No. 175, October 2000 Strategic Forum 

capabilities, doctrinal innovations, and evolving strategic intentions.

While U.S. and PRC interests intersect in

a number of areas, there are also important

differences. The status and future disposition

of Taiwan is perhaps the single greatest

flashpoint for conflict, a case in which U.S.

deterrence of a range of PRC military steps

may fail and escalation ensue.

A rising power, China is striving to

become a heavyweight in Asia. The longterm complementarity of U.S. and PRC interests is predicated in large part on Beijing’s

strategic choices. 

In a context of uncertainty, prudent

planning requires that the United States

develop and deploy deterrent and defense

capabilities that appropriately safeguard

national interests.

Some claims by opponents of ballistic

missile defense that prospective deployments

will trigger a reactive Chinese arms buildup

of long-range and/or short-range missile

systems tend to confuse cause and effect.

China is modernizing and numerically increasing its deployed missile forces; ballistic

missile defense is a countermeasure against

that buildup, not its cause.

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Furthermore, Beijing’s lack of transparency

concerning its strategic capabilities and modernization programs, and the intentions that

undergird each, make it difficult to confidently

forecast China’s future direction; yet significant

strategic decisions undertaken today will have

far-reaching and long-term implications. There

is a growing sense among defense analysts and

specialists that the future disposition of Chinese

strategic forces may only modestly resemble

that of the past. Looking ahead, U.S. policymakers must address three central questions:

(1) the likely extent of China’s strategic modernization; (2) the degree of complementarity

of U.S. and PRC regional and strategic interests

over time; and (3) the implications of each for

U.S. foreign and defense policy.

Evolving Capabilities

There is remarkably little verifiable

information on China’s military programs

and strategic capabilities. The relative absence

of accountability and transparency in China’s

defense establishment, together with the 

importance of deception in Chinese strategic

tradition, underscore the difficulties inherent

in credibly assessing PRC strategic capabilities. Unreliable or incomplete open source

capable of reaching anywhere in the United

States. China also maintains a small numbe

of intermediate-range DF–4 missiles and a

much larger stock of medium-range and sho

range ballistic missiles. The two-stage, solidfueled DF–21/21A, which is replacing the

DF–3/3A, has an estimated 600-kilogram

payload and an 1,800-kilometer range; its se

launched counterpart is the Ju Long (JL)–1.

With respect to short-range systems, China h

deployed a substantial number of DF–15 and 

lesser quantity of DF–11 missiles. Both are

generally thought to be nuclear-capable, although the majority of DF–15s probably carr

conventional warheads. Unclassified estimate

forecast that 500–650 short-range ballistic

missiles, together with a growing number of

land-attack cruise missiles, may be deployed

opposite Taiwan by 2005.

Most analysts believe that China has lo

had the capability to develop multiple-warhead missiles. Yet, the apparent lack of any

MRVed or MIRVed missiles in the Chinese

inventory suggests to some that China has

adopted “minimum deterrence” as its strate

doctrine. Others argue that the low number 

long-range missiles relative to short- and
medium-range weapon systems (missiles and

bombers) is indicative of China’s greater

concern over Soviet, more than American,

strategic intentions during the 1970s and

1980s. The Chinese strategic force mixture

appears to be changing as PRC security perspectives evolve. The significant buildup of

shorter-range missiles opposite Taiwan arguably represents a perceptual shift among

PRC military officials and policymakers toward greater warfighting or coercive utility for

the missile force. As for long-range systems, an

unclassified September 1999 National Intelligence Estimate forecasts that PRC missiles will

likely number in the “tens” by 2015. China

today has a largely discretionary capability to

build a larger force; much of the appropriate

technological infrastructure is already in

place. Moreover, the resources required for

significant increases appear, in principle, to be

available, although the extent to which this

would require expenditure tradeoffs with other

priorities is predicated in part on continued

economic growth. The congressional Select

Committee on U.S. National Security and

Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China (Cox Committee)

concluded in 1999 that, with “aggressive

development of a MIRV system,” China could

deploy “upwards of 1,000 thermonuclear

warheads on ICBMs by 2015.”

China is currently pursuing a substantial

military modernization campaign, central to

which are evident qualitative improvements to,

and likely quantitative increases in, its strategic

forces. While the parameters of many specific

activities are widely disputed, it is reported that

Beijing is exploring a number of technological

improvements. These include mobile systems,

solid fuel propellants, advanced guidance

systems, warhead miniaturization, space-based

vated to develop nuclear weapons for two reasons: to counter potential blackmail from the

nuclear weapon states and to join their ranks

status befitting a great power. A July 1998 whi

paper issued by the PRC Information Office

argues that China possesses “a small number 

nuclear weapons, entirely for meeting the nee

of self-defense.” At the same time, some senio

Chinese military leaders appear to see coerciv

utility in the longer-range strategic systems, a

evidenced by repeated statements that U.S.

officials would be unwilling to “trade” Los

Angeles, New York, or San Francisco for Taipe

Similarly, and despite Beijing’s long-standing

no-first-use declarations, ominous reminders 

Beijing’s ability to employ enhanced radiation

devices against Taiwan or the U.S. Seventh Fl

underscore a perceived utility of nuclear

weapons that goes well beyond a retaliatory r

for China’s nuclear forces. Indeed, the contin

ing deployment of shorter-range missiles acro

2 Strategic Forum No. 175, October 2

Jason D. Ellis is a research professor, and Todd M. Koca a research assistant, with the Center for Counter

proliferation Research at the National Defense University. Dr. Ellis can be reached at (202) 685–4207, 

by fax at (202) 685–2264, or via email at ellisj@ndu.edu. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations

expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent

the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other agency of the 

U.S. Government.

pppy p

* Probably dual-capable.

** Possibly multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) or multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capable.

*** Possibly MRV- or MIRV-capable
U.S.–PRC Divergence

The mid- to long-term complementarity

of U.S.–PRC strategic interests is uncertain. As

a growing power with a vested stake in significantly altering the regional status quo, Beijing’s strategic choices will weigh heavily on

the ultimate outcome. In the near- to midterm, both states will make a number of strategic decisions that have far-reaching implications. As recent work by Michael Pillsbury and

others indicates, some changes are already

evident in China’s evolving security calculus.

For instance, Chinese military leaders are

reportedly disturbed by the displays of American

power in the Gulf War and, more recently, in

Kosovo. Moreover, they are concerned about the

prospective deployment of ballistic missile

defenses (theater and national). Similarly,

Chinese officials harbor concerns relating to

Indian strategic capabilities, Japan’s future

security course, Russian political and military

developments, and other issues that bear on the

PRC security orientation. Finally, Chinese

political and military leaders have publicly

articulated concerns relating to what they label

U.S. “hegemony,” and perceive a concerted

American attempt to encircle and constrain

growing Chinese power. 

extent of China’s rise, and the degree to which

a rising, revisionist China ultimately intends to

or can displace the United States as a leading

regional power, are key strategic questions. 

While some U.S. and PRC strategic goals

converge, some of China’s evident regional

aims—e.g., reunification with Taiwan (on

terms with which Taipei and Washington may

disagree), a diminished American military

presence in the Asia-Pacific region, and a drive

toward enhanced Chinese regional

influence—clearly conflict with those of the

United States. With greater military power,

China might become more willing to use or

threaten to use force to realize these contested

objectives. In the near- to mid-term, the single

greatest flashpoint for conflict between China

and the United States is Taiwan. In no other

case are the apparent strategic objectives of

each state so evidently in direct conflict with

one another. According to recent work by Keith

Payne and Thomas Christensen, Taiwan’s

future disposition is perceived by the PRC

leadership to be a regime survival issue. The

political imperative of such a perception clearly

increases the prospects for crisis instability,

theater missile defense (TMD) and national

missile defense (NMD) systems often argue th

such efforts will: (1) trigger a reactive Chine

arms buildup of long-range systems, since

deployed defensive capabilities might obviate 

diminish the prospects for successful strategi

deterrence; and (2) encourage the further

buildup of short-range systems in order to

compensate for improved defenses. However,

reducing to a single issue the root cause of

China’s modernization activities oversimplifi

the sources of Chinese behavior, omits the

implications of such, and simply assumes th

all-or-nothing deterministic character of a

single factor. Moreover, it sidesteps two impor

tant points. First, absent the growing threat o

deployed offensive missile capabilities, there

would be little reason for the defensive response. Second, even without the contentious

issues surrounding missile defense, China

would certainly continue to modernize and

increase the quantity of its deployed forces.

Second, on the premise that China both

continues to build arms and intends to flex i

regional muscles, how does this affect the

deterrent relationship between the United Sta

and China? According to press accounts, one

senior State Department official suggested th

“there is a reasonable prospect that deterrenc

No. 175, October 2000 Strategic Forum 
4 Strategic Forum No. 175, October 2

possible warfighting context. Rather, analysts

have variously extrapolated what they view as

successful deterrence of the Soviet Union and

transferred such an understanding to the Chinese context, downplayed the prospects for a

military confrontation between the United

States and China (over Taiwan or other possible

issues), or inferred that deterrence will obviously work for the United States vis-à-vis China

due to the large asymmetries in deployed capabilities. But a simple count of approximately 20

long-range nuclear weapons for China (or even

the approximately 400 currently available

strategic and tactical nuclear warheads) misses

a critical point: that the U.S. ability to achieve

its regional security objectives, predicated in

part on power projection requirements, may be

adversely affected by increased Chinese nuclear

and missile capabilities. Maintaining stable

nuclear deterrence at the strategic level while at

the same time developing the military capabilities required to defend and promote U.S. regional interests is a clear challenge to U.S.

defense planners. Looking forward, a larger

Chinese nuclear force, together with a likely

smaller number of future U.S. nuclear weapons,

may suggest the need for a far-reaching review

of U.S. deterrence policy and plans. More generally, determining the pressure points to which

information gaps have intensified the effects of

Chinese deception, internal debate, and lack of

transparency, which have further hampered the

U.S. ability to discern the nature, purpose, and

likely extent of Chinese plans in this area and

to craft an appropriate policy response. The

diplomatic and defense communities also need

to devote more time and attention to a China

whose operational capabilities and strategic

intent may be changing. The relationship

between China and the United States may

become more confrontational as Beijing’s

objectives conflict in some cases with Washington’s. The United States must move beyond the

current level of uncertainty and improve its

ability to interpret these objectives. Indeed, the

extent to which U.S. policymakers can identify

and defuse occasions for armed conflict will

resource investment areas relating to China’s

military modernization and develop appropr

ate countermeasures.

■ The fractious domestic debate over th

nature and extent of the U.S. defense commi

ment to Taiwan may contribute to dangerou

misperceptions by China, thereby heightenin

instability. Accordingly, the President and

Congress should work together, perhaps in th

form of a senior level policy review group, to

develop an effective compact in this area.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research b

members of the National Defense University as well as

other scholars and specialists in national security affair

from this country and abroad. The opinions expressed o

implied in this publication are solely those of the author

and do not necessarily represent the views of the

National Defense University, the Department of Defense

or any other governmental agency.

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