alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 18, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-30244

Summary Calendar

 

JERRY MOORE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ST. TAMMANY PARISH JAIL; MARLIN PEACHEY, Warden,

Defendants-Appellees,

------------------------

JERRY MOORE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

RODNEY JACK STRAIN, JR., Sheriff; ST. TAMMANY

PARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 03-CV-709-J

USDC No. 03-CV-2779-J

--------------------

Before GARZA, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jerry Moore, St. Tammany Parish pretrial detainee #076945,

appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment and

dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, which challenged the
No. 04-30244

-2-

conditions of his confinement. We review a district court’s

award of summary judgment de novo. Banks v. East Baton Rouge

Parish Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2003).

Moore does not challenge the dismissal with prejudice of his

claims against the St. Tammany Parish Jail and the St. Tammany

Parish Sheriff’s Office or the dismissal with prejudice of his

claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Accordingly,

those claims have been abandoned. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d

222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).

Exhaustion is required for all inmate suits about prison

life. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,

524-32 (2002). The district court dismissed without prejudice

Moore’s claims against Warden Peachey in his official capacity

and against Sheriff Jack Strain because Moore had failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies. 

The competent summary judgment evidence established that

Moore did not exhaust his administrative remedies. Although

Moore submits on appeal a third step grievance he purportedly

sent to the sheriff, this evidence was not submitted to the

district court and may not be considered. See Theriot v. Parish

of Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 491 n.26 (5th Cir. 1999). 

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
Order filed September 3, 2020
.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14
- 19
- 01002
- CV

____________ VIRGINIA A
. KINNEY , Appellant

V. CB&I, LLC , Appellee
On Appeal from the 127th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No
. 2017
- 65953



### ORDER Appell ee petitioned for voluntary bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, under cause number 20

- 30336

. Because a stay is automatically effected by Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, when this court received notice of appellant ’ s bankruptcy filing,

on January 29, 2020 , we stayed all proceedings in the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 8.2.
On August 28, 2020 , appellant filed a motion to reinstate the appeal pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate P rocedure 8.3(a). The motion is granted. Accordingly, the case is ordered REINSTATED and placed on the court ’ s active docket.Appellant ’ s brief is due to be filed with the clerk of this court on or before

Oc tober 5, 2020.
PER CURIAM
P anel Consists of Just ices Spain, Hassan, and Poissant.
Ardent Acquisition Corporation

1415
Kellum Place, Suite 205 

Garden City, New York 11530



April 11, 2006


  Continental Stock Transfer & Trust Company

  17 Battery Place

  New York, New York 10004 

  Attn: Steven G. Nelson 

  

  EarlyBirdCapital, Inc. 

  275 Madison Avenue, Suite 1203 

  New York, New York 10016 

  Attn: Steven Levine 




               Re:      Investment Management Trust Agreement

Gentlemen:


           Reference is made to that certain Investment Management Trust Agreement (the “Agreement”), dated as of February 24, 2005, between Ardent Acquisition Corporation (“Company”) and Continental Stock
Transfer & Trust Company. Section 1(c) is hereby deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following: 


     “(c)           In a timely manner, upon the instruction of the Company, to invest and reinvest the Property in United States “government securities” within the meaning of Section 2(a)(16)
of the Investment Company Act of 1940 having a maturity of 180 days or less, and/or in any open ended investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 that holds itself out as a money market fund selected by the Company meeting
the conditions of paragraphs (c)(2), (c)(3) and (c)(4) of Rule 2a-7 promulgated under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as determined by the Company;” 











Except as indicated above, the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

	 	ARDENT ACQUISITION CORPORATION
       

	 	By:	/s/ Marc H. Klee  

      Name: Marc H. Klee

      Title: President 
	 	 	 




  

    Acknowledged and agreed this

    12th day of April, 2006 

 



  CONTINENTAL STOCK TRANSFER &

  TRUST COMPANY 



By: /s/ Frank Di Paolo 

          Name:
  Frank Di Paolo

          Title: CFO 




The undersigned is required to consent to this amendment pursuant to Section 5(c) of the Investment Management Trust Agreement and hereby does so. 

EARLYBIRDCAPITAL, INC.

    

By: /s/ Steven Levine 

            Name:
    Steven Levine 

            Title:
    Managing Director
§ 811.4 Selling visual information materials. ( a ) Air Force VI activities cannot sell materials.
( b ) HQ AFCIC/ITSM may approve the loan of copies of original materials for federal government use.
( c ) Send requests to buy: ( 1 ) Completed, cleared, productions, to the National Archives and Records Administration, National Audiovisual Center, Information Office, 8700 Edgeworth Drive, Capitol Heights, MD 20722-3701.
( 2 ) Nonproduction VI motion media to the DVIC. The center may sell other Air Force VI motion picture and television materials, such as historical and stock footage. When it sells VI motion media, the DVIC assesses charges, unless § 811.5 exempts the requesting activity.
( 3 ) VI still media to the DoD Still Media Records Center (SMRC), Attn: SSRC, Washington, DC 20374-1681. When SMRC sells VI still media, the SMRC assesses charges, unless § 811.5 exempts the requesting activity.
#### Maria LaRocca, Appellant, v Salvatore P. DeRicco, Respondent.

[833 NYS2d 213]

In an action to recover damages for dental malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Price, J.), dated May 12, 2006, which granted the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred and denied her cross motion, inter alia, for additional discovery, including the deposition of the defendant.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, (1) by deleting the provision thereof granting the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred, and substituting therefor a provision denying the motion, and (2) by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the plaintiffs cross motion which was for additional discovery, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the cross motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, with costs to the plaintiff.

*“A*defendant who seeks dismissal of a complaint pursuant to *487CPLR 3211 (a) (5) on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations bears the initial burden of proving, prima facie, that the time in which to sue has expired” *(Gravel v*Cicola, 297 AD2d 620 [2002]). The defendant in this case sustained his initial burden by establishing that the alleged wrongdoing occurred more than two years and six months before the instant action was commenced *(see*CPLR 214-a). In response to the defendant’s showing, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a course of continuous treatment by the defendant which, if established, would render this action timely *(see*CPLR 214-a; *Richardson v Orentreich,*64 NY2d 896 [1985]; *Chinosi v Kringstein,*7 AD3d 558 [2004]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

Moreover, under the circumstances, the court should have granted that branch of the plaintiffs cross motion which was for additional discovery, including the deposition of the defendant.

The appellant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Miller, J.P., Mastro, Ritter and Balkin, JJ., concur.
### Re: PROPRIETARY and CONFIDENTIAL statement

Brian Nelson to

: OAR-2009-0472

Cc

:

If the statement "PROPRIETARY and CONFIDENTIAL " appears in any of these documents, please disregard it. That statement is a legacy from earlier versions of the document, and was never intended to be in the version released to the public.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Brian J. Nelson U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Assessment and Standards Division
2000 Traverwood Dr. Ann Arbor, MI 48105 (734) 214-4278 nelson.brian@epa.gov

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549

_______________________

FORM 8-K

_______________________

CURRENT REPORT

PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15 (d) OF THE

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

Date of report (Date of earliest event reported): January 30, 2007

MS Structured Asset Corp.

(Exact Name of Registrant as Specified in Charter)

Delaware
      001-16443, 333-64879
      13-4026700(State or Other Jurisdiction
        of Incorporation)
      (Commission File
        Numbers)
      (IRS Employer
        Identification No.)


1585 Broadway, Second Floor
          New York, New York
          Attention: Madhu Philips
      10036(Address of Principal Executive Offices)
      (Zip Code)




Registrants telephone number, including area code: 212-761-2520

Not Applicable

(Former Name or Former Address, if Changed Since Last Report)



Check the appropriate box below if the Form 8-K filing is intended to simultaneously satisfy the filing obligation of the registrant under any of the following provisions (see General Instruction A.2. below):



o Written communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230.425)



o Soliciting material pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14a-12)



o Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14d-2(b))



o Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-4(c) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.13e-4(c))










---







Section 8Other Events



| | Item 8.01 | Other Events
| | --------- | ------------



On January 30, 2007, the Company issued a press release regarding the occurrence of a Trust Wind-Up Event under the terms of the Trust Agreement governing SATURNS Trust No. 2002-8, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 99.1 hereto.





| |  | 
| |  | 





---







SIGNATURES



Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned hereto duly authorized.



Date: January 30, 2007



MS STRUCTURED ASSET CORP.

(Registrant)

By:/s/ Madhu Philips

Name: Madhu Philips

Title:   Vice President










| |  | 
| |  | 





---







EXHIBIT INDEX

|Exhibit 99.1 | Press release, dated January 30, 2007
|------------ | -------------------------------------







| |  | 
| |  |
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 00-2093

DEBORAH M. MELTON, Plaintiff - Appellant, versusDONNA E. SHALALA, SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Marvin J. Garbis, District Judge. (CA-98- 2598-MJG) Submitted: December 20, 2000 Decided: January 8, 2001Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Deborah M. Melton, Appellant Pro Se. Lynne Ann Battaglia, United States Attorney, Allen F. Loucks, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Deborah M. Melton appeals the district court’s order granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment in Melton’s civil action in which she alleged claims of discrimination in her employment. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Melton v. Shalala , No. CA-98-2598-MJG (D. Md. June 20, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because thefacts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
### §1930. Continued availability of appropriated funds for direct real estate loans to farmers and ranchers

Funds appropriated for the purpose of making direct real estate loans to farmers and ranchers under this subchapter shall remain available until expended.

(Pub. L. 87–128, title III, §310, as added Pub. L. 91–524, title VIII, §806(b), Nov. 30, 1970, 84 Stat. 1383.)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Company's Balance Sheet as of June 30, 1998 and the Statement Of Income 
for the year ended June 30, 1998, and is qualified in its entirety by 
refenence to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                         403,827 
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,721,194<F1>
<PP&E>                                      39,000,000
<DEPRECIATION>                              35,977,192
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,744,002    
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,471,765    
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,744,002
<SALES>                                      3,009,375<F2>
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,055,971<F3>
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,168,942<F4>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,887,029
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,887,029
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,887,029
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   571.83<F5>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   571.83<F5>
<FN>
<F1>Includes prepaid rent
<F2>Rental income
<F3>Includes dividend income
<F4>Leasehold rent, supervisory fees, legal fees and amortization of
    leasehold
<F5>Earnings per $10,000 participation unit, based on 3,300 participation 
    units outstanding during the year
</FN>
        


</TABLE>
#### 1252.209-70 Organizational and Consultant Conflicts of Interest.

As prescribed in 1209.507-270(a), the contracting officer shall insert a clause substantially as follows in solicitations and contracts:

# Organizational and Consultant Conflicts of Interest (NOV 2022)

(a) An offeror shall identify in its proposal, quote, bid or any resulting contract, any potential or actual Organizational and Consultant Conflicts of Interest (OCCI) as described in FAR subpart 9.5. This includes actual or potential conflicts of interests of proposed subcontractors. If an offeror identifies in its proposal, quote, bid or any resulting contract, a potential or actual conflict of interests the offeror shall submit an Organizational and Consultant Conflicts of Interest Plan (OCCIP) to the contracting officer. The OCCIP shall describe how the offeror addresses potential or actual conflicts of interest and identify how they will avoid, neutralize, or mitigate present or future conflicts of interest.

(b) Offerors must consider whether their involvement and participation raises any OCCI issues, especially in the following areas when:

(1) Providing systems engineering and technical direction.

(2) Preparing specifications or work statements and/or objectives.

(3) Providing evaluation services.

(4) Obtaining access to proprietary information.

(c) If a prime contractor or subcontractor breaches any of the OCCI restrictions, or does not disclose or misrepresents any relevant facts concerning its conflict of interest, the government may take appropriate action, including terminating the contract, in additional to any remedies that may be otherwise permitted by the contract or operation of law.

(End of clause)
#### Capitol Refrigeration Co., Inc., Respondent, v. Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Company et al., Appellants.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term which granted summary judgment, and from the judgment entered thereon, in an action by a -subcontractor of the general contractor -for the construction of a motel against the surety on the general contractor’s labor and material payment bond to recover the amount of $5,555 fixed by plaintiff’s subcontract for the construction and installation of certain fixtures. In support of its motion, plaintiff submitted, with -its moving affidavit, copies of the subcontract, the bond sued upon, the notice of claim served upon defendant surety and the 1-otter’s acknowledgment thereof, together with a photograph of -the completed installation (and proof that the installation has been in continuous use since the motel opened for business) and an excerpt from the verified statement made by the general contractor to the owner (and filed in -the general contractor’s lien foreclosure action) pursuant to demand under section 38 of the Lien Law, stating the amount due plaintiff subcontractor as $5,555. As against this strong and impressive documentary proof no factual contradiction whatsoever is -asserted -and the affidavits in opposition do little more than to repeat the denials of information and belief set forth in the answer, with no indication whatsoever that complete information was not readily available and accessible at -all times before and after the surety’s receipt of plaintiff’s claim some five months -before the -action was commenced -and some eight months before defendants answered the motion. In certain respects, indeed, the asserted lack of knowledge is belied by other averments in the answering affidavits, as, *668for example, the contention, again unsupported by any factual statement, that work under the 'contract did not comply with the plans submitted to defendant surety prior to the issuance of its bond. The argument that an issue exists as to the timely commencement of the 'action was not raised upon the motion and is not available here hut, in any event, is refuted by one of the very affidavits filed in opposition to the motion which states the date of the contractor’s default. Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs. Present — Bergan, P. J., Coon, Gibson, Herlihy and Reynolds, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Joel Smith, Appellant.

In a *coram nobis*proceeding, defendant appeals from an order of the former County Court, Kings Count)', dated August 9, 1962, which denied without a hearing his application to vacate a judgment of the former Comity Court, Kings County, rendered October 28, 1959, after a jury trial, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, and imposing sentence. Order affirmed on the authority of *People*v. *Márchese*(19 A D 2d 728). Beldoek, P. J., Ughetta, Christ, Hill and Rabin, JJ., concur.
........... ---------------
Empire State Building Associates L.L.C.
June 30, 2002




                        Exhibit 99(2)

                Empire State Building Associates L.L.C.

                Chief Financial Officer Certification
                        Pursuant to Section 906
                of Sarbanes - Oxley Act of 2002

	The undersigned Stanley Katzman is signing this Chief
Financial Officer certification as a senior member of the
financial/accounting staff of Wien & Malkin LLP, the supervisor*
of Empire State Building Associates L.L.C.("Registrant"), to
certify that:

(1)    the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Registrant for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2002(the "Report") fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934(15 U.S.C.78m or 78o(d));
and

(2)    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of Registrant.

Dated:  August 28, 2002

                                By /s/ Stanley Katzman
                                Stanley Katzman
                                Wien & Malkin LLP, Supervisor





*Registrant's organizational documents do not provide for a Chief
Financial Officer or other officer with equivalent rights and
duties.  As described in the Quarterly Report, Registrant is a
limited liability company which is supervised by Wien & Malkin
LLP.  Accordingly, this Chief Financial Officer certification is
being signed by a senior member of the financial/accounting staff
of Registrant's supervisor.
#### § 516.27 Scope.

This subpart guidance when DA personnel, as a result of the performance of their official duties, are either sued in their personal capacity, or are charged in a criminal proceeding. Examples of civil actions alleging individual liability include the following: a medical malpractice lawsuit against health care providers; suits resulting from motor vehicle accidents; constitutional torts; or, common law torts such as assault, libel, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Likewise, state or Federal criminal charges can arise from the performance of official duties, including environmental crimes or motor vehicle accidents.