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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

JAMAL WILLIAMS, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

CHICAGO LIGHTHOUSE FOR PEOPLE 

WHO ARE BLIND OR VISUALLY 

IMPAIRED, an Illinois Not-for-Profit 

Corporation, 

 Defendant. 

 

No. 11 C 8993 

Judge James B. Zagel 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 Plaintiff Jamal Williams has brought this action against Defendant Chicago Lighthouse 

for People Who Are Blind or Visually Impaired for employment discrimination in violation of 

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Currently before the 

Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. For the 

following reasons, Defendant’s motion is granted. 

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff suffers from epilepsy, enduring 2-3 epileptic seizures per month. Plaintiff is also 

visually impaired. In mid-October 2009, Plaintiff began working as a part-time intern in the 

Communication Center of the Chicago Lighthouse for People Who Are Blind or Visually 

Impaired (“the Lighthouse”). The principal responsibility of those holding this position is to 

answer telephone calls regarding the Lighthouse’s Low Vision Clinic. 

 On November 18, 2009 Plaintiff had a seizure on a bus while on his way home from 

work. He was hospitalized as a result. The next day, he called Jeanette Bonzani, who was then 

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the Director of Human Resources at the Lighthouse. He explained what had happened to him 

and hold her he would not be able to work for a while. Ms. Bonzani told Plaintiff to take all the 

time he needed to recover. 

 Plaintiff returned to work on December 15, 2009. He asserts that, upon returning, he 

detected a difference in “mood” at the Communication Center. When a radio was playing loud 

music by his work station, Plaintiff wished to turn the volume down, fearing that the noise might 

prompt another seizure. According to the complaint, his supervisor, Miguel Zapata, refused the 

request. Plaintiff also sought to play his own radio at his work station; Mr. Zapata apparently 

refused that request as well. Next, after observing Plaintiff speaking with Edwvina Manzano, a 

KRIS Radio employee that had a desk in the Communication Center, Mr. Zapata pulled Plaintiff 

aside and admonished him that he was not paid to speak about KRIS Radio. 

 The following day, Plaintiff approached Mr. Zapata to express his displeasure with the 

way Mr. Zapata had spoken to him the previous day. Mr. Zapata does not appear to have 

engaged substantively with Plaintiff, electing instead to bring Plaintiff and the matter to Sheila 

Perkins, Mr. Zapata’s supervisor and then the Director of Employment Services at the 

Lighthouse. In the discussion that ensued between the three individuals, Ms. Perkins appears to 

have taken Mr. Zapata’s side. The discussion apparently grew somewhat heated, with Ms. 

Perkins raising her voice. 

 It is undisputed that Plaintiff became upset over how Mr. Zapata and Ms. Perkins were 

speaking to him. It is also undisputed that, at some point in the meeting, Plaintiff placed his 

badge on Ms. Perkins’ desk and walked out, never to return to the Lighthouse. Plaintiff contends 

that, prior to placing his badge on the desk, Ms. Perkins told him to “get off the premises.” 

Plaintiff’s deposition testimony appears to indicate that he was told to leave the premises after

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putting his badge on the desk. See Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Facts, Ex. 2 pp. 144:12-

145:1. 

 Defendant does not affirmatively acknowledge that Ms. Perkins ever told Plaintiff to get 

of the premises. In any event, it is undisputed that, prior to Plaintiff leaving, Ms. Perkins began 

speaking on the phone and told Plaintiff to “wait.” He did not wait, electing instead to walk out 

of the Lighthouse. Seeing Plaintiff on his way out, Ms. Bonzani walked after him to the entrance 

to try to persuade him to come back. Plaintiff did not respond and continued to walk away. 

 At some point in the subsequent 14 days, Plaintiff spoke on the phone with Zenobia 

Shelby, a Lighthouse employee, and mentioned the prospect of bringing an employment 

discrimination suit against the Lighthouse. On December 30, 2009 Ms. Bonzani sent Plaintiff a 

letter acknowledging the termination of his employment for “job abandonment.” 

 Approximately seven months later, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the 

EEOC alleging disability discrimination. This action followed. 

DISCUSSION 

 Summary judgment should be granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of triable fact exists only if “the evidence is 

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Pugh v. City of 

Attica, Ind., 259 F.3d 619, 625 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). 

 Once the moving party has set forth the basis for summary judgment, the burden then 

shifts to the nonmoving party who must go beyond mere allegations and offer specific facts 

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showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The nonmoving party must offer 

more than “[c]onclusory allegations, unsupported by specific facts” in order to establish a 

genuine issue of material fact. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Lujan 

v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)). A party 

will be successful in opposing summary judgment only if it presents “definite, competent 

evidence to rebut the motion.” EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 

2000). 

 I consider the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and I draw all 

reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Lesch v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 282 F.3d 

467, 471 (7th Cir.2002). I will accept the non-moving party's version of any disputed fact, 

however, only if it is supported by relevant, admissible evidence. Bombard v. Fort Wayne 

Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996). 

 Unlike employment discrimination claims on the basis of sex or race, claims of 

discrimination on the basis of a disability must account for the possibility that the employer may 

not have knowledge of the trait against which he or she is alleged to have discriminated. If the 

employer does not know the employee has a disability, any adverse action taken against the 

employee cannot have been taken “because” of the employee’s disability. Hedberg v. Indiana 

Bell Telephone Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1995); see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1). 

 The adverse treatment of which Plaintiff complains came at the hands of Mr. Zapata and 

Ms. Perkins. There appears to be no genuine dispute, however, that neither Mr. Zapata nor Ms. 

Perkins knew of Plaintiff’s disability when the adverse treatment occurred. Plaintiff does not 

claim to have informed either of them about his disability at any time. No one else at the 

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Lighthouse claims to have informed them of his disability. Plaintiff does not claim to have any 

knowledge that anyone else informed them of his disability. And Mr. Zapata and Ms. Perkins 

themselves have both sworn that they had no knowledge of his disability. 

 In response to this basis for summary judgment, Plaintiff points to the fact that three other 

Lighthouse employees have acknowledged that they themselves knew of Plaintiff’s disability. 

Plaintiff asserts only that there must then be a genuine issue of fact as to whether any of these 

employees informed Mr. Zapata or Ms. Perkins of his disability. This is an effort to dispute 

evidence with speculation, and it is precisely the sort of argument that summary judgment is 

meant to defeat. See Hedberg, 47 F.3d at 931-32; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). It is 

undisputed that no one claims or admits to having told Mr. Zapata and Ms. Perkins of Plaintiff’s 

disability. Plaintiff offers no definite evidence to the contrary, and mere conjecture will not 

suffice. 

 There is some anecdotal evidence in the record suggesting that Ms. Perkins may well 

speak harshly to her employees at times, and may even be an unpleasant person for whom to 

work. But to find definite evidence of disability discrimination in the record sufficient to rebut 

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment would be an invention of the Court. 

 In his response brief, Plaintiff also suggests that the letter he received formally 

acknowledging the termination of his employment was sent “only” after certain employees at the 

Lighthouse learned that he was contemplating an employment discrimination lawsuit. As a 

threshold matter, this is not factually accurate. The letter was also sent after Plaintiff turned in 

his badge, left the premises, and after two weeks had passed without contact between Plaintiff 

and his employer.1

 Further, there is no definite evidence that Ms. Bonzami, who wrote the letter, 

 

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 Defendant asserts that the Lighthouse afforded Plaintiff two weeks in an effort to give him time to “cool down” 

and reconsider his decision not to “wait” and continue his meeting with Mr. Zapata and Ms. Perkins. 

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knew that Plaintiff was contemplating a lawsuit when she sent the letter. 

 But these points aside, this assertion amounts to a retaliation claim, and retaliation was 

not claimed in Plaintiff’s EEOC charge, nor even in his complaint. It is therefore not properly 

before the Court. See Cheek v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 

1994). 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. 

ENTER:

James B. Zagel 

United States District Judge 

DATE: January 10, 2014 

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