THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE 

CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING 

EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. 

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Respondent, 

v. 

Antonio Miller, Petitioner. 

Appellate Case No. 2015-000365 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal from Aiken County 

Doyet A. Early, III, Circuit Court Judge 

Memorandum Opinion No. 2016-MO-009 

Heard January 12, 2016 – Filed March 30, 2016 

REVERSED 

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of 

Columbia, for Petitioner. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy 

Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant 

Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and 
Assistant Attorney General J. Anthony Mabry, all of 

Columbia, and Solicitor James Strom Thurmond, Jr., of 

Aiken, for Respondent. 

PER CURIAM: We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision 

affirming the trial judge's finding that the affidavit supporting the search warrant 

issued for petitioner's residence established the requisite probable cause. See State 

v. Miller, Op. No. 2014-UP-409 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Nov. 19, 2014). We find the 

affidavit, which was not supplemented with oral testimony, failed to establish 

probable cause that evidence of a crime may be contained within the residence 

sought to be searched. See State v. Kinloch, 410 S.C. 612, 616, 767 S.E.2d 153, 

155 (2014) (applying the fair probability standard and stating the duty of a 

reviewing court is to ensure the magistrate had a substantial basis for its probable 

cause determination (citing State v. Bellamy, 336 S.C. 140, 143–45, 519 S.E.2d 

347, 348–49 (1999))); State v. Tench, 353 S.C. 531, 534, 579 S.E.2d 314, 316 

(2003) (asserting the magistrate must make a practical, common sense decision 

concerning whether, under the totality of the circumstances set forth in the 

affidavit, there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in the 

particular place to be searched (citation omitted)); State v. Jones, 342 S.C. 121, 

126, 536 S.E.2d 675, 678 (2000) ("Although great deference must be given to a 

magistrate's conclusions, a magistrate may only issue a search warrant upon a 

finding of probable cause." (citation omitted)); State v. Smith, 301 S.C. 371, 373, 

392 S.E.2d 182, 183 (1990) (finding mere conclusory statements which give a 

magistrate no basis to make a judgment regarding probable cause are insufficient 

as the magistrate's actions "cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of 

others" (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983))); State v. Viard, 276 

S.C. 147, 149, 276 S.E.2d 531, 532 (1981) (noting the affidavit supporting a search 

warrant must contain sufficient underlying facts and information upon which the 

magistrate may make a determination of probable cause); State v. Owen, 275 S.C. 

586, 588, 274 S.E.2d 510, 511 (1981) ("[I]n passing upon the validity of the 

warrant, a reviewing court may consider only the information brought to the 

magistrate's attention."). Accordingly, we reverse petitioner's convictions, and 

note should the State seek to retry petitioner, it will be permitted to argue the 

evidence seized pursuant to the invalid search warrant may be admissible on some 

basis independent of our finding that the affidavit did not establish the requisite 

probable cause. 
REVERSED 

PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN, JJ., and Acting Justice 

James E. Moore, concur.