### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE June 2000 Session DANIEL B. TAYLOR v. DONAL CAMPBELL, COMMISSIONER, TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, ET AL 

### . Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 99-948-I Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr., Chancellor

No. M2000-00217-COA-R3-CV - Filed July 31, 2000

Daniel B. Taylor filed a petition for decl aratory judgment against the Commissioner and several other employees of the Tennessee Department of Correction, alleging that he is entitled to various sentence reduction credi

ts and that his se

ntence is void and illegal. The trial court dismissed Taylor’s petition . We vacate the judgment of the tria

l court and reman

d for further pr

oceedings. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery

Court Vacated; Case Remanded C HARLES D. S USANO , J R ., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which H ERSCHEL P. F RANKS and D. M ICHAEL S WINEY , JJ., joined. Daniel B. Taylor, Only, Tennessee, Pro Se. Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael Moore, Solicitor General; and Terri

L. Bernal, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellees,

Donal Campbell, Commissioner, Tennessee Department

of Correction; Williams Keeling; Roland Colson; Faye Claud; Dinna W ilson; Wyema Helms; and Shirley Pl

uckett. OPINION
I. Taylor is a prisoner in state custody, serving a life sentence for second degree murder. In April, 1999, he filed the subject petition, alleging (1) that the Department miscalculated his sentence by failing to give him credit for time served in jail following his sentencing; (2) that he is entitled to good conduct and prisoner performance sent e nce credits; and (3) that his sentence is void and illegal because he shoul

d have been sente

nced as an “Espe

cially Mitigated Offender, Range 20%, plus a 10% Reduction o f

the minimum sentence.” In his petition, Taylor alleges that he had filed a petition for a declaratory order with the Department of Correction and that

the petition was denied by the Department on March 3, 1999.1 Since the tri al court considered mat erial “outside

the plead ing,” see Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02, we have revi ewed the trial cour t’s judgm ent as one for sum mary ju dgme nt. Id

. -2- The Department file

d a motion to dismiss an

d/or for summary ju

dgment. 1 The trial cour t dismissed Taylor’ s petition, finding a s follows: Petitioner’s reliance on a letter from respondents ’ attorney explaining his sentence reduction credits is not an agency denial of a petition for declaratory relief. Theref ore, Petitioner ha

s n ot exhausted his administrative remedies and is accordingly not prop erly before this Court. Taylor filed a motion to reconsider, which was also denied. This appeal followed.
II. Under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, an individual who desires to pursue a petition for declaratory judgment in court in order to challen ge the validity or applicability of a statute, rule or order, must meet two requirements: (1) the complainant must first file a petition for a declaratory or

der with the appr

opriate agency

and (2) the agen

cy must refuse to

issue a declaratory order. T.C.A. § 4-5-225(b) (1998). Taylor alleg es tha t the Department denied his petition for a declaratory order

in a letter dated March 3, 1999. The subject letter is on Department of Correction letterhead and i

s signed by a “W.G . Lutche, Legal A ssistant.” The let

ter states as foll

ows: Your petition for a declaratory order has been referred to the Depar t ment of Correction, Office of the General Counsel by the Commissioner. I have been assigned to review your petition and respond on behalf of

the Commissioner.
A review of your sentence structure by Sentence Infor mation Servi ces (SIS) personnel reveals that you are s erving a Life sentence for a Class X felo ny. Accordingly, you are required to

serve 30 years to your Release Eligibility Date (RED), le ss Prisoner Sentence Reduction C redits (PSRC) after [emphasis in original] a signed waiver, effective 3/1/86. T hu s, your current se ntence structur

e is valid and correc

t. For the reason stated above, your petition for a declarator y orde r pursuant to T.C.A. § 4-5-223(

a)(2) is refuse d and the department denies your petition. (Except as otherwise indicated, emphasis added). The letter states that Tayl or’s p etition for a declaratory order was reviewed and subsequently denied by the Department

. Accordingly, we find-3-

that there was an agency denial of Taylor’s petition for a declaratory order as c ontemplated by T.C.A. § 4-5-225(b). Ther efore, we f ind that the trial court erred in dismissing Taylor’s petition based upon a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
IV. The judgment of

the trial court dis

missing Taylor’s pe

tition is vacated. Costs on appeal are taxed to the appellees.

This case is rema

nded for further

proceedings con

sistent with this

opinion.

___________________________________ CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE