NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL 

EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 2384, Plaintiff/Appellant, 

v.

CITY OF PHOENIX, et al., Defendants/Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0632 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CV2021-016584 

The Honorable Jay R. Adleman, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Martin & Bonnett, P.L.L.C., Phoenix 

By Daniel L. Bonnett, Jennifer L. Kroll 

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant 

Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix 

By Eric M. Fraser, Andrew G. Pappas 

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee City of Phoenix

William R. Brown Attorney at Law, Phoenix 

By William R. Brown 

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee PERB

FILED 10-17-2023
AMERICAN FEDERATION v. PHOENIX, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined. 

C A T L E T T, Judge: 

¶1 The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 

Employees, Local 2384 (“Union”) filed an unfair labor practice charge (the 

“charge”) against the City of Phoenix (“City”) alleging the City violated the 

Phoenix City Code (“Code”) by failing to meet and confer with the Union 

about contracting out certain work to a private company. Because we 

conclude the Code did not require the City to meet and confer, we affirm 

the superior court’s judgment. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶2 The Union and the City entered a memorandum of 

understanding (“MOU”) concerning wages, hours, and working conditions 

for the Union employees, which was effective from July 1, 2019 to June 30, 

2021. The 2019 MOU required, among other things, the City to “notify the 

Union, in writing, of the City’s intent to contract with a private agency for 

the provision of municipal services.” 

¶3 The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the 

Phoenix Employment Relations Board (“Board”), alleging the City violated 

the Code by not meeting and conferring with the Union before contracting 

out certain work to Felix Construction, Inc. (“Felix”). The Union alleged its 

member employees could perform the outsourced work. 

¶4 The Board referred the charge to a hearing officer who held 

an evidentiary hearing. The hearing officer issued a report concluding the 

City violated the Code’s meet and confer ordinance. After the City filed 

written objections to the report, the Board rejected the hearing officer’s 

conclusion that the City was required to meet and confer. 

¶5 The Union filed an action in the superior court, seeking 

special action review of the Board’s decision and a declaratory judgment 

regarding the City’s meet and confer obligations. The Union later filed an 

amended complaint, which the City moved to dismiss under Arizona Rule 
AMERICAN FEDERATION v. PHOENIX, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

3 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing the ordinance did not require the City 

to meet and confer with the Union about contracting out to Felix. 

¶6 The superior court accepted special action jurisdiction but 

denied relief on grounds the Code did not require the City to meet and 

confer with the Union under the circumstances. The court reasoned that 

“the meet and confer process is specifically identified as a temporary, 

periodic method by which the parties are intended to finalize a collective 

bargaining agreement.” The court dismissed the complaint. 

¶7 The Union timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. 

§ 12-2101(A).

DISCUSSION 

¶8 We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to 

state a claim. Hopi Tribe v. Ariz. Snowbowl Resort Ltd. P’ship, 245 Ariz. 397, 

400 ¶ 8 (2018). We assume the complaint’s well-pleaded facts are true and 

“affirm only if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff[] would not be entitled to 

relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.” Id. 

(cleaned up). 

¶9 The Code contains an ordinance requiring the City “to meet 

and confer” about certain subjects “with an authorized representative of the 

employees[.]” Code § 2-220(A)(5). For example, the Code requires the City 

to bargain with an authorized employee representative—here, the Union—

about “[t]he provisions contained in the 1988-90 and subsequent 

memoranda of understanding[.]” Code § 2-215(A). 

¶10 The parties disagree about the nature and timing of the City’s 

meet and confer obligations. The Union argues “[t]he plain text of the 

Ordinance mandates that the City’s obligation to meet and confer on noneconomic items is ongoing and not limited to only meeting and conferring 

as part of the negotiating process that precedes reaching and finalizing a 

specific MOU.” The City responds that the ordinance instead sets out a 

specific procedure for meeting and conferring and “[o]nce a memorandum 

of understanding has been reached, the parties’ meet-and-confer 

obligations under the Ordinance end.” We agree with the City. 

¶11 We interpret ordinances using statutory interpretation 

principles. Thomas & King, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 208 Ariz. 203, 206 ¶ 9 (App. 

2004). “Statutory interpretation requires us to determine the meaning of 

the words the legislature chose to use. We do so . . . according to the plain 

meaning of the words in their broader statutory context[.]” S. Ariz. Home 
AMERICAN FEDERATION v. PHOENIX, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

4 

Builders Ass’n v. Town of Marana, __ Ariz. __, 522 P.3d 671, 676 ¶ 31 (2023); 

see also Glazer v. State, 244 Ariz. 612, 614 ¶ 9 (2018). 

¶12 The Code’s text makes clear that the meet and confer process 

is the means through which the parties attain a MOU. The Code defines 

“meet and confer” as: 

the performance of the mutual obligation of the public 

employer through its chief administrative officer or his 

designee and the designees of the authorized representative 

to meet at reasonable times, including meetings in advance of 

the budget-making process; and to confer in good faith with 

respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of 

employment or any question arising thereunder, and the 

execution of a written memorandum of understanding 

embodying all agreements reached[.] 

Code § 2-210(11) (emphasis added). 

¶13 The word “and” is a “conjunction connecting words or 

phrases expressing the idea that the latter is to be added or taken along with 

the first.” Bither v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 226 Ariz. 198, 200 ¶ 10 (App. 2010) 

(citation omitted). The Code’s meet and confer provisions thus require the 

City and employee representatives to meet and confer and execute a written 

MOU containing all agreements reached (if any). See City of Phoenix v. Phx. 

Emp. Rels. Bd. ex rel. Am. Fed‘n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. Ass’n, Local 2384, 

145 Ariz. 92, 95 (App. 1985) (“[T]he meet and confer ordinance establishes 

a procedure whereby City management and employee representatives are 

expected to negotiate in good faith” and “produce a memorandum of 

understanding[.]”). Viewing the meet and confer process as the means to 

attain a particular end (the creation of MOUs) is consistent with a stated 

and central purpose for that process: “[T]hat the results of agreements 

between the employer and the employees will be drafted into written 

memoranda of understanding.” Code § 2-209(4) (emphasis added). 

¶14 Section 2-218 sets the procedures parties must follow when 

meeting and conferring to reach a MOU. It instructs that “[o]n or before 

December 1 of any year in which meeting and conferring is authorized by this 

ordinance and the terms of memorandums of understanding in effect pursuant 

thereto, authorized employee organizations shall submit their proposed 

memorandum of understanding in writing to the City Manager or his 

designee[.]” Code § 2-218(B). The section contains additional procedures, 

including allowing the Union to present to the City Council and requiring 
AMERICAN FEDERATION v. PHOENIX, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

5 

the City to provide a written response to a proposed MOU. Code § 2-

218(C), (E). 

¶15 If the parties are unable to “achieve agreement” within a 

reasonable time, or if a MOU “has not been reached prior to March 1,” the 

parties are required to begin impasse procedures. Code §§ 2-219; 2-210(8) 

(“Impasse means the failure of a designated representative of the public 

employer and a representative of an authorized employee organization to 

achieve agreement in the course of meeting and conferring.”). Impasse 

procedures include formal mediation and, if the parties are unable to agree, 

submitting the issue to the City Council for resolution. Code § 2-219. 

¶16 At bottom, the meet and confer ordinance only requires the 

City to meet and confer about certain subjects—primarily those to be 

addressed in a new or revised MOU—and at certain times. Once an MOU 

is reached, either amicably or through impasse procedures, the Code’s meet 

and confer process related to that MOU achieves its objective. The 

mandatory bargaining process under the Code does not begin anew until 

some period before the term of the MOU expires or as otherwise provided 

in the existing MOU. See Code § 2-218(B); Code § 2-215(B) (“A 

memorandum of understanding may be executed for a period not to exceed 

three years.”). In the meantime, the existing MOU, including any provision 

creating an interim obligation to meet and confer, governs the parties’ 

relationship for the duration of its term. 

¶17 The 2019 MOU between the City and the Union addressed the 

parties’ interim meet and confer obligations. For example, the 2019 MOU 

instructed that “[i]f any article or section of this Memorandum should be 

held invalid . . . the parties . . . , shall meet and confer to endeavor to agree on 

a substitute provision or that such a substitute provision is not indicated.” 

(Emphasis added). Although the 2019 MOU established procedures if the 

City decided to outsource work, those procedures did not require the City 

to meet and confer with the Union before doing so. To the contrary, the 

Union agreed that “[e]xcept as expressly provided in this Memorandum, 

the City shall not be required to meet and confer concerning any matter, 

whether covered or not covered herein, during the term or extensions 

thereof.” The 2019 MOU did not stop there. It also provided that because 

the Union “had an opportunity to raise all matters” during the meet and 

confer process leading to the 2019 MOU, the Union “is precluded from 

initiating any further meeting and conferring relative to matters under the 

control of the City Council or the City Manager.” Requiring the City to 

meet and confer about its agreements with Felix would be inconsistent with 

the bargain the Union struck in the 2019 MOU. 
AMERICAN FEDERATION v. PHOENIX, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

6 

¶18 The Union argues that the ordinance requires the City to 

provide the Union a “seat at the table” for any outsourcing discussions. If 

any such requirement existed, it needed to be found in the 2019 MOU. To 

be sure, the parties included a process in the 2019 MOU for the City to 

follow before outsourcing work, including requiring the City to provide 

notice to the Union. The 2019 MOU also provided that the parties would 

“continue to meet with affirmative willingness to resolve grievance[s] and 

disputes relating to wages, hours, and working conditions without 

affecting the terms of” the 2019 MOU. If the City violated any of the 2019 

MOU’s requirements, the Union could have filed a grievance or requested 

a meeting to discuss a grievance. But the Code did not require the City to 

meet and confer about contracting out, at least until the mandatory 

bargaining process for a subsequent MOU began. This is particularly true 

considering the Union’s agreement that the City was not required to meet 

and confer during the 2019 MOU’s term, and that the Union was precluded 

from asking the City to do so. 

¶19 The Union also argues that because the ordinance exempts the 

City from meeting and conferring about “economic items” during the 

budgeting process, the City is required to continuously meet and confer 

about non-economic items. As the Union explains, the deadline for 

economic items “allows the City to meet its budget deadlines and 

determine its financial commitment it is obligated to fulfill under the terms 

of an MOU.” We assume, without deciding, that contracting out work to 

Felix was a non-economic item. Yet we disagree that the inclusion of a 

deadline for economic items implicitly created a continual obligation to 

meet and confer regarding non-economic items. 

¶20 The Union’s attempt to imply a perpetual meet and confer 

obligation for non-economic items has at least two flaws. First, the 

argument is not based on text in the Code but is instead implied from the 

absence of text in the Code—the absence of a deadline for non-economic 

items. We agree with the superior court that “none of the language 

contained in [the Code] even remotely suggests that the parties are 

perpetually obligated to meet and confer regarding any particular issue 

whatsoever.” Second, the Union’s interpretation conflicts with text in other 

provisions in the Code—those imposing temporal limitations on the meetand-confer process. In fact, the Union’s position would render those 

provisions largely meaningless and the City’s meet and confer obligations 

nearly limitless. See City of Phoenix v. Phx. Emp. Rels. Bd., 207 Ariz. 337, 340 

¶ 11 (App. 2004) (“Courts avoid interpreting a statute so as to render any of 

its language mere surplusage[.]”). Thus, based on the Code’s text, we 

conclude that the meet and confer process—for economic and non-
AMERICAN FEDERATION v. PHOENIX, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

7 

economic items alike—is a discrete process for completing a memorandum 

of understanding on mandatory subjects of bargaining. When that process 

is not ongoing, the parties are bound to follow the MOU in effect at the time, 

including the grievance and interim meet and confer procedures (if any) 

contained therein. 

¶21 Lastly, the Union relies on several decisions from state and 

federal courts addressing the National Labor Relations Act or state 

analogues. None of those cases, however, address a statute or agreement 

materially like the Code or the 2019 MOU. Thus, those decisions are 

inapposite. 

¶22 In sum, under the plain language of the Code and the 2019 

MOU, the City was not required to meet and confer with the Union about 

contracting out with Felix. The superior court was, therefore, correct to 

dismiss the Union’s first amended complaint for failure to state a claim. 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES 

¶23 The City has requested its attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant 

to A.R.S. § 12-341.01. We deny the City’s request for attorneys’ fees but 

award the City its reasonable costs upon compliance with Arizona Rule of 

Civil Appellate Procedure 21. The Union has likewise requested its 

attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-348 and 12-341. Because 

the Union is not the prevailing party, we deny its request. 

CONCLUSION 

¶24 We affirm the superior court’s judgment.