Force Design 2030

March 2020
Force Design 2030 1

BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT

This report describes the progress of the Marine Corps on my watch in preparing for the sweeping changes 

needed to meet the principal challenges facing the institution: effectively playing our role as the nation’s naval 

expeditionary force-in-readiness, while simultaneously modernizing the force in accordance with the National 

Defense Strategy (NDS) – and doing both within the fiscal resources we are provided. A certain degree of 

institutional change is inevitable when confronting modernization on this scale, and that type of change is 

hard. As such, I want to be clear up front: our force design effort is a work in progress. Thanks to the dedication 

and effort of a great many Marines, Sailors, and civilians over the last six months, we have come to a clearer 

understanding of some force design changes we can confidently make today, while identifying other areas that 

require additional analysis. This reports explains, at length and in some detail, my argument for change, our 

force design methodology and organization, my personal assessment of the work to date, and the steps we are 

taking to move the force design effort into the next phase.

“Transformation is a process, not an event.”

— John P. Kotter

Harvard Business School
Force Design 2030 2

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE – THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

The 2018 National Defense Strategy redirected the 

Marine Corps’ mission focus from countering violent 

extremists in the Middle East to great power/peer-level 

competition, with special emphasis on the Indo-Pacific. 

Such a profound shift in missions, from inland to littoral, 

and from non-state actor to peer competitor, necessarily 

requires substantial adjustments in how we organize, 

train, and equip our Corps. A return to our historic role in 

the maritime littoral will also demand greater integration 

with the Navy and a reaffirmation of that strategic 

partnership. As a consequence, we must transform 

our traditional models for organizing, training, and 

equipping the force to meet new desired ends, and 

do so in full partnership with the Navy.

THE ARGUMENT FOR CHANGE

Our current force design, optimized for large-scale 

amphibious forcible entry and sustained operations 

ashore, has persisted unchanged in its essential 

inspiration since the 1950s. It has changed in details 

of equipment and doctrine as technology has advanced 

toward greater range and lethality of weapon systems. 

In light of unrelenting increases in the range, accuracy, 

and lethality of modern weapons; the rise of revisionist 

powers with the technical acumen and economic heft 

to integrate those weapons and other technologies for 

direct or indirect confrontation with the U.S.; and the 

persistence of rogue regimes possessing enough of 

those attributes to threaten United States interests, I 

am convinced that the defining attributes of our current 

force design are no longer what the nation requires of 

the Marine Corps.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FORCE DESIGN

This imperative for change explains why I concur with 

the diagnosis of my predecessor that, “The Marine 

Corps is not organized, trained, equipped, or postured 

to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving future 

operating environment.” I assess that the current force 

is unsuited to future requirements in size, capacity, and 

specific capability:

Size and Capacity

Operating under the assumption that we will not receive 

additional resources, we must divest certain existing 

capabilities and capacities to free resources for essential 

new capabilities. The most logical way to approach 

divestment is to take a systems perspective and 

reduce infantry battalions while proportionally 

reducing the organizations dedicated to supporting 

these battalions – direct support artillery, ground 

mobility assets, assault support aviation, light attack 

aviation, and combat service support capabilities whose 

capacity is similarly related to the size of the ground 

and air combat elements to be supported.

Specific Capability

With the shift in our primary focus to great power 

competition and a renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific 

region, the current force has shortfalls in capabilities 

needed to support emerging joint, naval, and Marine 

Corps operating concepts.

We have shortfalls in expeditionary long-range precision 

fires; medium- to long-range air defense systems; 

short-range (point defense) air defense systems; 

high-endurance, long-range unmanned systems with 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), 

Electronic Warfare (EW), and lethal strike capabilities; 

and disruptive and less-lethal capabilities appropriate for 

countering malign activity by actors pursuing maritime 

“gray zone” strategies.

Similarly – and understandably, in a force that was 

designed with different assumptions regarding threat 

and environment – there are some capabilities that I 

assess we are over-invested in. A partial list includes 

heavily armored ground combat systems (tanks), towed 

cannon artillery, and short-range, low endurance 

unmanned aerial systems (UAS) incapable of employing 

lethal effects. Finally, as an element of the integrated 

naval force, we have capability and capacity excesses 

and shortfalls in areas not organic to the Marine Corps, 

but which are essential to our ability to contribute 

to sea control and sea denial in a contested littoral 

environment.

These include a requirement for smaller, lower signature, 

and more affordable amphibious ships and a shortfall 

in affordable, distributable platforms that will enable 

littoral maneuver and provide logistical support in a 

very challenging theater for the kind of operations 

envisioned in our current concepts.
Force Design 2030 3

STARTING POINT FOR FORCE DESIGN

– VISION AND EXPECTATIONS

The Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) I issued 

in July 2019 identified force design as my number one 

priority. That prioritization was the result of my direct 

participation in five years of naval and global war games 

while the Commanding General of I MEF, Commander of 

Marine Corps Forces Pacific, and Deputy Commandant 

for Combat Development and Integration. Those war 

games helped shape my conclusion that modest and 

incremental improvements to our existing force structure 

and legacy capabilities would be insufficient to overcome 

evolving threat capabilities, nor would they enable us 

to develop forces required to execute our approved 

naval concepts.

In my planning guidance I outlined expectations 

regarding future force design, to include describing 

a number of specific attributes I saw as essential. 

Informed by trends in military technology, specifically 

the emergence and proliferation of the Mature Precision 

Strike Regime (MPSR), the rise of gray zone activities, 

and the Service imperative for maritime campaigning, 

I provided the following direction:

(1) “We must acknowledge the impacts of proliferated 

precision long-range fires, mines, and other smart 

weapons, and seek innovative ways to overcome 

these threat capabilities.”

(2) “Future force development requires a wider range 

of force options and capabilities. The Marine Corps 

must be able to fight at sea, from the sea, and from 

the land to the sea; operate and persist within range 

of adversary long-range fires; maneuver across the 

seaward and landward portions of complex littorals; 

and sense, shoot, and sustain while combining the 

physical and information domains to achieve desired 

outcomes. Achieving this end state requires a force that 

can create the virtues of mass without the vulnerabilities 

of concentration, thanks to mobile and low-signature 

sensors and weapons.”

(3) In the context of force design, we need better answers 

to the question “what does the Navy need from the 

Marine Corps?”

(4) I highlighted the naval operating concepts that shape 

the current, evolving vision of how we will fight in the 

future. Central among these are the Navy’s vision of 

Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and the related 

Marine Corps and Navy concepts of Littoral Operations 

in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and Expeditionary 

Advance Base Operations (EABO). I also referenced the 

draft Marine Corps concept of “Stand-In Forces,” an 

offshoot of EABO that emphasizes the generation of, 

“technically disruptive, tactical stand-in engagements 

that confront aggressor naval forces with an array of 

low signature, affordable, and risk-worthy platforms 

and payloads.”

(5) “While we stand by to perform such other duties as the 

President may direct, foreign humanitarian assistance, 

disaster relief, and noncombatant evacuations do not 

define us – they are not our identity. Rather, they are the 

day-to-day consequence of being the force-in-readiness. 

We are not designing an across-the-ROMO force; but 

rather, a force intended to prevent major conflict and 

deter the escalation of conflict within the ROMO.”

(6) “I do not believe joint forcible entry operations 

(JFEO) are irrelevant or an operational anachronism; 

however, we must acknowledge that different 

approaches are required given the proliferation of 

anti-access/area denial (A2AD) threat capabilities in 

mutually contested spaces.”

(7) “As the preeminent littoral warfare and expeditionary 

warfare service, we must engage in a more robust 

discussion regarding naval expeditionary forces and 

capabilities not resident with the Marine Corps such as 

coastal/riverine forces, naval construction forces, and 

mine countermeasure forces. We must ask ourselves 

whether it is prudent to absorb some of those functions, 

forces, and capabilities to create a single naval 

expeditionary force whereby the Commandant could 

better ensure their readiness and resourcing.”

“We must transform...to 

meet new desired ends, 

and do so in full partnership 

with the Navy.”
Force Design 2030 4

Broadly speaking, our future force must align to the 

NDS. Thus, we will purpose-build forces capable of 

assurance and deterrence – forces that are “combat 

credible” in accordance with the NDS. In short, our 

future forces:

• Will be capable of successfully competing 

and winning in the gray zone

• Will be a single, integrated total force, and 

not distinct and semi-independent active 

and reserve components

• Will be, while purpose-built to support joint 

maritime campaigning, inherently capable 

of facilitating other joint operations

Enabling these core characteristics, our future Marines 

will possess the physical and mental toughness, tenacity, 

initiative and aggressiveness necessary to win in close 

combat, along with the intellectual and technical skills 

required to innovate, adapt, and succeed in the rapidly 

changing 21st century operating environment. We will 

equip our Marines with mobile, low-signature sensors 

and weapons that can provide a landward complement 

to Navy capabilities for surface warfare, antisubmarine 

warfare, air and missile defense, and airborne early 

warning. And in partnership with the Navy, our units 

will possess littoral maneuver capabilities to include 

high-speed, long-range, low-signature craft capable of 

maneuvering Marines for a variety of missions.

“war games helped shape 

my conclusion that 

modest and incremental 

improvements to our 

existing force structure 

and legacy capabilities 

would be insufficient to 

overcome evolving threat 

capabilities.”
Force Design 2030 5

about elements of the force design the IPT ultimately 

proposed. A much more comprehensive follow-on effort 

must be made to wargame and analyze all aspects of 

our force design conclusions. Of particular importance in 

informing the Phase II effort were a series of war games 

conducted by the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory 

(MCWL), including the POM-20 wargame in March 2018 

and a series of games in October 2019, the June 2019 

Naval Services wargame, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s 

(INDOPACOM) August 2019 Global XI Wargame, and 

the Joint Staff J7’s Globally Integrated Wargame in 

September and November 2019. While these war games, 

again, were not designed to test the specific force design 

recommendations advanced by the IPT, they did offer a 

number of key insights. These include:

• The individual / force element which shoots 

first has a decisive advantage.

• Forces that can continue to operate inside 

an adversary’s long-range precision fire 

weapons engagement zone (WEZ) are more 

operationally relevant than forces which must 

rapidly maneuver to positions outside the 

WEZ in order to remain survivable. These 

“stand-in” forces attrite adversary forces, 

enable joint force access requirements, 

complicate targeting and consume adversary 

ISR resources, and prevent fait accompli 

scenarios.

• Range and operational reach matters in the 

Indo-Pacific Area of Responsibility (AOR).

• The hider-versus finder competition is real. 

Losing this competition has enormous and 

potentially catastrophic consequences. This 

makes success in the reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance mission an imperative for 

success.

• Forward bases and stations and fixed 

infrastructure are easily targeted, and 

extremely vulnerable to disruption.

• Mobility inside the WEZ is a competitive 

advantage and an operational imperative.

• Logistics (sustainability) is both a critical 

requirement and critical vulnerability. Forces 

that cannot sustain themselves inside the 

METHODOLOGY

Our force design effort is framed in four phases. Phase 

I focused on problem framing, began in July 2019, 

and centered on a small operational planning team 

(OPT) that worked directly with me to establish an initial 

visualization of the future force as well as aim points 

for follow-on work.

Phase II began in September 2019, when the OPT’s 

initial work transitioned to the Deputy Commandant for 

Combat Development and Integration (DC CD&I). The 

DC CD&I subsequently established twelve functionally 

and organizationally-focused Integrated Planning 

Teams (IPTs) to assess our current design and develop 

future force design recommendations. These IPTs 

were organized to address: (1) MEU reconfiguration; 

(2) the Marine Littoral Regiment construct; (3) Maritime 

Prepositioning Force reconfiguration; (4) aviation in 

support of the FMF; (5) logistics in support of the FMF; 

(6) anti-ship capabilities; (7) medium-range air defense 

capabilities; (8) infantry battalion reorganization; (9) 

manned-unmanned capability balance; (10) objective 

network requirements; (11) training and education; and 

(12) the reserves.

Upon completion of these twelve IPTs, an overarching IPT 

was established in February 2020 tasked with synchronizing 

and integrating all previous outputs and producing a plan 

of action for Phase III. Phase III will concentrate on rapid 

and iterative wargaming, analysis, and experimentation, 

while Phase IV will focus on refinement, validation, 

and implementation via the Planning, Programming, 

Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES). This interim 

report summarizes the results of our efforts in Phase I and 

II, while articulating our plan of action for subsequent 

phases of force design.

WARGAMING

Phase II of Force Design devised and executed a 

series of deliberate war games providing both an initial 

analysis of the Phase I effort as well as guidance to 

inform subsequent efforts. Additionally, the Phase II 

effort drew upon the results of a wider body of Marine 

Corps and Naval Service wargaming and analysis that had 

been conducted before its work began. It is important 

to note that, although much has been learned from 

this body of earlier work, to date we have explored 

initial implications of the EABO and LOCE concepts in a 

limited number of scenarios, permitting some inferences 

FORCE DESIGN EFFORT
Force Design 2030 6

WEZ are liabilities; however, those that 

can sustain themselves while executing 

reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance 

missions create a competitive advantage.

• There is no avoiding attrition. In contingency 

operations against peer adversaries, we will 

lose aircraft, ships, ground tactical vehicles, 

and personnel. Force resilience – the ability 

of a force to absorb loss and continue to 

operate decisively – is critical.

MODELING AND SIMULATION

Phase II was informed by the large body of previous 

campaign modeling done in conjunction with the 

wargaming efforts described above (as well as other 

related projects), along with modeling associated with 

the concurrent Navy-led Integrated Naval Force Structure 

Assessment (INFSA). This modeling informed the IPT’s 

analysis on a number of considerations including munitions 

and other logistical requirements; probabilities of success 

in various types of surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, airto-air and air-to-surface engagements; and the range 

and probability of detection of sensors employed against 

various target arrays.

EXPERIMENTATION

Limited experimentation has been conducted upon 

discrete elements of the future force utilizing approved 

naval concepts, to include some carefully constrained tests 

of the ability of the F-35B to operate and be sustained 

from austere, undeveloped landing sites. Some of this 

work has been conducted in the Indo-Pacific region in 

conjunction with scheduled training exercises conducted 

by 31st MEU. A single, limited-objective experiment 

addressing aspects of the organization, training, and 

equipment of a Marine infantry battalion was conducted 

in support of the Force 2025 force structure review in 

2016. We will need to conduct full-scale, empiricallybased experimentation of the future force in realistic 

maritime and littoral terrain. Our experimentation 

must be deliberate and iterative, informed by both 

threat developments and technology advancements.

INITIAL CMC DESIGN GUIDANCE

I provided the following specific guidance to bound 

the Phase II planning effort:

• Use the 2019 Commadant’s Planning 

Guidance as REF A.

• Use approved naval concepts (DMO, EABO, 

and LOCE) as REF B.

• The legacy 2 MEB JFEO requirement is 

unsuitable as a force-sizing construct.

• Aside from the CPG’s general guidance, 

orientation, and framing, start with the 

proverbial intellectual blank sheet of paper 

or white board, and build the operationally 

suitable force for 2030.

• Do not be constrained by current programsof-record.

• The force will be uniquely capable 

of performing EABO and Distributed 

Operations (DO).

• Use a threat-informed approach and naval 

warfare perspective.

• Plan for sufficient capacity to return the force 

to a 1:3 deployment to dwell ratio.

“We will need to conduct full-scale, empirically-based 

experimentation of the future force in realistic maritime 

and littoral terrain. Our experimentation must be deliberate 

and iterative, informed by both threat developments and 

technology advancements.”
Force Design 2030 7

The outcome of the Phase I and II effort was a redesigned 

“Objective Force” with the following characteristics:

Total Fleet Marine Force (FMF) structure

• Reduction of approximately 12,000 Marines 

relative to the current Total Force by 2030

Command Element

• Divestment of 3 active component law 

enforcement battalions

Ground Combat Element

• 7 infantry regimental headquarters 

(divestment of 1 regimental headquarters)

• 21 active component infantry battalions 

(divestment of 3 battalions)

• 6 reserve component infantry battalions 

(divestment of 2 battalions)

• Redesign of remaining infantry battalions in 

the direction of greater lethality and flexibility, 

with reduced structure (a proposed reduction 

per infantry battalion of approximately 200 

Marines).

• 5 cannon artillery batteries (divestment of 

16 batteries)

• 21 rocket artillery batteries (increase of 14 

batteries over current force)

• Zero tank companies (divestment of entire 

capacity of 7 companies and prepositioned 

capacity)

• 12 Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) 

companies (increase of 3 companies over 

current force)

• 4 Assault Amphibian (AA) companies 

(divestment of 2 companies)

Air Combat Element

• 18 active component fighter attack (VMFA) 

squadrons, with a reduction in the number 

of aircraft per squadron to 10

• 14 active component medium tiltrotor (VMM) 

squadrons (recommended divestment of 3 

squadrons)

• 5 active component heavy lift helicopter 

(HMH) squadrons (recommended divestment 

of 3 squadrons)

• 5 active component light attack helicopter 

(HMLA) squadrons (divestment of 2 

squadrons)

• 4 active component aerial refueler transport 

(VMGR) squadrons (increase of one squadron 

over current force)

• 6 active component unmanned aerial 

vehicle (VMU) squadrons (increase of three 

squadrons over current force)

OBJECTIVE FORCE
Force Design 2030 8

OBJECTIVE FORCE IMPLICATIONS

“The recommendations of the Phase II IPT result in a 

potential savings of $12B to be reallocated towards 

equipment modernization, training modernization, and 

force development priorities.”

The recommendations of the Phase II IPT result in a 

potential savings of $12B to be reallocated towards 

equipment modernization, training modernization, 

and force development priorities. However, I must 

emphasize that these initial results are just that: it remains 

for us to evaluate and refine during the upcoming 

Phase III effort. I have high confidence in several of 

the recommendations advanced by the Phase II IPTs, 

however, others require additional deliberate analysis 

during Phase III.

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS

I am not convinced that we have a clear understanding 

yet of F-35 capacity requirements for the future 

force. As a result, the Service will seek at least one 

external assessment of our Aviation Plan relative to 

NDS objectives and evolving naval and joint warfighting 

concepts.

As described in Congressional testimony, our continued 

pilot shortfalls are a factor we must consider and either 

scale programs of record accordingly or implement a 

sustainable, affordable solution. Other Services face 

similar shortfalls. This issue has recruiting, training, 

and retention factors – as well as fiscal and industrial 

base factors – that we must consider in reconciling the 

growing disparity between numbers of platforms and 

numbers of aircrew.

While the decrease in the number of infantry battalions 

is clearly articulated in the Phase II material, the absence 

of a major reduction in ground tactical combat vehicles 

is inconsistent with the systems-oriented reduction 

discussed above. DC CD&I will need to assess existing 

ground tactical vehicle programs of record and 

recommend appropriate adjustments to approved 

acquisition objectives.

FINDINGS IN WHICH I HAVE HIGH CONFIDENCE

Divestment of three infantry battalions

Based on the evolution of joint OPLANS that previously 

influenced capacity in our “base unit,” and on my 

elimination of the requirement to size the force for a 

generic “2 MEB JFEO,” the remaining 21 battalions 

will satisfy naval and joint requirements.

Investment in additional rocket artillery batteries

This investment provides the basis, over time, for 

generating one of the fundamental requirements for 

deterrence, and ultimately successful naval campaigns 

– long-range, precision expeditionary anti-ship missile 

fires. This requirement is based on one of the more 

well-supported conclusions from wargaming analysis 

conducted to date.

Divestment of tanks

We have sufficient evidence to conclude that this 

capability, despite its long and honorable history in 

the wars of the past, is operationally unsuitable for our 

highest-priority challenges in the future. Heavy ground 

armor capability will continue to be provided by the 

U.S. Army.

Divestment of three heavy helicopter squadrons

Based on analysis by our aviation subject-matter-experts, 

five squadrons provide sufficient capacity to satisfy our 

requirements as well as our future force as described 

in approved naval concepts.

Divestment of three medium-lift tiltrotor squadrons

Given the reduction of infantry battalion capacity and 

associated combat support, the remaining tiltrotor force 

should be sufficient to our needs.
Force Design 2030 9

Expansion and increased resourcing of training 

and education

The level of detailed planning and analysis done by 

the Training and Education IPT is commendable. 

I am confident that the issues identified by the IPT 

are accurate, and have full confidence in its overall 

recommendations. The warfighting impact of all 

other future capabilities is directly tied to the level of 

commitment we make to training modernization. We 

have a lot of ground to make up in this area, and must 

allocate adequate resources now and into the future 

to close this gap.

FINDINGS WHICH DEMAND ADDITIONAL 

ANALYSIS DURING PHASE III

Based upon my assessment of the results of the first 

two phases of our force design effort, we must now 

spend additional time ensuring that we have accurately 

framed the problem before us and continue to refine our 

understanding of assumptions, constraints, restraints, 

and operational realities that may affect the design of 

our future force.

Additionally, there are specific outputs from the initial 

phases that must be refined through focused analytic work 

and deliberate experimentation. These outputs include:

Redesign of the infantry battalion

I am not confident that we have adequately assessed all 

of the implications of the future operating environment 

on the proposed structure of our future infantry battalion. 

While I fully support redesign of the infantry battalion 

in principle, I remain unconvinced that the specific 

proposed new construct makes the force more capable 

of Distributed Operations. We must conduct more 

live-force experimentation to ensure our proposed 

design results in a truly DO-capable force. I would 

like to see intensive further analysis of this proposed 

new structure during Phase III.

Divestment of at least two light attack 

helicopter squadrons

While this capability has a certain amount of relevance 

to crisis and contingency missions which we must still be 

prepared to execute, it is operationally unsuitable for our 

highest-priority maritime challenges and excess to our 

needs with the divestment of three infantry battalions.

Investment in additional Unmanned Aerial 

Systems (UAS)

As a “stand-in” force of the future, the Marine Corps 

requires a family of UAS capabilities. We need to 

transition from our current UAS platforms to capabilities 

that can operate from ship, from shore, and able to 

employ both collection and lethal payloads. These future 

capabilities must be expeditionary and fully compatible 

with Navy platforms and command and control networks.

Divestment of 2 AA companies and reduction 

of AAV and Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) 

requirements

With the reduction of infantry battalions and the 

elimination of the 2 MEB JFEO force development 

sizing construct, it follows that the requirement for 

protected mobility to support them also decreases.

Divestment of three law enforcement battalions

This capacity is excess to our current needs, which can 

be met by the remaining force with some adjustments 

in current operational practice.

Divestment of Marine Wing Support Groups 

(MWSG)

We have sufficient evidence dating back to the 2010 

Force Structure Review Group analysis to support 

this move.

Divestment of three bridging companies

This capability is primarily relevant to sustained land 

operations. Given my guidance to avoid such criteria 

in designing the force, this capability is clearly excess 

to our requirements.

“The warfighting impact of all other future capabilities 

is directly tied to the level of commitment we make to 

training modernization.”
Force Design 2030 10

existing capacity, or committing billions of dollars 

in procurement funds towards the acquisition of an 

Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV).

Retention of 18 VMFA squadrons

Employment of the F-35 in support of future naval 

expeditionary TACAIR requirements requires additional 

study, as I noted previously. We will continue to learn 

more about the various roles that platform will fulfill, 

and we must be willing to assess and adjust our VMFA 

force structure and program of record accordingly. 

In addition, as noted earlier, our continued inability 

to build and sustain an adequate inventory of F-35 

pilots leads me to conclude that we must be pragmatic 

regarding our ability to support the existing programof-record. We must conduct a more thorough review of 

our VMFA capacity requirements and ability to satisfy 

those requirements. This will require an external review 

of the issue that will inform our subsequent decisions.

Emerging naval expeditionary force formations

I am convinced that a transformation of our current 

formations is essential for successful integration and 

employment of future capabilities. While the Marine 

Littoral Regiment (MLR), recommended as an output 

from Phases I and II, appears to possess the required 

characteristics, there is simply not enough evidence at 

this time to support a wholesale reorganization of III 

MEF. Therefore, as a first step, we will initially create a 

singular MLR formation. We will use that initial formation 

to test and validate our concepts and refine the structure 

of the Marine Littoral Regiment during Phase III. Before 

we undertake an ambitious force wide transformation, 

we must validate our assumptions, wargame rigorously, 

pursue the necessary modeling, and ensure that our 

primary warfighting partner – Fleet Commanders – share 

our conclusions.

Littoral maneuver and sustainment

I am not confident that we have identified the additional 

structure required to provide the tactical maneuver and 

logistical sustainment needed to execute DMO, LOCE 

and EABO in contested littoral environments against 

our pacing threat. While not an afterthought by any 

means, I do not believe our Phase I and II efforts gave 

logistics sufficient attention. Resolving these two areas 

must be a priority for Phase III.

MEU redesign recommendations

The Phase II IPT seems to have produced an incrementally 

improved version of today’s 3-ship ARG/MEU. This vision 

falls short of our future needs. We cannot accept or 

accede to recommendations for incremental change or 

better versions of legacy capabilities, but must pursue 

transformational capabilities that will provide naval 

fleets and joint force commanders with a competitive 

advantage in the gray zone and during contingency. I am 

confident that, with refined planning guidance, we can 

develop more operationally suitable recommendations 

for analysis and consideration.

Increase in Light Armored Reconnaissance

While I have repeatedly stated that all-domain 

reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance will be 

a critical element of any future contingency, I remain 

unconvinced that additional wheeled, manned armored 

ground reconnaissance units are the best and only 

answer – especially in the Indo-Pacific region. We need 

to see more evidence during Phase III to support this 

conclusion before engaging in an expansion of our 

“We cannot accept or accede 

to recommendations for 

incremental change or 

better versions of legacy 

capabilities, but must 

pursue transformational 

capabilities that will provide 

naval fleets and joint 

force commanders with a 

competitive advantage in 

the gray zone and during 

contingency.”
Force Design 2030 11

In addition to the refinement areas addressed above, 

we have logical next steps to take in addressing 

Marine Corps structure outside the Active Component 

Fleet Marine Force. Those follow-on efforts include 

a comprehensive assessment of our Reserve 

Component and our Supporting Establishment.

MARINE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

(MARSOC)

Force design places new demands on our FMF that 

require us to revisit our current manpower policies 

supporting MARSOC. We must develop assignment 

policies that continue to satisfy MARSOC personnel 

requirements while ensuring appropriate rotation 

of personnel in and out of MARSOC. Any change 

to the current policies should not limit MARSOC’s 

ability to recruit, assess and develop relationships and 

candidates, in coordination with FMF units and leaders. 

Recommended changes to policy should ensure Marines 

remain competitive for promotion and have broad 

opportunities for assignment within the Marine Corps 

and the joint force.

INFANTRY

I concur with IPT conclusions that our current entrylevel and advanced infantry training programs 

and policies will not meet future demands of our 

infantry elements. We will need to increase our upfront, entry-level training investment, and then look 

to make corresponding modifications to advanced 

infantry training to develop the quality, maturity and 

capabilities envisioned – including the multi-disciplinary 

infantry approach – in the IPT findings. This effort should 

include looking at ways to include all components of 

the 03XX occupational field, including reconnaissance 

and LAR. Explore ways to challenge existing models 

and paradigms to yield a more capable and mature 

infantry and reconnaissance force. TECOM will develop 

options for a modernized and more comprehensive 

entry-level infantry school to fundamentally improve 

the initial proficiency and skills of our infantry force.

EXPERIMENTATION AND WARGAMING 

RECOMMENDATIONS

To further refine and develop our understanding of 

force design changes, I am directing the immediate 

implementation of an intensive program of iterative 

concept refinement, wargaming, analysis and 

simulation, and experimentation. I will be personally 

involved in and responsible for setting priorities and 

ensuring that necessary resources are made available 

for this effort. This will be a time-limited “surge” effort 

aimed at expanding and deepening the analytical basis 

underpinning our force design conclusions in support of 

future budget submissions. The effort will be led by the 

Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), with 

additional resourcing and personnel augmentation.

I fully understand the challenges of establishing and 

sustaining a rapidly iterating research cycle, given the 

realities of resourcing and available time and personnel. 

It is also no panacea; there are uncertainties in the 

future we must account for. Technology and available 

funding are major factors, as is the rate at which our 

pacing threat modernizes and expands its operational 

reach. We must commit to a continuous cycle of 

learning and adjustment that ensures a margin of 

advantage over our adversaries, while remaining 

ready to respond to crisis 24/7/365.

DESIGN LEVERS AND FUNDAMENTALS

As we continue to refine our efforts and engage in 

additional IPTs, we must remain grounded in the 

fundamentals of force design vice pursuing only 

incremental change and minor adjustments to the current 

force. When visualizing the future naval expeditionary 

force, we will keep the following design levers in mind:

Organizational Design: Developing the form and 

function of elements (e.g. squad, etc.)

Force Design: Combining elements to form an 

organization (e.g. Brigade, FMF, JTF, etc.)

Force Structure: Capacities of elements and 

organizations; aggregate force structure capacities; 

setting end-strength

Force Posture: Where organizations are physically 

located and their anticipated activities

Naval and Joint Force Integration: Combining 

components into a system for employment; scalability 

and interoperability

New Capabilities: Enablers for doing things differently; 

impacts all other levers

FOLLOW-ON GUIDANCE
Force Design 2030 12

In addition to the design levers identified above, 

participants in our follow-on planning efforts should 

remain mindful of the following design fundamentals 

that will facilitate their efforts.

• Focus on capabilities and force postures that 

maximize conventional deterrence such as 

capabilities that provide the option for us 

to strike effectively first from a force posture 

(location and disposition) that balances 

forward presence and integration with allies 

and partners and allows for the flexibility to 

dictate the time and place of action.

• Focus on capabilities required to satisfy 

approved naval concepts of DMO, EABO, 

and LOCE.

• Focus on capabilities that create a 

competitive, asymmetrical advantage in 

maritime gray zone operations globally.

• Focus on capabilities required to develop 

a truly DO-capable force that can mass 

effects while minimizing signature; maximize 

efficient tactical mobility; reduce logistics 

demand; and expand the range of mutual 

support across all tactical echelons.

• Minimize organization reliance on 

attachments; goal should be to maximize 

unit cohesion and implicit communication.

• Develop multi-axis, multi-domain precision 

fires organic at all echelons, enabled by a 

federated system of networks to ensure all 

elements can fight in a degraded command 

and control environment.

• Develop smaller but better-connected 

formations that organically possess a 

complete kill chain appropriate to echelon, 

and that can prevail in a contested operating 

environment.

• Factor in the increased importance of 

range and endurance of manned systems, 

unmanned systems, and munitions given the 

expanse and non-contiguous nature of IndoPacific geography and the ever-expanding 

range of threat systems.

• Focus on rapid employment and the 

scalability of Marine force elements.

• Ensure composable force elements 

constructed from purpose-built modified 

formations.

• Maintain an all-domain (air, surface, 

subsurface, space, cyberspace) perspective.

• Create greater resilience in our C4 and ISR 

systems to counter more sophisticated threat 

capabilities.

• Develop military deception, camouflage, 

cover, concealment, and obscurant 

capabilities to defeat terminal phase attack 

and challenge broad area surveillance.

• Pursue the development of organic C4ISR, 

maneuver, and fires capabilities (organic 

network) at all echelons.

• Create purpose-built forces. (Ensure all 

elements are equipped and trained for their 

specified purposes. Aggregating specialized 

units with base elements creates a tailored 

multi-domain force in order to provide 

maximum relevant combat power (RCP) 

on-demand.)

“We will need to increase our 

up-front, entry-level training 

investment, and then look 

to make corresponding 

modifications to advanced 

infantry training to develop 

the quality, maturity and 

capabilities envisioned 

– including the multidisciplinary infantry approach 

– in the IPT findings.”
Force Design 2030 13

CONCLUSION

We have made significant progress to date in our force 

design efforts. While these efforts have undeniably 

been productive and will inform our divestment and 

investment decisions going-forward, we should view 

them as first steps in a longer journey. We have much 

more work to do to ensure our recommendations rest 

upon a solid analytic foundation. While I am confident 

in the merits and operational suitability of many of the 

IPT recommendations, in other areas we have a ways 

to go before making decisions. We simply must have 

more analysis and evidence, which comes from modeling 

and experimentation.

While the Future Force we are developing is different in 

terms of structure and capabilities, it is consistent with 

our historical roots as Fleet Marine Forces and directly 

supports our Title 10 responsibility to seize and defend 

advanced naval bases, and perform all such duties 

as directed by the President. It is also important to 

note that methods and concepts such as Expeditionary 

Advanced Base Operations are not the sum total of our 

contribution to the joint force. We will continue to serve 

as the nation’s premier crisis response force around the 

globe, and contribute to the deterrence and warfighting 

needs of all combatant commands.

Semper Fidelis,

David H. Berger

General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commandant of the Marine Corps