Securing Afghanistan: Entering 

a Make-or-Break Phase?

by Robert B. Oakley and T.X. Hammes

Strategic Forum

Afghanistan has reached a critical

point in its struggle for post-Taliban

recovery. The stakes are high and

bound to influence enormously the future

directions of Islamic extremism, global terrorism, a nuclear-armed Pakistan, and the

stability of south and central Asia.

During the past year, major problems

festered rather than being treated, mainly

because Iraq diverted high-level U.S. attention, resources, and leadership. Aggravating

these problems were internal tensions within

the Afghan Transitional Authority of President

Hamid Karzai, Pashtun resentment toward the

authority, and the emergence of a serious

Taliban-led insurgency in the south.

To correct these problems, major additional resources were allocated, Operation

Enduring Freedom adopted a new focus on

security and stability, and the United Nations

and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

agreed to expand the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force beyond

Kabul. The successful adoption of a new

constitution at the special national assembly

(Loya Jirga) in January 2004 by a strong

moderate consensus was a significant step

forward in national unity, reduced Pashtun

resentment, and strengthened the hand of

President Karzai as a national leader.

Even so, critical ground and time have

been lost, due in part to doubts regarding

America’s commitment. Success is not assured and will require a longer, harder, and

more painful slog for Afghanistan, the United

States, and the international coalition, as well

as sustained U.S. leadership commitment.

To appreciate Afghanistan’s predicament,

it is essential to understand that all Afghan

politics are tribal. Thus, while Afghans share a

genuine national identity, their immediate

concern in any political process is to advance or

preserve the welfare of their ethnic or extended

family group. Further, since the Russians and

British artificially imposed the country’s international borders, the tribes are not wholly

contained within Afghanistan. They straddle the

borders with surrounding nations. Thus, tribal

politics are also international politics.

This tribal nature of politics has made

Afghanistan highly susceptible to local warlords. These individuals draw power from the

tribally based militias of the civil war that broke

out after the Soviets left and that resumed in

much of the country after the defeat of the

Taliban. (The Taliban controlled or defeated

militias and maintained public order, albeit

ruthlessly, in most of the country from 1996

until 2001.)

Kabul has been relatively secure and

economically bustling under the protection of

the 5,000-person International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), now led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However,

the Afghan countryside has been dominated by

the local and regional warlords and their

militias, who have paid little heed (or taxes) to

the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) to

which they nominally belong as governors,

corps or division commanders of the regional

Afghan Militia Forces (AMF), ministers, or vice

presidents. In an attempt to improve the security situation, the AMF—that is, the warlords’

militias—were loosely incorporated into the

ATA structure. Unfortunately, while some 

militia members loyally assist the coalition,

others have continued to be the cause of, rather

than the cure for, insecurity, human rights

abuses, and criminality, frequently in alliance

with the increasingly powerful drug lords.

Neither the ATA nor coalition forces made

much of an effort to redress this situation. The

former did not feel that it had the power; the

latter felt that the anti–al Qaeda/Taliban

combat mission they had assumed in October

2001 did not extend to broader security or

intra-Afghan (“green on green”) disputes, even

to supporting the ATA against the warlords. In

many localities, the coalition was actually

allied with warlords and their militias in pursuit of al Qaeda and Taliban remnants. The

result is that outside Kabul, various warlords

represent the real power in Afghanistan.

Each of the prominent warlords was a

major commander during the war against the

Soviets and the civil war that followed. In the

north, west of Mazar-e Sharif, Abdul Rashid

Dostum leads the Uzbek militia. Just to the east

of the same city, Mohammed Atta leads the

Tajik militia. Over the past 2 years, these commanders ignored the ATA and repeatedly fought

to gain control of key locations and revenue

sources in the area. Unfortunately, while they

fought, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts were slowed or halted, exacerbating the unrest. In November and December 2003, some promising initiatives

ended the fighting, began the collection of heavy weapons, and started

improving governance. While

still volatile, the area is

much quieter and more

secure than just a

few months ago.

No. 205

March 2004

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points

Post-9/11 Critical 

Issues Series
In western Afghanistan, warlord Ismail

Khan remains firmly in control of the city of

Herat and surrounding areas and of the lucrative official and unofficial customs duties

generated by the substantial commerce with

Iran. With the continued instability in the

south and southeast, Iran has replaced Pakistan as the primary trade route, greatly increasing the value of the customs collected in

the west. While Khan passes along a token

portion of those revenues to the ATA, he has

made it clear that he is the functional authority in that portion of the country. There is

stability in his region, but it comes at a price

for the Afghan people and the Karzai government. One either does business Khan’s way or

not at all.

In the south and southeast, warlordism

extracts the highest price from both Afghans

and the coalition. There is no single powerful

Pashtun leader to unify the Pashtun tribes and

no effective security in the area. Instead, there

is constant fighting and shifting alliances

(which can include cooperation with both the

coalition and the resistance and cross-border

ties with tribes in Pakistan). The installation

of Governor Yusuf Pashtun in Kandahar

province and the commitment to provide

better security and revitalize reconstruction

initiatives are positive first steps in dealing

with this volatile area, which has become the

primary focus of Taliban efforts to disrupt

coalition and ATA efforts.

Minister of Defense Mohammed Qasim

Fahim Khan has been recognized as the most

powerful warlord. He assumed leadership of the

Northern Alliance in late 2001 and, with the

collapse of the Taliban, moved his Tajik forces

into Kabul. Despite agreeing at Bonn in 2001 to

move outside the capital, Fahim kept over 5,000

militia and over 200 tanks inside the city. Tajik

dominance of the ATA security establishment

was bitterly resented by the much more numerous Pashtun. In late 2003, he began to redress

his image by surrendering some heavy weapons

stocks from the Panjshir Valley, moving others

out of Kabul, and putting more non-Tajiks in

senior Ministry of Defense positions.

The Karzai government, supported by the

coalition, ISAF, the slowly expanding Afghan

national army, and newly trained police, has to

meld these and many other diverse elements

into a functioning nation.

Political Progress

The outcome of the recently completed

Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) will have an

important, long-term positive impact upon

security and national unity. Efforts by the anticoalition forces to disrupt the holding of the

CLJ failed. Subsequent efforts by Islamists and

Tajiks to block key provisions of the constitution also failed. The constitution was endorsed

largely as drafted with a strong presidential

system and a two-house parliament. Those

pushing for a strong Sharia law were rebuffed

as were those (mostly warlords) advocating

federal or provincial systems. Ethnic differences

were overcome after a fierce debate, and minority and women’s rights are protected. The

result has been a psychological boost to President Karzai in particular and, in general, to

national unity, the ATA, the United Nations

Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA),

the United States, and the international coalition. It is also a boost to the Pashtun, who

played a cohesive, decisive, and moderate role

in the CLJ outcome.

While the new constitution may provoke

discontent in some areas, these problems are

probably containable. Of critical importance is

not only the large majority of delegates who

supported the constitution but also the nature

and extent of the negotiations between power

blocs that went into its approval. The Pashtuns

had a majority of the seats and achieved most

of what they wanted but did not humiliate the

Tajiks, Uzbeks, or Hezara. The first real Afghan

foray into democracy post-Taliban was a positive experience for most participants.

The next big challenge will be the presidential elections tentatively scheduled for June,

possibly July 2004. Registration procedures and

the actual polling process are inherently susceptible to insecurities. They probably are

manageable for the presidential election, but

preparations have been lagging due to preoccupation with the CLJ and the major security

problems in the south and southeast. A belated

crash campaign to prepare for security and

registration in over 4,000 locations has been

begun by the United Nations, the ATA, Operation Enduring Freedom, and NATO/ISAF. It is

2 Strategic Forum No. 205, March 2004

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley is distinguished research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies

at the National Defense University. Colonel T.X. Hammes, USMC, is senior military fellow in the institute.

Please address questions or comments to their attention at ndu-inss-research@ndu.edu.

Herat

Mazar-e Sharif

Meymaneh

Kandahar

Qalat

Jalalabad

Kabul

Farah

A Bamian

Tarin Kowt

Lashkar Gah

Parwan

Sharana

Khowst

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Konduz

TURKMENISTAN URKM

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hedan

Quetta

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PAKISTAN

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ah INDIA

AFGHANISTAN

250 kilometers

250 miles

Afghanistan
likely that presidential elections can be held in

most of the country this summer. However, the

more daunting task will be the formation of

parties, the selection of candidates, and the

actual voting for parliamentary seats, which

can be much more easily influenced by the

Islamist warlords and drug lords than the

presidential elections. The objective is to hold

both sets of elections at the same time. However, the new constitution states that parliamentary elections may be delayed up to a year

after the presidential election, providing more

time for the buildup of security.

External Complications

Complicating efforts to gain control of the

warlords and their militias is the fact that each

major tribal faction has external supporters:

■ The Pakistanis want a friendly government

in Afghanistan to secure what they see as their

vulnerable rear area. For this and internal political

reasons, they support the Pashtun—the majority

tribe and traditional rulers of Afghanistan who

make up the vast majority of the population of

Pakistan’s tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.

Pakistan as well as President Karzai have been

frustrated by the absence of any single dominant

Pashtun leader.

■ The Indians continue their support to the

Tajiks (Panjshiris) that began during the antiTaliban period of the 1990s. They see this as a

counterbalance to Pakistan’s support of the Kashmir

insurgents. Pakistan sees it as a threat, designed to

promote subversion.

■ Uzbekistan and Russia provide support to

Dostum and his Uzbek militia.

■ The Iranians continue to support Ismail

Khan and the Hazara, who are Shia, and whom

Tehran regards as an ally in the part of Afghanistan

that borders Iran.

Thus far, respect for the powerful U.S. role

and a wait-and-see attitude toward the ATA and

Afghanistan’s recovery have kept external

support to various factions from reaching a

sufficient level to undermine Afghan sovereignty. However, all the external powers, particularly Pakistan, are hedging their bets.

Transnational Threats

Two transnational forces further cloud the

security situation in Afghanistan. First is the

transnational drug trade. In 2003, opium production quintupled to three-fourths of the total

world production. The opium trade is estimated

to have brought in more money than all foreign

aid during 2003. The huge injection of funds

increased instability by increasing criminality

and corruption throughout most of the country,

also reaching important officials in Pakistan,

Iran, the Central Asian states, and Russia. It has

clearly benefited the anti-coalition forces, just as

it had earlier financed al Qaeda. Estimates

indicate the acreage planted in 2004 could be

almost double that planted in 2003.

Operation Enduring Freedom did not

include a counternarcotics mission because U.S.

leadership felt it would be a complication and

diversion from combat activities against the

Taliban. The United Kingdom volunteered for

the mission and worked along with the Afghan

authorities, but they have lacked the assets to

attack the problem. The United States turned its

attention (and resources) to the issue in late

2003, assisting Great Britain and the ATA. 

The second transnational threat is the

Islamic radical movement. It provides both

direct funding for al Qaeda and the Taliban

and indirect funding through Islamic religious

schools (madrassas), mainly in Pakistan.

Even more important, the madrassas provide

a steady supply of Islamist recruits for the anticoalition forces spread among the Taliban/al

Qaeda remnants, and even Hekmaytar Gulbiddin, the fundamentalist mujahideen leader

who fought the Northern Alliance for control of

Kabul in the mid-1990s.

Pashtun Resentment

A major threat to Afghan stability emerged

from the southern Pashtun population (which is

twice as large as that of the northern Tajiks),

who see Kabul as their capital and the Tajiks as

enemy occupiers. Among the Pashtun, the

United States is portrayed as responsible not only

for opening the way to renewed Tajik occupation

of Kabul in November 2001 (by its assistance to

the Northern Alliance in expelling the Taliban)

but also for supporting their continued dominant presence. This argument resonates widely

with the Pashtun population on both sides of

the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. President

Karzai, the senior Pashtun in government, has

been seen—at least until recently—by many of

his fellow Pashtuns as too ineffectual to counterbalance Tajik domination of politics.

It has also struck a sympathetic chord

with the Pakistani military and intelligence

services, both of which dislike and distrust the

Tajiks and are extremely concerned about the

close ties (carried over from Indian support of

the Northern Alliance versus the Taliban in the

late 1990s) that the Indians have with the ATA.

When the ATA permitted the Indians to open

consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar, Pashtun

and Pakistani suspicions were further fueled.

Indian-Iranian cooperation in developing

railroads, roads, and commercial activities for

the flourishing Iranian-Afghan trade has also

upset the Pakistanis.

A second powerful and emotional message

among the Pashtun has been the portrayal of

the United States as basically anti-Islamic. This

message took on even greater credibility with

the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the aggressive,

highly publicized Israeli military action against

Palestinians with what is seen as American

acquiescence.

A corollary to the anti-Islamist theme has

been the portrayal of the United States as the

driving force behind efforts to modernize the

very conservative Afghan culture. Resistance to

any central government attempts to modernize

tribal society, particularly attempts to change

the rights and role of women, has always been

fierce. The initial tribal revolts against the

Afghan communists during the late 1970s

came in response to their attempts to modernize the society, not as a result of their deposing

the monarchy. The subsequent tribal resistance

to the Soviets was driven as much by the desire

to preserve their tribal culture as by hatred of

communism or Islamic rage.

The Taliban hardcore pushed all three

ideas—that America is responsible for the Tajiks

controlling Kabul, is anti-Islamic, and wishes to

destroy the Pashtun way of life—and accused

Karzai of being a U.S. puppet. The propaganda,

plus the prevalent insecurity, absence of authority, and slow expansion of reconstruction, contributed to support for the regrouping and

rearming of thousands of former Taliban fighters inside Afghanistan and in adjacent areas

inside Pakistan. Starting in early 2003, the

Taliban revitalized their alliance with al Qaeda

remnants and related Pakistani Islamic groups,

particularly Hekmaytar Gulbiddin’s Hezb-e

Islam. This conglomerate can be best labeled as

anti-coalition forces (ACF).

Anti-Coalition Forces

The term anti-coalition forces is used

deliberately here; to refer to the resistance as

either Taliban or al Qaeda oversimplifies the

problem. In fact, the resistance includes

elements of both, but its core is formed by

No. 205, March 2004 Strategic Forum 3
Pashtuns, who are sustained by their perceptions of being excluded from power and under

siege. In addition, the resistance gains strength

internally not just from Taliban and al Qaeda

remnants but also from drug lords and smugglers, and it enjoys support from elements on

Pakistan’s side of the border. One cannot simply neutralize al Qaeda and think the resistance will be broken.

Starting in spring 2003, the ACF conducted

hit-and-run raids on ATA and coalition targets

across the south and southeast of the country. Al

Qaeda targets were the United States and coalition forces. Of even more concern have been the

deliberate attacks by the Taliban on international assistance workers and those Afghans

helping them (identified as partners of the

United States in threatening traditional Islamic

values). Aid organizations that provided assistance and remained in place through the initial

Afghan revolution, the Soviet invasion, the

Afghan civil war, and Taliban rule have been

attacked for the first time. Also for the first time,

they (and the United Nations) are pulling their

people out of the south and southeast. As the

Taliban intended, the raids caused a sharp

reduction in reconstruction activities, still more

preoccupation with security, and a corresponding negative impact upon support for the

Karzai government, the United States, and the

international coalition.

The Coalition Response

The Bush administration and NATO are

moving aggressively to make up for the lost

ground. At the same time, the Karzai government, reinforced by increased international

support, is becoming more assertive. The United

States tripled its resources during 2003 with an

additional $1.7 billion; $1 billion more will be

available for 2004, with an additional $1 billion

to be pledged by the United States at the March

2004 Bonn donor’s conference. These new

resources represent a significant boost for activities in the security, democracy/governance, and

reconstruction sectors—including accelerated

military, police, and antinarcotics programs.

With U.S. support, the ATA also is proceeding

with the new constitution and elections, provincial government reform, and promotion of

women’s rights. Efforts also are being made to

increase the pace of road construction, infrastructure rebuilding, and community development. Among other milestones, the vital KabulKandahar road was completed in December

2003, and some 20,000 provincial police are to

be trained by June 2004.

The United States has reorganized the

coalition command structure and is reorienting the strategic thrust of Operation Enduring

Freedom. The commander has moved to

Kabul, where he is closer to and better able to

coordinate with the Afghan government, a new

American ambassador—who has not only

much greater resources with which to operate

but also, as President Bush’s special representative, a broader, more dynamic mandate for

support of the Karzai government—the UN

Special Representative, and the newly empowered NATO/ISAF. The broad military coalition of

Operation Enduring Freedom and NATO

plans to undertake enhanced security measures

outside of Kabul with a new nation-building

focus as well as continuing and sustaining

combat operations, especially in the south and

southeast. This new approach is much closer to

a classical, politically focused counterinsurgency strategy and represents a belated recognition that sporadic military actions alone cannot eliminate the renewed radical Islamist/

terrorist threat. Instead of responding to sporadic ACF attacks and withdrawing, small units

will remain in high-threat locations to deter

the ACF and protect the local population.

The long-called-for decision in October

2003 by the UN Security Council and NATO to

expand the ISAF mandate beyond Kabul is

also a response to accumulating threats and

reveals a determination to resolve them. In

addition to providing more potential resources

for the security of the countryside, this step

has injected greater dynamism into ISAF and

inaugurated closer coordination with Operation Enduring Freedom and a potentially

broader role in all security sector reform

programs. The United Nations continues to

coordinate the overall security sector reform

with increased efforts by the lead countries

designated in the Bonn process. One major

concern is the slowness of NATO to identify

and provide the actual forces that they will

commit to honor their expanded role.

Japan, in conjunction with UNAMA, has

commenced the Disarmament, Demobilization,

and Reintegration (DDR) plan. The Japaneseled effort has successfully concluded pilot

projects near Konduz and Gardez in which

1,600 militias forces turned in their weapons in

return for a small cash payment, aid, and

retraining. Demobilization is currently under

way in Kabul. In a significant positive development, both Dostum and Atta have turned in

some of their heavy weapons for cantonment in

the vicinity of Mazar-e Sharif. In a similar

move with political significance, Fahim has

moved some of his heavy weapons out of the

Panjshir Valley to supervised cantonment sites

and has removed some heavy weapons and

militia from Kabul. Japan, the United States,

and UNAMA will apply the lessons learned from

the pilot program and the heavy weapons turnin as they reorganize and expand the program

to other areas the government can secure.

Germany, meanwhile, has focused its

efforts on long-term police training. It developed a 3-year program to train senior police

officials to fill the top-level position in the

national and regional police. Large-scale,

short-term training provided by the United

States, in cooperation with Germany, is now

complementing this program.

The United Kingdom is leading the antinarcotics efforts but has limited resources for

what it sees as a huge undertaking. Further, the

ATA has very limited capacity in this area,

although it is now gearing up new programs.

The United States has allotted about $123

million to assist the ATA, alongside the United

Kingdom. Enduring Freedom units also have

recently been given orders to take down narcotics laboratories and smugglers of narcotics if

located. The key frustrations are the lack of an

economically viable alternative crop and the

absence of security in much of the poppy growing area. In September 2003, nongovernmental

organization (NGO) workers reported that an

Afghan farmer could earn only about onefourteenth the amount of cash from an acre of

wheat as from an acre of poppy. Also, in the

absence of government security forces, he can

be impelled to plant poppies by the warlords

and their allied drug dealers. Since both crops

are commodities, the price fluctuates, but it is

difficult to see how wheat can be made competitive with poppy on a purely economic basis.

Police and Army

Security assistance, particularly police

training, is picking up speed. In addition to the

long-term German efforts for senior officers

noted above, the United States is putting up

4 Strategic Forum No. 205, March 2004
over $60 million and has instituted a training

program for ordinary police officers with centers in Kabul and eight key regional locations

(such as Gardez and Kandahar). The total cost

for police could be over $75 million for

2003–2004 and $115 million for 2004–2005.

The European Union has contributed some $50

million to the police training fund. The number of trained provincial police is supposed to

reach 20,000 by June 2004. The United States is

also working with Germany to train a 3,600-

man border police organization by June 2004.

The objectives of the expanded police

force are to work with the Afghan National

Army (ANA) and coalition forces to provide

security for the provincial reconstruction effort,

to offer special protection against cross-border

movement (smuggling) and for customs collection, to enhance safe movement on the

roads, and to improve local intelligence. The

police played a major successful role in security

for the Constitutional Loya Jirga and will be the

main security force for elections. The principal

challenge will be the equipping and overall

coordination, as well as overcoming the current weaknesses in training and incentives (for

example, salary and allowances). Training,

which is done primarily by Afghan personnel,

lasts between 2 and 8 weeks, and there is no

provision for trainers/mentors to be present

alongside the newly trained police (as there is

with ANA). These shortfalls, especially the lack

of supervision on the job, can be dangerously

corrosive given the pressure of smuggling,

narcotics, clans, and sectarian tensions. However, with additional international police trainers assigned to the reconstruction effort in key

provinces and active police support programs

by Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs),

working in coordination with Afghan trainers

and police supervisors, the problem can be

largely overcome.

The newly minted ANA units and their

American, British, French, and Bulgarian

trainers have proven to be a positive development, although the army’s small size still

limits the number of missions it can undertake. As of December 2003, the army had

trained 13 battalions of roughly 600 to 650

soldiers each. As of mid-February, the army had

trained 14 battalions of over 8,000 soldiers. To

ensure loyalty to the central government rather

than to a warlord, each battalion is ethnically

mixed with recruits drawn from throughout the

nation. Each battalion is trained as a unit at a

rebuilt base just outside Kabul. During January

2004, the training base capacity grew from

6,600 to 10,800 trainees annually. Reports from

the field indicate that the ANA is a genuine,

multiethnic national army that is operating

effectively and steadily improving.

Reinforcing this success, recent changes

in U.S. regulations allow American trainers to

accompany the battalions to the field on operations. This is critical to complete the training

on tactics, techniques, and procedures; to

provide the communications links to coalition

firepower and rapid reaction forces; and to offer

a psychological boost to the army. ANA troops

have deployed on operations in the south and

southeast part of the country, conducted security for the Constitutional Loya Jirga, and

monitored heavy weapons cantonment activities in the north.

By June 2004, the three brigades of the

ANA Central Corps will be fully fielded with

infantry and mechanized battalions. Newly

instituted salary and benefits packages have

increased the number of recruits sufficiently

that the Office of Military Cooperation

Afghanistan and the Ministry of Defense plan to

expand the training program to produce three

battalions per month starting in January 2004,

depending on restructuring and retention.

Two issues cloud the future of the ANA.

First, until December 2003, recruiting was not

producing sufficient numbers to fill the ranks

at the current rate of one battalion per month.

Basic classes have a capacity of 750. Afghans

had been filling only about 650 seats and

delaying the classes by up to 3 weeks to reach

that number. Greater involvement by the

Afghan Ministry of Defense and General Staff,

the opening of new recruiting stations in four

locations nationwide, and increases in pay and

benefits seem to have reversed this trend. In

December 2003, the 14th training class began at

full capacity and 1 week early. In addition,

there are currently enough recruits awaiting

training to fill the next two classes. It remains

to be seen if this is a temporary or permanent

increase in the number of Afghans willing to

serve in the army.

A more serious issue had been the attrition (desertion) rate of around 10 percent per

month from August through October 2003. As a

result, when battalions 16 through 22 graduate, they will be broken up to bring the previous 15 battalions back up to strength to maintain the viability of the Central Corps. Although

the rate had decreased to 2 percent per month

by late January, the Ministry of Defense is

pressing forward with initiatives to increase the

retention rate by improving living conditions,

salaries, leave opportunities, and by building

mosques in the garrisons in order to avoid

another spike in attrition rates this spring. 

Reconstruction

Reinforcing the growing Afghan police

and army are new plans for accelerating the

promising Provincial Reconstruction Team

program. The PRT concept is drawn from

time-tested counterinsurgency doctrine of

extending the reach and influence of the central government. By providing basic security,

the teams serve as a catalyst to development by

opening up an area to both aid organizations

and Afghan government agencies.

In Afghanistan, a Provincial Reconstruction Team helps to provide security and assistance for the community in which it works.

Formed around a U.S. or international military

force of between 60 and 100 soldiers, it is ideally

reinforced with an ANA element, a national

police element, various aid organizations, and

effective representation of the ATA. Operation

Enduring Freedom provides more immediate

robust forces as a backup to the Provincial

Reconstruction Teams when needed. The combined security forces provide the protection that

the government departments need to begin

rebuilding the community.

Reinforcing the reconstruction efforts, the

teams work with the Departments of State and

Agriculture, the U.S. Agency for International

Development, UNAMA, and the Afghan government to coordinate closely with NGOs to ensure

that each focuses on those projects its organization does best. For instance, in Bamian

province, nongovernmental organizations were

rebuilding schools and municipal buildings.

They asked the provincial team if the military

could focus on rebuilding the bridges essential

to reaching some of the smaller villages. The

team concurred and is using its resources to

rebuild the vital bridges. With this division of

labor and the increased general sense of security, both NGOs and government agencies are

making steady progress in the area.

Using the PRT concept as a base, the aid

and governmental organizations can reach

further into the countryside. As security increases, they plan to set up other PRTs and

No. 205, March 2004 Strategic Forum 5
satellite facilities in the smaller communities.

In essence, this program uses the same

spreading “ink stain” concept that the British

used in Malaya. Together with an Afghan

internal security presence and greater support

from Enduring Freedom, the teams have

increased security in the Gardez area with a

resultant step-up in the pace of reconstruction. Consequently, regional government

officials have been replaced with more competent, honest, and loyal personnel. This area,

previously one of the most unstable in

Afghanistan, has become more supportive of

the Karzai government and more resistant to

the resurgence of the Taliban and al Qaeda

than the surrounding provinces. The new

DDR and police training programs will provide an additional impetus.

An unanticipated benefit accrued to the

government with the establishment of PRTs in

Gardez, Mazar-e Sharif, and Kandahar. They

have strengthened the position of the central

government sufficiently that, with the firm

backing of the United States, the Interior

Minister has been able to replace corrupt local

officials with more effective ATA representatives. This provides a visible sign of the commitment by the government to rural

Afghanistan. In the Mazar-e Sharif region, it

has been accompanied by the cantonment of

heavy weapons belonging to Dostum and Atta.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reportedly gave both warlords a push in this process

in early December 2003.

In addition to these three PRTs, the New

Zealand contingent established a team in

Bamian, the Germans have established one for

NATO/ISAF in Konduz, and the United States has

organized teams in Parwan, Jalalabad, Herat,

Khowst, Ghazni, Qalat, and Kandahar provinces.

There are at present 12 Operation Enduring

Freedom teams and over the next 3 months, the

operation plans to establish 4 more throughout

the south, southeast, and west to reach a total of

16 by mid-summer. In addition, NATO hopes to

establish two more PRTs in the North provided

the necessary resources can be found from

member states. While this is a positive step,

experience has shown that it takes months for a

PRT to gain the trust and confidence of the local

population. Further, while Enduring Freedom

can provide the forces to establish the teams, the

ATA will be hard-pressed to provide the additional ANA battalions, trained police, DDR

personnel, and competent staff for the governmental offices.

A new variation on the PRT theme is the

Regional Development Zone (RDZ), a deliberately coordinated program derived from the

success in Gardez. It will concentrate largerscale security, governance, and reconstruction

assets on a particular locality to achieve maximum synergy. It involves installing better government officials, providing better security

(more trained police and border guards, an ANA

presence, and support from Enduring Freedom), supporting effective counternarcotics

and judicial reform, initiating DDR, and making larger investments in new infrastructure

projects (such as dams and electrical power), as

well as reconstruction (schools, clinics, government buildings). The army will be assisted by

UNAMA and the PRT in overseeing and facilitating the RDZ, starting with Kandahar.

Pakistani Assistance

Reinforcing the coalition’s efforts in the

south and southeast, the Pakistani government

has moved forces into areas along the PakistanAfghanistan frontier. For the first time in their

history, Pakistani army forces are operating in

the tribal areas. Even more encouraging is the

fact that the Pakistanis are taking a long-term

approach, with a focus on winning public

support. Rather than simply hunting for 

al Qaeda and their Pashtun sympathizers, the

Pakistanis are dedicating significant resources

to improving the standards of living in particularly sensitive locations. They intend to have a

lasting, positive impact there. In addition to

stepped-up patrols and presence at known

border crossing points, where they and U.S.

forces have identified specific ACF targets, the

Pakistanis have conducted successful targeted

raids within areas of concern on Pakistan’s side

of the frontier. There are regular bilateral U.S.-

Pakistani military coordination meetings, at all

levels including Operation Enduring Freedom

Commander Lieutenant General David Barno,

and there are monthly Tripartite Commission

meetings, including senior U.S., Pakistani, and

Afghan military commanders. Lieutenant

General Barno recently praised Pakistan publicly for increased activity and for closer cooperation, building toward a major effort on both

sides in the spring against al Qaeda and

Taliban leadership and their forces.

The parallel major military operations in

mid-March on both sides of the PakistaniAfghan border represented a quantum leap

ahead in intensity and cooperation. On the

Afghan side, ANA elements performed well,

fighting alongside forces from Operation Enduring Freedom. The unprecedented Pakistan

operations in the tribal areas showed clearly the

commitment to take on al Qaeda and other

local supporters, once they were located, despite

considerable military, as well as political, costs.

The year 2004 may well be remembered

as a decisive year for Afghanistan’s long-term

stabilization and reconstruction, as well as the

fight against al Qaeda. As the foregoing indicates, the CLJ has imparted much needed

momentum to the forces favoring national

unity. The ATA is demonstrating a more

assertive, engaging posture toward the

provinces. Army recruitment, retention, and

training are accelerating. So is police training.

Current or would-be spoilers are being marginalized, albeit slowly and painfully. The

United States has demonstrated its commitment to stay the course; NATO is beginning to

shoulder greater responsibility; and the strategy for promoting provincial-level stability and

reconstruction is yielding measurable progress.

None of this should diminish our estimation of the remaining challenges, which are

enormous. The current momentum is fragile

and perishable. If it is squandered, Afghanistan’s

slide back into civil war—with all the hazards

that it entails—may be impossible to prevent.

6 Strategic Forum No. 205, March 2004

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by

members of the National Defense University as well as

other scholars and specialists in national security affairs

from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions,

and recommendations expressed or implied within are

those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect

the views of the Department of Defense or any other

agency of the Federal Government.

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