IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-1481

Filed January 24, 2018

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JOEL D. STENZEL

AND CHERYL A. STENZEL

Upon the Petition of

CHERYL A. STENZEL,

Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning

JOEL D. STENZEL,

Respondent-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Randy V. Hefner, 

Judge.

Joel Stenzel appeals from the spousal support provisions of the decree 

dissolving his marriage to Cheryl Stenzel. AFFIRMED.

James S. Blackburn of Finley Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Anjela A. Shutts and Van T. Everett of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des

Moines, for appellee.

Heard by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
2

DANILSON, Chief Judge.

Joel Stenzel appeals from the spousal support provisions of the decree 

dissolving his thirty-two-year marriage to Cheryl Stenzel. Joel characterizes the

support awarded to Cheryl as reimbursement support, which he contends is

improper here. He also maintains the statutory language that support should be 

“at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the 

marriage” is not forward looking and, thus, his “current and future earnings 

should not be a primary focus of the case.” Joel asserts the court’s consideration 

of certain of Cheryl’s expenses is not allowed under Iowa Code section 

598.21A(1).1 Additionally, Joel objects to the amount of spousal support ordered 

both before and after retirement, the equalization fee related to attorney fees, 

and the court’s finding that Joel’s cosmetic dental costs paid from marital assets 

should be reimbursed to Cheryl. Finding no failure to do equity in the court’s 

rulings, we affirm. 

I. Background Facts. 

Both parties agreed Cheryl was entitled to permanent spousal support but 

disagreed as to the amount and duration. At trial, Joel proposed Cheryl receive 

$3500 per month until he reaches the age of sixty-six;2 Cheryl asked for $15,000 

per month until she reaches the age of sixty-seven and $4000 per month 

thereafter until the death of either party or her remarriage. The court ordered 

spousal support in the amount of $12,000 per month, which would decrease to 

$8000 per month when Joel reached the age of sixty-two (the court found this 

 

1 We will refer to the 2017 Iowa Code as there have been no substantive changes to the 

pertinent sections since the date of the filing of the petition. 

2 Upon appeal, Joel alleges spousal support should be set at $5083 per month.
3

age was consistent with Joel’s testimony that he anticipated a career change in 

six or seven years, as well as being consistent with the couple’s plan that Joel’s 

move would expedite his retirement). The support would decrease again to 

$4000 per month when Joel reached the age of full social security retirement 

(age sixty-seven). 

Having thoroughly reviewed the testimony and exhibits, we agree with and 

adopt the following fact findings of the district court:

Cheryl and Joel were married on August 11, 1984. Cheryl 

was [twenty-three] and Joel [twenty-four] years of age. [At the time 

of trial,] Cheryl [was] [fifty-five] years and Joel [fifty-six] years of 

age. Neither brought any significant property or debt into the 

marriage. The parties did not execute a prenuptial agreement.

At the time of the marriage, Joel had just completed his 

second year of medical school at the University of Iowa. Cheryl 

entered pharmacy school at the University of Iowa shortly after the 

marriage. Joel graduated from medical school in 1986. He 

completed a family medicine residency in Cedar Rapids following 

medical school, and he completed a residency in pediatrics from 

1987–1990 at what is now Blank Children’s Hospital in Des Moines. 

Between 1990–1993, Joel completed a fellowship in neonatology at 

Texas Children’s Hospital in Houston. He returned to Des Moines 

in 1993 and worked for Newborn Care Consultants. Iowa

Methodist Medical Center purchased this practice in approximately 

1994 or 1995, and the practice was integrated into Blank Children’s 

Hospital. Joel worked at Blank until early 2013. He then took a 

position with Newborn Specialists in Tulsa. Joel is board certified in 

pediatrics and neonatal-perinatal medicine. He is licensed to 

practice medicine in Oklahoma and Iowa.

Cheryl graduated with a degree in chemistry in 1983 and 

then attended pharmacy school from 1984–1987. She graduated 

with a Bachelor of Science degree in pharmacy in 1987. She has 

been a licensed pharmacist in Iowa since 1987 and is now also 

licensed in Oklahoma. She does not, however, have a Doctor of 

Pharmacy degree [(Pharm. D.), which is currently required to 

become licensed].

Two sons were born to the marriage, both now adults. . . .

Cheryl describes her health as excellent. Joel is in relatively 

good health, but he testified that he is taking medication for anxiety,

depression, and hyperlipidemia. He believes these conditions may 
4

be related to stress associated with his current employment and the

dissolution of the marriage.

A basic understanding of the practice of neonatology is 

necessary to contextualize Joel’s contentions. Neonatology is the 

care of critically ill newborns. By necessity it is hospital-based. 

Neonatologists cover deliveries as necessary and neonatal 

intensive care units [NICU’s]. Critically ill newborns require roundthe-clock care. Neonatologists thus work night and weekend shifts. 

Some neonatologists are employed by a hospital and are paid a 

salary, as at Blank, and some neonatologists, such as those at 

Newborn Specialties, contract with hospitals to provide neonatology 

services privately and are paid on a service-provided basis. 

Four neonatologists served Blank when Joel originally began

working there. This number eventually increased to seven. Night,

weekend, and day shifts were divided evenly among the 

physicians. According to Joel, he would work [forty] to [fifty] hours 

per week, although Cheryl testified that she recalled Joel working 

substantially more hours while at Blank. He received five weeks of 

vacation and other benefits. 

During the 2005–2006 timeframe, Joel was contacted by 

Newborn Specialties, a neonatology group in Tulsa, about 

relocating and joining that practice. Joel and Cheryl traveled to 

Tulsa, but ultimately decided to remain in Des Moines for personal 

and family reasons, including the fact that their sons were in private 

school and they did not wish to relocate them to Tulsa.

Joel was recruited by this group again in 2013. The original 

group was splitting, and several of the physicians were intending to 

remain in private practice and serve two area hospitals. They 

required the services of one or more additional neonatologists to 

provide adequate coverage.

Until this time, Joel and Cheryl had not planned to leave the 

Des Moines area. Joel testified that he would “probably” have 

worked at Blank until his mid-[sixties]. But by 2013, both [sons] had 

graduated from high school. Joel recognized that the work hours in 

Tulsa would be substantially greater than at Blank, but he also 

realized that he would earn substantially more income. Joel and 

Cheryl discussed the benefits of accepting the Newborn Specialties 

position and moving to Tulsa. By doing so, they anticipated that 

Joel’s income would increase substantially, but in turn his 

retirement date would be accelerated. They ultimately decided to

make this move.

Joel moved to Tulsa in March of 2013. Cheryl remained in

this area at least in part to sell their home in Norwalk where they 

had lived for [fifteen] years. That house was ultimately sold in July 

of 2014 for $420,000. 

According to Cheryl, in May of 2014, [the couple 

experienced a breach of trust]. They discussed conditions that 
5

Cheryl imposed in order “to restore the trust in the marriage and to 

prove to [Cheryl] that [Joel] was committed to [the] marriage.” As a 

result, Cheryl decided not to move to Tulsa but to remain in Iowa.

Cheryl filed the petition to dissolve the marriage in May of 2015 

when she learned that Joel was involved in a relationship in Tulsa.

The district court also examined the earnings history of the parties. 

According to Joel’s social security earnings statement, his 

income at Blank increased from $183,125 in 1994 to $293,676 in 

2012. His gross income from 2008–2012, his last five years at 

Blank, averaged $300,204. Substantial contributions were made 

into Joel’s 401(k) account during this time.

Joel bought a [twenty percent] interest in Newborn 

Specialties for $150,000 in 2013. This buy-in was financed with a 

seller note which provided that $30,000 per year would be forgiven. 

This constitutes reportable income but does not constitute 

disposable income.

Joel originally agreed to a $350,000 salary at Newborn 

Specialists plus his proportionate share of profits. This base salary 

was incrementally increased to its current level of $500,000. His 

gross earnings in 2013, the year he moved from Blank to Newborn 

Specialists, totaled $608,811. His earned income in 2014, his first 

full year with Newborn Specialists, was $677,531 and $529,771 in 

2015. These amounts include the annual $30,000 of debt

forgiveness, but do not include rental income of $51,157 in 2014 

and $34,053 in 2015. They also exclude $23,000–$24,000 of 

[yearly] contributions to Joel’s retirement account. Joel’s current 

income is based upon the $500,000 salary plus periodic profit 

distributions.

Joel’s compensation package includes [a] full panoply of 

benefits, including family medical insurance, life insurance, a

retirement plan with employer contributions, disability insurance, a 

continuing education allowance, and reimbursement for medical 

licensure fees. Joel testified that it is not foreseeable that the 

practice will “slow down” in the near future. Though income may be 

affected by such variables as Medicaid reimbursement rates, those 

changes are by their nature unforeseeable. It is probable that 

Joel’s income will remain stable or will increase over at least the 

next five to six years, and his annual income from all sources will 

exceed $600,000.

Joel asserts that his increase in income comes at a cost. He 

is currently working longer hours with less time off than he had at 

Blank. He testified that he does not believe that he will be 

physically or mentally capable of maintaining his current work 

schedule and demands beyond the age of [sixty-one] or [sixty-two]. 
6

He testified that he would likely pursue a different career path or 

retire at that time. 

Joel’s testimony regarding his retirement plans was quite 

clearly affected, not only by the stress of the practice, but also by 

the stress of this proceeding. Any number of factors will ultimately 

affect Joel’s decision to retire or make a significant career change. 

For example, the practice could restructure to lessen the burden on 

the doctors. (The practice is currently hiring more doctors.) Joel 

may make another career move with unforeseeable financial 

consequences. All that can be reasonably forecast at this juncture 

is that Joel’s annual income will remain in excess of $600,000 for 

the next [six] or [seven] years, and that he may reduce his workload 

by age [sixty-two]. His most likely retirement date based upon this 

record is [sixty-seven], his social security full retirement age.

In regard to Cheryl’s employment and earnings history the district court 

observed:

From 1987 until 1990 Cheryl worked full-time at Mercy Hospital in

Des Moines, and she continued working full-time after [their first 

son] was born and until the family moved to Houston.

She worked at Texas Children’s Hospital in Houston from

1990–1993 while Joel pursued his neonatology fellowship. After 

[the younger son] was born in 1992, Cheryl left the work force and 

earned no income for the years 1993–1995. She returned to work 

part-time for Medicap in 1996 when [the younger child] began 

preschool. She worked for Dahl’s part-time from 2007–2014. She 

left that employment in anticipation of the move to Tulsa. Dahl’s 

went out of business, and she accepted a position as an on-call 

pharmacist for Target in late 2014. She worked there for

approximately one year. She then took a part-time position with 

DGS Foods, LLC, under its trade names of Price Chopper and 

Cash Saver, primarily to secure more consistent hours and reduce 

travel.

Cheryl is working approximately [thirty] hours per week, 

including every other weekend, earning $48.25 per hour. She 

receives no benefits. She is entitled to participate in the company’s 

401(k) retirement plan, but she is not entitled to an employer 

contribution. Health insurance, and perhaps other benefits, may be 

available to her if she works more than [thirty-two] hours per week, 

but her ability to increase her hours is speculative.

From 1984, the year the parties were married, until 2006, 

Cheryl’s highest annual income was $30,283. During that 

timeframe, she earned in excess of $30,000 in only two of those 

years—1988 and 1989. Her income at Dahl’s from 2010–2013 

ranged from $44,674 to $73,277. 
7

Cheryl testified that she could earn $90,000 to $100,000 per 

year if she could find full-time employment working [forty-two]–

[forty-four] hours per week. Cheryl has applied for full[-]time 

pharmacy positions in the Des Moines area but has not been 

successful. Her employability is limited to some extent by 

modification of entry-level education requirements or expectations 

for pharmacists [(a Pharm. D.)]. Though Cheryl has a valid 

pharmacist license in Iowa, her education is less than that required 

of more recent pharmacy graduates . . . . Her ability to find full-time 

employment is also limited, in her opinion, by her age.

Cheryl’s current plan is to stay at her present position. She

admitted that this decision is in part based upon personal

considerations. She prefers to retain some flexibility to travel and 

see her sons.

Based upon Cheryl’s age, education, experience, and 

health, it is reasonable to conclude that her earning capacity is 

$75,000 per year.

Cheryl was also entrusted with many responsibilities of the family and 

home. The district court noted, “As a result of Joel’s schedule, Cheryl was also 

primarily responsible for managing the household and caring for the children 

throughout the marriage. She was responsible for everything from managing the 

family finances, getting the boys to school, overseeing homework, shopping, 

laundry, cooking and cleaning.”

The parties also presented evidence of their standard of living during their 

marriage. In this regard the court stated,

Joel and Cheryl both described their standard of living during 

their marriage as “comfortable” or “very comfortable.” They did not 

own an extravagant residence, as evidenced by the 2014 sale price 

of their home. They would typically take two family vacations per 

year and traveled to such destinations as Hawaii, Cayman Islands, 

Australia, Cancun, Europe, New York City, and San Francisco. 

Neither have expensive hobbies.

Both [their sons] attended elementary school at Des Moines

Christian School, and [the older son] graduated from high school 

there. They paid private school tuition for both sons. [The older 

son] attended a private university, Bethel University in St. Paul, and 

Joel and Cheryl paid his college expenses. They also paid for [the 
8

[younger son]’s undergraduate education at the University of 

Michigan at a cost of approximately $50,000 per year.

The parties regularly made substantial charitable 

contributions. They reported deductible charitable gifts on their 

2012 tax return in the amount of $23,247; $29,310 in 2013; $42,830 

in 2014; and $39,431 in 2015.

The district court also elaborated upon the parties’ current living expenses 

and lifestyle while this action was pending.

Cheryl submitted a summary of current or reasonably 

anticipated monthly expenses with her revised financial affidavit. 

This summary estimates Cheryl’s monthly living expenses at 

$17,510. These expenses appear generally reasonable. Cheryl 

anticipates attempting to save $5878 per month toward retirement. 

Her anticipated monthly living expenses would be approximately 

$11,632 exclusive of retirement savings.

Joel also submitted a summary of actual or anticipated living

expenses with his financial affidavit. His summary also appears

reasonable. Joel estimated that his monthly living expenses, actual 

or anticipated, would total $6669. Joel currently has a roommate 

and at least some of the expenses shown in his affidavit would be 

shared. Joel does not estimate the amount he would save toward 

retirement, but this may be in part due to the fact that he is 

contributing $3834 per month toward his retirement account by 

payroll deduction.

Both parties are living in apartments. Neither is living

extravagantly. Since the separation, both parties have traveled. 

These trips were not inconsistent with their pre-separation lifestyle.

Their respective post-dissolution budgets reflect lifestyles which 

only approximate that enjoyed during the marriage.

With respect to the property division, the district court noted the parties 

“managed their finances prudently” and were able to 

finance their sons’ educations, contribute generously to their 

charities, save for retirement, live within their means, and avoid 

debt. They accomplished these goals.

Cheryl submitted a statement of requested relief, which 

included a proposed division of assets and debts. Joel did not 

dispute the valuations reflected in that exhibit. He did object to 

Cheryl’s proposed division because, according to him, her 

proposed division would result in a disproportionate award of cash 

assets to Cheryl. 
9

According to exhibit 151, the parties’ net worth is 

approximately $1,422,683, a portion of which Cheryl claims as 

inherited or otherwise separate property. The parties agree that the 

marital assets and debts should be divided equally, and thus each 

party will leave the marriage with approximately $638,971 of marital 

assets. As particularly pertinent to the spousal support issue, 

under her proposal, Cheryl’s assets would include approximately 

$230,000 available for her immediate needs. Joel conversely 

would have less cash available for his immediate support, but his 

income will continue to be substantially greater than Cheryl’s. The

assets he will be awarded will include the estimated value of his 

share of Newborn Specialists, LLC, and Newborn Specialists of 

Tulsa, PC, totaling approximately $282,000, a value that is not 

disputed.

(Footnotes omitted.)

The trial court considered the relevant factors of section 598.21A(1), noted 

Cheryl’s “contributions and sacrifices which substantially enhanced Joel’s career 

at the expense of Cheryl’s career,” Cheryl’s need “to increase her income to 

achieve the pre-dissolution standard of living,” and Joel’s “substantial ability to 

pay.” The court found “Joel’s current income and earning capacity from Newborn 

Specialties is clearly relevant in determining what support Joel would have 

provided Cheryl had the marriage continued.” The district court concluded 

Cheryl’s earning capacity was $75,000 per year and her monthly living expenses 

“necessary to maintain her reasonably comfortable standard of living, but 

exclusive of retirement savings” were $12,000 per month. The court then found 

Joel was able to pay $144,000 per year in support and still have “a 

conservatively estimated $456,000 per year” in income—which the court found 

“more than sufficient to maintain or improve his standard of living and to continue 

making substantial contributions into his retirement accounts.” 

Joel appeals.
10

II. Scope and Standard of Review. 

Dissolution proceedings are tried in equity, and our review is therefore de 

novo. Iowa Code § 598.3; In re Marriage of Mauer, 874 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa 

2016). We give weight to the fact findings of the district court, especially when 

considering the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by them. Iowa R. 

App. P. 6.904(3)(g). “[W]e accord the trial court considerable latitude in making 

this determination [of spousal support] and will disturb the ruling only when there 

has been a failure to do equity.” In re Marriage of Olson, 705 N.W.2d 312, 315 

(Iowa 2005) (citation omitted); accord Mauer, 874 N.W.2d at 104. 

III. Discussion. 

We begin by noting that types of spousal support—whether categorized as 

traditional, rehabilitative or reimbursement—are not mutually exclusive. In re 

Marriage of Witherly, 867 N.W.2d 856, 859 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015). In fact, as we 

have stated, the moniker is nothing more than a “red herring.” Id. And “there is 

nothing in our case law that requires us, or any other court in this state, to award 

only one type of support” or to “characterize the support award as purely” one 

form or another. In re Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 2008).

Rather, “[w]hat we are required to do is consider the factors mandated by the 

legislature contained in section [598.21A] when considering a spousal support 

award.” Id. We conclude Joel’s harangue about the district court’s use of the

term “reimburse” is much ado about nothing.

To determine a spousal support award, “Iowa courts ‘are compelled to 

follow the traditional multifactor statutory framework set’ forth in Iowa Code 
11

section 598.21A.” Mauer, 874 N.W.2d at 107 (citation omitted). Under Iowa 

Code section 598.21A(1), a court

may grant an order requiring support payments . . . for a limited or 

indefinite length of time after considering all of the following:

(a) The length of the marriage.

(b) The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.

(c) The distribution of property made pursuant to section 

598.21.

(d) The educational level of each party at the time of 

marriage and at the time the action is commenced.

(e) The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, 

including educational background, training, employment skills, work 

experience, length of absence from the job market, responsibilities 

for children under either an award of custody or physical care, and 

the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or 

training to enable the party to find appropriate employment.

(f) The feasibility of the party seeking maintenance becoming 

self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to 

that enjoyed during the marriage, and the length of time necessary 

to achieve this goal.

(g) The tax consequences to each party.

(h) Any mutual agreement made by the parties concerning 

financial or service contributions by one party with the expectation 

of future reciprocation or compensation by the other party.

(i) The provisions of an antenuptial agreement.

(j) Other factors the court may determine to be relevant in an 

individual case.

After quoting this statutory language of section 598.21A(1), the supreme 

court recently stated:

Our cases applying the statute have identified three kinds of 

support: traditional, rehabilitative, and reimbursement. While the 

categories may overlap in some cases, this case involves 

traditional spousal support. “The purpose of a traditional or 

permanent alimony award is to provide the receiving spouse with 

support comparable to what he or she would receive if the marriage 

continued.” In re Marriage of Hettinga, 574 N.W.2d 920, 922 (Iowa 

Ct. App. 1997). Traditional support is ordinarily of unlimited or 

indefinite duration.

In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015) (internal citations 

omitted).
12

Joel strenuously argues the Iowa courts should specifically disavow the 

language from Hettinga and Gust concerning the purpose of traditional alimony

being “to provide the receiving spouse with support comparable to what he or 

she would receive if the marriage continued,” claiming it misstates the law to be 

applied. Instead, Joel contends our analysis should be on the need for the 

spousal support and not the ability to pay because there is no division of future 

earnings.3 We agree there is no division of future earnings and perhaps the 

reference in Hettinga and Gust to “if the marriage continued” was a poor choice 

of words, but the point is simply to attempt to provide for a continuation of 

lifestyle enjoyed during the marriage. We acknowledge we are required to 

consider all of the criteria set forth in section 598.21A(1). See Mauer, 874 

N.W.2d at 107.

As noted in Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 407, the statutory framework provided by 

the legislature in 1970 when it enacted no-fault divorce “largely adopted” the 

criteria enunciated in Schantz v. Schantz, 163 N.W.2d 398, 405 (Iowa 1968).4 

 

3

“Reimbursement alimony” has been defined as alimony that “allows the spouse 

receiving the support to share in the other spouse’s future earnings in exchange for the 

receiving spouse’s contributions to the source of that income.” Becker, 756 N.W.2d at

826.

4 Schantz states:

Use of the following general formula may be helpful in arriving at 

an equitable determination of financial or property rights and obligations 

of the parties to a divorce action, though each element is not always 

present or important.

A. PREMARITAL CRITERIA:

1. Social position and living standards of each party.

2. Their respective ages.

3. Their respective mental or physical condition.

4. What each sacrificed or contributed, financially or otherwise, to 

the marriage.

5. The training, education and abilities of each party.

B. POSTMARITAL CRITERIA:
13

As stated in Schantz, the enunciated factors were pertinent to the “equitable 

determination in dissolution proceedings.” 163 N.W.2d at 405. 

Section 598.21A(1)(f) identifies one of the factors to consider and requires 

us to consider the past standard of living of the parties, i.e., “The feasibility of the 

party seeking maintenance becoming self-supporting at a standard of living 

reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage, and the length of 

time necessary to achieve this goal.” There is no analysis in Hettinga or Gust to 

suggest the court had a new or different interpretation of this factor. We also find 

no inherent inconsistency between the stated purpose of traditional support in 

long-term marriages as set out in Hettinga and Gust and the statutory factors to 

be considered in determining an equitable amount of such support. See Iowa 

Code § 598.21A(1). We are guided by the statutory words—“the standard of 

living . . . during the marriage” and are required to impose support so the payee’s 

standard of living during the marriage may be continued. The standard does not 

change simply because the payor’s income or financial condition improves after 

 

1. Duration of the marriage.

2. Number of children, their respective ages, physical or mental 

conditions, and relative parental as opposed to financial needs.

3. Net worth of property acquired, contributions of each party 

thereto by labor or otherwise, net worth and present income of each 

party.

4. Conduct of the spouses and particularly that of the guilty party.

5. Present physical and mental health of each party.

6. Earning capacity of each party.

7. Life expectancy of each party.

8. Any extraordinary sacrifice, devotion or care by either spouse in 

furtherance of a happy marriage or in preservation of the marital 

relationship.

9. Present standards of living and ability of one party to pay 

balanced against relative needs of the other.

10. Any other relevant factors which will aid in reaching a fair and 

equitable determination as to respective rights and obligations of the 

parties.

163 N.W.2d at 405.
14

the parties separate or after the marriage. This standard of living during the 

marriage sets the highest level of spousal support but this sum must then be 

adjusted by the payee’s income or earning capacity, whichever is greater. See 

Gust 858 N.W.2d at 411 (“In determining need, we focus on the earning 

capability of the spouses, not necessarily on actual income.”). Iowa cases 

“emphasize that in marriages of relatively long duration”—and all agree this 

thirty-two-year marriage is of long duration—the imposition of and length of an 

award of traditional spousal support is “primarily predicated” on need and the 

ability to pay. Id.; see also In re Marriage of Wendell, 581 N.W.2d 197, 201 

(Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (“The imposition and length of an award of traditional 

alimony is primarily predicated on need and ability.”). 

Although we consider the past standard of living, some future projections 

are necessary to determine needs. For example, a spouse may need to procure 

health insurance after the marriage is dissolved, and it will be necessary to 

determine the cost of health insurance post-dissolution. In Mauer, the court 

provided this analysis:

To determine how much income Carol would require to 

support herself at a standard of living reasonably comparable to 

that she enjoyed during the marriage, we begin with the budget 

Carol provided to the district court. Carol acknowledged the budget 

was essentially an estimate of historical expenditures for the entire 

family before the dissolution. Because it included past 

expenditures Carol was no longer obligated to pay at the time of the 

trial, the budget was an inaccurate basis for projecting her postdissolution support needs. After adjusting the budget to eliminate 

every inaccuracy pointed out by the district court, to remove childspecific items that could be paid for using child support, and to 

appropriately reduce the cost of food, clothing, travel, and 

household supplies, we find Carol requires approximately $13,000 

per month, or approximately $156,000 per year, to enjoy a standard 
15

of living approaching that she enjoyed during her marriage to 

Richard.

In determining how much spousal support Carol requires to 

support herself at that standard of living, we must also consider the 

tax consequences. Like employment income and investment 

income, spousal support is taxable. Assuming an effective tax rate 

of twenty-five percent, Carol requires approximately $208,000 in 

pretax income from her employment, her investments, and spousal 

support. Thus, because we find Carol can generate approximately 

$57,000 in pretax income per year through her employment and her 

investments, we conclude she requires approximately $151,000 in 

spousal support annually to maintain a standard of living 

reasonably comparable to that she enjoyed during the marriage. 

This equates to $12,583.33 per month. Richard’s substantial 

income from his ophthalmology practice is more than adequate to 

support this award. Accordingly, we determine $12,600 per month 

constitutes an equitable spousal support award in this case.

874 N.W.2d at 111 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Thus, the Mauer court 

acknowledged a spousal support award is to be based on post-dissolution 

expenses to arrive at an amount that permits the spouse to maintain the past 

lifestyle. Id. 

“Often in marriage dissolutions, incomes that were adequate to support 

married couples and their children are stretched precariously thin in order to 

cover the expense of maintaining two separate households.” In re Marriage of 

Florke, 270 N.W.2d 643, 645 (Iowa 1978). Moreover, if the same standard of 

living cannot be maintained, support should not be fixed at the cost of the 

standard of living of the payor. In re Marriage of Giles, 338 N.W.2d 544, 546 

(Iowa 1983). Ideally, the support should be fixed so the continuation of both 

parties’ standard of living can continue, if possible. See In re Marriage of 

Bornstein, 359 N.W.2d 500, 502 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). We turn to the disputed 

issue of the amount of support Cheryl needs.
16

With respect to Cheryl’s needs to maintain her standard of living, we 

observe the district court did consider the “feasibility” of Cheryl becoming selfsupporting at a similar level of comfort and concluded spousal support was 

required. See Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(f). We agree with the trial court that 

Cheryl’s earnings will likely not ever increase such that she will become capable 

of earning enough to maintain a comparable standard of living to that she 

enjoyed during her marriage to Joel.

Cheryl contends that she needs $17,510 per month to maintain her 

lifestyle. Joel takes exception to several items listed in Cheryl’s budget. Joel 

contends Cheryl’s list of expenses include current and anticipated expenses and 

are not reflective of the pre-divorce lifestyle. Specifically, Joel contests Cheryl’s 

budget items of $1200 per month for charitable donations, $500 per month for 

retirement savings, and $375 per month for gifts. Joel notes Cheryl also listed 

$208 for household maintenance and $183 for miscellaneous household costs so 

she has no need for additional savings. She also lists $1000 per month for travel 

so there is no need for savings for travel. Joel also challenges the entry for 

mortgage payments of $2200 per month for a fifteen-year mortgage with a loan 

of $250,000. He argues that, in essence, she will be receiving another $250,000 

in assets by this request. He suggests Cheryl should be obligated to pay the 

principal with her own assets and her housing expense entry should only reflect 

the interest of $811 per month. Cheryl contends these budget items will allow 

her the opportunity to continue with what had been the parties’ marital goals: 

contribute generously to charities, save for retirement, live within her means, and 

avoid debt.
17

In his brief, Joel asserts spousal support in the amount of $5083 per 

month is sufficient to provide Cheryl the “standard of living reasonably 

comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage.” See Iowa Code § 

598.21A(1)(f). But the statutory phrase modifies the subject of the provision: 

“The feasibility of the party seeking maintenance of becoming self-supporting . . . 

.” Id. We have already found that Cheryl’s earnings likely will not ever increase 

such that she will become capable of earning enough to maintain a comparable 

standard of living to that she enjoyed during her marriage to Joel. 

We agree with Cheryl’s recitation of the marital goals as the record reflects 

the parties paid over $20,000 in charitable donations in each of the past four 

years and transferred over $20,000 per year into their retirement account. 

Unfortunately, there appears no Iowa case addressing whether the needs of a 

spouse may include substantial monies for charitable donations or retirement 

savings. In the past, a spouse’s need for alimony has only included a modest 

amount for such expenses. See In re Marriage of Perry, No. 01-0057, 2001 WL

1448496, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2001) (finding a former spouse was 

entitled to more than nominal alimony notwithstanding her voluntary choice to 

save for retirement and make small donations to church).5

The issue of donations and retirement savings has been addressed in only 

a few cases in other states. Our review of those cases suggests that the 

resolution of the issue is dependent upon whether support is statutorily to be set 

to meet only basic needs or to the station in life to which the spouse was 

 

5 We also observe that in Mauer, 874 N.W.2d at 111, miscellaneous expenses were 

reduced or eliminated from the spouse’s listed needs, but no reference was made to the 

$500 monthly savings or the $83 per month in charitable donations.
18

accustomed. Compare In re Marriage of J.M.R. & K.L.R., CN12–03967, 2013 

WL 8181480, at *18 (Del. Fam. Ct. July 29, 2013) (“[I]t is not a reasonable need 

to give money away, and the court will not award [the spouse] alimony . . . so she 

can give it away.”), and Launey v. Launey, 722 So. 2d 406, 409 (La. Ct. App. 

1998) (finding charitable donations were not necessities) with Butler v. Butler, 

684 S.E.2d 191, 197-98 (S.C. 2009) (finding donations were a proper expense 

“when the parties established a certain standard of living during their marriage”),

Dobson v. Dobson, 294 P.3d 591, 598-99 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (finding gifts and 

donations may be proper “if the payor spouse’s resources are adequate, alimony 

should not be limited to provide for only basic needs, but should also consider 

the recipient spouse’s ‘station in life’” (citation omitted)), and In re Marriage of 

Schmitt, 626 N.W.2d 14, 19 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding it was proper to 

consider generous charitable donations as a part of a spouse’s standard of 

living). 

In Baranowski v. Barnowski, 80 P.3d 153, 156 (Utah Ct. App. 2003), the 

court stated, 

While the recipient spouse’s need to fund post-divorce 

savings, investment, or retirement accounts may not ordinarily be 

factored into an alimony determination, we cannot say that the 

ability to fund such post-divorce accounts may never be taken into 

account as part of a needs analysis. The critical question is 

whether funds for post-divorce savings, investment, and retirement 

accounts are necessary because contributing to such accounts was 

standard practice during the marriage and helped to form the 

couple’s marital standard of living. The inclusion of savings 

deposits as part of the needs analysis in an alimony determination 

is allowed only under such circumstances.

See also Tobler v. Tobler, 337 P.3d 296, 303 (Utah Ct. App. 2014) (affirming an 

allowance of savings expenses because “the parties regularly saved during the 
19

marriage, and it is reasonable for [the former spouse] to continue saving 

consistent with the parties’ married lifestyle”). 

Because section 598.21A(1)(f) requires us to consider the past standard 

of living of the parties, and not just basic needs or necessities, we conclude—as

have other courts with a similar statutory standard—that charitable donations and 

retirement savings in a reasonable sum may be a part of the needs analysis in 

fixing spousal support. Here, we have no difficulty with Cheryl’s expense item of 

$500 for retirement savings in light of the parties significant past history of 

preserving assets for retirement. However, we find her level of charitable 

donations significantly higher than the standard set for the parties as a married 

couple. For example, during the years of 2010 to 2012, their donations averaged 

about 6.5% of their gross income for two people. 

Cheryl’s expense of $1200 per month for charitable donations would 

constitute almost the same percentage for a single person. Accordingly, we find 

the amount of $500 a more proper sum in light of past standard of living. 

We are unable to conclude that Cheryl’s expense for gifts of $375 per 

month is unreasonable. 

With regard to the expense for the home mortgage, we note this is an 

estimate. We presume the sum of $2200 per month expense would include 

principal, interest, and property taxes because Cheryl has not otherwise 

identified property taxes as an expense. Because she will be leaving the 

marriage with approximately $230,000 in liquid assets, Cheryl has some ability to 

pay, but both parties are leaving the marriage with significant assets. It is not 

equitable to limit housing expense to just the interest on the mortgage. Cheryl 
20

will have interest, principal, and property taxes to pay should she choose to 

purchase a residence and finance it as planned. Under the circumstances we 

believe it is equitable for her to reflect $2200 per month for her housing expense.

Cheryl has net monthly income of $4485. She identified total monthly 

expenses of $17,510. The district court did not allow for the full amount of 

Cheryl’s request for $5878 per month toward retirement. While Cheryl’s sum for 

expenses could be reduced to provide for $500 per month for charitable 

donations, in determining the proper amount of spousal support we are also 

required to consider the tax consequences. See Mauer, 874 N.W.2d at 111.

Alimony payments will be taxable to Cheryl. See In re Marriage of Anliker, 694

N.W.2d 535, 542 (Iowa 2005). Because it quite clear her additional income taxes 

on the alimony payments will exceed $500 and Cheryl has not appealed the 

amount of alimony awarded to her by the district court of $12,000 per month, we 

conclude alimony should be fixed at that amount subject to Joel’s ability to pay 

that sum. 

With respect to Joel’s ability to pay Cheryl’s unmet expenses, he contends 

his current income—which is approximately double that which he earned at 

Blank—should not be considered. While it is to Joel’s advantage that we not 

consider his current income, the court’s task is to consider the “ability to pay.” 

See Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 411. Thus, even if Cheryl has not grown accustomed 

to a lifestyle with Joel’s higher income, Joel’s ability to pay is determined by his 

current income, not his historically lower income. The district court found Joel’s 

income is likely to stay at more than $600,000 for the next several years. Joel 

does not contest that finding. 
21

We agree with the district court that Joel is quite able to pay $144,000 per 

year in spousal support and still have more than $456,000 remaining. He will 

also benefit by the tax deduction permitted for alimony payments. See 26 

U.S.C. § 215. 

Joel next contends the district court “awarded far too much in retirement 

spousal support.” He states, “There is no mathematical way to come up with an 

award of retirement alimony.” But Joel acknowledges the support is determined 

based on each case’s particular circumstances. See Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 408. 

He suggests $1000 per month is “generous.” We disagree. We believe the trial 

court has adequately explained and equitably provided for Joel’s plan to 

accelerate his retirement from neonatology while allowing Cheryl support in 

decreasing amounts. We find no failure to do equity.

We do not address Joel’s challenge to the attorney fee equalization 

payment because the issue was first raised in a late-filed posttrial motion.6 See 

 

6 The decree was filed on July 14, 2016. Iowa rules of civil procedure then in effect 

require motions to amend or enlarge to be filed within fifteen days of the decree. See 

Iowa Rs. Civ. P. 1.904(2), 1.1007. The court had ruled on the parties’ timely motions on 

August 10, 2016, and that ruling had nothing to do with the attorney fee equalization 

payment. 

Joel raised this issue for the first time in a second motion to enlarge or amend, 

which was filed on August 23, 2016. This late-filed motion did not preserve his claim of 

error. “The timeliness of posttrial motions and appeal is a matter of jurisdiction and is 

not subject to waiver in Iowa.” State ex rel. Miller v. Santa Rosa Sales & Mktg., Inc., 475

N.W.2d 210, 214 (Iowa 1991), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in 

State v. Hagen, 840 N.W.2d 140, 152 (Iowa 2013).

In his reply brief, Joel argues Cheryl’s preservation-of-error argument avoids his 

contention. He does not, however, assert he ever brought the issue to the district court 

in a timely fashion. 

We note rule 1.904 has recently been amended and now specifically addresses 

such successive motions:

(2) Motion to reconsider, enlarge, or amend. On motion joined 

with or filed within the time allowed for a motion for new trial, the findings 

and conclusions may be reconsidered, enlarged, or amended and the 

judgment or decree modified accordingly or a different judgment or 
22

State v. Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d 339, 343 (Iowa 1995) (holding a party is to 

make an objection at the “earliest opportunity after the grounds for the objection 

become apparent” in order to preserve error). Thus, Joel has not preserved error 

on this issue.

As for Joel’s contention that the record supports a finding that his dental 

work was not a dissipation of marital assets, we are not inclined to make any 

modification of the court’s distribution of assets. Although the dental work was 

recommended by his dentist, Joel admitted his insurance company classified the 

dental work as cosmetic. Without more, we are unable to conclude the dental 

work was a necessary family expense. Considering the statutory factors, 

Cheryl’s need, and Joel’s ability to pay, we find no failure to do equity here. We 

therefore affirm. 

Cheryl seeks an award of appellate attorney fees. “Appellate attorney 

fees are not a matter of right, but rather rest in this court’s discretion.” In re 

Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 255 (Iowa 2006). “Factors to be 

considered in determining whether to award attorney fees include: ‘the needs of 

the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the relative 

 

decree substituted. Resistances to such motions and replies may be filed 

and supporting briefs may be served as provided in rules 1.431(4) and 

1.431(5).

(3) Motions to reconsider, enlarge, or amend other court orders, 

rulings, judgments, or decrees; time for filing. In addition to proceedings 

encompassed by rule 1.904(1), a rule 1.904(2) motion to reconsider,

enlarge, or amend another court order, ruling, judgment, or decree will be 

considered timely if filed within 15 days after the filing of the order, 

judgment, or decree to which it is directed.

(4) Successive rule 1.904(2) motions. Successive rule 1.904(2)

motions by a party are prohibited unless the court has modified its order, 

ruling, judgment, or decree and the subsequent rule 1.904(2) motion is 

directed only at the modification.
23

merits of the appeal.’” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 

270 (Iowa 2005)). While Cheryl has had to defend the trial court’s rulings, we 

conclude each party has the means to pay their own appellate attorney fees.

Costs of the appeal shall be taxed to Joel.

AFFIRMED.