Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 8 / Wednesday, January 13, 2021 / Notices 2733 

1The petitioner first raised concerns about SUA 

in Tesla vehicles in September 2019 

correspondence with the Agency. NHTSA did not 

consider this earlier correspondence to be a validly 

submitted petition because the petitioner did not 

provide his name and address. See 49 CFR 552.4. 

The September 2019 letter cited 110 incidents of 

alleged SUA in complaints to NHTSA, including 

102 reporting crashes. NHTSA has included the 

information in petitioner’s September 2019 

correspondence in the Agency’s analysis of the 

petition. 

2The petitioner identified a total of 225 VOQ in 

the original petition and five addendums. Six of the 

VOQs are duplicative of a prior VOQ. 

3This information was not available or not 

obtained for the remaining crash incidents, as 

detailed below. 

4ODI’s information request letter for DP20–001 

requested crash data and service history 

information for all 124 VOQs cited in the original 

petition and the first two addendums submitted by 

the petitioner. On February 10, 2020 and October 

20, 2020, ODI requested certain supplemental 

information for a total of 83 additional VOQs 

alleging crashes, including 80 that were cited in 

addendums submitted by the petitioner. 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration 

[Docket No. NHTSA–2019–0105] 

Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition 

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration (NHTSA), 

Department of Transportation. 

ACTION: Denial of petition for a defect 

investigation. 

SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the 

reasons for the denial of a petition 

submitted on December 19, 2019, by Mr. 

Brian Sparks to NHTSA’s Office of 

Defects Investigation (ODI). The petition 

requests that the Agency recall Tesla 

vehicles for an unidentified defect that 

allegedly causes sudden unintended 

acceleration (SUA). NHTSA opened 

Defect Petition DP20–001 to evaluate 

the petitioner’s request. After reviewing 

the information provided by the 

petitioner and Tesla regarding the 

alleged defect and the subject 

complaints, NHTSA has concluded that 

there is insufficient evidence to warrant 

further action at this time. Accordingly, 

the Agency has denied the petition. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. 

Ajit Alkondon, Vehicle Defects 

Division—D, Office of Defects 

Investigation, NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey 

Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20590 

(telephone 202–366–3565). 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

1.0 Introduction 

Interested persons may petition 

NHTSA requesting that the Agency 

initiate an investigation to determine 

whether a motor vehicle or item of 

replacement equipment does not 

comply with an applicable motor 

vehicle safety standard or contains a 

defect that relates to motor vehicle 

safety. 49 U.S.C. 30162; 49 CFR part 

552. Upon receipt of a properly filed 

petition the Agency conducts a 

technical review of the petition, 

material submitted with the petition, 

and any additional information. 49 

U.S.C. 30162(c); 49 CFR 552.6. After 

considering the technical review and 

taking into account appropriate factors, 

which may include, among others, 

allocation of Agency resources, Agency 

priorities, and the likelihood of success 

in litigation that might arise from a 

determination of a noncompliance or a 

defect related to motor vehicle safety, 

the Agency will grant or deny the 

petition. 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); 49 CFR 

552.8. 

2.0 Petition 

2.1 Petition Chronology 

Mr. Brian Sparks (the petitioner) first 

submitted a valid petition conforming to 

the requirements of 49 CFR 552.4 on 

December 19, 2019.1 On December 30, 

2019, the petitioner submitted an 

addendum to his petition. This 

addendum references NHTSA 

complaint 11291423, which alleges 

unexpected movement of a vehicle that 

was parked and unoccupied. 

On January 13, 2020, the Office of 

Defects Investigation (ODI) opened 

Defect Petition DP20–001 to evaluate 

the petitioner’s request for a recall of all 

Tesla Model S, Model X, and Model 3 

vehicles produced to date based on the 

information in his correspondence, 

petition and various addendums. On 

February 21, 2020, the petitioner 

submitted another addendum to his 

petition, identifying 70 new incidents of 

alleged SUA in NHTSA complaints (also 

known as Vehicle Owner 

Questionnaires, or VOQs) filed since 

DP20–001 was opened. Additional 

addendums updating VOQ counts were 

submitted on April 10, 2020, June 22, 

2020, September 10, 2020 and December 

1, 2020. The June 22 submission 

included a request to update the 

petition ‘‘to include a recent analysis of 

Tesla’s SUA defect from Dr. Ronald 

Belt.’’ 

2.2 Petition Basis 

Altogether, the petitioner identified a 

total of 232 VOQs involving unique 

alleged SUA incidents in his 

submissions, including 203 reporting 

crashes.2 The petitioner also submitted 

a document purporting to analyze Event 

Data Recorder (EDR) data from the 

incident reported in NHTSA VOQ 

11216155. The petitioner believes that 

‘‘Tesla vehicles have a structural flaw 

which puts their drivers and the public 

at risk’’ and bases his request for a recall 

of the subject vehicles on: 

1. His view that, ‘‘The volume of 

complaints in the NHTSA database 

indicates a severe and systemic 

malfunction within Tesla vehicles;’’ 

2. A third-party analysis of data from 

the crash reported in VOQ 11206155, 

which theorizes a fault condition that 

allegedly ‘‘caused the brake pedal to 

behave like an accelerator pedal;’’ and 

3. A complaint (VOQ 11291423) 

alleging SUA while the driver was 

outside the vehicle, which the petitioner 

describes as ‘‘the first SUA complaint 

involving a Tesla vehicle in which the 

driver cannot reasonably be accused of 

pressing the accelerator.’’ 

3.0 Analysis 

ODI performed the following analyses 

in its evaluation of the petition for a 

grant or deny decision: 

1. Analyzed crashes identified by 

petitioner for connection to SUA; 

2. Analyzed EDR or Tesla vehicle log 

data or both from 118 crash incidents; 3

3. Reviewed the crash incident 

reported in VOQ 11206155; 

4. Reviewed the crash incidents 

reported in VOQ 11291423; 

5. Reviewed Tesla’s system safeguards 

for the accelerator pedal position sensor 

(APPS) assembly and motor control 

system; 

6. Reviewed two defect theories 

referenced in the petition; 

7. Reviewed the brake system designs 

for the subject vehicles; and 

8. Reviewed service history 

information for the accelerator pedal 

assemblies, motor control systems, and 

brake systems for 204 of the 232 

vehicles identified in VOQs submitted 

by the petitioner.4

3.1 Crash Classification 

ODI’s crash analysis reviewed 217 

incidents, including the 203 crashes 

identified by the petitioner and fourteen 

additional crashes reported in VOQs 

that were either not selected by the 

petitioner (eight) or were submitted after 

the petitioner’s most recent submission 

(six). 

Table 1 provides a breakdown of the 

driving environments and crash data 

review for the crashes analyzed by ODI. 

Crash data (EDR, Tesla log data, and/or 

video data) were reviewed for 118 of the 

crash incidents. Crash data were not 

obtained for most of the incidents 

received after DP20–001 was opened. 

2734 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 8 / Wednesday, January 13, 2021 / Notices 

5Email from Brian Sparks to NHTSA Acting 

Administrator Owens, ‘‘Motor Vehicle Defect 

Petition: Recall Tesla Vehicles Due to Sudden 

Unintended Acceleration,’’ December 19, 2019. 

6Email from Brian Sparks to ODI, ‘‘Re_DP20–001 

Acknowledgement Letter,’’ February 21, 2020, 

attachment titled ‘‘My Experiences with Tesla 

Model 3.’’ 

7Tesla service manager, letter to the consumer, 

July 11, 2019. 

TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF CRASH INCIDENTS REVIEWED BY ODL 

Category Crash data 

reviewed 

Crash data 

not available 

Crash data 

not obtained Total 

Parking lot ........................................................................................................ 61 44 9 114 

Driveway .......................................................................................................... 26 16 4 46 

Traffic light ....................................................................................................... 11 7 2 20 

Parking garage ................................................................................................ 7 5 1 12 

City traffic ......................................................................................................... 3 1 0 4 

Stop-and-go traffic ........................................................................................... 2 2 0 4 

Highway traffic ................................................................................................. 2 1 1 4 

Stop sign .......................................................................................................... 2 1 0 3 

Charging station ............................................................................................... 1 1 1 3 

Street side parking ........................................................................................... 1 1 0 2 

Drive thru ......................................................................................................... 1 0 1 2 

School drop-off lane ........................................................................................ 1 0 0 1 

Car wash .......................................................................................................... 0 1 0 1 

Gated exit (China incident) .............................................................................. 0 1 0 1 

Total .......................................................................................................... 118 80 19 217 

Six of the crashes reported by the 

petitioner were assessed by ODI as 

unrelated to SUA. These include all four 

of the crashes occurring in highway 

traffic, one crash at a traffic light and 

one of the driveway crashes. The 

highway crashes include two involving 

loss of lateral control due to apparent 

loss of rear tire grip while driving in the 

rain (VOQs 11297507 and 11307255), 

one involving late braking for the cut-in 

of a slower moving vehicle (VOQ 

11278322), and one for which the crash 

data do not support the allegation and 

show no evidence of speed increase or 

failure to respond to driver inputs (VOQ 

11174732). The crash at a traffic light 

involved unexpected movement of a 

vehicle operating with Traffic Aware 

Cruise Control enabled after the vehicle 

had come to a stop behind another 

vehicle at a red light (VOQ 11307023). 

The driveway crash incident will be 

reviewed later in this report (VOQ 

11291423). 

All of the remaining 211 crashes, 

assessed by ODI as related to SUA, 

occurred in locations and driving 

circumstances where braking is 

expected. Eighty-six (86) percent of 

these crashes occurred in parking lots, 

driveways or other close-quarter ‘‘notin-traffic’’ locations. Almost all of these 

crashes were of short duration, with 

crashes occurring within three seconds 

of the alleged SUA event. 

3.2 SUA Crash Data Analysis 

ODI’s analysis of EDR data, log data 

or both from 118 crashes did not 

identify any evidence of a vehicle-based 

cause of unintended acceleration or 

ineffective brake system performance in 

the subject vehicles. The data shows 

that vehicles responded as expected to 

driver accelerator and brake pedal 

inputs, accelerating when the 

accelerator pedal is applied, slowing 

when the accelerator pedal is released 

(generally in regenerative braking mode) 

and slowing more rapidly when the 

brake is applied. ODI did not observe 

any incidents with vehicle accelerations 

or motor torques that were not 

associated with accelerator pedal 

applications. In the few cases where the 

brake and accelerator pedal were 

applied at the same time, the brake 

override logic performed as designed 

and cut motor torque. 

The data clearly point to pedal 

misapplication by the driver as the 

cause of SUA in these incidents. 

Analysis of log data shows that the 

accelerator pedal was applied to 85 

percent or greater in 97 percent of the 

SUA crashes reviewed by ODI. Peak 

accelerator pedal applications were 

initiated within two seconds of the 

collisions in 97 percent of the cases. 

Analysis of brake data showed no 

braking in 90 percent of SUA crashes 

and late braking initiated less than one 

second before impact in the remaining 

10 percent. The pre-crash event data 

and driver statements indicate that the 

SUA crashes have resulted from drivers 

mistakenly applying the accelerator 

pedal when they intended to apply the 

brake pedal. Approximately 51 percent 

of the crashes occurred in the first six 

months of the driver’s use of the 

incident vehicle. 

3.3 VOQ 11206155 

3.3.1 Consumer’s Description of the 

Event 

NHTSA complaint 11206155 alleges 

that a 2018 Tesla Model 3 experienced 

an SUA event resulting in a crash in the 

owner’s driveway on the evening of May 

6, 2019. The complaint states that: 

‘‘[The driver] turned into [the driver’s] 

driveway and was going to pull into 

[her] garage to park the car, when the 

car accelerated suddenly and violently 

and crashed into the front stone wall of 

[the] house. The stone wall is damaged 

and the front right side of the Tesla has 

significant damages.’’ 

The petitioner referenced the incident 

reported in VOQ 11206155 in the first 

addendum to the petition,5 which 

included a third-party analysis of EDR 

data from the crash. ODI requested a 

copy of the EDR data in the petition 

acknowledgement letter. In response, 

the petitioner provided an incomplete 

copy of the EDR, a copy of a letter Tesla 

sent to the consumer, and a document 

prepared by the driver that provides 

additional details about the SUA 

allegation.6 The driver alleges that the 

SUA event occurred after the vehicle 

was ‘‘slowed to a halt’’ and while the 

driver was ‘‘waiting for the garage door 

to fully open.’’ 

3.3.2 Tesla Letter to the Consumer 

In a July 11, 2019 letter, Tesla 

provided the consumer with the 

following summary of its analysis of log 

data for the crash event reported in VOQ 

11206155: 7

‘‘According to the vehicle’s diagnostic 

log, immediately prior to the incident, 

the accelerator pedal was released, 

regenerative braking was engaged and 

slowing the vehicle, and the steering 

wheel was turned to the right. Then, 

while the vehicle was traveling at 

approximately 5 miles per hour and the 

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 8 / Wednesday, January 13, 2021 / Notices 2735 

steering wheel was turned sharply to the 

right, the accelerator pedal was 

manually pressed and over about one 

second, increased from approximately 

0% to as high as 88%. During this time, 

the vehicle speed appropriately 

increased in response to the driver’s 

manual accelerator pedal input. In the 

next two seconds, the accelerator pedal 

was released, the brake pedal was 

manually pressed, which also engaged 

the Anti-Lock Braking System, multiple 

crash-related alerts and signals were 

triggered, and the vehicle came to a 

stop.’’ 

3.3.3 ODI Analysis of the Event 

ODI’s analysis of the subject crash 

event included reviews of vehicle log 

data, the EDR report furnished by the 

petitioner, statements from the driver, 

and a video of the incident provided by 

Tesla. This analysis confirmed the 

sequence of events described in Tesla’s 

letter to the consumer. Figure 1 shows 

pre-crash vehicle speed and driver 

controls over the ten seconds prior to 

impact. 

ODI’s review of the vehicle log data 

shows that, approximately seven 

seconds before the crash, the vehicle is 

completing a right turn as the steering 

angle returns from a large positive value 

to neutral. Over the next second, the 

driver releases the accelerator pedal and 

the vehicle begins a moderate 

deceleration under regenerative braking. 

The vehicle begins to turn right toward 

the owner’s driveway approximately 

five seconds before impact. 

Approximately two seconds before 

impact, as the vehicle nears the apex of 

the turn into the driveway, the 

accelerator pedal position begins to 

increase. The accelerator pedal 

increases from 0% to 88% in about one 

second. 

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P 

2736 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 8 / Wednesday, January 13, 2021 / Notices 

BILLING CODE 4910–59–C 

The accelerator pedal returns to 0% 

approximately 0.9 seconds before 

impact and the brake pedal is applied 

approximately 0.5 seconds later. The 

late brake application initiates ABS 

braking approximately 0.2 seconds 

before impact. 

3.3.4 ODI Analysis of Event Video File 

An event video file from the vehicle’s 

front camera sensor shows the vehicle 

moving slowly on a residential street 

before beginning the right turn into a 

short driveway with a moderate positive 

grade leading to twin garage doors 

separated by a center pillar covered by 

stonework. The vehicle briefly surges 

forward as it nears the apex of the turn 

into the driveway. The vehicle never 

stops moving and continues to turn 

right until impacting the center pillar, 

consistent with the steering angle data 


EN13JA21.007</GPH>
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 8 / Wednesday, January 13, 2021 / Notices 2737 

8This is the only event reviewed by ODI in this 

petition evaluation where the data log showed the 

brake was applied at T0 and the EDR did not. 

9Acceleration (a) is the change in velocity (v) per 

unit time (t), or a(T) = dv/dt. When vehicle speed 

is increasing over a given time interval, the 

acceleration is positive in that interval. 

10Second channel output voltage curve is half the 

slope of the first channel. 

11The APPS data refresh rate is 10 milliseconds. 

12The EEPROM is a non-volatile memory device 

that retains stored data after cycling power. 

from the log and EDR data. The garage 

doors remain closed throughout the 

event. 

3.3.5 ODI Analysis of EDR Data 

The EDR vehicle speed, accelerator 

pedal position and steering angle data 

mirror the log data, within the range of 

expected variation due to differences in 

data resolution, sampling intervals and 

data latencies in the two data recording 

systems. For example, the vehicle speed 

data reported in the EDR report for the 

Model 3 has a resolution of 1 mph, a 

sampling frequency of 5 Hz, and a 

maximum latency of approximately 200 

milliseconds, while the vehicle speed 

data recorded in the log data has a 

resolution of 0.05 mph, a logging rate of 

1 Hz, and a maximum latency of 

approximately 10 milliseconds. 

The EDR did not record the late brake 

application and subsequent ABS 

activation. The data log shows that the 

Restraint Control Module (RCM) echoed 

the brake application in the near 

deployment alert triggered by the 

impact, indicating that the EDR would 

be expected to show ‘‘On’’ for service 

brake status at impact. Tesla indicated 

it was unable to investigate the apparent 

discrepancy further without an original 

copy of the EDR report.8

ODI’s reviews of EDR reports for this 

and several other Model 3 crash events 

noted that the polarity of the pre-crash 

longitudinal acceleration data appeared 

to be reversed in relation to vehicle 

speed data (i.e., negative acceleration 

displayed when the vehicle speed is 

increasing and positive acceleration 

displayed when vehicle speed is 

decreasing).9 Tesla confirmed that the 

longitudinal acceleration data polarity 

was reversed in Model 3 EDR reports 

produced using EDR reporting services 

of v20.2.1 or earlier. Tesla advised ODI 

that the error has been corrected in EDR 

reporting service update v20.29.1. 

3.4 Analysis of Log Data for VOQ 

11291423 

VOQ 11291423 alleges multiple 

incidents of unexpected movement of a 

2015 Model S after parking on an 

inclined driveway in Lancaster, 

California on December 26, 2019. The 

complaint states that: 

‘‘[The] 2015 Model S 85D was 

reversed onto driveway then placed in 

park and doors were closed and locked. 

A few moments later the vehicle started 

accelerating forward towards the street 

and crashed into a parked car. Front 

wheels were receiving power while rear 

wheels where locked and dragging 

rather than wheels spinning. I reversed 

vehicle back onto driveway and it 

happened another 2 times after first 

incident within a 30 minute time span.’’ 

As previously noted, the petitioner’s 

addendum cited this VOQ as an ‘‘SUA 

complaint involving a Tesla vehicle in 

which the driver cannot reasonably be 

accused of pressing the accelerator.’’ 

When interviewed by ODI, the owner 

stated that the vehicle was backed up an 

inclined driveway and parked. The 

driveway was covered with freshly 

fallen snow. Shortly after he shifted to 

‘‘park’’ and exited the vehicle, the 

owner observed the vehicle move 

approximately two car lengths down the 

driveway. 

The movement stopped when the 

vehicle reached the level surface of the 

street at the base of the driveway. The 

owner alleged the movement occurred 

two more times after the vehicle was 

backed up the driveway and parked in 

a similar position. The second incident 

involved a minor impact with a vehicle 

parked within a couple of feet of the 

Tesla, resulting in a crack in the front 

bumper of the second vehicle and no 

damage to the Tesla. The third incident 

was like the first, with the movement 

ending at the base of the inclined 

driveway. 

ODI’s review of log data from this 

vehicle found that the movement 

occurred when the vehicle was shutoff 

with no torque applied to the front or 

rear drive motors. Based on the log data 

and the physics of the vehicle 

movement from the driveway to the 

street, it is ODI’s assessment that the 

unexpected movement of the parked 

vehicle was most likely caused by 

insufficient traction of the rear tires on 

the low-friction surface of the snowcovered driveway, which resulted in the 

vehicle sliding down the driveway. ODI 

has excluded this incident from its 

analysis of SUA crashes. 

3.5 System Safeguards 

The APPS system used in the subject 

Tesla vehicles has numerous design 

features to detect, and respond to, single 

point electrical faults, including: 

Redundant position sensors, contactless 

inductive sensing technology, 

independent power and ground 

connections to the sensors, and sensor 

voltage curves that differ by a fixed 

ratio.10 All subject vehicles are 

equipped with accelerator pedal 

assemblies with two independent 

inductive sensors that convert the 

angular position of the pedal to voltage 

signals. The pedal position can only be 

changed in response to an external force 

being applied, such as the driver’s foot. 

The Drive Inverter main processor 

controls motor torque based on 

accelerator pedal voltage. A separate 

processor (Pedal Monitor) acts as a 

safety monitor, continually checking 

both APPS signals for faults and 

independently calculating motor torque. 

Any malfunction or deviation in the 

APPS system results in a fault mode, 

cutting torque to zero for driver pedal 

applications or regenerative braking. In 

addition, the Pedal Monitor can shut off 

the Drive Inverter if driver’s 

commanded motor torque and actual 

motor torque do not match. 

The APPS voltage signals pass 

through A/D (Analog/Digital) converters 

in the drive unit, which then reports the 

data to the Controller Area Network 

(CAN) communication bus.11 The CAN 

data are time stamped and stored at 

specified intervals by the data log. The 

RCM receives the data from the drive 

unit via the CAN bus. The data is 

buffered in the RCM random access 

memory (RAM) and then written to the 

RCM Electrically Erasable 

Programmable Read-Only Memory 

(EEPROM) 12 in the event of a nondeploy or deployment event. 

3.6 ODI Review of SUA Theories 

As part of its evaluation of DP20–001, 

ODI reviewed two defect theories 

alleging vehicle-based causes of SUA in 

the subject vehicles. Both theories were 

developed by Dr. Ronald Belt, the first 

in 2018 and the second in 2020. A paper 

describing the most recent theory was 

submitted to NHTSA by the petitioner 

and is based upon Dr. Belt’s review of 

EDR data from the crash reported in 

VOQ 11206155. The other theory was 

referenced by the consumer who 

submitted VOQ 11206155 and is based 

upon Dr. Belt’s third-hand 

reconstruction of log data from an 

unknown SUA event. Both papers are 

based upon incorrect event data, 

incorrect reconstructions of event 

dynamics, and false assumptions 

regarding vehicle design factors. 

3.6.1 2020 Theory (VOQ 11206155 

SUA Event) 

In an addendum to the petition 

submitted on June 22, 2020, the 

petitioner requested that NHTSA 

include a recent paper by Dr. Ronald 

2738 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 8 / Wednesday, January 13, 2021 / Notices 

13Belt, Ronald. ‘‘Tesla Regen, Brakes and Sudden 

Acceleration.’’ Center for Auto Safety, June 1, 2020. 

https://www.autosafety.org/wp-content/uploads/ 

2015/03/Tesla-Regen-Brakes-and-SuddenAcceleration.pdf. 

14ODI estimates that the vehicle was within 

approximately five feet of the stone wall when ABS 

braking began. 

15Belt, Ronald. ‘‘Tesla’s Sudden Acceleration Log 

Data—What It Shows.’’ Center for Auto Safety, May 

1, 2018. https://www.autosafety.org/wp-content/ 

uploads/2015/03/Teslas-Sudden-Acceleration-LogData-What-It-Shows.pdf. 

16 ‘‘My Experiences with Tesla Model 3,’’ p 10. 

17The paper provides the following explanation 

of how the accelerator pedal position data was 

reconstructed: ‘‘In this paper, the author has 

obtained the complete accelerator pedal sensor log 

data for a sudden acceleration incident from a 

driver who got the log data from Tesla during a 

telephone conversation. The Tesla engineer gave a 

detailed description of the log data to the driver, 

who then provided it to the author. The author then 

plotted this data to create the figure used in this 

study.’’ 

18 Dr. Belt’s reconstruction imagines the APPS log 

data as a square wave, which he asserts could not 

have been produced by a physical application of the 

accelerator pedal. 

19ODI does not believe that Dr. Belt’s 

reconstruction of the log data is accurate. The data 

log is not capable of recording a square wave with 

1 Hz sampling of the APPS data. 

Belt in his petition.13 The paper, dated 

June 1, 2020, claims to explain how a 

‘‘faulty brake light switch [caused] the 

brake pedal to behave like an accelerator 

pedal’’ in the crash event reported in 

VOQ 11206155 that was reviewed 

earlier in this report (see section 3.3 

VOQ 11206155). The same analysis 

alleges that the proposed theory ‘‘is 

believed to be the cause of sudden 

acceleration in over 70% of Tesla 

vehicles.’’ 

The SUA theory proposed by Dr. Belt 

in the June 2020 paper appears to have 

originated from his reliance on the precrash longitudinal acceleration data in 

the EDR report with the polarity issue 

recently corrected by Tesla (see section 

3.3.5 ODI Analysis of EDR Data). Rather 

than recognizing the conflicts between 

the longitudinal acceleration data and 

other pre-crash data in the EDR report 

(e.g., vehicle speed, rear motor speed 

and accelerator pedal position all 

increasing over the same time interval 

as the reported deceleration), Dr. Belt 

develops his reconstruction of the crash 

event using the inverted longitudinal 

acceleration data and posits a theory to 

explain how a faulty brake light switch 

can cause the brake pedal to function 

like an accelerator pedal. The theory 

relies upon numerous assumptions, 

including: A defective brake switch, a 

large positive torque request from the 

electronic stability control (ESC) system, 

an alternate explanation for the large 

accelerator pedal position increase 

shown in the pre-crash data, and an 

alleged veer to the left caused by the 

presumed ESC activation. 

ODI does not believe that Dr. Belt’s 

June 2020 paper provides a valid theory 

of an SUA defect in the subject incident 

or any other crash. The theory is based 

upon inaccurate event data and several 

false assumptions regarding component 

defects, vehicle dynamics, and motor 

control system design and operation. 

For example, ODI notes the following 

factual errors and mistaken assumptions 

contained the subject paper: 

• The vehicle acceleration data used 

by Dr. Belt in his analysis was reported 

with the polarity reversed. In other 

words, the data shows the vehicle 

decelerating when it was accelerating 

and accelerating when it was 

decelerating. As shown in Figure 1, the 

vehicle first accelerates in response to a 

large accelerator pedal application, then 

decelerates in response to the late brake 

application that triggered ABS braking 

just prior to impact.14

• The evidence shows that the brake 

light switch functioned as designed in 

the event analyzed by Dr. Belt (see 

Figure 1). 

• The ESC and Traction Control 

systems cannot request positive torque 

in the subject vehicles. 

• The APPS data recorded in the EDR 

report and data log show the physical 

position of the accelerator pedal (see 

section 3.5 System Safeguards). There is 

no other source for the accelerator pedal 

data. 

• The vehicle does not veer to the left 

at any point during the crash event (see 

Figure 1 and section 3.3.4 ODI Analysis 

of Event Video File). 

3.6.2 2018 Theory (Unknown SUA 

Event) 

ODI also reviewed an earlier paper by 

Dr. Belt suggesting a different theory for 

a vehicle-based cause of SUA in Tesla 

vehicles.15 This paper, dated May 1, 

2018, was referenced in a supplemental 

submission from the consumer who 

submitted VOQ 11206155.16 The SUA 

theory proposed by Dr. Belt in the May 

2018 paper originated from his 

reconstruction of accelerator position 

log data from an unknown SUA incident 

that was described to him over the 

phone.17 Based on this reconstruction, 

Dr. Belt concluded that the APPS signal 

could not have been produced by the 

driver’s application of the accelerator 

pedal, as summarized below from the 

paper’s abstract: 18

‘‘Examination of the data shows that 

the accelerator pedal sensor output 

increased to cause the sudden 

acceleration. But the increase in the 

accelerator pedal sensor output could 

not have been caused by the driver. 

Instead, the increase in the accelerator 

pedal sensor output appears to have 

been caused by a fault in the motor 

speed sensor, with which it shares a 

common +5V power and ground.’’ 

Like his June 2020 paper, the theory 

proposed by Dr. Belt in the May 2018 

paper is based upon inaccurate event 

data and false assumptions about system 

design. The APPS data is not recorded 

in Tesla’s log data in the manner 

claimed in the paper (see section 3.3.5 

ODI Analysis of EDR Data).19 In 

addition, circuit design information 

provided to ODI by Tesla shows that Dr. 

Belt’s assumption that ‘‘[t]he two 

accelerator pedal sensors and the motor 

speed sensor share the same +5V 

regulator and ground,’’ is incorrect. 

Tesla uses two distinct regulators with 

different voltage outputs to supply 

power to the APPS and motor speed 

sensors. Thus, the May 2018 paper does 

not provide a valid explanation for a 

fault-based cause of SUA in the subject 

vehicles. Based upon the reported 

increase in accelerator pedal position to 

97 percent shortly before collision, the 

most likely cause of the incident 

described in the May 2018 Belt paper is 

pedal misapplication by the driver. 

3.7 Brake System 

The subject vehicles are all equipped 

with pedal-actuated hydraulic brake 

systems that are completely 

independent of the motor control 

system. No common fault has been 

identified or postulated that would 

cause simultaneous malfunctions of the 

brake and motor control systems in the 

subject vehicles. Power assist is 

provided either electro-mechanically or 

from a dedicated vacuum pump. In 

addition, all subject vehicles have 

Tesla’s brake override logic that will cut 

motor torque if the brake and accelerator 

are applied at the same time. If the 

accelerator pedal is pressed before the 

brake pedal (or within 100 milliseconds 

of brake pedal), motor torque is reduced 

to zero. If the brake pedal is pressed and 

then the accelerator pedal, motor torque 

is limited to 250 Nm and motor power 

is limited to 50 kW. In the latter 

condition, the driver should be able to 

hold the vehicle stationary regardless of 

accelerator pedal position with 85 to 

170 N (19 to 38 lbf) of brake pedal force, 

depending on the platform. 

Finally, the subject vehicles also 

contain Tesla’s Pedal Misapplication 

Mitigation (PMM) software which uses 

vehicle sensor data to identify potential 

pedal misapplications and cut motor 

torque to prevent or mitigate SUA 

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 8 / Wednesday, January 13, 2021 / Notices 2739 

crashes. ODI’s analysis found evidence 

of PMM activation in approximately 13 

percent of crashes where log data was 

reviewed for SUA crashes. The 

effectiveness of the PMM activations 

have been limited by the fact that the 

original PMM implementation is 

designed for conditions where the 

vehicle is traveling straight forward or 

rearward toward the collision obstacle. 

Most SUA crashes reviewed in this 

petition evaluation involved dynamic 

steering inputs (i.e., vehicles with 

steering angles of 180 degrees or greater 

when the SUA occurs) which the 

original implementation of PPM was not 

designed to address. 

3.8 Complaint Vehicle Service History 

Review 

ODI requested service histories for the 

accelerator pedal assemblies, motor 

control systems and brake systems for 

204 of the vehicles cited by the 

petitioner. Only two vehicles had faults 

diagnosed in those components: One 

motor fault resulting in a vehicle stall 

allegation and the other an APPS fault 

that appears to have resulted from 

damage incurred by the force of the 

driver’s foot on the pedal during the 

crash event. 

One of the VOQs identified by the 

petitioner reported feeling a jerk 

forward when approaching a stop sign, 

then a complete loss of power (VOQ 

11164094). The data logs from the 

vehicle show no increase in speed and 

the system cutting motor torque to zero 

in response to a drive inverter fault. ODI 

does not consider this incident a valid 

example of SUA. 

Another vehicle had an accelerator 

pedal assembly replaced to repair a 

crash induced fault in one of the pedal 

tracks (VOQ 11180431). The data log 

shows increased drive motor torque in 

response to manual application of the 

accelerator pedal to 88.4 percent. After 

the fault in the pedal assembly was 

detected, motor torque was cut to zero 

within 0.04 seconds. 

The service history analysis indicates 

that component faults are not a factor in 

the SUA incidents reported to NHTSA. 

The data logs for the two incidents that 

did involve component faults 

demonstrated that system failsafe torque 

cut logic worked as designed. 

5.0 Conclusion 

After reviewing the available data, 

ODI has not identified evidence that 

would support opening a defect 

investigation into SUA in the subject 

vehicles. The evidence shows that SUA 

crashes in the complaints cited by the 

petitioner have been caused by pedal 

misapplication. There is no evidence of 

any fault in the accelerator pedal 

assemblies, motor control systems, or 

brake systems that has contributed to 

any of the cited incidents. There is also 

no evidence of a design factor 

contributing to increased likelihood of 

pedal misapplication. 

NHTSA is authorized to issue an 

order requiring notification and remedy 

of a defect if the Agency’s investigation 

shows a defect in design, construction, 

or performance of a motor vehicle that 

presents an unreasonable risk to safety. 

49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(9), 30118. Given the 

fact that the event data do not provide 

evidence that the subject SUA was 

caused by a vehicle-based defect, it is 

unlikely that an order concerning the 

notification and remedy of a safetyrelated defect would be issued due to 

any investigation opened upon grant of 

this petition. Therefore, and upon full 

consideration of the information 

presented in the petition and the 

potential risks to safety, the petition is 

denied. The denial of this petition does 

not foreclose the Agency from taking 

further action if warranted or the 

potential for a future finding that a 

safety-related defect exists based upon 

additional information the Agency may 

receive. 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations 

of authority at CFR 1.95 and 501.8. 

Jeffrey Mark Giuseppe, 

Associate Administrator for Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. 2021–00501 Filed 1–12–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

[Docket Number: DOT–OST–2020–0254] 

Request for Information for the 

Inclusive Design Reference Hub 

Correction 

In notice document 2020–27994 

appearing on pages 83152–83154 in the 

issue of Monday, December 21, 2020, 

make the following correction: 

(1) On page 83152, in the first 

column, in the DATES section, change 

‘‘January 20, 2021’’ to read ‘‘January 21, 

2021.’’ 

[FR Doc. C1–2020–27994 Filed 1–12–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 1301–00–D 

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 

Office of the Comptroller of the 

Currency 

Agency Information Collection 

Activities: Information Collection 

Renewal; Request for Comment; 

Uniform Interagency Transfer Agent 

Registration and Deregistration Forms 

AGENCY: Office of the Comptroller of the 

Currency (OCC), Treasury. 

ACTION: Notice and request for comment. 

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continuing effort to reduce paperwork 

and respondent burden, invites the 

general public and other Federal 

agencies to comment on a continuing 

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