alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
The State of TexasAppellee/s

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

April 28, 2015

No. 04-14-00878-CR

Matthew Douglas HAYES,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 437th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013CR10841W

Honorable Lori I. Valenzuela, Judge Presiding

ORDER

Appellant, Matthew Hayes, entered into a plea agreement in two separate cause numbers 

whereby he pled guilty to two charges of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon under each 

cause number (for a total of four counts). Hayes subsequently perfected two separate appeals 

under each of the two cause numbers: 04-14-878-CR (878 appeal) and 04-14-879-CR (879 

appeal). 

On April 1, 2015, the State filed a notice and motion for correction in both appeals, in 

which it asserted Hayes waived his right to appeal in the 878 appeal as part of his plea bargain. 

The State asserted that although the trial court admonished Hayes regarding waiver of his right to 

appeal, the form signed by the trial court is ambiguous, in that the trial court’s marking appears 

in the space between that granting permission to appeal and that stating there is no right to 

appeal. The State requested this court obtain a corrected certification from the trial court 

indicating appellant has no right to appeal in the 878 appeal. 

Appellant responded to the State’s motion on April 20, 2015. In his response, appellant 

asserts the trial court granted permission to appeal in the 879 appeal, and thereby intended to and 

did grant permission to appeal in the 878 appeal as well. 

Review of the Clerk’s Record in the 878 appeal reveals the trial court’s form titled 

“Certification of Defendant’s Right to Appeal” is ambiguous as to Cause Number 2013-CR10841W. As the State asserts, this Court cannot determine which box the trial court intended to 

mark. 
For this reason, the State’s Motion for Correction and Motion to Abate filed in both 

appeals, the 878 appeal and the 879 appeal is GRANTED. The trial court is ORDERED to file a 

supplemental clerk=s record in this court in the 878 appeal, no later than May 12, 2015, which 

shall include a corrected “Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal” as to Cause Number 

2013-CR-10841W and which clearly indicates whether the trial court grants Hayes permission to 

appeal or whether there is no right to appeal. 

All deadlines in the 878 appeal and the 879 appeal are abated until the supplemental 

clerk’s record is received in the 878 appeal.

_________________________________

Jason Pulliam, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 28th day of April, 2015.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
<PAGE>

                                                                     EXHIBIT 15

TXU Gas Company:

We have made a review, in accordance with standards established by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, of the unaudited interim
condensed consolidated financial information of TXU Gas Company and
subsidiaries (TXU Gas) for the periods ended June 30, 2000 and 1999, as
indicated in our report dated August 7, 2000; because we did not perform an
audit, we expressed no opinion on that information.

We are aware that our report referred to above, which is included in TXU Gas'
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2000, is
incorporated by reference in Registration Statements No. 333-85769,
333-85769-01, 333-85769-02, 333-85769-03 and 333-43811 on Form S-3, and
Registration Statement No. 333-43811-01 on Post-Effective Amendment No. 1 to
Form S-3, of TXU Gas.

We also are aware that the aforementioned report, pursuant to Rule 436(c)
under the Securities Act of 1933, is not considered a part of the
Registration Statement prepared or certified by an accountant or a report
prepared or certified by an accountant within the meaning of Sections 7 and
11 of that Act.




DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

Dallas, Texas
August 9, 2000
### §511m. Regulation; hearings; employees; expenditures; authorization of appropriations

The Secretary is authorized to make such rules and regulations and hold such hearings as he may deem necessary to effectuate the purposes of this chapter and may cooperate with any other Department or agency of the Government; any State, territory, district, or possession, or department, agency, or political subdivision thereof; purchasing and consuming organizations, boards of trade, chambers of commerce, or other associations of business men or trade organizations; or any person, whether operating in one or more jurisdictions in carrying on the work herein authorized; and he shall have the power to appoint, suspend, remove, and fix the compensation of all officers, employees, and licensees not in conflict with existing law, except that inspectors and supervisors employed thereunder on a seasonal basis and working for periods of six months or less during any twelve-month period may be appointed without reference to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5. The Secretary is authorized to make such expenditures for rent outside of the District of Columbia, printing, binding, telegrams, telephones, books of reference, publications, furniture, stationery, office and laboratory equipment, travel, tobacco for use in preparing and demonstrating standards, and other supplies and expenses, including reporting services, as shall be necessary to the administration of this chapter in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, and as may be appropriated for by Congress; and there is authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such sums as may be necessary for administering this chapter.

(Aug. 23, 1935, ch. 623, §14, 49 Stat. 734; Oct. 28, 1949, ch. 782, title II, §202(28), title XI, §1106(a), 63 Stat. 956, 972.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

"Chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5" substituted in text for "the Classification Act of 1949" on authority of Pub. L. 89–554, §7(b), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 631, the first section of which enacted Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.

#### Amendments

1949—Act Oct. 28, 1949, substituted "Classification Act of 1949" for "Classification Act of 1923".

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Repeals

Act Oct. 28, 1949, ch. 782, cited as a credit to this section, was repealed (subject to a savings clause) by Pub. L. 89–554, Sept. 6, 1966, §8, 80 Stat. 632, 655.
### §9b. Rules prohibiting deceptive and other abusive telemarketing acts or practices

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), not later than six months after the effective date of rules promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission under section 6102(a) of title 15, the Commission shall promulgate, or require each registered futures association to promulgate, rules substantially similar to such rules to prohibit deceptive and other abusive telemarketing acts or practices by any person registered or exempt from registration under this chapter in connection with such person's business as a futures commission merchant, introducing broker, commodity trading advisor, commodity pool operator, leverage transaction merchant, floor broker, or floor trader, or a person associated with any such person.

(2) The Commission is not required to promulgate rules under paragraph (1) if it determines that—

(A) rules adopted by the Commission under this chapter provide protection from deceptive and abusive telemarketing by persons described under paragraph (1) substantially similar to that provided by rules promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission under section 6102(a) of title 15; or

(B) such a rule promulgated by the Commission is not necessary or appropriate in the public interest, or for the protection of customers in the futures and options markets, or would be inconsistent with the maintenance of fair and orderly markets.

If the Commission determines that an exception described in subparagraph (A) or (B) applies, the Commission shall publish in the Federal Register its determination with the reasons for it.

(Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 369, §6(f), as added Pub. L. 103–297, §3(e)(2), Aug. 16, 1994, 108 Stat. 1547.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section is comprised of subsec. (f) of section 6 of act Sept. 21, 1922. Subsecs. (a) and (b) of section 6 are classified to section 8 of this title. Subsec. (c) of section 6 is classified to section 9 of this title. Subsecs. (d), (e), and (g) of section 6 are classified to sections 13b, 9a, and 9c of this title, respectively.
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-12-00337-CV

Liberty Bank, F.S.B.

v.

Andrew B. Etter d/b/a Andrew B. 

Etter Law Offices

§

§

§

§

From County Court at Law No. 3

of Tarrant County (2008-064375-3)

September 19, 2013

Opinion by Justice Walker

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed.

It is further ordered that appellant Liberty Bank, F.S.B. shall pay all of the 

costs of this appeal, for which let execution issue.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By _________________________________

 Justice Sue Walker
#### § 1904.5 Authority of General Counsel.

Any questions concerning interpretation of this regulation shall be referred to the Office of General Counsel for resolution.
§ 935.94 Answer. ( a ) The defendant may, at his election, file an answer to the complaint.
( b ) The defendant may file a counterclaim, setoff, or any reasonable affirmative defense.
( c ) If the defendant elects to file a counterclaim, setoff, or affirmative defense, the Court shall promptly send a copy of it to the plaintiff.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Mark Jones, Appellant.

— Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County, rendered March 24, 1977, convicting defendant following a jury trial of robbery in the first and second degrees and sentencing him to concurrent terms with a maximum of 10 years, unanimously reversed, on the law, and the case remanded for a new trial. The trial court inadvertently omitted to instruct the jury, as requested by defendant’s counsel, to draw no inference from the failure of the defendant to testify. As appropriately conceded by the District Attorney on this appeal, the omission, although clearly an oversight, requires reversal of the conviction and a new trial. (See *People v Britt,*43 NY2d 111.) Concur —Kupferman, J. P., Birns, Lane and Sandler, JJ.
EXHIBIT 32.2



Certification of Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of
Duquesne Light Holdings, Inc. (the Company) for the period ending September 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), Stevan R. Schott, as Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of his knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



WITNESS the due execution hereof this 9thday of November, 2004.



/s/ Stevan R. SchottStevan R. SchottSenior Vice President andChief Financial Officer




This
certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.



A signed original
of this certification required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company, who will retain it and furnish a copy to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Contacts. With whom outside the FAA has this proposal been discussed?

Organization Person Contacted Date Response

National Business Aircraft Association Eli Coui Ih/o<£ -

I~egillllal Airline Asst)ciatioll D~n:eLotten'r 1//4/()f, -

Aircraft Owners IIPiloh Association Robert Hacklll:lIl '//I-ilril -

ATA Craig Fabian I/;'!/t& -
### §7951. Definitions

In this subchapter:

#### (1) Base acres for peanuts

The term "base acres for peanuts" means the number of acres assigned to a farm by historic peanut producers pursuant to section 7952(b) of this title.

#### (2) Counter-cyclical payment

The term "counter-cyclical payment" means a payment made under section 7954 of this title.

#### (3) Effective price

The term "effective price" means the price calculated by the Secretary under section 7954 of this title for peanuts to determine whether counter-cyclical payments are required to be made under that section for a crop year.

#### (4) Direct payment

The term "direct payment" means a payment made under section 7953 of this title.

#### (5) Historic peanut producer

The term "historic peanut producer" means a producer on a farm in the United States that produced or was prevented from planting peanuts during any or all of the 1998 through 2001 crop years.

#### (6) Payment acres

The term "payment acres" means—

(A) for the 2002 crop of peanuts, 85 percent of the average acreage determined under section 7952(a)(2) of this title for an historic peanut producer; and

(B) for the 2003 through 2007 crops of peanuts, 85 percent of the base acres for peanuts assigned to a farm under section 7952(b) of this title.

#### (7) Payment yield

The term "payment yield" means the yield assigned to a farm by historic peanut producers pursuant to section 7952(b) of this title.

#### (8) Producer

The term "producer" means an owner, operator, landlord, tenant, or sharecropper that shares in the risk of producing a crop on a farm and is entitled to share in the crop available for marketing from the farm, or would have shared had the crop been produced. In determining whether a grower of hybrid seed is a producer, the Secretary shall not take into consideration the existence of a hybrid seed contract and shall ensure that program requirements do not adversely affect the ability of the grower to receive a payment under this subchapter.

#### (9) Secretary

The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Agriculture.

#### (10) State

The term "State" means each of the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any other territory or possession of the United States.

#### (11) Target price

The term "target price" means the price per ton of peanuts used to determine the payment rate for counter-cyclical payments.

#### (12) United States

The term "United States", when used in a geographical sense, means all of the States.

(Pub. L. 107–171, title I, §1301, May 13, 2002, 116 Stat. 166.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

This subchapter, referred to in text, was in the original "this subtitle", meaning subtitle C (§§1301–1310) of title I of Pub. L. 107–171, May 13, 2002, 116 Stat. 166, which enacted this subchapter, amended sections 1361, 1371, 1373, 1378, 1428, and 1441 of this title, and repealed sections 1357 to 1359a and 7271 of this title. For complete classification of subtitle C to the Code, see Tables.
#### Irene Zarch, Respondent, v. Max Zarch, Appellant.

We find no reason to disturb the exercise of Special Term’s discretion in reducing by no more than $10 per week the payments for the wife’s support directed by the judgment. We find inadequate, however, the proof offered to contradict the evidence that the daughter is self-supporting or substantially so. In any event, and in view of her age and education, her employment status may have become stabilized during the intervening eight months. Order modified so as to delete the first decretal paragraph thereof and matter remitted to Special Term for *733additional proof with respect to the subject thereof, and, as so modified, affirmed, with $10 costs to respondent. Gibson, P. J., Herlihy, Reynolds and Aulisi, JJ., concur.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

OFFICE OF LEGISLATION AND CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

October 29, 2009

TO: Executive Officer 

Office of Legislation and Congressional Affairs

FROM: The Assistant Secretary for Legislation and Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: Delegation of Authority to Certify Fund Availability

I. DELEGATION

Under the authority vested in me by a delegation to all Principal Officers from the 

Chief Financial Officer, EL/GEN/1, certified on December 3, 1998, I hereby 

delegate to you, and to anyone serving for you in an acting capacity, the authority 

to certify funds available for administering the functions and responsibilities of 

the Office of Legislation and Congressional Affairs. This authority is issued 

pursuant to Title 31 of the U.S. Code, which governs the money and finances of 

the Department.

Unless otherwise noted in future delegations of authority, amendments to the 

authority delegated herein are included in the scope of this delegation.

II. RESERVATIONS: None.

III. REDELEGATION

This authority may not be redelegated

IV. CERTIFICATION AND EFFECTIVE DATE

This delegation is effective upon certification by the Department's Principal 

Delegations Control Officer. I hereby ratify actions within the scope of this 

delegation taken by you prior to the date of certification.

_________/s/___________

 Gabriella Gomez

Certified Date: 11/4/2009

Departmental Delegations Control Officer: /s/ Naty G. Beetle

Control Number: EJ/EJ/40
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED OCTOBER 8, 2014

NO. 03-14-00627-CR

Trevarrus Cortez Graves, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 27TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE JONES, JUSTICES ROSE AND GOODWIN

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION -- OPINION BY JUSTICE GOODWIN

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court. Having reviewed 

the record, it appears that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. Therefore, the Court 

dismisses the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Because appellant is indigent and unable to pay 

costs, no adjudication of costs is made.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED CONDENSED BALANCE SHEETS AND CONSOLIDATED CONDENSED STATEMENTS OF
INCOME AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                          29,952
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  387,298
<ALLOWANCES>                                    19,141
<INVENTORY>                                    499,951
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,046,275
<PP&E>                                       1,016,032
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0<F1>
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,041,099
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          548,169
<BONDS>                                        630,957
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       108,484
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,394,079
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,041,099
<SALES>                                        377,882
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               696,929
<CGS>                                          283,460
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  518,441
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              26,287
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,640
<INCOME-TAX>                                       796
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                518
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       518
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.01
<FN>
<F1>THIS AMOUNT IS NOT DISCLOSED IN THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND THUS A VALUE OF
ZERO HAS BEEN SHOWN FOR PURPOSES OF THIS FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE.
</FN>


</TABLE>
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

RAJKA SUBARIC, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 11 C 9222

)

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD )

TEAMSTERS LOCAL #781, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This Court’s January 5, 2012 memorandum order (“Order”) was

issued sua sponte to require pro se plaintiff Rajka Subaric

(“Subaric”) to offer more than her Complaint ¶27’s skeletal

assertion of the failure of her union (defendant International

Brotherhood of Teamsters Local #781) to provide her with fair

representation in her grievance against her employer, United

Airlines. In addition to drawing Subaric’s attention to a

relevant decision by our Court of Appeals, the Order directed her

“to flesh out that generalized allegation on or before

January 23, 2012.”

That due date came and went more than a week ago without any

response from Subaric. Not only has she failed to meet what the

Order referred to as “the ‘plausibility’ requirement that the

Twombly-Iqbal canon now requires of any plaintiff,” but she has

failed to show that her denial-of-fair-representation claim had

been brought within the six-month time frame mandated by Del

Costello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983). Accordingly both the
Complaint and this action are dismissed--both because of

Subaric’s failure to comply with the Order and due to

untimeliness.

________________________________________

Milton I. Shadur

Senior United States District Judge

Date: February 1, 2012

2
###### Editorial Note on Part 75

#### Editorial Note:

The provisions of this part marked [Statutory Provision] appear in Title III of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.

#### § 75.520 Electric equipment; switches.

[Statutory Provision]

All electric equipment shall be provided with switches or other controls that are safely designed, constructed, and installed.