. 

The subcommittee disagrees with those who suggest that the only metric for success 

of the PRTs is when they are no longer needed, and we welcome recent efforts to assess how 

well or poorly these units are meeting goals and objectives that support national and theater 

strategies. Although it appears that little was done related to Baghdad Embassy Cable 4045 

direction to design and collect PRT metrics from 2006 until late 2007, Phyllis Powers, the new 

Director of the Office of Provincial Affairs in Iraq, has recently tasked all Iraq PRTs 

(including coalition PRTs) to complete their workplans and to begin to measure performance 

against a development “maturity model,” which is a structured collection of elements that 

describe certain aspects of maturity in developing states. A maturity model can be used as a 

benchmark for assessing different 

provinces for equivalent comparison. 

The goal was to have an initial set of 

yardsticks in place before the April 

2008 Ambassador Crocker testimony 

to Congress. In addition, the 

Department of State Office of the 

Coordinator for Reconstruction and 

Stabilization has visited a number of 

PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 

Afghanistan, S/CRS representatives 

have been coaching and mentoring 

leadership teams on how to set 

appropriate measures of effectiveness. 

Finally, the Foreign Service Institute 

has invited S/CRS to present lessons 

Soldiers from 1st Platoon, 76th Engineer Company, Fort Knox, KY, build 

a hut in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. (Army photo) 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 28 

on designing effective metrics for stability and reconstruction operations. The subcommittee 

does recognize these efforts as progress. We further recognize that the Office of Provincial 

Affairs, despite experiencing turmoil as the result of a rapid turnover in leadership in its first 

few months, is now led by a director who has made a two-year commitment to the effort. In 

addition, the Office of Provincial Affairs is actively recruiting for strategic planners whose job 

it will be to coordinate strategic direction of the PRT program with Multi-National Force - 

Iraq, Multi-National Corps - Iraq, and the Department of State, and ensure that the PRT 

mission, objectives, and transition strategy are aligned with and supported by military 

planning.26

The bottom line, however, is that until PRTs receive consistent and clear direction 

from higher headquarters, they will not be able to maximize their efforts or judge their 

success. In this environment, resources cannot be programmed or applied effectively. The 

heroic tactical work being done by PRTs will go for naught without more coherent strategic 

and operational level guidance and oversight. In the absence of such guidance and oversight, 

resources, instead of supporting strategic agility, may be poorly prioritized and coordinated 

and, in some cases, squandered. 

 

26 International Resources Group Announcement, 

http://www.IRGLTD.COM/Contacts/recruitment.htm#iraq_sp. Accessed March 24, 2008. 

A teacher and his students sit in an outdoor classroom in the village of Alikheyl, Mehtar Lam District, Laghman Province, 

Afghanistan, February 2007. (Air Force Photo/Capt. Gerardo Gonzalez) 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 29 

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS: ARE WE ALONE? 

Coordination with PRT partners, particularly in Afghanistan, is haphazard and problematic. 

Differing national capabilities and priorities contribute to uncertainty in the PRT effort.

There is no agreement...between the U.S. and its allies on how PRTs should 

be organized [or] conduct operations, or what they should accomplish. 

Robert Perito 

United States Institute of Peace 

HASC Oversight and Investigations Hearing 

October 18, 2007 

Because PRTs fall under NATO direction, extensive coordination and 

consensus between allies is required to foster unity of effort....Different 

countries inherently have different capabilities and resources at their disposal, 

and some must rely on other, more capable allies for assistance in 

establishing and operating PRTs. 

Mitchell Shivers 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Central Asia Affairs 

HASC Oversight and Investigations Hearing 

October 4, 2007 

Domestic political constraints and priorities in the capitals of PRTcontributing countries are often directly translated into a PRT’s operational 

priorities. This diversity in field operations can negatively impact unity of 

effort and purpose across PRTs and creates the challenge of reconciling 

various PRT models in a multinational context...Politics aside, different 

countries’ capacities may make such variety necessary. 

“Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations” 

The Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University 

January 2008 

The United States does not have a monopoly on PRT activity in either Afghanistan or 

Iraq. In Iraq, coalition partners, the British, Italians and Koreans, run their own PRTs. In 

Afghanistan, more than half of the PRTs are run by NATO/ISAF nations, including Turkey, 

Germany, Norway, Sweden, Hungary, Spain, Italy, Lithuania, Canada, United Kingdom, the 

Netherlands, and the Czech Republic. In many cases, these coalition PRTs operate in a more 

permissive security environment and, accordingly, can often focus more on development 

work with non-governmental organizations and private sector partners. Their mandates 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 30 

typically focus on training and empowering local officials (capacity building) and building 

intra-governmental ties to Kabul. 

These coalition-led PRTs sometimes communicate with U.S.-led PRTs, sharing 

information, best practices, and goals. Communication is somewhat more structured in 

Afghanistan under ISAF, but overall there is no formal process in place that causes the PRTs 

to communicate with one another. U.S. representatives are embedded in almost all coalition 

PRTs as liaisons to facilitate a two-way flow of information and coordination. Partner PRT 

representatives are sometimes included in conferences, video discussions, and email 

exchanges, but their experiences and perspectives rarely appear to be factored into U.S. 

decision-making. Some American PRT representatives heading to Afghanistan as part of a 

coalition-led PRT may attend a week of training in Germany with their partner counterparts. 

The resulting personal connections contribute to better communications and coordination. 

This should be required training for U.S. personnel serving with coalition-led PRTs. 

Coalition partner PRTs have several major drawbacks for which the U.S. has had to 

compensate. Many of them are severely under-resourced, without access to funding streams 

such as CERP. For example, the Korean-run PRT in Irbil, Iraq has engaged with local 

officials, but is unable to provide significant resources to back up that engagement with real 

projects and programs. Others are able to provide varying levels of security and logistics 

support to their PRTs; few have a direct link to combat or security forces. While the 

Lithuanians in Afghanistan have provided a security force of approximately 125 military 

personnel, they rely on U.S. logistics and have no direct link to larger combat forces. On the 

other hand, Italy’s PRT in Iraq and New Zealand’s PRT in Afghanistan have been cited as 

models from which the United States could learn. 

Sgt. Amanda Timmer of the Wasit PRT in Iraq talks with students at the Kut Girls Secondary School after the 

ribbon-cutting ceremony for a new Internet center March 10, 2008. The center features 10 new computers and 

furniture. (Army Photo/ Sgt. 1st Class Stacy Niles) 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 31 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

This section of the report takes the information the subcommittee obtained and organizes 

that information into a series of findings and recommendations. Each of these sections begins 

with a brief recap of the relevant background material that informs the findings and 

recommendations within those sections. The findings and recommendations are made from 

three different perspectives, which are broken into three sections: 

(1) “Provincial Reconstruction Teams at the Tactical and Field Level” 

(2) “Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction – Policy and Guidance for PRTs 

from the Combatant Commands and Operational Level; and the services’ and 

agencies’ “Organize, Train, and Equip” Mission” 

(3) “DOD Directive 3000.05 and National Security Presidential Directive 44 – Policy and 

Guidance at the National Level.” 

There is a sense that PRTs are having some success connecting with their local 

counterparts. However, they are bound by the limits of their expertise and the support they 

receive from related military units, embassy country teams, and agencies in Washington. Our 

findings and recommendations are meant to outline persistent challenges and ensure that the 

people who do this difficult and dangerous mission have the tools and resources they need 

and should have. 

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS AT THE 

TACTICAL/FIELD LEVEL

Provincial Reconstruction Teams must have clear objectives against which to measure 

success or from which to identify alternate ways and means for achieving success. They must 

have a clear, unified chain of command to achieve unity of effort. They must have the right 

resources both in terms of funding and in terms of qualified personnel. Funding streams must 

make sense so they can be coordinated and deconflicted. Senior military and civilian leaders in 

Iraq and Afghanistan must also develop an idea of what PRTs will become as coalition forces 

transition from military combat and counterinsurgency missions to overwatch missions. 

Ultimately, the United States must define the conditions under which PRTs are no longer 

needed and more traditional diplomatic and development platforms can be used. 

As mentioned above, the subcommittee was not surprised that PRTs were begun in an 

ad hoc manner. However, we were amazed that, after five years, the PRT mission has not been 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 32 

more clearly defined, specifically regarding how they support U.S. and coalition strategies in 

Iraq and Afghanistan and support the host nations’ development plans. As part of Section 

1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), 

the President, acting through the Secretary of Defense, must report on the long-term strategy, 

mission, and objectives for each U.S.-led PRT in Afghanistan. The President’s first report 

under this requirement is not due until the end of April 2008. Other reports such as the 

Section 1227 Report on Iraq (Section 1227(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163)) and the Section 9010 Measuring Stability and Security 

in Iraq (Section 9010 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2007 

(Public Law 109-289)) require information to be reported to Congress. However, there is 

currently no statutory obligation to report on PRT strategies, work plans, or measures of 

effectiveness. None have been initiated by DOD in the absence of legislation. 

The subcommittee recognizes that the Office of Provincial Affairs has directed all Iraq 

PRTs to provide work plans with metrics based on a development “maturity model,” and we 

hope this effort will be both successful and sustained. However, we are not yet optimistic 

given how long this has taken and how much resistance there seems to be in some quarters to 

even the idea of “metrics” or “measures of effectiveness” for this mission. The subcommittee 

also recognizes that the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction 

and Stabilization (S/CRS) has visited some of the PRTs in Afghanistan to coach them on 

establishing measures of performance. Again, while we are reserved in our optimism, we are 

hopeful that leaders there are making headway.

“Unity of command” is an age-old principle of leadership and management that 

marries accountability and responsibility and provides personnel in the field clear guidance 

and direction. In 2003, Lieutenant General Barno and Ambassador Khalilzad in Afghanistan 

worked very well together. Similarly, today in Iraq, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker 

have collaborated closely. However, while “personalities matter,” the nation’s security should 

not have to rely on having compatible personalities to successfully carry out the mission. 

While senior leaders should get along in the interest of the mission, history is replete with 

examples where they have not. Rather than depending exclusively on personalities for success, 

the right interagency structures and processes need to be in place and working. As the 9/11 

Commission recognized, “Good people can overcome bad structures. They should not have 

to.”27

There is also no “unity of funding.” Instead there is a confusing array of “pots of 

money” with differing authorities and limitations. Although there is a significant amount of 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) directed funds and other organizations 

like the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, brigade combat teams (BCTs), and regimental combat 

teams (RCTs) have access to “reconstruction” money, the stream of money most often 

mentioned in conjunction with PRTs is the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program 

(CERP) fund. Not all CERP funds are spent by PRTs, but much of what the PRTs readily 

have at their disposal seems to be CERP. 

 

27 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. W.W. 

Norton and Company, New York, 2004, p. 399. 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 33 

Section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 

2006 (Public Law 109-163) defined CERP as the program established by the Administrator of 

the Coalition Provisional Authority to enable U.S. military commanders in Iraq to respond to 

urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility 

by carrying out programs that would immediately assist the Iraqi people. Department of 

Defense (DOD) guidance provides that CERP funds cannot be used for, among other things, 

providing goods, services, or funds to national armies, national guard forces, border security 

forces, civil defense forces, infrastructure protection forces, highway patrol units, police, 

special police, or intelligence or other security forces. Congress does not authorize CERP 

funding for Iraq and Afghanistan separately. The National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) authorized $977.4 million to be used in Iraq and 

Afghanistan for CERP during each of fiscal years 2008 and 2009. The law also extends the 

authority provided in 2006 NDAA for CERP. The 2008 NDAA CERP, consistent with the 

fiscal year 2006 authorization, is intended to provide commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan 

funds for use in small humanitarian and reconstruction projects in their area of responsibility 

that provide immediate assistance to the local population.

During the course of our investigation, we became convinced, as Secretary of Defense 

Robert Gates has often articulated, the civilian agencies of the federal government need more 

expeditionary capacity. In a speech last year at Kansas State University, Secretary Gates 

argued: 

What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending 

on the civilian instruments of national security – diplomacy, strategic 

communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic 

reconstruction and development. Secretary Rice addressed this need in a 

speech at Georgetown University nearly two years ago. We must focus our 

energies beyond the guns and steel of the military, beyond just our brave 

soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen. We must also focus our energies on the 

other elements of national power that will be so crucial in the coming years.28 

The federal government also needs a viable structure to manage that capacity. For that reason, 

the subcommittee supports funds for adding Foreign Service Officers and civil servants to the 

Department of State’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability office and to its efforts in 

the field. The latter is now known as the Civilian Stabilization Initiative.29

Finally, we need to know how PRTs will transition as security conditions and our 

military posture change. At the moment, this is more pressing in Iraq. At least nine Iraqi 

provinces have already transitioned to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). The United Nations 

presence will grow even as UN Security Resolution 1790, which provides the legal foundation 

for the Multi-National Force-Iraq presence in Iraq, expires on December 31, 2008. No one 

could tell us definitively what will happen to PRTs or the requirement for military support to 

PRTs once Provincial Iraqi Control occurs. In the meantime, U.S. and Iraqi leaders are 

 

28 The Honorable Robert M. Gates, Landon Lecture at Kansas State University, November 26, 2007. 29 H.R. 1084, “The Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act,” was passed by the U.S. House of 

Representatives by voice vote. The measure has not been taken up in the Senate because an individual Senator 

has a hold on it. 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 34 

designing a “strategic framework” and seek to conclude a Status of Forces Agreement and a 

diplomatic presence agreement. All of these activities and plans must take into account some 

transition in the composition and mission of the various kinds of PRTs, or the completion of 

their mission. 

Findings: 

(1) Section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public 

Law 110-181) requires the President, acting through the Secretary of Defense, to 

report, among other things, on the long term strategy, mission, and objectives for each 

United States-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan; the first report is 

due at the end of April 2008. However, neither the Department of Defense nor the 

Department of State has yet established a PRT strategy in Afghanistan or Iraq. 

(2) Neither the Department of Defense nor the Department of State adopted an “ends, 

ways, and means” approach to determine and measure Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams’ progress and their alignment with operational and strategic goals; nor have 

they adopted a performance monitoring system that measures the PRTs’ effectiveness, 

and progress in meeting clearly defined objectives. 

(3) Provincial Reconstruction Team tactical and operational objectives should be aligned 

with coalition operational and strategic goals and host nation development plans to 

ensure unity of effort. 

(4) Neither the Department of Defense nor the Department of State can provide basic 

information about what each Provincial Reconstruction Team is attempting to do or 

what progress PRTs are making individually or collectively. 

(5) The Department of Defense and the Department of State have not established clearly 

defined Provincial Reconstruction Team goals and milestones for achieving set 

objectives. 

(6) Neither the Department of Defense nor the Department of State set measures of 

effectiveness or measures of performance to assess the immediate, short-term, or 

longer-term impacts of Provincial Reconstruction Team activities. 

(7) The Department of Defense and the Department of State have only recently begun, 

and have yet to complete, plans to transition the Provincial Reconstruction Team 

mission in Iraq to more traditional diplomatic and development efforts. 

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM STRATEGIES AND 

EFFECTIVE, MEASURABLE PLANS AND MILESTONES
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 35 

Recommendation: 

The Departments of Defense and State should adopt a Provincial Reconstruction Team 

strategy (using an “ends, ways, and means”) approach to determine and measure PRTs’ 

progress, and to determine whether the PRT activities align with overall operational and 

strategic goals. The Departments of Defense and State should also adopt a performance 

monitoring system that measures the PRTs’ effectiveness and performance and their progress 

in meeting milestones for clearly defined objectives, including milestones for the eventual 

transition of the PRT mission to more traditional diplomatic and development efforts. 

Findings:

(1) Neither the stabilization and reconstruction activities, nor the civilian and military 

personnel serving on Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, 

enjoy unity of command. This shortcoming inhibits unity of effort, which can result 

in uncoordinated, and even counterproductive, outcomes. 

(2) Rather than having unity of command, PRTs in both Iraq and Afghanistan operate 

under complicated, disjointed and, at times, unclear chain(s) of command and receive 

direction from multiple sources. 

Recommendation: 

The Departments of Defense and State should unify leadership and command of Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams to match accountability with authority and to ensure unity of effort. 

Findings: 

(1) The demand for Commanders’ Emergency Response Program funds in Afghanistan is 

rising. Reasons for this increased demand include: increased military presence and 

activity in southern Afghanistan; expanded work and funding needs of Provincial 

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (AND STABILIZATION 

AND RECONSTRUCTION) INTERAGENCY UNITY OF COMMAND

USE OF THE COMMANDERS’ EMERGENCY RESPONSE 

PROGRAM (CERP) FUNDS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 36 

Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan; and, limited Afghan infrastructure and Afghan 

funding for reconstruction and development. 

(2) The demand for Commanders’ Emergency Response Program funds in Iraq should be 

decreasing. Reasons for a decrease include: growing Government of Iraq revenue and 

budgets; improved Iraqi infrastructure and basic services; and U.S. PRT guidance that 

directs PRTs to accomplish objectives without, or with minimal use of, U.S. funds. As 

governance and economic growth improve in Iraq, there is a requirement for more 

human (and more skilled human) capital that can improve Iraq’s government 

processes and project management. 

(3) The reasons for the increase in Commanders’ Emergency Response Program 

obligations in Iraq in fiscal year 2007 are unclear, but could reflect the use of CERP 

for counterinsurgency operations with a broader focus than urgent humanitarian relief 

and reconstruction. 

(4) The Department of Defense requested $1.2 billion in Commanders’ Emergency 

Response Program funding for fiscal year 2008, and is expected to further increase its 

request pending the completion of supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 2008. 

How this funding will be allocated between Iraq and Afghanistan to meet the 

respective needs of each country is unclear. 

Recommendations: 

(1) The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, should report to 

Congress on the current and planned allocation of Commanders’ Emergency 

Response Program (CERP) funding between Afghanistan and Iraq, and whether 

current policy for the allocation and use of CERP reflects: 

a. the need to encourage the Government of Iraq to assume responsibility for 

funding reconstruction and development projects; 

b. the evolving use of CERP in Iraq as part of the counterinsurgency; and 

c. the growing need for CERP funding in Afghanistan and the Government of 

Afghanistan’s inability to fund reconstruction and development projects itself. 

(2) The U.S. Government Accountability Office should conduct a study and report to 

Congress on all funding for Provincial Reconstruction Teams including both PRT 

and non-PRT Commanders’ Emergency Response Program, and other sources of 

funding, so that Congress can ascertain how much is spent per PRT per year. This 

assessment, along with measurable PRT objectives, will allow for a better 

understanding of the value of PRTs as a stabilization and reconstruction mechanism. 

GAO’s analysis can inform decisions on how best to consolidate and distribute 

funding for the PRT missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 37 

Findings: 

(1) When a province transitions to Provincial Iraqi Control, U.S. military presence is 

usually reduced and units move to a posture of operational overwatch. 

(2) The United States and the Islamic Republic of Iraq are negotiating a strategic 

framework agreement to provide the requisite authorities for U.S. presence in Iraq 

subsequent to the expiration of United National Security Council Resolution 1790 on 

December 31, 2008. 

(3) As the security situation in Iraq improves and the U.S. moves from a United Nations 

Security Council Resolution mandate to a strategic framework agreement, U.S. 

military presence in Iraq will likely decline and the work of Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams, with their focus on governance and economic development, will take on 

greater importance. 

(4) It remains unclear: 

a. whether embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams whose brigade combat 

teams or regimental combat teams redeploy will remain in place; 

b. whether PRTs operating in a province under Provincial Iraqi Control will be 

able to carry out their objectives, and whether they will continue to need 

significant coalition military support; and 

c. whether all or some of the PRTs will remain in place when a strategic 

framework agreement takes effect. 

Recommendations: 

(1) The Secretaries of Defense and State should notify Congress when they disband a 

PRT or e-PRT, or merge any combination of PRTs or e-PRTs in Iraq. 

(2) The Secretaries of Defense and State should report to Congress on: 

a. how the United States provides for the security and support of PRTs, e-PRTs, 

and similar units operating in provinces under Provincial Iraqi Control; and 

b. how the United States will provide for the security and support of PRTs, ePRTs, and similar units, subsequent to the expiration of United Nations 

Security Council Resolution 1790. 

IRAQ PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS AFTER 

PROVINCIAL IRAQI CONTROL AND THE EXPIRATION OF 

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1790
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 38 

STABILITY, SECURITY, TRANSITION, AND 

RECONSTRUCTION – POLICY AND GUIDANCE FOR PRTS 

FROM THE COMBATANT COMMANDS AND OPERATIONAL 

LEVEL; AND THE SERVICES’ AND AGENCIES’ ORGANIZE,

TRAIN, AND EQUIP MISSION

As mentioned above, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the field need the proper 

resources, both fiscal and human, to accomplish their mission. The combatant commands, 

military services, and government agencies all play a part in supporting field operations by: 

• giving policy guidance and setting requirements; 

• hiring and selecting the people with the appropriate mix of skills for deployment 

within a PRT, as well as sustaining those professionals with viable career tracks; 

• training and equipping the people sent into harm’s way; 

• ensuring that experience in the field is incorporated as lessons learned; and 

• formulating appropriate integrated strategies and plans for their operations. 

There is some overarching guidance. National Security Presidential Directive-44 

(NSPD-44) states that the Secretary of State shall lead the U.S. Government development of a 

strong civilian response capability including necessary surge capabilities and analyze, 

formulate, and recommend additional authorities, mechanisms, and resources needed to 

ensure that the United States has the civilian reserve and response capabilities necessary for 

stabilization and reconstruction activities to respond quickly and effectively. DOD Directive 

(DODD) 3000.05 states that the Department will continue to lead and support the 

development of military-civilian teams for stability operations. The Under Secretary of 

Defense for Personnel and Readiness has directed that an inventory of civilian skills for 

deployment be established and maintained and that DOD civilians be increasingly prepared to 

deploy.30 The Army Action Plan for Stability Operations and the February 2008 Army Field 

Manual 3-0 (FM 3-0) Operations envision the military and civilian components of the Army 

being capable of conducting stability operations as an integrated element of full spectrum 

operations.31 The Army Action Plan also envisions that personnel with stability operationsrelated skills will be adequately allocated and resourced. Yet, the entire system and all the 

agencies are falling short in meeting this guidance and these visions. 

How do we get there from here? First, we repeat our support for building capacity 

within the civilian agencies to ensure that civilian skill sets and resources are available and 

properly applied to stability operations. The subcommittee recognizes that the military has 

taken on too much of this mission because civilian agencies have not had expeditionary 

missions, resources, or cultures. Increasing the numbers, availability, and deployability of nonDOD civilians, however, will not be enough. 

 

30 “Building Increased Civilian Deployment Capacity,” Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

Memorandum, February 12, 2008. 

31 See also “Transition Team (TT) and Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Enduring Training Capabilities,” 

U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 Memorandum, July 10, 2007. 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 39 

Whether military or civilian, selecting qualified personnel, supporting them, and 

rewarding them properly is critical. Because not enough people with the appropriate skills and 

experience have been available, PRT positions have too often been filled by personnel who 

happen to be available or who volunteer. The subcommittee’s PRT surveys show that some 

military and non-military personnel did not so much willingly volunteer, as were volunteered 

by their organizations, in spite of lack of skills and experience. This practice, however 

necessary, obviously causes morale, mission, and other problems. Many of the skill sets 

required for stability and reconstruction operations do not currently exist in our government 

agencies. The government has had to hire from the private sector or establish new recruiting 

and training programs. Despite the recognition that there is a dire need, no organization yet 

has the ability to identify systematically or formally its few personnel who may have the 

requisite skills, training, or experience either in their private or professional capacity. Some 

have started to gather this information. However, the subcommittee found no plans to ensure 

that agencies are establishing new recruiting philosophies and processes, or that people now 

serving will have special experience identifiers in their records for future assignment and 

promotion purposes. Finally, we have only guarded optimism that the departments will follow 

through on their stated intention to recognize and promote otherwise deserving PRT 

members with their peers who have served in more traditional assignments. 

 

Civil Affairs (CA) soldiers are one group of military personnel in general purpose 

forces (GPF) who already possess some of the needed stability and reconstruction skills, but 

there are not nearly enough of them to staff an enduring mission. CA units’ operations and 

training should inform efforts related to PRTs. While the services do not have enough CA 

personnel to fully man all PRTs, the subcommittee found that CA personnel were recruited 

into some PRTs or have served with them. Although the curriculum for CA training and 

Army PRT training at Fort Bragg were essentially alike, no one attempted to match the two. 

In 2006, the Department of 

Defense directed the realignment of 

operational command and control of the 

bulk of the Army’s CA units from the 

U.S. Army Special Operations Command 

to the U.S. Army Reserve Command 

(USARC). This transfer essentially 

divided the active duty CA units from the 

reserve component units, which are the 

vast majority of CA units. The units 

transferred to the USARC are now part 

of the GPF and are intended to support 

other GPF units. The units retained by 

the U.S. Army Special Operations 

Command support Special Forces units. 

The U.S. Army Special Operations 

Command retains proponency for all CA 

units, including doctrine, combat development, and institutional training for both the active 

and reserve component CA units, notwithstanding the division in their command and control. 

A DOS representative USAF Lt. Col. Brad Bredenkamp, PRT 

commander, speak with villagers in Alingar District of Laghman 

Province, Afghanistan, about supporting the Afghan government, 

Aug. 2006. (Air Force Photo/Capt. Gerardo Gonzalez) 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 40 

The Department programmed an increase in the CA force from 64 reserve companies 

in fiscal year 2007 to a total of 112 in fiscal year 2011. The number of active component CA 

companies will grow from 6 in fiscal year 2006 to 16 in fiscal year 2009. Now is the time to 

rationalize the relationship between Civil Affairs and PRT or PRT-like efforts. 

By now most non-CA organizations involved in staffing PRTs have begun to 

understand the importance of specific training for these missions. Training for military 

personnel and civilians has improved since 2003 when there was essentially no specific 

reconstruction and stability training. Nevertheless this training must still be rationalized and 

improved. Organizations should not standardize for standardization’s sake. There are benefits 

to making Iraq and Afghanistan (and civilian and military training) more similar, and joining 

training efforts together to a greater extent would help both the people and their missions. 

Training is the keystone of the PRT effort. For U.S-led PRTs in Afghanistan, the 

Army conducts training for Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel (active duty, guard, and 

reserve) at Fort Bragg. PRT commanders and the PRT’s senior military staff receive theaterspecific and mission-specific classroom training for a period of three weeks before their teams 

arrive for more general pre-deployment training, which is a combination of classroom 

education and field training. Field training resembles that for all military personnel deploying 

to theater. Several weeks later, the interagency civilian personnel arrive at Fort Bragg for three 

weeks of classroom education and field training focused mostly on survival skills and on 

participating in the final mission rehearsal exercise. PRTs are not included in National 

Training Center or Joint Readiness Training Center Brigade mission rehearsal exercises for 

maneuver units. 

In addition to the training at Fort Bragg, most of the 2008 PRT military commanders 

traveled to Afghanistan to conduct pre-deployment site surveys and meet with the 

commanders they would be replacing. The Air Force PRT commanders were also able to 

attend the final pre-deployment mission rehearsal exercise at Fort Campbell for the division 

headquarters (101st Airborne Division) under whose command they will operate. The 

interagency civilian PRT members did not participate in these pre-deployment activities. 

There is no PRT-specific training for military personnel going to Iraq. However, 

contract role players assuming the role of PRTs are used in pre-deployment exercises at 

combat training centers to familiarize maneuver unit commanders and personnel with the 

PRT concept. The purpose of this is to emphasize to the maneuver unit commanders that 

they must coordinate their efforts with PRTs. Interagency personnel have recently begun to 

participate in the design of these role playing scenarios. Military personnel deployed as 

individual augmentees and DOD civilians and contractors receive pre-deployment training at 

the Combat Readiness Center at Fort Benning, but this training is not PRT-mission specific. 

These personnel receive further force protection orientation in Kuwait and Iraq. 

The Department of State developed and offers PRT-related classroom training at the 

Foreign Service Institute (FSI). The training is currently optional for the DOS personnel who 

will serve on PRTs. However, the current Director of the Office of Provincial Affairs told the 

subcommittee that she will not accept DOS personnel who have not attended the classroom 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 41 

training for an Iraq PRT.32 In addition, at least one Marine Corps RCT sent personnel to help 

mentor the civilians training at FSI and to meet the civilian PRT personnel that would embed 

with the regiment when it deployed. However, this was the result of individual initiative, not 

requirement. 

Foreign Service Institute courses are open to DOD and other agency personnel, but 

there is no certainty that the right people know about the training or attend. Although the 

training is Iraq-oriented, DOS Afghanistan PRT members can attend the FSI courses as well. 

There is no pre-deployment field training in the United States for civilians serving on Iraq 

PRTs. Once in theater, the PRT civilians receive force protection training, but the training 

does not relate to the PRT mission. 

One thing that could significantly improve training and mission accomplishment 

would be an integrated, comprehensive institutionalization of the single-agency and multiagency lessons learned processes that are currently conducted, but are disjointed. Effective 

guidance and sharing of lessons learned are key tools to institutionalize, and they facilitate 

efficient operations and training. Failure to utilize these lessons heightens the risk of repeating 

past mistakes and hampers an ability to build on the efficiencies others have developed during 

past operations. The Departments of Defense and State have not established a comprehensive 

or methodical interagency framework or process for capturing, assessing, and applying lessons 

learned from Provincial Reconstruction Teams to future stability, security, transition, and 

reconstruction (SSTR) operations or training. 

It is not enough to have qualified and trained personnel perform the necessary 

missions. The United States must plan in advance for how these valuable human resources 

will be used. While advances in planning have been made in the field, multi-national and 

interagency planning for the PRT mission leaves much to be desired. In fact, there are policy 

barriers to effective interagency planning for missions across the spectrum of peace and 

conflict. This is the crux of the interagency planning challenge for these operations. National 

Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) makes the Secretary of State responsible for 

coordinating the “interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency 

planning to prevent or mitigate conflict, and develop detailed contingency plans for integrated 

U.S. Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts for those states and regions and for 

widely applicable scenarios, which are integrated with military contingency plans, where 

appropriate.” NSPD-44 calls upon the Secretaries of State and Defense to “integrate 

stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when 

relevant and appropriate.” 

The May 2006 Building Partnership Capacity Quadrennial Defense Review Execution Roadmap

directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide the Deputy Secretary of Defense with a plan of action for 

integrating interagency participation in DOD planning by July 31, 2006. In his January 25, 

2008 letter to the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense reported that while progress had been made, the actions called for in the Roadmap

were not yet complete. 

 

32 Office of Provincial Affairs briefing to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

and House Committee on Foreign Affairs staff, January 16, 2008. 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 42 

The Roadmap also directed the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to provide the 

Department with a plan of action for integrating interagency planning at the combatant 

command, joint task force, and major subordinate command levels. JFCOM developed a draft 

concept of operations to improve interagency planning but the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy “has declined to take further action on it.”33

 

Coordination is necessary, but not sufficient. While we know that many people in 

many places are trying to make improvements to interagency planning and operations 

throughout the government, without direct Presidential involvement, these efforts are not 

enough. Action is needed. At the end of the day, someone has to be in charge. The 

subcommittee found a lack of unity of direction and “unity of command.” This results in a 

lack of unity of purpose. Among the efforts at staffing, training, applying lessons learned, and 

planning, there is no one person or organization in the lead for the “whole of government”. 

When “no further action” is taken, but the mission is not complete, someone must step up to 

lead. That leader must be empowered to direct the “whole of government” PRT, and larger, 

stabilization and reconstruction efforts. 

 

33 Joint Forces Command briefing and point papers for House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations staff, February 15, 2008. 

CAPT Brian Rick, a doctor from the Herat PRT, performs medical exams for children in 

Saghar, Afghanistan. Army photo/Sgt. Jeremy A. Clawson. 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 43 

Findings: 

(1) The Provincial Reconstruction Team experience in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrates 

that when there is inadequate non-DOD civilian capacity to deploy for post-conflict 

stabilization and reconstruction operations, military and DOD civilian personnel will 

be employed to carry out stability operations even if they do not possess the requisite 

skills, technical expertise, or training. Over time, the Department of Defense has made 

an attempt to consider the civilian skills of military personnel when placing them in 

these assignments. 

(2) Individual reserve component units informally keep track of civilian skills and 

experience, but there is no institutional requirement or formal means of doing so. 

(3) Currently, there are no special skills identifiers for military or DOD civilian personnel 

for Provincial Reconstruction Team assignments, nor is there any formal means to 

track military or civilian personnel with PRT experience. 

(4) Although there is no career track or special experience identifier in the military 

services for stability operations, the services understand that assignment with, and 

command of, Provincial Reconstruction Teams must be incentivized and valued. 

(5) Currently, there is no career track in the Department of State or other departments 

and agencies for personnel assigned to Provincial Reconstruction Teams or 

performing stability and reconstruction operations. 

Recommendation: 

The Secretaries of Defense and State, and other departments and agencies, should improve 

current selection processes, career incentives, and forms of recognition in order to encourage 

service with and select qualified personnel for staff Provincial Reconstruction Teams and 

stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations in the future. Further, the 

Secretaries should report to Congress on their respective processes, incentives, and forms of 

recognition for military personnel and civilians who have served on PRTs or other stability 

and reconstruction missions. 

SELECTION, INCENTIVES, AND RECOGNITION FOR MILITARY

AND CIVILIAN PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM 

PERSONNEL
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 44 

Findings: 

(1) While the Army has increased the number of Civil Affairs (CA) personnel in its force 

structure, and the other services have established CA units or are developing civil 

affairs capabilities, there is no joint CA effort or command. 

(2) Civil Affairs skills closely resemble those needed to conduct stability operations, which 

DOD Directive 3000.05 (DODD 3000.05) establishes as a core military mission on 

par with combat operations. DODD 3000.05 requires the military to prepare to 

perform all stability operations tasks needed to establish and maintain order when U.S. 

government civilians cannot do so. 

(3) Some Civil Affairs (CA) reservists provide functional expertise from their civilian 

experience and education, similar to those required in stability operations. CA units 

traditionally have a very high personnel and operations tempo. Army Force 

Generation and Army Reserve Expeditionary Force requirements and mobilization 

authorities can impact CA units’ training and availability for deployment for Provincial 

Reconstruction Team and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations. 

(4) The Provincial Reconstruction Team experience in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrates 

that the military could provide personnel to man the PRTs, but the non-Civil Affairs 

general purpose forces personnel deployed did not have the requisite training or 

desired technical and specialty skills to perform the PRT mission effectively. 

Recommendation: 

The Secretary of Defense should determine the role Civil Affairs (CA) forces will play as the 

Department makes stability operations a core military mission on par with combat operations 

and as stability operations are conducted throughout the full spectrum of conflict, including 

determining: 

a. the overall anticipated CA requirement; 

b. whether the programmed CA force structure supports the direction of the 

Secretary of Defense to make stability operations a core mission on par with 

combat operations; 

c. whether proponency for the general purpose CA units is appropriately placed; 

d. whether sufficient stability operations competencies are being developed in the 

non-CA general purpose forces; 

e. whether additional innovative authorities would assist in bringing needed CA 

competencies into the force on a temporary basis; 

f. whether the active/reserve component mix is appropriate given the continued 

demands for CA units and personnel; and 

g. whether a joint command structure for CA is appropriate. 

CIVIL AFFAIRS ROLE IN STABILITY OPERATIONS
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 45 

Findings: 

(1) Former Provincial Reconstruction Team members, both military and civilian, 

emphasized the importance of training the military and civilian leadership together as 

early as possible in order to build the team prior to deployment. At a minimum, even 

if the PRT members could not train with their assigned team, all former PRT 

members supported the value of interagency training. 

(2) The Army is analyzing how to institutionalize its training capability for future 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams and is considering moving the training to Fort Polk. 

(3) The Marines Corps’ role in Provincial Reconstruction Team-related training includes 

providing a Marine Corps instructor to teach Foreign Service Institute (FSI) courses. 

In addition, the First Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) sent 15 Marines to attend 

FSI courses and the MEF headquarters conducted two-day “economic reconstruction 

roundtables,” which included regimental combat team commanders, interagency 

participation, non-governmental organizations, and private industry. 

(4) The Departments of State (DOS) and Defense (DOD) have shared the costs for DOS 

trainees to get to training locations, and the Department of Defense has covered DOS 

trainee expenses while at Fort Bragg’s Provincial Reconstruction Team training. The 

Department of Defense also reimbursed the Department of State and U.S. Agency for 

International Development for PRT trainer expenses. The Department of Defense is 

reportedly willing to do whatever it takes to get federal civilians to interagency training 

because this supports DOD’s missions. 

Recommendations: 

(1) The Secretary of Defense, with the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the 

Agency for International Development, should further integrate the training of 

military and civilian personnel for Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan 

and Iraq and for stability and reconstruction training more widely. This training 

should be required rather than optional. Where appropriate, they should further 

standardize this training including both classroom instruction and field training, 

specific both to stabilization and reconstruction operations and to force protection 

and combat life-saving skills. They should also arrange for earlier and more extensive 

integration of non-DOD civilian PRT members into the training process, including, 

where appropriate, training with the maneuver units with which they will serve as 

embedded advisors. 

(2) The Secretary of Defense should take immediate action to ensure that the Department 

of Defense (DOD) civilian and military personnel who will fill non-DOD billets on 

IMPROVING PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM TRAINING
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 46 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams receive the PRT training administered by the 

Foreign Service Institute. 

(3) The subcommittee supports the Departments of Defense and State, and other federal 

agencies in their willingness to share expenses for trainers and trainees not only for 

Provincial Reconstruction Team training, but also for other interagency training, 

exercises, and experiments. 

(4) The Secretary of the Army should report on the Army’s plans to institutionalize the 

Provincial Reconstruction Team training capability for both Afghanistan and Iraq 

PRTs and for future stabilization and reconstruction operations for Army and the 

other services’ active and reserve component personnel and DOD civilians. 

Department of Defense Findings: 

(1) The Department of Defense (DOD) has established programs to collect lessons 

learned at all levels within the Department, including from exercises and operations. 

The Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute supports efforts to take 

the lessons learned from ongoing operations, particularly the PRT experience in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, and encourage units to incorporate them into current operations and 

activities. However, the integration of lessons learned into actual planning remains 

weak. Planners do not consistently examine past results as they develop future 

contingency plans, in part because DOD’s guidance for incorporating lessons into its 

plans is outdated and does not specifically require planners to take this step; accessing 

lessons learned databases is cumbersome; and, the review process does not evaluate 

the extent to which lessons learned are incorporated into specific plans. 

(2) The 2006 Joint Operating Concept for Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and 

Reconstruction Operations emphasizes the importance of implementing a continuous 

learning process that incorporates lessons learned into ongoing and future operations, 

including through constant observation of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); 

assessing best practices; understanding how to implement best practices; and adapting 

TTPs. However, it has not been fully implemented at the combatant command or 

service level. 

Recommendation: 

(1) The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should update 

their planning guidance to direct combatant commanders and service planners to 

include lessons learned and best practices as stability, security, transition, and 

STABILIZATION, SECURITY, TRANSITION, AND 

RECONSTRUCTION LESSONS LEARNED
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 47 

reconstruction (SSTR) plans are developed, and require that the SSTR planning 

review process include a step to verify that lessons learned have been considered and 

included as appropriate. 

Department of Defense and the Interagency Findings: 

(1) The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken several steps to improve planning for 

stability operations, but it faces challenges in developing capabilities and measures of 

effectiveness that adequately integrate the contributions of non-DOD agencies, 

particularly their lessons learned processes. 

(2) The U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute is working to achieve a 

collaborative military, civilian agency, non-governmental organization, and multinational lessons learned process, and the Department of Defense (DOD) has recently 

developed an information system to improve access to lessons learned within the 

Department and with non-DOD agencies. 

(3) Joint Forces Command, in supporting the development of joint doctrine, has drawn 

upon lessons learned in: publishing pre-doctrinal studies; developing the U.S. 

Government Draft Planning Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction; testing the 

government-wide National Security Presidential Directive-44 planning framework; and 

establishing the Interagency Management System with the Department of State Office 

of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. 

Recommendations: 

(1) The Department of Defense should also include more interagency stakeholders in the 

development of its new lessons learned information system as early as possible. 

(2) The Secretary of Defense should develop an action plan, as necessary, and report to 

Congress on the status of efforts to: 

a. identify and prioritize needed stability operations capabilities; 

b. develop measures of effectiveness to evaluate progress in achieving these 

capabilities; 

c. achieve greater interagency participation in the development of military plans; 

and, 

d. fully incorporate lessons learned in the planning process. The Secretary should 

also identify challenges to achieving an integrated interagency approach to 

stability operations, and potential solutions for mitigating those challenges. 

Interagency Findings: 

(1) As a result of the gap in processing lessons learned, there is an absence of accepted 

interagency doctrine for establishing, managing, or attaining goals for stability and 

reconstruction operations. 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 48 

(2) The Department of State, through the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction 

and Stabilization, has the responsibility under National Security Presidential Directive44 for gathering lessons learned from “whole of government” planning and 

operations, and for ensuring that they are integrated into future responses. 

(3) The Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 

Stabilization has taken initial steps to incorporate operational lessons learned from the 

PRT experience in Iraq and Afghanistan into future overall “whole of government” 

planning for stability and reconstruction. How well all other agencies are integrated 

into this progress and how the process is being applied across government is not yet 

apparent. 

(4) The Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 

Stabilization (S/CRS) developed a planning framework as the methodology for 

activating a “whole of government” lessons learned process in an operational setting; 

however doubts persist as to the degree to which S/CRS can implement it and how it 

would relate to existing Department of Defense processes. 

(5) The NATO International Security Assistance Force mission has also made a 

comprehensive and consistent effort to examine lessons learned and apply them to 

future strategy and doctrine. Any effort by other coalition members, including the 

United States, to integrate into this process has been haphazard and ad hoc, lacking 

central direction from NATO headquarters. On the other hand, a successful coalition 

conference to review lessons learned, sponsored by Lithuania and Canada in 

September 2007, demonstrated how useful a comprehensive and coordinated effort 

could be. A more formal structure to periodically review, validate, and apply lessons 

learned would benefit PRTs. 

Recommendations: 

(1) The Departments of Defense and State and other government agencies should 

approach the stability and reconstruction lessons learned process with the goal of 

using actual operations to find ways to better integrate the programs, policies, and 

activities of civilian and military agencies. This would produce a more coordinated and 

effective “whole of government” approach to pre-conflict and post-conflict 

operations. The lessons learned from the establishment and operations of PRTs 

would serve as a logical starting point for this process. 

(2) The Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 

Stabilization should move expeditiously to collect, analyze, and absorb lessons learned 

into its emerging “whole of government” planning framework and ensure that policy 

guidance being developed for its Response and Reserve Corps incorporates the 

experience of actual, ongoing PRT and other stability and reconstruction operations. 

(3) The United States should encourage NATO International Security Assistance Force 

to convene regular review sessions for coalition partners to incorporate PRT lessons 

learned into strategy and direction as well as to find other ways of consistent and 

comprehensive information gathering and sharing. 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 49 

Findings: 

(1) The National Security Presidential Directive-44 framework provides unclear and 

inconsistent guidance on agencies’ roles and responsibilities. In addition, the lack of an 

agreed-upon definition for stabilization and reconstruction operations poses an 

obstacle to interagency collaboration. 

(2) All the geographic combatant commands, as well as Transportation Command, Special 

Operations Command and Joint Forces Command, use some form of interagency 

coordinating body, but their placement within those commands, and their 

organization, staffing, and functions vary widely. 

(3) Special Operations Command created a new headquarters staff element, the J-10, with 

responsibility for irregular warfare in June 2007. Among other functions, the J-10 

assists in coordinating plans integration, at least in part by establishing a “collaborative 

network of the DOD and the interagency to facilitate United States Government 

application of Irregular Warfare Strategies in support of U.S. national objectives.” 

Recommendations: 

(1) The Secretary of Defense should seek clarification from the Secretary of State as to the 

respective roles and responsibilities of various Department of State bureaus and 

offices particularly those of the Office of the Coordinator for Stability and 

Reconstruction relative to the regional bureaus in whose geographic area of 

responsibility complex reconstruction and stabilization contingencies may occur. 

(2) The Secretary of Defense should improve integration of interagency partners from the 

outset of planning and operations in its six-phase model: 1) shape, 2) deter, 3) seize 

initiative, 4) dominate, 5) stabilize, and 6) enable civil authority. 

(3) While a draft Joint Forces Command concept of operations to improve interagency 

planning exists, the Secretary of Defense should report to Congress why no action has 

been taken and what alternatives to improve interagency planning are being 

considered. 

(4) The National Security Council (NSC) should move forward to fully implement 

National Security Presidential Directive-44 with a greater sense of urgency. The 

priority accorded to interagency coordination and direction for stability and 

reconstruction operations within the NSC should be elevated. 

STRENGTHENING INTERAGENCY PLANNING
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 50 

DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.05 AND NATIONAL SECURITY 

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 44 – POLICY AND GUIDANCE 

AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

At the Washington level, our challenges involve longer-term strategy, larger structures, 

and more complex processes. There is a significant amount of activity aimed at improving and 

supporting greater interagency integration for missions like PRTs and future stabilization and 

reconstruction operations. For instance, the Director of S/CRS, Ambassador John Herbst, 

told the subcommittee, “Building civilian capacity for reconstruction and stabilization is 

essential to our national security and I have no doubt that the U.S. Government will have this 

capability in the next ten years.”34 However, our overriding conclusion is that, after more than 

six years of war, and, despite the recognition that our nation’s future national security 

challenges and opportunities will almost certainly require a “whole of government” approach, 

progress in achieving meaningful integration of efforts has been limited and far too slow. 

Most importantly, these efforts have not assisted the people the nation has asked to perform 

difficult and dangerous missions today nearly enough. 

More can be done now. An independent study should be conducted to better 

determine the requirements for, and the respective civilian and military roles in, stability 

operations as these operations transition through the spectrum of conflict. An independent 

study is particularly appropriate because it will both complement the roles and missions study 

Congress has required the military services to undertake in 2008 and because it can serve to 

clarify issues as the Department reevaluates the relationship of stability operations within the 

context of irregular warfare.35 Subordinating stability operations within irregular warfare, as 

appears to be the intent of the Department’s policy revision, may send an unintended message 

of strategic proportions to our adversaries and allies, as well as to our citizens. 

 

Regardless of the Department’s ongoing reevaluation, we return to our earlier 

observation that non-DOD departments and agencies must have more capacity to deploy and 

operate overseas with military forces in all phases of peace and conflict. Consequently, 

additional structural changes which, among other improvements, would further empower the 

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and increase the number of 

Foreign Service Officers and other civil servants who by disposition and position can be 

deployed for contingencies, are important. Building capacity and changing structures will not 

be enough. Unity of command is missing at the tactical and operational levels. Perhaps more 

critically, that absence exists at the national level as well. The result is that there is no 

“quarterback” for PRTs. There is no quarterback for stability, security, transition, and 

reconstruction planning and operations. There is no quarterback for interagency coordination 

and actions. The nation needs these quarterbacks now. 

 

 

34 Statement of Ambassador John Herbst before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight & 

Investigations, October 30, 2007. 

35 Section 941, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181). 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 51 

Findings: 

(1) The Provincial Reconstruction Team experience in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrates 

that, where inadequate civilian capacity to deploy for post-conflict stabilization and 

reconstruction operations exists, military and Department of Defense civilian 

personnel will be employed to carry out stability operations, regardless of whether they 

possess the requisite skills, technical expertise, or training. 

(2) Military personnel are performing stability operations in certain instances where the 

employment of civilian personnel would be appropriate and preferable. 

(3) Joint Forces Command and the services are developing operational concepts and 

doctrine for stability operations. 

(4) The Army is considering how to develop an enduring capability to train teams of 

military personnel to perform Provincial Reconstruction Team-like missions. 

(5) Currently, there is no career track or special experience identifiers in the military 

services for stability operations, yet the services understand that assignment with, and 

command of, Provincial Reconstruction Teams must be incentivized and valued. 

(6) Currently, there is no career track for personnel performing stability operations in the 

Department of State or other departments and agencies. 

(7) In none of the departments or agencies did the subcommittee find overwhelming 

confidence among PRT members and veterans that they would be promoted ahead of 

or equal to their peers in classic combat, diplomatic, or development posts despite 

performing dangerous, critical, joint, interagency, and multinational stability and 

reconstruction missions. 

(8) Several different sources of funding have been employed in Afghanistan and Iraq to 

perform stability and reconstruction operations. 

(9) Non-governmental organizations play a significant role in pre-conflict and postconflict environment, but currently they do not participate regularly in stability and 

reconstruction operations planning. 

(10) Military units in Afghanistan and Iraq have performed stability and reconstruction 

operations, without particular specialized training, as part of their mission. 

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ROLES IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

THROUGHOUT THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 52 

Recommendations: 

The Secretary of Defense, with the Secretary of State, should establish an independent 

advisory panel to review and produce a report on the respective military and civilian roles in 

the conduct of stability and reconstruction operations throughout the spectrum of conflict. 

a. The advisory panel should assess the requirement for and the respective roles of 

civilian and military personnel as stability and reconstruction operations are 

conducted and transition throughout the spectrum of conflict; 

b. The panel should then make recommendations to Congress in the following areas: 

i. What skills and capabilities are required within the civilian and military 

ranks in order to perform stability and reconstruction operations, and 

which of those skills and capabilities are more suitably provided by nonmilitary interagency partners or other civilians; 

ii. The adequacy of joint and service concepts and doctrine development to 

define the nature, uses, and appropriate employment of civilian and 

military personnel in stability and reconstruction operations; 

iii. What interagency training curriculum should be adopted to enhance 

interagency integration in the performance of stability and reconstruction 

operations; 

iv. What actions are necessary to build a sufficiently trained cadre of future 

stability and reconstruction operations military commanders and 

personnel, including whether a formal career field and/or a special 

experience indicator should be established; 

v. What actions are necessary to develop an appropriate career track within 

the Department of State and other departments and agencies to build a 

cadre of future civilian stability and reconstruction operations leaders and 

personnel; 

vi. What funding mechanisms are appropriate for stability and reconstruction 

operations; 

vii. How U.S. Government planning and operations should take into account 

the role non-governmental organizations play during stability and 

reconstruction operations throughout the spectrum of conflict; and 

viii. Whether land component units should contain a stability operations-like 

element as a matter of standard force generation, and if so, at what unit 

level. 

c. The advisory panel should take into account the Provincial Reconstruction Team 

experience in Afghanistan and Iraq; the Department’s efforts to implement DOD 

Directive 3000.05; the Department of State’s implementation of National Security 

Presidential Directive-44; the Irregular Warfare Roadmap and Joint Operating 

Concept; the Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and 

Reconstruction Joint Operating Concept; Joint Publication 3-0 on Operations and 

the Army Field Manual 3-0 on Operations; the National Strategy for the 

Development of National Security Professionals and the May 17, 2007 Executive 

Order 13434 on National Security Professional Development; and any other 

material it deems relevant. 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 53 

A WORD ABOUT CONGRESS

Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be 

among the most difficult and important. So long as oversight is governed by 

current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people 

will not get the security they want and need. 

The 9/11 Commission Report36 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) 

contained a provision, Section 1049, titled “Study on National Security Interagency System.” 

This required the Secretary of Defense to commission a study and report to Congress and the 

President results and recommendations for legislative or regulatory changes to the national 

security interagency system by September 2008. The “system” is defined as “the structures, 

mechanisms, and processes by which the departments, agencies, and elements of the Federal 

Government that have national security missions coordinate and integrate their policies, 

capabilities, expertise, and activities to accomplish such missions.” 

The report language gives more insight into what the Armed Services Committees 

considered important and is relevant to our efforts on Provincial Reconstruction Teams: 

The conferees believe that the interagency coordination and integration of 

the United States Government for the training for, planning of, support for, 

and execution of overseas post-conflict contingency relief and reconstruction 

operations requires reform and that recent operations, most notably in Iraq, 

lacked the necessary consistent and effective interagency coordination and 

integration in planning and execution. As a result, the conferees note that the 

study conducted under the authority of this section should include... 

recommendations for improvements in congressional, executive, and other 

oversight structures and procedures that would enhance accountability within 

such operations. [emphasis added] 

In some ways, our investigation validated common perceptions among national 

security professionals that the interagency process is broken, but not just in the executive 

branch. Congressional oversight of national security programs is divided among many 

different committees, including the Armed Services Committees, the Select Committees on 

Intelligence, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign 

Relations, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Committee 

on Homeland Security, among others. In addition, interagency national security planning and 

execution mechanisms defy easy categorization within the existing Congressional budget and 

oversight structure, sometimes affecting Congress’ ability to exercise effective oversight. In 

many ways, Congress is as “stovepiped” as the agencies and functions we oversee. We should 

consider ways to best address national security issues more holistically. With that said, during 

 

36The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. W.W. 

Norton and Company, New York, 2004, p. 419. 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 54 

the course of our study this subcommittee has been pleased with the bipartisan cooperation 

and support of related committees at the staff and member level, particularly with the House 

Committee on Foreign Affairs and the House Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform. During the course of our investigation, other congressional efforts to more closely 

coordinate national security issues have also moved forward, including the Working Group on 

National Security Interagency Reform, created by subcommittee members Susan Davis (D, 

CA) and Geoff Davis (R, KY), and the House Armed Services Committee Roles and Missions 

Panel, which recently called for more creative thinking about the future of national security 

issues. Still, more remains to be done. 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 55 

CONCLUSION

We have learned much from our six-month look at interagency operations through the 

lens of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, the subcommittee 

remains unsure that the people directing the PRT effort now, and those planning for the 

future of such operations, fully appreciate how this experience may instruct government at all 

levels, from the field to combatant commands, departments and agencies, as well as at senior 

levels in the nation’s capital. While careful planning is necessary for the future, our people in 

the field cannot wait. We, in government, must gather good ideas, share them 

comprehensively, and make adjustments as quickly as possible in order to give people in the 

field the best possible guidance and resources now. The subcommittee’s work confirmed that 

many of the issues identified not only cross departmental and agency boundaries, but also cut 

across Congress as a whole and are not confined to any single committee’s jurisdiction. 

Therefore, no one committee alone will be able to make the critical changes we need. The 

nation’s ability to prevent, prepare for, and respond to national security challenges today, and 

in the future, may depend on how well and how quickly both the executive and legislative 

branches can overcome these jurisdictional and institutional barriers. All of government must 

exercise a greater sense of urgency in developing and practicing greater strategic agility, rather 

than having our national efforts diminished by stereotypical agency stovepipes. 

AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 57 

APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS

BCT Brigade Combat Team 

CA Civil Affairs 

CDR Commander 

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command 

CERP Commanders’ Emergency Response Program 

COCOM Combatant Command 

COIN Counterinsurgency 

CORDS Civil Operations and Rural Development Support 

CSI Civilian Stabilization Initiative 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense Directive 

DOS Department of State 

e-PRT Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team 

ESC Executive Steering Committee

ESF Economic Support Fund 

EU European Union 

FM 3-0 Army Field Manual 3-0 (Operations) 

FOB Forward Operating Base 

FSI Foreign Service Institute 

FSO Foreign Service Officer 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

GPF General Purpose Forces

HASC House Armed Services Committee 

ISAF International Security Assistance Force 

JCP Joint Campaign Plan 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JFC Joint Force Commander 

JFCOM Joint Forces Command 

LGCD Local Governance and Community Development 

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

 MNC-I Multi-National Corps - Iraq 

MNF-I Multi-National Force – Iraq 

MOF Ministry of Finance 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act 

NGO Non-Governmental Organization 

NSC National Security Council 

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive 

OPA Office of Provincial Affairs 

OPCON Operational Control 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 58 

PIC Provincial Iraqi Control 

PKSOI U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 

PST Provincial Support Team 

QRF Quick Reaction Funds 

RCT Regimental Combat Team 

RRD Regimental Reconnaissance Detachment 

S/CRS Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability 

SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (NATO)

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General

SSTR Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction 

TCN Troop Contributing Nation 

TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

UN United Nations 

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

USARC U.S. Army Reserve Command 

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 

USG United States Government 

USIP U.S. Institute of Peace 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 59 

APPENDIX B: HEARINGS, BRIEFINGS, INTERVIEWS

OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS HEARINGS:

“The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial September 5, 2007

Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan” 

Ms. Ginger Cruz 

Deputy Inspector General 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Ms. Michelle Parker 

International Affairs Fellow (Council on Foreign Relations) 

RAND Corporation 

Mr. Frederick D. Barton 

Senior Advisor & Co-Director, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project 

Center for Strategic & International Studies 

“Benefits and Medical Care for Federal and U.S. September 18, 2007 

Contractor Employees Deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan” 

Ms. Brenda Farrell 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

Secretary Patricia Bradshaw 

Deputy Under Secretary for Civilian Personnel Policy 

Department of Defense 

Mr. Shelby Hallmark 

Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs 

Department of Labor 

 “The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial October 4, 2007 

Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan” 

Mr. Mitchell Shivers 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Central Asia Affairs 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy) 

Major General Bobby J. Wilkes, USAF 

Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs (Asia) 

Strategic Plans and Policy 

The Joint Staff 

Mr. Mark Kimmitt 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 60 

Colonel (Promotable) Ralph O. Baker, USA 

Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs (Middle East) 

Strategic Plans and Policy 

The Joint Staff 

“Civilians on the Battlefield: Incentives, Benefits and Medical Care October 16, 2007

for Federal Civilian Employees Deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan” 

Ambassador Harry Thomas 

Director General 

U.S. Department of State 

Mr. Mark Ward 

Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Asia & Near East Bureau 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

Mr. Kirk Miller 

Associate Administrator for the Foreign Agriculture Service 

U.S. Department of Agriculture 

Mr. Bruce Swartz 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Criminal Division 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Mr. Larry McDonald 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Office of Technical Assistance 

U.S. Department of Treasury 

 “Measuring and Increasing the Effectiveness of October 18, 2007

Provincial Reconstruction Teams” 

The Honorable Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Mr. Robert Perito 

Senior Program Officer 

Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations 

United States Institute of Peace 

“Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations: Learning from October 30, 2007

the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Experience” 

Ambassador John E. Herbst 

Coordinator, Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization 

Department of State 

Ms. Celeste Ward 

Deputy Assistant Secretary, Stability Operations Capabilities 

Department of Defense 

Ms. Janet St. Laurent 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 61 

Mr. Joseph A. Christoff 

Director, International Affairs and Trade Team 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

“Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), Historical and December 5, 2007

Current Perspectives on Doctrine and Strategy” 

Mr. Bernard Carreau 

Senior Research Fellow, Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

National Defense University 

General Volney F. Warner, USA (Ret.) 

President and Chief Executive Officer 

V.F. Warner and Associates 

Brigadier General Eric “Rick” Olson, USA (Ret.) 

Former Commander, Combined/Joint Task Force-76 

Former Director, National Coordination Team 

Ms. Kathleen Hicks 

Senior Fellow, International Security Program 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

“A Continuing Dialogue: Post-Surge Alternatives January 16, 2008 

for Iraq (Part 1 of 2)” 

The Honorable John J. Hamre 

President & CEO 

Center for Strategic & International Studies 

General Jack Keane, USA (Ret.) 

Former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army 

General Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret.) 

President, BR McCaffrey Associates, LLC 

Mr. Christopher A. Kojm 

Professor of the Practice of International Affairs 

The Elliott School of International Affairs 

George Washington University 

 “A Continuing Dialogue: Post-Surge Alternatives January 23, 2008

for Iraq (Part 2 of 2)” 

Dr. Stephen Biddle 

Senior Fellow for Defense Policy 

Council on Foreign Relations 

Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. 

President, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 

Professor Lawrence B. Wilkerson 

Former Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell 

Visiting Pamela C. Harriman Professor of Government 

College of William and Mary 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 62 

Mr. Michael Eisenstadt 

Director, Military and Security Studies Program 

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 

 “Interagency Reform: Can the PRT Case Study Illuminate January 29, 2008

the Future of Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations?” 

Ambassador Barbara Bodine 

Diplomat-in-Residence, The Woodrow Wilson School 

Princeton University 

Ambassador Carlos Pascual 

Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy 

The Brookings Institution 

Ms. Michéle Flournoy 

President 

Center for a New American Security 

Dr. Nora Bensahel 

Senior Political Scientist 

RAND Corporation 

“Provincial Reconstruction Teams: A Case for National February 14, 2008

Security Reform?” 

The Honorable Ryan Henry 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy 

Department of Defense 

Mr. Barry Pavel 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Special Operations, 

Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities 

Department of Defense 

Ambassador Stephen Mull 

Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 

Department of State 

The Honorable Michael E. Hess 

Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Democracy, 

Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

“Hearing on Irregular Warfare and Stability February 26, 2008

Operations: Approaches to Interagency Integration” 

[Joint Hearing with the Terrorism and Unconventional 

Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee] 

The Honorable Michael G. Vickers 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, 

Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities 

U.S. Department of Defense 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 63 

Ambassador John E. Herbst 

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

U.S. Department of State 

RADM Dan W. Davenport 

Director, Joint Concept Development and Experimentation (J-9) 

U.S. Joint Forces Command 

Brigadier General Robert H. Holmes, USAF 

Deputy Director of Operations (J-3) 

U.S. Central Command 

Lieutenant General Frank Kearney, USA 

Deputy Commander 

U.S. Special Operations Command 

Colonel Joseph E. Osborne, USA 

Director, Irregular Warfare Directorate (J-10) 

U.S. Special Operations Command 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARINGS:

“Beyond the September Report: What’s Next for Iraq?” September 6, 2007 

 

The Honorable William J. Perry 

Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, and 

Professor, Stanford University 

Major General John Batiste, USA, Retired 

President, Klein Steel Services, Incorporated 

General John M. Keane, USA, Retired 

Keane Advisors, LLC 

 “The Status of the War and Political Developments in Iraq” September 10, 2007

General David Petraeus, USA 

Commander, Multi-National Forces—Iraq 

Ambassador Ryan Crocker 

United States Ambassador to Iraq 

“Security and Stability in Afghanistan: Status of U.S. December 11, 2007 

Strategy and Operations and the Way Ahead” 

 

The Honorable Robert M. Gates 

Secretary of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN 

Chairman 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 64 

Ambassador Eric S. Edelman 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

Department of Defense 

Lieutenant General John F. Sattler, USMC 

Director of Strategic Plans and Policy 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

“Assessment of U.S. Strategy and Operations in January 23, 2008 

Afghanistan and the Way Ahead” 

Lieutenant General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) 

Director, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies 

National Defense University 

Ambassador Karl F. Inderfurth 

John O. Rankin Professor of the Practice of International Affairs 

George Washington University 

Dr. Barnett R. Rubin 

Director of Studies and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation 

New York University 

MEMBER BRIEFINGS:

“Panel Discussion with Former Members of Provincial September 7, 2007

Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan” 

“Panel Discussion with Former Members of Provincial September 27, 2007

Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq” 

“Panel Discussion with Wounded Federal Civilian Employees October 2, 2007

and Representatives from their Advocacy Organizations” 

 

“Non-Governmental Organizations and Provincial December 19, 2007

Reconstruction Teams” 

“National Security Interagency Reform Working Group” January 17, 2008 

“Panel Discussion with Authors of the Recent CSIS Report, January 23, 2008

‘Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance’” 

STAFF BRIEFINGS AND MEETINGS:

Qubad Talabany, Kurdish Regional Government Representative August 7, 2007

Patrick Dickriede, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction August 10, 2007

PRT Audit Lead 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) August 10, 2007 

Robert Perito, U.S. Institute of Peace August 15, 2007 

Department of Defense: Office if the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff August 21, 2007

Mac McLaughlin, Interagency Resources Cell, U.S. Embassy Kabul August 22, 2007
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 65 

James Miller and Shawn Brimley, Center for New American Security August 22, 2007

BGen McMenamin, USMC (Ret.) August 23, 2007

Michelle Parker, RAND August 27, 2007

Frederick Barton, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) August 28, 2007 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)/Joint Staff August 30, 2007

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) August 30, 2007 

Lt Col McCarthy , USMC September 7, 2007 

Scott Kamins, Department of State September 20, 2007 

OSD/Joint Staff (Stability Operations Capabilities) September 20, 2007

Stuart Bowen, SIGIR September 24, 2007 

GAO September 28, 2007 

GAO (Civilian PRT/deployment staffing) October 3, 2007 

OSD, Joint Staff (Afghan National Security Forces) October 4, 2007 

Project Horizon, National Defense University October 5, 2007 

GAO (Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction & Interagency Issues) October 19, 2007 

Department of State (Role in PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan) October 19, 2007 

Department of State, Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS) October 24, 2007 

Michéle Flournoy, Center for a New American Security October 26, 2007 

Center for Army Lessons Learned (PRT Lessons Learned) October 30, 2007 

Catholic Relief Services Afghan Region Representative October 31, 2007 

U.S. Agency for International Development November 7, 2007 

OSD/Joint Staff (PRT Personnel and Staffing Briefing) November 13, 2007 

Kathleen Hicks, CSIS November 15, 2007 

Patrick Dickriede, SIGIR PRT Audit Lead November 15, 2007 

Stephanie Miley, PRT Team Leader Iraq November 15, 2007 

Robert Perito, U.S. Institute of Peace, Princeton PRT Class November 16, 2007 

Stephen Biddle, Council on Foreign Relations (Briefing on trip to Iraq) December 3, 2007 

CAPT Sterling Deramus, USN, CJ-9 (PRT Chief), ISAF December 11, 2007 

Robert Perito, U.S. Institute of Peace, Princeton PRT Class December 14, 2007 

Brigadier General Eric “Rick” Olson, USA (Ret.), former Director, December 14, 2007

National Coordination Team (NCT) 

GAO (Deployed Civilians Study) December 20, 2007 

International & Defense Solutions International (PRT Training) January 3, 2008 

World Vision Afghanistan Country Director January 8, 2008 

DOD/State (Iraq PRT Briefing for HCFA and HASC, Part 1 of 2) January 10, 2008 

DOD/State (Iraq PRT Briefing for HCFA and HASC, Part 2 of 2) January 11, 2008 

Special Operations Command (Unconventional Warfare Activities) January 17, 2008 

Phyllis Powers, Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) Director, HCFA briefing January 18, 2008 

Phyllis Powers, OPA Director January 18, 2008 

DOD/State (Afghanistan PRT Briefing for HCFA and HASC, Part 1 of 2) January 25, 2008 

Training & Doctrine Command (Combined Arms Center Briefing on Army FM 3.0) January 28, 2008 

DOD/State (Afghanistan PRT Briefing for HCFA and HASC, Part 2 of 2) January 29, 2008 

GAO (Joint Campaign Plan) February 5, 2008 

Southern Command (Reorganization briefing) February 8, 2008 

GAO (Joint Campaign Plan and PRTs) February 8, 2008 

DOD (Iraq Concerned Local Citizens) February 8, 2008 

CRS (Fiscal Year 2009 International Affairs Budget) February 8, 2008 

RAND (Building Complete Capabilities for Counterinsurgency) February 11, 2008 

GAO (Commanders’ Emergency Response Program) February 12, 2008

Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)(Briefing on PRTs, DODD 3000.05, February 15, 2008

interagency integration) 

JFCOM (Budget Brief) February 26, 2008 

JCS/J-7 Role (PRTs, DODD 3000.05, NSPD-44) February 28, 2008 

COL (P) Cheeks (PRT as Enduring Requirement) March 5, 2008 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 66 

CODELS AND STAFFDELS:

CODEL Ellsworth to Afghanistan September 8-9, 2007

CODEL Abercrombie to Iraq and Afghanistan (Air Land Subcommittee) September 20-25, 2007 

CODEL Davis to Afghanistan (Military Personnel Subcommittee) January 18-22, 2008

Staffdel Kruse to Kuwait and Afghanistan October 11-16, 2007

Staffdel Kruse to SOCOM/CENTCOM/SOUTHCOM November 26-28, 2007 

Staffdel McKenna to U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability November 29, 2007

Operations Institute, Carlisle, PA 

Staffdel Fenner to Army Ops Center, Pentagon December 11, 2007

Staffdel Fenner to Fort Bragg December 12-13, 2007

Staffdel Fenner to Joint Forces Command, Training & Doctrine Command December 16-18, 2007 

Staffdel Fenner to the Foreign Service Institute December 19, 2007 

Staffdel Fenner to Princeton University January 7, 2008

Staffdel Fenner to the National Guard Bureau January 8, 2008

Staffdel Fenner to the Army Human Resources Command January 11, 2008

Staffdel Oostburg to Iraq and Afghanistan Jan 31 – Feb 4, 2008

CODEL Andrews to Afghanistan February 15-19, 2008 

CODEL Etheridge to Iraq February 17-21, 2008 

Staffdel Fenner to National Defense University February 28, 2008 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 67 

APPENDIX C: PRT SURVEYS

INTRODUCTION

Between September 2007 and March 2008, the House Armed Services Subcommittee 

on Oversight and Investigations conducted more than 100 surveys and interviews with recent 

and current members of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The surveys were 

conducted both formally, with the assistance of the service legislative liaisons, and informally, 

through colleagues and when staff traveled to theater. The responses received reinforce the 

subcommittee’s findings and recommendations and illustrate the depth of commitment 

military and civilian team members have to the Provincial Reconstruction Team program. 

 More than 87% of survey respondents were military (Army, Air Force, and Navy) in 

either the active or reserve component, ranging in enlisted rank from E-3 to E-7 and officer 

rank from O-2 to O-6.1 The remaining respondents were civilian employees of the 

Departments of State and Agriculture, in both the foreign and civil service. 81% of those who 

responded to the survey served in Afghanistan,2 while 19% served in Iraq3 (see Figure 1). The 

majority of survey participants (79%) served on a PRT within the past two years, and many 

are currently deployed.4

Location of Survey Respondents 

Figure 1 

 

1 The Marine Corps have few personnel directly assigned to PRTs, and declined to provide a response. 2 Respondents served in the following Afghan provinces: Balkh, Farah, Gardhez, Ghazni, Kapisa, Khost, Kunar, 

Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Oruzgan, Paktia, Paktika, Panjshir, Parwan, Wardak, and Zabul. 3 Respondents served in the following Iraqi provinces: Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Najaf, Salah ad 

Din. 

4 Although USAID conducted its own surveys, the agency was unable or unwilling to share its results. 

Afghanistan Iraq
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 68 

PRTs are involved in a wide array of activities in both countries (see Figure 2). 

Nevertheless, members identified numerous tactical and operational obstacles to success both 

before and during deployment (the most commonly cited challenges are illustrated in Figure 

3). They also made several strategic-level suggestions for the continued improvement of the 

PRT program. 

Figure 25

PRE-DEPLOYMENT

Recruitment: “Voluntold” versus “ Volunteered.” 

Many survey participants recommended increased transparency in PRT recruiting, 

with regard to describing the applicant’s required skills and the actual job itself. When asked 

why she was selected for the PRT, one respondent replied, “a willingness to come to Iraq, a 

security clearance, a medical clearance, and a pulse? Honestly, I have little idea how ‘they’ 

decide on some of the candidates but I'd wager ‘they’ don't know either.” Some PRT 

members were selectees rather than volunteers, but most feel strongly that volunteers are 

better suited to the rigors of life on the PRT – “people who do not want to be there should 

certainly not be the ones interacting the most with Afghans.” Many felt blindsided when the 

reality in-country did not match the job description for the billet they thought they were 

 

5 Sample of responses to survey question 5.1: “What major projects did your PRT conduct?” 

Sample of Recent Projects Undertaken by PRTs 

Agriculture: agribusiness, drainage ditches, cold storage, irrigation, soil testing labs, farming 

cooperatives, flood protection walls, veterinary services, solar meat chillers, poultry industry 

development, fish farms, wind farms 

Education: school construction and repair, teacher training colleges, trade and vocational schools, 

literacy courses, small business development programs 

Power: erecting electrical poles, distributing fuel, initiating hydro-electric projects, promoting power 

networks, renovating electrical grids and power facilities 

Transportation: construction of airfields and airports, roads, bridges 

Governmental capacity: rebuilding district centers and government buildings, conducting village 

assessments and town halls, budget execution and economic capacity building, training and mentoring 

Healthcare: building clinics and hospitals, providing medical supplies, creation of a central sterile 

supply, public health projects 

Rule of law: building courthouses, establishing major crimes court, establishing federal appeals court 

Water projects: retention walls, wells, dams, micro-hydro projects, solar water treatment facilities, water 

compact units 

Finance: microfinance assistance, bank construction 

Media: reorganization of district media center, founding newspapers, purchasing radio station equipment 

Police assistance: building police stations, building police outposts along major roads, providing police 

with radio communications 

Other essential services: founding orphanages, building public works stations, establishing social 

welfare trailers, rebuilding sewer systems, initiating work for food programs, providing humanitarian aid 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 69 

filling. One wrote, “the canned advertisement does not really tell the story and people don't 

know what they are getting into.” Several survey respondents offered additional suggestions 

for improving recruitment and retention in the future, including allowing current PRT 

members to interview their replacements and establishing greater communication with civilian 

agencies to better emphasize the importance of participation in the PRT program. 

Figure 36

When asked what incentives currently exist for PRT assignments, participants 

mentioned increased hazard pay, credit for a “joint” assignment (for military officers who 

command a PRT), additional leave time (for civilians), and tax breaks. They frequently cited as 

motivating factors a sense of personal duty and accomplishment. However, survey 

participants also cited a worrying number of disincentives for PRT service, including the long 

length of tours, and a fear that the PRT skill set would make them a target for future 

deployments. Some were disappointed in the PRT’s perceived inability to increase the pace of 

change, the “frustration because of the inability to accomplish anything here and feeling like a 

stupid ‘Pollyanna’ for volunteering.” Many fear that service outside of a traditional career path 

will not be recognized. One respondent wrote, “Can only hope that Promotion Boards 

understand that IA [individual augmentee] tour on PRT is cutting edge, fall more in realm of 

Special Operation [than] in world of conventional forces.” PRT members perceived that their 

tours were undervalued by their home department or military service, and thus had a negative 

impact on career progression. One respondent summarized the feelings of many when she 

wrote that PRT service is a “probable career disruption rather than enhancing; agencies view 

 

6 Based on overall survey responses. Common responses grouped and tallied. 

86%

63% 62%

54%

45% 43%

35% 34%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Training

Staffing

Supplies

Service or CivilMilitary Conflicts

Security

Funding

Lack of

Interpreters

Lack of Strategy

Challenges Most Frequently Cited By PRT Members

% of Respondents 

Challenge Cited

86%

63% 62%

54%

45% 43%

35% 34%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Training

Staffing

Supplies

Service or CivilMilitary Conflicts

Security

Funding

Lack of

Interpreters

Lack of Strategy

Challenges Most Frequently Cited By PRT Members

% of Respondents 

Challenge Cited
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 70 

service as adversely affecting them, and may take it out on those who serve.” A lack of careerenhancing incentives may have a negative impact on volunteerism and recruitment for PRTs. 

Staffing: “One deep in a lot of critical positions.” 

PRT members consistently noted a need not only for more people, but the right people. 

A majority of survey participants agreed that PRTs are understaffed for the mission assigned – 

one wrote that “we had the manning for one province, while we are assigned two.” Most felt 

that they had the right mix of military and civilians, although several noted a specific need for 

additional engineers and agricultural specialists. PRT members described themselves as 

“motivated,” “flexible,” and “creative,” similar to “candlewax filling the cracks.” However, 

many said that they were regularly assigned to perform tasks outside of their military career 

field or area of civilian expertise. One wrote, “We had computer administrators and dental 

assistants driving Humvees.” One respondent summarized his PRT’s staffing issues by saying, 

“Some should not of [sic] been there. However, most were smart, motivated, quick learning 

professionals and grew into a team that accomplished a lot!” 

Training: “We were ‘trained’ ... but it was nothing like that when we got 

there.” 

The quality of the training program drew persistent complaints from survey 

participants. Language training, which ranged from one one-hour session to one week, was a 

particular area of concern, with more than two-thirds (69%) of respondents rating it as 

insufficient. Additionally, many PRT members serving in Afghanistan complained that the 

training at Fort Bragg for Afghanistan PRTs is too Iraq-centric, with one saying, “we made the 

best of it, but again the training was not geared for our sort of PRT or the operational 

environment we were in,” and another calling it “laughable at best, dangerous at worst.” Some 

commented that the training was not focused enough on PRT-specific skills. However, the Air 

Force and Navy personnel praised the Fort Bragg combat skills training, with one respondent 

writing that it was “vital for a group of airmen who were not familiar with land combat skills.” 

When asked how training could be improved, the most common suggestion was that 

teams should train as a team, with military and civilian PRT members as well as the PRT’s 

force protection unit included, in order to develop a comfort level early on and facilitate civilmilitary understanding. Other suggestions for additional training included: how to drive an 

uparmored vehicle (“it took a little time to get used to driving them”); the use of standard 

communications equipment, particularly Blue Force tracker (“I didn't really know how to use 

it”); as well as classes in governance issues, the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program 

(CERP) funding process, and management of contract projects. 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 71 

DEPLOYMENT

Funding: “You could always use more.” 

PRT members were generally satisfied with recent changes in funding sources and 

processes, particularly the introduction of the Department of State’s Quick Response Funds 

(QRF). One wrote, “There has been a drastic change in the system of accounting for funds. 

The new accountability allows for greater planning ability, as PRT team leaders are now aware 

of exactly what monies are available. This was not always the case.” However, they reported 

some continued frustrations, specifically, that QRF funding for projects greater than $25,000 

becomes mired in bureaucracy and often takes months for approval. Others reported that 

uncertainty over future funding amounts limited their ability to commit to long-term 

reconstruction projects, with one respondent questioning, “How can you plan strategically 

when you do not have a budget?” To ease process challenges, survey participants suggested 

including a budget officer on each team, and easing the restrictions on the use of QRF to 

mirror the military funding available through DOD’s Commanders’ Emergency Response 

Program. 

Supplies: “It is difficult to find a stapler.” 

The surveys reveal a general perception among PRTs members that they are often last 

in line to receive needed equipment. One wrote, “PRTs are relegated to second string in 

receiving equipment for replacement or upgrade despite the assertion we are the main effort.” 

Many purchased their own supplementary equipment, particularly office supplies (most often 

digital cameras and handheld commercial GPS systems), weapon holsters, and terrain-specific 

personal gear. Survey participants wrote that even basic provisions such as office equipment 

(copiers, scanners, shredders, and modern computers) are in short supply. They also expressed 

frustration that the lack of communications equipment (such as satellite phones and radio, and 

computers with access to the classified network) leaves them “out of contact with the world.” 

Finally, PRT members reported a lack of equipment necessary for movement off the Forward 

Operating Base (FOB), specifically, vehicles outfitted with Blue Force Tracker and a sufficient 

number of crew-served weapons. Many deployed to Afghanistan also noted that their 

HMMWVs were of low overall quality and were inappropriate for the rough terrain. One 

wrote, “The age and condition of the fleet negatively impacted our ability to accomplish our 

mission as the vehicles were breaking down constantly. During the summer months we 

returned back to base towing our vehicles more than not.” Survey respondents pointed out 

that this is a critical failure given that interaction with local nationals is an essential element of 

the PRT mandate. 

Security: “Always an Issue.” 

A majority of survey participants reported inadequate security for their mission some 

or all of the time. Some noted that they were at the mercy of the brigade combat team (BCT) 

in their area of operation when they wanted to travel to meetings, projects, and other events. 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 72 

One respondent noted that, though his PRT had a good relationship with the military, “If 

Brigade did not like you it would have been difficult.” In addition to insufficient security 

during movement, many respondents noted that their already understaffed teams were 

responsible for security and administration while on the FOB, further straining their 

personnel. Additional force protection was a consistent request across all surveys in both 

countries (excluding e-PRTs), and many suggested that a combat maneuver element should be 

dedicated to each PRT. 

Interpreters: “Country-wide shortage.” 

Access to interpreters varied across the PRTs. Many reported that while a sufficient 

number of interpreters and Bilingual Bicultural Advisors were provided, quality was both 

more important, and more inconsistent, than quantity. When asked if his team had a sufficient 

number of interpreters, one respondent seemed to summarize the general opinion when he 

wrote, “Yes in total, but only a few were well qualified and trustworthy.” Some survey 

participants reported infighting over who controlled and tasked interpreters. A lack of 

qualified interpreters sometimes meant that missions were delayed or documents were not 

translated. Specifically, respondents called for additional female interpreters, as well as 

interpreters with functional subject matter expertise, validated language skills, and security 

clearances. 

STRATEGIC CHALLENGES

Strategy, Metrics, and Tracking: “Unclear what everyone was working 

towards.” 

When asked about their mission, survey participants generally believed that it 

encompassed reconstruction, security and counterinsurgency, extending the rule of the central 

government, and winning hearts and minds. However, they were often surprised by the lack of 

instruction given to them or unsure of how their projects fit into the larger mission. One 

wrote, “Many of the factors contributing to success or failure were out of the PRT's control, 

such as lack of clearly defined role, lack of required subject matter/technical expertise, lack of 

specific instructions or standard operating procedures.” As a result, many PRTs created their 

own plans in conjunction with the BCT and local government officials, with one participant 

noting, “We have had to ‘write the book’ as we go.” Some respondents suggested that lack of 

planning led PRTs to pursue short-term “feel good” projects (with success measured by 

money spent or satisfaction of the local governor) without consideration of larger strategic 

and capacity-building implications. 

Many respondents noted that PRT effectiveness is hard to quantify, particularly in the 

short-term. One wrote, “I'd say most of us use a ‘gut’ check. Although the work plan 

contained an ‘Indicators and Targets’ column, the PRT did not have what I'd define as 

specific, measurable, agreed-upon, realistic, time-sensitive performance standards nor relevant, 

verifiable, consistent, easily-interpretable performance measures by which to evaluate 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 73 

achievement of goals and objectives.” Among some PRT members, there was a sense of 

frustration at the amount of paperwork required, and some questioned whether the project 

reviews and metrics they submitted were actually used to evaluate PRT performance. Survey 

participants had an awareness of the unique nature of their role, and some wondered if their 

knowledge was being secured for future contingencies. One wrote that “there seemed to be 

no plan to recruit the right people or capture their experience afterwards.” Another suggested 

that many PRT members would return for an additional rotation in a couple of years if they 

were asked, but “instead we completely fall off their radar.” 

Joint and Civil-Military Challenges: “Let’s make sure we are all on the 

same page.” 

Tensions between the services and between the civilian and military segments of the 

PRT are exacerbated by the interagency struggles that PRTs witness on a larger scale in 

Baghdad, Kabul, and Washington. One respondent noted, “This is a 'Sunday pick up team' for 

a war time mission, not a cohesive unit.” Within the military, PRTs often reflect the strains of 

the joint operating environment, particularly in Afghanistan, where soldiers, sailors, and 

airmen frequently expressed frustration with each other in their survey responses. Interagency 

tensions exist as well, particularly between the Departments of State and Defense, with one 

respondent writing that there was “no real understanding of how civilians could contribute to 

the team.” For their part, the civilian component felt undervalued by the military. Military 

respondents indicated impatience with the initial lack of civilian presence and with the 

civilians’ style of operating and management. The surveys revealed a perception amongst the 

PRT civilians that “the military will always have the upper hand in a situation like Iraq because 

they have the guns.” Many PRTs function successfully and thrive in the joint interagency 

environment. Problems, when they occur, often appear to be personality-driven rather than 

institutional. However, according to the surveys, a lack of clarity and limited guidance on 

operational control too often exacerbated these challenges. One respondent wrote, “We never 

knew exactly who had authority over us. Seemed to keep changing.” The survey responses 

indicate that struggles between some PRT and BCT commanders still exist and can have a 

chilling effect on the morale and operation of the PRT overall. 

CONCLUSION

Members of Provincial Reconstruction Teams generally reported that they are positive 

about the mission and the work they have accomplished, despite the numerous challenges 

they face. They called the program “indispensable” and “an excellent concept.” However, they 

noted that “reconstruction in an insecure environment is inherently and painfully slow and 

costly,” and frustration with the limitations on and speed of change is apparent. One survey 

participant wrote, “I am proud of my service, proud of my troops. My Soldiers did more with 

less than in any other position I have held. That being said, working with the PRT was very 

frustrating,” while another noted a “feeling of accomplishment to help people. But we could 

have done a lot more.” Still, they called working on the PRT “one of the best experiences of 

my military career,” “the best job in the Foreign Service,” and the “most rewarding experience 

of my life.” One participant summarized the general view when he wrote, “The PRT program 

is an excellent concept and if properly funded, equipped with a kinetic capability and 

competent staff, it will be very effective in the future.” 

AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 75 

APPENDIX D: NSPD-44
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 76 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 77 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 78 
AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY 79 
LESSONS WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 80