NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LUDWIG ANTONIO GOMEZ 

HERNANDEZ, AKA Ludwin Antonio 

Hernandez, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 20-71417 

Agency No. A042-245-175 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 10, 2021**

Pasadena, California

Before: MURGUIA and BADE, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY,*** District Judge.

Ludwin Gomez Hernandez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for the 

District of Montana, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUN 17 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal 

from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his motion for a fourth continuance.1 

Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recite them here. We 

review the agency’s denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. Ahmed v. 

Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009). We deny the petition for review.

1. The government argues that we lack jurisdiction over Gomez’s petition 

because the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683 

(2020), effectively overruled longstanding Ninth Circuit precedent explaining that 

the jurisdictional bar of § 1252(a)(2)(C) “does not sweep in all petitions for review 

filed by petitioners with a qualifying conviction in their past,” Garcia v. Lynch, 798 

F.3d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations, alterations, and citation omitted),

and holding that § 1252(a)(2)(C) does not deprive us of jurisdiction over “a 

procedural motion that rests on a ground independent of the conviction that triggers 

the bar,” id. at 881. But in Nasrallah the Court answered only the “narrow question” 

of whether an appellate court may review a noncitizen’s factual challenges to an 

agency’s order denying relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and 

it did not consider or decide how §§ 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D) apply to motions for 

continuances. See 140 S. Ct. at 1688. Because Nasrallah addresses a different 

1 The record offers various versions of Gomez’s first name, including “Ludwig,” 

“Ludwing,” and “Ludwin.”
3 

situation than the one at issue here, it is not “clearly irreconcilable” with Garcia and 

we maintain jurisdiction over the petition. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s authority must 

“undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a 

way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable”).

2. Gomez argues that the agency abused its discretion in denying his 

motion for a fourth continuance. An IJ “may grant a motion for continuance for 

good cause shown.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29; see Matter of L-A-B-R, 27 I. & N. Dec. 

405, 407 (A.G. 2018). An IJ’s decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance 

is within “the sound discretion of the judge and will not be overturned except on a 

showing of clear abuse.” Sandoval-Luna v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 

2008) (citation omitted).

Gomez contends that the agency erred here because he could have eventually 

received adjustment of status from a family-based petition if he were granted a fourth 

continuance. Gomez, however, offered no evidence of any family-based petition on 

appeal before the BIA. See Matter of L-A-B-R, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 418 (explaining 

that absent evidence from a noncitizen’s relevant collateral proceeding, a noncitizen 

“generally will not carry his burden of showing that a collateral matter is actually 

likely to bear on the outcome of the removal proceedings”). Gomez also contends

that he could have sought multiple forms of relief in light of changed country 
4 

conditions in El Salvador. Yet Gomez neither identified the purported changed 

country conditions nor provided evidence supporting any changed country 

conditions in El Salvador on appeal before the BIA.

Accordingly, the agency did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Gomez

suffered no prejudice from the IJ denying his motion for a fourth continuance. See 

Sandoval-Luna, 526 F.3d at 1245, 1247; Matter of L-A-B-R, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 413–

18.

PETITION DENIED.2

2 Gomez’s motion for a stay of removal (Doc. 1) is denied as moot.