Defense

Pick up any Department of Defense (DOD) document on strategy or organization and the terms warfighting and support to the

warfighter stand out on page after page. Warfighting appears 11

times in the U.S. Air Force Space Command Strategic Master Plan.1

War prevention and deterrence appear only in the context of nuclear

weapons and nuclear war. The fact is, since the end of the Cold War

the idea that military forces exist primarily to deter war and shape

the peace has fallen out of fashion.

Yet, policy guidance calls for transformation across the board,

not just in warfighting. The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review specifically

mandates moving to new forms of deterrence and war prevention

based on conventional capabilities and increased industrial base

readiness.2 Moreover, in 2002 the United States revitalized a joint combatant command, the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) in

Omaha, Nebraska, to take on expanded global deterrent forces,

including space, information operations, intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance (ISR), and long-range strike. Yet, the STRATCOM

mission statement describes the purpose of space assets as being to

“[p]rovide operational space support . . . to the joint warfighter.”3

Contrary to recent policy guidance, DOD remains wedded to a

warfighting mindset and unappreciative of deterrence, assurance,

dissuasion, and other methods of ensuring national security. Why

this limitation? What can be done about it? This paper addresses

these questions.

Impediments to Change

The primary impediments to implementing a new space and

information strategic posture for war prevention are:

■ Lack of in-depth strategic analysis and thinking about preventing

war in the new global environment.

■ Lack of many of the necessary capabilities, particularly in space and

information operations. A new set of tools must be developed to support

strategic objectives in a responsive way.

■ Organizational inertia. In particular, no military service is postured to

train, organize, and equip for the new global war-prevention needs. The U.S.

Air Force is the service charged with most of the responsibilities for providing

Overview

American strategists face a daunting challenge; they must assure

and defend American and allied interests, induce and encourage

international security cooperation, and deter, dissuade, and

defeat a diverse range of potential adversaries. This challenge

has been addressed by senior political leadership in recent policy

statements, such as the Nuclear Posture Review of 2002, and in

the formation of an expanded U.S. Strategic Command, but this

vision has not yet taken root in the Department of Defense components responsible for providing operational capability.

We propose a new strategic posture based upon a war-prevention focus. The central element of our proposal is a transformational space and information sortie capability. American space

capabilities now depend on a fixed infrastructure of large, expensive satellites. We argue for a complementary capability to launch

small, inexpensive payloads in time of crisis to augment and

reconstitute existing capabilities and perform entirely new special

operation missions and global conventional strikes through space.

These assets also would expand information operations beyond

network defense and network attack to create effects in the minds

of our adversaries and those who would support them. 

An enabler for these new capabilities will be the technology

to deliver effects in and through space rapidly and affordably. A

similar capability will be needed to deliver effects through cyber

space. Space-based nodes would be critical components of an integrated physical, cyber, and psychological application of military

force and strategic influence. These technologies exist today both

in the United States and elsewhere. But a focused and funded program to develop them for military purposes is not yet in place.

This new strategic posture will arguably require the formation of a new space and information military service to organize,

train, and equip the space and information force structure of the

future. The nucleus of such a new service exists today in the U.S.

Strategic Command and its components.

Responsive Space and Strategic

Information

by Simon P. Worden and Randall R. Correll

A publication of the

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

APRIL 2004

Number 40

Horizons

April 2004 Defense Horizons 1
military space capabilities, but its focus is decidedly on warfighting rather

than war-prevention.4

New capabilities, thinking, and organizations are unlikely to

evolve within the current service and command structure. It is time

to consider revolutionary change embodied in a separate space and

information service dedicated to global war-prevention strategies and

capabilities. The remainder of this paper discusses directions a new

service might take, capabilities it might seek to develop, and organizational constructs it could follow. 

A New Strategic Approach

The United States is in transition from Cold War deterrence

strategy to a new strategic posture. Before the terrorist attacks of

September 11, 2001, most strategic analysis focused on the rise of

one or more near-peer competitors. The generally accepted view was

that the world was moving toward a multi-polar condition rather

than returning to the bipolar circumstances of the Cold War. Unexpectedly, the global war on terrorism focused our attention on nonstate, global threats. These new threats engendered new thinking on

national security, but U.S. actions seem focused on warfighting as

the principle means of eliminating emerging threats. In the case of

terrorism, the military operations in Afghanistan in 2001–2002 represent our most direct action. The 2003 invasion of Iraq represented

a preemptive military solution to the potential rise of a near-peer

competitor armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).5

Senior defense officials have recognized that the lack of suitable

tools and strategies outside traditional warfighting approaches hampers our war on terrorism. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

has recently tasked his senior advisors to consider new solutions for

such shortcomings.6

We do not mean to suggest that the U.S. Government has not

approached the problems of terrorism and WMD proliferation on

many fronts other than military action. Numerous efforts have been

made to track down terrorists, cut off their resources, and prevent

hostile states from acquiring the expertise and components needed

to threaten the United States. Considerable progress has been made

on defensive measures, such as missile defense and civil preparedness. Yet, little progress has been made on shaping the global situation to prevent threats from arising and to eliminate conditions for

them to arise. This contrasts sharply with Cold War strategy that

sought to contain the threat of communism while simultaneously

working to expose its inconsistencies and reverse its virulent tendencies. A new strategy and the tools to pursue it are needed to address

the threats we now face and the ones that might arise in the future.

While the current war on terrorism clearly has ideological

aspects, we hold that conflict is always and foremost a conflict

between minds. This is epitomized by the statement, “Machines

don’t fight wars, people do, and they use their minds.”7 Where the

last century saw the development of maneuver warfare, emphasizing dominant maneuver in time and space, we now see the primacy

of maneuver in command and control—essentially maneuver of the

mind that extends beyond combat to the war of ideas.8 The aim is to

stay within an adversary’s cycle—to move in the realm of ideas and

actions faster than the adversary can react. Ideally, following the

admonition of Sun Tzu, our objective is to win a conflict before combat begins. 

Responsive Operations

To envision how space and cyber space (and information in

general) could enable new war-prevention strategies, consider possible future global security threats on three time scales: long-term

(years to decades), mid-term (months to years), and short-term

(minutes to days). Threats on each of these time scales are associated with different effects and require a different range of possible

responses. The objective in each case is to provide the President

with options and tools to manage and shape the global environment

to lower the risk of war and increase the opportunities for people

everywhere to enjoy free exchange of ideas and commerce.

Long-Term Responsiveness

Long-term threats fall into three categories. The first is the

emergence of a nation or alliance hostile to U.S. national security

interests and willing to use force to achieve its aims. This threat generally is referred to as a peer competitor, an adversary with roughly

comparable military power, at least within is own region. The paradigm here is a return to the circumstances of the 20th century, when

coalitions of totalitarian states imbued with doctrines of fascism and

communism threatened the United States and like-minded nations

with a virulent philosophy backed by formidable armed might. That

situation, which prevailed for much of the 20th century, is one we

would most hope to avoid.

The second category, which is related to the first, is the rise of

virulent states, possibly as part of a larger coalition, armed with

WMD (the canonical chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

weapons, to which we would add cyber attacks). We add cyber

threats to the growing potential of WMD to eliminate vital infrastructure, including basic services and potable water, because the

loss of cyber utilities could unleash destructive effects on unprepared urban populations. While such enemies may not threaten the

very existence of the United States or its way of life, they can cause

considerable damage to the United States and allies and could form

the nucleus out of which a peer competitor might grow. 

The third category of threats comes from non-state actors who

take advantage of the globally interlinked economy and society to

attack the foundations of established polities. This threat came to

the fore with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The nonstate actors may have objectives ranging from local independence

movements to globally dispersed groups, such as Al Qaeda. All seek

to move within the freely flowing ideas, goods, and people necessary for a peaceful and just society, and all seek to use that freedom

to disrupt the global community so that their political ambitions

can be forced upon others.

2 Defense Horizons April 2004

Brigadier General Simon P.Worden, USAF (sworden@darpa.mil) was Director of

Transformation and Development at the Air Force Space and Missile Systems

Center at the time of writing. Randall R. Correll (randall.correll@saic.com) is

Senior Scientist for the Integrated Resource Strategies Operation at Science

Applications International Corporation.
A long-term strategy to address these emerging threats has

many components. The fundamental long-term objective is to eliminate the circumstances that enable individuals, groups, or nations

to use violence to further their objectives. There are some very central roles that space and information capabilities—managed by the

U.S. military—can play in this strategy. First, we recognize that the

global interlinked culture has at its heart a set of global utilities,

such as the Internet, satellite communications, and the Global

Positioning System (GPS). These mostly grew out of U.S. military

initiatives and programs, their eventual public sector benefits

being serendipitous, but such dual-use capabilities could be part of

a coherent, cooperative strategy to shape the world situation. To do

so we should embark on a coherent cooperative program to develop

new global utilities, protect existing ones, and make use of all such

utilities to prevent the rise of the threats outlined above.

We would like to emphasize a key feature in this strategy: that

the U.S. pursue cooperative international arrangements. Traditionally

the American national security apparatus has strenuously avoided

international involvement in space

and information endeavors. This is

due in large part to the fact that

these technologies have been at the

heart of our intelligence collection

activities and were considered too

sensitive to share. Unfortunately,

this go-it-alone policy has encouraged others to develop their own

capabilities—most notably in imaging from space and global timing

and positioning systems (such as

GPS). Investing in bilateral and multilateral cooperation could pay

dividends to our future security by improving capability, sharing cost,

and allaying fears based on misperception of U.S. intentions.

Developing new global utilities cooperatively might prevent the

rise of hostile peer competitors. Conversely, refusal to cooperate

might generate new animosities. Recent experience with the American GPS and the proposed European Galileo system, which has similar navigation and timing objectives, is a case in point; repeated U.S.

rebuffs of European overtures, and insistence on an American-only

policy for security reasons were significant factors in pushing the

Europeans to build a competitive system. Cooperation in critical

global utilities creates economic and military ties that can mitigate

the rise of peer competitors and hostile actions by other entities.

Moreover, it could save the American taxpayer money. One very

exciting such program is a proposed small satellite development

between the U.S. Air Force and the Chilean Air Force. This program,

to be launched this decade, will provide valuable scientific data and

critical national security support to both nations.

Another long-term function of cooperative military ventures is

to protect the integrity of global utilities. The Internet is at the heart

of current global economic development, yet it suffers repeated

attacks by computer viruses and worms. A successful attack on the

entire Internet could destroy the global economy and should be

considered a form of WMD. Only the most rudimentary international

cooperative venues exist for protecting the Internet. STRATCOM

mounts one of the most effective computer network defense operations, but it is limited to the Defense Information Infrastructure.

However, many of these military methods could be adapted for

broader global defense of the Internet. More to the point, U.S. military infrastructure could form the basis for cooperative protection of

these global utilities. 

Similarly, we see increased threats to space infrastructure in

the form of electronic interference and even threats to ground facilities. Protecting this critical infrastructure is one of the highest priority DOD missions in space control. Unfortunately, space control is

seen by much of the world as a threatening, aggressive capability of

the United States. Establishing international capabilities to protect

the free use of space and deny it to aggressive entities could alleviate fears in the international community and gain acceptance for the

necessary space control initiatives.

Perhaps the most significant use of new global information utilities is in their capability to attack the root cause of threats. This is

particularly true of global terrorist threats. If the process by which a

person becomes a terrorist can be

well understood, it might be possible to interdict that process

through various information tools.

Terrorists develop among young

disenfranchised populations, often

within societies where access to

global free flow of information is

prevented by governmental, cultural, or religious authorities, and

where they are barraged by

extremist propaganda. If global

sources of information can be brought to bear to provide potential

terrorists free and open access to information, it is likely that most

would-be terrorists could be diverted towards peaceful political

alternatives for addressing grievances.

Means of delivering information, particularly through direct

broadcast space systems, can be a most potent tool in a long-range

strategy. Any new efforts to exploit the power of information and

influence operations in support of national security will need to be

well understood and supported, as they are becoming the most effective tools for ensuring national security in the future.9 The need for

a separate organization focused on these effects and capabilities is

noted in Secretary Rumsfeld's charge to his senior advisors.10

Mid-Term Responsiveness

Space and information capabilities can enable the world to

identify hostile preparations months or even years before they can be

brought to bear. This is not a new mission. Indeed, the primary use

of space capabilities during the Cold War was to provide early warning of hostile moves by the Soviet Union and its allies. In the new

multipolar world, this information should be made public and readily accessible. In a world where economic activity is dominated by

global utilities, negative world opinion can be translate to enormous

economic pressure. In the past, economic embargoes and blockades

were brought to bear and often produced results in the form of

changed behaviors over relatively long periods. In the future, lack of

access to such vital utilities as the Internet and GPS could bring an

April 2004 Defense Horizons 3

perhaps the most significant

use of new global information

utilities is in their capability to

attack the root cause of threats,

particularly global terrorist

threats
economy to its knees in a few weeks. The loss of a single electronic

pager satellite in the late 1990s had significant negative impacts on

the North American economy.11 With global utilities under a cooperative international arrangement, dictates from international fora

such as the United Nations could be translated immediately into

compelling economic action.

The most significant mid-term strategy would be to use control

of global utilities to stop the rise of new threats. Both space and

cyber space are principal channels for most global information flow.

As most intelligence agencies already realize, information on the

development of such threats as WMD can be obtained from cyber and

space sources. Cooperative collection of information could actually

strengthen our access to vital information about emerging threats,

opening new avenues for access. Moreover, if critical data were

gained in a cooperative manner it would be easier to convince allies

of the seriousness of the threat. 

In the past, the United States relied on the threat of escalation,

first conventional and then nuclear, to keep crises from exploding. But

these options both have drawbacks. A conventional military response

typically requires a lengthy time of

force deployment and buildup in the

crisis region. An aggressor acting

quickly may secure an objective

before the United States could

engage, thus raising the level of retaliation to undesirable levels. Crossing

the nuclear threshold is such a drastic step that it is effectively reserved

only for possible retaliation against

the use of WMD against the United

States. Thus, the ability to escalate in

a rapid and measured way with space

and information operations could be quite credible. Escalation could

start with mid-term denial of access to global utilities. Even the threat

of blocking access to global utilities could convince aggressors to step

back from the brink during a crisis. This would require sortie access to

space and cyberspace, as discussed below.

Short-Term Responsiveness

On the timescale of minutes to days, space and information

capabilities could become the most formidable tool in preventing

crises from escalating. Should combat become necessary, these same

capabilities could bring a conflict to a quick and satisfactory close.

Should economic forms of deterrence fail, we must be ready to move

to more forceful means. The mainstay of Cold War deterrence was

that exploitation of a crisis risked unacceptable damage to the

aggressor’s society and military forces. The prospect of such damage

alone was generally deemed sufficient to lead protagonists to step

back from a crisis. Because of the inability of the United States credibly to threaten nuclear retaliation, and the immense cost, risk, and

delay in bringing conventional forces to bear, an aggressor today can

contemplate a long period to act free from interference by the United

States or other stabilizing forces. Indeed, this view led Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait, and it could lead a more formidably armed

power to even more dangerous actions in the future. To deter such

aggression, the United States must be able to respond to military

movements in hours or days, vice months, and to respond in a credible, non-nuclear manner. Responsive space systems could provide an

effective capability to interdict an aggressor's initial use of force

before it grows into a large-scale military conflict.

The first objective in a crisis must be to greatly augment our ability to find, fix, and track the forces of potential adversaries. Today we

rely on a mix of space-based sensors and airborne assets. The latter

can take weeks to get into position, and the former currently cover

only a small fraction of adversary forces and movements. An answer to

these problems is to establish a continuous monitoring capability that

covers a broad range of potential adversary indicators. However,

putting in place a truly global satellite system covering many indicators continuously can be prohibitively expensive—many dozens of

satellites would be needed for each type of sensor, such as space-based

radar. However, a temporary capability based on reusable systems

could be tailored for a particular crisis and region. The act of putting

such sensors in place over a few days could itself send a strong message to an aggressor, since the sensors

also can serve as precise targeting

systems. The cost of such systems

could be quite affordable, and the

benefits could be enormous.

To be truly credible, a nonnuclear deterrent must have the ability to target, engage, and reassess the

objective. With current military

forces, assembling the ability to

strike takes many weeks, and usually

many months, and is expensive in

terms of equipment and personnel. It

also places many Americans in harm’s way (which becomes a reverse

deterrent where forward-deployed Americans are more of a hostage

than a threat). Finally, it requires forward basing of forces, which

allies must be induced to support. 

To deter or fight a war, the United States needs the means to

strike decisively and credibly in hours to days without forward bases.

The use of long-range kinetic strike forces based at great distances,

together with credible cyber strike options, could fill this requirement. The total numbers of critical adversary facilities that need to

be defeated could be relatively small—perhaps as few as several

hundred. Combining cyber attack with long-range, precision kinetic

attack would minimize potential collateral damage and thereby

make U.S. deterrence even more credible.

Tools for the New Strategy

The military term for the application of specific capabilities is

concept of operations, or CONOPS. An appropriate CONOPS is needed

to develop and employ any national security capability. To support the

full range of capabilities, from war prevention to warfighting, we will

have to explore new CONOPS and push new technological innovations.

A more responsive space force structure is needed, one that is flexible

in effects, rapid in time, and affordable in cost—one that is built on

the familiar military concept of sortie capability. 

4 Defense Horizons April 2004

a more responsive space

force structure is needed,

one that is flexible in effects,

rapid in time, and affordable

in cost—one that is built on

the familiar military concept

of sortie capability
Sortie Space CONOPS

Current space forces are infrastructure in earth orbit. Over the

years, primarily driven by the high cost and schedule inflexibility of

launch systems, the United States has packed satellites with more

and more capability and designed them to last longer on orbit. This in

turn leads to larger spacecraft, requiring larger launch vehicles, costing more money, and taking more time to deploy on orbit. This is not

a bad model for many services delivered through space; ISR, communications, and timing and navigation information can be reliably

delivered in bulk at an affordable cost. Services delivered from space

by these means have become a critical and irreplaceable part of commerce, scientific exploration, intelligence, and warfighting capability.

But this approach has limitations. Scheduled time on ISR

assets is highly sought after, and many targets of interest are not collected. The overflight by ISR assets on orbit can be plotted by adversaries, which undermines their effectiveness as collectors. ISR and

communications often are deployed to provide global coverage that

can be locally insufficient in a crisis. More importantly, infrastructure in space is vulnerable to attack and denial of services. Not many

nations around the world now have this capability, but the technical

sophistication to exploit inherent vulnerabilities is becoming

increasingly available around the world. Even worse, we have essentially no capability to reconstitute damaged satellites on time scales

shorter than years.

Sortie operations would focus capability on geographic regions

during critical periods rather than provide global coverage. We will

need to conceive of capabilities that optimize coverage and effect

over limited areas. Satellite constellations probably would be tailored to optimize either coverage of or proximity to a region. Payloads may be self-sufficient or networked with other land, sea, air, or

space sensors. In some cases, large satellite functionality could be

achieved by a cluster of small satellites acting in concert. Satellites

may need to be highly maneuverable, meaning that mission operations will need to be flexible and maneuverable, requiring sophisticated autonomous operations or sophisticated operations planning

and command and control in operations centers. Additionally, in

accordance with the evolving net-centric approach to military operations, these space-based assets will need to be designed and operated in a manner complementary to surface and airborne assets.

Developers of new responsive space systems will need to work

closely with specialists from other disciplines to ensure effective

strategic and theater joint force operations

Most discussions of space capabilities, particularly weapons,

assume that all capabilities would be stationed permanently in

space. This has several disadvantages. As noted earlier, a very large

and presumably expensive constellation of satellites is needed to

provide the truly global coverage necessary to address the full range

of possible threats. Moreover, once satellites are on orbit, an adversary has the advantage of being able to study and access the system

at will and devise counter-measures. In addition, the presence of relatively easily tracked objects in space could invite preemptive attack

and thus prove destabilizing.

To implement some of these new capabilities, important policy

issues must be addressed. There is growing international and even

domestic opposition to weapons in space. In these days of GPS-guided

munitions and satellite-delivered information operations, exactly

when a device is part of a weapon system and exactly when it is in

space are ambiguous; a sortie strategy could mitigate many of these

concerns, in that the weapons need not be stationed in space at all.

Along with kinetic systems, information operations will need to

become more sophisticated. Strategic forces will need to engage in

information operations on the battlefield to counter anti-U.S. propaganda and to challenge hostile ideologies. These operations will need

to be coordinated with other agencies involved in foreign policy to

assure they are effective and appropriate.

A sortie strategy for short-, mid- and long-term strategic effects

relies on responsive access to space. Responsive means not just

quick launch but also flexible capabilities. This means that a capability—sensor, weapon, or command and control—would be largely

maintained on the ground until needed. Upon request from the President for options in a crisis or to respond to an adversary’s move,

STRATCOM would prepare an option to fit particular requirements.

Upon approval of the President, the capabilities would be sortied

into space. For example, if we were responding to indications of an

aggressor’s troop movement, we might launch a set of 10–15 sensors

tailored to the mission. 

Since these sensors do not need to be everywhere continuously,

the total inventory of satellites would be half that needed for a fullglobal-coverage constellation. Moreover, appropriately designed

satellites initially could be launched into orbits that did not overfly

the aggressor nation. Adjusting the constellation to provide more or

less coverage could be a tool for managing a crisis. In a deteriorating

situation, satellites could be moved to new orbits for better coverage,

or satellites could be sortied to supplement those already in orbit.

Should the situation improve, satellites could be moved out of overflight paths or even de-orbited to reduce tensions.

Weapons also can be sortied. Indeed, it would appear that the

most cost-effective, long-range strike weapons would not be based in

space, but rather maintained in readiness on long-range, rapidresponse rockets in the United States or at a safe distance from the

theater of operations. Basing weapons outside the United States might

be less likely to invite responses against U.S. territory. However, systems must be based far enough from adversary territory so that they

can be safeguarded against preemptive attack. Since numerous

nations maintain long-range, conventional strike on ballistic missiles,

a similar American capability would not represent space weaponization or arms race escalation. The only reason to base weapons in space

might be to provide very-short-term weapon access (minutes vice the

tens of minutes inherent in ballistic missile strike). The latter is only

doable with directed energy weapons, such as lasers. The technology

for direct energy laser strikes from space is not yet mature and could

itself be considered for a short-term sortie into space. An alternative

is to keep the laser weapon on or near the earth’s surface and use mirrors in space to relay the beam to its target.

Sortie capabilities are especially needed to meet the rapid

response strategy of achieving effective control of space within a few

days, conducting precision global strike within a few hours, and being

able to tailor ISR assets within a few days. These capabilities might be

viewed as extensions of our current air superiority strategy within a

April 2004 Defense Horizons 5
specific theater of operations with similar time scales. The difference

is that what we used to be able to accomplish in a small area we might

accomplish regionally (possibly globally) within similar time scales.

Similarly, we would need to be able to perform ISR, control, and strike

operations throughout cyberspace. However, given the speed at which

things happen in cyberspace, the sortie function would need to be

accomplished in seconds or minutes, not hours or days. 

Technology Development

Key to a space- and information-oriented strategy is the technology for sorties into space. This consists of many elements: affordable access to (and probably from) space, fast reaction ISR payloads

in space, space control payloads in space, long-range strike, and

information operations. Technologists will have to explore how

smaller payloads can be deployed rapidly to achieve useful effects.

Initially, we should explore how such systems can augment and

reconstitute existing capabilities: imagery of force deployments,

weapons facilities, critical infrastructure, terrorist training camps

and strongholds, signals collection for intelligence and targeting,

additional communications channels, and timing signals for navigation and munitions delivery. But eventually, we will need to explore

how these systems enable new capabilities: space-based space control missions, delivery of sensors through space to the theater of

operations, and delivery through space of strike weapons.

The first, but by no means only, requirement is for rapid, affordable access to space. Affordability may be the most critical, because

no strategy that requires very expensive individual elements is likely

to withstand adversary efforts to proliferate beyond the scope of the

strategy. For the past decade and more, the cost of both access to

space and payloads has risen far faster than the cost of other military

capabilities. It is a considerable technical challenge to reverse this

trend while producing new, responsive, space access systems. 

Launch Vehicles Responsive space access itself does not seem

to require new technology. The intercontinental ballistic missile

(ICBM) developed four decades ago is very responsive. Indeed, the

Russians and the United States have adapted surplus ICBMs to provide occasional rapid access to space. Moreover, the Russian Zenit

booster was designed in the 1980s to provide rapid, unattended

space access for even large payloads using a fully automatic fueling

and launch system. But ICBM systems are high-performance systems

capable of launching within a moment’s notice, and they are relatively expensive systems for small satellite missions ($20 million and

higher).12 Here, again, the challenge is to make access not only rapid

but also affordable. The right approach is to start small and build up,

much as our original space access systems were developed in the

1950s. This requires innovation within a development and experimentation program characterized by an incremental build-and-test

flight-test program. In this phase, engineering and operational

expertise will be needed. Adequate but reasonable funding will need

to be devoted to experimental and developmental activities outside

the constraints of the current system acquisition approach. 

In 2003, the U.S. Air Force, in concert with the Defense

Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), began a program

called Operationally Responsive Spacelaunch (ORS). The ORS program is designed to produce a low-cost, rapid-response booster capable of putting small (100–1000 kilogram) payloads into space for a

total launch cost less than $5 million by 2007. A wide variety of concepts is emerging as of this writing. Many of the most creative and

promising launch concepts are the products of new entrants into the

launch business. Several concepts could even show results by early

2004. Some of these have been the result of wholly private funding.

The most important result of this initiative will be to enable launch of

microsatellites weighing 100kg or less within a few hours of call-up at

a launch cost below $6 million. The significance of these systems to

space control and tailored ISR is discussed further below.

Of course, many payloads cannot be reduced to 100kg. Some,

such as communications satellites, must operate in geostationary

orbits almost 36,000 km above the earth. Others require very large

antennas and power supplies. These larger satellites are carried by

the new evolved expendable launch vehicle (EELV) boosters produced by aerospace giants Lockheed-Martin and Boeing. But these

boosters are neither cheap (they cost well over $100M to build and

launch) nor responsive (they need many months of preparation

before launch). Thus, we must consider how to place larger payloads

into space cheaply and responsively.

The Air Force Space Command is completing an analysis of

alternatives that indicates that reusable rocket technology can meet

goals for a medium-size launch vehicle capable of placing more than

10,000 kg in orbit. Reusable launch vehicles have been the dream of

space experts since almost the beginning of the space age, but the

many efforts to produce such vehicles have failed. Technology does

advance, however, and by the end of this decade we could produce a

partially reusable launch vehicle that could place about 5000 kg into

low earth orbit for about $20 million per launch—a factor of five

improvement over a similar EELV. A reusable first stage vehicle with

an expendable upper stage now seems quite feasible and would avoid

the difficult technical challenge of high-performance, thermal protection systems needed for a reusable upper stage to survive reentry. This development could be followed by fully reusable systems

operational in the middle of the next decade that would affordably

and responsively meet most of our launch needs, with only the heaviest payloads requiring the large, expensive EELV.

Payloads But getting to space affordably and responsively is only

the first part of the problem. We also need to develop payloads that are

both affordable and capable of performing their mission in a matter of

minutes after launch. It does no good to get to space in an hour if it

takes, as it often does today, two months to safely activate the satellite. As with launch, our strategy is to start small with microsatellites.

Modern technology, especially computer technology, enables a

microsatellite weighing less than 100 kilograms to perform many of

the same functions of older satellites weighing thousands of kilograms. Interestingly, low-cost microsatellite capability has been furthest advanced outside the United States, particularly in the United

Kingdom and in Israel. Perhaps the leading experts in microsatellite

technology in the world are at the University of Surrey Space Centre

in the United Kingdom. Having produced over 25 working microsatellites, both they and the Israelis have shown that systems weighing in

the 100–200 kilogram range can produce earth imaging performance

better than one meter resolution—clearly within the range of meaningful military performance. 

6 Defense Horizons April 2004
Microsatellites show great promise for both quick-response ISR

and critical space control missions, such as space situation awareness. For example, the Canadian Space Agency launched a scientific

satellite in 2003 weighing about 60 kilograms that can produce space

surveillance data comparable to the U.S. space-based surveillance

sensor on the 3000 kilogram MSX satellite now operated by DOD.

Some U.S. agencies have begun developing quick response

microsatellite programs. Perhaps the most significant near-term

effort is a program jointly sponsored by the DOD Office of Force

Transformation and the Air Force Space Command Office of Transformation and Development. To be launched in early 2004 on a new

commercial booster costing less than $6 million per launch, a 100-

kilogram microsatellite will locate and report electronic emitter

data directly to deployed field commanders.

Although small satellites and microsatellites can do much, they

cannot perform all of the necessary missions. Larger satellites will

continue to be needed for such functions as space-based radar and

communications. These programs today are not responsive, taking

many years to develop and many months to launch and checkout.

Efforts have yet to be started to make these systems responsive. However, the basic technology to do so is under development. For example, DARPA has a program called Orbital Express that will enable a

system to be re-fueled or re-configured on orbit. As an alternative to

responsive launch, moving or re-configuring satellites on orbit represents another approach to obtaining responsive space capabilities.

Rapid Global Strike As mentioned above, basing global strike

assets on the ground and outside direct U.S. territory could be key to

an effective non-nuclear space- and information-oriented deterrent.

Such capability is now being developed under the collaborative

DARPA and Air Force FALCON program.13 It consists of the ORS

launcher development cited above (which may be used to launch

microsatellites into orbit or loft long-range strike weapons thousands of kilometers) and a device called the Common Aero Vehicle

(CAV). The CAV is a hypersonic glider with up to global range that

can carry 1000 pounds of munitions or sensors. The munitions could

consist of penetrating conventional warheads, small smart bombs, or

other precision munitions. Traveling at mach 10–15, the CAV can

maneuver to avoid overflying sensitive areas and still strike within 90

minutes anywhere on the planet. To be tested in 2005–2007 timeframe, the CAV will provide the United States truly global rapid conventional precision strike without the necessity of forward based elements. With technology advances, the CAV could be launched in

larger numbers on a single booster of the reusable class mentioned

earlier or be carried on a hypersonic global carrier vehicle that also

is being researched by DARPA.14

Global Information Tools One of the most exciting global information tools is commercially developed direct broadcast radios, which

receive signals directly from satellites and are thus difficult to jam.

Already in use in the global war on terrorism, these small radios, when

distributed to target audiences, can provide direct access to global

information sources. Information technology, particularly wireless

technology, can also help, as it also can send and receive information

through space links free from local interference or control. Coupled

with dramatic advances in automatic translation software, this technology promises us the ability to directly link isolated audiences, those

in which terrorist philosophies flourish, with information and ideas

from alternative sources from around the world. If we can accomplish

this, it will become far more difficult for terrorist philosophies to

attract adherents. However, these technologies, as well as more intrusive ones making it possible to identify and isolate terrorist activity,

are controversial. The DOD Office of Strategic Influence, which

focused on direct broadcast radio and satellite-delivered Internet

technologies, was quickly disestablished after inaccurate allegations

of planned disinformation operations appeared in the press. Similarly,

DARPA efforts to use the Internet to identify and root out terrorist

activities in its Total Information Awareness program have been

stopped. Nonetheless, these new technologies will be needed if we are

to achieve national security objectives.

Organization

The establishment of the new Strategic Command in Omaha,

Nebraska, was a big step in the coherent use of space and information

capabilities. But STRATCOM, as a combatant command, does not control the resources necessary to develop new capabilities. Another big

step was made in 2002 to coherently pursue strategic space capabilities. Based on the 2000 Rumsfeld Commission report recommendation, all Air Force and National Reconnaissance Office space acquisition was placed under a single office, the Under Secretary of the Air

Force. Moreover, Air Force space acquisition activities were moved

under the operational Air Force Space Command. However, space

budgets within the Air Force are still traded for other Air Force priorities, such as new fighters and command and control aircraft. Crucial

space science and technology programs and funding for certain other

space activities remain outside Air Force Space Command purview.

The traditional military space establishment views investing in

a new approach to military space capabilities as a risky and uncertain proposition. Moreover, the critical information operations piece

of a coherent future strategy does not even have an assigned service

to train, organize, and equip our operational forces in this area. Most

development today is fragmented under a number of defense agencies including DARPA, the National Security Agency, and the

Defense Information Services Agency. Even within the Air Force,

where all space and information operations are supposed to support

STRATCOM, the Air Force Space Command does not have responsibility for information operations. The latter has been retained by the

Air Combat Command. These problems result in little coherent

movement toward supporting the intent in forming a new Air Force

Space Command or STRATCOM.

The Rumsfeld Commission noted the problems in developing

new space capabilities and identified that at some future date all

space activities, including the train, organize and equip function,

should be under a separate military service. The commission suggested the first step is to form such a Service as a Space Corps within

the Department of the Air Force, much as the Marine Corps is part of

the Department of the Navy. The time for that move may be now.

Independent services generally are needed when there is a class of

security problems for which a single set of capabilities can best solve

the situation independent of other services and capabilities.

Warfighting solutions have become so complicated and interconnected that the efforts of all services are needed jointly. However, this

April 2004 Defense Horizons 7
now means that all services are focused on warfighting solutions. To

restore the focus on war prevention, a separate entity may needed. A

new Space and Information Corps could be just that solution. It is

particularly important that space and information responsibilities be

included under such an organization.

One must also consider the programmatic approach to acquiring new space and information systems. While developing these new

space capabilities is technically feasible, it will not be achieved

without innovation and determination. Considering the current

problems in the aerospace industry in acquiring new space systems

in a cost-effective and timely manner, as described in the recent

Congressionally-chartered Aerospace Commission report and the

DOD-sponsored Defense Science Board report, some have suggested

that it is premature to embark on new, transformational space development programs.15 We contend that this is exactly the wrong

approach. Putting the future on hold while fixating on current programs will mean our abandonment of the high ground of space as

other nations vigorously pursue space capability. Conversely, we

argue that a creative and reasonable responsive space development

program will become the incubator where we relearn how to successfully develop, acquire, and operate space systems of the

future—large and small, affordable and effective—whether they are

traditional space infrastructure or revolutionary mission sorties.

Conclusion

The growing threats facing the United States and allies demand

new approaches. The threats include the rise of new peer competitors, proliferation of WMD, and non-state, global terrorism. A new set

of capabilities is needed that would focus on war prevention. Key

among these capabilities are responsive space and information tools.

Much of the necessary groundwork for a new approach has been

laid. The formation of a new U.S. Strategic Command provides an

operational focus for war-prevention operations. The partial separation of space efforts from other capabilities within DOD has been

accomplished under the Air Force Space Command and Under Secretary of the Air Force. Key technology developments, particularly in

low-cost, rapid access to space, long-range strike, and microsatellites

has begun, primarily within defense agencies, such as DARPA.

There remains much to do. Organizational inertia within existing warfighting-focused organizations remains an impediment. Public angst over new forms of military conflict and activities such as

space weaponry, space control, and Internet operations will need to

be considered. New CONOPS and new technologies will need to be

developed to enable the responsive space sortie capability. Consequently, it may be time to separate these critical functions into a new

Space and Information Corps with sole responsibility for training,

organizing and equipping the forces necessary to carry out a crucial

piece of 21st century security.

Notes1 Air Force Space Command, “Strategic Master Plan FY04 and Beyond,”

accessed at <http://www.the memoryhole.org/mil/space-command-plan-fy2004.pdf>. 2 Department of Defense, Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review, January 9, 2002, accessed at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/jan2002/t01092002_

t0109npr.html>.

3 U.S. Strategic Command, “U.S. Strategic Command SNAP SHOT: A Summary of

Facts and Information Representative of USSTRATCOM, January 2004, accessed at

<http://www.stratcom.af.mil/factsheetshtml/SnapShot.doc>. 4 General John P. Jumper, USAF, interview by Jeremy Singer, in “Space as a

Means Not an End in Itself,” Space News, July 14, 2003. Jumper wisely admonishes

military thinkers to focus on effects rather than systems, but his remarks imply space

capabilities be relegated only to “put a cursor over the target.” 5 George W. Bush, “Radio Address by the President to the Nation,” September 14,

2002, accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020914.html>.

President Bush discussed the growing danger posed by Iraq: “By supporting terrorist

groups, repressing its own people and pursuing weapons of mass destruction in defiance

of a decade of U.N. resolutions, Saddam Hussein’s regime has proven itself a grave and

gathering danger.” 6 Dave Moniz and Tom Suitieri, “After grim Rumsfeld memo, White House supports him”, USA Today, October 22, 2003. 7 Statement by Colonel John Boyd, USAF (1927–1997). Boyd was one of the

most seminal thinkers in the last century on the subject on strategies of conflict. His

ideas originally focused on military conflict, but he later generalized them to cover

conflict in a broader sense. Unfortunately, he did not publish any of his work. The

materials he used in presentations have been copied, and former students and adherents have further developed his ideas. A biography by Robert Coram, Boyd: the Fighter

Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2002), provides an introduction to his theories. An exposition on his theories and their applications is available in G.T. Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institute Press, 2001).

8 John Boyd introduced the observe-orient-decide-act cycle, or OODA loop, in

his presentation on patterns of conflict presentation in 1986. Digitized copies can be

accessed at <http://www.d-n-i.net/boyd/pdf/poc.pdf>. Also, Thomas C. Schelling, The

Strategy of Conflict (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1960), provided a lucid and

insightful exposition of traditional theory. The traditional approach is essentially static, seeking a strategy (or series or moves) that can be played out serially once the

game is engaged. Boyd argued that achieving a winning position only motivates an

adversary to pursue new strategies. Consequently, we must be prepared to change our

strategy at least one step in advance of an adversary’s adaptation. 9 Information and influence operations were primary methods of the Office of

the Secretary of Defense Office of Strategic Influence, which was formed shortly after

the September 11, 2002, terrorist attacks. Initial efforts by that office were undermined by critics who misunderstood its role, leading to its disestablishment less than

6 months after its formation. One of the authors was the director of the office. 10 Moniz and Suitieri.

11 “Wayward Satellite Wrecks Havoc,” Reuters, May 20, 1998, accessed at

<http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,12414,00.html>. 12 Jeff Foust, “Operationally Responsive Spacelift: A Solution Seeking a Problem?” The Space Review, October 13, 2003, accessed at <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/52/1>. 13 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Special Notice (SN03–23), FALCON Program Broad Area Announcement, accessed at <http://www.darpa.mil/baa/

SN03-23.htm>. 14 Ibid.

15 Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force

Report, “Acquisition of National Security Programs,” May 2003 

8 Defense Horizons April 2004

Defense Horizons is published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy through the

Publication Directorate of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

Defense Horizons and other National Defense University publications are available online at

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/nduphp.html.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other

department or agency of the Federal Government.

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Hans Binnendijk

Director