COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

DARLENE SEKEREZ 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0372-98-4 PER CURIAM 

 DECEMBER 22, 1998 

HERBERT F. BRAVO 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 

William G. Plummer, Judge Designate 

 (Michael A. Ward; Gannon, Cottrell & Ward, on 

briefs), for appellant. 

 (Daniel G. Dannenbaum; The Lewis Law Firm, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Darlene Sekerez (mother) appeals the decision of the circuit 

court finding that the Virginia courts had jurisdiction to 

determine the custody of the parties' child. Herbert F. Bravo 

(father) filed an action in Virginia seeking custody shortly 

after mother left Virginia with the infant. Mother subsequently 

commenced an action in Indiana. Mother contends that the trial 

court erred by (1) finding that Virginia was the only state with 

jurisdiction to determine custody; (2) failing to make a 

determination sua sponte that Virginia was an inconvenient forum; 

and (3) ruling that visitation should be calculated based upon 

father's twenty-eight-day work rotation. Upon reviewing the 

record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is 

without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

Jurisdiction in Virginia

 Mother contends that no evidence supported the trial court's 

determination that Virginia was the only state where a custody 

proceeding was pending and, therefore, was the only state with 

jurisdiction to rule on custody. Evidence in the record, 

including affidavits of the parties, supported the trial court's 

determination that Virginia had jurisdiction to rule on custody 

of the infant child. See Code § 20-126(A)(1)(ii). The parties 

resided in Virginia at the time the child was born. The child's 

connections with Indiana arose only through mother's unilateral 

decision to return to her family home, taking the child with her 

from Virginia. Virginia was the child's home state at the time 

mother removed him from Virginia and father filed his custody 

proceeding. See Code § 20-125 (defining "home state" as "in the 

case of a child less than six months old the state in which the 

child lived from birth with [his parents, a parent, a person 

acting as parent]"). 

 While "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction . . . cannot be waived 

or conferred on the court by agreement of the parties," Morrison 

v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 169-70, 387 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1990), and 

may be raised at any time during the proceedings, it is clear 

that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction and that 

mother conceded as much. In the proceeding before the circuit 

court, mother's attorney stated: 

 Judge, I am here to tell you that after 
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discussing the matter with my client, we are 

prepared not to challenge the jurisdiction 

and to have the matter resolved here. 

Therefore, we find mother's first contention to be without merit. 

Inconvenient Forum

 Mother also assigns as error the trial court's failure, sua 

sponte, to decline to rule on the grounds that Virginia was an 

inconvenient forum to determine custody. See Code § 20-130. We 

disagree. The child was born in Virginia. Father remained a 

resident of Virginia. The parties' action for divorce was 

proceeding in Virginia. Representations by mother in her 

pleadings indicated that she was seeking to dismiss the Indiana 

custody proceedings. Mother expressed her desire to "have the 

matter resolved here." We find no error in the trial court's 

failure to decline sua sponte to exercise its jurisdiction as an 

inconvenient forum. 

Determination of Visitation Period

 Finally, mother contends that the trial court erred when it 

ruled that a "month" for purposes of the parties' visitation 

schedule would mean father's twenty-eight-day rotation period. 

 The authority vested in a trial court to 

decide issues concerning the care, custody, 

support and maintenance of the minor 

children, the visitation rights of the 

non-custodial parent, and the extent to which 

those rights and responsibilities shall be 

apportioned between estranged parents is a 

matter of judicial discretion which courts 

must exercise with the welfare of the 

children as the paramount consideration. 

Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 2 Va. App. 409, 412, 345 S.E.2d 10, 
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11 (1986). The trial court indicated that it considered the 

statutory factors set out in Code § 20-124.3 when making its 

decision. The evidence showed that father regularly worked three 

consecutive weekends, with the fourth weekend off. Nothing in 

the evidence which mother cites as supporting her assignment of 

error refutes the trial court's determination. We find no error. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.