COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Lemons 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

RONALD A. PARRISH 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2718-97-2 JUDGE DONALD W. LEMONS 

 MARCH 16, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG 

James F. D'Alton, Jr., Judge 

 Mary Katherine Martin, Senior Assistant 

Public Defender (Office of the Public 

Defender, on brief), for appellant. 

 Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 

 

 Ronald A. Parrish appeals his conviction for conspiracy to 

distribute cocaine, a violation of Code § 18.2-256. On appeal, 

he argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support his 

conviction. Because we hold that the evidence was sufficient to 

find that Parrish conspired to distribute cocaine, we affirm his 

conviction. 

 I. BACKGROUND

 On December 5, 1996, Investigator Robert Elkins of the City 

of Petersburg Police Department was working in an undercover 

narcotics operation. He parked his vehicle near the center of 

the street just before the intersection of Shore and Wilson 

Streets and saw Ronald A. Parrish standing near the middle of the 
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street. Parrish approached his vehicle and "asked me what I 

needed." Elkins told Parrish he needed "a dime or a twenty," 

referring to ten or twenty dollars worth of cocaine. Parrish 

then asked him for a ride up the street to "Green Lantern," but 

Elkins refused. 

 Elkins "crept the car up a little bit" on Shore Street, when 

a second vehicle pulled ahead of him. A passenger, later 

identified as Edward A. Hines, Jr., exited the second vehicle and 

the car drove away. Parrish told Elkins "[h]old on a minute," 

and Parrish jogged over to Hines. Elkins remained seated in the 

vehicle. Parrish "went over to [Hines]" and "stopped and spoke 

to [Hines] a minute -- or I observed [Parrish and Elkins] 

appearing to be talking." Parrish and Hines looked over in 

Elkins' direction. Elkins stated that "both [Parrish and Hines] 

walked back over to my vehicle where I was stopped in the road." 

Parrish "[was] standing less than five inches away from . . . 

Hines" and "both stood outside of my half open window together." 

Parrish watched Elkins' and Hines' hands as Elkins exchanged 

money for "two small chunks of crack cocaine in a cigarette wrap 

-- the clear outside packaging of a cigarette wrap" from Hines. 

After obtaining the drugs, Elkins left Parrish and Hines standing 

together in the street. Shortly thereafter, a second officer 

arrested Hines and Parrish. 

 Parrish's version of events was similar; however, Parrish 

stated, "I wasn't going to sell him [any drugs]. . . . I was 
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going to basically have −− I mean, ask somebody did they have 

anything, but I wasn't going to sell him nothing [sic]." Parrish 

admitted to having four or five prior felony convictions. 

 Parrish was convicted in a bench trial of distribution of 

cocaine, distribution of cocaine within 1,000 feet of school 

property, and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. On appeal, he 

argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 

 II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

 When the sufficiency of the evidence is an issue on appeal, 

an appellate court must view the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth. See Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 42, 

393 S.E.2d 599, 608 (1990). On appeal, the decision of a trial 

court sitting without a jury is afforded the same weight as a 

jury's verdict and will not be disturbed unless plainly wrong or 

without evidence to support it. See King v. Commonwealth, 217 

Va. 601, 604, 231 S.E.2d 312, 315 (1977). 

 A conspiracy is "an agreement between two or more persons by 

some concerted action to commit an offense." Brown v. 

Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 101, 107, 348 S.E.2d 408, 411 (1986) 

(citations omitted). Proof of a conspiracy to distribute 

narcotics can be inferred by surrounding facts and circumstances. 

See Moore v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 277, 289, 487 S.E.2d 864, 

870 (1997). In fact, 
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 [c]ircumstantial evidence is as acceptable to 

prove guilt as direct evidence, and in some 

cases, such as proof of intent or knowledge, 

it is practically the only method of proof. 

[A] common purpose and plan may be inferred 

from a development and collocation of 

circumstances. Where it is shown that the 

defendants by their acts pursued the same 

object, one performing one part and the other 

performing another part so as to complete it 

with a view to its attainment, the jury will 

be justified in concluding that they were 

engaged in a conspiracy to effect that 

object. 

Amato v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 544, 552, 352 S.E.2d 4, 9 

(1987) (citations omitted). 

 Although, "[e]vidence which merely established aiding or 

abetting in the commission of the distribution offense will not 

suffice to prove a conspiracy . . . [t]he evidence need not show 

that . . . [the defendant] knew the entire scope or details of 

the plan of distribution." Moore, 25 Va. App. at 288, 487 S.E.2d 

at 870 (citations omitted). In Moore, the defendant appealed his 

convictions for possession of heroin with intent to distribute 

and conspiracy to possess heroin with the intent to distribute. 

In part, he claimed that the evidence failed to prove a 

conspiracy existed between him and a co-felon. The evidence 

revealed Moore's admission that he knew that the co-felon 

intended to distribute heroin and his contradictory statements 

about his knowledge of the contents of the bag in his pants. 

 We affirmed both of Moore's convictions. With respect to 

the conspiracy conviction, we held, "[a]n agreement between Moore 

and [his co-felon] may be inferred from the facts and 
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circumstances." Id. at 289, 487 S.E.2d at 870. As we have 

noted, "determinations of credibility lie within the purview of 

the fact finder, who may reject a witness' testimony . . . [and] 

the fact finder may conclude that the defendant lied to conceal 

his guilt." Id. at 289, 487 S.E.2d at 870. 

 In the case now before us, Parrish argues that the evidence 

was not sufficient to support his conviction for conspiracy to 

distribute cocaine. Citing our decision in Feigley v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 717, 432 S.E.2d 520 (1993), he argues 

that the Commonwealth failed to prove the existence of a 

conspiracy between him and Hines beyond a reasonable doubt. In 

Feigley, we reversed the defendant's conviction for conspiracy to 

distribute narcotics, holding that when "the evidence is equally 

susceptible to two constructions, one of which would support 

conspiracy and another which would not, the fact finder is not 

free to arbitrarily select that theory of conspiracy." Id. at 

724, 432 S.E.2d at 525. Parrish contends that the evidence, even 

when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was 

equally subject to interpretations of guilt or innocence. 

 In reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support 

the finding that a conspiracy existed between Parrish and Hines 

to sell cocaine to Elkins. We hold that the Commonwealth 

excluded all reasonable hypotheses of Parrish's innocence in a 

conspiracy to distribute cocaine with Hines. Parrish asked 

Elkins "what he needed," and thereafter he conferred with Hines. 
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Hines came to Elkins' car with Parrish and, without any further 

conversation, completed the transaction. The evidence was 

sufficient to find beyond a reasonable doubt that an agreement 

was formed between Parrish and Hines to distribute crack cocaine 

to Elkins. The conviction is affirmed. 

Affirmed.
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Benton, J., dissenting. 

 Ronald Parrish appeals from a conviction of conspiring with 

Edward A. Hines, Jr., for the purpose of distributing cocaine. I 

believe the evidence proved only that Parrish aided and abetted 

Hines when Hines distributed cocaine to the police officer. 

Parrish was convicted of that offense. In my view, the evidence 

was insufficient to prove a conspiracy. 

 By long standing definition, a "'[c]onspiracy is an 

agreement between two or more persons by some concerted action to 

commit an offense.'" Falden v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 542, 544, 

189 S.E. 326, 327 (1937) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 

"The agreement is the essence of the conspiracy offense." Zuniga 

v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 523, 527-28, 375 S.E.2d 381, 384 

(1988). Thus, it necessarily "follows that if the Commonwealth 

has failed to prove an agreement to commit an offense . . . , the 

prosecution falls of its own weight." Falden, 167 Va. at 544, 

189 S.E. at 327. As in every criminal prosecution for 

conspiracy, the Commonwealth bears the burden of "'prov[ing] 

beyond a reasonable doubt that an agreement existed.'" Feigley 

v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 717, 722, 432 S.E.2d 520, 524 

(1993). 

 The police officer testified that after he stopped his 

vehicle near Parrish, Parrish asked what he needed. When the 

officer said $10 or $20 worth of cocaine, Parrish asked the 
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officer to drive him to another location four to five blocks 

away. The officer then described the following events: 

[Parrish] asked for a ride, and I told him 

no. I said, I didn't know him. I wasn't 

going to give him a ride. At that time he 

appeared that since I wouldn't give him a 

ride, there wouldn't have been a transaction 

made. 

 I crept the car up a little bit. A second 

vehicle pulled up ahead of me on Shore 

Street. A passenger got out of that vehicle. 

The vehicle left the area. Mr. Parrish said: 

Hold on a minute. He jogged over to the 

second individual . . . . 

 I stayed in the vehicle. . . . He went 

over to the second individual, who we later 

identified as Edward Hines. He stopped and 

spoke to him a minute -- or I observed them 

appearing to be talking. Their mouths were 

moving. They looked in my direction. 

 Both individuals walked back over to my 

vehicle where I was stopped in the road. Mr. 

Parrish, standing less than five inches away 

from Mr. Hines . . . . 

* * * * * * * 

 I observed [Parrish's] eyes looking in 

that direction at a transaction that occurred 

between me and Mr. Hines. 

 I exchanged $20 of police department funds 

for two small chunks of crack cocaine in a 

cigarette wrap -- the clear outside packaging 

of a cigarette wrap -- with Mr. Hines. At 

which time after I obtained the drugs, I left 

the area leaving Mr. Hines and Mr. Parrish 

standing in the street together. 

 No other evidence proved any further involvement by Parrish. 

As in Feigley, "[t]here is no evidence to prove . . . that 

[Parrish] and [Hines] had prearranged that they would distribute 

drugs or that [Parrish] would 'run' drugs for [Hines]." 16 Va. 
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App. at 723, 432 S.E.2d at 524. Indeed, the evidence suggests 

that Hines' appearance was fortuitous and that his conversation 

with Parrish was unplanned. In any event, because the evidence 

failed to prove the nature of the conversation between Parrish 

and Hines, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that 

Parrish, knowing the officer would not drive five blocks to buy 

cocaine from Parrish, informed Hines that a customer was sitting 

in the vehicle who wanted to purchase $10 or $20 worth of 

cocaine. Significantly and simply put, the evidence failed to 

prove an agreement. 

 Where evidence in the record "'is equally susceptible of two 

interpretations one of which is consistent with the innocence of 

the accused, [the trier of fact] cannot arbitrarily adopt that 

interpretation which incriminates [the accused].'" Corbett v. 

Commonwealth, 210 Va. 304, 307, 171 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1969) 

(citation omitted). "On this record, it is equally, if not more, 

plausible that . . . [Parrish], who had been approached by [the 

officer], simply facilitated a single drug sale between [Hines] 

and [the officer]." Feigley, 16 Va. App. at 723, 432 S.E.2d at 

524. In other words, Parrish "was simply aiding and abetting in 

the drug sale." See id. 

 The evidence leads only to speculation, is not wholly 

consistent with Parrish's guilt of the conspiracy offense, and 

certainly is not wholly inconsistent with innocence of that 

offense. See Bishop v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 164, 169, 313 
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S.E.2d 390, 393 (1984). Suspicion that an accused has committed 

an offense is insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id. at 170, 313 S.E.2d at 393. Therefore, I would 

reverse the conspiracy conviction. I dissent.