alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1201.102-70 DOT statement of guiding principles for the Department of Transportation Acquisition System. ( a ) *Vision.* The TAR applies to all Department acquisitions unless otherwise excluded by statute. DOT strives to make its acquisition process effective, efficient, and transparent, and to ensure that the process embodies fairness and Governmentwide best practices.
( b ) *Mission.* The TAR is a key component of DOT's acquisition process and is designed to provide clear and current regulatory and policy oversight to supplement or support implementation of the FAR.
( c ) *Role of the Office of the Senior Procurement Executive.* The Office of the Senior Procurement Executive (OSPE) applies leadership and best-in-industry acquisition practices to establish acquisition policies and procedures. The OSPE supports the DOT's mission by providing timely, effective, and ethical business policies, practices, products, innovative programs, strategies, and services.
### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIRD DISTRICT , AT AUST IN

NO. 03-00-00259-CR

David Tom

berlin, Appellant
v. The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE

DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAV IS COUNTY, 167 TH J

UDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 0994345, HONORAB LE MICHAE L LYNCH, JUDGE PRESIDING

The district court acc epted ap pellant David

Tomberlin’ s guilty plea and adjudged him guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child. SeeTex. Penal Code Ann. § 22. 021(a )(1)(B )(i), (2)(B ) (West Su pp. 2000)
. The court assessed punishment at imprisonment for fifteen years.

Appe llant ’s court-appointe d attorney filed a brief concludin

g that th e a ppeal is frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements o f Ander s v. Califor

nia , 386 U. S. 738 (1967), by presenting a prof essional evaluation of the record demonstrating wh y t here a re no arguable grounds to be advanced. See also Penson v. Ohio , 488 U. S. 75 (19 88); High v. State , 573 S
. W. 2d 807(Tex. Crim. App. 1978) ; Curr ie v. State , 516 S. W. 2d 684 (Tex. Cri m. App. 1974) ; Jackson v. State , 485 S
. W. 2d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) ; Gainous v. State , 436 S. W. 2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969)
. A copy of co unse l’s brief was deli

vered to appe llant, and appellant2

was advised of his right to ex amin e t he ap pe ll ate re cord

and to file a pro se br ief. No pr o se brief has been filed. We have reviewed the recor d and counsel’s brief an d agree that the appea l is frivolous and withou t mer it. We find not hing in th e recor d that mig ht ar guably su pport the appeal. The judgment of conviction is affir med.

__________________________________________ J. Woodfin Jones, Justice B efore Justices Jones, Kidd and Yeakel Affirm ed F iled: December 21, 2000 Do N ot Pu blish
#### BOARD OF EDUCATION OF DIST. NO. 6, Respondent, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF DIST. NO. 7, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

January 23, 1903.)

Action by the Board of Education, District No. 6, town of Cortlandt, county of Westchester, etc., against the Board of Education, District No. 7, town of Cortlandt, county of Westchester, etc.

No opinion.' Motion denied.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Lorenzo Jones, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Albany County Court, rendered December 7, 1977, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of the crime of robbery in the third degree. In essence, defendant contends that his plea of guilty should not have been accepted by the court since the record is insufficient to establish that in reality he admitted his guilt of the crime to which he was pleading or that this was an appropriate case for accepting defendant’s guilty plea without an admission of culpability (see *People v Viuda,*61 AD2d 938). The indictment charging defendant with robbery in the third degree alleged that he grabbed a pocketbook from the shoulder of his victim, knocking her to the ground. When specifically asked by the court whether he had knocked the woman to the ground, defendant replied in the negative. Accordingly, defendant theorizes that he cannot be guilty of robbery since that crime requires the use or threatened immediate use of physical force on another person (Penal Law, § 160.00). Where there is a factual dispute which tends to cast considerable doubt on defendant’s guilt of the crime to which he is pleading, the court must make further inquiry *(People v Serrano,*15 NY2d 304). We conclude, however, that while this appeal could have been avoided had the inquiry been more than *957cursory, the court’s questions did reveal that defendant admitted snatching the pocketbook from his victim’s shoulder and that she thereafter fell to the ground. In our view, this does not constitute a factual dispute casting considerable doubt on defendant’s guilt, but rather, simply creates a question as to how these facts would have been viewed by a jury, which is one of the factors considered by a defendant in arriving at his bargaining position (see *People v Francis,*38 NY2d 150, 155). Accordingly, we conclude that the court had no reason to believe that defendant’s plea was unfair or inappropriate, and therefore the bargain became final *(People v Francis, supra).*In so concluding, we refrain from passing on the question of whether purse snatching in and of itself constitutes forcible stealing within the meaning of the Penal Law (see *People v Santiago,*62 AD2d 572). Judgment affirmed. Mahoney, P. J., Greenblott, Sweeney, Kane, and Staley, Jr., JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-6915

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TRAYONE MAURICE BURTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:07-cr-00773-JFA-1)

Submitted: November 21, 2017 Decided: November 27, 2017

Before WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Trayone Maurice Burton, Appellant Pro Se. Stanley D. Ragsdale, John David Rowell, 

Jane Barrett Taylor, Assistant United States Attorneys, Columbia, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Trayone Maurice Burton appeals the district court’s orders granting his 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(2) (2012) motion for a sentence reduction under Sentencing Guidelines 

Amendment 782, and denying his motion for reconsideration. We review for abuse of 

discretion a district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2), and 

review de novo a district court’s conclusion as to the scope of its legal authority under 

that provision. See United States v. Muldrow, 844 F.3d 434, 437 (4th Cir. 2016). We 

have reviewed the record and discern no abuse of discretion by the district court. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders. See United States v. Burton, No. 3:07-

cr-00773-JFA-1 (D.S.C. Apr. 25, 2017; June 30, 2017). We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Daniel P. French et al., Respondents, v. Louis Caputo, as President of District Council No. 9, Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators *&*Paperhangers of America, for the Boroughs of Manhattan and The Bronx, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously affirmed, with costs to the respondents. Plaintiffs are officers of Local Union 490. Defendants are the officers of District Council No. 9, of which the local union is one of the constituent members. Plaintiffs were brought to trial on charges by the District Council, found guilty and subjected to discipline. They brought this action to annul the proceedings before the District Council’s trial board and to enjoin enforcement of the penalties. Trial Term found in their favor. It is true that the trial board was not constituted as the constitution of the council provides; and although the method adopted was not unfair to respondents, the decision of the Trial Term could be sustained on this ground. A ground, however, that appeals with more cogency to some of this court is that the charges upon which plaintiffs were tried are not a ground for disciplinary action. Plaintiffs circulated a leaflet criticizing the conduct and reflecting on the motives of certain officers of the District Council. While we *595do not understand that every such activity is immune from disciplinary action, we would find that the matter circulated here comes within the classification of criticism and opposition implicitly allowable for the preservation of the democracy of labor unions *(Madden*v. *Atkins,*41ST Y 2d 283). Concur — Breitel, J. P., Rabin, McNally and Steuer, JJ.; Eager, J., concurs in result,
### §1736q. Repealed. Pub. L. 104–127, title II, §268, Apr. 4, 1996, 110 Stat. 975

Section, Pub. L. 99–198, title XI, §1122, Dec. 23, 1985, 99 Stat. 1480, related to liberalization of agricultural trade policy.
3000’

UAS Launch Area #1

37.105199, -122.211111
3000’

UAS Launch Area #2

37.109785, -122.209566
EXHIBIT 32.2





Certification of Principal Financial Officer


Pursuant to U.S.C. Section 1350


As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of NeuMedia, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), does hereby certify, to such officer’s knowledge, that:





The Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ending March 31, 2011 of the Company (the “Form 10-K”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Dated: July 25, 2011


/s/ Lisa LuceroLisa LuceroCFO, Twistbox Entertainment, Inc.
§ 1639.1 Purpose; definitions. ( a ) The provisions of this part shall govern the consideration of a claim by a registrant for classification in Class 2-D (§ 1630.26 of this chapter).
( b ) The definitions of this paragraph shall apply to the interpretation of the provisions of this part: ( 1 ) The term *ministry* refers to the vocation of a *duly ordained minister of religion* or *regular minister of religion* as defined in part 1645 of this chapter.
( 2 ) The term *recognized church or religious organization* refers to a church or religious organization established on the basis of a community of faith and belief, doctrines and practices of a religious character, and which engages primarily in religious activities.
( 3 ) The term *recognized theological or divinity school* refers to a theological or divinity school whose graduates are acceptable for ministerial duties either as an ordained or regular minister by the church or religious organization sponsoring a registrant as a ministerial student.
( 4 ) The term *graduate program* refers to a program in which the registrant's studies are officially approved by his church or religious organization for entry into service as a regular or duly ordained minister of religion.
( 5 ) The term *full-time intern* applies to a program that must run simultaneous with or immediately follow the completion of the theological or divinity training and is required by a recognized church or religious organization for entry into the ministry.
( 6 ) The term *satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction* means maintaining a satisfactory academic record as determined by the institution while receiving full-time instructions in a structured learning situation. A full-time course of instruction does not include instructions received pursuant to a mail order program.
#### Noroton Heights Fire Department *v.*Vuono-Lione, Inc.

No appearance by counsel for either party.

Decided December 3, 1974

The defendant’s motion to dismiss the appeal from the Superior Court in Fairfield County at Stamford is dismissed.
MEMORANDUM

TO: Deputy Secretary

FROM: The Secretary

SUBJECT: Delegation of Authority 

I. DELEGATION

By the authority vested in me by section 412 of the Department of Education 

Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3472 and the U.S. Office of Special Counsel’s (OSC’s)

Guidance on Agency Reports available at: https://osc.gov/Resources/1213Appendix.pdf,

I hereby delegate to you, your successor in function, or anyone serving for you in an 

acting capacity or delegated the authority to perform the functions and duties of your 

position, the authority: (a) to review and sign written reports of investigation prepared in

response to referrals from the OSC regarding whistleblower disclosures; (b) to submit 

these reports of investigation to the OSC; and (c) to take actions as a result of the 

investigation pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 1213(d) and (f)(2).

Unless otherwise noted in future delegations of authority, amendments to the authority 

delegated herein are included within the scope of this delegation.

II. RESERVATIONS 

None.

III. REDELEGATION

This authority may not be redelegated.

IV. CERTIFICATION AND EFFECTIVE DATE

This delegation shall become effective upon certification by the Department's Principal 

Delegations Control Officer. 

___________/s______________

Betsy DeVos

OGC Clearance and date: Debbie Friendly, 7/13/2018

Certified date: 7/13/2018

Department Delegations Control Officer: Jim Clemmens

Control Number: EA/EB/176
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Horace Ross, Appellant.

Judgment of conviction for the crimes of assault in the third degree and unlawful possession of a narcotic drug (Penal Law, § 1751-a), unanimously reversed, on the facts and the law, and the informations dismissed. The arrest of defendant was made on the original charge of the misdemeanor of injury to property — breaking a window in a nearby bar. Defendant’s arrest was effected without a warrant for an alleged misdemeanor not committed in the presence of any of the arresting officers. The arrest was illegally made; and so the feeble resistance offered by defendant — resulting, as the District Attorney acknowledges, in more damage to defendant than to the officers — was fully justified under the circumstances *(People*v. *Cherry,*307 N. Y. 308; *People*v. *O’Connor,*257 N. Y. 473; *People*v. *Dreares,*15 A D 2d 204, affd. 11 N Y 2d 906). Therefore, the charge of assault in the third degree, based as it is on defendant’s resistance to arrest by one of the police officers, must fall. A search of defendant’s person after the arrest revealed the narcotics which are the subject of the third information. The search was not incidental to a lawful arrest and defendant’s motion during trial to suppress evidence of possession of said narcotics should have been granted and this information dismissed *(Mapp*v. *Ohio,*367 U. S. 643; *People*v. *Loria,*10 N Y 2d 368). Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, Rabin, Stevens and Eager, JJ.
### §249. Transfer of stored agricultural products

#### (a) In general

In accordance with regulations promulgated under this chapter, a warehouse operator may transfer a stored agricultural product from one warehouse to another warehouse for continued storage.

#### (b) Continued duty

The warehouse operator from which agricultural products have been transferred under subsection (a) shall deliver to the rightful owner of such products, on request at the original warehouse, such products in the quantity and of the kind, quality, and grade called for by the receipt or other evidence of storage of the owner.

(Aug. 11, 1916, ch. 313, pt. C, §10, as added Pub. L. 106–472, title II, §201, Nov. 9, 2000, 114 Stat. 2065.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 249, act Aug. 11, 1916, ch. 313, pt. C, §7, 39 Stat. 487, entitled injured persons to bring actions on bonds, prior to the general amendment of this chapter by Pub. L. 106–472. See section 245 of this title.

A prior section 10 of act Aug. 11, 1916, ch. 313, pt. C, was classified to section 251 of this title, prior to the general amendment of this chapter by Pub. L. 106–472.
#### State of Connecticut *v.*Rudolph Wright

*Arlen D. Nicho wits,*assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

No appearance for the appellant (defendant).

Argued February 4

decided February 4, 1975

The plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the appeal from the Superior Court in Fairfield County is granted unless the defendant files his brief on or before March 4, 1975.
(October 31, 1960)

#### William E. Gray, Respondent, v. Yale Transport Corp. et al., Appellants.

Motion by plaintiff to vacate the notice of appeal of defendant Yale Transport Corp. denied. In our opinion, the provisions in the order appealed from requiring the payment of the motion costs as well as the costs awarded by the existing judgment against plaintiff in favor of said defendant, were absolute and unconditional, and hence, its acceptance of such costs did not bar its right to appeal (ef. *Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.*v. *Bankers & Merchants’ Tel. Co.,*109 N. Y. 342). Nolan, P. J., Beldock, Ughetta, Kleinfeld and Christ, JJ., concur.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

February 27, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

129627 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

MONIQUE RIVERS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 129627 

 COA: 261547 

Wayne CC: 02-251317-DS

BEVERLY MOORE,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 14, 2005 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded 

that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

p0221 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

February 27, 2006 

Clerk
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-2186

In Re: THOMAS D. DIXON, JR.,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Prohibition. 

(1:05-cr-00131-RDB; 1:05-cr-00599-RDB)

Submitted: December 8, 2006 Decided: January 10, 2007

Before NIEMEYER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas D. Dixon, Jr., Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Thomas D. Dixon, Jr., petitions this court for a writ of

prohibition, seeking an order directing the district court to

enjoin all criminal proceedings in Case No. 1:05-cr-00131-RDB and

Case No. 1:05-cr-00599-RDB. We conclude that Dixon is not entitled

to relief.

A writ of prohibition should not issue unless it “clearly

appears that the inferior court is about to exceed its

jurisdiction.” Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 176 (1886). A writ

of prohibition is a drastic remedy that should be granted only when

the petitioner’s right to the requested relief is clear and

indisputable. In re Vargas, 723 F.2d 1461, 1468 (10th Cir. 1983);

In re Missouri, 664 F.2d 178, 180 (8th Cir. 1981). Further, a writ

of prohibition should be granted only when the petitioner has no

other adequate means of relief, In re Banker’s Trust Co., 775 F.2d

545, 547 (3d Cir. 1985), and a writ of prohibition may not be used

as a substitute for the normal appellate process. Missouri, 664

F.2d at 180.

Dixon asserts that the district court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction in both criminal prosecutions. However,

Dixon’s petition for a writ of prohibition is moot with respect to

Case No. 1:05-cr-00131-RDB, as that case was dismissed on

November 6, 2006. With respect to Case No. 1:05-cr-00599-RDB,

Dixon has failed to demonstrate that his right to relief is clear
- 3 -

and indisputable, or that this matter cannot be considered through

the normal appellate process. Accordingly, because Dixon may

challenge any adverse final judgment of the district court by

direct appeal, the relief he seeks in this proceeding is not

available. We therefore deny the petition. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-21-00143-CR

No. 02-21-00144-CR

On Appeal from the 396th District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1523899D, 1523904D

ABATEMENT ORDER

We have considered “Adam L. Arrington’s Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Attorney of 

Record.” 

The motion is GRANTED. The Hon. Adam L. Arrington is permitted to withdraw as 

counsel for appellant. We abate this appeal and remand this case to the trial court to appoint 

substitute appellate counsel and take any other measures that the trial court deems necessary to 

ensure that appellant does not forfeit his right to appeal. 

RODRICK DESHION STEELE JR., Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

The trial court shall file a supplemental clerk’s record containing the order appointing 

substitute appellate counsel on or before May 31, 2022. Upon our receipt of the supplemental 

clerk’s record, the appeal of this cause shall be automatically reinstated without further order. 

We direct the clerk of this court to send a notice of this order to the appellant, the Hon. 

Adam L. Arrington, the State’s attorney of record, the trial court judge, the trial court clerk, and 

the court reporter.

Dated April 28, 2022.

Per Curiam
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-6352

VICTOR TYRONE BASS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

IREDELL COUNTY; CLYDE LLOYD; SERGEANT RICK,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Graham C. Mullen, District

Judge. (CA-96-103-5-MU)

Submitted: August 28, 1997 Decided: September 16, 1997

Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Victor Tyrone Bass, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant, a North Carolina inmate, appeals the district

court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2) (West Supp. 1997). We have

reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find that

this appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal on the

reasoning of the district court. Bass v. Iredell County, No. CA-96-

103-5-MU (W.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 1997; Feb. 6, 1997). We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED