[Cite as State v. Barrett, 2024-Ohio-1108.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

LOGAN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

CASE NO. 8-22-44

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

 v.

ELIJAH BARRETT, O P I N I O N

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court

Trial Court No. CR 21 06 0162

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: March 25, 2024

APPEARANCES:

Victoria Ferry for Appellant

Eric C. Stewart for Appellee
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MILLER, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Elijah Barrett (“Barrett”), appeals the November 

22, 2022 judgment entry of the Logan County Court of Common Pleas. At the time 

of the underlying charges, Barrett was fifteen years old. Following probable cause 

and amenability hearings, the Family Court Division (“juvenile court”) granted the 

State’s motion to relinquish jurisdiction to the General Division (“adult court”) and

Barrett’s case was transferred to the adult court for criminal prosecution. 

Thereafter, Barrett was indicted on seven felony counts with related firearm 

specifications. He pleaded guilty to three of the charges while the State dismissed 

the others, and the adult court sentenced him to an aggregate twenty-five to twentyseven years to life in prison. Barrett now argues his due process and confrontation 

rights were violated and it was error to transfer his case to the adult court. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Incident and Complaint in Juvenile Court

{¶2} This case arose from a November 27, 2019 home invasion in 

Bellefontaine, Ohio, during which multiple residents were assaulted and two 

residents were shot and killed. The State alleged Barrett and two other juveniles,

Josia Bush (“Bush”) and Ethan Grim (“Grim”), trespassed in the home with the 

purpose of robbing the occupants with a firearm. The State further alleged they
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(Barrett, Bush, and Grim) ordered Kayla Foulks (“Foulks”) upstairs at gunpoint;

struck both Jamie Crum (“Crum”) and Kiley Titus (“Titus”) over the head with a 

firearm; and shot both Anthony Scartz (“Scartz”) and Caleb Chamberlin

(“Chamberlin”) in the head, causing their deaths. At the time of the home invasion, 

Barrett was fifteen, Bush was sixteen, and Grim was seventeen years old. 

{¶3} Additional background regarding the home invasion is contained in the 

recent opinions we issued on appeals from Barrett’s co-defendants. See State v. 

Bush, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-22-37, 2023-Ohio-4473, ¶ 2; State v. Grim, 3d Dist. 

Logan No. 8-23-01, 2023-Ohio-4474, ¶ 2-4.

{¶4} The Amended Delinquency Complaint filed against Barrett in the 

juvenile court set forth the following seven counts, along with a firearm 

specification for each of the counts:

1) Complicity to Aggravated Burglary, in violation of R.C. 

2911.11(A)(1), (2), (B) and R.C. 2923.03(A)(1)-(4), (F), a felony of 

the first degree if committed by an adult;

2) Complicity to Aggravated Robbery, in violation of R.C. 

2911.01(A)(1), (3), (C) and R.C. 2923.03(A)(1)-(4), (F), a felony of 

the first degree if committed by an adult;

3) Complicity to Kidnapping, in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2), (C)(1) 

and R.C. 2923.03(A)(1)-(4), (F), a felony of the first degree if 

committed by an adult;

4) Complicity to Felonious Assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), 

(D)(1)(a) and R.C. 2923.03(A)(1)-(4), (F), a felony of the second 

degree if committed by an adult;
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5) Complicity to Felonious Assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), 

(D)(1)(a) and R.C. 2923.03(A)(1)-(4), (F), a felony of the second 

degree if committed by an adult;

6) Complicity to Murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), (D) and R.C. 

2923.03(A)(1)-(4), (F), an unclassified felony if committed by an 

adult; and,

7) Complicity to Murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), (D) and R.C. 

2923.03(A)(1)-(4), (F), an unclassified felony if committed by an 

adult.

(Amended Delinquency Complaint). 

B. Preliminary Hearing in Juvenile Court Regarding Probable 

Cause

{¶5} On July 15-16, 2020, the juvenile court held a preliminary hearing on 

the State’s motion to relinquish jurisdiction over Barrett, pursuant to Juv.R. 30. 

(Oct. 26, 2020 Judgment Entry). Barrett was present at the hearing, along with his 

two attorneys. The hearing was a joint probable cause hearing for Barrett and his 

two co-delinquents. The stated purpose for the hearing was to determine if there 

was probable cause to believe Barrett committed the acts alleged and whether the 

acts would constitute criminal offenses if committed by an adult. (Id.). 

{¶6} At the hearing, the State presented the testimony of eight witnesses. 

The evidence showed the incident took place around 11:30 p.m. on November 27, 

2019 at 601 West Columbus Avenue in Bellefontaine, Ohio. Seven people lived at 

the house: Crum; Scartz, who was Crum’s son; Steven Travis (“Travis”), Crum’s 
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younger son; Foulks, who was Scartz’s pregnant girlfriend; Chamberlin, Titus, and 

Jada Nichols (“Nichols”), the three of whom were Scrartz’s friends.

{¶7} Austin Allen (“Allen”) was an adult indicted for the same charges as 

the three juveniles. During the hearing, a recording of Allen’s November 29, 2019 

police interview was played during the testimony of one of the investigating 

detectives. In the interview, Allen told the police he picked up Grim and Bush in a 

car earlier on the day of the incident, at Barrett’s request. Allen explained that

Barrett, Grim, and Bush together planned to rob someone who had marijuana. In 

exchange for some money, Allen agreed to drop the three off near Scartz’s home 

(which he did), and Allen waited for them in the car. According to Allen, about ten 

to fifteen minutes later, the three ran back to the car and got in. Barrett had been 

shot in the leg and was bragging about shooting two people. Allen then drove the

injured Barrett to Mercy Health hospital in Urbana, where he dropped Barrett off.

{¶8} Foulks testified Scartz sold drugs out of the home at 601 West 

Columbus Avenue. The night of the home invasion, three males, each wearing a 

facemask, opened the front door of the home and walked inside without knocking 

or asking for permission to enter. Four of the home’s residents were inside at the 

time; the other three residents—Scartz, Chamberlin, and Nichols—had gone to 

Walmart. One of the three intruders pointed a gun at Foulks and said “don’t fucking 

move,” and subsequently demanded she go upstairs. (July 15, 2020 Tr. at 161-164). 

Foulks then proceeded up the stairs, with someone else behind her and the intruder 
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with the gun in front of her, leading her up the stairs. Foulks testified one of the 

intruders lifted “up his arm while holding his gun and hit [Titus] twice in the head.” 

(Id. at 167.)

{¶9} Not knowing there were intruders in the home, Crum testified she 

walked to the home’s bathroom, she turned to close the door, she saw a person in a 

mask, she tried to close the door, and the masked person shoved the door open and 

hit her in the head with a blunt, sharp object. (Id. at 204-205). Crum later went to 

the hospital, where her wound was stapled where she had been hit with the object. 

(Id. at 206).

{¶10} Foulks testified that, while upstairs, one of the intruders pointed a gun 

at her, told her he would “blow your fucking head off,” and kept demanding she tell 

him “where the money was.” (Id. at 167-168, 186-187). After she took him to 

Scartz’s room in response to the demand to tell him where the money was, the 

intruder snatched something off the lid of a bucket and ran out of the room.

{¶11} Foulks testified she then heard gunshots. By the time she went 

downstairs, the intruders had left. She saw Chamberlin lying face down, and she 

saw Scartz at the bottom of the steps. Scartz was taken away by paramedics, and 

Foulks checked on Chamberlin—who was dead. Scartz later died at the hospital. 

(Id. at 169-172). Crum testified she saw Scartz (her son) get shot in his back, then 

watched his “head bounce off the wall behind him and him fall to the floor as he 

was shot in his head.” (Id. at 208-209).
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{¶12} Dr. John Daniels, a deputy coroner and forensic pathologist, testified 

Scartz suffered a gunshot wound to the head and a gunshot wound to the back. Dr. 

Daniels testified that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Scartz’s cause of 

death was a gunshot wound to the head. (Id. at 24, 26-28). Dr. Mary Goolsby, a 

deputy coroner and forensic pathologist, testified Chamberlin had two gunshot 

wounds to the head, and that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, 

Chamberlin’s cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds to the head. (Id. at 48-

49, 52, 54-55). 

{¶13} Ericka Jimenez, a DNA analyst from the Ohio Bureau of Criminal 

Investigation, testified that DNA analysis placed Barrett at the scene of the crime. 

Specifically, Barrett’s DNA was consistent with that in a blood smear located on a 

wall at the top of the steps in the home. Additionally, Detective Dwight Salyer of 

the Bellefontaine Police Department (“Detective Salyer”) testified he arrived at the 

scene and later learned from Travis (one of the seven residents present during the 

invasion) that an intruder had been shot during the incident. Detective Salyer 

located Barrett with a gunshot wound at a hospital in Urbana, where Barrett had 

arrived in the very early morning hours of November 28, 2019, i.e., soon after the 

incident. Police interviewed Barrett at the hospital on November 28, 2019, and they

interviewed Barrett a second time on November 29, 2019 after Barrett was released 

from the hospital. Grim and Bush were also, separately, interviewed by the police.
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{¶14} Following the hearing, the juvenile court concluded there was 

probable cause to support that Barrett committed the seven charged offenses, along 

with the related firearm specifications. (Oct. 26, 2020 Judgment Entry). The 

juvenile court also ordered a full investigation of each of the three juveniles, 

pursuant to Juv.R. 30(C).

C. Amenability Hearing in Juvenile Court 

{¶15} On March 3, 2021, the juvenile court held an amenability hearing on 

the State’s motion to relinquish jurisdiction over Barrett. (June 14, 2021 Judgment 

Entry). Once again, Barrett was present at the hearing, along with his two attorneys. 

(Id.). The court heard testimony from two State’s witnesses. First was Dr. Carla 

Dreyer, who completed a bindover evaluation of Barrett and whose report was 

admitted as an exhibit. Second was Probation Officer Amy Johnson, who worked 

for the Champaign County Juvenile Court. Barrett did not call any witnesses.

{¶16} Following the hearing, the juvenile court issued a nine-page Judgment 

Entry on Amenability that addressed each of the R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E) factors in 

determining whether to transfer Barrett’s case. In addressing the factor at R.C. 

2152.12(D)(7) of “The results of any previous juvenile sanctions and programs 

indicate that rehabilitation of the child will not occur in the juvenile system,” the 

Judgment Entry stated:

This factor applies. * * * The records reflect that beginning in May 

2016 and continuing throughout the remainder of the year, Juvenile 

Barrett was a ‘frequent flyer’ in the Court. He engaged in unruly and 
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delinquent behavior in school and throughout the community. 

Beginning in school year 2016, the Assistant Principal reported that 

he had 33 incidents. Multiple detention hearings were held. Multiple 

probation violations were filed. Multiple complaints for contempt of 

court were filed. The Juvenile would pick up new violations before 

prior violations could be resolved. He was ordered to have no contact 

with Juvenile Ethan Grim which he ignored. Juvenile Barrett 

exhibited behaviors that were defiant in nature and showed complete 

disrespect for persons and property. He was scratching students, 

making threats, leaving home and school without permission, 

violating clear court orders, violating curfew, and being disrespectful 

to teachers, bus drivers, the Court, his probation officer, law 

enforcement officers and his parents. Juvenile Barrett was also 

provided with repeated and clear instructions regarding his ankle 

monitoring system which he ignored. * * * Juvenile admitted to 

abusing different drugs over the course of his life to Dr. Dreyer.

In December 14, 2016, Champaign County Judge Gilbert ordered 

Juvenile Barrett to go to the CRC (Community Residential Center) 

where he was ordered to participate in individual and family 

counseling and follow any release recommendations; successfully 

complete the CRC program; must complete all school work; and that 

upon his release from the CRC Program, he would be successfully 

terminated from probation. Probation Officer Johnson testified that 

CRC is located in Marysville, Ohio, and is a 90-day treatment 

program. 

Subsequent to his release from treatment (sometime in March 2017), 

two complaints were filed in April 2017 * * * wherein Juvenile 

Barrett’s family reported him as missing. He was located and returned 

to his father but later left again that evening. He was held in the 

detention center for unruly/runaway charges due to being a 

community threat and in danger of picking up new charges. Sixteen 

days later on May 25, 2017, his initial appearance and pre-trial hearing 

were held. The Court released him under house arrest with a GPS 

ankle monitor along with no contact orders including Ethan Grim.

The Adjudication Hearing took place on August 14, 2017, wherein he 

admitted to running away twice in one day and to the amended charge 

of disorderly conduct which was initially charged as a felony from 

events that took place in May 2017 where Ethan Grim was present. 
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* * * Juvenile Barrett was charged with stealing a firearm on or about 

October 17, 2017, a felony of the third degree. He later entered an 

admission to the amended charge of attempted theft of a firearm, F4 

in June 2018. Juvenile Barrett was committed to the Department of 

Youth Services for a minimum period of 6 months up and through his 

21st birthday. Judge Gilbert suspended the commitment and placed 

the youth at West Central Juvenile Rehabilitation Center. The order 

went on to state that upon his release he would be under community 

control and placed on Level II probation. Probation Officer Johnson 

explained that West Central is considered a community control 

facility with lock down for those adjudicated with a felony. Juvenile 

Barrett was transported to the facility on June 28, 2018, where he 

stayed for approximately one year. His stay was extended.

In May 2019, Juvenile Barrett was successfully released from West 

Central Juvenile Rehabilitation Center. He was released to the 

custody of his father, placed on community control – Level II 

probation for 60 days.

Three months later, a complaint for probation violation was filed on 

Juvenile Barrett. On August 28, 2019, the juvenile failed to appear 

resulting in the issuance of an arrest warrant. A statewide warrant was 

issued * * *.

A pre-trial hearing was held on September 10, 2019, whereupon the 

juvenile admitted violating the terms of his community control. His 

probation was extended for 30 days.

On October 10, 2019, Judge Gilbert signed an order successfully 

terminating Juvenile Barrett’s probation. On the very same day of 

October 10, 2019, an unruly complaint * * * was filed because 

Juvenile Barrett ran away from school again without permission. His 

initial hearing was held on November 5, 2019, wherein he entered 

admissions to three pending unruly cases and was placed again on 

Community Control – Level I probation which terms the juvenile is 

required to observe for the first semester of the 2019-2020 school 

year. However, during the intervening time period between the filing 

of the complaint and the disposition, two more unruly complaints * * 

* were processed, involving Juvenile Barrett walking away from his 

first day of school Mac-O-Cheek and not returning home. He was 

reportedly seen leaving in a silver Honda with a white male driving. 
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The Urbana Police Officer noted on the complaint that they have dealt 

with Elijah S. Barrett 101 times. The other unruly complaint involved 

his habitual truancy.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that rehabilitation will not 

occur in the juvenile system. 

(June 14, 2021 Judgment Entry at 3-5). Within this same subsection, the juvenile 

court noted: “Due to the volume of records and numerous unruly and delinquency 

actions, the Court has not addressed [Barrett’s] entire history as set out in the 

certified records in State’s Exhibit 4.” (Id.) 

{¶17} Addressing the factor at R.C. 2152.12(D)(9) of “There is not sufficient 

time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile system,” the Judgment Entry stated: 

This factor applies. The Court finds that there is not sufficient time to 

rehabilitate this Juvenile and adopts the findings in this regard made 

by Dr. Dreyer. Juvenile Barrett is not amenable to treatment. He lacks 

the insight and motivation to change. He had all Fs in 8th grade and 

despite efforts, refused to engage in school. Instead, he was 

disrespectful to school officials and walked off multiple times without 

permission. He did the same things at the alternative school. Upon 

review of the assessments and findings of Dr. Dreyer, the Court finds 

that Juvenile Barrett cannot be rehabilitated. Dr. Dreyer testified that 

this Juvenile had the benefit of programs (Thinking for a Change and 

other cognitive programs) but failed to implement the lessons and life 

skills.

Juvenile Barrett moved to Bellefontaine where he stayed with his 

girlfriend. Instead of making new friends in a new town, he invites 

Ethan Grim and Josia Bush to come to Bellefontaine to celebrate the 

release of Josia from detention. He failed to implement the lessons 

learned from programs and his past mistakes. Juvenile Barrett had no 

long stretches of proving to be a law-abiding child. He was constantly 

in and out of Court for almost four years. He clearly did not respond 

favorably to past efforts regarding his rehabilitation. Dr. Dreyer 

testified that his prognosis if sent to DYS is poor and the Court agrees.
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(Id. at 6). In its assessment of the R.C. 2152.12(D)(1) factor, the juvenile court 

noted: “[t]wo individuals suffered the worst serious physical harm—death.” (Id. at 

2). Ultimately, the juvenile court found seven of the nine factors favoring 

transferring jurisdiction applied to Barrett.

{¶18} The juvenile court found none of the factors favoring retaining 

jurisdiction to be applicable. Among the court’s assessment of those factors, the 

Judgment Entry addressed whether there was sufficient time to rehabilitate the child 

within the juvenile system and the level of security available in the juvenile system 

and concluded:

This factor does not apply. Defense argues that there is sufficient time 

to rehabilitate the child. As indicated hereinbefore, there is not. This 

juvenile received family counseling through a relative’s case, had the 

supervision of a probation officer, went to a 90-day treatment 

program, spent a year in a residential facility, and was afforded 

multiple chances by the Court to learn from his poor choices. In Fall 

2019, he left his home county of Champaign and began living with a 

family in Logan County. Rather than re-think his past actions and 

choices, he engaged in the same pattern of breaking the law. Despite 

being court-ordered to have no contact with Ethan Grim, the records 

support that he violated the clear order. Juvenile Barrett has 

demonstrated his propensity to breaking the rules, violating the laws, 

and lack of amenability in the juvenile system. 

(Id. at 7-8). The juvenile court further found that “Barrett is not amenable and 

cannot be rehabilitated with services available in the juvenile system, including the 

Department of Youth Services” and “that a blended sentence in this action would 

not protect the community.” (Id. at 8).
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{¶19} In accordance with R.C. 2152.12(B)(3), the juvenile court found the 

applicable factors under R.C. 2152.12(D) outweighed the applicable factors under 

R.C. 2152.12(E). The juvenile court also found Barrett was fifteen years old at the 

time of the alleged offenses. (Id.). Therefore, the juvenile court granted the motion 

to relinquish jurisdiction and ordered, pursuant to R.C. 2152.12, that Barrett’s case

be transferred to the adult court for further proceedings. (Id.).

D. General Division Indictment, Plea, and Sentencing

{¶20} In the adult court, Barrett’s Indictment charged him with the same 

seven counts as set forth in his Amended Delinquency Complaint, as well as a 

firearm specification for each count pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(A). Ultimately, and 

pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Barrett entered a plea of guilty to three of 

the charges and the State applied to dismiss the other four charges. (Dec. 7, 2021 

Judgment Entry; Dec. 10, 2021 Judgment Entry). At sentencing, having accepted 

Barrett’s petition and the State’s application, the court found Barrett had been 

convicted of Count Two (Complicity to Aggravated Robbery), Count Four 

(Complicity to Felonious Assault), and Count Six (Complicity to Murder), along 

with the firearm specification to Count Six. (Nov. 22, 2022 Judgment Entry). For 

Count Two, the court sentenced Barrett to a term of four to six years in prison. For 

Count Four, the court sentenced Barrett to three years in prison. For Count Six, the 

court sentenced Barrett to fifteen years to life in prison, plus three years in prison 

for the firearm specification. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served 
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consecutively, for an aggregate term of twenty-five to twenty-seven years to life in 

prison. This appeal followed.

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶21} Barrett raises six assignments of error for our review:

First Assignment of Error

The trial court erred when it failed to suppress Elijah’s statements to the 

police because they were involuntary and obtained in violation of the 

right to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 

to the U.S. Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio 

Constitution. (11.22.22 Final Judgment Entry).

Second Assignment of Error

The juvenile court erred when it consolidated three juvenile cases for a 

single, joint probable cause hearing, in violation of his right to due 

process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution and Article I, Section 16, Ohio Constitution. (11.22.22 

Final Judgment Entry).

Third Assignment of Error

The juvenile court erred when it admitted the interviews of Elijah’s 

codefendants, in violation of his right to confrontation as guaranteed by 

the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution 

and Article I, Section 10, Ohio Constitution. (11.22.22 Final Judgment 

Entry).

Fourth Assignment of Error

The trial court abused its discretion when it transferred Elijah’s cases 

for criminal prosecution, in violation of R.C. 2152.12(B); Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; and Article I, Section 

10, Ohio Constitution. (11.22.22 Final Judgment Entry).
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Fifth Assignment of Error

The trial court erred when it sentenced Elijah Barrett to an indefinite 

sentence under the unconstitutional Reagan Tokes Law. Fifth, Sixth, 

and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; Article I, Section 

5 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. (11.22.22 Final Judgment Entry).

Sixth Assignment of Error

Elijah was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel in 

juvenile court. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 

Constitution; Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution. (11.22.22 

Final Judgment Entry).

III. DISCUSSION

{¶22} In his reply brief, Barrett conceded his fifth assignment of error in light 

of the Ohio Supreme Court’s recent decision in State v. Hacker, --- Ohio St.3d ---, 

2023-Ohio-2535. (See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 9). Therefore, we proceed with 

addressing the remaining assignments of error, but not in the order presented.

A. Third Assignment of Error

{¶23} In the third assignment of error, Barrett contends the juvenile court 

erred and violated his right to confrontation when it admitted the interviews of his 

co-delinquents at the probable cause hearing. He argues he was entitled to confront 

and cross-examine both of his co-delinquents, Bush and Grim. In response, the 

State argues the Confrontation Clause does not apply to juvenile preliminary 

hearings in Ohio. We addressed this same issue in Grim.
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1. Standard of Review

{¶24} “Generally, the admission of evidence lies within the broad discretion 

of the trial court.” Grim, 2023-Ohio-4474, at ¶ 11, citing State v. Conway, 109 Ohio 

St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815, ¶ 62. “However, we review de novo evidentiary rulings 

that implicate the Confrontation Clause.” State v. McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 

2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 97. De novo review is independent, without deference to the 

lower court’s decision. State v. Azeen, 163 Ohio St.3d 447, 2021-Ohio-1735, ¶ 59.

2. Applicable Law

{¶25} “Juvenile courts have exclusive initial subject-matter jurisdiction over 

any case involving a person alleged to be delinquent for having committed, when 

younger than eighteen years of age, an act which would constitute a felony if 

committed by an adult.” State v. Golphin, 81 Ohio St.3d 543, 544-45, 692 N.E.2d 

608 (1998). “Before such an individual may be tried as an adult in common pleas 

court, the juvenile court must comply with” certain statutory provisions pursuant to 

procedures established by the rules of juvenile procedure. Id. at 545; see also, e.g.,

R.C. 2152.10; R.C. 2152.12; Juv.R. 30.

{¶26} “R.C. 2152.12 governs the transfer of a child from the juvenile court 

to the general division of the common pleas court.” Bush, 2023-Ohio-4473, at ¶ 20. 

“Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(B), a juvenile court has the discretion to transfer a case 

for criminal prosecution if the court finds that three conditions are met: (1) the child 

was 14 or older at the time of the act charged; (2) there is probable cause to believe 
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that the child committed the act charged; and (3) the child is ‘not amenable to care 

or rehabilitation within the juvenile system, and the safety of the community may 

require that the child be subject to adult sanctions.’” Id., quoting R.C. 2152.12(B). 

Under Ohio’s Rules of Juvenile Procedure, “[i]n any proceeding where the court 

considers the transfer of a case for criminal prosecution, the court shall hold a 

preliminary hearing to determine if there is probable cause to believe that the child 

committed the act alleged and that the act would be an offense if committed by an 

adult.” Juv.R. 30(A).

{¶27} In Grim, we held that, because “the probable cause hearing here did 

not constitute a trial, the Confrontation Clause” did not apply to bar one of the 

State’s witnesses from testifying at the preliminary hearing regarding statements 

elicited from Grim’s co-delinquents. Grim, 2023-Ohio-4474, ¶ 10, 16. We quoted 

at length from a Twelfth District opinion that had recently addressed the issue:

The United States Supreme Court has explained that ‘[t]he right to 

confrontation is basically a trial right.’ Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 

725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968). A juvenile transfer 

hearing “is not a trial as it does not ‘find as a fact that the accused 

minor is guilty of the offense charged. It simply finds the existence of 

probable cause to so believe.’” State v. Garner, 6th Dist. Lucas No. 

L-18-1269, 2020-Ohio-4939, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio 

St.3d 83, 93 (2001). The United States Supreme Court ‘has repeatedly 

declined to require the use of adversarial procedures to make probable 

cause determinations.’ Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338, 134 

S.Ct. 1090, 188 L.Ed.2d 46 (2014). The federal courts have repeatedly 

held that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause does not apply 

to preliminary hearings. Likewise, the Ohio Supreme Court has held 

that the constitutional right to confront one’s accusers ‘relates to the 

actual trial for the commission of the offense and not to the
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preliminary examination * * *.’ (Emphasis added.) Henderson v.

Maxwell, 176 Ohio St. 187, 188, 198 N.E.2d 456 (1964).

Id. at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Fuell, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2020-02-008, 2021-

Ohio-1627, ¶ 29-30. “[W]e agree[d] with the other Ohio Appellate Districts, and 

the statements from the Supreme Court of the United States, that confrontation is 

essentially a ‘trial right.’” Id. at ¶ 16; see also State v. Riley, 5th Dist. Muskingum 

No. CT2012-0022, 2013-Ohio-1332, ¶ 49 (“[t]he juvenile bindover procedure is 

analogous to the adult preliminary hearing: both evaluate probable cause, neither is 

a determination of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”). 

{¶28} In addition to the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, the Ohio 

Constitution provides: “In any trial, in any court, the party accused shall be allowed 

to * * * meet the witnesses face to face.” (Emphasis added.) Ohio Constitution, 

Article I, Section 10. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that Section 10, Article I 

of the Ohio Constitution provides no greater right of confrontation than the Sixth 

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. State v. Arnold, 126 Ohio St.3d 290, 2010-

Ohio-2742, ¶ 12.

3. Analysis

{¶29} Based on Grim, which involved the exact same probable cause hearing 

here, we find no error by the juvenile court, or violation of Barrett’s Confrontation 

Clause rights, when it admitted the interviews of Barrett’s co-delinquents at the 

probable cause hearing. Grim, 2023-Ohio-4474, at ¶ 16; see also In Re B.W., 7th 
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Cir. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0071, 2017-Ohio-9220, ¶ 1, 41, 48 (explaining, “[w]e 

do not believe the juvenile court (at a probable cause hearing held prior to 

transferring a juvenile to the general division) was bound by confrontation clause 

standards for admissibility of evidence,” and deciding the juvenile court should have 

considered co-delinquent’s statements to a detective). Moreover, Barrett has not 

directed us to any U.S. Supreme Court or Ohio Supreme Court authority holding 

that the right to confrontation applies to a juvenile court’s preliminary hearing. 

Barrett’s third assignment of error is overruled. 

B. First Assignment of Error

{¶30} In his initial assignment of error, Barrett argues his statements to the 

police during his first and second interviews were involuntary and obtained in 

violation of the right to due process, resulting in the court committing plain error by 

admitting the statements at the probable cause hearing. However, we need not 

determine whether the court committed error by admitting his statements to police. 

As shown below, even without considering Barrett’s statements, there was more 

than enough evidence “to determine * * * there is probable cause to believe that 

[Barrett] committed the act alleged and that the act would be an offense if committed 

by an adult.” Juv.R. 30(A).

1. Standard of Review

{¶31} The determination of “whether the state presented sufficient credible 

evidence of probable cause * * * is reviewed de novo.” State v. Martin, 170 Ohio 
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St.3d 181, 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 23. The juvenile court’s credibility assessments at 

a probable-cause hearing are entitled to deference on review; this deference is 

directed to the reliability of the evidence presented, not to the ultimate resolution of 

competing evidence. Id. at ¶ 23, 27.

2. Applicable Law

a. Probable cause hearing in juvenile court for 

purposes of binding over to adult court

{¶32} “In the context of establishing probable cause for purposes of binding 

a juvenile over to adult court, ‘[t]he state must provide credible evidence of every 

element of an offense to support a finding that probable cause exists to believe that 

the juvenile committed the offense.’” In re E.S., --- Ohio St.3d ---, 2023-Ohio-4273, 

¶ 23, quoting State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 752 N.E.2d 937 (2001), paragraph 

three of the syllabus. ‘“[P]robable cause exists when the facts and circumstances 

are sufficient to provide a reasonable belief that the accused has committed a 

crime.”’ Id. at ¶ 22, quoting Martin at ¶ 17. ‘“The inquiry requires the judge to 

review all the circumstances and make a practical, common-sense decision as to 

whether probable cause is present.”’ Id. 

{¶33} The state’s burden is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt or a 

preponderance of the evidence. In re E.S. at ¶ 23; Martin at ¶ 18. The state’s burden 

is to produce evidence that raises more than a mere suspicion of guilt. In re E.S. at 

¶ 23. “The juvenile court presiding over a probable-cause hearing does not sit as 
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the ultimate trier of fact.” Martin at ¶ 31. “It is tasked only with conducting a 

preliminary hearing to determine whether the state has presented sufficient credible 

evidence to proceed with its prosecution in a criminal court.” Id.

b. Complicity

{¶34} All of the offenses against Barrett were charged under a theory of 

complicity to commit an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult. 

(See Amended Delinquency Complaint; see also Indictment). The complicity 

statute provides, in relevant part:

(A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the 

commission of an offense, shall do any of the following:

(1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense;

(2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense;

(3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of

[R.C. 2923.01];

(4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the 

offense.

(B) It is no defense to a charge under this section that no person with 

whom the accused was in complicity has been convicted as a principal 

offender.

(C) No person shall be convicted of complicity under this section 

unless an offense is actually committed, but a person may be 

convicted of complicity in an attempt to commit an offense in 

violation of [R.C. 2923.02].

* * * 
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(F) Whoever violates this section is guilty of complicity in the 

commission of an offense, and shall be prosecuted and punished as if 

he were a principal offender. * * * 

R.C. 2923.03(A), (B), (C), (F). The statutes and requirements for the individual 

underlying offenses are set forth below in the sections analyzing the specific counts.

3. Analysis

{¶35} The juvenile court concluded there was probable cause to support that 

Barrett committed the seven charged offenses, along with the connected firearm 

specifications. (Oct. 26, 2020 Judgment Entry). As set forth below, based on the 

evidence presented at the July 15-16, 2020 preliminary hearing, we likewise 

determine there was probable cause to believe Barrett committed the seven charged 

complicity offenses, each of which would be an offense if committed by an adult, 

as well as the connected firearm specifications. Juv.R. 30(A). We make this 

determination even without considering Barrett’s statements to the police.

a. Complicity to aggravated burglary

{¶36} The Amended Delinquency Complaint alleged Barrett, Bush, and 

Grim trespassed in the residence with the purpose to rob the occupants by means of 

a firearm, during which time they either inflicted, or attempted or threatened to 

inflict, physical harm on the various occupants of the home. The aggravated 

burglary statute provides, in relevant part:

(A) No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass in an 

occupied structure * * *, when another person other than an 
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accomplice of the offender is present, with purpose to commit in the 

structure * * * any criminal offense, if any of the following apply:

(1) The offender inflicts, or attempts or threatens to inflict 

physical harm on another;

(2) The offender has a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance 

on or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s 

control.

R.C. 2911.11(A). Regarding the requisite “trespass,” we recently explained:

One way a person can commit a ‘trespass’ is by ‘[k]nowingly 

enter[ing] or remain[ing] on the land or premises of another,’ ‘without 

privilege to do so.’ R.C. 2911.21(A)(1). And, ‘[p]rivilege’ ‘means an 

immunity, license, or right conferred by law, bestowed by express or 

implied grant, arising out of status, position, office, or relationship, or 

growing out of necessity.’ R.C. 2901.01(A)(12).

State v. Choudri, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-22-70, 2023-Ohio-4476, ¶ 18.

{¶37} The State provided sufficient credible evidence of each element of 

complicity to aggravated burglary to support finding that probable cause existed to 

believe Barrett committed the offense. For example, among other supporting 

evidence:

• Allen stated during his police interview that Barrett, Grim, and Bush 

together planned to rob someone; he then dropped the three off near 

Scartz’s home; and, about ten to fifteen minutes later, the three got 

back in the car, Barrett had been shot in the leg, and Barrett bragged 

about shooting two people.

• Foulks testified three males, who were wearing facemasks, walked in 

through the front door of the residence, without knocking or asking 

for permission to enter. She also testified the door had been shut, so 

they had to open it to come into the residence.

• Foulks testified four residents were inside the home at the time the 

intruders entered.
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• Foulks testified Scartz was selling drugs out of the home.

• Foulks testified one of the three masked males pointed a gun at her 

and said “don’t fucking move.” (July 15, 2020 Tr. at 163). 

• Ericka Jimenez, a DNA analyst from the Ohio Bureau of Criminal 

Investigation, testified that DNA analysis placed Barrett at the scene 

of the crime (specifically, Barrett’s DNA was consistent with that in 

a blood smear found on a wall at the home).

• Detective Salyer testified he learned from Travis that one of the 

intruders had been shot during the incident, and Detective Salyer 

located Barrett with a gunshot wound at a hospital in Urbana, where 

Barrett had arrived in the very early morning hours of November 28, 

2019.

b. Complicity to aggravated robbery

{¶38} The Amended Delinquency Complaint also contained a count for 

aggravated robbery, with allegations similar to those in the aggravated burglary 

count. The aggravated robbery statute provides, in relevant part:

(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined 

in [R.C. 2913.01], or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or 

offense, shall do any of the following:

(1) Have a deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or 

under the offender’s control and either display the weapon, 

brandish it, indicate that the offender possesses it, or use it; 

* * * 

(3) Inflict, or attempt to inflict, serious physical harm on 

another.

R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), (3). 

{¶39} The State provided sufficient credible evidence of each element of 

complicity to aggravated robbery to support finding that probable cause existed to 
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believe Barrett committed the offense. In addition to the evidence that was 

presented to show Barrett’s complicity to aggravated burglary, the State also 

presented Foulks’ testimony that one of the masked males pointed a gun directly at 

her saying he would “blow your fucking head off,” and he kept demanding she tell 

him “where the money was.” (July 15, 2020 Tr. at 167-168, 186-187). After taking 

him to Scartz’s room in response to the demand to tell him where the money was, 

the masked male snatched something off the lid of a bucket in Scartz’s room and 

then ran out of the room.

c. Complicity to kidnapping

{¶40} The Amended Delinquency Complaint alleged Barrett, Bush, and 

Grim ordered Foulks to move at gunpoint from the place where she was found, for 

the purpose of facilitating an aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary or flight 

thereafter. The kidnapping statute provides, in relevant part:

(A) No person, by force, threat, or deception, * * * by any means, 

shall remove another from the place where the other person is found 

or restrain the liberty of the other person, for any of the following 

purposes: * * * 

(2) To facilitate the commission of any felony or flight 

thereafter; * * * 

R.C. 2905.01(A)(2).

{¶41} Among all of the other evidence at the probable cause hearing, Foulks 

testified one of the three masked males pointed a gun at her and said “don’t fucking 

move,” and he subsequently “demanded [she go] upstairs.” (July 15, 2020 Tr. at 
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161-164). Foulks then proceeded up the stairs, with someone else behind her and 

the intruder with the gun in front of her, leading her up the stairs. This testimony,

along with the previously-mentioned evidence, constituted sufficient credible 

evidence of each element of complicity to kidnapping to support finding that 

probable cause existed to believe Barrett committed the offense.

d. Complicity to felonious assault

{¶42} The Amended Delinquency Complaint included two counts of 

complicity to felonious assault. One count related to Crum being hit in the head as 

she went into the bathroom and the other related to Titus being pistol whipped. The 

felonious assault statute provides, in relevant part:

(A) No person shall knowingly do * * * the following: * * * 

(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another * * * by 

means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance.

R.C. 2903.11(A)(2).

{¶43} The State provided sufficient credible evidence of each element of 

complicity to felonious assault of Crum and of Titus to support finding that probable 

cause existed to believe Barrett committed the offenses. Evidence at the probable 

cause hearing included Foulks’ testimony that one of the intruders lifted “up his arm 

while holding his gun and hit [Titus] twice in the head.” (July 15, 2020 Tr. at 167.) 

Crum testified she walked to the bathroom, she turned to close the door, she saw a 

person in a mask, she tried to close the door, and the person shoved the door open 
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and hit her in the head with a blunt, sharp object. (Id. at 204-205). Crum later went 

to the hospital and her head was stapled where she had been hit with the object. (Id.

at 206).

e. Complicity to murder

{¶44} The Amended Delinquency Complaint included two counts of 

complicity to murder. The first related to Scartz’s death, the other related to 

Chamberlin’s death. The murder statute provides, in relevant part:

(B) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result 

of the offender’s committing or attempting to commit an offense of 

violence that is a felony of the first or second degree and that is not a 

violation of [R.C. 2903.03 or R.C. 2903.04]. 

R.C. 2903.02(B). Both aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery constitute 

felonies of the first degree and are both offenses of violence listed in R.C. 

2901.01(A)(9). See R.C. 2901.01(A)(9), 2911.11(B), and 2911.01(C). 

{¶45} Among other evidence at the probable cause hearing, Foulks testified 

she heard gunshots after one of the masked males had snatched something off the 

lid of a bucket in Scartz’s room and run out of the room. By the time she went 

downstairs, the intruders had left. She saw Chamberlin lying face down, and she 

saw Scartz at the bottom of the steps. Additionally, Crum testified she saw Scartz 

get shot in his back, then watched as he was shot in his head. Dr. John Daniels, a 

deputy coroner and forensic pathologist, testified Scartz suffered two gunshot 

wounds, with the shot to the head being fatal. Likewise, Dr. Mary Goolsby, a 
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deputy coroner and forensic pathologist, testified Chamberlin died of multiple 

gunshot wounds to the head.

{¶46} Considering the record and the evidence presented against him, we 

conclude that the State provided sufficient credible evidence of each element of 

complicity to murder Scartz and Chamberlin to support finding that probable cause 

existed to believe Barrett committed the offenses.

f. Firearm specifications

{¶47} Finally, each count included a firearm specification. The applicable 

firearm specification statute provides, in relevant part:

(A) Imposition of a three-year mandatory prison term upon an 

offender under [R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(ii)] is precluded unless the 

indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the 

offense specifies that the offender had a firearm on or about the 

offender’s person or under the offender’s control while committing 

the offense and displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, 

indicated that the offender possessed the firearm, or used it to facilitate 

the offense. * * * 

R.C. 2941.145(A).

{¶48} Here, once more without considering Barrett’s statements to the 

police, we conclude the State provided sufficient credible evidence to support the 

firearm specification for each of the seven offenses. The record is replete with 

testimony regarding the use of a firearm to effectuate the various offenses. At least 

one of the intruders had a firearm on or about his person or under his control while 

committing the offenses and not only displayed and brandished the firearm, but used 
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it to facilitate the offenses. Moreover, Allen said during his police interview that 

Barrett bragged about shooting two people. Barrett’s first assignment of error is 

overruled.

C. Sixth Assignment of Error

{¶49} In the sixth assignment of error, Barrett argues he was denied effective 

assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel’s (1) failure to preserve for appeal the 

issue of constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes law and (2) failure to object to the 

introduction of his statements made to police.

{¶50} To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant “must 

show (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., performance falling below an 

objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would have been 

different.” State v. Tench, 156 Ohio St.3d 85, 2018-Ohio-5205, ¶ 264.

{¶51} Here, both of Barrett’s alleged instances of ineffective assistance of 

counsel at least fail at the second requirement, prejudice. Barrett conceded his 

argument concerning the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes law was decided

contrary to the position advocated in his initial brief. Hacker, --- Ohio St.3d ---, 

2023-Ohio-2535. And, as shown above in addressing the first assignment of error, 

his counsel’s failure to object to his allegedly involuntary statements made to police 

did not affect the result of the proceeding. Even without considering Barrett’s 

statements to the police, there was more than enough evidence to find probable 
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cause for each of the charged offenses and specifications. Barrett’s sixth assignment 

of error is overruled.

D. Fourth Assignment of Error

{¶52} In the fourth assignment of error, Barrett argues that the juvenile court 

erred in transferring his case to the Common Pleas Division to be prosecuted as an 

adult. Specifically, he says it was unreasonable for the juvenile court to transfer the 

case when the safety of the community could be adequately protected, there was 

appropriate time and resources in the juvenile system, and he was amenable to 

treatment. In short, this assignment of error attacks the juvenile court’s findings in 

the June 14, 2021 judgment entry on amenability issued after the March 3, 2021 

amenability hearing.

1. Standard of Review

{¶53} In the Bush decision, we set forth the applicable standard of review for 

discretionary-transfer proceedings in juvenile court:

The Supreme Court of Ohio has consistently applied the abuse-ofdiscretion standard in the review of discretionary-transfer proceedings 

from juvenile court to the general division of common pleas court. In

re M.P., 124 Ohio St.3d 445, 2010-Ohio-599, ¶ 14, 923 N.E.2d 584; 

State v. Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 93, 95, 547 N.E.2d 1181 (1989). ‘[A]n 

amenability hearing is a broad assessment of individual circumstances 

and is inherently individualized and fact-based. Thus a juvenile 

court’s determination regarding a child’s amenability to rehabilitation 

in the juvenile system is reviewed by an appellate court under an abuse 

of discretion standard.’ In re M.P., at ¶ 14. An abuse of discretion is a 

decision that was arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. 

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 

(1983). ‘A review under the abuse-of-discretion standard is a 
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deferential review.’ State v. Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio2407, ¶ 14, 972 N.E.2d 528. ‘As long as the [juvenile] court considers 

the appropriate statutory factors and there is some rational basis in the 

record to support the court’s findings when applying those factors, we 

cannot conclude that the [juvenile] court abused its discretion in 

deciding whether to transfer jurisdiction.’ State v. Phillips, 12th Dist. 

Clinton No. CA2009-03-001, 2010-Ohio-2711, ¶ 39.

Bush, 2023-Ohio-4473, at ¶ 24, quoting State v. Everhardt, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 

5-17-25, 2018-Ohio-1252, ¶ 19.

2. Applicable Law

{¶54} As noted above, the third requirement for a juvenile court to transfer a 

case for criminal prosecution pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(B) is a determination that

“[t]he child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system, and 

the safety of the community may require that the child be subject to adult sanctions.” 

R.C. 2152.12(B)(3). Thus, if a juvenile court finds probable cause at the preliminary 

hearing, then it shall hold an amenability hearing and consider the R.C. 2152.12

criteria in deciding whether the third requirement is met. Juv.R. 30(C). That 

“statute requires the juvenile court to decide whether the factors in R.C. 2152.12(D) 

that favor transferring jurisdiction outweigh the factors in R.C. 2152.12(E) that 

favor retaining jurisdiction.” Bush, 2023-Ohio-4473, at ¶ 21. At the time of the 

March 3, 2021 amenability hearing, the version of the statute setting forth the factors 

favoring a transfer of jurisdiction provided: 

(D) In considering whether to transfer a child under division (B) of 

this section, the juvenile court shall consider the following relevant 
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factors, and any other relevant factors, in favor of a transfer under that 

division:

(1) The victim of the act charged suffered physical or 

psychological harm, or serious economic harm, as a result of 

the alleged act.

(2) The physical or psychological harm suffered by the victim 

due to the alleged act of the child was exacerbated because of 

the physical or psychological vulnerability or the age of the 

victim.

(3) The child’s relationship with the victim facilitated the act 

charged.

(4) The child allegedly committed the act charged for hire or 

as a part of a gang or other organized criminal activity.

(5) The child had a firearm on or about the child’s person or 

under the child’s control at the time of the act charged, the act 

charged is not a violation of section 2923.12 of the Revised 

Code, and the child, during the commission of the act charged, 

allegedly used or displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, 

or indicated that the child possessed a firearm.

(6) At the time of the act charged, the child was awaiting 

adjudication or disposition as a delinquent child, was under a 

community control sanction, or was on parole for a prior 

delinquent child adjudication or conviction.

(7) The results of any previous juvenile sanctions and programs 

indicate that rehabilitation of the child will not occur in the 

juvenile system.

(8) The child is emotionally, physically, or psychologically 

mature enough for the transfer.

(9) There is not sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within 

the juvenile system.
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R.C. 2152.12(D) (effective October 12, 2016 to April 3, 2023). And, the version of 

R.C. 2152.12(E) setting forth the factors weighing against a transfer of jurisdiction 

provided:

(E) In considering whether to transfer a child under division (B) of 

this section, the juvenile court shall consider the following relevant 

factors, and any other relevant factors, against a transfer under that 

division:

(1) The victim induced or facilitated the act charged.

(2) The child acted under provocation in allegedly committing 

the act charged.

(3) The child was not the principal actor in the act charged, or, 

at the time of the act charged, the child was under the negative 

influence or coercion of another person.

(4) The child did not cause physical harm to any person or 

property, or have reasonable cause to believe that harm of that 

nature would occur, in allegedly committing the act charged.

(5) The child previously has not been adjudicated a delinquent 

child.

(6) The child is not emotionally, physically, or psychologically 

mature enough for the transfer.

(7) The child has a mental illness or intellectual disability.

(8) There is sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the 

juvenile system and the level of security available in the 

juvenile system provides a reasonable assurance of public 

safety.

R.C. 2152.12 (E) (effective October 12, 2016 to April 3, 2023).
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3. Analysis

{¶55} After the amenability hearing, the juvenile court issued a very detailed 

judgment entry, individually addressing the factors in favor of transfer under R.C. 

2152.12(D) and the factors against transfer under R.C. 2152.12(E). (June 14, 2021 

Judgment Entry). It found seven of the nine factors favoring transfer applied and 

none of the eight factors against transfer were applicable. (Id.) The juvenile court 

concluded “that the factors for transfer outweigh the factors against transfer.” (Id.

at 8).

{¶56} As recognized above, “the juvenile court has wide latitude in 

determining whether it should retain or relinquish jurisdiction over a juvenile.” 

Bush, 2023-Ohio-4473, at ¶ 39. Here, the juvenile court considered the appropriate 

statutory factors, and there is at least “some rational basis in the record to support 

[its] findings when applying those factors.” Id. at ¶ 24. Therefore, we conclude that 

the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to transfer jurisdiction to 

the adult court for further proceedings. 

{¶57} Barrett’s arguments on appeal primarily focus on the factors in R.C. 

2152.12(D)(7), (D)(9), and (E)(8). Each of those factors was thoroughly addressed 

by the juvenile court in its judgment entry, as set forth in the Facts and Procedural 

History section above. The juvenile court explained there was substantial evidence 

supporting that both 2152.12(D)(7) and (D)(9) applied as factors favoring 

transferring jurisdiction and there was considerable evidence that 2152.12(E)(8) did 
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not apply as a factor favoring retaining jurisdiction. Additionally, the evidence 

presented at the amenability hearing demonstrated Barrett’s extensive prior 

involvement with the juvenile system and the attempts to rehabilitate him over the 

years before the deaths of Scartz and Chamberlin. In our review of the record, we 

conclude the juvenile court’s concerns about the safety of the community and its 

findings that support the juvenile system’s inability to rehabilitate Barrett are fully 

supported by the record. We disagree with Barrett’s contention that it was 

unreasonable to transfer his case “for prosecution as an adult when the safety of the 

community could be adequately protected, there was appropriate time and resources 

in the juvenile system, and [he] was amenable to treatment.” (Appellant’s Brief at 

22). The evidence presented at the amenability hearing showed otherwise.

{¶58} Barrett’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

E. Second Assignment of Error

{¶59} In the second assignment of error, Barrett contends the juvenile court 

erred in consolidating three juvenile cases for a single, joint probable cause hearing. 

At the time of the hearing, Barrett’s counsel objected to the juvenile court holding 

a joint probable cause hearing for all three juveniles: Barrett, Bush, and Grim.

1. Standard of Review

{¶60} Barrett acknowledges we review a trial court’s determination on 

joinder issues under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Foster, 3d Dist. 

Hancock Nos. 5-22-26 & 5-22-27, 2023-Ohio-1434, ¶ 39. “An abuse of discretion 
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is more than an error in judgment; it suggests that the decision is unreasonable, 

arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Id., citing State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157-

158, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).

2. Applicable Law

{¶61} Despite there being no reference to joinder in the Rules of Juvenile 

Procedure, neither party argues joinder is prohibited in juvenile court proceedings. 

In fact, caselaw shows juvenile courts implement joinder of alleged delinquent 

children and conduct joint proceedings. E.g., In re L.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

99527, 2013-Ohio-5735, ¶ 40 (juvenile court jointly tried co-delinquents at the 

adjudication hearing); State v. Marshall, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150383, 2016-

Ohio-3184, ¶ 1-5 (Fischer, P.J.) (juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in 

relinquishing jurisdiction, where juvenile court had held joint probable-cause 

hearings for appellant and three other individuals accused of involvement in 

aggravated robberies).

{¶62} Barrett cites the Rules of Criminal Procedure in support of his

contention that the juvenile court erred in holding a joint probable cause hearing.

However, the criminal rules generally do not apply to juvenile court proceedings,

which are considered civil actions. See Crim.R. 1(C); In re Barchet, 3d Dist. 

Hancock Nos. 5-02-27, 5-02-28, 5-02-29, 5-02-30, 5-02-31 and 5-02-32, 2002-

Ohio-5420, ¶ 27; In re Anderson, 92 Ohio St.3d 63, 65, 748 N.E.2d 67 (2001). Even 

so, courts have looked to the Rules of Criminal Procedure in providing guidance
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when addressing joinder issues in juvenile proceedings. E.g., In re L.W. at ¶ 38-40 

(analyzing Crim.R. 8 and the purposes of joinder in finding the juvenile suffered no 

prejudice as a result of a joint trial with his co-delinquent); State v. Majoros, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 42062 and 42063, 1980 WL 355366, *2-3 (Nov. 13, 1980) 

(looking to the Rules of Criminal Procedure in determining whether the juvenile 

court erred in joining appellant with three other juveniles in the same proceeding, 

because the “Rules of Juvenile Procedure do not address the issue of joinder of 

multiple juvenile defendants”). 

{¶63} One reason to look at the Criminal Rules for guidance in juvenile 

delinquency proceedings is the essential protections the Criminal Rules provide to 

persons accused of violating criminal statutes. For example, Crim.R. 14 provides 

relief from prejudicial joinder. Furthermore, traditional reasons for joining 

defendants (i.e., conserving judicial and prosecutorial resources, lessening the 

expense of multiple trials, diminishing inconvenience to witnesses, and diminishing 

the possibility of incongruent results) all coincide with Juv.R. 1(B)(2)’s objective 

“to secure simplicity and uniformity in procedure, fairness in administration, and 

the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.” See State v. Thomas, 61 Ohio 

St.2d 223, 225, 400 N.E.2d 401 (1980).

{¶64} The Rules of Criminal Procedure permit, in certain circumstances, the 

joinder of offenses and the joinder of defendants. Crim.R. 8. Although the law 

favors joinder, “a trial court should not order joinder where the defendant will be 
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prejudiced.” Foster, 2023-Ohio-1434, at ¶ 41; see also Crim.R. 14 (“[i]f it appears 

that a defendant * * * is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants * * *, 

the court shall order an election or separate trial of counts, grant a severance of 

defendants, or provide such other relief as justice requires”). “Joinder may be 

prejudicial when the offenses are unrelated and the evidence as to each is very 

weak.” State v. Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d 340, 343-344, 421 N.E.2d 1288 (1981). 

Joinder may not be prejudicial “when the evidence is direct and uncomplicated and 

can reasonably be separated as to each offense.” Id. 

{¶65} To prevail on a claim that the trial court erred in not granting a 

severance, the accused has the burden to “affirmatively demonstrate (1) that his 

rights were prejudiced, (2) that at the time of the motion to sever he provided the 

trial court with sufficient information so that it could weigh the considerations 

favoring joinder against the defendant’s right to a fair trial, and (3) that given the 

information provided to the court, it abused its discretion in refusing to separate the 

charges for trial.” State v. Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d 51, 59, 600 N.E.2d 661 (1992). 

Furthermore, “[i]n a bench trial, the defendant’s burden becomes steeper.” State v. 

Harris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104833, 2017-Ohio-2985, ¶ 8. This is because, “[i]f 

a jury is permitted to hear multiple cases of distinct and separate crimes, then a trial 

court with the benefit of the legal experience necessary to the position would be in 

a better position to sift through the relevant evidence.” Id. at ¶ 15; see also State v. 

Thomas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90623, 2008-Ohio-6148, ¶ 33-34, 39 (no showing 
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of prejudice by joinder with co-defendants’ cases in a joint bench trial; the trial court 

in a bench trial is presumed to have considered only the relevant, material, 

competent evidence in arriving at its judgment, unless it affirmatively appears 

otherwise).

3. Analysis

{¶66} During the probable cause hearing, it was undisputed that the amended 

delinquency complaints for all three juveniles were the same. (July 15, 2020 Tr. at 

12). Furthermore, all charged offenses arose from the same incident. This presented 

a situation where a joint hearing aligned with many of joinder’s purposes. Foster, 

2023-Ohio-1434, at ¶ 40, quoting Thomas, 61 Ohio St.2d at 225. Additionally, an 

experienced juvenile judge, not a jury, was the decision maker at this particular 

proceeding. “We can presume the trial court is competent and capable of 

determining the facts pertinent to the distinct elements of the crimes in each separate 

case,” unless the appellant fulfills his or her obligation in identifying something in 

the record that demonstrates the trial court considered improper evidence. Harris, 

2017-Ohio-2985, at ¶ 13.

{¶67} Barrett has not met his burden to demonstrate his rights were 

prejudiced. He asserts that “[t]he breadth of these proceedings resulted in 

pronounced confusion regarding the nature and extent of [his] culpability.” 

(Appellant’s Brief at 19). However, he fails to point to any confusion, let alone 

“pronounced confusion.” Instead, his assertion is based on the testifying victims’ 
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inability “to distinctly identify each person and how each individual was specifically 

involved.” (Id.) Not only does this ignore other evidence presented, it also ignores 

the fact Barrett was charged under a theory of complicity. All of the delinquency 

offenses were related and the evidence as to each—for purposes of the juvenile 

court’s determination at that stage—was simple, direct, and quite strong. See 

Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d at 343-344.

{¶68} We do not find the juvenile court abused its discretion in overruling 

Barrett’s request to sever the probable cause hearing into separate hearings for each 

of the three juveniles and, instead, holding a single, joint probable cause hearing. 

See In re L.W., 2013-Ohio-5735, at ¶ 40; Majoros, 1980 WL 355366, at *3; State v. 

Eames, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-93-3, 1994 WL 66643, *7 (Mar. 7, 1994) (appellant 

failed to show he was prejudiced by joinder of the defendants in a bench trial, 

particularly in light of “the usual liberal approach to joinder to conserve judicial 

resources, reduce the chance of incongruous results in successive trials and to 

diminish the inconvenience to witnesses and all others concerned”); State v. Salyers, 

3d Dist. Marion No. 9-05-07, 2005-Ohio-5038, ¶ 8-9 (trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying motion to sever where appellant and co-defendant were being 

tried on charges based on the same incident and appellant was unable to demonstrate 
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her rights were prejudiced by denial of the motion). Barrett’s second assignment of 

error is overruled.

1

IV. CONCLUSION

{¶69} For the foregoing reasons, Barrett’s assignments of error are 

overruled. Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars 

assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Logan County Court of 

Common Pleas.

Judgment Affirmed

WALDICK and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.

/hls

1

In response to this assignment of error, the State argues the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in not 

severing the probable cause hearing into three separate hearings since Crim.R. 14—the rule upon which 

Barrett relies for his argument—only applies to trials and not preliminary hearings in juvenile court. Because 

Barrett has not met his burden to show that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting a severance, 

we need not decide this disputed issue.