United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-60756

Motaleb Abdul, 

Petitioner,

versus

Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General, 

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A215 916 148

Before Clement, Haynes, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Motaleb Abdul, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, applied for asylum 

on the basis of political persecution under 8 U.S.C. § 1158. The immigration 

judge (the “IJ”) denied his petition and the Board of Immigration Appeals 

(the “BIA”) affirmed. For the reasons below, we DISMISS the petition for 

review in part and DENY it in part.

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 30, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I. Background

In 2018, Abdul entered the United States without inspection. 

Approximately two months later, the Department of Homeland Security 

commenced removal proceedings against Abdul by issuing a Notice to 

Appear. In response to the Notice, Abdul sought relief from removal by 

applying for asylum.1 He claimed that he was persecuted for being a member 

of the Liberal Democratic Party (the “LDP”), an opposition political party 

in his home country, by the ruling Awami League party. 

At the merits hearing, Abdul testified that he joined the LDP because, 

out of all the parties that came into his father’s tea shop to discuss their 

activities, he appreciated the LDP’s work the most. As a general member, he 

attended LDP events, publicized the party in public places, and encouraged 

people to join. According to Abdul, the Awami League threatened and 

attacked him—and only him—for being an LDP member because his father’s 

tea shop was popular with political members and he was liked by many people 

in his neighborhood. 

Two such incidents—involving the Awami League’s alleged attempts 

to kill him—served as Abdul’s main reasons for seeking asylum. Both attacks 

occurred while Abdul was walking home alone from his father’s tea shop after 

spending the earlier part of the day doing an activity for the LDP. Abdul 

claimed that his attackers were Awami League members because they 

loitered in an area where many Awami League programs occurred and 

1 Abdul also applied for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) and 

protection under the Convention Against Torture under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). The IJ 

denied Abdul’s applications on both grounds, the BIA affirmed, and Abdul does not raise 

any errors of the BIA’s or the IJ’s decisions on these two claims on appeal. Accordingly, 

we do not address them. See Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 260 

n.9 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that “the failure to provide any legal or factual analysis of an 

issue results in waiver of that issue”).

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various Awami League leaders frequented. Abdul further claimed that the 

Awami League president ordered the attacks because Abdul had rejected the 

president’s request to leave LDP and join the Awami League. After the 

attacks, Abdul fled to his extended family’s homes, and ultimately left 

Bangladesh after continuing to receive threats from anonymous people over 

the phone and in person. 

Based on the evidence Abdul presented,2 the IJ determined that 

Abdul’s political membership could not be found to be the central reason for 

the attacks. Concluding that the evidence failed to establish a nexus between 

Abdul’s political membership and the attacks he experienced, a requirement 

for asylum, the IJ denied Abdul’s application. See Thuri v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 

788, 792 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (noting that nexus is required for 

asylum eligibility).

Abdul appealed to the BIA, which dismissed his case. It concluded 

that the IJ did not err in determining that there was no nexus between 

Abdul’s political membership and the attacks, as Abdul failed to 

meaningfully explain why he was the only LDP member attacked. Abdul 

timely petitioned for review of the BIA’s nexus determination. 

II. Standard of Review

We review the BIA’s decision, considering the IJ’s underlying 

decision to the extent that it had “some impact on” the BIA’s determination. 

Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 2009). We must affirm the BIA’s 

decision “if there is no error of law and if reasonable, substantial, and 

2 In addition to his testimony, Abdul also submitted affidavits from other LDP 

members and family who all stated that Abdul’s father owned a tea shop where lots of 

political party members met; that Abdul worked for the LDP; that Abdul was attacked (with 

one witnessing the aftermath of the attack); and that Abdul was not safe in Bangladesh due 

to the Awami League. 

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probative evidence on the record, considered as a whole, supports the 

decision’s factual findings.” Thuri, 380 F.3d at 791 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). The findings of fact are “conclusive unless any 

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id.

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)); see also Garland v. Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669, 

1678 (2021) (“The only question for judges reviewing the BIA’s factual 

determinations is whether any reasonable adjudicator could have found as the 

agency did.”).

III. Discussion

Abdul makes two argumentsregarding the BIA’s nexus determination 

over which we have jurisdiction: (1) that the BIA erred by failing to identify 

an alternative motive for his attacks that would prevent him from seeking

asylum protection; and (2) that there was substantial circumstantial evidence 

establishing a nexus.3

 Neither argument is persuasive.

First, Abdul erroneously places the burden of proof on the BIA. The

responsibility to demonstrate the requisite nexus is on Abdul. See Thuri, 380 

F.3d at 792 (requiring the alien to prove nexus). Thus, the BIA was not 

required to identify an alternative motive for Abdul’s attack, and it did not 

err in concluding that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the 

attacks were centrally motivated by Abdul’s political membership in the 

LDP. 

Second, record evidence supports the BIA’s decision. Although 

Abdul provided circumstantial evidence that could support a conclusion that 

3 Abdul also argues that the BIA engaged in impermissible factfinding, but we lack 

jurisdiction to address that issue, as Abdul failed to first raise it to the BIA in a motion for 

reconsideration. See Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 319–20 (5th Cir. 2009). We 

accordingly dismiss that part of Abdul’s petition.

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his membership in LDP motivated the attacks, the evidence could also 

support the BIA’s affirmation of the IJ’s findings: as the BIA determined, the 

entire record lacked a meaningful explanation as to why Abdul was the only 

LDP member targeted. Where, as here, “there are two permissible views of 

the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly 

erroneous.” Alvarado de Rodriguez v. Holder, 585 F.3d 227, 234–35 (5th Cir. 

2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Dai, 141 S. Ct. 

at 1678 (recognizing that the BIA’s factual findings are to be upheld if they 

qualify as “one of potentially many reasonable possibilities”). Abdul has thus 

failed to show that the circumstantial evidence he provided “compelled” a 

contrary conclusion. Thuri, 380 F.3d at 791 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

Accordingly, we DISMISS the petition in part and DENY it in part.

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