UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4964

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NATHAN DANIEL LARSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District 

Judge. (1:10-cr-00249-GBL-1)

Submitted: March 17, 2011 Decided: April 8, 2011

Before KING and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished 

per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. 

Pratt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Brooke Sealy Rupert, 

Research & Writing Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Jacquelyn 

Rivers, Special Assistant, James P. Gillis, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Nathan Daniel Larson appeals the judgment and amended 

judgment revoking supervised release. He contends that (1) the 

twenty-four month sentence was procedurally unreasonable; 

(2) the district court failed to ascertain whether he wanted to 

allocute prior to imposition of sentence; (3) the district court 

erred by imposing as a condition of supervised release that he 

remain medication compliant; and (4) the district court was not 

authorized to enter the amended judgment. We affirm the court’s 

judgment in all respects except for the length of supervised 

release, vacate that portion of the judgment stating the 

duration of supervised release, vacate the court’s amended 

judgment and remand the case to the district court for the 

limited purpose of entry of final judgment reflecting the 

correct duration of supervised release.

This court will affirm a sentence imposed after 

revocation of supervised release if it is within the applicable 

statutory maximum and is not “plainly unreasonable.” United 

States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In 

determining whether a revocation sentence is “plainly 

unreasonable,” the court first assesses the sentence for 

unreasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the procedural and 

substantive considerations that [it] employ[s] in [its] review 

of original sentences.” Id. at 438. A revocation sentence is 
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procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the 

Guidelines’ Chapter 7 advisory policy statements and the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors that it is permitted to consider in 

a supervised release revocation case. Id. at 440. A revocation 

sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court 

stated a proper basis for concluding the defendant should 

receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Id. 

Only if a sentence is found procedurally or substantively 

unreasonable will this court “then decide whether the sentence 

is plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439. A sentence is “plainly” 

unreasonable if it is clearly or obviously unreasonable. Id. 

Because it is clear that the district court intended 

to sentence Larson to the maximum allowed by law, any procedural 

error regarding the advisory Guidelines range of imprisonment 

was harmless. 

Larson’s claim that the district court failed to 

ascertain whether he waived his right to allocute is reviewed 

for plain error. Plain error review requires: (1) that there 

be an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affected the 

Defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Lewis, 10 F.3d 

1086, 1092 (4th Cir. 1993). Larson bears the burden of showing 

his substantial rights were violated. Id. Even if there is 

plain error, this court will correct the error only if it 

seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation 
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of the proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 

(1993). Given the clear intent of the district court to 

sentence Larson to the statutory maximum, we will not notice the 

error. 

We further conclude that the district court did not 

err when it continued as a condition of supervised release that 

Larson remain medication compliant without providing a rationale 

for the condition. Given that the original sentencing court 

supported this condition with factfinding and the condition was 

affirmed on appeal, it was not necessary for the court in this 

instance to engage in further factfinding prior to continuing as 

a condition of supervised release that Larson remain medication 

compliant.

We conclude that the district court erred by entering 

an amended judgment based on Larson’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) 

motion more than fourteen days after sentencing. Although the 

amended judgment corrected the term of supervised release to one 

year, the court was without jurisdiction to do so. See United 

States v. Shank, 395 F.3d 466, 469 (4th Cir. 2005) (sentencing 

court lacks jurisdiction to correct a sentence outside the 

period specified in Rule 35). For that reason, we vacate the 

amended judgment.

We affirm the judgment in all respects except for the 

length of supervised release. We vacate that portion of the 
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judgment stating the length of supervised release, and remand 

the case to the district court for the limited purpose of entry 

of final judgment reflecting that the supervised release be one 

year. We also vacate the amended judgment. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART,

VACATED IN PART,

AND REMANDED