alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CESAR MOISES SANCHEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 14

- 71670

Agency No. A094

- 301

- 658

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted September 27, 2016 **

Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Cesar Moises Sanchez, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s order denying his motion to reopen. Our jurisdiction is

governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

OCT 4 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 14

- 71670

motion to reope n. Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir. 2011). We

deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Sanchez’s motion to

reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than four years af ter the filing

deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)

, and he did not provide sufficient evidence

of changed country conditions to invoke the filing deadline exception, see 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.23(b)(4)(i) . Sanchez’s contention that a change in law makes hi m e ligible

for asylum and thus invokes the exception to the filing deadline is unavailing. See

Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2004) (asserting a change of

law, rather than a change in conditions in the country of removal, is an improper

expansion of the exception).

We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary decision not to

reopen proceedings sua sponte , and Sanchez fails to raise a colorable constitutional

claim or question of law that would invoke our jurisdiction

. See Mejia

- Hernandez

v. Holder , 633 F. 3d 818, 823

- 24 (9th Cir. 2011); cf. Bonilla v. Lynch , No. 12

-

73853, 2016 WL 3741866, at *10 (9th Cir. July 12, 2016) (“ [T] his court has

jurisdiction to review Board decisions denying sua sponte reopening for the limited

purpose of reviewing the reasoning behind the decisions for legal or constitutional3 14

- 71670

error. ”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
<PAGE>                                                      Exhibit 99(a)

                        REPORT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


The Board of Directors and Stockholders
Southwest Bancshares, Inc.

    We have audited the consolidated balance sheets of Southwest Bancshares,
Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1996, and the related consolidated
statements of income, stockholders' equity and cash flows for each of the two
years in the period ended December 31, 1996 (not presented separately herein).
These financial statements are the responsibility of the Company's management.
Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements
based on our audits.

    We conducted our audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards.  Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of
material misstatement.  An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence
supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements.  An audit
also includes assessing the accounting principles used and significant
estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall financial
statement presentation.  We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis
for our opinion.

    In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements referred to above
present fairly, in all material respects, the consolidated financial position
of Southwest Bancshares, Inc. and subsidiaries at December 31, 1996, and the
consolidated results of their operations and their cash flows for each of the
two years in the period ended December 31, 1996, in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles.


/s/ Kemp & Company

Little Rock, Arkansas
January 31, 1997
NOTICE OF PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD

The West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) is announcing an

opportunity for public comment on a proposed revision to the State Implementation Plan (SIP) to

attain and maintain the national ambient air quality standards for ozone and very fine particulate

matter. The SIP is the plan developed by West Virginia in order to fulfill its responsibilities

under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to attain and maintain the ambient air quality standards

promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). The public comment

period begins April 18, 2008 and ends May 19, 2008.

In this proposed revision to the SIP, West Virginia is demonstrating compliance with

specific CAA section 110(a)(2) requirements through a document affirming that the State meets

these express requirements through authorities granted under state laws and regulations, as well

as implementation of existing air programs. DEP is seeking comments on whether the document

adequately demonstrates West Virginia’s compliance with the pertinent federal CAA mandates

related to these so-called infrastructure elements.

Upon completion of the public notice period, and after addressing any written comment,

the DEP will submit the final documentation to the U.S. EPA as a revision to the SIP. This

proposed SIP revision is considered to be non-controversial in nature. Therefore, a public hearing

will be held only if requested in writing, and the written request is received by May 19, 2008.

Any person who requests a public hearing should identify any substantive issue they intend to

raise in a hearing. If properly requested, the hearing will be held at 6:00 p.m. on May 27, 2008 at

the address below. A public notice announcing whether a hearing will be held will be posted in

the West Virginia Register published on May 23, 2008. 

Copies of the proposed CAA §110(a)(2) SIP revision may be viewed between 8:30 a.m.

and 4:30 p.m. at the DEP-Division of Air Quality, 601 57th SE, Charleston, WV 25304,

beginning April 18, 2008, or electronically upon e-mail request to: tmowrer@wvdep.org. The

proposal may also be accessed via the following web address: www.wvdep.org/daq. Choose

Public Notice and Comment.

Send written comments to be included in the formal record to John A. Benedict, Director,

Division of Air Quality at the above address. Please identify the document to which the

comments apply, the commenter’s name, address, and telephone number. Comments will also be

accepted by e-mail if received by 5:00 p.m. on May 19, 2008 to: tmowrer@wvdep.org.

Comments submitted by U.S. Mail must be postmarked by May 19, 2008.
1235.003 Policy. ( b ) *Cost sharing.* DOT cost sharing policies that are not otherwise required by law shall be in accordance with FAR 16.303 and 42.707(a) and Operating Administration (OA) procedures.
( c ) *Recoupment.* DOT recoupment not otherwise required by law shall be in accordance with OA procedures.
#### In the Matter of Pacemaker Construction Corp., Appellant, v. Heidi Construction Corp., Respondent.

Motion to dismiss appeals denied, without costs, with leave to renew on the argument or submission of the appeal. Motion to resettle record on appeal denied, without costs. Beldock, Acting P. J., Ughetta, Kleinfeld, Christ and Brennan, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Joseph H., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent. Christopher H. Gardner, as Schenectady County Attorney, Respondent; Joseph H., Appellant.

[834 NYS2d 344]

Cardona, P.J.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Schenectady County (Powers, J.), entered February 10, 2006, as amended by an order entered May 8, 2006, which granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 3, to find respondent in violation of a prior order of disposition.

In February 2005, respondent was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent after perpetrating an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute assault in the third degree. He was placed on probation for 12 months, however, just two days after that disposition, respondent, then 16, committed the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree. Respondent later pleaded guilty to that crime.

Thereafter, in October 2005, petitioner commenced this proceeding alleging that respondent breached the terms of his probation by, among other things, violating the law by committing sexual abuse in the first degree, threatening another student and failing to comply with required electronic home monitoring procedures. Subsequently, respondent admitted to violating his probation. A dispositional hearing began in November 2005 and was adjourned various times in order to find a residential treatment facility that would accept respondent in light of his status as a sex offender. After several adjournments for that purpose, in February 2006, an appropriate facility was found and Family Court issued an order and amended order concluding, among other things, that such a placement was in respondent’s best interests and the one-year “period spent in detention shall be measured from October 26, 2005.” Respondent appeals, arguing that he was not accorded a speedy dispositional hearing.

Although it appears that the flexible standard for postdispositional procedures was not violated under the particular circumstances of this case *(see*Family Ct Act § 360.3 [1]; *Matter of Carlos MM.,*238 AD2d 707, 708 [1997]), it is nevertheless apparent that respondent’s appeal is now moot and must be dismissed. Not only does it appear from the record that the placement orders have expired by their own terms *(see Matter of Wayne C.,*11 AD3d 775, 775 [2004]; *Matter of Evan P.,*1 AD3d 831, 832 [2003]), but, additionally, respondent attained the age of 18 during the pendency of this appeal *(see Matter of Jamie D.,*255 AD2d 631, 632 [1998]). Therefore, this appeal is moot and no exception to the mootness doctrine applies herein *(see id.).*

*897Crew III, Spain, Mugglin and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, as moot, without costs.
§ 751.8 Adjudicating authorities. ( a ) *Claims by Navy personnel.* (l) The following officials are authorized to adjudicate and authorize payment of PCA claims up to $100,000: ( i ) The Judge Advocate General;
( ii ) The Deputy Judge Advocate General;
( iii ) Any Assistant Judge Advocate General; and
( iv ) The Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General (Claims and Tort Litigation). (2) Any individual, when designated by the Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General (Claims and Tort Litigation Division), may adjudicate and authorize payment of PCA claims up to any designated amount.
( b ) *Claims by Marine Corps personnel.* (1) The following officials are authorized to adjudicate and authorize payment of PCA claims up to $40,000: ( i ) Commandant of the Marine Corps;
( ii ) Deputy Commandant, Manpower and Reserve Affairs Department;
( iii ) Director, Personal and Family Readiness Division;
( iv ) Head, Military Personnel Services Branch;
( v ) Head, Personal Property Claims Section; and
( vi ) Any individual personally designated by the Commandant of the Marine Corps may adjudicate and authorize payment of PCA claims up to any delegated amount not to exceed $40,000.
(2) The Assistant Head, Personal Property Claims Section is authorized to adjudicate and authorize payment of PCA claims up to $25,000. (3) Any individual at Marine Corps Field Transportation Management Office/Claims Activities, when personally designated by the Director, Personal and Family Readiness Division, may be authorized to adjudicate and authorize payment of PCA claims up to any delegated amount not to exceed $40,000. [72 FR 53423, Sept. 19, 2007]
& Memorandum 

U.S. Department of 

Transportation 

Office of the Secretary 

of Transportation 

Subject: Notice of Communication in Docket: Date: 

FAA-2010-0109 APR 1 2 2010 

Petition for Waiver of tlie Terms of the Order 

Limiting Sch^uled Operaticun^t LaGuardia Airport 

From: ( Qm/gtatFoiliMtottp 1 "'' ^^^^Si// Reply to 

, D^uK Assistant Secretary for Aviation "' ° ' ' J^ j 

and International Affairs _^ d^ 

To: Chief, Dockets -' "~ 

In accordance w^ith Department rules (14 CFR Part 300), I am reporting the following 

commurucation. 

On April 9,2010, during an aviation round table discussion at Stewart 

International Airport that was attended by Secretary LaHood and myself. 

Captain Doug Ralph of the Airline Pilots Association and James Van Woert 

of Delta Air Lines expressed their support for the joint request submitted 

by Delta Air lines and US Airways for a waiver from the prohibition on 

purchasing operating authorizations at LaGuardia Airport. Captain 

Ralph also expressed his hope that the Department would handle the 

proceeding expeditiously and asked about its status. Secretary LaHood 

responded that, because the matter was under active consideration, he 

could not comment upon any aspect and he noted that any discussion of 

the case at this time would be inappropriate. 

Please place this memorandum in the appropriate file and in the Docket.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED October 18, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-30244 Summary Calendar

JERRY MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus ST. TAMMANY PARISH JAIL; MARLIN PEACHEY, Warden, Defendants-Appellees,

------------------------ JERRY MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus RODNEY JACK STRAIN, JR., Sheriff; ST. TAMMANY PARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE, Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 03-CV-709-J USDC No. 03-CV-2779-J

-------------------- Before GARZA, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Jerry Moore, St. Tammany Parish pretrial detainee #076945, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment and dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, which challenged theNo. 04-30244 -2- conditions of his confinement. We review a district court’s award of summary judgment de novo. Banks v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd. , 320 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2003). Moore does not challenge the dismissal with prejudice of his claims against the St. Tammany Parish Jail and the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office or the dismissal with prejudice of his claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Accordingly, those claims have been abandoned. See Yohey v. Collins , 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993). Exhaustion is required for all inmate suits about prison life. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle , 534 U.S. 516, 524-32 (2002). The district court dismissed without prejudice Moore’s claims against Warden Peachey in his official capacity and against Sheriff Jack Strain because Moore had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The competent summary judgment evidence established that Moore did not exhaust his administrative remedies. Although Moore submits on appeal a third step grievance he purportedly sent to the sheriff, this evidence was not submitted to the district court and may not be considered. See Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson , 185 F.3d 477, 491 n.26 (5th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
SCR on Eastern Wall-Fired EGUs 

Here is a look at real-world hourly CAM emission data for wall-fired eastern EGUs retrofitted 

with SCR and operated during the summer ozone season: 

[attachment “2006 Wall-fired Dry-bottom Eastern EGUs with SCR charts.xls "] 

We see a consistent pattern of reductions from 0.3 - 0.6 lb/mmBtu down to 0.05 lb/mmBtu when 

the SCR is operating on these wall-fired EGUs. If we take a closer look at the period when the 

SCR was actually operating, we find the following operating statistics: 

[attachment "2006 wall-fired EGU Ozone Season summary data sheet.xls"] 

The summary table indicates that there is little variation in average emissions depending upon 

averaging time. For example, the average ozone-season average NOx emission rate was 0.041 

lb/mmBtu, the average 30-day average was 0.041 lb/mmBtu, and the average 24-hour average 

was 0.042 lb/mmBtu. Because most cost-effectiveness calculations should be based upon annual 

averages, it seems appropriate to assume an annual average emission rate of 0.04 lb/mmBtu for 

that task. 

The median values showed a little more variation than the average values, and lower than the 

average values, indicating that the distribution is skewed slightly by some of the higher emission 

rates. 

Because the BART Guidelines recommend a maximum 30-day rolling average, we also have 

data for this parameter and it indicates much more variation, as one might expect for this extreme 

value. 

The bottom section of the table is most important in that it attempts to relate the ozone-season 

average emission used in the cost calculations the 30-day average emission typically used in 

establishing permit limits. This data appears to support a 30-day limit of 0.06 lb/mmBtu. 

However, because these EGUs are only required to meet mass emission limits--lb/hr instead of 

lb/mmBtu, the SCRs may be “tuned” to meet a lb/hr target instead of lb/mmBtu. So, as load 

drops, there is no reason to maintain the SCR efficiency (and the lb/mmBtu rises), as long as the 

lb/hr target is met. If that is the case, then it is probably more useful to look a the ratios of the 

mass emission rates to determine the true ratio of maximum 30-day average to annual average 

emissions if the SCR were always operated to maximize its effectiveness; the tabulated results 

indicate that this ratio is 1.4:1 for these EGUs. 

If we can assume that a modern SCR retrofit can achieve 0.04 lb/mmBtu on an annual average, 

and that an SCR that is operated to achieve its maximum effectiveness would typically result in 

maximum 30-day average emissions no more than 1.4 times the annual average, then we could 

assume that a 30-day rolling average limit of 0.06 lb/mmBtu would provide more than an 

adequate margin of safety for the EGU to operate.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
               
       
<S>                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                         576,106
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,296,784
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             4,321,453
<PP&E>                                     109,066,076
<DEPRECIATION>                              63,764,028
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              50,081,309
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,584,745
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    12,761,100
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                50,081,309
<SALES>                                      8,745,718
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             9,531,393
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                7,759,789
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             324,172
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,447,432
<INCOME-TAX>                                   505,847
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            941,585
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   941,585
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .07
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .07
        


</TABLE>
### §2231. Official expenses of employees stationed abroad

Employees of the Department of Agriculture stationed abroad may, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture, enter into leases for official quarters, for periods not exceeding one year, and may pay rent, telephone, subscriptions to publications, and other charges incident to the conduct of their offices and the discharge of their duties, in advance, in any foreign country where custom or practice requires payment in advance.

(Sept. 21, 1944, ch. 412, title VII, §705(c), 58 Stat. 742.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

This section was enacted as part of the Department of Agriculture Organic Act of 1944.

Section was formerly classified to section 543b of Title 5 prior to the general revision and enactment of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees, by Pub. L. 89–554, §1, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 378.

#### Prior Provisions

Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in the following Department of Agriculture Appropriation Acts:

June 28, 1944, ch. 296, 58 Stat. 426.

July 12, 1943, ch. 215, 57 Stat. 393.

July 22, 1942, ch. 516, 56 Stat. 665.

July 1, 1941, ch. 267, 55 Stat. 409.

June 25, 1940, ch. 421, 54 Stat. 532.

June 30, 1939, ch. 253, title I, 53 Stat. 940.

June 16, 1938, ch. 464, title I, 52 Stat. 711.

June 29, 1937, ch. 404, 50 Stat. 395.
### §3412. Investigations; power to subpena and take oaths and affirmations; aid of courts

The Secretary may make such investigations as the Secretary deems necessary for the effective administration of this chapter or to determine whether any person subject to the provisions of this chapter has engaged or is about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of any provisions of this chapter, or of any order, or rule or regulation issued under this chapter. For the purpose of such investigation, the Secretary is empowered to administer oaths and affirmations, subpena witnesses, compel their attendance, take evidence and require the production of any books, papers, and documents which are relevant to the inquiry. Such attendance of witnesses and the production of any such records may be required from any place in the United States. In case of contumacy by, or refusal to obey a subpena to, any person, the Secretary may invoke the aid of any court of the United States within the jurisdiction of which such investigation or proceeding is carried on, or where such person resides or carries on business, in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents; and such court may issue an order requiring such person to appear before the Secretary, there to produce records, if so ordered, or to give testimony touching the matter under investigation. Any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof. All process in any such case may be served in the judicial district whereof such person is an inhabitant or wherever such person may be found.

(Pub. L. 95–113, title XVII, §1713, Sept. 29, 1977, 91 Stat. 1039.)

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective Oct. 1, 1977, see section 1901 of Pub. L. 95–113, set out as an Effective Date of 1977 Amendment note under section 1307 of this title.