ARMY LINEAGE SERIES 

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades 

by 

John B. Wilson 

CENTER OF MiLiTARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.c., 1998 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Dala 

Wilson, John B., 1934-

Maneuver and firepower : the evolution of divisions and sepa rate 

brigades I by John B. Wilson. 

p. cm. 

Army lineage series 

Incl udes bibliographi cal references and index. 

1. United States. Army- Organization- I·listory. I. Center of 

Mi litary History. II. Title. 

VA25. W554 1997 

355.3'0973- 0 C20 94-2 1031 

CIP 

CMH Pub 60- 14-1 

First Printing 
ARMY LINEAGE SERIES 

Jeffrey J. Clarke, General Editor 

AdvisOlY Committee 

(As OfScplcmbcr 1997) 

Joseph T. G lauhaar 

University of Houston 

Raymond A. Ca llahan 

University o f Delaware 

Maj. Gen. James J. Cravens, Jr. 

U.S. Army Tra ining and Doctrine 

Command 

Carlo W. D'Eslc 

New Seabury, Mass. 

George C. Herring, Jr. 

University of Kentucky 

Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Inge 

U.S. Army Command and Genera l 

Staff Coliege 

Michael J. Kurtz 

National Archives and Records 

Admi nistration 

Brig. Gen. Fletcher M. Lamkin, Jr. 

U.S. Mi litary Academy 

e"fol A. Reardon 

Pennsylva nia Siale University 

Col. Everett L. Roper, Jr. 

U.S. Army War College 

Mark A. Stoler 

University o f Vermont 

LI. Gen. Frederick E. Vollrath 

Arch ivist orlhe Army 

Gerhard L. Weinberg 

University of North Carolina 

u.s. Army Cel/ler ofMililwy HislDlY 

Brig. Gen. John W. Mountcastle, Chief of M ilitary History 

Chief Historian 

Chief, Fie ld Programs and 

Historical Scrvices Division 

Editor in Chief 

III 

Jeffrey J. Clarke 

John T. Grecnwood 

John W. Elsbcrg 

Foreword 

This work traces the evolution of two unique U.S. Army organizations---divisians and brigades- which combi ned combat arms, combat support, and combat 

service support units into well-oiled engi nes for war. The Army has used divisions for over two hu ndred and twenty years on the battlefield and for nearly 

eighty years has maintained them in peacetime as well. Separate combined arms 

brigades, a newer phenomenon, date to the 19605. Both organizations have played 

a pivotal role in the American military experience, and their exploits form the 

corc of the Army's history in the twentieth century. 

The following study is a systematic account of the way these two organizations evolved, highlighting the rationales behi nd Ihal evolulion and Ihe many factors Ihal played a part in bringing those changes inlO reality. This book will also 

comp lement Ihe forthcoming revised edition of Armies, Corps. Divisions, and 

Separ(lIe Brigades, a vol ume in the Army Lineage Series. 

In this work the reader, whcther mi litary or civilian, can follow the developmen t of two of the Army's complex organizations. Force planners today will find 

thc cha llenges faced by their predecessors in making these insti tutions responsive 

to an ever-changing threat in an evolvi ng political and technological environment 

highly relevant. By telling this story in a comprehe nsive manne r, the volume 

makes a signifi ca nt contribution to the history of the Army. 

Washington, D.C. 

2 February 1998 

v 

JOI-IN W. MOUNTCASTLE 

Brigadicr Gcnera l, USA 

Chicfof Military J-listory 
The Author 

John B. Wilson was born and grew up in Imperia l, Pennsylvan ia. He is a 

graduate of Duquesne University, receiving a B.A. degree in history in 1963 and 

an M.A. degree in America n history in 1966. He joined the Organi zational 

History Branch, Center of Military History, in 1968 and served the re until he 

retired in 1997. He compi led Armies, COIpS. Divisions. alld Separafe Brigades in 

the Army Lineage Series and is the author of several articles on the organizations 

of divisions and separate brigades. 

VI 
Preface 

This volume examines the evolution of divisions and separate brigades in the 

U.S. Army as it searched for the most effective way to fuse combat arms, combat 

support, and service units into combined arms teams. The Army has used divi· 

sions and brigades since the colonia l era, but the national leadership did not provide for their permanency in the force until the twentieth century. When divisions 

became a part of the standing force, experiences on American battlefields in the 

eighteenth and nineteenth centuri es, as well as Europea n military practices, 

sha ped their organization. The permanent divisions and brigades thai the Army 

organized, however, were uniquely American. 

AI the beginning of the seventeenth century annies had no permanent tactical 

subdivisio ns. Admin istrative orga ni zations called " regiments" were primarily 

designed to bring armed men to the battlefield. Upon arriv ing at the battle site, 

the men were usua lly grouped into battal ions or squadrons, tactica l organizations. 

King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden establ ished brigades during the Thirty Years 

War as tactica l organizations, assigning several battalions to them for the duration 

of 1I campaign, an arrangement that minimized the necessity for regrouping or 

retra ining his army before go ing into ba it Ie. Shortly therea ft er, other nations 

adopted the Swedish example. 

The size of annies increased by the early eighteenth century, and Frederick the 

Great of Prussia began dividing his army into col umns, which marched as wings or 

lines that fell into a prearranged order on the battlefield. Such maneuvers required 

disci pline and well-drilled troops. To overcome the Prussians, Marshal Maurice de 

Saxe of France reintroduced the cadence step, which had fa llen into disuse, and 

stressed discipline to control an army on the march and in combat. By marching 

troops at a measured step, Maurice could judge the time requ ircd to move his army 

to engage an enemy. Wi th the ability to calculate marching time, Marsha l Victor F. 

Broglie in the mid- 1700s began divid ing the French Army into several permanent 

columns or divisions of infantry and artillery for a campaign. These divisions made 

an anny easier to maneuver and occasionally permitted him to lise part of it as an 

independent force. Almost two hundred years later Basil Liddell Hart described that 

process as making a limbless army grow arms that could grip an enemy at different 

poi nts wh ile others struck him. 

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Europea n mi litary theorists 

incorporated the doctrine for organizing divisions and brigades in to the ir publicaVH 
tions, and many o f those works we re known to military leaders in coloni al 

America. The British Army also brOllght European methods of war to North 

America before the Revolutionary War, and the colonists adopted much of that 

practice and doctrine in developing their own divisions and brigades as command 

and control units. 

Aga inst this background, Chapter I su rveys the types of brigades and di visions the Army empl oyed in the various wars of the eighteenth and ninetecn th 

centuries. These units and the doctrine underlying them were the basis for organizing and mainta ining permanent divisions and brig<ldes in the twcntieth cent ury. Chapters 2 through 14 trace the evolution of United States Army div isions and 

separate brigades from approximately 1900 to 1990. Their various reorganizations and th eir roles in the total Army arc the grist of the study. Chapter 15 draws 

together some of the lessons ex plored in the main body of the volume. Since the 

manuscript was prepared seven years ago momentous changes have oeurred in 

the Army, and a brief look forward examines some of them. 

The word "division" over the years has had many meanin gs within the Army, 

as well as within the other military se rvices. As used in th is stud y, th e term 

addresses only a large, combined arms tcam ca pable of independent operations. 

But an integral part of the story is also thc deve lopment of the " brigade," initia lly 

a comma nd and control headquarters for two or more regiments or battalions 

from the same arm or branch. In the mid-twenti eth century the brigade evolved 

into a combined arms unit smaller than a division. The combined arms brigade, 

although a relatively new structure, is also a subject of this study. 

A fcw words need to be said about the charts and tabl es in the vo lume. T<lbles 

of organization and equipment (TOE) published for di visions and separate 

brigades and their subordinate e lements served as the skeleton for the study, and 

the ch<lrts were derived from them. No one table, however, contains all the information that appears in e<lch charI. Therefore, to develop each chart, I began with 

the largest unit, such <IS the division, and compi led the data for each subordi nate 

element down to and inc luding company, Iroops, battery, or det<lchment. The 

charts, nevertheless, represent on ly windows in time, for the organi zations constantly changed. The tabl es listing di visions and brigades, their location, maneuver clements, and olher information were also drawn from many sources. Hence, 

they are not attributed to any parti cular work or document. 

Many colleagues have served as mentors in the rese<Jrch and writing of this 

manuscript. To name everyone who assisted in the work is impossible, but key 

support ers in the Center of Mi lita ry History have been Morris J. MacGregor, 

Actin g Chi ef Historian of the center in 1989- 90; Dr. David Trask, former Chi ef 

Historian; and LI. Col. Clayton R. Newe ll, fo rmer Chi ef, Histori cal Serv ices 

Division. I am also indebted to Col. Raymond K. Bluhm, Colonel Newell's successor, who read the manuscript and offered insightful suggestions, and to Dr. 

John T. Greenwood, who arranged space and support for me within the center 

after I retired to compl ete the work. Jani ce E. McKenney, Chi ef, Organizational 

V111 
History Branch, read, commentcd on, and cd ited numerous versions of each 

chapter, and Romana M, Danysh from thc Organizational History Branch read 

and commcnted on the work and listened to cndlcss hours of discussion about the 

scope and presentation of the material. Rebecca Robbins Raines, Donna Everett, 

and Edward Bedessem, all currentl y assigned to the Organi zational Histo ry 

Branch, assisted in defining ideas and the rclationships ofarrns, su pport, and service units to divisions and separate brigades. 

Outside the branch but wit hin the centcr, Dr. Edward Orca, former Chief, 

Historical Research and Analysis Division, offercd invaluabl e help in clarifying 

the ideas presented. Maj. Glenn Hawkins and Dr. Edgar F. Raincs rcad sections of 

the manuscript and forced close examination of some of its basic assumptions. 

Dr. Robert K. Wright, Chief, Historical Resources Branch, otTered suggestions 

for orga niz ing and presenting the material. Over the years the ccntcr's library 

statT, especially James Knight, offered indispensable hclp in locating books and 

articles and complet ing citations in the notes and bibliography. Gera ldine 

Harcarik from the Historical Resources Branch cheerfully searched for countless 

documents in the center's archival holdings. 

No serious historical work about th e Army can be accomp lished without 

drawing on ho ldings of the U.S. Army Mi litary History Insti tute at Carlisle 

Barracks, Pennsylvania. The staff there was a steady source of help. In particular, 

John Slonaker, Dennis Vetock, and Louise Arnold-Friend always found time to 

stop during a busy day to respond to my requests for documents, books, and articles. They gladly sha rcd their knowledge of Army organi zation, suggesting works 

that might not have come to my atten tion. Another individ ual in the historical 

community who sha red his knowledge about the Army was John L. Romj ue of 

the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. 

The preparation of the vo lume for publication has a lso been the result of the 

efforts of many people. I would like to ex press my apprec iation to Susan Carroll, 

who edited the manuscript and prepared the index; Joycelyn M. Ca nery, who 

typed the final text; Beth E MacKenzie, who designed the charts and obtained 

and placed the photographs; Joh n A. Birmingham, who created the pages and 

designed the cover; and Sherry Dowdy who created the maps. I am particularly 

apprecia tive of the work of Cath erine A. Heeri n, who oversaw the editorial 

process, and Arthur S. Hardyman, who saw the production e ffort to fruition. 

Many have contri buted to the completion of this work by their knowledge, 

advice, cooperation, and encouragemcn t- and to all of them lowe a debt of gratitude. For any and all errors of fact or interpretation, I am responsible. 

Washington, D.C. 

2 February 1998 

IX 

JOI-IN B. WI LSON 

Contents 

Chapfer Page 

I. EARLY EXPERIENCES 

RevoluliollGlY War 

~f/arofI812 

3 

3 

7 

10 

12 

16 

Mexican I1flr 

Civil 1#11" 

War Wilh Spain. 

2. GENESIS OF PERMANENT DIVISIONS 

Reforms Following the mil' Wilh Spain 

COllcentl'(lfioll 01/ the Mexican Border ill 191 1 

The Stimsoll Plan. .......... . 

Operations 01/ 'he Mexican Borde/: "/9/3- / 917 

AlIlllOriz(lfiOIl of Pel'lI/onell' Divisiolls 

3. THE TEST- WORLD WAR I .... 

Firsl Revisions . . . . . . . . . 

23 

23 

29 

31 

34 

37 

47 

47 

The Baker Board and Pers"ing s SraifOrgalliz(lliollof Study 52 

Plans To Organize More Divisiolls 55 

Organizing the Divisio1ls . . 58 

Expansion of the Divisional Forces 65 

Divisional Challges . 67 

4. THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR I 79 

Occupation and Demobilization 79 

TheAEF Evaluates World mw I Divisional Organizatiol/s 83 

Development of Divisions Ullder tlie 1920 National De/elise Act 86 

ReOlgal/ization of Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . 97 

5 A RETURN TO H IE PAST; A LOOK TOTHE FUTURE 109 

Paper Divisions 109 

Resel'l'e Divisions . . . . . . . 11 5 

More Realistic Mobilization Plalls 11 7 

Motorization and Mechanization 120 

A Nell' II//al//ly Division 125 

A Nell' Cavalry Division. . . 133 
Chapter 

6. PRELUDE TD COMBAT 

III/allllY alld Cavaby Divisiolls Revisiled 

Olgallizillg Armored Divisiolls .. 

Mobilizalioll 0/ Naliollal Guard Vllits . . 

Expanding Divisional Forces 

Reorganization a/the National GI/ard Divisions 

Allother Reorganization 

Increases ill the Force Stl"llcture 

7. THE CRUCIBLE- COMBAT. 

Wartime Reorganization, J 943 

Lighl Divisiolls . . 

6pallding Divisiollal Forces: Meetillg tlte Troop Basis 

Deploymelll alld More Olganizatiollal Changes 

Correcting OlganiZGliolial Problems. 

Redeployment 

8. AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 

Demobilizatioll. Occupatioll. al/d the Gel/eml Reserve 

Reorganization 0/ Reserve Dil'l'siollS 

Postwar Divisional Orgallizations 

The State 0/ Divisiol/al Forces. 

9. TH E KOREAN WAR AN D ITS AFTERMATH 

Deployll/ent 0/ Forces 10 Korea 

Rebuildillg tlte Genemf Reserve 

Organizational Trellds 

Readjustmellt 0/ Divisiollal Forces 

Improving the Reserves .... 

10. THE SEARCH FOR ATOM IC AGE DIVISIONS 

Explorillg Altemalive Divisiolls 

Pelltomic Divisions . . . . 

Reorganization o/lhe Divisiolls 

Evall/ating ROCID Gild ROCAD 

II. A NEW DIRECTION- FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 

MOMAR-I ..... 

Tlte Development 0/ ROA D 

ROA D Delayed . . . . . 

Tlte ROAD Reorganization 

Ail'lI/obilily . . . . . 

12. FLEX IBLE RESPONSE 

The Buildup 0/ lite Army 

XII 

Page 

143 

143 

147 

152 

154 

158 

160 

169 

179 

179 

187 

190 

193 

196 

199 

207 

207 

213 

222 

229 

239 

239 

242 

247 

250 

254 

263 

263 

270 

279 

281 

291 

291 

293 

303 

308 

3 14 

323 

323 
Chapter Page 

Expansion a/the Force. . . . . . . . . 330 

Orgallizational Changes 10 Units in Vietnam. 333 

Divisions and Brigades ill Other Commal/ds 336 

Relreflchmellt . . . . . . . . 341 

D. THE TOTAL ARMY . . . . . . 353 

The 21-Division, 21-Brigade Force 353 

A New Force- Greater IflleglUtioll of Regulars all(/ Reserves 364 

14. A NEW ASSESSMENT 379 

The Divisioll Restructurillg SlIIdy 379 

Divisioll-86 . . . . . 383 

Elusive Light Divisiolls 390 

The Army 0/ Excellence 39 1 

A New Direction 403 

15. CONCLUSION . 413 

A LOOK FORWARD 42 1 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 

INDEX ........ . 

, 

Tables 

427 

445 

No. Page 

I. National Guard Infantry Divisions, 19 14 32 

2. National Guard Infantry Divisions, 1917 40 

3. Geographic Distribution of National Guard 

Divisions, World War 1 . . . . . 59 

4. Geographic Distribution of National Army 

Divisions, World Wa r I . . . . . 61 

5. Expansion of Divisional Forces, 19 18 66 

6. Deployment of Divisions to France 70 

7. Demobilization of Divisions . . . . 82 

8. Distribution of Regular Army Divisions and Brigades, 1922 100 

9. Allotment of Reserve Component Infantry Divisions, 1921 102 

10. Allotment of Reserve Component Cavalry Divisions, 1921 103 

II. Allotment of National Gua rd Cavalry Brigades, 1927 116 

12. Divisions Active on 7 December 1941 157 

13. Divisions Activated or Ordered Into Active 

Mi litary Service in 1942 17 1 

14. Divisions Activated in 1943 ...... 192 

XIII 
No. 

15. Deployment of Divisions to the Pacific Theater 

16. Deployment of Divisions to the European Theater 

17. Status of Divisions, 1 June 1946 

18. Location of National Guard Divisions, Post- World War II 

19. Location of Organized Reserve Corps Divisions, 

Post- World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

20. Di visions Designated as Training Centers, \947- 50 . 

2 1. Combat Divisions on Active DUly During the Korean War 

22. Regular Army Training Divisions, \950- 56 

23. Operation GYROSCOPE ...... . 

24. Maneuver Element Mix of Divisions: 

ROAD Reorganization, 30 June 1965 

25. Maneuver Element Mix of Brigades: 

ROAD Reorganization, 30 June 1965. 

26. Divisions and Brigades: Selected Reserve Force, 1965 

27. Deployment of Di visions and Brigades to Vietnam 

28. Maneuver Elements Assigned to Divisions and 

Brigades in Vietnam, 30 June 1969 .... . 

29. Maneuver Element Mix of Divisions and Brigades on 

Active Duty Outside Vietnam, 30 Ju ne 1969 

30. Nati onal Guard Divisions and Brigades, 1968 

3 1. Redeployment of Divisions and Brigades From Vietnam 

32. The 2 1 Di vision Force, June 1974 

33. The 2 I-Brigade Force, June 1974 

34. Round-out Units, 1978 

35. The 24-Division Force, 1978 

36. The 24-Brigade Force, 1978 

37. Divisions, 1989 .... . 

38. Brigades, 1989 .... . 

39. Di visions and Brigades in Southwest Asia, 1990-9 1 

Charts 

No. 

I. Infantry Division, 1917 . . 

2. Cavalry Division, 191 7 

3. Infantry Division, 24 May 1917 . 

4. Infantry Division, 8 August 1917 

5. Infantry Division, 7 October 1920 

6. Cavalry Division, 4 April 1921 

7. Cavalry Division, 1928 

XIV 

Page 

194 

195 

209 

216 

220 

222 

244 

245 

253 

310 

313 

329 

333 

336 

339 

340 

345 

362 

363 

365 

368 

369 

404 

406 

407 

Page 

39 

41 

50 

56 

93 

96 

114 
No. 

8. The Mechanized Force, 1928 . . . . 

9. Proposed In fan try Division, 30 July 1936 

10. In fan try Division (Peace), 1939, Corrected to 

8 Ja nuary 1940 . . . . 

I I. Cava lry Division, 1938 

12. In fantry Division, I November 1940 

13. Cavalry Division, I November 1940 

14. Armored Division, 15 November 1940 

15. In fantry Division, I August 1942 

16. Armored Division, 1 March 1942 . 

17. Motorized Division, I August 1942 

18. Airborne Division, 15 October 1942 

19. Infantry Di vision, 15 July 1943 . 

20. Armored Division, 15 September 1943 

2 1. Light Division, 1943 . . . . 

22. Airborne Division, 1944 . . . 

23. Infantry Division, 7 July 1948 

24. Armored Division, 8 October 1948 

25. Airborne Division, I April 1950 

26. Atomic Field Army In fantry Division. 30 September 1954 

27. Atomic Field Anny Arrnorcd Division, 30 September 1954 

28. PENTANA Div ision . . . . .. .... 

29. Airborne Division (ROTA D). 10August 1956 

30. Infantry Division (ROCID), 2 I December 1956 

3 1. Armored Division (ROCAD), 1956 .... 

32. Pentomic Infantry Division, I February 1960 

33. Traini ng Division, I Apri l 1959 .. 

34. Medium Division (MOMAR), 1960 

35. Heavy Division (MOMA R). 1960 

36. ROAD Division Base, 1961 

37. Airborne Division, 1961 ... . 

38. Airborne Brigade. 1961 ... . 

39. Howze Board- Air Assau lt Division, 1963 

40. Airmobile Division, 10 July 1965. 

41. Training Division, 1966 

42. TRICAP Division . . . . . . 

43. Training Division, 1970 . . . . 

44. Heavy Division, Division Restructuring Study, 

1 March 1977 .......... . 

45. Heavy Division (Tank I-I cavy) as Briefed to Genera l Meyer 

on I 8 October 1979 .... 

46. Heavy Division, 1 October 1982 

xv 

Page 

124 

128 

134 

136 

146 

148 

151 

162 

164 

165 

168 

183 

186 

189 

197 

226 

228 

230 

266 

268 

273 

275 

278 

280 

283 

285 

294 

295 

299 

30 1 

302 

315 

317 

342 

358 

37 1 

38 1 

385 

388 
No. 

47. Li ght Division, 1 October 1985 

48. A irborne Division, I April 1987 

49. Air Ass<lult Division, I April \98 7 

Maps 

No. 

I. Corps Areas in the United States, 20 August 1920 

2. Field Armies in the United States, 1932 

3. Field Armies in the United States, Post-World War II 

Illustrations 

Page 

394 

398 

399 

Page 

88 

11 8 

218 

Soldiers of tlte Americall Revolutioll, Trell/on, December 26, 1776 4 

Bvl. Lt. Gen. Winfield SCOIl 8 

The Battle of Palo Alto II 

Camp Humphreys, Virginia , 1863 15 

Staff of the 2d Di vision, I Army Corps, 1898 17 

Camp Alger, Virginia, 1898 . . . . . . . 18 

The Public Views the 1904 Maneuvers, Manassas, Virginia 26 

Troops Pass in Review, 1904 Manassas Maneuvers 26 

Maj. Gen. Henry C. Corbin and Col. Arthur L. Wagner 27 

Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell . . . . . 29 

27th In fantry, 2d Division, Encampment, Texas City, Texas 35 

4th South Dakota In fantry, San Benito, Texas, 1916 36 

Maj . Gen. Hugh L. Scott. . . 48 

Maj . Gen. Tasker H. Bliss . . . . 49 

16th In fantry, I Sl Division, Parades in Paris, 1917 51 

The Gondrecourt, France, Training Area 51 

Officers of the American Expeditionary Forces 

and the Baker Mission . . . . 53 

Draftees Drill in Civilian Clothes, Camp Upton, New York 62 

Camp Meade, Maryland, 1917 . . . 63 

165th Infantry, 42d Division, in Trenches, 1918 69 

Traffic Congestion in the Argonne, 19 18 . . . 72 

American Occupation Troops Cross the Rhine at 

Coblenz, Germany, 1919 80 

1st Field Arti llery Brigade, 1st Division, on Occupation 

DUly in Germany, 1919 . . . . . . 81 

51h Field Artillery Troops at the I sl Di vision Parade, 

Washington, D.C., 19 19 84 

XVI 
Superior BOHl'd Members, 1919 

26th Division I)Hrade, Fort Devens, Massach usetts, 1925 

Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summcrall ... . 

OlTicers Quarters, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 1925 . 

I st Cavalry Division Maneuvers, 1927 . . . . . . 

Medium Armored Car of the Mechanized Force, 193 1 

General Malin Craig . . . .... . 

General George C. Marsha ll .... . 

I st Cava lry Division Maneuvers, Toyahvale, Texas, 1938 

671h Infantry (Provisional Tank Brigade) at Third Army 

Maneuvers, 1940 . . 

37-111111 . Gun and Crew, 1941 

Brig. Gen. Ad na R. Chaffee 

Half-Track Personnel Car, 1941 

Tanks of the 68th Arrnored, 2d Armored Division, at the 

Louisiana Ma neuvers, 1941 . . . . . . 

Provisional Tank Destroyer Baltation, Fori Meade, 

Maryland, 194 1 . . . . . . . . 

Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short Reviews the Hawaiian Division, 194 1 

Camp Shelby, Mississippi, 1941 . . ... . 

Paratroopers in a Spec ial Demonstrati on, Fort Belvoir, 

Virginia, 194 1 

LI. Gen. Lesley J. McNa ir .......... . 

Genera l McNHir and Maj. Gen. Elbridge O. Clmpman Inspect 

13th Airborne Division Troops, 1944 .... 

8th Infantry Division Arrives at I-Iamplon Roads, Virgini a, 

Port of Embarkation, 1945 . . . . . . . . 

4 1 sl Infantry Di vision Departs the Phi lippines, 1945 

7th Infantry Division Band, Seoul, Korea, 1945 

350th In fantry, 881h Infanlry Division, Parades in 

Gorizia, italy, 1945 . . . . . . . . . . 

A Final Pa rade in Gorizia, Prior 10 the 88th Division's 

Departure, 1947 ....... . 

82d Airborne Di vision Troops at the New York City 

Victory Parade, 1946 ......... . 

Elements of the 2d Infantry Division Near Wonju, Korea, 195 1 

40th Infantry Division Troops Prepare To Replace Ihe 24th 

Division, 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4th Infantry Division Leaves New York for Germany, 195 1 

3.5-inch Rockel Launcher in Action Against the 

Nort h Koreans, 1950 ........... . 

M4 I Light Tank Bound for the 7051h Tank Battalion, 1954 

37th Infantry Division Troops Pass in Review, 1954 

XV II 

86 

110 

I I I 

113 

113 

123 

127 

133 

135 

144 

145 

149 

152 

155 

156 

158 

160 

167 

18 1 

19 1 

200 

208 

21 1 

22 1 

23 1 

23 1 

24 1 

246 

247 

248 

249 

25 1 
General Matthew B. Ridgway . . . . . . . . . 

Genera l Maxwe ll D. Taylor .... .... 

10 Ist Airborne Division Simulates an Atomic Blast 

During Training, 1957 . . . 

Honest John Rocket Launcher, 1957 

M60Tank ...... . 

M48 Tanks. . . . . . . . . 

Genera l Clyde D. Eddleman . . 

Davy Crockett Rocket Launcher 

Little John Rocket Launcher . . 

32d Infantry Division Elements Train During the Berlin Crisis, 

1961 . . . . . . . . . . . .... 

Pre-positioned Equipment in Germany During 

Operation BIG LWT ....... . 

1st Batta lion, 60th Infantry, at Fort Richardson, Alaska, 1963. 

Elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade Arri ve in Vietnam 

9th In fantry Division 's First Base Camp in Vietnam, 1966 

Soldiers of the I st Brigade, 10 I st Airborne Di vision, 

Fire From Viet Cong Trenches, 1966 

Elements of the 69th Infantry Brigade Train at Fort 

Riley, Kans.1s, 1966 .... .... 

3d Brigade, 25th In fantry Division, Members Engage the 

Viet Cong, 1966 . . . . 

Elements of the 9th Infantry Division Departing 

Viet nam, 1969 . . . . 

Tube-Launched, Optica lly Tracked, Wire-Guided Missile 

Genera l Creighton W. Abrams . 

Chaparral Surface-to-Air Missile System 

Vulcan Air Defense System 

General Fred C. Weyand 

General Donn A. Starry 

Genera l Edward C. Meyer 

Bradley Fighting Vehicle System 

Multiple Launch Rocket System 

9th Infantry Di vision "Dune Buggy" 

Genera l John A. Wickham, Jr. 

Wi nter Tra ini ng, 205th Infantry Brigade, 1986 

Reactivation Ceremony, 29th In fantry Division, 1985 

265 

270 

27 1 

272 

292 

292 

296 

298 

300 

304 

304 

3 12 

324 

326 

327 

328 

33 1 

343 

354 

357 

360 

360 

380 

384 

386 

387 

387 

392 

393 

396 

396 

Illustrations courtesy of Ihe following sources: PI'. 4, 380, 386, and 393, U.S. 

Army Art Coll ection; 1'1'.8, 15, 17,36,48, 113 (top), 22 1, 247, 272, 304 

(bot/om), 324, 326, 360 (lOp alld bOllom), 387 (lOp), and 396 (top), U.S. Army 

Center of Military History; Pl'. 11 ,26 (fOp alld bottom), 27, and 53, Library of 

XV ll1 
Congress; pp. 18,35,5 1 (boflom), and 144, U.S. Army Military History Institute; 

p. 23 1 (top), Will iam Gardner Bell; pp. 23 I (boltom), 292 (lOp and boltom), 300, 

304 (lOp), 328, 354, 387 (botlom), and 396 (ballom), National Guard Association; 

p. 298, Firestone News Se rvice; p. 384, U.S. Army Tra ining and Doctri ne 

Command; and p. 392, Fort Lewis Military Museum. All other ill ustrations from 

the files of the National Archives and Records Administration. 

XlX 

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades 

CHAPTER I 

Early Experiences 

RegularilY {/lid due Subordilllllioll. being so essen/fully necessary. 10 rhe good 

Order and Govel"lllllelll of lIIl Arl/lY, (///(/ wi/hollt ii, fhe whole IIIl1st $0011 become (f 

Scel/e of (li~'oj"(le,. alld OI!fiI.~ioll. The Gel/eral fillds il illdi~pe"s(lb y lIecessmy, lI'ilholll 

wailillg (IllY tal/gerlol' dispatchesji'oll/ (he General COlltil/emal Congress. immediately 

(0 /o/'/11 the Army illfo three Grand DivisioWi, ami oj dividing each of 'hose Grand 

Dillisiolls ill/o Brigades. 

General George Washingtonl 

Revolutionary War 

On 22 July 1775, George Washington, General and Commander in Chief of the 

American revol utionary forces, ordered the army at Boston to be organized into 

three divisions. Each div ision comprised two brigades of approximate ly eq ual 

strength. Major generals commanded the divisions, and most brigades were commanded by brigadiers who were general officers. The division commanders had no 

staffs, but the brigade commanders had brigade majors to assist them. Brigade 

majors were officers through whom orders were issued and reports and correspondence transmitted, analogous to regimental adjutants. Initially, both divisions and 

brigades were admi nistrative commands rather than tactica l organizations.2 

Divisions and brigades soon evolved into semipermanent tactica l, as well as 

adm inistrative, organiza tio ns. Because regime nts cou ld not ma intain their 

authorized strengths, Wash ington made the brigade, consisting of several regiments, the basic tac tical and adm inistrative unit for the Continenta l Army. 

When organized in 1775 all brigades at Boston had about 2,500 men each. 

During the war commanders deli berately ba lanced the strength of the brigades 

for each campaign. For example, WaShington employed brigades of rough ly 

1,400 officers and enlisted men each at Trenton in December 1776 and at 

Monmout h in June 1778. At Yorktown in 1781 each of his brigades had approximately 1,000 officers and enl isted men) 

Alt hough the Continental Army was reorgan ized on several occasions, many 

brigades had the s ame reg ime nts assigned over lo ng pe ri ods of time. 

Nevertheless, Washington and other army commanders had the authority to alter 

regimen tal assignments. In 1778 he emphatica lly told his subordinate, Maj . Gen. 

Charles Lee, that he [Washington] could change it "every day if I choose to do 
4 MANEUVER AND FI REPOWER 

Soldi ers orlhe AmcriC<ln Revolution, Trellton, December 26, 1776, 

by 11. CJllIrles Mc8arI"Q1I 

it." But the commander in chie f also be lieved that frequent changes in regimental 

assignment wit hou t apparent calise would be ascribed to "caprice and whim" 

rather than "stabilit y and judgement [sic]."4 

The Continenta l Army employed a variety of artillery weapons, includi ng 

field, siege, and garrison guns, but the use of infantry and field arti llery as com· 

bined arms tcams was spo radi c. During some campaigns two to fOllr field 

artillery guns were attached to infantry brigades, and the brigade commander in 

turn attached the guns to infantry battalions. Harnessing the two arms together 

increased firepower, provided a means to break up cncmy formations, and protected infantry aga inst bayonet charges, as we ll as offering a psyc hologica l 

advan tage. A major problcm for th e fi e ld arti llcry was to kccp up with the 

infantry on the march because of the rough, broken terrain in colonial America. 

The key to cross-cou ntry travel was the design of light, mobil e artill ery carriages, 

but on the battlefield guns were manhandled. Unlike European armies, colonial 

commanders oOcn lIsed field artillery for siege work because of the shortages of 

guns, officers, and trained gun crews.S 

With thc employment of brigades, Congress increased their staff officers. The 

first such olTicer was added in May 1777 when Congress authorized a brigade 

chaplai n to care for the religious needs of the men. In January 1778 WaShi ngton 

proposed thaI an infantry brigade have a quartermaster, fo rage master, wagon mas-
EARLY EXPERIENCES 5 

tcr, and commissary, along with armorers, a traveling forge, and some artificers. 

The following May, however, Congress authorized only the brigade quartermaster. 

Allhough not provided by Congress. in June 1778 Washington introduced the pasi· 

lion of brigade inspector, whose duties included maintaining unit rosters, regulating 

details (any spccia l l<lsks assigned to the brigade), and caring for the formation and 

march of al l guards and details. Furthermore, the inspector received the commander's orders and communicated them to brigade and regimenta l officers; thus the 

position incorporated duties of the brigade major. Allhough the brigade inspector 

assisted in executing brigade maneuvers, he was not in the chain of command. 

Congress officia lly authorized the posit ion in February 1779 and made the former 

brigade major an aide-dc-camp to the brigadier. At the samc time Congress also 

provided a second aide fo r the brigadier.6 

In early 1779 Washington directed the appointment of" conductor ofmititary 

stores fo r each brigade. Equipped wit h a portable fo rge, <111 ammun ition wagon, 

and 11 wagon with an arms chest for each regiment in the brigade, the conductor 

of mil itary stores and his assistan ts (t he latter being fu rn ished by the regiments) 

ca red for its arms. Th us, by the end of the war each infantry brigade compriscd 

several semipermanently assigned infantry regiments and a few attached artillery 

pieces and their crews. The brigade commander had a staff consisti ng of two 

aides, a brigade quartermaster, an insl>cctor, a conductor of mi litary stores, and a 

chaplain. Infantry brigades were generally known by the names of their commanders, but the morc permanent brigades were often known by numerical designations, such as the 1st Maryland and 2£1 Pennsylvania Brigades.1 

Washington assigned infantry brigades to divisions, but the number of brigades 

assigned to each division varied. Divisions, neverthelcss, bccmnc q~l\ i-pe rr nanent 

commands, with the samc brigades serving in the same divisions for ex tended periods of time. As this organizational relationsh ip matured, the divisions maneuvered 

independently and conducted operations away from the mai n army. ij 

Washington occasiona lly expressed theories about the proper organ ization of 

divisions and brigades. In January 1777, as the army was about to be reorganized, 

he told Congress that three ful1 ~s rength regiments, approximately 700 men each, 

would be sufficient for a brigadc and that three brigades would be adequate for a 

division. The following year, du ring similar discussions, Washington ex pla ined that 

the division-brigade-regiment organization was fo r the sake of order, harmony, and 

discipline. Each brigade and division would have a general officer as its commander and would be capable of mov ing eit her jointly 0 1' se parately like a "great 

machine" as the circumstances required. Because of shortages in I>crsonnei, at no 

time duri ng the war did either divisions or brigades adhere to organizational concepts, particularly as far as the number of assigned regiments and brigades was concerned. Nevertheless, bot h di visions and brigades fulfil led Washington's requirement ofbcing able to operate either jointly or separately when the need arose.9 

The basi c figh ting team used during the Revol utionary Wa r consisted of 

infantry and artillery, but the Contincnl<ll Army also used cavalry. Cavalry units 
6 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

were initially mounted militia commands, but in late 1776 Congress authorized a 

regiment of light dragoons for the Continenta l Army. Thai act was soon followed 

by another, which authorized 3,000 li ght horsemen to be organized into four regi w 

menls. The regiments were never fu lly manned because of Ihe ex pense of their 

special weapons and equipment, their horses, and their training. By 1780 the 

units were converted into " legionary organizations." In the mid-eighteenth century Europeans had developed small mixed units of cava lry and infantry, known as 

legions, to overrun or hold an area, gather information, and conduct raids away 

from the main army. Legions in the Continental Army were to comprise four 

troops of dragoons and two companies of infantry. They were not large, indepen. 

dent combined arms units capable of defeating the enemy such as the divisions 

and brigades in the Con ti nenta l Army. 10 

Fo llowing the British surrender at Yorktown in 1781 , the Continental Army 

dwindled away, and its divisions and brigades slowly disappeared. But the doc· 

trine for their orga ni zati on end ured, and fu ture leaders built upon it in the fol. 

lowing century. 

Before the new nation ratifi ed the peace with England, Congress asked 

Washington for his views on the future peacetime mi litary establishment. On 2 

May 1783, recognizing his countrymen's fear of standing armies and the expense 

of maintai ning them, he called for a military establishment consisting of a small 

active force organized on a regimental basis and a larger reserve based on the 

militia arranged by divisions. His mi litia division was to consist of two brigades 

of four infantry regiments each, with each infantry regiment organized into two 

four·company battalions. Furthermore, Washington recommended that two caval. 

ry troops and two artillery companies be raised for eac h division. These units 

were not part of any combi ned arms concept for divisions, but merely a formula 

for ca lculating the number of cava lry and artillery units that would be needed by 

future armies. I I 

Eventually the legislature created a military establishment based on standing 

and reserve forces. In 1784 the Con tinental Congress set the strength of the 

standing army at a mere 700 men. and the Regular Army. organized on a regi· 

mental basis, grew steadily in the years that followed. In 1792 the new nationa l 

Congress also provided for a reserve force based upon the state militia, whieh the 

federal government co uld employ under certa in conditions with in the United 

States. The militia forces were to consist of all able·bodied white male citizens 

between the ages of eighteen and forty· five and were to be organized into campa· 

nics, battalions, regiments, brigades, and divisions. The legislation provided that 

each brigade consist of fOllr two-battalion infantry regiments. A militia division 

could also have an artillery compa ny and a cavalry troop. bOlh of which were to 

be formed From vol unteers within the brigades at the discretion of the governors. 

Major generals and brigadi er generals were to command divisions and brigades, 

respectively, and the only staff officer authorized was Ihe brigade inspector, who 

was also to serve as the brigade major. The strengt h of the brigade was to be 
EARLY EX PERIENCES 7 

approximately 2,500 men. Presumably div isional strength would vary, for the law 

prescribed no set number of brigades in a division.12 

As implemented, the militia div isions and brigades were generally paper 

organizations. Congress provided ne ither federal supervision nor effective support for them. Furthermore, no provision was made fo r a militia force that would 

be available immediately to react in an emergency. Although ineffectual, the system lasted fo r over one hundred years. In practice, when the federa l government 

called upon the mi litia, the president asked for a specific number of men from a 

stale and the state organized them into regiments. 

Shortly after Congress passed the militia law, it authorized the use of volu nteers, a third category of soldiers, for national defense. Volunteers served freely, 

like soldiers in the Regular Army, but they were not part of any standing or 

reserve force. Generally, the states raised the volunteers that Congress considered 

necessary on a regimenta l basis, and the federal government used the volunteer 

regiments to form divisions and brigades.13 

The Regul ar Army also experimented with the legion as a combined arms 

unit in the 1790s. Differing from the legions employed during the Revolutionary 

War, the Legion of the United Stales resembled the organizations described by 

Marshal Maurice de Saxe in 1732 and advocated in the 1780s by Maj. Gen. 

Frede rick Wilhelm vo n Steuben, formerly the Inspector General of the 

Continenta l Army, an d Secretary of War Henry Knox. The legion was a field 

army, combining infantry, cavalry, and artillery into one organization, which 

totaled 5,120 men. Rather than being subdi vided into divisions, brigades, and 

regiments, the legion consisted of four sublegions, which some consider to be the 

forerunners of the regimenta l combat teams of the twentieth century. The Regular 

Army adopted the legion in 1792, but it was never fully manned. For the campaigns against the Miami Indians in the Northwest Territory between January 

1790 and August 1795 the Army emp loyed militia and volunteer units and the 

Legion of the United States. Its sublegions, however, were not employed ex tensively. The Army abandoned the legion in 1796 for regimenta l organizations. 

Henceforth, the regulars were scattered throughout the country, guarding its frontiers and seacoast and rarely forming organizations above the regimental level. 14 

Waro/I812 

When the second war with England began in 1812, Congress raised fo rces by 

expanding the Regular Army, authorizing the use of volunteers, and ca ll ing out the 

militia. In raising the troops both the federal and state governments used regimental organizations, and Ihe Army organized these regiments into ad hoc brigades 

and divisions, which varied widely in strength. For example, Brig. Gen. Joseph 

Bloomfield's New York militia brigade assigned to Maj. Gen. Henry Dearborn's 

fo rce in 1813 counted 1,400 strong; Brig. Gen. Winfield Scott's Regular brigade in 

1814 before the Battle of Chippewa fielded 1,300 men; and the Pen nsylvania vol-
8 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

unicef brigade that crossed the bo ~ 

def int o Up pe r Canada in 1814 

numbered 413. The strength of the 

divisions n ucluatcd just as much. In 

18 12 the New York quota for mi ia ~ 

men wa s \3,500, whi ch the state 

organized into two divisions of four 

brigades each. At the same lime, 

wi lh a quota of 2,500 men, 

Tennessee orga nized a di vision of 

two infantry regiments pillS a nondivisional cava lry rcgimcnt.15 

Whi le assembl ing brigades and 

d ivisions in 1813, the question 

arose as to whether or not Regu lar 

Army and militia units should be 

" brigadcd" togethe r. Because the 

drill and discipline of the regulars 

differed greatly from that of th e 

militia , each slat e prescribing its 

own drill, the general practi ce was 

to brigade each category of troops 

Gel/eral SCOff separate ly. Alt hough Regular, mili· 

tia, and vol unteer brigades served 

at limes in commands that eq ualed Ihe size of a di vision, such organizations 

were frequently called "annies."16 

Raising and maintai ning troops during the War of 18 12 proved to be difficult 

because of the opposition to the war. As a result, when divisions and brigades 

look to the field for the various campaigns, they were temporary organizations. 

Most of the units assigned to them had little training and were poorly equipped, 

creating largely ineffective fighti ng forces. One exception was Scott's Regular 

Army brigade. In the spring of 1814, after establishi ng a camp near Buffa lo, New 

York, he used French dri ll regulations to tra in his men. When the brigade later 

fought at Chi ppewa as a we ll-disciplined force, it prompted the British comm,m· 

der to excla im, "Those are Regulars, by God!"17 

During the War of 18 12, as in the Revolution, Army leaders discussed the 

organ iza tion of brigades and divisions, and their comments sometimes dis· 

agrecd with the co ntemporary pract ice or with the laws then in effect. The 

Register of the Arm)' published in 18 13 stated that a brigade wou ld consist of 

two regiments and a div ision of two brigades with but II si ngle staff officer, the 

brigade major, in each. The laws in fo rce, however, aut hori zed a brigade staff of 

an inspector, subinspector, qua rtermaster, wagon IlHlster, ,lnd chaplain. When a 

brigad ier general commanded a brigade, his brigllde major and a ides were 
EARLY EXPERIENCES 9 

included in the siaff. Major generals continued to command div isions, and their 

staffs consisted of a quartermaster, judge advocate, and two aides. The offic ial 

handbook for infantry compi led by Wi lli am Duane, the Adjutant General, in 

1813 called for a brigade in the peace establishment to consist of any number 

of batta lions, but for field se rvice it was not to exceed 4,000 men. A div ision 

could have from two to four brigades. During congressional deliberations as to 

the number of major and brigadier genera ls needed in 1813 to conduct the war, 

Secretary of War John Armstrong expressed his belief that a brigade should 

have only two regiments because the ma nagement of 2,000 men in the field was 

ample duty for a brigadi er general. Also, in his opinion, the direction of 4,000 

men was a suitable command for a major general. But the lac k of trained personnel and the short duration of campaigns in the War of 1812 resulted in ad 

hoc brigades and divisions that did not approach the combined arms teams of 

the Revolutionary War.18 

After the War of 1812 the militia units were released from federal service, the 

volunteers were discharged, and the Regu lar Army units were eventually reduced 

to seven infantry and four artillery regiments. Despite the small size of the Army 

of the United States, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott in 1819 secured congressional 

approval for the preparation of a code incorporating the laws, regulations, orders, 

and practices governing the Army. Having studied foreign armies, particularly the 

French, he thought sllch regulations woul d be useful. In them he introduced a 

new organization- the army corps. During the Napoleonic wars the French had 

decentralized their armies for greater mobility and maneuverability. French field 

armies had consisted of several army corps, which in turn were made up of two 

or three divisions of infantry or cavalry. Each division comprised two brigades. 

With this structure, an army could be dispersed over a wide area, but the command mechanism allowed it to concentrate quickly to destroy the enemy.1 9 

Scott's General Regularions for rite Unired Stares Army, published in 1821, 

thus included the new European concepts. Two regiments constituted a brigade, 

two brigades a division, and two div isions an army corps. Infantry and cavalry 

were to be brigaded separately. The only staff officer for either the brigade or the 

division was a "chief of staff," who acted in a manner similar to a brigade inspector or brigade major. The divisions and brigades were to be numbered according 

to the rank of their commanders. For ease in distinguiShing each body of troops 

in official reports, units were to be identified by their commanders' names.20 

Between the War of 18 12 and the Mexican War these concepts meant little to 

the Regu lar Army. The periodic campaigns against the Indians, using Regular, 

militia, and volunteer troops, were fought with small bodies of troops, usually of 

regimental or smaller size. Such constabulary tactics neither infl uenced the formation of large units in the field nor affected the regulations that governed such 

organizations. The only alteration in Army Regula/iolls prior to the Mexican War 

specified that neither the division nor the brigade was to have a fixed staff, with 

their size and composition varying according to the nature of their service.2 l 
10 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Mexican War 

In the fall of 1845, just before hostilities broke out between the United States 

and Mexico, Brevet Brig. Gen. Zachary Taylor organ ized the Regular Army 

fo rces that had gathered at Corpus Christi, Texas, numbering about 3,900 men, 

into three brigades, each consisting of two infantry regiments or their eq uivalent. 

The 2d Dragoons and Regu lar Army fie ld artillery companies supported the 

brigades. With these forces Taylor fought and won the Battles of Palo Alto (8 

May 1846) and Resaca de Palma (9 May 1846).22 

After the declaration of war in the spring of 1846, Congress ca ll ed for 

50,000 volunteers. Individual states organ ized their volunteers into regiments, 

which the War Department initia lly planned to brigade, mixing foot and mounted infantry23 in the same units. Two or more vo lun tcer brigades, each consisting of three or more regiments, were to form a division. Under the wartime 

laws, a brigade was to be authorized at least 3,000 men and a di vision 6,000. 

Since Army Regulations ca lled fo r no fixed staffs, the president was to appoi nt 

a quartermaster, commissary, and surgeon for each brigade. Each staff officer 

was to have an assistant. Congress further provided that the regimen tal officers 

of a brigade eould emp loy a chaplain.24 

In the late summer of 1846 Taylor organi zed his army into di visions for a 

campaign against Monterrey, Mexico. Using the three brigades he had organized 

in 1845, plus a new brigade, Taylor formed two Regular Army divisions of two 

brigades eaeh. Eaeh brigade had two infantry regiments; th ree brigadcs had a 

field arti llery company attached; and one div ision had an additional fi eld artillery 

company and a regiment of dragoons assigned. Because the volunteers did not 

deploy in any prearranged order, Taylor temporarily brigaded a portion of those 

who had joined him for instruction and camp service. Others he organizcd as a 

volunteer division of two brigades, each containing two 500-man infantry regiments. A regiment of mounted volunteers from Texas completed the division. 

With these forces Taylor captured Monterrey in September 1846.25 

When Taylor took to the field after his victory at Monterrey, he had planned 

to continue to use divisiona l organizations. But, si nce the politica l leadershi p in 

Washington decided to shift the center of operations more directly toward Mexico 

City, the bulk of Taylor's troops were transferred to a new command under Maj. 

Gen. Winfield Scott and wcre replaced by green volunteers. With 5,000 mostly 

untra ined troops, in February 1847 Taylor fought the Battle of Buena Vista, where 

his inex perienced troops performed well. Buena Vista was particularly a triumph 

for American artillery, whose mobility allowed it to counter enemy thrusts with 

intense firepowe r and close infantry support when and where needed. Infantry 

and artillery had formed a more effective combined arms team.26 

Scott's command against Mexico City, a force of about 12,000 men, was initially organized into two Regular Army infantry brigades and a th ree-brigade volunteer div ision. Each brigade was supported by field artillery. After the siege of 
EARLY EX PERI ENCES I I 

71,e Banle of Palo AIIO 

Ve ra Cruz Scott organized the Regul ars into a div ision, but before rcaching 

Mexico City he had to reorgani ze his army anew due primarily to losses by disease and expiring enlistment terms. When morc volunteers arrived, he formed his 

infantry into four divisions of two brigades each, with an artillery company supporting each brigade. He placed elements of three dragoon regimen ts in a brigade 

under Col. Will iam S. Harney. Satisfi ed wit h his field dispositions, Scott attacked 

and then entered Mex ico City on 13 September)7 

Duri ng the course of the war both Taylor and Scott organized ad hoc divisions as combined arms learns. These underwent several reorgan izations for a 

variety of reasons, including a lack of transportation fo r moving units and supplies, a need to establish and protect lines of communication, and a shortage of 

personnel to main tai n units at some semblance of fighting strength. The war, nevert heless, brought about a new in tegration of infantry and field arti llery within 

divisions, which operated as independent, maneuverable commands. The stocktrail gun carriage, adopted in 1836, was a technological breakthrough that gave 

U.S. fie ld artillery in the Mexican War sufTic ient mobility and maneuverabi lity 

for integration of tile anns.28 

The revised Army Regulations published in 1857 reflected the changes developed during the course of the war for combining the combat arms. Doctrine 

ca lled for a division usually to consist of " two or three brigades, either infantry or 
12 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

cavalry, and troops of the ot her corps in th e necessary proporti ons."29 Each 

bri gade was to consist of two or more regiments. "The Iroops of the other corps" 

were artil lerymen and engineers, but there was no ind ication as to what proportion of a division th ey were to be. A division staff or that of a detached brigade 

was st ill minimal- artill ery, engineer, and ordnance offi cers. The regulations 

changed the system for designating divisions and brigades from being numbered 

according to the rank ofthei .. commanders to be ing numbered according to their 

position on the line, although the names of the commanders were still to be used 

in reports. Finally, the regulations provided that only the War Department could 

authori ze the formation of divisions and brigades duri ng peacetime. In practi ce, 

such units would thus rema in only wartime expedients.30 

Civil War 

The Civil War brought about the first large armies in the nation's history, and 

both Uni on and Confederate leaders used brigades, divisions, and army corps as 

command and control un its. A ft er rebe l troops fired on Fort Sumler, South 

Carolina, President Abraham Lincoln ca lled for 75,000 militiamen to assist the 

Regular Army in quelling Ihe rebe llion. Shortly thereafter Congress began to 

ex pand the Regular Army and call for vol unteers. Following the rout of the Union 

fo rces at Manassas in July 1861 Congress authorized the first large call for men, 

500,000 volunteers to serve three years. To train the new Army Lincoln selected 

George B. McClellan, a former West Point officer and president of the Eastern 

Di vision of th e Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company) 1 McCle lla n lat er 

described the Union troops at Manassas, who were mostly militia, as "a collee· 

tion of undisciplined, ill ·o fTi cc c(~ and uni nstructed men" instead of an army. The 

new commander in chief had much 10 do.32 

As the volunteer regiments arrived in the Washington, D.C., area, McClellan 

began to organize them into what became known as the Army of the Potomac. 

During the course of the war additional Union armies were formed and served, 

but Ihe experience of the Army of the Potomac serves as the model to illustrate 

the difficulties fa ced by commanders on both sides in organizing their forces. As 

many of the future leaders of the Army after the war fought with the Army of the 

Potomac, the ir experi ences had a profound impact on Army organization in the 

last halfofthe nineteenth century. 

In the Army of the Potomac the largest unit initially was a division, wh ich con· 

sisted or three infantry brigades, one cavalry regiment, and rour artillery batteries. 

The division commander did not have a staff, except for his three aides and an assis· 

tant adjutant general. The brigade commander, on the other hand, had two aides, a 

surgeon, a commissary or subsistence, an mljutant general, and a quartermaster)) 

McCle ll an pl anned to organi ze the volu nteers into brigades, di visions, and 

army corps. Each army corps, about 25,000 men, was to consist of two or more 

di visions. He hesitated to implement that organiza tion, however, until his offi· 
EA RLY EXPERIENCES 13 

cers gained experience as division commanders. He also de layed the organization of army corps for politica l reasons. Over one-ha lf of his division commanders were Republicans who were ardent s upport ers of Lincoln , while 

McClellan, II political foc of the president, was a Democrat. In March 1862, 

before the Peninsula campaign began in Virginia, Lincoln, co ncerned about 

command and conlrol in combat, directed that McClellan 's forces be organized 

into army corps. McClellan orga ni zed the Army oCthe Potomac on the peninsula into four army corps of three divisions each. The Union fo rces on the upper 

Potomac were a lso placed into an army corps.34 

Comba t expe rien ce bro ught organizational changes to th e Army of the 

Potomac. Cava lry assigned to divisions within army corps were generally unable 

to pcrform army-level missions. In July 1862, after the Peninsula campaign, Brig. 

Gen. Georgc Stoneman, Chief of Cavalry of the Army orthe Potomac, shifted cavalry units from the infantry divisions and organized two cavalry brigades fo r the 

army, but he left a cavalry sq uadron35 in each army corps for picket, scout, and outpost duti es. Little improvement resulted from havin g separate cavalry brigades, 

which were used the same as the cavalry sq uadrons in the army corps. 

[n November 1862 Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside took command of the Army 

of the Potomac and reorgan ized it into three "grand divisions." He planned for each 

grand division to move and fight as a heavy column of two corps and a cavalry 

division, which removed the cava lry from army corps. The grand division commanders, however, were reluctant to use cava lry as an independent force. In Fcbruary 

1863 Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, the new commander of the Army of the Potomac, 

abolished the grand divisions and reverted to the army corps structure. At the same 

time the Union cavalry was also reorganized as a separate corps under Stoneman, 

with approximately 13,000 men divided into three divisions. Each division had two 

brigades, with each brigade havi ng three to fi ve regiments. Artillery was assigned 

to the cavalry corps headquar1ers. The cavalry corps operated as an independent 

unit thereafter, but the jest "Whoever saw a dead cavalryman?" remained within the 

Army of the Potomac.36 By Jun e 1863 Un ion cava lry proved eq ual to th e 

Confederate cavalry. At Brandy Station the Union cava lry corps cxcelled under the 

aggressive Icadership of Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan in 1864.37 

Experience a lso led to the standard ization of fi e ld artill ery pieces and their 

massin g withi n th e army corps. At Mana ssas the Union arti ll e ry had been 

assigned to bri gades, but when organizing the Army of the Potomac McClellan 

assigned it to di visions, usually one artillery battalion per di vision. He a lso 

approved a ratio of 2.5 artillery picccs to 1,000 infantrymen, with six artillcry 

pieces of the same ca liber, if possible, fo rming a battery. One of every four battcrics was to be a Regu lar Army unit, the commander of which was to assist the 

div ision commander in orga ni zin g and training the artil lery. Because of the 

shortage of artillery pieces in 1861, the Union's arsenals were ransacked and 

guns of va riolls calibers wcre sent to the troops in the field, causing ammunition and su pply problems. But evcnt uall y th e Army of the Potomac achieved 
14 MANEUVER AN D FI REPOWER 

uniformity wi thin its field a rt il lery batteries by lIsing 3-inch or 12-pou nder 

"Napoleon" gll lls.38 

Alt hough standardization o f weapons eased some field artillery problems, 

others rema ined. With the organization of army corps, ha lf of each corps' divisional artillery was withdrawn to form an Army of the Potomac artillery reserve 

orlhrcc arti llery brigades. The army corps had no artil lery except that in its divisions, and division commanders were loath to lose control over their guns. By 

1863 most commanders recognized that their heavy losses stemmed from fronta l 

infantry assaults on entrenched positions. Rines, with a max imum range of a 

thousand yards and an effective range of half that distance in the hands o r good 

marksmen, pl us supporting artillery fire presented formidable obstacles to mass 

attacks. Fic1d arti llery could break up the in fantry's defensive positions, but with 

the gu ns scattered among the corps' divisions the coordination and concen tration 

of arti llery fi re was difficult 10 o rchestrate.39 

After the Union defeat at Cha ncellorsville in 1863 the fie ld artillery batteries 

were withdrawn from the divisions of the Army of the Potomac and concentrated 

in fie ld artillery brigades directly under the corps headq uarters. These brigades, 

with fou r to six batteries and their own officers and staff, rendered efficient service, which resu lted in a red uction in the amount of artillery needed and in the 

dependence on the army's arti llery reserve without any red uction in fi re support. 

The reserve gradua lly became a place ror recuperation a nd reorgan ization of battered batteries.40 

To be successful, armies in the Civil War needed more than infantry, field 

artillery, and cavalry. As the Regular Army had few engineer units, volun teer 

infantry regiments often served as engi neers. In the Army of the Potomac these 

regiments eventua lly formed a brigade. Army corps in other Union armies also 

employed infantry as engi nee rs. As the medical, ord nance, signa l, and quartermaster department lacked units, their fie ld tasks were performed by personnel 

assigned to the departme nts o r by soldiers detailed from the line regiments or 

by hired c ivilians.41 

To coordinate all the activ ities within an army corps, supporting staffs grew 

at each level- corps, division, brigade, and regimen t. Event ually an adj utant, 

commissaries of muster and subsistence, and a chief of ordnance comprised the 

div isiona l sta ff. T he sta ff for the brigade incl uded an adjutant, quartermaster, 

commissary of subsistence, and, when the brigade served as an independent command, an ordnance officer. In addition, genera l officers continued to have aides 

as their personal staff.42 

As army corps evolved, the method by which they were designa ted changed. 

Initially each Union army corps was designated within an army- i.e., I Army 

Corps, Army of the Potomac-but later the practice o r numbering them consecutively without any re ference to the army to which they were assigned was adopted. Divisions withi n army corps were numbered consecutively. as were brigades 

within divisions.43 
EARLY EXPERIENCES 

CiI/l/fJ Humphreys. Virgi,,;a, he(lt!ql/{WferS of AI/aback's Brig{/(Ie. Pellnsylvania 

Volullteel's, 1863 

15 

Basica lly th e Army of the Potomac served as th e mode l for all Un ion 

forces. In the West army corps were introduced aftcr the ir organization in the 

Army of the Potomac. As the war ebbed and flowed commanders orga ni zed, 

consolida ted, and discontinued army corps as needed. When regi ments were 

reduced because of attrition, thea ter commanders added morc regiments to the 

brigades to maintain their strength and thai of divisions withi n the army corps. 

When the volun teer system broke down, both the Union and Confederate goy· 

emments turned to draftees, substitutes (men hired to serve in draftees' places), 

and bounties to mai nt ain the ir arm ies. To re lieve manpower problems, the 

Union Army bega n using bl acks in 1862, while the Confede rate Congre ss 

au thorized the enrollment of bl ack troops in Ma rch 1865. Sma ll numbers of 

Negroes had served in past wars, both in integrated and segregated units, but 

during the Civil War both sides organized segregated regiments. The Union 

eventually created the XXV Army Corps with Negro enlisted personnel from 

the X and XV III Army Corps.44 

Wit h the Confederate Army springing from the same ancestral roots as Ihe 

Un ion Army, it was not surprising that both armies used similar patterns of 

organization. At Bull Run in July 1861 , the Con federates emp loyed two ovi~ 

sional army corps made up of brigades without an interveni ng div isiona l-level 

structure. Eventua lly the ir army co rps consisted of infantry brigades and divi. 
16 M AN EUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

Slons. Parall eling the Union armies, the fi eld artillery batteries were organized 

as corps-level units, whi ch we re designat ed battalions rath er tha n bri gades. 

Confederate cavalry employed a di visional rather than a corps structure, but it 

functi oned as an agg ressive inde pe nde nt force earli er tha n Union cava lry. 

Unlike the Union forces, Southe rners rare ly numbered the ir brigades and di visions but used the names of commande rs for identification. Army corps were 

numbe red within the ir respective armies. 45 

To he lp control and idenl'ify units on the battle fi eld, armies traditionally used 

nags, and Un ion army corps and their divisions and brigades employed them during the Civil Wa r. The national colors formed the basis of the fl ag system. Along 

with distinctive flags, Union corps badgcs wcre introduced to identify men and 

foster esprit de corps.46 

Foll owi ng the Civil War th e War Departmcnt disbanded the fi eld a rmies, 

along with the ir army corps, divisions, and brigades. Militia units returned to 

the ir states, the vol unteers leO se rvice, and most of the Regula r Army troops 

returncd to scattercd posts throughout the South and Wcst. Congress in 1869 set 

the peacetime Regular establishment at 25 infantry, 10 cava lry, and 5 artill ery 

regiments, but few were ever able to assemble thcir far-flu ng companies, I'roops, 

and batteries in one place unl'il the end of the century. Fie ld operations usually 

invol ved less than a regiment or were conducted by gathering the geographica lly 

closest elements of several regiments on a temporary basis. Army Regulations, 

nevertheless, continued to repeat the ideas for organizing army corps, divisions, 

and brigades, wit h the division described as "the fundamental cl ement and ba sis 

of organi zation of every active army."47 

War With Spain 

On 25 April 1898, Congress dec lared that a state of war existed between the 

United States and Spain. Even though the USS Maille had been Slink six weeks 

be fore, threatening war, the nati on had taken only minima l steps toward mobili zatio n. One of these ste ps, howeve r, wa s congressiona l a uthori za ti on for 

President Will iam McKinley, when necessary, to orga nize a new army consisting of the Regular Army and the Volunteer Army of the Un ited States. The regiments of the Volu nteer Army were to be raised <lnd officered by th e states and 

eventually incl uded most of the ir organized militia units. The regulars and volunteers were to be fo rmed into brigades, divisions, and army corps. On 23 Apri l 

th e Mc Kinl ey admi nistra ti o n d irec ted t he regulars con ce nt rat ed at 

Chickamauga Natiollll l Park, Georgia, to be organized as an army corps; those 

at Mobil e. Alabama. as an indepe ndent di vision; and those at New OrlC;:II1S, 

Louisiana, as a separate brigade.48 

A ft e r th e declara ti o n of war Mc Ki nl ey re vised that arra ngeme nt and 

approved the organization of eight army corps, each of which was to consist of 

th ree or more di visions of three brigades each. Each brigade was to have approxi-
EA RLY EXPERIENCES 17 

Staffo/the 2d Dil'isioll. I Army COI1Js. 1898 

matcly 3,600 officers tlnd enlisted men organized into three regiments and, with 

three such brig<ldcs, cHch division was to total about 11,000 officers and men. 

Thus the division W<lS to be abollt the same size as the division of 186 1, but army 

corps were to be larger. The division sta rr initially was to have an adjutant general, quartermaster, commissary, surgeon, inspector general, and engineer, with an 

ordnance ofTiccr added tater. The brigade slatT was ide ntica l except that no 

inspector genera l or ordnance officer was authorized.49 

The Commanding General of the Army, Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, had 

planned to ex pa nd the Army in an orderly fa shion by holding the volunteers in 

state camps ror sixty days. There they would be organized, equipped, and trained 

ror fie ld duty. During that period the Wa r Department was to prepare large trai ~ 

iog camps and collect the necessary stores 10 outfit the new army, while 

Mc Kin ley was to appo int the general officers who wou ld command th e new 

brigades, divisions. and army corps. Miles' plan soon went awry. Because or the 

lack or Regula r Army officers to staff state camps and the need to have vol unteers 

and regulars train together, he quickly abandoned it. In mid·May the volunteers 

were moved to a rew large unfinished camps in the South, and when they arrived 

only seven instead or the eight projected army corps were organized. Two army 
18 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

-I .......... -~---....-; -...... --.. ~,. 

... ..... -

Camp Alger. Virginia, 1898 

corps, the IV and Y, consisted of regulars and volunteers, while the others were 

made up of volunteers.50 

To facil it ate command and control, corps and di v ision commande rs 

requested pe rmission to use distincti ve Civil War flags and badges for their 

units. Secretary of War Ru ssell A. Alge r. however, disapproved the request 

be cause of pressure from Civ il War veterans who had bee n pe rm itted by 

Congress to wea r their distincti ve unit insignia and guarded the privilege jealously. The quartermaster general, therefore , had to prepared an entirely new 

group of hera ldic items for the recently organized army corps and th eir di visions and brigades.51 

Before the new army completed its organization and trai ning, it was thrust 

into combat. About two-thirds of V Army Corps, one dismounted cava lry and 

two infantry divisions, sail ed ror Cuba in June 1898. Ex peditions also were 

mounted for Puerto Ri co and the Philippi ne Islands in which partial army corps 

provided the troops. The war ended in August 1898. and less than two months 

later the wartime army began to rade away. The War Depa rtment disba nded the 

last army corps on 13 Ap ril 1900. Following the war, the Army maintained 

troops in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, but those commands did not 

employ army corps nnd di visions.52 
EARLY EX PER IENCES 19 

During major confl icts of Ihe United States prior to the twentieth century, 

Army leaders sought to find the best command level at which to merge infantry, 

cavlllry, and artill ery int o effective, coordina ted combat units. Brigades and 

divisions usually comprised a single arm, wh ile the army corps was the basic 

combined arms unit. Withi n the army corps itself, [ittle special ization existed 

beyond the combat arms. Usua lly no field units were organ ized for signa l, medica l, transportation, mil iwry poli ce, engi neers, ordnance, or other combat suppori services. Hired c ivilians or detailed soldiers provided such support in the 

field. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, innovations in warfare, especially technological developmen ts, requ ired more sophist icated organizations, both to use the new tech nology and to in tegrate it into a larger operationa l and tactica l framework. 
20 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Notes 

I George Washington, 1'11(1 Wrilillgs 0/ George W(/sMltg/oil Frum Ihe Origimd M(II/IIscripl 

Sol/ree, 1745- 1799. ed .. John C. Fitzpatrick. 39 vols. (Washington. D.C.: GovCnlOlcnl Printing 

Office, 1931-44).3:354-55. 

2 Ibid.; Worthington C. Ford, cd., JOI/I"II(I/$ Qjlhe COlllil/en/(i1 CQI/gress. J 774- 1789. 34 lIols. 

(WaShington, D,C.: GOllcnlmcil! Priming Office, 1904- 37), 2: I 03, 191 (hereafter cited as l ee): An 

Universal Military Dictionary (London: J. Milian, 1779; rcprinl, Ottawa: Museum Restoration 

Service, 1969), p. 36. In the initial legislation Congress made brigadiers genera l officers. 

Washington nevertheless viewed their function during the war as nothing more than regimental 

colonels who acted on a larger scale. Regiments of the Continental AnllY were authorized staff offi· 

eers, which included adjlllants, surgeons, quanennasters, nnd paymasters. 

3 Washingto n, Writillgs, 9:103- 04.12:60- 61: Peter Force. cd., AlllericllI/ Archh'es: If 

COlft!CliOIl of AllllllmllC Records. SimI.' Papers. t/J1t/ Lellers (IIul Olhcr Notices of Public Affairs, 9 

vols. (Washington. D.C.: M . SI. Clair & I'eter Foree, 1839- 53),2: 1028; Charles H. Lesser, 11lc 

SillclI's of Il/delXmdellcc: MOlllhly Strcllgth Report.f of 'he COlllillellwl Arlll)' (Chicago: University 

of Ch icago Press, 1976), pp . 43, 72, 208 ; Robert K. Wright. Jr., rhe COII/illellllil Ar/lly 

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983). p. 97. Infantry regiments varied in strength 

during the war. but were usually authorized appro)(inmtc1y 700 officer.> and enlisted mcn cacho 

4 Washington, IVri/illgs, 9:103-04,12:60- 6 1. 

5 Boyd L. Daslrup, Killg of /Jallle: A IJI"{I/Ich His/OIY of fhc u.s. A,.m)1 ~ Fie/(I Anil/ery (Fort 

Monroe, Va.: U.S. Arnly Training and Doctrine COl11mand, 1992). pp. 12- 3 1; Wright , COlllil/ellw! 

Arm)" pp. 54, ISO; William E. Birkhimer.lHstoricuf Skefch offhc Org(///;;:m;oll. Adm;n/slmlioll. 

Mmeriel. all(/ Tuclies oflhe ArlilfclY. Unil('(1 SUlles Army (Washington, D.C.: James J. Chapman, 

1884),pp.76-77,96-97. 

6 Ford, JCC, 8:390-91, 11:542, 13: 197- 98; Washington, Writings, 10:374, 12:67,79. 

7 Washington. Writings, 16: 10 I. Lesser's Tlte Sincws of IlIdepell(lellce illustrates the point on 

brigade deSignations. 

8 Wright, COlllillellWI Ar/l/Y, p. 29; Washington, Wriling.f, 3:354-56; James C. Scudieri, "The 

Continentals: Compamtive Armlysis ora Latc Eightecnth·Ccntury Standing Anny," l'h.D. dissertation, City Univer.>i ty of New York. 1993. Lesser's The Sinews of Il1delJelulellce illustrates the point 

about quasi~penllanent divisions. 

9 Washington. IVrilillgS, 7:49. 10:363. 

10 Ford, lCC, 6:1025,1045, 18:960; M;Iry Lee Stubbs and St;ulley Russell Connor, Arll/QI" 

C(lmby. Pm'll: Regnlar Anll)1 (111(1 Arlll)1 Rescl"e (Washington, D.C.: Govenullent Printing Office, 

1969), pp. 3- 6; Wright. COillil/elltal Arm)" pp. 105- 07, 133- 34. 160- 6 1; Oli ver L. Spaulding, 

Hoffman Nickerson. and John W. Wright. Ww"/tlre (Washington. D.C.: Harcourt Brace, and Co., 

1925), pp. 554-55. 

I I Washington, Writings, 27:374-98. 

12 Ford. JCC, 3 Jlln 1784; John F. Call:m, comp., The Mili/(II J' I.all's of Iltl..' UI/ifl..'d Sfafe~' 

(Philadclphia: G.W. Childs, 1863). pp. 95- 100. 

I) Callan. Mili/(//)' Lows, pp. 122- 25. This was the first law authorizing volunleers; the other 

laws conceming them were cnacted during periods of crises. Those printcd in this volume cover the 

period ullli11863 . 

14 Maurice de Saxe, Rel'eries 011 'he Arl of War. trans .. Thomas R. Philipps (Harrisburg. I'a. : 

Military SCI'\'ice I'ublishing Co., 1944), PI). 36- 38; Frederick Wilhelm von Steuben. A Leller 011 I!II! 

Subjecl of 0/1 E.uablished ',..fili,ill. (///(/ MiliullY Armllgell/ellls. Adt/ressel/to Ihe 'nlwhitmlls of ,fte 

Vlliled SIMI'S (New York: J. McLean and Co., 1784), p. 45 ; tlenry Knox, A Plan for Ihe Gel/eml 

i/,.ml1gemelll of Ihe Mililill oflhe Vlliled Siaies (1786), Jlu blished in /Jolilica! PlIlllphfel.r, Jefferson 

Col lcction, Library o f Congress: John K. Mahon and Ronmna D:lIIysh. II/fillliry. I'a/"I I: Regu!a,. 

Arlll)' (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1972). pp. 12- 13; Francis I). tleitman. 

1/;.floricllJ Regi.\·ter all(/ Dieliol/ary oflhc Ulliled SUIIC5 AI'II/)' From 1150rgm/iztlliol/. Septcmbn' 
EA RLY EXPER IENCES 21 

/779/0 March 1. 1903,2 'lois. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1903), 1:139-41: 

Francis Paul Prucha, nil! Swol'd of ,lie Republic: The VI/IMI Arm)' 01/ 'he FrQllf;er. 1783- 1846 

(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971). PI'. 17- 24. 

IS Marvin A. Kreidbcrg and Mer10n G. Ilcnry, His/at)' of Mili/ary Mobilizfllioll ill 'he Ullifetl 

S/(l/e.I' Army. 1775- /945 (Washington, D.C.: Government Print ing Office, 1955), PI'. 44-46. hereafler ciled llS Mobilization; Benson J. Lossing, Hie Pictorial Field-Book oflhe Wa/' of 1812 (New 

York: Harper and Brothers. 1869). PI'. 366, 142: Allledcm/ S/mc Pupas. Mifiwry Affoil:~, 7 'lois. 

(Washington, D.C.: Gales and Senton, 1834). I :618; Charles W. Ellioll, IVinfiefd &01/: n,e Soldie,. 

({lid 'he MWI (New York: Macmillan Co., 1937), p. 15 1. 

16 Americtll/ SUI/e PlIlx-n', Milillll)' Aff"ir.~, 1:495. 

17 Ellioll , Willfleltl Scvl/. pp. 146-47, 162. 

18 AmericlII/ SllI/e I'''per.f. MilillllJI Affi/ir~·. 1:330, 425; Wi ll iam DUllne, II HlInd Book for 

I"jillllr),. 9th cd. (Philadelphia: William Duanc, 1814), p. 20; Cal lan, Mililnr)' L(lII'~' , pp. 136, 213. 

219,228,240. 

19 Amcric(1II SllIle Pl11x-r.f. MilillllY Affilirs, I: 199- 200; Ellioil, Wil/jieftl Seoll. pp. 228- 29. 

20 Gelleml Reglllllliol/sfvr lite VI/iled Slflles , 11'111)" 1821, pp. 85-89; Michael Howard, W(II' ill 

£"ropetlll IlislOIJ' (Oxford: Oxford Universily Press. 1976), PI). 83- 84. 

21 Gel/er,,1 Regula/iollsfor lite Arm)' oflhe Vlliled Slales, 184 1, p. 67. 

22 Juslin H . Smith, The 1JI(l1" lVilh Mexico, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan Co .. 1919). 

I: 143- 80 passim: Kreidberg and Ilcnry, Mobili:.alivlI. PI'. 74-75. 

2l Mounted infantry men were dragoons who reached the banleficld on horse but as fOOl soldicrs. 

24 Callan, MilillllJ' a1\l~', pp. 367- 69, 373, 375. and 380; Kreidberg and Henry. iHobiliZtllioll. 

p. 73; Mexical/ Wor CO/.,.e.~pO/l(lell/ e (Washinglon, D.C.: Wendell and van Belllhuyscn, Printers. 

1848), p. 458. 

25 Mt!fictlll Wtll" CVl"l"espv/ulellce, PI'. 417- 19. 498- 500; Edward D. Mansficld. 71,e Mt!fical/ 

IVtll": A IJi.vlOl), of lIS Origill (New York: A.S. Barnes and Co., 1850). p. 57. 

26 Mt!\'ic(1I/ lVor COl"re.l·p()//dellce. Pll. 5 13- 14; John D. Eisenhower, So Far FIYJ/IJ God: The 

U.S. W(II" \1'ilh Mexico 1846- 1848 (New York: Random 1·louse. 1989), pp. 178- 91; Daslrup, King 

of/Jal/le, PI). 7 1- 78. 

21 R. S. Ripley, TIle War willi MClka (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1849), PI" 17,55- 56; 

Mansfield. 71,e Me:ric(II1 Wur. pp. 225- 27, 

28 Sianley L Falk. "Artillery ror the Land Service: The Developmenl of a System." Milil(ll), 

IIffilir!; 28 (F:llI 1964): 97- 110. 

29 !legltlalioll.l· of/he Army oflhe VIIi/eli Slale!;. 1857, p. 13. 

30 Ibid .. pp. 13.71- 73. 

II George 13. McClellan, McClel/ml's OU'I/ SIOI)': rlIC IVaI" of Ihe Vllioll (New York: Charles 

L Webster and Co., 1887), p. 2; War Department General Ordcrs (WD GO) 49, 1861. 

32 MeClell,Ul, MeGlellal/':; aII'll Slary, p. 68. 

D The War of Ihe Rebellioll: A COIIII)ilalioll of Ihe Official Records vf Ihe Vl/ivl/ al/d 

COllfe(f<'Nlle Al'lIIies. SeT. 1.53 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Governmcnl Prinling Office, 1881 - 98), 

5: 11- 17, hereafter ciled as OR: WD GO 49, 186 1. 

34 Robert M. Epstein, "The Creation and Evolution of the Amly Corps in the American Civil 

War." )ollrlwl of Military Hislmy 55 (Jan 199 1): 21-46; OR, 5: 11- 67 passim. Congress provided 

for anny corps on 17 July 1862. 

35 II e:lvalry squadron was and still is cquivalenllo a batlalion. 

36 I'hilil) II. Sherid;ll1, I'el'sol/ol Meillvil'.~ of {>.11. Shedd/III. Gel/eml oflhe Vlli/etl SI(l/e,~ AI'IIIY, 

2 vols. (New York: Charles L. Websler& Co" 1888), 1:347. 

37 Ibid.; B. W. Crowninshielf. "Cavalry in Virginia During Ihe War of Ihe Rebellion," )0111"1/(/1 

of Ihe MilillllJ' Se/1'ice IIISlillllioll 12 (May 1891): 527- 5 1; Kenneth P. Williams, Lil/co/" Fill(/s II 

Gel/eral, 4 vols. (Nell' York: Macmillan, 1949).2:483,487; OR. 25:471- 72: Moses Harris, ··The 

Union Cnv<llry," )oltl"llol oflhe V.s. Cllllalry A:;sodaliOIl 5 (Mar 1892): 2- 16. 

38 Henry J. Hunl , "Our Experience in Arlillery AdminiSlr;llion," )0111'11111 vf Ihe Mifil(llJ' 
22 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

Sen'ice 111:;1;111/;011 12 (Mar 189 1): 197- 224; John C. Tidb.,II, "The Arlilicry Sen'ice in Ihe W,lf or 

the Rebellion. 1861- 1865," JOIII"II(lI oflhe }.-lUi/my Service IIISlilWioll J 2 (Jul 1891): 697- 733. 

J'l OR, 5:67. 471 - 72: Tidbllll , ''The Artillery Service," PI'. 697- 733. 

40 Tidb.,JI, "The Artillery Service:' pp. 697- 733. 

41 History /iliff TI'l/(lilioll.~ oflhe Corps of Ellgilleers. Engineer School Special Text 25- 1, (Fort 

Belvoir, Va.: Enginlocf School. 1953), p. 29; OR. 15:716 17; Mary C. Gillen, The Army Me(liefl/ 

Departlll(!lII. 1818- 1865 (Washington, D.C.: Govcmmcll\ Printing omcc, 1987), pp. 156-57. 

42 WD GOs 12,79. 1862; 411, 1863; lllld 3 1, 193, 1865. 

43 Frederick 1I. Dyer, A COl/wel/dill1ll oflhe War oflhe Rebellioll (Des Moines, lo\\'a: Dyer 

Publishing COIllJXmy, 1908). pp. 26 1- 69. 

44 See chari Civil War Army Corps rnlscd on notes from Dyer 3nd OR. author's notes Civil 

War: OR, 15: 7 16- 17 and 30. pI. I. pp. 2 11 12; George W. Williams. A 1-/i.~IQlJ' oflhe Negro 

Troops ill Ihe lVar oflhe Rebellioll. 1861- 1865 (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1888: reprint, New 

York: Ncgro Univcrsities I'ress. 1969). pp. 10- 58 passim: James 1. Robcrlson. Jr .. Soldiers BIlle 

lIIlll Grtl)' (Columbia: Uni\'ersity of South Carolina Press. 1988), pp. 19-40; QuarlcnJl<lster Gellcml 

or the Anny. comp .• Tabllhlr Sill/eli/elliS Sltowillg Ihe Nf/lll e.~ ofColIIlII(lllllers of Ann)· COIPS. 

Divisiolls. (wd Brigades. Vllile(1 Sltl c.~ Anll)'. l)"rill8 Ihe Wflr of 186/11) /865 (Philadelphia: !lurk 

and MeFetrigde, I' rimers and Lithogmphers. 1887). XXV Anny Corps table. 

45 Crowninshield. "Cavalry in Virginia:' pp. 527- 51; Tidball. "The Arlillery Service," pp. 

697- 733; Richard J. Sommers, Richmolld Re(leeme(/: The Siege at Pelersburg (New York : 

Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1981). PI). xii- xiii . 

46 OR, I I. IlL 3, 33- 36; John W. Wike, "The Wearing or Anny COIl)S and Division Insignia in 

the Un ion Army," lV/ilillllY Col/ector lIlId /-lislorial/. [V (J une 1952): 35- 38: Julia Lorri1:ml 

BUHerlield, cd .• A Biagraphic(11 Memol'i(l/ afGellel'll1 DWliel Blllleljieltl (New York: Granou Press, 

1(04). pp. 11 6-18. 

47 WD GOs 56. 1866, and 15, 1869; Anll)' Regula/ions, 1873. pp. 6 5- 66; Troops ill 

C(IIIII'(lig l/, Regl/{(ltioll~' for Ihe Arm)' uf Ihe Uniled Silltes (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing 

Officc, 1892), IIp. 3-4: I'erry O. Jamieson. Crossillg lite /)emily Grollnd: Ullile(1 S/(/Ie.~ AI"III)' 

TllCfics. /865- /899(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. 1994). pp. 123- 27. 

48 WD GOs 25 and 30, 1898; CorreslJO lldcllce Helll/illg /0 'he W(II" lVith Spai". 2 vols. 

(Washington, D.C.: Govcmlllent Printing Office, 1902), 1: I. 

49 WD GOs 30. 36. and 96. 1898. 

SO Rpt or the Maj Gcn Commanding the Anny, Alllllmi Repol'fs oflhe lV"r Dep(lnlllelll. /898, 

pp. 7- 8, hcreaner cited as ARWD; Russell A. Alger. TIl(' Sp(lIIi.fh.Amel"ic(1I/ War (New York : 

Harper and Co., 1901 ). pp. 26- 27; HlII7JCI"S PiClori(lllli.tllllJ' oflhe IV(W 1V;lh S,)llill (Ncw York: 

I [a'1>er and Co .. 1899). p. 187; CO/"l'espundence Refutillg 10lhe War Wilh Spain, 1:509.5 19. 534. 

539. and 547: WD GO 30 and 96, 1898. 

5t Llr. V Anny Corps to The Adjutant General. U.S. AmlY, 28 May 1898. no subject, \Vilh 

fi ve endorsements, AGO file 8541\. Telegram, 111 Corps to the Quarlcnnasler Gcneral (QMG). 

U.S. AnllY, 28 May 1898, no subjcct, AGO file 3 198, Llr. 1st Division. IV Corps, to The Adjutant 

General. IV Corps. 19 Junc 1898, no subject, Adjutant Geneml's Officc (AGO) file 114100, all in 

Record Group (hereaner cited as RG) 165. National Archives and Records Administration (here. 

aner cited as NARA); WD Cir 12, 1883: WD GO 99. 1898. 

S2 Rpt orlhe Maj Gcn of the AnllY, ARWD. 1898, pp. 499-50[; CorreslJOmlellcc Relaling 10 

lite Wm' lVilh S,Xlill, 2:705- 08. 
CHAPTER 2 

Genesis of Permanent Divisions 

Officers ",ho IUlI'e IICI'er seellll corps. division. or brigade orgallized (lml 011 the IIIlWcJ, 

C(/I/ 1/01 be e.\pecfed to pello/"1II pelfecfly ,lte dillies required of Ihelll II'hell war cOllies. 

Elihu ROOII 

At the opening or tile twen tieth century, followi ng the hasty organization and 

deployment of the army corps during the War with Spain, the Army's leadershi p 

rea lized that it needed to create permanent combined arms units tra ined for war. 

Accordingly. senior officers worked towa rd that goal until the nation entered 

World Wa r I. The ir efforts rcOcclcd the princ ipal mission of the Army at the time: 

to defend the vast conti nental United States and ils modest insular empire in the 

Ca ri bbean Sea a nd Pacific Ocean. During this period the infa ntry di vision 

replaced the army corps as the basic combined arms unit. Growing in size and 

fire power, it acquired combat support and service elements. a long with an adequate staff, refl ecting visions of a more complex battlefield environment. The 

cavalry division, designed to achieve mobility rather than to realize its combined 

arms potential, underwent changes similar to those of the infantry division. Army 

leaders also searched fo r ways to mainta in permanent di visions that could take 

the fi eld on short notice. That effort accomplished little, however, because oftraditional American antipathy toward standing annies. 

Reforms Following the War With Spain 

T he Army began ctosely examining its o rgan izations after the War with 

Spain. The War Department had been severely criticized for its poor leadership 

during the 1898 mobil ization. Under the guidance of Secretary o f War Elihu 

Root, it established a board to plan an Army war college that wou ld "direct the 

instruction and intellectual exercise of the Army."2 Th is concept inspired creation 

of the Genera l Staff in 1903, which led to major reforms in Army organizutioll 

and mobiliz..1tion.3 

Under the leadership of Maj . Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, the Chief of Stuff, the 

new organiza ti on had a profound influence on the structure of the fi eld army. In 

1905 the War Departme nt published Field Serllice Regulations. United Stales 

Army, in whi ch Capt. Joseph T. Di ckman, a Genera l Staff member and fu ture 

Third Army commande r, drew toge ther contemporary thought on tactics and 
24 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

logistics. Designed for the first level of officer training within the Army's educational system, the regulations covered such subjects as orders, combat, services of 

information and security (inte lligence), subsistence, tran sportation, and organization. Under the guidance of Cha ffee and ot her staff officers Dickman 's organizationa l section d irected the fo rmation of prov isional brigades and divisions during 

field exercises so thai sma ller permanent units could train for war.4 

With these new ordinances, the Army deplIflcd from national and international practice, and the infantry division replaced the army corps, whi ch had been 

used in the Civil War and the War wit h Spain, as the basic unit for combini ng 

arms. Si nce the mid-nineteenth century a typical Europcan army corps had consistcd of two or more di visions, a cavalry brigade, a field artillery regiment, and 

supporting units- about 30,000 men. Divisions usually included only infantry. 

Although they sometimes had artillery, cava lry, or engineer troops, they rarely 

included service units.S 

In march formation (infantry in fours, cava lry in twos, guns and caissons in 

single fil e), a European army corps covered approximately fifteen mi les of road, 

a day's march. To partic ipate in a battle involving the va nguard, the corps' rear 

elemen ts might have a day's march before engaging the enemy. Any g reater distance meant that all corps clements could not work as a unit. In the continental 

United States an army corps actua ll y req ui red abou t thirty-five miles of road 

space because of the broken terrai n and poor roads. Within a moving army corps, 

however, a division occupied only cleven miles.6 

By replaci ng the army corps with the division, Di ckma n's regulation sought 

an orga ni zational framework appropriate to the mission and the ex pected terra in. In 1905 the statT did nol ide ntify specific adversaries, but the planners 

beli eved that if war broke ou t a divisional o rganization was more appropriate 

for usc in North America . Their assumption was that the nation would not be 

involved in a war overseas.? 

For traini ng, the regulations outlined a division that included three infantry 

brigades (two or more infantr y regiments each), a cavalry regiment, an engineer 

battalion 10 fac ilitate movement, a signal company fo r communicatio ns, and four 

fie ld hospita ls. Nine fi eld artillery batteries, organized as a provisional regiment, 

served both the division and other commands such as corps arti llery. To attain a 

self-sufficient division, the planners added an ammunition column, a supply column, and a pack train, all to be manned by civilians. The regulations di d not fix 

the strength of the organization, but in march formation it was estimated to usc 

fo urteen miles of road space. That distance represented a day's march, paralleling 

the length of a contemporary European army corps.8 

In the field, di visions were both tacti cal and admi nistrative units. Mail ers 

relating to courts martial, supply, money, property accouTltability, and administration, all norma lly vested in a territoria l commander duri ng peace, passed 10 the 

divisio n commander during war. To carry out these duties, the division was to 

have a c hief of sta tT, an adjutant general, an inspector genera l, iI provost marshal, 
GEN ESIS OF PERMANENT OIVISIONS 25 

a judge advocate, a surgeon, and a quartermaster, a long wit h commissary, engineer, signa l, ordnance, and muster officers. The scnior artillery officer served ex 

officio as the chief of the division arlillery.9 

The cava lry division, also described in the regulations, consisted of three cava lry brigades (two or three cavalry regiments each), six horse arti llery batteries, 

mounted engineer and signal companies, and two field hospitals. Civilians were 

to man ammunition and supply columns. Because mou nted troops were likely to 

be employed in small detachments, the cava lry division had no prescribed stafT.IO 

Above the division leve l, the regulations only sketched corps and armi es. Two 

or three infantry divisions made up an army corps, and several army corps, along 

with one or more cava lry divisions, formed an army. Specific details regarding 

higher command and control were omitted.tl 

When the Field Service Regula/iolls were published, Genera l Chaffee ar~ 

nessed them to training and readiness. First, he directed the garrison schools to 

use them as textbooks, tak ing precedence over any ot hers then in lise. Second, 

he appl ied the regulations to both the Regula r Army and the Organized Militia 

when in the field .1 2 

Mil itia, or National Guard, units had dual missions. Each served its stale of 

origin but, when ca ll ed upon, also servcd in national emerge ncies. Under Ihe 

Dick ACI of 1903, Nationa l Guard units had five years to achieve the same ga~ 

nizalional st.andards as the Regular Army units. To accomplish that goal, the fed~ 

eral government increased the funds for arms and equi pment and an nual training 

and provided additiona l Regular Army offi cers to assist with tra ini ng.13 

Hav ing an olltline for fie ld organ izations a nd units ava ilable to prepa re fo r 

wa r, the Army tu rn ed its att ention to tra ini ng. Comb ined arms trai ningartillery, cavalry, and infantry- had been a part of the school curriculum at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, since 188 1, but Sec retary Root gave sllch tra in ing added 

meaning in 1899 when he nOled thaI o ffi cers needed to see a corps, division, or 

brigade organized and on the mareh to perform the ir duties in wa r. In 1902 

some state and federal units he ld maneuvers at Camp Root, Kansas,I4 but the 

fi rst large drill took place two years later nca r Manassas, Virginia. At that time 

Guard units from e ighteen states and selec ted Regular Army units tra ined 

together- a tota l of26,OOO men. Maneuvers on a lesser sca le were held in 1906 

and 1908. These biennia l ma neuvers proved benefici al to bot h professional and 

citizen soldiers. Regul ars gai ned command experience, and guardsmen refi ned 

the ir mi litary skills. IS 

Alt hough periodic maneuvers had their merits, the General Staff soon real~ 

ized that they fe ll short of prepa ring the Army for war. In 1906 the Regular Army 

was still dispersed among posts that accommodated any\Vhere from two com a~ 

nics to a regime nt. To provide for more sustained tra ining, the stafT urged 

Secretary of War Wil liam Howard Taft to concentrate the regulars at br gade~size 

posts. Taft proved receptive, but most members of Congress opposed the reform, 

particula rly if closing a post might affecl their consti tuents adverscly.16 
Public view.\· 'he 1904 IIWllelll'e,.~·. MlIIllIssfls. Virgillia; below, 'roops pass ill 

reviell', 1904 Manassas IIUlllel/l'ers. 
GENESIS OF PERMANENT DIVISIONS 

Maj. Cell. NeillY C. Corbi" allli 

Colollel Wagller 

27 

In 1909 Assistant Secre ta ry of 

War Robert Shaw Oliver, a veteran 

with ex pe ri ence a s a vol unt eer, 

Regular, and Guard officer, adopted 

a not her approach 10 readiness. 

Following the European exampl e of 

mixing regulars and reserves in the 

sa me formation , he divided th e 

nation into eight distri c ts. Within 

each district, Oliver planned to form 

brigades, divisions, a nd corps for 

training Regular and Gua rd unilS. 

The district comma nde r was 10 

supervise all assigned reguhu s, but 

to exercise only nominal contro l 

over Guard units, which were to be 

federalized only during a nalio nal 

eme rgency o r wa r. Neve rtheless, 

O liver expec ted the dist ri ct commander to influence the c itizen-soldier by man ifesting an interest in the 

reserve forces. The plan was voluntary for th e Nat ional Guard, but by early 1910 th e governors of the New 

England states and New York had agreed to have their units participate.17 

About the same timc this agreement was reached, the Army modified its field 

orga nizations, retaining div isions but replacing the corps and army commands 

with a field army. Since the mid-nineteenth centu ry military theorists had debated 

the need for the corps. Col. Arthur L. Wagncr, a founding fat her of the Army 

school system, be lieved that it was a necessary eche lon between division and 

army, but ba sed on experience during the Civi l War Maj. Gen . Andrew A. 

Humph reys, former Chief of StafT of the Army of the Potomac, disagreed. 

Humphreys wanted a strong division capable of independent operations, noting 

that the terrain and poor roads in the United States prevented the easy maneuver 

or movement ofa large uniL IS 

Agreeing with Humphreys, the General Staff decided that a command made up 

of divisions, designated as a field army, best fit the nation's needs. As described in 

the Field Service Reglila/iolls of 1910, the fi eld army comprised two or more 

infan try divisions, plus sUPl>ort troops, which included pioneer infanlry (service 

troops for the forward area of the battlefield), heavy artillery, engineers, signal and 

medica l troops, and ammunition and supply units, which could maneuver and fight 

independently. Cava lry might be included in Ihe division jf appropriate. 19 

To fit within the new concept, the General SlafT, in conjunct ion with the 

Army School of Ihe Line al Fori Leavenworth, made the infantry division a 
28 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

morc powerful and self·sufficicnt organization. A field artillery brigade of two 

regiments with forty-ei ght guns rcplaced the provisional regiment. In fantry and 

cilvalry regiments benefited from add itional firepower. Based on experiments 

with nUlchinc guns in 1906, a provisional two-gun platoon had been added to 

each infantry and cavalry regiment, and with the new regulations the authorization was increased to six guns. Depending on range, one machine gu n eq ual ed 

Ihe firepower of between sixteen and thirty-nine rincmcn. Thus, divisiona l firepower grew substantia lly. Other changes improved communications by replacing the signal company with a two-company battalion and ex panded the med· 

ieal service by adding fout' ambulance companies. For the first time, a directive 

fixed the strcngth of a di vision at 19,850 men- 740 officers, 18,533 cnlisted, 

and 577 civilians, the last se rving mostly in the ammuni tion and su pply units. 

Transport for a di vision included 769 wagons and carts, 48 ambulances, and 

8,265 animals.20 

While making the di vision more powerful, the regulations realigned the division staff. The new staff consisted of a chief of staff, an adjutant general, an 

inspector general, a judge advocate, a quartermaster, a commissa ry officer, a surgeon, the commander's three aides, ami six civi lian clerks. Engineer and signa l 

battlliion commanders joined it at the discretion of the division cOlllmander. The 

provost marshal was eliminated, as were the ordnance, muster, and senior artillery 

officers, wit h most of these positions moving to the field army headquarters) I 

A new nomenclature for divisions indicated their self-sufficiency. Instead of 

being numbered as the 1st, 2d, and 3d Divisions, I Army Corps, as during the 

Civil Wa r and the War wit h Spain, units were to be numbered consecuti vely in the 

order of their formation . No reference to any field army appeared in divisiona l 

designations. As before, brigades we re identified only as the 1st, 2d, and 3d 

brigades of a division.22 

The new ordinances also included a 13,836-man cavalry di vision in th e 

fi eld army, and, as in the infantry division, interna l changes affectcd fi repower, 

logistics, and staff. A field artillcry regiment replaced Ihe six battc ri es, and 

each cavalry regiment fi elded a provisional machine gu n troop. The engineer 

and signal companies were expanded to battalions, and two ambulance compa -

nies were added. A pack train compl eted the division. For th e first time, the 

cavalry di vision was given a staff similar to that in th e infantry division. 

Designations of cavalry divisions were also to be numeri cal and consecuti ve in 

the order of th eir organization.23 

Maj. Gen. James Franklin Bel l, the Chief of Staff of the Army, established the 

First Field Army on 28 Februa ry 1910. Although merely a paper orga nization 

be fore mobilization, it consisted of three infantry di visions, each with three 

infantry brigades. Each infantry brigade comprised three infantry regiments, and 

the other div isional un its included a cavalry regiment, an engineer battal ion, and 

medica l and signal units. In place of the field artillery brigade, each division had 

only one field artillery regiment. Because the artill ery and caval ry regiments 
GENESIS OF PERMANENT DIVISIONS 

General Bell 

29 

were made up of bot h Rcgular Army 

and Na ti onal Guard c lements, Bell 

designated thcm as "Nationa l" regiments. The suppl y and ammunition 

tra ins, manned by civi lians, were to 

be formed after mobi lization.24 

Within a few months the new 

Chief of StafT, Maj. Gen. Leo nard 

Wood, reported to Secretary of War 

Jacob M. Dickinso n that th e First 

Field Army ex isted in name only. 

Noting th at th e Army lacked th e 

req uired units and equipment to field 

the organization, he nevertheless 

believed that the Wa r Department 

had taken the first step in organizi ng 

the Regular Army and the Natiomd 

Guard for modern war.25 

Not everyo ne in the War 

Department agreed with the concept 

of the First Field Army. The Chief of 

the Division of Mi litia Affa irs, Brig. 

Gen. Robert K. Evans, recommended 

that General Wood revoke the orders 

establishing the organization for two reasons. First, the field army did not fit any 

plan fo r the national defense, and, second, he believed that Regular and Guard 

units did not be long in the same formation. He further contended that the orders 

implied the existence of a field army. Events along the Mexican border soon 

caused the Army to abandon the organization, and event ually the secretary of war 

resc inded the orders.26 

Concentration on the Mexican Border in 1911 

In March 1911 , during disorders resulting from the Mexican Revol ution, the 

War Department deployed many Regular Army units of the First Field Army to 

the southern border. Units assembl ed at San Antonio, Texa s, const ituted the 

Maneuver Division and the Independent Cavalry Brigade, while ot hers, concentrated at Galveston, Texas, and San Diego, California, made up separate infantry 

brigades. The division, following the Field Service Regula/iolls outline, consisted 

of three infantry brigades, a field artillery brigade, an engineer battalion, and 

medi cal and signa l units, but no trains. Thirty-six compani es from the Coast 

Artillery Corps, organized as three provisional infantry regiments, comprised the 

brigade at Galveston. The brigade at San Diego had two infantry rcgimcnts and 
30 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

small med ica l, signal, and cavalry units, along with a provisional quartermaster 

(bakers and cooks) un it. The Ga lveston and San Diego brigades were intended to 

defend against possible attack by the Mex ican Navy, whi le the Mane uver 

Division read ied for offensive operations aga inst Mcxico.27 

The Army experienced great difficulty with this assembly of troops. Scores of 

movement orders had to be issued. and inadequate arrangements for transportation 

c<l used innumerable delays. Upon <lrriving at their new stations, the uni ts found 

themselves considerably under strength. The division in itially had about 8,000 officers and enlisted men but, with the addition of recru its, its strength climbed to 

12,809. That total represented only about two-thirds of the authorized strength outlined in the regulations fo r the division. Although the division impressed some 

American citizens, General Wood's comment was "How little."28 

During the concentration of troops along the borde r, which lasted for 

almost five months, the Army learned many lessons about readiness. The fo remost one concerned the effects o f lhe lack ofa mobiliz'ltion pl,\I\, which caused 

delays in notifyi ng and transporting units. Sixteen days were req uired to assemble the small force. By comparison, the followi ng year the Bulgarians needed 

only eighteen days to mobilize 270,000 men aga inst the Turks. After the Iroops 

arrived at the mobilization sites, the div ision's inspector gene ral fo und ma ny 

problems. No two units had the same tentage , tra nsporta tion equipme nt, or 

quartermaster supplies. The large numbers of recruits overwhelmed the units 

and caused genera l con fusion. Medical uni ts performed poorly since they had 

been haphazardly organized.29 

To correct these fa ul ts, the inspector genera l recommcnded thai st andard 

field eq ui pment be issued 10 a ll units, that their peacetime strength be increased, 

and that permanen t fiel d hospita ls and ambu lance compa nies be maintained. 

Logistica l problems stemmed from the lack of regulatory civilians in the ammunition <l nd supply tra ins. But rather than urging the organi;wtion of those units, 

the inspector suggested th<lt the Army experiment with "autotrucks."30 

In the communiC<lt ions arena, the Signal Corps tested the telegraph, wireless 

tclegraph (radio), and the airplane during tactica l exercises. Cavalry employed the 

wire less telegraph, whil e infa ntry used telegraph wire, and bot h reported grea t 

success. In <Iddit ion to traini ng officers to fl y, the airplane was used for eeon~ 

naissancc in the division, which spurred further aeronautica l development.31 

When the Maneuver Division and the brigades we re mobi li zed, General 

Wood expected that they could rema in on the border for three months withou t 

asking Congress fo r addi tion<ll money. He succeeded. The brigades at Ga lveston 

and San Diego were discontinued in June 191 1, and divisiona l elements began 

returning to their home stations at lhe end of July. On 7 August the division headquarters passed into history.32 

The mobilization served many purposes, not the least of which was to give 

impetus to General Wood's preparedness campaign. The performa nce of the division and the brigades illustrated the nation'S un preparedness for war. 
GENESIS OF PERMANENT DIVISIONS 3 1 

The Stimson Plan 

After the break up of the division and brigades, Secretary of War Henry L. 

Stimson requested the Genera l Staff to review national defense pol ic ies and to 

develop a mobi lizat ion plan for the Army. Maj. William Lassiter, Capt. John 

McAuley Palmer, and Capt. George Van Horn Mose ley prepared the reCOm -

mendations submitted to Sti mson in 19 12 as the Reporl 011 fhe Orgallization of 

Lalld Forces of fhe United Slales.33 Known as the Sti mso n Plan, it set out Ihe 

need for "A regular army orga nized in divisions and cavalry brigades ready fo r 

immediate lise as an expeditionary force or for other purposes ... . " Behind it 

was to be "an army of national citizen soldiers organized in peace in complete 

di visions and prepared to reen fo rce the Regular Army in time of war." Fi nally, 

the plan called for "an army of volunteers to be organi zed under prearranged 

plans when greater forces are requ ired than can be furn ished by the Regular 

Army and the organized c iti zen soldiery."34 

Alt hough the St imson Plan rece ived su pport throughout the Army and the 

nation, changing the military establishment proved difficult. Congress balked at 

altering the laws governi ng the Army. The General Staff therefore opted to improve 

readiness by implementing as many of the recommendations as possible on the 

basis of existing legislation. After conferences with general officers, the National 

Guard, and concerned congressional members, sixteen divisions emerged as a 

mobilization fo rce. The Regular Army was to furnish one cavalry and three infantry 

divisions, and the National Guard twelve infantry divisions. With these goals established, the staff developed plans to reorganize the two components.35 

On 15 February 19131 Stimson announced his new arrangement for the Regular 

Army. To administer it, he divided the nation into Eastern, Centra l, Western, and 

Southern Departments and created northern and southern Atlanti c coast artillery 

districts, along with a third for the Pacific coast. These departments and districts 

provided the framework for conti nued command and control regardless of the units 

assigned to them. Second, he arranged to mobilize field un its into di visions and 

brigades. The 1st, 2d, and 3d Divisions were allotted to the Eastern, Central, and 

Western Departments, respectively, and the Cava lry Division (1st and 2d Cava lry 

Brigades) to the Southern Department. The 3d Cavalry Brigade, a nondiv isiona l 

un it, was assigned to the Central Department. When necessary, two regiments in the 

Eastern Department were to combine to form the 4t h Cavalry Brigade. The plan 

addressed primarily the defense of the continenta l United States, but also included 

the rerritory of Hawaii. The three infantry regiments stationed in the islands were to 

form the 1st Hawaiian Brigade.36 

These arrangemen ts fe ll short of perfection. Divisiona l components remained 

scattered unlilmobilization, thereby precluding continuous training. For example, 

the I st Division 's elements occupied fourteen posts. All di visions lacked units 

presc ribed in the Field Service Regulatiolls. Stimson, however, hoped that 

Congress would eventually authorize completion of the un its)7 
32 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

To organi ze the National Guard divisions, Stimson had to gain the cooperation 

of state govern ors who controll ed the Guard units unti l federalized. Captain 

Moseley devised a system to di vide the nation into twelve geographic districts, each 

with an infantry di vision. T hirty-two states accepted the scheme, two states 

remained noncommitta l, and fifteen refused comment. Although the staff failed to 

g<l itl unanimous support orits proposal, in 1914 it adopted the twel ve-d ivision force 

fo r the Guard (7f1ble I), to which was added three l1luhidistrict cava lry divisions,38 

Implementation of the plan moved slowly in the states. Governors hesitated to 

fo rm certai n units needed in the divisions, particu larly expensive field artillery and 

medical organizations that did not Supporlthe Guard's state missions. The staff likewise moved slowly in developing procedures to instruct, supply, and mobilize the 

units. One bright area, the District of New York, which had ma intained a division of 

its own design since 1908, quickly completed its part of the plan, perhaps because 

the state had been a pillar of support for the preparedness movement. Pennsylvan ia, 

the other state constituting a divisional district, which had sltpp0l1ed a nonregulation division si nce 1879, gradually began to adj ust its organization. Progress in the 

multistate districts, not unexpectedly, fell behind Pennsylvania.39 

As it developed plans for the tactica l reorganization of the Army, the General 

Staff pionee red the creation o f tabl es of o rgani za tio n fo r a ll Iypes of units. 

Foreru nners of those used today, the tabl es brought together for easy comparison 

a mass of information about uni t person nel and equipment previollsly buried in 

Division 

5th 

6th 

7th 

8th 

9th 

10th 

11th 

12th 

13th 

14th 

15th 

16th 

TABLE I 

National Guard Infantry Divisions, 191 4 

Di.5IriCI 

Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, VemlOnt, 

Rhode Island, <'Ind Connecticut 

New York 

Pennsylvania 

Delaware, New Jersey, Maryland, District of Columbia, 

Virgin ia, and West Virginia 

North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, and Georgia 

Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky 

Michigan and Ohio 

Illinois and Indiana 

Wisconsin, Min nesota, North Dakota, SOUlh Dakota, 

and Iowa 

Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, and Wyoming 

Arkansas, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Oklahoma, 

and Lou isiana 

Cali fom; a, Oregon, Montana, Utah, Idaho, Nevada, 

<l nd Washington 
GENESIS OF PERMANENT DIVISIONS 33 

various War Department publi cations, greatly easing the task of determining 

requirements for mobili zations. Alt hough the new tables did not a lter the basic 

combat triad structure of the infantry division, their formulation was accompanied by in ternal changes in the infan try regiments and the divisiona l support echelon. Revisions e liminated the pack train, authorized a small engineer train, and 

mann ed the engineer, supply. and ammunition trains wit h mi litary personne l 

instead of civilians.40 

In 1912 Congress created a service corps within the Quartermaster Corps to 

replace civilian employees and soldiers detailed from combat units for duty as 

wagonmaslcrs, teamsters, blacksmiths, and other such laborers and artificers. 

Only ninetcen civilians- vcterina rians and clerks- remaincd in the division. For 

the first timc , so urces for military poli cc and train guards werc specified. 

Traditionally, commanders gave regiments or battalions that had su ffered severely 

in battle the honor of serving as provost guards, espec ially those that had con~ 

ducted themselves with distinction.41 

In the infantry regiment, besides the provisional machine gun company o~ 

vided for in 1910, provisional headquarters and supply companies were to ro ~ 

vide mounted orderlies and regimenta l wagon drivers. The arrangement eliminated the need to detail men from rine companies, a practice that had plagued unit 

commanders since the Revolutionary War. These and other changes raised the 

division's strength to 22,646 officers and enlisted men and 19 civi lians.42 

The place of possible employment continued to inn uence the division's basic 

structure. Be fore the tables of organization were prepa re(~ the stall debated whether 

a division should have two or three infantry brigades, noting that European armies 

continued to lise a two-division corps organization. Maj. Na thaniel F. McClu rc, 

appo inted as an instructor in mi li tary art at the Army Se rvice Schools, Fort 

Leavenworth, in 19 13, attributed the European organization to economy in the usc 

of personne l and to the proper use of sophisticated road networks. Hc concluded, 

however, that what the Europeuns reu lly wanted was u corps built upon multiples of 

three- regiments, brigades, and divisions. When preparing the Stimson Plan, the 

officers determined that a division with hVO infantry brigades limited the commander's ability to subdivide his forces for frontal and nank attacks while at the same 

time attempting to mainta in a reserve. Along with ease of command, deployment on 

a road influenced the decision. Because a division containing two infantry brigades 

would make less economical use of road space than one of three brigades, the 

three-brigade division remained Ihe Army's basis for combi ning arms. In march 

formation, it measured about fifteen miles.43 

The revision of the cava lry division in many ways paralle led that of the 

infan try division. Military person nel man ned ammunition and supply trains, and 

troopers from the cavalry regiments served as mi litary police and traill guards. 

Each cava lry regiment was authorized provisional headquarters and machine gun 

troops similar to those in the infantry regiment. The most signifi ca nt change was 

in the division's three cava lry brigades, wit h each being reduced from three to 
34 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

two regiments since three cavalry regiments in a brigade required 100 much road 

space. The div ision's strength stood at 10, 161 , approx imately 4,000 fewe r men 

tha n the 1910 unit.44 

To complement the 1914 tables of organization, Maj. James A. Logan revised 

the 19 10 Field Service Regulatiolls. The new edition emphasized the division as 

th e basic orga ni zation for conducti ng offensive operations in a mobile army. 

Logan defined the division as "A self-contai ned unit made up of a ll necessary 

arms and services, and complete in itself with every requirement for independent 

action incident to its operations."45 His definition became the customary description of a division. 

Operations on the Mexican Bordel; 1913- 1917 

The Mexican border rema ined a troubl ed area, Foll owing th e mobilization 

of 1911, the Army patrolled the frontier with sma ll units, but when insurrectionists overth rew the Mexica n government in 1913, President Tan decided on a 

show of force similar to the earlier concentration of ('roops. On 21 February he 

ordered Maj. Gen. Wi lliam 1-1 . Carter, commander of the Centra l Department, to 

assemble the most fully manned of the Army's divisions, the 2d, on the Gulf 

coast of Texas. Un like its mob ilization of the Maneuver Division in 1911 , the 

War Department L1 sed a mere five-line telegram to deploy the unit. Carter, who 

arri ved with his staff in Texas within th ree days, establ ished the division headqu arters and its 4th and 6th Brigades at Texas City and the 5th Brigad e at 

Galveston. The division lacked, however, somc ri e ld artillcry, medica l, signal, 

and engineer elements and all its Irains.46 

Tension remained high between the United Stales and Mexico in 1914, and in 

response President Woodrow Wilson adjusted the deployment of military units to 

protect America n interests. United States naval forccs occupied Vera Cruz, 

Mexico, and soldi ers soo n re lieved the sailors ashorc. On 30 April the 5th 

Brigade, 2d Division, augmented with cavalry, fie ld artillery, engineer, signal, 

bakery, and aviation units, and almost the entire divisional staff took up positions 

in the city. To placate uneasy United States citizens along the border, the 2£1 and 

8th Brigades, elemen ts of the 1st and 3d Divisions, and some small er units moved 

to the southern frontier. In November the crisis at Vera Cruz ended and the 5th 

Brigade returned to Ga lveston, but activity resumed the following month whcn 

thc 6th Brigade, 2d Division, deployed to Naco, Arizona. For the next few mont hs 

no major changes took placc in the disposition of forces. Then, in August 1915, a 

hurricane hit Texas City and Galveston, killing thirteen enlisted men and causing 

considerable damage to the 2d Division's property. Officials in Washington 

decided that the division was no longer needed there and ordered its units moved 

to other posts in thc Southcrn De partment. The divisional headquarters was 

demobilized on 18 October 1915.41 

Before the Vera Cruz ex pedi tio n, Gene ral Ca rt er had eval uat ed the 2<1 
GENESIS OF PERMANENT DIVISIONS 35 

27,h Infallll)" 2d Dil'isiOIl, encampment. Texas 01),. Texas 

Division. Although he found no glaring deficiencies in the unit, he recommended 

the maintenance of permanent headquarte rs detachments for di visio ns and 

brigades in peacetime to ease mobilization and to prevent the breakup of regimenta l organizations fo r division details. Carter also recommended that al l communications equipment be centralized in Ihe signal un it because the training of 

men assigned to combat arms units to operate signal gear seemed wasleful.48 

On 9 March 1916, trouble flared again on the southern border when Mexican 

bandits raided Columbus, New Mexico, killing and wounding severa l soldiers and 

civilians. The following day the Sout hern Department commander, Maj. Gen. 

Frederick Fu nston, ordered Brig. Gen. John 1. Pershing, commander of the 8th 

Brigade, to apprehend the perpetrators. For his mission Pershing organized a provisional division and designated it as the Punitive Expedition, United States Army.49 

This division differed considerabl y from the organizations outlined in the 

Field Service Regulations. It consisted of two provisional cavalry brigades (two 

cava lry regimen ts and a field artillery battery each) and one infantry brigade (two 

regiments and two engi neer companies), with medical, signal, transportation, and 

air units as divisional troops. The design of the division followed the organizational axiom that it adapt 10 the terrain and roads where the enemy was located. 

In hostile and barren northern Mexico, Pershing plan ned to pursue the bandits 

wit h cavalry and to protect his eomlllunication lines with infantry.50 
36 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

I 

4,11 SOlllli Dakota/n/ allll), on 'he Mexica/l borde/', /91 6 

Vi olence intensified along the border during the spring of 1916, causing a 

gene ra l mob ili zati on. After a ra id in May at Gl en Springs, Texa s, Preside nt 

Wilson called the Nationa l Guard of Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas into fed ~ 

al service. Following another raid on 16 Junc, he federalized all Guard units 

assigned to tactical divisions designated in the Stimson Plan,51 

This final call exposed flaws in the nation's war plans. In some stales mobi· 

lization locations were inaccessible, quartermaster supplies were insuffic ient, and 

even required forms were in short supply. Guard un its were under strength and 

poorly trai ned. Some men failed to honor their enl istments, whil e others who 

were physically unfit entered the service. Besides these and other defic iencies, 

the need to have troops on the border meant thaI only I\vo divisions, the 6th from 

New York and the 7th from Pennsylvania, mobili zed in accorda nce with the 

Stimson Plan. On 4 August th e War Department directed General Funston to 

organize ten div isions and six brigades provisiona lly from the remai ning Guard 

units. But not all of these organi zations could be formed because of the rapid 

shifting of units to and from the border. Although the mobili zation pointed out 

many weak nesses in the nation's preparation for war, it provided an inva luabl e 

training opportunity for the Guard.52 

The Puniti ve Expedition stayed in Mexico until February 191 7. When hostil e 

acts had abated along the border during the fall of 19 16, the War Department had 

begun to demobilize the Guard. By the end of March most units had returned to 

state control. Pershin g, the new SOllthern Departme nt commander foll owing 
GENESIS OF PERMANENT OIVISIONS 37 

Funston's sudden death from a heart attack in February 1917, realigned the 

Regular Army forces. He organized provisiona lly a cavalry brigade and three 

infantry divisions, bUllhcy existed for less than three months. With the nation's 

en try into World War I and the need for troops in Europe, Pershing's divisions 

were disbanded. Smaller units, however, continued border surve illance.53 

Authorization a/Permanent Divisions 

While the Army concentrated most of its regulars in the United States on the 

Mexican border in 19 15, the ongoing war in Europe prompted Secretary of War 

Lindley M. Garrison to reexamine national defense policies. Among other matlers, he asked the General Staff to investigate the organizations and strength figures needed by the Regular Army and Nati onal Guard, the rese rve forces 

rcquired, and the relationship of the regulars and gua rdsmen to a volunteer force. 

Garrison held the opinion that the federa l government's lack of control over the 

National Guard was a fundamental defect.54 

Members of the General Staff worked for six months to answer Garrison, and 

the War Department published their findings as the Statement of Proper MiJilal)1 

Policy in 1915. It outl ined a 281 ,OOO-man Regular Anny and a 500,000-man federal reserve. An additional 500,000 reserve force was 10 buttress the reserves. 

Under the new policy the National Guard was downgraded 10 a volunteer contingent force that would be used only during war.55 

Proposed legislation based on the policy statement, which was dubbed the 

"Continental Army" plan, qui ckly ra n into congressiona l opponents who were 

unwilling to abandon the National Guard. But the debate led eventually to the 

National Defense Act of 1916. The new act provided that the "Army of the Un ited 

States" wou ld consist of the Regular Army, the Vo lunteer Army, the Officers' 

Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, the National Guard in the service of 

the Un ited States, and such other land fo rces as were or might be authori zed by 

Congress. The president was to determine both the number and type of National 

Guard units thaI each state would mai nta in. Both the Regu lar Army and the 

National Guard were to be organized, insofar as practi cable, into permanent 

brigades and divisions. Command ec helons above divisions reverted to army 

corps and armi es, the trad itional command system; no mention was made of 

independent Field armies directly con trolling divisions. Undoubted ly the war in 

Europe, which involved large armies, caused the staff to revert to that system. To 

rcsolvc the long-standing question of whcther Guard units could be used outside 

the United Statcs, the law empowered the president to draft units into federal servicc under cerl<lin conditions. Men in drafted units woul d be discharged from 

state service and become fede ral troops subjcct to employment wherevcr needed. 

Congrcss continucd to dictate regimental organi;wtions.56 

The War Dcpartment published new tables of organization for infa ntry <Ind 

cavalry divisions in MOlY 19 17. The structure of the infantry division remained 
38 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

simi lar to that mandated in 1914. Internal changes dea lt with firepower, another 

consequence of observing the pattern of the European war. Infantry regiments 

gai ned additional riflemen , and th e provisiona l headquarters, supply, a nd 

machine gun companies were made permanent. The rield artillery brigade also 

gained considerable firepower, with one regiment of3.8-inch howitzers and two 

regiments of 3-inch guns replacing the two regimen ts authorized in 19 14. A 

two-batta lion engineer reg ime nt repla ced the batta lion, the signa l battalion 

grew in size, and an aero squadron eq uipped wit h twelve aircra ft joined the 

division for recon naissance a nd obse rvation. Enlarged ammunition, supply, 

engineer. and sa nitary trains supported the arms, and the tables provided for the 

trains to be either motorized or horse-drawn. The tables a lso ca ll ed for a headquarters troop for the division and headquarters detachments fo r infan try and 

artillery brigades. These units were to furnish mess, transport, and admi nistrative support fo r the division to ope rate on a more complex battle fi e ld. The 

redesigned div ision for war numbered 28,256 olTicers and enlisted men when 

the trai ns were au thori zed wagons or 28,334 when they were authori zed motorized equipment (Chart /).57 

The staff, in rationali zing the division, divided the road space it would usc 

between combat and support e lement's. Combat elements used fourteen miles. 

wh ile the support elements, depending on whether the trains were motorized or 

horse-drawn. used fi ve to six miles. Although it required about twenty miles in 

march format ion, a 25 percent increase in road space over the 19 14 organization. 

the division was still thought to be able to move 10 battle on a single road. 58 

The new tables dramatically changed the structure of the cavalry division 

for war. CflVa lry brigades reverted to three regiments each. and the nine cavalry 

regimen ts acquired permanent headquarters, supply. and machine gun troops. 

As in the infan try division, the cava lry di vision fielded an aero squadron. The 

tables also introduced a divisional engineer train and enlarged the ammunition, 

supply, and sa nitary trains. The division headq uarters and headquarters troop 

and brigade headquarters and headquarters detachments rounded out the unit. 

Given these c hanges, the size of the division rose from 10, 16 1 to 18, 164 when 

the trains were eq uipped with wagons and 18, 176 when they were equipped 

with motorized vehic les (Chart 2), and it occupied approximately nine teen 

miles of road space on the mareh.59 

To achieve the mobilization force that the Statement of Proper Mifit(UJ' Policy 

proposed- six cava lry brigades, two cavalry divisions, and twenty infantry divisions- the Army needed more troops. In 1916 Congress increased the number of 

Regular Army regiments to 118 (7 engineer, 21 field artillery, 25 cavalry, and 65 

infantry) and increased the size of the National Guard, 800 men for each senator 

and representative, to be raised over the next five years. Several developmen ts, 

however, interfered with implementation of the Regular Army portion of the act, 

especia lly activities along the Mexican border, a reduction in the General Staff that 

prevented appropriate planning. and the nation's plunge into the European war.60 
HQ, 

/51 

ENGR REGT 

",. 

CHART I-Infantry Division, 1917 

FIELD sm BN 

259 __ -'I " 'II L-....:.... 

I 

H~S II I~~~~E~AT ffi 

fA BTRY 

195 ea 

1 Division trains equipped with wagons 

1 Division trains equipped with motorized vehicles 

1 Chart 2. Cavalry Division, 1917, depicts thl structure of the Cavalry Regimen

• Contains two:r gun regimenu and one 3.8" howiuer regiment 
40 

Divisioll 

5th 

6th 

71h 

8th 

9th 

10th 

11 th 

121h 

13th 

14th 

15th 

161h 

17th 

18th 

191h 

20th 

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

TABLE 2 

National Gua rd Infantry Divisions, 191 7 

Dis/ricl 

Maine, New Hampshire. Massachusetts. Connecticut, 

Vermont, and Rhode Island 

New York 

Pennsylvania 

New Jersey, Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, 

and Virgi nia 

North Carolina, Soulh Carolina, and Tennessee 

Alabama, Georgia, and Florida 

Michigan and Wisconsin 

Illinois 

Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, and 

SOUlh Dakota 

Kansas and Missouri 

Oklahoma and Texas 

Ohio and West Virgi nia 

Indiana and Kentucky 

Arkansas. Lo uisiana, and Mississippi 

Arizona , California. Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico. 

and Utah 

Idllllo, Montnna, Oregon, Washi ngton. lmd Wyoming 

Meanwhile the Militia Bureau, formerly the Division of Militia Affa irs, 

began work on new plans 10 organize Guard divisions. It scrapped the voluntary 

Stimson Plan and directed the organization of sixteen infantry and two cavalry 

divisions. Brig. Gen. Wi lliam A. Mann, Chief of the Militia Bureau, sent the 

states advance copies of the new tables in January 1917 to acqua in t them with the 

types of units they needed to maintain. Then on 5 May he fOlwa rded the plan for 

organizing the div isions (n,ble 2), which gave the infantry divisions priority over 

the cava lry divisions. Because the Regular Army could more expeditiously orga~ 

nize ncw units for the existing emergcncy, Mann did nOI ask the Slates to ra ise 

any un its at thattimc.61 

Between the War wit h Spain and the United States' intcrvention in World War 

I, thc Army's principa l mission was to defend the national territory and its insular 

possessions. Duri ng Ihis pcriod the Army tested and adoptcd the infantry division 

as its basic combined arms unit. The underlying planning <Issumption was that the 

infantry div ision wou ld fight in the United States. This meant, in tUl'll, Ihal one of 

the principal determi nan ts ofa division's size was oad~marchi g speed. Thc v~ 
CHART 2-Cava1ry Division, 1917 

CAVALRY DIVISION 

18,164 1' /8,176 2 

I 

I I 

HQs CAY BOE FIELD SIG BN ENGR BN FA REGT. HORSE 

150 4,756 ea 259 387 1.374 

HQs CAY REGT HHB SUPPLYBTRY 

19 1,579 ea 114 44 

FABN ME

HHT MG TRP MED & CHAP 392ea 

88 95 40 

CAY SQON SUPPlYTRP HQs FA BTRY 

434 ,a 54 2 195ea 

HQs CAVTRP 

2 108ea 1 Division trains equipped with wagons 

2 Division trains equipped with motorized vehicles 
42 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

airy division, although not neglected, remained morc or less a theoretical unit. As 

the Army mobilized for the Mexican border crisis and look note of trends in foreign armies duri ng th e initial campaigns of World War 1, ils leaders became 

inc reasingly convinced of the need to c reate pe rmanen t ta cti cal divisions. 

Congress approved them in 1916, but the nation entered World War I before these 

plans had been perfected. 

Events during the next two years, however, profoundly affected divisiona l 

organizations, the infantry division in particular. For the fi rst lime in the nation'S 

experi ence, the United Stales Army mobili zed a huge expeditionary force to fight 

overseas in Western Europe, a mission for which it was thoroughly unprepared. 

The day of the old constabulary army was over. Faced wit h th reats to national 

security of hitherto unimagined scope emanating from the Old World, the nation 

had to revolutioni ze its army to wage war agai nst a formidable continen tal opponent. The necessity for an e ffective combi ned arms organizat ion wou ld force 

extraordi nary changes in its entire structure. 
GENESIS OF PERMANENT OIVISIONS 

Notes 

I Rpl oflhc Sec. o f War, ARIVD. 1899. p. 49. 

2 Ibid. 

3 WD GO 120, 1903. 

43 

4 Llr, Capt Joseph . T. Dickman 10 Brig Gell J. Franklin Bell, 16 Scp 1904, no subject. and lIr, 

Brig Gell J. Franklin Oclilo Capi J. T. Dickman, J I Nov 04, no subject, AGO file 1168, RG 393, 

NARA: Field Service Regulatiolls. Vlli/ed Slale.I' Anl/)'. 1905, sec table of contents. 

5 Field Sen'ice Regula/iam .. 1905 pp. 11- 13: Arthur Wagner, Orglilliz(J/ioll (llId Tac/ics, 7th 

cd. (Kansas City: Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Co., 1906), I'p . 11 - 12; Paul Bronsarl Van 

Schcl1 cndorff, The Dllfie.f of the Gel/eral SUI]!. 4th cd. (London: Ilarrisoll and Sons, 1905), pp. 

223- 26,235-38; William Oalck, T(lkli/( (f(Ielies), vol. ), Kriegsglicllcnmg, NachrichlClI, lie/ehle. 

Mtll"schdicllst (Mili/wy Orglwiza/iQII, CommllllicaliollS, Orders, (tlltl Marches). 4th cd. (Berlin: R. 

Eiscnschmidl, 1903- 07), pp. 16-17,28- 33. 

6 FieM Service Regllllliiolls. 1905, p. 44: Memo Rpl. War Plans Division to the C of S, 5 May 

1905, sub: A Proper Proportion of field artillery for the mobile artilY of the U.S. AGO file, Journal, 

Reports and Related Pupcr o flheThird Division, 1903- 1910, ItG 165, NAI~.A. 

7 N. F. McClure. "The Infantry Division and Its Composition," JVII/"Iwl of/lie Mili/my SC/"I'ice 

Im'li/lllioll 50 (Jan- Feb 191 2): 5- 9. 

8 Field Service Regll/miolls 1905. p. 12.87-88. Infantry and cavalry regiments were Ihe 

largest pcnlllment units in the peacetime Anny. In 1901 Congress abolished artillery regiments 

(eoost lind field). Field ar1il1ery regiments were reestablished in 1907. 

~ Field Service Regulations, 1905, pp. 25- 26. 

10 Ibid., p. 12. 

11 Ibid. 

12 WD Cirs 28, 50, and 61. 1905. In 1903 Congress revised the militia systenl, dividing the 

militia into Organized Mililia and ReSC:lVe Militia classes. The Reserve Militia consisted of an 

unorganized manpower pool, while the Organized Militia , commonly known ;IS Ihe National 

GU:lrd, included those units maintained by Ihe states, territories. :lnd Dislriet of Columbia. When 

discussing the National Guard. thc District of Columbia is treated as II state unless Olhcrwisc nOlcd. 

13 WD GO 7, 1903. 

14 Timothy K. Nenninger, 71w Lel/ve//wonll Scllools WId tile Old Arlll)' (Westport. Conn: 

Grcenwood Press, 1978). p. 22- 23; Rpt of the Sec. of War, IIRWD. UJ99. pp. 48-49, ARWD. 1902, 

pp. 50- 52; Jamieson, Crossillg /ilc Oemll)' Groll/Ill, pp. 60-62. Camp Root, Kans.1s, tod:lY is Camp 

Whiteside, a subpost of Fort Riley. 

15 ARWD. 1904. p. 30, ARWO. 1906, p. 47. ARWD. 1908, p. 37. ARWD, 1909, pp. 28- 32: Rill 

oflhe Chief of Staff. ARWD. 1904. p. 223. 

16 Rpt of the Chief of Staff, ARIIID. 1906. pp. 552- 53; L1r. Brig Gen 1. Franklin l3elllo Gen 

Leonard Wood, 18 Apr 12, Wood Papers, Library or Congress (hercnficf cited as Le). 

17 Rpt of the Sec. of War, ARWIJ, 19~, Pll. 28- 32; "The Firsl Field AmlY, the Initial SICP in 

the Correlation of Ihe Regular Amly with Ihe National Guard." me N(ltiolllll Guard Mtlg(lzi//e 6 

(Apr 1910): 352- 54; WD GO 35.1910. 

IS McClure, "The Infantry Division:' pp. 6-9; Fieltl Sen'icc Reglilmiolls, 1910, p. 13. 

19 FieM Scrvice Regll/miol/s. 1910, p. 13. 

20 Ar",y (llId Nul')' JOIIl"llol 46 (22 May 09): 1063; Llr, CG, I'hilippine Dept, to AmlY C or s, 

27 Jan 19 14, sub: Revision of Field Service Regulations. Wood I>"pers, LC; Field Sen'ice 

Regllia/iolls. /9/0. pp. 12- 13. 15,42-45; Edgar Raines. "MG J. Fmnklin Bell and Military Reform; 

The Chief of Staff Years, 1906- 19 10" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Wisconsin. 1976). p. 470; 

Mahon and )),lIIysh, IlIfimtl)1 Port I, pp. 38-40. 

21 Fielll Se/1'ice Reglllatiolls, 1910. p. 15- 16. 

22 Ibid., p. 13.34-35: Memo for SI.'crelary, Second Section, Amly Staff, I Feb 19 10. sub: 

Repor1 ofCommiucc of Second Seclion. General Staff. on proposcd scheme for organizing into one 
44 MANEUVER AND FIREPDWER 

unit the mobile troops orlhe regular nnny and organized mi1ili" now stationed in New York and 

New England, AGO Rpl of Second Section, General Staff 11ml- 30 Apr 1910, RO 165, NARA 

21 Field Se"l'ice ReglllflliOlu', 1910, pp. 36-37. 

24 WI) GO 35,1910. 

25 Rpt orthe Chic f ofSlafT, ARWD. 1910. p. 128. 

26 Memo, Chief, Div. of Militia Affairs, [0 Cors, sub: Revocation of Gcncrnl Orders No. 35, 

WD 1910,8 Jul II , AGO file 6\06-3, RG 168. NARA; RepQl'lol/ Mobilizmioll o/fhe Orgulli;::cd 

IHililia llIlll Nli/iolla/ G,ll/rtf of tile VI/iI/HI SImes (Washington: D.C.: GovemmCllt Printing arnec, 

1916), p. 48; WO OO 6,1914. 

27 Rpl of the Sec. of War, Rpi of TAG, ItPI of 111 QMG, ARWD. 1911 , pp. 12- 16. 238-41. 

337; Memo for record, 7 Mar II , no subject, Wood Papers. Le. 28 Rpt orlhe Chief of Staff and Rpt o f TAG, IIRIVD. 1911, pp. 156-57, 238- 42. Russell F. 

Weiglcy, HislOlY o/Ille UI/i/{!(I S/(lIe.f Army (New York: Macmi llan. 1%7). p. 334. TIrc quote is 

from Itr. Gen Wood to Col James G. Harbord, 26 Apr 19 11, Wood Papers, LC. 

29 Clarence C. Clendenen, Blood UII Ihe Border: The U'liled States 111'111)' (lmlllle Mexicml 

Irregulars (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 148-49; WeD, "Statement for release in tnoming 

papers on Monday, Fcbrmtry 3," Wood Papcrs, Le. 

30 Rpi oflhe Inspector Gencml, ANIVD. 1911, Pl'. 267- 69. 

31 Rpt of the Chief Signal Officer, ARIVD. 191 I. pp. 721, 739. 

32 LIT, William lIoward Tanto Gen Leonard Wood. 12 Mar 19 12, no subject, Wood Papers. 

LC: Rpt of TAG. ARIVD. 1911, p. 242. 

33 Llr, John M. I)almer to J. F. Morrison, 22 Jan 12. John McA. Palmer Papers, LC; L 13. 

I·lolley. Jr., Gel/eml Jolrn M. Palmer. Citizen Soldier:;. (lJI(I the Army 0/ (I Dcmocl'(lcy (Westpon, 

Conn: Greenwood I'rcss, 1983), pp. 202- 05. 

34 Rpl on the Organization ofL,md Forces of the United Stmes. Appendix A, ARII'D. 1912, p. 

125. 

35 Rpi Sec. of War, ARII'D. 1912, pp. 14- 16; Llr, AG, Mass. to Gen Wood, 3 Oct 1912, Wood 

Papers. LC (other letters from slate adjutants general are in the Wood Papers; Memo for CotS, dran 

of Llr to governors on the reorganization oflhe National Guard, 6 Nov 12. War College Division, 

Anlly SlatT (hereafler cited as WCD). 7409-1. RG 168, NARA. 

J6 WD GO 9, 19 13; weD, "Statement for release in moming papers on Monday, Fcbnmry 3," 

I Feb 13, Wood Papers, LC. 

J1 "Generol Orders No.9," InfilllIIJ' .Jol/l'II(l19 (Mar- Apr 1913): 706-08. 

38 George Van Hom Moseley, "One Soldicr's lounlcy," Ms history, 3 vols., 1:103, Moseley 

I'apcrs, LC; Memo 52103, C. Division of Militia Aff.1irs, to C, WCD. sub: Organized Mil itary 

Divisional Organi7 .. 1tion. 12 Jan 15, AGO fi le 7409- 25. RG 168. NARA: WD Cir 8.1913, and 19, 

1914; ·'The Division I'lan." Natiollal Gllurd M(lgozillc 10 (Jan 1913): 14. 

39 Rpt o f the Sc<:. of War and Rpt of the C of S. ARWD. 19/3, Pl'. 3 1. 174; GO 7, Slate of 

New York. 1908, printcd in Rpt of tire Adjutant Gel/eml. Stale of Nell' York. 1908. p. 270; GO l. 

I)ctlnsylvania National Gua rd. 1879, printcd in Rpl o/Ihe Adjll/alll Gellem/. Pellllsyll,(lIIia. 1879, p. 

83. 

40 Mcmo, WCD for C ofS, 21 Fcb 19 14, sub: Tables o/Org(lll;z(l/ioll. US Army. 1914, AGO 

file 837 1, RG 165, NARA; Tables o f Organization: U.S. Army. t9 14 (Was hington: D.C.: 

Govemment I'rinting Office. 1914), p. 19 (hereafter ciled as TO. 1914). 

41 TO. 1914. p. 19; lames A. Huston, Sillew:,' of W(//,: Army Logislics (WaShington. D.C.: 

Govemmcnt Printing Office, 1966). p. 295; Wagner. Org(/llizmioll mId Tactics. pp. 19- 20. 

42 TO. 1914, PI'. 12- 13. 19_ 

43 McClure, "The Infantry Division," p. 10: Repo/"l 011 Ihe O'gtmiztllioll of Lwull:'orces ill 

ANII'D. 1912. pp. 103- 04. 

441'0. 1914.l'p. 14. 23; Report on Ihe O,gmli:(l/iol/ Q/Lmul Fo/'ces. Pl'. 104-05. 

45 Field Sen'ice Rt'glll(l/iolls 1914. 1'. 10. 

46 Rpl of the Sec. of War. ARWD. 1912. pp. 13- 14; Rpt o f the Sec. of War and Rpt of the 

Second Division. ARWD. 1913, pp. 9- 10. 113; Thomas 11 Burden, "Mobilizations of 1911 and 
GENESIS OF PERMANENT OIVISIONS 45 

1913," iHililmY Rel'iew 53 (Jul 1974): 72. 

47 Frederic L. Iluidckopcr, Mifiwl')' Unp,'cpal"edllcss oflhe Unilc,/ Simes (New York: 

Macmi llan, 1915). ])p. 446-48: Rpl orlhe C ors, 1914, and R])t of TAG, ARWD. 19/4, pp. 135-

36, 179: RpI orthe C ors and RpI of TAG, ARWD, 1915. ])p. 151 - 52.21 1- 12: Clendenen, BIOOlI 

oilihe Bo,.del', p. 162; Burdell. "Mobilizations of 1911 and 1913," p. 72: RPI of TAG, ARII'D. 

1916. p. 278. 

8 Rpl of the Second O;\';S;OIl, ARIVD, 191 J, pp. 118- 19. 

49 Rpl of the Chief of SlafT, ANII'D, 19/6, pp. 186-89: John J. Pershing, Report of Operations 

of the Punitive Expedition to 30 June 1916. pp. 4-5, AGO file 2480591 ItO 120. NARA: John A. 

]'orter, "The Punitive EX1}Cditioll," Quarlcnn:lstcr Review 12 (Jan- Feb (933): 18- 30. 

50 Frederick FUllston. Annual Report for FY 1916. Southern Department. p. 26. AGO file 

243231, RG 120. NARA: Robert T. Thomas and Inez V. Allen, "The Mexican Punitive Expedition 

under Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing," Ms in the Organi7.ational History Branch, Centcr of Military 

m story, hereaftereitcd as DAMH-USO. p. 11- 2; POrler. "The I'unitive Expedition," pp. 22- 23. 

SI RptofthcChiefofStaff,ARWD. 19/6. PI'. 186-89. 

52 Repor/ 011 Mobifizm;oll of lite Orgal/;Zel/ Militia am/t"e Nm;ol/(I/ Guard of t"e Ullitell 

St(l/es. 1916, PI). 10, 50- 5 1; "Mobilization in Spite of War ])cpartrnel1t," Na/iorw/ Gmml 

Magazine, 13 (Aug 191 6): 153+; Ltr, Georgc Van Horn Moseley to Leonard Wood, 3 Sep 1916. no 

subject. Wood Papers. LC; John F. O'Ryan, n,e StOl)' of Ihe 27th Oil'isioll, 2 vols. (New York: 

Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co .. 1921). 1:120- 25; Pelllls)'iI'llllia ill lite Worlll WlII': All 

IIIl1s/nll'''/ His/OIJ' ofllle Twel/f)I-Eigllllt Dir'is;oll. 2 vols. (Pillsburgh: States Publications Society. 

1921),pp.I: 120- 25. 

Sl Rpt ofTAG,ARWO. 1917, p. 196-97; GO 8 and 25, Southern Dcparlment, 1917. copics in 

Division General files, DAM H-HSO; Order of lillllie of tlte Ulli/ed Silites LUlld Forces in lire 

World JV(I/' (191 7- 19). 20l/e ofl/Ie IlIIeriOl" (Washington. D.C.: Govenullent Printing Office. 1949), 

pp.602- 05. 

S4 John I' . Finncgan, Agllillst the S,H!Cter of (I DmgOlI (Westport. COllllecticut: Greenwood 

Press, 1974), pp. 45-46; Rpt of Sec. o f War. Appendix C, Statemcnt of Proper Military Pol icy, 

ARWD. 191 5, pp. 11 3. 126- 31. 

SS Statemcnt of Propcr Mi litary Pot icy, pp. 126-3 1; Finnegan. Against the Specte r or a 

Dnagon, pp. 47-48. 

S6 Weigley, History of the United States Anny, 344-48; WD Bul l 16. 1916: Finnegan, Agaillst 

the Specter ofa Omgoll.l'. 44- 52; "Mobilization in Spite of War ])el)urtment," 153+. 

S7 Table ofOrgtllliZlllioll US Arm)'. 1917 (Washington. D.C.: Governmcnt Printing Omce, 

19 17), PI'. 39-40, (hereafter cited as TO 1917). 

S8 Ibid. 

s') Ibid., Pl'. 57- 58. 

60 SWtelllelll of Proper Militlll)' Policy, 1>1). 124-26; WD Bull 16. 1916; WD GO 22 and 50, 

19[6. 

6t RpI of the Chicfofthe Militia Bureau, ARWD. 1917, pp. 850-52; Rpt of the Chieroft he 

Militia Bureau. ANII'D, 1918, p. 1102: Llf, Chicf of the Mi litia Bureau. to TAGs o f all States. 

Territory of Hawaii, District of Columbia. and inspector-instructors and officcrs in chllrgc of militia 

affairs, department headquarters. 5 May 1917. sub: Organization and entry in Fedcml service of 

Nation;11 Guard, (MB) file 325.4. RG 168. NA RA. 

CHAPTER 3 

The Test- World War I 

/Jolh [French lIlIll British] commissiOlls were lll/xious for till AmericlIlI force. 110 lIlt/fIcr how .fllwlf . ... I opposed this all the grollnd 111lI1 the small force II'OllftJ beliflle 0111" 

efforl; lI'as lI"digllijiel/ (lIll/Il'OIlItl give II wrollg illlpre:i~;iol/ of OIW il/lel/liolls. I held 0111 

for at least (I divisioll 10 show 'he quality of 01/1' troops alld COIIIIII(/lU/ respect for ollrjlag. 

M aj . Gen. Hugh L. Scott i 

World War I, an unprecedented conflict, forced fundamenta l changes in the 

organization of United States Army field fo rces. The infantry division remained 

the Army's primary combined arms uni t, but the pri nciples governing its organiZ<1tion took a new direction because of French and British experiences in trench 

warfa re. Column length or road space no lo nger controllcd the size and composition of the infantry division; instead, fire power, supply, and command and control 

became paramount. The cavalry division received scant attention as the European 

bau le field offered few opportuni ties for its use. 

First Revisions 

Between 6 April 19 17, when the nation declared war, and 12 June, when the 

first troops left the Unitcd Statcs for France, the War College Division of the Army 

General Staff revised the structure of the infantry division extensively. British and 

French otriccrs spurred the changes when they visited Washington, D.C., to discuss 

the nation's participation in the war. They believed the American division lacked 

firepower and presented command and control problems because of its many small 

uni ts. But they also had their own politica l-military agenda. Believi ng that time precluded organizing and traini ng U.S. uni ts, they wa nted the nation's immediate 

involvement in the war to be through a troop replacement program for their drained 

formations, a scheme that became known as "amalgamation."2 

Chief of StafT Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott opposed America ns' serving in All ied 

units, bclieving that the U.S. division could be reorganized to overcome any 

French and British objections. Sueh a unit would prove the q uality of the 

American soldier and ensure that the Allies did not underestimate the nation's war 

efforts. Scott directed the War College Division to study a di visiona l structure 

comprisi ng two infantry brigades, each having two large infan try regimen t's, as a 

means of red ucing the span of control. It was also to incl ude light and heavy 
48 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

arti llery, signal and engineer troops, 

and serv ice un its. A small division, 

some 13,000 infantrymen, would 

allow g rea ter mobilit y and e nhance 

the ability to exchange units in the 

line and maintain battle momentum. 

The French and the British had found 

thaI for eac h unit 011 lin e- army 

corps, di vision, brigade, regi me nt, 

battal ion, or company- they needed 

a comparable unit prepared to relieve 

it without mixing organizations from 

variOliS commands. The French had 

tried rcl icfby army corps but had settled on relief by small di visions. 

SCOIl felt lhal his proposa l wo uld 

case the diffic ulty o f exchanging 

units on the battlefi eld ) 

By 10 May 19 17, Majs. John 

McAuley Pa lmer, Dan T. Moore, and 

Brian t Wells of th e Wa r College 

Division outl ined a division of 17,700 

men, wh ich included about 11 ,000 

infantryme n in accordance with 

Scott 's idea. In part it resembled the 

French square division. I)lanners elimGeneral SeOI/ inaled I infantry brigade and cut the 

number of infantry regiments from 9 

to 4, thereby reducing the number of infantry batta lions from 27 to 12. But regimental firepower increased, with the rifle company swelling from 153 officcrs and 

cnlisted men to 204, and the number of regimental machine guns rising dramatically from 4 to 36. To accommodate the additional machine guns, Palmer, Moore, and 

Wells outlined a new infantry regimental structurc that consisted of headquarters 

and supply companies and three battalions. Each batta lion had onc maehinc gun 

company and three rifle companies. Given the reduction in the number of infantry 

units, the proportion of artillery fire support per infantry regiment increased without altering the number of artillery regiments or pieces. The new division still fielded forty-eight 3-inch guns, now twelve pie(;es per infantry regiment. The division 

was also authorized a regiment of twenty-four 6-inch howitzers for general support, 

and twelve trench mortars of unspecified ca liber completed the division's general 

fire support weapons.4 

Cavalry suffered the largest c ut, from a regiment to an clement with the 

division headquarters, a change in line wit h British and French recommenda-
THE TEST- WORLD WAR J 

lions. The Allies argued that trenc h 

warfare, domin ated by ma c h ine 

gun s and artill ery weapons, denied 

cava lry the traditional missions of 

reconna issance, pursuit, and shock 

action. Moun ted troops, possibl y 

assigned to the div ision's headqua rters company, 111i ght serve as messengers withill Ihe di vision but little 

more. The A llies further advised 

th at the Army should not co nsider 

send ing a large cava lry fo rce to 

France. Ho rses a nd fodder would 

occu py prec iolls shipping space, and 

Ihe French and British had an abundance of cavalry. Engi neer, sign al, 

and medica l battalions and an a ir 

squadron rounded out the division.5 

To co ndu ct o pe ra t ions, the 

French advocated a functional div i· 

sional staff, Ih<lt would in c lude a 

49 

General Bliss 

chie f of sta ff and a chie f of artillery as we ll as intelligence, operations, and supply offi cers, along with French interpreters. Alt hough small, such a body would 

have sufficient resources to allow the division to function as a tactica l unit while 

a sma ll headquarters troop would furnish work details. Adj utants alone were to 

comprise the staff of the infantry and artillery brigades, which had no headquarters troop fo r work deta ils. The nex t higher headqumters, the army corps, would 

provide plan ning and administration for active opcrations.6 

Based on the report of 10 May. War College Division officers prepared tables 

of organization that authorized 19.000 officers and enlisted men for the division 

(Chari 3), an incrcase of about 1,300. No basic structural changes took place; 

self-su ffi ciency justified the additional men. On 24 May M<lj. Gen. T<lsker H. 

Bl iss, the Acting Chief of Staff,7 approved the t<lbles, but only fo r the initia l ex peditionary rorce. He hoped, <IS did the staff, that Congress wou ld <luthori ze a larger 

infmllry regiment, providing it with more firepower. Bliss <llso recognized that the 

expeditionary comln<lnder might wish to a lter the di vision. With these ractors in 

mind, he felt that time would permit additional changes in the divisional structure 

because a second division would not deploy in the ne<lr ruturc. Ir a large ex peditionary force was dispatched in the summer of 19 17, its deployment would rest 

Oil pol itical, not mil itary, objecti ves.S 

Early in May SCOIl <ll erted Maj . Gen. John J. Pershi ng, commander of thc 

Southern Department, about the possi bility of se ndin g <I n ex peditionary rorce 

to France and asked him to select one fie ld artillery <lml rour infantry regiments 
CHART 3- lnfantry Division, 24 May 191 7 

' MttrIO. WCDIo< CotS.21 hit, 1911. wb; I'\IIII'OU 

pos.siIIIo upad_ry lore. 111 Fr..,c., indicf{eINt 

\lit d"MsIoo1 woMlOIII19.m. bull cllM:k 01 'l1li MIll 

inditllHlhatlho IOtIlwlllUI9. 
16111 Il/filllllJI, lsi Dillisioll, 1)(lI"(u/es ill Paris, 4 July 1917: below, GOI/(/!'ecol/l'I, 

Fral/ce, Iraining area, 
52 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

for overseas service. Pershing nomi nated the 6th Pie ld Arti llery and th e 16th, 

18th, 26t h, and 28th Infantry. Following a prcplanned prolocol, the French 

requested th e deployment of a di vision to lift Allied morale, and Preside nt 

Woodrow Wilson agrced.9 

Shortly thereafter an expeditio na ry force was organized. The regiments 

picked by Pershing, filled to war strength with recruits, moved to Hoboken, New 

Jersey. On 8 June Bri g. Gcn.William L. Sibert assumed command and began 

organizing the 1st Expeditionary Di vision. Four days latcr its ini tial c lements 

sai led for France without most of their equipment, as the French had agreed to 

arm them. Upon arriva l in France, one di visional unit- the 2d Battalion, 16th 

Infantry- paraded on 4 July in Paris, where the French people enthusiastica lly 

welcomed the Americans. Following the reception, the di visio n's unsc hooled 

recruits, except the artillerymen, underwent six months of arduous training at 

Gondreco urt, a trai ning area south east of Vcrd un , whi lc the division artillery 

trained at a French range near Le Valdahon.IO 

The Baker Board and Pershing 's SlajJOlganizational Study 

Upon compl etion of the Army's fi rst World War I divisional st udy the 1st 

Ex peditionary Division was deployed. Even before that investigation was fin~ 

ished, however, two new groups initiated additional studies. Pershing, who had 

been appointed commander of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) on 26 

May, headed one group; Col. Chauncey Baker, an expert in military transportation and a West Point classmate of Pershi ng, headed the ot her. Prev iously 

Majors Palmer, Moore, and We lls had consulted Pershing as they developed 

th eir ideas about the infantry di visio n, and he fou nd no fault with them. 

Nevertheless, Pershing's staff bega n exploring the organization of the ex pedi ~ 

ti onary forces en route to Fra nce. Lt. Col. Fox Conner, who had served as the 

War Coll ege Di vision interpreter fo r the French mission whi le in Washington; 

the newly promoted Lieutenant Colonel Palmer; and Majs. Alvin Barker and 

Hugh A. Drum assisted Pershi ng in this work .11 

Independen tly. Secretary of War Newton D. Baker directed Colone l Baker 

and twelve other officers to study the British, French, and Belgill n ll nnics. After 

six weeks the secretary expected Baker to make recommendations that would 

he lp in organizi ng American forces. Colonel Baker himse lf met Pershing in 

England, and both agreed to work together after Baker conducted separate inves· 

tigations in England, France, and Belgium. A single report, known as the General 

Organization Project. resulled from these efforts. Refl ecting a consensus of the 

Baker and Pershing planners, it covered all aspects of the organization of the AEF 

except for the service of rear Iroops.12 

The General Organization Proj ect described an infan try division of about 

25,000 men consisting of two infantry brigades (each wit h two infantry regiments 

and one three·company machine gun battalion), a fi e ld artill ery brigade (com-
THE TEST- WORLD WA R I 53 

Officers oj 'he AmericlIlI Expediriollmy Forces mill the Bake,. missioll 

prising one I 55-mill. howit zer regiment, two 3-inch [approximately 75-nun.1 gun 

regiments, and one trench mortar battery), an engineer regiment, a signa l battalion, and trains. The trai ns included the division's headquarters troop and military 

police, ammunition, supply, ambulance, fie ld hospital, and engineer supply units. 

The air sq uadron was omitted from the division,I3 

During the course of the ir work, Pershing and Baker reversed the rationale 

fo r the division. Instead of an orga nization that could easi ly move in and Ou l of 

the trenches, the division was to fiel d enough men to fight prolonged battles. 

Both plan ning groups sensed that Ihe French and British wan ted that type of 

division bu t lacked the resources to ri eld it because of the extensive losses a nel' 

three yea rs of warfare. To susta in itself in combat, the di vision needed more, 

not less, combat power. The infantry regiment reverted to its prewa r structure of 

headq uarters, mach ine gun, and supply companies and three battal ions each 

with four ri ne companies. The rine companies were increased to 256 officers 

and enl isted me n, and each company fielded sixtee n automa ti c ri n es. 14 

Because the law specified only one machine gu n company per regiment, the 

Genera l Organization Project recommended the organization of six brigade and 

five div isional machine gu n companies. These were to be organized into two 

batta lions of three compa nies each and one five-company batta lion. Eight of 

these compa nies augmen ted the four in the infantry regiments, thus providing 

each d ivisiona l infantry battalion wi th a mach ine gun company. The three 

remaini ng companies were assigned as the div isiona l reserve; two were comparable to those in the infantry regimen ts, and the ot her was an armored motorca r 

machi ne gun company labeled "tank" company.15 
54 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

The major dispute between Pershing's staff and the Baker Board developed 

over the artill ery genera l support weapon. The board's positi on, presented by 

future Chie f of Staff Cha rles P. Summerall, was Ihal one regiment shou ld be 

equipped with either the British 3.8- or 4.7-inch howitzer because of their mobility. while Pershing's officers favored a regiment of French 155-111111 . howir-.Gcrs. 

The need for firepower and the possib ility of obtaining 1555 frolll Ihe French 

undoubtedl y innuenced the staff, and its view prevail ed. For high-angle fire, 

Baker's group proposed three trench mortar batteries in the division, but settled 

for one located in the field artillery brigade and six 3-inch Stokes morla rs added 

to each infantry regiment.t6 

The report also recommended changes in cavalry and engineer divisional elements. An army corps, it suggested, needed two three-sq uadron cava lry regiments 

to support four divisions. Normally one squadron would be attached to each di vision, and the army corps would retain two squadrons fo r training and rcplacement 

un its. The squadrons withdrawn from the divisions would then be reorgan ized and 

retrained. Divisional engineer forees expanded to a two-battalion regiment, which 

would accommodate the amount of construction work envisioned in trench warFa re. 

Infantrymen would do the simple diggi ng and re pairing of trenches under enginecr 

supe rvision, while the engineer troops would prepare machine gun and trench mortar emplacements and perform major trench work and other construction. 17 

Pershing sought a million men by the end of 19 18. He envisioned fi ve army 

corps, each hllving fo ur combat di visions, along with a replacement and school 

di vision, a base and tmi ning division, and pioneer in fantry, cavalry, fie ld and antiaircraft artillery. engi neer, signal, aviation, medical, supply, and othcr nccessary 

units. The basc and training division was to process incoming personnel into the 

theater, and the replacemcnt and school division was to provide the army corps wit h 

Fully trai ned and equipped soldiers. Because these SUpp0I1 divisions did not need to 

be lit full strength, Pershing foresaw some of the soldiers serving as replacements in 

combat divisions and others as cadre in processing and tl'lIining units. He 1I1so anticipated that some surp lus units would be attached to army corps or arm ies. 

Furthermore, Pershing wanted a seventh division for each army corps, not countcd 

in his desired force of II million men, which was to be organized and mllintained in 

the United States to train officers beforc they came to France. To asscmbl e thc fi rst 

urrny corps, he asked the War Department to send two combat divisions, followcd 

by the replacemcnt and school division, the other two combat divisions, lind finally 

the base and training division. When five army corps arrived in France, Pershing 

wou ld have twenty combat divisions and ten processing lind replacement divisions. 

Also, fi ve more divisions were to be in training in the United States. IS 

The Gelle rul Organi zation Project reachcd Wash ington in Jul y. and Bliss 

noted Ihe shift in di visional philosophy. Instead of II division that could move 

quickly in and out of trenches, Pershing wanted a unit with sufficicnt ovcrhclld 

(stafT, communi cations, and supply units) and enough infantry and artill ery to 

permit continUOliS fighting over cxtended periods. Becausc Pershing would com-
THE TEST- WORLD WAR I 55 

mand the di visions sent to Europe, neither Bliss nor the General Sta ff questioned 

his preference. Also, the Jack of experienced divisional-level officers and staffs 

made a smaller number of larger divisions more practical,I9 

Using the General Organization Project, the War College Division prepared 

tables of organization, which the War Department published on 8 August 1917 

(Chari 4). The tables for what became known as Ihe "square division" included a 

few changes in the division's combm arms. For example, the five-company divisional mach ine gun battalion was reduced to fOllr companies by eliminating the 

mmored car mach ine gun unit. Pershing had decided to submit a separate tank program because he considered tanks to be assets of e ither army corps or fi eld army. In 

the infantry regiment, the planners made the 3-inch mortars optiona l weapons and 

added three one-pounde r (37-mm.) gu ns as antiltlllk and anti- machi ne gu n 

weapons. The supply traill was motorized, and the ammunition and ambulance 

trains were equipped with bot h motor- and horse-drawn transport. The additional 

motori zed eq ui pment in the train s stemmed from the quart ermaster general's 

attempt to ease an expected shipping sho rtage, not 10 enhance mobility. Craled 

motor vehicles occupied less space in an ocean tmnsport than animals and fodder.20 

The War College Division also prov ided a larger div isional statT than Pershing 

had recommended because the un it most likely wou ld have both tactical and administrative roles. The statT comprised a chief of statT, an adjutant general, an inspector 

genera l, a judge advocate, and quartermaster, medical, ordnance, and signal officers. In addition, interpreters were attached to overcome any language mlrriers, particularly between the Americans and the French. As an additional dUly, the eommanders of the field artillery brigade and the engi neer regiment held statT positions. 

A division headquarters troop with 109 officers and enlisted men would furnish the 

necessary se rvices fo r effic ient operations. The infantry brigade headquarters 

included the commander, his three aides, a brigade adjutant, and e ighteen enlisted 

men who furnished mess, transportation, and communications services. The fi eld 

artillery brigade headquarters was larger, with nine officers and forty-ni ne enlisted 

men, but had simi lar functions. Planners did not authorize headquarters detachments for e ither the infantry or field artillery brigade.2t 

Plans To Organize More Divisions 

While Pershing and Baker investigated the organizational requirements for 

the expeditionary forces, steps were taken to expand the Army at home. These 

measures included the forma tion of al l 117 Regular Army regiments authori zed 

in the Nationa l Defense Act of 1916 and the drafting of the National Guard inlO 

federal service and of 500,000 men through a se lective service system. Draftees 

were to fi ll oul Regular Army and National Guard units and to provide manpower 

for new units. Organizations formed with all selective service personne l eventually became "Nationa l Army" units. Although the War Department was unsure of 

either the fi na l structure of the infantry division or the number of di visions need-
CHART 4--lnfantry Division, 8 August 1917 
THE TEST- WORLD WAR I 57 

ed, it decided to organize 32 infantry div isions immediately, 16 in the National 

Gua rd and 16 in the National Army. The Army co ntemplated no additional 

Regular Army divisions. Alt hough existi ng Regu lar Army regimen ts could be 

shipped overseas and organized into divisions if necessary, most regu lars were 

needed to direct and train the new army. Un like past wars, draftees rather than 

volunteers would ri ght World War 1.22 

To organize National Guard and Natio nal Army div isions, the Army Staff 

adopted extant plans. For the Guard it used the Militia Bureau's scheme developed following the passage of the National Defense Act, and for the National 

Army it turned to a con tingency plan drawn up in February 1917 to guide the 

employment of draftees. Divisions in both components had geographic bases. As 

far as practicable, the area that supported a Gua rd division coincided with a 

National Army divisional area.23 

The thirty-two new divisions nceded traini ng areas, but the Army had o nly 

one faci lity large enough to train a division, Camp Fu nston, a subpost of Fort 

Ri ley, Kansas. Therefore, the stafT instructed territorial commanders to select 

an additional thirty-two areas, each large cnough to house and train a division. 

Early in the summer Secrctary Baker approved leasing the sites. To save money, 

he dec ided to buil d ten t cities fo r the Nationa l Guard div isions in the sout hern 

states, where winte rs were lcss severe, while camps fo r Nationa l Army div isions, which were to have permanent bui ldings, were located wit hin the geog raph ic areas that supported them.24 

Establishing a tentative occu pancy date of I September, the Quartermaster 

Corps began constructing the train ing areas in June. It designed each site to 

accommodate a th ree-brigade division as called for under the prewar tables of 

organization. When Bliss approved the squa re di vision in August, the camps 

ha d to be modificd to ho use the larger in fa ntr y regime nts. Although the 

cha nges delaycd completion of the tra ining areas, the Iroops' arri val date, I 

September, remained firm. 2S 

The War College Division and the adj utant general created yet anot her system for designating divisions and brigades and their assigned elements. Divisions 

were to be numbered I through 25 in the Regular Army, 26 through 75 in the 

National Guard, and 76 and above in the National Army. Withi n the Regular 

Army numbers, mounted or dismounted cava lry divisions were to begi n with the 

number 15. The National Defense Act of 1916 provided fo r sixty-five Regular 

Army infantry regimen ts, including a regiment from Puerto Rico. From those 

units, excluding the ones overseas, the War Department could organize thirteen 

infantry divisions in addition to the 1st Expeditionary Division a lready in France. 

Th is arrangement explains the decision to begin numbering Regular Army cavalry divisions with the digit 15. The system did not specify the procedure fo r numbering National Guard or National Army cavalry divisions. It reserved blocks of 

numbers for infantry, cavalry, and fie ld arti llery brigades, with I through 50 allotled to the Regu lar Army, 51 through 150 to the National Guard, tilld 15 1 and 
58 MANEUVER AND FIR EPOWER 

above to the National Army. The designation of each Guard or Nationa l Army 

unit, if raised by a single stale, was to have that slale's name in parentheses. 

Soldiers in National Guard and National Army units were a lso to wea r disti nctive 

collar insigni a showing their componcnl. 26 

As the summer of 191 7 advanced, the War Department announced additional details. In July it identified specifi c slates to suppor! the first sixtee n 

National Gua rd and the first sixteen Nationa l Army divisions and desig nated 

the camps where they woul d tra in. At that lime the department announced that 

the designations of the Nationa l Guard 's 51h through 20th Di visions were to be 

changed to the 26t h throug h the 41 51 to conform with the new numbering system. In August the adjutant general placed the 76th through the 9 1st Di visio ns, 

National Army units, on the rolls of the Army and announced the appointmen t 

of commanders for both Nationa l Guard and N<l lio nal Army divisions. In additio n to the 1 st Ex peditio na ry Divisio n in France, the Wa r Coll ege Di visio n 

adopted plans to o rgani ze six more Regular Army di visio ns. No plans were 

made to concentrate their div isio nal e lements for trai ning, but they were to be 

brough t up to strength with draftees.27 

When the initia l planning phase for more divisions close(~ the mobiliza tion 

program encompassed 38 divisions-16 National Gua rd, 16 National Army, and 

6 Regular Army. With these, exclusive of the 1st Ex ped itio nary Di vision in 

France. redesig nated o n 6 July as the 1st Di vision, the War Department met 

Pershing's requirement fo r th irty divisions. The divisions in excess of Pershing's 

needs were to be held in the United States as replacement units. 

Organizing the Divisions 

Between 22 August 1917 and 5 January 19 18. the Army Staff authorized 

o ne cavalry and three additional infan try di visions, for a tota l of fo rty-t hree 

div isions. But establishing these uni ts proved a monumental task fo r which the 

Army was woefully unp repa red . Besides un fi nis hed training areas a nd the 

absence of a system for classifying new recruits as they entered service. the 

Army faced a shortage o f equipmen t and officers. The quartermaster ge neral 

cla imed that the only items of clothing he expeetC(1 to be avai lable to outfit the 

National Army men were hats and cotton undershirts. Except fo r a hand fu l o f 

Regular Army officers, the Na tio nal Army made do wit h newly minted officers 

fresh rrom twe lve weeks of training.28 

Fonn<ltion of the new Army nevertheless began with the organization ofl he 

Nationa l Guard di visions. In August Guard units, which had been drafted into 

federa l service and temporarily housed in state camps and armories, reported to 

their designated training camps and formed divisions in agreement with the 3 

May tables. During September a nd October the div ision commanders reorganized the units to eon rorm to th e new sq uare con fig uration as the 26th through 

4 1 st Di visions (Table 3). 
Old 

Desigl/(/(iol1 

5th 

6th 

71h 

81h 

91h 

10th 

11th 

12th 

[3th 

14th 

15th 

161h 

17th 

18th 

19th 

20th 

TABLE 3 

Geographi c Distribution of 

National Guard Divisions, World War I 

New 

Designalioll Geographic Area 

261h MOline. New Hampshire, 

Vermont, Massachusetts, 

Rhode Island, and 

Connecticut 

27th New York 

28th Pennsylvania 

29th New Jersey, Virginia, 

Maryland. Delaware,2 and 

District of Columbia 

30th Tennessee, NOl1h 

Carolina, and South 

Carolina 

31s1 Georg ia, A labama, and 

Florida 

32d Michigan and Wisconsin 

33d Illinoi s 

34th Minnesota, Iowa. 

Nebraska. North Dakota, 

and South Dakota 

35th Missouri and Kansas 

36th Texas and Oklahoma 

37th Ohio and West VirginiaJ 

38th Indiana and Kentucky 

391h Louisiana. Mississippi. 

and Arkansas 

40lh Caliromia, Nevada. Utah, 

Colorado, Arizona, and 

New Mexico 

41st Washington, Oregon, 

Montana, and Wyoming 

I Di vision conccnlmled al various locations in Ncw England. 

2 Delaware troops relicvcd rrom the di vision 8 January 1918. 

) Reassigned 10 the 381h Division. 

CalllP 

Greene. N.C.! 

Wadsworth, S.C. 

Hancock, Ga. 

McClellan , Ala. 

Sevier, S.c. 

Whee ler, Ga. 

MlIcA rthur, Tex. 

Logan, Tex. 

Cody.N.M. 

Don iphan, Okla. 

Bowie, Tex . 

Sheridan, Ala. 

Shelby, Miss. 

Beauregard, Miss. 

Keamy. Calif. 

Fremont, Calif.4 

4 Camp changed from Camp Fremont. Cal ifonlia, 10 Camp Grecilc. North Carolina . 
60 MANEUVER AND FI REPQWER 

At thaI time division commanders broke up many historic slale regiments 10 

meet the required organi zations in the new tabl es, a measure that incensed the 

states and the units thcmsclves.29 

The histori es of the 26 th and 4 1st Di visions were somewhat difTe rc nt. 

Deciding 10 send another division to France as soon as possible, on 22 August 

Secretary Baker ordered Brig. Gen. Clare nce E. Edwa rds, commander of the 

Northeaste rn De pa rtmen t, to organize the 26th Division in slate camps and 

armories under the sqll(lrc tables. Without assembli ng as a unit, the 26th departed 

Ihe following month for France, where it underwent training. To accelerate the 

formation of the 4 151 Division, its tmining site was shifted from Camp Fremont, 

California, which needed a sewage system, to Camp Greene, North Carolina. 

Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett took over the camp on 18 September and the next day 

organized the 4 1st under the 8 August tables. In October its first increment of 

troops departed for France.30 

Be fore the 26th Di vision went ove rseas in Se ptember, many stat es had 

wanted the honor of havi ng th eir units become the first in France and pressed 

Bake r and the War Depa rtmen t fo r that assignment. To stop the clamor, Baker 

proposed to Bliss that he consider sending a di vision to Europe represe nti ng 

many stales. Maj. Douglas MacArth ur, a Genera l Staff officer, had earlier suggested Ihat when Gua rd di visions adopted the new tab les some militia units 

wou ld become s urplus an d mi gh t be g rou ped as a division. MacA rth ur 

described the div ision as a " rainbow," covering the entire mltion. After consulting Brig. Gen. William A. Mann, Chie f of the Militi a Bureau, the War College 

Division drafted a scheme to orga ni ze such a di vision with surplu s units from 

twenty-six states and the Dislrict of Col umbia. On 14 August the 42d Div ision 

was placed on the rolls of the Army, and six days late r its units began arriving 

at Camp Mi lls, New York, eventua lly a transien t faci lity for soldiers going to 

Fra ncc. The following mont h Ma nn, who was reassig ned from the Militia 

Bureau and a ppoin ted the di vision comma nde r, organized the " Rainbow 

Division," wh ich sa il ed for France a few weeks later)1 

The organization of the sixteen National Army divisions also began in August 

when the designated division commanders, a ll Regular Army officers, and officer 

cadres reported to the ir respecti ve training camps. Immed iate ly th ereafter th e 

commanders established the 76th through the 9 1st Di visions and a depot brigade 

for eac h (Table 4). 32 On 3 Sept ember th e first draftees a rri ved. The depo t 

brigades processed the new draftees while the divisions began a rigorous training 

program. Many of these men, however, quickly became fillers for National Guard 

and Regular Army units going overseas, one of the reasons that National Army 

divisions were unready for combat for many months)) 

One Regular Army infantry division, the 2d, was organi zed in France. When 

the first troops deployed, the U.S. Mari ne Corps wanted a share of the action, and 

Secretary Baker agreed that two Ma ri ne regiments should serve wit h the Army. 

The 5th Marines sailed with the 1st Expeditiona ry Di vision, and Pershing assigned 
THE TEST- WORLD WAR 1 

Desigll(l/iOIl 

76th 

77th 

78th 

79th 

80th 

81st 

82d 

83d 

84th 

85th 

86th 

87th 

88th 

89th 

90th 

91st 

TABLE 4 

Geographic Distribution of National Army Divisions 

World War I 

Geograpflic Area Camp 

Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Devens, Mass. 

Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 

and ConnecticlIt 

Metropolitan New York City Uplon, N.Y. 

New York and northern Pennsylvania Dix, N.J. 

Southern Pennsylvania Meade, Md. 

New Jersey, Virgi nia, Maryland, Lee, Va. 

Delaware, and District ofColtl1nbia 

Tennessee, North Carolina, Jackson, S.c. 

and Sout h Carolina 

Georgia, A labama, and Florida Gordon, Ga. 

Ohio and West Virginia Sherman, Ohio 

Indiana and Kentucky Taylor, Ky. 

Michigan and Wisconsin Custer, Mich. 

Illinois Grant, 111. 

Arkansas, Louisiana.-:md Mississippi Pike, Ark. 

Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, Dodge, Iowa 

North Dakota, lind South Dakota 

Missouri, Kansas, and Colorado Funston, Kans. 

Texas, Oklllhoma, Arizona, and Travis, Tex. 

New Mexico 

Washington, Oregon, Californ ia, Lewis, Wash. 

Nevada, Utah, [daho, Montana, 

and Wyoming 

61 

them as security detachments and labor troops in France. Shortly thereafter he 

advised the War Department that the marines did not fit into his organizational 

plans and recommended that they be converted to Army troops. The mari nes, however, continued 10 press for a combat role. Eventually the Departments of War and 

the Navy agreed that two Regular Army infantry regiments, initially programmed 

as lines of communi cation troops, and the two Marine regiments (one serving in 

France and one from the United States) should form the core of the 2d Division. 

The adjutant general informed Pershing of the decision, and Brig. Gen. Charles A. 

Doyen, U.S. Marine Corps, organized the 2d Division on 26 October 19 17 at 

Bourmont, Haute-Marne, France. The division eventually included the 3d Infantry 

Brigade (the 9th and 23d Infantry and the 3d Machi ne Gun Battal ion), the 4th 

Marine Brigade (the 51h and 6th Marines and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion 

[Marines]), the 2d Fi eld Artillery Brigade, and support units.34 
62 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

Draftees (h'ill ;/1 civilial1 c/olhe~;. Camp U,JlOIi. New )'Ol'k. 

The 3d through the 8th Di visions, Regular Army units, were orga ni zed 

between 2 1 November 19 17 and 5 January 191 8 in the United Stales. Of these 

divisions, only the 4th and 8th assembl ed and trained as un its before go ing over· 

seas because the Guard and Nationa l Army uni ts occupied the div isional tra ining 

.... cas. The 4th replaced the 4 151 Division at Camp Greene, and the 8th occupied 

Camp Fremont upon its completi on. To fi ll the div isions, parti a ll y tra ined 

draftees were transfe rred from Nationa l Army units, a process thai eroded the 

concept of the three separate components- the Regul ar Army. the National 

Gua rd, and the National Army.35 

As the three-component idea deteriorated, Baker discussed the elimination or 

sllch distinctions altogether with Scott and Bliss. The off icers opposed the action, 

be lieving it would undermine the loca l pride that Nati ona l Guard and Nationa l 

Army uni ts ex hi bited. General Peyton C. March, who had served as Army Chie f 

of Sta fT since the spring of 19 18, disagreed. He announced that the nation had but 

one army, the United States Army, and discontin ued the distinctive names and 

insignia fo r the three components. Afte r 7 August 19 18, all soldiers, including 

those in di v isions, wore th e coll ar insignia o f the United Sta te s Army. 

Nevertheless, the men still considered their divisions as belonging to the Regular 

Army, the National ~ or the Nati onal Anny,36 

All-bl ack units comprised II spec ial category o f troops. The draft of th e 
TI-IETEST- WORLDWAR 1 63 

Camp Meat/e. MmY/(lIld. 1917 

National Guard included some black units, and the War Department directed the 

organi zation of addit ional regiments if sufficient numbe rs of black dl'artees 

reported to National Army camps. In October t 917 Secretary Baker ordered the 

units at Camps Funston, Grant, Dodge, Sherman, Dix, Upton, and Meade to form 

the 92d Division. Brig. Gen. Charles C. Ballou organized a division headquarters 

at Camp Funston lalcr Ihat month, but the division did not assemble or train in 

the United States. The following June the 92d moved to France and first saw 

combat in the Lorraine area)? 

After the organization of the 92£1 there remained the equivalent of four black 

infantry regiments in the United States, and the staff anticipated that their personnel would serve as replacements for the 92d or lines of communication troops in 

France. For administrative purposes, these black troo ps were orga nized in 

December 1917 as the 185th and 186th Infantry Brigades. Shortly thereafter the 

Headquarters, 93d Division (Provisional), a small administrative unit, was organized. Never intended to be a tactica l unit, it simply exercised admin istrative control over the two brigades while they underwent training.38 

Puerto Ricans comprised another segregated group in the Army, and the 

General Staff gave special consideration to them when organizing divisions. Initially 

it planned a provisional Puerto Rican division using the prewar tables that called for 

three infantry brigades, but that idea was soon dropped. Instead, the War Plans 
64 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Division, which had succeeded the War College Division, endorsed the creation of a 

Spanish-speaking square division (Jess the fie ld artillery brigade), to be designated 

the 94th Division. Maj. Gen. William J. Snow, Chief of Field Artillery, opposed the 

orgrmizalion orthe field artillery brigade because the Army lacked Spanish-speaking instructors and an artillery traini ng area in Puerto Rico. He be lieved that a 

brigade could be furn ished from artillery units in the Un ited Slates. Others opposed 

fo rmal'ion of the division on ethn ic grounds, arguing that Puerto Ricans might not 

do well in combat. Proponents countered that good leadership would guamntee 

good performance in combat. The slaff worked oul a compromise. The divisional 

designation was to be withheld, but the organization of the divisional elements was 

to proceed. The infantry regiments were assigned numbers 373 through 376, which 

would have been associated with the National Army's 94th Division. During the war 

the Army organized only three of those regiments, with approximatcly 17,000 

Puerto Rican draftees, but never formed the 94th Division itsel[39 

Pershing ignored French and British recommendations that cavalry divisions 

not be sent to France. Himself a cavalryman, the genera l decided that he migh t 

use such a force as a mobile reserve. After ail, both Allies still hoped for a breakthrough a nd maintained 30,000 to 40,000 mounted troops to exploit such an 

opportun ity. Most of the Regu la r Army cavalry regiments, however, had been 

scattered in small detachments along the Mexican bordcr and had furnished pcrsonnel fo r overseas du ty. The cavalry arm needed to be rebuilt. That process 

began when the secretary of wa r approved the formation of the 15th Cavalry 

Division. On 10 Decembcr 1917, Maj . Gen. George W. Reed organized its headquart ers at Fort Bliss, Texas; the 1 st Cava lry Brigade at Fort Sam Houston, Texas; 

the 2d Brigade at Bliss, Texas; and the 3d at Douglas, Arizona. The division had 

two missions: to prepare for combat in France and to patrol the Mexican border.40 

The breakup of thc 15th Cava lry Division began shortly after its formation. 

Responding to Pershi ng's req uest for army corps troops, the War Departmen t 

detached the division's 6t h and 15th Cava lry and sent them to France. Because of 

the paucity of cavalry units, they werc not replaced in the division. In May 1918 

Maj. Gen. Willard Holbrook, the Southern Department commander, informed the 

chief of staff of the Army that the situation on the border required the remai nder 

of the division to rema in therc. Holbrook further stalcd that border-patrol work 

could be improved if the divisiona l organization were abandoned. On 12 May the 

division headquarters was demobilized, but the div ision's three cavalry brigades 

continued to serve on the border until July 1919, when their headquarters were 

also demobilized. With the demobilization of the division, Pershing's hope for a 

cava lry division died. Baker informed him that a ll remaining mou nted troops 

were needed in the United Slates.41 

When the first phase of the mobilization ended on 5 January 1918, the Army 

had 42 infantry divisions, I short-lived cava lry di vision, and I provisional divi· 

sion of 2 infantry brigades. All di visions were in various stages of tra in ing. 

Shortages of uniforms, weapons, and equipment remained acute. 
TH E TEST- WORLD WAR I 65 

Expansion of the Divisional Forces 

By the spring of 1918 Pershing had requested more divisions than he had outlined in the General Organization Project because the Allies' fortunes had drastically changed. Russia had been forced out of the war, and the British and French 

armies had begun to show the strain of manpower losses sustai ned since 1914. 

Alt hough Germany also fe lt the effects of the long war, it was busy transferring 

troops from the now deFunct Eastern Front to the West for one final offensive. 

Alarmed, the Allies wanted 100 U.S. Army divisions as soon as possible. Within 

the War Department the request caused considerable debate as to its feasibi lity, 

particularly with regard to raw materia ls, production, and shipping of war suppl ies. Only in July did President Wilson approve a plan to mount a 98-division 

force by the end of 1919, 80 for France and 18 in reserve in the United States.42 

During the debate over force structure, the War Plans Division considered 

whether the additional di visions should be Regular Army or National Army uni ts. 

Not all Regular Army infantry regiments authorized under the National Defense 

Act of 1916 had been assigned to divisions, th us raisi ng the question of why 

those reg imen ts shou ld exist. The War Plans Division recommended that the 

Regular Army infantry regiments become the nuclei of the next group of divisions, which would be completed with Nationa l Army units. The National Army 

units would pass out of existence after the war.43 

In July 19 18 Secretary Baker approved the organization of twelve more divisions. Regular Army infantry regiments in the United States and from Hawaii and 

Panama fo rmed the core of the 9th through 20th Divisions (Table 5).44 These 

divisions, organized between 17 July and I September, occupied camps vacated 

by Nationa l Guard and Nati ona l Army divisions tha t had gone to France. 

Conforming to Pershing's fi xed army corps idea, the 11th and 17th Divisions 

were scheduled to be replacement and school divisions, while the 14th and 20th 

were programmed as base and training divisions. The only change in these divisions from the others was in their artillery. The I I th and 17th had one regiment 

eac h of 3-inch horse-drawn gu ns, 4.7-inch motorized howitzers, and 6-inch 

motorized howitzers, wh ile the 14th and 20th each had one 3-inch gu n regiment 

carried on trucks, one regiment of 3-inch horse-drawn guns, and one regiment of 

6-inch motori zed howitzers. These artillery units were to be detached from the 

divisions and serve as corps artillery, except the 3-inch gun regiment carried on 

trllcks, which was to serve as part of army artillery.45 

As the Army Staff perfected plans to organize additional Regular Army divisions, steps had been taken to assure adequate mil itary forces in Hawaii. On I 

June 19 18, the president ca lled the two infantry regime nts from the Hawa ii 

National Guard into federal service, and they repl aced units that had transferred 

to the United States from Schofield Barracks and Fort Shaft er.46 

The Philippine Islands also proved to be a potential source of manpower for 

fighting World War I. When the United States entered the conflict, the Philippine 
66 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

TABLE 5 

Expansion of Divisional Forces, 19 18 

Division COII/pollent Camp 

9th RA and NA Sheridan, Ala. 

10lh RA and NA Funston, Kans. 

11th RA and NA Meade, Md. 

12th RA and NA Devens, Mass. 

13th RA and NA Lewis, Wash. 

14th RA and NA Custer, Mich. 

151h itA and NA Logan, Tex. 

16th RA and NA Kearny, Calif. 

17th RA and NA Beauregard, La. 

181h RA and NA Travis, Tex. 

19th RA and NA Dodge, Iowa 

20th RA and NA Sevier, S,c. 

95th NA Sherman, Ohio 

96th NA Wadsworth, N.Y. 

97th NA Cody,N.M. 

981h NA McClellan, Ala. 

99th NA Wheeler, Ga. 

100th NA Bowie, Tex. 

lOis! NA Shelby, Miss. 

t02d NA Dix, N.J. 

people offered to raise a volunteer infantry division to be a pari of American forces. 

The offer was declined, but Congress authorized federal izing the Philippine Militia 

to replace U.S. Army units if necessary. Nine days aOcr thc armistice President 

Wilson orde red nascent militia into federal service for training, and the 1st 

Division, Philippine National Guard, was organized under the prewar divisional 

structure. The division, however, lacked many of its requ ired units, and its headquarters was mustered out of federal service on 19 December 191 8.47 

There were also two Regu lar Army nondi visiona l infantry regiments in the 

Philippi ne Islands. [n July 191 8 they joined an international force for service in 

Siberia. To bring the regiments to war strength, 5,000 well-trained infantrymen from 

the 8th Division at Camp Fremont, California, joined the Siberian Expcdition.48 

In July 19 18 Secreta ry Baker approved fina l expansion of divisional forces, 

which involved black draftees. The plan required black units to replace sixteen 

white pioneer infantry regiments serving in France. These white units were to be 

organized into eight infantry brigades and eventually be assigned to divisions partially raised in the United States. By II November the War Department had organized portions of the 95th through the 102d Divisions in the United States (see 

Table 5), but the brigades in France had not been organized.49 
THE TEST- WORLD WAR I 67 

Divisional Changes 

The General Staff had approved several changes in the August 1917 struclure when the Army began to organize the last group of infantry divisions for 

World War I. Changes included reduc ing the di vision's reserve machine gun 

battalion from a four-company organization to a two-company unit and 

increasi ng the infantry brigade's machine gun battalions from three to fou r 

compani es. Altho ugh the total number of machine gun uni ts remained th e 

same, the real ignment afforded better comma nd and control withi n the infan try 

brigades. More Signal Corps men were added, and more motorized ambulances 

were provided for the sanitary trains. Us ually each modifi cation brought a 

change in th e strength of the division, which by Novembe r 1918 stood at 

28, I 05 officers and enlisted men.50 

The demands of combat led to severa l changes in divisional weapons. The 

French agreed to rep lace all U.S. 3-inch guns with their 75-mm. guns in excha nge 

for supplies of ammunition. The 3-inch Stokes mortars, optiona l weapons in the 

infantry regiment, were made permanent. To defend the division against enemy 

airplanes, antiaircraft machine guns were authorized in the field artillery regiments. The most signi fi cant change, however, involved machine guns and automatic rifles. In September 1918 elements of the 79th and 80th Divisions used 

new machine guns and au tomatic rifl es invented by John M. Browning. The 

Browning water-cooled machine gun was a lighter, more rel iable weapon than 

eit her the British Vickers or the French Hotchkiss, and the Browning automatic 

rine (BA R) surpassed the British Lewis and French Chauchat in reliability. New 

Browning weapons, however, were not <lvailable in sufficient quantities fo r all 

divisions before the end of the war.51 

Pershing fo rmally modified the di vision staff during the wa r. In February 

1918 he adopted the European functi onal staff, which he had been tentatively 

using since the summer of 191 7. Under that system the staff consisted of five 

sections: 0 - 1 (personnel), 0~2 (intelligence), G- 3 (operations), G-4 (supply), 

and 0 - 5 (training). Each section coordinated all activ ities withi n its sphere and 

reported directly to the chi ef of staff, thereby re lieving the commander of many 

rouline deta ils.52 

Pershing and his stafr also changed plans for assembling army corps to meel 

conditions in France. When four divisions had arrived in France, the 1st, 2d, 26th , 

and 42d, the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) staff began planning a corps 

replacement and school division. After reviewing the re<ldiness status of the divisions, the statT recommended that the 42d be reorgani zed as the replacement and 

school unit. Pershing disagreed. For political reasons, the " Rainbow" Division 

had to be a combat unit. Also, he did nol agree that the army corps required a 

replacement and school unit at that time; he wanted a base and training division 

to receive and process replacements. For that job he selected the 41 st Division, 

which hadjllst begllnto arrive in France.53 
68 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Shortly thereafte r Pershing revised the replacement system for the AEF. 

Instead of relying Oil a replacement and school di vision and a base and training 

division for each army corps, he split the replacement function between the army 

corps and the "communications zone," the area immediately behi nd the ballle~ 

fie ld controlled by the "Servi ce of the Rear." In the communications zone a depot 

(base and tra ining) di vision would process personnel into the thealer, whi le a 

replacement (replacement and school) division in each army corps distributed 

new personnel to their units. He assigned the 41 sl Division to the Service of the 

Rear (lalcr the Services of Supply) as a depot division, which was to receive, 

train, equip, a nd forward replacements (both officers and en listed men) to 

replacemen t divisions of th e corps, and designated the 32d Di vision as the I 

Army Corps' replacement unit. But when the German offensive began along the 

Somme (2 1 March to 6 April 19 18), the 32d Division was assigned to combat 

dUly. To chan nel replacements from the depot division to their assigned units, 

each army corps instead established a replacement battalion. The depot div ision 

processed casuals into the theater, and the replacement batta lions forwarded them 

to the units. The 41 st served as the depot division for the AEF L1ntil July 1918. No 

replacement division was organized during World War 1.54 

The German offensive on the Somme upset Pershing's organizational plans. He 

offered all American divisions to the French Army. The 1st, 2d, 26th, and 42d 

Divisions were sent to variolls quiet sectors of the line, and they and more recent 

arrivals did not come under Pershing's control until late in the summer of 191 8. He 

also placed the fo ur regiments of the black 93d Division (Provisional) at the disposal of the French with the understanding that they wou ld be returned to his control 

upon request. The French quickly reorgani zed and equipped the regiments under 

their tables of organization. Although they were to be relmned 10 Pershing's control 

after the crisis, they remained with French units until the end of the war. The headquarters oflhe provisional93d Division was disconti nued in May 191 8.55 

The Army and the nation did not have enough ships to transport forces to 

France, and this lack was a major obstacle to the war e ffort. After lengthy discussions in early 1918, the British agreed to transport infantry, mach ine gun , signal, 

and engineer units for six divisions in their ships. Upon arriva l in France, these 

un its were to trai n with the British. The divisional artillery and trai ns were to be 

shipped when space became available, and they were to tra in in American train ing 

areas. The British executed the prog ram in the early spring of 191 8, eventually 

moving the 4th, 27th, 281h, 30th, 33d, 35th, 77th, 78th, 80th, and 82d Divisions. By 

June 1918 the nation's transport capabi lity had increased markedly. In addition, the 

adoption of the convoy system g reatly reduced the effect of German submarines, 

allowing the number of divisions in France to rise rapidly (Table 6).56 

As more divisions arri ve(~ Pershi ng revamped his ideas about the army corps. 

He made it a command co nsisting of a headquarters, corps artillery, techn ical 

troops, and div isions. The divisions and technical troops could be varied for each 

specific operation. Under his system, pattcrned after the French, the army corps 
THE TEST- WORLD WAR I 69 

165,h Illfallll)" 42(/ Division, ill trencltes, Jlllle 19/8 

became a more mobile, fl exible command. The concept also took advantage of 

the limited number of American divisions in the theater, shifting them among 

army corps as needed. Eventually, Pershing organized seven army corps. 

To mainta in them, the 39th, 40th, 41 st, 76th, 83d, and 85th Divisions served 

as depot organizations. The 3 151 Division was slated to become the seventh depot 

division but never acted in that ro le, having been broken up for needed rep lacements. Because depot divisions needed only cadres to operate, most of the personnel, except For men in the field artillery brigades, were also distri buted to 

combat div isions as replacements. After additional training, the field artillery 

brigades assigned to the 41 st, 76th, 83d, and 85th Divisions saw combat primarily 

as army corps arti llery_ Those assigned to the 39th and 40t h were still training 

when the fighti ng ended. 57 

When the Services of Supply reorganized the 83d and 85th Divisions as 

depot units, some of their elements were used as special expeditionary forces. 

The 332d Infantry and 33 1 st Field Hospita l, elements of the 83d Division, partie· 

ipated in the Vittorio Veneto campaign on the Italian front during October and 

November 1918. The 3391h Infantry; the 1st Battal ion, 3 10th Engineers; the 

337th Ambulance Company; and the 337th Field Hospital of the 85th constituted 

the American cont ingent of th e Mu rmansk Ex ped ition, whic h served under 

British command in North Russia from September 1918 to July 1919.58 
TABLE 6 

Deployment of Divisions to France 

Divisioll Dales of Movement Over.I'ells Remarks 

1st June-December 191 7 

2d September 191 7- March 1918 Organ ized in France 

3d March- June 19 18 

4th May- June 191 8 British shipping program 

51h March- June 19 18 

61h June-July 191 8 

7th July- September 19 18 

8th November 1918 Headquarters only 

26th September 19 17- January 191 8 

27th May- July 19 18 British shipping program 

28th April- June 1918 British shipping program 

29th June-Jul y 1918 

30th May- June 191 8 British shipping program 

3 1st September- November 19 18 Skeletonized 

32d January- March 19 18 

33d May- June 191 8 Brit ish shipping program 

34th September- October 1918 Ske letonized 

35th April- June 191 8 British shipping program 

36th July- August 191 8 

37th June-July 19 18 

38th September- October 19 18 Skeletonized 

39th August- September 19 18 Depot, later skeletonized 

40th July- September 191 8 Depot 

41 st November 19 17- February 191 8 Depot 

42d October- December 19 17 

76th Jul y- August 19 18 Depot 

77th March- May 19 18 British shipping program 

78th May- June 19 18 British shippi ng program 

79th Jul y- August 1918 

80th May- June 19 18 British shippi ng program 

Sist Jul y- August 191 5 

82d April- Ju ly 19 15 British shippi ng program 

83 d June-August 191 8 Depot 

84th August- October 19 18 Depot, Iflter skeletonized 

85th July- August 19 18 Depot 

86th September- October 191 8 Ske letonized 

87t h June- September 19 18 Broken up for Iflborcrs 

88th August- September 19 18 

89th June- July 19 18 

90th June- July 19 18 

9 1 sl June- Ju ly 19 18 

92£1 June-July 19 18 

93<1 December 19 17- Apri11 9 18 Prov isionuluJlit, 

d iscont inued Mfly 19 18 
THE TEST- WORLD WA R 1 71 

Heavy losses during the greatest American involvement in World War I, the 

Meuse-Argonne campa ign that bega n on 26 September 191 8, created a need for 

additional replacements. One week of combat left di visions so depleted that 

Pershing ordered personnel from the 84th and 86th Divisions, which had just 

arrived in France, to be used as replacements.59 The arrangement was supposed to be tempora ry, and at fi rst only men from infantry and machine gun 

un its served as replacemen ts. Eventually a ll di visional personn el were swallowed up, except for one enlisted man per company and one officer per regimen t who mai ntained unit records. The manpower shortage persisted. On 17 

October the 3 151 Division, programmed as the depot division, was skeletonized 

and its me n used as repla ceme nts. The 34th and 38th Divisions were also 

stripped of the ir men as they arrived from the United States. Nevertheless, the 

high casua lty rale took a to ll on a ll combat units, and Pershing slashed the 

authorized strength of infantry and machine gun companies from 250 to 175 

en listed men, the reby temporarily reduci ng each di vision by 4 ,000 men. 

Smaller combal div isions, however, conducted some of the fi ercest fighting of 

the war- attacks agai nst the enemy's fortified positions on the hills between the 

Argonn e Forest and the Meuse River.60 

While scrambling for personnel, Pershing again reorgani zed the replacement 

system, trying to improve its responsiveness to the nexible army corps and army 

organizations. Army corps replacement battalions fa iled because divisions left the 

corps so rapid ly that the battalions were unabl e to keep up with them. There fore, 

he ordered the 40th and 85th Divisions to serve as regional replacement depots 

for the First and Second Armies, respectively, and the 41 sl and 83d as depot divisions in the Services of Supply. The other two depot di visions, the 39th and 76th, 

were stripped of their personnel. The replacement system, however, rema ined 

unsatisfa ctory to the end of the war.61 

Di visions in France also suffered from a shortage of animals for transport. As 

the quartermaster general had predicted in 1917, units never had more than ha lf 

the transportation authori zed in their tables of organi zation for lack of an imals. In 

some divisions artillerymen moved their pieces by hand. To overcome the shortage, Pershing's staff planned to motorize the 155-mm. howitzer regiments and 

one regiment of 75-mm. guns in each div ision. By November 1918, however, 

only eleven ISS-mill. howitzer regiments had been thus eq uipped.62 

Troop shortages also hit support units. During the fall of 1918 the commander of the Services of Supply, Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, requested personnel 

from three combat di visions for labor units in his command. On 17 September 

Pershing's headquarters reassigned three divisions scheduled to arrive from the 

United States to Harbord. Only one of these, the 87th, reported before the end of 

the fighti ng, and it was broken up for laborers in the Services of Supply.63 

Handicapped by the scarcity of men and anima ls, Pershing sought ways to 

make divisions more effective combat units. In October 191 8 he adv ised new 

division commanders to lise their personalit ies to increase the patriotism, morale, 
72 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Traffic cOllgeslioll ill Ihe A'golllle. November 1918 

and fighting spirit of their men. One way to deve lop un it esprit, Pershing suggested, was for divisions to adopt distinctive cloth shoulder sleeve insignia. At that 

lime the 8 1st Division had already begun using slIch insignia. On his return to the 

United States aftcr visiting the Western Fron t in the fall of 191 7, the div ision 

com mand er, Maj. Ge n. Charl es J. Bailey, had autho ri zed a shoulde r sleeve 

insignia for his unit. He instructed the men not to wear the patch until after leaving the Un ited States. When the div ision arrived in France, the insignia carne to 

Pershi ng's attention. Bai ley explained thai no official sanction existed for the 

embl em, but that it c reated comradcs hip among the me n, helped to deve lop 

esprit, and aided in controlling small units in open warfare. Pershing apparently 

liked the idea for he ordered a ll divisions to adopt shoulder sleeve insignia. 

Within a short time the other divisions had their own shoulder patches, many 

adopting their div isional property symbols. Along with the insignia, the men 

began 10 adopt divisional nicknames, such as " Big Red One" and "Wildcat" for 

the I st and 81 sl Divisions, respective ly.64 

Comba t, particul arly in the Meuse-Argonne campaign, tested the assumptions that lay behind the large square division. Designed to conduct susta ined 

frontal attacks, not maneuver, it was thought to possess tremendous firepower 

and endurance. The division's firepower, however, proved ineffective. The lack of 

wire and the continual movement of infantry units in the offensive hindered communications between infantry and artillery. In addition, the French transportation 
THE TEST- WORLD WAR J 73 

network could handl e only so many men, guns, and suppl ies. Traffic congestion 

bogged down the movement of units and also prevented communication. When 

divisions were on Ihe line they suffered from Ihe lack of food, ammunition, and 

other supplies. Part of the logistical probl ems also rested with a div ision's lack of 

combat service troops to carry rations, bu ry the dead, and evacuate casualties.65 

By Armistice Day, 11 November 1918, the Army had fi elded 1 cavalry division, I provisional infantry division, and 62 infantry divisions. Of this total, 42 

infantry divisions and the provisional division deployed to Europe (see nlble 6), 

with one, the 8th Division, not arriving until aftcr the fighting had ended. On the 

Western Front in France, 29 divisions (7 Regular Army, I I National Guard, and 

II National Army) fought in combat. Of the others, 7 served as depot divisions, 2 

of which were skeletonized, and 5 were stripped of their personnel for replacements in combat un its, laborers in rear areas, or expeditionary fo rces in North 

Russia or Italy. The provisional black division was broken up, but its four infantry 

regiments saw combat. Starting from a limited mobilization base, this buildup, 

lasting eigh teen months, was a remarkable achi evement. 

Despite the difficulties, Worl d War I brought about mo re coordinati on 

among the combat arms, combat support, and comba t service organizations in 

the infantry division than ever before. Infantry could not advance without support from engineers and artillery; artillery could not con tinue to fire without a 

constan t supply of ammunition. Transportation and sign al un its provided the 

vital materiel and command connections, while medical units administered to 

the needs of the wounded. This complex type of combin ed arms unit became 

possible because of advances in tech nology, weapons, communi cations, and 

transportation. 

The adoption of the unwieldy square division, however, proved to be less than 

satisfactory. Pershing 's staff believed that a di vision of28,000 would conserve the 

limited supply of trained officers, maximize firepower, and sustain itself effectively in combat. [n practice, the square division lacked mobility. Its defic iencies 

became app<lrent du ring the important Meuse-Argonne offensive, when American 

divisions bogged down and suffered excessive casualties. The successes and failures of the infantry division's organization set the stage for a debate that would 

su rround it for the next twenty years. 
74 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Notes 

! Hugh L. Scott, Some Melllorie.\" v/a So/die,. (New York: Century Co., 1928), p. 552. 

2 Scott, Memories, pp. 550- 56; Frederick Palmer, Bliss, The Peacemaker: The Life and 

Letters or General Tasker Howard Bliss (NelV York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., (934), pr. 146- 56. 

1 Memo, We D for CotS, JO May 17, sub: Plans for a Possible Expeditionary Force to 

France, WeD file 10050, RG 165, NARA. The WeD 10050 file is replele wilh background 

malerial on the development orthe new division. 

4 Memo, WeD, 10 May 1917, sub: Plans for a Possible Expeditionary Force 10 France; 

Drafi of MenlO prepared in May 1917, WeD for Cors, 7 Jul 1917, sub: The Organization of an 

American AmlY, WeD file 10050, RG 165, NARA. The French used two types of divisions in 

191 7, one fielding about 17,000 men based on tlVO brigades of tlVO infantry regiments each and 

the other of 14,000 organized around three infantry regiments. 

5 Ibid. ; Draft of Memo prepared in May 1917, WCD for Cors, 7 J ul 17 , sub: The 

Organization of an American Army, WCD file 10050, RG 165, NARA. 

6 L. Van Loan NaisalVald, The US Infilllll}' Divisioll: Challging COllcepls in Organization 

/900- 39, Project Shop, I- ORO S- 239 (Chevy Chase, Md,: Johns Hopkins University, 1952), pp. 

12 and fig. 4; Memo, WCD for CofS, 21 May 17, sub: Plans for a possible expeditionary force to 

France, WCD file 10050, RG 165, NARA. 

7 General Scott had becn sent to Russia lVith a presidential commission to establish eOlllaet 

lVith the revolutionary governmcnt Ihat had overthrown the czar. Scott, Memories, p. 570. 

8 Memo, WCD for Cors, 21 May 17, sub: Plans for a possible expeditionary force to 

FnUlee, and Memo, CotS for WCD, 24 May 17, no subject, WCD file 10050, RG 165, NARA. 

9 John J. Pershing, My /:.:I"periellr;es ill the World Wal'. 2 vols. (New York: Frederick A. 

Stokes Co., 1921) 1:2- 3; Llr, The Adjufant General of the Army (hcrcafler eitcd as TAG) to CG, 

Southern Department, 23 May 17, sub: Organizations designated for foreign service, and Ltr, 

TAG to CG, Southern Department, 26 May 17, same subject, 1st Inf Div file , DAMH-HSO: 

Society of the First Division, Histol)' oj the Fi"st /)il'isioll During World War 1917- /919 

(Philadelphia: John C. Winston Co .. 1922), p. 2. 

t(l Society of the First Division. Hiswry oj the First /)il'l'sioll , pp. 6- 18; GO I, 1st 

Expeditionary Division, 8 lun 1917, 1st Infoi v file. DAMH-HSO; Forrest C. Pogue. George C. 

Morslwll: £duc(I(ioll oj 0 Generol (New York : Viking I)rcss, 1963), pp. 146-47; John Whiteclay 

Chambers, 11. To Noise (/II Army: The Dl'tlji Comes to iHodem America (New York: The Free 

Press. 1987), p. 147. 

tt Pershing, My E"pe"iellce,~. 1:38-40, 43-44, 100- 10 I; Llr. TAG to Col. Chauncey B. 

Baker, 28 May r 7, printed in Ullited St(l/e~' Army ill the World War 1917- 1919: Org(/IIiuitio/l oj 

the Amel"ic(/II E\'peditioll(llJ' Forces (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948). p. 

55 (hercafterciled as Orgmrizatio/l. AEF): Memo. CofS for Maj Gen Pershing. 21 May 17. sub: 

Organizations higher than Divisions, WeD file 10050, RG 165, NARA; Memo. John McA. 

Palmer for Gen Pershing. 19 Oct 2 I, no subject. John McA. Pahner Papers, LC. 

12 Organizatioll. AEF. pp. 55- 56, 91, 108; Ltr. Baker to Pershing, 7 Jun 17, no subject, 

Pershing Papers, LC. The officers who accompanied Baker were Colonels William A. Graves. 

Dwight E. Aullman, Mark L. Hersey. :md Charles P. Summerall; Lieutenant Colonels Hanson E. 

Ely, Edward D. Anderson, Kirby Walker, and Sherwood A. Cheney; Majors George S. Simonds, 

Morris E. Lock , :llId Frederick A, Ellison, :llId C:,ptnin John J. Quakemeyer. 

13 Organization. AEF, pp. 97- 98. 

t4 The aUlomntie rine lind the machine gun were viewed as similar rapid-fire infantry 

weal)ons, and the Baker Board recommended the adoption of concise descriptions for them. It 

proposed that the automatic rine be detined as a weapon where recoil was sustained by the body 

of the firer. while recoil from the machine gUll would lJ.c sustained by some sort of solid lIlount 

clamped to the weal)on, (Sec Org(lllization. A/~T. p. 75). 

t5 Organizatioll. AEF. pp. 56- 89 and pp. 93- 114 passim. 
TH E TEST- WORLD WA R I 75 

16 Ibid .. pp. 109- 14; LIT. Maj Gcn John J. I)ershing to Maj Gcn Tasker H. Bliss, 9 Jul 17. no 

subjl.:c[, Pershing Papers, LC; 1'lInes W. Rainey. "Ambivalent Warfare: The Tactical Doctrine of 

the AEF in World War I," 1'(wall1elel'$ 13 (Scp 1983): 38; Pershing, My Experiellces, I: 106- 07. 

11 O''gllllizlIIiOIl. AEF. pp. 83. 99 100.1 05. 

18 1bid., pr. 93- 96. 

19 I'nll11c r. Bliss, PI}. 170- 7 1; rll C~ G . !-Iarlxml. The Americal/ Al'lIIy ill Fl'Clllce /917- /9/9 

(Boston: Liule Brown and Co., 1936), PI'. 102- 04. 

20 OrgallizlIIioll. AEF. p. 138: Tables of Organization (hcrcaflcr cited as T/O ), Series A. 

Table !.Infantry Division. 1917. 

21 T/O. Series A. Table 2, Hcad<luarlcrs. Infantry Division, Table 3, Infantry Brigade, Table 

12. Field Anillcry Brigade, IIcadquartcrs, 1917. 

22 WO Bull 32. 19 17: WD GO 88. 1917: cnry Jcn'cy. "Mobilization of thc Emcrgeney 

Anny," lecture at thc Army War Collcge. 3 Jan 1920, copy in DAM II Library. Washington, 

D.C.; Chambers, To Rai.~e (/II Arm),. p. 140. 

23 Mcmo. WCD for CofS. 20 Feb 17, sub: A plan for nn cxp,LI1siblc army of 500,000 men 

bllscd on univcrs.!1 liability to the mi litary service, localization o f organizations, lind decentl1llizntion o f administfUtion. TAG fi le 94)3, RG 165. NA RA (thc memo offers the CIS thrce options 

to increase the size o f the Army); LtT, Ch of the M 11, to TAGs of llil Siales, Terri tory of Haw" ii, 

District o f Columbia, and inspector-instructors .t1ld orficers in ch'lrgc of militia affairs, department headquartcrs, 5 May 17, sub: Org;l1Ii z<l tion and cntry in Fedeml service of Nmional Guard. 

Mil file 325.4, RG 168, NARA. Also see U.S. Congress, Housc of Representalives, Comlllillee 

on Military Affairs. Tile N(liiolllll Dticllse "eurillgs. 69th Cong., 2d Sess .• 3 May 19 17, pp. 

303- 04. 

24 Rpt orthe Sec of War. IIRIVO, 1917, pp. 25- 34. 

25 Ibid.: Rpi o f the Construc tion Div, AR IIID. 1918. pp. 1283- 86. 

26 Memo, WCD for CofS. sub: Designat ion of foree 10 eOIllJlOsc the Army of the United 

States. 23 Jun 17. and Memo. WC D for Cors, sub: Designation of organizmions, 23 Aug 17, 

WCD file 9876, ItG 165, NA RA; W I) GOs 88 and 11 5, 19 17; Specia l Rcgulat ions No, 41. 

Ch.ll1ge I, Uniform Regu lations, 19 17. 

27 WD GOs 90. 10 1, 109. and 114, 1917; Army War College (hereaf'ler cited as AWC) 

St;lIcment, Proposed organization of the increased mi litary establi~hme t ,Ind proposed plan for 

providing the necessary offiecrs. 9 Aug 17, Co15 files 1917- 1921. file 1080, RG 165, NA RA. 

28 Kreidbcrg and I-i enry, Mobifi;:(1/ioll. pp. 320- 21: A WC Statement: Proposed organization 

of the incrcased mil itary establishment. 9 Aug 17: Order of Bill/Ie of lite Uniled Sillies LUlld 

Forces ill Ihe WorM "'{II' (1917- 19). lOIlt' of Ille IlIIeriol' (Washington. D.C.: Government 

Printing Office, 1949). pp. 79- 80. 

29 Orde/' of Bill/Ie of Ihe Ullill'd Slme.\· ,,(///(I Forces ill lite World War. AlJlcric(1II 

£.I'peditioumy Forces. Dil ~iulI.l' (Washington, D.C.: Govcrnment Printing Office, 1931), pp. 

117- 265 passim. hercafter ci ted <IS Dil';'I·ioll.l', and ZOlle of Ihe IIl/eriOI" /1(1/'1 2. Directory of 

Trool'~' (Wa hington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1949), PI'. 1277- 78, hereafter eited as 

Dil'cc/m,)' of Troops: "ellllsyll'llllill ill tile World War. I: 131-40,2: 14 1; O'Ryan, The SIOI,)' Ofllll! 

2711, DMsioll. 1:61 - 70; Frederick L. lIuidekoper, The His/OI')' of /Iw 33(1 OMsioll, A. E.!"" 4 vols. 

(Springfield: Il linois Statc I listorical Library, 192 1) I: 1-7. 

30 Ltr. TAG 10 Brig Gcn Clarence R. Edwards. sub: Prepar:llion of the 26th Division for service abroad, 13 Aug 17, and Ll r. CG. 26th Division to TAG, sub: Organization of the 26th 

Division. 22 Sep 17. eopics in DAM II-I-ISO World War I ordcrofban le file: I-larry A. Benwell, 

/lis/Oly of the "(/Ilkee DiI'isioll (Boston, Mass.: Cornhil l Co., 1919), Pil. 20- 2 1: RJlI of the Ch or 

the MO. AN"'/). 1918. p. 1104: William F. Strobridge. GOIt/t'1I Gale /0 Goldell HoI''' (San Mateo. 

Calif.: San MaleoCounty 1-listorie'll Associmion. 1975). p. 3: Dil'i~ iolu . pp. 117.256. 

3t Frederick PlIlmer. NewlOII I). B"ker. AllleriCllII til 11'''1'.2 vol5. (New York: Dodd. Mead. 

and Co" 1931) 1:356- 57: Memo. WC D for Cors, 30 Jul 17. sub: Composition Division, National 

Guard ror service in France, ItG 165, NARA: Ll r, TAG to Dept COlllmanders. I Alig 17, SHllle 

subjcct. TAG 322.07 ce in 42d Inf Oiv Fi le, DAI\-UI-I·ISO: Divisions. p. 275. Urig Gen William 
76 MANEUVER AND FI REPOWER 

A. Mann was the brother of James Robert Manu. who was the second ranking Republican from 

Illinois. His brother's appointment was a bipartisan move for World War I. 

J2 Secretary Buker had authorized the camp commanders, who served as division commanders, to organize depot brigades as divisional clements. The depot brigade filled IwO purposes: 

one was to train replacements for the A.E.F. since the War College Division did nOI agree to 

Pershing's seventh division for the corps; the olher was to act as a receiving unit for men sent to 

the camps by draft boards. David F. Trask, cd., Historical Survey of US Mobilization: Eight 

Topical Studies of the Twentieth Century, SlUdy 6, Terrence J. Gough. "Equipment", pp. 6- 7. 

Ms. DAM H-I·ISR. 

33 Dil'l'siom;, pp. 291-421 passim; Memo. Office Chicf of StalT(OCS) for TAG, 11 Aug 11. 

no subject, OCS 9876-59, RG 165, NARA; WD GO 101 , 1917; Jervey, "Mobilization of the 

Emergency Army," pp. 14- 15; Memo. WCD for Corso 19 Oct 11. sub: Plan for Organization ;Uld 

Dispatch of Troops to Europe. WCD tile 10050- 119. RG 165. NARA: also scc Julius O. Adler. 

!-lis/or)' of Ihe Sel'ellfy-Scl'elllh DiI'isioll (New York: Wynokoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co., 

1919), pp. 11 - 18; John G. LillIe, Jr.. Tlte Official HislOIY oflhe EighIJ,-Sixlh Dil'isioll (Chicago: 

State Publication Socicty, 1921), pp. 1- 17; ;lIld Tile 881h Dil'isioll ill Ihe World War of 

1914- 1918 (New York: Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co., 1919). PI'. 21- 36. 

34 Memo, WCD for CofS, 21 May 11, sub: Plans for a possible expeditionary force to 

France, WCD tile 10050- 21. RG 165. NARA; Mcmo. WCD for CofS, ~ub: Organization of the 

2d Division (Regular) for service overseas, approved 20 Sep 17, and Memo. TAG to multiple 

addresses, 21 Sep 11, Organization of2d Di vision (Regular), both 2d Inf Div tile, DAMH-HSO; 

Ulliled SIMes Army ill fhe World War, 1917- 1919: I~oficy-Formillg Dacl/me",s tllllerict/il 

E.\pe(lilioll(ll)' Forces, (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948) p. 35. hereafter 

cited as DocIllIICIIIS; Ulliled Slales Army ill lite World War, 1917- 1919: Tmillillg alld Ihe Use of 

Aillericull UllifS willi Brilish alld Frellch, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1948) 

pp. 491 - 92, hereancr citcd as Tmillillg; Oliver L. Spaulding and John W. Wright. The Secolld 

Dil'isioll. Amedc(l1I Expedilioll(llY Forces ill Fi-tillce 1917- 1919 (New York: Hillman Press. Inc .. 

1937), pp. 6- 7; Thomas Shipley. TIle HislOJY oflhe A.E.F. (New York: Gcorge H. Dorna Co .. 

1920), p. 46; Allan R. Millelt, Semper Fidelis: The HislOlY oflhe Ulliled Slates Marille GO/ps 

(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc .• 1980). I)p. 289- 94. 

35 Dilli~'iQI15, pp. 47- 109 passim. 

36 Edward M. Coffman, The Hill oflhe SWOI"(/: TIle Career of PC)'1011 C. March (Madison: 

University of Wisconsin Press. 1966). pp. 129- 30: WD GO 13, 1918. 

J7 Memo, WCD for TAG, I Aug 11, sub: Utiliz;Ltion of colored men dmflcd for the NatiOI1<Ll 

AmlY. WCD file 8142- 13, Memo, WCD for CofS. 21 Aug 17. same subject, Memo. OCS for 

TAG, 24 Oct 17, sub: Organization of the Division. Colored, WeD file 8142- 24, RG 165, 

NA RA ; Divisiolls, pp. 431 - 35. 

38 Memo, WCD for CIS, 13 Nov 17, sub: Utilization of Color cd nit ~ of the National Guard 

and Colored Drafl, and Ltr., TAG to Brig Gen Ray Hoffman, 5 Jan 18, sub: 93d Division 

(Provisional), WCD filc 8 142, RG 165, NARA; GO I, Provisional Division (Colored). 24 Dce 

1917. 93d Inf Div file. DAMH-HSO: Dil'i.l·iulls. p. 437. 

39 Memo. War Plan Division (WI'D) for Cors, 9 May 18. sub: Organi7.3tion of Troops of 

the Puerto Rico Drafl. WPD file 9816- 191, and Memo. WI'D for Cars. 27 May 18, same subject, 

WI'D file 9876- 203, RG 165, NARA; ZOlle oflhe IlIIe";or, p. 661 - 62: Dircc/OJJ' oj1i'oops, p. 

1400. 

40 Memo. WCD for Corso 23 Nov 17, sub: Organization ofthc Cavalry Di vision (Regular), 

Memo. WCD for TAG, 27 Nov 17, same subject, weD file 6815- 32, RG 165. NA RA; ZOlle of 

Ille IlIIeriol". pp. 673- 74; I'almer. Bakel". 2: 18- 19. 

41 MenlO. WPD forCofS. undated, sub: 15th Cavalry Division. and Drafl Tclg, WI'D to CG. 

AEF, 10 May 18. WCD file 6815- 64. RG 165, NARA; Zone oflhe fllieriol', p. 67 1- 74; 

DireclOlJ' of Troops, p. 1270. 

012 ZOlle oflhe fllleriOJ·. pp. 52- 55; Coffman. The Nill oflhe Sword. pp. 85- 90: Edward M. 

ColTman. The War To Eml All Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966). pp. 171- 80; 
THE TEST- WORLD WAR I 77 

Kriedbcrg ilnd Henry, Mobili;:(lfioll. pp. 302- 09. 

H Memo. wro for Dir of Operations. 31 May 18, sub: Qrglmization of the next 23 divisions, Wr Q file 848 1-84, RG 165, NARA. 

44 Because the 15th Cavalry Division was demobi lized in May 1918, the number 15 was 

available in July for a Regular Army infantry division wilhoul a duplication ofnlll11bcrs. 

45 Memo, WI'D for TAG, 8 Jul 18, sub: Organizlllion of Ihe 91h. 101 h, 11 \h. 121 h, 131h, and 

14th Divisions. WPQ fi le 8481 -96, and Memo, WPD for TAG, 19 Jul 18, sub: Organization of 

Ihe 151h, 161h, 171h, 181h, 191h, and 20lh Divisions, WI'O file 8481 - 97, RG 165, NA RA; TID 12, 

Field Artillery Brigade (Combat Division), 14 Jan 18, correcled 10 26 Jun 18; ZOlle o/flle 

Illicrior, pp. 641 - 61. Motorized llrtillery during World War I referred to tractor-drawn field 

artillery. 

46 lOl/e of the ""erior, p. 629; Director), ofTrQQps. p. 1405. 

H Rpls of the Governor Gcncrnl o f the Phi lippine Islands. 19 17. printed in ARWD, 1918. pp. 

5, find 1918. printed in ARWD. 19/9, p. 6; ZOlleoftfle IlIIeriOl", pp. 674- 75. 

48 Ol"del" of BailIe of the Uni/e(1 Simes Lalld FOl"ces ill Ihe World Wal". American 

£xpe(li/ioll(ll), Forces. Gel/eml Ne(ldl/llarler.~. Armies. Arm)' CQlPs. Sen/ices ofSllppf),. Separate 

Fm·t,:es (Washi ngton. D.C.: Govcrnme nt Pri nting Office. 1949), I). 386, hc reaftcr c ited as 

Gellemf Headql/arlerS, Armies. 

49 Mcmo. Cors for TAG. 23 Jul 18. sub: Disposal of the Colored draft (Organization ofncw 

divisions). A WC fi le 8 142- 185. RG 165, NARA; ZOl/e oflhe IlIIeriol" pp. 662- 70. 

50 Changes in the tables o f organization and weapons can be t"lced through the fo llowing 

sources: TIO Series A. 14 January 19 18, corrC(:ted to 26 June 1918 (printed in Orgalli;wlioll, 

AEF, PI'. 335-88). and tablcs printed in Gel/esis of Ihe Allle";CIII/ Fil":'·/ Arlll)' (Washington. D.C.: 

Government Printing Office. 1938), pp. 59- 61. 

~I George M. Chin, The Mllchille GI/II. 3 \'ols. (Washington, D.C.: Govcrnmcnt Printing 

Office. 1951). I: 173- 86; Sevellon Brown. The SIOI)' of Ordllfmce ill the Wodt/ 11'(11" (Washington. 

D.C.: James Will iam Bryan I'rcss, 1920), I)P. 128- 30. 

52 AEF G031.1918. 

S) " Rcport of Assistant ColS. G- 1. G.B.O .. A.E.F. and Statistics," VIIi/eli Stales Arm)' ill 

Wodtl Wor: Reports of COII/II/(/Iu!e,·-ill-Chiej. A.E.F. (Washington, D.C" Govcrnment Printing 

Office, 1948), PIl, 150-52, hercafier CilCd as Rel)Qr/HfCINC. 

S4 Ibid.; AEF GOs9. 46. and 111. 1918. 

55 Pcrshing. M)' £1"jJerif.'lIcf!s, 1:291. 353- 65; ()Qnald Smythe. Persllillg: Geneml oflhe 

Armies (Bloomington: Indiana University Prcss. 1986). p. 72; Dil'isiolls. pp. 437-42. 

56 Coffman. The WlIr To EII(I All W(U:s, pp. 168- 7 1; Weiglcy. flis/OI)' oflile Vlli/ed Siales 

Army, p. 384; [)ocumellts, Tl"flillillg contains numerous documents pertaining to the agreement 

and training with British and French. 

$7 Huntcr Liggeu. AEF. Tell Years Ago ill Fmllce (New York: Dodd. Mead, and Co., 1928), 

p. 28 Gel/em/ Neat/ql/lIrters. Arlllies. PI'. 193.220,237,268,290.316, and 329; Dil'isiolls. 1'1'. 

251,269.293,363- 64.379. 

58 Gellerlll fleadqu{/l"Ien. Al'llIie.\·, pp. 38 1- 83; Joe l R. Moorc, "The North Russian 

E",pedition:' 11I/tlllllyJol//'Iw/29 (Jul 1926): 1- 2 1; Richard K. Kolb. "Polar Bears vs. Bois." 78 

IIFW Mflgfdll(, (Jan 1991): 16- 20; Dil'isioll.v. p. 363. 

S9 1u addition to combat losses, the f:11I of 1918 witucssed one or the mosl severe innucnza 

epidemics in history. which spread 10 over 25 percellt of the Amly in F"mec (sec Coffman. Tlte 

War To Eml All Wars. pp. 81 - 84). 

60 "Final Rcport" and "Rcport of Assistant Cors, G- I. G.II.Q. , A.E.F., printed in Reporl$ of 

CINC. PI'. 55. 147- 52; Mauriec Matloff. cd .. AlllericlW MilitalJ' t/islOl)' (Washington. D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1969). p. 40 I. 

6t "RCI)ort of Assistant ColS. G I. G.B.O .. A.E.F.," printed in Reports ofCINC. I'p. 

147- 52. 

62 " Final I~cport of Assistant Chief of Staff (G- 4)." and "Final Report of Ihe Chicf of 

Artillery, American E"'pedi lion:lry Forces." printed in RI!IIOI'IS of CINC. PI'. 77. 205- 06; 
78 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

McKenney. "Field Artillery:' p. 188. 

63 10hn Hagood, The Sen'ices of Supply. A Memoir of ,IIe Gl"lml Wll/" (Boston: Houghton 

Miffiill Co., 1927), pp. 317- 20: DM$ioIlS, p. 389. 

64 L1 r, Pershing 10 Maj Gen George Bell, Jr. , 24 Oct 18, no subject, Pershing Papers, LC; lSI 

Endorsement 323.3 (GS) Military Department and Di visions, Uq. Slst Division to CinC, AEF, 4 

OCI 18, no subject, GS file ]23.3, and Memo, Cors AEF for TAG, 18 Oct 18, no subject. The 

Institute of Heraldry (T[OH) Library, Fort Belvoir, Va.; Ken Sltwitzkc, "The Shoulder Palch," 

II/fill/II)' 65 (Dec 1975): 40-42. 

65 Conr-Id H. Lanzc. "The Artillery Support of the Infantry in the A.E.F," Fielll Ar/illery 

Jour/wi 26 (Jan- Feb 1936): 67- 68; TimOlhy Nenninger. "Tactical Dysrunction in the AEF, 

191 7- 1918," ,"'ili/(/ry Affairs 5 I (Oel 1987): 177- 81: Robert H. Fleleher, Jr., "The 351h Division 

in the First Phase of Ihe Meuse Argonne Operalion, Seplembcr 26- OcIODe r, 1918:' p. 2 1, Ms, 

35th lnfDiv file, DAMI-I-H SO. 
CHAPTER 4 

The Aftermath of World War I 

I IlIillk 'hat /he work of {his Board 1m,\' IIl1derlakell so Joon after the close of Imstililies ,hal (he members \I'ere IIlIduly il/j/llel/ced by the special Sill/aliol1 which exisled during 01/1" parlicipalioll ;11 'he World War. 

General John J. Pershing l 

The abrupt end of World War 1 and the immediate demand for demobilization 

threw the Army into disarray, but out of the disorder eventually came a llew military establishment. Between the armistice in November 1918 and the slimmer of 

\923 the Army occupied a portion of Ge rmany, demobilized its World War I 

forces, helped revise the laws regu lating ils size and structure, and devised a 

mobilization plan to meet future emergencies. Amid the turmoil Army officers 

analyzed and debated their war experience, arguing the merits of a large, powerful infan try div ision designed to penetrate an enemy posi ti on with a frontal 

assault versus a lighter, more mobile unit that could outmaneuver an opponent. 

The cavalry division received a si milar but less extensive examination. After 

close scrutiny. the Army adopted new infantry and cava lry divisions and reorganized its forces to meet postwar conditions. 

Occupation and Demobilization 

Hosti lities ended on II November 19 18, but the Army sti ll had many tasks to 

perform, including the occupation of the Coblenz bridgehead on the Rhine River. 

For that pu rpose, Maj . Gen. Joseph T. Di ckman, at the direction of Gene ral 

Pershing, organized the Third Army on 15 November. Ten U.S. divisions eventually served with it- the I st through 5th, 32d, 42(~ 89th , and 90th in Germany and 

the 33d in Luxembourg- as well as the French 2d Cava lry Division. Also e lements of the 6th Division began moving toward the bridgehead in later April 

1919, but that movement was halted in early May. Di visional missions included 

the administration of civi l government, the maintcnance of public order, and the 

prevention of renewed <lggression.2 

The divisional structure proved unsatisfactory for thc mi litary government 

rol e. Its organization could no! mesh with the civil government of Germ<lI1Y, 

and the Third Army lacked the lime and expertise needed to mature a uniform 

civil affairs program. Furthermore, assigned areas for the divisiona l units shift-
80 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Americall OCCIlPlIf;OIlII'OOPS (;1'0$$ the Rhille at Cob/ell:!. GermallY. JlIlllftUY 1919. 

cd rapidly as divisions departed Ihe bridgehead fo r Ihe United States. Yet, under 

the terms of occupation, the entire bridgehead had to remain under American 

su pervision. By the summer of 19 19 American divisions had len for home, and 

the military gove rnme nt fu nctio ns moved from the tactica l un its to an a rea 

command, the Office of Civil Affairs. With the departure of Ihe divisions, only 

brigade-size or sma ller units remained in Germany, and they too departed by 

January 1923.3 

As the Third Army grappled with occupation duty. offic ials in Washington COIlfronted the problem of demobilizing the wartime army. On II November 19 18 a 

quarter of a million draftees had been under orders to report fo r military duty. With 

the signing of the armistice the War Department immedi ately halted the mobiliZ<ltion process, but it had no plans fo r the Army's transition to a peacetime roleA 

One man, Col. Casper H. Conrad of the War Plans Division, had begun to 

study demobilization, and he submitted his report eleven days after the armistice. 

From Conrad's severa l proposals on disbanding the forces, Chief of Sta ff March 

decided to discharge soldiers by units rathe r than by individuals. Because 

National Guard and National Army divisions originally had geographica l ties, he 

also ruled that units returning from overseas would be demobilized at the centers 

nearest to where their men had en tered the serviee.S 

Demobilization began in November 1918. March fi rst disbanded the partially 

orga nized divisions in the United States, making their camps available as dis-
THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR 1 81 

/sl Field ArlillelY Brigafle. /sl Divisiol/, 01/ OCCllpllliol/ dilly ill Germany. Augusl 19 J 9 

charge cen ters. In January 1919 Pers hing sent home the divisions that had been 

skeletonized or had perfo rmed replacemen t func ti ons. Comba t div isions followed, beginn ing with Ihe 92d, the Army's only black division. A year after the 

armistice the Army had demobilized fifty-five of its sixty-two divisions, including all the National Guard and National Army units (Table 7). Before the units 

left service, the War Department gave the American people the opportu nity to 

show their appreciation to the men who had fought in the war. Boston, New York, 

Philadelphia, Ba ltimore, and Washington held divisiona l parades and ovcr five 

hundred regiments marched through the streets of their homctowns.6 

After November 19 19 only the 1st through the 7th Divisions and a few smaller units remained active. All were Regular Army units. These divisions retained 

their wartime configurations, but personnel au thorizations fo r fisca l ycar 1920 

prevented full manning. Divisional regiments had the strengths prescribed in the 

prewar tables oforganiZ<1tion issued on 3 May 191 7, and the ammunition, supply, 

and sanitary trains hnd only enough men to care for their equipmenl. Wi thin only 

a year, the mighty combat force the Army had struggled to build during 1917- 18 

had vanished without any plans to replacc it.7 The heltcr-skelter pace of dcnlObilization and the lack of a ny sound tra nsitional planning grently undermined 

efforts to create an effective peacetime force. A student of demobilization, 

Frederic L. Paxon, chamctcrized this situation as worse than a "madhouse in 

which the cmzy might be incarccrated. They were at large." 8 
TABLE 7 

Demobi li zation of Divisions 

/)i1'i~' iQII Rellll'II1!tliO u.s. Delllobifi:c(/ CiIlIlI)I Loc(lliol1 

I" September 1919 Zachary Taylor, Ky. 

2d August 1919 Travis, Tex. 

3d August 1919 Pike, Ark. 

4th August 1919 Dodge, Iowa 

51h July 19 19 Gordon, Ga. 

6th June 1919 Grant, III. 

7th June 1919 Funston, Kans. 

81h- September 1919 September J 919 Dix, N.J. 

9th • Fcbnmry 1919 Sheridan. Ala. 

10th • Fchnlary 191 9 Funston, Kans. 

11th • FchOlary 1919 Meade, Md. 

12th • February 191 9 Devens, Mass. 

13th • March 1919 Lewis, Wash. 

14th • Fcbnll'lry 1919 Custer, Mich. 

151h • February 191 9 Logan, Tex. 

16th • March 1919 Kcamy, Calif. 

17th • Fcbn13ry 1919 Beauregard, La. 

18th • Fcbrunry 1919 Travis, Tex. 

19th • Fcbnmry [91 9 Dodge. Iowa 

20th • Fcbmary 1919 Sevier. S.C. 

261h April 1919 May 1919 Devens. Mass. 

27th March 1919 AI)ri11919 UpIOIl, N,Y. 

281h A1)ril 1919 Mlly 1919 Oix, N.J. 

29th May 1919 May 1919 Dix, N.J. 

30th Apri1191 9 May 1919 Jackson, S.C. 

31s1 December 19 18 January 1919 Gordon. Ga, 

32d May 1919 May 191 9 Custer, Mich. 

33d May 19 19 June 19 19 Granl. Ill. 

34th January 1919 February 1919 Grant, 111. 

35th April 191 9 May 1919 Funston, Kans. 

36th JUlie 191 9 June 191 9 Oowie, Tex. 

37th April 1919 June 191 9 Shennan, Ohio 

38th December 1918 January 1919 Zachary Taylor, Ky. 

39th December 191 8 January 1919 Oeaurcgard, La . 

40lh March 1919 Apri11919 Kearny, Calif. 

41st February 19 19 February 19 19 Dix, N.J. 

42d May 1919 May 1919 Di 1t, N.J. 

761h December 1918 Janu:uy 1919 Devcns, Mass, 

77th April 1919 May 1919 Upton, N.Y. 

78th June 1919 June 191 9 Oix, N.J. 

79th May 1919 June 19[9 Di1t. N.J. 

80th May 1919 June 1919 Lee. Va. 

81s1 June 191 9 June 1919 Iloboken, N.J. 

82d May 1919 May 1919 Upton, N.Y. 

83d January 191 9 October 191 9 Shernlan. Ohio 

841h January 1919 July 1919 Zachary Taylor, Ky. 

851h March 19 19 April 1919 Custer, Mich. 

86th Janu,lry 191 9 JilIlUary 191 9 Granl, III. 

871h January 191 9 February 1919 Dix. N.J. 

88th June 191 9 JUlie 19 19 Dodge. Iowa 
THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR I 

TABLE 7- Colllillllefl 

DiI'isioll Rellll'//e,11O u.s. Demobilizel/ 

89th May 1919 July 1919 

9O,h June 1919 June 19 19 

91s1 April 1919 May 19 19 

92d February 1919 Fcbru3ry 1919 

93d@ 

95th , December 19 19 

96th , January 1919 

97th , December J 9 18 

981h , November 19 18 

99,h , November 19 18 

100lh , November 19 18 

lOI s! , November 19 18 

102d , November 1918 

Notes: .. Only part of the division overseas. 

/I Did not go overseas, 

Call1plLocfllioll 

Funston, Kans. 

Bowie, Tex. 

Presidio of 

San Francisco, Calif. 

Meade, Md. 

Shem131l, Ohio 

Wadsworth, N.Y. 

Cody, N.Mex. 

McCle llan, Ala . 

Wheeler, Ga. 

Bowie, Tex. 

Shelby, Miss. 

Dix, N.J. 

@ Provisional division, headquarters demobilized in France in May 1918. 

The AEF Evaluates World War I Divisional Organizations 

83 

Although rapid demobilization destroyed the Army 's combat e ffectiveness, military and congressional leaders wanted to avoid what they considered the major 

mistake made after every earlier wnr- the loss of well-trained, experienced, combat 

soldiers. Notwithstanding that World War I was to have been "the war to end all 

wars," perceived intenwtional realities required that the nation be prepared for war. 

80th Cong ress and the War Department had been considering changes in the 

National Defense Act, and Brig. Gen. Lytle Brown, Chi e f of the War Plans 

Division, suggested that March obtain the AEF's views on the new Army establishment. He sllspected that division, corps, and army organizations used in the "Great 

War" might not meet future battlefield requirements because they were tied so 

closely to trench w"'J.rfare, a type of warfare he thought unlikely to recur.9 

Under War Department orders, Pershing set up boa rds in France to examine 

the AEF experiences wit h the arms and services and to draw appropriate lessons 

for the future. At his sta ff's suggestion, he also cOllvened the Superior Board to 

review the other boards' findings. In April Pershing re lieved Dickman as the 

commander of Third Army and appointed him and other senior officers to the 

review board. All its members had close professiona l tics to Pershing and had 

witnessed from various positio ns the "success" of the heavy in fantry division 

during the war. The board's primary mission was an examination of that in fantry 

div ision. After a two-month investigation, the Superior Board tendered its recolllmendation, basically endorsing the World War I square division with modifications. Changes centered on improvements in combat and service suppor!, firepower, and command and control.IO 
84 MANEUVER AND FI REPOWER 

5,h Fieltl ArfillelY tmops lIlllte h'l Oil'i.\';oll parade, September 1919 

Changes in command and control touched all divisional echelons. The board 

recommended headquarters detachments for artillery and infantry brigades along 

with larger staffs. Because the ammunition train served primarily with the artillery 

brigade, it proposed making the train an organic clement of that unit but serving 

both artillery and infantry troops. Similarly, the board members believed that the 

engineer train should be a part of the engineer regiment. Following the principle of 

placing resources under the control of those who used them, the board wanted to 

drop the machine gun battalion from the infantry brigade and place a machine gun 

company in each infantry banalion. The board members believed that only when 

the infantry cOlllmander had his own machine gun company cOllld he learn to handle it properly. For training in mass machine gu n fire, the board advised that the 

companies assemble occasionally under a brigade machine gun officer. [t also 

advocated the retention of a divisional machine g un officer and a di visiona l 

machi ne gun battalion to provide a reserve for ba rrage or mass fire. 

The board regarded th e rear area div isio n tra in headquarters and the accompanying military poli ce as unnecessary. When needed, the div ision commander 

could appoi nt an officer to command the rear elements. The military poli ce 

coul d become a separate company. The war had disclosed comp lex commu ni cation problems, particularly in the use of radios, but no uniform signal orga ni zation existed. To overcome Ihat defect, the board advised that a closer exami nation of divisional signa l needs be conducted with consideration given to di viding them along fu nctio nal lines. 

Turning to firepower, the Superior Board recommended the elimination of 

ineffect ive weapons and the addition or retention of effective ones. Based on 

wartime experience, the 6-inch mortar battery in the field arti llery brigade was 
THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR I 85 

deleted and a howitzer company added to the infantry regiment. The infantry was 

to continue to use 37-l11m. gu ns and 3-inch Stokes mortars temporarily, but eventually howitzers were to replace the mortars. The board found that mortars lacked 

mobility, accuracy, and range and were difficult to conceal and su pply. The board 

looked upon tractor-drawn arti llery pieces as a success in combat and felt that 

retention of motorized artill ery was appropriate if future wars were fOllgh t in 

countries having an extensive road net like thai in France. For flexibility, however, 

the board adv ised that one 75-mm. gun regiment remain horse-drawn and the 

other be motor-drawn, along wit h a motorized ISS-mill. howitzer regiment. They 

decided Ihat Ihe new weapon, the tank, used during the war to break up wire 

en tanglements and to reduce machine gun nests, belonged to the infantry, but 

instead of assigning tank units to the division, the officers placed them at army 

level. Tan ks could then be parceled out to divisions according to need. 

The board also addressed the combat support needs of the division. Since the 

division routinely employed aircraft for artillery observation, liaison, registration 

of fi re , and reco nnaissance , the board suggested the ad d ition of an a ir 

squad ron, a ba lloon company, a photographic section, and an intelligence officer to the division. The board endorsed the addition of a litter batta lion 10 the 

sanitary trai n to improve med ical support and the el imination of all horsedrawn transportation from that unit and from the rest or the division, except for 

artillery. Because engi ncers had often been used as infantry in combat, some 

board members proposed reducing the number of engineer troops. The board 

concl uded, however, that while engineers often had been employed as infantry, 

this practice stemmed from a failure to understand their role. It advised the 

retention of the engineer regiment. 

Summarizing the requirements for the fu ture infantry division, the Superior 

Board recommended that it be organized to meet varying combat and terrain conditions encountered in maneuver warfare but have only those elements Ihal it customarily needed. The army corps or army level would supply infrequently used 

organizations. The board's report endorsed a square division that numbered 

29,000 officers and enlisted men- an organization " imbued with the divisional 

spirit, sense of comradeshi p and loyalty, that wi ll guarantee service . .. in critical 

moments when the supreme effort must be madc."11 

Although Pershing had not employed a cava lry division in France, the 

Superior Board also examined its structure in light of Allied cx periences, particularly in Italy and Palestine. The board concluded that, except for distant reconnaissance by airplanes, the missions of mounted troops- screeni ng, shock action, 

and tactical reconnaissance- remained important on the postwar battlefield. To 

conduct such missions. the cavalry division nceded to capitalize on its mobil ity 

and firepower. Finding the 1917 unit of 18,000 men too large, the board entertained two proposals for reorganizing it. One cal led for a division of three cava lry 

regimen ts, an artill ery regiment, and appropriate combat and service support 

units; the other comprised two cavalry brigades, each with two cavalry regiments, 
86 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Superior BOlml J/IembeD', Left to right, /I1aj. Gel/s. Joseph T Dickman, Johll L. 

Hilles, (/I/d Willialll Lassilel'. Col. Geolge R. Spa/dil/g, IJrig. Gell. William 811rtt. 

mI(l Col. Parker Nifl. 

and a machine gun sq~la rOI1, <Ill artillery regiment, and auxiliary units. The board 

rejected the three-regiment unit because it eliminated a general officer billet, recommending instead a square cavalry div ision of some \3,500 men. 

The Superior Board completed ils work 011 I July 1919, but Pershi ng held the 

report to consider its findi ngs. He did not forward it to the War Department until 

almost a year later.12 

Development of Divisions Under the 1920 National Defense Act 

Although Pershing temporarily shelved the Superior Board Report, Congress 

and the War Department proceeded to explore postwar Army organization. On 3 

August 1919, Secretary Baker proposed a standing army of approximately 500,000 

men and universal mil itary training for eighteen- and nineteen-year-old males, With 

that number the department envisaged maintaining one cavalry and twenty infantry 

divisions. March testified that before 1917, when the Army was stationed at small, 

scattered posts, officers had no occasion to command brigades or divisions or gain 

experience in managing large troop concentrations. Under the proposed reor'ganization, officers would have the opportunity to command large units and to train combined arms units, thus correcting a major weakness of past mobilizations. 13 
THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR [ 87 

After much debate Congress amended the National Defense Act on 4 June 

1920, providing for a new military establishment but scuttling the unpopular univ 

versal military training proposal. Instead it authorized a Regular Army of296,OOO 

officers and enlisted men, a National Guard of 435,000 men, and an Organized 

Reserve (Officers Reserve Corps and Enlisted Reserve Corps) of unrestricted 

size. To improve mobil ization the law required that the Army, as far as practical, 

be organized into brigades, divisions, and army corps, with the brigades and div ~ 

sians perpetuating those that had served in the war. The new law replaced the old 

territorial departments with corps areas, which assumed the lasks of administer· 

ing and training the Army. Each corps area was to have at least one National 

Guard or Organized Reserve division. Corps areas were to be combined into 

army areas for inspection, mobilization, maneuver, and demob ilization. Rather 

than mandati ng the structure of regiments as in the past, Congress authorized the 

number of officers and enlisted men for each arm and service and instructed the 

president to organize the units. To adv ise on National Guard and Organized 

Reserve matters, Congress directed the format ion of committees with members 

from the Regular Army and both reserve components. t4 

On I September 1920, the War Department established the general out line of 

the postwar Army. It consisted of three army areas divided into nine corps areas 

(Map 1). Each army area supported one Guard and two Reserve cavalry divisions, 

and each corps area mai nta ined one Regular, two Gliard, and three Reserve 

infantry divisions, all to be sustained by combat support and combat service sup· 

port units to be perfected later. ls 

Six committees of the War Plans Division developed the postwar Army. Only 

one, however, the Committee on Organization, dealt directly with the structure of 

the division through the preparation or organizational tables. Until that work was 

completed, no rea listic calculation orruturc military requirements could be made. 

The other committees derined the roles or the National Guard and the Organized 

Reserves, estimated the number or Rcguln r Army person nel required to trai n nnd 

administer them, established mann ing requirements ror rore ign garrisons, deter· 

mined the number or regulars needed ror an ex peditionary force, and fixed the 

distri bution of the Regular Army in the United States to meet strategic and train· 

ing considerations. 16 

The Committee on Organization prescribed a 23,OOO*man square division 

patterned after the unit or World War I. Seek ing comments from beyond the 

conrines or the General Staff, Col. William Lassiter or the War Plans Division 

sent the tables to the commandants of the Infantry School at Fo rt Benning, 

Georgia; the Ge neral Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and the 

General Staff College in Washington, D.C., as well as to General Pershing's 

A EF headqua rters in Washington.17 

Faced with the possibility or having a decision made without his views being 

considered, on I G June Pershing fina lly forwarded the Superior Board report 

along with his comments aboul the in fantry div ision, which differed substantially 
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90 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

from the board's findings, to Baker. [n comments prepared mostly by Col. Fox 

Conne r, Pershing suggested a 16,875·man division having a single infantry 

brigade of three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, a cavalry squadron, and 

combat support and combat service support units, a design that foreshadowed the 

triangular division the Army adopted for World War 11 .18 

Pershing felt the Superior Board undertook its work 100 soon aftcr the close 

of hostilities and that its report suffered unduly from the special circumstances 011 

the Western Front. After examining all organi zationa l features, he concluded that 

no one divisional structure was ideal for all battlefi eld situations. Factors stich as 

the mobi lity and flexibility of the division to meet a variety of tasks, the probable 

theater of operations, and the road or ra il network available to support the division had to be weighed. The most likely future theater of war for the Army was 

still considered to be Nort h America, and he believed that the infan try divisions 

employed in France were too unwieldy and immobile for that region. Therefore, 

he recommended a small mobi le division.19 

According to Pershing, specific signposts marked the path to a smaller division, among them putting infrequently used support units at the army corps or 

army level, organizing the divisional staff to handle needed attached units, making a machine gun company an integra l part of the infantry battalion, and providing horse- or mul e-drawn vehicles throughout the division because of the poor 

roads in the United States. Summarizing the requirements for the infantry division, he wrote: "The division should be sma ll enough to permit its bei ng 

deployed from ... a single road in a few hours and, when moving by rail, to permit all of its elements to be assembled on a si ngle railroad line within twenty-four 

hOllrs; this means that the division must not exceed 20,000 as maximum."20 

On 18 June representatives from the General Staff and Pershing's headquarters conferred to iron OLi t the differences between the two positions. The conference failed to reach agreement. Therefore, at Baker's direction, a special commitIce met to solve Ihis organizational issue,2! 

Like the Superior Board, the Spec ial Committee, commonly referred to as the 

La ssiter Committee, drew upon the talents of fo nner AEF officers. From the 

General Staff, besides Colonel Lassiter, came Lt. Col. Briant H. Wells, Maj. John 

W Gulick, and Capt. Arthur W Lane. Majs. Stuart Hei ntzelman and Campbell 

King represented the General Staff College; Maj. Hugh A. Drum, the Genera l 

Services Schools; and Col. Charles S. Farnsworl h, the Infantry School. Col. Fox 

Conner and Capt. George C. Marshall spoke for Pershing. Except for Farnsworth, 

who had commanded the 37th Division during combat, all had held army corps, 

army, and General Headquarters staff positions where they had gained firsthand 

knowledge about the operation of div isions and higher commands in France. [n 

addition, Wells had helped draft the initial proposal for the square div ision adopted during the war; Con ner had been a French interpreter for the General Staff in 

19 [7 when the proposal was prepared; and Heintzelman had edited General 

Pershing's report of operations in France.22 
THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR 1 91 

Meeti ng between 22 June and 8 July 1920, the committee examined three 

questions: Was the World War I division too large? Irso, should the Army adopt a 

smaller division comprising three infantry regiments? Finally, if a division of four 

infantry regiments were retained, could it be reduced to fewer than 20,000 men, a 

figure acceptable \0 Pershing?23 

The committee reviewed all previous divisional studies and recommendations; acquainted itself with views held by officers of the General Staff, departments, and operating services of the Army about divisions; and investigated the 

views about them developed al the service schools since the end of the war. 

Approximately seventy officers appea red before the committee, including Col. 

William (Billy) Mitchell of the Air Service and Brig. Gen. Samuel D. 

Rochenback, the former chief of the Tank Corps, who testified about two new 

weapon systems lIsed in the war- the airplane and the tank.24 

From the evidence, the committee concluded that the wartime infantry division was 100 large and unwieldy. In reality it had been an army corps without the 

proper organization. The division's size made moving the unit by road and railroad 01' passing through lines an extremely complex and time-consuming process. 

Furthermore, its size had compl icated the problems of command and control of 

all activities in combat.25 

The committee examined various organizational options. The argument for 

th rce (versus four) infantry regiments in the division centered on the division's 

probable area of employment, North America. Experts deemed another war in 

Europe unl ikely, and they doubted that the Army would agai n fight on a battlefield like that see n in France. They felt technological advan ces in artillery, 

machine guns, and aviation made obsolete stabilized and highly organized lines 

and flanks resting on impassable obstacles, such as those encountered 0 11 the 

Western Front. Future enemies would most likely organize their forces in great 

depth; therefore, the Army had to be prepared to overcome that cha llenge. 

Nevert heless, the committee bel ieved a div ision of four infa ntry regiments, 

although lacking the flexi bility of Pershing's suggested unit, would have the necessary mobility and striki ng power. Divisional support troops needed to be reduced, 

but the retention of the square division preserved the organizations for army corps 

and armies that had been developed during the war. Because most officers were 

famil iar with those units, no change in doctrine was required above the division 

level. On a more mundane level, the retention of general officers' billets also inn uenced those who wanted to keep the square division. Its brigades required brigadier 

generals, which allowed ofl'icers to rise from second lieutenants to general officers 

within their specialties, while a smaller triangular division would terminate that 

progression at the colonel level. Concluding its examination, the committee decided 

a fie ld commander could more readily modify the square di vision to oppose a lesser enemy than strengthen a smaller organization to fight a powerful foe.26 

The third question remained: Could the Army reduce the size of the square 

div ision to increase mobi lity? Recolllmendations to achieve this included a reduc-
92 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

lion in the !lumber of platoons in the infantry company from four to three and a 

cut in the number of companies in the battalion by a like amount, a realignment 

of the ratio between rifles and machine guns, elimination of the 155~mm. howitzers, and the removal of unnecessary support troops. The division could obtain 

add itional I'roops from pools of combat support and service units located at the 

army corps or army leveL The Lassiter Committee concl uded that the square division could be cui in size yet retain much of its firepower.27 

After making its report, the Lassiter Committee prepared tentative tables of 

organization for the div ision, wh ich March approved on 3 1 August. When the 

War Department distributed the draft tables in the fa ll of 1920 for the division, 

it totaled 19,385 officers and enlisted men (Cho!'1 5) and covered about thirty 

miles of road space in march formation. To arrive at that strength and size, each 

of the four infantry regiments lost 700 men. The regiment consisted of three 

in fantry battalions and su pply, howitzer, and headquarters companies. Each battalion included one machine gun company and three rifle companies. The 

assignment of a machine gun company to each infantry battalion simpli fied 

command and con trol of those weapons, and the realignment of the guns created a substan tial saving in personnel. Machine gun units were e liminated from 

the infantry brigades, and the divisional machine gun battalion was replaced by 

a tank company, which was 10 serve as a di visional mobile reserve. The committee endorsed Pershing's suggestion of a divisional tank company bu t was 

aware that a single company could not mOll nt an effective attack on a stabilized 

front; the la rge numbers of tanks required for that type of operation would have 

to come from the army level. The committee dropped the 155-mm. howitzer 

regiment but stipulated its return to the division whcn these weapons acqu ired 

the necessary mobility for use on the North American con tinent. The engineer 

regiment and train were combined and reorganized initially as a battalion 

because the planners thought that the division had little nced for large numbers 

of engineers in mobile warfare, which precluded building ex tensive fortifications, trenches, and simil ar works. The chief of engineers and others, however, 

insisted that the regiment be retained to assure mobility, permit training of lieutenant colonels and colonels, and provide the opportunity for higher grade officers to serve at least olle year in five with troops. March thus deci ded to retain 

the engineer regiment but red uced its number frolll 1,83 1 officers and enlisted 

men to 867. All these changes husbanded personnel spaces an d increased 

mobility without lessening fi repower.28 

Substantial reductions also took place in divisional services. The committee 

cut the size of the ammunition train from 1,333 to 169 officers and enlisted 

men and changed its missio n to serve only the field artillery brigade. 

Ammunition resupply for all other divisional elements shifted to the tactical 

units and qua rtermaster train. That train consisted of half motorized and half 

animal-drawn transportation, presuming the potential theater of operations to 

be the rugged North American continent. Ordnance personnel formerly 
CHART 5- lnfantry Division, 7 October 1920 

FA BTRY 

IiOU 

= 

, Oivt"on hndQu,nef$ detachmentatrnMtled 27 Apra 1921 by the division 

hlldquartlrl company. 

! On 20 April 1921 the motor'Vcl. company wu moved 10 the trains and 

the serviet company added 10 speci.ltroops. 
94 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

attached to th e va riolls regiments and the mob ile repa ir shop were gro uped in 

an ordnance company, central izi ng all ordnance maintenance. A signal company replaced the signa l battalion, and it assumed responsibilit y for message traffic between division and brigade headquarters. Withi n the infantry and fi eld 

artillery regiments, men from the combat arms were to handle a ll communications. The new division abandoned the traill headquarters and military police 

organization, following the recommendation orthe Superior Board, but retained 

a separate mi litary police company. Given the many small separate compani es 

in ils structure (division headquarters, signal, lank, service, ordnance, and mili· 

tary police), the division incl uded a new organization, headquarters, speci a l 

troops, to handle their administration and discipline. 

The committee substitutcd a medical regiment for the sanitary train and 

revamped health services. Three hospital companies replaced the four used during the wa r, and the number or ambulance compani es in the regiment was similarly reduced. In addition, a sanitary (collecting) battalion comprising three companies corrected the need for li tter-bearers, who had previously been taken from 

combat units. Veterinarians, forme rly scattered throughout the di vision, now 

formed a veterinary company. A laboratory section, a supply section, and a service company compl eted the new regiment. Despite the innovations, the regiment 

fi elded about the same number of men as its World War I eounterpart. 29 

Allesting to the greater depth envisaged for th e battlefield, an air squadron 

of thirteen airp lanes was to serve as the reconna issance unit for the division. As 

undcr the wartime configu ration, units for grou nd reconnaissance were to be 

attached as needed.30 

Although the committee 's infantry division was larger than that contemplated 

in Pershing's proposal, the planners believed it had only those organic elements 

necessary ror immediate employment under normal conditions. In an emergency, 

the new di vision could be quickly adj usted to meet an enemy armed with inferior 

arms and equipme nt. The problem the pl anners tried to address was how to 

design a division to deal with superior forces without significantly modifying il. 

The committee's div ision, nevert heless, had its opponents. Conner and Marshall 

of Pershing's staff sti ll preferred the small er triangular division for its mobility 

and ease of command and control. Years later Marshall reca ll ed that if 

Heintze lman and King had not been such "kindly characters," the triangular division would have been adopted instead of Drum's large division ) 1 

The question arises why Pershing, after becoming chief of staff on I July 

192 1, fai led to replace the infantry div ision wit h one more compatibl e with his 

co ncept ofbattlerield mobility. Marshall pointed out later that the basi c recommendation for retaining the square infantry division came from his own ofTieel'S, the Superior Boa rd. To disavow their advice would have been an embarra ssment. Furthermore, by July 1921 th e reorgani zation of the divisions had 

already begun. To undo so much work would have been unrea listic and wou ld 

have implied a lack or leadershi p within th e Army. Therefore , the sq uare 
THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR I 95 

infantry division stood with the understanding that il might be modified to deal 

wit h a pa rticular cncmy.32 

The Lassiter Committee appare ntly devoted li ttie atten tion to the cava lry 

div ision and recorded less about its rationale for retaini ng the unit. Mobi lity 

and firepower dominated the new organization. The COl/al,y JOI/I'I/(//, the offic ial organ fo r the ann , had repeatedly condemned the 19 17 organizatio n as an 

absu rd ity. Burdened with Illorc than 18,000 men and J 6,000 an ima ls, Ihe division was 100 large and cumbersome. It required a preposte rous amoun t of road 

space, roughly thirty miles. and was incapable of maneuver because il lacked 

an efficie nt communication system.33 

The postwa r cavalry di vision, approx imately two-fift hs the size of its predecessor, abandoned thc thrce-brigade structure (Chol'l 6). It incl uded two cavalry brigades (two cava lry regi men ts <1I1d one machi ne gUll squadron each), one 

horse arti ll ery batt alion, and combat a nd service support units. Each cava lry 

regi mcnt consistcd of two sq uad rons (of threc troops each), a headquarters and 

hcadq uarters troop and a scrvice troop. Initially Ihe comm ittee desired a thi rd 

squadron to train men and horses. wh ich rcp rcscnted a major invcstment in 

timc and money. Ma rch denied the rcquest bccausc the Army was to ma intai n 

twini ng centers. Unlike the infa ntry, which incorporated the mach inc gun in to 

the regi ment, cavalry mai nta ined sepa rate mach ine gun squadrons of th ree 

tTOOpS each because of the pcrcc ived immobi lity of such weapons compared 

wit h other divisio nal a rms. A headquarters for speci al troops was authorized, 

under whi ch wc re pl aced the div ision hcadquarters troop, a signa l troop, a n 

ordna ncc mai nte nance company, and a vctcrinary company. All transportation 

was pack- or anima l-drawn, except for 14 cars, 28 truc ks, and 65 motorcycles 

scattered throughout variolls headquartc rs elemcnts in the division. Wi thout 

trains, thc d ivision measured a pproximatcly 6.5 mi les if the men rode in 

columns of twos. The Army c hief of stafT approved the new cava lry division on 

3 1 August 1920.34 

After approving both types of di visions, March di rected thc preparation of 

final tables of organization. When published the following year, the infantry division fc ll just below Pershing's recommcndation of 20,000, !l umbering 19,997 

ofTicers and enlisted mcn. The cava lry division tota led 7,463.35 

As the War Plans Division prcpared the new tabl es, it also deve loped tables 

for understrcngth peacetime units bceause the Army's lelldershi p did not cx pect to 

be able to maintain the number of mcn authorized under the National Defense 

Act. These tables werc designed so tha t the un its could expand withou t having to 

undergo reorganization. The peacetime infantry division was th us cut to 11,000 

with all e lemen ts retaining thc ir intcgrity cxeept the div ision hcadquarters and 

military police companies, which were combined. The peacetime cava lry div ision 

strcngth was set at 6,000. But scvere cuts in the Wa r Depa rtmen t's budget made it 

impossi bl e initia lly evcn to publish the peacetime tabl es. Fort unately, the service 

jOlll'1l11 ls undertook that task.36 
CHART 6-Cavalry Division, 4 April 1921 

CAVALRY DIVISION 

7,463 

OIVHQ CAY BOE ENGR BN MEO CO (AMBI FABN OIV 

34' 2,803ea 357 63 790 

HHT CAY REGT MG SOON HHB&C8TTRAlNS 

TO' I,I55e8 392 227 

I I I I 

FA BTRV 

HHT HHD /6188 

'" I I " I 

CAVSQON 

J MG TAP III MED&CHAP I 

418/111 31J I 

'" 

I·SQONMHD I I. CAVTRP ~ MED&CHAP 

35 131" I 15 I 

J SUPPLVTRP I 

m I 

J MEO&CHAP I 1 Includes lour Medical Department personnel and two Chaplains that w

" 
THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WA R I 

Reorganization of Divisions 

97 

March directed the War Pla ns Div ision to implement the tentative tables of 

organization he had approved. Plranni ng for reorganization of the Army had been 

under way si nce 5 June 1920, when the War Plans Division had sel up committees 

to carry out the provisions of the National Defense Act. Officers from the Genera l 

Staff, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserves helped formulate the plans)7 

One com mi ttee, originall y charged with defining the missions of the 

National Guard and the Organized Reserves, widened its task to encompass the 

Regular Army. The committee delineated fo ur missions for the regulars: form 

an expeditionary force in an emerge ncy; furn ish troops for foreign and coastal 

defense ga rrisons; provide person nel to develop and train the reserve compo· 

nents; a nd su pply the administrative overhead of the Army. The National 

Guard's dual missions rema ined unc ha nged. It contributcd to the federa l forces 

during nationa l emergencies or war and supplied the states wit h forces to main· 

taill law and order and cope with loca l disasters. The mission of the Organized 

Reserves was to expand the Army duri ng war or nationa l emergencies. Because 

of the strong antiwar sentiment afler World War I, the cxpense of mai ntaining 

large numbers of enlisted men, the lack of trai ning fac ilities, and the possibl e 

adverse effec t on the rec ru itment for the Guard, units of the Organized 

Reserves were to have only offi cers and enlisted cadres. Afler a declaration of 

war or nationa l emergency, the rema inder of the enlisted men woul d come from 

volu ntary enlistments or the drafl.38 

Anot her committee looked into the number of divisions that could be orga· 

nized and supported during peacetime. Given a Regular Army of296,000 officers 

and en listed men, the committee determ ined that the War Department could 

mai ntain nine infantry divisions (one per corps area), three cavalry divisions (one 

per army area), and one infantry brigade of black troops in the Un ited States. Of 

these divisions, one cava lry and three infantry div isions were to be ready for war 

while the ot hers were to be at red uced strength. This arrangement evenly distributed the ex peditionary fo rces throughout the nation and provided an infantry division to serve as a mode l for the reserves withi n each corps area.39 

In view of the great personne l tu rbulence caused by the rapid demobilization, 

the commi uee recommended that the Regul ar Army quickly rebu il d its seven 

existing in fantry divisions to meet the strength in the new peacetime tables and 

permit the units to conduct realistic training. The other two plan ned infantry divisions could be organized aner the first seven had reached their reduced strength 

leve l, and whe n a ll nine atta ined that level one or more divisions could be 

increased to full man ning for war. How the Regu lar cavalry divisions were to be 

formed remained unaddressed. With 486,000 men in the National Guard. the 

committee envisioned forming eighteen Guard infan try div isions, two for each 

corps area , and three or more Guard cava lry di visions, at least one fo r each army 

area. For the Organ ized Reserves, twenty·seven infan try div isions were contem-
98 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

plated, three PCI" corps area, and three or morc cavalry divisions, at least one for 

each army area.40 

When March approved the structure of infantry and cavalry divisions, he also 

sanctioned the formation of divisions based on that report. Instead of three Regular 

Army cava lry divisions, he saw a need for only two. The Army's mobilization base 

would thus be fifty-four infantry divisions and eight or more cavalry divisions.41 

Reorganization of the Regular Army began in late 1920 as the infantry elements of the 151 through 7th Divisions began to adopt the new peacetime tables. 

In the 2d Division a Regular Army infantry brigade, the 4t h, replaced the Marine 

Corps unit that had been attached to Ihe div ision in France. As tables for other 

divisional units became available, they too were put into e ffeCl.42 

All this work quickly appea red somewhat premature. By the fall of 1921, cuts 

in Army appropriations indicated that the Regular Army could not support seven 

infantry divisions in the United States. Secretary of War John W. Weeks, there~ 

fo re, instituted a poli cy allowing inactive units to remain on the " rolls" of the 

Army but in an inoperable status-that is, without personnel and eq uipment. 

Congressional insistence o n maintaining the tactical di vision frameworks to 

ensure immediate and complete mobili zation made such arrangements necessary. 

Judging that nothing was wrong with the mobil ization plan, but recogni zing the 

shortage of funds for the fiscal year, Weeks directed that some units be taken "out 

of commission" or inactivated. The policy represented a marked departure from 

past Army experience. PreviolLsly, when a unit could not be maintained or was 

not needed. it was removed from the rolls of the Army either by disbandment or 

consolida tion with another unit. Acting othe rwise threatened to obscure the 

Army's reduced strength through a facade of paper units.43 

Nevert he less, under the new system the Army cut the div isional forces in 

September and October 1921 by inactivating the 4th through the 7th Divisions, 

except for the even numbered infantry brigade in each. These brigades- the 8th, 

10th, 12th, and 14th- remained active to serve as the nucle i of their parent divisions upon mobilization. To save even more personne l, th e 2d Division, prog rammed at wartime strength, was placed under the reduccd strength tables, leaving the Army without a fully manned division in Ihe United States.44 

During the summcr of 192 1 the General Staff turned its attention to Regu lar 

Army cava lry divisions. On 20 August the adjutant general constituted the 1st and 

2d Cavalry Divisions to meet partial mobil ization req uirements, and the fol lowing month the commandcr of the Eighth Corps Area organized the 1 st Cavalry 

Di vision. Thc headquarters of the division and its 2d Brigade were located at Fort 

Bliss, Texas, and that of the I sl Cavalry Brigade <It Douglas, Arizona. Resources 

were not available to organize a second cava lry division unlil World War 11.45 

The Regular Army di visions underwent postwar reorgani zation and reduction 

even before the War Departmcnt could determi ne their permanent stations. A 

comrnitlee establ ished in June 1920 to make recommendations about posti ng 

units never submitted a report because of the unsettled size of the Regular Army. 
THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR I 99 

When Congress funded a Regular Army of 150,000 enlisted men for 1922, the 

Acting Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, directed a new war plans 

group to prepare an olltl ine for stationing these troops. If possible, he wanted 

un its to have adeq uate hOllsing and training facilities as we ll as to be located 

where the men could assist in the development of the reserve components. The 

recommendations ca lled for the Second and Ninth Corps Areas each to have an 

infantry division, the Eighth Corps Area to have both infantry and cava lry divisions, and the remaining corps areas each to have a reinforced brigade.46 

As the existing div isions and brigades moved to their permanent stations in 

1922, the Army organized the 16th and 18th Infantry Brigades to complete the 

Regular Anny portion of the plan (Table 8). To fulfill mobilization requirements 

for nine Regular Army infantry divisions, the adjutant general also restored the 

8th and 9th Divisions to the rolls in 1923, but they remained inactive except for 

their 16th and 18th Infantry Brigades. The stationing plan allowed the regulars to 

su pport the reserves, but only the 2d Division was concentrated at one post- Fort 

Sam Houston, Texas.47 

The last large unit recommended for the Regular Army in 1920 was a black 

brigade schedu led for service along the Mexican border. However, only four 

black regimcnts, two cava lry and two infantry, remained after the war, and the 

War Department decided Ihal thcy should not be brigaded. In 1922 IwO of them, 

the 10th Cavalry and the 25th In fantry, served along the border. Of the remainder, 

the 9th Cclvalry was stati oned at Fort Ri ley. Kansas, the home of the Cavalry 

School, and the 24th Infantry was posted to Fort Benn ing, Georgia, where the 

lnfanl'ry School had been established.48 

The post- World War I Army also maintained forces in the Ph ili ppine Islands, 

China, the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Ri co, Germany, and Hawaii. To assure 

that these areas were adequately garrisoned, the Wa r Plans Di vision examined 

their manning needs. Based upon its findings, March approved the formation of 

the Panama Canal, Hawaiian, and Philippine Divisions. In 192 1 the commanders 

of those overseas depa rtments organized their units as best they could from available person nel and equipment. The infantry and field artillery brigades and many 

of the other divisional elements had numerical designations that wou ld be associated with the 10th, II th , and 12th Divisions. These elements, all table of organization units, could be assigned wherever needed in the force. Because the divisions themselves were not expected to serve outside of their respect ive territories, 

they had territorial designa tions. The division headqu arters were at Quarry 

Heights, Canal Zone; Schofield Barracks, Hawaii ; and Fort Wi lliam McKinley, 

Philippine Islands. Personnel for the Hawaiian and Panama Canal Di visions came 

from the Regular Army, but the Phi lippine Di vision was fi lled with both regu lars 

and Philippine Scouts, with the latter in the majority.49 

Section V of the Nationa l Defense Act prescribed a committee to devise plans 

for organizi ng the Nationa l Guard di visions. Formed in August 1920, this group 

consisted of Regular Army and Guard officers who represented their embryonic 
100 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

TABLE 8 

Distribution of Regular Army Divisions and Brigades, 1922 

COIl'S Area Vllif Stafioll 

First 18th Infantry Brigade Fort Devens, Muss. 

(9th Division) 

Second 1st Division Fort Hamilton, N.Y. 

Third [6th Infantry Brigade Fort Howard, Md. 

(8th Division) 

Fourth 8th Infantry Brigade Fort Mc Pherson, Gn. 

(4th Division) 

Fifth 10th Infantry Brigade Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind. 

(51h Division) 

Sixth 12th In fantry Brigade Fort Sheridan, Ill, 

(6th Division) 

Seventh 14th Infantry Brigade Fort Omaha, Neb. 

(7th Division) 

Eighth 2d Division Fort Sam Houston, Tex. 

1st Cavalry Division FOri Bliss, Tex. 

Ni nth 3d Division Fort Lewis, Wash. 

(Units in parentheses arc the inactive parent organizations.) 

corps areas. Wi thin a short lime the committee presented the states with a blueprint 

fo r eighteen infantry divisions. Corps area commanders were to resolve any divergent views or disputes among the slates over the allotment of the units. The plan 

offered the states the 26th through the 41st Divisions, organized during World War 

I, and three new units, the 43d, 44th, and 45th Divisions, as Guard uni ts. The 42d 

"Rainbow" Division was omitted because it lacked an association with any pm1ielllar state or geographic area. All corps areas except the Fourth received two divisional designations. Thc states in the Fourth Corps Area, which had raised the 30th, 

31 st, and 39th Divisions during World War I, decided to reorganize the 30th and 

39th Divisions. By the spring of 192 1 the states had agreed on the allotmen t of 

most units in the infantry div isions, the War Department had furnished the new 

divisional tables of organization, and the states had begun to reorganize their forces 

accordingly. Between 1921 and 1935 the National Guard Bureau granted federal 

recognition to the headquarters of all eighteen Guard infantry divisions (7i:lble 9). 

Although a few divisions lacked federally recogn ized headquarters unti l the 1930s, 

most of the divisional clemcnts were granted federal recognition in the 1920s.50 

The historical continuity of Guard units rested upon geographic areas that 

supported the organizations, and during the reorganization most units adopted the 

designations used during World War I. Some shifting of units to new geographic 

areas took place, resulting in some designation changes. For example, in World 

War 1 Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi had ra ised the 39th Division, but 
THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR 1 101 

when the 39th was reorgan ized in the postwar era Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, 

and Lou isiana supported the unit. Subsequently. a joint board of Regular and 

Guard officers recommended that the division be renamed the 3151 Division, a 

unit that during the war had raised troops from Florida, Alabama, and Georgia. 

Secretary Weeks approved the change, and on I July 1923 the 391h Division was 

replaced by the 3 151 Division.51 

The allocation and organization of the Guard cava lry divisions foll owed the 

same procedure as the infantry divisions. But in order to lise all existing cavalry 

units, a fourth cavalry division was added to the force. In 192 1 the formation of 

the 21 st through 24th Cavalry Divisions began with the First, Second, and Third 

Army Areas supporting the 21 st, 22d, and 24th Cava lry Divisions. respectively. 

The 23d was the nation's at-large cavalry division, supported by all army areas 

(Table 10). In a short time the divisions had the prescribed cavalry regiments and 

machine gu n sq uadrons but not thc majority of their support organizations.52 

The organization of the third component's units began in 1921 when the War 

Depa rtmen t published Specia l Reg ul at ions No. 46, General Policies alld 

Regulatiolls for the Orgallized Reserves. The regulations cxplained the procedures for administering, train ing, and mobilizing the Organized Reserves and 

provided a tentative outline for thc corps area commanders to follow in organizing the units. Using the outline and a 6 Apri l 1921 troop allotment for twentyseven infantry divisions, corps area commanders set up planning boards to establish the units. In locating them, the boards considered the distribution and occupations of the population, attempting to station the units where they would be 

most li kely to receive effecti ve support. For exampl e, a medi ca l unit was not 

located in an area where there was no civilian medical faci lity. Arter determining 

the location of the un its and giving the Guard some time to recruit, thus avoiding 

competition with it, officers began to organize the 76th through the 91st and the 

94th through thc l04th Di visions.53 

Recruiting the units proved to be slow. Regular Army advisers were armed 

with lists of potential reservists and little else. There were not enough recruiters, 

office spa ce and eq uipment, or fu nds avai labl e to accomplish th e wo rk. 

Furthe rmore, a marked apathy towa rd the mi li tary prevailed throughout the 

nation. By March 1922, however, alltwenty-sevcn infantry divisions had skeletal 

headquarters (see Table 9).54 

To complete the di visio nal forces in the Organized Reserves, the War 

Department added the 61 st through the 66th Cavalry Divisions to the rolls of the 

Army on 15 October 1921. Corps area commanders followed the same procedures used previously for the infantry divisions in allotting and organizing them. 

Within a few months they too emerged as skeletal organizations (see Table 10).55 

Thus. in ea rly 1923 the Army had 66 divisions in the mobilization force 

shared aTllong three componcnts- II in the Regular Army (2 cavalry and 9 

infantry), 22 in the Natio nal Guard (4 cavalry and 18 infantry), and 33 in 

Organized Reserves (6 cavalry and 27 infantry). In addition, three understrength 
TABLE 9 

A llotment of Reserve Component Infantry Divisions, 192 1 

Corps Arett Dil';SjOIl CQlllpo"t!II' Loclltioll 

First 26th NG MIlSsachusclIs 

43d NG Connecticut, Maine, 

Rhode Island, :md Vermont 

761h OR Connecticut and Rho<lc Islnl1d 

941h OR Mltssachusctls 

971h OR Maine. New lIampshire, and 

Vennonl 

Second 27th NG New York 

44th NG New Jersey, New York, and 

Delaware 

77th OR New York 

78th OR New Jersey and Dclnw:1re 

981h OR New York 

Third 281h NG Pennsylvania 

291h NG Maryland, Virginia. and 

District of Columbia 

791h OR Pennsylvania 

80th OR Mmyland, Virginin, and 

District of Colul11bill 

99.h OR Pennsylvania 

Fourth 30th NG Georgia, TcnncsSl.'C. 

North Carolina, and 

South Carolina 

39th NG Alab:lIna. Florida, 

Mississippi, and Louisiana 

81s1 OR North Carolina and Tennessee 

82d OR Soulh Carolina lind Georgia 

87th OR Louisiana, MissiSSippi. and 

Alabama 

Finh 37th NG Ohio 

38th NG Kentucky. Indian:l. and 

West Virginia 

8Jd OR Ohio 

84th OR Indiana 

looth OR Kentucky and West Virginia 

Sixth J2d NG Michigan and Wisconsin 

J3d NG Illinois 

85th OR Michigan 

861h OR Illinois 

10Ist OR Wisconsin 

Sevcnth 34th NG Iowa, Minncsota, North Dakota. 

and South D:1kota 

35th NG Ncbrnska, Kans.1S. and Missouri 

88th OR MinncsOIa. Iowa. and North DakOla 
TA BLE 9- Colllinued 

Cmps Area Dil'i.l'ioll CompOlrellt LoeatiOIl 

89!h OR South Dako!a. Nebraska, and 

Kansas 

102d OR Missouri and Arkansas 

Eighth 36th NO Texas 

45th NO Oklahoma, Colorado, New Mexico. 

and Arizona 

90th OR Texas 

95!h OR Oklahoma 

103d OR New Mexico, Colorado, and 

Arizona 

Nim h 40!h NO Califonlia, Nevada, and Utah 

4 Is! NO WashingWII, Oregon, Wyoming, 

Momana, and Idaho 

91st OR California 

96th OR Oregon and Washingwn 

100th OR Nevada, Utah. Wyoming, and 

Idaho 

TABLE 10 

Allotment of Reserve Component Cavalry Divisions, 192 1 

Dh';sioll COII/pollellt Locatioll 

21s1 NO Ncw York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and 

NelV Jersey 

22d NO Georgia. Illinois, Indiana. Kcrnueky, Louisiana, 

Michigan. Ohio. West Virginia, 

and Wisconsin 

23d NO Alabama. MassachuseUs. New Mexico, 

North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and 

Wisconsin 

24th NO Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, North 

Dakota, South Dakota, Vlah, W,Lshinglon, 

and Wyoming 

61st OR New York and New Jersey 

62d OR Maryland, Virginia, District of Columbia, 

and Pennsylvania 

63d OR Termcssce, Louisiana, Georgia, North Cllrolinll, 

Texas, Oklahoma, and CoJomdo 

64th OR Kentucky, Massachuscl1S, Vennolll, and 

New Hampshire 

65th OR l1Iinois, Michig,Hl, and Wisconsin 

661h OR Nebraska, Missouri , Utah, and North Dakota 
104 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

infantry divisions were located overseas. No separate brigades existed. [n almost 

every case, however, these divisions, which varied frolll inactive units to partia lly 

manned organizations, were "paper tigers." 

After World War I the Army quickly demobilized its forces, but memories of 

the unpreparedness of 191 7 caused the nation to change Ihe way it maintained its 

military forces. Infantry and cavalry divisions, rather than regiments or smaller 

units, became the pillars that would support fu ture mobilization. Officers examined the structure of those pillars and adopted a modified, but powerful, sq uare 

infantry division designed for frontal attack and a sma ll light cavalry division for 

reconnaissance. Although the lessons of war in nuenced the structu re of these 

divisions, morc traditional criteria regarding their local geographical employment 

continued to affect their organization. Bul with no real enemy in sight and the 

nation's adoption ofa generally isolationist roreign pol icy, it is not surprising that 

Congress provided neit her the manpower nor the maleriel to equip even a caretaker force adequately. 
THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR [ 

Notes 

[05 

I Wrapper Indorsement (Forwarding Report of AE.F. Superior Board on Organization and 

Tactics). General Helldquartcrs (GHQ), AEF, to Sec of War, 16 Jun 20. AGO 322 (4- 19- 19), RG 

407, NARA. 

2 General HeailqlUlrler.l'. 1/l'lIIies, pp. 170- 91; Henry T. Allen, The Rhille/(md Occupation 

(Indianapolis; Bobbs-Merrill Co .. 1927), p. 13 ; Huidckopcr, The His/Oly oj the 33n/ Divi~'ioll , 1: 

257- 95. 

3 Gel/eNd Hemlt/tll/l'lets. Arlllie~', pp. 399- 404 ; Irwin L. Hunt, Americal/ Military 

GOI'/:mml!llf a/ Occllpied Gel'll/(/IIY 1918- 1920 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 

1943), pp. 76- 84; Robert S. Thomas, "The United Stales Army 1914- 1923 ," pI. I, pp. XIX48-49, Ms in Historical Resources Branch. Center of Military History. hcrcaner cited as DAMHHSR. 

4 Secolld Repol"I of the Promst MarsllUl Genera/to Ihe Secret(ll:V of IVar 011 the Operations 

of Se/ecth'e Service S)I.I"lelll 10 December 20. 191 8 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

Office, 1919), p. 239. 

5 Rpt of the Cors, ARIVO. 1919, pp. 451 - 52; lohn W. Sparrow, History of PerSQIIlle/ 

Demobilization of the Unitell States (W:lshington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 

11- 19. 

6 WD Cir 77, 2 1 Nov 1918; Thomas, "The United States Arnly 1914- 1923," p. XX- 22; 

DireC/oIJ' ofTl"{)ops, pp. 1310- 16; Peyton C. March, The Nation at War (Garden City, N.Y.: 

Doubleday, Dorn, and Co. , 1932), PI). 310- 25 . The New York Times /Ildex, vol. 7, nos. 1, 2, and 

3, provides a quick guide to the divisional parades. 

7 Memo, Ch of Operations Branch to TAG, 12 Aug 19, sub: Retention of Divisional 

Organization, WPD filc 8481 - 131, RG 165. NARA; WD GO 91, 1919. 

S Frederic L. Paxson, The Grellt Demobilizatio/l (Il/(l Ollw/" ES~'ays (Madison: University of 

Wisconsin Press, 1941), p. 7. 

9 March, The Na/ioll at /Va!", pp. 330- 33, 336--41: Memo, WPD for Cors, 24 Feb 19, sub: 

Tactical org:mizalioll of the division and higher tactical units, WrD 8481 - 116, RG 165, NARA; 

lohn MeA. Palmer, 'The Military Policy of the Uni ted States as Settled by Recent Law and 

Executive Order," lecture at the A WC, published in WO Bull 19, 1921. 

to Memo, 0 - 5. AEF. to General Nolon, sub: Board of Revicw, 16 Mar 19, RO 120, NARA; 

Special Orders (SO) 98, AEF, 8 Apr 19, and Rpt ofthc Superior Board, AEF, on Organization 

and Tactics, AGO 320 (6- 21- 20), Bulky Files, RG 407, NARA. Unless otherwise indicated, thc 

following discussion of the infantry and cavalry divisions is based on the board report. Also see 

rcports of the various postwar AEF boards 011 the arms and services, which are included in the 

same file. Sec John B. Wilson, "Mobility Versus Firepower: The Post-World War I Infantry 

Division," P(//"{/II/elers 13 (Scp 1983): 48, for biogr:tphiea! data .. bollt the board members. 

t t Rpt of the Superior Board, p. 85. 

t2 Wrapper Indorsement (Forwarding Report of the AEF Superior Board), 16 lun 20. 

Although Pershing held the report, its recommcndations werc widely known by the Army StalT. 

t3 John Dickinson. The Bllilding of (/11 Arlll)' (New York: Century Co. , 1922), pp. 330-34. 

t4 \VD Bull 25, 1920. 

t5 WD GO 50, 1920; MCl11o, WPD for Oir. WI'D, 10 luI 20, sub: Committee No.2 Report 

on Army Reorganization, AWe file 52- 21 , Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa, 

hereafter cited as MHI. 

t6 Melllo, WPO, 5 Jun 20, sub: COlllmittees for Working out An11y Rcorganization, A we 

file 52- 2 1. 

t1 Memo, WPD to Gcneral StalT Collcge (hereafter cited as GSC), 14 lun 20. sub: Anny 

Organization, 14 lun 20, with enclosures, Memo, WPD to GSe, 151un 20, sub: An11y Organization, 

AWe file 52- 10. Pershing maint:tined an AEF headquartcrs in Washington between the time he 

retunted from France and the time he assumed the position of Chief of StalT, AmlY. 
106 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

III Wrapper Indorsement (Forwarding Report of AEF SUllCrior [roard). 16 Jun 20: Dmll entitled "Noles on Organ izat ion" wilh Fox Conner's initials. undated. A we file 52- 21. 

19 Wrapper Indorsement (Forwarding Report of AEF Superior Ooard). 16 Jun 20. 

20 Ibid. 

21 Memo WPD to ase, IS Jun 20. sub: Army Organizalion. AWe file 52- 10. MHI; Memo, 

W]>I) 10 TAG. 2 1 JUI1 20. sub: Spcci(tl COtllmiuee on Rcorganiz<ltion of the Army. AGO 320 

(6- 2 1- 20), itO 401. NARA. 

22 Rpl of Special Commil1cc Appointed by Dir, WPD, to De fin e the General I'l an of 

Organi;r.3tion to be Adopted by the Anny of the United Slaies provided by the Act of 4 June 20, 8 

Jul 20, A we course material 52 51. M H L hcreaflcr cited as Rpl of Special CommillCc, WI'D. 8 

Jul 20: Wilson, "Mobility Versus FircllOwer." p. 49. 

23 Ar1hur W. Lanc, "Tablcs ofOrgani z;!tion," 111/011'1), JOI/I'lwl 18 (May 1921): 489- 91. 

24 Ibid.; Wilson, "Mobility Versus Firepower," p. 49. 

2S Lane, "Tables ofOrganiZ1\1101l," pp. 489- 91. 

26 Ibid. 

27 Ibid. 

28 Ibid. ; ApI). 2 10 Rpl of Special Commiuec, WI'D. 8 Jul 20: Memo. CofS, 3 1 Aug 20, no 

subject. WPD fi le 6935- 1, RG 165, Draft T/Os. 7 Oct 1920. WI'D fil e 6935- 8. RG 407, NARA: 

1'/0, 15 Oct 1920, DAMI-I-J-I SO. 

29 Lane. "Tables ofOrganiz'ltion." pp. 489- 9 1; App. 2 to Rpl of Special COlllmiuee, WI'D. 

8 Jul 20: T/O 1921, Table I W~r (W), Infantry Di vision, 4 May 1921. 

)0 TIO, 192 1. Table I W, Infanlry Division. 4 May 1921: HeM Sen'ice Regulations. 1923. p. 

IS. 

JI La ne. "Tables of Organization." pp. 489- 90; L1r. George C. Marshall to Fox Conner, 17 

Jan 38, and lIr, Mnrshall to William M. SI)Cnccr. 18 Mar 38, Marshall Papers, George C. 

Marshall Rescarch Foundation, Lexington. Va. 

J2 L1 r, George C. Marshall 10 Walton H. Walker, 2 1 Dec 37. Marshall Papers. 

JJ Rpt of Special Committee. WI'D. 8 Jul 20; "Cavalry Organization." Ctll'O ft"), JOIII"II(lI 29 

(J ul 20): 116; "Cavalry Reorganization," Cm'aftyJoul"llal30 (Jan 2 1): 62- 63. 

)4 T/O 1921 , Table 401 W, Cavalry Division, 4 AI)r 2 1: Memo, GSC for DirofOpeT3lions. 

30 Jul 20, sub: Comments on rel)on of Special Commitlee on Reorganization of the Regular 

Army, Memo. eh of Cavalry for Col'S. 10 Aug 20, sub: Comments on ~e ommendat ol1s of 

Special Committec on Reorgani:llltion of the Army, II Aug 20. CSC file 848 1- 136. RG 165, 

NA RA: Memo. Cots, 31 Aug 20. 

JS T/O. Table I W, Inr.,ntry Oivision.4 May 2 1: TIO, Table 40 1 W, Cavalry Division. 4 Apr 2 1. 

16 T/O, Table I Peace (I'), Infantry Division. 192 1: T/O, Table 401 I', Cava lry Division. 2 1: 

"Tables of Organization", em'llll")' JOllrno/ 30 (Oct 192 1): 422- 15. 

J7 Memo, Cots. 3 1 Aug 20: Memo. WPD. 5 JUII 20. sub: Committees for Working Oul 

Army Reorganization, A WC file 52-2 1. 

311 Memo, WPO for Dir. WI'O. 10 J ul 20. sub: COlllmittee Rellorl on Army Reorganization. 

A WC fil e 52-2 1. 

39 Ibid.: R]>t ofCommillee 5. nppoinlcd by Dir. War Plans Di vision. June 7, 1920,30 Ju1 20. 

John L. 1-1 illCS Papers. LC. 

40 Rpt ofCOlllmillce 5, 30 Jul 20. 

41 Memo. Cots, 3 1 Aug 20. 

42 WD Cirs 400 and 415, 1920: GO 2, 1 st Di vision. 1921: GO I, 3d Division, 1921; GO 2. 

4th ~ivision. 192 1; GO 10. 5th Division. 192 1: GO I, 6th Division. 192 1: GO 23. 7th ~i on. 

1921. copics of these and othcr divisional gelleral orders relating 10 the I\:organization of Rcgular 

Army units in Oi \'isioll Gencral file . DAMH-I-ISO. Circular 400 ,authorized thc 2d Division to be 

at war strength. which included its 41h Bri gadc. 

43 WDG03I,I921. 

44 WD GO 33, 192 1; GO 19. 2d Di vision. 1921. Di vision Gene ral file, and 3d Ind. 

llislorica l Section. A WC to TAG, 15 No\' 21. 2d Inf Oiv file. both in DAM1-l-Ii SO. 
THE AFTERMATH OF WORLO WA R I 107 

45 LIT, TAG to CG of all Corps Areas. 20 Aug 21. sub: Organization of lhe Cavalry. Cavalry 

Reorganization file . 1921 .28, J-listorical Data Card. \SI Cllvalry (Cav) Di v. DAMH-HSO. By 30 

June 1922 aOOll! 10,000 officers and enlisted men were aVlli lab1c in the fourteen active cavalry 

regiments (see Annual Rpt. Sec o f War, 1922, p. 305). 

46 Memo, WilD, S lUll 20, sub: Committee;; for Working out Army Reorganization; Memo 

Ollcnllions (lnd Training Division. 0 - 3.1 1575 fo r DealS, 27 Dec 2 1, sub: COl11l11enls on Report 

of Boa rd of GS officers relati ve 10 distribution. sheller, and tmining areas for the Army (basic 

report aHachcd). AGO 320 fil e. 27 Dec 2 1, RG 407, NARA, 

47 LIT. TAG to CGs. all Corps Areas Oln<l Depls: Chief of Infantry; CO. American Forces in 

Germany: CG. FOT1 Benning, Ga.: :lnd COs of Exempted Places concerned. sub: Organization 

and Redistribution of the Infantry, AGO Central file 1917- 25.320.2 (7- 15- 22) RG 407. NA RA : 

WD GO 10. 1923. 

48 Memo, WPD for Dir. WPD. 10 Jul 20. sub: Committee RepoT1 on Army Reorganization: 

" lJrief History of the 24th Infantry." 27 Sep 26. Ms, 24th Infantry fil e, DAM H-IIS0: Hisforieal 

(lII(II'iefor/al Rel'iew Secoud Cm'tilly Divisioll, Vllifetl SillIes Army (lJaton Rouge. La.: Army 

and Navy Publ ishing Co .. 1941). p. 50. 

49 Mcmo. WPO for Oir. WPD, 9 Jul 20. sub : Strength of the Foreign garrisons requircd and 

the ir s pccial organization. Availab lc troops to bc considered in the conncction (Report of 

Committee No.3), 9 Jul 20, A WC 52·2 1, MHI; WD Cir 149. 1921: WO GO 15, 192 1: Ltf. TAG 

to CG. I' hilippine Dept., 22 Oct 22, sub: Completion of overseas gllrrison. 320 (10- 7- 2 1). 12th 

Inf Div file. OAl\'IH-HSO: Relurns. Panama Canal, I-Iawaiian, and Philippine Divisions. divisional liles, DAMH-HSO. Thc NatiolHII Defense Act continucd dep.1r1lllcnts in the Ilawai ian Islands, 

thc Philippine Islands. and thc Panama Canal Zone. 

50 Mcmo G- 3 for Corso 14 Mar 22, sub: Basic plan for the organiz,1tion of the National 

Guard. AGO 320 G12253 (10- 3 1 22) to (7- 28- 22). Bulky Fi les. RG 168, NA RA : Llr. TAG to 

CGs all Corps Areas, 19 Oct 20. slIb: Allotment of National Guard troops, 323 (Misc. Div.); Llr, 

Fourth Corps Area 10 TAG, 17 Nov 20. sub: AlIotmcnt of National GUlird Troops: and Llr, TAG 

to CG of all Corps Areas, 7 Dec 20, sub: Designation and location of units of the National Guard 

and lhe Orgililized Reserve, 325.344 (Misc. Div.). a ll Reference Files, Niltional Guard. DAMI-I· 

HSO. The granting of federill recogni tion to divisional clements maybe Irllced through the 

Official Nlllivl/al GI/ard RegiS/f'r 1931. 1936, (II/d 1939 and state and unit records in DAMI-II-ISO. 

Regular Army members of the Section V committee were Col. Briant I-\, We lls. Lt. Col. 

John W. Gulick. and Maj. William Bryden: the National Guard officers were Cols. Walter E. 

Bare of AlabanJa, Grced G. Ilammond of Oregon, Milton A. Reekord of Maryland, George C. 

Richards of Pennsylvania. Frank M. Rumbold of Missouri. and Franklin W. War of New York: 

Lt. Cols. Chalmer R. Wilson of Ohio and Guy M. Wilson of Michigan: and Majs. J. Ross Jves of 

Connecticut and J. Wall Pilge of Texas. 

51 Ltr., TAG to CGs of all Corps Areas. 7 Dec 20. sub: Designation and location of units of 

Ihe NlItional Gunrd and the Organized Reserves. Reference Files. Nationnl GUHd. DAMH-HSO: 

RepfJI'l Offf/(' Chie/o/lhe Mililia Oil/Will, 1923, p. 11. 

52 nfH oflhe ellie/v/fhe Militia Bureau, 1922. pp. 24- 26: Memo. WPD to TAG, 15 Feb 22. 

sub: Normal numerical desigllil1ions of un its of NlI1ional Guard Cuvu lry Divisions, WPD 9691. 

AGO 325.455, and Llr. TAG to CGs al l Corps Areas. 29 Nov 21. sub: Revised Tables of normal 

numerical designations of units NlI1ional Guard Cavalry Divisions, 325- 455 ( 11 28- 21) (Mise. 

Div.), Reference Files, National Guard, DAMI-I-tISO. 

53 Special Regulations No. 46. Gel/eNd Policies (I//(I Regllimiolls /01' the Org(lllized 

Reserw!s. 1921: Ltr. Maj Gcn John L. tlines to John J. Pershing. 26 Dec 2 1. John L Hines 

Papers, LC: L1 r. TAG to CGs all corps arcas, 24 Jun 21, sub: Nornlal numerical designations of 

infantry divisions. AG 325.455, ReJcrcnce Files. Army Reserve, DAMII· HSO. 

The numbers 94, 103, and 104 werc new dcsignations, and Ihe numbers 92 and 93 were 

omilled because during Ihe war these divisions had not come from anyone state or group of 

st:lle5. Furtherlllore. Ihe 92d Division and 93d Dil'ision (Provisional) in World W:lr I had bcen 
108 MANEUVER AND FI REPDWER 

organized with Negro soldiers, and the department's pol icy WlIS 110t 10 maintain large Negro ullits 

during ]lcacctimc. 

54 Repor/ oflfte Set:rCIlII'Y of Wlir. 1912. p. J 8; Organized Reserves (infantry division nOlcs). 

Reference Files. AmlY Reserve, DAM II· USO. Also sec Markell's notcs on Organizational 0313. 

ROAD Brigades, Brigade General Files, DAM II-IIS0. 

55 LIT. TAG \0 CGs all Corps Areas, 15 Oct 21, sub: Numerical designations of AmlY and 

GHQ Reserve Troops, First, Second, and Third Ficld Armies, Organized Reserves, AG 320.2 

Organized Reserves (10- 2 1- 21) (Misc. Di v.), AG Reference fi les, 1921 . OAMI I-I-ISO. 
CHAPTER 5 

A Return to the Past; A Look 

to the Future 

Nor call il be quesiiolleli llia( 'he Division as 11011' OIgallized (/11(/ composed . .. of foot. 

(llIilll(ll, (111(/ 1II0/or elelll elll~·. (Ill wil1t 1'(U),illg rales oj speed, is III/eCOnomical, I/l/Il'ieldyalld 

III/{u/apfel/to Ihe dem(Uuls o/mot/em lllo"ile \\'mfill"e. 

General Malin Craig1 

After establishing post- World War I divisions, the Army experienced a prolonged period of stagnation and deterioration. The Nationa l Defense Act of 1920 

authorized a Regular Army of 296,000 men, but Congress gradually backed away 

from that number. As wit h the Regular Army, the National Guard never recruited 

its authorized 486,000 men, and the Organized Reserves became merely a pool of 

reserve offi cers. The root of the Army's probl em was money. Congress yearly 

appropriat ed onl y aboll t hal f th e funds tha t th e Ge ne ra l Staff requ ested . 

Impoverished in manpower and funds, infantry and cavalry divisions dwindl ed to 

ske letal organizations. 

Meanwhile, the General Sta ff and service schools searched for a divisional 

structure, particularly for the infantry. that best suited the conditions of modern 

warfare. Like their European counterparts. American military planners remembered, above all, the indecisiveness that had dominated the battlefield in World 

War I. The result had been a protracted war of hitherto unimagined devastation. 

The sea rch for a sound divisional organization was part of the effort to find the 

means of restoring decisiveness to warfare. Otherwise, victors might suffer as 

much as, or even more than, the vanquished. These considerati ons drew attention 

especia lly to va rious means of improving the di vision's mobility and maneuverability so that the Army could avoid future wars of position that would force it to 

adopt the bloody strategy of attrition. 

Paper Divisions 

Between 1923 and 1939 divisions gradually declined as fighting organizations. After Reg ul ar Army d ivisio ns moved to permanent P OS IS, the Wa r 

Depa rtment modified command relat ionships between divisiona l units and the 

corps areas. It placed elements of the 1 st and 3d Divisions and the 8th, 10th, 
110 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

261h Divisioll parade. For' Del'el/oI'. Man'm:/Illsell.l'. 1925 

12th, 14th, 16th. and 18th Infantry Brigades directly under Ihe corps area COTn* 

manders, making division and brigade commanders responsible only for unit 

training. They were limited to hVO visits per year to their assigned clements- and 

that only if corps area commanders made funds avai lable. Latcr, as a further 

economy move, the War Department reduced the number of command visits to 

one pcr year, a restriction tha i dfectively destroyed the possibility of traini ng 

units as combined arms teams.2 

In July 1926 the commander of th e 1st Division, Brig. Gen. Hu gh A. 

Drum, wrote 10 Ihe Second Corps Area commander, Maj. Gen. Charles P. 

Summe ra ll, that "it is not an exaggeration to say that the division as a unit 

ex ists only on paper."3 Drulll requested the return of all admi nistrative, logisti· 

ca l, and disciplinary functions for his divisional clements withi n the corps area 

and aut hority to visit each divisiona l regiment once a month and each brigade 

every three mont hs. He also wanted to organize a proper division hcadquar· 

ters. Summera ll concu rred with Drum's requcst, but Chi c f of Staff Maj. Gen. 

John L. Hinc5 denied it in thc in terest of cconomy and simplicity of adminis· 

tration, sup ply, and discipli ne. On 31 Dcecmber 1926 Summe rall , by then 

Chi ef of Staff, reve rsed the decision and gave Drum command of all 151 

Division units in the Second Corps Area and permission to reorganize the divisional headquarters. Drum could also coordi nate inspection arrangements with 

other corps area commanders where his units we rc sta lioned. The following 

July Summcra ll restored the samc privileges to thc 3d Division's commander, 
A RETURNTOTI-IE PAST; A LOOK ToniE FUTURE III 

Brig. Ge n. Richmond P. Davis. at 

Fort Lewis, Was hington. Brigade 

commande rs, howeve r. we re not 

granted similar aU lhority.4 

While discussing the need to 

reconst itute the 151 Division as a 

combat uni t, Drum stressed the 

importan ce of buildin g esprit. 

Unro rtunate ly, the few tangible 

sy mbol s the Arm y had lIsed to 

e nha nce mora le were init ially 

denied to divisions and brigades 

after the ""m', Regular Army soldiers 

returning fro rn France were not 

al lowed to wcar divisional shoulder 

sleeve insignia because they "cluttered" the uni form . The men 

appea led to Secretary of Wa r 

Newton O. Bilker, who subsequently 

Gel/eral SUlllmerall approved the lISC of shoulder sleeve 

insi g ni" throughout the Army. 

When a division adopted a " patch" design, soldiers put it on their uniforms and 

emblazoned it on their divisiona l nag. The other item, the campaig n streamer, 

representing participation in a major operation was denied to headquarte rs of 

divisions and brigades because they were command and control units rat her than 

righting organizations. Alt hough the policy was contested, it was not until aOer 

th e I st an d 3d Div isions reestablished effective headquart ers that the War 

Depa rtmen t granted division and brigade headq uarters the right to display on 

their flags streamers symboli zing the campaigns in which they had directed their 

subordinate units.S 

A sharp decline in divisional readiness occurred aOer 1922, when Congress 

<lgai l1 cut the Regular Army's size, th is time to 136,000 orricers and en listed men. 

The Chief of Staff, General of the Armies John J. Pershi ng, reduced the strengt h 

of the infan try division from 11,000 to 9,200 men, but he did not authorize the 

inactivation of any divisional elements. Four years later Congress expanded the 

Army Air Corps without a corresponding increase in the Army's total strength. 

Rather than cut the size of ground combat units, the War Department turned 

agai n to inactivating units. The Panama Canal Division lost an infan try regiment, 

the 8th Brigade an infantry battalion, and the 16th Brigade two infantry baltal· 

ions. Given con tinuing person nel shortages, the chief of infantry complained in 

1929 that not another man could be taken from his units if they were to conduct 

cffective training. Therefore, another rou nd of inactivations look place. The 8th, 

10th, 12th, 14th, and 18th Brigades and the Philippine Division each 10s1 a battal-
11 2 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

iOIl . A year later the Philippine Di vision inacti vated an infantry brigade headqua r* 

(ers, and in 193 1 the division lost another infantry regiment.6 

Infantry divisions also suffered shortages in the area of combat support. By 

1930 the 151 and 2d Divisions and the Philippine Divisioll had the only active 

medica l regiments in the Regular Army, and they were only partially organi zed. 

During the previous year the War Department h .. d removed the air squadron and 

its attached photographic section from the di vision. Simplic ity of supply, maintenance, and coordina tion and be tter use of pe rsonne l justified the reduction. 

OfTsclling that loss, a small aviation section was added to the division headqua rters \0 coordinatc air activities after air units were attached. In 193 1, to provide 

quartermaster personnel for posts and stations in the Unitcd States, the qu rt ~ 

master train in each active division except the 2d was reduced to two motor om~ 

panics and a motor repair section. Besides these units the 2d retained one wagon 

company. No train headquarters remained active ) 

Unlike the other organizations, in theory d ivisional fi e ld arti ll e ry wa s 

increased during the interwar years. Until 1929 the Army maintained two 75-mm. 

gUll regiments for the 1st, 2d, and 3d Divisions and a battalion of 75s each for the 

Panama Cana l Di vision, th e Ph ilippine Di vision, and the separate infantry 

brig'ldes. The Hawaiian Division fie lded one I 55-mill. howitzer and two 75-mm. 

gun regiments, a[1 motorized. During 1929 Summera ll restored the 55~ mm . 

howitzer fi eld artillery regiment to all infantry divisions. Although the 155-mm. 

howitzer still lacked the mobility of the 75-mm. gun, the change made di visiona l 

artillery, in theory, commensurate wit h that found in fore ign armies.8 

Besides a shortage of person nel, the 2d Di vision, the only di vision housed on 

one post in the United States, lacked adequate troop quarters. Living conditions 

at its home, Fort Sam Houston. Texas, were deplorabl e for both offi cers and 

enlisted men by the l1lid ~ I 920s. To remedy the situation the War Department 

dec ided to break up the div ision in 1927 and move its 4th Brigade to Fort D. A. 

Russe ll, Wyoming, where suita bl e quarters were available. That move left only 

the Hawaiian Division concentrated at one post, Schofield Barracks, a situation 

that continued until the Army began to prepare for World War II. Thus, despite 

the wishes of Army leaders, by 1930 the Army was agai n scattered throughout the 

eOUlnry in a number of isolated bases.9 

The cavalry di vision il lustrated other aspects of the Army's dilemma between 

realism and idealism. In 1923 the 1st Cavalry Division he ld maneuvers for the fi rst 

time, intending to hold them annually thereafter. However, financia l constmints 

made that impossible. Only in [927, through the generosity of a few ranchers who 

provided free [and, was the division able to conduct such exercises again. to 

In 1928 Maj. Gen. Herbert B. Crosby, Chief of Cavalry, faced with personnel 

ClilS in his arm, reorganized the cava lry regiments, which in turn reduced the size 

of the c~ va ry division. Crosby's goal was 10 decrease overhead whi le mainta ining 

or increasing firepower in the regiment. After the reorgani zation the cava lry regiment consisted of a headquarters and headquarters troop, a machine gun Iroop, 
Officers ({lIal'lers, ForI Salll HOlIstOIl, Texas; below, lsI C(J\I{/hy Divisioll 

mallell vel'S, 
CHART 7-Cavalry Division, 1928 

CAVALRY DIVISION 

9.595 

I I 

HHT CAY BOE ENGR SOON MEO SOON FA REGT ARMORED 

37 2,972ea 411 233 1.717 CARSQON 

I 278 I 

I MED~

HHT CAY REGT HHe FABN SERV BTRY 

88 I."lea 92 760., 46 

HHT & BAND I CAVSQON M,~RP .11 MfO;CHAP_1 HHS& TRAIN~ I FABTRY 

", I 349.- 27l 161 .. 

l~ l"""-~ 

3 113 .. 
A RETURN TOTHE PAST; A LOOK TOTHE FUTURE 11 5 

and Iwo squadrons each with Iwo troops. The cavalry brigades' machi ne gun 

squadrons were inactiva ted, while the responsibi lity for training and employing 

machine guns (cillo the regimental commanders, as in the infantry. I I 

About the same time that Crosby cui the cavalry regiment, the Army Staff, 

seeking to increase the usefulness or the wartime cavalry division, published new 

tables of orga ni zation for an even larger unit. The new structure summarized 

changes made in the division since 1921 (Char' 7), which involved increasing the 

size of the signal troop, expanding the rnedicalunillo a squadron, and endorsing 

Crosby's movement of the machine gun units from the brigades to the regiments. 

A divisional aviation section, <In armored car sq uadron, and tank company were 

added, and the field artil lery battalion was expanded to a regiment. Divisiona[ 

strength rose to 9,595. Allhough the new tabl es had little impact on the peacetime 

cavalry structure, the 1st Cavalry Division did eventually receive one troop of an 

experi mental armored car sq uadron, and a field arti l[ ery regiment rep [aced its 

field arti[ lery ballalion.12 

Even with austere conditions, the Army did not lose sight of its tactica l missions. For exampl e, Maj. Gen. Preston Brown, commander of the Panama Canal 

Department, urged the replacement of the Panama Cana l Division with Atlantic 

and Pacific command groups. I-laving examined the supply system, the probabl e 

tact ical employment of troops, and the adva ntages of other command systems, he 

decided that a divisional structure did not represent the best solution in the Canal 

Zone. The War Department agreed to inactivate the division headquarters in 1932 

with the understanding that spec ial tables of organization would be kept on file to 

faci litate the reorganization or the division within a few hours. Such a situation, 

however, never occurred, and Ihe division remained inactive. I) 

Reserve Divisions 

The condition of reserve divisions paralleled that or the Regu[ar Army. In 

1924, th ree years after the states began reorganizing the National Guard divisions, the Militia Bureau suspended federal recognition of new units because of 

the chronic lack of money. The sllspension lasted two years, until Secretary of 

War Dwight F. Davis lifted it to provide additional units for the states. That dec ision permitted further organization of the 40th Division (Ca lifornia), the least 

developed orall the Guard infantry div isions. The repeal also allowed Minnesota 

and New York to organize two infantry brigade headquarters, the 92d and 93d, 

respectively, for nondivisionalunits to meet mobilization needs. 14 

Infantry divisions in the National Guard remained basica[ly stabl e organizations despite being extreme ly under strength, and before 1940 only a few regimenta l changes were made. [n most divisions the artillery brigade's ammunition 

train was not authorized because it had an exe[usively wartime mission. As in the 

Regu lar Army, the 155-mm. howitzer regiment was authorized in 1930, and by 

rnid-1937 all divisions had a federally recognized I 55-mm. howitzer regiment or 
116 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

TABLE I I 

Allotment of Nalional Guard Cavalry Brigades, 1927 

Cmps Area Vnif Slales SI/pporfing fI Brig(l(le 

First 59th Massachusetts and New Jersey 

Second 51 SI New York 

Th ird 52d Pennsyl vania 

Fourth 55th Louisiana, Tennessee, North Carolina, 

and Georgia 

Fifth 54th Ohio and KCnlucky 

Sixth 53d Wisconsin, [Ilinois, and Michigan 

Seventh 57th Iowa and Kansas 

Eighth 56th Texas 

Ni nth 58th Wyoming and Idaho 

part of one. The strength of infantry div isions varied, but no di vision reached the 

11 ,000 men prescribed in the peacetime National Guard tables of organization. 

The nadir was in 1926, following the suspension of federa l recognition. By 1939 

Guard infantry divisions averaged 8,300 troops each,lS 

Nati onal Guard cavalry divisions proved unsatisfa ctory because they were 

scattered over too large an area for effective trai ning. The Militia Bureau first 

attacked Ihe problem in 1927, when it realigned some divisional elements to 

reduce the geographic size of the divisions. Two years later the bureau limited 

cava lry formations 10 brigade-size units, assigning one brigade to each corps arca 

(Table II). The format ion of the 59th Cavalry Brigade was authorized to meet the 

need for the additional brigade called for in the plan. At that time the bureau 

withdrew federal recognition from the 22d Cava lry Division headquarters, the 

only cavalry division to have a federa lly recogni zed headquarters. Unlike Regular 

Army cavalry regiments, Guard regiments reta ined their six line troops, except 

those in the 52d Cavalry Brigade, whose regiments were able 10 recruit and maintain suffi cient personnel to support nine Iroops. 16 

Brigades remained the ~lrges t cavalry units in the Guard until the l11 id- 1930s, 

when Congress authorized an increase in its strength. In 1936 the Nationa l Guard 

Bureau, formerly the Milit ia Bureau, returned to federally recognizing cava lry 

division headquarters. By mid- 1940 the bureau had federa lly recognized headquarters for the 22d, 23d, and 24th Cavalry Divisions, but not for the 21 sl. At that 

time the 21st consisted of the 5 1 st and 59th Cav<llry Brig<ldes, the 22d of the 52d 

<lIld 54th, the 23d of the 53d and 55th Brigades, and the 24th of the 57th and 58th 

Cavalry Brigades; the 56th Cav<llry Brigade served liS a nondivisional unil.17 

The Organized Reserves maintained infantry <lnd cava lry div isions that were 

authori zed a full complement of officers but only enlisted cadres. Many divisions 

met or exceeded their manning leve ls fo r officers, but enlisted strength fell below 
A RETURN TO THE PAST; A LOOK TO THE FUTURE 117 

cadre level. In 1937 Secrctary of Wilr Harry W. Woodring he ld the opinion that 

the dearth of enl isted men kept the Organized Reserves from contributing much 

to mobilization. Under these conditions effective uniltrailling was impossible. 18 

More Realistic Mobilization Plans 

Mobilization underpinned the maintenance of divisions, bUllhc Army's preparedness program lacked substa nce. Undermanned divisions had no higher 

command headquarters despite ambitious plans to group a ll 54 infantry divisions in the United Slates into 18 Orgmlized Reserve army corps and these 

corps into 6 Organized Rese rve armies with each army also having 2 cavalry 

divisions. In 1927 the General StafT began to shift toward more rea listic war 

plans. When division and corps aret. commanders met in Washington to discuss 

Army programs that year, one of the topics th ey examined was the sta tus of 

Regular Army divisions and brigades. The senior ofTicers believed that reinforced brigades serving as nuclei of divisions were impractical. Chief of StafT 

Summera ll argued that 10 mobilize a ske letal division (a re inforced brigade) 

wou ld take the same amount of time as organizing a completely new division 

since both would have to be fill ed with recruits. 19 

In August 1927 the stafT released new war plans for the Regular Army that 

reassigned the active brigades of the 8th, 9th, and 7th Divisions to the 4th, 5th, 

and 6th Divisions, respectively, and the inactive brigades of the last three divisions to the fi rst three. These were paper transactions only. In an emergency, however, the Regu lar Army wou ld now be able to field th e I st through the 6t h 

Divisions. For the 4t h, 5th, and 6th, it needed only to activate divisional headquarters and support units. But with no station changes, the Army leadership lost 

further sight of an important World War I lesson: the need to have divisions concentrated for combined arms training.20 

Also in 1927, for echelons above div isions in the Regular Army, the adjutant 

general constituted one army, one cavalry corps, and three army corps headquarters. In addition, the 3d Cavalry Division, a new Regular Army unit, was added to 

the rolls to complete the cavalry corps. No army corps, cavalry corps, or army 

headquarters was organized al that time, but moving these units in the mobilization plans from the Organized Reserve to the Regular Army theoretica lly made it 

easier to organize the units in an emergency. The Organized Reserve units, after 

all, were to be used to expand the Army following the mobilization of Regu lar 

Army and National Guard units.21 

With increased tensions in the Fa .. East and the rearmamen t of Eu ropean 

nations, Chi e f of StafT General Douglas MacArthur scrapped existi ng plans for 

echelons above divisions and created an army group in 1932. He established 

Genera l Headquarters (GHQ), United States Army, with himsetfas commander, 

and ordered the acti vation of four army headquarters, one each for the Atl antic 

and Pacifi c coasts and th e Mexican and Canadian borders (Map 2). To the four 
MAP 2 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

J 

I 

.... ------1. . ...;-.. -

FIELD ARl\IIES IN TilE UNITED STATES 

1932 

o U. &. F...JJ .\"", '1 <-"~I""1<" 

I) . V"M \""~' n, ,,, ,~I .. ) 

I 

( . 

l 

THIRI 

~ 

~~ 

~. FORT SAM HOI. 

SAN ANTONIO 
D 

".-,~ .' 

A 

-- ....... -. l l' II .\ 
120 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

army headquarters he assigned e ighteen army corps headquarters, and to the 

corps headquarters the fifty-four infantry di visions. The Regular Army cavalry 

corps, which comprised the lSI, 2d, and 3d Cavalry Di visions, was assi gned to 

the Fourth Army, and the fo ur mounted National Guard di visions to the GHQ. 

Organi zed Reserve cavalry divisions remai ned in those areas where the armies 

were to raise units.22 

In plan ning fo r the four armies, Brig. Gen. Charles E. Kilbourne, chief ofthe 

War Plans Di vision, suggested to MacArthur that he drive home to the president, 

the secretary of war, and th e Cong ress exactly how the Army's strength had 

affected readiness. The Army could not even fie ld four infan try divisions as a 

quick responsc force because of the lack the men to fill such a force and the 

bases to accommodate it. Furthermore, ifsllch a forc e were on ce ntrat e(~ or even 

committed, it would be unable to support tra ining of the reserves. Kilbourne 

viewed an increase in Army strength as unl ikely but nevertheless recommended 

as a goa l the maintenance of four peace-strength infantry div isions, one for each 

army, and five rei nforced infantry brigades.23 

The War Department established an embryoni c readin ess forc e on I 

October 1933. Di visional forces returned to their pre-I 927 configuration, wit h 

the 1st, 2d, and 3d Di visions having two active infa ntry brigades and th e 4t h 

through 9th Divisions hav ing only one active brigade each. In the Fourth Corps 

Area the 4th Division also rece ived a third active infantry regiment, another 

step closer to the four-di vision ready force. The next year the field artillery 

brigades of the I st through 4th Divisions were rea ligned to consist of one 155-

111m. howitzer and two 75-l11m. gun regiments, and each active infantry brigade 

was aut horized a 75-mm. gun regiment. All fie ld artillery units were parti ally 

active. No division or brigade was concentrated on a single post during the 

reorganization.24 

The fou r-army plan introduced some rea lism into the arrangements for mobili zing Regular Army infantry di visions, bu t no true emergency force ex isted 

because of personnel shortages. During the next few years the Army revised the 

preparedness plans by reassigning divisions and assigni ng new priorities to them, 

but no di vision could meet an immediate threal. 

Motorization and Mechanization 

Even though the status of div isions betwecn the two world wars fell far 

short of readiness because of low manning levels, deve lopments in at least 

organi zational theory were significant. Di visions designed to fight on a stati c 

front and endure heavy casua lti es were no longer accep table. World armie s 

sought div isions that could defeat an opponent with maneuver and firepower. 

Writers such as the Englishmen J. F. C. Full er and Basil Liddell Hart led the 

way, advocating the employment of machines to restore mobi lity and maneuverability to the battlefield. 
A RETURN TO TH E PAST; A LOOK TO THE FUTURE 121 

Motori zation, Ihe use of machines to move men and eq uipme nt, had begun 

ea rly in the twenti eth century and progressively increased thereafter wit h technological advances. As a means of movement and transportation behind the 

fron t li ne in Fra nce, infantry div isions used cars, motorcycl es, truck s, and 

motorized ambu lances. Some fi eld artil lery regime nts also used c<ltcrpi llar Imetors to move heavier art ill ery pi eces. After Worl d War I a ll divisions were 

authorized some motorized vehicles, but neit he r infantry nor caval ry divisions 

had enough to move all their men and equipment. Field Service Regula/ions 

stipulated that infan try divisions woul d depend upon army corps or army unils 

10 provide transportati on in the field.25 

In 1927 the 341h Infantry, an element of the 4th Division, conducted experiments using trucks to move itself, disembark, and fight. Two year later, in 1929, 

the Army started a program to motorize e ight infa ntry regimen ts, four in the 

Hawaiian Division und four in the United States assigned to the 4th and 5th 

Di visions. To equip euch of these small peacetime regiments, the statT aut horized 

I passenger and 4 cross-country cars, 15 motorcycles, and 50 trucks, with most 

vehicles coming from obsolete World War I stocks. [n 193 1 Congress uppropriatcd money for the first significant purchase of tfucks since Worl d Wa r I, enabli ng 

the Army to motorize the supply trains of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Divisions. One 

wagon company in the 2d Di vision remained however, because of the relucta nce 

to consign the horse and wagon to the pa st.26 

By 1934 the Army had deve loped motorized equ ipmen t for fi eld artillery that 

equaled the cross-country mobility of the horse and had suffic ient endurance to 

conduct high-speed marches. Motorization of the Regu lar Army 's field arti llery 

began when Congress gave the Public Works Admi nistration money to buy veh icles for the Army. Within fi ve years a ll Regular fie ld artillery regiments assigned 

to infantry di visions had truck-drawn pi eces)? 

Besides providing mobility on the battlefield, trucks helped the Army save 

money between World Wars [ and II. In 1932 a crisis developed in the Nationa l 

Guard infantry divisions because they lacked a suffic ient number of horses to 

train the field arti llery. After exte nsive evaluation, the Guard determined that 

trucks were more economica l than horses, and the fo llowing year it began to 

motori ze the 75-ml1l. guns. By the end of 1939 all Guard div isions had truckdrawn fi e ld artillery, except for one regiment in the 44th Di vision.28 

Mechanization involved employing machines on the battlefie ld as distinct 

From transporting personnel and equipment. During World War I the Brit ish and 

French had developed tanks to aid the infan tr y in the assault, and, using borrowed 

equipment, the AEF had organized tank brigades before the end of the war. In 

combat, however, tanks fo ught in small units, usually platoons, in in fantry support roles. Their slow speed and lack of electronic communications capabi lity 

made any ot her tactica l employment impractical. After the war the tank company 

replaced the motorized machine gun battalion in the American infantry di vision. 

Postwar Army doctr ine for tanks still prescri bed that they sllpport infantry in 
122 MAN EUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

close combat to provide "cover invul nerable to the ordinary effects of rifle and 

mac hine gun fire, shrapnel, and she ll spli ntcrs."29 Alt hough the British and 

French Armies adopted simi lar doctrine, contin uous improvements in engines, 

suspension, and radios steadi ly increased the capilbil ities of suc h machines. In 

1926 the British, respond ing to the prodding of Fuller, Lidde ll Harl, and ot hers, 

tested an independen t mechanized force that could make swift, deep penetrations 

in an enemy's rear, disorgan izing and defeating an opponen t before efTec tivc 

resistance could be mou nted.30 

The fo llowing yem' Secretary of War Davis observed a mechan ized demonstration at Aldcrshot, England, and upon returning home ordered development or 

a similar force. On 30 December 1927, he approved an experimental brigade consisting of two light tank batta lions, a medium tank platoon, an infantry battalion, 

an armored car troop, a field arti llery battal ion, an ammuni tion trai n, chemical 

and ordna nce maintenance platoons, and a provisional molor repa ir section, all 

exist ing uni ts. In July 1928 units of what was ca ll ed th e Experimen tal 

Mec hanized Force asscmbled al Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, under the 

command of Col. Olive r Estridge. For the nex t three mon ths the force, more 

motorized than mechanized, conducted fie ld tests. Automobile ma nufactu rers 

contributed trucks and cars, but the rew avai lable pieces or mcchan ized equi pment were obsolete)1 

Short ly after Davis approved the organ ization of th e Experimental 

Mechanized Force, Maj. Gen. Frank Parker, Assistllllt Chief of Staff, G- 3,32 

adopted another approach toward mecha nization. He concluded that thc mechanized experiment would lead nowhere because Ihe rorce "would lack the fixi ty of 

tactical purpose and pcrmaneney of personne l Oil which to base experimell tal 

work, and its equipment will be so obsolete as to render its employment very dissimilar to that of a modernly-equipped mechanized force.")) Parker recommended that SUlllmerall appoin t a board to prcpare wbles of organization and equi pment ror a mechanizcd force, cstabl ish the characteristics of its vehic les, and 

develop doctrine. Summerall, with Davis' concurrence, established the 

Mechanized Force Board on 15 May 1928.34 

Wit hin six months the board designed a combined arTllS armored force of 

approximately 2,000 officers and enlisted men. [t consisted of a headqua rters 

and he<ldquarters company, a light tank battalion with an attached chemical 

company, a field artillery battalion, an enginecr company, and two infantry battalions each consisting of two rine and two machine gun companies (CharI 8). 

A medium tank company, an armored car troop, and a .50-calibcr antiaircraft 

artillery detachme nt were to be attachcd to the rorce. Probable missions 

embraced spearheading an attack, scrving as a eountcrofTensive rorce, penetrating enemy defenscs, tcmporarily holding a kcy position, and operating in the 

enemy's rear area to disorganize his reserves. To carry out these missions. the 

olTicers drew up a "shopping list" for light and medium tanks, armored reconnaissance ca rs, semiautomatic rines, rapid cross-coUll try vehicles for inrmllry, 
A RETURN TO THE PAST; A LOOK TOTHE FUTURE 123 

., 

Me(/ill/II armorell ellr of the 

Mec/ulllized Foret: 

se lf-propelled 37-111111. antitank 

guns, se lf-propelled 75- mm . and 

105-mlll. howitze rs, and two-way 

radios. The report re commended 

that the force begi n (IS a small unit 

and build gradually to full strength. 

Since new mechanized equipment 

would not become <Iva ilable before 

fiscal ycar 1930, the board saw 110 

need \0 assembl e Ihe unit until thell. 

Dav is endorsed th e plan In 

November 1928)5 

Two yea rs later, just before 

Summerall left office, Col. Dani e l 

Van Voorhis organized the first increment of the unit, which was designated the Mechanized Force. at Camp 

Eustis, Virgi nia. Consisting of a tank 

company, an armored car troop, a 

field artill ery battery, and an engineer comp,my, it total ed roughly 600 men. 

There, however, the project stopped. Because of the Great Depression, Congress 

never appropriated money for more new equ ipment, <lnd Van Voorhis' force had 

to make do with World War I- vintage equipment along with horses and wagons. 

Of more co ncern, the infantry, cavalry, and other arms and services opposed thc 

lise of scarce Anny funds to finance the new organization. With limited amounts 

of new wine aV<lilable, customers wanted their old bottles filled rirst)6 

In May 1931 the new Chie f of Staff, General Doug[<ls MacArthur, changed 

the direction of mec hanization. I-I c observed that rccent experimental units had 

bee n ba sed on equipment rather Ihan on mission and that <In item of equipment 

W<lS nOI limited to one ann or service. He there rore instructed all anns or ser~ 

vices to develop rully their mechaniziltion and motorization potential. Under 

MacArthur'S concept, cava lry was to eontinuc work with combat vehicles to 

enhance its rol e in such areas as reconnaissance, nank action, and pursuit, 

while inrantry was to explore ways to increase its strikin g power by using tanks. 

His dec ision spe ll ed the end of the sepa rate Mechanized Force, and five months 

later it wus disbanded. Units and men assigned to the rorce were returned to 

their rormer assignments, except ror abollt 175 o ffi ce rs and enlisted men, 

including Van Voo rhis, who remain ed with mechani zed cavalry. They tra ns· 

rerred to Camp Henry Knox (later Fort Knox), Kentucky, to crea te a new 

armored cavalry lInit)7 

On I March 1932, Van Voorhis organized the 7th Cavalry Brigade to experi~ 

ment with mechanization. At that time it consisted of on ly a headquarters, but the 

rollowing January the 1st Cava lry moved from Marfa, Texas, to Fort Knox where it 
HHC 

90 

ARMORED 

CAR UNIT 

28' 

---1 AAA UNIT I 

19' 

lTTANK BN 

261 

H HQ 

54 

fi , 

... -

TANK CO 

6ge8 

CHEM CO 

65' 

CHART 8- The Mechanized Force, 1928 

I--

'---

MECH FORCE 

2,027 

I 

FA BN 

2982 

HHB& 

TRAINS 

FA BTRY 

75-mm 

'i05-mm 

75·mm SP 

I 

I 

IN F BN, MECH 

533ea 

I--

I--

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HHC 

153 

RIFLE CO 

16188 

MG CO 

8gea 

E

1 A

2 In
A RETURN TO TH E PAST; A LOOK TO THE FUTURE 125 

became part of the brigade. Shortly thereafter the regiment adopted tentative tables 

of organization that provided for a covering squadron, a combat car squadron, a 

mach ine gun troop, and a headquarters troop. Each squadron had two troops, and 

the regiment had a total of seventy-eight combat cars. That structure lasted until 1 

January 1936, when the War Deparlmcl11 outlined a new organization that consisted 

of a headquarters and band, two combat ca r squadrons of two troops each, and 

headquarters, service, machine gun, and armored car troops. The new tables authorized the regiment to have seventy-seven combat vehicles, all developmental items. 

Eventually the War Department assigned a second cavalry regiment, a field artillery 

battalion equipped with 75Mmm. guns (mounted on selfMpropelled half tracks), ordM 

nance and quartermaster companies, and an observation squadron to the brigade. 

The brigade became the Army's fi rst armored unit of combined arms, contri buting 

much to the deve lopment of mcchanized theory in the intelwar years. However, 

bureaucratic inMfighting onen stifled the unit's development.38 

Although many European theorists urged the development of independent 

armored forces, their armies made little progress toward the formation of such 

units. The British abandoned their experiments in 1927 and did not organize their 

first armored divisions until 1939. The French organi zed light armored div isions 

in the 1930s, but put most of the ir tanks in variolls infantry support roles. [n the 

United States the Regular Army fielded two partially organized tank regiments as 

a part of the infantry arm between 1929 and 1940.39 

Both German and Russian Armies took a different approach. Neither had 

empl oyed tanks in World War I, but both saw their potential. Only after Adolph 

Hitler abrogated the military provisions of the Vcrsail les Treaty in 1935, however, 

did the German Army develop offensive-oriented armored panzer divisions. BlLt 

their interest in mechan ization, especially tanks, was evident throughout the periM 

od, as witnessed by the several visits by German officers to the 71 h Cavalry 

Brigade at Fort Knox in the mid- 1930s. The Russians experimented wit h ta nks 

from a ll industrial nations and favored the use of mass armor in the midMthirties. 

On the eve of World War II, however, the Russians had shifted emphasis to small 

tank units in support of an infantry role.40 

A New InfanllY Division 

January 1929 marked the beginni ng of a ten-year struggle to reorganize the 

infantry division. The Assistant Chief of Staff, 0 - 3, Genera[ Parker, reported that 

European countries were developing armies that could trigger a war of greater 

velocity and intensity than anything previollsly known. Great Britain, France, and 

Germany were engrossed with "machines" to increase mobility, minimize losses, 

and prevent stabili zation of the battlefront. The British favored mechanization 

and the French, motorization, whi le the Versa illes Treaty limited the Germans to 

ideas and dreams. Some Europeans adopted smaller, more maneuverable, IrianM 

gular infantry divisions that were easier to com mand and co ntrol than the 
126 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

ullwieidy sq uare division. Since the Army planned to introduce semiau tomatic 

fiOes and light air-cooled machine guns, Parker suggested that the 2d Division 

conduct tests to determine the most effective combination of automatic riOcs and 

machine guns. Sum mera ll agreed to the proposa l but exte nd ed the st udy to 

encompass the total infantry division. The st udy was to concentrate on approved 

standard infantry weapons, an ima l-d rawn combat trains, and motori zed field 

trains. The chief of sta ff placed no limit on road space, a princi pal determinant of 

divisional organization before and immediately aficr World Wllr 1.41 

The Chief of Infantry, Maj. Gen. Robert 1-1 . Allen, who had responsi bility for 

organizing and training inrantry troops, agreed to the examination but objected to 

having the commander or the 2d Di vision supervise the tests, which he believed 

rell within the purview or his own office. Eventua lly Summcrall agreed, and 

All en assigned the job to the Inrantry Board at Fort Benning. Gcorgia .42 

During the investigation scve ral proposa ls surraeed ror a triangula r inrmllry 

division, which promised greater maneuverabi lity, better command and control, 

and simplified communications and supp ly. Neverthe less, Army leaders turned 

down the idea. Maj. Bradrord G. Chynoweth or the Inrantry Board attributed the 

ret ention or the sq ua re division, whi ch was immi nent ly suitable ror rrontal 

all'leks, to Summe rall. As a rormcr division and army corps commander in 

Fmncc, Summerall smv no need ror change.43 

The question orthe inrantry division's organization lay dormant until October 

1935, when Maj. Gen. John B. Hughes, Assistant Chie r or Staff, G- 3, revived it. 

In a memorandum ror Ge neral Ma lin Craig, MacArthur's Sllcccssor as Chi er or 

Sta ff, Hughes suggested that the General Stan" consider mode rni zation or the 

Army's combat organizations. Although great strides had been madc in weapons, 

equipment, transportati on, and communications, organizations were still based on 

World War I experiences. He also noted that such organizational iniliatives were 

the purview or the Genera l StafT, an obvious rererence 10 Ihe resistance or the 

chieror in rantry in 1929 to reexamine divisional organizations. Since the Genera l 

Staff was responsible ror 10lal Army organization, Hughes thought it should conduct any such examination.44 

In November Crai g ca nvassed senior commanders rega rding reorganization 

issues. He noted the inranlry division in pa rti cul ar had foot , animal, and motor 

units. all with varyi ng rales or speed. wh ich did not meet the demands of modern warra re. Cra ig wondered if the division were 100 large, and, if so, whet her 

or not could it be red uced in size. Possibilities ror reduct ion included moving 

support and service ru nctions to army corps or army leve l. cutting inran try to 

th ree regiments. and reorganizi ng the field artill ery into a three-batta lion regiment. No consensus eme rged. Even the three champions or inrantrY- lhe 

Inrantry School, the Inranlry Board, and th e chier or inrantry- railed to agree 

011 a suitable organ ization, differing espec i'llIy on the co ntinued ex istence or 

inrantry and fie ld artillery brigades as intermediate headquarters between the 

regiment and the division.4S 
A RETURN TO TH E PAST; A LOOK TO THE FUTURE 127 

Genemf Cmig 

On 16 Ja nuary 1936 Craig created a new bod y, the Mode rn iza tion 

Boa rd, to exami ne the orga nization 

of the Army. Under the su pervision 

of Hughes, the board was to explore 

such areas as fi rcpower, su pply. 

motorization. mecha nization, hOllsing, perso nllel authoriza ti o n, a nd 

mobilization . II was to consider recommenda tions from the field, the 

General Staff, service schools, and 

ally ea rlier studies, includi ng those 

conce r ned with foreign armies. 

Despite this broad cha rter, Ihe boa rd 

members nevert he le ss addressed 

only the infantry division, considering the total Army orga nization 100 

extensive and too comp lex to be 

covered in one study. Besides, the 

board concluded that the fo rmation 

of higher commands rested upon the structu re of the infantry division.46 

The board's report, submitted on 30 July 1936, rejected the sq uare infan try 

division and endorsed a sma ller triilllgular division (Cha}'1 9), which could easily be 

organized into three "combat teams." lis proposal cut the infant ry division from 

22,000 officers and enlisted men to 13,500 and simplified the command structure. 

The brigllde echelon for infantry and field artillery was climinated, enabl ing the 

division commander to deal dif(,,'Ctly with the regiments. The enduring problem of 

where to locate the machine gun was dealt with again; one machine gun battalion 

was included in the infantry regiment, which also had three riOe battalions. Thc 

ficld artillery regiment consisted of one 105-mm. howitzer battalion and three 

mixed battalions of 75-mm. howit7..crs and 8 1-mm. mortars. The latter were to be 

attached to the infantry regiments in combat. To assist in mov ing, sea rching, and 

operating quickly on a bro<ld front. cavalry returned to the division for the first time 

si nce before World War 1 in the form of a reconnaissance squadron, to be equipped 

with inexpensive unarmored or lightly armored cross-coulltry vehicles. The allticipated mpid movement of the division minimized the need for extensive engineer 

work, except on roads. Therefore, an engi neer battalion replaced the existing regiment. Because engi neers would be primarily concerned with road conditions, they 

were also to provide traffic control in the divisiona l area. A signal com ~lIly was to 

maintain communications between the division and regimental headquarters, and 

attachcd signal detachments were to perform these services within regiments.47 

To increase mobility, the division's combat servicc support elcments undcnvent 

radical changes. A battalion of trucks and a quartermaster service company of 

A RETURN TO THE PAST; A LOOK TO THE FUTURE 129 

laborers formed the heart of a new supply system. They handled the baggage and 

noncombat equipment of all divisional elements. Each divisional un it was responsible for its own ammun ition resupply. The new arrangement led to the elimination of 

the ammunition train, regimenta l field trains, and the quartermaster regiment. A 

quartermaster light maintenance company was added to service the motor equi pment. The mai ntenance of hospitals passed to the army corps. A newly organized 

medical battalion collected and evacuated casua lt ies, while infantry, field artillery, 

cava lry, and engineer units kept their medical detaclunents to provide immediate 

aid. All service elements were placed under a division service troops command. 

headed by a general officer, with a headquarters company that performed the 

provost marshal's duties and included the division's special staff.48 

To comply with Craig's d irective for the division to employ the lat est 

weapons, the board recommended that its infantrymen be armed with the new 

semi automatic Garand rifle, which the War Department had approved in January. 

For field artillery, the board wanted the even newer lOS-mill. howitzer, which was 

nOI yet even in the Army's inventory.49 

Members of the board concluded that they had given the div ision all the 

combat and service support resources needed for open warfare. Those e lements 

not required were moved up to Ihe army corps or army echelon. Additiona l 

units, stich as heavier field arti llery, antimechan ized (a ntitank), tank, antiaircraft, aviation, motor transport, engineer, and medica l units, might be required, 

but the board made the divisional staff large enough to coordinate the attachment of sllch troops. Although sma ll, the new division was thought to have 

eq ual or greater firepowe r than the square division and occupied the same 

frontages as its predeccssor. 50 

In a separate letter to Cra ig, Hughes summarized the advantages and disadvantages of the new infa ntry division. Pluses included its highly mobile nature, 

the ease wit h which infantry and fie ld artillery could form combat teams, and the 

reduction in the number of command ec he lons and amoun t of administrative 

overhead. He also pointed to improvements in transportation, su pply, and maintenance, since a ll animal transport was e liminated. Given such a division, he 

believed that the Regular Army could achieve a viable readiness fo rce without an 

increase in authorized personne l. Drawbacks appeared minor. The states might 

not accept a reallotment of National Guard infantry divisions in peacetime. As a 

federal force, those divisions served only in national emergency or war, but as 

state forces they had been located and frequently used to cope with local emergencies and disasters. Hughes questioned spl itting communi cation func tions 

between the arms and the signal company and Ihe pooling of transportation for 

baggage and other noncombat equipment into the service echelon. Both arrangements could generate friction because the functions would be outside the control 

of the user. He was also concerned about the loss of the infantry and field 

artillery brigades because they eliminated genera l otTicer positions. Finally, training literature would need revision and dissemination to the field. 5l 
130 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

After reviewing the report, Craig decided 10 test the proposed division wit h 

attached antimechanized (an lil<lIlk) and antia ircraft artil lery battalions and an 

observation squad ron. He selected the 2d Div ision, comm<lndcd by Maj. Gen. 

James K. Parson, to cond uct the test between September and November 1937. 

The resulting Provisiona l Infantry Division (PID) included 6,000 men from the 

2d Division and a similar !lumber from olher commands, which also furnished 

much orthe equipment. The examination, the first in the history of the Army, was 

he ld in Texas, where space and terra in permitted a thorough ana lysis of the un i1.52 

Even before the lest ended, Maj. Gen. George A. Lynch, Chief of Infantry, 

vetoed the proposed organization in a report to the stafT in Washington. Hilving 

wit nessed part of the exercise, he viewed the separation of the machine gun from 

thc ri nc battalion and the altachment of the signal detachment illld mortar ballery 

to the infantry regiment as mistakes. The fi rst preven ted teamwork in the regi· 

mcn t, and the second interfered with unity of command. Lynch considered the 

attachcd antitank battalion an infantry unit bccause it used the same antitank 

weapons as the infantry regiment. He objected to the commander of the scrvice 

troops, contending that the prcsence of a gencral ofTicer in this position compli· 

cated the c hain of command. Furthermore, since the movement of Ihe train s 

depended on the tactical situation, only the division commander could make the 

decision to move them. Because field, sllpply, and ammunition trains opcmted to 

the rear orthe combat units, Lynch discerned no need for them in the division. He 

suggested that the Army return to the fixed army corps, in which div isions did the 

fighting and the corps provided the logistica l support.5J 

Shortly after Lynch's negative account, the Nell' York Tillles reported that Cra ig 

planned to appoint a sl>ccial comlllillee to design an infantry division based on the 

PIO test. The article claimed that the committee was to include Maj. Gen. Fox 

Conner, Col. George C. Marshall, and a third unnamed officer. Eventually Brig. 

Gen. Lesley 1. McNa ir, the Chief of Staff of the PIO, was identified in private cor· 

respondence as the third member. Con ner and Marshall, former members of the 

Lassiter Board, had supported I>ershing 's small division. Conner had also servcd as 

Craig's l>ersonnel representative at the PID test. Within a few days Marshall, writing 

from Vancouver Barracks, Washington. told a friend that slieh a board would look 

like a "stacked deck" to secure a small division. As it happened, any plans for the 

group felllhrough when Conner retired for medical reasons.S<I 

The final report on the PI D test, mostly the work of McNair, noted many of 

the divisional weak ncsses idcntified by Lynch, but, instead of assigning the division to a fixed army corps, McNair proposed a new sma ller and marc powcrful 

division. To attain it, he recommended that the infantry regiment have an antitank 

company and three ballalions, each with one machine gun and three rine campa· 

nics. The machine gun cOlilpany was to be armed with both machine guns and 

mortars. Inclusion of the nntitank company in the regiment eliminatcd the need to 

attach such a battalion to the div ision. Like Lynch, he suggested eliminating g~ 

nal detac hments in favor of infantry, arti llery, and cavalry troops. To increase 
A RETURNTOTHE PAST; A LOOK TOTHE FUTU RE 131 

fi repower and range, McNair wanted to replace 75-111m. howitzers with 75-mm. 

gUllS and one battalion of lOS-mill. howitzers with 155-111111. howitzers. He felt 

that mortars had no place in the division artillery because they could not provide 

close support for infantry and their rate of fire, range, and accuracy fa iled to meet 

field arti llery standards. Another battery of 75-mm. guns in each direct support 

battalion was to replace the mortars. Because the reconnaissance squadron operated considerably ill front of the divisioll and on its flunks, he proposed that it be 

moved to the corps level. McNair sensed an overabundance of engineers. In a war 

of movement, engi neers wou ld not have the lime to do extensive road work. 

Another responsibility, that of traffic control, could return to the military police. 

Therefore, the engineer battalion could be reduced to a company and a separate 

military police unit would combine provost marshal and traffic control missions. 

McNair also fa ulted the special command for the service troops organization and 

advised its elimination. He believed the ordnance company and band were unnecessa ry and advocated their reassignment to higher echelons. The quartermaster 

service company and motor battalion were to be combined as a quartermaster 

battalion, which was to supply the division with everything except ammunition. 

Each combat clement was to remain responsible for its own ammunition supply. 

These changes produced a division of 10,275 officers and enl isted men.55 

After analyzi ng a[[ reports and comments, the Modernization Board redesigned 

the division, retaining three combat teams built around the infantry regiments. Each 

regiment consisted of a headquarters and band, a service company, and three battalions, each with one heavy weapons company armed with 8 1-mm. mortars and .30-

and .50-caliber mach ine guns and three ri ne companies, but no antitank unit. The 

.50-caliber machine guns in the hcavy weapons companies and the 37-tll111. gUlls in 

the regimenta l headquarters companics wcre to se rve primarily as anti tank 

weapons. The large four-battalion artillery regiment was broken up into two smaller 

regiments, one of three 75-m111. gun battalions and the other with a battalion of 

I05-1111ll. howitzers and a battalion of 155-mm. howitzers. Although the tcst had 

shown that the field artil lery commander had no problems with thc fow··batta lion 

unit, school commandants and corps area commanders questioned the quality of 

command and control within the regiment. Two general officers assisted the eommander, one for infantry and one for fi eld artillery, but they were not in the cha in of 

cOlllmand for passing or rewriting orders. Within the combat arms regiments, signal 

functions fell under the regimental commanders, while the divisional signal company operated the communication system to the regiments. The engineer battalion 

was retained but was reduced in size and consisted of three li ne companies in addition to the battalion headquarters and headquarters company. Traffic control duties 

moved to a new military police company that combined those activities with the 

provost marshal's office.56 

The board completely reorganized the supply system. The combat arms wcre 

given responsibility for their own ammunition resupply and baggage. Therefore, the 

1110tor battalion was eliminated. A new quartermaster battalion was established, 
132 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

which included a truck company to transport personnel and rations, a service company to furnish laborers, and a headquarters and headquarters company. The headquarters company could do minor motor mai ntena nce requiring less than three 

hours, while major motor maintenance moved to Ihe army corps level. The quartermaster tight maintenance and ordnance comp..1nies were removed from the division. 

Medical service within the division was based on the assumption that it would be 

responsible for the collection and evacuation oflhe sick and wounded to field hospitals established by corps or higher echelons. The former headqumtcrs company, 

service troops, was incorporated into the division headquartcrs company.S7 

With no change expected in total Army strength , the new division had two 

authorized strengths, a wartime one of 11 ,485 officers and enlisted men and a 

peacetime one of 7,970. During peacctime all elements of the division were to be 

fiUed except for the division headquarters and mi lita ry police compani es, which 

were to be combined. Other divisional elements required only enlisted personnel 

to bring them up to wartime manning leve ls.58 

After the Modernization Board redesig ned the division, Cra ig dec ided to 

spend a year evtlluating it before he determined its fate. The 2d Division, selected o nce more fo r the task, again borrowed personne l and equipment from other 

units to fill its rank s. Be twee n February 1939 and Germany's invasion of 

Poland on I September, the " Provisional 2d Divisio n" conu1HlIlded by Maj. 

Gen. Walter Krueger tested the proposed unit. Krueger found th e organization 

sound except for the quartermaster batta lion and the need to make some minor 

adjustments in a few ot her c lements. The quartermaster batta lio n lacked enough 

laborers and trucks to supply the division, and he recommended increases in 

both. With its many pieces of motorized equipment, the di vision req uired more 

maintenance personnel. Minor changes included augmentations to the divisio nal inte lligence (G- 2) and opera ti ons (G- 3) starT sections, a slig ht increase in 

the signa l company to handle communi cations for the second field artillery regiment, a complete motorization of the engineer battalion, and the replacement 

of the five regimenta l bands with one divisional band.59 

Maj. Gen. Herbert J. Brees, Eighth Corps Area commander and the test 

director, concurred with most of Krueger's findings except for the e ngineer and 

qua rtermaster battalions. He opposed complete ly motorizi ng the enginee r unit 

beca llse the enginee rs were to be limit ed to the divisional area instead of a 

broad front. He favored an increase in the number of trucks in the qua rtermaster ballalion but not 10 the extent suggested by Krueger. Brees a lso saw no need 

for in fa ntry and artillery sectio ns havi ng their own general officers, because the 

commander could easily deal with a ll e lements, but he recommended a stafT 

officer, not necessarily a genera l offi cer, to coordinate field a rtill ery rire . To 

make room fo r a second genera l officer in the division, he suggested that the 

di visio n's c hi ef o f staff become th e second-in-command with th e rank of 

brigad ier genera l because he would know more about the di vision than anyone 

else except for the commander.60 
A RETURN TO THE PAST; A LOOK TO THE FUTURE 133 

On 14 Septembe r 1939, LI. 

Col. Harry Inglcs of the Modernization Board summarized the evolution of the div ision's organi zation, foc lising on t he report of 

Kr ueger a nd t he co mme nts of 

Brees. He also recommended resolutions to the disputed points. Two 

days late r Ma rs hall, who had 

replaced Cra ig as Chicf of Staff on 

1 Septembe r, approved a new 

peacetime division, which incl uded 

infantry and artillery sections headed by genera l officers in the division headquarters, a motorized 

engineer batta lion , a d ivisiona l 

band within the headquarters company, and an increase in the number 

of trucks in the quartermaster battalion (CharI 10). Marshall's division was completely motorized.61 Gel/eml Marshall 

Sti ll, the new organization did 

not totally satisfy Marsha ll. Hav ing followed its deve lopment closely as chief of 

the War Pl ans Division and later as deputy chi ef of staff, he believed that the vi~ 

sion shou ld be even stronger to cope with susta ined combat. In Marshall's view, 

however, the new organization's overwhelming advantage was that the National 

Guard divisions could easily adopt it. Furthermore, the onset of war in Europe 

added urgency because the Army could no longer de lay moderni Z<1.tion.62 

A few days after Marshall approved the new structure he authorized the reo ~ 

gani Z<1.tion of the 1st, 2e1, and 3d Divisions and the activation of the 5th and 6th 

Divisions, each with a strength of 7,800 officers and enlisted men. No div ision 

was concentrated because the Army did not have a post large enough to house 

one. Divisional elements, however, were conveniently located wit hin corps areas 

to ease trai ning. Geographically, the div isions were distri bu ted so that one divi· 

sion was on each of the seabonrds (Atlanti c and Pac ific), one near the southwest 

front ier, and two centra lly located to move to e ither coast or the southwest. Wit h 

the outbreak of war in Europe, Congress quickly authorized increases in the 

strength of the Army, and by ea rly 1940 Ihe infantry division stood al 9,057.63 

A New Cavahy Division 

The Modern ization Board look up the cavalry division in 1936. Most officers 

still envisioned a rol e for the horse because it could go places inaccessible to 
~ OIVHQ 

110 

1 

HHe I 

135 

1 

HHe 

-I 18 

~ 

CHART IO-Infantry Division (Peace), 1939 

Corrected to 8 January 1940 

I INFANTRY DIVISION I 

9,057 

I DIVHQ&MPCD -l I SIG CO I 

1 

MEO BN 

I 139 I 184 I 234 

INF REGT 

1 

ENGR BN 

-I 1 

FA REGT, 75-mm I 

1,818ea 325 1A17 I 

I 

1 

lNF BN 

510ea 

RIFLE co 

118ea 

svco I 

74 I 

I MEO & CHAP I 

79 I 

] I WP,~:co_1 

eTN" Combat Train 

WPNS" Weapons 

SV" Service 

1 

HHB I I MED&CHAP 

100 I 33 

75·mm BN h 

428ea II 

I 

I HHB&CTN_I 

"' 'TRY -m IOJe8 
A RETURN TO THE PAST; A LOOK TO THE FUTURE 135 

lsI Ca l'llliy /)il'isio/ll//(/llelivers, To),alil'(l/e. Texas. 1938 

motori zed and mechanized equipmen t. Taking into accoun t recommendations 

from the Eighth Corps Area, the Army War Col lege, and th e Command and 

General Staff School, the board developed a new sma ller triangular cavalry div ision (CharI II), which the lsi Cavalry Division evaluated duri ng maneuvers at 

Toyahvale, Texas, in 1938. Like the 1937 infantry di vision test, the maneuvers 

concen trated on the di visional cava lry regiments around which all other units 

were 10 be organized,64 

Following the test, a board of 151 Cavalry Division officers, headed by Brig. 

Gen. Kenyon A. Joyce, rej ected the three-regiment di vision and recommended 

retention of the two-brigade (four-regiment) organi zation. The latter configuration allowed the division to deploy easily in two columns, which was <lccepted 

standard cavalry tactics. However, the boa rd advocated reorganizing the cavalry 

regiment along trian gular lines, which would give it a headquarters and headquarters troop, a machine gun squadron wi th speci al weapons a nd machine gun 

troops, and three rifle sqlladrons, each with one machine gun and three rifle 

troops. No significant change was made in the field artillery, but the test showed 

that the engi neer element should remain a squadron to provide the divisional elemen ts greater mobility on the battlefield and that the specia l troops idea should 
CHART II-Cavalry Division, 1938 

CAVALRY 

DIVISION' 

I I I I 

HQs HQs RECON MEO 

TROOP SQON SQON C

CAY FA ENGR QM 

REGT REGT TROOP SQON 

I I 

HHB 75-mm 105-mm 

BN BN 

I I 

I I I I 

HHB & BTRY HHB& BTRY 

CBTTRAIN CBTTRAIN 
A RETURN TO THE PAST; A LOOK TO THE FUTURE 137 

be extended to include the div ision headquarters, signa l, and ordnance troops; 

quartermaster, med ica l, engineer, reconnaissa nce, and obse rvation squadro ns; 

and a chemical wa rfare detachment. One headquarters would assume rcsponsibil~ 

ity for the administration and disciplinary control for these fo rces.65 

Although the study did not lead to a general reorgtlniz..1tion of the cava lry division, the wanimc cavalry regiment was restrllCI'Ufcd, effcctive I December 1938, to 

consist of a headquarters and headquarters troop, machine gun and special weapons 

tTOOpS, and three squadrons of th ree rifle troops cacho The special troops remained 

as structured in 1928, and no observation squadron or chemical detachment found a 

place in the div ision. Wi th the paper changes in the cavalry divisions and other 

minor adjustments, Ihe strength of a wartimc divisional rosc 10 10,680.66 

Such paper c ha nges c harac terized mu ch of the inte rwar Army's work. 

Although planners lacked the resources to man, equ ip, and tcst functional divisions, they gave considerable thought to th eir organization. They deve loped a 

new concept for the infantry division, ex perimented wit h a larger cava lry division, and explored the organization of a mec hani zed unit. Designi ng the new 

infa ntry division with a projected battle fi e ld in North America, officers took 

into account the spa n of control, the number of req uired command echelons, 

thc statT, the ba lancc between infantry and field artillery, the loca tion of the 

reconnaissancc clcment, th e role of engineers, and the best way to orga nize the 

services and supply system. The triangu lar infantry div ision appeared to offer 

the best solution to these requirements accordi ng to the plan ners, who Ma rsha ll 

though t were among " the best in the Army."67 
138 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

NOles 

I LIT, Cors to COs ;111 corps areas anti other addresses. 5 Nov 20. sub: Reorganization of 

Di visions and Higher Units, AG 320.2 (1 1-4-35), RG 177. NARA. 

2 LIT, TAG to CGs of all corps areas. 9 Oct 22. sub: COlllmnnd. AG 320.2 (10-4-22), and 

Memo. 0 - 3 10 ColS, 27 Aug 26, sub: Reconstitution orthe lSi Di vision, AG 320.2 (7- 19- 26), RO 

407, NA RA. 

3 LIT, CG, 1st Division to CO, Second Corps Area, 19 Jul 26, sub: Reconstitution orthe Fi rst 

Division, AG 320.2 (7- 1726), ItO 407. NARA . 

.. Ibid .. with 1st Ind. CO, Second Corps Area. to TAG. 5 Aug 26. and 2d Ind. TAG to CO, 

Second Corps. ) I Aug 26. Memo. G 3 for Cors, sub: Reconstitution of the 1st Di vision, 27 Aug 

26, and Llr. TAG 10 CGs of all corps areas, 3 1 Dee 26. sub: RCCOIiSlilUlion of Ihe First Divisiol1. 

AG 320.2 (7- 19-27). RG 407. NARA: llr. Maj Gcn Suml11cr.all to Brig Gcn Richmond r . Davis. 6 

Jul 27. and Llr, Summcrall to M:ti Gcn John L. 1·lines. 6 Ju127. John L. lIincs I'apers. LC. 

5 WD Cir 42, 1919; Memo, Wf'D for ColS. f6 Jan 20. sub: Recommendations of Conference 

of Department and Division Coml11anders, Memo, ColS. no subject. 23 Jan 20. Memo. Newton D. 

B:Lker to Gen Mnrch, 20 Apr 20, Memo. WIlD for TAG. 28 Apr 20, sub: Shoulder Patch Insignia 

for Di vision, Corps. SelViees. etc .. copies TIOH; ltr, Pershing to Maj Gen Clarence R. Edw:trds. 

27 May 20. Pershing Papers. LC; WD Cir 59. 1928. 

6 Rpls of the Sec of War. ANII'D 1912. PI'. 15- 16, and ARWD 1913. fl. 125; "New Tablcs of 

Organiz.1Iion." 11I/(lIIIIY )0/11"1/(/1 2 1 (Aug 1922); 186- 92 (The new tllblcs CUI Ihe inr.1ntry regiment 

from 1.490 101.205 officers and enliSled men.); "llatealions Declared Inaetive."llijallIIJ' )mll'll(11 

30 (Jun 1927): 660: Annual Report of the Chiefof Infantry. FY 1929. p. 38, RG 177. NARA: "Five 

Ballalions of Infantry to be Made Inlletive." IlIfilllll)' JOllrl/1I1 32 (ScI' 1929): 317; Returns, 

Philippine Division. 193 /. RO 94, NA RA: also see nOI,,:S "Infimtry During Ihe Inlerwar Years," 

ltuthor's files. 

7 Army f)irecIOIJ'. July 1929. p. 28: Llr. TAG to Chief of .he Air Corps. 17 Jan 29. sub: 

Princil}/es to be followed in assignment of Air Corps Troops to higher tactie:!1 organization, with 

Endorsements, AG 320.2 Air Corps (12- 20- 28) Pub., Microfilm A 2765, Albert F. Simpson 

1 listoric:tl Rese:!rch Center, M:t;o;well Air Force Base. Alabal11:l : WD Cif 14, 1931 , 

8 TIC. Table 3 1 W, Field Art illery Brigade. Infantry Division, 18 AI)r 1929: WDCir 39,1929: 

Llr, TAG 10 Chiefs of all Anns and Services, and other addresses, 7 Dec 29. sub: Assignment of 

Troops, AG 320.2- FA (/ 1-4-29) Misc. (Ret)·C, DAMII-IISO. 

9 Memo, G- 3 for Cors, 2 May 27, sub; G- 3/ 17531-Change in Cenain Regul3r AmlY Units, 

AG 370- 5 (4-28-27). RG 94. NARA: LIT, SULIlmer;LlIto l'larry M. Worsb..1ck. MC, I Jun 27, AG 

370- 5 (5 2 1- 27), Llr. TAG 10 CO. Eighth Corps AfC3. 6Jlln 27, sub: Troop Movement, AG 370- 5 

(5 2 1 27) (Mise). RG 94, NA RA; "Shift ing of Infantry Units," IlIjimllJ' Jollnm{ 3 I (Ju l 1927): 89. 

to Adna R. Chaffee. "The M:!neLlI'ers of Ihe First Cava lry Di vision, Scptember- Oetober, 

1923," COl'll" ), JOIII"II(l{ 33 (Apr 1924): 133- 62; George Dillman , "1st Cava lry Di\'isio11 

Maneuvers," CaI'{jI!J,.I()Il/"Iw{ 37 (Jan 1928): 47. 

t t Aubrey Lippincol1, "New RegimeL11al Orga niza tion," CaI'llIiJ' JOllrnal 32 (Jan 1929): 

22 24, 

t2 T/O. Table 401 W, O I":llry Division. 10 May 1928; "btracts from the Annual Report of 

the Chief of Cavalry, Major Geneml lIerbert 13. Crosby," Cm'fl/lJ' )0/11"11(11 37 (Jan 1928): 108: 

Llr. TAG 10 All Corps Areas, DepartmeL11s. and E;o;elllpted St:ltions Commanders and other 

addresses, 26 OCI 34, sub: Reorganizlltion oflhe Field Artillery. AG 320.2 FA (12- 26 33) Pub, 

AG Reference files. DAMII,II SO; Llr. TAG to CO. Eighth Corps Area, 16 OCI 28. sub: Annored 

Car Unit, 320.2 Cavalry (10228) Mise'C, and Lt Col Regnier, " lIistory of the 91st 

Reconna issa nce Squ adron, lSI Cava lry Division." undated Ms, 91st Armored Cavalry 

I(eeonllllissance Bal1:llion file, DAM II-II SC. 

13 Llr, Panama Canal (I'C) DeJlt to TAG. 7 May 3 1, sub: Crganitation of .roops wilhin PC 

Department, LtT. I'C Dept to TAG,S Feb 32, sub: Reorganization or the l':tnallIa Can:!1 Departmenl, 
A RETURN TO THE PAST; A LOOK TO THE FUTURE 139 

with 1st Ind, TAG 10 CO. I'e DePI, 17 M:lr 32, AG 320.2 PC (5- 7-3 1), :md Rctums. PC Division. 

all RG 407. NARA. 

14 Reports oflhe ellil!/oflile ,\Iili/ill Burellli. 1925, p. 13, and 1926. pr. 11- 18: Memos for 

Assistant Chief of Sta ff (ACofS), G 3, 30 Apr 26. 28 Feb 27. and 31 May 27. MIJ ]25.4 Gen- G, 

War DepMtlllCI11 MobiliZ;lIion Pl,m, 19 Mar 26. Misccl l;lIlcous files, DAM I I-IISO. 

15 Memos for Statistical Section. ACors G 3.31 Mar 27 and 2 Jan 30. MO 325.4 Gen 6, 

DAMII·IISO: Report (iflhe C/u'(iojl/II! Mililifl Burcall, 1926. Appendix C; Repom' o/rlle Naliomd 

GilaI'd IJmwlII, 1936, p. 7, and 1939, I). 27; also sec author's nOh::S "National Guard Interwar 

Years:' 

16 Repol"' o/fhe Alljll/tllli Gel/emf of Nell' JCI:n')'. 1927, p. 7: SUI/I! of Ne,.. York. Allmwf R!.'I)(Jr' 

of 'hI! "(ljl/ifllll Gel/em/. 1918, p. 2 t; Reporl.l· of Ihe Chi!.'f of lhe Mililia HII/WIII. 1928. pp. 25- 26. 

and 1929, Pt>. 14,22-23: Memos for Statistical Section. ACofS. G ·3. 28 Feb 27. 31 Mar 27. and 3 

Scp 29, Mil 325.4 Oen- 6, DAM II-IISO. 

17 Memos for Statistical Section. A Cors, [ Apr 36, I Nov 39. I Mar 40, MI3 325.4 Gen. 

DAMI I-IISO: John 13. Smith. "Our First Nalional Guard Cavalry Division," ('(lI'(IIr),JOIIl'llol 46 

(Sep OCI 1936): 378- 79; "Two More Cavalry Divisions Authori7etl." elll,tlIi), )0111'1/11/48 

(ll1n Feb [939): 67; Nmiollill Gmll'd Regislel' ([ 9]9). p. t 5. 

11( "Progress of Assignments of IIlf"n ntry Reserve OfTi cers 10 Infanlry Division of thc 

Orgllllized Reserves," u.s. I/rlll)' Uecl'llilillg Neil'S 5 (May 1922): no jlllginalioll; Comptroller's 

Records. US Amly Divisions- Inf:mlry !Lnd Cavalry Strength,]O Jun 1928 1931, Reference 1':lper 

Files, Anny Reserve 1916-1 9]9, DAM II-IISO: UPI of III<' Sec ofll'(II·. /937, p. 6. 

19 War Departmellt Mobili7 .. 1tion Plans. 1923. 1924. and 1926. Miscellaneous files, DAMIIII S0: Proceedings of Conference of Corps Arca alld Divisioll Commanders held al Washingloll. 

D.C .. June 1927, p. 140. A WC course material 1927, MI·I!. 

20 Ltr. TAG \0 Chiefs of:11I War Dcl):tnmenl I3 rancht.'S and other addresses, 15 Aug 27. sub: 

Constitution, Reconstitution, or Redesignation of Certain Units of the Regular Army and the 

Reorgau izlltion of Regular Army Divisions, AO Refcrcnee files. 320.2 (6 5- 27) Mise (Ret). 

DAMI I-IISO. 

21 Ibid. 

22 UPI (ifilli! Sec of WOI'. 1932. I). 53; Ltr. OCS to CGs of Corps Areas and Depts .• 9 Allg 32, 

sub: Establishment of Field Amlies. oes 20696. Four Anny Plan file. 1933. DAMII·I·ISO. 

23 Mell1o, WI'D for Cors, Sub: Four Army Organization, 27 Mar 3]. WPD ]56 1- 15, AG 

]20.2 (8- 6 32). Section I-A, ItO 407, NA RA. 

2-1 Ltr. ColS to CGs of Annies and Corps Area, 18 Aug 33. sub: Development or Four Anny 

Organization. AO 320.2 (8- 1633) (Misc.) M-E (WPD) ]561- 27. Four Anny Plan file. 1933. Ltr. 

TAG to eGs all Corps Areas, Dcp.1rtments, and Exemptt.'d Slat ions. 26 Oct 34, sub: Reorganiz.1tion 

of Field Arti llery, AG 320.1 FA ( 12- 26- ]3), Pub, AO Reference Jiles, DAMI I-IISO. 

25 T/O. Table I W. lnraillry Division. 192 1: TID. Table 401 W, Cavalry Division. 192 1: Field 

Sel'l'ice Ueglllflliolls Ullited St(l/e~' AI'II/)' (192]). I). 66. 

26 UI'I oflhe Sec ofWol'. 191/1, p. 82; WD Cir 29. 1929; Ema Risch. QIIl/l'tel'lIl11stel' Support of 

Ihe AI'III,I': II 11i.~101) ' o.flhe CO/p.l· 1775 1939 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Oniee. 

1962). pp. 717- 19; WD Cir 14, 19] 1. 

27 UI'I of the St.'C of War. 1934. pp. 40-41. and /935, I). 7; Ur. TAG 10 COs all Corps Areas, 

Departments, and Exempted Stations. 26 Oct ]4. sub: Reorganiz.1tion of Field Artillery: Al'lIIy /.isl 

tI//(I/)iI'l'CIOI"J'.20Qct 1939. pp. 9 10,15. 

211 John S. Shetler, "Motors for the Guard." Quarterlllaster Rel'ie,,· 14 (Mar-Apr 1935): 47-49; 

NmiO/wl GII(lrtf RegiSler (19]9). pp. 1422 2]. 

2'l Field Service Regulations (192]). p. 13. 

30 J. F, C, Fuller. "Tactics and Mechaniz.1tion:· and "Editorial Comment: Mechanization of 

Military Forces," IlIfilllll)' JO/ll'/la/ 30 (May 1927): 457- 76. 533 35. The entire issue is devoted 10 

mechanization. 

3t Timothy K. Nenninger, "The Experimclltal Mechanized Forces," /lrl/lor 78 (May-Jun 

1969): 33 39; GO 16. Third Corps Arc:1. 5 Jul 1928, 66th Armor fi le. DAMII-IIS0; Brig Gen 
140 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

Daniel Van Voorhis. lecture, "Mcch,mization," 13 Oct 1937. at the Army War College. AWe 

course mnlerial 1937- 1938, MHI. 

32 A ftcr World War I, the Amly Staff was reorganized 10 consist of the Chief of Slafl', Deputy 

Chief of SlatT. and Assistant Chiefs of Staff, 0 - 1. 0 - 2. 0 - 3. and 0-4. lind WilT Plans Division. 

The 0 - 1 position corrcspondcu to personnel. 0 - 2 to intelligence, 0 - 3 to operations, and 0-4 10 

sliPllly. 

33 Memo, 0-3 for ColS, 20 Mar 28, sub: A Mechanized Force, A We Course material, 

0 - 3/10677,84--17, MHI. 

34 Ibid.; WD SO 110, 10 May 1928, extract printed in RPI, Mechanized Force, I Del 28, A we course material 84-20, MI·I!. 

35 Rpl, sub: A Mechanized Force, 1 Oct 28, Melllo, Deputy Cors for Cors, 31 Oct 28, sub: A 

Mechanized Force, AWC coursc mntcrial, OCS 18500- 57,84- 20, MHL Thc bonrd includcd Mnj. 

Adna R. Chaffcc, who would bccomc n bencon for mechanilmtion in the ncxt decade. 

36 Mildred Hanson Gillie, Forgillg Ille Thullderbolt (Hnrrisburg, Pn.: Military Service 

Publishing Co., 1947), I)P. 36--40; Charles L. SCOIl, "Early History of Mechnnization," draft Ms. 

Chnrlcs L. Seoll Pnpcrs, LC; Nenninger, "The Experimental Mechanized Forces," pp. 33-34. 

l7 Nenninger, "The Expcrimental Mechnnized Forces," p. 39; Memo, OCS, I Mny 3 1, sub: 

General Principlcs to Govcm Meclmnization and Modcmization Throughout thc AmlY. Mi[itnry 

Intelligence Division Correspondence, 1917- 1941,2045- [ 192/ 12, RO 165, NARA; Nomlnn Millcr 

Cary, "The Use of Motor Vehicles in the United States Army, 1899- 1939," Ph.D. disse rtMion, 

University of Georgin, 1980. p. 244; Rpt of the Sec 0/ War. 1931, p. 43; Daniel Van Voorhis, 

"Mechnnization"; Robert W. Grow. "The Ten Lean YeaTS," Ms. Feb 1969, pp. 19- 22, DAMH· 

HSO. 

l8 Ltr, TAG to CG of nil Corps Areas and Depts and other addresses. 16 l an 31. sub: Changes 

in Assignment of Divisionnl Cavalry units, AG 320.2 ( 12- 24- 3 I} Misc. (Ret) MC, 1st Annored 

Div file, DAMH.I·ISO; GO 2. Fifth Corps Area, 6 Feb 1932. Records of U.S. Anny Continental 

Commands, 1920-42, RG 394, NARA; Guy V. Henry, "The Trend of Organization and Equipmcnt 

of Cavalry in the Principal World Powers and Its Probable Role in Wars of the Ncar Futuro," 

e m'all)' JO/I/"IIlI141 (Mar- Apr 1932): 5- 9; T/O. Table 423 P, Cnvlllry Regiment (Mcchnnized), I 

Jan 1933; Grow, "Thc Tcn Lean Years," pp. 22-38; 1'/0 , Table 423 p. Cavalry Regiment 

(Mechanized), 14 Oct 1935; Daniel Van Voorhis, "Mcchnnization"; SCOII, '"Early History of 

Mechanization." 

39 Corelli S amell, Bri/ail! (111(/ Her Army /507- /970 (Wlln1lOlldsworth. England: Allcn Lane, 

Penguin Press, 1974). p. 469; Glenn S . Hel[mich. "ChMlcs de Gaulle: His Ideas on Mechanized 

Warfare and the Anny of thc Future and the Application of These Ideas," Master thesis. Xavier 

University, 1955. p. 68; Jeffcry A. Gunsburg, Dil'/'(/ed alld COllqrlered: Tlte Fr'ellch Nigh Command 

(/lid the Defcat of tire Wesl. /940 (Wcstport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1979). p. 9- 10, 15.41-42; 

Timothy K. Ncnninger, "A Rcvised Meehaniz.1lion Policy," AmlOr 78 (Sep-Oct 1969): 45-49. 

40 Hcinz Guderian. I>unzer Lel/der (New York: E. P. Dullon and Co ., 1952), pp. 36, 316; 

Gillie, Forging the Thunderbol t, p. 85- 89; Richard M. Ogorkiewcz. Armol': A HistOt)' tlf 

Mechanized Forces (New York: Fredcrick A. I'raegcr, 1960). pp. 222- 28. 

4t Mcmo, G- 3 for CofS, 23 Jan 29, sub: Recent developments in organization and training in 

amlies of England, France, Gcnnany. and Japan. Melllo, G- 3 for CofS, lan 32, sub: Prospective 

changes in organization based on recent dcvelopments in organization and training of foreign 

llTrnies, Memo on confercncc. Office, Chief of Infantry (CI). 5 lui 29. G-3 21930 and CI files. 

400- 112- 7988, 13- [V. RG 177, NARA. 

42 Melllo on Confcrcnce. 5 Jul 29; 1st Iud CI to G- 3, 2 Feb 29. CI 320/8510,B, CI files, 

400- [ 12- 7988, B- 1V. RG 177, NARA. 

43 Minority Repon. Infantry Reorganization Project. 20 Oct 29, Division General file , 

DAMH-HSO; Llr. Clto TAG. 23 Nov 29. sub: Reorganization of the Infantry Battalion. and 1st 

Ind. Clto TAG. 5 Dec 29. Llr. TAG toCI. 18 Dec 29, sub: Reorganization of the Inr..1ntry Division. 

War, Ltr, Infantry Board to CI, 2 Apr 30, sub: Reorgani7 .. ,tioll of the Inr..'lItry Division. Memo. LI 

Coll3mcc Magmdcr for General Fuqua, 7 May 31, sub: Rensons for not delaying reorganization 
A RETURN TO TH E PAST; A LOOK TO HI E FUTURE 141 

Project, all CI files 400- 112- 7899, RG 177, NARAj Uf, Brig Gell Chynoweth to author, 30 Aug 

77 author's l11e. 

44 Memo, 0 - 3 for CofS, 5 Oct 35, sub: Modernization of Ihe Organization of the Arm)" 

Memo, DeS for A CotS, 0 - 3, 28 Oct 35, sub: Modcmization of the Organization of the AmlY, 

WDp 0 - 35651, RG 165, NARA. 

45 leT, DeS to all CGs Corps Area and other addresses, 5 Nov 35, sub: Reorganization of 

Divisions and Higher Units, A we Course material, AG 320.1 (11-4-35) (Mise) F· M, 52- 12, MH1; 

LIT, Commandant of the Infantry School to Ihe CI, 13 Dec 35, sub: Review of Plans for 

Reorganization of the Division and Higher Units submitted by the Academic Dcp,Lrtmcnt of Ihe 

Infantry School and by the Infantry Board, Llr, Cl IO TAG, 31 Dec 35, sub: Reorganization of the 

Division and Higher Units, CI files 400-12217988 B H, C4-1, RG 177, NARA. 

46 Ltr, TAG to Brig Gell John H. Hughes, 16 Jan 36, sub: Modemization of the Organiz.1tion 

of the Anny, AO 320.1 ( 1-6- 36) (C) Off, Memo, 0 - 3 fo r Cors, 21 Dec 35, sub: Model11ization of 

the Organization of the AmlY, Memo, G- 3 for Cors, 30 Ju! 36, sub: Initial Report of Organization 

Committee on '·Modemization of the Organization of the Army" with special reference to the 

Infantry Division, 0 - 3 35651, all RO 165, NARA; Harry C. Ingles, "The New Division," Sigllal 

COI1)S Dllllelill No. 108 (Apr- Jun 1940): 15- 31. The board consisted of Brig Ocn John H. Hughcs, 

Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, as the presidcnt; Cols. Philip B. Peyton (0- 1) and Fay W. 

Bradson (0-2), Lt Cols Gilbert R. Cook (0- 3) and Leonard C. Sparks (0-4), and Maj. Harvcy O. 

Allcn, War Plans Divisions. Between 1936 and 1940 the membership on the board changed, but thc 

0 - 3 remained its presidcnt and Ingles, who replaced Cook in 1936, servcd thc longcst and perf0n11Cd most of the work relating to thc 0 -3. 

47 Memo for Cors, 30 Jul 35, sub: Initial Report of Organization Committce. 

48 Ibid. 

49 Ibid. 

50 Ibid. 

51 Memo, 0 - 3 for Cors, 4 Aug 36, sub: Initial Report on the Organization Committee on 

"Modemization of the Organiz.1tion of thc Anny"' with special refcrence to the Infantry Division, 

0 - 3/35641- 12, RG 165, NARA. 

52 Ibid.; Menlo, 0 - 3 for CotS, 5 Dec 36, sub: Tcsts of Propos cd Inf:mtry Division, with TAB 

A, Mcrno, Lt Col Ingles for Oenera! Hughes, 14 Jan 1937. no subject, G- 3/3565 1- !2, RO 165, 

NARA; Memo 2, Proposed Infantry Division (PID), 20 May 37. sub: Composition of Proposed 

Inf:mtry Division and Attached units, and Mcmo 4, 1'10, 4 Jun 37, sub: Armament, AG 320- 2 

(1- 6-36), RG 407, NARA; !-Icrbert E. Smith, "The Proposed Infantry 'Streamlined' Division," 

RccmiliJ/gNews 20 (Jan 1938): 9-11 and (Feb 1938): 8- 10. 

53 Ltr, ClIO TAO, 26 Nov 37, sub: Report of Observation, Proposed Infantry Division Test, 

Vicinity of San Antonio, Texas, October 18- 28, CI 4ooI112- 7988- B 11 C (4- 1) Inf. Div., RO 177, 

NARA. 

54 Ltr, George C. Marshall to Walton H. Walker, 21 Dee 37, Marshall Papers; " Push Plan To 

Lin Mobility or An11Y;· New York Times, 13 Dec 1937; Ltr, Marshall to William M. Spencer, 18 

Mar 38, Marshall Papers. 

S5 Lesley J. McNair, High Lights of Report by CO. 2d Division of the Field Service Test of 

the I'ID including the Division Reeolllnlcnded, 31 Mar 1938, McNair Pal}Crs, RG 407, NA RA. 

S6 Harry C. Ingles, "The New Division," IlIfilllll}' 49 (Nov- Dec 1939): 521-29; Llr, TAO to 

CG, Eighth Corps Area, 24 Jan 39, sub: Directive for extendcd field service test of new division 

organizmion, AO 320.2 ( 12- 29- 38) Misc. (Ret) M-C, 2d Infantry Division file, DAM H-HSO. 

S7 Ltr, TAG to CG, Eighth Corps Area, 241an 39. 

S8 Ltr, TAO to CO, Eighth Corps Area, 15 Oct 38, sub: Rcorganization of the 2d Infalllry 

Division, AO 320.2 (9- 3- 38) Misc. (Rct) M-C, 2d lnf Div tilc, DAM H-HSO. 

59 Memo, G- 3 for Cors, 3 Sep 38, sub: Reorganization of the Infantry Division, 0 - 3/3565 I- 55, 

RO 165, NARA; Special Report based on Ficld Service Test of the Provisional 2d Division conducted 

by the 2e1 Division U.S. AmlY, 1939. AWCeoursc material. MHI; Ltr, Provisiona12d Division, 7 Scp 

39. sub: Thc test orthe New Division Organi1 .. 1tion, AG 320.2 (9- 7- 39), RO 165, NARA 
142 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

60 Llr, Provisiona12d Division, 7 Sep 39, sub: The lest of the New Division Organization. lind 

lsl lnd, CO, Eighth Corps Area 10 TAG, Sep 1939. AG 320.2 (9- 7- 39) RG 165, NARA. 

61 Memo, 0 - 3 for Cors, 14 Sep 39, sub: corganiz~l[ion of the Infantry Division , 

0 - 3/3565 1- 55, RG 165, NARA; TaMes o/Organizatio/l lind Reference /)(Ilajor lite "!filllll» 

lJil'isioll. Trial/gulor (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Slaff School, 1939), I'p.1-

37. 

62 L1r, M:lfshallto lames L. Collins, 4 Oct 39, Marshall Papers. 

63 Memo, 0 - 3 forCofS, 16 Scp 39, sub: Org,lIlization of Regular Anny, First Priority (17,000 

increase), 16 SCI) 39, 0 - 3/6541-0el1 697, Llr, TAG to CI, Ficld Artillery, Engineers and other 

addresses, 8 Scp 38, sub: Preliminary measures in connection with the organization of the new 

Illfalltry Division, AG 320.2 (8- 31 - 39) M (Het) G·M. all Study on Triangular Divisions, 1939. 

DAMH-I·ISO. 

64 LIr, TAG to CG, Eighth Corps Area, 12 Oct 36, sub: Orgnniz;ltion of thc Cavalry Division, 

AG 320.2 {10- 6- 36 Misc. (Rel)-C. Mcrno, G-3 for the Cornmandnm. AWC, 30 Dec 36, sub: 

Reorgan;z;Ltion. Cavalry Division, G- 3 35651. LIr. TAG to CG, Eighth Corps Area. 15 Fcb 38, 

sub: 1st Cavalry Division MnneLlvcrs. Fiscal Year 1938,353 (1- 29- 38) Misc. c., Rcport of 130ard 

of Review, vol. I, Fort Bliss, Tex,ls, 2 lun 1938, all;11 AWC eourse materi .. l, MHI. 

65 Report of Board of Review, vol. J, Fort Bliss, TCJlas, 2 Jun 1938, A WC course material. 

MHI. 

66 " Revised Tables of Organization, Cavalry Regiment, Horse," Comll)' )olll"llal 48 (MllrApr 1939): 58- 63. 

67 Ltr, Mm-:;Imllto Collins, 4 Oct 39, M;Lrshall f>;LJX:rs. 
l 

CHAPTER 6 

Prelude to Combat 

Mililmy opera/iam abroad constitufe a grcallabom/ory and proving groundfol' fhe 

delle/oplllelll and les/ing of OIgallizlIIioll (lml materiel. These o/Jerations have beell eha/'-

aCferized by increasing use and impol'fal/ce of armored /IIolorizetl, and olher specialized 

divisiolls and by COIICI/,./,elll ejfol'lJol' fhe development of means /0 COli/lie!' armored 

(/(llIk) division.s operating ill c/o~'e coordilla/ioll wirll air and motorized IIlIi/s. 

General George C. Marshall I 

The German invasion of Poland in September 1939 marked the beginning of 

World War II in Europe and the beginning of the gradua l end of American isolationism. As the Axis threat grew ever larger, it soon became evident that paper 

units would no longer suffice for the nation's defense. In this new international 

environment, the Army began its rebuilding program. Initi ally an emphasis on 

protection of the Western Hemisphere drove mobil ization, and the victories of the 

German Army and Navy and their possi ble th reat to the Americas accelerated the 

expansion. As events in Europe unfolded, relations between the United States and 

Japan deteriorated, eventua lly culminati ng in the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 

December 1941. Meanwhile, the Army steadi ly mustered forc es, gaining fresh 

manpower from the rirst peacetime draft. Army leaders and their staffs worked 

overtime attempting to create an effective military force from the hollowed-out 

interwar Army. Along with new weapons and new concepts of warfare, new divisiona l tactica l organizations appeared, most of which underwent severa l transformations before seeing comb<lt. 

fnJantlY and Cavahy Divisions Revisited 

In 1939 the Army created a protective mobilization force fo r the defense of the 

Western Hemisphere. The force included the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th , and 6th Divisions, 

which were organized under the new triangular configuration. These forces, however, still needed to be manned <lnd trained for war. Congressional increases in the 

size of the Regul ar Army, which began thaI year, provided much of the needed 

manpower, while the largest peacetime maneuvers ever undertaken by the Army to 

date provided a taste of war in 1940.2 Between 5 and 25 May 1940 the 1st, 2d, 5th, 

and 6th Infantry Divisionsjoined the lsi Cavalry Division, the 7th Cavalry Brigade, 

a provisional brigade of light and medi um tanks, and other units for maneuvers near 
144 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

67tft Infilll/IJI (Prol'isiol1a/ Tank Brig(l(lej, (II ThiNI Arm)' maneuvers, /940 

the Louisiana and Texas border, a step envisaged at the turn of the century to train 

an army corps. Not surprisingly, the exercises highlighted weaknesses in most un its 

in almost every area of concern, incl uding organization) 

To improve the infantry di vision, it was again reorgan ized, making it more 

powerful and easier to command and control. A headqua rters and headquarters 

battery, which provided a fire direction contro l center and a brigadier general as 

commander of the division artillery, replaced the field arti llery section in the 

division headq uarters. Four field artill ery battalions, three direct su pport and 

one general support, replaced the two regiments. The direct support battalions 

were to be armed wit h newly approved 105-mm. howitzers, while the general 

support battalion fielded 155-111111. howitzers and 75-111111. gUllS, the latter 

retained primarily as antitank weapons. Each field artill ery battalion also was 

outfitted with six 37-111m. antitank guns. To counter operations suc h as the 

German blitzk rieg, wh ic h ha d proven so s uccessfu l in Po land, an titank 

resources were cen tralized in the infantry regiments to form regimen tal antita nk 

compa ni es outfitted with 37-111111. antitank guns. [n infantry battal ions the number of antitank "guns"- the .50-caliber machine guns- was doubled. For targets of opportunity, more 8 1-mm. mortars were added to the heavy weapons 

company and three 60-l11m. mortars were aut horized for eac h rifle company. A 

reconna issance troop appeared in the division, reflecting the growth in its operational area on the battlefield, and the number of collecting companies in the 

medical ba11alion was in creased from one to three. Finally, new tables of orga-
l 

PRELU DE TO COM BAT 145 

37-111111. gun fllld erell', 1941 

nization eliminated the infantry section with its genera l officer in the division 

headquarters but provided an assistant division commander wil h the rank of 

brigadier general. These changes brought the strength of the division to 15,245 

officers and enl isted men, with its combat power still foc lised in the th ree regimental combat teams (Chal'! 12),4 

Despite the trend in foreign armies to replace horse cavalry wit h mechanized 

units, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, decided to 

table any organizational decisions affect ing the cavalry. Until a de finite theater of 

operations could be ascertained, the Army needed to prepare general purpose 

forces. The horse was capable of goi ng where a machine could not, and the cavalry division appeared to have a place in the force. Among the questions Andrews 

wanted answered was, again, whether the division should be built on a triangular 

or square configuration. He a lso wa nted to explore if and how horse and mechanized units could operate together within a cava lry corps.5 

After the 1940 maneuvers Maj. Gcn. Kcnyon A. Joyce, commanding the 1st 

Cavalry Division, recommended rctention of the sq uare cavalry division. A division with two brigades, each with two cavalry regiments, was easily split in to 

strike and reserve forces. If the division wcre organi zed along triangular lines, the 

regimen ts would have to be enlarged to maintain their firepower, but it would 

make them too large ror effective command and control. Joyce suggested that the 

cavalry regimellt comprise a headq uarters; headquartcrs and service, machine 

gun, and special weapons troops; and two rinc squadrons of three troops each. He 
CHART 12- lnfantry Division, I November 194

, Includes t9n p90ple for the surgeon·s OffiC8 in the division heodquerte,s. 

A r. AnIitanI: 
l 

PRELUDE TO COM BAT 147 

wanted to strengt hen the t\Vo~battalion field artillery regiment by creating batteries of six rather than four 75-llltll. howitzers and adding a truck-drawn I05-mm. 

howitzer battalion. To improve mobi lity, the division needed enough trucks to 

move horses and equipment to the battlefield. He suggested the elimination of 

only one organization- headquarters, special lroops- which facilitated admini stration in garrison, but not in the ficld,6 

Joyce decided that horse and mechani zed units were compatible within a cavalry corps sin ce the 151 Cava lr y Di vision and the 7th Cava lry Brigade 

(Mechanized) had sllccessfully conducted joint operations during the maneuvers. 

He urged the Army to maintain a corps that incl uded both types of units. The proportion of horsc and mechanized units could vary to meet various tacti cal situations, but he thought the corps should be strong in artil lery and engi neers and 

contain suffic ient support troops to enable it to operate with maximum speed, 

flex ibility, and stri king power) 

The reviscd cavalry division remained squarc and was to have I 1,676 officers 

and enlistcd men (Cftarl /3). Divisional cavalry regiments conformed to Joyce's 

recommendations, bu t instead of increasing the size of the field artillery regimen t, one truck-drawn 105-111 1ll. howitzer battalion and two 75-mm. pack howitze r battalions replaced it. As in the infantry di visio n, the cavalry division 

received antitank weapons. The new wartime division tables authorized a divisiona l antitank troop fielding twelve 37-mm. antitank guns and a weapons troop 

having antitank guns and 8 1-mm. mortars wit hin eac h brigade. The engineer, 

quartermaster (formerly the div ision train), and medical squadrons were enlarged 

to meet the needs of the bigger di vision. Draft, pack, and riding horses were limited to the cava lry brigades and the division artil lery, while other elements of the 

division were motorized. Headquarters, special troops, was e liminated.8 

As the 1940 Louisiana man euvers drew to a close and the fall of France 

appeared imminent, the War Department authorized an increase in the number of 

active Regular Army infantry divisions and the adoption of the new tables. Between 

June and August 1940 the Army activated the 4th, 7th , 8th, and 9th Divisions. 

Neither those divisions nor the other active divisions had sufficient personnel 

to meet the new manni ng levels. The I st Cavalry Division did not adopt the revised 

configuration until early in 1941 when it concentrated at Fort Bliss for training.9 

Organizing Armored Divisions 

During the 1940 maneuvers the Army also had tested a provisional mechanized division. After the German invasion of Poland in 1939, Brig. Gen. Adna R. 

Chaffee had call ed for "armored" divisions separate from both infantry and cavalry. Chaffee's 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized), Brig. Gen. Bruce Magruder's 

Prov isional Tank Brigade (organized in 1940 with infantry tank units), and the 

6t h Infantry made up the new unit. At the conclusion of the exercises, Chaffee; 

Magruder; Col. Alvan C. Gill em, Magruder's executi ve officer; Col. George S. 
r 

• •• 

"-• 

L 
PRELUDE TO COMBAT 

..• " .. ~ 

.. 

Genemf Chaffee 

149 

Patton , commander of the 3d 

Cava lry at Fort Myer, Virginia; and 

other advocates of tank warfare met 

with the G- 3, General Andrews, in a 

school house at Alexandria, 

Louisiana, to discuss the future o f 

mechanization. All agreed that the 

Army needed to unify its efforts. 

Th e question was how. Both the 

chief of cavalry and the chief of 

infantry had attended the maneuvers, but th ey were excluded from 

the meeting because of their expected opposition to any change that 

might dcprive their arms of personnel, equipment, or missions. IO 

Returning to Washi ngton, 

Andrews proposed that Marshall ca ll a 

conference on mechanization. The crisis in Europe had by then increased 

congrcssional willingness to support a 

major rcarmament effort, and at the same time the success of the German panzers 

highlighted the need fo r mechanization, however costly. Andrews' initiative, made 

three days aftcr the British evacuated Dunkirk, noted that the American Army had 

inadequate mechanized fo rces and that it needed to revise its policy of allowing 

both infantry and cavalry to develop such units separately. He suggested that the 

basic mechanized combined arms unit be a division of between 8,000 and 11 ,000 

men. With the chief of cavalry planning to organize mechanized cavalry divisions, 

which mixed horse and tank units, such a conference seemed imperative. Marshall 

approved Andrews' proposal. ll 

From 10 to 12 June 1940 Andrews hosted a meeting in Washington centering 

on the organization of mechanized divisions. Along with the General Staff and 

the chiefs of the arms and services, Chaffee, Magruder, and other tank enthusiasts attended. Andrews disclosed that the War Department would organize an 

independent armored force, belonging to neither the Infantry nor Cavalry branches, in the form of "mechanized div isions." In such divisions the command and 

control echelon wou ld consist of a headquarters and headquarters company and a 

signal company. A recon naissance battalion wit h an attached aviation observation 

squadron wou ld constitute the commander's "eyes," which would operate from 

100 to 150 miles in advance and reconnoiter a front from 30 to 50 miles. At the 

heart of the division was an armored brigade made up of a headquarters and 

headquarters company, one medium and two light armored regiments, a field 

artillery regiment, and an engineer battalion. Using the two light armored regi-
ISO MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

ments as the basis for two combat teml1S, the di vision was to conduct reconnaissance, screening, and pursuit missions and exploit tacti cal situations. An armored 

infantry regiment, along with armored field artill ery, quartermaster, and medica l 

battalions and an ordnance company, supported the armored brigade. Similar to 

the German panzer di vision, it was to number 9,859 offi ce rs and enlisted mcn.1 2 

When approving the establishme nt of the Armored Force to oversee th e 

organi za ti on and trainin g of two mecha ni zed di visions on 10 July 1940, 

Ma rshall also ap proved desig nating th ese units as " armored" divisions. 

Furthermore, he directed the chi e f of cavalry and the chie f of infantry to make 

personnel who were experi enced with tank and mechani zed units available for 

assignment to the di visions. On 15 July, without approved tabl es of organ izati on, Magruder organi zed the I st Armored Division at Fort Knox from personne l and equipme nt of th e 7th Cavalr y Bri gad e and t he 6th Infantry. 

Concurrently, Brig. Gen. Charl es L. Scott, a former regimenta l commander in 

the 7th Cavalry Brigade, acti vated the 2d Armored Div ision at Fort Benn ing 

using men and materie l from the Provisional Tank Brigade. Marshall se lected 

Chaffee to cOlllmand the new Armored Force.13 

Four months later the War Department published tables of organization for 

the armored division (Charf 14). It resembled the unit deve loped during the summer, except that the engineer battalion was removed from the armored brigade 

a nd assigned to the division headquart ers, and th e ordnance company wa s 

expa nd ed to a batta lion. To the surprise of Chaffee, who had supervised the 

preparation of the tables, the authorized strength of the di vision rose from 9,859 

to 12,697, including attached personnel. 

The di vision fi elded 381 tanks and 97 scout cars when all units were at war 

strength. 14 Cha ffee envisaged the establishment of corps-size units comma nding 

both armored and motori zed divisions, the latter essentially an infantry division 

with suffic ient motor equi pment to move all its personne l. On 15 July 1940 the 

War Department selected the 4t h Division, whi ch had recently been reacti vated as 

pa rt of th e Regul a r Army's expansion, for this rol e. Coll ocated with the 2d 

Armored Di vision at Fort Bennin g, the 4th 's di visional el eme nts had earli er 

ex pe rimented with motori zed infantry. Eventua lly th e de pa rtment published 

tables of organization for a motori zed division that retained the triangular structure but fielded 2,700 motor vehi cles incl ud ing over 600 armored half-track personnel carriers. IS 

Along with the reorgani zati on and ex pansion of di visional forces, the Army 

increased un it manning levels and concentrated un its for training. A peacetime 

dra ft, adopted on 16 Septembe r 1940, provided the men, a nd eventuall y th e 

strength of a ll divisions neared war level. Prior to 1940 units were scattered over 

130 posts, camps, a nd st ations in the Unit ed St at es, but wi th mobi liza ti on 

Congress provided funds for new facil ities. The Quartermaster Corps, during the 

wi ntcr of 1940-4 1, built accommodations for 1.4 million men, incl uding divisiona l posts of the type constructed in World War J. 16 
0 

'" '" -

~ 

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E 

~ 0 

Z j 

'" 

I <. 

- • " t 

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:~ I 

0 

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e 

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152 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

H(llf-track {Je/'SOllllel ca/', 1941 

But as in World War " eq uipment shortages could not be quickly remedied 

and greatly inhibited preparation for war. Among other thi ngs, the Army lacked 

modern rie ld arti llery, rifl es, tanks, and antitank and antiaircraft weapons. 

Although acutely aware of the shortages, Marshall bel ieved that the Army could 

conduct basic training while the production of weapons caughlup,l7 

Mobilization of National Guwd Units 

As the possibility that the nation might be forced into the European war 

increased, some members of the War Department favored federalization of the 

National Guard to correct defic iencies in its training and equipment. In August 

1940, after much debate, Congress approved the induction of Guard units for 

twelve months of training. It also authorized their use for the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the territorics and possessions of the United States, including the Philippine Islands. IS 

Induction of Guard units began on Monday, 16 September, with federalization of the 30th, 41 st, 44t h, and 45th Divisions, less their tank and av iation units. 

These latlcr units eventually served in World War II , but not as divisional organizations. The divisions were considerably underslrength, eaeh having approximately 9,600 men, but training eamps were 110t prepared even for that number. To 

bring the divisions to war level, the War Department suppli ed draftees, and within 
PRELUDE TO COMBAT 153 

six mon ths all e ighteen Guard infan try divisions had entered federal service and 

were training at divisional posts. 19 

Federa l law required Gua rd units to be organized under the same tables as 

the regulars. But the Guard divisions had not yet adopted the triangular config· 

unltion, and the General Staff hesitated 10 reorganize Ihem immediate ly as they 

were in federal service only for training. Furthermore, the staff fe ared politica l 

repercussions when general and field grade officers wcre el iminated to conform to the new tables.20 

The National Guard also maintained two separate infantry brigades, the 92d 

and 93(~ which did not fit in to any war plans of 1940. At the request of the 

National Guard Bu reau, New York COllverted the 93d to the 7 1 st Field Artillery 

Brigade, and Minnesota reorganized the 92d as the 10lst Coast Arti llery Brigade, 

and the units entered federal service as such)l 

Although war plans did not ca ll for separate infantry brigades in the United 

States, the War Department authorized a new 92d Infantry Brigade in the Puerto 

Rico National Guard to command forces there. The new headquarters came into 

federal service on 15 October 1940, but served less than two years without seeing 

combat. In July 1942 the Caribbean Defense Command inactivated the brigade 

and replaced it with the Puerto Rican Mobil e Force.22 

Besides in fantry di visions and brigades, the National Guard mainta ined 

four partially organ ized cavalry divisions and one cava lry brigade. As these 

forces did not fit into any curren t war plans, the Gencral StafT initiated a stud y 

in August 1940 to determine the Guard's requirements for horse and mec hani zed units. It concluded that the Guard needed both types of organizations, but 

not four horse cavalry divisions. At the time of the study it was rumored that 

the personnel from two cavalry div isions would form the nucl ei of Iwo armored 

divisions. The states, however, objected to the loss of cavalry regiments, and 

Armored Force leaders believed that armored divisions were too big and complicated for the Guard. On I November 1940 the National Guard Bureau withdrew the allotment of the 2 1st through 24th Cavalry Divisions, which in effect 

disbanded them. Some of their elements were used to organ ize mechani zed cavalry regiments. Afte r Novem ber th e 56th Cavalry Brigade, a Texas unit, 

remained the only large unit aut horized horses in the National Guard. It entered 

federal service before the end of the year.23 

With 18 infantry divisions, I infantry brigade, and I cavalry brigade from the 

National Guard undergoing training in 1941 , a crisis soon developed regarding 

their future. The 1940 law had authorized the federa lization of the Guard for only 

one year, and that pcriod was about to expire for some units. But the units were 

now filled with both draftees and guardsmen, and the release of the latter from 

federal service would complete ly break up these units. In the summer of 194 1 the 

War Department thus prevailed upon Congress to extend the Guard units and men 

o n active duty. This decision allowed Marshall to cond uct the g reat General 

Headquarters Maneuvers in the summer and fa ll of 1941.24 
154 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Expanding Divisional Forces 

Using the protective mobili zation plan, in 1941 the Army also proceeded to 

increase the number of cavalry, armored, and infantry divisions in response to the 

growing th reat of war. The Regular Army organized a second cavalry div ision 

against a backdrop of domestic politics. As a resu lt of debates over increasing the 

size of the Army, Congress had provided "That no Negro because of race, shall 

be excluded from enlistment in the Army for service with colored military units 

now organi zed and to be organized."2S In the midst of the 1940 presiden tial campaign prominent black leaders complained bitterly to President Frank lin D. 

Roosevelt about the limited number of black units. Under political pressure the 

Army activated the 2d Cavalry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas, on I April 1941 , 

wit h one black and one white brigade,26 

Armored divisions were viewed as far more essential than cava lry div isions. 

As early as 6 August 1940, Chaffee, commanding thc Armored Force, plan ned 

morc armorcd divisions, and he directed the 1st and 2d Armorcd Divisions to 

mai ntain a 25 percent overstrength as cadre for addi tional units. In January 1941 

the War Department approved the establishmcnt of two morc armored divisions, 

and on 15 Apri l the Armored Forcc activated the 3d and 4th at Camp Beauregard, 

Louisiana, and Pine Camp (later Fort Drum), New York, respecti ve ly. Shortly 

thereafter plans su rfaced for two more armored divisions. The 5th Armored 

Di vision, added to the rolls in August, became a reality in October, and the 6th 

joined the force in January 1942,27 

Thc European war cl ea rly demonstra ted a need to have antitank forces. 

Marshal l had decided thaI all units had an antitank role, bUI he also recognized 

the requirement for specific countcr-armor units. He did not want to assign them 

to an existing ann bcctluse their organization, tactical doctrine, and devclopment 

secmed beyond the scope of anyone arm. The problem struck the ncw Assistant 

Chief of Sta ff, G- 3, Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle, as similar to that ofemploying 

the machine gu n during World War I. As an ex pedient, separate mach ine gun batta lions had been establ ished, although the guns were prevalent in all combat formations. Twadd le believed that antitank units. which would not be a part of any 

existing arm, should also be organized as an ex pedient to provide the strongest 

antitank capabilit y possible; later the Army could sort out whet her they were 

infantry or field artillery weapons,28 

Twaddle's sta ff developed plans to provide fOllr antitank battal ions for each 

ex isting division. One batta lion wou ld serve with the division and the three others 

would be held at higher echelons for employment as needed. For the upcoming 

maneuvers the War Department authorized the formation of provisional an titank 

battalions in June 1941 , using the antitank gun s from fie ld arti ll ery battalions. 

Thc following December, a ft er the maneuvers, the battalions were made pennanent organizations and redesignated as tank destroyer units to indicate their offcnsive nature. They wcrc not divisional elements, as recoml11cnded by First, Third, 
PRELUDE TO COMBAT 

Tanh oj ,lte 681h Armored, 2(1 Arll/ored Division. jJarlicipate ill fhe LOllisio/lo 

Malleuvers, J 94 /. 

155 

and Fourth Army COlllmanders after the 1941 maneuvers, but assigned to General 

Headquarters (G I-I Q). This arrangement placed the units outside the control of the 

existing arms, thu s creating basically a new homogeneous antitank force. The 

independent tan k destroyer batta lions would later prove an organ izational error, 

denying division commanders a major resou rce that they hab it ually needed. It 

did, however, foc lis attention on an area that was a growing tactica l concern.29 

The possible theater of operations shifted from the Western Hemisphere to 

the Pacific in 1941 as relations deteriorated between the United States and Japan. 

To be prepared for that contingency, LI. Gen. Walter C. Shorl, commandi ng the 

Hawai ian Department, requested permission to expand the square Hawaiian 

Division into two triangula r infantry divisions with the primary mission of 

defending Oahu, the most populous of the islands and a major base of the U.S. 

Pacific Fleet. Recognizing that the Regular Army lacked the un its required for the 

reorganization, Short proposed that Guard units complete the two divisions. The 

departmen t approved Short's proposal, and on I October he reorganized and 

redesignated the Hawaiian Division as the 24t h Infantry Division and activated 

the 25th Infantry Division. Elcmcnts of the Hawaiian Division were distributed 

between the two new divisions, and, as planned, each had one Hawaii National 

Guard and two Regular Army infantry regiments. Divisional strengths hovered 

around 1 1,000 men.30 
156 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Provisional Tank Des/royer Ballalion, Fori Meade. MtIIJ'ltmd. 1941 

About the same time the Army introduced two new distinctions into its official lexicon. First, the word "infantry" was made a part of the official designation of sllch divisions. In the past the wo rd infantry was understood, but, 

because of the expanding variety of divisions, the Army needed some way to 

distinguish among them. The adjutant general specified that unit designations 

thus include the major combat e lement or even the Iype of unit when Ihe former 

was not sufficiently descriptive. Some divisions issued genera l orders introducing infantry as a part of the official name, and the adjutant general constituted 

the 25th specifically as an infantry division. The term, however, was not officia lly added 10 the tables of organization, documents that tech nically controlled 

the names of units, unli l 1942.31 

The second change concerned Ihe meaning of Ihe term "Army of Ihe Un ited 

States." Before 1940 it had embraced the Regula r Army, the National Guard 

while in the service of the United States, and the Organized Reserves. With the 

growth of the force, the term Army of the United States was broadened to encompass units that had not been a part of the mobilization plans during the interwar 

years. The 25th Infantry Division was the first division-size unit activated under 

the expanded definition,32 

In the Pacific area, the defense of the Philippine Islands presented unique 

problems. They were too distant and 100 scattered fo r ground defense. Nevert heless, Marshall asked the local commander, General Douglas MacAnhur, whet her 
TABLE 12 

Divisions Active on 7 December 194 1 

Dale ACli\l(l/cd ol'lndlicled 

COIIIPQlI(tIIl Dillisi()11 11110 FCl/eml SCl'l'il:e L()(;(lliot1 

RA 1st Infantry • FOri Devens, Mass. 

RA 2d Infantry • Fon Sam Houston, Tex. 

RA 3d Infantry • Fort Lewis, Wash. 

RA 41h Infantry I June 1940 Fon Benning, Ga. 

RA 5th Infantry 16 October 1939 Fort CUSter. Mich. 

RA 61h Inr.1nlry 10 October 1939 Fort Ll:on;lrd Wood, Mo. 

RA 71h Infantry 1 July 1940 Fort Ord. Calif. 

RA 81h infarury 1 July 1940 Fort Jackson, S.C. 

RA 9th Infantry 1 August 1940 Fon Bragg, N.C. 

RA 24th nf~ntry • Schofield Barracks, Hawaii 

AUS 25th Infantry I October 1941 Schofield Bamlcks, Hawaii 

NO 26th Infantry 16 January 1941 Camp Edwards, Mass. 

NO 27th Infantry IS October 1940 Fort McClellan, Ala. 

NO 28th Infantry 17 Febnl;lry 1941 @lndiantown GapMilitary 

Reservation. I'a. 

NO 291h Infantry 3 February 194 I @FOr1GeorgeG. Meade, Md. 

NO 30th Infantry 16 September 1940 FOr1 Jackson, S.C. 

NO 3 1st Infantry 25 November 1940 Camp Blanding, Fla. 

NO 32d Infantry 15 <ktObeT 1940 Camp Livingston, La. 

NO 33d Infantry 5 March 1940 Camp Forrest, Tenn. 

NO 341h Infantry 10 Febnmry 1941 Camp Claihome, La. 

NO 351h Infarllry 23 December 1940 Camp Joseph T.Robinson, Ark . 

NO 361h Inf:ulIry 25 November 1940 Carnp Bowie, Tex. 

NO 371h Inf.1ntry 16 October 1940 Cmlll) Shelby, Miss. 

NO 381h Infantry 17 January 194 1 Camp Shelby, Miss. 

NO 40lh Inf.1111ry 3 March 1941 For1 Lewis, Wash. 

NO 41stlnfanlry 16 September 1940 FOr1 Lewis. Wash. 

NG 43d Infantry 24 February 1941 Camp Shelby, Miss. 

NO 44th Infantry 16 September 1940 FOr1 Di,.;, N.J. 

NO 45th Inf.1ntry 16 September 1940 Camp Berkeley, Te,.;. 

RA 1st Cavalry • FOr1 Bliss. Tex. 

RA 2d Cavalry 15 April 1941 FOr1 Riley, Kans. 

RA 1st AmlOrcd 151uly 1940 FOr1 Kno,.;, Ky. 

"A 2d Annored 15 July 1940 Fort Benning, Ga. 

RA 3d AmlOrcd 15 April 1941 Camp Beaurega rd, La. 

RA 4th Annored 15 April 1941 I'ine Camp, N.Y. 

RA 5th Annored I <klober 1941 Camp Cooke, Calif. 

NOTES: ·Aclive before I September 1939. 

@En routefrornmaneuvers, arrivcdathome station9Deccmber 1941. 
158 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

General Shor' reviews fhe liall'aiian Di"i.~;oll, September 1941. 

he wanted a Guard di vision to reinforce his g round units. MacArthur instead 

asked for aut hority to reorganize the Philippine Division as a triangu lar unit and 

to fill its regimental combat teams with Regular Army personnel. Since the division's fo rmation in 192 J, most of its enlisted men were Phi lippine Scouts, and he 

wanted to use them to help organize new Phili ppine Army units. Marshall 

approved the request and initiated plans to send two infantry regiments, two field 

"rtill ery battalions, a headquarters and headq uarte rs battery for the division 

artillery, a reconnaissance troop, and a military police platoon to the islands. The 

Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor an d other installatio ns in the Pac ific on 7 

December 194 1 aborted the plan.33 

At the time of the attack the Army had thi l'l y~s x div isions, excluding the 

Philippine Division ('J(,ble 12), and two brigades on active duty. The nation was 

thus much better prepa red for war in December 1941 than in Apri l 1917. 

Reorganization of the National Guard Divisions 

The Japanese atta ck and th e e nsui ng American declaration of war on 

Japan, Germany, a nd Italy immediately shifted the foells of Army plann ing 

from hemispheri c defense to overseas operations. The first priori ty was to 

streamline the sq uare National Guard div isions. Eve n before the attaek Marsha l! had asked Twaddle to explore that possibi lity, be li eving that the sur plus 
PRELUDE TO COMBAT 159 

units could be used ove rseas or to creale new organizati ons as S0111e divisions 

appea red 10 lend themselves to ex pansion. In November 1941 Twaddle took 

the 121st and 16 1st In fant ry from the square 30th and 4 1st Di visions and reassigned them. At the lime of the attack on Pearl Harbor he had replaced the 

34th Infantry with the 121s1 In fantry in the 81h Division and had slated the 

34th and Ihe 161s1 for deployment to the Philippines. The day ancr the attack 

he attached one infantry regiment eac h from the 32d, 33d, and 36th Divisions 

10 th e Fourth Army to augment the forces protecting the West Coast. A week 

later the 124th Infantry from the 3 1st Division was assigned to the Infantry 

School al Fort Benning, Gcorgia .34 

On 3 1 December 194 1, Marshall asked Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, Chief of 

Staff, GHQ, to investigate bottlenecks that had developed during attempts to ship 

units overseas. Six days later McNair told Marshall that the Guard divisions used 

to organize task forces going overseas had "overheads" (noncombat personnel) 

that approached the "grotesque" and recommended their immediate reorganization as triangular divisions.35 Shortly therea fter Marshall directed the staff to prepare plans for reorganizi ng thirteen of the eighteen Guard di visions, omitting five 

because they already had orders for overseas duty. Ultimately either Marshall or 

his deputy approved the conversion to triangular formati ons of a ll Guard div isions except one, the 27th, which was targeted for Hawaii where that command 

was planning to receive a square division. Twaddle's staff prepared in structions 

for the reorganiz<1Iion, which he sent to the division commanders for commcnt. 

Units that the states had not adequate ly supported were to be e liminated.36 

The reorganization began wit h the 32d and 37th Divisions on I Fcbruary 

1942. All infantry brigades were disbanded except the 5 1 st, an element of the 

26th Di vision. One infantry brigade headquarters company from each div ision 

was converted and redesignated as the div ision reconnaissance troop, except in 

the 28th and 43d Divisions. In the 43d both infantry brigadc headquartcrs companies were disba nded, and in the 28t h one brigade headquarters company became 

the recon naissance troop and the other the di vision's military police company. 

The headquarters and headquarters battery of each fie ld artillcry brigade became 

the headquarters and headquarters battery, division artillery. Other divisiona l e le· 

ments were reorgani zed, redesignated, rcassigne(~ or disbanded. The reorgani zation was completed on I Septcmber 1942 when the 27t h Di vision, whic h had 

arrived in Hawaii that summer, adopted the triangular con fi guration.37 

In January 1942 the War Dcpartment created Task Force 6814 from surplus 

National Guard units to help defend New Caledonia, a French possession in the 

Pacific. Among these units were the 51st Infantry Brigade headq uarters and the 

182d Infantry from the 26t h Di vision (Massachusetts) and the 132d Infantry from 

the 33d Division (Ill inois). The units arrived in New Ca ledonia in March and others quick ly followed. Eventually the Opcrations Division (OPD), War Department 

General Staff,38 instructed Maj. Gen. Alexa nder M. Patch, comma nding Task 

Force 6814, to organize a division. Because he lacked men and equipment for a 
160 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

CalliI' Shelby. Missis:;iP!);. !tollle oflhe 37,It (11/(/ 38,h Divisiol/s, /941 

complete table of organiza tion unit, the slaff decided that the division wou ld 

carry a name rather than a numerical designation. Titles such as "Ncenl" and 

"Bush" surfaced, but Patch turned to the men assigned to the task fo rce for suggestions. Pre. David Fonesca recommended "Ame ri ca]" frolll the phrase 

"American Troops on New Caledonia," and on 27 May 1942 Patch activated the 

America! Division.39 

Another Reorganization 

With the aHack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December the "great laboratory" phase 

for deve loping and testi ng organiz.1tions, about which Marshall wrote in the summer of 1941 , c losed, but the War Depa rtme nt still had nOI develo ped idea l 

infantry, cavalry. armored, and motorized div isions. In 1942 it again revised the 

divisions based on experiences ga ined during the great Gl-I Q maneuvers of the 

previous yea r. As in the past, the reorganizations ranged from mi nor adjustments 

to wholesa le changes. 

The Chief of In fantry, Maj. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges, proposed the principal 

change in the infantry division, the addition of a cannon compa ny to the infantry 

regiment to provide it with arti llery that could move forward as rapidly as the 

troops advanced on foot. The Chi ef of Field Arti ll ery, Maj. Gen. Robert M. 

Danford, opposed the idea, contending that al l cannon should be in artillery units. 

McNair, appointed Chief of Army Ground Forces (AG F) in March 1942 and 

responsible for organizing and training all ground combat units, a lso objected. 

For five years the division had been in a state of nux in an effort to make it light 
l 

PRELUDE TO COMBAT 161 

and therefore easier to handle. Command and control had replaced road space as 

the basic factor behind divisional size. Constant changes were destroying those 

goals. McNair ad vised Marshall that the division should have a maximum of 

\5,000 men with the arms being fixed accordingly and thai it should not be 

increased in size at the insistence of arm-conscious chiefs. His view did not prevail. Hodges won the armament battle, and a cannon company became a part of 

each infantry regimcIlt.40 

The addition of regimental cannon companies was not the only change in the 

infantry division. To increase artillery fi repower, the tables provided twelve rather 

than eight 155-mm. howitzers and eliminated the 75-mm. guns, which had been 

assigncd to tank destroyer units, as an ti tank weapons. To protect the division from 

hostile aircraft, the number of .50-ca liber machine guns rose from sixty to cightyfour. Improved reconnaissancc capabilities were also added to the infantry division, with ten light armored cars rep lacing the sixteen seoul cars in the reconnaissance troop. In the infantry regimcnts themselves, intell igence and reconna issance platoons replaced intelligence platoons.41 

The GHQ maneuvers of 1941 had also revealed a need for more trucks in the 

division. McNair, howcver, beli eved that the suggested number of trucks was 

excessive, requiring 100 much space on ships when sent overseas. Although the 

number of trucks was cut at his insistence, the division still had 315 more vehicles under the 1942 tables than those of 1940. Finally, the new tables spli t the 

div ision headq uarters and mi litary poli ce company into Iwo separate un its, a 

headquarters company and a military pol icc plaloon. These changes together 

added about 270 men to the division (CltarI 15).42 

Modifications continued even after publication of the new tables oforganization for the infan try di vision. Army Ground Forces withdrew the small ordnance 

maintenance platoon from Ihe headquarters company of the quartermaster battalion and reorganized the unit as a separate ordnance light maintenance company to 

improve molor repair. After th is cha nge, food ,md gasoline suppl y functions 

became the responsibil ity of the regimen ts and separate batta lions in thc division, 

and the quartermaster battalion was reduced to a company to provide trucks for 

water supply and emergency rations and to augment the di vision's ability to move 

men and equipment.43 

The cavalry division retained its squ a re con fi gura ti on after the 1941 

maneuvers, but with modifications. The division lost its antitan k troop, the 

brigades their weapons troops, and the regime nts their machine gun and special weapons troops. These changes brought no decrease in divisional firepower, but placed most weapons within the cavalry troops. The number or .50-caliber mac hine gu ns was increased almost threefold. In the reconnaissance 

sq uadron, the motorcycle and armored car troops were e liminated, leavi ng the 

squadron with one support troop and three reconna issance troops equipped 

with ligh t tanks. These changes increased the division from 11 ,676 to 12, 112 

officers and enlisted men.44 
CHART IS-Infantry Division, I August 1942 

INFANTRY DIVISION 

15,514 

I 

I HHe I RECON TRP I SIGCO 

-I I DIV ARTILLERY 313 201 322 2,557 

I MPP~TOON_I INF REGT 

I ENGR BN I I 

3,472ea 768 

I HHC&BAN~I I ATCO _I I·CANNON C~ I 

I HHB I 

164 169 123 118 

I SVCO INFBN -m I. MED DET 105·mm 

I 132 916e8 136 I 593

I 

~j 

'" ~P~! CO_ J [- H,~ -J l SV~RY_ j 

[_R IFLE CO 

198e8 1 BTAY -m /II e8 ME~
PRELUDE TD CDM BAT 163 

The GI-IQ maneuvers also had a significant impact on the organization of the 

armored di vision. The exercises led to numerous situations that called for infantry, 

artillery, and armor to form combat teams, but the division lacked the resources to 

organi ze them. The division as organized was heavy in armor but too light in both 

infantry and artillery. The armored brigade complicated Ihe command chan nel, 

while the service clements needed g reater control. To COlTect these weaknesses, the 

Armored Force, under the direction of Maj. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, dramatica lly 

reorga ni zed the division (Chal" /6). The armored brigade headquarters and one 

annored regiment were eliminated. and the remain ing two armored regiments were 

reorgan ized 10 consist of one light and two medium tank battalions each. Three selfpropelled I05-mm. howitzer batta lions replaced the field 3I1illery regiment and battalion, and control of the di vision artillery passed to an artillery section in the di vision headquarters. The infantry regiment was reorgan ized to consist of three battalions of three companies each, and trucks replaced armored personne l carriers. The 

engineer battalion was authori zed four, rather than three, line companies and a 

bridge company. Two combat command headquarters wcre au thori zed but were to 

have no assigned units. allowing the division commander to build fighting teams as 

the tactical situation dictated yet still have units in reserve. Maintenance and supply 

battalions replaced ordnance and quartermaster battalions, the maintenance unit 

I<lking over all motor repairs in the division. For better control of the service elemellts, division trains were added and placed undcr the command of a colone l. A 

service company was also added to provide transportation and supplies for the rear 

echelon of the division headquarters company.45 

The 4th Division had tested the motorized structure along with attached tank, 

antitank, and antiaircran artillery units during the Carolina portion of the GI-I Q 

maneuvers in the fall o f 1941 . At thcir termination, the di visio n commander, 

Brig. Ge n. Fred C. Wa ll ace, rcported to General Twaddle that the forc e was 

" undesirably large." Furthermore, de fici encies ex isted in command and control, 

traffic conlrol , administrati ve support, rine strength, commun ications, motor 

maintenance, ammunition supply, and engi neer capabilities. Also, the attached 

unils- tank, antitank, and antia ircran artillery battalions- needed to be permanelltly assigned to the division.46 

Wh en the War Departmcnt published new tab les of organizat ioll for the 

motorized division in the spring of 1942 (Cllarl / 7), it differed considerably from 

the Structure tested by Wal lace. In those tables, the hand of McNair, who almost 

always opposed "specia l" units, was evident. The di vision closely resembl ed an 

infantry division. Motorized infa ntry regiments were to have an organization similar to standard infantry regiments. Gone were armored ha lf-track personnel carriers, but the regiment was 10 have enough trucks to move all its men and equipment. The division headq ua rters and headquarters company and the arti ll ery were 

identie,il to their counterpa rts in the infantry division, and the reconna issance battalion was the same as that of the cava lry division. A reconnaissa nce company 

WllS addcd to the engineer batta li on. The ordnance unit remained company size, 
N 

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'" 

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:2 

.it 

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~ 

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is 

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166 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

and a mi litary police company was added. As redesigne(~ the motorized division 

fielded ne'lrly 17,000 men. Following McNair's idea that a unit should have only 

those resources il habitually needed, the division, as other infantry divisions, 

lacked organic lank, tank destroyer, and antiaircraft artill ery baualions.47 

Before al l the tables for the revised divisions were published in 1942, the War 

Department alerted the field commands about the pending reorganization or their 

units. Divisions were to adopt the new configurations as soon as eq uipment, 

hOllsing, and other facilities became available. Most divisions adhered to the 

revised strllctures by the end of 1942.48 

[n the Slimmer of 1942 the Army organized a fifth type of division. Between 

World Wars I and II it had experimented with transporting units in airplanes, and 

in 1940 the chief of infantry studied the possibi lity of transporting all elements of 

an infantry division by air. When the Germans successfully used parachutists and 

glidcrs in Holland and Belgium in 1940, the Army reacted by developing parachutc units. The mass employment of parachutes and gliders on Crete in 1941 

stimulated the developmen t of gl ider units. Both types of units were limited to 

battal ion size because tacticia ns did not envision airborne operations involving 

la rger units. Brig. Gen. William C. Lee, commander of the U.S. Army Airborne 

Command, which had been established to coordinate all airborne training, visited 

British airborne trainin g faci lities in England in May 1942 and following that 

visit recommended the organization of an airborne division.49 

At that time the British airborne division consisted ofa small parachute force 

capable of seizing a target, such as an airfield, and a glider force to reinforce the 

parachutists, leaving the remainder of the div ision to join those forces through 

more conventiollalmeans. Lee reported to McNair that the British had found the 

movement of ordinary troops in gliders wasteful because about 30 percent of the 

troops suffered from air sickness and became ineffective during air-land operations. Since the British were organizing airborne divisions, in which glider personnel were to receive the same training as parachutists, Lee suggcsted the U.S. 

Army also organize them. Heeding Lee 's suggestion, McNair ou tlined to 

Marshall a 9,OOO-man ai rborne division that could have a varyi ng number of 

parachute or glidcr units in accordance with tactical circumstances.50 

Although the General Starr accepted the proposal , it had several reservations. 

The div ision selected for the airborne role had to have completed basic training 

but should not be a Regular Army or National Guard unit, as many traditionalists 

in those components wanted nothing to do with such an ex perimental force. For 

ease of training, it also had be stationed where air facili ties and flying conditions 

were good. The 82d Division met the criteria. It was an Organized Reserve unit, 

training under Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, and located at Camp Claiborne, 

Louisiana. McNair recommcnded that it be the basis for two airborne divisions 

with the existing parachute infantry regiments assigned to them. For the designation of the second airborne div ision, the staff se lected the 10 I st, an Organized 

Reserve unit that was not in active military service.5t 
PRELUDE TO COM BAT 167 

Paratroopers stage (/ special demOlls/ralion for melllbers of COlIgre~'s, Fori 

Belvoir. Virginia, 1941. 

The Third Army and the Airborne Command executed McNair's rCcotnmcn~ 

dation on 15 August 1942. The 82d Infantry Division (less the 3271h Infantry. the 

321s1 and 9071h Field Arlillcry Ballalions, the 82d Cavalry Reconnaissance 

Troop, and the Mil itary Police Platoon) plus the 5041h Parachute Infantry became 

the 82d Airborne Division. Concurrentl y, the adjutant general disbanded the 

101 SI Division in Ihe Organized Reserve and reconstituted it in the Army of the 

United States, activating it as the 10 1s\ Airborne Division at Cmnp Cl aiborne, 

Louisiana. The 502d Parachute Infantry, the 3271h Glider Infantry, and the 32lst 

and 9071h Glider Field Artillery Battalions were assigned as divisional clemen ts. 

Shortly thereafter each division was authorized an anliaircnlft artillery battalion, 

an ordnance company, and a military police platoon. The parach ute infantry c le* 

ments did not immediatc ly join their divisions, but by early October 1942 all ele* 

ments of both divisions asscmbled at Fort Bragg fo r training. 52 

On 15 October 1942 thc War Department published the first tables of organi* 

zation for the airborne division (Charf / 8). Reflecting the light nature of the unit, 

the parachute infantry regiment had only .30*caliber machine guns and 60*mm. and 

81 *mm. mortars besides the individual weapons, and its field artillery battalions 

used 75*mm. pack howitzers. In the division artillery, however, a new antitank 

weapon was introduced, the 2.3 6*inch roc ket launc her (the " bazooka"). 

Transportation cquipmcnt ranged fi'olll bicycles and handcarts to 2*II2*ton trucks, 
CHART 18- Airborne Division, 15 October 194
PRELUDE TO COMBAT 169 

bu t the airborne div ision had only 40 I trucks as opposed to over 1,600 in an 

infantry division. The new division numbered 8,505 officers and enlisted men, of 

whom approximately 2,400 were parachutists. 53 

The Airborne Command also tra ined smaller parachute and glider units and 

requested the authority to organize tactical airborne brigades in 1942. The Deputy 

Chief of StafT, Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNamey, turned down the request, believing 

that only div isions should conduct operations involving more than a regiment. 

The Airborne Command, nevert heless, orga ni zed the lsi Parachute Infantry 

Brigade, a nondeployable un it, to assist in train ing parachute units.54 

Increases in the Force Structure 

Aft er 7 December 1941 (he General StafT a lso tu rned its attention to the 

future size of the Army and the number of divisions required to wage and win the 

war. Some officers believed that as many as 350 divisions might be needed, while 

ot hers estimated considerably fewer. Outside considerations included the manpower needs of the other services and civilian industry as well as the speed at 

which divisions could be organized, equipped, and trained given the limited pool 

of experienced leaders and industrial limitations. On 24 November 1942, nearly a 

year after Un ited States en tered the war, the War Department published a troop 

basis55 that called for a wartime fo rce structure of 100 divisions- 62 infantry, 20 

armored, I 0 motorize(~ 6 airborne, and 2 cavalry- to be organized by 1943 within a total Army force of 8,208,000 men.56 

Meanwhile, the Army continued to expand the number of divisions. Working 

with tentat ive troop bases early in 1942, the General Staff decided to bring the 

Organized Reserve divisions into active military service. President Fran klin D. 

Rooseve lt signed an executive order calling units of the Organized Reserves into 

active military service for the duration of the war plus six months. The order was 

a public re lations documen t more than anything else because most Organized 

Reserve person nel were already on active duty.57 

Members of General Twaddle's staff nex t examined the sequence for inducting infantry divisions. They considered such factors as the number of World War 

1 battle honors earned by units; the location and availability of training sites, pa rticularly in the corps areas where divisions were located; and the ability of the 

Army to furnish divisional cadres. Based on these considerations, the staff established a tentative order, beginning with the 77th Di vision, which had the most 

combat service in World War 1, and ending with the 103d, which had not been 

organi zed duri ng World War 1. 58 

Meanwhil e, corps area commanders prepared the Organized Reserve units 

for induction early in 1942 by placing the infantry divisions under the 1940 tables 

of organization. Infantry and field arti llery brigades were eliminated, wit h the 

headqua rters and headquarters compani es of the infantry brigades consolidated to 

form division"l reconnaissa nce troops. As in the Nationa l Guard divisions, the 
170 MANEUVER AND FI REPOWER 

headqua rters and headquarters batteries of the fi eld artillery brigades became the 

headquarters and headquarters batteries orlhe division arti llery. Other units within the div ision were reduced, redesignated, reassigned, or disbanded to fit the triangular con riguration. The six Organized Reserve cavalry divisions were dropped 

from the tentative troop program and disba nded.59 

Induction of the infantry divisions began on 25 March 1942, and by 3 1 

December, twenty-six of the twenty-seven di visions were on active dUly (Trible 

13). The 97th Infantry Division was not inducted into active military service until 

February 1943 because personnel were not available for its reorgan ization. Since 

nonc of these divisions had rcservc cadrc or equi pment, the Army Ground Forces 

had to reb uild them tota lly. That process started when the War Department 

a ssigned a co mmand er and se lec ted a parent unit to provide a cadre. 

Approximately thirty-scven days before reorgan ization of the division, the COlllmander and his staff reported to the unit 's station. Officers and enlisted cadrc, 

about 1,400 men from the parent unit, followed some seven days later, and shortly thereaftcr the rema ining 500 officers arri ved. Within five days after the arrival 

of all officcrs and cadre, a stream of about 13,500 recruits began 10 report. The 

div ision was considcred reorganized and active fifteen days after the first fillers 

reached the di vision. Fifty-two weeks of training followed, wh ich incl udcd seventeen weeks of basic and individual training. The divisions, aftcr their initial fil l, 

were to re ly on replacement centers for personnel.60 

Along with the reorgani zat ion of the Organi zed Reserve units, th e War 

Department expanded the number of divisions in the Army of the United States. 

Reversing a post- World War I policy, the staff planned to act ivate somc all-black 

divisions to accommodate the large number of black draftees. On 15 May 1942 

Army Ground Forces organized the 93d Infantry Division at Fort Huachuca, 

Arizona. Although it had the same number as the provisional Negro unit of World 

War I, it had no relationship or lineal tie with the old 93d. Following its activation, the Army Slaff chartered at least three more all-black infantry divisionsthe 92d, 1051h, and 107th. The 92d Di vision, the all-black unit of World War [, 

was to be reconstituted, but the other two were to be new units. Under the plan, 

the 93d Infan tr y Division was to furnish the cadre for the 92d, the 92d fo r the 

I 05th, and the 105th for the I 07th. Army Ground Forces organi zed the 92d on IS 

October 1942, but a shortage of personnel for worldwide scrvice units prevented 

the formation of thc olhers. Eventually th e 105th and 107th Divisions were 

dropped rrom the activation list.6 1 

To meet the number of divisions in the troop basis, the Armored Force activated nine more armored divisions in 1942, the 6th through the 14th. In organizing them, it followed the same cadre system as the Army Ground Forces used for 

in fantry divisions.62 

With the increased number of armored divisions, Brig. Gen. Harold R. Bull, 

the G- 3 Oil the General Staff, discerncd a way to eliminate unwanted cavalry divisions. He suggcsted to Army Ground Forces that it consider converting the two 
TABLE 13 

Divisions Activated or Ordered Into Active Military Service 

in 19421 

C OIII/JO/WIII Division Dale Localioll 

AUS 6th Armored 15 February Fori Knox, Ky. 

AUS 7th Armored J March Camp Polk, La. 

OR 77th Infantry 25 March F011 Jackson, S.c. 

OR 82d Airborne 25 March Camp Claiborne, La. 

OR 90th Infanlry 25 March Camp Berkeley, Tex. 

AUS 8th Armored 1 Apri l Fon Knox, Ky. 

OR 85th Infantry 15 May Camp Shelby, Miss. 

AUS 93£1 Infantry 15 May Fori Huachuca , Ariz. 

AUS America! 27 May New Caledonia 

OR 76th Infantry 15 June Fort George G. Meade, Md. 

OR 79th Infantry 15 June Camp Pickell, Va. 

OR S 1 sl Infnntry 15 June Camp Rucker, Ala. 

AUS 91h Armored 15 July Fort Riley, Kans. 

AUS 10th Armored 15 July Fori Benning, Ga. 

OR 80th Infantry 15 July Camp Forrest, Tenn. 

OR 88th Infantry 1;5 July Camp Gruber, Okla. 

OR 89th Infantry 15 July Camp Carson, Co lo. 

OR 95th Infantry 15 July Camp Swift, Tex. 

AUS 11th AmlOred 15 August Camp Polk, La. 

OR 78th Infantry 15 August Camp Butner, N.C. 

OR 83<1 Infantry 15 August Camp Atterbury, Ind. 

OR 91st Infantry 15 August Camp White, Oreg. 

OR 96th Infantry 15 August Camp Adair, Oreg. 

AUS 10Ist Ail'bome 15 August C,llllP Claiborne, La. 

AUS 12th AmlOred 15 September Camp Campbell, Ky. 

OR 94th Infantry 15 Septcmber Fort Custcr, Mich. 

OR 98th Infantry 15 Seplcmbcr Camp Brcckinridgc, Tcnn. 

OR 102e! In fantry 15 Septcmbcr Camp Maxcy, Tex. 

OR 1041h Infantry 15 September Camp Adair, Oreg. 

AUS 13th Annored 15 October Camp Bea le, Calif. 

OR 84th Infantry 150ctobcr Camp Howze, Tex. 

AUS 92<1 Infantry 15 October ForI McClellan, Ala. 

AUS 14th AmlOred 15 Novembcr Camp Chaffee, Ariz. 

OR 99th Inf.1nlry 15 November Camp Va n Dorn. Miss. 

OR 100th Infantry 15 November Fort Jackson, S.c. 

OR 103d Infantry 15 November Camp Clai bornc, La. 

OR 86th Infantry 15 December Camp Howze, Tex. 

OR 87th Infantry 15 December Camp McCain , Miss. 

I Table in chronological order. 

l 
172 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Regular Army horse divisions to mechanized cavalry because there was no forcsee~ 

abl e role for horse-mounted units. Maj. Gen. Mark W. Clark, Chief of Staff of 

Army Ground Forces, disagreed, as did Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. The 

latter opposed the conversion because the war was worldwide, and he believed that 

horse cavalry could be lIseful in many places, particularly in areas where oil was 

scarce, a reference to the other types of divisi ons thaI required large quantities of 

petroleum products. He also opposed the conversion because orthe lime requ ired to 

tra in new horse cavalry units. Nevertheless, because of a shortage of men in the 

summer of 1942, the 2d Cava lry Di vision was inactivated to permit organization of 

the 9th Armored Division. White cavalrymen were assigned to the 9th, and the allblack 4th Cava lry Brigade became a nondivisional unit. Later, when preparing 

troops for operati ons in the North African theater, the engineer and reconnaissance 

squadrons and the 105-mm. howitzer batta lion were withd rawn from the 1st 

Cava lry Division and sent to North Africa.63 

With the activation of additional armored divisions, General Twaddle decided 

to convert some infantry divisions to motorized divisions. He se lected the 6th, 

7th, and 8th Divisions for reorgani zation, which was accomp lished by August 

1942. The staff planned to form three more such divisions that year, but Army 

Ground Forces reorganized only the 90th because of shortages in personnel and 

equ ipment. On 9 Apri l 1942 the adj utant general officially redesignated the 6th, 

7th, and 8th Divisions as motorized. The 4th Di vision issued general orders 

adopti ng the "motorized" designation under an Army Grou nd Forces direetive.64 

From the fall of 1939 to the end of 1942 divisional designs fl uctuated as the 

nation prepared fo r war. The War Depa rtment revised infantry and cavalry di visio ns, developed and revised armored and motorized divisions, and created airborne divisions. During this period of organizational upheaval , the Army 

retai ned the basic idea of three regimental combat teams fo r the infantry div i· 

sion and adopted the same concept for the motorized and airborne di visions. 

The armored di vision was he ld to two figh ting teams, as was the horse cava lry 

division. Many officers, however, wanted to eliminate the laller because they 

saw no role for the horse on the modern battlefield. The trend wit hi n all types 

of divisions was to increase fi repower and sta ndardize div isional elements so 

that they could be interchanged. Organizational questions remai ned, however, 

stic h as the nat ure and location of antitank weapons or the amount of organic 

transportation in any tactica l unit. The peri od proved frui tful , for the Army 

organ ized the divisions needed to pursue the war. By 3 1 December 1942 the 

Army had fielded I cavalry, 2 airborne, 5 mo torized, 14 armored, and 51 

in fan try divisions, for a total of73 active combat divisions. 
PRELUDE TO COMBAT 173 

Notes 

I Rp/ oflhe Sec ojWm", 1941, p. 60. 

2 Kreidbcrg and Henry, Mobilizatioll, pp. 563- 68, From the summer of 1940 to the Slimmer of 

1944 General Headquarters (G HQ) and its successor, Army Ground Forces (AG F), conducted 

large-scale maneuvers 10 provide and evaluate training at the corps level, often piuing corps against 

corps. Each corps fielded two or more divisions and support Imils, and they also came under scnJti· 

ny. Maneuver afCas were al limes established in New York, North and South Carolina, Tennessee. 

Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma, California. Arizona, and Nevada. Oller the years the Louisiana 

Maneuvers have received the most attention. 

3 Jean R. Moenk, A His/oly of Large-Scale Arm)' MllI/CIiVers ill the Ulli/ed Slates, 1935-/964 

(Fort Monroe, Va.: Continental Army Command (CONARC), 1969), pp. 26- 37; fli.~tO/ y oj tile 

Third Army, AG F Study 17 (WaShington, D.C.: Historical Section, AGF, 1946), p. 7; Army alld 

Nm'Y Register 61 (14 Scp 1940): 10. 

4 TID 70, Infantry Division (Triangular), I Nov 1940; TID 6-80, Division Artillery, TnlckDrawn, Infantry Division, I Oct 1940; TID 7- 11 , Infantry Rcgiment, I Oct 1940; TIO 8-65 . 

Medical Battalion, I Oct 1940; Field Manual (FM) 7- 5, /lIfilll/lY, 1940. 

5 Rpt oJthe Sec oj War. /94/, p. 60; Ltr, TAG 10 CG, 1st Cavalry Division, 24 Apr 40, sub: 

Report on Corps and Anny Mancuvers, AGO 320.2 (4-15-40) file, RG 407, NARA. 

6 Llr, CG, 1st Cavalry Division to TAO, 91u140, sub: Report on Corps and AmlY Maneuvers, 

AGO 320.2 (4-15-40), RO 407, NARA. 

7 Ibid. 

8 TID 2, Cavalry Division, I Nov 1940; TIO 2- 11 , Cavalry Regiment, Horse, I Nov 1940; TIO 

6-110, Division Artillery, Cavalry Division, Horse, I Nov 1940; Llr, TAG to Chicfofall anllS and 

services and other addresses, 13 Sep 40, sub: Cavalry Division, Horse, AO 320.2 Cav (9- 11-40)P, 

AGO 320.2 Cavalry 8- 1-40 to 4-30-41 file, RG 407, NA RA; "Notes from the Chief of Cavalry," 

Cm'ally )0111"11(1149 (Sep-Oe\ 1940): 408- 11. 

9 LIT, TAG to CO of all Corps Areas and other addresses, 22 Jun 40, sub: Organization and 

Movement of Units and Cadres in connection with Augmentation 10 the Anny to 280,000, AG 

320.2 (6- [8-40) M (Ret) M-C, Llr, TAG to CG of all Corps Areas and other addresses, 20 Jul 40, 

sub: Organization and Movemcnt of Units and Cadres in Connection with Augmentation of the 

Amly 10 375,000, AG 320.2 (7- 10-40) M (Ret) M-C, LIT, TAG to CO of all Corps and Corps 

Areas, 10 Sep 40, sub: ReorganiZation of Triangular Divisions, AG 320.2 (8- 31-40) M (Ret) M-C, 

Ltr, and TAG to CO of all Annies, Corps Areas, and othcr addrcsses. 13 lan 41, sub: Constitution 

and Activation of Units, AG 320.2 (1- 7-4 1) M (Ret) M.C, all AG Reference files, DAMH·HSO; 

Memo, 0 -3 for TAO, 81an 41, sub: Concentration of 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Bliss, Texas and 

method of filling lower bordcr posts vacated thereby with elements of the 56th Cavalry Brigade, 8 

lan 41 , G-4/43327. AG 320.2 (8- 26-40), RG 407, NARA; Bertram C. Wright, eomp .. The 1st 

C(/I'(dry Division ill Wor/(/ War If (Tokyo: Toppan Prinling Co., 1947), p. 3; Charles E. 

Kirkpatri ck, All Ullk/IOJllII FlIIllre (I//(/ (/ DOllbtfll1 Presellt: Writillg the VictOlY Plal/ oj 194/ 

(Washington, D.C.: Govemmcnt Printing Office, 1989), pp. 44- 47; See Historical Data Cards for 

4th, 7th. 81h, and 9th Divisions, DAM H-HSO. 

to Adna R. Chaffee, "Mechanized Cavalry," A WC Iccture, 29 Scp 1939, A WC coursc material, MHI; Gillie, Forgillg the Thullderbolt, pp. 109, 162- 64: HislOl")' oJ tile Armored FOI·cc. 

COlllllllllld. (///(/ Cellter, AGF Study 27 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Section, AGF, 1946), p. 7. 

t t Melllo, G- 3 for Col'S, 5 Jun 40, sub: Mechaniz.,tion, G- 3/41665, AGO 320.2 (6-5-40), RG 

407, NARA. General Andrews' background was not with cavalry, infantry, or mechanized forees, 

but with the U.S. Anny Air Corps. 

t2 Me lllo, 0 - 3 for Cars, 5 lUll 40, sub: Mechanization; Notes on G- 3 Mec hanized 

Conference, G-4/235 1 8- 69, AGO 320.2 (6- 5- 40), RG 407, NARA. 

13 Mcmo, G- 3 for Col'S, 23 Jun 40, sub: Mechanization. 0 - 3/41665, AGO 320.2 (6-5-40), 

RG 407, NARA; Llr. TAG to CG of all Anllies, CO'1)S Areas. and othcr addresses, 10 lui 1940, 
174 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

sub: Organization of the AmlOrcd Force, AG 320.2 (7- 5-40) M (Ret) M-e, AG Reference files, 

DAM H-HSO: Historical Daln Cards, lSI ,HId 2d Armored Oivisions (Anlld Divs), DAM I-I-I-lSO. 

14 T /Q 17. Armored Di vj~ion, 15 Nov 1940: LIT, ChafTcc to Scott, 9 Scp 40, and LIT. ScotllO 

Chaffee, 12 SCI' 40, Clmrlcs L. Scolll'apcrs, Le. 

tS Statement of Adna R. Chaffee, 14 May 1941, Document Collection, U.S. Army Armor 

School Library, Fort Knox, Ky.; LIT, Seolllo Grow, 3 Sep 40, Scott Papers, LC; LIT, TAG [0 CO of 

all Corps Areas and olher addresses, 20 Jul 40, sub: Organization and Movement of Units and 

Cadres in Connection with Augmentation of Ihe Army [0 375,000; TIO 77, Infantry Di vision 

(Triangular, Motorized), I Noy 1940. 

16 Biel/llial Reporl oflhe ChiefoJSll1}f. July I. 193910 Jlllle 30. 1941 , pp. 1- 3: Rpl oflhe Sec 

of War. 1941, pp. 61- 68. 

11 Rpl oflhe Sec of lVI/I'. 1941, pp. 62, 68- 10; Erna Risch and Chester L. KielTer. 2 vols., Tile 

QI/{/l"Ic/"lI/(/Slcr GOIpS: Orgallizfllioll. SlIpply. ali(I Serl'ice~' ( Washington, D.C.: Government 

f>rinting Office, 1955),2:293 

18 Kreidbcrg ,md Henry, Mobilizmioll, pp. 515- 11: WD Bull 22, 1940. 

19 RepoI"I oj Ihe Chicf of Ihe NaliOlw/ Guard Bllreau. 1946, pp. 24- 21; Roben Bruce Sligh, 

The Nmiol/al GilaI'd alld Nmioll(11 DeJellse: The Mohilizalioll oJlhe Gmll"ll ill Wol'ld War /I (Ncw 

York: Proeger, 1992), pp. 126- 28. 

20 Memo, G- 3 for Corso 6 Nov 41. :;ub: Triangulation of National Guard Di visions, and 

Memo, Mobilizmion Branch 10 G- 3, 12 Nov 41, same subject. G- 3/41141 , AGO 320.2 (8- 2-40). 

RG 401. NA RA. 

21 Memo, ACors. G- 3. I Aug and 1 Nov 1940, NG1l325.4 Gen.-6, DAM1-I· HSO; Rpl oflhe 

Chief of Naliollal Cuan/lJureall. 1946. pp. 220,230. 

22 92d [nf:mtry Brigade. Organizational History From 25 August 1940 to 31 December 1941. 

Ms. Ltr. f'uerto Rican DeJlt to TAG. [0 Ju142, sub: Inactivation ofllni!. HHC, 92d Infantry 

Brigade, 320.2 Gen, and Llr, Opemtions Division (OPD) to Caribbean Defense Command, 24 Ju[ 

42, same subject, MR-OPO, a[1 in 92d Infantry Brigade file, DAM1-l·[-fSO. 

23 Rpl oJlhe ChieJoJlhe Naliollal Cuard Burcal/. 194f. p. 14: Urs, ChaITce to Seoll. 5 Aug 

40. and Scoll to ClmlTec, 8 Aug 40, Scoll f>aJ}CTS, LC; Ltr, TAG 10 Natioll:ll Guard Bureau, 8 Nov 

40. sub: Withdrawal of Certain Cav:l1ry Units from Allotment to the Nationa[ Guard. 325.4 

(10- 21-40) M (ReI), AG Reference file, DAMH·HSO; Rpt of the Chief of Ihe Naliol/al GII(IJ"(/ 

8ul"e(lu. f946, p. 2 11: WD Bull 26.1940: Wright. The lSI Cm'(lliJ' Dirisiol/ ill WorM War/l. p.3. 

24 Mark Skinner Watson, ChiI'JoJSlaf): Prcwar PlallS (lwl P/"(:pa/"(/liOlI. United States Anny 

in World War [) (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 2 14-3 1. 

25 WD Bull 17, 1940. 

26 Ltr, TAG to CO of All Annies and Olher addresses, 10 Oct 40, sub: 2d Cavalry Division. 

AG 320.2 (10- 8-40) M (Ret) M·C, 2d Cav Div file. DA MI-I-HSO; Ulysscs Lee, The £mplo)'mellt 

of Negro Troops. United Slates Army in World War [) (Washington, D.C.: Govemment Printing 

Office, [966), pp. 65- 68, [22- 28: Morris J. MacGregor. Jr .. IlIIegralioll of llie AmiI'd Forces 

1940- 1965 (WaShington, D.C.: Govcmmenl Printing Office, 198 I). PI). 30- 31. 

27 Hi~'lory of Ihe Armored F(JI"{:e, p. 50: Ltr. TAG to CG of all Annies and othcr addresses, 13 

Jan 4[ , sub: Constitution and Acti vation of Units, AG 320.2 (1 - 1-4 1) M (Ret) M·C, Llr, TAG to 

Chicf. Armort!d Foree, and other addresses. 28 Aug 4 [. sub: Constitution and Activation of 5th 

Armored Division. AG 320.2 (8- 22-41) MR-M-C, and Llr, TAG to Chief, AmlOrcd Force, and 

other addresses. 8 Jan 42. sub: Constitution and Activation of the 6th Armored Division, AG 320.2 

(12- [ 1--41). MR-M-C, nil [etters in DA MH·HSO: John B. Wilson. AnI/iI'S, COIpS. Dil'i.¥iolls. (///(1 

SefJIII'me Brigades, Anny Lineage Series (Washington. D.C.: Govemmcnt Printing Office, 1981). 

Pt). [69, [81,203, and 2 15. 

2S Memo, OCors lor G- 3, 14 May 4 [, sub: Defense Against AmlOrcd Forces, G--412 [ [03- 6. 

and Memo. G- 3 for Cars. 18 Aug 41 sub: Orgnniz<l1ion of Antitank Units in the Army. OCS 

2 [ 103- 6. AG 320.2 (8- 16-4 I). RG 407, NARA. 

2<) Memo, 0 - 3 for Cors, 18 Aug 41. sub: Organization of Antitank Un its in the Army, and Ur. 

TAG to CG all Armies. 24 lun 4 [, sub: Organization of Provisiomtl Division ;md GI-lQ Antitank 
PRELU DE TO COM BAT 175 

I3 nllalions for Usc in Current Maneuvers, AG 320.2 (6-19-41) MIt-M-e, RG 407, NARA; L1r, 

TAG 10 CO orall Annics and olher addresses, 3 Dec 1941, slIb: Organization of Tank Destroyer 

Battalions, AG 320.2 (11- 17- 41) MR-M-C, Tank DeS1foycr File, DAMH-HSO; Christopher R. 

Gable, HIe U.S Army GHQ MallCI/I'crs of 1941 (Washington, D.C.: Govcmrncnt Printing Office, 

1992), pp. 174-76; Kent Roberts Greenfield. Robert R. ]'almer, and Bell J. Wiley, The Org(/I/;zolioll ojGmlllu/ Comba! 7i'oops, United States AmlY in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Govemmenl Printing Office, 1947), p. 82- 84. 

30 Llr, CO, Hawniian Dept to TAG, 26 Apr 41, sub: Reorganization of the Forces in the 

Hawaiinn Department, AG 320.3137. AG 320.2 (9- 27-40), and Llr, TAG 10 CO, Hawaiian Dept, 

26 Aug 41 , sub: Constitution and Reorganization of Units, Hawaiian Department, AG 320.2 

(8- 1-4 1) MR-M-C, AG 320.2 (8- 1-41), RG 337, NARA; GO 53, Hawaiian Department, 1941 , 

Hawaiian Dept. RG 338. NA RA. 

31 Memo, G- 3 for ColS, 19 May 41 , slIb: Designation of Divisions, Amly Corps, and Annies, 

G- 3/45832, Division Gcneral file , DAMH -HSO; WD Cir 197. 1941; "AmlY Designations," Arm)' 

and Nm')l Regis/er, 9 Aug 1941 ; author's notes. The use of the word infantry in divisiona l dC5igna-

[ions; TIO 7, I Aug 1942. 

32 "Lineage and Honors: History, Principles, and Preparation," Organiz,ltional History I3 raneh, 

Officc, Chief of Military History (OCMH), June 1962; Llr, TAG to CG, Hawaiian Dept, 26 Aug 

41. sub: Co n5titution and Reorganization of Uni ts, Hawaiian Department, 241h Inf Div file, 

DAMH-I·ISO. 

33 Louis Morton, Th e Foil of/he Philippines, United States Anny in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Govemment Printing Office, 1953), pp. 31- 37. 

34 Memo, G- 3 for ColS, 18 Sep 41 , sub: Triangularization of Square Divisiou to Removal of 

Elements for l3ases, G- 3/4174 I , AGO 320.2 (8-2-40), and Memo, G- 3 for TAG, 22 Nov 41 , sub: 

Assignment of the 121st Inf.1ntry from the 30th Division to 8th Division, G- 3/43726, AGO 320.2 

(8- 2-40), RG 407. NARA; L1r, TAG to CG. Third and Fourth Annies, 8 Dce 41, sub: Attachment 

of Thrce Infantry Regimcnts, Third Army to Fourth AmlY, AG 370- 5 ( 12- 8-41) MC-M-C, and 

L1r, TAG to CG, Third Army, 15 Dec 41, sub: Assignment of 124th Infantry. AG 352 InfSch 

( 11- 27-4 1) MR-M-C, AG Reference file s, DAMH-HSO. 

JS Memo, GHQ for CG, Field Forces, 6 Jan 42, sub: Triangulating Square Divisioll, 322.13/22 

( 1-6-42), AGO 320.2 (1 - 6-42), RG 407, NARA. 

36 Memo, OCS for G- 3, no subject, 8 Jan 42, OCSI20117- 124, RG 407, NARA. Memos pertaining to the reorganization of the National Guard divisions in 1942 arc in National Guard Induction and Reorganization fil e, 1938- 1942, DAM H-HSO. 

37 Lellers of inslnlction for reorganizing the National Guard divisions and divisional general 

orders implementing those instructions are in National Guard Induction and Reorganization file, 

1938- 1942, DAM I·I-I·ISO 

38 On 9 Mareh 1942 thc War DCllarttllent's Gcneral StafT was reorganized and many of the 

functions of the five assislanl chiefs of staff (G- l to G-4 and Ihe War Plans Di vision) were 

realigned. Much of the responsibility for organizing and training combat units, fomlcrly he ld by the 

G- 3, was passed to Army Ground Forecs (AG F), and the Opera.tions Division (OPD), formerly the 

War Plans Di\'ision, focused on the cmployment of units. All three, G-3 , AOF, and 01'0, however, 

would eonlinue to deal with divisional orgnnizalion during World War 11 . 

39 Francis D. Cronin. Undel'/he SOll/hel'1I Cross. The f)(lga oflhe AlI/eric,,1 Divisioll (Washington, D.C.: Combat Forees Press, 1951), pp. 4-29; Llf, TAG to CG, U.S. AOIlY Forces in New Clledonia, 24 May 42, sub: Constitution and Org'Hl ization of AMERICAL Di vision, 24 Mny 42, AG 

320.2 (5---23--42) MR-M-OPO: and GO 10, US Amly Forees in New Caledonia, 1942, 23d Inf.1l11 ry 

Division file , DAMH-HSO. 

40 Memo, Lcsley J. McNair for CG. Field Forces, 2 Fcb 42, sub: Field arti llery organi1..ll1ion, 

triangul<Jr division, 320.2/37 (I' A)-F (2- 2-42), McNair Pal)Crs: T/O 7- 1 I. Infantry Regiment, 1942. 

On 9 Mareh 1942 the chiefs of the combat anllS were abolished ns a part oflhe reorganization of 

thc General SlafT(sec I'[ewes, Pi'olll Roo/lo McNmlltlm, pp. 67- 76). 

4t T/O 7, Infanlry Division, 1942. 
176 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

42 Memo, CO, AGF, for Requirement Division, AGF, 4 Apr 42. sub: New Infantry regiment. 

320.2 Gcn-(Clear), McNair Papers; Greenfield Cl al., Orglllli;:(lliOIl ojG/"Q/llld Combal Trool's, pp. 

281 - 86; TIO 7.1nfanlry Division. I Aug 1942. 

43 TIO 7, Infantry Division. I Aug 1942; WD Cirs 245.267, and 274, 1942; Memo, AGF for 

TAG, 11 Scp 42, sub: Organiz.nlion ofOrdllullcc Light Maintenance Companies, Infantry Division. 

320.2/43 (Ord) (R}-GNGCT/ 10922 AG 320.2 (9- 11--42), RG 407, NARA. 

44 TIO 2, Cavalry Division. I Aug 1942. 

45 Gabel, me u.s. Anll)' Mmwl/\>er$ 0/ 1941, pp. 176- 79; Llr, Hqs, AmlOred Force to 0 - 3, 20 

Sep 4 1. sub: Proposed Armored Division. 20 Sep 41, and Memo. G3 for eolS, I Scp 41, sub: 

Roorganizalion of Armored Divisioll. 320.2 (03/41665. both AG 320.2 (9- 20-41), RG 407, 

NARA; T/O 17, Annorcd Division, 1 Mar 1942; His/()IJ' ofllle Arlllol"(.'f/ Force, Pl'. 29- 32. 

46 Llr, TAG to Third Amly. 8 Jul 41, sub: Test of Motorized Division Organization, 320.2 

(6- 25-41) MR-M-C. 4th Infantry Division Iile, DAM H-I'ISO: Ltr, 4th Motorized Division to TAG, 

9 Dee 4 I. sub: Test of Motorized Dh'ision Organization, 353- I'MD, AG 320.2 ( 12- 9-41). RG 407, 

NARA. 

41 TID 77, Motorized Division, I Aug 1942. 

4H Ltr. TAG to CGs, AmlY Air Forces. Amly Ground Forces, and Olhcr addrcsses. 16 JUIl 42, 

sub: Allotments of Grades and Ratings and Authorized Strength to T"clical Un its, AG 221 

(6- 3-42) EA-M-C, AO Rcferenee liles.llnd Divisional Historical Data Cards. DAM H-HSO. 

49 Tile AirbQl"lle COllllllalll/ (lIId Center, AOF Study 25 (W:lshington. D.C.: Historical Section, 

AGF, 1946). pp. 1- 12, 21; James A. Huston. Oul oflhe Blue: U.S. Arm)' Air!Jo,."e Ope/"(/Iiol/ ~ ill 

1I'0l"ld 11'(11" 1/ (West Lal:1yelle. Ind.: Purdue University Studies, 1962). p. 48. 

50 Memo. AOF for ColS, 2 Jul 42. sub: Policy re Training of Airbome Troops, 320. 1126 (Inl) 

(ONTRO) (7- 2-42), AO 320.213 Airbome, RG 337, NARA. 

5t James M. Gavin, 011 10 Bedill: Bal/le of (/1/ Airoomc COII!III({/ufer. 1943- 1946 (New York: 

Viking Press, 1978), p. 3; Memo, AGF for TAG. 29 Ju142, sub: Airbome Division. 320.21 10 (AO 

Cmd) (R) ONGCT/06440 (7- 29-42). AG 320.2 (7- 29-42), RG 407, NARA. 

52 Ltr, AGF to CG, Third Army. 30 Ju l 42. sub: Activation of 82d and 10 lst Airborne 

Divisions, 30 Jul 42, 320.2/9 All Cmd (R)-GNGCT (7- 30-42), (sec nmendments nnd revisions o f 

this let ler in the Iiles o f 82d and 10lst Airbome Divisions). DAMH-HSO; The Airbomc CQlIIlIWlld 

(/1/(/ eenfer. p. 21. 

5) T /O 71, Airborne Division, 15 Oct 1942. 

54 lIr, AGF to CG, Airborne Command, 4 Jul 42, sub: Activation of HUC, 1st Parachute 

Infantry Brigade, AG t: lile, DAMI I-HSO: Memo, AGF to ColS, 21 Nov 42, sub: Tactical Airbome 

Inf.1ntry Brigades, 320.2 (Airbomc)(R) GNGCT ( 11- 21-42), and Memo, G- 3 forColS, 14 Dec 42, 

S.1mc subject. WDCGT 320.2 Aetiv (1 1- 21-42). 320.2 ( 11 - 2 1-42), RG 407. NA RA. 

55 A troop basis was the list of military units and individuals required for the perfonnanee ofa 

panicular mission. by numbers, organization, C<\uipment, deployment. and types of personnel. 

56 Kreidbcrg and Henry, Mobili;:(liioll, PI). 625- 26; Green lield ct .11.. Tlte Orgalli:;afioll of 

GrOUlld COl/lbm TI"OOps, Ill). 164-84. 

S7 Memo, G- 3 for JAG. 8 Jan 42, sub: Entry o f Org;mized Reservcs into active Fcderal service, G- 3/6457-404, Memo, JAO ror G- 3, 12 Jan 42, same subject, 210.455. Military Affairs, and 

Memo. G- 3 for Cors, 14 Jan 42. same subjcct, 0 - 3/6457-404 . .111 Reference PnjlCT liIe, Army 

Reserve, DAM H-HSO; WD Bull 7, 1942. 

58 Memo. A WC for AColS. G- 3, 30 Dec 41. sub: Order of divisions, and Memo, G- 3 for 

eolS. 17 Jan 42. sub: Order of activation of Reserve Divisions. G- 3/6457-435, Refercnee I)apcr 

liles, Anny Resen'e, DAM I-l-I ISO. 

59 LIT. TAG to CG. All Corps Areas and Depanmcnt 30 Jan 42. sub: Reorganization of 

Org.1nized Reserve (less Army Air Force un its). AO- 320.2 OR (1 - 22-42) MR-M-C; GO 15, First 

Corps Area, 12 Feb 42; LIT. Second Corps Area to Executive Omces. Firsl, Second, and Third 

Mi litary Areas. 20 Feb 42; sub: Reorganization of the Organized Reserves (less Anny Air Force 

units): GO 17. Third Corps Aren. 12 Feb 42; L1 r, Fourth Corps Arel! to Commanding Omcers all 

Posts and Stations. 13 Feb 42. sub: Reorglt1lizalion of Units of the Army Rescn'cs (less Army Air 
PRELUDE TO COM BAT 177 

Force units), Foul1h Corps Area; Uf, l=i Oh Corps Area to TAG, 23 Feb 42, sub: Rcorgani7 .. 1tion of 

lhe Organized Re se rves (less Army Aif Force Un its); lIr, S ixth Corps Area [0 TAG, 

Reorganization of Ihe Organized Reserves. 3 1 Mar 42, sub: Rcorg:miz3 lion or Ihe Organized 

Reserves: Llf. Seventh Corps Area [0 TAG, 22 Feb 42. sub: Rcorganiz'llion of the Organized 

Reserves (less A1111Y Air FOl"(;c Units): GO 2, First Militnry District. 1942. GO 27. Second Military 

District. 1942, GO 11 , Third Mi litary District, 1942, Eighth CO'1)S Arcll; lsI Ind, Ninth Corps ATCn 

10 TAG \0 Llf, TAG 10 CG, All Corps Arc<ls and Departillent, 30 Jan 42. sub: Reorganization of 

Org.mizcd Reserve (less Amly Aif Force units). all Re ference I'aper fil es, Amly Reserve. DA MIIIISO. 

60 Historical Data Cards. Rescrve Di visions. DAMH-HSO: Robert R. Palmer. Bell I. Wiley. 

and William R. Keast, The Procuremell/ (///(I Trail/illg 01 Groll/ul Comlxll Troo/'S, United States 

Army in World War II (Washington. D.C.: OOVCnlment Printing Omce. 1948), pp. 434-41. 

61 Lee. The Elllplo)'1II1!1II olNegl'O Troops. pp. 128.407.424: MacGregor.II/IL'grtllioll olllll! 

Anl/I!(I l:o/'cl!s. pp. 32- 33. Also see unit files of the 92d and 93d Infantry Divisions in DAMHII S0. 

62 Scc unit filcs for the 6th through 141h Armored Divisions in DAMII-I-1S0. 

63 Ltr. AGF to I3rig Gen H. R. Bull. 5 May 42. sub: Cavn lry Organi zHtion. 320.2/51 (OwGNTIIG) (5- 5-42), and Memo, SW for the Under Secretary of War. 2 1 Jul 42. AGF 32 1 Cavll lry. 

RG 337. NA RA; Llr. AGF \0 CG. Second AnllY and Chief of the AmlOred Foree, 3 Jun 42. sub: 

Activation ofthc 9th and 10th Annored Divisions. 320.2 (Ar1l1d Forec)(R)-GNOPN (6-3-42): also 

AGF letters, same subject, 4 :md II Jul 42. 9th Annd Di ... file. DAM ll · II SO; Llr, TAG to CG. Task 

Force "A," 7 Scp 42, sub: Assignment of Units to Task Force "A," AG 320.2 (9- 7-42) MR-M-ON, 

AG Reference files, DAMH-HSO. 

M Ltr. TAG to CG. Fourth Anuy. 18 Nov 42. sub: Reorganization of the 7th Infantry Division. 

AG 320.2 ( 10- 15-41) MR-R·C. 7th Inf Div file. DAM I-I-I'ISO; Memo. G- 3 for TAG, smue subject, 28 Jan 42, 0 - 3/43930, AG 320.2 ( 1- 28-42), RG 407, NARA; L1 r, CG. Seventh Corps Area to 

TAG, 24 Mar 42, sub: Designation of the 6th Infantry Division. MRD 320.2 Designation, 24 Milr 

42. 6th lnf Di v file. DAM H-II SO; Ltr, TAG to CGs, First. Second, and Fourth Amlies. 8 Jan 42, 

sub: Equil)lllent for Motorized Division, AG 320.2 (1 - 6-42) MR-M -C, L1r, TAG 10 CGs, First and 

Second Armies, 27 Nov 41, sub: MOlorization o f Regular AnllY Division. AG 320.2 (11 - 14-41), 

Ln. TAG 10 eGs Eastem and Westem Defense Commands and Second Army, 9 Apr 42, sub: 

Redesignation of Infantry Divisions. AG 320.2 (4-2--42) MR-R-GN, :md lIr, AGF to COs, Second 

and Th ird Armies, 7 Aug 4 2, s ub: Armored and Motorized Divisions. 320.2153 (R)·GNGCT 

(8- 7-42). all AG Reference files, r>AM II-llS0: GO 14. 4th MotOri7.l.>d Division. 1942, RG 407. 

NARA. 
• 
CHAPTER 7 

The Crucible-Combat 

Whell A(/miml Doellilz l'ltIT(!.lI(lel'(!.(J Ihe Gerll/al/ GOI'f!mmel/l. (!1'eIY Americal/ tiil'i-

~; ioll II'(lS ill I"e opemliol/a!lheafer.\'. All but 111'0 II(/(/ seel/ acliOIl; olle I/(/d 'he mission oj 

.~ecll"illg rhe I'i/{l/ illSlllllllfiolls ill 'he H(Ill'(liiall Isl{/IId.~ : Ihe olhel' W(J.~ (11/ airbome d;I/;-

.~ ioll ill SHA£F Resen'e. 

GClleral George C. Marshalll 

At the end of 1942, with divisions on the offensive in North Africa and the 

South Pac ific, World War II became the crucible in which divisions tested their 

combat skills. After the attack on Pearl Harbor the Army accclcmtcd mobiliz.1tion, 

but only a few divisions were parceled out to meet threats. For almost another year 

the W<lr Department failed to decide on the ultimate number of divisions needed to 

fight the war in European and Pacific theaters. Force planners, however, continued 

to increase the size and number of divisions without regard for the domestic econo~ 

my. Planners also paid little heed to logistic[l[ requiremcnts, especially the means of 

moving units overseas. When logistical problems came to the fore, their solutions 

brought about changcs in the structure of the divisions. Infantry, armored, [lnd air~ 

borne divisions were reorganized; horse cavalry and motorized di visions were e lim· 

inated; and experiments with light divisions began. When victory came in Europe. 

the combl.lI Iheaters fielded a lotal of ighty~nine divisions. These units had under· 

gone considerable changes in less than three years. 

Wartilll e Reorganization, 1943 

In the latc slimmer and early fall of 1942, while prepa ring Task Force "A" to 

participat e in Operation TORell, the invasion of North Africa, trained soldi ers 

were still ex treme ly scarce. To fill the task fo rce, the War Department deferred 

reorganizing and filling the 97th Inf'lI1try Division, Ihe last of the Organized 

Reserve divisions to en ter active military service, and reduced three partially 

trained divisions 10 less than 50 percent of their authorized strengths. To avoid 

stri pping divisions again and disturbing their training, Ihe War Department desig~ 

nated the 76th and 78th Infantry Divisions as replacement units to receive, train, 

and hold men until needed. The divisions served in that capacity from October 

1942 to Ma rch 1943, when replacement depots took over. Both divisions, refilled, 

then began the ir combat training program anew.2 
180 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

In latc 1942 the War Department selected the 7th Motorized Division to be 

pa rt of the assault forces to be used to dri ve the Japanese from the Aleuti an 

Islands. In spite of growing doubts by Army Ground Forces about the useful ness 

of fu lly motorized div isions, the division was chosen because of its high state of 

readiness. Furthermore, it was located Ilcar Fori Ord, California, an amphibious 

training site, and could conveniently undergo Ihe training required for the operatio n. On [ January 1943 the 7th Motorized Division reverted to a standard 

infantry div ision) 

Besides the shortage of trained manpower, the nation also faced a severe 

shortage of shi ps large enough to transport divisions to the combat theaters. For 

this and other military and political reasons, plans for an early invasion of Europe 

across the English Channel were postponed. Also, the expansion and deployment 

of Army Service Forces and Army Air Forces units placed heavy demands on 

avai labl e shi pping, whil e the success of German submarin es ofT the Eastern 

Seaboard of the United States made that shortage of tonnage even more acute. 

Fina lly, the demands of the hard-pressed Pacific theaters put an unprecedented 

strain on shipping faci lities. Therefore, from October 1942 to March 1943 no 

div ision departed the United States, and from March to November 1943 only 

eleven went overseas.4 

In October 1942, acting to alleviate the growing shi pping problem, Marshall 

directed Army Grou nd Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces to 

eliminate unnecessary vehicles and excess noncombatants. He sought a 15 percent reduction in personnel and a 20 percent reduction in vehicles. In particular, 

he deemed the requirements for divisional transportation in the tables of organization and eq uipment to be extravagant because they represented what div ision 

commanders asked for rather than what they actually needed.S 

To accomplish these objectives, McNair established the Army Ground Forces 

Reduction Board to review all units under his control. Two principles, streamlining and pooli ng, guided the work. The fo rmer limited a unit to what it needed on 

a daily basis, whi le the laller gathered at corps6 or army levels resources that 

were believed to be only occasionally required. Pool ing was derived from the 

assumption that a division would be lIsually assigned to a corps or an army.? 

After the Reduction Board concluded its work on the infan try division in 

March 1943,2, 102 officers and enlisted men and 509 ve hicl es were stripped 

from the divisional tables of organization. The scalpel slashed most di visional 

elements. The cuts eliminated 363 men and 56 vehicles from the infantry regiment, with the can non company deleted entirely. The regiment retained six 105-

mm. towed howitzers, which required less shipping space than 75-mm. self-propelled guns, used less gasoline, and did less damage to light bridgi ng. These were 

placed in the regimental headquarters company. The number of automatic rines 

was pruned from 189 to 81, but the introduction of the new 2.36-inch roc ket 

launchers (bazookas) provided powerful antitank and antipi ll box resources that 

required no designated operator in the regiment. Reductions in medical, commu-
HIE CRUCIBLE- COMBAT 181 

ni ca lian, and serv ice person nel 

accounted for most of the other regimental pcrsonnellosses.8 

The board carved 475 men and 

95 trucks from the div ision artillery. 

Firepower did not decline since the 

number of artillery pi eces remained 

at twelve 155-111111 . and thirty-six 

lOS-mill. howitzers. The headquarters and service batteries were combined, a nd a ntitank and a ntiairc raft 

platoons were e liminated. An antitank capabi lity remained wit h the 

addition of 166 bazookas. To save 

pe rsonnel s pa ces, the numbe r of 

truck drivers, mechani cs, cooks, and 

orderli es was reduced.9 

The board provided for the return General McNair 

of the airplane to the infantry di vision, a step thai reflected the expanded width and depth of the battlefi e ld. The 

aero squadron had been e liminated from all divisions by 1940, but field artillery 

offi cers continued to request their own aircraft to guide counterbattery and indirect fire. In 1941 and 1942 the field artillery experimentcd wit h light planes, and 

on 6 June 1942 two lig ht obscrv.lIion aircraft were added to each field artillery 

battal ion and two to the headquarters of the div ision artillery. The board's dec ision forma lized these additions.tO 

Divisional combat support and service support units were severely cut. The 

engineer batta lion and signal company each lost about 100 men, mostly because 

certa in bridging equipment was taken from the engineer battalion and the radio 

inte lligence platoon was detached from the signa l company. Both funct ions 

moved to army leve l. The quartermaster company lost about 150 men, but the 

number of trucks remained approximately the same. No basic changes took place 

in the medical battalion, ordnance compa ny, or military pol ice platoon. I I 

The board also bel ieved that the div ision headquarters and its headquarters 

company had g rown too large. To reduce the size of the headqua rters company, 

ils strength was cut almost in half by e liminating the de fense platoon and some 

vehicles, drivers, and orderlies. The band assumed the mission of protecting the 

divisional headquarters as an additional duty. Divisional sltlff sectio ns remained 

the same, but the board cuI some assistant staff offi cers and enlisted men. Total 

reductions in the division represented a 13.5 percent decrease in all ranks and 23 

percent in vehicles.12 

Marshall tentati vely approved the new division but directed that its tables of 

organi zation be sent to the theater commanders for comme nt. To sell the new 
182 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

structure, General McNa ir and Maj. Gen. Idwal Edwards, Assistant Chief of 

StafT, 0 - 3, wen t to North Africa, where they found no support. The division and 

corps commanders in the combat zone rejected the euls on the grounds thai the 

division had already been reduced to the lowest acceptable minimum. 13 

With shipping and m<lnpawer shortages sti ll severe, Edwa rds' siaff prepared 

another set of tables for the infantry div ision that was a compromise between the 

Army Ground Forces proposal and the desires of the overseas division and corps 

commanders. The new division had 14,253 officers and enlisted men (Cha,., 19). 

Its combat su pport and combat service elements remained about the same as 

those proposed by the Reduction Board. To satisfy division and corps commanders in North Africa, cannon compani es were restored to the infantry regiments 

and service batteries to the field artillery batta lions. The 2.36-inch rocket launchers were retained as antitank weapons, but 57-mm. antitan k guns replaced the 37-

mm. gu ns. In the division headquarters company the defense platoon reappeared, 

as did the service platoon in the quartermaster company. Finally, Edwards' sta ff 

added a new it eadql1arte s, special troops-which provided administrative 

support to Ihe reconnaissance troop; 10 the signal, ordnance, and quartermaster 

companies; and to the military police platoon. As for vehicles, the new compromise organization had 2,01 2, almost the same as in the 1942 tables.14 

In Janua ry 1943 the Red uction Board tu rned its atten tion to the motori zed 

div ision concept. Several alternatives had always ex isted. Since the motori zed 

and infantry divisions had similar organizations, the latter could simp ly be augmented as needed with 2- 1/2-ton trucks, permitting the simultaneolls movelllent 

of all divisional c lements. Another option was to "a rmori ze" the organization 

by equi pping it with tanks, armored personne l carri e rs, and self- propelled 

artillery. McNair recommended to the Army Staff the reorgan iza tion of all 

motorized di visions as standard infantry div isions, except for the 4th, which 

was to be eq ui pped with armored personnel ca rriers. The sta ff supported 

McNair's recommendation. IS 

On 12 March 1943 the Act ing Chicf of Staff, General Joseph T. McNarncy. 

approved replacing motorized divisions with infantry divisions. He also approved 

the activation of additional truck companies organ ized with black soldiers to 

motorize the infantry division when necessary. The 4th Motorized Division, however, was to remai n intact pending its possible usc overseas. Also, the armored 

division was to be reorganized to achieve a better balance between infantry and 

armor e lements. The following May the 6t h, 8th, and 90th Motorized Divisions 

were reorganized as infantry divisions. Because the revised structure of the 

infantry division was not settled. the divisions adopted and retrained under the 

1942 infantry division tables.16 

After the March decision, none of the overseas commanders wanted the 4th 

Motorized Di vision because they thought it would make inordinate demands on 

critical shipping space and the already limited supply of tires and gasoline. The 

tires for a motorized division's vehicles alone required 318 tons of rubber eOI11-
CHART 19-1nfantry Division, 15 July 1943 

'Includes chaplains. 
184 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

parcd to 166 tons for those in the infantry division. Besides, the 4th was the 

only motorized div ision authorized a full complement of equipment plus addilional personnel and eq uipment to constitute a special task fo rce. Its potential 

punch in combat, however, did not appear to justify the costs of sh ipping and 

logistical su pport. On 1 August 1943 the 4th reverted to the standard infantry 

division struct ure. 17 

The organization of the armored division had been in question for severa l 

mont hs because of the imbala nce between armor and infa ntry forces. Some 

options existed for imp rovement. Lt. Gen. Ja cob L. Devers, Chi ef of th e 

Armored Force, wanted to obtai n a better balance at corps level by having one 

motori zed and two armored divisions in a corps and by "armori z ing" the 

motori zed division,18 McNair be lieved that the armored division was "so fat 

the re is no place to begin."19 He wa nt ed c ither to increase the infantry or 

reduce the armor in the existing div ision, changes that wou ld result in a sweeping reorganization oflhe unit. 20 

Eventually McNair directed the Reduction Board to cut the divisional armor, 

believing the use of tanks had cha nged since 1940. Both the British and the 

Ge rmans had successfull y llsed a division that fiel ded fewe r tanks than the 

American armored division. The armored division was not free to roam at will, as 

first envisioned, because of improvemen ts in antitank weapons. McNa ir saw it as 

a unit of opportunity to exploit a breakthrough, to take part in a pursuit, or to 

cover a withdrawal- all fonner cavalry missions. Therefore, the (ln1lOred division 

could be smaller. Furthermore, McNair saw the need for fewer armored div isions 

in the total force, and with fewe r armored divisions more separate tank battalions, 

which were needed to support infantry divisions, could be organized)1 

Combat-experienced officers in the North African th eater opposed a major 

reorgan ization of the armored di vision. In March 1943 the Fifth Army convened a review board, chaired by Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon, the commander 

of the 2£1 Armored Division. The boa rd recommended reten tion of the existing 

division structure with the add ition of more infantry <l nd the assignment of tan k 

desl'royer and antiaircraft artillery battalions. To simplify logistical and ma intena nce operations, the board wanted to reduce the types of vehicles wit hin the 

div ision, recommending that motorcycles and amphib ious trucks be replaced 

with II4-ton trucks and that obsolete tanks be removed. Since the 1st Armored 

Di vision had been lIsed in piecemeal fashion on the Tun isian front and the 2d 

Armored Division was the only such division to gai n ex perience as a di visional 

organization, the board believed that a major reorganiza tio n of the armored 

div ision was premature.22 

After months of study and discussion, the War Department rejected the field 

reeo111mendations and on 15 September 1943 published new armored division 

tables of organization that followed McNair's ideas (Chari 20). Three tank and 

three armored infantry battalions replaced the armored and infantry regiments. 

Each la nk battalion included Ol1e light and three medium tank companies, and the 
TI-IE CRUCIBLE-COMBAT 185 

armored infantry battalion had three line companies. For self·sufTiciency, infantry 

and ('ank batta lions each had a service company thai assumed many of the fu nctions of the former regimental headquarters and service compani es and rendered 

some maintenan ce. No basic change took place in the division 's three field 

artillery battalions but, as in the infantry division, the ta bles prov ided for liaison 

aircra ft for Ihal arm. The results reduced the vari ety of vehicles. No additional 

organ ic antitan k or antiaircraft artille ry battalions were in c luded, for Army 

Grou nd Forces believed that the divisions had sufficien t antitank and antiaircraft 

resources within their infantry, armor, and fie ld artillery units. Besides, the command felt the divisions could obtain additiona l antitank and antiaircraft artillery 

resources from pools of such un its at higher eche lons)) 

The armored division continued to fi e ld two combat commands as task force 

headquarters, which were to be used to build fl exible fi ghting teams of armor, 

infantry, and artillery with support appropriate for the tacti cal requirements. A 

brigadier genera l led one command and a colonel the other. The Reduction Board 

gave no ex planation for this curious ra nk arrangement. Undoubtedly one of the 

billets permitted the assignment of a second genera l officer to the division to 

replace the assistant division commander, whose slot had been eliminated. The 

reserve command, a new orga niL.l tion led by an infantry colonel with a sma ll 

staff, served to clarify command and control in the division's rear area. In the past 

the reserve commander had been the senior officer among those units.24 

The tables made substa ntia l changes in the armored division's combat support 

nnd combat service support arena. The engineer battalion lost its bridge company 

(higher headquarters were to supply bridging equipment) and the number of engineer line compnnies fe ll from four to three. To compensate fo r the removal of 

reconnaissance elements from tank and infantry units, the reconnaissance squadron 

included a troop for each of the combat commands. In addition, the squadron had 

two reconnaissance troops for divisionnl missions, an assnu lt gun troop of four platoons (one for each reconnnissance troop), and a light tank company. The division 

trdi ns comprised only medical and maintcnance battalions, the supply battalion having been eliminated. Each unit was made responsible for its own resupply. Also, the 

divisional supply company was discarded and its functions divided between the 

headquart'ers compm1y of the division and the headquarters company of the trains. 

These changes pared the division's strength from 14,630 men to 10,937, slashed the 

number of tanks from 360 to 263, reduced the variety of vehicles to ease repair 

problems, and eliminated the maintenance-prone motorcycles)5 

The War Deparrment on 16 October 1943 summarized why the reorganizing 

of divisions and ot her units was necess..1ry in Circular 256. It cited the need to 

secure the maximum use of available manpower, to permit transporr overseas of 

the maximum amount of fighti ng power, and to provide greater fl exibility in 

organization in keeping with the principle of economy of force and massing of 

military strength at th e dec isive poi nt. In addition, the reorganiza tion was to 

reduce headquarters and other noncombatants in ordcr that command fu nction 
CHART 20-Armored Division, 15 September 19

ARMORED DIVISION 

10,937 

I 

ARMORED 

[ 

HHe 

-[ TANK BN RECON SUON I INFANTRY BN 

309 751 ea 94' 1,037 ea 

HHC COMBAT Has RESERVE I SIG CO ENG

COMMAND COMMAND I 302 7

99/97 8 

HHe I H·HH&SVTllP J HHe I 

147 142 173 

RECON TRP 

--1 TANK co 

m 

J _ RIFLE CO 

~ 

122ea H 145 ea 251 ea 

--1LTTANK CO I H·LTTANKCO I sv co I 

97 97 75 

--j svco I ASSAULT J MEO OET I 

I- GUN TROOP 

119 36 

116 

--1 MED DEl y. MEDDEl 

22 14 

1 Includes chaplains. 
l 

THE CRUCIBLE- COMBAT 187 

might keep pace wit h modern communication and tnmsport facil ities and to provide commanders with the g reatest possi ble amount of offensive power th rough 

reduction in passive defensive elements.26 

Reorganization of infantry and armored divisions began shortly after publicalion of the new tables. infantry and armored div isions, including those most 

recently activated in the United States, adopled the new organizations between I 

August and 11 November 1943. Overseas commands reorganized their infantry 

divisions as soon as possible but had the authority to delay Ihe changes if units 

were under alert, warning, or movement orders or if they were engaged in maneuvers or active operations against an enemy. The divisions needed time to retra in. 

Except for the 3d and 34th Infantry Divisions, the eight infantry divisions in the 

European and Mediterranean theaters were reorgan ized by the begin ni ng of the 

new year. The 34th came under the tables immediate ly prior to its participation in 

the Anzio campaign in March 1944 and the 3d after Rome fell in June. Of the 

twe lve infantry div isions in the Pacific thealer, eight were converted by the beginning of 1944 and the remaining four by the fol lowingAugust.27 

Reorganization of the three overseas armored di visions followed a somewhat 

different course. The 1st Armored Division adopted the new structure whi le in a 

rest and training area in Italy in 1944. The 2d and 3d Armored Divisions retai ned 

the 1942 confi guration th roughout the war. During the fal l of 1943 the comman -

der of the Eu ropean Theater of Operations. General Devers, who had been a leading spokesman for the heavy armored division decided that the war was too 

adva nced to permit changes in those units.28 

When the divisions in the Pacific adopted the new tables, MacArthur restructured the Americal Division to conform to other infantry divisions. On I May 

1943 he placed it under th e tables prepared by the Reduction Board, the only division to use them, but in September it was reorga nized under the 15 July struct ure. 

Because o f the unit's widely acclaimed comba t record, which included a 

Presidcntial Citation (Navy) fo r its clements' service on Guadal canal, the War 

Departmcnt retaincd its name rather than give it a numerical designation.29 

Light Divisions 

Early in 1943 Army Ground Forces deve loped a new type of unit, the light 

division, which the Operations Division of the Army Staff had suggested earli er 

as a possibility for the Pacific theater. Planners thought sllc h a division could 

func tion in a variety of combat conditions, such as j ungles and mountains, simply 

by varying the unit's mode of transportation. Initially, McNair, who disli ked specia l units, opposed the idea becallse of the unique training it required. Given the 

shortage of shipping in the fall of that year, the Operations Division again put 

fo rth the proposal. By this time pla nners had extended the idea to include 

amphibi ous operations. When prepari ng fo r the invasion of North Africa, the 

Solomon Islands, and New Guinea , infantry divisions had to be reorganized, 
188 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

reeq uipped, and retrained to make assauh landings. In add ition, a light division 

structure also seemed appropriate for the airborne division.30 

On 17 January 1943 McNair appointed Col. Michael Buckley from the Army 

Ground Forces G- 3 section as chairma n of a committee assigned Ihe task of 

developing a structure for light units using pack animals or light trucks. The committee's report ca lled for a 9,OOO-l11 al1 triangular infan try division (Cha,., 21) with 

two types of fi e ld arti llery and quartermaster units. The pack div ision had over 

1,700 animals. 1110s1 of which were mu les for the field artillery and qua rtermaster 

units, whi le the truck div ision had only 267 114-lon trucks and 200 1/4-lon tra ilers. Both divisions were also authorized numerous handc<lrts.3 1 

Geneml McNamey, the Deputy Chief of Staff, decided to test these organ izations and on 2 1 June approved the fo rmation of three rather than two light divisions. One was to be truck, another pack, and the third a modi fi ed pack. The mod ified l)Hc k division's men and uni ts were to be equipped wit h skis, snowshoes, 

toboggans, and cargo sleds. Because of the growing number of troops undergoing 

spec ia l winter trai ning at Camp Hale, Colorado, Army Grou nd Forces suggested 

they be organized under a divisional structure. The adj utant genera l added the 10th 

and 71st Light Di visions to the rolls. On 15 Ju ly 1943 Brig. Gen. Robert L. 

Spragin, a veteran of the Guadalcanal campaign, assumed command of the 71st at 

Camp Carson, Colorado, and Maj. Gen. Lloyd E. Jones, former commander of the 

U.S. Army Forces at Amchitka, Alaska, took over the 10th at Camp Hale. The 7 1 st 

was built around the 5th and 14th Infantry, regiments that had served in the jungles of Panama. The 10th was based on the 86th Infantry and ot her units at Camp 

Hale that were undergoing winter warfare training. Eventually the 87th Infantry, 

which had served in Alaska, joined the 10th. The 89th Infantry Division at Camp 

Carson supplied fillers fo r both divisions. On I August 1943 the 89th itself was 

reorgani zed and redesignated as the 89th Light (Pack) Di vision. Ne ither light 

amphibious no r light a irborne di visions were organ ized because the War 

Department opposed any cha nge in the existin g ai rborn e division a nd the 

Southwest Pacific Area Command lacked confidence in the light amphibious concept, preferri ng standard infantry divisions for amphibious opcrations.32 

Army leaders qu ickly noted some major problems in the light di visions during 

their training. Neither the 7 1 st Light (Truck) nor 89th Light (Pack) Div ision incl uded adequate infantry staying l)Ower; the II4-ton trucks lacked sui table mobility on 

wet, mountainolls, makeshift roads; the 75-mm. pack howitzer provided inadequate 

firepower; the division lacked reconnaissance resources and had insufficient engineer and medical capabilities; and the division staff was unable to operate twentyfO llr hours a day withi n the authorized assigned personnel. The divisions were not 

self-sllstai ning. Maj. Gen. John Millikin, who tested the divisions in maneuvers, 

recommended, "That unless a definite need for these types of divisions can be foreseen, the present Light divisions (motor and pack) [should) be returned to a standarel division status."33 No nced seemed to exist for the divisions, and even the 

Southwest Pacific Area, the command for which they were origina lly designed, 
CHART 21~Light Division, 1943 

LIGHT DIVISION 

$IG PLAT 

"3 

'Includes mtclical detachment 

J Pack 15·mm Howitzer Battalions. When the situation warranted, the Truck-drawn 

15·mm Howitter Battalions (362 men) may be substituted. 

J Includes chaplains. 

' OM Truck Company (209 menl may be substituted for the 3 OM Pack Companies. 
190 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

wanted noth ing to do with them. Army Ground Forces therefore reorganized the 

71st and 89th Divisions in May 1944 as standard infantry divisiollS.34 

The 10th Light (Alpine) Division proved unsatisfactory fo r many of the same 

reasons as the truck and pack units. Marshall, however, wanted it reorganized and 

retained in the force because of ils mountain warfare skills. Eventua lly Army 

Ground Forces recolllmended the addition of three weapons companies to each of 

the division 's infantry regiments; an increase in the size of the engineer, signal, 

and medical elements; and the provision of mul e transport for all combat elements. [n November 1944 the War Department published tables of organization 

and equipment renecting these changes, whieh gave the div ision 14,101 officers 

and enlisted men and 6, 152 animals. The same month, the 10th Light Di vision 

became the 10th Moun ta in Division , and in December it moved to th e 

Mediterranean theater. The division went overseas without animals, recclvmg 

them from remount stations ill the theater before going into combat. 35 

Expanding Divisional Forces: Meeting the Troop Basis 

While Army Ground Forces and General Staff officers revised divisional 

organizations, the number of div isions ex panded and a final determination was 

made rega rding the total number needed. Army Ground Forces organized the last 

reserve infantry division, the 97th, in February 1943. By August 1943 it had also 

activated as 11 part or the Army of United States the 42d, 63d, 65th, 66th, 69th, 

70th, 75th, and J06th Inrantry Di visions; the 16th and 20th Armored Divisions; 

and the 11 th, 13th, and 17t h Airborne Divisions (Table /4).36 

The 42d was a unique ullit, for it was a reconstitu tion of the World War I 

"Rainbow Division." Except for the division headquarters, none or its earli er clements were returned, but Army Ground Forces filled its new units with personnel 

from every state. To emphasize the division's tic to its World War I predecessor, 

Maj. Gell. Harry J. Collins, the commander, activated the unit on 14 July, the cve 

or the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Champagne-Marne campaign in France 

du ring which the "Rainbow" had helped to stem a Germa n drive on Pa ris.37 

[n addition to activating more a irborne divisions in 1943 , the War 

Department made changes in the ai rborne brigade rorce. To emphasize both 

th e parachute a nd the glider training missions, th e 1st Airbo rn e Infantry 

Brigade replaced the lsi Parachute Infantry Brigade as a tra ining unit. The 

Airborne Command also form cd the 2d Airborne Infantry Brigade that year to 

help in training. The J st Brigade ex isted for approximately seven months and 

was disbanded after most nondivisiona l airborne un its had gone overseas. In 

the fall or 1943 the 2d Brigade deployed to Europe where it con tinued to su ~ 

port airborne tra ining)8 

The need for the cavalry division remained questionable. Because Secretary of 

War Henry L. Stimson had insisted 011 mai nta ining large horse units, Army 

Ground Forces replaced the organizations withdrawn from the 1st Cava lry Division 
THE CRUCIBLE- COM BAT 

Maj. Gell. Elbrillge G. Chapmall and 

Gel/emf McNair inspect the 13/h Ai,.· 

home Dil'is;oll. 13 May 1944. 

191 

for the North African campaign and 

reactivated the 2d Cavalry Di vision 

early in 1943 as an all-black unit split 

between Ca mp Clark, Texas, and 

Camp Lockett, Ca lifornia.39 

Dep loyme nt of cavalry di visi on s, however, proved to be a 

thorny probl em. The units remained 

unpopular with theater commanders 

because of the shi pping space they 

required and the logisti ca l nightmare 

they presented, given their horses 

and equipment. The need for units in 

the Southwest Pacifi c Area, however, led MacArthur to accept the 1st 

Cavalry Division as a dismounted 

un it. The division turned in its horses and associated gea r in Ma rc h 

1943 and left for Australia in June. 

Many of th e horses of th e 1st 

Cavalry Division fo und a home in the 2d Cava lry Oi vision.40 

In Austra lia the di vision was reorgani zed partly under infantry and partly 

under cava lry tables. Each cavalry squadron was allotted a heavy weapons troop 

similar to the weapons company in the infantry battalion. The veterinary Iroop in 

the med ic al sq uadron became a coll ec ting troop, and th e reconna issance 

sq uadron was reduced to a troop similar to the unit in the infantry div ision. Some 

or the personnel and equipment of the reconnaissance sq uadron were used to create a light tank company. The addition of a I05-mm. howitzer battalion gave the 

arti llery two I05-mm. and two 75-mm. howitzer battalions. Along with the reorga nization, Ihe adjutant general redesignated Ihe unil as the 1st Cavalry Division, 

Specia l, because of its unique orga nization under infanlry and cavalry tables and 

the desire to reta in the cavalry "name" among the divisiona l forces. Having cornplcted a ll changes by 4 December 1943, the div ision moved to New Guinea for 

combat. More organi zational chan ges took place thereafte r, particularly in the 

artillcry, which eventually included four tractor-drawn I05-mm. howitzer battalions and an attached 155-mm. howitzer battalion.41 

Personnel shortages dictated a different fate for the 2d Cavalry Division and 

the 56th Cava lry Brigade. The Mediterranean theater needed service troops, and 

in Septcmber 1943 the War Department decided to lise the personnel of the 2d 

Cavalry Division in Ihal role. Leaving the eountry in February 1944, the division 

was inactivated shortly thereafter in North Africa and its men reassigned 10 a 

va ri cty of service units. Army Ground Forces e limina ted th e 56th Cavalry 

Brigade when no lise for it developed overseas. Its headquarters troop became the 
192 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

TABLE 14 

Divisions Activated in 1943 

Compollelll Division Dale Locatio" 

RA 2d CflVUlry 25 February Fort Clark, Tex. 

AUS 11 til Airborne 25 February Camp Mackall, N.C. 

OR 97th Infantry 25 February Camp Swift, Tex. 

AUS 20th Armored 15 March Camp Campbell, Ky. 

AUS 106111 Infa ntry 15 March Fort Jackson, S.c. 

AUS 17th Airborne 15 April Camp Mackall, N.C. 

AUS 66th Infantry 15 April Camp Blanding, Fla. 

AUS 75th Infantry 15 April ForI Leonard Wood, Mo. 

AUS 69th Infantry 15 May Camp Shelby, Miss. 

AUS 63d Infantry 15 June Camp Bland ing, Fla. 

AUS 70lh lnfalltlY [5 June Camp Adair, Oreg. 

AUS 42d Infantry 14 luly Camp Gruber, Okla. 

AUS 10lh Light 15 July Camp Hale, Colo. 

AUS 161h AmlOrcd 15 July Camp Chaffee, Ark. 

AUS 71s1 Light 15 July F011 Benning, Ga. 

AUS 131h Airborne [J August Fort Bragg, N.C. 

AUS 65th Infantry 16 August Camp Shelby, Miss. 

56th Cavalry Reconnaissan ce Troop, Mcchani zed, but did not see combat. The 

fonner brigade's cavalry regiments wcn t on to fight in the Pacific and Chi na· 

Burma·lndia theaters.42 

With ongoi ng manpower shortages, the Army cont inually examined the 

relationshi p between the tota l mi li tary force and the manpower pool available 

for military service. That relationshi p was constantly balanced against the man· 

power required to maintain th e productive capacity of industry, which remained 

vital to the overall Allied war effort. As the war progressed, staff studies sug~ 

gested that the number of divisions mobili zed could be cut. Soviet armies had 

checked the German advance, and it appeared that the All ies would ga in air 

superiori ty over Europe. Therefore, shortly before the invasion of northern 

France in 1944, the War Department approved a troop basis that contained 90 

divisions rather than 100 wit hin a total Army strength of 7,700,000. The French 

were to raise ten divisions, and the Un ited States was to equip them, wh ich ere· 

ated equipment shortages. That troop basis called ror I light, 2 cavalry, 5 air~ 

borne, 16 armored, and 66 infantry div isions. With the inactivation of the 2d 

Cava lry Division in May 1944, the number or divisions in the troop basis was 

reduced by one and the num ber or d ivisions raised durin g World War II 

remained at eighty·nine. The decision to limit the number of divisions haunted 

War Department planners during the remai nder of the war fo r they feared that 

mobilization had nOI gone far enough. Marsha ll , however, held to the eighty· 

nine div isions in the troop basis.43 
THE CRUCIBLE- COMBAT 193 

Deployment and More Organizational Changes 

Although the Army began deploying divisions shortly aOcr the nation entered 

the war, Ihe number of trai ned and partially trained divisions still located withi n 

the Un ited Slates mounted in 1943 because of porI and shipping problems. 

Unlike World War I, no troops were to be sent to foreign stations unless the War 

Department could guarantee their supply. In August 1943 sixty divisions were at 

various stages of readiness in the United Stales.44 

Toward the end of 1943 the deployment pi cture bri ghtened. With the 

nation's massive ship-build ing program and the relreat of German submarines 

from the weste rn Atlantic, the War Department was able to accelerate the 

deploymcnt of divisions. Most went to Europe to take part in the cross-Chan nel 

attack and th e drive to strike at th e German heartla nd. Event ually 68 divisions--47 infantry, 16 armored, 4 ai rborne, and I mou ntain- fought in Europe 

and 2 1 div isions- I ai rborne, I cava lry (orga ni zed as infantry), and 19 

infantry- in th e Pac ifi c area. (Ttlbles 15 (jlld 16 give the dat e that each division 

movcd to the port of emba rkation.) No division remained in the continental 

Un ited States after February 1945.45 

Alt hough most infantry and armored divisions had been reorganized prior to 

seeing combat because of the delay in moving them overseas, Ihe Army reorganized ils airborne divisions to mect specific combat nceds. The first modifi cation, involving only the 82d, took place during the preparation for the Sicil ian 

campaign. Because or a shortage of shipping space ror gliders, a crated glider 

being one or Ihe largest pieces or eq ui pment sent overseas, a parachute infantry 

regi ment replaced one of the glide r regiments, and a second parachute fie ld 

artill ery battalion was added. The change was in keeping wit h the original plan 

for thc division, which envisioned a task force organizalion.46 

After the Sicily campaign, Gene ral Ridgway. the commande r of the "A ll 

American" 82d, organi zed a small pathfinder team to he lp divisional e lements 

reach their targets. The team's mission was to jump into the assault area and guide 

the remainder of the division to the drop zone. After the team proved successful 

in Ita ly, other airborne divisions organized similar units.47 

Combat operations soon demonstrated that the airborne div ision lacked suffic ient manpower and equipment ror sustained operat ions. In Sic ily and Italy 

resources were not ava il able to relieve or replace the di vision wilh either an 

infantry or armored division as quickly as planners had envisioned. In December 

1943 Ridgway recommended changes in the airborne division to correct major 

deficiencies. Because it served primarily as infantry, he wantcd more transportation resources; additiona l medi ca l, engineer, and quarterma ster support; and 

grea ter infantry and artillery firepower. Planne rs in Wa shington opposed the 

changes because they thought the additiona l equipment and personne l would prevent the di vision rrom serving as a light, mobile roree, stripped to the bare essentials and easily air transportable.48 
194 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

TABLE 15 

Deployment of Divisions to the Pac ific Theater 

DiI)i~'ioll DlIIe 

1 sl Cavalry June 1943 

6th Infantry July 1943 

7th r nfalltry April 1943 

11th Airborne Apri11944 

24th In fantry • 

25th Infantry • 

27t h Infa ntry March 1942 

31st Infantry Fcbnmry 1944 

32<1 Infantry April 1942 

33<1 Infantry June 1943 

37th Infantry May \942 

38th Infantry December 1943 

40th Infantry August \942 

4[st Infantry March [942 

43d Infantry September 1942 

77th Infantry March 1944 

Slst Infantry June 1944 

93<1 Infantry January 1944 

96th Infantry July 1944 

98th Infantry April 1944 

Americal • 

Phi lippine # 

• Unit organized outside the continental United States. 

#Partially organized in 1941; surrendered in April 1942. 

After the aSS<'1lI1t landings by the 82d and 10Ist in Holland in 1944, Ridgway 

aga in attempted to revise the authorized structure of the divisions. The 82d had an 

additional 4,000 troops attached in the Normandy jump and over 5,000 for its operations in Holland. The IOlst had a lso been augmen ted for both operations. 

Frustrated with the bureaucracy, Ridgway, then commanding the XVIII Airborne 

Corps, appealed personally to General Marshall fo r aid in reorganizing the divisions. Marsha ll directed his staff to reconsider their str ucture and invited Ridgway 

or his representative to Washington to ex plain his ideas. Instead of coming himsel f, 

Ridgway sent Maj. Gen. Maxwe ll D. Taylor, the 10 lst's commander. On the day the 

German Ardennes offensive began, the War Department published new tables of 

organization and equipment for the airborne division. Marshall described it to 

Ridgway as "in all probability wholly acceptable to you and your associates."49 

The new airborne division consisted of one glider infantry and two parach ute 

infantry regiments, div ision artillery, antia ircraft arti llery and engineer battalions, 
THE CRUCIBLE- COM BAT 195 

TABLE 16 

Deployment of Divisions to the European Theater 

Division Dale Division Dale 

1st Annorcd May [942 42d Infantry November 1944 

1st In fantry June 1942 44th Infantry August 1944 

2e1 Anllorcd September 1942 45th infantry May 1943 

2d Cavalry February 1944 63d Infantry November 1944 

2d Infantry September 1943 65th Infantry December 1944 

3d AmlOfcd September 1943 66th Infantry November 1944 

3d Infitntry September 1942 691h lnfanlry November 1944 

41h AmlOred December 1943 70lh In fantry November 1944 

4th Infantry January 1944 7lslinfHtliry January 1945 

5th Annored February 1944 75th [nfantlY October 1944 

5th Infantry April 1942 76th Infantry November 1944 

6th Annorcd February 1944 781h Infantry October 1944 

7th Annored MlIY 1944 79th Infantry March 1944 

8th Annored October 1944 80th Infantry June 1944 

8th Infantry November 1943 82d Airborne April 1943 

9th Armored August 1944 83d Infantry March 1944 

9th Infa ntry September 1942 84th Infantry September 1944 

10th Armored September 1944 85th Infantry December 1943 

10th Mountai n December 1944 86th Infantry February 1945 

11th ArnlOred September 1944 87th Infantry October 1944 

12th ArnlOred September 1944 88th Infantry November 1943 

13th Airborne January 1945 89th Infantry January 1945 

13th Anllored January 1945 90th Infantry March 1944 

14th Annored October 1944 91 sl Infantry March 1944 

16th Armored January 1945 92d Infantry September 1944 

17th Airborne August 1944 94th Infantry Ju ly 1944 

20th Armored January 1944 95th Infantry July 1944 

26th Infantry August 1944 97th Infantry February 1945 

28th Infantry September 1943 99th Infantry September 1944 

29th Infantry September 1942 100th Infantry September 1944 

30t h Infantry January 1944 IOl st Airborne August 1943 

34th Infantry January 1942 102d Infantry September 1944 

35th Infantry May 1944 103d Infantry September 1944 

36th Infantry April 1943 1041h Infantry August 1944 

I06th Infantry October 1944 

medical and parachute maintenance companics, and spccia l troops, to which the 

division hcadquarters, ordnance, and quartermastcr companies; military poli ce 

and reconnaissance platoons; band; and medical dctachmcnt reportcd (Chart 22). 

The tables reversed the proportion of parachute and glidcr infantry regiments and 

considerably strengthened the units. The glider in fantry regiment was authorized 
196 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

a third batta lion and an antitank company, and both types of regiments fielded 

heavier weapons. In the engineer battalion the number of parachute and glider 

companies was also reversed. The four battalions in the division artillery, both 

parachute and glider units, were authorized 75-mm. pack howitzers, but a note on 

the tables indicated Ihal one gl ider artil lery battalion CQuid be equipped with 105-

mm. howitzers if morc firepower was necessary. As in the ot her divisions, the 

field artillery was au thorized observation and liaison a ircraft. The number of 

trucks jumped from 400 to ',000, and the authorized strength soa red to 12,979. 

Approximately 50 percent orthe men were parachutists. SO 

To adopt the new structure, the overseas commands were fo rced to rely on 

their own resources because the War Department made no additiona l men available. Existing nondiv isional parachu te infantry and fi eld artill ery un its were 

assigned to the airborne divisions, and othcr units, including 2d Airborne Infantry 

Brigadc headquarters, were disbanded to obtain personnel. In March 1945 the 

European Command reo rganized thc 13th, 17th, 82d, and IOlst Airborne 

Divisions. The 11 th Airborne Division in the Pac ific was reorganized in Ju ly but, 

unlike the European divisions, the unit was authorized two 10S-mm. howitzer 

glider battalions in place of two 7S-mm. pack units, and one glider infantry regiment was converted to parachute infantry. Throughout the war Maj. Gen. Joseph 

Swing, the 11th's commander, had insisted upon cross-training glider and parachute Iroops. Only the 17th Airbbrne Division participated in an assaul t landing 

after the reorganization; all others scrved as infantry fo r the rema inder of the 

war.51 

Combat experience also led to alterations in both the infantry and armored 

divisions after the 1943 revision. The most signi fi cant change took place in the 

armored division, where the sma ll headquarters of the division artillery command 

was expanded to a headq uarters and hcadquarters battery, provid ing the div ision 

with a fire di rec ti on center. Because of the many minor cha nges, the War 

Depa rtment pu blished new tabl cs for both types of div isions in January 1945, 

incorporating all the changes sincc 1943. At that timc the sl'rength of the infantry 

division stood at 14,037 and thc armored division at 10,700.52 

Correcting Organizational Problems 

Ne ithcr infantry nor armored divisions proved to be completely satisfactory 

during combat becausc they lacked all the resources habitually needed to operatc 

efficien tly. In the European theater, when an infan try division conducted offensive operations it almost always had attached tank, tan k destroyer, and antiaircraft 

arti llery battalions. Beca use of the shortage of tank and ta nk destroyer units, 

these units were not availablc to serve regularly with the same division, resu lting 

in considerable shuming of attached units, which diminished effective teamwork. 

The cannon company in the infantry regiment was hampered by the limited crosscountry ability ofthc 10S-mm. howitzer's prime mover. Often tied to the division 
" i 

J 
198 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

arti llery, the company also created ammunition shortages for that headquarters. 

Di visional reconnaissance suffered because the troop lacked sufficient strength 

and its vehicles were 100 lightly armored and armed. The decision to have fewer 

divisions and to maintain them th rough a consta nt flow of rep lacements proved 

costly. Ma ny recruits were killed or seriollsly wounded before they could be 

effectively worked in to the fabric ofrranlline units.53 

The armored division lacked suffi c ien t infantry and medium arti llery. To 

solve this probl em, att ac hme nts look place when slich units were availab le. 

Combat ex pe ri ence also di ct ated thaI the division have three combat teams. 

Under the \942 struct ure the infantry rcgimcnt's headquarters in the 2d and 3d 

Armored Divisions was often provisiona lly organized as a third combat command. In the other div isions, under the 1943 configuration, an armored group 

headq uarters and hcadquarters company was attached to serve as a combat command. 54 These expedients created command and control problems and complicated teamwork. The div ision 's reconnaissance unit and replacement system stdTered 

from the same weaknesses as in the infantry division.55 

In Ja nuary 1945, recogniz ing these organ iza ti o nal pro blems, th e War 

Department began to rev ise the infa ntry div ision structure for units planned for 

redeployment frolll Europe, after the defeat of Germany, to the Pacific theater 

to aid in the conquest of Japan. The War Department cast aside its policy of 

rej ectin g changes in units because of personne l considerations and directed 

stafT agenc ies to prepare tables for sound fighti ng teams. It ordered the e limination of dua l assignmen ts fo r personnel, the addition of any eq uipmen t listed 

ea rl ier as special but that had been used routi nely, provisions for more adequate 

cOlllmunications in a ll components, and an ex pansion o f milita ry police 

resources. The infan try regiment was to receive more mobil e, se lf-propell ed 

howitzers and better antitank weapons. Later the War Department instructions 

indicated that the rev ised structure would not be limited to use in the war 

against Japan.56 

On I March 1945 Army Gro und Forces subm itted three proposals for reorgan iz ing the infantry division. Each spec ified different mann ing levels, but the 

planners recommended the one that maximized the division's size and firepowe r. An enlarged infantry regi ment wi th 700 add itional men provided mo re 

punch. The weapons platoon in each rifle company had two new sections, one 

wit h six 2.36-inch rocket launchers and the ot her with three 57-mm. recoilless 

rifl es. 57 In the battalion's weapons company a new platoon o f six 75-m111. 

recoilless rifles augmented the two platoons equipped with ligh t and heavy 

machine gUllS. Because the regiment's 105-mm. howitzers lacked cross-country 

mobility for close support, commanders had tied the can non company to the 

fi eld artillery fire direction center to serve as an additi onal indirect fire battery. 

Army Ground Forces thus replaced the cannon company with a tank company 

comprising nine tan ks. The tanks also replaced the 57-111m. towed gun s in the 

an titank company, which were too lightly armored and judged to be too road-
TH E CRUCIBLE-COMBAT 199 

bound. The number of truck drivers, communications and postal personne l, and 

ammu nition bearers was increased. The mi litary police force grew from a plaw 

loon to a company and a signa l battalion rep laced the signal company. A lank 

batta lion was added to the di vision and a fou rt h company to the division engi· 

neer battalion. To expand the "eyes and ears" of the division, the reconnaissan ce troop was inc reased in size and autho ri zed two li ght ai rcraft. These 

changes together resulted in a proposed di visional strength of 18,285 personnel, 

an increase of 4,248 men over the January 1945 figure.58 

On 5 Apri l the Army Staff informed Army Ground Forces that because of 

ex pected personnel shortages divisions could not be reorganized accord ing to any 

of the proposed changes. Instead, the stafT directed the command to prepa re 

another set of tables that would increase personnel for communications, replace 

the military police platoon with a company, enlarge each lOS-mill. and 155-mm. 

howitzer battery from four to six pieces, and restrllcture the infantry regiment 

along the lines of the March proposal. Shortly after issuing these instructions, the 

staff told Army Ground Forces that about fifty more men could be added to the 

division for various service duties.59 

On I June the War Department published tables for the infantry division calling for 15,838 officers and enlisted men. The di vision met most of the Army 

Staff's guidance, except for the proposed increases in the artill ery batteries. The 

planners be lieved that the new organizatioll gave the division more mobility, fl exibility, and fi repower, in particula r for tank warfare. No unit, however, adopted 

the structure ulltil October 1945.60 

Redeployment 

The war ended in Eu rope in May 1945, and the Army had to come to grips 

with demobilization while still engaged in the war against Japan. Aware that the 

call to "bring the boys horne" wou ld eventua lly be irresistable, as early as 1943 

Acting Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson had appointed Maj. Gen. William F. 

Tompkins to head the Special Plans Division (SPD), Wa r Department Spec ial 

Staff, to plan for demobil ization and reorganization of the postwar Army.61 

Tompkins began wit h the assumptions that the war in Europe would end first , 

that an occupation force would be needed there, and that those who had served 

the longest should be released as quickly as possible. Enough soldiers had to be 

retained to conclude the war in the Pacific. With these ideas in mind, the Special 

Plans Division and the overseas commands worked out a redeployment pol icy 

based on a point system. Under it, men received points for length of service, 

combat participation, military awa rds, and ti me spen t overseas. Soldiers who 

were parents were also to receive special consideration. Out of this rati ng system, 

four categories of soldiers emerged: those to be retai ned for service in a command; those to be transferred to a new command; those to fo rm new units in a 

command; and those to be discharged.62 
200 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

8,h II/filllll)' Divisioll arrives (If Hall/plOIl Roads PorI ojEmbwkaliol1, /945. 

When the War Department approved the redeployment policy in the spring of 

1945, planners believed the European command would need to furnish fifteen 

divisions to end the war in the Far East and twcnty·one to the United States to 

reconstitute a strategic reserve, which had ceased 10 exist in February 1945. 

Following the German offensive in the Ardennes in December 1944, the last 

seven divisions in the nincty·division troop program had been sent to Europe. 

With the point system and a ten tative troop basis in place, redep loyment waited 

only for the fighting to end in Europe.63 

On 12 May, fou r days a ft cr the surrender of Germany, Genera l Dwight D. 

Eisenhower, the Supreme Allicd Commander, scI the rcadj ustmcnt program in to 

molion. High and low poinl lllcn switched units, and in June the 86th, 95th, 97th, 

and 104t h In fantry Divisions left Europe for reassignmen t. Arriving home, the 

men look thirty-day leaves before undergoing training to prepare for the Pacifie 

thealer. 8utthe successful use of atomic bombs agai nst Hiroshima and Nagasaki 

in Augusl skewed a ll readjustment plans toward demobilization. By Septembcr 

1945, 19 divisiolls- J airborn e, I mou llt ain, 2 a rmored, and 15 infantryreturned from Europe for use elsewhere. Of those units, only the 86th and 97th 

Infantry Divisions moved to the Fm' East, arri ving in the Philippines and Japan 

a ft cr the fighting had ended.64 
THE CRUCIBLE- COMBAT 201 

Compared to World War I, divisional organizations had rap idly adjusted to 

the demands orthe Second World War. Ini tially three considerations greatly in fl uenced the organization orthe various divisions: the availabi li ty afmen to field the 

units desired by the Army; the availability of shippi ng space to move them to the 

combat theaters; and the avail ability and quality of equipmen t. The last proved 

influential, continua lly forc ing the Army to make structural changes to accommodate improved weapon systems or, in some cases, to eliminate those that proved 

less than successful in combat. In 1943 McNair attempted to reorganize divisional structures based on experiences acqui red d uring the ma neuvers of 1940 

through 1942 and on the battlefield, where infantry, armored, and airborne divisions had to be augmented routinely, in parlicular to oppose tanks and airplanes. 

As the Eu ropean war came to a close, the Genera l Staff attempted to give infantry 

divisions the additional resources they habitual ly needed, but this effort came too 

late to benefit them during the conflict. 

Before and during World War 11 the Army also sought to develop several new 

lypes of divisions and to achieve an acceptable balance between firepower and 

mobility. Planners tried not to sacrifice either capability to the other, seeking 

instead to serve both masters. This effort proved reasonably successful in the acid 

test of battle, especially by comparison with the performance of divisions during 

World War I. The accumulated ex perience of the twentieth century eased the task 

of maki ng periodic organizational adjustments to satisfy changing requirements. 

Nevert heless, th is evolutionary process wou ld conti nue after World War II as the 

pace of tech nological developments and expanded global security roles of the 

United States Army fo rced it down roads that had never been traveled before. 
202 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

Notes 

I Biellllia/ Report o/fhe Chief 0/ Staff oj file United S/(/Ie.~ Army. JlIly I. /943. /0 Jlllle 30. 

1945, to Ihe Secretary of War, p. 106. 

2 Memo, AOF to CofS, U. S. Army, 24 lui 42, sub : Modification of Troop Basis, 1942, 

320.21267 (S)-GNGPS (AGF, Plans Section) (7- 22-42), and lSI Ind, same subject, 8 Aug 42, 

AG 320.2 (7- 24- 42) MS-C, AG 320.2 (7-24- 42), RG 407, NA RAj Palmer c\ aL. The 

Pl'ocl/l'clllel!! alld Tr(lillillg a/Ground Combat Tmops, PI'. 175- 79; Joseph J. Huln ik and Leonard 

Kobrick, cds., We Ripened Fast, The Unofficial His{OIY of the SCI'Cllly-Sixlh III/WillY Dil'isioll 

(Frankfurt, Germany: Otto Lcmbcck, 1946), pp. 19- 2 [; Ligh/llil/!;: The His/ol}' oj fhe 78th 

[n/rlll/i), Division (WaShington, D,C.: 111fatllry Journal Press, 1947), pp. 9- 11 . 

J Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, Byron Fairchild, Glll/nlillg lite Ullited Slales (lnd lis 

OIiIPOSIS, Un ited States Amly in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 

1964), p. 277; Llr, TAG to CGs AGF and II Armored Corps, I Jan 42, sub: Redesignation and 

Reorganization of the 7th Motorized Di vision, AG 320.2 (1 2-3 1-42) OB· I·GN·M (Order of 

Battle, Intell igence. AGF), 7th Inf Div file, DAMH-HSO. 

4 Green field et aI. , Orgallizaliun uj Ground Comb(/{ TI"oops. p. 286: Palmer et al.. 

PmCIII"emelll (lnd n'ail/illg ojGI"Olllld Comb(/{ Troops , pp. 489- 93, 

S Greenfield et aI., Ol"g(//Iiz(/{ioll ojGro/llld Comb(/{ Troops, I)P. 286- 87. 

6 On 19 August 1942 arl\lY corps were officially redesignated as corps. 

7 Greenfield et al., Org(lIIizalioll ojGI"ound Combal TI"oops, Pl'. 288- 89, 29 1. 

8 Ibid., pp. 274-75, 303- 14; 1'/0 7- 11 , Infantry Regiment, I Apr 42; 1'10 7- 11 , Inf.1ntry 

Regiment, I Mar 43. The 1942 cannon company had six 75-mm. self-propel led howitzers and 

two 105·mm. self-propelled howitzers. 

9 Greenfield et aI., Orgtlllizalion ojGrO/md Combal TI"oops, pr. 304- 05. 

to 1'10 6- 10, Division Artillery, Motorized . Infantry or Motorized Division, I Mar 43 ; 

Memo, G-3 for AGF, 6 Jun 42, sub: Organic Air Observation for Field Artillery, WDGCT 

(Assistant Chief of Stafl', G- 3, General Stafl) 320.2 (2- 5-42), reprinted in Richard Tiemey. The 

Army AI'/'al;ol/ Sial), (Northl)Ort. Ala.: Colonial Press, 1963), pp. 68- 69; William E. Vance, 

" History of Army Aviation." ,Ivill/ioll Digest 3 (lun 1957): 7- 12. 

II 1'/0 5- 15, Engineer Baualion, In fantry Division. 1 Apr 42; 1'10 5- 15, Engineer Ballalion, 

1 Mllr 43; 1'/01 1- 7, Signa l Company, Infantry Division. I Apr 42; TID 11- 7, Signal Company. 

In fantry Division, I Mar 43; TIO 10- 17, Quartcrmastcr Comp,my, Infanuy Di llision, 15 Sel} 42: 

TID 10- 17, Quarterma ste r Comp,lny, Infantry Div ision, I Mar 43; Grecnfield ct at., 

Orgmlizal io/l ojGrolllld Com/WI Troops. pp. 309- 11. 

12 1'/07- 1, Headquilflers, Infantry or Motorized Division. I Jun 42; TID 7- 1, Headquarters, 

Infantry Division, I Mar 43; 1'/0 7- 2. Headquarters Compnny, In fan try or Motorized Division, I 

Jun 42; 1'10 7- 2, Hcadquarters Company, In fantry Division. J Mar 43; Greenfield et a1.. 

Orgallizalio/l ojGroulI(/ Comblll Troops. pp. 311 - 14. 

13 Greenfield et aI., OrgollizlIliOil ojGroll/li1 COIII/)(11 Troops, pp. 3 14- 17. 

14 Ibid., pp. 317- 18; TOE 7, Infantry Division. 15 Ju143. While prcp:lring the 1943 tables, 

the Wnr Department combined T:lbles of OrganiZiltion and Tables of Equipment into a single 

document, a Table ofOrgnnizatioti and Equipment (TOE). 

IS Memo, GN DCG (Commanding General. Anny Ground Forces) for 0 - 3, 28 Jan 43, sub: 

Basis of Organi7.mion of Motorized Division. 320.2119 (Annd.F) (S)-ONDCG, Memo. OrganiZillion 

and Mobili7 ... 1tion 13mneh. G- 3. to Edw:lrds. 18 Feb 43. sub: Conference on Motorized Division. AG 

320.2 ( 1- 28-43). amI Memo, WDGCT for Cors, 24 Feb 43, sub: Reorganization of the MOlOrized 

Division, WDCGr 320 (2- 24-43), AG 320.2 (2- 24-43), all RG 407, NARA. 

16 Memo. WDGCT for CotS. 24 Feb 43. sub: Reorganization of the Motorized Division, 

and Llr, TAG to CGs. II Armored Corps and other addresses, 7 May 43. sub: Redesignation and 

Reorgani zation of 61h, 8th, and 90th Motorized Divisions, bOlh AG 320.2 (4- 30-43) OB-IGNGCT-M. AG Refcrcnce files, DAMH-l-lSO. 
THE CRUCIBLE-COMBAT 203 

17 Greenfield ct aI., OrglllliZlllioll o/Gro/lllli COlllbm Troops, pp. 337- 39; Llr, TAG to COs, 

AGF and XIII Corps, 30 lui 43, sub: Rcdcsignation and Reorganization of the 4th Motorized 

Division, AG 322 (28 Ju143) OI3-J-GNGCT-M. AG Reference tiles. DAM H-HSO. 

L8 Greenfield et ,II., Organization ojCrOI/I/(! Combat Troops, p. 324. 

19 Ibid., p. 322. 

20 Memo. AG F for CofS, 7 Dec 42. sub: Organization of Armored Units, 320.2 (Armd 

Force) (R) (11 - 6- 42), lind Memo. WOGCT for ColS. 16 Jan 4), sub: Organizational of Armored 

Units, wooer 320 ( 12- 7--42), both RG 407, NA RA. 

21 Memo, WDGeT for Cors, 16 Jan 43, sub: Organization of Armored Units; Greenfield CI 

al .. O''gtlllizlIlioll a/Gmllllt/ COIII&(I/ Troops, pp. 3 19- 26. 

22 Report of Proceedings of a 13 0ard of Officers, 27 Mar 194 3, Mcmo, AGF for 

Requirements Section, and CG, AGF, lmdalcd. sub: Comments on 1·larmon Board report, both 

Ground AG Section. Project Decimnl file 1942- 1943, AG F 319.1, North African Binder, RG 

337, NARA. 

23 Memo, AGF for Requirements Section and CO, AG F, undated, sub: Comments on 

Harmon Board report; TOE 17, Armored Division, 15 Sep 43: Greenfield etll!., Ol"g(llliZ(lliOIl of 

GrOlllld Comb(/{ Troops, pp. 327- 3 I. 

24 TOE 17. Armored Division , 15 Sep 43; Orecnfield el nl., Organization 0/ Groulld 

Combal ]i'OOps, pp. 327- 31. 

25 TOE 17. Armored Division, 15 Sep 43: Oreen fi eld el nl. , Orgallizmioll o/Grolilld 

Comb(/{ Troops, pp. 329- 35; J. M. I' iumnn. "Reorganization of the Armored Division," Milil(llJ' 

Hel'iew 24 (April 1943): 4~7. 

26 WD Cir 256,1943. 

27 Llr, TAG to CGs. AG F and other addres~es, 20 Aug 43. sub: Uliliznlion of Personnel. AO 

320.2 (31 Jul 43) PE·A· M·C, Llr, TAG 10 CGs, AGF and XIII Corps, 30 Jul 43. sub: 

Redesignalion and Reorganization of41h Motorized Division, Ltr, TAG to CGs, AO F lind Olher 

addresses, 2 Aug 43 , sub: Reorgllnizalion of Infanlry Divisions, AG 322 (28 Jul 43) OB-[-

ONOCT. M, LIT, TAG to CGs. AGF and Third Army. 20 Sep 43. sub: Reorganization oflhe 381h 

Infantry Division, AG 322 ( 18 Sep 43) OB-[-GNOCT-M, Ltr, TAO 10 CGs, AOF and other 

addresses, 23 Sep 43, sub: Reorganization of the 93d [nrantry Division, AG 322 (22 Sep 43) OBI-GNGCT, Ltr, TAG to CinC, Southwest Pneilie Area and other addresses, 12 Oct 4), sub: 

Constitution of Units. AO 322 (6 Oct 43) OJ3-I-GNCGT-M. Llr. TAG to CG, North African 

Theater of Operations, 29 Ju[ 43, sub: Reorganization of the 34th Infantry Division, AG 322 (26 

Ju[ 43) OB-I-ONGCT, Ltr. TAO to CG, South Pacific Area, 20 Sep 43, sub: Reorganization of 

the America[ Division, AG 322 (17 Sep 43) OO-I-ONGCT. L1r, TAG to CG U.S. Army Forces, 

Central Pacific Arell, slIb: Reorganizlllion oflhe 33d Infantry Division. AG 322 (30 Sep 43) 00-

I-GNOCT.M, Llr. TAG to AGF and other addresses, [5 Sep 43, sub: Reorganization of Armored 

Divisions. AG 322 (10 Se[) 43) OB-l-GNGCT-M, Llr, TAG to CGs. AGF and Third Army, 3[ 

Alig 43. sllb: Reorganization oflhe 4th Armored Division. AG 322 (29 Aug 43) OJ3-I-GNOCTM, Ltr. TAG to CGs, AGF and Armored Command, 3 Sep43, sub: Reorganization of the 16th 

Armored Division. AG 322 ( I SCI' 43) OJ3·I·GNGCT-M, and Ltr. TAG to CGs, AGF and 

Armored Command, 3 Sep 43. sub: Reorglll1izlltion of the 20th Armorcd Division, AG 322 (1 

Sel) 43) OB·[-ONGCT-M. all AG Reference files, DAM H. HSO; Historical Datn Cards, 

Divisions. The si:<ty infantry divisions in the United States did not include Ihe 89th [nfnntry 

Division, which was reorganized as a light division on I August [943 (sec below). 

28 GO [18, Fifth Army. 1944. 1st Armel Div file. DAM H-HSO: L1r, Dcvers to A.C. Gillcm 

Jr., 29 Nov 43, Dcvers P,lpers, MH [. 

29 Memo, AGF to TAG, [ Apr 43. sub: Rcorg,mizalion of the Amel'iea[ Division, 320.2il 9 

(PTO) (S)·GNG CT/064[4 (3- [8- 43),320.24- [- 43 (18), RG 407 , NARA; Llr. TAG to CG, 

South Pacific Area, 3 Apr 43. sllb: Reorgallizntion of Ihe Ameriea[ Division. AG 320.2 (4- 1-43) 

OJ3-[-GNGCT, AG Refcrence files, [)AMI I-I·ISO; L1r. TAG to CG, South Pacific Area, 20 SCI' 

43, sub: Reorganization of America[ Division; Cronin, U"der/he SOlilhem emS.I·, pp. 104, [28; 

Department of the Army (DA) GO 73, [9410:. 
204 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

30 Greenfield \:1 al., Org(wiullioll o/Groll/lll CommIt Troops, PI). 331 - 43. 

31 Memo, AGF ror G·3, 2 Mar 4), sub: Light Division, 2 Mar 43, 322.2 (Di v) (S), RG 407, 

NARA; TOE 72 (Trk) and (Pack). Light Division, I Jul 43, 891h and 7151 Inr Div files, DAMH· 

I·ISO. 

J2 Greenfield ct al. . Org(wizalifJ/I of Gr(JIllld COlllba/ 7h)ops, 1)1'. 345-46; Fred Clinger, 

Arthur Johnson, and Vincent Masci, /·/iSIOI)' of IIII! lIs/llIjalllly D;";$;OIl (Augsburg, Germany: 

E. Kieser KG, 1946), PI'. 1- 2; /-liS/DI')' of the /0,,, Ligh' Dil'isioll, AGF Study 28 (Washington. 

D.C.: Historical Section, AGF. 1946).1'. 1; Maynard L Diamond, Willard E. Simllls. Edward 11. 

Ilaldi ngcr. and Meyer Sicgclbaulll , 891h Ill/olllr), Dil'isloll, 1942- 1945 (Washington, D.C.: 

Inrantry Journal Press, 1946), pp. 47-48. Also see the IOlh, 7 lst, and 89th Infantry Di visions 

Iiles in DAMH-IISO. 

) 3 Diamond el al.. 89th II/fill/try Divisiol1. p. 61. 

34 Ibid., pp. 60-61; Greenlield ct lll.. Org(lIIi:atioll o/GrOtlllcl Combat Troops, pp. 347- 48; 

Lu. TAG to CGs, Second Army and other addresses. 16 May 44, sub: Redesignation and 

Reorganization of71st Light Division, AG 322 (12 May 44) OB-I GNGCT-M, 1 1st Inf Div, and 

LtT, TAG to CGs, Fourth Army and other addresses, 16 May 44, sub: Redesignation and 

Reorganization of the 89th Light Division, AG 322 ( 12 May 44) OB-I-GNGCT-M, 89th In f Div, 

both AG Reference liles, DAM II-HSO. 

35 Tmill;IIg ill MOlllllaill (Illd lVilller !l'miore. AGF Study No. 23 (WaShi ngton, D.C.: 

Historical Section, AGF, 1946), pp. 11- 12; TOE 10_ Mountain Division, 4 Nov 44; L1r, TAG to 

CG, Fourth ArnlY, I Nov 44, sub: Reorganization and Redesignation of the 10lh Lighl Division, 

AG 322 (25 Oet 44) OB-J-GNGCT, 10th Mt Div lile, DAM I-I -II SO; Inlerview, aut hor with 

Walter L. Galson, National Association of the 10th Mountain Division, Washington, D.C., 28 

Nov 79, author's Iiles. 

16 Historical Data Cards for the 42d, 63d. 65th, 66th, 69th, 10th, 15th, and 106th Infantry 

Divisions; the 161h and 20th Armored Divisions; and the 11th, 13th, and 17th Airborne Divisions 

and unit Iiles for each division in DAMH-HSO. In addition to the di visions listed, TAG also 

l)laeed thc 6lst, 62d, 67th, 68th, 12d, 13d, and 141h In fantry Divisions and the 18th, 19th. 21sl, 

;lIId 22d Armored Divisions on the rolls, bulthcy were never organ ized during the war. The 15th 

Airborne Division was also placcd on thc rolls but never organized. 

37 "The ' Rainbow Division'," N(I/;OIIl1I GII(JrdsmaJl 3 (Aug 49): 18- 19; Uf, Harry J. Collins 

to George C. Marshall, 19 Jun 43, Marshall Papers. 

}II Llr, TAG to CG, Airborne Command, I Jul 44. sub: Organization or HHC, lSI and 2d 

Airborne Infantry Brigades. AG 322 (29 Jun 43) OB-I-GNGCT-M, and L1r, TAG to CGs, AGF 

and Airborne Command, sub: Disbandment ofliHC, 1st Airborne Infan try Brigade, 23 Nov 43, 

AG 322 (2 1 Nov 43) OB-I-GNGCT-M. both 1st Bde, ISllnf Div, liIe, DAMH-HSO; Ltr, TAG to 

Chief, Historical Section, AWC. 21 Feb 45, sub: Organizational History, AG 314.7 OB-I, and 

Unit Di ary. Second Airborne Infantry Bri gade, 1943- 1944, both 2d Bde. lSI Inf Div f'ile, 

DAM H-I·ISO. 

39 Llr, AGF to CGs, Third Army and IX Corps, 12 Sep 42, sub: Activ;ltion of Elements of 

lhe l SI Cava lry Division, 322. 13/1 ( 1st Cav Di v) (R)-GNGNT (9- 12-42), 1st Cav Di v file, and 

Ltr. TAG to CGs, Services of Supp ly and other addresses, 23 Nov 42, sub : Activation of 2d 

Cavalry DiviSion, AG 320.2 (1 1- 2 1-42) 013.I-GN-M, 2d Cav Div IiIc, both DAMH-HSO. 

"0 Greenlield ct al., Ol'gcllliulliol/ o/Groll/u/ Combat Troops, p. 336: L1 r, TAG to CG, Third 

Army, 2 Mar 43, sub: ReorganiZation of lSI Cavalry Division, AG 320.2 (2- 28--43) OB-IGNGCT-M, lSI Cav Div lile, DAM H-HSO; James W. Uinds, Sec01I(1 Cm'alry Dil'isiol/ (no pub. 

lisher, (981), pp. 60-61 . 

.. t Ltr. TAG to CinC, Southwest Pacilie Area, 17 Scp 43. sub: Rcorganization of Unils in 

South west Pacific Area. AG 322 (14 Scp 43) OB-I-GNGCT-M, and Llr, TAG to CinC, 

Southwest Pacific Area, 13 Nov 43, sub: Redesignation and Reorganization or 1st Cavalry 

Division, AG 322 (9 Nov 43) OB-I-GNGCT-M, both AG Reference liles, DAMH-HSO: Wright, 

The /:;1 C(lm/IJ' Dil'isioll ill World War II, p. 240 . 

.. 2 MacGregor, IlIIl'gm/ioll o/Ifle AI'II/ed FOl'ce.~. I). 33; Ltr. TAG to CGs, AG F and North 
TH E CRUC1BLE-COMBAT 205 

African Theater of Opcr'dtions. II Apr 44, sub: Inactivation and Disbandment of Units, AG 322 

(8 Apr 44) OI3-I-GNGCT-M, AG file, DAM H. HSO; Hinds. SecQl/d Caw/lry DMsiol/, pp. 64--67: 

Llr, TAB to COs. Fourlh Anny and Southern DdclIsc COlllmand. 24 Apr 44, sub: Assignll1crll, 

Reorganization and Rcdcsignation ofCcrtuill Cavalry Units, AG 322 (22 Apr 44) OB-I-GNGeTM. AG Reference files, DAMII-HSO; Mary Lee Stubbs and Stan ley Russell Connor, Armorem'ally Par' II: Army Naliullal GII{/rd, Army Lineage Series (Washington, D,C.: Government 

Printing Office, 1972), pp. 167- 87. 

~3 Greenfield ct aI., Org(/lIi:(/I;OI/ a/Grollml Combill Troops, table, "Ground Forces in the 

Army. Dec 41 - Apr 45," and pp. 163- 8 1: Maurice Malloff, "The 90·Di vision Gamble," 

COI/IIIUII/(1 D<.'(;i5ioIl5, Kent R, Greenfield, cd. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 

1960), pp. 365- 81. 

44 Malloff, "The 90-Division Gilmble," p. 374. 

45 Roberl W. Coakley illld Richilrd M. Leighton, Glo/)ol LngislicSfllld Slr{J/cgy: 1943- 1945, 

United Statcs Anny in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968).1'. 

246-47; Palmcr et ill., Procllremelll alld T/'{/illillg ofGl'ol/lul Com/)m TI'OOP5, pp. 489- 92. 

46 Lu, TAG to CGs, Second Army and Airborne Command. 4 Feb 43, sub: Changes in 

Assignment of Units to the 82d Airborne Division and Airborne Command, AG 320.2 (2- 3- 43) 

03-I-GN-M, 82d Abn Di v file, DAM II-I'ISO: James E. Mrazek, TIle GlideI' IVaI' (London: 

Robert lIale and Company, 1975), p. 108. 

47 James M. Gavin. 011 10 Ber/ill, pp. 49- 50. 

48 Memo, AGF for Cors, 17 Dec 43. sub: Change in T/O, Airborne Division, 320.3n5 (S)-

GNGCT, and Memo. G- 3 fo r ACors, 17 Dec 43 , sa lllc s ubject, WDGCT 320.2, both 

Correspondence, Matthew Ridgway in Marsholl l'apers. 

49 Ltr, Ridgway to Marshall, 1 Nov 44, Ltr, Ridgway to MarshalL 4 Dec 44, Summary Sheet 

(SS), G- 3 for Cors. 8 Nov 44. sub: Reorganization of the Airborne Di vision, all in Manhcw 

Ridgway, Marshall Papers; Maxwell D, Taylor, Swords {/luI PlOlI'slwre.f (New York: W. W. 

NOrlOI1 and Co .. 1972), PI', 97- 98: TO E 7 1, Airborne Division, 16 Dec 44; cited milterial from 

Ltr, Mllrshall to Ridgway, 18 Dec 44, Marshall Papers. 

50 Memo, G- 3 for CotS, 15 Dec 44, sub: Reorganization of the Airborne Division, WDGCT 

322 ( 15 Dec 44), RG 407, NARA: TOE 7 1, Airborne Division, 16 Dce 44, 

Sl SS, G- 3 for DCors, 16 Dee 44, sub: Reorganization of Airl>orne Divisions, 322 (16 Dec 

44), RG 407, NARA; Llr, TAG to CG US Forces in the European Theater of Operations (ETO). 

16 Jan 45, s ub: Reorganization of the 10Ist Airborne Division, AG 322 (8 Jan 45) 013-1· 

GNGCT-M. Llr, TAG 10 CG. US Forces in the ETO. 22 Feb 45. sub: Reorganization oflhe 13th, 

17th and 82d Airborne Di visions, AG 322 (18 Feb 45) 013-I-GNGCT-M, an(1 Llr, TAG to CinC, 

USAF, I'ncific, 4 Jul 45, sub: Reorganiz:tlion and Redesigllllt ion of Certllin Airborne Units, AG 

)22 (30 Jun 45), OO-I-GNGCT-M, all AG Reference files. DAMH-HSO; Edward M. Flanagan, 

Tlte AlIgel5: A I-lislOIY of II Ie IIIIt Airborllc D;";sioll 1943·1946 (Washinglon. D.C.: Inr.,nlry 

Journal !'ress. 1948), pp. 1- 2; also see 11th. 13th, 17th. 82d. and 101 st Abn Divs files, DAM 11-

I·ISO. 

52 TOE 6- 160- 1. lI eadquMlcrs and lI eadquarl ers Bauery (HI'lI), Division Artillery, 

Armored Division, 12 Feb 44; TOE 7, lnfalllry Division. and TOE 17, Armored Division. 24 Jan 

45. 

53 General Board, ETO. Rcporl 17, Typcs of Divisions- Postwar Army, pp. 8- 9, 1945, 

DAM II-Library, 

54 The Ilrmored group headquarters and headquarters eomp.my WIlS organized almost idellli· 

cal 10 Ihe he;ldquaners and headquaners eoml)any of a combat command in an armored division. 

It contained the necessary stati, communication. and transporlnlion to enable it to function as the 

headquarlcrs of a task foree comparable in size to a eOlllb.1t command. 

55 General Bo.ard, ETO, Rcporl 17, Types of Di\,isions, pp. 12- 1). 

S6 Greenfield et Ill. , OrglllliZ(l/iOIl afGmllllt1 Call1blll 7i'oops, pp. 454-55, 

57 Recoilless rifles had been developed during the war, and the weapons combined the eOcet 

of arlillcry with the mobility of hand-carried ;lrIns by using high velocil), gas pOl1s 10 eounlenlet 
206 MANEUVER AND FI REPOWER 

recoil, as Ol)posed \0 absorption of recoi l by springs and/or oil OOll'ing through various orifices. 

S8 Greenfield ct al.. OrgllllizlIfioll o/GrOlllld Com/Hil TrQQP.f, pp. 456- 75 . 

59 Ibid., pp. 476- 77. 

60 Ibid .. pp. 477- 83: TOE 7, Inr.11l1ry Division, 1 lUll 45. 

61 Hewes, From Roo/tQ McNulIl(lra, p. 112. 

62 WO Readjustment Regulations. I- I, 12 Feb 1945. 

63 Coakley and Leighton, G/omll Logistics (ll1d Smileg)'. PI'. 584- 85. 

64 "Redeployment," Ms, Occupation Forces in Europe series. pp. 82- 84, 89. and Bell I. 

Witey, "I\GF on the Eve o f Demob ilizat ion Period:' Ms, History of AOF during t he 

Demobilization Period. chan, "Arrivlll of Major Ground Un its for Redeployment to 10 

September 1945." both OAMU-IISR. 
CHAPTER 8 

An Interlude of Peace 

II seems cerlllill thar (/folllie. and other /lew weapO/lS, which we lIIay expect a majol' 

/"II/Mess appol/ellifo lise ill ,heforeseeablefillllre. will 1/01 allel' 'he 11(11lwe ofll'mfare 10 

sllch {III eXfelll IIulI 'he immediale ground COli/mIl need fo/' vel'sali/e, lIIobile, {Iud hard· 

/tiffing divisions will be diminished or altered. 

Genera l Jacob L. Devers] 

By the summer of 1946 the peacetime Army fielded sixtee n active divi· 

sions, to be backed by an additional fifty-two in the reserve components. For 

the firsllime in its history the United Slates kepI more than a token army in the 

aftermath of victory. This radica l departure from tradition resulted from the 

in ternational instability that characterized the postwar yea rs and spawned the 

Cold War, an era of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United 

Sta tes. To counter the th reat of Soviet expa nsion, successive administra tions 

made ex tensive politica l an d mil itary comm itments around th e world that 

matured into a fore ign policy known as "contai nment." Associated wil h containment we re seve ral co ll ective defense treati es, most notably th e Nort h 

Atlantic Treaty Organi7.3tion (NATO), wh ich required a signifi ca nt degree of 

peacetime readiness on land and sea and in the a ir. 

Shortly after establishing the postwar force, the Army leadership reorganized 

div isions based upon the lessons from World Wtlr II. Despite the Soviet military 

th reat, various obstacles hindered the Army's effort to mainta in readiness- the 

totality of the recent victory, tin apat hetic publi c, and an economy-mi nded 

Congress. One of the most critical, but widely ignored, issues ftlc ing the ntlt'ion 

was the possible lise of atomic weapons in future wars. That nuclear war did not 

receive ex tensive anenlion during Ihe etlrly postwar yetlrs was a consequence of 

the nation's short-lived monopoly of atomic weapons and the complexity of military decision making in a dangerous international environment. 

Demobilization, Occupation, and the General Reserve 

In late 1945 the Army began to retool for new missions, which included 

occupying former enemy territories and establishing a Geneml Reserve, while 

demobilizing the bul k of the World War II forces. The poinl system deve loped 

carlier. which served as an interim dcmobilization measure until the defeat of 
208 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

41 sl II/jill/II)' Dil'/sion deparfS fhe PhililJpille Isl(flld~. July 1945. 

Japan, provided the basic methodology for execution but did not control the pace 

of the reduction. As after World War I, the Army rai led to prepare a genera l 

demobilization plan. Demobili zati on thus proceeded rapidly, driven largely by 

public pressure and reduced resources, without the benefit of sOllnd estimates 

aboul the size and location of the occupation forces thai the Army would need or 

the length of time that Ihey would have to serve overseas. The divisions that 

returned to the United States in 1945 and 1946 were genera lly administrative 

holding organizations without any combat capabi lity. They were paper organizations " to bring the boys homc."2 

Within a year after the end of the war in Europe, the number of divisions on 

active duty dropped frolll 89 to 16 (Table 17); of these, 12 were cngaged in occupation duty: 3 in Germany, 1 in Austria, 1 in Italy, I in the Philippine Islands, 4 in 

Japan, and 2 in Korea. The remaining 4 were in the United States. By the end of 

January 1947 three morc infa ntry divisions overseas were inactivated: the 42d in 

Austria; the 9th in Germany; and the 86th in the Philippine Islands. In addition, 

the 3d Infantry Division was withdrawn from Germany and sent to Camp (later 

Fort) Campbell, Kentllcky, where it replaced the 5th Division. When demobilization cndcd in 1947, the number of active divisions stood at twelve) 
TABLE 17 

Status of Divisions, 1 June 1946 

Dil'i.fi()11 Sill/liS Remarks 

lsI Armored Inactive Inacti va ted 25 Apri l 1946 

1st Cavalry Active Ja]);ln 

1st Infantry Active Gcnnany 

2d Armored Active Fon Hood, Texas 

2d Inflltllry Active Fon Lewis, Washington 

3d AmlOrcd itmcl ivc Inactivated 10 November 1945 

3d Infill1lry Active Gcnnany 

41h AmlOrcd Active Rcorgani;~l'{\ as Constabulary 

41h Infantry Inactive Inactivated 12 March 1946 

51h Amlorcd Inactive Inactivated II October 1945 

51h [nr.'lllry Active Camp Campbell, Kentucky 

6th Armored Inactive lrHlc liv,lICd 18 September 1945 

61h lnfimlry Active Korea 

71h Amlorctl Inaclive Inactivated 9 October 1945 

7th Infantry Active Korea 

81h Annorcd Inactive Inactivated 13 November 1945 

81h Inf.1nlry Inactive Jnacliv(llcd 20 No\'cmbcr 1945 

9th Annored Inactive Inact iv.lted 13 October 1945 

9th Infa ntry Active Genmmy 

10th Annorcd Inactive Inactivated 13 October 1945 

10th Mountain Inactive Inactivated 30 No\'ember 1945 

II th Airbome Active Jnp.U1 

11th Armored Disb,lIlded Disbanded 31 August 1945 

12th AmlOrcd Inactivc Inactivated 3 Decemocr 1945 

131h Airoom" Inactive Inacliv<lted 25 Fcbmary 1946 

13th Annorcd In .. 1ctivc Inactivated 15 Novcmber 1945 

14th Amlorcd Inactive hwctiv<lted 16 September 1945 

16th A rmorcd Inactive hmctiv<ltcd 15 October 1945 

17th Airborne Inactivc Inacti v:Jted 14 September 1945 

20t h A nllOrcd Inactivc Inactivated 2 April 1946 

24th Infantry Activc Japan 

25th Infantry Active Jarmn 

26th Infantry Inactivc Inactivated 29 December 1945 

27th In fantry Inactive Inactivatcd 31 December 1945 

28th Infantry Inactivc In<lctiv:lIed 13 Dccember 1945 

29th InfallIry Inactivc Inactivated 17 January 1946 

30th Infantry Inactivc Inactiv<ltcd 25 November 1945 

3 1 st Infantry Inactive Inactivatcd 21 Dt:ccmber 1945 

32d Infuntry lrHLctivc In<lctivatc(t 28 Febnlnry 1946 

33d Infantry Inactive Innctiv:JICd 5 Febnla ry 1946 

34th Infantry Inactive In<lctivated 3 November 1945 

35th Infmltry Inactivc In<lctivated 7 Deccmocr 1945 

36th Inf<lntry hmctivc Inactivated 15 December 1945 

37th Infantry Inactivc In<lctivnled 18 D\,'Cember 1945 

38th Infantry Inactive Inacliv:Jled 9 November 1945 
TABLE 17-Colllilll/(!fJ 

f)h'is;(m SIlIIIIS Remarks 

401h Inf,1ntry Inacli vc Inactivalcd 7 April 1946 

4l sllnf,1nlry In"cti ve Inactivated 3 1 Dcccmhcr 1945 

42d InfalUry Active Austria 

43d Inf,1ntry In"cti vc Inactivalcd I November 1945 

44th Inf,1ntry Imlcti ve Inaclivalcd 30 November 1945 

451h Inr.1ntry Inactivc InaCli\'alcd 7 1)".-ccmber 1945 

63d Infantry Inacllvc Inactivated 27 Septcmber 1945 

651h lnfimlry Disbanded Disbanded 3 1 August 1945 

66lh Infantry Inacli,'c Inactivatcd 8 Novcmber 1945 

69th InfalUry hlllClivc Inactivatcd 18 Septcmber 1945 

70th Inf.1nlry Inaclivc Inaclivatcd I I Oclobcr 1945 

71sl lnf,1ntry Inacti vc Inactivatcd II March 1946 

75th Inf,1ntry In<lctivc Inactivated 14 Novcmber 1945 

76th InfiUltry Disbanded Disbandcd 3 1 August 1945 

77th Inf.1ntry In<lctivc Inactivatcd 15 March 1946 

78th Infantry Inacti vc Inactivatcd 22 May 1946 

79th Inr.1ntry Inacti vc Inactivated II Decclllhcr 1945 

80th Inr.1ntry Inacli vc Inactivated 4 Janullry 1946 

81stlnfantry Inacli vc Inactivated 20 )<l nu<lry 1946 

82d Airbornc Activc Fon Bragg, Nonh Carolina 

83d Inr.1nlry Inaclivc Inactivatcd 27 March 1946 

84th Inf.' lltry Inacli ve Inactivatcd 2 1 Jmlllary 1946 

85th Infa ntry Disbanded Disbanded 25 August 1945 

86th Inf,lI1try Active Philippine Ishmds 

871h Inflnnry Inacti ve InaClivatcd 2 1 Septcmber 1945 

88th InfalUry Active Italy 

89th Infa ntry [nlIcli ve Irlllctivalcd 17 December r 945 

90lh Inf,1ntry Inacti ,'e Inactivated 27 Dccemhcr 1945 

91st Infarnry hl<lCli,'c Inactivated I o...'Ccrnber 1945 

92d Inr.1lUry Inacli,·c Inactivated 15 Oclober 1945 

93d Inr.1lUry Inaclive Inactivated 3 February 1946 

941h Illfa ntry Inaelivc Inactivated 7 Febnmry 1946 

95th Infa ntry Inaclivc Inactivatcd 15 October 1945 

961h Infa ntry Inaclivc Inaclivated 3 Fcbnl3ry 1946 

97th InfalU ry Inaclive Inaclivatcd 3! March 1946 

981h Inf:Ullry In;tcti ve Inaclivated 16 February 1946 

991h lur.,nlry Inaclive Inaelivated 27 Septcmber 1945 

l00lh Infantry [naclive Inactivated 10 Janumy 1946 

10Isi Airborne [nacli,'c InnClivntcd 30 Novemhcr 1945 

102d Infantry Inaclive Inactivatcd 12 March 1946 

103d Infantry Inacti"e 1n.1ctivated 20 Septcmber 1945 

100th Inf.1lltry inaClive Inactivated 20 Decemhcr 1945 

106th Irlfantry Inacllvc Inactivated 2 Octohcr 1945 

Americal [naclive inaclivalcd 12 Decemhcr 1945 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 2 11 

711,IIl!aIlf/J' Dillil'iol/ Ballll OIllhe C(lpillli grmllltl'i o/Seollf, Korea, 1945 

To replace the divisions on occupation duty in Germany that were being inactivated, the U.S. European Command organized the U.S. Constabulary. Heavi ly 

armed, lightly armored, and highly mobile, the Constabulary served as an instrument of law enforcement, supporting civil authority, quelling civi l disorders, and 

providin g a covering fo rce 10 engage a hostil e enemy until the United Slaies 

could dep loy larger tactical units overseas. The 1st and 4th Armored Divisions, 

both experi enced in mobi le warfare, furnished many orthe Constabula ry's units.4 

Although the U.S. Army saw no action in Korea du ring World War II , the 6th, 

7th, and 40th Infantry Divisions arrived there in September and October 1945 to 

occupy the southern portion of the COlllltry and assist in the demobi lizati on of the 

Japanese Army. An agreemen t with the Soviet Union had divided the fo rmer 

Japanese colony at the 38th Parallel. The Korean continge nt for a short time 

rema ined at three divisions but soon dropped to two, the 6th and 7th Infa ntry 

Divisions. Following establishment of an independent South Korean government 

in 1948, the Far East Command inactivated the 6th and moved the 7th 10 J<lP,II1 , 

leaving only a milita ry advisory group in Korea.S 

Demobili zation and the ensuing personnel turbulence played havoc wit h the 

active divisions. During a twelve-month period the 88th Infantry Division in Italy 

received 29,500 officers and en listed men and shipped out 18,500. The lSI 

Cava lry Division in Japa n opera led at one-fourth of its authorized strength during 
2 12 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Ihe first year on occupation duty, and most replacements were teenaged recruits. 

Divisions in the United States fared no bett er. The 3d Infantry Di vision was 

authori zed approximately 65 percent of its wartime strength but fell well below 

that fi gure. Demobi lization, rar from be ing orderly. became what General George 

C. Marshall described as a "tidal wave" that completely disru pted the internal 

cohes ion of the A rmy.6 

As the nation demobilized, Congress approved, with the consent of the 

Philippine government, the ma intenance of 50,000 Philippine Scouts (PS) as 

occupation forces for Japan. On 6 April 1946 Maj. Gen. Louis E. Hibbs, who had 

commanded the 63d In fantry Di vision during the war, reorganized the Philippine 

Division, which had surrendered on Bataan in 1942, as the 12th In fantry Division 

(PS). Un li ke its predecessor, the 12th 's enlisted perso nne l we rc exclusive ly 

Philippine Scouts.7 

The War Department proposed to organize a second Ph ilippine Scout di vision, the 14th, but never did so. After a short period President I-larry S. Truman 

dec ided to disband all Philippinc Scout units, determining that they were not 

needed for duty in Japan. The United States could not afford them, and he fe lt the 

Republic of the Philippines, a sovereign nalion, should not furnish mercenaries 

for the United Stales. Therefore, the Fa r East Command inacti vated the 12th 

Infa ntry Di vision (PS) ill 1947 and eve ntually inacti vated or disbanded all 

Philippine Scout units.S 

Besides the requ irement for occupation forces, an urgent need existed for 

some combat-ready divisions in the United Slates, where none had been rnaintained since Februa ry 1945. The War Department scaled back its earlier estimate 

for "strategic" forces and dec ided to main tain one airborne, one armoreel, and 

three in fantry divisions, all at 80 percent strength. Initia lly the department designated the force as the Strategic Stri king Force but soon rcnamed it the Gencral 

Reserve, to renecl its mission more adequately. But Ihe Genera l Reserve quickly 

felt thc effects of demobilization, and it was soon reduced to four divisions- the 

82d Airborne, the 2d Armored, and the 2d and 3d Infantry Di visions.9 

Departing from its post- World War I poli cy, the War Department kept di visionalunits in the United States concentrated on large posts to foster training and 

unit cohesion. However, shortages in personne l, obsol ete equipment, mId insufficient maintenance and tra ini ng runds preventcd the divisions from being combat 

effective. By the winter of 1947-48 the Genera l Reserve consisted of Ihe airborne 

div ision at Fort Bragg at near war strength , two ha lf-strength infantry divisions, 

one at Fort Campbe ll and the ot her at Fort Lewis, and the armored division at 

Fort Hood with fewer than 2,500 men. to 

As many di visions were eliminated from the active rolls, variolls divisiona l 

cOlllmanders jockeyed to have the ir units reta ined in the active roree. By what 

some thought was chicancry. thc 3d In fantry and 82d Airborne Di visions had 

replaced the 5th In fantry lind the IOl st Airborne Di visions on the active rolls. 

These changes caused considerabl e resentment within the ranks, and unit desig-
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 2 13 

nations became a contentious issue with many active duty personnel as well as 

veterans. Thus, the adjutant genera l solicited recommendations from the commanders of Army Ground Forces and the overseas theaters for divisional numbers 

to be represenl'ed ill the Regular Army. In the ensuing study. the adjuta nt general 

recommended the numbers I through 10 and 24 and 25 for infantry div isions (lile 

10lh Mountain Division to be redesignated as the 10th Infantry Div ision); the 

numbers 1,2, 3, and 4 for armored divisions (when elements or the 4th Armored 

Division serving in the Constabulary were inactivated, they were to revert \0 divisional units); and 82 and 10 1 for airborne divisions. The recommendations also 

incl uded the priorilY fo r Ihe retention of divisions on the active rolls. 11 

The study recommended Ihat the I st Cavalry Division be inactivated upon 

completion of its occu pation duties and its elements reta ined as nondivisiona l 

units. Large horse units were not to be included in the post- World War II Army. 

Chie f of Sta ff General Dwigh l D. Eisenhower disagreed wit h the elimination of 

the division. There fore, the Army Staff reworked th e list, designating the 1st 

Cavalry Division eighth on the retention list for infantry (the division had been 

organized partially under infantry and partial ly under cava lry tables during World 

War II) and recommending modificati on of the unit's designation to show its 

character as infantry. After examining several proposals, Eiscnhower approved 

the name " 1st Cavalry Division (lnfantry)."12 

No change in the numbcr of div isions on active duty resulted From the study; 

it simply provided the nomenclature fo r the Regula r Army's divisiona l forces. 

Eventua ll y the I st Cavalry Di vision, the 10th Mountain Di vision, and the 

Constabula ry units conformed to these dec isions. Also, the 10lst Airborne 

Division and the 10th and 25th Infantry Divisions (Army of the United States 

uni ts) and the 82d Airborne Division (an Organized Reserve organi za tion) were 

allotted to the Regular Army.13 

Reorganization of Reserve Divisions 

With the nation victorious in war and alone armed wilh the most awesome 

weapon known 10 man, the atomic bomb, a lasting peace appeared at hand. Some 

military pl anners believed, howeve r, that the need for ground combat units 

remained unchanged. Plan ning For a postwar conventional force had begun in 

1943, and over the next three years those plans, which included reserves, were 

debated in Congress and by the War Department and state officials. 14 

When Maj. Gen. Ellard A. Walsh, president of the National Guard Association, 

learned the sta fTwas studyi ng a postwar reserve structure, he pressed fo r consideration of reserve officers' views, petitioning Congress to ensure that the Wa r 

Department establish reserve affairs committees in agreement with the provisions 

of the National Defense Act. In August 1944 Deputy Chie f of Staff MeNarney 

appointed a six-member committee of Regular Army and National Guard officers 

to prepare policies and regulations for the Guard. Then, in October, he aut horized a 
214 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

similar committee for the Organil'..cd Reserves. He also arranged for joint meetings 

of the two groups where they disclissed matters common to both. IS 

On 13 October 1945 the War Department published a postwar policy statement for the entire Army. It call ed for a ground military establishment consisting 

of the Regular Army, the National Guard of the United States, and the Organ ized 

Reserve Corps, 16 whi ch were to form a ba lanced force for peace and war. The 

Regular Army was to retain only those units required for peacetime missions, 

which were the same as those identified after World War I. The dual-mission 

Guard was to furnish units needed immediate ly for war and to provide the stales 

with military resources to protect lifc and property and to prcserve peace, order, 

and th e public sa fety. The Organi zed Rese rve Corps was to suppleme nt th e 

Regular Army and National Guard contributions suffic iently to meet any projected mobi lization requirements.17 

Arter the policy statement was published, the Army Staff prepared a postwa r 

Nationa l Guard troop basis, wh ich included twenty-four di visions. [t derived that 

number by countin g th e prewar e ightee n Na tiona[ Guard infantry and four 

Nationa l Guard cavalry divisions, the Ameri cal Division (whi ch had been large[y 

composed of Guard units), and the 42d In fantry Di vision. Most soldiers considered the 42d, initially organi zed with slate troops in 19 17, as a Guard unit. The 

fa ct that the new plan allowed each of the forty-eight states to have at least one 

genera l offi cer also he lped earn ils acceptance. In the end it was necessary to 

approve a 27-division structure wit h 25 infantry divisions and 2 armored di visions to accommodat e the desires of a[ 1 the stales. During this process New York, 

fo r example, successfully petition ed the Wa r Department for the 42d In fantry 

Di vision . When the allotme nt was compl eted, th e Guard contai ned th e 26th 

through 48th and the 5 [st and 52d In fantry Di visions and th e 49th and 50th 

Armored Di visions. The number 39 was used for th e first time since 1923. 

Ahhough a 44th In fantry Division had existed during the interwar years, the postwar 44th in Illinois was a new unit, as were the 46th, 471h, 48th, 5 1 st, and 52d 

Infa ntry Divisions a nd 49th Armored Division. The 50lh Armo red Di vision 

replaced the 44th Infantry Division in New Jersey. 18 

Whil e the stat es and th e War Depa rtment se ttl ed troop ba sis issues, th e 

National Guard Bureau changed the procedures for organi z ing the units. In the 

pa st states had raised compani es, rorming regimcntal headq uarters on ly whcn 

suffic ient companies existed to ma ke a regiment. Under the new regulations, divisiona[ and regimental headquarters were to be organized first, and they were to 

assist the division commander in ra ising the smaller units. t9 

Duri ng the spring or 1946 the National Guard Bureau surfaced the complex 

problem of how to preserve historical continu ity in the Guard units. In 1942 the 

divisions had been reorga nized rrorn square to triangu lar units, which le ft them 

only vaguely resembling the formations inducted into redera l service in 1940 and 

194 1. Furthermore, the ex panded troop basis or 1946 compounded the probl em 

by adding units that had never be rore existed. To keep rrom losing the historical 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 2 15 

link with the prewar units, some dati ng as far back as 1636, the bureau and the 

Historical Section, Army War College, reaffirmed an earlier poli cy validated 

between World Wars I and II. Units were to perpetuate organiz'ltions that had 

been raised in the same geographic areas, rega rdl ess of type or designation. For 

example, New Jersey, which had supported part of the 44th Division before the 

war, now supported the 50th Armored Division. Therefore most of its elements 

"inherited" the history of the organic units of the old 44th, and elements of the 

new 44th perpetuated the history and traditions of fo rmer units in Illinois.20 

The command arrangement within the Inultistatc divisions presented another quandary. The War Department di d not rul e on the question, but some states 

that shared a division developed and signed fo rmal command armngement doc· 

uments. Fo r exampl e, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina, states that con· 

tributed to the 48th a nd 5 1 st Infantry Divisions, contracted 10 rotate command 

of the units every five years) I 

After the stale governors rormally notified the Nationa l Guard Bureau that 

they accepted the new troop allotments (ulble 18), the bureau authorized reorga· 

nization of the units with 100 percent or their officers and 80 percent or their 

enlisted personnel. The rirst division gra nted federal recognition after World War 

II was the 45th Infantry Division from Oklahoma on 5 September 1946. Within 

one year al l Guard di visio n headquarters had rece ived federal recognition )2 

On Veterans Day 1946, at Arlington National Cemetery, President Truman 

announced the return of the National Guard colors and flags or those units that 

had served during the Wilr. In concurrent ceremonies in state capitals, forty·five 

governors rece ived those colors and nags. The other th ree states obtained their 

standards in separate ceremonies. These actions did much to express the tie of the 

postwa r National Guard forces to prewar units)) 

The rebuilding of the Orga nized Reserve Corps divisions posed some similar 

problems and ot hers that were unique to it. A tentative troop basis, prepared in 

March 1946 (after the National Guard organizational structure had been present· 

cd to the states), outli ned 25 divisions- 3 armored, 5 airborne, and 17 infantry. 

These divisions and all other Organized Reserve Corps units were to be main· 

tai ned in one of three strength categories, labeled Class A, S, and C. Class A 

units were divided into two groups, one fo r combat and one ror service, and units 

were to be at required table of organization strength; Cla ss B units were to have 

their full complement of officers and enlisted cadre strength ; find Class C were to 

have officers only. The troop basis listed nine divisions as Class A, nine as Class 

B, and seven as Class C.24 

Maj. Gen. Milton A. Reekord, the adjutant general of Ma an(~ and General 

Walsh of the National Guard Association protested the provision ror Class A divi· 

sions, whose cost, they bel ieved, would detract greatly from funds avai lable to the 

Guard. They argued that if Class A units were needed, they should be allotted to 

the Regular Army or the National uar(~ not to the Organized Reserve Corps, 

beca use these units were augmentations to rather than essential components of 
216 

Division 

26th Infantry 

271h Infantry 

28th Infantry 

29th Infantry 

30th Infantry 

3 1 s\ Infantry 

32d Infantry 

33d Infantry 

34th Infa ntry 

35th Infantry 

36th Infantry 

37th Infantry 

38th Infantry 

39th Infantry 

40th Infantry 

4 151 In fantry 

42d Infantry 

43d Infantry 

44th Infantry 

45th Infantry 

46th Infantry 

471h Infantry 

481h Infa ntry 

49th AmlOrcd 

49th Infantry50th AmlOfcd 

51 s\ Infantry 

52d Infantry 

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

TABLE 18 

Location of Nat ional Guard Divisions 

Post- World War II 

S{lIfes 

Massachusetts 

New York 

Pennsylvania 

Maryland and Virg inia 

Tennessee and North Caro lina 

Alabama and Mississippi 

Wisconsin 

Illinois 

Iowa and Nebraska 

Kansas and Missouri 

Texas 

Ohio 

Indiana 

Arkansas and Louisiana 

California 

Washington and Oregon 

New York 

Connecticut, Rhode Islund, and Vermont 

Illinois 

Oklahoma 

Michigan 

Minnesota and North Dakota 

Georgia 

Texas 

California 

New Jersey 

Florida and South Carolina 

California 

• The 52d Infantry was redesignated the 491h Inf.1ntry in 1947. 

the immedi ate mo hili z<ltio ll fo rcc. Maj. Gen. Ray E. Po rter, director o f th e 

Spec ia l Plans Divisio n, supported the Guard 's view regarding funds and noted 

that facilities were not ava ilable for use by CI<lsS A divisions. Furthermo re, he 

believed the Organized Reserve Corps divisions would compete with Guard form<lt ions for available personncl. Porter there fore proposed reclassification of all 

Class A divisions as Class B units. Eventua lly the War Department agreed and 

made the appropriate changes.25 

Althoug h th e dispute over Cla ss A un its la sted seve ral months, the War 

Department proceeded with thc reorga ni zation 01" the Organi zed Reserve Corps 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 217 

divisions du ring the summer of 1946. That all div isions were to begin as Class C 

(officers only) units, progressing to the other categories as men and equipment 

became avai lable, undoubtedly influenced the decision. Also, the War Depa rtment wanted to take advantage of the pool of trained reserve officers and enlisted 

men from World War II. By that time Army Ground Forces had been reorganized 

as an army group headquarters that commanded six geographic armies (Map 3). 

The armies replaced the nine corps areas of the prewa r em, and the army commanders were tasked to organize and tra in both Regu lar Army and Orga ni zed 

Reserve Corps units. The plan the army commanders received called for Iwcntyfive Organized Reserve Corps divisions- the 19th, 2 1 Sl, and 22d Armored Divisions; the 15th, 84th, 98th, 99th, and 100th Airborne Divisions; and the 76th, 

77th, 79th, 81st, 83d, 85th, 87th, 89th, 90th, 9 1st, 94th, 95th, 96th, 97th, 102d, 

103d, and 104th Infan try Divisions. Dcmography served as the basic tool for 

locating the units within the army areas, as a fter World Wa r 1.26 

The twen ty-rive reserve div isions activated between September 1946 and 

November 1947 (Table /9) differed somewhat from the original troop basis. 

The First Army declined to support an airborne division, and the 98th Infantry 

Di vision replaced the 98th Airborne Di vision. A note on the troop list nevertheless indi cated that the unit was to be reorganized and redesignated as an airborne unit upon mobil ization and was to trai n as such. Afier the change, the 

Organized Rese rve Corps had fo ur airborne, th ree armored, and eighteen 

infa ntry divisions. The Second Army insisted upon the ll umber 80 fo r its airborne unit because the division was to be raised in the prewar 80th Division 's 

area, not that of the 99th. Finally, the 103d Infantry Di vision, orga nized in 

192 1 in New Mexico, Colorado, and Arizona, was moved to Iowa, Minnesota, 

South Dakota, and North Dakota in the Fifth Army area. The Seventh Army 

(la ter replaced by Third Army), allotted the 15th Airborne Division, refused 

the designation, and the adjuta nt gene ra l replaced it by eonstitllting the 108th 

Airborne Di vision, which fe ll withi n that component's list of infantry and airborne di visional numbers.27 

A major problem in fo rming divisions and other units in the Organized 

Reserve Corps was adequate hOllsing. Wh ile many National Guard units owned 

their own armories, some dating baek to the nineteenth century, the Organized 

Reserve Corp s had no fa ci lities for storin g equipment and for training. 

Although the War Department requested funds for needed faci lities, Congress 

moved slowly in response)8 

Given a smaller Organized Reserve Corps troop basis that called for infantry, 

armored, and airborne divisions, six prewar infantry divisions in that component 

were not reactivated in the reserves. The War Department deletcd the 86th, 97th, 

and 99th Infantry Di visions when other div isions took over their rec ruiting 

areas, and the Regular Army, as noted, retained the 82d and 10I st Divisions, 

whi ch had been reorganized as airborne during the wa r. The future of the 88th 

Infantry Division, still on occupation duty in italy, remained unsettled. Within the 
" 

c 

r',"-"_" A N <. ~ .. -.-.-.. -.. -. f 

, ~ 

, 

., 'r'_'" (-----,\ r:--~~r _J -------

. , r------_. , 

I - --_ 

f --r------ ;L ___________ _ 

, 

, 

, 

! ~ 

SIXTH ARMY 

FIFTI 

-'-'-.-L.:ri"""' ......... _ ./ 

"C"'\ , 

, 

, 

r-'--=': 

, 

MAl) 3 

, 

., 

'. 

, 

., 

,-"- --'- .~ 

FIELD AIU\IlES IN THE UNITED STATES 

Post-World Wn II 

o u. S . • -,dd "'my Il....Jqumm 

U. S. .,;'Id Army """'""'" 

1:15.'100.000 

-J. 

FOURTH AI 

'> 

~ FORT SAM 

~ HOU 

o 
D A 

, 

, 

.' " .. -~ '\ 

, ,. , FIRST , 

I ARMY '.' , 

(-. .~, 

\ 

Y 

\ 

\ 

CUBA 

" . < ,y;;! --
220 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

TABLE 19 

Location of Organized Reserve Corps Divisions 

Post- World War II 

DilrisiOIl A/'lI/yArea Stale~' 

131h Armored· Sixth Califomia, Oregon , nnd Arizona 

21st Armored Fifth Michigan and Illinois 

22d Armored Fourth Texas and Oklahoma 

761h Infantry First Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, 

Maine, and VCnllOnt 

77th Infantry First New York 

78th Infantry First New Jersey and Delaware 

791h Infantry Second Pennsylvania 

80th Airborne Second Maryland, Virginia, and District ofColumbiH 

81sI Infantry Third Georgia, North Carolina, and Soulh Carolina 

83d Infantry Second Ohio 

84th Airborne Fifth Indiana 

85th Infantry Fifth Illinois, Minnesota, South Dakota, and 

North Dakota 

87th Infantry Third Alabama, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Florida 

89th Infamry Fifth Kansas, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Colorado 

90th Infantry Fourth Texas 

91st Infantry Sixth Californ ia, Oregon, and Washi ngton 

94th Infantry First Massachusetts 

95th Infantry Fourth Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana 

96th Infantry Sixth Montana, Washington, Idaho, Nevada, 

and Utah 

98th In fantry First New York 

100th Airborne Second Kentucky and West Virgi nia 

I02d Infantry Fifth Missouri and Illinois 

I03d Infantry Fifth Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota, and 

Nonh Dakota 

104th Infantry Sixth Washington and Oregon 

108th Airborne Third Georgia, Florida, Nonh Carolina, 

and Alabama 

• 13th Annorcd Division rcplaced the 191h ArnlOred Division in 1947. 

Organized Reserve Corps' block of numbers fell the 92d and 93d Infa ntry 

Divisions, but they were not c lassified as a part of that component. The War 

Department, however, decided not to maintain all-black divisions or lise their traditional numbers in the postwar reorganization.29 

Two changes took place shortly after the reorganization of the reserve divisions. [n [947 the 13th Armored Division replaced the 19th in the Organized 

Reserve Corps, and the 52d Infan try Division became the 49th in the National 
AN INTERLUDE DF PEACE 221 

350111 II/jill/'ry, 881h [1/!tIllIIJ' Dil'isi()II.I'(f/'(/de.~ ill Gorizia, /(aly. 1945. 

Guard. Redcsignation of Ihe 52d coi ncided with California '5 centennial celebration. The division's home area covered the region where gold had been discovered 

in 1849, and the state requested the name change to honor the "Forty-Niners" of 

that era. The 13th replaced the 19th Armored Division, also at C<lIifornia's bidding, because or the former unit's association with the state; the 13th had served 

there during and aftcr World War 11 .30 

The War Department tentatively planned to organize the 1061h Infantry 

Division in Puerto Ri co using units from all three components. The Regular 

Army and the National Guard were to furn ish the regimental combat teams and 

the Organized Reserve Corps the combat support units. By early 1948 the combat elements had been organized, and the formation of most other units had 

been authorized, including the headquarters company of the division. The War 

Department determ ined, howeve r, that the 106th Infantry Di vision was not 

needed and never added it to the reserve troop list. The division headquarters 

company was inactivated in 1950, but most other units remained active as nondivisiona l organizations)1 

Manning reserve units proved to be a difTicult task. Ini tially the Army 

planned that the rank and file of the units would be men who had undergone un iversa lmilitary training in centers operated by Regular Army divisions. With public se ntiment opposed to unive rsal military Iraining, Congress declined to 
222 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

TABLE 20 

Divisions Designated as Training Centers, \947- 50 

Dillisioll 

3d Annorcd 

4th Infantry 

5th AmlOred 

51h Infa ntry 

9th Infantry 

10lh Infantry 

171h Airborne 

JO ist Airbomc 

Locatioll 

Fort Knox, Ky. 

Fort Ord, Calif. 

Camp Chaffee, Ark. 

Fort Jackson, S.c. 

Fort Dix. N.J. 

Fort Riley, Kans. 

Camp Pickell. Va. 

Camp Brcckinridge, Ky. 

DlIIes 

Jul y 1947- Aclivc 

Jul y I 947- Acti vc 

July 1948- Fcbruary 1950 

July I 947- April 1950 

July I 947- Active 

July I 948- Acti ve 

July J948-Junc 1949 

July 1948- May 1949 

npprove it. The reserves there rore relied upon volunteers who had prior service, 

the Reserve Offi cer Tra in ing Corps (ROTC), and personnel who had 10 compl ete 

a commitmen t aftcr serving on active duty in conj unction with the draft, whi ch 

was reenacted in 1948. That year to stimulate interest in the Organized Reserve 

Corps, Congress authorized pay for inactive duty training. With a sma ll pOri ion 

of the postwar Army dependent upon the draft, it generated few reservists for the 

National Guard and the Organ ized Reserve Corps, and those units fe ll considerably below full strengt h.32 

Although th e War Department did not lise di visions as a part of a universa l 

military training program. it decided to use divisional designations fo r replacement tra ining centers in the summer o f 1947. The 3d Armored Di vision and the 

4th, 5th, and 9th Infantry Divisions were activated and their clements reorgani zed fo r that purpose. The cad res who trained the recruits responded favorably 

to the use of di visions as a mea ns of building esprit since they wore the di visional shoulde r sleeve insignia, and the recruits were inspired by the accomplishmen ts of historic units. The Army authori zed more tra in ing centers divisiona l designations in the summer of 1948 (1(lble 20). As the trai ni ng load Ouetuated, so did the number of "div isional " tra ining centers, which stood at four 

two years later.33 

Postwar Divisional Organizations 

In reorganiz ing the postwar divisions, the Army used World War 11 tabl es of 

organization and equipmen t, but studies of combat experience that were under 

way pOrlended revisions. The U.S. European Theater of Operations established 

the Genera l Board, consisting of mally committees, to analyze the strategy, tactics, and admi nistration of theater forces. A committee headed by Brig. Gen. A. 

Franklin Kibler, fo rmerly the G- 3, 12th Army Group, examined the requirements 

ror vari olls types of divisions. A Hcr we ighing division"l strengths and weaknesses 

and considering new combinations of arms and servi ces, the committee reeom-
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 223 

mended the retention of infantry, armored, and airborne divisions. The committee 

concluded that a standard infantry division could accomplish missions Ihalmight 

require either ligh t or mountai n troops, and that therefore such special divisions 

were unnecessary. However, it also recOlllmended that the Army maintain at least 

one horse cavalry division to guanllltee that a few officers and enl isted men 

would contin ue to be tra ined as mounted troops. No other postwar study urged 

the retention of the cavalry division, and, as noted, the War Department rejected 

any large horse un its for the futu re.34 

Other General Board committees examined the requirements for each type of 

division. The committee for the infantry division surfaced many of the same 

requirements identified previollsly in the spring of 1945 and recommended a unit 

of 20,578 men. Additional men were needed in the infantry regimen t to provide 

communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, and administration, and improved 

weapons were required for cannon and antitank compani es. The committee proposed the development of a low sil houette 105-mm. self- propelled howitzer, but 

unti l its adoption the cannon company was to use a 105-mm. howitzer mounted 

on a medium tank. To arm the antitank company, the planners proposed either a 

self-propel led antitank gun or a medium tank, with most favoring the latter. Some 

committee members advocated removing the antitank company from the infantry 

regiment and adding a three-battalion tan k regiment to the division. Because of 

the size and complexity of the infantry regiment, the committee urged that its 

commander be a brigadier general.35 

Cavalry and field art illery arms were also expanded within the infantry 

division. To ensure adeq uate intell igence and counlerrecon naissance (i.e., security), a divisional cavalry squadron rep laced the troop. Because the division 

often lacked sufficient field a rtill ery, the committce recommcnded add ing a 

towed 155-mm. howitzer battalion for a total of two ISS-mill. howitzer battalions and three self-propelled lOS-111m. howitzer battalions. All fifteen artillery 

batteries were to have six pieces each)6 

Di visional combat and comba t service support a lso grew. An antiaircra ft 

artillery battalion was added fo r air defense, an engineer regiment replaced the 

battalion, and a milit ary police company supplanted the platoon. Given the 

increases in the arms and combat support elements, the div ision needed greater 

ma intenance and quartermaster resources, and the committee urged expansion of 

these units to battalions. Fi na lly, a new reinforcement battalion was suggested to 

process and forward replacements. In SU Ill, the General Board cOl11mittee preserved the division's th ree regimental combat teams used during the war, bu t 

added or enlarged units that had been organic or habitually attached and organizations to service them)7 

The committee analyzing the airborne di vision concluded it should have the 

same orga ni zation and equipment as the infa ntry division, along wit h augmentations needed to perform its airborne missions. Two sets of equipment were 

thus recommended for the division, a lightweight set fo r airborne assaults and a 
224 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

heavy set for sustained ground combat. All di visional clements were to be 

trained in parachute, gl ider, and a ir transport techniques, making all divisional 

clemen ts airborne unils)8 

The General Board's third committee on divisional organization reviewed 

the armored div ision. Examination of both the early heavy armored division 

and the lighter va riant introduced in 1943 revea led defects that had been COf -

rected by attaching units. Usin g the 1943 di vision as a base, the committee 

added a fourth 105-mm. howitzer battalion, an antia ircraft artillery batlalion, 

and a lank destroyer battalion. During combat operations these units had been 

added to the division, as was an infantry battalion or regiment, when available. 

The committee viewed the combat command as a major weakness because it 

did not have assigned units, a violation of unity of command. Furthcrmore, 

bot h types of armored divisions had only two authori zed combat commands, 

but in combat they normally had operated with th ree. To provide the third command in the heavy division, the headquarters and heudquarters company of the 

armorcd infantry regiment had been organized provisionally as a combat COmmand headquarters, and in the light division a headquartcrs and headquarters 

company of an armored group augmented the reserve command. The committee recommended that the comba t commands be replaced with three regiments, 

each made up of one tank and two armored rifle battalions, and that brigadier 

generals command the regimen ts. Upon re fl ection, thc committee omitted one 

unit previously attached to the division, the tank destroyer battalion, because of 

the wa rtime trend toward arming American tanks with high-veloc ity weapons 

capable of destroying cnemy armor, an evol ution that made the lightly armored 

tank destroyer redundant. The strength oflhe projected armored division rose to 

19,377 officers and enlisted men, nearly double thc size of light armored divisions of 1943.39 

The Army Staff received the reports from the Genera l Board and passed them 

a long to the Army Ground Forces. In September 1945 that command began 

preparing new tabl es of organization for the postwar Army, but General Devers, 

commander of Army Ground Forces, refrained frOIll making any decisions about 

divisional organization pendi ng review of the boa rd 's findings and the recommcndations of infantry and armored conferences being he ld in the spring of the 

fol lowing year. In July 1946 he finally forwarded proposals to the General Staff 

for ncw infantry and armored divisions that combined recommendations or the 

committees and of the conferences. The new tables for the infantry di vision were 

similar to those developed in 1945 when restrictions were lifted on their manning. 

The armored division retained its 1943 configurati on with augmentations to correct organizational deficiencies. Devers believed these divisions would meet the 

Army's needs for versatile, mobile, ha rd-hitting units. Despite the availability of 

the atomic bomb, the nature of ground combat had not chan ged. The infantry 

division was capable of operating in jungle, arcti c, desert , and mountain terrain or 

011 plains; the armorcd di vision remained a hi ghly mobil e unit to break through 11 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 225 

line or exploit success on Ihe battlefield. He questioned, however, the appropriate 

rank for commanders of Ihe new infan try combat teams (formerly infantry regiments) in the infantry div ision and combat commands in the armored division- a 

colonel or brigadier gcncr<l1.40 

Eisenhower sent the di visional proposals 10 senior officers, including his own 

advisory group, fo r commcnt.41 He was concerned that units were too large, possessi ng everyt hing they might need under almost any condition, vio lating the 

principles of ncx ibility and economy of force foll owed during the war. I-Ie a lso 

requested the officers' views as to whether the Army should break each division 

into three smaller units, and if so whether the infantry regiment should be 

renamed an infantry combatteam.42 

The advisory group concurred with the Army Ground Forces proposals. It did 

not believe that di visions had too many people and too much equipment; they had 

only those units habitua lly allaehed duri ng combat. The group did not fear a 

diminution of morale because the infantry regiment was to be known by another 

name. Moreover, it supported the rank of brigadier general for the commanders of 

infantry comba t teams in the infantry di vision and combat commands in the 

annored division because it was commensurate with the assigned rcsponsi bilities.43 

Among the other general officers who commented on the divisions, General 

Omar N. Brad ley, head of the Veterans Administration, wanted the staff to develop a division organization that combined aspects of both infantry and armored 

divisions. For the time being, however, he deemed the proposed units sound. Lt. 

Gens. Wa lton H. Wa lker and Oscar W. Griswol d, the Fifth and Seventh Army 

commanders, also endorsed the organiza tiona l proposals bu t disagreed on the 

ap propriate ra nk for comba t command a nd infan try combat learn leade rs. 

Eisen hower approved the div isions on 2 1 November 1946, but disapproved the 

change in general officer positions and the new name for infantry units. The following month Army Ground Forces prepared draft tables of organization for a 

17,000-man infantry division and a IS,ooO-man armored di vision.44 

In 1948, when the Department of the Army4S finally published new tables for 

the infantry division, il authorized 18,804 officers and enlisted men (Cllar' 23). The 

di vision, however, remained basica lly the same as approved by Eisenhower. The 

rati o of combat to service troops was 4 to I, and a 50 percent increase in firepower 

was atta ined by merely authorizing each fie ld artillery firi ng battery six pieces.46 

Somc changes made betwecn thc time Eisenhower approved the division and 

publication of its tables, howevcr, are noteworthy. In thc medica l service, a medical company replaced the allached medica l detac hment in each infantry regiment, and artillery, engineer, and tank ballalions fielded organic medical detachments as did the division headquarters. The medica l batta lion was to provide only 

clearing and ambulance services. Thc reconnaissance troop was redesignated as a 

reconnaissance company to eliminate the lerm "Iroop" from the Army's nomen· 

clmure except for cavalry and constabulary units. At the insistence of officers 

who nllcnded an In fan try confcrcnce in 1946 that discussed thc slntus of the arm, 

AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 227 

Army Ground Forces added a replacement company to receive and process 

incoming personnel. One unit thai did not survive the postwa r revision was headquarters, spec ial troops, beca use it was deemed un necessary. A major genera l 

continlled to command the division, and it was authorized Iwo brigadier ge nerals, 

the assistant division commander and the artillery commander. Reg imental commanders remained colonel5.47 

A controversial area that a rrected development of Ihe wbles for the infantry 

division was the postwar battlefield's greater depth and breadth, which increased 

Ihe difficulty of conducting reconnaissance and intelligence collection. Ten airplanes had been assigned to the division artillery in 1943 and an additional three 

to the infantry regiments in 1945. In 1946 Army Grou nd Forces proposed assigning aircraO to the division headquartcrs and to lank and enginccr battalions. The 

Army Staff endorscd thc additi onal planes but wanted them poolcd in one uni t, 

except for those in the division artillery. Opposition to that proposa l came from 

thc Army Air Forces, wh ic h arg ucd tha t a ll air un its came unde r their 

jurisdiction.48 The Army countered that the National Security Act of 1947 authorized it to organize, train, and cquip aviation resourccs for prompt and sustaincd 

combat incident to opcrations on land.49 Nevert he less the tables provided no aviation unit, but ten planes were assigned to the division arti llery and eight to the 

division headquarters company.so 

Thc postwar armored division (Char, 24) retained the nexible command structu re of the 1943 organization wit h three mediulll tank battal ions, th ree armored 

infantry battalions, and three 105-1111ll . howitzer battalions, along with some significant changes. Army Ground Forces made the reserve command identica l to the tvro 

existi ng combat commands, replaced the attached tank destroyer batta lion with a 

hcavy lank battalion, and added an antia ireraO artillery battalion, and a replacemcnt 

company. Para lleling the infantry division, the military police platoon was expanded to a company and the reconnaissance squadron was redesignated as a battalion. 

A ISS-111m. self-prope lled howitzer battalion was added to give the division 1110re 

general support fire, and, in the division trai ns, the quartcrmastcr supply battalion, 

climinated in 1943, was restored to transport fuel, provide bath and laundry fac il ities, and assume graves registration duties. Besides thc ficld artillery'S aircraft, ten 

pillnes werc placcd in the div ision hcadquarters company to serve division and 

combat command headquarters, the engineer battalion, and the reconnaissance battalion. The number of general ofl"icers was increased from two to three, a division 

commander and IwO combat comma nd commanders. The commanders of the 

reserve command and the division artillery remained colonel billets.5t 

Infantry and armored divisions were reorga nized between the fall of 1948 

and the end of 1949. Most divisions, however, never attained their table of organization strengths prior 10 the Korcan Wa r. Only the 1st Infantry Division in 

Germany was authorized at ful l strcngth. Strengths in ot her Regular Army divisions fell between 55 and 80 percenl. In the Nati ona l Guard the strengt h of the 

divisional elements varied. wit h some un its being cu t by individuals, by crews 

AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 229 

(th e fi eld artillery batteries had fOllr rather than six gun crews), or by companies 

(Ihe engineer battalion had three instead of fOllr line compani es and there was no 

divisional replacement company). Strengths in the Guard units ranged between 

5,000 and 10,500 men of all ranks. The divisions of Ihe Organized Reserve Corps 

rema ined either Class B or Class C units. 52 

The development or the postwar airborne division took almost two years longer 

than infantry and armored divisions. On 16 August 1946 Army Ground Forces forwarded to the General Staff an outline for an airborne division. It was an infantry 

division with the addition of a pathfinder platoon and a parachute maintenance 

company. The division had approximately 19,000 jump-qualified offi ccrs and 

enlisted men and two sets of cquipment, one for air assault and the other for sustained combat. Eisenhower rejected the proposal because the unit could not be airtransported. He directed Army Ground I-orces to prcparc an organization that could 

be llloved by existing aircra ft. Eisenhowcr also rejected the resulti ng proposa l, but a 

third idea developed by thc Organiz.1tional and Training Division of the General 

Staff won acccptance. The sta ff proposed an airborne division with two categories 

of units, organic elements that could be airliftcd and attached ground units that 

were to link up with them. To makc the unit air-transportable, the sta ff eliminated 

heavy mortars and tanks from infantry regiments and restri cted the numbcr of howitzers in fie ld artil lery batteries to four. Thc attached units included two heavy tank 

battalions, a 155-mm. howitzer battalion, a reconnaissance company, a mediulll 

maintcnance company, and a quartermaster compa ny, wh ich totaled 2,580 offi cers 

and enlisted men. Those units along with the division's organic elements, which 

numbered 16,470, made the division's size approx imately the same as the Army 

Ground Forces pro]>05..11.53 

With the proposed airborne division attempting to meet two competing needs, 

strategic mobility and tactical sustainment, the General Staff decided to test it. The 

82d Airborne Division (less one regimenta l combat team at Fort Benni ng) adopted 

the new structu re on I January 1948. After the test, Army Field Forces (AFF), the 

successor of Army Ground Forccs, recommended organizing the airborne division 

in thc smne manner lIS an infantry division. As organized for the test, the airborne 

division was not air-transportable. The Army Staff, nevertheless, still sOllght a large 

a irborne unit for stratcgic mobility. Therc fore, on 4 May 1949 the new Chie f of 

Staff, General Omar Bradley, dirccted that the attached combat elements be made 

organic to the di vision and that only 11,000 of its 17,500 men be airborne qualified. 

The Department of the Army published new tables (Chal" 25) mirroring these dec isions on I April 1950. Reorganization of Regular Army and Organized Reserve 

Corps airborne divisions followed shortly thereafter.54 

The Stale 0.( Divisional Forces 

While the Army dcvc loped and reorgan ized its postwar divisions. it con tinued to maintain and redcploy its cx isting fo rces to meet changing internationa l 
'C 

0-

« 

o 

o 

:§ 

> 

o 

" E 

~ 

1 

N 

b2 

« 

:I: 

u 
Ajilla/ parade ill Gorizi(l, be/ore 

,lie 88,h Divisioll dep(lrls, 1947; 

below, 82d Airbol'l/e Di vision 

,roops (II Ihe Nelli York Cily 

ViC/OI) 1 parade, 1946. 
232 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

situations. Wit h the ratification of the Italian peace treaty in the fall of 1947, 

the Army inactivated the 88th Infantry Division (less one infan try regiment, 

which remained in Trieste) and, as noted, wit hdrew its forces from Korea at the 

end of 1948. To make room in Japan for the 7th Infantry Di vision, the 11th 

Airborne Division, which had been stationed there since 1945, redeployed to 

Fort Campbe ll , Ken tucky, where it was reorganized with only two of its three 

regimental combat teams. The reduction of forces in Korea a lso resulted in the 

inactivation of the 6th Inf<uHry Division.55 

Four years aRer the end of World War II the number of Regular Army divisions had fallen to ten. Overseas Ihe 1st Infantry Division was scattered among 

installations in Germany, while the 1st Cavalry Division and the 7t h, 24th, and 

25th Infantry Divisions were stationed throughout Japan. In the United States the 

2d Armored Division was split between Camp (later Fort) Hood, Texas, and Fort 

Sill, Oklahoma. The 2d Infantry Di vision W,IS based at Fort Lewis, Washington; 

the 3d Infantry Division at Fort Benning, Georgia, and FOri Devens, 

Massachusetts; the II th Airborne Division (less one inactive regimental combat 

tcam) at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, 

North Ca rolina. The twen ty-five Organized Reserve Corps (lnd twellty-seven 

National Guard divisions were at various leve ls ofreadiness. 

Initially overwhelmcd by the tidal wave of demobi lization afier World War II , 

the Army had struggled to rebuild both Regular Army and reserve divisions during the late 1940s. Its ncw divisional strllctures were based on combat experiences during the war, under the assumption Ihal atomic weapons would not alter 

Ihe nature of ground combat. Units previollsly attached to divisions from higher 

headquarters during combat were made organic to divisions, which also received 

additional firepowcr. Although thc postwar divisions or the era wcre not rully prepared for combat because they were not properly manned and equipped, they 

nonetheless represe nted an unprecedented peacetime rorce in the Army of the 

United States, reflecting the new Soviet-American tensions. 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 233 

Notes 

1 Disposition Form (DF). AG F 10 Cors. USA, 22 Jut 46, sub: New Infantry and Armored 

Divisions, Appll, AO F/AG 322 Divisions. case 100. RG 337. NARA. 

2 Sparrow, /liS/VI)' of PersOllnel Ikmubi!i:aliOIl, pp. 229- 30. 

3 Willi1ll11 W. Epley, All/erica's First Cold Wa/' Army. 1945- 1950 (Arl ington. Va.: Institute of 

Land Warfare, Association orthe U.S. Anny, 1993), p. 4; Llr, AOF to CO, Second Army, ) 1 Aug 

46, slIb: Inactivation of 51h l nf,lrllry Division, 322/107 (5th InfOi\l) (31 Aug 46), and lIr, TAG [0 

U.S. Forccs. European Theater, 13 Feb 47, sub: Inactivation of Units, AOAO-[ 322 ( 13 Feb 47)-M, 

both AG Reference fi les. DAM H· HSO; lIr, TAG \0 U.S. Forces, European Theater, 6 May 46, 

sub: InaCliv(l[ion of Units, AG 322 (29 Apr 46) AO-I-E-M. 42<1 Inf Div file. and Llr. TAG 10 CinCo 

Far East. 30 Dec 46. sub: Activation, Inactivlltion. Reorgani;wtion Ilnd Redcsigll:ltion of Certain 

Units in the !'acific Theater, AG 322 (13 Dec 46) AO-I-WDGOT-M, 86th In f Div file. both 

o AMH-i'lSO; AHssioll Accomplish,'(I: Thinl Ullile(1 Slates Art")' OcCllpllliOIl 0/ GertlulI/y. 9 M(IY 

1945- 15 FC'lmlfll), 1947 (n.p., 1947), p. 23. 

4 Emest N. llannon, "U.S. Constabulary," Armore(1 C(ll'{tfry.lollnla/55 (Sell- Oct 1946): 16; 

James M. Snyder. The E!}lablislllllelll (11/(/ Opel'll/iolls of Ihe u.s. COIlswlmlary (Frankfurt, 

Gennany: Historical Sub-Section. G- 3, U.S. Constabulary, 1947), Ilil. 52- 59; Ltr, TAG to CG, U.S. 

Forces, European Theater. 17 Jun 46, sub: Reconstitution. Redesignation. Reorganization, 

Activation and Assignment of Units for Constabulary Force in Europe, AG 322 (II Jun 46) AG-I· 

GNGCT-M. 4th Am1d Oiv file. oAMH-HSO. 

5 James F. Schnabel. 1)01iC)1 (jllfl DircctiOIl: 'i11C Finl l'lmr, United St~ltes Am1y in the Korean 

War (Washington, o .c.: Government Printing Office, 1972). PI). 6- 12; LIT. TAO 10 COs, BOSlon. 

New York and olher ports ofemb.1rkation. 7 Jan 46, sub: Inactivation of Certain Anny Air. Oround 

and Scrvicc Forces Type Units, AO 322 (4 Jan 47) OB-I-SPMOU·M. 40th Inf Div file, Llr, TAG to 

CinCo Far Eas!. 24 Jan 49. sub: Inactivation of Certain Units in FECOM, AGAO-1322 (31 Dec 48) 

CSGOT (Organizalion and Training Division. General Stafl).M. 6th Inf oiv file, and AGAZ 373, 

Historical Data Cards, 6th. 7th, and 40th In f Oivs, all oAMH-IlS0; HisfOlY of lIte 7111 llIfillll/'y 

(BaYOIlCI OMS/Oil) (Tokyo. ~llllln: o ai Nippon Printing Co" 1967), 110 pagination. 

6 John I'. Delancy, The Illi,e f)CI'i1.~ ill fllIly: A /JiSIQ/)' of Ihc 88,,, II/filllfl)' Dil'isioll ill World 

"'tII'/I (Washington, D.C.: Inrantry Joumal Press, 1947), p. 275; Wright, The lsI ClIw/lry Dil'isioll 

hI /l'orM Wa/' II, p. 206: Llr, TAO to CG. Second Am1Y, 26 Sep46, sub: Reorganiz.1tion of Ihe 3d 

Inf.1ntry Di\'ision, AG 322 (20 SCI' 46) AO·I-ONGCT-M, 3d Info;v file, oAMH. HSO; George C, 

Marshall, Rem,lrks by the Sccretn ry of o efcnse nt the National Prep nr edne~s Orientation 

Conferencc, 30 Nov 50. Marshalll'apcrs. 

7 WD Bull 19, 1945: Ltr, TAG to CinC, US Army Forces, Pacific, 26 Mar 46, sub: 

Constitution, Activation, Inactivation. oisb.1ndment, Reorganization and Redesignation of Certain 

Philippine Scout Units, AG 322 (19 Mar 46) OB-I·GNGCT·M, 5th Ind. U.S, Army Forces, 

Western Pacific, 10 CinC, Anny Forces, Pacific, 20 A.ug 46. 12th Infoiv file, oAMH-HSO. 

8 Ltr, TAG to CinC. US Army Forces, I'aci lic, 26 Mur 46, sub: Constitulion, Activation, 

Inaclivation, Disbandmcnt. Reorganization and Redesignation of Certain Philippine SCOUI Units: 

Semi·Aml/wl Report; U.S. Army Forces lI'estel'll Pacific. / )ml- JO)IIII 46, p. 33: Robert R. Smith, 

"The Status of Members of the Philippine Military Forces During World War II ," Ms, PI'. 45-47, 

Refcrence Papcr files, Philippine Scouts, DAMH-I-ISO: "Philippine Scouts," MilittllJI Rel'iell' 29 

(Jul 1949): 72; Llr, TAG to CinC, Far East. 29 Apr 47, sub: Reorganization, A.ssignment and 

Inactivation of Certain Units in Ihe Far East Command, AGAO·I 322 (28 Mar 47) WOGOT-M, and 

OF, TAO to lIistorical Di\'ision, WO Specinl Sta ff, sub: Shoulder Siceve Insignia, Ph ilippineRyukyus Command, 27 Aug 47, AOAO·[ 42 1.4 (30 Apr 47), both 12th Infoiv file, oAMH·I-ISO. 

9 Joseph Rockis, "Rcorgani7A1t ion of AGF During Demobil;zulion," Demobil ization Scries, 

Study No.3 (Historical Section, Am1y Ground Forces, 1948), pp. 36-46. oAM11-HSR. 

10 Ibid.; Fir.~1 Reporl o/Ihe Sec/'CUII)' o/Ifi.jellse. 1948. pp. 60-63: Strength RejXlrts of Ihe 

A1l11Y, I Jml 1948, pp. 4- 6, 
234 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

11 Missioll AccomplMlI!d. p. 23; James M. Gavin. all 10 BCI'IiIl, p. 295; 55, WOOOT 10 ColS. 

27 Aug 46, sub: Regular AmlY Divisions to be RClaincd in the l'osllVar AnJIY, 27 Aug 46, WDGOT 

322 (26 Jlln 46), 1st Cay Div file, DJ\MII-II SO. 

12 Statetllent by the CotS. Approved WD Policies Relating to PosllVnr National Guard and 

Organized Reserve. 13 OcI4S. Reference I'UIlCT files, AmlY Reserve, DA MH-HSO: S5, WDGOT 

to ColS, sub: Regular Anny Di visions to be Retained in the I'ost\\,ar AmIY, 27 Aug 46; Memo, 

WDGOT for Assistant Deputy Cors, same suhjt'Cl, 30 Scp46, WDGDT 322 (26 Jun 46), 151 CaY 

Div file, DA MI-I-I-ISO. 

13 LIT, TAO 10 CinCo Far E.1St, 14 M3T 49, sub: Redcsigllation and Reorgani7.8 lion of the 151 

Cavalry Division, Special. AGAO-l 322 (28 Feb 49) GCSGOT·M (Genernl and Special Staffs, U.S. 

Anny, Organi"llltion lLild Trnining Division), lst Cav Div file: Ltr, TAG to CG, Armies. Zone of the 

Interior (ZI), 25 Jun 48, sub: Activation and Rcorgani ... ation ofCenain Divisions (Trnining), AGAO·I 

322 ( 18 Jun 48) CSGOT.M, 10th Mt Div file: Ltr, TAGO to TAG, 27 Jun 49. sub: Designation ofthc 

25th In fantry Division as Regular Army. AGAO-I (27 Jun 49).M, 25th InfOiv fil e; and Ltr, TAGO to 

TAG. 15 Nov 48, sub: Designation o f the 11th and 82d Airborne Divisions as Regular Anny. AGAO· 

1322 (15 Nov 48). 82d Abu Div file, all AG Reference fil es, DAMII·I·ISO. 

t4 Memo. AG F for chiefs a ll staff sections, 6 Mar 48, sub: Inter·relations between professional 

and non.professiona l person nel in the arme d forces o f a democratic state, GNGSE (AGF 

Secretariat) 300.6 (6 Mar 48). National Guard, Reference Paper files, DAM H· ]-I SO. 

15 Ibid.; Merna, Anny Service Forees for Corso 4 Aug 44. sub: Appoi ntment of Committee 

under Section 5 of the National Defense A<.;t o f 1916, as amended. Memo. OCS for G- I, G-2. G- 3, 

G-4, 0 1'0. 3 Oct 44, sub: Committee to study policies a ffecting the Officers' Rc.."SCrve Corps. the 

Organized Reserve Corps. and the Enlisted Reserve Corps, and Memo, OCS for Cors. 21 Sep 44, 

sub: Recommended War Departmcnt Policies for the Post War National Guard and Organized 

Reserve Corps, all Nat ional Guard Reference Paper fil es. DAMII· HSO. 

t6 The 1920 amendments to the National Defense Act designated the third component of the 

Army lIS the Organized Reserves, but in all post.World War 11 planning documents the tenn 

Organized Reserve Corps was used and it was offi cially adopted in 1948. Therefore. to be eonsislent with the planning documents. the tern1 Organized Reserve Corps is used hereafter. 

17 Statement, Approved WD I'olicies Re lating to Postwar Nat ional Guard and Organized 

Reserve, 13 Oct 45. 

18 Memo, W!XiCT for CotS. 2 Nov 45. sub: National Guard Troop Basis. WDGCT 320 

Troop Basis (2 Nov 45). National Guard. Reference PallCr files, DAMH· HSO; RelJOI"f o/Ihl! Cltie/ 

o/Ilte Nt/liollal GI/t/rd Ill/refill, 1946. PI' . 324- 76: Natioll lll Guard Troop Basis and Troop 

Allotments, I Sep 46, National Guard. Reference Paper liles, DAMH -HSO: L1r. See of War to W, 

G. Andrews, House of RcpfCsentatives. 13 May 46, and OF, Chief, NGB, to TAG, 26 Jun 46. sub: 

Numerica l Designat ion, 325.4-42 Div 3, AG 322 file. RG 407. NA RA: Ltr, TAG toCG. AGF. and 

Chief, NG B. 17 Sep 46. sub: Allotment of 42d Infantry Division to the National Guard, AG 322 

( 17 Sep 46) AG-I·WDSNG-M (National Guard Bureau, WD Special Staff). 42d Inf Di" file, 

DAM II·I·ISO. 

t9 RcpoI'1 o/fhe Chitioffhl! Nmiol/a/ GI/ard IllII"CUl/. 1946. pp. 11 0- 11 . 

20 Memo, NGB for Chief. BiSlorical Section. A WC, 18 Apr 46. sub: Continuity of History of 

the National Guard Units, WDNGR (National Guard Register. WO) 3 14.7 Gen.·23 (18 Apr 46), 

NGB Cir 9. 1932. and Memo, Historical Section, A WC. for Col. E. Colby. National Gu~rd Bureau. 

19 Apr 46. all National Guard, Pol icy and I' rccooence liles, DAMII·HSO. 

2t Draft agreement between the States of Gcorgia. South Carol ina, and Florida. undated. and 

Ltr. Florida National Guard (FNG) to Ch ief. NG B, 25 Feb 59. sub: Reorganization of 48th 

Amlored Division. FNG- IO. both 481h Anlltl Div file, DAMII·IISO. 

22 L1r, AGF to CGs First. Second. Founh. Fifth, Sixth. and Seventh AIll1ies and other address· 

es. 6 Jun 46, sub: Trnining and Administration of the Civilian Components. Incl I, AGF plan for 

the National Guard of the U.S .• 6 JUl1 46, 326/2 15 (6 Jun 46) GNGCT II, AGF PI. 1. RG 3 19, 

NARA; sec National Guard Fedeml Recognition Reports. 1946-47. National Guard Geneml files. 

DAM II·I·ISO: RI'/JOI"f o/"//! Chief lite of Nl/I;Oll/l1 Gill/I'd Hl/rl!(III, 1947. p. 73. 
AN INTERLUDE DF PEACE 235 

23 Repor, o/fhe Chief of the N(lIiolluf GI/Clrrl B"reml, 1947, pp. 8- 10. 

24 Statement. Approved WD Policics Relating 10 the POSllvar NO and ORC, 13 Oct 45; LIT. 

AOF 10 cas, First. Second, Fourth. Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Armies and olher addresses. 6 JUIl 

46. sub: Training and Administrat ion of the Civi lian Components, Incl 3, AOF Plan for the 

Organized Reserve Corps; Richard O. Crossland and JalllCS T. Currie, Twice the Cili:ell: II 

His/or)' of the Ullitcd Siaies Arm)' Resen·e. 1908- /983 (Washington. D.C.: Government I'rinting 

Omec, 1984), p. 86. 

25 Memo. \VDSS I' (Special Planning Division, Gcncml and Special Staffs). for AColS. 0 - 3, 

14 Mar 46. sub: Class A UllilS. Organized Reserve Corps, and Memo, WD Gell Siaff, Org:U1i zatioll 

and Training Division , ror a ll WD Agencies, 20 Dee 46, sub: Clarification or WD Pol icies 

Pertaining to the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps, WDGOT 325 (9 Oct 46), both 

Amly Reserve, Rererence Paper files, DAM H-HSO. 

26 Ltr. AGF 10 CGs, First and Second Armies, and other addresses, 6 Jun 46, sub: Training 

and Administration of Ciyilian Components, Incl 3, AGF I'lan for the Organized Reserve Corps; 

WD Cir 138, 1946; C. T. Tench, "The New Organization." II/filllll)' JOIlrl/al 59 (Jul 46): 18- 22. 

27 Ur, AGF to CGs. First and Second Annies, and other addresses, 6 Jun 46, sub: Training and 

Administrmion of Civilian Components, Incl 3. Plan for Ihe Organized Heserve Corps: see author'S 

notes lor activation dalf.:s of ORC diyisions, which arc based on unit divisional file s in DAM II-I·ISO. 

28 "Our Floundering Anny Reserve Program," Hesen 'C Officer 25 (Jul 1948): 4-6ff. 

29 AGF map showing location of division headquarters and states 10 which division have been 

allol1ed, 27 Apr 47, Anny Reserve Reference Paper files, DAMH-HSO: WD Cir 124, 1946. 

30 Ltr, TAG to CG, Sixt h Army, 8 Aug 47, sub: Inactivation and Assignment of 19th Armored 

Division and Assiglltllent and Aetivalion of 13th Armored Di yisioll, AGAO-I ]22 (31 Jul 47) 

GNGCf-M, 13th Anlld Di v file , DAM H-I-ISO; Assembly Joint Resolution No. 38 Relative to the 

perpetuation of the 13th AmlOred Division to this State, Cit. 191. 571h &ss. Cali/orllia Slale 

Legislalllre, 131h Armd Div file , DAM H-HSO: 8iellllial Heporl of Ihe Adjil/lllll Gell eral. 

Coli/omi(/. 1947- 1948. p. II. and GO 56. Adjutant General of California, 1947, reprinted in the 

report, pp. 72- 73. 

31 Llr, Michael S. Davison 10 author, 13 Feb 78: Ltr, TAG to CG. U.S. Amly Cnribbean, 25 

Mar 48, sub: Activation of Units or the Organized Reserves, AGAO-322 Org Res (8 Feb 48) 

GSCOT-M, L1r, CG, U.S. AmlY Cnribbcan to TAG, 21 Aug 50, sub: Jrmclivnlion or ORe TOE 

Units not included in the New ORC troopl'rograill. AG 326 (CG), and Ltr. TAG to CG. U.S. Amly 

Caribbean, 27 Sep 50. sub: Inactivation of Units of the Organized Reserve, AGAO-I Org Res (21 

Aug 50) G- 3- M, all l06th InfDiy liIe, AM ~I SO. 

32 Allllllal Repor' of Ille SecrCIW)' oflile Army. 1948, pp. 34-35; Joint AmlY and Air Foree 

Bull No.9. 1948 (in 1948 and 1949 the Departments oflhe Army and Air Foree jointly published 

bulletins). 

3J Llr, TAG to CGs, First. Second, Third, and Sixth Amlies, 8 Ju147, sub: Discontinuance of 

Replacement Training Centers and Activation or the 3d Annored and the 4th, 5th, and 9th Infantry 

Divisions, AGAO-I 322 (10 Jun 47), GNGCf-M, 3d Anlld Div file , DAM I·I-I·ISO: C. D. Dunlap, 

Jr .. "The Third Armored Training Division," Ar/l/ored C(lI'ally JO/l/"lwl 57 (Jul- Aug 48): 26- 29; 

Llr, TAG to CG, Annies. ZI. 25 Jun 48, sub: Acti vation and Reorgani7.l1tion of Certain Division 

(Training), AGAO- 1322 ( 18 lun 48) CSGOT-M, 3d Amw Diy liIe, DAMI·I· HSO: also sec the unit 

files of 3d and 51h Annored. the 4th. 5th. 91h, and 10th InC and the 17th and 10 Ist Abn Divs in 

DAMH-I·ISO. 

~ Genemll3omd. "Types of Divisions Postwllr Am,y," Rpl 17. U.s. Forces, ETO. 

3S General BO.1fd, "The Infantry Division." Rpt 15, U.S. Forces, ETO. 

36 [bid. 

31 Ibid. 

3H General Board, "Organization, Equipmcnt, and Tactica l Employment of the Airborne 

Division," Rpt 16, U.S. Forecs, ETO. 

39 Genera l Board. "Organization, Equipment, and Tactical Employment of Ihe Armored 

Division:' Rpt48, U.S. Forces, ETO. 
236 M ANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

40 DF,I\GF to CofS, 22 Jul 46, sub: New Ini:U1try and Armored Di visions, Apl>cndix 11 . 

41 The Chief ofSlafT's Advisory Group. established in May 1946. consisted ofscnior officers 

who advised him on matters pertaining \0 the Army's long-I'lmge program. U Gell Wade H. 

Haislip; Maj Gens Gilbert Cook (who had wrjllcn the 1935 memorandUIll to General emig ndlloeating the studies that rcsultt-d in the triangular division). Alexander D. Surles, and I-Ioward M. 

Snyder; and Elrig Gen William E. lIali made up the group. Memo. OCS for COs, AAF. AGF. ASF, 

and olher addresses, 8 May 46, oes (1946) )34 "1\," RG 165, NARA. 

42 Memo. Deors for CofS's Advisory Group. 10 SCI' 46, no subject. WDeSA 322 (6 Aug 46). 

ocs ( 1946) 334 "A," RG 165, NARA. 

43 Memo. Lt Gell Haislip \0 Deal'S, 13 Sep 46, no subjlXt, OCS ( 1946) 334 "A," RG 16S, 

NAKA, 

44 Memo, Acting Cors for Generals Stilwell, Bradley, Wlllker, Eddy, and Griswold, 24 Sep 

46. no subjlXt, Memo, Omar N, Bmdley to Gen Thomas T. I-landy, 6 Nov 46, sub: Comments on 

proposed di visional organization for Infantry and Anllored Divisions, Memo, Lt Gen Walton H. 

Walker to Gen Handy, 29 Oct 46, no subject. Ltr, Lt Gen O. W. Griswold to General 11andy. 3 Oct 

46, no subject. Memo. Maj Gen Louis A. Craig for Anny Commander. 27 Sep 46, no subjlXt, 

WDeSA 332 file, and Llr, C. 1'. I-I all 10 CG. AGF, 22 Nov 46, sub: Types of Divisions in the 

Postwar Anlly (Anllored and Infantry). WDOOT 370.01 (22 Nov 46), G- 3 (1946) 370.01, vol. 3. 

all RG 165. NARA. 

45 In 1947 Congress established the Department of Defense comprising the DeplIrtrnents of the 

AmlY. Navy, and Air Foree. The War Departmcnt was pcrpchmlcd by the Department oflhe ArIllY. 

46 TOE 7 N. Infantry Division. 1948. 

47 [bid.; Ltr. AGF 10 CGs, First. Second. Fourth. Fillh. Sixth. lind Seventh Annies and other 

addresses. 28 Feb 47, sub: Charts for New Infantry Division. 32211 01 (Divs) (28 Feb 47) GNGCT711436S, Division Gelleral file. DAMH-11S0: DA Cir 47. 1947: ''The Division Rcplacement 

Comp.1ny," 11/flm/lJ' School QlllIrlcrly 33 (Oct 48): 67- 74. 

48 Llr, AOF to Dir ofOrganizHlion and Training. WoGS. 161un 47, slIb: I-Ieadquaners and 

1-leadqulIrters Company Ncw Divisions ([nfantry and Annored). with [st. 2d. and 3d [nds. 322 

(Divs) (16 lun 47) GNGCT- 71 - S066. and Memo. Organiz.1tion and Training Division, Gencral 

StalT, for Orig Gen Benjamin F. CalTey. 31 Oct 47, sub: Liaison Aireraft in New Divisions TOEs. 

with Bolte's hand wril1cn comments, 3 Nov 47, AFG/AG 322 Divisions, case 100, RG 337, 

NAKA; Wilson B. I'owcll. "Army Ground Force During th e Demobilization I'criod," 

Demobilization Series. Study 4 (Historical Section. Army Ground Forces. undated). I). 149. 

DAMI I-IISR. 

49 Kcnneth W. Condit, The Joilll Chiefs ojSlajJ(/IId NaI;ol/ol l~olic)', 1955- 1956. voL 6. 

I-listory of the 101m Chicfs ofSta rr(Washington. D.C.: Govemrnent Printing Omce, 1992). p.n. 

50 TOE 7 N, Infantry Division. [948. 

51 Llr. AGF to CGs. Firs\, Second, Fourth. Fifth. Si;l(th. and Seventh Armies and other 

addresses, 13 Mar 47. sub: Charts for New Armorcd Division, 3221101 (Divs) ( 13 Mar 47) 

GNGCT- 71-4556, Division Generallile. DAMH-IIS0: TOE 17, Annorcd Division, 1948; lames 

L King and Melvin A. Goers. "Modem Annored Cavnlry Organiz'llion," Armored GII"lIIIyJOIIl"llal 

57 (Jul- Aug 1948): 47- S0. 

52 See AG lcllers of illstnJetioll. "Reorganization of Regular Anny Divisions. 1948- 1949," 

and "Rcorganizntion ofORC Divisions, 1949." author'S file~: also see division files. DAMH-HSO; 

"The Ncw T/O- Greater Firepower, Greatcr Strength," Nationa[ Guardsman 2 (Nov 48): 2S; 

Report of fhe Chief of fIll! NaI;ollal Gllanl BurC'lll/. 1949, pp. 3. 29, and 109: l'rogmm Review and 

Analysis Division, COml)tro)[Cr of the AmlY, TIle Tro<J{J Progmm (IIIlI Tl'Oop Li$/: 1~lIn (fl, Arm)' 

ResC'/,\'C' ESllIbfishmC'lIl, I lun SO, CM U Library, 

53 DF, \VD Dir Organization and Training. to CG AGF, 26 Aug 46. sub: Orglmization or thc 

Airbomc Division. 322 (Div) (26 Aug 46- ONGPS. AGF/AG 322 Div. Case 100, RG 337, NARA; 

oona[d T. Kcllctl and William Friedman. "Airborne On Parler Wings," I'"rt I, IlIfmlll)' JOIWIIIII 62 

(May 1948): 9- 14, Part 11 (lun 1948): 30-33; Powell. "AGF During the Demobilization Period:' p. 

ISO: Llr. AGF to CGs First. Second, Third, Founh. Fifth. and Si;l(th Amlics and other addresses, 16 
AN INTERLUDEQFPEACE 237 

Oct 47. sub: Charts for New Airbomc Division, ]221101 (1)1\'s) (16 Oct 47) GNOCT- 71- 5521. 

Division Gcncral lilc. OAM H-IIS0. 

Sol Annual History, Office, Chief of Anny Field Forces (OCAFF). I J,Ul 1949 31 Dec 1949, 

Ch. 8. Ill). 4- 6, Manuscript Collection, DAM II-IISR; TOE 71, Airborne Division. I Apr 1950: LIT. 

TAG to COs. ZI, 19 May 50. sub: Rcorgnnizlllioll of Organized Reserve Airborne Divisions. 

AOAO-I-322 (O R Res) (24 M,IT 50) G 3 lvi, UT. TAO to CO, Second ArI11Y, 14 Jun 50, sub: 

Rcorgllniz(llion of the lllh Airborne Division, AOAO-I 322 111h Abu Diy (3 1 MOlY) G- I- M, :Ind 

LIT, TAG to CO, Third Army, 12 Jun 50, sub: Reorganization orthe 82J Airborne Division. 

AOAO-I 322 82d Abn OJ,, (25 May 50) G I- M. all AG Reference files and airborne divisions 

fi les. DAM II-II SO. 

55 Ur, TAG to CG, USAF in the Mediterranean Theater of Openllions, 12 Nov 47. sub: 

In"ClivRtion of Unils. AGAO-I 322 ( 12 Nov 47)- M. Ltr. TAG 10 CG. Second Anny. 10 Mar 49, 

sub: Reorganization of the II th Airborne Division, AGAO-I 322 II th Abn Div (12 Feb 49) 

CSGOT·M. Ur. TAG 10 CinC, Far Easl, 24 Jan 49, sub: Inaclivntion ofCertnin Units in FECOM. 

AGAO-I 322 (31 Dcc 48) CSGOT·M, and Llr, TAG to Ci nC, Far E~ SI, 22 Jul 49. sub: 

Reorg,miznlion of Certain Inf:ul1ry Divisions, AGAO·I 322 (22 Ju149) M. all AG Reference files, 

and AGAZ 373 HistoriC'11 Datn Cnrds, 6th, 7th, and 88th Infantry Divisions mid I 11h Airborne 

Division. division fi les, all DAM II·II SO. 

CHAPTER 9 

The Korean War and Its Aftermath 

lib; apparellf ,ha( the Ullifell Stales is reqllired 10 iI/crease ill' mililmy strellg,h lIlIt! 

prcp(/l'ellllCSs 1101 ollly 10 dealll'ith Ihe aggressiol/ ill Korell but (I/SO (0 increase 0"1" COII/-

111011 tie/elise. willi olher/ree /la/iOIlS, against fWlher aggressioll. 

President I-larry S. Tnunanl 

In Ju ne 1950, when a Soviet trained and armed North Korean army attacked 

South Korea, the Cold War turned hot. The U.S. Army was forced to adopt emergency ex pedients during the first months of the war, but the ma intenance of a signi ficant mi li tary sustaining base aner World War II , a response to SovietAmerican tensions, allowed the nation to mobilize morc quickly and easily than 

in the past. Within a year and a ha lf the number of Army combat divisions on 

active duty went from ten to twen ty. The Army, reacting to changing politica l, 

strategic, and operational requirements worldwide, for the first time in its history 

reassessed its reserve forces during a major war. Neverthe less, the end of the 

fighting in Korea brought new reductions, whi ch resulted in fewer Army div isions by the end of the decade than during the war. 

Deployment oj Forces to Korea 

The invasion of Soulh Korea on 25 June 1950 ex posed a holl ow Army. 

Divisions in Japan we re compl e tin g a reorgani zat ion that re n ected greatly 

reduced manning and equipment levels. The 1st Cava lry Di vision and the 7th, 

24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions all lacked reconnaissance, military poli ce, 

and rcplacemcnt compani es, medi cal detac hments, and bands. Their infa ntry 

regiments were each short one battal ion and the tank company, and the 105-

mill. howit zer battalions had only two firing batt eries. Only one company or 

battery was fill ed in the tank and antillircra fl arti llery batta li ons. Tank companies we re equi pped with the M24 light tank because the Far East Command had 

fell red that heavier tanks would damage Japanese roads and bridges. The one 

exception was the 25th Infa ntry Di vision, whi ch fie lded a black regimental 

combat team buill around the 24th In fantry. In that team the infantry regiment 

and th e fi eld arti llery battalion had all their clements, but at reduced levels. The 

aut hori zed strengths of the di visions ranged between 12,500 and 13,650 01Tieel'S and enlisted men) 
240 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Although the divisions fell well below war levels, President I-larry S. Truman 

responded to the United Nations resolution to stop aggression in SOllth Korea by 

ordering troops to Korea on 30 Junc. The next day Task Force Smith, elements of 

the 24th Infantry Division, the closest to Korea at Kobura, Japan, deployed to 

Suwon, South Korea , by air. The rest of the division quickly followed by sea. 

Shortly a n er the 24th's departure. the Far East Command brought the 25th 

Infantry Di vision and the 1st Cavalry Division to some semblance of effective 

fighting strength by sl'ripping the 7th Infantry Division. By the end of Ju ly both 

divisions had joined in the rig ht, with the almost totally gu tted 7th Division 

remaining in Japan) 

As the three understrengt h div isions fought in Korea, the Army Staff set 

about to bring them to Full strength, along with the 7th Infantry Division in Japan. 

Personnel were involuntarily extended, and the length of their overseas tours was 

increased. Other commands were cannibalized for units, personnel, and equipment. Particularly scarce in the Far East Command were tanks and antia ircraft 

artillery. Because a ll the div isional tank and antiaircraft artillery battalions there 

had been reduced to a company or battery, replacement units had to corne from 

the United States. Wit h the divisions in Korea taki ng heavy casualties and the 

replacement system on the verge of bank ru ptcy, several mon ths elapsed be fore 

the units neared war levels.4 

Heavy losses and the amount of time required for units and personnel to 

reach the Orient resulted in an agreement on 15 August between the Far East 

Command and the South Korean government fo r the temporary assignment of 

Korean nationals to U.S. Army units. Under the Korean Augmentation to the 

United States Army (KATUSA) program, approximately 8,600 Koreans were to 

serve in each American division as sold iers. Various barriers- language, cul tural 

differences, in adequate train ing, and unfamilia rity wi th Army organiza tion, 

weapons, and tactics- hinde red the program from achieving its goal. A few 

months after the plan's inception, the command curtai led it because of improvements in the replacement system and the desire to concentrate on rebuilding the 

Republic of Korea Army. Although U.S. divisions continued to rece ive some 

Korean recruits, no division received the 8,600 initially envisaged.S 

With United Nations troops being overwhelmed in South Korea, General 

Douglas MacArthur, the United Nations Forces commander, requested immediate 

reinforcemen ts from the Un ited States. In July he asked for the 2£1 Infan try 

Di vision, stationed at Fort Lewis; a regimental combat team from the 82d 

Airborne Division at Fort Bragg; and some sma ller units. Army Chief of Staff 

General J. Lawton Collins refused to send a regimental combat team from the 82d 

Airborne Division, preferring to keep the division intact for other contingencies. 

Instead, he favored dispatching a team from the 11th Airborne Division at Fort 

Campbell built around the 187th Airborne Infan try. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

obtai ned Presiden t Truman's approval for the moves on 9 July, but many units in 

the Uni ted States had to be stripped to fill the 2d Di vision before it could deploy. 
THE KOREAN WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 

2d Il/filllll)1 Dil/;sioll elements II/OW! through (I 1I/0/l/lW;II I)(ISS SO/II11 of WOII}II, 

Korea, /951 . 

241 

Elements of the 2d arrived in Korea on 3 1 July, and the division entered combat 

in late August. The 187th did not arrive until Octobcr.6 

The arrival of the 2d In fantry Di vision in Korea allowed Lt. Gen. Walton 1-1 . 

Walker, command ing the Eighth Army there, to withdraw the 24th Infantry 

Division from combat aiong the Naklong River. Due to the heavy losses sustained 

by the division, Walker decided to transfer all personnel and equipment from the 

341 h Infantry and the 63d Field Artillery Battalion to ot her units in the division, 

replacing them wit h the 5th Regimental Combat Team (organized around Ihe 5th 

Infantry), which had recently arrived from Hawaii. Wi th the infusion, the division 

was ready for combat agai n by the end of August. Subsequently the 34th Infantry 

and 63d Field Artillery 8allalion returned to Japan, where they were reorga nized 

to train replacements.7 

In August 1950 MacA rt hur plan ned an amphibio us assau lt at Inchon, 

Korea, Ihat would include the 7t h Infan try Div ision, the only U.S. Army di vi· 

sion left in Japan. To replace it in his reserve, hc requested deploymc nt of the 

3d Infantry Di vision, the lasl Regu lar Army infantry division in the Un it ed 

States. After much debate in Washington, Truman sanctioned its deployment. 

Sinee a large portion of its personnel and equipment had been wit hdrawn carli· 
242 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

er to meet other demands in Korea , the 3d Di vision had fewer than 5,000 men. 

To address the personnel probl em, the division commander reassigned the personnel from one of its regimental combat teams and one general support fie ld 

artill ery battalion elsewhere in the di vision. At the same time, the Army StafT 

assigned two field artillery battalions and attached the 65th Infantry, the Puerto 

Ri ca n regiment, to the division. The 3d Infantry Di vision arrived in Japan on 15 

September, except for the 65th Infan try, which had moved directly to Korea 

from Camp Losey, Puerto Rico. In Japan the di vision rece ived a Korean augmentation and began to tra in fo r combat. As e lements of the 3d arri ved in 

Japan, elements of the 7th Infantry Division landed at Inchon. Following the 

Chin ese int erve ntion in the wa r durin g the fal l of 1950, the 3d Infantry 

Division also moved to Korea where the 65th Infantry joined it.8 

The attachment of the 65th In fantry to the 3d Infantry Division ma rked a 

dcparture in the Army's segregation policies. In the pa st nati ve Puerto Ri cans 

were assigned exclusively to Puerto Rican units. In September 195 1 the only 

units in whi ch Puerto Ri cans could serve outside the Cari bbean area were elemen ts of the 65th Regimental Combat Team in Korea. However, si nce more 

Puerto Ricans had e ntered the Army than were needed for these segregat ed 

Spanish-speaking units, the Army removed all restri ctions on the assignments of 

Puerto Ricans who spoke English.9 

The first few months of the war the Army relied on stopgap measures to fie ld 

its six undermanned divisions in Korea but was still able to evolve a strategy for 

condu ctin g the war. Under MacArthur, a strat egy of att rition wa s qui ckly 

replaced by a strategy of annihilation. When the Chinese entered the war in the 

fall of 1950 the United Nations reverted to an attrition strategy, but one which 

depended on firepower rather than manpower. No major reinforcements would be 

provided to the forces in Korea. Although limited manpower mobilization in the 

Uni ted States solved many personnel problems in the Fa r Easl Command, divisions continued to lack trained infantry and artillery troops. After the United 

Nations spring counteroffensive, which ended on 8 July 1951, negotiations began 

for an armistice, with the number of Army di visions in Korea rema in ing fixed at 

six until the summer of 1953.10 

Rebuilding the General Reserve 

To field the divisions destined for Korea, the Army stripped the Genera l 

Reserve of its resources. After the summer of 1950 its di visional units consisted 

of only the understrength 2d Armored Division, the partia lly organi zed 11th 

Airborne Di vision, and, c losest to its wartime authori zed strength, the 82d 

Airborne Division. The reserve had to be qui ckly rebuilt for other conti ngenc ies, partic ularly for Western Europe, whe re many national lcaders feared a 

major chall enge from the Soviet Uni on. In July defense officials began discllssi ng the means for enl arging the Army, but many months passed before they 
THE KOREAN WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 243 

decided upo n a program. [n the meantime, the Army ex panded piecemeal. 

Secretary of Defense Lou is Johnson approved the activation of another infantry 

division on 14 July 1950, but it was not until October that the 4th Infantry 

Division, which had been serving as a training division at Fort Ord, moved to 

ForI Benning to be reorganized as a combat unit. The Army Staff expected the 

division to be trained by the latc spring of \951.1 t 

Because it would have taken 100 much lime to organize new Regular Army 

divisions and Class B Organized Reserve Corps di visions (officers and enlisted 

cadre), the Army's leadership decided to recommend bri nging some undcrstrcngth 

Nationa l Guard divisions into federal service. On 10 August the president approved 

inducting four Guard infantry divisions. To accommodate them, the Army reactivat· 

cd four World War [I camps, and early in September the 28th (Pennsylvania), 40th 

(Cali forni a), 43d (Connecticut, Rhode [sland, and Vermont), and 45th (Ok lahoma) 

Infantry Divisions entered active federa l service. Army Field Forces and the Army 

Staff selected those units because of their geographic distribution, the status of their 

equipment, and their strength, which ranged from 8,000 to 9,500 officers and 

enlisted men each. The Army Staff immediately began working to bring the divi· 

sions up to their fuillable of organization and equipment strength. 12 

Initially individual reservists recalled to active duty filled Regular and Guard 

divisions, but to maintain them and other divisions, as well as organi ze new units, 

the Army Staff relied on volunteers and draftees who were schooled in existing or 

reactivated training cen ters. To operate the cen ters, Army Field Forces activated 

five Regular Army divisions, the 8th Infantry at Fort Jackson, South Carolina ; the 

10Ist Airborne at Camp Breckinridgc, Kentucky; the 5th Armo red at Camp 

ChatTee, Arkansas; the 6th Armored at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; and the 7th 

Armored at Camp Roberts, Ca lifornia, between August and November 1950. The 

6th Infan try Division was also reactivated to rep lace the 4th at Fort Ord.13 

The Chinese intervention in the fall of 1950 stimulated broader mobiliza· 

tion measures. After considerable debate, Presiden t Truman declared a nationa l 

emergency, which required additional military forces to meet the Soviet threat 

in Europe as we ll as to fight the wa r in Korea. The mobilization plan ca lled for 

eighteen comba t divisions to be on active duty by June 1952. To obta in the 

addition al di visio ns, the president a pproved the induction of th e Nationa l 

Gua rd's 3 1st (Alabama and Mississippi) and 47th (Min nesota a nd North 

Dakota) Infantry Divisions into federal service in January 1951. These were 

reorgan ized under reduced tables that ca lled for approximately 14,500 officers 

and enl isted men. For the eighteenth division, the Army reactivated the Regu lar 

Army's lSI Armored Division in March. This last unit improved the bala nce in 

the active force ,mlong infantry, armored, and a irborn e divisions, whic h slood 

at 2 armored, 2 ai rborne, and 14 infan try.14 

In the fall of 1951 the Joint Chie fs of Staff reevaluated the mobili zation 

program and set a new goa l of twenty·one active duty combat divisions by 31 

December 1955. FrOIll the Nationa l Guard, the 37th (Ohio) and 441h (Illinois) 
244 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

TABLE 21 

Combat Divisions on Active Duty During the Korean War 

Di"i.\";OIl COlI/pOllell1 

1st Armored Regular Army 

lsI Cavalry Regular Army 

lsI Infantry Regular Army 

2<] Allllorcd Regular Army 

2d Infantry Regular Army 

3d Infantry Rcgulnr Army 

4th Infantry Regular Army 

7th Infantry Regular Army 

11 th Airborne Regular Army 

24th Infantry Regular Army 

25 th Infantry Regular Army 

28th Infantry National Guard 

31 st Infantry National GUflrd 

37th Infantry National Guard 

40th Infantry National Guard 

43d lnr.'lt1lry • National Guard 

44th Infantry Natiol1<l1 Guard 

45th Infa ntry National Guard 

47th In fa ntry National Guard 

82<1 Airborne Regular Army 

Infantry Divisio ns were brought into federal service in early 1952, but the 

twenty-fi rst div ision was not federalized or activated because of budgetary limitations. Thus the Korean War and the Cold War mobiliza tion peaked at twenty 

div isions (Table 21).15 

Personnel po licies for manning divisions duri ng the Korean War ditTe red 

from those used in World Wars I and 11. Prior to [951 , when soldiers went overseas to fight, their tour was usually for the durntion of the war. With far-fiung 

commitments th roughout Europe and Asia, Army leaders adopted a personnel 

rotation policy during the second year of the Korean Wa r. They hoped such a system would avoid alienating the general public and maintain the morale of the soldiers themselves. To accommodate the add itional personne l needed to implement 

the rotation, the trai ni ng base was further expanded in the spring of 1951. The 5th 

Infantry Division was activated at Ind ia ntown Gap Military Reservation, 

Pennsylvania, increasing the number of training divisions to ten, the maximuill 

number during the Korean War (Tc/hle 22). General Reserve divisions were also 

tasked to train reel"uits.t6 

By April 1951 the Army was able to provide additional forces to improve the 

security of Japan, where no divisional reserve had existed since the Chi nese inter-
TH E KOREAN WA R AND ITS AFTERMATH 

TABLE 22 

245 

Regular Army Training Divisions, 1950- 56 

Divisioll 

3d Amlorcdl 

41h In fantry I 

5th Armored 

LOC(lliOI1 

Fon Knox, Ky. 

Fort Ord, Calif. 

Camp Chaffee, Ark. 

Remarks 

Reorganized as a combat 

division in 1955 

Rcorglll1izcd as a combat 

di vision in 1950 

Act ivated in 1950; inactivated 

in 1956 

Sth Infantry Indiantown Gap Activated in 195 1; 

Mil itary Reservation, Pa. inactivated in 1953 

61h Armored Fon Leonard Wood, Mo. Activated in 1950; inactivated 

6th Infantry2 Fort Ord, Calif. 

71h Annorcd Camp Roberts, Ca lif. 

81h [nfa lllry Fort Jacksoll, S.C. 

9th Infant ry' Fort Di x, N.J. 

10lh Infa ntry I Fort Riley, Kans. 

691h Infantry] Fort Dix. N.J. 

lOis! Airborne CHlllP Brccki nridgc, Ky. 

I Activ,ltcd before 1950. 

2 Replaced the 41h Inrantry Division. J Replaced the 9th Infantry Divisioll. 

in 1956 

Activated in 1950; inacti vated 

ill 1956 

Activated in 1950; inactivated 

in 1953 

Activated in 1950; reorganized 

as a combat di vision in 

1954 

Rcorgfl1lized as a combat 

division in 1954 

Reorganized as a combat 

division in 1954 

Activalcd in 1954 

Activated in 1950; inacti vated in 

1953; aclivated in 1954; 

reorganized as a combat 

division in 1956 

venlion in Ihe Korean War. The 40th and 45th Infantry Di visions moved to Japan, 

where they completed their tra ining. Congress insisted, however, that the National 

Guard divisions have an opportunity to fight, and in the winter of 195 1- 52 the 

40th and 45th Divisions replaced Ihe lSI Cavalry and 24th Infantry Di visions in 

Korea. The melhod of exchange revived a technique that had been deve loped dur· 

ing World War II. Ships Ihat carried the 40th and 45th Infantry Div isions to Korea 

brought the 1st Cavalry Division and 24th Infanlry Division back 10 Japan. The 
246 

40lh Il/fillIlIJ' Division lroo" ~ prepare 10 rep/ace the 241h Infollll), 

Division, Jail/wI}' 1952. 

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

units swapped a ll heavy equ ipment 

and suppl ies wh ile the men carried 

only their personal arms and eq uipment with them. Thus the units experienced only a limited decline in 

combat clTiciency. The two seasoned 

divisions returned to Japan to serve 

as a rescrve. Until July 1953 the 2ei, 

3d, 7th, 25th, 40th, and 45th Infantry 

Divisions carried the figh t in Korea. 

During the wan ing days of the conflict , immediately before t he 

armist ic e on 25 Ju ly. the 24th 

Infan try Division ret urned to Korea 

as a rear area force to bolste r the 

secu rity of prisoner-of-war camps.17 

In 19 52 Congress authori zed 

what were in e ffect eigh t more divi ~ 

sions for the Na t ional Guard to 

replace the units in federa l service. 

These organizations gave some areas 

of the country military forces where 

none had existed since units we re 

fede ra lized two years earlier for the Korean War. Under the new law the federal 

government could retain National Guard units (exclusive of personnel) for five 

years, but the states could organi ze replacements for the units in federal service. 

The new local units were to have the same designations as the units in federal service, with the additional identification NGUS (National Guard of th e United 

States). Furt hermore, th e legislation required thai when the Guard units in federal 

service were returned to the states, Ihey were to be consolidated with their sister 

organizations. States began organizing NGUS units in 1952, and by the end of the 

Korean War on 23 July 1953, six out of the eight Guard divisions in federal service had local counterparts. Of the remaining two, the 37th Infantry Di vision 

(NGUS) reecived federal recogn ition on 15 January 1954, but the 44th never had 

an NGUS counterpart. The governor of Il linois, as an economy move, declined 10 

organize it and requested the state's troop allotment be amended to de lete the 

44th Infantry Di vision. The division was removed from the force when it was 

released from federal service in December 1954. t8 

In addition to fighting the war in Korea in the early 1950s, the nation committed forces to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since 1947 only 

the I st Infa ntry Division had been stationed in Europe, but wit h the establishment 

of NATO President Truman announced a substantial increase in forces there. 

Between May and November 1951 the 2d Armored Division <ltld the 4th, 28th, 
T HE KOREAN WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 247 

4,,, II/filll/I)I Division le(ll'es Nell' York ell rOllle /0 Germall),. 195 J. 

and 43d Infan try Divisions joined the 1st In fant ry Division in Germany. The 

cOlllmillnenl of these forces and similar actions by the NATO partners demonstrated a new reliance on collective security to deter aggression. 19 

Organizational Trends 

During the Korean War the Army modified some aspects of its di visiona l 

organizations, but the basic triangular structures adopted during World WlIr II and 

revised in the immediate postwar period fo r infantry, "rmarcel, and airborne divisions rema ined intact. In 1952 a divisiona l ordnance battal ion replaced the ordnance company, which increased self-sufficiency in e<lch Iype of division. The 

trend in most organizations, however, was to save personnel and increase firepower. Chief of Staff Coll ins estimated that the clmnges in the infantry division 

enhanced its firepower by 68 percent compared to its World War II counterpart 

with only a 20 percent increase in personnel.20 

Firepower in the infantry regiment was increased through tl series of changes. A 

105-mm. recoilless rine found a pl,lce withi n the regime nt, as did the more powerful 3.5-inch " bazooka ," a rocket fired from a shoulder posit ion. In the first engagements of the Kore,HI War, the 2.36-ineh bazooka had proved inadequate against the 

Soviet T - 34 tanks supplied to the North Koreans. To meet the Far East Command's 

requirement for an improved antitank weapon, 3.5-inch rocket launchers were 

nlshed to the theater. On 20 Ju ly 1950 elements of the 24th Infantry Di vision used 
248 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

• 

3.5-illclt rocke/lalillcher ill (Ic/ioll agaillslllie Nor'h Korealls 

them to knock oul several Russian-built tanks, and thereafter the weapon rece ived 

wide use. Infantry lIsed new models of the Si-mlll. and 4.2-inch mortars, and the 

number of automatic ri ncs was increased in the regimcnt.2 1 

Improved aircraft technology provided a ll three types of div isions with new 

resources. The helicopter, boasting both vertica l lifl and hover capabi lity, became 

11 practical tactica l and transport asset, playing a key role in supply and medical 

evacuation in Korea. Infantry and airborne divisions were authorized sixteen traditional fixed-wing a irc raft and ten he li copters, while eac h armored division 

fi e lded eighteen aircraft and tcn he li copters. The debate agai n su rfaced as to 

whet her all divisional aviation should be located in one unit si nce they usually 

used the same airfield. No scparate aviation unit won approval, and technica lly 

the aircraf! rema ined dispcrsed to the various units throughout the divisions. 

Di visions in combat, howevcr, centralized their aircmf! under divisional av iation 

officcrs who organized provisional aviation compani es.22 

The Army madc morc signi fi cant changes in the armored division. Although 

largc armored formations were considered unsuitable fo r the rugged terrain in 

Korea, the AmlY still faced a massive Soviet armored threat in Europe. In response, 

the armored division fi elded the first new family of tanks since World War II . The 

M I 03 (T43) tank armed with a 120-mm. gun was authorized fo r the heavy tank 

batta lion. Weigh ing about sixty tons, it was the largest and 1110st powerful American 

combat vehicle adopted to datc. The new medi um tank, the M47, had an improved 

fire control system and a hi gh-velocity 90-tlllll. gun, which enhanced its letha lity, 

but it did not become available in any quantity until 1953. For the reconnaissance 
THE KOREAN WA R AND ITS AFrERM ATH 249 

All M41 light tallk (Walker Blllldog) 

desfillell jor fhe 705tll Tallk Baffalio /l. 

102d IlIfill/fly Divisioll 

squadron the tabl es provided for the 

new M4 1 light ta nk, nicknamed the 

"Wa lker Bulldog" for General Walker, 

who had been ki lled in a jeep accident 

in Korea. In all, the armored division 

fielded 343 tanks.2) 

The di visio ns de pl oyed in 

Korea, Japan, and Germany lIsually 

adopted changes short ly after they 

were announced, in con tra st to those 

in th e Un it e d Sta tes. T he la ll e r, 

exce pt fo r th e 82 d A irb o rn e 

Division, served in a training capac· 

il y, mostly providing rcpt<l cemcnts 

for the overseas forces. As not ed, 

training ce nte rs fail ed to mee t th e 

demand for repl acements, but the 

political decision to limit mobilizatio n precl uded expandi ng the ex isting traini ng centers or opening others, fo rc ing the Army to usc combat 

divisions to perro rm that runetion.24 

The Korea n War brought abollt a major social change that to uched all units 

througho ut the Army. The Army had ma intained all· black units since the Civil 

War, but military effic iency tests showed Ihal blacks rought and perrormed better 

in integrated units than in segregllted o nes. Also, post- World War II socia l aui· 

tudes increased the demand ror integrati on. In 1948 President Truman had direct· 

ed desegregation or the armed rorces, but the Army was slow, as were the other 

services, to respond. By May 195 1, however, 6 1 percent or the line in rantry com· 

pl.lllies in Korea had both white and black soldiers because little consideration 

was given 10 replacement by race. On I Ju ly or that year the Army authorized the 

new Far East commander, Generll l Malthew B. Ridgway (Truman had relieved 

MacArthur thc prev iolls April) to integ rate all units under his control, except for 

the 40t h an d 45 th Infantry Di visions. These units, which had rece ntly arri ved 

rrom the United States, were exempt rrom the order because they were National 

Gua rd organizations. The Army reared pol itical repercussions from the states if 

their units were rac ia lly mixed. Nevert he less, despite the initia l hesitation, the 

40t h and 45th were integrated shortly a fter they entered combat in Korea.25 

The Far East Command usually integrated units through normal ad lllinistra· 

live processes. For example, the 3d Baltalion, 9th Inrantry, and the 3d Batta lion, 

15th Infan try, clements orthe 2d and 3d In rantry Divisions that had been rilled 

with black soldiers. were desegregated by simply reassigni ng them. The 25 th 

Infantry Division had the 24th Infantry, the only a ll·black regiment in the Regular 
250 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Army, and Ridgway approved inactivating the regiment to disassociate all divisiona l elements with segregation. The Army StatT transferred the 14th Infantry, 

less its personnel and eq uipment , from the United Stat es to the Far East 

Command, and 011 I August 195 1 the regiment replaced the 24th in the division. 

Most of the 24th's black soldiers were dispersed throughoLlt the command, whi le 

white soldiers to fill the 14th were drawn from the 34th Infantry in Japan. Units 

in the other regional commands integrated soon thcrcaftcr.26 

Readjustment qf Divisional Forces 

Hostilities ended in Korea on 23 J uly 1953 when the United Nations and 

North Korea signed an armistice, but demobil ization, like mobil iza tion, did not 

fo llow a preplanned course . A th reat sti ll hung over Korea, and the defense of 

Western Europe remai ned of paramount concern. The size of the Army depended on the new presiden t, Dwight D. Eisenhower, inaugurated in January 1953, 

who was committed to reducing military ex penditures. Between I July 1953 

and I July 1956, the Congress, at the president 's request, cut the active Army 

from 1.5 to I million men, a reductio n tha t required major adj ustments in di visiona l forces.27 

By that time the an nual load in the training centers had stabi lized at a lower 

peacetime leve l, and the Army StafT had turned its attention to improving the 

Genera l Reserve, particularly as a reenforcement force for Europe. [n October 

[953 the staff designated the 1st Armored Division and 44t h Infantry Division as 

30-day rei nforcement un its for NATO and named the 82d Airborne Division as 

the Western Hemisphere's contingency force. To bring these and other divisions 

in the General Reserve lip to war levels, the 5th Infantry, 71h Armored, and 10 Ist 

Airborne Divisions, which had been operating training centers, were inacti vated 

and their personnel reassigned. The training center operated by the 10th Infantry 

Di vision was also closed, and a new mission was planned for the division.28 

In Decembe r 1953 Eisenhower, who had hesitated to reduce fo rces in Korea 

because of the precarious armistice, announced that two of the seven U.S. Army 

div isions there were to return home, a step permitted by improved capabilities 

of the South Korean Army. United States Army Forces, Far East, se lected the 

40th and 45th Infantry Div isions fo r return to th e Uni ted States, and they 

departed Korea in the spring of 1954 with only a token personnel compl ement. 

Short ly thereafter the divisions were re leased from active federal service and 

reverted to st ate control. Co ncern ed abou t the effects of demobili zati on because 

of events in Southeast Asi a (t he French were on the verge of withdrawing from 

th at area), Sec retary of Defe nse Charles E. Wilson sllspended further reductions in the Far East Command on 7 April 1954.29 

Although the Army could reta in Natio nal Guard designations for five years, 

Secreta ry Wilson decided to release the 28 th , 3 1st, 37th, and 43d In fantry 

Divisions 10 state control in June [954. This decision was primarily an admin is-
THE KOREAN WA R AND ITS AFrERMATH 

37/h I"Jall/IY Divisioll pa ~ses /Olh I,,!(//IIIY Divisioll ill review before leallillg 

For' Riley. 

25 1 

tralive action and did not affect Ihe actual number of combat or training divisions 

in acti ve service. In Europe the 9t h and 5th Infantry Di visions replaced the 28th 

and 43d Infantry Di visions, whil e the 8th and 10th In fantry Di visions in the 

United States replaced the 3 1 sl and 37th at Fori Ca rson and Fort Ri ley. The 69th 

In fa ntry Di vision and the 101 s1 Airborne Di vision were reactivated 10 fi JI the 

gaps le ft by the 51h and 9th in the training basc)O 

By the summer of \954 th e Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republi c of 

Korea and the ex pansion of its army to twenty di visions pe rmitt ed additiona l 

American reductions in Korea and allowed the Departmen t of Defense to release 

all reserve units from active dUly. In October the 25th Infantry Division with its 

personnel and equipment moved from Korea to Hawa ii. where it became part of 

the Pac ific area reserve. Shortly thereafter the 2d a nd 3d Infantry Divisions, 

reduced 10 near zero strength in Korea, replaced the Nationa l Guard 44th and 

47th Infan try Di visions a t Forts Lew is a nd Benni ng. The Guard di visions 

returned to stale con trol, thus ending the involvement of the reserve divisions in 

the Korean War. When those di visions leO fede ral service, only their designations 

reverted to the states si nce the guardsmen themselves had been released earli er. 

The states reorgani zed the units, except for the 44th. which Il linois did not want, 

by using the NGUS divisions as the nllclei, as planned) 1 

Aft er many revisions of the blueprints for a residual force in Korea , Ihe 

Department of Defense instructed the services 10 plan for three divisions, one 

Army, one Marine, and onc United Nations, plus combat support and combat service support units to remain there. In December 1954 Secretary Wilson decided 

that the Marine unit wou ld return to the United States, leaving two Army divisions in Korea. As a rcsult, the 241 h Infantry Division, in the midst of moving to 

Japan, reversed its course and rejoined the 7th In fant ry Division in Korca.32 
252 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

To improve the balance withi n Regular Army divisional forces after the 

Ko rea n War, Genera l Ridgway, who had become Army Chi ef of Sta ff in 1953, 

decided to rev ise the ratios among infantry, armored, and airborne units. In Ju ne 

1954 the Fou rth Army activated the 4th Armored Division, the first division to be 

eq uipped with the new M48 90-l11m. tank. Ridgway planned to organize another 

armored div ision, ra ising the Reg ular Army lola I to four, but tank production 

lagged, preventing its formation until 1955. The 3d Armored Division was then 

converted from a trai ni ng to a combat unit)3 

Although tota1 Army strength decli ned and the reserves were rel eased, the 

Army remained committed to an active force of twenty divisions. The Department 

of Defense, there fore, authorized the acti vation of the 23d and 7 1st Infa ntry 

Di visions. Those units, dubbed "Wilson Divisions" after Secretary of Defense 

Wilson, who approved their activation while cutting the strength of the Army, made 

use of ex isting regimental combat teams. The 23d Infarll"ry Division, the former 

Americal Division of World War II fame, controlled units stationed in the Canal 

Zone, Puerto Rico, and the southeastern Un ited States from its headquartcrs at Fort 

Amador, Panama Cana l Zone. The 7 1st, with its headquarters at Fort Richardson, 

Alaska, included units in Alaska and the northwestern United States. Because of 

the ir scattered divisional elements, the Army StatT labeled the div isions "static 

units," indi cating that they were not capable of early deployment.34 

With further cuts on the horizon for the Regular Army, the Army Staff had to 

economize on manpower if it was to maintain twenty divisions. A review of all di ~ 

sional tabl es of organization resulted in slightly smaller divisions. For example, 

without a change in structure, the infantry division dropped from 18,2 [2 men of all 

ranks to 17,452. In addition, the tables provided for a reduced peacetime strength 

division, with some 2,700 fewer men for each di vision in the General Reserve. 

Before its divisions were sent into combat, they wou ld, of course, need sufficient 

time and personnel to be brought to war strength as required for sustained opera~ 

tions. The lessons of Task Force Smith and the deployment of other units to Korea 

in the Slimmer of 1950 thus appeared to be already lost. General Reserve divisions 

adoptcd the new tables in the summer of 1955. In addition, because of the Army's 

severc manpower shortages divisions in Europe were also reorgani zed under the 

reduced tables that same Slimmer, and the tables were app lied to the 25th Infantry 

Division, posted at Schofield Barracks, the following ycar.35 

Besides looking at the organizational tables for possible personnel cuts, the 

Army exami ncd th e indi vidual repl acement system. T he system trad itionally 

required the Army to mainta in a large manpower overhead as a substantial ~ 

centage of its soldiers were a lways in transit. Lt. Gen. John E. Dahlquist, Chief of 

Army Field Forces, and Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, the Army StatT's Deputy 

Chi ef of Staff for Personnel (G- I), believed that a unit replacemcnt system would 

be more economical, improve esprit de corps, and provide more etTic ient units. In 

response, the Army StafT developed the GYROSCOPE program, which paired a div ~ 

sion in the Un ited States with an overseas div ision. Personne l from the paired 
TI·IE KOREAN WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 253 

divisions were to exchange places every three years. In addition, the divisions in 

the United States were to conduct basic and advanced indiv idual training. cUlling 

the trai ning base and providing each soldier with a home throughout most of his 

career. It also theoretically Illtldc it possible to replace an entire division if it were 

destroyed in a nuclear atlnck)6 

Beginning in 1955 fOllrteen divisions participated in the GYROSCOPE program 

CTable 23). To meel the changing needs of the Army, however, some deviation 

occurred during the duratio n of the program. For example, the 11 th Airborne 

Division from Fori Campbell replaced the 5th Infantry Division in Germany in 

1956, but the 5th 's new station was Fort Ord, a former training center. Severa l 

benefits resulted: the Europeml command received an airborne division, a unit it 

had wan ted for some time; the U.S. Continenta l Army Command (CONARC), 

Sllcccssor to thc Army Fic ld Forces, ga ined a post, Fort C.ltllpbell, and equipment 

to tcst a new div isiona l struct urc fo r the airborne division; and the number of 

divisions rcmaincd unchanged.37 

As the div isions rotatcd, the U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army closely 

monitored their activities and readiness to determinc the effect of the moves on 

the units. They found that divisional combat efficiency decli ned for a number of 

weeks before and after rotation, and Lt. Gen. Bruce C. Clarke, Seventh Army 

commander, recommended limiting GYROSCOPE to units sma ller than divisions. In 

1958 the last divisiona l exchange took place when the 3d Infantry Division from 

Fort Ben ning replaced the 10th In fant ry Di vision. The reafter the prog ram 

invo lved only mall ~s ze units. On I September 1959 the Army terminated 

GVROSCOI' E, foll owing the recommendati ons of General Clyde O. Edd leman, 

Commander, U.S. Army, Europe, who believed that ot her replacement systems 

worked better with less disruption. GYROSCOPE helped to susta in morale, but the 

scheme did not save money or improve combat readi ness.38 

TABLE 23 

Operation G YROSCOPE 

CONUS OCONUS 

YeaI' Divisioll S/(llioll Dillisioll 

1955 10th Infantry Fon Riley, Kans. 1st Infantry 

1956 lllh Airbome Fon Campbell, Ky. 51 h Infantryt 

1956 3d Annored Fort Knox, Ky. 4th Inf.1tllry2 

1956 2d Infantry Fon Lewis, Wash. 71st lnfan try3 

1956 81h Infantry Fort Carson, Colo. 9th Infantry 

1958 41h Armored Fon I-I ood. Tex. 2d AmlOred 

1958 3d Infantry Fan Benning, Ga. 10th Infantry 

I The 5th tnt:1nlry Di vision's ncw station was Fon Ord, California . 

2 The 41h Infiullry Di vision was rcduccd to zero slrcngth. 

Slation 

Germany 

Genllany 

Gennany 

Alaska 

Gemlany 

Genllany 

Gentlany 

) The 71st Inflmlry Division was inllctivalcd, and thc 41h Infnnlry Division replaccd it. 
254 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

With divisions in the GVROSCOPE program conducting individuallrai ning, the 

Department of the Army reduced Ihe number of training centers. By I July 1955 

only seven major training cellters remai ned, of which five were operated by divisions. The continued lise of di visional names for the centers, however, was being 

questioned. Lt. Gen. Walt er L. We ibir, the G- I, wanted to change the centers' 

names to reneet their missions more accurately. For some time the divisional designations had confused the genera l public, government officials, and the trainees. 

In th e sp rin g of 1956 th e Army thu s in ac ti vated the 61h and 69th Infantry 

Divisions and 5th and 61h Armored Divisions and reassigned the 10Ist Airborne 

Division as a test unit. Branch replacement centers replaced Ihe trai ning divisions. For example, the organization at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, became the U.S. 

AnnyTraining Center, Field Artil lcry.39 

The savings that resulted from the revised tables of org<l1li zation, modifications in the rep lacement system, and a reduction in the training base did not 

eq ual the req uired cuts in Army strength. The Army was therefore unabl e to 

maintain twenty Regular Army di visions. Further reductions req uired the commanders of United States Army, Caribbea n, and Sixth Army to inactivate the 23d 

and 7 1 st Infa ntry Divisions in 1956. Some of the ir clements, however, continued 

to serve in the active force.40 

Improving the Reserves 

The structure of the reserve components came under close scrutiny du ring the 

Korean War. By then military leaders had decided the large underman ned force of 

fifty-two divisions developed aftcr World War II waS unrealistic. On 24 October 

1950 the chief of staff directed a committee to reevaluate the reserve structure 

and develop plans to meet both limited and major mobi lizations. Six months 

latcr, before the dec ision to mobilize 20 di visions due to the Korean Wa r, the 

committee reported that the Army needed 18 divisions on active dut y- 12 

Rcgular Army and 6 National Guard- and 33 reserve divisions to back them up. 

The lattcr divisions fcll into two c<ltcgorics for mobi lization, un early ready force 

or9 divisions from the Nli tionul Guard and a late ready force of24 divisions wit h 

12 from the Guard and 12 Frolll the Organized Reserve Corps. The units in the 

Na tiona l Guard were to be maintained at 100 perce nt offi cer and 50 percent 

enl isted strength, whi le those in the Organized Reserve Corps were to have 100 

percent of their officers but only an enlisted cadre. The committee decided that 

the remaining thirteen Orga nized Reserve Corps divisions \vcre unnecessary and 

recommended their immediatc inactivation.41 

During the summer and fall of 1951 the six army comma nders in the United 

States, slaffageneies, and the Section V Committee, created aftcr World War I for 

the reserve components to have a voice in their affairs. eval uated the plan. The 

army commanders urged th at all divisions in the Organi zed Reserve Corps be 

infantry divisions because Ihey believed that the reserves cOli ld nOI adequately 

( 
TI-IE KOREAN WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 255 

su pport armored and airborne training. They thought thirteen, rather than twelve, 

reserve divisions should be maintained to provide a bellcr geographic distribution 

of the uni ts. The Section V Committee opposed the reduction of the Organized 

Reserve Corps from twenty-five to thirteen div isions because it feared unfavor-

"ble publicity, particularly with the nation at wa r. On 20 December the Vice Chief 

of Staff, General John E. l'lull, delayed reduction in the number of Reserve Corps 

divisions until 31 December 1952 but directed the reorganization and redesignalion of airborne and armored divisions as infa ntry as soo n as practicable. In 

March 1952 the 80th, 841h, 100th, and 1081h Airborne Divisions were reorganized and redesignated as infantry divisions, and the 63d, 70th, and 75th Infantry 

Divisions replaced the 13th, 2 1 st, and 22d Armored Divisions. The Army made 

no other di visional changes in the reserve troop basis at that time.42 

Along with the reorgani zation of the Organized Reserve Corps divisions, the 

Army published new regulations forma li zing a "Ready Reserve" concept. Under 

the ncw rules the Ready Rescrvc comprised Early and Late Ready Forces, categories which replaced the old Class A, B, and C ullits. The Early Ready Force 

was to have 110 percent officer and 100 percent enlisted strength, whi le the Late 

Ready Force, which incl uded all Organizcd Rcscrve Corps divisions, was to have 

100 percent officer and 5 percent enlisted strength. In July 1952 Congress passed 

new legislation that redesignated the Organized Rese rve Corps as the Army 

Reserve and gave legal status to the concept of the Ready Reserve.43 

Be fore the dust had sett led on the reforms, the Army realized that it had failed 

to improve unit manning or meet reasonable mobilization requirements. [n the fall 

or 1952 Army leaders thus proposed that the personnel rrom the thirteen inactivated 

Army Reserve di visions be assigned to strengthen the remaining twelve divisions. 

A new reserve troop basis resulted, this time ca lling ror 37 divisions, 27 in the 

Nationa l Guard and 10 in the Army Reserve. To kccp the unneeded fifteen Army 

Reserve divisions active, they \VCI'C to be reorganized as training divisions to staff 

trai ning centers upon mobiliZ<1lion or man maneuver area commands for training 

troops. The continental army commanders implementcd the new Army Reserve 

troop basis in 1955 piecemeal. They reorgan ized, without approved tables of organization, thc 70th, 76th, 78t h, 80th, 84th, 85th , 89th, 91 st, 95th, 98th, 100th, and 

108th Infantry Divisions as cadre ror rep lacement trai ning centers and organized 

the 75t h "Maneuver Area Commands" using the resources of the 75t h Infa ntry 

Division. Two years later the 75 th Infantry Division was inactivatcd along with 87th 

Infantry Division. Assets of the 87th were lIsed to organizc a maneuver area comm<lnd; thus onc unneeded division rcmai ned in the troop basis.44 

To prepare for challcnges in Westcrn Europe, the new troop basis authorized 

the conversion of fo ur Nationa l Guard infantry divisions to armored divisions. New 

York, C<llifornia, Gcorgia, and Florida agreed to convert the 27th, 40th, and 48th 

Infantry Divisions. For the fourth armored division, the Army planned to usc the 

slot temporarily occupied by the 44th Infantry Division, wh ich Illinois no longer 

wanted. Eventually Tennessee and North Ca rolina, which shared the 30th Infantry 
256 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Di vision, each agreed to maintain a division; Te nnessee orga nized Ihe 30th 

Armored Division, wh ile North Carolina organized the 30th Infantry Oivision,45 

In 1955 Congress again legislated measures to improve the reserves. Among 

the amendments to the 1952 law was a provision that al lowed young men eighteen and a half years old to enlist in the Army Reserve for eight years. Not less 

than three and not morc than six months of that obl igation was to be spent on 

active duty for basic trai ning. The law also provided that reservists who did not 

perform satisfactorily aocr basic trai ning might be ordered, without their consent, 

to active duly not to exceed forly-five days. Although the Army Reserve hoped 

these provisions would he lp to meet manning problems, Ihe measure failed. Most 

young men were uninterested in military service, and for Ihe few who were Ihe 

acti ve Army lacked the resources to provide ba sic traini ng and the Nat ional 

Gua rd proved more attractive than the Army Reserve.46 

At the beginning of 1957 the Army thus had 56 combat divisions and 12 

training di visions. Of thcse, the Regular Army fielded [8 combat divisions, many 

not fully manned; the National Guard 27; and the Army Reserve II . Of the 56 

divisions. 3 were airborne. 10 were armored, and the remainder were infantry. 

Between 1950 and 1957 Army di visions fought a war in Korea and deterred 

the Soviet challenge in Western Europe. At the hcight of the Korean War the 

active Army had eight divisions in the Far East, rive in Germany, and a sevendi vision General Reserve in the United States. Di visions retained thcir World War 

[I structure with modifications while gaini ng additional fire power. As the United 

Stllles assumed leadership of the Western democracies, a rcady fo rce, backed by 

fully manned and equipped reserves, took on added significance . Nevertheless, 

the Regular Army, Nationa[ Guard, and Army Reserve divisions all su tTered from 

a lack of personnel. After the Korean War budgetary constra ints exacerbated the 

manning conditions, while the genera l reliance of the Eisen howe r administration 

on nuclear deterrence put the fiscal emphasis on weapons systems rather than on 

the combat divisions. 
THE KOREAN WA R AND ITS AFTERMATH 

Notes 

257 

! Public Papers oflhe PrcsidCllls oflhe VIIi/eli Slates: Hany S. Tmlllllll. JalllUIIY I. 195010 

December /950 (Washington, D.C,: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 532. 

2 Llr, TAG 10 CinC, Far East, 121uI1 50. sub: Activation, Inactivation, Redesignalion, and 

Rcorganiz;lIion of Certain Units in the Far East COl11mand, AGAO-l 322 (10 Apr 50) G- I- M, 

AG Reference files. DAMH-i-ISO; Schnabel, Polic)1 alld Direc/ion, pp. 86- 87, 90- 94; Stubbs 

and Connor, Armor-em'ally, p. 77. 

J Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 80- 88. 

4 Llr, TAG to CinC, Far EaSI, 26 lui SO. sub: Reorganization of Certain Units in the Far East 

Command, AGAQ-I 322 (21 lui SO) 0 - 1 M, AG Reference files, OAMH-HSO; Elva StilllVaugh. 

"Personnel Policies in the Korean Conniet:' eh, I, pp. 32-40, Ms, DAMH-HSR. 

5 Roy E. Appleman, SOlllh 10 lire N(lktollg. Nortlr 10 the YlIllI. United States Army in the 

Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 385- 89; Charles G. 

Cleavcr, " History of the Korcan War." vol. 3, pI. 2, Personnel Problems. pp. 7- 12. Ms. DAM HHSR; David Curtis Skaggs. "The KATUSA Ellperimcnt: The Intcgration of Korean Nationals 

into the U.S. Army, 1950- 1965," Milil(ll)' Affairs 38 (Apr 1974): 53- 58. 

6 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 92-96, 168- 71. 

7 Applcman, SOlllh 10 Ihe NlIklOllg, pp. 389- 90; T.R. Fehrcnback. This Kind oIIV(I/'; A Sllidy 

ill Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 202; Llr, Henry P. Carrington to 

Edgar M. Howell, 18 Nov 50, 63d Ficld Artillery Banalion filc, DAMH-HSO; Military History 

Section, "A Brier History of thc 34th Infantry Regimcnt" (United States Amly Forccs. Far East, 

Nov 1954), 34th Infantry file, DAMH-HSO. 

8 Schnabcl, Policy amI DirecliOIl. pp_ 13 1- 34; Mall W. Dolcala, 3d II/jilllll)' lJil'io5ioil i/l 

Ko/'ea (Tokyo: Toppan Printing Co" 1953), pp. 57- 65; L1r, TAG to CGs, Third and Second 

Armies, 25 Aug 50, sub: Organization and ReorglmizlLtion of Certain Units, AGAO-I 322 (17 

Aug 50) G- l- M, Ltr, TAG 10 CinC, Far East, 6 Oct SO, sub: Changes of Certain UnilS in thc Far 

East Command, AGAO-I 322 (4 Sep SO), G- I- M, and Llr TAG to CG, Third Army, 19 Mar 5 1, 

sub: Change in Status of Certain Units, AGAO-I 322 (2 Mar 5 I) G- I- M, all 3d Inf Div file, 

DAMH-HSO. 

9 Stillwaugh, "Personncl Policies," eh. 6, I)P. 1-4. 

10 Billy C. MOSSLlHltl, Ebb (111(1 Flow. Now:mber 1950- J/lly 1951, United States Army in the 

Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Govemment Printing Officc, 1990), PI'. 237, 247, 503; Wlliter 

G. Hemles. Truce Telll {lnd Fighlillg PrOIlI, United Slll!es Army in Ihe Korean WlLr (Wllshington, 

D.C.: Governmentl'rinling Officc, 1966), p. 472. 

It Schnabel, Policy (/1/(1 Direclioll, pp. I 17- 20; Sti llwllugh. "Personnel Policies," ch. I. pp. 

9- 12; Llr, TAG to CGs, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Annies, 16 Oct 50. sub: Change in Sla!us of 

Certain Units, AGAO-I 322 (29 Aug SO), G- I- M, 4th Inf Div file , DAMH-HSO. 

12 Schnabel, Policy alld DirectiOIl, Pl'. 122- 25,294; National GUlLrd OurCllU, " Induction 

and Release or Army Nationlll Guard Units," Pl'. 21 - 24, NllIionlll Guard Induction, Korean 

War, Refercncc Papcr filcs. DAM H-I·ISO; OCAFF DilLry, "Action in Support orFECOM 3 July 

1950- 30 September 1950:' Ms, DAMH-HSR: Ltr, TAG to CGs, First. Second. Third, Fourth, 

Fifth, and Sixth Armies. 6 Sep 50, sub: Reorganizlltion of Certain Units Ca lled to Active Duty 

from Civilian Components, AGAO-I 322 Gen Res (23 Aug SO) G- I- M, AG Reference files, 

DAMH -HSO. 

t3 Crossland and Currie, Twice (I Citi:;en, pp. 96- 97; Llr, TAG to CG, Third Army, 10 Aug 

SO. sub: Activation ofthc 8th Infantry Division (Training), AGAO-[ 322 (7 Aug SO) G- I- M. 8th 

InfDiv file, GO 51. Fort Jllekson. South Carolina. 1950, Ltr. TAG to CG. Second Army, 10 Aug 

50, sub: Activation of the 10l s1 Airborne Division (Training). AGAO-I 322 (7 Aug 50) G- I- M, 

10Isl Abn Div file , Ltr, TAG to CO, Fourth Army, 2 1 Aug SO, sub: Activation of the 5th 

Armored Division, 2 1 Aug SO. /\GAO-I 322 Training Di v (I S Aug 50) G- l- M, 5th Annd Div 

file, Ur. TAG to CG. Fifth Army. 2 1 Aug SO. sub: /\etiv;lIion of the 6th Armored Division, 
258 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

1'101'10-1 322 Training Div (15 Aug 50) G- I- M, 61h Armd Div file. LIT. TAG to CG, Sillth 

Army, 10 Nov 50, sub: Activation of the 7th Armored Division, 1'101'10-1 322 ( 11 Oct 50) 

G I- M, 71h Armd Djv file. L1r, TAG to COs, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Armies, 16 Oct 50. sub: 

Change in Status of CCr1nin Units, AOAO-I 322 (29 Aug 50), 4th lnf Div file. and Divisional 

I-[istorical Data Cards, "I! DAMH-HSO. 

14 Schnabel, Pulicy (Iud Directioll. pp. 298- 300: Truman, Papers of lite President, 1950, PI), 

746- 47; "Induction and Release of Army National Guard Units," I'p. 39--41; Ll r, TAO to COs, 

Third lind Fourth Armies, 26 Apr 51. sub: Reorganization of Certain GenerJI Reserve Units. 

AGAD-l 322 Gen Res (2 Apr 5 1) G- I- M, AG Reference files, LIT, TAG to CGs. Third and 

Four!h Amlies, I Mar 51, sub: Activation of the 1st Annored Division, AGAO·I 322 (24 Feb 51) 

G- I- M, 1st AmId Div file. DAMII·HSO. 

IS Still waugh, " Personne l Policies." ch. r. PI'. 51 - 60; "Induction and Release of Army 

National Guard Units," PI'. 48 58. 

t6 Sti llwaugh, "Personnel Policies:' ch. 3, 1). I: Llr. TAG to CG. Second AmlY, 21 Fcb 51. 

sub: Activation or the 5th Infantry Division (Training). AGAO·I 322 (2 Feb 51) G- I- M, 5th Inf 

Div file, and Historical Data Card 5th Inf Div, DAMH·HSO; Rober! W. Conk1cy, Karl E. Cocke, 

D,111iel p, Griffin, "Dcmobilizntioll Following the Korean War," OCMH Study 29, pp. 7 1- 73, 

Ms, DAM I-I· HSR. 

17 Hermes, Truce Telllll/Ill Fighlillg Pi'Qllt, PI'. 202- 04. Prior to the redcployment of 24th 

Infantry Division to Korea in summer of 1953, clements of thc 1st Cavalry Di vision and 24th 

Infantry Division had scrvcd there as security forccs on a rotation basis sillce October 1952. 

t8 DA l1ul1 15, 1952; AIIII/mi Repor, of Ihe Chief of Ihe NOliollal GlI(II"cl BI/reoll. 195], PI'. 

2- 3, 1954, P, 15; see notes based on NG·AROTO (National Guard Bureau·Organization and 

Tnlining Branch) 325.4 le tt ers, 1952- 54, author's files; " Illinois Declines Allotment to 

Reorganize 44th Di vision." Arm)' Times. 9 Jan 54; " Protcsts Rip Illinois Guard; Generals Urge 

Boyle's Removal ," ' /I"IIIY Tillles, 16 Jan 54; leT, NGB to AG. 11lillois. 17 Feb 54, sub: 

Withdrawal of Federal Recognition, National Guard Units, NO·AROTO 325.4- 111, 44th Inf Div 

file. DAMH· HSO. 

t9 Truman, Papers of (I/e Pl'csidclII, 1950. p. 626; Dean Acheson, PI'CSCIII m Ihe Cremioll: 

My YCl/I'S ill lire Stale OelUlrllllell1 (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969), PI' . 437- 40; 

Historical Data Cards for the 4th, 28th, and 43c\ Inf Oi vs and the 2e1 Anll(1 Div, DAMH·HSO. 

20 TOE 7, Inr;1 ntry Di vision, 15 May 1952; TOE 17, Armored Di vision. 29 Dec 1952: TOE 

57, Airborne Division, I Jan 1952; Lloyd Nornlan, "The New Look Stmtegy," Comool Forces 

)0111'1/(/14 (Feb 1954): 15- 20. 

I t TOE 7- 1\. Infantry Regiment, 15 May 1952; "Tools for the Fighting Man: Small Arms," 

ArIIle(1 Forces T(llk ( 18 Jan 1952) pp. I- IS; Walter II. Ramsey, "The Big Bazooka: Russian 

Tanks Were No Match for Our 3.5·lnch Weapon," Onlllllllce 35 (May-Jun 195 1): 638-40. 

22 TOE 7, Infantry Division. 15 May 1952; TOE 17. Armored Di vision, 29 Dec 1952; TOE 

57, Airborne Division, I Jan 1952; James C. Smith, "Centralized Operations:' Army AI'ialioJ} 

Oige.\·( 1 (Mar 1955): 19- 25; Joseph Bonanno, "The Hclicopter in Combat," Ordn(lnce 37 (MarApr 1954 ): 868- 72; Donald F. Harrison , "A History of Army Aviation," eh. Y, PI'. 11 - 20, 

25- 27, Ms, DAMH·HSR. 

13 TOE 17, Armored Division. 29 Dec 1952: Stubbs and Connor. Armor.em·all)" [Jp. 77-

78: "Thc T43 Heavy Tank." A"nwr 63 (May- Jtlll 1954): 32- 33; "Army's Ncw M48 Medium 

Tank Ready fOT Distribution to Armor Troops," Armor 61 (May-JIm 1952): 30- 31. 

24 Llr, TAG to CinC, U.S. ArnlY. Europe. 6 Fcb 53, sub: Change in Status of Certain Units. 

AGAO·I (M) (28 Jan 53) G- 1. and Ltr, TAO to CG, U.S. Anny Forces, Far East (Main). 9 Feb 

53. s ub: Change in Status or Cerlliin Units, AGAO·I (M) 322 (4 Feb 53) G- \. bot h AG 

Refercnce files, DAMI·I· HSO; OCAFF, "Summary of Major Events and ProbJcms, FY 1953," ch. 

9,1)11 . 1- 18. 

25 DA Bull 23,1948; Morris J. MacGregor. IJllegrtJ/ion of/he ,Irlll"d Forces, PI'. 428- 59 

passim. 

26 MacGregor, IJllegl'(llioJl oflhc Al'lIIed Forces, PI). 442- 45: Bernard C. Nally and Morris J. 
THE KOREAN WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 259 

MacGregor, Blacks ill the Mili/(//")': Essell/iol f)oc lIlIlellls (Wilmingwll, Del.: Scholarly 

Resources Inc .• 1981). Pr>. 309- 11: LIT. TAG to COs, Third 1111U Fifth Armies. 9 Aug 51, sub: 

Clmngc in Status of Certain General Reserve Units, AOAO· I 322 (26 Jul 51) G- I- M, 14th Inf 

file. DAMH-HSO; "FE Racial Integration Means New Names for 2 Regiments," Ann)' Times, 4 

Aug 52. 

27 Pub/it: Papers oj tile Presidents of lite Ullitcd Siale.f. Dwight D. Eisenhower. 1954 

(Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1960), pp . 121 - 25; Coakley cl ai., 

" Demobilization," pp. 8- 9. 

28 Coakley ct aI., "Demobilization;' pp. 69- 72, 85- 87. 

29 Eisenhower, I>apers of Ihe Presidellts. 1953 , pp. 860- 61: Coakley ct aI., 

"Demobilization:' pp. 28- 29; "[nduc[ion and Release of Army Nationa[ Guard Uni ts," pp. 

2[- 24. In 1952 Gener<ll Mark W. Clark reorganized the Far East Command as a unified command with U.S. Army Forces. Far East, as the Army's clement. 

30 Llr, TAG to CinC, U.S. Anny, Europe, <lnd CG, First Army, 7 Apr 54, sub: Change in 

Status of Certai n Di visions, AGAO-[ (M) 322 (2 Apr 54) G- I, 9th [nfDiv file, L[r, TAG to CGs, 

Third <llId Fifth Armies, 27 Apr 54, SlIb: Change in Statns of Ceria in Di visions, AGAO-I (M) 322 

(22 Apr 54) 0 - 1, 8th Inf Di v file, Llr, TAG to CG, Fifth Army, 27 Apr 54, sub: Reorga niz'lIion 

of the 10th Inf:m[ry Division, AGAO-I (M) 322 (22 Apr 54) G- I, 10lh [nfDiv fire, Llr. TAG 10 

CG. First Army, 23 Apr 54, sub: Activalion of the 69th Inl;1ntry Division (Training), AGAO-[ 

(M) 322 (22 Apr 54) G- I, 69th Inf Di v fi le, aud Historical Data Cards for the 5th. 8th. 9th, 28th. 

31st, 43d, and 69th Inf Divs and Ihe 101s[ Abn Div, all DAMH-HSO. 

31 Semiallilal Report uf tile Secretar), of Defellse, 1954. pp. 56- 57; Coakley ct aI., 

"Demobilization." pp. 39-43; Llr, TAG to CG, Sixth Army, 27 Scp 54, sub: Reorgan ization or 

the 2d Infantry Division. AGAO-I (M) 322 (16 Scp 54) G- I, 2d In f Di v file, and Llr. TAG 10 

CG, Third Army, 27 OCI 54, sub: Reorganization of the 3d Inf~ntry Division. AGAO-I (M) 322 

(19 Oct 54) G- I, 3d Inf Div rile, both DAM H-HSO; "Schofield Ready to Welcome 25th 

Division," Arm)' Tillle~', 18 Sep 54; '"Induelion and Release of Army Nationa l Guard Units," pp. 

48- 58: Repol'l of the Clliefof/lle Natiol/al GII(/rd Bllreml. 1955, pp. 14- 15. 

J2 Coakley el aI., '"Dcmobilization," Pl'. 29- 38. 

33 Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 1954, OCAFF, eh. 14, pp. 1-4; Llr. TAG to 

CG, Founh Army, 28 M~y 54, sub: Activation of the 41h Armoreel Division, AGAO-l (M) 322 

(26 May 54) G- I, 4th Armd Di v file, and Ltr. TAG 10 CGs, Second Army and Continental Army 

Command (CONARC). 9 Mar 55. sub: Change in St.I!US of 3d Armored Division, AGAO-I (M) 

322 3d Armd Div (8 Mar 55) G- I, 3d Armd Di \' file, both DAMH-HSO: "4th Armored 

Reactivated al Ft. l'lood," Arlll)' Tillles, 26 Jun 54; "4th Armel Build-Up Underway," Army Tillies. 

3 Jul 54; Will iam R. Rock. 3d Arlllvred 1Ji\'isiol! (Spear/teml). II HistO/')1 vf Ihe 3d Ilrllloret/ 

Dil1isioll (Darmst:ldt, Germany: Stars and Stripes, 1957). pp. 45-46. 

34 Llr. TAG 10 CGs, U.S. Army, Caribbean, and Third Army, 2 Dec 54, sub: Organization 

of the 23d Infantry Division. AGAO-I (M) 322 ( 17 Nov 54) G- , 23d InfDiv file, and Ltr, CGs, 

U.S. Army, Alaskn, and Sixth Army, 27 Oct 54. sub: Organization of Ihe 71st Infantry Division, 

AGAO-I (M) 322 71 st Inf Di v ( 12 Oct 54) G- 1. 71 sl Inf Div file. bOlh DA M I-I-I-I SO: Sell/iall/wal 

Repol"I of the SeCl'e/tIIJ' of tile Arllly. I Jld- Dec 54, p. 20: "Scallcred fro111 Hcre [0 Yon, Two 

' Wilson Divisions' Formed," tll"l/lY Times, 20 Nov 54, 

35 Coakley et aI., '"Delllobi liz,ltion," pp. 88- 89; TOE 7R, Infantry Division. 1955; TOE 

l7R, An110red Division, 1955: TOE 57, Airborne Division. 1955: Ltr. TAG to CGs, CONARC, 

and Second and Four1h Armies, 23 May 55. sub: Reorganization of lsI. 3d, and 4th Armored 

Divisions, AGAO-I (M) 322 (18 May 55) G- I, Llr, TAG to CGs, CON ARC, and Third. Fifth, 

nnd Sixth Armies. 23 May 55. sub: Rcorg;mizUlion of Certain Infantry Divisions, AGAO-I (M) 

322 ( 19 May 55) G- 1. Llr. TAG to CGs. CON ARC, lllld Third Army. I Aug 55. sub: 

Reorganizat ion of the 11th Airborne Division, AGAO-I (M) 322 (20 lui 55) G- 1. Llr. TAG 10 

CGs, CONA RC and Third AmlY, 26 May 1955. sub: Reorganizalion of 82d Airborne Division, 

AGAO-I (M) 322 (24 May 55) G- I, Ltr, TAG to CinC, U.s. Army, Europe. 9 Sep 55, sub: 

Confirmation of Reorganization of Cerlain Units, AGAO-O (M) 322 ( 16 Aug 55) G- I, and Llr, 
260 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

TAG to CG, U.S. AmlY, Pacific. 5 Mar 56, sub: Change in Status of Certain Units, AGAO-O322 (27 Feb 56) DCSI'ER (Deputy Chie f of Sta rr for Personnel), all AG Reference liIes. DAMH· 

I-ISO; Historical Data Cards for di visions. DAM II-I-ISO. 

36 Memo for Record. sub: Unit Rotation Plan , 23 Feb 54, and lIr. John E. Dahlquist 10 

Malthcw 11. Ridgway, 7 Apr 54, Records orlhe Army Staff, G 1, 2 10.2 1 Feb- Mar 54, RO 319, 

NA RA ; "World-wide Unit Rotation," Arm)' Comblll Forces JOIII'I/(/i 5 (Nov 1954): 37; Robert N. 

Young. "Operation G VROSCOI'I:, Rotation Plus Stabili ty," Army Ill/o/'/llu/io/l Dige.w 10 (Mar 

1955): 2- 6; Historical Division. U.S. Army Europe (USA REUR), Operlllioll Gl'ROS<"OPE ill the 

US Arm)' Ellrope. 1957, pp. I 2 (Secret. material used unclassified), DAM I-I-HSR. 

J7 Historical Section, USA REU R, O,Je/"m;oll GYROSCOI't: il/ Ihe US ArlllY Ellrope, pp. 26-

40; SS, G- I fo r Cof'S, sub: Training Center Desig nations, Tab A, 15 Dec 55, I S 323.3, 

Division General file, DAMI-I·I-ISQ. 

38 1·listorical Section, USAREUR, "The Replacemcnt and Augmentat ion Systcm in EurollC 

(1945- 1963)," pp. 47-48, Ms, DAM I-I-I-ISR. 

39 Coakley et aL, "Demobilization," pp. 72- 80; U,S. Congrcss. Sellate, Elel'ellih Repori of 

Ihe PreW/lwlncss SubcOlllll1ilfeC of Ihe COlllmilfee 011 AnI/cd Sen 'ices of Ihe Unilell Stales SCl/rIIC 

IlIIdc /·/he AUI//Oril), ofS.Re,I'. 18, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., Apr 195 1; SS, G- I for Cof'S, s ub: 

Training Center Designations, 15 Dec 55, SS, DCS PER fo r Cof'S, same snbject, 27 Jan 56. 

DeSPER S 323. and DOD News Release No. 152- 56. s ub : Army to Stop Using Di vision 

Designations to Identify Training Divisions, 23 Feb 56, all Division General file , DAM I·I-I-ISO; 

also see unit files of the 10 Ist Abn, 6th and 9th InC and 5th and 6th Armd Divs, DAM H-HSO. 

40 Lt r, TAG to CG, U.S. AmlY, Caribbean, I Mar 56, sub: Change in Status of Cerlain 

Units, AGAO·O (M) 322 ( 10 Feb 56) DCS PER, 23d Inf Di v liIe , and Ltr, TAG to CGs. 

CONA RC and Sixth ArIlIY, 6 Sep 56, s.1me subject, AGAO-O 322 (9 Aug 56) DCSPER, 7 1st Inf 

Div file . DAM H-HSO. 

4t Memo, G- I for G- 3, 24 Oct 50, sub: Development of Army's I'osit ion in a Complete 

Review of Civilian Components Structure, G- I 326 (24 Oct 50), and SS, G- 3 for Col'S, 5 Apr 

5 1, s ub : Deve lo pment o f Army Position in a Compl ete ReviclV of Civi lian Compone nts 

Structure, G- 3 326 (24 Oct 50), both ArlllY Reserve filc, DAM H-HSO. 

42 SS, G- 3 for Cof'S, 18 Dec 5 1, sub: Implementation of the Approved Outline Plan. Aflny 

Reserve Forces, 326 (5 Dec 5 1), Army Reservc Forces Confercncc, Dcpanmem of the AmlY, 

Army Field Forces, Contine nta l Arm ies, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 5- 9 Nov 1951. Memo for 

R\.'Conl, OCof'S. 20 Dc<: 5 1, sub: Implementation of the Army Rescrve Force Reser\'c Divisional 

Reorganizatio n, GS 326 ( 19 No\' 51), and DA Army Rcserve Forces Program Summary, I Mar 

52, all Anny Reserve Re ference fi les, LtT, TAG to CG, Second Army, 18 ApT 52, sub: Change in 

Status of Certain Amly ReseTve Divisions, AGAO-I 322 Army Res (6 Mar 52) G- 3- M, LtT, 

TAG to CG, Third Army, 23 Feb 52, same subject, AGAO·I 322 Army Res (28 Jan 52). Ltr, 

TAG to CG, Fourth Amty, 21 Feb 52. same subject, AGAO-I 322 Army Res (30 lan 52) G- 3- M, 

Ltr, TAG to CG, FiOh Army, 13 Feb 52. samc subject. AGAO-I 326 (25 Jan 52) G- 3- M. Ltr. 

TAG to CG, Sixth Anny, 22 Feb 52. same subject. AGAO-I 322 Army Res (29 Jan 52), all AG 

Reference fil es, and Histori cal DatH Cards, Army Reserve di visions, all DAM H· HSO. The 

Section Five Committee, established in 1920, was the vehicle for reserve officers to provide 

input noout reserve affairs. 

4lAR 140-305, 1 Feb 1952: DA Bull 7, 1952. 

44 Karl Cocke, "The Reserve Compo nents," OCM H Study 130. pp. V- 38-49, VI- I-45 passim, Ms, DAMH·RAD: "General SlaffSludy Leading to the PreparJtion of Rescrve Components 

Mobiliz.1tion Preparedness Objectives Plan L" I Jul 53. DAM II-HSR: Lu. TAG to CG, First 

Army, 15 Mar 55, sub: Dcsignation and Organization of Cenain Divisions or the Army Reserve, 

AGAO· I (M) 322(2 1 Feb 55) Army Res, Ltr, TAG to CG, Secolld Army. 19 May 55, same subject. AGAO·I (M) 322 Army Res (21 r.,·ll,r 55) Amly Res. Lt r, TAG to CG, Third Army, 15 Feb 

55. sub: Designation and Organiz,uion of 108th Infa ntry Di vision (Repl,lceme nt Traini ng), 

AGAO-l (M) 322 (9 Feb 55) Army Res. Ltr, TAG to Fourth Army, 25 lan 55, sub: DeSignation 

and Organization of the 95th lnl:1ntry Division, AGAO-I (M) 322 95 th InfDiv (1 8 Jan 55) Army 
THE KOREAN WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 261 

Res. and LIT, TAG 10 CO. Fiflh Army. 23 May 55. sub: Designation and Qrganiz,Llion ofCcrlain 

Divisions of Ihe Army Reserve, AGAO-J (M) 322 Army Res (II May 55) Army Res, all AG 

Reference /lie, DAMI I-II SO; GO 152. Sixth Army, 1955; Llr, TAG 10 CO. Fourth Army, 11 Mllr 

55, sub: Ch'lIlgc in SIal us of Certain Army Reserve Units, AGAO-l (M) 322 Army Res (17 Feb 

55) RES, and LIT, TAG 10 CGs, CONARC. and Third ,1Ild Fourth Armies, 10 Jan 57, sub: 

Change in Status of Certain Units orlhe Army Reserve, bOlh AG Reference files, DAMI-I-I-ISO. 

45 Uf, NO B \0 AG. Cillifornia. IS JUI1 54, sub: Organization. Conversion, Rcorgani7.:lIion. 

and Redesign,llion of National Guard Units (40th il'i.~ion), NO·AROTO 325.4-Calif (4 Jun 54), 

401h lnf Oil' file. Ur. NGI3 10 ColS. Div of Militllry llnd N(n'al AlTllirs, New York. 15 Dec 54. 

sub: Organization. Reorganization. Conversion. and RcdesigrHllion, Naliolllli Guard Unils of the 

27th Infantry Division to be the 27th AmlOfed Division. NO·AROTO 325.4-NY (13 Dee 54). 

27th Inf Bde file , Ltr, NGBto AG. Georgia. 17 Oel 55. sub: Allotllleni. Conversion. 

Redesignation. Organization. Reorgllnizlliion and Withdrawal of Federal Recognition. Army 

Naliona l Guard UniiS. NG-AROTO 325.4 (30 SCI) 55) GA, GA NG file, L1r, NG O to AG, 

Florida. 17 Oct 55. sub: Allolment. Conl'ersion, RedesigrHllion. Orgnniz,Llion, Reorgnnizntion 

and Withdrawal of Federnl Recognilion, Army N;Ltional Guard Units. NG-AROTO 325.4-Fla. FL 

NG file. Lif, NGB 10 AG, Tennessee, 20 Oct 54. sub: Nation al Olwrd Troop AIlOlment 

(Tennessee), 20 Oct 54, NO-ARaTa 325.4·Tenn, TN NG rile. and GO 33, North Carolina 

National Guard. 18 OCI 54, NC state file. DAMII-I-ISO; RepQI"/ of Ihe Chief Ntlliol/a/ Guard 

B"reall, 1955.1'. 15.and 1956,1'. 21. 

46 DA Bull 12, 1955; Crossland and Currie, Twice Ihl' CilizC!lI, Pl'. 120- 27. 

CHAPTER 10 

The Search for Atomic 

Age Divisions 

Since we call1lOI equal 01/1" po/ellfial el/emies 011 a IIIWI jo/' 111(111 basis. we mils/ gilre 

01/1' soldiers fhe means of increasing their ejJeclil'e firepower and we IIIIISI create (III 

organization fO cOlI/l"ol il. 

Col. Stanley N. Lonning] 

After the Korean War the Eisenhower admin istration adopted a military posture that emphasized nuclear capability through air power rather than ground 

combat. Three considerations dictated this change: limited resources, a worldwide commitment to conta in communism, and the desire to reduce defense 

spending. Given the declining number of ground combat troops, the Army fielded 

fewer divisions, but because the possibility of nuclear war remained, Army leaders wanted to devise units that could fight and survive on a nuclear as well as on 

a conventional battlefield. The divisions developed by the Army for the two combat environments we re sma ll er tha n in Ihe pasl, and they we re authorized 

weapons and equipment still under development and not yet in the inventory. The 

newly designed divisions, however, staked out a role for the Army on the atomic 

battlefield, which justified appea ls for funds to develop new weapons. 

Exploring Alternative Divisions 

Some Army planners thought a general war would be too costly to wage by 

conventional mea ns because the Communist bloc could field more men and 

resources than the Un ited States and its allies. Firepower appeared 10 bc the 

answcr for overcoming the enemy. Evcr sincc the United States dropped the first 

atomic bomb in 1945, American military planners had pondered the use of 

nuclear weapons on the battlefield. The Army, however, was hampered in its 

effort to understand the effects of tactica l lluclear wea pons by the lack of data. 

Studies suggested that nuclear weapons eould be used much li ke conventional 

artillery. To achieve Ihe aim of increased firepower with decreased manpower, the 

Army began to take a closer look at that proposition in the early 1950s.2 

As had happened between World Wars I and II, the new divisional studies 

began with the infantry regiment. Army Field Forces initiated the studies in 1952, 
264 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

when it asked the Infantr y School to examine both infantry and airborne infantry 

regiments. FOllr goals were to guide the effort: e limination of non fighters; expansion and more efTective use of firepower; simplification and improved organization and con trol; and a reduction in the size of the regiment. Army Field Forces 

dropped the last goal when it decided austerity should begin in service and support units before being applied to infantry and a irborne infantry regiments. Both 

regiments were to be ali ke except for the number of antitank weapons) 

The infantry regimen t recommended by the Infantry School consisted o f 

three rine bHltalions, a headquarters and headquarters company, a service company, an antitan k company, and a weapo ns company a rmed wit h .50-caliber 

machine gu ns. Removed from the regiment were the medical, heavy mortar, and 

tank comptlni es. Assets of the tank company were transferred to the division and 

those of the heavy mortar company to the div ision artillery; instead of the medical company, medical personnel were assigned directly to the infantry batta lions. 

The study proposcd mergi ng the heavy weapons company of each infantry ballalion with the battalion headquarters company, except for the heavy .50-caliber 

mach ine gun s, which were to be integrated into each batta lion'S three rine companies. Additional automatic rines were placed in the battalions, and more communication personnel were assigned throughout the regiment.4 

Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, COlllmandant of the Infantry School, had many 

reservations about the proposed changes and believed that thorough fi eld testing 

was needed to evaluate thelll. As a result, an underequipped and understrength 

325th Infantry, an clement of the 82d Airborne Division, began testing the organiz.ltion in May 1953 and completed the eva luation in September. The results indicated that the proposed regimental organization was less effective than the one 

then being used in Korea.S 

In the meantime, the Tactical Department of the Infantry School had also 

begun work on a new type of infantry division. The redesign effort also sought 10 

e liminate nonfighters and to increase fire l>ower as well as to simplify the organiz.lti on and improve control at the divisional level by using task force organizations similar to those in the armored division. A fixed organization such as an 

infantry regiment, the studi es noted, forced the comma nder to ba se his operational plans on the organi zation rather than on the mission. Task force structures 

would permit him to organize his fo rces to accomp lish a broader vuriely of missions. The di vision that evolved consisted of three brigade headquarters, nine 

infantry battal ions, two armored batta lions, division arti ll ery, and combat and 

combat service su pport. The brigade headquarters elements had no permanently 

assigned combat or support units. No reduction resulted in the size of the di vision, which totaled 18,762 officers and enlisted men.6 

In April 1954 Army Chi ef of Staff Ridgway shined the emphasis of div isional studi es. Under pressure from the Defense Department for sma ll er units, he 

noted that divisions had increased firepower and capabiliti es but were larger and 

less mobil e than their World War II counterparts. The possibility ex isted, he 
THE SEARCH FOR ATOM IC AGE DIVISIONS 265 

L.;;..oIlI _ _ _ ~ 

Gel/eral Ridgway 

believed, to make divisions more 

mobile, morc fl exible, and less vulnerable to atomic attack. To achieve 

such goa ls he directed Army Field 

Forces to exp lore the fol low ing 

seven objectives: ( I) greater combat 

manpower ratios; (2) greater combat 

to support uni t ratios; (3) greate r 

nex ibi lily and g reater mobi li ty in 

combat units; (4) maximum use of 

techno logical improvements; (5) 

improvements in the Army's capability to sustain land combat; (6) development of tactica l doc trine to support the changes; and (7) reorganization of the un its by I January [956.7 

Alt hough Army Fiel d Forces 

became the executive agent for the 

study, the Command and Ge ne ral 

Staff College at Fort Leavenworth 

did much of the work required to meet the tight sched ule. The study centercd 

on infantry and armored divisions bec<lllse of the simi larity bctween infantry 

and airborne divisions. Changes in the infa ntry division would automatically 

apply to major aspects of the a irborne division. By the fall of 1954 Army Fie ld 

Forces had developed the Atomic Field Army, or "ATFA- l," which it believed 

could be organized in 1956.8 

Under ATFA- l infantry and armored divisions were as similar as possible 

(CharI 26). The infantry division included a separate headquarters battalion; signal, engineer, and tank battalions; seven infantry batl<llions; division arti llery; and 

a support command. Withi n the di vision headquarters battalion were aviation and 

reconnaissance companies, and with ill its headquarters and service company were 

three combat command headquarters along with the divisional staff. One 4.2-inch 

mortar and two I05-rnm. howitzer battalions made lip the division artillery. The 

su pport command, a ncw orga nization, comprised a battalion, which included 

medical, maintenance, supply and transport, and personnel service companies. 

Divisional elements lost all administrative Functions except those needed to maintain un it efficiency. Personnel for administration, mess, and maintenance functions 

were concentrated in batta lion headquarters companies throughout. All staffs were 

mi nimal; the divisional G- I and G-4 func tions were reduced to policy, planning, 

and coordina ting activities. Routine administrative and logistical matters were 

moved to the support command. Infantry divisions, similar to armored divisions, 

were to use task force organ izations as sit uatio ns required. Combat command 

headquarters, the combat arms batta li ons, and the support units were the building 
CHART 26-Atomic Field Army Lnfantry Division, 30 Sep

INFANTRY DIVISION 

13.542 

I 

I D'VHQSBN_I 

1 

SIG BN 

-I 1 TANK BN 9O-mm 

I 670 617 611 

lNfBN I DIV ARTILLERY J I SUPPORT 

1,01998 L 2,539 1,323 

I HH&SVCO I I HHB I --1 

I 363 I I 128 I 

I I COMBAT 

m 

I lQ5-mm fA BN n -1 M

COMMAND 81ge8 

J RECON CO I JU'MORTARBNI -1 MA

I 151 I I '4<1 I 

I AVIATION CD I I MEODET I -1 SU

140 33 TR

J MEDICAL DET I ---1 PER

L 16 I 
THE SEARCH FOR ATOM IC AGE DIVISIONS 267 

blocks. The strength of the di vision stood at approximately \ 3,500 officers and 

enlisted men, a cut of nearly 4,000 from the 1953 division.9 

The armored division (CharI 27) retained its task force structure. It consisted of 

hClIdquarlcrs, signal, engineer, and reconnaissance battalions; three mediulll and 

three heavy lank battalions; three armored infantry battalions; division artillery; and 

a support command. The headquarters batta lion was the same as in the infantry 

division except for the reconnaissance unit, which was ,\ separate battalion. The 

artillery was also similar to that in the infantry division, but Ihe lOS-mill. howitzers 

were sclf-prol>e llcd rather than towed. A maintenance 1>.111<11ion and a supply and 

transport battalion were assigned to the support command, but the division had no 

separate medical or personnel service units, those functions being integrated into 

the support battalion. The strength of the division was approximately 12,000 ofTi· 

cers and enlisted men, a drop of almost 2,700 soldiers. 10 

Wi thin both divisions the designers of the Atomi c Field Army- I introduced 

some sign ificant changes. Al l aircraft were gathered into an aviation company in 

the headquarters battalion. The signa l battalion, rather tha n maintaini ng communications along various axes, provided a grid system that encompassed the en tire 

division area. New FM (frequency modu lation) radios permitted that change. 

Antiaircraft gu ns were placed in the field arti ll ery battalions, and the military 

police functions we rc split between the personnel service and the supply and 

transport units in the support commands. Separate antiaircraft artillery battalions 

lUld military pol ice companies disappeared from both divisions. Neither division 

fielded nuclear weapons, which were in stead located at the field arllly level. I I 

In February 1955 the 3d Infantry Division in Excrcise FOLLOW Me and the 

I st Armored Division in Exercise BLUE BOLT tried out these new organiZlilions. 

The resu lts of the infantry division test showed that independent infantry battalions and the combat commands added flexibility and that the support COlllmand 

provided an acceptable base from whi ch to improve logistical functions. 

Generally, however, the division lacked Ihe capability to wage susta ined combat 

operations. It needed more on-the-ground strength to execute norma l battlefield 

missions during an atomic war and larger reconnaissance forces to cove r the 

extended fro ntages and depths envisaged for the nuclear battlefield. Additiona l 

antitank and artillery weapons were also required. Staffs at division, combat command, and battalion levels were too small to be fully e ffective. BLUE BOLT neither 

proved nor disproved that the 1st Armored Division possessed less vulnerability 

to atomic attacks. But the usc of the smne command posts for combat command 

headq uarters and tank battalions increased the div ision's vulne rab il ity to air 

attacks, as did the omission of the antiaircraft artillery batta lion.t2 

Following the exercises Army Field Forces revised the two organizations, and 

the 3d In fantry Division and 1 st Armored Division again tested them, this time in 

Operation SAGEBRUSH, a joint Army and Air Force exercise. Both div isions 

reta ined combat commands, but their statTs were increased to allow them to con· 

duct operations from separate command po!';ts. The infantry di vision had two tank 
CHART 27-Atomic Field Army Annored Division, 30 Sep

ARMORED OIVISIDN 

11,938 

[ DIV HQs BN [ 

RECDN BN 1 TANK BN 12C1-mm I IARMORED ENGR BNI 

'15 8Ii8 672 I 741 I 

I' TANK BN 9O-mm ARMORED INF BN 

~ I OIV ARTILLERY _I I 

59ge6 876 ea I l433 I 

H HH&SVCO COMBAT HHB 

-I 1 ME~fT _I 

COMMANO 

'" 

H AVIATION CO 1 11OS-mm FA BN n 14ZMORTARBNI 

762" '45 

Y MEODET 1 I HH 
THE SEARCH FOR ATOMIC AGE DIVISIONS 269 

b.1ltalions and eight four-company infantry batta lions, while the armored division 

had one heavy and three medium tank battalions and four infantry battalions of four 

companies each. To improve command <lnd control, separate division headquarters, 

aviation, and administration companies replaced the headquarters battalion. The 

division's artillery reverted 10 its traditional structure of a headquarters and headquarters ballcry, a medica l detachment, and one ISS-mm. and th ree IOS-mm. howitzer battalions with an antiaircmfl artillery battery in each batlalion. A reconnaissance battalion, identical to the one in the armored division, improved the "eyes and 

ears" orthe infantry division. Engineer resources were increased in both divisions, 

and a bridge company was restored to the annored division. The support commands 

in both organizations were restructured to consist of a headquarters and headquarters company, a band, military pol icc and medical companies, a maintenance battalion, and a supply and transport unit. In the infantry division the supply and transport unit rcmained a company, wh ile in the tank division it was a battalion. The signal battalion in both divisions continued to furn ish an area system of communications. These changes increased the strength of the infantry division from 13,542 to 

17,027 troops and the armored di vision from 11,930 to 13,971.13 

Maj. Gen. George E. Lynch, the "Marne" Di vision commander, and Maj. 

Gen. Robert L. Howze, commandin g "Old Ironsides," reached different conclusions about the revised divisions. Lynch found that the infan try division operated in much the same man ner as a conven tional division with an improved logistica l system. He nevertheless concluded that the Army should return to the traditional divisio n organiza tion with three regimental combat teams, which, he 

believed, were as fl exible as combat cOlllmands. Furthermore, Lynch thought 

regimental organization fostered morale; encouraged teamwork between subordinate and superior commanders, as well as their staffs; provided knowledge 

about capabilities and weaknesses of units and their leaders; and stimulated 

cooperative working methods. Lynch's proposed changes raised the divisional 

strength to 2 1,678 officers and enl isted men. Howze, on the other hand, fo und 

the imllored di vision genera lly acceptabl e. He suggested returning all mess and 

second-echelon maintenance to the company level, converting the medical unit 

to 11 b;:lttal ion, forming headquarters and service compani es or batteries fo r battalions ill all the arms, conce ntniling antia ircraft resources into olle battalion, 

and augmenting mai ntenance throughout the division. Howze di d not specify 

the strengt h of his proposed division, but Lt. Gen. John H. Coll ier, Fourth Army 

commander, in whose area the operation was conducted, reported on the test 

and recommended 15,8 19 of a ll ranks.l4 

In 1956 the U.S. Continental Army Command, whi ch had replaced Army 

Ficld Forces, distributed revised tables of organization fo r Atomic Field Army 

divisions throughout the Army for review and comment. Whilc controversies persiste(~ the command noted that gains had been made in the infantry division's 

abil ity to carry Ollt a variety of missions and to prOtect itself aga inst atomic attack. 

The Atomic Field Army st udies refra ined from making IIny revolutionary changes 
270 

Gel/eral Taylol" 

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

111 the armored div ision. 

Recommended changes incorporated 

such desirable fea tures as the area 

system of communications, the 

administrative services company as a 

home for special staffs and the 

replacement section, an aviation company for more Oexibil ity in the lISC of 

a ircraft, and the new support command for better logistical support. IS 

AI this poin t Chief of Staff 

General Maxwell D. Taylor ca lled a 

halt. On 10 April \956, he decided the 

Army would not adopt the recommenda tio ns o f the Atomic Fie ld Army 

studies. They were not achieving more 

austere divisions, but, in fact, were 

recommending units that were larger 

than the post- World War II ones. He 

directed the Continental Army Command to termi nate all init iatives concerning the 

Atomic Field Army but to complete reports for future reference. 16 

The Army 's search fo r austere units that could survive on bot h conventional and 

nuclear batt lefields thus appeared to have gone nowhere. Those who had tested or 

commented on the Atomic Field Army divisions either disagreed with or had misunderstood the overa ll objectives of Ridgway and the Army Staff. Maj . Gen, 

Garrison 1-1 . Davidson, Commandant of the Command and Genera l Staff College, 

opposed a " lean" division because he thought it would sacrifice tra ining between 

the combat arms and services. He also thought that such a division was inappropriate for use as a mobilization base. The college, he noted, preferred "a very flexible 

outfit, which could be beefed lip or skinned down as necessary on deployment."!7 

Furt hermore, those who eval uated th e divisions paid li ttle heed to usc of 

tactical atomic weapons. Over 250 simulated tests had been conducted in the 

SAGEBRUSH excrcise. Taylor concl uded a ft er the exerc ises that "we in the Army 

have a long way to go before we unde rstand the pro blems of usi ng these 

weapons," noting that "we wou ld have probably destroyed ourse lves and a ll our 

friends had we tossed atomic weapons about a real battlefield in the way we did 

in th is maneuver." IS 

Pentomic Divisions 

In response to Ridgway's directive in November 1954, the Army War College 

had begun work on a study en titled " Doctri nal and Organizational Concepts for 

Atomic-Nonatornic Army During the Period 1960- 1970," which had the shorl tit le 
HIE SEA RCH FOR ATOM IC AGE DI VISIONS 27 1 

IOlsl Airborne Division simlilares 

all l/fomie bomb blasr. ForI 

Campbell. Kellfllcky. 1957. 

of PENTANA. Ridgway wa nted the 

study to outline broad doctrinal and 

organizational concepts applicabl e to 

sustai ned ground combat on th e 

Eurasian land mass during the period 

1960- 70. Whil e the stu dy was 10 

make usc of the maximum technologica l developmen ts, includi ng nucl ea r 

weapons of all types, Ridgway also 

desired that the Army retai n a c.:'lpability for conventiona l warfare. 19 

Completed in December 1955. the 

Army War College study ca lled for 11 

completely air transportable 8,600-

man di vision to replace infantry, airborne, a nd a rmored div isions. The 

new di vision was to be built around 

five small , se lf-sufficie nt " battl c 

groups" that would include their own 

artillery. The ballte g roups were to 

meet the tactical requirements for dis· 

persion of lorees, operations in depth, and increased Oex ibility and mobility on the 

atomic battlefie ld. Organic division artillery, although meager, included the Honest 

John, a surface-to-surface rocket with a nuclear warhead. The division had min imal 

logistical and administrati ve support and lacked tanks, antiaircraft artillery, engineer, and reconnaissance units (ChaI'128).20 

Not surprisingly, many Army leaders found the PENTANA division urlaC· 

ceptable. When Genera l John E. Dahlquist, commander of the Continenta l Army 

Command, forwarded the st udy 10 Washington, he noted that the reaction of the 

arms and services to the division was directly related to the impact of the proposal o n their strengths and missions. Those who perceived an increase in responsibility endorsed the idea , those who saw no change acqui esced, and those who discerned a diminution o r strength s and responsibilities violently opposed it. The 

Armor School objected to the lac k of divisional tank s, th e Artillery School 

desired more conventiona l artillery, and the Command and Genera l Staff College 

questio ned the division's staying power. The most damning comment came rrom 

Chief of Engi neers LI. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr., who considered the concept 

"completely unacceptabl c inrellect ually and scientifica lly."21 

Nevertheless, Chief of Sta fTTaylo r approved the PENTANA study on I June 

1956 as a goal for future research and deve lopment of new weapons, equipment. 

and organizations. It was not an entirely new idea for him. As Ihe commander of 

the Eighth Army he had ex perimen ted with a division havi ng five subordinate 

elements in the Korean Army. In th e meantime, the Army wa s to fill the gap 
272 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

'. , ' 

Honcsl johll rockel laUl/cher 

between what it had and what it wan ted by adopli ng modified versions of the 

concept, using new weapo ns and eq uipme nt as th ey became avai lab le. He 

beli eved that until the goal of a PENTANA div ision could be reached, the Army 

wou ld conti nue to need infantry, airborne, and armored divisions.22 

Be fore Tay lor approved the PENTANA study, he had directed the reorganization of the airborne division using a modification of the concept. He j udged the 

existing airborne di vision incapable of function ing effective ly either in an airborne role or in susta ined ground combat. It could neither be divided into balanced task forces nor be airl ifted. Taylor suggested a division of 10,000 or 12,000 

men organi zed in to five battl e groups Ihal fie lded nuclear weapons. Including 

such arms in the division, he believed, would bolh stimulate the ir deve lopment 

and assist in developing doctrine for their Llsc.23 

On 15 December 1955, the Continenta l Army Command submitted a proposal for an airborne di vision that incorporated feat urcs of bot h the PENTANA and 

ATFA studies. Each one of its five battle groups would consist of four infantry 

companies; a 4.2-inch mortar battery; and a headq uartcrs and service company 

comp rising engi neer, signa l, su ppl y, maintenance, reco nnaissance, assa ult 

weapons, and medical resources. A di visional support group made up of a maintcnance battalion and administrati ve, medical, and supply and transport companies provided logist ica l services. The di visional command and control battalion 

assets incl uded the di vision headquarters, a headquarters and service company, an 

aviation company, and a reconna issance troop. A signal battalion furnished a grid 

communication system, and a sma ll engineer battalion provided Ihe resources 

needed 10 construct an airstrip within fo rty-eight hours. The artillery fi elded three 
CHART 28- PENTANA Division 

PENTANA DIVISION 

8,661 

I I I 

HQs BN SIG BN COMBAT GRP ARTILLER

566 400 1,279 ea 772 

- HH&SVCO I I 

209 

HH&SV CO INFANTRY CO ARTIlLERY BTR

240 20Bea 215 

AVIATION CO 

- 

210 

SPEC OPS CO 

- 

147 
274 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

105-mm. howitzer batteries (eigh t pieces each) for direct support an d one nuclear 

weapons battery. equipped with two cumbersome 762-111111 . Honest Joh n rockets, 

for general support. Planners sacrifi ced the range of the I 55-111m. howitzers to 

gain lhc air deliverability of the I05-mm. howitzers and their prime movers. No 

command leve l intervened between the division headquarters and the bailie 

groups or between the battle groups and company-size units, speeding response 

time. StatTs for all un its were minimal. Because orthe lean nature orthe division, 

mess fac ilities were e liminated except in the medical company and the headquarters company oCthe support group. ln stea(~ the Continental Army Command recommended the attachment of a food service company in garrison.24 

Taylor approved the concept in Februa ry [956 with the followi ng modifications: the addition ofa fifih infantry compa ny 10 each battle group, an increase in 

the number of 105-111m. howitzer batteries from three to fi ve (while reduci ng Ihe 

number of pieces from eight to five), inclusion of a band, and Ihe elimination of 

the attached food service company. He also wanted the admin istration company 

moved from the support group 10 the command and conlrol ba tt alion and Ihe 

artill ery group redesignated as div ision artillery.2S 

Followi ng Taylor's guidance, the command published tabl es of organization 

and equipment on [0 August 1956 known as ROTAD (Reorganization of the 

Airborne Division). The division had 11 ,486 officers and enlisted men (CharI 29), 

and, for the first time in its history, all men and equipment, except for the Honest 

Johns, could be carried on ex isti ng aircraO. The designers of the new division 

thought that it was capable of operating from three to five days independently, but 

it would need to be reinforced fo r operations that lasted for a longer period.26 

To teSI what Taylor ca lled the new "pcntomic"27 division, he se lected his former unit, the IOlst Airborne Division, then serving as a training division at Fort 

Jackson. On 31 April [956, the division moved without its personnel and equipment to Fort Campbe ll, Kenlueky, where it was reorganized, acquiring personnel 

from the 187th and 5081h Regimental Combat Teams and equipment from the 

I I th Airborne Division thai had been left at Fort Campbell after the unit had participated in the GYROSCOPE program.28 

The "Screamin g Eagles" conducted a series of individual unit eva luations 

rather than one divisional exercise. LI. Gen. Thomas F. Hi ckey, the test director, 

judged the new division suitable for short-duration airborne assaults, with improved 

prospects for survival and success during eit her an atomic or a conventional war. 

However, he noted mitior deficiencies in the direct support artillery- its short range 

;:md lack of lethality; in logistical resources, which were less effective than in the 

triangular division; and in the total strengt h of the division. The division was so austere that it could not undertake garrison duties and ma intai n combat readiness.29 

To remedy these weaknesses, Hickey recommended replacing the 105-mlll. 

howitzers wi th 155-111111. pieces except fo r parachute assaults. Instead of five howitzer batteries, he proposed folll'. The larger howitzer would give the direct support 

artillery the range he believed that the division required. Also, si nce the fifth battle 
CHART 29- Airborne Division (ROTAD). 10 Augus

I AIRBORNE DIVISION 

•• AM' 

, Includes the division band. 
276 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

group in the division was to be held in reserve, he proposed deleti ng its direct support artillery battery. Other recommendations included eliminating the support 

g roup and reorganizing the logistical resources, except for mai ntenance organized 

<llong func tional lines, in a pre- Atomic Field Army configu ration. A 10 percent 

increase in divisional strength was suggested, as well as an enlarged garrison complement wherever a pentomic division was stationed. Hickey wished to move the 

administration company to the rear because ils fu nctions d id not require the uni t's 

presence in the forward area; he thought the infantry p1<lloon should be eliminated 

from the reconnaissance troop because it lacked the mobility of the troop's other 

clements; and he wanted a military intelligence detachment added to the division's 

headquarters batta lion to help with order of battle, photograph ic interpretation, and 

other 0 - 2 duties. Fi nal ly, he advocated an increase in the grades of the eomman~ 

ders of the riOe companies, morl'ar batteries, and howitzer batteries to make their 

nmk commensurate with the responsib ilities associ,lIed with independent actions 

requ ired on the " pentomic bl.ltt lefield."30 

The test find ings and Hickey's recommendations worked their way through the 

Continenta l Army Comma nd. Dahlqu ist agreed with most of Hickey's proposals 

except for the artillery and support g roup. He believcd that 105·mm. howitzers 

shou ld be retained as direct support weapons becausc they could be airlifted in two 

helicopter loads or towed by 3/4-ton trucks. Rather than decreasi ng the number of 

artillery batteries, he wanted the di vision to retain five, each with six pieces. He 

opposed changes in the support g roup because its structure had not been fully test· 

ed, and he fel t that Hickcy's reeommcndation to climi nate it was premature,3' 

The Army Staff ag reed with Da hlqu ist's views regarding the number of 

artillcry batteries but 1I0t 011 increasing the number of pieces in each battery. No 

change in the support g roup won approval, and the sta fT opposed the elimination 

of the infantry platoon from the reconnaissance troop, the addition of the military 

intelligence detachment, and alterations in the rank of company and battery com· 

manders. The Continental Army Command published tables of orga nization for 

the pentomie airborne division reflec ting the views of the Army Staff in June 

1958 without a change in unit's overa ll strength. Both the 82d and 10 I st Airborne 

Di visions adopted them by December,32 

Shortly after the 101 5t Airborne Division began testing ROTAD, Taylor direct· 

ed the Continental Army Command to develop a new infantry division along simi· 

lar pentagonal lines. It was to have five battle groups (a headquarters and scrvice 

company, one mortar battery, and fou r infantry companies each); conventional and 

nuclear artillery; tank, signal, and engi neer battalions; a reconnaissance sq uadron 

with g round and air capabilities; and train s. The trains, who commander was 

responsible for the activities of the service troops in the rear area, were to incl ude 

a transl>ortation battalion, an avi ation company, and an admi nistration company. 

The transportation batta lion was to have sufficient armored personnel carriers to 

move an en tire battle g roup at o ne ti me, and the aviation company was to be 

placed in the trains fo r beller supervision of its ma intemU1 ee. Taylor wanted to 
THE SEARCH FOR ATOM IC AGE DIVISIONS 277 

optimize the span of control in the division by giv ing cflch commander the maxi· 

mum number of subordinate c lements that co uld be co ntroll ed effectively. He 

be lieved such a division could be organized wilh \3,500 men of all ranks, a reduclion of nearly 4,000 from the 1955 inFantry division.3) 

On 15 October 1956 the Continent"] Army Command forwarded manning 

charts (Chart 30) for "ROClD" (Reorganization of the Current Infantry Division) 

to Washington. The planners followed Tnylor's general guidance but recommended 

a division slightly larger than expected. They provided the tank and engineer battalions with five companies each and the division arlillcry wi th two battalions- five 

batteries of I05-mm. howitzers in one and an Honest John rocket, one 8-inch howitzer, and two 155-mm. howitzer batteries in the other. Each 105-mm. howitzer battery fielded six pieces and boasted of its own fire direction center, and each mortar 

battery in the battl e group had assigned liaison, fire direction, forward air controller, and forward observer personnel. In addition to headquarters and headquarters detachment and band, the division trains included medical, ordnance, and transportation battalions and aviation, administrative, and quartermaster companies. 34 

Taylor hesitated to adopt the pentagonal structure fo r the armored di vision 

because he fea red that such a change would make the organization too large. 

Nevertheless, Lt. Gen. Clyde Eddleman, the Deputy Chief of Sta ff fo r Military 

Operations, instructed the Continental Army Command to mode rni ze the division by adding atomic weapons, increasing target acq uisition capabi lities, and 

reduc ing the number of vehicles. To ca rry out his wishes, the command added a 

reconnaissa nce and surveillance platoon to the recon naissance batta lion, provided aircraft in the aviation company to support it, and replaced the 155-mm. 

howitzers in one battery of the general support battalion with 8-inch howitzers 

that could fire nuclear rounds. No signifi cant reduction in the number of vehic les took place because the atomic and conventional battlefie lds req uired more 

transportation resources than au thorized in the existing division. A comma nd 

and con trol batta lion that included administration and aviation companies was 

added. To offset increases in the divisional elements, the command e liminated 

the antiaircraft artill ery balta lion.35 

On 5 November 1956 the Army Staff approved the pen tomic armored division wit h some exceptions. The staff directed the formation of se parate divisional headquarters, aviation, and admin istrative compani es in place of the suggested command and control battal ion and moved th e administration company 

to the tra ins. The fanne r 155-mm. howitzer battalion was reorgani zed as a composite unit comprising an Honest John, an 8-incll howitzer, and two I 55-ml11 . 

howitzer batteries. The Army published the '·ROCAD" (Reorganization of the 

Current Armored Di vision) tables rcnccting these changes in December 1956. 

They call ed for a division o f 14,61 7 offi ce rs and enlisted men (Cha,., 31), 34 

fewer than included in the 1955 tables. The tan k cou nt stood at 360, of which 

54 were armed with 75-111111 . guns and 306 with 90-mm. guns. All the medium 

tanks were in four tank ballalions.36 

THE SEA RCH FOR ATOM IC AGE DIVISIONS 

Reorganization of the Divisions 

279 

After the Con tinental Army Command compl eted the tables of organization 

for infantry and armored divisions, Taylor met with Army school commandants 

all 28 February 1957 to sell them on the pentamic reorganization orthe Army. He 

noted that the doctrine of massive retaliation ruled oul nuclear war, but that the 

chance existed that war might stem from unchecked tocal aggression or error. 

The Army had to be prepared to preven t or SlOp a sma ll war as well as conduct a 

nucl ear conflict. He believed that the new divisions, although controversial, could 

meet both challcnges)7 

More importa nt was what Taylor did not say about the pentamic divisions and 

why the Army was adopting them. The Army's budget called for unglamorous 

weapons and equipmen t such as rines, machine guns, and trucks, which had little 

appea l for Congress or the nation. Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson earli er 

had returned the Army's budget to Taylor, directing him to substitute "newfangled" equipment that Congress would support. 

The Army's literature soon reported on such ideas as "convertiplanes," which 

combined the advantages of rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft; one-man " nying platforms"; and the adoption of pentomic di visions, which fie lded nuclear 

weapons. Later Tay lor wrote, " nuclea r weapons were the going thing and, by 

including some in the division armament, the Army stClked out its claim to a share 

of the nuclear arsenal."38 

When reorgani zing Regular Army infantry and armored div isions in 1957 

under the pentomic structure, several major changes were made in the fo rce to 

accommodate a cut of 100,000 men and changing world conditions. In the Far 

East, the United StCltes agreed to withdraw a ll ground combat troops from Japan. 

Subsequently the 1st Cava lry Di vision moved to Korea, where it replaccd the 

24 th Infantry Division. While the 7th Infantry Division rema ined in Korea, the 

24 th was eventually reorganized in Germa ny to replace th e 11 th Ai rbo rne 

Division. Also in Germany, the 3d Infantry Division replaced the 10t h Infantry 

Division, which was returned to Fort Benning as part of GYROSCOPE. With these 

changes U.S. Army, Europe, still fielded five divisions, the 3d and 4th Armored 

Divisions and the 3d, 8th, and 24t h Infantry Di visions. The European command 

also retained an airborne capability by reorga nizing two battl e groups in the 24th 

Infa ntry Di vision as airborne units. At FOri Benning, Georgia, the 2d Infan try 

Division, whi ch ea rlier had been reduced to zero strength, rcplaced the 10th 

Infantry Division, wh ich was inactivated. The 5th Infantry Division was also 

inactivated at Fort Ord; the I st Armored Di vision, less its Combat Command A, 

was reduced to zero strength; and the 25 th Infantry Division was clli onc battle 

group. When the g.lme of musical chairs wit h divisions was over, the Regular 

Army consisted of fifteen div isions. In most cases only the division names and 

nags moved, not the person nel and equipment. These changes in the di visional 

designations reflected the desire of Army leaders to keep divisions with outstand-
CHART 31 - Annored Division (ROCAD), 1956 

ARMOR EO OIVISION 

uc,., 
THE SEA RCH FOR ATOM IC AGE OIVISIONS 281 

ing histories on the active rolls. Most soldiers, however, did not understand the 

rationale, and unit morale suffcred.39 

As the Army reorganized and shumcd divisions around the worl(~ it adopted 

the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) for infantry, artillery, cavalry. and 

armor. During the ATFA and PENTANA studies a debate arose regarding unit 

designations. Traditionally regiments were the basic branch element, espec ially 

for the infantry, and their long histories had produced deep traditions considered 

essen tial to unit esprit de corps. The llew divisional structure, replacing infantry 

regiments wit h anonymous bailie groups, th reatened to destroy all these traditions. Sec rcta ry of the Army Wilbe r M. Brucke r sClIled the question on 24 

January 1957 when he approved the Combat Arms Regimental System. Although 

regiments wou ld no longer exist as tactica l units except for armored cava lry, certain distingu ished regiments were to become " parent" organizations for the combat anns. Under the new concept, the Department of the Army assumed control 

of regimental headquarters, the repository for a un it's lineage, honors, and traditions, and used elements of the regiments to organize battle groups, battalions, 

squad rons, companies, batteries, and troops, which shared in the history and honors of their parent units.40 

When infantry regiments were e liminated in di visions as tactic,,1 units, they 

wcre also elimimltcd as nondiv isional organizations. The Army rcplaced the nOlldivisional regime ntal combat teams with se parat e, flexible combined arms 

" brigades," shifting the concept of a brigade. Instead of being composed of two 

or more regiments or battalions of the same arm or service, the concept encompassed a combined arms unit equivalent to a reinforced regiment. Initially only 

two brigades were formed. First was the 2d Infantry Brigade, activated at Fort 

Devens on 14 February 1958 to replace the 4th Regimental Combat Tem11 . No 

tables of organization ex isted for the unit, which at the time consisted of a headquarters, two battle groups, one artil lery battal ion, a reconnaissance troop, two 

engineer and two armor companies, and trains. The last e lement was an adaptation of the trains of an infantry division and consisted of a headquarters clement 

and administration, ordnance, quartermaster, and medical companies. A miniature division, the 2d Brigade had 4,188 omcers and enlisted men commanded by 

a brigadier general. To support the Infantry School at Fort Benning, the Third 

Un ited Stales Army organized the 1st Inrantry Brigade on 25 July 1958. It contained two bailie groups; one artillery battalion (onc Honest John, onc ISS-111m. 

howitzer, and two 105-mm. howitzer batteries); armor, transportation, and engineer companies; and signal and chemica l platoons, but no trains. A colonel commanded the 3,600 officers and enlisted men assigned to the unitAl 

Evaluating ROCID and ROCAD 

After compl et in g the pentomic reorganizat ion in the Regular Army, the 

Cont inental Army Command conducted rurther tests orthe new organizations. In 
282 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

general, such efforts eli cited favorable reports, finding the divisions to be adequate for atomic and conventional warfarc. In particular, the command noted the 

new infantry d ivision's flexibility, unity ofcomrnalld, mobility, and decisive combat power in terms of nuclear firepowe r. The infantry div ision, however, suffered 

from deficiencies in four arcas- stayi ng power, grou nd surveillance, artillery 

support, and staff organization. To correct these problems, the command made 

several recommendations: addi ng a fiflh rifl e company and a radar section to 

each battle g roup; eliminating the 4.2-illCh mortar as an artillery weapon (but 

retaining some in the headquarters company of the batt le group); reorga nizing the 

artillery into one divisional composite battalion (one Honest John and two 8-inch 

howitzer batteries) and five I05/ 155-mm. howitzer battalions (two self-propelled 

and three towed); and bolstering the aviation company wit h an aircraft fi eld 

mai ntenance element, an av ionics repair team, and approach control teams. More 

staff offi cers were esse ntia l, particul arly for th e G- 3 operation sections. The 

transportation battalion's truck company was found to be inadequate, and officers 

in the field suggested that a ll compa nies in the battalion be equ ipped wi th 

armored personnel carri ers.42 

As in the development of the pentomi e airborne di vision, rank structures also 

came under sc rutiny. Beca use of the increased command responsibilit y, the 

Continental Army Command recommended that the commander of the headquarters company of the bailie group be raised from a capta in to a major and that 

commande rs of the small er art il le ry battalions be redu ced from lie utenant 

colonels to majors. Compared to an infantry regiment, th e new battle group 

lacked bil lets for majors, a circumstance that would adverse ly affect the career 

pattern of infantry ofTicers.43 

On 29 December 1958 Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations Lt. 

Ge n. James E. Moore ap proved the recommendations for reorgani zing the 

infantry division with some changes. He rejected changes in the grades of the 

commanders of artillery batta lions and the headquarters company of the battle 

grou ps and vetoed additional armored personne l carri ers for the transportation 

battalion. He dropped an 8-inch howitzer battery from the composite artill ery 

battalion, leaving it with only one 8-incll howitzer battery and one Honest Joh n 

battery, and split the headquarters company of the battle group into two organizations, a headquarters company and a combat support company. All tactica l 

su pport, including the radar section and the reconna issance, heavy mortar, and 

assault weapons platoons, were to be co ntained in the battle grou p's combat 

su pport company to achieve improved command and control. A separate transportat ion detachment was added to provide third-echelon aircraft maintenance. 

With this guidance in hand, the Cont inental Army Command published new 

tables of o rga ni zation for the division , wit hou t a c hange in its overall 

strength- 13,748 of all ranks (ChoI"l32).44 

For the armored division, fu rther tests led to a number of minor adjustments. 

These incl uded mov ing the reconnaissance ,md surveillance platoon in the recoll-
CHART 32- Pentomic Infantry Division, I February 

INFANTRY DIVISION 

." ., .. " 

StG BN 

531 
284 MANEUVER AND FI REPOWER 

naisSClncc squadron to the aviation company, providing a transportation aircraft 

maintenance detachment to support the aviation company, and reorgani zing the 

reconna issance squadron as in the infantry division. Observers also saw the need 

for an alternate , or backup, div isional command post, a larger starr for the 

artillery coordination center, and the establishment of a radiological center to 

detect radioactive contaminates. Minor alterations were also to be made in the 

service units to slipport these new a lignments. All changes in the armored divi ~ 

sia n were made withoul increasing its strength of 14,61 7.45 

In 1959 and 1960 the Army placed Regular Army infantry and armored divi* 

sians under the revised tables that resulted from the field tests. Also, to meet a 

Depal1ment of Defense manpower ceiling of 870,000, the Army Staff decided to 

eliminate the 9th Infantry Division at FOri Carson, Colorado. The Fifth United 

States Army reduced the division to zero strength and later inactivated it, cutting the 

number of active Regular Army divisions to fourteen. In Korea the Army conti nued 

to resort to the Korean Argumentation to U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, begun 

during the Korean War, to keep the 1st Cavalry Div ision and the 7th Infantry 

Division al Fu ll strength; each division was assigned about 4,000 South Koreans.46 

The Army Staff had delayed reorganization of the reserves, but in 1959 it 

decided to realign National Guard and Army Reserve divisions under pentomic 

structure s. A controversy immediate ly surfaced over the required number of 

reserve di visions. Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy dec ided on 37 divisions, 

27 National Guard and 10 Army Reserve. By I September [959 the twenty-one 

infantry and six armored divisions in the Guard had reorganized, and one month 

later ten Army Reserve infan try divisions completed their transition, bu t at a 

reduced strength. The eleventh combat division, the 1041h, in the Army Reserve 

was converted to training, For a tota l of th irteen trai ning divisions, all of which 

were in the Army Reserve.47 

Followi ng the pattern establ ished by the regulars, the states eliminated nOI1-

div isional regi mental combat teams From the Guard and replaced th em with 

separate combined arms brigades. Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Arizona organized 

the 29th, 92(~ and 258 th Infantry Brigades, respectively. These units had varying numbers of combat arms elements but lacked trains needed to support independent operatiolls.48 

When reserve units began to adopt pentomic configurations, the Continental 

Army Command developed separate organizational tables for train ing div isions. 

These tables permitted the Army Reserve to retai n the ex isting authori zation of 

th ree genera l ofTicers- the commander and two assistant commanders- and 

ensured standardization of these noncombat divisions. Each training di vision COllsisted of a headquarters and headquarters company, five regiments (an advanced 

indi vidual, a common spec ialist, and three basic combat training regiments),49 a 

rece iving company, and a band (Charf 33). Each div ision in reserve status had 

about 3, I 00 of all ran ks and on mobilization would rUll a rcplacement training 

center capablc of training 12,000 men. The continen tal armies reorgani zed the 
CHART 33-Training Division, 1 April 1959 

NOTI'2d Bn (Ado Indill Tng!ineludes: 

(AD AllY! IAdv Indiy Tng) 

(FA! IMylndillTng) 

2 (EnO') (Ady IndillTng) 

NOTE'3d Bn lAdY Indill Tngl include$: 

lemll IAdvlndiv l'ng) 

lOrd! IAdvlndilll'ngl 

IMed) (Ady Indiy Tng) 

IMP) (Adv Indill Tng) 
286 M ANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

training divisions in 1959, and the adjutant general offic ially redesignated them 

as "divisions (training)."50 

One of the objectives of the pentamic reorgani zation was to enable the units 

10 absorb new eq uipment. The M I4 riflc, a 7.62-calibcr fifl e that could fire in 

semiautomatic or automatic modes, rcplaced the vi ntage M 1 rifle, the carbine, the 

subma c hin c gun , and the Brown ing automat ic rine; th e 7.62-calibc r M60 

machine gun rcplaced the heavy water-cooled and light air-cooled Browning .30-

caliber machine guns. These new weapons simplified production; reduced spare 

pa ris, maintenance, and training time; and used standard NATO cartridges, permitti ng greater compatibility with Western European weapons. The diesel-powered M60 tank, armed with a 105-mm. gun , and the low silhouette, ai r-transportable M 11 3 armored personne l carrier also entered the Army 's inventory. 

Work began on new antiaircraft weapon s, recoilless rines, and 4.2-inch mortars, 

but most did not become available for several more years.51 

When the Army completed the pentomic reorganization in 1960, it had 5 1 

combat divisions in its three components ( 14 in the Regular Army, 10 in the 

Army Reserve, and 27 in the Natio nal Guard), 5 infantry brigades (2 in the 

Regular Army and 3 in the Guard), and I Regular Army armored combat command. Although divisions were organi zed for nuc lear warfare, only a few were 

actually ready for combat. Some Regular Army divisions continued to conduct 

their own ba sic trainin g courses to reduce costs and personnel, and Korean 

nati onals served in the di visions in Korea . Guard units ranged between 55 and 71 

percent of the ir authorized strength s, while Army Reserve organi zations vari ed 

from 45 to 80 percent. 52 

[n sum, as the Eisenhower administration reduced the Army's budget from 

$ 16 billion to $9.3 billion between 1953 and 1960, the total force dropped to the 

lowest number of divisions since the beginning of the Korean War. On the surface, changing concepts of warfare during this period led the Army to adopt pentamic divisions, structures that fell ou tside traditional organizational practices. 

But whatever the concerns of Army leaders for opcratin g on a nuclear baltlefiek~ 

Taylor, the primary force behi nd the new divisions, clearly was using the pcrllomic concepts to get increases in the military budget from political leaders who were 

less interested in supporting more conventional military systems. Nevertheless, 

the fertile ideas of this period resulted in new organizational concepts and ncw 

eq uipment and weapon systems, all of which were to see further development in 

the next two decades. 
THE SEA RCH FOR ATOMIC AGE DIVISIONS 

Notes 

287 

1 Col Stanley N. Lanning 10 Acting Assistant Commalldlllll, The lnf.1ntry School (TIS). 23 

Apr 53, sub: Proposed Reorganization orthe Infantry and Airborne Divisions, UA 27.51 15 

(4/23/53), Infantry School Library (ISL), Fort Benning, Ga. 

2 John J. Midgley, Deadly /IIusivlls: Arm)' Polity for the Nuclear Balllefieid (Boulder, Colo.: 

Westview Press, 1986), pp. 2- 5. 

3 LIT, OCAFF to CG, Infantry Center, 28 Apr 52, sub: Organization or the Infantry Regiment. 

28 Apr 52, AnNO (Deputy ChicfofSlafT, G- 3-Tmining)-23 32216 (Regt) (28 Apr 52), ISL. 

4 Report of 0011rd of Officers, 10 CG. Infantry Cemer, 11 Aug 52. sub: Report of Board of 

Officers, ISL. 

5 lsI Ind, TIS 100CAFF. 11 Aug 52. sub: Report of Board of Officers. GNKEAD-R 320 (11 

Aug 52), and Ltr, In(hntry School Rcprcscntntivcs, XV III Airbome Corps, to CG, XVIII Airbonlc 

Corps, 25 SCIl 53, sub: Rcport of Evalu:llion, Phasc III, Operation FA LCON, Infantry School 

Represcntativcs, AIlCGC (Airbornc Corps General Correspondcncc) 353 Opn FALCON, ISL; 

OCAFF, "Summ:lfY of MajoT Evems and Problems, FY 1953," ch. 8, pp. 1- 12, DAM H-I-ISR. 

6 Llr, Attack Group, Tactical Department, T[S, 28 Jul 52, sub: Proposed Reorganization of 

Infamry Units, ISL; Col Lonning to Acting Assistant Commandant, TIS, 23 Apr 53, sub: Proposcd 

Reorganiz..1tion ofthc Infantry and Airborne Divisions. 

7 Matthew Il, Ridgway, Soltlier: The Memoirs ofMllllhcw B. Ridgway (Ncw York: Harper and 

Brothers, 1956), pp. 286- 87; Llr, OCors to OCAFF, 19 Apr 54, sub: Organizational Studies to 

Improve the Anny Combat Potcntial-Io-Manpower Ratio, RG 337, Anny Field Forces, NARA. 

S Midgley , Deadly IllusiollS, pp. 44 - 45; Llr, OCo fS 10 OCAFF, 19 Apr 54, su b : 

Organizational Studies to Improve the Anny Comb:ll Potential-to-Manpowcr Ratio, LIT, OCAFI: to 

Chief of Information , Department of the Army (CINFO), 13 Sep 54, slIb: Fact Sheet, Project 

ATFA-I (hereafter cited as Fact Sheet, Project ATFA-I , 13 Scp 54), both An'IS (OCAFF, 

Infonnation Section) 320, RG 337, NARA. 

9 Fact Shcct, Project ATFA-I, 13 Sep 54; TOE 7 ATFA, Infantry Division, 30 Sep 1954. 

to Fact Sheet, Project ATFA-I, 13 Sep 54; TOE 17 ATFA. AmlOrcd Division, 30 Sep 1954. 

II Fnct Sheet, Project A TF A-I, 13 Sep 54. 

t2 LIT, CQNA RC 10 TAG and othcr addrcsscs, 25 Apr 56, sub: Concept and Technical Rcview 

of the Tentative 1956 ATFA Inf.,ntry Division, A'n'NG-D&R (Office of the CofS, G- 3-RCSC:L rch 

and Development, 322150 (Div) (25 Apr 56), and Llr, CO NARC 10 TAG and other nddrc~ses, 23 

May 56, sub: Concept and Technical Review of the Tentalivc 1956 ATFA An1lOred Division, 

ATTNG-D&R 322/ 16 (Div) (23 May 56), both Division General file, DAM H-HSO; Midgley, 

Deadly Iffusiom', p. 49. 

t3 Moenk, Large-Scale Arm)' Mall/tllL'e/':;, pp. 205- 20; TOE 7, ATFA Jnf.1nlry Division, 30 

Jun 1955; TOE 17, ATFA AmlOred Division, 30 Jun 1955. 

t4 3d Infantry Division, Final Evaluation Report on thc ATFA Infantry Division (TOE 7T), 15 

hn 56, Command and General Staff Collegc (CGSC) Library, Fort Leavenworth. Kans.; Llr, 

CONA RC to TAG and olhcr addrcsses, 25 Apr 56, sub: Concept and Technical Rcvicw of thc 

Tentative 1956 ATFA Infantry Di vision, ATTNG-D&R 322150 (Div) (25 Apr 56), RG 337. 

NARA; Llr, 1st Armd Div to CG, Fourth An11Y. I Jan 56, sub: Final Report on Exercise B LUE 

BOLT II , AKDHD-CG 354.2, and Llr, Fourth An11Y to CG, CONARC, 13 Fcb 56, Final Report, 

Exercisc BLUE BOLT II, AKADC-M-BEG 354.2, both casc Library; Llr, CONARC to TAG and 

other addresses, 23 May 56. sub: Concept and Technical Review of the Tentative 1956 ATFA 

Armored Division. ATTNG-D&R 322/ 16 (Div) (23 May 56). RG 337, NARA. 

15 Ltr, CONARC to TAG and other addresses, 23 May 56. sub: Concept and Technical 

Review of the Tentative 1956 ATFA Armorcd Division, :wd Llf, CONARC to TAG and other 

addresses, 25 Apr 56, sub: Concept and Technical Review of the Tentalive 1956 ATFA Infantry 

Division. 

16 Ltr, TAG to CG, CONARC, 6 Jun 56, sub: The 1956 Army Rcorganization, AGAM-I' 
288 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

(Office of the Adjutilnt General, Pllblications Branch) 320 (5 Jun 56) DCSOPS, Division General 

file.DAMH-HSO, 

17 Llf, Garrison H. DavidSOillO Willard G. Wyman. 2 1 Feb 56, cose Library. 

18 Mocnk, La/'ge-St:alc Arm)' MtII/el/l'(!rs, p. 212; Transcript of Address by Gcncml Maxwell 

D. Taylor, Chief of Slaff. United SI,ltcs AmlY, Before the Amly School Commandants, Room 2E7 1 SA. The Pentagon, Washington, D.C" Thursday, 28 Feb 57, CS 322 (I Feb 57). RO 319, NARA. 

19 lIf. 0 - 3 10 CO, CONARC, 17 Nov 54, sub: Organization of the Amly During the Period 

FY 1960- 1970, RO 319. NARA; Midgley, Deadly IIIIISioIlS, pp. 58- 59. 

2Q L1f, CONA RC 10 TAG and olher addresses, 28 OCI 55, sub: PENTANA Army (U), 

ATSWD (Combat DcvcloJltllcl1ts)-G- 322/4 (Anny) (28 Oct 55), 322/4 (Army). RO 3 19. NARA. 

21 Ltr, John E, Dahlquist to Maxwe ll D. Taylor, 12 Dee 55, 3221191AmlY 6- 10 Aug 56, RG 

3 19, NA RA, 

22 Taylor. Sll'Qrd~ (Illd Ploll'sllflres, pp. 152- 53; John M. Taylor, Gel/aliI Maxwell T(I)"for: 

The Swol'ff alld Ihe Pel/ (New York: Doublcday, 1989). PI), 198- 99; Ltr, Maxwell D. Taylor to CG, 

CONA RC, sub: Amly Organization. I Jun 56. Division General file, DAMH-HSO. 

23 lIr. Cors to CG. CONARC. s ub : Reorganization of the Airbome Di vision and the 

Development of Special Airbome Reconnaissance Units, 20 Sep 55. RG 3 19, NA RA. 

24 Llr, CONARC to Cors, 15 Dec 55, sub: Reorganization of the Airborne Division (S), 

ATSWD 322/3 1 (Div) (15 Dec 55), 10lst Abn Div fite, DAMH-HSO. During the planning for the 

pentomic reorganiziltion the Army returned to use troop and squadron for cavalry reconnaissance 

units. 

25 Llr, DCotS for Military Opernliol1li to CG, CONARC, 20 Fcb 56, sub: Reorganization of 

the Airbornc Division, OPS OT DC 2, IOlst Abn Div Iile, DAMH-HSO. 

26 TOE 57T, ROTAD, Airborne Division, 1956; CONARC, "Summary of Major Events and 

r' roblems, 1956," vo l. I, Doctrine and Requirements Division, G3 Section, I Jan- 30 Jun 56, 

Reorganization and Test of the Airbome Division (Project ROTAD). pp. 1-4, DAM H-I-l SR. 

27 Taylor coined thc Madison A\'cnue tC1l11 "pentomic" to describe units org(LIlized with pentagonal stnlctures and atomic capllbililies. Sec T;lylor, Swords IIlId Plowshares. p. 17 1. 

2H DOD News Re lease No. 1205--55, 14 Dec 55, Ltr, TAG 10 CG, Third Army. 4 Jutl 56, sub: 

Reorganization of the 10Ist Airborne Division. AGAO·O (M) 322 (23 May 56) DCSPER. and 

Wilber Dnlckcr, Address before AMVETS N:ltion:ll Convention, I Sep 56,:111 IOlst Abn Div file, 

DAMH-HSO; "Run Down on the 101," 111'111)17 (Oct 1956): 5 1- 53, 

1- 5. 

29 CONA RC, "Suillmary of Major Events and Problems, r Jul 56- 30 Jun 57:' vol. I, ch. 2, pp. 

30 Ibid., p. 6- 12. 

31 Ibid, 

J2 Ibid., p. 13; CONARC, "Suillmary of Major Evenlsand Problcms, I Jul 57- 30 JUIl 58." vol. 

3. Organiza1ion and E<tuiplllcnt Division. pp. 1-4. DAM H-HSR; TOE 570. Airbome Division. 

1958; Ltr, TAG to CG, Third Army, 19 Nov 58, sub: Rcorganiza tion of the 82nd and IOls1 

Airbomc Divisions, AGAO-O (M) 322 (20 Oct 58) DCSPER, 10lst Abn Div filc, DAMH-HSO; 

"The Army's Month," ;/1'111), 8 (Apr 1958): 20. 

JJ Ltr, CofS 10 CONARC, 23 Aug 56, sub: Reorganization of Current Infantry Di vision, 

Division Gcncrnl file, DAMH-HSO. 

34 lIr. CONARC 10 DCotS for Military Operatio ns and othcr addresses, 15 Oct 56, sub: 

Reorg:mization ofCurrcnt IllfiUltry Division, ATI'NG-D&R 322/53 (Div) (15 Oct 56). and lIr, CG, 

CONARC, 10 Cors, 2 1 Dec 56. sub: Basic Doctrinal G\lidance in Connection with New (ROClD) 

Division Organization, ATeG (CG, CONA RC), both Di vision Genernl fite, DAM H-HSO. 

3S Taylor's address. 28 Feb 57: CONA RC_ "Major Events and I'roblems, r Jul 56- 30 Jun 57." 

vol. r, Doctrine and Rcquircmcnts Division. G3 Section_ 1 Jan- 30 Jun 57. pp. 20- 23. 

36 CONARC, "Major Evellts and I'roblems. I Jul 56- 30 Jun 57," vol. 3, Orga nization and 

Equipment, G3 Section, pp. 3- 7; TOE 17T ROCAD, AmlOred Division, 1956. 

37 Taylor's addrcss. 28 Fcb 57. 

38 T;!ylor, Swords (Illd P/olI"sl/fll"es. p. 171: Glcnn Hawkins. "Un ited States FOl"Ce Structure 
THE SEA RCH FOR ATOM IC AGE DIVISIONS 289 

and Force Design lnilillli vcs, 1939- 1989," Ms, pp. 35- 36, DAMI-I-RAD; "rnfnntry of Tomorrow," 

Anny, 6 (Sep 1955): 47--48; "Let's All Fly on PlullonllS," Army 6 (Dec 1955): 25. 

39 OF, omcc, Deputy Chief ofStafi" for O]>CJ1llions (DDeSOrS) 10 Sec of the General SlatT 

and other addresses, sub: Reorga nization of Di visions. 2 May 57, OI'S OT OR I, I'cntollli c 

Divisions, Di vision General file , Ur. TAG to CinC, U.s. Anny, Pacific (USARPACj, and olher 

addresses, 22 Aug 57, sub: Transfer of the 241h Infantry Division and Reorganization of the ls\ 

Cavalry Division, AGAO-O (M) )22 (16 Aug 57) DeSPER, Llr, TAG 10 CinC, USA R.I'AC, and 

olher addresses. 29 Aug 57, same subject, AGAO-O (M) 322 (2 7 Aug 57) DeSPER, Llr, TAG 10 

CinC, U.S. Army Europe (USAREU R), and other addresses, 8 Feb 57, sub: Reorga nization of 

the I st Infantry Di vision, AGAO-O (M) 322 (5 Feb 57) DCS I' ER. LtT, TAG to CinC, 

USA REUR, 21 Jun 57, sub: Reorganization of the 2d Armored Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 (13 

Jun 57) DCSPER, L1r, TAG to CGs, CONA RC, and Third U.S. Army. 17 Mar 58, sub: Change 

in Status of the 2d and 10th Infantry Di visions, AGAO-O (M) (5 Feb 58) DCS PER, Llr, TAG to 

CinC, USA REUR, and other addresses, 30 Aug 57, sub: Reorga nization of the 3d Armored 

Di vision, AGAO-O (M) 322 (26 Aug 57) DCSPER, Ltr, TAG to CinCo USAREUR, 26 Dee 57, 

sub: CIl<lnge in StalllS of Certain Units, 26 Dec 57. AGAO-O (M) 322 (1 3 Dec 57) DCSPER, Ltr, 

TAG to CinC, USA REUR, and othcr addresses, 12 Mar 57, sub: Reorgani zation of the 4th 

Armored Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 (6 Feb 57) DCSPER, Ltr, TAG to CG, CON ARC, and 

other addresses. 27 Mnr 57. sub: Reorganization of the 4th Infantry Division. AGAO-O (M) 322 

(25 M;Lr 57) DCSPER, Llr, TAG to CG, U.S. Army Far East, and other addresses, 3 1 May 57, 

sub: Reorganization of the 7th Infantry Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 (24 May 57) DCS I' ER, L1r, 

TAG to CinC, USA REUR. 16 Jul 57, sub: Reorganization of the 8th Infantry Di vision, AGAO-O 

(M) 322 (10 Jul 57) DCSPER, LtT, TAG to CinC, USA REUR, and other addresses, 13 Nov 57, 

sub: Reorganization of the 9th Infantry Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 9th Inf Div (8 Oct 57) 

DCSPER, LtT, CinC, USA REUR, and other addresses, 14 Jun 47, sub: Reorganization of the 

10th Infantry Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 (3 1 May 57) DCS PER. Ltr. TAG to CinC, 

USA REUR, 20 Feb 57, sub: Reorganization of thc 11th Airbornc Di vision. AOAO-O (M ) 322 

( 19 Feb 57) DCSPER, Draft leller. undated, sub: Organization of the 24th Infnntry Di vision, LIT. 

TAO to CinC, USA REUR, I I Fcb 57, sub: Reorgani zation of the 1st ArnlOred Division, AGAOo (M) 322 (5 Feb 57) DCSPER, Ltr, TAG to COs. CONA RC and Fourth U.S. Army, 5 Dec 57, 

sub: Change in Status of Certain Uni ts, AGAO-O (M) 322 ( 13 Nov 57) DCSPER, and Llr, CGs, 

CONA RC and Sixth U.s. Army, 27 May 57, sub: Inacti vill ion of the 5t h Infantry Division, 

AGAO-O (M) 322 (24 May 57) DCSI)ER, all AG Reference files; and Historical Data Cards. 

Di visions, DAMH-HSO. 

40 Memo, St'C of Amly for See of Defcnse, 31 Jan 57, sub: Comblll AnllS Regimenta l System 

(CA RS). and Fact Sheet, undated. sub: Combol Arms Regimell1al System, both CARS fiks, and 

News Relense, Historic Tmditions of Regiments to be Preserved in Pentomic Army. 7 Feb 57. 

Division General file. all DAM H· HSO. 

41 CONARC, "Summary of Mlijor Evell1S and !'roblems. I Jul 56- 30 lUll 57;' vol. 4, Doctrinc 

and Re(luireLllents Division, G3 Section . I Jan- 30 Jun 57, pp. 18-19; Infomlll!ion Paper: Scpamte 

Combined Anns Brigades in the Reserve COmlXl1lents. 30 Apr 58. Brigade General file. Llr, TAG 

10 CGs, CONA RC and First U.S. AmlY, 12 Feb 58, sub: Organization of the 2d Infantry 13rigllde, 

AGAO-O (M) 322 (5 Feb 58) DCSPER, and Ltf, TAG to CG, Third Army, 8 Jill 58, sub: Change 

in Status of 1st Infantry Brigadc and other units. AGAO-O (M) 322 ( I 1 Jun 58). DCSPER. all AG 

Relcrcnce fi les: and Historic;ll Dnta Cards, 1111 DAM H-HSO. 

~2 Llr. CONA RC to DCors for Military OI}cl1ltions, 28 Aug 58. sub: Evaluation of ROClD, 

ATING-D&R 3221 17 (Div) (28 Aug 58). Division Gencml fi le, DAM H-HSO. 

43 Ibid. 

4~ 1st Ind, ODCSOI'S to CG. CONA RC, 29 Dec 58, sub: Evoluotion of ROCID. OI'S OT OR 

2, Division Geneml file, DAMI I-I ISO; TOE 7D. Inf.1ll1 ry Di vision, 1960. 

4~ John A. Beall. "Revisions of ROCAD," Armor 68 (Mar- Apr 1959): 48- 51; TOE 170, 

Armored Division. 1960. 

46 Ltf. TAG to CG, Fifth U.S. Army, 14 Jul 60, sub: Reorganization of the 9th Infantry 
290 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 (27 lUll 60) DeSPER, and Ltr. TAG to CG, Fifth U.S. Anny. 30 Jan 

62, sub: inactivation of 9th Inf;'utry Division and 9th Military Intelligence Detachment, AGAO-O 

(M) 322 (23 Jan 62) DeSPER. 9th Inf Div file. DAMH-I-ISO; HistoriC(Ll Data Cards for the 1st, 2d, 

3d, 41h, 7th, 81h, 9th, 241h, and 25th Inf Oivs, the 2d, 3d, and 4th Anlld Divs, and lSI Cav Div. 

DAM H-l-ISO: Ullile(1 Siules f)l1ell.I'(I P()licie~' ill 1959 (WashinglOll . D.C.: Government Printing 

Office, (964). p. 32; Amlllaf Report oflhe SecrCI(II), of lite , 11"111)'. Jllly I. 1959. /0 Jlllle 30. 1960, p. 

143: Skaggs. "The KATUSA EI>pcrimcnl." p. 55. 

4110hn W. Bowell, "Reorganizing the Reserve Components," AI"/I/)' Ill/orma/ioll Digesl 13 

(Nov 1959): 11- 15; AIIIIlIO/ Report 0/ tile Chie/. Natiollal GlI(mi BIII"(!(II/. FY 1960, p. 33; Fact 

Sheet on Department of the Anny Revised Plan for Reorganization of the United States Army 

Reserve, undated, Army Reserve liIe; Ltr, TAG to CG. Sixth U.S. Army. 31 Mar 59, sub: 

Reorgani:anion of the 63d Infantry Division. AGAO-O (M) 322 (16 Mar 59) RES, Ltr. TAG to CG, 

First U.S. Anny, 7 Apr 59, sub: Reorganization of the 77th Infantry Division, AGAO-O 322 (20 

M:,r 59) RES. Llr, TAO to CO, Second U.S. Amly. 17 Mar 59, sub: Reorganization of the 79th 

Inl;1 ntry Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 (2 M:lr 59) RES, LIT. TAG to CG, Third U.S. AmIY, 10 Apr 

59. sub: Reorganization of the 81st Infllntry Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 (26 Mar 59) RES, Llr, 

TAG to CG, Seeond U.S. AmI)" 19 Mar 59, sub: Reorganiz'lIion of the 83d Infantry Division, 

AOAO-O (M) 322 (2 Mar 59) RES, leT, TAG to CG, Fourth U.S. Army, 19 Mar 59, sub: 

Reorgani7.ntion of the 90th Infantry Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 (3 Mar 59) RES, Ltr, TAG to CO, 

First U.S. Anny, 6 Apr 59, sub: Reorganiz.1tion of the 94th Infantry Division. AGAO-O (M) 322 

(16 Mar 59) RES. Ltr, TAG to CG. Sixth U.s. Anny, 29 Apr 59, sub: Reorganization of the 96th 

Infantry Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 (10 Apr 59) RES. L1r, TAG toCG. Fifth U.S. Anny, I I May 

59. sub: Rcorganiz,1tion of the 102d Infantry Division, AOAO-O (M) 322 (I May 59) RES, Ltr, 

TAG to CG, Fifth U.s. Ann)'. 20 Apr 59. sub: Reorganization of the 103d Infantry Division. 

AOAO-O (M) 322 (10 Apr 59) RES. Ltr, TAG to CG, Sixth U.S. Army, 30 Apr 59, sub: 

Redesignation and Reorganization of the 1001h Infantry Division, AGAO-O (M) 322 (24 Apr 59) 

RES, all DAMH-J-ISO. 

48 Infommtion Paper, Separate Combined Arms Brigades in the Reserve Components, 30 Apr 

85; Ltr, NG B to AG, Hawa ;i, 23 Jan 59. su b: Troop Allotment. ConSOlidation, Conversion, 

~e esignatio , and Reorganization, AmI)' NG Units, NG-AROTO, Ltr, NGB to AG, Arizona, 4 

Feb 59, sub: Reorganization of AmlY NG 1958- 60, NO-A ROTO 325.4 Arizona. Llr. NG B to AG, 

Puerto Rico, 6 Feb 59, sub: Reorganiz.'Ition of the Amly NG 1958- 60, NG-AROTO 325.4-Puerto 

Rico, all National Guard state liles, OAMH-HSO. 

~9 Regiments in training divisions were nOi tactical units, therefore fell outside the Combat 

Anus Regimental System. 

SO TOE 29- Tf. Division Trnining, 1959; Fact Sheet, Department of the Amly Revised Plans 

for Reorganization of the United Slates Ann)' Reserve; see notes, Historical Data Cards for the 

70th. 76th. 78th. 80th. 84th, 85th, 89th. 9lst. 95th, 98th. lOOth. 100th. and 108th Divs (Training). 

OAM H-HSO. 

S t AIIII//al Reporl 0/1/1(' Secl"ct{IJJ' 0/ D,1clI.\·e. 1959. pp. 169- 81. 

52 DCSPER, The Troop Progr;lI11 of the Amly, Annex I, TrOOI) BlLses Dllta, Current Actions 

Strength. 30 J Uri 60. liP. 29- 35. ACot'S Reserve Components. Reserve Components Control 

Program of the Anny, FY 1960, Pl'. 53- 96. Omee. Chief of Amly Reserve and Reserve Omecr 

Trnining Corps. "Summary of Major E\'ents and Problems, I Jul 60- 30 Jun 61:' p. 14. all OAM II-

!-I SR: /1111/11(11 RepoI"I o/Ih" ellie/. Nmiomt/ Glford 8111"c(IIl. F;.~c(ll I'C(lI" 1960. p. 33: Donald 

McGowan. "Anny National Guard Today," A,.my III/OI"II/(/lioll Digest 15 (Mar 1960): 17. 
CHAPTER II 

ANew Direction-Flexible Response 

I alii directillg Ihe Secrcrmy oj DeJellse 10 /lllderlllke {/ reorganization (1l1d lIIodemiZ(llioll oj Ihe Army '0\' divisiol/al structure, /0 increase ifs IIOu -lIl1e/car firepower. to 

improve its tacticaf lIIobility ill (IllY cl/viral/melll, fa insure ilsjlexibility 10 lIIeel (IllY db'eel 

or illdirect '''relll, /0 fiu:iliflllC i/~' coordillmiOll wilh 0111' major allies, (lmiIO provide //lure 

lIIodel'll mechanized divi~'iolls ill EUl'ope alld bring 'heir equipment lip 10 date. alld [IV 

provide) /lew airbome brigades ill b011l the Pacific ({lid Europe. 

President John F. Kennedy! 

President John F. Kennedy ushered in the era of " flexible response" in 196 1, 

deciding that the threat of a general nuclear war had become remote, but Ihat the 

possibility of brush-fi re wars had increased. To meet the varied challenges of the 

era, the Army soon abandoned pentomic structures and struck out in new directions. Even tually divisions with a standard divisional base and interchangeable 

maneuver elements- infantry, mechanized infantry, airborne infantry, and armor 

baualions--cmerged as a means of tailoring units for service in diverse environments. The idea theoretica lly resulted in more nexible forces and divisions that took 

ful l advantage of new equipment, in particular new tanks, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters. International events delayed immediate reorganization, and 

when the Army was able to act, constra ints on personnel and fu nds forced the adoption of many compromises in the structure of the divisions that emerged. 

MOMAR-I 

To move beyond the unrealistic PENTANA concept of a universal div ision, 

General Bruce C. Clarke, commander of the Continenta l Army Command, put his 

staff to work in early 1959 on a new organizational model, the "Modern Mobile 

Army 1965 (MOMAR-I)." Clarke, who had served as Gene ra l Maxwe ll D. 

Taylor's deputy in Korea, believcd the Army of the future had to be capable of 

operating effectively on both nuclear and nonnuclear balllefields anywhere in the 

world against a variety of threats. Its units had 10 be capable of fighting independently or semi-independently under a diverse set of geographica l and climatic 

conditions. Furthcrmore, he be li eved that conventional firepower had to be 

increased and tactical mobi lity and maneuverability improve{~ primarily by using 

armor-protected vehicles and aircraft.2 
The M60 alld. below, M48 f(lnks 
A NEW DIRECTION- FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 293 

When completed, MOMAR-l called for heavy and medium divisions (Clwrls 

34 (lnd 35), Both types had five combat commands, but within the commands 

were th ree task fo rce headquarters to which commanders could assign tank and 

infantry companies and clements of a train (su pport) company and "morilzer" 

battery. The proposed morilzer was to be a cross between a mortar and howitzer. 

Thus, the new models retained the fl exible command structure of the armored 

division and foreshadowed the idea of "bui lding blocks" around which to organi ze forces. Every man and every piece of equipment in both divisions was to be 

ca rried or mou nted on vehicles) 

War games indicated that medium and heavy MOMAR-J divisions could not 

meet the Army's needs in many potential trouble spots throughout the world, and 

they were never fi eld tested. In December 1960 the Vice Chief of Staff, General 

Clyde Eddl eman, rejected the concept entire ly. He noted that MOMA R-I divisions lacked the simplicity, homogeneity, versati lity, and fl exibility that the Army 

needed to fulfil l its worldwide responsibility in the coming decadc.4 

The Development of ROAD 

General Eddl eman set the Army on a new organizat ional co urse on 16 

December [960 when he directed General Herbert B. Powell, who had replaced 

Clarke as commander of the Continental Army Command, to develop divisions 

for the period 1961- 65. The vice chie f wanted the command to consider infantry, 

armored, and mechani zed di visions. The heart of his mechani zed division was to 

be armored infantry units that had the mobility and the survi vabi lity needed for 

the nuclear battlefield. But all divisions were to have both nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as any other new wea pons or eq uipment that might 

become available by 1965. Because of the many areas for potential employment 

throughout the world, Eddleman suggested that divisions be tailored for different 

environmen ts. However, since he still wanted 10 make the types of divisions as 

simil"r as possible, Eddleman instructed the planners to weigh the retention of 

battle groups or their replacement with infantry battalions in bot h infantry and 

airborne divisions. Hc questioned whether those divisions should have a combat 

command or a regimenta l command level between the division commander and 

the battal ions as in the armored division. Furthermore, preliminary evidence suggested the possi bility of interchanging battalion-size armor, mech"ni zed infantry, 

infantry, and artillery units within the divisions. No set strengths were establ ishcd 

for divisions, but Eddleman expected nonc to exceed 15,000 men,S 

Eddl eman 'S instructions renectcd many of th e orga nizational ideas he had 

developed after leaving the position of dcputy chie f of staff fo r military operations 

in May 1958 and before returning 10 Washington as the vice chief of slMT in 

November 1960. In the intervening period he served as commander of U.S. Army, 

Europe, and Seventh Army, becoming involved with the establishment of the West 

German Army. That army, unlike those of some NATO countries that had "dopted 
CHART 34-Medium Division (MOMAR), 1960 

296 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

pentagonal di visions, employed a 

building-block approach to organization. Rather than establishing permaIlCllt infantry and armored div isions, 

Ihe Germans rel ied on infantry and 

a rmored brigades that would be 

formed into divisions tailored for specific missions. The German brigades, 

although fixed organizations, could 

a lso control additional ballalions. To 

increase flexibility, elements of armor 

and mechani zed infantry batta li ons 

could be interchanged to form combat 

teams heavy in infantry or annor.6 

In less than three months Powell 

subm itted a stud y entitled 

"Reorga niza ti on Objective Army 

Div isio ns ( 196 1- 1965)," usua lly 

Gel/eml El/d/ell/tlll called ROAD, 10 the Army Chi ef of 

Staff, Genera l George H. Decker. 

Un like the PENTANA and 

MOMA R-I studi es, ROAD did not address the gene ra l reorga ni zation of the 

Army; it dea lt only with infa ntry, mechanized in fantry, and armored div isions. 

Using the armored division as a model, the study ca lled for all three to have a 

common base to which commanders could assign varyi ng numbers of "maneuver" (i.e., ground combat) c lements- infantry, mechani zed infantry, and tank battalions. The predomi nant maneu ver element determined whether the division was 

classified as infantry, mecha nized infantry, or armor.7 

The base for every ROAD division wou ld consist of a hetldquarters element, 

which included the division commander and two assistan t division commanders; 

three brigade headquarters; a military police company; aviation, engineer, and signal battalions; a reconnaissance squadron with an air and three ground troops; division artillery; and a support command. The di vision artillery incl uded three 105-

mm. howitzer battalions, an Honest John rocket battalion, and a composite battalion (one 8-inch and three 155-mm. howitzer batteries). All artillery was self-propelled. The division artillery commandcr, however, WllS reduced from a brigadier 

general to a colonel. The support command embodied a headquarters and headquarters company, an administration company, a band, and medical, supply and 

tmnsport, and maintcnancc battalions. Although structured alike in all divisions, the 

supply and transport and the maintenance battalions varied in strength and equipment to accommodate the missions of the divisions. Thc commander of the support 

command assumed responsibility for all di visional supply, maintenance, and medica l services and the rear mea activities, including security. Supply and maintenance 
A NEW DI RECTION- FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 297 

functions were to be provided at one·stop service points. Elements of the support 

command were designed so that they could be detached and sent to support task 

fo rces in independent or semi-independent operations. The brigade headquarters, 

like the combat commands in the existing armored di vision, were not to have permanently assigned uni ts and were not to enter the administrative chain of command; instead, they wcre to function exclusively as command and control headquarters, supervising from two to five maneuver elements in tactical operations.8 

Responding to Eddleman's wishes, the designers of ROAD determined that an 

infantry battalion was more appropriate than a battle group as the main building 

block of the infantry division. Benefits of a battalion inc luded a better span of control, simpler traini ng procedures, greater dispersion on the battl fi l(~ and more 

career opportu nities for infantry offi cers. In the battle group, the commander's 

effecti ve span of control was too great. He had so many diverse elements to supervise (infantry, artillery, engineer, medical, signal, reconnaissance, supply, and maintenance) that he found it difficult to manage the unit. A return to the infantry battalion would simplify command and control, logistics and maintenance, and also 

training. Gi ven the need for dispersion on the battle field, the study noted that 20 

percent of the pcntomic infantry di vision's combat strength was in each battle 

group. The loss ofa single battle group in combat wou ld be Significant. With nine 

infa ntry battalions, the new di visio n would lose only II pe rcent of its battl e 

strength if one of its battalions were hit by nuclear fi re. [n addition, many situations 

in combat required a greater variety of responses than the battle group could easily 

provide. Some tasks werc too large for a company but too small for a battle group; 

others call ed for a forcc larger than one battle group but sma ller than two. The 

smaller-size infantry battalions appeared to answer those needs. Finally, the batt le 

group provided little oppo!1 un ity for infantry officers to gain command experience. 

If the battle group were ret ~ only 5 percent of the Army's infantry lieutenant 

colonels wou ld receive command assignments and only 4 percent of the majors 

would serve as second-in-command. Weighing all these aspects, the planners recommended that infantry battalions replace battle groups.9 

In an e ffort to provide maximum homogeneity, simplicity, and fl exibility, the 

maneuver battalions were kept as simi lar as possible consistent with their individual roles. Each infantry, mechani zed infa ntry, and armor battalion comprised a 

headq uarte rs, th ree line compani es, and a headqua rters and se rvice company. 

Similarity among the maneuver batta lions extended to the reconna issance platoons, which were the same in all battalions, and to the platoons in the reconnaissance squadrons. Given battalions of this nature, companies and platoons could 

be lIsed to bui ld task forces for spec ifi c operations with a minimum of turbulence. Taking advantage of the latest weapons, all infantry battalions and reconnaissance squadrons had two Davy Crocketts, low-yield nuclear weapons that 

were considered the "Sunday punch" of tile ROA D divisions. Infantry and mechanized infantry battalions also had the new ENgin-Teleguide Anti-Char (ENTAC) 

missile, a French-designed antitank weapon. to 
298 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

With fixed bases and va rying 

numbers and types of maneuver bat ~ 

la lions, planners envisaged that divi· 

sia ns could be tailored in three ways. 

The first, "strategi c t,lilori ng," gave 

the Army Starf the opportunity 10 

design un its for a particular environment; the second, "inlernallaclica llailori ng," allowed the division commander to build combat teams for specific 

missions; and the third, "external tactical w iloring," pe rm itted army or 

Davy Crockelf rocket laul/cher corps commanders 10 alter divisions 

according to the circumstances. In the past, divisions had been adapted in all three 

ways, but ROAD made such tailoring easier at all levels. 1 I 

On 4 April 1961 officers from the Continenta l Army Command and the Army 

Staff briefed Decker on the concept, and he approved it nine days later. He told 

Powell, however, that divisions were to be largely fixed organizations because the 

Army lacked the resources to maintain a pool of nondivisional maneuver ballalions 

for intra- or inlenheater tailoring. In Decker's opinion, the interchangeable characteristics of the battalions were sutricicnt to provide tailori ng within and among divisions without keeping extra units. He asked Powell only to consider substituting 

towed artillery for self-propelled artillery, eliminating the I 55-mm. howitzers, and 

reorganizing the rocket balla lion SO that it would includc both an Honest John rocket 

and two 8-inch howitzer batteries. The amount of organic transportation in the 

infantry battalion also seemed excessive, and Decker wanted reductions if possible. 

The st udy provided only two Davy Crocketts for each infantry battalion and reconnaissance squadron; Decker suggested adding a third, making one available for each 

line company or troop in those units. As a priority, Decker wanted doctrine and 

training literature to be quickly developed, panicularly for the support command. 

Doctrine for the employment of nuclear weapons rema ined unclear. 12 

Within a few months the Continental Army Command published draft tables 

fo r ROAD infantry, mec hani zed infantry. and armored divisions (CharI 36). They 

ca lled for I05-mm. howitzers in the infantry division to be towed and a 30 percent reduction in the organic transportation of the infantry battalions. The 155-

mm.l8-inch howitzer battalion remained as planned, but a new rocket battalion 

was designed consisting of a headquarters and service e lement and two Honest 

John batteries. Each infant ry batta lion and reconnaissa nce squad ron had three, 

instead of two, Davy Crocketts.13 

Be fore briefing Chief of StalT Decker on ROAD, Eddleman asked Powe ll 's 

Conti nental Army Command to have ava il able a concept for reorganizing the 

airborne divisio n along sim ilar lines. The vice ch ief of staff believed that 

ROAD could be modi fi ed to incorporate lighter eq uipment for such forces. For 
HHe 

286 

CHART 36-ROAD Division Base, 1961 

AVIATION BN 

290 

Includes one 8" HOW BTAY 

ROAD 

PLUS 

RECON SOON 

788 

VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF 

" II 11 

:; II ME~INF II T~:K 

SIG

S

401 iMECH

4D5tARMO

/Ian; I Strength wi. YlUY depending On the combination 01 m8nuever elements assigned
300 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

U"/e Johll rocket lallllclte,. 

example, the a irborne division would not need as many infantry or tank batta lions <IS other units, towed artill ery could be substituted for self-propelled, the 8-

inch howitzer battery could be eliminated, and a ligh ter rocket could be used in 

place of the Honest John. 14 

Afte r the ap proval of ROAD, the Continenta l Army Command qui ckly 

applied the concept to the airborne division. Its airborne study ca lled for a division base similar to ROAD units. For the arti llery. the 3 18-111111. Little John rocket 

replaced the larger Honest John, and two batteries of Little Johns along wit h a 

battery of 155-mlll. howitzers formed a composite artillery batta lion. They recommended deleting the bridge company from the ROAD engineer battalion and 

reducing the airborne division 's reconnaissance squadron by one ground troop. 

The light tank battalion was to be equipped with new M551 Sheridans, armored 

reconnaissance airborne assault vehicles, but, pending their avai labil ity, the unit 

would employ I06-lllm. recoill ess rifles mOllnted on 1/4-lon trucks. 15 

In September 1961 the Army Staff approved the concept in principle with 

minor modifications. The new 90-mll1. self-propelled antitank guns (M56 SPATs) 

would replace the recoilless rifles, and the number of vehicles was cuI throughout 

the division. When the tables (Char' 37) were published, the airborne division 

tdso lacked the COIllI)Qsite artillery battalion because the 155-111111. howitzer was 

not air-transportable. Instead, the Little John rockets were organized into a twob .. ttery bmta lion.16 

The doctrine of flexible response required combi ned arms units smaller than 

divisions, ilnd the Continental Army Command responded by developing an air-
CHART 37-Airborne Division, 1961 

AIRBORN E DIVISION 

NOTE I 

I 

HHC 

1 

MPCO 

-I OIV ARTILLERY I 

1 

ENGR BN 

134 156 1,661 I 643 

BOE HHC AVIATION BN CAVSQDN 

118 ea 3/0 579 

I I 

1 

HHB 

-I FA BTRY I05·mm HOW 1 ,HHC &~AND 1/8 LITTLE JOHN FABN 

123 4508a 

I. AOM

31

II II 

INFBN TANK BN 

828· 492* 

* Number and type of maneuver battalions may vary. 

NOTE 1 Strength witt vary depending on the number and type of manuever elements as
CHART 38- Airborne Brigade, 1961 

AI RBORN E BRIGAD E 

NOn: 1 

I 

I 

HHC TANK CO ENGR CO 

248 101 147 

RECON TRP FA BN SU

171 105-mm TOWED 

450 

HHO MEO CO 

39 99 

~ ADMIN CO SUPPL

136 TRANS 

188 

* Number and type of maneuver battalions may vary. 

NOn: 1 Strength will vary depending on the combination of manuever element
I 

A NEW DIRECTION- FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 303 

borne brigade. Like divisions, the brigade had no fixed structure but consisted of a 

base, which could command and control from two \0 five maneuver battalions. The 

brigade base consisted of a headquarters company; a recon naissance troop; light 

tank and engineer companies; a lOS-mill. howitzer batta lion; and a support battalion (Cllarl 38). Within the latter organiz.1lion were admin istrative, med ical, supply. 

transport, and ma intenance resources that allowed the brigade to conduct independent operations. The brigade, however, had limitations, incl udi ng inadequate air 

defense artillery and airlift resources. Its mobility on land was restricted by its limited number of org<lnic vehicles. Nevertheless, the brigade met most of the Army's 

requirements fo r a small airborne combat team. At the Army Staff's direction, the 

idea was extended to armor, infantry, and mechan ized infantry brigades. Since such 

units could operate independently or rei nforce divisions, thcy promised to greatly 

increase the overall fl exibility of the fi cld army.! 7 

Powell suggested to Eddlemen during the early development of ROAD Ihal if 

il were • .Ipproved the Army s hou ld have a comprehensive information plan 

explaining the rationale for sueh a major reorga nization. Both the mi li tary and the 

general public had to be rcminded that organizations evolved in response 10 past 

experience and new eq ui pment. Furthermore, politica l implications had to be 

considered. General Taylor, the primary advocate o f pentomic div isions, then 

servi ng on the Wh ite HOllse statT, migh t question the radical shifi. Also, the 

reserve community might object to the turbu lence so soon aOer completi ng the 

penlomie reOl·gan ization.1 8 

Powe ll 's desire for a publicity plan received a boost when the new Kennedy 

admin istration, reacting to the worldwidc struggle with communism, dcc ided to 

improve the readiness of th e na tion's mili tary forces. 011 25 Ma y 196[ , 

President Joh n F. Kennedy announced to a joint session of Congress thaI the 

Army's di visiona l fo rces wou ld be moderni zed to increase conventiona l firepower, improve lactical mobility in any environment, and ensu re nexibi lity. In 

addition, separat e brigades wou ld be organi zed to hel p mcct direct or indirect 

threats th roughout the world.19 

ROAD Delayed 

Kennedy's statement impl ied an immediate l-corganization, but international 

events delayed changes. Du ring the summer of 1961 relations between the Soviet 

Uni on and the United States deterioratcd, particularly over the status of Bcrlin, 

and on 25 July the president asked Congress for funds to fill cxisting pentomic 

divisions and modernize their equipment. He also sought authority to order the 

reserves to a yea r of acti ve duty. Congress agree(~ and the Army postponed the 

ROAD reorganization.20 

To answer Sovie t in iti a tives in Be rlin, Sec re tary of Defense Robe rt S. 

McNamara directed that the five divisions in Europe be brought to full table of 

organization strength and that th e 3d, 8th, and 241h Infa ntry Di visions each be 
ElcmellfS oJ the 32tf Il/fill/tlY /JiI'isiulI trllill lit Fort Lewis. Wushillgtull. durillg 

the Berlin (; ,.i.~is: below, pre-positiol/ell equipment ill GermallY (limits the 

(//.,.;\'(// oJthe 4th Armorell /Jil'isiull ill Operatioll BIG LtFT. 
I 

A NEW DIRECTION- FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 305 

au thorized an additiona l 1,000 troops. The troop increase permitted the complete mechanization of the divisions with additiona l armored personnel carriers. The readiness of the Strategic Army Force wa s in creased in the United 

Stat es and the training ba se WlIS expanded, e limina ting the basic training mission in combat div isions.2l 

In the summer of 196 1 Congress also authori zed the Defense Department 

to order 250,000 reservists (indiv iduals as well as those in units) to acti ve duty 

for twe lve months. The subsequent closing of the Berli n border on 13 August 

1961 sparked another series of mobili zation mea sures. In October the Army 

Reserve's l Oath Division (Tmining) was ordered to active military duty to open 

the traini ng cenler al Fort ChafTce, Arkansas. That same monlh the Kennedy 

admin istration approved the depl oyment of two additional combat divisions to 

the Euro pea n command. Two Nat iona l Gua rd di visions were federa li zed in 

October to replace the divisions programmcd to be deploycd from the strategic 

force, bringing the Iota 1 numbcr of div isions on acti ve du ty 10 six tecn. The 32d 

In fa ntry Division (Wisconsin) was sen t to Fort Polk, Louisi ana, and the 49th 

Armored Di vision (Texas) reported to Fort Hood, Texas. In a ll, 113,254 officers 

and enl isted me n of the Army National Guard and Army Resc rve were ordered 

into active military service.22 

During the crisis no division deployed to Germany, but during the nex t few 

months thc Army took othcr steps to strengthen its forces in Europe. Measures 

included eq uipping the troops with new M 14 ri nes and M60 machine guns and 

accelerating production of M60 ma in battl e tank s and M 11 3 armored personne l 

carriers, actions that permitted the Army to field those systems ea rli e r tha n 

planned. To shorten the time required to move units to Europe, the Army positioned suffic ient materie l in Germany to equip one armored di vision, one in fantry 

division, and several nondivisiona l battalions. To maintain the equipment, personnel from the 2d Armored a nd 4t h In fantry Divisions moved to Germany, but 

eventually permanent caretaker units replaced these men. Shortly afler the eq uipment was placed in Germany, the Army launched Operation BIG LIFT, with units 

from the United States traveling to Europe and conducting exercises with the 

stockpiled equi pmen t, a preclll"Sor of similar exercises that were soon to become a 

regular fixt ure in the Army.23 

The Anny also increased combat readiness in other commands. It replaced the 

cumbersome Honest Johns with Litt le Jol111s in the 82d and 10lst Airbo rn e 

Divisions and 4th and 25 th Infantry Divisions, a step directed toward improving the 

ability to move these units by air. The 25th Infantry Division was brought to full 

strength in Hawaii, and the reinforced airborne balt1e group that had been sent to 

Okinawa in June 1960 was re lieved from assignment to the di vision but remained 

in Okinawa. In Korea the strengt h of two divisions was !l lso incrclIsed.24 

Fol lowi ng the ca ll-up of the reserves for the Berlin crisis, Congress au thorized .1 modest penllllllcnt increase in the strength of the Regular Army, and in 

January 1962 Secre tary McNamara app roved th e act iv,lIion o f the fi rst two 
306 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

ROAD div isions. wh ich were eventually to replace the two National Guard units 

in the strategic fo rce. On 3 February the Fou rth U.S. Army reorganized the l SI 

Armored Division, using its Combat Command A as its nucleus, at Fori Hood. 

The division became a mechanized infantry unit having four armor and six mechanized infantry battalions. Sixteen days latcr the Fifth U.S. Army reactivated the 

5th Infantry Di vision (less its 2<1 Brigade and a lank battalion) at Fort Carson, 

Colorado, by abso rbing th e personnel of the training ce nt er th ere. T he 2d 

Brigade, 51 h In fantry Division, was activated at Fo ri Devens, Massachusetts, 

lIsin g the resources of the 2<1 Infa ntry Brigade, wh ich was inacti vated. The 

brigade continucd to support reserve traini ng in the First U.S. Army area, wh il e 

one of the 5th Di vision's tank battalions stationed at Fort Irwin, California, supported the Comba t Developments Command 's test and eva lua tion programs. 

Stretched from coast to coast, the 5th Infantry Di vision had three in fantry batta lions at Fort Devens, onc armor and six infantry batta lions at Fort Carson, and one 

tank battalion at Fort Irwin .25 

Whcn McNamara approved the activation of the two Regular Army divisions 

in early 1962. he decided to delay reorganization of the remainder of the Army 

until fisca l ye'lr 1964 because of the Berli n crisis. But events soon overtook that 

decision. For example, during the spring of \ 962 Powell directed that all instruction at th e Infantry School aner I July re nect ROAD doctri ne. Thereforc. the 

In fantry School asked for permission to reorga nize the 1st Infantry Brigade under 

a ROAD structure. Instead, the Army Sta ff decided to inactivate the pentomicstructured brigade and replace it with a new ROAD unit, the 197th In fantry 

Brigade, which resolved a unit designation issue.26 

The ROAD reorganization once again brought up the matter of unit designations. Di visiona l brigades had not appeared in the Army force structure since 

the dem ise of the old squa re di vision. Army leaders dec ided that two out of the 

three new brigade headqua rters in each infantry divisio n would inherit disbanded or inactiva ted infantry brigade headquarters assoc iat ed wit h the former 

square di visions. Wi th the designation 1st Infantry Brigade slated to ret urn to 

the 1st In fantry Di vision when it converted to ROA D, the ex istin g unit at Fort 

Bcnning required a new name. Fo r it and ot her se parate bri gades, the st afT 

se lec ted infantry brigade numbe rs that had been assoc iat ed wit h Organ ized 

Reserve divisions that were no longer in the force. For the new ROAD brigade 

at Fo rt Benning, Georgia, for example, the adju tmll general on I August 1962 

restored e lements of the 99t h Reconnaissance Troop, which thirty years earlier 

had been orga nized by consol idating infantry brigade headquartc rs and headqua rters companies of th e 99th In fan try Di vision, as He adquart ers and 

Headq uarters Companies, 197th and 198t h Infantry Brigades. The fo llowing 

month the 197th Infan try Brigade was acti vated at Fort Benning. For the third 

brigade in each infan try divisio n, the stafT redesignated the division headquarters company, which had been disba nded duri ng the pentomic reorganizlllion, as 

a brigade he"dq uarters. For example. the 3d Brigade, 5th Infan try Division, 
I 

A NEW DIRECTION- FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 307 

perpe tuated Headquarters Company, 5th Infa ntry Di vision, which had bee n 

inacti vated in 1957. In the armored div ision, Combat Commands A, S , and C 

were redesignated as the 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades.27 

When the Third U.S. Army activated the 1971h Infa ntry Brigade at Fort 

Benning to support training at the Infa ntry Center, it consisted of a composite 

artillery battal ion (105-rnm. and IS5-mm. howitzers and Honest Johns), an armor 

battal ion, a mechani zed infan try battal ion, two infa ntry batta lions, an engineer 

company, and a chemical platoon, but no support battalion. The strength of the 

brigade was approx imately 3,500 Illcn,28 

Aficr the abofted Bay of Pigs invasion and rumors of Soviet assistancc to 

Cuba, McNamara decided to bolster available Army forccs in the Ca ri bbean area. 

The Army replaced the battle group in the Canal Zone with the 193d In fantry 

Brigade, whieh was activated on 8 August 1962. Initia lly it consisted of only one 

infan try batta lion and one airborne infantry battalion, bu t short ly after activation 

lln artillery baltery and an engineer company were added. 29 

By mid-August 1962 the I st Armored and 5th Infantry Divisions atlllined the 

approved readiness status for the strategic fo rce, and the Army readjusted its divisions by rcleasing the reserve units three months early. Subsequently the National 

Guard's 32d Infantry Division and 49t h A rmored Di vision left federal service and 

revcrtcd to state control, and the 100th Di vision (Training) a lso reverted to 

reservc status, closing the training center at Fort Chaffee.30 

In Octobcr 1962, less than three months after the 1st Armored Division hlld 

become pa rt of the strategic force, the Army lIsed it <IS part of an cmcrgency 

assault force be ing llsscmb1cd to countcr the buildup of Soviet missiles in Cuba. 

For morc immediatc access to port fa cilities, the division moved from Fort Hood 

to Fort Stewart, Georgia, where it conducted a series of amphibious exerc ises. As 

tensions eased during thc late fall, "Old Ironsides" rct urned to Fort Hood without 

conducting any active opcrations against Cuba .3t 

When the Army put ofT reorganizing the remainder of the Regula r Army divisions under ROAD un til Jan uary 1963, the delay pcrmitted the 1st Armorcd and 

5th Infantry Di visions to evaluate the conce pt. General Dec ke r re ported to 

Secrctary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance that "ROAD provides substantial improvements in command structure, organi zation fl ex ibility, capabilit y For sllstained 

combat, t<lct ica l mObility (grou nd and air), balanced fire power (nuclear and nonnuclear), logist ical support, and compatibi lit y with Alli ed forces (particula rly 

NATO)."32 The chief of sta lT added thaI commanders of the 1st Armored and 5th 

In fant ry Di visions had not identified any major problems Ihat wou ld req uire 

changes in Ihe general concept)] 

Decker 5.1W advantages and disadvantages in the pending ROAD reorganiz.1-

lion. A comparison between the ROAD infantry and mechanized infantry divisions 

wi th the augmented pentomic infnntry division showed somc sign ificant gains for 

the new organi zation. With only a 2 percent increase in manpower strength , the 

ROAD organization exhibited .1 profound growth in combat power, which in some 
308 MANEUVER AND FIR EPOWER 

weapons systems was over 200 percent. But the new divisions were going to be 

costly and the full implementation of ROAD would have to await the arrival of new 

equipment. Until then fixed-wing aircraft wou ld have to be lIsed in place of he licopters, and infantry battal ions would substitute for mechanized infantry battalions 

until armored persollnel carriers were available. Furthermore, because of insufficient personnel, the divisions wou ld be maintained alless than idea l strength ,34 

The ROA 0 Reorganization 

The Army Staff began planning fo r the ROAD reorganization during the summer of 1962. It sci the combination o f ma neuver clements as follows: for the 

armored di vision, six tank and five mechanized infa ntry battal ions; for the mechanized infantry div ision, three tank and seven mechani zed infantry battal ions; for 

the infantry div ision, two tank and eight infantry battalions; and for the airborne 

division, one assault gun (tank) lind eight airborne infantry batta lions. The planners <tnticipaled difficulty in finding the men to fill the units because the <tuthorized strengt h of the Regular Army w<ts only 960,000. Decker recommended that 

Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance seek Department of De fen se approval fo r an 

increase in Army strength as well as the retention of 3,000 KATUSA personnel in 

both the I st Cavalry and 7th Infantry Divisions stationed in Korea. If no increase 

could be ob ta e(~ then Decker recommended that divisions in the United States 

and Korea have fewer maneuver battalions than outlined in the pla n.35 

Reorgani zation of the remaining divisions look place between January 1963 

and May 1964 (Table 24). BUI, as fea red, the Department of De fense decided not 

to seek an increase in the size of the Army. and the reoftJanization left the Army's 

divisions at reduced strength except for the units in Europe. Infantry, mechanized 

infantry, and armored di visions ra nged between 14,000 and 16,000 me n each, 

except for th e I st Cava lry and 7th Infantry Di visions, whi ch were authorized 

about 12,000 men each plus their KATUSA I>crsonnel. In the airborne di visions, 

nine airborne infantry battalions and a tank battalion replaced the e ight airborne 

infantry battalions and assaul t gun (tank) battalion, but the airborne tank batta lion 

was alloned only experimental equipment. The 82d and 10Ist Airborne Divisions 

fi elded about 13,500 men each. In Germany the airborne ca pabi lity was moved 

from the 24th Infantry Division at Augsburg to the 8th In fantry Division at Bad 

Kreuznach, with one brigade conta ining all the airborne assets.36 

As the Regu lar Army completed the ROAD reorgan ization, the Army made 

rllrthcr revisions in the division organizations. Headquarters and service batteries 

in all artill ery battalions except fo r the Honest John unit were combined to save 

l>ersonnel. More important, the Davy Crocketts were restricted to infantry battalions, and the weapons were to be issued only in response to spec ific instructions. 

The Army had debated the appropriate level at which to control nuclear weapons 

sinee their introduction. Like its predecessors, thc Kenned y administration continued to stress pol itica l control of such weapons.3? 
A NEW DIRECTION- fLEXIBLE RESPONSE 309 

Departing from past practice, the Defense Depa rtment decided to reorganize 

the reserve divisions concu rrently with the Regular Army's cOllversion 10 ROAD. 

Immediately the old question arose about the number of divisions needed in the 

reserves to meet mobilization requirements. Studies after the pentamic reOl"ganization suggested that the Army needed forty-t hree divisions, including twentynine in the reserves. The new numbers gave the Army a surplus of eight reserve 

divisions, but Army leaders also wa nted more separate brigades to add flexibility 

to the fo rce. Laic in \962 the De fense Department approved reorganizing reserve 

units under ROAD.38 

Following the Defense Department's guidance, thc Army Staff decided to 

retain one Army Reserve division in each of the six Army areas and to eliminate 

four divisions. Army commanders selected the 63<1. 77th, 81 st, 83d, 90th, and I02d 

Infantry Divisions for reten tion and reorganized them under ROAD by the end of 

April 1963. Each division had two tank and six infantry battalions. With the elimination of the 79th, 94th, 96th, and I03d Infantry Divisions, the Army decided to 

reta in thcir headquarters as a way to preserve spaces for general and field grade 

officers. It reorganized the un its as operationa l headquarters (subsequently called 

command headquarters [division]) and directed them to supervise the training of 

combat and support units locatcd in the former divisional areas and to provide for 

their administrative support. If an extensive mobilization were to occur, the staff 

believed that these units could become the nucle i for new divisions.39 

In December 1962 Sccreta ry Vance asked the states and territories to accept a 

new National Guard troop allotment contain ing 23 divisions (6 armored and 17 

in fantry). The Army Staff initia lly planned to mechanize two of the seventeen 

infantry divisions, but shortages of equipment forced their retention as standard 

infantry organizations. Somewhat reluctan tly, the governors <lccepted the new 

troop basis. By 1 May 1963 the states completed the reorganiz<ltion, a mon th 

ahead of sched ule, with the in fantry divisions having two tank and six infantry 

battalions and the armored divisions contrOlling five ta nk and four mecha nized 

infantry battalions.40 

Because of equipment shortages each National Guard infantry division lacked 

its full ROAD base. The stales were allowed to omit two company-size units in each 

division base from the following menu: an airmobile company in the aviation battalion, an air cavalry troop in the reconnaissance squadron, or the Honest John battery in the composite artil1ery battalion. They chose not to organize a total of 16 air 

cavalry troops, 13 airmobile companies, and 5 Honcst John batteriesAl 

In planning the ROAD reorganization, the Army Staff determined that the 

Regular Army needed one airborne and five infantry brigades for uniq ue missions not appropriate for a division. The airborne brigade was to replace the battle 

group on Okinawa, thus significantly increasing the forces there, and the infantry 

brigades were to serve in Berlin, Alaska, the Canal Zone, and the United States. 

No fixcd combination of maneuver clements was est'lblished for the brigades, 

which were, instead, to be tailored for thcir special missions.42 
TABLE 24 

Maneuver Element Mix of Divisions 

ROAD Reorganization, 30 June 1965 

Division Localion Ma

Reglliar Army oj Headqllarters 0." Illf Mech A

1st Armored Fe Hood, Tex. Feb 62 5 4 

1st Cavalry Ft. Benning, Ga. Jul 63 5 2 

I SI Infantry Fe Riley, Kans. Jan 64 5 2 

2d Armored Ft. Hood. Tex. Jul63 4 

2d Infantry Ft. Benning, Ga. Apr64 5 2 

3d Armored Germany Oct 63 5 

3d [nfant!)' Germany Aug 63 7 

4th Armored Germany Aug63 5 

4th Infantry Ft. Lewis, Wash. Oct 63 5 2 

5th Infantry FI. Carson. Colo. Feb 62 8 

7th Infantry Korea Jul63 5 2 

8th Infantry Germany Apr63 4 

24th Infantry Gcmlany Feb 63 7 

25th Infantry Hawaii Aug 63 6 

82dAirbomc FI. Bragg, N.C. May 64 

IO! SI Airborne Ft. Campbell, Ky. Feb 64 

National Gllard 

26th Infanll)' BOSlon, Mass. Mar 63 6 

27th Armored Syracuse, N.Y. Apr 63 4 

28th Infantry Harrisburg, Pa. Apr 63 6 

29th Infantry Baltimore, Md. Mar 63 6 

and Staunton. Va. 

30th Infantry Raleigh, N.C. Mar 63 6 

315t Infantry Binningham, Ala. Apr/May 63 6 

and Jackson, Miss. 
TABLE 24-Collliinued 

Dil,isioll Locatioll Ma

NatiOlla! Guard oj Headquarters Dale "i Mech A

(cont.) 

32d Infanuy Milwaukee. Wise. Apr 63 6 

33d Infanlry Urbana, Ill. Apr 63 6 

36th Infanlry Austin, Tex . Mar 63 6 

37th Infantry Columbus. Ohio Apr 63 6 

38th Infantry Indianapolis, Ind. Mar 63 6 

39th Infantry New Orleans, La. May 63 6 

and Little Rock. Ark. 

40th Armored Los Angeles, Calif. Mar63 4 

41st Infantry Portland. Ore. Mar63 6 

and Seattlc, Wash. 

42d Infantry New York. N.Y. Apr63 6 

45th Infantry Oklahoma City, Okla. Apr63 6 

46th Infantry Lansing, Mich. Mar63 6 

47th Infantry SI. Paul. Minn. Apr63 6 

48th Armored Macon, Ga. Apr 63 4 

49th Armored Dallas. Tex. Mar63 4 

49th Infantry Alameda. Calif. Mar63 6 

50th Armored East Orange. N.J. Jan 63 4 

Army Reserl"e 

63d Infantry Bell. Calif. Apr 63 6 

77th Infantry New York, N.Y. Mar 63 6 

8lst Infanlry Atlanla, Ga. Apr 63 6 

83d Infantry Cleveland. Ohio Apr 63 6 

90th Infantry Austin, Tex. Mar 63 6 

102d Infantry SI. Louis. Mo. Apr 63 6 

a Equipment only. 

b Reorganized as an aimlObile division 30 June 1965. 
312 

." 

lSI Om/alioll. 60/11 IlIfilllll),. al For/ 

Ricl/(//'d~oll. Alaska 

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Even tually four more Regul ar 

Army brigades were orga ni zcd in 

ad di tion to the 19 3d and 197th 

Infantry Brigades (Table 25). To test 

new materie l al Fori Ord, California , 

th e Co mb,l t Deve lopmcn ts 

Co mmand formed th e 194t h 

Armored Brigade, whi c h assumed 

the missio n of the 5 th In fa ntr y 

Di visio n c leme nt. Unit ed States 

Army, Alask a, organized the 171s1 

and 172d Infan try Brigades al Forts 

Wainwrig ht and Richardson, and 

U. S. Army, Pacific, organi zed the 

173d Airborne Brigade in March 

1963 on Oki nawa. The 2d Battl e 

Group , 503d Infantry, station ed 

there si nce 1960, and the I st Battle 

Group, 503d Infantry, d e pl oyed 

from Fort Bragg, formed the nueleus 

o f tha t brigade. Shortly thereafte r 

the 173d's bailie grou ps were reo rgani zed as ni rbornc in fantry battal ions. 

Berlin, howcver, did not receive a tabl e of orga ni zation infantry brigade but 

reta ined the Berli n Brignde orga ni zed in 1961 under a rnissiollworientcd table of 

distribution and allow<lnccs.43 

In the Army Reserve some former di visiona l units assigned to thc 79th, 

94th, 96th, and 103d Infantry Di visions were used to orga nize four brigades, 

wh ich added nexibi lilY to the force as well as provided fou r genera l offi cer 

reserve billets. In Jan uary nnd February 1963 the 157th, 187th, 191sl, and 2051h 

Infant ry Brigades we re orga nized wit h headquarters in Pennsy lva ni a, 

Massach usetts, Montana, and Min nesota, respectively (see Table 25). As with 

the Regu lar Army brigades, the number and type of maneuver e leme nts in each 

ArlllY Reserve brigade vflricd.44 

The 34th, 35th, 43d, and 5 1 sl Infantry Divisions, lllultistate National Guard 

units, dropped Ollt o f the force during the reorganiza tion, and in pari we re 

rep laced by the 67th (Nebraska and Iowa), 69th (Kansas and Missouri), 86th 

(Vermont and Connecticut), a nd 53d (Florida and South Caroli na) In fantry 

Brigades. Each brigade fielded five maneuver clements. In addition, the governors a lso agreed to mai ntain the 34t h ( Iowa), 35 th (M isso u ri), 43<1 

(Con necticut), 51st (South Ca ro li na), a nd 55 th ( Fl orida) Co mm and 

Headquarters to supervise the training of combat and support units located in 

the former divisional areas. The st al es also reorgani zed the 29t h, 92d, and 258th 

Infantry Brigades, which had been formed in 1959.45 
TABLE 25 

Maneuver Element Mix of Brigades 

ROAD Reorganization, 30 June 1965 

Location Date 

Compollem Brigade of Headquarters Reorgani=ed Inl 

NG 29th Infantry Honolulu. Hawaii Apr 63 3 

NG 53d Annored Tampa, Fla. Feb 63 

NG 67th Infantry Lincoln. Neb. Apr 63 

NG 69th Infantry Topeka, Kans. Apr 63 2 

NG 86th Annored Montpelier, Vt. Apr 63 

NG 92d Infantry San Juan, Puerto Rico May 64 4 

AR 157th Infamry Upper Darby. Pa. Jan 63 1 

RA 171s1 Infantry Ft. Wainwright, Alaska Jut63 

RA [ 72d Infantry Ft. Rich3rdson, Alaska Ju163 

RA 173d Airborne Okinawa Mar 63 

AR 187th Infantry Boston, Mass Jan 63 3 

AR 191 SI Infantry Helena, Mont. Feb 63 

RA 193d Infantry Ft. Kobbc, Canal Zone Aug 62 

RA 194th Annored Ft. Ord, Calif. Dec 62 

RA 197th Infantry Ft. Benning, Ga. Sep62 2 

AR 205th Infantry Ft. Snelling, Minn. Feb 63 3 

NG 258th Infantry Phoenix, Ariz. Mar 63 3 

a Company-size unit 
JI4 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

The following year, to increase fUrih er flexibility in the rese rves, the 

National Guard's 53d and 86th Infantry Brigades were converted to armored 

brigades, and the 671h Infant ry Brigade was reorganized as mechanized 

infantry. The 53d and 67th retained their five maneuver elements, but the 86th 

lost one batt ali on. The 1964 reorgan ization also provided the 2581h Infantry 

Brigade in Arizona with an armor battal ion from Missouri and a field artillery 

batta li on from fa r-away Virginia.46 

Airmobility 

The ROAD reorganization sought nex ible fo rces to meet worldwide commitments on various battl efields, but by April 1962 McNamara had become COIlcerned about unit mobility. He believed thai firepower had been favored over 

maneuverability and that morc aircraft. could achicvc a bctter balance. The Army's 

earl icr explorations had focused primarily on thc number o r aircraft., airplanes 

and helicopters, needed for observation and transportation, bu t some championed 

a tactica l role for the latter. McNamara wanted the Army to take a new look at thc 

employment of aircraft in land warfare, particularly the helicoptcr.47 

In th e spring of 1962 the Con tine ntal Army Command appoi ntcd the 

Mobility Requirements Board, often referred to as the Howze Board aftcr its 

president, Ll. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, to study the matter. After three months 

of frantic work, including fi eld exerciscs, the board came to the general conclu~ 

sion that the adoption of air mobil ity, the capabi lity ofa unit to deploy and receive 

support from aircraft. under the control of a ground commander, was necessa ry 

and desirable. In some ways, Ihe transition seemed as inevitable as that from ani~ 

mal to molor transporl.48 

The Howze Board recommended sweeping cha nges in the usc of aircraft., 

including the organ ization of air assault di visions. Although combat support e~ 

ments were not idenlifie(~ these divisions were to resemble ROAD organizations 

(CharI 39) and were to have sufficient aircraft to lift one~third of the divisional 

combat elemcn ts at one time. The division had some xed~w in g aircrart, but most 

were to be in <In air transport brigade, a nondivisional unit, which was to reinforce 

the transport capabilities of the division. To keep the division as light as possible, 

the board suggcsted the use of new, lighter I 05~mm. howitzers, Little John rock~ 

cIs, and air~to~groun d rockets mou nted on helicopters as replacements for the 155~ 

mill. howitzers. In addition, infantry was to be relieved of all burdens except ror 

those associated with combat. The board's estimates for divisional aircraft. ranged 

between 400 and 600, but g round vehi cle requirements fell from 3,400 to I, I 00. 

Air assault divisions were to rep lace airborne div isions, and the board recom~ 

mended assigning airborne~qllalified personnel to the new units. Air cavalry com~ 

bat brigades (ACCB) were endorsed for classic cavalry missions-screening, 

reconnoitering, and delaying actions. Such brigades werc to be strictly air units, 

and they were to employ attack helicopters in antitank roles. The board also rec~ 
CHART 39- Howze Board-Air Assault Division, 

AIR ASSAULT 

DIVISION 

I 

I I 

AI R CAVALRY 

~ 

BN 

DIV D

ARTILLERY AVIA

I I I 

LlTILE JOHN AERIAL ROCKET SURVEILLANCE 

BN BN ATIACK BN 

105-mm 

~ ASSAULT 

HOWITZER BN HELLICOPTER B
3 16 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

ommcnded more aircrafl for infantry, mechanized infantry. and armored divisions; 

and the formation of aviation units for corps, army, ilnd special warfare un its.49 

The Contin ental Army Command developed tabl es of organization for a 

ROAD ypc air assault di vision, which the Department of the Army dec ided to 

test. The first step was the activation orthe 11th Air Assau lt Division (the former 

11th Airborne Di vision) on I February 1963, along with the 10th Air Transport 

Brigade, at Fort Benning, Georgia . As proposed by the Howze Board, the air 

transport brigade was not organic to the division. but was to serve as a lines of 

communications unit for hau ling men, equipment, and supplies in the field. In 

October and November 1964 the experimental division, including 3,250 soldiers 

from the 2d Infantry Division, and the transport brigade conducted full-sca le tests 

of assault tactics. At the conclusion of the test the director, Lt. Gen. Charles W. G. 

Rich, recommended the addition of both units to the permanent force structurc . 

He reported that the integration of Army aircraft into the ground units provided 

the crucial maneuver capability for light mobi le forces to close wit h and destroy 

the enemy. Operati ng with other divisions, airmobi le units offered a balance of 

mobi lity and increased Army combat readiness on a theater level.50 

The rccommendation to organize an airmobile division set offa debate wit hin 

the Joi nt Chiefs of Staff. The U.S. Air Force had been watChing the development 

and growth of Army aviation for years with increasing concern. Eaeh divisional 

reorgmlization after World War II resu lted in more aircraft being added to these 

unit's. The chief of staff. U.S. Air Force, believed acti vation of the div ision premature and judged it too speciali zcd to be cost effective. Although nOI slated, the Air 

Forcc rell that airmobi lity in rringed on its ground support mission. Earlier in the 

1960s the Air Force had cond ucted tests to en hance the mob ilit y and combat 

e ffectiveness of divisions by improving troop lift, aerial resupply, close air support, and aeri al firc sUPI>Ol't, but found most of the Army's eq ui pment 100 large 

for its aircraft. At the time thc Air Force had recommended that the Army develop 

equipmen t in the infantry di vision that was more compatible with existing Air 

Force planes. McNamara now disagreed. He and the Defense Dcpartment sta ff 

had been pushing for greatcr Army involvement in aviation since 1962. The 

Army's proposa l met his approval, and he directed the forlllll tion of an airlllobil e 

div ision as part of the permanent rorce. The air tra nsport brigade, however, did 

not win a place in the forcc.5 t 

The Army Staff selected the I sl Cavalry Di vision 10 become the Army's first 

airlllobi le division. Since that unit was serving in Korea, this resulted in a massive paper shuffle, wit h men and materiel remaining in place tIrld unit designations moving back and forth. In the end the Korean-based 1st Cavalry Division 

was replaced by the 2d Infantry Di vision while the assets of the 2d Infantry 

Di vision and II tit Air Assau lt Division at Fort Benning were used to reorgani ze 

the 1st Cava lry Division (Airlllobil e).52 

Thc 1st Cavalry Di visions configuration differed from the teslunit (Cha,., 40). 

It had no Little John rocket batta lion or attack helicopter battalion because the Air 
AVN BN 

ASSAULT 

52iU 

CHART 40-Airmobile Division, 10 July 1965 

' One .1rllornt bngede. 

I Thle, .,rborn, bftuoliof'ls. 

' On, firborn. b'ltllion. 
318 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Force o r other orga nic divisiona l wcapons assumed the lludcnr fire suppo!'t mission 

of the rockets. The di vision fi elded an aviation group (<1 general aviation support 

company and one assault support and two assault aviation ballaliolls). Divisional 

he licopters numbered 335. Althoug h the Howze Board believed the !lumber of 

ground vehicles could be cuI by two-thirds, the division was authorized 1,500, or 

approximately half the number in the other types of ROA D divisions. The vehicles 

moved supplies, artillery, and antitan k weapons and helped in g round reconnaissance. The airmobile infan try battalion had one combat support company (reconnaissance, mortar, and antitank resources) and three rifle companies. Although the 

battalion lacked ENTACs, 4.2-inch mortars, and .50-caliber machine g un s, the 

Infantrymen had a number of new weapons. The M 14 rifle was superseded by the 

lighter MX 16E I (M 16), wh ich put out more firepower and was supplemented by 

the M79 40-111111. grenade I,llltlchcr with a dedicated grenadier. S3 

The question as to whether the airmobile division should replace the airborne 

division had not been resolved. Planners decided that one brigade- three in fantry 

battalions and one artillery battalion- was to be authorized airborne-qualified 

personne l as an in terim measure.54 

In summary, the ROA D reorganization ensured the Army's ability to offer 

flex ible responses to changing world conditions. On I July 1965, the Army 's division and brigade forces consisted of 45 div isions (16 in the Regular Army, 23 in 

the National Guard, and 6 in the Army Reserve) and 17 brigades (6 in the Regular 

Army, 7 in the National Guard, and 4 in the Army Reserve). Of the Regula r Army 

di visions, e ight se rved outside the co ntinental United States and e ight with in. 

Di visions and brigades in the three components had more fl exibility than ever 

before. As in the past, personne l problems prevented the Army from fi elding divisions at their ideal strength, but ROAD's inherent capability for interchanging 

battalions meant that, if necessary, some units could be brought to wa rtime standards quickly. The di visions, however, still awaited their true test-combat. 

From the Army's poin t of view the Ken nedy era had produced measurable 

organizational gains. The budget-driven pentomi c divisions had been adopted primarily fo r politica l purposes and had never been popul<lr within the Army. While 

Army leaders were enamored of the new airmobi le concept backed by McNamara 

and others, Ihe ROA D divisions werc morc popular, providi ng the Army with 

solid standard divisional bases and the abi lity 10 tailor brigade-size task fo rces 

w ithin the d ivision usi ng a va riabl e mix of combat battalions. And with 

Kennedy's support for expanding the g round componcnts and technologica l capabilities, the future of the Army seemed morc secure in the budget-driven defense 

community. 
A NEW D[RECT[ON- FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 

Notes 

J[9 

I Public I~{/"en' of {he Prcsidel1ls of 1111: Ullited Stales: ./01111 F. Kennedy. /961 (Washinglon. 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 401. 

2 Robert A. Doughty, 711(: E\'{III/mioll of us A rill)' TaClic(I/ Doc/rillc, J 946- 76: Lcm,cl/l1'orlh 

/Japers (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combal Stlldics Institute, J 979), p. 19. 

3 Modern Mobile Army 1965- 1970 (U) (S hOfl Title: MOMAR I), (Fort Monroe. Va.: 

COlllincntal AmlY COtnl11l1nd, 1960), DAMH-HSO; Gordon 13. Roger. "Ground Mobility," Armor 

69 (SCp- OCI 1960): 24-26. 

4 Ltr, aeors 10 CO, CON ARC, 16 Dec 60. sub: Reorganization of Infantry nnd Armored 

Divisions and Creation ofa Mccllllnizcd Division, Division General file, OAMH-HSO. 

5 Ibid.; Interview, nuthor with Col George Sedberry, 19 Jun 78, DAMI-I-HSO; Memo, George 

Donmis for General Starry, sub: Historical Background of Three Versus Four Companies, 16 May 

69. Historielll Office, U.S. Amly Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). 

6 Interview, author with Edd leman. 18 Scp 74. DAM H-HSO: J. Perret-Gentilll, "Divisiol1sThree or Five Elements?" MifiWIJI Rel'ieu' 41 (Feb 1961): 16- 25. 

7 Llr. CG. CONARC, to CofS, 1 Mar 61 , sub: Reorganization Objective Army Oi"isions 

1961 - 1965, ATCO 322 (Oiv). Divisiol1 General file. OAMH -HSO; Reorganization Objective 

Army Divisions 1965 (hereafter dted as ROAD (5) (Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Continenta l 

Army Command, 1960). Some speculate thnt the ROAD concept was worked out at the Arnly War 

College before Eddleman instructed the command to undertake the study. (Sec Memo, Donmis to 

Starry, sub: HistoricallJackground on Three Versus Four Companies.) 

S ROAD 65, Annex E. 

9 Ibid., Annex A. 

10 Ibid .. Annex E. Annex F. 

t t Ibid., Annex 13. 

t2 Ltr, 0 - 3, CONARC, to DCofS for Military Orcrations, DA, 10 Apr 61 , sub: Prepnmtion of 

TOE for ROAD-65 Concept. ATrNG-O&E 320.3, and Llr. CofS to CG, CONARC, 13 AI}r 61 , 

sub: Reorganization of Army Di visions. both Division General file, DAM H-HSO. 

tJ TOE 7E (Draft), Infantry Division, undated; TOE 17E (Draft), ArnlOred Division, undated: 

and TOE 37E (OmO), Mechanized Infantry Di vision, undmed. 

t4 Memo for Record, CONARC. Combat Developments Plans Division. 23 Mar 61. sub: 

DCSO PS I'reliminary Report to the Vice Chief of Slnff on "Reorganizat ion Objective Army 

Division 1965 (ROAD-65):' ATSWD-P 322 (Army). Division Genernl file. DAMH-HSO. 

t5 Reorganization Objective Army Divisions 1965 (ROAD-65) Airborne Division (Fort 

Monroe. Va.: Continental ArmyComm,md. 1961), DAMH-HSO. 

t6 CONARC, "Summary of Major Events and Problems. FY 1962," vol. 3, pp. 3- 7, DAMHI-ISR; TOE 57E, Airborne Division, 15 Aug 1963. 

t7 Llr, CONARC to DCofS for Militnry OI}cTntions, 31 M;IY 61. sub: ROAD-65 Type Brigade 

(Separatc, Airborne), ATSND-P 322 (Di\'). and Ltr, CONARC to Commandant, U.S. Armor 

School, 28 Sep 61, sub: Separate Brigade Organizations Under ROAD, AlTNO-D&R (Div), both 

Brigade General file, DAMH -I-ISO. 

t8 Llr. Powell to Eddleman. 23 Feb 61 , Division General file. DAM I·I-I-ISO. 

t9 Kennedy. Papers of the Presidell/s. 1961. p. 401. 

20 Ibid., pp. 533- 36; DA Bull 5, 1961. 

2t Robert W. Coakley, Walter G. I-i ermes, J:mles 1'. Schnabel, and Earl F. Ziemke, "U.S. 

Army Expansion and Readiness. 1961 - 1962:' Ms. eh. II. DAMH-HSR. The Slralegic Army Force 

(STRAF) was comprised of units to provide a mobilization expansion base. a source of trained 

units and replacements to support forces deployed overseas. and a combat-ready elemem designed 

to serve as a readily aVllilable force for usc wherever needed. 

22 Ibid.; Executive Order 10957. OA Bull 5. 1961; Department of Ihe Army. Forces ill 

Depth. "Olle ArIllY " ill Actioll. /96/- /962 (W:lshingtotl. D.C.: n.p .. (962) (herealkr cited as 
320 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

"Olle Arm)''' ill ;/cliQII). 

23 Fom::SI K. Kleinman. "Front lmu Ccnlcr: The Chunging Army," An11Y 12 (Feb 1962): 16; 

DepW"/lIIelll of Defellse Al/lll1at Uep0rl. FY 11)62, PI'. 100, 110, 113; Public AITairs Division. Big 

Lift /963 (U.S. Army. Europe, 1963). 

24 Kleinman, "Front and Ccnlcr." PI'. 17- 18; Llf. TAG 10 CGs, Third and Sixth Armies. (md 

Chief of Engineers, 28 NOli 61, sub: Rcorgallizlllion of Units, AOAO-O (M) 322 (6 Nov 61) 

DeSPER, Llr, TAG to co, Third U.S. Army, 27 Feb 62, sub: Reorganization orlhe 82d Airbol11c 

Division, AOAO (M) 322 (16 Feb 62) DeSPER. LIT. TAO to CinC, USARI'AC, 14 JUIl 61 , sub: 

Ch:mgc in Status OfUllils, AOIIO-O (M) 322 (2 Jun 61) DCsrER. Llr, TAG 10 CinC, USARI'AC, 

27 Mar 62, sub: Change in SIMllS ofUllilS. AOAO-O (M) 322 (14 M:lr 62) DCSPER, and Ur, TAG 

to CG, Sixlh U.S. Army, 15 Feb 62, sub: I~eorganiz:llion of the 4th Il1fhl1try Division, AGAO-O 

(M) 322 (15 Feb 62) DCSPER. all AG Reference files, HistoriClll Dula C;lrds, Divisions, DAMHIISO. 

25 COllkley et ;11., "Army Expansion, 1961 - 62," IIp. 124-57 passim; Mcmo, Deputy Sec o f 

Defense to Scc of Defense. sub: Plan fOT Activation of Two Additional Active AOlly Divisions, 18 

Jlln 62, Division General file. llnd Llr, TAG 10 CGs, CONARC. and other addresses, 22 Jan 62. 

sub: Change in Status of Units. 22 Jan 62, AGAO-O (M) 322 (22 Jan 62) DCSPER, and Llr, TAG 

to CGs. CONARC, and olher addresses, 26 Jan 62. same subject, AGAO-O (M) 322 (26 Jan 62) 

DCSI'ER. both AG Reference files, all DAMH-I-ISO. 

26 Llr, Corso U.s. Anny Infantry Center. to CGs. CONARC and Third U.S. AOllY, 12 Mar 62. 

sub: Reorganization of 1st Brigmlc under ROA D, AGICT (Adjutant General, Inf)uI1rY Center), Ltr. 

CONARC to CG, U.S. Army InJ:1ntry Center, same subject. 13 Jun 62; ATUR-I'&O (Unit Tmining 

:lnd Readiness-I)lans and Operation Branch. DF. DCors/Unit Training and Relldiness), CONARC, 

to DCG :'Ind CotS. CONARC, same subject, 23 May 62. and Ltr, TAG to CG. Third U.S. Anny, 20 

Sep 62. sub: Change in Status of I St and 197th Infantry Brigade, AGAO-O (M) 322 (5 Sep 62) 

DCSPER, all lSI Brigade, IstlnfDiv, DAM H-J-ISO. 

27 John W. Wike, ., 173d AirbonlC Brig;HJe," Fact Sheet for DOD I-Iearings, 30 Apr 63. 173d 

Airborne Orig;lde file , DAM H-HSO; Llr. TAG to CG. Third U.s. Anny, 20 Scp 62, sub: Change in 

St,ltus of lsI and 1971h Infantry Brigade. 

28 Ll r, TAG to CG, Third U.S. AnllY, 20 Sep 62, sub: Ch,mge in Status of 1st and 1971h 

Infantry Brigade. 

29 Mallofr, IIl11cl'ic(II! Mili/(I/}' His/VI}'. pp. 594- 95; Memo, Cors for SA, 15 Aug 62 , sub: 

Schedule for Conversion o f Army Divisions to ROAD, 320 (15 Aug 62), Division Generlll tile. 

DAMH-HSO: Ltr. OTAG to TAG. 27 Aug 62, sub: Change in StllluS of Unit, AGAO-O (Ml 322 

(15 Aug 62), GO 69, U.S. Army Caribbean, 1962, and Ltr, TAG to CG, U.S. Amly Caribbean, II 

Feb 63. sub: Cllllnge in StlltuS of Units, all 193d [nfOdc tile, DAM H-HSO. 

30 Dcp(ll'/mcl!I oj DeJellse ;IIII/UIII ReIIOI'/. F)' 1963, Jl. 109: Arrny Neil'S Service, Release No. 

46, 191ul 62, SA Sends Message to Army National Guardsmen and Reservists, Berlin Crisis 

1961 - 1962, Reference Paper files, DAMH-HSO; "Ol!e Army" in Ac/iol/. 

31 Depa!"lmen/ oj Defense Ill!Inl((l Repor/, FY 1963, I)P. 111 - 14 ; Joseph R. Wisnaek, "Old 

Ironsides' Response to the Cuban Crisis,"Army 13 (Apr 1963): 26- 30: LtT. 1st AmlOred Division to 

ca, [II COl'])s. 20 Apr 63, Incl, sub: Historical Narrative of the lsI Annored Division in the Cubnn 

Crisis, 1962, AKDFA-CG, lSI Armd Div file. DAM H-J-1S0. 

J2 Memo, Cots to SA, 15 Aug 62, sub: Schedule for Conversion of Army Divisions to ROAD. 

33 Ibid. 

34 Ibid. 

JS Ibid.: F,lel Sheet on Reorganization of Army Division (ROAD). 10 Jan 63, Division 

Geneml file, DAMH-HSO. 

36 Llr, TAG to CG. Four1h U.S. Anny, lind olher addresses, 31 May 63, sub: ReorganiZation of 

lhe 2d Anllored Division Under ROAD, AGAO-O (M) (10 May 63) DeSPER, LIT, TAG to CinC, 

USAREUR, 21 Jun 63, sub: Reorgani~.il ion of 3d AmlOrcd Division Under ROAD TOE, AGAO-O 

(M)(22 May 63) DCSPER. Llr. TAG to CinC. USAREUR, 19 Jun 63, sub: Reorganization of the 4th 

Annored Division Under ROAD TOE. AGAO-O (Ml (22 M3Y 63) DCSPER, Llr, TAG to CinC, 
A NEW DIRECTION- FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 321 

USARI)AC, and CO, CONARC. 15 Jul63, sub: Reorganization of the lSI Cavalry Division. AGAD· 

o (M) ( 14 Jun 63) OCSPER, Llr, TAG lOCO, Fifth U.S. AmlY, 23 Oct 63, sub: Reorganization orlhe 

lSI Infillltry Division. AOAO-O (M) (30 Scp 63), DCSPER. LIT, TAG to CinC, USAREUR. and olher 

addresses, 25 Jan 63. sub: Change in SIt1ll1SofUnils, AOAO-O (M) (22 Jan 63) DeSPER. UT. TAO 

10 CINCs, USAREUR find USA RPA C, 23 May 63, sub: Rcorgani7.;ltion of 3d Infantry Division. 

AOI\O·O (M)( 18 Apr 63) DeSPER, Llr, TAG to CGs, CONARC and Si.~lh U.S. Army. 21 Aug 63, 

sub: I~corgani;r,.ation oflhe 4th Inr.11l11)' Division Under ROAD. AOAO-O (M) (29 Jul 63) DeSPER, 

LIT, TAO to CinCo USARI'AC, and CO, CONARC, 7 JU1163. sub: Roorg.1ni7.11Iion orlhe 71h Inf.1nlry 

Division. AGAO·O (M) (31 May 63) DCSPER. Llr, OTAG to TAG. 20 Sep 63, sub: Ch,mgc in 

Stalus of Unils. 20 Scp 63, AGAO·O (M) (13 St:p 63), Llr, TAG 10 CinC, USAREU R, 8 May 63, 

sub: Reorganilation oflhc 241h Infinury Division (Ml'Chaniloo). AGAO·O (IO Apr 63) DeSPER, 

Llr, TAG 10 CinC, USARI'AC, ,md CG, CONARC. 17 Jul 63. sub: Reorganization of Ihe 25th 

Infantry Division. AGAO·O (M)(24 Jun 63) DCSI'ER. Ltr, TAG to CG. Third U.s. Anny. 2 1 Jan 64, 

sub: Roorganization ofSTRAF Units. No. 18. FY 64, AGAO·O (M) (31 Oct: 63) DCSPER. U r, TAG 

to CG, Third U.S. Anny. 6 Mar 64, sub: Reorgani ... lllion ofSTRAF UnilS, No. 58, FY 64, AGAO·O 

( 19 Feb 64) DCSPER, all AG Reference lilcs, Historical Data Cards. Divisions. DAMH·HSO; "8th 

ln fill1lry Division."' SIJldiel·.\· 39 (Jan 1985): 13- 14. 

37 TOE 7E. Infantry Di vision. 1963; TOE l7E, Armored Division, 196 3, TOE 37E, 

Mcc1mniled Infantry Division, 1963, and TOE 57E. Airborne Division. 1963, 'lIld subordinate 

TOEs for each division: Midgley, Dea(/I), IfIIISioJ/.~, p. I 16. 

)8 AmlY News Sen'icc, "Reorganilation of Amly Forces," Release No.4, 9 Jan 63. Division 

General lile. DAMH·I-JSO: Memo. OColS for DeolS and other addrcsSt.'S. 9 Sep 61. sub: Review 

of Plan to Reorganizc and Realign the Rcscn'e Components of the Army, 326 (9 ScI' 61). Memo. 

AColS for Reserve Components (ACSRC) for ColS. 13 Dec 61. sub: White lIouse Brieling, 

ACSRC·OT·M&r (Organization ,lIId Tmining·Mobilil.1tion and I'ersonncl), Ltr. Under SA to F. 

Edward liebert, 20 Jun 62. no subject. all Anny Reserve file. DAMH·HSO. 

39 Anny News Service, '"Anny Announces Plans for Reorganilation of Reserve Components." 

Release Number 29. 5 Apr 62. nnd Msg 922374. Chief of Information, DA 10. CG, CONARC. and 

other nddrcl>sel>. 0400072 Dee 62, 110 subjecl, both Army Rescn'e lilc, DAM H· HSO; Llr, TAG 10 

CGs, CONARC, (IUd First U.S. Army, 25 Mnr 63, sub: Reorg!Lllil Mioli of the 77t h In fantry 

Division Under ROAD. AGAO·O (M) (18 Mar (3) oeAR, Llr. TAG to CG~, CONARC, and 

Second U.S. Amly. 27 Mar 63. sub: Reorganization of the 83d Inf.,ntry Division Under ROAD, 

AGAO·O (M) (18 Mar 63) OCAR. Llr, TAG to CGs, CONARC, and Third U.S. Anuy. 26 Mar 93. 

sub: Reorg:mil.1tion of 8 lsI Infantry Division Under ROAD, AGAO·O (M) (18 Mar 63) DCAR. 

Llr. TAG to CGs, CONARC. and other addresses. 22 Mar 63, sub: Reorgl1lli;mtion of the 90th 

Inf.1ntry Division Under ROAD. AGAO·O (M) (18 Mar 63) OCAR. Ltr. TAG to CGs. CONARC. 

and Fiflh U.S. Anny. 26 Mar 63. sub: Reorganilation of the 102d Inf.1nt ry Division Under ROAD. 

AGAO·O (M) (18 Mar 63) OCAR, Llr. TAG 10 CGs. CONARC. and Sixth U.S. Anny, 27 Mar 63, 

sub: Reorg;mil.1tioll of63d Inf.,nlry Division Under ROAD, AGAO·O (M) ( 13 Mar 63) OCAR, all 

AG Refercnce liles, DAMH·][SD; " ])A Publishes Details on Reorgnnization of the Army 

Reserve." Arm)' Uc.rc/"l·is/9 (Mnr 1963): 6- 10; TOE 29- 70 IT. Command Headquarters. Divisional. 

1963: Wilson, AI"llIies. CO/1J.~ . DMs;ou.\·. aud Se/JfI/"me 8rigades. PI'. 436. 523. 534; GO LXIV 

U.S. Army Corps. 1963, 103d Inf Di v li le. DAMH·JlSO: "'Cross of Lorrnine Di vision' 79th 

COlllmand HQ(Div)." Anny Reserve Magazine II (Nov 1965): 4 5. 

40 "The Guard Goes ROAD," N(I/iOllflf GlIlIn/.\"I/IllII 17 (Feb 1963): 2-4: News Release No. 

665- 63. "Amly Rcscn'e Components Complete Reorganil.1Iion," 10 May 63. Army Resen'e file. 

DAf-.'III· IISO: 1///11//(/1 RCIJOI·t oft"" Cllilf, Nmiol/af Glum! Burl!tlll. FY 1963. p. 27. 

41 "The Gu:.rd Goes ROAD." PI'. 2-4; sec notes b.1SC<! on NG letters. 1963, cOl'ies in nulhor 

files. 

42 Memo. Cors for SA, IS Aug 62. sub: Schedule for Conversion of Army Di visions to 

ROAD. 15 Aug 62, Anny News Sen'ice. ROAD Reorganilation of Army Forces. 9 Jan 63. Army 

News Service. Rcorgnnilation of Army Di visions Begins this Month al F011 Benning. Release No. 

8,22 Jan 63, all Division Gcnernllilc. DAMIl·IlS0. 
322 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

43 Ur, TAG \0 CG, U.S. Army Combat Dcvcloprncl1Is Command, 4 Dec 62 , sub: Chnnge in 

SI<lIUS of Units, AOAO-O (M) (26 Nov 62) DeSPER, 194th AmId Ode file, Llr, TAG 10 CG, U.S. 

Army, Alaska, 20 May 63, sub: Ch,lIlgc in Status of Units. AOI\O-O (M) (1 May 63) DeSPER. 

171SIInf13dc file , Ur, TAG to CinC, USA RI'AC. 2 May 63, sub: ACli\'alion of 173d Airbomc 

Brigade, I\OAO-O (M) (26 Mar 63) DeSPER, 173d Abn Ode file, and L1r, TAG \0 CinC, 

USARI'AC. 31 Jul 63, sub: Rcorganiz:lIion of the 173<1 Airbomc Brigade, 1\01\0-0 (M) (28 lUll 

63) OCSI'ER, 173d Abu Bclc file, all OAMH-HSO. As a Table of Distribution and Allowance unit, 

the Berlin I3rigadc was not counlCd as a part of division and brigade forces. 

44 "Reorganization of Amly Reserve," Arll/)' Rescn'iSI, p_ 7; "157th Infamry llrigadc." Ilrilly 

Rcscl'lie I'dagazillc. 12 (Jul- Aug 66): 4-5; Historical D,lta C<lrd. 1871h Inf Ode, GO I. Si;.;th U.S. 

Am1Y, 1962, 191stlnrOdc file, GO I, XIV U.S. AmlYCorps, 1963, 205th Infllde file, all DAM HI·ISO, The design'lIion of each brigade was derived from the lowest numbered infantry brigade 

associated with the division under the sqU:lrc structure. 

45 AIIIIIIIII Reporl oflhe Chief No/iOllal GIIII,.d BIII"Cf1fl Relwrl. FY f963, p. 27: sec notes based 

on NG lcl1crs, 1963, copies in author's files. 

46 AIIIII/ol Nepal" {)f fhe Chief N(lfiOlIllI GI/ortl BI/reall, 1965, p. 29: Reserve Component rrogram of the Amly. FY 1965, Annex II. Anny National Guard Unit Program, pp. 144- 53. 

47 Barbara A. Sorrill and Constance J. Suwalsky, 11Ic Origills. Ddibemliolls. alld RecOllllllell-

(/a/iolls of /he u.s. Arm)' Tacficol Mobilif)' Reqlliremcllfs Board (Howze 80(lrd) (Fort Leavenworth, 

Kans. : U.S. Aml)' Combnt Developments Command, 1969), pp. 10- 11. 

48 U.s. Army Tactical Mobility Requircments Board (Howze Board), Final Report, 20 Aug 

62, p. 95. DAM H-I-ISR: Hamilton 1·1. Howze. Mcmoirs of (/ TlI'elllie,h-CCIIIIII), Arlll)' Geneml: II 

C(IL'(IIi},IIIWI'S SIOIJI (Washington. D.e.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996), pp. 233- 57. 

49 Howze 80ard, pp. 19.34-50 passim and Incl 5: Howze, A C(lWIII)'II/(/II'S SIOI:!'. p. 251: 

Christopher e.S, Cheng, Air MobililY: The Dewdoplllelll of a Doell-illc (Westport, Conn.: Prneger. 

1994). pp. 179-80. 

50 John 1. Tolson. Ail'llwbifily , 1961- 197f (W,lshinglon, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 

1973). pp. 50- 57. 

SI Richard Fryklllnd. "Soldiers or the Sky:' National Gunrdsman 18 (March 19(4): 3-7+; SS. 

ACSFOR (Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development) to the CotS, 25 Fcb 65, sub: Plan for 

Jnlrochletion for an Air Mobile Division in the Active Army, and Memo_ SD 10 SA and Chaimlan. 

JCS, 15 JUll 65, sub: Organization of AirnlObi le Division. bolh lSi Cav Div file , DAMH- HSO. 

52 S5. ACSFO R for Col'S. 25 Feb 65. sub: Plan for Introduction of an Air Mobilc Division. 

Llr. TAG toCGs, Third U.S. Army. and othcr addresses. 22 Ju165. sub: Reorgani7.ation of lSI Cavalry Division (Amb) STRAF, No. FY 66. AGAO-O (M) (8 Jul 65) DCSPER. and GO 185, Third 

U.S. Army, 1965, all 1st Cay Div lite, OAM H-HSO. 

53 SS, ACSFOR lor Col'S, 25 Feb 65, sub: I' lan for Introduction of an Air Mobile Division: 

TOE 67T, AirnlObi!c Division. 1965; Waiter G. HemlCs, Victn,1!ll l3uildul). ch. 5, p. 30, undated 

Ms. DAMH -HD. 

S4 TOE 67T, Aimlobile Di vision, 1965. 
CHAPTER 12 

Flexible Response 

General lVesllllore!wu/ It(/S ,lie lIlII/wril)' fa lise lite American/orees IIIl1I (Ire 11011' ill 

Vie/-Naill ill Ihe 11'(1), which he cOl/sider:; l/Ios1 e.ff(·clil'(1 /0 resist the COII/lllllllist aggressioll (/lid 'he lerror,hal i.~ faking place . ... I have ordered . .. AmericlIlI tmops asho/'e ill 

ol"(ler 10 give IJI"OleClioll /0 /t1/l/(ll'e(ls of AmeriC(lIIS who (Ire slill ill Ihe Dominical/ 

RelJUblic . ... Oller fh e pasl 15 IIIOII/h.V 'he North Koreal/s have plwsllel/ (/ sleppell-up 

ClIlIIlJlligll o/l'iolcl/{:e agail/sl Soulh Koreall al/d tIle Americal/ IrOOI)s . ... We (Ire laking 

cerllli" precolllio//w)' lII (l Il,.e.~ f() IIwke sure (hat 0111" mililm)' forces (Ire preparel/ for 

allY COlllillgellc), Iflll/Illigh, arise. 

President Lyndon B. Johnsonl 

Presidenl Lyndon B. Johnson orde red the first American combat units to the 

Republic of Vietnam in 1965. After the French abandoned Indochina, the 1954 

Geneva Accords created two Vietnams, South and NOrlh, using the 17th Pa rallel 

as the demarcation line. Almost immediately the Army began <ldvising the South 

Viel"rmmese Army, and over the next decade the armed confli ct between North 

and South Vietnam slowly esca lated, finally leadi ng to the direct participation of 

U.S. Army divisions and brigades alld the lise of the tail oring principles embodied 

in ROAD. In addition, Army divisions continued to stand vigilant in Europe and 

Korea agai nst Commu nist agg ression and restored order in the Dominican 

Rcpublie foll owing a period of political unrest. 

Th e Buildup of the Army 

In May 1965 President Johnson committed Regula r Army combat units to 

South Vietnam to ha lt North Vietnamese in cursions and supp ress Natio nal 

Liberation Front insurgents. The 173d Airborne Brigade from Okinawa was the 

Army's first combined a rms un it to arrive in Southeast Asia. In Jul y the 2£1 

Brigade, !sl lnfantry Di vision, and the 1st Brigade, 101 s1 Airborne Division, also 

deployed from the Un ited Slales. The brigade from the 10Ist was originally 

planned 10 replace the 173d Airborne Brigade but, wilh thc need for additional 

combat units, bot h brigades remained in Vietnam. Two months later the 1st 

Cavalry Di vision, recently reorgani zed as an airmobi le unit, reported in country, 

and the rema inder of the 1st In fa ntry Division arrived in Octobcr) 

As the Army responded to its new mission, divisions were reorganized using 

ROAD's tailoring concepts. Before the 1st Infantry Division deployed, it had fi ld~ 
324 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

....... . .' ~!- . 

ElelllelllS of Ihe J 73(1 A irhome Brig(l(le arril1e ill Vie/t/(llll, May /965. 

cd five infantry, two mechanized infantry, and two armor b'lttalions. Wit h the 

change in assignment from NATO reinforcement to counteri nsurgency in Vietnam, 

the division was restructured. Honest Johns and Davy Crocketts disappeared while 

requirements for infantry rose. As no pool of unassigned maneuver batta lions existed, IwO infantry battalions from the 2d Brigade, 5th Infa ntry Di vision, at Fort 

Devens, Massachusetts, were relieved and assigned to "The Big Red One." The 151 

Di vision also reorganized two of its mechanized infantry battalions as standard 

infantry, bringing the number of infantry battalions in the division to nine.3 

The commander of the I st Infantry Division, Maj. Gcn. Jonathan O. Seaman, 

wanted to take a tank battalion to Vietnam, but Gencral Harold K. Johnson, Chief 

of Staff since July 1964, overruled hilll. Tanks wcre too vulncrable to mi nes, and 

no major enemy armor threat existed. Furthermore, Johnson thought that the 

tempo of the battlefie ld might be slowed by the limitations of the tan k, whose 

presence might foster a conventional war mentality rathcr than the light, fastmoving, unconventional approach needed. Gcnernl Wil liam C. Westmore land, 

commander of U.S. Army, Vietnam, agree{~ reporti ng that fcw places existed in 

Vietnam where tanks could be employed. Johnson, however, granted Seaman permission to take the reconnaissance squadron's M48A3 tanks 10 test thc effectiveness of armor units.4 
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 325 

The decision 10 cOl11mit di visions and separate brigades to Vietnam triggered 

a debate wit hin Ihe administration about the means of ex pandi ng the Army to 

maintain the strategic force. Proposa ls ranged from ca ll ing lip Ihe reserves to 

increasing the draft. On 28 Ju ly, however, President Johnson rejected usc of the 

reserves and announced that the Army would base its expansion on volu nteers 

and draftees. Shortly thereafter, Secretary of Defense McNamara disclosed that 

one infantry division and three infantry brigades would be added to the Regular 

Army in fiscal year 1966 (between 1 July 1965 and 30 June 1966),5 

Expansion of the Army began in September 1965, when the First U.S. Army 

organized the 1961h Infantry Brigade. The 2d Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, less 

its personnel, moved to Fort Ca rson, Colorado, where it was refilled, <lI1d the 

remaining men at Fort Devens became the cadre for the 196th Infantry Brigade. 

The 196th eventually consisted of threc infantry batta lions and the brigade base, a 

recon naissance troop, an engi neer company, a support battalion, and a field artillery 

battalion. Recru its were assigned to the brigade under a " tru in and retain" program, 

which lessened the imp..1ct oflimitcd mobilization on thc train ing base·6 

The brigade's infantry batta lions used a new light structure designed for 

counterinsurgency warfare. Each ballalion consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company, three rifle companies, and a combat support compa ny. The IMler organi zation, simila r to that in the airmobile infantry batta li on, had morta r, 

reconnaissance, and antitank platoons. These light battali ons fielded about ha lf 

the number of vehicles assigned to a standard infantry battalion, and the riflemen 

carried M 14 rifles.7 

The Fifth U.S. Army activated the 9t h Infantry Division, the second unit in 

the expansion program, at Fort Riley, Kansas, on 1 February 1966, also employing the "train and retain" concept. Filled in three increments, the division included one mechanized in fantry battalion and eight infantry batl'alions. By the end of 

July the division had graduated the last cycle of basic trainees, and it was ex pect· 

cd to be combat ready by the end of the yea r.8 

While organizing the 9th Infantry Division, the Army decided to usc it as a part 

of the Mobile Afloat (Riveri ne) Force in Vietnam. Brig. Gen. William E. DePuy, 

who was serving on Westmoreland 's staff, had developed the idea of a joi nt ArmyNavy force for use in Vietnam's Mekong River Delta. Army units were to include a 

brigade-size element that would live and move on ships and work with two brigade· 

size shore con tingents. Learning of the riverine mission, Maj. Gen. George S. 

Eckhardt, the 9t h Division's commander, requested permission to mechanize one 

infantry balla lion, which would allow him to have one brigade (three infantry b..1 ttal ions) aboard nav,,1 ships " nd two brigades (one mechanized infantry and two 

infantry batta li ons ellch) operat'ing from land bases. The Army Staff in Washington 

agreed, and Eckhard t organ ized the second mecllll1lized infantry battal ion in 

October. To take advantage of the dry season in Vietnam. the division began departing Fori Riley at the end of 1966 and by February 1967 clemen ts of the "Old 

Rcliables" took part in the first U.S. Army-Navy riverine operation of the war.9 
326 

9,h 111/(1111/)' Division .~. fin" b(/se 

Ct/lllP il/ Vie/lw/II, 1966 

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Shortly the reafle r, the Army's 

buildup plan wen t awry. Army Chi ef 

of S t<l ff Genera l Joh nson had 

req uested his staff to consider forrn~ 

ing a d ivisional·type brigade (Le ., 

witho ut the sup porting units CO Ill -

mon to <l separate brig<lde) to 

replace the 25th Infantry Division at 

Schofie ld Barracks. Hawaii, which 

was progr<lmmed for dep loyment to 

Vietnam in early 1966. Re sourccs 

sc heduled for onc of the rema ining 

brigade authorizations could then be 

used for the Hawaiian unit. Another 

propos<ll, ca ll ing for organizing both 

t he re maulin g brigades In 

MeNmn<lr<l's expansion program in 

Hawaii, was presented to the Army 

Staff. However. the Army had <letivated the 199th Infantry Brig<lde at 

Fort Benning, Georgia, on I Jun e 

1966 in response to a request from Westmoreland for a brigade to protect the 

Long Binh- Saigon area. Units in Europe were ta sked to furn ish the cad re for 

the brigade, wh ich field ed three light infantry battalions. In le ss than six 

months it deployed to Vietnam. to 

l'lavi ng authority to organize only one morc brigi.lde. the Army activated the 

II th Infantry Brigade, a pre- World War II element of the 6th Infantry Division, 

in Hawaii on I July 1966. Behind the selection of the II th was the assumption 

that the 6th would be the next division to be activated. The II th consisted of three 

infantry battalions, a suppor! ball<llion, a reconnaissance troop, and a military 

police company. Because of a shortage of personne l and equipment, the brigade 

lacked its field artillery battalion, engineer company, ,1I1d signal platoon authorized fo r an independent brigade. But despite the ir absence , training began and 

the missing units were even tu<llly organized. Rather tll<ln remaining in Hawaii as 

plan ned, the 11th Infantry Brigade deployed to South Viet nam in December 1967 

in answer to an ever-growing need for forces there. I I 

As the Army's involvement in SOlltheast Asia deepened, more units moved to 

Vietnam. As noted, the 25t h Infantry Division was alerted for deployment in 

December 1965. and al thai lime Geneml Johnson, Army chief of staff, directed 

that two new infantry battalions be added to it. However, almost immediately 

after their organization began, the battalions were inactivated and replaced wit h 

two existing battalions from Alaska, <l means of speeding the deparlure of the 

division. When the division deployed in the spring of 1966 it fielded one mccha-
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 327 

Mell off/Ie Is! Brig{llle. 101 ~f AirbQ/"IIC Dil'iJ'ioll.fireji-o/ll old Vief COllg 'rel/ches. 

ni zcd infantry battalion and e ight infantry battalions. In addition, the commander, 

Maj. Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, insisted o n laking the division'll tank balla lion.1 2 

The 4th Infantry Division, the last Regular Army infa ntry d ivision ava ilable in 

the United Siales in 1965 fo r service in Vietnam, experienced similar turblilence. 

The Sixth U.S. Army relieved one tank baualion from the division, equ ipped the 

other with M48 tanks, reorgan ized one mechanized infantry battalion as standard 

infant ry, and added two morc in fa ntry balt'alions, giv ing the division the same 

maneuver mix (1 - 1- 8) as the 25th Infantry Division. Shortly after the 4t h completed its reorgani zation in November 1965, the division received 6,000 recruits to 

bring all units up to fu ll strength. From Ju ne through August 1966 the 4th also 

assisted forty-seven nond ivisiona lunits in preparing for duty in Vietnam and helped 

activate the tra in ing ce nter at Fort Lewis, Washington. Neverthe less, the " Ivy 

Division" deployed to Vietnam between August and October 1966.13 

As the confli ct in Vietnam intensified, Westmoreland requested additional 

infantry for the 173d Airborne Brigade and the 1st Cavalry Di vision. When the 

173d Airborne Brigade arrived in Vi etnam, it had only two airborne battalions 

and was augmented with an Austra li an battalion, whil e the 1st C.wa lry Division 

had only e ight airmobil e infan try battalions, whi ch left one of its brigades short a 
328 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

£femellis of 69,h II/filllll)' Brigade, pari of the Selected Re~ en'e Force. /mill (1/ 

Fori Riley, Kallsas, /966. 

maneuver e lement. Afte r considerable de liberat ion, the Conti nental Army 

Command activated one uirborne bnttal ion and one airmobile battal ion, using 

person ne l drawn from the IOlst Airborne Division and the 5th In fantry Division. 

Both b<l ttalions deployed to Vietnam in the summer of 1966 to join the J 73d 

Airborne Brigade and the 151 Cava lry Division, respectively.ltI 

Wit h the depart ure of units for Vietnam, the reserves look on a more signiriCant role. The nation needed a reserve contingent that could report to mobil ization stations on a seven-day notice. The Army, therefore, created the Selected 

Reserve Force in the Army National Guard that included three infantry divisions 

and six infantry brigades, one of which was mechanized. To assure the foree 's 

equitable geographical distribution so that one section of the nation would not be 

asked to bear the burden of a partia l mobilization, each div ision consisted of the 

division base and one brigade in one state, while the ot her two brigades were 

divisiona l units from adjacent states (7(lbfe 26). The Army selected Ihe 28th, 38th, 

and 47 th Infan try Divisions for the force. For the separa te brigades, the stales 

organized three new units, and aga in their geogra phic distribution played a role. 

Elements from the 36th, 41 st, and 49th In fan try Divisions were withdrawn to 

form the 36th, 41st, and 49th Infan try Brigades. The divisions themselves 

remained active, but each lacked a brigade. The force's other three brigades were 

the 29th, 67th, and 69th Infantry Brigades, which had been orga nized earlier.I S 

To improve the readi ness of the Selected Reserve Force, the Army authorized 

its units to be fu lly manned, increased their number of drill days, and ra ised their 

priority for receiving new equipment. Because of shortages in personnel and equ ipment, McNamara ach ieved a long-standing controversia l goal of the Defense 

Department, a reduction of the reserve troop basis. Those reserve units that were 
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 

TABLE 26 

Divisions and Brigades 

Selected Reserve Force, 1965 

VIIi, 

28th Infa lltry Division 

3d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division 

3d Brigade, 29th Inf.1.ntry Division 

3d Brigade, 371h Infantry Division 

381h Infa ntry Division 

76th Brigade, 38th Infantry Division 

2d Brigade. 46th Infantry Division 

3d Brigade, 33d Infantry Division 

47th Infantry Division 

2e1 Brigade, 471h Infa ntry Division 

lSI Brigade, 32d Infantry Division 

3d Orig'ldc. 451h Infantry Division 

291h Infantry Brigade 

361h InHl1Itry Brigade 

41 sl Infantry Brigade 

491h Infantry Brigade 

67th lnr<ll1try Briglldc (Mechan ized) 

69th Infantry Brig:ldc 

SWle 

PenllsylvaniA 

Pennsylvania 

Maryland 

Ohio 

Indiana 

Indiana 

Michigan 

Illinois 

Minnesota 

Minnesota 

Wisconsin 

Ok lah01lla 

l'lawaii and California 

Texas 

Washington and Oregon 

California 

Iowa and Nebraska 

Kansas alld Missouri 

329 

judged unnecessary and others that were undermanned and underequipped could 

now be deleted with minimum controversy and their assets llsed to field contingency forces. Among the uni ts inactivated were the last six combat divisions in the 

Army Reserve- the 63d, 77th, 8 1st, 83d, 90th, and 102d Infantry Divisions- and 

the 79th, 94th, and 96th Command Headquarters (Division). The 103d Command 

Headquarters (Division) was converted to a support brigade headquarters. 16 

In the spri ng of 1965 the Army also responded to a crisis in thc Cari bbean area. 

To help restore political stability and protcct United States citizens and property, 

President Joh nson sen t the 82d Airborne Division and other forces to the 

Dominican Republic. Subsequently, the Inter-American Peace Force was organi zed 

there, and by the autumn the only United States combat force len \vas one brigade 

of three battalions from the 82<1 Division. The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that the 

brigade be returned to the Un ited States so that the 82<1 could resume its place in 

the strategic force as a full-strengt h unit. In response, the Army selected the 1961h 

Infantry Brigade to replace the divisional brigade in June 1966. But by the time the 

I 96th had completed its train ing. stability had returned to the Dominican Republic, 

and the president withdrew all Un ited States forces from the country. I? 

To meet Westmorel and's continuing demand for more troops in Vietnam, 

President Johnson then approved the transfer of the 196th In fantry Brigade to 

Southeast Asia. As the unit had been trained for street fighting and riot control, 
330 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

the 196th had to undergo add itional training fo r combat in South east Asia . 

Also, support units norma lly attached to sepa rate brigades in Viet nam had to be 

organized, incl uding signal and mi lita ry police platoons and chemical, military 

intelligence, Army Security Agency, military history, and public information 

detachments. The tra in ing process bega n in June. and by August 1966 the 1961h 

had deployed to ViClnam.18 

Expansion of the Force 

After July 1966 no further increase look place in the number of divisions and 

brigades un til the s pring of 1967 . In Ma rch of that year, respondi ng to 

Westmoreland's request for additional forces, the Army Sta ff considered organizing either an infantry or a mechanized infan try brigade for se rvice al ong the 

demilitarized zo ne between Nort h Vietnam and SOllth Vietnam. The original 

request ca lled for a mechanized infantry brigade with person nel drawn mostly 

from the I st and 2d Armored Divisions at Fort Hood. Before the unit could be 

acti vated, Westmore land decided that he needed a standard separate infantry 

brigade. On 10 May the 198th Infantry Brigade was activated using l>ersonne l 

from the 151 and 2d Armored Divisions. Two days late r, at the insistence of 

General Ralph E. Haines, Vice Chi ef of Staff and former commander of the 1st 

Armored Division, the brigade 's three infantry battalions and artillery battal ion 

were inactivated and replaccd with lInits takcn from regiments assigned to the 1st 

and 2d Armored Di visions. In turn, new b'lual ions from those regiments were 

activated to rcplace the units taken from the two divisions.1 9 

Westmoreland's plan to usc the 198th along the demilitarized zone between 

the two Vietnams went astray. Unable to wait for the brigade to arrive, he established a blocking force in April 1967 with units already in the theater. Designated 

"Task Force Oregon,"20 it included the 196th Infantry Brigade; the 3d Brigade, 

25th Infantry Division; and the 1st Brigade, IO lst Airborne Di vision.21 

In August 1967 a complex organizational exchange took place in Vietnam due 

in large part to the awkward location of units in relation to their parent divisions. 

Both the 4th and the 25th Infantry Di visions had "orphan" brigades that operated 

outside their parent div ision's areas. To correct the probl em, Headquarters and 

Headq ua rters Company, 3d Brigade, 4th In fan try Di vision, and the brigade 's 

non-color-bcari ng clements were transferred (less personnel and equipment) from 

Tay Ni nh to Task Force Oregon at Chu Lai; Headquartc rs and Headquarters 

Company, 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, and its non-color-bearing units (less 

personnel and equipment) concurrently joined the 25th Infantry Division at Tay 

Ninh. The color-bearing units (i nfantry and art ill ery battalions) att achcd to the 

brigades were relieved frolll the di visions in place and reassigned. Thcse administrative actions gave the commander of the 25th Infrllltry Division operational COlltrol of his 3d Brigade for the first time in Viet nam. The 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry 

Division, however, remained under the operational control of Task Force Orcgon.22 
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 

3d Brig(l(le. 25,h II/filii/I)' DiI·j.\';OIl, engages 'he Viet Cong betweel/ 8al/ Me 

TI/IIOI (lilt! Pleikll, 

331 

Soon aficr forming Task Force Oregon, Westmore land decided to replace it 

wit h a division. Fo r the un it's designation, he selec ted the Americal Di vision 

bcclIlIse it was to be organized under circumstances simi lar to those in which tha t 

division first had been formed d uring World War II with National Guard units 

fro111 Task Force 68 14 in New Ca ledonia. Westmoreland had origina lly planned to 

assign the 11th and 198th In fantry Brigades, then preparing to deploy, and the 

1961h Infantry Brigade, already in Vietnam, to the division. The Army Staff 

agreed but insisted that the unit's officia l designat ion be the 23d Infan try 

Division rather than "America l" (the America l Division had bcen redesig natcd as 

the 23d Infantry Division in 1954). On25 September 1967 the division was activated to con trol the 196th In fantry Brigade; the 1st Brigade, IOlst Airborne 

Division; and the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. The division base was to be 

activated as requirements were identificd.23 

In December 1967 the 23d Infan try Division received its planncd brigades. In 

addition to the 196th Infantry Brigade, the II th and 1981 h Infa ntry Brigadcs, 

reorganized as light infantry un its, had arrived in Vietnam a nd repl aced the 

brigades of the 4th Infantry and 10 I st Airborne Divisions, which retu rned to their 

parent units.24 

To strengt hen the fo rces in Viet nam, Westmore land h'ld requested the remaindcr of the 10 I st Airborne Division by February 1968. Because of ominolls intel ligcnce reports about thc encmy's ilctivilies, Westillore lillid pressured W,lshington 

to advance the div ision's arrival clute. Thlls, by 13 December 1967, follow ing the 

longest troop movement by air in history, the "Sc reaming Eagles" arrived in 

Vietnam. The division fie lded len airborne infantry b'llIalions. the three that hnd 

deployed with the l Si Brigade in 1965 and the seven that arrived in 1967.25 
332 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

To replace the 10 I SI Airborne Division and the 11 th Infantry Brigade in the 

Army strategic contingency forces, the Army activated the 6t h Infantry Division, 

with nine infantry battalions, on 24 November 1967. Initially all units of the division were to be organized at Fori Campbell, KentlLcky. but U.S. Army, Pac ifi c, 

requested that one brigade be transferred 10 I-I awaii to take over the property and 

nondcployable perso nne l of the 11th Infantry Brigade. According ly, the 6th 

Infantry Di vision was split between Fort Campbell (the di vision base and two 

brigades) and Schofield Barracks (one ri g~ de), l-I awaii.26 

With the allachmCllI of the I [Ih Infantry Brigade, originally a component of 

the 61 h Infantry Division, to the 23d Infantry Division in Viet nam, a new designa· 

tion was needed for the 6th Infantry Division's third brigade headquarters. The 

staff, in an unprecedented move, decided to lise the designation 4th Brigade, 6t h 

Infantry Division, until the lllh could be returned to the div ision. 

January 1968 turned into a month of crises for the nation. On 23 Jan uary, afier 

a series of incidents in Korea, the North Koreans seized th e intell igence shi p 

Pueblo in the Sea of Japan and incarcerated the crew. This resulted in the strength· 

ening of United States air and naval forces there and the authorization of haz.1rdous 

duty pay for elements of the 2d Infantry Division in Korea. Shortly thereafter the 

North Vietnamese began their expected offensive during the Tet holiday in Vietnam, 

shocki ng both Westmoreland and the nation with its intensity. President Johnson 

ordered additional forces to Vietnam, including the 3d Brigade (three airborne 

infantry battalions) of the 82d Airborne Division and a Marine Corps uni t. Those 

units arrived in February, and eventually the 82d's 3d Brig<lde, organized as a sepa· 

rate brigade, became a part of the standing forces in Vietnam,27 

Because of other contingency plans the Ma rine un it had to return to the 

United Stales, and Westmorel<l nd asked for a mechanized infant ry brigade to 

replace it. Army Chief of Staff Johnson approved the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry 

Division, as the replacement. The unit, reorganized as II separate brigade fielding 

one battalion e<lch of infantry, mecha nized infantry, a nd armor, a rri ved in 

Viet nam in July 1968 and was the last large Army unit to be sent to Southeast 

Asia (Trible 27),28 

The seizure of the Pueblo, the Tet offensive, and the need to maintain the 

strategic force prompted the president to call a lim ited number of National 

Glia rd and Army Reserve units to active duty in the spring of 1968. The c,d l 

included two brigades from the Na tional Guard, the 29th Infant ry Brigade 

(Hawaii), whi ch reported to Schofield Barracks on 13 May, and the 69th 

In famry Brigade (Mechanized) (Knnsas), which took up station at Fort Carson. 

To case the burden of mobilization, the brigades acquired c lements not previ· 

o llsly associated with them. The 29th got the I DOth Battalion, 442d Infantry, 

from the Army Reserve, and the 69th included the 2d Batta lion, 133d Infantry, 

from the Iowa Nation,ll GU(lrd.21J 

Following the Tet offensive and the limit ed reserve mobilizat ion , th e 

Department of Defense ended the buildup of divisional and brigade units in the 
FLEXI BLE RESPONSE 

TABLE 27 

Deployment of Divisions and Bri gades to Vietnam 

Vllif 

I sl Cavalry Division 

181 Infantry Division 

2d Brigade'" 

4th lnfmllry Division 

2d Brigade· 

I SI Brigade, 5th Infantry Division 

9th Infantry Division 

2d Brigade23d Infantry Division 

II th Infantry Brigade· 

[96th Infantry Brigade· 

198th Infantry Brigade'" 

251h Infantry Di vision 

2d Brigade· 

3d Brigade· 

3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division 

IOlst Airborne Division 

I sl Brigade· 

173d Airborne Brigade 

199th In fantry Brigade 

• Arrived scpamlciy. 

D(//e ;/l'rive(1 ill Vietllam 

September 1965 

October 1965 

July 1965 

October 1965 

August 1966 

June 1968 

December 1966 

January 1967 

September 1967 

December 1967 

August 1966 

October 1967 

April 1966 

January [966 

December 1965 

February 1968 

Deccmbcr 1967 

July 1965 

May 1965 

December 1966 

333 

active Army. At peak strength the Army had 19 divisions (counting the 3 brigades 

attached to the 23d as I division), with 7 divisions serving in Vietnam, 2 in Korea, 

5 in Europe, and 5 in the United Sta tes, and I I brigades, of which 4 were in 

Vietnam, 2 in Alaska, I in the Cana l Zone, and 4 in the continental United States. 

Organizational Changes 10 Units in Vietnam 

Airmobility gave comma nders the ability to concentrate men and their fi repower on the Vietnamese battlefield quickly, and the Army planned to organize a 

second airmobile division as early as 1966. These plans fo undered until 1968 

becausc of the aviation needs of other combat units in Vietnam and the gcnera l 

shortage of aviation equipment. But after the 101 Sl Airborne Di vision arrived in 

Southeast Asia, U.S. Army, Vietnam, began a phased reorganization of the division into an airmob ile confi guration, which took over a year to cOlllpl ete.30 

During the conversion of the 10 I st, the Army adopted a decentral ized 

approach to aircra ft maintenance. Init ially the 101sl, like Ihe 1st Cavalry 

Division, was to have a la rge aircraft maintenmlcc battalion, bu t the need of COIllpany-, ballery-, and troop-size aviation units fo r Iheir own maintenance organiza-
JJ4 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

lions resulted in a cellular maintenance structure. In the lSI Cavalry Division and 

10 lst Airborne Di vision an aircra ft maimcnance detachment was activated to 

support each company-size aviation unit.3l 

Whe n the IOl st was reorganized as an ainnobil c unit, confusion and COlltention reigned over its designat ion. Instructions from Washington renamed the 

division the IOl st Infantry Di vision (Airmobile) beca use the designation was 

thought to accurate ly desc ribe ils mission. Officers in Vietnam opposed the 

change, and after much discussion the Army StafT sen t new instructions redesignating bot h the IOl sl Airborne Di vision and the 1st Cavalry Division as "air 

caval ry." In July 1968 Westmoreland replaced Harold K. Johnson as Army 

Chief of Staff, and Westmoreland directed that the div isions retai n their histori c 

designations.32 

Ever conscious of ways to save person ne l, U.S. Army, Vietnam, req uested 

permission in September 1968 to reorgan ize the 23d Infantry Di vision (th e 

Ameri cal) along the lines of other infan try div isions to save over 500 personnel 

spaces. The request proposed that the 11th, I 96th, and 198 th Infan try Brigades 

be redesignated as the 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades, 23d In fantry Di vision, and that 

a compl ete division base be organized. West mo re land, as chief of staff, 

approved the reorga nization of the division but not the numerical redesignation 

of the brigades. He directed that the brigades be attached rather than assigned 

as orga nic elemen ts of the div ision. His reaso ns for reta ining the se para te 

brigade designations included th e compl ex it y of the units' histories and the 

desi re nOI to c ha nge the designat ions of units se rving in Viet nam. On 15 

Februa ry 1969, the 23£1 was thu s reorga ni zed with a di vision base resembling 

that in ot her infantry divisions, except for the attached brigade headquart ers 

a nd the om ission of the orga nic cava lry squadron. The I st Squadron, 1st 

Cavalry, an e lemen t of the lsi Armored Di vision, had becn serving with the 

"America l" because General Haines, the former lSI Armored Division commander, had wanted the squadron to represent "Old Ironsides" in Vietnam. The 

starTehose not to lamper wit h this arrangemen t)3 

To increase rirepower, some divisions and brigades received an additiona l 

ba tta lion or batta li ons of infantry withou t upse tting their structure. As noted 

above, the 1st Cavalry Division and the 173d Airborne 13rigade each had an additi onal infantry batt alion assigned in 1966. The fo llowing yea r the 173d was 

assigned a fourth infantry ba tt alion, and after the 1968 Tet offensive the 9th 

Infantry Division and the 11th, 198t h, and 199th Infantry Brigades each ga ined 

an additiona l infantry battalion. At the peak of the buildup the combined arms 

teams in Viet nam fielded eighty-three infantry and armor batta lions.34 

Di visions and brigades deployed to Vietnam wit h infantry, light infantry, airborne infantry, and airmob il e infan try battalions but, responding to the demands 

of the eonniet, U.S. Army, Vietnam, reorganized most of them under mod ified 

li ght infantry tabl es of organi zation. Each of these batta lions consisted of a ea ~ 

quarters and headqua rters company, four rine companies, and a combat support 
I 

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 335 

company. The fourth fine company provided a unit for base defense and allowed 

the battalion to operate with three compani es outside the base camp.35 

Comb", brough t about several changes in the infantryman's weapons. The 

light M 16 rine became the standard individual weapon, and a one-man light anti· 

tank weapon (LAW) onen replaced the heavy and awkwa rd 90-111111 . recoilless 

rine. Because of the nature of the fighting, heavier infan try weapons, slich as the 

ENTAC, 4.2-inch morlar, and IOG-mm. recoilless rifle, saw little service. When 

used, both the 81-mm. and 4.2-inch mortars were usua lly "slaved" to fire direction centers at American fire bases. Units did not suffer a loss of effective firepower because their mobilit y a ll owed them to concentrate thei r remai ning 

weapons, while improved field rad io communications a ided in putting tremendous amounts of supporting fire at their disposa l. Given organic, altaehed, and 

supporting aviation and signal units, all divisions and brigades had extensive airmobile and commun ications capabi lities.36 

Although only one armor compa ny, equipped with 90-mm. se lf-propelled 

antitank guns, assigned to a brigade and three divisio nal armor battal ions, 

equipped wit h M48A3 tanks, se rved in Vietnam, di visions and brigades there 

had considerable armor. Each divisiona l reconnaissance sq uadron, except for 

the two in the airmobi le divisions, had tanks and reconnaissance vehicles. The 

latter carried additiona l machine gu ns and gu n shie lds, permitting the reconna issance squadrons to fu nction as armor. Also, the cight mechanized infan try 

battal ions in Victnam frequen tly performed as light armor units, using modified 

armored pe rso nnel carriers. By 1969 some reconna issan ce and mechanized 

infa ntry units employed Sheridans. the M55 I armored reconnaissance assault 

ve hicles, in place of the light tank and armored personnel ca rrie rs. The 

Sheridan fi lled the need fo r a light tracked vehi cle wit h greater firepower tha n 

the M 113 armored personnel carri er.37 

Artillery, the third combat ann assigned to divisions and brigades, also underwent modifications in Vietnam. In the two airmobile divisions. a 155-mln. howit zer battalion was perma nently attached aOer the 1st Cava lry Di vision demonstrated that the heavy howitzer could be moved by helicopter. Because of the large 

operational areas of divisions and separate brigades. their direct support artillery 

battali ons often had fo ur firing batteries, which were created in various ways. In 

the 173d Airborne Brigade. a fourth battery was authorized; in the 23d In fant ry 

Division, each direct support battalion consisted of two five-gull and two four-gun 

batteries; and in the 1st Infantry Division, one or two 4.2-inch mortar platoons 

were attached to direct support artillery battalions as Batteries D and E)8 

By mid-I969 the seven divisions and four separa te brigades in Vietnam 

reached their final configuration (Trible 28). The ROAD building-block concept 

worked well, particularly in a war that was fo ugh t by brigades with divisions 

serving in a co rps-like rolc. The Army, however. had difficu lt y meeti ng the 

demands of cOlllmanders for more tactical maneuver uni ts because there was 110 

pool of separate batta lions to dnlw upon when needed for additional support. 
336 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

TABLE 28 

Maneuver Elements Assigned to Divisions and Bri gades in Vietnam 

30 June 1969 

IJlIIWliolls 

DivisiOi/IBI'igade III! Mech fllf Mod Illf Armol' Total 

[st Cnv'llry Di vision 9 9 

1st Infantry Di vision 2 7 9 

4[h Infan try Division 8 10 

lSI Brigade, 5th Infantry 3 

Division 

9th Infa ntry Division 2 7 10 

23d Infantry Di vision 11 11 

25th Infuntry Divi sion 3 6 10 

1st Brigade, 82d Airborne 3 3 

Division 

10Isl Airborne Di vision 10 10 

173d Airborne Brigade 4 • 4 

199th Infantry Brigade 4 4 

Total 2 8 70 3 83 

• A company. 

Divisions and Brigades ill Other Commands 

The Army directed its major effort in the mid· and latc- 19605 toward Viet nam, 

Hnd di visions and brigades in olher commands supported that endeavor. All active 

duty divisions and brigades in the United States fu rn ished units or men for service 

in Vietnam, and as a result most fell below combaHcady status. Ultimately the 

maneuver clemcnt mix in the I st and 2d Annorcd Divisions was reduced to four 

tank and four mechanized infantry batta lions, which was considerably below the 

prototype of six tank and five in fantry battalions. To mai ntain thcm as fully manned 

armored divisions, the Army designated one mechanizcd infantry and two armor 

battalions from the National Guard as " round-out" units for each. Round-out units 

maintained a close association with their designated divisions, cven taking annual 

field training wi th them, but were not on active federa l scrvice.39 

Although the Army did not withdraw any divisions from Eu rol>C for service 

in Viet nam, U.S. Army, Europe. also contributed to the combat effort. As a lready 

noted, the eadre for the 199th Inf;mtry Brigade hnd come from Europe. Begi nning 

in February 1966 the Army levied the command in Europe for officers ;md enl isted personne l with spec ific skills, pa rticularly junior grude and noncommissioned 

officers. Within a year 1,800 soldicrs a month were departing for duty in Viet nam 

to meet the levy. This drain on the European forces severely affected unit leadership and the readiness of the remaining forces.40 
FLEX IBLE RESPONSE 337 

In the armored a nd mechani zed infantry divisions designed to fight in 

Europe, aviation battalions were eliminated after a study all the lise of aircraft 

rationalized that heavy divisions did nol need extensive air lines of communications. Fifty-seven hel icopters remained in each division, spread throughout the 

reconnaissance squad ron, maintenance battalion, division artill ery, and div ision 

and brigade headquarters companies. The operation of the divisional airfield 

passed to a new transportation detachment attached to the supply and transport 

battalion. Although not stated, the forty aircraft removed from each armored and 

mechanized infantry division were needed in Vietn(lIll,41 

Notwithstand ing person nel and equipment problems in Eu rope, div isions still 

had to be prepared to count er Soviet mechanized forces, primaril y thro ugh 

increased firepowcr. In the 3(~ 8th, and 24th Infantry Divisions an armor battalion replaced a mechanized infantry battalion in 1966. (Armor battalions required 

fewer people than mecha nized infantry battalions but had more firepower.) The 

change gave the div isions a maneuver mi x of four armor and six mechanized 

infan try battalions. In those battal ions, as well as in the reconnaissance squadron 

and the arti llery ballalions, an air defense section that used the new shoulderfired, low-altitude, Rcdeye guided missile was introduced. In the artillery of both 

the armored and mcchanized in fantry divisions, se lf-propelled 155-mm. howitzers replaced I05-mm. pieces because the larger howitzers could fire both conventional and nuclear warheads and had a longer range. The capability of firing 

nuclear rounds from convent ional artillery tubes also eliminated the need for the 

jeep-mounted Davy Crocketts.42 

Although the military and political leadership still perceivcd a Soviet threat in 

Western Europe, the first reduction in the number of Army divisions stationed in 

Europe since the beginning of NATO took place during the Vietnam conflict. The 

desire of the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United 

States to realign their balance of payments precipitated the reduction. By mutual 

agreement one division (less one brigade) and some smal ler units in Germany 

were to return to the United States but were to remain under the operational control of the commander in Europe and return periodically to Germany for tra ining 

exercises. The divisional brigade that remained in Germany was to be replaced by 

one from the United States during each training exercise. The sta ff named the plan 

~ . .EFORGER, "Return of Forces to Germany." During the first half of 1968 the 24th 

Infantry Division, without its 3d Brigade, moved to Fort Riley.43 

The following December the Department of Defense announced that the first 

REFORGER exercise would take place in early 1969 but, to prevent personnel turbulence, no rotation of brigades would occur. Since the Warsaw Pact countries 

had invaded Czechoslovakia the previous August, the timi ng of the exercise, 

between 5 January and 23 March 1969, demonstrated to NATO that the United 

States would honor its commitments.44 

Spec ial mission brigades throughout thc world also contri buted to the forces 

in Vietnam. [n late 1965 an infantry battalion of the 197th Infantry Brigade, 
JJ8 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

which supported the Infantry School, was inactivated at Fort Benning \0 provide 

personnel fo r expanding the Army in Vietnam. [n a personnel-saving aCl ion, the 

Combat Developments Command's 1941h Armored Brigade at ForI Ord was 

replaced by a battalion-size combat team and reorganized at Fori Knox to support 

the Armor School in place of the 16th Armor Group. Under the new configuration the brigade included one mechanized infantry and two armored battalions. 

The [7 [51 and Ind Infantry Brigades in Alaska each losl their aviation company, 

and in the 193d Infantry Brigade in the Canal Zone, the airborne battalion was 

replaced with a standard infantry battalion. (Tc,ble 29 shows the composition of 

divisions and brigades outside Vietnam in 1969.)45 

In 1968 Secreta ry of Defense Clark Clifford decided 10 reduce forces in Ihe 

con tinental United States to four divisions because the budget did not permit filling and ma intai n ing five di visions. He directed the inactiva tion of the 6th 

Infantry Division, the activation of a brigade to replace Ihe 82d's 3d Brigade in 

Vietnam, and higher manning leve ls for the 69th Infantry Brigade attached to the 

5th Infantry Division at Fori Carson and the 29th Infantry Brigade at Schofield 

Barracks. The 6th Division was inactivated on 25 July 1968, and the rest of 

Cli ffo rd's proposals were accomplished by early 1969.46 

Four weeks after the 6th Infantry Division was inactivated, the Vice Ch ief 

of Staff, General Bruce Palmer, Jr., considered reactivating the division in 

response to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Wa rsaw Pact armies. Lacking 

men to organize the unit, the sta fTconsidered the di vision 's reactivation a "show 

the nag" action. The plan was eventua lly dropped because it was an empty geslure. Thus, the strategic reserve forces in the United States stood at four divisions in September 1968 and remained at that level until the close of the 

Vietnam era.47 

During the 1960s the Department of Defense continued to scruti nize the 

reserve forces and to question the number of divisions and brigades as well as the 

redundancy of maintaining two reserve components, thc National Guard and the 

Army Reserve. In 1967 Secreta ry of Defense McNamara decided that 15 combat 

div isions in the Army National Guard were unnecessary and cut the number to 8 

div isions (I mechanized infantry, 2 armored, and 5 infantry), but increased the 

number of brigades from 7 to 18 (I airborne, I armored, 2 mechanized infantry, 

and 14 infantry). The loss of the divisions did not set well with the states. Their 

o bj ections included the inadequate maneuver element mix for those that 

remained and the end to the practice o f rotating divisional COmmands among the 

states that supported them. Under the proposal, the remaining di vision comman -

ders were to reside in the state of the division base. No reduction, however, in 

total Army National Guard strength was to take place, which convinced the governors to accept the plan.48 

The states reorganized their forces accordingly between I December 1967 

and I May 1968. All remaining d ivisions were shared by two or more states 

(Table 30). Di visional brigades located in states without the division base consist-
TABLE 29 

Maneuver Element Mix of Divisions and Brigades on Active 

Outside Vietnam, 30 June 1969 

Balta/io

Unil Location I,,! Mech Ill! Abn In

lSI Annored Division Fon Hood, Tex. • 

2d Annored Division Fon Hood, Tex. • 

2d Infantry Division Korea 5 2 

3d Armored Division Germany 5 

3d Infantry Division Gennany 6 

4th Armored Division Gcnmmy 5 

5th Infantry Division Fon Carson) Colo. 8 

7th Infantry Division Korea 5 2 

8th Infantry Division Germany 6 

24th Infantry Division Fort Riley,2 Kans. 6 

82d Airborne Division Fort Bragg,) N.C. 9 

29th Infantry Brigade Hawaii 3 

17lst Infantry Brigade Alaska 2 

! 72d Infantry Brigade Alaska 2 

193d Infantry Brigade Canal Zone 3 

194th Annored Brigade Fort Knox, Ky. 

TOTAL 17 52 9 

! Does not include the 1st Brigade in Vietnam, but does include the 69th Infantry Br

2 One brigade in Gennany. 

3 Does not include the I st Brigade in Vietnam, but does include the 4th Brigade. 82d 
340 MANEUVER AND FI REPOWER 

TABLE 30 

National Guard Divisions and Brigades, 1968 

Vllil 

26th Infantry Division 

28th Infantry Division 

30th AmlOrcd Division 

30th Infantry Division (M)· 

381h Infantry Division 

42d Infantry Di vision 

47th Infantry Division 

50lh Armored Division 

291h Infantry Brigade 

32d Infantry Brigade 

33d Infantry Bri gade 

36th Infantry Brigade 

39th Infantry Brigade 

40th Armored Brigade 

40th Infantry Brigade 

41st Infantry Brigade 

45th Infantry Brigade 

49th Infantry Brigade 

53d Infantry Brigade 

67th Infantry Brigade (M)* 

69th Infantry Brigade 

71st Airborne Brigade 

72d Infantry Brigade (M)'" 

8[st Infantry Brigade 

92d Infantry Brigade 

2561h Infantry Brigade 

"'Mechanized. 

LocmioJl 

Massachusetts and Connecticut 

Pennsylvania. Maryland, and Virginia 

Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee 

North Carolina, South Carolina, 

and Georgia 

Indiana , Michigan, llnd Ohio 

New York and Pennsylvania 

Illinois, Iowa, and Minnesota 

New Jersey, New York, and Vermont 

Hawaii and Californ ia 

Wisconsin 

Illinois 

Texas 

Arkansas 

Cal ifornia 

California 

Oregon 

Oklahoma 

California 

Florida 

Nebraska 

Kansas 

TCXHS 

Texas 

Washington 

Puerto Rico 

Louisiana 

ed of the maneuver c lements, an artillery battalion, an engineer company, a medical company, a forward support maintenance cOmpany, and an administrative 

section. The remainder of each division was located in the state with the division 

base. Infantry divisions had ten maneuver battalions, as did the mechanized 

infantry divisions, except the 47th, which had eleven. The 30th and 50th Armored 

Divisions had ten and e leven maneuver battalions, respectively. A si ngl e state 

maintained each of the eighteen separate brigades, except for the 29th (Hawaii), 

wh ich had elements in the con tinental United States.4? 

The Army Reserve brigades also felt McNamara's axe. Initi'llly the Defense 

Department planned no combat forces for the Army Reserve, but congressional 
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 341 

opposition saved the 157th (Pennsylvania), 187th (Massachusetts), and 2051h 

(Minnesota and Iowa) Infantry Brigades. Al l the ir expensive armor and mechanized infantry battalions, however, were e limina ted, leav ing each brigade with 

only three standard infantry batta lions. [n the western part of the country, the 

poorly manned [9 151 Infantry Brigade fe ll out of the force, with its headquarters being inactivated in February 1968 al Helena, Montana. The foll owing June 

an armor battalion was restored to the 1571h Infantry Brigade to increase its 

capabil iti es,50 

Concurrent with reorgani zing the rese rves, Secretary of the Army Stanl ey 

Resar authori zed a new Se lected Reserve Force in 1967 to lessen the heavy 

burden of th e accc icratcd tra inin g program. All units in th e ori ginal force 

retained the ir equipmcnt but lost th eir priorit y fo r new equipment. The new 

"selected rese rve" forc e, designed spec ifi ca ll y to rei nforce the Army in 

Southeast Asia, consisted of the 26th and 42d Infantry Di visions and the 39th, 

40th, 1571h, and 2561h Infantry Brigades. But two years late r the secretary 

abolished the forcc, seeking to bring all National Gua rd and Army Rese rve 

units to the same readiness leve l.51 

Thc Dcfense Department did not questi on the number of training div isions 

in the Army Reserve, but they we re reorgani zed to conform to Regular Army 

training centers. In 1966 th e Continenta l Army Command developed new tables 

of organi zat ion that e liminated regiments in trainin g divisions and replaced 

them with brigades (Cllal'( 4/). The division fielded two basic combat train ing 

brigades, each consisting of four ball<llions with five training compani es each; 

an adva nced indi vidual training brigade, three battalions with three to six compani es or batteries of fie ld artillery, armor, infantry, <lnd engineers each; and a 

combat support training brigade, two battalions of five compa nies each, and a 

COlllmittee d irectorate. All ba sic trai ning instru ctors were concentratcd in a 

committee group. Along with the di vision headquarters and headqua rtcrs company, the division had support and spec ia l lraining companies and a noncommissioned oITi ce r/dril1 sergeant academy. These changes enhanced the tra ining 

di vision's abi lity for se lf-susta inmen t in both reserve and active duty status, but 

it could not tra in as many men under the new structure. All thirteen divisions 

were organi zed under the new tables by 1968.52 

Retrenchment 

On 8 June 1969, President Richard Nixon announced that 25,000 men would 

be withdrawn from Vietnam as part of a "Viernami zation" effort , which invol ved 

transferring increased responsibility for conducting all aspects of the war to the 

Rcpubli c of Vi etnam. An und erl ying cause wa s th e d isillusionment or th e 

Amcrican people with a war that seemed permanently sla lemated. Popular sentiment favored the return of U.S. forces From Vietnam and a retrcnchment or U.S. 

invol vement in world affairs, parli cularly in Asia.53 
CHART 4 I-Training Division, 1966 

, Each banalion will contain 3·6 of any of the following types of companies/batteries (

Infantry. Field Anillery. Armor. or Engineer. 
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 343 

£fell/ems oflhe 9,h {lIftll1l1Y Divisioll begin (fepor/jllg Viellll/m, Jllty 1969, 

General Creighton Abrams, commander of u.s. Army, Vietnam, designated 

two brigades of the 9th Infantry Division serving in the Mekong Delta to be the 

first combined arms units \0 leave. In July 1969 the 2d Brigade, 9th In fantry 

Di vision, de parted Vietnam a nd was inactivated at Fort Ritey. The fo llowing 

month Ihe di vision base and the 1st Brigade moved to Hawaii to become a part of 

the Pacific reserve. The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, was reorganized as a 

separate brigade and continued to serve in Vietnam.54 

The incremental rede ployments from Vietnam betwee n 1969 and 1972 

caused considerable confusion, but less than in previous connicts where demobi~ 

lization had to be accompl ished rapi dly. Shortly after the withdrawal began, 

Acti ng Secretary of the Army Thaddeus R. Beal announced a reduction in total 

Army forces for economic reasons. One resu lt was the immediate inactivation of 

the 9th Infantry Di vision, except for ils brigade in Vietnam. To repl ace the 29th 

Infantry Brigade in Hawaii, which was to be released from federal service along 

wit h other reserve units in December 1969, the U.S. Army. Pacific, activated the 

4t h Brigade, 25th Infantry Di vision, on 6 December and returned the 29th 

In fantry Brigade to state control on 13 December. When disclosing the formation 

of the new brigade, Secretary of Defense Clifford stressed that the 25 th Infantry 

Division was not returning from Vietnam, explai nin g that the designation was 

selected only as a tribute to the di vision's service in Vietnam. Nevert he less, the 

announcement caused some rumors that the 25th would soon be home.55 
344 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Meanwhile, in September 1969 President Nixon announced another troop withdrawal. The only large lInit in that increment was the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne 

Division, wh ich returned to Fori Bragg in December to replace the division's 4th 

Brigade. As note(~ the Army released the reserve units in December, including the 

69th Infantry Brigade. To maintain a full division at Fort Carson, the Fifth U.S. 

Army activated the 4th Brigade, 51h InFantry Division, a Regular Army unil.56 

A pattern ofredcploymcill soon emerged.57 As one group of units left Vietnam 

the president announced another reduction. Under redeployment policies, selecl'ed 

units ceased to receive replacements sixty days before leaving the command; their 

equi pment was turned in fo r stomge or red istribution; and personnel were genemlly 

reassigned e lsewhere in Viet nam. Usua lly each returning unit had only a small 

detachment to sa feguard its colors or flags and essential records. Few soldiers had 

opportunity to participate in any welcome-home ceremonies. Unneeded companysize or smaller units were inactivated in Vietnam, while batta lion-size and larger 

unit's, including divisions and brigades, returned to the United Stales fo r retention 

or inactivation. The Army genemlly followed these policies over the next two and 

one-ha lf years as divisions and brigades left Vietnam (Tc/hle 31).58 

To accommodate some redeploying units, the Army rearranged the local ion 

of divisional designations in the Regular Army. In 1970 the I st Infantry Di vision 

rcplaccd the 24th In fantry Di vision at Fort Riley and in Germany, and the 4th 

Infantry Division succeeded the 51h Infantry Division at Fort Carson. The 1st 

Brigade, 25th Infantry Di vision, replaced the 4th Brigade, 25 th Infantry Division, 

in Hawaii. The 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions simultaneously became mechanized 

infantry units, adapti ng to a NATO reinforcement role. In the 1st, the maneuver 

elements consisted of 4 armor and 6 mechani zed infimtry battalions, whi le the 

4th included I infantry,2 armor, and 7 mechan ized infa ntry baualions.59 

Another complex exchange of divisio ns took place in 197 1 when the 1 st 

Cava lry Division returned to the United States. At that time the Army planned to 

test a new air cavalry combat brigade in conjunction with a irmobile and armor 

units. The sl'aff had progmmrned the I st Armored Division at Fort Hood as the 

test un it, but when the 1st Cavalry Division returned from Southeast Asia it 

replaced the armored division, which was to be inactivated. Protests by former 

members of "Old Ironsides" aga inst taking the uni t designation out of the active 

force led Westmoreland, now Army chief of staff, to rel'ain the div ision on the 

active rolls by transferring it to Germany where it replaced the 4th Armored 

Division. The 1st Cava lry Division, less its 3d Brigade, whi c h remai ned in 

Vietnam, was reorganized at Fort Hood.6O 

The 173d Airborne Brigade posed a problem for redeployment planners 

because it had been the first large unit sent to Vietnam. They wanted to retai n it 

in the force, but the brigade was no longer needed in Okinawa as negotiations 

were under way to retu rn the islllnd to Japan. Westmorela nd decided to station 

the brigade at Fort Campbel l until the IOlst Airborne Di vision returned and to 

lise the ll11i t or some o f' its clements later to reorgani ze the IOlst. The 173d 
TABLE 31 

Redeployment of Divisions and Brigades From Vietnam 

Unit 

1st Cavalry Division (less 3d Brigade) 

3d Brigade 

1st Infantry Division 

4th Infantry Division (less 3d Brigade) 

3d Brigade 

1st Brigade. 5th Infantry Division 

9th Infantry Division (less 3d Brigade) 

3d Brigade 

23d Infantry Division 

11th Infantry Brigade 

198th Infantry Brigade 

25th Infantry Division (less 2d Brigade) 

2d Brigade 

3d Brigade. 82d Airborne Division 

\olsl Airborne Division (less 1st, 2d, 

and 3d Brigades) 

1st Brigade 

2d Brigade 

3d Brigade 

173d Airborne Brigade 

196th Infantry Brigade 

Dale 

Redeployed 

Apri11971 

June 1972 

April 1970 

December 1970 

April 1970 

August 1971 

July 1969 

October 1970 

November 1971 

November 1971 

November 1971 

December 1970 

April 1971 

December 1969 

March 1972 

January 1972 

February 1972 

December 1971 

August 1971 

June 1972 

Rema

Replaced the 1st Annored Divisio

Replaced the 4th Brigade, I st Ca

Replaced the 24th Infantry Divisi

and in Gennany 

Replaced the 5th Infantry Division 

Replaced the 4th Brigade, 5th Inf

al Fort Carson. Colorado 

Inactivated 

Inactivated 

Inactivated 

Inactivated 

Inactivated 

Inactivated 

1st Brigade replaced the 4th Briga

Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; c

and 3d Brigade reduced to zer

Reduced to zero suength 

Replaced the 4th Brigade, 82d Ai

Fort Bragg, North Carolina 

Returned to Fort Campbell,Kentu

Returned to Fort Campbell, Kentu

Returned to Fort Campbell, Kentu

Returned to Fort Campbell, Kentu

Inactivated at Fort Campbell, 197

Inactivated 
346 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

arrived at its new post in September 1971 , and the following January the 

brigade headquarters was inactivated whi le some of the brigade's elements were 

reassigned to the 10lsl.61 

In June 1972 the last two U.S. combat brigades, the 3d Brigade, lsI Cava lry 

Division, and the [96th Infantry Brigade, left Vietnam. The cavalry brigade 

rejoined its parent unit at Fori Hood, replac in g the 4th Brigade, 151 Cava lry 

Division, whi le the [96th was inactivated at Oakland, California. The last brigade 

clement, the 3d Battalion, 2151 Infantry, departed Vietnam in August 1972, marking the end of U.S. Army divisions' <lnel separate brigades' direct partici pation in 

Ihe war in Vietnam.62 

Shortly after the withdrawa l of troops from Vietnam had begun in 1969, 

President Nixon adopted a new doctrine for milit<lry involvement in world affairs. 

He based the "Nixon Doctrine" on several principles: the United States would 

honor all treaty commitments; it would provide a shield if a nuclear power threatened one of its allies or a nation whose survival was considered vita l to U.S. 

national intcrest; and it would offer military and economic assistance to its allies 

whcn rcquested. But the United States expccted 11 nation directly threatcned to 

assume primary responsibil ity for its own defense. Following these principles, 

Nixon directed a 20,000-man reduction of Army forces in Korea by 30 June 

1971. To accomplish that goal, the 7th Infan try Division concludcd its 2 I -year 

stay in Korea and returned to Fort Lewis, whcre it was inactivated on 2 April. Its 

departure left only the 2d Infantry Di vision, now reorganizcd to consist of two 

armor and six infantry battalions, augmented by Korean forces.63 

With a smaller Army the nation could no longer maintain two brigadcs in 

Alaska , and Westmoreland decided to eliminate one. In September 1969 both 

brigades had been reorganized from mechanized to light infantry as modernization and cost-saving measures. U.S. Army, Alaska, chose to inactivate the 171 st 

Infantry Brigade and reorganize the I nd. Under the new alignment a light 

infantry battalion and th e reconna issance troop were stationed at Fort 

Wainwright, while two light infantry battalions and the remainder of the brigade 

base were at Fort Richardson. The reduction of forces in Alaska was completed 

by November 1972.64 

By May 1972 post-Vietnam retrenchmen t had cut the active forces by about 

650,000 men from its peak wartime fi gure of 1.5 million. The number of Regular 

Army divisions fell to twelve, and only four special-mission brigades remained. 

The divisions, particularly those in the Un ited States, were far from being effective fighting teams. The vicissitudes of the war in Vietnam and the reductions in 

the size ofthc Army combined to erode combat effectiveness. The decline in unit 

capabilities had becn less abrupt than in 1919 or 1945--46 but just as alarming. 

The years between 1965 and 1972 had been tumultuous for both the Army 

and the nation. Organizationally, howevcr, the ROAD concept had proved sound. 

The activc Army increased more than 66 percent during this period, and divisions 
FLEX I BLE RESPONSE 347 

and brigades had been tailored for various missions within variolls regional commands. Light units campaigned effective ly in Vietnam, heavy units continued to 

meet NATO commitments in Europe, and Army forces in the United States covered contingencies for all cOlllmands. The major problem for the Army was the 

acquisition of personnel and equi pment. Al l div isions and brigades, except for 

those in Vietnam, suffered a decline in readi ness, th e price of meeting the 

demands of the conflict. Soldiers were withdrawn from Vietnam as individuals, 

and most units returned to the United States as paper organizations. The Army 

appeared to have solved its organizational problems associated with flexible 

response, but it had not come 10 grips with its perennial difficulty, shortages of 

human and materiel resources. 
348 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Notes 

I Public l~lIpl!rs of/he Presil/elllS oJlfle United Siales, L)'lIdo/! Il . .I0{IIISOII, /965 (Washing!Ol1. 

D.C.: Govcnlmcnl Printing Office. 1966). I'p. 461. 736; 1969, p. 77. 

2 Johnson, Pub/ic PU{Je/'s, f965, p. 495; U. S. O. Shllrp :l1ld W. C. Wcstillorclnnd, RelJOri 011 Ille 

IVar ill Vietnam: 1964- 1968 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1969), PI'. 275- 76; 

Henlles, "Vic1l1am Buildup," eh. 5, pp. 34-38. 

3 Richard r. We inert. Tbe Rule of USCONA RC ill tile Army Buildup. FY /966 (Fort Monroe. 

Va.: U.S. Continental Amly Command, 1967). PI'. 113- 18; UT, TAG 10 CGs. First (lnd Fifih US. 

Amlics. 30 SCI) 65. sub: Reorgani zation orlhe lsI Infantry Division, AGAO-O (M) (20 Scp65) 

DCSPER, lSI InfOi l' fil e, DAM H-I-ISO. 

4 Donn A. Starry, M Ol/l/fed Combat ill ViCtlWIII (Washington. D.C.: Govemn\Cnl Prinling OtTtce, 

1978). PI). 54-58. 

5 Johnson, Public Papers. 1965, p. 795; Hemles, "VielmHll Buildup." ch. 5, pp. 2- 1\ ; "'!\nllY 

Un its Phm Swifl Activmion:' JV(/shillgtol/ Posl. 6 Aug 1965. 

6 Weinert. Arm)' Bllildllp. /966. Pl'. 82- 84: TOE 77- \OOT. Scparnte Light InflUltry Brigade, 

1965; LIT, TAG to CG. Firsl U.S. AmlY, 7 Oct 65, sub: Chlltlge in Stntus ofSTRAF Units, AGAO-O 

(M) (2 1 Sep 65) DCSPER, and Fact Sheet (OSD 1078). ACS FOR for While House, The 1961h 

Infilntry Brigade has achieved a Combat Ready Posture, 20 Jun 66, both 1961h Inf Bele file, DAMHHSO. 

7 TOE 7- 175T, Infimtry Oa11alion. Lighl InfiHltry Division or Light [nf.1l1try Brigade, 1965. 

8 Msg. DCSPER 10 CG. CONARC. DA 748 172, 22 Jan 66. sub: Activation of the 9th Infimtry 

Division. Msg, ACSFOR to CG, CONARC. DA 748332, 24 Jan 66, same subject, Msg. CG, Fit\h 

U.S. Amly. to CG, CONA RC, 161806Z Fcb 66. ~1 mc subject, Ur. TAG to CG, Fifth U.S. A11llY, 18 

Feb 66, same subject, a1l91h Inf D]v file. DAMH-HSO; Richard I'. Weinert, The Role USCONARC ill 

tile Arlll)' Blliftlllp. FY /96 7 (Fort Monroe. Vl1.: U.S. Continental Amly Command. 1968). p. 73-76. 

9 William F. I'ullon, Rh'l'rilll' Opc/"{ltiolls. 1966- 1969 (Washington, D.C.: Govenlment Printing 

omce. 1973). pp. 26-4 1. 5 1- 60: UT, TAG to CG. Fifth Anlly. and Cine. USA RPAC. 2 \ Mnr 67, 

sub: Rcorgnni 7.<ltion ofElemellts of the 9th In11:lI1try [)ivi~ion. AGSD-C (M) (21 Oel 66) ACSFOR. 2d 

Bn, 47th [nf, file, DAMIH ·ISO, 

10 Weinert. A,.",)' lJl/ifdu{I. 1966, pp. 97- 99; Henlle~, "VicttHlm Buildup," ch. 13. pp. 34-38; Ur, 

TAG to CG, Third U.S. Army, 17 Jun 66. sub: Actil'lllion of the 1991h [nt:1ntry Brigade, AGSD,C 

(M) (3 Jun 66) ACSFOR, and Thc 199th Light Infantry Brigade (Sep) "Redcmcher:' undnted. Ms, 

both 199th Inf fide fil e, DAM H-HSO; Sharp and Wcstmoreland. Report of tile War ill VietlwlII. p. 

129. 

II Ur. TAG to CinC, USA RI'AC, 2 I Jul 66. sub: Activation of thc I I th Infantry Brigade. 

AGSO-C (M) (2 1 Jul66) ACSFOR, and Joe 1'. Gallc. "A History of the 11th Infanll), Brigade. I July 

1966- 1 Mny 1970" (3d Military History Dell1chmcnt. 1970?), p. 9. Ms, bOlh I 11h Inf Bdc fil e, 

DAMH-HSO; SS, ACSFOR for Co15, I Apr 66. sub: Brigade AClivmions. FOR 1)1' TP, Memo, ACSFOR for VCofS. 16 Oct 67. sub: Activmion of the 6th In11:1l1try Division, Ind I, FOR 1'1' 1"1'. and 

Memo for Record. OCMH, 29 Sejl67, Sllt11e subjecl, all 6th Inf Div file. OAMH-HSO. 

12 Sta rry, MOil/lied Com/)(I/, p. 58; Ltr. TAG to C inC, USARI'AC. 26 Jan 66. sub: 

Reorganization or the 25111 Inrantry Division. AGAO-O (M) (26 Jan 66) ACSFOlt and Llr. TAG to 

CinC. USA RI'AC, 10 Mar 66, sub: ReorganiZ<llion ofElemcnls of the 25th Infnnh)' Division, AGSOC (M) (10 Mar 66) ACSFOR, both 251h Inf Oiv fil e. DAM H-HSO; Ur, TAG 10 CG. U.s. AmlY, 

Alaskn. 10 Jan 66, sub: Activation of Uni ts. AGAO-O (M) (10 Jan 66), AG Referencc files, OAM HI-ISO: HenlleS, '"Vietnam Buildup," ch. 13. pp. 1- 13. 

U LtT. TAG to CG. Si;t;th U.S. Army. 29 Dec 65. sub : Reorgani zat io n of the 4th Infantry 

Di\'ision, AGAO-O (M ) ( 12 Nov 65) DCSPER, 4th lnf Di \' file , DAMH- HSO; Weinert , " 1"1/1)' 

Buildup. 1966. pp. 122- 25: Hermes, '"Vietnam Buildup:' ch. 13, pp. 27- 34. 

14 Weinert. A,.",), Buildup. 1966. IIp. 99- 101; Henllcs. "Vietnam Buildup.'" ch. 13. pp. 14-18: 

Ltr. TAG to CGs. Third l1l1d Fifth U.S. Amlies. 20 Apr 66. sub: Activation of Aviation Units. AGSD-
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 349 

C (M) (13 Apr 66) ACSFOR, Slh fin, 7th Cav file. DAM I-I-HSO, The subj(."(;\ of the letter is lhe activation of:lvialion unilS, but il pertains \0 the activa tion o rinfanlry and cay-,d ry units. 

IS Llr, TAG to Chief. NOB. and other addresses, 9 Oct 65. sub: Increased Readiness of the 

Selected Reserve Component Force. AGAM-I' (M) (8 Oct 65) ORC (Office of Reserve Components) 

·OrT (Orgnnizlllion, Plans and Trnining)-OF. Sc lcctcd Reserve Force file. DAM II-I-ISO; "Reserve 

Units [n Selected Reserve Force," Arm)' R('$cn'c M(lgm;illc II (Dec 1965): 4-6; Llr, NOB to AG, 

California, I Nov 65, sub: Reorganization of Cali fomi a ARNG, 1965, \0 Include SRF Units. NOAROTD loo2-California. LIT, NOB 10 AG, Texas. 24 1an 66, sub: Rcorganil..1lion of Texas ARNG \0 

Include SRF units, NG-AROTO [002-0[-Tellas. Ltr. NGB to AG. Washington. 28 Oct 65. sub: 

Reorganization of the Washington ARNG. [965, to Include SRF Ullits. NG-A ROTO 1002-01-

Washington, and Ltr, NGB to AG. Oregon, 28 Oct 65, sub: Reorganization ar the Oregon ARNG. 

1965, to Include SRF Units. NG-A ROTO IOO2-01-0rcgan. all NGB Reference fil es, DAMH-HSO. 

16 Ltr. TAG ta Chief, Organizl'<i Reserve Camponents. [3 Nov 65, sub: Inactivation of USA R 

Reinforcing Reserve Unils, AGAM (M), Scl~ted Reserve Force file. DAMI-l-IiSO. 

17 "Stability Ol'tralions Dominican Republic." pI. I. vol. I. eh. II. p. I. Ms. DAM II-IISR; 

Hennes, "Vietn;ull Buildup," ch. 2. pp. 34--36, ch. 15. pp. 1-4. 

1ft Weinert. Army Ili/ift/up. 1966. pp. 85- 88; Depl/l"llIIelll {if Defellse Allnlllfl Reporl. 1967. p. 

144. 

19 Weiner!, Army Illlildllp. 1967. pp. 97- 101 ; Telephonc infoflllation request sheets, sub: 

Composition o f the ]98th Infantry Brigade, 2 ,md 5 May 1%7, Msg DA 813926 to CG. CONA RC, 9 

May 67. sub: Org.mi7 .. 1tion of the 198th Inf Bde. lmd Memo for Record, undated, sub: Evolution of 

[98th Inrllde. alll98th InfBde fil e. DAMH-HSO. 

20 Task Foree Oregon was named for Ihe home slnte of its commander, Maj Gen William E. 

Rosson. 

21 William C. Westmoreland, A Soltlier e1X)I"/~' (Garden City. N.J.: Doubleday and Co .. (976). 

p.201. 

22 Msg. USA RV 10 USA RPAC. 18 1303 May 6 7, sub: 3d Brigades, 4th and 25th Infantry 

Division. Msg. ACSFOR 10 Ci nC, USA RPAC. DA 824266. 192355Z Ju167, samc subject. GO [44. 

USARPAC, 1967, Ltr, TAG ta CinC, USARI'AC. [2 Sep 67, sub: Change in Stalus of USA RI'AC 

Units. AGSD-C (M) (I Sep 67) ACSFOR. all 3d Bde. 25th InfOiv file, DAM II-HSO. 

21 SS, ACSFOR for Co lS, 7 Scp 67, sub: Americal Division. FOR PP TI'. Memo for Rl'Cord. 29 

Scp 67, sub: OrganiZ.11ion and Aetivalion o f the ZJd Inf.1nlry Division. and GO 175. USARPAC. 20 

Scp 1%7, a1l23d InfDiy file. DAMI·I-HSO. 

2.j Ltr. TAG 10 CinC, USA RPAC, 29 Sci) 67. sub: Ch:mge in Status of Units, AGSD-C (20 Scp 

67) ACS FOR. Ltr. TAG to CG. CONARC, 28 Sep 67. sub: Rcorganiz.1Iion o f the 198th Inr.U1 try 

Brigade. AGSD-C (M) (21 Sep 67) ACSFOR. both AG Re ference files. DAMII-I-l SO; "For Freedom 

Under the Soulhem Cross." Amedml I (Mny 1%8): 2-6. 

25 Sh,lrp lmd Westilloreland, Reporl Oil Ihe lVl/r ill I'iell/ml/, p. 156; News Release. 1170-67, 

Arrival of IOl st Airbome Division in Vietnam. 13 Dec 67, and Llr. TAG to CG, Third U.S. Amly. 30 

Nov 67. sub: Reorganization or Elements of the 10Ist Airbomc Division. AGSD-C (M) ( IS Nov 67) 

ACSFO R, bol h IOtst Abn Diy file. DAM H-IISO. 

26 SS. ACSFOR ror CofS, 18 Oct 67. sub: Activation orthe 61h Inf.1ntry Division. FOR PI) Ti), 

Msg. DA ACSFOR for CG. CONARC, and CinC. USARPAC. 837848. 26 1426Z Oct 67, saille subject. Msg. CinC, USARPAC, to ACSFOR. 062056 Nov 67. same subjcct. and GO 358, Third U.S. 

AmlY, 1967,a l161h InfDiv file, DAM I-I-IIS0 . 

27 W. W. RoSIOw, rile Diffllsioll ofPoH"l'r(New York: Macmi llan Co., (972). p. 410: Report by 

the 1- 1 to the JCofStatT on SI>ceial ray for Duty subjecllo lIoslile fire in Korea, 2 1 Feb 68. JCS 

2478/130. Korea. Special Pay for Ilostile Fire fil e, DAMI-l-l [SO; Sharp and Westmoreland, Reporl (if 

Ihe /I'll,. 11/ Viellllllll. pp. 157- 62, ] 83- 84. 

21! Ltr. TAG 10 CG, Fillh U.s. Amly. 13 May 68. sub: Chan!:.'C in Status ofUnils. AGSD-C (M) (2 

May 68) ACSFOR, 5th [nf Div file. DAMII-/·ISO: Msg. DA 10 CG. CONARC, and olher addn.-sses. 

866004. 28 M.ty 68. sub: Final Movement Direelive 68- 56, 1st I3de, 5th [nf Diy, file. DAM H-J[SO; 

Unit History orthe 1st In f.,ntry Ilrig'tde. 5th Inf.1ntry Division (Mechanized), 191 7- 1971, ~. Mi ll. 
350 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

29 Lyndon Gaines Johnson, The VOllloge PO;J/1 (New York: 11011, Rinchard, and Winston. 1971), 

pp. 385-415 passim; Msg. ACSFOR, OA. to JCS, and olher addresses. 8593 14. 11 Apr 68. sub: 

Mobilization Order, Msg, ACSFOR. DA, to JC5, and other addresses, 860342. 18 Apr 68. sub: 

Mobilization Station Change. 18 Apr 68, nnd ORC·OPT. Fact Sheet. sub: 12 Apr 68, Selectioll of 

Reserve Components for Mobili:r ... 1tion, ;tli Vicln;l111, Reserve C01111>OI1Clltlilc, DAMH-I·ISO. 

30 Tolson, Airlllobifily, PI'. 195- 98; Msg, ACSFOR, DA, to CinC, U$ARPAC, 866236, 28 May 

68, sub: Second AimlObilc Divisioll, 10lsi Ahl! Div file, DAMH-I-ISO. 

l! Tolson, Airll/obilifY. p. 197: Msg, AC$FQR, DA. 10 CinC, U$ARI'AC, 907931, 6 May 69, 

sub: Activation/Inactivation! Reorgmlil'.ation of Units in RVN. and GO 577. USA RpAC, 1969, both 

1st Cav Div file. DAMI-I-JISO. 

32 Drnfi SS, ACSFOR for Col'S. undated, sub: Redesigllation of IOlst Air Cavalry Division. 

FOR Pi> Fl'. and Msg. ACSFOR. DA. to CinCo USARPAC. 877510. 26 Aug 68. sub: Rcdesignmion 

of AimlObile Division. 10lsi Abn Div file. DAMH· HSO. 

JJ Cover Sheet (OPS 28) ACSFOR. 15 Nov 68. sub: RC<1fglIni7.ation of the 23d Infantry Division 

(Amerieal), FOR OT OR 1'0. and GO USARV 113,69, both 23d InfDiv file, OAM H-HSO. 

34 Richard p. Weinert. 17/C Role of usc ON ARC ill lite Arlll)' iJl/iltillp. FY 1968 (Fort Monroe. 

Va.: U.S. Continental Anny Command. 1969). p.71; Llr, TAG to CG. CONA RC, and otheT address· 

es, 7 Mar 67, sub: Activation ofSTARF Units, 7 Mar 67, AGSD·C (M) (14 Mar 67) ACSFOR, Ltr, 

TAG to CG, CONARC. 20 Oct 67. sub: Activation ofSTRAF Units. AGSD-C (M) (16 Ckt(7) ACSFOR. and LtT, TAG to CinCo USARPAC, 2 Oct 67. sub: Aetiv,ltion of Units, AGSD-C (M) (22 Sep 

67) ACSFOR, all AG Reference files, DAMH·HSO. In addition to the infantry ballalions assigned 10 

divisions and brigades. one nondivisional infantry unit served in Vietnam in a military poliee role. 

35 Mahon and Danysh. "ifill//IJ" I'P. 11 5- 16; Westmoreland. A Soldier Reports, p. 283. 

36 Mahon and o-.Ulysh. hifilllll)', p. 115; George E. Ocxter. "Scarch and Destroy in Vietnam," 

hifill1/I)' 56 (Jul- Aug 1966): 36-42. 

37 Starry, MOil/lied COlllbm, pp. 142.234- 37; John H. Hay. Jr.. Taclicallllul Mmeriei 

Im/oWllioll.f (WaShington, D.C.: Goven11l1ent Printing Office, 1974), pp. 111 - 16: Army Concept 

Team in Vietnam, Final Report: Optimum Mix of AmlOred Vehicles for Usc in Stability Operations, 

p. 11- 20. casc Libmry, Fon Le,lVenwonh, Kans. Although nine rnc~hanil'.ed infantry ballalions 

served in Vietnam. only eight served there at lIny given time. The assets of the 5th l3al1alion, 60th 

Infantry, on clement of the 91h Infantry Division, were used 10 organi..:e Ihe lSI Battalion. 161h 

Infantry.:111 clement of the 1st Infiltltry Division, in 1968. 

38 David Ewing 011, Fielfl ArlillelJ' 1964- 197J (Washington, D.C.: Govcmment Printing Office, 

1972).pp. I68- 73. 

39 USCONARC/ARSTRIKE (AnllY Strike) "Annuall-listorical SUmn1..1ry. FY 1969:' p. 87. 

40 Andrew P. O'Mearn, "Drnwdown for Viet.101m: How U$AREUR Makes Do," Army 16 (Oct 

19(6): 73- 75+; James 11. Polk. "A Changing US Anny Europe: Building Coml>.1t Capability for 

Tomorrow," Ar/ll)' 17 (Ckt 1967): 65 66+. 

4t Aviation Requirements for Combat Structures of the Army, Annex II . 1965; TOE 170, 

Annored Division, 1966; TOE 370. Infantry Division (Mechanized), 1966; TOE 1- 87G, Division 

Aviation SUJ)pon Det'L~hlllent. 1%0. 

42 Msg. ACSFOR to CinCo USAREUR, DA 737567. 22 Oct 65, sub: Reorganizatioll of 

USAREUR Division. Division Oeneml file. Ltr, TAG to CinCo USAREUR, 12 Apr 66. sub: Change 

in Status of Units, AOSD-C (M) (12 Apr 66) ACSFOR. both (26 Sep 66), Ltr, TAG to CinC, 

USAREUR.3 Oct 66, sub: Attiv,ltion of US AmlY Europe Units. AOSD-C-C (MX26 Scp 66) ACS· 

FOR. AO Reference Iilcs. Msg, ACSf-'OR to CinC, USAREUR, lllW.1 CG, CONARC, 112158Z Feb 

66, sub: Tmnsferofthe 5th Bn 32d Annor, DA 750634. 5th Bn. 32d Annor. Iile, all DAM II-liSa: 

TOE 170. AmlOrcd Division. 1966; TOE 370, Mechanized Infantry Division. 31 Mar 1966: TOE 

7-45G. Mechanized Infantry Battalion, 1966; TOE 17- 35G. Tank Battalion. 31 Mar 1966; John S. 

Yakshe. ··REDEYE Ground to Air." "ifill/II)' 56 (Jul- Aug 1966); 22 23. 

43 "US. UK, and Oenllany Conclude Tril3teml Talks," Depf//·/Illellt viS/me Bulletill 56 (22 Noy 

(7): 788- 89; Richard 1'. Weinet1. USCONARC (lml Redeplo)'lIIellt oIF(J/"f.:e~I/"Q'" Europe (RHOKGI:R) 

(FOTt Monroe. Va.: U.S. Continental Anny Command. 1969). 
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 35 1 

44 Msg, DA 10 CO, CONARC, 889661, 6 Dt.'c 68, sub: J'ublic Announcement-Reforger 1, and 

LIT. TAG to CO, CONA RC. and olher addresses. 28 May 69, sub: Aller Action Report, Exercise 

Reforger I, AGAM-!, (23 May 69) FOR OT ur 69EOOI. bolh Rclorgcr file , DAMH-I-ISO. 

45 Llr, TAG 10 CG. Third U.s. AmlY, 23 May 66, sub: lnaclivlLlion or the 2d Bal1alion. 291h 

Infantry, AGSD-C (M) (3 May 66), 197[ h Inf Bdc file , DAMH-IIS0: Telephone or Verba l 

Conversation Record. Mrs Stubbs and Lt Col Dcrlmy, II J UIl 67, sub: An Anllored Brigade for Ft 

Knox , and Llr, TAG 10 CG. U.S. ATmy Combat Developments Command. 24 Jan 68, sub: 

Reorganization of Unit, AGSO-C (M) ACSFOR, both 1941h AmId Bdc file, Llr. TAG to CO, US 

AmlY, Alaska, 10 Jul 67, AOSD-C (M) (3 Jul 67) ACSFOR, 171st Inf Bde file. and GO 70, U.S. 

Forces Southem Command, 1968. 3d Bn. 5th Inf file, all DAMH· H$O. 

46 Msg, OCINFO DA to CG, CONARC, and CinC, USARPAC 870873. 3 Jul 68, sub: Decision 

by the Secretary of Defcllsc not to Activ~He the 6th Infan try Division, and Ur, TAG to CG. 

CONARC, and CinC, USARPAC, 18 No" 68. sub: Change in Status ofUnics. AGSD-C (M) (3 1 Jul 

68) ACSFOR. both 6th Inf Di" file, DAMH· HSO; Llr. TAG to CG. CONA RC. 7 Nov 68. sub: 

Change in Status of Units, AGSD-C (M) (10 Oct 68) ACSFOR, 4th Bde. 82d Abu Oiv, file. alld Ed 

Gerhardt, Unit History of the 69th Jnfarnry Origade (Mechanized) 1963- 1978, 15 Feb 79. Ms. pp. 

10- 21. 691h Ode,. 35th Inf Div, file. 

47 Memo for Rceord. Scc of the Gcneral Staff, sub: Meeting with VCSA on Re·examination of 

~-dueti on of Forces in Europe and Reconstitution of the 6th Division (2 Brigades), 23 Aug 68. and 

OI'S Foml 28. ACSFOR to Cots, 30 Scp 67, sub: Activation ofOivisiol1 Headquarters and a Origadc 

size Foree of the 6th Infantry Di vision (Show the Flag Concept), FOR 1'1' FP, 6th Inf Div file, 

OAMI·I·IISO. 

48 Chief of Information, DA, Wily Merge (Washington, O.C,: Govemment Printing Office, 

1965): Llr, TAG to CinC, USAREU R, and other addresses, 14 Jun 67, sub: Reserve Componcnt 

Reorgani zatiol\, AGAM·P (M) (13 Jun (7) O RC·OPT·OP, Llr, TAG to CinC, USA REU R, and other 

addresses, 20 Ju167, same subjcct, AGAM-P (M) (20 Ju1(7) ORe·OPT·OP, and News Release, 27 

Nov 67, Amly Reserve Components Will Commence Reorganization. all Anny Reservc file, DAMI-II-I SO; "The President Reports to the 89th General Conference," Nmiollal GI/ardsmall, 2 1 (Oct 1967): 

insidc frollt cover and pp. 36- 39; "Oivision Command Rotatioll Plan Set Aside," Na/ioll(ll 

GlIfIrdSIll{/II, 22 (Mar 1968): 16; James F. Cantwell, "A Salute 10 Ihe ' Lost' Divisions," Na/iOllal 

GII(II'"f/~ IIWII, 22 (Feb 1968): inside fronl cover. The Guard lVanted the maneuver element mix ror 

mechanized inf.,ntry and annored divisions to be the same as the prototypc divisions under the 1966 

tables of organi ..... 'Ition. but for infantry divisions it desired eight inf.'Illtry, two mcehanized infiUltry. 

and two annor ballalions; thus the infa ntry division would have beell larger than Regular Amly divisions. 

49 Repon of /lte Chief Nil/iollal Gllal'(l Bllreall. 1968, pp. 33- 34: Keith E. McWilliams, 

"O;\·isions or Brigades for the National Guard." AHliwlJ' Re l'iew 5 I (Jan 1971): 37; also NG-AROTO 

1002- 1 lellers 1967- 1968, cO]Jics in CMI I. 

SO Office of Reserve Components, "Annual Historical Summary, 1 Jul 67- 30 Jun 68," p. 4, 

OAMH-I-ISR; Historical Data Cards, 157th, 1871h, 191sl, and 205th InfUdes, DAM H-I·ISO. 

SI LtT, TAG to CinC, USAREUR, 25 Apr 68. sub, SRF II Troop List, AGAM·" (M) (16 Nov 

67) ORC-OPT·OP. Anny Reservc file , DAM II· HSO; "CONARC Report on US Anny Reservc 68:' 

Arm)' Reserve Magil:inc 25 (Mar 1968): 4-5; "SRF 130m 27 September 1965; Died September 1969," 

N(tJiol/af GII(/I'"fls/II(II/ 23 (Scp 1969): 12- 16: DepU/,/IIIt'lIf ofille , fnll)' His/or'ical SWIIIIIlII)'. 1970, p, 

70. 

S2 TOE 29- 7T- 3, Division (Trnining). 1966; "Things 10 Come: CONARC Present Plans fOT the 

New Year," ..11"111)' Rt'sel1'/! Mtlg(dllt' 13 (Dec 1967): 8- 9; NOles, "Tl'llining Division Reorganization. 

1967- 1968:' Division Gencml files, OAMH·HSO. 

Sl /)lIblic P(II)I!I"S oJlhe Preside/lls oflhe Ulli/ed Slates. Ric/wl'd Nixon. 1969 (WaShington, D.C.: 

Go\'emment Printing Office, 197 1), p. 443. 

S4 Wcslmoreland, A Soldier RCI}()I'/S, p. 381: GO 236, Fifth US AmlY, 23 Jul 1969; Ltt. TAG to 

CinC, USARPAC. and other addresses, undatcO, sub: Letter of Instruction for Redeployment of US 

AmlY Forees from RVN (U), AGAM,], (21 Ju169) OPS 00 FE. Vietnam Redeployment file, Msg. 
352 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

CINFO, DA, 10 CG, USARI)AC ,lI1d other addresses, 919410. 8 Aug 69, sub: Inactiva tion 0(91h 

Infillltry Division. 9th InfOiv file. GO 2434, USARV, 6 Ju169. 3d I3dc, 9th InfDi\', file. all DAM HI-ISQ. 

H Msg. CINFO, DA, to CO, USARI'AC and other llddrcsscs, 919410. 8 Aug 69, sub: 

Inactivation of 9th Infml1ry Division; LIT. TAG 10 CinC, USAREU R lIl1d Seventh Amly lind Olher 

addresses, [8 Dec 69, sub: Plan lor Release of Units and Individuals ordered to Active Duty under the 

Reserve Forces Mobiliz.1Iion, Ml1Y 68, AGAM-J> (M) ( 13 Dec 68) DeSPER-pLD. Vietnam, Reserve 

Component, file. DAMH-I-\SO; Msg. [>CSQPS, DA, 922222. 2 Scp 69, sub: Dcmobiliz.1lion of the 

291h Inf I3de, 29th Inf Ode file, OAMII-IIS0; LIT, NOll to AG, lIa waii , 12 Nov 69, sub: 

Recstablishment and RCQfgo1ni .. ution orthe 29th [nI:1n1ry Brigade. NG-A RQTQ [OO2'()[·Hawaii 291h 

Inf 1.Jdc, DAMH·HSO: GO 645, USARI'AC, 26 Aug 1969: Msg. SECDEF to CinC, Pacific Area 

Command, 6 Nov 69, sub: Public AfT.,irs Guiduncc for Activation of Units in Hawaii, 41h Ode, 251h 

InfDiv. filc, DAMI-I·IISO. 

SO Nixon, Public Papel'll', 1969. p. 7 18: Msg. CG, U.s. Anny. Victnam (USA RV). to CG. 3d 

Bdc, 82d Abn Div, 13441 I [40847Z Oct 69. sub: Implementing Instmetions to USARPAC Advanec 

Movement Directivc 13- 69. and Ur, TAG to CG, CONARC. 9 Jan 70, sub: Approval of MTOE, 

AGAO·D (M) (17 Dec 69) ACSFOR. both 3d Bde, 82d Abu Div, fil e. DAM H-HSO: Ur, NGB to 

AG, KanSlls, 2 1x.'C 59. sub: Reestablishment of 69th [nf Ude ,111<1 995th Maint Co in Kansas ARNG. 

NG·AROTO·OI, Kansas, Kans.1s NO file. DAMH·[·ISO. 

57 Redeployment had a brrn,der meaning than just translcrring units from one command to 

another. It included the inactivation of units in Vietnam, the transfer of units to olher commands for 

rctentioll in the force. and the retun, of units to the United States for inactivation. 

58 Msg, Cine. USAR[>AC. to DCS['ER, 12 134Z Dec 1%9, sub: [Icrsonnel Policics to Suppon 

SubSC<llIent Redep[oyment from RVN. as amended, Vietnam Redep[oyment file. DAMH·HSO. 

59 Msg, ACSFOR to CinC, USARPAC, 940715 9 Feb 70, sub: Inactivation/roorganiz.1tionl activation, ACSFOR MF CRA. and Ltr, TAG to CinC, USARPAC, and other addresses, 14 Nov 70, sub: 

Letter of Instmetion for the Fifth Increment Redep[oyment of US Am,y Forces from RVN, AGDA 

(M) ([4 Nov 70) OI'S 00 TR, both Viehmm Redeployment file. DAM[·I-I·ISO. 

60 Ltr, TAG to CinC, USARI'AC, and other addresses, 17 Feb 71, ub : Lellcr of Instmction for 

the Sixth Increment Redeployment of US Anny Forces from RVN, AG I'A-A (M) ( 12 Feb 7 1) OI'S 

OD TR, Vietnam Redeployment file, OAMI-I-I-1SO; LIt. TAG 10 CinC, USA RPAC. 15 Apr 7 [. sub: 

Letter or [nstmction for the Rcorgani7.alionllnactivation of the 1st/4th AnnoTed Division. AGDA-A 

(M) (8 Apr 7 1) 01' OD TR, GO 147, [[[ Corps and Fort 1-1000, 1971, and Llr. 1st Annd Div to U.S. 

Anny Institute ofHernldry, 25 M:lY 7 1, sub: Request for Information, AETSKA, ors 28 Form. ACSFOR, sub: Rcdcsign.1tion of the 1st AnlloTed Division, OAI'D·MFI'-T. 22 Scp 72: all 1st Annd Div 

file, DAMH· HSO: Llr, Uruce Clark to Westmoreland, 26 Mar 7 1. and LIf, I-lal Pallison. Chief or 

Military IlistOf)' to Clark, 3 I Mar 71. both 4th Annd Div fi[c. DAMI1 · HSO. 

61 Memo for Record. Vincent M Russo. Asst Sec of the Gell Staff. 22 Jun 7 [, sub: Stationing of 

the 173d Airborne Brigade. lind Msg. ACSFOR to CG, CQNARC, 172206Z Dec 7 [ sub: 

Organi .. alion of 10lst Abn Div (Ambl) in CONUS, both 173d Abu Ode file, OAMH·HSO. 

62 Llr, TAG to CinCo USARI'AC. and olher addresscs. 5 Jlln 72, sub: LCller of Instruction for thc 

Twelflh Incremental Redcployment of US Anny Forees from RVN. DAAG·I'AI'·A (M)(24 May 72) 

DAMO·ODT. and Ur. TAG to CinC, USARI'AC, lind other addresscs, 10 Allg 72, sub: Lettcr of 

Instruction for .he Thinecnth Incrementa[ Redep[oyment of US Anny Forees from RVN, OAAGI'AP-A (M) (2 Aug 72). DAMO·ODT. both Vietnam Redep[oyment file, DAMI [-I ISO. 

63 Nixon, Public Papers. 1969. pp. 905- 06: Llr. TAG to CinC, USARI'AC, and olhl"f addresses. 

22 Jun 71, sub: Letter of Instruction for Redep[oyment of US Amly Forees from the Repub[ic of 

Korea. A DGA·A (M) (8 Jun 71) O I'S 00 TR. Korea. Redep[oyment of Un its 1971 - 1972 file. 

DAMI-l·J[SO: GO 162, Sixth US Anny. 1971. 7th InfO!\' file. DAM] I-IISO. 

6" US Amly Alaska, "Annual Historical Summary. I Ju168- 30 Jun 69," p. [4. 1 Ju[ 69- 30 Jun 

70, p. 17, DAMH -HSR: Depllrtlllem o/Ifll' AI'III)' Hislorical SIIIIIIIWI)'. f972, Jl. 10; GO 657. US 

Anny Alaska, 1972, 171st InfBde file, DAMIl ·[ISO. 
CHAPTER 13 

The Total Army 

The Ulli/ed Slates IIIlIsf COJI/ill lll! 10 //Iail/Illill (1(lequ(lle !>'frellgth to /IIect ils responsi. 

bilifies . ... The clIpabilities of OUI" aClil'c fi}/·ce.~ 11111.\" be improve(1 substantially ,hrollgh 

moderl/ization lIlId ill/pro!'!!ll readilless. AI Ihe sallie lime, we lire placing increased 

eml,llflsis 011 0/11' NlIIiolllll Gllarc! lIlIll Resen'c ('ompuI/ems so {11m we /lilly ol)(aill II/(Ixi11111111 defellse capaiJilifies frolll lite limiled resources aW/i/able. 1111! .~·Irengl"ellillg of lite 

Naif 01/01 GI/orr! alld Reserve Po/'ce,\' . .. is fill illlegml,JlIrI of ,he /OIaI force plalllling. 

Sccrclary of Defense Melvin R. Laird l 

Disillusioned wi th the experience in Vietnam, the nation questioned and reexamined the role of the United States in world affairs. The Army turned 10 a smaller, 

all-vol unteer rorce ror the first time since the end or World War II. A smaller Anny, 

however, req uired more convcntiona l firepower to provide a credible detcrrent 

against Soviet aggression. A reexamination or division and brigade organizations 

began, resulting in the incoq>oration o r new, sophisticated weapons and equipment. 

To meet the nation 's needs with rewer resources, planners re lied upon the concept 

or "One Army" or "Tota l Army," depe ndi ng upon the jargon in vogue, wh ic h 

stressed the integration of th e Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army 

Reserve. Although the three components had served the nation together in the past, 

they had always remained separate and distinct rrom one another in many ways. 

The 21-Division, 2 I-Brigade Force 

The Nixon doctrine and small er budgets drove Secretary or Derense Melvin 

R. Laird to set an Army goal or 2 1 di visions, 13 in the Regular Army and 8 in the 

National Guard, by 1973. Structured and equipped primari ly to de fend Western 

Enrol>C, the divisions were designed ror conventional warra re aga inst the Soviet 

Union's heavy armor rorces. To complement the divisions, the Army main tained 

21 separate combi ned arms brigades, 18 in the Army National Guard and 3 in the 

Army Reserve. In addition, the Regular Army continued to employ specia l mission brigades as theater derense rorees.2 

In October 1969 the Army Staff ll )(~nded all new work on revised tables or 

orga ni 7..<l tion and equipment ror arrnorc(~ inrmllry, and mechanized inrantry divisions because the proposed changes required too many men to fie ld them. Instead, 

il directed the Comb..lt DevcJoprncnls Command to develop divisions or rewer than 
354 

TOW (rllbe-Ialli/ched. oprically 

/racket/. lI'ire-gllifled) missile 

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

17,000 men. The proj ect, entitled AIM 

(armored, infantry, and mechani zed 

infantry di visions), would occupy 

Army planners' attention for the next 

several years and focus primarily on 

the European battlefi eld ) 

In their final form the new AIM 

tables ne ith er altered the ove rall 

ROAD doctrine nor radically modi* 

fied divisional struc ture s but 

addressed ways to counler va rious 

Iypes of Soviet threats. To defend 

aga inst low· altitudc hostile a ircraft 

and surface targets, the tables provided each div ision with an air defense 

arti ll e ry ba tt a lion eq u ipped w ith 

Chaparral missi les and Vulcan guns, 

\veapons that had been under developIllent si nce 1964. The new batta lion 

gave divisions the first dedicated antiaircraft artillery unit since pen tomi c 

reorga nization. Aviation companies 

reappeared in mechan ized infantry 

and armored divisions to enhance air 

support. In the divisional support command, adjutant general and fi nance companies replaccd the administration company to improve personnel services, and automatic dala proccssing cquipmcnt was addcd to providc centra lized control of personnel and logistics. Eventually automatic data processi ng lcd to the introduction of 

a materiel (supply and mai ntenancc) management ccnter in each divisioll.4 

In infantry, mcchanized infantry, and armor battalions, the tables concentrated combat support (SCOlltS, mortars, a ir defense and antitank weapons, ground 

su rveillance eq ui pment, and maintenance resou rces) into a combat support company. Tube-lau nched, Optically trackc(~ Wire-guided missi les (TOWs) rcplaced 

ENTACs and I06·rnm. recoi llcss riflcs as antita nk wCllpons in the infantry and 

mechanized infant ry battalions. Sincc the TOW was only j ust emerging from its 

developmental stage, the tables approved the retention of the 106·ml11. recoilless 

rifle as a temporary measure.S 

Modernization of armored, infantry, and mechanized infa ntry div isions 

becllme an ongoing process primarily to due to shortages of equipmen t. Because 

of the need for ant iaircraft weapons in the divisional area, the Air Defense 

Arti llery School at Fort Bliss, Texas, inaugurated a program in the spring of 1969 

10 activate and train Chaparra l-Vulcan battalions. which were assigncd 10 divisions 

upon completion of training. After the new divisional tables were published in 
THE TOTAL ARMY 355 

1970, the Honest Joh n rocket battalions were eliminated as divisional units, and 

new Lance missile units replaced them at corps level. The adjutant genera l and 

finance companies were introduced in 1971, the aviation companies returned in 

1972, the materiel management center appeared in 1973, and new combat intell igence companies were assigned beginn ing in 1974 (replacing the combat intelligence unit, which had been regularly attached to every division since the pentomic 

reorganization of 1957). The company provided tl battlefield information coordination center to plan and manage the collection of intelligence and consolidated 

ground surveillance radar and remote sensors lInder one commandcr.6 

The standard maneuver clement mix of the mechanized in fantry div ision was 

a lso adjusted for the European battlefield. An additional armor batta lion was 

added to the mode l division, making the mi x five armor and six mechanized 

infantry battal ions. Subsequently the Army activated additional armor battalions 

for the 3d and 8th Infantry Di visions stationed in Germany in 1972. That same 

year the Con tinental Army Command replaced a mechanized infantry battalion 

with an armor battalion in the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado, and 

in 1973 made a similar change, givi ng the division a maneuver clement mix of 

four armor and six infantry battalions. [n the armored division the maneuver mix 

rema ined at ri ve mechanized infantry and six armor battalions. Infantry divisions 

fielded one armor, one mechanized infan try, and eight " foot" infantry battalions.1 

To have thirteen Regular Army divisions, the Army Staff directed the 25th 

Infantry Division, which fielded only one brigade afier leaving Vietnam, to be 

reorganized at Schofie ld Barracks in the spring of 1972. Because of environmen. 

tal issues surrou nding the use of Schofi eld Barracks at that time, the division had 

only two brigades (six infantry batta lions), with the Hawaii Army National Guard 

agreeing 10 " round out" the 25th with the 29th In fa ntry Brigade. Since the 

brigade included the 100lh Battalion, 442d Infantry. from the Army Reserve, the 

division was truly representative oflhe "Total Army."8 

For the thirteenth Regular Army division in the fo rce, the Continental Army 

Command reactivated the 9th In fantry Division at Fort Lewis on 21 April 1972. 

Over the next few months the divisio n organized one armor, o ne mechani zed 

infantry, and seven infantry battalions, which was one less infantry unit th<ln the 

standard fo r an infantry division. The division b<lse had all its authorized elements 

except for the Honest John battalion, then under consideration for elimination in all 

divisions. Two years later the Army Staff directed the 9th to establish one brigade as 

an armored unit to support contingency plans, and when it became evident that the 

active Army was unable to field an additional tank battalion, the Washington Army 

National Guard agreed to furnish a tank battalion as a round-Ollt lInit.9 

While organizing the thirteen-division force, the Continenta l Army 

Command dctermined that the 197t h Infantry Brigade, assigned to the In fantry 

School at Fort Benning, Georgia, was overman ned for its training support mis· 

sion in the post-Vietnam Army. To provide pcrsonnel needed for the school, the 

command directed that the school support troops be reorganized and the 197th be 
356 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

restructured as a unit in the Strategic Army Force. On 2 1 March 1973 the brigade 

officia lly joined the strategic force, fi elding one battalion each of infantry, mechanized infantry, and armor, 10 

The Regular Army also maintained three other brigades with special missions 

in the cady 19705. The 172d and 193d Infantry Brigades se rved in Alaska and the 

Canal Zone, respectively, as theater defense units. At Fort Knox, Kentucky, the 

194th Armored Brigade was a bri gade in name only. It had been reduced to a 

headquarters, and ils infmllry, armor, and field artill ery units had been assigned 

directly to the Armor School. The 1941h, however, remained at Fori Knox as a 

command a nd control orga ni zation for various un its ranging in size from a 

finance section to a supply and service battalion. I I 

In lat e 1972 the Arrny approved the reorganization of the 10 I sl Airborne 

Division using new airmobi le divisiona l tables. Since returning from Vietnam, 

the IOl st had comprised two airmobile brigades and one airborne brigade, with 

the airborne brigade separat ely dep loyable. Defense planners had insisted thaI 

the division serve as a qui ck reaction force until the thirteen-division force was 

combat ready. The existing div ision employed a conglomeration of old, new, 

and test tables of organization and equipment, which cre,lted organ izational 

problems in the division's combat and support units, parti cularly in signa l 

rcsourccs and medium-range fi e ld artillery. Afte r ex tensive study Army Chief 

of Staff Creighton Abrams approved the reorgani zation of the division under 

new tables, whi ch continued to provide two airmobile brigades and one a irborne brigade, with its supporting elements parachute qualified. Signal , engineer, ma intenance, and aviation resources were in creased; and an air defense 

artillery battalion, adjutant ge neral and finance complUlies, and a materi e l 

management center added. A 155-mm. howitzer battali on, wh ich had beell used 

in Viet nam by the di vision, was made an organi c clement in the tables, but in 

fielding the !lew structure, Abrams directed that the 155-mm. towed howitzer 

battalion be temporaril y elimi nat e d a s a wa y to reduce personne l 

req ui rements. [2 

By early 1974 th e thirteen-division Regular Army rorce was deemed combat ready. and contingency plans no longer required an airborne brigade in the 

10 I st. United Stat es Anny Forces Command, which in parI replaced the United 

Stal es Continental Army Command in 1973, reorganized the di vision as a completely airmobile orga ni za tion. The reorga nization also e liminated int ernal 

riva lries between the higher pa id paratroopers (soldi ers on "jump status") and 

the regu lar airmobil e soldiers. To compensate for its loss o r airborne status in 

recruiting, Maj. Gen. Sidney B. Berry, the commander of the 10 I st, decided to 

ca pitali ze on the division's air assault traini ng, req uestin g that the di vision's 

parenthetica l designation be changed from "airmobile" to " air assault" and that 

the personnel who compl eted air assault trainin g be authorized to wea r a speci al 

badge. The Army Staff app roved the chan ge in designa tion and eve ntually 

authori zed the air assa ult badge.IJ 
THE TOTAL ARMY 

Gel/emf Abrtlllls 

357 

The airborne division was the last 

type of division to be modernized. As 

in other divisions, the new tables pro· 

vided an air de fense artillery battalion, 

adj utant genera l and finance compa· 

nies, and a materiel management cen· 

ler. The structure also continued to 

include a much debated li gh t armor 

battalion, equipped with reco nnais· 

sanee airborne assault vehicles, which 

had been assigned to the division in 

1969. The most sign ifica nt change, 

however, was the replacement of the 

suppl y company with a supply and 

service battalion, which provided the 

division with over 500 additional service personnel. The one remaining 

active airborne division, the 82<1, with 

nine airborne infantry btlUalio ns and 

an armor battalion, adopted the new 

structure by the fa ll of 1974.14 

After returning from Vietnam the 1st Cava lry Di vision h<ld been given two 

primary missions: eV<l luate th e interaction of armor, mechanized infantry, air· 

mobi le infantry, and air cava lry (a rmed heli copters); and fill the ro le o f an 

armored division in the strategic reserve forcc. To covcr the second mission, the 

division con tinued to use Nati onal Guard round-out units, which had originally 

been designated for the 1st Armored Division- the unit that the 1st Cavalry 

Division rep laced at Fort Hood in 1971. To eval uate the interaction of armor, ai r 

cavalry, and mechanized and airmobi le infantry, the "First Team" was organized 

under new tables (Char' 42) that included resources fo r an air cavalry combat 

brigade (ACCS). This was not to be the type of bri g<lde the Howze Board had 

suggested in 1962, which was to be a completely air·fighting unit, but one that 

troops in Vietnam and Europe had been testing under limited conditions as a 

combined arms assault unit. With the di vision combining armor, infan try, and 

ai r cavalry in o ne org<lll izatio n, Westmoreland coined the te rm "TRICA P" 

(triple capability) to describe it.1 5 

During the evaluation ofTRICAP two views emerged about the structure of 

an air cavalry combat brig'lde. Some planners saw it prim<lrily as a separate 

anti armor brigade with infantry and air cava lry integrated into attack helicopter 

squadrons without o rganic support. Ot hers desired the brigade to be a strong, 

wel ·balance(~ versati le organization wit h attack hel icopter, infantry, recQlmais· 

sance, artillery, and combat support units that could perform a variety of missions, including an antitank role. Du ring the summer of 1972 Vice Chief of Stan' 

THE TOTAL ARMY 359 

Bruce Palmer noted that a brigade consisting of only attack helicopter squadrons 

was an expensive organization. (The table for such a proposed squadron called 

fo r 88 (45 attack, 27 observation, and 16 uti lity) helicopters. Therefore he did not 

envision it as an independen t strike force. Nevertheless, he directed further dcvel* 

opment of an attack helicopter squadron because of concerns voiced by General 

Michae l S. Davison, the commander of U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army. In 

Europe Soviet armor forces greatly outnumbered their NATO counterparts, and 

Davison needed some sort of long-range capability that could destroy, disrupt, or 

at IC,151 delay enemy mechanized units behind the ma in battlefield. Following the 

development of the squadron, Palmer be lieved that the planners could sort out the 

matter of whether the brigade should be assigned to a division or a corps.16 

By the end of 1972 the cou rse of the TRICA P/ACCB studies appeared set. 

The Combat Deve lopmen ts Command recomme nded reorga ni zing the 1st 

Cava lry Di vision to consist of two a rmored bri gades (with two mechanized 

infantry and fo ur armor batta lions divided between them) and one a ir cavalry 

combat brigade. The latter, 10 be employed as a part of the division or independently, was to consist of an airmobi le infantry baualion and two attack hel icopter 

squadrons. The brigade was to have no orga nic sllPl>ort batta lion. Rou nd-out battal ions con tinued to be assigned to the I st Cavalry Division so that it could 

deploy as a full armored div ision along with the air cavalry combat brigade.17 

Before the ink dried on the new instructions, Abrams dec ided to reorga ni ze 

the air cavalry combat brigade as a separate unit for employment at corps leve l 

and to make the division exc lusively an armored unit. With one organic brigade 

organ ized as air caval ry, the 1st Cava lry Di vision with only two mecha nized 

infa ntry and four armor battalions lac ked the necesSllry ground-ga ini ng a nd 

holding ability of a normal armored division. On 2 1 February 1975 the Army 

thus organized the 6th Cavlliry Brigade (Air Combat) at Fort Hood, Texas. The 

fi rst of its Iype, the brigade consisted of a headq uarters and headq uarters troop, 

an air cavalry squadron (wit hout the armored cavalry troop), two attack hel icopter batta lions, a su pport battalion, and a signal compa ny. Stri ctly an air unit, 

the brigade's mission was to locate, disrupt, and destroy cnemy armored and 

mechan ized units by aeri al combat power. In the summcr of that ycar the 1st 

Cavalry Division was reo rgan ized wholly as an armored di visio n with four 

armor and four mechanized in fa ntry battalions in the Regu lar Army. One mechanized infantry and two armor ba tt alions in the Na tiona l Guard contin ued to 

rou nd out the division.l8 

Although the 21-division, 2 I-brigade force did not a lter the numbe r of 

reserve di visions and brigades, the reserve components underwen t numerOliS 

changes aner the Army wit hdrew from Vietnam. Like the Regular Army, the 

Guard bega n increasing its heavy fo rces in 197 1 wit h the 32d (Wisconsin) and 

81s1 (Washington) In fan try Brigades being converted to mechan ized infantry. 

[n 1972 the states began modern izi ng their div isions and brigades lIsing the 

recently published tables, bu t Ihey lacked the materie l 10 complete the proccss. 
The Chapal'ml shorf-range ail' defellse slIIj(lce-IO-ail' missile system: be low, 

Ihe Vulcall (IiI' defellse ,\J'~' telll. 
THE TOTAL ARMY 361 

To field air defense artill ery battalions, Guard units used " Duste rs," M42 

tracked vehicles with dual · mollntcd 40-111111. antiaircraft guns, rllth er than 

Chaparrals and Vulcans. As only limited numbers of M60 tanks, M551 assau lt 

vehicles (Sheri dans). and AH- I helicopters (Cobras) were avai lable, the Guard 

contin ued to usc vintage equipment. 19 

Shortly after the National Guard reorgan ized its div isions, a controversy 

arose over the command of the 30th Armored Division, a mullistalc unit supported by Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama . Tennessee was about to appoin t a 

new divisional commander, and the governors of Mississippi and Alabama threatened to withdraw their units from the division un less their officers had the opportunity to be the divisional comma nder. Governor Winfield Dunn of Tennessee 

objected to rotation o f the commander's position, and Secretary of the Army 

Robert F. Froehl ke supported him. Abr<lms there fo re directed Maj . Gen. Francis 

S. Greenlief, Chief of the Na tional Guard Bureau, to review such command 

arrangements in all Guard div isions.20 

Before Greenl ie f could propose a solution, other events made the question 

moot. The Department of Defense directed the Army to convert six reserve 

brigades from infantry to armored or mechanized infantry as reinforcements for 

Europe. In the mea ntime, Mississippi Governor William L. Wa ller dec ided to 

withdraw his units from the 30th Armored Division. Given the requiremen t to 

convert some brigades, the Army StatT decided to have Ten nessee, Mississippi, 

and Alabama each organize an armored brigade and to move the al lotment of the 

armored division to Texas, which could support the necessary units itself. After 

much negotiating, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi agreed to org<lnize the 

30th, 31 st, ilnd 155th Armored Brigades, and Texas took on the 49th Armored 

Di vision in 1973. For the other three brigades, the Army replaced the 30th 

Infantry Di vision, another tri ~s tate div ision, with the 30th (Nort h Carolina), 48th 

(Georgia), and 2 18th (Lou isiana) Infantry Brigades and reorgan ized the 40th 

Infantry Division in California. All were mechanized infa ntry. The reorganil ..ation 

did not change the total number of reserve divisions or brigades, and the Na tional 

Guard continued to field 8 di visions ( I mechanized infantry, 2 armored, and 5 

sta ndard infantry) and 18 brigades (3 armored, 6 mechani zed infantry, and 9 stan~ 

dard infantry), wh ile the Army Reserve supported 3 brigades (I mec ha nized 

infantry and 2 infantry).21 

By 30 June 1974, the Army had attained the 2 1 ~div sio , 2 1 bri gade force 

(Tables 32 (ll/d 33). The 25t h Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks, with two 

brigades, and the 197th Infantry Brigade at Fort Ben ning were regarded as eq lli v~ 

alent to one division in the Regular Army. Some Regular Army divisions in the 

continental United States, however, had rOllnd~out battalions from the reserves to 

meet mobil ization missions. More serious was the fact that reserve di visions and 

bri gades co ntinu ed to expe rie nce readin ess problems. Recruitme nt lagged 

because of the end of the draft, and eq uipmen t shortages continued due to the 

lack of money. The " total force" thus ex hibited significant weaknesscs.22 
TABLE 32 

The 21-Division Force, June 1974 

Location of M

Division CompOllellt Headquarters In! Me

1st Annored RA Ansbach, Germany 5 

lSi Cavalryl&3 RA Fort Hood, Tex 2 

ISI Infamry2 RA Fort Riley, Kans. 5 

2d Armored) RA Fort Hood. Tex. 4 

2d Infantry RA Camp Casey, Korea 4 2 

3d Armored RA Frankfurt, Germany 5 

3d Infantry RA Wuerzburg, Germany 6 

4th Infantry RA Fort Carson, Colo. 6 

8th Infantry RA Bad Kreuznach, Germany 6 

9th Infantry RA Fort Lewis, Wash. 7 

25th Infantry3 RA Schofield Barracks, Hawaii 6 

26th Infantry NG Boslon, Mass. S 

28th Infantry NG Harrisburg, Pa. S 

38th Infantry NG Indianapolis, Ind. 8 

40th Infantry NG California 6 

42d Infantry NG New York, N.Y. 8 

47th Infantry NG St. Paul, Mich. 8 

49th Annored NG Austin, Tex. 5 

50th Armored NG East Orange, N.J. 

82d Airborne RA Fort Bragg, N.C. 

10lst Airborne RA Fort Campbell, Ky. 

1 Docs not include the 6th Cavalry Brigade units. 

2 One brigade deployed forward in Germany. 

3 Less round·oul unit or units assigned. 
TABLE 33 

The 2 I-Brigade Force, June 1974 

Location oj Ma

Brigade Camponelll Headquarters In/ Mcch 

29th Infantry NO and AR Honolulu, Hawaii 2 

30th Annored NG Jackson. Tenn. I 

30th Infantry (M)I NG Clinton. N.C. 2 

31s\ Annorcd NG Tuscaloosa. Ala. 2 

32d Infantry (M)I NG Milwaukee, Wisc. 2 

33d Infantry NG Chicago. Ill. 3 

39th Infantry NG Little Rock. Ark. 3 

41st Infantry NG Ponland. Oreg. 3 

45th Infantry NG Edmond. Okla. 3 

48th Infantry (M)I NG Macon. Ga. 2 

53d Infantry NG Tampa. Fla. 3 

67th Infantry (M)! NG Lincoln. Ncb. 2 

69th Infantry NG Topeka, Kans. 3 

81s1 Infantry (M)I NG Seatlle. Wash. 2 

92d Infantry NG San Juan, Pueno Rico 3 

155th Annored NG Tupelo, Miss. I 

157th Infantry (M)I AR Horsham, Pa. 2 

172d Infantry2 RA Fort Richardson. Alaska 

187th Infantry AR Wollaston, Mass. 3 

193d Infantry2 RA Fort Kobbc. Canal Zonc 2 

194th Annorcd RA Fon Knox, Ky. No assigned 

197th JllfantryJ RA Fon Benlling. Ga. I I 

205th Infamry AR Fon Sllclling. Mill1l. 3 

2J8th lnfalllry (M)l NG Newberry. S.C. 2 

256th Infantry NG Lafayctte, La. 3 

1 Mechallized unit. 

2 Special mission brigade. 

J The brigade and the 25th Jllfanlry Division with two active brigades counted as a divi
364 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

A New Force- Greater Integration a/Regulars and /leserves 

As the Army struggled to meet the 21-division, 21-brigadc force, General 

Abrams turned his attention to the nation 's ability to execute its mi litary strategy 

without resorting 10 nuclear weapons and to the task of providing the resources 

needed to deal with a variety of world situations. In testimony before congressional committees in 1974, he characterized the Regular Army's portion of the 

21-div ision fo rce as a high-risk, " 110 room for error" force.23 He further testified 

that through more efficient management, cuts in nonessential su pport activities, 

and reorganization of various headquarters throughout the Army, a 785,OOO-man 

Regular Army could support sixteen divisions. Congress gave no opposit ion, and 

the Department of Defense lent its support. Therefore, Abrams directed his staff 

to pl an for th ree additiona l Regular Army divisions by 1980.24 

Although some officers on Abrams' staff were th understruck at thc directive, 

since a 785,000-1113n force had not been suffic ient in the past to maintain 16 

Regular Army divisions, the Army Staff eventua lly developed plans involving 

both regu lars and reserves to raise a 24-division force. A mcchanized infa ntry 

division and two infa ntry div isions were to be phased into the force over thc next 

few years. The firSI increment was to include activating three new div isional 

brigades, reorganizing the I sl Cava lry Division as an armorcd division (as dcc ided ea rl ier), and adj usti ng the number of maneuver elements in other divisions in 

the United States. Phase two was to provide the base and an additional brigade 

for cach of the three new divisions. Phase three was vague, but the divisions werc 

to be completed using reserve round-oul units.25 

During the Slllllmer of 1974 Forces COlllmand began to implement the 24-division force. To provide some of the resources, various headq uarters throughout the 

Army were reorganized, Cllts were made in nonessential support activities, and the 

I sl and 4th Infantry Divisions each saw one of their Regular Army maneuver battalions inactivated and rep laced by a National Guard round-out unit. On 21 October 

the command activated the 7th Infantry Division headquarters and the 1st Brigades 

of the 5th, 7th, and 24th Infantry Divisions at Forts Pol k, Ord, and Stewart, respectively. The 7th and 24th were standard, or " foot," infantry divisions, and the 5th was 

mechan ized infantry. Because Fort Polk, in Louisi ana, lacked adequate housing 

facili ties, the brigade of the 5th fielded only two maneuver batta lions. The larger 

faciliti es at Fort Orcl California, allowed the 7th to support four maneuver battalions, and the brigade of the 24th at Fort Stewart, Georgia, fielded three. As noted 

above, Forces Command organized the 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat) as a separate corps-level aviation unit and reorganized the 1st Cavalry Division as an 

armored division consisting of four armor and four mechanized infantry batta lions 

in the Regular Army and three round-out battalions from the National Guard.26 

Phase two of the program required organi zing the base and a second brigade 

fo r eac h division. For thc 5th and 241 h Infantry Divisions clements of the 194th 

Armored Brigade and the 1971h Infa ntry Brigade wcre to be used, but all cle-
TH E TOTAL ARMY 

Divisioll 

1 sl Cavalry 

I sl Infantry 

2d Annorcd 

4th Infantry 

5th Infantry 

7th Infantry 

9th Infantry 

24th Infantry 

25th Infantry 

TABLE 34 

Ro nd~o ll t Units, 1978 

Ullil 

2<1 Battalion, 120th Infantry 

2<1 Battalion. 252d Armor 

1 SI Battalion, 263d Annor 

2d Battalion, J 36th Infantry 

3d Battalion, 149th Infantry 

1st Bultulion, 123d Armor 

2<1 Battalion, 123d Armor 

1st 8l1l1alion, 117th Infantry 

2561 11 Infantry Brigade 

4151 Infantry Brigade 

8th Battalion, 40th AmlOr 

1 SI Battalion, 803d Armor 

48th In fantry Brigade 

29th Infantry Brigade 

CompOllell1 

N.C.NG 

N.C.NG 

S.c. NO 

Minn. NO 

Ky. NO 

Ky. NO 

Ky. NO 

Ten n. NO 

La . NO 

Wash. NO 

Army Reserve 

Wash. NO 

Ga. NO 

Hawaii NO 

und Army 

Reserve 

365 

ments of the second brigade in the 7th Infantry Division were to be newly organized. On 28 August 1975, however, the Army canceled the plans to use the 194th 

Armored and 197th In fantry Brigades because of congressiona l pressure to 

improve the ratio of combat to support troops. All units in phase two were to be 

formed new in the Regular Army.27 

Forces Command began activating phase two units in the fall of 1975, organizing all required Regu lar Army units within two years. While the Regu lar Army 

units were being activated, Louisiana, Washington, and Georgia agreed that the 

256th, 41 st, and 48th Infantry Brigades would be assigned to round out the 5th, 

7th, and 24th Infantry Divisions, respectively. Because the 7th needed an armor 

battalion, the 8th Battalion, 40th Armor, an Army Reserve unit, was assigned to 

it. Hence, in order to raise the 24-division force, the rOlll1d-out concept was 

extended to all divisions except those forward deployed in Germany and Korea 

and the airborne and airmobi le units (Table 34).28 

Although Forces Command did not use the 194th Armored and 197th 

Infantry Brigades to organize the new divisions, both brigades were assigned 

strategic missions after 21 October 1975. Responding to Genera l Abrams' congressional testimony to provide a bettcr balance of combat to support units, the 

Army StafT converted 4,000 general support spaces to combat positions in the 

con tinental United States, <lI1d the command used some of them to reorga nize the 

194th as a strategic reserve unit. The brigade eventually included one mechanized 

infantry battalion and two tank battalions. In addition, it continued to support the 

Armor School at Fort Knox.29 
366 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

In 1974 congressional dissatisfaction led Senator Sam Nutln of Georgia to 

sponsor an amendment requiring the Army to reduce th e number of support 

forces in Europe by 18,000 officers and enlisted personnel but permitting those 

spaces to be lIsed to organize combat units there. The new units could include 

battalions or smaller units of infantry, armor, field and air defense artillery, cavalry, engineers, specia l forces, and aviation, which were to improve the visibility of 

the nation's combat power in Europe.30 

To execute the Nunn amendment U.S. Army Forces Command and U.S. Army. 

Europe, and Seventh Army agreed to a plan for organizing a mechanized infantry 

brigade and an armored brigade fo r Europe, wh ich were known as Brigade-75 and 

Brigade-76. Under the plan the headquarters and a support battalion fo r each 

brigade were to be stationed in Germany whi le the infantry, armor, and field 

artillery banal ions, engineer companies, and cavalry troops from the United States 

were to rotate eve ry six months. No provisions were made for dependents to 

accompany the soldiers since they were to be away from home on temporary duty 

for only 179 days. The short duration of the assignment was to be a cost-saving 

measure, which indirectly also attacked the balance of payment problem between 

the Un ited States and its allies, and a morale bOOSler. To support the rotation of 

Brigade-75, the first unit in the program, the Army selected the 2d Armored 

Division, at Fori Hood, Texas. Belween March and June 1975 the 3d Brigade, 2d 

Armored Division, deployed to Germany, wi th its headquarters at Grafellwoehr and 

its clements scattered al various traini ng areas. A few weeks before each unit 

de parted Fort I-Io od, Forces Command act ivated a similar unit, including 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th Brigade, 2d Armored Division, to 

maintain the three-brigade structure of the division in the continental United Stales. 

Duri ng the deployment the Army Staff approvcd a request from Forces Command 

10 use a battalion from the I st Cavalry Division, rather than have all elements fi'()l11 

the 2d Armored Di vision, in order to reduce perso nnel turbu lence in t!le 2d. 

Because of the shortage of tank crews, the Army changed Brigade-75 from an 

armored to a mechanized infantry unit. Another factor in the decision to deploy a 

mechanized brigade was the shortage of tanks resulting from U.S. replacement of 

tanks the Israelis had lost in their 1973 war against the Arabs. In September 1975 

the fi rst rotation of brigade elements between Germany and Fort Hood began.3! 

Forces Command selected the 4th Infantry Division to support Brigade-76 

and in December 1975 activated the 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, at Fort 

Carson, Colorado. The following year the brigade moved to Germany. To lighten 

the burden of the 4th Infantry Di vision at Fort Carson, a mechanized infantry battalion from the 1st Infantry Di vision at Fort Riley was included in the rotation 

scheme. Fol lowing the procedu re used to send Brigade-75 to Europe, new organ izations were activated in the 1 st and 4th Infantry Divisions to maintain their divisional integrity.32 

As elements of the 3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division, and the 4th Brigade, 4th 

Infantry Division, rotated, the Army monitored the effect on the budget, readi ness, 
THE TOTAL ARMY 367 

and morale. Evidence soon suggested that the rotation of the brigades improved 

neither cost effect iveness nor readiness. Therefore, the Army dec ided thai the 

brigades would be assigned permanently to U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army. 

The reassignment of the 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, took place in the fall of 

1976. At that lime the 3d Battalion, 28th Infantry, the element orlhe 1st Infantry 

Division supporti ng the brigade, was reassigned to the 4th In fantry Di vision. To 

improve the alignment of All ied forces in Europe, Army leaders dec ided to station 

Brigade-75 (the 3d Brigade, 2£1 Armored Division) in northern Germany, where no 

American combat unit had served since the end of World War I L Such problems as 

th e lack of housing, particularly for dependents, and opposition from German 

nationals over the impact of the troops on the environment, caused the elements of 

the brigade to continue to rotate until the questions could be resolved. Two years 

later. after building a new military complex at Garlstedt, the 3d Brigade, 2d 

Armored Division, became a permanent part of the European forces. At Fort Hood 

the 4th Brigade, 2d Armored Di vision, and the batta lion of the I st Cavalry Di vision 

that supported the brigade were inactivated. A new battalion was assigned to the 2d 

Armored Division from its traditional regiments to replace the 1st Cavalry Division 

unit inactivated in Germany. The net result of the Nunn amendment on divisiona l 

forces was two more brigades forward deployed in Germany but a reduction of one 

brigade in the 2£1 Armored Division in the United States.33 

Readiness became the watchword for the seventies. Alt hough some Army 

leaders believed that the first battle of any future war might be the last and final 

ground battle, a high state of readiness served as a deterrent against aggression. 

Improving readiness in the Army's 24-division force thu s became the primary 

obj ective of Army Chi ef of Staff Fred C. Weyand, who was appointed after 

Abrams died in office in September 1974. Weyand requested the National Guard 

Bureau to explore the consolidation of the 50th Armored and the 26th, 28th, 38th, 

42d, and 47th Infantry Divisions inlo single or bi-state configurations and to consider the possibility of forming five more brigades. The latter were to be organized only with the secretary of defense's approval. In 1975 and 1976 the 50lh 

Armored Division was reorgani zed in New Jersey and Vermon t, the 28th Infantry 

Division in Pennsylvania, and the 42d Infantry Division in New York. Former elements of the 28t h from Maryland and Virgi nia supported the new 58th and 11 6t h 

Infantry Brigades, respectively. In 1977 Ohio d ropped out of the 38th Infa ntry 

Division, leaving Indiana and Michigan to main ta in it. Ohio organized the 73d 

Infa ntry Brigade. The only divisional element not concentrated within each div ision's new recruiting area was the air defense arti llery battalions. Wi th these 

changes, the Army reached the 24-division, 24-brigade force (Tables 35 alld 36). 

Also, the 36th Airborne Brigade and 149th Armored Brigade headquarters were 

organized and federally recognized in the National Guard, but they were headquarters only, without assigned clements.34 

The Army Reserve continued to maintain three brigades within the total rorce. 

These brigades were the least combat ready units in the Army. Without the draft, the 
TABLE 35 

The 24-Division Force, 1978 

LOCaliOIl Mom!/II'er Bmw/iolls 

Dil'isioll Camponelll of Headqlloners 1"1 Mech A, Ab" 

1st Annored RA Ansbach, Gcnnany 5 6 

lSI Cavalry I RA Fort Hood. Tex. 4 5 

1st Infantry2 RA Fort Riley, Kans. 5 , 

2d Annored3 RA Fort Hood. Tex. 6 5 

2d Infantry RA Camp Casey. Korea 4 2 2 

3d Annored RA Frnnkfun. Gennany 5 6 

3d Infantry RA Wucrzburg. Gcnnany 6 5 

4th lnfantry4 RA Fort Carson. Colo. 7 5 

5th Infantry H RA Fort Polk. La. J J 

7th Infantry (-) RA Fort Ord, Calif. 6 

8th Infantry RA Bad Kreuznach. Germany 6 5 

9th Infantry (-) RA Fort Lewis. Wash. 7 I 

24th Infantry (-) RA Fort Stewart. Ga. , 2 

25th Infantry (-) RA Schofield Barracks, Hawaii 6 

26th Infantry NG Boston, Mass. , I 

28th Infantry NG Harrisburg, Pa. , I 

38th Infantry NG Indianapolis. Ind. S I 

40th Infantry NG Long Beach, Calif. 6 5 

42th Infantry NG New York. N.Y. , I I 

47th Infantry NG SI. Paul, Mich. 8 I I 

49th Armored NG Austin. Tex. 5 6 

50th Armorcd NG Somerset, N.J. 5 6 

82d Airbornc RA Fort Bragg. N.C. I 9 

IOlst Airbornc RA Fort Campbell. Ky. 

lOne battalion supported the 3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division (Brigadc.75). 

2 The 1st Infantry Division Forward was in Germany. 

3 Supported 3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division (Brigadc·75) in Germany. 

4 Supported 4th Brigade. 4th Infantry Division (Brigadc·76) in Germany. 
TABLE 36 

The 24-Brigade Force, 1978 

Localion Mallelwer Bmfafiol!s 

Brigade Compollelll of Headqll{ll"fers hif Mech A, Ll

29th Infantry (RO) NG&AR Honolulu, Hawaii 3 

30th Annored NG Jackson. Tenn. 2 

30th Infantry NG Clinton. S.C. 2 I 

31 SI Annorcd NG Northport, Ala. 2 

32d Infantry (M) NG Milwaukee, Wise. 2 I 

33d Infantry NG Chicago. Ill. 1 

36th Airborne NG Houston. Tex. No assigned battalions 

39th Infantry NG Little Rock, Ark. J 

41 SI Infantry (ROJ NG Portland. Oreg. J 

45th Infantry NG Edmond. Okla. J 

48th Infantry (M) (ROJ NG Macon. Ga. 2 

53d Infantry NG Tampa, Fla. J 

58th Infantry NG Pikesville. Md. J 

67th Infantry (M) NG Lincoln, Ncb. 2 

69th [nfantl)' NG Topeka. Kans. 2 

73d Infantry NG Columbus, Ohio 1 

81st Infantry (M) NG Seattle, Wash. 2 

92d Infantry NG San Juan, Puerto Rico 4 

1 16th Infantry NG Staunton. Va. 1 

1491h Annored NG Bowling Green. Ky. No assigned battalions 

l55th Annored NG Tupelo, Miss. I 2 

157th Infantry (M) AR Horsham. Pa. 2 I 

172d Infantry RA Fort Richardson. Alaska I I 

187th Infanlry AR Fort Devens. Mass. J 

193d Infantry RA Fort Kobbe. Canal Zone 2 

194th Annorcd RA Fort Knox. Ky. 2 

197th [nfanlry RA Fort Benning. Ga. 2 

205th Infantry AR Fort Snelling. Minn. 

218th Infantry (M) NG Newberry. S.c. 2 

256th Infantry (RO) NG Lafayettc. La. 2 
370 MANEUVER AND FIR EPOWER 

reserves continued to suffer m<ljor recruiting problems. When planning for the three 

new Regular Army divisions, some A rmy Slaffmcmbers and Secretary of the Army 

Howard Callaway had wanted to lISC an Army Reserve infantry brigade as a roundoul unit, but Ilone of the component 's brigades mel the req uired manning and 

equipment levels. As an alternmive the staff considered moving either the 1571h or 

the 187th Infantry Brigade, or both, to the sOllthern pari of the United Stales and 

shifting the 2051 h Infantry Brigade to the West Coast, all areas where recruiting 

was thought to be better. But congressional opposition stopped these proposals, and 

the units remained generally in their existing areas)5 

Despite these difficulties, Forces Command wished to improve the readiness 

of the Army Reserve brigades. At rirst it proposed reducing the number of llnits, 

particularly in the northeast, the First U.S. Army's area, and in February 1975 it 

inactivated a battalion in the 157th Infantry Brigade at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. 

Then, early in 1976, Maj. Gen. Henry Mohr, Chief of the Army Reserve, submitted a brigade improvement plan that retained the units in their recruiting areas but 

elimi nated other units from the areas to limit the competition for scarce personnel 

resources. As the Army Reserve staff developed the plan, Deputy Chie f of Staff 

for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) Lt. Gen. Donald H. Cowles selected the 41 st 

Infantry Brigade, the only brigade with a northern Arctic mission, as the roundout unit for the 71h Infantry Division. To rep lace the brigade in the contingency 

plans, Moh r agreed to reorganize the 205th Infantry Brigade as a light unit. The 

brigade assumed responsibi lity for the contingency mission on 4 July 1976.36 

As the Army National Guard and Army Reserve shouldered a more active 

role in the Total Army's deterrence plans, the Army Staff developed a plan in the 

mid-1970s to upgrade the effectiveness of brigade- and battalion-size units. 

Known as the Affiliation Program, the initiative had three goa ls: improving readiness; establ ishing a formal re lationship between regular and reserve units; and 

developing a system of priorities for manpower, equi pment, training, funding, and 

administrative resources. Wilhin the program rive categories of combined arms 

brigades existed: round-out units, which gave Regular Army divisions their full 

organizational structure; augmentation units, which increased the combat potential of standard div isions; worldwide deployable units, which needed assistance to 

meet deployment sc hedul es; speci al missio n llnits, which se rved as th ea ter 

defense forces; and units to suppo rt the Army school system. Thus, each brigade 

in the reserves was to have a mission and train for it in a "come-as-you-are for 

war" mode, wh ich was a far cry from mobilization plan ning that had existed 

before and after World War 11 .37 

In 1970 the Army had revised the tables of organization for the ,Idministrative 

training division so that it could function more effective ly in reserve status. The 

div ision consisted of a di vision base, a headquarters and headquarters company, a 

leade rship academy, and a support battal ion; a committ ee g roup; a nd four 

brigades- two brigades for basic training, one for advanced individual training, 

and one for combat support training (CharI 43). Basic combat training brigades 
CHART 43-Training Division, 1970 

DIVISION 

BRIGADE tBCn 

, Includes the band. 

2 Structure of the Advanced Individual Training brigade 

varied depending upon the type cftraining (infantry, 

armcr, reconnaissance, field artillery, or engineer) cffared. 
372 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

and the committee group underwent little change, but significant modifications 

were made in both ad va nced indi vidual tra ining and combat support training 

brigades. The composition of the advanced individual traini ng brigade varied 

with the type of trai ning (infantry, armor, reconnaissance, artillery, or engineer) 

olTered, and the combat support training brigade was rcorgani zed to consist of 

admin istrati ve, food service/supply, automotive, and communications baualions. 

Upon mobi li zation the div ision could train between 12,500 and 14,000 enlisted 

personnel, depending upon the type of traini ng provided by each brigade. All thirteen training div isions had adopted the tables by the end of 1971 .38 

Two years later, seeking again to improve readiness of the Army Reserve 

units, Forces Command inactivated some training di vision elements. Advanced 

individual training brigades in the 76th, 78th, 80th, 85th, and 91st Divisions and 

the combat support training brigades in the 89th and lOat h Divisions were na eti~ 

vated and the spaces used to organi ze "mi ni" maneuver area comma nds. The new 

commands planned, prepared, con uctc(~ and controlled company and batta lion 

exercises for the reserves.39 

As in other reserve units, rec rui ting difficulties caused undermanning in 

some training units. In 1975 Forces Command inactivated the 89th Division. The 

personnel formerly assigned to it were used to strengthen other Army Reserve 

units and to organize the 5th Brigade (Training), an <II'mor training unit with 

headquarters at Li ncoln, Nebraska , that consisted of onc squad ron and two batt ~ 

ions. Wit h thc saving in personnel, a nondivisional Army Reserve combat unit, 

the 3d Battalion, 87th Infantry, was organized at Fort Carson, Colorado, to sup~ 

port the 193d Infantry Brigade in Ihe Canal Zone.40 

The Army Reserve's 51h Brigade (Tra ining) and the training divisions were 

reorganized once again in late 1978. To save both time and money in train ing, 

the active Army had earli er adopted the One Station Un it Training (OSUT) ~ 

gram, under which recruits received both basic and advanced individual train~ 

ing at the professional home of their arm or service. The program proved suc~ 

cessful, and Forces Command .. dopted it for the Army Reserve training divisions. In addition, the revised structure a llowed divisions to be tailored for speci fi c mobili zat ion stations. To renect these changes, the Depart ment of the 

Army published new tables of organization, which retained as the division base 

a leadership academy and a support batlalion but broke the brigades and battalions down into cells th at filled together to meet specific train ing requirements. 

Divisional training brigadcs no longer cond ucted basic combat or advanced 

individ ual training but carried out both, the same as in the Regular Army. The 

fonner divisional committee group and the committee g roup from the comb,1I 

support brigade evolved into a training conunand.41 

By October 1978 the Army was fielding the 24-division, 24~brjg de force 

that Abrams had envisaged five years em·lier. But organizational developments 

had been eclipsed by even deeper changes in the fabric of the Army. Prior to its 
THETOTALARMY 373 

withdrawa l from Vietnam, the Nixon admin istration had adopted an all·voluntccr 

force and imposed cuI's in money and personne l. To make up for these losses, 

Army leaders drew the Regular Army and reserve componen ts closer together, 

first through the round-out and then though the affiliation prog rams. The Army 

could no longer enjoy the luxury of gencral·plLrposc forces. Every div ision and 

brigade was e ither forward deployed 0 1' assigned a spec ifi c mission within the 

current contingency and mobili zation plans. The Regular Army's specia l mission 

combined arllls brigades included the J 93d Infantry Brigade in the Cana l Zone 

and the 172d Infantry Brigade in Alaska. The 1941h Armored and 197th Infa ntry 

Brigades served both as Strategic Army Force units and as support troops for Ihe 

InFantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and the Armor School at Fort Knox, 

Kentucky, in the trai ning base. Changes in the Total Army since the withdrawal 

from Vietnam stressed combat units at the expense of support units. The nation 

did not have the resou rces for both. 
374 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

Notes 

I Melvin R. Lain.!, Nafirmol Secwify Strafeg)' of Realistic Deterrence: AII//llot De/elIse 

Del'(l1"/1II1:1II Report. FY 1973 (Washington, D.C.: Govcmmcllll'rinling Ollice, 1972), p. 24. 

2 Ibid., pp. 86- 87. 

3 U.s. Army Combat Developments Command (CDC), "Annual Historical Summary. FY 

1970." p. 116, DAMH-HSR; OF, ACSFOR 10 DeSPER and other addresses, 9 Jan 70, sub: 1-1 -

Series TOE, FOR OT OM TO, Division General file, DAMH-HSO. 

" U.S. Army CDC, "Historical Summary. FY 66," p. 362, FY 70, pp. 116- 17; TOE 7H. 

Infantry Di vision. 1970; TOE 171-1. Armored Division. 1970; TOE 371-1. Mechanized Infantry 

Division. 1970; TOE 44-3251 r, Air Defense Arlillcry Bul1nlioll, 1970; TOE 29- 1 H. TOE 29- 11 H, 

and TOE 29- 21 1-1 , Division SUPl>Ort Command, 1970; TOE 17- 87H, Division Aviation Company, 

Amlorcd Division, 1970; TOE 37- 871-1 , Division Aviation Compnny, Mechnnized Division, 1970: 

TOE 29- 3H, Division Mnteriel Mnnagetllent Center, 1975. 

5 TOE 7- 15H, Infantry Bn1tlllion, 1970; TOE 17- 15H, AmlOr Ba1taJion, 1970; TOE 7-45H, 

Mecimnilcd Infhntry Battalion, 1970; Jnllles Stone, "TOW Rcnlly Works," "ifilllll)1 64 (Sep-Oet 

1974): 12- 13. The tnbles provided two vllrintions of the infimtry nnd mech,mized inflUltry bllttalions: one vnriation nuthorized the unit to be equipped with TOWs, the other with 106-111111. recoilless rifles. 

6 Ch:lllges I nnd 2, TOE 71-1, Infanoy Division. 1970; Changes I nnd 2, TOE 17H, Armored 

Division, 1970: Changes I nnd 2, TOE 37 1-1 . Mechanized Infantry Division, 1970; TOE 6- 1001-1, 

Infantry Division Arlillery, 1970; Change I, TOE 6- 3001-1 , Armored or In f.1ntry Division Arlillery 

(Mechanized), 1970; TOE 29- 11-1 , hlfantry Division Support Command, 1970, and changes 1- 3; 

TOE 29- I IH, Infan try Division Support Command (Mechanized), 1970. mId ehnnges 1- 3; TOE 

29- 211-1, Armored Di vision Support Command. 1970; TOE 30- 17H, Militllry Inte lli gence 

Company (Di vision). 30 Nov 1970; TOE 30- 19T, Combat Intelligence Company, Armored 

Division or Infnntry (Mcelmnizcd) Division. 1975; Msg, ACSFOR to CG, CONARC, DA 892 178, 

3 1 Dee 68, sub: Activation Order. 1st Bn. 59th Air Defense Artillery (A DA) file. Msg, ACSFOR 10 

CO, CONARC. and other addresses, 201544 Apr 72. sub: DA SmfT Review of I-I Series Conversion 

Schedule. and Assignmcnt of ADA units, Rcorganizution of Divisional Administrnlivc Companies 

ns Adjutnnt General nnd Finance Compnnics. Activation of Di visiomll Materiel M(l11<lgcmellt 

Ccnters and Militilry Intelligence Units. and Inactivation of Divisional Honest John Units. author's 

notes. :111 G/1-I TOEs file. DAMH-HSO. 

7 U.S. AmlY CDC, "Historical SUlltmary. FY 70," p. 116; Llf, TAG to CinC, USA REUR. 17 

Aug 72. sub: Approval of MTOE, DAAG-ASC-D (M) (15 Aug 72) DA FD, AG Reference files. 

Msg, DALO-SMS-D (Deputy CofS for Logislies, Distribulion Branch) to Cdr, CONA RC, 201946 

Dec 72. sub: Medium Tnnks M60Al for Unit Aetivntion. 1st Un. 77th Amlor: Msg. DA 10 CO. 

CONARC, 12 12152 Apr 72, sub: Movement Directive 72- 10, 6th Bn. 32d Annor; file. Historical 

Dntfl Cards. 3d and 8th InfiUltry Divisions, nil DAMH-HSO. 

8 Msg, ACSFOR to CinC, USA RI'AC. DA IOt 815Z Nov 7t, sub: Organization and Stnlcture 

of 25th Infantry Division and Suppon Units. Msg, ACSFOR to CinC, USARPAC, DA 172209Z 

Feb 72. sub: Rcorganizalion of 25th Int' Di v and lS I (Initial Sustnining Increment) units. Msg, 

DCSOI'S to Cdr, 25th II1 f.1ntry Division, DA 101930Z Nov 72, sub: Rendiness ~el'orting of 25th 

Inf Div, Msg, DSCOI'S to CinCo USARI'AC, DA 272141Z Nov 72_ sub: Stntioning and 

Organization of 251h Inf Dill in Hawaii, and Memo of Agreemcnt. sub: Command and Staff 

Relationship Between the 25th Infnntry Division and the 29th I3rigade (HlARNG) nnd thc 100th 

l3attalion, 442d InfiU1try Regiment (USAR), 2 Aug 73, all 25th InfDill file. DAM I-I-HSO. 

9 Msg. CG, CONARC, to CG, Sixth U.S. Army, 212039Z Jan 72, sub: Planning Data for 

CONUS/Activation. and Msg. U.S. Army Training Center, Infand Fort Lewis. Wnsh., to CG, Sixth 

U.S. Anny. [00018 Feb 72, sub: Proposcd News Release ACliv:llion ofthc 9th Infantry Division. 

both 9th Inf Oiv filc, DAMH-I-ISO; 9th Infantry Division, "Annual Historical Supplement," t974, 

PI). 43-44. DAMI-I-I-ISR. 
THE TOTAL A RMY 375 

1055, ACSFOR to Cors, 22 Jun 72. sub: Force Structure, Fon Benning. DAFD-MFP. Msg, 

ACSFOR to CG, CONARC, 161845Z Oct 72. sub: Unit Designation 1971h Bdc, DAFD-MFI'-T, 

Llr, CG, CONARC. to Cdr. Third U.S. Army, 18 Oct 72. sub: FOnllalioli of n School Support 

Qrgllniz.1Iion and Conversion or lhe 197th Infantry I3rigade. ATFOR-FS-SR. <tnd Msg, U.S. Army 

Inf<um y Cenler to Cdr. Third, U.S. Army, 22 1427Z Mar 73, same subject, all 1971h Inf Bde !He, 

DAM1 1·1·1SO. 

11 U.S. Amlor Center lWei Fon Knox, "Annua l Historica l Supplement;' I JIltJ- J I Dec 74, l) f Cf. 

ace, DAMB-i-ISR. 

1255. ACSFOR to CotS, 28 Nov 72. sub: Reorganization of 10I si Airbomc Div (Ambl), DO 

DArT-MFP, IOl sl Abn Div liIe, DAM H-HSa. The omission of the ISS-mm. towed howitzer battalion reduced the division by 546 officers and enlisted men. 

13 SS. TAG Center to ColS. 13 Sep 74. sub: Proposed Change in Nomenclature, 10Ist 

Airborne Division (Ainllobile), DAAG-AMO, and U r. TAG to Cdr, IOlst Airborne Division. 16 

Oct 74, sub: Change of Parenthetical Identifier, both IOlst Abn Oiv file. DAM H-HSO: "lOlst 

AirbonlC Division I-listorical Summary. 1974," pp. 10-12. DAMI I-I ISR: " Interview of LTG John 

Willn McEmery, II Apr 83, p. 16, IOl st Abn Div file, DAM I-I -HSOj AR 672- 5- 1, Military 

AW;lrds, 1984. 

14 TOE 57 1-1 , Airbome Division, 1974: TOE 29-5 11-1, SUPl)Ort Command, Airborne Di l'ision, 

1973: TOE 29-451-1, Supply and Service Battalion, 173: TOE IO-37 F, Supply Company (Airbome 

Division). 1965: TOE 17·215 11 , Annor Battalion (Airbomc), 1973. GO 600, 603. 605, 608, U,S, 

Arnly Forel'"S Command (FORSCOM. 174. 4071h Spl Bn file, DAM H-I-ISO: and 11 uthor's nOle GIll 

Tables File, DAM I-I- I·ISQ, 

15 Fact Sheet. ACSFOR 10 SofA, 15 Jan 7 1, Fonnat ion of the TR.rCA I' Division. FOR OS 

TRICA I', News Release. New Army Test Division Announced, 25 Mar 7 1, Msg. SECDEF to 

Supreme Allied Commander. Europe. DA 252110Z Jan 71. sub: Redcsignation and Reorganization 

of First Armored Division : Msg. ACSFOR to CG, CONARC, DA 292217Z Jan 71, sub: 

Contingency Planning for TRICAI' Oi l': Msg, OCINFO to CG, CONA RC, :111d other addresses, 

2321 14Z Mar 7 1, sub: TRICAI' Division, documents located in TRICA]' file, DAMH-I-1 S0: TOE 

47T. TRICAI' Di vision. 15 Febnmry 197 1: Cheng. Air M obility. p. 180: John Norton, "TRICAI':' 

Arll/)' 21 (Jun 197 1): 14-19. 

16 Memo for Record, ACSFQR, undated, sub: Conferencc 15 June 1972 on TRICA P/ACCB 

Organization and Testing, OAFD, TRICA I' fil e: TOE 17-285T, Attack Helicopter Squadron. TRICA P Division or Attack Helicopter Squadron Air Cavalry Combat Brigade. 1972. 

11 U.S. Anny CDC. ~onfi rn ion or the TRICA P Division," E:o;~ ti\'e Summary, 151k-c 

72, CGSC Library; Msg, ACSFOR to Cdr. CONARC, DA 13 1807Z Mar 73, sub: Unit Designalion, 

lSI Cav Div, DAFD-MFP-T, OI'S 28, ACSFOR, 30 Sep 73, sub: Reorganiz,'\Iion of the lsi Cavalry 

Division. DAFO-MI'F-M. both in TRICA P file, DAM H-HSO. 

18 "TRICA P Shortcomings Bared," .1/1'111)' Tillles, 5 Jun 1974: News Rclease. 1st Cavalry 

Division Reorganizat ion, 10 Mny 1974. TRICA I' fil e; GO 200, FORSCOM, 13 Feb 75, 61h Cal' 

Ode file, both DAM H-HSO: TOE 17-20011, Air Cal'alry Combat Brig;lde, 1975; Ch:lllge I, TOE 

17-205H. Air Cav,llry Squndron, Infantry Division , 1975. 

19 Allllual Repol"'. G1liej NaliOllal Gual'll 8ul'('(/I/, 1971 , pp. 32, 38-40.1972, p. 32, 38·41; 

TO£ 44-85G, Air Defense Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion. Self. 1'ropelled, 1966. 

ro Dmllhr, Chief, Nal iollal Guard Ourcau. 10 Winfield Dunn, NGD-ZA. and Memo, NG B for 

SA, sub: Aller Action Reports, 13 Dec 73, NG B-A RO, both 30th Annd Div file. DAMH-HSO, 

2t Memo, NGB for SA, 2 1 Nov 73, sub: After AClion Reports, NG U-A RZ-A, 30 InfOiv fil e. 

DAMH· HSO; L1r, NGB for SA, sub: After Action Report. 13 Dec 73. 

22 LaVen! E. Wcber. " For the Minutemen of the '70s: The Guard: 'A Long Way'" Arlll)' 24 

(Oct 1974): 65-7 1: Milnor Robert. "Strong Reserve Boosted by Total Foree Impetus:' Ar",), 24 

(Oct 1974): 76-79. 

23 I'oint ]'npcr, DAMO-RQr: (Del)uty Chief of StnlT for Opemtions und I'I;ms-Requiremenis 

Direclorme), sub: Why a 16-Division Active Army, 27 Sep 74. 16-Div Force fil e, DAMH-HSO. 

24 Ibid.: Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. , "The Si:o;leen Di vision Force: An:ltomy of a Dceision:' 
376 MANEUVER AND FI REPOWER 

thesis. Command and General Staff College. Fort Leavenworth, Kans .. 1975; 5S, ACSFOR to 

CofS, 16 Apr 74, sub : Revised FY Force Structure Actions. DA FD·MFD (ACars for Force 

Development-Manpower and Forces Directorate), IG-Div FOr<:c file. DAM I-I-I-ISO. 

25 Robert Sorley, nWl/{lerbo!l: General CreighlOil A{)mllls find the Army fir His Tillie.\" (New 

York: Simon ,LI1d Schuster. 1992). pp. 362·64: LIT. TAG 10 Cdrs. FOR-SCOM. and TRADOC. 7 

May 74, sub: Revised FY 75-80 Force Structure Guidance, DAAG-AMM DAFO-MFI', 16· Div 

Force file, DAMH-HSO. 

2(' Ibid; Msg. Cdr. FORSCOM, \0 DSCOPS. 041800Z Mny 74, sub: itmClivalion of Infantry 

l3al\;llions (Mech) in FY 75. 2d I3n. 16th Inf file, DAMH-HSO; OI'S 28 DAMO-RQD, FirepolVer 

Division, for DeSOI'S. sub: ACCIl. 13 Jan 75. DAMO-RQD, TR1CAI' file; --AmlY Guard AT' 75 

Highlights;' Na/ioll(ll Cl/urd.ml(lJI 29 (May 1975): 2- 5: Notes Based on FORSCOM GOs. 16-Div 

Forcc filc. DAMI-l-HSO. 

27 Cors Memo 75- 10 for Heads of Anny Staff Agencies. 12 Feb 74. sub: Action Required to 

Attain a 24-Divisiol1 Total Force Prior to FY 77, and Msg. DSCOl'S to Cdrs. FORSCOM. and 

TRADOC. DA 28210lZ Aug 75. sub: Activatiol1 of the 5th and 24th Infantry Division and 

Rcdcsignation of the 1941h and 1971h Brig:u1cs. both 16-Div Force file. DAMH-HSO. 

2R "Separate Brigade Plnn Out:' Arlll)" Tillles. 3 Dec 1975; NOlcs Based on FORSCOM GOs. 

16-Div Force file: Robcrt F. Fairchild. "Training Guard and Reserve Divisions." Arlllor 86 

(Mar- Apr 1977): 47-48. 

29 U.s. Army FORSCOM. "Annual Historical Review. I July 1975- 30 Sep 1976:' pp. 

198- 05; Msg, DSCOr's to Cdrs, FORSCOM. and TRADOC, DA 28210 lZ Aug 75. sub: Aclil'.l1iol1 

of the 5th and 241h Infantry Divisions and Redesignalion of the 194th and 197th Origades: "Ode to 

Become 1·lcavy;· Arlll)' Tillles, 12 Nov 1975; Historical Data Card. 194th Armored Brigade. 

DAMH-HSO. Also sec notes in 194th Am1(] Ode file. DAMH-HSO. 

30 Cors Memo 74-5-70 for 1·leads of Anny Staff Agencies. sub: Increased Combat Cnpability 

in Europe. 2 Aug 74. Ode-75 file. DAMH-HSO: Frank W. Pew. The u.s. Arlll)' Forces Comlll(lud 

alld I{U: Del'cloplllelll of Ihe Brigade 75/76 COIICCpI jor Ille Supporl of E/I/"Ope (Fort McPherson, 

G<I.: U.S. Anny Forces Command, 1980), pp. 1-4. 

Jt ··How DOD Is Improving lhe COl11b<lt Proporlions of US Forces in Europe:· COllllllandel" 

Djgesl 19 (20 Nov 1975): 2- 3: Msg, Cdr. FORSCOM. to Cdr, III Corps and Fort Hood. Tcx .. 

032207Z Dec 74. sub: Reorganization of Units at Fort Hood! Selected FY Activations. Msg. 

DAMO-FDP-T to Cdr, FORSCOM, DA 162021Z Apr 75. sub: Involvemell1 of lSI Cavalry Division 

in Origade 75. both Ode-75 file DAMH-HSO; Pcw. Brigade 75176 COllcepl. pp. 74-109. The Nunn 

<lmendmcnl limited the additional combat units to balllliion or smallcr size units. thcrefore the 

Amly SIMI considered the headquaners and headquarters comp<lny of each brig:lde as onc of thc 

smaller units. 

32 Msg. DAMO-ODO to Cdr, FORSCOM. and CinC, USAREUR. DA 131830Z Ju176, sub: 

Movemcnt Directive 23- 76. Ode-75 file. DAM H-HSO: U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army. 

S/rcnglhcllillg NATO (Norlll Alfrllllie n·ea/)' Orgolliza/ioll): S/(lliollillg oil/ie 2(/ Arllloret/ Dil'jsioll 

(Forward) ill NOr/llel"/I Cent/wI)' (n.p .. 1980), p. 3; Pew. Brigade 75/76 CD/leepl, pp. 184-20l~. 

33 Cors Memo 75-570-94 for Heads of Army Slaff Agencies. sub: Conversion of Rotational 

Brigadcs 10 PCS, 10 Dec 75, Msg, DAMO-ODO to CinC, USAREUR, DA 241942Z Sep 75, sub: 

Declassification of Ode 76 stationing. and Msg. DAMO-ODO to Cdr, I'ORSCOM. and other 

addresses. DA 131515Z May 76. sub: Termination of Unit Rotations. all Brigade 75176 file, 

DAMH-I-ISO: PO 48- 1 and 52- I, 1st Infantry Division and Fort Riley. 24 Sep 1976. 3d an, 281h 

Inf fi le, DAMH-I·ISO: Msg, DAMO-ODO to Cdr, FORSCOM. and Olher addresses. 201845Z Apr 

78. sub: Movement Directivc 24-78. <Iud PO 63- 2, FORSCOM. 21 Apr 1979. bolh 5th On. 7th Cav 

file. DAMH-HSO; USAREU R and Seventh Anny. S/rellgl//CI/illg NATO, pp. 2- 7. 

34 FM 100- 5. OpeN/lioI/S, p. I- I; Cors Memo for Heads of Anny Swff Agencies, 5 Fcb 75, 

sub: Realignment of ARNG Spl1l Divisions. Infonmlion Paper. NUO. same subjcct. 24 Nov 74, 

NGI3-A RO-O. Memo. NGO to Sec of Army. undated. same subject. NGll-ARO. all National 

Guard Rcorg<lllization. 1975. file. DAM H-HSO; Amlllal Repon. Chief. Nmj(lI/a/ Gllard BlIl"c(/I/. FY 

/975. p. 32; AII/llwl Rel'je", (jorllled), Rel'(}rl). Chief. Nwio//(/I CuW"d Bureoll. FY /976 alld TQ. IJ. 
THE TOTAL A RMY 377 

30; Ltr, NOB 10 AG, Ohio, 25 Feb 77, sub: Rcorgalliz<ltioll orOhio ARNG Units, NCi13-ARO-O 

207- 02. Ohio N:"ional Guard file. DAMI I-HSO: Reserve COnll>Ollcnls Troop Basis of the Army 

Annex I: Anlly Nat ion:.! Guard Unit ProgrJIll, 28 Feb 1977, DAM II-HSO. 

35 Telephone or Verbal Conversation Record (DA rOml 751), Mr. Bart, FORSCOM. and 

author, sub: 187th lnflJdc (Mass). 13 JUII 75, and DA Fonll 751, Mr. Smith, TAG, and author, IS 

JUIl 75, both 1871h Inf I3dc file. DAMII-I-ISO: "Callaway, Thurmond : Brigade Affiliation 10 

Involve Politics?" , /1"/1/) ' TiIllCS, 3 Sep 1975. Congressional leaders traditionally have \x.'cn protective of miliwry uuits and inSlaliations in their districts because they arc a source of jobs and 

income. 

36 U.s. Army FQRSCOM. "Annual Ilis!Orical Revicw, I Jul 7S 30 Sep 76," p, 226- 27: Ur, 

OCAR!O Maj Gell Gordon 1. Duqucmin. 29 Jan 76, "Taking A Ca ndid Look." H('.\·('I"I'l! 22 

(Nov- Dec 1976): 18- 19; Msg, DA 07 14452 May 76, sub: 205th Infantry Brigade, Msg, DA 

251520Z May. same subject. and PO 6- 2, Fifth US Amly, 1976, all 205th Inf Bde file. DAMHII SO. 

n AR 11- 29, Affi liation Program. 1975; Infommtion I'aper, NOll. sub: Affi liation ['rogroml, 

13 lun 78, NGB-A RO-T, Roundout/Afliliation file. DAMII·I ISO: U.S. Army FORSCOM, 

"Annual Historical Review, I Oct 76 30 Sell 77," pp. 238-42. 

J~ TOE 97, Division (Training), 1970: Ltr, Org:LIlization :LIld Directory Branch to TAG, sub, 

jeet: Change in Status of Units, AGAO·D, 18 Feb 71, AG Refe rence files, also sec Training 

Division General files. 1970-71. DAMH,IISO. 

39 J. Milnor Robcns. "USAR Movcs into 1973," AmI)' H('sc/1'e Maga:ille 19 (Mar 1973): 4- 5. 

40 GO 174, Sixth US Army, 1915, 5th Brigade (Trailling) filc. DAMH-USO, U.s. Anny 

FORSCOM, "Annual Historical Review, FY 1915," p. 181. GO 64, U.S. Sixth Amly. 3d Bn, 87th 

Inffile, DAMI·I-I·ISO. 

4t Dep,/rlmeul /Jjllw / 1/"111)' lIi.I'lorie(l! SIIm/l/(I/")'. !974.1l. 32.1979, p. 16; U.S. Army 

FORSCOM, "Annunillistorical Review, I Oct 77- 30 Sep 78," p. 166: TOE 97-500118, Recruit 

Training Organization, 1978; "It's No Easy Job Retaining Trainers liS the USAR's I081h Division 

Outdoes Itself," Rcscrve 25. No. I. (1979): 20- 2 1, 

CHAPTER 14 

A New Assessment 

711t~ lIIosl (tell/alldillg challellge collfrol/lillg rhe us mili(my ill the ,/('<:{I(/e of'he 1980s 

is 10 (lel'Clop lIml demOllSfl'lIIe 'lte l..>tllXlbiliry to !!'"//cces.'iflllly meel ,IIl'eals /0 \!;/a/ US iI/Ie/,-

· olll,l'ide oj Europe. Wilhoul compromisillg lite decisil'e thelller ill Cellll'lll Ellrope. 

General Edward C. Meyerl 

Foll owing the conflict in Viet nam the Army undertook a concerted program 

to achieve parity with the heavy forces of the Soviet Union. Various schools, 

commands, and agencies devised divisional models from wh ich they argued the 

need fo r new weapons, equipment, tactics, and doctrine, a process similar to that 

which had produced the pentamic and ROAD divisions. Yet even as the Army 

retooled for a European batl ri (~ its senior leaders also tried to anticipate what 

ot her contingencies wou ld have to be faced in the future. By 1990 the effectiveness of this work in sea rching for organizationa l designs that wou ld give the 

Army even greater fl exibility wou ld be put to a severe test. 

The Division Restructuring Study 

The ligh tning war between the Arabs and Israelis in 1973, when the Egyptian 

and Syrian armies lost more tanks than the United States had in Europe at the 

time, causcd the Army to rethink its doctrine and the structure of its divisions and 

brigades. An examination of the seventeen-day confl ict led to new ideas about 

how to prepare for war and how to fight. Known as the "Acti ve Defense," the new 

doctrine stressed defense as the principal mode of combat. Other fac tors embedded in the new approach were the speed wit h which dec isive act ions would take 

plaee and an awareness of the increased lethality of modern we<lpons on the b<lttle ri eld. Both considerations put added pressure on the Army to improve the combat capabilities of forwa rd-deployed active forces and the speed wit h which effective reserve components units could be del ivered to overseas battlegrounds) 

Si nce the Army was on the thres ho ld of adopting new equipme nt and 

weapons that increased mobil ity, firepowe r, and maneuver, the Army's schools, 

commands, and agencies examined such issues as mil itary in tell igence organ iz<ltio ns; signal and aviation req uirements; and chemica l, biologica l, <lnd nuclea r 

de fense, seeking better ways to max imi ze the new tec hnology and not just provid in g " tag alongs" in ex istin g orga nizations. Fire support teams for artill ery; 
380 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

bifunctional staffs (the unit commander se rving as a ch ief of siaff 

with two deputies, one for operati ons and mili tary intelligence and 

th e other for personnel and logistics); rearmament , refue ling, and 

main tenance in the fo rward area of 

the battlefield; and consolidati on of 

administration at the battalion level 

al so came under scrutiny) 

In March 1975 Chief of Staff 

General Fred C. Weyand suggested to 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations 

and Pl ans Lt. Gen. Donald H. Cowles 

Ihal the structure of divisions should 

be reexa mined. Weya nd was conce rn ed that new tech nology had 

resulted in only "add OilS" to di vi- Gel/eml Weyal/d sions. increasing their weight and complexity and decreasing their overall flexibility. Cowles turned to General William 

E. DePuy, command er of th e U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRA DOC), established in 1973 spec ifica lly to address tra ining and doctrine 

issues, for his views. DePuy assembl ed a group of officers from his command 

and the Army's schoo ls and centers to conduct a division restructuring ana lysis 

focllsed on finding the optimum antiannor capability for divisions. Among the 

areas considercd were the employment of the new armored vehicles coming into 

service and the problems associated with ex ploiting new arti ll ery and ta rget 

acq uisition systcms whose range had been g reatly incrcased.4 

The major produ ct of the Division Restructuring Study (DRS) was th e 

" heavy division" (Char' 44), an organization designcd to replace both mechanized infantry and armored divisions. Headed by Col. (latcr Gcncral) John Foss, 

from the Traini ng and Doctrine Command, the planning group believed that the 

princi ples underlying the new organi zation could be applied to all divisions. 

The heavy div ision inc luded th ree brigades, each consisting of a permanent 

combat team of two mechanized infantry and three tank battalions. Infantry battalions consisted of one combat support, one TOW, and three sma ll riOe companies; 

tank battalions, similar in structurc to the mechanized infantry un its, fielded thrce 

tank compa nies and maintenancc, TOW, and combat support companies. A tank 

company had three tank platoons with each platoon having only three tanks. The 

prccise location of the TOW antitank missile launchers posed the old problem of 

centralized vcrsus deccntralized control for the planners, much as had the introduction of other ncw weapons and equipment, such as the machine gun, tank, antitank 

gun, airplanc, and helicopter. For now they remained under control of the battalion.S 

382 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

To increase fi repower, the number of 155-mm. howitzers in each direct support 

artillery battery was increased from six to eight, and the number of firing batteries 

in a battalion rose from three to four. The number of batteries in the 8-inch howitzer 

battalion was also increased to fOll f. Since the group foresaw a larger divisional 

combat area in both width and depth, the artillery's counterfirc (destroyi ng enemy 

artillery) capabi liti es moved from the corps level to the division, with a target 

acqu isition battery added to the division artillery to locate those targets. A smaller 

cavalry squadron fielded only three ground troops, with the air cavalry troop moved 

to a new divisional aviation battalion. For antiaircraft defense, the study gave the 

heavy division an air defense arti ll ery brigade comprising two batta lions, one for 

the forward area of the battlefield and another for the rear.6 

With smaller di visiona l infantry and armor battalions, planners envisioned 

integrating the combat arms at the battalion ra the r tha n at the company leve l. 

Under the ROAD concept a company team had been the princi pal combat formati ol1 . For example, a mechanized infantry company was normally rei nforced with 

engineers, forwa rd artillery observers, and possibly tanks, antitank weapons, and 

helicopters. But the company commander who integrated these forces had no 

staff and probably lacked the experience to achieve the most effective use of all 

these resources. A change of foclls therefore appeared necessary.7 

Combat support within the new division also underwent rad ica l changes. A 

combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI) battalion was organi zed from military intelligence and Army Security Agency resources. Consisting of an electronic warfare company and a g round surve illance company, along with a headquarters and operations company, the batta lion greatly expanded the division's intelligence co ll ec tio n and ana lysis c apab ilili es. As noted, the reconnaissance 

squadron 's aviation troop was moved to a new divisional aviation battalion, which 

consol idated the attack helicopter company and the division 's command and control aviation resources in one unit. All mess resou rces were grouped at battalion 

level, and a personnel service company merged finance and personnel services 

in to one company, whi ch was inc luded in the support command. That command 

also fi e lded a supply and transport battalion, a maintenance battalion, and a su pport operations center. A chemica l company provided th e division with smokegenerating resources and the ability to assist in defense agai nst biolog ica l, 

nuclea r, and chemica l weapons. In the past no chemica l unit had ex isted in a division, and all units had been expected to defend against those weapons as a primary responsibility. Finally, the study moved the divisional medica l battal ion and the 

bridge company from the engineer battalion to the corps level.8 

A fie ld test of the new structure at Fort Hood by a brigade of the 1 st Cavalry 

Di vision in 1979 produced mixed results. Lt. Gen. Marvin D. Ful ler, the III Corps 

comman de r, who oversaw the test , foun d the divisio n ove .- ma nne d and 

overeq uipped in many areas, giving commanders resources to cover every possible deficiency or contingency. He thought the additional costs in personnel and 

equi pmen t would pri ce the division out of reac h. He also found that radios had 
A NEW ASSESSMENT 383 

proliferated to the exte nt that communications we re hampe red rather than 

improved, that bifu nCliorull staffs filtered information needed by commanders, 

and that air defense coverage was still inadequate. However, the test validated the 

belief that tank and mechani zed infantry battal ions should be the foca l poin t for 

the integration of the combined arms.9 

During the evaluation of the division restructuring concept, the Army Staff 

approved selective improvements in existing divisions based on lessons learned 

from the 1973 Arab~Jsrac i War. A target acquisition battery was placed in the 

division artillery to identify targets up to 50 kilometers in front of the forward 

edge of the battle arca. Chemica l companies were added to divisions to provide 

nuclear, biological, and chemica l reconnaissance and decontamination support. 

Because of the need to acquire and evaluate information about the enemy, divisiona l military intelligence batta lions of the CEW I ty pe werc organized beginning in 1979. In the armored and mechani zed infantry di visio ns, aviation 

rcsou rces were again pooled to form aviation battalions. The a irborne division 

was assigned th ree antitank TOW companies, one for each brigade, while the 

infantry division in Korea was assigned only a company. When the aerial field 

artillery battalion was inactivated in the air assault division, antitank resources 

were concentrated in an aviation battalion. to 

Along with upgrading existing divisions, the Department of De fense directed 

the Army to increase its mcchani zed forces. In September 1979 the 24th Infantry 

Division converted from infantry to mec hanized infantry, and the fol lowing yea r 

clements were assigned to the previously unmanned l49t h Armored Brigade in 

the Kentucky Army National Guard, raising the number of brigades in the total 

force to twenty-five. By 1980 the Texas Guard had eliminatcd its unfilled 36th 

Airborne Brigade, using iI's personnel 1'0 organize a corps-level combat engi neer 

battalion. Planners also considered reorganizing all infan try divisions, except the 

airborne and the airmobile forces, as mcchanized units. t t 

Division-86 

Before the 1st Cavalry Division completed its eval uati on of the heavy division in 1979, the new commandcr of the Training and Doctrine Command, 

General Donn A. Starry, began to develop another divisional concept thaI built 

upon the Division Restructuring Study. From his experience as the V Corps COIllmander in Europe, Starry bel ieved that Foss' Division Restructuring Study group 

had worked too quickly. Units had conducted tests without proper training, and 

the opposing forces lacked adequate knowledge of Soviet tactics. Therefore, he 

judged that the test rcsults could not be totally ascribed to deficiencies in tacti cs, 

leadership, or organizatioll.12 

The Division Restructuring Study had concentrated on the active defense, the 

lethality of the battlefield, and the need to win the first battlc, but Starry stressed 

the offense and "centra l battle" where all aspects of firepower and maneuver, air 
384 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

and g round, wou ld come toget her 

over a wide area to produce a decisive action. He believed that ann lysis 

of those e lements in the baule m"cn, 

including th e range of weapons and 

the ir rates of fire , th e size of the 

opposing forces, the terrain ove r 

whi ch they wou ld ad va nce, and the 

speed of thaI advance, would permit 

development of morc effective operational co nce pts. In add ition , he 

thought considerati on had to be given 

to "force generati on," the task of concen trating the combat power of the 

division for the centra l battl c. These 

ideas evo lved into the "AirLan d 

Battle" doct rine, whi ch was published in 1982 in th e revised Fie ld 

Manual, 100- 5, Opel'Clliolls.I J 

Analysis of combat wi thin the 

framework of the AirLand Battle con* 

Genemf Stan), cept le d to th e development of 

" Divisio n*86," so named because 

1986 was as far out as General Meyer and his advisers could project the threat. 

Because of the importance of Europe to national security, Di visi ol1*86, like the 

Division Restructuring Study, emphasized a standardized heavy division, which 

combi ned both armored and mechanized infantry divisions, and focused on max i* 

mizi ng the new equipment entering the invcntory. In October 1979, fo ur months 

aftcr General Edwa rd C. Meyer became Chief of Staff, Starry prese nted his 

Division*86 proposa l, which Mcyer approved in princi ple on the 18th of that 

month. His final decision about fielding such a division depended upon studies to 

be conducted for light divisions (i nfantry, airborne, and airmobile), corps, and ech* 

elons above the corps level.14 

Di visio n*86, as presented to General Meyer, retained th e fl exible ROAD 

structure. The new heavy division consisted of a headquarters and headq uarters 

compa ny; three brigade headquarte rs; a military police company; sig nal, air 

defense artillery, engineer, and mi litary intelligence battalions; a recon naissance 

squadron; division artillery; an air cavalry attack brigade; a division support COI11* 

mand; and a number of maneuver c leme nts to be determined, possi bly four or 

five mechani zed infantry battalions and five or six armor battalions. The division 

would total approximately 20,000 officers and cnlisted men (Chart 45).15 

Under the "come-as*you-a re, fight-as-YOlHlre" approach to war, combat service support had to be immediately available in the battle area. To meet the new 
CHART 45- Heavy Division (Tank Heavy) 

As Briefed to General Meyer on 18 October 1979 
386 

Gelleral /Heyer 

MANEUVER AN D FI REPOWER 

logisti ca l re q uireme nts, the stud y 

called for a radical reorganization of 

the di vision support command, primarily to address the fo rward area of 

the battle fi eld. The command incl uded a mat eri e l man ageme nt ce nt e r, 

adjutant general and finance companies, a supply and transport battalion, 

a maint enan ce battalion, a nd th ree 

support battalions, one for each divisiona l brigade. Sup port ba ttali o ns, 

which were to " arm, fue l, fix , a nd 

fe ed forward," included headquarters 

and headquart ers, suppl y, ma int e -

na nce, and me di ca l compani es. A 

small medical batta lion supported the 

rest orthe division. Planners had diffic ult y deciding whe the r to pla ce a 

chemical company at corps, division, 

o r div ision support command leve l, 

but gave it to the supply and transport 

battalion in the support command.1 6 

Evidcnce of fu ndamental change existed within the combat arms. Each tank 

battalion consisted of a headquarters element and four tank companies, and each 

tank company ri d ded three platoons of four tanks each. Mechani zed in fantry batta lions contained a headquarters element along with one TOW and four rifle companies, with the riflemen to be mounted on new Bradley infantry fighting vehicl es. To COlLnt er the Soviet Union 's hi g h de nsit y of a rtille ry a nd imp roved 

weapons, the Di vision-86 study, like its predecessor, sig nificantly increased the 

division artil lery. It fi elded three batta lions of 155-mm. self-propell ed howit zers 

organi zed into three batteri es, each having e ight pi eces; one battali on of sixteen 

8-inc11 howitzers and nine multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) mounted o n 

vehicles; and a target acquisitio n batta lion. 17 

The reconna issance squadron called fo r three troops, each having two platoons equ ipped with cavalry fighting vehicles- similar to the Bradl ey fighting 

vehicle-and a platoon of motorcycles. A new organi zation, an a ir cavalry attac k 

brigade (later designated as an aviation brigade), which resulted from the pioneer 

work of the I st Cavalry Di vision and the 6th Cava lry Brigade at Fori 1-100£1 and 

others, appeared in the di vision to provide helicopters for an antitan k role. Two 

attack battalions, each consisting of four companies with six he licopters eac h, 

and a combat support aviation battalion, whi ch provided resources for command 

aviati on, a irc ra ft maintenance, and the mil itary intel li gence battal ion, made lip 

the brigade. The brigade fi elded 134 aircrafl.l8 
The Bradley fighting vehicle (flld, below, mlllliple Iflllllch /'Odet ~J's lellls 
I ""' ,~ 

CHART 46-Heavy Division, 1 October 1982 

HEAVYOIVISION_I 

~ .. "He I MP co SIG BN J ADA I 

'" '" '" '" 

I 

ENGRBN MIBN CHEM co BOE HO 

UJ41 "" '" 133ea 

OIV ARTILLERY AVIATION BOE 

3,136 1,749 

I 

". I t55-mm I ""' AECON SOON 

'" FABN " ." 

'" 

I 155-mm SP n I II" HOWIMLlIS I CSABN 

FA BN FABN I ATIACK BN _ ~ "' .. '" '" 

I ""' AGCO 

'" '" 

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A NEW ASSESSMENT 389 

The distribution of air defense weapons had haunted the planners. Because of 

th e breadth and depth of the battlefield one commander could not casily supervise a ir defense in the division's forward and rcar areas, with each area requiring 

unique weapons. An air defense artillery brigade seellled to be one solution, but 

personnel constraints ruled it OLlt. Therefore, the division was authorized an air 

defense artillery battalion outfitted with a mix of short-range (man-portable 

Stingers) and mid-range (Chaparral) missiles, to be supplemented by the still 

experimental Sergeant York gun system,l? 

The Training and Doctrine Command publ ished tables of organization and 

eq uipment fo r this second try at the heavy division concept on I October 1982 

(Chari 46). One set of tables covered bot h the mechanized infantry division and 

the armored division, but with five variations. Five or six armor and four or five 

mechani zed infantry battalions wcre to be assigned to an armored division, and a 

mec han ized infa ntry division was to have five armor and five mechanized 

infantry battalions. Variations in the tables also covered dilTeren t eq uipment, M60 

tanks and M I 13 armored person nel carriers or thc new M I Abrams tank s and 

Bradley infantry fighting vehiclcs. Given the variations, the strength of heavy 

divisions ranged between 19,000 and 20,500 olTicers and enlisted men)O 

The published tables differed somewhat from the proposed heavy division 

that Meyer had approved three years earl ier. Cavalry fighting vehicles replaced 

tanks in the reconna issance squadron, and the squadron, consisting of two ground 

and two air troops, had no motorcycles. Rather than being a divisional unit, it was 

a part of the av iation brigade. The finance unit moved to the eorps level, and thc 

reorganized military intell igence battalion fielded electronic warfare, surveillance, and service companies. In the support command, the medical battalion 

reappeared, but the chemical company was returned to divisional level, and the 

target acquisition element was red uced to a battery)! 

The Army fa ced complex problems in fielding Division-86. Over forty major 

weapons or new pi eces of eq uipment needed to be procured, and some were still 

in deve lopmental stages. Doctrina l li terature and training programs required revision, and budgetary limitations had to be considered. The solution approved by 

the Army Sta ff, as in the past, was to adopt the heavy division concept but with 

interim organizations lIsing obsolete equipment until new weapons and equipment were available. Delivery of many new items was expected to begin in 1983. 

Therefore, organizational and eq uipment modernization was 10 begin in January 

of that yea r. The number of mancuver elements for a heavy armored division was 

set at six armor ,lIld four mechanized infantry ballal ions, wh ile Ihat for a heavy 

mechanized infantry division was placed at five a rmor a nd fi ve mechan ized 

infantry battalions.22 

The Army a lso fa ced another problem in fie lding the new heavy division, a 

shortfall in personnel. The Training and Doctrine Command esti mated that a 

strength of 836,000 was required to field Army-86, but only 780,000 was authorized for the foreseeable future . Therefore to provide manpower spaces for Illod-
390 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

crni zing the forces in Germa ny, the 4th Brigade, 41h Infantry Division, was inactivated in Europe in 1984 a long with olher units throughout the Army. Shortly 

thereafte r the moderni za tion plan went awry. Because of various problems 

involved in funding and procuri ng equipment, the Army leadership slipped the 

completion date for modernizing heavy divisions to the mid- [990s)3 

Early in the planning process for modernizing divisional forces, Meyer also 

decided to adopt a new regimental system. It was to address one aspect of the 

"hollow Army" (t he problem of having su ffi c ient personnel and equipment to 

support and sustain the for.vard-deployed Army), un it cohcsion.24 Patterned aOcr 

the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS), the new United States Army 

Regimental System assigned eac h armor, air defense artillery. cava lry, fi e ld 

arti llery, and infa ntry regiment- later avi ation regimen ts and special fo rces25 

were <Idded- a home base from which regimental clements would rotate between 

continental and overseas assignments. A soldier could affi liate with a regimen t 

and expect to serve in it for most of his or her career. By necessity the new system broke traditiona l regimental associations with divisions since fewer regiments could be accommodated in the system because of the linking of clements 

between overseas and eontincnta l stations. Meyer beli eved thaI the benefits of 

unit cohesion outweighed the loss of divisional affiliation. He tied implementation of the new regimenml system to moderniz.."Ition of the force . By 1985 implementation of Ihe regimenta l system was sepa rated from force modernization 

bccause of production delays, and uni t rotation was abandoned because of personnel turbulence and its adverse elTect on readi ness. Nevertheless, designating 

regiments as part of the system contin ued, paced by the number of flags that the 

U.S. Army Support Activity, Philadelphia, could manufacture each month. The 

nags were needed when the battalion designations were changed.26 

Elusive Light Divisions 

In 1979, when Meyer had approved the heavy division, he a lso had directed 

Sta rry to sta ndardi ze infan try, airborne, and ai rmobile divisions- now ca lled 

" ligh t divisio ns." Meye r, who op posed th e total heav y force envisioned by 

Depn rtment of Defense planners, wanted the Training and Doctrine Command to 

focus on the in fantry division; airborne and airmobile divisions were to be co ~ 

sidered later. He parti cularly wanted to know if the infantry division could be 

designed to move and fight in contingency areas, sueh as the Asiatic rim. and sti ll 

have sufficient resources to dclay and fight Soviet forces in Central Europe. This 

question posed the dilemma that had plagued the airborne division community 

since World War II- how to give a unit strategic mobility and still have it possess 

the firepower and the resources to sustain itself in combm. Meyer thought the 

answer to the problem lay in the usc of new technology. which included advanced 

radar, intelligence, and satellit e resources; containerized food and equipment; 

li ghtweight, high power cOllllllunications; new lightweight vehicles; highly ae ll ~ 
A NEW ASSESSMENT 391 

rate an d powerful , but lightweight, weapons; advanced he li copters; and other 

developments. Two interna tiona l eve nts in 1979, the widening of the connie! 

between the Soviets and the Afghans and Iran's se izure of American hostages, 

spurred Ihe need fo r lig ht, versati le unils.27 

An effective structure for the " non-heavy" infantry di vision, however, proved 

elusive . Initia lly Sta rry set restrictions on the division. Its size was nol to exceed 

14,000 soldi ers, it was to be without organic tank or mechani zed infantry units, 

and it was to be deployable in Air Force C- 141 aircraft. A ftcr four tries and a 

re laxation o rthe strength req uirement, Starry recommended a division of 17,773 

officers and enlisted men, which Meyer approved for further development and 

testing 011 18 September 1980)8 

As planners deve loped various ideas for a li ght d ivision, th e Army Staff 

se lected the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington, to serve as a "test 

bed," or a field laboratory, for equipment, organi zation , and ope rations. One 

objective was to shorten the equ ipment developmental cycle-typically from five 

to seven years- wh ich had frustrated Meyer and others. Although Meyer obviously wanted the di vision to experiment with new equipment, d iffi culties in fu nding hobbled the e ffort from the start. Some of these problems were overcome 

through the direct intervention of the Army Staff, but others were never surmounted. In 1982 Meyer thus changed the emphasis of the 9th Di vision's mission 

from testing highly techni ca l equipment to developing innovative organizational 

and operational concepts. The result was the design of a motorized division of 

13,000 men and capable of being airlifted anywhere in the world. Before the 9th 

Infantry Division compl eted its new assig nment, however, the Army set off in a 

new direction for the light division )9 

The Army a/Excellence 

By 1983 planners had reassessed the nature and direction of world events and 

the types of connicts that could be expected. As Meyer saw a need fo r a balance 

between heavy and light divisions, so did his replacement, Chief of Staff General 

John A. Wi c kh am. The successful operations of the Brit is h in th e Fal kl a nd 

Islands, the Israelis in Leba non, and the United States in Grenada all drove home 

the poillt that credible forces did nol have 10 be heavy forces. To have li ght di visions within the Army's limited resources, Wickham ordered the replacement of 

the 16,000-man standard infantry division with a new light infantry un it of about 

10,000 men and the adaptati on of light concepts to airborne and airmobi le divisions. He also wanted the design applied to the motorized division under developmen t at Fort Lewis. Furthcrmore, Wickham desircd ligh t di visions 10 have an 

improved "Iooth-Io-tai l" (i .e., combat strength 10 logistics) ratio and to be deployable three times faster than cx isti ng infantry div isions. With these changes he 

a nti cipated that th e corps would be strengthe ned and made th e focus of th e 

AirLand Battle doctrine.30 
392 MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

91h ("fan/I)' DilrisiOJl "dlll/e bl/ggy ,. IIsel/ ill {milling 

Under Wickham 's guidance the Army specified that corps were to plan and 

conduct major operations, whi le div isions were to concentrate on the tactical battlefield. The revised Fie ld Manual 100- 5, Opera/jolls, of 1986 defined the corps 

as the Army's largest tactical unit. Tailored for a particular theater and mission, 

the corps was 10 contain all combat, combat support, and combat service support 

required for sustained operations. In add ition to variolls types of divisions, the 

corps was 10 have available an armored caval ry regiment; field arti ll ery, air 

defense arti llery, engineer, signa l, av iation, and military intell igence brigades; 

and a mi lita ry pol ice group. Infan try and armored brigades and psychological 

operations, special opera tions forces, and civil affairs units could be attached as 

needed. When organi zed for a particular theater and mission, the corps was thus 

to be a re lati vely fixed organization with area as well as combat responsibil ities. 

The newly defined corps was rea lly a throwback to the begin ning of the centu ry 

when Field Service Regulations described a prototype corps) I 

Wick ham's guidance resulted in the development of units for the "Army of 

Excel1ence."32 Within that rubric, the tables of organization and equipmcnt ca lled 

for a 10,220-l11an light infantry div ision, which comprised a headquarters and 

headq uarters company; a mi litary police company; signal, air defense artillery, 

and engineer battalions; three brig,lde headquarters; nine infantry battalions; division artillery; ,Ul aviation brigade; a support cOlllmand; and a band. Shortly thereafter a milita ry intelligence battalion was added and add itional personnel autho-
A NEW ASSESSMENT 

Gel/em/ Wick/Will 

393 

rized for the sli pport comllla nd, 

which ra ised the division's strengt h to 

10,791 (Cha!'f 47). All men and their 

eq uipm en t were transportab le in 

fewer than 550 C- 141 sorlies in less 

than four days, a key feature in 

Wick ham's guidance for the design 

of the light division)3 

The light div is ion g reatly 

improved the ratio of combat Iroops 

to support personnel. Infantry battalions fielded three rifl e companie s 

and a headquarters company, a tolal 

of 559 officers and enlisted mell. The 

battalion headquarters com pany 

included a "footrnobil c" reconnaissance platoon (no vehicles in it), an 

anliarmor platoon (follr TOW launchers), and a heavy mortar platoon 

(four 4.2-inch mortars). The only 

veh icles in the battalions were the 

new "high mobility multi-purpose 

wheeled vehicles" (HMMWVs, or " Hummers") and motorcycles. Brigades provided mess and maintenance for battalions. The division artillery consisted of 

three towed IOS-tnln. howitzer battalions, three batteries with six howitzers each 

and one battery of ISS-tnm. howitzers fie lding eight pieces. A command aviation 

company, an attack helicopter battalion, and the reconnaissance squadron comprised the aviation brigade. The air defense artillery battalion fielded 20-mm. 

mu ltibarrel, electrically driven Vulcan guns and the Stinger missiles fired from a 

shoulder position, and the engineer batta lion had no bridging equipment. Support 

elements followed the funct ional ideas of ROAD, with the division having a 

maintenance batta lion, a su pply and transport battalion, a medical battal ion, and a 

transportation aircraft maintenance company, along with the command headquarters and materiel management center. Support troops totaled about 1,300 men.34 

The light div ision met several needs of the Army. It cost less and was simpler 

to ma intain and support than the heavy infantry division. It was well suited for 

rear area operations if provided with air and ground transport and could easily 

adapt to urban operations, heavily forested or rugged areas, and adverse weather 

conditions- all c ircumstances found in Weste rn Europe. Easily deployed, the 

division enhanced the Army's strategic response options. The division's weaknesses included lack of organic ground and air transport and an inability to face 

heavy forces in open terrain becausc it lacked armor. Also, thc division was vulnerable to heavy artillery, nuclear, and chemical attacks and had only minimal 

A NEW ASSESSMENT 395 

indirect fire support. To compensate for those deficiencies, the div ision was to 

look to the corps for reinforcements.35 

Plans to introduce light divisions sen t reverberations throughout all Regular 

Army divisions since there was to be no increase in strength. Wickham directed 

reductions in the size of heavy div isions to about 17,000 officers and enl isted 

men, with armored divisions ma intaining six armor and four mechanized battalions while mechanized divisions con ti nued to field five armor and five mechanized infantry batta lions. Cuts were therefore made in the combat support and 

service support elements. As noted, the motorized division was limited to 13,000 

men. He ordered the reorganization of the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord and 

of the 25th In fantry Division at Schofield Barracks as li ght di visions without 

round-ou t brigades and the activation of the 10th Mountain Division at Fort 

Drum, New York, and of the 6th Infantry Division at Fort Richardson, Alaska. 

The 10th was to have a Guard round-out brigade, and the 6t h was to draw its 

round-out un its from both the Nationa l Guard and the Army Reserve)6 

With the plans to reorganize two standard infantry divisions as untested light 

divisions, the Defense Department decided to add another mechanized infan try 

division to the Nationa l Guard force. [n August 1984 the Guard's 35th Infantry 

Division, organized from three existing brigades, returned to the active rol1s under 

the new tables as a mechanized division. Five states- Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, 

Missouri, and Nebraska-contributed units to the division, including a mechan ized 

infantry brigade each from Kansas and Nebraska and an armored brigade from the 

Kentucky National Guard. The headquarters of the ncw mechanized infantry division was at FOit Leavenworth, Kansas. To preclude the command and control problems that some multistate divisions experienced after their reorganizations in 1967 

and 1968, the five states supporting the division agreed that a division council (the 

adjutant generals from the five states) was to select the division commander and 

key personnel, who would serve a maximum of three years)7 

The 7th In fan try Division began to transition to light division structure in 

1984, and it was followed by the conversion of the 25th Infantry Division and 

the activation of the [Oth Mountain and 6th In fantry Divisions. Because Fort 

Drum lacked facilities to hOllse even a small division, one Regular Army 

brigade of the 10th was stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia, for three years. A 

new brigade, the 27th Infantry Brigade fro111 the New York Army National 

Gliard, compl eted the 10th. The 172d Infantry Brigade in Alaska was inactivated, and its personnel provided the nucleus for the 6th Infa ntry Di vision. To 

retain an airborne capability in Alaska, one company in each of the initial three 

infantry battalions assigned to the 6t h remained airborne qualified. Eventua lly 

all airborne assets were concentrated in one divisional battalion. Although the 

chief of Army Reserve agreed to have the 205th Infantry Brigade round out the 

6th Infantry Division, the Regular Army still lacked all the resources to complete the division. Thereforc, <ldditional round-out units from the A[aska Army 

National Guard and the Army Reserve were assigned. The 6th Di vision, howev-
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Willie,. Imining. 205111 II/filllll)' Brigade, 1986: below, 291h l/lfilllliJI Di\li~ i(J1I 

re(/Cril'llfioll cerelllOlly. 1985. 

.J 
A NEW ASSESSMENT 397 

cr, never met the approved design for a light div ision, as one light infantry battalion was not organized because of the want ofresources.38 

In addition to the Regular Army di visions, the Department of Defense authorized the Nationa l Guard to organ ize one light di vision, raising the total number of 

such divisions to five. The 29th Infantry Di vision returned to the active force in the 

Maryland and Virginia Army National Guard as a light division in 1985. Resources 

from the 58th and 1161h Infantry Brigades provided the nucleus for the new division, which was headquartered al Fort Belvoir, Virginia. With the activation of light 

infantry divisions, the number of divisions in the forc e rose to 28 (18 Regular Army 

and 10 National Guard) and the number of brigades fell to 23 (16 in the National 

Guard, 4 in the Regular Army, and 3 in the Anny Reserve).3? 

As part of the Army of Excellence prog ram, Wickham's directive included 

cutting and standard izi ng a irborne, airmobile, and motori zed div isions. As a 

result, the Training and Doctrine Command published tables for a sma ller airborne division, with its strength plummeting from over 16,000 offi cers and enlisted men to approximately 13,000 (CharI 48). The new division was built on the 

li ght di vision base with three brigade headquarters and nine infantry batta lions as 

its maj or components. However, it was stripped of both its armor battalion and its 

separate TOW-equipped infantry compan ies. Each infantry battalion consisted of 

a headquarters and headquarters company, three rifle companies, and an antitank 

compa ny fielding five platoons, each eq uipped with four TOWs. The one div isional addition, an av iation brigade, conta ined the reconnaissa nce squadron, an 

attack helicopter battalion, and two combat aviation compani es. The target acquisition battery was elimil1<lted from the div ision artillery, and its three 105-mm. 

howitzer battal ions were orga nized simi larly to those in the li ght division. No 

155-ml11 . howitzers were assigned.40 

The great est personnel economy in the airborne division took place in the 

support comma nd. It embodi ed a headquarters and headquarters company; a 

materiel management center; medical, supply and transport, and maintenance 

battalions; and an aviati on maintenance company, a tota l of about 1,750 soldiers 

rather than 2,500. Mi litary police and chemi ca l companies and sig nal, military 

intelligence, a ir defense artillery, and engineer batta lions completed the airborn e 

division. As in the li ght infantry division, it had to be reinforced from corps level 

when engaged in sustained operations. The 82d Airborne Division began adopting the new struct ure during fiscal year 1986 and compl eted it the following year 

when the quartermaster airdrop equi pmen t company, which had been a nondivisional unit at Fort Bragg since 1952, was added to the supply and transport battalion, a lmost doubling its size.41 

Along with the airborne div ision, the Training and Doctrine Command standardi zed the air assault div ision, which was decreased by abou t 25 percent (Char' 

49). It also was similar to its old organization, but with a li ght division base. The 

division consisted of three brigades, nine airmobile in fantry battalions, division 

arti llery, a support cOlllmand, and divisional Iroops. The one exception was the 
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400 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

replacemen t of the aviation group by an aviation brigade; the taller consisted of a 

command aviation battalion, a combat aviation battalion, a medium nviati on battalion, and four attack aviation battalions. Artillery units were patterned after 

those in the airborne division, having three [OS-mm. towed howitzer battalions, 

and th e support command retained medi cal, supply and transport, and maintenance battalions, along with an av iation maintenance battalion. The reconnaissance squadron had a headquarters and four Iroops plus a long-range surveillance 

detachment. The latter was a military intel ligence un it manned by infantrymen 

who were dependent on the cavalry squadron for transportation; doctrinally its 

location created a problcm, and the planners had no easy sol ution for its position 

within the division. Each air assault infantry batta lion fielded threc rifle companies and an antiannor company.42 

In 1986 Forces Command began to phase the new structure into the 10Ist 

Airbornc Di vision; by 1990, howcver, the Training an d Doctrine Command 

changed the aviation brigade. The recon naissance squadron, which had been a 

divisional elcment, moved to the brigade, which fielded one command, one medium, two assault, three attack battalions, along with the recon naissance unit. A 

fourth attack batta li on was planncd for the brigade, but not active.43 

The one typc of division that failed to win a place in the Army of Excellence 

was the motorized infantry division (a lso re ferred to as the middleweight rather 

than li ght di vision). Motorized ex periments conduc ted by the 9th Infantry 

Division had produccd unsatisfactory results because of funding problems created by going outside normal combat development channels. The kinetic cnergy 

assault gu n, the division's primary weapons system, and the fast attack vehicle 

never got beyond the experimenta l slage. In 1988 a reduction in the size of the 

Army forced the inactivation of the 9th Division's 2d Brigade. To maintain the 

integrity of the division, the 81st Infantry Brigade, from the Washington Army 

Nationa l Gua rd, was assigned as a round-out un it. Also, Forces Command transferred the I st Battalion, 33d Armor, a Regular Army unit, from I Corps to the 

division. Its new maneuver element mix, including rou nd-out units, consisted of 

two light attack infantry, two mechanized infantry, three armor, and four combined arms (motori zed) battalions. The lalter included two rine companics and an 

assault gun company equi pped with TOWs mounted on HMMWVs.44 

With the reorganization of the Army into heavy and light divisions, only the 

2d Infantry Di vision in Korea and the 26t h, 28th, 38th , 42d, and 47th Infantry 

Divisions in the Army Nati onal Guard remained org,mi zcd under the dated standard infantry division's tables of organization and equipment. Wick ham exempted 

the 2d Infantry Division from conversion to either the heavy or light configuration because of its mission in Korea, the absence of a corps organization there, 

<lnd Korean augmentation assigned to it. Working with tlte Training and Doctrine 

Command, Eight h Army devised a unique structure for the 2d thai increased its 

firepower, especia lly the artil lery <l nd the anti armor capabi lities, and provided a 

mix of light and heavy maneuver battalions. The division was planned to field 
A NEW ASSESSM ENT 40 1 

two armor, two mechanized infantry, and two air assault infantry battalions, while 

the other maneuver elements were to come from the Korean Army. By September 

1990 the 2d Infantry Division had adopted ilsArmy of Excel lence strtlcturc.45 

The reorganization of the Nat ional Guard div isions unde r the Army of 

Excellence concepts, except for the 29th Infantry Division, wh ich rch,lmed to the 

active force in 1985 as a light division, proved to be a challenging endeavor. In 

1985 the 49th and 50th Armored Divisions and 35th and 40th Infantry Divisions 

were reorganized as heavy divisions with the same maneuver element mix as the 

Regu lar Army divisions. Because of recruiti ng problems the areas that supported 

the Guard divisions were expanded, usually to adjacent states. One exception to the 

expansion was the 50th Armored Division, which was headquartered in New Jersey 

but had the allotment of one of its brigades moved to the Texas Army National 

Guard in 1988. Thus the future of the division in the force was uncertai n.46 

The Guard's rive infantry divisions carried on under modified versions of the 

" 1-1 " series tables of organization and equi pment, wh ich were nearly twenty years 

old. Strengths for those div isions ranged from 14,000 to 17,000. Wit h uncertainty 

about the need for more light div isions, the need for state troops, which the loca l 

authorities were unwilling to lose, and the lack of funds, which did not material· 

ize, the reorga nization of the units was held in abeyance. The National Guard 

divisions were, however, truly a part of the "Total Army." Because of concerns 

over sensitive equi pment in the military intelligence battalion, the Army Reserve 

provided that unit for each Guard division except the 29th Infant ry Division, 

which organized with its guardsmen.47 

As the Army modern ized its heavy divisions, it continued to rev ise their 

structure. In 1986 the 8·ineh howitzers were transferred from the heavy division 

to corps level, but the Ill ultiple·launch rockets, organized as separate batteries, 

remained a pa rt of the division artillery. The sallle year the division's support 

command was reorganized. Three forward suppo rt battalions (one for each 

brigade), a ma in support battal ion, and an avia tion maint ena nce com pa ny 

replaced the div isiona l mcdical, support and transport, and main tenance balta]· 

ions in the support command. The fu nctions and services provided by the dis· 

placed units were performed by mixed area support batta lions. Thc divisional 

adjutant general company was inactivated, and its functions moved to the corps 

leve l where they were reorganized as a personnel service company, and the divi· 

sional materiel management center was absorbed by the headquarters company in 

the support command. The reorganization of the support command saved over 

400 personnel spaces. In the National Guard heavy divisions, the air defense 

art ill ery battalions were e liminated beca use spare parts for ant iquated M42 

Dusters were not available. On mobilization the corps was to provide antiaircraft 

resources for these divisions.48 

By the end of 1989 the on ly Army of Excellence structure that the Training 

and Doctrine Command had developed fo r separate brigades was for the heavy 

one- armored and mecha nized infantry. Like th e tables of organiza tion and 
402 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

equipment for heavy divisions, they included variations for the types of equipment and the number of ma neuver elements that the brigades fie lded. Each 

bri gade, authorized approximately 4, 100 soldiers, included a headquarters and 

headquarters company, engineer and military intellige nce companies, a cavalry 

reconnaissance troop, a fie ld artillery battalion (three batteries of six se lf-prope lled I 55-mill. howitzers each), a support battalion, and a combination ofannar 

and mechanized infantry ballalions.49 

The reorgani zation of reserve brigade fo rces, both separate and round-out 

units, also became an ongoing process. For the 9th Infantry Di vision (Motorized), 

the 151 Cavalry Division, and 5th and 24th In fantry Divisions the maneuver element mix of their National Gua rd round-ollt brigades was increased from three to 

four battalions, two armor and two mechani zed infantry. The light round-ou t 

brigades for the 6th Infantry and 10th Mountain Di visions continued to field 

three maneuver battalions. The 27th In fantry Brigade, rounding out the 10th 

Mountain Division, however, did not have all of its brigade base units. Fi ve other 

heavy brigades in th e National Guard were a lso orga nized under Army of 

Exce llence tables, while the e ight Nationa l Guard and the two Army Reserve 

infantry brigades, like the National Guard infantry divisions, employed a mishm<lsh of old and new structures. Although eight Guard infantry brigades were not 

modernized, each had the same number of assigned maneuver clements, except 

for the 92d In fantry Brigade in Puerto Ri co, which had fou r .... ther than three 

infantry battalions. The 157th Infantry Brigade, the only mechanized infantry 

brigade in the Army Reserve, fielded only three maneuver c lements as did the 

1871h Infantry Brigade.50 

The Regular Army brigades continued to lack uniformity. In 1984 Forces 

Comm<lnd reorganized the 194th Armored and 1971h Infantry Brigades under Ihe 

he<lvy brigade configuration. The 193d Infan try Brigade, the spec ial mission 

brigade in Panama, was reorganized as a light un it consisting of two in fantry battalions (one being airborne qualified), <I fie ld artillery bauery, and a support battalion. 

The 3d Battalion, 87th Infantry, from the Army Reserve was identified as a roundoul unit for the brigade. An additional table of ol'ganiz.1tion brigade was added to 

the Regular Army in 1983 when United States Army, Europe, and Seventh Army 

orga ni zed the Berlin Bri gade under a standard sepa rate infantry brigade table, 

which provided resources for improved command and control of its assigned units. 

It had thrce infantry battalions, a field artillery battery (eight 155-mm. self-propelled howitzers), a tank company, and a newly activated support battalion. 51 

The ce llular organiz.1tion adopted in 1978 for the twelve training divisions 

and two training brigades (a new brigade, the 402d, had been orga nized in 1985 

for field artillery training) in the Army Reserve crcated problems, particularly in 

accounting for the personnel assigned to the units. Some positions were authori zed within divisional tables of organization and eq ui pment cells and others were 

provided for as a part of the Uni ted States Army Reserve centers to which the 

divisions and brigades werc assigned. Between the two documentation sources, 
A NEW ASSESSMENT 403 

Forces Command found it difficult to tel l which parts or the reserve centers were 

dedicated to support the training units. The command eventually recommended a 

solution, which the Army Staff approved on 11 December 1986. The training 

divisions and brigades were to be reduced to zero strength to keep the units active 

and then backfilled lIsing tables of distribution and allowance. The change 

.. Il owed Forces Command to identify specific billets for each division, brigade, 

and reserve center for its specifi c mission. The lineage, honors, and history orthe 

divisions and brigades continued to be represented in the reserve forces. Units 

began adopting the system in September 1988 and comple ted the process 

September 1990.52 

A New Direction 

With its light and heavy di visions and brigades, the Army of Exce ll ence 

reorganization was ex pensive, and ultimate ly the high cost forced the Army to 

move in a new direction during the late 1980s. All clements of the military 

establ ishment, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, competed for modernization monies, which helped drive the national debt to unacceptable levels. 

In 1988, as a part of its share in reducing defense costs, the Army inactivated 

one brigade from the 9th Infantry Division, as already noted, and replaced it 

wit h the 81 st Infantry Brigade from the Washi ngton Army National Guard. The 

following year the 2d Brigade, 4th In fantry Division, was inactivated, crea ting a 

gap that was closed by the I I 6th Cavillry Brigade from the Idaho, Oregon, and 

Nevada National Guard. The Guard's 116th and 163d Armored Cavalry regiIllcnts had bcen reorga nized by 1989 as armored brigades because no requirement existed for those regiments in the force. By the end of fiscal year 1989 the 

Army had twenty-e ight divisions and twen ty-five brigades (Tables 37 alld 38) 

in the active Army and reserve components combined.53 

During the summer of 1989 the Warsaw Pact bega n to disintegrate. Economic 

and social isslles fired the changes, and nations in Eastern Europe wrenched control of their affairs from the Soviet Union. By the end of the year most Soviet 

client states were set on a path of self-determination. Given this change, the rationa le for the North Atlan tic Treaty Organization, the basis for hav ing United States 

forces forward deployed in Europe, and much of the Army doctrine for fighting 

the AirLand Battle came under close scrutiny. 

Before any reassessment of the defense establishment in light of these events 

was complCled, in December 1989 the Army was ca ll ed upon to deploy the 7th 

Infantry Division and the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, to Panama as ,\ pilrt 

of Operation JUST CAUSE, an effort to restore democracy to that Latin American 

republic. Several months later American div isions and brigades participated in 

Ol>cration DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, a multinationa l endeavor to halt Iraqi 

aggression in Southwest Asia and to restore the independence of Kuwait (fflble 39 

lists the divisions and brigades that deployed to Soutlnvcst Asia). 
TABLE 37 

Divisions, 1989 

LocUlion Manellver Baltalion 

Division Compo"en! of Headquarters Inf Mech A, Abn AAST LI 

1st Annored RA Ansbach, Germany 4 6 

1st Cavalry RA Fort Hood, Tex. 2 3 

lSI Infantry RA Fort Riley, Kans. 4 6 

2d AmlOred RA Fort Hood, Tex. 4 ; 

2d Infantry RA Korea 2 2 3' 

3d Annored RA Frankfurt, Germany 4 6 

3d Infantry RA Wuerzburg, Germany ; 5 

4th Infantry RA Fon Carson, Colo. 4 5 

5th Infantry RA Fon Polk, La. 3 3 

6th Infantry RA Fon Richardson, Alaska 3 

7th Infantry RA Fort Ord, Calif. 9 

8th Infantry RA Bad Krcuznach, Germany ; 5 

9th Infantry RA Fon Lewis, Wash. 1 2 

10th Mountain RA Fon Drum, N.Y. 6 

24th Infantry RA Fon Stewart, Ga. 3 3 

25th Infantry RA Schofield Barracks, Hawaii 9 

26th Infantry NG Buzzards Bay, Mass. S 2 

28th Infantry NG Harrisburg, Pa. S 1 

29th Infantry NG Fort Belvoir, Va. 9 
TABLE 37-Continued 

Location Maneu~'er Battalion 

Division Component of Headquarters In! Mech A," Abn AAST L

35th Infantry NG Fort Leavenworth, Kans. 5 5 

38th Infantry NG Indianapolis, Ind. 8 1 1 

40th Infantry NG Los Alamitos, Calif. 5 5 

42d Infantry NG New York, N.Y. 6 1 3 

47th Infantry NG SI. Paul, Minn. 8 1 1 

49th Annored NG Austin, Tex. 4 6 

50th Annored NG Somerset, N.Y. 4 6 

82d Airborne RA Fort Bragg, N.C. 9 

IOlst Airborne RA Fort Campbell, Ky. 9 

l One air assault battalion inactivated in September 1990. 
TABLE 38 

Brigades, 1989 

Loca/ioll 

Brigade Compollen! of Headquaners Illf 

27th Infantry NG Syracuse, N.Y. 

29th Infantry NG Honolulu, Hawaii 31 

30th Armored NG Jackson, Tenn. 

30th Infantry NG Clinton, S.C. 

3 [st Armored NG Northport, Ala 

32d Infantry NG Milwaukee, Wise. 

33d Infantry NG Chicago, III. l 

39th Infantry NG Liuie Rock Ark. l 

4151 Infantry NG Ponland, Oreg. 3 

45th Infantry NG Edmond, Okla. l 

48th Infantry NG Macon, Ga. 

53d Infantry NG Tampa, Fla. l 

73d Infantry NG Columbus. Ohio l 

8 1st Infantry NG Seattle, Wash. 

92d Infantry NG San Juan, Puerto Rico 4 

1161h Cavalryl NG Boise, Idaho 

[55th Armored NG Tupelo. Miss. 

[57th Infantry AR Horsham. Pa. 

163d Armored NG Bozeman, Monl. 

187th Infantry AR Fon Devens, Mass. l 

193d Infantry RA Fon Clayton, Canal Zone 

194th Armored RA Fort Knox, Ky. 

197th Infantry RA Fort Benning, Ga. 

205th Infantry AR FOri Snelling, Minn. 3 

218th Infantry NG Newberry, S.C. 

256th Infantry NG Lafayette, La. 

Berlin RA Berlin, Gennany 3 

lOne Anny Reserve and two National Guard Battalions. 

2 Reorganization of the I I 6th Annored Cavalry as the I I 6th Cavalry Brigade not complete. 

3 One Anny Reserve and one Regular Anny banalion. 
A NEW ASSESSMENT 

TA BLE 39 

Divisions and Brigades in Southwest Asia, 1990- 9 1 

Ullil 

lSI Armored Di visioll (less 

1st BTi gad!!) 

I SI Cavalry Division (less 2561 h 

Infantry Brigade) 

1st Infantry Di vision (less 

1st Infa ntry Division Forward) 

1st Brigade, 2d AmlOTcd Division 

3d Brigade, 2d Annorcd Di vision 

3d AmlOTcd Di vision 

3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division 

24th Infantry Di vision (less 48th 

Infantry Brigade) 

82d Airbome Di vision 

101 s1 Airbome Division 

197th Infantry Brigade 

HOllie S/(I(ioll 

Germany 

F0I1 Hood, Texas 

Fort Riley, Kansas 

Fort I-Iood, Tcxus 

Gemlany 

Gennany 

Gennany 

ForI Stewart , Georgi;! 

ForI Bragg, North Ca rolina 

Fort Campbell. Kentucky 

Fort Benning, Georgia 

407 

The nation and the Army reached a watershed in 1990 with the disintegration of Soviet Union and the deployment o f fo rces to Southwest Asia. Since the 

end of the conflict in Vietnam, national leaders had focused on the coun tering 

of the Soviet menace, and the Army's Division Restructuring Study, the Airland 

B<lttl e doctrine, and the Army of Excell ence heavy di visions, fi rst and foremost , 

had addressed that th rea t. Although the need for other types of divisions and 

separate brigades was recognized, limit ed resources bridl ed fu ll implementation 

of the Army of Ex cell ence design. Aggression by the small Iraqi nation introduced a series of new questions about the size, type, and location of division 

and separate brigade forces needed. The answers to these questions arc len to 

the future, but an ever-changi ng world and ongoi ng revolution in weapons and 

information technology wi ll continue to challenge the designers of the Army 

force structure in years ahead. 
408 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Noles 

I E. C. A-/e)'el". Gel/erlli. UIli/e(1 Slflle,\" ,lmlJI, ChiefofSI{/ff. ./lme /979- JI/IIC 19(13 (n.p., 1983). 

p.52. 

2 John r . Rose, Tile EI'Qflllioll of u.s. ArlllY Nlie/CIII' Doc/rille. 1945- 1980 (Boulder. Colo.: 

WcslvicwPrcss. 1980), PI). 11 5- 16. 

3 f'M 100- 5, Opel"(/Ii()ll.l", 1976, pp. 1- 1- 5; Kevin P. Sheehan, " Preparing for an [Illilginary 

War: E;I{amining Peacetime FunClions and Changes of AmlY Doctrine," Ph.D. thesis, Harvard 

Unil'crsilY. 1988, pp. 75- 76: U.S. TRADOC. "Annual 1-lislOric,11 Review, FY 1976," pp. 38-47; 

Memo, CG, TRADOC, unoalt:d, sub: Outline Concept Paper Division Rcslnlcluring Study (DRS) 

ATCG·R. TRADOC. Exccutive Summary: dmn, Phase I: Division Reslmeltlring Study (DRS). 20 

D<x: 76. both DRS file, DAMI-I-IIS0; John W, Foss, Donald S. Pih]. and Thomas E. Fitzgcrold, 

"The Division Rcstructuring Study: Thc 1·lcavy Division," Milit(lry R CI'jew 57 (Mar 1977): I 1- 2 1. 

4 Ltr, DCSOPS to TRADOC, 2 1 Mar 75, no subject, DRS file; Foss et aI. , "The Hcavy 

Division," I)P. 11- 21: TRADOC, E:'Iccutivc Summary. DRS. 

S TRADOC, E:'Iccutivc SlIIllIl1<uy, DRS. 

6 Ibid.; Foss ct al., "The I !cavy Di vision," PI'. 11 - 2 1. 

7 Foss ct al.. "Thc !·Ieavy Division," PI). 11- 2 1. 

II TRADOC, E:'Iecutive Summary, DRS; John I'. Finncgan. "Military Intclligenee. An 

Ovcrview, 1885- 1987:' Ms, 1988, pp. 205- 0 7, DAMH· IIS0. Also sec TRADOC. "Annual 

lIistorieal Review, FY 1977 ," I>P. 170- 73 for a discussion of thc lIew division. 

9 Llr. CG. III Corps and Fort Hood. to FORSCOM. 16 Aug 79, sub: Letter of Transmittal· 

DRS Report.Phase Ill. and DRS. Urigadc Evaluation, 2d Ildc. 1st Cav Div. Phase III Final Report. 

\'01. 1.3 1 Aug 79, both DRS filc. 

to FORSCOM, "Anl1ual ll istorieal Revicw, I Oct 1977- 30 Scp 1978," pp. 155-56, and I Oct 

1978- 30 Sep 1979, pp. 16 1- 66: John L. Romjuc. A HisfQlJ' of Arll/)' 86, vol. I, Divisioll 86: Thc 

f)cI'c/opmellt of tile Hem'), Oi,,;s;/II/ (Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrinc 

Command, 1982). pp. 42- 48; Changc 2, TOE 6- 3001-1 . Armored Division or Infantry Division 

(MechaniZed) Artillery. 1976: TOE 6- 30711, Target Acquisition Battery, Airborne, Armored. 

InrMl1 ry, and Mechanized l .. rantTY Divisiou, 1976; TOE J- 87 H, Nuclear. Biological. Chemic,,1 

Ocfense Company. 1977: OPS 28. Dir, Foree Management, DCSOI'S, to DCSOI'S, 18 Apr 79, sub: 

CBR JA Teams, DAMO·RDI'. Chemica l General file, DAMII· HSO; TOE 17·85 H, Combat 

Aviation Battalion, Armored or Meehanizcd Infantry Division. 1977; TOE 34-1651-1 , Combat 

Elcetronie Warfare Intelligence Ilattalion, 1979: TOE 7- 1071-1. Antiarmor Company. 1977: sec 

author's notes for implementation date, Di" Rcorgan;7 .. ,I;on 1976-1980, DAMH· HSO. 

II iJeplIrtlllcllt of thc Arlll)' NisfOl'iclil SIIII/I11(//)'. FY 79, p. 13: I>() 64- 7, FORSCOM, 1978, 

24th Inf Div file, LtT, NOB to AG, Kentucky. 30 Sep 80, sub: Reorganization of KY ARNG Units, 

NG B·ARO·O 207- 02, No. 195- 80, Kentuck y NG file, Ltr, NGUto AG, Texas, I Apr 80, sub: 

Reorga nization of Texas ARNG Units, NGB·ARO·O 207- 02, No. 7 1- 80, Texas NG file. nil 

OAMI I· I-ISO: John L. Romjue, A I-liSfOl')' of A 1'11/)' 86, vol. II, Thc f)(:I'C/OPIIICIII ofthc Light 

f)i1·isioll. the COIPS. all(1 Echelons aluJI'c Corps (Fort Monroe, Vlt.: U.S. Army Tr"ining and 

Doctrine COlllmand. 1982), p. 25. 

t2 Romjue, Thc HI'(lIIY DiI'ision, p. II. 

Il Ibid., pp. 11 - 16: iJep<lr/IllCIII of the Arlll)' Historic,,/ SIIIIIIII(II),. FY 79, p. 18: Clyde J. Tatc 

lmd L. D. 1I0ider, "New Doctrine ror the Ocrense," .Hilitm)' Rel'iew 59 (Mar 1981): 2- 9; Donn A. 

Swrry, "Extending the Ballie field," MilitlllJ' Rel'iew 59 (Mar 198 1): 3 1- 50; FM 100- 5, Opcmt;QI/.f, 

1982. pp. 2- 1- 10: John L. Romjue. FI'OIII Actil'e f)(,fellse to Ai,.LiIIlfl HallIe: The f)el'C!oplIIl'lIt of 

Anll)' /)(x'trille /973- 1981 (Fort Monroe. Va.: U.S. Anny Training and Doctrine Command. 1984), 

PI'. 51 73. 

t4 LuAnnc K. Leven and l3e njnmin F. Schemmer. "AFJ Interview: 'Now everybody can shoot 

nt mc,'" Armed Forcc.\' JOl/l'lIalllltel'lwtimwl (Mar 1980): 46: Romjue, TIle Hem,)' f)h 'isioll, pp. 

42-46,48-49, Ill. 128. Between pages 50 and I JO of this work is a detniled discussion of the evo· 
A NEW ASSESSMENT 409 

IUlion of Division-86. 

IS "'eyer, Chief o/Slaff. p. 55; Romjuc. The /-Iem'Y D;I-;:";Oll, I). 112. 

16 Romjuc, The /-Iem'Y DiI'isioll. I'p. 8 1- 85, 89: Paul A. Uigclman, "Force Designs for the 

Future," Anll)' 31 (Jun 198 t): 22- 33. 

17 Romjuc. rhe l-/em') Dil'i~ iOIl, pp. II), 116. 

18Ibid.,p(l.115,117. 

19 Ibid .. pp. 119- 20. 

20 TOE 87. Heavy Division, 1982. and associated TOEs. The Ml tank was named the 

"Abrams" in memory ofOcncrnl Creighton Abr.uns, Chief of Staff, who died in office in J 974. 

21 TOE 87, to/cavy Division, 1982, and associated TOEs. 

22 John L. Romjue. The Ugh' Dil'isiQII, pp. 17- 24: U.S. Amly TRADOC. "Annual Command 

History. I Oct 82-30 Sep 83," Pil. 2%- 302: USA REUR, "Historical Review, I J:1I1 82- 3 1 Dec 83," 

PI),20- 22. 

21 Romjuc, The Ugh' f)il 'i.~;OIl, p. 17; John L. Romjue, The Arlll)' of E.I'ce ffellce: The 

DewdoplllclIl oflhc 1980$ Army (Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Artny Tr:lining and Doctrine Command, 

1993), pp.20- 21: John A. Wickham. Jr., Collecled Works of I/Ie n,;nielli Chief of Siaff. UII;feI/ 

Sillies Am,)' (n.p., 1987), pp. 157- 60.217 18; PO 58- 5. USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1983,4th 

lldc, 4th InfDiv, file. OAMH-HSO. 

24 Meyer. ChicfofSlaJJ; p. 174 

2S The 1st SI>ccial Forces regiment under CARS was considered a pan ofinr.mtry, but in 1983 

they were made a separate ann. 

26 AR 600--82. The Us. Anl/)' Rl.'g;melllal Syslcm 1986; Llr. ODCSOPS to TAG and other 

addresses. 8 Feb 83, sub: Regimental Implementation Plan-Initial Regiments, DAMO-ODO, and 

Memo ror Record. DCSPER, Chief. New Manning System Division, 29 Mar 85, sub: CSA 

Guidance on U.S. Artny Regimental SystemICOHORT, DAPE·PSll. USARS file. both DAMl1-

IISO. 

21 ROllljue. The Lighl Dil';s;on, I)P. 25- 27; Joseph R. Bongiovi. " I Corps: Light Infantry 

Dillision," Ms, p. 8, DAMII-I-ISR. 

211 Romjuc, 71,e Lighl Dil'i.l'irlll, pp. 26- 55. 

29 Stephen L. Bowman, John M. Kendall, and Jmnes L. Saunders. MO/lwizcfl Experiellce aflhe 

91h "!frlllll)' Di",'~'ion (Fort Lewis, Wash.: n.p., 1989), I'p. 8- 13, 30- 41; FORSCOM. "Annual 

History Review, FY 1982,"I)P. 175- 76: Glen R. Hawkins, Us. Anny Force S/I'IICII/re wul Fon'c 

Desigll Inilialil'C. 1939-1989 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Amly Center of Military Ilistory, undaced), 

PI'. 76- 78. 

30 Wickham, "White Paper 1984. Light Infantry Division." COflet'/el/IVO/·ks. pp. 3 11 - 12: 

TRADOC, "Historical Review, 1 Oct 83 to 31 Dec 86," 1'. 108; FORSCOM. "Annual Historical 

Review, I Oct 83- 30 Scp84." p. 178. 

31 FM 100- 5, Opel'fl/ions, 1986, p. 185. 

32 The tCrtll "Art11y of Excellence" npl>cars to have been an outgrowth of the ArtllY'S lheme, 

"Excellencc." for 1983. All briefing slides l)reparcd by the U.S. Army Combincd Arms Combal 

Dellelolllllent AClillity al ForI Leallenworlh, Kansas, had the logo "Army of Excellence," which 

was adopted for the new organi1.a1ional initiali ... c. 

J) John L. Romjue. Tile Army of £.rceflellce, pp. 46-47. 52: TOE 77, lnfamry Oillision. 1984, 

and associated tablcs. 

l4 Vclocci, "The New Light Di llision, Will it Work,!,' "I/ml/ly 74 (Jan- Fcb 1984): 56- 60; 

Jamcs J. Lindsey, "The Inr.,ntry Dillision (Light)," II/fmlll)' 74 (Jan- Feb 1984): 2- 3 and (Mar- Apr 

1984): 14-16. 

3S Dallid H. Petraeus. "Light lnfamry in Europe: Strategic Flexibi lilY and COllllentional 

Deterrence." ,Hi/iu,,)' Rel';cw 64 (Dec 1984): 35- 53. 

36 1JelX/rImCIII oflhe Arm)' /Iislorie(d SIIII//11(//)'. FY 1985, PI'. 59 60; TRADOC. "Historical 

Rell;ew, I Oct 83- 31 Dec 86," pp. 11 3- 14; Wickham, "White Pape r 1984, Light Infantry 

Dillisiolls." Although the 10th Moul11ain Dil'ision was ligll1 infantry, the Secre1llry of AmlY, John 

O. Marsh. decided to usc the designation that the unil foughl under during World War II . 
410 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

J7 Llr, NOB to AG, Kans.1S, 9 May 84, sub: Reorgani7.ation of KS ARNG Unit, 9 MOly 84. 

NOO-A RO-O 207- 2, No. 13- 84. LIT. NO B to AG. Kansas. 23 Aug 85. sub: Organiz.1Iion of 35th 

Infantry Division Units in Kansas. NOB-A RD-O No. 73- 85. Llr. NOB to AG. Kentucky. 14 SCI' 

85, sub: Organization of units of the 35th Infantry Division (Mcch) and Rcorgn ni zl1l iou and 

Consolidat ion or Co I), 20 1s1 Engineer Bn in Kentllcky, NGI3-AI{O-O No. 72- 85, Llr. NO B to 

AG, Missouri , 14 Jun 85, sub: Organization of 351h Inr;1I11fy Division (Mechanized) units in 

Missouri, NGB-ARO-O No. 70 85, LIT, NOB to AG. Nebraska, 27 Scp 85, sub: Organinllion of 

IInits of the 35th Infantry Division (Mcch) and JOSth Personnel Service Co in Nebraska. NOBARO-O No. 71 - 85. Llr, NG B 10 AG, Colorndo, 27 Scp 85, sub: Organi7.alion of units of the 351h 

A"ialion Battalion and Del I, 2 11 31h Trnns Co in Colorndo, NGO-ARO-O No. 69- 85, Memo of 

Understanding between Adjutants Gencrnl of Colorndo, Kallsas, Kentucky, Missouri, Ncbrnska, 

and the Ch ief. National Guard Bureau, 6 Dec 83. sub: Command and Control 35th Infanlry 

Division (Mechanized). al1351h InfDiv lile, OAMH-HSO. 

311 Wickham, "While I'a pcr 1984, Lighl Infantry Oi\'isiolls": Depflrlmelll oflhe Arm)' 

Ilis/oric(I/ SIIIIIIIIW)'. Fiscli/ I'em' /9l'f6, pp. 65--66; Romjue, The Arm)' of Excel/ellce, pp. 62- 65: 

Activalion Ceremony 10th Mountain Division (Li ght Infantry) 13 Feb 1985. 10th Mountain 

Division file, DAMH-HSO; Bulletin oflhe Chief. AmlY Reserve. CAlrNOTES. Sep- Oet 1985. 

39 Ltr, NGB to AGs Maryland and Virginia, 30 SCI) 85, sub: Organization oflhe 29th Infillllry 

Division (Light). NG B-A RO-FD-207- 02, No. 125- 85, 29th InfDi v file, DAM H-HSO. 

010 Combined Arms Combat Development Agency (CACDA), Ughl IlIflll1tlY Dil'isioll: Hie 

Arm)' 0/ Ercel/ellce: Film/ R('pon, I Oct 1984, ch. 9. pp. 1- 7: I'OR$COM, "Annual Historical 

Rcvicw, 1983- 1984:' p. 182: TOE 57L. Airborne Division. 1985.lmd associaled tables, publislu:d 

I April 1987. Earlier versions of TOE omilled thc chemical company and contained a smaller avialion brigade ::Ind a military intclligence OOllalion. 

01. CACDA, LightlllflmllY IJil'isioll. ch. 9, pp. 1- 7: FORSCOM, "Annual Hislorieal Review. 

1983- 1984.'" p. 182; TOE 57L, Airbonlc Division, 1985, and associated tables; IJepllrtlllcllt o/tlte 

Anll)' /1istQricol SIIIIIIII(II)', Fi.\·c(I/I'ew 11)87, I'. 30: PO 88- 19, ~SCOM, 1987, 4071h Supt Bn 

file ,DAMIl-HSO. 

42 CACDA, Ughtll/jill/II)' Dil-i.violl, ell. 9. pp. 1- 7; TOE 67L, Airborne Division, 1986, and 

associaled tables. 

013 Departlllellt of Ihe Arm)' /-lis/orico/ SI/II/II/(//)', Fisc(II Yew' 1986. p. 66: TOE 1- 200L. 

Division Aviation Brigade (AASL T), I October 1990; lsl- 8lh Battalions, 10 1st Aviation, assigned 

to the division in September-October 1987, sec 10Isi Aviation file. DAM II-I·ISO. 

44 Romjuc. Tlte Arll/)' 0/ ExcellellCt!. pp. 74- 76: Bowman et aI., Mmori:t.'11 £'\1Je1'icllce of lite 9th 

"tfimtl)' Dill.fioll. pp. 38-44. 285 86: TRADOC. "Historical Review. I Oct 83- 31 Dec 86:' JlP. 115: 

FORSCOM, "Annual 11istOficai Rcview, FV 88," p. 4-3; FORSCOM, "Anllua] llistorical Revicw, 

FV 89:' p. IV- 27: PO 56-19, FORSCOM, 1988; The lsi Battalion, 803d AmlOr, which earlier had 

been designated as a round-olll unit to the division, was m::ldc an clement of the 8 1st Int:1ntry Brigade 

at Ihis time. Reserve Components Troop Basis of Ihe AmlY. Anne:rt I, Anny National Guard Unit 

Program, 31 March 1989, pI. Ill. pp. 16 17; TOE 7- 95L, Infantry Bal1a]ion (CAB-L!), 1987. 

015 TRADOC, "Historical Review, l OcI 83- 3 1 Dec 86:' p. 114; 1'0 100- 2, Eighth Army, 

1990, 2d Bn, 503d Inf, file, DAM H-HSO. 

46 L1r, NOB 10 AG, Te:rtas. 28 May 88. sub: Reorganization of Te:rtas ARNO Units. NO BA RO· F 31 0-4ge, 50th Armd Di v filc. DAMII-I·ISO; Amlllal Rel'iew 0/ lite C/tilf. Natiol/al Gluml 

8111"('(111. 1985, p. 26: Reserve Components Troops Basis of the AntlY, Annex 1, Anny Natiollal 

Guard Unit Program, 30 Sep 1989, pp. 11 1- 5-15, 111--6 1-66. 

017 Romjue. Arm)' of £.rcl'l/ellce, PI). 79- 80; Rcserve Components Troops Basis of the Anny. 

Annex l. Anny National Guard Unit Program. 30 Sep 1989: Memo. Ccntral SeeurilY Service for 

Sec of Def. 29 Feb 88, sub: Signal IlItclligenee Capabi lity for Anny National Guard Units. and 

Memo. Office Sec of Oer for Dir Cenlral Security Service, 26 Apr 88. no subject, 629th MI fil e. 

DAM II-HSO; PO 66-5 and 66- 12. First U.S. Anny, 1986. 126lh and 128th M[ Un files, PO 69-4 

ll1ld 82- 8, Fourth U.S. Army. 1986. 147th and 1381h MI Bn file s, Ilnd 1'0 24- 1, First U.S. Anny. 

1987. 542d Mll1n file. all DAM H-HSO. 
A NEW ASSESSMENT 4 11 

48 TOE 63- IOOL. Support Command {-Icavy Oi \'ision, 1986. and assoc iated tables; TOE 

6- 300L, Division Artillery, {'!cavy Division, 1986. and associated tables: The institute of Land 

Warfare, AUSA. " Di\'isions of the United Stales Army," I Oct 1989; "Air Defense Artillery 

MOdernization," Nmiolllli Gill/ttl 63 (Jan 1989): 101. 

49 TOE 87- IOOL, I-Icav), Scpamlc Brig(lde. 1986. and associated \;tblcs. 

50 Llr, NCB 10 AG. New York, I Oct 85, sub: Reurganization of 27th Inf Odc, NGIl-AROFD, 141 - 85, 27th Inf Bdc file , DAMII·HSO: Reserve Components Troop Basis of the Army, 

Annex I, AmI)' National Guard Unit Program. 30 Sep 1989, Anllex II, US Army Reserve Unit 

Allocation, 1989, pp. 29- 30. 

51 FORSCOM, "Annu"l Historical Review, I Oct 84- 30 Sep 85:' p. 141 ; PO 132- 5, 

FORSCOM, 1983, 197th Inf Bde file, PO 132--4, FORSCOM, 1983, 194th Amid Bdc file, and Ltr. 

CG, Ilcrlin Brigade to CinC, USAREUR, 4 Jan 80, sub: Concept Plan for Reorganization of the 

Berlin Brigade, AEBA-GA-M. PO 59- 6. USAREU R and Seventh Ann)" 1982. Berlin Brigade file, 

all OAMII-HSO. From 1961 to 1983 Ihe Berlin I3rigade had been orgnnized under n lable of distri· 

bution and allowance, which did not provide ndequnte resources 10 COl1lllllmd nnd conlrol its fire 

support and service support units. 

S2 1'073- 2, Fifth U.S. Ann)" 1985, 402d Brigade (Training) file; Infonnall0n Paper, 24 Ma)' 

83, sub: Training Organizlllion Structurc, FORSCOM, DCofS Operations, Force Structure and 

Stationing Divisioll, Rcserve (AFOP-FSR), Ltf, 1'0RSCOM 10 Ch, Ann)' Rescrve, 7 Nov 1986, 

sub: Reorgani7 .. 1tion of USA R Tl";linilig Division, AFOP-I'SR, Ur, TAG to CG, FORSCOM, II 

1)(:(; 86, same subject, Ch, Ann)' Reserve, Force Mobilization and Illans (DAAR-FMP). Division 

General file, DAMH-I·ISO; September 1988 reorganization of training divisions and brigades based 

on POs from First. Second, Fourth, Fifth. and Si:'lth Amlies. 1988- 1990 PO file. DAMI·I·HSO. 

53 PO 56-10, FORSCOM, 1988, 2d Bde, 9th Inf Div file, PO 78 10, FORSCOM, 1989, 2d 

Bd e, 4th fnf Di v file, Llr, NGIl to AGs, Idaho, Oregon, and Nevada, 18 Aug 88, sub: 

Rcorganizalion of Idaho. Oregon, and Nevadll ARNG Units, NGB-ARO·F, 310--4ge, No. 183- 88, 

I 16th Cav Ode fil e. UT. AG Montana, Wyoming, 25 Aug 88. sub: Rcorgnnization of Montana and 

Wyoming ARNG Units, NGB-ARO-F 3 10--49c, No. 189- 88, 163d Cnv Bde file, all DAMH-USO. 

Under the fixed cor]JS concel)! outl ined in I'M 100- 5, Operations, 1986, the AmlY maintained the I, 

III , V, and VI I Corps and Ihe XV III Airbome Corps, which required five armored cavalry regi. 

ments. The Regular Anll)' fielded three and Ihe Anny National GU:lrd four, for a tolal of seven 

armored cavalry regiments. With Ihe reduced requirement, the Guard convcl1ed two of its regiments to brigades. 

CHAPTER 15 

Conclusion 

flllla), be ,akelt (M' ({II axiolllllial the org{lIIizalioll oJ lIllil ~' comprising armies should 

be adapted /0 fhe ferraill ... 'he probable ,hcaler oj II'a/" ((lid /0 fhe c/wl"{lclerislics of Ihe 

enemies to be encoul/tered 

Maj. Nathan iel F. McClurel 

In 191 2 Maj. (Ialcr Brig. Gen.) Nat haniel F. McCl ure, a future instructor in 

military art at the Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, listed terrain, 

theater of war, and the enemy as issues that planners should consider in developing military organizations. These ideas h"d particular appl ication to di visions and 

separate combined arms brigades, and over the last eighty-odd years have been 

ex pressed in va rious ways. Yet other fa ctors have 'llso had significant impact on 

military organizations. The rapid evolution of military technology is perhaps the 

most obviolls. Ot hers include the manner in which the nation has raised its mi litary manpower- a combination of active, reserve, and expansion components; 

the aptitude of that manpower to harness the new technology; and the political 

and economic constraints that create the environmental parameters within which 

military structures must operate. This study has attempted to show the infl uence 

of these broad and interrelated factors on the changing organi zation of the Army's 

large, combined arms tactical units. 

Prior to the twentieth ccntury the Anny did not lise one specific command level 

at which to organizc infantry, artillcry, and cavalry units into combi ned arms teams. 

Brigades and divisions often comprised a single arm, while the army corps was the 

combi ned arms unit, with its size vary ing greatly according to the mission and the 

forces available. Renecting the Army of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, little speciali zation existed withi n the Army's corps, divisions, and brigades beyond 

the traditional combat arms. Fi eld units for signal, medical, transportation, military 

police, ordnance, and other supporti ng branches simply did not exist. Often civilians were hired to undertake those dUlies, sold iers were detailed from the combat 

regiments to perform them, or entire regiments were reorganized for new missions, 

such as infantry units' service as engi neers duri ng the Civil War. 

By the beginning of the twentieth century, tcchnological developments, primarily in the range and lethality of weapons, greatly expanded the size of the batI McClure, ·'The In f,1ntry Division and lis COmposilion:· p. 8 
414 MANEUVER AND FI REPOWER 

tlefield, making the coordination of fire and maneuver exceedingly complex. To 

simplify and regularize that coordination, the Army organized its fi eld units into 

permanent combined arlns teams, termed divisions, capablc of independent operations. Included in Stich organization, in increasi ngly larger numbers, were combat su pport and combat service support units that co ntributed to the combat 

power and self-sufficiency of lite division on both the battle field and the traini ng 

ground. The organization of permanent divisions, with their fixed requirements 

for personnel and equipment, training, and research and development, also greatly facilitated the expansion orthe Army upon the outbreak of war. 

From the turn of the century until American intervention in World War I, the 

Army defended the nation and its modest insular possessions with what was basica lly a constabula ry force. To some limited extent the Army tested the infantry 

division as a basic combined arms unit in field exercises or maneuvers. The cavalry div ision, although not totally neglected, remained more or less a theoretical 

orga nizatio n. In 1916 and 191 7, when the Army pursued bandits al ong the 

Mexican border, a provisional division was organized. Heavy in cavalry and light 

in infantry, it was tai lored to meet an elusive, mobile enemy. 

Mobil ization for the crisis on the border and observation of trends in foreign 

armies during the initial campaigns of World War I caused na tiona l leaders to 

become increasingly concerned about the need to create permanent tactical divisions. Congress approved their organization in 1916, but the Army en tered World 

War I before any such units had been organized, and the ensuing mobilization and 

battlefield experiences witnessed constant cha nges in both their theoretical (i.e., 

authorized) and their actual composition. 

The Army created the square infantry di vision during World War I in response 

to the German usc of entrenched positions that blocked flanking movements. The 

division was designed to punch through the enemy's position using ovenvhclming 

manpower and tremendous firepower. Strong in staying power. the di vision lacked 

the mobility and fl exibility to conduct highly mobile operations. But the nature of 

the war also pUI a premium on coordination between the combat arms and combat 

support organizations within the infantry division. Not infantry and not artillery but 

coordi nation of all Ihe branches held the key to success. Infantry could not move 

fonvard without engi neers and artillery; artillery could not provide adequate fire 

support without a constant supply of ammunition; quartermaster troops supplied 

food and clot hing; signalmen served as the link between the arms and support 

units; and medi cal personnel cared for casua lties of all types. This complex combined arms interaction, or synerb'Y, became both necessary and possible because of 

advances in weapons, communications, and transportation. 

World Wa r I posed probl ems that military plan ners wo ul d face for th e 

remainder of the cent ury. They had to ba lance military requ irements against those 

of the horne front, which provided the materie l for war. Mobilization for total war 

theoretically demanded the maximum amount of the nation's best manpower for 

ils military forces, but without the civilian manpower to provide the logistica l 
CONCLUSION 415 

base for Ihal force, it wou ld soon collapse of its own weight. A re lated question 

concerned the size and readiness of the peacetime active and reserve forces, 

which innucnced the preparation for a swift industrial and manpower mobilization without bankrupting the nation. Military planners in the United States also 

had to confront the problem in the twentieth century of how best to deploy their 

military forces abroad in the face of limited means, because the number of ships 

ava il able for what was termed "strategic mobil ity" would always constrain the 

speed wit h which the Army could bring its major combat organizations to bear on 

far-away battlefields. 

Although memories of the Army's helter-skelter mobilization during World 

War I cast a long shadow over the interwar period, 1919- 39, isolationist sentiment caused a certain mala ise in organizational development. Nevertheless, Army 

leaders recognized that infantry and cava lry divisions, rathcr than regiments or 

smaller units, had become the pillars that supported a future mobi li zat ion. 

Officers examined the structure of various types of divisions, and the Army 

adopted in the post- World War I era a modified but powerful square infantry 

div ision designed for a straight forwa rd frontal attack, and a smaller cavalry division for recon na issance. Alt hough the lessons of World War I influenced the 

structure of these divisions, the traditional nineteen th cen tury criterion of distance or road space still dominated their design. 

Once permanent divisions were establishe(~ any reorganization of them was 

controversial. Because no foreign threat or opponent could be identified, divisions were initially designed to fi ght on the North American continent, and their 

organizations stressed firepower over mobility. And once that organizational 

structure bceame embedded in both the Regular Army and the reserve components, it became exccedingly difficult to alter it in any substanti al way. Although 

many Army leaders viewed the situation with increasing misgivi ngs, major 

changes ultimately depended on changes in the political climate of the nation. 

Before any major reorganization of its divisions could be effected, the Army 

needed more specific gu idance from its political leaders rega rding futu re missions and the availabi lity of COlllmensurate resources. 

From the fall of 1937 to the summer of 1943 the Army slowly fashioned the 

divisional designs it used to fight World War II. Not only revised infantry and 

cavalry divisions, but also armored, motorized divisions and airborne divisions 

appeared. The concept of having three reg imental combat tcams within the 

infantry and ai rborne div isions a lso solidified. Other trends in c luded steady 

increases in firepowe r- with mobility or maneuvering capability, always trying 

to catch ul>-and the increasing standardization of div ision base clements. In the 

entire process, the horse cava lry and motorized divisions di ed, while the armored 

division, designed initially as a two-clement organization, was often comm itted 

on the battlefield as small task forces. 

One princ iple holds that military units shou ld be organized to counter the 

characte ristics of the enemy they ex pect to face on the battlefield, whcther 
4 16 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

German foot-soldiers or tanks, Philippine or Vict Cong guerri lla s, or an army 

equipped with chemical and nuclea r weapons. Such problems inevitably brought 

soldiers from the theoretical realm orthe schoolhouse into conflict with those living in the reality of the army in the rield. Doctrine, which dictated how units 

should be organized, fell within the domain of the service schools, while employment of the units rested wit h field commanders. To both, such seemingly esoteric 

matters as the best span of control, the number of command echelons, the composition of the siaff, the balance between infantry and artillery, the location of the 

reconnaissance clement, the role of engineers, and the organization of the supply 

system were recurring subjects of exploration and argument in designing divisions and separate brigades. No final determination emerged as to whether the 

schools or the field commands should perform organi zational studies, but one 

aspect of the Army's experience became clear. The Army cou ld not solve all its 

organizational issues in a single study. The questions were- and still arc- too 

enormous and complex for one group of plan ners to address. The reorganization 

study of 1936, PENTANA 1955, and MOMAR 1959 all failed because the issues 

they addressed were too broad and varied. After the Army came to terms with its 

div isional echelon, as in the triangu lar, ROAD flexible response, and Army of 

Excellence st udies, the remainder of the force somehow fe ll into place. 

Ultimately nothing infl uenced Army pla nners in their search for the ri gh t 

combined arms units more tha n the desire to ensure mobility and maneuverabil ity 

on the battlefield. The disappearance of operational flcx ibility on the Western 

Front in World War I convi nced many officers that the rcsulting stalemate had 

caused unacceptable losses in men and equipment for both the victors and the 

vanquished. The square division was adopted for the peacetime Army because 

Army leaders relied upon their World War I experience and believed that the unit 

could be adapted to maneuver and mobility. 

The evolution of technology eventua lly brought aboltt more mobile and flexible forces, which included various types of infantry divisions (airborne, airmobile, light, and motori zed), the replacement of obsolete horse cavalry divisions 

with armored and mechanized units, and the introduction of separate combined 

arms brigades. Infantry divisions dominated World War II , due primarily to the 

influence of such Icaders as Chief of Sta ff General George C. Marsha ll and Lt. 

Gcn. Lesley J. McNair, the chief of Army Ground Forces, who believed that it 

was vita l to standardi ze, at least for the moment, the size and structure of the 

fiel d army to assist in both manpower and materiel mobilization plann ing. 

However, in the postwar era the regular "fool" or " leg" infantry di vision was 

slowly replaced by variotls types of armored, mechanized, airborne, and airmobile 

orga ni zations developed to serve spec ial needs. Tanks stopped tanks; airborne 

troops intimidated and threw the enemy's rear area into disarray; and helicopters 

inserted and ex tracted units with precision on the battlefield. Given the specialization of div ision and brigade forces, planners had to decide how many of each 

type the Army needed and how many it could afford. Since each specialized unit 
CONCLUSION 41 7 

crea ted difTerent requi rements for equipment and training, advocates of stich 

organizations were pitted against those who favored more universal formations 

that performed a variety of missions. As always, permancn t solutions proved elusive, and planners continued to balance the number and type of divisions and separate brigades required to meet Ihreats, both real and perceived. By the 1990s the 

trend was toward two types of divisions and brigades, light and heavy. but within 

those two Iypes were variations that allowed the Army to build tailored forces for 

specific missions with armored, infantry, mechanized infantry, li ght infantry, airborne, and air assault units. 

New weapons often presen ted probl ems for planners o f divisions and 

brigades. First, they had to decide the level at which a weapon belonged- army, 

corps, division, or brigade- and where it fit within the chose n organization. 

Examples of this dil emma were the tank and machine gu n in World War I, the 

tank destroyer in World War II, the Honest John rocket in the atomic fie ld army 

and pentomi c divisions, and the TOW in the Army of Excellence. This recurring 

problem also manifested itse lf in the conni ct between centrali zation and decentralization of reso urces. Whe n introduced into a division, new weapons we re 

often put under centralized control, usually in a battalion or cOlllpany-size unit, 

and attached to the user only when needed. Since such practices violated the principle of command and control, eventually new weapons were reassigned to the 

primary user. Certain divisional items, however, were better used under centralized con trol. Aircraft, for example, which used a COlllmon airfield and required 

sophisticated maintenance, still require centralized organization. 

As wcapons evolved, dispe rsion wit hin and between units on the battlefield 

became more necessary, espec ially as more lethal weapons, incl uding those with 

nuclear warheads, became avai labl e. The probl em within the division was how to 

separate divisional e lements physica lly yet maintain effective command and contro l over them. Improved communi cation systems and the use of airplanes and 

he licopters aidcd such dispersion, but the need fo r the division to operate in a 

widely dispersed nuclear environment fortunately h<ls never arisen. 

Pcrhaps it is endemic to a democracy that in peacetime its army suffers from 

neglect. The economic and financia l wherewithal for personnel, equipment, training, research, and development are ofte n availabl e only when a th rea t to the 

nation's security is readily apparent. The Army's divisions, separate brigades, and 

other units in peacetime were seldom fully manned and trained and at times were 

on ly paper organizations. This neglect manifested the Amc ri c an people's 

ingrained disdain for standing armies, which dated from the beginning of the 

Il<ltion. After Worl d War II, although begrudging ly, the nation improved the 

Army's susta ining base, which lessened the time reqll ircd fo r mobilization. 

Neve rth eless, during the forty yea rs of the Cold War many units, parti cularly 

those ill the reserve components, were only marginally ready for combat. 

After World Wars I and II and thc Korean War, the Anny's di visional forces, as 

well as the Army itself, were devastated by a tidal wave of turbulence caused by 
418 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

dcmohiliZ<'ltion, or force reduction. Following each period the Army struggled to 

rebuild and maintain a mobilization force of standing and reserve forces before the 

next crisis struck. On each occasion military planners designed a mobilization force 

requiring morc divisions and brigades than the nation needed or was willing to SllP~ 

porI. Also, political pressure, particularly from the reserve components, often influenced the size of that force more than defense requ irements. The result was what 

many called a "hollow army," with some units deteriorating into paper organizati ons, some serving as training units, and others lacking so much of their personnel 

and equipment that they had little ability to conduct either combat or training. 

Following major con fli cts the poor manning and eq uipping levels that characterized most Army units resulted partly from a lack of resources and partly 

from unreasonable expectations. Obviollsly, funding limited the number of soldiers, bot h officers and en listed personne l, in the Regular Army and the reserve 

components. In the Organized Reserves, between 1921 and 1948 no system was 

even ava ilable to recruit untrai ned e nlisted personnel; Congress simply expected that reserve enlisted personnel would be unpaid volunteers with prior service. Few former enl isted pe rson ne l, however, volunteered to se rve in th e 

Organized Rese rve, and reserve officers came into the Army th rough the 

Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). Alt hough Congress funded officers 

and enlisted men in both reserve components after World War II , interest in 

serving as reservists lagged. Between the end of World War II and the ea rly 

1970s, when conscripti on was e liminated, the draft served as a stimulus fo r 

serving in the reserves. With the elimination of the draft, recruitment in the 

reserves suffered further, and the ir division and separate brigade forces underwent an almost conti nuous series of realignments. 

Time and agai n after the disappeara nce of any immediate threat Congress 

or thc administration cut the Army's fundi ng drastically. At times money was 

available only to provide ske lc ta l uni ts in the Regula r Army. These units 

manned ga rrisons, su pported limited reserve training, and provided the overhead to opcrate the Army. Few men were availablc fo r combat units or for occupation forces overseas. Scattercd throughout the nation on small posts or scrving overseas, the Army o ft cn had neither the moncy nor the opportunity fo r 

combined arms training. Under the "come as you arc, fight as YOll arc" philosophy adopted In thc 1970s, only the Regu lar Army divisions in Europe were 

maintaincd at ful l strength. Regular Army divisions in the Unitcd Statcs wcre 

rounded oul by reserve units, and the division in Korea relied upon KAT USA , 

or Korean Army person nel. 

During periods of scant resources for the defense establishment, the largcst 

share ofthc military budget \Ven t to the other services. Both the Navy and the Air 

Force required sophisticated, expensive equipment whose construction a lso provided civilian jobs and valuable investments in advanced technology. The Army, 

in contrast, is thc most labor-intensive of the services. To gain support from thc 

executive and legislative branches, its leaders lIsed divisional models to justify 
CONCLUSION 419 

fu nding requests for the research, development, and production of new equipment 

and weapons. Looking at the division as a weapons system rather than merely as 

a personnel organization has in fact proved lIse ful in conceptuali zing what the 

Army needs and what it does for both Congress and the genera l pUblic. 

The end of the Cold War has prompted another examination of divisions and 

brigades as the Army adapts to new threats and new national missions. Whatever 

direction the changes may take, divisions and brigades will be organized for a 

parti cular mission, against a particular enemy, at a particular time, and in a particular place. The search for better combined arms units will continue unabated as 

new lessons and ex perienccs are weighcd. and the search to integrate new technology into existing organizational concepts will likewise present an ongoing 

challenge in the immediate future. 

• 

A Look Forward 

In 1990 the U.S. Army began deploying major units to Southwest Asia as pari 

of a coa lition effort to counter the military aggression of the Iraqi armed forces. 

But even before that, maj or c hanges in the Army's organization had begun. 

Between 1989 ,md 1991 Ihe Soviet Union collapsed and with it the Communist 

Warsaw Pact all iance system that had posed a major threat to the United Slates 

and it's West European NATO all ies for nearly fifty years. In the wake of those 

momentous events, the national leadershi p began to tra nsform the Army from a 

"forward-deployed" force to a "power-projection" force based in the United 

States, with the wa r in Southwest Asi a the first test of that concept. But at the 

same time, the Army assumed a host of major humanita rian and peacekeeping 

missions that soon took it to new areas of the globe, many of which it had never 

visited previollsly in any major way. Although an objective assessment of these 

developments is premature, some brief observations about what happened during 

the years between 1990 and 1996 are appropriate. 

Even before the successful 100-hour Persian Gulf War in February 1991 , 

Army plans called for a significant reduction in the number of di visions and 

brigades. Without the threat posed by the Soviet Union, the nation no longer saw 

the need to field twenty-eigh t di visions and twenty-seven combined a rms 

brigades. Both political pundits and national leaders expected that the American 

"victory" in the Cold War would result in what was termed a "peace dividend," 

allowing the government to shift its economic priorities from military readiness 

to ot her programs, including the pressing need to reduce the an nual deficit. One 

of the first Army units to feel the axe was the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, 

Washi ngton, with one of its two remaining brigades inacti vated in September 

1990, and then the entire division the following year. Wi th what remained, the 

Army organi zed the independent 199th Infantry Brigade, but tha t unit would 

enjoy only a short existence. 

As di visions and brigades returned from Southwest Asia in the summer of 

199 1, the force underwent furthe r change. Readiness concerns had prevented the 

deployment of the National Guard round-alit brigades to the Gulfregion with the 

24t h Infantry Division and [st Cava lry Division. Consequently, to fi ll, or round 

out, these divisions, the active duty 197th Infantry Brigade from Fort Benning, 

Georgia , and I st Brigade, 2d Armored Division, at Fort Hood, Texas, had taken 

their place. Now these brigades were inactivated, with the ir personne l and equi p-
422 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

men I Llsed to organize third maneuver brigades in the 24 th Infantry and 151 

Cavalry Divisions. At the same time, the fa ilure to deploy the reserve component 

rou nd-oul units set off a debate over the utility of the twenty-year-old concept, 

which remained to be settled in 1996. 

Meanwhile, U.S. Army, Eu rope, resumed its plans to inactivate two divisions 

and two brigades and to real ign its two remaining divisions as a pari of the 

expected peace dividend. In August 1991 the 1st Infantry Division Forwa rd (a 

reinforced brigade) left the active forcc. Five months later the 8th Infantry 

Division was inactivated, followed by the 3d Armored Di vision in August 1992 

and the 3d Brigade, 2d Armo red Division (the forward~ eployed brigade in 

Garlstedt, Germa ny), in December of that year. About the same time, Ihe VII 

Corps, one of the two corps headquarters in Europe, also was inactivated, with its 

armored cavalry regiment, the 2d Armored Cavalry, returning to the Un ited 

States. The reduction left only the V Corps headquarters in Europe, along with 

the 1st Armored Division, the 3d Infantry Di vision, and one armored cavalry regiment, the 11 th Armored Cavalry. 

Forces in the United States also took their sha re of cuts ill 1992. The 2d 

Armored Division, the only armored division continuollsly active si nce the organization of the Armored Force in 1940, was slated for inactivation but, to keep it 

on the active rol ls, it replaced the 5th Infantry Division, which was scheduled to 

move from Fort Polk, Louisiana, to Fort Hood, Texas. In the summer or 1992 the 

199th Infantry Brigade was inactivated when the 2d Armored Cavalry moved to 

Fort Lewis, Washington. In addition, forces in Korea felt the reduction kni re, with 

the 2d Infantry Division fo rced to inactivate one of its brigades. Less tha n two 

years after fight ing in Southwest Asia, the Regular Army had thus lost four divisions, one div isional brigade, and two separate brigades. 

The precipitolls decl ine in the number of Regu1<lr Army divisions and 

brigades continued after 1992, with Congress tentatively setting the strength of 

the active Army at 495,000 by end of 1996. In 1994 the 6th and 7t h Infantry 

Divisions were inactivated, with one brigade of each div ision remaining active at 

Fort Richardson, Alaska, and Fort Lewis, Wash ington, respectively. In Germany 

the 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, was e liminated, and the 3d Brigade, 1st 

Armored Division, the only di visio nal unit to redeploy wit h its personnel and 

equipment, moved from Germany to Fort Lewis, Washi ngton. These Cllts reduced 

the Army 's forwar ~de ploye d European maneuver force to the 1 st Armored 

Division and the 3d Infantry Division, both with only two brigades each, and the 

11 th Armored Cavalry. 

To meet the projected end strength of 495,000, political as well as economic 

factors had to be considered, and a series of flag and designation cha nges began 

in 1995. Th ree factors drove the decision of which flags would continue to fly: 

the desire to retain historic div isions in the active force; the decision to field all 

div isions with a full complement of maneuver brigades; and the advantages of 

maintaining a regional distribution of divisional troops in the United Slates. In 
A LOOK FORWARD 423 

April 1995 the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Di vision, replaced the 3d Brigade, 1st 

Armored Di vision, at Fort Lewis, Wash ington, with the latter's flag movi ng to 

Fort Ril ey, Kansas. Also, the flag of the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, 

moved to Fort Lewis from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to dislodge th e 1st 

Brigade, 7th Infantry. which was inactivated. In November 1995 the 1st Brigade, 

6th Infantry Division, in Alaska was associated with the 10th Mountain Division 

at Fo rt Drum, New York, but without a change in the brigade's designation. The 

following month the 4th Infantry Division (less ils 3d Brigade, which remained at 

Fort Carson, Colorado) relocated to Fort I-Iood, Texas, where it replaced the 2d 

Armored Division, which was c liminated from the active force. 

A signifi cant change took place in Jan uary 1996, when the 1st Infantry 

Division (Icss its 3d Brigadc) transferred its nags and colors from Fort Ril ey, 

Kansas, to Germany, where it succceded the 3d Infantr y Division; concurren tly 

the 3d Infantr y Division shifted its division and brigade nags and colors to Forts 

Stewa rt and Benning, Georgia, to replace the 24th Infantry Division, which was 

inactivated. In order to have three maneuver bri gades in the I st Infantry Division, 

its 3d Brigade, inactivated in 1991 , returned to the active rol ls. Upon completion 

of the programmed changes the Regular Arrny force had been pared down to 10 

div isions- I airborne, 1 air assault, 2 light, and 6 heavy di visions. Only the 1st 

Cava lry Division at Fort Hood, Texas; thc 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, 

North Ca rolina ; and th e 10lst Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 

were concentrated; all of the others were split bctwcen two or more installations. 

The independent brigades in the active Army sutTered more severe red uctions. When the 199th Infantry Brigade was inactivated in 1992, only the Berlin 

Brigade, the 193d Infantry Brigade, and the 1771h and 194th Armored Brigades 

remained in the forc e. For almost fifty years the Army had units stationed in 

Bertin, but with the end of the Cold War and the return of the city of Berlin 10 the 

German government, the Berlin Brigade fell from the force in the summer of 

1994. Nex i to go was the 193d Infantry Brigade, stationed in the Panama Canal 

Zone. In anticipation of the Panamanian government's taking over complete control of the Cana l Zone in 1999, the 193d Infantry Brigade was inactivated in 

1994. That same year the 11th Armored Cava lry, which could not be supported 

withi n U.S. Army, Europe, troop strength, returned to the Un ited States. To reta in 

it in the force, the chief of staff approved replacing the l77t h Armored Brigade at 

the Natio nal Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, wit h the armored caval ry 

regiment in October 1994. Red uctions also required the inactiva tion of the 194th 

Armored Brigade at Fort Knox, Kentucky, in 1995, leaving th e Regul ar Army 

without any separate combined arms brigades. 

The reserve components also underwcnt turmoi l caused by fo rce reduction. In 

1993 the Natio nal Gu a rd lost two divisio ns, th e 26th Infantry and the 50t h 

Armored. Both had been ex periencing rccruitment problems over the past twentyfive years. At the same time, to maintain heavy forces in the Nationa l Guard, the 

28th and 42d Infantry Divisions were reorganized as heavy divisions. The 42d, now 
424 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

an armored division, reta ined its traditional designation for historical and esprit de 

corps reasons. To strengthen the 28th Infantry Division, the 37th Infantry Brigade, 

Ohio National Guard, was reorgan ized as a brigade of that division, but a year laler 

the brigade was transferred to the 38th Infantry Division. To make room for the unit 

in the 38th, the 76th Brigade, 38th Infantry Division, Indiana National Guard, was 

withdrawn from the di vision and reorganized as the 76th Infantry Brigade. The net 

result of these changes was that the National Guard fielded 8 divisions- I light, 2 

infantry, 2 armored, and 3 mechanized infantry div isions. At the same time, the 

Guard continued to field 20 separate combined arms brigades. Although these units 

provided the Army with the flexibili ty to ta ilor forces upon mobilization, planned 

reductions would leave only 14 enhanced and 2 theater defense brigades in the 

force by 1997 (with an armored cavalry regiment often counted as the National 

Guard's fifteenth "enhanced brigade"). 

Following the "Bottom-Up" review, an assessment of all military requirements 

by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in 1993, the Army Reserve agreed to give up its 

combat arms units and foclls on maintaining combat support and combat service 

su pport fo rmations. Conscq uently, the Army inactivated the 157th, 187th , and 

205th Infantry Brigades in 1994. To improve the readiness of the rema ini ng reserve 

units prior to mobilization, the U.S. Army Forces Command developed the "exercise division," an organization designed to both conduct and assist the trai ning of 

Army Reserve combat support and combat service support un its. Through the use 

of simulations and simul ators, the new organization also provided exerciscs to 

improve unit proficiency and cOl11mand and staff tra in ing. In 1993 the 78th, 85th, 

and 91 st Divisions (Tra ining) were reorganized as exercise divisions. At the same 

time the 75th and 87th Maneuver Area Commands were discontinucd and the 75 th 

and 87th Infantry Divisions reactivated as the 75th and 87th Divisions (Exercise). 

In 1996 the fu nctions of training divisions were expanded to include institutional as 

well as basic and advanced traini ng under the Total Army Traini ng Strategy. 

Although the functions of the training div isions were expanded, two unneeded 

training brigades and two surplus training divisions were eliminated, leavi ng the 

Army Reserve with the 80th, 84th, 95th, 98th, 100th, 104th, and 108th Divisions 

(Training). By the l11id-1990s the Army Reserve had no combined arms units, but 

fielded five exercise and seven tra ining divisions. In su m, as the Army moved 

toward the end of the century, the total force had been pared down to e ightcen 

combat divisions (ten Regular Army and eigh t National Guard), with plans to 

reduce the number of National Guard independen t combined arms brigades from 

twenty to six teen. As noted above, the Army Reserve had five exercise and seven 

training divisions. 

Although the number of divisions and separate brigades decreased rapidly in 

the 1 990s, the story of the post- Cold War era encompassed more than just tHunbel'S of units. The divisions and separate brigades that remained in the force continued to be constructed from building blocks, a pract ice that provided the flexibility to tailor units for specific missions and for different regions of the world. 
A LOOK FORWARD 425 

Such methods a lso made it easier to introduce new technol ogies and new capabilities into the ex isti ng force organi zation. 

Under the Force XXI prog ram, the Army's current effort to guide the modern -

ization of the Army into the early twenty-fi rsl century, Army leaders wanted even 

more fl exible divisions rather than more specialized but ri gid ones. In June 1996 

General Wi ll iam W. Hartzog, the commander of the U.S. Trai ning and Doctrine 

Cornm n(~ noted that the Army no longer could send only its light units, such as the 

10th Mountain Division and the 82d Airborne Division, to every unconventional or 

low-intensity operation. Elements of th e 82d Airborne Division had served in 

Panama (Operation J UST CAUSE) in [989, in Sou th west Asia (D ESERT 

SI I1 EW/STORM) in 1990 and 199 1, and in south Florida aftcr Hurri cnnc Andrcw in 

1992. Elemcnts of the 10th MOllntain Division had also served in south Floridn in 

1992 nnd deployed to Somalia (Operation RESTORE HOPE) in 1992 and 1993 and to 

Hniti (Operation UNIOlD DEMOCRACY) in 1994. Hence forth, like the 1st Armorcd 

Div ision in Bosnia (Operalion JOINT ENDEAVOR) in 1995 and 1996, all divisions in 

thc force had to be prepnred to undertake humanitnrian and peacekeeping missions. 

To meet the need for fut ure contingencies and stil l provide forc es for conventional operations, the Training and Doctrine Command began taki ng a new look 

at the Army's heavy division. Previously it had sel the maneuver elemcnt mix fo r 

an armo red division at fi ve tank and fo ur mechanized infantry batta lions while 

reversing those numbers in the meclla nized infantry division. Proposals in 1996 

envisioned e liminating about 3,000 soldie rs from organi zationnl tables of the 

heavy division wh ile increasing the maneuver e lement mix to five tank and fi ve 

mechanized infantry battalions. The proj ected change would add abou t 300 dismounted infant rymen to each mecha nizcd infantry unit, eliminate the an titank 

company of each infantry battalion, and move suppo rt functions from eac h 

infantry battalion to the division support battalions. The engineer brigade with 

three engineer batta lions, whi ch was tcsted in Southwest Asia and added to di visions shortly therea ft er, was to lose one battalion, and one of the heavy division 's 

two attack aviation batta lions would also disappear. In the latter case, planners 

expected that new " Long Bow" Apache and Comanche helicopters would provide 

greater combat power to makc up for the loss. Also, a newly improved, self-propelled ISS-mill. howit zer, the Paladin, was to be fi e lded in three battcries of six 

weapons each, repl ac ing the existing batta lions, whi ch had three batteries of eight 

pieces eac h of older weapons. The divisiona l target acquisition and multipl elaunch rocket batteries were prog rammed to bc combined in a single artill ery batta lion, giving the division greater fl exibil ity in engaging closc- up and distant targets. In addition, the manCllver brigades in the division were given increased 

scouting capability in the fO l"m of a reconnaissance troop. Fi nally, the key to this 

smaller but more deadl y division was to be a digital communi cati on system, or 

what was referred to as digitalization. Using new informatio n technology, Army 

leaders wanted to provide engaged commanders with immediate data rcgarding 

avai la ble resources and the encmy they fa ce(~ enabling them to bring a wide va ri-
426 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

ely of forces to bear on the foe as quickly as possible and to sustain them until 

final victory. A test oCthe new division was sched ul ed for 1997. 

Six years aftcr the war in Southwest Asia, many questions regarding the 

Army's future fo rce structure remain. The failure to implement the round-out 

concept during that connie! is only the first of many. I-I ow well did the Army's 

divisions and separate brigades perform in Southwest Asia against a confused and 

greatly weakened adversary? Has the Army cut 100 many div isions from the force 

100 qui ckly; will it attain the right balance of divisions in the active and reserve 

forces; and how radically can the heavy and light div isions be redesigned 10 meet 

conti ngencies of the future within budgetary constraints that appear ever changing? How seriously has the elimination of the separate combined arlllS brigades 

hindered flexibil ity in designing the active fo rce? A more basic question was also 

left unanswered. Is the division the best vehicle to organize the combat arms for 

the future or should it be the brigade, as some have argued? If history has shown 

us anything, it is that the future is always unpredictable and that the basic ingredient of success will contin ue to be a mind-set that a llows the greatest speed and 

flexibility in adopting new technologies, new missions, and new constrai nts to the 

Army's ever-changing organizations for combat. 
Bibliographical Note 

When George Washington organized the first American army in 1775, Ihe 

orga ni zation of divisions and brigades almost immediately became a subject for 

discussion, but no comprehensive study has ever been pu blished about thei r 

evol ution in the United States military. This st udy, prepared from a wide ra nge 

of sources, was intended to fi ll that gap. Ma ny of the so urces consulted arc pari 

of the archiva l holdings of the National Archives and Records Administration 

(NARA), Washington , D.C. Alt hough many record groups in the Na tional 

Archives were searched, the following groups were particularly usefu l: 165 , 

records of the Wa r Department and specia l sta tTs; 168, records of the Nationa l 

Guard Bureau; 177, records of the Chief of Arms; 94 and 407, records of the 

Adjutant Ge nera l; 393 and 394, records of the U.S. Army Con tinental 

Commands; and 337, records of Headquart ers, Army Ground Forces. At the 

Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania , the records 

of the Army War College, 1920- 40, were a rich source of information. Also 

va luable were the holdings in th e Manusc ript Division of the Library of 

Congress, Washington, D.C., which house the papers of Leonard Wood, Joh n J. 

Pershi ng, John McA uley Palmer, George Van Horn Mose ley, John L. Hinds, 

Charles L. Scott, and others. The George C. Marshall Foundation, Lexi ngton, 

Virginia; the Command and General Staff College Library, Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas; the Infantry Center and School Library, Fort Benni ng, Georgia; the 

Institute of Heraldry Li brary, Fort Belvoir, Virgini a; and the Patton Museum, 

Fort Knox, Kentllcky, all we re helpfu l in locating and providing documen ts. 

Since World War II, the weekly newspa per A,.my Times has becn a source of 

informa tion about the Army, and routi nely information abou t di visions and 

brigades has been culled from it by members of the Center of Mi litary History. 

The official publications of the War Department and the Department of the 

Army were essential to the study. They incl uded the periodic General Regulations 

of the United SIMes Army; Field Service Regulations, Ulliled Slales Army; and 

Official Army Registers; and War Department and Department of the Army regulations, general orders, circulars, bull etins, and fi eld manuals. Anot her coll ection 

of offi cia l material that proved to be invaluable in preparing the work was the 

published Annual Reports of the War Department. Within those reports, the most 

frequently cited were the Report C?l the Secret(ll}1 of '11"11: Report of lite Major 
428 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Geneml COli/mol/ding file Arlll)" Repal'l of 'he Chief of Slaff, Report of ,lie 

Adjll/Ollf Generaf, and Report of rhe Chief of 'he Militia Bureall, later the Repor' 

of 'he Chief of the Na/iollal Guard B/lreoll. Between 1920 and 1941 the reports 

were basical ly limited to those of the Secretary of War, the Chief of Siaff, and 

Chief of the National Guard Bureau (the last sti ll being published annually). 

Between 1948 and 1968 the reports pertaining to activities of the Department of 

the Army were published in the Department of Defellse Reports. After 1968 the 

Depar(mel1l oflhe Anll)' His/aricol SlImmaries carried on the tradition of the official Neparls of rhe J.1Ic",r Deparlmelll. Since 1939 reports of the Chief of Staff of 

the Army have been published intermittently under variolls titles. All of the official publications listed in the notes arc in the library of the U.S. Army Center of 

Mil itary History (DAMH), Washington, D.C. , and when cited in th e notes no 

location was given. 

The third category of documents that proved particularly significant was the 

unpublished ann ual summari es or reviews that the major commands have prepared since World War II. They included documents prepared by the Office, 

Chi e f of Army Field Forces (OCAFF), U.S. Continental Army Comma nd 

(CONARC), U.S. Army Comba t Developments Command (CDC), U.S. Army 

Forces Command (FORSCOM), U.S. Army Trai ning and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC), U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), 

and others, which arc a part of the holdings of the Historica l Records Branch, 

U.S. Army Center of Military History, cited as DAMH-HSR. 

Although many types of documents have been consulted, tables of organization and equipment (TOE) published in the twentiet h cenl'Ury served as the 

skeleton for the study. The Army first published TOEs in 1914 as an aid to 

mobilization planning, and many are required to describe a div ision or separate 

combined arms brigade. To list all used in preparing this study is prohibitive, 

but those cited in the notes are avai lable in the Organizational History Branch 

of the Center, cited as DAMH-HSO. Along with the TOEs, the su bj ect fil es in 

the Organizationa l History Branch pertaining to such topics as the National 

Guard, Army Reserve, mobilizations, and other areas involv ing units; the adjutant general reference files and the unit historical data cards, both of which 

contain data about the changes in status of units, were indispensable. The last 

group or files in the Organizational History Braneh without which the st udy 

could not have been prepared was the unit files. They a lso contain letters of 

instructions for changes in status of units, general orders from the commands 

implementing those instructions, studies prepared by statT officers concerni ng 

the organizations, newspaper articles about the units, and sundry miscellaneous 

papers about them. 

The se lective bibliography that follows has been divided into books,journals, 

and unpublished manllscripts. 
BIBLIOGRAPH ICAL NOTE 429 

Books 

Acheson, Dean. Pn;!senl af ,lte Crealioll: My Yem:s ill the Stale Department. New 

York: W. W. Norton and Co., \969. 

Adler, Julius O. His/ol)' oj ,he Sevellly-Sellellfh Divisioll. New York: Wynokoop 

Hallenbeck Crawford Co., 1919. 

Alger, Russe ll A. The Spanish-America/l »h,.. New York: Harper and Co., 1901. 

Allen, Henry T. The Rhineland Occupalioll. Indianapolis: Robbs-Merri ll Co., 

1927. 

Americall Archives: A Col/ection of Alit hell lie Records, Slate Papers, alld Lelfers 

alld Olher Notices of Public Affairs. 9 vats. Scr. 4. Washington, D,C.: M. $1. 

Cla ir and Peter Force, 1839- 53. 

Alllericoll Slale Papers. Mili/(II), Affairs. 7 vols. Washington, D,C.: Gales and 

Seaton, 1834. 

Appleman, Roy E. SOlit" to the Nak/ollg. North /0 tite Yalu. United States Army in 

the Korean War. Washi ngton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961. 

Balck, Will iam. Taktik (Tactics), vol. 3, Kriegsgliedenll1g, Nacitrichten, Bejehle, 

Marschdiellst (Mili/lII)' Organization. Commlfllica/iolls, Orders, Marches). 

4th cd. Berli n: R. Eiscnschmidt, 1907. 

Barnett, Corrclli. Bri/ain and Her Army 1509- 1970. Warmondsworth, England: 

Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 1974. 

Bcnwell, Harry A. HistOJ)' of the Yankee DivisioJl. Boston: Cornhill Co., 1919. 

Birk himer, Will iam E. His/orical Skefch of the Organization, Admillistration, 

Maleriel, alld 7(lctics of the ArlillelJI, United Slates Army. Washington, D.C.: 

James J. Chapman, 1884. 

Blumcnson, Martin. Salemo 10 Cassino. United States Army in World War II. 

Washington, D.C.: Governmen t Printing Offiec, 1969. 

Bowman, Step he n L. , John M. Kenda ll , and James L. Saunders. Motorized 

E.\periellce of/he 9th IlIjallflJI Division. Fort Lewis, Wash.: N.p., 1989. 

Brown, Sevellon. The StOlJI of Ordnance ill the World W(II· . Washington, D.C.: 

James William Bryan Press, 1920. 

Butterfield, Jul ia Lorri lard, cd. A Biographical Memorial of General Dalliel 

Blltlerfield. New York: Grafton Press, 1904. 

Ca llan, John F., comp. The Milil(ll), Laws oftlte Ullited States. Philade lphia: G. 

W. Childs, 1863. 

Chambers, John Whiteclay II. To Raise an Army: Tlte Draft Comes to Model'll 

America. New York: Free Press, 1987. 

Cheng, Christopher C.S. Air Mobility: The Developmelll of a Doc/rille. Westport, 

Conn.: Pmeger, 1994. 

Chin, George M. The Machine GIIII . 3 vols. Washington, D.C.: Gove rnment 

Printing Office, 195 1. 

Clendenen, Cla rence C. Blood 011 tlte Border: The Ullited Slates Army and the 

Mexican Irregulars. London: Macmi lla n and Co., \969. 
430 MANEUVER AND FIR EPOWER 

Clinger, Fred, Arthu r Johnson, and Vincent MaseL The His/ol)' oflhe 71st 

Infilll"Y Divisioll, Augsburg, Germany: E. Kieser KG, 1946. 

Coakl ey. Robert w., and Richard M. Leig hton. Global Logislics lIlId Srrflfegy: 

1943- /945. United States Army in World War II. Was hi ngton, D.C.: 

Government Printing Offi ce, 1968. 

Coffman, Edward N. rhe Hi/I of 'he SlVord. The Career of Peyloll C. March . 

Madison: University of Wise OilS in Press, 1966. 

---. The 1#11'10 ElldAII ~11lrs. New York: Ox ford University Press, 1966. 

Coleman, J. O. Pleikll: The DawlI of Helicopter Wm/are ill Vietnam . New York: 

$1. Martin's Press, 1988. 

Conn, Stetson, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchi ld. Gllart/illg rile Ullired 

Slates (lnd IfS OIlIPO.l'ls. United States Army in World Wa r II. Washington, 

D.C.: Government Prin ting Office, 1964. 

COl'l'espolldellce Relaring 10 Ihe Wal" lI'ilh Spain. 2 vo ls. Washington, D.C: 

Government Pri nting Offi ce , 1902. Reprinted. Was hington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1993. 

Cosmas, Graham A. All Al"lIIy fOI" Elllpire, The Vlliled Slates ill Ihe Spalli.l"h~ 

Americall 1#1r. Col umbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971. 

Cronin, Franc is D. Ullder the SOli/item Cross, Tlte Saga o/lheAmerical Division. 

Washington, D.C: Combat Forces Press, 1951 . 

Cross1alH~ Richard 8., and James T Currie. 7ivice tlte Cifize1l: A HistOJY of the 

Vllited SUlles Ar/lly Reserve, 1908- 1983. Washington, D.C.: Office of the 

Chief, Army Reserve, 1984. 

Department of the Army Chief of Information, Why Merge. N. p., March 1965. 

Da strup, Boyd L. Killg of Baffle: A Bmlle" NiSfOI}1 of the U.S. A/'II/yj' Field 

Al'fiffelJI. Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992. 

Delaney, Jo hn P. The BIlle Devils ill I(aly: A HislOJY o/the 881h IlIjilllllJl Division 

ill World mil· II. Washington, D.C: Infantry Journal Press, 1947. 

Devlin, Gerard M. Pomlmopers: The Saga of Parachllte alld Glider Combal 

Troop, 1914 fO 1945. New York: SI. Martin 's Press, 1986. 

Diamond, Maynard L., Willard E. Simms, Edward B. Bald inger, and Meyer 

Siegelbaum. The 8911, III/OIIII Jl Division, 1942- 1945. Washi ngton, D.C.: 

Infantry Journal Press, 1946. 

Dicki nson, John. The Bllildillg 0/ {/II AI'lIIy. New York: Century Co., 1922. 

DoJcater, Max W. 3d IlIfilllllY Divisioll ill Korea. Tokyo: Toppan Printing Co., 1953. 

Doughty, Robert A. The Evaillalioll of Ihe us Arllly Ttlctical Doctrille. 1946- 76. 

Leavenworth Papers. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 

1979. 

Duane, William. A liand Bookfor InfilllIIY. Philadelphia: Wi lliam Duane, 18 14. 

Dye r, Frederick H. A CompendiulJI of Ihe War o/Ihe Rebellion. Des Moines, 

Iowa: Dyer Publ ishing Company, 1908. 

88,h Divisiol/ ill fhe World War of 1914- 1918. Tlte. New York: Wynkoo p 

Hallenbeck Crawford Co., 1919. 
BIBLIOGRA PHICAL NOTE 431 

Eisenhower, John D. So Far From God: The Us. Hf,,. Wi,h Mexico 1846-1848. 

New York: Random HOllse, 1989. 

Ellio tt, Charl es W. Winfi eld SCOII: The Soldier (jlld fh e M(lll. New Yo rk : 

Macmillan Co., 1937. 

Fe hrcnback, T. R. This Killd of War: A Study ill Unpreparedness. New York: 

Macmil lan Co., 1963. 

Finnegan, John P. Agaillsl the Specler of (I Dragon . Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 

Press, 1974. 

Flanaga n, Edward M. The AI/gels: A HisfOlY of 'he Illh Airborne Divisioll 

1943- /946. Washington, D.C.: Inrantry Journal Press, 1948. 

For ~ Worthington c., cd. JOl/rnals of 'he COlllinellwl COl/gress, 1774- / 789. 34 

vols. Washi ngton, D.C.: Government Printi ng Offi ce, 1904-37. 

Full er, J. F. C. British U ght Ill/a l/ Iry ill 'he Eigllleellfh ee" flIlY. Londo n: 

Hutchinson, [925. 

Fu lto n, Willi am F. Rive rill e Opemtiolls. /966- /969. Wa shi ngton, D.C. : 

Government Pri nting Offi ce, [973. 

Gabel, Christopher R. The U. S. Army GHQ Mal/el/vers of 1941 . Washi ngton, 

D.C.: Government Printi ng Offi ce, [992. 

Gavin, James M. 011 to Berlill: Bailie of (III Ail'bome COlIIlI/fII/{le/; 1943- /946. 

New York: Vik ing Press, [978. 

Genesis of the Americ(l1/ First Army. Washington, D.C.: Gove rnment Printin g 

Offi ce, [938. 

Gi llett, Ma ry C. TheA/my Medical Deparlment. 1818- 1865. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1987. 

Gillie , Mi[dred Hanson. FOI g illg the Thullderbolt. Harrisburg, Pa.: Military 

Service Publishing Co., [947. 

Greenfi eld, Kent Roberts, Robert R. Palmer, and Be llI. Wiley. The Orgallizalioll 

oJGround Combat Troops. United States Army in World War II. Washington, 

D.C.: Government Pri nting Office, 1949. 

Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., [nc., 1952. 

Gunshurg, JefTery A. Divided alld Conquered: The Frellch High COlI/lJI(llId (llId 

'he Defeat of lhe West. 1940. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979. 

Hagood, Jo hn. The Ser vices of Supply. A Memoir oj Ihe Greal War. Bosto n: 

Houghton Mimin Co., 1927. 

Harbord, James G. The Americall Army ill Frallce. 191 7- / 9/8. Boston: Litlle, 

Brown and Co., 1936. 

/-Im1JerS Pictorial History of Ihe litll' Willi Spaill. New Yo rk: Harper and Co., 

1899. 

Ha y, Jo hn H., Jr. T(l c tical alld Malel'iellllllovlItio lls. Wa s hing to n, D.C.: 

Government Printing Offi ce, 1974. 

['Ie itman, Francis B. His/orical Regisler (llId Dicliol/my of the Vlliled S/{/Ies A rilly 

From lIs Olgallizalioll . September 1779 to Marcil 2. 1903, Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing OlTi ce, 1903. 
432 MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Hermes, Walter G. Tl'lfce Tellt al/d Fighlillg Frollt. Uni ted States Army in the 

Korean War. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966. 

Hewes, James E. , Jr. From Rool to McNamara: Army Organizatioll lIlId 

Administration, /900- /963. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 

1975. 

Historical (llId Pic/orial Review Second Cava/J)' D;II;.\';OIl , Unired Slates Army. 

Bman Rouge, La.: Army Navy Publishing Co., 194 1. 

l-listOlY lIlId Traditiol/s of fhe COIJ'S of Engineers. ForI Belvoir, Va .: Engineer 

School, 1953. 

I-I olley. I. B. Gel/eral Joh" M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, alit! 'he Army of (f 

Democmey. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. 

HowanL Michael. m". ill Elll'Opeall His/ol)'. Ox rord: Ox rord University Press, 

1976. 

Howze, Hami lton H. A Cava rymall:~ StOlY. Washi ngton, D.C.: Smithsoni an 

Instilution Press, 1996. 

Huidckoper, Frederic L. Militmy Ullpreparedlless oJthe Ultited Stares. NcwVork: 

Macmi llan, 19 15. 

---. The HistDlY oJthe 33d Divisioll, A.E.F. 4 vols. Springficld: Illinois State 

Historica l Library, 1921. 

Hunt , Irwin L. American Military Government 0/ Occupied GermallY. 

1918- 1919. Washi ngton, D.C.: Government Printi ng Office, 1943. 

Huston, James A. Sillews oJlVar: Army Logistics. Washington, D.C.: Government 

Printing Office, 1966. 

HUlnik, Joscph 1, and Leona rd Kobriek, cds. We Ripel/ed Fast. The UI/official 

/-/;StOl), oj the Sevellfy·SLrth II/fillltl)' Divisioll. Frankfurt, Germany: 0 110 

Lcmbeck, 1946. 

Jami eson, Perry D. Crossing the Deadly Ground: UI/ited States Army Tactics. 

1865- 1899. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1994. 

Johnson, Lyndon Baines. The V(fI/fage Poil/t. Ncw York: Holt, Ri neha rd, and 

Winston, 197 1. 

Kirkpatrick, Charles E. All UI/klloll''' Fulure alld a Doubt/ul Present: Writing the 

Victory Plan of 1941. Washington, D.C.: Govcrnment Printing Office, 199 1. 

Knox, Henry. A Plolt for lite Gel/emf A/'I'(II/gemell/ of lite Milifia oj /he Ulli/ed 

States. Politica l Pamphlets, No. 95, 1786. 

Kreidberg, Marvin A., and Merton G. Henry. His/OI)1 ofMilittll J' Mobilizatioll ill 

the United Stales Army. 1775- 1945. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

Office. 1955. 

La ird, Melvin R. National Secllrity Strategy of Realistic Deterrellce: Anlll/al 

Defom'e Departmen/ Report. Fi!J'c(tI Year 1973. 

Lee, Ulysses. The Emplo)'mellt of Negro Troops. United Sl ates Army in World 

War ,I. Washi ngton, D.C.: Government Printi ng Office, 1966. 

Lesser, Charl es H. The Sinews {if II/dependence: MOl/tMy Stmngth Report oj the 

COllfinellta{ A I'I11Y. Ch icago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. 
BIBLIOGRAPH ICAL NOTE 433 

Liddell l-l art, Basil Henry. Colonel Lawrence. New York: Halcyon I-Iollse, 1937. 

Liggett, Hunter. AEF; Tell Years Ago ill Fl'(llIce. New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 

1928. 

Lightning: The /-lisrol)' o/Ihe 78111 II/fill/oJ' Divisioll. Washington, D.C.: Infantry 

Journal Press, \947. 

Little, John G., Jr. The Official /-liSfOl)' of Ihe EigIJly-Si;al! Divisioll. Chicago: 

State Publi cation Society, 192 1. 

Lossing, Benson J. Tile Pictorial Field-Book v/the mil' of 18 12, New York: 

Harper and Brothers, 1869. 

McClellan, George B. cC/ellan ~' OUI/I SrOlY: The mil' of 'he Unioll, New York: 

Charles L. Webster and Co., 1887. 

MacGregor, Morris J. t Jr. IlIl egm/io/l of tlte Armed Forces /940- /965. 

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981 . 

McKenney, Janice E. Air De/elise ArlillelY. Army Lineage Series. Washington, 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985. 

Mahon, John K., and Romana Danysh. III/alll1Y Part I: Regular Army. Army 

Lineage Series. Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1972. 

Mansfi e ld, Edward D. The Mexicall Mil': A His/my 0/ Its Origill. New York: A. S. 

Barnes and Co., 1850. 

March, Peyton C The Nalioll at /#11'. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Dorn, and 

Co., Inc., 1922. 

Matioff, Mauri ce. "The 90-Di vision Gam ble." In COll/Illalld Decisiolls. 

Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1960. 

---, cd. American MililC/ly History. Washington, D.C: Government Printing 

Office, 1969. 

Mexicall Wi'll' Correspolldellce. Washington, D.C: Wendell and van Bentllllyscn 

Printer, 1848. 

Meyel; Edward C. Gel/em/, Ullired Slates Army. Chief 0/ Staff. Jlllle 1979- Julle 

1983. N.p., 1983. 

Midgley, Jo hn J. Deadly IIIIISiolls: Army Policy jor the Nllclear Ballle/ieid. 

Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986. 

Mi llett, Allan R. Semper Fidelis: The HislOlY o/the Uniled Slates Marille Corps. 

New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1980. 

Missioll Accomplished: Third Ullited States Army OCCllpMioli o/Gel"llwny. 9 May 

1945- 15 Febmary 1947. N. p., 1947. 

Moen k, Jean. A Histmy 0/ Lwge-Scale Army Malleuvers ill Ihe Ullited Slates. 

1935- 64. ForI Monroe, Va.: U.S. Continental Army Command, 1969. 

Morton, Louis. The Fall a/the Philippilles. United States Army in World War II. 

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953 . 

Mossman, Billy C Ebb (llId Flow November /950-Jllly 1951. United States Army 

in the Korean War. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990. 

Mrazek, James E. The Glider HitI'. London: Robert Hal e and Co., 1975. 

Na isawa ld, L. van Loan. The US III/aIlIIY Di vision: Cha llging COl/cept:>; ill 
434 MANEUVER AND FI REPOWER 

Organizatiol/, 1900- 39, Project Shop, ORO-S 23. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 

University, 1952. 

Nally, Bernard c., and Morris J. MacGregor. Blacks ill the Mili/{//JI: Essential 

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BIBLIOGRAPH ICAL NOTE 443 

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Abrams, Creighton w., Jr. "The Sixteen Di vision Force: Anatomy of a Dec ision." 

Thesis, Command and General StafTCollege, 1975. 

Army Ground Forces Study No. 17, " I-lislory of Third Army."Historical Secti on, 

Army GrOllnd Forces, 1946. 

Army Ground Forces Study No. 23, "Tra ining in Mountain and Winter Warfare." 

Historica l Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946. 

Army Ground Forces Study No. 25, "The Ai rborne Command and Cent er." 

Historica l Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946. 

Army Ground Forces Study No. 27, " History of the Armored Force, Command, 

and Center." Histori cal Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946. 

Army Ground Forces Study No. 28, " History of th e Tenth Light Di vision." 

Histori cal Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946. 

Bongiove, Joseph R. " I Corps: Light Infantry Division." Ms, R. 

Boni n, John A. "Combat Copter Cavalry: A Study in Conceptua l Confusion and 

er~Se cc Misunderstand ing in the Exploitation of Armed He licopters as 

Cava lry in the U.S. Army, 1950- 1965." Master thesis, Duke University, 1982. 

Cameron, Robert Stewart. "American izi ng the Tan k: U.S. Army Admi nistration 

and Mechani zed Development within the Army, 191 7- 1943." Ph.D. sserta ~ 

tion, Templ e University, 1994. 

Cary, Norman Mill er. "The Use of Motor Vehi cles in the United States Army, 

1899- 1939." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia, 1980. 

Chaffee, Adna R. "Mechanized Cavalry." Lecture, Army War College (AWq , 29 

September 1939. Military History Institute. 

Clcaver, Charles G. "History of the Korean War." Ms, R. 

Coa kl ey, Robe rt W , Ka rl E. Cocke, a nd Dan ie l P. Griffin . " Demobili zation 

Following the Korean War." Ms, R. 

Coaklcy, Robert W , Walter G. Hcnnes, James F. Schnabel, and Earl F. Zicmkc. 

"U.S. Army Expa nsion and Readiness, 196 1- 1962." Ms, MH I-I . 

Cocke, Karl . "The Reserve Componcnt." Ms, AM . 

Finncgan, John P. "Military Intelligence." Ms, MI-I SO. 

Fl etcher, Robe rt H., Jr. "The 35th Di vision in th e First Phase of the Meuse 

Argonnc Operation, September 26- 0 ctober, 191 8." Ms, I-I I-I 0. 

Gall e, Joe F. "A History of the 11th Infantry Bri gade, I July 1966- 1 May 1970." 

Ms, DAMH-HSO. 

Grow, Robert W. "Thc Ten Lcan Years." Ms, DAMI-I-l-ISR. 

Ha rrison, Donald F. "A History of Army Aviation." Ms, DAMH-l-ISR. 

]-Icllmich, Glenn B. "Charl es dc Gaulle: His Ideas on Mechan ized Warfare and 

the Army of the Future and the Appli cati on of These Idcas." Master thesis, 

Xavicr Un iversity, 1955. 

Hermes, Wa lter. "The Bui ldu p," Ms, DAM I-I -I-I D. 

"History of the 651h In fantry 1899- 1946." Ms, DAMH-HSO. 
444 MANEUVER AN D FIR EPOWER 

" History of United States Armed Forces in Korea," Ms, DAM I-I -HSR. 

" Lineage and Honors: History, Principles, and Preparation." Ms, DAM I-l-HSO. 

McKenney, Jani ce E. " Field Arti llery." Ms, DAMH-I-IS0. 

Milita ry History Section, U.S. Army Forces Far East. "A Brief History of the 34th 

Infantry Regiment." Ms, DAM H-I-I SO. 

Moseley, George Van Horn. "One Soldier's Journey." Ms, Li brary of Congress. 

Raines, Edgar. " MG J. Franklin Bell and Military Reform: The Chief of Staff 

Years, 1906- 19 10." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1976. 

" Redeployment." Occupation Forces in Europe series. Ms, DAM H-HSR. 

Regn ier, T. C. " Histo ry of th e 9151 Reconnaissance Squadron, I SI Cava lry 

Division." Ms, undated, DAMH-HSO. 

"Repl acement and Augmenta ti on System in Europe, The." Ms, Histori ca l 

Section, U.S. Army, Europe. DAMH-HSR. 

Rockis, Joseph. " Reorga nization of AGF Durin g De mobili za tion. " 

Demobilization Series, Study 3, DAM H-HSR. 

SCOII, Charles L. "Early History of Mechani zation." Ms, Scoll Papers, LC. 

Scud ieri, James C. "Th e Contin e ntals: Comparative Analysis of a Lat e 

Eighteenth-Centu ry Standing Army." Ph.D. dissertation, City University of 

New York, 1993. 

Sheehan, Kev in P. " Preparin g fo r an Imaginary War: Examining Peacetime 

Functions and Changes of Army Doctrine." Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 

1988. 

"Stability Operations, Domini can Republic." Ms, DAM H-HSR. 

Stillwaugh, Elva. " Personnel Policies in the Korea n Conni ct." Ms, DAM H-HSR. 

Thomas, Robert S., and Inez V Allen. "The Mexican Punitive Expedition under 

Brig. Ge n. John J. Pershing." Ms, DAMI-I-HSO. 

Thomas, Robert S. "The United States Anny 191 4- 1923." Ms, DAMH-HSR. 

Trask, David F., ed. " Histori cal Survey of US Mobil ization: Eight Topica l Studies 

of the Twentieth Centu ry." Ms, DAMI-I-HSR. 

Van Voorhis, Danie l. "Mechanization." Lecture, AWe, 13 October 1937. MHI. 

Wi ley, BellI. "AG F on the Eve of Demobilization Period." Ms, DAMH-HSR. 

Wilson, Powell B. "AGF During th e Demobili zation Period." Demobili zation 

Series, Study 4, DAM H-HSR. 
Index 

Ahrmns, General Creighton: 343. 356, 359, 361, 

364.365,367.372- 73.4091120 

Adjutant general companies: 354-55,356,357, 

386, 401 

Adj utants general: 12,14,17,20112.24--25,28, 

55,98, 99. 11 7,284,286,306-07 

Administration companies: 267,270,272,274. 

276-77,28 1,296-97,354 

Administrative sections: 338, 340 

Aero squadrons: 38, 181 

Affi liation Program: 370,373 

AIM projcct: 353- 54 

Air Assault Division, 11th: 3 16 

Air assnul! divisions: 3 14,31 6,383,397, 400 

Air assault infa ntry banalions: 400-401 

Air cavalry nllack brigadcs: 384.386 

Air cava lry comb.1t brigndcs: 3 14, 3 16. 357, 359 

Air c:lVnlry squadrons: 359 

Air cav:Llry troops: 309,382 

Air defen se arti llery battalions: 354- 55,356, 

357,36 1, 367.384,389, 392-93,397,401 

Air defense artillery brigades: 382,389,392 

Air ~ef se Artillery School: 354- 55 

Air squadrons: 49,53,85, 94. 112 

AirTTllnsport Brigade, 10th: 316 

AirtTllus()Ortbrigades: 3 14,3 16 

Air units (divisional): 35.49 

Airborne battalions: 327- 28,338 

Airborne brigades: 190, 196,300.303,309,356 

36th : 367,383 

173d : 3 12,323,327- 28,334.335.344. 

345- 346 

Airborne Command: 190 

Airborne Corps, XVI II: 194 

Airborne Division, 82d 

:md Dominican Republic: 329 

clements of used to test regimental 

01'go1niZllIion: 264 

and Korean War: 240,242, 249 

alld Opemtion JUST CAUSE: 403,425 

organized: 167 

I>ost- Korean War: 250 

post- World War II: 212- 13 ,232 

reorganized: 193- 94, 276, 357, 397 

Airbome Division, 82d- Continued 

and ROAD: 308 

used to tcst airbome division stnlcture: 229 

in Victnam: 332.338,344 

and World War 11 : 193. 194. 196 

Airborne Division, IOlst 

inactivated: 250 

organizcd: 167 

post- World War [I : 2 12- 13 

reactivated: 25 1 

reorganized: 243.274,276.333- 34,356, 

400 

and ROAD: 308 

used to test pentomic division: 274 

in Vietnam: 328.330-32,333.344,346 

and World War II: 194, 196,200 

Airbome di\·isiotls 

aircraft for: 248 

battle groups: 272,274 

development o f: 166-67, 169, 188, 190 

need to be air-tr.U1sportable: 229,272.274 

and nuc lear weapons: 272.274 

in Organized Reserve Corps: 2 17 

reorganized forcomb., t: 193- 96 

strength: 167, 169, 196,229,272.274,39 7 

tables of organization: 167, 169 

tablcs of organization and equipment: 

194- 96,223- 24.229,272,274,276- 77, 

298,300,308,356- 57 

in World War IJ : 193 

Airborne divisions, comjlOsition of 

1 970s: 357 

1 980s: 390- 91 

ATFA- 1: 265,267 

pentomic: 276- 77 

ROAD: 308 

ROTAD: 272. 274 

Airborne divisions (units) 

11th: 190.1%.232,240,242.253.274.279. 

31. 

13th: 190. 196 

15th: 204,,36,2 17 

17th : 190, 196 

80th: 255 
446 

Airborne divisions (unils)-Contin\lf.:d 

82d. &'C Airborne Di vision, 82d. 

841h: 217.255 

981 h: 217 

991h: 2 17 

100th: 217.255 

IOI.~t. See Airborne Division, 101 st. 

1081h: 217,255 

Airborne Infalltry. 187Ih: 240--41 

Airbomc infantry baualions: 307,308,) 12, 

33 1.332,334-35.357 

Airbome infantry brigades 

1st: 190 

2d: 190, 196 

Airbomc unils 

in airmobile divisions: 318.356 57 

in infantry divisions: 279 

Airallfi 

for airborne di visions: 248 

for annorcd divisions: 227,248,261,3 14, 

316 

for field anillcry units: 18 1, ISS, 196,227 

for inf.1n1ry divisions: 30, 181 , 199. 227. 

248.267,3 14,)16 

for inf.1nlry regiments: 227 

for mechanized infantry divisions: 3 14,3 [6 

role of in AmlY units: 31 4,3 16,318,417 

used for rcconn;liSSMICC: 30 

Aircra ft nminlcn;mcc baltaliolls: 333- 34,386 

Aircra ft maintcnancc companics: 393 

Airernft maintcl1<mce det:lChl11 cnts: 333- 34 

Airfi eld operation : 333 

AirLand l3allle doctrine: 384, 386, 39 1, 403, 

407 

AinllObile brigades: 356 

Ainnobilc companies: 309 

AinllObile divisions: 333- 34,335,356, 

390- 9 1,397 

Ainllobile illfa lltry batt;lIions: 3 18,327- 28. 

334- 35,359,397, 400 

AinllObility: 3 14, 3 16, 3 18, 333 

Alabamll National Guard IIllits: 100- 101 ,243, 

361 

Alaska: 309,326,333,338,346,356,373, 

395,397 

Alaska Nationa l Guard units: 395 

Alelltian Islands: 180 

Alger, Russell A.: ]8 

All-volunteer Anny: 353,372- 73 

Allen, Maj. ]lar.'eyG.: 1411146 

Allen. Maj . Ge n. Robert II.: 126 

Ambulance companies: 28,30, 94 

Ambulance Company, 337th; 69 

Ambulance trains: 55 

Ambul'l1lce units in divisions: 52- 53,55 

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Ambu ces; 28,67 

Americal Division: 159- 60, 187, 214, 252, 

331. 334. s.:.'C (ilso ]nl:lntry divisions, 23<1. 

American Expeditionary Forces: 49,52, 

55- 57,67,68,83- 86,87, 1051117 

Ammunition column: 24,25,28 

Ammunition resupply, responsibility for: 129, 

131 - 32, 198- 99 

Ammunition tmins: 29,30,33,38,52- 53,55, 

84,92, ] 15,1 22, 129 

Ammunition wagons: 5 

Amphibious operations: 187- 88 

Anderson, Lt. Col. Edward D.: 74/11} 

Andrews, Maj. Gen. Fronk M.: ]45,147, ]49, 

173 /111 

Animals 

cav" lry: 147, 153. 172,191.2 13 

in light divisions: 188, 190 

numbers of: 28 

problems shil)ping: 55 

shortages of: 7 1, 121 

IISC o fbclwccn the world wars: 90.92, 12 ], 

126 

Antiaircraft artillery battalions: 130,166, 167, 

184-85, 194- 96, 223,224,227.239, 240, 

267, 277.354 

Antiaircraft artillery batteries: 269 

Antiaircraft artillery detachments: 122 

Antiaircraft wcallOns: 16 1,354-55 

in airbonle briglldcs: 303 

Chaparrnl: 354- 55,389 

Duster: 36 1,40 I 

machine guns: 67 

in National Gunrd units: 361, 40 ] 

placement of: 185.267.269. 389 

Sergeant York gun system: 389 

Vulcan guns: 354 

Antiannor companies: 400 

Antiannor platoons: 393 

Antitank bal1alions: 130. 13 1. 154-55, 185. 

196, 198- 99 

Antitankcollll)anics: 130, 131, 144,194-96. 

198- 99,223.397, 425 

Antitank force s 

placemcnt of: 154- 55, 166, 172. 18 1, 185. 19' 

weal)()ns for. St!e Antitank weapons. 

Antitank platoons: 325 

Antitank troops: 147, 161 

Antitank wcapons: 198 

37-mm.: 55,122- 23, 144, 147,154-55 

57-mm.: 182. 198- 99 

90-mlll. self-propelled: 300,335 

ENTAC: 297,335 

LA W (light anliwnk weallOn): 335 
INDEX 

Antil:mk \\,cap·ons- Continucd 

M56 SPAT: 300 

nUl1lbc~ of: 264 

placement of: 380,382 

TOW: 354,374115,380,382,383, 386,393, 

397,400 

Arizona National Guard units: 36,217,284. 

314 

Arkansas National Guard units: IOG- IOI 

Armies (U.s.) 

First: 71,217,306,325,370 

Second: 71 , 211 

Third: 79- 80,167,281,307 

Fourth: 120, 159, 252,306 

Fifth: 184,217,284,306,325,344 

Sixth: 254,327 

Sc.:vcnlh: 217, 25),366-67,402 

Eighlh: 241,271 - 72.400--401 

Armor 

33<1, lSI BaUalion; 400 

401h. 81h l3analion: 365 

803d. lsi Battalion: 4101144 

An110f ballalions: 296,297.306.307,334-35, 

336,337,338,34 1, 344, 3511148, 354, 

355,357,359.366,380,382,384,389, 

397,400-402 

Annor companies: 281,335 

AmlOrGroup, 161h: 338 

Armor School: 271 . )38, 356, 365. 373 

Armored brigades 

301h: 361 

31sl: 361 

53d: 314 

86th: 314 

149th: 367,383 

1551h: 361 

I 77lh: 423 

194th: 312.338,356,364-65,373.402,423 

Annored brigades, composition of: 149- 50, 

163,359.366 

Amlorcd car squadrons: 115 

AmlOred car Iroops: 122- 23, 125, 161 

AmlOrcd cavalry regiments: 392,4111153,424 

2d: 422 

1 I th: 422, 423 

1161h: 403 

163d: 403 

Anllorcd cavalry unils: 123,125 

Armored Division, 1st 

andATFA- J: 267, 269 

and Bosnia: 425 

in Gcrnlllny: 344,422 

and Korean War: 243 

in the 1990s: 422- 23 

organized: 150,154 

Armored Division, Ist-Continued 

post- Korean WUf: 279 

post- World War 11 : 213 

as reinforcement unit for NATO: 250 

reorganized: 187,306,307 

round-out units for: 357 

and U.S. Constabulary: 2 11 

in Vietnam: 330,334,336 

and World War II: 184.200 

Annored Division, 2d 

in Germany: 246-47, 305, 366-67,422 

inactivated: 423 

organized: 150, 154 

posl- Worid War JJ: 212- 13,232, 242 

in Southw<;sl Asia: 421 - 22 

in Vietnam: 330,336 

and World WarJJ: 184.187,198 

ArnlOred divisions 

airerafl for: 248 

ATPA- I' 265, 267 

designations of brigades in: 307 

missions: 149- 50, 184 

nuclear weapons for: 277 

number of: 170 

organized: 147.149- 50 

Orgllllized Reserve Corps: 217 

post- World Wilr 11 : 224 

447 

reorganized: 182,187,196,277,279,309 

strength: 149- 50,154,185,196,224,225. 

267.269,277,282,284,353- 54 

tables of organization: 150,184- 85,196, 

225,227,277,279,284.286,298 

tallks for: 248-49 

tmins: 163, 185 

in World War 11 : 193,196, 198- 99 

Armored divisions, composition of 

AIM: 354.355 

AmlyofExcellcnec: 395 

ATPA- I: 267.269 

Division-86: 389 

in Europe: 336 

penlomic: 277.281 - 82,284, 286 

post- World War 11 : 224 

ROAD: 296-98.308 

ROCA D: 282, 284,286 

World War II: 163.184- 85 

AmlOrcd divisions (unils) 

3d: 154,187.198.213,222.252, 279,422 

4th: 154.211.213.252,279.344 

51h: 154,243, 254 

61h: 154, 170, 243, 254 

7th: 170,243,250 

8th: 170 

91h: 170, 172 

101h: 170 
448 

AmlOrcd divisions (Ullils)- Colllinucd 

11th: 170 

12th: 170 

13th: 170, 220- 21, 255 

14th: 170 

16th: 190 

18th: 2041136 

19th: 2041136, 217, 220- 21 

20th: 190 

21st: 2041136, 217,255 

22d: 20411J6, 217, 255 

30th; 256, 340, 361 

49th: 214,220- 21,305,307. )61,401 

501h: 214-15, )40, 367,401,423- 24 

Annorcd Force: 150,153, 154,163, 170.172 

Anllorcd groullS: 198,2051154,224 

Annorcd infantry battalions: 184- 85,227,261 

Annorcd inf,lIllry regiments: 224 

Armored motorcar machine gun ("tank") COI1lpanics: 5],55 

Armored personnel carriers: 150,163,182, 

276-77, 282, 305 

M I 13: 286, 305, 308, ]35. 389 

Armored rcconnaiss.1l1cc cars: 122- 23, 127 

Armored regiments: 149- 50,163,224 

Antlored rinc banalions: 224 

Armorers: 4- 5 

Arms chests: 5 

Armstrong, John: 9 

AmlY, U.S. Dep:lrtlllClll ofthc: 225 

Anny-86: 389- 90 

Amly Air Co'Vs: 111 

Amly Air Forces: 180,227 

Amly Arc:ls: 87,97,101 

Amly Field Forces: 217, 229,243,263- 65, 

267, 269 

AnllyGround Force~: 170,172,173112. 

17511J8, 180, 185, 187- 88, 190- 91, 

198-99, 217,224-25.227,229 

Amly Ground Forces Reduction Board: 

180-82, 184- 85, 187 

Amly group: 117 

AmlY NatiOnal Guard. See National Guard. 

Amly ofExcellcnce: 391-403, 407, 4091132, 

416,417 

Amly of the 1'0tOIll:lC: 12- 15 

AmlY of the United StlltCS: 190, 213 

Anny Reserve: 255. See (liso Organized 

Reserve COIl)S. 

combat service support units: 424 

combat SUP1}Ortlinits: 424 

number of divisions and brigadcs: 284, 286, 

309.328- 29, 338,340-41,353, 359,361 , 

367.370,397,423- 24 

officcr billcts: 284 

MANEUVER AND FI REPOW ER 

Amly Reserve- Continucd 

and pentomic ~tructures: 284, 286 

and volunteers: 256 

Artny Reserve brigades. St.'C by IJ'pe o/brigade. 

Amly Reserve eentcrs: 402- 03 

AmlY Reserve divisions 

ordered to activc duty: 305, 332 

reorg;mized: 284, 312, 341, 372, 402 

and ROAD: 309, 312 

strength: 284, 286 

AmlY Rcserve units 

readiness of: 367, 370,372, 424 

round-out units: 395,402-03 

training lor: 424 

ArtilY School of the Linc: 27- 28 

Artny Sccurity Agency dctllchmcnts: 330,382 

Army Servicc Forces: 180 

Army Service Schools: 33 

Army St:llT. See a/~'o War Dep:lnment GCllcral 

St:llT. 

and :lir mobility: 3 I 6, 318 

lind Amly Reserve: 309.365 

:lnd General Rcserve: 250 

:111(1 mobili7A1tion for World War]: 55,57- 58 

and numbcrs of divisions: 355, 364 

O]lCnltions Division: 187- 88 

org:lniz:ltion of: 140llJ2 

and post- KOrc:lll War period: 252, 284 

and troop b:lsis: 2 14 

and unit desigll:ltions: 331 

and unit rcpi:lcelllent system: 252- 53,366 

Amly War Col1ege: 135,214-15.270-71, 

319117 

Artificers: 4-5 

Artil1cry batterics: 12.13- 14.16,24,25.123, 

307.335 

Artillery b:lllcries, weapons for: 223.276. 

337,382, 425 

Artillery coordination centers: 284 

Artillery School: 271 

Aspin, Les: 424 

Assault avintion battalions: 318 

ASSllllh gun companics: 400 

Assauh gun (tank) ballalions: 308 

Assault gun troops: 185 

Assault SlI1)port battalions: 318 

Assanlt wC<1pons platoons: 282 

Atomic Field Army (ATFA- I). See Amored 

divisons; Infautry divisions. 

Atomic weapons, See Nuclear weapons, tacticaL 

Attack helicopter bnl1alions: 359, 382.386, 

387,393, 397.425 

Allaek helicopter squadrons: 357. 359 

Aultman, Col. Dwight E.: 741112 
INDEX 

Australia: [91. 327- 28 

AlISlria: 208 

Aviation bat1aliolls: 309,337,382,383,386, 

397, 400,425 

Aviation brigades: 386, 389, 392- 93. 397, 400, 

4101140 

Aviation companies: 248.265,267,269- 70, 

272,276- 71,282,284,296,338,354-55, 

393,397 

A viation groups: 318, 397,400 

Aviation llluinlCnancc battalions: 400 

A viatioll mailllcnancc companies: 397,401 

Aviation observation squadrons; 149 

A vialion sections: I 12, 1 15 

A vialion suppon companies: 318 

Aviation unils: 314,316,333- 34,335 

l3adges 

niT assault personnel: 356 

Union corps (Civil War): 16 

War with Spain: 18 

Bailey. Mllj. Gen. Charles J,: 72 

Baker, Col. Chauncey: 52,53,55,741112 

Baker, Newton D.: 52,57,60,62,63,64,65, 

66,761/32,86,90, III 

Baker Board: 52- 55,741114 

Balloon companies: 85 

Ballou, Brig. Gen. Charles c.: 63 

Bands: 125, 131 , 132,133, 181,194-96,239. 

269,274,277,284,296,392 93 

Barc, Col. Walter E.: 1071150 

Barkcr, Maj. Alvin: 52 

Battle groUI)S (divisional) 

airbome: 272, 274, 305 

eomposilion of: 272,274,276-77.282,297 

lmd unit mOl11le: 281 

Battlefield infomlation coordination centers: 

355 

Bazookas: 167.180-81 ,182.247-48 

Beal. Thaddeus R.: 343 

Bell. Maj. Gen. Jllllles Fr;l1lklin: 28 29 

Berlin. Gemlany: 303,305- 06,309,312 

Berlin Brigade: 312, 3221143, 402. 4111151. 

423 

Berry, Maj. Gen. Sidney B.: 356 

"Big Red One. The." See Infantry Division, 

lsI. 

Black soldiers: 15, 154. 170, 182. 249 50 

Black units: 62 63, 66, 97, 99,1071153.154, 

170, 182, 191.217,220,239.249- 50 

Bliss, Maj. Gen. Tasker H.: 49.54-55.57.60, 

62 

Bloomfield, Brig. Gen. Josel)h: 8 

"BoHom-Up" review: 424 

Br<1dky. Geneml Omar N.: 225,229 

Bradson, Col. Fay W.: 1411146 

Brees, Maj. Gen. Herbert 1.: 132. 133 

Brigade, 1st Hawaiian: 31 

Brigade-75: 366--67 

Brigade-76: 366- 67 

Brigade inspectors: 5.6--7,8- 9 

Brigade majors: 3,5,6- 7.8- 9 

I3 rigade (Training) 

5th: 372 

402d: 402- 03 

Brigades (1913) 

2d: 34 

4th: 34 

5th: 34 

6th: 34 

8th: 34 

449 

Brigading together of Regular Amly and Illilitia 

units: 8, 16 

British Army: 121 - 22,125,166, 184 

Brown, Brig. Gen. Lytle: 83 

Brown, Maj. Gen. Preston: 115 

Browning, John M.: 67 

Bmeker, Wilber M.: 281 

Bryden. Maj. William: 1071/50 

Buckley, Col. Michael: 188 

Buelw Vista, Battle of: 10 

Bull, Brig. Gen. Harold R.: 170, 172 

Burnside, Maj. Gen. Ambrose: 13 

Califomia National Guard units: 115,221.243, 

255- 56,361 

Callaway, Howard: 370 

ClImps. See (I/so Forts. 

Beauregard. La.: 154 

Breekinridge, Ky.: 243 

Campbell, Ky.: 208 

Carson, Colo.: 188 

Chaffee, Ark.: 243 

Claibome, La.: 166,167 

Clark, Tel':': 191 

Eustis, VlI.: 123 

Fremont, Calif.: 60,62 

Funston, Kans.: 57.63 

Greene, N.C.: 60,62 

Hale, Colo.: 188 

Hood. Tex.: 232 

Henry Knox, Ky.: 123.125 

Lockett, Calif.: 191 

Losey, P.R.: 242 

Mills, N.Y.: 60 

Roberts. Calif.: 243 

Cimnoneornpanics: 160-61,180,182,196,198, 

202118, 223. &>e also lnt:1ntry regiments. 

Caribbean Defense Command: 153 

Carter. M'ti. Gen. William 1-1.: 34-35 
450 

Cavalry 

mechanized: 123 

missions of: 48-49,64,85,123 

and Modcmiz:l(ion Board: 127 

and War with Spain: 18 

and World War I: 48- 49,54,64,85 

Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat), 6th: 359,364, 

386 

Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized), 7th: 123.125, 

143-45. 147, 150 

Cavalry brigades 

composition of: 25.33- 34.35,38,95,115, 

123.125,145.147, 161,2881124.359 

dcsignmions for: 51- 58 

Cavalry brigades (units) 

1st: 64,98 

2d: 64,98 

3d: 64 

41h: 172 

51st: 116 

52<1: 116 

53d: 116 

541h: 116 

55th: 1 [6 

561h: 116,15],191- 92 

57th: 116 

58[h: 116 

591h: 116 

1 16th: 403 

1st (1913): 34 

2d (1913): 34 

3d ( 1913): 34 

41h (1913): 34 

Cavalry corps: 13, 117, 120, 145,147, 149 

Cav:tlry Division (1913): 31 

Cavalry Division, lsI 

between Ihe world wars: 112, 115. 120. 135 

clements in Gennany: 366,367 

in Japan: 21 1- 12, 232, 239 

in Korea: 240,245-46,2581117,279,284,308 

organizcd: 98 

post- World War II: 213 

reorganized: 316, 318, 344, 357, 364, 402 

in Southwest Asia: 421 - 22 

and training Illiltleuvers: 112, 143- 45, 147 

units ofsc1l1to North Africa: 172.190- 91 

used for organizational studies (TRICA!'): 

344,357,359,382- 83,386 

and World War II: 172, 190- 91 

Cavalry Division (Ainnobile), lst: 316,318, 

323,327- 28,333- 34,335,344,346 

Caviliry Division (Infantry), 1st: 213 

C;\valry Division, Special, 1st: 191 

Cav:llry divisions 

between the world wars: 86- 87,95,97,98, 

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Cavalry divisions- Continued 

101,1071145,116 

Civil War: 13,16 

composition of: 25,28,33- 34,38,85- 86, 

95, ! 15,133,135, 137, 145, 147, 161 

designations for: 28,57 

mcchanizcd: 172 

National Guard: 87, 97,101, 116 

Organized Reserves: 87, 170 

road space: 38, 95 

stalT for: 25, 28 

strength: 33- 34,38,85- 86.95,1071145, 115, 

137, 147,161 

tables of or gani zillion: 37- 38, 95,101,115 

Cavalry divisions (units) 

2d: 98, 120, 154, 172, 190- 92 

3d: 117, 120 

15th: 64,771144 

21st: 101 , 116, 153 

22d: 101,116,153 

23d: 101,116, 153 

24th: 101,116, 153 

6lst: 101 

62d: 101 

63d: 101 

64th: 101 

65th: 101 

66th: 101 

Cllvalry fighting vchicles: 386,389 

C(/wdl),jQUl"lw/; 95 

Cavalry Rcconnaissancc Troop, 82d: 167 

Cavalry Rcconnaissance Troop. Mechanized, 

56th: 19 1- 92 

CllValry rCCOlmaiSSllncc troops: 402 

Cavalry regiments: 5- 6,8, 12,24,28 

composition of: 54.95. 112, 115, 125, 135, 

137, 145, 147, 161 

Caviliry rcgimcnts (units) 

1st: 123.125 

1st, 1st Squadron: 334 

6th: 64 

9th: 99 

10th: 99 

15th: 64 

Cavahy School: 99 

Cavalry sqUlldrons; 13, 211135, 223, 382, 400 

Cavalry troops: 6- 7,366 

ChalTee, Maj. Gen. Alina R.: 23- 24,25 

ChalTcc, Brig. Gcn. Adna R. 1401135, 147.149, 

150,154 

Chaparral-Vulcan ballalions. Sec A1l1iaircrall 

weapons. 

Chapillins: 4- 5,8- 9.10 

Chemical companies: 122.382.383,386.389, 

397.4101140 
INDEX 

Chemica! detachments: 330 

Chemical platoons: 122,281,307 

Chemica! warfare detachments: 135, 137 

Cheney, U, Col. Sherwood fl.: 74/11 2 

Chickamauga National Park, Ga.: 16 

Chief of artillery, divisional: 49,55 

Chief of Staff's Advisory Group: 236//41 

China, U.S. forces in: 99 

Chippewa, l3al11c of: 7- 8 

Chynoweth, Maj. Bradford G.: 126 

Civil War: [2- 16 

Clark, Maj. Gell. Mark W.: 172,2591129 

Clarke. Lt. Gen. OruceC.: 253 ,29 1.293 

Clitrord, CI<lrk: 338,343 

CO,ISI Artillery Brigade, IOlst: 153 

Coast Artillery COIVS: 29- 30 

Coast artillery districts: 31 

Coilier, LI. Cen.John 1-1.: 269 

Collins, Maj. Gen. )'larry 1.: 190 

Coilins, Gcncml J. Lawton: 240,247 

Colorado National Guard units: 217, 395 

Columbus, N. Mcx.: 35 

Combat AnllS Regimental System (CA RS): 

281, 2901/49, 390, 4091/25 

Combllt ellr squlldrons: 125 

Combat eomnmnd headquaners in annored 

divisions: 163. 185,2051/54.224,225, 

227,265,267 

Combat Dcvelopments Commnnd: 306, 312, 

338.353- 54,359 

Combat electronic IVnrtiue intelligence 

(CEWI) bauaiions. See Military intelligence bnllalions. 

Combat scrvice support system 

armored divisions: 185 

infantry divisions: 223 

Modcmization Board: 127.129,130, 131 

World War 11 : 181 - 82 

Combined arms (motorized) battnlions: 400 

Command and control battalions (airbomc 

divisions): 272.274.277 

Comnmnd and Gcnernl StntTCollcge: 265, 

270,27 1 

Command nnd Gcnernl StatT Sehool: 135 

Command hcadquarters (division): 309, 312 

34th: 312 

35th: 312 

4]d:]1 2 

51st: 312 

55th:] 12 

79th: 3 12,329 

94th: 312, 329 

96th: 312, 329 

103d: ] 12, 329 

Commissarics: 4- 5, 10,17,24- 25,28 

451 

Commiss.1ries of muster and subsistence: 14 

Commissaries of subsistence: 12, 14 

Communications, divisionnl: 28,84,94, 129, 

131,132,198-99,267,270,272,335. See 

also Sign.1lunits. 

Communications equipmcnt: 30,35,84, 

122- 23,267,335,] 82- 8],425- 26 

Conductors ofmilit.1ry stores: 5 

ConfcdernteArmy: 15- 16 

Connecticut National Guard units: 24],312 

Conner, Maj. Gen. Fox: 52,90.94, 130 

Conrad, Col. C.1sper 1-1.: 80 

Continental AmlY: 3- 6, 20112 

"Continent.11 Anny" phm: 37 

Continental Congress: 6- 7 

Cook, Maj. Gen. Gilben R. : 1411146,2361141 

Corps: 9,12- 13.14,15- 17,2 11134,24,49,54. 

67- 69,7 1.117.120, 181- 82,]92 

1: 68 

V:422 

VI I: 422 

X (Civil War): 15 

XVlll (Civil W3f): 15 

XXV (Civil War): 15 

IV (Wnr with Spain): 17- 18 

V (War with Spain): 17- 18,422 

Corps area commanders: 100.101. 109- 10 

Corps areas: 87,97,99,100, 116 

Second: 99, 110 

Founh: 100, 120 

Eighth: 98- 99, 132, 1]5 

Ninth: 99 

Cowles, Lt. Gcn. Donllid 1-1.: 370,380 

Cmig, Gencral Malin: 109, 126, 127,129. 

130,132, 13],2]61141 

Crosby, Maj. Gen. Hcrbcn S.: 112,115 

Cubll: 18, 307 

Dnhlquist, General John E.: 252- 53.271. 276 

D:1IIford. Maj. Gen. Robert M.: 160-61 

Davidson, Mnj. Gcn. Gnrrison 1-1.: 270 

Dnvis, Dwight F.: 115, [22, 123 

Dnvis, Brig. Gen. Richmond P.: 110- 11 

Dnvison, GencmJ Michael S.: ]59 

D.1 vy Crocketts. See Nliclenr wealXlns. tacticaL 

Dearborn, Maj. Gen. Hcnry: 7- 8 

Decker, Gene"ll George H.: 296,298.300, 

307- 08 

Defense, U.S. Depanment of: 305,308, 309, 

3]8, 340-41, ]6 1, 364, 383. 397 

Demobilization 

allcr the Civil War: 16 

aller Ihe Korenn War: 250- 51 

allcr the war in Vietn<lrn: ]43-44 

aller lhcWarorl812: 9 
452 

DCrlIobili:wtion- Colltinllcd 

after World War I: 79,80- 81,83,97 

after World War II : 199- 200,207- 08,211 - 13 

Departments 

Central: 3 1, 34 

Eastem: 3 1 

I'anam:l Canal: 115 

Southern: 31.34,35, 36-37 

Westen!: 31 

Depol brigades: 60, 76//32 

Depot divisions: 68- 69,71,13 

DePuy, General William E.: 325,380 

Devers, GCllcrallacob L.: 163,184,187,201, 

224 

Dick Act of 1903: 25 

Dickinson, Jacob M.: 29 

Dickman, Maj , Gen. Joseph T.: 23- 24,79,83 

District or Columbia National Guard: 431112 

Division, 2d (Provisional): 132 

Division , H,lw,Liian: 99, 112, 121 , 155 

Division, Panama Canal: 99, Ill, 112, 115 

Division. Jlhilippinc: 99,111 - 12, 158,212 

Division-86: 383- 84,386,389- 90 

Division urtillery 

aircraft for: 199,227,337 

ATFA- I: 265,267 

headquarters baueries for: 144.159, 

169- 70.181 , 269 

in heavy divisions: 382.383,384.386,401 

in light divisions: 392- 93, 397.400 

ROAD: 296- 97 

ROClD: 277 

ROTA D: 274 

World War II: 181 , 194-96,198 

Division Restnleturing Sludy (DRS): 379- 80, 

382- 84,407 

Division trains. See by IJpe uJ dil·isiOlI. 

Divisions ( 1913) 

1st: 34 

2d: 34 

3d: 34 

Divisions (World War I). See also by Iype oj 

dil·isiQII. 

10th: 65.99,213,250,251,253,279 

11th: 65.99 

121h: 65, 99 

14th: 65 

17th: 65 

20th: 65 

Divisions, base ilnd training: 54,65,67.68 

Divisions, heavy: 380, 382- 83,384,386,389. 

395.400-403.407, 417.425 

Divisions, light: 390-91. 392- 95 . 397. 

400-403,4091136,417 

Divisions. light (World War 11): 187- 88. 190, 

MANEUVER AND FI REPOWER 

Divisions, light (World War 1I)- Col1tinued 

203//27 

10th: 188, 190 

7lst: 188, 190 

89th: 188, 190 

Divisions, Nntional Anny 

designations of: 57- 58 

as sources o f manpower for Regular AflIlY: 

62 

Divisions, replacement and school: 65 

"Doctrinal and Organizational Conccpts for 

Atomic·Nonatomic Amly During the Period of 

1960- 1970": 270- 72,281. 291 

Dominican Republic: 323, 329 

Douglas. Ariz.: 98 

Doycn, I3 rig. Gen. Charlcs A.: 61 

Draftees. See also A1l11y orthe United States; 

"National Army" units. 

Black: 62- 63,66, 170 

Civil War: 15 

and Korean War: 243 

Puerto Rican: 64 

reserve service requirements for: 222 

training of: 57,60, 170,243 

in Vietn,Jln: 325 

World War I: 55,57,58,60,62 

Dragoon regiments: 10, II 

Dragoons: 211123 

Dragoons, 2d: 10 

Drum, Maj. Hugh A.: 52.90.94. 110. 111 

Duane. William: 9 

Dunn, Winfield: 361 

"'Dusters." See Antiaircra ft wellpons. 

Eckhardt, Maj. Gcn. George S.: 325 

Eddlcman, Gcncral Clyde D.: 253,277,293, 

297,298,300,303,319//7 

Edwards, I3rig. Gen. Clarence E.: 60 

Edwards, Maj. Gen. ldwal: 181 - 82 

Eiscnhowcr, Gencral Dwight D.: 200,213. 

225,229,250 

Electronic warfare companies. See Military 

intelligence battalions. 

Ellison, Maj. Frederick A.: 7411/2 

Ely, Lt. Col. l·ranson E.: 74/112 

Enginecr battalions (divisional) 

I 990s: 425 

foramlOreddivision: 149- 50,163 

Army of Excellence: 392- 93,397 

ATFA- I: 265.267,269 

Division Restructuring Study: 382 

Ficld Scrvice Regulations of 1905: 24 

Field Service Regulations of 1910: 28 

Modemi;'.ation 130ard: 127, 131.132,133 

pcntomic divisions: 276-77 
INDEX 

Engineer battalions (divisional)-Colllinued 

post- World War II: 225.227,229 

ROAD: 296,300.384 

ROTAD: 272 

World \Vllf I: 49 

World War II: 181 , 185,194-96,199 

Engineer battal ions (nol1divisiol1al): 383 

Engineer bridge comp:LIlic~; 163, 185, 269, 

300,382 

Engineer brigades (corps): 392,425 

Engineer companies: 25, 35, 122- 23, 185, 28 1, 

303,307,325,326,338,340, 366,402 

Engineer officers: 24-25,28,55 

Engineer regiments: 38.52- 53,54,84, 85. 92, 223 

Engincersqundrons; 135, 137, 147, 172 

Engineer trains: 33,38,84,92 

Engineer units: 54.68 

Engineers: 12, 14, 17 

Engineers. 3101h: 69 

Enlisted Reserve Corps: 37 

Equipment shortages: 8,58,64,122- 23,152, 

172, 309, 326,328- 29,333,337,347, 

354- 55,361,366,370 

Estridge. Col. Oliver: 122 

Evans, Brig. Gen. Roben K.: 29 

Exercise divisions: 424 

Exercises 

BLUE llOLT: 267 

FOLLOW ME: 267 

REI'ORGER: 337 

S,\GEURUSII: 267, 269, 270 

Expeditionary Division, lsI. Sce Inf~lI1try 

Division, 1st. 

Experimental Mechanized Force: 122 

Far East Command: 2 [ I, 212, 239, 240, 242, 

247-48,249- 50,2591129 

Fanlswol1h, Col. Charles S.: 90 

Fie[d anllics: 27,28- 30 

I:ield AmlY, First: 28- 29 

Field Arti[lery, 6th: 52 

Fie[d anillcry ba1talions (units) 

63d: 24 [ 

32[sl: 167 

907th: [67 

Field anillcry bancrics: 225, 227, 229, 239. 

274,276 

Ficld al1illery brigades: 14,28,38,49,52- 53, 

54,55, 57- 58,68,69,84-85, 120. [59. 392 

Field anillery brigades (units) 

2d: 61 

71sl: [53 

Field anil[ery eompnnies: 6-7, [0- [ I, 12 

Field anillcry guns 

3,inch: 38, 48. 52- 53, 65 

Ficld al1illcry guns- Continued 

37-mm.: 85, 131 

453 

75-mm.: 67,71,85,112,120, 121,130-31, 

144,16[ 

Civil Wnr: 13- 14,16 

horse-drawn: 65,85 

Mexicnn War: II 

"Napoleon": 13- 14 

Revolutionary War: 4,5 

stock-tr,lil gun carriage: II 

truek,mounted: 65, 121 

Field al1i1lery regiments: 24,28- 29,38, 43118, 

48, 52- 53,65,7 1,84-85, 115- 16, 149- 50 

Field hospi1al companies: 94 

Field hospital units: 52- 53 

Field hospilnls: 24,25,30 

331st: 69 

337th: 69 

Field Manual, 100- 5, Open/lions 

1982: 384 

1986 392,4111153 

Field SeI1'ice Regulalions. Ullile(/ Stales Army: 

121 

1905: 23- 24,25 

1910: 27- 30,31 

19[4: 34 

Finance companies: 354-55,356,357,386 

Fire direction conlrol centers: 144, 196,198, 

277,335 

"First Team." Sce C"vlllry Division, 1st. 

Flngs 

Civil W"r units: 16,18 

divisional: II I, 2 15. 422- 23 

National Guard units: 2 15 

regimental: 390 

War with Spain: 18 

Florid" National Guard units: 100- 10 I. 215, 

255- 56, 312 

Fonesca, Pfe. David: [60 

Food service companies: 274 

Forage mastcrs: 4- 5 

Foreign garrisons. military personnel needed 

for: 87 

Forges, traveling: 4-5 

Fons. See also Camps. 

Amador, Panmlla Cana[ Zone: 252 

Belvoir. Va.: 397 

Benning, Ga.: 99,126,150, 159,232,243, 

251 , 253, 279. 281 , 306- 07, 316, 326, 

337- 38, 355- 56, 36 1, 373, 395, 421 , 423 

Bliss. Tex.: 64,98, [47,354-55 

Bragg. N.C.: 167, 212,232,344,397,423 

Campbell, Ky.: 208,212.232,253, 274, 

332.344.423 

Carson, Colo.: 25 [, 284, 305. 325, 332, 338, 
454 

Forts- Continued 

344.355,366,372.423 

Ch;llT.:C, Ark.: 254,305,307 

Devens, Mass.: 232, 28 1, 306, 324. 325 

DnUll, N.Y.: 154,395, 423 

llood, Tex,: 2 12,232,305, 306.307.330. 

344,346,357,359,366.367,382- 83, 

386, 421 , 422, 423 

Sam Houston, Tex,: 64,99, 1]2 

Ilullchuca, Ariz.: 170 

Invin, Calir.: 306.423 

JAckson. S.c.: 243 

Knox. Ky.: 123, 125,150,338,356,365, 

373,423 

LCll\'Cllworth, Kans.: 25,27- 28,33,395, 

4091132 

Lewis, Wash.: 2 12,232.25 1, 327,346,355, 

39 1, 421,422. 423 

George G. Meade, Md.: 122 

Or<!, Calif.: 180.243,253.279.312.338, 

364,395 

Polk, La.: 305.364,422 

Richardson. Alaska: 252.312.346.395,422 

Riley, KMS.: 57,99, 154,25 1,325.337. 

343.344,366.423 

D.A. Russell, Wyo.: 112 

Sill. Okla.: 232 

Stcwllrt, Ga.: 307,364,423 

Wninwright, Alaskn: 312,346 

Leonard Wood. Mo.: 243 

Foss, General John: 380,383 

Fmnce 

army. See French Amly. 

and weapons for U.S. units: 67,68 

French AmlY: 7411'1 

and mechanization: 12 1- 22, 125 

as model for World War 1 nnny corps: 68- 69 

Frochlkc, Robert F.: 36 1 

Fuller. J. F. C.: 120,122 

Fuller, LI. Gen. Marvin D.: 382- 83 

Flillston. Maj. Gen. Frederick: 35,36-37 

Galveston. Tex.: 29- 30,34 

Garrison. Lindley M.: 37 

Gcnerul Board. U.s. European Thenter of 

Operations (ETO): 222- 24 

General Hcndquartcrs (G I-IQ), Unitcd States 

AmlY: 117. 120 

General Organization Project (World War I): 

52- 53,54- 55,65 

Ceil/mil Polide.f mlf/ Rcgulmi(}l1.~ for Ifle 

Organize(/ Reserves (Special Regulations No. 46): 

101 

C/;III:m{ Regu/(llioll.r for tile Ulliled Siaies 

IIl'lIIy( 1821): 9 

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

General Reserve: 2 12- 13.242-47.250.252 

General Service Schools: 87, 90 

General Sta lTColiege: 87.90 

Georgia National Guard units: 100-101. 215, 

255- 56. 361. 365 

German Army: 125, 184 

Gemlany 

equipment stockpiled in: 305 

occupation forees in: 208,2 1 I, 232 

U.S. forces in: 99.246-47,249,253,279, 

303,305.308,337.344,355,365. 

366-67,389- 90,422- 23 

and World War I: 65 

Gillem, Col. Alvan C.: 147 

Glen Springs. Tex.: 36 

Glider artillery battnlions: 196 

Glidcr fie ld anil1ery battalions 

32 1st: 167 

907th: 167 

Glidcr infhntry. 327t h: 167 

Glider infantry regiments: 193,194-96 

Gmves, Col. William A. : 74/1 12 

Gren! Britain, and World War I: 47-49.53. 

64,65,68,69 

Grccnlief, Maj. Gen. Francis S.: 361 

Griswold, LI. Gen, Oscar W.: 225 

Ground survei llance companies. See Military 

intelligence battalions. 

Guadalcanal: 187 

Gulick, Lt. Col. John W.: 90, 1071150 

Gun regiments: 52- 53. 65 

GYRO$tOI'r: program: 252- 53,254,274. 279 

Haines. General R;llph E.: 330,334 

Haislip. LI. Gen. Wade n .: 236,,4/ 

Hall, Brig. Gen. William E.: 2361141 

Hammond, Col. Greed G.: 1071150 

Harbord, Mnj. Gen. James G.: 71, 99 

Hannon. Maj. Gen. Emest N.: 184 

Hamey. Col. William S.: I I 

Hartzog, Generul Will iam W.: 425 

Hawaii: 31,99, 107,,49 

infantry regiments from: 65 

National Guard units: 65,155 . 284,332. 

340,355 

units sent to: 159.25 1.305,326.332,343, 

344.355 

Hawaiian Department: 155 

Headquarters. anllored groups: 198,205,,54, 

224 

Headquarters. specia l troops: 94,95. 135. 

137,182,227 

Headquarters defense platoons: 18 I, 182 

I-Ieavy weapons COnl l)anics: 144. See a/so 

InfanllY regiments. 
INDEX 

I-Ieavy weapons troops: 191. See also Cavalry 

regiments. 

Heintzelman, Maj. Stuart 90,94 

I-IclicOI)\crs. See ((Iso by type of m'il/lioll I/llil. 

AI-J- I (Cobra): 361 

in Korean War period: 248 

in Vietnam: 335 

Hersey, Col. Mark L.: 741112 

Hibbs, Maj. Gen. Louis E.: 212 

Hickey. Lt. GCIl. Thomas F.: 274,276 

High mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles 

(HMMWVs): 393,400 

Hines, Maj. Gcn.lohn L.: 110 

Hitler, Adolph: 125 

j'lodges, Maj. Gen. Courtney H,; 160- 61 

Holbrook, Maj. Gen. Willard: 64 

Honest Johl1 rockets: 271,274,277,282, 

296-97,298,300,)05,307.308,309, 

324,354--55 

I-looker, Maj. Gen. Joseph: 13 

Hospitab: 129, 132. Sec a/so Medical 

regiments. 

Howitzer companies: 92. See also lnfhrl1ry 

regiments. 

Howitzers 

J.S-inch: 38 

4.7·inch: 54,65 

6-inch: 48. 65 

8-inch: 277, 282. 296, 298. 300, 382, 386, 

401 

75-mm.: 67,122- 23. 125,127.130-31,145, 

147, 167, 180,188,191,196.202118 

75-111111. (horse): 95 

105-mm.: 122- 23,127,129,130- 31,1 44, 

145,147.163, 172, 180- 81, 191, 196. 

198, 199,202118,223, 224,227.239,265. 

267,269,272,274,276,277,282,296, 

298,303,307,314,337,393,397,400 

155-mm.: 52- 53,54,71,85,92, 112, 

115- 16,120,130- 31,144,161,181,191. 

199,223,227,229,269,274,276,277, 

282,296,298,300,307,3 14,335,337, 

356, 3751112. 382. 386, 393, 397,402 

British: 54 

French: 54 

mobility of: 54,92,112,196,198 

motorizcd: 65,71 , 771145,84- 85,1 12 

self-propelled: 122- 23, 125, 163, 180, 198. 

202118, 223, 227, 267, 282, 296, 298, 386, 

402 

towed: 180- 81, 191. 223, 282, 298, 300, 

3751112,393.400 

Howze, Lt. Gen. Hamilton 1-1.: 314 

Howzc. Maj. Gcn. Rober! L.: 269 

Howze Board: 314,316,318 

455 

Hughes, Maj . Gen. John 1-1.: 126.127, 129. 

1411146 

Hull, General John E.: 255 

Humphreys, Maj. Gcn. Andrew A.: 27 

Idaho National Guard units: 403 

111inois National Guard units: 159- 60, 214-15, 

243-44,246,251.255- 56 

Independent Cavalry Brigade ( 19 11 ): 29- 30 

Indiana National Guard units: 367,424 

Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, Pa.: 244 

Indi vidual replacement systcm: 252- 53 

Infantry battalions: 4.11 1- 12, 122,144,265, 

269,296,297,298,300,307- 08,309, 

323- 24,325,326- 27,330,332,334- 35, 

336,337- 38,341,344,346,3501134, 

3511148, 354, 355, 366, 374115, 380, 382, 

392- 93,397.400 

Infantry Board: 126 

Infantry brigadcs 

composition of: 3- 5,6- 7,8- 9,10- 11,12, 

16- 17,24-25,28,29- 30,35,38,47-48, 

52- 53, 84,120,281.284.325,326. 

355- 56 

design:ltions for: 5, 12, 14, 16,28, 57- 58 

c1imin:lted from division structure: 127 

numbers of: 286,309,353- 59,361 

provisional: 24 

reinforced: I 17. 120 

staffs for: 3,4-5, 6- 7, 8- 9, 10, 12, 14, 17, 

49,55,84 

Infantry brigades (units) 

lsI: 281,306. SeeillsfJ Airborne i!\f,1ntry 

brigades, 1st. 

2d: 281, 306. See (/1;;0 Airbome inr.1ntry 

brigades, 2d. 

41h: 98,1061142 

8th: 98.109 ..... 10, 111- 12 

10th: 98, 109- 10,111- 12 

11th: 326,331 - 32,334 

12th: 98,109- 10.111 - 12 

14th: 98,109- 10.11 1- [2,117 

16th: 99.109- 10,111 - 12,117 

18th: 99,109- 10,111- 12,117 

27th: 395,402 

29th: 284,312,328,332,338,343,355 

30th: 361 

32d: 359,361 

361h: 329 

37th: 424 

39th: 341 

40th: 341 

41 st: 328, 365, 370 

48th: 361,365 

49th: 328 
456 

Infan, ry brigades (unils)- Colliinucd 

51st: 159- 60 

S3d: 3 12,3 14 

58.h: 367,397 

671h: 3 12,3 14,328 

69th: 3 12, )28, 332, ]38, 344 

73d: 367 

76t h: 424 

8 1sl: 359.361 ,400.403,41 011 44 

86th: 3 12,314 

91d: II S. 153, 284. 3 12, 402 

93d: 11 5. 153 

1161h: 367,397 

1571h: ] 12, 340-41, 370, 402, 424 

171st: 3 12, 338, 346 

l72d: 3 12, 338, 346, 356, 373, )95 

1851h: 63 

186th: 63 

187th: 3 12. 340-41 , 370, 402, 424 

1915.: 3 12,34 1 

193d: 307.312.338,356,372- 73,402,423 

1961h: 325.329- 30.33 1.334.346 

197th: 306-07,3 12,337- 38,355- 56, ]6 1, 

364-65,373.402.42 1- 22 

198th: 306-07,330- 3 1.334 

1991h: 326,334, 336,42 1,422.423 

205.h: ) 12,340-41,370, ] 95, 424 

2 181h : ]61 

2561h : 341. 365 

2581h : 284,3 12,3 14 

Inf:ul1ry Center: 307 

Inf.1111ry Division, lSI 

be,ween the world wars: 79.81.98. 109- 10. 

111.112.1 17 

in Gennany: 227,232.246-47.366-67.423 

as mechanized division: 344 

n:organized (1939): 133, 143 

round·out units for: 364 

and tmining maneuvers. 1940: 143- 45 

in Vietnam: 323- 24,335.3501137 

(lnd World War I: 52, 57- 58. 60- 61. 67. 68. 

72 

Infantry Division, 2d 

between the world W:lTS: 79.8 1. 98. 99. 

1061142,1 12,1 17. 120, 126 

composit ion of: 61.98 

c lcments of inactivated: 422 

clements movt:d: 423 

in Korea: 240-41.246.249- 50.251.346. 

400--401 

orglmized: 60-6 1 

[KJst- Korcnn Wnr: 279,332 

post- World War 1[ : 212- 13.232 

reorganized: 133. 143. 346 

and tmining manellvers. 1940: 143-45 

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Infa ntry Division. 2d- Continucd 

used for organiz.1lional studies: 126. 130-31. 

132.3 16 

lmd World War I: 67.68 

Inf.1 111 ry Di vision, 3d 

I 990s: 422- 23 

andATFA- l : 267.269 

between Ihc world wars: 79,8 1,98. 109- 11 , 

11 2.1 17. 120 

in Europe: 253.279,303.305,337.355 

and Korean War. 24 1-42.246,249- 50.25 1 

org.1nizcd: 62 

post- World War II: 208.2 12- 13,232 

reorganized: 133. 143 

and World War II: 187 

Infantry Division. 4th 

19905: 423 

between the world wurs: 79, 81. 98, 11 7, 

120. 121 

in Gcnllnny: 24647,305.366-67,389- 90 

inactivated: 98 

motorizmion of: 12 1. 150. 163, 172, 182 

organi7.cd: 62 

reactivated : 147.222 

reorganized: 182. 184,243.327.344,355, 

403 

round-out units for: 364 

in Vietnam: 327,330- 31 

and World W"r I: 68 

1nfmmy Division, 5th 

19905: 422 

activation of: 133, 143,222,244 

bctwecn thcworld wars: 79,8 1.98, 117. 120 

clcments of scnt to Vietnam: 324, 325, 328, 

m 

in Europe: 251, 253 

in"ctivated: 98,250,279 

motoriz"tion of: 121 

or£"nizcd: 62 

post- World War II: 208,2 12- 13 

reorgmlized: 306-07, 364-65, 402 

and tmining mancuvers, 1940: 143--45 

units ofllctivaled: 344 

units :lUached 10: 338 

Infantry Division, 6th 

199Os: 423 

activated: 133.143,332 

wecn the world \\~ rs: 79,8 1, 98. 11 7.120 

e lemcnt ofllctivated: 326 

inacti\'med: 98, 232. 254, 338. 422 

ill Korca: 211 

motorized: 172 

organized: 62 

rcnctivlltcd: 243,395,397 

reorganized: 182. 402 
INDEX 

Infantry Division, 6th- Continued 

and tmining maneuvers, 1940: 143-45 

Infl11llry Division, 7[h 

1 99Os: 423 

between the world wftrs: 8[,98,117,120 

inactivated: 98,346,422 

in Jal'an; 232,239,240,241 

in Korea: 211. 241-42, 246, 251. 279. 284, 

308,346 

!!lotorized: 172 

and Opemlion JUST CAUSe: 403 

organized: 62 

reactivated: 147 

reorganized: 308, 364- 65, 395 

round-oulunits for: 370 

World War II: 180 

Infantry Division. 8th 

1990s: 422 

between the world wars: 99,117. 120 

in EUTOJlC: 279,303,305,308,337,355 

motorized: 172 

organized: 62 

post- Korean War: 2S 1 

rcacth'atcd: 147,243 

reorganized: 159, 182 

and Siberian Expedition: 66 

and World War I: 73 

Infantry Division. 9[h 

between the world wars: 99,117,120 

in EUTO\>C: 251 

innclivatcd: 208, 284, 421 

organi<:ed: 65 

rc:lclivntcd: 147,222,325,355 

reorganized: 402,403 

used for org.lnizntiollnl tests: 39 1, 400 

in Vietnam: 334,343,3501137 

Infantry Division, 241h. See a/so Division, 

Ilawaiian. 

1990s: 423 

in Genml1lY: 279,303,305.308,337,344 

in J;,p:m: 232,239. 240 

in Korea: 240,241,245-46,247-48.251, 

2581117,279 

organizcd: 155 

post- World War II: 213 

reorganized: 364-65,38],402 

in Southwest Asia: 421 - 22 

Infantry Division, 25th 

19905: 423 

in Bawaii: 251,252,326,36 1 

in Japan: 232, 239 

in Korea: 240,246,249- 50 

organi1.cd: 155,156 

post- World War II: 213 

rC;1(liness of: 305 

Inl:,ntry Division, 25th- Continued 

reorganized: 279. ]55, 395 

in Victrmm: 326 27,330,343,344 

Infantry Division Forward, 1st: 422 

Infantry divisions 

457 

c0I11111andm,d control of: 83,84,1 27,129, 

130.13 1,132,133, 144-45,185, 198, 

224,227,269,282,297 

motorizcd: 150, 172, 179, 180, 182, 184 

road sp..lce required for: 24.33- 34,38, 40, 

92 

stationing of: 3 1,98- 99, 112,117,120.133, 

150,212,243.252,306,338.340,344, 

422- 23 

lnl:,ntry divisions. composition of 

AIM: 355 

Annyofthe Potomac: 12- 13, 14 

AH A- I: 265,267.269 

between the world wars: 120, 135, 144-45 

Division Rcstmcturing Study: 380, 382- 84 

Field Se""ice Regufllliolls of 1905: 24- 25 

Field Se,.";<:e Regufflfiolls of 1910: 27- 28, 

29-30 

Infantry School propos:,1 (I 950s): 264 

KOI'Cnl1 Wnr period: 247 

Lassiter Committee: 91 - 92,94- 95 

Mexican War: 10,11- 12 

Modemization Board: 127.129- 33 

pentomic: 276- 77.281- 82.284,286 

Pershing 1'1'0I>OS.1I: 87.90 

l)Cst- World W.,r 11 : 223,4 16- 17 

Punitive Expedition: 35 

Revolutionary War: 3,5 

ROAD: 296-98.308.309,3 14, 335,346- 47, 

353- 54, 382, 384 

square: 47-48,55,57,58,60,72- 73.83, 

85- 86.87,90,91- 92.94-95,125- 26. 

127,4 14.4 15,416 

Stimson Plan: 33 

Superior Uo:rrd recommendations: 84-86 

triangular: 24,33.90.94.1 25- 26. 127.135, 

143-44,161, 170,247,264,415- 16 

in Victn:rm: 326- 27 

Warofl81 2: 7- 8 

War with Spain: 16- 17 

World War I: 47- 49.52- 53,54,55.83 

Infnntry divisions, designations for 

air 3ssault divisions: 356 

ainnobilc divisions: 334-35 

Civil War: 14,16 

and designations ror brigades: 57- 58, 

306-07, 3221144 

Field Se/'vice Regll/miolls of 1910: 28 

Mc;>(iclU' War: 12 

post- World W;trl l: 2 12- 13,2 17 
458 

Inf..111'ry divisions, designations for- Continued 

priorities for: 213,422- 23 

territorial: 99 

used for replacement training centers: 222 

World War I: 57- 58 

World War II : 156 

Infmllry divisions. numhcrs of: 364- 65,403, 

42 1- 24 

aOcr the war in Vietnam: 325,332- 33 

between Ihe world wars: 86-87,97- 98, 101, 

104 

posi- Korean War: 252.254,279.284,286 

posl-Victnam: 346,353- 57,36 1 

po5l- World War II: 207,208,2 12 

World War I: 55.57- 58, 64, 73 

World War II: 169,179, 192.193.207 

Infantry divisions, stalT 

ATFA- I: 265,267,269 

chief of staff: 24-25. 28, 49. 55 

Civil War: 12. 14 

Ft.-dend Service R'1:lIhlliOl/s of 1905: 24-25 

Federal Sen'ice Regll/miolls of 1910: 28 

Mexican War: 12 

Modcmization Board: 129, 132 

orguni1 .. 1tion of: 67 

posl- Revolutionary War: 6- 7 

Rcvoluliona ry War: 3 

ROClD: 282 

Warof l81 2: 9 

WlIr with Spain: 17 

World War 1: 49,55,67 

World War 11 : 18 1 

Infantry divisions, strength 

1917: 38 

1940: 144-45, 150,155,161 

1943: 180-82 

1945: 1%, 199 

1946: 2 11- 12 

I 970s: 353- 54 

AH A- I: 265,267,269 

between the world wars: 8 1,98, 1061142, 

127, 132, 133 

Federal Service Regula/ialls of 19 10: 28 

lind Genernll30ard (ETO): 223 

Inr.,ntry School proposlIl ( 19505): 264 

in Japan : 239 

and lassiter Committee: 91- 92, 95 

Mexican border buildup, 191 1: 30 

Modenlizntion Board: 127, 132, 133 

motori zed divisions: 166 

pentomic divisions: 276-77. 282 

Pershiug proposal: 87.90 

post- Korean War: 252 

post- World War 11: 2 12 

Revolutionary W:lr: 5 

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

Infantry divisions, strength- Continued 

ROCID: 282 

Stimson Plan: 33 

SU[lCriof Bo,\rd recommendations: 85 

War lIIilh Sp:li1l: 17 

World War I: 49,52- 53,67.7 1 

World War II : 180- 81 

In fantry divisions, t"blcs of organization 

1917: 37- 38 

1940: 169-70 

1942: 161 

1943: 180-82 

1945: 96, 198- 99 

lassiter Committee: 92. 95 

post- Korean War: 252 

post- World WHf II : 222- 23,225,227,252 

ROAD: 298 

ROCID: 276- 77,279.282,284,286 

World War I: 49,55 

Inr:lI1lry divisions (units) 

101 h: 250, 25 1. 253. 279. See also 

Mountain Division, 10th. 

23d: 252. 254, 33 1, 332, 334, 335 

241h, See Infantry Division, 24th. 

25th. See Infantry Division. 25th. 

26th: 58.60.67. 68, 100. 159- 60,2 14,341 . 

367, 400, 423- 24 

27th: 68, 100, 159, 2 14,255- 56 

28th: 68, 100. 159,214, 243,246-47,250- 5 I. 

328,367,400.423- 24 

29th: 2 14, 340, 397, 40 I 

301h: 68, 100, 152, 159,2 14,255- 56, 36 1 

] ls1: 58.69.71.100, 101 , 159,21 4,24]. 

250- 51 

32d: 58,68,79, 100, 159. 2 14,305.307 

33d: 58,68,79. 100, 159- 60, 214 

34th: 58,7 1, 100,187.214,3 12 

35th: 58.68. 100,2 14,312,395, 401 

36th: 58, 100,1 59, 2 14, 328 

37th: 58, 100, 159,2 14.243-44,246,250- 51 

38th: 58,71,100,2 14,328,367,400, 424 

39th: 58.69,71,100- 101 ,2 14 

40th: 58,69,7 1, 100,115,2 11 ,2 14, 243, 

244-46.249,255- 56,361, 401 

41st: 58.60.62.67,68.69.7 1, 100,1 52, 

159,2 14,328 

42d: 60,67,68.79. 100, 190,208,214,341. 

367.400, 423- 24 

43d: 100. 159.2 14.243,246-47,250-51. 

312 

441h: 100, 12 1, 152,2 14-15.243-44,246, 

250,251,255- 56 

451h: 100,1 52.2 14,215.243.244-46,249. 

250 

46th: 2 14 
INDEX 

Infantry divisions (units)- Continucd 

47th: 214,243.251,328, )40. 367, 400 

48th: 214,215,255- 56 

491h: 328 

51st: 214,215,312 

52d: 214.220- 21 

S3d: 312 

551h: 312 

61sl: 204//36 

62d: 2041136 

63d: 190,255, )09, 329 

671h: 2041136 

68th: 2041136 

69th: 190,251. 254 

70th: 190,255 

71sl: 252.254 

72d: 2041136 

73d: 204//36 

74th: 2041136 

75th: 190,255.424 

76th: 58,60,69.7 1.101 ,179,217,255.372 

77th: 58,60,68,101, 169.2 17,309,329 

78th: 58,60,68,101, 179.255,372.424 

79th: 58, 60, 67, 101, 217. 309, 312, 329 

801h: 58,60,67,68,101. 217,255,372, 

424. See als/) Airbomc divisions, 801h. 

8 lst: 58,60,72,101,217,309,329 

82d: 58,60.68,101.166-67. Seea/so 

Airbomc Division, 82d. 

8ld: 58.60,69,7 1,101,217,309.329 

84lh: S8. 60, 71. 101. 255.424. Seed/SO 

Airborne divisions, 84th. 

85th: 58,60,69,7 1, 101. 217, 255, 372. 424 

86th: 58,60,7 1, 101 ,200,208,2 17 

87th: 58,60,71,101,217,255,424 

88th: 58,60.101,21 1- 12.217.232 

89th: 58,60,79.101, 188,2031127,217, 

255.372 

90th: 58,60,79,101,172,182,217,309.329 

9lst: 58,60,10 1,217,255,372,424 

92d: 62- 63,81,1071153,170.220 

93d: 170.220 

94th: 63-64,101, 107115J, 217, 309, 312, 329 

95th: 66, 101,200,217,255,424 

96th: 66.101,217,309.312,329 

97th: 66.101,170,179.190.200,217 

98th: 66, 101, 217, 255. 424. See a/so 

Airbomc di visions. 98th. 

99th: 66,10 1,217,306- 07 

100th: 66. 101, 255. 305 , 307, 372. 424. 

See (I/so Airbo111c divisions, 100th. 

101st: 66.101,166- 67. Sec (llsQ Airborne 

Division.lO lst. 

102d: 66,101.217.309,329 

103d: 101.107//53.169.217.309,312,329 

Infantry divisions (units)- Continued 

104th: 101,1071153,200,2 17.284, 424 

105th: 170 

100th: 190,221 

107th: 170 

459 

108th: 255,424. See 1I1S() Airbome divisions, 

108th. 

Infantry fighting vchicle, Bradley: 386,389 

Infantry regimcnts: 3- 7, 14,20113,28,29.33, 

38,48,53,54,55,57.8 1,92,1 11- 12. 

127,130- 3 1, 160- 61. 163, 180-8 1, 

182,198,199,225.227.247 48 

Infantry regiments (units) 

5th: 188, 241 

6th: 147,150 

91h: 61 

91h, 3d Ballalioll: 249- 50 

14th: 188. 249- 50 

15th, 3d Batlalion: 249- 50 

16th: 52 

161h, Isi llallalion: 3501137 

18th: 52 

21sl, 3d Battalion: 346 

23d: 61 

241h: 99,239,249- 50 

25th: 99 

26th: 52 

28th: 52 

28th, 3d Ballalion: 367 

34th: 121,159,241.249- 50 

60th, 5th Ballalion: 350l/J7 

65th: 242 

86th: 188 

87th: 188 

87th. 3d B:l!lalion: 372, 402 

121st: 159 

1241h: 159 

132d: 159- 60 

133d, 2d Bal1alion: 332 

161st; 159 

182e!: 159- 60 

325th: 264 

3271h: 167 

332d: 69 

339th: 69 

373d: 64 

3741h: 64 

3751h: 64 

376th: 64 

442d, 100lh Battalion: 332,355 

503d, I st and 2d Battlc Groups: 3 12 

Infantry School: 87,90, 126,159 

divisional studies: 263-64 

suppon brigade: 281 , 337- 38, 355- 56. 373 

InOucn7.a cpidcmics: 771159 
460 

Ingk-s, U . Col.l-lany: 133,1411146 

Insignia: 58,62,72, 111,222 

InSj>CClors general: 17,24--25.28,30. 5S 

Inler·American Peace Force: 329 

JOWll 

Army Reserve units: 340-4 1 

N:ltionul Guard units: 2 17.] 12. 332 

Italy: 69.198.208,21 1- 12.217,232 

Ives, Maj. J. Ross: 1071150 

" Ivy Division." See Infantry Division, 4th. 

Japan: 208,211- 12,232,239,240-41,244-46, 

249,279 

Johnson, Gencl1lll-larold K.: 324.326 27,334 

Johnson, Louis: 243, 332 

Johnson, Lyndon 13.: 323.325.329- 30,332 

Joint Chie fs ofStalT 

and ainnobilily of Amly units: 316 

and Dominican Republic: 329 

and Korean War: 240,243- 44 

Jones, Maj. Gen. Lloyd E.: 188 

Joyce, Urig. Gen. Kenyon A.: 135.145,147 

Judge advocates: 9, 25.28.55 

Kansas National Guard units: 3 12, 332, 395 

Kennedy. John F.: 291,303,3 18 

Kentucky National Guard units: 383,395 

Kibler, Brig. Gen. A. Franklin: 222- 23 

Kilooumc, Brig. Gcn. Charlcs E.: 120 

King, Maj. Campbell: 90.94 

Knox, HCIJl"y: 7 

Korc" 

miliulI)' advisory group in: 2 11 

occupation forces in: 208.211,232 

U.S. forces in: 239- 56,258,,/7,279,284, 

286,305,308.3 16. 318.323.332- 33, 

400-401,422 

Korean Augmelltation to the United States 

Amly (KATUSA) program: 240, 242, 

284.286,308,400-40 1.418 

Knlcger, Maj. Gen. Walter: 132, 133 

L"ird. Mc lvin R. : 353 

Lane. Capt. Anhur W.: 90 

Lassiter. Col. William: 31, 87, 90 

Lassiter Committee (1920): 90-92. 94-95 

Leadcrship academics: 370.372. See(llso 

Training divisions. 

Lee. Maj. Gell. Charles: 3- 4 

Lce. Brig. Gen. William c.: 166 

Legion of the United Slates: 6-7 

Liddel1l1arl. Basil: 120,122 

Liggell. Maj. Cell. Hunter: 60 

Light dragoons: 5- 6 

Light (Pack) Di vision. 89th: 188,190. See 

MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

Lighl (I'llck) Division, 89th- Continued 

(llso Infantry divisions, 891h. 

Lincoln, Abraham: 12,13 

Liller b..111:11ions: 85. St.'!! (liso Medical regiments. 

Little John rockets: 300, 305, 314, 3 16, 3 18 

Lock, Maj. Morris E.: 74111 2 

Logan, Maj. James A.: 34 

Lanning, Col. St:lIlley N.: 263 

Louisiana Natiol1;ll Guard units: 100-101. 

361,365 

Lynch. Maj. Gen. Gl'Orge A.: 130 

Lynch. Maj. Gen. Gcorge E.: 269 

MacArthur. General Douglas: 60 

as Chier ofStnO': 117. 120, 123, 126 

and Korean Wllr: 240-42 

and World War II: 156, 158, 187, 19[ 

McC[el[an, Maj. Gen. Georgc B.: 12- 13 

McC[ure, Orig. Gen. Nathaniel F.: 33, 41 3 

McElroy, Neil l L: 284 

Machinc Gun Battalion, 3d: 60 

Machinc Gun Ballalion [Marines), 6th: 61 

Machine gun b.1ualions: 52, 55,67, 84, [27, 

145.147 

Machine gun companies: 33,38,48,53,67, 

7 1,84,90,92. 122, 130.131 

Machine gun squadrons: 95,115,135 

Machine gun troops: 211,1 12, [ 15, 125,135, 

137, 145, [61 

Machine guns 

.30-ealiber: 13 1. [67 

.50-ca[iber: 13 1, 144. 161 

air-cooled: 126 

antiaircraft: 67 

M60: 286. 305 

McKinley, William: 16-17 

McNair, LI. Gen. Lesley J.: 130-3 1, 159. 

160- 61. 163, 166-67, ISO. 181 - 82, 

184-85. 187- 88,20 1,4 16 

McNamara, Robert S.: 303,305- 06,307,314, 

316,3 18,325,326,328- 29,338,340-4 1 

McNamey, Gcncra[ Joseph T.: 169, 182, [88, 

213- [4 

Magruder. Brig. Gen. Bnlce: 147, 149,150 

Maintcnance battalions: 163, [85,223,267. 

269,272.296-97.337,382.386.393, 

397.400,401 

Maintenance cOIllp.1nics: 229.265.338,340, 

380,386 

Maneuver arca commands: 372 

751h: 255, 424 

871h: 255, 424 

Mancuvcr Division (1911): 29- 30.34 

Mancuver clements, intcrch;1I1gability of: 29 [, 

296,297- 98,303.308,309 
INDEX 

M:LIlcuvcrs,lmining 

1902: 25 

1904: 25 

1927: 112 

1940: 143-44 

General Hcad<[uartcrs (O HQ): 143-45, [47, 

153, [54-55, 160, 161 , 163, 173111 

Louisiaml: 143-45, 147, 17311 2 

National Guard: 100- 101,361 ,365 

Mallll, James Robert: 151131 

Mann, Brig. Gen. Willinlll A.: 40, 60,751131 

March, Gencrol Peyton C.: 62,80- 81,83,86. 

92,95,97.98,99 

Marine Brigade, 4th: 60, 98 

Marines 

5th: 60-61, 98 

61h: 61 

Marsh, John 0.: 4091136 

M:'lrShall, Gcncml George c.: 90,94, 130, 

133,137 1~ 1~150,15 3, [54,1~ 

158- 59,160- 61,166,179,180.181 - 82, 

190,192, 194,212,4 16 

Maryland National Guard units: 2 15 , 367, 397 

Massachusetts 

Amly Reserve units: 312,340-41 

National Guard units: 159- 60 

Mnlcricl l1111nagcl11cnt centers: 354-55, 356, 

357,386.393.397,401 

Mt,(;hanization: 120- 23,125,149 

Mechanized Force: 123, 124 

Mechanized Force 13oard: 122, 1401/35 

Mechanized infantry baualions: 365, 366- 67, 

402 

and AIM: 354,355 

and AmlY of Excellence: 400-40 I 

in Army Reserve: 341 

nnd Division-86: 389 

and Division Restructuring Study: 380 

in Europe: 337 

National Gunrd: 309,336,3511148 

in Regular Anny divisions: 344 

reorganized as infantry ballalions: 324,327 

and ROAD: 296,297,306,307- 08,309, 

384,386 

and TRJCAP/ACC13 : 359 

in Vietnam: 325, 326- 27,332,335,336, 

3501/37 

wCllpo ns for: 374115 

Mechanized inf.1llt ry divisions: 149- 50,293, 

296- 98,306,308,336,344.353- 55,364. 

380,383.389,395 

Medie,llbauulions: 49,1 19, 144, ISO, 181, 

185,225,277,296-97,382, 386,389, 

393,397.400,401 

Medical companics: 194- 96.225,265,269, 

Medical companics- Continucd 

272,274,28 1,338,340,386 

461 

Medical detachments: 129.194-96.225.239. 

269 

Medical regiments (divisional): 94, 11 2 

Medical squadrons: 115,135, 13 7, 147. 191 

Medical units (early): 28,30.35.115 

Mediterranean theater: 190.191 

Meuse-A rgonne campaign: 7 1, 72- 73 

Mexican Revolution: 29- 30 

Mcxican Wllr: 10- 12 

Mexi!':o: 10- 12,29- 30,34- 37,64,99 

Meyer. General Edward c.: 379.384, 389, 

390.391 

Michig,lll Nlltional Guard units: 367 

Miles. Maj. Gen. Nelson A.: 17 

Military districts: 27 

Military history detachments: 330 

Military intelligence baualions: 384.386,389. 

392- 93.397,401,4101140 

Military intelligence briglldes: 392 

Militnry intclligence companics: 355,402 

Miliwry intclligencc detachments: 276,330 

Military personnel, shortages of 

for Amly-86: 389- 90 

bctwecn the world wnrs: 81,111 - 11, 120,147 

post- Korean War: 252, 256, 308 

post-Vietnam period: 361, 366 

post- World Wnr II: 212.22 1- 22 

reserve units: 221 - 22, 367. 370, 372 

Rcvolulionnry War: 3,5 

in Vietnam: 326.328- 29.347 

World War J: 71 

World War I I: 172, 180, 182. ! 92, 198, 199 

Militllry 1}()lice 

ATFA- I: 267 

sources for: 33, 3501134 

World War J: 52- 53,84 

Military police companies (divisional): 159 

AmlyofExccllence: 392- 93 . 397 

ATFA- l: 267,269 

in brigades: 326 

Gencral 130,lrd (ETO): 223 

in Japan: 239 

Lassiter Committee: 94 

Modernization Board: 131 , 132 

motorized divisions: 163.166 

I}()st- World War II: 227,239 

ROAD divisions: 296.384 

World War II: 198- 99 

Military police groups: 392 

Military police platoons: 161 , 167. 181. 182. 

194-96.330 

Militia brigades: 6- 8. 10, 12, 16. See also 

NllIional GUllrd. 
462 

Militia Bureau: 40,57, 115,116 

Millikin, MlU. Gen. John: 188 

Minnesota 

Amly Reserve \lnil~: 312,340-41 

Naliolllli Guard units: 115.153, 217,243 

Missiles 

Chaparral: 354-55,389 

ENTAC: 297 

Lance: 354-55 

Rcdcyc: 337 

Stinger: 389,393 

TOW: 354,374115,380, 382,383, 386, 393, 

397, 400 

Mississippi Nationa! Guard units: 100- 101 , 

24],361 

Missouri Nlltional Guard units: 312, 314, 395 

Mitchell, Co1. William (Billy): 91 

Mobile, Ala.: 16 

Mobile Afloat (Riverine) Force: 325 

Mobility Requirements l3oard: 314 

Mobilization planning: 414- 15 

1970s: 370,371 - 72 

aficr the War with Sp,Lin: 23- 24 

bCllI'ccnthcworldwMS: 87,98,99.101, 

104,115,117,120, 143-44, 

"comc-as-you-arc for \VnT" mode: )70,384, 

386 

Korean War: 24).--45,254 

lack of: 30 

pre-World War I: 34-35,38 

post- World War II : 214 

Stimson l'I,m: 31- 34 

Moderni;.:ation Board: 127,129- 33.135.137. 

1411146 

Mohr, Maj. Gen. Henry: 370 

MOMAR- I (Modern Mobile Arnly 1965): 

291,293 

Montana ArnlY Reserve units: 312 

Monterrey, Mexico: 10 

Moore, Maj. Dan T.: 48.52 

Moore, Lt. Gen. James E.: 282 

Mortar batteries: 272, 276, 277. See al,\'o 

Baltle grOUI)S. 

Mortar platoons: 282, 325.335,393 

Mortars 

4.2-inch: 247-48,265, 272, 282.286.335, 

393 

60-m111.: 167 

81-lnm.: 127, 131. 144. 147, 167,247-48. 

335 

Slakes: 54,55, 67,84-85 

Moseley, Cap\. George Van Horn: 31.32 

Motor repair sections: 112. 122 

Motor vehicles 

arnlOrcd: 122- 23,127.150, 161,163,198 

MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

Motor vehicles-Continued 

nrmorcd personnel enrricrs. See ArnlOrcd 

personnel cnrriers. 

half·wlck: 150 

HMMWVs: 393 

maimenance of: 129,132 

nUl11bcrsof: 95, 121 , 150,161,182,184, 

277,314, 318,325 

repair of: 161. 163 

scout cars: 150 

variety of: 184, 185 

Motorcycles: 95, 121 , 161, 184, 185, 386, 

389,393 

Motori zation: 120- 23,126,133,172,182,184 

Motorized divisions 

1940s: 163, 166 

1980s: 395, 397,400 

41h: 172,182,184 

6th: 182 

8th: 182 

9th: 391 

90th: 182 

Mountain Division. 10th: 190,193,200, 213, 

395,402,4091136,423,425. See also 

Int:1ntry divisions. 10th. 

MUTl11ansk Expedition: 69 

Mustcrofficers: 24- 25,28 

Naco. Ariz.: 34 

"National ArnlY" units: 55 , 80, 81 

National Defel1~e Act of 1916: 37,55,57, 65, 

83 

National Defense Act of 1920: 86- 87,95, 97. 

99- 100, 1071149.109,213- 14,2341116 

N;nional Guard 

allotment of units: 99- 10 I. 214-15, 309 

command headquarters maintained: 312 

undCongress: 4311/2, 213- 14 

districts: 32, 36 

federalization of: 36,37,55,58,65,152- 53, 

243-44.246.249,250-51.305.332 

officer billets: 153, 214 

and pentomic divisions: 284,286 

post- World War 11 reorganization o f: 213- 17 

round-out units. See Round-out units. 

Selected Reserve Force: 328- 29, 341 

state units. Sce by ill(/il'i(/II(1ls/(l/c. 

troop basis: 214.255- 56 

National Guard Association: 213- 14, 215- 16 

National Guard Bureau: 100, 116,153, 214, 

215.367 

National Guard divisions 

between the world wars: 87, 97,99- 100, 

101. 104. 115- 16 

geographic bases for: 57 
INDEX 

National Guard divisions- COlltinued 

rnulti~talc; 2 15, 3 12, 338, 361, 367, 395 

numbers ofdivisiolls and brigades: 32,37, 

40, 57, 97, 152- 53,2 14, 246, 254, 284, 

286, 309, 338, 340-41, 353, 359, 361, 

367,397,423- 24 

sl<lIC. See by illlliv;dlwi sUlle. 

National Guard of the United Slales: 214,246, 

251 

National Guard units 

command arrangements: 215, 312, 338, 36 1, 

395 

deSignations of: 57- 58,246 

dndlccs assigned 10: 152- 53 

tederal recognition of: 115,215 

and Field Service Regllia/iolls of 1905: 25 

missions of: 25. 32, 97, 2 14 

mobilization of( 1940): 152- 53 

preservation of hislOrical continuity in: 

214- 15 

reorganized: 1 15- 16, 158- 60, 215, 220- 22. 

284,309.312,314,338,340-41,359, 

361,367,395,401- 02 

replacements for fcdeTlllized units: 246 

state. See by ;,,(/;v;((II(l1 stale. 

"National" regiments: 29 

National Security Act of 1947: 227 

Ncbraska National Guard units: 312.395 

Ncvad:1 National Guard units: 403 

New Calcdonia: 159 

New Guinea: 187- 88,191 

New Jcrscy National Guard units: 214- 15, 

367,401 

New Mcxico National Guard units: 36,217 

New Orleans, La.: 16 

New York National Guard units: 27.32.36, 

115,153,2 14,255- 56,367.395 

New York Timcs: 130 

Nixon. Richard M.: 341,344.346 

Nison Doctrine: 346,353 

North African theater: 172, 179,18 1- 82, 184, 

187- 88,190- 91 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): 

207,246-47, 250.307,337.344.347. 

359.403 

North Carolina National Gunrd units: 255- 56, 

361 

North Dakota National Guard units: 217, 243 

Nuclear battlefield: 263.267.270- 71. 281- 82, 

286.291,293,297,298 

Nuclcar wcapons, tactical: 207,263,270 

Davy Crockctt: 297.298,308,324,337 

doctrinc for thc lise of: 272. 298 

I-lonest John: 271,274.277,282,296- 97, 

298,300,305,307,308,309.324,354- 55 

463 

Nuclcnr weapons, tactical-Continued 

Little John: 300, 305. 314. 316, 318 

placement in military organizations: 263, 

267,271,272,274,276- 77,279.282, 

293,296- 97,308,316.318,417 

Nunn 1Ullendmcnt: 366- 67,3761131 

Obscrvation S{IUadrons: 125,135, 137 

Occupation forces: 207- 08 

Austria: 208 

Germany: 208, 211 

Italy: 208 

Japan: 208 

Korca: 208, 21 1,232 

Philippine Islands: 208 

Officcr billcts 

AmlY Rcservc: 284, 309, 312 

brigades: 28 1, 312 

divisions: 91.129,132, 133, 144-45, [85. 

223,224,227 

Gcncral Board (ETO): 224-25 

Modernization Board: 129.132,133 

National Guard: 153,2 14 

post- World War II: 224-25,227 

ROAD: 296- 97,309,3 12 

ROCID: 282 

ROTAD: 276 

shortagcs or: 17,58 

tmining of: 58 

Officers, lack of: 54-55 

Ohio National Guard units: 243-44,367.424 

Okinawa: 305,309,3 12,323,344 

Oklahoma National Guard units: 215.243 

"Old Ironsides." See AmlOred Division, 1st. 

'·Old Rcliablcs." See Inflmtry Division. 9th. 

Olivcr. Robert Shaw: 27 

Onc Station Unit Training program: 372 

Opcrations 

B IG Ltn: 305 

DESERT SfllELO/DESERT STOR"t: 403, 

407,421 , 425 

JUST CAUSE: 403, 425 

TORCIl : 179 

Ordnancc battalions: 150,247,277 

Ordnancc companies; 94, 125, [3 [, 132, 150. 

163,166, 167, 181,182.194-96.281 

Ordnance light maintcnance company: 161 

Ordnancc rnaill1enance companies: 94, 95 

Ordnance maintenance platoon: 122 

Ordnanccofficers: 12.14,17,24-25,28.55. 

92,94 

Ordnance troops: 135,137 

Oregon National Guard units: 403 

Organized Reserve Corps: 37,2341116 

cavalry divisions: 97- 98, 101, 120. 170 
I 

464 

Organized Reserve Corps-Continued 

illf:mlry divisions: 97- 98.169- 70,217,254 

missions: 97, 214 

organization of units: 101. I 16-17, 169- 70 

post- World War II reorganization of: 213- 17 

strength: 87,97- 98.109 

troop basis: 215,217 

units: 166.169- 70.215- 17.220- 22.229. 

232 

usc of dcsignntions for independent brigades: 

306-07 

Pack IT:lins: 24,25,28,33 

Page, Maj. J. Walt: 1071150 

Paladin: 425. See also Howitzer.;, 155-111111. 

I'almer, Gcncmll3rucc, Jr.: 338,357,359 

I'almer, Lt. Co1.10hn McAuley: 31,48,52 

)';mama Canal ZOlle: 99, 1071149 

infantry regiments from: 65 

U.S. forces in: 252,307,309.333,338,356, 

372- 73,402, 403,423 

l'anzcrdivisions(Gcrman): 147, 149- 50 

Paper orglmiznlions 

field annics: 28- 29 

inf.111lry divisions: 98.101. 104. 109- 12, 

120,208,344,347,356, 417- 18 

Pnnlehute field artillery battalions: 193 

PiH'<lchute Infuntry Brigade, 1 st: 169 

I'nf:tehute infnntry regiments: 166-67,193, 

194--96 

502d: 167 

504th: [67 

Parachute maimcnancc companies: 194--96,229 

I'nfkcr. Maj. Gcn. Fmnk: 122,125- 26 

Parson. Maj. Gen. James K.: [30 

P,ltch, Maj. Gen . A[exilllder M.: 159- 60 

Pathfinder teams: [93, 229 

Pnttcrson, Robert 1'.: 199 

PaxolI, Frederic L.: 81 

Paymllsters: 20112 

Pennsylvania 

Anny Reserve units: 3 [2. 340-4 [ 

Nationa[ Guard units: 32,36,243.367 

I'ENTANA. See "Doctrina[ illld 

Orgllnizationll[ Concepts for AtomicNonatomie Amly During the Period of 

1960- 1970." 

Pentomic divisions: 270- 77,279. 281 - 82, 284, 

286. 2881124. 1127, 291,297,303,307-08, 

31S 

Pershing, General John J. : 35, 36-37, [051117 

:IS chicf of stll1T: 94- 95, 11 I 

<lnd Lassiter Commillee: 90,91,92,94,95 

lind Superior Bonrd: 83.85- 86.87.90, 

105/112 

MANEUVER AN D FIREPOWER 

Pershing, Genera[ 10hn 1.- Continued 

lind World War I: 49,52,53,54--55,58, 

60-6 [ ,64,65,67-69.71 - 72. 761132, 79, 81 

Personnel service companies: 265, 267, 382, 

401 

Peyton, Co1.l'hilip B.: 1411146 

Philippine Islands: 18, 99,1071149 

militia in: 66 

occupation forces in: 208 

and Philippine Seoll1s: 99.158,212 

and World War I: 65- 66 

and World Warl l: 152, 156,158,[59 

Photogmphic sections: 85, 112 

Pioneer infantry: 27,54,66 

Porter, M:lj. Gen. R:ly E.: 2 16 

Powell, Genem l Herbert B.: 293.296,298, 

300,303,306 

Preparedness movcment: 32 

Provisioual lnf.1ntry Division (1'1 0): 130 

l>rovisiOllal Tank Brigade: 147.149,150 

[>rovost marshals: 24- 25, 28, 33, 129, 131 

Public infomlation detaehmcnts: 330 

Public Works Administration: 121 

Puerto Rican Mobile Force: 153 

PuerlO Ricans. segregation of: 63- 64. 242 

Puerto Rico: 18, 99 

infantry regimcnt frolll: 57,242 

Niltiona[ Guard units: 153, 221, 284, 402 

U.S. forces in: 252 

Punitivc Expedition: 35- 37 

Quakcmcyer, Cal)!. John J.: 7411J2 

Quartcrmastcr airdrop equipmcnt companies: 

397 

Qu<lt1crmasterbal1alions: 131- 32,133.150, 

161,223,227 

Quartcrmaster compllnics: 125, 161, 18 [, 182. 

194- 96,229,277.281 

QuartermastcrCorps: 33,57, ISO 

Quartennaster light maintenance comp,mies: 

129, 132 

QUllrtennasler service comp..1nies: , 27, 129, 131 

Quartermaster squadrons: 135,137, 147 

Quartcrmastcrtrains: 92, 112 

Quarccrmastcrs: 4--5, 8- 9. 10, 12, 14, 17. 

20n2. 24--25, 28, 55 

Racial integr:ltion of the Army: 249- 50 

Radar sections: 281 

Radio intelligence platoons: 181. Sce ats() 

Signal com panics. 

Radiological centers: 284 

Ibdios: 30,84,335 

cxeess of: 382- 83 

I'M: 267 
INDEX 

Radios- Continued 

tIl'O-wlly: 122- 23 

"Rainbow Division": 60. See (I{SO lllf.1l1try 

divisions, 42d. 

Ready Reserve: 255 

Receiving companies: 284 

Reckard, Maj. Gen. Milton A.: 1071150,215- 16 

Reconnaissance 

air squadrons used for: 38,85,94 

aircraft used for: 30 

as cavalry mission: 48-49,1 23, 127 

Reconnaissance airoomc assault vehicles: 300. 

357 

Reconnaissance and SlIIVCilllll1CC ]>lnloon5: 277, 

282,284 

Reconnaissance battalions: 149, [63,227,267, 

269,277 

Reconnaissance COml)anics: 163, 225, 229, 239, 

265 

R("~ollnais~ancc platoons: 194- 96, 282, 297, 

325,393 

Reconnaissance s([lmdrons: 127, 13 1. 135, 

137, 161, 172, 185, 248-49, 276- 77, 282, 

284,2881124,296- 97,298.300.309.324, 

335,337,382,384,386,389,393.397, 

400 

Rcconnaiss.1nce Troop, 99th: 306 

Reconnaissance troops, brigades: 281, 303, 

325,326.346 

Rcconnaissance troops, divisional: 144.159. 

161,169- 70,182,185,191,198- 99.272. 

276,425 

Reed. Maj. Gen. George W.: 64 

Regimental combat teams 

as basis of divisions: 252, 415 

eliminated: 281,284 

Modemization Board: 129.131 

WorldWarll: 144- 45, 172 

Regimcntal combat teams (units) 

4th: 281 

5th: 241 

65th: 242 

187th: 274 

508th: 274 

Register ojthe Ar/lly. The ( 1813): 8-9 

Reillforcement bnHalions: 223 

" Reorganization Objcctive Amly Divisions 

(1961- 1965)" (ROAD). See by type oj 

divisioll. 

Replacement and school divisions: 54,67.68 

Rep];lcclIlcnt eOlllp:lIIies: 225.227.229.239 

Replacemcnt personne! 

post- World War II : 223,270 

World War I: 62, 63, 68. 69. 71, 73, 761132 

World War 11: 179, 198 

465 

Replacement systems: 240, 241, 252- 53. See 

(1150 GVRoscorr.; program. 

l{ eplacementtraining centers: 222,249, 

254- 55,284,286 

Reporl 01/ the Orgallizmioll oj Ltllld Forces oj 

Ihe Ullited States (Stimson ['[an): 31 

Repub[ic of Korea Amly: 240,250.251, 

271 - 72 

Rescrve command (amlored divisions): 185, 

227 

Reserve Omcer Training Corps (ROTC): 222, 

418 

Reservists, individual: 87,97,243 

Resor, Stanley: 341 

Return of Forces to Europe (REFORGIOR): 337. 

See also Exercises. 

Revolutionary War: 3- 7 

Rhode Island National Guard units: 243 

Rich, Lt. Gen. Charles W. G.: 316 

Richards, Col. George c.: 1071150 

Ridgway, General MaHhew 13.: 166, 193- 94, 

249- 50,252,264- 65,270- 71 

Rines 

automatic: 53.67.741114, 180- 81,247- 48. 

305,318,325,335 

Browning(BAR): 67,74/114 

Garand: 129 

M 14: 286,305,318.325 

MI6(MX16EI ): 318,335 

reeoillcss: 198,2051157,247-48,286,300, 

335,354,374115 

semiautomatic: 122- 23.126.129 

Riverine operations: 325 

ROAD divisions. See by Iype ojdivisioll. 

ROCAD (Reorganiz.1tion of the Current 

Annorcd Division). See AmlOrcd divisions. 

Roehcnbaek.l3rig. Gen. Samuel 0.: 91 

ROCID (Rcorganization of the Current 

Infantry Division). See Infantry divisions. 

Rockets 

air-to-ground: 314 

Honest John: 271,274,271. 282, 296-97, 

298,300,305,307,308,309,324,354-55 

Littlelohn: 300,305.314,316.318 

Illultiple.launeh: 40 1,425 

Sllrfaee-to-surfhcc: 27 1 

Rooscvelt, Franklin D.: 154,169 

Root, Elihu : 23,25 

Rosson. Maj. Gen. William E.: 3491120 

ROTAD (Reorganization of the Airbomc 

Division). See Airborne divisions. 

Round-out units: 337,355,357,359,361, 

364-65.370,373.395,400,402,403, 

4101144,418,421 - 22,426 

Rumbold, Col. Frank M.: 1071150 
466 

Russia: 65,69,74117 

Russian Amly: 125 

S~n Antonio, Tex .: 29- 30 

San Diego, Calif.: 29- 30 

Sanitary (collecting) baUalion~: 94. Sec (l/:m 

Medical regiments. 

Sanitary trains: 38,67,85,94 

Saxe, Marshal Maurice de: 7 

Schofield Barracks, Hawaii: 99, 112,252, 

326,332,338,355,361,395,423 

SCOII, Brig. Gen. Charles L.: 150 

Scon, Maj. Gen. !-Iugh L.: 47-48,49,52,62, 

74117 

Scotl. Maj. Gen. Winfield: 7- 8,9,10- 11 

"Screaming Eagles." See Airbomc Division, 

IOlst. 

SC;lman, Maj. Gen. Jonathan 0 .: 324 

Section V committee: 99- 100, 1071150, 

213- 14, 254-55.2601142 

Segregation. racial 

blacks: 62- 63,66,154,170 

Civil War: 15 

Korean War: 242,249- 50 

Puerlo Ricans: 63- 64 

Selected Reserve Force: 328- 29,341 

Service batteries: 181 , 182 

Scrviceconlpanies: 13 1- 32,163,184-85 

Service troops, cavalry regiments: 95, 125 

Service troops command, divisional: 129, 130, 

131, 132 

Services of Supply: 68, 69. 71 

Sheriilim, M551 amlOTC<1 n:~onnaiss..1nce vehicle: 

300, 335, 361 

Sheridan, Maj. Gen. Philip n .: 13 

Ships, shonages of 

World War I: 55, 68 

WorldWarll: 180,182,187- 88,191,193 

Shon, Lt. Gen. Walter C.: 155 

Siberian Expedition (1918): 66 

Siben, Brig. Gen. Willimn L.: 52 

Sicilian eilmpaign: 193 

Signal baualions: 28,38, 49,52- 53,198- 99, 

265,267,269,272,276- 77.296,384, 

392- 93,397 

Signal brigades: 392 

Signal companies: 24, 25, 28, 94, 127, 131. 

132, 149- 50, 181. 182, 359 

Signal detachments: 127, 130 

Signal officers (division stall): 24-25,28,55, 67 

Signal platoons: 28 1, 326,330 

Signal troops: 95,115,135,137 

Signal units: 35, 68,84,335 

Simonds, Maj. George S.: 7411 12 

Snow. Maj. Gen. William J.: 64 

MANEUVER AND FI REPOWER 

Snyder, Maj. Gen. Howilrd M.: 2361141 

Solomon Islands: 187- 88 

Soulh Carolina Natiorml Guard units: 215, 3 12 

South Dakota National Guard units: 217 

South Vietnamese Anlly: 323 

Southwest Asia: 403,407. 421 

Southwest l'acific Area Command: 188, 190, 

191 

Sparks, Lt. Col. Leonard c.: 1411146 

Special Forces Regiment. 1st: 4091125 

Specialwcaponstroops: 135,137, 145,161 

Spragin. Brig. Gen. Roben L.: 188 

Starry, General Donn A.: 383- 84.390- 91 

SllI/elllclll uf IJmper Mili/llry Policy (1915): 

37.38 

Steuben, Maj. Gen. Frederick Wilhelm von: 7 

Stimson, Henry L.: 31, 32, 172, 190- 91 

Stimson PI,m: 31 - 34,36,40 

Stoncman.Brig. Gcn. George: 13 

Stratcgic Army Force (STRAF): 305- 06,307. 

3191121,325,332,338,355- 56,357,373 

Strategic rescrve units: 365 

Stratcgic Striking Foree: 212 

Strength. See by fype of dil'isioll (/lid brigade. 

Sturgis, Lt. Gen. S<lnluel D. , Jr.: 271 

Summerall, Maj. Gen. Charles P.: 54.741112, 

110,112,117.122,123.126 

Superior Board (AEF); 83- 86,87,90,94 

Supply and service battalions: 357 

Supply and lranspon b<lltalions: 267,269, 

296-97,337.382,386,393,397,400,401 

Supply and transport companies: 265.267, 

269,272 

Supply battalions: 163, 185.227 

Supply columns: 24.25,28,29.30,33 

Supply companies: 33,38,48,53,92.386. 

Sec nlso Infantry regiments. 

Supply system, Modernization Board: 127, 

129.131- 32 

Supply trains: 38, 55, 121 . See olw Supply 

eolUnlns. 

Suppon bntlalions: 303,325,326.359,370. 

372,386,401 - 02,425 

Support command (divisional): 265,267, 

269- 70, 296- 97, 298,354.382,384.386, 

389,392- 93,397.400 

Suppon groups, divisional: 272,274,276 

Surgeons: 10, 12, 17, 20112, 24-25, 28 

Surles, Maj. Gen, Alexander D. : 2361141 

Swing, Maj. Gcn. Joseph: 196 

Tables of distribution and alloWilllces: 312, 

3221143 

Tables of organization. See also Airborne 

divisions; Annored divisions; Cavalry 
INDEX 

Tnblcs oforganizalion- Colltinucd 

divisions: Cavalry regiments: Infantry 

divisions; Infantry regiments. 

creation of: 32- 34 

motorized divisions: 150,163 

Tables of organi1..lllion and c(tuipmcnt: 

20211 J 4. See ii/SO Air assault divisions; 

Airoomc divisions; Armored divisions; 

Atomic Field Army; Infantry divisions: 

Training divisions. 

Taft, William Howard: 25,34 

Tank battalions 

ATFA- I: 265,267,269 

Division-86: 386 

and Division Rcstmcturing Study: 380 

GCllcmll30ilrd (ETO): 224 

heavy: 227,229,248--49,267,269 

li!;ht: 122,163,184-85 

medium: 163,166.227,267,269 

post- World War [I: 225,227,239 

ROAD: 296,297,300,306, )08, 309, 365 

ROCAD: 277 

ROCID: 276-77 

as round-out units: 355 

in Vietnam: 324,327,336 

World War II: 196,199 

Tnnk eompnnies: 92,94,115, 121 - 23, 

184-85, 191, 198- 99,239,240,303,380, 

382,386.402 

Tank destroyer b:lualions: 154- 55, 161, 166, 

184, 196, 224 

Tnnk guns 

7S-mm.: 277 

90-mm.: 248,252,277 

120·mm,: 248 

Tnnk units: 85 

T,lIlks: 55,122- 23, ISO, 184, 185,277 

M I Abmms: 389,4091120 

M24: 239 

M41 : 248-49 

M47: 248 

M48: 252 

M48A3: 324,327,335 

M60: 286,305,361,389 

M103: 248 

1'43: 248 

Target acquisition balleries: 382,383,386, 

389,397,425 

Tnrget aequisilion systems: 380 

Task forees 

6814: 159- 60 

"A": 179 

Oregon: 330- 31.3491120 

Smith: 240,252 

Taylor. Genend Maxwell D.: 194,270.27 1- 72, 

467 

Taylor, Geneml M~xwell D.- Continued 

274,276- 77,279,286, 288n27, 291, 303 

Taylor, Brig. Gen. Zachary: 10, II 

Tennessee National Guard units: 255- 56,36 1 

Te;t;as: 10, 34 

as division test site: 130, 135, 143-44 

National Guard: 36, 153. 361, 383, 40 1 

Texas City, Tex,: 34 

Tompkins, Maj. Gen. William F.: 199 

Total Army Training Strategy: 424 

TOW banalions: 380 

TOW companies: 383, 386 

Toyahvale, Tex.: 135 

"Train :lIId retai n" programs: 325 

Training 

advanced individual: 253.254,34 1, 370.372 

air assault: 356 

airborne: 166, 167, 169,190 

amphibious: 180, 187- 88 

annored divisions: 150,372 

Army Reserve units: 424 

artillery units: 68, 69 

artillerymen: 13,52. 115 

basic: 152,253,254,256,286,305,325, 

341,370,372 

eomb,lt support: 370,372 

combined anns: 25,86, 117 

conducted by divisions: 253,254 

corps area responsibility for: 87 

draftees: 57, 60, 325 

in Frnnee, World War I: 52,60,68 

at garrison schools: 25 

Inck offacililics for: 217 

lack of funding for: 2 12 

light divisions: 187- 88 

machine gun units: 68,84 

National Gunrd units: 25,27,87, 152- 53 

officers: 24, 58,222, 418 

One Station Unit Tmining (OSUT) program: 

372 

Organized Reserves: 116- 17.170,217,222 

recruits: 52,372 

of Regulllr and National Guard units together: 

21 

for reservists: 11 6- 17,170,2 17,222,256 

Scott's Regular Anny brigade: 8 

and stationing of divisions: 117, 133 

usc of Regular Amly personnel for: 57,87,97 

War with Spain: 17- 18 

Training areas, World War 1: 57,58,62 

Training brigndes: 372,402-{)3 

Training eC1l!ers: 243, 250, 254, 305, 307,327 

Training divisions: 243,244,249,254,255, 

256,284,286,2901149,305,307,309, 

34 1,370,372.402-03,424 
468 

Training regiments: 284,286,2901149 

Tral1spor1mion 

animals used for. See Animals. 

llSSctS: 28, 35, 95, 167, 169, 180,298 

shortat;cs of: I 1, 30, 71, 180, 182 

Transportation aircraft m:linlcnancc companies: 

393 

Trnnsportation battalions: 276- 77. 282 

Tr:msportnlion companies: 281 

Trench mortar ballcrics: 52- 53,54,84- 85 

Trench mortars: 48 

TRICAP. See Cavalry Division, lsI. 

Troopbnsis: 169, 170,1761155, 190-92,200 

Amly Reserve: 255, 328- 29 

National GLiard: 214- 15,255- 56,309 

Tnlck bal1111iolls (divisional): 127, 129 

Tnlck companies, divisiolllll: 131- 32, 182, 282 

Tnlcks: 121,161,163,181,188 

Tmman, Harry S.: 212,215.239, 240, 

241-42,243, 246-47, 249 

Twaddle, Brig. Gen, I-larry L.: 154,158- 59, 

163, 169. [72 

Union AmlY: 12- 16 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

and Cold War: 207, 242-43,303,305 

and Cuba: 307 

and Europe: 246-47, 248, 353- 54,359,386, 

403,407 

Unit rcplacement systcm. See GYROSCOPE 

program. 

United Nations forces in Korea: 240-41, 242 

U,S.AirForcc: 316,318 

U.S. Arrny, Alaska: 312,346 

U.S. AmlY, Caribbean: 254 

U.S. Army, Europe: 253, 279, 336, 359, 

366- 67, 402,422, 423 

U.S. AmlY, Pacific: 312,332,343 

U.S. AmlY, Vietnam: 324 . 333,334-35,343 

U.S. Anny Airborne Command: 166- 67, 169 

U.s. Amly Combined Arms Combllt 

Development Activity: 4091132 

U.S. AmlY Forces, Far East: 250,2591129 

U.S. Amly Forces Command: 356,364-65, 

366,370.372,400, 402- 03, 424 

U. S. Anny Regimcntal System (USARS): 390 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC): 380, 383, 389- 90,397, 

400-402,425 

U.S. Amly Training Center, Ficld ArtillelY: 

254 

U.s. Congress 

and Anny Reserve: 256 

and m1illery regiments: 43118 

andtheCivilWar: 12,211134 

MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER 

U.S. Congress- Continucd 

and Korean War: 244-45,246 

and Mexican War: 10 

and National Guard: 43///2,152- 53 

;md Org,mized Rescrve Corps: 222 

and post- Revolutionary War military estab· 

lishment: 6- 7 

and Stimson Plan: 31 

;md universal military tmining: 221- 22 

andWarofl812: 7- 8 

U.S. Constabulary: 211 , 213 

U.S. Continental Amly Command 

(CONARC): 253,269- 70,272, 274, 

276-77,279,28 1- 82,284,286, 291,293, 

298,300,303,314.316,328,341,355- 56 

U.S. EUT01lCan Command: 196,200,211 

U.S. Euro1lCan Thcatcr of Opcr.,tions, Gcncml 

Board: 222- 24 

U.S. Marine Corps: 60- 61 , 332 

U.S. Navy, joint operations with: 325 

Universal military training: 86,87,221 - 22 

Van Voorhis. Col. D:miel: 123, 124 

Vance, Cynls R.: 307,308, 309 

Vera Cnlz, Mexico: 34 

VemlOllt National GU<lfd units: 243,312,367 

Veterinary companies: 94,95 

Veterinary troops: 33,94,191 

Vietnam: 323-47 

rcdeploymcnt from: 343-44, 346,3521157 

U.S. forees in: 323- 35,337- 38,346-47, 

3501/34,1/37, 357 

Vietnam, Republic of: 323,341 

Virginia National Guard units: 314,397 

Volunteers: 7- 8. 10-11. 12, 17- 18, 2011 / 3,325 

divisions: 10- 11 

and Korean War: 243 

and National Gu:mi: 256 

as souree for reserves: 222, 256 

Wagner, Col. Arthur L.: 27 

Wagon companics: 112, 121 

Wagon drivers: 33 

Wngon masters: 4-5,8- 9 

Wnlker, Le. Col. Kirby: 74/112 

Walker, Le. Gen. Walton 1-/,: 225, 241,248-49 

"Walker Bulldog." See Tanks. M41. 

Wallace, Brig, Gen. Fred C.: 163 

Waller, William L.: 361 

Walsh, Maj. Gcn. Ellard A.: 213- 14.215- 16 

War. Col. Franklin W.: 1071150 

War Department 

nnd black divisions: 220 

Circulars: 185, 187 

and Organized Reserve Corps fL"{lrganization. 
INDEX 

Wnr Dcparllllcnl Conlinllcd 

1946: 2 15- 17 

imd post- World War II policy: 213- 14 

War Department General Stilff(WOG S) 

creation of: 23 

Opcmlions Division (01'0): 159- 60,1751138 

Organization and Training Division: 229 

nnd (.~ gll1li:wlion of 191 0: 27- 28 

reorgani zation of 1942: 1751138, 1140 

Special Plans Division: 199 

War College Division: 47-48, 49,55,57, 

58,63- 64,761132 

War Plans Division: 63- 64,65,80,87.95, 

97,99, 120 

Warof18 12: 7- 9 

War wilh Spain: 16- 18 

Washington, George: 3- 5,6,2011 2 

Washington National Guard units: 355.359, 

36 1, 365, 400, 403 

Weapons. See by specific type. 

Weeks, John W.: 98,101 

Wcibir, L1. Gen. Wahcr L.: 254 

Weils, Col. Briant H.: 48,52,90.1071150 

West German AmlY: 293,296 

469 

Westem hemisphere, defense of: 143-44 

Weslmoreland. Generul Willinm C: 323.324, 

325,326,327- 28,329- 30,33 1. 332,334, 

344,346.357 

Weyand, General Frederick C.: 326-27,367, 

380 

Wickhnm, Generul John A.: 391 - 93,395.397. 

400-401 

"Wildeal." See Infantry di visions, SIst. 

Wilson, Ll. Col. Clmlmer R. : 1071150 

Wilsoll. Charles E.: 250- 5 1. 252,279 

Wilson, Lt. Col. Guy M .: 1071150 

Wilson, Woodrow: 34,36,52,65,66 

" Wilson Divisions": 252 

Wisconsin National Guard unils: 359,36 1 

Wood, Maj. Gen. Leonard: 29,30 

Woodring, l'larry W.: 11 7 

Young, Maj . Gen. Rober! N.: 252- 53,264 

PIN 07501 1-000