alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### WAGNER TYPEWRITER CO. v. ROBINSON.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

June 22, 1903.)

1. Replevin—Ownership—Sufficiency op Evidence.

In replevin for a typewriter by a company dealing in such machines, it was insufficient for it to show by its records that it had received the machine in stock, and that it was never sold, leased, rented, or exchanged, and had not passed out of its hands in the regular course of business.

3. Same—Alternative Judgment—Evidence op Value.

In replevin for a typewriter it was error to render judgment that the defendant recover the property, or, in event of nondelivery, the sum of §60, as its assessed value, where the only evidence of value was the price paid by the defendant for the machine.

Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Second District.

Replevin by the Wagner Typewriter Company against Joseph Robinson, sued as John C. Robinson. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Modified and affirmed.

Argued before FREEDMAN, P. J., and GILDERSLEEVE and MacLEAN, JJ.

Charles Struss, for appellant.

Marks & Marks, for respondent.

MacLEAN, J.

In replevin for a typewriter known by a certain number, the plaintiff, by two of its employés in charge of its steel department, and without contradiction, testified to the receipt of the machine from its Buffalo office on April 18th, and to its pres*282ence, not on their view, but according to figure appearing on the steel book, in the stockroom, on October ist last and the ist of January of this year; that all machines sold, leased, rented, or exchanged by the company passed through the stock department; that the machine in question was never sold, leased, rented, or exchanged; these employés did not do the leasing, selling, or exchanging; and that the machine never passed through their hands in the regular course of business. Inability to account for an article is not enough. Nor is there proof that it was stolen or wrongfully taken from their ■ possession. The defendant exhibited some title to the chattel by him —testimony to its purchase in midsummer from a person, whom he named. Judgment was rendered that the defendant recover the property mentioned, or, in the event of nondelivery, the sum of $6o, as the assessed value of the property. The award of $6o was error, there being no evidence of its value "beyond the price paid by the defendant for the machine, and so the judgment must be modified by striking therefrom such sum in the alternative.

Judgment modified by striking out such sum in the alternative, and, as modified, affirmed, without costs. All concur.
### §3318a. Cooperative research projects; agreements with and receipt of funds from State and other agencies

On and after December 30, 1963, the Administrator of the Agricultural Research Service may enter into agreements with and receive funds from any State, other political subdivision, organization, or individual for the purpose of conducting cooperative research projects with such cooperators.

(Pub. L. 88–250, title I, Dec. 30, 1963, 77 Stat. 820.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section was formerly classified to section 450a of this title prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as this section.

Section was enacted as part of the Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1964, and not as part of the National Agricultural Research, Extension, and Teaching Policy Act of 1977 which comprises this chapter.
### §228c. Federal preemption of State and local requirements

No requirement of any State or territory of the United States, or any subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, with respect to bonding of packers or prompt payment by packers for livestock purchases may be enforced upon any packer operating in compliance with the bonding provisions under section 204 of this title, and prompt payment provisions of section 228b of this title, respectively: Provided, That this section shall not preclude a State from enforcing a requirement, with respect to payment for livestock purchased by a packer at a stockyard subject to this chapter, which is not in conflict with this chapter or regulations thereunder: Provided further, That this section shall not preclude a State from enforcing State law or regulations with respect to any packer not subject to this chapter or section 204 of this title.

(Aug. 15, 1921, ch. 64, title IV, §414, formerly §410, as added Pub. L. 94–410, §9, Sept. 13, 1976, 90 Stat. 1252; renumbered §414, Pub. L. 100–173, §9(1), Nov. 23, 1987, 101 Stat. 919.)
### §1907. Practices involving nonambulatory livestock

#### (a) Report

The Secretary of Agriculture shall investigate and submit to Congress a report on—

(1) the scope of nonambulatory livestock;

(2) the causes that render livestock nonambulatory;

(3) the humane treatment of nonambulatory livestock; and

(4) the extent to which nonambulatory livestock may present handling and disposition problems for stockyards, market agencies, and dealers.

#### (b) Authority

Based on the findings of the report, if the Secretary determines it necessary, the Secretary shall promulgate regulations to provide for the humane treatment, handling, and disposition of nonambulatory livestock by stockyards, market agencies, and dealers.

#### (c) Administration and enforcement

For the purpose of administering and enforcing any regulations promulgated under subsection (b), the authorities provided under sections 10414 [7 U.S.C. 8313] and 10415 [7 U.S.C. 8314] shall apply to the regulations in a similar manner as those sections apply to the Animal Health Protection Act [7 U.S.C. 8301 et seq.]. Any person that violates regulations promulgated under subsection (b) shall be subject to penalties provided in section 10414.

(Pub. L. 107–171, title X, §10815, May 13, 2002, 116 Stat. 532.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

The Animal Health Protection Act, referred to in subsec. (c), is subtitle E (§§10401–10418) of title X of Pub. L. 107–171, May 13, 2002, 116 Stat. 494, which is classified principally to chapter 109 (§8301 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 8301 of this title and Tables.

#### Codification

Section was enacted as part of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 and not as part of Pub. L. 85–765, which comprises this chapter.
Exhibit 32 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTEDPURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002.

The undersigned officer of FieldPoint Petroleum Corporation (the"Company") hereby certifies that:

     i.     theaccompanying Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of the Company for the fiscal year ended December 31,2004 (the "Report") fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

     ii.     theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

<R>Dated: April 5, 2005</R>

/s/ RayReaves                              Ray ReavesChief Executive Officer andChief Financial Officer
##### 



EXHIBIT 31.1 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Thomas D. Karol, certify that:  1.
    
    I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of ElkCorp;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15 and 15d-15e) for the registrant and
have:  a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,
to ensure that material information relating to the registrant,
including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others
within those entities, particularly during the period in which this
report is being prepared;b)
    
    [Paragraph omitted pursuant to S.E.C. Release Nos. 33-8238 and
34-47986];c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end
of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; andd)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants
most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in
the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal
control over financial reporting; and  5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,
to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board
of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):  a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to
record, process, summarize and report financial information; andb)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting. Date: May 14, 2004
    By   /s/ Thomas D. KarolThomas D. KarolChief Executive Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Preston S., Appellant.

[833 NYS2d 421]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Michael Corriero, J.), rendered on or about May 13, 2005, unanimously affirmed. No opinion. Order filed. Concur—Saxe, J.P., Friedman, Sweeny, McGuire and Malone, JJ.
#### David J. Elmer, Appellant, v. Patricia A. Hourihan, Respondent.

Order affirmed, without costs of this appeal to either party. All concur, except Bastow, J. P., and Del Vecchio, J., who dissent and vote to reverse and reinstate the verdict. (Appeal from order of Monroe Trial Term granting defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict in favor of plaintiff in an automobile negligence action.) Present — Bastow, J. P., Goldman, Henry, Noonan and Del Vecchio, JJ.
##### 



As amended and restated
May 18, 2007, effective April 2, 2007
 EMS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Executive Annual Incentive Compensation Plan
 1. PURPOSE
  2. DEFINITIONS
  (a)
    
    Plan - This Annual Incentive Compensation Plan for executives.(b)
    
    Business Unit - A principal subsidiary, business division or group of the
Company as identified for the purposes of the Plan by the Committee.(c)
    
    Board - The Board of Directors of the Company.(d)
    
    Company - EMS Technologies, Inc.(e)
    
    Committee - The Compensation Committee of the Board, which has the exclusive
authority to interpret and make awards under the Plan.(f)
    
    Plan Year - A fiscal year of the Company.(g)
    
    Base Compensation - A Participants annual salary compensation, before
reduction for Cafeteria Plan, Savings Incentive Plan, Stock Purchase Plan or other
elective reductions or deductions, and before deduction of any taxes.(h)
    
    Participant - A person selected in accordance with Section 4 to be eligible to
receive a bonus in accordance with this Plan.(i)
    
    Target Incentive - The bonus payable under the Plan in the event 100% of
financial and individual performance objectives are met.
 3. ADMINISTRATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE PLAN




---



##### 



4. ELIGIBLE PARTICIPANTS
    5. DETERMINATION OF INCENTIVE COMPENSATION AWARDS
  (a) Determination of Targets
 (b) Determination of Company and Business Unit Financial Targets
 (c) Determination of Participant Individual Performance Goals, and of Related Award or
Evaluation Factor.




---



##### 



Or, in the alternative
  (d) Determination of Award Based on Financial Objectives
 (e) Preliminary Determination of Each Participants Award
 (f) Final Approval
 6. PAYMENT OF INCENTIVE COMPENSATION AWARDS




---



##### 



7. CHANGE IN CONTROL OF THE COMPANY
 (a) Contrary Provisions
 (b) Change in Control
  provided however
   (c) Payment Upon a Change in Control




---



##### 



(d) Amendment or Termination
   (e) Trust Arrangement
 8. NON-ASSIGNABILITY
  9. NO RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT
  10. AMENDMENT OR TERMINATION
#### STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RICHARD LEE BURNS

No. 118A97

(Filed 7 November 1997)

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the unpublished decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 125 N.C. App. 616, 483 S.E.2d 194 (1997), awarding defendant a new trial in cases tried before Martin (Jerry Cash), J., in Superior Court, Forsyth County, which resulted in convictions and judgments of imprisonment for attempted incest, first-degree sexual offense, and taking indecent liberties with a minor. On 8 May 1997 the Supreme Court allowed discretionary review of additional issues. Heard in the Supreme Court 16 October 1997.

*Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Jill B. Hickey, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.*

*Lawrence J. Fine for defendant-appellee.*

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 28, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 04-40894

Summary Calendar

_____________________

DELTON SPREE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellee.

__________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:03-CV-107

__________________________________________________

Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The judgment of the district court is affirmed for the

reasons given by the judge in his order of May 11, 2004. Under

the Federal Tort Claims Act limitations barred this action six

months after the date of the Coast Guard’s denial letter on

September 20, 2002, but no suit was filed until September 5,

2003.

AFFIRMED.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

September 8, 2021

No. 04

- 20

- 00609

- CV

OPUS AE GROUP, L.L.C.

, Appellants

v.

AKF GROUP, LLC

, Appellee

From the 73rd Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2020

- CI

- 10826

Honorable Aaron Haas , Judge Presiding



### ORDER

In accordance with this court’s memorandum opinion, the parties’ joint motion to dispose of this appeal is GRANTED, this appeal is DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION, and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for entry of a judgment in conformity with th e parties’ settlement agreement. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.1(a). It is ORDERED that costs on appeal are taxed against the party who incurred them. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.1(d). It is FURTHER ORDERED that the mandate issue immediately. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 18.1( c).

It is so ORDERED on September 8, 2021.

_____________________________ Irene Rios , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 8th day of September, 2021.

_____________________________ Michael A. Cruz , Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

OFFICE OF CAREER, TECHNICAL, AND ADULT EDUCATION

MEMORANDUM

TO: Deputy Assistant Secretary 

SUBJECT: Redelegation of Authority to Serve as OCTAE Action Official for External 

Audits 

I. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

In accordance with the policy and procedures set forth in the Department’s 

Handbook for External Post Audit Process, ACSH-OFO-0007, dated 7/3/2019, and 

my responsibilities as Action Official for the Office of Career, Technical, and Adult 

Education (OCTAE), I hereby delegate to you, to your successor in function, and to 

anyone serving for you in acting capacity, the authority to serve as the OCTAE 

Action Official in carrying out all cooperative audit resolution responsibilities 

related to external audits, including authority to sign program determination letters. 

II. RESERVATIONS

None. 

III. REDELEGATION

This authority may not be redelegated.

IV. CERTIFICATION AND EFFECTIVE DATE

This delegation is effective upon certification by the Department's Delegations

Control Officer.

______________/s__________________ 

Amy Loyd, Ed. L.D. 

OGC Concurrence and Date: Michael Taylor; 8/2/2022 

Departmental Control Officer: Jim Clemmens

Certification Date: 8/30/2022 

Control Number: EV/EV/105 

400 MARYLAND AVE. SW, WASHINGTON, DC 20202

www.ed.gov

The Department of Education’s mission is to promote student achievement and preparation for global competitiveness by 

fostering educational excellence and ensuring equal access.
IV 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. RES. 1282 

Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 3018) to authorize the issuance 

of extreme risk protection orders. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 7, 2024 

Mrs. MCBATH submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on Rules 

RESOLUTION 

Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 3018) to 

authorize the issuance of extreme risk protection orders. 

1 Resolved, That immediately upon adoption of this res2 olution, the House shall proceed to the consideration in 

3 the House of the bill (H.R. 3018) to authorize the 

4 issuance of extreme risk protection orders. All points of 

5 order against consideration of the bill are waived. The bill 

6 shall be considered as read. All points of order against 

7 provisions in the bill are waived. The previous question 

8 shall be considered as ordered on the bill and on any 

9 amendment thereto to final passage without intervening 

10 motion except: (1) one hour of debate equally divided and 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•HRES 1282 IH 

1 controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of 

2 the Committee on the Judiciary or their respective des3 ignees; and (2) one motion to recommit. 

4 SEC. 2. Clause 1(c) of rule XIX shall not apply to 

5 the consideration of H.R. 3018. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
EO12866_SSM Petition_2060-AR68_Suppl emental Proposal_FRN_20140717

Summary of Responses to E. O. 12866 Review Comments

August 25, 2014

Page numbers refer to the “Summary of In teragency Working Comments on Draft Language

under EO12866/13563 Interagency Review.”

Page 9 – Clarifying edits have been made to footnote 2.

Page 13 – These terms are not defined in exis ting 40 CFR part 51 rule text and we are not

proposing to add or revise any rule text th rough this action. No edits have been made.

Page 19 – Clarifying edits have been made.

Page 21 – A clarifying f ootnote has been added.

Pages 26 and 27 – New text has been added to respond to the comments.

Page 29 – Clarifying edits have been made.

Page 34 – Clarifying edits have been made.

Page 35 – Clarifying edits have been made.

Page 39 – Clarifying edits have been made.

Page 49 – We have added a cross referen ce to another section of the preamble.

Page 104 – A clear reference to the NRDC v. EPA court case has been ad ded in several passages.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 01-4787

DAVID TERRELL JOHNSON,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News.

Jerome B. Friedman, District Judge.

(CR-01-50)

Submitted: March 14, 2002

Decided: March 26, 2002

Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Stephen A. Hudgins, Newport News, for Appellant. Paul J. McNulty,

United States Attorney, Toby M. Jesson, Special Assistant United

States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

David Terrell Johnson pled guilty to assault resulting in serious

bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6) (1994), and was

sentenced to a term of forty-six months imprisonment. He seeks to

appeal, alleging that his sentence was disproportionately harsh. We

find that Johnson waived his appeal rights and, therefore, dismiss the

appeal. 

In his plea agreement, Johnson waived the right to appeal a sentence within the statutory maximum. This provision of the agreement

was brought to his attention by the district court during the plea colloquy, and Johnson stated that he understood the waiver and affirmed

his intention to waive his appeal rights. A defendant may waive the

right to appeal if the waiver is knowing and intelligent. United States

v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir. 1995). We find that

Johnson’s waiver was knowing and voluntary and effectively bars

review of his challenge to the district court’s imposition of sentence.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument, because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED

2 UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON
###### Editorial Note on Part 724

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 724 appear at 65 FR 62616, Oct. 19, 2000.

#### § 724.116 Counsel/Representative.

An individual or agency designated by the applicant who agrees to represent the applicant in a case before the NDRB. It includes, but is not limited to: a lawyer who is a member of the bar of a Federal Court or of the highest court of a State; an accredited representative designated by an organization recognized by the Administrator of Veterans Affairs; a representative from a State agency concerned with veterans affairs; or a representative from private organizations or local Government agencies.
#### STATE v. STOKES

No. 383P97

Case below: 126 N.C.App. 832

Petition by defendant for discretionary review pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 denied 2 October 1997.