FILED 


February 25, 2016 


I n the Office of the Clerk of Cou rt 


W A State Court of Appeals, Division III 


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 


DIVISION THREE 


STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) 

) No. 33278-I-III 

Respondent, ) 

) 

v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

) 

DANIEL ALCARAZ MENDOZA, ) 


) 


Appellant. ) 


LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. - Daniel Alcaraz Mendoza appeals his Benton County 

bench trial conviction of unlawful possession of a controlled substance-­

methamphetamine. He challenges evidentiary rulings by the court and the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support the conviction. We find no error and affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURE 

The facts are summarized from testimony at the bench trial. On July 4, 2013, 

Kennewick Police Officers Dale Kuebny and Matt Newton made a probable cause arrest 

ofDaniel Alcaraz Mendoza at his place ofemployment. Officer Kuebny searched Mr. 

Alcaraz Mendoza's pocket incident to the arrest and located a plastic baggie containing a 

white crystalline substance that field tested positive for methamphetamine. Following 
No. 33278-1-III 

State v. Alcaraz Mendoza 

Miranda l warnings and Mr. Alcaraz Mendoza's waiver ofthose rights, Officer Newton 

asked him what the substance was that Officer Kuehny had pulled from his pocket. 

Officer Newton testified that Mr. Alcaraz Mendoza said, "It's methamphetamine." 

Report of Proceedings (RP) at 12. 

Officer Kuehny testified that he collected the substance seized from Mr. Alcaraz 

Mendoza's pocket, field-tested it, and packaged it into an evidence bag, which he placed 

in the police evidence locker. He tilled out a form requesting the item be sent to the 

Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory (Crime Lab) for testing. He received a report 

back from the Crime Lab. He examined the white crystalline substance in court and 

testified it appeared to be in relatively the same condition as when he collected it and 

requested testing. After a series of defense objections (discussed infra), Officer Kuehny 

testified that he recalled Mr. Alcaraz Mendoza admitting it was his "crystal meth," and 

that later at jail he said "he had the crystal meth because he had back pain." RP at 25. 

Crime Lab scientist Martin McDermot testified over defense objections to 

foundation and chain of custody that he tested the submitted white crystalline substance 

and determined it contained methamphetamine. The court admitted the substance 

(exhibit 2) into evidence. 

I Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 161. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 

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No. 33278-1-III 

State v. Alcaraz Mendoza 

Based on the testimony, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law 

to the effect that Mr. Alcaraz Mendoza admittedly possessed what he knew to be 

methamphetamine and was thus guilty as charged of unlawful possession of a controlled 

substance. He appeals. 

ANALYSIS 

Mr. Alcaraz Mendoza first contends the trial court erred by admitting Officer 

Kuehny's testimony regarding his (Mr. Alcaraz Mendoza's) admissions to possessing 

methamphetamine because the officer lacked independent recollection of the statements 

and had already improperly refreshed his recollection because he initially testified from 

his report. 

Decisions involving evidentiary issues lie within the trial court's discretion and 

will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. State v. 

Castellanos, 132 Wn.2d 94, 97, 935 P.2d 1353 (1997). "A trial court abuses its 

discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable 

grounds or for untenable reasons, Le., if the court relies on unsupported facts or takes a 

view that no reasonable person would take; the standard is also violated when the trial 

court makes a reasonable decision but applies the wrong legal standard or bases its ruling 

on an erroneous view ofthe law." State v. Hudson, 150 Wn. App. 646,652,208 P.3d 

1236 (2009). A witness's use of a written memoranda, such as a police report, to refresh 

a past recollection when the report has not been admitted into evidence lies within the 

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No. 33278-1-III 

State v. Alcaraz Mendoza 

discretion of the trial court. State v. Huelett, 92 Wn.2d 967, 968-69, 603 P.2d 1258 

(1979); Statev. Little, 57 Wn.2d 516,520,358 P.2d 120 (1961) (use of notes to refresh 

memory ofwitness must be closely supervised by the trial court whose sound 

discretion is the most effective safeguard). The criteria for the use ofnotes or other 

memoranda to refresh a witness's recollection are (1) the witness's memory needs 

refreshing, (2) opposing counsel has the right to examine the writing, and (3) the trial 

court be satisfied that the witness is not being coached-that the witness is using the 

notes to aid, and not supplant, his own memory. Little, 57 Wn.2d at 521. Even after 

reviewing the memoranda, the witness must still testifY from independent recollection of 

the matter. McCoy v. Courtney, 30 Wn.2d 125,128, 190 P.2d 732 (1948); Preston v. 

Metro. Life Ins. Co., 198 Wash. 157, 164,87 P.2d 475 (1939); see Huelett, 92 Wn.2d at 

969-70. During Officer Kuehny's testimony the prosecutor asked whether the defendant 

made any comments to him about the methamphetamine. Officer Kuehny answered that 

he did, and started to explain the comments when defense counsel objected that the 

officer appeared to be reading directly from his report. The court agreed with defense 

counsel that the State should first inquire whether the officer had any independent 

recollection, and if so, he could refer to the report to refresh his recollection. Officer 

Kuehny then stated that he prepared the report shortly after the incident and that he had 

"some recollection" ofthe events. RP at 23. He stated: "I don't think 1 could recall word 

for word what was said, but 1 could recall the gist ofwhat was said." RP at 23. Defense 

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No. 33278-1-III 

State v. Alcaraz Mendoza 

counsel then reiterated the objection: "[H]e's indicating that he's got some recollection, 

not a verbatim recollection. I'd ask that he be allowed to testify from his recollection." 

RP at 24. The court explained to the prosecutor that "[ w]e need to get the extent of his 

memory on the record before you can refresh." RP at 24. After the prosecutor stated that 

he believed Officer Kuehny had exhausted his memory and should be allowed to refresh 

his recollection by referring to his report, defense counsel reiterated the objection: 

Your Honor, I'm not going to get Officer Kuehny's words exactly, 

but he said he remembers the gist of what was in the report. I think that is 

the basis for recollection. Verbatim? No, but definitely a recollection of 

what he placed in the report, so we're going to renew our objection to 

allowing him to read from his report. 

RP at 25. The court agreed and told the prosecutor that he would need to ask some 

specific questions before he could be allowed to refresh and that he needed to "make a 

little more foundation." RP at 25. 

The prosecutor then asked Officer Kuehny if he recalled what specifically the 

defendant said. Officer Kuehny responded, "I recall the defendant admitting it was his 

methamphetamine ... or his crystal meth." RP at 25. The prosecutor then asked ifhe 

recalled ifthe defendant said why he had the crystal meth. Officer Kuehny responded, 

"Later at the jail he told me he had the crystal meth because he had back pain." RP at 25. 

The defense did not object to the testimony. Officer Kuehny made no further reference to 

his report. 

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No. 33278-I-III 

State v. Alcaraz Mendoza 

Mr. Alcaraz Mendoza contends that the State failed to establish Officer Kuehny's 

independent memory ofthe subject matter as required under Washington law because he 

only had "some recollection," and that was after having already reviewed his report. He 

contends it was equally improper for the court to allow the officer to testifY from his 

report without initially establishing that he had an independent recollection. He 

concludes that given the inculpatory nature of the evidence, the improper admission of 

the testimony was so prejudicial that a new trial is required. We reject these arguments. 

As the State contends, the trial court properly restricted Officer Kuehny from 

using his report based on the defense objections, and the officer ultimately testified from 

his independent recollection in any event. Indeed, consistent with the above-cited case 

law, the trial court closely supervised the issue by not allowing the officer to read from 

his report while testifYing and then requiring the prosecutor to establish the officer's 

independent recollection ofthe subject matter before the report could be used to refresh 

his memory. In the end, the report was not needed because the only indication is that the 

officer testified from his independent recollection of what Mr. Alcaraz Mendoza told him 

about the methamphetamine. There is no abuse of discretion or error by the trial court. 

Mr. Alcaraz Mendoza next contends the court erred in admitting the white 

crystalline substance (exhibit 2) into evidence because the State failed to establish 

adequate foundation and chain of custody. 

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No. 33278-1-III 

State v. Alcaraz Mendoza 

A trial court has broad discretion in admitting physical objects; we review for an 

abuse of discretion. State v. Campbell, 103 Wn.2d 1,21,691 P.2d 929 (1984). A 

physical object connected with a crime may be admitted into evidence when properly 

identified and when shown to be in substantially the same condition as when the crime 

was committed. Id. The evidence need not be identified with absolute certainty, nor 

must every possibility of alteration or substitution be eliminated. Id. Courts consider the 

nature of the item, the circumstances surrounding the preservation and custody, and the 

likelihood of tampering or alteration. Id. A sufficient foundation for the admission of 

evidence may be established even without proof of an unbroken chain of custody so long 

as the exhibit is properly identified as being the same object and in the same condition as 

it was when it was initially acquired by the party. State v. Picard, 90 Wn. App. 890, 897, 

954 P.2d 336 (1998); see also State v. McGinley, 18 Wn. App. 862, 866-67, 573 P.2d 30 

(1977) (not necessary for State to negate every possibility of tampering with exhibit by 

means of testimony of each custodian). Minor discrepancies or uncertainties will affect 

only the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Campbell, 103 Wn.2d at 21. 

Officer Kuebny testified that exhibit 2 contained the white crystalline substance 

that he collected from Mr. Alcaraz Mendoza's pocket incident to arrest. He recognized 

the item based on the contents and the packaging that bore his writing and signature. 

Once he collected and packaged the item, he placed it into an evidence locker and 

requested that it be sent to the Crime Lab for testing. He received a report back from the 

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No. 33278-1-III 

State v. Alcaraz Mendoza 

Crime Lab. He examined the exhibit in court and testified itappeared to be in relatively 

the same condition as when he collected it and sent it to the Crime Lab, except for blue 

tape the Crime Lab used to reseal the packaging. 

The Crime Lab scientist, Martin McDermot, testified that exhibit 2 was the 

material in its packaging that he received for analysis in this case, and that its item 

numbers, case numbers, and general description correspond with the report that he 

prepared. He testified he made markings on the object indicating that he tested or 

handled it. He acknowledged, however, that he did not receive the item directly from 

Officer Kuehny, but rather from Victor Alcorey, a Crime Lab property and evidence 

custodian, who did not testifY. Mr. McDermot was unable to testify how or where Mr. 

Alcorey received the item. 

The defense thus objected to admission of exhibit 2 on foundation and chain of 

custody grounds. The court overruled the objection and admitted the exhibit on the basis 

that Officer Kuehny received the item and created the packaging and the item was as he 

observed it other than evidence of entry by the Crime Lab; Mr. McDermot testified there 

was an indication of his entry into the item; and, based on the testimony the only 

indication of changed condition goes to the weight of the evidence and not admissibility. 

Mr. Alcaraz Mendoza contends the court erred in admitting exhibit 2 and related 

testimony ofMr. McDermot because crucial elements ofthe chain of custody were 

mlssmg. He argues the reliability of the evidence was compromised because Mr. 

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No. 33278-1-III 

State v. Alcaraz Mendoza 

McDermot was unable to testify how or where Mr. Alcorey obtained the item, thus 

leaving a critical gap in establishing that the evidence was the purported item taken from 

him in substantially the same form. We also reject these arguments. 

The trial court's ruling indicates it found nothing to suggest tampering or 

alteration of the item beyond what Mr. McDermot did for purposes of testing. The State 

adequately identified the item and showed that it was in substantially the same condition 

as when the crime was committed, irrespective of lack of testimony regarding Mr. 

Alcorey's. handling of the item. The court was correct that in this situation any 

deficiencies in chain of custody go to weight and not admissibility. The court did not 

abuse its discretion in admitting exhibit 2 and Mr. McDermot's testimony that the 

substance tested positive for methamphetamine. 

Finally, Mr. Alcaraz Mendoza challenges the sufficiency ofthe evidence to 

support the conviction for methamphetamine possession. He contends that without the 

erroneously admitted exhibit 2 and testimony of Officer Kuebny and Mr. McDermot, the 

properly admitted evidence failed to establish the elements of the crime. 

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency ofthe evidence, we view the evidence 

and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements ofthe crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980). Following a 

bench trial, appellate review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence 

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No. 33278-1-II1 

State v. Alcaraz Mendoza 

supports the findings of fact and, if so, whether the findings support the conclusions of 

law. State v. Stevenson, 128 Wn. App. 179, 193, 114 P.3d 699 (2005). "Substantial 

evidence" is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the 

asserted premise. Id. We review challenges to a trial court's.conclusions of law de novo. 

State v. Gatewood, 163 Wn.2d 534,539, 182 P.3d 426 (2008). We defer to the trier of 

fact on issues of conflicting testimony, witness credibility, and persuasiveness ofthe 

evidence. State v. Walton, 64 Wn. App. 410, 415-16,824 P.2d 533 (1992). 

The crime of unlawful possession of a controlled substance requires proof ofjust 

two elements: (1) possession (2) ora controlled substance. RCW 69.50.4013(1). 

Methamphetamine is a controlled substance. RCW 69.50.206(d)(2). 

As discussed, there was no error in the admission of Officer Kuehny's testimony, 

or in the admission of exhibit 2 that Mr. McDermot testified contained 

methamphetamine. Mr. Alcaraz Mendoza told both Officer Newton and Officer Kuehny 

that the substance seized from his pocket was methamphetamine. The trial court made 

written findings that Officer Kuehny searched Mr. Alcaraz Mendoza's pants pocket 

incident to his arrest and located a plastic baggie containing a white crystalline substance 

that Mr. Alcaraz Mendoza admitted was methamphetamine that he uses for back pain. 

The substance proved in Crime Lab testing to contain methamphetamine. (Findings of 

Fact 3-4, 8-10) These findings are supported by substantial evidence and support the 

court's conclusions of law that Mr. Alcaraz Mendoza knowingly possessed 

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No. 33278-I-III 

State v. Alcaraz Mendoza 

methamphetamine-a controlled substance-in Benton County on July 4, 20l3. 

(Conclusions ofLaw 1-3) A rational trier of fact could find him guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt based on the evidence. RCW 69.50.4013(1); Green, 94 Wn.2d at 221. 

Affirmed. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

j WE CONCUR: 

1ztLhfU~( C!-F-?K JL,H 


Siddoway, C.J. Pennell, J. ~ 

Lawrence-Berrey, J. 

11