Combating a Modern Hydra

Al Qaeda and the Global 

War on Terrorism

Sean N. Kalic

Global War on Terrorism 

Occasional Paper 8 

Combat Studies Institute Press 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
Combating a Modern Hydra

Al Qaeda and the Global 

War on Terrorism

Sean N. Kalic

Combat Studies Institute Press 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Kalic, Sean N., 1970-

 Combating a modern hydra: Al Qaeda and the global war on terrorism/ 

Sean N. Kalic.

 p. cm.

 1. Qaida (Organization) 2. War on Terrorism, 2001- 3. National security--United States. I. Title. 

HV6431.K24 2005

 363.32’0973--dc22

 2005008282 

CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of the author and not necessarily 

those of the Department of the Army or Department of Defense. 

A full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available for downloading, can 

be found at: http://leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp. 
Foreword

Combating a Modern Hydra: Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism 

is number eight in the Combat Studies Institute’s Global War on 

Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Paper series. This work resulted from 

discussions at Fort Leavenworth about the nature of the enemy facing 

the United States and its allies since 11 September 2001. Osama bin 

Laden and his terrorist network had been present at some level in the 

national and international consciousness since the late 1990s. The events 

of 11 September 2001 and subsequent global operations taken against 

Al Qaeda have brought this group to the forefront of the GWOT. While 

successes have been achieved in the GWOT, the enemy has proven to be 

resilient and adaptive. This study by Mr. Sean Kalic, of the Department 

of Military History, US Army Command and General Staff College, 

examines modern transnational terrorism from the 1960s to the present 

day, with special emphasis on the adaptation Al Qaeda and other nonstate 

actors have taken in response to the actions of the United States and its 

allies. This work provides a cautionary warning about the likelihood 

Al Qaeda will continue to survive and execute missions in the current 

operating environment. Mr. Kalic synthesizes much of the pertinent 

literature and offers insights into the actions taken to fight terrorists. Most 

importantly, he advises a continual reevaluation of the threat, based on 

Al Qaeda’s flexibility, resiliency, and adaptability. Officers and soldiers 

who have recently served in operations against the terrorist worldwide 

will certainly see utility here. As the US Army continues its efforts in 

combating terrorists, the thoughts found in this narrative are well worth 

considering. 

THOMAS T. SMITH 

COL, IN 

Director, Combat 

Studies Institute 

i
ii
Table of Contents

Foreword....................................................................................... i

Table of Contents........................................................................iii

List of Figures.............................................................................. v

Introduction.................................................................................. 1

The Need for Definitions ............................................................. 2

Terrorism as a Security Threat..................................................... 3

Measuring Success..................................................................... 13

On Sources................................................................................. 15

New Terrorism ........................................................................... 16

The Case of Al Qaeda ................................................................ 21

Combating New Terrorists......................................................... 27

Assessing the Numbers.............................................................. 31

Beyond the Numbers.................................................................. 52

Conclusion ................................................................................. 60

iii 
iv
Figures

Figure 1. Total Terrorist Events, 1968-2003 .............................. 32

Figure 2. Type of Terrorist Attacks on International Targets,

 1990-2003 ................................................................... 38

Figure 3. Type of Terrorist Attacks on US Targets, 

1990-2003 ................................................................... 39

Figure 4. International Terrorist Incidents by Type of Facility, 

1990-2003 ................................................................... 41

Figure 5. Attacks on US Targets, 1990-2003 ............................. 42

Figure 6. International and US Casualties, 1990-2003 

 (Dead and Wounded) .................................................. 46

Photos

Photo 1. Khobar Towers complex, near King Abdul Aziz 

Air Base, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 

bombed 25 June 1996, killing 19 and 

injuring over 260.......................................................... 49

Photo 2. Crater caused by the explosion of a fuel truck 

 outside the northern fence of Khobar Towers............. 49

Photo 3. Pentagon crash site, 11 September 2001 ..................... 50

Photo 4. The west-facing wall of the Pentagon ......................... 50

Maps

Map 1. Khowst, Afghanistan Terrorist Camps........................... 51

Map 2. Zhawar Kili Al-Badr Terrorist Training Camp:

 Main ............................................................................... 51

Map 3. Zhawar Kili Al-Badr Terrorist Training Camp: 

West................................................................................ 51

v 
vi
Combating a Modern Hydra 

Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism

Introduction 

On 11 September 2001 a new epoch in warfare emerged. With 

Al Qaeda’s attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City 

and the Pentagon in Washington DC, the United States suffered 

one of the most catastrophic attacks on the continental United 

States in the nation’s history. Nineteen days after the attacks, 

President George W. Bush addressed a joint session of Congress 

and stated, “Our war on terrorism begins with Al Qaeda, but 

does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of 

global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”1 In essence, 

the president confirmed the opening of the US-led global war on 

terrorism (GWOT). Unlike previous experiences in which the 

United States has gone to war, in this new era of warfare, the 

enemy is fundamentally different. 

In the past, the United States went to war against nations, 

regimes, and alliances. In stark contrast within the parameters of 

the GWOT, the enemy is not a traditional nation-state, regime, or 

alliance structure. Rather, non-state actors seek to use terrorism 

and violence to advance their political, theological, and ideological 

agendas. Since the entire international community structure has 

been and is based upon traditional nation-states, the GWOT era 

presents some specific legal, political, and social complications. 

The objective of this study, however, is to analyze how the terrorist 

organizations have adapted to the actions taken by the United 

States and its international allies to win the war on terrorism. 

Since 11 September 2001, the United States and its allies 

have pursued terrorist organizations by using a wide variety of 

law enforcement, financial, military, and diplomatic tools. While 

the conglomerate of actions taken by the US-led coalition have 

impacted the organizational structure, finances, and operations of 

terrorist regimes, these non-state actor remain flexible, resilient, 

and adaptive in the current security environment.2 

1 
The Need for Definitions 

Before a detailed analysis of the non-state actors’ adaptation 

to the GWOT can begin, it is necessary to establish the definition 

of terms, parameters, and units of measurement used in this 

study. First, a brief discussion of terrorism is necessary. Title 

22 United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 2656f (d) provides the 

definition of terrorism for the United States.3 According to Title 

22, terrorism is defined as: “premeditated, politically motivated 

violence perpetuated against noncombatant targets by subnational 

or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”4 

In addition to this broad and ambiguous definition of terrorism, 

the US State Department provides a definition of “international 

terrorism” and “terrorist group.”5 Title 22 defines international 

terrorism as “terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more 

than one country.”6 The US State Department defines a terrorist 

group as “any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups 

that practice, international terrorism.”7 Although these definitions 

emerged in response to a rise in international terrorist activity 

during the 1980s, they remain the standard by which the US 

government executes the GWOT. The US State Department’s 

definition of terrorism, international terrorism, and terrorist groups 

provides flexibility and leeway to legitimate actors in their efforts 

to combat terrorism. 

Although the US government established an applicable 

definition of terrorism, the international community has not 

agreed to a universal definition.8 The members of the United 

Nations (UN), a leading ally in the GWOT, failed continually 

to reach an agreement on the definition of terrorism because of 

the need to differentiate “freedom fighters” from “terrorists.” 

Despite this obstacle, the member nations have loosely agreed 

that terrorism is “an assault on the principles of law, order, human 

rights, and peaceful settlement of disputes on which the world 

body was founded.”9 Striving to move beyond the debate over 

defining terrorism, the member nations of the UN identified the 

characteristics of terrorism as a means to identify terrorist activity. 

According to the UN’s Working Group on Terrorism, “terrorism 

is an essentially political act meant to inflict damage and deadly 

injury on civilians and to create an atmosphere of fear, generally 

2 
for a political or ideological purpose.”10 The member nations of 

the UN agree, “terrorism is a criminal act, but it is more than mere 

criminality.”11 Despite a lack of consensus on the legal definition of 

terrorism, the Working Group on Terrorism provides an additional 

level of understanding and structure in the fight against terrorism. 

Importantly, the international community identified links between 

transnational organized crime factions and terrorist organizations. 

The links between these two distinct non-state actors are a central 

element in the GWOT security environment.12 The work done by 

the UN members provides insight into the characterization and 

classification of terrorist organizations and transnational organized 

crime factions as a distinct sect of non-state actors. 

The terms non-state actor and terrorist are not synonyms. 

Scholars define non-state actors as “actors autonomous from the 

structure and machinery of the state, and of the governmental and 

intergovernmental bodies below and above the formally sovereign 

state: transnational, rather than transgovernmental.”13 This broad 

and ambiguous definition of non-state actors allows the term 

to apply to a wide variety of groups. In the current security 

environment, terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, Liberation Tigers 

of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hezbollah, as well as transnational 

organized crime groups have emerged as a distinct variety of nonstate actors. The elimination of the threat posed by rogue nonstate actors to the stability and security of the global community 

remains the objective of the United States and its allies in the 

GWOT. Therefore, within the parameters of this study, terrorist and 

criminal organizations are the only non-state actors discussed. 

Terrorism as a Security Threat 

The recognition of terrorist groups as a national security threat 

to the United States is a relatively new phenomenon. In the Cold 

War era, the United States spent little time concerning itself with 

the threat posed by terrorist groups.14 Within the collective minds 

of the US populace, terrorism was something that happened in 

other nations, and Americans largely believed their nation was 

immune from these types of attacks. The strategic nuclear balance 

between the United States and the Soviet Union and the threat 

posed by a massive nuclear exchange overshadowed terrorism 

in the minds of millions of Americans. Successive US presidents 

3 
from Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan focused on stemming 

communist expansion. Hence, terrorism remained a relatively 

obscure and minor element within the national security concerns 

of the United States during the Cold War. 

Despite the US focus on the dynamics of the Cold War, terrorist 

groups and their actions occasionally merited attention from US 

presidents. For example, in the aftermath of the 1972 Munich 

Olympics, President Richard Nixon acknowledged the emerging 

threat posed by terrorists by establishing an executive working group 

titled “Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.”15 Composed of 

State Department personnel such as Henry Kissinger and Robert 

Kupperman, the Department of Justice’s Rudolph Giuliani, 

National Security Council (NSC) Staffer Richard T. Kennedy, and 

others, the group considered “rumors and unconfirmed reports” of 

potential attacks against “American nationals and/or businesses.”16 

Specifically the group mentioned hijackings, “crude atomic bombs 

(dirty bombs),” the use of chemical and/or biological weapons, 

and the use of Soviet shoulder-fired SA-7 missiles.17 Additionally, 

the Committee to Combat Terrorism recognized the need for the 

international community to unite to fight the growing terrorist 

threat.18 Despite the foundations established by the Committee 

to Combat Terrorism, President Jimmy Carter’s NSC “eventually 

absorbed” the team, and the lessons learned became victims of the 

executive branch’s bureaucratic quagmire.19 

The second major terrorist action faced by the United States 

surfaced in the 1980s under the tenure of Reagan. In 1985-1986 

Reagan faced a series of Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks.20 

The president responded by using military force in the form of 

Operation EL DORADO CANYON, whereby the US conducted 

precision air strikes against Libya. The use of overt military force 

signaled to Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi that the United States 

would not stand for the state sponsorship of terrorist operations 

against Americans. Despite such occasional episodes, terrorism 

for the United States remained a nuisance rather than a significant 

threat to the integrity of US national security objectives.21 As the 

Cold War ended, terrorism emerged as a national security concern 

for the United States. 

4 
Beginning in 1990, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, in his 

Annual Report to the President and Congress, listed terrorism as a 

“national security concern.”22 Specifically, the report stated: 

“Americans are vulnerable to terrorist activities around the 

globe, and the number of incidents involving Americans may 

increase. This will enhance the likelihood of US counterterrorist 

actions supported by the Department of Defense.”23 Although 

Department of Defense (DoD) acknowledged “terrorism may 

increase” in the post-Cold War security environment, it did not 

identify terrorism as an overt threat to the national security of the 

United States. Interestingly, within the same DoD Annual Report, 

the administration identified narcotics trafficking and drug abuse as 

emerging national security threats, while not linking these forces to 

terrorist organizations.24 Within the present security environment, 

the US administration, as well as the international community, 

openly acknowledge the relationship between narcotics traffickers 

and terrorist organizations.25 Despite the connection between 

terrorist organizations and transnational criminal factions, US 

President George H.W. Bush focused on outlining a plan to “combat 

drug trafficking,” while only maintaining a vague awareness of 

the rise of international terrorism. 

Building upon its recognition in 1990 that “terrorism may 

rise” in the future and the threat posed by narcotics traffickers, 

DoD stated in its 1991 Annual Report: “the flow of illegal drugs 

into the United States and the demand for such drugs in our 

society continue to present an unprecedented and perplexing 

national security threat. The US armed forces continue to combat 

the production, trafficking, and illegal use of drugs.”26 While 

still identifying drug and narcotics traffickers as a major national 

security threat, the administration addressed terrorism by simply 

stating: 

There are those who seek to frustrate our foreign policy 

and our national security goals through terrorism. This 

form of intimidation also threatens the lives, freedom, 

and property of Americans around the world. DoD is 

pursing efforts to combat terrorism and assist friendly 

nations to counter this global menace.27 

5 
By 1991, it appeared the United States had finally identified 

terrorism as a potential national security threat and considered 

how to combat it. In its 1992 DoD Annual Report, however, 

Bush’s administration failed to mention terrorism as a national 

security concern or even list it as a defense priority.

28 Yet, by the 

end of 1992, terrorism remained a mounting threat to the national 

security of the United States. 

Similarly in 1993, President Bill Clinton failed to list 

terrorism as a major national security threat or even as a defense 

priority. To reconsider the rapidly changing security environment 

in the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union, Clinton’s 

first secretary of defense, Les Aspin, initiated a Bottom-up 

Review of the national security environment and the military 

force structure of the United States. In the DoD’s 1994 Annual 

Report, Aspin provided the first mention of terrorism as part of 

the post-Cold War security environment. Specifically, the DoD 

identified “state-sponsored terrorism” as a regional danger and 

the “terroristic use of nukes” as permanent elements in the postSoviet threat environment.29 With its analysis of the changing 

security environment and the acknowledged terrorist threat, the 

Clinton administration provided the first official recognition that 

the United States needed to confront this new unconventional 

threat. For the next two years (1995 and 1996), Clinton continued 

to list terrorism as a “prominent threat to the interests of the 

United States and its allies.”30 DoD recognized the connection 

between the “illegal drug trade and international organized crime” 

as subsidiary national security threats in the post-Soviet security 

environment.31 

Clinton and the DoD provided the first official recognition of 

a new security environment with threats posed by non-state actors 

such as terrorist organizations, drug traffickers, and transnational 

organized crime to the security of the United States and its allies. 

Following this recognition, Secretary of Defense William S. 

Cohen acknowledged a “war on terrorism” based on analysis of 

recent trends in terrorist attacks in 1997.32 The DoD, in its 1997 

Annual Report, outlined the administration’s response to the new 

and expansive terrorist threat. 

6 
Cohen acknowledged the “new” terrorist threat by first 

outlining the factors responsible for the changes in the post-Soviet 

security environment.33 Under Cohen’s leadership, the DoD 

identified “the disintegration of the Soviet Union, changing terrorist 

motivation, the proliferation of technologies of mass destruction, 

increased access to information and information technologies, and 

the accelerated centralization of vital components of the national 

infrastructure” as the forces that prompted the rise of terrorism 

as a threat to US national security in the post-Soviet security 

environment.34 Additionally, DoD recognized the transition 

of terrorist groups from “political motivation” to “religious 

motivation.”35 This ideological shift to religious motivation led 

the administration to conclude terrorist attacks in the near future 

would be planned to inflict “maximized carnage” as a result of the 

radical interpretation of the Koran.36 DoD believed the terrorists’ 

fundamental motivation for violence changed as did their preferred 

method of attack. 

By 2000, Cohen maintained that future terrorist attacks 

would be more “prevalent, prominent, and lethal” than those in 

previous eras.37 The unsecured status of biological, chemical, 

and nuclear weapons and technology in the former Soviet Union 

greatly concerned the United States, as well as the international 

community. Fearing terrorist organizations had easier access 

to “technologies that were once the sole preserve of world and 

regional powers,” DoD worried that a terrorist organization could 

use an improvised weapon of mass destruction (WMD) to advance 

its cause, as well as inflict mass casualties on a scale not normally 

associated with terrorist attacks. 

AccesstoandthepotentialuseofWMDsbyterroristorganizations 

provided these once marginalized non-state actors with the potential 

capability to influence national, regional, or international affairs 

greatly.

38 Having identified the motivation and potential nature of 

the “new terrorist” threat, Cohen and DoD focused on the nation’s 

vulnerability and the US efforts to combat the emerging threat. 

Moving away from the threat posed by transnational terrorist 

groups in the post-Soviet security environment to the potential 

targets of such groups, the Clinton administration considered the 

7 
vulnerability of nations to terrorist attacks. The DoD postulated 

that modern national infrastructures presented “high value and 

vulnerable” targets for terrorist groups based on their “dependence 

on computers” and the “interdependence” of vital systems.39 

Specifically, the DoD identified the potential of a cascading effect 

if a terrorist organization attacked vulnerable electric grids, air 

traffic control systems, computer networks, or the gas and oil 

pipelines in the United States.40 Based upon this analysis, Cohen 

identified the need to combat terrorism. 

The DoD identified two courses of action: antiterrorism 

and counterterrorism.41 DoD defined antiterrorism as “defensive 

measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and 

property to terrorist attacks” and counterterrorism as “offensive 

measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.”42 

Backed by structural and organization arrangements within 

DoD, Clinton established a coordinated antiterrorism and 

counterterrorism force to meet the terrorist threat. 

The Clinton administration’s successive Annual Reports from 

the DoD are of fundamental significance in the current GWOT. 

First, within these reports, DoD provided the recognition and 

identification of terrorism as an overt threat to the national security 

of the United States and the international community in the postCold War security environment. Second, Cohen’s 1997 DoD 

Annual Report established the basic organizational and structural 

arrangements with the executive branch of the government to 

begin combating the terrorist threat. And finally, within the 1997 

Annual Report, the secretary of defense openly acknowledged the 

emergence of the new terrorist threat as an international security 

threat that revolved around “ideologies.”43The genesis of the current 

GWOT can therefore be found in the DoD’s 1997 Annual Report. 

Having dedicated a full chapter on terrorism in its 1997 

Annual Report, Cohen and DoD failed to include the same chapter 

in 1998, but instead handled the issue within their analysis of 

the “transnational dangers” in the DoD’s 1998 Annual Report.

44 

By 1998, Clinton and the DoD fully outlined the “transnational 

dangers” posed by transnational terrorist organizations. 

Specifically, the administration declared: 

8 
The variety of sub-state and supra-state actors that 

can affect the security environment will continue to 

grow in number and capability. Violent, religiouslymotivated terrorist organizations have eclipsed more 

traditional, politically-motivated movements. The 

latter often refrained from mass casualty operations 

for fear of alienating their constituencies and actors 

who could advance their agendas or for lack of 

material and technical skill. Religious zealots rarely 

exhibit such restraint and actively seek to maximize 

carnage. Also of concern are entrenched ethnic- and 

nationalist-motivated terrorist organization, as well 

as the relatively new phenomenon of ad hoc terrorist 

groups domestically and abroad. Over the next 15 

years, terrorists will become even more sophisticated 

in their targeting, propaganda, and political action 

operations. Terrorist state sponsors like Iran will 

continue to provide vital support to a disparate mix 

of terrorist groups and movements. The illegal drug 

trade and other forms of international organized crime, 

including piracy, and the illegal trade in weapons and 

strategic materials, will also persist, undermining the 

legitimacy of friendly governments, disrupting key 

regions and sea lanes, and threatening the safety of US 

citizens at home and abroad.45 

By the halfway point of his second term, Clinton and his 

national security team provided a characterization of terrorism as 

transnational non-state actors that demanded consideration at the 

forefront of US national and international security concerns. The 

rapid proliferation of non-state actors gravitated toward the use 

of terrorism to advance their agendas emerged as a defining issue 

in the post-Cold War security environment. Interestingly enough, 

and despite its essential work done in identifying terrorism as a 

national and international security threat in the post-Soviet Union 

threat environment, the Clinton administration remained strangely 

silent on efforts to combat international terrorism in 1999 and 

2000. Compared with its deep treatment and analysis of terrorism 

in its 1997 Annual Report, DoD’s reports for 1999 and 2000 

lacked any follow-up on the nature of the new enemy. It was not 

until after the Al Qaeda attacks on 11 September 2001 that the 

9 
predictions, first voiced in DoD’s 1997 Annual Report, became 

the primary priority of the United States and the international 

community. With Al Qaeda’s attacks on the World Trade Center 

and the Pentagon, this once obscure non-state actor convinced the 

United States that it was a serious and deadly threat to the nation’s 

security and international stability. The GWOT had begun. 

After the attacks on the United States by Al Qaeda, President 

George W. Bush enlisted the support of the international 

community in the GWOT. In fact, on 12 September 2001 the UN 

General Assembly and the Security Council “adopted resolutions 

condemning the attacks and calling on all states to cooperate in 

bringing the perpetrators to justice.”46 UN Secretary General, 

Kofi Annan, declared that in the struggle with terrorism there is 

“no alternative to international cooperation.”47 Mimicking the 

language found in the DoD’s 1997 Annual Report, Annan asserted 

the “greatest danger arises from non-state actor” and their potential 

to “obtain nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.”48 To stem 

the threat of terrorists and their possible use of WMDs, Annan 

recommended the UN needed to take the following actions: 

Redouble the efforts to ensure the universality, 

verification and full implementation of key treaties 

relating to weapons of mass destruction, including those 

outlawing chemical and biological weapons and the 

nuclear nonproliferation treaty; promote cooperation 

among international organizations dealing with these 

weapons; tighten national legislation over exports 

of goods and technologies needed to manufacture 

weapons of mass destruction and their means of 

delivery; and develop new efforts to criminalize the 

acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction by 

non-state groups.49 

While the secretary general’s initial recommendations focused 

on curbing and criminalizing the manufacture, distribution, and 

use of WMDs by terrorist groups, the Security Council moved to 

create the Counter-Terrorism Committee to report on the status 

and operations within the international community’s efforts to 

combat terrorism.50 In response to the measures enacted by the 

Security Council (resolutions 1368 and 1373) and the intensified 

10 
threat posed by terrorist groups, the UN General Assembly formed 

the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism in 

October 2001.51 

The nations of the General Assembly believed the Policy 

Working Group provided assistance in the “global effort” to 

“dissuade groups from embracing terrorism, deny groups or 

individuals the means to carry out terrorist acts, and sustain broadbased international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism.”52 

Based upon the group’s mission, the General Assembly stipulated 

the Policy Working Group needed to focus on eight specific issues 

related to international terrorism.53 The General Assembly decided 

to subdivide the scope of the Policy Working Group to provide a 

range of “diverse perspectives” on the various issues.54 Ultimately, 

the creation of the Policy Working Group provided the UN with 

an active organization through which the international community 

could strive toward minimizing the threat of a WMD attack by 

terrorist groups. The Policy Working Group allowed the UN to be 

an active participant in the fight to eradicate this new international 

security threat. 

Parallel with the actions taken by the UN in the aftermath of 11 

September 2001 attacks, various other multinational organizations 

joined the US-led GWOT. Most notable, on 12 September 2001, 

NATO, a Cold War organization, for the first time in its history 

provisionally invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The 

language found in Article 5 states an “armed attack on one 

Ally in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 

against them all.”55 Upon the determination that the attacks on the 

United States were “ordered from abroad,” Lord F.N. Robertson, 

secretary general of NATO, confirmed the alliance’s decision.56 

In the aftermath, NATO became a primary ally in the fight to end 

international terrorism. Specifically, NATO members agreed to 

“enhance intelligence sharing and cooperation, provide assistance, 

based on capabilities, to allies and other states in the campaign 

against terrorism, increase security measures for US facilities 

and other Allies on their territory, provide blanket overflight 

clearances for US and Allied aircraft, deploy naval forces to the 

Eastern Mediterranean, as well as provide AWACS.”57 NATO, by 

11 
the beginning of October 2001, firmly supported the GWOT by 

enacting military measures designed to assist the United States in 

the war on terrorism. 

Beyond its initial support of the United States, NATO remained 

an active coalition partner in the GWOT by supporting the US and 

British operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.58 

NATO’s support of the war on terrorism did not remain confined 

to alliance partners. In response to constant terrorist activity in 

Chechnya and threats posed by terrorist organizations throughout 

the Russian Federation, President Vladimir Putin met with NATO’s 

Lord Robertson to discuss cooperation between NATO and Russia 

in Russia’s war on terrorism.59 By November 2001, NATO became 

a major actor in the international community’s efforts to eradicate 

the threat posed by terrorist groups. 

The international community’s response to the 11 September 

2001 attacks on the United States did not remain confined solely 

to military and political alliances. On 19 September 2001, the 

leaders of the Group of Eight (G8) “condemned the attacks” and 

offered assistance and cooperation.60 The G8 leaders endorsed 

and implemented UN Resolution 1373, as well as supported the 

efforts of the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee. 

Beyond just supporting and endorsing the efforts of other 

organizations, G8 members established a set of “principles 

and priorities” to aid in the defeat of terrorist groups.61 The G8 

believed curtailing terrorist access to finances, communication, 

and organization networks in Afghanistan substantially reduced 

the international security threat posed by terrorist groups.62 Also, 

the G8 nations sought to “reduce the threat of terrorist attacks” 

by making travel safer for their citizens, limiting the number of 

sanctuaries available to terrorist groups, and providing improved 

cooperation in the international monitoring and tracking of 

terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations.63 The 

actions taken and recommended by the members of the G8 nations 

supported, assisted, and strengthened the measures taken by other 

international actors such as the UN and NATO. 

Taken as a sample of the international community’s responses 

to the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, the 

12 
measures advocated and enacted by the UN, NATO, and the 

G8 provided a network of interlocking military, legal, financial, 

and political actions designed to assist the United States in the 

GWOT. In the days and months after the attacks, the international 

community rallied with the United States to curb the threat 

posed by transnational terrorist groups. These political, military, 

financial, diplomatic, and judicial actions provided the United 

States and the international community with a solid foundation 

to pursue the GWOT. By the close of 2001, the United States and 

the international community succeeded in assembling a strong 

international coalition armed with a multitude of tools to defeat 

the threats posed by non-state terrorist organizations. 

Measuring Success 

The unconventional nature of terrorism and the subsequent 

war on terrorism present specific issues when the question of 

“are we winning the war on terrorism?” is posed. Edward F. 

Mickolus, in his article “How Do We Know We’re Winning the 

War Against Terrorists? Issues in Measurement,” tackles this 

complex and vexing question. According to Mickolus, the analyst 

has a choice of characteristics to use in analysis. Some analysts 

opt to focus on “the characteristics of the group,” others on the 

“characteristics of the events,” and some on “behaviors.”64 Each 

one of these approaches has merits and provides valuable insight 

into the “groups, events, and behaviors” of terrorist organizations. 

Despite their qualitative utility and the depth of their analytical 

penetration into the understanding of terrorism and terrorists, 

the approaches lack an ability to answer the simple question “is 

terrorism increasing or decreasing?”65 To the “man on the street,” 

this is the true measure of the war on terrorism.66 The process for 

providing a quantitative evaluation on the success of the GWOT 

mandates an events-focused approach be applied in this project. 

The events-focused approach is simply compiling numerical 

data on the types, targets, and regions of terrorist activities for a 

given period. While Mickolus acknowledges the events-focused 

approach provides the best answer to the question “is terrorism 

increasing or decreasing? ” he highlights a few shortcomings 

as well.67 First and foremost, Mickolus notes it is difficult to 

13 
establish a baseline of “normal terrorist activity.”68 Therefore, 

characterization of increasing or decreasing activity may provide 

a skewed conclusion. As an example, Mickolus observes terrorist 

groups may need time for planning operations, and these down 

periods provide false readings if one is counting the number of 

events within a specific time period and comparing it against 

another.

69 According to Mickolus, these limitations do not subvert 

the usefulness of the events-based paradigm, but rather demand 

that the analyst using the process simply be “aware of the inherent 

limitations” of the events-based approach. 

In the context of judging the adaptation of terrorist organizations 

to the GWOT, the positive attributes of the events-based approach 

outweigh its limitations. Based upon Mickolus’s analysis, the 

events-based analytical methodology provides insight into the 

identification of trends. Using this methodology for analysis, 

one can ascertain if the terrorist organizations are: “continuing 

with the same type of attacks, shifting to new targets, using new 

innovative types of attacks, and/or changing their calculus of the 

cost involved.”70 The trends identified through the events-based 

methodology provide data useful in judging the adaptation of 

terrorist groups to the declared GWOT. Additionally, the eventsbased methodology allows a comparison of terrorist activity before 

and after the 11 September 2001 attacks. 

While the use of the events based methodology provides 

insight into trends of terrorist activities, it is necessary to collate 

this numerical data with observations and analysis provided by 

experts. Therefore, I will supplement the analysis derived from the 

event-based methodology with the opinions and analysis found in 

scholarly and professional journals. Combined, these two sources 

provide a snapshot of terrorist activity from 1990 to 2003 aimed 

at discerning how non-state terrorist organizations adapted to the 

GWOT. While the GWOT is ongoing, it must be acknowledged 

that any analysis at this juncture is only a small segment of an 

enduring and much larger and complex analytical process. Despite 

this limitation, this study provides a significant assessment of the 

emergent trends within the quest to exterminate terrorism as an 

international security threat within the first years of the declared 

GWOT. 

14 
On Sources 

In considering the events conducted by terrorist organizations, 

the State Department since the 1980s compiles an annual report 

titled Patterns of Global Terrorism. Within these reports, the State 

Department provides a yearly overview of terrorism, terrorist 

organizations, and their activity. In reporting on the annual 

activities of terrorists, the State Department offers a regional 

analysis, a chronology of events, and background information 

on the “major groups” identified in the report. In addition to this 

useful information, the State Department provides a statistical 

review of international and anti-US terrorist attacks. For the 

purpose of this study, both categories of terrorist events presented 

in Patterns of Global Terrorism are considered. Within the review 

of “International Terrorist Incidents” and the “Anti-US Attacks,” 

the State Department categorizes the attacks by “region, type of 

facility, type of victim, and casualties.” To provide a comparative 

and useful analysis of the adaptation of terrorists to the GWOT, 

the data set spans will remain parallel and cover the years 1990 

to 2003. The process of using parallel categories provides a basic 

comparison of events prior to and after the attacks on 11 September 

2001 as a way to gauge terrorist activity and actions in two distinct 

epochs. The comprehensive nature of Patterns of Global Terrorism 

necessitates that it will be the primary source for the analysis of 

terrorist activity. This event-based approach lacks insight into 

the impact of the measures enacted by the United States and its 

international allies in the GWOT; therefore, to gauge the impact 

of these measures, a different variety of sources are necessary. 

Professional and scholarly journals such as Jane’s Intelligence 

Review, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and Journal of 

Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International provide 

critical analysis into the operation of terrorist groups in the years 

prior to and after 11 September 2001. The authors within these 

sources attempt to assess the impact of the military, criminal, 

financial, and political measures enacted by the United States 

and its allies in the GWOT. Together, the primary and secondary 

sources merge to present a broader and richer analysis of the 

evolution of non-state terrorist organizations within the security 

environment defined by the GWOT. 

15 
New Terrorism 

Terrorism since 1968 has been coined “new terrorism” as a 

way to distinguish it from previous epochs. Bruce Hoffman, of 

the RAND Corporation, argues that terrorism in the past “was 

practiced by groups of individuals belonging to an identifiable 

organization with a clear command and control apparatus who 

had a defined set of political, social, or economic objectives.”71 

Hoffman believes that a distinction exists between the “traditional” 

and “new” terrorists based upon the traditional terrorist use 

of public “communiqués” to justify their actions within their 

particular ideological beliefs.72 Specifically, Hoffman identifies 

the Japanese Red Army (JRA), the Red Brigades of Italy, the Irish 

Republican Army (IRA), Abu Nidal, and the Basque Separatist 

Group (ETA) as traditional terrorist groups. A further distinction 

exists between “traditional” and new terrorist groups in that 

“traditional” groups practiced “highly selective and discriminate 

acts of violence” on “symbolic targets” to attract “attention and 

advance their cause.”73 The objective of these “traditional” groups 

was not to maximize the number of casualties, but rather to use 

acts of violence (kidnappings, assignations, and bombings) to 

support their prescribed agendas. The key determinant between 

the traditional terrorist organizations and the new terrorist 

organizations is in their practice of violent acts, the issuance of a 

claim of responsibility, their command and control structure, and 

professed ideology. 

The new terrorists are organizationally diffused, intent on 

inflicting mass casualties, religiously aligned, and content with 

maintaining “anonymity.”74 The transition between traditional 

and new terrorist groups essentially means that today terrorist 

organization are “far more lethal,” evasive, and dispersed than 

they were several decades ago. Hoffman, writing before the 

Al Qaeda attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, 

stressed that despite the systemic augmentations of the new 

terrorist organizations, the threat posed by new terrorists may be 

“exaggerated.”75Hoffman followed up this assertion by recognizing 

terrorism remained “a serious threat to America and American 

interests both in this country and overseas.”76 Obviously, the 

16 
attacks on 11 September 2001 categorically challenged Hoffman’s 

notion of new terrorist groups as not living up to their preferred 

intent for mass violence. 

The new terrorists emerged in the late 1960s and the early 

1970s as various non-state terrorist groups heightened their 

visibility through bombings and actions that caught the attention 

of the international news media. In 1972, the Palestinian-based 

Black September shocked the international community by brashly 

taking Israeli athletes hostage in the midst of the 1972 Olympics. 

This single event remains one of the most significant terrorist 

events that ushered in the era of the new terrorism. Under the 

watchful eye of international news cameras, the events at the 

Munich Olympics unfolded before the world. The bloody climax 

came when the terrorists and their hostages attempted to leave, 

and West German police attempted to neutralize the terrorists and 

free the hostages. Unfortunately, the Israeli hostages as well as 

the terrorists died in the ensuing gun battle. The tragedy of this 

single event prompted the United States and the international 

community to recognize two important points. First, terrorism 

and terrorists posed a threat to national, regional, and international 

stability. Second, as a direct result of the botched rescue attempt 

carried out by West German police in 1972, the nations of the 

international community recognized the need for effective 

counterterrorism forces. Because of the terrorists’ actions at 

the 1972 Olympics, new terrorism became a permanent and 

recognized part of the international security environment. Despite 

an emerging recognition by European nations of the international 

security threat posed by terrorist organizations, the United States 

remained primarily focused on the context and threats found 

within the dynamics of the Cold War, rather than the threats posed 

by terrorists and terrorist organizations.77 

Throughout the 1970s, the international community witnessed 

sharp spikes in the number of international terrorist events.78 

Specifically in Northern Ireland, Europe, and the Middle East, 

terrorist attacks flourished. 79 Additionally in this period, the 

hijacking of commercial aircraft became a political tactic of 

terrorist groups to advance their agenda, as well as provide a quick 

17 
means of transportation to a terrorist-friendly nations. Interestingly 

enough, the hijackers seldom harmed the crew and passengers, as 

long as victims cooperated with the terrorists’ demands. By the 

1990s, flight crews were informed to concede to the demands 

of hijackers as a quick way to diffuse the situation. Analysis of 

Al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 

speculated that the flight crews of the four hijacked aircraft initially 

followed this “proven” method. Seemingly by the end of the 20th 

century, the hijacking of aircraft had become little more than a 

nuisance and major inconvenience to the crews and passengers 

involved. Although the hijacking of aircraft often ended with 

minimal casualties, the international community took lessons 

from the 1972 Olympics and began using specialized paramilitary 

and police forces to neutralize the hijackers.80 Internationally, 

counterterrorism measures increased as the scale and scope of 

terrorism expanded in the 1970s and 1980s. 

In addition to hijacking, new terrorists used bombs, firebombing, vandalism, arson, and kidnapping as methods to advance 

and gain notoriety for their cause.81By the 1980s, the hijacking 

of aircraft had given way to bombing as the preferred method of 

terrorist groups to advance their agendas. Three specific examples 

demonstrate the evolution of terrorists toward more violent and 

destructive acts. In 1983, a suspected Hezbollah “suicide bomber” 

killed 241 US Marines when he drove his truckload of explosives 

into the US Marine compound in Beirut, Lebanon.82 Second, Sikh 

terrorists exploded an Air India flight in 1985, killing all 328 people 

aboard.83 Last, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi “commissioned” 

the bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 

all 278 people aboard the aircraft.84 Combined, terrorists killed a 

total of 847 people in these three individual bombing incidents. 

In comparison, RAND analysts Brian Jenkins and Janera Johnson 

established international terrorists killed 247 people in 1974.85 

Jenkins and Johnson characterized 1974 as a particularly bad year, 

as the total number of casualties from terrorism had surpassed 

those found in the period 1970 to 1973.86 By the middle of the 

1980s, it appeared that terrorists had begun to target great numbers 

of civilians. The number of casualties in the 1970s and the 1980s 

reaffirms the transition from the “traditional terrorist” era to the 

18 
“new” era as one of increased violence. Beyond the use of more 

violent tactics designed to kill greater numbers of people, the new 

terrorist era witnessed a gravitation of groups away from political 

and economic ideology toward the theology driven transnational 

terrorist organizations. 

Largely stemming from the takeover in Iran by the radical 

cleric Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, militant Islam became an 

ideological foundation for the perpetuation of terrorism and terrorist organizations within the international security environment. 

Prior to the rise of Khomeini, the majority of international terrorist organizations tended to focus on nationalist, social, or political 

issues. Groups such as the IRA, ETA, and Palestine Liberation 

Organization (PLO) focused exclusively on the liberation of their 

people from the control of the British, Spanish, and Israelis. Each 

of these terrorist groups easily incorporated the tactics and strategies associated with the new terrorism into their organizations 

and in their fight for national sovereignty. Beyond the advancement of nationalistic goals, terrorist groups, such as the JRA, Red 

Brigades of Italy, and the Baader-Meinhof group of West Germany, sought to advance various forms of Marxism within the 

international community by advocating and practicing the use of 

terrorism. Like the nationalist-focused terrorist groups, the JRA, 

Red Brigades, and the Baader-Meinhof Group easily integrated 

the elements associated with new terrorism into their operational 

strategies and objectives. Contrary to the argument made by Hoffman, the above mentioned terrorist groups blurred the distinction 

between “traditional” and “new” terrorism.87 Building on experience gained in the decades prior to the 1970s and 1980s, all six 

groups remained active participants in the use of terrorism well 

into the post 11 September 2001 era. Moreover, the rise of the 

new terrorist era coincided with the political rise of Khomeini and 

his adherence to radical Islam in Iran. The Iranian support and 

sponsorship of terrorist organizations in the declared jihad against 

the West additionally characterized the era of new terrorism. 

The establishment of a revolutionary “Islamic theocracy” 

by Khomeini in Iran in 1979 provided a shining example to 

militant Shi’ite Muslims around the world as hope for the future. 

Historian John Murphy observes Khomeini recognized this 

19 
attraction and used his position to advance the cause of militant 

Islam.88 Specifically, Khomeini, Hussein Ali Montazerti (head 

of the Council for Islamic Revolution), and Iranian President 

Ali Khameni stressed that “Islamic Iran would be the source of 

funds and training camps for any Muslim anxious to carry out the 

permanent holy war.”89 Coincidentally, at the same time Khomeini 

established Iran as the epicenter of militant Islam, the Soviet Union 

invaded Afghanistan and Iran became a major source of funds and 

training for the Islamic mujahidin freedom fighters in their vicious 

opposition to the Soviet Union’s invasion. 

Within the context of the Cold War, the United States 

overlooked the theological underpinnings of the mujahidin fighters 

and covertly assisted in their arming and training. Beyond the 

fundamental ideological differences, the United States (specifically 

the Reagan administration) saw the mujahidin and their success 

in the Afghanistan war as an opportunity to stem communist 

expansion and weaken the Soviet Union. Only after the demise 

of the Cold War and the rise of transnational terrorism did links 

between the United States and Osama bin Laden surface in the 

context of the Afghan war in the 1980s. The Afghan war provided 

an excellent training ground for militant Muslims to become 

battle hardened and demonstrate their faith in the concept of a 

perpetual jihad. Iran remained at the epicenter of this fundamental 

change in the international security environment by advocating 

and supporting like-minded terrorist organizations. 

The Iranian revolution and the Afghanistan war led to the 

emergence of sympathetic terrorist militia groups, such as 

Hezbollah, designed to advance a militant Muslim cause.90 Amid 

the political turmoil and chaos of Lebanon’s civil war in the late 

1970s and early 1980s, Hezbollah formed to halt the “usurpation 

of Muslim lands” and to “serve their community” against the 

Israelis.91 Specifically, Hezbollah sought to emulate the Iranian 

example and establish an Islamic Republic in Lebanon and 

believed Lebanon needed to purge “all non-Islamic influence.”92 

Based upon these beliefs, Hezbollah became vehemently anti-West 

and anti-Israel.93 Acting on its beliefs, Hezbollah attacked US and 

Israeli forces in Lebanon during their peacekeeping operations, 

which ultimately led President Reagan to remove US Marines 

20 
from Lebanon. Hezbollah advanced its agenda through the use 

of bombings as well as guerilla operations throughout Lebanon 

and Israel. By the mid-1990s, Hezbollah attempted to distance 

itself from its terrorist past by recasting itself as a quasi-legitimate 

political actor within the regional politics of the Middle East as 

well as within Lebanon.94 

Hezbollah was not the only militant Islamic organization that 

emerged after the Ayatollah Khomeini came to power. The rise of 

Hezbollah characterizes the essence of new terrorism. The rise of 

militant Islamic terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah evolved 

in the late 1970s and early 1980s and ascended to their zenith as the 

Cold War screeched to a halt. In a break with traditional terrorist 

organizations, these new groups used strong international ties to 

support their agendas. Recruitment was not limited to a specific 

country or region, but strove to attract like-minded Muslims 

from around the world, who believed in the goals and theology 

advocated by the militant Muslims. Once the groups had recruited 

from around the globe, they sent their “soldiers” off to training 

camps funded and sponsored by states, charity organizations, and 

wealthy individuals. These camps thrived in the Middle East, 

Northern Africa, and Central Asia to instruct jihadists in bomb 

making, infiltration, communication techniques, and militant 

theology of the Islamic terrorist organizations. In addition to the 

training camps, these transnational terrorist groups relied on a 

complicated web of legal and extra legal financial resources to 

support their sustained operations. Ultimately, these new terrorist 

groups believed they were engaged in an ideological struggle with 

the West.95 By the end of the Cold War, a whole range of highly 

advanced, well-funded, and substantially armed transnational 

terrorist organizations existed within the international security 

environment. These non-state based security threats posed a 

substantial risk to national, regional, and international stability. In 

the midst of this environment, Al Qaeda emerged as the ultimate 

model of a transnational terrorist organization. 

The Case of Al Qaeda 

In the wake of its attacks on the United States, Al Qaeda became 

one of the most widely known transnational terrorist organizations 

21 
in history. Prior to these attacks, however, the group and its leader, 

Bin Laden, remained relatively unknown.96 However, despite its 

low international profile, Al Qaeda became the embodiment of a 

new terrorist organization. Originally developed with the specific 

objective to train like-minded “Islamic extremists” in the fight 

against the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, Saudi national 

bin Laden joined the mujahidin resistance in 1979 and later founded 

Al Qaeda.97 Bin Laden used his family’s amassed material wealth 

to help “recruit, finance, and train” mujahidin resistance fighters for 

the Afghan War.

98 Having participated in the successful defeat of 

the Soviet Union, bin Laden used experience gained in Afghanistan 

to construct a well-funded, trained, and organized transnational 

terrorist organization designed to combat the “ideals and influence 

of unbelievers.”99 Bin Laden’s objective was to “re-establish the 

caliphate” by reaching out to support Muslims (Sunni and Shi’ite) 

oppressed by “non-Muslim regimes.”100 As Iran and the Ayatollah 

Khomeini became the epicenter of the first wave of new terrorism 

in the early 1980s, bin Laden and Al Qaeda emerged in the 1990s 

as the primary terrorist source willing to support, fund, and train 

terrorist groups and individuals committed to the jihad against the 

West. 

The origins of Al Qaeda are of profound significance to the 

status and structure of the organization today. During the Soviet 

Union’s war in Afghanistan, mujahidinfighters “portrayed the event 

as a holy war,” which resonated throughout the Islamic world.101 

Islamic freedom fighters committed to ejecting the foreign invaders 

from Afghanistan converged from around the globe to fight the 

Soviet Union. In addition to the indigenous support from various 

local Islamic sources, the mujahidin received substantial support 

from the US, European, and Saudi Arabian governments.102 The 

experiences gained by mujahidin fighters in Afghanistan served 

as a common force in the creation of Al Qaeda’s network.103 The 

success in Afghanistan led militant Muslims to assume a “heady 

sense of confidence” and belief that they assisted in the demise of 

the once-powerful Soviet Union.104 The development of an esprit 

de corps among the radical mujahidin led to an intensified belief in 

the concept of the jihad. The Afghan war provided bin Laden with 

a “rolodex” of willing participants in his vision for the future. 

22 
In the aftermath of the mujahidin’s success in Afghanistan, the 

global security environment fundamentally changed, significantly 

influencing the belief and vision of Bin Laden. In the summer of 

1990, Saddam Hussein invaded the oil-rich kingdom of Kuwait, 

provoking a military response from the United States and the 

UN. Saudi Arabia, fearing an invasion, granted permission to the 

United States and its alliance partners to use its military and port 

facilities to launch Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT 

STORM. In an effort to appease Muslims and Arabs alike, the 

Saudi government initially required the foreign troops to leave 

after the cessation of hostilities. However, in the aftermath of 

Operation DESERT STORM, Saudi Arabia allowed US and 

coalition forces to remain in the country to enforce the peace 

settlement. This action by the Saudi royal family led bin Laden 

to claim they were “false Muslims” for reneging on their policy 

concerning the US presence.105 Bin Laden used the opportunity to 

call for the installation of a “true Islamic state in Saudi Arabia.”106 

In response to his claim about the royal family being “false 

Muslims,” as well as his call for the establishment of a “new 

state,” the Saudi government deported bin Laden and revoked 

his citizenship in 1994. As a result of his diplomatic troubles, bin 

Laden increasingly relied upon the contacts and networks he had 

fostered while fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. 

Using his international contacts and his vast monetary 

resources, bin Laden renewed the fight against “globalization” in 

Bosnia, Kashmir, the Philippines, and the Muslim republics of the 

former Soviet Union.107 Through the early stages of building his 

new transnational terrorist network, bin Laden moved between 

bases in Sudan and Pakistan before settling in Afghanistan. With 

the control of Afghanistan in the hands of the radical Islamic 

Taliban regime, bin Laden had sympathetic governmental support 

for his declaration of war against “foreign unbelievers.”108 Beyond 

the charisma of its leader, the revolutionary nature of Al Qaeda as 

a new terrorist group stemmed directly from bin Laden’s reliance 

on an ideology with mass appeal to militant Muslims. Bin Laden 

relied upon his business education to develop an organizational 

structure and diverse financial network to support his militant 

Islamic network of terrorists. 

23 
According to Al Qaeda expert Rohan Gunaratna, bin Laden 

and Al Qaeda subscribe to an ideology that is general and broad 

in appeal to “Middle eastern and non-Middle eastern groups 

that are Islamic in character.”109 Anti-Western and anti-Israeli 

rhetoric forms the foundation of Al Qaeda’s ideological paradigm. 

Gunaratna argues that bin Laden’s reliance on using militant 

Islamic theology to target the United States and Israel allows the 

message to have a “global and resilient appeal” to militant radical 

Muslims.110 To further capitalize on his mass appeal, bin Laden 

emphasizes the development of “pan-Islam unity” aimed toward 

the establishment of a “community of believers or a umma” to 

displace the hegemony of the West.111 Within the post-Soviet 

security environment, the United States embraced an expanded 

interventionist foreign policy in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti. 

Bin Laden used these endeavors as examples to justify his call 

to combat the expansionistic tendencies of Western culture and 

ideology led by the United States. This attack against America’s 

cultural, political, and military encroachment struck a chord with 

militant Muslims around the globe, and bin Laden used this to 

his advantage. Gunaratna observes Al Qaeda believes “until US 

troops are removed from all lands of the Muslims, no Muslim is 

absolved from sin except the mujahidin.”112 This belief had mass 

appeal to the militant Muslim community, which is the exact group 

bin Laden wished to mobilize. 

To advance his theological paradigm, bin Laden and Al Qaeda 

members believe they are fighting a perpetual jihad against the 

West. This “call to battle” allows bin Laden to cast his struggle 

as a zero-sum struggle. From bin Laden’s perspective, the zerosum nature of this conflict demands steadfast belief and devout 

principles. Beyond the ideological/theological foundations of 

Al Qaeda, bin Laden revolutionized the structure of terrorist 

organizations by moving away from the strictly centralized model 

of traditional organizations.113 While the core structure of Al Qaeda 

is vertically aligned in a traditional manner, the organization also 

relies heavily upon semiautonomous cells found in operational 

territories throughout the globe that are “horizontally integrated” 

into the centralized command structure.114 This amorphous 

structure permits the central command to maintain control over 

24 
specifically identified strategic operations, such as the attacks on 

the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, while also allowing 

the cells to maintain autonomy in their own local and regional 

operations. The organizational structure of Al Qaeda is important 

to its success. 

Bin Laden is at the pinnacle of the core-centralized structure. 

Below are the Shura majilis, who operate as a “consultative 

council” on the day-to-day operational and management details 

needed to maintain the vast Al Qaeda network.115 The Shura majilis 

receive information from four subordinate committees designed 

to focus on the specific segments of planning and operations. 

The military, finance, religious/legal, and media committees 

independently handle compartmentalized portions of current 

and future Al Qaeda operations. The military committee, by far 

the most robust and active of the four committees, is directly 

responsible for “recruiting, training, procuring, and launching 

support and military operations.”116 Base teams work with field 

teams in “planning and preparing attacks,” including the analysis 

and dissemination of intelligence, training and procurement of 

armaments, and the arrangement of necessary documents such as 

passports and visas needed to conduct the operation.117 

In coordination with the military committee, the other three 

committees operate to support and sustain operations. The finance 

committee, as the name implies, is responsible for overseeing and 

developing the “financial resources needed to sustain Al Qaeda and 

its operations.”118 Al Qaeda relies on a complicated global system 

of “licit and illicit companies, private investors, government sponsors, and religious charities” to fund its operations. 119 Breaking 

from the other terrorist organizations, Al Qaeda relies on the use 

of “legitimate businesses to generate revenue” to sustain its operations.120 In addition to the use of legitimate businesses such as 

“construction companies, agriculture products, fishing boats, and 

furniture companies,” Al Qaeda relies on the covert use of philanthropic “Islamic nongovernment organizations (NGOs).”121 Combining the use of legitimate businesses and the charity organizations allows Al Qaeda to retain a substantial capability to generate 

large sums of capital despite actions taken by the United States and 

the UN to freeze the financial assets of the terrorist organization.122 

25 
The remaining committees, the religious/legal and the media, 

are removed from the operational side of Al Qaeda’s planning. 

However, they remain vital in the overall synergy of the network. 

The religious/legal committee “justifies” the actions and operations 

of attacks within the theological parameters of “Al Qaeda’s model 

of Islam.”123 In bin Laden’s ultimate objective of reestablishing 

the caliphate, the justification of attacks and operations within 

the tenets of Islam are necessary because they reinforce the 

significance of the movement. All actions taken by Al Qaeda are 

interpreted within the context of bin Laden’s radical theology. 

To further spread the word of Al Qaeda’s actions, the terrorist 

organization relies on a media committee to produce “news and 

information” in support of Al Qaeda operations.124 The actions of 

the media committee build upon the justifications of the attacks 

by the religious/legal committee to produce propaganda designed 

to influence Muslims to support the Al Qaeda organization and its 

objectives. 

The coordinated actions advocated by the military, finance, 

religious/legal, and media committees stream in from Al Qaedalinked cells found throughout the globe. These cells have their 

own organizational structures and operate both directly in support 

of centralized directives and upon their own individual plans. This 

loosely organized cell structure provides Al Qaeda with regional 

and operational flexibility by allowing the cells to generate and 

raise their own capital, as well as plan their own operations. Using 

this diffused method of organization, bin Laden influences a much 

broader segment of the international political spectrum, more so 

than if all operations were run and controlled by the centralized 

network. While the cells have autonomy, they have received strict, 

rigid, and detailed training in conducting their business based upon 

the exacting requirements of bin Laden’s Al Qaeda model. 

The organizational structure of Al Qaeda enables the network 

to sustain itself and its operations within the increasingly hostile 

environment of the GWOT. Despite significant arrests, foiled 

operations, and tighter financial controls, Al Qaeda remains 

adaptive and flexible. More than any other terrorist group, Al 

Qaeda embodies the complex and complicated nature of new 

terrorism. 

26 
Combating New Terrorists 

In the post-Cold War security environment, transnational 

threats such as terrorist groups emerged to fill the void left by 

the demise of the Soviet Union. However, unlike the days of the 

Cold War where military and diplomatic solutions provided the 

best options to combat the expansive enemy, the United States 

and the international community remained unsure of how to target 

and prosecute transnational terrorists. Essentially, the United 

States and other nations used criminal and financial methods 

to prosecute and bring terrorist organizations to justice for two 

reasons. First, the use of criminal proceedings to combat terrorism 

allows the US government and other nations to apply legislation 

that has a proven track record in fighting crime. By characterizing 

transnational terrorist groups as criminal enterprises, the nations 

of the international community can use the well-established 

international networks, such as INTERPOL, to combat the actions 

and movement of terrorist members. Through the application 

of criminal legislation, the United States and the international 

community are attempting to decapitate and erode the membership 

of transnational terrorist organizations. Experience in fighting 

transnational organized crime factions provided the model the 

United States and other nations used to begin their attack on nonstate terrorist organizations.125 

By using their experiences to combat the influence of 

transnational organized crime groups, the United States and the 

UN have expanded the scope and application of traditional criminal 

legislation to apply to terrorist groups. The objective behind the 

application of criminal statutes is to weaken the leadership of 

terrorist organizations by degrading their operational capability. 

Law enforcement agencies have been successful in applying this 

approach to capture leadership in Al Qaeda. However, this method 

has not curbed membership at the lower levels. 

In conjunction with the application of criminal legislation, the 

United States and the UN have sought to erode the capability and 

operations of terrorist organizations by limiting the international 

terrorists’access to operating finances. Money is a vital component 

in the operations carried out by terrorist organizations. Therefore, 

27 
the United States and the UN have surmised that if the international 

community can limit a terrorist organization’s access to its capital, 

the nations of the world can slowly destroy the operational 

capability of terrorist organizations. The Banking Secrecy Act and 

the Money Laundering Control Act are two examples of legislation 

used by the United States to deprive terrorist organizations of their 

operating funds.126 As with the use of criminal legislation, the 

experience gained from fighting and prosecuting organized crime 

groups provides vital insight into the adaptation and evolution of 

financial legislation for the war on terrorism. 

The United States and its allies in the war on terrorism 

extensively use criminal and financial methods to erode the 

growing presence of transnational terrorist organizations. 

Clinton established a precedent when he used executive orders 

as an additional tool to fight transnational terrorism. Specifically, 

Clinton issued Executive Order (E.O.)12947 on 23 January 

1995 to deter potential terrorists from disrupting or attempting 

to stop the Middle-East peace process. Clinton stated in the E.O. 

12947 “grave acts of violence committed by foreign terrorists 

that disrupt the Middle-East peace process constitute an unusual 

and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, 

and economy of the United States.”127 The executive order also 

outlawed an individual or a group’s “financial, material, and 

technological support and/or assistance” to terrorist organizations 

identified as hostile to the Middle-East peace process.128 Although 

Clinton issued E.O. 12947 to ensure stability in the peace process, 

the document provides another example of US legislative attempts 

to reduce the support and influence of terrorist organizations in the 

years prior to the attacks by Al Qaeda. 

In addition to the use of criminal legislation, financial 

legislation, and executive orders to fight terrorism, military force 

is yet another tool available to political leaders as they attempt to 

curb the threat posed by groups such as Al Qaeda.129 However, until 

the openly declared “GWOT” by President George W. Bush, the 

military option remained the most reserved and guarded response 

used by US presidents. 

28 
As the United States expanded its fight against terrorism in 

the 1990s, so did the UN. Scholars Jane Boulden and Thomas 

G. Weiss argue “prior to the 1990s, the General Assembly of the 

UN approached the issue of terrorism as a general international 

problem.”130 Within this period, the General Assembly strove 

to develop “an international framework for cooperation among 

states,” while still directly avoiding a definition of terrorism.131 

Based on increased terrorist activity in the 1990s, the persistent 

issue of terrorism slowly gravitated toward the jurisdiction of the 

Security Council and away from the General Assembly. Boulden 

and Weiss observe that the “attempted assassination of Egyptian 

President Hosni Mubarak, the bombing of American embassies, 

and first attacks on the World Trade Center” led the Security 

Council to begin issuing sanctions as a way to deal with the state 

sponsorship of terrorism.132 The Security Council directed these 

actions against nations such as Libya and Sudan, which supported 

terrorism, and any other nation refusing to cooperate with the rest 

of the international community in the condemnation of terrorism. 

In the aftermath of the Al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade 

Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington DC, the UN 

and the Security Council fundamentally embraced the position of 

President George W. Bush in his efforts to eradicate the threat 

posed by terrorism by initiating a “global war on terrorism.” 

Although efforts to combat terrorism before 11 September 

2001 had been well established, the severity and high casualties in 

the Al Qaeda attacks reinforced the sentiments within the United 

States and the international community that terrorism needed to 

be stopped. International actors such as the UN and NATO, as 

well as individual nations such as Britain and Russia, pledged to 

assist in the US war to eradicate transnational terrorist groups. The 

response to terrorism by the United States and the nations of the 

world fundamentally changed after 11 September 2001. 

For the United States, actions taken against terrorist groups 

prior to 11 September 2001 focused on the criminal actions and 

financial assets of transnational terrorist networks in an effort to 

reduce their operational capability. In the period after the attacks, 

29 
President George W. Bush established that the United States would 

use all means necessary to combat the forces of terrorism. Bush 

warned that nations assisting, supporting, or conducting terrorist 

operations would be held accountable for their actions. Bush 

openly declared a GWOT and broke with previous administrations 

by arguing the transnational terrorist threat, posed specifically by 

Al Qaeda and its leader bin Laden, demanded overt military force. 

Bush and his National Security Council viewed the attacks as 

“acts of war.”133 As the administration officially linked Al Qaeda 

and bin Laden to the attacks, Bush’s cabinet moved to align the 

nation for a “campaign against terrorism.”134 Congress supported 

the president’s decision by “approving a joint resolution that 

authorized the use of armed force against those responsible for 

the attacks.”135 Secretary of State Colin Powell diplomatically 

maneuvered to align nations with the US position, while Secretary 

of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his staff at DoD worked on 

putting together a military package to use against Al Qaeda and 

the Taliban government in Afghanistan. 

On 7 October 2001, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 

began. The initial stage of the attack consisted of “aircraft and 

cruise missile attacks on Taliban forces, Al Qaeda fighters, training 

sites, command and control systems, and radar installations” in 

Afghanistan.136 The second phase of the operations entailed the 

landing of US Special Forces and Army Rangers.137 Behind the 

special forces and rangers, US Marine Corps Expeditionary Units 

(MEUs) followed to establish a base in the vicinity of Kandahar, 

from which US forces could fight for control of the nation.138 

The combat operations carried out in Afghanistan by the 

United States were not unilateral. The British, Russian, and 

Pakistani governments as well as other nations overtly supported 

and contributed to the combat effort.139 The sustained combat 

operations in Afghanistan by the United States and its allies against 

the Taliban and Al Qaeda therefore represent a fundamental break 

with how nations attempted to combat terrorism prior to September 

2001. The use of overwhelming military force is not what made 

this action different; rather it was the alliance forged in the wake 

of 11 September 2001 to reduce the international security threat 

posed by transnational terrorist groups. 

30 
In conjunction with the use of military power, the United 

States and the international community recognized the fight 

against terrorism demanded the application of a whole spectrum 

of approaches. The work done before 11 September 2001 became 

fundamentally significant because it provided a foundation 

upon which the United States and the international community 

began to build and expand common links found throughout the 

national systems. The link of transnational organized crime, arms 

traffickers, and narcotics traffickers to terrorist organizations 

proved to be one such connection made and pursued in the 

international community’s fight to eradicate transnational 

terrorist groups. The use of criminal, financial, and immigration 

legislation, combined with the use of force by law enforcement 

and military organizations, converged to offer the nations allied in 

the GWOT a plethora of tools to combat the transnational terrorist 

activity. In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, the international 

community worked diligently with the United States to establish a 

loosely grouped cooperative network of national and international 

laws designed to curtail and eventually eradicate threats posed 

by terrorist organizations. The actions taken by the United States 

and the international community discussed thus far describe how 

Al Qaeda’s attacks forced the United States and the international 

community to focus on transnational terrorism as an international 

security issue. The second part of this study details the adaptation 

of terrorist groups since they were first identified as a potential 

security risk in the immediate post-Cold War environment. 

Assessing the Numbers 

Since the 1980s, the US State Department has compiled 

annual data on the actions and attacks conducted by terrorists. 

These annual reports provide the numerical data on international 

terrorist attacks as well as anti-US attacks. Combined, these 

sources provide a composite of terrorist activity prior to and after 

the established GWOT. 

Before a detailed analysis of the adaptation of terrorist 

organizations after the declaration of the GWOT, it would be 

useful to compare the trends of international terrorism from 

the beginning of the new terrorist era in 1968 to the current 

31 
other years, a general trend emerges. 

environment. The trend from 1968 to 2003 demonstrates that 

the peak of international terrorism occurred well before the 

11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the 

Pentagon (see Figure 1). The peak of international terrorist events 

reached its apogee in 1987 before falling off significantly in 1989. 

According to the State Department, the total number of terrorist 

activities reached a high of 665 incidents in 1987.140 Alone, these 

numbers mean virtually nothing; however, when compared with 

Figure 1. Total Terrorist Events, 1968-2003 

In comparison with the high point of 665 incidents in 1987, 

at the start of the new terrorist era in 1968, the total numbers 

of events failed to ascend beyond 200.141 Between 1968 and 

1970, international terrorist activity steadily increased to a high 

of approximately 300 incidents.142 In 1971, the total number 

of terrorist incidents slightly decreased to just over 200 events 

before reaching a high of approximately 550 in 1972. This high 

point of terrorist activity in the first years of the new terrorist era 

produced a trend in which terrorist activity remained between 350 

and 580 total incidents for the remainder of the decade.143 Overall, 

the 1970s witnessed a slow and steady increase in the total 

number of international terrorist events. By the end of the decade, 

32 
international terrorist incidents more than doubled. Despite this 

steady increase, terrorism for the United States remained a relative 

nuisance that flared up from time to time and demanded cursory 

presidential attention. 

At the beginning of the 1980s, the base level of international 

terrorist events started at 499.144 While this total number of 

events was more than double the number of the events carried 

out in 1968 by international terrorist groups, the initial years of 

the 1980s witnessed a flat growth rate in the total number of 

terrorist incidents. From 1980 to the end of 1983, the total number 

of terrorist activities fluctuated no more than 10 incidents.145 

Beginning in 1984, terrorist activity increased to beyond 600 

incidents per year. The rise above 500 total incidents, which had 

not been seen since 1978, emerged in 1984. Unlike the years 1973 

and 1978 that saw the terrorist activity immediately drop after 

spiking, between 1984 and 1989 the total number of incidents 

remained above 600. Contrary to the trend throughout the 1980s, 

terrorist groups slowed their pace of attacks significantly in 1989 

to just 375 incidents.146 

This low point for international terrorist activity coincided 

with the first rumbling of the demise of the Cold War security 

environment. Despite this short reprieve for the international 

community, international terrorist groups rebounded from their 

low in 1989 to a pinnacle of 565 events in 1991.147 Despite the 

vast increase made between 1989 and 1991 (a jump of 180 events 

over two years) by terrorist groups, their activity fell off again 

in 1994.148 International terrorist activity again surged in 1995 to 

440 events before this vacillating trend stabilized in the period 

1996 to 1999.149 At the turn of the century, total international 

terrorist attacks stood at approximately 400 events per year, 

which represented an approximate 100-percent increase in 

terrorist activity from the beginning of the new terrorist era in 

1968. Clearly by the end of the 20th century, terrorist groups had 

become a much more visible threat to international, regional, and 

national security and stability. 

Al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States on 11 September 

2001 provided the impetus for the GWOT. President Bush led the 

33 
international charge to curtail the threat posed by transnational 

terrorist groups. While the United States and Great Britain, as well 

as organizations such as the UN and NATO, responded to the war 

on terrorism, the statistics provided by the US State Department 

offer a different perspective. 

Before the 11 September 2001 attacks by Al Qaeda, the trend 

of international terrorist incidents ebbed in 1998 to 274 events 

throughout the globe.150 The year 1998 represents a low point for 

the total number of international terrorist events. Not since the 

beginning of the new terrorist era had the international community 

experienced such a low number of total terrorist incidents. By 1999, 

the decreasing trend in the total number of international terrorist 

events reversed itself. For the year, terrorists carried out 395 events 

as compared with 274 in 1998.151 This net increase of 121 events 

brought the total number of international terrorist events to a level 

approximately that found in 1974.152 The general upward trend 

that began at the close of the 20th century maintained its trajectory 

throughout 2000. In 2000, the international community witnessed 

426 international terrorist events, marking a major upswing from 

the low of 1998.153 Yet the number of terrorist events experienced 

in 2000, although high, was still well below the high point 

witnessed by the global community in 1987.154 On the eve of Al 

Qaeda’s 11 September 2001 attacks, the international community 

was at the apogee of a spike in the total number of international 

terrorist attacks. While at first this trend may seem alarming, the 

total number of terrorist attacks experienced in 2000 was only 

approximately two-thirds of the total number experienced in 

the second half of the 1980s, when terrorism was considered an 

international, regional, or national nuisance rather than a major 

international security and stability threat. Due to the high number 

of casualties, the method of attack, and the sophistication of Al 

Qaeda’s planning, the events of 11 September 2001 fundamentally 

challenged the international community’s perception about the 

need to combat transnational terrorist groups in the interest of 

international, regional, and national stability and security. 

Reporting in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001attacks, 

the US State Department reported a sharp decline in the total 

34 
number of international terrorist attacks. For 2001, international 

terrorist groups carried out 355 attacks, including the three attacks 

by Al Qaeda cells on the United States.155 A cursory glance at the 

statistics provided by the State Department leads one to assume 

that the rapid response by the United States and the international 

community in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks 

influenced the decline in the total number of international terrorist 

attacks in the closing months of 2001. Despite the noticeable dip 

in the total number of terrorist attacks from 426 in 2000 to just 355 

in 2001, attribution for the decrease in terrorist activity cannot be 

placed solely on the actions and policies enacted by the United 

States and the international community in the aftermath of 11 

September 2001.156 

While the overall number of international terrorist attacks 

decreased by 71 attacks between 2000 and 2001, the global 

community saw an even greater decline of international terrorist 

attacks in the following years. After a year of being engaged in the 

GWOT, the international community experienced just 198 terrorist 

attacks for 2002.157 Judging from statistics provided by the US 

State Department, the first year of the GWOT had substantially 

reduced the overall ability of transnational terrorist organizations 

to execute attacks. In comparison, the total number of international 

terrorist attacks in 2002 was the third lowest point in history of 

the State Department’s recording of international terrorist attacks. 

Only the years 1968 and 1969 experienced lower rates of terrorist 

attacks. Again in 2003, the US State Department reported a decline 

in the total number of terrorist attacks. While the decline for 2003 

was only a net decrease of eight events from 2002, this decline 

characterized a return to terrorist activity levels not seen since 

1968.158 While it is not entirely conclusive to attribute the US-led 

GWOT as the sole contributor to the marked decline in the total 

number of international terrorist attacks, it appears the increased 

attention and focus by the United States and its allies on efforts 

to curb terrorism has had an impact on the operational capability 

of groups such as Al Qaeda. However, beyond this superficial 

statistical analysis, it is difficult to project the future impact the 

GWOT will have on the number of terrorist attacks. 

35 
While the starting point of 1968 and the ending point in 2003 

have roughly an equal number of terrorist attacks, the points 

between 1968 and 2003 depict a general trend.159 Looking at the 

data in general terms, a characterization can be made that the 

number of international terrorist attacks steadily increased from 

1968 to 1987.160 After reaching a peak in 1987, the total number of 

terrorist attacks steadily declined from 1988 to 2003.161 

This period of decline started well before the US recognition 

of transnational terrorist groups as legitimate national security 

threats. It is interesting to note the foundation established by the 

Clinton administration vis-à-vis the recognition of terrorism as a 

legitimate national security threat emerged at a point when the 

total number of international terrorist attacks declined from the 

numbers encountered by his predecessor, George H.W. Bush. 

Despite presiding over a downward trend in the total number 

of terrorist acts in his first term, Clinton saw an increase in the 

number of terrorist attacks in his last years in office. The increase 

in terrorist activity in the late 1990s reversed itself in the year 

before 11 September 2001. It is difficult, therefore, to attribute 

the decline in the total number of international terrorist attacks 

to George W. Bush’s declaration of a war on terrorism. While it 

appears based on the statistics provided by the State Department 

that the GWOT has assisted in the decline of international terrorist 

attacks, the need for more information and time will prove if 

the trend extrapolated from the State Department’s statistics are 

consistent with the general decline since 1988, or conversely 

the beginning of another upswing in the total amount of terrorist 

activity. It is evident from the analysis based on the “Total 

International Terrorist Attacks” that this source provides only a 

rough characterization of how transnational terrorist organizations 

have adapted to the GWOT. The inconclusiveness found in the 

above evidence demands that additional sources merit attention in 

an attempt to provide a more detailed characterization of terrorist 

adaptation to the GWOT. 

To supplement the data provided by the State Department on 

the total terrorist attacks between 1990 and 2003, it is important 

to assess the data on international and anti-US terrorist attacks 

36 
within several categories (type of attack, type of facility attacked, 

and casualties). However, unlike its multiyear presentation of the 

total number of terrorist attacks, the State Department’s data on 

international and anti-US attacks according to type of facility, 

event, and region appears on an annual basis only. Interestingly, 

the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism makes no 

attempt to assess this data across a multiyear spectrum. To get a 

comparative sense of how terrorist organizations have adapted to 

the GWOT, this multiyear comparison is necessary. By assembling 

the annual data found in Patterns of Global Terrorism, it is possible 

to build a graphic representation of the terrorist attacks by type 

of attack, facility attacked, and casualties (see Figures 2-6). This 

information provides additional insight into the types of targets 

and methods used by international terrorist groups from 1990 to 

2003 to conduct operations. 

To begin a more detailed inspection of terrorist activity, it is 

helpful to analyze the preferred methods used by terrorist groups in 

attacking both international and US targets. In international attacks 

by terrorist groups from 1990 to 2003, the favored method of 

attack has consistently been the use of bombs (see Figure 2). With 

the exception of the years 1992 and 1996, bombings accounted for 

well over half of the total number of international terrorist attacks 

from 1990 to 2003. At the beginning of the 1990s, bombings 

accounted for approximately 63 percent of total international 

terrorist events.162 By the middle of the decade, terrorist bombings 

had dropped off to a mere 30 percent of the total international 

terrorist events.163 In 1995, firebombing supplanted bombings as 

the primary event used by terrorists.164 

In comparison, the additional categories of events studied by 

the State Department, such as armed attack, arson, and kidnapping, 

in the first half of the 1990s never accounted for more than 35 

percent of the total international events carried out by terrorists. In 

fact, by the beginning of the Clinton administration’s second term, 

armed attacks, kidnappings, arson, and hijackings dropped below 

20 percent. In stark contrast, as these “other” types of terrorist 

events receded midway through the 1990s, bombings and fire 

bombings accounted for almost 80 percent of international terrorist 

37 
State Department’s analysis of anti-US terrorist attacks by type of 

event presents a similar phenomenon. 

activity. By the end of Clinton’s tenure as president, bombings as 

a percentage of total terrorist events rose beyond the 90 percent 

mark.165 Judging from the data provided by the State Department 

in its annual assessment on terrorism on the 11 September 2001 

attacks on the United States, bombing became the preferred 

method of carrying out attacks on international targets. All other 

types of terrorist activities remained far below bombings. The 

Figure 2. Type of Terrorist Attacks on International Targets, 1990-2003 

In the same period, 1990 to 2000, terrorists continued to rely 

on bombing and firebombing in their attacks on US targets (see 

Figure 3). In 1991 and 1992 bombings accounted for more than 

50 percent of the total anti-US attacks carried out by terrorist 

organizations.166Despite an overall drop in the number of bombings 

used in attacking US targets by terrorist groups in 1994, bombings 

as a percentage of total events still remained at approximately 50 

percent. The steady rate of bombing by terrorist groups in their 

US attacks led to the steady decrease in armed attacks, arson, and 

kidnapping. 

In a phenomenon similar to international terrorist events in 

the period between 1992 to 1996, bombings against US targets fell 

as a percentage of total US attacks before they rebounded in 1997 

38 
Figure 3. Type of Terrorist Attacks on US Targets, 1990-2003 

(see Figure 3). Prepared in 1997, the Clinton administration’s 

recognition of a “war on terrorism” in its DoD Annual Report 

coincided with the resumption of bombings as the preferred 

method of terrorist groups in both international and anti-US 

attacks. In 1998, bombings used in anti-US attacks accounted 

for approximately 80 percent of the total anti-US attacks carried 

out by terrorist groups.167 The percentage of bombings dropped 

slightly in 1999 to approximately 75 percent. 168Despite this small 

reduction, bombings at the end of the 1990s remained the primary 

method used by terrorist organizations in their attacks on US 

targets. 

In the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, the total number 

of bombings against US targets declined as a total percentage of all 

anti-US attacks. Interestingly, while bombings after 2001 dropped, 

the other methods of terrorism (armed attack, kidnapping, and 

arson) used in anti-US attacks remained consistent with pre-11 

September 2001 levels, leading to their increase as a percentage 

(see Figure 3). The steadiness of the other methods of terrorism 

used in attacks on US targets and the decline in bombings as 

percentage of total attacks appears to be a phenomenon limited to 

attacks on US targets (see Figures 2 and 3).169 

In comparison with US events, terrorist groups increased 

their use of armed attacks in 2002, while still favoring bombing 

39 
in attacking international targets.170 While the international 

community witnessed a spike in the use of armed attacks in 2002, 

terrorist groups’ use of kidnapping and hijacking continued to 

fall as an overall percentage of total international attacks. In stark 

contrast to the terrorists’ reduction in the use of bombing against 

US targets in the post-11 September 2001 security environment, 

these same rogue groups maintained their commitment to the use 

of bombings to attack international targets. 

Due to the lack of data available after 2003, it is difficult to 

predict how the GWOT has impacted the operations of terrorist 

organizations with any degree of certainty. In the past three years, 

it appears the terrorists’ commitment to the use of bombing has 

maintained itself. Although bombing as a percentage of total 

international and anti-US attacks has declined in the aftermath of 

11 September 2001, it still accounts for well over 50 percent of all 

terrorist attacks. Even with the declared GWOT, the trend toward 

the use of bombings in international terrorist attacks remained 

constant. It is only in attacks on US targets that it appears the 

declared GWOT had an impact on the terrorist operations. 

However, as Mickolus observed in his article “How Do We Know 

We’re Winning,” this decline in the terrorists’use of bombs against 

US targets can as easily be attributed to factors such as the need 

for terrorist organizations to plan, conduct reconnaissance, raise 

funds, and train for future missions, as it can be attributed to the 

GWOT.

171 On a positive note, it appears terrorists’use of hijacking, 

arson, and sabotage in both international and US attacks remained 

consistent with their pre-11 September 2001 levels (see Figures 2 

and 3). Based on the data provided by the US State Department 

for 2002 and 2003, it appears this trend to favor other methods of 

terrorist attacks on both international and US targets will remain a 

minority in the calculation of total terrorist attacks. 

Although the analysis of terrorist events conducted against 

international and US targets fails to produce a conclusive answer 

to the question of how terrorists have adapted to the GWOT, it does 

provide insight into terrorist operations in the period prior to and 

after 11 September 2001. To supplement the analysis of the type 

of events conducted by terrorist organizations on international and 

40 
US targets, it is important to look at the type of facility or victims 

attacked by terrorist groups.172 This information, combined with 

the analysis of the type of event, provides an even greater picture 

of international terrorist activity in the years 1990 to 2003. 

Interestingly, at the start of the 1990s, terrorist organizations 

in their attacks on both international and US targets favored 

targets classified as other by the US State Department (see Figures 

4 and 5).173 In both international and US terrorist events in 1990, 

terrorists attacked targets classified as other 40 percent of the time. 

These attacks on other targets outpaced attacks against military and 

government targets by a 2:1 margin. Attacks against “business” 

targets in 1990, however, hovered at roughly 35 percent of total 

facilities attacked.174 Despite this initial year of terrorists favoring 

other targets, by 1991 a trend emerged in which facilities classified 

as “other,” “government,” “military,” and “diplomatic” began to 

decline as a total percent of international and US facilities attacked 

by terrorist organizations (see Figures 4 and 5). As for attacks 

against business facilities, terrorist organizations increasingly 

favored these softer and less secure targets over all others by 1991 

in both their international and anti-US attacks. 

While business facilities accounted for over 60 percent of 

both international and US attacks by 1993, terrorist attacks on 

diplomatic, governmental, and military sites fell to below 10 

Figure 4. International Terrorist Incidents by Type of Facility, 1990-2003 

41 
Figure 5. Attacks on US Targets, 1990-2003 

percent of the total type of facility attacked.175 In comparison to the 

low level of attacks against government, military, and diplomatic 

locations, terrorist attacks on targets classified as other fell to 

an estimated 25 percent of the type of facilities attacked in both 

the international and anti-US categories. With the exception of a 

spike in the targeting of other facilities in 1994, terrorist groups 

continued to favor attacking businesses rather than government, 

military, or diplomatic facilities throughout the remainder of the 

1990s (see Figures 4 and 5).176 

By the end of the 1990s, attacks against government and 

military installations vacillated between 2 and 10 percent of the 

total type of facilities attacked for both international and anti-US 

events. However, in 1998 an interesting phenomenon occurred that 

produced an uncharacteristic spike in the graph of the percent of 

“type of facility for anti-US” attacks. In 1998, the State Department 

reported that the terrorist organizations launched only 23 attacks 

against US facilities.177 As a result of this low number of facilities 

attacked by terrorist organizations, graphing by percentage leads 

to a huge spike in the diplomatic category, while the business 

graph plummets (see Figure 5). This anomaly is the only major 

42 
deviation between the comparative data on international and US 

facilities attacked by terrorist organizations in the decade before 

Al Qaeda’s attacks on 11 September 2001. However, without 

primary sources from the terrorists’ perspectives, it is difficult to 

ascertain the significance of this anomaly. 

After 2001, the trends established by terrorists in the 1990s 

concerning the type of facility attacked for international and US 

attacks changed. In the international attacks, business locations 

as a total percentage of type of facility attacked dropped from 

a high of approximately 75 percent in 2001 to an estimated 55 

percent in 2002 (see Figure 4).178 By 2003, businesses accounted 

for only 45 percent of the total international facilities attacked by 

terrorist organizations.179 Such a low figure had not been seen since 

1994. However, while business as a total percentage of facilities 

attacked declined, terrorist organizations dramatically increased 

their targeting of facilities categorized as “other.” Terrorist attacks 

on other facilities rose from an estimated 19 percent in 2001 

to approximately 35 percent in 2003, and even further in 2003 

to a high of nearly 41 percent of total type of facility attacked 

(see Figure 4). Conversely, international attacks on government, 

military, and diplomatic facilities rose only nominally and stayed 

under 10 percent, a stabilized point since 1993. 

In overall judgment of the statistics presented by the State 

Department, the GWOT seems to have reduced terrorists’targeting 

of business facilities and, at least, stabilized attacks on government, 

military, and diplomatic sites. Unlike the trends discussed in the 

type of method used by terrorists in attacks on international and 

US targets, there was no decline prior to the attacks on the United 

States on 11 September 2001. The reduction and the stabilization 

in the business, government, military, and diplomatic categories 

of facilities happened after 2001 and seem to be a result of the 

international efforts to reduce the threat posed by transnational 

terrorist groups. 

Compared with the international statistics, the impact and 

events after 11 September 2001 had a different effect on terrorists’ 

targeting of US facilities. In the year after 11 September 2001, 

terrorists increasingly targeted US diplomatic, government, and 

43 
military sites. As a percentage of total facility types attacked, 

diplomatic sites rose to a point just over 10 percent, while 

government and military targets only slightly increased to 

approximately 6 and 4 percent, respectively, for 2002.180 Attacks 

on US facilities classified as other also increased in 2002 to 

roughly 21percent of total type of facility attacked by terrorist 

organizations (see Figure 5).181 Despite a net increase in the percent 

total of attacks against military, diplomatic, government, and other 

facilities, attacks against US businesses substantially decreased in 

2002. Between 2001 and 2002, the percent total of attacks aimed 

at US business sites fell from an all-time high of nearly 90 percent 

in 2001 to a much lower 60 percent in 2002 (see Figure 5).182 

This reduction proved short-lived, and by 2003 attacks against US 

business facilities as a percentage of the total facility type attacks 

by terrorists again started to rise.183 Likewise, the percentage of 

other US facilities attacked by terrorist groups in 2003 rose to 

approximately 22 percent of the total type of facilities attacked.184 

Despite an increase in the percentage of US businesses and other 

facilities targeted by terrorists between 2002 and the end of 2003, 

attacks against diplomatic sites fell roughly 7 percentage points to 

about 5 percent, while government and military maintained their 

position below 10 percent of total type of US facilities attacked. 

Based on statistics presented by the US State Department 

for the type of US facility targeted in the midst of the GWOT, 

it appears that after a short one-year decline in 2002, business 

and other facilities witnessed an increase in 2003, while attacks 

against diplomatic facilities fell, and government and military 

remained stable. Extrapolating from this data, it appears that the 

United States can expect increased attacks against business and 

other facilities to increase as the United States continues to lead 

the GWOT. 

Overall, the data on the type of facilities attacked by terrorist 

groups provides a glimpse into the type of targets selected before 

and after 11 September 2001. It appears that from the international 

facilities targeted between 1990 and 2003, business sites outpaced 

all other types by three times. After 2001, other facilities as a 

group began to rise, while businesses as a group dropped in the 

wake of Al Qaeda’s attacks. In 2003, the business and other 

44 
groups converged, while the diplomatic, government, and military 

groups remained flat as a percent of the total types of international 

facilities attacked by terrorist groups. In comparison, the data for 

US facilities maintained a similar pattern to international facilities, 

with the exception that the other category remained at less than 25 

percent of the total type of facilities attacked by terrorist groups. 

While providing some insight into the impact of the GWOT and 

the adaptation of terrorist organizations, these statistics still fall 

short of providing a definitive answer. 

Beyond looking into the method of attacks and the types of 

facilities attacked by terrorist groups to understand terrorist groups’ 

adaptation to the GWOT, it would be useful to assess international 

and US casualties from terrorist attacks (see Figure 6). As with 

the analysis of the two groups of terrorists’ behavior, the analysis 

of casualties will span the period from 1990 to 2003. Within the 

context of this study, casualties include both dead and wounded 

and cover both international and US victims. For international 

victims, the State Department provides annual numbers based 

upon region (Latin America, Middle East, Africa, Eurasia, Western 

Europe). The annual figures for each region and year were added 

together to get a sum for all international casualties.185 To keep 

the data as congruent as possible, the State Department separates 

the wounded and dead in its counting of US victims of terrorist 

attacks; therefore, two categories were added together for a total 

of all US casualties. Based on the data provided by the US State 

Department in Patterns of Global Terrorism, the total number 

of the international and US casualties from 1990 to 2003 can be 

compared to assist in the analysis of terrorist adaptation prior to 

and after 11 September 2001. 

In 1990, terrorists inflicted 834 international casualties, 

as compared with 43 US casualties.186 For the next three years, 

international casualties resulting from terrorist attacks remained 

below 1,000 victims. Within the same period, US casualties 

decreased to 23 in 1991, and just three in 1992.187 Resulting from 

Al Qaeda’s first attempt to destroy the World Trade Center in 

February 1993, US and international casualty figures inverted from 

their previous positions (see Figure 6).188 International casualties 

stood at 504, while US casualties doubled the international figure 

45 
Figure 6. International and US Casualties, 1990-2003 

(Dead and Wounded) 

by ascending to a record 1,011.189 Despite this brief spike in the 

total number of US terrorist victims, the casualties of the United 

States remained on the average a hundred times lower than the 

international casualty rate from terrorist attacks. While the US 

rates stayed well below 1,000 for the remainder of the decade, 

the international community experienced wild fluctuations in 

casualties from 1995 to 1999. In the years 1995 and 1998, the 

international community experienced over 6,000 casualties 

attributed to terrorist attacks (see Figure 6). In 1996, international 

casualties declined to roughly 4,000. In contrast, the years 

1997 and 1999 saw casualties just below the 1,000 mark for the 

international community.

190 Based on data, it appears terrorist 

groups increasingly used violence against international, regional, 

or national targets, as opposed to directly targeting mass numbers 

of US citizens. Al Qaeda reversed this trend in 2001. 

In the aftermath of Al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States, 

for the first time since 1993, US casualties were more than 

double those of the international community, despite the fact that 

the 11 September 2001 attacks became the largest loss of life 

to terrorist organizations for the United Kingdom. The United 

States experienced approximately 3,000 casualties, whereas the 

international community bore 1,340 (see Figure 6).191 Although Al 

Qaeda’s dramatic attacks signaled the beginning of a new epoch 

for the United States and the international community, the trend 

46
in high casualties for the United States did not sustain itself in the 

years after the attacks. In 2002, total US casualties fell to a mere 

62, and a year later fell even further to 52.192 

Simultaneously, as the United States witnessed a marked 

decline in its casualties from terrorists, the international community 

saw an increase in casualties to 2,742 for 2002, and another decline 

in 2003 to 1,900.193 Therefore, despite the attacks by Al Qaeda and 

the initiative of the United States to launch an international war 

against terrorism, casualties resulting from terrorist attacks fell 

back to their pre-11 September 2001 pattern. 

This drop in US casualties after 2001 does not necessarily 

indicate that Al Qaeda backed away from targeting and killing 

US citizens. Rather, it seems to signal Al Qaeda’s commitment 

to plan, execute, and conduct a long-term war against the West. 

While this change in the international dynamics of terrorism has 

been a core element in the new terrorist era, Al Qaeda has adapted 

its ideology and structure to usher in a fundamental change in the 

paradigm of new terrorists. 

Overall, the statistics covering the general trend of terrorist 

attacks since 1968, type of terrorist attacks, the type of facility 

attacked, and casualties merge to provide insight into the changes 

terrorist groups have undertaken between 1990 and 2003. As far as 

a general trend, terrorism attacks overall have declined since 1987 

and have even fallen to a point not seen since the beginning of the 

new terrorist era in 1968. Based on the data, it is not clear if this 

decline is a result of the GWOT or other unquantifiable factors. 

While the State Department has yet to publish its Patterns of 

Global Terrorism for 2004, terrorist activity remained a prominent 

threat in the global security environment and has even seemed to 

increase within Operation IRAQ FREEDOM. Three years into the 

GWOT, Al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations 

still pose a threat to the international community, as exemplified in 

the Al Qaeda-supported Madrid bombings in the spring of 2004, 

as well as in events in Mosul, Baghdad, and Fallujah, Iraq. 

A simple scan of the news relating to terrorism in 2004 shows 

a resounding propensity on the part of terrorists to continue to 

use bombings as the preferred method of attack. The major worry 

47 
by the United States and the international community is that 

terrorists will further adapt their bomb-making capability to use or 

incorporate WMDs. Based upon declassified intelligence sources, 

it appears several Al Qaeda cells have already been working on the 

incorporation of nuclear, biological, chemical, and/or radiological 

bombs. The United States and the international community fear 

this type of adaptation most. While the United States and the 

UN work diligently to curb illegal access to WMDs, terrorist 

organizations have become resourceful in their desire to improve 

their destructive capability beyond traditional explosives, which 

the data on terrorist methods of attacks does not bear out. This 

point definitely highlights one of the major limits of focusing on 

events to judge terrorist adaptation. 

Beyond their continued use of bombs of various types, 

terrorists have moved away from targeting government and 

military facilities in favor of attacking business sites and other 

facilities. Since the start of the GWOT, terrorists have adapted to 

the new security environment by increasingly targeting US and 

international business facilities. While a small spike in terrorist 

activities directed toward military, government, or diplomatic 

facilities occurred in 2001, these types of attacks began to decline 

again in 2002. Again, from the available data, it is difficult to 

derive any definitive conclusion from these sources. Likewise, 

the casualty figures present some additional insight into terrorist 

behavior in the era of the GWOT but provide no real indication 

of “how we are doing” against the primary global threat. To 

gain further insight on the impact of the GWOT, it is necessary 

to look toward a different type of source. Beyond the analysis 

of the statistics, the writings and analysis advanced by scholars 

and experts in the study of terrorism and terrorist organizations 

provide even greater insight. Several journals, such as Jane’s 

Intelligence Review, Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland 

Security International, and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 

provide direct commentary on the subject of terrorism, as well as 

an informed assessment of the impact of the war on terrorism and 

terrorist adaptation. 

48 
DoD photo

Photo 1. Khobar Towers complex, near King Abdul Aziz Air Base,

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, bombed 25 June 1996,

killing 19 and injuring over 260

Photo 2. Crater caused by the explosion of a fuel truck outside the 

northern fence of Khobar Towers 

W orrell, US 

Airforce 

Airman Sean DoD photo, Senior 

49
50

Photo 3. Pentagon crash site, 11 September 2001

Photo 4. West-facing wall of the Pentagon

DoD photo, 

Tech SGT Cedric H. Rudisill DoD photo, R.D. 

Ward
DoD photo

51 

Map 1. Khowst, Afghanistan Terrorist Camps 

Zhawar Kili Al Badr Terrorist Training Camp sustained severe damage 

Map 2 above: main camp; Map 3 below: west camp 

DoD photo DoD photo
Beyond the Numbers 

Former CIA Director R. James Woolsey, in an article 

for the Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security 

International, argues that the United States was/is in the middle 

of World War IV.

194 Woolsey observes that, even before the 

events of 11 September 2001, “Islamist Shi’a, Iraqi and Syrian 

Ba’athists, and Islamist Sunnis” have been at war with the United 

States.195 Although the “war” has been an ongoing process from 

the “enemy’s perspective,” Woolsey observes that Al Qaeda’s 

attacks forced the United States to admit finally it is engaged in 

a war with practitioners of militant Islam.196 Essentially, Woolsey 

argues based upon the radical theology advocated by terrorist 

organizations such as Hezbollah and Al Qaeda, the United States 

is engaged in an ideological struggle and needs to convince 

moderate Muslims that this fourth World War is not against Islam. 

Woolsey believes the United States can use the historic examples 

of World War II as a lesson in the GWOT by convincing Muslims 

around the world that the fight is not “against them, but against 

tyranny.”197 Woolsey is not the only advocate of this position. 

Former US Chief Assistant Attorney Andrew C. McCarthy 

supports Woolsey’s position. McCarthy argues the terrorist attacks 

of 11 September 2001 solidified the recognition on the part of the 

United States and the international community of the overt need 

to combat the growing appeal of militant Islam.198 

Both Woolsey and McCarthy advance the opinion that 

transnational terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda have 

increasingly sought to convince Muslims everywhere they are 

engaged in a protracted ideological struggle against the oppressive 

regimes of the United States and Israel. From the perspectives 

of Woolsey and McCarthy, terrorist organizations have merely 

ramped up their rhetoric and destructiveness of their attacks in the 

wake of the attacks on 11 September 2001, whereas the United 

States and the international community adapted to the attacks 

by finally recognizing the need to engage and fight a protracted 

war against the forces of militant Islam.199 Additionally, Woolsey 

and McCarthy argue that the United States and the international 

community need to work hard to forge relationships and long-term 

52 
alliances with the international moderate Muslim community. Only 

by discrediting the radical theology advanced by bin Laden and 

other militant mullahs can the United States and the international 

community succeed in eradicating militant Islamic terrorism. 

Within the context of this study, it is interesting to note that 

both McCarthy and Woolsey avoided any significant discussion 

on the changing nature of terrorist groups either before or after 11 

September 2001. Judging from their remarks, the most significant 

adaptation to emerge within the context of the GWOT came from 

the United States and the international community. The recognition 

by the United States and the international community of the need 

to combat the radical theology and militant ideology advocated 

by Al Qaeda and other like-minded terrorist entities serves as the 

first major change identified by Woolsey and McCarthy within the 

new era of warfare. 

In addition to the adaptation made by the United States and the 

international community to fight and win the war against militant 

Islam, Hoffman provided an assessment of Al Qaeda and terrorist 

organizations in the post-11 September 2001 security environment. 

Hoffman maintains that in the first year of the war on terrorism, 

a “gloomy prognosis” emerged from within the United States.200 

While the Bush administration remained fixated on capturing 

bin Laden and staving off further attacks on the United States, 

the nation remained shrouded in a fog of fear. Hoffman asserts, 

however, that by March 2003, the Bush administration began 

forecasting the demise of Al Qaeda based on the arrest and capture 

of key figures such as Khalid Sheik Mohammed.201 Hoffman cites 

quotations made in the early spring of 2003 by Congressman 

Porter J. Goss (current director of Central Intelligence as of 

December 2004) and the former director of Central Intelligence, 

George Tenet, that the United States “had turned the tide on Al 

Qaeda.”202 Despite the optimism advanced by the administration 

in spring 2003, Hoffman argues that it would “be imprudent to 

write Al Qaeda’s obituary,” based on Al Qaeda’s ability to “mutate 

into new and more pernicious forms.”203 

Hoffman bases his stunning revelation on several facts. First, 

despite the death or arrest of over half of Al Qaeda’s central 

53 
leadership, Al Qaeda’s “weakened” central command structure 

“remains operational.”204 Second, bin Laden and Al Qaeda have 

portrayed US military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq as 

glaring examples of US imperial aims to “occupy Islamic Holy 

lands.” Third, Al Qaeda and bin Laden have used the actions taken 

by the United States and the international community to justify 

an expanded concept of jihad against all infidels.205 In the post11 September 2001 security environment, Hoffman maintains that 

bin Laden “fused the concepts of individual jihad and revenge” to 

incite radical Muslims to take up arms in his struggle.206 Last, Al 

Qaeda continues to attract new jihadists. Hoffman points to the 

production of video tapes and maintenance of websites as prime 

examples of Al Qaeda’s continued efforts to export its message 

that “the West is hostile to Islam, violence is the only language 

understood by the West, and Jihad is the only option.” Based on 

these foundations, Hoffman maintains that Al Qaeda remains 

“committed to its sense of purpose.”207 

Other experts and scholars on terrorists and terrorism share 

Hoffman’s pessimistic characterization of the impact of the 

war on terrorism on Al Qaeda and other like-minded terrorist 

organizations. A terrorist specialist from the University of Saint 

Andrews, Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, argues that since 11 September 

2001 Al Qaeda has adapted to the GWOTby “identifying loopholes 

and gaps in the western security architecture,” thereby enabling 

them to maintain an operational capability in an increasingly 

complex security environment.208 Gunaratna uses excerpts from 

Ayman al-Zawahiri’s “Knights Under the Prophets Banner: 

Meditations on the Jihadist Movement,” printed in December 

2001 to build his case that Al Qaeda has adapted to the GWOT, as 

well as maintained its commitment to its ideological struggle.209 

According to Gunaratna, al-Zawahiri advocated the “escalation of 

terrorism.” After the GWOT had already commenced, al-Zawahiri 

stated Al Qaeda needed to: 

inflict the maximum casualties against the opponent, 

no matter how much time and effort such operations 

take; the need to concentrate on the method of martyrdom operations as the most successful way of inflicting damage on the opponent and the least costly to the 

54 
Mujahideen in terms of casualties; the targets as well as 

the type and method of weapons used must be chosen to 

have an impact on the structure of the enemy and deter 

it enough to stop its brutality, arrogance, and disregard 

for all taboos and customs; and focusing on the domestic enemy alone will not be feasible at this stage.210 

Gunaratna argues that despite the US-led efforts to weaken 

and eradicate Al Qaeda, the transnational terrorist organization 

continues to adapt to the efforts designed to counter its operations. 

Increasingly, Al Qaeda called on militant Islamic groups around 

the globe to ally in the fight against the West. In the wake of 11 

September 2001, Al Qaeda co-opted political parties, Islamic 

charities, and other militant Islamic groups to strengthen and 

expand its international support base.211 

Although the US and its allies continue to erode the leadership 

of Al Qaeda, membership flourishes. According to former 

director of the US Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and 

Unconventional Warfare Yosef Bodansky, in the pre-11 September 

2001 era Al Qaeda relied on “approximately 250,000 individuals 

willing to die for the cause, while an additional 2.5-5 million 

people supported their efforts.”212 In the post-11 September 2001 

era, Bodansky claims “as many as 500,000-750,000 people are 

willing to be trained” as suicide bombers, while a further 10 million 

more radical Muslims are willing to “support the operations of 

suicide bombers.” 213 In addition to the 10 million plus cited by 

Bodansky, he states an additional “50 million more Muslims are 

willing to offer financial support” to Al Qaeda’s cause.214 Based on 

these numbers, Bodansky concludes that “America is losing the 

war on terrorism” based upon actions taken within the context of 

the GWOT and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.215 

In addition to expanding its global support base, Al Qaeda 

has also sought to increase its destructive power by investing in 

surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), 

and light antitank guns.216 Documents recovered in Kabul after the 

US invasion of Afghanistan and in the aftermath of a UK police 

raid on suspected Al Qaeda safe houses, revealed the terrorist 

organization possessed manuals on the use and manufacture of 

chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) weapons.217 While it 

55 
appears that Al Qaeda has not yet developed or produced a CBR 

weapon, experts agree it will attempt to do so in the near future.218 

Acquisition of a CBR weapon by a terrorist organization has been 

the nightmare scenario envisioned by successive US presidents 

since the 1990s. 

Al Qaeda appears to be readily adaptive to the post-11 

September 2001 security environment. Since 11 September 

2001, Al Qaeda has consistently maintained its commitment to 

its ideological struggle by expanding its international support 

base while also improving its weapons cache. In addition to these 

adaptations, Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have 

maneuvered to maintain high levels of international funding, 

despite sanctions and actions taken by nations to impede the 

funding of terrorist organizations. One of the most significant 

changes to Al Qaeda’s post- 11 September 2001 operations has 

been its willingness to partner with international drug traffickers.219 

In the group’s early genesis as an emerging international security 

threat, bin Laden and Al Qaeda renounced drug traffickers for 

religious purposes. Two main factors led to the partnership with 

this once taboo element. First, Al Qaeda and bin Laden recognized 

that through their association with the Taliban government in 

Afghanistan, they could easily get involved in the international 

trafficking of heroin to supplement their finances.220 Second, Al 

Qaeda ignored its previous theological aversion to participating 

in narcotics trafficking, claiming the production and subsequent 

sale of heroin contributes to the “social degeneracy” of the US and 

Western population.221 

The relationship between terrorist groups and drug traffickers 

is not isolated to transnational groups such as Al Qaeda. Since the 

1980s, Latin American and South American terrorist organizations, 

such as the M-19 in Colombia and the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, 

actively participated in narcotics trafficking to raise capital to 

support their terrorist agendas. This relationship between terrorist 

and criminal enterprises established a model through which the 

vast majority of terrorist organizations have “ties to drug related 

activity.”222 In the wake of the international crackdown on state, 

group, and individual financial support of terrorist organizations, 

terrorists have increasingly cooperated with drug traffickers.223 

56 
The relationship between drug traffickers and terrorist 

organizations has additional benefits beyond the generation of 

profits. Drug traffickers, long experts in the laundering of money, 

have passed on this vital information to terrorist organizations.224 

This provides terrorists with the technical knowledge of how 

to clean and rechannel illegal profits into legitimate businesses. 

Also, the nefarious relationship between terrorist groups and 

drug traffickers has opened access to “corrupt government 

officials and political institutions” previously closed to terrorist 

organizations.225 Terrorist groups are not the only ones to benefit 

from this association. 

For their part, drug traffickers receive “protection, production 

facilities, and transportation assistance” from the terrorist 

organizations.226 Afghanistan, under the control of the Taliban, 

offers the most recent example of how Al Qaeda provided 

“protection, production facilities, and transportation” for heroin. 

In this model, Al Qaeda and the Taliban also provided workers 

to cultivate and produce opium poppies. From either the terrorist 

or the drug trafficker perspective, the relationship is a winning 

proposition for both sides. 

The recognition of the relationship between these two 

international security threats is not a product of the GWOT. 

Rather, this relationship has been acknowledged by the United 

States since the 1980s.227 However, prior to September 2001, 

the US government viewed threats posed by terrorists and drug 

traffickers as two individual and distinct security threats. As the 

threat from terrorist organizations evolved throughout the 1990s, 

the US government began slowly to see the mutual relationship 

between terrorist organizations and drug traffickers. In April 

2002, the US government “officially” recognized the relationship 

between terrorist organizations and drug traffickers.228 Likewise, 

the international community by the mid-1990s began to associate 

transnational organized crime factions with terrorist organizations. 

Within the post-Cold War security environment, this threat 

surfaced in Latin America, Southwest Asia, and in the former 

Soviet republics. The recognition by the United States and the 

international community of the cooperative relationships between 

terrorist organizations and narcotics traffickers is a significant 

57 
change in the GWOT. The nations allied in the fight against 

terrorism have finally started to view transnational terrorism as 

a security threat beyond the use of violence. However, alliances 

with drug traffickers are not the only evolution devised by Al 

Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations to adapt to 

the post-11 September 2001 security environment. 

In addition to allying with criminal groups, Al Qaeda, since 

the beginning of the GWOT, has reached out to other Islamist 

groups to form a broad and deep terrorist coalition.229 Before the 

attacks on the United States, Al Qaeda “served as a local and 

regional” indoctrination and training center for Islamic terrorist 

organizations.230 With the loss of his support and training centers 

in Afghanistan, bin Laden searched for “associate groups” that 

could perpetuate Al Qaeda’s objectives. Seeking alliances with 

groups such as Abu Sayyaf, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, 

Egyptian Islamic Jihad Group, Tunisian Combatant Group, 

Libyan Islamic Fighters, and Al-Ansar Mujahidin in Chechnya, 

Al Qaeda has significantly expanded its operational capability and 

its geographic influence.231 A broad alliance between Al Qaeda 

and smaller Islamic terrorist organizations provides Al Qaeda 

with much more operational flexibility, as well as with a greater 

diffused organizational structure.232 

Al Qaeda’s decision to expand its affiliation and contact 

with other militant Islamic groups in an effort to “disperse 

and decentralize” in the aftermath of the US-led invasion in 

Afghanistan is a prime example of the adaptive capability of the 

Al Qaeda network. According to Hoffman, Al Qaeda relies on 

and emphasizes a “mix and match” approach to its operations.233 

Hoffman asserts that Al Qaeda uses “four different levels of 

operational styles” to carry out it objectives. For large-scale 

operations, such as those on the World Trade Center and the 

Pentagon, Al Qaeda relies on its “professional cadre” to conduct 

attacks that require substantial funding and are controlled by the 

central committees of Al Qaeda.234 One step below the professional 

cadre level, Hoffman suggests that Al Qaeda supports “trained 

amateurs.” These individuals, characterized by Ahmed Ressam 

and shoe-bomber Richard Reid, receive target information from 

58 
the central committees and little funding for their operations.235 

With only sparse support, these operators are encouraged to recruit 

additional support from within militant Islamic communities and 

to generate operational capital beyond the “seed money” provided 

by central command through “petty thievery.”236 In addition to 

these two types of operational styles, Al Qaeda uses affiliations 

with “local walk-ins” and “like-minded insurgents, guerillas, and 

terrorists” to advance its agenda.237 These last two groups are the 

ones Al Qaeda has increasingly sought to ally with in the post-11 

September 2001 environment. 

Al Qaeda supports local walk-in Islamic radical groups because 

these groups provide indigenous plans and operations based upon 

local situations and observations. Essentially, these groups pitch 

their plans to Al Qaeda in an effort to get financial support.238 This 

mutually beneficial appeal allows the local group to conduct an 

active operation to advance its agenda while Al Qaeda provides 

financial support. Al Qaeda’s interest in these groups is that they 

provide additional reach and expand the operational capability 

beyond the central Al Qaeda structure for minimum investment. 

In addition to supporting walk-ins, Al Qaeda supports likeminded organizations.239Hoffman observes that bin Laden supports 

groups in “Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Chechnya, Philippines, Bosnia, 

and Kashmir” who advance the jihad.

240 Al Qaeda’s support of 

like-minded groups is not just about advancing the jihad, but 

also to build operational ties with national and regional terrorist 

organizations that can assist Al Qaeda in future operations.241 

Within the context of the GWOT, Al Qaeda has increasingly 

relied on the second, third, and fourth styles of operation. With 

movement to a more decentralized and diffused operational style 

via associations and alliances with other radical Islamic groups, Al 

Qaeda has been able to maintain itself as a local, national, regional, 

and international security threat while minimizing the exposure 

of the central command structure, which has been a major focal 

point of the US and international community’s GWOT.

242 This 

adaptation toward the increased reliance on alliances has allowed 

Al Qaeda to remain active in an increasingly difficult operational 

environment. 

59 
The analysis offered by scholars and experts such as Woolsey, 

McCarthy, Bodansky, Hoffman, and Gunaratna provides a bleak 

picture. While the experts’ prognosis is rather grim, they do offer 

hope. Hoffman, Gunaratna, Woolsey, and McCarthy all suggest 

that the United States and the international community need to 

conceptualize this war as an ideological struggle (which President 

Bush acknowledged in his commencement address to Air Force 

Academy graduates in June 2004). Beyond this acknowledgement, 

the allies in the GWOT ought to gravitate away from focusing on 

the actions of terrorists and refocus on the symptoms of radical terrorism.243 The United States and the international community need 

to work with moderate Muslim communities throughout the world 

to assist in stemming the influence of radical Muslims.244 Only by 

discrediting the ideals and agendas of militant Islam can the international community eradicate Islamic terrorism and succeed in 

the GWOT.

245 Consistently, scholars and experts alike have agreed 

that “Militant Islam is our enemy, and we cannot co-exist with 

it.”246 However, terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda have sought to 

subvert the war on terrorism by claiming legitimate acceptance 

within the Islamic community. This method of claiming legitimacy is yet another adaptive effort by a transnational terrorist organization to justify its actions within the context of a radical theology. 

Conclusion 

After three years of sustained warfare against terrorism, the 

United States and its allies have made progress in their efforts to 

diminish the threats posed by non-state actor such as Al Qaeda. 

The Taliban regime, which provided bin Laden and Al Qaeda with 

substantial support, has been deposed and removed from power in 

Afghanistan. Roughly 50 percent of Al Qaeda’s top leaders have 

been arrested or killed in the months and years after 11 September 

2001. Throughout the globe, most notably in Britain and the 

Philippines, law enforcement and intelligence agencies foiled 

plots by Al Qaeda cells. The United States and the international 

community, including the UN, froze the assets of individuals and 

organizations that support and fund terrorist activity and terrorist 

groups. Despite the substantial progress made in the GWOT, Al 

Qaeda and other like-minded organizations remain operational. 

The attack by Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (GICM), an 

60 
affiliate of Al Qaeda, killed 191 people with a commuter train 

bombing in Madrid on 11 March 2004.247 Despite successes in the 

GWOT, this single event demonstrates that terrorist organizations 

remain capable of conducting large-scale operations even while the 

United States and the international community continue to apply 

pressure on these nontraditional threats. The brief investigation of 

the bombing in Madrid reveals that this incident exemplifies the 

trends and adaptive efforts of terrorists identified in this study. 

As for supporting the statistical analysis found in this essay, the 

bombing in Madrid reinforces the trend that terrorist organizations 

continue to use bombings designed to inflict the maximum 

number of casualties as their preferred method of attack. Second, 

the commuter rail facility struck by GICM supports the trend 

that terrorist organizations since 11 September 2001 focus their 

attacks on targets classified as business and other as identified by 

the US State Department. Third, the terrorist attack in Madrid in 

March 2004 supports the consistent trend since 2002 that terrorist 

organizations have increasingly targeted international civilians 

rather than US citizens. Finally, the Madrid bombing supports 

the evidence that terrorist organizations have increasingly scaled 

back on the total number of operations conducted in a year while 

striving for higher casualties in each attack. The Madrid bombing 

serves as a fitting example of the nature and behavior of terrorist 

organizations in the post-11 September 2001 period. 

In addition to supporting the statistical characterization of 

terrorist behavior within the last two decades, the Madrid attacks 

also reinforce the analysis of the experts and scholars cited in this 

study. Christopher Jasparro, assistant professor of transnational 

studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, reports 

that GICM was an affiliate of Al Qaeda. This affiliation supports 

Gunaratna’s thesis that since 11 September 2001, Al Qaeda has 

increasingly established alliances and affiliations with other 

militant Islamic terrorist organizations. Using Hoffman’s styles 

of operations, GICM used characteristics identified with both the 

local-walk in and like-minded group styles. According to Jasparro, 

GICM had the support of Al Qaeda, but the organization also used 

criminal activity to support its plan.248 GICM incorporated the mix 

and match approach to planning the successful bombing of the 

61 
commuter rail system in Spain’s capital. This type of multilevel 

approach by terrorist organizations has become a standard tactic 

in the post-11 September 2001 period. Additionally, the GICM 

attack exemplifies another element of terrorist adaptation in that 

GICM exploited contact with “drug traffickers and other criminal 

elements.” 249 Since 11 September 2001, the United States and 

the international community have increasingly sought to reduce 

the financial support of terrorist organizations by freezing their 

financial assets, as well as those of their supporters. In an effort 

to recuperate their financial resources, terrorist organizations 

have increasingly allied with drug traffickers. These nefarious 

alliances are emblematic of the major adaptive efforts taken by 

terrorist organizations to maintain their violent presence within 

the GWOT. The United States and the international community 

have recognized the significance of this scheme and have worked 

diligently in the past years to curb these associations. 

The significance of the Madrid train bombing is that it 

reinforces the flexible, resilient, and adaptive nature of transnational 

terrorist organizations. Although terrorist activity has declined 

overall since 1987, and even further since it was recognized by 

Clinton as a substantial security threat in 1997, transnational 

terrorist groups remain a substantial threat in the international 

security environment. It appears that these nontraditional threats 

maintain a resilient nature and will continue to adapt to the forces 

designed to curtail them. The United States and the international 

community need to convince Muslims round the world that the 

GWOT is designed to eradicate the small sect of militant Islamists 

and not Islam writ large. Only by stifling the international Islamic 

community’s acceptance of militant Islam can the United States 

and international community stop the continued evolution of 

transnational terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. 

Understanding the adaptive and resilient nature of 

transnational terrorist groups provides the allies in the GWOT 

with critical insight into the enemy. By incorporating this data 

into antiterrorist doctrine, strategy, and tactics, the allies in the 

GWOT can adjust their operations to meet the changing demands 

of the security environment. Against a dynamic enemy such as Al 

62 
Qaeda, it is necessary to leverage the full spectrum of political, 

diplomatic, military, and law enforcement measures in the fight 

against terrorism. To date, the United States and its allies have 

consistently applied a broad spectrum of resources to combat the 

terrorist threat. As the fight continues and the enemy adapts, the 

allies in the GWOT need continually to reassess the threat and 

adjust accordingly. In the context of the GWOT, the United States 

and its allies need to maintain a constant awareness of how best 

to eradicate the terrorist threat by assessing and adjusting the best 

mixture of political, diplomatic, military, and law enforcement 

measures to apply. By retaining flexibility and maintaining 

constant pressure on transnational terrorists, the United States and 

its allies will prevail in the GWOT. 

63 
Endnotes

1 Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2001, (Washington DC: State Department, May 

2002), i. 

2

Bruce Hoffman, “Change and Continuity in Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict 

and Terrorism, (May-June, 2001), 419; Anthony Davis, “Resilient Abu Sayyaf 

Resists Military Pressure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, (September 2003), 14; 

Tamara Makarenko, “Transnational Crime and Its Evolving links to Terrorism 

and Instability,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, (November, 2001), 23; Rohan 

Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda Adapts to Disruption,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 16 

(February, 2004), 20. 3 Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990, (Washington DC: State Department, 1991), 

iv. 

4

Ibid., iv; The State Department further clarifies the term noncombatants as 

“civilians and military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed 

or off duty.” 5

Pattern of Global Terrorism: 1990. iv. 6

Ibid., v. 7

Ibid. 

8

Kofi Annan, “Immediate Far-Reaching Changes in UN Response to Terror,” 

Text of Address before the UN General Assembly, Press Release SG/SM 7977, 

October 10, 2001, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sgsm7977.doc.

htm>, August 17, 2004, 3, 9

UN Security Council Policy Working Group on the United Nations and 

Terrorism, “Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations an 

Terrorism,” <http://www.un.org/terrorism/a57273.htm>, November 1, 2004, 5. 10UN Policy Working Group on Terrorism, 5. 11

Ibid. 

12UN Security Council, “Press Release SC/7158,” September 28, 2001, <http://

www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm>, November 11, 2005, 2. 13 Daphne Josselin and William Wallace. “Non-State Actors in World Politics: A

Framework,” Non-State Actors in World Politics, Daphne Josselin and William 

Wallace eds. (New York: Palgrave Press, 2001), 3. 14John Eubanks and Evan Kohlmann, “Trends in Anti-American Terrorism,” 

Journal of Counterterrorism and Security International (Winter, 1999), 22-24. 15Robert A. Fearey, Memorandum to Members and Participants in the Working 

Group Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, “Minutes-One Hundredth and 

Ninth Meeting of the Working Group/Cabinet to Combat Terrorism,” June 10, 

1976, <http://wid.ap.org/documents/nixonterror.html>, January 25, 2005, 1. 16Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, “Threat Assessment,” undated, 

<http://wid.ap.org/documents/nixonterror.html>. January 25, 2005, 2. 17Richard T. Kennedy, Memorandum to Henry Kissinger, “Status of USG 

Actions Against Terrorism,” November 25, 1972, <http://wid.ap.org/documents/

nixonterror.html>, January 25, 2005, 1; Robert A. Fearey, Memorandum to 

Members and Participants in the Working Group Cabinet Committee to Combat 

Terrorism, October 20, 1975, <http://wid.ap.org/documents/nixonterror.html>, 

January 25, 2005, 3. 

64 
18Kennedy, 2-3. 19Interestingly, many of the scenarios and ideas envisioned by the Committee 

parallel the ideas and scenarios discussed by the United States and the 

International community in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001. 

See Frank Bass and Randy Herschaft, “US Foresaw Terrorist Threats: Nixon Era 

Panel Planned Defense,” Lawrence Journal, January 24, 2005, 3A. 20For a quick reference to the successive incidents faced by President Ronald 

Reagan and his administration, see Peter Huchthausen, America’s Splendid Little 

Wars: A Short History of US Military Engagements 1975-2000 (New York: 

Viking, 2003), 89-94. 

21Walter Laqueur. The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass 

Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3. 22Dick Cheney, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress, 

[hereafter DoD, Annual Report 1990] (Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office (GPO), 1990), 2. 

23Ibid. 

24Ibid. 

25Don Barnard. “Narco-Terrorism Realities: The Connection Between Drugs 

and Terror.” Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International,

(January 2003), 31; Makarenko, 22. 

26Dick Cheney, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress, 

[hereafter DoD, Annual Report 1991] (Washington DC: GPO, 1991), 2. 27Ibid. 

28Dick Cheney, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress, 

[hereafter DoD, Annual Report 1992] (Washington DC: GPO, 1992). 29Les Aspin, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress, 

[hereafter DoD. Annual Report 1994] (Washington DC: GPO, 1994), 2-3. 30William J. Perry, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and 

Congress, [hereafter DoD, Annual Report 1995] (Washington DC: GPO, 1995), 

1-2; William J. Perry, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and 

Congress, [hereafter DoD, Annual Report 1996] (Washington DC: GPO, 1996), 

2.

31DoD, Annual Report 1995, 1-2; DoD, Annual Report 1996, 2. 32William S. Cohen, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and 

Congress, [hereafter DoD, Annual Report 1997] (Washington DC: GPO, 1997), 

79.

33The access to weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups, combined with 

the potential use of such weapons, led the Clinton administration to consider this 

threat “new.” 34 DoD. Annual Report 1997, 76. 35Ibid. 

36Ibid. 

37Ibid. 

38Ibid. 

39DoD, Annual Report 1997, 76. 40Ibid., 76-77. 

41Ibid., 77. 

65 
42Ibid. 

43Ibid., 79. 

44William S. Cohen, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and 

Congress, [hereafter DoD, Annual Report 1998] (Washington DC: GPO, 1998), 

2. 

45DoD. Annual Report 1997, 2. 46Annan, 1. 47Ibid., 2. 48Ibid., 3. 

49Ibid. 

50Security Council Committee of the UN. “Guidelines of the Committee for the 

Conduct of its Work,” S/AC.40/2001/CRP.1, October 16, 2001, http://un.org/

Docs/sc/committees/1373/guidelines.htm. 

51UN Security Council, 2. 

52Ibid., 1. 

53The General Assembly identified the following issues for observation by 

the Policy Working Group: “International legal instruments and international 

criminal justice issues; Human rights; Activities of the UN system; Weapons of 

Mass Destruction and other weapons and technology; use of ideology (secular 

and religious) to justify terrorism; Counter-terrorism Committee of the Security 

Council, Media Communications, and Non-UN multilateral initiatives.” See UN 

Security Council, 3. 

54UN Security Council, 3. 

55 Christopher Bennett. “Aiding America,” NATO Review, web edition <http://

www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0104-01.htm>, October 18, 2004, (Winter 

2001), 1. 

56Bennett, 1. 

57Ibid., 2.

58Ibid., 4. 

59Ibid. 

60Group of Eight. “G8 Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Since September 11,” US 

State Department, Fact Sheet, June 26, 2002, <http://www.state.gov/e/ed/rls/

fs/11477.htm>, October 15, 2004, 1. 61Ibid., 1. 

62Ibid., 2. 

63Ibid., 3. 

64Edward E. Mickolus. “How Do We Know We’re Winning the War Against 

Terrorists? Issues in Measurement.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, (MayJune, 2002), 151. 

65Mickolus, 152. 

66Ibid. 

67Ibid. 

68Ibid. 

69Ibid. 

70Ibid., 153. 

71 Hoffman, 417. 72Ibid. 

66 
73Ibid., 417-18. 

74Ibid., 418. 

75Ibid. 

76Ibid., 419. 

77This sentence is not meant to convey the idea that the United States has 

completely ignored the terrorist threat, but rather that the implications and issues 

framed within the strategic nuclear balance and the Cold War obscured the 

severity of the security threat posed by the “new” terrorists. 

78 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990, 39. 79Brian M. Jenkins and Janera A. Johnson. “International Terrorism: A

Chronology (1974) Supplement,” Report for the Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, February 1976, 1-3, R1909-1-ARPA. 80The most significant examples would be the Israeli Raid on Entebbe, France in 

Marseilles 1994, and Germany in Mogadishu in 1997. 

81Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990, 38. 82Judith Palmer Harik. Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: 

I.B. Tauris, 2004), ix. 83 Laqueur, 3. 84Ibid. 

85Jenkins and Johnson, 1. 

86Ibid. 

87Isabelle Duyvesteyn, “How New is New Terrorism” Studies in Terrorism, 

(September-October, 2004), 439-451. 88John F. Murphy Jr. Sword of Islam: Muslim Extremism from the Arab Conquest 

to the Attack on America (New York: Prometheus Books, 2002), 123. 89Murphy, 122. 90Harik, 1. 

91Ibid.

92 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1995 (Washington, DC: State Department, 1996), 

48. 

93Ibid.

94Harik. 1. 

95Andrew McCarthy, “Global War on Terrorism? No, It’s a Global War on Militant 

Islam,” Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International, 

(Summer 2004), 53. 

96According to Gunaratna, in Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New 

York: Berkley Books, 2002), the US government did not learn the “real name” 

of bin Laden’s group until after its attacks on US embassies in Africa in 1998, 

xlii. Gunaratna’s claim differs from that information provided by the State 

Department in Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997 which was published in April 

of 1998, in which the State Department clearly identified bin Laden’s groups as 

Al Qaeda. See Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997, 30. 97 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997, 30. 98Ibid. 

99 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 74. 100Ibid. 

67 
101Brian Michael Jenkins. Countering al Qaeda: An Appreciation of the Situation 

and Suggestions for Strategy (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2002), 3, MR1620-RC. 

102Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 74. 103Jenkins, 3. 104Ibid. 105Rohan Gunaratna, “Blowback,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, (August 2001), 

43; Gunaratna. Inside Al Qaeda, 74. 106Gunaratna, “Blowback,” 43. 107Jenkins, Countering al Qaeda, 3. 108Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 56. 109Gunaratna, “Blowback” 43. Gunaratna observes that bin Laden’s theological 

preaching was influenced by the teachings and ideas of Dr. Ayman Muhammad 

al Zawahiri.

110Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 116. 111

Ibid. 

112Ibid., 17. 

113Ibid., 72. Brad McAllister offers a contradictory position in “Al Qaeda and 

the Innovative Firm: Demythologizing the Network,” Studies in Conflict and 

Terrorism, (July-August), 297-319. McAllister argues that, while the original 

organization of Al Qaeda by Osama bin Laden was “innovative,” the actual 

structure does not “differ much from other Islamist organizations.” 114Gunaratna, “Blowback,” 43. 

115Ibid. 

116Ibid. 

117Ibid. 

118Ibid. 

119Mark Basile. “Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda’s Financial Network Is 

Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing,” Studies in Conflict 

and Terrorism, (May-June 2004), 169. 120Basile, 170. Basile observes that the vast majority of terrorist organization 

tend to rely on “fraud, narcotics trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion” to raise 

operating capital. 

121Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 90-91. 122Basile, 183. 123Gunaratna, “Blowback,” 43. 124Ibid. 125Alok Baveja, “America’s ‘War’ on Terrorism: Can the US Learn from its War 

on Drugs?” Journal of Counterterrorism and Security International, (January 

2002): 16. 

126 Paul J. Smith. “USA Adopts Financial Legislation for Counterterrorism,” 

Jane’s Intelligence Review, (August 2004), 35. 127 William J. Clinton “Executive Order 12947: Prohibiting Transactions With 

Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process,” The Federal 

Register, (January 25, 1995), 5079. 128Executive Order (E.O.) 12947, 5079; The US government specifically identified 

Abu Nidal, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Hezbollah Islamic 

68 
Resistance Movement (HAMAS), Jihad, Kach, Kahane Chai. Palestinian Islamic 

Jihad-Shiqaqi Faction (PIJ), Palestine Liberation Front-Abu Abbas faction, 

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Popular Front for the Liberation 

of Palestine-General Command as the primary terrorist organizations that posed 

a threat to the Middle-East peace process in 1995. 

129President Ronald Reagan’s authorization of Operation EL DORADO 

CANYON in 1983 and President Clinton’s use of cruise missiles against targets 

in Sudan and Afghanistan in the wake of Al Qaeda bombing on US embassies 

remain the two primary examples of the use of military force against terrorists 

in the years prior to the Al Qaeda attacks on the United States on 11 September 

2001. 

130 Jane Boulden and Thomas G. Weiss, “Wider Terrorism and the United 

Nations,” Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11, Jane Boulden 

and Thomas G. Weiss, eds. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 10. 131Ibid. 132Ibid., 6 and 11. 133 Charles H. Briscoe, Richard L. Kiper, James A. Schroder, and Kalev I. Sepp. 

Weapon of Choice: US Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), 33. 

134Ibid. 135Ibid. The approval by Congress was not a declaration of war, but rather the 

authorization and support of the president’s decision to use military force against 

Al Qaeda and Bin Laden. Under the War Powers Act, the president must inform 

Congress of his decision to use military force, upon which those forces can only 

be deployed for 60 days. If the president needs an extension, he may appeal 

to Congress for an additional 30 days before the troops then either need to be 

removed or approved by Congress. 

136Stephen M. Duncan. A War of a Different Kind: Military force and America’s 

Search for Homeland Security (Annapolis: Naval Institution Press, 2004), 53. 137Ibid. 138Ibid., 34. 139Approximately 12 nations supported and assisted the United States in its 

operations in Afghanistan. The activity of support ranged from the commitment 

of combat forces by nations such as Britain, to fly-over rights granted by several 

republics of the former Soviet Union. 

140 Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 (Washington DC: State Department, 2004), 

176.

141Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1990, 39. Until 1995, the State Department did 

not provide a total number of terrorist incidents. It only graphed the “totals” based 

on a scale ranging from 0 to 1,000. Beginning in 1994, the State Department 

maintained the scale, but also provided annual totals for the number of terrorist 

incidents. 

142Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990, 39. 143Ibid. In the fours years between 1973 to 1977, the total number of international 

terrorism activity fluctuated slightly around 400 incidents. 144Patterns of Global Terrorism 1994, 65. 145Ibid. 

69 
146Ibid. 147Ibid. 148The State Department attributed 322 incidents to international terrorists 

groups in 1994. This low level of activity parallels the total number of events 

experienced in 1975. 

149Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, 176. 150Ibid. 151Ibid. 152Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1990, 39; Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, 

176. 

153Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, 176. 154Patterns of Global Terrorism1994, 65; Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, 

176. 

155Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, 176. 156Ibid. 157Ibid. 158Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990, 39; Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, 

176. 

159According to the State Department’s statistics, there is significant fluctuation 

between years 1971and 1972, while 1995 and 1996 register as relatively flat. 160The steady increase is a general characterization, and it is noted that in the 

years from 1968 to 1987, levels of terrorist activity ebbed and flowed throughout 

the 19-year period. 

161Compared to the general upward swing in terrorist activity from 1968 to 1987, 

the downward trend from 1988 to 2003 followed a similar pattern. 

162Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990, 38. 163 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1995 (Washington DC: State Department, 

1996), 70. 

164Ibid. 165Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, appendix C; Patterns of Global Terrorism 

2001, 176. 166Patterns of Global Terrorism 1991 and Patterns of Global Terrorism 1992. 167 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998 (Washington DC: State Department, 

1999), 98. 

168 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999 (Washington DC: State Department, 

2000), 106. 

169 The analysis of this information does not include information and data from 

the invasion and fighting in Iraq. It appears from the preliminary data streaming in 

from the battlefront that kidnappings and murders have increased to rival bombings as a preferred method of terrorist attacks. There are several problems, however, with the Iraq example. It is unclear if the insurgents are Al Qaeda-affiliated 

agents determined to inflict damage on the United States and its allies, or if the 

insurgents are indigenous fighters focused on stabilizing their country. These objectives are by no means exclusive of one another and demonstrate the complexity of attempting to quantify the impact of the global war on terrorism (GWOT). 170 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002 (Washington DC: State Department, 

2003), xx. 

70 
171Mickolus, “How Do Know We’re Winning,” 152. 172A word on methodology; for international terrorist incidents the US State 

Department from 1990 to 2003 consistently used “type of facility” to gauge 

terrorist activity against “business, government, military, diplomatic, and other” 

targets. In providing data on anti-US attacks, the State Department from 1990 

to 1999 referred to “type of victim” of terrorist attacks. The victim categories 

identified by the State Department were “business, government, military, 

diplomatic, and other.” In 2000 the State Department changed its characterization 

from “type of victim” to “type of target,” while still employing the “business, 

government, military, diplomatic, and other” categories. As a result the data used 

in the development of the graph for anti-US attacks combines the data from both 

styles to get a representation of the continuity and/or change on terrorist target 

both before and after the internationally declared GWOT. 173For the purposes of this study, the category classified as “other” refers to those 

facilities that cannot be classified as “business, government, military, or diplomat.” 174Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990, 38-42. 175 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1993 (Washington DC: State Department, 1994), 

68-71. 

176It is interesting to note that in both the international and anti-US category, the 

1994 spike in terrorist attacks classified as other both rose to an approximated 38 

percent of total type of facilities attacked. 

177 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998 (Washington DC: State Department, 1999), 

91-96. 

178 Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 (Washington DC: State Department, 2002), 

174; US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 (Washington DC: 

State Department, 2003), 164. 

179Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, 178. 180Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, 174; Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, 

164.

181Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, 166. 182Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, 181; Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002,

166. 

183Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, 181. 184Ibid. 185In this listing of region casualties, the State Department had a category for 

North America. However, because these numbers tend to closely reflect the US 

totals, they have not been included in the total international casualty figures used 

in this analysis. 

186Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990, 40-41. 187Patterns of Global Terrorism 1994, 67. 188A solid account of the planning and operational detail that went into this first 

attempt to destroy the World Trade Center in New York can be found in Daniel 

Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War 

Against America (New York: Random House, 2003). 189Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998, 93. 190According to data provided by the State Department, the highs in 1995 and 

1998 were 6,456 and 6,694 respectively. In comparison, the years 1997 and 1999 

71 
saw the number of international casualties drop to 907 and 950; Patterns of 

Global Terrorism 1999, 103. 191Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, 173. 192Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, 180. 193Ibid., 178. 194R. James Woolsey. “World War IV: An Address Delivered at the Restoration 

Weekend,” Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International, 

(January 2003), 23. 

195Ibid. 196Ibid., 24. 197Ibid., 29. 198 McCarthy, 52-54. 199Woolsey, 29; McCarthy, 56. 200Bruce Hoffman, “Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism, and Future Potentialities: 

An Assessment,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, (November-December, 

2003), 229. 

201Hoffman, “Al Qaeda,” 430. 202Ibid. George Tenet resigned as Director of Central Intelligence in November 

2004. President Bush selected Congressman Goss as the next director of Central 

Intelligence, pending Senate approval. In late November of 2004, the US Senate 

confirmed Goss’s appointment as the new director of Central Intelligence. 203Hoffman, “Al Qaeda,” 430. 204Ibid., 433. 205Ibid., 431. 206Ibid. 207Ibid., 439. 208Rohan Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda Adapts to Disruption,” Jane’s Intelligence 

Review, (February 2004), 20. 209Rohan Gunaratna, “Confronting the West: Al Qaeda’s Strategy After 11 

September,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (July 2002), 27. 210Cited by Gunaratna, “Confronting the West,” 27. 211

Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda Adapts to Disruption,” 20. 212 Etgar Lefkovitz, “Terror Expert: Qaeda WMD Attack on US Likely Soon,” 

Jerusalem Post, November 29, 2004, <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/edfiles/

e20041129339615.htm>, November 29, 2004: 2 213Ibid. 214Ibid. 215Ibid. 216Anthony Davis, “The Afghan Files: Al Qaeda Documents from Kabul,” Jane’s 

Intelligence Review (February 2002), 18; and Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda Adapts to 

Disruption,” 21. 

217Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda Adapts to Disruption,” 21; Davis, “The Afghan Files,” 

17. 

218Lefkovitz, 1. 219 Barnard, 32. 220Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 17. 

72 
221Brian LeBlanc, “Sources of Terrorist Funding: The Drug Trade,” Journal of 

Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International (Summer 2004), 28. 222Barnard, 32. 223LeBlanc, 27. 224Barnard, 33. 225LeBlanc, 28. 226Barnard, 32. 227Barnard, 32. 228Ibid. 229Rohan Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda’s Operational Ties with Allied Groups,” Jane’s 

Intelligence Review (February 2003), 20; James Risen, “Evolving Nature of 

Al Qaeda is Misunderstood, Critic Says,” New York Times, November 8, 2004, 

<http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20041108335596.htm>, November 8, 2004, 

1. 

230Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda’s Operational Ties,” 20. 231Ibid. The US State Department has identified these groups as terrorist 

organizations and have listed them on the international watch list. 

232Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda’s Operational Ties,” 20. 233Bruce Hoffman, “Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11,” 

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, (September-October 2002), 309. 234Ibid. 235Ibid. 236Ibid. 237Ibid. 238Ibid. 239Ibid. 240Ibid., 310. 241Ibid. 242Risen, 1. 243Ibid. 244McCarthy, “57. 245Ibid. 246Ibid. 247Christopher Jasparro, “Madrid Attacks point to Sustained Al Qaeda Direction,” 

Jane’s Intelligence Review (August 2004), 30. 248Ibid. 30-31. 249Ibid. 

73 
Global War on Terrorism

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