DLD-168 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 23-2085 

___________ 

IN RE: JOSE TORRES, 

 Petitioner 

____________________________________ 

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 

(Related to D.C. Crim. No. 2-20-cr-00418-001) 

____________________________________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 

June 29, 2023 

Before: JORDAN, CHUNG, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: July 14, 2023) 

__________ 

OPINION*

__________ 

PER CURIAM 

 Pro se petitioner Jose Torres seeks a writ of mandamus. Because Torres has not 

demonstrated that he is entitled to such relief, we will deny his petition. 

 In February 2020, Torres was charged through a criminal complaint in the United 

States District Court for the District of New Jersey with two counts of Coercion and 

Enticement in violation of the Mann Act (18 U.S.C. § 2422(a)). In subsequent 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2 

superseding indictments, Torres was charged with four additional counts of Coercion and 

Enticement. The indictments alleged that Torres knowingly persuaded, induced, enticed, 

and coerced six different individuals to travel in interstate commerce to engage in 

prostitution and sexual activities between May 2015 and October 2019. Those charges 

are currently pending in the District Court. 

 On March 5, 2021, Torres filed a counseled motion to reopen his detention 

hearing, arguing, among other things, that Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) 

Emma Spiro had a conflict of interest because she was previously employed by the law 

firm representing several of the alleged victims in his case. See ECF No. 85. The 

Government opposed the motion and submitted a letter from an ethics advisor to the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office, contending that there was no conflict of interest. See ECF No. 88. 

The District Court agreed with the Government and denied Torres’s conflict motion and 

his motion to reopen the detention hearing. 

On August 20, 2022, after filing various pro se motions that the District Court did 

not entertain, Torres filed a pro se motion to proceed under hybrid representation, or 

alternatively, to proceed pro se with standby counsel. See ECF No. 174. The District 

Court granted Torres’s motion to the extent that he sought to proceed pro se with standby 

counsel, directed him to submit all pro se filings to chambers for screening, and 

appointed a special master to screen his pro se filings. See ECF Nos. 232, 233. Torres 

thereafter filed numerous motions and letters, several of which were barred or partially 

redacted by the special master for non-compliance with governing rules. In light of the 
3 

volume of Torres’s submissions, his failure to abide by the District Court’s order and 

applicable rules, and the delay to the proceedings that he caused, the District Court sua 

sponte reconsidered and reversed its decision allowing him to proceed pro se. See ECF 

No. 295.1 

 Torres has filed a pro se petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court arguing that 

the District Court erred in denying his motion to disqualify AUSA Spiro and in reversing 

its decision allowing him to proceed pro se. He contends that, based on those errors, he is 

entitled to a writ ordering the District Court to dismiss the criminal case against him or, 

alternatively, to reinstate his pro se status, disqualify AUSA Spiro, vacate all orders and 

opinions entered by the District Court, and assign the case to another District Judge. 

A writ of mandamus is a “drastic remedy” that may be granted “only in 

extraordinary circumstances in response to an act amounting to a judicial usurpation of 

power.” In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation 

omitted). “Before a writ of mandamus may issue, a party must establish that (1) no other 

adequate means [exist] to attain the relief he desires, (2) the party’s right to issuance of 

the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under the 

circumstances.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) 

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

1

 Through counsel, Torres filed a notice of appeal as to that order; that appeal is pending 

in this Court. See C.A. No. 23-1913. 
4 

Mandamus relief is not appropriate here. First, as to his argument that the District 

Court erred in reversing its decision allowing him to proceed pro se, Torres has not 

shown that he has no other adequate means of relief. See United States v. Peppers, 302 

F.3d 120, 127-37 (3d Cir. 2002) (reviewing on direct appeal an order denying selfrepresentation and remanding for a new trial); see also Flanagan v. United States, 465 

U.S. 259, 267-68 (1984) (“post-conviction review of a disqualification order is fully 

effective to the extent that the asserted right to counsel of one’s choice is like, for 

example, the Sixth Amendment right to represent oneself”). 

While the Supreme Court has not ruled out the use of mandamus to challenge 

orders denying disqualification of counsel in exceptional circumstances, see Firestone 

Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378 n.13 (1981), Torres has not shown that 

his right to a writ of mandamus to compel disqualification of the prosecuting attorney (or 

to obtain other relief) is “clear and indisputable.” In re Pressman-Gutman Co., Inc., 459 

F.3d 383, 401-02 (3d Cir. 2006). The Government explained in the District Court that 

AUSA Spiro obtained specific authorization to work on this case from the General 

Counsel of the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, see 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502, 

despite her previous employment at the firm now representing some of the alleged 

victims.2

 The District Court accordingly determined that she took all actions necessary to 

2

 The scope of this alleged representation is unclear from the existing record. Torres 

appears to believe that the firm, Sher Tremonte, will assist the alleged victims in seeking 

restitution and filing civil suits against him in the event that he is convicted of the present 

charges. 
5 

comply with applicable regulations, that she no longer had a financial relationship with 

the firm, and that her involvement in the case did not create a conflict or the appearance 

of impropriety. 

Torres nevertheless contends that AUSA Spiro violated the “revolving door” 

restriction within the Ethic Commitments by Executive Branch Personnel, which 

precludes a government appointee, for a period of two years after his or her appointment, 

from participating in matters in which the appointee’s former employer represents a 

party. See 74 Fed. Reg. 4,673 (Jan. 21, 2009). But Torres has not made the requisite 

showing that this restriction is implicated here, where AUSA Spiro’s former employer is 

not representing a party in the criminal case. See United States v. Stoerr, 695 F.3d 271, 

276 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that crime victims are not “parties” to criminal 

proceedings). He has accordingly not met the demanding standard of showing that his 

right to a writ of mandamus overriding the District Court’s exercise of discretion is clear 

and indisputable. See In re Pressman-Gutman, 459 F.3d at 402-03. The same is true 

regarding Torres’s remaining contentions relating to AUSA Spiro’s alleged conflicts of 

interest based on the appearance of impartiality or unethical behavior.3

 

Finally, to the extent that Torres seeks recusal of the District Judge, he has not 

shown that a reasonable person would question the impartiality of the District Judge. See

3

 We note that in denying this mandamus petition, we are not affirming the District 

Court’s order. “Rather, we are holding only that [Torres’s] claim for issuance of the writ 

is not ‘clear and indisputable,’ and our holding is not intended to prejudice a later appeal, 

if there is one, after entry of final judgment.” In re Pressman-Gutman, 459 F.3d at 403. 
6 

28 U.S.C. § 455(a); In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d Cir. 2004). Nor 

has he shown that any of the circumstances enumerated in § 455(b) are present here. See

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994) (explaining that “judicial rulings 

alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion”). Thus, we will 

deny Torres’s petition.