IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES ex rel. BILLY )

SPRINKLE (#C15277), )

) 

Petitioner, )

) Case No. 12 C 0288

v. )

)

ALEX DAWSON, Warden, Logan )

Correctional Center, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:

Before the Court is pro se Petitioner Billy Sprinkle’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). For the following reasons, the Court denies Sprinkle’s

habeas petition and declines to certify any issues for appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

BACKGROUND

In 1969, Sprinkle pleaded guilty to charges of murder and deviate sexual assault, and the

Circuit Court of Will County sentenced him to an indeterminate term of 75 to 90 years in prison. 

In 1977, while incarcerated, Sprinkle was convicted of aggravated battery and was sentenced to a

consecutive indeterminate term of one to ten years. By operation of state law, Sprinkle’s

consecutive sentences were combined into a single indeterminate term of 76 to 100 years. 

Sprinkle was paroled in 1981, but after he violated his parole, he was re-incarcerated in 1986. 

He was paroled again in 1990, and was re-incarcerated in 2001 for parole violations.

In September 2009, Sprinkle sought federal habeas relief in this Court alleging that the

Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) failed to award him day-for-day good conduct

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credit. On October 29, 2009, the Court dismissed Sprinkle’s habeas petition without prejudice

because he had failed to exhaust his state court remedies. Thereafter, on December 15, 2009,

Sprinkle filed a complaint for mandamus relief in the Circuit Court of Logan County, Illinois

asking the state court to compel recalculation of his sentence and order his immediate release on

the ground that the IDOC had wrongfully denied him day-for-day good conduct credit. In April

2010, the Circuit Court granted Respondent’s motion to dismiss Sprinkle’s mandamus

complaint, after which Sprinkle filed an appeal in the Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District. 

On May 13, 2011, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s dismissal of

Sprinkle’s mandamus complaint. See Sprinkle v. Randolph, No. 04-10-0378 (4th Dist. 2011)

(unpublished). Thereafter, Sprinkle filed a petition for leave to appeal (“PLA”) in the Supreme

Court of Illinois regarding his good conduct credit claim and on September 28, 2011, the

Supreme Court of Illinois denied Sprinkle’s PLA.

On January 13, 2012, Sprinkle filed the present pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Construing Sprinkle’s pro se habeas petition liberally, see

Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2012), he contends that: (1) IDOC is violating his

due process and equal protection rights by failing to award him good conduct credit for time

served after February 1, 1978; and (2) IDOC is violating Illinois statute 730 ILCS 5/3-3-10(b)(1)

for failing to award good conduct credit for time served following his parole revocations. It is

undisputed that Sprinkle has exhausted these claims.

LEGAL STANDARD

“[I]n all habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the successful petitioner

must demonstrate that he ‘is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

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United States.’” Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 611 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a)). Sprinkle brings his habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), arguing that

the Illinois Appellate Court’s opinion “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” As the Seventh Circuit teaches,

a “petitioner’s challenge to a state court decision based on a factual determination under §

2254(d)(2) will not succeed unless the state court committed an ‘unreasonable error.’” Morgan

v. Hardy, 662 F.3d 790, 798 (7th Cir. 2011).

Sprinkle, however, does not present clear and convincing evidence challenging the

statement of facts in the last state court decision to address his arguments on the merits, which

was the Illinois Appellate Court’s opinion in Sprinkle’s mandamus action. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1). Instead, he is challenging IDOC’s calculation of his good conduct credits based on

Illinois law. Therefore, Sprinkle’s argument is not that the state court committed an

unreasonable factual error, but that IDOC applied the wrong system in calculating his good

conduct credits.

ANALYSIS

I. Constitutional Claim

In his first habeas claim, Sprinkle asserts that IDOC is violating his due process and

equal protection rights by failing to properly award him good conduct credit for time served after

February 1, 1978. See Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Prisoners have a

liberty interest in their good-time credits and credit-earning class and thus must be afforded due

process before prison officials interfere with those rights.”). In particular, Sprinkle argues that

because IDOC is improperly calculating his good conduct credit, IDOC is violating his

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constitutional rights resulting in him serving time past his maximum outdate. 

Sprinkle’s indeterminate sentence – which began in 1969 – spans a time period in which

IDOC used two systems to calculate a prisoner’s good conduct credit. The Supreme Court of

Illinois explains the first system as follows:

Until February 1, 1978, Illinois had a system of indeterminate sentences in which

those committed to the Department of Corrections for commission of a felony

were sentenced to minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment. Goodconduct credits were applied to the minimum term to advance the date of parole

eligibility and to the maximum to advance the date beyond which a prisoner could

not be incarcerated. The Department was required to prescribe, at a rate within its

discretion, a schedule of good-conduct credits for good behavior. These were

known as “statutory good time credits.” The Department was also empowered to

award good-conduct credits to prisoners who performed work assignments or

participated in other Department programs. These credits were known as

“compensatory good time credits.”

Johnson v. Franzen, 77 Ill.2d 513, 516, 34 Ill.Dec. 153, 397 N.E.2d 825 (Ill. 1979) (internal

citations omitted). “Under this formula, inmates were eligible to receive progressively increased

‘statutory good time credits’ during their first six years of incarceration until they reached an

annual maximum of six months of good time credit (exclusive of credit for participation in work

programs) in the sixth year of their prison term.” Barksdale v. Franzen, 700 F.2d 1138, 1139

(7th Cir. 1983). This older system is often referred to as “the statutory and compensatory

formula” because there were two components – statutory good time credits and additional

compensatory good conduct credits that are awarded to prisoners who performed work

assignments. See Johnson, 77 Ill.2d at 516; Barksdale, 700 F.2d at 1139-40.1

 

 1 In September 1975, IDOC altered the regulation for compensatory good conduct

credit because there were not enough inmate jobs available. The amended regulation allows

compensatory good time for all inmates eligible under the old system. See Hampton v. Rowe, 88

Ill.App.3d 352, 355, 43 Ill.Dec. 511, 410 N.E.2d 511 (3d Dist. 1980) (“compensatory good time

is no longer correlated to rehabilitation or satisfactory performance of work assignments, but is

available to all prisoners within the Department”). 

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As of February 1, 1978, the Illinois General Assembly amended the Unified Code of

Corrections awarding day-for-day good conduct credits. See id. at 1139; Johnson, 77 Ill.2d at

516. The new system provides that prisoners are entitled to one day of good conduct credit for

each day of service in prison to the extent that the prisoner’s conduct merits the award of credit. 

See Johnson, 77 Ill.2d at 522; Mosley v. Moran, 798 F.2d 182, 183 (7th Cir. 1986) (good conduct

credit is calculated solely on the basis of time served with good behavior). Meanwhile, “[i]n

order to permit a prisoner to participate in the more beneficial of the two separate good time

credit plans, the Department of Corrections continue[s] to apply the statutory and compensatory

formula to reduce the prison terms of inmates for whom the statutory and compensatory formula

[i]s more favorable than the day-for-day plan.” Barksdale, 700 F.2d at 1140. “[T]he statutory

and compensatory method and the day-for-day formula are two entirely separate and distinct

time computation methods, and [] inmates are not eligible to have their prison terms reduced

under both formulas at the same time.” Id. at 1141-42.

Due to Sprinkle’s lengthy sentence, IDOC continues to apply the statutory and

compensatory formula of good time credit because is its more beneficial than the application of

the day-for-day system. (See R. 7, Habeas Pet., Ex. 4, 8/19/08 IDOC letter.) Specifically, under

the statutory and compensatory formula, Sprinkle is eligible for statutory time, namely six

months a year, along with compensatory time of 7.5 days per month, which amounts to three

extra months a year. See McGee v. Snyder, 342 Ill.App.3d 274, 276, 277 Ill.Dec. 78, 795 N.E.2d

445 (2d Dist. 2003) (compensatory credits are “awarded at a rate of 7 1⁄2 days each month for the

entire sentence, equaling three months per year”). In other words, in the sixth year of his

incarceration, Sprinkle started earning up to nine months of good conduct credits each year. See

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id. On the other hand, under the day-for-day good time credit system, Sprinkle would be eligible

for approximately six months a year, but would not get the extra three months of time under the

compensatory component of the pre-1978 system. See id. (“Under the day-for-day system, a

prisoner would earn one day of good-conduct credit for each day served in prison, thereby

receiving six months of good-conduct credits each year.”).

Nevertheless, Sprinkle contends that he is entitled to the day-for-day credit and not the

“abolished” 7.5 days per month credit. Sprinkle, however, does not address the fact that he is

not only getting 7.5 days per month of compensatory good time credit under the old system, he is

also getting an additional six months of statutory good time credit for a total of nine months of

good time credit a year – three more months per year than the day-for-day credit. Meanwhile,

Sprinkle’s argument in his reply brief that he should earn twelve months of good conduct credit a

year is simply not supported by the statute or Illinois cases in which day-for-day good time credit

under the post-1978 system amounts to six months a year. See McGee, 342 Ill.App.3d at 276;

McGee v. Snyder, 326 Ill.App.3d 343, 346, 260 Ill.Dec. 209, 760 N.E.2d 982 (2d Dist. 2001)

(“Following the change, prisoners were entitled to day-for-day credit at the rate of six months

per year during their entire sentence.”).

In addition, relying on a 1989 case from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois, Sprinkle argues that IDOC should have subtracted all of his good time credits

“in one lump sum” at the outset of his incarceration. See Walker v. O’Leary, 727 F.Supp. 444,

448 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (“Rather than apply the credits to a sentence as the credits are earned,

the Department of Corrections subtracts these credits from the minimum and maximum

sentences in one lump sum at the outset of a prisoner’s incarceration.”). The Court respectfully

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disagrees with the Walker decision and notes that the proposition set forth in footnote 3 is not

supported with any legal authority. In addition, a 1981 Illinois Appellate Court decision

unequivocally states as follows:

It is evident from the language and structure of this Administrative

Regulation, as well as from the inherent nature of statutory good-time credits, that

the Department’s policy was to award statutory good-time credit based upon a

prisoner’s good behavior during the time he served. Stated more simply, statutory

good-time credits were earned by prisoners when they served time without

infractions of the rules and regulations of the Department. As an example, a

person sentenced to 25 years did not earn 6 years and 3 months good-time credit

by being sentenced or by beginning his incarceration. He would earn that amount

by serving his sentence on good behavior. 

See Williams v. Irving, 98 Ill.App.3d 323, 328, 53 Ill.Dec. 746, 424 N.E.2d 381 (3d Dist. 1981). 

In short, Sprinkle’s argument that he should be awarded his good time credit “up front” is not

supported by controlling legal authority. See Rogers v. Prisoner Review Bd., 181 Ill.App.3d

1039, 1044, 130 Ill.Dec. 777, 537 N.E.2d 1106 (3d Dist. 1989) (good conduct “credit does not

accrue or vest until the prisoner actually serves the applicable time with good behavior.”). To

clarify, because federal courts defer to state courts’ interpretations of state laws, see Gresham v.

Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 908 (7th Cir. 2000), the Court must follow the Illinois Appellate Court

cases which hold that inmates do not earn their good conduct credit at the beginning of their

incarceration. See Williams, 98 Ill.App.3d at 328.

Sprinkle’s remaining argument that the old system of calculating good time credits was

abolished ignores post-Johnson modifications made to good conduct credit calculations. More

specifically, the “Illinois Supreme Court in Johnson v. Franzen required that the day-for-day

system be used in computing a prisoner’s good time credits after February 1, 1978. Later cases

have explained, however, that for any prisoner sentenced prior to the effective date of the day7

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for-day system, the more beneficial of the two good conduct credit systems should be applied to

the post February 1, 1978 period of incarceration.” Rogers, 181 Ill.App.3d at 1042.

In sum, Sprinkle’s arguments do not support his equal protection or due process claims

based on IDOC’s calculations of Sprinkle’s good time credit under the old system. See Daniels

v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) (the due process clause is 

not triggered by unintentional or negligent acts); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct.

3194, 82 L.Ed. 2d 393 (1984) (intentional deprivation of property does not violate due process as

long as adequate state post-deprivation remedies exist); David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265, 1271

(7th Cir. 1988) (“the Equal Protection Clause has long been limited to instances of purposeful or

invidious discrimination rather than erroneous or even arbitrary administration of state powers”)

(citations omitted). Indeed, the State of Illinois afforded Sprinkle sufficient due process through

the State’s mandamus proceedings. See New Burnham Prairie Homes, Inc. v. Burnham, 910

F.2d 1474, 1480 (7th Cir. 1990). Because IDOC’s calculations do not violate Sprinkle’s

constitutional rights, the Court denies Sprinkle’s first habeas claim. 

II. State Law Claim

Next, Sprinkle maintains that IDOC is violating 730 ILCS 5/3-3-10(b)(1), which he

argues mandates that IDOC award him day-for-day good conduct credit for the time he served

following his parole revocations. Habeas relief, however, depends on a demonstration that

Sprinkle is in custody in violation of the United States Constitution. See Payne v. Brown, 662

F.3d 825, 828-29 (7th Cir. 2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). As such, whether the IDOC misapplied

730 ILCS 5/3-3-10(b)(1) is not a cognizable claim on federal habeas review. See Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (“it is not the province of

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a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions”);

Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 2004) (“errors of state law in and of themselves

are not cognizable on habeas review”). Put differently, a “violation of state law is not the basis

for federal collateral relief.” Johnson v. Acevedo, 572 F.3d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 2009). As the

Seventh Circuit explains, the “remedial power of a federal habeas court is limited to violations of

the petitioner’s federal rights, so only if a state court’s errors have deprived the petitioner of a

right under federal law can the federal court intervene.” Perruquet, 390 F.3d at 511. The Court

therefore denies Sprinkle’s second habeas claim.

III. Certificate of Appealability

Under the 2009 Amendments to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254

Proceedings, the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a

final order adverse to the applicant.” Accordingly, the Court must determine whether to grant

Sprinkle a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) in this order. 

A habeas petitioner does not have the absolute right to appeal a district court’s denial of

his habeas petition, instead, he must first request a certificate of appealability. See Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1039, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); Lavin v. Rednour,

641 F.3d 830, 832 (7th Cir. 2011). A habeas petitioner is entitled to a certificate of appealability

only if he can make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See Miller-El,

537 U.S. at 336; Narvaez v. United States, 641 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2011); 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(2). Under this standard, Sprinkle must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate

whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different

manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” 

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Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146

L.Ed.2d 542 (2000)). 

Here, jurists of reason would not debate the Court’s conclusion that IDOC did not violate

Sprinkle’s equal protection or due process rights by calculating his good conduct credit under

Illinois’ pre-1978 system. Also, because Sprinkle’s second habeas claim is not cognizable on

habeas review, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability on this claim. Therefore,

the Court declines to certify any issues for appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court denies Sprinkle’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and

declines to certify any issues for appeal. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253(c)(2), 2254(d)(2). 

Dated: June 4, 2012

ENTERED

 

AMY J. ST. EVE

United States District Judge

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