RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3263-20

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

M.T.,

Defendant,

and

R.O.,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

GUARDIANSHIP OF

W.O. and W.O., minors.

___________________________

Submitted April 5, 2022 – Decided June 23, 2022

Before Judges Currier and Berdote Byrne.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-3263-20

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket 

No. FG-07-0087-20.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Cecilia M.E. Lindenfelser, Designated 

Counsel, on the briefs).

Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General, attorney 

for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Wesley Hanna, Deputy Attorney 

General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,

attorney for minors (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy 

Public Defender, of counsel; Neha Gogate, Assistant 

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this appeal, we consider whether the court erred when it found the New 

Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency proved all four prongs of 

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence and terminated 

defendant father's parental rights. Defendant claims there was no evidence 

presented at trial he actually harmed the children, the Division did not make 

reasonable efforts to help him find adequate housing, and the Division failed to 

prove terminating his parental rights would do no more harm than good to the 

children. The children's law guardian urges us to affirm. After reviewing the 
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record, we conclude the trial judge's factual findings are fully supported by the 

record and, in light of those facts, her legal conclusions are correct. We affirm.

As set forth by Judge Nora J. Grimbergen in her well written, twenty-fourpage opinion, then nine-year-old twin children -- Wyland and Wanda1

-- were 

removed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 from their biological mother, Mandy, for 

knowingly leaving them alone in a hotel room.2 Mandy eventually returned to 

the hotel and was found slumped over in her car. She tested positive for heroin. 

At the time, Mandy was unemployed and supporting the twins with social 

security benefits, food and medical benefits. The family was residing in a hotel 

due to homelessness. Roy, the biological father of the twins, could not be found

at the time of the twins' removal and placement in the Division's custody. The 

Division located Roy in November of 2018. 

The record reflects Roy was incarcerated for tax fraud shortly before the 

twins were born. He was released in October of 2013. He concedes he 

financially supported the children for only one year and stopped seeing them to 

avoid being arrested again for non-payment of child support, for which he was 

1 We employ pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the parties and children. R.

1:38-3(d)(12). We further adopt the pseudonyms chosen by defendant for clarity 

of the record.

2 Mandy voluntarily surrendered her parental rights prior to trial on November 

4, 2020, and has not joined in this appeal. 
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arrested twelve times. He had no contact with the children between 2016 and 

2018 when he moved to North Carolina to avoid child support enforcement. 

The Division has been involved with the family since 2012 due to their 

struggles with poverty, Mandy's mental health issues, and the children's special 

needs. In 2012 the children's daycare reported Wyland and Wanda were 

severely delayed in communication. The children suffer from severe asthma. 

They both have individualized education plans.

After a one-day trial, during which the Division called two witnesses – a 

caseworker and Dr. Mark Singer, an expert in psychology and parental bonding 

– and defendant called none, Judge Grimbergen rendered a comprehensive 

opinion terminating Roy's parental rights. 

Our review of a trial judge's decision to terminate parental rights is 

limited. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007) 

(citing In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002)). The trial court 

is best suited to assess credibility, weigh testimony and develop a feel for the 

case, and we extend special deference to the Family Part's expertise. Cesare v. 

Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). 

Parents have a constitutionally protected right to raise their children. In 

re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999); see also Santosky v. 
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Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). Both the Federal and the New Jersey 

constitutions protect the inviolability of the family unit. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 

U.S. 645, 651 (1972); N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 

599 (1986). However, "the right of parents to be free from governmental 

intrusion is not absolute." A.W., 103 N.J. at 599. It is "tempered by the State’s 

parens patriae responsibility to protect the welfare of the children," K.H.O., 161 

N.J. at 347, "when their physical or mental health is jeopardized." A.W., 103 

N.J. at 599 (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979)).

When a child’s parent contests the termination of parental rights, we must 

decide whether the parent can raise the child without causing the child further 

harm. In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992). "[T]he cornerstone of 

the inquiry is not whether the biological parents are fit but whether they can 

cease causing their child harm." Ibid. The "burden falls on the State to 

demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the natural parent has not 

cured the initial cause of harm and will continue to cause serious and lasting 

harm to the child." Ibid. The Legislature has recognized "the health and safety 

of the child shall be the State’s paramount concern when making a decision on 

whether or not it is in the child’s best interest to preserve the family unit." 

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-1(a).
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"The balance between parental rights and the State’s interest in the welfare 

of children is achieved through the best interests of the child standard." K.H.O., 

151 N.J. at 347. The best interest standard, codified in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a),

requires the Division establish each of the following elements by clear and 

convincing evidence before parental rights may be severed:

1. The child’s safety, health or development has 

been or will continue to be endangered by the 

parental relationship;

2. The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate 

the harm facing the child or is unable or 

unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for 

the child and the delay of permanent placement 

will add to the harm; 

3. The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to 

provide services to help the parent correct the 

circumstances which lead to the child’s 

placement outside the home and the court has 

considered alternatives to termination of 

parental rights; and

4. Termination of parental rights will not do more 

harm than good.

The four criteria are not discrete and separate, but "relate to and overlap 

with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a child’s 

best interests." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348. The considerations involved are 

extremely fact-sensitive and require particularized evidence that address the 
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specific circumstances present in each case. Ibid. Emphasis has shifted from 

protracted efforts for reunification with a biological parent to an expeditious, 

permanent placement to promote the child’s well-being. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.1; 

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super. 76, 111 (App. Div. 

2004). "A child cannot be held prisoner of the rights of others, even those of 

his or her parent. Children have their own rights, including the right to a 

permanent, safe, and stable placement." Ibid.

The key question with respect to the first prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), 

is not whether the parents "are themselves unfit or whether they are the victims 

of social circumstances beyond their control." A.W., 103 N.J. at 607. Rather, 

the question is "whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the parents can cease

to inflict harm upon the children entrusted to their care." Ibid. "No more and 

no less is required of them than that they will not place their children in 

substantial jeopardy to physical or mental health." Ibid. Even when the parents 

are not blameworthy because they were "short-changed by either nature or 

society," this prong is satisfied when their behavior "indicates a further 

likelihood of harm to the child in the future." Id. at 615-16.

A court need not find actual harm occurred. This prong refers to the harm 

that "threatens the child’s health and will likely have continuing deleterious 
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effects on the child." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 353. Although a single harm can 

trigger the best interest standard, "the standard may be triggered by an 

accumulation of harms over time." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. P.P., 

180 N.J. 494, 506 (2004). The trial court found Roy harmed his children because 

a parent's failure to provide love and nurture to a child is a recognizable harm in 

New Jersey, despite the Division's lack of findings of abuse and neglect against 

him.

Roy engaged in supervised visitation with the children while they were in 

resource care, despite not having had any relationship with them for the two 

years prior to their removal. He also engaged in individual therapy and attended 

several psychological evaluations. However, Roy demonstrates a marked lack 

of insight regarding his role in the children's lifelong instability and lack of 

responsibility for their needs. Prior to their removal, he refused to provide for 

them financially, voluntarily absenting himself from their lives to avoid paying 

child support. During the entire time they were in resource care, he failed to 

provide a plan for their housing and blames "the system" for his lack of

preparedness. He failed to identify any source of income. A parent’s failure to 

provide a "permanent, safe, and stable home" engenders significant harm to a 

child. D.M.H., 161 at 383. 
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The Supreme Court has stated the first and second prongs "relate to and 

overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a

child’s best interests." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348. The inquiry in the second prong 

is "aimed at determining whether the parent has cured and overcome the initial 

harm that endangered the health, safety, or welfare of the child and is able to 

continue a parental relationship without recurrent harm to the child." Ibid.

Title Thirty presents some difficulties when applied to matters where the 

parent at issue has never been the primary caregiver of the child, because it 

speaks to "remediation" of the prior existing harm and "reunification" of the 

child with the parent. It is undisputed the children were not removed from Roy, 

but from Mandy, who exposed them to risk of harm. In the instant case, Roy

never lived with or parented Wyland or Wanda. Nevertheless, the court found 

Roy's failure to provide a safe and stable home for the children rendered him 

unfit as a parent and delayed their stability. 

Throughout the children's lives, both prior to their removal and after they 

were placed in resource care, Roy acted minimally and without any sense of 

urgency to their needs. He knew the children were suffering from homelessness 

and was aware of the Division's involvement in their lives years before their 

eventual removal yet made no effort to obtain custody or financially provide for 
10 A-3263-20

them. He left the State to avoid child support enforcement. During the entire 

time the children were in resource care, Roy resided in a one-bedroom 

apartment; his adult son slept in the bedroom while he and his wife slept in the 

living room. It remained dangerously full of storage and clutter. 

Once the children were removed, Roy was made aware of the statutory 

timeline for the children's permanency by both the Division and the court and, 

in fact, the twelve-month goal of reunification was extended an additional three 

months to see if reunification with him could be achieved. He claimed he could 

not provide appropriate housing for the children due to his prior incarceration 

and his existing credit score. Roy is financially supported by his adult children 

and states he is "retired;" at trial he failed to demonstrate any inability to earn 

income. Roy never presented a stable parenting plan for the children, and never 

identified adequate housing or a source of income for their care. "Concern and 

efforts by a natural parent after his or her child has been removed from the home 

and making genuine and successful efforts...is of enormous significance" when 

determining fitness. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.R., 405 N.J. Super.

418, 437 (App. Div. 2009). 

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3) requires the Division to make reasonable 

efforts to provide services that will enable a parent "to become a functioning 
11 A-3263-20

parent and caretaker of [his] child . . . ." K.H.O., 151 N.J. at 354. It 

"contemplates efforts that focus on reunification of the parent with the child and 

assistance to the parent to correct and overcome those circumstances that 

necessitated the placement of the child into [resource] care." Ibid. Those efforts 

"must by their very nature take into consideration the abilities and mental 

conditions of the parents." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. 

Super. 418, 442 (App. Div. 2001). Nonetheless, the Division does not have to 

attempt more than "reasonable efforts under the circumstances to accommodate 

[a parent]’s disabilities," and a court may not find the efforts unreasonable 

simply because they "did not bear fruit." Ibid.

The trial court found substantial evidence the Division provided Roy with 

reasonable services throughout the litigation. The Division offered supervised 

visitation once a week, which Roy attended regularly and all parties concede 

went well until the summer of 2020, when Roy's interrogation of the children 

and comments to the children about the pending litigation made them cry and 

act out behaviorally. Roy underwent various psychological evaluations. He was 

offered and attended parenting skills class and individual therapy. He 

participated in family team meetings with the Division and the litigation. He 

also met with the resource parents. Roy offered his wife as an integral part of 
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his parenting plan but also claimed she is an invalid who needs his constant care. 

The Division made several efforts to evaluate her as part of Roy's parenting plan,

even offering an in-home evaluation, which both he and his wife refused. 

Specifically with respect to housing, Roy requested the Division rent an 

apartment in the agency's name because he claimed he was unable to obtain 

housing assistance due to his prior incarceration. The Division informed him it 

could not rent housing under an assumed name, but provided him a list of lowincome housing, a recommendation letter to the Safe House program, referred 

him to the Housing and Urban Development and Keeping Families Together 

programs, and a referral to Legal Services to assist with his particular housing 

concerns. At trial, Roy did not submit any evidence he contacted these agencies 

and his credit score was not admitted in evidence. He also submitted no 

evidence his prior incarceration was an impediment to obtaining housing. 3 

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4) assesses whether termination of parental rights 

will do more harm than good to the children. It "serves as a fail-safe against 

termination even where the remaining standards have been met." N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 609 (2007). Pursuant to the fourth 

3 Tax fraud is not listed as a mandatory or discretionary basis for the denial of 

HUD benefits pursuant to 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.552 - 553.
13 A-3263-20

prong the trial court must determine "whether, after considering and balancing 

the two relationships, the child[ren] will suffer a greater harm from the 

termination of ties with its natural parents than from the permanent disruption 

of [their] relationship with [their] foster parents." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 355. The 

Division also "must show 'that separating the child from his foster parents would 

cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm.'" Ibid. (quoting 

J.C., 129 N.J. at 19). 

However, it has long been recognized where a parent is unable to care for 

a child for a prolonged period of time . . . and would not be able to take custody 

for an indefinite period of time, it is against a child’s best interest to prolong 

resolution of his status by indefinitely extending foster care placement. N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. B.G.S., 291 N.J. Super. 582, 592 (App. Div. 

1996). 

Although the Division's expert found no underlying pathology rendering 

Roy unable to parent, he failed to demonstrate the necessary urgency to parent 

them both before and while his children were in resource care. Roy has never 

taken the steps necessary to parent his children during their lifetimes. He has 

been unwilling to accept any responsibility for their instability. Harm is caused 
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by withdrawing "the most precious of all resources, a parent's attention and 

care." A.W., 103 N.J. at 613.

One Division expert opined Roy does not take responsibility for his 

actions and displays narcissistic features, which explain his inability to accept 

any personal shortcomings. Dr. Singer testified at trial that although Roy 

exhibits no psychosis or formal thought disorder that would prevent him from 

parenting, he presents with a degree of paranoia and persecution. He also 

minimalizes personal faults and expects strict obedience to his demands, 

rendering him inflexible in parenting. Dr. Singer's uncontroverted, expert 

opinions – that the children have a heightened need for stability and consistency

and Roy cannot empathize with them or understand these special needs – formed 

the basis for the trial court's finding the Division had proved prong four. Dr. 

Singer further opined the children do not view Roy as a significant parental 

figure and he is not likely to become a viable parent in the near future despite 

his expressed willingness. In contrast, Dr. Singer opined the children's resource 

parents are their psychological parents and a "source of stability." He opined if 

the relationship with the resource parents was severed it "would have a marked 

impact" upon them that Roy could not mitigate. 
15 A-3263-20

We find no fault in the judge's reliance upon the unrebutted expert 

testimony, or her consideration of other evidence adduced at trial, and conclude 

her findings are supported by credible evidence.

Affirmed.