IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2021 WY 49

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2021

April 6, 2021

CHERI DAVIDSON-EATON,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

CHRISTY IVERSEN and SUSAN D. 

KIRK, as co-personal representatives 

of the Estate of Gale S. Iversen, 

deceased,

Appellees

(Plaintiffs).

S-20-0150

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County

The Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge 

Representing Appellant:

Bernard Q. Phelan, Attorney at Law, Cheyenne, Wyoming

Representing Appellees:

John E. Masters, Attorney at Law, Cheyenne, Wyoming

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before 

final publication in the permanent volume.
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DAVIS, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Christy Iversen and Susan Kirk, co-personal representatives of the Estate of Gale S. 

Iversen (hereinafter “the Estate”), sued Cheri Eaton, Mr. Iversen’s caretaker. The Estate 

sought to recover property that it alleged Ms. Eaton unlawfully transferred to herself, and 

it requested that she be ordered to provide the Estate an accounting. Ms. Eaton in turn filed 

a creditor’s claim against the Estate claiming a right to compensation for services rendered 

to Mr. Iversen during his lifetime. When that claim was rejected, she sued the Estate in a 

separate action in district court for breach of express contract, breach of implied contract, 

and quantum meruit. The court then consolidated the actions brought by Ms. Eaton and 

the Estate. 

[¶2] The Estate moved for a partial summary judgment, and the district court granted 

that motion as to its property claims. After a bench trial, it denied Ms. Eaton’s claims and 

ordered that she provide the Estate an accounting. Ms. Eaton filed a notice of appeal 

identifying the order after trial and the summary judgment order as the orders appealed. 

We conclude that no final order has been entered in this matter, and we thus dismiss Ms. 

Eaton’s appeal for want of jurisdiction.

ISSUE

[¶3] The dispositive issue is whether the district court has entered a final appealable order 

that resolves all outstanding issues in this matter.

FACTS

[¶4] Gale Iversen died on August 4, 2017. On September 21, 2017, his Estate sued Ms. 

Eaton, alleging that she unlawfully transferred Mr. Iversen’s real property to herself shortly 

before his death. It sought an order quieting title to the property in the Estate, an order 

declaring the deeds that Ms. Eaton recorded void, and an order ejecting her from the 

property. The Estate also alleged that Ms. Eaton was acting as a fiduciary under a power 

of attorney, and it thus sought imposition of a trust and accounting. 

[¶5] The record on appeal is not complete as to Ms. Eaton’s complaint. At some point 

she filed a creditor’s claim against the estate for compensation that she claimed she was 

owed for care she provided Mr. Iverson during his lifetime. Apparently that was rejected, 

and she then sued the estate in district court. Her complaint asserted causes of action for 

breach of express contract, breach of implied contract, and quantum meruit. On April 17, 

2018, the district court consolidated the Estate’s and Ms. Eaton’s complaints for hearing.

[¶6] The Estate moved for partial summary judgment on its property claims, and on 

February 21, 2019, the district court granted that motion. The court ruled that the property 

deeds Ms. Eaton recorded were invalid and void, and it therefore ordered that title be 
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quieted in Gale Iversen, his estate, and his heirs and beneficiaries. The court further ruled 

that the Estate was entitled to judgment on its ejectment claim, and it ordered Ms. Eaton to 

vacate the property. 

[¶7] The district court held a bench trial August 19 through August 21, 2019 on Ms. 

Eaton’s claims and the Estate’s remaining claim for imposition of a trust and accounting. 

On December 19, 2019, the court issued an “Order and Opinion,” which ruled against Ms. 

Eaton on all of her claims, and ordered as follows concerning the Estate’s claim for an 

accounting:

[I]t is not appropriate to impose a complete fiduciary 

responsibility on Eaton and make her account. However, as to 

the transfer of titles to vehicles or real property, or of moneys 

in and out of [Mr. Iversen’s] bank and investment accounts, 

she was a fiduciary as she acted only through the limited grant 

of authority of the power of attorney and must account in 

response to a specific demand by the Estate.

Estate is entitled also to loss of rents and profits on real 

estate properties unlawfully transferred, in addition to the 

amounts revealed by the accounting ordered. 

[¶8] On December 30, 2019, Ms. Eaton filed a W.R.C.P. 59 motion to alter or amend the 

order. On January 21, 2020, she filed a notice of appeal to this Court, and on January 31, 

2020, the district court denied her Rule 59 motion. 

DISCUSSION

[¶9] Although the parties have not raised the question of whether a final appealable order 

was entered in this matter, we may do so sua sponte because it implicates our jurisdiction 

over the appeal. Edsall v. Moore, 2016 WY 71, ¶ 10, 375 P.3d 799, 801 (Wyo. 2016) 

(quoting City of Casper v. Holloway, 2015 WY 93, ¶ 16, 354 P.3d 65, 70 (Wyo. 2015)).

Whether we have jurisdiction is a question of law that we consider de novo. Jontra 

Holdings Pty Ltd v. Gas Sensing Tech. Corp., 2021 WY 17, ¶ 28, 479 P.3d 1222, 1231 

(Wyo. 2021) (citing Martin v. Hart, 2018 WY 123, ¶ 17, 429 P.3d 56, 62 (Wyo. 2018)). 

[¶10] W.R.A.P. 1.05(a) generally defines an appealable order as one that determines the 

action. Such an order has “three necessary characteristics. . . . It must affect a substantial 

right, determine the merits of the controversy, and resolve all outstanding issues.” Jontra 

Holdings, ¶ 29, 479 P.3d at 1231 (quoting Estate of Dahlke ex rel. Jubie v. Dahlke, 2014 

WY 29, ¶ 31, 319 P.3d 116, 124 (Wyo. 2014)); see also Woods v. Woods, 2001 WY 131, 

¶ 8, 36 P.3d 1142, 1144 (Wyo. 2001) (“Generally a judgment or order which determines 

the merits of the controversy and leaves nothing for future consideration is final and 
3

appealable, and it is not appealable unless it does those things.”) (quoting Pub. Serv. 

Comm’n v. Lower Valley Power & Light, Inc., 608 P.2d 660, 661 (Wyo. 1980)). “[T]he 

purpose of requiring a final appealable order ‘is to avoid fragmentary appeals and decisions 

made in a piecemeal fashion.’” Painter v. McGill ex rel. Wyo. Bd. of Med., 2019 WY 108, 

¶ 15, 450 P.3d 1243, 1247 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Estate of McLean ex rel. Hall v. Benson, 

2003 WY 78, ¶ 8, 71 P.3d 750, 753 (Wyo. 2003)).

[¶11] The district court’s order required that Ms. Eaton make an accounting to the Estate 

for all vehicle and real property transfers as well as moneys removed from Mr. Iversen’s 

bank and investment accounts. It further contemplated that the Estate’s damages would be 

calculated based in part on that accounting. It is thus apparent that the order required 

further proceedings and did not resolve all outstanding issues. Under similar 

circumstances, we have held that such an order is not a final appealable order.

In the underlying case, both Roger and Marquietta 

Woods have asked for an accounting of the administration of 

the trust. While an interim accounting and an interim 

distribution of trust assets have been accomplished, there has 

not yet been a final accounting. The district court maintains 

jurisdiction to take such further action as is necessary to 

accomplish the final accounting. Thus, the order on appeal is 

clearly an interlocutory order and not appealable at this time.

Because the order on appeal does not resolve the merits 

of the underlying claim, it is not an appealable order.

Therefore, this appeal is dismissed.

Woods, ¶¶ 9-10, 36 P.3d at 1144-45.

[¶12] In Woods, the plaintiff’s claim was for an accounting, and a distribution of trust 

assets that would be affected by that accounting. Id. ¶¶ 3, 6, 36 P.3d at 1143-44. Likewise, 

in this case, the Estate requested an accounting, as well as damages that will be calculated 

in part based on the accounting. The district court’s order after trial took a step toward 

resolving those claims by ordering the accounting, but it did not enter a final appealable 

judgment on damages. This is exemplified by the fact that on November 24, 2020, after 

Ms. Eaton’s appeal, the district court issued an “Order on Accounting” to enforce the 

accounting. In that order, it ruled:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the interests of 

justice, judicial economy, and equity require that the dollar 

amount from matters determined in the underlying order, and 

the amount resulting from this Accounting should be reduced 

to a judgment against [Ms. Eaton]. The Estate, following return 
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of the items, will prepare a notice of unreturned items and their 

value as noted above and file it with the Court, along with a 

judgment reflecting all amounts ordered. 

[¶13] We recognize that after a notice of appeal is filed, a trial court retains jurisdiction 

over matters unrelated to the appeal and to enforce its orders. W.R.A.P. 6.01(b); Garwood 

v. Garwood, 2010 WY 91, ¶ 26, 233 P.3d 977, 984 (Wyo. 2010) (citing KC v. KM, 941 

P.2d 46, 50-51 (Wyo. 1997)). In this case, however, both the order following trial and the 

Order on Accounting show that a final judgment on damages will not be entered until the 

accounting is complete. Moreover, the damages that will be ordered in that future 

judgment are directly related to the claims Ms. Eaton raises in this appeal, in that she 

challenges the very basis for at least some of the damages that may ultimately be awarded 

to the Estate.

[¶14] Finally, we note that this matter has produced the fragmentary appeals the 

requirement of a final appealable order is intended to avoid. Ms. Eaton first appealed the 

district court’s partial summary judgment order, and we dismissed that appeal. 

Additionally, while this appeal was pending, she appealed the above-cited Order on 

Accounting, which we dismissed, explaining:

[T]he “Order on Accounting” indicates the district court 

intends to enter a money judgment after various items are 

returned (or not returned). Thus, the “Order on Accounting” is 

not a final appealable order, because it does not determine the 

action or “resolve all outstanding issues.” In re KRA, 2004 WY 

18, ¶ 10, 85 P.3d 432, 436 (Wyo. 2004).

Davidson-Eaton v. Iversen, No. S-21-0041 (Order Dismissing Appeal Mar. 9, 2021). 

[¶15] Ms. Eaton’s appeal from the order following trial suffers the same defect. That 

order did not determine the action or resolve all outstanding issues, and it therefore was 

not a final appealable order. We therefore dismiss this appeal.