SERVED: JANUARY 14,2013 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, DC 

) 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ) 

) 

Complainant, ) 

) 

v. ) FAA Docket No. [To Be Assigned] 

) (Civil Penalty Action) 

FROST AD ATELIER, INC. ) 

) 

Respondent. ) FDMS No. FAA-2011-0294 

) __________________________ ) 

INITIAL DECISION 

OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE RICHARD C. GOODWIN 

Found: 1. Respondent violated §§171.2(e), 172.200(a), 172.202(a)(1), 172.202(a)(2), 

172.202( a )(3), 172.202( a)( 6), 172.202( a )(7), 172.204( a) or ( c )(1 ), 

172.204(c)(2), 172.204(c)(3), 172.30l(a), 172.600 and 172.602(b)(3), 

172.604(a)(3), and 173.1(b) as charged; and 

2. Respondent is assessed a civil penalty of $5,000. 

I. Background 

This matter originated with the discovery by authorities of certain restricted 

substances in the luggage of a passenger preparing to board an aircraft. 

On May 29,2010, Ronda (Ronnie) Frostad, a ticketed passenger on Southwest 

Airlines, prepared to depart Louisville, KY for Sacramento, CA.1 She was travelling 

1 Tr. 211. The Complaint stated the date as May 7, 2010. Complainant later served an erratum to the Complaint 

correcting the date ofthe incident to May 29,2010. See Tr. 210. 
2 

on behalf of a company she owns and runs~ Respondent Frostad Atelier~ Inc.~ of McClellan and 

Sacramento~ CA. (''Respondent" or ''the company"). Respondent is a bronze casting foundry 

(Tr. 208-09; Exh. C-9~ p. 1). Ms. Frostad and the two Respondent employees travelling with her 

were returning after completing a job that the company had been contracted to perform (Tr. 209-

12). 

Agents of the Transportation Security Administration ("TSA"i searched a bag checked 

by Ms. Frostad and found two substances inside warranting further examination: a 16.4-ounce 

can of propane and an 8-ounce container of an aerosol lubricant popularly known as WD-40 

(Exhs. C-2 and C-4). They determined that both substances were classified as hazardous 

materials ("hazmats") under the Department~s Hazardous Materials Regulations ("HMRs")~ 49 

C.F.R. §§171-180. 

The HMRs are designed to facilitate proper handling of inherently dangerous goods and 

to alert first responders in the event of an incident. As such, hazardous materials offered for 

transportation by air must comply with detailed marking, labeling, packing, and informational 

requirements spelled out therein. Certain training obligations must be observed as well. 49 

C.F.R. § 172. Ms. Frostad's tender had been undeclared: that is, the luggage in question had 

contained no warning or notice of the hazardous nature of its contents. Midtown Neon Sign 

Corporation, FAA Order No. 96-26 (August 13, 1996), p~ 2. 

Based on the foregoing, the Complaint ofthe Federal Aviation Administration 

("Complainant," "FAA," or ''the agency") cited Respondent for the following fourteen HMR 

violations: § 171.2( e), in offering hazardous materials for transportation improperly classed, 

described, packaged, marked, and labeled; §§172.200(a), 172.202(a)(1), 172.202(a)(2), 

172.202(a)(3),172.202(a)(6),, and 172.202(a)(7), in offering hazardous materials for 

transportation without properly describing the material on shipping papers, including the failure 

to set out the materials' identification number, shipping name, hazard class or division, the total 

net mass per package, and the number and type of packages; §172.204(a) or (c)(1), in offering a 

hazardous material without certifying that the material was offered in accordance with applicable 

HMRs; § 172.204( c )(2), in offering a hazardous material and failing to provide two .copies of the 

certification; § 172.204( c )(3), in offering a hazardous material and failing to add prescribed 

language to the certification; § 172.301(a), in offering hazardous materials in a non-bulk package 

not marked with the proper shipping names and identification numbers; §§ 172.600 and 

172.602(b )(3), in offering hazardous materials without providing emergency response 

information in the manner required; §172.604(a)(3), in offering a hazardous material without 

providing a 24-hour emergency response telephone number; and § 173.1 (b), in offering 

hazardous materials without instructing its agents and employees in preparing such goods for 

shipment. Complainant asked for a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C. §5123(a) of$37,500. 

Respondent denied the charges. It raised several substantive defenses to liability and to 

mitigate or avoid the civil penalty sought. It also asserted that the imposition of a civil penalty 

would constitute. a financial hardship for the company. 

2 A witness asserted that the "S" in "TSA" stands for "Safety." This is incorrect. See Tr. 28. 
3 

I held a hearing in San Francisco, CA., on July 10,2012. The parties have filed briefs 

and the matter is now ready for decision. 3 

Complainant bears the burden of proving its case. 14 C.F.R. §13.224. It also bears the 

burden of proving that the penalty it seeks is appropriate. See, e.g., American Air Network, FAA 

Order No. 2006-5 (February 10, 2006), 2006 WL 265369, p. 9 n. 19. Financial hardship may 

constitute grounds for a reduction of an assessment which is otherwise fitting. Conquest 

Helicopters, FAA Order No. 1994-20 (June 22, 1994), p. 3. The plea of inability to pay, 

however, is an affirmative defense. On that issue it is Respondent which assumes the burden of 

proof. 14 C.F.R. §13.224(c). As the Administrator has explained, this assignment of the burden 

is "reasonable and necessary" because the Respondent has control of its financial information. 

Salvatore Giuffrida, FAA Order No. 1992-72 (December 21, 1992), p. 2. Claims of such a 

nature must be substantiated to be credited. See, e.g., Michael John Costello, FAA Order No. 

93-10 (March 24, 1993), 1993 WL 833110, p. 4. 

II. Discussion and Findings and Conclusions 

I find and conclude that Complainant has sustained its burden of proof on its allegations. 

Respondent is found in violation of each of the fourteen charges preferred against it. I will 

assess a civil penalty against Respondent of$5,000. 

The facts which make up the charges are straightforward and may be briefly summarized. 

On May 29,2010, the evidence showed, Ms. Frostad and two employees of the company were 

preparing to board Southwest Airlines at the Louisville International Airport in Louisville, KY. 

(''the Airport").4 They had been working in the Louisville area on a job for Respondent and were 

returning home. Luggage Ms. Frostad had checked at Southwest's ticket counter was flagged by 

agents of the TSA. Inside the luggage the agents observed a Ziploc-type plastic see-through bag. 

Inside the bag they found an 8-ounce spray can of WD-40 and a 16.4-ounce cylinder of propane 

(Tr. 9-11,30-31,58-61,65,69-70,76, 108; Exhs. C-2 and C-3, and C-9, p. 1). 

Both substances are listed by the Department's HMRs as hazardous materials (Tr. 191; 

See §172.101 Hazardous Materials Table; see also Exh. C-7 and Tr. 164-70, 175, 179 (propane); 

Exh. C-6 and Tr. 157-61 (WD-40)). As noted, when such items are offered for shipment certain 

marking and labeling conventions must be observed. The HMRs require that propane be 

described as "Petroleum gases, liquefied, Hazard Class 2.1 (flammable gases)." The substance is 

assigned the United Nations ("UN") identification number known as UN 1075. This material is, 

as the parties stipulated, not permitted in passenger air transportation (Tr. 13 7, 152-53). The 

second hazmat found in Ms. Frostad's luggage, WD-40, is properly described for shipping 

purposes as "Aerosol, flammable, Hazard Class 2.1." Its assigned identification number is UN 

1950. The correct label for both the propane and the WD-40 is "FLAMMABLE GAS." 

(emphasis and caps in original). Respondent recognized that WD-40 also is considered a 

3 Complainant's Brief will be referred to as "Compl. Br."; Respondent's as "Resp. Br."; and Complainant's Rebuttal 

Brief as "Compl. Rebut. Br." · 4 The three-letter identifying code for the Airport is SDF. Tr. 82; see, e.g., Exh. C-2, p. 5. 
4 

hazardous material (Tr. 152). See also table following §172.101 ofthe HMRs; §172.400; 

§172.417.5 

The luggage had been undeclared. No labeling, marking, warnings or other information 

required under the HMRs were present (Tr. 170; see Initial Decision ("I.D."), p. 2). Nor had the 

company's employees undergone the HMR-required training in the transport by air ofhazmatsa fact Respondent conceded (Tr. 264). 

Ronda Frostad testified for Respondent Frostad Atelier, Inc. She generally was a credible 

witness. Ms. Frostad acknowledged that Respondent had offered the luggage in question for 

transport (Exh. C-9, p. 1). But in defense to the charges she insisted that she was not aware that 

the offending materials were in it. She did not pack them, she said. She asserted that she never 

travels with propane. It was used on the Louisville job, yes, but company policy is to purchase 

propane locally and to avoid travelling with it. The presence ofWD-40 is a bigger mystery, Ms. 

Frostad insisted; while it is used at the foundry in California, Ms. Frostad denied using it on this 

job. One of the employees travelling with her packed the hazmats, she added (Tr. 213-27, 260). 

These circumstances do not avail Respondent; they do not absolve it from legal 

responsibility stemming from the tender of the luggage. The trip manifestly was carried out on 

behalf of Respondent. Respondent, of course, had been hired in order to perform and had 

performed the work for which the travel had been undertaken. The airline tickets were 

purchased referencing the company address (Exh. C-2, p. 2). All matters involving the trip, 

including the tender, are properly the company's responsibility. In any event employers are 

vicariously liable for the actions of their employees acting within the scope of their employment 

(see, e.g., Warbelow 's Air Ventures, Inc., FAA Order No. 2000-3 (February 3, 2000), p. 5, 

reconsid den., FAA Order No. 2000-14, June 8, 2000,pet. den. 19 Fed.Appx. 606 (unpublished 

opn., September 20, 2001)). The offending materials were packed as part of the winding up of 

the job that had just been completed. The conduct underlying the charges, then, was within the 

scope. Ms. Frostad acknowledged also that the tools of the trade (which, the evidence showed, 

included both items under review) are the property of Respondent (Tr. 221-24). The 

circumstances described above show, I conclude, that Respondent is obligated to answer for the 

conduct of its employee and to accept responsibility for the consequences of the presence of the 

offending materials in Ms. Frostad's luggage. 

It is not necessary to Complainant's proof to show that Respondent or one of its agents or 

employees actually knew what was inside Ms. Frostad's luggage. Nor is it necessary for the 

agency to demonstrate that Respondent or one of these individuals was aware that either or both 

of the offending items in fact were regulated or prohibited hazardous materials. The governing 

statute contains no such requirements. It subjects any person to a civil penalty who has 

"knowingly committed an act which is a violation ... " "Knowingly" means only that a person 

(the definition of which includes a business) has actual knowledge of the facts giving rise to the 

violation (49 U.S.C. §5123(a)(l)). In this matter, it means that Respondent- through an agent 

5 Complainant's witness P. Cartrice Dye, a security specialist who reviewed the agency's investigative file, stated 

that WD-40 is permitted to be shipped by air in a quantity no greater than four fluid ounces, citing 49 C.F.R. 

§ 173.306. Tr. 162. The particular item at issue, however, was stored in an aerosol can of eight fluid ounces. Ms. 

Dye reiterated that the HMRs prohibit the movement of propane in air transportation in any quantity. Tr. 169. 
5 

or employee, of course -- knew that it was offering the luggage in question for air transport. 

This, of course, was proven. The statute also makes clear that knowledge of the law is 

unnecessary to a finding of violation; persons are liable even if they do not know they are 

breaking the law. Riverdale Mills Corporation, FAA Order No. 2003-10 (September 12, 2003), 

p. 5; Scott H Smalling, FAA Order No. 94-31 (October 5, 1994), p. 7. Congress intended to 

prevent individuals from relying on ignorance of the law as an excuse in civil hazardous 

materials cases. 6 

Ms. Frostad also asserted that she failed to see any signs at the Airport warning 

passengers of such things as categories of restricted or prohibited hazardous materials, hazmats' 

associated risks and dangers, and the possible adverse consequences of attempting air transport 

of such substances (Tr. 263-64). The evidence showed that the Southwest Airlines area where 

passengers tender their checked baggage features a large poster board containing pictures and 

descriptions of items which may not be packed or brought aboard aircraft. The carrier also had 

posted notifications at the counter on either side of the baggage wells where passengers place 

their bags for tagging and weighing. The signs advise that violators are subject to fines of up to 

$110,000 (Tr. 42-47; Exh. C-1, p. 2). 

The various signs provided ample warning to would-be passengers of the risks associated 

with travelling with hazmats. But Ms. Frostad' s failure to spot any of them is in any event 

irrelevant to the charges. No duty to warn existed. The finding of violations is grounded simply 

on proof that Respondent offered the luggage containing the restricted or prohibited materials for 

carriage in passenger air transportation undeclared. The luggage failed to conform to pertinent 

HMRs. 

Pursuant to the foregoing discussion, it is concluded that Complainant proved its case. 

Respondent is found in violation of the HMRs as charged in the Complaint: § § 171.2( e), 

172.200(a), 172.202(a)(1), 172.202(a)(2), 172.202(a)(3),172.202(a)(6), 172.202(a)(7), 

172.204(a) or (c)(1), 172.204(c)(2), 172.204(c)(3), 172.600, 172.602(b)(3), 172.604(a)(3), and 

§173.1(b)(Tr. 191). 

III. Penalty 

I will assess against Respondent a civil penalty of $5,000. 

A. Standards 

In determining the amount of the penalty, the decisionmaker must consider ''the nature, 

circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation," and, with respect to the violator, ''the degree 

6 Scott H Smalling, p. 7. The legislative history ofthe Hazardous Material Transportation Act conftrms that 

Congress intended to impose civil penalties on persons who knew about the act constituting the violation but did not 

know about the law. The conference substitute explains that "a civil penalty may be imposed only upon proof that 

the defendant knowingly committed the act which constitutes the violation (it is not necessary to show that he knew 

the act constituted a violation) ... (emphasis supplied)." S. Conf. Rep. No. 1347, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 

197 4 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7669, 7686; see also TCI Corporation, FAA Order No. 92-77 (December 22, 

1992), pp. 8-9 n. 13. 
6 

of culpability, any history of prior violations, the ability to pay, and any effect on the ability to 

continue to do business" and "other matters that justice requires" (49 U.S.C. §5123(c)). 

The Administrator has provided policy guidance· for agency employees to follow when 

recommending an appropriate civil penalty in hazardous-materials cases. The guidance is found 

· in the agency's Penalty Guidelines ("the Guidelines"). The Guidelines have been published as 

FAA Order 2150.3B, Appendix C. They were marked (but not admitted) in this proceeding as 

Exhibit C-1 0, of which I took judicial notice (Tr. 196). (I will refer to it as "Exh. C-1 0" even 

though it was not admitted). The Guidelines assess all relevant statutory criteria, including 

mitigating and aggravating circumstances. They additionally aid Complainant's penalty 

determination through a Sanction Guidance Matrix ("the Matrix"). The Matrix sets out specific 

penalty ranges for each input, cross-referencing such pertinent factors as the respondent's size, 

the quantity of the violative material offered, the extent of the respondent's usual dealings with 

hazmats, the relative risk of harm posed by the substances involved, and any adverse 

consequences associated with the hazmats' transport. 

The Guidelines are intended to indicate the Administrator's "general views" about the 

civil penalty ranges appropriate for different types of violations. Folsom's Air Service, Inc., 

FAA Order No. 2008-11 (November 6, 2008), 2008 WL 4948488, p. 13. They are not binding. 

Each situation, being dependent on so many variables, is unique. "Evaluation of the case," the 

FAA has emphasized, "is based on the totality of the facts and circumstances."7 · · 

An administrative law judge ("ALJ") is not required to follow the guidelines. The 

guidelines are intended for agency personnel, and ALJs are not agency personnel. Folsom's, 

supra, p. 14. ALJs make decisions independently, and the ALJ determines (subject to agency 

review) whether a civil penalty is to be assessed, and if so, in what amount. The Guidelines 

nonetheless must be respected as an expression of agency sanction policy. They represent an 

effort to produce consistent results in similar cases. The Administrator has asserted the power to 

impose the agency's sanction policy on appeal if an ALJ assesses a civil penalty that is not 

consistent with the Guidelines. Warbelow 's, supra, p. 20; Northwest Airlines, FAA Order No. 

1990-37 (November 7, 1990), pp. 8-10. 

B. Complainant's Position 

Complainant seeks a civil penalty totaling $37,500. It calculated the sum as follows: 

first, by slotting the HMRs violated into five categories (shipping papers, labels, markings, 

training, and emergency response) and then by describing Respondent per the Guideline category 

"Business Entity that uses or handles hazmat in the course of business" (Exh. C-10, p. 14; 

Compl. Br., pp. 9-10). The Matrix suggests a range of$7,500 to $22,000 per violation category 

for this type of business entity found to have offered an undeclared shipment of a hazmat 

exceeding quantity limits or forbidden on passenger aircraft (Exh. C-12, Fig. C-1, intersection of 

7 FAA Policy on Enforcement ofthe Hazardous Materials Regulations: Penalty Guidelines, 64 Fed.Reg. 19443, 

19444, 1999 WL 226610 (F.R.) (April21, 1999), also published on Aprill4, 1999, as Change 26,Appendix 6, to 

FAA Order 2150.3A. Order 2150.3B, effective October I, 2007, updated and superseded the original guidelines. 

See 72 Fed.Reg. 55853. FAA Order 2150.3B may also be found at www.airweb.faa.gov and rgl.faa.gov. See Tr. 

194. 
7 

Offense Category III and column C.; Compl. Br., p. 9; Compl. Rebut. Br., pp. 4-5). The agency 

does not explicitly state how it arrived at its suggested civil penalty; but multiplying the 

minimum amount per violation category suggested by the Matrix, $7,500, by the number of 

violation categories, five, leads to the total sought of$37,500. 

C. Respondent's Position 

Respondent offers the affirmative defense of inability to pay. It states that its financial 

circumstances justify a finding that no penalty be assessed. Respondent is "not in any position to 

pay," it argues. Any penalty would force the company ''to cease doing business" (Resp. Br., pp. 

3-4). Ms. Frostad testified that the company could not continue to operate if a civil penalty were 

levied in the amount sought (Tr. 252). 

In support of its position, Respondent submitted company federal tax returns for the years 

2009 and 2010 (Exhs. R-1 and R-2; Tr. 240). Ms. Frostad testified that in the year 2010 

Respondent did not make any money. She did not take a salary in either 2009 or 2010 (Tr. 241, 

244). She added that she has never taken a salary since founding the company in 1999 (Tr. 228-

29, 251) .. 

D. Determination 

Weighing the appropriate penalty in this matter requires initially an evaluation of the 

violative act. Frostad intended to check luggage containing flammable gases. This conduct was 

highly dangerous. The degree of potential peril such an act posed to affected persons and to the 

aircraft itself is suggested by the fact that both substances - propane in any amount and WD-40 

in the amount offered -- are banned from passenger air transportation under all circumstances. 

The civil penalty must be substantial in order to appropriately reflect the unacceptable 

and significant risk of harm the offering of these hazardous materials brought to flight. 

I do not accord validity to Respondent's affirmative defense of financial straits. The 

evidence supporting its argument simply is insufficient. Respondent fails to show how 

Complainant's proposed assessment would work the grievous consequences claimed. It did not 

fashion a nexus between the civil penalty amount suggested and the result feared. Another factor 

undermining the power of Respondent's argument is that neither tax return submitted in support 

is signed by any officer representing the company (Exh. R-1, p. 2; Exh. R-2, p. 1 ). Respondent, I 

conclude, failed to prove that it is unable to pay any assessment. 

Matters in addition to the nature of the violative act must also be considered; and an 

evaluation of all the surrounding circumstances compels the finding that the civil penalty 

proposed is considerably greater than warranted. I conclude that an assessment of $5,000 most 

closely accounts for the situation as a whole. 

There are several reasons for my determination. First, the agency's proposal is 

disproportionate to the nature of Respondent's behavior and to the policies sought to be 

advanced. The conduct complained of involved a single underlying act. To assert that the 
8 

penalty necessarily is grounded on five violation groupings, and then calculating the proposed 

assessment on that basis, fails to account for this fundamental fact. Complainant is not 

sufficiently appreciative of the Administrator's warning that deriving an assessment simply by 

multiplying the number of violations by the penalty recommended per sanction -- even a 

category minimum-- could result in a fine disproportionately severe. War below's Air Ventures, 

Inc., FAA Order No. 2000-3 (February 3, 2000), pp. 20-21, pet. for reconsid. den., Order No. 

2000-14 (June 8, 2000). Complainant's calculation smacks of"piling on," a policy the 

Administrator frowns upon in non-egregious circumstances such as these. Paul A. Carr, FAA 

Order No. 98-2 (March 12, 1998), pp. 11-12. 

The fine suggested also would do little to vindicate the agency's policies of compliance 

and deterrence for this Respondent. Frostad Atelier, Inc. is an entity which does not need to be 

educated or lectured about the dangers of hazardous substances. On the contrary, it is well aware 

of the risks broadly associated with chemicals. The very nature of its business warrants and 

compels such an awareness. Ms. Frostad testified that the company uses over one hundred 

different chemicals in casting. Employees performing their duties often must wear protective 

clothing (Tr. 256-62). Ms. Frostad, Respondent's owner and president, also testified that her 

business customarily bans the transport of these materials for reasons she well understands. It 

additionally is noteworthy when determining penalty that Ms. Frostad credibly asserted that she 

was unaware that the propane and WD-40 had been packed in the company's luggage. Against 

this background, a fine of the magnitude suggested clearly would do little to impress upon this 

company the agency's policies of compliance or deterrence. 

Finally, it bears mention that the civil penalty suggested is much greater than the agency 

has sought in roughly comparable matters. In one case the agency asked for an assessment of 

$3,750 for the attempted undeclared shipment on a passenger-carrying flight of"strikeanywhere" matches and two cylinders of compressed gas. These are substances which are 

banned from passenger air transportation under all circumstances. 8 In another instance, the 

FAA sought a civil penalty in the same amount for the failure to properly mark, label, and 

package a shipment of three one-gallon cans of concrete sealer (Berthan Macaulay, Docket 

CP02S00029 (DMS 12591)). Kaden and Macaulay are not unlike the instant case. 

It is true, of course, that the agency has virtually unfettered discretion in suggesting civil 

penalty totals. Moreover, because each case presents a unique set of circumstances, comparisons 

with other proceedings can be elusive. But the request of the agency -- whose Guidelines are 

designed to produce consistent results in similar cases (see I.D., p. 6)-to seek a civil penalty ten 

times the amount sought in the referenced matters must, without additional justification, be 

viewed with considerable skepticism. 

I have considered all other arguments advanced by both parties and reject them as 

without merit.9 

8 Todd Kaden, FAA Docket No. CP05NM0024, Initial Decision of Administrative Law Judge Richard C. Goodwin, 

served June 22, 2006. The Respondent was found to have violated the HMRs as charged and was assessed a civil 

fenalty of$3,000. . . 

Two more matters require attention. The first concerns the fact that the docket in this case has been sealed. See 

Order Sealing Docket served August 10, 2012. The docket, now including the briefs, will remain sealed for the 
9 

Weighing all the circumstances discussed above, I conclude that a civil penalty of $5,000 

is warranted. The amount equals the minimum suggested by the Guidelines for a business entity 

committing one category ofhazmat violation. Such an assessment best reflects the totality of the 

circumstances in the context of the statutory factors. The fine also will fittingly promote the 

agency's policies of compliance and deterrence for similarly-situated entities. It is substantial 

but not unduly punitive. In the circumstances it is appropriate. 

Respondent Frostad Atelier, Inc. is hereby assessed a civil penalty of $5,000 for 

violations of the following HMRs: §§171.2(e), 172.200(a), 172.202(a)(l), 172.202(a)(2), 

172.202(a)(3),172.202(a)(6),172.202(a)(7), 172.204(a) or (c)(l), 172.204(c)(2), 172.204(c)(3), 

172.301(a), 172.600 and 172.602(b)(3), 172.604(a)(3), and §173.l(b). 10 

Attachments - Service List 

reasons stated in the Order, but this Initial Decision, I hold, does not touch on any subject appropriate for 

withholding from public disclosure and, therefore, is not subject to that Order. The I.D. may be freely disseminated. 

The second matter concerns Complainant's Motion to Strike ("Motion") Respondent's Post Hearing Brief, dated 

December 17, 2012, on the grounds that the brief was one business day late. The Motion, failing to demonstrate any 

ftrejudice to Complainant, is denied. 0 Any appeal from the Initial Decision to the Administrator must be in accordance with section 13.233 of the Rules 

of Practice, which requires 1) that a notice of appeal be filed no later than 10 days (plus an additional 5 for mailing) 

from the date of this order and 2) that the appeal be perfected with a written brief or memorandum not later than 50 

days (plus 5 for mailing) from the date of this order. Each is to be sent to the Appellate Docket Clerk, Room 924-A, 

Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, Washington, DC 20591, and to agency counsel. 

Service upon the presiding judge is optional. 
10 

SERVICE LIST 

ORIGINAL & ONE COPY 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W1 0001 

ONE COPY 

David W. Williams, Respondent's Counsel 

Attorney at Law 

16372 Underhill Lane 

Huntington Beach, CA 92647 

TEL: 714-745-5610 

Lisa J. Toscano, Complainant's Counsel 

Attorney, Office ofthe Regional Counsel, AWP-7 

Western-Pacific Region 

Federal Aviation Administration 

P.O. Box 92007 

Los Angeles, CA 90009-2007 

TEL: 310-725-7110 

FAJ<: 310-725-6816 

FDMS No. FAA-2011-0294 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

The Honorable Richard C. Goodwin, Administrative Law Judge 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (E11-310) 

Washington, DC 20590 

TEL: 202-366-2139 Attorney-Advisor 

202-366-5121 Staff Assistant 

F AJ<: 202-366-7536 

1 Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person or by expedited courier, use the following 

address: Federal Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright BuildingSuite 2WIOOO, Washington, DC 20591, Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430.