UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION

FELICIA MUHAMMAD,

Plaintiff,

v.

VILLAGE OF SOUTH HOLLAND;

OFFICER B. BURKE, individually and as 

an agent of THE VILLAGE OF SOUTH 

HOLLAND POLICE; OFFICER P. 

WILLIAMS, individually and as an agent 

of THE VILLAGE OF SOUTH 

HOLLAND POLICE; ADOLPH CLARK; 

and ROGER BOWEN,

Defendants.

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Case No. 12-CV-275

Judge John W. Darrah

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Felicia Muhammad (“Muhammad”) filed her Second Amended 

Complaint on May 24, 2013, against the Village of South Holland (“South Holland”); 

Officers B. Burke and P. Williams (collectively, “Defendant Officers”); Adolph Clark; 

and Roger Bowen. Defendants South Holland, Defendant Officers, and Clark move to 

dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Muhammad submitted her original Complaint under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983, 

and 1985, against thirteen defendants, comprising municipalities, businesses, and 

individuals. The Complaint meandered through fifteen counts, all but one asking

combined punitive and compensatory damages in excess of one million dollars. 
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Concurrently, Muhammad moved to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of 

counsel, both of which were granted. Before counsel was appointed, Muhammad 

properly filed her Complaint. Most Defendants then filed motions to dismiss for failure 

to state a claim on which relief could be granted. 

Before these motions could be briefed, Muhammad’s appointed counsel moved 

the court for leave to withdraw.1 Replacement counsel was appointed immediately and 

each of Defendants’ motions was withdrawn without prejudice, with leave to refile. 

Although granted leave to file an amended complaint with the assistance of appointed 

counsel, Muhammad was unable to do so before her replacement counsel was granted 

leave to withdraw.2

 No further replacement counsel was appointed, and Muhammad 

filed an Amended Complaint that was almost indistinguishable from the original. The 

primary differences in the Amended Complaint were a reduction of two pages and an

addition of one count, bringing the total to sixteen. 

Again Defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which 

relief could be granted. The motions were fully briefed and each was granted by this 

Court on April 25, 2013, with respect to all sixteen counts. Muhammad was once more 

given leave to file this Second Amended Complaint.

 1 Counsel’s reason for withdrawing was a vague allusion to conflict. (Dkt. No. 70)

2 Counsel cited Local Rules 83.38(a)(3) and (5) allowing for relief of appointed 

counsel in the case of “disagreement on litigation strategy” or if, “[i]n counsel’s opinon, 

the party is proceeding for purpose of harassment or malicious injury, or the party’s 

claims or defenses are not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by good 

faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” 
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Count I alleges excessive force and illegal search and seizure against 

Defendant Officers. Count II alleges civil conspiracy against Clark and 

Defendant Officers. Count III alleges trespass to chattel against Bowen, South Holland, 

and Officer P. Williams. Count IV alleges negligence against South Holland and 

Defendant Officers. Count V alleges a Monell claim against South Holland. Finally, 

Count VI alleges an indemnification claim for the Local Government Tort Immunity Act 

against South Holland.

Muhammad alleges she possessed on all dates relevant to this Complaint a valid 

lease of the property located at 84 Woodland Drive in South Holland, Illinois. (2d Am.

Compl. Introduction, ¶ 24.) On August 22, 2010, Adolph Clark filed a police report to 

have occupants of the Woodland property removed. (Id. ¶ 12.) South Holland Police 

accompanied Clark to the property and arrested Muhammad and two others. (Id. ¶ 6.) 

While handcuffing Muhammad, police allegedly twisted Muhammad’s arms behind her 

back, put the handcuffs on tightly, and forgot to double lock the handcuffs so they grew 

tighter on Muhammad’s wrists. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) At some point during the arrest, officers 

allegedly seized Muhammad’s purse, keys, and a 2003 Mercury Marquis. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 16.)

The Circuit Court of Cook County issued Muhammad an order to retrieve her 

property from the residence. (Id. ¶ 22.) Before Muhammad could enter the residence to 

retrieve her belongings, she alleges Bowen entered the residence, then seized and 

destroyed her property. (Id. ¶¶ 31-32.) South Holland (including Defendant Officers) 

and Clark have moved to dismiss. 
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LEGAL STANDARD

To properly assert a claim in a complaint, the plaintiff must present “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and a demand 

for the relief sought . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual 

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (Iqbal) (quoting Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (Twombly)). 

If pleadings do not conform to these guidelines, a defendant may move to dismiss, 

asserting that the plaintiff failed “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Alleged facts are presumed true, and pleadings must contain facts to 

“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 572. 

Certain pleadings, though, may require more factual support than others to achieve 

plausibility. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 670. “Deference is afforded to pro se litigants with 

regards to pleading standards.” Triplett v. Donahoe, No. 12-cv-5719, 2013 WL 1787497, 

at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2013) (citing Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 

1981). Nevertheless, presenting legal conclusions as factual allegations does not afford 

them the same presumption of truth in pleading. Twombly at 678.

ANALYSIS

Count I – Excessive Force and Illegal Search and Seizure

Muhammad asserts her August 22, 2010, arrest carried out by Defendant Officers 

was an illegal search and seizure and, moreover, involved excessive force. However, 

nothing in her Second Amended Complaint requires novel analysis. In fact, 
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Muhammad’s Second Amended Complaint alleges even less than the original. See 

Muhammad v. Village of South Holland, No. 12-cv-275, 2013 WL 1788448, at *3 

(N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2013). The public record submitted by Defendants, reflecting Clark’s 

property interest in the residence (Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Ex.1)3, remains sufficient to 

establish probable cause to arrest; and the natural consequences of placing someone in 

handcuffs still do not rise to excessive force. Id. at *4. 

For the third time, Muhammad insists on generically listing concepts rather than 

factually describing any event. Such a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). Muhammad’s assertion 

of excessive force and illegal search and seizure lacks the amplification by way of facts

required by Iqbal, and Count I is therefore dismissed.

Count II – Civil Conspiracy

A claim of civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege 

“[s]he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States 

and that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.” 

Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 648 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 

436 U.S. 149, 155-156 (1978). Once alleged, four factors must be present to sustain such 

a claim:

 3 Defendants submitted the public record of title to the property at issue. The title 

shows that Clark retained a property interest through March 18, 2011. “[O]n review of a 

motion to dismiss, the court may take judicial notice of facts that are readily ascertainable 

from the public record and not subject to reasonable dispute.” Kirley v. Bd. of Educ. of 

Maine Twp. High Sch. Dist. 207, No. 13 C 1706, 2013 WL 6730885, at *5, n.3 (N.D. Ill. 

Dec. 20, 2013).
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(1) an agreement; (2) where the agreement is not overt, the alleged facts must 

sufficiently raise an inference of mutual understanding; (3) acts performed by 

coconspirators are adequate when they would not likely have been undertaken 

absent an agreement and (4) a “whiff” of the alleged conspirators' assent must be 

apparent from the complaint.

Piphus v. City of Chicago, No. 12-cv-7259, 2013 WL 3975209, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 

2013) (citation omitted). 

Muhammad flatly alleges that Clark and Defendant Officers “conspired.” 

(2d Am. Compl. ¶ 53.) It is undisputed that the Defendant Officers were acting in their 

official capacities when they effected Muhammad’s arrest. Yet, as discussed under 

Count I, there was no apparent constitutional violation. Further, even if there were a way 

to plausibly infer a constitutional violation, the Second Amended Complaint is devoid of 

even the slightest hint of an agreement between Defendant Officers or either officer and 

Clark. Count II is dismissed.

Count V – Monell Claim

When a “government’s policy or custom” results in an injury to civil rights, the 

government may be held responsible as an entity. Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 

U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Failing to submit a set of facts that demonstrates a particular 

policy precludes the sufficiency of a Monell claim. McTigue v. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 

381, 382 (7th Cir. 1995). Muhammad’s Second Amended Complaint alleges a number of 

scenarios that could form the foundation on which to build a Monell claim; but as she

fails to allege any facts in support, they remain merely conclusions. As a result, Count V 

is dismissed.
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Counts III, IV, and VI – Trespass to Chattel, Negligence, and Indemnification

The remaining counts are governed by state law. “Generally, when a court has 

dismissed all the federal claims in a lawsuit before trial, it should relinquish jurisdiction 

over supplemental state law claims rather than resolve them on the merits.” Cortezano v. 

Salin Bank & Trust Co., 680 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Clark’s Motion to Dismiss [152] is granted in its 

entirety. Clark’s Motion to Dismiss [139] is moot. The Village of South Holland’s 

Motion to Dismiss Muhammad’s Second Amended Complaint [140] with respect to

Counts I, II, and V is granted, and they are dismissed with prejudice. The remaining 

Counts based on state law are dismissed without prejudice and remanded to the Circuit 

Court of Cook County, Illinois.

Date: 1/28/2014 ______________________________

JOHN W. DARRAH

United States District Court Judge