No. 254, February 2010 Strategic Forum 1

new sense of trust and friendship between our 

people; similarly, the Merida Initiative is assisting our neighbor in defeating the drug threat, 

and has further helped to build trust between 

our countries.

Hence, the term compatible interface

in the title of this paper refers to the fact that 

the United States and Mexico have complementary areas of concern in each of our four 

instruments of national power (diplomatic, 

information, military, and economic), which 

have been shaped by events that uniquely impact upon North American neighbors. Hence, 

expanded cooperation between Mexican 

counterparts and the U.S. Northern Command 

and our interagency community will improve 

the security and prosperity of the citizens of 

both our nations.

This paper responds to a previous 

Strategic Forum (no. 243, July 2009) entitled U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: An 

Incompatible Interface by Craig Deare. 

Some of the assertions and conclusions 

within Dr. Deare’s paper were flawed due to 

an outdated U.S.-Mexico paradigm that preceded the 9/11 attacks and recent counterdrug operations in Mexico. If his work had 

been published prior to the establishment of 

U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), 

it would have been well received, but times 

have changed. Because of our collective 

The United States and Mexico share a 

common history shaped by military incursions 

during the 19th and early 20th centuries. The 

bond between the American and Mexican 

people, however, has continued to grow closer 

over time despite occasional negative rhetoric 

from politicians in Washington, DC, and 

Mexico City. At local and state levels, relations 

solidified through the closely knit fabric of our 

border towns, intermarriage between families 

on each side of the border, and the development of infrastructure (to include water, 

wastewater, and gas and electricity utilities) 

that serves communities to the north and south. 

At the national level, our relationship became 

closer due to economic growth resulting from 

the North American Free Trade Agreement 

(NAFTA), which now accounts for almost $1 

billion (U.S. dollars) in trade per day between 

the two countries.

The events of 9/11 helped political leaders 

realize that an attack on one NAFTA partner 

could have significant impact upon all trading 

partners. Trade decreased among all three 

NAFTA nations due to security concerns, 

which brought together our elected officials 

to discuss areas of mutual concern in defense 

and security. Mexican military support in the 

aftermath of Hurricane Katrina helped build a 

 Strategic Forum No. 254

February 2010

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

U.S.-Mexico Homeland Defense: 

A Compatible Interface

by Victor E. Renuart, Jr., and Biff Baker

experiences over the past 6 years, we find 

implausible the notion that USNORTHCOM 

is not staffed or experienced enough to support Mexico’s security cooperation needs. 

Hence, U.S.-Mexico Homeland Defense: A 

Compatible Interface is intended to set the 

record straight by pointing out the numerous areas of cooperation between Mexico and 

the United States since the establishment of 

USNORTHCOM.

The term compatible interface in the 

title of this paper refers to the fact that the 

United States and Mexico have complementary areas of concern in each of our four 

instruments of national power: diplomatic, 

information, military, and economic. A firm 

understanding of where we were, and where 

we are, in these elements of power gives the 

reader a better picture of the strong relationship between Mexico and the United States.

Diplomacy and 

Information

During the first 100 years of U.S.-

Mexican relations, diplomacy and information-sharing suffered setbacks due to armed 

conflicts between the nascent powers. School 

children who study history on both sides of 

our borders are familiar with the early interludes between our countries:
No. 254, February 2010 Strategic Forum 2

■ 1836: Texas gained independence from 

Mexico.

■ May 1846: Congress declared war on 

Mexico, which was ended with the Treaty of 

Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848).

■ April to November 1914: The United 

States occupied Veracruz due to the Tampico 

Affair.

■ March 1916 to February 1917: The 

United States retaliated against the Francisco 

“Pancho” Villa raids.

Diplomacy and misinformation 

appeared to remain in a continuous state of 

conflict, in part due to accusations thrown 

across the border that typically served 

the needs of U.S. and Mexican politicians 

who sought reelection. In contrast, diplomatic relationships between Mexico City 

and Washington did not inhibit the winwin relationships among families and local 

governments in our border communities. 

Formally, relationships between the governments of our two nations remained distant 

in the last century;1 informally, however, 

our ties have grown stronger over the past 

150 years. Despite the distance between various political leaders and occasional negative rhetoric used in election campaigns 

north and south of the border, the people of 

the United States and Mexico married, nurtured extended families, developed trade, 

and collaborated on many social and economic issues. In short, while our politicians 

saw a glass half-empty, the citizens in our 

border communities saw the U.S.-Mexican 

relationship as a glass half-full, with much 

of the fruit-bearing diplomacy occurring at 

local levels.

Economic

The United States and Mexico have separate and distinct national centers of gravity, 

but from a bilateral perspective, the North 

American economy, trade, and related critical infrastructures are shared centers of 

gravity that must be defended to preserve our 

way of life. Over the past century, collaboration and economic prosperity grew due to the 

initiatives of small businesses, corporations, 

and local governments. In addition, border communities developed common water, 

wastewater, and electric and gas utilities that 

shared costs, which benefited citizens from 

both nations. These growing economic relationships were further enhanced and formalized when Mexico, the United States, and 

General Victor E. Renuart, Jr., USAF, is Commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command 

and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). Dr. Biff Baker is a USNORTHCOM Senior Policy Analyst in 

Security Cooperation and Partnerships.

$400

$350

$300

$250

$200

$150

$100

$50

$0

19861987198819891990199119921993199419951996199719981999200020012002200320042005200620072008

Exports to Mexico Imports from Mexico

U.S. Exports to and Imports from Mexico (US$ billions)
No. 254, February 2010 Strategic Forum 3

tured goods (such as computers and electrical equipment).

In recent years, almost 85 percent of 

Mexico’s exports have gone to the United 

States, making Mexican economic success 

dependent on the balance between trade and 

security. U.S. economic success is also dependent on this balance. Continued prosperity 

depends on reliable homeland defense and 

security, which can only be achieved through 

greater coordination and information-sharing among military partners as well as the 

law enforcement and interagency community. 

Since USNORTHCOM has over 50 different 

Federal agency representatives in or near its 

headquarters every day, the command is ideally situated to reach out to our border partners for homeland defense-in-depth, as well as 

cooperative civil support initiatives.

Military

Prior to 1940, politicians on both sides of 

the border acknowledged the conflicts of 1836, 

1846, 1914, and 1916. At times politicians 

ignored their neighbors, and at other times 

they fanned the flames of former conflicts 

in political speeches. However, since 1940, 

there have been five influential events in the 

U.S.-Mexican defense relationship that have 

fostered increased security cooperation. In 

addition to partnering in World War II, developments include the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 

Security and Prosperity Partnership of North 

America, Hurricane Katrina, and the election 

of President Felipe Calderón and his counterdrug initiatives.

Partnering in World War II. The 

Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor was one of the 

defining moments in U.S. history leading to 

a declaration of war against the Axis powers. Canada had been at war with Germany 

since September 1939 and, showing solidarity 

with the United States, immediately declared 

war against Japan. Mexico immediately broke 

off relationships with the Axis powers in 1941. 

Then, due to the sinking of the oil tanker 

Portero de Llano and numerous submarine 

attacks on Mexican ships throughout 1942, 

Mexico declared war against Nazi Germany 

and Imperial Japan. The war led to greater 

trade between our nations, with Mexican oil 

fueling the U.S. war machine. Due to a common threat, historical animosities were set 

aside, which led to enhanced military cooperation for the mutual defense of North America.

This new level of cooperation resulted 

in the training of Mexican fighter pilots 

in the United States, and the creation of a 

Mexican P–47 Thunderbolt fighter squadron 

called the “Aztec Eagles.” The 201st Mexican 

Fighter Squadron, Mexican Expeditionary 

Air Force (Fuerza Aérea Expedicionaria 

Mexicana) pilots flew close air support 

missions over U.S. ground forces in the 

Philippines. U.S.-Mexican joint and combined operations during World War II contributed to the defeat of the Japanese in 

1945 and ensured survival of our nations. 

However, as the memory of a common 

enemy grew distant, the strong military and 

diplomatic ties forged during World War II 

decreased with each passing year as well.

9/11 Terrorist Attacks. A continental view of homeland defense and security 

once again became important after the 9/11 

terrorist attacks, which renewed the perspective that U.S. and Mexican armed forces 

have defense and security “connections” 

with areas of mutual interest. For instance, 

the United States and Mexico quickly 

crafted and implemented a “Smart Border 

Plan” in March 2002 that enhanced border 

security, while simultaneously facilitating 

transit of people and goods across the border. 

In addition, the Homeland Security Act was 

passed in November 2002, incorporating the 

continued prosperity 

depends on reliable 

homeland defense and 

security, which can only 

be achieved through 

greater coordination and 

information-sharing among 

military partners as well as 

the law enforcement and 

interagency community

Canada implemented the North American 

Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, 

which eliminated tariffs and many nontariff 

barriers, resulting in current trade between 

the United States and Mexico of almost $1 

billion per day.

The increasing integration of the Mexican, 

American, and Canadian economies represents 

a model of mutually beneficial trade. In contrast to the gloom-and-doom debates held in 

1993, NAFTA’s implementation has been beneficial to each nation’s economy. While maintaining distinct monetary, fiscal, economic, and 

social policies and practices tailored to each 

nation’s particular needs and economic structure, our countries have managed to forge an 

open marketplace where goods, services, and 

capital can move freely. To preserve that economic freedom and prosperity, our homeland 

defense and security initiatives must be planned 

and coordinated continentally.

As shown in the figure, security measures and concerns about further terrorist attacks resulted in a short-term recession 

that adversely impacted our economies. This 

short-term decline in trade started in 2001 

and continued through 2003, with substantial 

recovery in 2005 and 2006. These trade figures make clear that an attack on one nation 

affects not only the defense and security of 

that nation, but also the economic well-being 

of trading partners. Temporarily closing the 

shared border to legal trade after 9/11 had 

dramatic consequences for both of our economies; hence, both nations must plan to ensure 

this does not happen again. Specific examples 

of economic interdependency include:

■ Oil: Ninety percent of Mexican oil 

exports go to the United States.

■ Natural gas: The Mexican Government 

Petroleum Company operates 5,700 miles of 

natural gas pipelines that include 12 active 

connections to the U.S. pipeline system.

■ Coal: The United States exports coal 

to Mexico for electricity generation and steel 

production.

■ Electricity: Mexico imports from the 

United States and vice versa, depending on 

the region and time of year.

■ Manufactured goods: The majority of 

U.S. exports to Mexico consist of manufac-
assuming office, he has initiated numerous 

government reforms, and his administration has worked toward the elimination of the 

drug trafficking organizations within Mexico.

Just a month after assuming the presidency, Mexican authorities captured 

drug cartel leader Pedro Díaz Parada and 

announced his extradition to the United 

States. This action, combined with ongoing SPP activities, significantly enhanced 

the spirit of cooperation between the nations. 

In addition, President Calderón published 

a national strategy directing greater cooperation on matters of mutual interest with 

Mexico’s neighbors, which makes his election 

a pivotal moment in U.S.-Mexico relations.

Paradigm Shifts

The 9/11 terrorist attacks helped political leaders realize that an attack on one 

NAFTA partner could have significant impact 

upon all trading partners, since the oceans 

no longer insulate North America from 

defense and security threats. The Security 

and Prosperity Partnership of North America 

helped senior level administrators focus 

upon cooperation in areas of mutual concern that can decrease costs and increase 

benefits for people on both sides of the border. Hurricane Katrina helped people on 

both sides of the border view one another 

as friends who may need a helping hand, 

instead of as historical adversaries. Finally, 

the election of President Calderón brought 

U.S.-Mexican cooperation to a new level, 

simply because he recognized that diplomacy, information, defense, economics, and 

security are all interrelated. His emphasis on 

Immigration and Naturalization Service, 

the Border Patrol, Customs, and other agencies into the Department of Homeland 

Security, which streamlined coordination 

with our neighbors.

After 9/11, the defense organizations 

inside Mexico did not change their structure or mission. The Mexican armed forces, 

including the navy, army, and air force, are 

subordinate to the President of the Republic 

for internal security and exterior defense of 

the federation. In addition, the Mexican navy 

(Secretaria de Marina-Armada de Mexico, 

or SEMAR) and Mexican army and air 

force (Secretaria de la defena nacional,

or SEDENA) assist in civil defense efforts 

throughout their nation.

But as a consequence of 9/11, U.S. 

Northern Command was created in 2002, 

with the missions of homeland defense and 

providing military assistance to civil authorities. Although the organization and missions of USNORTHCOM do not exactly mirror 

the Mexican armed forces, they are complementary. For the first time in U.S. history, 

a geographic combatant commander was 

tasked to plan for the homeland defense of 

the United States from a multidomain and 

multinational perspective, which mandated 

focused outreach not only to our northern neighbors, but also to our neighbors in 

Mexico and The Bahamas.

Security and Prosperity 

Partnership of North America.

Trilateral cooperation has grown stronger 

since March 23, 2005, when the elected leaders of Mexico, Canada, and the United States 

announced a cooperative venture called the 

Security and Prosperity Partnership of North 

America (SPP). During this meeting, all three 

North American leaders described the security and prosperity of our nations as mutually dependent and complementary. They 

observed that over the preceding decade, their 

nations had taken important steps to expand 

economic opportunities for their people, creating the most vibrant and dynamic trade 

relationship in the world. In addition, to protect North America from external threats, 

prevent and respond to threats within North 

America, and streamline legitimate cross-border trade and travel, our three national leaders committed to:

No. 254, February 2010 Strategic Forum 4

■ implement common border security 

strategies

■ enhance infrastructure protection

■ implement a common approach to 

emergency response

■ improve aviation and maritime security

■ enhance intelligence partnerships

■ combat transnational threats

■ implement a border facilitation strategy.

Although SPP was not specifically 

focused on the military, the initiative 

opened discussions among key interagency planners and decisionmakers from 

the nations. In addition, the focus on these 

seven critical goals created a nexus among 

USNORTHCOM, the Mexican military, and 

our interagency partners.

Hurricane Katrina. Just 5 months 

after agreeing to the SPP initiative, Hurricane 

Katrina formed over The Bahamas, crossed 

southern Florida, and made landfall in 

southeast Louisiana as a category 3 storm on 

the morning of August 29, 2005. The storm 

surge caused loss of life and property damage 

in New Orleans and surrounding areas after 

the levee system failed.

The U.S. National Response System was 

focused first upon local, then state, and lastly 

Federal responses. However, the damage during Hurricane Katrina was so widespread that 

the nascent Department of Homeland Security 

requested assistance from the military. In 

addition, offers of assistance were accepted 

from both Canada and Mexico. Americans 

were grateful for the Canadian navy and coast 

guard ships, as well as SEDENA convoys and 

a SEMAR ship laden with food, supplies, and 

personnel who assisted the Hurricane Katrina 

relief effort. The symbolic journey by Mexico’s 

military into the disaster area marked the 

beginning of a new age of cooperation 

between our nations.2

Election of President Calderón.

Felipe de Jesús Calderón Hinojosa was elected 

President of Mexico and assumed office in 

December 2006 for a 6-year term. After his 

election, President Calderón increased the 

level of cooperation and interaction with his 

SPP and NAFTA counterparts in Canada and 

the United States. President Calderón promised to improve security, thereby enhancing prosperity for the Mexican people. Since 

the election of President 

Calderón brought U.S.-

Mexican cooperation to a 

new level, simply because 

he recognized that 

diplomacy, information, 

defense, economics, and 

security are all interrelated
No. 254, February 2010 Strategic Forum 5

constructive dialogue, rather than confrontational diatribes, has enhanced cooperation.

A Glass Half Full

The designation of the Commander of the 

North American Aerospace Defense Command 

(NORAD) as the dual-hatted Commander of 

USNORTHCOM provided the benefit of almost 

five decades of binational military cooperation and experience. Similarly, the CanadaU.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defense and the 

Canada-U.S. Military Cooperation Committee, 

which have continuously met since the 1940s, 

have provided superb models of cooperation 

and have contributed to a unique view on bilateral partnerships.

In contrast, the former U.S.-Mexico 

Bilateral Working Group (Bi-WG) dissolved 

after only 2 years, in part due to the departure of Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, 

and partly because the process, meetings, 

and outcomes were not formalized between 

the U.S. and Mexican militaries. The absence 

of a dedicated geographic combatant command relegated the Bi-WG initiative to an 

additional duty for already overworked 

Pentagon action officers.

With the assistance of our Office of 

Defense Coordination (ODC) in Mexico City, 

USNORTHCOM initiated outreach efforts to 

SEMAR and SEDENA in 2003. Several seniorlevel meetings led to a positive focus on the 

future, rather than a negative focus on the 

distant past. In 2005, just 2 years after our 

first meetings, the trinational SPP initiative 

was implemented, and only 5 months later, 

SEDENA and SEMAR contributed to post-hurricane relief that cemented the spirit of cooperation between U.S. and Mexican leaders.

In the summer of 2007, USNORTHCOM 

co-hosted a Senior Executive Dialogue with 

the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at 

the National Defense University, which opened 

candid dialogue among USNORTHCOM leaders, Mexican elected officials, and senior 

military leaders in a nonattribution environment. Trust and respect were enhanced 

among the senior U.S. and Mexican participants based on an open dialogue that focused 

on areas of common concern rather than 

flowery platitudes. Just a few months later, 

USNORTHCOM hosted an interagency conference for participants from Canada, Mexico, 

and the United States to discuss pandemic 

influenza; USNORTHCOM served as a catalyst for this trinational meeting, which helped 

move interagency and international planning 

and coordination forward. Additional H1N1/

pandemic influenza conferences were organized and working groups met during 2008, 

which paid significant dividends during the 

2009 outbreak of the H1N1 virus.

Increased trust by the government 

of Mexico is further evidenced by Federal 

Civil Protection System officials’ willingness to engage in frank discussions with 

USNORTHCOM regarding emergency preparedness capabilities and collaboration with 

the command, in conjunction with the U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency, on projects 

to provide hazardous material equipment and 

training to several Mexican border cities. This 

follows the first acceptance of Department of 

Defense humanitarian assistance by the government of Mexico in October 2008, when 108,000 

personal protective ensembles were employed 

during the spring 2009 H1N1 response.

Teaming with others depends upon 

building trust-filled relationships. Hence, 

our cooperation was greatly enhanced by the 

assignment of a SEMAR foreign liaison officer to USNORTHCOM in 2007 and the assignment of a SEDENA officer in 2009. Both 

officers have helped to open communications 

and enhanced information-sharing between 

USNORTHCOM and the Mexican military. 

Their professionalism and personable leadership styles have also contributed to higher 

levels of trust with their U.S. counterparts, 

which have assisted greatly when responding to natural disasters on both sides of our 

shared border.

In the aforementioned Strategic Forum, 

Dr. Deare argued that there were five significant obstacles that Mexico must overcome to 

improve links with its U.S. counterparts:

■ the continued existence of two service secretaries rather than a unified defense 

ministry

■ inadequate budgeting for the military 

realities of the country

■ lack of properly trained civilian leaders to exercise effective policy control over the 

two secretariats

■ widespread mistrust of the armed 

forces by other federal agencies

■ domestic political realities.

USNORTHCOM’s experiences in working 

with both SEMAR and SEDENA do not support this claim.

Security cooperation with SEMAR is 

facilitated by Fleet Forces Command, 2d Fleet 

and 3d Fleet, and Marine Forces North; and 

security cooperation with SEDENA is facilitated by U.S. Army North and Air Forces 

Northern. The Commander, USNORTHCOM, 

works with the two service secretaries rather 

than a unified defense ministry, and the level 

of cooperation has never been better.

Obviously, budgets can impact any military organization, but President Calderón 

has reallocated resources to support military 

actions against drug trafficking organizations. 

In addition, the U.S. Government has enacted 

legislation for the Merida Initiative, which will 

assist our neighbors in defeating this threat. 

Could funding be better? Yes—there is always 

a need for more training, better equipment, 

and better wages to improve retention; however, this has not been a major impediment.

The NORAD and USNORTHCOM staffs 

include U.S. and Canadian officers who were 

directly involved in or previously deployed 

to Operations Enduring Freedom and 

Iraqi Freedom, as well as those who formerly supported Plan Colombia. So the assertion that only U.S. Southern Command 

(USSOUTHCOM) is specially situated to assist 

the Mexican military is a specious one. If 

one used similar faulty logic, USSOUTHCOM 

should have developed the counterinsurgency 

plans in Iraq and Afghanistan instead of U.S. 

Central Command due to its experience in 

Colombia. The reality is that USNORTHCOM 

Mexico is a North 

American country that 

has greater ties to the 

United States and Canada 

than it does to the 

Caribbean and Central 

and South America
and USSOUTHCOM share in the strategic 

interest of reducing illicit trafficking in our 

hemisphere, with each offering well-integrated contributions.

An alleged absence of properly trained 

civilian leaders has not been an issue in the 

military-to-military relationships among 

USNORTHCOM, SEMAR, and SEDENA. The 

interface between ODC-Mexico’s civilian and 

military employees with their Mexican counterparts has been professional, congenial, and 

productive. Although Mexico does not have 

equivalent layers of civilian defense secretaries, under secretaries, and assistant secretaries, this has not negatively impacted 

USNORTHCOM-Mexican military relations. 

In fact, SEMAR and SEDENA have discovered that the singular focus of a geographic 

combatant commander can result in more 

focused dialogue and quicker responses than 

attempting to navigate the Pentagon maze. 

The leadership of both SEDENA and SEMAR 

specifically highlight these close personal and 

professional relationships in every interaction 

they have with the Department of Defense.

Dr. Deare argued that USSOUTHCOM has 

greater cultural awareness of Latin America, 

but cultural awareness of the Southern 

Cone or the Andean region does not make 

one an expert in Mexico. U.S. Foreign Area 

Officers with experience in Latin America and 

assigned to USNORTHCOM correctly identify 

that Mexico, as a North American country, has 

greater ties to the United States and Canada 

than it does to the Caribbean and Central and 

South America, since geography and economics often drive defense and security initiatives.

During our numerous interagency planning meetings focused upon the H1N1 crisis, forest fires, and other natural disasters, 

we have witnessed quite the opposite of Dr. 

Deare’s alleged widespread mistrust of the 

Mexican armed forces by other Mexican 

federal agencies. Perhaps his observation 

was true at some time in Mexico’s past. 

Numerous polls, as well as personal experience, have found that the military is one of 

Mexico’s strongest and most respected institutions. Mexico’s National Human Rights 

Commission has documented alleged cases 

of abuse by the military in their fight against 

drug cartels, but the secretaries of SEMAR 

and SEDENA have made firm commitments 

No. 254, February 2010 Strategic Forum 6

to ensure responsibility and accountability at all levels. In addition, USNORTHCOM 

and USSOUTHCOM have partnered on several region-wide initiatives to provide training 

assistance as requested.

Dr. Deare’s only argument that may 

have merit is about “political realities” affecting U.S. assistance to Mexican military and 

agency partners. The Mexican constitution 

is a political restraint upon security cooperation and security assistance because article 76 requires Mexican senate approval for 

“the departure of national troops beyond the 

borders of the country, the passage of foreign 

troops through the national territory, and 

the sojourn of squadrons of other powers for 

more than one month in Mexican waters.” 

Although this article is at times interpreted 

as never permitting foreign troops within 

Mexican national territory, it does permit troops with Mexican senate approval. 

Like some politicians in the United States, 

Mexican senators will not approve military assistance inside Mexico if they perceive 

repercussions at the polls. However, attitudes 

are changing; for example, the Mexican senate approved SEMAR’s participation in the 

recent UNITAS maritime exercise.

Compatible interface refers to the fact 

that the United States and Mexico have complementary areas of concern in each of the 

four instruments of national power. Since 

political realities can inhibit cooperation 

within the Mexican national territory, it simply makes sense to expand cooperation with 

USNORTHCOM and our interagency community on the northern side of the border, for the 

security and prosperity of the citizens from 

both nations.

Notes

1

 Patrick M. Cronin, ed., “The Americas: Securing 

the Three Borders,” in Global Strategic Assessment 2009: 

America’s Security Role in a Changing World (Washington, 

DC: National Defense University Press, 2009), 351.

2

 Biff Baker, “Neighbors Helping Neighbors: 

Instruments of National Power Define U.S.-Mexico Relations,” 

Agora Magazine 1, nos. 2 and 3 (July 2008).

I N S T I T U T E F O R N A T I O N A L S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

Phillip C. Saunders 

Interim Director of Research

Christopher J. Lamb

Interim Director

The Strategic Forum series presents original 

research by members of NDU as well as other 

scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The 

opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 

expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect 

the views of the Department of Defense or any 

other agency of the Federal Government. Visit 

NDU Press online at www.ndupress.edu. 

The mission of the Institute for National 

Strategic Studies is to conduct strategic 

studies for the Secretary of Defense, 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

the combatant commanders, to support 

the national strategic components of the 

academic programs at the National Defense 

University, and to provide outreach to other 

U.S. Government agencies and to the broader 

national security community.