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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 47731

In the Interest of John Doe I, A Child 

Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age.

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STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 

HEALTH AND WELFARE,

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

JANE DOE (2020-04),

Respondent-Appellant.

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Filed: April 8, 2020

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 

District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Andrew Ellis, Magistrate. 

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed. 

Anthony R. Geddes, Ada County Public Defender; Joshua D. Mills, Deputy Public 

Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Madison N. Miles, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge 

Jane Doe (2020-04) appeals from a judgment terminating her parental rights. We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Doe is the mother of the minor child in this action who was born in 2017. The child was 

removed from Doe’s care due to mental health and substance abuse issues that prevented Doe from 

meeting the child’s basic needs for food, clothing, and supervision. The Idaho Department of 

Health and Welfare was given temporary custody of the child. The magistrate court subsequently 
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approved case plans for Doe and the child’s father and conducted several review hearings while 

the child was in the Department’s custody. Eventually, the magistrate court amended the 

permanency goal to the termination of parental rights and adoption and granted the Department’s 

request to suspend reasonable reunification efforts. Ultimately, the Department petitioned to 

terminate the parental rights of both parents. After trial, the magistrate court terminated Doe’s 

parental rights, finding clear and convincing evidence that she neglected the child and that 

termination is in the child’s best interests.1 Doe appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the 

decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243, 

245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). In a termination proceeding, due process and the 

substantial evidence test require the trial court’s findings be supported by clear and convincing 

evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); Doe v. Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 346, 144 

P.3d 597, 600 (2006); State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383, 386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Clear and 

convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved 

is highly probable or reasonably certain. In re Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 

(2006). Further, the magistrate court’s decision must be supported by objectively supportable 

grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600. The appellate court will indulge all reasonable 

inferences in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order terminating parental 

rights. Doe, 148 Idaho at 245-46, 220 P.3d at 1064-65.

III.

ANALYSIS

Doe challenges the magistrate court’s decision terminating her parental rights, arguing that 

the magistrate court ignored relevant evidence of her parenting abilities in concluding that she

neglected the child and improperly weighed the evidence in concluding that termination is in the 

 

1 The magistrate court also terminated the father’s parental rights, which decision is not at 

issue in this appeal.
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child’s best interests. The Department argues that Doe failed to address the magistrate court’s 

alternative statutory basis for termination and that the magistrate court properly weighed all the 

relevant evidence in reaching its decision to terminate. We affirm the magistrate court’s decision.

A. Statutory Basis for Termination

A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her 

child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341, 

343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the 

Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family 

life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits 

a party to petition the court for termination of the parent-child relationship when it is in the child’s 

best interests and any one of the following five factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or 

abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the 

parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities for a prolonged period that will be injurious 

to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain 

incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each statutory ground is an independent basis for 

termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117. 

The magistrate court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that Doe 

neglected the child under I.C. § 16-2005(1)(b) and that Doe was unable to discharge her parental 

responsibilities for a prolonged period of time under I.C. § 16-2005(1)(d). Doe does not challenge 

the magistrate court’s conclusion that she was unable to discharge her parental duties. We can, 

therefore, affirm the statutory basis for termination on that unchallenged basis. See Fischer v. 

Fischer, 92 Idaho 379, 382, 443 P.2d 463, 466 (1968) (recognizing that appellate court must 

uphold the finding and judgment of the trial court if it is capable of being upheld on any theory). 

Even if there was not an alternative ground on which to affirm the magistrate court’s statutory 

basis for termination, we hold there was sufficient evidence to support the magistrate court’s 

finding that Doe neglected the child under I.C. § 16-2005(1)(b). 

Idaho Code Section 16-2005(1)(b) provides that a child is neglected when the child is 

without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary 

for the child’s well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents, or their neglect 
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or refusal to provide them. The magistrate court’s factual findings support its conclusion that Doe 

neglected the child according to the foregoing definition. The magistrate court found that, during 

the underlying child protection action, Doe had not attended the child’s appointments;

demonstrated parenting abilities; nor shown that she could provide a safe and stable home for the 

child. Additionally, the magistrate court found that Doe had long-standing, untreated mental 

health and substance abuse issues that she refused to address and that negatively affected her ability 

to parent. The magistrate court further found Doe was convicted of a crime in Oregon during the 

underlying child protection action and that Doe’s incarceration in Oregon is likely to continue until 

December of 2020 because of her conduct while incarcerated. 

Doe argues that the magistrate court’s analysis is fatally flawed because it ignored evidence 

that she is capable of caring for the child with outside assistance. In support of this argument, Doe 

points to her initial contact with the Department in October 2018. The Department’s investigation 

at that time found that Doe was able to manage her psychotropic and pain medications and maintain

a furnished and clean residence for the child with daily, volunteer in-home help. Doe’s argument 

is unpersuasive. Although Doe was able to provide a safe and sanitary home for the child when 

receiving volunteer in-home assistance, the facts found by the magistrate court show that such an 

arrangement is not a viable, long-term solution. As previously stated, the magistrate court found 

that Doe suffered from mental health issues that she refused to address. The magistrate court 

further found that these mental health issues resulted in fantastical thinking and volatile reactions 

to feedback Doe considered critical of her.

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 It is probable that Doe’s mental health issues 

contributed to the conflict over Doe’s parenting decisions that resulted in her decision to “fire” the 

individual who volunteered to assist Doe with her personal and parental needs. Doe’s refusal to 

address her mental health issues, the lack of parenting skills she demonstrated during the child 

protection action, and her past interactions with volunteer help support the magistrate court’s

finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that Doe neglected her child.

 

 

2 Doe’s volatility is exemplified by her communications with Department employees during 

the underlying child protection action. During telephone conversations with Department 

employees, Doe often yelled, used profane language, and would abruptly hang up the phone. 
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B. Best Interests of the Child 

Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next 

determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship. 

In re Aragon, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When determining whether 

termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the parent’s history with 

substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the unemployment of the parent, the 

financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the child is placed in protective custody, 

the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s efforts to improve his or her 

situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. In re Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 

P.3d 77, 83 (2015); In re Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it 

is in the best interests of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective 

grounds. In re Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012).

The magistrate court found that Doe’s child deserves to have immediate permanency and 

certainty about his future. Doe’s behavior during the child protection proceeding demonstrated 

that she will not be able to provide a permanent, stable home environment for at least a year after 

being released from incarceration. Prior to being incarcerated in Oregon, Doe failed to 

demonstrate that she could provide food, clothing, housing, education, or emotional support for 

the child. Upon being released from incarceration in Oregon, Doe will have to establish housing, 

employment, sustained sobriety, and mental stability before she can care for the child--a process 

that could take a year or more. However, the magistrate court found it likely that Doe would not 

overcome her substance abuse and mental health issues during the child’s minority. Moreover,

Doe and the child lack a normal parent-child bond. During the limited visits Doe had with the 

child, Doe displayed no nurturing behaviors, and the child showed no attachment to Doe. To the 

contrary, the child was fearful of Doe and did not refer to her as his mother without prompting. 

Additionally, at the time of the termination trial, the child was in the custody of the same individual

who has guardianship over the child’s older brother, with whom the child shares a strong bond. 

This foster parent is a potential adoptive placement for the child. 

Doe contends that the magistrate court improperly weighed the relevant evidence when 

considering the child’s best interests. Specifically, Doe faults the magistrate court for crediting 

the testimony of the Department’s witnesses over her own testimony, disregarding evidence that 
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the child spent time in daycare while in foster care, and ignoring evidence that Doe had provided 

adequate care to the child during certain periods. The magistrate court found that Doe’s mental 

health issues, which visibly affected her behavior during trial, rendered her testimony unreliable. 

Although the child’s foster parent did place the child in daycare, Doe points to no evidence in the 

record indicating any adverse effects this had on the child. Weighing conflicting evidence and 

determining witness credibility are functions of the magistrate court. King v. King, 137 Idaho 438, 

442, 50 P.3d 453, 457 (2002). We will not substitute the magistrate court’s view of the evidence

with our own. Id. Doe has failed to show error in the magistrate court’s conclusion that 

termination of Doe’s parental rights served the child’s best interests. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

Doe failed to challenge the magistrate court’s finding that Doe was unable to discharge her 

parental duties. Further, Doe has failed to show that the magistrate court erred in finding, by clear 

and convincing evidence, that Doe neglected the child and that termination of her parental rights 

served the child’s best interests. Consequently, the judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights is 

affirmed.

Chief Judge HUSKEY and Judge GRATTON, CONCUR.