Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-22-00582-CV

IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF Marissa Vivares BONNET and James T. 

Bonnet and in the Interest of T.J.B., A Child

From the 408th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2016CI19887

Honorable Antonia Arteaga, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Irene Rios, Justice

Delivered and Filed: June 12, 2024

DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART

Appellant James T. Bonnet appeals the trial court’s August 17, 2022 “Order Granting Joint 

Motion to Enforce and Order Modifying and Supplementing Order Appointing Receiver.” Bonnet

argues the trial court erred by ordering him to turnover his property. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Marissa Vivares Bonnet and James T. Bonnet were married in 1999. After seventeen years 

of marriage, Vivares Bonnet petitioned for divorce in 2016; Bonnet counter-petitioned for divorce 

shortly thereafter. The trial court entered a divorce decree in January 2019.
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Later that year, Vivares Bonnet filed a “Motion for Contempt and Application for 

Turnover,” explaining Bonnet failed to comply with the requirements in the divorce decree 

including, among other things, paying $9,500 in attorney’s fees. In her motion, Vivares Bonnet

sought relief under Section 31.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, requesting the 

appointment of a receiver and an order requiring Bonnet to turn over all non-exempt property to 

satisfy his obligations under the divorce decree. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.002. The 

trial court issued an order in December 2019, appointing a receiver for the turnover of Bonnet’s 

firearms (except two) and authorizing the receiver to sell the firearms to satisfy Bonnet’s financial 

obligations in the divorce decree. The order further required Bonnet to pay the attorney’s fees for

the turnover application and the receiver’s fee. Bonnet did not comply with the turnover order.

In July 2022, Vivares Bonnet and her attorney filed a “Joint Motion to Enforce and Compel 

and Motion to Modify and Supplement Order Appointing Receiver,” seeking to enforce the 

turnover order, grant the receiver additional powers to satisfy the judgment including the turnover 

of all non-exempt personal and real property, and increase the receiver’s fee to 25% of the proceeds 

of any sale of non-exempt property. After an August 17, 2022 hearing, the trial court entered an 

order granting the July 2022 motion.

Bonnet then filed this appeal.

TURNOVER ORDER

Bonnet argues the trial court erred when it issued the turnover order because (1) he uses 

his firearms for his business; (2) the trial court committed malfeasance and colluded against him; 

and (3) the order violates his Second and Fourth Amendment rights of the U.S. Constitution.
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A. Standard of Review & Law 

“We review a turnover order for an abuse of discretion.” Robison v. Watson, No. 04-20-

00138-CV, 2021 WL 2117936, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 26, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

Section 31.002 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code provides judgment creditors are 

“entitled to aid from a court of appropriate jurisdiction, . . . through injunction or other 

means . . . to reach property to [satisfy] the judgment if the judgment debtor owns property . . . that 

is not exempt from attachment, execution, or seizure [to satisfy] liabilities.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 

REM. CODE § 31.002(a). A turnover order “may”:

(1) order the judgment debtor to turn over nonexempt property that is in the debtor’s 

possession or is subject to the debtor’s control, together with all documents or 

records related to the property, to a designated sheriff or constable for execution; 

(2) otherwise apply the property to the satisfaction of the judgment; or 

(3) appoint a receiver with the authority to take possession of the nonexempt 

property, sell it, and pay the proceeds to the judgment creditor to the extent required 

to satisfy the judgment. 

Id. § 31.002(b). 

B. Analysis 

Turning to Bonnet’s first contention he uses his firearms for his business and therefore, 

they are exempt from seizure, personal property identified in Texas Property Code Section 

42.002—with “an aggregate fair market value of not more than $50,000” if owned by a single 

adult—“is exempt from garnishment, attachment, execution, or other seizure.” TEX. PROP. CODE

§ 42.001(a).1 Section 42.002 identifies “tools[] [and] equipment . . . used in a trade or profession”

as exempt. Id. § 42.002(a)(4). 

1 See Li v. Pemberton Park Cmty. Ass’n, 631 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tex. 2021) (“This Court has often held that a party 

sufficiently preserves an issue for review by arguing the issue’s substance, even if the party does not call the issue by 

name.’” (quoting St. John Missionary Baptist Church v. Flakes, 595 S.W.3d 211, 214 (Tex. 2020))).
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However, Bonnet raises this issue for the first time by challenging the trial court’s August 

2022 turnover order enforcing the initial turnover order—the December 2019 turnover order. Here,

the trial court’s initial turnover order already required Bonnet to turnover all of his firearms, except 

two exempt from the turnover order. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.002(a); TEX. PROP.

CODE § 42.001(a)(7). The August 2022 turnover order duplicated that turnover requirement. But 

Bonnet did not appeal the December 2019 turnover order, which was a final, appealable order. See 

Robison, 2021 WL 2117936, at *2 (“Thus, a trial court may render multiple turnover orders, each 

of which could be a final, appealable judgment.”). And permitting him to challenge the portion of 

the August 2022 turnover order requiring him to turnover his firearms when he did not appeal the 

December 2019 turnover order requiring him to do the same “would serve to improperly resurrect 

[an] unappealed” portion of the December 2019 turnover order.2 See Bahar v. Lyon Fin. Servs., 

Inc., 330 S.W.3d 379, 387 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied) (“[W]e conclude that because 

the 2008 order was not appealed, an assertion of jurisdiction by this Court over the entire 2009 

order—which includes, verbatim, the 2008 order’s substantive provisions—would serve to 

improperly resurrect the unappealed, ‘finally final’ portions of the 2008 order.”); see, e.g., Abira 

Med. Lab’ys, LLC v. St. Jude Med. SC, Inc., No. 14-17-00849-CV, 2018 WL 3911084, at *2 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 16, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same, citing Bahar); Alexander, 

Dubose, Jefferson & Townsend LLP v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., L.P., 503 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. 

App.—Beaumont 2016) (same, citing Bahar), rev’d on other grounds, 540 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. 

2018); see also Robison, 2021 WL 2117936, at *4 (“Because Robison and Gov Whiz did not file 

2 Bonnet also raises a series of arguments attacking the underlying divorce decree. However, the record shows 

Bonnet’s divorce decree became final after he elected not to appeal it, and it is not subject to collateral attack. See, 

e.g., Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. 2009) (“Attempting to obtain an order that alters or modifies a 

divorce decree’s property division is an impermissible collateral attack.”); Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. 

2003) (“Absent an appeal, the judgment became final, and Edwin may not now collaterally attack the court's division 

of property in the decree.”).
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a timely notice of appeal challenging the second turnover order, they did not invoke our appellate 

jurisdiction over this order. As a result, the part of this appeal challenging the second turnover 

order must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”). We therefore dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 

the portion of Bonnet’s appeal challenging the portion of the August 2022 turnover order that 

replicates the December 2019 turnover order.3 See Abira, 2018 WL 3911084, at *2; Bahar, 330 

S.W.3d at 387.

Turning to Bonnet’s second contention the trial court erred when it issued the turnover 

order, he argues the trial court committed malfeasance and colluded when the court “lied to [him]” 

during the hearing and “told [him] [the court] . . . was not able to sign the [turnover] Order today,’ 

that [it] would schedule a Compliance Hearing for a later date.” The record demonstrates no such 

exchange ever took place. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise 

argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”). 

The trial court indicated during the hearing it intended to issue an order granting the motion, 

explaining it would “[h]onor” the previous judge’s turnover order and grant the July 2022 motion. 

Then, the trial court explained if the movants wanted to file a motion to enforce the turnover order

for Bonnet’s failure to comply, they could do so, but it was not “ordering a compliance hearing.”

In other words, the trial court indicated it would sign the order granting the motion, but it would

not commit to overseeing any enforcement of the order, if needed, through a compliance hearing. 

Even if the exchange had taken place, Bonnet fails to show how the trial court’s signing of an order 

constitutes malfeasance or collusion or how either malfeasance or collusion would constitute 

3 Because we do not have jurisdiction to consider Bonnet’s challenge to turning over his firearms, we do not consider 

his Second Amendment challenge to the July 2022 turnover order. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals 

must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to 

final disposition of the appeal.”).
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reversible error.

4 See id.; TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a) (“No judgment may be reversed on appeal on the 

ground that the trial court made an error of law unless the court of appeals concludes that the error 

complained of: (1) probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment; or (2) probably 

prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case to the court of appeals.”).

Bonnet also argues, for the first time on appeal, the trial court’s order violates his Fourth 

Amendment right against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” However, Bonnet did not assert 

this complaint before the trial court, and he has therefore failed to preserve this argument for 

appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.5

Accordingly, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in rendering the 

August 2022 turnover order.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s August 17, 2022 order.

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

4 Bonnet further argues the trial court’s order was erroneous because (1) “[a]ll property listed on the Order” was his 

“personally[-]owned land and assets,” and the trial court had no “RIGHT to give [the] property away to a Receiver.” 

However, a trial court may, in its sound discretion, order a party to turnover all non-exempt assets in compliance with 

Section 31.002 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, and Bonnet does not identify any other basis in law or 

fact demonstrating the trial court erred. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.002; TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). 

5 We decline to consider Bonnet’s contention the hearing was “beyond the statute of limitations” for the same reason.

See id. R. 33.1.