[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 12-11397

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-23139-JAL

JANET FELICIANO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

EDGARDO GONZAGA,

 Plaintiff,

versus

CITY OF MIAMI BEACH,

a municipal entity,

 Defendant,

LT. ROBERT ACOSTA, 

Miami Beach Police Lt., in his individual capacity,

DET. ANDREW DOHLER, 

Miami Beach Police Det., in his individual capacity, 

DET. DOUGLAS DOZIER, 

Miami Beach Police Det., in his individual capacity, 

SGT. JAMES NASH,

Miami Beach Police Sgt., in his individual capacity, 

 Defendants-Appellants.

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________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(February 5, 2013)

Before CARNES and COX, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,* Judge.

CARNES, Circuit Judge:

At early common law parties and others with an interest in the outcome of 

litigation were deemed incompetent to testify and barred from the witness stand on 

the ground that their interest made them unworthy of belief. 2 John H. Wigmore, 

Evidence in Trials at Common Law §§ 575–77 (Chadbourn Rev. 1979). The idea 

was similar to the one that H.L. Mencken expressed in another context when he 

remarked, “It is hard to believe that a man is telling the truth when you know that 

you would lie if you were in his place.” H.L. Mencken, A Little Book in C Major

22 (John Lane Co. 1916). Parties with an interest, it was presumed, would lie. 

That presumption and the rule of exclusion it supported were worn down by 

criticism over time. See, e.g., 5 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence

81 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1995) (1827) (describing the rule as “blind and 

brainless”). As Logan Bleckley, one of Georgia’s greatest judges, explained more 

than a century ago:

 

* Honorable Jane A. Restani, United States Court of International Trade Judge, sitting by 

designation.

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Interest and truth may go together. Is there, in the world, an honest 

man who does not know that he can tell the truth against his interest? 

. . . Where there is impossible doubt as to the effect of villainy upon 

veracity, the jury ought to be left to decide it. As coming from the 

average of society, they know best what to think on such a question. 

Interest is a great rascal; but is not an absolute reprobate. Its doom is 

not perdition at all events. It has a chance of salvation. It is not 

obliged to commit perjury.

Davis v. Central R.R., 60 Ga. 329, 333 (Ga. 1878) (Bleckley, J.). Early in the last 

century the Supreme Court could say that “what was once regarded as a sufficient 

ground for excluding the testimony of [an interested witness] altogether has come 

to be uniformly and more sensibly regarded as affecting the credit of the witness 

only.” Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 380, 54 S.Ct. 212, 215 (1933). On 

claims subject to trial by jury, issues about whether to credit the testimony of a 

witness, interested or not, are for the jury. See Moughon v. State, 57 Ga. 102, 106

(Ga. 1876) (Bleckley, J.) (“What shall come to the jury as evidence, is for the 

court. What it is worth when it arrives, is for the jury. They can discern its true 

value with spare assistance from the bench.”). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and countless decisions applying it 

express the modern rule that a case should be put to the jury if there is any genuine 

issue of material fact, including one created solely by the testimony of a party. 

See, e.g., Strickland v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 1160 (11th Cir. 2012);

Hulsey v. Pride Restaurants, LLC, 367 F.3d 1238, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004); Stewart 

v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 850 (11th Cir. 2000). Occasionally 

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there is pushback against this rule, sometimes expressed in orders granting 

summary judgment despite what is described as the non-movant’s

“unsubstantiated” or “uncorroborated” or non-objective testimony. At other times

we have seen summary judgment based on disapproval of a party’s testimony as 

“conclusory” when it is not. There appears to have been some of that in this case, 

although the district court did reach the right result anyway. 

I.

Police officers Robert Acosta, Andrew Dohler, Douglas Dozier, and James 

Nash appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for partial summary 

judgment on Janet Feliciano’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unlawful search claim. 

Feliciano’s claim alleges that those four officers violated her Fourth Amendment 

rights when they conducted a warrantless entry into her home and searched it. The 

district court denied the defendant officers qualified immunity on the claim, 

reasoning that although their initial entry did not violate Feliciano’s clearly 

established Fourth Amendment rights, they plainly exceeded constitutional bounds 

when they searched, among other things, her underwear drawer and kitchen pantry. 

The officers contend that the district court erred in denying them qualified 

immunity because the scope of their search did not violate Feliciano’s clearly 

established constitutional rights.

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We review de novo a district court’s denial of summary judgment based on 

qualified immunity, applying the same legal standards that governed the district 

court. Edwards v. Shanley, 666 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012). Summary 

judgment is appropriate when the record evidence, including depositions, sworn 

declarations, and other materials, shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a), (c). In conducting our review, “we are required to view the evidence 

and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party, and resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the nonmovant.” Skop v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 485 F.3d 1130, 1143 (11th Cir. 2007) 

(quotation marks omitted). Thus, “when conflicts arise between the facts 

evidenced by the parties, we [must] credit the nonmoving party’s version.” Evans 

v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Although the “facts,” 

as accepted for purposes of summary judgment, may not be the actual facts of the 

case, “our analysis . . . must begin with a description of the facts in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff” and our decision must accept those facts. Davis v. 

Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006).

II.

Aside from the time, place, and persons involved in the incident giving rise 

to this case, the parties’ accounts of the material events differ. At this stage of the 

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proceedings we are required to credit Feliciano’s version if there is any evidence to 

support it, and it is that version we set out here.

In August 2006, the Miami Beach Police Department received a confidential 

tip from one of Feliciano’s neighbors. According to that tip, a couple living at 

Feliciano’s apartment were possibly drug dealers and had three small children in 

the household.1

 Responding to that tip, narcotics officers Acosta, Dohler, Dozier, 

and Nash went to Feliciano’s apartment at around 9:00 p.m. on September 2, 2006, 

to investigate. Feliciano, who was five to eight weeks pregnant at the time, was 

inside the apartment with her domestic partner, Edgardo Gonzaga, and their three 

children, aged 7, 6, and 4. Feliciano’s eldest son answered the officers’ knock on 

the door by opening it a little. When Feliciano came to the doorway, the officers 

identified themselves, informed her that they had received an “anonymous” tip that 

drugs were being sold out of her apartment, and asked if they could come inside 

 

1 The signed letter submitted to the police stated:

As a neighbor on Crespi Blvd., I am concerned about the following situation. There is 

a lot of activity (drugs?) that occurs in the section 8 housing unit at 8235 Crespi Blvd., 

Miami Beach, I believe #1(?) (the apartment closest to the street). I believe the female 

living there, along with her husband, are active drug dealers. People come and go at 

all hours of day and night, and there are many loud disputes and fights. Neighbors are 

scared of them. With the three small children in the household, it is especially 

dangerous for the welfare of not only those children, but others on this block. 

Feliciano filed a motion in the district court to exclude the allegations in the neighbor’s 

tip because the officers failed to timely disclose its existence under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a). 

Although the district court has yet to formally rule on Feliciano’s motion, it implicitly overruled 

her request for purposes of summary judgment by considering the contents of the neighbor’s tip 

in its decision. We need not decide whether the district court abused its discretion in doing so 

because the contents of the tip do not affect the result of this appeal. See infra pp. 19–20.

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and search it. Feliciano disputed the accuracy of the tip and told the officers that 

they could not come inside without a search warrant. Officer Dohler replied that 

the officers didn’t need a search warrant because Feliciano had a religious candle 

burning in her window, which presented a fire hazard justifying the removal of her 

children from the home. (The officers have not repeated that assertion since then.)

Around this time, Gonzaga came walking out of the back bedroom where he 

had been watching television. When the officers spotted him, they pushed their 

way through the door and rushed into the apartment. Acosta grabbed Feliciano’s

neck, forced her towards the living room couch, held her arms behind her back, 

and began repeatedly slamming her stomach into the wooden side arm of the 

couch. Although Feliciano begged Acosta to stop because she was asthmatic, 

pregnant, and didn’t want any harm to come to her unborn child, Acosta ignored 

her pleas and continued to ram her stomach into the arm of the couch. Officer 

Nash, who was standing beside Acosta and Feliciano, did not intervene. 

While Acosta was restraining Feliciano, Dohler and Dozier grabbed 

Gonzaga by the neck and, when Feliciano’s eldest son ran near, one of the officers 

grabbed the child by the shoulder and threw him against the wall. Following a 

brief struggle, Dohler and Dozier handcuffed Gonzaga. Acosta then allowed 

Feliciano to sit on the couch and comfort her three children. Without the consent 

of either Feliciano or Gonzaga, Acosta, Dohler, and Dozier proceeded to search the 

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residence, rifling through Feliciano’s underwear drawer in her bedroom, the 

medicine cabinet in the bathroom, and the cabinets and pantry in the kitchen. One 

of the officers eventually emerged from the kitchen holding what he claimed was a 

half of a marijuana joint that he claimed to have discovered. Gonzaga remarked 

“that’s not my weed,” but was soon escorted out of the apartment on misdemeanor 

charges of resisting arrest without violence, possession of cannabis, and possession 

of drug paraphernalia. After the officers left, Feliciano experienced stomach 

cramping and vaginal bleeding. She went to the emergency room the next day and 

learned that she had suffered a miscarriage.

In his arrest report, completed after the incident, Acosta stated that the 

officers noticed the smell of marijuana emanating from Feliciano’s apartment after 

she opened the door and as they were explaining to her the reason they were there. 

The report also indicated that Gonzaga was “smoking a joint” as he emerged from 

the bedroom, tried to conceal the joint as soon as he saw the officers standing 

outside, and then dropped it and attempted to run out of the apartment. The 

officers reportedly recovered the joint and also found a small amount of cannabis 

and rolling papers in Gonzaga’s pocket during a search incident to arrest. Acosta 

indicated in his report, however, that it was unknown whether Gonzaga was under 

the influence of drugs.

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Gonzaga was formally charged with resisting arrest, possession of 

marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia, but the charges were later 

dismissed because no officer appeared in court. The alleged marijuana that the 

officers claimed to have seized at the apartment was never tested and has since 

been destroyed. 

III.

Feliciano filed a fifteen-count amended complaint against the City of Miami 

Beach and the four officers in their individual capacities, asserting numerous 

constitutional claims for excessive force and unlawful search and seizure, as well 

as several state-law tort claims. In Count Six of the complaint, which is the only 

claim at issue in this appeal, Feliciano alleged that the officers violated her Fourth 

Amendment rights when they entered her home without a warrant and searched the 

premises. The officers moved for partial summary judgment on a number of the 

claims, including the one asserted in Count Six. They maintained that they were 

entitled to qualified immunity on that claim because the warrantless entry and 

resulting search of Feliciano’s apartment were justified by probable cause and the 

presence of exigent circumstances—namely, the need to prevent the destruction of 

drug evidence and to otherwise ensure that there were no drugs “within the plain 

grasp” of Feliciano’s children. Officer Nash also maintained that he was entitled 

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to qualified immunity because he did not personally participate in the search of 

Feliciano’s bedroom, bathroom, or kitchen. 

The officers based their defense of qualified immunity, in large measure, on 

Acosta’s arrest report and his deposition testimony. During his deposition, Acosta 

testified, in relevant part, that he smelled marijuana emanating from Feliciano’s 

apartment when the officers first approached the residence and before they 

knocked on the door. Acosta also testified that he saw Gonzaga smoking a joint as 

he walked out of the bedroom “with slits for eyes,” and that Gonzaga attempted to 

conceal the joint by lowering his right hand and hiding it in his palm. Feliciano, in 

both her deposition testimony and sworn declaration, adamantly disputed the 

officers’ account, testifying that Gonzaga had nothing in his hands when he 

emerged from the bedroom, that neither she nor Gonzaga was smoking marijuana,

and that there was no marijuana smell in the apartment when the officers arrived. 

She also testified that there was no marijuana in her apartment before the officers 

arrived and began their search. Gonzaga was not deposed. 

The district court rejected the officers’ claims for qualified immunity, but 

solely on the ground that the scope of their search, particularly of the underwear 

drawer and kitchen pantry, violated Feliciano’s clearly established Fourth 

Amendment rights because it plainly exceeded constitutional bounds, including the 

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demands of any apparent exigency.2 The court concluded that the officers did not 

violate clearly established law when they entered Feliciano’s apartment without a 

warrant. Its reasoning was that the officers had arguable probable cause and faced 

arguable exigent circumstances given the “effectively undisputed evidence” that 

they smelled marijuana coming from the apartment and saw Gonzaga holding a 

joint. Although the court acknowledged Feliciano’s testimony to the contrary, it 

found that her “bare assertions” were insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact 

about the officers’ observations because her testimony was “conclusory” and 

unsupported by any objective evidence. Accepting the officers’ assertions that 

they smelled and saw marijuana, the district court found that arguable probable 

cause and arguable exigent circumstances justified their immediate entry into

Feliciano’s home, without her consent, in order to arrest Gonzaga and to prevent 

the possible destruction of drug evidence.

IV.

The officers contend that, while the district court correctly concluded that 

arguable probable cause and arguable exigent circumstances justified their

warrantless entry into Feliciano’s home, the court erred in concluding that they 

exceeded the scope of a permissible search by looking through her underwear 

 

2 The district court did not address Nash’s contention that he was entitled to qualified 

immunity because he did not personally participate in the search of Feliciano’s apartment. See

infra p. 20. 

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drawer and pantry. They argue that the entry and search of Feliciano’s apartment 

was supported not just by arguable probable cause but also by actual probable 

cause given the “undisputed” evidence that they had received a tip from a neighbor 

that the couple residing in Feliciano’s apartment was selling drugs; they smelled 

marijuana when they approached the apartment; when the door was opened, they

observed Gonzaga coming out of the bedroom with a joint that he attempted to 

conceal; and they found marijuana and rolling papers on him during a search 

incident to arrest. On the specific issue of exigent circumstances, the officers 

argue that once they saw Gonzaga with the marijuana joint they were justified in 

searching the apartment, including in drawers and cabinets, for additional drugs 

because they reasonably believed that Feliciano would attempt to destroy any 

remaining drug evidence and they were also otherwise concerned that there might 

be readily accessible drugs that posed a risk to the safety of the children.

3

 

3 Feliciano maintains that we lack jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal because the 

officers’ challenge to the denial of qualified immunity centers on a number of disputed issues of 

material fact, including whether they actually smelled marijuana coming from the apartment, saw 

Gonzaga holding a joint, or found marijuana that was already in her home before their arrival. 

Although we do lack interlocutory jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 when the only issues 

appealed in a qualified immunity case are evidentiary issues about which facts a party may, or 

may not, be able to prove at trial, we have jurisdiction where the district court’s denial of 

qualified immunity is based, even in part, on a question of law. Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 

1283, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2009); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1484–85 (11th Cir. 1996). 

And that includes the district court’s determination in this case that the officers were not entitled 

to qualified immunity under a given set of facts. See Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1484–85. Moreover, in 

the course of deciding such an interlocutory appeal, we may resolve any factual issues that are 

“part and parcel” of the core legal issues. Id. at 1486. The requirement that the evidence be 

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff can itself create an issue of law. Id. at 1486 

n.3. We do have jurisdiction over this appeal.

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A.

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The “chief evil” against which the Fourth 

Amendment is directed is a government agent’s warrantless entry into a person’s 

home. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1379 (1980). A

warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a person’s home, and any resulting 

search or seizure, violates the Fourth Amendment unless it is supported by both 

probable cause and exigent circumstances. See id. at 587–90, 100 S.Ct. at 1381–

82; United States v. Tovar-Rico, 61 F.3d 1529, 1534–35 (11th Cir. 1995); United 

States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 

Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within an 

officer’s knowledge are “sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect 

had committed or was committing a crime,” Skop, 485 F.3d at 1137, while 

probable cause to search requires a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of 

a crime will be found in a particular place,” Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1510 (quotation 

marks omitted). Exigent circumstances, in turn, arise when “the inevitable delay 

incident to obtaining a warrant must give way to an urgent need for immediate 

action.” United States v. Burgos, 720 F.2d 1520, 1526 (11th Cir. 1983). We have 

held that the “presence of contraband without more does not give rise to exigent 

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circumstances,” though an exigent circumstance may arise “when there is danger 

that the evidence will be destroyed or removed.” Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1510 

(quotation marks omitted). The exigency question is whether the facts would lead 

an objectively “reasonable, experienced agent to believe that evidence might be 

destroyed before a warrant could be secured.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

Nevertheless, in cases involving arrests or warrantless searches or seizures, 

law enforcement officers are entitled to qualified immunity if they had even 

arguable probable cause.4

 See Swint v. City of Wadley, Ala., 51 F.3d 988, 996 

(11th Cir. 1995); Eubanks v. Gerwen, 40 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 1994). 

Arguable probable cause exists if “reasonable officers in the same circumstances 

and possessing the same knowledge as the Defendants could have believed that 

probable cause existed.” Swint, 51 F.3d at 996 (quotation marks omitted).

B.

We agree with the district court’s ultimate conclusion that the officers are 

not entitled to summary judgment on Feliciano’s Fourth Amendment claim on the 

basis of qualified immunity, though not for the same reasons articulated by the 

district court. See Parks v. City of Warner Robins, Ga., 43 F.3d 609, 613 (11th 

 

4 The initial inquiry in a qualified immunity case is whether the government officials 

being sued were “acting within the scope of [their] discretionary authority when the allegedly 

wrongful acts occurred.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks 

omitted). Here, there is no dispute that the defendants were acting within their discretionary 

authority when they entered and searched Feliciano’s residence. 

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Cir. 1995) (“[W]e may affirm the district court’s [summary judgment] decision on 

any adequate ground, even if it is other than the one on which the court actually 

relied.”). Instead, we conclude that, given the facts as we must view them for 

purposes of summary judgment, the officers lacked even arguable probable cause

or exigent circumstances justifying their entry into Feliciano’s apartment without a 

warrant or her consent.

5

In concluding that the warrantless entry of Feliciano’s apartment did not 

violate her clearly established Fourth Amendment rights, the district court 

improperly discounted her sworn statements about what the officers could have 

observed before they entered the apartment, failed to construe the facts in the light 

most favorable to her, and impermissibly credited the officers’ assertions that they 

 

5 The officers contend that we lack jurisdiction to consider whether the initial entry into 

Feliciano’s apartment was unconstitutional because the district court resolved that specific issue 

in their favor and they have not raised that issue in their notice of appeal or initial brief. They 

are wrong about that. Under Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(b), we have jurisdiction to review any 

judgments, orders, or parts thereof that are designated in a notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

3(c)(1)(b); White v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 664 F.3d 860, 863–64 (11th Cir. 2011). The 

officers’ notice of appeal expressly designates the denial of summary judgment “on the 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 unlawful search claim in Count 6 of the Second Amended Complaint.” In Count 

6, Feliciano claimed that both the initial entry and search of her apartment violated the Fourth 

Amendment. 

Moreover, on de novo review of a summary judgment ruling, we may not only affirm on 

any ground supported by the record, see Parks, 43 F.3d at 613, but may also choose to disregard 

a district court’s determination of the facts for summary judgment purposes and determine those 

facts ourselves, see Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1486 (noting that, “[i]n exercising our interlocutory 

review jurisdiction in qualified immunity cases,” we may either “accept the district court’s 

[factual] findings, if they are adequate,” or “make our own determination of the facts”). 

Although the officers understandably do not challenge the district court’s ruling in their favor 

concerning the initial entry, they do contend, as their position requires them to do, that the ruling 

was correct. 

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noticed the smell of marijuana coming from the apartment and saw Gonzaga 

smoking or holding a joint. When considering a motion for summary judgment, 

including one asserting qualified immunity, “courts must construe the facts and 

draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and when 

conflicts arise between the facts evidenced by the parties, [they must] credit the 

nonmoving party’s version.” Davis, 451 F.3d at 763 (quotation marks and 

emphasis omitted). Even if a district court “believes that the evidence presented by 

one side is of doubtful veracity, it is not proper to grant summary judgment on the 

basis of credibility choices.” Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th Cir. 

2006). This is because credibility determinations and the weighing of evidence 

“are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513 (1986).

Despite those fundamental precepts, the district court accepted “as 

uncontroverted” and “effectively undisputed” the officers’ assertions that before 

entering the apartment they smelled marijuana and saw a joint in Gonzaga’s hand, 

and the court dismissed Feliciano’s testimony directly to the contrary as “bare,” 

“conclusory,” and unsupported by objective evidence. The court based its ruling 

on our statement in Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1227 n.8 (11th 

Cir. 2004), that “a court need not entertain conclusory and unsubstantiated 

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allegations of fabrication of evidence.”6

 See also Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 

F.3d 695, 745 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that summary judgment was appropriate 

where the plaintiff relied on conclusory assertions that were based entirely on her 

own subjective beliefs), overruled on other grounds, Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 

U.S. 454, 457–58, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 1197–98 (2006); Stewart, 232 F.3d at 851

(holding that “bare and self-serving” allegations that are not based on personal 

knowledge are inadequate to survive summary judgment).

But Feliciano’s sworn statements that Gonzaga was not holding anything in 

his hands when he emerged from the bedroom into the officers’ view, that neither 

she nor Gonzaga was smoking marijuana, and that there was no marijuana odor in 

the apartment are not conclusory. They are non-conclusory descriptions of 

specific, discrete facts of the who, what, when, and where variety. They describe 

the external world as Feliciano observed it at the time and are based on her firsthand personal knowledge, not her subjective beliefs. And they directly contradict

the officers’ assertions about what they observed before and after they entered the 

apartment. The contradiction presents a classic swearing match, which is the stuff 

of which jury trials are made. 

 

6 Kingsland actually reversed a grant of qualified immunity to officers on a Fourth 

Amendment claim for false arrest, which makes the quoted statement dicta, though we do not 

dispute the correctness of that statement. See Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1231–34; see also United 

States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1253 n.10 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that dicta includes “those 

portions of an opinion that are not necessary to deciding the case then before us,” while the 

holding of a case is “comprised both of the result of the case and those portions of the opinion 

necessary to that result”) (quotation marks omitted). 

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To be sure, Feliciano’s sworn statements are self-serving, but that alone does 

not permit us to disregard them at the summary judgment stage. As we stated in 

Price v. Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005), “[c]ourts routinely and 

properly deny summary judgment on the basis of a party’s sworn testimony even 

though it is self-serving.” Or as Justice Bleckley put it, the law allows that 

“[i]nterest and truth may go together.” Davis, 60 Ga. at 333. Besides, Feliciano’s 

sworn statements are no more conclusory, self-serving, or unsubstantiated by 

objective evidence than the officers’ assertions that they smelled marijuana coming 

from her apartment and saw Gonzaga smoking or holding a joint. While it is 

undisputed that Gonzaga was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana, 

those charges were dismissed after none of the officers appeared in court, and there 

is no physical evidence, at least none that survives, to show that marijuana was 

present in Feliciano’s apartment. The substance that the officers purportedly 

seized was never tested and has long since been destroyed. And Feliciano’s 

interest in obtaining a judgment against the officers is not different in kind from 

their interest in preventing her from doing that. 

The officers fault Feliciano for failing to explain how she could see what 

Gonzaga was holding in his hands (or not holding in his hands according to her) 

because, they say, she was facing and speaking to them at the time. As a general 

principle, a plaintiff’s testimony cannot be discounted on summary judgment 

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unless it is blatantly contradicted by the record, blatantly inconsistent, or incredible 

as a matter of law, meaning that it relates to facts that could not have possibly been 

observed or events that are contrary to the laws of nature. See Scott v. Harris, 550 

U.S. 372, 380–81, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007) (holding that a court should not 

adopt a party’s version of the facts when it is “blatantly contradicted by the record” 

in the form of videotaped evidence); Holley Equip. Co. v. Credit Alliance Corp., 

821 F.2d 1531, 1537 (11th Cir. 1987) (concluding that a plaintiff’s testimony could 

not be disregarded on summary judgment because the discrepancies in that 

testimony were not “incredible as a matter of law” or “blatantly inconsistent”); 

United States v. Flores, 572 F.3d 1254, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that 

testimony is only incredible as a matter of law “if it relates to facts that the witness 

could not have possibly observed or events that could not have occurred under the 

laws of nature”) (quotation marks omitted). There is nothing in the record in this 

case to rule out the possibility that Feliciano turned her head or body, momentarily, 

to look at Gonzaga as he walked out of the bedroom. The officers imply that she 

did not, but Feliciano’s testimony implies that she did. 

In affirming the grant of summary judgment against the officers, we have 

not forgotten about the tip supplied by the neighbor, which brought the officers to 

the apartment to begin with. Whether an informant’s tip can give rise to probable 

cause or arguable probable cause depends on the totality of the circumstances, 

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particularly the informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge, as well as 

any independent corroboration of the details of the tip. Ortega v. Christian, 85 

F.3d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996). We need not go into all of that because the 

officers conceded at oral argument that the tip alone was not enough to justify their 

entry into the apartment or their search inside it, and we accept that concession for 

purposes of this case.

Nor have we forgotten Nash’s argument that he is entitled to summary 

judgment because he did not personally participate in the search once inside the 

apartment. Part of Feliciano’s claim, however, is that the officers, including Nash, 

“forcibly entered and invaded [her] home” in violation of her Fourth Amendment 

rights. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Feliciano, shows that 

Nash, as well as the other officers, did that. See Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 

638, 122 S.Ct. 2458, 2459 (2002) (emphasizing that “the Fourth Amendment has 

drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house,” such that “police officers need 

either a warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a 

lawful entry into a home”) (quotation marks omitted). We affirm the denial of 

summary judgment to Nash as well as to the other officers. 

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V.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment

on the basis of qualified immunity, albeit for reasons other than those upon which 

it relied. 

AFFIRMED.

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