COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Elder and Lemons∗

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

CORY DeLAURENCIO 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION∗∗ BY 

v. Record No. 2497-98-1 JUDGE DONALD W. LEMONS 

 JUNE 20, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

Frederick B. Lowe, Judge 

 Andrew G. Wiggin (Donald E. Lee, Jr. and 

Associates, on briefs), for appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 ∗

 Justice Lemons prepared and the Court adopted the opinion 

in this case prior to his investiture as a Justice of the 

Supreme Court of Virginia. 

∗∗ Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

 Cory DeLaurencio was convicted of capital murder, robbery 

and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. On appeal, 

he contends (1) the trial court erred by refusing to strike a 

juror for cause and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support 

the convictions for robbery and murder during the commission of 

a robbery. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the 

convictions. 
I. BACKGROUND

 At approximately 11:00 p.m. on January 14, 1996, Traibeon 

Thomas was driving eastbound on Route 44. He had trouble with a 

tire and pulled his vehicle over to the side of the road, near 

the Laskin Road exit in Virginia Beach. Carl Gilliam, who was 

also driving eastbound on Route 44, stopped his vehicle to 

assist Thomas. Gilliam drove Thomas to his apartment where 

Thomas called a tow truck. Gilliam then took Thomas to an ATM 

to obtain money to pay for the tow truck. When they returned to 

Thomas' car, Gilliam saw a white Honda Civic parked in front of 

the vehicle. Gilliam stopped his car in front of the Honda. 

According to Gilliam, Thomas said, "it looked like somebody was 

in his car." Thomas walked up and confronted DeLaurencio, who 

then fatally shot Thomas in the head. Gilliam drove off, called 

"911" and reported the incident. 

 Shortly after the incident, DeLaurencio was arrested and 

taken into custody. He admitted that he and Aaron Merritt had 

broken into the car to remove the speakers and were in the 

process of removing them when Thomas returned. Thomas told 

DeLaurencio to "rise up out of the car." DeLaurencio admitted 

backing out of the car, pulling a gun out of his pocket, and 

shooting Thomas. DeLaurencio said he then returned to the Honda 

where his friend Merritt was waiting. After speaking with 

Merritt, DeLaurencio returned to where Thomas was lying and took 

his wallet. Merritt and DeLaurencio drove off in the Honda. 

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When the police examined Thomas' vehicle, they discovered that 

the back area in the rear seat had been pulled away from the 

frame of the vehicle exposing two of the large speakers. 

 DeLaurencio was indicted by a grand jury for capital murder 

in violation of Code § 18.2-31(4), robbery in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-58, and (3) use of a firearm in the commission of a 

felony in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. On December 3, 1996, 

the robbery indictment was amended by adding "or attempted 

robbery." 

 After all the evidence was presented, the jury received a 

capital murder instruction predicated only on robbery and 

omitting attempted robbery. DeLaurencio was convicted on all 

charges and sentenced to a term of life for capital murder, 

twenty years for robbery and three years for the use of a 

firearm in the commission of a felony. 

II. MOTION TO STRIKE PROSPECTIVE JUROR

 The constitutional right of an accused to a trial by jury 

is only meaningful if that jury is impartial. See U.S. Const. 

amends. VI and XIV; Va. Const. art. 1, § 8. This constitutional 

guarantee is reinforced by legislative enactment and by the 

Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia: veniremen must "stand 

indifferent in the cause." Code § 8.01-357; see Breeden v. 

Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 298, 227 S.E.2d 734, 735 (1976); 

Swanson v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 182, 184-85, 442 S.E.2d 

702, 704 (1994) (citation omitted); Rule 3A:14. 

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 "'Trial courts, as the guardians of this fundamental right, 

have the duty to procure an impartial jury.'" Brown v. 

Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 315, 326-27, 504 S.E.2d 399, 404 

(1998) (quoting Griffin v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 619, 621, 

454 S.E.2d 363, 364 (1995)). Accordingly, "the trial judge must 

probe the conscience and mental attitude of the prospective 

jurors to ensure impartiality." Griffin, 19 Va. App. at 621, 

454 S.E.2d at 364. A juror holding "a preconceived view that is 

inconsistent with an ability to give an accused a fair and 

impartial trial, or who persists in a misapprehension of law 

that will render him incapable of abiding the court's 

instructions and applying the law, must be excluded for cause." 

Sizemore v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 208, 211, 397 S.E.2d 408, 

410 (1990). 

 "'[I]n determining whether a prospective juror should have 

been excluded for cause, we review the entire voir dire, rather 

than a single question and answer.'" Brown, 28 Va. App. at 327, 

504 S.E.2d at 404 (quoting Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 

161, 173, 477 S.E.2d 270, 277 (1996)). Whether a juror is 

impartial is a question of historical fact. See Wainwright v. 

Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985). On appeal, a trial judge's 

decision to seat a juror is entitled to great deference, and the 

decision will not be overturned unless the error is manifest. 

See McGill v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 237, 241, 391 S.E.2d 

597, 600 (1990). 

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 Here, DeLaurencio contends that the prospective juror 

should have been struck for cause based on his "prejudice 

relating to the presumption of innocence" and based on his 

"prejudice relating to bias toward law enforcement witnesses." 

We disagree and hold that the trial court did not err by not 

striking this prospective juror for cause. 

 "Even though a prospective juror may hold preconceived 

views, opinions, or misconceptions, the test of impartiality is 

whether the venireperson can lay aside the preconceived views 

and render a verdict based solely on the law and evidence 

presented at trial." Griffin, 19 Va. App. at 621, 454 S.E.2d at 

364. The rationale behind this rule of law has been stated by 

the Supreme Court of the United States: 

In these days of swift, widespread and 

diverse methods of communication, an 

important case can be expected to arouse the 

interest of the public in the vicinity, and 

scarcely any of those best qualified to 

serve as jurors will not have formed some 

impression or opinion as to the merits of 

the case. This is particularly true in 

criminal cases. To hold that the mere 

existence of any preconceived notion as to 

the guilt or innocence of an accused, 

without more, is sufficient to rebut the 

presumption of a prospective juror's 

impartiality would be to establish an 

impossible standard. It is sufficient if 

the juror can lay aside his impression or 

opinion and render a verdict based on the 

evidence presented in court. 

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961). The Supreme Court 

of Virginia observed: 

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"In these days of newspaper enterprise and 

universal education, every case of public 

interest is almost, as a matter of 

necessity, brought to the attention of all 

the intelligent people in the vicinity, and 

scarcely any one can be found among those 

best fitted for jurors who has not read or 

heard of it, and who has not some impression 

or some opinion in respect to its merits. 

It is clear, therefore, that upon the trial 

of the issue of fact raised by a challenge 

for such cause the court will practically be 

called upon to determine whether the nature 

and strength of the opinion formed are such 

as in law necessarily to raise the 

presumption of partiality." 

Briley v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 180, 184-85, 279 S.E.2d 151, 154 

(1981) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155-56 

(1878)). Therefore, "[t]he constitutional guarantee of an 

impartial jury does not contemplate excluding those who have 

read or heard news accounts concerning the case or even 

exclusion of those who have formed an opinion based on such 

accounts." Wilmoth v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 169, 173, 390 

S.E.2d 514, 516 (1990). 

 Accordingly, jurors are not required to be totally ignorant 

of the facts and issues involved in a case on which they sit. 

See Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 124, 360 S.E.2d 352, 358 

(1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1015 (1988). It is sufficient if 

they can set aside any impression or opinion and decide the case 

solely on the evidence presented at trial. See id. This 

ability to set aside any impression or opinion garnered from 

newspaper or other media sources, however, must be demonstrated 

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beyond a reasonable doubt. See Gosling v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. 

App. 642, 647, 376 S.E.2d 541, 544 (1989). Accordingly, any 

reasonable doubt as to a juror's qualifications must be resolved 

in favor of the accused. See Breeden, 217 Va. at 298, 227 

S.E.2d at 735. 

 Here, the prospective juror acknowledged awareness of 

accounts of the crime in the media but his awareness was 

coextensive with the brief summary of allegations provided by 

the trial judge at the commencement of voir dire. Although he 

characterized the media's account as "prejudging" the accused, 

the prospective juror repeatedly stated that he would base his 

decision upon the evidence presented at trial. 

 Additionally, viewing the voir dire of the prospective 

juror as a whole, it is clear that he was committed to hearing 

the evidence and observing the demeanor of witnesses before 

making determinations of credibility. The juror dispelled any 

notion that the status of being a police officer would per se

render the officer's testimony more believable than contrary 

testimony by one who was not a police officer. In the 

hypothetical "swearing contest" posed by defense counsel, the 

prospective juror stated, "it would depend on who the individual 

is and what the facts were." A person's occupation is not 

excluded from the mix of facts that are permissible in 

determining credibility. 

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 It is ironic that the entire colloquy with the prospective 

juror over credibility of police testimony took place when the 

defendant's theory of the case did not involve any credibility 

determinations based upon testimony by police officers. The 

defendant had confessed to his involvement in the shooting and 

to taking the victim's wallet. At trial, he argued that he did 

not intend to take the victim's wallet when he shot the victim 

and that the killing and the taking of the wallet were two 

separate acts. In both his motion to strike and in his motion 

to set aside the verdict, he argued that the evidence was 

insufficient to show that the killing occurred during the 

commission of a robbery. From the identification of potential 

witnesses for the defense, it is clear that the hypothetical 

"swearing contest" with a police officer was not anticipated and 

was not part of the defendant's theory of the case. 

 DeLaurencio's reliance upon Brown v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. 

App. 199, 510 S.E.2d 751 (1999), is misplaced. In Brown, one 

juror had been the victim of an attempted abduction and possible 

sexual assault and expressed reservations about her ability to 

set aside her personal experiences in a trial involving similar 

charges. The second juror in Brown could not embrace the 

presumption of innocence. Neither of the issues in Brown are 

implicated in this case. 

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 Upon review of the voir dire as a whole, we find that the 

trial judge did not err by refusing to strike this prospective 

juror for cause. 

III. ROBBERY

 The issue on appeal as granted by this Court is as follows: 

Whether the trial court committed reversible 

error by failing to grant appellant's 

motions to strike and to set aside the 

jury's verdicts and by finding the evidence 

sufficient that appellant committed robbery 

sufficient for a finding of guilty for 

robbery under Code § 18.2-31(4). 

In DeLaurencio's motion to strike, he maintained that a larceny 

of the wallet took place but that the evidence was insufficient 

to sustain a conviction for robbery. Additionally, DeLaurencio 

maintains that "the killing and the robbery were two separate 

acts"; consequently, the evidence was "insufficient to show that 

the killing occurred in the commission of a robbery or attempted 

robbery." 

 Robbery is "the taking, with intent to steal, of the 

personal property of another, from his person or in his 

presence, against his will, by violence or intimidation." Jones 

v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 615, 618, 1 S.E.2d 300, 301 (1939) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted). "The violence or 

intimidation must precede or be concomitant with the taking." 

Whitley v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 73, 286 S.E.2d 162, 166 

(1982). Additionally, "[t]he intent to steal and the taking 

must coexist. And the offense is not robbery unless the animus

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furandi was conceived before or at the time the violence was 

committed." Branch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 91, 94-95, 300 

S.E.2d 758, 759 (1983). 

 The robbery instruction given by the trial court without 

objection provided: 

 The Court instructs the jury that the 

defendant is charged with the crime of 

robbery. The Commonwealth must prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt each of the following 

elements of that crime: 

1. That the defendant intended to steal; 

and 

2. That a wallet and United States currency 

was taken; and 

3. That the taking was from Traibeon Thomas 

or in his presence; and 

4. That the taking was against the will of 

the owner or possessor; and 

5. That the taking was accomplished by 

violence to the person. 

 If you find from the evidence that the 

Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt each of the above elements of the 

offense as charged, then you shall find the 

defendant guilty but you shall not fix the 

punishment until your verdict has been 

returned and further evidence is heard by 

you. 

 If you find that from the evidence that 

the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt any one or more of the 

elements of the offense, then you shall find 

the defendant not guilty. 

 DeLaurencio maintains that he did not have the requisite 

intent to steal the wallet prior to or concomitant with the act 

of violence. However, the object of his intent is immaterial 

under the instruction approved by DeLaurencio. He concedes that 

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he came to the disabled vehicle with the intent to steal the 

speakers. Further, he concedes that a wallet with currency was 

taken from the victim against his will. The violence preceded 

the taking. "[W]here the violence against the victim and the 

trespass to his property combine in a continuing unbroken 

sequence of events, the robbery itself continues as well for the 

same period of time." Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 532, 543, 

273 S.E.2d 48, 55 (1980). Here, DeLaurencio's mental intent to 

steal, the shooting, and the taking of the wallet are closely 

connected in time, place, manner and causation. The evidence 

was sufficient to support the jury's finding that a robbery 

rather than a mere larceny occurred. 

 Finally, the Grand Jury indictment charged DeLaurencio, 

[o]n or about January 14, 1996, did 

willfully, deliberately, and with 

premeditation, kill Traibeon L. Thomas, 

during the commission of robbery or 

attempted robbery. 

Upon conclusion of the evidence, counsel and the trial judge 

discussed jury instructions. Apparently, concerned that the 

jury would be confused by the inclusion of "robbery or attempted 

robbery" in the instruction, the trial judge allowed DeLaurencio 

to choose which of the two circumstances would be offered to the 

jury as a basis for liability for capital murder: attempted 

robbery of the speakers or robbery of the wallet. We do not 

express an opinion concerning the correctness of this procedure 

because it is not before us on appeal. It is recited herein to 

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explain how the jury was instructed. DeLaurencio chose the 

robbery instruction, and attempted robbery was removed from the 

jury's consideration. 

 DeLaurencio concedes that he took the victim's wallet. He 

maintains, however, that "the killing and the robbery were two 

separate acts" and that the evidence was "insufficient to show 

that the killing occurred in the commission of a robbery." The 

Commonwealth argues, "[t]he defendant intended to steal from the 

victim before the killing and did steal from him before or after 

the killing through the use of force. He killed during the 

commission of a robbery." 

 In Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 402 S.E.2d 

218, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991), a larceny became a 

robbery because the victim interrupted the theft and was killed 

in a continuing unbroken sequence of events that were the 

"interdependent objects of a common criminal design." Id. at 

374, 402 S.E.2d at 224. The jury in Quesinberry was instructed 

concerning robbery and found that a robbery occurred. 

 The Virginia Supreme Court in Quesinberry revisited its 

analysis in Briley, 221 Va. 532, 273 S.E.2d 48. It said, 

In Briley, Linwood Briley and his cohorts 

stopped their victim outside a restaurant, 

robbed him at gunpoint, forced him into his 

own automobile, abducted him, and took him 

to an island located in the James River. 

Upon arrival at the island, approximately 15 

to 20 minutes after the initial robbery, 

they shot him fatally. They drove away in 

his car, which they later stripped of parts 

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and abandoned. We hold that the murder was 

closely related in time, place, and causal 

connection to the robbery, making it a part 

of the same criminal enterprise as a matter 

of law. Id. at 544, 273 S.E.2d at 56. 

Since Briley, we have affirmed convictions 

for capital murder during the commission of 

a robbery when the evidence was sufficient 

to support a conclusion that the killing and 

theft were interdependent objects of a 

common criminal design. 

Quesinberry, 241 Va. at 373, 402 S.E.2d at 224 (citations 

omitted). 

 In this case the murder and the robbery were closely 

related in time and place and causation sufficient to say that 

the murder and robbery were interdependent objects of a common 

criminal design. 

 Finding no reversible error, the convictions for capital 

murder, robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a 

felony are affirmed. 

Affirmed. 

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