Filed 5/12/16 White v. County of Los Angeles CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

SUSAN WHITE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 B254503

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BS140506)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Luis A. 

Lavin, Judge. Affirmed.

Mark J. Saladino, County Counsel, Joyce Aiello, Assistant County Counsel, Julie 

A. Dixon, Deputy County Counsel; Housman & Sosa, Jeffrey M. Hausman, and Larry D. 

Stratton for Defendants and Appellants.

Green & Shinee, Richard A. Shinee, and Audra C. Call for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

____________________________
2

Under Government Code section 3305, which is part of the Public Safety Officers 

Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA), a public safety officer has the right to review 

and respond to “any comment adverse to his interest entered in his personnel file, or any 

other file used for any personnel purposes by his employer.” Respondent Susan White, a 

senior district attorney investigator, filed this mandamus action against appellant County 

of Los Angeles and other entities and individuals,1 alleging that they violated the POBRA

by failing to disclose memoranda that White’s supervisors had prepared and submitted to 

their superiors regarding their concerns about White’s psychological condition and fitness 

for duty. The trial court concluded that the County violated Government Code section 

3305 in failing to disclose the memoranda and issued a writ of mandate that, among other 

directives, enjoined the County from using the memoranda as a basis for ordering White 

to undergo a medical reevaluation to assess her fitness for duty. The trial court also 

awarded attorney’s fees to White under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The 

County challenges both orders on appeal. We affirm. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

I. White’s Employment as a Senior District Attorney Investigator

White was employed as a senior district attorney investigator for the Los Angeles 

County District Attorney’s Office (DA) and was assigned to the DA’s Bureau of 

Investigation in the Major Fraud Section. In that capacity, White was a peace officer 

pursuant to Penal Code section 830.1. The essential functions of her position included 

personally serving arrest warrants, making arrests, interrogating suspects, and booking 

prisoners. During the relevant time period, White’s direct supervisor was Terisa Carver, 

 

1 For the sake of convenience, we shall collectively refer to the defendants named in 

White’s petition for writ of mandate as “the County.”

2 White previously filed a petition for writ of mandate against the County, which 

was the subject of an appeal before Division Three of this court. (White v. County of Los 

Angeles (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 690 (White I).) A portion of the factual and procedural 

background in the present appeal is taken from this prior opinion. 
3

the Supervising Investigator in the Major Fraud Section. Carver in turn reported to Kris 

Carter, a Lieutenant in the Major Fraud Section and White’s second-level supervisor. 

In late 2009, White began experiencing emotional difficulties. She was observed 

by both her supervisors and coworkers acting erratically in the workplace, exhibiting 

dramatic emotional highs and lows. Beginning in April 2010, Carver and Carter 

documented their observations and concerns about White’s workplace behavior in a 

series of confidential memoranda addressed to their superiors—Alan Jarvis, Captain of 

the Fraud and Corporate Division, and Dominick Rivetti, Chief of the DA’s Bureau of 

Investigation.3 The memoranda were never placed in White’s personnel file, and she had 

no knowledge of their existence at the time they were prepared by her supervisors and 

submitted to upper management at the DA’s Bureau of Investigation. 

The memoranda set forth specific instances where White had exhibited poor 

judgment or unprofessional conduct in the performance of her job duties. For instance, 

the memoranda described two incidents where White made poor tactical decisions during 

the execution of a search warrant by suddenly changing her position without warning to 

her team members, which jeopardized her safety. The memoranda also described an 

incident where White lost her composure and acted unprofessionally while testifying at 

trial in a criminal case, and was later accused by the defendant’s attorneys of committing 

perjury. In addition, the memoranda detailed many of the personal observations made by 

White’s supervisors and coworkers about her behavior. White’s coworkers reported that 

they had observed her on several occasions crying, shaking uncontrollably, slurring her 

speech, and appearing to be under the influence of a controlled substance. Carver and 

Carter recounted instances where White reported to work with unexplained physical 

injuries, exhibited drastic mood swings, and expressed difficulty coping with problems in 

 

3 These memoranda consisted of the following: (1) an April 21, 2010 memorandum 

from Carter to Jarvis, (2) an April 22, 2010 memorandum from Carter to Rivetti, (3) an 

April 22, 2010 memorandum from Carver to Rivetti, (4) a May 7, 2010 memorandum 

from Carter to Rivetti, and (5) a May 31, 2011 memorandum from Carver to Rivetti.
4

her personal life. In these memoranda, Carver and Carter advised their superiors that 

they believed White was experiencing emotional or psychological issues that were

interfering with her ability to perform her job duties, and that they were concerned White 

could pose a risk of harm to herself or others.

II. The DA’s Efforts to Require White to Appear for a Medical Reevaluation

In May 2011, White went on a medical leave of absence under the federal Family 

Care and Medical Leave Act (FMLA; 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.), which grants eligible 

employees 12 weeks of leave due to a serious health condition that renders the employee 

unable to perform the functions of the job. Upon the expiration of White’s FMLA leave, 

she was placed on an authorized unpaid medical leave at the request of her treating 

physician. On September 7, 2011, after White’s physician released her to return to work, 

White was placed on a paid administrative leave pending an internal investigation into 

allegations of misconduct. The DA later sought to compel White to submit to a medical 

reevaluation regarding her fitness for duty.

Pursuant to Los Angeles County Civil Service Rule 9.07, the DA was required to 

obtain the consent of the Occupational Health Programs (OHP), a division within the 

County’s Chief Executive Office, before it could order White to undergo a medical 

reevaluation. On December 7, 2011, George Mueller, Assistant Chief of the Bureau of 

Investigation, submitted a written request to Dr. Sepideh Souris, Chief of Psychological 

Services at OHP, seeking OHP’s consent for an order compelling White to appear for a 

medical reevaluation. According to Mueller, beginning in early 2010, he became aware 

of concerns about White’s emotional and psychological condition, including incidents of 

erratic behavior, which he believed affected whether White could safely and effectively 

perform her job duties. Mueller specifically became aware of the memoranda that Carver 

and Carter had submitted to their superiors about White’s behavior. After consulting 

with Chief Rivetti, Mueller decided to seek a medical reevaluation of White because he 

was concerned whether White could safely discharge her duties as a peace officer based 

on the information he had received. In his request to OHP, Mueller did not attach copies 
5

of the memoranda prepared by White’s supervisors. However, in a seven-page letter, 

Mueller provided a detailed account of White’s workplace behavior over the prior two 

years, including an almost verbatim description of many of the incidents documented by 

White’s supervisors in their memoranda.

After reviewing Mueller’s December 7, 2011 letter, Dr. Souris consented to the 

DA’s request for an order compelling White to appear for a medical reevaluation. 

According to Dr. Souris, Mueller’s letter detailed the factual basis for the OHP’s decision 

to provide consent for the order. The DA thereafter ordered White to appear for a 

medical reevaluation scheduled for January 27, 2012, and advised her that if she failed to 

appear, it might be cause for disciplinary action. When White did not appear for the 

appointment, the DA informed her that her failure to appear was an act of insubordination 

that subjected her to discipline and that her appointment had been rescheduled for 

February 28, 2012. The DA again advised White that a failure to appear might be cause 

for disciplinary action. White did not, however, intend to appear, believing that the

medical reevaluation had been ordered in violation of her rights under the FMLA. 

III. White Files an Action Under the FMLA Based on the County’s Order for a

Medical Reevaluation

On February 23, 2012, White filed the action in White I, seeking injunctive relief 

or writ of mandate to prohibit the County from requiring her to appear for the medical 

reevaluation, or from disciplining her for failing to appear. White argued that ordering 

her to submit to a medical reevaluation violated her right under the FMLA to be restored 

to employment based solely on her physician’s certification that she was able to return to 

work. In May 2012, the County filed an opposition to White’s request for a permanent 

injunction and writ of mandate, and supported its opposition with declarations from 

several individuals, including Carver, Carter, Rivetti, and Mueller. The County also 

attached as exhibits to the declarations copies of the memoranda that Carver and Carter

had prepared and submitted to their superiors about White’s behavior. Upon receipt of 

the County’s opposition, White’s counsel provided the documents to White. This was the 
6

first time that White saw the memoranda from her supervisors or became aware of the 

existence of such documents. 

The trial court in White I issued a permanent injunction and writ of mandate 

prohibiting the County from requiring a medical reevaluation of White based on her 

conduct prior to September 7, 2011, or from charging White with insubordination for 

failing to comply with the reevaluation. The trial court also awarded attorney’s fees to 

White under the FMLA. The County filed an appeal in White I. 

In a published decision, the Division Three of this court reversed the judgment and 

order for attorney’s fees in favor of White, and remanded the matter to the trial court with 

directions to dissolve the injunction, discharge the writ of mandate, and enter judgment in 

favor of the County. (White I, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 708.) The court held that, 

once an employee has been returned to work as required by the FMLA, an employer is 

not prohibited by the FMLA from requiring a medical reevaluation related to the serious 

health condition for which the employee was granted FMLA leave. (Id. at p. 701.) The 

court concluded that, because White was in fact returned to work and then placed on a 

paid administrative leave, the County did not violate the FMLA in requiring White to 

submit to a medical reevaluation regarding her fitness for duty. (Id. at p. 707.) 

IV. White Files The Present Action Under The POBRA Based on the County’s 

Failure to Disclose Adverse Comments in the Memoranda

On November 21, 2012, White filed the present action against the County, seeking 

a writ of mandate and other relief arising out of the County’s use of the five memoranda 

prepared by Carver and Carter and the December 7, 2011 letter from Mueller to OHP. In 

a first amended petition, White alleged that the County’s reliance on the memoranda as a 

basis for requiring her to submit to a medical reevaluation violated Government Code 

sections 3305, 3306, and 3306.5 because White was never shown the documents or given

an opportunity to respond to their contents. White sought injunctive relief under 

Government Code section 3309.5 and issuance of a writ of mandate under Code of Civil 

Procedure section 1085, and specifically requested that the County be ordered to delete 
7

the documents from any file used for personnel purposes and to refrain from using any

adverse comments in the documents for any purpose against her. White also sought

statutory penalties for each adverse comment in the documents under Government Code 

section 3309.5, and requested attorney’s fees under Government Code section 3309.5 and 

Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. 

On October 21, 2013, the County filed an opposition to White’s petition for writ of 

mandate. Among other arguments, the County contended that the only relief afforded 

under the relevant provisions of the POBRA was the right to obtain disclosure of certain 

documents and an opportunity to place responses in the personnel file, and that the 

documents at issue in this case were disclosed to White in the prior action and White 

failed to avail herself of the opportunity to comment on them. The County also argued 

that the POBRA does not require disclosure of internal confidential communications 

among an employee’s supervisors about the need for the employee to undergo a medical 

reevaluation, and that the documents in this case were not used to determine White’s 

qualifications for employment because OHP, the agency responsible for conducting a 

medical reevaluation, was never provided with any of the documents. 

In a supporting declaration, Mueller stated that the memoranda were prepared by 

Carver and Carter as part of their supervisory responsibilities solely “to communicate the 

important issue of Ms. White’s psychological status and condition to upper 

management.” Mueller also stated that the memoranda “were used as the factual basis 

for the DA’s request to [OHP], seeking OHP’s consent for White’s reevaluation,” and 

“were an integral part of the DA’s request.” Mueller asserted that the memoranda were 

never placed in White’s personnel file, but rather were retained in the “Supervisor’s 

Working File, which was not used, and was not intended for use, in determining 

Ms. White’s qualifications for employment, promotion, additional compensation or 

termination, or any disciplinary action.”4 Mueller further noted that, since White became 

 

4 The declarations submitted by Carver, Carter, Rivetti, and Mueller in White I

similarly stated the memoranda were prepared solely for the purpose of communicating 
8

aware of the memoranda during the prior action, she had not made any request to review 

the documents or to respond to any comments contained therein. 

Dr. Souris also submitted a declaration supporting the County’s opposition to the

petition for writ of mandate. Dr. Souris explained that, in determining whether a peace 

officer meets the necessary psychological standards of the job position, “OHP considers 

the department’s request for reevaluation such as that sent by Mr. Mueller as one part of 

its evaluation,” but OHP “makes an independent determination, and it includes the review 

by its own medical professionals.” Dr. Souris also stated that, once a psychological 

reevaluation is completed, OHP “will recommend to the department a variety of possible 

actions,” which “are based solely upon the result of the reevaluation, and may for 

instance include no action, modification of assignment, or reassignment.” Dr. Souris 

confirmed that Mueller’s letter requesting consent for a medical reevaluation of White

did not include any of the memoranda prepared by her supervisors, and that OHP did not 

receive or consider such documents in consenting to the reevaluation.

On December 3, 2013, the trial court granted White’s petition for writ of mandate. 

The court concluded that the County had violated Government Code section 3305 in 

failing to disclose the memoranda to White because the documents contained adverse 

comments about White’s fitness for duty and were used for personnel purposes when the 

DA requested OHP’s consent to ordering a medical reevaluation for White. The court 

found that the fact that OHP consents to and conducts the medical reevaluation of an 

employee did not affect the application of the statute because the DA was the entity 

seeking to require White to submit to a medical reevaluation, and the memoranda formed 

the factual basis of the DA’s request to OHP for such consent. The court further 

concluded that White’s available remedies were not limited to reviewing and responding 

to adverse comments in the memoranda within 30 days of their disclosure, and that White 

 

concerns about White’s psychological condition to superiors within the DA’s Bureau 

of Investigation, and that the memoranda were never used, or intended to be used, 

“to determine Ms. White’s qualifications for employment, promotion, additional 

compensation, termination, or disciplinary action.” 
9

was entitled to seek injunctive relief under Government Code section 3309.5 to remedy 

the violation and to prevent future violations of a similar nature. The court concluded, 

however, that White was not entitled to recover statutory penalties or attorney’s fees 

under Government Code section 3309.5 because she had not established that the County 

acted with malice in creating and maintaining the memoranda. 

Based on its findings and conclusions, the trial court issued a peremptory writ of 

mandate that (1) ordered the County to allow White to note her agreement or objection to 

the comments and memoranda at issue; (2) enjoined the County from requiring White to 

undergo a future medical reevaluation based on the challenged adverse comments and 

memoranda or White’s responses to them; and (3) enjoined the County from retaliating 

against White based on the adverse comments and memoranda or White’s responses to 

them, unless the responses reflect a danger to White, the County, or members of the 

public. The court denied White’s request for statutory penalties and attorney’s fees under 

Government Code section 3309.5. The court also denied the request for attorney’s fees 

under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, but without prejudice to a noticed motion 

for attorney’s fees being made after judgment was entered. 

On February 24, 2014, following the entry of judgment, White filed a motion for 

attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. White sought attorney’s 

fees in the amount of $31,625, asserting that the writ proceeding arose directly from 

White’s exercise of her rights under the POBRA, that White had prevailed on the merits 

of the action, and that the trial court’s ruling in the action had conferred a significant 

benefit on the general public or a large class of persons. On May 13, 2014, the trial court 

granted White’s motion for attorney’s fees. The court found that the action had enforced 

an important right affecting the public interest because it required interpretation of the 

POBRA and the Los Angeles County Civil Service Rules regarding the County’s duty to 

disclose documents that may serve as a basis for affecting a police officer’s employment 

status, which was a matter of concern to all peace officers subject to the POBRA or 

discipline under the County’s civil service rules. The trial court awarded White $30,845

in attorney’s fees and $812.50 in costs.
10

The County filed an appeal from the judgment entered in White’s favor on her 

petition for writ of mandate, and an appeal from the post-judgment order awarding White 

attorney’s fees and costs.

5

 On July 8, 2014, during the pendency of the appeals, White 

voluntarily resigned from her employment with the County. 

DISCUSSION

On appeal, the County challenges the trial court’s order granting White’s petition 

for writ of mandate, arguing that the County did not violate the POBRA in failing to 

disclose the memoranda concerning White’s fitness for duty and that the injunctive relief 

ordered by the trial court was vague and improper. The County also challenges the trial 

court’s order awarding attorney’s fees to White under Code of Civil Procedure section 

1021.5, asserting that White failed to satisfy the criteria for attorney’s fees under the 

statute and the amount of the award was excessive. 

I. Mootness

As a preliminary matter, we address the County’s argument that its appeal from 

the judgment entered in White’s favor has been rendered moot because White voluntarily 

resigned from her employment with the County while the appeal was pending. The 

County has not requested that its appeal be dismissed, but rather urges us to reverse the 

judgment and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to dismiss the action

filed by White. White, on the other hand, asserts that the appeal should not be considered 

moot because the issues raised in the action concern matters of public interest that are 

likely to recur. White also contends that, if the matter is moot, the proper remedy would 

be to dismiss the County’s appeal, not the underlying action.

As a general rule, an appellate court only decides actual controversies. It is not 

the function of the appellate court to render opinions “‘“‘upon moot questions or abstract 

propositions, or . . . declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in 

 

5 At the County’s request, these appeals have been consolidated.
11

issue in the case before it.’”’” (Giles v. Horn (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 206, 227.) “‘“‘It 

necessarily follows that when, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and 

without any fault of the defendant, an event occurs which renders it impossible for this 

court, if it should decide the case in favor of the plaintiff, to grant him any effectual relief 

whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal.’” 

[Citations.]’” (Ibid.; see also Lincoln Place Tenants Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 

155 Cal.App.4th 425, 454 [“case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical 

effect or cannot provide the parties with effective relief”].) 

The County filed appeals from two separate orders: (1) the judgment entered in 

White’s favor on the petition for writ of mandate; and (2) the post-judgment award of 

attorney’s fees to White under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The trial court 

awarded attorney’s fees to White as the prevailing party in the action, and her subsequent

resignation does not change that status. Moreover, in reviewing the attorney’s fees

award, we must address the merits of her writ petition because “‘the propriety of the trial 

court’s ruling on the merits of the action determines whether [the plaintiff] was eligible 

for an award of attorney fees [under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5] as the 

successful party.’” (Indio Police Command Unit Assn. v. City of Indio (2014) 230 

Cal.App.4th 521, 534; see also Save Our Residential Environment v. City of West 

Hollywood (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1745, 1750-1751 [where award of attorney’s fees under 

Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 “depends on the propriety of the trial court’s 

ruling on the merits of the action, the appeal is not moot”].) In addition, we agree with 

White that the question of whether the POBRA requires a law enforcement agency to 

disclose to a peace officer internal memoranda concerning his or her fitness for duty 

raises an issue of continuing public interest that is likely to recur. (Building a Better 

Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852, 867 [“[w]hen an 

action involves a matter of continuing public interest that is likely to recur, a court may 

exercise an inherent discretion to resolve that issue, even if an event occurring during the 

pendency of the appeal normally would render the matter moot”].)
12

However, although we are exercising our discretion to address whether the County 

violated the POBRA in failing to disclose the challenged memoranda to White, we 

decline to consider whether the injunctive relief ordered by the trial court to remedy the 

alleged violation was proper. In issuing the writ of mandate, the trial court ordered the 

County to allow White to respond to the adverse comments contained in the memoranda, 

enjoined the County from requiring White to undergo a future medical reevaluation based 

on the adverse comments in the memoranda or White’s responses to them, and enjoined 

the County from retaliating against White based on the adverse comments or White’s 

responses, unless the responses reflected a danger to White, the County, or members of 

the public. The injunctive relief ordered by the trial court thus related directly to the 

employment relationship between the County and White going forward. Given that 

White is no longer employed by the County, the question of whether the scope of 

injunctive relief ordered was appropriate has been rendered moot. 

II. Writ of Mandate for Violation of the POBRA

A. Standard of Review

“In reviewing a trial court’s decision on a petition for writ of mandate, we uphold 

the trial court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] We, 

however, independently review the court’s decisions on questions of law, including the 

trial court’s interpretation of statutory language, such as POBRA. [Citations.]” (Barber 

v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 638, 644.) In 

cases where “‘the facts are undisputed and the issue involves statutory interpretation, we 

exercise our independent judgment and review the matter de novo. [Citation.]’ 

[Citation.]” (McMahon v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1331.)

The rules governing statutory interpretation are well-settled. “‘“[W]e begin with 

the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and 

usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context. . . .” [Citations.] The plain 

meaning controls if there is no ambiguity in the statutory language.’ [Citation.] In 

interpreting a statutory provision, ‘our task is to select the construction that comports 
13

most closely with the Legislature’s apparent intent, with a view to promoting rather than 

defeating the statutes’ general purpose, and to avoid a construction that would lead to 

unreasonable, impractical, or arbitrary results.’ [Citation.]” (Poole v. Orange County 

Fire Authority (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1378, 1384-1395 (Poole).)

B. Violation of Government Code Section 3305

The POBRA provides public safety officers with certain rights concerning their 

employment, including rights with respect to their personnel files. Government Code 

section 3305 states, in pertinent part, that “[n]o public safety officer shall have any 

comment adverse to his interest entered in his personnel file, or any other file used for 

any personnel purposes by his employer, without the public safety officer having first 

read and signed the instrument containing the adverse comment indicating he is aware of 

such comment.” Section 3306 provides that “[a] public safety officer shall have 30 days 

within which to file a written response to any adverse comment entered in his personnel 

file,” and that “[s]uch written response shall be attached to, and shall accompany, the 

adverse comment.” Section 3306.5 entitles a public safety officer, upon reasonable 

request, “to inspect personnel files that are used or have been used to determine that 

officer’s qualifications for employment, promotion, additional compensation, or 

termination or other disciplinary action.”

Section 3309.5 of the Government Code sets forth the remedies available to a 

public safety officer for a violation of one or more of these provisions. Subdivision (c) of 

the statute provides that “[i]n any case where the superior court finds that a public safety 

department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render 

appropriate injunctive or other extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent 

future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a 

temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting 

the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety 

officer.” (Gov. Code, § 3309.5, subd. (c).)
14

In County of Riverside v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 793 (Riverside), the 

California Supreme Court addressed the scope of documents subject to disclosure under 

Government Code section 3305. The Court specifically considered whether a law 

enforcement agency must disclose to a probationary peace officer confidential documents 

that were prepared in the course of a routine background investigation of the officer for 

the purpose of determining whether to continue his employment. The Court concluded 

the language of the POBRA should be construed broadly to include any document that 

“‘“may serve as a basis for affecting the status of [a peace officer’s] employment,”’”

regardless of whether it is kept in a file separate from the officer’s personnel file. (Id. at 

p. 802.) In “reject[ing] the assertion that a law enforcement agency’s background 

investigation of a peace officer during probationary employment is somehow not a 

personnel matter subject to the [POBRA],” the Court reasoned that the materials in the 

file at issue “unquestionably ‘“may serve as a basis for affecting the status of the

employee’s employment”’ [citation]; indeed, that is the very purpose of the background 

investigation.” (Ibid.) The Court further concluded that where “the adverse comments 

arise out of an investigation, the very purpose of which was to assess the employee’s 

qualifications for continued employment, . . . the [POBRA] applies, whether or not the 

comments are prepared and filed prior to termination.” (Id. at p. 803.)

More recently, the California Supreme Court considered the meaning and scope of 

Government Code section 3255, a provision in the Firefighters Procedural Bill of Rights 

Act (FBRA; Gov. Code § 3250 et seq.) that is substantially similar to the POBRA 

provision at issue here.

6

(Poole, supra, 61 Cal.4th 1378.) In Poole, the Supreme Court 

 

6 Government Code section 3255 provides that “[a] firefighter shall not have any 

comment adverse to his or her interest entered in his or her personnel file, or any other 

file used for any personnel purposes by his or her employer, without the firefighter 

having first read and signed the instrument containing the adverse comment indicating 

he or she is aware of the comment.” As the Supreme Court observed, this statute “is 

virtually identical to [the] statute applicable to public safety officers ([Gov. Code,] 

§ 3305), and it establishes rights regarding adverse comments that are very similar 

to those that have been granted to teachers. (Ed. Code, § 44031, subd. (b)(1).) 
15

addressed whether Government Code section 3255 provides an employee with “the right 

to review and respond to negative comments in a supervisor’s daily log, consisting of 

notes that memorialize the supervisor’s thoughts and observations concerning an 

employee, which the supervisor uses as a memory aid in preparing performance plans 

and reviews.” (Id. at p. 1382.) In that case, the supervisor and author of the daily log 

was the only person who had access to it. Although the supervisor discussed some of the 

incidents described in the log with his superiors, he did not permit them to review the log 

itself. Additionally, to the extent that the supervisor used any of the adverse comments 

contained in the log in reviewing the employee’s performance, those comments were 

disclosed to the employee as part of a performance plan or review before being entered 

into his personnel file. (Id. at p. 1384.) The question before the Supreme Court was 

whether “negative comments contained in a document memorializing a supervisor’s own

thoughts and observations that is not itself made available to or shared with anyone else” 

constitutes a “file ‘used for any personnel purposes by his or her employer.’” (Ibid.)

In construing the scope of Government Code section 3255, the Supreme Court in 

Poole determined that “the Legislature was not concerned with any and all files that 

might in some sense be connected with personnel matters; the Legislature was, rather, 

specifically concerned with ‘personnel files that are used or have been used to determine 

th[e] firefighter’s qualifications for employment, promotion, additional compensation, or 

termination or other disciplinary action.” (Poole, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 1385-1386.) 

The Court thus concluded that the statutory phrase “‘any other file used for any personnel 

purposes by his or her employer’ . . . should be interpreted to encompass any written or 

computerized record that, although not designated a personnel file, . . . may be used by 

the employer to make decisions about promotion, discipline, compensation, and the like.” 

(Id. at p. 1386.) The Court further concluded that, as recognized in cases applying the 

POBRA and other similar statutes, “a document containing adverse comments may come 

 

Consequently, cases interpreting those statutes are relevant to [the] interpretation 

of [Government Code] section 3255.” (Poole, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1386, fn. 2.) 
16

within the disclosure requirement even if not formally entered into the official personnel 

file, if the document was either (1) maintained in such a manner that it would be available 

to those making personnel decisions in the future, or (2) was actually used by the 

employer in making a personnel decision, or both.” (Id. at p. 1387.) Applying this 

statutory interpretation to the case before it, the Court in Poole held that “because the log 

was not shared with or available to anyone other than the supervisor who wrote the log, it 

does not constitute a file ‘used for any personnel purposes by his or her employer’ and

[Government Code] section 3255 does not apply.” (Id. at p. 1381.)

In reaching its holding in Poole, the Supreme Court found its prior decision in 

Miller v. Chico Unified School Dist. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 703 (Miller) distinguishable. In

Miller, the Court held that, under Education Code section 44031, a school principal was 

entitled to review and respond to “derogatory written material compiled and maintained 

by a school district even though the material has not been properly placed in his 

personnel file” because it had been used by the school board in its decision to transfer the 

principal to a teaching position. (Id. at p. 707.) The principal’s supervisor had used his 

“‘personal notes and calendar’” to dictate a summary of “‘meetings, contacts, 

occurrences, and events’” involving the principal, which were then transcribed into 20 

memoranda that were submitted to the school board for its use in deciding whether to 

reassign the principle to a teaching position. (Id. at p. 711.) The school board “received 

[these] confidential memoranda without first allowing [the principal] the opportunity to 

correct any inaccurate derogatory information contained therein.” (Id. at p. 714.) The 

Court in Miller rejected the school board’s argument that these memoranda were never 

“‘entered or filed’” in the principal’s personnel file, concluding that an employer “may 

not avoid the requirements of the statute by maintaining a ‘personnel file’ for certain 

documents relating to an employee,” while “segregating elsewhere under a different 

label materials which may serve as a basis for affecting the status of the employee’s 

employment.” (Id. at pp. 712-713.) In distinguishing Miller, the Court in Poole noted 

that the adverse comments in Miller were contained in documents available to those 

making personnel decisions about the principal. (Poole, supra, at p. 1389.) In contrast, 
17

the supervisor in Poole “did not share his log with anyone; he merely discussed with 

others some of the incidents that he had observed and also recorded in his log.” (Ibid.) 

Because “there was no evidence that [the] log would be available to anyone making 

personnel decisions in the future,” it did not fall within the scope of the statute. (Ibid.)

Applying the reasoning in Riverside, Poole, and Miller to the present case, we 

conclude that the memoranda that were prepared by White’s supervisors and submitted to 

their superiors regarding their observations and concerns about White’s fitness for duty

constituted a file that was “used for any personnel purposes by [the] employer” within the 

meaning of Government Code section 3305. It is undisputed that the memoranda were 

transmitted to members of upper management at the DA’s Bureau of Investigation. 

Accordingly, as in Riverside and Miller, the documents were available to individuals with 

the authority to make personnel decisions about White’s employment status, including 

decisions about her qualifications for employment, promotion, compensation, and 

discipline. It is also undisputed that the memoranda were actually used by management

in making a formal request to OHP for consent to ordering White to submit to a medical 

reevaluation. Indeed, Mueller specifically stated in his declaration that the memoranda 

“were used as the factual basis for the DA’s request to [OHP]” and “were an integral part 

of the DA’s request.” Dr. Souris likewise stated in a declaration that Mueller’s December 

7, 2011 letter, which summarized the contents of the memoranda, “detail[ed] the factual 

basis ultimately leading to [Dr. Souris] providing the DA with OHP’s ‘consent’” to order

White’s reevaluation. The fact that Dr. Souris did not receive copies of the memoranda 

with the DA’s request is not determinative of whether these documents came within the 

scope of Government Code section 3305. The disclosure required by the statute was 

triggered when White’s supervisors, Carter and Carver, transmitted the memoranda to 

upper management at the Bureau of Investigation, who could then use the memoranda to 

seek consent for ordering a medical reevaluation of White or to make other personnel 

decisions affecting White’s employment status.
18

The County argues that the memoranda were not subject to disclosure under 

Government Code section 3305 because they were not actually used to determine White’s 

qualifications for employment, promotion, compensation, or disciplinary action, but 

rather were used for the sole purpose of communicating matters of concern about White’s 

psychological condition to upper management. However, the DA based its decision to 

seek a medical reevaluation for White on the information detailed in the memoranda 

about White’s psychological condition, and as the trial court observed, the results of a 

peace officer’s medical reevaluation can lead to significant changes in his or her

employment status. Under the Los Angeles County Civil Service Rules, an employee 

who is found to be partially or fully incapacitated following a medical reevaluation may 

be subject to a range of employment actions, including a modification of duties, a change 

of classification or reduction in position, or termination if there is no suitable position 

that the employee can perform satisfactorily. (L.A. County Civil Service Rules, rule 

9.08.) Because Government Code section 3305 applies to any document that “‘“may 

serve as a basis for affecting the status of [a peace officer’s] employment”’” (Riverside, 

supra, 27 Cal. 4th at p. 802), White had the right to review and respond to documents that 

formed the basis of the DA’s request for a medical reevaluation. 

The County also asserts that the memoranda could not have been used to affect 

White’s employment status because she failed to comply with the DA’s order to appear 

for her medical reevaluation. However, even if the reevaluation ordered for White did 

not result in any change in her employment status due to her refusal to appear, the 

memoranda would have remained available to upper management at the Bureau of 

Investigation, and thus, could have been used in future personnel decisions affecting 

White’s employment. As the Court of Appeal observed in Sacramento Police Officers 

Assn. v. Venegas (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 916 (Venegas), “the broad language employed 

by the Legislature in sections 3305 and 3306 does not limit their reach to comments that 

have resulted in, or will result in, punitive action against an officer. . . . [E]ven though an 

adverse comment does not directly result in punitive action, it has the potential of 

creating an adverse impression that could influence future personnel decisions concerning 
19

an officer, including decisions that do not constitute discipline or punitive action.” (Id. at 

p. 926.) Therefore, “regardless of whether the employing agency contemplates or has 

rejected further action regarding an adverse comment made against a peace officer 

employee, the officer is entitled to disclosure of the comment if it is entered in an 

agency file used for a personnel purpose.” (Ibid.; see also Seligsohn v. Day (2004) 121 

Cal.App.4th 518, 530 [in determining whether a document is subject to disclosure under 

Government Code section 3305, “what is relevant is not whether the document will serve

or has served as a basis for disciplinary action but whether it may serve such a 

function”].)

The County further contends that the memoranda did not fall within the scope of 

Government Code section 3305 because the documents were deemed “confidential” and 

maintained in a separate “Supervisor’s Working File” rather than in White’s personnel 

file. In support of this claim, the County notes under Government Code section 3303, 

which prescribes the protections that apply when a peace officer is subject to certain 

administrative interrogations, an officer is entitled to “any reports or complaints made 

by investigators or other persons, except those which are deemed by the investigating 

agency to be confidential.” (Gov. Code, § 3303, subd. (g).) However, as the Court of 

Appeal recognized in Venegas, Government Code section 3303, subdivision (g) “does 

not give [an employer] an absolute right to deem any and all information confidential and 

to assert such confidentiality against any and all requests for access. It applies in the 

circumstances set forth in [Government Code] section 3303, i.e., with respect to the 

interrogation of a peace officer under investigation.” (Venegas, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 923.) Because the County did not seek to withhold the memoranda during the 

course of an administrative interrogation of White, the confidentiality limitation set forth

in Government Code section 3303 does not apply. Additionally, the fact that the County 

maintained the memoranda in a separate file labeled “Supervisor’s Working File” is of no 

import. As the Supreme Court succinctly stated in Riverside, “the label placed on the . . . 

file is irrelevant.” (Riverside, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 802; see also Venegas, supra, at 

p. 928 [“the law does not permit a law enforcement agency to shield [an adverse]
20

comment from a peace officer employee by purporting to segregate it from other 

personnel files”]; Aguilar v. Johnson (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 241, 251 [“compliance with 

Government Code sections 3305 and 3306 is not excused simply because the complaint is 

placed in a file separate from the personnel file”].) Instead, the relevant inquiry is 

whether the document “was actually used by the employer in making a personnel 

decision” or “maintained in such a manner that it would be available to those making 

personnel decisions in the future.” (Poole, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1387.) Given that the 

memoranda were prepared for and transmitted to upper management at the DA’s Bureau 

of Investigation, the documents inarguably would be available to those making personnel 

decisions about White’s employment status in the future.

The County claims that, even if the memoranda were subject to disclosure under 

Government Code section 3305, White is not entitled to seek any relief under the statute 

because she received copies of the memoranda during the course of White I and did not 

file a response to any adverse comments contained in the documents within 30 days of 

her receipt, as required by Government Code section 3306. This argument is unavailing. 

Government Code section 3305 provides an employee with the right to review an adverse

comment before that comment is entered into a file used for personnel purposes. (Gov. 

Code, § 3305 [“[n]o public safety officer shall have any comment adverse to his interest 

entered in . . . any other file used for any personnel purposes by his employer, without the 

public safety officer having first read and signed the instrument containing the adverse 

comment”]; see also Poole, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1390 [timing requirement in FBRA 

provision requiring disclosure of adverse comments in file used for personnel purposes 

“is the requirement that the employee have the opportunity to review the adverse 

comment before it is actually entered into the file”].) In this case, it is undisputed that the 

memoranda were not disclosed to White before they were placed in the “Supervisor’s 

Working File,” submitted to upper management at the DA’s Bureau of Investigation, 

or used by the DA as the basis for seeking consent to order a medical reevaluation for 

White. As the Supreme Court noted in Riverside, it would “permit an inappropriate end 

run around the [POBRA]” if a law enforcement agency could withhold disclosure of 
21

adverse comments concerning an employee until after those comments were used by the 

agency for personnel purposes. (Riverside, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 803; see also Aguilar 

v. Johnson, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at pp. 250-251 [police chief’s belated compliance with 

Government Code sections 3305 and 3306 did not preclude officer from seeking judicial 

relief based on prior violations of the statutes].) Accordingly, the County’s belated 

disclosure of the memoranda during the course of White I did not preclude White from 

enforcing her rights under Government Code section 3305 in a court of law.

For these reasons, the trial court did not err in concluding that the County violated 

Government Code section 3305 in failing to disclose the memoranda to White, and that 

White was entitled to seek judicial relief under Government Code section 3309.5 based 

on the County’s POBRA violation. 

III. Attorney’s Fees Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5

A. Standard of Review

An award of attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 

generally is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. (Indio Police Command Unit 

Assn. v. City of Indio, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 541.) “‘[W]ith respect to the amount 

of fees awarded, there is no question our review must be highly deferential to the views 

of the trial court.’ [Citations.]” (Concepcion v. Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2014) 223 

Cal.App.4th 1309, 1309.) As our Supreme Court has observed, “‘[t]he “experienced trial 

judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and 

while his [or her] judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless 

the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong” -- meaning that it abused its 

discretion. [Citations.]’” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

B. Statutory Criteria for an Attorney’s Fee Award

Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 provides in relevant part: “Upon motion, 

a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more opposing 

parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right 

affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or 
22

nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the 

necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public 

entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and 

(c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.”

Accordingly, “‘[t]o obtain attorney fees under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 

1021.5, the party seeking fees must show that the litigation: “‘“‘(1) served to vindicate an 

important public right; (2) conferred a significant benefit on the general public or a large 

class of persons; and (3) [was necessary and] imposed a financial burden on plaintiffs 

which was out of proportion to their individual stake in the matter.’ [Citation.]” 

[Citation.]’” [Citations.] Because the statute states the criteria in the conjunctive, each 

must be satisfied to justify a fee award. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (City of Maywood v. 

Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 362, 429.)

With respect to the first element, the California Supreme Court has recognized that 

the enforcement of procedural rights in the POBRA serves to vindicate an important right 

affecting the public interest. (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 143 (Baggett).) In 

Baggett, four police officers sued the City of Los Angeles and its police chief because 

they had been reassigned to lower paying positions after an internal investigation into 

alleged misconduct without being given an opportunity for an administrative appeal. 

(Id. at p. 133.) The Supreme Court held that Government Code sections 3303 and 3304 

provide a right to an administrative appeal to police officers who are reassigned to lower 

paying positions, and the officers who sued to enforce that right were entitled to an award 

of attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. (Id. at pp. 141-143.) In 

considering whether the officer’s action had resulted in the enforcement of an important 

public right, the Court specifically concluded: “Plaintiffs’ action resulted in securing for 

themselves and many others the basic rights and protections of the [POBRA]. . . . [T]hese 

rights and protections are matters of statewide concern. It follows that the rights 

vindicated by plaintiffs are sufficiently ‘important’ to justify an attorney fee award.” 

(Id. at p. 143.) Cases following Baggett have similarly concluded that lawsuits enforcing 

procedural rights in the POBRA enforce important public rights for purposes of awarding 
23

attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. (See, e.g., Robinson v. 

Chowchilla (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 382, 395-396 [enforcement of right to administrative 

appeal prior to punitive action under Government Code section 3304]; Otto v. Los 

Angeles Unified School District (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 328, 335-336 [same]; Aguilar v. 

Johnson, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 253 [enforcement of right to review and respond to 

citizen complaints placed in personnel file under Government Code sections 3305 and 

3306]; Riverside Sheriffs’ Assn. v. County of Riverside (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 414, 422

[enforcement of procedural protections afforded during interrogation under Government 

Code section 3303]; Mounger v. Gates (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1248, 1259 [same].)

With respect to the second element, the Supreme Court in Baggett concluded that 

an action to enforce procedural rights under the POBRA also confers a significant benefit 

on the general public by helping “to maintain stable relations between peace officers and 

their employers and thus to assure effective law enforcement. . . .” (Baggett, supra, 32 

Cal.3d at p. 143.) Following Baggett, courts repeatedly have recognized that a significant 

benefit is conferred on the general public or a large group of persons when the procedural 

protections contained in the POBRA are enforced. (See, e.g., Robinson v. Chowchilla, 

supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 399; Riverside Sheriffs’ Assn. v. County of Riverside, supra, 

152 Cal.App.4th at p. 422; Otto v. Los Angeles Unified School District, supra, 106 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 335-336; Aguilar v. Johnson, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 253; 

Mounger v. Gates, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 1259.) Indeed, “‘“[t]he rights and 

protections afforded by [POBRA] benefit not only public safety officers but the public in 

general. By promoting stable employer-employee relations, [POBRA] fosters a solid and 

secure public safety work force. [Citation.] It also encourages peace officer cooperation 

in investigations of possible wrongdoing. [Citation.] Alleged violations of [POBRA] 

therefore implicate duties ‘which inure[] to the benefit of the public at large’ [citation], 

transcending the employer-employee relationship....” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]”

(Riverside Sheriffs’ Assn. v. County of Riverside, supra, at p. 422.)
24

With respect to the third element regarding the necessity and financial burden of 

private enforcement, the Supreme Court in Baggett stated: “[T]he record before this 

court indicates that the financial burden this suit placed on plaintiffs was out of 

proportion to their personal stake in the case. By their action, plaintiffs have secured the 

enforcement of basic procedural rights, . . . However, enforcement of these procedural 

rights may well not result in any pecuniary benefit to plaintiffs themselves. [Citation.]. . . 

[¶] This court is satisfied that plaintiffs’ action meets the requirements of section 1021.5 

of the Code of Civil Procedure.” (Baggett, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 143.) Other courts 

have likewise held that a plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees for enforcing procedural 

rights under the POBRA where the cost of prevailing in the action ultimately transcends

the plaintiff’s personal interest in the litigation. (See, e.g., Riverside Sheriffs’ Assn. v. 

County of Riverside, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 422-433; Otto v. Los Angeles Unified 

School District, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at pp. 335-336; Henneberque v. City of Culver 

City (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 837, 846-847.)

In this case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining that White was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under Code of Civil 

Procedure section 1021.5. White’s action to enforce the procedural rights afforded to 

peace officers under the POBRA to review and respond to adverse comments in 

personnel records served to vindicate an important right affecting the public interest and 

conferred a significant benefit on a large group of persons. Throughout the litigation, the 

County maintained that internal memoranda shared among management about a peace 

officer’s fitness for duty were not subject to disclosure under the POBRA so long as

the documents were marked confidential and kept in a separate file from the officer’s 

personnel file. While the trial court’s ruling that such materials must be disclosed under 

the POBRA conferred a direct non-pecuniary personal benefit on White, the outcome of 

the litigation also benefits other peace officers who may be the subject of similar internal

documents containing adverse comments about the officers’ fitness for duty. 
25

Additionally, the trial court reasonably could find that the cost of litigating the 

action to a successful conclusion transcended White’s personal interest in the matter. The 

question of whether the County could order White to submit to a medical reevaluation 

based on the documented concerns about her fitness for duty has now been the subject of 

two writ proceedings filed by White and two appeals filed by the County. Although 

White successfully enforced the basic procedural rights guaranteed under Government 

Code sections 3305 and 3306 by prosecuting the present action and obtaining injunctive 

relief, she did not secure any direct pecuniary benefit for herself through such 

enforcement, as her request for statutory penalties under the POBRA was denied. On this 

record, the trial court reasonably concluded that White satisfied each of the enumerated 

criteria in Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, and thus, was entitled to an attorney’s 

fee award.

In arguing that the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees, the County asserts 

that the litigation did not result in any novel interpretation of the POBRA that could 

benefit the public at large, but rather in the application of an already existing right under 

Government Code section 3305 to documents pertaining to White. However, “‘[t]he fact 

that litigation enforces existing rights does not mean that a substantial benefit to the 

public cannot result. Attorney fees have consistently been awarded for the enforcement 

of well-defined, existing obligations. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Otto v. Los Angeles 

Unified School District, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 335.) Because the County 

vigorously denied that the documents were subject to disclosure under Government Code 

section 3305, White had to file suit to enforce her rights under the statute, which justified 

an attorney’s fee award. (Riverside Sheriffs’ Assn. v. County of Riverside, supra, 152 

Cal.App.4th at p. 422.) The County also contends that an award of attorney’s fees was 

not warranted because the primary effect of the litigation was the vindication of White’s 

own personal rights and economic interests. However, “where each of the criteria is met, 

the fact the primary effect of the action was to vindicate a plaintiff’s personal economic 

interests does not foreclose an award of attorney fees” under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 1021.5. (Robinson v. Chowchilla, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 399.) In this case, 
26

White satisfied each of the statutory criteria and there were no special circumstances 

rendering an award of attorney’s fees unjust. (Id. at p. 391 [“attorney fees must be 

awarded when the statutory criteria are met unless special circumstances render such an 

award unjust”].) As the prevailing party in the action, White was therefore entitled to an 

attorney’s fee award under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.

C. Amount of Attorney’s Fee Award

The County also challenges the amount of attorney’s fees awarded by the trial 

court on the ground that White’s request for attorney’s fees was excessive and duplicative 

of work that was performed in litigating the prior action in White I. We see no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s determination of the attorney’s fee award. The trial court 

awarded White $30,845 in attorney’s fees based on the lodestar method, which was 

slightly less than the amount of fees requested by White. In support of the motion for 

attorney’s fees, White’s counsel submitted a declaration stating that she had reviewed the 

attached attorney’s fees bills, and that “[a]ll the time reflected on the attached bills was 

spent in connection with the present litigation only.” While the County speculates that 

White’s attorneys should have spent less time on discovery given the factual similarities 

between the present action and White I, the County has failed to demonstrate that the 

amount of time expended was unreasonable. The record further reflects that the trial 

court carefully reviewed the bills submitted by White’s counsel, reduced the amount 

requested by $780 for attorney conferences that appeared to be duplicative, and then 

determined that, apart from that single reduction, the hourly rates requested and total 

number of hours expended were reasonable and necessary. The trial court’s award of 

attorney’s fees based on the hours reasonably spent by White’s attorneys in litigating the 

action to a successful conclusion did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
27

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. White shall recover her costs on appeal.

ZELON, Acting P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

BLUMENFELD, J.



 



Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.