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*********************************************** 
R & P REALTY COMPANY ET AL. v.

PEERLESS INDEMNITY

INSURANCE COMPANY

(AC 40864)

Lavine, Moll and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs, R Co. and U Co., sought to recover damages from the defendant insurance company for breach of contract. R Co. had leased certain

property to U Co., which operated a business in a building on the

property that was damaged by an overload of snow and ice on its roof.

At that time, the defendant provided a policy of casualty insurance to

the plaintiffs, who filed an insurance claim for the damage to the building.

The defendant accepted that the roof had been damaged by an event

covered by the policy and agreed that replacing the roof and its supporting structures was necessary. After the parties had engaged in an adjustment process, the defendant remitted a payment to the plaintiffs in the

amount of $167,006.03, upon which the parties had settled, and a portion

of which was allocated to the cost of demolishing the existing roof. As

part of the rebuilding process, a company retained by the plaintiffs

found that asbestos containing material was present in at least two

small areas of the roofing membrane and that lead based paint was

detected on a ceiling located in the building. The cost of demolishing

and removing all of the old roofing material in a safe and safety compliant

manner was $90,139.26. The defendant refused to pay the additional

demolition costs, and this action followed. The trial court rendered

judgment for the defendant on the breach of contract count, from which

the plaintiffs appealed to this court. They claimed that the trial court

erroneously concluded that the defendant did not breach the policy by

declining to cover the increased demolition costs resulting from the

presence of asbestos and lead in the building. Specifically, the plaintiffs

contended that the trial court improperly found that the increased demolition costs constituted replacement costs, rather than being a component of the actual cash value of the plaintiffs’ loss, and that the plaintiffs

failed to provide reasonable notice to the defendant of their claim seeking recovery for the increased demolition costs. Held that the plaintiffs

having failed to provide this court with an adequate record, this court

declined to address the merits of their claim on appeal: although the

trial occurred over two days, the plaintiffs provided this court with only

a partial transcript consisting of the testimony of a single witness on

the second day of trial, and in the absence of transcripts of the entire

trial, this court could not evaluate the plaintiff’s arguments in support

of their appellate claim without resorting to speculation; accordingly,

the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

Argued March 14—officially released October 1, 2019

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for breach of contract

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

New Haven, where the matter was tried to the court,

Pittman, J.; judgment for the defendant, from which

the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Richard F. Connors, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Heather J. Adams, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The plaintiffs, R & P Realty Company

and Unger’s Floor Covering, Inc., appeal from the judgment of the trial court, following a court trial, rendered

in favor of the defendant, Peerless Indemnity Insurance

Company, on count one of their operative complaint

sounding in breach of contract. On appeal, the plaintiffs

claim that the trial court erred in concluding that the

defendant did not breach the parties’ casualty insurance

policy by declining to pay for the increased costs of

demolition resulting from the presence of asbestos and

lead within the insured property, which the plaintiffs

discovered after the defendant had remitted an initial

insurance payout to which the parties agreed. We conclude that the record is inadequate for our review, and,

accordingly, we decline to review the plaintiffs’ claim

and, thus, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the trial court in its

memorandum of decision or as undisputed in the

record, and procedural history are necessary for our

discussion. At all relevant times, R & P Realty Company

owned real property located at 915 Grand Avenue in

New Haven, which it leased to Unger’s Floor Covering,

Inc., a floor covering business in an older brick building

situated on the property. In February, 2011, the building

was damaged by an overload of snow and ice on its

roof. At that time, the defendant provided a policy of

casualty insurance (policy) to the plaintiffs. Pursuant

to the policy, the plaintiffs filed an insurance claim for

the damage to the building caused by the snow and ice

overload. The defendant accepted that the roof had

been damaged by an event covered by the policy and

agreed with the plaintiffs that replacing the roof and

its supporting structures was necessary. On October

17, 2012, after the parties had engaged in an adjustment

process, the defendant remitted a payment to the plaintiffs in the amount of $167,006.03, upon which the parties had settled. The payment included the cost for

removing and rebuilding the roof with new supporting

structures, reconfiguring certain heating and ventilation

equipment and electric routes, and repairing or renovating certain interior areas and finishes. Of the

$167,006.03 paid by the defendant to the plaintiffs,

$26,738.83 was allocated to the cost of demolishing the

existing roof.1

In 2013, the plaintiffs began planning to reconstruct

the damaged roof. As part of the rebuilding process,

they retained a company to test for the presence of

asbestos and lead in the components to be demolished

during the reconstruction of the roof. The company

found that asbestos containing material was present in

at least two small areas of the roofing membrane, and

that lead based paint was detected on an old metal

ceiling located underneath a hanging ceiling in the building. During the adjustment process, the parties had
contemplated the demolition of those components, but

they never discussed the possible presence of asbestos

or lead therein. The demolition of materials containing

asbestos and lead is subject to Occupational Safety and

Health Administration regulations and state laws, which

require workers involved in such demolition to have

special training, clothing, and apparatus, and that there

be a special means of handling and removing the debris

created by such demolition. According to a revised estimate obtained by the plaintiffs, the cost of demolishing

and removing all of the old roofing material in a safe and

safety compliant manner was $90,139.26. The defendant

refused to pay the additional demolition costs.

On February 14, 2013, the plaintiffs commenced the

present action against the defendant. In count one of

the operative two count complaint filed on September

3, 2013, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had

breached the policy by failing to fully compensate them

for the loss they sustained resulting from the damage

to the building caused by the snow and ice overload.2

More specifically, they contended that, in contravention

of the policy, the defendant refused to cover the

increased demolition costs resulting from the presence

of asbestos and lead in the building.3 On April 22, 2014,

the defendant filed an answer and special defenses. On

June 26, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a reply, denying the

allegations set forth in the defendant’s special defenses.

On August 31, 2017, following a two day court trial,

the court issued a memorandum of decision rendering

judgment on count one in favor of the defendant. After

determining that the presence of asbestos and lead in

the building was a latent condition not contemplated

by the parties during the adjustment process, the court

stated in relevant part: ‘‘[T]he defendant insurer might

still be obligated under the policy if it had been given

reasonable notice of the supplemental claim [for the

increased demolition costs]. But it appears that the

issue of asbestos and lead was never presented to the

defendant until nearly the start of this litigation, certainly more than two years after the date of the loss.

. . . [I]f recovery is sought for the repair or replacement cost, rather than the actual cash value, the policy

requires the [plaintiffs] to first perform the repairs

before the defendant is obligated to pay for these

increased costs.’’ This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court erroneously concluded that the defendant did not breach the

policy by declining to cover the increased demolition

costs resulting from the presence of asbestos and lead

in the building. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that

the court improperly found that (1) the increased demolition costs constituted replacement costs, rather than

being a component of the actual cash value of the plaintiffs’ loss,4 and (2) the plaintiffs failed to provide reasonable notice to the defendant of their claim seeking
recovery for the increased demolition costs. We decline

to address the merits of this claim because the plaintiffs

have failed to provide this court with an adequate

record.

Practice Book § 61-10 (a) provides: ‘‘It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide an adequate record

for review. The appellant shall determine whether the

entire record is complete, correct and otherwise perfected for presentation on appeal.’’ ‘‘The general purpose of [the relevant] rules of practice . . . [requiring

the appellant to provide a sufficient record] is to ensure

that there is a trial court record that is adequate for an

informed appellate review of the various claims presented by the parties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Buehler v. Buehler, 175 Conn. App. 375, 382, 167

A.3d 1108 (2017). This court also has explained that

‘‘[a]n appellate tribunal cannot render a decision without first fully understanding the disposition being

appealed. . . . Our role is not to guess at possibilities,

but to review claims based on a complete factual record

. . . . Without the necessary factual and legal conclusions . . . any decision made by us respecting [the

claims raised on appeal] would be entirely speculative.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cianbro Corp. v.

National Eastern Corp., 102 Conn. App. 61, 72, 924

A.2d 160 (2007); see also Calo-Turner v. Turner, 83

Conn. App. 53, 56, 847 A.2d 1085 (2004).

In the present case, the trial occurred over two days.

In claiming that the record is devoid of any evidence to

support the trial court’s findings, however, the plaintiffs

have provided this court only with a partial transcript

consisting of the testimony of a single witness on the

second day of trial. In the absence of transcripts of the

entire trial, we cannot evaluate the plaintiffs’ arguments

in support of their appellate claim without resorting to

speculation. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Rocco, 267 Conn. 59,

71–73, 836 A.2d 1158 (2003) (concluding that plaintiff

failed to provide adequate record regarding whether

trial court’s ruling precluding plaintiff from adducing

certain evidence on cross-examination was harmful).

As previously noted, we decline to do so. See Buehler

v. Buehler, supra, 175 Conn. App. 382 (this court would

not surmise, speculate, or guess at factual predicate for

trial court’s rulings and declined to review appellate

claim where defendant failed to provide complete

record of trial court proceedings); Calo-Turner v.

Turner, supra, 83 Conn. App. 56–57 (same); see generally Rice v. Housing Authority, 129 Conn. App. 614,

616, 20 A.3d 1270 (2011) (this court unable to determine

whether evidence supported plaintiff’s arguments

regarding granting of motion to set aside verdict where

no transcripts had been filed). Accordingly, we decline

to review the plaintiffs’ claim.

The judgment is affirmed.

1 The court noted that the parties had used ‘‘the ‘actual cash value’ rubric

in agreeing to the loss payout, rather than the restoration or replacement
cost.’’ Generally, the ‘‘actual cash value’’ of a loss is the cost of repairing

or replacing the loss, less depreciation, whereas the ‘‘replacement cost’’ of

a loss is the actual cost of repairing or replacing the loss without a deduction

for depreciation. See Northrop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 247 Conn. 242, 245 n.3,

720 A.2d 879 (1998) (discussing actual cash value and replacement cost in

case involving fire insurance coverage); see also Kellogg v. Middlesex Mutual

Assurance Co., 326 Conn. 638, 641 n.2, 165 A.3d 1228 (2017) (‘‘Many insurance

policies expressly provide that an insured may recover the [actual cash

value] of destroyed property, and subsequently make an additional claim

on a replacement cost basis. . . . [S]uch policies invariably include as a

condition precedent to a supplemental replacement cost recovery a requirement that the insured first complete restoration of its property.’’ [Internal

quotation marks omitted.]).

2

In count two of the operative complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the

defendant had breached the terms of the policy by failing to fully compensate

them for a separate loss they suffered in August, 2011, resulting from damage

to the building caused by a hurricane. The plaintiffs later abandoned that

claim.

3

In addition, the plaintiffs asserted that the policy obligated the defendant

to pay costs associated with the repair and reconstruction of the exterior

walls of the building. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim seeking recovery

for the damage to the exterior walls. The plaintiffs have not appealed from

that portion of the court’s judgment.

4 See footnote 1 of this opinion.