DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Headquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

4 October 1996

FOREWORD

This doctrinal publication describes a theory and philosophy

of command and control for the U.S. Marine Corps. Put very

simply, the intent is to describe how we can reach effective

military decisions and implement effective military actions

faster than an adversary in any conflict setting on any scale.

In so doing, this publication provides a framework for all

Marines for the development and exercise of effective command and control in peace, in crisis, or in war. This publication represents a finn commitment by the Marine Corps to a

bold, even fundamental shift in the way we will view and deal

with the dynamic challenges of command and control in the

information age.

The Marine Corps' view of command and control is based

on our common understanding of the nature of war and on our

warfighting philosophy, as described in Fleet Marine Force

Manual 1, Warfighting (to be superseded by Marine Corps

Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting). It takes into account

both the timeless features of war as we understand them and

the implications of the ongoing information explosion that is
a consequence of modern technology. Since war is fundamentally a clash between independent, hostile wills, our doctrine

for command and control accounts for animate enemies actively interfering with our plans and actions to further their

own aims. Since we recognize the turbulent nature of war, our

doctrine provides for fast, flexible, and decisive action in a

complex environment characterized by friction, uncertainty,

fluidity, and rapid change. Since we recognize that equipment

is but a means to an end and not the end itself, our doctrine is

independent of any particular technology. Taking a broad

view that accounts first for the human factors central in war,

this doctrine provides a proper framework for designing, appraising, and deploying hardware as well as other components

of command and control support.

This doctrinal publication applies across the full range of

militaiy actions from humanitarian assistance on one extreme

to general war on the other. It applies equally to small-unit

leaders and senior commanders. Moreover, since any activity

not directly a part of warfighting is part of the preparation for

war, this doctrinal publication is meant to apply also to the

conduct of peacetime activities in garrison as well as in the

field.

This publication provides the authority for the subsequent

development of command and control doctrine, education,

training, equipment, facilities, procedures, and organization.

This doctrinal publication provides no specific techniques or

procedures for command and control; rather, it provides
broad guidance which requires judgment in application. Other

publications in the command and control series will provide

specific tactics, techniques, and procedures for performing

various tasks. MCDP 5, Planning, discusses the planning side

of command and control more specifically.

"Operation VERBAL IMAGE," the short sto!y with which

this publication begins, offers a word pictUre of command and

control in action (done well and done poorly) and illustrates

various key points that appear in the text. It can be read separately or in conjunction with the rest of the text. Chapter 1

works from the assumption that, in order to develop an effective philosophy of command and control, we must first come

to a realistic appreciation for the nature of the process and its

related problems and opportunities. Based on this understanding, chapter 2 discusses theories of command and control,

looking at the subject from various aspects, such as leadership, information management, and decisionmaking. Building

on the conclusions of the preceding chapters, chapter 3 describes the basic features of the Marine Corps' approach to

command and control.
A main point of this doctrinal publication is that command

and control is not the exclusive province of senior commanders and staffs: effective command and control is the responsibility of all Marines. And so this publication is meant to guide

Marines at all levels of command.

DISTRIBU11ON: 142 000001 00

© 1996 United States Government as represented by the Secretary of the Navy. All rights reserved.

Corps
MCDP 6

Command and Control

Operation VERBAL IMAGE

Chapter 1. The Nature of Command and Control

How Important is Command and Control? — What is

Command and Control? — What is the Basis of Command

and Control? — What is the Relationship Between

"Command" and "Control"? — What Does it Mean to be

"In Control"? — Complexity in Command and Control —

What Makes Up Command and Control? — What Does

Command and Control Do? — The Environment of

Command and Control: Uncertainty and Time —

Command and Control in the Information Age —

Conclusion

Chapter 2. Command and Control Theory

Point of Departure: The OODA Loop — The Information

Hierarchy — Image Theory — The Command and Control

Spectrum — Leadership Theory — Planning Theory —

Organization Theory — Communications Theory —

Information Management Theory — Decisiomnaking

Theory — Conclusion
Command and Control MCDP 6

Chapter 3. Creating Effective Command

and Control

The Challenges to the System — Mission Command and

Control — Low-Level Initiative — Commander's Intent —

Mutual Trust — Implicit Understanding and

Communication — Decisionmaking — Information

Management — Leadership — Planning — Focusing

Command and Control — The Command and Control

Support Structure — Training, Education, and Doctrine —

Procedures — Manpower — Organization — Equipment

and Technology — Conclusion

Notes
MCDP 6 Operation VERBAL IMAGE

Operation VERBAL IMAGE

Scene: A troubled corner of the globe, sometime in the near

future. The Marine expeditionary force prepares for an upcoming offensive.

2248 Monday: Maj John Gustafson had taken over as the

regimental intelligence officer just in time for Operation

VERBAL IMAGE. Who thinks up the names for these operations anyway? he wondered. This would be his first command

briefing and he wanted to make a good impression. The colonel had a reputation for being a tough, no-nonsense

boss—and the best regimental commander in the division.

Gustafson would be thorough and by-the-numbers. He would

have all the pertinent reports on hand, pages of printouts containing any piece of data the regimental commander could

possibly want. He went over his briefing in his mind as he

walked with his stack of reports through the driving rain to

the command tent.
Command and Control MCDP 6

The colonel arrived, just back from visiting his forward

battalions and soaking wet, and said, "All right, let's get

started. S-2, you're up."

Gustafson cleared his throat and began. He had barely gotten through the expected precipitation when the colonel held

up his hand as a signal to stop. Gustafson noticed the other

staff officers smiling knowingly.

"Listen, S-2," the colonel said, "I don't care about how

many inches of rainfall to expect. I don't care about the percentage of lunar illumination. I don't want lots of facts and

figures. Number one, I don't have time, and number two, they

don't do me any good. What I need is to know what it all

means. Can the Cobras fly in this stuff or not? Will my tanks

get bogged down in this mud? Don't read me lists of enemy

spottings; tell me what the enemy's up to. Get inside his head.

You don't have to impress me with how much data you can

collect; I know you're a smart guy, S-2. But I don't deal in

data; I deal in pictures. Paint me a picture, got it?"

"Don't worry about it, major," the regimental executive officer said later, clapping a hand on Gustafson's shoulder.

"We've all been through it."

0615 Tuesday: The operation was getting underway. In his

battalion command post, LtCol Dan Hewson observed with

satisfaction as his units moved out toward their appointed objectives. He watched the progress on the computer screen before him. Depicted on the 19-inch flat screen was a color map

of the battalion zone of action. The map was covered with
MCDP 6 Operation VERBAL IMAGE

luminous-green unit symbols, each representing a rifle platoon or smaller unit. If a unit was stationary, the symbol remained illuminated; when the unit changed location by a

hundred meters, the symbol flashed momentarily.

Hewson tapped on a unit symbol on the touch screen with

his finger, and the unit designator and latest strength report

came up on the screen. Alpha Company; they should be moving by now.

"Get on the hook and find out what Alpha's problem is,"

Hewson barked. "Tell them to get moving."

With rapid ease he "zoomed" down in scale from

1:100,000 to 1:25,000 and centered the screen on Bravo Company's zone. Hewson prided himself on his computer literacy;

no lance corporal computer operator necessary for this old

battalion commander, he mused. Hewson was always amazed

at the quality of detail on the map at that scale; it was practically as if he were there. That was the old squad leader in him

coming out. He tapped on the symbol of Bravo's second platoon as it inched north on the screen.

No, they should turn right at that draw, he said to himself.

That draw's a perfect avenue of approach. Where the hell are

they going? Don 't they teach terrain appreciation anymore

at The Basic School?

"Get Bravo on the line," he barked. "Tell them I want second platoon to turn right and head northeast up that draw.

Now. And tell them first platoon needs to move up about 200

yards; they're out of alignment."

Satisfied that everything was under control in Bravo's

zone, Hewson scrolled over to check on Charlie Company.
Command and Control MCDP 6

Back when he was a young corporal, some 22 years ago, this

technology didn't exist. It was amazing how much easier

command and control was today compared to his old squad

leader days, how much more control there was now. He wondered if the junior Marines realized just how lucky they were.

0622 Tuesday: Second Lieutenant Rick Connors was feeling

anything but lucky. Justpast the mouth of a draw, he angrily

signaled for second platoon to halt. Company was on the radio, barking about something. He was wet, he was cold; his

rain top had somehow sprung a leak, and a stream of icy water poured down his spine. And on top of everything else,

now this.

"Come again?" he said to his radio operator.

"Sir, Hotel-3-Mike says we're supposed to turn right and

head up this draw," LCp1 Baker repeated.

Damn PLRS, Connors cursed to himself. He had never actually seen a PLRS, that venerable piece of equipment having

been replaced by a newer, lighter generation of positionlocating system which attached to any field radio and sent an

updated position report every time the transmit button was

cued. But like all the more experienced Marines, he insisted

on calling the new equipment by the old name.

"Up that draw," Connors repeated, as if to convince himself he had heard correctly.

"Hotel-3-Mike says it's an excellent avenue of approach,

sir," Baker reported dutifully.
MCDP 6 - Operation VERBAL IMAGE

Connors studied the impenetrable web of thorny, interlocking undergrowth in the draw and snorted scornfully. Maybe

on somebody's computer screen it is, he thought. But on the

ground it's not. Somebody at battalion must have his map on

1:25,000 again. So much for the decentralized mission control they told us about at TBS. What do they even need lieutenants for f they're going to try to control us like puppets?

He despised the prospect of hacking his way through the thick

brush of the draw, especially when first squad had spotted

what looked like an excellent concealed avenue of approach

not 200 yards ahead. Of course, if he followed Instructions,

higher headquarters would be squawking about his slow rate

of advance—there were no thickets of pricker bushes on a

computer map. He could just imagine the radio message:

"What's taking you so long, 3-Mike-2? It's only an inch on

the map." And if he chose the other route they'd be on him in

no time about disobeying orders. He cursed the PLRS again.

But then he decided it wasn't the PLRS that was the problem;

it was the way it was being used.

1118 Tuesday: A section of SuperCobra Ills churned

through the driving rain on its way back to the abandoned

high school campus that served as an expeditionary airfield,

returning from an uneventful scouting mission.

"I'll tell you what, skipper," 1 stLt Howard Coble said from

the front seat of the lead helicopter, "this soup isn't getting

any better."
Command and Control MCDP 6

In fact, it was getting considerably worse, Capt Jim Knutsen decided as he piloted the buffeting attack helicopter. A

squall was moving back in. Goo at 500 feet, visibility down

inside a mile and worsening.

"I'm glad I'm not those poor bastards," Coble said, indicating a mechanized column on the muddy trail below them to

starboard.

"You got that right," Knutsen said, not paying much attention.

Until Coble cursed sharply.

"Those aren't ours," Coble said. "Take a look, skipper.

BMPs, T-80s."

Coble was dead right. What they were looking at was an

enemy mechanized column, Knutsen guessed, of at least battalion strength. Probably more. His first instinct was to make

a run at the column, but his intuition told him otherwise.

Something was not right. Knutsen banked the Cobra away

sharply to avoid detection, and his wingman followed.

What's wrong with this picture? Knutsen said to himself.

The mission briefing had said nothing about enemy mechanized forces anywhere near this vicinity. The enemy had apparently used the cover of the bad weather to move a sizable

force undetected through a supposed "no-go" area into the division's zone. Knutsen was familiar enough with the ground

scheme of maneuver to know instantly that this unexpected

presence posed a serious threat to the upcoming operation.

We got ourselves a major problem. These guys are not supposed to be here.
MCDP 6 Operation VERBAL IMAGE

His wingman's voice crackled over the radio: "Pikeman,

did you see what I just saw at two o'clock?"

"Roger, Sylvester."

"We need to let DASC know about this," Coble said on the

intercom.

Knutsen considered the problem. Reporting the sighting to

the direct air support center would, of course, be the standard

course. But because of the weather, they'd had trouble talking

to the DASC all day; they couldn't get high enough to get a

straight shot. In these conditions, he figured they were nearly

a half hour from the field. And when he finally got the message through, he could imagine the path the information

would take from the DASC before it reached the units at the

front—and that was provided they even believed such an unlikely report. DASC hell, we need to tell the guys on the

ground, he thought. They might like to know about an enemy

mech column driving straight through the middle of the

MEF's zone. Forget normal channels. Unfortunately he had

no call signs or frequencies for any of the local ground units.

"Howie, find me some friendlies on the ground," he said.

He radioed his wingman with his plan.

"Got somebody, skipper," Coble said shortly. "AAV in the

tree line at nine o'clock. Got it?"

"Roger, I'm setting down."

1132 Tuesday: You got to be crazy to be flying in this

weather, Capt Ed Takashima said to himself when he heard

the sound of approaching helicopter rotors. He was twice

7
Command and Control MCDP 6

amazed to see the Cobra appear low over the trees and settle

into the clearing not a hundred yards away while its partner

circled overhead. He hopped down from his AAV and jogged

out into the clearing to meet the Marine emerging from the

cockpit and was three-times astonished to recognize him as

an old Amphibious Warfare School classmate.

"Knut-case," he said, pumping his friend's hand enthusiastically. "I should have known nobody else would be crazy

enough to fly in this stuff. What the hell are you doing here?"

Knutsen quickly explained the situation and, when he was

finished and saw Takashima's expression, said: "Don't look

at me like I'm crazy, Tak."

Anybody else Takashima would have thought was crazy—or else completely lost—but not Knutsen. He had known

Knutsen too long for that. Knutsen was too squared away.

"Give me your map, I'll show you," Knutsen said. "We're

right here, right? And the enemy is right there, heading in

this direction," jabbing the map and tracing the enemy movement.

As Knutsen had begun to diagram the enemy move, Takashima was already considering the situation. With all the sensors and satellites and reconnaissance assets that support a

MEF, Takashima wondered, how does an enemy mechanized

battalion drive through the middle of our sector without being

detected? He remembered reading something somewhere

about uncertainty being a pervasive attribute of war. Chalk

one up to Clausewitz 's 'fog of war," Takashima decided. Of

course, Takashima knew, since it was a "no-go" area—and
MCDP 6 Operation VERBAL IMAGE

that meant that somebody up the chain had looked at the terrain and decided it was impassable—it would remain relatively unobserved. But how it had happened didn't matter: it

had happened. What to do about it? That was the problem.

Six or seven clicks, tops, he thought, looking at the map. Not

much time. This changed everything. The original battalion

plan would have to be scrapped; it was as simple as that.

Takashima recognized that his original mission was overcome by events. He made his decision. The situation called

for quick thinking, and quicker action. The objectives might

change, but the overall aim remained the same. The ultimate

object, Takashima knew, was to locate the main enemy fotce

and attack to, destroy it. That could still be the object; it wiId

just have to happen a lot farther south than had been plan4ed.

If the battalion could make a 90-degree left turn in time, hey

might just pull it off. Now if he could just get battalion t? go

along with it . . . . he needed to talk to the battlion cpmmander.

Knutsen had finished tracing the enemy movement, and his

finger rested on the map, pointing at a small town called Culverin Crossroads.

"That's it then," Takashima said. "Culverin Crossroads."

"I hear you, Tak," Knutsen said. "You're thinkng of that

West Africa map ex we did last year at AWS, aren't you?

The one where we wheeled the whole regiment and took the

red force in the flank."

"Yeah, that's the one," Takashima said.

9
Command and Control MCDP 6

"What the hell; let's do it. I got enough fuel for maybe one

pass. You want me to work them over, or don't you want

them to know that we're on to them?"

"Let's wait and surprise them. Can you bring back some

friends?"

What a kick, Knutsen thought. A couple of captains standing in the middle of a muddy field in a downpour working out

the beginnings of a major operation. It reminded him of playing pick-up football as a kid and drawing improvised plays in

the dirt.

"We'll be here," he said with a grin. "You'll recognize

me—I'll be the one in front."

"See you then, K.nut-case," Takashima said.

They shook hands, and Knutsen climbed back into the

cockpit.

"Olsen!" Takashima bellowed at his radioman. "Try to get

me battalion. 1 need to talk to the colonel direct."

1310 Tuesday: "General, the latest weather pictures are

coming in," the lance corporal reported, the note of anxiousness unmistakable in his voice.

MajGen Harry Vanderwood doubted if there was a single

Marine anywhere in the wing who did not recognize the significance that attached to the latest forecasts.

"I'll be right there, Marine," he replied.

No sooner had Vanderwood arrived in the tactical air cornmand center than the MEF commander bustled in unannounced as he had a disconcerting habit of doing. You never
MCDP 6 Operation VERBAL IMAGE

knew when he was going to show up, or where, Vanderwood

mused. Wing commander or mechanic on the flight line, you

were never safe.

"Have you gotten the latest on the situation, Harry?" the

MEF commander asked.

"As of the last 15 minutes, general," Vanderwood replied.

"Not that I'm any smarter than I was before. I'd still like to

know what the hell is going on."

"That makes two of us. I'd like to talk to those Cobra pilots

myself."

"It's being arranged, general. They managed to take off on

another sortie before we could grab them. Under terrible conditions, I might add. When they get back, I'm either going to

give them a medal or a butt-chewing; probably both."

The MEF commander grunted. "How's the weather looking?" he asked.

"We're just in the process of pulling down the latest pictures from the weather satellite," Vanderwood said.

A large-scale map of the area of operations appeared on the

large screen, color-coded to illustrate the precipitation forecast.

"No good news there," Vanderwood said. "Let's take a

look at the incoming weather."

A broader map, much like a weather map on a television

newscast, appeared on the screen. Heavy white blotches

swept sputteringly across the screen from left to right.

"Freeze it right there," Vanderwood said, and the image

stopped moving. "Good. That could be the break we're looking for. I figure in about 90 minutes we'll be able to get
Command and Control MCDP 6

something going. If this pattern holds, I plan to blot out the

sun—what little sun there might be—with aircraft by 1500.

Now all we need is to know what we're going to be attacking."

"How about cueing up the MEF situation package, and

we'll see if we can't make some sense of this," the MEF commander said. "And see if we can get General Bishop on teleconference."

"Somebody ask the Top to come over here," Vanderwood

said, meaning the intelligence chief.

"General, the division commander's away from the CP, but

we're setting up video with the chief of staff," a Marine reported.

"Very well," the MEF commander said. He fully expected

Bishop to be away from the command post; in fact, the division command post was the last place he'd expect to find, the

division commander in the middle of a battle.

The computer operator, Cpl Beale Davis, tapped quickly

on his keyboard, and the wall-sized screen blinked, the

weather map replaced by a situation map of the MEF's area

of operations. From the menu across the top of the screen, he

opened a "conference" window, and the division chief of staff

appeared in a live video feed.

"How are you, Tom?" the MEF commander said.

"Hanging in, general," Col Tom Hester replied. "Sir, General Bishop has gone forward. Do you want him paged? If

he's at one of the regimental CPs, we can get him on video

too."
MCDP 6 Operation VERBAL IMAGE

"No, that's all right. We're just going to try to piece this

picture together, and I want everybody to share the same image. Are you looking at the same thing we are?"

"Yessir, he is," Davis said, meaning that the screen in the

division command post would depict the same information

and images that were being called up on the wing situation

map.

Davis had logged into the theater data base and could "pull

down" almost instantaneously any individual piece of data, or

complete or partial package of information, that had been entered into the system anytime, anywhere, by any means. He

had access to text, imagery, and live or prerecorded video-and

audio, which he could call up by opening additional windows

on the screen. Through the theater data base, he had access to

State Department reports, Defense Intelligence Agency summaries, Central Intelligence Agency accounts, and National

Imagery and Mapping Agency charts. Likewise, he could call

up the latest tactical reports and analyses by a variety of categories—time, unit, contents, location, reliability—and could

specify the level of information resolution— "granularity,"

they called it. Any time he asked for tactical reports over a

period of time, the software would automatically "crunch

out" a trend analysis, both in picture and bullet form. With a

little manipulation, he could get direct feeds from satellites or

aerial reconnaissance drones. (This procedure was not taught

in the classroom; it was an unauthorized "back door" gateway, but nobody complained when Davis pulled it off.) Perhaps most important of all, he could access the Cable News

Network for the latest-breaking developments. There was no

13
Command and Control MCDP 6

lack of information out there, Davis knew. You were being

bombarded by it. Any yahoo could access a near-endless flow

of impressive data. The trick to being a good computer operator was being able to sift through it all to access the right information in the right form at the right time so the old man

could figure out what it meant.

In an effort to make some sense of the enemy situation,

they pulled down various "packages" of information, mostly

in picture form, which promptly appeared and disappeared on

the screen at Davis' command. Enemy armor spottings within

the last 48, 24, and 12 hours. All ground contacts reported in

the last 48 and 24 hours. All enemy artillery units spotted and

fire missions reported in the last 48 hours. Road and rail usage in the last 72 hours. Sightings of enemy mobile air defense equipment, usually a good indicator of the disposition

of the main body, in the last 48 and 24 hours. Enemy radio

traffic in the last week. Enemy aviation activity in the last 2

days. Every once in a while the MEF commander would ask

for a "template," a computer-generated estimate of possible

enemy dispositions and movements based on the partial information that was available. Each template automatically came

with a reliability estimate—"resolution," they called it—calculated as a percentage of complete reliability. The best resolution they had gotten for any one template was 45 percent;

most were in the twenties and thirties. Statistically not very

good—but certainly as good as could be expected.

Another set of red enemy symbols flashed on the screen.

"What the hell," the MEF commander said, looking at the

screen which indicated a heavy flow of enemy helicopter
MCDP 6 Operation VERBAL IMAGE

traffic along a single route. A major heliborne operation? In

this weather? As if things aren 't sticky enough. And why is

this the first I'm hearing of it? "You're telling me the enemy's been flying fleets of helicopters continuously the last 6

hours?"

Vanderwood looked to MSgt Edgar Tomlinson, the intelligence chief.

"No, general," Tomlinson said. "He's not flying anything.

What you're seeing on the screen, believe it or not, is actually

a row of power lines. We checked it out. Radiating and blowing in this wind, our sensors picked them up as helicopters."

"You're kidding me, Top," the MEF commander said

skeptically. "Our sensors think a set of power lines is a bunch

of helicopters?"

"I guarantee it, general," Tomlinson said. "If you want to

call up an aerial photo, I can show you the power lines."

"No, I believe you, Top."

"I've seen it happen before," Tomlinson said. "This gear is

great, as long as you don't trick yourself into thinking that it's

actually smart."

Despite an aggregate resolution of under 25 percent, Vanderwood sensed that a possible pattern had slowly begun to

develop, but hardly anything conclusive. A possibility. A

hunch. A little better than a wild guess. Despite the admittedly amazing technology, you could never be certain of anything, Vanderwood knew. Despite the artificial intelligence,

the decision aids, the computer analysis. As long as war remained a clash of human wills, Vanderwood mused, no mat15
Command and Control MCDP 6

ter how much technology you had, it still boiled down in the

end to intuition and judgment.

"General, the division commander's coming in on video

link," a Marine interrupted.

A window opened on the wall screen, and MajGen Miles

Bishop appeared, apparently from inside a command AAV

somewhere on the battlefield, the trademark cigar stub

clamped in his teeth.

"Hey, can anybody hear me?" he was saying gruffly over

the background noise in the AAV. "Is this blasted thing on?"

"Bish, this is Vanderwood with the MEF commander," the

wing commander said. "You're coming in fine on this end."

"The video whatzit thing is on the blink on this end, but I

can hear you okay," Bishop replied.

"Glad you could spare a few minutes out of your busy

schelule," the MEF commander said. "We've been trying to

figure out what the hell's been going on. We've been running

some software for the last half hour, and we think we might

have something."

"You want to know what the hell's going on, general?"

Bishop said. "Hell, I can tell you what's going on."

"Okay, let us have it," the MEF commander said, and

Bishop proceeded to describe in his own colorful but accurate

way the same situation that had begun to take shape, with

much less clarity, on the wall screen of the TACC. Vanderwood and the MEF commander exchanged glances. Bishop,

Vanderwood mused, shaking his head. What apiece of work

Glad he 's on my team.
MCDP 6 Operation VERBAL IMAGE

"How did you come by that, Bish?" the MEF commander

asked.

"Me and a couple of the boys sitting around a heat tab

making some coffee just swagged it," Bishop said with a lopsided grin. "Ever-lovin' coop da oil—isn't that what you're

always calling it, Harry?"

"Coup d'oeil, Bish," Vanderwood pronounced—referring

to the French term which described the ability of gifted commanders to peer through the "fog of war" and intuitively

grasp what was happening on the battlefield.

"Yeah, whatever," Bishop snorted.

Vanderwood grinned at Bishop's famous good-old-boy

routine. Outside the circle of general officers, few Marines

knew that French was one of the four foreign languages that

Bishop spoke like a native.

"As long as he's got it," the MEF commander said, "let

him pronounce it however he likes."

1428 Tuesday: Capt Takashima heard the unmistakable

sound of the ATGMs firing off in unison like a naval broadside. The doctrinal manuals called it "massed, surprise fires."

Takashima called it "a world of hurt for the bad guys." Damn

if those bastards didn 't walk right into it, he thought as he

scampered forward to get a better look at the situation at the

crossroads where first platoon had just sprung an ambush on

the leading elements of the enemy column. I owe Knutsen a

beer when this is all over. He couldn't explain how he knew,

but just from the sound of things he could tell that first

17
Command and Control MCDP 6

platoon had caught them pretty good. Amazing how you

learned to sense these things. The ground nearby erupted in a

massive explosion, and he hit the deck—S--or rather, the 6

inches of water that covered the deck.

"Olsen, you all right?" he yelled after checking to make

sure he was still in one piece.

"Yessir," his radioman replied. "Captain, third platoon

wants to talk to you."

Second Lieutenant Tim Dandridge, Golf Company's least

experienced platoon commander, was several hundred yards

off to the right. Takashima had originally put third platoon

where he could keep his eye on Dandridge, but when he'd

spun the company, it had left third platoon off on the right

flank by itself. Takashima switched on his headset.

"Oscar-3, this is Romeo-2-Oscar, go."

"Romeo-2-Oscar, I've got mechanized activity to my front

and more activity moving through the woods around my right

flank, over," Dandridge reported.

Even over the radio Takashima could sense the nervousness in the lieutenant's voice.

"Echo's on your right flank," Takashima said.

"Roger, Romeo-2-Oscar, I don't think it's Echo," came the

reply. "I'm not picking them up on PLRS."

Takashima checked his electronic map board, networked to

Olsen's radio, which in addition to his own eight-digit location could show the location of friendly transmitters. He

punched in a request for the location of all transmitters of platoon level or higher. Dandridge was right: no Echo Company
MCDP 6 Operation VERBAL IMAGE

units. Which meant one of two things: either Echo was so

badly lost they weren't even on the map, or somebody had

keyed the wrong code into all of Echo's transmitters.

"Have you made contact with Echo?" Takashima asked.

"Negative. Can't raise them."

"Any visual with the enemy?"

"Negative, but they're definitely out there," Dandridge

said. "Estimate at least a company."

"Roger, are you in position yet?" Third platoon should

have been well set in by now, ready to ambush the advancing

enemy forces.

There was a pause. "Er, roger . . . pretty much,

Romeo-2-Oscar," came the halting reply.

Which meant "No," Takashima knew. Good news got

passed without hesitation; bad news always seemed to move

more reluctantly. Not a good sign. For a second, he considered heading over to third platoon's position to check things

out, but he quickly dismissed the idea. His intuition still told

him the critical action was taking place in front of him at first

platoon's position. Events were still unfolding as expected,

thanks to Knut-case. This was where he needed to be.

Chances were that the young lieutenant was exaggerating; but

yet, if Dandridge was right, then Takashima had read things

wrong, and the enemy had other ideas in mind. You could

never count on the bastards doing what they were supposed

to.

"Gunny!" Takashima bellowed over the sound of the shelling.

19
Command and Control MCDP 6

A moment later GySgt Roberto Hernandez splashed down

beside him.

"Gunny, third platoon is reporting enemy activity to their

front and flank," Takashima began.

"Roger that, skipper," Hemandez said. "I was listening in."

Naturally, Takashima thought. Nothing the gunny did surprised him anymore.

"I'm concerned about what's going on over there," Takashima said. "But I don't have time to check it out myself.

That activity they reported might or might not be Echo Company. Gunny, I want you to hustle over there, have a look

around, and report back to me what you see. Use an alternate

net. If it's real trouble, I need to know in a hurry. Don't step

on any toes, but you might want to make a few tactful suggestions if it's appropriate."

"You want me to be, sir, what is sometimes referred to in

the literature as a 'directed telescope,' "Hernandez said.

"Directed tele-what? Get outta here, gunny," Takashima

said with a grin.

Sometimes it was a pain having the best-read staff NCO in

the Marine Corps as a company gunny, he decided as he

watched Hernandez charge away. But not usually.

1455, Tuesday: "Any questions?"

Any questions? Col Perry Gorman, the division G-3, wondered incredulously. Where should I start?

MajGen Bishop had just spent the last half hour orienting

his staff to the new situation. He stood in front of the large

20
MCDP 6 Operation VERBAL IMAGE

electronic mapboard in the musty tent which housed the division's future ops section. The map was crisscrossed with the

broad arrows and symbols he had been drawing with the stylus while he talked. Every once in a while Bishop would call

for an estimate or opinion, or one of his staff would ask a

question, make a recommendation, or take the stylus to sketch

on the map. An energetic discussion would usually ensue and

Bishop would let this go on for a few minutes, listening to the

arguments for and against and benignly chewing on his cigar

while the members of his staff had their say; then he would

suddenly shut the discussion off and announce his position.

Sometimes Bishop followed the advice of his staff; sometimes, Gonnan was convinced, the general had already made

his decision but wanted to make sure his people felt that they

had had the opportunity to participate. It was truly an education watching Bishop work his staff, Gorman decided. It was

a fluid and idiosyncratic process, reflective of Bishop's own

personality. Never exactly the same twice and yet very effective. Anybody who thought staff planning was a mechanical

process had never been around MajGen Miles Bishop.

There was an old military saying, attributed to the Prussian

Field Marshal Moltke, that no plan survives contact with the

enemy. In a short period of time by merely modifying an existing branch plan, Bishop quickly reoriented the efforts of

the division to meet the new situation. Gorman's first thought

was for the wasted effort; but he quickly realized the effort

had not been wasted at all: it had been a valuable learning

process which had resulted in an improved situational aware21
Command and Control MCDP 6

ness that was shared by Bishop, the entire staff, and subordinate commanders.

A feeling had engulfed the command post that through previous good planning and adaptability the division had turned

a potential crisis into a decisive opportunity. Of course, Gorman mused, an awful lot of things had to happen to make

adaptability during execution possible. It's amazing how

much preparation is required to provide flexibility in execution. A division contained an awful lot of independent parts

that needed to be working toward the same goal. The inteiiigence collection plan would have to be reoriented to the new

axis of advance, as would the fire support planning and the

logistics effort. Potential enemy countermoves would have to

be considered, as well as possible ways to deal with them.

One good thing that doesn 't have to change is the commander 's intent and its end state. The force would have to be

reorganized to support the new taskings. Fragmentary orders

would have to be issued. Necessary coordination would have

to be effected above, below, and laterally—especially with

the wing since all the aviation support requirements had

changed. The light armor battalion would have to be redeployed to continue the counterreconnaissance battle. With

Task Force Hammer as well as all the forward units committed to the exploitation, a new reserve would have to be çonstituted somehow, but not immediately. Thought would have to

be given to protecting the lengthening lines of communications as the pursuit continued. The general's concept for a

regimental helicopterborne attack into the enemy rear would

have to be worked out—a major evolution in itself (although

22
MCDP 6 Operation VERBAL IMAGE

most of the planning and coordination would be done by the

regiment). Landing zones and helicopter lanes would have to

be reconnoitered, air defenses located and targeted for suppression...

"Last chance," Bishop was saying. "No saved rounds?"

"You want this by when exactly, general?" a voice from

the back of the tent asked.

Laughter broke out, and Bishop smiled but did not bother

to answer. The general's obsession with tempo was legendary.

"Look, people, don't worry about trying to control every

moving piece in this monster. It's not gonna happen. I can tell

you it's gonna be chaos for the next few days at least. Maybe

longer. The battalions and regiments are already starting to do

what we need them to do, so let's not try to overcontol this

thing. I just want you to make sure that all the chaos and mayhem are flowing in the same general direction and that we

keep it going. Coordinate what absolutely needs to be coordinated and don't try to coordinate what doesn't. Keep this

thing pointed straight, but let it go. Remember, the sign of a

good plan is that it gives you both direction and flexibility.

"All right," the general concluded, "I think everybody

knows where we stand and what needs to be done. Let's get at

it."

1505 Tuesday: If 2ndLt Connors had been unhappy before,

he was positively miserable now. He decided he felt about as

useful as a mindless pawn in some giant chess game, being

23
Command and Control MCDP 6

moved around one square at a time. Certainly don't want to

get too far ahead of ourselves, do we? The analogy was

pretty appropriate, he thought. Too bad the chess player who

was ordering him around showed every sign of being an indecisive beginner who seemed to be taking an awful lot of time

between moves.

What made things worse was that from the distant shelling

and the radio traffic he could tell that there was one heck of a

battle going on. And he was missing it. Every time he radioed

for instructions he'd get the same reply—"Wait out"—and

when the orders eventually arrived, it seemed that he was always one step too late. Usually, he'd arrive just in time to

have to duck the tail end of somebody else's fire mission. He

might just as well have been wandering around the pine forests of beloved Camp Lejeune for all the action he was getting. Was that a red-cockaded woodpecker he just saw?

He crawled to the edge of the vegetation and peered across

the clearing. That was the objective, alt right, some 300 yards

away. Hill 124, now known as Objective Rose after the company commander's mother-in-law. He checked his watch; the

prep fires were scheduled to commence at half past. He

searched the hilltop carefully through his thermal binoculars

and saw no sign whatsoever of enemy activity.

Of course, he didn't know what he had expected to see.

He'd been given no information on the enemy situation on the

objective, and he had no idea why he was attacking this hill in

the first place. He certainly had no idea what made Hill 124

so important—-other than that it was a convenient place to

draw a goose egg on some higher-up's map. He was expected

24
MCDP 6 Operation VERBAL IMAGE

to attack and seize Objective Rose, commencing at 1530, and

that was that.

With his squad leaders, Connors crawled back to rejoin the

platoon.

"Lieutenant, company wants to talk to you," his radioman

reported.

Connors switched on his headset.

"Hotel-3-Mike, this is 3-Mike-2," he said.

"3-Mike-2, are you ready yet?"

For about the tenth time, Connors said to himself. Keep

your shorts on; the attack doesn 'I gofor another 20 minutes.

"Roger that," he replied out loud. "The objective is deserted."

"Roger. The prep fires commence at 1530, as scheduled,

and last for 5 mikes."

"I say again, the objective is deserted, Hotel-3-Mike,"

Connors said. "We don't need the prep fires; we can just walk

up on the objective."

There was a pause. Connors could imagine the captain

wrestling with that one. He couldn't blame the captain, really.

Battalion wanted things done a certain way. To change things

now, Connors knew, would throw off the timetable and would

mean shutting off the scheduled fires—in short, it would disrupt the plan. And you certainly didn't want to interfere with

the plan, he knew—not in this battalion anyway. The plan

was everything. All the elements of the battalion were supposed to attack in close synchronization, Connors knew—

"synchronization" was LtCol Hewson's favorite buzzword.

Of course, when Connors thought of synchronization he

25
Command and Control MCDP 6

invariably thought of synchronized swimming, and he smiled

at the ridiculous image of a couple of swimmers pirouetting

in graceflul unison in a pool. He couldn't imagine anything

less like combat than that. I might not have a world of experience, he thought, but how could anybody in his right mind

think you could synchronize the confusion and mayhem of any

military operation? It boggled the mind.

"Listen, the prep starts at 1530," came the eventual reply

over the radio, somewhat testily. "Just do it."

"Roger, out," Connors said resignedly. Three bags fulL

Setting in the base of fire and getting the other two squads

in position for the assault was the work of only a few minutes.

Connors checked his watch: still only a quarter past. Hope

nobody falls asleep waiting, he thought, abundantly aware of

Marines' remarkable ability to doze off on a moment's notice

anytime, anyplace, in any conditions. Fifteen minutes later,

exactly on schedule, the preparation fires commenced and

ended 5 minutes later. Battalion would be pleased: the attack

went flawlessly; there was no enemy resistance to screw it up.

His two squads swept through the tall grass toward the hill

and within minutes were consolidating on the objective.

There was no sign that the enemy had ever occupied the hill.

Whether the enemy was anywhere in the vicinity he couldn't

tell: because of the tall grass, visibility was about 10 yards in

any direction. No matter; they had accomplished the assigned

task.

"Litutenant, company gunny wants our ammo and casualty

report," his radioman said.

26
MCDP 6 Operation VERBAL IMAGE

Connors chuckled scornfully. Seeing as there was nobody

to shoot at us and nobody for us to shoot at. . . . Now,

Connors, you're being a malcontent again. Just go through

the motions and don 't make waves.

"I'll take it," he said, switching on his headset.

"Hotel-3-Mike, this is 3-Mike-2. No casualties; no ammo expended. Mission accomplished. What next, over?"

There was pause, then finally the reply came: "Wait out."

1635 Tuesday: "Romeo-2-Oscar, this is 2-Oscar-3."

Capt Takashima recognized the gunny's voice on the command alternate net. He had been hearing the firefight coming

from that direction for some time now—he didn't know how

long: it could be 20 minutes, it could be 2 hours—but he

didn't have time to think about it. He'd feel a lot better once

he got the gunny's opinion of the situation.

"This is 2-Oscar, go," Takashima said.

"Confirm situation as described earlier by 2-Oscar-3," Hernandez reported. "Engaged, situation well in hand. Echo was

a little slow getting their act together, but Oscar-3 saved their

butts. Caught the enemy pretty good."

"Have you made contact with Echo?"

"Roger," Hernandez said. "Have been attached."

"Say again," Takashima said, confused.

"2-Oscar-3 has been attached to A(pha-7-HoteL"

What the hell? Who the hell does Schuler think he is, taking it on himself to attach one of my platoons to his company?

Takashima was about to cut loose with some choice words,

27
Command and Control MCDP 6

but he thought better of it. He knew that he was in no position to try to control what third platoon was doing; he was too

busy dealing with the situation at the crossroads. Sometimes

the enemy didn't use the same boundaries that we did, Takashima realized: third platoon was really part of Echo's fight.

That being the case, Takashima knew that for the purposes of

unity of command third platoon ought to be answering to

Schuler and not to him. It was hardly conventional, Takashima decided—certainly not the school solution—but, under

the circumstances, it was the right thing to do. I guess that's

what gunny would call a "self-organizing, complex adaptive

system, "Takashima mused. I'lljust have to remember to give

Schuler a hard time about needing four platoons to do what

we can do with only two.

0255 Wednesday: The MEF commander shed his dripping

poncho as he stepped out of the rain into the MEF command

post. The military policeman snapped to attention and saluted.

"Carry on, Sgt McDavid. Cpl Cooper," he said to his

soaked driver, "get some sleep. It's been a long day."

He made his way into the operations center and dropped

wearily into his chair where he'd started the operation some

24 hours before. In the last 24 hours, he'd been all over the

MEF area of operations. He'd been to the division forward

command post to talk to the division commander face-to-face

about how to deal with the unexpected developments. He'd

insisted on a face-to-face because he wanted to make sure

they understood each other. He'd been to the wing head28
MCDP 6 Operation VERBAL IMAGE

quarters twice to try to get a handle on the overall situation

and to see what could be done about air support. He'd personally debriefed the Cobra pilots who'd first spotted the enemy

column. He'd videotaped a new intent statement—an "intento-mmercial," as the Marines jokingly referred to it—to be

broadcast to the entire MEF (at least down to battalion and

squadron level, the lowest level that had video capability). He

and the wing commander had taken a terrifying V-22 flight

over the battlefield (and unfortunately had gotten precious little out of it). He'd been back to the MEF command post once

during the day to see if the situation had gotten any clearer

since he'd left: it hadn't. He'd visited the division's maineffort regiment and that regiment's main-effort battalion near

Culverin Crossroads. (It hadn't been until he'd met that CO

from Golf Company, Capt Taka-something, and had seen the

indomitable fighting spirit of his Marines that he'd realized

that the MEF would carry the day—"Just get me some air,

general," the captain had said.) He'd visited the engineers to

make sure that the roads were going to hold up for at least the

next 72 hours in this rain. He'd even spent several hours supervising an assault river crossing during the critical early

stages of the pursuit. And he'd happened upon the FSSG

commander at a maintenance contact point, of all places,

where they'd watched an M1A3 main battle tank repaired and

put back into action; they'd discussed the logistics needed to

support the upcoming exploitation.

It seemed like days since he'd been at the command post.

On the wall screen before him, the amorphous wave of flashing green unit symbols had crept considerably farther north

29
Command and Control MCDP 6

since the last time he had looked at the map. There were far

more red enemy symbols now as well, most of them encircled

in the lower left-hand part of the screen, an indication that the

intelligence effort had managed to locate many of the enemy

forces that had been unknown at the beginning of the operation. He knew that many of those units, although still reflected on the map and still present on the ground, had ceased

to be effective fighting forces by now. He also knew that the

clean image portrayed on the screen could not begin to capture the brutal fighting and the destruction that he had witnessed during the day. That was the great danger of being

stuck in a command post, he knew; you began to confuse

what was on a map with reality.

Based on the tempo of activity in the operations center, he

wondered if the staff knew that the battle was all but won. In

the next room, the major and the two staff sergeants who

made up the future plans cell would be working feverishly on

the plans for the next week to exploit the advantage the MEF

had won today. The responsibility of command is never finished, he decided; always something else to be done. Curiously, he thought, he found himself thinking back to his days

as a brand-new lieutenant at The Basic School, remembering

the adage that had been drilled into them: "Camouflage is

continuous." Command is continuous, he found himself

thinking. I'll have to remember that one, he decided, for the

next time I'm invited to speak at a TBS mess night.

He thought of stopping in to see how things were going in

the future plans cell, but he knew his chief of staff would

have things moving along briskly, and he would just be
MCDP 6 Operation VERBAL iMAGE

getting in the way. Even when the issue had still hung in the

balance, Col Dick Westerby had been pushing the future ops

guys to develop a plan for exploiting the outcome. Around the

MEF command element, Westerby was known with a certain

grudging admiration as "Yesterday," because that was when

he seemed to want everything done. "If it's not done fast,"

Westerby was fond of saying, "it's not done right."

As if by cue, the small, balding colonel appeared, bearing a

cup of steaming coffee.

"You look like you could use this, general," he said.

"Thanks, Dick," the MEF commander said.

A staff sergeant appeared. "Here's the new MEF op order,

colonel," he said, handing a flimsy document to Westerby.

Westerby perused the two-page order which consisted of a

page of text and a diagram, nodding as he read.

"General, do you want to have a look at this?" be asked.

"Hell, no. I couldn't even focus my eyes on it. That's what

I've got you for. You know my intent."

"Looks good, Staff Sergeant Walters," Westerby said, initialing the document and returning it to the staff sergeant.

"Let's get it out 10 minutes ago."

"Aye, aye, sir; it'll go straight out on the secure fax," Walters said and quickly departed.

The MEF commander sipped his coffee and gazed at the

large situation screen.

"Well, what do you think, Dick?" he asked.

"What do I think?" Westerby said. "I think we went in

with an unclear picture of the situation, and it only got worse.

As is usually the case, the enemy tended not to cooperate.
Command and Control MCDP 6

Weather precluded using the bulk of our aviation and restricted the mobility of some of our vehicles. Our original

plan had to be quickly discarded and another put in its place.

We had to adapt to a rapidly changing situation. Our previous

planning efforts provided us with the flexibility and situational awareness to react to a changing situation and provided

flexibility to our subordinates. Thank goodness for staff officers, pilots, and subordinate commanders who exercise initiative and quickly adapt to changing situations."

"Yes," the general said with obvious satisfaction, "don't

you love it when the system works to perfection?"

32
Chapter 1

The Nature

of

Command and Control

"War is the realm of uncertainty, three quarters of the factors

on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of

greater or lesser uncertainly... . The commander must work

in a medium which his eyes cannot see; which his best deductive powers cannot always fathom; and with which, because

of constant changes, he can rarely become familiar."

—Carl von Clausewitz

MCDP 6 The Nature of Command and Control

T

o put effective command and control into practice, we

must first understand its fundamental nature—its purpose, characteristics, environment, and basic functioning.

This understanding will become the basis for developing a

theory and a practical philosophy of command and control.

How IMPORTANT IS COMMAND AND CONTROL?

No single activity in war is more important than command

and control. Command and control by itself will not drive

home a single attack against an enemy force. It will not destroy a single enemy target. It will not effect a single emergency resupply. Yet none of these essential warfighting

activities, or any others, would be possible without effective

command and control. Without command and control, campaigns, battles, and organized engagements are impossible,

military units degenerate into mobs, and the subordination of

military force to policy is replaced by random violence. In

short, command and control is essential to all military opera

tions and activities.

With command and control, the countless activities a military force must perform gain purpose and direction. Done

well, command and control adds to our strength. Done poorly,

it invites disaster, even against a weaker enemy. Command

and control helps commanders make the most of what they

35
Command and Control MCDP 6

have—people, information, material, and, often most important of all, time.

In the broadest sense, command and control applies far beyond military forces and military operations. Any system

comprising multiple, interacting elements, from societies to

sports teams to any living organism, needs some form of

command and control. Simply put, command and control in

some form or another is essential to survival and success in

any competitive or cooperative enterprise. Command and

control is a fundamental requirement for life and growth, survival, and success for any system.

WHAT IS COMMAND AND CONTROL?

We often think of command and control as a distinct and

specialized function—like logistics, intelligence, electronic

warfare, or administration—with its own peculiar methods,

considerations, and vocabulary, and occurring independently

of other functions. But in fact, command and control encompasses all military functions and operations, giving them

meaning and harmonizing them into a meaningful whole.

None of the above functions, or any others, would be purposeful without command and control. Command and control

36
MCDP 6 The Nature of Command and Control

is not the business of specialists—unless we consider the

commander a specialist—because command and control is

fundamentally the business of the commander.'

Command and control is the means by which a commander

recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. Sometimes this recognition takes the

form of a conscious command decision—as in deciding on a

concept of operations. Sometimes it takes the form of a preconditioned reaction—as in immediate-action drills, practiced

in advance so that we can execute them reflexively in a moment of crisis. Sometimes it takes the form of a rules-based

procedure—as in the guiding of an aircraft on final approach.

Some types of command and control must occur so quickly

and precisely that they can be accomplished only by computers—such as the command and control of a guided missile in

flight. Other forms may require such a degree of judgment

and intuition that they can be performed only by skilled, experienced people-as in devising tactics, operations, and

strategies.

Sometimes command and control occurs concurrently with

the action being undertaken—in the form of real-time guidance or direction in response to a changing situation. Sometimes it occurs beforehand and even after. Planning, whether

rapidltime-sensitive or deliberate, which determines aims and

objectives, develops concepts of operations, allocates resources, and provides for necessary coordination, is an important element of command and control. Furthermore, planning

37
Command and Control MCDP 6

increases knowledge and elevates situational awareness. Effective training and education, which make it more likely that

subordinates will take the proper action in combat, establish

command and control before the fact. The immediate-action

drill mentioned earlier, practiced beforehand, provides command and control. A commander's intent, expressed clearly

before the evolution begins, is an essential part of command

and control. Likewise, analysis after the fact, which ascertains

the results and lessons of the action and so informs future actions, contributes to command and control.

Some forms of command and control are primarily procedural or technical in nature—such as the control of air traffic

and air space, the coordination of supporting arms, or the fire

control of a weapons system. Others deal with the overall

conduct of military actions, whether on a large or small scale,

and involve formulating concepts, deploying forces, allocating resources, supervising, and so on. This last form of command and control, the overall conduct of military actions, is

our primary concern in this manual. Unless otherwise specified, it is to this form that we refer.

Since war is a conflict between opposing wills, we can

measure the effectiveness of command and control only in relation to the enemy. As a practical matter, therefore, effective

command and control involves protecting our own command

and control activities against enemy interference and actively

monitoring, manipulating, and disrupting the enemy's command and control activities.

38
MCDP 6 The Nature of Command and Control

WHAT IS THE BASIS OF COMMAND AND

CONTROL?

The basis for all command arid control is the authority vested

in a commander over subordinates. Authority derives from

two sources. Official authority is a function of rank and position and is bestowed by organization and by law. Personal

authority is a function of personal influence and derives from

factors such as experience, reputation, skill, character, and

personal example. It is bestowed by the other members of the

organization. Official authority provides the power to act but

is rarely enough; most effective commanders also possess a

high degree of personal authority. Responsibility, or accountability for results, is a natural corollary of authority. Where

there is authority, there must be responsibility in like measure. Conversely, where individuals have responsibility for

achieving results, they must also have the authority to initiate

the necessary actions.2

WHAT IS THE RELATIONSIIIP BETWEEN

"COMMAND" AND "CONTROL"?

The traditional view of command and control sees "command" and "control" as operating in the same direction: from

the top of the organization toward the bottom.3 (See figure 1.)

Commanders impose control on those under their command;

39
Command and Control MCDP 6

commanders are "in control" of their subordinates, and subordinates are "under the control" of their commanders.

We suggest a different and more dynamic view of command and control which sees command as the exercise of

authority and control as feedback about the effects of the action taken. (See figure 1.) The commander commands by deciding what needs to be done and by directing or influencing

the conduct of others. Control takes the form of feedback—the continuous flow of information about the unfolding situation returning to the commander—which allows the

commander to adjust and modify command action as needed.

Feedback indicates the difference between the goals and the

situation as it exists. Feedback may come from any direction

and in any form—intelligence about how the enemy is reacting, information about the status of subordinate or adjacent

units, or revised guidance from above based on developments. Feedback is the mechanism that allows commanders

to adapt to changing circumstances—to exploit fleeting opportunities, respond to developing problems, modify

schemes, or redirect efforts. In this way, feedback "controls"

subsequent command action. In such a command and control

system, control is not strictly something that seniors impose

on subordinates; rather, the entire system comes "under control" based on feedback about the changing situation.4

Command and control is thus an interactive process involving all the parts of the system and working in all directions. The result is a mutually supporting system of give and

40
MCDP 6 The Nature of Command and Control

A typical view of command and control—command and control seen

as unidirectional.

Command and control

viewed as reciprocal influence—command as

initiation of action and

control as feedback.

Figure 1. Two views of the relationship

between command and control.

take in which complementary commanding and controlling

forces interact to ensure that the force as a whole can adapt

continuously to changing requirements.

COMMANDER I COMMANDER I

I COMMANDER COMMANDER

I—
Command and Control MCDP 6

WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE "IN CONTROL"?

The typical understanding of effective command and control

is that someone "in command" should also be "in control."

Typically, we think of a strong, coercive type of command

and control—a sort of pushbutton control—by which those

"in control" dictate the actions of others and those "under

control" respond promptly and precisely, as a chess player

controls the movements of the chess pieces. But given the nature of war, can commanders control their forces with anything even resembling the omnipotence of the chess player?

We might say that a gunner is in control of a weapon system

or that a pilot is in control of an aircraft. But is a flight leader

really directly in control of how the other pilots fly their aircraft? Is a senior commander really in control of the squads

of Marines actually engaging the enemy, especially on a modern battlefield on which units and individuals will often be

widely dispersed, even to the point of isolation?

We are also fond of saying that commanders should be "in

control" of the situation or that the situation is "under control." The worst thing that can happen to a commander is to

"lose" control of the situation. But are the terrain and weather

under the commander's control? Are commanders even remotely in control of what the enemy does? Good comm anders may sometimes anticipate the enemy's actions and may

even influence the enemy's actions by seizing the initiative

and forcing the enemy to react to them. But it is a delusion to

42
MCDP 6 The Nature of Command and Control

believe that we can truly be in control of the enemy or the

situation.5

The truth is that, given the nature of war, it is a delusion to

think that we can be in control with any sort of certitude or

precision. And the further removed commanders are from the

Marines actually engaging the enemy, the less direct control

they have over their actions. We must keep in mind that war

is at base a human endeavor. In war, unlike in chess, "pieces"

consist of human beings, all reacting to the situation as it pertains to each one separately, each trying to survive, each

prone to making mistakes, and each subject to the vagaries of

human nature. We could not get people to act like mindless

robots, even if we wanted to.

Given the nature of war, the remarkable thing is not that

commanders cannot be thoroughly in control but rather that

they can achieve much influence at all. We should accept that

the proper object of command and control is not to be thoroughly and precisely in control. The turbulence of modem

war suggests a need for a looser form of influence—something that is more akin to the willing cooperation of a basketball team than to the omnipotent direction of the chess

player—that provides the hecessary guidance in an uncertain,

disorderly, time-competitive environment without stifling the

initiative of subordinates.

43
Command and Control MCDP 6

COMPLEXITY IN COMMAND AND CONTROL

Military organizations and military evolutions are complex

systems. War is an even more complex phenomenon—our

complex system interacting with the enemy's complex system

in a fiercely competitive way. A complex system is any system composed of multiple parts, each of which must act individually according to its own circumstances and which, by so

acting, changes the circumstances affecting all the other parts.

A boxer bobbing and weaving and trading punches with his

opponent is a complex system. A soccer team is a complex

system, as is the other team, as is the competitive interaction

between them. A squad-sized combat patrol, changing formation as it moves across the terrain and reacting to the enemy

situation, is a complex system. A battle between two military

forces is itself a complex system.6

Each individual part of a complex system may itself be a

complex system—as in the military, in which a company consists of several platoons and a platoon comprises several

squads—creating multiple levels of complexity. But even if

this is not so, even if each of the parts is fairly simple in itself, the result of the interactions among the parts is highly

complicated, unpredictable, and even uncontrollable behavior. Each part often affects other parts in ways that simply

cannot be anticipated, and it is from these unpredictable interactions that complexity emerges. With a complex system it is

usually extremely difficult, if not impossible, to isolate

44
MCDP 6 The Nature of Command and Contro'

individual causes and their effects since the parts are all connected in a complex web. The behavior of complex systems is

frequently nonlinear which means that even extremely small

influences can have decisively large effects, or vice versa.

Clausewitz wrote that "success is not due simply to general

causes. Particular factors can often be decisive—details only

known to those who were on the spot. . . while issues can be

decided by chances and incidents so minute as to figure in

histories simply as anecdotes." The element of chance, interacting randomly with the various parts of the system, introduces even more complexity and unpredictability.

It is not simply the number of parts that makes a system

complex: it is the way those parts interact. A machine can be

complicated and consist of numerous parts, but the parts generally interact in a specific, designed way—or else the machine will not function. While some systems behave mechanistically, complex systems most definitely do not. Complex

systems tend to be open systems, interacting frequently and

freely with other systems and the external environment. Complex systems tend to behave more "organically"—that is,

more like biological organisms.8

The fundamental point is that any military action, by its

very nature a complex system, will exhibit messy, unpredictable, and often chaotic behavior that defies orderly, efficient,

and precise control. Our approach to command and control

must find a way to cope with this inherent complexity. While

a machine operator may be in control of the machine, it is

45
Command and Control MCDP 6

difficult to imagine any commander being in control of a

complex phenomenon like war.

This view of command and control as a complex system

characterized by reciprocal action and feedback has several

important features which distinguish it from the typical view

of command and control and which are central to our approach. First, this view recognizes that effective command

and control must be sensitive to changes in the situation. This

view sees the military organization as an open system, interacting with its surroundings (especially the enemy), rather

than as a closed system focused on internal efficiency. An effective command and control system provides the means to

adapt to changing conditions. We can thus look at command

and control as a process of continuous adaptation. We might

better liken the military organization to a predatory animal—seeking information, learning, and adapting in its quest

for survival and success—than to some "lean, green machine." Like a living organism, a military organization is

never in a state of stable equilibrium but is instead in a continuous state of flux—continuously adjusting to its surroundings.

Second, the action-feedback loop makes command and

control a continuous, cyclic process and not a sequence of

discrete actions—as we will discuss in greater detail later.

Third, the action-feedback loop also makes command and

control a dynamic, interactive process of cooperation. As we

have discussed, command and control is not so much a matter

46
MCDP 6 The Nature of Command and Control

of one part of the organization "getting control over" another

as something that connects all the elements together in a cooperative effort. All parts of the organization contribute action and feedback—"command" and "control"—in overall

cooperation. Command and control is thus fundamentally an

activity of reczprocal influence—give and take among all

parts, from top to bottom and side to side.

Fourth, as a result, this view does not see the commander

as being above the system, exerting command and control

from the outside—like a chess player moving the chess

pieces—but as being an integral part of this complex web of

reciprocal influence. And finally, as we have mentioned, this

view recognizes that it is unreasonable to expect command

and control to provide precise, predictable, and mechanistic

order to a complex undertaking like war.

WhAT MAKES UP COMMAND AND CONTROL?

The words "command" and "control" can be nouns,9 and used

in this way the phrase command and control describes a system—an arrangement of different elements that interact to

produce effective and harmonious actions. The basic elements

of our command and control system are people, information,

and the command and control support structure.

47
Command and Control MCDP 6

The first element of command and control is people—peopie who gather information, make decisions, take action,

communicate, and cooperate with one another in the accomplishment of a common goal. People drive the command and

control system—they make things happen—and the rest of

the system exists only to serve them. The essence of war is a

clash between human wills, and any concept of command and

control must recognize this first. Because of this human element, command is inseparable from leadership. The aim of

command and control is not to eliminate or lessen the role of

people or to make people act like robots, but rather to help

them perform better. Human beings—from the senior commander framing a strategic concept to a lance corporal calling

in a situation report—are integral components of the command and control system and not merely users of it.

All Marines feel the effects of fear, privation, and fatigue.

Each has unique, intangible qualities which cannot be captured by any organizational chart, procedure, or piece of

equipment. The human mind has a capacity for judgment, intuition, and imagination far superior to the analytical capacity

of even the most powerful computer. It is precisely this aspect

of the human element that makes war in general, and command in particular, ultimately an art rather than a science. An

effective command and control system must account for the

characteristics and limits of human nature and at the same

time exploit and enhance uniquely human skills. At any level,

the key individual in the command and control system is the

commander who has the final responsibility for success.

48
MCDP 6 The Nature of Command and Control

The second element of command and control is information, which refers to representations of reality which we use

to "inform"—to give form and character to—our decisions

and actions. Information is the words, letters, numbers, images, and symbols we use to represent things, events, ideas,

and values. In one way or another, command and control is

essentially about information: getting it, judging its value,

processing it into useful form, acting on it, sharing it with

others. Information is how we give structure and shape to the

material world, and it thus allows us to give meaning to and

to gain understanding of the events and conditions which surround us. In a very broad sense, information is a control parameter: it allows us to provide control or structure to our

actions.'°

The value of information exists in time since information

most often describes fleeting conditions. Most information

grows stale with time, valuable one moment but irrelevant or

even misleading the next.

There are two basic uses for information. The first is to

help create situational awareness as the basis for a decision.

The second is to direct and coordinate actions in the execution of the decision. While distinct in concept, the two uses of

information are rarely mutually exclusive in practice. There

will usually be quite a bit of overlap since the same exchange

of information often serves both purposes simultaneously. For

example, coordination between adjacent units as they execute

49
Command and Control MCDP 6

the plan can also help shape each unit's understanding of the

situation and so inform future decisions. An order issued to

subordinates describes the tasks to be accomplished and provides necessary coordinating instructions; but the same order

should provide a subordinate insight into the larger situation

and into how the subordinate's actions fit into that larger

situation. Likewise, a call for fire, the primary purpose of

which is to request supporting arms from a supporting unit,

also provides information about the developing situation in

the form of a target location and description.

Information forms range from data—raw, unprocessed signals—to information that has been evaluated and integrated

into meaningful knowledge and understanding. A commander's guidance to the staff and orders to subordinates

constitute information as do intelligence about the enemy,

status reports from subordinate units, or coordination between

adjacent units. Without the information that provides the basis of situational awareness, no commander—no matter how

experienced or wise—can make sound decisions. Without information that conveys understanding of the concept and intent, subordinates cannot act properly. Without information in

the form of a strike brief which provides understanding of the

situation on the ground, a pilot cannot provide close air support. Without information which provides understanding of

an upcoming operation,and the status of supply, the logistician cannot provide adequate combat service support.

50
MCDP 6 The Nature of Command and Control

Effective command and control is not simply a matter of

generating enough information. Most information is not important or even relevant. Much is unusable given the time

available. More is inaccurate, and some can actually be misleading. Given information-gathering capabilities today, there

is the distinct danger of overwhelming commanders with

more information than they can possibly assimilate. In other

words, too much information is as bad as too little—and

probably just as likely to occur. Some kinds of information

can be counterproductive—information which misleads us,

which spreads panic, or which leads to overcontrol. Information is valuable only insofar as it contributes to effective decisions and actions. The critical thing is not the amount of

information, but key elements of information, available when

needed and in a useful form, which improve the commander's

awareness of the situation and ability to act.

The final element of command and control is the command

and control support structure" which aids the people who

create, disseminate, and use information. It includes the or

ganizations, procedures, equipment, facilities, training, education, and doctrine which support command and control. It is

important to note that although we often refer to families of

hardware as "systems" themselves, the command and control

system is much more than simply equipment. High-quality

equipment and advanced technology do not guarantee effective command and control. Effective command and control

starts with qualified people and an effective guiding philosophy. We must recognize that the components of the command

51
Command and Control MCDP 6

and control support structure do not exist for their own sake

but solely to help people recognize what needs to be done and

take the appropriate action.

WHAT DOES COMMM4D AND CONTROL DO?

The words "command" and "control" are also verbs,'2 and

used that way, the phrase command and control describes a

process—a collection of related activities. We draw an important-distinction between a process, a collection of related activities, and a procedure, a specific sequence of steps for

accomplishing a specific task. Command and control is a

process. It may include procedures for performing certain

tasks, but it is not itself a procedure and should not be approached as one.

Command and control is something we do. These activities

include, but are not limited to, gathering and analyzing information, making decisions, organizing resources, planning,

communicating instructions and other information, coordinating, monitoring results, and supervising execution.

As we seek to improve command and control, we should

not become so wrapped up in feeding and perfecting the process that we lose sight of the object of command and control in

the first place. For example, we should not become so concerned with the ability to gather and analyze huge amounts of

52
MCDP 6 The Nature of Command and Control

information efficiently that we lose sight of the primary goal

of helping the commander gain a true awareness of the situation as the basis for making and implementing decisions. The

ultimate object is not an efficient command and control process; the ultimate objective is the effective conduct of military

action.

So rather than ask what are the functions that make up

command and control, we might better ask: What should effective command and control do for us? First, it should help

provide insight into the nature and requirements of the problem facing us. It should help develop intelligence about the

enemy and the surroundings. As much as possible, it should

help to identify enemy capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities. It should help us understand our own situation—to

include identifying our own vulnerabilities. In short, it should

help us gain situational awareness.

Next, command and control should help us devise suitable and meaningful goals and adapt those goals as the situation changes. It should help us devise appropriate actions to

achieve those goals. It should help us provide direction and

focus to create vigorous and harmonious action among the

various elements of the force. It should help us provide a

means of continuously monitoring developments as the basis

for adapting. It should provide security to deny the enemy

knowledge of our true intentions. And above all, it should

help generate tempo of action since we recognize that speed

is a weapon.

53
Command and Control MCDP 6

So, what does command and control do? In short, effective

command and control helps generate swift, appropriate, decisive, harmonious, and secure action.

Tm ENVIRONMENT OF COMMAND AND

CONTROL: UNCERTAINTY AND TIME

The defining problem of command and control that overwhelms all others is the need to deal with uncertainty.'3 Were

it not for uncertainty, command and control would be a simple matter of managing resources. In the words of Carl von

Clausewitz, "War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters

of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in

a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to

scent out the truth."4

Uncertainty is what we do not know about a given situation—which is usually a great deal, even in the best of circumstances. We can think of uncertainty as doubt which

blocks or threatens to block action.'5 Uncertainty pervades the

battlefield in the form of unknowns about the enemy, about

the surroundings, and even about our own forces. We may be

uncertain about existing conditions—factual information—

such as the location and strength of enemy forces. But even if

we are reasonably sure about factual information, we will be

54
MCDP 6 The Nature of Command and Control

less certain of what to infer from those facts. What are the enemy's intentions, for example? And even if we make a reasonable inference from the available facts, we cannot know

which of the countless possible eventualities will occur.

In short, uncertainty is a fundamental attribute of war. We

strive to reduce uncertainty to a manageable level by gathering and using information, but we must accept that we can

never eliminate it. Why is this so? First, since war is fundamentally a human enterprise, it is shaped by human nature

and is subject to the complexities, inconsistencies, and peculiarities which characterize human behavior. Human beings,

friendly as well as enemy, are unpredictable. Second, because

war is a complex struggle between independent human wills,

we can never expect to anticipate with certainty what events

will develop. In other words, the fundamentally complex and

interactive nature of war generates uncertainty. Uncertainty is

not merely an existing enviromnental condition; it is a natural

byproduct of war.

Command and control aims to reduce the amount of uncertainty that commanders must deal with—to a reasonable

point—so they can make sound decisions. Though we try to

reduce uncertainty by providing information, there will always be some knowledge that we lack. We will be aware of

some of the gaps in our knowledge, but we will not even be

aware of other unknowns. We must understand the forces that

guarantee uncertainty and resolve to act despite it on the basis

of what we do know.

55
Command and Control MCDP 6

It is important to note that certainty is a function of knowledge and understanding and not merely of data. Although

they are clearly related—they are all forms of information, as

we will discuss—the distinctions among them are important.

Data serve as the raw material for knowledge and understanding. Knowledge and understanding result when human beings

add meaning to data. Properly provided and processed, data

can lead to knowledge and understanding, but the terms are

not synonymous. Paradoxically, not all data lead to knowledge and understanding; some may even hamper the gaining

of knowledge and understanding. The essential lesson from

this distinction is that decreased uncertainty is not simply a

matter of increased information flow. More important are the

quality of the information and the abilities of the person using

it—and the willingness and ability to make decisions in the

face of uncertainty.

The second main element that affects command and control, second only to uncertainty in order of importance, is the

factor of time. Theoretically, we can always reduce uncertainty by gaining more knowledge of the situation (accepting

that there is some information we can never gain). The basic

dilemma is that to gain and process information takes time.

This creates three related problems. First, the knowledge we

gain in war is perishable: as we take the time to gain new information, information already gained is becoming obsolete.

Second, since war is a contest between opposing wills, time

itself is a precious commodity used by both sides. While we

strive to get information about a particular situation, the

56
MCDP 6 The Nature of Command and Control

enemy may already be acting—and changing the situation in

the process. (Of course, the enemy faces the same problem in

relation to us.) And third, the rapid tempo of modern operations limits the amount of information that can be gathered,

processed, and assimilated in time to be of use. Command

and control thus becomes a tense race against time. So the

second absolute requirement in any command and control

system is to be fast—at least faster than the enemy.

The resulting tension between coping with uncertainty and

racing against time presents the fundamental challenge of

command and control. This is perhaps the single most important point to take from this chapter. It is also important to recognize that the enemy faces the same problems—and the

object is to achieve some relative advantage. Although there

is no easy answer to this problem, the successful commander

must find a solution, as we will discuss.

CorvI1iil AND CONTROL IN THE

INFORMATION AGE

Many of the factors that influence command and control are

timeless—the nature of war and of human beings and the twin

problems of uncertainty and time, for example. On the other

hand, numerous factors are peculiar to a particular age or at

least dependent on the characteristics of that age. As war has

57
Command and Control MCDP 6

evolved through the ages, so has command and control. In

general, as war has become increasingly complicated, so have

the means of command and control. What can we conclude

about the environment in which command and control must

function today and in the foreseeable future?

The prevailing characteristics of the information age are

variety and rapid, ongoing change. An unstabLe and changeable world situation can lead to countless varieties of conflict

requiring peacekeeping operations on the one extreme to general war on the other. Since we cannot predict when and

where the next crisis will arise or what form it will take, our

command and control must function effectively in any environment.

Technological improvements in mobility, range, lethality,

and information-gathering continue to compress time and

space, forcing higher operating tempos and creating a greater

demand for information. Military forces may move more

quickly over greater distances than ever before, engaging the

enemy at greater ranges than ever before. The consequence of

this is fluid, rapidly changing military situations. The more

quickly the situation changes, the greater the need for continuously updated information and the greater the strain on

command and control. Future conflict will require military

forces able to adapt quickly to a variety of unexpected circumstances.

58
MCDP 6 The Nature of Command and Control

The increasing lethality and range of weapons over time

has compelled military forces to disperse in order to survive,

similarly stretching the limits of command and control. Military forces are bigger and more complex than ever before,

consisting of a greater number and variety of specialized organizations and weapons. As a result, modern military forces

require ever greater amounts of information in order to operate and sustain themselves, even in a peacetime routine.

In the current age, technology is increasingly important to

command and control. Advances in technology provide capabilities never before dreamed of. But technology is not without its dangers, namely the overreliance on equipment on the

one hand and the failure to fully exploit the latest capabilities

on the other. It is tempting, but a mistake, to believe that technology will solve all the problems of command and control.

Many hopes of a decisive technological leap forward have

been dashed by unexpected complications and side effects or

by the inevitable rise of effective countermeasures. Moreover,

used unwisely, technology can be part of the problem, contributing to information overload and feeding the dangerous

illusion that certainty and precision in war are not only desirable, but attainable.

In this complicated age, command and control is especially vulnerable and not just to the physical destruction of

facilities and personnel by enemy attack. As the command

and control system becomes increasingly complex, it likewise

becomes increasingly vulnerable to disruption, monitoring,

59
Command and Control MCDP 6

and penetration by the enemy as well as to the negative side

effects of its own complicated functioning. Its own complexity can make command and control vulnerable to disruption

by information overload, the overreliance on technology, misinformation, communications interference, lack of human

understanding, lack of technical proficiency or training, mechanical breakdown, and systemic failure.

CONCLUSION

Although command and control systems have evolved continuously throughout history, the fundamental nature of command in war is timeless. Noteworthy improvements in

technology, organization, and procedures have not eased the

demands of command and control at all and probably never

will. While these improvements have increased the span of

command and control, they have barely kept pace with the increasing dispersion of forces and complexity of war itself.

Whatever the age or technology, the key to effective command and control will come down to dealing with the fundamental problems of uncertainty and time. Whatever the age or

technology, effective command and control will come down

to people using information to decide and act wisely. And

whatever the age or technology, the ultimate measure of command and control effectiveness will always be the same: Can

it help us act faster and more effectively than the enemy?

60
Chapter 2

Command and Control

Theory

"Confronted with a task, and having less information available than is needed to perform that task, an organization may

react in either of two ways, One is to increase its informationprocessing capacity, the other to design the organization, and

indeed the task itself in such a way as to enable it to operate

on the basis of less information. These approaches are exhaustive; no others are conceivable. A failure to adopt one or

the other will automatically result in a drop in the level of

performance."

—Martin van Creveld, Command in War

MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

Having reached a common understanding of the nature ofcommand and control, we turn to developing a theory

about the command and control process that will in turn serve

as the basis for creating an effective command and control

system.

POINT OF DEPARTURE: THE OODA LOOP

Our study of command and control theory starts with a simple

model of the command and control process known as the

OODA loop.' The OODA loop applies to any two-sided conflict, whether the antagonists are individuals in hand-to-hand

combat or large military formations. OODA is an acronym

for observation-orientation-decision-action, which describes

the basic sequence of the command and control process. (See

figure 2.) When engaged in conflict, we first observe the

situation—that is, we take in information about our own

status, our surroundings, and our enemy. Sometimes we actively seek the information; sometimes it is thrust upon us.

Having observed the situation, we next orient to it—we make

certain estimates, assumptions, analyses, and judgments about

the situation in order to create a cohesive mental image. In

other words, we try to figure out what the situation means to

us. Based on our orientation, we decide what to do—whether

that decision takes the form of an immediate reaction or a deliberate plan. Then we put the decision into action. This in63
Command and Control MCDP 6

ciudes disseminating the decision, supervising to ensure

proper execution, and monitoring results through feedback,

which takes us full circle to the observation phase. Having

acted, we have changed the situation, and so the cycle begins

again. It is worth noting that, in any organization with multipie decision makers, multiple OODA loops spin simultaneously, although not necessarily at the same speed, as

commanders exercise command and control at their own level

and locale.

64

Figure 2. The command and control process:

The OODA loop.
MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

Importantly, the OODA loop reflects how command and

control is a continuous, cyclical process. In any conflict, the

antagonist who can consistently and effectively cycle through

the OODA loop faster—who can maintain a higher tempo of

actions—gains an ever-increasing advantage with each cycle.

With each reaction, the slower antagonist falls farther and farther behind and becomes increasingly unable to cope with the

deteriorating situation. With each cycle, the slower antagonist's actions become less relevant to the true situation. Command and control itself deteriorates.

The lesson of the OODA loop is the importance of generating tempo in command and control. In other words, speed is

an essential element of effective command and control. Speed

in command and control means shortening the time needed to

make decisions, plan, coordinate, and communicate. Since

war is competitive, it is not absolute speed that matters, but

speed relative to the enemy: the aim is to be faster than our

enemy, which means interfering with the enemy's command

and control as well as streamlining our own. The speed differential does not necessarily have to be a large one: a small advantage exploited repeatedly can quickly lead to decisive

results. We should recognize that the ability and desire to

generate a higher operational tempo does not negate the willingness to bide time when the situation calls for patience. The

aim is not merely rapid action, but also meaningful action.

65
Command and Control MCDP 6

Tm INFORMATION HIERARCHY

We use the term information generically to refer to all manner

of descriptions or representations from raw signals on the one

hand to knowledge and understanding on the other. But it is

important to recognize that there are actually four different

classes of information. We must understand the differences

between these classes because they are of different value in

supporting command and control. (See figure 3.) We must

also understand what happens to information as it moves between levels on the hierarchy.2

Raw data comprise the lowest class of information and include raw signals picked up by a sensor of any kind (a radio

antenna, an eyeball, a radar, a satellite) or communicated between any kind of nodes in a system. Data are bits and bytes

transferred between computers, individual transmissions sent

by telephone or radio or facsimile, or a piece of unprocessed

film. In other words, raw data are signals which have not been

processed, correlated, integrated, evaluated, or interpreted in

any way. This class of information is rarely of much use until

transformed in some way to give it some sort of meaning.

The next class is data that have been processed into or have

been displayed in a form that is understandable to the people

66
MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

TUNDERSTANDING I examples.

Situational

Synthesized, visualized

awareness Coup doeil

Gives greater

situational

meaning to

I KNOWLEDGE i Example:

Intelligence Evaluated, integrated, analyzed report

Gives some

A

meaning to IE I I )I

IOU

I PROCESSED DATA I Examples:

Situation report Formatted, plotted, Call for fire translated, correlated

Putsin

understandable I I

form Il 101 I'— U

Example:

I RAW DATA I Encrypted

Raw signals transmission

Figure 3. The information hierarchy.

67
Command and Control MCDP 6

who must use them.* Processed data include film that has

been developed into a photograph, radio transmissions copied

into a standard report format, a computer file displayed as

text or a graphic on a screen, grid coordinates plotted on a

map, or an intercepted enemy message deciphered. The act of

processing in itself gives the data a limited amount of value.

Clearly, processed data are more useful to people than raw

data—and some may have immediate, obvious and significant value—but they have not yet been evaluated or analyzed.

The next rung on the information hierarchy is knowledge—data that have been analyzed to provide meaning and

value.. Knowledge is data which have been evaluated as to reliability, relevance, and importance. Knowledge is various

pieces of processed data which have been integrated and interpreted to begin to build a picture of the situation. For example, military intelligence is a form of knowledge as

compared to combat information which has not yet uixlergone

analysis and evaluation. Likewise, situation reports pieced together to create an estimate of the situation represent knowledge. At this level, we are starting to get a product which can

be useful for decisionmaking.

* This class is often referred to as "information," in a more specific usage

of that term. To avoid confusion, we will continue to refer to this class as

"processed data" and will use "information" to refer to the full range of

information classes.

68
MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

The highest class of information is understanding—knowledge that has been synthesized and applied to a specific situation to gain a deeper level of awareness of that situation. We

may know what is going on; we understand why. Understanding results when we synthesize bodies of knowledge, use

judgment and intuition to fill in the gaps, and arrive at a complete mental image of the situation. Understanding means we

have gained situational awareness. Understanding reveals the

critical factors in any situation. It reveals the enemy's critical

vulnerabilities. It reveals the patterns and logic of a situation.

Understanding thus allows us to anticipate events—to recognize in advance the consequences of new or impending developments or the effects of our actions on the enemy. We try to

make understanding the basis for our decisions—although

recognizing that we will rarely be able to gain full understanding.

The gradations between the different classes of information

are not always very clear. It is not always easy to tell the exact difference between raw and processed data, for example.

But it is important to realize that there are differences and that

knowledge is usually more valuable than data, for instance.

Moreover, it is also important to recognize that information is

transformed as it moves up the hierarchy and to understand

the forces that cause that transformation.

Raw data are turned into processed data, as we might expect, through processing, an activity involving essentially the

.69
Command and Control MCDP 6

rote application of procedure. Processing includes formatting,

translating, collating, plotting, and so on. Much processing

occurs automatically (whether by humans or by machines)

without our even being aware that it is taking place—such as

when a facsimile machine converts bits of data into understandable text or graphics. In many cases, machines can process data much more quickly and efficiently than people.

We turn processed data into knowledge through the activity of cognition—the act of learning what something means,

at least in general terms. To a degree, cognition may be based

on rules of logic or deduction ("If A happens, it means B").

Expert systems and artificial intelligence can assist with cognition to a certain extent—by helping to integrate pieces of

processed data, for example. But cognition is primarily a human mental activity—not primarily a procedural act like

processing, but an act of learning.

We transform the complex components of knowledge into

understanding through judgment, a purely human skill based

on experience and intuition, beyond the capability of any current artificial intelligence or expert system. Judgment simply

cannot be reduced to procedures or rules (no matter how complex).

We should note that as information moves up the hierarchy

from data toward understanding, an integration occurs. Multi70
MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

pie bits of raw data are pieced together to make processed

data. Numerous pieces of processed data coalesce into knowledge. Various bodies of knowledge distill into understanding.

This integration is essential to eventually reaching understanding because it involves reducing the total number of

"pieces" that must be considered at any one time. The vast

number of bits of raw data that describe any situation would

overwhelm any commander f they had to be considered singly. It takes a certain amount of time and effort to make these

integrations, but without this effort the commander would be

overloaded by a staggering number of things to consider.

By nature, data are significantly easier to generate, identify, quantify, reproduce, and transmit than are knowledge

and understai ding. But commanders need knowledge and understanding in order to make effective decisions. Likewise,

subordinates need not merely data but knowledge and understanding of the commander's concept and intent. The goal in

command and control should not be collecting, processing,

and communicating vast amounts of data—and increasing the

danger of information overload in the process—but approaching understanding as closely as possible. However, we cannot

simply provide commanders with ready-made understanding.

They will have to make the final judgments themselves. But

we can strive to provide information that is as easily assimilable and as close to final form as possible. This means

providing information in the form of images.

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Command and Control MCDP 6

IMAGE THEORY

Human beings do not normally think in terms of data or even

knowledge. People generally think in terms of ideas or images—mental pictures of a given situation. Not only do people

generally think in images, they understand things best as images and are inspired most by images.3

We can say that an image is the embodiment of our understanding of a given situation or condition. (The term coup

d'oeil, which refers to the ability of gifted commanders to intuitively grasp what is happening on the battlefield, means literally "stroke of the eye.") Images apply not only to the

military problems we face but also to the solutions. For example, a well-conceived concept of operations and commander's

intent should convey a clear and powerful image of the action

and the desired outcome.

People assimilate information more quickly and effectively

as visual images than in text. The implications of this are

widespread and significant, ranging from technical matters of

presentation—the use of maps, overlays, symbols, pictures,

and other graphics to display and convey information visually—to conceptual matters of sharing situational awareness

and intent.

Our image of a situation is based not just on the facts of the

situation, but also on our interpretation of those facts. In other

72
MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

words, it is based on our intuition, appreciation, judgment,

and so on, which in turn are the products of our preconceptions, training, and past experiences. New information that

does not agree with our existing image requires us to revalidate the image or revise it—not easily done in the turbulence

and stress of combat. The images we create and communicate

to others must approximate reality. Conversely, if we want to

deceive our enemies, we try to present them with an image of

the situation that does not match reality and so lead them to

make poor decisions.

We generate images from others' observations as well as

our own. In general, the higher the level of command, the

more we depend on information from others and the less on

our own observations. All but the smallest-unit commanders

receive most of their information from others. This can cause

several problems. First, when we observe a situation firsthand, we have an intuitive appreciation for the level of uncertainty—we have a sense for how reliable the image is—and

we can act accordingly. But when we receive our information

secondhand, we usually lose that sense. This is especially

dangerous in a high-technology age in which impressively

displayed information appears especially reliable. Second, we

can sense more about a situation from firsthand observation

than we can faithfully communicate to others or, at least, than

we have time to communicate in a crisis. Third, since each of

us interprets events differently, the information we communicate is distorted to some degree with each node that it passes

through on its way to its final destination. And fourth, this

73
Command and Control MCDP 6

same information is likewise delayed at each node. Since the

value of information exists in time, this delay can be critical.

Commanders need essentially three different pictures. The

first is a closeup of the situation, a "feel" for the action gained

best through personal observation and experience. From this

picture, commanders gain a sense of what subordinates are

experiencing—their physical and moral state. From this image, commanders get a sense of what they can and cannot demand of their people. In the words of Israeli General

Yshayahor Gavish about his experience in the 1967 ArabIsraeli war: "There is no alternative to looking into a subordinate's eyes, listening to his tone of voice."4

The second picture is an overall view of the situation.

From this view, commanders try to make sense of the relative

dispositions of forces and the overall patterns of the unfolding

situation. From this view, they also gauge the difference between the actual situation and the desired end state. The desired result of the overall view is a quality we can call

"topsight"—a grasp of the big picture. If "insight is the illumination to be achieved by penetrating inner depths, topsight

is what comes from a far-overhead vantage point, from a

bird's eye view that reveals the whole—the big picture; how

the parts fit together."5

The third picture we try to form is the action as seen

through the eyes of the enemy commander from which we try

to deduce possible enemy intentions and anticipate possible

74
MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

enemy moves. Of the three pictures, the first is clearly the

most detailed but usually offers a very narrow field of vision.

Commanders who focus only on this image risk losing sight

of the big picture. The second picture provides an overall image but lacks critical detail—just as a situation map does not

capture more than a broad impression of the reality of events

on the battlefield. Commanders who focus only on this image

risk being out of touch with reality. The third picture is

largely a mental exercise limited by the fact that we can never

be sure of what our enemy is up to.

Squad leaders or fighter pilots may simultaneously be able

to generate all three images largely from their own observations. Higher commanders, however, feel a tension between

satisf'ing the need for both the closeup and overall images—the former best satisfied by personal observation at the

front and the latter probably best satisfied from a more distant

vantage point, such as a command post or higher headquarters.

As we have mentioned, any system which attempts to communicate information by transmitting images will suffer from

a certain degree of distortion and delay. There are several

ways to deal with this problem. The first is for commanders

to view critical events directly to the greatest extent possible

(consistent with the competing need to stay abreast of the

overall situation). In this way they avoid the distortions and

delays which occur when information filters through successive echelons.

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Command and Control MCDP 6

Because as war has evolved, it has become increasingly

complex and dispersed, commanders have found it increasingly difficult to observe all, or even most, critical events directly. One historical solution to this problem is a technique

known as the directed telescope, which can be especially useful for gaining a closeup image. This technique involves using a dedicated information collector—whether a trusted and

like-minded subordinate or a sensor—to observe selected

events and report directly to the commander. Commanders

may direct the "telescope" at the enemy, at the surroundings,

or at their own forces. In theory, because these observers report directly, the information arrives with minimal delay or

distortion. Directed telescopes should not replace regular reporting chains but should augment them—to avoid burdening

lower echelons with additional information gathering and to

check the validity of information flowing through regular

channels. Improperly used, directed telescopes can damage

the vital trust a commander seeks to build with subordinates.6

The second way to deal with the problems of delay and

distortion of information is to rely on implicit communications to the greatest extent possible. Implicit communication

minimizes the need for explicit transmission of information.

Theoretically, because implicit communication requires individuals who share a common perspective, information will

suffer minimal distortion as it passes up or down the chain.

We will discuss implicit communication in greater detail

later.

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MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

The third way to deal with the problems of delay and distortion of information, also discussed later in more detail, is

to decentralize decisionmaking authority so that the individual on the spot, the individual who has direct observation of

the situation at that spot, is the person making the decisions.

THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SPECTRUM

Historically, there have been two basic responses to the fundamental problem of uncertainty: to pursue certainty as the

basis for effective command and control or to accept uncertainty as a fact and to learn to function in spite of it.

The first response to uncertainty is to try to minimize it by

creating a powerfiul, highly efficient command and control

apparatus able to process huge amounts of information and

intended to reduce nearly all unknowns. The result is detailed

command and control. Such a system stems from the belief

that if we can impose order and certainty on the disorderly

and uncertain battlefield, then successful results are predictable. Such a system tends to be technology-intensive.

Detailed command and control can be described as coercive, a term which effectively describes the manner by which

the commander achieves unity of effort.7 In such a system, the

commander holds a tight rein, commanding by personal di77
Command and Control MCDP 6

rection or detailed directive.8 Command and control tends to

be centralized and formal. Orders and plans are detailed and

explicit, and their successful execution requires strict obedience and minimizes subordinate decisiomnaking and initiative. Detailed command and control emphasizes vertical,

linear information flow: in general, information flows up the

chain of command and orders flow down. Discipline and coordination are imposed from above to ensure compliance with

the plan.

In a system based on detailed command and control, the

command and control process tends to move slowly: information must be fed up to the top of the chain where sole decisionmaking authority resides, and orders must filter to the

bottom to be executed. Understandably, such a system does

not generally react well to rapidly changing situations. Nor

does it function well when the vertical flow of information is

disrupted. While distrust is not an inherent feature of detailed

command and control, organizations characterized by distrust

tend toward detailed command and control.

This approach represents an attempt to overcome the fundam ental nature of war. Since we have already concluded that

precise direction is generally impossible in war, detailed command and control risks falling short of its desired result. The

question is whether it nears the desired result enough to

achieve overall success.

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MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

By contrast, mission command and control accepts the turbulence and uncertainty of war. Rather than increase the level

of certainty that we seek, by mission command and control

we reduce the degree of certainty that we need. Mission command and control can be described as spontaneous: unity of

effort is not the product of conformity imposed from above

but of the spontaneous cooperation of all the elements of the

force.9 Subordinates are guided not by detailed instructions

and control measures but by their knowledge of the requirements of the overall mission. In such a system, the commander holds a loose rein, allowing subordinates significant freedom of action and requiring them to act with initiative. Discipline imposed from above is reinforced with self-discipline

throughout the organization. Because it decentralizes decisionmaking authority and grants subordinates significant freedom of action, mission command and control demands more

of leaders at all levels and requires rigorous training and education.

Mission command and control tends to be decentralized,

informal, and flexible. Orders and plans are as brief and simple as possible, relying on subordinates to effect the necessary

coordination and on the human capacity for implicit communication—mutual understanding with minimal information

exchange. By decentralizing decisionmaking authority, mission command and control seeks to increase tempo and improve the ability to deal with fluid and disorderly situations.

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Command and Control MCDP 6

Moreover, with its reliance on implicit communications, mission command and control is less vulnerable to disruption of

the information flow than is detailed command and control.

The two approaches to the problem mark the theoretical

extremes of a spectrum of command and control. (See figure

4.) In practice, no commander will rely entirely on either

purely detailed or purely mission methods. Exactly what type

of command and control we use in a particular situation will

depend on a variety of factors, such as the nature of the action

or task, the nature and capabilities of the enemy, and, perhaps

most of all, the qualities of our people. This is not to suggest

that the two types of command and control are of equal value

and merely a matter of personal preference. While detailed

command and control may be appropriate in the performance

of specific tasks of a procedural or technical nature, it is less

than effective in the overall conduct of military operations in

an environment of uncertainty, friction, disorder, and fleeting

opportunities, in which judgment, creativity, and initiative are

required. Militaries have frequently favored detailed command and control, but our understanding of the true nature of

war and the lessons of history points to the advantages of

mission command and control.
MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

Figure 4. The command and control spectrum.

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Command and Control MCDP 6

LEADERSHIP THEORY

Leadership is the influencing of people to work toward the

accomplishment of a common objective. Because war is fundamentally a human endeavor, leadership is essential to effective command and control. There are two basic theories of

leadership that generally correspond to the theories of command and control.

The authoritarian theory of leadership is based on the assumption that people naturally dislike work and will try to

avoid it where possible, and that they must therefore be

forced by coercion and threat of punishment to work toward

the common goal. This theory further argues that people actually prefer to be directed and try to avoid responsibility. The

result is an autocratic style of leadership aimed at achieving

immediate and unquestioning obedience. Leaders announce

•their decisions and expect subordinates to execute them. The

authoritarian leader is sometimes also known as a telling or

directing leader. While authoritarian leadership may result in

rapid obedience, it also can often result in subordinates who

are highly dependent on the leader, require continuous supervision, and lack initiative. Military discipline is widely seen

as an example of this model since quick and unquestioning

response to orders may be required in the heat of an emergency. This is, however, only one version of leadership that

military leaders have used successfully.

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MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

The opposite theory of leadership, known as persuasive or

delegating leadership, assumes that work is as natural as rest

or play, that people do not inherently dislike work, and that

work can be either a source of satisfaction (in which case

people will perform it willingly) or a source of punishment

(in which case they will avoid it). This theory rejects the idea

that external supervision and the threat of punishment are the

most effective ways to get people to work toward the common objective. The persuasive theory argues that people will

exercise initiative and self-control to the degree they are committed to the organizational objective. Under proper conditions, people learn not only to accept responsibility but to

actively seek it. According to this theory, the potential for exercising imagination, ingenuity, and creativity in the solution

of unit problems is widespread throughout any unit. Leadership thus becomes a question of inspiring, guiding, and supporting committed subordinates and encouraging them to

perform freely within set limits. Over time, delegating or persuasive leadership tends to produce subordinates who exhibit

a high degree of independence, self-discipline, and initiative.'0

The leadership style we adopt in a given situation depends

on a variety of factors. Key among them is the maturity of

subordinates—that is, how motivated, experienced, and willing to accept responsibility they are. Here maturity is not necessarily linked to age or seniority. The more mature the

subordinate, the more we can delegate; the less mature, the

more we will have to direct. All other things being equal, we

prefer the persuasive approach because it seeks to gain the

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Command and Control MCDP 6

committed performance of subordinates and encourages subordinate initiative. Moreover, persuasive leadership reduces

the need for continuous supervision, an important consideration on a dispersed and fluid battlefield on which continuous,

detailed supervision is problematic.

PLANNING THEORY

Planning is the process of developing practical schemes for

taking future actions. Planning may occur before a decision

and so support decisionmaking—by analyzing the mission,

the enemy, or the environment to help develop situational

awareness or by studying the feasibility of different courses

of action. Planning may also occur after a decision and so

support its execution—by working out necessary coordination

measures, allocation of resources, or timing and scheduling.

Planning facilitates future decisions and actions by helping

commanders provide for those things which are not likely to

change or which are fairly predictable (such as geography and

certain aspects of supply or transport). Planning helps them

to examine their assumptions, to come to a common understanding about the situation and its general direction, to anticipate possible enemy actions, and thus to consider possible

counteractions. Planning helps to uncover and clarify potential opportunities and threats and to prepare for opportunities

84
MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

and threats in advance. Conversely, planning helps to avoid

preventable mistakes and missed opportunities.

By definition, planning is oriented on the future. It represents an effort to project our thoughts and designs forward in

time and space. Because the future is always uncertain, planfling should generally not seek to specify future actions with

precision. The farther ahead we plan, the more time we allow

ourselves to prepare, but the less certain and specific our

plans can be. Planning ahead thus becomes less a matter of

trying to direct events and more a matter of identifying options and possibilities.

Depending on the situation and the nature of the preparations, planning may be done rapidly or deliberately. RapidI

time-sensitive planning is conducted in response to existing

conditions and is meant for immediate or near-future execution. In contrast, deliberate planning is based on anticipated

future conditions and is intended for possible execution at

some more distant time. We should keep in mind that all

planning takes time and must facilitate the generation or

maintenance of tempo, while ensuring that time allocated for

planning does not adversely impact on tempo.

Planning routines can improve the proficiency of a staff by

creating an effectiveness and efficiency of effort. The goal of

the Marine Corps is to develop an institutionalized planning

framework for use at all echelons of command. However, we

must guard against using an institutionalized planning frame85
Command and Control MCDP 6

work in a lock-step fashion. We must ensure that the application of this planning process contributes to flexibility in conducting operations.

Planning occurs at different levels and manifests itself differently at these levels. At the highest level is what we can

call conceptual planning which establishes aims, objectives,

and intents and which involves developing tactical, operational, or strategic concepts for the overall conduct of military

actions. Conceptual planning should provide the foundation

for all subsequent planning, which we can call functional and

detailed. These are the more routine and pragmatic elements

of planning which are concerned with translating the concept

into a complete and practicable plan. Functional planning is

concerned with the various functional areas necessary to support the overall concept, such as subordinate concepts for mobilization, deployment, logistics, intelligence, and so on. Detailed planning encompasses the practical specifics of execution. Detailed planning deals primarily with scheduling, coordination, or technical matters required to move and sustain

military forces, such as calculating the supplies or transport

needed for a given operation.

In general, conceptual planning corresponds to the art of

war, detailed planning applies to the science of war, and functional planning falls somewhere in between. Detailed and, to

a lesser extent, functional planning may require deliberate

and detailed calculations and may involve the development of

detailed schedules or plans, such as landing tables, resupply

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MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

schedules, communications plans, or task organizations.

However, the staff procedures which may be necessary in detailed and functional matters are generally not appropriate for

broader conceptual planning. Rather, such planning should attempt to broadly influence rather than precisely direct future

actions. Conceptual planning should impart intent, develop

overall operating concepts, and identify contingencies and

possible problems but otherwise should leave the subordinate

broad latitude in the manner of functional or detailed execution.

ORGANIZATION THEORY

Organization is an important tool of command and control.

How we organize can complicate or simplify the problems of

execution. By task-organizing our force into capable subordinate elements and assigning each its own task, we also

organize the overall mission into manageable parts. The organization of our force, then, should reflect the conceptual organization of the plan.

Specifically, what should organization accomplish for us?

First, organization establishes the chain of command and the

command and support relationships within the force. The

chain of command establishes authority and responsibility in

an unbroken succession directly from one commander to an87
Command and Control MCDP 6

other. The commander at each level responds to orders and

directions received from a higher commander and, in turn, issues orders and gives directions to subordinates. In this way,

the chain of command fixes authority and responsibility at

each level while at the same time distributing them broadly

throughout the force; each commander has designated authority and responsibility in a given sphere. Command and support relationships specify the type and degree of authority one

commander has over another and the type and degree of support that one commander provides another.

Importantly, organization should establish unity of command which means that any given mission falls within the

authority and responsibility of a single commander and that a

commander receives orders from only one superior for any

given mission. Similarly, organization should ensure that a

commander has authority over or access to all the resources

required to accomplish the assigned mission.

Organization also serves the important socializing function

of providing sources of group identity for members of the organization. For example, Marines may see themselves first as

members of a squad, next as members of a platoon, and then

as members of a company. An organization operates most effectively when its members think of themselves as belonging

to one or more groups characterized by high levels of loyalty,

cooperation, morale, and commitment to the group mission.

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MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

Each commander (supported by the staff) and immediate

subordinates constitute an integrated team—a cohesive group

committed to the accomplishment of a single mission. For example, a company commander and platoon commanders constitute a team cooperating in the accomplishment of the

company mission. A platoon commander and squad leaders

also constitute a team cooperating in the accomplishment of

the platoon mission. The size of a team can vary with the

situation, as we will discuss. Whereas the chain of command

conveys authority and responsibility from commander to

commander, the idea of an integrated team is to pull individuals together into cohesive groups. (See figure 5.) Each team

functions as a single, self-contained organism—characterized

by cooperation, reciprocal influence, lateral and vertical communication, and action-feedback loops operating continuously in all directions. Each member of the team may perform

a different task, but always within the context of the team

mission. Continuity throughout the organization results from

each commander's being a member of two related teams, one

as the senior and one as a subordinate.'1

Organization should also provide commanders with staffs

appropriate to the level of command. The staff assists the

commander by providing specialized expertise and allowing a

division of labor and a distribution of information. The staff

is not part of the chain of command and thus has no formal

authority in its own right, although commanders may delegate

authority to a staff officer if they choose.

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Command and Control MCDP 6

S

•.. S• •IIS• ••S •S •S ••• • An integrated team, a cohesive group consisting

of a commander (and by association his staff)

and his immediate subordinates who work together toward the accomplishment of a common goal. The

size of each team will depend on circumstances. All

teams shown here in triangles are four persons.

Continuity is provided by the fact that each commander is a member of two related teams, one as

the senior and one as a subordinate. Through this

overlapping structure, the commander is able to extend his command over the entire force.

Figure 5. Overlapping units and teams.

Organization should ensure a reasonable span of control

which refers to the number of subordinates or activities under

a single commander. The span of control should not exceed a

commander's capability to command effectively. The optimal

number of subordinates is situation-dependent. For example,

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MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

the more fluid and faster-changing a situation is, the fewer

subordinate elements a commander can keep track of continuously. Likewise, commanders exercising detailed command

and control, which requires them to pay close attention to the

operations of each subordinate element, generally have narrower spans of control than commanders who use mission

command and control and let their subordinates work out the

details of execution.

Although a reasonable span of control varies with the

situation, as a rule of thumb an individual can effectively

command at least three and as many as seven subordinates.

Within this situation-dependent range, a greater number

means greater flexibility—three subordinate units allow for

more options and combinations than two, for example. However, as the number increases, at some point we lose the ability to effectively consider each unit individually and begin to

think of the units together as a single, inflexible mass. At this

point, the only way to reintroduce flexibility is to group elements together into a smaller number of parts, thereby creating the need for another intermediate echelon of command.

The evolution of the Marine rifle squad during the Second

World War is a good example of this. Entering the war, the

rifle squad consisted of nine Marines—a squad leader and

eight squad members with no additional internal organization.

In combat this squad lacked the flexibility needed for smallunit fire and maneuver. Moreover, squad leaders often could

not effectively command eight individual Marines. The answer was the creation of an intermediate organizational level,
Command and Control MCDP 6

the fire team of four Marines, which also allowed an increase

in squad size to thirteen Marines. The creation of the fire

team decreased the number of immediate subordinates the

squad leader had to deal with, while extending the squad leader's influence over a larger squad.

Narrowing span of control—that is, lessening the number

of immediate subordinates—means deepening the organization by adding layers of command. But the more layers of

command an organization has, the longer it takes for information to move up or down. Consequently, the organization becomes slower and less responsive. Conversely, an effort to

increase tempo by eliminating echelons of command, or flattening an organization, necessitates widening the span of control. The commander will have to resolve the resulting tension

that exists between organizational width and depth. (See figure 6.)

Finally, organization does not apply only to people and

equipment. It also applies to information. In large part, organization determines how we distribute information throughout the force and establishes communication channels.

Information may flow vertically within the chain of command, but it should not be restricted by the chain of command. It also flows laterally between adjacent units, or even

"diagonally"—between a platoon and an adjacent company

headquarters, for example, or between a supported unit and a

supporting unit outside the chain of command. Information

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MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

Example of an extremely "flat" organization with

"wide" span of control; direct link between top and

bottom.

... U. •SS U.S SSS SSSSSSSS* . Example of the same unit organized "deeper" with

"narrower" spans of control; never more than three

"wide; two intermediate echelons between top and

bottom.

Figure 6. Organizational width and depth.

flows informally and unofficially—that is, between individuals according to personal relationships—as well as according

to formally established channels. These informal channels

provide an important redundancy and are especially important

in team building.

93

S 55555.555S•••••• S S SSS• S S.SS
Command and Control MCDP 6

CoIiiIuNIcAT1oNs THEORY

Because military evolutions require cooperative effort, it is

important that we be able to communicate effectively with

others. Communications are any method or means of conveying information from one person or place to another to improve understanding. In general, effective organizations are

characterized by intense, unconstrained communications—

that is, the free and enthusiastic sharing of meaningful information throughout the organization.'2 Moreover, communication has an importance far beyond the exchange of

information; it serves a socializing flinction. Separate from

the quality or meaning of the information exchanged, the act

of communicating strengthens bonds within an organization

and so is an important device in building trust, cooperation,

cohesion, and mutual understanding.

The traditional view of communications within military organizations is that the subordinate supplies the commander

with information about the situation, and the commander in

turn supplies the subordinate with decisions and instructions.

This linear form of communication may be consistent with

the exercise of detailed command and control, but not with a

system based on mission command and control which instead

requires interactive communications characterized by continuous feedback loops. Feedback provides the means to improve and confirm mutual understanding—and this applies to

lateral as well as vertical communications.

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MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

We communicate by a wide variety of means: face-to-face

conversation, radio, telephone, data link, written word, visual

signal, picture, or diagram. Human beings communicate not

only in the words they use, but also by tone of voice, inflection, facial expression, body language, and gestures. In fact,

evidence suggests that in face-to-face conversation, humans

actually communicate most by visual means (such as gestures, body language, or facial expressions), second by vocal

nonverbal means (such as tone or inflection), and least by the

actual words they use.'3

Moreover, people can communicate implicitly—that is,

they achieve mutual understanding and cooperation with a

minimal amount of information having to be transmitted—if

they have a familiarity formed of shared experiences and a

common outlook. A key phrase or a slight gesture can sometimes communicate more than a detailed order. Since it reduces the time spent drafting and relaying messages, implicit

communication also reduces the problems of delay typically

associated with information flow. Implicit communication

helps to maximize information content while minimizing the

actual flow of data, thereby making the organization less vulnerable to the disruption of communications.

While conciseness is a virtue, so is a certain amount of redundancy. Used within reason, redundancy of communications can improve clarity of meaning and mitigate against

disruptions to the communications system. Effective communications consequently exhibit a balance between conciseness

95
Command and Control MCDP 6

and redundancy. (In general, the greater the implicit understanding within the organization, the less the need for redundancy.)

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT THEORY

Since effective command and control is concerned with getting the right information to the right person at the right time,

information management is crucial.

We initiate communications under two basic principles:

supply-push and demand-pull.'4 A supply-push system pushes

information from the source to the user either as the information becomes available or according to a schedule. (See figure

7.) The advantages of supply-push are that the commander

does not need to request the information and that the information generally arrives in a timely fashion. The challenge with

a supply-push system is to be able to anticipate the commander's information needs. The danger of information overload arises primarily from supply-push.

By contrast, a pure demand-pull system does not rely on

the ability to anticipate information needs; it is inactive until

a demand is made on it. In a pure demand-pull system, the

user generates all information requirements. (See figure 7.) If

the information is readily available—already resident in some

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MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

Figure 7. Supply-push and demand-pull information

management.

data base, for example—the demand can be filled quickly and

efficiently. However, if the information is not readily available, the demand typically triggers a "demand cascade," as

the requirement filters through the chain of command until it

reaches the appropriate level for gathering. This takes time

and can be a burden to lower echelons, especially in a centralized command and control system in which all information

must be fed to the senior echelons. An answer to the demand

cascade is for commanders to keep dedicated gathering assets

which answer directly to them, such as the directed telescopes

already mentioned.

Demand-pull can help focus scarce resources on those

tasks which the commander has identified as critical; it can

deliver information specifically tailored to the commander's

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Command and Control MCDP 6

information needs; and it will produce only that information

which the commander requests. These characteristics can be

both strengths and weaknesses. They can be strengths because

information flow is tailored specifically to identified requirements. However, they can also be weaknesses because there

will often be information requirements that the commander

has not identified, and in a pure demand-pull system those requirements will go unsatisfied. One definite disadvantage of

demand-pull is the cost in time since the search for information may not begin until the commander has identified the

need for that information.

We can also discuss information management in terms of

how information is transmitted. First, information may be

broadcast, sent simultaneously to a broad audience—anyone

with access to the information network—to include different

echelons of command. (See figure 8.) The great advantage of

broadcast is that it gets information to the widest audience in

the shortest amount of time. If the information is of a generic

nature, this method may be extremely efficient. However,

since the information is sent to a wide audience with varying

information requirements, the information cannot be tailored

to suit any specific commander's needs. Perhaps the greatest

drawback of broadcast transmission is that undisciplined use

of this method can quickly lead to information overload.

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MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

The alternative to broadcast is point-to-point transmission—or "narrowcast"—in which information is sent to a

specific user or users. As appropriate, infonnation is then

passed sequentially from one user to the next. (See figure 9.)

Point-to-point transmission has two basic advantages. First,

information can be tailored to meet the specific needs of each

recipient. Second, point-to-point transmission has built-in

control mechanisms which broadcast transmission lacks.

Each node in the sequence can serve as a control mechanism,

filtering and integrating information as appropriate before

passing it on—lessening the risk of overload and tailoring information to the needs of the next recipient. The major disad99

Figure 8. Broadcast transmission.
Command and Control MCDP 6

rUSE

Figure 9. Point-to-point transmission.

ISERI.

SOURCE

vantages of point-to-point are that information reaches a

broad audience more slowly and that the chances of distortion

increase with each node that information passes through.

In practice, the different aspects of information management are far from incompatible; in fact, combined wisely they

can effectively complement one another within the same

command and control system.

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MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

DEcIsIoNr&iurG THEORY

A principal aim of command and control is to enhance the

commander's ability to make sound and timely decisions. As

we might expect, the defining features of command and control—uncertainty and time—exert a significant influence on

decisionmaking.'5 All decisions must be made in. the face of

uncertainty. Theoretically, we can reduce uncertainty by gaining more information, but any such decrease in uncertainty

occurs at the expense of time. And as we have already mentioned, it is not so much the amount of information that matters, but the right elements of information available at the

right time and place.

There are two basic theories on how we make decisions.'6

The traditional view is that decisionmaking is an analytical process based on generating several different options,

comparing all the options according to some set of criteria,

and identifying the best option. The basic idea is that comparing multiple options concurrently will produce the optimal

solution. As a result, analytical decisionmaking tends to be

methodical and time-consuming. Theoretically, reasoning

power matters more than experience.

The other basic approach, called intuitive decisionmaking,

rejects the computational approach of the analytical method

and instead relies on an experienced commander's (and

staff's) intuitive ability to recognize the key elements of a

101
Command and Control MCDP 6

particular problem and arrive at the proper decision. Intuitive

decisionmaking thus replaces methodical analysis with an intuitive skill for pattern-recognition based on experience and

judgment. The intuitive approach focuses on situation assessment instead of on the comparison of multiple options.

Intuitive decisionmaking aims at "satisficing," finding the

first solution which will satisfactorily solve the problem,

rather than on optimizing, as the analytical approach attempts

to do.'7 The intuitive approach is based on the belief that, war

being ultimately an art rather than a science, there is no

absolutely right answer to any problem. Intuitive decisionmaking works on the further belief that, due to the judgment

gained by experience, training, and reflection, the commander

will generate a workable first solution, and therefore it is not

necessary to generate multiple options. Because it does not

involve comparing multiple options, intuitive decisionmaking

is generally much faster than analytical decisionmaking. If

time permits, the commander may further evaluate this decision; if it proves defective, the commander moves on to the

next reasonable solution.

Each approach has different strengths and weaknesses, and

determining which approach is better in a given situation depends on the nature of the situation, particularly on how much

time and information are available. The analytical approach

may be appropriate for prehostility decisions about mobilization or contingency planning when time is not a factor and

extensive information can be gathered. It may be useful in

102
MCDP 6 Command and Control Theory

situations in which it is necessary to document or justify a decision or in decisions requiring complicated computations

which simply cannot be done intuitively (such as in making

decisions about supply rates). It may be appropriate when

choosing from among several existing alternatives, as in

equipment acquisition, for example. Finally, an analytical

approach may have some merit in situations in which commanders are inexperienced or in which they face never.-before-experienced problems. However, that said, the intuitive

approach is more appropriate for the vast majority of typical

tactical or operational decisions—decisions made in the fluid,

rapidly changing conditions of war when time and uncertainty

are critical factors, and creativity is a desirable trait.'8

We frequently associate intuitive decisionmaking with

rapid/time-sensitive planning and analytical decisionmaking

with deliberate planning. This may often be the case but not

necessarily. For example, a thorough, deliberate planning effort in advance of a crisis can provide the situational awareness that allows a commander to exercise effective intuitive

decisionmaking. Conversely, the analytical approach of developing and selecting from several courses of action may be

done rapidly. The point is that the planning model or process

we choose, and the decisionmaking approach that supports it,

should be based upon the situation, the time available, the

knowledge and situational awareness of the organization, and

the commander's involvement in the planning and decisionmaking process. While the two approaches to decisionmaking

103
Command and Control MCDP 6

are conceptually distinct, they are rarely mutually exclusive

in practice.

CONCLUSION

Our view of the true nature of war leads us to one of two responses to dealing with the fundamental problem of command: either pursuing certainty or coping with uncertainty.

These responses lead to two distinctly different theories of

command and control. Each theory in turn imposes its own

requirements on the various aspects of command and control—decisionmaking, communications, information management, planning, organization, training, education, doctrine,

and so on—and so forms the basis for a distinct and comprehensive approach to command and control. The question is:

Which approach do we adopt? The Marine Corps' concept of

command and control is based on accepting uncertainty as an

undeniable fact and being able to operate effectively despite

it. The Marine Corps' command and control system is thus

built around mission command and control which allows us to

create tempo, flexibility, and the ability to exploit opportunities but which also requires us to decentralize and rely on

low-level initiative. In the next chapter, we will discuss the

features of such a command and control system.

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Chapter 3

Creating Effective

Command and Control

"Whoever can make and implement his decisions consistently

faster gains a tremendous, often decisive advantage. Decision

making thus becomes a time-competitive process, and timeliness of decisions becomes essential to generating tempo."

—FMFM 1, Warfighting

MCDP 6 Creating Effective Command and Control

H

aving reached a common understanding of the nature of

command and control and having laid out its key theories, we can develop the characteristics of an effective command and control system. How do we create effective

command and control, both in our units and within the Marine

Corps as a whole?

Tm CHALLENGES TO TILE SYSTEM

Before we discuss the features of our command and control

system, it might help to review the challenges that the system,

as a complex blend of people, information, and support, must

face. What obstacles must our command and control system

overcome and what must it accomplish? First and foremost,

the system must deal effectively with the twin problems of

uncertainty and time. It must be compatible with our doctrine

of maneuver warfare. It must function effectively across a

broad spectrum of conflicts and environments—that is, in

"any clime and place." Moreover, while designed principally

to work effectively in war, it should also apply to peacetime

activities, operational or administrative.

Our command and control must improve our ability to generate a higher tempo of action than the enemy. It should help

us adapt to rapidly changing situations and exploit fleeting

opportunities. It should allow us to withstand disruptions of

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Command and Control MCDP 6

all kinds, created by the enemy, the environment, or ourselves, since we recognize that disruption will be a normal

course of events. It should help to gather information quickly,

accurately, and selectively and to get the right information to

the right person at the right time and in the right form—without creating information overload. It should improve our ability to build and share situational awareness.

Our command and control should help provide insight into

the nature of the problem facing us and into the nature and

designs of our enemy. It should help us to identify critical enemy vulnerabilities and should provide the means for focusing our efforts against those vulnerabilities. At the same time,

it should help conceal our true designs from the enemy. It

should help establish goals which are both meaningful and

practicable, and it should help devise workable, flexible plans

to accomplish those goals.

It should facilitate making timely and sound decisions despite incomplete and unclear information, and it should provide the means to modify those decisions quickly. It should

allow us to monitor events closely enough to ensure proper

execution, yet without interfering with subordinates' actions.

It should help us communicate instructions quickly, clearly,

and concisely and in a way that provides subordinates the

necessary guidance without inhibiting their initiative.

With this in mind, what should such a command and control system look like?

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MCDP 6 Creating Effective Command and Control

MISSION COMMAND AN)) CONTROL

First and foremost, our approach should be based on mission

command and control. Mission command and control is central to maneuver warfare. We realize that the specific combination of command and control methods we employ in a

particular situation depends on the unique requirements of

that situation. We also realize that, within an overall mission

approach, detailed command and control may be preferable

for certain procedural or technical tasks. That said, however,

for the overall command and control of military actions, we

should use mission command and control as much as the

situation allows. Why? Mission command and control deals

better with the fundamental problems of uncertainty and time.

Since we recognize that precision and certainty are unattainable in war anyway, we sacrifice them for speed and agility.

Mission command and control offers the flexibility to deal

with rapidly changing situations and to exploit fleeting windows of opportunity. It provides for the degree of cooperation

necessary to achieve harmony of effort yet gives commanders

at all levels the latitude to act with initiative and boldness.

Mission command and control relies on the use of mission

tactics in which seniors assign missions and explain the underlying intent but leave subordinates as free as possible to

choose the manner of accomplishment. Commanders seek to

exercise a sort of command by influence, issuing broad guidance rather than detailed directions or directives. The higher

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Command and Control MCDP 6

the level of command, the more general should be the supervision and the less the burden of detail. Commanders reserve

the use of close personal supervision to intervene in subordinate's actions only in exceptional cases. Thus all commanders

in their own spheres are accustomed to the full exercise of

authority and the free application of judgment and imagination.' Mission command and control thus seeks to maximize

low-level initiative while achieving a high level of cooperation in order to obtain better battlefield results.

Orders should include restrictive control measures and

should prescribe the manner of execution only to the degree

needed to provide necessary coordination that cannot be

achieved any other way. Orders should be as brief and as simple as possible, relying on subordinates to work out the details of execution and to effect the necessary coordination.

Mission command and control thus relies on lateral coordination between units as well as communications up and down

the chain.

The aim is not to increase our capacily to perform command and control. It is not more command and control that

we are after. Instead, we seek to decrease the amount of command and control that we need. We do this by replacing

coercive command and control methods with spontaneous,

self-disciplined cooperation based on low-level initiative, a

commonly understood commander's intent, mutual trust, and

implicit understanding and communications.
MCDP 6 Creating Effective Command and Control

LOW-LEVEL Th1TIAT1VE

Initiative is an essential element of mission command and

control since subordinates must be able to act without instructions. Our warfare doctrine emphasizes seeking and rapidly

exploiting fleeting opportunities, possible only through lowlevel initiative. Initiative hinges on distributing the authority

to decide and act throughout an organization rather than localizing it in one spot. And as we have already discussed,

where there is authority, there is also responsibility. Being

free to act on their own authority, subordinates must accept

the corresponding responsibility to act.

Our command and control must be biased toward decision

and action at all levels. Put another way, the command and

control process must be self-starting at every level of command as all commanders within their own spheres act upon

the need for action rather than only on orders from above.

It is important to point out that initiative does not mean

that subordinates are free to act without regard to guidance

from above. In fact, initiative places a special burden on subordinates, requiring that they always keep the larger situation

in mind and act in consonance with their senior's intent. The

freedom to act with initiative thus implies a greater obligation to act in a disciplined and responsible way. Initiative

places a greater burden on the senior as well. Delegating

authority to subordinates does not absolve higher command111
Command and Control MCDP 6

ers of ultimate responsibility. They must frame their guidance

in such a way that provides subordinates sufficient understanding to act in consonance with their desires while not restricting freedom of action. Commanders must be adept at

expressing their desires clearly and forcefiilly—a skill that requires practice.

Beyond its tactical utility, initiative has an important psychological effect on the members of an organization. Recognizing what needs to be done and taking the action necessary

to succeed is a satisfying experience and a powerful stimulant

to human endeavor. People not merely carrying out orders but

acting on their own initiative feel a greater responsibility for

the outcome and will naturally act with greater vigor. Thus,

initiative distributed throughout is a source of great strength

and energy for any organization, especially in times of crisis.2

As we emphasize initiative, we must recognize that subordinates will sometimes take unexpected actions, thus imposing on commanders a willingness to accept greater uncertainty with regard to the actionsof their subordinates.

Colnt4rER's INTENT

In a decentralized command and control system, without a

common vision there can be no unity of effort; the various ac-
MCDP 6 Creating Effective Command and Control

tions will lack cohesion. Without a commander's intent to express that common vision, there simply can be no mission

command and control.

There are two parts to any mission: the task to be accomplished and the reason, or intent. The task describes the action

to be taken while the intent describes the desired result of the

action. Of the two, the intent is predominant. While a situation may change, making the task obsolete, the intent is more

enduring and continues to guide our actions. Understanding

our commander's intent allows us to exercise initiative in harmony with the commander's desires.

The commander's intent should thus pull the various separate actions of the force together, establishing an underlying

purpose and focus. It should provide topsight. In so doing, it

should provide the logic that allows subordinates each to act

according to their unique circumstances while maintaining

harmony with one another and the higher commander's aim.

While assigned tasks may be overcome by events, the commander's intent should allow subordinates to act with initiative even in the face of disorder and change.

In a system based on mission command and control, providing intent is a prime responsibility of command and an essential means of leading the organization.
Command and Control MCDP 6

M!rruAJ. TRUST

Mission command and control demands mutual trust among

all commanders, staffs, and Marines—confidence in the abilities and judgment of subordinates, peers, and seniors. Trust is

the cornerstone of cooperation. It is a function of familiarity

and respect. A senior trusts subordinates to carry out the assigned missions competently with minimal supervision, act in

consonance with the overall intent, report developments as

necessary, and effect the necessary coordination. Subordinates meanwhile trust that the senior will provide the necessary guidance and will support them loyally and fully, even

when they make mistakes.

Trust has a reverse side: it must be earned as well as

given. We earn the trust of others by demonstrating competence, a sense of responsibility, loyalty, and self-discipline.

This last is essential. Discipline is of fundamental importance

in any military endeavor, and strict military discipline remains a pillar of command authority. But since mission command and control is decentralized rather than centralized and

spontaneous rather than coercive, discipline is not only imposed from above; it must also be generated from within.

In order to earn a senior's trust, subordinates must demonstrate the self-discipline to accomplish the mission with minimal supervision and to act always in accord with the larger

intent. Seniors, in order to earn subordinates' trust, must likewise demonstrate that they will provide the subordinate the
MCDP 6 Creating Effective Command and Control

framework within which to act and will support and protect

subordinates in every way as they exercise initiative.

Mutual trust also has a positive effect on morale: it increases the individual's identity with the group and its goals.

Mutual trust thus contributes to a supportive, cooperative environment.

IMPLICIT UNDERSTANDING AND

COMMUNICATION

The final essential ingredients of effective mission command

and control are implicit understanding and communication

which are the basis for cooperation and coordination in maneuver warfare.3 These intangible human abilities allow us to

harmonize our actions intuitively with others.

Implicit understanding and communication do not occur

automatically. They are abilities we must actively foster and

are the product of a common ethos and repeated practice—as

with the members of a basketball team who think and move

as one or the members of a jazz band who can improvise

freely without losing their cohesion. Gaining this special state

of organizational effectiveness has significant implications

for doctrine, education, and training, as we will discuss.
Command and Control MCDP 6

DEcrsIoiAxi1G

Effective decisionmaking at all levels is essential to effective

command and control. Several general principles apply. First,

since war is a clash between opposing wills, all decisionmaking must first take our enemies into account, recognizing that

while we are trying to impose our will on them, they are trying to do the same to us. Second, whoever can make and implement decisions faster, even to a small degree, gains a

tremendous advantage. The ability to make decisions quickly

on the basis of incomplete information is essential. Third, a

military decision is not merely the product of a mathematical

computation, but requires the intuitive and analytical ability

to recognize the essence of a given problem and the creative

ability to devise a practical solution. All Marine decisionmakers must demonstrate these intuitive, analytical, and creative

skills which are the products of experience, intelligence, boldness, and perception. Fourth, since all decisions must be made

in the-face of uncertainty and since every situation is unique,

there is no perfect solution to any battlefield problem; we

should not agonize over one. We should adopt a promising

scheme with an acceptable degree of risk, and do it more

quickly than our foe. As General George Patton said, "A

good plan violently executed Now is better than a perfect

plan next week."4 And finally, in general, the lower the eche-
MCDP 6 Creating Effective Command and Control

Ion of command, the faster and more direct is the decision

process. A small-unit leader's decisions are based on factors

usually observed firsthand. At successively higher echelons

of command, the commander is further removed from events

by time and distance. As a consequence, the lower we can

push the decisionmaking threshold, the faster will be the decision cycle.

Maneuver warfare requires a decisionmaking approach that

is appropriate to each situation. We must be able to adopt and

combine the various aspects of both intuitive and analytical

decisionmaking as required. Because uncertainty and time

will drive most military decisions, we should emphasize intuitive decisionmaking as the norm and should develop our

leaders accordingly. Emphasizing experienced judgment and

intuition over deliberate analysis, the intuitive approach helps

to generate tempo and to provide the flexibility to deal with

uncertainty. Moreover, the intuitive approach is consistent

with our view that there is no perfect solution to battlefield

problems and with our belief that Marines at all levels are capable of sound judgment. However, understanding the factors

that favor analytical decisionmaking—especially when time

is not a critical factor—we should be able to adopt an analytical approach or to reinforce intuitive decisionmaking with

more methodical analysis.
Command and Control MCDP 6

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Our management of information should facilitate the rapid,

distributed, and unconstrained flow of information in all directions. At the same time, it should allow us to discriminate

as to importance, quality, and timeliness as a means of providing focus and preventing information overload. It should

enhance the ability of all commanders to communicate a concept and intent with clarity, intensity, and speed.

We should supply information, as much as possible, in the

form of meaningful images rather than as masses of data.

This means, among other things, that our system must have

the means of filtering, fusing, and prioritizing information.

By filtering we mean assessing the value of information and

culling out that which is not pertinent or important. By fusing

we mean integrating information into an easily usable form

and to an appropriate level of detail. And by prioritizing we

mean expediting the flow of information according to importance. All information management should focus on critical

information requirements. This demands vision on the part of

the commander and understanding on the part of subordinates

in order to recognize critical information when they see it.

Our command and control system should make use of all

the various channels and methods by which information

flows—implicit as well as explicit and informal as well as

formal. Our system must facilitate communications in all
MCDP 6 Creating Effective Command and Control

directions, not only vertically within the chain of command,

and should ensure that information flow is interactive rather

than one-way. Our system should provide redundant channels

as a safeguard against disruption and battle damage; which

channel information follows is less important than whether it

reaches the right destination.

Since information is changed by each person who handles it, important information should pass directly between

principal users, eliminating intermediaries, such as equipment

operators or clerks. Wherever possible, person-to-person information should be communicated by word of mouth and

face-to-face since humans communicate not only by what

they say but also by how they say it. The desire to have principals communicate directly and by voice does not mean that

we do not need to keep a record of communications; permanent records can be important as a means of affirming understanding and for reasons of later study and critique.

Our information management system should be a hybrid

exhibiting the judicious combination of broadcast and pointto-point transmission and supply-push and demand-pull.5

Generic information of value to many users at a variety of

echelons may be broadcast, the transmission method which

reaches the broadest audience most quickly. However, we

must exercise discipline with respect to broadcast transmissions to avoid the danger of information overload. In comparison, we should use point-to-point transmission for

119
Command and Control MCDP 6

information that needs to be tailored to suit the needs of individual users.

Our information management system should also combine

the best characteristics of supply-push and demand-pull. We

recognize that supply-push is the most efficient way to provide much of the information needed routinely—whether

broadcast or point-to-point. Through the implicit understanding and shared images of its members, the system should attempt to anticipate commanders' needs and should attempt to

push routine information to an easily accessible, local data

base. Commanders then pull from the base only that information they need. In this way, we avoid the danger of information overload associated with supply-push and broadcast and

circumvent some of the delays normally associated with

demand-pull. (See figure 10.)

We also recognize that commanders will likely be unaware

of the need for certain information, so we must ensure that

truly critical, time-sensitive information is pushed directly to

them without delay, even if it means skipping intermediate

echelons of command. Echelon-skipping does not mean, however, that intermediate echelons are left uninformed. After

critical information has passed directly between the primarily

concerned echelons, both those echelons should inform intermediates by normal channels.

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MCDP 6 Creating Effective Command and ControJ

Figure 10. Hybrid information management system.

Additionally, since no system can effectively anticipate all

infonnation needs, commanders must have available directed

telescopes by which they can satisfy their own information

needs quickly. It is important, however, that the directed telescope not interfere (or be perceived to interfere) with the normal functioning of the chain of command: the perception of

spying or intruding on the province of subordinate commanders can damage the vital trust between senior and subordinate.

t2 1
Command and Control MCDP 6

LEADERSHIP

Because people are the first and most important element of

our command and control system, strong and effective leadership is of essential importance to our command and control.

Mission command and control requires predominantly a persuasive or delegating approach to leadership. It becomes the

role of the leaders to motivate Marines to perform to the highest standards and to instill self-discipline. Leadership is thus a

matter of enlisting the committed, enthusiastic, and loyal performance of subordinates, both as a habitual quality and in

support of each specific mission. A good part of this comes

from keeping subordinates informed and from one's own

demonstration of commitment.

Mission command and control does not imply a depersonalized or detached demeanor. Since leaders who employ mission tactics are not overly involved in the details of execution,

one of their primary roles will thus be to provide the intent

which holds together the decentralized actions of subordinates.

Another important role of leadership will be to create a

close-knit sense of team which is essential to developing trust

and understanding within the organization. Leaders should reinforce the common core values which are the basis for implicit understanding and trust. Leaders should strive to create

an atmosphere of mutual support in which subordinates are

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MCDP 6 Creating Effective Command and Control

encouraged to demonstrate initiative and to effect the necessary coordination locally. Importantly, this means avoiding a

"zero-defects" mentality which tends to penalize initiative.

Leadership also becomes a matter of developing subordinate maturity—which means engendering in subordinates a

willingness to exercise initiative, the judgment to act wisely,

and an eagerness to accept responsibility. Leader-as-teacher is

an essential component of our approach to leadership.

PLAIMNG

Planning is an essential element of effective command and

control. Our philosophy of command and control calls for

planning methods that are based on the particulars of each

situation, especially on the nature of the activity being

planned. In general, we should not think of planning as a

scripting process which establishes specific actions to be

taken and often establishes timetables for those actions. This

approach seeks to narrow possibilities in order to minimize

uncertainty and simplify preparations and coordination.

Rather, we should view planning as a learning process which

helps us understand how to exploit the various possibilities an

uncertain future may hold. The intent should be to maximize

opportunities in order to generate freedom of action and not

to minimize possibilities in order to simplify coordination.

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Command and Control MCDP 6

Whether done rapidly or deliberately, effective planning

requires a sensitive awareness and judicious use of time. If

time is available, there can be little excuse for not planning

adequately. A company commander who spends an hour deliberately developing a detailed plan in the heat of a crisis

when seconds matter is no better than a division commander

who has several days to prepare for an amphibious landing

and hastily develops an ill-conceived ship-to-shore plan. Just

because time may be available does not mean that we should

use it to develop lengthy, detailed directives. Elaborateness

and detail are not generally measures of effective plans. Instead, directives should convey the minimum amount of instruction necessary for execution. Directives should be as

clear, simple, and concise as each situation permits.

Planning should be participatory. The main bcnefits of

planning are not from consuming the product but from engaging in the process. In other words, the planning matters more

than the plan. We should view any plan as merely a common

starting point from which to adapt as the situation requires

and not as a script which must be followed. We should think

of the plan as a scheme for solving a problem. Since the future will always be uncertain, plans must be flexible and

adaptable, allowing the opportunity to pursue a variety of

options.

Effective planning must involve an appreciation for time

horizons. We must project far enough into the future so that

we can maintain the initiative and prepare adequately for

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MCDP 6 Creating Effective Command and Control

upcoming action, but not so far into the future that plans will

have little in common with actual developments. Effective

planning should facilitate shaping the conditions of the situation to our advantage while preserving freedom to adapt

quickly to real events. As actions approach and our ability to

influence them grows, planning should have helped us develop an appreciation for the situation and get into a position

to exploit it.

As with decisionniaking, we should decentralize execution

planning to the lowest possible levels so that those who must

execute have the freedom to develop their own plans. A plan

should dictate a subordinate's actions only to the minimum

degree essential to provide necessary coordination unattainable any other way. Ideally, rather than dictating a subordinate's actions, a good plan should actually create opportunities for the subordinate to act with initiative.

Without question, planning is an important and valuable

part of command and control. However, we must guard

against overcontrol and mechanical thinking. A properly

framed commander's intent and effective commander's planning guidance create plans which foster the environment for

subordinate commanders to exercise initiative to create tempo

while allowing for flexibility within execution of operations.

The object of planning is to provide options for the commander to face the future with confidence. The measure of a

good plan is not whether it transpires as designed but whether

it facilitates effective action in the face of unforeseen events.

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Command and Control MCDP 6

FOCUSiNG COMMAI1) AND CONTROL

The focus of the command and control effort should reflect

the overall focus of efforts. We should focus the command

and control effort on critical tasks and at critical times and

places. We can do this by a variety of means. We concentrate

information-gathering assets and other command and control

resources where they are needed most. We concentrate planning, coordination, analysis, and other command and control

activities on the most important tasks, and we exercise economy elsewhere. We prioritize information requirements and

concentrate gathering, processing, and communications on

the critical elements. We filter, prioritize, and fuse information to ensure that critical, time-sensitive information moves

quickly and effectively and that less important information

does not clutter communications channels. We manage that

most precious of all commodities, time, to ensure that the

most important tasks receive our earliest and utmost attention.

We especially ensure that commanders devote their time and

energies only to critical tasks, and that they are protected

against routine distractions. The commander should do only

those things which only the commander can do or which nobody else can do adequately. Routine tasks must be delegated

to others.

A key way commanders can provide focus is by personal

attention and presence. In the words of Field Marshal Sir

William Slim, "One of the most valuable qualities of a

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MCDP 6 Creating Effective Command and Control

commander is the flair for putting himself in the right place at

the vital time." As we have mentioned, by positioning them..

selves at the critical spot, commanders can observe events

more directly and avoid the delays and distortions that occur

as information fitters up the chain of command. In so doing,

commanders can gain firsthand the essential appreciation for

the situation which can rarely be gained any other way.

Equally important, they can influence events more directly

and avoid the delays and distortions that occur as information

filters down the chain of command. By their personal presence, commanders can provide the leadership that is so essential to success in war. And simply by the moral authority that

their presence commands, commanders direct emphasis to the

critical spot and focus efforts on the critical task.

We have discussed the need to gain several different images. Commanders go wherever they must to get the most important image. For the closeup image, this often means at the

front—which does. not necessarily mean at the forwardmost

point of contact on the ground, but wherever the critical action is taking place or the critical situation is developing. For

ground commanders, even senior ones, this may in fact mean

at or near the point of contact. But for others, and even for

ground commanders, this may mean with a subordinate commander in the critical sector—in a ready room listening to

flight debriefs during an important phase of an air operation,

at a critical point along a route of march, or in an aircraft flying over the battlefield. If the critical view at a particular moment is the overall picture, the commander may want to be in

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Command and Control MCDP 6

the command post's operations center, piecing together various reports from far-flung sources, or even at a higher headquarters, learning about the larger situation (although in

general it is better for senior commanders to come forward

than for subordinate commanders to go rearward to exchange

information). And for that matter, if a commander is trying to

get inside the mind of an adversary who has made a bold and

unexpected move that has shattered situational awareness, the

best place may be sequestered from distractions, sitting

against a tree, alone with a map.

Our philosophy of command calls for energetic and active

commanders with a flair, as Slim says, for being in the critical

place, lending leadership, judgment, and authority wherever it

is needed most. The commander might start at the command

post to piece together an overall image and supervise the development of the plan, but should then usually move forward

to supervise execution at the critical spot, returning to the

command post only long enough to regenerate an image of

the overall situation before moving out again to the next critical spot. The important point is that commanders must not

feel tied to the command post, unable to leave it for fear of

missing a valuable report—especially since modem communications increasingly allow commanders to stay informed

even when away from the command post. When commanders

leave the command post, it is imperative that they empower

the staff to act on their behalf. The staff must be able to act

with initiative when the commander is away and therefore

must understand the commander's estimate of the situation,

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MCDP 6 Creating Effective Command and Control

overall intent, and designs. Mutual trust and implicit understanding apply to the staff as much as to subordinate commanders. Commanders who do not empower the staff to act

on their behalf will become prisoners in their own headquarters, out of touch with reality and limited in their ability to influence events.

Tiu COMMAND AND CONTROL SUPPORT

STRUCTURE

It is important to keep in mind that the command and control

support structure merely provides the supporting framework

for our command and control; it does not constitute the system itself. The sole purpose of the support structure is to assist people in recognizing what needs to be done and in taking

appropriate action. In addition to supporting our approach to

command and control, the components of our command and

control support structure must be compatible with one another. And since people are the driving element behind command and control, the components of the structure, together

and alone, must be user-friendly—that is, designed first and

always with people in mind.

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Command and Control MCDP 6

TRAINING, EDUCATION, AND DOCTRINE

Collectively, training, education, and doctrine prepare people

for the roles they play in command and control. First, since

mission command and control demands initiative and sound

decisionmaking at all levels, training, education, and doctrine

must aim at fostering initiative and improving decisionmaking ability among all Marines. It is not enough to allow initiative; we must actively encourage and demand an eagerness to

accept responsibility. This means that we must develop an institutional prejudice for tolerating mistakes of action but not

inaction. Training and education should seek to develop in

leaders the pattern-recognition skills that are essential to intuitive decisionmaking.

Second, training, education, and doctrine must prepare

Marines to function effectively in varying environments amid

uncertainty and disorder and with limited time. Exercise scenarios should purposely include elements of disorder and uncertainty—an unexpected development or mission change, as

examples. Field exercises and command post exercises should

purposely include disruption of command and control, for example, "destruction" of a main command post or loss of communications during a critical phase of an evolution. Planning

exercises should incorporate severe time limits to simulate

stress and tempo. As Field Marshal Erwin Rommel said, "A

commander must accustom his staff to a high tempo from the

outset, and continuously keep them up to it."
MCDP 6 Creating Effective Command and Control

Third, education and training should teach the appropriate

use of techniques and procedures. Training should provide

techniques and procedures which emphasize flexibility,

speed, and adaptability—fast and simple staff planning models, for example. Education should provide an understanding

of when to apply different techniques and procedures—when

to use intuitive or analytical decisionmaking techniques, for

example.

Last and perhaps most important, training, education, and

doctrine should provide a shared ethos, common experiences,

and a shared way of thinking as the basis for the trust, cohesion, and implicit communication that are essential to maneuver warfare command and control. They should establish a

common perspective on how Marines approach the problems

of command and control.

PROCEDURES

Used properly, procedures can be a source of organizational

competence—by improving a staff's efficiency or by increasing planning tempo, for example. Procedures can be especially useful to improve the coordination among several

people who must cooperate in the accomplishment of repetitive tasks—such as the internal functioning of a combat operations center. Used improperly, however, procedures can

131
Command and Control MCDP 6

have the opposite effect: applied blindly to the wrong types of

tasks or the wrong situations, they can lead to ineffective,

even dysfunctional performance.

We must recognize that procedures apply only to rote or

mechanical tasks. They are not acts of judgment, nor are they

meant to replace the need for judgment. The purpose of procedures "is not to restrict human judgment, but to free it for

the tasks only it can perform." 6 We must keep in mind that

procedures are merely tools to be used, modified, or discarded as the situation requires. They are not rules which we

must follow slavishly.

Our command and control procedures should be designed

for simplicity and speed. They should be designed for simplicity so that we can master them easily and perform them

quickly and smoothly under conditions of extreme stress.

They should be designed for speed so that we can generate

tempo. Streamlined staff planning sequences, for example,

are preferable to deliberate, elaborate ones. The standard

should be simple models which we can expand if time and

circumstances permit, rather than inherently complicated

models which we try to compress when time is short—which

is likely to be most of the time. As Second World War German General Hermann Balck used to say to his staff, "Don't

work hard, work fast."

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MCDP 6 Creating Effective Command and Control

MANPOWER

Since people are the first and driving element of our command and control system, effective manpower management is

essential to command and control. Since mission command

and control relies heavily on individual skills and judgment,

our manpower management system should recognize that all

Marines of a given grade are not interchangeable and should

seek to put the right person in the right billet based on specific ability and temperament. Additionally, the manpower

management system should seek to achieve personnel stability within units and staffs as a means of fostering the cohesion, teamwork, and implicit understanding that are vital to

mission command and control. We recognize that casualties

in war will take a toll on personnel stability, but the greater

stability a unit has initially, the better it will absorb those

casualties and incorporate replacements.

ORGANIZATION

The general aims of organization with regard to command

and control should be to create unity of effort, reasonable

spans of control, cohesive mission teams, and effective information distribution. Organization should not inhibit communications in any way but instead should facilitate the rapid

133
Command and Control MCDP 6

distribution of information in all directions and should provide feedback channels.

In general, we should take a flexible approach to organization, maintaining the capability to task-organize our forces to

suit the situation which might include the creation of nonstandard and temporary task groupings. However, the commander

must reconcile this desire for organizational flexibility with

the need to create implicit understanding and mutual trust

which are the product of familiarity and stable working relationships.

Mission command and control requires the creation of selfreliant task groups capable of acting semiautonomously. By

task-organizing into self-reliant task groups, we increase each

commander's freedom of action and at the same time decrease the need for centralized coordination of support.

We should seek to strike a balance between "width" and

"depth" so that the organization is suited to the particular

situation. The aim is to flatten the organization to the greatest

extent compatible with reasonable spans of control. Commanders should have the flexibility to eliminate or bypass selected echelons of command or staff as appropriate in order to

improve operational tempo. Additionally, it is not necessary

that all echelons of command exercise all functions of command. Just as we task-organize our force, so should we taskorganize our command and control structure.

134
MCDP 6 Creating Effective Command and Control

A word is in order about the size of staffs. The larger and

more compartmented the staff, the more information it requires to function. This increase in information in turn requires an even larger staff, and the result is a spiraling

increase in size. However, the larger a command and control

organization, the longer it generally takes that organization to

perform its functions. In the words of General William T.

Sherman, "A bulky staff implies a division of responsibility,

slowness of action and indecision, whereas a small staff implies activity and concentration of purpose." Also, a large

staff takes up more space, emits a larger electromagnetic signature, and is less mobile than a small one, and consequently

is more vulnerable to detection and attack. A large staff, with

numerous specialists, may be more capable of detailed analysis and planning than a small one, but we have already established that we generally value speed and agility over

precision and certainty. We should therefore seek to keep the

size of staffs to a minimum in order to facilitate a high operating tempo and to minimize the space and facilities that the

headquarters requires. The ideal staff would be so austere it

could not exercise fully detailed command and control.

EQuipi'LENT AND TECHNOLOGY

Equipment, to include facilities, is an integral part of any

command and control support structure, but we must re135
Command and Control MCDP 6

member that it is only one component. As we have mentioned, there are two dangers in regard to command and control equipment, the first being an overreliance on technology

and the second being a failure to make proper use of technological capabilities. The aim is to strike a balance that gets the

most out of our equipment and at the same time integrates

technology properly with the other components of the system.

We believe very strongly that the object of technology is

not to reduce the role of people in the command and control

process, but rather to enhance their performance—although

technology should allow us to decrease the number of people

involved in the process. As a first priority, equipment and facilities should be user-friendly. Technology should seek to

automate routine functions which machines can accomplish

more efficiently than people in order to free people to focus

on the aspects of command and control which require judgment and intuition. We may even use technology to assist us

in those human activities so long as we do not make the mistake of trying to replace the person who can think with the

machine that cannot.

Command and control equipment should help improve the

flow and value of information within the system. But as we

have said repeatedly, improving information is not simply a

matter of increasing volume; it is also a matter of quality,

timing, location, and form. To the greatest extent possible,

communications equipment should connect principals directly, minimizing the need for specialized operators. Ad136
MCDP 6 Creating Effective Command and Control

ditionally, equipment should minimize the input burden

placed on people; ideally, the input of information into the

system should be automatic. Last, but hardly least, technological developments should focus on presenting information

in a way that is most useful to humans—that is, in the form of

meaningful visual images rather than lists of data.

As with all the components of our command and control

support structure, our command and control equipment

should be consistent with our overall approach to command

and control. For example, equipment that facilitates or encourages the micromanagement of subordinate units is inconsistent with our command and control philosophy. Moreover,

such technological capability tends to fix the senior's attention at too low a level of detail. A regimental commander, for

example, does not as a rule need to keep track of the

movements of every squad (although with position-locating

technology it may be a temptation); a regimental commander

needs a more general appreciation for the flow of action.

Commanders who focus at too low a level of detail (whether

because the technology tempts them to or not) risk losing

sight of the larger picture.

The reality of technological development is that equipment

which improves the ability to monitor what is happening may

also increase the temptation and the means to try to direct

what is happening. Consequently, increased capability on the

part of equipment brings with it the need for increased understanding and discipline on the part of users. Just because our

137
Command and Control MCDP 6

technology allows us to micromanage does not mean that we

should.

CONCLUSION

Our approach to command and control recognizes and accepts

war as a complex, uncertain, disorderly, and time-competitive

clash of wills and seeks to provide the commander the best

means to win in that environment. We seek to exploit trust,

cooperation, judgment, focus, and implicit understanding to

lessen the effects of the uncertainty and friction that are consequences of war's nature. We rely on mission command and

control to provide the flexibility and responsiveness to deal

with uncertainty and to generate the tempo which we recognize is a key element of success in war. We focus on the

value and timeliness of information, rather than on the

amount, and on getting that information to the right people in

the right form. We seek to strike a workable balance among

people, procedures, and technology, but we recognize that our

greatest command and control resource is the common ethos

and the resulting bond shared by all Marines.

138
MCDP 6 Notes

Notes

Epigraphs: The quotation on page 33 is from Carl von Clausewitz,

On War, Book 1, chapter 6. The quotation on page 61 is from

Martin van Creveld, Command in War, p. 269. The quotation on

page 105 is from FMFM 1, Warfighting, p. 69.

The Nature of Command and Control

1. Command and control the business of the commander: In

Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms, defmed as: "The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in

the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions

are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,

communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces

and operations in the accomplishment of the mission."

2. Authority and responsibility: Henri Fayol, General and Industrial Management (Pitman Publishing Corp., 1949), pp. 2 1—22

3. The traditional view: Command in Joint Pub 1-02 is defmed as "the authority that a commander in the Military Service

lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of,

139
Command and Control MCDP 6

organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces

for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned

personnel." Control in Joint Pub 1-02 is defmed in our context as

"physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as directed."

4. Feedback as control: See Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics, or,

Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, 2d ed.

(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1962), pp. 95—115, and The Human

Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society (Boston: Houghton

Mifflin, 1950), pp. 12—15 and pp. 69—71. As applied to command

and control: See John R. Boyd, "An Organic Design for Command

and ControJ," A Discourse on Winning and Losing, unpublished lecture notes, 1987.

5. The illusion of being "in control": Peter M. Senge, The

Fffih Discipline: The Art and Practice of The Learning Organization (New York: Doubleday/Currency, 1990), pp. 190—193.

6. Command and control as a complex (adaptive) system: See

M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the

Edge of Order and Chaos (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992);

Roger Lewin, Complexity: Life on the Edge of Chaos (New York:

Macmillan, 1992); or Kevin Kelly, Out of Control: The New Biology of Machines: The Rise of Neo-Biological Civilization (Reading,

MA: Addison-Wesley, 1994). Also described as "far-fromequilibrium, nonlinear" systems in Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature (New

York: Bantam Books, 1984) and Gregoire Nicolis and Ilya Prigogi, Exploring Complexity: An Introduction (New York: W.H. Freeman & Co., 1989).
MCDP 6 Notes

7. "Success is not due simply to general causes . . . ": Carl

von Clausewitz, On War, trans by Michael Howard and Peter Paret

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 595.

8. "Organic" versus "mechanistic" systems: T. Burns,

"Mechanistic and Organismic Structures," in Derek Salman Pugh,

comp., Organization Theory. Selected Readings (Harmondsworth,

England: Penguin Books, 1971), pp. 43—55; David K. Banner and T.

Elaine Gagné, Designing Effective Organizations: Traditional &

Transformational Views (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications,

1995), pp. 152—194; Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1986).

9. "Command" and "control" as nouns and verbs: Thomas P.

Coakley, Command and Control for War and Peace (Washington:

NationalDefense University Press, 1992), p.17.

10. Information as a control parameter: Jeffrey R. Cooper,

"Reduced Instruction Set Combat: Processes & Modeling." Presentation given at Headquarters Marine Corps, 5 Jan 95.

11. Command and control support structure: In Joint Pub

1-02: "Command and control system—The facilities, equipment,

communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned."

12. Coakley, p. 17.

141
Command and Control MCDP 6

13. Uncertainty as the defming feature of command: See

Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1985), especially chapters 1 and 8.

14. "War is the realm of uncertainty . . .": Carl von

Clausewitz, On War, p. 101.

15. Uncertainty as doubt which blocks action: See Ra'anan

Lipshitz and Orna Strauss, "Coping with Uncertainty: A Naturalistic

Decision Making Analysis," unpublished paper, 1996.

Command and Control Theory

1. The OODA loop: John R. Boyd, "Patterns of Conflict" and

"An Organic Design for Command and Control," A Discourse on

Winning and Losing. The OODA loop is, naturally, a simplification

of the command and control process (since we have already described command and control as a process characterized by feedback and other complex interactions). It is not meant to provide a

complete description of the various phases and interactions, but

rather a basic conceptual model. Numerous individual interactions

take place within and among each of the four basic steps. Any effort

to divide a complex process like command and control into neat, sequential steps is necessarily going to be partly artificial. Various

other similar command and control models exist. We have selected

the Boyd model because it is widely known to many Marines.

See also William S. Lmd, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder,

CO: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 4—6.

142
MCDP 6 Notes

2. The information (cognitive) hierarchy: Jeffrey R. Cooper,

"The Coherent Battlefield—Removing the 'Fog of War.' "Unpublished paper, SRS Technologies, June 1993. Also Cooper, "Reduced

Instruction Set Combat: Processes and Modeling."

3. Not only do people think in images, they understand best

and are inspired most. . . : Thomas J. Peters, Thriving on Chaos:

Handbook for a Management Revolution (New York: Alfred A.

Knopf, 1988), p. 418.

4. Gavish: "There is no alternative. . .": quoted in Martin

van Creveld, Command in War, p. 199.

5. "Topsight": David Hillel Gelernter, Mirror Worlds, or,

The Day Software Puts the Universe in a Shoebox—How It Will Happen and What It Will Mean (New York: Oxford University Press,

1991), pp. 51—53. Gelernter argues that topsight is "the most precious intellectual commodity known to man.. . . It is the quality that

distinguishes genius in any field." (Italics in original.)

6. The directed telescope: Van Creveld, Command in War, p.

75 and pp. 255—57. See also Gary B. Griffm, The Directed Telescope: A Traditional Element of Effective Command, Combat Institute Studies Report No. 9 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies

Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1985).

7. Control as "coercive" or "spontaneous": Gregory D. Foster, "Contemporary C2 Theory and Research: the Failed Quest for a

Philosophy of Command," Defense Analysis, vol. 4, no. 3, September 1988, p. 21!.

143
Command and Control MCDP 6

8. Command by personal direction or detailed directives: See

Thomas J. Czerwinski, "Command and Control at the Crossroads,"

Marine Corps Gazette, October 1995.

9. Foster,p.211.

10. Authoritarian (Theory X) versus persuasive (Theory Y)

leadership: Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise (New

York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), chapters 3 and 4. Situational Leadership

Grid (telling, selling, participating, delegating) and follower maturity: Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Management of Organizational Behavior, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,

l972),p. 134.

11. Integrated teams (work groups): R. Likert, "The Principle

of Supportive Relationships," in Derek Salmon Pugh, comp., Organization Theory: Selected Readings (Harmondsworth, England:

Penguin Books, 1971), pp. 279-304. Figure 5 adapted from Likert,

p. 289.

12. Effective organizations characterized by intense communications: Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr., In Search

of Excellence (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), p. 122.

13. On the relative importance of verbal and nonverbal communication: Psychologist Dr. Albert Mehrabian has estimated that in

face-to-face conversation the actual meaning of words accounts for

a mere 7 percent of communication, nonverbal voice (such as tone,

volume, or inflection) accounts for 38 percent, and visible signals

(facial expression, body language, gestures, etc.) account for the re144
MCDP 6 Notes

maining 55 percent of the communication that takes place. Albert

Mehrabian, Nonverbal Communication (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton,

1972), p. 182.

14. Supply-push/demand-pull and "demand-cascade": James

P. Kahan, D. Robert Worley, and Cathleen Stasz, Understanding

Commanders' Information Needs (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1989), pp. 37—55.

15. The effects of uncertainty and time on decisionmaking:

John F. Schmitt, "Observations on Decisionmaking in Battle,"

Marine Corps Gazette, March 1988, pp. 18—19.

16. Intuitive (naturalistic) versus analytical decisionmaking:

Gary A. Klein, "Strategies of Decision Making," Military Review,

May 1989, and "Naturalistic Models of C3 Decision Making," in

Stuart E. Johnson, Alexander H. and Ilze S. Levis (eds.), Science of

Command and Control (Washington: AFCEA International Press,

1988).

17. "Satisfice" versus "optimize": Herbert A. Simon, "Rational choice and the structure of the environment," Psychological

Review, vol. 63, 1956, pp. 129—138.

18. Intuitive decisionmaking more appropriate for the vast majority of tactical/operational decisions: A 1989 study by Gary A.

Klein (based on 1985 observations) estimated that decision makers

in a variety of disciplines use intuitive methods 87 percent of the

time and analytical methods 13 percent of the time. Evidence now

suggests that this study was actually biased in favor of analysis.

More recent studies estimate the breakdown at more nearly 95 percent intuitive to 5 percent analytical. G. A. Klein, "Recognition145
Command and Control MCDP 6

Primed Decisions" in William B. Rouse (ed.), Advances in ManMachine System Research (Greenwich, CT: Jai Press, 1989); G.

L. Kaempf, S. Wolf, M. L. Thordsen, and G. Klein, Decision Making in the Aegis Combat Information Center (Fairbom, OH: Klein

Associates, 1992); R. Pascual and S. Henderson, "Evidence of Naturalistic Decision Making in Command and Control" in C. Zsambok

and G. Klein (eds.), Naturalistic Decision Making, forthcoming

publication (Hilisdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates); Kathleen Louise Mosier, Decision Making in the Air Transport Flight

Deck: Process and Product, unpublished dissertation (Berkeley,

CA: University of California, 1990).

Creating Effective Command and Control

1. All commanders in their own spheres. . . : Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the German General Staff(Westrninster: A. Constable, 1895), p. 106.

2. Initiative as a source of energy in crisis: Fayol, General and

Industrial Management, p. 39.

3. Implicit understanding and communication: Boyd, "An Organic Design for Command and Control," p. 18.

4. "A good plan violently executed . . .": George S. Patton,

WarAs We Knew It (New York: Bantam Books, 1980), p. 335.

5. Hybrid information management: Kahan, et al., Understanding Commanders'Information Needs, pp. 66-67.

146
MCDP 6 Notes

6. The purpose of procedures "not to restrict human judgment

.": Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Sw/i: Thoughts on TwentyFirst Century Warfare (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers,

1985), p. 239.

7. "A bulky staff implies. . .": William 1. Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman (New York: Da Capo Press,

1984), p. 402.

147

GPO 1996 — 171—637 QL 3