BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILE 

THREAT

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE BALLISTIC MISSILE ANALYSIS COMMITTEE

2017
2

Many countries view ballistic and cruise missile systems as cost-effective weapons and symbols of national power. These weapons 

present an asymmetric threat to US forces. Many ballistic and cruise missiles are armed with weapons of mass destruction. However, 

numerous types of ballistic and cruise missiles have achieved dramatic improvements in accuracy that allow them to be used 

effectively with conventional warheads. These highly accurate weapons can be used in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) missions. The 

term A2/AD refers to capabilities designed to deter or counter adversary forces from deploying to or operating within a defined space. 

North Korea has been developing the road-mobile Hwasong-13 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for several years and in 

October 2015 unveiled the Hwasong-14, a new road-mobile ICBM. The Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2), which placed a satellite in orbit for 

the first time in December 2012, placed a second satellite in orbit in February 2016. Flight testing of the Hwasong-10 (Musudan) 

intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) began in April 2016 with multiple failures. Several new solid-propellant missiles including a 

short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) are 

also being developed. In April 2017, North Korea also commenced flight testing of a new liquid-propellant IRBM, the Hwasong-12.

Tehran’s desire to have a strategic counter to the United States could drive it to field an ICBM. Progress in Iran’s space program 

could shorten a pathway to an ICBM because space launch vehicles (SLV) use inherently similar technologies. Since 2008, Iran has 

conducted multiple successful launches of the two-stage Safir SLV and has also revealed the larger two-stage Simorgh SLV, which 

could serve as a test bed for developing ICBM technologies. Iran has developed the Qiam-1 SRBM, the fourth-generation Fateh-110 

SRBM, and claims to be mass-producing ballistic missiles capable of striking ships. Iran has modified its Shahab 3 MRBM to 

extend its range and effectiveness and also claims to have deployed the two-stage, solid-propellant Sejjil MRBM. In 2015, Iran 

publicized the launch of the Emad-1, which officials claim is Iran’s first long-range missile that is guided throughout flight and capable of 

hitting its targets with high-precision. Iranian officials have also announced plans for an Emad-2 with greater precision as well as a new 

Sejjil which can also be guided all the way to the target.

India Agni IV IRBM

Key Findings
3

Hypersonic Glide Vehicles 

(HGVs),

a new class of weapon propelled to 

hypersonic velocity by ballistic missile 

boosters, are an emerging threat.

China continues to have the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world. It is developing and testing 

offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, qualitatively upgrading missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic 

missile defenses. China's deployed ballistic missile force, operated by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and PLA Rocket Force 

after being renamed - from the Second Artillery late last year as part of the PLA’s reorganization - is expanding in both size and types 

of missiles. China continues to field conventionally armed SRBMs such as the CSS-6 (DF-15) and the CSS-7 (DF-11) opposite Taiwan, 

and has developed a number of mobile, conventionally-armed MRBMs and IRBMs. Missiles such as the CSS-11 (DF-16), CSS-5 Mod 

4 (DF-21C) and Mod 5 (DF-21D) and DF-26 are key components of the Chinese military modernization program, specifically designed 

to prevent adversary military forces’ access to regional conflicts. The CSS-5 Mod 5 and a variant of the DF-26 have anti-ship missions. 

China’s nuclear-armed missile force is also expanding. China is 

adding the CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A) and CSS-4 Mod 3 (DF-5B) 

to the ICBM force; the DF-5B is China’s first ICBM with multiple 

independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The number of 

Chinese ICBM nuclear warheads capable of reaching the United 

States could expand to well over 100 within the next 5 years. 

The CSS-N-14 SLBM gives China its first long-range, sea-based 

nuclear capability. China is also developing a new road-mobile 

ICBM, the CSS-X-20 (DF-41), possibly capable of carrying MIRVs. 

China attributed both nuclear and conventional missions to the 

DF-26 displayed for the first time during the Victory Day Parade in 

September 2015.

In September 2014, Russia surpassed the US in deployed nuclear warheads with over 1,500 deployed on ballistic missiles capable of 

reaching the United States. Despite arms control limitations and resource constraints, development of new ICBM and SLBM systems 

is proceeding, and Russia is expected to retain the largest force of strategic ballistic missiles outside the United States. According to 

official statements, a new missile called the Rubezh, which is smaller than the SS-27 Mod 2 ICBM, will be deployed. The Bulava SLBM 

has been deployed on the new DOLGORUKIY-class SSBNs. Officials have stated that Russia is set to begin flight-testing a new heavy,

liquid-propellant ICBM called the Sarmat. Additionally, Russian 

industry officials have indicated deployment of a new rail-mobile 

ICBM is being considered.

Land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) are highly effective 

weapon systems that can present a major threat to military 

operations. The majority of LACMs fly at subsonic speeds, 

but there are a few which fly at supersonic speeds, and, 

in the future, some will be able to reach hypersonic speeds. 

Subsonic missiles are able to fly at low altitude and attack 

a target from multiple directions. Aircraft, ground and 

naval platforms can all launch LACMs. Russia has various LACMs which can be launched from all three types of platforms. China has 

ground and air-launched LACMs and Iran is developing a ground launched LACM. According to open press reports, Russia has used 

air- and naval-launched LACMs several times in Syria. 

Some weapon systems have characteristics of both ballistic and cruise missiles. For example, ballistic missile-launched hypersonic 

glide vehicles (HGVs), are essentially unpowered cruise missiles. Future supersonic/hypersonic powered cruise missiles may be 

launched by large rocket boosters that have traditionally been associated with ballistic missiles. 

Pakistan RA'AD Cruise Missile
4

Guided cruise and ballistic missiles were first used when Germany attacked targets in England and Northern Europe with V-1 cruise 

missiles and V-2 ballistic missiles during World War II. Although these missiles were inaccurate, their use resulted in tens of thousands 

of Allied casualties.

Ballistic and cruise missiles present a significant threat to US and Allied forces overseas, and to the United States and its territories. 

Missiles are attractive to many nations because they can be used effectively against an adversary with a formidable air defense 

system, where an attack with manned aircraft would be impractical or too costly. In addition, missiles can be used as a deterrent or 

an instrument of coercion. Missiles also have the advantage of fewer maintenance, training, and logistic requirements than manned 

aircraft. Even limited use of these weapons could have devastating consequences if armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear 

warheads.

The ballistic and cruise missile threat continues to increase with the proliferation of missile technology. Over 20 countries have ballistic 

missile systems, and missiles likely will be a threat in future conflicts involving US forces. Ballistic missiles have been used in several 

conflicts over the last 30 years, including the Iran-Iraq war, the Afghan civil war, the war in Yemen, the 1991 and 2003 Persian Gulf 

conflicts, the Russian military actions in Chechnya and Georgia, and most recently in the conflicts in Syria and the Ukraine. Russia 

used cruise missiles for the first time during the conflict in Syria.

The US Armed Forces are responsible for countering the ballistic and cruise missile threat through deterrence and, if necessary, 

active suppression. Threat suppression may include attacks on missile systems, both before launch and in flight, and attacks on their 

supporting infrastructure. This document includes information on some of the major current and projected foreign ballistic and cruise 

missile systems. 

The table and timeline depict selected ballistic missiles to highlight first flight tests, notable systems, and significant development 

achievements for various countries. 

The Threat
5

# System Country Year Range (km)

1 V-2 SRBM Germany 1942 320

2 SS-1 SRBM Soviet Union 1948 270

3 SS-2 SRBM Soviet Union 1949 1,200

4 SS-3 MRBM Soviet Union 1955 1,200

5 SS-6 ICBM Soviet Union 1957 8,000+

6 SS-9 ICBM Soviet Union 1963 10,200+

7 CSS-1 MRBM China 1964 1,250

8 CSS-2 MRBM China 1966 2,500

9 SS-13 ICBM Soviet Union 1966 9,500

10 CSS-3 ICBM China 1970 5,500+

11 CSS-4 ICBM China 1971 12,000+

12 SS-18 ICBM Russia 1973 10,000+

13 SS-19 ICBM Russia 1973 9,000+

14 CSS-5 MRBM China Late 1970s 1,750+

15 JL-1 SLBM China 1981 1,700

16 SS-24 ICBM Russia 1982 10,100+

17 SS-25 ICBM Russia 1983 11,000+

18 SCUD-B SRBM North Korea 1984 300

19 No Dong MRBM North Korea 1993 1,200+

# System Country Year Range (km)

20 SS-27 ICBM Russia 1994 11,000+

21 SS-26 SRBM Russia 1996 350

22 TD-1 MRBM North Korea 1998 2,000+

23 Shahab 3 MRBM Iran 1998 Up to 2,000

24 Agni-II MRBM India 1999 2,000+

25 CSS-10 ICBM China 1999 7,000+

26 Agni-I SRBM India 2002 700

27 Fateh-110 SRBM Iran 2002 300

28 CSS-5 Mod 5 

MRBM China Mid-2000s 1,500+

29 TD-2 ICBM/SLV North Korea 2006 12,000+

30 Sejjil MRBM Iran 2009 2,000

31 Emad MRBM Iran 2015 Up to 2,000

32 Shaheen-3 

MRBM Pakistan 2015 2,750

33 Hwasong-10 

(Musudan) IRBM North Korea 2016 3,000+

34 Bukkeukseong-2 

MRBM North Korea 2017 1,000+

35 Hwasong-12 

IRBM North Korea 2017 3,000+

Ballistic Missile System Development
6

Ballistic and cruise missiles can be armed with conventional 

or nonconventional warheads. Conventional warheads rely on 

the detonation of an explosive and can be designed for various 

effects. Nonconventional warheads include weapons of mass 

destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons) and 

nonlethal warheads designed to disable equipment rather 

than harm personnel. Conventional, biological, and chemical 

weapons can be packaged in unitary (single) warheads and 

in submunitions (multiple small bomblets that are released at 

altitude to disperse over a wide area). 

Conventional warheads can be optimized for specific types of 

targets. For example, submunitions can be used to create craters 

in an airfield runway or destroy armored vehicles. A penetrator 

warhead, which uses a relatively small amount of explosive 

surrounded by a heavy metal casing, can pass through a 

hardened structure, such as a bunker, to destroy its contents.

Many ballistic missiles and several types of LACMs carry nuclear 

warheads. Most of these warheads have an explosive force 

that is tens to hundreds of times more powerful than the atomic 

bombs used in World War II. 

Chemical and biological weapons are attractive to some 

countries because they are much easier to produce than nuclear 

weapons. Accuracy is not very important for these weapons 

when used against urban areas or large concentrations of 

military forces. Chemical and biological weapons can be packaged in submunitions to be dispersed over a wide area. They are capable 

of producing massive casualties, inducing panic and chaos in civilian populations, and severely degrading military operations. 

North Korea Hwasong-12 IRBM

India Dhanush Ship Launched Ballistic Missile (ShLBM) 

Taiwan Wan Chien LACM

Warheads and Targets
7

North Korea Hwasong-10 (Musudan) IRBM

India Prithvi-I CRBM

Iran Emad-1 MRBM

China CSS-6 Mod 3 SRBM
8

Trajectories are for illustration purposes only.

Ballistic missiles can be deployed in silos, on submarines, surface ships, road- and rail-mobile launchers, and aircraft. Mobile missiles 

can provide greater pre-launch survivability. The last decade has seen a dramatic increase in ballistic missile capabilities to include 

accuracy, post-boost maneuverability, and combat effectiveness. 

Some shorter range missiles remain intact until the warhead detonates; however, others have a warhead in a reentry vehicle (RV) 

that separates from the booster. In most long-range ballistic missiles, warheads are contained in separating RVs. Some long-range 

ballistic missiles carry MIRVs, with up to 10 RVs per missile. RVs reenter the Earth’s atmosphere at very high velocities, on the order 

of 6-8 kilometers per second at ICBM ranges. Some types of reentry vehicles have the capability to maneuver to avoid defenses and/

or increase accuracy. Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) are being developed as a new type of ballistic missile payload. HGVs are 

maneuverable vehicles that travel at hypersonic (greater than Mach 5) speed and spend most of their flight at much lower altitudes than 

a typical ballistic missile. The combination of high speed, maneuverability, and relatively low altitude makes them challenging targets for 

missile defense systems. HGVs are currently in development in Russia and China.

Ballistic missiles can use solid- or liquid-propellant rocket propulsion systems. The trend in modern missile systems has been toward 

the use of solid propellants because of their reduced logistical requirements and simplicity of operation. However, some nations have 

greater access to liquid-propellant technology and continue to develop new liquid-propellant missiles. In addition, liquid-propellant 

missiles can be more efficient for very heavy payloads than solid-propellant missiles. The missiles with the world’s heaviest payloads, 

the Russian SS-18 and Chinese CSS-4, are liquid-propellant ICBMs, and Russia is developing a new heavy-lift, liquid-propellant ICBM 

called the Sarmat. 

Missile Range

Ballistic Missiles
9

Multiple-stage missiles, with each stage having its own independent propulsion system, are more efficient for longer range missions. 

ICBMs typically have two or three stages, with powerful liquid-propellant engines or solid-propellant motors to propel the payload 

toward its target, and a postboost vehicle (PBV) with a much smaller propulsion system. A PBV can be used to improve the RV 

deployment accuracy for a single-RV missile. For a missile with a MIRV payload, the PBV is used to release RVs so that they follow 

different trajectories, allowing them to hit separate targets. Some MIRV missiles can hit targets separated by over 1,500 kilometers with 

a single missile.

Many ballistic missiles carry penetration aids to improve the chances of an RV penetrating a ballistic missile defense system. 

Penetration aids are devices intended to deceive, obscure, or jam sensors used to detect and track missiles and RVs. They are of 

increasing importance to countries developing and operating ballistic missiles. Other techniques that complicate missile defense 

operations include separating payloads, multiple RVs, depressed trajectories, and boost-phase, midcourse, or terminal maneuvers.

An ICBM with a high-quality inertial guidance system is capable of delivering an RV within a few hundred meters of the target after a 

flight of 10,000 kilometers. For many missiles, accuracy can be greatly improved by utilizing satellite-aided navigation. Missiles also can 

use maneuvering RVs with terminal sensors to attain very high accuracy. The use of improved guidance techniques and a maneuver 

capability can allow conventionally armed ballistic missiles to be used effectively against many fixed targets as well as moving targets 

such as ships at sea. 

As more modern guidance technology is proliferated, countries will be able to improve the accuracy and lethality of their missile forces. 

However, even a missile with a guidance system only accurate enough to hit a large city is capable of inflicting massive casualties 

when armed with a weapon of mass destruction. 
10

Over the last decade there has been a significant increase in worldwide ballistic missile testing. The emphasis on ballistic missile 

development around the world is noted by Chinese scholars who have stated, “ballistic missiles have become an important factor that 

influences the world political setup, controls the battlefield posture, and even decides the outcome of war”and “it is appropriate to say 

that ballistic missiles have become an important sign of national defense strength and symbol of national status.”

The graphic below depicts the approximate number of ballistic missiles launched per year from 2005 to 2016. In the graphic, all ballistic 

missiles are categorized by range, regardless of launch platform; all missiles with a range of 1,000 km or greater are classified as longrange ballistic missiles (LRBM) and all missiles with a range from 300 km – 1,000 km are classified as short-range ballistic missiles 

(SRBM). This graphic does not include close-range ballistic missiles (CRBM - missiles with a range less than 300 km) or ballistic 

missiles launched in combat.

Launch Trends 
11

Iran Qiam-1 SRBM

Russia SS-25 ICBM India Agni V IRBM

China CSS-N-14 SLBM
12

Webster’s Dictionary defines a ballistic missile as, “A projectile that assumes a free-falling trajectory after an internally-guided, 

self-powered ascent.” Some newer “ballistic” missiles are stretching this definition as they move beyond “internally-guided” and 

purely ballistic trajectories to include maneuvers during flight and various means to achieve accuracy. Some missiles today have 

characteristics of both ballistic and cruise missiles. Modern ballistic missiles can include maneuvers during boost, midcourse, and/

or terminal phases of flight. Some ballistic missiles remain in the atmosphere for large portions of their flight with control provided 

by aerodynamic surfaces. In-flight maneuverability can act as a missile defense countermeasure and/or improve accuracy. In-flight 

maneuvers, combined with guidance updates, can allow ballistic missiles to be precision-strike weapons.

Nearly all of our adversaries are concerned with US missile defenses and have devised various means to complicate missile defense 

operations. Traditional countermeasures include penaids such as balloons, chaff, decoys, and jammers. Multiple RVs are also 

employed to increase the probability that at least one RV arrives on target.

In-Flight Maneuverability, Accuracy, and Defense Penetration
13

Pakistan Shaheen-2 MRBM TD-2 ICBM/SLV

Russia SS-27 Mod 2 ICBM

Russia SS-18 Mod 5 ICBM Launch Canister
14

States including Russia, China, North Korea, Pakistan, India, 

and Iran are likely pursuing increased accuracy, range and 

lethality for their close-range ballistic missile systems. China 

is likely marketing and/or producing various CRBM variants 

with a maximum range of just under 300 km and marketing the 

B611MR, a CRBM with an anti-radiation homing seeker. CRBM 

variants currently in research and development (R&D) or in 

production worldwide are included in the chart on page 15.

China and Russia are marketing and/or producing CRBMs 

with various warhead types. These warhead variants likely 

include dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) 

Iran CSS-8 India Prithvi II

China CSS-14 Mod-X-1

Close-Range Ballistic Missiles (CRBM)
15

warheads, thermobaric and high explosive (HE) warheads. 

CRBMs with DPICM, thermobaric and HE warheads are more 

effective than similar unguided rocket rounds against stationary 

or moving targets including armor, mechanized artillery and 

personnel. The improved accuracy of CRBMs (compared to 

unguided artillery rockets) reduces the miss distance from the 

intended target and increases the probability that the CRBM 

warhead blast wave or the warhead's fragments will reach the 

intended target and neutralize it.

Iran and North Korea are likely progressing towards producing 

the Fadj-5 Aero CRBM and KN-SS-X-9, respectively. If the 

Iranians and North Koreans use satellite navigation systems 

(such as GPS) onboard their CRBMs, then the miss distance of 

these CRBMs could be reduced to tens of meters. High accuracy 

of CRBMs would be a force multiplier for both the Iranian and 

North Korean artillery forces by giving them precision strike 

capability against high priority targets. Russia SS-21 Mod 3
16

Pakistan Hatf-9

China BRE7

China A100-111

Russia SS-21 Mod 2
17

Close-Range Ballistic Missiles

Note: All ranges are approximate.

COUNTRY / SYSTEMS MAXIMUM

RANGE (km)

BRAZIL

SS-150 150

CHINA

WS-22

BRE7

GR1

BRC-3 (300-mm PHL-03/AR2/AR1/AR1A/AR3)

A100-111

A100-311

WM-120

BRC-4 (300-mm PHL-03/AR2/AR1/AR1A/AR3)

BRE-2 (300-mm PHL-03/AR2/AR1/AR1A/AR3)

BRE-3 / Fire Dragon 140 (300-mm PHL03/AR2/AR1/AR1A/AR3)

CSS-14 Mod-X-1

CSS-9 Mod 1 

CSS-X-16

WS-2 (HE, TBX, DPICM)

WS-3

BRE-6 (370-mm AR3)

CSS-9 Mod-X-2

CSS-14 Mod-X-2

BRE-8 / Fire Dragon 280 (370-mm AR3)

40

40

70

70

80

120

120

130

150

150

150

150

200

200

200

220

260

280

280

INDIA

Pinaka-II Guided

Prithvi I 

Prahar

Prithvi II 

65

150

150

250

IRAN

Fadjr-5 Aero

CSS-8

>75

150

COUNTRY / SYSTEMS MAXIMUM

RANGE (km)

ISRAEL

Romach ("Magic Spear") 

STRIKES

ACCULAR

MLRS-TCS

JUMPER

ExTRA (HE, Cluster, Penetrator, MIMS)

Predator Hawk

LORA

35

40

40

45

50

150

250

300

NORTH KOREA

Toksa 

KN-SS-X-9

120

190

PAKISTAN

Hatf-1 

NASR (Hatf-9)

Abdali (Hatf-2)

50

60

200

RUSSIA

122-mm Guided

SS-21 Mod 2 

9M55 (F, K, K1, K3, K4, K5, K6, K7, S)

9M5 (25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37)

SS-21 Mod 3 

9M542

40

70

70

90

120

120

SERBIA

Guided 128mm

R-400 Guided

21

143

SOUTH KOREA

130MM CRBM

Chunmoo 239-mm CRBM

36

80

THAILAND

DTI-1G 150

TURKEY

TRG-122 CRBM

“Tiger” 300-mm CRBM

35

120
18

Several countries are now producing and/or developing SRBM 

systems, while many other countries have purchased SRBMs 

or SRBM technologies. 

The Russian SS-1C Mod 1, also called the SCUD B, has been 

exported to more countries than any other type of guided 

ballistic missile, and has proven to be a versatile and adaptable 

weapon. For example, the Iraqi SCUD missiles used during 

the 1991 Persian Gulf War had been modified to double their 

range. North Korea has produced its own version of the SCUD 

B and the SCUD C, which is an extended-range version of the 

SCUD B as well as extended range variants of the SCUD C - 

the SCUD D and the SCUD ER. 

New SRBM systems are in development in several countries. 

China has deployed a very large force of modern solidpropellant SRBMs in the vicinity of Taiwan. In August 2010, 

Iranian officials hailed the successful test firing of the liquid-fuel 

Qiam-1 SRBM. Around the same time, the Iranian Minister 

of Defense told reporters that the third-generation of the 

Fateh-110 missile had been successfully test fired and that the 

system was officially delivered to the missile force in September 

China CSS-7 Mod 2 North Korea SCUD C

Iran Shahab 1

Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM)
19

2010. In 2012, Iran claimed to have also successfully flight tested a fourth-generation Fateh-110. Iran has also flight tested an antiship-capable variant of its Fateh-110 missile. A seeker has likely been added to the missile to improve the system’s accuracy against 

sea-based targets. 

Recent conflicts have highlighted missile defense capabilities, motivating ballistic missile developers to pursue missile defense 

countermeasures. Some SRBM developers have already begun to develop countermeasures such as maneuverable RVs (MaRVs), 

and are expected to continue countermeasure development.

Iran Fateh-110 China CSS-6 Mod 3
20

Russia SS-26 Iskander

New North Korea SCUD Variant on Tracked TEL

Pakistan Ghaznavi

Multi-Country SCUD C
21

Short-Range Ballistic Missiles

Note: All ranges are approximate.

* The missile inventory may be larger than the number of launchers; launchers can be reused to fire additional missiles.

COUNTRY / SYSTEMS PROPELLANT DEPLOYMENT

MODE

MAXIMUM

RANGE (km)

NUMBER OF

LAUNCHERS*

CHINA

CSS-6 Mod 1

CSS-6 Mod 2

CSS-6 Mod 3

CSS-7 Mod 1

CSS-7 Mod 2

CSS-11 Mod 1

CSS-11 Mod 2

Solid 

Solid

Solid 

Solid 

Solid

Solid

Solid 

Road-mobile 

Road-mobile 

Road-mobile 

Road-mobile 

Road-mobile 

Road-mobile 

Road-mobile 

600

 850+

 725+

300

600

 700+

 700+

More than 200

INDIA

Agni I Solid Road-mobile 700 Fewer than 75

IRAN

Fateh-110 

Shahab 1

Shahab 2

Qiam-1

Solid

Liquid

Liquid

Liquid

Road-mobile

Road-mobile

Road-mobile

Road-mobile

300

300

500

800

Fewer than 100

NORTH KOREA

SCUD B 

SCUD C 

Liquid

Liquid 

Road-mobile

Road-mobile 

300

500

Fewer than 100

PAKISTAN

Ghaznavi

Shaheen I 

Solid

Solid

Road-mobile

Road-mobile

300

750

Fewer than 50

RUSSIA

SCUD B (SS-1c Mod 1) 

SS-26 (Iskander-M/E)

Liquid 

Solid

Road-mobile 

Road-mobile

300

350

Fewer than 200

SYRIA

Fateh-110 

SCUD D 

Solid

Liquid 

Road-mobile

Road-mobile 

300

700

Fewer than 100
22

New MRBM and/or IRBM systems are in development in China, 

North Korea, Iran, India, and Pakistan, and many will be armed 

with nonconventional warheads. All of these countries except Iran 

have tested nuclear weapons. 

China continues to deploy nuclear-armed MRBMs to maintain 

regional nuclear deterrence, and its long-term, comprehensive 

military modernization is improving the capability of its 

conventionally-armed ballistic missile force to conduct highintensity, regional military operations, including “anti-access 

and area denial” (A2/AD) operations. Currently, China deploys 

the CSS-5 Mod 2 for regional nuclear deterrence. China has 

the conventionally armed CSS-5 Mod 4 and Mod 5 MRBMs 

to conduct precision strikes. The CSS-5 Mod 4 (DF-21C) is 

intended to hold at-risk or strike logistics and communication 

nodes, regional military bases including airfields and ports. 

China has also deployed the CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D), an antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) that gives the PLA the capability to 

attack aircraft carriers in the western Pacific Ocean. According 

to a Chinese CCTV report, the DF-21D brigades are capable of 

quickly reloading in the field and launching multiple salvo strikes 

within a few hours.

Pakistan Shaheen-2 MRBM

Iran Emad-1 MRBM North Korea Hwasong-12 IRBM

Medium-Range (MRBM) & Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM)
23

China debuted the new DF-26 IRBM during the 3 September 2015 Victory Day Parade. Official Chinese media commentary described 

the system as “one carrier, many warheads.” Other media reports revealed it was capable of nuclear and conventional missions and 

its design enabled strikes against many kinds of targets, including large ships. It also requires little support equipment and has fast 

reaction times, according to descriptions in official Chinese media outlets.

North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile development program and has exported missiles and missile technology to other 

countries, including Iran and Pakistan. North Korea has also tested nuclear weapons and claims its missiles are capable of carrying 

nuclear warheads. Initial flight testing of the Hwasong-10 (Musudan) IRBM in 2016 resulted in several failures. Beginning in February 

2017, North Korea began flight-testing the solid-propellant Bukkeukseong-2 MRBM, which is a land-based variant of the solidpropellant Bukkeukseong-1 SLBM. Initial flight testing of the liquid-propellant Hwasong-12 IRBM commenced in April 2017. 

Iran has an extensive missile development program. The Iranian Shahab 3 MRBM is based on the North Korean No Dong missile. Iran 

has modified the Shahab 3 to extend its range and effectiveness, with the longest range variant reportedly being able to reach targets 

at a distance of about 2,000 km. Iran also claims to have mass-produced Shahab 3 missiles. Iranian solid-propellant programs are also 

progressing. Iran has conducted multiple launches of the Sejjil, a solid-propellant MRBM with a claimed range of 2,000 km. In 2015, 

Iran publicized the launch of the Emad-1 missile, which officials claim is Iran’s first long-range missile that is guided throughout flight 

and capable of hitting targets with high-precision. Iran also announced plans for an Emad-2 with greater precision than the Emad-1. 

India continues to develop and improve its ballistic missiles. All of India’s long-range missiles use solid propellants. The Agni II MRBM 

and Agni III IRBM are deployed. The Agni IV IRBM has been successfully flight tested six times since the 2010 failure, but Indian 

officials still say further testing is required before deployment.
24

China DF-26 IRBM

Iran Shahab-3 MRBM

The Agni V has been flight tested four times. In the two most recent launches, the missile was launched from a sealed canister aboard 

a road-mobile launcher. More flight testing is required before deployment.

Pakistan continues to improve the readiness and capabilities of its Army Strategic Force Command and individual strategic missile 

groups through training exercises that include live missile firings. Pakistan has tested its solid-propellant Shaheen-2 MRBM seven 

times since 2004. In 2015, Pakistan began testing a longer range Shaheen-3 MRBM and, in January 2017, began testing the MIRVed 

Ababeel MRBM.

North Korea Hwasong-10 (Musudan) IRBM

North Korea Bukkeukseong-2 MRBM

China CSS-5 Mod 5 MRBM
25

Pakistan Ababeel MRBM India Agni V IRBM

Medium- and Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles

Note: All ranges are approximate.

* The missile inventory may be much larger than the number of launchers; launchers can be reused to fire additional missiles.

COUNTRY / SYSTEMS NUMBER OF 

STAGES PROPELLANT DEPLOYMENTMODE

MAXIMUM

RANGE (km)

NUMBER OF

LAUNCHERS*

CHINA

CSS-5 Mod 2 (MRBM)

CSS-5 Mod 4 (MRBM)

CSS-5 Mod 5 (MRBM)

DF-26 (IRBM)

2

2

2

2

Solid

Solid

Solid

Solid

Road-Mobile

Road-Mobile

Road-Mobile

Road-Mobile

1,750+

1,500+

1,500+

3,000+

Fewer Than 50

16+

16+

16+ 

INDIA

Agni II (MRBM)

Agni III (IRBM)

Agni IV (IRBM)

Agni V (IRBM)

2

2

2

3

Solid

Solid

Solid

Solid

Rail-Mobile

Rail-Mobile

Road & Rail-Mobile

Road-Mobile

2,000+

3,200+

3,500+

5,000+

Fewer Than 10

Fewer Than 10

Not Yet Deployed

Not Yet Deployed

IRAN

Shahab 3 (MRBM)

Emad-1 (MRBM)

Sejjil (Ashura) (MRBM)

1

1

2

Liquid

Liquid

Solid

Silo & Road-Mobile

Road-Mobile

Road-Mobile

Up to 2,000

Up to 2,000

2,000

Undetermined

Undetermined

Undetermined

NORTH KOREA

Bukkeukseong-2 (MRBM)

ER SCUD (MRBM)

No Dong Mod 1/2 (MRBM)

Hwasong-12 (IRBM)

Hwasong-10 (Musudan) IRBM

2

1

1

1

1

Solid

Liquid

Liquid

Liquid

Liquid

Road-Mobile

Road-Mobile

Road-Mobile

Road-Mobile

Road-Mobile

1,000+

1,000

1,200+

3,000+

3,000+

Not Yet Deployed

Undetermined

Fewer Than 100

Undetermined

Fewer Than 50

PAKISTAN

Ghauri (MRBM)

Shaheen-2 (MRBM)

Shaheen-3 (MRBM)

Ababeel (MRBM)

1

2

2

3

Liquid

Solid

Solid

Solid

Road-Mobile

Road-Mobile

Road-Mobile

Unknown

1,250

2,000

2,750

2,200

Fewer Than 50

Fewer Than 50

Not Yet Deployed

Not Yet Deployed

SAUDI ARABIA

CSS-2 (MRBM) (Chinese-produced) 1 Liquid Transportable 3,000 Fewer Than 50
26

Both China and Russia currently deploy multiple types of 

ICBMs and are modernizing their ICBM forces. North Korea 

has demonstrated ICBM technology with the launch of the 

TD-2 space launch vehicle (SLV) and has displayed two types 

of road-mobile ICBMs. India is developing an ICBM, and Iran 

may also develop an ICBM.

On 5 February 2011, the New Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty entered into force. This treaty limits the United States 

and Russia to no more than 1,550 warheads each (including 

warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, and counting each heavy 

bomber as one warhead) seven years after entry into force. 

Russia retains over 1,000 nuclear warheads on ICBMs. Most 

of these missiles are maintained on alert, capable of being 

launched within minutes of receiving a launch order. Although 

the number of missiles in the Russian ICBM force will continue 

to decrease because of arms control agreements, aging 

missiles, and resource constraints, Russia probably will retain 

the largest ICBM force outside the United States. Efforts to 

maintain and modernize the force are underway. According 

to official statements, the new RS-26 Rubezh is smaller than 

the SS-27 Mod 2. The Russian SS-27 Mod 1 ICBM, a missile 

designed with countermeasures to ballistic missile defense 

systems, is now deployed in silos in six regiments. Russia 

began deployment of the road-mobile version of the SS-27 

Mod 1 in 2006. A MIRV version of the SS-27, the SS-27 Mod 

2 (RS-24), was first deployed in 2010, and continues to be 

deployed in at least five road-mobile missile divisions according 

to Russian press reports. In addition, Russian officials claim 

a new class of hypersonic vehicle, probably called “object 

4202,” is being developed to allow Russian strategic missiles 

to penetrate missile defense systems, and the Russian press 

has indicated deployment of a new rail-mobile ICBM is being 

Russia SS-25 North Korea TD-2

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)
27

considered. Russia has stated that it will soon begin testing a developmental, heavy, liquid-propellant ICBM called the Sarmat to 

replace the aging SS-18. Russia’s goal is to begin Sarmat deployment in the 2020 timeframe.

China is strengthening its strategic nuclear deterrent force with the development and deployment of new ICBMs. China retains a 

relatively small number of nuclear armed, liquid-propellant CSS-3 (DF-4) limited range ICBMs and CSS-4 (DF-5) ICBMs capable of 

reaching the United States. China first displayed the CSS-4 Mod 3 (DF-5B) ICBM, with a claimed MIRV payload in 2015. It is also 

modernizing its nuclear forces by adding more survivable, road-mobile delivery systems. Both the road-mobile, solid-propellant CSS-10 

Mod 1 and the longer range CSS-10 Mod 2 ICBMs have been deployed to units within the PLA Rocket Force. The CSS-10 Mod 1 is 

capable of reaching targets throughout Europe, Asia, and parts of Canada and the northwestern United States. The longer range CSS10 Mod 2 will allow targeting of most of the continental United States. China is developing the CSS-X-20 (DF-41), a new road-mobile 

ICBM possibly capable of carrying a MIRV payload. The number of warheads on Chinese ICBMs capable of threatening the United 

States is expected to grow to well over 100 in the next 5 years.

The North Korean TD-2 has been launched as a space launch vehicle (SLV). If configured as an ICBM, it could reach the United 

States. TD-2 SLV launches in July 2006, April 2009, and April 2012 ended in failure, but December 2012 and February 2016 launches 

successfully placed a satellite in orbit. In an April 2012 military parade, North Korea unveiled the new Hwasong-13 road-mobile ICBM 

and in an October 2015 parade displayed the new Hwasong-14 road-mobile ICBM. Neither missile has been flight tested. Any of 

these systems could be exported to other countries in the future. During an April 2017 parade, North Korea showcased a modified 

Hwasong-13 ICBM launcher with a launch canister, as well as a new mobile-erector-launcher with a launch canister. Road-mobile 

launch canisters are typically associated with solid-propellant missiles. Actual missiles for the launch canisters were not displayed. 

Tehran’s desire to have a strategic counter to the United States could drive it to field an ICBM. Progress in Iran’s space program could 

shorten a pathway to an ICBM because space launch vehicles use inherently similar technologies. Since 2008, Iran has conducted 

multiple successful launches of the two-stage Safir SLV. In early 2010, Iran unveiled the larger Simorgh SLV.

India’s Agni VI ICBM is reportedly in the design phase with a range of 6,000 km.
28

North Korea Modified Hwasong-13 TEL with Launch Canister

North Korea Hwasong-13 on TEL China CSS-10 Launch Canister on MEL

Russia SS-27

Russia SS-27 TEL
29

Russia SS-27 Mod 2 North Korea Hwasong-14

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

Note: All ranges are approximate. 

* The missile inventory may be much larger than the number of launchers; launchers can be reused to fire additional missiles.

** We have observed launches of the TD-2 space launch vehicle from both east (2006 and 2009) and west (2012) coast facilities.

*** The Russian press indicated the missile was initially tested to ICBM range. Russian officials quoted in the press have claimed the missile is “lighter and, 

consequently, has a shorter range” than the SS-27 Mod 2 ICBM on which it is based.

COUNTRY / SYSTEMS NUMBER OF 

STAGES

WARHEADS

PER MISSILE PROPELLANT DEPLOYMENTMODE

MAXIMUM

RANGE (km)

NUMBER OF

LAUNCHERS*

CHINA

CSS-3

CSS-4 Mod 2

CSS-4 Mod 3

CSS-10 Mod 1

CSS-10 Mod 2

CSS-X-20

2

2

2 + PBV

3

3

3 + PBV

1

1

Multiple

1

 1

Multiple

Liquid

Liquid

Liquid

Solid

Solid

Solid

Transportable

Silo

Silo

Road-Mobile

Road-Mobile

Road-Mobile

5,500+

12,000+

12,000+

7,000+

11,000+

UNK

10 to 15

About 20

5 to 10

More than 15

In Development

NORTH KOREA

Taepo Dong 2

Hwasong-13

Hwasong-14

3

3

2

1

1

Unknown

Liquid

Liquid

Liquid

Fixed

Road-Mobile

Road-Mobile

12,000+

5,500+

5,500+

 Undetermined**

Undetermined

Undetermined

RUSSIA

SS-18 Mod 5

SS-19 Mod 3

SS-25

SS-27 Mod 1

SS-27 Mod 2

SS-X-28***

Sarmat

2 + PBV

2 + PBV

3 + PBV

3 + PBV

3 + PBV

At least 2

2 + PBV

10

6

1

1

Multiple

Multiple

Multiple

Liquid

Liquid

Solid

Solid

Solid

Solid

Liquid

Silo

Silo

Road-Mobile

Silo & Road-Mobile

Silo & Road-Mobile

Road-Mobile

Silo

10,000+

9,000+

11,000

11,000

11,000

5,500+

10,000+

About 50

About 50

About 100

About 80

More than 50

In Development

In Development
30

Russia maintains a substantial force of nuclear powered ballistic 

missile submarines (SSBNs) with intercontinental-range missiles. 

Upgraded SS-N-23s are intended to replace older SS-N-23s on 

DELTA IV Class SSBNs. The SS-N-32/BULAVA is a new solidpropellant SLBM deployed on the new DOLGORUKIY class 

SSBNs. Russian SLBMs are capable of launch from surfaced 

and submerged SSBNs from a variety of launch locations.

China has deployed the new CSS-N-14 SLBM on new 12-tube 

JIN Class SSBNs. This missile will, for the first time, allow 

Chinese SSBNs to target portions of the United States from 

operating areas located near the Chinese coast.

North Korea is developing an SLBM, possibly designated the 

Bukkeukseong-1 or Polaris-1. According to North Korean press 

statements, the SLBM will be cold-launched, solid-fueled, will 

carry a nuclear warhead, and is intended for launch from the 

Sinpo-class submarine. North Korea conducted multiple flight 

tests of the developmental SLBM in 2016. 

India is developing a new ballistic missile-capable submarine, the 

INS ARIHANT. The INS ARIHANT will carry either 12 SRBMrange K-15s or four IRBM-range K-4 SLBMs. The Dhanush, a 

liquid-fueled, ship-launched ballistic missile (ShLBM), is a naval 

variant of India’s Prithvi II CRBM.

China CSS-N-14 Russia SS-N-18

Submarine-Launched (SLBM) & Ship-Launched Ballistic Missiles (ShLBM)
31

India K-15 Russia Bulava Launch Canister
32

India Dhanush Russia SS-N-18 Payload Section

North Korea Bukkeukseong-1 Launch
33

North Korea Bukkeukseong-1

Submarine and Ship-Launched Ballistic Missiles

Note: All ranges are approximate.

COUNTRY / SYSTEMS NUMBER OF 

STAGES

WARHEADS

PER MISSILE PROPELLANT DEPLOYMENTMODE

MAXIMUM

RANGE (km)

NUMBER OF

LAUNCHERS*

CHINA

CSS-N-14 3 1 Solid JIN Sub 7,000+ 48

INDIA

K-15

K-4

Dhanush

2

2

1

1

1

1

Solid

Solid

Liquid

ARIHANT Sub

ARIHANT Sub

Sukyana-class Patrol 

Boat

700

3,500

400

12

4; Not Yet Deployed

2

NORTH KOREA

Bukkeukseong-1 2 1 Solid SINPO Sub UNK 1; Not Yet Deployed

RUSSIA

SS-N-18

SS-N-23 Sineva

SS-N-32 Bulava

SS-N-32 Bulava

2 + PBV

3 + PBV

3 + PBV

3 + PBV

3

4

6

6

Liquid

Liquid

Solid

Solid 

DELTA III Sub

DELTA IV Sub

DOLGORUKIY (BOREY) 

Sub

TYPHOON Sub

5,500+

8,000+

8,000+

8,000+

96

96

48

20; Not Yet Deployed
34

Cruise missiles are typically categorized by their intended 

mission; either a land attack cruise missile (LACM) or as an 

anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM). Cruise missiles can further be 

categorized by launch platform: aircraft, ship, submarine, or 

ground-based launcher.

A LACM is an unmanned, armed, aerial vehicle designed to 

attack a fixed or relocatable target. It spends the majority of its 

mission in level flight, as it follows a preprogrammed path to the 

predetermined target. LACMs typically use a small gas turbine 

engine for propulsion. 

Russia Kh-101 India Brahmos

France SCALP-EG

Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM)
35

LACM guidance usually occurs in three phases: launch, midcourse, and terminal. During the launch phase, a missile is guided using 

only the inertial navigation system (INS). During the midcourse phase, the missile’s INS is updated by one or more of the following 

systems: a satellite navigation system (such as the US Global Positioning System (GPS) or the Russian Global Navigation Satellite 

System (GLONASS)), a terrain contour matching (TERCOM) system, or a radar or optical scene matching system. The terminal 

guidance phase begins when a missile enters the target area and uses either a more accurate scene matching system or a terminal 

seeker (usually an optical or radar-based sensor). Some advanced LACMs have the potential to have highly accurate guidance 

systems that can place the missile within a few feet of the intended target. 

LACMs can be challenging targets for air defense systems. Cruise missiles can fly at low altitudes to stay below a radar’s line of sight. 

Depending on a country’s ability to do mission planning, the missile can use terrain features, such as mountains/valleys, to hide from 

radars. Furthermore, LACMs may fly circuitous routes to the target, avoiding radar and air defense installations. A salvo of missiles can 

be launched to approach a target simultaneously from different directions, potentially overwhelming air defenses. Some missiles have 

incorporated stealth features to make them less visible to radars and infrared detectors. Some developmental systems may incorporate 

chaff or decoys as an added layer of protection, though concealment will remain a cruise missile’s main defense. The cruise missile 

threat to US forces is increasing in the number of countries possessing LACMs, the number of LACMs, and the number of LACMs 

possessing advanced capabilities. 

The CJ-10 (DH-10) is the first of the Chinese Changjian series of long-range missiles and LACMs. It made its public debut during a 

military parade in 2009 and is currently deployed with the PLA Rocket Force. 

In March 2015, Iran displayed the Soumar LACM. The Soumar is a ground-launched LACM that appears to be based on the Russian 

air-launched AS-15. Iran claims the Soumar has a 2000 km range. In 2012, Iran announced development of a similar missile called 

“Meshkat”. The Soumar could be a new name for the Meshkat or a variant of the Meshkat. Iran could develop alternate launch modes, 

aircraft or naval, for the Meshkat/Soumar. 

The Club-K cruise missile “container launcher” weapon system, produced and marketed by a Russian firm, looks like a standard 

shipping container. The company claims the system can launch cruise missiles from cargo ships, trains, or commercial trucks. 

Beginning in fall 2015, Russia fired LACMs from surface ships, submarines and aircraft in support of ongoing military operations in 

Syria.
36

China Cruise Missile Launchers

Russia KH-555M Israel Popeye Turbo

Iran Soumar

Russia R-500
37

Land-Attack Cruise Missiles

Note: All ranges are approximate and represent the range of the missile only. The effective system range may be greatly increased by the range of the 

launch platform.

*The BLACK SHAHEEN is an export version of the SCALP-EG.

COUNTRY / SYSTEMS LAUNCH

MODE

WARHEAD

TYPE

MAXIMUM

RANGE (km) IOC

CHINA

YJ-63

CJ-10

CJ-20

Air

Ground

Air

Conventional

Conventional

Conventional

Undetermined

Undetermined

Undetermined

Operational

Operational

Operational

FRANCE

APACHE-AP

SCALP-EG

Naval SCALP

Air

Air and ship

Sub and Surface Ship

Submunitions

Penetrator

Penetrator

100+

250+

250+

2002

2003

 2013+

GERMANY/SWEDEN/SPAIN/SOUTH KOREA

KEPD-350 Air Penetrator 350+ 2004

INDIA/RUSSIA

Brahmos 1

Brahmos 2

Air, ground, ship, & sub

Air, ground, ship, & sub

Conventional

Conventional

less than 300

300+

 2010+

 2020+

IRAN

Meshkat/Soumar Air, ground, & ship Conventional Undetermined Undetermined

ISRAEL

Popeye Turbo Air Conventional 300+ 2002

PAKISTAN

RA'AD

Babur

Air

Ground

Conventional or Nuclear

Conventional or Nuclear

350

350

Undetermined

Undetermined

RUSSIA

AS-4

AS-15

SS-N-21

Kh-555

Kh-101

3M-14

3M-55

Air

Air

Submarine

Air

Air

Ship and sub

Ground, ship, & sub

Conventional or nuclear

Nuclear

Nuclear

Conventional

Conventional

Conventional, Nuclear Possible

Nuclear Possible

300+

2,800+

2400

Undetermined

Undetermined

2500

400+

Operational

Operational

Operational

Operational

Operational

Operational

Operational

TAIWAN

Wan Chen

HF-2E

Air

Ground

Conventional

Conventional

150

300

2006

Undetermined

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BLACK SHAHEEN* Air Penetrator 250+ 2006

UNITED KINGDOM

Storm Shadow Air Penetrator 250+ 2003
38

Overall, the threats posed by ballistic missile delivery systems 

are likely to continue to increase and grow more complex. 

Adversary ballistic missile systems are becoming more mobile, 

survivable, reliable, and accurate while also achieving longer 

ranges. Hypersonic glide vehicles delivered by ballistic missile 

boosters are an emerging threat that will pose new challenges 

to missile defense systems. Prelaunch survivability is likely to 

increase as potential adversaries strengthen their denial and 

deception measures and increasingly base missiles on mobile 

platforms. Countries are adopting technical and operational 

ballistic missile defense countermeasures in their ballistic 

missiles.

Russia probably will retain the largest force of strategic ballistic 

missiles outside the United States. The development of new 

ballistic missile systems is a high priority for Russia. Russian 

officials have claimed that a new class of hypersonic vehicle is 

being developed to allow Russian strategic missiles to penetrate 

missile defense systems. Russia claims it will deploy the RS26 Rubezh for shorter-range targets and has stated it will soon 

begin flight testing a new heavy liquid-propellant ICBM, called the 

Sarmat, to replace the aging SS-18. Russia is also offering the 

advanced Iskander-E SRBM for export.

North Korea Hwasong-10 (Musudan) IRBM

Iran Fateh-110 SRBM North Korea Bukkeukseong-1 SLBM

Summary
39

Ballistic and Cruise Missiles,

with their relatively low operating costs, their potential 

to penetrate defense systems, and their value as 

a symbol of national power, will continue to be the 

offensive weapons of choice for many nations. 

As such, they are threats that must be carefully 

considered in future military planning and operations.

China is producing technologically advanced ballistic missiles, has sold ballistic missile technology to other countries, has deployed a 

large force of ballistic missiles in the vicinity of Taiwan, and is expanding the reach of its ballistic missiles to attempt to prevent foreign 

powers from becoming involved in any future regional conflict. China can already target the United States with a relatively small force of 

ICBMs, and its ICBM force is growing quantitatively and qualitatively.

North Korea has had two successful flights of the TD-2 SLV, has unveiled road-mobile ICBMs, has IRBMs in development, has tested 

a new solid-propellant SLBM and MRBM, and maintains a large SRBM inventory. The pace of North Korea’s ballistic missile flight tests 

has increased dramatically in recent years

Iran has ambitious ballistic missile and space launch development programs and continues to attempt to increase the lethality of its 

ballistic missile force. Iranian ballistic missile forces continue to train extensively in highly publicized exercises. These exercises enable 

Iranian ballistic missile forces to hone wartime operational skills and evolve new tactics. Iran is fielding increased numbers of theater 

ballistic missiles, improving its existing inventory, and is developing technical capabilities to produce an ICBM through its ballistic 

missile and SLV programs.

The cruise missile threat to US forces is increasing. The majority of LACMs will still be subsonic, but supersonic and hypersonic missile 

will be deployed in the future. LACMs will also have increased survivability by minimizing radar signature and/or the use of chaff and 

decoys. 
Materials copyrighted by others may be included. No claim of copyright is made for any included 

works of the US Government. 

This report was prepared by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) in collaboration 

with the Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee (DIBMAC).

NASIC-1031-0985-17

June 2017

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE BALLISTIC MISSILE ANALYSIS COMMITTEE

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