alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Albin A. Kazlauskas, Petitioner, v. William S. Hults, as Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, Respondent.

Determination annulled, with $50 costs and disbursements. Memorandum: We find no substantial evidence to support the determination that the petitioner violated subdivision (a) of section 1142 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. All concur, except Williams, P. J. and MeClusky, J., who dissent and vote to confirm the determination. (Review of determination of Commissioner of Motor Vehicles suspending petitioner’s chauffeur’s license for 30 days transferred by Monroe Special Term.) Present — Williams, P. J., Goldman, Halpern, MeClusky and Henry, JJ.
exv10w16



 







Exhibit 10.16




Form of

AMENDMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES AGREEMENT




     This AMENDMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES AGREEMENT (the “Agreement”), is entered
into as of ___, 2006, by and between CBS Personnel Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation
(f/k/a Compass CS Inc.) (the “Company”) and Kilgore Consulting II LLC, a Connecticut
limited liability company (“Kilgore”).



RECITALS:




     WHEREAS, the Company and Kilgore entered into that certain Management Services Agreement dated
October 13, 2000 (the “MSA”);



     WHEREAS, the Company and Kilgore desire to amend certain provisions of the MSA in accordance
with the terms of this Agreement;



     NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual premises and the respective mutual agreements
contained herein, the Company and Kilgore agree as follows:



     Section 1. Termination by Company. Paragraph 1 of the MSA is amended by adding the
following language to the end of Paragraph 1:




“Notwithstanding any provision of this Agreement to the contrary, the Company may
terminate this Agreement upon 30 days’ prior written notice to Kilgore.”



     Section 2. Assignment. Paragraph 9 of the MSA is amended by adding the following
language to the end of Paragraph 9:




“Notwithstanding any provision of this Paragraph 9 to the contrary, Kilgore may
assign this Agreement to Compass Group Management LLC and shall upon such assignment
provide written notice thereof to the Company within 10 calendar days of such
assignment.”



     Section 3. Offsetting Management Services Agreement. The MSA, as amended by this
Agreement, shall be an “Offsetting Management Services Agreement” as defined in that certain
Management Services Agreement dated of even date hereof, by and between Compass Group Diversified
Holdings LLC and Compass Group Management LLC.



     Section 4. Effectiveness of MSA. Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, the
terms and provisions of the MSA remain in full force and effect.



     Section 5. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be construed under and shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut.



     Section 6. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts,
each of which will be deemed to be an original copy of this Agreement and all of which, when taken
together, will be deemed to constitute one and the same agreement.



 









 





{remainder of page left intentionally blank; signature page follows}





 









 








     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed and delivered this Amendment to
Management Services Agreement as of the date first above written.



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	COMPANY: 



CBS Personnel Holdings, Inc., 

a Delaware corporation

 	 
	 	 	By:  	 	 
	 	 	Name:  	 	 
	 	 	Title:  	 	 
	 
	 	KILGORE:



Kilgore Consulting II LLC, 

a Connecticut limited liability company



By: The Compass Group International LLC,
its Managing Manager

 	 
	 	 	By:  	 	 
	 	 	Name:  	 	 
	 	 	Title:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Johnathan Rice, Appellant.

[834 NYS2d 254]

*568Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Cooperman, J.), rendered May 13, 2004, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (two counts), robbery in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress certain identification testimony.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant improperly relies upon trial testimony to challenge the hearing court’s determination denying suppression of the showup identification evidence. “ ‘Where, as here, the defendant fails to move to reopen a suppression hearing, he or she may not rely upon the trial testimony to challenge the suppression ruling’ ” *(People v Crosby,*33 AD3d 719, 720 [2006], *lv denied*8 NY3d 845 [2007], quoting *People v Gold,*249 AD2d 414, 415 [1998]; *see People v Abrew,*95 NY2d 806 [2000]). In any event, the defendant’s contention is without merit. The showup took place within 30 minutes of the crime and less than one mile away from the crime scene. The factual circumstances represent one unbroken chain of events—crime, escape, pursuit, apprehension, and identification—all of which occurred in rapid sequence within a limited geographic area *(see People v Mitchell,*185 AD2d 249 [1992]). Accordingly, the showup was not unduly suggestive, notwithstanding that the defendants were handcuffed and in the presence of uniformed officers *(see People v Gilyard,*32 AD3d 1046 [2006], *lv denied*8 NY3d 846 [2007]; *People v Loo,*14 AD3d 716 [2005]; *People v Pierre,*2 AD3d 461 [2003]; *see also People v Colson,*148 AD2d 626 [1989]).

The court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for an adverse inference charge. Where a defendant claims that the loss of evidence deprived him of a fair trial, the court must consider a number of factors including the proof available at trial, the significance of the missing evidence, and whether the loss was intentional or inadvertent *(see People v Haupt, 71*NY2d 929, 931 [1988]; *People v Holman,*283 AD2d 440 [2001]). The court’s determination of an appropriate sanction must be based primarily on the need to *569eliminate prejudice to the defendant *(see People v Holman, supra).*The record shows that the defendant was not prejudiced by the loss of the evidence at issue.

The defendant’s remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, are without merit. Santucci, J.P., Krausman, Lifson and Dillon, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    Exhibit 23.1


                         INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT


The Board of Directors
American Vantage Companies

We consent to incorporation by reference in registration statement No.
333-00905 on Form S-8 of American Vantage Companies (formerly American Casino
Enterprises, Inc.) of our report dated October 2, 1997, relating to the
consolidated balance sheets of American Vantage Companies and Subsidiaries as
of July 31, 1997 and 1996, and the related consolidated statements of income,
changes in shareholders' equity, and cash flows for the years then ended, which
report appears in the July 31, 1997 annual report on Form 10-KSB of American
Vantage Companies.


Las Vegas, Nevada
October 29, 1997
#### Andrew J. Melechinsky *v.*Roman J. Lexton et al.

*Barney Lapp,*assistant attorney general, for the defendants.

*Andrew J. Melechinsky,*pro se, the plaintiff.

Argued October 1

decided October 1, 1974

The defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss the Notices of Appeal dated February 25, 1974, and May 20,1974” from the Superior Court in Hartford County is granted.
§ 564.58 Determination of amount allowable. ( a ) The maximum amount which may be allowed is the value of the property immediately prior to the accident or incident. Subject to the foregoing, the amount allowable is the cost, incurred or estimated to be incurred, of replacing the property, or of restoring it to the condition in which it was immediately prior to the accident or incident. However, if as the result of the repairs effected, the value of the property is appreciably enhanced, a sum equal to the increase in value will be deducted from the cost of restoring the property in determining the amount allowed. Conversely, if after the repairs have been effected, the value of the property is appreciably less than that prior to the accident or incident, the difference in value will be added to the cost of repairs in determining the amount allowed. However, no award in excess of the amount claimed may be made.
( b ) In determining the amount allowable for repairs, the permanency of parts replaced will be considered and deductions made for depreciation as appropriated. Thus, an automobile tire is not expected to last through the life of a vehicle so that when a tire three-fourths worn is replaced with a new tire, the amount allowable is one-fourth of the cost of the new tire. The same principle applies to batteries and other items of equipment or accessories during relatively short wearout periods. However, no allowance for depreciation is made in replacing parts, such as fenders, bumpers, radiators, which normally would last through the life of the vehicle.
( c ) Deprivation of use of property (including motor vehicles) is allowable as an item of damages, but only in those cases where the claimant has sustained legally provable damages. Towing charges are also allowable items of damage. However, interest, cost of preparation of claim and of securing supporting evidence, inconvenience, and similar items are not property allowable items of damage.
#### Edward A. Grannas, Plaintiff, and Natalie Grannas, Respondent, v. Charles E. McCarthy, Appellant.

Order, entered February 10, 1960, denying defendant’s motion to set aside verdict in favor of plaintiff Natalie Grannas, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Judgment in favor of plaintiff Natalie Grannas, unanimously affirmed, with costs to plaintiff-respondent, Natalie Grannas. Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, Valente, McNally and Noonati, JJ.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

REYNA MARQUEZ GARCIA; ABIMAEL EMIGDIO MARQUEZ; CARLOS EMIGDIO MARQUEZ; JOSUE MARQUEZ GARCIA,

Petitioners,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 22

- 688

Agency No s

. A208

- 587

- 540

A208

- 587

- 541

A208

- 587

- 542

A208

- 587

- 543

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 19, 2023 ** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: NGUYEN, COLLINS, and LEE, Circuit Judges

.

Lead Petitioner Reyna Marquez Garcia ; her adult son, Abimael Emigdio

Marquez ; and her two minor children (collectively, “petitioners”) petition for

review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) adopting

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAY 23 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 and affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying asylum, withholding

of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Reviewing the agency’s factual

findings for substantial evidence

, see Flores Molina v. Garland , 37 F.4th 626,

632 (9th Cir. 2022) , we deny the petition for review.

The a gency properly rejected petitioners’ applications for asylum and

withholding of removal. 1 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding

that petitioners did not demonstrate an objectively reasonable fear of future

persecution because their claim is based only on generalized criminal violence

in Mexico and fail s to establish an individualized risk of harm. Petitioners did

not establish an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution because they

did not suffer mistreatment in Mexico, did not ide ntify any specific groups or

individuals that might harm them in the future, and acknowledged that their fear

of future harm is based on generalized violence in Mexico. See Singh v. INS

,

134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T] o establish a well

- founded fe ar,

p etitioner cannot simply prove that there exists a generalized or random

possibility of persecution ; s he must show that s he is at particular risk

— that her

predicament is appreciably different from the dangers faced by her fellow

citizens.” ) (cleaned up and citation omitted).

PETITION DENIED.

1 The IJ also denied petitioners’ CAT claim, but petitioners did not challenge that determination before the BIA, nor do they challeng e it in this court

.
Exhibit 31.2
**Certification**
**Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes — Oxley Act of 2002**
I, Kenneth A. Corby, certify that:
 1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Emerson RadioCorp.;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessaryto make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under whichsuch statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this report, fairly present in allmaterial respects the financial condition, results of operations andcash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented inthis report;  4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for theregistrant and have:
a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made knownto us by others within those entities, particularly during theperiod in which this report is being prepared;
b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures asof the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and
c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourthfiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and
 

 

 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee ofregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):
a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal control over financial reportingwhich are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and
b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting.
Date: August 5, 2004     /s/ Kenneth A. Corby   Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
A signed original of this written statement required by Section 302 has beenprovided to Emerson Radio Corp. and will be retained by Emerson Radio Corp. andfurnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
§ 776.89 Background. ( a ) A covered USG attorney's primary professional responsibility is to the DoN, and he or she is expected to devote the required level of time and effort to satisfactorily accomplish assigned duties. Covered USG attorneys engaged in the outside practice of law, including while on terminal leave, must comply with local bar rules governing professional responsibility and conduct and obtain proper authorization from the JAG as required by §§ 776.57 and 776.88 of this part.
( b ) Outside employment of DoN personnel, both military and civilian, is limited by the UCMJ, MCM, and 10 U.S.C. 1044. A covered USG attorney may not provide compensated legal services, while working in a private capacity, to persons who are eligible for legal assistance, unless specifically authorized by the JAG. See § 776.24. Because of the appearance of misuse of public office for private gain, this prohibition is based upon the status of the proposed client and applies whether or not the services provided are actually available in a DoN/DoD legal assistance office.
( c ) Additionally, DoN officers and employees are prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 209 from receiving pay or allowances from any source other than the United States for the performance of any official service or duty unless specifically authorized by law. Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. 203 and 205 prohibit Federal officers and employees from personally representing or receiving, directly or indirectly, compensation for representing any other person before any Federal agency or court on matters in which the United States is a party or has an interest.
( d ) These limitations are particularly significant when applied to covered USG attorneys who intend to engage concurrently in a civilian law practice. In such a situation, the potential is high for actual or apparent conflict arising from the mere opportunity to obtain clients through contacts in the course of official business. Unique conflicts or adverse appearances may also develop because of a covered USG attorney's special ethical responsibilities and loyalties.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Company's Balance Sheet as of June 30, 2000 and the Statement Of Income
for the year ended June 30, 2000, and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                       3,620,460
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,644,291<F1>
<PP&E>                                      39,000,000
<DEPRECIATION>                              36,394,128
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               6,250,163
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,758,277
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 6,250,163
<SALES>                                      3,009,375<F2>
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,153,057<F3>
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,168,942<F4>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,984,115
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,984,115
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,984,115
<EPS-BASIC>                                   601.25<F5>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   601.25<F5>
<FN>
<F1>Includes prepaid rent
<F2>Rental income
<F3>Includes dividend income
<F4>Leasehold rent, supervisory fees, legal fees and amortization of
    leasehold
<F5>Earnings per $10,000 participation unit, based on 3,300 participation
    units outstanding during the year



</TABLE>
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h

Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,

J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk February 26, 2010

p0222 

# Order

February 26, 2010

140053

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 140053 COA: 293685 Wayne CC: 08-006410 ADRIAN LAMAR BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal th e October 13, 2009 order of the Court of Appeals is consider ed, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented s hould be reviewed by this Court.
1

MEMORANDUM

TO: Addressees

 

FROM: The Secretary

SUBJECT: Delegation of Authority

I. DELEGATION

Under the authority vested in me by section 412 of the Department of Education Organization Act 

(DEOA), 20 U.S.C. Section 3472, Public Law 96-88, I hereby delegate to you, your successor in 

function, or anyone acting for you, the authority to accept, pursuant to section 421 of the DEOA, 

20 U.S.C. Section 3481, Public Law 96-88, as amended by Public Law 103-382, gifts of travel 

provided by a Department of Education (ED) employee for his or her own official travel. Unless 

otherwise noted in future delegations of authority, legislative amendments to the authority 

delegated herein are included within the scope of this delegation.

II. RESERVATIONS

Gifts of travel provided by an ED employee for his or her own official travel may be accepted 

only in accordance with the attached Department standards for acceptance of such gifts. Gifts 

covered by this delegation that have a fair market value over $500 may only be accepted with 

concurrence from the Office of General Counsel. This delegation does not delegate the authority 

to accept gifts of travel from non-Federal sources pursuant to 31 U.S.C. Section 1353.

III. REDELEGATION

This authority may not be redelegated.

IV. CERTIFICATION AND EFFECTIVE DATE

This delegation is effective upon certification by the Department’s Principal Delegations 

Control Officer.

___________(Signed)___________ 

Richard W. Riley
2

OGC Clearance and Date: /s/ R. Wexler, 11/7/95

Certification Date: 11/7/95

Certified by Departmental Delegations Control Officer: /s/ Naty Beetle 

 

Control Number: EA/EJ/27

ATTACHMENT

Standards for Accepting Gifts of Official Travel Provided by the Traveling Department of 

Education Employee

In considering whether to accept a gift of official travel from the traveling employee, the following 

standards must be met:

1) The timing of the travel will not cause a reasonable person with knowledge of the

relevant facts to conclude that the primary purpose of the trip is personal, such as a 

vacation;

2) The travel is an event, such as a conference, forum, or training event, the attendance at 

which is not required by law;

3) While attending the event, the employee will not participate in duties that are required by 

law;

4) There is no comparable event available within the employee’s duty station;

5) Personal payment of the event has not been suggested by the employee’s supervisor(s);

6) Attendance at the event has not been required by the employee’s supervisor(s); and

7) The employee’s payment for official travel expenses is completely voluntary.
3