i,i ~i~,~i i 

! i~!i,~,~, ~i~~!~i~i~i~!~!~i~i~i~!~~~~~~~ii~i~i'ii!,~!~i~i~,ii~i 
The Bear Went 

Over the Mountain: 

Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan 
Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanista

Translated and Edited by 

Lester W. Grau, 

Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, 

Introduction by 

David M. Glantz, Former Director, 

Foreign Military Studies Otfice, Fort Leavenworth, 

Graphics and maps by 

Stephan K. Stewman and Marcin E. Wiesiolek

Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, 

National Defense University Press 

Washington, D.C. 20319-6000 
joint, combined, or coalition warfare, peacekeeping operations, a

al strategy; and a variety of briefer works designed to circulate c

rary comment and offer alternatives to current policy. The Press 

ally publishes out-of-print defense classics, historical works, and o

cially timely or distinguished writing on national security. 

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or imp

within are solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily repre

the views of the National Defense University, the Departmen

Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency. Cleared for pu

release; distribution unlimited. 

Portions of this book may be quoted or reprinted without permis

vided that a standard source credit line is included. NDU Pr

appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints or reviews. 

Many NDU Press publications are sold by the U.S. Governmen

Office. For ordering information, call (202) 783-3238 or wr

Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printin

Washington, DC 20402. 

Second Printing, August 1996 
Foreword ..................................................................................

Acknowledgements .............................................................

Introduction .......................................................................

Preface .................................................................................

Frunze Comments. .......................................................

Frunze Foreword. ...............................................................

Chapter 1: Blocking and Destroying Guerrilla Ban

. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

An airborne battalion searches Sherkhankel villa

Searching a populated area in the Charikar Valle

Blocking and destroying a guerrilla band in Kunar 

Province .......................................................................

Combing the city of Bamian and its outlying town

during the course of a raid .......................................

Blocking and searching the green zone of the 

Arghandab River .......................................................

Blocking, searching for and destroying a guerrilla 

force in Ishkamesh region ........................................

Sweeping a green zone in Helmand Province ......

Sweeping villages with Afghani and Soviet subun

Sweeping a potential ambush area ........................

Blocking, sweeping and destroying the mujahideen 

in the Varduj Valley. .................................................

Sequential blocking and sweeping of a mountain 

valley near Anushella .............................................

Blocking and sweeping an inhabited region .........

Blocking the enemy in an area of villages and then 

destroying them during the sweep .........................
17. An airborne battalion seizes the Satukandav Pass .

18. Storming Spinakalacha village ..................................

19. A motorized rifle battalion offensive at night 

in the mountains of the Andarab Canyon ...............

Chapter 3: The Application of Tactical Air Assaults 

20. Tactical air assaults in Nangarhar and Laghman 

Provinces ........................................................................

21. An air assault in the area of Rumbasi village ..........

22. Air-assaulting and blocking the enemy in the LarMandikur Valley ..........................................................

23. Destruction of a guerrilla force by a tactical air 

assault into Lowgar Province ......................................

24. Seizing and holding a mujahideen training center 

with a tactical air assault. ............................................

25. An airborne battalion lands in Islam-Dara Canyon 

and seals it off. .............................................................

26. Conducting a tactical air assault in the "Melava" 

fortified region .............................................................

Chapter 4: 

27. 

28. 

29. 

30. 

31. 

32. 

33. 

34. 

Defense and Outpost Security. ..................

A motorized rifle platoon defends outside Jurm vi

Organizing a security outpost in the suburbs of K

Repelling a raid on a security post ...........................

A mobile security patrol in combat near the village 

of Chandaran ...............................................................

A mobile security patrol destroys a guerrilla force in 

Khinjan Canyon ..........................................................

Repelling a mujahideen attack on a security 

detachment in the Panjsher valley. ...........................

Securing a base camp ................................................

LOC security. ...............................................................

vi 
Daulatabad ...............................................................

38. Convoy escort and battle near Maliykher. ..........

Chapter 6: Conducting Ambushes ..............................

39. A reinforced MRC conducts an ambush in 

Kandahar Province ..................................................

40. An airborne group ambushes a bridge site ...........

41. A MRP conducts an ambush in the area of Aibak 

42. A MRC conducts an ambush in the Loy-Karez 

region ........................................................................

43. An airborne platoon conducts an ambush in 

Helmand Province ...................................................

44. A reinforced reconnaissance platoon conducts 

an ambush northwest of Surubi ............................

45. Conducting ambushes on the basis of radio 

intercept data in the area of Khanabad ................

46. A reinforced motorized rifle company conducts 

an ambush to the northwest of Jalalabad ..............

47. A recon platoon conducts an ambush in 

enemy-controlled territory. .....................................

48. A reinforced recon company conducts an 

ambush west of Bagram ..........................................

49. Conducting an ambush on the Yakpay Mountain 

Pass ............................................................................

Chapter 7: And in conclusion ........................................

Glossary .....................................................................

About the authors ..................................................

Map symbols .............................................................

Maps of Afghanistan ..............................................
evaluated their chances for success upon their experienc

Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately fo

diers, as well as the people of Afghanistan, they ignored no

experiences of the British in the same region, but also 

experience with the Basmachi resistance fighters in Ce

from 1918-1933. Consequently, in Afghanistan the Soviet a

its tactics inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the d

rain and the highly motivated mujahideen freedom fighters

To capture the lessons their tactical leaders l

Afghanistan and to explain the change in tactics that fol

Frunze Military Academy compiled this book for their com

general staff combat arms officers. The lessons are valuab

for Russian officers, but for the tactical training of platoon

and battalion leaders of any nation likely to engage i

involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rough terrain. Thi

dealing with the starkest features of the unforgiving landsc

tical combat: casualties and death, adaptation, and surviva

Battalion and company commanders, platoon le

sergeants will find realistic issues within these vignettes 

with squad and team leaders, and with vehicle commande

vers. Basic and Advanced Infantry Officer and NCO c

fmd useful applications for both classroom and field in

Senior leaders may find invaluable insights into the da

opportunities tactical units under their command may face 

wars. Above all, the lessons in this book should help smal

ers understand the need for security, deception, patrols, li

ter discipline, caution, vigilance, and the ability to seize th

in responding to unpredictable enemy actions and ambus

Hans Binnendijk 

Director, Institute for National Strate
Many people contributed to this book. Colonel General F

Kuzmin, the Commandant of the Frunze Academy, made t

possible. Other Frunze Academy officers who helped me im

were General Major Ivan N. Vorob'ev and Colonel Analto

Mary Fitzgerald of the Hudson Institute suggested the present 

out. Michael Orr of the United Kingdom's Combat Studies 

Centre in Sandhurst and Allen Curtis of the National Trainin

Fort Irwin, California read and commented on the manuscript

(Ret) Dave Glantz, the former director of the Foreign Militar

Office (FMSO), read and commented on the manuscript and 

introduction. My directors, Colonel Tod Milton and Colone

Johnston, and my co-workers at FMSO, Dr. Graham T

Colonel (Ret) Bill Mendel, Dr. Jacob Kipp, LTC (Ret) Tim 

LTC (Ret) Bill Connor, LTC John Sray, LTC Geoff Demere

Brian Dando, Major Ray Finch and Major Steve Button read 

mented on the manuscript. Randy Love of FMSO and my go

Michael Gress painstakingly checked my translation. Stephen 

of FMSO did a fantastic job on the maps. General Yahya M. 

former Chief of Operations of the Afghanistan Ministry of 

mujahideen strategist, and interim Minister of Defense, read and 

ed my manuscript and identified and corrected place names

Ali AhmadJalali, former Afghan Army and mujahideen comma

noted author, also read and corrected my manuscript and iden

corrected place names. SPC Marcin Wiesiolek cleaned 

scrubbed the graphics. Peter D. Neufville provided good cou

direction based on his experience in Afghanistan and researc

Panjsher operations. James H. Brusstar and Fred Kiley guided 

uscript through the acceptance process at National Defense U

Richard Stewart of the Special Operations Command at Ft. Bra

additional publication funds, andJonathan Pierce of NDU Pre

final edit and design. Finally, Gina Grau, my bride of 29 w

years, helped with encouragement and understanding. Than

for your help. The mistakes are mine, the product is ours. 

× 
Sixteen years after its commencement and six years a

sation, the Soviet-Afghan War remains an enigma for West

against the backdrop of earlier successful Soviet militar

tions in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and Czec

(1968), and occasional Soviet military pressure on Poland

military power of the Soviet state seemed to be an irresist

indefatigable Soviet political power. Ever concerned 

specter of a Soviet theater strategic offensive across th

Europe, the West was thankful that nuclear deterrence m

the Cold War balance, and was conditioned to accept, a

tantly, the results of Soviet intervention within its Socialis

wealth or in Soviet border regions. Having suffered throug

ma of Vietnam, Americans, in particular, watched curio

how the vaunted Soviet military machine would deal w

equipped tribesmen of this inhospitable region. A few 

the Afghan experiences of the British in the late Nineteent

when British imperial power was humbled by the ancesto

very same tribesmen. Few Westerners, however, doubte

Soviets would ultimately prevail. Some even proje

European fears to Asia, and pondered the applicability of 

theater-strategic offensive to southern Asia. More than a 

gic pundits and military planners envisioned a bold Sovi

thrust from southern Afghanistan to the shores of the Pers

challenge Western strategic interests and disrupt Wester

critical Middle Eastern oil. 

Despite these fears and dire warnings, the Soviet Afgh

effort soon languished as the British experience began to r

Although appearing to have entered Afghanistan in seem

cal fashion and with overwhelming force, the Soviet mi

mitment was, in reality, quite limited, and the immense an

ritory of Afghanistan swallowed the invaders up. Across 

barren landscape, guerrilla fighters multiplied, and, with
p, y, 

and the disease of the Afghan adventure infected Soviet so

the Soviet body politic itself. What began as yet another st

expansion of Soviet power ended in a welter of systemic in

al self doubt that exposed the corruption within the Sovie

and ultimately brought that system and its parent state to ru

To this day the Western view of the Afghan War has bee

ed in mystery and shadows. Soviet writers have p

Westerners with a mixture of political diatribe, military fabl

ry, and analogy, set against the backdrop of few facts. W

have recounted the war based on this Soviet material, 

mujahideen accounts, the reports of the occasional Western 

respondents in Afghanistan, and pure supposition. This vol

first factual material to shed real light on the conflict, rep

unique first step in setting the Afghan record straight. 

Several stark realities immediately emerge which p

Afghan War in proper perspective and permit its proper as

in the context of Soviet military, political, and social deve

First, although violent and destructive, the war was a limite

particular, in comparison with other notable recent local w

ferocity and decisiveness did not ~natch that of the series 

Arab-Israeli wars which scarred the Cold War years. It la

well-defined, large-scale military operations of the Korean 

the well-defined political arrangements that terminated tha

also differed significantly from the oft-compared U.S. 

Vietnam. In Vietnam, American military strength rose 

500,000 troops and the Americans resorted to many divis

multi-divisional operations. By comparison, in Afghanistan

five times the size of Vietnam, Soviet strength varied 

104,000 troops. The Soviet's five divisions, four separate 

and four separate regiments, and smaller support units of 

Army strained to provide security for the 9_1 provincial cen

few industrial and economic installations and were hard-p

xii 
techniques suited to theater war, the Soviet Army was ha

to devise military methodologies suited to deal with the Af

lenges. Afghanistan aside, the 1980's were a challenging p

itarily for the Soviet Union as it struggled to come to 

changing political-military and military technical realities. 

geoning arms race and increasing military strength o

democracies placed undue and unprecedented strains on t

weakening Soviet economy and forced the Soviets to face 

military expenditures at at time when the older policy of 

had increased popular contacts with and knowledge 

Western and raised expectations of Soviet consumers. Sovi

authorities were increasingly unable to cope with military

realities in the form of a technological revolution in weapo

produced the looming specter of a proliferation of costly 

precision weaponry. In the short term, while an economic 

nological solution was being sought, the military was force

its operational and tactical concepts and its military force s

meet the new realities. Coincidentally, this was done whi

tary searched for appropriate ways to fight the Afghan Wa

As a result of these twin military challenges, the Sovi

lated new concepts for waging war in non-linear fashion

operating on battlefields dominated by more lethal high

weapons. This new non-linear battlefield required the aba

of traditional operational and tactical formations, a rede

traditional echelonment concepts, and a wholesale reorga

formations and units to emphasize combat flexibility and, 

vivability. During the early and mid 1980s, the Sovi

altered its concept of the theater strategic offensive, deve

concepts for shallower echelonment at all levels, develope

cept of the air echelon, experimented with new force struc

as the corps, brigade, and combined arms battalion, t

more-flexible, logistical support concepts (for material sup

adopted such innovative tactical techniques as the use of 
[SPETSNAZ] units sharpened their skills, and air assault tec

were widely employed. 

Third, the inability of the Soviet military to win the w

sively condemned it to suffer a slow bloodletting, in a proc

exposed the very weaknesses of the military as well as th

political structure and society itself. The employment of a dr

with full periodic rotation of troops back to the Soviet Union 

ted the travails and frustrations of war and the self doubts of t

mon soldier to be shared by the Soviet population as a who

problems so apparent in the wartime army soon became 

cosm for the latent problems afflicting Soviet society in gener

messages of doubt were military, political, ethnic, and social

end they were corrosive and destructive. As evidence, on

only review the recently released casualty figures to unders

pervasiveness of the problem. Soviet dead and mis

Afghanistan amounted to almost 15,000 troops, a modest pe

the 642,000 Soviets who served during the ten-year war. 

dead tell no tales at home. Far more telling were the 469,6

alties, fully 73 percent of the overall force, who ultimately 

home to the Soviet Union. Even more appalling were the n

of troops who fell victim to disease (415,932), of which 115

fered from infectious hepatitis and 31,080 from typhoi

Beyond the sheer magnitude of these numbers is what thes

say about Soviet military hygiene and the conditions surr

troop life. These numbers are unheard of in modern arm

modern medicine and their social impact among the return

the Soviet population, in general, had to be immense. 

This volume puts a human face on the Soviet Afghan ex

and begins to add flesh and blood to our previously skeletal 

ation of the war. In time-honored fashion, this volume also 

ues the Soviet General Staffs penchant for conducting detaile

sis of combat based on concrete combat experiences du

course of war. All the warts and blemishes are present, as th

xiv 
y , p, pg

these military experiences ultimately ignited political and 

moil in the Soviet Union. 

This is the first of the Soviet Afghan revelations. Let u

it will not be the last. 

David M. Glantz 

Colonel, US Army (Retired

Carlisle, Pennsylvania 

Colonel Glantz is the West's leading expert on the Sovie

World War II and a leading figure in current Russian/Am

itary cooperation initiatives. He is the author of When Tita

How the Red Army Stopped Hitler, Soviet Military Deception i

World War, Soviet Military Operational Art in Pursuit of Deep B

Military Intelligence in War, The Military Strategy of the Sovi

History, The Soviet Conduct of Tactical Maneuver: Spear

Offensive, The History of Soviet Airborne Forces, From the 

Dniepr: Soviet Offensive Operations December 1942 August 19

Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front: 22June-August 1

series editor of The Soviet Study of War series and editor of 

of Slavic Military Studies. His last military position was the 

the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, K
The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union structured, equ

trained their forces for nuclear and high-intensity war o

northern European plain and the plains of northe

However, their political leadership thrust them into the mi

Afghanistan civil war to reconstitute and to support a 

Marxist-Leninist government. The terrain, the climat

enemy were entirely different from what they had prepa

this locale, their equipment functioned less than optim

force structure was clearly inappropriate and their tactics 

ously wrong. The citizens of the Soviet Union did not u

why their sons were being conscripted for battle in a strang

failed to see how their sacrifices contributed to the secu

fatherland. Those with connections sought to avoid the dr

their fathers who fought the Nazi invaders, the returni

were not welcomed as heroes or treated with respect. 

shunned and often scorned by their fellow citizens. A g

between the Armed Forces and the citizenry and man

found they could not fit back into the lifestyle of the comp

self-centered citizenry. The effects of the Afghanistan wa

ate throughout Russia today. 

The Communists took power in Afghanistan on 27 

with a bloody military coup. President Nur M. Taraki, th

ident, announced sweeping programs of land distributio

status for women and the destruction of the old Afghan

structure. The new government enjoyed little popular su

wobbly new government was almost immediately met 

resistance fighters who contested this new order. The co

ness of the Army of the Democratic Republic of Afghan

meted as bloody government purges swept the office

March 1979, the city of Herat revolted. Most of the A

Infantry Division mutinied and joined the rebellion. For

Taraki advanced and occupied the city while the Afghan 
tance, halved the size of the officer corps. In September 1979

Prime Minister, Hat'mullah Amin, seized power and execute

Amin's rule was no better and the Soviet Union watched 

communist state spin out of control and out of Moscow's or

Soviet Politburo moved to stabilize the situation. 

On 27 December 1979, Moscow struck with a Coup 

Using the same techniques as they employed during the in

Czechoslovakia, the Soviets rapidly seized the major cities, 

tions and centers of power. They executed Amin and put a

communist exile, Babrak Karmal, in power. They crushed 

tance by the Afghan Army and began consolidating their p

The Soviets soon discovered that Afghanistan was not go

a repeat of their Czechoslovakian experience. Their force 

ment, initially assessed as requiring several months, was to 

nine years and require increasing numbers of Soviet fo

proved a bloody experience in which the Soviet Union re

killed 1.3 million people and forced five and a half million 

(a third of the prewar population) to leave the country as 

Another two million Afghans were forced to migrate within 

try. The countryside is ravaged and littered with mines. Cl

a percentage basis, the Soviet Union inflicted more suf

Afghanistan than Hitlerite Germany inflicted on the Sovi

during World War II. 

The Soviet concept for military occupation of Afghan

based on the following: 

• stabilizing the country by garrisoning the main rout

cities, airbases and logistics sites; 

• relieving the Afghan government forces of garris

and pushing them into the countryside to battle the resistan

• providing logistic, air, artillery and intelligence supp

Afghan forces; 

xviii 
In the end, the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanist

communist government was defeated. Approximatel

Soviets served in Afghanistan. Of these, 525,000 were in 

Armed Forces while another 90,000 were in the KGB and 

in the MVD. The Soviets invested much national treasu

13,833 killed. Of their 469,685 sick and wounded, 10,7

invalids. The Soviets lost 118 jets, 333 helicopters, 147 

armored personnel carriers, 433 artillery pieces and mo

radio sets and CP vehicles, 510 engineering vehicles a

trucks? 

There are some striking parallels between the Sov

Afghanistan and the United States' role in Vietnam. Like 

States, the Soviets had to restructure and retrain their for

the combat zone. Eventually, military schools and trai

began to incorporate Afghanistan combat experience an

personnel for Afghanistan duty. Mountain warfare train

sprang up in many districts. However, unlike in the Un

Army, the Afghanistan war was not an all encompassing 

for the officer corps. Barely 10 percent of the Soviet moto

armor, aviation and artillery officers served in Af

However, a majority of airborne, air assault and Spetsn

served in Afghanistan. 

1 Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Pe

Afghanistan, London: Brassey's 1991, p. 10; and Boris Groinov, O

kontingent [Limited contingent], Moscow: Progress, 1994, p. 172

2 Manuscript of Aleksandr Lyakhovskiy, Tragediya I doblest" A

Tragedy and Valor of the Afghan Veterans], Moscow: Iskona, 1

3 Spetsnaz are "forces of special designation" or special troo

include a variety of branches and jobs. The highly-trained
pg pp

Infantry magazine entitled The Distant Challenge. These la

were a compilation of successful U.S. actions in Vietnam w

mentary on what was done correctly and what needed wo

Soviets also (though belatedly) discussed tactical changes in 

tical journal Voyenney vestnik ]Military herald] and taught m

warfare in their training center in Ushgorod in the Turkestan 

District as well as the other new mountain training centers. 

With the breakup of the Soviet Union, U.S. relations 

Russian military have slowly changed. Tentative military-to

contact programs are developing and attempts are being 

bridge the vast differences between our two forces with the 

ity of future joint operations and peacekeeping. A con

amount of formerly classified or hidden material is now bein

to the West. Recently I received a 1991 book entitled Com

of Soviet Forces in the Republic of Afghanistan. This book was 

by the History of Military Art department at the Frunze C

Arms Academy in Moscow. The Frunze Academy is a t

command and staff college for Russian combat arms offic

Academy is named for M. V. Frunze, a famous Soviet mili

retician, Minister of Defense and the architect of Soviet vict

mountain-desert region of Soviet Central Asia in the 1920s. 

tory faculty of the Frunze Academy interviewed Afghanist

ans, analyzed their actions and then recorded the incidents 

commentary as lessons learned tor future combat in mounta

terrain. 

The book was intended for internal use only and, as su

both the good and the bad. Mistakes and successes both illu

Spetsnaz who performed long-range reconnaissance, commando 

cial forces functions are the ones referred to throughout this boo

of percentages of officers of various branches serving in Afghanis 

author's estimate based on a variety of conversations and sources
terrain. Indeed, Afghanistan is not all mountains and des

forests and tangled "green zones"--irrigated areas thick 

crops, irrigation ditches and tangled vegetation. This th

history of the Afghanistan war. Rather it is a series of sn

combat as witnessed by young platoon leaders, company 

ders, battalion commanders, tactical staff officers and adv

Afghan government forces. It is not a book about right 

Rather, it is a book about survival and adaptation as y

come to terms with a harsh, boring and brutal existence 

by times of heady excitement and terror. I have translated 

mented on these vignettes in the hope that the tactical gr

mander of the future can use them to meet the challen

future and to help keep his soldiers alive. 

There are 47 Frunze Academy vignettes in this book, 

its own map. I have translated the text, but put the comba

in the first person instead of the third person. The comme

vided by the Frunze Academy follows. To this I have add

commentary. In addition, I have interjected my own co

footnotes and marked them as "(cal.)". I have added 

vignettes from Voyenney vestnik, since I felt that they wou

nificandy to the defensive chapter. Finally, I have adde

concluding chapter to the book. I derived much of the 

chapter from the dozens of conversations that I have 

Afghanistan veterans--Soviet generals, officers and soldier

resistance fighters. The map of Afghanistan is indexed to 

in the book. Some of the translation is rather free in orde

certain points for the reader. I have tried to put as much o

rience into American military English as possible. So, fo

in an air assault I talk about "first lifts" instead of "forwa

and "ground-support aircraft" instead of "sturmoviks". T

term is referenced in the glossary. 

Stephan Stewman has done a yeoman's job in redraw

Russian maps in the book. We have translated them into E
pg

Russian map graphics. Since this is not printed in color

forces are shown by double lines on the map. 

There are several problems with the book. First, the plac

are often pure transliterations from the Russian. Western 

Afghanistan are often pure transliterations from the Pushtu 

original. Often, it is difficult to tell what the name of the act

is--especially when dealing with small towns which may hav

three names, depending on who surveyed the map. So, it is 

ficult to pinpoint the exact site of thc vignette. I have 

Gazetteer of Afghanistan Second Edition published by the 

Mapping Agency in June 1983 where possible. General Y

Nawroz, formerly Chief of Operations of the pre-co

Afghanistan Ministry of Defense and strategist of the M

Military Committee, has graciously assisted me in pinpointi

other locales. Colonel Ali Ahmad Jalali, a reknown comm

both the Afghanistan Army and the resistance and a noted 

his own right, has also reviewed the book and helped clear 

of the mystery locales. But others remain mysteries to both 

Further, many of the maps that accompany the vign

problematic. Apparendy, most of the maps were drawn fro

ory, although some of them show evidence of access to the 

mapsheet. Over time, details fade and many of the sketch 

rough approximations. Distances, directions, place names 

graphic features may differ from the actual ground. Dista

transcriptions from the original except where clearly in err

the maps must be used as an approximation and not as an 

depiction of the ground. 

Finally, some of the original editing of the Russian text 

shod. Typing errors, differences in place name spellings bet

map and the text, and transcription errors are evident in the 

texts. I have done my best to correct these where possible. 

Still, these vignettes are an absolute gold mine for any 

xxii 
Lester W. Grau 

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Ar

Leavenworth, Kansas 
AKA}][EMH,q HMeHH M. B. q)PYH3E 

Order of Lenin and the October Revolution, Red Banner and 

of Suvorov Military Academy named in honor of M. V. Fr

Ka~e,~pa HcTOpHH BOeHHOFO HcKycc'rsa 

by the Department of the History of the Military Art 

6OEBBIE ~EI~ICTBH~I 

COBETCKHX BOI~ICK 

B PECIIY63-IHKE Ac:DFAHHCT

COMBAT ACTIONS OF SOVIET FORCES 

IN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN 

TeMaTHqeCKHft c6OpHHK TaKTHqecKHX rlpHMep

(A thematic collection of tactical examples) 

MOCKBa 

Moscow 

H3,~aHHe aKa,~eMHH 

The Frunze Academy Press 

1991 

Frunze Title Page 
This collection of tactical experiences is based on th

al experience of student-officers at the academy who, du

ous years, served in combat as part of the Limited Con

Soviet Forces in Afghanistan. The following group of m

torians assisted them in the preparation of this book: 

One-LTC S. A. Shumaev, LTC A. M. Korelov, Major V. V. 

Major S. N. Zagorurkin; Chapter Two.Major I. I. Latynin a

Yu. B. Sinel'shchikov; Chapter Three-Major Yu. G. L

Chapter Four-Major Yu. B. Sinershchkov. Chapter Five-M

Ionov; and, Chapter Six-LTC S. A. Morozov and Ma

Reznichenko. 

The teaching faculty of the Academy's History of M

Department provided assistance in the collection and 

materials. 

Candidate of Historical Science Colonel Yu. N. Yarove

ed the team of authors and served as editor-in-chief. 

xxvi 
The Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in the Re

Afghanistan garnered valuable combat experience and sig

ly expanded the theory and practice of combat in moun

desert terrain. Battalion and regimental-level 1 combat wa

primarily in the mountains against separate detachm

mujahideen [insurgents]. The war was fought under c

where the enemy lacked any aviation capabilities, but had 

air defense systems and modern mines. A lack of front 

advances along varied axes (which were not mutually su

characterized the decisive actions of the opposing sides 

attempted to seize the initiative and gain control over cer

tories. 

The Soviet forces encountered several unique comba

teristics which necessitated that they adopt more effectiv

ods for combating guerrilla forces of mujahideen. 

Combat experience disclosed that the principal types 

bat included: company, battalion and regimental raids; blo

areas where the enemy was located prior to searching 

destroying guerrilla forces; and the simultaneous attack o

groups of the enemy located at various depths and locatio

specific combat conditions influenced the way in w

advance through mountains and inhabited areas was co

led to a change in air assault tactics; changed the method

ducting marches and providing convoy security; and c

change in the tactics of organizing and conducting ambus

At the present time, a number of studies have been p

based on the combat lessons of Afghanistan. These an

conditions in this Theater of Military Operations, focusing 

ly on the tactics of the mujahideen guerrilla forces, 

1Here the Russian text employs the generic terms subunits (po

lenie) and units (chasti). I put them into Western equivalent (e
Afghanistan combat experience. Thus, insufficient at

devoted to specific combat episodes and to the analys

and bad points in the combat situations. Further, co

between military history and operational-tactical traini

command cadre needs improvement. 

In this respect, the team of authors has made an a

draw general conclusions about the little-investigated ex

in the training and the conduct of combat which were influ

Afghanistan experience. These include specific mission 

involving blocking and destroying guerrilla forces, the 

mountains and through populated areas, the use of air a

tics, the conduct of the defense in a security detachment

duct of a march and convoy security, and the conduct o

es. 

This is not an exhaustive study of the training and c

battle by the Soviet battalions and regiments in Afg

Rather, it is a collection of material which describes and 

individual combat episodes. 

xxviii 
The Bear Went 

Over the Mountain: 

Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan 
FORCES 

Research on the combat experience acquired by the Sov

in Afghanistan showed that one of the fundamental method

filling combat missions was to block off a region in which 

forces were located and then to thoroughly comb the regio

and destroy the mujahideen. 

Successful accomplishment of this task required thorou

ration of personnel and weapons for combat; skillful coo

between the blocking and combing forces, their bronegrupp

and aviation; the application of military cunning and the ap

of reasoned initiatives; and the brave and decisive actions of 

mander and personnel. Excellent results were achieved by 

ly blocking-off those regions which had been the site of mili

ity several days prior. 

1The bronegruppa (armored group) is a temporary grouping of 

BMPS or BTRs, or any combination of such vehicles. The BMP

combat vehicles) or BTRs (wheeled combat vehicles) are deploy

their normally assigned infantry squad and fight away from their 

ed troops. The grouping has a significant direct-fire capabilitiy 

as a maneuver reserve (ed.) 
Parvan Province. Guerrillas hit our convoys, outposts an

groups of soldiers. They regularly shelled the Bagram a

the base camp of our airborne regiment. Intelligence re

cated that a well-armed gToup of approximately 40 rnuja

operating out of Sherkhankhel village. 

The airborne regiment commander received orders 

this guerrilla force. Preparations for combat were rapidly 

Sufficient ammunition for three days combat was issue

paratrooper and two combat loads of ammunition were lo

the combat vehicles. The regimental commander persona

ed the battalion's readiness. 

The 3rd Airborne Battalion commander planned to 

battalion secretly to the Sherkhankhel region and to seal 

two companies of paratroopers while a third company wo

the village. One airborne company would remain in re

artillery battalion and four Mi-24 helicopter gunships wou

support with the initiation of combat. 

In the predawn hours of 20 March, the battalion move

Bagram to Sherkhankhel. A reconnaissance patrol m

meters in front of the column. The approach march m

wide, straight road. Along the left side of the road stretch

high, long adobe wall while on the right side lay a con

canal which was five meters wide and two-and-a-half me

Suddenly, through an embrasure cut in the adobe wall, 

cally at point-blank range, the enemy opened fire on the 

sance patrol. The survivors scrambled for safety into the 

machine gun opened fire from a house 150 meters further 

the ambush site. The battalion column halted and the batt

mander called in artillery and helicopter support. 

The battalion finally began to maneuver its reserve c

an effort to encircle the enemy, but only after the rnujahi

2S.N. Petrov served in the OKSVA from 1981 to 1983 as the co

of an airborne company. 
j

already gone. Instead, the battalion returned to its base ca

/ 

i 

m 

m 

Gulrrllkll Band 

(up to 4o men) 

Airborne Company ~ J~'~ is/ 

;.., X \ 

~'~~MO0 MAR 

~Ki I ~ LEGEN

At 200SO0 

At 201OOO 

Zomaer' ' '1 ........ 

Map 1: The sweep of Sherkhankhel village on 20 March 

3A system of underground tunnels used for the collection of gro

and for carrying water for surface irrigation. 
as to prevent maneuver by the subunits. The battalion co

merely put a reconnaissance patrol to his front and did no

using flanking patrols. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: Operations security is dif

ticularly when fighting on someone else's turf and workin

indigenous force which may not be 100% on your side. 

tions security is absolutely imperative for preserving your 

winning battles. In this vignette, the regimental comma

oughly inspected his force prior to its moving out. This s

a good idea, however, this was the dread stroevoy smotr [c

inspection] which was an unwelcome part of peace-time, ga

diering in the Soviet Army. The entire regiment would lay 

equipment on the parade ground. All equipment would b

on tarps in front of the vehicles. Every piece of equipmen

formally checked and accounted for, the correct spacing o

items would be checked with a template, and displays 

aligned with pieces of string. The process could take t

Although inspections are good ideas, these massive form

tions were almost always conducted before a planned ac

mujahideen in the vicinity were tipped off that an action wa

and could sound the warning. This Soviet pattern often 

mised operational security. In this vignette, the raujahideen 

were warned and punished the careless Soviet force. T

smotr may have been part of the Soviet problem. 
provinces were quiet and there was no combat in thi

However, with the arrival of spring, organized guerrilla gro

ated an active campaign. 

I commanded the 7th Motorized Rifle Company 5 w

mounted on BMPs. On the morning of 21 July, I was given 

sion to conduct a road march from Kabul to Charikar and 

force one of the mountain rifle battalions which would c

deep raid and search. 

Preparations for combat began in garrison. The com

100% fill in personnel, weapons and equipment. We carr

days worth of dry rations 6 and the vehicles were topped

POL. After a thorough inspection, I reported to my batta

mander that we were ready for combat. 

We completed our road march to the AO (area of oper

the 3rd Mountain Rifle Battalion. That evening, the batta

mander, Captain Yu. P. Levintas, explained the 3rd Battalio

and instructed me to prepare my company to move in the m

of the battalion along a designated route and search all th

villages. 

At 0500 hours on 22July, the 3rd Mountain Rifle Batta

forced by my 7th Motorized Rifle Company, moved out. R

4A.L. Makkoveev commanded a motorized rifle company in th

Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan from Decembe

November 1981. He was decorated with the Military Order "For 

the Fatherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" Third Class. 

5Evidendy a part of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division (ed.). 

6Dry rations are similar to the old U.S. Army C-ration. There 

types of dry rations. The first contained a can of meat, some c

toast, some jam and a tea bag. The second contained two ca

mixed with oatmeal. The third contained a can of meat and a c

etables or fruit (ed.). 
ed the squad to cover the company as it deployed. On th

of the village, I established firing positions for the mac

Field • 

• . .... ,, , 

! -t': MRs 

-Whee| ' RP "Fl.id" ." .~p 

i... }.~ii ,m Im [] 

m f -~ 

•; -.,11tl lm 

l " 

...-- .. ~..~,- I .= 

\l ~.,~. ,,, 

- .... 

I/: , o.=.... ,~=,,,,00=

Map 2: Motorized rifle company searching a village w

separated from the main force on 22 July 1980. 
eavy e o. e copay wet to te deese 

up positions behind the adobe walls on the south and 

edges of the village. I decided to send two squads from th

toon to envelop hill #2 and then destroy the enemy by 

from the front and rear. I also decided to dispatch a patro

the top of hill # 1. However, just as the platoon started to 

carry out its tasks, the mujahideen opened fire [from hills # 

My forces had to stay in place and return fire. After 30 m

received orders to withdraw my company to the hill from 

started [#4]. During the withdrawal from the village, my 

was pinned down by fire from hill #3. After we destroyed t

on hills #2 and #3 with small arms fire and helicopte

strikes, I moved my company to the designated area. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: The positive aspect of this 

was that the personnel displayed high morale and rapidly 

all orders even though this was their first time under fire. 

the helicopter gunships displayed great skill as they made 

on the enemy. However, the skirmish also showed that th

ny had insufficient experience in conducting combat in mo

regions and neither the officers, sergeants, nor soldiers 

enemy's tactics. If the enemy had held his fire until the en

party was moving on the path between hill # 1 and # 2 (w

was nothing but open wheat fields to the right and left), th

ny would have been in a very serious predicament. In

enemy opened fire immediately when the company re

southern outskirts of the village. The Soviet force did a w

reconnaissance. Their failure to seize the dominant terrai

the enemy to suppress practically the entire company area 

Another shortcoming was that the company had never 

7The machine gun/grenade-launcher platoon was the fourth pla

motorized rifle company and provided suppressive fire from PK

machine guns and AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers. This p

appeared during force reorganization in the mid-1980s. 
gy 

ful handling of squads and, consequently, of platoons in bat

is necessary and training did not achieve this. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: The commander learne

must control dominant terrain and position over-watch for

beginning the sweep. Failure to properly employ recon

forces and failure to control high ground are constant 

throughout this book. 

This 1980 example gives a partial look at one of the in

in force structure which the Soviet Army made in an attem

with the guerrilla forces-the mountain rifle battalion. A

most of these came from the mountain training cent

Turkestan Military District. 
pp

at night. Then it stopped to rest in a canyon.We decided 

the mujahideen within the confines of the canyon which w

to the southwest of Chaghasarai. The commander planne

duct the battle as follows: Insert an airborne company (

platoon) by 0400 hours, 15 December to block the southern 

canyon and simultaneously insert an airborne platoon and 

mental airborne reconnaissance platoon to block enemy e

north and west. At 0500 hours, move the rest of the battali

the blocking company) into the canyon to search for and d

enemy which was resting in the village located in the cany

At 2200 hours 14 December, the blocking group mov

GAZ 66 trucks. The trucks headlights were off. They drov

battalion lager, which was located along the highway, nor

Chaghasarai. In order to deceive mujahideen reconnaissanc

GAZ 66 trucks also drove south from the lager. The truck

the first group two kilometers south of the canyon and th

ued north. The first group walked to their blocking posit

second part of the blocking force was dropped north of th

and walked to their positions. By 0400, 15 December the 

the canyon were sealed. 

At 0500 hours, the battalion (minus the blocking 

began its sweep into the canyon. The mujahideen security d

this force at 0600. Adhering to their tactics, part of the en

ated combat with our main force while the rest began a w

The withdrawing forces were caught in our ambushes. 

The enemy lost 24 killed and 4 captured. We had one 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: This example contains ty

ments used to deceive the enemy (complete light discipline

by trucks; running trucks in opposite directions; final move

8V.A. Gukalov served in the OKSVA in 1979-1981 as the senior 

the Chief of the Operations Section on the staff of an airborne d
Airborne Platoon 

~Recon Platoon 

~.1S0400 ~IEC 

Guerrilla Force 

(up to 50 men) 

(mlnul i~latoon) --~----.'~ (mlnull one 

150400 DEC 142300 

~.. o~i~,:E~ t P,.,

ABN 

~._ ~ lSO$OO BN DE

Map 3: Blocking and destroying a guerilla force 

in Kunar Province on 15 December 1980. 
Termez and Kabul worsened. Enemy activity was particula

in the area of the Salang pass leading to the critical Sala

Guerrilla forces struck convoys of military vehicles and tru

motorized rifle regiment, composed of three reinforced 

rifle battalions, was tasked to secure this sector from Febr

May of 1980. By May, the situation along this section of 

become even more acute. Consequently one of our batta

structured as a raiding detachment. The battalion was 

with a tank company, a self-propelled artillery battery from 

artillery, the regiment's reconnaissance company, a platoo

23-4s 11 and a squad of sappers. 

The reconnaissance company carried out its first raid i

of Ghorband during the pre-dawn hours of 20-21 May and 

the village at daybreak. The detachment quickly broke i

band and killed up to 10 mujahideen. After this, we began a 

search of all the houses of the village. During the search

found some mujahideen small arms, for the bulk of the guer

had secretly withdrawn to the north. On the following day, 

raiding detachment finally began to move onto the city o

The detachment moved by road and fell into a mujahidee

losing one BMP and one ZSU-23-4. The detachment seize

Our companies assaulted and searched the city's blocks. O

showed that the mujahideen had abandoned the city. Our d

stayed in the city for several days. During that time we se

nearby villages but found no mujahideen. The enemy had 

ily abandoned the populated areas. My reconnaissance 

9A.E Pivovarenko served as a reconnaissance platoon lea

OKSVA from January 1980 to December 1980. 

10Most likely, the regiment was a part of the 108th Motorized Ri

(ed .). 

liThe ZSU-23-4 is a self-propelled air defense weapon whic

23ram machine guns simultaneously. This weapon proved extre

tive in counter-ambushes and in the destruction of ground targe
withdrawn and the battalion swept empty blocks and area

MRB 

220800 MAY 

MRC 

=~ MAY 

GHORBAND 

LEGEND 

At 210

One Kilometer ~ At 220

Map 4: Sweeping Bamian and the surrounding villages 

course of a raid by a motorized rifle battalion. 
deny all paths and routes of withdrawal to the enemy and 

disengagement from the strike of the blocking groups. 

enemy must be destroyed by the main sweeping force or 

attack. The unsuccessful accomplishment of any one of 

resulted in a failed mission. Combat experience demonst

is necessary to establish close contact with the enemy, pin 

by battle while simultaneously maneuvering blocking 

position, and then surrounding and destroying his guerril

is absolutely essential to search for the enemy, and this r

effective utilization of reconnaissance forces. In order to 

ly accomplish their combat mission, subunits need to 

tiously divided into search, support, and fire support grou

main body. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: The commander 

mujahideen rear guard and made no efforts to pin the ma

the guerrilla force in place, cut off its escape route and a

outmaneuver it. The commander did not use his reco

fought his way through in a by-the-numbers manner, an

ing to accomplish the mission rapidly. Sweeping an area w

posting blocking forces is, at best, a waste of time and a g

get one's nose repeatedly bloodied. The commander sh

initiative and less field sense. Originally, this was the lea

ple to the book, but it was so weak that I moved it. I le

prime example of the problems of the Soviet Army 

Afghanistan. Their army was trained for the European 

and was unable initially to cope with this new environme

commanders lacked initiative and the mujahideen took a

this. 

Soviet commanders used their reconnaissance forces 

and did not restrict them to reconnaissance missions. 

sance forces were better trained and motivated than mo

forces, but their casualty rate must have been much highe

use of reconnaissance forces may have also been dictated 

gppy 

ing north of Kandahar city in the "green zone" bord

Arghandab River. This fertile "green zone" stretches for 1

meters along the northern bank of the river and is up to s

meters wide. It is an agricultural region of gardens and 

bisected by a network of irrigation ditches. It is practicall

ble for vehicles. 

The brigade received an order to destroy these rnujahid

commander's concept was to seal off the north with the b

of three battalions. Helicopter gunship patrols would fly p

terns to seal off the south and the east. 

Two motorized rifle battalions and an air assault battal

search the area from the west to detect and destroy the en

artillery battalion would support the action. 

The force moved to its assembly areas and designated 

at night. By 0500 hours 6 October, the battalions' bronegrup

occupied their designated positions, the dismounted tr

closed in their assembly areas, the artillery battalion had 

their firing positions and were prepared to conduct firing 

and the helicopters were on station and flying their standin

At 0530 hours, the brigade commander gave the sign

force began their sweep on a wide front. The 3rd Motor

Battalion was on the left, the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion 

center and the air assault battalion was on the right flan

immediately, an irregular group of five-to-seven men be

range small-arms fire on our forces and then withdrew to 

east. Our subunits went in pursuit of them. 

At 1600 hours, the 2nd Air Assault Company, comm

12S. V. Zelenskiy served in the OKSVA from 1981 to 1983 as th

der of an air assault company and as the senior assistant to the 

brigade operations section. He was decorated with the "Order 

Star." 

13Th e 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (ed.). 
Prepare to destroy the enemy in concert with the 2nd Com

I was a senior lieutenant at the time and commanded t

Assault Company. It took me a half hour to form up my 

and begin the maneuver. During this time, the 2nd Com

Map 5: Block and search of a green zone along the Argand
tion. I had seven soldiers, including myself, in the comm

Before I could reposition, approximately 70 enem

approached my command post. My six soldiers and 

enemy under fire. At that point, I lost radio communic

both battalion headquarters and my subordinate platoons

I still had radio contact with brigade headquarters. The b

mander demanded the exact coordinates of my position 

call in artillery fire. However, I was unable to determine 

location. I could only give an approximate location w

would be accurate to within 50 meters. The artillery refu

the mission without more precise data. 

The enemy force attacked three times. During the th

the command post was running out of ammunition. Ea

of the command group, at my direction, simultaneou

grenade and broke contact with the enemy and withdrew 

platoon position. Even when we had joined forces with t

toon, we did not pursue the enemy because of his clea

superiority. 

Enemy losses were 20 killed. My company had no c

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: From this local episod

evaluate the following characteristic features associated w

brigade-size block and search action: 

• using helicopters to seal off areas; 

• tight coordination between subunits; 

• skillful leadership and the ability to make the right d

the battlefield; 

• initiative and steadfastness by our conscript soldiers 

mand post of the air assault company; 

• failure of communications; 

• the absence of platoon leaders' initiative (a significan

taking place to their right, yet the platoon leaders ke

toons in their positions awaiting orders from the com

mander); and, 
Soviet European tactics, since Soviet forces usually physic

all sides of an encircled area. In Afghanistan, they only use

blocking forces when dominant terrain or a village mark

This was probably done to avoid fratricide between closing 

and the blocking forces. Frequently in Afghanistan, the So

helicopter patrols, bronegruppa and RDM as an econom

measure to block a side. In this vignette, the Soviets used 

pa and helicopter patrols. One wonders how effective t

helicopter patrol was overflying a forested area. 

The vignette points out that small unit leaders need to 

and given the freedom to react to combat in their area w

contact is lost. The question is whether the platoon leaders 

they had lost radio contact with their commander and if 

any steps to determine whether they still had contact or no

The vignette also points out that the artillery would not 

the ground force commander knew his exact location. Th

commander could determine his location within 50 mete

brigade commander would not fire artillery beyond that 

allow the commander to adjust that fire onto the enemy f

company did not have a FO with it and the air assault comp

mander either could not adjust artillery fire or he was n

enough to do so. Soviet artillery was normally fired acco

preplanned schedule with all fire concentrations plotted 

veyed firing points. Normative fire destruction was used 

more-accurate, adjusted artillery fires. Soviet artillery 

pressed to "hip shoot" without their own FO on the groun

normative firing methodology was unsuited for combati

guerrilla forces who refused to stay put for massed arti

One wonders whether the brigade commander refused th

fire, since he might personally suffer more from an invest

deaths from "friendly" fire than for enemy-inflicted deaths
of Ishkamesh, 60 kilometers southeast of the city o

Guerrilla forces trained at this center engaged in firing 

landing at Kunduz Airport and attacked supply convoy

Kunduz-Puli-Khumri road. This made it difficult to supp

tain the garrisons and forces located in the province. 

LTC V. M. Akimov commanded the motorized rifl

which was ordered to prepare for combat to destroy th

forces operating in this region. 15 For this mission, the re

reinforced with a separate reconnaissance battalion, a se

copter squadron, and two artillery battalions. In addition, 

infantry division supported the regiment. 16 

On 19January 1984, the regiment and its subunits rec

combat orders: 

The reconnaissance battalion, reinforced with an 82r

platoon and a flamethrower squad, air assaults into 

Marzek, and Kokabulak region to cut off the enemy in 

and Fuloli by 0900 hours 20January. Be prepared to coo

the 2nd Battalion in blocking and destroying the enemy i

The 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion, reinforce

flamethrower squad, air assaults into the Kuchi, Bad

Apikutan region and destroys the enemy located there. L

your bronegruppa no later that 0700 hours and conduct a 

direction of Kuchi, Badguzar and Pil'kha to destroy the en

ed between Pil'kha and Ilig and to seize the ammunition s

ed there. Subsequently, be prepared to link up with the 

sance battalion on the axis Kokabulak-Fuloli to block and 

enemy in the village of Fuloli. 

14A. M. Kovyrshin served in the OKSVA from September 19

November 1984 as a platoon leader in a motorized rifle compa

decorated with the Order of the Red Star. 

15Most likely the 149th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 201st 

Rifle Division (ed.). 

16Th e 20th Infantry Division (ed.). 
70O/o personnel strength and 90% equipment fill. Enemy pe

the area numbered 1,100-1,300 men armed with approx

grenade launchers, 25 DShK 12.7 mm heavy machine gun

/~J'// 4 ,E-=¥ ~'a >'~.'," - - - - -, 

~/J •200700 JAN ~-'~C~.~'~ 2 2nd0 MRB 

f ~)\ ".,,....~A Z) G V Z A R 

200.0 JA.-f/J"/J ~ l 

,. ~ ~,,~,~ , 

200200 

" PIL'KItA 

2nd MRB 

201300 JAN 

' 4 Su-17 

200710 JAN 

ISHKAMESH 

2~),oo;,. 2o'o7o~'~'. 7J~ .+-' 2 .,.0 

l<~j \. // ~/2oo7oo.,,oo J.. 

BURKA ~ 201700 JAI~ 

~o Kilometers 

1st 

~170

2nd 

20170

Map 6: Destruction of the enemy in his training cente

vicinity of Ishkamesh 
Rifle Battalion made an air assault landing two kilomete

Kuchi. The mujahideen did not react to the helicopter flig

used Mi-6 helicopters-a cargo helicopter not usually u

assaults. This deception effort against the enemy paid off

The reconnaissance battalion, commanded by LTC 

cut the guerrillas southern route of withdrawal and block

the strongpoints of Kokabulak and Marzek. 

The 1st Battalion, commanded by Major A. V. Vlasov

the success of the reconnaissance battalion, arrived at the 

Marzek and Kokabulak by 0830 hours and joined force

reconnaissance forces. Over the course of the next two an

hours, they destroyed the enemy in these strong points. 

The 2nd Battalion, commanded by LTC V. Krokhin, 

destroyed the enemy in the strong point of Kuchi. By 0

they had linked up with the approaching bronegruppa, whi

ven there under the command of the 6th Company's co

Senior Lieutenant R. S. Zarifov. The 2nd Battalion mount

cles and conducted a raid on the axis Apikutan-Badguz

missions of searching and destroying weapons and a

caches. 

The enemy, while conducting delaying actions withd

their force into the mountains, while the other part wit

Ishkamesh-the main strong point in this mujahideen trainin

The 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion, having destroyed 

in Marzek and Kokabulak, moved on Ishkamesh from the 

arrived there at 1300 hours. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battal

destroyed the enemy in Badguzar and Apikutan, 

Ishkamesh from the north. The mujahideen in Ishkar

blocked from two sides. 

After a ten-minute artillery barrage by three artillery 

both motorized rifle battalions, supported by a flight of 

gunships, attacked Ishkarnesh. By 1500 hours, Ishkamesh 

The 1st Battalion pursued a group of mujahideen who m

break out and flee toward Darayi-Pashay. The 2nd Batta
1700, was unable to take the village from the march mo

BMPs. They dismounted and tried to encircle the village 

ing the mountain and coming over the southern flank. 

they were unable to do this since the encircling force ca

interlocking enemy fire. The battalion fought for possess

village for the next 24 hours, but was unable to take it. 

The 2d Battalion attacked Fuloli from the march mo

BMPs. They were also unsuccessful, so they dismou

blocked Fuloli from the south. The 2d Battalion and the r

sance battalion fought for possession of Fuloli for the next 

They were finally able to take it, but discovered that m

enemy had slipped out under the cover of fog and dark

escaped into the mountains to the southeast. 

During 90 and 21 January, we destroyed the organi

guerrilla force in the Ishkamesh region. The enemy lost 

men killed and captured. Further, we captured a large a

weapons and ammunition. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: The following points are p

noteworthy: 

• deception against the enemy (using the Mi-6 helicopter 

the normal Mi-8); 

• misleading the enemy as to the actual region in which 

bat actions were planned (through information suppl

Afghan division); 

• wide spread use of maneuver, combining frontal st

flanking attacks, encirclements, vertical envelopmen

foot as well as mounted on various carriers; 

• tight coordination between the combined arms subuni

aviation and artillery support (an artillery FO acc

every company and TO&E FACs accompanied every 

while additional FACs accompanied every company

had adequate communications); 
EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: Tactical surprise gained 

landings and air assaults dissipates rapidly. Once the enem

into a mountainside, green zone or village, heavy forces w

or numbers and superior fire power are necessary to blast 

Once the surprise had worn off on this raid, the Soviets we

two separated actions and lacked the combat power to wi

them. 

The use of the Mi-6 transport helicopters for the air assa

motto "never set a pattern but do the unexpected." One h

however, was it deliberate deception or were they just 

these were the aircraft available? 
y yg 

ment of Afghanistan. By this time, Soviet forces had accu

great deal of experience in conducting sweeps of separa

and inhabited areas. Usually, motorized rifle soldiers d

from their carriers and conducted the sweeps on foot wi

carriers. Practically speaking, this meant that they condu

sweeps without the immediate fire support of tanks, art

BMPs (or BTRs). The mujahideen had also amassed exp

countering subunits conducting these sweeps in various re

developed tactics and techniques to deal with the sweep. 

they would lure us into predetermined areas and then op

us at a distance of no more than 50 to 100 meters. They w

fight in close contact to us since we could not use our artill

ation support within 100 meters of friendly forces. The 

knew the local area and local terrain features quite well 

thus able to outmaneuver the Soviet forces. 

Planning for this operation began long before its star

very thorough. After being briefed on the concept of the 

LTC Romanov, the commander of an airborne battalion, 

push his attached tanks and his personnel carriers into the g

ahead of his dismounted paratroopers. The tanks woul

armored cover for the paratroopers while cutting firing lan

of them. This was a very bold and original idea since t

usually mined those areas where tanks could maneuver a

rain was laced with irrigation canals and potential ambush 

battalion commander planned that the combat formati

consist of two bronegruppa in column, each one led by tank

by personnel carriers which would push through the green 

airborne company would move on each flank of the brone

The sweep began at 0800 on the morning of 11 May a

day's end of 13 May, we had completely cleared the muj

17V. I. Kurochkin served in the OKSVA from February 1984 un

1986. 
due to the skillful use of tanks to destroy the enemy by d

Engineer subunits found the enemy obstacles, particularly 

fields, in timely fashion. The dismounted sappers worked 

Map 7: Sweeping the green zone with an airborne ba

11-13 May 1984 
ported and adjusted artillery fire for that company. Thus, 

the enemy was spotted, firing data was transmitted to the s

battery. The enemy was unable to conduct accurate, a

since such fire instantly resulted in an answering artiller

Consequently, not one of the antitank RPG rounds hit a t

thanks to well organized fire control and engineer suppor

talion was able to use tanks successfully in the green zone 

cessfully fulfill its mission in a short time with no casualtie

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: This vignette could be su

it's dumb and it works, it's not dumb". On the other han

slow and expensive way to clear a zone. No mujahideen cas

mentioned, so at the end of three days, the force blaste

through 14 kilometers of vegetation and owned it until 

Then the mujahideen came back. 
jy pg

tary struggles between the government of Afghanistan and th

opposition led by Ahmed Shah Massoud. 19 Operations w

been conducted in this valley earlier had resulted in heavy c

The mountain massif (located high above sea level)and the s

mate limited the capabilities of machines and men. 

I was an adviser to a battalion of the Afghan Army'

mando" Brigade garrisoned in the Barak fortress. 20 We rec

order to sweep the villages of Tal'khana, Dashtak, Turkha, 

and Chislak to capture or destroy mujahideen operating in 

In addition, we were to find and destroy prepared firing 

and supply caches of ammunition, equipment and food. 

Preparations for the operation began upon receipt of the 

However, due to the massive disaffection and desertions o

brigade officers and men to the mujahideen, the Afghan conce

operation was almost immediately known to the enemy. 

morning of 28 October 1984, I received the order to start 

sion. The concept of action for the battalion was as follow

out of the fortress and precede on foot to conduct a sweep o

ignated villages. In the event that the enemy offered any re

call in artillery fire on them from the artillery battalion that b

18S. G. Davydenko served with the OKSVA from Septembe

September 1986 as the adviser to an Afghan battalion commande

19Ahmed Shah Massoud is one of the best-known guerrilla lead

West. He is a minority Tadjik who assembled the largest single 

army in Afghanistan. This army, put at 11,000 regulars by the So

have numbered 50,000 when part-time partisans are added. Ma

born around 1950, studied engineering in Kabul and is fluent in Fr

control of the 70-mile-long Panjsher Valley was frequently challen

Soviets, yet in the end Massoud dominated the valley. Massoud b

West's favorite Afghan when Ken Follett based his best seller, Lie D

Lions on this tough guerrilla commander (ed.). 

20The 212th Separate Assault Brigade (ed.). 
necessary, they could support the Soviet motorized rifl

which would independently sweep the villages of Tal

Dashtak. Following this, the two units would switch role

Afghan battalion swept Turkha. 

At the designated time, the 150-man Afghan battalion 

fortress. It reached Post 21 in an hour and a half. The S

pany swept the villages of Tal'khana and Dashtak. No 

were discovered during the sweep, but a hidden mujahid

tion with a small supply of food and anti-Soviet leaflets 

ered. 

The battalion reached the village of Turkha on the ev

October. Observers at Post 20 had seen mujahideen movi

Turkha the day before. On the morning of 30 October, th

searched the village. There, they found a few flintlock m

an AK-74. That evening, the battalion returned to t

fortress where they rested. 

On the morning of 31 October, following joint planni

the Afghan battalion commander and the Soviet motoriz

iment commander, the forces set out to search the villa

Kalatak, and Kishlak. The plan was that the Afghan batta

enter the canyon and search the villages sequentially. T

was controlled by two ridges which rimmed the canyon. 

essary to put a Soviet battalion onto each of these ridges. 

reached the crest of the ridge, the Soviet battalions woul

the high ground and could support the Afghan batt

artillery was ready to open fire from protected positions 

fortresses. 

At noon, the Afghan battalion began to sweep the ca

Soviet battalions began to mount the ridges. Comba

moved in front of the sweeping Afghan forces. As the A

talion attempted to enter Kishlak to search it, they wer

21probably the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 108

Rifle Division (ed.). 
draw to Bazarak village. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: This combat example show

good plan is only as good as its skillful implementation. Th

,v KAL'TARI [ "" 

lira mall 

s /"~--~11 

KALATAK 

~" INF BN 

2110100 OCT 

[] BA

[~ KISHLA K 

2rid MRB 

311200 OCT 

311200 

El 

I BAZARAK 

/ MRC 

% 280830 OCT 

/m 

B • rAL'K~AN, J 

INF BN 

~830 OCT 

.,/ ~ A J ) |NF BN ,/~ 280.30 OCT 

I ~wo Kilometers 

2e°

~~ 

Map 8: Afghan and Soviet forces sweep village
sectors or away from planned strikes. 

When conducting a sweep over such an extensive a

mander cannot relax, even for a minute. The enemy 

forces from vigilance to complacency by secretly withdr

the first villages prior to our sweep. Then, they initiated 

the time and place of their own choosing. Communica

problem throughout the operation. This led to a loss of 

a loss of current information on the status and situation 

units. Coordination between the Afghan battalion and the 

artillery was unsatisfactorily organized. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: The main lesson in this 

do not move a ground force where you cannot cover 

artillery fire. Radio communications are very difficult in 

tains, but uninterrupted radio communications with 

artillery or aviation is essential for survival. Radio ret

points on mountain tops or aircraft are a solution. The gr

were moving without adequate flank, forward and re

Consequendy, both Soviet battalions bogged down in min

left the Afghan battalion stranded. The Afghan battalion 

main body into restrictive terrain without first clearing i

ing that the Soviet battalions were securing its flanks and 

overwatch. The further lack of available airpower to ov

Afghan battalion sealed their fate. 
units of the Soviet forces. Our main missions became bloc

sweeping mountain canyons and populated areas, providin

escort, and participating in tactical air assaults which wo

v 

'...~ 

:.~ TA GAB 

-I :~m ml 

-i 

lira 

BI 

IB 

One Kilometer 

; MRC '2511o0 MAY 

~ ~ 

f--~..C'~ ~ L- 

- - ,,,.~250930 MAY 

I r~ ~ ~ 250800 MAY 

GUL 

LEGEND 

----~ At251100 

~. At 252300 

Map 9: Sweeping a potential ambush zone with an M

25 May 1985 
one of our companies which would air assault into the reg

copters. 

At 0800 in the morning on 25 May 1985, the 8th Mot

Company airlanded in a area close to the village of Tagab

pany commander sent one platoon ahead as his forward 

moved the rest of his company around the high ground 

The patrolling platoon reached a clearing. The platoon le

ed that the area across the clearing looked like a p

ambushes might be laid. The company commander ord

form a platoon line and sweep forward. The mujahidee

that they had been discovered, opened fire. The compan

der decided to maneuver the rest of his company to e

enemy and hit him on the flank. It took the company a h

maneuver into position. By that time the enemy had bro

and withdrawn. The company swept the area but was un

the enemy. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: When conducting a comp

of unfamiliar terrain, you must have reconnaissance. 

combat actions of your subunits must be provided with 

sance and security elements. Further, you must seize th

terrain before you begin your sweep. Raiding groups a

this function. Finally, in order to conduct a successful 

destroy the enemy, you have to fix the enemy in place th

bat to his front while simultaneously encircling or flankin

221. P. Tereshchenko served in the OKSVA from April 1984 u

1986 as the deputy commander of a battalion. 
up its headquarters near the village of Jurm in the Varduj 

This guerrilla force consisted of approximately 500 men a

well-armed and equipped-to include three mountain guns, 

ten mortars, and communications systems. The local p

strongly supported Najmuddin and disliked the Afghan gove

We received intelligence reports that a caravan had arrived a

lage. The authorities decided to destroy the guerrilla headq

capture the caravan and seize supply caches. 

My 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion was assigned the mi

insert two companies and a mortar battery on the night of 4

to establish blocking positions on the east and west walls of 

ley. 24 Then, my remaining company would join the 2nd 

Battalion of the Afghan Army and conduct a sweep north up 

ley. The sweep would seize supply caches and draft young 

the spot into the Afghan army. My battalion was supported 

30 122mm howitzer battery and a battery of BM-21 "GRAD

ple rocket launchers. 

I supervised pre-battle preparations in our base camp. 

night on the night of 4-5 June, my 2nd and 3rd Companies 

mortar battery moved out. The 2nd Company's mission wa

one mortar platoon and block the west wall of the valley 

hours. My 3rd Company, with the other mortar platoon

block all exits along the east wall of the valley by 0400 hour

My 2nd Company completed its mission and moved in

tion by 0300 on 5 June. The mujahideen did not detect their 

At 0345 hours, as my 3rd Company was closing onto its p

the enemy discovered it and fired on it from the hill nort

246.0. Our mortar platoon returned fire and killed the 

Fifteen minutes later, the 3rd Company established its block

23S. V. Krutyakov served in the OKSVA from 1985 to 1987 as 

mander of a motorized rifle battalion. 

24probably the 1st Battalion, 860th Separate Motorized Rifle R

(ed.). 
(located on hill 246.4 with the 1st Platoon) came under a

As soon as I understood the situation, I ordere

Company's bronegTuppa (which was under my control) an

~uppa of the 1st Company (my sweeping company) to 

11l MRC 

2nd MRC #/) JURM 

060300 MAY /~! 

BRONEGRUPPA 

3rd MRC 

DASHTAK 

:'~ I 2nd MRP ~J~/~ 

MR"~'*~'~ lit & 2nd " "~" Wlthdrswlll 

, RECON ,J I F, JI/ 

is! MRC 

® 

BRONEGRUPPA 

2nd MRC & RECON PLT 

II 8atta|lo• Rellerve 

~RAK 

1st & 2rid CO " 

AFGHAN B~.. 

BRONEGRUPPA 

3rd MRC 

" Ri~ r 

Four Kilom

Map 10: Combat actions in Varduj Valley. 
ppy, 

tact. The enemy had "melted" into the population. During t

we found a food cache with 90 tons of grain. 

FRLrNZE COMMENTARY: The following points should 

from this action: 

• the battalion commander's skillful control of the battle 

ed by his rapid transfer of reserve forces and forces from 

areas to the threatened sector; 

• the lack of mutual fire support and coordination betw

toons operating on the same axis; 

• the inability of the junior commanders to rapidly org

lay in a defensive fire plan; 

• the lack of skill displayed by the personnel in quickly 

fighting positions and tying in their defenses with mort

• the lack of FSCs accompanying the subunits to adjus

fire, which lessened the effectiveness of the attached ar

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: The bronegruppa concept is 

for providing a quick reaction reserve and for moving fire p

a threatened sector. Mechanized infantry must train to func

from their personnel carriers. 
the area of Kandahar, Kalat and Shar-e-Safa including a

Soviet and Afghan convoys, road mining, shellings of milita

and security outposts, and the armed protection of guerrilla 

carrying weapons and ammunition from Pakistan. 

LTC V. N. Tsarev, the commander of the air assault b

and my boss, received the following mission: "Prepare to 

in several days to conduct a block and sweep action to de

enemy in the valley near Anushella. The action will also in

Brigade's 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion minus one of its c

(the 1st MRB was commanded by LTC A. G. Ivanov)." 

Training and rehearsals for this action began on 16 M

concentrated on combat in mountains, clearing and ov

minefields and booby-traps, night combat, sealing off c

killing their defenders, evacuation of wounded from the m

and the destruction of supply caches by explosives (this la

was done in conjunction with attached sappers-each com

an attached sapper squad for this action). The train-up end

full battalion tactical exercise. 

The battalion commander refined his final orders at 20

on 24 March and issued them to his subordinates at 2200 

"The 1st MRB (minus its 3rd Company) will establish 

blocking positions on the eastern wall of the canyon and 

enemy a break-out to the east. The blocking force must b

by 0600 hours on 25 March. This 1st MRB will be suppo

flight of Mi-24 helicopter gunships. 

"The 3rd Air Assault Company will establish a series 

sive blocking positions also running from the south to the 

25p. A. Skovorodnikov served in the OKSVA from 1985-1987 a

of Staff of an air assault battalion. He was twice decorated with 

of the Red Star and was also decorated with the Combat M

Bravery." 

26The air assault battalion of the 70th Separate Motorized Rif

(ed.). 
self-propelled howitzer battalions, a battery of BM-22 "Hu

(RSZO) 220mm MRLS, a squadron of Su-25 "FROGFOOT

air support aircraft, and a flight of Mi-24 helicopter gunships 

Map 11: Successive blocks while sweeping a 

mountain valley 
mujahideen withdrawal to the north. Following the artillery 

tion, the battalion began its sweep. 

An artillery forward observer accompanied each compa

1st MRB as well as the 3rd Air Assault Company. An avia

bat control group (GBU) also accompanied the 1st MRB. 

MRB and the 3rd Air Assault Company seized the dominan

They controlled the canyon walls and blocked the paths 

canyon with part of their force while leapfrogging the oth

their force north to establish the next position. In this man

were constantly able to support the air assault battalion in 

of the canyon. 

By 1430 hours, the sweep had been completed. In the 

combat, we killed up to 20 mujahideen, captured and evacu

eral weapons caches and captured and destroyed several 

tion caches. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: We found that when con

block and sweep of a canyon, it was best to accomplish the 

march and get into attack positions at night. Further, close 

tion between the blocking and sweeping forces was absolute

in order to maintain the tempo of the sweep and accomplis

on time. These were done well. 

However, there were shortcomings in this action. The 

and aviation support could have been used more effective

were many causes for this. Too much time was wasted dur

for-fire. The mujahideen had enough time to move the bul

force into the safety of caves while maintaining observers in 

ing positions. The enemy was able to deceive our aviatio

playing our panel markings for friendly forces on their 

RDM mines were not delivered accurately enough and 

between RDM minefields allowed a significant portio

mujahideen to escape to the north. Further, the enemy disco

movement into the area in sufficient time to mine the entran

valley and the passes. 
gunships can save the day when things have gone bad. 

using standard or SOP displays of panels or pyrotechnic

friendly positions or communicate with pilots is risky. The 

quick to learn these codes and to use them against the fo

needs air support. What is really needed is the capability 

forces to talk directly to air forces. 
Kandahar from March to the first days of September 19

inflicted such appreciable casualties on the guerrilla force

majority of them left for the safe haven of Pakistan. 

By the beginning of September, active combat had cea

Afghan command decided to allow its forces the time to 

training and to rest in their base camps. Consequent

September, the regiments of the 9th Infantry Division bega

out in march column to their camps in Ghazni Province. 

The march took the division through Zabol Province, w

or six guerrilla forces with a total of approximately 500 m

located. The local guerrilla leader Pahlawan command

mujahideen. They were located near the border with Pak

were well-armed with recoilless rifles, mortars, rocket laun

antiaircraft guided missile systems. They knew the local te

well and could quickly and secretly maneuver their forces a

ment throughout the area. 

The terrain in this area is mountainous and semi-desert 

The guerrillas used the extensive Karez underground irrig

tem for ambushes. The enemy knew about the movement 

Infantry Division. Since the road network in this area w

developed, the enemy knew at what time which forces w

through the narrow sections on the Kandahar-Ghazni rout

At 0500 hours on 7 September, two explosions ripped 

roadbed close to the village of Shingali-Kalay. Simultan

mujahideen ambush opened ftre with every weapon at its 

Within the first few minutes, they destroyed four tanks, thre

and seven trucks. 

27V. V. Shubin served in the OKSVA from 1986 to 1988. He w

ed with the "Medal for Merit in Combat", the "Medal for Persona

and the "Order of Glory". 

28The BTR or bronetransporter is an eight-wheeled armored perso

er that can carry up to an 11-man squad. It mounts 14.5mm an

machine guns and can carry antitank weapons as well. The BTR 

were the most-common infantry carriers of the Soviet Forces (ed
KHAD 30 to aid the trapped subunits. 

The province's plan was to draw the guerrilla main forc

battle, hit them with aviation and artillery fire, and then s

N 

A

A

W t "(o° 

35th SEP BN 7%~i seP 

One Kilometer 

Map 12: Blocking and destroying enemy ambushe

in an inhabited area 
Artillery strikes and helicopter gunships fired prepara

from 0610 to 0625 hours. At 0630 hours, the flanking de

(2nd Company) radioed that it was in its designated positio

talion subunit then gave the signal and the battalion hit the 

the flank and rear. The enemy abandoned their casualties, 

and ammunition and withdrew. Enemy losses were 27 KI

WlA. The Afghan government forces captured two recoill

six mortars, two DShK 12.7 mm heavy machine guns, th

antitank grenade launchers, two crates of grenades and 

assault rifles. Losses of the 35th Operational Battalion w

killed and six wounded. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: The successful blocking and 

tion of enemy ambushes was made possible by a variety of 

I the rapid assembly of personnel and the readiness of 

and equipment for combat; 

• the resourcefulness and military cunning of the battal

mander; 

• the thorough knowledge of the local terrain; and 

• the correct determination of the probable enemy c

action. 

29The Sarandoy were Ministry of Interior armed forces-a heav

police force. They were organized into six brigades or regiments 

ing about 6,000 men) and were based in Kandahar, Badakhstan

and Paravan provinces plus two in Kabul. The Sarandoy had an 

al estimated 6,000 men in operational and mountain battalions (e

30The KHAD were the secret police of the Afghan government 

responsible for detecting and eradicating domestic political oppos

verting the mujahideen, penetrating opposition groups abroad an

ing military intelligence to the armed forces through its military w

KHAD was patterned after the KGB and GRU and apparently r

the KGB (ed.). 
tle. Finally, there was insufficient fire suppression on the w

ing enemy. 

Further combat analysis shows that the enemy studied th

and the convoy structure carefully and selected his ambush 

the goal of limiting, to the maximum extent possible, the 

potential of the division march columns and especially its 

port. Combat experience clearly shows that all march colu

have air cover regardless of their ground power. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: Ambush sites are best 

from the flank or rear. Conversely, when your force is ca

killing zone, the best immediate action is to assault into the 

the ambush rather than passively remaining and dying in t

zone. Part of the Afghan division apparently tried defendi

kill zone. The total division casualties are not given, but t

probably significant. 
that a guerrilla force of 100-120 men, armed with small a

located in the village of Karamagul'. 

Our regimental commander decided to destroy this forc

ing off the area and then sweeping it to find and destroy th

My battalion, the 2nd MRB, was given this mission and r

with the regiment's reconnaissance company and two arti

teries. Six helicopter gunships from army aviation would b

port. 

All the forces would be used for the initial blocking ac

the night of 11-12 February, two motorized rifle companies

out on foot, by morning had to to occupy the dominant ter

1864.4 and 1973.0) along the southern and eastern comba

At 0600 hours on 12 February, our 4th MRC and the reconn

company had to land and secure the dominant terrain to 

and west of Karamagul' village by tactical air assaults. The 5

was to establish a platoon-sized ambush to cover any a

mujahideen withdrawal from Karamagul' to Batash. 

Our plan was to begin the sweep at dawn only after 

seized and occupied the dominant terrain and had surrou

enemy. 

Following a 10-minute artillery and helicopter gunship 

tion, the reconnaissance company moved forward and bega

ing the area. The enemy tried to break out of the enc

through the various gullies and ravines. A group of m

attempted to break out to the southwest. Then another grou

break out of the encirclement. But all the enemy attempts w

Only a small part of his force was able to break out through 

in the direction of the village of Batash. 

In the course of the combat, the enemy lost up to 60 

wounded and we captured 12. We also captured 25 weapo

battalion's losses were negligible. 

31S.S. Gazaryan served in the OKSVA from August 1984 to S

1986 as the Chief of Staff of a motorized rifle battalion. 
trapped forces and an enemy rescuing force. Only afte

forces were in place, would the Soviets fragment and me

, 

BA TASH 

II 

120630 FEB 

Guerrilla Band % ~ ~' 100-120 Men ,, ~ ~, 

.<" 

k- ~'~'~RECDNFEBCO L~ ~'~ ~~ 1206006 MRC E jw- 316 MRC J 

RECON CO I' F| 

0630 One Kilometer 

Map 13: Blocking the enemy in an inhabited region 

destroying him during the sweep 
y y gp

escaping from the encirclement. In Afghanistan, the enemy 

mally dismounted and could usually slip through the Sov

clement. 

The Soviets apparently showed little concern for the civ

ulation and started each sweep with an artillery bombardm

did not win many hearts and minds for the Soviet forces. 

Soviet effort seemed deliberately aimed at killing civilians 

them out of the rural areas. 
AND MOUNTAINS 

The peculiarities of this theater of military operation

called for special training for advancing in populated a

mountains. Success was often determined by the skill of 

mander and staff in the creative fulfillment of the requireme

regulations when dealing with these particular terrain c

with the troop control of TO&E, attached and supporting 

and their coordinated interaction; and with the correct dete

of the enemy's strong and weak points. 

Special attention was devoted to determining the pla

support in the combat formation and its application 

Characteristically, the troop formation used in an advan

function of the degree of preparation which the mujahidee

into their defensive positions and whether the comma

employing assault detachments and assault groups. 32 As a 

offenses were launched from base camps or jumping-off 

because of their distance from the combat zone, organizi

ment became very important. 

32An assault group is a platoon or company-size detachment t

created for blocking and destroying a single strong point or 

structure(s) during an assault. An assault group typically consist

ized rifle forces, engineers, and flamethrower operators. An assa

ment is normally battalion-sized and also has armor or direct-fi

attached (ed.). 
forcements as well as new weapons from Iran. They launc

on Soviet and Afghan convoys and struck at the Kushka-S

pipeline. They constituted a threat to the Herat airfield and 

vators. 

The operational group of the regiment with field post n

(FPN) 51883 was ordered to: block part of the southern edge 

city with the 2nd MRB (minus a company) and fragm

mujahideen force. Further, in coordination with the 2nd MRB 

83260 regiment and the 3rd MRB of FPN 51931 regiment

the enemy. 

Preparation for this action was conducted in base camp. 

pany commanders and above, plus all the attached compa

manders conducted coordination on a terrain model. Enem

es of action and the sequencing of his destruction were also 

out on the terrain model. Personnel who would physically c

the mujahideen conducted training in a deserted village wh

became familiar with the specific make-up of an assault gr

gained practical experience. 

At the end of October, my company (the 7th MRC) w

nated part of the operational group of regiment FPN 5188

assembled outside Herat. At 0400 hours on 4 November, 

units were ordered into the city. By 0540 hours, the force 

off the eastern section of the city. The east side was held 

83260, the north and west sides were held by FPN 51931 

south side by my regiment FPN 51883. 

33V. M. Bogdashkin served in the Republic of Afghanistan from J

through June 1985 as a platoon leader and a company comma

motorized rifle battalion. He was awarded the "Order of the Red 

34Field post numbers (FPN) were postal numbers assigned to div

higher headquarters, regiments and separate battalions and com

compilation of field post numbers was considered classified. The 

numbers referred to here are probably of the 12th, 101st 

Motorized Rifle Regiments of the 5th Motorized Rifle Division (e
forced to stop and go over to the defense. 

Regiment ordered my 7th MRC to turn over our port

southern block to a bronegruppa and to move to the comma

FPN 51883 regiment. My regimental commander was L

Budeyev. He ordered my company commander, Senior L

S. N. Bogrov, to advance along a city street to fragment th

ing mujahideen force. My MRC had two BMP-2s 36 and a ta

of our assault group. 

Following a five-minute artillery strike, the 7th MRC 

battle at 0730 hours. It advanced 150-200 meters wh

stopped by heavy small arms fire as well as the fire from t

less rifles, a grenade launcher and a mortar. The small 

came from close range from a grape arbor and through e

cut in the adobe walls. One of our soldiers was wounded. 

pany commander was ordered to break contact and withdr

his professional, organized withdrawal (there were no mo

ties), the company deployed along the edges of a village. 

Afghan intelligence reported that there were some 80

the guerrilla forces which operated in this immediate te

square kilometers) but we had no idea how many we w

now. We called in ground attack aircraft 37 and artillery f

35The mountain motorized rifle battalions retained most of thei

MRB TO&E equipment, but had special training, and additiona

ment for mountain warfare (ed.). 

36The BMP-2 is an upgrade of the BMP-1 (Boevaya mashina p

which first appeared in 1967. Both BMPs are tracked infantry fi

vehicles that carry a three-man crew and a squad of eight soldie

BMP-I mounted a 73mm cannon, a 7.62mm machine gun and 

missile. The BMP-2 substituted a 30mm automatic gun for the 

non as well as a different antitank missile and launcher. The BM

introduced in 1981, has a greatly enhanced elevation and depre

bility over the 73ram cannon (ed.). 

37SU-25 FROGFOOT (ed.). 
from the company flanks through the grape arbor and blo

adobe walls. 

LTC A. M. Budeyev, the regimental commander, reque

BM-21 "Grad" 122ram multiple rocket launchers to condu

2nd BNJ83260 REGT ~ At 040

N'~'--"-'<$ ~ 0401;40 NOV • • 

At 040

At 041

7th MRC 7ih MRC I ~.,..~..~ 

041230 NOV 040810 NO:O~__~ 5,88~ 

040S40 NOV 

NOV 

One Kilometer 

Grain 

Elevatorl 

Map 14: Combat by a reinforced MRC serving as an assau
company advanced 300 meters before the first mujahideen f

Mujahideen fire was very weak. On signals from the com

platoon commanders, the two SP 152mm howitzers, two 

four BMPs opened direct suppressive fire on the enemy. T

ing platoons were able to move at the same tempo as the c

signaled their progress with signal rockets. The assault g

mine field at a street intersection. They defused seven min

as a 250-kilogram aerial bomb rigged as a mine. The assau

ment advanced 1.5 kilometers when it was stopped by s

from a village. The fire came from dugouts cut in earth di

gation canals. Tank and BMP-2 fire suppressed the enemy 

company had two more men wounded during this advanc

In all, the company accomplished its mission in an h

half at the cost of three wounded. They killed seven muj

close combat. By 1130 hours, the opposing guerrilla force 

tered. However, at 1400 our attempts to destroy anothe

force failed. We made a second unsuccessful attempt at du

nightfall, the mujahideen managed to slip out of the blockad

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: In this example, a very la

of enemy was encircled, but the combat power was insu

destroy it. This was the result of poor intelligence which 

insufficient information about the enemy and led to an i

force density in the blocking forces. 

Nevertheless, good points included the rapid reconcen

subunits from one direction to another, the powerful influe

power on the enemy, the proper reinforcement of the com

the skillful application of BM-21 fire to strengthen the mor

flanking platoons which also strengthened the fighting sp

soldiers and officers. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: The Soviets used MRL

katyusha or "little Kathyrn') in the direct fire role during W

II. The war in Afghanistan showed that it is still an effect
of infantry. It was an expensive, indiscriminate and, proba

fective practice. 

Unlike World War II, the Soviet Army in Afghanistan 

push on despite heavy casualties. They transition to the def

moderate casualties and call for fire support. 

The Soviets assigned commands not so much by rank a

ity (or connections). Vignettes throughout this book show 

majors and lieutenant colonels commanding battalions, se

tenants and captains commanding companies and captains 

tenants commanding platoons. In this vignette, a senior l

commands a company which has a captain as one of its plat

ers. This captain could be a platoon leader as a punishment 

misdeed, or he could have been doing his normal job since 

regulations allowed the army to carry a man in a position o

higher than that authorized. Further, he might have just b

moted. In the peacetime Soviet Army, it was not unusual f

ranking officers to work for a lower-ranking officer. The po

the Soviets, was more important than the rank. The Sovie

pay scale reflects this when it adds command or responsibil

an officer's pay based on rank. 
camps and of the usual zones, the subunits of a separate sec

talion were also called on to support combat in response 

gence gathered by units and subunits. 

InJuly 1985, our reconnaissance units in Kunduz Provi

mined the area from which the enemy planned to fire 122

ets on our division headquarters and on the base camps o

ments. 39 Colonel Volobuev, the division chief of staff, d

move a motorized rifle battalion reinforced with a tank 

quickly into the mujahideen base camp, forestall his launche

with artillery and seize his launchers and stores of launch b

One of the platoons from my company of the separat

battalion would provide security for the raiding detachme

quarters and would move on its TO&E equipment. I was 

at the time and took command of the platoon for the miss

raiding detachment moved quickly to the place where th

bombs were stored thanks to the skilled actions of our atta

per platoon. Within the space of a half hour and practicall

incident, we found and destroyed the launch-bomb cache a

al prepared launching sites. Surprise and the decisivene

actions guaranteed the completion of our mission. 

At that time, the reconnaissance platoon of the raidi

reported that a caravan of 40 cargo-carrying camels, guard

eral horsemen, were moving from Upper Chaharasia 

• Chaharasia. Colonel Volobuev decided to occupy the hig

dominating the road and shoot the enemy from these 

38S. A. Nikitin served in the OKSVA as a company commande

rate security battalion in 1985. 

39probably the 201st MRD (ed.). 

40The launch bomb was a 122mm rocket designed to fire from 

MRLS. Although the resistance had access to some RPU-14 

most launch bombs were simply rockets fired from a tripod or e

of crossed sticks. It is not an accurate weapon, but can do an e

when fired against a city, military base or other area target (ed.). 
which covered the withdrawal of the main body. As my br

was pulling out, the mujahideen opened fire on us from nei

heights with a DShK heavy machine gun and small arms. T

. ,.w ;~'..,y, oLt,'~ ~x, ~ / 

Map 15: The actions of a motorized rifle battalion 

as a raiding detachment 
FRUNZE COMMENTARY: Weak vigilance creates cas

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: The Soviet separate secur

ion was seldom discussed in print. From this vignette, the 

mission was to provide security for the division CP and tr

map shows that at least a company from the battalion was 

in CP security and manning the three entrance and exit pos

also used as an immediate reaction force and as a reserv

mounted on BRDMs, which are armored cars. This imp

was a low-strength battalion when compared to a regular 

rifle battalion. The division had two helipads, which is n

since the division did not have many organic helicopters. T

pads were most likely for material support, since the divisi

significant aerial resupply at this location. 

In the vignette, the captain takes command of the plato

sent with the raiding detachment. It was a common pr

senior commanders to take command of a subordinate's 

the task might get challenging or fun. 

41The BRDM is a four-wheeled armored car which is used pr

reconnaissance. It has two auxiliary wheels for extra mobility. 

ous configurations, it carries either a 12.7mm machine gun, 

machine gun or both. This amphibious vehicle protects the cr

small arms fire and shrapnel, so the fuel tank was probably pen

heavy machine gun fire (ed.). 
SNAZ detachment received information from a group of in

agents and staff of the Ministry of State Security of Afghan

cerning the presence of weapons and ammunition cach

Xadigar Canyon, Kandahar Province. In order to confirm 

mation, the detachment commander dispatched two SP

reconnaissance groups to the area. He reported the resul

able information to the higher staff and requested aerial r

sance of the site. 43 Their data confirmed the earlier repo

senior leadership decided to conduct an assault on the can

Two motorized rifle battalions from a separate m

brigade, 44 a SPETSNAZ detachment, a D-30 artillery ba

platoon of ZSU-23-4 SP AA guns, a squadron of Mi-8 heli

squadron of Mi-24 helicopters and a squadron of Su-25 

FOOT" ground attack aircraft were selected to conduct th

The Chief of Staff of the Turkestan Military District, 

Lieutenant Yu. G. Gusev, had overall responsibility for c

the action. 

According to the plan, two motorized rifle battalions r

with an artillery battalion would depart their base camp in 

and conduct an 85-kilometer night road march to the can

assault would begin at 0900 hours, 20 March 1986 when 

would conduct strafing and bombing runs in the canyon. T

SNAZ detachment would air assault four companies on h

onto mountains close to the canyon. Their mission wo

block the mujahideen withdrawal and call in and adjus

artillery fire. 

The "operation" began exactly as planned. At 0600 

42S. Yu. Pyatakov served in the Republic of Afghanistan from M

through June 1985 as the deputy commander of a motorized rifl

tie was decorated with the "Order of the Red Star." 

43The SPETSNAZ battalion garrisoned at Kandahar airfield (ed

44Battalions of the 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade ga

Kandahar (ed.). 
SPINa To ., 

"~,... To 

".,..-_ an . OLD,4~ 

r 

200800 MAR ~"~ 

SPE

nRON e

200

~ ~-~ ./~ ~ 200800 MAR ~ lit MRB 

2210t SPETSNAZ 312th SPETSNAZ CO 

,,~ 200800 MAR~ ~t 200800 MAR 

200600 MAR 

! ! 

One Kilometer 

/ 

2 M

: 2(~080

$ >--.--

Map 16: Assaulting Xadighar Canyon. 

45Each SPETSNAZ group consisted of 16 men armed with th

automatic grenade launcher, two PK machine guns, an SVD snip

various other small arms. 
hours of airstrikes had preceded the artillery fire and th

weapons systems were either destroyed or well-suppressed. 

mounted assault was supported by BMP and ZSU- 23-4 d

The combat formation had two echelons with an MRB in 

elon. A SPETSNAZ company mounted on BMPs was the 

Because of the advantages in strength and speed of m

rifle subunits, they quickly cleared the canyon without me

significant resistance. At the beginning of the assault, grou

or six mujahideen tried to move out of the canyon over vario

but they were interdicted by SPETSNAZ groups which 

down in ambushes or called in helicopter gunships and 

attack aircraft on them. Aerial reconnaissance continued 

down and destroy newly discovered targets. 

The assault on the Xadighar Canyon was finished by 1

20 March. We killed 20 mujahideen and destroyed four DS

machine guns, one mortar and two assault rifles. We cap

DShK heavy machine guns, one mortar, 20 various smal

large amount of ammunition, documents and combat equ

the guerrilla groups. There were no Soviet casualties. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: In general, this "operation" 

ded out successfully. However, it did not achieve surprise

to say that the increased force activity and abrupt appeara

types of reconnaissance enabled the enemy to guess in ad

start time and the direction of the advance. On the other ha

bat experience in Afghanistan shows that limiting the a

reconnaissance assets employed lessened the effectivene

advance, weakened the fire support, allowed the enemy th

tunity to slip away into the mountains at the start of the offe

led to the establishment of only a few covering forces. 

The success of the assault on the Xadighar Canyon was, 

extent, due to the direction and guidance of the senior l

who included all necessary branches of services in this "op

It is important when conducting similar operations to create 
block and sweep is commanded by the chief of staff of the T

Military District. General-Lieutenant Gusev was nowher

with the 40th Army's chain of command, but could field a co

group which could control all the aviation required in a se

Afghanistan far removed from the 40th Army CP. It is unor

but apparently worked. This demonstrates, however, that th

leadership did not always trust their subordinates to "do 

More cynically, this practice allowed outside senior comma

collect combat medals while in the safety of an armored veh

saved them the bother of a full, uncomfortable Afghanistan 

duty while covering their chests with symbols of glory. 

This vignette also provides a good look at the employ

SPETSNAZ personnel. Unlike the U.S. Special Forces 

British SAS, SPETSNAZ were mounted on personnel ca

Afghanistan, but when they were airdropped, the carriers fu

as a bronegruppa. This provided more flexibility in the emp

of these rugged soldiers and gave them much more maneuve

Three hours of airstrikes is not a good way to achieve 

Again, the Soviet force seems to have engaged the rear guard 

"uninformed". 

The distances and direction on this map are wrong. Spi

is approximately 70 kilometers southeast of Kandahar. 
against Afghan government and Soviet forces and practical

off Khost district. They cut off the lines of communicatio

ited the supply of weapons, munitions, and food to our to

high command decided to conduct Operation "Magistral'

eral divisions and regiments of the army. The main purp

crush the guerrilla forces on the Kabul-Gardez-Khost m

[magistral']. Further, the operation would clear mines from 

and support the resupply of material and the establi

materiel reserves for the government forces in Khost distr

Prior to the start of the operation, the Afghan governm

an attempt to resolve the problem of delivering sufficien

other resources to the district through peaceful methods 

armed conflict. However, the field commander of 

Province resistance, Mawlawi Jalaluddin Hagani, used t

augment his guerrilla forces and, in the end, rejected this o

decided not to allow Soviet and government forces to 

province. A key enemy blocking element was those guer

concentrated in the Satukandav Pass, which is, practically 

the only way through the mountains between Gardez and 

the start of the operation, approximately 15,000 mujahidee

in the area. The Satukandav Pass, which is located 30 kilo

of Gardez, was touted in the western press as "the unassa

tion on which the Russians will break their teeth". 

The operation involved a motorized rifle division, a

division,47a separate motorized rifle regiment, 48 a separat

46A. N. Shishkov served in the Republic of Afghanistan fro

1986 through June 1988 as the Senior Assistant to the C

Operations Section of an airborne division. He was awarded th

the Red Banner", the "Order of the Red Star", and the order "

to the Fatherland in the Armed Forces", Third degree. 

47Actually, both the 201st and 108th Motorized Rifle Divisions 

in the operation, but since neither could move their entire divisi

porarily abandon their base camps and the LOCs that they gu
011200 DEC mn ' 

.to c~z 

I 

DARI DF.C 

Map 17: The capture of Satukandav Pass. 

formed a composite division under the 201st headquarters. Th

division was the 103rd Airborne Division. General Gromov, in a

Krasnaya ~ez.da (Red Star) on 30 December 1993, listed the follow

units participating in Magistral: the 108th and the 201st MR

Airborne Division, 56th Separate Air Assault Brigade, the 345th 

Airborne Regiment and other units and subunits. He also lists t

ing Afghan government units: 8th, 1 lth, 12th, 14th, and 25th Inf

sions, 15th Tank Brigade and several special forces subunits (ed.)

48Either the 860th or 191st Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment, m

ably the 191st. General Gromov doesn't list this unit by number

because of its abysmal performance (ed.). 
gy g , g

additional combat preparations after they moved from 

camps and concentrated in the region of Gardez c

November 1987. We considered several plans to seize th

dav Pass and then to develop this success to extend o

power deep into Paktia Province along the main highway

Daily we increased our supplies and stockpiled ammu

other necessary material in the area where we billeted ou

and regiments. The division and regimental command po

Army Artillery Groups (AAG) and Division Artillery Gro

were positioned and dug in from 21 to 27 November. E

mental and subunit commander began a thorough co

reconnaissance of the area. On 28 November, following u

negotiations, the 40th Army divisions and regiments plus 

regiments began the attack. General Gromov had decide

mine the location of enemy weapons systems (parti

defense) and so he faked an airborne landing using 20 du

troopers in parachutes. The enemy fired its weapons on t

troopers" which enabled artillery reconnaissance to pinpo

strong points and firing positions. Army and frontal aviati

these positions. The airstrikes were followed with a 

artillery barrage. 

49The 345th Separate Airborne Regiment part of the 10

Airborne Division invaded Afghanistan and, through attrition

shrunk to the 345th Separate Airborne Regiment (ed.). 

50In the Soviet Army, maintenance, guard, work details and spe

always detracted from the time available for training. The army 

only those people who were not on detail, but eventually reali

was producing a very uneven quality in the readiness o

Therefore, they developed a program whereby regiments an

would pull guard and details for the division on a rotating ba

have 12 days for training when they would not be involved in 

and station details. This cycle continued even in the combat zo
tion of the Parachinar Salient). 

Heavy enemy fire greeted the subunits. Indecisiven

excessive fear on the part of the regimental commander bog

regiment down in the initial stage of the operation. On the 

29-30 November, the mujahideen took advantage of the comm

mistakes and errors and launched attacks on his motorized 

talions along several axes. 

The enemy kaaew the territory well and was well supplied 

ample supply of first-class weapons and munitions. He used 

inflict severe casualties on the regiment. 

The regiment did not succeed for several reasons. First, 

imental CP was located a fair distance from the subunits 

could not provide direct combat leadership in the mo

Second, there was no regimental forward observation post. 

the commander incorrectly calculated the required am

ammunition (and by the second day of combat, personn

down to the emergency ammunition reserve). Fourth, the 

was led in a passive and indecisive manner and the regimen

ership had a poor grasp of the situation. 

General Gromov decided to continue the advance on th

positions with subunits of the airborne division together w

units of the Afghan force. Therefore, on 1 December, 

Airborne Battalion of an airborne regiment and a battalio

Afghan "Commandos" assembled near the CP of the separat

ized rifle regiment. 

The airborne battalion commander, Major V. N. Petrov, 

Afghan "Commando" battalion commander thoroughly stu

situation and coordinated their actions. Then they beg

assault on the main peak. Two airborne companies capt

nearest dominant terrain and used this lodgement to sup

assault on the main peak by two assault groups. Enemy mo

DShK heavy machine gun fire held up the advance until the 

battalion commander called in the fires of the DAG on enem

ing positions and firing points. 
Major Petrov reported his situation and decision to 

commander. He decided to continue the advance on the 

the area of the Satukandav Pass and strike the enemy on 

and rear in order to control the pass. 

Following an artillery preparation, the 1 st Airborne Ba

the "Commando" Battalion began the assault toward S

Pass. The enemy had not expected the decisive attack an

Soviet and Afghan forces at the main peak. The mujahid

initiative. Part of the enemy force withdrew. The battalion 

to the south under supporting artillery fire and did not 

enemy to regain his composure. 

The guerrilla forces defending the Satukandav Pass did 

the exact size of the Soviet and Afghan forces approachi

flanks and rear. They began a hasty withdrawal, abando

crew-served weapons and ammunition at their firing posi

Taking advantage of the panicked enemy withdrawal i

the 1st Airborne Battalion captured the pass on the move 

with the Afghan forces, dug in along their newly secured 

This decisive and brave advance seized the prime defe

which proved to be the key to the enemy defensive s

Satukandav Pass. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: Analysis of combat in the i

of Operation "Magistral'" (November-December 1987) le

following conclusions: 

1. Thorough knowledge of the situation, continual ana

siveness, initiative and bravery are the basis for succ

informed mission fulfdlment in combat. 

2. Artful distribution of forces during an advance in 

careful coordination between combined arms subuni

constant support of artillery fires are the most importa

such a successful operation. 

3. Proper use of the protective characteristics of mount
masterful use of deception to discover enemy firing p

Operation Magistral' was the largest operation of the war an

tually involved large air assaults, attacks on different axes 

successful lifting of the siege of Khost. In this vignette, O

"Magistral'" massed the fires of an AAG and a DAG for a f

artillery preparation during the fight for the Satukandov Pa

goal was complete destruction of the area by air and artiller

far outside any Soviet artillery norms. This extensive artiller

ration still did not do the job. Nor did Magistral'. After th

Operation Magistral', the mujahideen once again cut off Kh

again put it under siege (a constant feature since 1981). 
responsibility of an Army Corps of the Army of the R

Afghanistan. 52 As a result, the enemy began freely movin

weapons into the Kandahar region. Two battalions o

Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade were unable to restor

tion. 53 

At 2000 hours on 27 December, our division c

General-Major Uchkin, called me in and gave me my ord

time, I was a major and commanded a motorized rifle ba

ordered me to take my battalion on a 500-kilometer roa

Kandahar. 54 My battalion had to be in the Spinakalac

area by the morning of 31 December. I was to s

Spinakalacha village from the major supply bases and cr

tions which would allow the Separate Motorized Rifle 

recapture lost positions. In the course of preparing fo

march and ensuing combat, I added extra ammunition, 

and rations to what we usually carried and picked up som

ing subunits. At 0400 hours 29 December, my battalion 

to accomplish its mission. 

At 1600 hours 30 December, we arrived in Kandahar

was met by General-Major R. K. Pishchev, the Deputy c

of the 40th Army. He gave me specific orders. We were 

contested area at If00 hours 31 December and assault a

Spinakalacha village by 1500 hours. We were then to 

canyon and hold this area until 7January 1988. During th

51V. D. Vlasyan served in the Republic of Afghanistan from O

through June 1988 first as a deputy commander and then as t

der of a motorized rifle battalion. He was decorated with the "

Red Banner" and the "Order of the Red Star". 

52Afghan 2nd Army Corps headquarted in Kandahar (ed.). 

5370th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (ed.). 

54The battalion could be from the 5th MRD if it came fr

Afghanistan (Shindand area) or from the 108th MRD if it cam

ern Afghanistan (Kabul area) (ed.). 
~4th MRC 

/,* #311340 DI 

~ 2nd MRB 

311730 DI 

mm 

m 

b~G~N 

, Znd MRB ~11000 DEC 

;H-~OMB / 

" ~11340 DEC 

~' peel ~ 311SS0 

MRC~ ~ :lad 4 $|h S1123G DEC 

-- ~'~ i 112 XUome~r ....... : 

Map 18: Storming Spinakalacha village, 31 Decembe

55The Afghan Army had both a brigade and a regiment force 

This regiment was from either the Afghan 7th MRD or 15th M

tioned in Kandahar (ed.). 
to Spinakalacha village. During their advance, the recon

patrol uncovered a launch-bomb cache with 150 launch b

two launchers. The patrol rigged the cache for detonatio

ceded up the hill where they could secure the left flank of 

detachment. At 1320 hours, the patrol attacked and des

enemy outpost and established solid communications with 

At 1320 hours, I signalled the start of an artillery prepa

152mm SP howitzer battalion, a separate 122mm SP howi

ion and a MRLS battalion participated in a 10-minute artill

ration. This was immediately followed by a bombing an

attack by two squadrons of SU-25 FROGFOOT ground-

craft. 

At 1335 hours, my 5th MRC moved out to it's jumping

some 250 meters from the village. The 5th MRC was co

by Captain B. M. Mikul'skiy. The 5th MRC was con

Assault Group #1. It had 46 men, including a squad of sa

eight BMP-2s. I added a tank with a mine plow and a

infantry company of 40 men to this company. As the 

moved out, I covered its movement with the fires of a sni

a flamethrower platoon, an AGS-17 platoon and a mortar b

1340 hours, I had the MRLS battalion lay down a smoke 

blind the enemy. 

At 1340 hours, my subunits attacked Spinakalacha. 

strong resistance on the right flank and the Afghan army 

withdrew to the jumping-off area. I was not able to get the

back and they did nothing further toward accomplishing ou

The enemy began to shift his forces to his left flank in or

flanking fire on the 5th MRC. For awhile, we were held b

thick adobe walls of the village. Then, however, my troops 

to blow gaps in the adobe walls and my platoons burst thro

gaps in three-man groups on the attack. My 5th MRC 

enemy main force. 

At 1355 hours, my 4th MRC (Assault Group #2) attac

battalion's left flank. The 4th MR.C, commanded by Capt
By 1600 hours, the 5th MRC completed the destruct

enemy in the eastern part of the village and established 

positions against the access points from the neighboring gr

The surviving enemy had fled into the green zone. At 180

organized the defense of Spinakalacha and provided fire 

an Afghan infantry regiment which attacked north to seize 

ern slope of Grakalacha. 56 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: Analysis of the organization 

duct of combat in this advance in a village shows: 

First, the totally successful march and concealed concen

the battalion near Kandahar was possible due to the thor

complete preparations for the march and follow-on comba

Second, prior combat experience allowed the subunit 

correctly use initiative during combat in the village. 

Third, the battalion commander's actions merit attenti

ularly when you consider how he coordinated actions an

conducted his personal reconnaissance and arranged the 

fire support to destroy the enemy and then decisively 

results to conduct the advance of his subunits. 

Finally, the battalion commander's interesting maneu

reconnaissance platoon's supporting fire on the enemy fr

nant terrain, his skillful use of snipers and portable flam

and the actions of his platoons' three and five-men sectio

the assault on the village are all worthy of study. 

56According to his map, the 7th Infantry Regiment (ed.). 
Kabul from the successful completion of Operation Magi

opening of the road to Khost) to our base camp in Kunduz

we negotiated the Salang tunnel, the division commande

our regiment to halt in the Andarab Canyon. With his or

the following important information: exactly 24 hours e

mujahideen kidnapped the governor of Baghlan Provinc

commander of the Ministry of Security Forces in Andarab 

Our regimental commander, LTC V. V. Telitsyn, receiv

to move to the borders of a zone controlled by Afghan go

forces, gain contact with the enemy, punish him with ma

and create the conditions necessary to free the province le

The regimental commander was able to muster two 

rifle battalions, the reconnaissance company, and the SP ar

talion (minus one battery) for this mission. In addition, tw

batteries supported this force with illumination missions f

tions along the Salang-Puli-Khumiri highway. Each moto

battalion was down to two motorized rifle companies, the 

reconnaissance platoon and the mortar battery (in reduced 

In all, the regiment consisted of 40-45 BMPs, 25-30 how

vasilek (cornflower) automatic mortars, four 82mm mortar

"tray") and about 300 men. 

The regimental commander decided to advance to the 

the Afghan controlled zone at night and drive to the f

mountain on BMPs with one MRB and the reconnaissanc

ny. At the base of the mountains, the subunits would dism

begin the ascent in three company-sized groups (two moto

companies and the reconnaissance company). They woul

about a kilometer or a kilometer and a half to establish co

57V. G. Tarasyuk served in the OKSVA from April 1986 through 

as the Chief of Staff of a motorized rifle battalion. He was aw

"Order of the Red Star". 

58Either the 122nd, 149th or 395th MRR from the 201st MRD 
motorized rifle battalion in an attempt to deceive the enemy 

ducted a reconnaissance sweep along the opposite canyon 

The 1st MRB was ordered to move out, under the 

artillery fire and the 2nd MRB, which would be firing over 

LEGEND 

Prior to the action 

At start of the action 

Fire support of the BR

Beginning the ascent 

After the action 

_... - _. 

RECON CO 

1st MRB~ 

Two Kilometers 

Map 19: Advance of a MRB in the mountains at nig
Captain A. V. Ribakov. The second group was the 3rd 

the recon platoon. I was the battalion chief of staff and I 

ed this second group. We were to climb the mountain

enemy and cut off his escape. The battalion bronegruppa w

port us with BMP-2 30mm automatic gunfire into the ga

our two groups. 

The 1st MRC dismounted group consisted of 36 pe

12.7mm utes (cliff) machine gun, one 30mm AGS-17 

grenade launcher, and two 82mm podnos [tray] mortars 

arms. My dismounted group comprised 49 people, two ut

guns, one AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher, two podn

plus small arms. The dismounted reconnaissance compa

men, two utes machine guns, one AGS-17 automatic grena

er and one podnos mortar plus small arms. 

Intelligence reports told us that there were suppos

guerrilla forces with a total of 170-200 men in this area. 

We prepared for combat during 10 hours of daylight. T

pulled vehicle maintenance and cleaned their weapons. T

essentially no material reserves to replenish since we had 

our combat loads when we left Kabul and had not used th

the march. 

The subunit commanders received their orders and f

their own plans. Particular attention was paid to coordina

way this was done is particularly instructive. The regim

mander took all commanders from platoon leader up on 

daytime reconnaissance. This group moved to the reco

site in two stages mounted on two BMPs. The majority o

manders were hidden inside the BMPs and practically 

dressed as ordinary soldiers (without rank and commande

trements). The officers had the chance to scrutinize t

march route and coordinate their movement to the depth 

sion. 

At 2100 hours on 25 February, the regiment moved ou

the movement and deployment of the 1st MRB went ac
vening natural obstacle-the dry river bed. The bank of thi

was impassable, it was practically sheer and was from on

meters high. Therefore, we had to jockey our BMPs ar

zigzag by some 50-to-100 meters to enter and exit from 

bed. This also ate up the time. 

The approach was done by platoons traveling by bou

successive height was occupied by a platoon which would 

the advance of the other platoon with his on-board wea

success of the advance was also supported by covering fir

artillery group and supporting BMPs. The 1st MRC ad

the mountain some 800 meters and the 3rd MRC with the 

toon some 1,300 meters. The 1st MRC fulfilled its missi

hours while the 3rd MRC fulfilled its mission at 03

February. 

During the climb up the mountain, we found several a

defensive works and campfires with smoldering embers

armed two explosive devices. However, the delay d

approach and deployment kept us from cutting off the ene

drawal. At the same time, the guerrilla forces did not succ

ring out of the area completely since the other side of the c

controlled by Afghan government forces. 

At dawn, we were able to establish visual reconnaiss

discovered signs of enemy activity and called artillery fire 

area and also shot it up with fire from the utes machine gun 

17 automatic grenade launcher. However, the enemy kn

rain well and was well versed in the art of camouflage. 

the rounds mainly impacted on the ground and effects 

were minimal. 

With the approach of darkness, we were ordered to c

from the mountain and rejoin the regiment. We travelled 

base camp, but later learned from agent intelligence that 

time of our action, enemy losses were up to 30 KIA or W

region. 
There was insufficient consideration given to the impact of 

the combat approach by the subunits, which led to the u

jockeying about to cross the dry river bed. Further, recon

of the march route and mine detecting were poorly done. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: The Soviet infantry car

incredible weights. Carrying a 58-pound heavy machine g

pod and ammunition up a hill at night is a challenge. Th

and 82mm mortar are not any easier. How the command

ed his infantry to cut off the enemy escape route, when t

mujahideen already had an uphill advantage, is questiona

landed blocking forces seems to be an answer to cutting 

routes. 

The Soviets adopted bounding overwatch in this vig

apparently throughout the Afghanistan War. Bounding 

was not in the European battle book since it slowed down m

tempo. However, bounding overwatch is essential whe

over rough terrain or when your enemy is not totally occu

your artillery and air strikes. 

In this vignette and others, the Soviets had no problem 

a staff officer as a temporary commander. Here, the reco

was attached to a MRC and the battalion chief of staff was p

command. This was a normal field practice and does not 

ly mean that they were having problems with the regular 

commander. 

As the vignette demonstrates, mine clearing in mountai

ficult proposition-particularly against some of the no

mines. Soviet equipment was frequently not up to the 

Soviet Army lost 1,995 KIA and 1,191 vehicles to mines 

course of the Afghanistan War. 

From the entire book, it is apparent that Soviet fo

spread very thin. Vignette 14 required a battalion each f

different regiments from a division spread over 400 k

They could not assemble a single regiment, which would 
Afghanistan to help hold the area during the division's abse

Soviets did not commit sufficient force to win the war. T

mitted forces to bolster the Marxist-Leninist govern

Afghanistan and hoped that they could buy enough tim

Afghan government to build up its own forces to fight its o

This is not to say that the Soviets did not try to win the 

itarily. The 40th Army was much larger that the Afgha

Army and Afghan government security forces and was rein

Air Force units and reserves located just across the Amudar

river in the Soviet Union. The Soviets controlled the cou

were able to effectively intervene at any point in Afghanist

time they desired. However, such intervention was effectiv

long as they remained in the area. They could not conquer 

try. General Secretary Gorbachev directed that the militar

victory in 1985 and casualty figures on both sides reflect t

This effort failed and Gorbachev finally decided that t

Union must withdraw with dignity from Afghanistan. 

Why did the Soviets fail to achieve military v

Afghanistan? First, they were unable to seal the bor

Pakistan and Iran to prevent the rnujahideen resupply of the

Second, they were unable to bring enough force into the co

to public opinion (particularly in the third world) and thei

to provide the logistic support necessary with a larger forc

Afghanistan is a country of strong beliefs and traditions and 

ulation opposed the Soviets and the hostile communist id

the government of Afghanistan. The communist ideolog

attacked the ethnic structure, community structure and 

beliefs of the people and the people violently rejected this 

Fourth, the Soviets had little respect for the people of Afg

They used the Afghan Peoples Army, Sarandoy, the Kha

local militias ("Defenders of the Revolution") as canno

These demoralized and inefficient forces regained some of 

respectability only when the Soviets left. Further, the So

ducted indiscriminate air and artillery attacks against the ru
battalion in Vignette 18 is short an entire company. The re

Vignette 19 is short two battalions and each battalion is 

company. Even these companies are at one-third strength. 

this regiment was returning from hard fighting during 

"Magistral'", but the personnel strength of the regiment is 

that of a full-strength battalion. These are skeleton figures

should have 2,315 men. An MR]] should have 455 men. 

should have 103 men. An MRP should have 28 men. So

were badly understrength and Afghan forces were in ev

shape. Other sources describe the significant Soviet prob

disease which cut into units' present-for-duty-strength in Af

From 1/4 to 1/3 of a unit's strength was normally sick with 

typhus, malaria, amoebic dysentery, and meningitis. Gua

and LOC security cut further into the strength. Units w

twice a year from the spring and fall draft call-ups. Consc

to the Turkestan Military District had 6-12 month's traini

going to Afghanistan for the rest of their service. Furthe

districts and Groups of Forces were levied for troops twice 

These levies were quite significant. Yet, the unit stre

appallingly low. Apparently, units need to be filled well in 

100°/0 in some regions of the world if one hopes to field a r

fighting force. 
ASSAULTS 

The study of combat experience in Afghanistan allow

fect the theory and practice of tactical air assaults. Afghan

tice demonstrated that tactical air assaults were s

employed for independent, surprise attacks against guer

and base camps in remote locales or difficult terrain. A

were also employed in joint actions involving other subun

iments, advancing along the front. 

Air assaults were normally conducted to seize domin

and road junctions. They would land directly on the targ

cent to it. As a rule, prior to landing the first lift and the m

we would use air, artillery and even small-arms fn'e to su

enemy. 
approximately 150 enemy were functioning in groups in t

area of responsibility (AOR).60 They were shelling securi

and civilian facilities with 81mm mortar fire and were min

The brigade commander decided to eradicate these gro

AOR. He planned to attack the enemy in the village of Ka

ed in Nangarhar Province about 12 kilometers from our b

and the village of Ghaziabad. He would air-land two comp

into the area near Kama and would later follow this landin

against Ghaziabad. The bronegruppa of the participating 

rifle battalion and airborne company would move out from

to Ghaziabad in support. The air landing would be prece

10-minute artillery preparation. Captain Kostenko, the ac

ion commander, would command the air landing. Major 

the deputy commander for technical support, would com

bronegruppa. The first lift would consist of an air assault p

engineer squad and a flamethrower squad. 

On 12 February, the air landing took place near Kama

AAslt company swept through the green zone, but did no

enemy. The bronegruppa moved toward the village of Gha

On 13 February, we conducted an air landing with the 

company, this time near Ghaziabad to seize the crest of th

mountain and block the enemy withdrawal. However, 

bronegruppa reached Ghaziabad from the north, the enemy 

into the mountains. On the morning of 14 February, th

commander decided to pick up the two air assault compan

land them near the village of Charbagh (in Laghman 

From there, they would advance across the mountains to 

lage. According to preliminary intelligence, the mujahi

ammunition and had a hospital in Bailam. The advanci

59S. A. Urban served in the Republic of Afghanistan from Dec

through April 1984 as a platoon leader and then a company com

an air assault battalion. He was awarded the "Order of the Red 

60The 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (ed.). 
commander gave us the necessary air and artillery suppo

the village. The battalion lost 25-30 men. 

~III CO 

~ BAIL4

-'AA.It CO.. ..':l--J" ~l---~'~"~.4.z ~ I ~ 12APR 

Three Kilometer= I\\ 15-17 APR ( [ k. I ~ ",. "" 

Map 20: Air assaults in Nangarhar and Laghman Prov
Motorized Rifle Brigades were forces created especially 

terinsurgency. They were composed of two-three motorize

talions, an air assault battalion, an artillery howitzer ba

reconnaissance battalion, a tank battalion and support troop

are also some indications that a MRLS battalion mi

belonged to this organization. In this vignette, a MP, LS b

part of the Brigade Artillery Group (BRAG) of the 66th. Ev

was not brought in just for this action. In Vignette 18, an M

talion supports an attack in the 70th's AOR. The 70th was 

Kandahar and it was over 400 kilometers from Kandahar t

major Soviet force. Perhaps the Afghan forces in the 

MRLS, but there is also the possibility that a MRLS batt

part of both separate brigades. 

Soviet military vocabulary is very precise when it dif

between tactics and operations in the European theater. T

the business of platoons, companies, battalions, regiments 

sions while operations are the business of armies and fron

the 40th Army conducts Operation Magistral (Vignette 1

operation. When divisions and regiments fight, it is tactics. 

whenever the 103rd Airborne Division, the 56th Air Assaul

the 345th Separate Airborne Regiment, the 66th Separate M

Rifle Brigade, or the 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade 

an operation. This is probably due to the unique combi

mixes of the separate brigades and the level of impact of the 

and air assault forces. 

In this vignette, the actions of the bronegruppa spook t

before the air assault element is in a position to deal w

Apparently, there were problems with the coordination and 

nications between the two elements. 

It would also appear that intelligence for this operation 

poor. This may be a reflection of poor performance by t

naissance forces and a demonstration of an inability t

enemy positions. 
py 

Rumbasi (located southwest of Kandahar). The mee

involve the leaders of the main guerrilla forces in a thr

area and was being held to coordinate their future actions

sion was made to destroy the enemy at this meeting. 

The brigade commander decided to conduct an appr

to Rumbasi on 25 January, cut up the guerrilla forces 

approach, launch a tactical air assault to block the enem

lage and then destroy the enemy. The following m

brigade would continue the advance to the southwest an

the destruction of any enemy in the region. The brigade w

in a single echelon and use the brigade's air assault battali

air assault. 

Our air assault battalion's mission was to seize an LZ t

east of Rumbasi, destroy any enemy in the vicinity of th

lish blocking positions to the east and southeast of Rumba

these positions until the arrival of the brigade's main forc

would link up with the brigade and join its subsequent a

We prepared our battalion for combat at our base ca

to 25 January. Our preparations included outfitting o

preparing our weapons and equipment for combat, and 

air assault training for our soldiers. The battalion staff p

load plans for each helicopter and each lift, as well as the 

and the materiel and armaments transport plan. The aer

located near our base camp. At 1100 hours on 25 Janu

talion began moving to the aerodrome, loading the heli

finalizing the lifts. Embarkation was finished by 1300. 

61V. V. Kovalev served in the Republic of Afghanistan fro

through July 1985 as a platoon leader, company commander 

chief of staff. He was decorated with the "Order of the Red 

Republic of Afghanistan order "For Valor". 

62The 70th Separate Motorized Brigade (ed.). 

63The 4th Air Assault Battalion (ed.). 
main body was slipped one kilometer to the southeast of th

landing site. The first lift courageously and decisively dest

enemy in their LZ and established blocking position

Rumbasi. During this combat, they killed a large number 

2slsoo JAN 

"~ ~k ~ 2 M~-24 /8" / 4 sU-,r ~.~.:~,~IS JAN 1440 ,/7 j/ TULYAMAN 

251600 JAN 

;'OUt 8EP BDE 

st lho end of 

26 JAN 

AIR AAslt DN 

261:130 JAN 

! I 

Four ~Ltlolnc#¢l'j 

RUVABAD 

\ 

LEGEN

START 

A,..,.oo JA

Map 21: An air assault in the area of Rumbasi villa
did not haul any artillery along with our assault, we had 

suppressing the enemy until the brigade closed to within 

When the brigade artillery moved to within firing range

able to put fire on the enemy and the battalion main body 

ward to take up blocking positions. Mujahideen who tried 

out of R.umbasi to Ruvabad were cut down by fire from 

Our battalion lost two killed and three wounded. En

ties were over 100 men. We captured a large supply of w

ammunition. Our success was due to our achieving surp

tion measures we took to deceive the enemy (we prepared 

another area), and the courageous and decisive actions 

group. 

However, our battalion did not fulfill its entire missi

not coordinated fully with the supporting aviation and 

in an insufficient amount of aviation ordinance being Ft

up the LZ. Further, we operated out of the range of t

artillery and had not considered using smoke or remote

mines (RDM). 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: Combat experience 

depending on the type of mission and the anticipated e

teraction, a single lift should consist of a complete, rei

assault (or airborne) company or even up to a reinforce

As a minimum, a company should be reinforced with a 

toon, an AGS-17 platoon and a sapper squad. As a mini

talion should be reinforced with a mortar battery, two or 

17 platoons and a sapper platoon. A supporting artille

and a supporting battery of BM-21 MRI.R must be wit

the landing. Army and frontal aviation must support the 

is better to fly in one air corridor where the enemy air 

ture is weaker and where the terrain facilitates an 

approach. Helicopter gunships must precede and flank 

force to soften up the LZ and then circle the LZ and use 
AGS17s, perhaps the realistic solution is to remind plann

that an air assault needs accompanying and supporting i

support. Despite all the photos showing D-30 artillery p

carried by helicopters to an action, the air assault forces an

forces seem to have gone on operations without acc

artillery on numerous occasions. Perhaps this was the r

limited availability of lift ships. 
30 kilometers northeast of Kabul. The division comman

my regimental commander to destroy them 65. My c

decided to air land the regiment some six kilometers aw

guerrillas and then sneak up to the valley, block off its ex

conduct a hunt with part of the regiment, while the rest w

their movements. Aviation would provide fire suppor

some MRI-q located some 15 kilometers from the vall

bronegruppa. Illumination support would be planned and 

be fu .rnished by illumination flares, artillery illumination 

air-delivered flares. After accomplishing our mission, th

would walk to our bronegruppa. 

On 19 March, we hit the LZ and were immediately 

the enemy. The enemy opened up with a heavy volume 

began rapidly pulling his units out from under our air a

strikes. Only the forward subunits of our 1st and 2nd batt

aged to reach their blocking positions and they did not 

cient combat power to stop the enemy main body. Duri

48 hours, our search groups found and destroyed we

ammunition caches. Our covering subunits managed to 

dominant terrain, support the search groups, and rep

attempts to clear away the blocking forces. 

Over in an adjacent valley, a similar situation had 

The enemy managed to extricate his subunits away from 

the regiment and conduct a march through the valley

because we landed at the tail end of the enemy column an

not get to the blocking positions designated by the regime

tion, once again our landing had been discovered and w

put down in the wrong place. This was because rather t

at the designated sites, we landed in places s',ffe from ene

64V. G. Chabanenko served in the Republic of Afghanistan fro

1983 through June 1985 as a battalion commander. 

65The 103rd Airborne Division (ed.). 
p

necessity of conducting continuous reconnaissance of 

and, depending on the existing situation, fine-tuning your 

/-,.-- 

r,:: 

t/ 

'i 

J .RECON CO 

2 SU-17 

I 

| 

* ~ /"~-~ 

2 Su-17 

,s 

J 

Region of 

/'. enemy 

~." concentration 

"L" 

I" 

kt:. 

2 SU-I? 

I I 

One Kilometer 

eth ABN CO 

$th ABN CO 

1

2

Map 22: Air assaulting and blocking the enemy in th

Mandikul' valley. 
demonstrate that evacuating the assault force after miss

plishment requires particular attention, since it is during 

the operation that the subunits receive their most signifi

ties. During the return to the assembly areas on helicopte

ticular attention to ensuring that the enemy has not place

around them. In order to keep the enemy away from 

points, use air-delivered or MRLS-delivered RDM 

approach routes. When covering a region from domin

evacuate the force by establishing a series of perimeter p

the 1 Z. After evacuating the main force, evacuate the po

neously. When moving the assault force to seize an evacu

cover the movement with overwatching forces and aviatio

precombat formation and lead with reconnaissance. 

Start helicopter load plans immediately upon receipt 

uation order and refine them when at the pick-up point. 

crews and mortars out first and riflemen last. The air a

mander directs the evacuation and is on the last helicopte

with the last part of the perimeter security posts. Supp

copter gunships are held in full readiness or fire on the e

their climbing paths. Air assault troopers, once on boa

copters, must be ready to conduct small arms fire thro

openings. 

Experience shows that helicopters should spend the 

possible time at the air evacuation point as personnel and 

are already concentrated there as a tempting target. Heli

spend a maximum of one and one-half minutes on the gr

Airborne and air assault forces can return to their in

bly area, after mission accomplishment, on board helico

board their armored vehicles. In this operation in the La

Valley, the regiment withdrew mounted in their bronegru

Idling their mission. They pulled out at night. In order 

at night, commanders used compasses and parachute flar

the day, they could have used route reconnaissance. The 

various bronegruppa moved by bounds as subunits prov
EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: Pulling out the mortars p

infantry is a commander's call and depends on the tactica

but there are times when the mortars will be the final sys

mander wants to evacuate. 

Many commanders prefer forming an uninterrupted 

ring" for evacuation zone security. This ring gets tighter 

lift-off. The collapsing ring has a better chance of prevent

infiltration of the perimeter and evacuating the security 

than establishing a series of far-off posts as this vignette rec

The withdrawal of the force mounted in its bronegrupp

be a withdrawal under pressure. Night movement of a m

column through the Pandshir valley using parachute flare

passes seems to be an option that a commander would 

under pressure. 
and civilian convoys and attacked Soviet and Afgha

According to intelligence reports from the Afghan securit

guerrilla forward detachments were located in the area b

the villages of Khurd-Kabul, Malang, Kala and Malikhey

of 500 to 600 men in 10 to 15 guerrilla units were located 

main concentration of guerrilla forces was located som

kilometers further to the southeast of this area. There, in 

of Tizini-Khas, they had created ammunition and armam

which were guarded by some 300 men armed with D

machine guns and mortars. The Afghan government dec

the shelling of Kabul from Lowgar Province by establis

camp in the Lowgar Valley manned by a "Sarandoy" bat

The airborne division 68 was ordered to go after the 

The airborne division commander decided to move his u

operation into the area secretly from 9 to 11 August. Th

to 18 August, he would surround and destroy the enem

detachments and prevent their retreat into their major ba

Two airborne regiments were selected for this operati

the regiments was short a battalion and the other was sh

talions. The division commander reinforced this forc

reconnaissance company of the remaining regiment, 

reconnaissance company, a sapper battalion, a tank batta

artillery regiment (which was short a battalion). Two rec

groups were formed-one from the reconnaissance com

remaining regiment and one from the separate reconnais

pany. Their mission was to conduct a 50-kilometer deep 

August to block two canyons south of the Lowgar Prov

The main body of the force (three airborne battalions

66V. V. Selivanov served in the Republic of Afghanistan as 

Intelligence of an airborne regiment. 

67KHAD (ed.). 

68The 103rd Airborne Division (ed.). 
Sarandoy battalion. The battalion did not put up any fi

from the base in a panic. The division commander then d

rather than having the recon groups move out to the pla

he would combine the two reconnaissance groups into o

~_._~~ ~ LEG

O

I '~ O

One Kilometer 

Map 23: Destroying guerrilla forces in Lowgar Pro
all day to insure constant communications. 

The assault flight took 30 minutes. The two lifts land

west slope of the canyon and moved south under hea

DShK and mortar fire. They escaped without any casual

only to nightfall. They could not receive any artillery sup

they were out of artillery range and, since it was dark, they 

get any air support. The enemy held the dominant terrain 

at them from the surrounding heights from three directions

pinned them down while the enemy moved a guerrill

approximately 600 men out of the canyon. The reconnaiss

pany shot at the withdrawing guerrillas, but the plan was t

entire force down in the canyon blocking this very w

However, the heavy enemy fire kept the reconnaissance g

mander from moving his force into the canyon and he du

along a high ridgeline instead. On the next morning, 14 A

first regiment of the division landed following an artiller

tion of the LZ. The enemy suffered some casualties, ho

goal of the operation was not achieved. The air assault cam

and the enemy had already managed to withdraw his mai

through the canyon and away from our strike. 

The division commander, General-Major Yarygin, rece

more detailed information on the enemy and decided to s

operation by preceding to the next stage and capturing th

and ammunition caches and also destroying guerrilla fo

villages of Tizini-Khas and Zandekhkalai. 

The remaining tactical air assault force consisted of a

regiment commanded by LTC Solov'ev and a reconnaissa

which I commanded. The reconnaissance group was th

recon company and the Afghan "Sarandoy" regiment whi

inserted the previous night. 

The division commander's plan was that at 1445 ho

August, the force would lift out of the area near Malikhey

helicopters. The force would air assault into the area aro

Khash using three lifts and four LZs. The first lift woul
battalion (120 men on 12 Mi-8s) of the 350th Airborn

The second lift included the division CP, the regimental 

imental recon company, a company of the 1st battalion 

18 Mi-8s) and the reconnaissance group (120 men on 12 

third lift consisted of the transferred recon group (180 me

Ss). The landings were distributed so that the 2nd batta

at LZ # 1, the first battalion (minus a company) landed a

recon group on LZ #4 and the rest at LZ #3. Artillery 

the LZs from 1412 until 1428. Then airstrikes would po

from 1430 until 1500. Aviation support would be on stat

completion of the landing until 1800. 

The commander of the air assault group made a mis

all my groups down six kilometers west of the planned 

to cross the mountains to get to our correct LZ. The facto

was lost. We did not find any arms and ammunition cach

lage of Tizini-Khas. However, an Afghan guide's 

cleared this up. What map names are printed for tiny vil

necessarily what the villages are actually called or ho

refer to them. Thus it was with the so-called village of 

On the map, it is actually named the village of Zand

pushed on to Zandekhkalai, seized it and concentrate

there. We dislodged the enemy security forces on the ap

the village and on the dominating heights which se

approaches to the canyon. Then the recon group searche

while an airborne company and the Afghan "Sarando

covered us. 

As a result of this fluke, our recon group killed ap

150 raujahideen and captured seven weapons caches. 

actions of the recon group contributed to the completion 

sion's mission. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: The first and second s

operation were filled with mistakes: During the first stag
EDITORS COMMENTARY: Soviet artillery theory oc

allows Division Artillery Groups (DAG) to be split to pro

coverage. In reality, in the European theater, this never 

In Afghanistan, it became necessary to spread the covera

vignette shows a split-DAG doing fire support. 

The Soviets had no difficulty in taking the reconnai

ments from one force and putting it in support of another. 

em commanders would not willingly surrender their reco

element. This vignette shows a typical example of the red

of TO&E reconnaissance forces to another unit. 

Map reading and terrain navigation from an aircraft is 

region without hard-top roads, powerlines, major rivers a

nent bridges. It is not any easier on the ground. Map read

ticularly difficult in the mountains. The Soviet performa

area seems about average. 
g , g

surface-to-air missile systems, was located southwest of K

On the basis of this intelligence report, my battalion 

gave me his concept of battle. 70 My 12th Air Assau

would conduct an air assault landing and secure an LZ n

ing center on 13 October. Then, when the rest of t

arrived, we would join it and help capture and destroy 

center. 

We prepared our force for combat at our training g

emphasized the organization for the air assault to inclu

analysis of past combat actions which we went over in de

personnel and then assessed the missions of the platoon 

ny commanders. We used aerial photographs to work o

of the plan. From these photos, we identified "dead s

approach to the objective, likely enemy firing positions 

fire concentration, and targets that we wanted to destroy 

artillery fire. 

We had 48 hours to prepare prior to the beginning 

tion. The battalion commander carefully planned ea

mission on the map and "wargamed" various conting

devoted special attention to balancing the subunit's fi

that of the supporting aviation. At the same time, the ba

mander personally designated the firing positions of the 

the AGS-17 as well as the site for the company CP/

wargaming each of the contingencies, he paid particular 

the actions of my forward group as we seized a.nd secur

My 12th Air Assault Company air landed onto th

morning of 13 October. Despite the careful planning, we 

69V. G. Istratiy served in the Republic of Afghanistan from 

1986 as a company commander. 

70The 4fll Air Assault Battalion of the 70th Separate M

Battalion (ed.). 
became apparent that they would not make it before the m

14 October. We could not hold out that long. So, after rev

situation, I decided to attack at nightfall. The 3rd platoon w

/ / 

. __ .~,~" ~ 

- ~ ~ At 13

~ At 13

At 14

One Kilometer At 14

Map 24: Seizing and holding a training center 

with an air assault company. 
My plan worked and by 0400 we took the base wit

ties. We captured three DShK heavy machine guns, tw

rifles, 17 individual .small arms and ammunition. At 0600

tried to retake the base, but we drove him off. In the cou

bat, my troopers used the weapons and ammunition th

captured from the enemy. When the main body of th

arrived, they punished the enemy badly and forced him t

denying him the opportunity to retake the base. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: This combat example sh

proper equipping of air assault personnel, including suffi

nition, rations, water, and radio batteries is essential. F

must insure that there is uninterrupted resupply and ac

LZs. Resupply can determine the course of battle in the 

And as important as resupply and evacuation of the w

the length of time needed to complete the entire milit

depends on how well direct coordination is done with t

Weather conditions are a major factor in employing comb

as is the effectiveness of the enemy's air defense. The cl

is to the objective or fewer the number of available LZ~

it will be to resupply forces and conduct timely MEDEV

During another battle (on 21 July 1985) in the 

Alikheyl' village, a battalion had to take part of its forc

clear an area of trees, brush, and large boulders to crea

evacuate the wounded, since their original LZ was under 

Sometimes, during the course of this battle, the only way 

their unit was to throw the supplies out of the helicopter

food and drinking water in bags and rubber bladders 

chemical defensive equipment stores prior to dropping t

without the proper containers for drops, about half of t

water was destroyed in the drop. 

In order to fight independently for three or four da

assault trooper needs to carry the following: two or th
of ammunition for the AGS-17, enough rations for three-to

two-or-three canteens of water or tea, a poncho or shelte

one blanket for two people or a sleeping bag. The weigh

kit is 3540-40 kilograms, so if regular resupply is guaran

considerable load can be lightened. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: In this vignette, an air as

pany runs out of ammunition in a day's combat. This is pa

to the Soviet philosophy that small arms fu'e suppresses e

and eventually may kill the enemy. The West wants to kill 

with small arms fire and uses crew-served weapons to 

enemy fire. The standard Soviet assault rifle's fire selector s

from safe to full automatic to semiautomatic. The standar

assault rifle's fire selection switch goes from safe to semiau

full automatic. The West sees semiautomatic fire as the n

Soviets saw full automatic fire as the norm. Perhaps the So

ed to devote more time to rifle marksmanship for a guerr

saves on ammunition consumption. In the mountains, a b

rifle with range and accuracy is frequently of more use tha

firing assault rifle (though not in an ambush). 

71Similar to the U.S. LAW (light-antitank weapon) (ed.). 
provinces of Kabul and Kunar, the enemy markedly st

intensity of combat. He shelled military bases and outp

up civilian convoys. There was a particularly unpleas

along the southern border of the country in Kandah

One of their largest guerrilla bases was located 150 kilo

of Kandahar. This base trained guerrilla forces a

weapons and ammunition for combat deep inside Afgh

base was located in Islam-Dara Canyon and consiste

camps, a hospital, a large bakery, and weapons and 

stores. 

The division commander ordered my airborne regi

mander to air land a battalion at the northern mouth o

and air land another battalion at the southern mouth of t

They were to block the enemy inside the canyon and the

in his destruction when the other regiments of the divisi

capture and destroy the base. My battalion, the 1st Bat

initially load an airborne company plus the reconnaiss

on eight Mi-8 helicopters and, escorted by four Mi-24 he

ships, conduct an air assault to seize LZ #1. By th

November, they were to seize the dominant heights (h

2100) and the pass. On 19 November, they were to supp

tion of the rest of the battalion and the regiment. We 

block the canyon in the north and prevent the enem

drawing in that direction. 

During our preparations for this combat, the subu

ders paid particular attention to studying the objective a

ial photographs, coordinating their actions, and directin

72S. I. Pariy served in the Republic of Afghanistan from Se

through October 1987 as the chief of staff of an airborne batt

airborne battalion commander. He was awarded the "Ord

Star" twice and the Afghanistan "Order for Bravery." 

73The 103rd Airborne Division (ed.). 
mander would command the first lift. 

At 1500 hours on 18 November, our first lift (forward 

airborne. During our approach to the LZ, the enemy sho

of our helicopters. Seven of our troopers were wounded 

! 

2nd ABN CO / 

ON P ~ 

f ~ ~n:' AnN CO "~ "~ --~ 

iii ! .oo.o,.ov .oo.oo.o, 

3rd ABN CO [ "f ."'~'~' __ _ --~. 

I,.?:'0g'.'o! 

Enol 

200~ 

JP~'~

fM~, 

~' ~)

." I 

| L

I ~ At 

On 

I One Kilom¢ ~ On 

I 

Map 25: An airborne battalion in Islam-Dara Can
the survivors. He hit the enemy on the flank, destroye

points and captured hills 2300 and 2100. The recon plat

ed covering fire which enabled the survivors to withdr

pass and dig in on high ground. 

On the morning of 19 November, air strikes and a

rained down on the enemy firing points which reconna

identified. Then, the rest of the battalion, followed by th

landed at LZ #2. The first lift covered this insertion succ

0800 on the 19th, the 2nd Airbome Company seized 

which blocked the northern approach into the canyon. 

20 November, the 3rd Airborne Company seized the do

rain along the west wall of the canyon. Two platoons 

Airbome Company drove off the surviving enemy on hi

by 0630 hours on 19 November, they had occupied it. 

by 0400 hours on 20 November, the northern exit to the 

completely sealed. Consequently, the enemy had to try t

to the southwest. By this time, other subunits of the divisi

tured the heights and sealed the canyon. They com

destruction of the enemy. 

Our battalion had no irrevocable losses. We had sev

ed-all from the first lift on the fh-st day. We had three 

bruised and shaken up from an accident with a BTR on 

day. Four Mi-8 helicopters were shot down. The enemy 

imately 35 men KIA. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: The enemy concentrated 

his combat power in the southern section of the ca

deceived him as to the location of the main strength o

force which led to his defeat. Attention must be paid 

organized air defenses which the enemy fielded. His air 

ing points were interconnected and well-protected. They 

be safe from artillery fire and airstrikes. Because we did n

intelligence data on the location of the enemy air defens

our supporting helicopter gunships indiscriminately s
ready for independent action, since followon lifts into th

may not be possible. How helicopters are used will va

height of the mountains. An Mi-8MT helicopter can c

eight ta'oopers with all their kit at 2000 meters altitude, bu

or-five at 3000 to 4000 meters altitude. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: Guerrilla warfare is 

leader's and company commander's war. Lower level 

essential for survival and success. This vignette shows a g

ple of how the Soviets were developing junior leader initi

airborne and air assault forces. Motorized rifle forces seem

tinue to suffer from top-driven lack of initiative. 

Success in guerrilla war is hard to define and body c

tainly a poor criteria. However, example after exam

blocks, sweeps and raids into areas supposedly containin

of guerrillas. At the end of a battle or operation, the muja

alties are in the dozens and the action is termed a success b

guerrilla force has been smashed. From Vietnam experien

rilla force is very difficult to destroy. After very rough ha

majority of them seem to bounce back. It seems that what 

were normally engaging were the rear guards and the slo

formed guerrillas. The Soviet block seemed very porous 

at night) and the sweep seemed to miss a lot. 

The lack of a professional NCO cows really hurt the S

ing these block and sweep actions. According to intervi

conducted, a conscript NCO was norm'ally in charge of 

post. Time and time again, the Soviet troops would either 

on post or fail to engage the enemy for fear of getting k

firefight. The NCO should have corrected this, but wa

instigator. 
jg

Nangarhar Province. The so-called "Melava" fortified r

tained huge stores of weapons, ammunition, medicine and 

which had been brought over from Pakistan. The domin

in this area were well-fortified with dense minefields and 

trenches and dugouts dug into the rocky strata. Each mo

been turned into a self-sufficient strong point, prepared for 

all directions. Each mountain fortress had an antiaircra

and 82mm mortar and a heavy machinegun. Accordin

gence reports, about 500 men, armed with automatic we

sniper rifles defended the region. The enemy correctly m

defenses around the clock. 

The Separate Air Assault Brigade 75 was commanded 

A. Raevskiy. He received orders to conduct a 120 kilo

march with two reinforced airborne battalions, an artiller

and some of the specialized subunits of the brigade to Ka

there, he refueled his equipment and rested his men befo

ducted a 170 kilometer roadmarch from Kabul to Jala

Jalalabad, he moved his brigade into an assembly area an

for action. 

The plan for destroying the enemy in the fortified reg

follows: Conduct a 32-kilometer road march in the early 

April and in the morning air assault two battalions close to 

strong points. The battalions would destroy the enemy s

ments and then, exploiting success, would engage the re

ture the stores, strong points and firing positions; and the

the enemy fortifications. 

The day before the operation, the brigade command

assistants diligenfly studied the map and aerial photogra

74N. G. Ten'kov served in the OKSVA as the Deputy C

Operations Section of a Separate Brigade. He received the 

Service to the Fatherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" T

75The 56th Separate Air Assault Brigade stationed in Gardez (
In accordance with the plan, the brigade moved out 

march at 2030 hours on 11 April under black-out drive 

Due to the heavily mined roads, the brigade arrived thre

at the staging area. They immediately began to load the 

5th AIR ASSLT CO 

120644 APR 

O 

4th AIR AGSLT CO 

120044 AP| 

lit AIR 

ASSLT CO "~"~¢ 

120644 APR ~¢/ 

~3td AIR ~' ASSLT CO 

••RECO ~J~.A /2 

i / ' 

. ~12o

.%o / 

I LE

ALALABAD ] One Kilometer [ ~ At 12

Map 26: Air assault brigade destroys the "Melava" fortif
the force at 0644 hours on 12 April. Mi-24 helicopter gu

ported the insertion while artillery fire closed down the e

points. Simultaneously, two pair of Mi-8 MT helicop

DShK heavy machine gun and the guards' barracks. 

The fight for the dominant heights lasted 17 minutes. 

lost two KIA and three WIA, while the enemy, cau

unawares, lost several dozen men. The next 24 hours 

rooting out the survivors of the guerrilla forces. We capt

supply of arms and ammunition. The number of captu

bombs alone surpassed 1,000. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: The success of the ope

achieved by thorough preparation, a high state of train

troopers and helicopter crews, and a penetrating anal

enemy situation. The qualitative study of the enemy and 

to a correct understanding of the situation, defined th

enemy courses of action, and resulted in a superior comb

our forces. The successful actions of our units and subun

allowed us to seize the enemy mountain positions with mi

alties. The mountains should have been the enemy's al

Instead, they were ours. Finally, the careful coordinati

encompassing support of our combat allowed us to ca

assigned task on time. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: The force failed to clea

ahead of time and was three hours late. This appears to 

to conduct proper reconnaissance. Throughout this ch

are getting lost and getting surprised. Helicopters are 

down. No one appears to be looking into these areas befo

force arrives. Apparendy, the Soviet Army did not alw

pathfinder-type units prior to air assaults. Perhaps it sh

Most of the difficulties encountered seem to be due to a fa

reconnaissance forces properly. 

Why did the force perform the night march to a field 
Afghanistan. The Soviets relied on helicopter maneuver 

the mobility that they were unable to realize from their 

armored personnel carriers on Afghanistan's rugge

Armored vehicles were restricted to the roads and va

Soviet infantry were uninspired conscripts who were gene

tant to close with the dedicated and motivated mujah

Soviet advantage was found in the skies. The Soviet heli

ship was a very significant system in the war. Their Mi

was the most dreaded and effective weapons system 

against the mujahideen until 1988, when "Stinger" portable 

air missiles limited their ability to range freely over resi

trolled areas. The Soviet military would have liked to 

more helicopters in Afghanistan, however, the lack of m

facilities, the increased logistics demand and the lack of s

ating bases prevented this. The Soviets were unwilling (o

make a larger logistic and psychological commitment to 
The Soviet and Afghan government forces seldom w

the defense in Afghanistan, so we have little defensive 

from the Afghanistan war. This was the result of seve

there was no continuous front line; our assigned miss

defeat the guerrilla forces; the nature of the mujahideen fo

hit and run; and we enjoyed a qualitative and quantitativ

ty in units, equipment and weaponry over the enemy. 

defended, most often it was subunits (platoons, compani

talions) that went over to the defense. 

But combat experience showed us that good, organiz

actions were vital for protecting the day-to-day activitie

regions, cities and our garrison base camps in A

Effectively organized security yielded positive results in 

with the mujahideen and helped in keeping convoys sec

sweeping mujahideen from the areas around garrisons, air

tric power plants and transfer stations, mountain passes, 

other important sites. 

76The Soviets see a big difference between a defensive positio

rity post. They defend when they are in immediate danger o

whelmed and when the correlation of forces is against them. A 

post is a control measure which incorporates defensive measur

multipliers (ed.). 
gg

Badakhshan province. A separate motorized rifle regim

risoned in Faizabad and in the surrounding area. The 

subunits provided stability and control in the province. 

large area the regiment had to control, it was split into 

one in the fortified village of Baharak (60 kilometers from 

and the rest in outskirts of Faizabad. The regiment's tan

stayed behind in the Soviet Union. 78 

The regimental commander decided to destroy the e

hills surrounding Faizabad and then move on the villa

surround it and then destroy the guerrilla forces which w

ing there. In order to support the timely entry of the re

the combat zone, my platoon was sent to Fix several sect

and a bridge over the Kokcha River which had been dest

entire platoon was not available for the mission, since 

mounted motorized rifle soldiers were taken for other du

left with my three BMPs and their crews. I was reinfor

Afghan soldiers on two trucks and a bulldozer. In prepa

mission, I paid particular attention to the maintenance 

cles and their armaments. I loaded 72-hours worth of 

these vehicles. 

On 3 August, I guided my rag-tag torce into the area 

or two and one/half kilometers west of Jurm where th

bridge stood. A quick scan of the countryside reveal

enemy had constructed a well-prepared defense on th

77S. V. Milyuk served in the OKSVA from January 1980 throu

as a platoon leader. He was awarded the medal "For Excellenc

Service" First Class. 

78The 860th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment was g

Faizabad. Its 1st Battalion was garrisoned in Khamrabad (B

later, its 3rd Battalion was garrisoned in Kishim. The action t

the 1st Battalion area (ed.). 
We dug our individual and vehicle fighting positions 

hours and I dispersed the Afghan soldiers between the B

fighting positions were circular and looked like wells. T

permitted firing throughout 360 degrees and also provid

L'BI 

Map 27: A motorized rifle platoon defends outside Jur
cle commanders stood outside the tracks and adjusted fir

strike of the tracer rounds. They talked to the gunners o

com by linking the issue 10-meter extension cables to the

helmets and the intercom sets. They talked by toggling 

met's breast-level switch. The attacking enemy finally w

sunrise, but had not given up his intention to overrun m

He proved this on the following night when he resumed h

The time which we were able to gain gave me the opp

give detailed orders to my subordinates and arrange co

During the daylight, we put out mines and trip flares 

approaches to our position and also worked on repairin

and bridge. 

The enemy employed various ruses against our def

example, on the next day Private Tagirov noticed that a s

of men, disguised as local natives, was crossing the bridg

some kind of material on donkeys. He saw that a thin 

some kind of liquid was spilling out from one of the pack

wooden bridge. We investigated and found that the liquid 

line. We washed part of it off with water and covered th

sand. That night, the enemy fired many tracer rounds at 

but were unable to set it on fire. 

79When in use, the electrically-powered turret of the BMP ra

energy from the vehicle. Therefore, during alerts and comba

engine must be kept running in order to keep the battery charg

vide adequate voltage to the turret (ed.). 

80Soviet trip flares are not merely ground flares which illumin

Soviet trip flares contain multiple green, yellow and red rocke

into the air and produce a whistling sound. These trip flares (m

ly signal mines-signal 'nye rainy) draw the sleepiest sentry's at

repeated lights and sounds (ed.). 
a motorized rifle platoon leader is put in charge of so

troops and civilians and is expected to accomplish this m

apparently does so. 

Usually, in a defense, the bronegruppa serves a mob

capable of rushing to a threatened sector. Here, the brone

basis of the defense. 

In this vignette, the platoon leader does not incor

ground into his defense, but leaves a significant piece of h

immediately outside his perimeter. He may have done 

he could not position his vehicles onto that ground or, 

his vehicles would not have been able to support each ot

is remarkable that he apparently did not even put a secu

observation post on the dominant terrain. 
ticular, they fired directly on the 40th Army headquarters. 

ership of the guerrilla forces announced that they would 

headquarters in the near future. Therefore, the high 

decided to upgrade the defense and security of the army 

ters. 

As a result, Major Avramenko, my battalion comman

ed to establish a new security post which would be man

motorized rifle platoon which had three BTR-70s and 28 m

platoon was reinforced with two AGS-17s and three P

guns with night sights. We also received some night vis

for night observation. An engineer excavator came to t

within 72 hours, dug the primary and reserve fighting p

my BTRs and men and then connected all the positions 

fighting trenches. We dug secret forward redoubts on th

the security outpost for our machine gun crews. 

We also built an observation post for a long-range fie

over our area. We established visual communications b

secret dugouts and the observation post to assist in coordin

We built two barbed wire fences all around the security 

Between the two rows of barbed wire fence, we put in 

sonnel minefield (using both pressure and tension-release 

the far side of the wire, we laid in trip flares. A land-line w

to give us telephone communications with the battalion co

a neighboring tank platoon and the duty officer at army 

ters. I organized my post to have two-thirds of my me

their posts at night and one third during the day. Every 

81S. V. Mos'kin served in the OKSVA from September 1

November 1982 as a platoon leader. 

82The 2nd Platoon, 2nd Company, 1st Motorized Rifle Batt

Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 108th Motorized Rifle Divisi

and 2nd Battalions were mounted on BTRs while the 3rd B

mounted on BMPs (ed.). 
flock of sheep into our mine field. 

And on the next night, the mujahideen attempted to pene

army headquarters using a dry fiver bed and irrigation 

killed two of these who wandered into our mines. W

Map 28: Layout of a security outpost in the Kabul s
including the establishment of a new security outpost on 

approach route. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: Due to the preemine

offense in Soviet military training, the Soviets rarely train

defense. There seems to be a hunker-down-and-wait m

their defenses, whereas one would expect to see patrol

ambushes, mechanical ambushes, and aggressive recon

This is particularly true at night. The only night patrols d

vignette are done by the Afghan police. After a unit h

ground so thoroughly, it is hard to imagine putting it into 

sive action without some serious readjustments and retrai

unit seems to have bunker mentality. 
course of an operation in the Panjsher valley which invol

government forces and a SPETSNAZ detachment. T

Army had a series of security outposts on the dominant 

rounding Rukha. These posts were poorly fortified, the

enough soldiers and heavy weapons to hold them and 

soldiers' morale was low. The high command decided 

the existing posts and to add additional outposts by ass

from a SPETSNAZ detachment to man them. a4 

Thus on the 13th of June, I received orders to take my 

SNAZ Group and occupy the heights opposite the rest 

across the Panjsher River. 85 I was a lieutenant at the tim

mander wanted me to establish an observation post a

mujahideen activity in the area of the hamlet of Mafis

would also deny the enemy the opportunity to condu

reconnaissance and launch a surprise attack on our batta

There were 15 men in my 31st SPETSNAZ Rec

Group. Besides small arms, we had two AGS-17 automa

launchers, one DShK heavy machine gun and one 8

mortar. We were supported by an artillery battery [that 

the SPETSNAZ detachment]. We expected enemy a

region on 15 or 16 July, and that action might include a

the security outposts. 

831. A. Egiazarov served in the OKSVA from 1982 through 

commander of a SPETSNAZ group. He was awarded the 

Military Merit." 

84A SPETSNAZ detachment is equivalent to a battalio

although its personnel strength was less than 100. They ar

called SPETSNAZ companies. SPETSNAZ groups were 

company commands, but had a personnel strength of 15-16 

Some were four-man groups. They were sometimes called SPE

toons (ed.). 

85The 31st SPETSNAZ Group of the 177th SPETSNAZ Deta
es to the post. Fifth, on a nearby terrace, build a hidden, 

obstacle. 86 Sixth, organize an uninterrupted schedule of o

and security. Three men were always on guard during th

seven men were always on guard at night. The detachm

n'l> ) "urn 

,,~'~,,, MARxSX

[] °.oo. .n 

Mountain 

Map 29: Repelling a raid on a security outpost
DShK heavy machine guns from Black hill and Fang 

My men, with the exception of two look-outs, dove behin

and in the dugouts for shelter. The guerrillas had resolu

the initiative and pushed their attack forward, throwing 

they came. The mujahideen having climbed onto our h

ran toward our defenses, but were caught in our tangle

broke their attack and we were able to destroy them wi

our dugouts. The enemy left four corpses on the terrace

withdrew under the cover of DShK fire. We had no casu

EDITOR'S COMMENT: Even, and sometimes especi

forces, the commander must stay on top of his personnel 

that they maintain vigilance and perform other routi

duties. Soldiers' carelessness almost led to the destruction 

This vignette indicates that an artillery battery may 

part of a SPETSNAZ detachment. In this particular v

detachment was operating within MRI.~ range, since 

artillery plan is for MRLS. 

The Soviet tanglefoot obstacle appears to be a mo

obstacle. It has not been adopted by western armies. Pe

armies ought to consider doing so. 

86This Soviet tanglefoot obstacle is different than that used 

armies. It is a large, compressed, banded spring made of high

It is similar to an uncontrolled "Slinky" toy. When unbanded d

it uncoils wildly in every direction. It will stop dismounted 

mals, vehicles and even tanks. It is almost impossible to extric

from this without heavy-duty wire cutters, pliers and lots of 

obstacles are called MZP (malozametnye prepyatstviya) or con

cles (ed.). 
ment's 65-kilometer stretch of the Termez-Kabul highw

reinforced with a tank company and an artillery battery. 

was to secure the unimpeded movement of Soviet and A

voys in my area of responsibility and to prevent the demo

pipeline, bridges and sections of highway. 

My regimental commander 88 constituted 14 mobi

patrols and 23 security posts for the mission. A reinforced 

rifle platoon usually functions as a mobile security patrol

ized rifle company usually constitutes two-or-three mob

patrols and five-or-six security posts. I designated my s

patrols and posts and constituted a reserve in case I sudd

do battle with the mujahideen. 

Mobile security patrol #31 was my largest mobile sec

since I had integrated my CP/OP in that grouping. The 

193 men including my battalion command group, a sign

the 1st fuing platoon of my mortar battery, a tank comp

one platoon), the artillery battery (minus a firing platoo

battalion's recon platoon. 

A guerrilla force of about 500 men operated in my 

area of responsibility. They were armed with 82mm mor

less rifles, heavy machine guns, launch bombs and many 

From 16 to 21 April, our division participated in an o

destroy guerrilla forces in this region. After the operatio

ticipating units and subunits returned to their base camps

activity quickly picked up. Agent reconnaissance repo

wounded miner [i.e. one who emplaces land mines] was 

Chandaran village. This miner had been trained by forei

Two renegade Russian soldiers who had gone over to the 

in 1981 and 1983 were guarding the miner. 

87F. V. Zhitoryuk served in the OKSVA in 1985 as a battalion 

88Most likely the 177th MRR of the 108th MRD (ed.). 
At 0100 hours on 23 April, two groups of five men e

along the pipeline. They were disguised to look like pip

ers and carried pipeline equipment as they walked and c

STATION 3 

DET #31 

~uin$ 

To KABUL 

N~HANDARAN 

I Ruins ~ .~ 

ASSEMBLED FORCE 

10 Men - For blocking & support 

12 Men - From the recon platoon & Afg

For sweeping and snatching: 

8 Recon troops 

10 Men from the 3rd MRC 

25 Afghans from "Sarandoy" Battalio

Map 30: Blocking and sweeping Chandaran villa
Precise coordination between the Soviet subunits and 

armed police allowed the battle to precede with minimum 

We killed three mujahideen and captured 16. Among th

were the bodyguards of Said Mansoor, an important gue

leader in the northern provinces, and the wounded miner. 

out later that the mujahideen were resting in the village a

of the sudden and unconventional nature of our subun

they were unable to offer any resistance. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: This was a heavy force t

minelayer and his renegade guards. Probably the main i

the mission was to capture or kill the renegades. It is inte

their fate is not mentioned. 
y g

force had 15 men armed with two RPG-2 antitank gren

ers, a DShK heavy machine gun, a sniper rifle and se

assault rifles. 

On 12 March 1986, my battalion was pulling security 

I received a report that a BRDM belonging to the local 

battalion was firing in the Khinjan canyon. This was n

where my mobile security patrol #32 was working. I o

2nd MRC commander, Captain V. P. Yusov, to take 

(eight soldiers on two BTRs) and move on the enemy. Fo

later, Captain Yusov reported that the enemy was indeed 

fie in Khinjan canyon and was firing small arms and gren

ers. 

My reconnaissance platoon was on alert and I had 

march on their vehicles to the combat site. My plan w

Captain Yusov and the reserve block the rnujahideen in 

while my recon platoon would split into two groups an

canyon on two sides to hit the enemy in the rear and d

when he tried to withdraw. This plan required a thoro

edge of the local terrain, the availability of two Mi-8 

(which were in the area) to fly over the battle and report 

position and location of the enemy, and the availability o

sary combat power to block and destroy the mujahideen. 

Twenty to twenty-five minutes after the pursuit began

G. Kravets, my political deputy, reported that we had ov

enemy and joined battle. As a result we killed 13 men an

two. Additionally, we captured two grenade launchers, o

gun, eight assault rifles, and two rifles. 

89F. V. Zhitoryuk served in the OKSVA in 1985 as a battalion 

[This is the same author of the last vignette.) (ed.)]. 
finds, fixes and finishes his enemy. These are classic e

how to do it right. The Soviets seem to have enjoyed so

when cobbling together a mixed force at the spur of the m

GROUP 

3

Map 31: Destruction of the Naima force. 
outposts. Apparently, the commander should rotate his m

stationary elements frequently in order to maintain an aggr

tude. 
jyp, 

ion down into mobile security patrols and security posts 

uted them along the route. One of the mobile security 

commanded by Lieutenant Yu. B. Tyubekin. He put h

perimeter defense, dug it in and fortified it to the ex

resources allowed, laid in an interlocking and coordinat

and laid mines on the near and far approaches to Post # 

had 13 men in the mobile security patrol. 

The mujahideen knew that the mobile security patr

only of a small group of draftees and attempted to over

tion. At 1715 hours on 4 August, they began shelling the 

The mujahideen fire knocked out an 82mm mortar, a 12

heavy machine gun, and an AGS-17 automatic grena

Sniper fire from the surrounding heights pinned down t

made it difficult to move personnel from one sector 

Capitalizing on the reduced fire from our patrol, the rnu

able to move a recoilless rifle up to a position to blow a p

the minefield. [Minefield not shown on map.] 

The enemy moved within hand grenade range. A h

tery commanded by Captain S. A. Ivanov, plus a platoo

pelled howitzers, had been firing in support of the detach

however the fog and twilight restricted observation an

porting fire became much less effective. One of my co

manders, Captain Lavrent'ev, was bringing up the res

BMP-2s, when Lieutenant Tyubekin called in fire on h

tion. We fired air bursts on the post killing 23 mujahideen 

ed approximately 30 others. They withdrew. The secu

ment lost its leader and six soldiers were wounded. 

90V. G. Serebryakov served in the OKSVA from May 1

June 1988 as an airborne battalion commander. He was 

"Order of the Red Banner", the "Order of the Red St

Afghan "Order of the Red Banner". 
pied the defensive position for a night lager. There were n

vehicles incorporated in the defense. The force became a 

security post. The soldiers had to shelter in open-topped 

when the artillery hit their position. 

Map 32: Lieutenant Tyubekin's last battle. 
tronic warfare company, an artillery battalion, a helicop

and a brigade headquarters. The battalion's mission wa

first, to provide security to a base camp near Lashkargah 

Province, second, to escort convoys two-or-three times 

an 80-kilometer stretch of road, and finally to fight guerr

the immediate vicinity. My battalion was reinforced with 

D-30 122mm howitzers and two tank platoons. A 12-ki

meter encompassed our base camp. I had seven fight

spaced around the perimeter. Each position was occupi

two motorized rifle platoons. When providing convoy se

ally dispatched one or two motorized rifle platoons with 

82mm mortars. When fighting guerrillas, I usually 

motorized rifle company, with the artillery battery, rec

platoon,and two mortar platoons. 

The guerrillas began firing launch bombs at my base 

ly after we created a security zone. These attacks we

from the green zone along the Helmand river. In early 1

ducted an operation, in conjunction with the Afghan A

out the guerrilla forces from Lashkargah and to establish 

posts in t.he green zone for a Sarandoy battalion. After th

we established another security outpost in the O ala-Bust 

to control the green zone adjacent to the observation po

91 This and the following vignette are not part of the Frunze bo

extracts from P. Alexseev's "Okhranenie" [Security], V

[Military herald], April 1994, p. 42-46. Colonel Alexseev is 

of the Frunze Department of the History of Military Art. H

used LTC Yunakov's report that was in the Frunze Afghani

Although both examples lack the element of combat, they sh

camp and LOC security were organized (ed.). 

92probably the 5th Motorized Rifle Battalion, 70th Separa

Rifle Brigade. The article (which is riddled with typographic

the 2nd Battalion, but this is unlikely (ed.). 
position had a dugin sleeping quarters (where possible), am

point, platoon command post, dining room, water point, w

and latrine. In order to improve observation, I establishe

security posts which consisted of a BTR machine-gunner

REGISTAN DESERT 

d 

LASHKARGAH 

QALA-BUST F( 

/ 

® 

AA 

| I 

LEGEND 

FIGHTING POSITI

OBSERVATION PO

TRIP FLARE FIELD 

BARBED WIRE 

ANTI PERSONNEL 

Map 33: Base camp defense. 
fighting positions. Artillery fired scheduled harassing and 

fires and had fires planned throughout the area. We wer

open fire without warning when a target appeared in 

night. At daybreak, I pulled all my forward posts back 

any person, convoy or caravan that we discovered in 

Desert within four kilometers of my camp. None of m

was allowed to withdraw from a fighting position. 

Every six months, the battalion commander ordere

subunits. The rotation occurred during daylight. Snbuni

base camp defense were assigned to convoy security duti

ration for these duties, we trained the subunits in pr

clearing roads of mines, checking and clearing bridg

enemy attacks and evacuating vehicles under fire. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: The 70th Separate Mo

Brigade was headquartered in Kandahar, while this sche

a brigade headquarters in the Lashkargah base camp-so

meters away. Despite the text, this headquarters is that o

Soviet SPETSNAZ brigades. The brigade also had a b

supporting elements in Lashkargah. The sketch shows 

headquarters, three battalion headquarters, two artiller

helipad and a radio-electronic warfare company in the 

The motorized rifle battalion provided security for the 

elements. The area of this base camp is only a little ov

kilometers. This must have been very cramped and a 

get for mujahideen gunners. 
Normally, a motorized rifle battalion would be responsible 

to 150-kilometer stretch of road, whereas a company wou

from two- to 10-kilometers. In February 1986, my 3rd M

Rifle Battalion, reinforced with a tank company and two art

teries, was responsible for the security of a 102-kilometer 

road along the Puli-Charkhi toJalabad highway as well as 

rity of the Naghlu power dam site. 93 I could field 11 tanks, 4

twelve self-propelled howitzers, 27 82mm mortars, nine 

relled anti-aircraft guns 94, and 23 AGS- 17 automatic grenad

ers. I decided to split the area into three sections. My 7th M

a 32-kilometer section, my 8th MRC had a 40-kilometer se

my 9th MRC had a 30-kilometer section. I determined the 

each section after considering the terrain, key sites, enem

and the line strength of my subunits. I considered several 

before I selected the one which seemed to best concentrat

power in critical sectors. 

My LOC security was based on a series of security outp

ning the length of the road. An outpost was usually occup

motorized rifle platoon, one or two AGS-17 automatic 

launchers, one or two heavy "Utes" or DShK machine gun

two 82mm mortars and a tank. These could be combined in

rity detachment (a motorized rifle company or battalion r

with artillery, tanks, and engineers). 

The security outposts functioned around the clock. D

day, one man per squad or tank was on watch while a two-m

worked the area. At night, every security outpost would sen

or two security points. These four-man points were locate

800 meters from the security outpost and had wire and vi

93The 3rd Battalion of either the 180th or 181st Motorized Rifle R

108th Motorized Rifle Division (ed.). 

94The ZSU-23-2. These 23into machine guns could fire 2,000 r

minute and could be mounted on a truck bed or BTR (ed.). 
reserve sectors of fire. Artillery fire planning was car

Artillery subunits were usually collocated in the secu

with the motorized rifle subunits. The artillery was p

order to effectively support all the security outposts. A

Map 34: LOC security 
talion commander. Normally, it took not more than twot

utes to bring artillery fire onto a group of mujahideen. 

We selected the position for the outposts carefully a

them thoroughly. We piled up earth and stones to mak

trenchworks, bunkers, and ammunition, food and water 

ran two rows of barbed wire fence around each outpo

antipersonnel mines between the fences. We put trip flar

sors at remote and concealed approaches to the outp

entrance and exit to the security outposts were closed an

night. Rules of conduct were posted at the perimeter of 

zone and outside the security outposts. The signs w

Afghan, Russian and English languages. 95 

Every security outpost had five combat loads of amm

and 10 days worth of food, water and fuel. Night-visi

"Blik" binoculars, night scopes, parachute flares and trace

tion were available for night-time employment. 

Each security outpost maintained the following docu

maps: 

• the combat mission of the outpost and the sequence 

fulfillment: 

• the commander's map marked with positions, fire 

known enemy situation; 

• a diagram of the strongpoint; 

• orders from the battalion commander; 

• combat orders of the security outpost commander; 

95There is no single Afghan language. Pushtu and Dari are the 

guages, while Tadjik, Uzbek, Kirghiz, Baluchi, Turkrnen, and Ar

spoken (ed.). 

96The combat load [boekomplekt] is a logistic planning term w

from the U.S. "basic load". Five combat loads is a significant am

ably enough for six good fights (ed.). 
The battalion produces the security plan which show

ber and composition of each security outpost, the quant

cles, weapons and ammunition at each security outpost, 

belt at each outpost, the defensive plan for key sites, the c

measures between elements, the defensive fire plan, the 

for communication between garrisons, convoys, dispatch 

the fire support elements. In addition, the battalion had a 

ule for its subunits and also the battalion commander'

organization of the security zone. Subunits had their TO

ment plus additional radios, telephones and cable com

gear for command and control. 

Radio is the primary mean of communications in LO

All armored vehicles, TO&E and attached subunits and p

voys monitor a common channel. The battalion reconna

toon is located close to the battalion command post. It's 

to cut off and destroy any groups of mujahideen in the batt

They usually do this by setting up ambushes on s

mujahideen could approach the highway. Their ambush 

dinated with the regiment's ambush plan and usually last

There have been times, however, when the ambush party 

on site for three days. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: The Soviet concept of L

ty appears to have been to establish a series of fortifie

man them and then sit back and wait. This is a very passi

posture. There is no aggressive patrolling or reconnaissa

97Duty weapons were manned, crew-served weapons in tem

tions. Only these weapons would engage enemy reconnaissanc

elements while the rest of the force moved to battle positions

weapons would then move to battle positions. Enemy return f

on the temporary position and the enemy knowledge of the 

defending Soviet crew-served weapons would be faulty (ed.). 

Side by side with the mission of destroying guerrilla 

Soviet forces had a mission of delivering cargo and esc

voys. Analysis of enemy tactics shows that during the fi

the war, the enemy hit convoys mainly by mining isolate

of road. During the later years of the war, the enemy b

more focused on the convoys and used special diversion

to attack the convoys physically. 

The enemy's attacks on the convoys were character

maximum effort to achieve surprise; a skillful selection 

sites; well-prepared, excellently fortified and masterfully 

ambush positions; a well-prepared route of withdrawal; a 

mining the roads which included the shoulders and det

and the simultaneous destruction of equipment in several l

the convoy to prevent maneuver and the movement of 

out of the kill zone. 
special attention to mining the roads where convoys wou

The 9th MRC was stationed six kilometers west of 

our parent regiment. 99 On 5 September, our company 

was ordered to provide an escort on the next day for an 

convoy from Gh~ni to Kabul. On 7 September, we w

the cargo and would return on 8 September. Two motori

toons were detailed to provide security and convoy escor

pany commander would command the detail on an R-1

from the regimental communications company. 10° The 

kilometers long. 

The only preparation that the troops had for the 

drawing their ammunition and cleaning their individua

served weapons. The drivers pulled maintenance on th

by themselves. 

My company commander decided to keep the conv

in one single column. He put a BTR in the lead of the 

two at the tail. He spaced the remaining BTRs between 

16 trucks in the convoy. Altogether, he committed seven 

mission. In the event that the mujahideen would attack 

rifle squad, each squad's BTR would pull over to the side 

from which the enemy was firing and return fire with all 

Thus, it would provide covering fire for the trucks drivin

kill zone. Once the convoy was clear, the BTRs would re

umn and reoccupy their positions in the march column

98V. I. Rovba served in the OKSVA from 1981 to 1983 as the p

of a motorized rifle platoon. He was awarded the medal "For 

99The 9th MRC, 3rd Battalion, 191st Separate Motorized R

(ed.). 

100The R-142 radio system is actually au R-130 shortwave rad

medium-range FM radios and one R-123 short-range FM radio 

a GAZ-66 truck. The R-142 can communicate over distance a

copter aviation (ed.). 
at 0600 hours and finally got started at 1030 hours. We 

the outskirts of Kabul for four hours waiting for all of the 

While we were waiting, individual Afghan trucks loaded 

and cargo continually passed by the entire convoy. 

81t

I ~ ~ 81t

I S.'l "--~'" I "-~ 

| ~ G

~ -'~'~--~-- 1S-

Map 35: Defeating an enemy attack on a convoy
and we relaxed our vigilance as we approached the post

pany commander's BTR and the truck with the R-142 ra

eled at the front of the column. Right behind them was 

towing a broken-down fuel truck. Once the entire c

flanked by the green zone, the enemy opened fire on th

cles with grenade launchers at a range of 25-to-30 mete

truck towing the other fuel truck was hit. Simultaneously

opened fire on the tail end of the convoy and knocked 

BTR with a RPG. 

The escort vehicles reacted as they had been b

returned fire. The track column began to drive out of t

while the enemy was rattled by the return fire. The com

mander radioed for air support and 30 minutes after the b

helicopter gunships arrived. They hit the enemy and su

motorized riflemen in their battle. The enemy ceased fir

to withdraw to fall-back positions. In this combat, we lost 

KIA and seven WIA. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: This vignette shows 

preparation for the convoy duty and further insufficient 

in its accomplishment. On the day before the mission, th

commander did not conduct training with his personne

training on coordination of actions in the event of enemy 

prolonged wait along the road side permitted the enem

study the convoy as he drove by the column. The use o

gunships to cover the column from the air did not come s

to ward off the enemy attack. Reconnaissance was not 

the course of the march. Nevertheless, the high psycholo

ration of the drivers and the selfless actions of the motori

diers allowed the column to rapidly exit the kill zone. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: In this vignette, the co

taken to task for not carefully supervising the prepara

troops for the march. Part of this criticism is based on lac
that his Soviet counterpart had to. This leaves more time 

fully planning the action. The Soviet system overburdened 

pany grade officers and limited individual training opportu

The mujahideen learned to take out command vehicle

the battle. Command vehicles were always distinguished 

antennae and convoy commanders usually rode in the first 

the main column. This is the case throughout this chapte

Soviet writings talk about strapping extra antennae on a

before going into action and varying the commander's posi

column. This did not happen. Consequently, when the 

der's vehicle was hit, communications were usually lost and 

mander, if he survived, could not control the fight. In thi

the essential communications were in a soft-bodied truck, 

an armored vehicle. The Soviets used radio almost excl

control the battle. Although the mujahideen had little jamm

bility, once they knocked out the Soviet vehicles with th

antennae, they usually had disrupted the tactical control n
Province at the end of October 1981. The enemy wo

diversionary attacks against Soviet bases, while simultaneo

to prevent the export of cotton from the cities of She

Imam-Sahib. 1 o2 

On 26 October 1981, I received an order to provide 

convoy of 70 trucks hauling cotton. My 7th Air Assaul

was to provide escort along the 114-kilometer route from 

to Shirkhan. My company had two air assault platoons an

forced with a mortar platoon, a machine-gun squad, and t

automatic grenade launchers mounted on BTR-D carrier

While preparing for the mission, I brought in all m

sergeants and drivers and we went over the route on a te

in detail. We developed several courses of action for eac

the event of an enemy attack on the column. In my forw

ty patrol, I had two BMDs l°a and a BTR-D mounting 

They moved at one-kilometer intervals in front of the ma

101A. M. Portnov served in the OKSVA from 1979 through 

assistant company commander of an air assault company and 

company commander of an air assault company. He was 

"Order of the Red Star" and the medal "For Military Valor". 

102Both cities bordered the Soviet Union and cotton was one 

modifies with which the Afghan government paid the Soviet 

for their aid. Afghan export of cotton to the Soviet Union sta

agreement in the 1930s in exchange for Soviet gasoline and m

goods. Cotton was only a small part of Afghan exports to p

arms. Natural gas, uranium, precious stones, fruit, and other re

also sent north (ed.). 

103BMD or boevaya raashina desanta is an air-dropable, armor

carrier that carries up to nine men (usually a maximum of seve

same turret as the BMP, so the BMD-1 has the 73mm ca

BMP-1, while the BMD-2 has the 30mm chain gun of the B

both mount three Z62mm machine guns. They were widely u

airborne and air assault forces (ed.). 
the forward security patrol with grenade launchers and 

command detonated mine. 104 The enemy was trying to 

bridge across the canal and the BTR-D that was on it. 

hoped to stop the convoy. Thanks to the skilled handling 

IMAM-SAHIB 

30k ms 

% 

h'~ "~, 

[~ Afghan PLT~ 

• Tdq; I 

2nd 

AAsI| P

f 

K~ADZHAG.4XZ") /--- ~ 

60 kms ~ / One.half Kilometer 

<C~]] S

..<~ S

.... 

,~.~ S

Map 36: The 7th Air Assault Company destroys the 
AGS-17 crew and the mortar platoon were sufficient to p

enemy and allow the Afghan police company to deploy. 

Having failed their mission, the enemy began to wit

prepared positions and came under fire from my platoon

encircled them from the rear. The trapped guerrilla forc

to resist and we destroyed them. I had one air ass

wounded in my company. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: Combat experience show

preparing for a march, it is necessary to conduct coord

only with your officers and sergeants, but with your armo

drivers as well. Your forward security patrol must not 

route reconnaissance mission, but must also be instructe

actions to take when necessary in order to fight in coord

the rest of the subunits. When combat is joined, it is n

maneuver subunits boldly to take the enemy on the flan

rear. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: The column deployed 

security patrol, but their reconnaissance effort seem

Although they went over the route on a terrain model, it 

simple map reconnaissance was neglected and choke 

potential kill zones were not identified and planned for. 

is an obvious chokepoint and a place for a reconnaissan

to dismount and check for mines. Flank security is neve

and evidently seldom deployed. 

104The Russian here is fugas, similar to the western word fo

Russian term means a large explosive charge buried in the gro

ered with rocks and debris. The western term describes a fl

that is a buried 55-gallon drum of thickened gasoline with 

explosive charge at the base (ed.). 
aog te ee, Sebega, doy, aaa oute. 

Ocularly difficult in the region of Daulatabad. Intelligen

indicated that a guerrilla force of 2540-30 men armed 

operated in this area. Acting secretly, the enemy would at

gle vehicle or column. Their goal was to paralyze resupp

area. 

On 2 December 1981, the 2nd Reconnaissance Compa

was garrisoned in Maimana, was ordered to escort a 120-v

voy loaded with supplies from Andkhoy to Maimana. Th

was 110 kilometers. The company reinforcements include

squad, a flamethrower squad armed with the RPO flamet

ZSU-23-4 self-propelled air defense gun, and a BTS-4 to

cle.106 

We had two days to prepare for the mission. During th

studied data which we received from the high comm

resolved issues of rear support and maintenance support. 

particular attention to readying the vehicles for the mar

preparing our weapons for combat. The troops drew r

ammunition. 

The convoy commander was the deputy commander o

SNAZ detachment, N. Beksultanov. He decided to co

march from Maimana to Andkhoy on a single route and pr

with a forward security patrol. At 0500 hours on 4 Dece

column moved out and 11 hours later closed into the asse

some three kilometers northeast of Andkhoy. The truc

already loaded with supplies, joined us. We then had to a

march column, distribute our combat power throughout th

105A. A. Agzamov served in the OKSVA from 1981 through 

commander of a reconnaissance group of a reconnaissance com

was awarded the "Order of the Red Star". 

106Th e BTS-4 bronirosanyy tyagach sredniy is a turretless T-55 tan

for towing tracked vehicles (ed.). 
By 0900, the forward patrol reached the village of Daulata

reported back that the village was deserted. This report pu

guard, and the convoy commander ordered us to increase 

vation. When the lead vehicles of the convoy beg

ANDKHOY 

2 MI-24 

P 

[] ;'" 

2 MI-24 

"AIMAr,'.4 [ I I 

30 kms I One-half Kilometer 

. 

~' ...... 

Map 37: Defeating an enemy attack in a village
tions. We returned fire, but it was not controlled or dire

convoy commander lost control over his subunits since h

nications were gone. Individual vehicles independent

break out of the kill zones. The FAC called in helicopte

and directed their fires. The helicopters began gun ru

enemy in the village. In the meantime, the trail platoon re

mission to sweep the western part of the village. The d

troopers moved under the cover of BMP and helicopter f

out their mission. The enemy withdrew when faced with th

action. 

In the course of this three-hour battle, four of our sol

killed (all drivers), six were wounded, three BMPs were 

and five trucks were burned up. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: This example shows poo

making, inadequate preparation for battle and inadequate 

trol during the course of the battle. None of the co

involved had been briefed on the probable sites of enem

and the likely enemy courses of action. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: In this vignette, the reco

reports that all the people in a village, which is a traditio

spot, have left. This leads to increased observation, but the 

der does not dismount a force and have them probe the 

ambushes. This appears to demonstrate a basic lack of fie

the part of the commander. 

Again, the company commander muddles through a 

battle with a lightly-armed platoon and only manages t

himself when airpower is brought to bear. There seems to 

reluctance to dismount and close with the enemy. There 

reliance on firepower. 

107Th e BMP-2KSH is the the command version of the BMP-2 

On the llth of December 1982, the commander 

Motorized Rifle Company received orders to escort a truc

from Ghazni to Kabul and return. 109 They were to insure 

peded movement of the convoy in both directions on th

meter stretch. 

The road march to Kabul went as planned and the ene

try to attack the convoy. After loading the trucks, we were 

for our return trip to Ghazni. My company commander 

place two BTRs at the head and two BTRs at the tail of t

and then intersperse five BTRs within the truck column. 

BTR between every eight trucks. He had the 1st MRP 

reconnaissance platoon and move ten kilometers in front 

voy. The average road speed of the convoy would be 354

ters per hour. There would be one rest stop at the end of t

driving. 

In case the enemy would attack the column with smal

BTRs and helicopter gunships would place maximum fn

the enemy while the convoy moved out of the kill zone. 

ant, should the terrain permit, the BTRs would roll righ

ambush sites of the attacking enemy. 

At 0730 hours on 13 December, my company comma

the order and the convoy moved out. After 30 minutes of 

of our heavy-transport trucks broke down. My company 

der had another transport truck link up with this vehicle 

right behind his command BTR at the front of the column

hours, the lead vehicles of the main body approached the 

near the village of Maliykhel'. As the vehicles crossed 

108A. I. Guboglo served in the OKSVA from 1981 to 1983 as 

rifle platoon leader. He was awarded the "Order of the Red S

medal "For Valor". 

109The 7th MRC, 3rd MRB, 191st Separate Motorized Rifl

(ed.). 
the bridge site through a gully. However, the enemy had 

exit from the gully. The 2nd platoon's lead BTR h

Attempts to extricate this BTR failed, and while they w

another BTR hit another mine. Taking stock of his i

"¢,. 

/ 

I 

/ 

I 

I 

t 

/ 

/ 

S" 

/ 

s 

4 

J 

NAMELES~ 

One-fourth Kilometer 

2nd MRP 

MI-24 

Ma©hlnegUn~ " 

Grenade Lauhchor 

Plaloon ( 

s 

/ ~.A~ I ~ 

• 

,•..•

Map 38: The 7th MRC defeats an attack. 
and hill 1760 was ours. 

During this time, our force continued attempts to reta

and move the convoy to a safe place. However, due to 

fire from "Nameless" mountain, we were unsucce

approaches to the mountain were wide-open and a flan

did not appear possible. Despite our heavy small arms an

plus the repeated gun runs by helicopter gunships on the 

were not able to take it. 

Finally, the company commander's radio requests res

additional flight of helicopter gunships. The commander 

attack the enemy with the 1st platoon, which had origina

the recon platoon. At 1240 hours, the 1st platoon attack

supported by fire from the machine-gun/grenade-launch

and a flight of helicopter gunships. It took the hill. The co

now resume its march. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: This vignette shows that 

necessary to "wargame" several variants for your subu

event of an enemy attack. Further, sapper subunits should 

a part of a convoy escort along with the motorized rifle f

again we see how good combat training of the troops lead

in battle, regardless of how difficult the situation is. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: The companies in this v

the first vignette in the chapter (#35) are from the sam

There is a year's difference between the two incidents. It w

reasonable to check for improvements and a learning cu

appears to have some tactical improvements made in this 

force now moves with a reconnaissance force forward and 

responsive air cover. But, the commander still rides in th

cle, bridges are not checked for mines, and likely ambu

not probed by dismounted forces. Broken-down convoy 

still towed at the front of the column right behind the com
convoys with mines during the early stage of the war and

progressed, they began to conduct full-scale attacks on co

these examples are from 1981 or 1982-the early stage of t

yet, the mujahideen seem well advanced in convoy att

point. In these vignettes, however, the Soviets are not 

that are standard in western armies. There seems to b

opening force on these routes. Evidently, there are no 

hunt" decoy convoys. Rapid reaction forces supporting 

escorts are not apparent. There is no evidence of any plan

airmobile forces on likely guerrilla escape routes. Artille

port planning also seems absent. These examples fail to 

and terrain work to identify chokepoints, kill zones and a

in advance. Reconnaissance forces seem road-bound. 

appears passive and reactive. 
Combat experience in Afghanistan shows that not o

ambush an accepted form of reconnaissance, but it is also o

more widely used methods of combat practiced in the 

responsibility of regimental-sized and division-size

Reconnaissance, air-assault, airborne, and SPETSNAZ sub

tinely conduct ambushes and motorized rifle subunits may 

duct them once they receive special training. 

Ambushes are widely employed in all types of comba

conditioned by the fact that the tactics of the guerrilla fo

very different from those of regular forces and more close

bled those of partisan warfare. Therefore, it was necessary 

forces to find more effective ways of combatting the mujahid

these circumstances. 
its new base camp in March 1981.111 Its movement w

from the air by a squadron of helicopter gunships. At the 

the squadron began reconnaissance of enemy forces lo

the Kandahar-Shindand road. 

The squadron commander reported that at 1820 ho

convoy carrying supplies entered Musa-Kala village. Furt

ber of enemy was concentrated at Musa-Kala, which is lo

20 kilometers from Kandahar. The brigade intelligence 

confirmed this information. 

We could not waste any time. The village of Musa-K

ed close to the border with Pakistan and was a rest stop 

ing point for the rnujahideen bases. Weapons and ammu

brought through this village for distribution throughout 

Our brigade commander, LTC Yu. P. Shatin, devised th

plan. He would seal off the village from the north and th

with two motorized rifle battalions. Then he would 

assault battalion and some Afghan Army subunits to sw

lage. At the same time, in order to halt the northwest m

the enemy convoy, he would fly a reinforced motorized 

ny ahead of the convoy to establish an ambush. 

My battalion commander, S. V. Antonov, designa

Motorized Rifle Company as the ambush company. I w

Lieutenant at the time and the company commander. 

commander personally gave me my mission. My co

three motorized rifle platoons. The brigade commande

my company with three AGS-17 automatic grenade lau

their crews, three sappers with twenty mines, and two RT

110V. I. Pavlenko served in the OKSVA from 1980 throug

motorized rifle company commander. He was awarded the 

Bravery". [This medal was given to enlisted men and junio

only (ed.).] 

111The 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (ed.). 
assembled my company at the rally point which was l

meters from the LZ. We waited for the cover of darkn

moving out. I pushed out a patrol squad in front of the c

had each platoon split into two groups and move side-by

[] [] ( [] MVSA-XALA 

v • s ~ § ! l /, 

MRS 

3rd MRP 

0430 

MAR 81 

2nd MRP (-) 

0430 

MAR 81 

0430 

MAR 81 

One.fourth Kilometer 

Map 39: An ambush in Kandahar Province. 
I put my platoons and squads into position. I place

block the entrance and exit to the ambush site and conce

bulk of my force in the center of the ambush site. All-aro

vation was maintained on the site entrance and exit while 

dug in and fortified their firing positions and then camoufl

The sappers mined the road at the ambush site. By 0430 

company ambush was ready. 

At 0500 hours, brigade subunits sealed off the villag

Kala and began the sweep at 0530. The enemy, shoo

Soviet forces in the village in order to slow them down

ammunition-truck convoy on the road and headed t

ambush. At 0620 hours, my sentry reported that five t

approaching the site. The trucks entered the site and the 

hit a mine. The 1st and 3rd platoons immediately opened 

enemy. Two trucks turned around and tried to leave. We 

with a command detonated mine and the 2nd platoon 

other. The enemy was confused and his return fire was w

organized. Some of the mujahideen tried to break out, but w

down. The battle was short. 

The results of our ambush were 26 enemy killed a

tured. Eight of the captives were wounded. We destroyed 

loaded with ammunition and food. I lost one soldier KI

WIA. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: The success of this c

determined by the rapid decision to employ the ambush

time taken to organize the action; the rapid, concealed 

into the ambush site; the initiative and bravery displayed 

manders, the uninterrupted control of the subunits and 

and the support and continual coordination with the subu

were carrying out the block and sweep of the village. 
the Soviets lost one killed and five wounded. Some of th

casualties may have been from fratricide. Further, if the 

had entered the ambush at night, the force on the low grou

have fired into the force on the high ground, since nigh

inevitably high unless bars and elevation blocks are con

each firing position. These field firing aids are hard to put 

Although this ambush worked, there are still some tro

details. There was apparently no control on traffic enteri

zone from the west and inadvertently setting off a mine, s

ambush. Further, the use of conventional mines on the 

control away from the ambush commander. If the muja

sent a patrol vehicle ahead of the main convoy, it might 

gered a mine and ruined the ambush. Command-detona

seem appropriate here. 
commander decided to establish ambushes along the 

that these armament caravans would travel. 113 In Ju

battalion commander ordered me to prepare a reconnais

I had 10 days to select and prepare a 20-man group 

sion. I selected battalion officers, sergeants and soldiers 

exceptional physical shape, and had combat experience

consisted of two officers, a warrant officer, five sergeant

diers. The soldiers included two RTOs, two sappers, a m

interpreter. I also received an officer from the Afghan 

accompany the mission. 

My group's equipment included six machine guns

assault rifles, and an AKMS automatic rifle with a silenc

ded two combat loads per weapon, four hand grenades p

RPG-18 antitank weapons, five mines, seven radios (tw

could link with helicopters), seven pair of binoculars

vision device, and a flak jacket for every man. The grou

ouflage smocks and tennis shoes. 

Our target was a bridge over which, according to A

terintelligence, enemy trucks, motorcycles and tractors 

on previous nights. At the end of July 1982, my group b

Mi-8TV helicopters. We were inserted some five kilomet

bridge one hour prior to sunset. Four Mi-24 helicopter g

ered our insertion. The insertion was timed to allow the 

to return to the battalion base camp during daylight. W

darkness and then moved stealthily to the bridge. My p

112V. p. Gladishev served in the OKSVA from February 1982 

1984. He served as the deputy commander and then the com

airborne battalion. He was awarded the "Order of the Red S

113Th e 103rd Airborne Division (ed.). 
group. By 2130 hours, my ambush was established and m

were ready for battle. 

Every 15-20 minutes, the enemy sentries would signal 

villages with some flashlight signals. From this, I under

IN B 

AN O VA 

~ 3102 

Snatch 

Fire Su

Suppo

a=my | ~ k 5 

14 JUg[ t 

F ~ ¢S 

nUn N, 

One.fourth 

Map 40: An airborne group ambushes a bridge s
my security force threw grenades into the enemy OP. 

The enemy never got a shot off and it was all over i

minutes. The enemy was completely destroyed. Afte

group and the fire support group ceased fire, we gath

weapons, ammunition and documents. We killed 28 

tured 32 weapons of varying types as well as their ammun

no casualties. We quickly reassembled and moved out to 

zone. The helicopters had us back to our base camp by 

From the end of July to the end of September, we c

similar ambushes. We had positive results from 14 of th

this time, we had three soldiers wounded. Our ambush 

approximately 200 mujahideen and captured about 20. 

approximately 200 various weapons, a large amount of 

and a large sum of money. There were about 50,000

rials, Pakistani rupees and Atghanistan afghans. This 

destined to pay for their Iranian and Pakistani advisers. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: The successful accompli

these ambushes was due to the careful selection of the p

the mission, the well-thought-out training, the clearly d

during the organization of the ambushes, the detailed 

between the subgroups, the superb physical conditio

troopers and the use of specialized clothing and shoes. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: The Soviets did no

integrity to the same degree as in the west. Time and a

units are assembled without any apparent regard for mai

integrity and habitual relationships. This ambush group 

endy drawn from throughout the battalion. 
gppg

talion's area of responsibility, bringing fuel from the US

Republic of Afghanistan. The battalion's mission was 

attacks on the pipeline, insure the uninterrupted moveme

convoys, and to safeguard and defend important facilities 

area of responsibility. 

In April 1984, the city of Aibak was subjected to 

enemy mortar fire. Their main target was the 9th Motor

Company which was garrisoned there. The constant enem

interfered with the company's ability to perform its mis

damaged civilian property and created panic. We tried 

the enemy with our artillery, but these attempts failed. T

knew his terrain like the back of his hand. He would fire fi

mortar rounds and then change firing positions so that he 

be caught under our return fire. 

Agent intelligence reported that the group of eight-t

who conducted the mortar attacks on Aibak had left for the 

Kakabulak to rest and replenish their ammunition supply. 

would be resting there for two days. We knew the rout

raujahideen would use. The 3rd MRB commander decided 

this route with a platoon backed by the rest of the 8th MR

The battalion commander decided to establish an amb

night before the mujahideen returned west. The 8th MRC

on BTRs, would support the ambush site with direct fire if 

and would provide the ambush platoon. The ambush plat

be reinforced with an AGS-17. In order to deceive the e

conducted our reconnaissance in the Aibak area and coord

actions with the Afghan subunits. 

The ambush platoon's mission was to dismount fro

114V. N. Popov served in the OKSVA from February 1984 thro

1986 as the assistant to the chief of staff of a motorized rifle batt

115Th e 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion, 12End Motorized Rifle 

201st Motorized Rifle Division (ed.). 
for the mission on a piece of ground that was similar t

ambush site. On the first day of training, several alterna

action were devised depending on the way that the muja

approach the ambush site. In the event that the enemy 

LEGEND 

MUJAHIDE

MUJAHIDEE

DISMOUNT 

PATROL R

X i > 

3rd MRB KAZLAN! 

~ TOLA~~ GA CHI 

8~ MRC [] 

IBII ' 

!111 / 

Map 41: A motorized rifle platoon conducts an am
bat. In the afternoon, the platoon rejoined the 8th MRC. 

The platoon moved to the ambush area on two BTP, s 

MRC. We normally used two BTRs for conducting road p

2100, the bronegruppa set out on patrol. At 2230 hours, as 

was coming to an end, the personnel of the ambush gro

jumping out of the moving BTRs. They lay spread out 

along a 500 meters stretch of the road waiting for the plato

signal. They lay there for 30 minutes until the platoon le

that they had not been discovered. Then he gave the sig

platoon to assemble. He sent out two patrols in front of t

and they all moved to the ambush site. The platoon took 

to get to the site. At 0230 hours, they arrived at the site s

kilometers east of Tolagachi. After putting his platoon int

ing positions, the platoon leader fme-tuned the mission

group on the ground. At the appointed time, the plato

"broke squelch" twice on his radio set to signal the batta

mander that the ambush was ready for battle. 

At 0500, we saw the enemy approach. The platoon 

their forward patrol pass through the site and waited for 

body. When the main body came into the kill zone, we 

and demanded that they surrender. The mujahideen did n

der, but began firing small arms at us. Their fire was int

battle began. The platoon leader immediately reported th

the battalion commander by radio. The battalion chief 

the 8th MRC to blocking positions to prevent the enemy 

al and to support the ambush party. As the fire fight 

mujahideen realized that they were in a trap and tried to b

the encirclement. However, the 8th MRC arrived at that 

blocked their exit route. Close coordination between th

party and their supporting MRC insured that the enem

escape. 

We killed 14 enemy and captured four more. We als

three mortars, plus small arms and ammunition. We had t
force than they expected. Further, it is not always a g

demand that your enemy surrender. Surprise, sudden

fire demoralizes an enemy and significantly lessens your 

ties. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: The platoon's mission 

capture the enemy force. Why they would challenge th

demand their surrender is puzzling. Their specific mis

require prisoners, and yet, if they wanted prisoners, co

ence shows that there are usually prisoners (wounded o

left at the end of any ambush. There seems to be no re

lenge the enemy and lose surprise. To challenge a force t

ly equal in size seems foolhardy and a risk to your own 
population, torched schools and attempted to seize Kand

The 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of a separate mot

brigade was garrisoned in the city of Kandahar. 117 Th

was the most experienced and combat-hardened sub

brigade and had participated in all the brigade operation

talion was particularly skilled in ambush techniques and 

adept at moving to the ambush site on helicopters or on o

BMPs. 

We prepared for ambushes in a very exacting and tho

ion. We would prepare and check our personnel, their w

gear, and the night-vision devices. In the event that t

would involve a helicopter insertion, the battalion comma

chief of staff would personally train the ambush party. W

the soldiers and sergeants for our helicopter-borne amb

based on their superior physical conditioning, their com

ence, and their skill with various types of weapons and c

tions equipment. When we travelled to the ambush 

BMPs, we took everyone in the subunit. 

On 12 June 1984, my fuUy-equipped motorized rifl

moved on BMPs to the Loy-Karez region to conduct 

Captain V. Patrushev, the battalion chief of staff, was in c

mission. My company was divided into four ambush gr

of these groups moved to a small river to block a fordin

ambush group commander gave his orders, organized h

and put the rest of the soldiers to work digging their firin

After 0200 hours on 13 June, the look-outs spotted 

lights as a truck drove down from the heights. In a few 

116A. V. Van'yants served in the OKSVA from 1982 to 1984 

leader and company commander and from 1987 to 1988 as a b

of staff. He was awarded the "Order of the Red Star". 

117Th e 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (ed.). 
y 

away from the ambush site and unable to provide fire su

At dawn, the ambush party arrived at the compan

Map 42: A MRC conducts an ambush near Loy-K

12-13 June 1984. 
cans, cigarette butts and empty cigarette packages. Appa

mujahideen thought that only 10-to-15 men were in the are

I ordered one of my platoons to deploy near the compa

bly area in ambush and prepare for battle. I ordered the 

platoons to move stealthily to the flanks of the mujahidee

terrain folds to hide their movement. We waited for the 

move onto the large plain on the valley floor, so we could 

the encirclement. At the right moment, I called for a pa

copter gunships to come to our assistance and gave the ord

fire. 

We killed 28 mujahideen, and captured 32 weapons, 

three grenade launchers. We also captured valuable docu

Islamic official seals. My company had no casualties. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: The ambush was success

following reasons: the thorough reconnaissance of the en

and terrain; the precise planning of the group's actions; 

siting of the company in ambush using the terrain features

terrupted and resolute control of the subunits during the 

the support of helicopter gunships. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: The Soviet Army seld

clean bivouac area or fighting position. They dug field la

the troops were as likely to defecate and urinate around th

to use the latrines. Trash was strewn everywhere. Appa

sloppiness extended to their ambush sites and alerted the 

to their presence. In this case, however, there apparentl

enough trash to reveal the true size of the ambush force an

pany commander turned this to his advantage. 

More disturbing than the trash is the fact that the am

was smoking in position. Even if the smokers were smoki

poncho or tarp, cigarette smell carries-particularly in th

cooler night air. Russian cigarettes are strong and pung
fered. 
y 

Based on intelligence reports furnished by the Afghan K

battalion commander decided to employ ambushes to 

enemy. 

My ambush party was returning to our base camp by 

after conducting an ambush along the border. As we flew 

Helmand River, I discovered a road that skirted the green 

river. We dropped down to five-or-10 meters off the deck 

noticed fresh truck tracks. When we got back to our ba

rest, I received information that a truck-mounted guerri

about 50 men had arrived in our AO. I went to the batt

mander and suggested that I set up an ambush on the ne

ered road. 

My battalion commander told me to conduct an amb

area from 3 to 10 December 1984. My ambush party con

men, two of which were officers. The force had three sq

of which consisted of the squad leader and two three-man 

I picked out my ambush site independently as we 

area. The helicopters faked insertions at one false airhea

phony LZs-one LZ some 10-to-20 kilometers away from 

the other five to six kilometers away from it. We landed b

ness. 

I had rations and water for 10 days. We took two d

with us and buried and concealed the rest. Each man ca

40 kilograms of equipment. When night fell, we mo

ambush site. When we came to the road, I personally s

firing positions, organized sectors of fire, and specified ho

tions were to be protected and concealed. Every soldier d

firing position. They hauled the dirt away to a depression

engineers laid in a mine field, using trip-wire and MON

118A. A. Tolkachev served in the OKSVA from May 1983 t

1985 as an airborne company commander. He was awarded th

the Red Banner". 
Map 43: Airborne platoon ambush in Helmand pro

119Th e MON (minna oskolochnaya napravlenogo deistvie) series 

directional, anti-personnel mines similar to the U.S. claymore 

can be set to detonate from a trip-wire or with a firing device 
On the next day, a shepherd drove a large herd of shee

the area between the green zone and our minefield. Later, 

with three camels came through. Neither man discov

ambush. I fed my force twice a day in the "day lager" loca

depression. They received a meal in the morning when t

off ambush and in the evening before they went back to t

tions. I gave each soldier a liter of water every 24 hours. 

happened during the first two nights. The next morning, 

platoon leader with several soldiers to our rations and wate

replenish our on-site supply. 

On 5 and 6 December, we had a sand storm, but fina

evening of the 6th, the wind calmed down. Suddenly on th

6 and 7 December, we heard the sounds of truck engines. 

command "To Battle". The men got their weapons ready an

their RPG-18s. After 30 minutes, three ZIL-130 h

trucks 120 and two light-trucks approached the site. Their l

off. When all the trucks were in the kill zone, I detonated t

which was the signal to open fire. The platoon leader a

trolled the fire and used illumination flares and tracer 

adjust and shift the fire. All the trucks were hit by RPG- 18 

arms ture within the first minute. One truck, which had tri

around and exit the ambush was destroyed by a mine. T

personnel were surrounded by burning, exploding am

When they tried to get away from it, we cut them down

action, the enemy lost 44 KIA and three truck-loads of 

ammunition and gear. My group had no casualties. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: The airborne subunit enj

cess as a result of the correct, skillful organization of the am

120The ZIL-130 is a 150 horsepower, 4x2 Soviet truck that cou

tons (ed.). 
tine for four days before they had contact. Local inhab

been through the area, and although the commander wa

they had not been detected, that possibility existed. Is it a 

to remain in the same position for so long, or is this a g

set up a force for counter-ambush? 
of Kabul, Kandahar and Takhar. Caravans moved 

amounts of arms, ammunition and war supplies from Pak

guerrilla forces. In order to stop this anti-government act

mujahideen, the high command decided to conduct amb

areas of responsibility. 

I was the commander of an airborne battalion. Togeth

battalion chief of staff and my battalion chief of reconn

received our orders to conduct ambushes. We worked to p

subunits and to prepare an ambush plan in an organized 

A guerrilla force was active in the battalion AOR. Ou

centered on the village of Surubi, some 50 kilometers ea

on the Kabul-Jalalabad highway. The guerrillas kept pres

local populace by forcibly kidnapping them and takin

Pakistan, attacking government officials, blowing up ele

lines, attacking convoys, and shelling our base camps w

bombs. KHAD intelligence, with whom we maintained 

tact, reported the movement of weapons caravans from 

the Panjsher Valley. Their reports described how thes

passed through the battalion AOR. Further KHAD report

how the mujahideen routinely came from Dzhigdalay to 

scout our garrison and commit acts of terror. 

I decided to conduct ambushes on possible mujah

located five kilometers northwest of Surubi. I selected th

reconnaissance platoon, an airborne platoon, and engi

and an AGS-17 crew for the ambush. This was a total am

of 23 personnel. We trained the force to react to all possi

scenarios. We prepared the force in secret, under the guis

training. Self-propelled mortars would support the ambu

At dusk one evening in the second half of Decembe

forced reconnaissance platoon, commanded by Cap

Bobrov, moved to the ambush site. There was difficult

1211. V. Solonin served in the OKSVA from 1985 to 1987 as t

der of an airborne battalion. 
"3- ~i ,NF..T.. 

J;. ..... - 

~ ~ ..... .....'"""'" 

// ~J .. SUB-UNIT 

am Be I ~¢. APPROA

m I ~" TO AMBU

m -- ........ I , I.---~~..W_$.L_.ROU2 

JEGDALEY ' One-half Kilometer i ....... FROM AM

Map 44: Reconnaissance platoon ambush northwest of 

122The Aighan Army 14th Infantry Brigade and the Afghan 4t

Brigade (ed.). 
Nothing happened the first night. During the day, th

were concealed in a hide position and only lookouts s

fighting positions. Additionally, the battalion OP on h

vided warning. 

When night fell again, the ambush party reoccupie

tions. At 2345 hours, the ambush party saw a dar

approach on the path from Jegdaley. They let him p

since they thought that he was a patrol. This was a var

had considered and trained against. The man returned 

peared back down the path toJegdaley. At 0300 hours, 

party saw 11 armed men approach. The platoon leade

capture the force. The force entered the kill zone, and 

intense fight, five mujahideen were killed and six were ca

ambush party quickly started to withdrew by a different p

time, all the Afghan Army security posts were notified th

naissance platoon was returning through their positio

hours, the platoon returned to the battalion base camp. 

casualties. 

When the captured mujahideen were interrogated, the

a large weapons and ammunition cache in Surubi. Furth

oners gave us information which allowed us to preven

against the Surubi hydroelectric station. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: This combat experienc

conducting a successful ambush is very hard work. Up t

ambushes were without result. There were several reas

First, our units did not always get to the ambush site 

Second, the high command issued regulations on amb

specified that no fewer than 25 men had to go on every 

that every ambush must contain heavy crew-served weap

precautions were not always justified. The compositi

ambush party depended on the actual situation. Third

require an inordinate number of radio reports-depar
that they were uncomfortable and inhibited movement. A

are totally unsuited for ambushes. They are uncomforta

heavy for mountain climbing and the mujahideen could re

mine our ambush sites from our boot tracks. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: The Soviets and Afgh

ment forces apparently did little to contest the raujahidee

of the night. Night patrols and ambushes were a singu

event, not a routine mission. Battalions and companies 

their bunkers at their base camps at night for prote

mujahideen mortar and rocket attacks. Consequently, muj

ply caravans routinely passed by base camps unmoleste

sized ambushes were prohibited by 40th Army regulation

toon-sized ambush is frequently too cumbersome. The 

not "allow squad-sized ambushes in Afghanistan since t

were not professional and perhaps not trusted. Yet, 

ambushes, as well as platoon-sized ambushes, were part 

ing program for Soviet forces not deployed in Afgha

Afghanistan, two officers usually accompanied every am

successful ambush still did not accomplish its mission-th

tion of supply caravans from Pakistan. 

Two Vietnam innovations, the mechanical ambush an

mores and grenades only" ambush are not mentioned. T

ical ambush, which uses claymore mines rigged with trip 

control from the ambush-site commander, but leaves t

party undetected. The "command-detonated clay

grenades only" ambush gives the commander control and 

ambush party undetected until the ambush party resor

arms fire. The Soviets apparently did not employ these 

The Soviet desire for positive control at all times did 

unnecessary number of radio reports. Radio security was 

practiced and when traffic was encoded, it was often slo

As a result, the mujahideen were sometimes able to determ

activities or intentions from radio traffic. 
and ammunition in his bases near Ishkamesh, located so

meters southeast of Kunduz. These armaments were in

use by rnujahideen subunits in the green zones of Ku

Khanabad. We received intelligence reports that four ca

rying weapons and ammunition arrived at these bases in 

of March. 

After the arrival of these caravans in the enemy stagin

radio interceptors began monitoring a wide range of radi

the short wave and ultra-short wave bands. The radio 

encrypted in four-letter code groups. Part of the encoded 

was broken by a higher headquarters. From a deciphere

we determined that the enemy would transport arms an

tion to Kunduz at the end of March, start of April. Ba

information, the division commander decided to conduc

utilizing our separate reconnaissance battalion. 124 

Preparations for the ambush began when the comma

1st Reconnaissance Company and the commander of the 

Electronics Reconnaissance Company received their or

reconnaissance company commander was given the a

future action, the mission, the composition of the ambush 

reinforcements and the sequence of events for preparing h

the ambush. The commander of the radio and electro

naissance company was ordered to increase his radio-inter

in the direction of Khanabad and Ishkamesh and det

enemy radio-traffic pattern during movement of caravan

The reconnaissance company commander and his pl

ers rode to an outpost which was located five kilometer

123A. M. Tangaev served in the OKSVA from 1985 to 1987 a

assistant to the chief of division reconnaissance. He was decora

"Order of the Red Star", the order "For Service to the Fathe

Armed Forces" Third Class, and the Republic of Mghanistan

the Star" Second Class. 

124The 201st MRD (ed.). 
ic tactical exercise on terrain similar to that of the ambu

The troops cleaned their weapons and drew ammunition 

plies for the ambush. On 2 April, the company stood a f

out inspection to check the company's readiness for the am

Radio-intercept and agent reconnaissance reported 

enemy moved a caravan from Ishkamesh to Khanabad fro

2200 hours on 2 April. The division chief of reconnaissa

time to be ready to leave on ambush-1800 hours on 3 Ap

The concept of the ambush was as follows: 

Reconnaissance Company would move out secretly at nig

April to some ruins. They would establish two OPs and c

company. During the day, they would be in radio contac

battalion, the radio and electronics reconnaissance compa

mortar battery. The company bronecruppa would move 

lager ready to advance rapidly to the ambush site and give 

port. Then, on the evening of 4 April, the company wou

occupy its firing positions and prepare to ambush the ene

would wait for a signal from the reconnaissance chief or t

ny commander of the radio and electronics reconnaissance 

that the enemy had started to move a convoy. They would 

enemy forward security patrol to pass through the ambush 

destroy the main body. When the lrronegruppa arrived, th

party would withdraw from the ambush site, mount the c

ride back to the base camp. There were 23 men in the amb

They carried three PK general-purpose machine guns, t

light machine guns, one 12.7 mm utes heavy machine gun 

AK-74 assault rifles, and five mines. The bronegruppa consi

BRDM and three BMP-2s. A mortar battery supported t

ny. 

125Th e systematic tactical exercise [taktiko-stroevoe z.anyatie] was 

cise by elements, in which the event was rehearsed step-by-st

gressed on as each step was mastered. 
At 0530 hours on the 4th of April, radio interceptors 

radio transmitter in Ishkamesh talking to a radio tra

Khanabad. Traffic pattern analysis indicated the enemy 

Map 45: Recon company ambush using radio-interc

in the area of Khanabad. 
later, a division OP reported that a truck had entered t

with its lights on. He let it pass. Twenty minutes later, 

roared into the ambush area at the maximum possible 

they entered the kill zone, the company commander d

mine which was the signal for the support group to open 

destroyed both trucks. At the commanders' signal, the sn

then moved into the kill zone to inspect the trucks and p

weapons and ammunition. As the bronegruppa approa

ambush party discovered a pocket of enemy who we

toward the ambush. The ambush force cut down part of 

and the armored vehicle fire cut down the rest. The com

moved back to the mount-up site, loaded onto the carrier

back to our base camp. 

Our ambush killed 12 mujahideen, and destroyed two 

captured a lot of weapons and ammunition. The reco

company had one soldier wounded. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: The success of this ambu

to the following factors: the use of intelligence generate

intercept; the undetected deployment to the ambush site

organized ambush on unfamiliar ground; the excellent em

of OPs, a support group, and a snatch group; the use of su

the excellent combat training of the personnel. Further e

of the vignette, however, shows that the company comma

not adjust mortar fire effectively. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: This is the second exam

use of a bronegruppa in an ambush. In the first example (V

the bronegruppa sneaks the ambush party closer to the am

Then, the rest of the company mounts these vehicles. L

the Soviets spring the ambush, this mounted company dr

ambush site to support by fire and cut off the enemy esca
radio traffic. This emphasizes the importance that the 

command placed on intercepting the mujahideen LOCs. 
conducted by our separate motorized rifle battalion in o

Kunar Province were successful. 127 The mujahideen h

appreciable losses which were causing him to improve hi

moving munitions and armaments by caravan. 

Beginning in 1986, Soviet ambushes that had conta

enemy noticed that the mujahideen had noticeably beefed 

ward security element on his caravans and their ac

ambushed had become more precise. When the raujahid

our ambush force, his counteraction took two form

mujahideen had superiority in personnel and weaponry, h

to flank the Soviet ambush force and destroy it from the fl

If the mujahideen lacked superiority, then, as a rule, the

around the ambush site using an alternate route leading t

We learned that platoon-sized ambushes were pointle

er ambush required a motorized rifle company, reinfor

sapper subunit and supported by artillery fire. 

On the morning of 2 October, the 2nd MRC comm

directed to interdict the flow of mujahideen caravans alon

some 25 kilometers northwest of Jalalabad. The compa

men, 12 BTRs, and its TO&E weaponry. An artillery ba

support the company. The company would move to the a

in two stages. The dismounted company would hitchhike 

126V. P. Podvorniy served in the OKSVA from March 1985 thr

1986 as the senior assistant to the chief of the operations sectio

rate motorized rifle battalion. He was awarded the "Order of th

[An operations section at the battalion level is remarkable. Th

been a particular feature of this battalion (ed.)]. 

127This is probably the 2nd MRB of the 66th Separate Mo

Brigade. The 2nd MRB was 

garrisoned in Asadabad, Kunar Province some 70 kilomete

brigade headquarters in Jalalabad, Nangahar Province. The 

has the unit located in Kandahar Province. This must be a ty

error, since this would require a company road march of some 
tion (one of these loads would stay on the BTRs), and th

dry rations. They had to be ready to deploy by 050

October. 

LE~ GEN

(~, ~ ENEMYRouTEA

~ COMPANY 

• RO

VE.,CLE M

O,.T 

" /j.. 

Caravan at 040500 OCT 

' % 

3rd MRP ~, 

3rd SQ

4th MR

040030 OCT 

% 

% 

I One-

Map 46: Ambush by a reinforced MRC supporte

by an artillery battery 
The training included: the organization of combat; perso

ing in weaponry and mission accomplishment; political-

work; and practical work by the battalion commander, h

and the chief of the operations section. 

The organization for combat included: the company 

der's decision and his briefing it to the battalion command

orders to the platoon leaders; and working out coordinatio

rain model. Company preparations included: studying th

area of combat; training in the applications of tactical f

and engineering relevant to mission accomplishment; 

radio checks to insure that the radio sets were working; ch

night-vision devices; resting the personnel; and reporting 

talion commander that the company was ready. 

The battalion commander, his deputies and his chiefs 

approved the company commander's plan; assisted in co

with the artillery battery and the supply and maintenance 

the company; issued the battalion order to the company f

and conducted a filll lay-down inspection of the company 

readiness for combat. 

At 0600 hours on 3 October, the company moved o

with the convoy to the outpost. When night fell, the 

moved out by dismounted platoons to the ambush site

hours, they were in ambush positions with overlapping 

connected fields of fire. Their flanks and gaps were c

minefields. 

At 0300 hours 4 October, the forward security p

mujahideen caravan moved down route # 1. They moved t

kill zone of the 1 st Platoon and in an hour were in the kill 

2nd Platoon. This particular caravan stretched out over 

ters. The company commander decided that the bulk of t

was located in front of the two platoons and ordered the 

Platoons to open fire while the artillery pounded the ca

guard. The majority of the mujahideen and their pack an

destroyed, but a part of the caravan was able to withdraw
Platoons, the company commander gave the order to op

of the rnujahideen moved to the tail of the caravan and be

draw hurriedly. The company commander radioed the 

the outpost and ordered them to open fire on the w

enemy. But five-to-seven minutes passed from the fire c

the start of the fn-ing and the enemy escaped. 

At dawn, the company commander called in the bro

helicopter gunships. When they arrived, he arranged a s

destroyed caravans and gathered weapons, ammunitio

plies. At 0700 hours, the company loaded onto their 

under the cover of the helicopter gunships, returned t

camp. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: It proved advantageous, 

ation, to have a motorized rifle company with four mo

platoons. 128 The company was able to cover three poss

routes simultaneously. After they destroyed a caravan o

they did not abandon their positions, but continued to p

mission. As a result, the company destroyed yet another 

another route that same night. It follows that one shou

skillful organization of troop control by the company c

However, the combat revealed that the company comm

not quickly, correctly, precisely and clearly call in an 

mission and adjust its fire. 

128Usually an MRC has three MRPs. During the first half of 

MRC had three MRPs and a machine gun/anti-tank plat

mounted units or three MRPs and a machine gun/autom

launcher platoon in BMP-mounted units. This is not the case 

arate motorized rifle battalion had four MRPs per MRC as 

reinforcements (ed.). 
professionals. 

It is a commander's call whether to leave forces in p

ambush to guard supplies and weaponry left in the kill zo

the ambush site. Any enemy who revisits the ambush si

the ambush is either unaware of the previous ambush or 

strength to wipe out the ambush party. The force had 

devices and could also have called for battlefield illumin

artillery in order to police up the first caravan and then sh

er site. The 2nd MRP had an alternate site planned, 

move to occupy it. 

In this incident, the bronegruppa did not have a direct 

in support of the ambush. Rather, it remained passively n

post until dawn. 

In this region, guerrilla forces apparently moved in l

and, consequently, platoon-sized ambushes were 

Company-size ambushes are much harder to place and 

were probably a unique tactic of this border region. 
kilometers from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. 130 In t

of February 1987, we received orders to deny the d

weapons and ammunition from Pakistan to the guerrilla fo

brigade commander decided to use ambushes to stop cara

transporting weapons, munitions, and military supplies to 

region of Afghanistan. 

Our battalion controlled the northwest outskirts of 

City. Intelligence reports made it clear that at the end of 

large weapons caravan would travel along the road that 

the Rega Desert with Kandahar. This road ran through m

controlled territory. The battalion commander told me, an 

company commander, to prepare and lead the reconnais

toon in ambush. In the event that the recon platoon foun

van, it would have air support. 

I went to the "Pipe" outpost with Senior Lieuten

Kholod, the platoon leader, Sergeant A. R. Babaev, and t

From the outpost, we studied the mujahideen-controlled ter

plotted our approach route. The ambush party would hav

three mountain ridges to get to the ambush site. Accordin

ligence, the mujahideen had several OPs which they mann

the clock, on the ridges closest to the outpost. The mujah

them to monitor Soviet movements. The "Pipe" outpost w

129V. A. Stolbinskiy served in the OKSVA from March 1985 th

1987 as the commander of an air assault company. He was a

"Order of the Red Banner" twice. 

130probably the 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade. Ther

inconsistencies in this vignette. The city of Jegdaley, which app

map, is in the Kabul area, not the Kandahar area. However

desert, cited in the vignette, and the terrain of the vignette are c

of Kandahar, not Kabul. And there was not a separate mot

brigade in Kabul. This vignette must have taken place near Kan
between these outposts on New Year's Eve night (by the M

endar). My trip to the "Pipe" outpost helped me fin

ambush plan and the approach route. 

Usually, our battalion commander would report the 

dinates and number of personnel in every ambush by r

higher staff. The majority of our ambushes were not succe

enemy intercepted our radio messages, deciphered them 

best case, avoided our ambushes. In the worst case, 

would try to destroy our ambushing force. Since this amb

be conducted deep in enemy territory, the battalion c

decided not to use the radio, but report the ambush de

brigade commander in person. 

The recon platoon trained for the ambush on a site sim

actual one. Particular attention was given to training for c

mountains, coordination between groups and physical co

Only the battalion commander, myself and the platoon le

the time and place of the ambush. 

The recon platoon moved to "Pipe" outpost a week 

ambush. In order to deceive the enemy, soldiers of the 

mounted the three BTRs of the recon platoon and retur

battalion base camp. They did this in full view of the e

At the outpost, the recon platoon was hidden from sight 

I let them come out only at night. 

At 2330 hours on 20 March, the 26-man recon pla

forced with an AGS-17 squad, moved out from the outp

the ambush site. A three-man patrol moved 30 meters in 

main body. The platoon traveled in a single column. Som

meters from the ambush site, I left a 16-man group comm

the Deputy Platoon Leader, Senior Sergeant R. A. Usman

job was to cover the withdrawal of our look-outs, snatch 

covering group. They hid in a cave which they close

131The 12th MRC, 3rd MRB, 70th Separate Motorized Rifle B
some 800 meters from the road on the withdrawal route. 

commanded by my squad leader, Sergeant V. A. Sukha

group's missions were to watch for the enemy, and if nece

port the snatch group by fire. Communications were by r

,V~ r ~ APPROA

TO AMB

s ~ WITHDR

FROM A

=,. ~ ENEMY 

. OF ADV

PIP

jj "N 

MIRBAZAR 

Map 47: Recon platoon conducts an ambush in enemy 
lages. At 0800 hours, armed people began to gather i

Sergeant Sukhanov reported that 140-150 people were 

mujahideen began doing calesthentics. They finished thes

ning, crawling and other movements necessary in comba

took place 400 meters from the culvert. At 0900, Sergean

reported that the mujahideen had established guard posts o

The nearest posts were a kilometer left and right of the cu

the snatch group sat. At 1000 hours, movement started o

In the culvert, we could hear the roar of the motors and th

the people. 

We stayed there for 48 hours without success. The c

not come. On the third day, I decided that we could not 

arrival of the caravan. I decided to capture one vehicle 

to the battalion. At noon, when it got really hot, the muj

ally quit training and went to the villages. I told Sergean

to tell me what was coming down the road. At noon, h

that some armed bicyclists were coming down the ro

Sergeant Sukhanov to keep reporting the distance of th

from the culvert. When they were at 20 meters, my group 

on the road and captured the mujahideen. They were not a

any resistance. We tied up our captives and pulled them 

bicycles into the culvert. 

I then called Sergeant Sukhanov on the radio. He re

a car was moving down the road at approximately 60 kilo

hour. Eight motorcycles were about 1.5 kilometers behi

When Sergeant Sukhanov reported that the car was abou

from the culvert, we again ran out onto the road and ope

it. We killed the driver instantly. The car coasted 40 me

and stopped. Two mujahideen jumped out, but we cut 

instantly. We recovered weapons, four seals, documents 

from the dead. We blew up the car with grenades and beg

draw. 

The motorcyclists pulled over and began firing on 

group. Sergeant Sukhanov's group opened up on them. 
the leader of a large guerrilla force, and his adviser, Turan

Afghan Army captain. We captured weapons, docum

money. Private A. N. Sivushin was wounded in the shoul

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: In this vignette, specia

should be given to how the commander got his platoon in

from which to move out on his ambush. This area was 

observed by the enemy, so he deceived the enemy by sm

platoon into the security outpost, while members of a dif

unit rode back on his BTRs to his base camp. The plato

on foot to the ambush site under the cover of darkness. T

a fine example of excellent coordination between loo

snatch group and the f'n'e support group. Finally, the bra

and decisive actions during the assault need to be noted. 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: This is an interesting app

putting both officers in the snatch group is questionable

that recon troops are better trained and motivated than th

but these are conscript soldiers and NCOs. Who would 

mand and get the platoon out if the snatch group were 

The support group was 800 meters from the snatch group

long way to support and cover, particularly if done at nig

In Vietnam, American Army units put out ambushes e

on likely trails or where intelligence reports indicated lik

would occur. In Afghanistan, the Soviets apparently 

ambushes against specific intelligence and on an irregular 

There does not appear to be any standard distance 

patrol and the main body for night dismounted move

Vignette 43, the forward patrol is 50-60 meters out front

trail patrol is 40 meters behind. In Vignette 38, the pa

meters in front. In Vignette 37, the patrol is 20 minutes ou

this vignette, the patrol is a mere 30 meters in front of the 

This seems very close and seems to negate the advantage 

a forward patrol. 
y y 

announced that in the course of one or two years, 

Contingent of Soviet Forces would withdraw from Afgh

did not conduct any combat during January and Feb

allowed the guerrilla forces to stockpile a large quantity 

amnmnition and explosives. A large guerrilla force 

Pakistan border and transited the Panjsher valley unm

selected the remote village of Dzhobal'-Ussarazgi in the 

Massif as its base station. The village is located in the B

zone. This force conducted missions against the K

stretch of highway. They would attempt to destroy o

attack our security outposts and observation posts, a

Bagram military airfield. 

During the time that we did not conduct combat, the 

considerably stronger. The number of guerrilla forc

stockpiles increased dramatically. Their arsenals s

weapons, ammunition, communications gear and heavy 

Our separate reconnaissance battalion was stationed 

We were ordered to neutralize the enemy in our AO. O

experienced good results from our planned ambushes 

1987. We thoroughly prepared our companies for thes

Officers began with sketches and maps of the area. We 

personnel on ground that was similar to the actual amb

paid a great deal of attention to preparing our weapon

ment for the upcoming action. 

Senior Lieutenant Yu. N. Petrov, the commander of 

pany, received the mission to destroy a caravan which 

arms and ammunition for a guerrilla force located in t

massif west of Bagram. The company was transporte

trucks to the "Closer" [blizh'nyaya] security outpost on 

132Vo N. Syemin served in the OKSVA from 1986 to 1988 

staff of a separate reconnaissance battalion. He was awarded 

the Red Star" twice and the medal "For Valor". 
march and the order of movement to the ambush site to 

leaders. 

At 2240 hours, the company reached the ambush site 

group occupied its position. The sapper group mined the 

APPROA

TO AMB

WITHDRA

"" FROM A

~ POSSIB

~'~='="=-''" MOVEME

t'O VEHICLEp

One.half Kilometer 

Map 48: Reinforced recon company ambush west of B
fire. The mine field was in the right place, for the fleeing 

right into it. All the emplaced mines exploded. Within 

destroyed the caravan. 

We killed 38 mujahideen. The search group captu

amount of weapons, ammunition, and large-caliber round

pers blew up the weapons and equipment that we could n

The company successfully withdrew to a mount site 

mounted their BTRs and moved back to the battalion 

Two of our soldiers were slightly wounded. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: This vignette shows 

artillery to provide battlefield illumination for a

Uninterrupted communication and coordination with 

battalion insured the success of the subunits in the am

company commander correctly determined the proba

route of withdrawal and selected this site to emplace his 

EDITOR'S COMMENTARY: Again, reconnaissance 

used for combat and not reconnaissance. Reconnaissan

be a secondary function. Yet, the lack of good tactical rec

seems to have been a weakness of Soviet forces in A

Once again, the Soviets use the bronegruppa for extrica

force. The ambush party used a good covered approach 

woods and gully to the ambush site. The question is why 

site was located where it was, if the rnujahideen had thr

routes in the area and the route junction was near at 

didn't the commander put the ambush there, or at lea

observers at the junction and plan some RDM fires on th

Soviets established ambush positions on both sides of th

This seems like a good idea. Were all positions fully man

they merely sited so that forces could shift between them
their attacks on government and Soviet forces. To support 

bat, the rnujahideen leaders increased their deliveries of wea

ammunition from Pakistan. The deliveries would start at th

border with caravans of some 300 pack animals. Later, th

break into caravans of 15-20 animals which would cross t

tain passes to the guerrilla base camps. 

By this time, the mujahideen knew Soviet reconnaiss

SPETSNAZ subunits' tactics well and used this knowledg

advantage. Thus, if their caravan was traveling during th

was approaching a likely ambush site, the mujahideen would 

pass before-hand and hold it for two or three hours until th

passed through. The mujahideen would post two or three ar

outs every 200 or 300 meters on the pass. The caravan w

come through in groups of 15-20 pack animals, with an hou

groups, until they had all crossed this dangerous area. 

If the caravan were to approach a pass at night, they w

out one or two unarmed patrols at twilight. These patrols 

guised as shepherds and often accompanied by children. 

van would start to move when it became dark. Five to se

armed with rifles, would move forward as a reconnaissan

The caravan moved behind this patrol. Drovers, armed w

or assault rifles, moved between every two pack animals

security force of two to three men, armed with small arm

behind the caravan. 

Based on this situation, the high command decided t

our ambush activity. On 27 August 1987, I was ordered 

group from my battalion to conduct ambushes in Yakpa

Paktia Province. 134 My commander gave me the order to 

at night to the area of Yakpay Pass and to conduct ambu

from 28 August to 2 September to destroy a caravan. Th

133V. I. Korotkikh served in the OKSVA from 1986 to 1988 as 

commander. 

134 A battalion from the 56th Separate Air Assault Brigade (ed.)
030 8 g98, y gp v

ambush site. A three-man patrol with night binoculars m

front. The main body followed the patrol in a single 

0230 hours 29 August, my group finished its ascent and 

Map 49: Ambush on the Yakpay Mountain Pas
decded tat te caavawoud ot coe tougte pas

I decided to take my force back to the day lager, pick up 

al that we had cached there and move further down into 

During the day of 30 August, we continued to obser

During the afternoon, we spotted 30 armed mujahid

toward the pass. After they climbed the mountain, th

establish posts in the pass. It was clear that the stretch o

chosen to ambush would not do. I conferred with the re

leader and then decided to put the ambush in a differen

do so, it was necessary to move five kilometers in an un

bound. I called my unit commander on the radio, repor

ation and advised him of my decision. 

I ordered my force to move to the new site and we se

hours. We reached the new site at 2330 hours. During 

to-15 minutes, I fine-tuned the plan and coordinated 

actions while the personnel got into firing positions. Afte

utes, a caravan started to move up from the valley. A six

moved in front of the caravan. We let it pass. When the 

in the kill zone, I gave the signal and my men opened fi

mination group fired off parachute flares to illuminate th

We destroyed the caravan within a few minutes. W

mujahideen, captured two others and seized 15 pack ani

with arms, ammunition and medicine. Our sappers blew 

tured ammunition. 

I reported our ambush results by radio to my brigad

der. He ordered us to withdraw to an area where our B

pick us up at 0800 hours. We took the prisoners, weapo

uments; linked up with our BTRs at the appointed 

returned to our unit base camp. 

FRUNZE COMMENTARY: In this example, the brav

tiative displayed by the commander should be noted. 

evaluated the situation, made the decision to change am
rediscovered that slight wounds at high altitude can rapid

Medical evacuation by helicopters in these areas was 

and often wounded soldiers had to be carried to lower 

MEDEVAC helicopters to pick them up. Wounded sol

times could not survive the hours needed to reach treatm
FRUNZE CONCLUSION: Combat experience in the R

Afghanistan confirms the correctness of the basic tenets o

tive documents. However, in addition, it confirms th

reassess some of them which touch on forces and means 

circumstances. 

Several combat principles lay at the heart of the muja

tics. First, they avoided direct contact with the superior m

ular forces which would have wiped them out. S

mujahideen practically never conducted position',d warfare 

threatened with encirclement, would abandon their positio

in all forms of combat, the mujahideen always strove to a

prise. Fourth, the mujahideen used examples from the 

movemen0 35 and employed terror and ideological cond

a peaceful populace as well as on local government repre

The mujahideen knew the terrain intimately, were nat

and were capable of rapidly transmitting the necessary i

about secret Soviet unit and subunit movements over grea

using rudimentary communications gear and signallin

Among the guerrilla forces' tactical strong suits were all typ

actions, the ability to rapidly and clandestinely move in 

tains, and the fielding of a very broad agent reconnaissanc

The constant changes in the military-political s

Afghanistan, the outfitting of the guerrilla forces with new 

and the mujahideen use of various techniques and procedu

135Th e Basmachi were resistance fighters in Central Asia who 

imposition of Red rule from 1918 to 1933. The Bolsheviks 

extend their revolutionary order into Muslim Asia was resisted 

run raids and ambushes. A good English-language account of th

resistance is in Dr. Robert E Bauman's Russian-Soviet Unconven

the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, Leavenworth Paper 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1993 (ed.
increased demands on the production of improved unif

bearing equipment and gear for the soldiers. 

Experience shows that the basic conditions for achiev

in battle are making a well-informed decision in accordan

specific combat situation; thorough and complete prep

mission accomplishment; securing tactical surprise and in

coordination between subunits and units of various branch

ation performing common missions; hard but flexible a

rupted control of subunits; and daring, brave and enterpri

by the commander and his troops as well as comprehens

for the combat actions. 

Military cunning was given great importance. As a 

subunits went into battle, they were thoroughly prepare

hours or several days were set aside for this. Special atten

to be paid to practical training of the soldier, sergeant, 

Training was frequently conducted on terrain similar to th

they would fight. This allowed subunits to work out sev

ios for the conduct of battle. 

It must be remembered, however, that the experienc

forces in the Republic of Afghanistan is specific to that lo

practical application of this experience will require creativ

have to take into account the specific nature and types 

actions. 

EDITOR'S CONCLUSION: The Soviet Army had 

experience in subjugating and controlling unhappy popu

break-away Marxist-Leninist governments. During an

Russian Civil War, well into the 1920s, the Bolshevik g

employed political pressure, subversion, or outright mili

to incorporate into the Soviet Union numerous regions an

ities which had asserted their independence during the c

revolution and civil war. In Ukraine, Central Asia, the 

casus, and finally, the Far East, nascent republics were 

and reintegrated into the Bolshevik fold, often by force. 
territory in the Soviet Union in 1944 and 1945, it faced u

and open resistance from nationalist forces in the re

Ukrainian UPA openly resisted the Red Army and Sov

authorities, and in March 1944 claimed as one of its vic

the best Soviet front commanders (Army General N. F. V

1st Ukrainian Front). So serious was the opposition that 

Soviet authorities continued in Ukraine and parts of Bel

the early 1950's, when Soviet military and security forces 

vailed. In all of these post-Civil War and post-Second 

experiences, Soviet military power earned for itself a rep

seemingly invincible pillar of the state. Where Soviet mi

tread, political domination would inexorably follow. 

This reputation was born out during the Cold War 

the Soviet Union wielded military power in support of 

Empire. Their experiences in subjugating the Hungarian 

of 1956 (where they suffered 669 KIA, 51 MIA and 154

to improved methods and techniques. In the 1968 

Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Army lost a total of 96 killed. 

ments of their invasion plan included the establishme

country Soviet military and KGB element to assist the in

and the production of a cover or deception operation to 

tion away from the future invasion. A General Staffgroup 

the country in advance of the invasion, under some 

order to assess and fine-tune invasion plans. When t

began, the in-country Soviet military and KGB elemen

arm or disable the national military forces. Airborne 

SNAZ forces would spearhead the invasion and seize ma

transportation choke points, the capital city, key govern

136G. F. Krivosheev (editor), Grif sekretnosti snyat: Poteri Foo

SSSR b voynakh, boevykh deystviyakh i voennykh konfliktakh [R

secret seal: Casualty figures of the Armed Forces in war, comb

military conflicts], Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1993, p. 397-398. 
This invasion plan was also used in Afghanistan. So

and KGB advisers permeated the structure of the Afghan

Forces. In April 1979, General of the Army Aleksiy A. Y

head of the Main Political Directorate, led a delegatio

generals in a visit to Afghanistan to assess the situatio

Yepishev made a similar visit to Czechoslovakia prior 

invasion. In August 1979, General of the Army Ivan G

CINC Soviet Ground Forces, led a group of some 60 

several-weeks-long reconnaissance tour of Afghanistan

Pavlovski commanded the invasion force in Czechoslova

The invasion of Afghanistan was launched on Christm

tainly not a Muslim holiday, but a time when the Wes

ments were not prepared to react. Soviet advisers disa

ment, blocked arms rooms and prevented a coordinated 

itary response. Soviet airborne and SPETSNAZ force

Salang tunnel, key airfields, and key government and 

tions sites in Kabul. Soviet SPETSNAZ soldiers kille

Amin. The Soviet ground invasion force crossed into 

fought battles with pockets of Mghan military resistanc

pied the main cities while the Soviet government in

Afghan puppet regime. 

The Soviets expected the resistance to end here. It d

rationalizing that pervades the West did not hold in the m

Afghanistan. The Afghans' values, faith and love of freed

them to hold out against a superpower, although th

tremendous casualties in doing so. 

How did the Soviets get it so wrong? The Russian E

ied the area and maneuvered against the British over Af

"the great game" of the last century. The Soviet Union 

matic ties with Afghanistan since 1919 and extensive bi

contacts since the 1930s. Soviet economic and military 

been a constant feature in Afghanistan since 1950. The 

much of Afghanistan's road network (including the Sa

and airfields. The Soviet General Staff must have been 
ing military accomplices who carried out Politburo directive

protest. And, although many in the West view Gorbache

eral democrat and point out that he ordered the Soviet w

from Afghanistan, the bloodiest years of fighting in Af

(1985-1986) were under his leadership. Ideologically, the So

ership was unable to come to grips with war in Afghanistan

Leninist dogma did not allow for a "war of national liberati

people would fight against a Marxist regime. So, initially 

carded pictures of happy Soviet soldiers building orphan

did not mention that they were also engaged in combat a

those very orphanages. By the end of 1983, the Soviet press 

reported six dead and wounded soldiers, although by that 

40th Army had suffered 6,262 dead and 9,880 combat 

Soviet solutions for Afghanistan were postponed, as one ge

retary after another weakened and died and the military w

healthy general secretary who could make a decision. It 

during the last three years of the war, under Gorbachev's gl

icy, that the press began to report more accurately 

Afghanistan war. 

The Soviet Army that marched into Afghanistan was 

fight within the context of a theater war against a modern en

would obligingly occupy defensive positions stretching 

northern European plain. The Soviet Army planned to con

this defensive belt by physically obliterating hectares of 

positions through the weight of massed artillery fires and 

ving through the subsequent gap to strike deep and pursue 

tered foe. Soviet tactics and equipment were designed sole

ate within the context of this massive strategic operation. F

was seen as a lethal, high tempo event where forces and 

were carefully choreographed. Consequently, Soviet ta

simple. They were designed to be implemented rapidl

scripts and reservists and to not get in the way of the unfol

ation. Spacing between vehicles and the ability to dismo

sonnel carrier, form a squad line and provide suppressive s
to be reworked on site. The most tactical innovation was s

the airbome, air assault and SPETSNAZ forces and the tw

motorized rifle brigades. These forces did the best in the 

surgency battle. Far less innovation was apparent among 

ized rifle regiments. Tanks were of limited value in this wa

copters were a tremendous asset. Engineers were always i

The Afghanistan War forced the 40th Army to chan

equipment, training and force structure. However, de

changes, the Soviet Army never had enough forces in Afg

win. From the entire book, it is apparent that Soviet f

spread very thin. Often, they could not assemble a singl

for combat and had to cobble together forces from vario

create a make-shift unit. Base-camp, airfield, city and LO

tied up most of the motorized rifle forces. KGB border t

also stationed in Afghanistan in a security role. 

This book shows that the Soviet Union failed to ma

quate personnel strength in its line units. Regiments we

single battalion strength, battalions at single company st

companies at single platoon strength. First priority on 

replacement always went to filling the driver, gunner a

commander slots for the unit combat vehicles. This left f

nel to dismount and fight the resistance. There was also 

dislike of close combat and a preference to use massive 

f'ure power instead. Disease cut into units' present-for-du

in Afghanistan as poor field sanitation practices and poo

tributed to the spread of disease. From 1/4 to 1/3 of a uni

was normally sick with hepatitis, typhus, malaria, amoebic 

and meningitis. Units were filled twice a year from the 

fall draft call-ups. Conscripts sent to the Turkestan Milit

had six months to a year's training betore going to Afgh

the rest of their service. Further, military districts and 

Forces were levied for troops twice annually. These levies 

large. Yet, the unit field strengths remained appallingly 

Soviets learned, like the Americans learned in Vietnam
Forces were in Afghanistan, it was very difficult to get out

ical-military climate and the subsequent decisions belong 

book. What remains is to examine tactical-level change i

Ground Forces in Afghanistan. 

Tactics: The Soviet Ground Forces developed the 

concept to use the firepower of the personnel carriers in 

dent reserve once the motorized rifle soldiers had dism

was a bold step, for commanders of mechanized forces d

rating their dismounted infantry from their carriers. Ho

rain often dictated that the BMPs, BMDs and BTRs coul

or support their squads. The bronegruppa concept gave th

der a potent, maneuverable reserve which could attack in

ly on the flanks, block expected enemy routes of withdraw

a mobile fire platform to reinforce elements in contact, se

tle taxi to pick-up forces (which had infiltrated or air-lan

and had finished their mission), perform patrols, serve i

my-of-force role in both the offense and defense, and prov

escort and security functions. 

The Soviet Ground Forces adopted bounding overwa

mounted ground forces. One combat vehicle, or a group 

vehicles, would occupy dominant terrain to cover anothe

groups of vehicles as they would advance. The advan

would then stop on subsequent dominant terrain to co

ward deployment of their covering group. When dismo

ever, the Soviet motorized rifle units normally placed 

served weapons in overwatch positions, but did not us

them forward periodically to cover the advance. Reco

forces, however, used bounding overwatch when dismou

Air assault tactics and helicopter gunship tactics ch

improved steadily throughout the war. However, the S

never brought in enough helicopters and air assault forces 

all the necessary missions. Helicopter support should hav

of every convoy escort, but this was not always the case. 
p 

strongholds to isolate them, destroy bases, cut LOCs 

routes of withdrawal. The ground force would advance 

with the heliborne forces. Usually, the heliborne force wo

deeper than supporting artillery range or would take its ow

with it. However, as the book demonstrates, the Soviets wo

times insert heliborne troops beyond the range of supportin

and harvested the consequences. And, although the comb

heliborne and mechanized forces worked well at the batt

brigade level, the Soviet preference for large scale operat

got in the way of tactical efficiency. Ten, large, conventio

sives involving heliborne and mechanized forces swept the 

Valley with no lasting result. 

Enveloping detachments were used frequently in Af

Battalion or company-sized forces were split off from the m

and sent on a separate route to the flank or rear of the mu

support the advance of the main body, perform a separat

prevent the withdrawal of mujahideen forces, or to conduct 

neous attack from one or more unexpected directions

enveloping detachment was dismounted, it was usually co

airborne, air assault or reconnaissance forces. If the e

detachment was mounted, it was frequently just the unit's 

pa. 

In general, ground reconnaissance personnel were bet

and better quality soldiers than the average motorized ri

But, they appear to be used for more active combat than 

sance duties. The Soviets relied primarily on aerial recon

radio intercept, and agent reconnaissance for their intelli

duction. Quite often, these reconnaissance sources failed t

usable tactical intelligence. However, since the ground tb

always critically short of combat elements, reconnaissa

were used for active combat. Consequently, the Soviets o

to find the mujahideen unless the mujahideen wanted them t
rifle. Tanks were present, but were not too useful in m

fare. Consequently, the newest tank models did 

Afghanistan. Several models of the Mi-24 helicopter g

introduced during the war. 

The concept of the motorized rifle force was a ma

diers and armored personnel carriers. The soldier wa

posed to be more than 200 meters from his carrier. His 

equipment, uniform, weaponry, and other field gear 

orientation. Yet, Afghanistan was a light-infantryman's 

Soviets did not have light infantry. In general, the Sovie

dier remained fled to his personnel cartier and to th

which was designed to be carried by that person

Consequently, the standard flak jacket weighed 16 k

pounds). This was okay when dismounting a carrier a

for less than a kilometer. However, a dismounted adv

kilometers in flak jackets would stall due to troop exha

reconnaissance flak jacket was lighter and better, but in 

The Soviet field uniform was inappropriate for Afg

was restrictive and uncomfortable. The camouflage 

designed for northern Europe, not the high mountains. 

were noisy and unsuited for climbing in mountains. C

who could scrounge them, put their soldiers in track sh

Most Soviet load-beating equipment and rucksac

designed for continuous field use outside of an armor

carrier. The technology was from the 1950s. Some m

sacks, boots, ice axes, and load beating equipment w

mountain rifle battalions and SPETSNAZ, but they w

supply. 

The Soviet sleeping bag was made of cotton and w

proof. When it rained, which it did in the mountains, 

bag soaked up water and gained several pounds in we

hard to stay warm in this bag. The premier trophy for 

dier was a mujahideen sleeping bag from the West. The

weight, waterproof and warm. 
able. 

The Soviet emphasis on massed firepower instead o

meant that the dismounted soldier carried a lot more a

than his Western counterpart would. Further, heavy c

weapons always accompanied the dismounted force. Th

heavy machine gun weighs 34 kg (75 pounds) without its 

ammunition. The AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher w

kg (66 pounds) and each loaded ammunition drum wei

(32 pounds). Dismounted Soviet soldiers were less agile 

not catch up with the Afghan guerrillas. 

Experimental systems were developed during the 

AGS-17 was mounted on trucks and BTRs. Various ordn

were developed for helicopter gunships. New mine-cle

mine plows and mine rollers were tried with varying suc

were trained to detect mines and guerrillas. The Soviets 

a new helmet, which provided better protection. 

Force structure: The Soviets experimented with se

structures during the Afghanistan war. They constituted 

ing separate motorized rifle brigades and separate mot

battalions for independent actions. They formed mounta

talions. They experimented with combined arms batt

motorized rifle companies with four line platoons. All 

done to come up with an optimum troop mix for counter

and independent actions. Materiel support brigades and 

were formed to provide more effective support to the co

Airborne, air assault and SPETSNAZ forces were re

roomier BTKs and BMPs instead of their BMDs. Force

gunned with extra machine guns, AGS-17 and mortars. T

used these new formations as a test bed and the post-A

force structure for the Russian Army currently envision

corps and brigades for maneuver war and non-linear c

divisions and regiments for conventional, ground-gaining 
to fight Chinese and American mercenaries. When t

Afghanistan, they soon discovered that they were unwel

piers in a hostile land. Morale further plummeted at this 

As in other armies, the field soldiers were too busy to get 

trouble, but those soldiers in the rear with routine supp

nance and security duties had too much time on their ha

conscripts developed a narcotics habit in Afghanistan. Th

their habit by selling equipment, ammunition and weapo

turned to violent crime. Soviet soldiers robbed mer

passersby. At Soviet checkpoints, the soldiers would sea

civilians' luggage for weapons. Routinely, Afghans car

amounts of money were "sent to Kabul". That meant i

civilian and his luggage behind a wall and out of sight o

point. Once there the civilian was killed and his money 

Officer's morale also suffered. Although an officer go

service credit toward his pension for every year 

Afghanistan, he saw that the officer corps had been given 

sible task and would be the scapegoats for its failure. The

stant tension within the officer corps at base camps as th

the affections of the female PX cashiers, nurses and 

Afghanistan service saw the rebirth of the Soviet World W

tion of the field wife. But, with a shortage of women, c

was fierce and sometimes violent among the officers. Vo

officers' drug of choice and some quarrels were settled wi

and small arms. 

In the field, villages were razed and the occupants m

retaliation for ambushes or suspected aid to the guerrilla

these seem to have been officially sanctioned while other

have resulted from a break-down in discipline. 

Hearts and minds: The Soviet policy seems to have 

rorize the population, not to win them over to the govern

Despite all the press photos showing Soviet soldiers w

adults and children, genuine fraternization between S
en the resolve of the resistance. 

And in the end, the soldier and officer returned to a 

Soviet Union. Many were unable to fit back into this st

society. Many of the officers asked to go back to Afghanis

The war in Afghanistan lasted almost 10 years an

heavy casualties on all sides. The effects of the war w

decades. The tactical lessons that the Soviets learned are n

ly Soviet, but equally apply to other nations' forces caught i

dle of a civil war on inhospitable terrain. 
the Soviet system is very different from the U.S. system, man

translated terms are approximations. Where necessary, I hav

included the transliterated Soviet term for the specialist. 

AAslt 

AAsltB 

AAsltC 

AAG 

AO 

Airborne 

AOR 

BMP 

BrAG 

BRDM 

bronegruppa 

BTR 

Air Assault [takticheskiy vozdushnyy desant]

Helicopter borne assault into an area. 

Air Assault Battalion [Desanto-shturmoviy b

Air Assault Company [Desanto-shturmovay

Army Artillery Group [armeyskaya artilleriy

gruppa]. A temporary group of three to five a

battalions under the control of the Army Chie

Troops and Artillery for a particular mission. D

operations, a gun AAG and a MRLS AAG are 

formed. 

Area of Operations [naznachennyy rayon]. 

in which a unit is authorized to conduct comba

Parachute trained forces [parashutno-desant

deployed by parachute or helicopter. 

Area of Responsibility [zona otvetstvennosti

The area that a unit is responsibile for securin

and controlling. 

A tracked infantry fighting vehicle [boevay

mashina pekhoty]. 

Brigade Artillery Group. A temporary grou

five artillery battalions under the control of the 

Chief of Rocket Troops and Artillery for a part

mission. 

A four-wheeled armored reconnaissance v

An armored group of 4-5 tanks, BMPs or 

combination of such vehicles. The BMPs a

are employed without their normally assigned 

rifle squad on board and fight away from their 

troops. 

An eight-wheeled armored personnel carr

[bronetransporter]. 
FAC 

FDC 

FSC/FO 

FSE 

Full-field 

KHAD 

KIA 

 arU7 

Launch 

bomb 

LOC 

LZ 

MEDEVAC 

MIA 

MRD 

MRR 

MRB 

MRC 

Forward Air Controller [gruppa boevogo upra

An airman or soldier who requests, coordinates

adjusts aviation strikes in support of the ground 

He can be on the ground or flying above the bat

Fire Direction Center [punkt upravleniya ogny

Fire Support Coordinator or Forward Obser

[artilleyskiy korrektirovshchik]. A soldier who r

coordinates, and adjusts artillery fire in support 

ground force. 

Forward Security Element [golovnaya pokhod

zastava}. A reinforced company-sized element t

normally moves in front of the battalion during 

road march. 

An exhaustive inspection by a higher headqua

layout of forces field gear and personnel with ev

laid out on tarps in front of the vehicles [smotr]. 

Secret police of the Afghan government patter

after the Soviet KGB. 

Killed in Action 

An Afghanistan system of underground tunn

for the collection of ground water and for carryi

for surface irrigation. The mujahideen used them 

and ambush. 

A 122mm rocket, used in the BM-21 MLRS 

This rocket can be fired individually from a hom

tripod or two crossed sticks. It is inaccurate, but 

connects with a target, it is devastating. 

Lines of Communications [put' soobshchenniy

Landing Zone [ploshchadka prizemleniya]. 

Medical Evacuation [meditsinskaya evakuatsiy

Missing in Action. 

Motorized Rifle Division [motostrelkovaya 

diviziya]. The Soviet equivalent to a western 

mechanized division. 

Motorized Rifle Regiment [motostrelkovyy po

Motorized Rifle Battalion [motostrelkovyy bat

Motorized Rifle Company [motostrelkovaya r
POL 

PX 

RAG 

RDM 

Recon 

RTO 

Sarandoy 

Subunit 

SOP 

SP 

SPETSNAZ 

TCP 

TO&E 

unit 

WIA 

ZSU-23-4 

[ogranichennogo kontingenta sovetskikh voysk 

Mganistane]. 

Petroleum, oil and lubricants [goryuche-sm

materialy]. 

Post Exchange [voyentorg]. A store for soldi

they can buy non-issue items. 

Regimental Artillery Group [polkovaya arfi

gruppa]. A temporary group of two-to-five art

battalions under the control of the Regimental 

Rocket Troops and Artillery for a particular mi

Remotely Delivered Mines [sredst distantsio

minirovaniya]. Mines which can be emplaced 

artillery or MRLS fire. Similar to the US FAS

(Family of Scatterable Mines). 

Reconnaissance [razvedka]. 

Radio-Telephone Operator [svyazist]. 

Afghan Ministry of the Interior armed pol

[Defenders of the Revolution]. 

Soviet term for a battalion, company, batte

platoon or squad [podrazdelenie]. 

Standard Operations Procedures [poryadok 

Self-PropeUed [samokhodnaya], as in self-pro

artillery. 

Troops of Special Designation. For this boo

forces trained for long-range reconnaissance, c

and special forces type combat. 

Traffic control point. 

Table of Organization and Equipment [sht

official document specifying the number of per

military specialty, the types of weapons and th

equipment that an organization should have as

A regiment or independent battalion with 

its own colors [chast]. 

Wounded in Action 

Self-propeUed air defense weapon which fi

23mm machine guns simultaneously. 
y y g

and staff college located in Moscow on Proyezd De

Polya near the Novodevichiy Monastery. It trains s

tains and majors over a three year course of instructio

chairs of operational-tactical disciplines, history of wa

itary art, foreign languages and scientific research se

primarily trains ground forces officers in combined 

fare, but has representatives from all branches and 

World-famous military historians are included in its f

Lester W. Grau is a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Co

served as an infantry officer and a Soviet Foreign Ar

(FAO) throughout his career. He fought in Vietnam. 

he completed one year of Russian language traini

Defense Language Institute at Monterey, California 

graduated from the U.S. Army Russian Institute (U

Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany in 1983. USA

two-year post-graduate school which dealt with all 

the then Soviet Union and all classes were taught in 

He has served in Moscow and traveled extensively 

mer Warsaw Pact and former Soviet Union and cont

travel today. Since 1983, his work has exclusively b

area of Russian and Soviet tactics and operations. As 

infantryman, he finds it fascinating to compare and 

how both the US and USSR fought and fight. Mr. 

rently works at the Foreign Military Studies Offic

Leavenworth where he continues to work on operat

tactical issues. 
1 

1 

,L 

1⁄2 

0 

N 

P7 

i 

Medium Machine Gun 

Heavy Machine Gun 

AGS-17 

LAW 

RPG-7 

Light AnU-AIrcraft 

Machine Gun 

Heavy Anti-Aircraft 

Machine Gun 

Shoulder-fired 

Air Defense Missile 

Claymore Mine 

Claymore Mlne 

(Command Detonated] 

Airfield or Helipad 

Enemy Cache 

Entry/Exit Point 

Buildin B 

00 

(T 

E 

~5 

Q 

• Bouncing Betty" M

Trip Flare 

Parachute Flare 

Tank 

BMP or BMD/BTR 

Nonarmored Vehicle 

Truck{s) 

Motorcycle 

Helicopter 

Mortar/Self Propelle

Radio Transmitter 

Radio Intercept 

Hellborne Landln B 

Helicopter landing 

214 
® 

V 

@ 

1S2mm Gun Battery 

(in firing position) 

Multiple Rocket Launcher System 

Multiple Rocket Launcher Battory 

(in firing position) 

.• IF-/ Planned Artillery Concentratlon 

I Standing Artillery Barrage 

Z~ ~ Commandp°st 

(Platoon/Company) 

<~ ~] Command Post 

(Battalion/Brigade) 

[~] I~Commend Post 

| i(Re glm ent/Dlvlllon/Army) 

/~ Obeervatlon Post 

Patrol 

70,'1 

e. s ,¢~ Foot Petrol 

{ s~.-~ X" Helicopter Patrol 

Gully 

Levee or High Ground 

/ 

% 

L 

v 

7 

Battalion Attac

Attacking Unit 

end Goes to G

Defensive Pos

Enemy Defens

Posltlon 

Enemy Unit Wi

From the Defe

Ambush 

Air Strikes 

Helicopter Gun

Built-up Area 

Brldge 

Culvert 

Pipeline 

Electrified Fen
216 
3__7_e 

Mazar-I-Shar|f 

BAL KH 

SAMANGAN 

BAMIAN 

KUNDUZ 

GHAZNI 

41 Ayb.l( / ~-.~I 

Bamlan 

Tallqan 

TAKHAR 

Falzabad • 

BADAKHSH

PARVAN ")¢1 4 ~.o,~. • 

13~ "---) 

Kowt-e-Ashro~ KABUL 23( 

w,~0,~ ,/~ ~../-- 

""--~B Barakl eTrak / 

-- LOWGAR -- 

Ghaznl 

• f PAKTIA 

.~e *,.I.b,,d 

• PAKIS

Khost 
v Islam Qata 

HERAT 

FARAH 

14 

• Herat 

GHOWR 

Chaghcharan 

ORUZGAN 

• Farah 

IRAN____ • ZaranJ 

" / 

NIMRUZ 

Lashkar Gah 

o3 

4__O0 Z 

HELMAND 

4_33 

47-18 _5 r

39 • KanOahs 

21 16 

KANDAHAR 

2,_5_ 

218 
Agzamov, A. A. - 143 

air assault (airlanding) - 13, 19, 21, 23, 31, 32, 56, 78, 80, 81, 

85, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 97, 98, 100, !0 o, 102, !04

150, 185, 202, 203, 204, 209 

(units) 15, 16, 36, 38, 61, 81, 94, 102, 105, 140, 142, 19

airborne - 2, 3, 9, 24, 25, 60-65, 78, 80, 83, 85, 87, 89, 91, 92, 

102, 151, 156, 167, 169, 171, 199, 200, 202, 204, 206, 20

Akimov, V. M.- 19 

Andreev, A. V. - 104 

Antonov, S. V.- 152 

Arghandab River- 15 

Army of Afghanistan - 

7th Infantry Division - 67 

Infantry Division - 61 

Infantry Division - 40 

Infantry Division - 61 

8th 

9th 

llth 

14th 

15th 

17th 

20th 

25th 

Infantry 

Infantry 

Infantry 

Infantry 

Division - 61 

Division - 67 

Division - xvi 

Division- 19 

Infantry Division - 61 

15th Tank Brigade - 61 

212th Separate Assault Brigade - 27 

Asadabad- 180 

Babaev, A. N. 185, 188 

Badakhstan Province 108 

Bagram 2, 190 

Bamian 11, 14 

Basmachi 197, 199 

Beksultanov, N. 143 

Bogdasl~in~ V. M. 48 

Bogrov, S. IN. 49 

bounding overwatch 74, 203 
Davydenko, S. G. 27 

disease 76, 202 

Dzhumaev, I. A. 188 

Egiazarov, L A. 115 

enveloping detachment 204 

Faizabad 108 

Gazaryan, S. S. 44 

Ghazni 40, 136, 147 

Gladishev, V. P. 156 

green zone 15, 23-26, 69, 78, 126, 138, 147, 167, 169, 190 

Gromov, Boris 61-63 

Guboglo, A. I. 147 

Gukalov, V. A. 9 

Gusev~ Y. G. 56, 59 

Hagani, Mawlawi Jalaluddin 60 

Helmand Province 24, 126, 167 

Herat 48 

Ishkamesh 19-22, 175-178 

Islam-Dara Canyon 98 

Istratiy, V. G. 94 

Ivanov~ A. G. 36 

Ivanov, S. A. 124 

Jalalabad 78, 102, 105, 171, 180, 181 

Jurm 33, 108, 

Kabul 5, 11, 27, 41, 58, 66, 70, 72, 85, 89, 90 

Kandahar 15, 36, 40, 56, 59, 66, 67, 69, 78, 79, 94, 98, 126, 12

152, 156, 163, 167, 171, 180, 182, 183, 184 

KHAD 41, 75, 156, 167, 171 

Kholod, A. N. 185, 188 
Kurocbklr V. I. 24 

Las~-gah 126, 128 

Le:~mta~, Yu. P. 5 

Lowgar Province 89, 90 

Makkoveev, A. L 5 

Mansoor, Said 120 

Maslov, A. V. 104 

Massoud, Ahmed Shah 27 

Mikul'skiy, B. M. 66 

MUyuk, S. V. 108 

Mos'kin, S. V. 112 

mountain rifle battalion 3, 6, 205, 206 

Nikitin~ S. A. 53 

Operation Magistral 60, 61, 64, 65, 70, 75, 76, 80 

Panjsher valley 27, 115, 124, 171, 190 

Pariy, S. I. 98 

Patrushev, V. 163 

Pavlenko, V. L 152 

Petrov, S. N. 2 

Petrov, V. N. 63, 64 

Petrov, Yu. N. 190 

Pishchev, I~ IC 66 

Pivovarenko, A. P. 11 

Podvorniy, V. P. 180 

Popov, V. N. 159 

Portnov, A~ 1VL 140 

Pyatakov, S. Yu. 56 

Raevskiy, V. A. 102 

reconnaissance 2, 4, 7-11, 13, 15, 19-23, 32, 35, 43, 44, 51, 53, 

65, 68-74, 80, 86, 87, 89-93, 96, 100, 104, 112-115, 118

124, 130, 132, 133, 138, 140, 141, 143, 145, 147, 149-15

165, 171-173, 175-178, 185-195, 197, 200, 203-206, 211 
Satukandav Pass 60, 61, 63, 64 

Selivanov, V. V. 89 

separate security battalion .53~ 5.~ 

Serebryakov, V. G. 124 

Shalkin, Ym A. 69 

Sherkhankhel village 2 

Shishkov, A. N. 60 

Shubin, V. V. 40 

Sivushkin, A. N. 188, 189 

Skovorodnikov, P. A. 36 

Solonin~ L V. 171 

Soviet advisers 200 

Soviet 40th Army 59, 62, 66, 75, 80, 112, 174, 201-203 

5th MRD 48, 66 

12th MRR 48 

101st MRR 48 

371st MRR 48 

103rd Airborne Division 61, 80, 85, 89, 98, 156 

108th MRD 5, 9, 28, 60, 61, 66, 112, 118, 129 

177th MRR 118 

180th MRR 129 

181st MRR 129 

682nd MRR 28 

201st MRD 19, 53, 60, 61, 70, 159, 175 

122nd MRR 70, 159 

149th MRR 19, 70 

395th MRR 70 

56th Separate Air Assault Brigade 61, 80, 102, 10

66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade 78, 80, 18

70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade 13, 36, 56, 

111, 126, 128, 162, 184, 186 

191st Separate MRR 61, 136, 147 

345th Separate Airborne Regiment 60, 62, 80 

860th Separate MR_R 33, 61, 108 

SPETSNAZ 56-59, 115, 117, 128, 143, 151, 193, 199, 200, 202

211 

Stolbinskiy~ V. A. 185 
Tolkachev, A. A. 167 

Tsarev, V. N. 36 

Tubeev, M. 129 

~ubekin~ Yu. B. 124, 125 

Urban, S. A. 78 

Usmanov~ 1L A. 186 

Van'yants, A. V. 163 

Varduj Valley 33, 34 

Vlasyan* V. D. 66 

Xadigar Canyon 56 

Yunakov, A. 126 

Yusov, V. P. 121 

Zelenskiy~ S. V. 15 

Zhitoryuk, F. V. 118, 121 
The Bear Went Over the Mountain 

Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan 

Text composed in 11-point Palatino 

Cover design and art by Harry Finley 

Production Editor, Jonathan W. Pierce 
~ ~ i~i ~.iiL ~,~....~ L ~ " • .' i, ' i • "~"~,-'~i"~. '~'~ ̧-