IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DAAIYAH MANNING,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN SWEITZER, Park Forest Police

Detective; MICHAEL BAUGH, Park

Forest Police Detective Corporal;

PETER GREEN, Park Forest Police

Detective Commander; THOMAS FLEMING,

former Park Forest Chief of Police;

and the VILLAGE OF PARK FOREST

Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On Jan. 20, 2012, pro se Plaintiff Daaiyah Manning

(“Manning”) filed this 12-count complaint against various Park

Forest police officers and the Village of Park Forest following

her arrest pursuant to an Arizona warrant. Named in the

complaint are Detective John Sweitzer, Detective Corporal Michael

Baugh, Detective Commander Peter Green, and former Police Chief

Thomas Fleming. Manning alleges: (1) unreasonable search and

seizure of her vehicle; (2) denial of the right to counsel; (3)

cruel and unusual punishment; (4) a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §

1985; (5) failure to train; (6) unlawful detention, and several

state law claims. Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint

in its entirety for failure to state a claim. For the reasons

that follow, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. 
Counts I and II may go forward, along with Manning’s

indemnification claim against the Village of Park Forest. The

remainder of the complaint is dismissed.

I.

As a preliminary point, the parties dispute what facts I

should consider in ruling on this Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss. Manning has attached to her complaint the police

reports from her arrest, as well as a copy of an email sent by

her daughter to police while she was being held at the Park

Forest Police Department. Defendants argue that the police

reports should be considered part of the pleadings pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). While this is true, it does not mean that

Manning vouched for all the facts in the police report. Guzell

v. Hiller, 223 F.3d 518, 519 (7th Cir. 2000). Rather, “the

plaintiff’s purpose in attaching an exhibit to his complaint

determines what assertions if any in the exhibit are facts that

the plaintiff has incorporated into the complaint.” Id; see Gale

v. Hyde Park Bank, 384 F.3d 451, 452 (7th Cir. 2004) (“the

plaintiff may tell the court what his adversary has said without

throwing in the towel.”). 

Plaintiff’s complaint adopts some of the facts in the police

reports, but it is clear that she did not intend to adopt the

reports in their entirety. For example, she contends that she

did not waive her right to counsel while being interviewed by

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police, while police reports indicate that she did. Given that

Plaintiff has not adopted the reports as true, I will not

consider them to be true in all respects. I will, however,

consider the warrant for Manning’s arrest attached to Defendants’

motion to dismiss, given that it is referred to in her complaint

and is central to her claim. 188 LLC v. Trinity Indust., Inc.,

300 F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted).

The following facts are taken from Manning’s complaint and

the warrant and considered in the light most favorable to the

Plaintiff. Manning was indicted in Maricopa County, Ariz., for

conspiracy to commit custodial interference, and on July 16,

2010, a fugitive felony warrant for her arrest was issued. 

Manning was accused of interfering in a custody dispute involving

her grandson. Because Manning was a resident of Park Forest,

Arizona police sought the assistance of Park Forest police in

executing the warrant. Detective Sweitzer was assigned the case,

and on July 29, 2010, Detective Sweitzer arrested Manning in

Chicago. 

According to the police reports, Detective Sweitzer arrested

Manning after having received a tip from an apartment manager in

Chicago. The apartment manager reported that Manning came to his

office to complete a rental application and was accompanied by a

small boy. Suspicious of her demeanor, the apartment manager

looked her up on-line and realized she was wanted for custodial

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interference.1

 Manning was scheduled to return to the apartment

later that day to pick up keys, so Detective Sweitzer set up

surveillance and arrested her as she was walking to the building.

Plaintiff alleges that she was handcuffed, put in the back

of a squad car, and not shown a copy of the warrant for her

arrest. Detective Sweitzer proceeded to search Manning’s

vehicle, which was parked nearby. Manning’s complaint points to

a portion of the police reports indicating Detective Sweitzer did

an inventory search of the vehicle before it was towed. (Dkt.

No. 1, Ex. A, at 5.)

After searching the vehicle, Detective Sweitzer brought

Manning back to the Park Forest Police Department, where she was

detained in a small holding cell. Manning alleges that when they

arrived at the police station, she requested a phone call, and to

speak with an attorney, but Detective Sweitzer refused. Other

officers, acting at Detective Sweitzer’s direction, later refused

to let her call to check on the well-being of her minor child.

The next day, on July 30, 2010, Manning’s daughter,

Tauheedah Najee-Ullah Bey, emailed police and told them their

conduct in arresting and detaining Manning was illegal. 

Defendant Thomas Fleming, then chief of the Park Forest police,

responded by saying “Good luck on this matter.”

1 Although Manning disputes some of the events described in

the police reports, she appears to accept the basic facts as to

how her arrest occurred, and references them in her response. 

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Then, on July 31, 2010, Detective Sweitzer and Detective

Corporal Baugh questioned Manning without the benefit of counsel. 

Manning contends she repeatedly requested counsel, while the

police reports indicate that she knowingly waived her right to

counsel. At some point, Manning’s son hired her a lawyer.

On July 31, 2010, Manning’s grandson was brought to the Park

Forest police station by her attorney. On Aug. 2, 2010, Manning

was transferred to the custody of the Cook County Sheriff’s

Department. Manning alleges that during the time she was held at

the Park Forest Police Department, she had no access to bathing

facilities, bedding, clean clothing, or her prescribed

medication. Her glasses were removed from her possession when

she arrived at the police station.

Manning was not charged with any crimes in the state of

Illinois, and was eventually extradited to Arizona on the

custodial interference warrant.

II.

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint

must contain sufficient facts, accepted as true, “to state a

claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Although a complaint's

factual allegations need not be detailed, they must provide more

than “labels, conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the

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elements of a cause of action, and allege enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Ruiz v. Kinsella, 770 F.

Supp. 2d 936, 941–42 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555). In ruling on such a motion, the question is whether the

facts, accepted as true, “present a story that holds together.” 

Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). I

will address each count in turn.

III.

A. Count I: Search of Manning’s Vehicle

Count I of Manning’s complaint, brought under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, alleges an unlawful search of her vehicle. Defendants

contend that Count I must be dismissed because the search of the

vehicle was either a lawful search pursuant to an arrest or a

lawful inventory search. 

First, it is important to clarify the nature of Manning’s

arrest. Generally, an arrest warrant issued in one state may not

be lawfully executed in another. Street v. Cherba, 662 F.2d

1037, 1039 (4th Cir. 1981). However, police may conduct a

warrantless arrest of a fugitive from another jurisdiction as

long as the arresting officer has probable cause and the arrest

was lawfully executed in the jurisdiction where it was made. 

United States v. Miles, 413 F.2d 34, 40 (3rd Cir. 1969). Here,

Detective Sweitzer’s knowledge of the Arizona warrant gave him

probable cause to arrest Manning, and under Illinois law he was

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authorized to do so anywhere in the state, even outside his

jurisdiction of Park Forest. See 725 ILCS 225/14 (providing that

any person may lawfully arrest a person who is charged with a

felony offense in another state). Manning’s arrest, then, was

lawful.

Defendants, however, do not cite the controlling law as to a

search of a vehicle incident to a lawful arrest until their reply

brief. In Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343–44 (2009), the U.S.

Supreme Court held that a vehicle search incident to a lawful

arrest may be conducted only when the arrestee is unsecured and

within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time

of the search, or when it is reasonable to believe that evidence

relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. 

Defendants do not argue that the first exception applies. 

Rather, they argue that when Manning was arrested, her grandson

was not with her. It was reasonable to assume, given the nature

of the charges against her, that evidence of the child’s

whereabouts, or perhaps the boy himself, could be found in the

vehicle. This argument, however, was not raised until the reply

brief, and therefore is waived. Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

673 F.3d 547, 571 (7th Cir. 2012).

Additionally, Defendants argue that this was a valid

inventory search, noting that the police report itself, which

Manning cites in her complaint, indicates that Detective Sweitzer

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searched the vehicle as part of an inventory search prior to it

being towed. An inventory search is a well-recognized exception

to the warrant requirement. United States v. Cartwright, 630

F.3d 610, 613–14 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing South Dakota v.

Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976)). An inventory search is

lawful if: (1) the individual whose vehicle is to be searched was

lawfully arrested; and (2) the search is conducted as part of a

routine procedure incident to incarcerating an arrested person

and in accordance with established inventory procedures. Id. at

614. The decision to impound the vehicle is analyzed separately

from the decision to inventory the vehicle. Id.

The mere fact that the police reports refer to the search as

an inventory search is not enough to establish the applicability

of this exception. At this stage of the case, Defendants have

not articulated their rationale for impounding the vehicle, nor

have they shown that the inventory search was conducted in good

faith according to established department procedures. In short,

it is premature to evaluate the applicability of this exception

to the warrant requirement. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

denied as to Count I.

B. Count II: Denial of Right to Counsel

In Count II, Manning contends that she was denied her right

to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments when the

defendant officers refused to let her consult with an attorney. 

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In order to determine whether a violation of an individual’s

Sixth Amendment right to counsel has occurred, courts must

consider: (1) whether the right to counsel had attached at the

time of the statement or proceeding at issue; (2) if so, whether

the accused executed a valid waiver of her right to counsel; and

(3) absent a valid waiver, whether the police conduct violated

the accused’s right to counsel. Walden v. City of Chicago, 391

F. Supp. 2d 660, 677 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (citing United States v.

Spruill, 296 F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 2002)). 

Defendants incorrectly argue that Plaintiff’s claim should

be analyzed under the rubric of the Fifth Amendment right to

consult with an attorney during a custodial interrogation. Here,

Manning was indicted in Arizona prior to her arrest in Illinois. 

Her Sixth Amendment right to counsel at critical stages of the

proceedings attached at that point. Swanigan v. Trotter, 645 F.

Supp. 2d 656, 683 (N. D. Ill. 2009) (citing Watson v. Hulick, 481

F.3d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 2007)). An interrogation after

indictment is considered a “critical stage” of the proceedings. 

Spruill, 296 F.3d at 585. In their reply, Defendants argue the

questioning in Illinois was not about the Arizona custodial

interference charge, but rather about a charge of aiding and

abetting child abduction that Park Forest police planned to bring

against Manning as they attempted to locate the child. 

Defendants argue that because the Sixth Amendment right is

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offense-specific, Manning had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel

when she was questioned for this offense, with which she was

never charged. Defendants’ argument, however, is raised for the

first time in their reply and underdeveloped, so I will not

dismiss Count II on this basis.

Thus, the key questions are whether Manning waived her right

to counsel, and whether, absent a valid waiver, police violated

her right to counsel. These questions cannot be answered at this

stage of the case. Although Defendants rely on statements in the

police reports indicating that Manning waived her right to

counsel, she denies waiving her rights, and this is not an issue

that can be resolved on a motion to dismiss. As such,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied as to Count II.

C. Count III: Cruel and Unusual Punishment 

In Count III, Manning contends that she was subjected to

cruel and unusual punishment when she was detained in a small

holding cell at the Park Forest police station for five days. 

She brings her claim under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

As a pretrial detainee, the Eighth Amendment did not apply to

Manning, but she had equivalent rights under the due process

clause. Smentek v. Dart, --- F.3d ---, 2012 WL 2305229, at *1

(7th Cir. 2012). Regardless, the standard is the same. Williams

v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 401 (7th Cir. 2007). Manning must

show that she was incarcerated under conditions that posed a

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substantial risk of serious harm, and that the Defendants were

deliberately indifferent to that risk. Grieveson v. Anderson,

538 F.3d 763, 775 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). 

Defendants argue that even taking the allegations of Manning’s

complaint as true, her complaints are not severe enough to add up

to a constitutional violation. It is true that some of Manning’s

complaints are relatively minor, for example that she was

confined in a small cell, forced to lie on hard surfaces, and

denied a change of clothes. See Tesch v. Cty. of Green Lake, 157

F.3d 465, 476–77 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that short-term

impositions that are part of the general discomfort of being

jailed do not rise to the level of constitutional violations). 

Manning alleges a more serious complaint, however, that she

was denied needed prescribed medication for an unnamed mental

ailment. In her response, Manning elaborates that she was denied

exercise, which aggravated her sacroidosis, a disease that causes

inflammation of the organs.2 She adds that her daughter

contacted the police after her arrest, “notifying them of her

need for medical attention and was assured the station stocked

the medication needed, but had no knowledge of her prescriptions. 

Consequently, Plaintiff was forced to avoid the station’s

medication for fear of overmedication or a harmful interaction.” 

2 In ruling on this motion, I may consider statements in

Plaintiff’s response that supplement the facts in her complaint. 

Hentosh v. Herman M. Finch Univ., 167 F.3d 1170, 1173 n.3 (7th

Cir. 1999).

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Pl.’s Resp. at 8. This passage is confusing, but appears to

indicate that Plaintiff was offered medication, but declined to

accept it. Based on Manning’s complaint in conjunction with her

response, I cannot find that Manning has stated a claim that she

was subjected to inhumane conditions or that police were

deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. 

Consequently, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to

Count III.

D. Count IV: Civil Rights Conspiracy 

In Count IV, Manning brings a civil conspiracy claim against

all the Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. She alleges they

“together reached an understanding, engaged in a course of

conduct, and otherwise jointly acted and/or conspired among and

between themselves to commit the unconstitutional overt acts set

forth in the facts . . . .” Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 49. 

In her response, Manning clarifies that she is bringing this

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Her wholly conclusory

allegations, however, fail to state a claim that the Defendants

participated in a racially motivated conspiracy to violate her

federally protected rights, so her claim must be dismissed. See

Winchester v. Marketti, No. 11 C 9224, 2012 WL 2076375, at *5

(N.D. Ill. June 8, 2012) (dismissing § 1983 conspiracy claim

where it was based on a “vague and conclusory” pleading). 

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E. Count V: Failure to Train

In Count V, Manning brings a claim against the Village of

Park Forest for failure to properly train and supervise its

officers. “In limited circumstances, a local government’s

decision not to train certain employees about their legal duty to

avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the level of an

official government policy for the purposes of § 1983.” Connick

v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011). In order to establish

such a claim, a plaintiff must show that the failure to train

amounted to deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens

with whom the untrained employees come into contact. Id. The

U.S. Supreme Court has described this as a “stringent standard of

fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known

or obvious consequence of his actions.” Id. at 1360 (internal

citations omitted).

To demonstrate deliberate indifference, a plaintiff

typically must prove a pattern of similar constitutional

violations by untrained municipal employees. Id. Because

Manning does not allege any other incidents of wrongdoing by

defendants, she is essentially bringing a claim for “single

incident” liability. While the U.S. Supreme Court has not

entirely foreclosed the possibility of such claims, a plaintiff

pressing such a theory must show that the unconstitutional

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consequences of the failure to train were patently obvious. Id.

at 1361.

Regardless, Manning’s claim lacks any factual specificity,

and as such fails to satisfy the pleading standards of Twombly

and Iqbal. Recently, in dismissing a failure-to-train claim

brought post-Connick, Judge Zagel observed that while the Connick

opinion does not address pleading standards, it does suggest that

such claims, because of their complexity and difficulty of proof,

require a greater degree of specificity. Winchester, 2012 WL

2076375, at *4. Whether judged under this standard or the more

liberal standard typically required, Manning has failed to allege

a plausible claim for failure-to-train, and as such Count V is

dismissed. 

F. Count VI: Unlawful Detention

In Count VI, Manning brings a state law claim for unlawful

detention. Her unlawful detention claim contends that her rights

were violated when police failed to take her before a magistrate

or surrender her into the custody of the Cook County Sheriff’s

Office within 48 hours. 

As Defendants argue, however, all of Manning’s state law

claims in Counts VI through XI are time-barred. Under Illinois’

Tort Immunity Act, claims against local governments and their

employees are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. 745

ILCS 10/8-101. This applies even when the state law claims are

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joined with claims brought under § 1983. Williams v. Lampe, 399

F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 2005). Manning filed her complaint on

Jan. 20, 2012, more than a year after these claims accrued. As

such, all of Manning’s state-law claims are dismissed as

untimely. Manning’s request for indemnification from Park Forest

under 745 ILCS 10/9-102 in Count XII may stand however, pending

the resolution of the case.

As Defendants recognize, Manning’s claim for unlawful

detention could be construed as having been brought under the

Fourteenth Amendment rather than as a state-law claim. See

Sivard, 17 F.3d at 189. Defendants argue, however, that

Manning’s claim is not viable in light of Sivard. In that case,

an arrestee was held for 17 days in an Indiana jail pending

extradition to Massachusetts, where he had been indicted. Id. at

188. Like Manning, the arrestee in Sivard relied on Gerstein v.

Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), under which arrestees are entitled to

a prompt judicial determination of probable cause. Id. at 189. 

Citing Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282 (1978), the Seventh

Circuit noted that there was serious doubt as to the

applicability of Gerstein to an indicted fugitive awaiting

extradition. Id. at 191. Given this uncertain state of the law,

the Seventh Circuit found that the arrestee could not show that

his clearly established constitutional rights had been violated,

so the defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity. 

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Id. at 191. The same is true here. Manning cannot show that the

Park Forest officers violated any clearly established

constitutional right by detaining her for five days pending

extradition to Arizona. Consequently, whether as a state law or

federal claim, Count VI is dismissed.

IV.

For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

(Dkt. No. 25) is granted in part and denied in part. Counts I

and II may go forward, along with Manning’s indemnification claim

against the Village of Park Forest. The remainder of the

complaint is dismissed.

 ENTER ORDER:

 ____________________________

 Elaine E. Bucklo

 United States District Judge

Dated: July 2, 2012

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