This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A16-0780

Dennis Szymialis,

Appellant,

vs.

James Kuronen, et al.

Respondents.

Filed January 17, 2017

Affirmed

Connolly, Judge

St. Louis County District Court

File No. 69DU-CV-15-1744

Dennis Szymialis, Duluth, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Steven P. Pope, Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and 

Reilly, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

CONNOLLY, Judge

Appellant, pro se, challenges the grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims 

arising out of personal injuries he sustained when a dog allegedly belonging to respondents 
2

caused him to fall. Because we agree with the district court that appellant cannot meet the 

threshold requirement of showing that respondents owned the dog, we affirm.

FACTS

In September 2008, appellant Dennis Szymialis was in the backyard of the house of 

his friends, D.A. and her daughter, L.A., with their two dogs. Respondents James and Amy 

Kuronen lived nearby. A dog allegedly belonging to them entered the backyard where 

appellant was and caused appellant to trip, injuring his wrist. Other than having D.A., a 

retired nurse, wrap his wrist, appellant received no medical attention.

Respondents did not learn of this incident until July 2015, when they were served 

with a summons and complaint from appellant seeking damages under Minn. Stat. § 347.22 

(2016) (“If a dog, without provocation, attacks or injures any person who is acting 

peaceably in any place where the person may lawfully be, the owner of the dog is liable in 

damages to the person so attacked or injured to the full amount of the injury sustained.”) 

and under a common-law-negligence theory. Both theories of recovery have as a threshold 

requirement that the plaintiff prove that the defendant(s) owned the dog that caused the 

injury. 

Following discovery including depositions, respondents moved for summary 

judgment dismissing appellant’s claims. After a hearing, the district court issued an order 

granting respondents’ motion and dismissing appellant’s claims on the grounds that 

appellant’s allegations about the involvement of respondents or their dog did “not rise 

above the speculative level” and that there was “insufficient proof that a dog owned, 

harbored, or kept by [respondents] attacked or injured [appellant].” 
3

Appellant challenges the summary judgment, arguing that he provided sufficient 

proof that he was injured by respondents’ dog in 2008.

D E C I S I O N

This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, determining whether any 

genuine issue of material fact precludes the judgment and whether the district court 

properly applied the law. Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 

N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010). “[W]hen the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof 

on an element essential to the nonmoving party’s case, the nonmoving party must make a 

showing sufficient to establish that essential element.” DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 

71 (Minn. 1997). A district court “is not required to ignore its conclusion that a particular 

piece of evidence may have no probative value.” Id. at 70. Allegations based on 

speculation are insufficient to create a jury question. Harvet v. Unity Med. Ctr., Inc., 428 

N.W.2d 574, 579 (Minn. App. 1988).

The record supports the district court’s conclusion that “the dog involved in the 

incident is not definitively identified as belonging to [respondents].” Appellant testified 

that, when he fell over the dog, “at that instant, I didn’t know for sure whose dog that was, 

so I yelled at [L.A.’s dog] to go get the [other] dog” and L.A.’s dog “went running after 

the [other] dog.” He also testified that L.A. “came running out of the garage chasing after 

[her dog] and followed him to [respondents’] house where she retrieved [her dog.]” 

Appellant also testified that, about a year later, when he and L.A. drove by 

respondents’ alley, L.A. told him “that was the dog that tripped [him] in [her] back yard” 

and she “wanted to make sure that [he] knew what dog it was that was the problem.” 
4

Appellant was asked two questions about the period before L.A. identified the dog to him 

a year after the incident. When he was asked if he knew then that it was the dog that had 

caused him to fall, he replied, “You know, I can’t specifically recall. But I—I think . . . I’d 

seen the dog in their back yard before. At the time of the incident, I didn’t have specific 

recall of the dog. But I’d seen it in their yard before and after on my own.” When asked 

if he knew then where the dog lived, appellant answered: “If you had shown me a picture 

of the dog and said, ‘[D]o you know where this dog lives?’ I would have been able to tell 

you that it was [respondents’] dog; except at the time of the incident, I didn’t have specific 

recall of that.” Appellant first testified he was not sure if L.A. actually saw him fall, then 

testified that he did not believe she actually saw him fall; he also testified that he was lying 

down on the lawn when L.A. went to retrieve her dog from respondents’ house.

Appellant also testified about his only attempt to contact respondents. He said that, 

later in the week of the incident, he attempted to contact them by knocking on their door 

for five or ten minutes, but made no other attempts to contact them between the incident in 

September 2008 and beginning this lawsuit in July 2015. He further testified, “When I 

went down the alley initially to go knock on their door, front door, I saw one of their dogs 

and I don’t recall if it was –I think it was their other dog and not the dog that tripped me 

[that] was outside on the chain.” When asked, “[W]hen [L.A.] was chasing [her dog], did 

she actually observe the other dog?” he answered, “I believe she did when she got . . . 

closer to [respondents’] house. I’m sure she – I know she observed it when she got closer 

to [respondents’] house. I’m not sure if she specifically observed it when it – when it 

tripped me or not.” He was questioned further:
5

Q. So on the day of the incident, did [L.A.] see the other 

dog go to [respondents’] house?

A. That is correct.

Q. Did she see – did she see how it gained access back to 

their property?

A. I didn’t – I didn’t ask her about that. 

Thus, appellant relied entirely on L.A.’s acts and testimony to establish a line between the 

dog he tripped over and respondents’ dog.

But L.A.’s testimony does not support appellant’s version of what happened. She 

testified that she had read appellant’s deposition testimony before her own deposition, and 

her testimony reflects that she was not sure what she remembered from reading his 

deposition and what she remembered from the event itself.

Q. This lawsuit is about an incident that allegedly occurred 

in 2008 around Labor Day. Can you tell me everything 

you remember about the incident?

A. Well, I didn’t remember it happened in 2008 and I 

didn’t remember it was Labor Day. But I did read 

[appellant’s] deposition and that’s what it says in that 

deposition. And so I didn’t remember much, because it 

was apparently seven years ago.

Q. . . . [A]re you able to parse out what you remember[ed] 

about that incident before reading the transcript [of 

appellant’s deposition] and what you remember after 

reading the transcript?

A. You know, not exactly. . . . I would say I’m not able to 

parse out some of it.

Q. [W]hat do you remember about the incident underlying 

this lawsuit?

A. The first thing I noticed is I [didn’t] even remember 

[respondents’] names until I heard their names. I 

basically knew them through their dog. And it was 

years ago, and basically [I] had very little interaction 

with them. Usually it was just the fact that their dog 

was running loose and I was returning their dog.

. . . .
6

Q. Do you remember [appellant] being injured on your 

property in the past, in 2008, whenever it happened?

A. I remember [appellant] saying . . . that he was injured. 

I didn’t see him being injured. I remember him being 

in the backyard. I remember him saying he was injured. 

Q. When did he tell you he was injured, was it the same 

day as the alleged incident?

A. Yeah, I believe it was.

Q. Can you tell me everything you can remember around 

that statement?

A. I just remember – I thought – now I’m getting his 

deposition, it’s like is that what happened?

Q. Is it fair to say you don’t remember this incident?

A. I don’t remember a lot of it. . . . I didn’t really 

understand what happened because I didn’t see it. 

. . . .

Q. After [appellant] told you he was injured . . . [d]id he 

tell you about another dog [other than your dogs] being 

in the yard when he told you he was injured?

A. I think he did. I think he said there was another dog and 

it ran off or –it gets kind of fuzzy here just because . . . 

Q. So when you think he said that, are you a hundred 

percent positive or are you uncertain?

A. That he said there was another dog?

Q. Correct.

A. Well, I’m not sure what I’m a hundred percent positive 

of, but I believe he said there was another dog. 

Q. At any point did you try and investigate and find the 

other dog on that day?

A. You know, you can see the neighbor’s house from my 

mom’s backyard, and I don’t really remember. I read 

[appellant’s] deposition. I don’t remember lots of it, 

but, you know, I think he believed it was the neighbor’s 

dog and I think we believed it was that dog, the dog that 

normally ran loose.

Q. Are you able to tell me today what neighbor had the dog 

that was normally running loose, like where were they 

in proximity to your backyard?

A. They weren’t across the alley, they were kind of the next 

house over through the alley.

. . . .
7

Q. On that day when [appellant] injured his arm, did you 

actually see any other dog in the area after he injured his 

arm?

A. You know, I’m not sure. Like I said, I haven’t thought 

about this for a very long time and at this point I’m not 

sure.

Q. I’m not trying to pick on you, I’m just trying to make 

sure I understand. At this point you can’t say whether 

– you don’t remember whether you saw the other dog 

that [appellant] spoke about on the day of the accident?

A. I would have liked to have read the case, the pleadings 

just as a – my understanding is [respondents] filed 

something in rebuttal and [appellant] filed something, 

his case. I believe at the time we believed that it was 

[respondents’] dog. I don’t remember where the dog 

ran – you know. We believed it was [respondents’] 

dog. . . .

Q. What did you base that belief on?

A. I don’t really remember if I saw its hind end running out 

of the yard or close to their yard or, you know, just the 

fact that it routinely ran loose.

Q. So you don’t remember specifically any of the things 

you just listed?

A. What things that I just listed?

Q. As you sit here today, can you tell me that you 

remember seeing a dog run to [respondents’] yard after 

[appellant’s] injury? Because earlier it sounded like 

you were unsure of that.

A. That’s what we believed at the time, I remember that. 

You’re asking me seven years after the fact if I can 

swear to something that I haven’t been asked about for 

seven years. And I haven’t had the opportunity to look 

at anything that was filed other than [appellant’s] 

deposition, which I had a very short period of time to 

look at. 

Q. Would it surprise you to learn that [respondents] never 

filed anything against [appellant], but this lawsuit arose 

when [appellant] filed a lawsuit against [respondents]

for this incident?

A. That wouldn’t surprise me.

Q. Did you ever have a discussion after the incident 

involving the dog with [respondents]? Did you talk to 
8

[respondents] and say, hey, I think your dog injured my 

friend [appellant]?

A. I don’t think I did.

Q. Did you do any sort of follow-up investigation, like did 

you ask other neighbors if they had seen a dog running 

loose on that day of the incident or anything like that?

A. No, I don’t think there was any neighbors around. I 

rarely saw [respondents].

Q. And you said that – it sounded like [respondents] had 

had a dog and it got loose on a prior or subsequent 

occasion. Can you describe that dog?

A. It was – I don’t know if it was a golden retriever or a 

yellow lab mix. I think it was a female, yellow, tan, 

gold. I don’t remember its name. It had a tag, that’s 

how I knew where it lived. We would return it, I mean 

once we learned what dog it was we would return it. I 

don’t remember its name. I thought it was Lily or Layla 

or a name like that.

Q. When you returned the dog to [respondents], do you 

remember having any discussions with [them] about the 

dog getting out?

A. I did.

Q. Were they friendly conversations, like neighborly, or 

were you kind of upset about it?

A. I just said that I was worried their dog was going to get 

hit by a car and that it was going to cause an accident. 

Or it was running through the neighborhood and you 

could hear the dogs barking throughout the 

neighborhood when it would run loose. They said it was 

getting out under the fence or over the fence. It 

happened a lot. Finally it – usually it was the husband 

that would – I don’t remember ever actually talking to 

the wife, who I don’t even remember seeing. She must 

have worked a lot. 

. . . .

Q. Now, prior to reviewing the deposition transcript that 

[appellant] gave you . . . do you remember the last time 

you thought about this incident?

A. No. 

Thus, L.A. did not have any specific recollection of respondents’ dog tripping 

appellant; she remembered only that respondents had a dog who sometimes got loose and 
9

that appellant said a dog had been in the yard and caused him to trip. She had no 

recollection of going to respondents’ house right after the incident or of going there at any 

other time to discuss the incident. L.A.’s deposition testimony supports the district court’s 

conclusion that “[appellant’s] claim that [L.A.] identified the dog as belonging to 

[respondents] is inadmissible hearsay that cannot be considered on summary judgment.” 

L.A. did no more than speculate that, because respondents were neighbors and their dog 

sometimes ran loose, it was their dog that caused appellant to trip. Appellant did not 

present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact on the threshold requirement 

that the dog responsible for his injuries was owned by respondents.

Affirmed.