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S

ecurity alliances can take many forms. They can be bilateral or multilateral, symmetric or asymmetric, highly institutionalized or largely unstructured. Regardless of form, security alliances as instruments of statecraft, 

at their most fundamental level, reflect a deliberate commitment among states 

to aggregate resources in the pursuit of common interests. For over 60 years, the 

U.S.–Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance has defended South Korea from external attack and, through the combined efforts of both countries, contributed to 

peace and stability not only on the Korean Peninsula, but also in Northeast Asia, 

across the Asia-Pacific, and beyond.

For an alliance to endure, it must adapt to changing circumstances. Such 

changes may occur in the external security environment or in the domestic dynamics of the states themselves. The U.S.-ROK alliance has undergone significant evolution from its Cold War origins as a narrowly focused, patron-client 

relationship to today’s partnership, which is building a comprehensive strategic 

alliance for the 21st century. The October 2015 U.S.-ROK Summit reaffirmed 

the two countries’ commitment to strengthening the alliance, with President 

Barack Obama remarking, “our alliance remains a linchpin of peace and security—not just on the Korean Peninsula, but across the region.” For her part, 

ROK President Park Geun-hye stated that the alliance was “stronger than ever” 

and “moving beyond a security alliance and an economic alliance, and evolving 

into a comprehensive global alliance.”1

The strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance and the confidence it brings have 

enabled President Park to embark on an ambitious foreign policy, including 

with China. It has also enabled a reenergized inter-Korean policy based on her 

concept of “trustpolitik” and elevated Korean unification2 to the center of her 

administration’s agenda—and of her legacy as South Korea’s president.3 More 

Korean Unification and 

the Future of the U.S.-ROK 

Alliance

by David F. Helvey

STRATEGIC FORUM

National Defense University

About the Author

David F. Helvey is a Visiting 

Distinguished Research Fellow in 

the Center for the Study of Chinese 

Military Affairs, Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, at the National 

Defense University. He previously 

served as Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for East Asia from 

December 2012 to April 2015.

Key Points

◆ Unification of the Korean Peninsula 

would remove the primary threat 

that has animated the U.S.–Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance for over 

60 years, but it need not require 

termination of the alliance.

◆ An alliance between the United 

States and a unified Korea would, 

at a macro level, reinforce the international liberal democratic order. At 

a micro level, it could help ensure 

security on the Korean Peninsula 

during the process of integrating 

the North, assist in the defense of 

Korea, and serve as a platform for 

multilateral security cooperation.

◆ A future alliance should be a part 

of planning for Korean unification 

and should consider the purpose of 

the alliance, its roles and missions, 

coordinating structures, and presence (if any) of U.S. troops. It should 

also include diplomatic efforts to 

assure China, Russia, and Japan that 

a future alliance would respect sovereignty and support stability.

◆ A reconfigured alliance should reflect greater equality between the 

United States and a unified Korea 

to ensure its political sustainability in both capitals. Planning for a 

future alliance must not erode the 

critical functions of deterrence that 

the alliance performs today.

February 2016

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF CHINESE MILITARY AFFAIRS
2 SF No. 291 ndupress.ndu.edu

practically, President Park’s emphasis on Korean unification is intended to boost waning interest among the 

younger generations in the South and to mobilize international support not only for the diplomacy necessary to 

promote unification but also for the significant investments that ultimately will be required for reconstruction, reconciliation, and integration of the two Koreas.

Unification, however it may occur—from conflict, 

collapse of the regime in the North, or peaceful negotiation—will be an extraordinarily complex undertaking but 

will offer significant benefits to the Korean people, the 

region, and the world. First, unification would address the 

immediate human security issues such as poverty, poor 

living conditions, and widespread human rights abuse 

that define the existence of the Korean people living in 

the North. Second, unification would contribute to an 

enduring peace on the peninsula by removing a source 

of potential regional conflict and set the conditions for 

denuclearization. Third, as President Park noted in her 

March 2014 Dresden speech, unification would unlock 

the potential for the Korean people to focus more resources on economic and social development and to make 

larger contributions to regional and global security and 

development.4

By eliminating the central threat that has animated 

the U.S.-ROK alliance, unification would also give rise 

to questions about the future of the alliance itself, with 

some perhaps calling for its dissolution. The 2009 Joint 

Vision for the Alliance, reaffirmed in 2013 and again in 

2015, charts a path for the future of the alliance, including consideration of a post-unification Korea.5

 This vision represents only the beginning, not an end, of the 

conversation. A sustained dialogue is needed on how the 

American and Korean people can continue their pursuit 

of common interests by adapting the alliance to the challenges and opportunities in a post-unification security 

environment.

This first section of this paper reviews the evolution of the U.S.-ROK alliance during the Cold War and 

post–Cold War periods and describes how the alliance 

has adapted to changing conditions both on and off the 

peninsula. The second section explores the prospects for 

unification and its implications for the alliance. The third 

section examines key factors and planning considerations 

necessary to prepare the alliance for post-unification 

roles and missions, including the need to ensure that 

nothing done in planning for a post-unification alliance 

undermines the critical functions of deterrence and response that the alliance performs today.

The Evolution of an Alliance

The U.S.-ROK alliance, forged on the battlefields 

of the Korean War (1950–1953), has demonstrated a resiliency and adaptability that has served the interests of 

both nations in securing peace and maintaining stability 

on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. A detailed history of the alliance is beyond the scope of this 

paper.6 However, a short review of the historical contours 

of the alliance—including several of its missteps—will 

set a useful foundation for the discussion on structuring 

the alliance for a post-unification future.

Cold War Origins. The U.S.-ROK alliance was created in 1953 following the cessation of hostilities on the 

Korean Peninsula. Explicitly focused on defending the 

Republic of Korea against external aggression, the alliance was part of the San Francisco system of bilateral 

alliances in East Asia (the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty 

[1951], U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty [1953], and 

U.S.–Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty [1954]), 

commonly referred to as the hub-and-spokes system.7

Its purpose was to serve as a bulwark against communist 

a sustained dialogue is needed on 

how the American and Korean 

people can continue their pursuit 

of common interests by adapting 

the alliance to the challenges and 

opportunities in a post-unification 

security environment
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 291 3 

expansion and to support U.S. policy objectives in Asia.8

At the same time, particularly with respect to the ROK 

and Republic of China, the design of each alliance was 

informed by a U.S. desire to avoid entrapment by weaker 

allies in unwanted wars.9 Such wars would not only risk 

distraction from the global strategy of containment but 

also, according to the prevailing “domino theory,” require 

prosecution by the United States for fear that losing one 

conflict would precipitate a chain reaction of weakened 

and demoralized friendly nations falling to communist 

aggression or subversion.

Although both the United States and the Republic 

of Korea were brought together by a shared interest in 

opposing communism, each harbored fears and insecurities about the other.10 For the Republic of Korea, it was 

the fear that the United States would abandon it. For the 

United States, it was the fear that then-ROK President 

Syngman Rhee would resume hostilities with North Korea, potentially leading to a wider conflict. This meant 

structuring the alliance to provide a security guarantee 

and assurance of the U.S. commitment to the South. It 

also meant maximizing U.S. influence by, among other 

things, ensuring that the U.S.-led United Nations Command, which had been granted operational command of 

ROK forces in 1950, retained operational control (OPCON) of ROK forces during the armistice. The U.S. intent was made explicit in language that accompanied its 

ratification of the mutual defense treaty:

neither party is obligated . . . to come to the aid 

of the other except in case of an external armed 

attack against such party; nor shall anything in the 

present Treaty be construed as requiring the United 

Sates to give assistance to Korea except in the event 

of an armed attack against territory which has been 

recognized by the United States as lawfully brought 

under the administrative control of the Republic of 

Korea.11

Accordingly, the U.S.-ROK alliance took on three 

basic functions: as part of a network of alliances to “ring 

the Soviet threat in the Pacific”; to deter a North Korean 

attack, with U.S. ground forces serving as a “tripwire” 

guaranteeing U.S. involvement; and as a means to restrain the South from engaging in adventurism.12

From the ROK perspective, the presence of U.S. 

forces not only helped to deter North Korean aggression but also symbolized Washington’s commitment to 

its defense. In this context, President Richard Nixon’s 

call in July 1969 for Asian nations to be primarily responsible for their own defense (what came to be known 

as the Nixon Doctrine) and subsequent announcement 

of the withdrawal of 24,000 troops from the Korean 

Peninsula heightened ROK fears of abandonment.13

Similarly, President Nixon’s pursuit of détente with the 

Soviet Union, opening to China, and later withdrawal 

from Vietnam fueled Seoul’s concerns about U.S. resolve 

to defend it against North Korean aggression. Such concerns, in part, prompted Seoul to begin a nuclear weapons program, which was suspended in 1976 only after 

significant U.S. pressure.14 South Korean fears of abandonment were magnified by President Jimmy Carter’s 

1977 call to withdraw all U.S. troops from the peninsula in response to the poor human rights conditions in 

South Korea under then-President Park Chung-hee.

The basic structures of the U.S.-ROK alliance were 

formed during the Cold War period. For example, in 

1968, in part to coordinate responses to the North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo, the United States and ROK 

created the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) between the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister 

of Defense, which has since become an annual platform 

for strategic-level consultations on the alliance. Similarly, the Military Committee was established to bring together the U.S. and ROK chairmen of the joint chiefs of 

staff and other senior officers to coordinate implementation of guidance from the SCM. In 1978, the two sides 

established the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command 

(CFC) under a U.S. four-star general and ROK fourstar deputy with an integrated staff of U.S. and ROK 

personnel. The CFC commander, who is also designated 

as the commander of United Nations Command and 

commander of U.S. Forces Korea, was given OPCON of 
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select ROK forces under armistice conditions and, subject to national command authority decisions in both 

capitals, OPCON of designated ROK forces in wartime 

as well. 15 Each of these steps reduced the early asymmetry between the allies by giving the ROK a greater 

voice in and influence over alliance decisionmaking and, 

in acknowledgment of its increased capacities, more responsibility for its own defense—while at the same time 

binding the United States more closely to the peninsula.

Enabled by the stability and security the alliance 

provided, the Cold War period also saw the ROK economy begin to take off and the pro-democracy movement in South Korea begin to take hold. In this context, the U.S. pattern of supporting authoritarian—albeit 

staunchly anti-communist—leaders, such as Rhee, Park 

Chung-hee, who seized power in a 1961 coup d’état, and 

Chun Doo-hwan, who took control in a 1980 coup d’état, 

produced profound anti-alliance leanings within the democracy movement, particularly among the so-called 

386 generation, which would rise to political prominence 

in the 1990s and early 2000s.16

Post–Cold War Transitions. With the collapse of 

the Soviet Union, the Cold War consensus that had sustained the U.S.-ROK alliance began to fray. The decline 

of bipolar confrontation created opportunities for U.S. 

allies, including the ROK, to pursue “soft balancing” to 

limit Washington’s ability to impose its preferences and 

to increase their own diplomatic flexibility. For example, 

ROK President Kim Young-sam (1993–1998) promoted ROK participation in multilateral security structures, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, to enhance 

Seoul’s regional influence and reduce its dependence on 

Washington. 17

Moreover, the triumph of democracy in the ROK by 

1987 expanded the range of politically acceptable views 

about the North. This energized the inter-Korean diplomacy, which produced the Joint Declaration on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation 

(December 13, 1991) and the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (December 31, 

1991). But continued North Korean nuclear developments in 1992 soon brought progress to a standstill. The 

Sunshine Policy of the Kim Dae-jung administration 

(1998–2002) reflected further changes in popular attitudes 

toward Koreans in the North who, in the aftermath of the 

catastrophic famines and economic collapse of the early 

1990s, came to be seen as objects of sympathy in need of 

assistance rather than a threat to be confronted or contained. Likewise for the United States, the collapse of the 

Soviet Union opened additional policy options for dealing 

with the North and its emergent nuclear programs, ranging from unilateral pressure and confrontation to engagement, including direct bilateral talks, with Pyongyang.18

Scott Snyder describes the alliance during this period as being on “auto-pilot”—continuing to function 

with Cold War premises, structures, and patterns of 

operation.19 With the exception of the 1994 transfer to 

the ROK of peacetime OPCON over all ROK forces, 

there was no serious or sustained effort to adapt the alliance to the post–Cold War security environment or to 

ensure its compatibility with the political, economic, and 

social transformations on the peninsula. An initial effort 

to evaluate the alliance in the context of a broader regional strategy and posture review, termed the East Asia 

Strategy Initiative (EASI), was launched in 1990 by the 

George H.W. Bush administration. However, elements 

of EASI related to U.S. posture on the Korean Peninsula, 

including troop reductions, encountered early resistance 

from Seoul and were ultimately shelved in 1992 as the 

North Korean nuclear threat emerged. The institutional 

inertia and growing divergences in threat perceptions 

within the ROK body politic and between the ROK and 

there was no serious or sustained 

effort to adapt the alliance to the 

post–Cold War security environment 

or to ensure its compatibility with 

the political, economic, and social 

transformations on the peninsula
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 291 5 

the United States that characterized this early post–Cold 

War period persisted over the course of the decade, creating the conditions in which a series of events in 2002 

and 2003 would generate the most significant crises in 

the alliance since its inception.

The first crisis emerged in June 2002 following the 

tragic deaths of two Korean school girls in a highway 

accident involving a U.S. military vehicle participating in 

an exercise on the outskirts of Seoul. The “Highway 56 

incident” sparked protests across South Korea that continued to build momentum into the fall, featuring the 

burning of U.S. flags and an effigy of President George 

W. Bush, calls for the removal of U.S. troops from South 

Korea, and demands for the U.S. Soldiers involved in 

the accident to face local prosecution.20 In keeping with 

the provisions of the U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement,21 the United States refused to turn over the Soldiers, who were eventually acquitted by a U.S. military 

tribunal. The incident caused a fissure in the alliance and 

exposed a deep resentment over the local impacts of the 

U.S. military presence—particularly in an increasingly 

urbanized and congested Seoul metropolitan area—and 

anger over the perceived injustice that allowed U.S. military personnel to be on South Korean soil but beyond the 

reach of South Korean law.

The second crisis erupted in fall 2002 following revelations that North Korea had engaged in a covert uranium enrichment program in contravention of its obligations under the 1994 Agreed Framework. Reflecting 

the prevailing Sunshine Policy of ROK President Kim 

and the similar Peace and Prosperity policy of his successor, Roh Moo-hyun, Seoul sought mediation and direct 

engagement with Pyongyang in response to the revelations, in contrast to the U.S. preference for a multilateral 

framework for denuclearization. Similarly, the Roh administration saw establishment of a peace regime on the 

peninsula as a step toward denuclearization rather than 

a potential outcome from it.22 This divergence sparked 

criticism within the United States over the credibility of 

the ROK as an alliance partner in confronting the proliferation threat posed by the North.

A third challenge came in the form of widespread 

protests in South Korea over U.S. policy in the lead up to 

Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Seoul eventually chose 

to deploy the Zaytun Division to Iraq (2004–2008) and 

supported coalition operations in Afghanistan by deploying a field hospital, a provincial reconstruction team, security forces, and financial assistance. However, the protests 

exposed a rift in an alliance that had not adapted to post9/11 U.S. priorities, including that for “strategic flexibility,” or the use of U.S. military assets based on the Korean 

Peninsula for off-peninsula contingencies, potentially including those involving China. ROK fears of abandonment became manifest in its opposition to the deployment 

of U.S. troops from Korea to other contingencies that it 

feared could erode deterrence of North Korea. At the 

same time, reflecting South Korea’s desire for greater independence in its foreign policy and more influence within 

the alliance, Seoul sought to avoid entrapment in regional 

conflicts involving U.S. operations from the peninsula.

Building an Alliance for the 21st Century. The crises 

of 2002 and 2003 prompted Seoul and Washington to 

engage in a long-overdue evaluation that would move 

the alliance toward a more equal footing and a stronger political foundation. These changes were enabled by 

a reemerging consensus in both capitals over the North 

Korean threat. Both sides shared concerns about North 

Korean nuclear and missile developments and, despite 

an erosion in conventional military capabilities, North 

Korea’s continued capacity for asymmetric attacks and 

violent provocations such as the August 2015 landmine 

incident in the Demilitarized Zone, the 2010 sinking of 

the ROK navy vessel Cheonan, the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, or the cyber attacks against South Korea 

and Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014.23 In addition, 

at the highest levels in both the ROK and the United 

States, a new consensus emerged on the value of the alliance as a strategic asset.

The transformation of the alliance began with the 

2-year-long bilateral Future of the Alliance Talks. The 

talks revived some of the earlier EASI recommendations 

about U.S. force posture on the peninsula, including 
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relocation of U.S. military units out of Seoul and areas 

north (that is, the Yongsan Relocation Program and the 

Land Partnership Plan), as well as an initial agreement 

in 2007 to transfer wartime OPCON to the ROK.24 The 

two sides also agreed to establish the Security Policy 

Initiative under the SCM in 2004 to discuss future alliance roles both on and off the peninsula. This broader 

perspective was captured in the Joint Statement released 

following the November 2005 summit between Presidents George W. Bush and Roh Moo-hyun, which noted 

the “two leaders agreed that the alliance not only stands 

against threats, but also for the promotion of the common values of democracy, market economy, freedom, and 

human rights in Asia and beyond.”25

The summit outcomes included creation of the Strategic Consultations for Allied Partnership (SCAP) between 

the U.S. Secretary of State and the ROK Foreign Minister, 

which focused on North Korea and a range of regional and 

global issues, such as counterterrorism, nonproliferation, 

peace-keeping, and pandemic disease. Importantly, the inaugural meeting of the SCAP in January 2006 included a 

bilateral understanding on the role of U.S. military forces 

based in the ROK in regional contingencies:

The ROK, as an ally, fully understands the 

rationale for the transformation of the U.S. global 

military strategy, and respects the necessity for 

strategic flexibility of the U.S. forces in the ROK. 

In the implementation of strategic flexibility, the 

U.S. respects the ROK position that it shall not be 

involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia 

against the will of the Korean people.26

These changes helped rebuild the relationship following the crises of 2002 and signified progress in adjusting the alliance to new domestic and international 

realities, but did not produce a shared vision of the future 

to guide further transformation of the alliance.

The 2008 election of President Lee Myung-bak returned conservative leadership in Seoul, with Lee explicitly seeking to strengthen ties with the United States—

and with it the U.S.-ROK alliance—as a central element 

of his foreign policy. During President Lee’s first visit to 

the United States in April 2008, the two sides agreed to 

transform the alliance into a “Strategic Alliance for the 

21st Century” that would continue to ensure peace and 

stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia 

and that would also “contribute to global peace and security.”27 The articulation of a “strategic alliance” reflected 

the two sides’ desire to expand the alliance agenda beyond 

security cooperation (although military and security cooperation would remain at the core) to include cooperation in the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres.

This broader framework for alliance cooperation was 

carried forward into the Obama administration and expanded upon in the 2009 Joint Vision for the Alliance, 

which called upon the two sides to build a “comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional, and global scope 

based on common values and mutual trust.”28 The statement committed the two sides to strengthen and improve 

the ability of the alliance to provide for combined defense 

on the Korean Peninsula and to cooperate globally, reflecting enhanced ROK capabilities and ambitions as well as a 

U.S. desire, in a more resource-constrained environment, 

to partner with others in support of regional and global 

stability. The areas marked for deeper alliance cooperation included responses to terrorism, proliferation, piracy, 

the Joint Vision put reunification of 

the Korean Peninsula explicitly on 

the alliance agenda for the first time, 

with the declaration that “we aim to 

build a better future for all people 

on the Korean Peninsula, establishing 

a durable peace on the Peninsula 

and leading to peaceful reunification 

on the principles of free democracy 

and a market economy”
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 291 7 

organized crime, poverty, climate change, infringement of 

human rights, threats to energy security, and pandemic disease, as well as support for peace-keeping and postconflict 

stabilization and development.29 Accordingly the United 

States and ROK agreed in 2011 to establish the KoreaU.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue to better coordinate and 

synthesize alliance initiatives ranging from North Korean 

threat assessments to base relocation and regional security 

cooperation to extended deterrence and counterproliferation within a single, coherent framework.30 The Joint Vision 

also put reunification of the Korean Peninsula explicitly on 

the alliance agenda for the first time, with the declaration 

that “we aim to build a better future for all people on the 

Korean Peninsula, establishing a durable peace on the Peninsula and leading to peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy.”31 These 

changes reflect shared aspirations and a mutual commitment to pursue them, as well as a shared recognition of the 

growing equality within the U.S.-ROK alliance consistent 

with South Korea’s political evolution, economic development, and military modernization.

The 2009 Joint Vision has continued to guide alliance development under the Park Geun-hye administration. Its goals were reaffirmed in 2013 and again in 2015, 

which included an agreement to extend U.S.-ROK partnership into “New Frontiers of Cooperation,” such as cyber, space, climate change, and global health.32 The 2015 

summit also included a commitment to open high-level 

bilateral consultations “to create conditions conducive to 

peaceful reunification,” creating a platform for the two 

sides to assess pathways to unification and, potentially, 

to conduct detailed planning for a post-unification future.33 Such planning will be important for the alliance 

to anticipate and adapt to changes in the domestic and 

international security environments. 

An Alliance Agenda

In January 2014, President Park Geun-hye used the 

first press conference of her presidency to call for greater 

emphasis on, and urgency in, planning for unification, 

elevating Korean unification to the center of her administration’s agenda.34 The priority that President Park attaches to unification is not without precedent; all ROK 

presidents have sought to cement their legacies by establishing a path to unification. However, she is the first to 

frame the rationale for unification in terms of enabling 

the Republic of Korea to realize its potential and highlight the benefits of unification to the Korean people and 

the world. Park’s urgency reflects increasing anxiety over 

the unpredictability of the North Korean regime and the 

persistent threat posed by its nuclear and missile developments and capacity for violent provocations.

At the same time, President Park is seeking to bolster waning interest in unification among the younger 

generations in the South. As 2014 polling data from the 

South Korean Asan Institute for Policy Studies reveals, 

support for reunification among South Koreans in their 

20s (the youngest cohort in the poll) was nearly 20 percentage points below that of South Koreans in their 60s 

and older—a gap that had widened from the previous 

years.35 Moreover, President Park seeks to mobilize international diplomatic, and particularly economic, support 

for the unification process, recognizing the role that key 

stakeholders China, Russia, Japan, and the United States 

could play in setting the regional conditions for unification and, along with the broader international community, helping to underwrite the costs of reconstruction, 

reconciliation, and integration of the two Koreas.36

Unification of the Korean Peninsula could occur in a 

number of ways. First, North Korean leaders could realize that their state model has failed and that they have 

no hope of reunifying the peninsula on their terms, and 

could seek to unify peacefully with South Korea following a negotiated “soft landing” scenario similar to the 

unification of East and West Germany. Second, unification could follow a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. 

For example, one possible alliance goal in response to a 

North Korean attack could be to repel the offensive and 

seek regime change during the counteroffensive. Third, 

unification could occur following instability in North 

Korea and collapse of the regime in Pyongyang. This paper focuses on a collapse scenario.
8 SF No. 291 ndupress.ndu.edu

Effective alliance deterrence at the high end, combined with eroding North Korean capabilities to project and sustain the combat power necessary to mount 

an offensive, render a North Korean aggression scenario, 

while dangerous, relatively remote. Although peaceful 

unification would be preferred and, indeed, is President 

Park’s official policy and the alliance objective as defined in the 2009 Joint Vision Statement, North Korea’s 

nuclear developments and the international response to 

them increasingly suggest a more likely outcome will be 

unification by absorption following some sort of crisis on 

the peninsula, such as regime fracture or perhaps conflict 

erupting from uncontrolled escalation following provocation. Moreover, even if Seoul and Pyongyang are able 

to negotiate peaceful unification, the process of integration and replacing—or establishing—governance in the 

North would entail significant instability risks highlighting a need for plans and forces that are ready to perform similar missions as in a collapse scenario, if not on 

a similar scale.

Collapse could produce four distinct but related types 

of crises.37 First, a humanitarian crisis may result from the 

breakdown of central government control and the public distribution system for food and medical supplies to 

a significant portion of North Korea’s 24 million people, 

many of whom already suffer from malnourishment and 

disease. Although economic reforms have led to a growing reliance on markets, implementation remains uneven. 

An increasingly vibrant black market could offset failures 

in markets or government allocation, but the availability 

of goods may be spotty and disrupted through poor infrastructure, inflation, and hoarding. Military assets would 

be needed to provide humanitarian relief, including the 

provision of supplies and medical services until those 

functions could be transferred to civilian authorities, and 

to protect critical infrastructure, lines of communication, 

and relief convoys.

The inability to meet food and physical security 

needs in an increasingly chaotic situation could give rise 

to a second crisis in the form of mass migration and refugee 

flows as North Koreans attempt to flee to the northern 

and southern borders, or perhaps in boats to the ROK, 

China, or Japan. China and Russia would likely handle 

northward flows and might seek to establish camps on 

the Korean side of the border, with the ROK handling 

southward flows and coordinating what would likely be 

a multilateral response to seaborne flows. A refugee crisis 

could further complicate the third potential crisis in a 

collapse scenario: loss of control over stockpiles of nuclear, 

chemical, and biological materials and weapons vulnerable 

to theft and smuggling out to the international black 

market. Estimates suggest that North Korea today has 

perhaps 10 to 16 nuclear weapons with the potential for 

20 to 125 by 2020.38 Pyongyang is assessed to have a 

longstanding chemical weapons program and a potentially robust biological warfare capability.39 Preventing or 

controlling the flow of these materials—not to mention 

the people and records—would require a massive undertaking to shut off possible transit routes, ports, and airfields; monitor and secure known facilities; and conduct 

a detailed sweep of the country to discover and properly 

control any facilities that remain as yet unknown.

Fourth, even in the most benign collapse scenario, 

there would be the potential for active resistance and insurgency by elements of the North Korean population, 

including the Korean People’s Army, which, by ROK 

estimates, numbers 1.2 million in the active force and 

some 7.7 million in the reserve, or almost 40 percent of 

the North Korean population.40 These forces would need 

to be disarmed, demobilized, and properly reintegrated 

into society. The U.S. experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom reveals that the failure to rapidly disarm and secure 

weapons from the Iraqi military after the fall of Saddam 

Hussein fueled the insurgency that followed. In the Korea case, as in the Iraq case, the potential for resistance 

and insurgency following collapse is path dependent but 

requires advanced planning and resourcing.

In sum, in addition to planning for long-term political, economic, and social integration, unification following crisis and regime collapse would require planning for 

stability operations, border control and maritime security, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) elimination, 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 291 9 

conventional disarmament, and countering any resistance. Although the ROK armed forces could perform 

the bulk of the missions, the resourcing requirements, 

which estimates suggest could range from 260,000 to 

400,000 personnel under optimistic assumptions, might 

quickly outstrip ROK capacities.41 Moreover, the ROK 

would likely rely on the U.S. military for certain aspects 

of the WMD elimination mission, particularly securing 

North Korean nuclear weapons and fissile materials—

in keeping with ROK obligations under the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Treaty—as well as logistics and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In terms of the 

broader implications of the unification process on the 

U.S.-ROK alliance, it is useful to note that ROK attitudes toward the alliance after unification would likely 

be influenced heavily by the extent to which the United 

States commits its resources to achieve it and by the 

timeliness of its contributions.

In addition to alliance planning for post-unification 

stability, the United States and ROK must consider the 

interests and perspectives of China, Russia, and Japan on 

the issue of unification, both in terms of its outcomes and 

the risks and costs of transition, and on the issue of the 

alliance in a post-unification environment.

China. China’s overarching interests on the Korean 

Peninsula lie in maintaining stability and security along 

its northeastern borders. In this context, China views 

North Korea, with whom it has maintained a treatybased alliance since 1961, as a “buffer state” ensuring 

separation between U.S. and allied forces on the peninsula and the Chinese mainland. The concept of a buffer 

state has retained currency among many strategic thinkers in Beijing even as China has drawn closer to Seoul, 

particularly in terms of two-way trade and investment, 

and more distant from Pyongyang due to North Korea’s 

nuclear programs and destabilizing behavior.42 Despite 

the damage to China’s interests from North Korean nuclear and missile developments—or perhaps put differently, the international responses to the growing North 

Korean threat—China has chosen to continue to provide 

aid, energy supplies, and other assistance to prop up the 

regime. One analyst has even suggested that the security afforded by a North Korean buffer enables Beijing to 

concentrate its military forces opposite Taiwan.43

China officially supports Korean unification based 

on a process agreed to by both sides and independent 

from external powers. This position was reaffirmed on 

the eve of President Park’s inauguration in December 

2012: “China always supports the South and the North 

to improve their relations through dialogue, promote 

reconciliation and cooperation, and eventually achieve 

the independent and peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.”44 In practice, China’s policy has been 

to favor the status quo, or at best a gradual unification 

process that results in the transformation of the two 

Koreas into a neutral state. China’s preference for the 

status quo in the short run indicates that Beijing fears 

the risks and costs of alternatives would be worse, leading some analysts to suggest that Beijing might seek to 

prevent any attempt to achieve unification before arrangements could be made to ensure its interests are adequately protected in a post-unification environment.45

Others have suggested that in absence of a U.S.-China 

condominium (thus eliminating North Korea’s role as a 

counterbalance) or actions by North Korea to directly 

harm China’s “core interests,” Beijing will continue to 

provide enough support to enable North Korea to survive as an independent state.46 In the event that China 

cannot prevent a collapse, it would likely seek to influence the terms of unification to preserve its overarching 

interest of security along its borders.

ROK attitudes toward the alliance 

after unification would likely be 

influenced heavily by the extent to 

which the United States commits its 

resources to achieve it and by the 

timeliness of its contributions
10 SF No. 291 ndupress.ndu.edu

China, in this context, might see value in Korean 

unification under the ROK as this would eliminate the 

security challenges and economic drain imposed on it by 

North Korea today. Beijing would also see a unified Korean Peninsula as potentially helping the development of 

its “rust belt” in Northeast China through greater regional economic integration. These potential benefits would 

be balanced against the loss of the buffer that North Korea has historically provided and the potential for a unified Korea to rekindle territorial disputes over Goguryeo, 

seen by Koreans as lost territory.47

China would likely be suspicious of a unified, democratic, economically successful and military capable 

Korea and would seek to encourage a restructuring (if 

not disestablishment) of the U.S.-ROK alliance and a 

diminished (if not the complete removal) of U.S. troops 

from the peninsula. Some Chinese analysts have asserted 

that any U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula 

following unification would be unacceptable, with others 

suggesting that China would not oppose such a presence 

if a unified Korea wanted it, provided that it was limited 

to the southern half of the peninsula (that is, below the 

38th parallel).48 Beijing is likely to use its leverage over 

the unification process to pressure the ROK to limit any 

U.S. troop presence and the role of the post-unification 

alliance in regional contingencies.49

Japan. Japan’s historical approach to Korean unification has been “cautious, reactive, [and] adaptive to the 

process.”50 It recognizes that unification could produce a 

powerful political and economic rival aligned with Beijing 

or a close partner and ally, but because of unresolved issues 

of history, including North Korea’s abduction of Japanese 

citizens during the 1970s and 1980s, and Japan’s colonization of Korea and use of Korean women (and others) 

as “comfort women” (a euphemism for sex slaves) during 

World War II, it has generally avoided actions to either 

prevent or encourage unification in order to avoid accusations of interference in Korean internal affairs. Nevertheless, Japan has preferences regarding the outcomes.

Japan would support a unified, nonnuclear Korea 

aligned with the United States and Japan and would 

see a Korea that shared Japan’s political values and economic system as fundamentally advancing its interests.51

Likewise, Japan would support a continuation of the 

U.S.-ROK alliance and the presence of U.S. forces on 

the peninsula as a means to support regional stability 

and limit the potential for a unified Korea to align with 

China or act independently against Japanese regional 

interests and influence. Indeed, Japan likely fears that 

unification could usher in intensified anti-Japan Korean 

nationalism and a deterioration of Korea-Japan relations, which could complicate resolution of the territorial dispute over Liancourt Rocks, also known as Dokdo 

(Korea)/Takeshima ( Japan). Tokyo would be particularly concerned over the development or retention by a 

unified Korea of offensive strike systems, such as longrange ballistic and cruise missiles, or expanded naval capabilities in the absence of a U.S. presence, and might 

seek to address these insecurities through countervailing 

investments of its own, which could lead to a destabilizing arms race.

Russia. Russian interests on the Korean Peninsula 

include averting another major war, preventing proliferation of nuclear and missile technology, maintaining 

Moscow’s status as a regional player, and eventually the 

peaceful elimination of nuclear weapons.52 Despite these 

interests, however, Moscow has relatively limited diplomatic and economic resources to influence dynamics on 

the Korean Peninsula.

Moscow supports, in principle, Korean unification 

based on a process agreed to by the two sides. Before 

his November 2013 visit to Seoul, Vladimir Putin told 

the Russian press that “we unconditionally support the 

Koreans’ yearning for the unification of their nation. It is 

a natural process. But I proceed from the certitude that 

it must be absolutely peaceful and the interests of both 

the northern and southern parts of the peninsula must 

be taken into consideration.”53 Russia would likely see 

primarily economic benefits through Korean unification, 

particularly in terms of energy trade and infrastructure 

investment (for example, the Trans-Siberian Railway 

and Trans-Korean Railway Link).
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 291 11 

However, Russia would also be concerned that a 

North Korean collapse leading to sudden unification 

under the ROK would produce a shift in the regional 

balance of power, a concern that has grown following 

Russia’s seizure of Crimea and the geopolitical divide 

that has reemerged between Russia and the West.54 In 

this context, Moscow would seek to avoid domination 

of a unified Korean Peninsula by any great power and 

likely oppose any outcome that increases U.S. influence 

on the peninsula or a continuation of the U.S. presence 

after unification. Furthermore, Moscow might be wary 

that unification could diminish Sino-Russian alignment and give rise to greater suspicion or rivalry between Beijing and Moscow. As a cautionary note, Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, aggression in Ukraine 

in 2014, and launch of military operations in Syria in 

2015 suggest that unification planning cannot rule out 

the potential, however remote, for Russian intervention 

to protect its interests.55

The obstacles and suspicions identified herein reinforce preferences for the status quo among these stakeholders—despite each having an official policy that supports Korean unification—and will need to be addressed 

through a process of sustained diplomatic engagement in 

both bilateral and multilateral constructs, ideally before 

a crisis unfolds. While challenging, the objections and 

concerns are not insurmountable.

China will need to be convinced, for example, that a 

unified Korea—and a restructured U.S.-Korea alliance—

would not pose a threat to its interests. A China that does 

not seek conflict with the United States or its allies, or to 

dominate the region, has no reason to fear a U.S.-Korea 

alliance or a U.S. military presence on a unified Korean 

Peninsula. Moreover, continuation of the U.S.-Korea 

alliance would help maintain stability during and after 

unification, help address a unified Korea’s security needs, 

thereby limiting the potential for it to pursue nuclear 

weapons of its own, and help manage Sino-Japanese competition, all of which would be of interest to Beijing. For 

its part, a unified Korea might also assure China through 

robust bilateral diplomatic and economic engagement as 

well as by championing the establishment of an inclusive regional security architecture, while maintaining its 

alliance with the United States. Moreover, China should 

be confident that a unified Korea would have significant 

need for resources and technical assistance in managing 

reconstruction in the North—and throughout the integration process—which would naturally provide Beijing 

with considerable sources of influence. The extent to 

which China chooses to use (or develop) such cooperative 

tools to exercise its influence or chooses to rely on more 

familiar competitive and coercive approaches would go a 

long way in defining the nature of China’s relationship 

with a unified Korea and the region.

In terms of Japan’s concerns, realizing historical reconciliation between Tokyo and Seoul prior to unification 

could help limit the potential for Korean nationalism on 

a unified Korean Peninsula to turn sharply anti-Japanese. 

The December 28, 2015, announcement by Japan and the 

ROK of an agreement regarding “comfort women” is a 

good start.56 A continued U.S. military presence on the 

peninsula could help to lessen Tokyo’s fears that a unified Korea would align with China; it could also limit the 

potential for anti-alliance pressure to build in Japan as the 

last U.S. military outpost in Asia. Maintaining engagement with Russia on Korean Peninsula futures will be 

important to ensure that its interests will not be damaged 

and to limit its potential to act as a spoiler in the process.

Building an Alliance Vision

Unification of the Korean Peninsula would bring 

substantial benefit to the Korean people, especially those 

a China that does not seek conflict 

with the United States or its allies, 

or to dominate the region, has no 

reason to fear a U.S.-Korea alliance 

or a U.S. military presence on 

unified Korean Peninsula
12 SF No. 291 ndupress.ndu.edu

living in the North, remove a source of potential regional 

conflict, and enable a global Korea to contribute more 

to international security and development. Unification, 

however, would also remove the principal threat that 

has animated the U.S.-ROK alliance since its inception, 

which leads to a natural question of whether an alliance 

can survive in the absence of a clear threat.

Alliance literature suggests there are three key factors to consider: if there is an asymmetry of power between the two allies, if the allies share similar political 

values, and if the relationship is highly institutionalized.57

Moreover, there is value in retaining capabilities that an 

alliance has already built as a hedge against uncertainty 

in the future, particularly if such capabilities are adaptable to new circumstances and if the cost of maintaining 

them is less than the cost to reacquire them.58 A continued U.S. alliance with a unified Korea based on the principles of democracy and a market economy, adapted to 

the regional security environment of a post-unification 

Korea, meets those criteria.

The prior question, however, is whether the parties 

will choose to preserve the alliance in the first place. A 

recent Center for a New American Security study postulates three alternative foreign policy orientations for a 

unified Korea: a continental, China-leaning approach; 

a maritime, Western-oriented approach; or inwardfocused and neutral.59 For its part, in the aftermath of 

Korean unification, the United States may choose to 

reduce its commitments on the peninsula in the face of 

budgetary pressures at home and assume the role of offshore balancer in competition with a rising China. For 

the purpose of this exercise, I assume that both Washington and Seoul would have the desire and intent to 

maintain the alliance. There would be ample reason for 

them to do so.

Support for the alliance in South Korea remains 

high, with the most recent South Korean Asan Institute 

polling data (from March 2014) returning an overall 93 

percent favorability rating, with 66 percent of those surveyed favoring keeping the alliance after unification.60

Retaining the alliance with the United States would 

support Korea’s interests in protecting its fundamental political and economic system while reducing its 

own security costs through burdensharing. It would 

also serve as an “insurance policy” to secure unification, 

maintain stability, and as described above, assist Korea 

as it deals with a range of challenges through an extended unification process. The alliance would provide 

Korea with leverage to deal with its neighbors, both as 

a foundation for security and a hedge with respect to 

the rise of China and Russia—and as a buffer in rising 

Sino-Japanese competition—thereby enhancing its status as a “middle power.” It would also provide a platform 

to mobilize resources to facilitate Korea’s participation 

in the delivery of international public goods, such as 

disaster relief, search and rescue, and maritime security. 

As President Park has stated, the alliance, “which will 

be upgraded through unification, will continue to evolve 

into an alliance which stands for humanity.”61 Finally, an 

alliance would be in keeping with the traditional basis 

for Korea’s relationship with the United States in which 

it has sought to align itself with “greater power that 

would offer security but not be so close geographically 

that it would threaten Korean sovereignty.”62

For the United States, retaining the alliance with 

a unified Korea would help ensure that a united Korea 

remains free under a democratic political system and 

market economy, which is a strong U.S. interest. The alliance would also play a role in helping to manage shifting 

power dynamics with a rising China and advance U.S. 

nuclear nonproliferation goals. By providing security to 

the ROK, the United States could help ensure that Korea, as well as Japan, remain nuclear free. A post-unification alliance would also provide a second anchor, the 

other being Japan, for a U.S. forward presence in Asia to 

support regional stability and security.

Finally, both Washington and Seoul have already 

taken steps to preserve the alliance well into a post-unification future. For example, the goal established in 2009 

of building a “comprehensive strategic alliance” based on 

common values and shared interests is intended to define the terms of the alliance in ways that do not require 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 291 13 

a common enemy.63 The introduction of “New Frontiers” 

for the alliance in 2015 is similarly intended to broaden 

cooperation beyond the immediate challenges posed by 

North Korea.64 However, the articulation of a vision represents only the start of the discussion; detailed planning 

and preparation are required to operationalize it.

Four Principles in Considering a Post-Unification 

Alliance. Any effort to define and operationalize a comprehensive strategic alliance needs to begin with a solid 

grounding in common values and ideals and a clear sense 

of shared interests between the United States and Korea. 

Some common values include a shared commitment to 

democracy, open societies, and free market economics; respect for human rights and the rule of law; and support 

for peaceful resolution of disputes. Likewise, the United 

States and Korea have a shared interest in preserving the 

security of a unified Korea and its political and economic 

systems, as well as an interest in maintaining regional 

peace and stability, including free and open access to the 

global commons in the maritime, air, space, and cyber domains, and in supporting international efforts to respond 

to disasters and to combat terrorism, proliferation, organized crime, and infectious disease.

Second, do no harm. Efforts to plan for the alliance of 

the future should avoid doing anything that undermines 

deterrence today. North Korea remains, in the words of 

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, “an up close, dangerous, 

and continuing threat to the security of the Peninsula and 

the region.”65 In this context, continued alliance investments in interoperable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; air and missile defense capabilities; 

and command, control, communications, and computers 

enhance alliance readiness to “fight tonight,” if necessary, 

and strengthen the foundation for combined, coalitionstyle operations in the future. Continued rotation of U.S. 

Army units up to and including brigade-level units to the 

Korean Peninsula, similar to a practice long maintained 

by the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy, not only would help 

improve the readiness and flexibility of current forces 

assigned to Korea, but also could create a pattern for a 

future presence on a unified peninsula that might rely 

more heavily on rotational forces. Likewise, U.S. force 

realignment under the Yongsan Relocation Program and 

Land Partnership Plan should continue66 not only to 

ensure the long-term political sustainability of the U.S. 

force presence but also to realize the flexibility in force 

employment that such relocation provides. Strengthening 

the U.S. Navy presence, including through forward (or 

rotational) deployment of advanced surface combatants 

such as the DDG-1000, would enhance deterrence while 

providing a stronger platform for alliance contributions to 

regional maritime security. Continued trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and the ROK or the 

United States, Australia, and the ROK would be useful 

to build and sustain habits of cooperation, as well as to 

better integrate the bilateral components of the alliance 

relationships that the United States has with each into 

a larger multilateral construct reinforcing international 

rules, norms, and standards. In developing exercises to 

practice off-peninsula operations such as counterpiracy 

or disaster relief, the alliance should avoid diluting or repurposing the critical combined forces exercises for the 

defense of Korea, such as the annual Key Resolve/Foal 

Eagle series or Ulchi Freedom Guardian.

Third, a future U.S.-Korea alliance should emphasize 

the principle of respect for and protection of sovereignty. 

This is important not only for the defense of Korea; it also 

assures other regional states, including China, that a unified Korea would respect and maintain current territorial 

boundaries. In addition, the principle of respect for sovereignty would signal that the alliance would not become 

a platform for territorial expansion or an interventionist 

foreign policy. This does not mean, however, the alliance 

should not respond to regional aggression or coercion 

that disrupts the regional order.

efforts to plan for the alliance of the 

future should avoid doing anything 

that undermines deterrence today
14 SF No. 291 ndupress.ndu.edu

Finally, leaders on both sides need to ensure that 

the framework and function of a comprehensive strategic alliance is politically sustainable in both capitals. 

This would require a foundation of equality and a mutual commitment to sharing the responsibilities and 

resourcing the military capabilities needed for security 

on the peninsula, in the region, and across the globe. 

In this context, the United States and Korea need to 

“find—and articulate together—the linkages between 

shared strategic goals and the operational manifestations of the alliance” and define action, particularly Korean participation in out-of-area operations, in terms 

responding to common challenges as an alliance, rather 

than something done for the alliance.

67 In addition, the 

institutional mechanisms of the alliance should evolve 

from being predominantly defense-focused to a broadbased, whole-of-government approach that reflects a 

more comprehensive alliance agenda.

Four Questions to Guide Post-Unification Alliance 

Planning. The following four questions may serve as useful reference points in planning for a post-unification 

U.S.-Korea alliance.

First, what is the nature of the security environment, 

and what role will a united Korea play within it? Korean 

unification, however it comes about, could precipitate a 

rise in tension and increased rivalry among the major regional stakeholders. As described above, a united Korea 

in this environment might follow one of three basic orientations—continental and China-leaning, maritime and 

oriented on the West, or neutral—or it might resist the 

choice and pursue a more balanced approach incorporating elements of all three. Although ROK values of democracy and market economics, posited to carry through 

in this scenario, suggest a preference for a maritime orientation, the nature of the U.S.-China relationship and the 

power dynamics between them could be the most important external factor influencing Korea’s post-unification 

foreign policy. Korea’s traditional role as a middle power 

might lead it to attempt to calibrate relations with Beijing 

and Washington to maximize its strategic independence, 

similar to the soft balancing under the Kim Young-sam 

administration.

Korea’s relations with Japan would also be a factor 

and suggest that a united Korea could play a role in balancing Sino-Japanese rivalry for regional leadership. In 

this context, if effective multilateral security architectures 

in Northeast Asia are developed (something that South 

Korea has advocated in the past), they may enable Seoul 

to accumulate and exercise influence through promoting 

cooperation and confidence-building in the region, although it would likely still seek alignment with a larger 

power to ensure its sovereignty and security.

Second, what is the purpose of the alliance? Should it 

focus narrowly on the defense of Korea or have an outward orientation for regional stability and global security 

cooperation? The answer will be shaped to a large degree 

by the answer to the first question regarding the nature 

of the security environment and the role Korea plays in 

regional power dynamics. At its most basic, the alliance 

could assist Korea in preserving its sovereignty and defending against threats to its territory and serve as a hedge 

against negative outcomes in the rise of China or Russia. 

However, the alliance could also perform a more expansive function of enabling security cooperation in support 

of shared interests consistent with the transformation of 

the alliance into a fully equal partnership. The two roles 

need not be mutually exclusive. A broadly defined alliance 

agenda might also help ameliorate the security concerns of 

Korea’s neighbors, including China and Russia, who may 

be suspicious of a unified Korea’s ties to the United States.

Third, what structures and mechanisms are needed for 

alliance coordination and cooperation? The U.S.-ROK alliance enjoys a high degree of institutionalization through 

the CFC and SCM constructs, supported by a wide variety of bilateral dialogues and coordination mechanisms. 

However, this structure would need to be modified postunification. Unification and the elimination of the North 

Korea threat would certainly meet the conditions to complete the transfer of wartime OPCON to the ROK (if 

it had not already been transferred) and, eventually, the 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 291 15 

disestablishment of the United Nations Command and 

related structures. Would the alliance, however, retain its 

unique character of having a CFC-like system for combined operations for the defense of Korea—as is currently envisioned for the post-OPCON transfer “future 

command structure”—or certain regional contingency 

responses? Or would it adopt a “supported/supporting” 

relationship in which the United States provides supporting forces under a unified Korea’s leadership? Apart 

from the question of alliance command and control, there 

might be value in retaining a platform for strategic dialogue and coordination at the ministerial level, such as 

the SCM with its supporting Military Committee (albeit 

reconfigured) and policy- and working-level venues to 

perform day-to-day alliance management. A broader alliance agenda would also place a premium on establishing 

an interagency or whole-of-government dialogue, fusing 

together defense, diplomacy, development, and trade/economic agencies. In this context, institutionalizing “2+2” 

meetings between the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and their Korean counterparts, with participation 

by other agencies as necessary, would be an option.68

Fourth, what is the nature of the U.S. military presence?

Any U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula following 

unification would need to be aligned with the mission and 

focus of whatever relationship is established between the 

countries. As noted, some military presence would likely 

be required to support stability operations as part of the 

unification process as well as to assist a unified Korea in 

maintaining external security as it focuses on reconstruction and integration. Beyond the immediate requirements 

for stability, a U.S. military presence could be useful in 

managing the shifting regional power dynamics that will 

follow unification. However, given the role that China 

could play in supporting (or not preventing) unification, 

the United States and ROK will need to balance China’s 

concerns about a U.S. force presence on a unified Korean 

Peninsula against a united Korea’s sovereign decisions in 

providing for its own defense and how it wishes to position itself relative to U.S.-China competition. As part of 

this process, consideration would need to be given to the 

size, location, composition, and purpose of U.S. forces, as 

well as the related arrangements concerning access, status of forces, and if applicable, deployments in support of 

contingencies off the peninsula.

For example, would the alliance seek to maintain 

a robust, long-term military presence of forward-based 

forces similar to the current construct—or perhaps a 

more expeditionary, air- and maritime-heavy presence 

similar to that which supports the U.S.-Japan alliance? 

Or would the alliance shift to nonpermanent, rotational 

deployments with prepositioned equipment sets to enable training and exercises and, if necessary, contingency 

responses similar to the emerging posture in support of 

the U.S.-Australia alliance featuring U.S. Marine Corps 

unit rotations to Darwin and periodic U.S. Air Force 

rotations to Tindal? Another model could feature an 

even lighter footprint, with the alliance characterized 

primarily by regular military-to-military relations and 

security cooperation, contingency access, and periodic 

exercises similar to arrangements under the U.S. alliance 

with Thailand, where the United States was able to use 

U-Tapao Air Base as a regional hub during the response 

to the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami and 

where the annual Cobra Gold exercise has evolved into a 

given the role that China could play 

in supporting (or not preventing) 

unification, the United States and 

ROK will need to balance China’s 

concerns about a U.S. force presence 

on a unified Korean Peninsula against 

a united Korea’s sovereign decisions 

in providing for its own defense 

and how it wishes to position itself 

relative to U.S.-China competition
16 SF No. 291 ndupress.ndu.edu

platform for building multinational cooperation and interoperability with an emphasis on humanitarian assistance and disaster response. Any of these arrangements 

would involve a considerable restructuring of, and likely 

reduction from, the current 28,500 U.S. forces assigned 

to the Korean Peninsula.

Conclusion

For over 60 years, the U.S-ROK alliance has defended South Korea against external attack and supported the shared interests of both allies in regional stability and, increasingly, global security. Over the course 

of its history, the alliance has proved itself resilient and 

able to adapt to changes in the external security environment and to the domestic political, economic, and social 

changes within the United States and ROK, particularly 

as South Korea emerged from the devastation of the Korean War to become the vibrant democracy and global 

economic leader it is today. However, as the lessons of 

the immediate post–Cold War era show, if change is unanticipated or adaptation delayed such that inertia becomes confused with progress, the alliance might weaken 

and wither. Unification of the Korean Peninsula and the 

elimination of the North Korean threat in this context 

could precipitate an existential crisis in the alliance. But 

it does not have to.

In recent years, the United States and Republic of 

Korea have taken steps to strengthen the alliance by redoubling efforts to counter the immediate threats posed 

by North Korea and by setting an affirmative agenda for 

security cooperation in the region and globally based on 

common values and shared interests. This vision enables 

the two sides to imagine a future of alliance cooperation 

between the United States and a unified, global Korea in 

the absence of a clearly defined threat and in support of 

a safer and more secure regional and international order.

Simply having the vision, however, is insufficient. To 

endure, the alliance needs to be an integral part of the 

detailed planning and preparation for Korean unification. This vision also needs to be operationalized and put 

into practice through exercises and contingency response 

operations with the caveat that efforts to prepare for a 

post-unification future must not detract from the deterrence that is required today. In this context, in addition 

to adding planning for a post-unification alliance to the 

agenda for high-level, bilateral consultations on unification, the United States and ROK may also consider reenergizing the work called for by the 44th SCM in October 

2012 to “initiate long-term strategic planning, including 

a joint study on the long-term defense vision of the alliance,” and include within it a discussion of the alliance 

post-unification.69

A common vision for a post-unification alliance 

could help guide both countries through the uncertainties of the unification process. Although the answers to 

the questions about a unified Korea’s regional roles and 

orientation are fundamentally political and will take 

time to be debated and resolved, it would be a mistake 

for either country to abandon the alliance or wait until 

those questions are answered before analyzing the postunification options for the alliance and the pathways to 

achieve them.

The U.S.-ROK alliance, and the stability and security that it provides, has enabled the Korean people in 

the South to realize the remarkable political, economic, 

social, and cultural achievements that give new meaning 

to the idea of “the Miracle on the Han River.” There is no 

reason that an alliance between the United States and a 

unified Korea—properly structured and supported—cannot bring the same benefits to the Korean people across 

the peninsula.

as the lessons of the immediate 

post–Cold War era show, if change is 

unanticipated or adaptation delayed 

such that inertia becomes confused 

with progress, the alliance might 

weaken and wither
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 291 17 

Notes 1 The White House, “Remarks by President Obama and 

President Park of the Republic of Korea in Joint Press Conference,” 

October 16, 2015, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/10/16/remarks-president-obama-and-president-parkrepublic-korea-joint-press>.

2 The terms unification and reunification appear interchangeably 

in the literature. As such, both terms appear in this paper.

3 Park Geun-hye, “A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust Between 

Seoul and Pyongyang,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 5 (September/October 2011), available at <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/northeastasia/2011-09-01/new-kind-korea>.

4 Park Geun-hye, “An Initiative for Peaceful Unification on the 

Korean Peninsula,” speech delivered at Dresden University of Technology, Dresden, Germany, March 28, 2014, available at <http://english1.

president.go.kr/activity/speeches.php?srh%5Bboard_no%5D=24&srh

%5Bpage%5D=3&srh%5Bview_mode%5D=detail&srh%5Bseq%5D=5

304&srh%5Bdetail_no%5D=27>.

5 Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and 

the Republic of Korea (Washington, DC: The White House, June 16, 

2009), available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/joint-visionallaince-united-states-america-and-republic-korea>. Hereafter referred 

to as the 2009 Joint Vision Statement.

6 See, for example, Victor D. Cha, “Outperforming Expectations: 

The U.S.-ROK Alliance,” in Kurt M. Campbell et al., Going Global: 

The Future of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance (Washington, DC: Center 

for a New American Security, 2009), 9–32; Victor D. Cha, “Powerplay: 

Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” International Security 34, 

no. 3 (Winter 2009–2010), 158–196; Scott A. Snyder, “The U.S.-ROK 

Alliance and the U.S. Rebalance to Asia,” in U.S. Alliances and Partnerships at the Center of Global Power, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. 

Denmark, and Greg Chaffin (Washington, DC: National Bureau of 

Asian Research, 2014), 60–85. 

7 Cha, “Powerplay,” 158.

8 National Security Council (NSC) 48/2, December 30, 1949, 

“The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia,” in Foreign 

Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1949, Volume VII, Part 2, The 

Far East and Australasia (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 1949), Document 386.

9 NSC 48/5, May 17, 1951, “United States Objectives, Policies 

and Courses of Action in Asia,” in FRUS, 1951, Volume VI, Part 1, 

East Asia and the Pacific (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 1951), 49.

10 For a deeper, theoretical discussion of alliance formation and 

management, see Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).

11 U.S. Department of State, “Mutual Defense Treaty Between 

the United States and the Republic of Korea,” October 1, 1953, 5 U.S. 

Treaties 2368, available at <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/

kor001.asp>.

12 Cha, “Powerplay,” 174.

13 Richard M. Nixon, “Informal Remarks in Guam with 

Newsmen,” July 25, 1969, available at <www.presidency/ucsb.edu/

ws/?pid=2140>. See also Richard M. Nixon, “Address to the Nation on 

the War in Vietnam,” November 3, 1969, available at <www.presidency.

ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2303>.

14 See, for example, Rebecca K.C. Hersman and Robert Peters 

“Nuclear U-Turns: Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback,” Nonproliferation Review 13, no 3. (November 2006), 539–553. In 

addition, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars hosts 

a digital archive with declassified U.S. Government assessments and 

diplomatic reporting cables detailing U.S. concerns and responses to 

South Korean nuclear developments. It is available at <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/128/south-korean-nuclear-history/2>.

15 Michael Finnegan, Benchmarking America’s Military Alliances: 

NATO, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (Washington, DC: The Asia 

Foundation, 2009), 16, available at <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/FinneganBenchmarkingFeb09.pdf>.

16 The “386 generation” refers to those who in the 1990s were 

in their 30s, educated in the 1980s, and born in the 1960s. See, for 

example, L. Gordon Flake, “The Rise, Fall and Transformation of the 

‘386’: Generational Change in Korea,” in J. Patrick Boyd et al., Emerging Leaders in Asia: The Next Generation of Political Leadership in China, 

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (Seattle: National Bureau for Asian 

Research, 2008).

17 Sung-han Kim, “From Blood Alliance to Strategic Alliance: 

Korea’s Evolving Strategic Thought Toward the United States,” Korean 

Journal of Defense Analysis 22, no. 3 (September 2010), 267, available at 

<http://dx/doi.org/10.1080/10163271.2010.500001>.

18 Cha, “Outperforming Expectations,” 21–22.

19 Scott A. Snyder, The U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Meeting New 

Security Challenges (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2012), 6.

20 Barbara Demick, “Anti-Americanism Sweeps South Korea,” 

Los Angeles Times, November 27, 2002, available at <http://articles.

latimes.com/2002/nov/27/world/fg-uskorea27>.

21 U.S. Department of State, “Agreement Under Article IV of the 

Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the 

Republic of Korea Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of 

United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea, July 9, 1966, as 

amended,” 17 U.S. Treaties 1677. Of note, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was revised in the late 1990s to allow the Republic of 

Korea greater autonomy in dealing with off-duty crimes committed 

by U.S. military personnel. The United States retained the primary 

right to exercise jurisdiction over offenses committed by U.S. personnel 

under the SOFA in the performance of official duty.

22 Kim, “From Blood Alliance,” 274.

23 A detailed review of North Korea’s military capabilities is 

beyond the scope of this paper. For more, see Office of the Secretary 

of Defense (OSD), Military and Security Developments Involving the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2015 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016), available at <www.defense.gov/Portals/1/

Documents/pubs/Military_and_Security_Developments_Involving_

the_Democratic_Peoples_Republic_of_Korea_2015.PDF>; or Bruce 

E. Bechtol, Jr., “The North Korean Military Threat in 2015: The Threat 

to the ROK-U.S. Alliance and Peninsula Unification,” International 

Journal of Korean Studies 19, no. 1 (Spring 2015), 1–35.

24 Snyder, “Expanding,” 8.

25 Joint Declaration on the ROK-U.S. Alliance and Peace on the Korean 

Peninsula (Washington, DC: The White House, November 17, 2005), 

available at <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/ot/57075.htm>.

26 U.S. Department of State, “United States and the Republic of 

Korea Launch Strategic Consultations for Allied Partnership,” January 

The author thanks Dr. Phillip C. Saunders and Dr. 

James J. Przystup, as well as two anonymous reviewers, for their helpful comments and suggestions on 

earlier drafts of this paper.
18 SF No. 291 ndupress.ndu.edu

19, 2006, Washington, DC, available at <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/

pa/prs/ps/2006/59447.htm>.

27 The White House, “President Bush Participates in Joint Press 

Availability with President Lee Myung-bak of the Republic of Korea,” 

April 19, 2008, available at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.

gov/news/releases/2008/04/20080419-1.html>.

28 2009 Joint Vision Statement.

29 Ibid.

30 “Joint Communique of the 43rd U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting,” Yonhap News Agency, October 28, 2011, available at 

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/10/28/60/030100000

0AEN20111028002000315F.HTML>.

31 2009 Joint Vision Statement.

32 The White House, “Joint Fact Sheet: The United States–Republic of Korea Alliance: Shared Values, New Frontiers,” October 16, 2015, 

available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/16/jointfact-sheet-united-states-republic-korea-alliance-shared-values-new>. 

33 The White House, “Remarks by President Obama and 

President Park of the Republic of Korea in Joint Press Conference,” 

October 16, 2015, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/10/16/remarks-president-obama-and-president-parkrepublic-korea-joint-press>.

34 The Republic of Korea Cheong Wa Dae (Blue House), “Opening 

Remarks by President Park Geun-hye at the New Year Press Conference,” January 6, 2014, available at <http://english1.president.go.kr/

activity/speeches.php?srh%5Bboard_no%5D=24&srh%5Bpage%5D=4

&srh%5Bview_mode%5D=detail&srh%5Bseq%5D=4024&srh%5Bde

tail_no%5D=22>.

35 Jiyoon Kim et. al., South Korean Attitudes Towards North Korea 

and Reunification (Seoul: Asan Institute for Policy Studies, January 26, 

2015), 30, available at <http://en.asaninst.org/contents/south-koreanattitudes-toward-north-korea-and-reunification/>. 

36The costs of unification are difficult to estimate with a variety 

of variables that depend on the scenario. For example, South Korea’s 

Ministry of Finance in 2013 placed the figure at “up to” 7 percent of 

the Republic of Korea’s annualized gross domestic product (GDP). 

See Christine Kim, “Korean Unification May Cost South 7 Percent of 

GDP: Ministry,” Reuters, January 1, 2013, available at <www.reuters.

com/article/us-korea-north-unification-idUSBRE90004F20130101>. 

More pessimistic estimates place it at 100 percent of ROK GDP. See 

for example Petersen Institute for International Economics researcher 

Marcus Noland’s presentation to “Panel A: The Economic Synergy 

Effect of Unification on the Korean Peninsula,” in Korean Unification in 

a New Era, ed. Victor D. Cha (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 

and International Studies/Rowman & Littlefield, December 1, 2014), 7, 

available at <http://csis.org/files/publication/141121_Cha_KoreanUnificationNewEra_Web.pdf>.

37 For a detailed analysis of these missions and the force requirements to support them, see Bruce W. Bennett and Jennifer Lind, 

“The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,” 

International Security 36, no. 2 (Fall 2011), 84–119.

38 Scott A. Snyder, Addressing North Korea’s Nuclear Problem, 

Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 54 (Washington, DC: Council 

on Foreign Relations, November 2015), available at <www.cfr.org/

north-korea/addressing-north-koreas-nuclear-problem/p37258>.

39 OSD, 21.

40 Defense White Paper, 2014 (Seoul: Ministry of Defense, December 31, 2014), 261, available at <www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd_eng/

upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_201506161156164570.pdf>.

41 Bennett and Lind, 86.

42 See Carla P. Freeman, ed., China and North Korea: Strategic and 

Policy Perspectives from a Changing China (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2015).

43 Dingli Shen, “North Korea’s Strategic Significance to China,” 

China Security (Autumn 2006), 20.

44 As quoted in Bonnie S. Glaser and Yun Sun, “Chinese Attitudes Toward Korean Unification,” International Journal of Korean 

Unification Studies 24, no. 2 (2015), 73.

45 Ibid., 75.

46 Xiaohe Cheng, Chinese Strategic Thinking Regarding North Korea

(Seoul: Asan Institute for Policy Studies, October 7, 2013), available at 

<www.theasanforum.org/chinese-strategic-thinking-regarding-northkorea/>. 

47 Goguryeo was an ancient Korean kingdom that existed 

between the 1st century BCE and 7th century CE. It occupied and 

controlled all of what is now North Korea, along with contiguous territories in Northeast China and some parts of what is now South Korea.

48 Author interviews in Beijing, July 2015 and December 2015.

49 Author interviews in Beijing, December 2015.

50 Michael H. Armacost and Kenneth B. Pyle, “Japan and the 

Unification of Korea: Challenges for U.S. Policy Coordination,” NBR 

Analysis 10, no. 1 (March 1999), 30.

51 See, for example, Masashi Nishihara, “Japan’s Receptivity to 

Conditional Engagement,” in Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China, ed. James J. Shinn (New York: Council on Foreign 

Relations, 1996), 187–188; and Yamaji Hideki, Policy Recommendation for Japan: Unification of the Korean Peninsula, Brookings Institute 

Working Papers by CEAP Visiting Fellows No. 30 (Washington, DC: 

The Brookings Institute, July 2004), available at <www.brookings.edu/

research/papers/2004/07/northeastasia-yamaji>.

52 Richard Weitz, “Moscow Ponders Korea Unification,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 20, no. 1 (2011), 124.

53 “Russia Supports Korea’s Drive for Unification as ‘Natural Process’—Putin,” RT.com, November 12, 2013, available at <www.rt.com/

politics/putin-russia-korea-unification-587/>.

54 Georgy Toloraya, Korean Security and Unification Dilemmas: A 

Russian Perspective (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute of 

America, 2015), 2, available at <http://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/kei_aps_georgy_toloraya_june11.pdf>.

55 Sung-han Kim, “The Day After: ROK-U.S. Cooperation for 

Korean Unification,” Washington Quarterly 38, no. 3 (Fall 2015), 42, 

available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2015.1099024>.

56 “Full Text of Announcement on ‘Comfort Women’ Issue by 

Japanese, South Korean Foreign Ministers,” Japan Times, December 28, 

2015, available at <www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/12/28/national/

politics-diplomacy/full-text-announcement-comfort-women-issuejapanese-south-korean-foreign-ministers/#.VoQsfDbUjL9>.

57 Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997), 170.

58 Ibid., 166.

59 Patrick M. Cronin et al., Solving Long Division: The Geopolitical 

Implications of Korean Unification (Washington, DC: Center for a New 

American Security, December 2015), 8–9, available at <www.cnas.org/

solving-long-division#.VoV0hv5dPL8>.

60 Choi Kang et. al., South Korean Attitudes on the Korea-U.S. Alliance and Northeast Asia (Seoul: Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2014), 

15, available at <http://en.asaninst.org/contents/asan-report-southkorean-attitudes-on-the-korea-us-alliance-and-northeast-asia/>. 

61 Park Geun-hye, “Statesmen’s Forum Address at the Center 

for Strategic and International Studies,” Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, Washington, DC, October 15, 2015, available 

at <http://csis.org/files/attachments/151016_PresidnetPark_StatesmensForumAddress.pdf>.

62 Scott A. Snyder, “Sino-Korean Relations and the Future of the 

U.S.-ROK Alliance,” NBR Analysis 14, no. 1 ( June 2003), 72.
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 291 19 

63 Changsu Kim and In-hyo Seo, “The Future of the ROKU.S. Alliance: Suggestions for Developing the Alliance, Based on 

Considerations of the Korean Reunification and Post-Reunification,” 

unpublished paper, September 30, 2013, 3.

64 See, for example, Anthony J. Blinken, “New Frontiers for 

Northeast Asia,” remarks at the Asan Institute, Seoul, Republic 

of Korea, October 7, 2015, available at <http://www.state.gov/

s/d/2015/248054.htm>.

65 U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Press Briefing by Secretary 

Carter and Minister Han Min-goo in Seoul, South Korea,” November 2, 2015, available at <www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/

Transcript-View/Article/627049/joint-press-briefing-by-secretarycarter-and-minister-han-min-goo-in-seoul-sout>.

66 One exception is the maintenance of U.S. counterfires capability in Area I pending ROK development of adequate replacement 

capabilities. See U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Communique of 

the 46th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting,” October 23, 2014, 

Washington, DC available at <http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/

Documents/pubs/46th_SCM_Joint_Communique.pdf>.

67 Finnegan, 19–20.

68 Although the United States and Republic of Korea held their 

first 2+2 meeting in July 2010, with subsequent meetings in June 

2012 and October 2014, scheduling them is ad hoc. They are not yet 

institutionalized.

69 U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Communique of the 

44th U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting,” October 24, 

2012, Washington, DC, available at <http://archive.defense.gov/

news/44thSCMJointCommunique.pdf>.

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