IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DENEEN JOHNSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 11 C 9249

)

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Deneen Johnson (“Johnson”) has sought to enter the federal

courthouse door through what may be the most confused (and

confusing) pleading that this Court has encountered in its more

than three decades on the bench. But it is unnecessary to

provide chapter and verse itemizing all of the errors in

Johnson’s pro se filing, for in any event he must be sent back to

the Circuit Court of Cook County because he has failed to satisfy

his obligation to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction.

In brief, Johnson attempts to remove this mortgage

foreclosure action from its court of origin to this District

Court. But as explained later, one of Johnson’s attachments 1

does contain a caption in the underlying state court case, so

this opinion can go on to the real issues.

 One of Johnson’s myriad errors is to employ a case 1

caption identifying himself as plaintiff and mortgagee Nationstar

Mortgage LLC as defendant. If that were really the posture of

the parties, Johnson would be precluded from seeking removal

because 28 U.S.C. §1441(a) confers that privilege only on

defendants. For convenience, all further citations to provisions

of Title 28 will simply take the form “Section --.” 
Because Johnson’s brief conclusory references to federalquestion jurisdiction are totally frivolous, this opinion will

focus on the possibility of diversity-of-citizenship

jurisdiction. In that respect part of Johnson’s hodgepodge

presentation reads:

This matter and this Case is that of complete

diversity, as there are no other parties in this case

that have been properly served.

And Johnson follows that statement with a statement of his belief

“that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00 [seventy-five

thousand dollars],” an assertion that is relevant only to

diversity cases.

Probably through oversight, Johnson has not submitted with

his notice of removal a copy of the state court complaint, even

though his filing here says that he has attached it as Exhibit 1. 

But he has instead tendered a photocopy of a “Judgment for

Foreclosure and Sale.” Even though that document bears no

judicial signature (it is obviously the form of proposed judgment

prepared by counsel for the mortgagee), it sets out the state

court case caption: Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Deneen Johnson;

Calvin Jackson; Palisades Collection LLC; Unknown Owners and

Nonrecord Claimants, No. 11 CH 014383.

Johnson does reflect himself as having an Illinois domicile,

which equates to Illinois citizenship for diversity purposes. 

But that automatically disqualifies the case for removal, because

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Section 1441(b) expressly permits removal of diversity cases

“only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and

served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such

action is brought.”

That is not Johnson’s only fatal mistake, for he has failed

to identify the state of citizenship of his individual

codefendant Calvin Jackson or the states of citizenship of all of

the members of Nationstar Mortgage LLC (a limited liability

company) or another limited liability company, codefendant

Palisades Collection LLC (in those respects, see Thomas v.

Guardsmark LLC, 487 F.3d 531, 533 -34 (7th Cir. 2007), which

exemplifies a host of cases so holding). But in all events, the

prohibition referred to in the preceding paragraph is enough on

its own to require remand.

Accordingly it is an understatement to say that “it appears

that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction” (the

language of Section 1447(c)), so that the same section mandates a

remand of this action to the Circuit Court of Cook County. This

Court so orders, and the Clerk of this District Court is ordered

to mail a certified copy of the order of remand forthwith to the

Clerk of that court.2

 That means that Johnson has simply wasted the $350 filing 2

fee that he paid in his effort to bring the case here. Lest he

were to consider compounding that error by seeking to appeal this

remand order and paying the required $455 in appellate filing

fees to do so, he should read Section 1447(d), which states

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________________________________________

Milton I. Shadur

Senior United States District Judge

Date: January 3, 2012

expressly that a remand order “is not reviewable on appeal or

otherwise.”

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