UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

PAMELA D. McKINNEY, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) No. 12 C 00220 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) Judge Edmond E. Chang 

JEH JOHNSON, Secretary, United States ) 

Department of Homeland Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pamela D. McKinney worked for the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) until March 2007, when she was fired. After she was fired, 

McKinney brought suit against Jeh Johnson1, Secretary of the United States 

Department of Homeland Security, alleging that she was fired in retaliation for 

complaints she made about discrimination in her workplace, in violation of Title VII 

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 R. 13, Am. Compl. Specifically, McKinney claimed 

that because of her age, sex and race, she was being paid less than two of her coworkers, despite performing the same work, and that she was fired in retaliation for 

having complained about that discrimination to FEMA’s Office of Equal Rights. Id.

at 3. 

 1Originally, McKinney brought suit against Janet Napolitano, who was Secretary of 

the Department of Homeland Security at the time McKinney filed suit in January 2012. 

R. 1, Compl. In December 2013, Jeh Johnson was sworn in as the new Secretary. R. 78 at 1 

n.1. He then became the Defendant in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 

2McKinney also alleged that she was discriminated against on the basis of her age, 

sex, and race in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964. R. 13, Am. Compl. The previously assigned district judge granted 

summary judgment in favor of Defendant on those claims. R. 85. 
2 

On June 19, 2015, after a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for the 

government. Minute Entry (June 19, 2015). The Court entered judgment that same 

day. R. 191, Judgment. McKinney now moves for a new trial under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 59. R. 211, Pl.’s New Trial Mot. McKinney argues that she is 

entitled to a new trial for three reasons: (1) Juror Diane Burrell improperly 

concealed her bias in favor of the defendant, (2) Trial Witness David Skarosi gave 

false testimony, and (3) Anthony Pinelli, one of McKinney’s attorneys, had a conflict 

of interest that adversely affected his trial performance and tainted the verdict. Id.

For the reasons explained below, McKinney’s motion is denied. 

I. Legal Standard 

 McKinney moves for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, 

which can only be granted “if the jury’s ‘verdict is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, ... or if for other reasons the trial was not fair to the moving party.’” Willis 

v. Lepine, 687 F.3d 826, 836 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Marcus & Millichap Inv. Servs. 

v. Sekulovski, 639 F.3d 301, 313 (7th Cir. 2011)). Although the new-trial standard is 

difficult to satisfy, it is not impossible: a new trial may be granted if “no rational 

jury” could have rendered the verdict, Moore ex rel. Estate of Grad v. Tuelja, 546 

F.3d 423, 427 (7th Cir. 2008), or if an attorney’s misconduct prejudiced the moving 

party, Wiedemann v. Galiano, 722 F.2d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 1983). 
3 

II. Analysis 

A. Concealed Juror Bias 

McKinney first argues that she is entitled to a new trial because one juror, 

Diane Burrell, allegedly failed to answer honestly one or more questions during voir 

dire, which concealed Burrell’s bias in favor of Defendant, and which, if disclosed, 

would have led to Burrell’s dismissal for cause. Pl.’s New Trial Mot. at 7. McKinney 

contends that Burrell “selectively hid” a “key aspect” of her employment: that she 

was an “HR specialist” with the Social Security Administration. Id. at 8. To support 

her allegation, McKinney relies on (1) a “Linked-in” page she obtained off the 

internet, which identifies Burrell as a “Human Resource Professional,” R. 226, Exh. 

O, Burrell Linked-in Page; (2) a private website that publishes federal employees’ 

salaries, which identifies Burrell as being in “human resources management,” 

R. 224, Exh. B, OPM Email to McKinney (Oct. 6, 2015) (website identified as 

www.fedsdatacenter.com); and (3) an email from a FOIA officer with the Office of 

Personnel Management (OPM), which identifies Burrell as a “human resources 

specialist” and as part of “human resources management,” id., Exh. A, OPM Email 

to McKinney (Sept. 8, 2015). McKinney argues that had Burrell disclosed the fact 

that she was a human resources specialist, it would have exposed Burrell’s potential 

“institutional bias in favor of the defense.” Pl.’s New Trial Mot. at 10. 

Contrary to McKinney’s contention, Burrell did not hide her employment or 

her duties with the Social Security Administration (SSA) during voir dire. When 

asked to describe her employment, Burrell stated that “[f]or the past 30 years[,] 
4 

[she] worked for the Social Security Administration.” R. 220, Trial Tr. Excerpt at 

3:9-10. She explained that she was “the training director,” that she “managed the 

employee training and development section,” and that she was “responsible for all of 

[SSA’s] training for all technical positions and for management training.” Id. at 

3:12-15. Burrell’s Linked-in page does not come close to contradicting what Burrell 

said, nor does the private website or email from OPM McKinney cites. There is 

nothing odd about employee training positions being housed in an agency’s human 

resources department. On the SSA’s website, for example, one of the described 

functions of human resources is “employee training.” SSA Website, 

http://www.ssa.gov/careers/hr.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2016). Burrell described 

her job duties; it does not matter that she did not specify what particular 

department her position fell in. There was no dishonesty. 

In addition, the fact that Burrell may have worked in the Social Security 

Administration’s human resources department does not show that she had “the 

routine authority to hire and fire federal agency personnel in her HR role,” as 

McKinney suggests. Pl.’s New Trial Mot. at 8. McKinney argues that as a “higher 

up within HR,” Burrell would have “performed analogous or related functions” to 

those performed by Liz Barentzen (the FEMA Employee Relations Specialist 

involved in McKinney’s firing); and that, if employed by FEMA, Burrell “would have 

worked with Barentzen on [McKinney’s] termination.” R. 224, Pl.’s Reply Br. at 12-

13. This similarity in role, McKinney argues, gave Burrell a pro-defense bias and 

made Burrell sympathetic to Barentzen. Again, however, McKinney has no evidence 
5 

to support her allegations. Outside of the Linked-in page, the OPM email, and the 

one private website—none of which show Burrell had the “routine authority” to fire 

employees—McKinney does not offer other evidence. The mere fact that Burrell 

may have worked in the human resources department does not, on its own, 

establish that Burrell had the general authority to hire and fire employees. It also 

does not show that Burrell’s role within the Social Security Administration was the 

equivalent of Barentzen’s within FEMA. 

And in fact, Burrell’s responses during voir dire actually suggest that Burrell 

did not have the “routine authority” to fire individuals in the most recent job 

position that she held at the SSA. During voir dire, the Court asked all potential 

jurors whether they had ever—without a time limitation—terminated an employee 

or been in a position to do so. R. 182, Minute Entry (June 12, 2015), Exh. 2 (Voir 

Dire Question 4: “Have you ever been in a supervisory job position with the 

authority to fire an employee or to set the salary or the pay of an employee?”). 

Burrell raised her hand in response and stated that she had held such a position 

within the federal government. In the sidebar that followed, Burrell explained that 

more than 20 years ago, during her time as “a supervisor” in one of the Social 

Security Administration’s “field office[s],” she had to let an employee go due to 

“work performance” issues. R. 220, Trial Tr. Excerpt at 13:23, 14:6-14. Burrell did 

not hide the fact that she had been in a position to fire someone some two decades 

ago, nor did she hide the fact that she had in fact fired someone in the past. So there 
6 

is no plausible inference that Burrell more recently had the routine authority to fire 

employees. 

McKinney separately argues that Burrell also concealed from McKinney’s 

lawyers and the Court that “the pending actions” against Burrell were against her 

“in her capacity as an embattled HR official, not merely a training employee.” Pl.’s 

Br. at 13-14. Presumably, the “pending actions” McKinney is referring to are the 

EEO complaints Burrell brought up during one of the sidebars. Burrell explained 

that she had been named in her employment capacity with the SSA in three 

separate EEO complaints. R. 220, Trial Tr. Excerpt at 15:16-18 (“COURT: ... [C]an 

you approximate how many times you have been named in EEO complaints? / 

[BURRELL]: Three times.”). The first involved a complainant who alleged that he 

had been discriminated against on the basis of his race and gender. Id. at 16:7-8. 

Burrell explained that the last time an SSA in-house attorney contacted her 

regarding that case was in November (about seven months before the trial); she 

explained that she had been asked if she might be willing to testify, and that as far 

as she knew, the case remained pending before an Administrative Law Judge. Id. at 

16:10-25. The second case involved a complainant who alleged he had been 

discriminated against on the basis of his race, id. at 18:6-11, and the third a 

complainant who alleged she had been discriminated against on the basis of her 

race and gender, id. at 19:23-25, 20:1-3. Burrell stated that neither of the last two 

cases made it past the investigative stage. Id. at 18:15-19, 20:5-8. 
7 

McKinney now argues that the fact that Burrell was represented by a 

governmental agency—the SSA—in those cases “instill[ed] [in Burrell] an actual 

pro-government bias,” and “influence[d] Burrell’s adjudication of [FEMA’s] alleged 

retaliation [against McKinney].” Pl.’s New Trial Mot. at 14. According to McKinney, 

these facts “would have supported a challenge for cause.” Id. There are two 

problems with this argument: first, McKinney did not make a for-cause challenge 

against Burrell during jury selection; and second, a for-cause challenge would have 

been rejected anyway. Of course the attorneys for both parties were there at the 

sidebar when Burrell explained these prior EEO charges. So, there is no question 

that McKinney’s counsel, Anthony Pinelli and Susan Pavlow, knew about the EEO 

complaints before the lawyers made their for-cause and preemptory challenges 

following voir dire. During the sidebar, Pinelli and Pavlow were also given the 

chance to ask Burrell follow-up questions, and on one occasion chose to do so. See R. 

220, Trial Tr. Excerpt at 17:9-13 (“COURT: Any follow-up questions on that 

one? ... MS. PAVLOW: I do. ... ”). Had they wished to delve deeper into these EEO 

complaints during the sidebar, or to raise a for-cause challenge against Burrell 

following voir dire, they could have done so. They chose not to. R. 226-10, Exh. U, 

Jury Challenges at 8-9. McKinney is bound by her attorneys’ decision not to raise a 

for cause challenge against Burrell. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Grover, 792 F.3d 753, 

754 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)). 

Aside from the forfeiture of the for-cause challenge, the Court would have 

rejected the challenge anyway. McKinney disagrees, asserting that “where, as here, 
8 

the record contains no assurances that ... the prospective juror can exercise a 

judgment unclouded by [a particular] belief, the verdict cannot stand.” Pl.’s New 

Trial Mot. at 12. But contrary to McKinney’s assertion, the record in this case does

contain such assurances. During voir dire, Burrell repeatedly stated that her prior 

EEO experiences would not impede her ability to be fair and impartial in this case. 

After Burrell described each EEO complaint, the Court specifically asked Burrell 

whether “[she would be] able to give a fair hearing to both sides in this case,” and 

whether “[a]nything about [her] experience[s] ... would prevent [her] from being fair 

in this case?” R. 220, Trial Tr. Excerpt at 17:1-5, 18:20-21, 20:14-16. Each time, 

Burrell credibly and unequivocally stated that nothing from those experiences 

would prevent her from being fair. Id. at 17:6, 18:22-23, 20:17-18. The Court did 

accept, and still does accept, those answers as true. Given that neither party 

challenged Burrell’s voir dire, it would appear that counsel for both parties found 

her responses genuine as well. United States v. Brodnicki, 516 F.3d 570, 575 (7th 

Cir. 2008) (finding no error in district court’s refusal to dismiss a juror for cause 

when the court received an affirmative response that the juror could be fair and 

impartial and there was no reason to believe otherwise); Warfield v. City of Chicago, 

679 F. Supp. 2d 876, 883 (N.D. Ill. 2010). McKinney has fallen far short of proving 

that Burrell’s assertions were anything but genuine. 

Because McKinney has failed to show that Juror Diane Burrell provided false 

statements during voir dire, or that Burrell could not be fair and impartial, 

McKinney is not entitled to a new trial on this ground. 
9 

B. False Testimony Provided by Witness David Skarosi 

 McKinney next argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the verdict 

was based on false testimony provided by Witness David Skarosi. Pl.’s New Trial 

Mot. at 21. When McKinney worked at FEMA, Skarosi was the Division Director of 

the Response and Recovery Unit for Region V, which is the region where McKinney 

worked. R. 225-1, Exh. F, Skarosi 2008 Dep. at 8:12-133; R. 225-2, Exh. G, Skarosi 

2013 Dep. at 6:16-21; R. 224-5, Exh. E, Admin. Hr’g Skarosi Test. at 332:3-4. 

Skarosi also supervised Larry Bailey, who was the Recovery Branch chief and 

McKinney’s immediate supervisor at the time of McKinney’s termination. Skarosi 

2008 Dep. at 32:10-12, 42:1-3; Skarosi 2013 Dep. at 8:3-14, 34:12-20, 45:10-23. 

McKinney called Skarosi as an adverse witness in her case-in-chief. R. 201, Trial Tr. 

Excerpt (June 17, 2015 a.m. session); R. 202, Trial Tr. Excerpt (June 17, 2015 p.m. 

session). 

McKinney argues that Skarosi lied during trial when he testified that he 

never told McKinney to withdraw her pending EEO complaint during a meeting 

attended by Skarosi, Bailey and McKinney on February 28, 2007. Pl.’s New Trial 

Mot. at 22. In support of her allegation, McKinney relies on (1) Skarosi’s August 14, 

2008 deposition, which Skarosi gave before McKinney’s EEO administrative 

hearing, R. 225-1, Exh. F, Skarosi 2008 Dep.; (2) Skarosi’s March 18, 2010 

testimony, which Skarosi gave at the administrative hearing, R. 224-5, Exh. E, 

Skarosi Admin. Hr’g Test.; and (3) Skarosi’s May 2013 deposition, which Skarosi 

gave during discovery for this case, R 225-2, Exh. G, Skarosi 2013 Dep. According to 

 3The citations to Skarosi’s 2008 deposition are based on the PDF pagination. 
10 

McKinney, these three prior statements by Skarosi contradict his trial testimony 

and show that Skarosi did tell McKinney to withdraw her complaint. Pl.’s New Trial 

Mot. at 21; Pl.’s Reply Br. at 6. 

Of course false testimony can be a ground for a new trial: “If a verdict is 

based on false testimony, [then a court] has the discretion under Rule 59 to grant 

the injured party a new trial.” Antevski v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 4 

F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 1993). In this case, the problem for McKinney is that she has 

failed to show that Skarosi lied on the stand. None of Skarosi’s prior statements 

contradict his trial testimony. 

In Skarosi’s 2008 deposition, he was initially asked whether he knew if 

McKinney had filed an EEO complaint at the time of the February 2007 meeting. 

Skarosi 2008 Dep. at 27. He stated that he did not know about the complaint (a 

position he consistently held in both depositions). Id. (“Q. During this meeting, do 

you know whether [McKinney] had already filed an EEO complaint? A. I didn’t 

know if it was formal or informal. Didn’t know if she had put anything in writing.”); 

see also Skarosi 2013 Dep. at 28:7-13 (quoting a prior affidavit signed by Skarosi in 

which he said: “I was not aware of [McKinney’s] complaints or concerns except that 

she had a problem with her initial pay grade when she was hired ... and issues with 

Stacie Grathen.”). Skarosi was then asked: “Did you suggest to [McKinney] that she 

can resolve the EEO complaint outside of the EEO process?” Skarosi 2008 Dep. at 

27. Skarosi replied: “Yeah, I -- well, I wanted Larry [Bailey] to try to work these 

things, you know. I mean ... some of this stuff can be solved ... outside of the EEO 
11 

process or any other process ... if you just sit down and talk and communicate with 

one another.” Id. It is important to note, however, that Skarosi then went on to 

clarify that “[McKinney] always ha[d] [the] right to [contact the EEO office],” id. at 

28, and to raise a discrimination complaint with the EEO office instead of her firstline supervisor, id. at 55-56 (“Q. Is there any problem with her going to the EEO 

office instead of her first-line supervisor ... about a discrimination complaint? A. No, 

she has a right to do that.”). So, although it is true that Skarosi suggested at his 

2008 deposition that he told McKinney during the February meeting that he 

thought it would be better if they could try to work through any issues in-house, he 

never admitted that he told McKinney to withdraw her complaint—a complaint 

that, according to his testimony, he did not even know about. Skarosi’s 2008 

deposition does not contradict Skarosi’s trial testimony. 

Skarosi’s March 2010 testimony at McKinney’s EEO administrative hearing 

also is consistent with Skarosi’s trial testimony. At the administrative hearing, 

Skarosi reiterated that he told McKinney and Bailey during the February meeting 

that “[he] expected ... employees to ... work through the supervisory chain, that if 

employees had issues, ... it’s best to try to resolve them at the lowest level.” Skarosi 

Admin. Hr’g Test. at 329:21-24. He then went on to clarify (as he did before) that 

McKinney always had the right to go through the EEO. Id. at 334:24-335:1-9 (“Q. 

Did you suggest to her that you’d like to resolve the complaint internally instead of 

have her go through EEO? A. She had the right to go through EEO. ... I guess what 

I was saying is if there are things that we could resolve, let’s try to do that, but she 
12 

certainly had the right to go to EEO if she wanted to.”). So here too, Skarosi merely 

said that he told McKinney and Bailey that he thought it best to try to work things 

out internally. He never conceded that he told McKinney to withdraw her EEO 

complaint. 

In Skarosi’s 2013 deposition, he likewise testified that “the point of the 

[February] meeting was for [him] to kind of reinforce with Pam and Larry about the 

supervisory chain of command.” Skarosi 2013 Dep. at 25:18-21. During this 

deposition, however, Skarosi actually went on to explicitly state that he never told 

McKinney to withdraw her EEO complaint: 

Q. Now, prior to Ms. McKinney being terminated, at any time did you suggest 

or make a comment to Ms. McKinney that she should drop her EEO concerns 

and just deal with her issues with you and Mr. Bailey directly? 

A. Absolutely not. Every employee has the right to go [to] EEO. 

Id. at 66:6-12. So, contrary to McKinney’s contention, Skarosi’s 2013 deposition 

actually is consistent with his trial testimony. Without any inconsistent statements 

on which to rely for this topic, it is no surprise that McKinney’s trial counsel decided 

not to bring up any of Skarosi’s prior statements, despite McKinney’s desire to the 

contrary.4

 4Defense counsel’s decision to highlight Skarosi’s trial testimony during closing 

arguments, and to emphasize the fact that Skarosi did not tell McKinney to withdraw her 

EEO complaint, is similarly insufficient to warrant a new trial. To warrant a new trial, 

statements made during closing arguments must be “plainly unwarranted and clearly 

injurious.” Jones v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 188 F.3d 709, 730 (7th Cir. 1999). Here, defense 

counsel had every right to emphasize Skarosi’s testimony; it was admissible trial testimony 

and, as discussed above, was not contradicted by Skarosi’s prior deposition testimony or his 

testimony at the administrative hearing. 
13 

McKinney also points to the earlier summary judgment decisions [R. 85, 

decided by the previously assigned judge] to support her allegation that Skarosi lied 

at trial. Specifically, she points to the following statement: “On February 23, 2007, 

McKinney had a meeting with Bailey and David Skarosi ... Skarosi told McKinney 

that ‘issues could be resolved on his level’ and that she should ‘drop the complaint.’” 

R. 85, Summ. J. Ruling at 5. Sure, this statement can be found in the background 

section of the summary judgment opinion. But this “fact” statement in the opinion 

does not help McKinney. In evaluating a summary judgment motion, the Court is 

required to view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party (here, that was McKinney). Scott v. Harris, 550 

U.S. 372, 378 (2007). So in this case, when the Court was evaluating the defense’s 

summary judgment motion, the Court was required to credit McKinney’s version of 

the facts. But crediting the non-movant’s factual assertion for summary judgment 

purposes is not the same as making a finding that the assertion is true. Factual 

findings like that are not made during summary judgment. Id. (“As this case was 

decided on summary judgment, there have not yet been factual findings by a judge 

or jury ... .”). The prior opinion does not establish that Skarosi lied at trial, nor does 

it save McKinney’s motion. 

What’s more, even if Skarosi’s prior testimony was sufficiently inconsistent to 

be admissible as a prior inconsistent statement, the fact that this evidence was not 

offered at trial still would not entitle McKinney to a new trial. Presumably, 

McKinney’s attorneys made a strategic choice in not trying to admit this evidence. 
14 

McKinney might not have liked that choice, but she is nevertheless bound by it. As 

the Seventh Circuit has said: “[L]itigants are bound by the acts and omissions of 

their chosen agents, including their lawyers.” Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 792 F.3d at 

754 (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)). If an attorney “bungl[es]” a 

case, or if a client is “aggrieved by counsel’s inept handling of a suit,” as McKinney 

seems to be here, then the proper “remedy is malpractice litigation against the 

wrongdoer, not more litigation against an innocent adversary in the original 

litigation.” Id. (Of course, the Court is not at all suggesting that any malpractice 

occurred.) 

Without sufficient evidence to show that Skarosi provided false testimony, or 

committed perjury on the stand, McKinney is not entitled to a new trial based on 

Skarosi’s trial testimony. 

C. Attorney Conflict of Interest 

 Finally (and relatedly), McKinney argues that she is entitled to a new trial 

because one of her attorneys, Anthony Pinelli, had a conflict of interest involving 

Witness Janet Odeshoo. Pl.’s Br. at 24. Odeshoo was the Deputy Regional 

Administrator of FEMA’s Region V at the time of McKinney’s termination. 

(Remember, that is the region where McKinney worked.) Pl.’s Trial Exh. 84, 

Odeshoo Dep. at 6:9-10. She was also Skarosi’s immediate supervisor. Id. at 7:9-21. 

McKinney asserts that because of Pinelli’s close family relationship with Odeshoo—

Pinelli’s wife and son know Odeshoo’s daughter—Pinelli failed to impeach Skarosi 
15 

and to point out the inconsistencies between Skarosi’s trial testimony and his 

previous statements. Pl.’s New Trial Mot. at 24-25. 

“To obtain a new trial on attorney misconduct grounds, the [moving party] 

must show both that misconduct occurred and that it prejudiced their case.” Waldon 

v. City of Chicago, 846 F. Supp. 2d 963, 976 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (quoting Whiting v. 

Westray, 294 F.3d 943, 944 (7th Cir. 2002)). McKinney cannot make this showing. 

Putting aside whether a conflict of interest even exists here, McKinney has not 

shown that she was prejudiced by this alleged conflict to such an extent that a new 

trial is warranted. McKinney argues that Pinelli’s relationship with Odeshoo 

adversely affected her case because it prevented Pinelli from properly attacking 

Skarosi’s trial testimony. But as discussed above, Skarosi’s trial testimony was not 

inconsistent with his prior statements. So, there were no prior statements for 

Pinelli to use for impeachment purposes. And, even if there were, and even if Pinelli 

had performed inadequately, the appropriate remedy here would again be an action 

against Pinelli for malpractice, not a new trial. Deppe v. Trippe, 863 F.2d 1356, 1365 

(7th Cir. 1988) (“[W]here privately retained counsel performs inadequately (and this 

would include continuing to represent two or more parties notwithstanding a 

conflict of interest), the proper remedy is not a new trial, but rather an action 

against the attorney for malpractice.”). 

It is crucial too that McKinney was fully aware of Pinelli’s potential conflict 

of interest well before trial. The morning after the trial ended, while jury 

deliberations were still ongoing, McKinney emailed Pinelli asking him whether the 
16 

Court and defense counsel were aware of his conflict of interest. R. 207-1, Exh. H. In 

that email, McKinney clarifies: “I am talking about the conflict of interest with 

Janet Odeshoo that you expressed before you took my case.” R. 207-1, Exh. H at 6 

(emphasis added). As proven by this email, Pinelli disclosed his potential conflict of 

interest to McKinney right from the beginning. McKinney agreed to retain him 

anyways. Under these circumstances, McKinney has failed to show that Pinelli’s 

alleged conflict of interest resulted in a miscarriage of justice sufficient to warrant 

the grant of a new trial. 

III. Conclusion 

 For the reasons discussed above, McKinney’s motion for a new trial is denied. 

 ENTERED: 

 s/Edmond E. Chang 

 Honorable Edmond E. Chang 

 United States District Judge 

DATE: March 21, 2016