IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

SYLVESTER JAMISON, (R21155) )

and ALI EVANS, (K83175), )

)

Plaintiffs, ) No. 12 C 0242

)

v. ) Judge Ronald A. Guzmán

)

COMMANDER WILLIAM FRANKO, )

and SUPERINTENDENT SCOTT )

BRATLIEN, incorrectly sued as )

SCOTT BRADLEY, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiffs Sylvester Jamison and Ali Evans, Illinois Department of Corrections

inmates, have sued Cook County Jail Commander William Franko and Superintendent Scott Bratlien

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that defendants wrongfully kept them in disciplinary

segregation at Cook County Jail (“the Jail”). Defendants have filed a Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure (“Rule”) 56 motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court

grants the motion.

Discussion

As an initial point, defendants are correct that plaintiffs failed to comply with the

requirements of Local Rule 56.1. However, plaintiffs are proceeding pro se.

1

 Due to plaintiffs’ pro

se status, the Court has reviewed the record in full. It is clear that the parties do not dispute the facts

1

Plaintiffs never asked the Court to recruit counsel to assist them, perhaps because they

were assisted by fellow inmate Larry Maurice Banks, who is extremely litigious. See In re

Banks, No. 13 C 1014 (N.D. Ill.). 
at issue, and the record does not suggest any “unanswered questions” from discovery that remain

as a result of plaintiffs’ pro se status. Junior v. Anderson, __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 3886791, at *4 (7th

Cir. July 30, 2013). Thus, the Court proceeds with the summary judgment ruling.

“The Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a); Wackett v. City of Beaver Dam, 642 F.3d 578, 581 (7th Cir. 2011). The Court may

not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations, but the party opposing summary

judgment must point to evidence demonstrating a genuine dispute of material fact. Omnicare, Inc.

v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 705 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). The moving party

has the initial burden of showing there is no genuine dispute and he is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Carmichael v. Vill. of Palatine, 605 F.3d 451, 460 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). If the moving party meets this burden, the non-moving

party must respond with specific facts showing that the jury could find in his favor, and that there

is a genuine dispute that needs to be adjudicated at trial. Carmichael, 605 F.3d at 460 (citing

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586

(1986)).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect

to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . , or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined to any

jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006); Dole v. Chandler,

438 F.3d 804, 808 (7th Cir. 2006). A prisoner is required to utilize a jail grievance system before

filing a section 1983 claim so that jail officials have an opportunity to take remedial action. Porter

v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002); Dole, 438 F.3d at 809; Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727,
733 (7th Cir. 1999). Exhaustion requires “a prisoner [to] file complaints and appeals in the place,

and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Brengettcy v. Horton, 423 F.3d 674, 682

(7th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). 

There is no dispute that Jamison did not file a grievance at any time. (See Def.’s Ex. A,

Jamison Dep. at 141-42.) Instead, he attempted to rely upon the grievance filed by fellow inmate

Larry Maurice Banks. (Id.) As the Court has previously ruled, however, Jamison cannot rely on

Banks’ grievance to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Jamison v. Franko, No. 12 C 0098, 2013

WL 1093118, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2013); see Defs.’ Ex. D, Johnson Aff. ¶ 4 (“The Inmate

Grievance Procedure does not authorize one inmate to prepare and file grievances on behalf of

another.”). Because the record establishes that Jamison did not exhaust administrative remedies,

defendants are entitled to summary judgment on his claim. 

Turning to Evans, the record shows that he submitted a grievance on November 30, 2011. 

(Def.’s Ex. B, Evans Dep. Ex. 4, Grievance.) According to the Jail’s grievance system, correction

officials had thirty days, or until December 30, 2011, to respond to it. Evans did not receive a

response by that date. (See Def.’s Ex. D, Johnson Aff. ¶ 8.) Thus, on January 12, 2012, he filed this

suit.2

There is no dispute that Evans did not file an appeal of his grievance, which is required to

exhaust administrative remedies. He claims, however, that he could not appeal because the Jail did

not respond to his grievance, effectively making the process unavailable to him. See Dole v.

2

 In theory, the suit was filed earlier than January 12, 2012. January 12th is the date the

complaint was received by the Court. There is no proof of service to show when the complaint

was submitted to jail officials with sufficient postage to allow for the benefit of the mailbox rule

of Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988). The Court uses the January 12th date because it is the

most favorable date possible for Evans in the record. 
Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that the exhaustion requirement is excused if

jail officials’ failure to respond to a grievance renders the grievance process unavailable). 

But as Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395 (7th Cir. 2004) illustrates, a grievance process is not

unavailable simply because the prison’s response to a grievance is tardy. Though the prison officials

in Ford were required to rule on inmate appeals within sixty days “whenever possible,” it took them

six months to rule on Ford’s appeal. Id. When the sixty-day period set forth in the regulations had

elapsed, Ford filed suit, arguing that he had exhausted all of the remedies that were available to him. 

Id. The Seventh Circuit disagreed:

[The] regulation provides that decision will be rendered within 60 days of the appeal

“whenever possible.” That means, Ford contends, that once 60 days have expired

without a decision, the administrative process is no longer “available” and the

prisoner may start the litigation. That’s a non-sequitur. An aspiration to act quickly

“whenever possible” does not mean that the prison system tosses out the papers and

closes the files after two months . . . . Some appeals are simple and will be wrapped

up within two months; others are more complex. . . . Section 1997e(a) applies to all

grievances, not just to the simple ones. Illinois made a process available to Ford; he

had to stick with that process until its conclusion rather than make a beeline for court

just because the administrative officials gave his appeal the time needed to resolve

it.

Id.; see Dole, 438 F.3d at 812 (stating that an inmate must do “all that is reasonable to exhaust his

administrative remedies”). Like the plaintiff in Ford, Evans made a “beeline” to court – getting his

complaint through the prison and U.S. Mail systems and on file with this Court less than two weeks

after the response was due – as soon as the Jail’s response time elapsed. As in Ford, however,

Evans’ haste does not mean the Jail’s grievance process was unavailable to him.3

3

Exactly where the line is between a late response and an unavailable process is unclear. 

What is clear, however, is that the prison’s delay and the inmate’s efforts must be far greater

than in this case for the process to be deemed unavailable. See Dole, 438 F.3d 807-08 (process

unavailable to inmate who, over eighteen-month period, filed three different grievances and

repeatedly asked jail officials about them before filing suit); Brengettcy, 423 F.3d at 678

(grievance process unavailable given Jail’s failure to respond to inmate’s grievance and inquiries

about it and his follow-up grievance during four-month period after response was due). 
Conclusion

The record establishes that Jamison and Evans did not exhaust administrative remedies

before filing this suit. Accordingly, the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment

[23], and dismisses plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice for failure to exhaust. See Ford, 362 F.3d

395, 401 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[A]ll dismissals under § 1997e(a) should be without prejudice.”)

(emphasis original). This case is terminated. 

SO ORDERED. ENTERED: September 13, 2013

__________________________________

HON. RONALD A. GUZMAN

United States District Judge