UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MELISSA ARCHIBALD, )

) No. 12 CV 326

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner, )

Social Security Administration, )

) January 16, 2013

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

Melissa Archibald seeks review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her application for disability insurance

benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2),

1382c(a). Archibald asks the court to reverse the Commissioner’s decision and remand the

case for further proceedings. For the following reasons, Archibald’s motion for summary

judgment is denied:

Procedural History

Archibald protectively applied for DIB and SSI on March 19, 2009, alleging disability

beginning on March 29, 2009, as a result of reflex sympathetic dystrophy (“RSD” or

“RSDS”), and an injury to her right hand. (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 190-91, 192-94.) 

The Commissioner denied her applications on June 19, 2009, and again on reconsideration

on October 22, 2009. (Id. at 91-94, 95-98, 103-05, 107-09.) Archibald thereafter requested,

and received, a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) on December 3, 2009. 
(Id. at 27-90, 111-12, 127-33.) On July 29, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision finding

Archibald not disabled. (Id. at 11-22.) The Appeals Council denied Archibald’s request for

review on December 6, 2011 (id. at 1-3), making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the

Commissioner, see Shauger v. Astrue, 675 F.3d 690, 695 (7th Cir. 2012). Archibald initiated

this civil action for judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),

and the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of this court, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

Background

A. Medical Evidence

Archibald, who is 49 years old, claims that her disability stems from an injury she

suffered in December 2007 when, while working as a security guard, her right hand was

caught between a gate and a latch. Her right thumb became numb immediately, and she

noticed swelling and pain. (A.R. 421.) That same day, she went to the emergency room, and

X-rays showed no fracture. (Id.) The pain and swelling persisted, and Archibald observed

tingling and numbness. (Id.) Archibald saw Dr. Mary Ling, an orthopedist, who diagnosed

her with a sprain of the carpometacarpal and metacarpophalangeal joint, noting mild swelling

at Archibald’s right thumb and tenderness in the joint areas. (Id. at 421-22.) Archibald was

able to actively flex and extend joints of her thumb, though with some pain, and sensation

was slightly altered to light touch. (Id. at 421.) Dr. Ling recommended, and Archibald

proceeded with, splint protection. (Id. at 422.) Archibald continued to report increasing

pain, tingling, and numbness, and movement of her pain into other areas of her body. (Id.

at 398-405, 407, 411, 413, 415, 419.) She requested a note to be excused from work, but

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Dr. Ling declined to issue one, explaining that Archibald was still able to use her uninjured

hand. (Id. at 418.) An MRI of Archibald’s right fingers and thumb returned unremarkable

findings (id. at 413, 424), and electromyography testing—designed to evaluate electrical

activity produced by nerves and skeletal muscles—also revealed normal findings (id. at 413,

416).

Archibald regularly saw Dr. Ling in 2008. Dr. Ling noted that Archibald’s right hand

exhibited no gross deformity, swelling, or discoloration and that she could actively flex and

extend her wrists and digits fully. (Id. at 407, 411.) There was a positive Tinel’s

sign—tingling in the irritated nerve—over the thumb metacarpal (the site of her injury), and

Archibald had reduced grip strength in her right hand. (Id. at 405, 411.) Dr. Ling

recommended occupational therapy and the increased use of Archibald’s right hand to

strengthen it. (Id. at 407, 410, 414.) Yet Archibald reported persistent pain. To manage her

pain, Archibald took several pain medications—Tylenol, Ibuprofen, Norco, Naprosyn,

Vicodin, Darvocet, and Percocet—underwent two cortisone carpal tunnel injections, and

applied Lidoderm patches. (Id. at 318, 347, 399-401, 404-05, 407, 409, 415.) Archibald also

continued to wear a splint. (Id. at 398, 403-04.) 

When Dr. Ling recommended a second opinion, Dr. David Tulipan, an orthopedist,

examined Archibald in January 2009. He noted that she exhibited marked pain withdrawal

behaviors when he attempted to manipulate her hand and that she had limited wrist range of

motion. (Id. at 318.) Dr. Tulipan opined that Archibald had “what appear[ed] mostly to be

a pain management problem.” (Id. at 319.) He noted her “somewhat” flat affect and pain

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restriction behaviors, which were, he observed, consistent with chronic pain. (Id.) The only

objective finding that Dr. Tulipan gleaned from the examination was a suggestion of carpal

tunnel syndrome. (Id.) Observing that Archibald’s pain was “certainly way out of

proportion to the injury described,” Dr. Tulipan recommended electrodiagnostic studies and

evaluations by a pain management specialist and a psychologist. (Id.) 

The electrodiagnostic studies returned normal results. (Id. at 392, 425.) Dr. Vinita

Mathew who performed the tests noted that Archibald’s symptoms were “more suggestive

of complex regional pain syndrome [“CRPS”] or [RSD]” without neuropathy. (Id. at 395.) 

Still feeling persistent pain and reporting that the pain was spreading through her entire right

upper extremity, neck, back, and left hand, Archibald requested stronger prescription

medications. (Id. at 394, 460-62, 464-66.) Dr. Ling declined to prescribe them—though she

continued to prescribe Lidoderm patches—and believing no surgical interventions to be

available, recommended pain management treatment. (Id. at 392-94, 435.) Dr. Ling also

recommended a Functional Capacity Evaluation to determine whether Archibald had any

permanent work restrictions. (Id. at 433-34, 460-61.) 

In March 2009, Dr. Edward Yang, a pain management specialist, evaluated Archibald.

He found that she had allodynia—pain from non-painful stimulation such as a light

touch—over her entire right hand to her elbow, severely limited range of motion in her right

hand and grip strength, and a definite decrease in temperature in her right fingertips. (Id. at

348.) Dr. Yang also noted that her right upper extremity motor strength was intact, she had

full range of motion in her cervical spine, and there was no cyanosis. (Id.) He concluded

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that Archibald’s pain was “out of proportion” to her injury and seemed consistent with

CRPS. (Id.) Later that month, Archibald reported to the emergency room complaining of

chest and back pain. (Id. at 334, 465.) But her chest x-ray and physical examination were

within normal limits, and she was discharged. (Id. at 341, 343.)

In May 2009, Archibald’s mother, Shirley Lahr, completed a Third Party Function

Report. Lahr, who was living with Archibald at the time, noted that Archibald was on the

computer daily taking an online course, cared for her cat, talked to her friends daily on the

phone, and shopped. (Id. at 232, 234-35.) Lahr reported that Archibald was capable of doing

laundry, ironing, and light cleaning but that she had difficulty lifting, reaching, squatting,

walking, using her hands, bending, sitting, standing, and kneeling. (Id. at 234, 236.) Lahr

also observed that Archibald had difficulty concentrating and difficulty following

instructions. (Id. at 236.) Finally, Lahr noted that Archibald had no difficulty getting along

with others, but had become less social since her injury. (Id.) 

Dr. Calixto Aquino, a state-agency physician, submitted a Physical Residual

Functional Capacity (“RFC”) Assessment in June 2009. Dr. Aquino opined that Archibald

could occasionally lift and carry 20 pounds, frequently lift and carry 10 pounds, stand or

walk about six hours in an eight-hour workday, sit for about six hours, and was unlimited in

her pushing and pulling. (Id. at 438.) Dr. Aquino further opined that Archibald was limited

in reaching and handling, noting that even though motor strength was intact, she exhibited

pain with the slightest touch, swelling, and allodynia. (Id. at 440.) He opined that she was

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unable to use her right hand and arm due to CRPS, but added that her left hand was

unaffected. (Id.) 

When Archibald met with Dr. Ling the following month, she reported pain in her right

upper extremity and difficulties in her lower extremities, stating that she believed her “‘RSD’

ha[d] spread.” (Id. at 456.) Dr. Ling observed no obvious discoloration or swelling in

Archibald’s right upper extremity but noted that she demonstrated withdrawal of the

extremity when light touch was applied. (Id.) Dr. Ling declined to place Archibald on strong

narcotic pain medication, instead offering Ultracet, and recommended treatment at a pain

management center. (Id. at 457.) Dr. Ling informed Archibald that “even if the ‘RSD’ was

present, there is a chance that things will improve from today’s status.” (Id.) 

One month later, in August 2009, Archibald sought treatment from Dr. Dinora

Ingberman. She reported to Dr. Ingberman that the pain had spread to other parts of her body

as a stabbing pain. (Id. at 478.) Archibald told Dr. Ingberman that she used her left upper

extremity for most of her activities and that her right upper extremity was at only one to two

percent of its function prior to her injury. (Id.) The only painless activity, she said, that she

could perform with her hands was typing 70 words per minute; pre-injury, she was able to

type 90 words per minute. (Id.) She informed the doctor that she had difficulty balancing

and started using a cane for walking in March. (Id. at 479.) Archibald also noted a problem

with concentration and memory, slurred speech, and difficulty sleeping. (Id.) 

Dr. Ingberman noted an unremarkable gait and normal lumbar and cervical range of

motion. (Id.) The doctor also observed that Archibald had significant limitation of bilateral

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hip range of motion, deficits in her right shoulder range of motion, and decreased sensibility

in her left thigh. (Id.) Archibald reported increased pain in her left leg when walking on her

toes and that she could not squat. (Id.) Dr. Ingberman observed that Archibald was guarding

her right upper extremity when touched but less so when distracted, and that she did not

complain during the muscle stretch reflex testing but reported extreme hypersensitivity in the

right forearm at the slightest touch. (Id.) The doctor also observed that she exhibited

exaggerated pain behavior when withdrawing her right hand after taking off her socks, noting

that she then used both hands to put her socks and shoes on. (Id.) Dr. Ingberman diagnosed

Archibald with chronic pain syndrome, noting that she did not meet the criteria for a

diagnosis of CRPS. (Id. at 473, 479.) The doctor prescribed progressive resistive intensive

daily exercise (“PRIDE”) treatment for several weeks, suggesting that Archibald would then

be at maximum medical improvement and be able to return to work. (Id. at 472, 476.) 

Shortly after, Archibald asked for a note excusing her from work, but Dr. Ingberman declined

to issue one. (Id. at 474.) 

Later that month, Archibald saw Neil Mahoney, Ph.D., for a psychological evaluation. 

(Id. at 481.) She reported that at times she felt depressed but had undergone no formal

treatment or taken antidepressants, and neither were recommended. (Id. at 482.) She denied

any drug-seeking behavior or suicidal ideations, but had thoughts that life might not be worth

living. (Id. at 482-83.) Dr. Mahoney observed no impairment of her concentration, attention,

or memory during the conversation and noted that she demonstrated the full range of affect. 

(Id. at 483.) He diagnosed Archibald with psychological factors affecting her medical

7
condition and ruled out a personality disorder. (Id. at 484.) Noting inconsistences in her

physical and occupational therapy examinations, he observed that her complaints of pain

seemed extreme and unusual. (Id.) He also recommended PRIDE. (Id. at 483-84.) 

In September 2009, orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Theodore Suchy, D.O., conducted an

independent medical evaluation of Archibald. (Id. at 545.) Archibald complained of

numbness to her right hand and characterized her generalized pain as a 10/10. (Id. at 546.) 

Dr. Suchy’s examination revealed good pulses but obvious color and temperature changes

in her right hand when compared to her left. (Id. at 547.) He noted decreased sensation to

her ulnar and median nerve, decreased right grip strength, and Archibald’s ability to make

only an 85 percent fist. (Id.) Archibald, he observed, had pain with any wrist motion and

pain and tenderness over her wrist, thumb, and carpometacarpal joint. (Id.) Archibald was

also hypersensitive to light touch. (Id.) Dr. Suchy diagnosed Archibald with a contusion of

her right hand with “subjective complaints outweighing [the] objective findings.” (Id. at

548.) He noted that Archibald appeared to have developed CRPS or RSD post-injury, and

while she was not at maximum medical improvement, she could perform light work with no

work performed by her right hand. (Id.) He recommended aggressive occupational therapy,

an evaluation for a stellate ganglion block, and a psychological evaluation. (Id.) 

The following month, in October 2009, Archibald sought a consultation with

psychologist Joan Hakimi, Psy.D. Dr. Hakimi observed that Archibald walked with a cane

and had her right hand in a brace, which, when removed by Archibald, caused pain. (Id. at

498.) Dr. Hakimi also observed significant temperature differences in places on her hand and

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arm and that Archibald complained of pain in response to even a very light touch. (Id.) 

Archibald reported that she had no history of psychiatric or substance abuse issues, was not

taking pain medication because workmen’s compensation would not approve it, and was

receiving pain management therapy. (Id. at 499.) She also informed Dr. Hakimi that she

“lost all her friends” because of her injury. (Id.) Archibald said that she was taking an online

course but found it difficult to study because the RSD affected her short-term memory. (Id.) 

Archibald related feelings of hopelessness, helplessness, and anhedonia and admitted to

thinking about suicide daily because of the pain, though she did not act on these thoughts. 

(Id. at 499-500.) Dr. Hakimi found no evidence of a formal thought disorder and diagnosed

her with depressive reaction secondary to a chronic medical condition. (Id. at 499, 501.) 

Later that month, Ronald Havens, Ph.D., completed a Psychiatric Review Technique,

confirming Dr. Hakimi’s diagnosis. (Id. at 507.) He noted that Archibald had mild

limitations in activities of daily living; mild difficulties in maintaining social function; mild

difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace; and no episodes of

decompensation. (Id. at 514.)

The following year, in April 2010, Archibald sought treatment from Dr. Arnold Farr

for pain management. (Id. at 535.) He observed right hand tenderness, reduced grip strength,

and bilateral pain. (Id.) Noting very little objective findings, Dr. Farr diagnosed her with

pain secondary to CRPS and prescribed a transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation

(“TENS”) unit—a device that produces an electric current to stimulate the nerves and

muscles—and Nerontin, Oxycodone, and Oxycontin for her pain. (Id.) A few months later,

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in July 2010, a family nurse practitioner, Steven Edelman, FNP-BC, wrote a letter noting that

Archibald has RSD and that she was unable to work because of her pain. (Id. at 543.)

B. Archibald’s Testimony

At the hearing before the ALJ, Archibald described her ailments, the pain she

experiences, and the side effects of her pain medication. According to Archibald, she

experiences pain in her right hand and her back, with the pain radiating from the middle of

her back up through both her shoulders and down to her left lumbar area. (A.R. 36-37.) She

testified that she sweats constantly, suffers hair loss, and experiences involuntary movement

in her right arm and hand. (Id. at 68-69.) To alleviate the pain, Archibald takes Oxycodone,

Oxycontin, and Gabapentin, which she said provide only about 10 percent relief. (Id. at 45,

71.) She also employs a TENS unit on her right hand. (Id. at 70.) Archibald described the

side effects she experiences from her medication, stating that she suffers from irritable bowel

syndrome, which causes constipation, rectal bleeding, bowel pains, and diarrhea. (Id. at 72-

73.) She testified that these symptoms can occur as often as three weeks out of the month. 

(Id.) Archibald stated that she also suffers from short-term memory loss, and experiences

drowsiness during the day, which in turn requires more afternoon naps. (Id. at 73-74.) She

also has difficulty sleeping at night, which affects her energy level during the day. (Id.) 

Archibald further described the limitations caused by her pain. She said that she can

sit for 15 to 20 minutes before the pain requires her to stand, and she can then stand for about

15 to 20 minutes before the pain returns. (Id. at 37.) The pain diminishes somewhat after

she changes her posture, but the pain still prevents her from performing her job duties. (Id.

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at 38.) She can only walk 100 feet before losing her balance, and then she must reset herself

to prevent herself from falling down. (Id.) According to Archibald, the pain prevents her

from using her right arm to do anything. (Id. at 39.) She stated that she finds it difficult to

hold even a piece of cheese. (Id.) She can drive with her left hand—about six miles per

week—but not for long distances. (Id. at 39-40.) She can also use her left arm to do

activities but for only an hour. (Id. at 77.) When pushed beyond the one-hour limit, she

experiences extreme nerve jolts. (Id.) Archibald testified that she can perform household

chores like laundry, vacuuming, dusting, mopping, and washing dishes, albeit slowly. (Id.

at 43-44). She can also cook, but she said that the pain makes it difficult for her to hold the

pans to stir the food. (Id. at 44.) Archibald acknowledged that after her injury, she worked

part-time as a gate guard (16 hours a week), but she stopped working because of the pain. 

(Id. at 75.) She later explained that she worked part-time hours because those were the only

hours that were available. (Id. at 89.) She also testified that although she lived with her

mother after her injury, in March 2010, she moved to Arizona and currently lives by herself. 

(Id. at 42, 47-48.) The reason for the move, she said, was that Chicago’s stormy weather

caused her to experience pain in her right shoulder down through her hand. (Id. at 42-43.)

C. Medical Expert’s Testimony

Dr. Ahmet Semerdjian testified at the hearing as a medical expert (“ME”). He began

by recounting Archibald’s medical history. (A.R. 50-55.) Noting the conflicting medical

opinions regarding whether Archibald suffers from CRPS or chronic pain syndrome with a

significant overlay of psychological factors, Dr. Semerdjian characterized Archibald’s injury

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as a soft tissue injury to her right hand. (Id. at 54-55, 79.) Explaining that “[CRPS] is a

tough diagnosis to make,” Dr. Semerdjian added that “there are not any specific tests” that

will confirm such a diagnosis, instead “just a complex [set] of findings.” (Id. at 52.) He

testified that if Archibald’s examining doctors “used the classic criteria” to evaluate her,

“then she has [CRPS], and she has reasons for having pain which is probably amplified by

psychological factors.” (Id. at 54-55.) He also added that he was “not in a position” to say

whether Archibald has CRPS. (Id. at 54.) 

D. Vocational Expert’s Testimony

The ALJ also heard testimony from a vocational expert (“VE”), Linda Gels. She

classified Archibald’s past work as a gate guard as light, semi-skilled work with a specific

vocational preparation score (“SVP”)1

 of three, and requiring no more than occasional

reaching and handling. (A.R. 83-84.) She classified Archibald’s past work as a data entry

clerk as a sedentary and skilled position, requiring frequent reaching and handling and

constant fingering. (Id. at 84, 86.) The ALJ then asked the VE whether Archibald would be

able to perform her past relevant work if he credited Archibald’s testimony regarding her

functional limitations. (Id. at 88.) The VE responded that if Archibald required unscheduled

breaks, she would not be able to perform her past work. (Id. at 88-89.)

E. The ALJ’s Decision

1

 An SVP denotes the amount of time required by a typical worker to learn the techniques,

acquire the information, and develop the facility needed for average performance in a

specific job-worker situation. 

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In evaluating Archibald’s claim, the ALJ applied the standard five-step sequential

inquiry for determining disability, which required him to analyze: 

(1) whether the claimant is currently [un]employed; (2) whether the claimant

has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or

equals one of the impairments listed by the [Commissioner], see 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404, Subpt. P, App. 1; (4) whether the claimant can perform her past work;

and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing work in the national

economy.

Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309,

313 (7th Cir. 1995)). If the ALJ finds at step three that the claimant has a severe impairment

that does not equal one of the listed impairments, he must “assess and make a finding about

[the claimant’s RFC] based on all the relevant medical and other evidence” before moving

on to step four. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). A claimant’s RFC is the “most [she] can still do

despite [her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ then uses the RFC to

determine at steps four and five whether the claimant can return to her past work or different

available work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e)-(g). If the claimant can

perform her past work, she is not disabled. Strittmatter v. Schweiker, 729 F.2d 507, 509 (7th

Cir. 1984) (stating if claimant “is physically capable of doing the type of work she has done

in the past (whether or not she could actually find a job today), she cannot be found to be

disabled.”).

The ALJ made the following findings: (1) Archibald had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since the alleged onset date; (2) the soft tissue injury to her right hand, her

obesity, and her mood disorder constitute severe impairments, but her blurred vision, irritable

13
bowel syndrome, RSD, poor balance, lower extremity pain, and back and neck pain are nonsevere impairments; (3) her severe impairments do not individually or collectively meet or

medically equal any of the listings; (4) Archibald has the RFC to perform medium work,

except that she can reach only occasionally and “cannot understand, remember, or carry out

more than detailed instructions”; and (5) she can therefore perform her past relevant work

as a gate guard, which is considered to be light work. (A.R. 13-22.) Based on these findings,

the ALJ concluded that Archibald is not disabled as defined by the Act, and denied her

benefits. (Id. at 22.) 

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Analysis

In her motion for summary judgment, Archibald challenges the ALJ’s decision in

three respects. She first contends that the ALJ erroneously assessed her RFC when he

concluded that she was able to perform a restricted range of medium work. Archibald next

argues that the ALJ ignored the guidelines of Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 03-02p. 

Finally, Archibald asserts that the ALJ failed to comply with SSR 86-62 when he neglected

to identify the physical and mental demands of her past relevant work as a gate guard. 

This court confines its review to the reasons offered by the ALJ, Steele v. Barnhart,

290 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 93-95 (1943)),

and examines whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, O’ConnorSpinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2010). Substantial evidence is “‘such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Skinner

v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,

401 (1971)). This court may not “reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions

of credibility, or substitute [its] own judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Clifford, 227

F.3d at 869. But remand is warranted if the ALJ’s decision “lacks evidentiary support or is

so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review,” Steele, 290 F.3d at 940, or fails to

“provide an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the conclusion that the

claimant is not disabled,” Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

A. The ALJ’s RFC Finding

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The ALJ concluded that Archibald has the RFC to perform medium work, except that

she can only occasionally reach and “cannot understand, remember, or carry out more than

detailed instructions.” (A.R. 15.) Archibald challenges this RFC assessment, arguing that

it is not supported by substantial evidence. Archibald further contends that the ALJ failed

to provide a narrative discussion that sufficiently explains how her reported systems and

functional limitations are inconsistent with the medical evidence. 

Beginning with the question of whether the ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported by

substantial evidence, at the outset, the court notes that the ALJ found that Archibald has the

RFC to perform restricted medium work. In doing so, the ALJ necessarily found that

Archibald also has the RFC to perform light work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c) (assuming if

claimant can perform medium work, she can also perform light work). The regulations

define medium work as “lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or

carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c), 416.967(c). By

contrast, light work involves “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting

or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b).

The ALJ’s finding that Archibald can perform medium work is relevant here because the

ALJ found at step four that Archibald is capable of performing her past work as a gate guard,

classified by the VE as light work. As explained below, the court finds that the ALJ’s RFC

determination that Archibald can perform light work is supported by substantial evidence. 

Whether Archibald has the ability to perform medium work is a closer question. But because

Archibald’s ability to perform light work is supported by substantial evidence, ultimately this

16
court can affirm the determination that she is not disabled. See Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300,

307 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding disability determination where substantial evidence supported

finding that claimant could perform sedentary work even where finding that claimant could

perform light work was a “closer question”) (citing with approval Johnson v. Bowen, 851

F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that although determination that claimant could

perform light work was not supported by substantial evidence, ruling could be affirmed

because substantial evidence supported conclusion that claimant could perform sedentary

work)).

The objective medical evidence supports an RFC finding that Archibald can perform

light work. The medical testing returned normal findings. (A.R. 392, 413, 416, 424, 425.) 

Dr. Tulipan, an orthopedist, concluded that Archibald had a pain management problem,

noting that her pain was out of proportion to the injury she sustained. (Id. at 319.) When

Archibald requested stronger medication for her pain, Dr. Ling, her treating physician,

declined to prescribe it, informing her that no surgical intervention was available and

recommending pain management treatment. (Id. at 392-94, 435). Dr. Yang, a pain

management specialist, had a similar observation as Dr. Tulipan, noting that Archibald’s

pain was out of proportion to her injury. (Id. at 348.) While he observed that Archibald had

severely limited range of motion and grip strength in her right hand, he also noted that her

right upper extremity motor strength was intact and that she had full range of motion in her

cervical spine. (Id.) Despite Archibald’s continued requests, Dr. Ling declined to prescribe

stronger pain medication, instead she recommended pain management treatment. (Id. at 457,

17
462.) Dr. Ingberman concurred, diagnosing her with chronic pain syndrome. (Id. at 472,

476.) At the end of intensive pain management therapy, the doctor noted, Archibald would

be at maximum medical improvement. (Id.) Declining to issue a note excusing her from

work, the doctor added that even with her limitations, she might be able to work some jobs. 

(Id. at 474.) Additionally, the state agency physician who evaluated Archibald limited her

to light exertional work, though he noted that she could not use her right hand or arm. (Id.

at 437-44.) And although the ALJ declined to give this assessment great weight because

additional evidence was submitted after his review of the record, the ALJ noted that his

opinion supports the determination that Archibald has the RFC to perform light work and

ultimately that she is not disabled. (Id. at 21.) 

In addition to the medical evidence, further supporting, and indeed, key to the ALJ’s

RFC determination that she could perform light work, was his discrediting of certain of

Archibald’s allegations regarding her functional limitations (on which she relies to support

her claim she cannot perform light work) as exaggerated. (A.R. 20.) The ALJ pointed to

several objective and subjective factors influencing his determination that some of

Archibald’s symptoms were exaggerated, including: (1) the fact that she performed her past

work as a gate guard for over a year after she injured her hand; (2) the medical findings that

her subjective complaints were disproportionate to the objective findings; (3) the fact that she

was hypersensitive to even light touch; (4) notes from Dr. Ling documenting her continued

requests for additional narcotic pain medications, despite knowing that Dr. Ling would not

write those prescriptions; (5) Dr. Ingberman’s observations that Archibald was less guarded

18
with her right upper extremity when distracted, that she did not complain during the muscle

stretch reflex testing but became hypersensitive to light touch, and that she was exhibiting

“exaggerated pain behavior” during the examination; and (6) the ALJ’s personal observations

that she had no “facial grimaces or any other looks of distraction or discomfort during the

hearing while changing her posture.” (A.R. 20.) Considering all these factors, the ALJ

properly discounted certain of Archibald’s allegations as not credible. And significantly,

Archibald makes no challenge to the ALJ’s credibility determination as “patently wrong.” 

Filus v. Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2012). 

Archibald’s testimony regarding her activities of daily living and her description of

her past work as a gate guard, both of which were appropriate factors for the ALJ to consider

in crafting her RFC, further support the determination that she can perform light work. See

SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5 (July 2, 1996); Williams-Overstreet v. Astrue, 364 Fed.

Appx. 271, 276-77 (7th Cir. 2010). The ALJ noted that Archibald testified to very limited

activities of daily living but contrasted that testimony with the Third Party Function Report

completed by Archibald’s mother in which she noted that Archibald spent time on the

computer daily taking an online course, socialized with her friends, cared for her cat,

shopped, and did laundry, ironing, and light cleaning. (A.R. 16.) Ultimately, the ALJ

concluded that Archibald has no restrictions in activities of daily living and no difficulties

in social functioning. (Id. at 14.) At the minimum, the ALJ noted, Archibald’s testimony

established that she was able to care for herself. Indeed, she testified that she had recently

moved to Arizona, lived by herself, and took care of her home. (Id. at 42-44, 47-48.) The

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ALJ thus observed that any limitation in social functioning or daily activities would be

inconsistent with Archibald’s own description of her social activities and ability to care for

herself. 

The ALJ also reasonably relied on Archibald’s ability to work at her past job as a gate

guard for over a year after her hand injury as evidence that her impairments do not limit her

as much as she complained. See Williams-Overstreet, 364 Fed. Appx. at 276-77. Even

though Archibald performed this work on a part-time basis, the ALJ noted that she worked

part-time not due to restrictions from her impairments but because those were the only hours

she was able to secure. (A.R. 20.) What’s more, Archibald testified that her work as a gate

guard at a retirement home—a job she performed for over a year after her injury—consisted

of her mainly sitting at her desk, greeting visitors, giving directions, observing those entering

and exiting the building, and sometimes pushing patients in their wheelchairs to their

destinations. (Id. at 34-36.) Her work history reports characterized the functional demands

of the position as requiring her to walk and stand for six hours per day; lift and carry less

than ten pounds frequently or occasionally; handle, grab, and grasp big objects eight hours

per day; and reach or handle small objects eight hours per day. (Id. at 213-14, 244.) They

also noted that the position did not require any technical knowledge or skills, she did not

supervise other individuals in this position, and she was not a lead worker. (Id.) The VE

testified that this job was a light exertional job, at the low end of semiskilled, requiring no

more than occasional reaching and handling. (Id. at 83-84.) The testimony of Archibald and

the VE regarding the functional limitations of that work and her ability to perform it for a

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time supports the RFC finding that Archibald is capable of doing light work. Accordingly,

in light of the record and testimonial evidence (and credibility), which the ALJ considered,

the ALJ’s assessment of Archibald’s capability to perform light work is supported by

substantial evidence. 

As for SSR 96-8p’s requirements, the guidelines require that the ALJ include in the

RFC assessment “a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each

conclusion, citing specific medical facts . . . and nonmedical evidence.” 1996 WL 374184,

at *7. In other words, the “RFC assessment must include a discussion of why reported

symptom-related functional limitations and restrictions can or cannot reasonably be accepted

as consistent with the medical and other evidence.” Id. Although the ALJ “has the

obligation to consider all relevant medical evidence and cannot simply cherry-pick facts that

support a finding of nondisability . . . an ALJ need not mention every piece of evidence, so

long as he builds a logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.” Denton v. Astrue,

596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010).

Contrary to Archibald’s claims, the ALJ satisfied SSR 96-8p’s requirements. Indeed,

the ALJ thoroughly recounted the record evidence and explained why he did not find that

Archibald’s impairments prevent her from working. He observed that Archibald had not

sought the type of treatment an individual would seek given her allegations of totally

disabling impairments, and noted that Dr. Ling determined that after cortisone injections and

physical therapy, she did not require any surgical intervention or further treatment. (A.R.

21.) The ALJ also observed that although Archibald complained of a decreased memory,

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poor concentration, and poor sleep, she never sought any formal mental treatment or

medications, nor sought treatment from a primary care physician for her mental health

symptoms or pain. (Id.) The ALJ further considered and discussed the non-medical

evidence. As discussed above, he noted Archibald’s daily activities, including her ability to

occasionally drive and care for herself and her home, and her past part-time work, concluding

that these were factors that supported a finding that her impairments were not so severe as

to prevent full-time work. (Id.) In all these ways, the ALJ adequately matched up his

assessment of Archibald’s RFC to the record, testimonial evidence, and nonmedical

evidence. See Knox v. Astrue, 327 Fed. Appx. 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2009).

Archibald’s remaining attacks on the RFC assessment center on her assertions that 

the ALJ failed to recognize that she walked with a cane, used a brace on her right hand, had

difficulty gripping and pushing patients in wheelchairs, experienced side effects from her

medications, napped two to three times a day, and had difficulty concentrating. But the

ALJ’s opinion rebuts this, demonstrating that he considered Archibald’s allegations (id. at

16-17), and to the extent that he found them credible (id. at 17, 20-21), accommodated the

credible limitations by restricting her physical RFC to occasional reaching and handling and

mental RFC to work not requiring her “to understand, remember, or carry out more than

detailed instructions” (id. at 15.) For all of these reasons, this court concludes that the ALJ’s

RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence.

B. SSR 03-02p Guidelines

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Archibald next claims that the ALJ failed to apply the guidelines in SSR 03-02p,

which discuss how to evaluate cases involving RSDS and CRPS. According to Archibald,

the ALJ failed to discuss the clinical signs that she suffers from this impairment—the

presence of which was corroborated by her examining physicians Drs. Ingberman, Ling, and

Yang, state agency psychologist Dr. Hakimi, and state agency consulting physician

Dr. Aquino—and the side effects of her medications. She also faults the ALJ for failing to

consider the side effects of her medications, which included short-term memory loss,

gastrointestinal problems, and daily naps lasting two to three hours. Finally, Archibald

claims that the ALJ misconstrued the testimony of Dr. Semerdjian, the ME in this case. 

Although not explicitly argued by Archibald, it appears that by making these arguments, she

means to challenge the ALJ’s determination at step two that her RSDS/CRPS is not a severe

impairment. (R. 16, Pl.’s Mot. at 6.) 

SSR 03-2p defines RSDS/CRPS as “a chronic pain syndrome most often resulting

from trauma to a single extremity.”2

 2003 WL 22399117, at *1 (Oct. 20, 2003). “A

diagnosis of RSDS/CRPS requires the presence of complaints of persistent, intense pain that

results in impaired mobility of the affected region.” Id. at *2. Pain, swelling, extreme

sensitivity to touch or pressure, abnormal sensations of heat or cold, and involuntary

movements of the affected region can be associated with this disorder. Id. at *2, 4. SSR 03-

2p recognizes that the disorder may progress beyond the limb or body area originally

2

 SSR 03-2p uses the terms RSDS and CRPS synonymously. 

23
involved and manifest in pain that is out of proportion to the severity of the sustained injury. 

Id. at *2. SSR 03-2p describes how to evaluate disability claims based on RSDS/CRPS,

providing that “[c]laims in which the individual alleges RSDS/CRPS are adjudicated using

the sequential evaluation process, just as for any other impairment.” Id. at 6. “Given that

a variety of symptoms can be associated with RSDS/CRPS, once the disorder has been

established as a medically determinable impairment, the adjudicator must evaluate the

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the individual’s symptoms to determine the

extent to which the symptoms limit the individual’s ability to do basic work activities.” Id.

If the ALJ determines that “the pain or other symptoms cause a limitation or restriction

having more than a minimal effect on the individual’s ability to perform basic work

activities, a ‘severe’ impairment must be found to exist.” Id. Once the ALJ finds a severe

impairment, the ALJ next considers whether that impairment meets or equals a Listing, and

if it does not, determines a claimant’s RFC. Id. at *6-7. 

Here, at step two, recognizing that a non-severe impairment is a “slight abnormality

. . . that has no more than a minimal effect on the claimant’s ability to do basic work

activities,” the ALJ concluded that Archibald’s RSDS/CRPS did not “significantly impede

her functional abilities in the workplace.” (A.R. 14.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that

Archibald’s RSDS/CRPS, among others, are not severe impairments. (Id.) The ALJ

concluded though that the soft tissue injury to her right hand, her obesity, and her mood

disorder are severe impairments. (Id. at 13-14.) After reaching this conclusion, he

determined her RFC and found that she was able to perform her past work. (Id. at 14-22.) 

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The ALJ did not, as Archibald claims, fail to consider the clinical signs of her

RSDS/CRPS. Rather, the ALJ thoroughly recounted Archibald’s treatment and examination

history with Drs. Ling, Yang, and Ingberman, her reported symptoms, and their findings.

(A.R. 17-19.) Also in the ALJ’s opinion is an extensive discussion of Dr. Hakimi’s

examination and her diagnosis of depressive reaction secondary to a chronic medical

condition. (Id. at 19-20.) The ALJ further considered the opinion of Dr. Aquino, noting that

his opinion supported a finding of disability, but declined to afford it much weight since new

evidence was admitted after he rendered it. (Id. at 21.) A reading of the ALJ’s opinion

additionally reveals that the ALJ considered the side effects that Archibald complains he

ignored. (Id. at 14, 16.) The ALJ thus did not fail to consider the symptoms and factors

Archibald points to, but rather rejected her allegations regarding these signs as not fully

credible or supported by the medical evidence. (Id. at 17, 20.) 

Archibald’s claim regarding the ALJ’s misinterpretation of Dr. Semerdjian’s

testimony, on the other hand, has some traction. The ALJ stated that, “[a]fter reviewing the

record, including the claimant’s testimony, the ME testified that the clamant does not have

a medically determinable impairment resulting in CRPS or RSD according to SSR 03-2p.” 

(Id. at 21.) But a review of Dr. Semerdjian’s testimony reveals his opinion to be not as

definitive as the ALJ believed. Characterizing her impairment as a soft tissue injury to her

right hand, Dr. Semerdjian noted the conflicting opinions regarding whether Archibald

suffers from CRPS or chronic pain syndrome with a significant overlay of psychological

factors. (Id. at 54-55, 79.) Explaining that a diagnosis of CRPS is a “tough one to make,”

25
he stated that “there are not any specific tests” that will confirm such a diagnosis, instead

“just a complex [set] of findings.” (Id. at 52.) He testified that if Archibald’s examining

doctors “used the classic criteria” to evaluate her, “then she has [CRPS], and she has reasons

for having pain which is probably amplified by psychological factors.” (Id. at 54-55.) But

the ME also testified that he was “not in a position” to say whether Archibald has CRPS. (Id.

at 54.) Dr. Semerdijan therefore does not appear to have conclusively testified that Archibald

does not suffer CRPS/RSD, contrary to the ALJ’s ruling. 

But any error by the ALJ in this regard is immaterial to the ALJ’s ultimate decision

for even if the ALJ misinterpreted the ME’s testimony, which led, in part, to erroneously

finding Archibald’s RSDS/CRPS as a non-severe impairment at step two, any error was

harmless. See Henke v. Astrue, No. 12-2364, 2012 WL 6644201, at *4 (7th Cir. Dec. 21,

2012). Although the ALJ determined that Archibald’s RSDS/CRPS is not a severe

impairment, he also concluded that she suffers from a number of severe impairments. (A.R.

13-14.) He then proceeded to step four, and considering both her severe and non-severe

impairments, determined her RFC. (Id. at 15.) Given the ALJ’s alternate finding at step four

that Archibald could perform her past work (id. at 21)—a determination the court upholds

as supported by substantial evidence—any error in the step-two severity determination was

harmless. See Arnett v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 2012); Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d

923, 926-27 (7th Cir. 2010). 

C. SSR 82-62

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Finally, Archibald argues that the ALJ did not comply with SSR 82-62 when he failed

to make specific findings about the physical and mental demands of her past relevant work

as a gate guard. SSR 82-62 requires that an ALJ analyze the specific physical requirements

of a claimant’s previous job, and “assess, in light of the available evidence, the claimant’s

ability to perform these tasks.” Nolen v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing

Strittmatter, 729 F.2d at 509); see also SSR 82-62, 1982 WL 31386, at *4 (1982) (requiring

ALJ to make findings of fact as to individual’s RFC, physical and mental demands of past

occupation, and that individual’s RFC would permit return to past occupation). An ALJ may

not “describe a claimant’s job in a generic way . . . and conclude on the basis of the

claimant’s residual capacity, that she can return to her previous work.” Nolen, 939 F.2d at

518. In other words, an ALJ cannot describe a job as “sedentary,” “light,” or “medium” and

then conclude that the claimant is fit to perform that job without inquiring into what the job

requires. See Cohen v. Astrue, 258 Fed. Appx. 20, 28 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Smith v.

Barnhart, 388 F.3d 251, 252-53 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding reversible error where ALJ failed

to consider whether claimant could perform duties of specific jobs she held and equated

claimant’s past relevant work to sedentary work in general)). 

That is not what the ALJ did here. During the hearing, the ALJ questioned Archibald

regarding the demands of her past work as a gate guard (A.R. 32-38), and he discussed

Archibald’s testimony and her characterization of the functional demands of this job in his

opinion (id. at 22). The ALJ also discussed the VE’s testimony (id.), which he elicited at the

hearing, that Archibald’s past work as a gate guard was a light exertional job that required

27
only occasional reaching and handling (id. at 83-84). The record thus rebuts Archibald’s

contention that the ALJ failed to identify facts describing the demands of her previous job

as a gate guard or provide an assessment of her ability to perform those specific tasks. 

Indeed, the ALJ’s opinion demonstrates that he went beyond a generic description of

Archibald’s past work as “light.” He was presented with and in fact considered the specific

demands of that work and determined whether her RFC—with the physical restriction that

she can only occasionally reach and mental restriction that she cannot understand “more than

detailed instructions”—allowed her to perform the job. Considering the VE’s testimony, the

ALJ compared the functional requirements of Archibald’s past work (including Archibald’s

description of those requirements) to her functional capabilities, and concluded that she was

capable of performing the physical and mental demands of that work with certain restrictions. 

Accordingly, the court finds that the ALJ satisfied the requirements of SSR 82-62 and that

the ALJ’s step four determination is supported by substantial evidence. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Archibald’s motion for summary judgment is denied, and

the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. 

ENTER:

_________________________________

Young B. Kim

United States Magistrate Judge

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