[Cite as In re Estate of Reinhard , 2020-Ohio-3409.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

MADISON COUNTY

IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHN REINHARD, DECEASED :

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: CASE NO. CA2019-11-028

O P I N I O N

6/22/2020

APPEAL FROM MADISON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PROBATE DIVISION Case No. 20191079

Arenstein & Andersen Co., LPA, Eric R. McLoughlin, Nicholas I. Andersen, Jessica L. Sohner, 6740 Avery Muirfield Drive, Suite B, Dublin, Ohio 43017 , for appellant

HENDRICKSON, P.J. {¶1} Chasity Skidmore appeals from the decision of the Madison Count y Probate Court, which, within an estate proceeding, issued a preliminary injunction ordering Skidmore to preserve assets in her possession that belonged to the decedent, John Reinhard. For the reasons that follow, this court dismisses th e appeal for lack of a final appealable order. {¶2} John Reinhard died in March 2019. In June 2019, David Stewart applied toMadison CA2019-11-028

- 2 - administer Reinhard's estate. The application indicated that R einhard died intestate and that in excess of $1,000,000 of his personal and real property was subject to administration. On the Form 1.0 listing next of kin, Stewart indicated that Rei nhard died unmarried, without children, and that Stewart lacked knowledge of other next of ki n. {¶3} The probate court set a hearing on Stewart's application and St ewart published notice of the hearing in the local newspaper. Follow ing the hearing, the probate court issued letters of authority appointing Stewart. {¶4} Stewart thereafter filed a petition in the estate proceeding re questing that the court review the actions of Chasity Skidmore with respect to a power of attorney ("POA") executed by Reinhard in December 2018, which nominated Skidmore as his attorney-infact. The petition alleged that one week after the execution o f the POA, Reinhard moved into an assisted living facility where Skidmore was an employee . Then, between January 2019 and the date of Reinhard's death in March 2019, approximat ely $500,000 was removed from Reinhard's bank account. Additionally, a benefici ary designation on Reinhard's investment account had been changed to make Skidmore the sole beneficiary. {¶5} The petition requested that the court review Skidmore's actions as Reinhard's agent against the duties set forth in R.C. 1337.34(A) and (B), order her to provide documents accounting for her actions, and to grant any other ap propriate relief. Stewart attached a copy of the POA as well as Reinhard's bank records a nd the beneficiary change form. Stewart served a copy of the petition on Skidmore's attor ney. {¶6} The court subsequently issued an order scheduling a hearing and ordering Skidmore to appear to give testimony as to her actions using th e POA, and to produce all records documenting her actions. The court additionally ordere d Skidmore to "preserve any and all assets under her control that once belonged to John Reinhard or were acquired with funds which once were the property of John Reinhard."Madison CA2019-11-028

- 3 - {¶7} Prior to the hearing, Skidmore filed an application to probate Reinhard's last will and testament. Skidmore filed Reinhard's will, executed J anuary 2019. The will

nominated Skidmore as Reinhard's executor and made her the sole beneficiary of his

estate. {¶8} Skidmore additionally moved the court to vacate Stewart's lette rs of authority. Citing Civ.R. 73(E)(6), Skidmore argued that Stewart's appointm ent as administrator was void based upon Stewart's failure to – prior to publishing noti ce of the hearing on his application to administer – file an affidavit with the court ce rtifying that "name, usual place of residence, or existence of the person to be served is unknow n and cannot with reasonable diligence be ascertained * * *." Finally, Skidmore moved the court to strike its order granting Stewart's petition to review her actions as POA. The parties filed various other motions irrelevant to this appeal. {¶9} Ultimately, the probate court issued an entry addressing all ou tstanding motions. The court agreed with Skidmore that Stewart's failure to file the affidavit required by Civ.R. 73(E)(6) rendered Stewart's letters of authority void . The court therefore revoked Stewart's letters. The court also found that the petition to r eview Skidmore's actions had been filed by Stewart under void letters and therefore the peti tion and entry granting the petition must be stricken. {¶10} In the same entry, the court indicated that it had not yet admi tted the will filed by Skidmore to probate. Instead, pursuant to R.C. 2107.18, the court indicated it intended

to examine the two witnesses to the will and would set a hearin g date. Also, in the same entry, the court continued its previous order requiring Skidmor e to "preserve any and all assets under her control that once belong to John Reinhard or w ere acquired with funds which once were the property of John Reinhard." Skidmore appea ls, raising a singleMadison CA2019-11-028

- 4 - assignment of error. 1 {¶11} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY SUA SPONTE ISSUING AN INJUNCTION

ORDERING CHASITY SKIDMORE "TO PRESERVE ANY AND ALL ASSETS UNDER HER CONTROL THAT ONCE BELONGED TO JOHN REINHARD OR WERE ACQUIRED WI TH

FUNDS WHICH ONCE WERE THE PROPER TY OF JOHN REINHARD" WITHOUT

PROVIDING HER WITH REASONABLE NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE

HEARD. {¶12} Skidmore argues that the probate court violated her procedural due process rights and Civ.R. 65 by issuing a preliminary injunction withou t first holding a hearing or giving her notice that the court intended to issue a preliminar y injunction. However, this court concludes that Skidmore's appeal must be dismissed becaus e the probate court's order with respect to the preliminary injunction did not consti tute a final appealable order. {¶13} "A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that is consi dered interlocutory, tentative, and impermanent in nature." Wells Fargo Ins. USA Servs. v. Gingrich , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-05-085, 2012-Ohio-677, ¶ 5. 2 Consequently, "an order granting or denying a preliminary injunction does not aut omatically qualify as a final appealable order." Id . To be appealable, such an order must fulfill the two-pronged test forth in R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). Id

. {¶14} Pursuant to R.C. 2505.02(B)(4), an order that grants or denies a provisional remedy is a final order that may be reviewed by this court if ( 1) "[t]he order in effect

1. Stewart did not separately appeal the probate court's decis ion and did not otherwise participate in this appeal. 2. A preliminary injunction has also been defined as "a remedy provided for present need or for the immediate occasion; one adapted to meet a particular exigency. Particula rly, a temporary process available to a plaintiff in a civil action, which secures him against loss, irreparable injury, dissipation of the property, etc., while the action is pending. Such include the remedies of injunction, app ointment of a receiver, attachment, or arrest." Premier Health Care Servs. v. Schneiderman , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 18795, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5170, *10-11 (Aug. 21, 2001), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 640 (5th Ed.1983).Madison CA2019-11-028

- 5 - determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy an d prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy[,]" and (2) "[t]he appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or ef fective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action." {¶15} This first prong is met if the order determines the provisional remedy in question and prevents a judgment in favor of the appealing part y. Sinnott v. Aqua-Chem,

Inc. , 116 Ohio St.3d 158, 2007-Ohio-5584, ¶ 20-22. Here, the proba te court's order granted a preliminary injunction, i.e., a provisional remedy, against S kidmore, the appealing party. Accordingly, the first prong is met because the order determine d the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevented a judgment in Skidmore's f avor. {¶16} With regard to the second prong, Skidmore must be able to demon strate that she would be deprived of a meaningful and effective remedy if s he cannot appeal now. Wells Fargo , 2012-Ohio-677 at ¶ 10, citing E. Cleveland Firefighters, IAFF Local 500 v. E.

Cleveland , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88273, 2007-Ohio-1447, ¶ 4. The statu te recognizes that while a court has an interest in avoiding piecemeal litiga tion, "occasions may arise in which a party seeking to appeal from an interlocutory order wou ld have no adequate remedy from the effects of that order on appeal from final judgment." State v. Muncie , 91 Ohio St.3d 440, 451 (2001). Examples of preliminary injunctions that othe r courts have determined are final appealable orders include "an order compelling the pr oduction of documents containing trade secrets, an order compelling the production of privileged communications, or an order denying a request to enforce a covenant not to comp ete." Empower Aviation, L.L.C. v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 185 Ohio App.3d 477, 2009-Ohio-6331, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.). {¶17} This court concludes that the preliminary injunction issued in this case would not deprive Skidmore of a meaningful and effective remedy at th e conclusion of the estateMadison CA2019-11-028

- 6 - proceedings. Effectively, the probate court ordered Skidmore t o preserve the status quo as it concerns any assets in her possession that were formerly Rei nhard's assets or were acquired using his assets. Ohio courts have held that "a preli minary injunction which acts to maintain the status quo pending a ruling on the merits is no t a final appealable order

under R.C. 2505.02." Hootman v. Zock, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2007-A-0063, 2007-Ohio5619, ¶ 116, citing E. Cleveland Firefighters at ¶ 5; and Deyerle v. Perrysburg , 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-03-063, 2004-Ohio-4273. If Skidm ore were to prevai l in a challenge to her use of the POA, or other legal action against her by interested parties to the estate, she would not be deprived of a meaningful remedy because she appare ntly possesses the assets in question. Consequently, this court dismisses the app eal for lack of a final appealable order. {¶18} Appeal dismissed.

S. POWELL and RINGLAND, JJ., concur.