UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

JOHNSON, BERG, and KRAUSS 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Private E2 PAYSON C. AVERILL 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20090491 

Headquarters, United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence 

James Pohl, Military Judge 

Colonel Tracy A. Barnes, Staff Judge Advocate (pretrial and recommendation) 

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffery D. Lippert, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (addendum) 

For Appellant: Captain Kristin McGrory, JA; Mr. Frank J. Spinner, Esquire (on 

brief). 

For Appellee: Major Amber J. Williams, JA; Captain Kenneth W. Borgnino, JA (on 

brief). 

7 December 2011 

--------------------------------- 

SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

---------------------------------

Per Curiam: 

A panel of officer and enlisted members, sitting as a general court-martial, 

convicted appellant, contrary to his pleas, of aggravated sexual assault, indecent 

conduct, and adultery, in violation of Articles 120, and 134, Uniform Code of 

Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 920, and 934 (2007) [hereinafter UCMJ]. See Manual 

for Courts-Martial, United States, (2005 ed.) [hereinafter MCM], Part IV, para. 62.b. 

The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence of a bad-conduct discharge, 

confinement for one year, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to E1.1

 

1

 Prior to taking action, the convening authority considered the addendum to the 

staff judge advocate recommendation (SJAR). The SJAR addendum was signed 

by Lieutenant Colonel Lippert as the “Deputy Staff Judge Advocate.” However, 

Article 60(d), UCMJ, requires a convening authority to obtain the written 

recommendation of his staff judge advocate or legal officer, not the deputy staff 

 (continued . . .) 
AVERILL—ARMY 20090491 

2

Appellant’s case is now before this court for review under Article 66, UCMJ. 

Appellant raises two assignments of error.2

 In addition, it is evident that 

Specification 1 of Charge II, setting forth a violation of Article 134, UCMJ, does not 

expressly allege a terminal element. We have considered the Article 134 charge and 

specification in light of United States v. Fosler, 70 M.J. 225 (C.A.A.F. 2011), and 

we have also considered the issues raised by appellant, the government’s answer, 

and the record of trial. We find the issues raised by appellant to be without merit, 

and we hold that Specification 1 of Charge II, when liberally construed, states the 

offense of adultery. 

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

Whether a charge and specification state an offense is a question of law that is 

reviewed de novo. United States v. Roberts, __ M.J. ___, slip op. at 4 (Army Ct. 

Crim. App. 14 Oct. 2011). Together, the charge and specification must “allege every 

element of the offense either expressly or by necessary implication, so as to give the 

accused notice and protect him against double jeopardy,” id. (quoting United States 

v. Dear, 40 M.J. 196, 197 (C.M.A. 1994)). Rule for Courts-Martial 307(c)(3). Here, 

appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge of adultery—which in this case does not 

expressly allege that appellant’s conduct was to the prejudice of good order and 

discipline or of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. However, 

appellant did not object to the language of the charge and specification at trial, nor 

did he object in his post-trial matters to the convening authority, or in his appeal to 

this court. Appellant’s silence on this issue speaks volumes and informs our 

decision on this matter. See United States v. Hoskins, 17 M.J. 134, 136 (C.M.A. 

 

(. . . continued) 

judge advocate. Consequently, it was plain error for the deputy staff judge 

advocate to sign the SJAR addendum. United States v. Hudgins, 69 M.J. 630, 631 

(Army Ct. Crim. App. 2010). Regardless, we find no prejudice in this case. 

Appellant did not allege the error to this court nor did he make “any colorable 

showing of possible prejudice.” United States v. Wheelus, 49 M.J. 283, 289 

(C.A.A.F. 1998). 

2

 In one assignment of error, appellant avers that the military judge erred when he 

did not instruct the panel that appellant first possessed the burden to prove the 

affirmative defenses of consent and mistake of fact as to consent by a preponderance 

of the evidence. UCMJ art. 120(t)(16). We hold that the military judge erred by not 

giving a legally sufficient explanation when he provided an instruction that was 

inconsistent with Article 120, UCMJ. United States v. Medina, 69 M.J. 462, 465 

(C.A.A.F. 2011). However, under the facts of this case, we are satisfied that this 

error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The instruction that was given was 

clear and correctly conveyed that the burden to disprove the affirmative defenses 

beyond a reasonable doubt rested solely with the government. Id. 
AVERILL—ARMY 20090491 

3

 1984) (listing factors that directly impact the ultimate decision of whether a charge 

and specification necessarily imply an element). Where a charge and specification 

are not challenged at trial, their language is to be liberally construed. Roberts, __ 

M.J. at ___, slip op. at 4 (citing United States v. Watkins, 21 M.J. 208, 209–10 

(C.M.A. 1986)). Cf. Fosler, 70 M.J. at 230. This liberal rule of interpretation is 

applicable even where an appellant does not plead guilty. United States v. Fox, 34 

M.J. 99, 102 (C.M.A. 1992); Roberts, __ M.J. at ___, slip op. at 5; United States v. 

Berner, 32 M.J. 570, 572 (A.C.M.R. 1991). 

In the absence of an objection at trial, we will not set aside a charge and 

specification unless it is “so obviously defective that it could not be reasonably 

construed to embrace [the] terminal element.” Roberts, __ M.J. at ___, slip op. at 5; 

United States v. Watkins, 21 M.J. 208, 209–10 (C.M.A. 1986). We hold that in this 

case the Article 134 charge and specification can be so construed, and, therefore, 

state the offense of adultery. In this case, appellant did not object at trial; therefore, 

his standing to challenge the charge and specifications is circumscribed. Roberts, __ 

M.J. at ___, slip op. at 4. Cf. Fosler, 70 M.J. at 230. In addition, the allegations 

contained in the adultery specification mirror those supporting the separately 

charged specifications alleging an aggravated sexual assault and an indecent act. In 

other words, altogether the charges notified appellant that the adultery was 

committed by engaging in sexual intercourse with a substantially incapacitated 

woman that was not his spouse in violation of Article 134, UCMJ. Therefore, the 

adultery charge and specification in this case necessarily imply that appellant’s 

conduct was prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting. 

Furthermore, this textual relationship of necessary implication provided 

appellant with fair notice. The charge sets forth a violation of Article, 134, UCMJ, 

and the specification states the date, location, and the victim of the offense. See, 

e.g., United States v. Dear, 40 M.J. 196, 197 (C.M.A. 1994) (holding a maltreatment 

specification provided notice because “it set[] forth the Article of the Code, name of 

the victim, the time frame of the offense, and the comments alleged to have been 

made by appellant”). Additionally, the panel was instructed in open court, without 

comment from appellant or his defense counsel, that the Article 134 offense 

contained terminal elements and required proof of the same. Buttressed by the 

presumption of the defense counsel’s competence, this is strong evidence that 

appellant was not misled about the nature of the charge leveled against him. See 

MCM, Part IV, paras. 60.c.(6)(a), and 62.b. Finally, the factual allegations in the 

specification combined with the record of trial sufficiently protect appellant against 

double jeopardy. 

CONCLUSION 

On consideration of the entire record, and in light of United States v. Fosler, 

70 M.J. 225 (C.A.A.F. 2011), we find appellant’s arguments to be without merit. 

We hold the findings of guilty and the sentence as approved by the convening 
AVERILL—ARMY 20090491 

4

authority correct in law and fact. Accordingly, the findings of guilty and the 

sentence are AFFIRMED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

 Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: