SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

595 

KA 07-01561 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, CARNI, GREEN, AND GORSKI, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KEITH B. KILBURY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (PIOTR BANASIAK OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (SUSAN C.

AZZARELLI OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Joseph E.

Fahey, J.), rendered March 2, 2007. The judgment convicted defendant,

upon a jury verdict, of rape in the first degree (two counts), sexual

abuse in the first degree (three counts), rape in the third degree

(two counts), endangering the welfare of a child, sexual abuse in the

second degree (two counts) and sexual abuse in the third degree (three

counts). 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him following a

jury trial of two counts each of rape in the first degree (Penal Law

§ 130.35 [1]), rape in the third degree (§ 130.25 [2]), and sexual

abuse in the second degree (§ 130.60 [2]), three counts each of sexual

abuse in the first degree (§ 130.65 [1]) and sexual abuse in the third

degree (§ 130.55), and one count of endangering the welfare of a child

(§ 260.10 [1]), defendant contends that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel. We reject that contention (see generally

People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147). Specifically, the fact that

defense counsel did not move pursuant to CPL 200.20 (2) (c) to sever

the two counts of the indictment stemming from an incident in 1998

from the 11 counts stemming from an incident in 2001 against the same

victim does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 

“Defendant has not shown that a [severance] motion, if made, would

have been successful and thus has failed to establish that defense

counsel was ineffective in failing to make such a motion” (People v

Borcyk, 60 AD3d 1489, 1490, lv denied 12 NY3d 923). We reject

defendant’s further contention that defense counsel was ineffective in

failing to call an expert witness on the subject of child sexual abuse

accommodation syndrome. “Defendant has not demonstrated that such

testimony was available, that it would have assisted the jury in its
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KA 07-01561 

determination or that he was prejudiced by its absence” (People v

Castricone, 224 AD2d 1019, 1020; see People v Brandi E., 38 AD3d 1218,

1219, lv denied 9 NY3d 863). We agree with defendant, however, that

defense counsel should have objected to a prosecutorial comment on

summation that had the potential to deflect the attention of the

jurors from the issues of defendant’s guilt or innocence and to “cause

them instead to focus on protecting the victim and correcting an

alleged error in the child protective system” (People v Ballerstein,

52 AD3d 1192, 1194). Nevertheless, we conclude that the failure of

defense counsel to object to that isolated comment, which “was not so

egregious or improper as to deny defendant a fair trial” (People v

Walker, 50 AD3d 1452, 1453, lv denied 11 NY3d 795, 931), did not

render defense counsel ineffective (see generally Baldi, 54 NY2d at

147). With respect to the remaining instances of alleged ineffective

assistance advanced by defendant, we conclude that he has failed to

establish “ ‘the absence of strategic or other legitimate

explanations’ for [defense] counsel’s alleged shortcomings” (People v

Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712).

Contrary to defendant’s contention, viewing the evidence in light

of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v

Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349), we conclude that the verdict is not

against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v Bleakley,

69 NY2d 490, 495). “Where, as here, witness credibility is of

paramount importance to the determination of guilt or innocence, [we]

must give ‘[g]reat deference . . . [to the] fact-finder’s opportunity

to view the witnesses, hear the testimony and observe demeanor’ ”

(People v Harris, 15 AD3d 966, 967, lv denied 4 NY3d 831, quoting

Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495). Although an acquittal would not have been

unreasonable given the inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony, it

cannot be said that the jury failed to give the evidence the weight it

should be accorded (see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495). We

further conclude that the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

Finally, we note that the certificate of conviction incorrectly

reflects that defendant was convicted of two counts of endangering the

welfare of a child and one count of sexual abuse in the second degree

and was sentenced as a second felony offender. The certificate of

conviction must therefore be amended to reflect that defendant was

convicted of one count of endangering the welfare of a child and two

counts of sexual abuse in the second degree and that he was sentenced

as a second violent felony offender (see People v Martinez, 37 AD3d

1099, 1100, lv denied 8 NY3d 947). 

Entered: April 29, 2011 Patricia L. Morgan

Clerk of the Court