Africa Security Brief

a publication of the africa center for strategic studies

No. 37 | May 2020

Africa Security Brief No. 37 1

Conflict in Libya has claimed the lives of tens of thousands, 

generated instability throughout North Africa and the 

Sahel, and become an increasingly pitched focal point for 

geostrategic competition. Since April 2019, the civil war 

in Libya has intensified particularly in the west of the 

country, where General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National 

Army (LNA) laid siege to Tripoli in a bid to oust the United 

Nations-supported Government of National Accord (GNA). 

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) 

estimates some 231,000 civilians are in the immediate frontline 

areas, with an additional 380,000 living in areas directly 

affected by conflict. More than 370,000 people are estimated 

to remain internally displaced by the violence and hundreds 

of civilians have been killed since Haftar’s April 2019 assault.1

According to UNSMIL, the LNA and affiliated forces conducted 

at least 850 precision air strikes by drones and another 170 

by fighter-bombers between April 2019 and January 2020.2

Of these, some 60 precision air strikes were conducted 

reportedly by Egyptian and Emirati fighter aircraft. 

Meanwhile, the GNA and affiliated forces conducted roughly 

250 air strikes. 

The economic impact of the conflict coupled with the 

COVID-19 pandemic may cause the country’s GDP to contract 

by more than 12 percent in 2020. The LNA’s blockade of 

oil terminals since January 2020 has further deepened the 

economic crisis. Oil production has plunged to around 120,000 

barrels per day from 1.14 million in December 2019. This has 

resulted in financial losses of approximately $2 billion per 

month for the state-owned enterprise.3

While the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Egypt 

have been supporting competing sides of the Libyan conflict 

from its early stages, the geostrategic stakes escalated in 

September 2019 with the deployment of Russian mercenaries 

in support of Haftar’s forces. This precipitated an intervention 

of Turkish ground forces in support of the GNA. In addition, 

external actors have deployed Syrian, Chadian, and Sudanese 

mercenaries, drones, ground-to-air defense systems, and 

Geostrategic Dimensions of Libya’s Civil War

By Tarek Megerisi

HIGHLIGHTS

•The Libya conflict has escalated into an increasingly dangerous geostrategic competition for influence, 

pitting the UAE, Egypt, and Russia against Qatar, most of Europe, and Turkey in a petroleum-rich 

country straddling the regions of North Africa, southern Europe, the Sahel, and the Middle East. 

• General Khalifa Haftar lacks a strong domestic constituency and instead serves largely as a proxy 

for external actor interests. He has, moreover, consistently acted as an obstacle to de-escalation 

and stabilization. Consequently, he lacks the standing to be treated as a political equal to the UNbacked government. 

•A UN-brokered settlement supported by nonaligned states is the only viable means for a stable 

de-escalation that would generate a nonthreatening outcome for the regional competitors while 

enabling Libya to regain its sovereignty.
2 Africa Center for Strategic Studies

other high-tech assets in an attempt to swing the balance 

in favor of their proxies.

Libya’s post-revolutionary decline toward fragmentation 

and state collapse represents a growing cause for alarm. 

With external actors coalescing around the two main 

Libyan factions, the conflict has become increasingly 

internationalized. This has compounded its complexity, 

taking on drivers far different from those with which it 

began. The internationalization of the conflict poses 

a geostrategic nightmare for the UN’s efforts toward 

stabilization and has upped the stakes for Libya’s civil war, 

posing an even greater threat to international security.4

DRAWING BATTLE LINES

The internationalization of Libya’s transition began with 

what itself was a very internationalized revolution. 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) 2011 

intervention, which largely took place from the skies, 

received most of the attention during Libya’s moment 

in the Arab Spring. Less recognized, however, were the 

rival interventions by Qatar and the UAE to equip, train, 

and otherwise assist Libyan revolutionary militias on the 

ground, which set the scene for a competition that would 

come to define Libya’s revolutionary aftermath. 

The two Gulf States mobilized their assistance through 

proxies with whom they had pre-existing relationships and 

who came to represent their divergent interests. Those who 

fell into Qatar’s camp included Libyan actors who were 

ideologically opposed to Muammar el Qaddafi as a tyrant, 

those who had often been imprisoned or persecuted by him, 

and those who defined their opposition in Islamist ideology. 

The UAE maintained links with a technocratic class who had 

often worked with Qaddafi’s son in a failed reform attempt 

and with older generations of opposition.

Tarek Megerisi is a policy fellow with the North Africa 

and Middle East program at the European Council on 

Foreign Relations, specializing in politics, governance, 

and development in the Arab world. He has worked 

extensively on Libya’s transition since 2012 with Libyan 

and international organizations. 

FIGURE 1. AREAS OF CONTROL IN LIBYA’S CIVIL WAR

Note: Areas of control are illustrative and not to be interpreted as precise or constant delineations.
Africa Security Brief No. 37 3

During the revolutionary war, these two distinct camps 

were often demarcated by personal contacts with a 

particular militia leader, a go-between from the older 

generation, or ties to a geographical area. As the war 

progressed, their military operations, diplomatic dealings, 

and the machinations of their political proxies who pursued 

exclusive control over Libya’s levers of power pitted the two 

camps against each another. The rift grew in acrimony even 

as the war ended and as the country’s first elections in over 

half a century took place in July 2012 to elect a parliament, 

the General National Congress (GNC). This would become 

the first theatre of this new, now more political, conflict.

The two coalitions continued to confront each other rather 

than compromise in a zero-sum pursuit of wealth and 

authority encouraged by their backers. The National Forces 

Alliance (NFA), a political coalition with close ties to the 

UAE, won a majority and was able to command 64 seats of the 

GNC (including nominally aligned members of parliament). 

The Justice and Construction Party (JCP), Libya’s Muslim 

Brotherhood-aligned political party, counted 34 seats. 

The myopic use of militias by domestic political actors to 

achieve their internal political outcomes institutionalized 

violence as a political tool. Meanwhile, competition over 

often corrupt business dealings with international partners 

destroyed the integrity and legitimacy of the GNC as an 

institution. Once the NFA, plagued by internal fissures 

and consistently outmaneuvered, failed to make its initial 

majority count, the coalition boycotted the GNC, severely 

undermining its effectiveness. 

Although the UN hoped that a fresh round of elections 

could restart a political transition that had been lost to 

the greed and immaturity of Libya’s political class, the 

damage was done. Libya’s foreign and domestic factions 

had fossilized, the use of violence had normalized, and a 

zero-sum mindset had become locked-in.

LIBYA’S GEOSTRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

If the Arab Spring was a time of regional flux for the Middle 

East and North Africa, to those in the Gulf with a more 

stable perch and considerable resources, it was a time of 

opportunity. As the old pillars of the region collapsed—

first Iraq, then Syria, and then Egypt—there was a sense 

that the moment was ripe for a new regional order. Qatar 

took the view, perhaps born of its own history of palace 

coups, that revolutions birthed new orders and new elites, 

and thus fully supported revolutionary actors in the hopes 

that this would create a regional network of friendly, if 

not gracious, states. Their own role in hosting many of the 

region’s exiled Islamist dissidents, and the fact that most 

organized long-standing opposition movements in the 

region were themselves Islamist, meant that their regional 

enterprises had a distinctly Islamist flavor.

If Qatar’s approach was built on opportunism and the 

prospects of soft power, then the UAE’s was forged from fear 

and realpolitik. The harsh domestic crackdowns on activists 

and those offering even modest proposals for reform showed 

an undercurrent of fear in Abu Dhabi that the Arab Spring 

contagion might cross Emirati borders. Its regional strategy 

since then shows an Emirati preference for evolution 

over revolution with a focus on securing key interests. 

This preference for recreating the old order with new leaders 

is evident in the UAE’s support for General Abdul Fattah 

el Sisi in Egypt, the jewel of this policy. Emirati activities 

in Yemen showcase the economic angle of its policy, an oil 

diversification strategy to become the regional leader in 

shipping and logistics, all while maintaining a dominant 

presence in the network of ports connecting the Far East 

to the Atlantic.

Libya’s strategic location at the heart of the Mediterranean, 

the Maghreb, and as a door to sub-Saharan Africa, as well 

as its significant oil and gas reserves and its revolutionary 

upheaval, meant that it fell neatly at the intersection 

of Emirati ideological and economic policies.5 As the 

remnants of the state crumbled and Libya destabilized, 

it attracted others like Egypt and France who saw an 

opportunity to build a friendly state that could be useful for 

their own economic, security, and regional policymaking 

interests.6 This dynamic continued as Libya’s decline 

persisted and worsened.

THE HAFTAR PROJECT

The collapse of the GNC was a turning point in Libya’s 

transition, symbolized best by the re-emergence of 

Qaddafi-era General Khalifa Haftar who had failed to 

establish himself after Qaddafi’s ouster. In 2011, he was 

quickly sidelined and ostracized. Many Libyans were 

unwilling to work with him, deeming him responsible for 

atrocities committed during the Chadian war of the 1980s. 
4 Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Others saw him as a divisive force given that they already 

had a commander, Abdul Fatah Younis. Haftar’s next 

emergence, a coup-by-television on Valentine’s Day 

2014, was laughed off by many at the time. However, it 

represented the beginning of politics by other means in 

Libya—the moving away from politicians employing 

militias toward a paradigm whereby militias employed 

politicians to provide a shroud of legitimacy.

Although Haftar has often leveraged local Libyan 

grievances, such as the rise of jihadism in eastern Libya or 

a long-standing oil blockade by rogue militias, his attempt 

to grow his position and attract supporters has never been 

an entirely Libyan or autonomous enterprise. Haftar’s 

reintroduction to Libya passed through Cairo, where his 

vision of emulating Qaddafi’s quasi-military dictatorship 

found resonance with a resurgent Egyptian military 

institution emboldened by the successful installation of 

Sisi following Egypt’s aborted democratic transition. 

While Haftar’s coup attempt failed to gain traction in Tripoli, 

he quickly discovered a new raison d’être over the course 

of 2014—by launching a war on terror in eastern Libya.

7

This allowed him to remain close to Egypt, which supplied 

him militarily to construct a hybrid security institution that 

patched together former regime intelligence and military 

officers with tribal militias and other auxiliary forces such 

as Salafists. This movement came to represent one side 

of the growing national divide as some sympathetic and 

recently elected politicians from the new parliament, the 

House of Representatives, ordained Haftar and his forces 

as Libya’s national armed forces. These same politicians had 

unilaterally moved this new legislative body to Tobruk in 

eastern Libya in an attempt to side-step their opponents and 

dominate the parliament, effectively bifurcating governance 

of the country.

Although the UN attempted to build a new power-sharing 

institution, the Government of National Accord (GNA), 

Haftar’s backers lost interest in political compromise 

in 2015. Under the cover of the war on terror narrative, 

the UAE built an airbase near Haftar’s headquarters in 

eastern Libya while the French deployed special forces 

and provided other expert assistance. Coming at a time 

when France was increasing its counterterrorism activity 

to Libya’s south in the Sahel, Haftar’s counterterrorism 

narrative and Emirati support (with whom France already 

enjoyed a close security partnership) made him a natural 

ally. Moreover, Haftar and his wider movement was 

considered a useful vehicle to expand French influence in 

Libya, which had long been dominated by Italy, and a key 

component of the wider security architecture the French 

were building in the Sahel.

With his external support in place, Haftar refused to 

support the Libyan Political Agreement, which was 

intended to reunify the country, and ultimately declared 

the agreement void in 2017.8 Haftar himself spent much 

of this time refusing to meet with any UN or diplomatic 

missions that were not coming to offer support, as he 

built up his base in eastern Libya.9 As the war on terror 

gradually ended, his foreign backers provided him the 

technology, finances, airpower, and manpower needed 

to extend his network further to acquire Libya’s oil export 

terminals and to conquer the remainder of eastern Libya. 

All the while, they ensured that no international criticism 

could come his way for a growing litany of war crimes 

committed by LNA forces including besieging the city of 

Derna, the execution-style killings of captured fighters from 

the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, and at least 

7 other incidents involving orders from a LNA commander 

to kill at least 33 prisoners in the area around Benghazi.10

THE SACRIFICIAL SARRAJ

The UN talks which birthed the GNA in December 2015 

began as a process firmly backed by a host of countries, 

including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy, 

in the hopes that it could end Libya’s civil war and create 

a credible partner for combatting terrorism and migration. 

However, as the talks dragged on, the crisis worsened, and 

with hundreds of thousands crossing the Mediterranean

and the Islamic State having taken the city of Sirte a year 

earlier, these needs became more acute. The Libyan Political 

Agreement which resulted from the UN talks held little 

local legitimacy and exhibited minimal structural capability 

to enforce many of its provisions, such as those to secure the 

capital. Moreover, the new Prime Minister, Fayez al Sarraj, 

a relatively unknown politician with no clear constituency, 

“ moving away from politicians 

employing militias toward a paradigm 

whereby militias employed politicians
Africa Security Brief No. 37 5

was chosen by virtue of being the least controversial and 

thereby most agreeable person to be found.

Sarraj and his weak government were delivered to Tripoli in 

March 2016 on an Italian naval vessel. The GNA struggled to 

operate in a city controlled by militias that were more than 

happy to hold the GNA hostage as a means of tapping the 

country’s central bank. Unable to immediately contribute 

to the counterterror or counter-migration efforts, many 

international actors who had supported the UN and the 

GNA quickly abandoned it for more expedient policies. 

These policies often revolved around nonstate actors and 

further undermined the GNA, reducing it to the status of a 

payer rather than a player. 

The GNA’s lack of political power was on full display 

when French President Emmanuel Macron hosted a 

conference between Haftar and Sarraj in 2018.11 Dubbed 

a peace conference, despite the two parties never actually 

having been at war with each another, it created a false 

equivalence between the civilian leader of the country 

and the commander of one of the country’s multitude of 

armed groups. It also set in play a dynamic that molded 

Libya’s political process over the coming years, with Sarraj 

being forced to negotiate deals with Haftar who continued 

expanding his presence and military power. Meanwhile, 

even the GNA’s staunchest allies, such as Italy, who had 

considered Sarraj key to preserving their influence in the 

country, began to lose confidence. 

UN Special Representative Ghassan Salamé tried to break 

this mold during 2018-2019 to create a new, inclusive political 

process that would lead to a new civilian government and 

national security institutions more reflective of Libya’s 

patchwork of political and military actors. Following a 

power-sharing agreement struck between Haftar and Sarraj 

in Abu Dhabi at the end of February 2019, the new UN plan 

seemed to offer some hope. However, the plan remained 

highly contested with many in Libya refusing to support it, 

which eroded UN and international credibility in the country. 

On March 27, 2019, in a reported meeting between Saudi 

FIGURE 2. GEOSTRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS IN 

LIBYA’S CIVIL WAR

February-October 2011 Libyan Revolution – Qatar and UAE support 

opposing factions of revolutionary forces.

July 7, 2012 Elections held for seats in Libya’s parliament, the General 

National Congress (GNC).

February 14, 2014 Khalifa Haftar announces he has suspended the 

GNC with no immediate effect.

June 25, 2014 Elections held for a new legislative body, the House of 

Representatives (HoR).

November 6, 2014 The Constitutional Chamber of the Libyan Supreme 

Court rules the HoR elections unconstitutional.

December 17, 2015 Members of the GNC and HoR sign the Libyan 

Political Agreement in Skhirat, Morocco. The agreement establishes the 

Government of National Accord (GNA) with Fayez al Sarraj as Prime 

Minister.

March 30, 2016 Prime Minister Sarraj arrives in Tripoli to lead 

the GNA.

December 17, 2017 Haftar declares the Libyan Political Agreement 

void.

May 29, 2018 Paris Peace Conference brings Haftar and Sarraj together 

and concludes with a tentative pathway for new elections. The elections are 

never organized.

March 27, 2019 Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and 

Emirati representatives reportedly meet with Haftar in Riyadh and decide 

to launch a military offensive to take Tripoli.

April 4, 2019 Haftar’s LNA lays siege to Tripoli and takes control of 

coastal towns west of Tripoli.

September-December 2019 Hundreds of Russian mercenaries 

employed by the Wagner Group arrive in Libya to support the LNA.

November 28, 2019 The GNA and Turkey sign maritime and security 

agreement, securing Turkish military support for the GNA.

January 12, 2020 Leaders of the LNA and GNA meet in Moscow to 

discuss end to conict.

January 19, 2020 German Chancellor Angela Merkel holds 

International Berlin Conference on Libya signaling increased engagement 

from European Union (EU) to end conict. 

End of January 2020 The LNA reasserts control over western ports 

establishing a blockade of oil terminals.

March 31, 2020 EU launches naval Operation IRINI to enforce the UN 

arms embargo in place since 2011.

April 14, 2020 GNA forces with Turkish air support recapture several 

western coastal cities, including Sabratha and Surman, extending GNA 

control west from Tripoli to border with Tunisia.

April 27, 2020 While LNA forces suffer defeats in western Libya, Haftar 

claims a “popular mandate” to govern Libya, brushing aside civilian 

government based in eastern Libya.

“

it created a false equivalence between 

the civilian leader of the country and 

the commander of one of the country’s 

multitude of armed groups
6 Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Haftar, and Emirati 

representatives, the decision was made that Haftar would try 

to seize power by launching a surprise attack on Tripoli—

even as UN Secretary General António Guterres was in town 

trying to salvage the UN-backed political process.

TRIPOLI OR BUST

Haftar’s plan to blitzkrieg Tripoli and assume power in April 

2019 failed. He quickly found himself in a war of attrition 

confronted by the greatest mobilization of fighters Libya 

had witnessed since the 2011 revolution against Qaddafi.12

He simultaneously struggled to maintain long supply 

lines through territory that he controlled only nominally. 

However, the decision to take Tripoli left Haftar and his 

backers with few alternatives but to persist or risk losing 

everything. The finality of the situation, whereby either 

Haftar wins and sets up a new dictatorship or he loses 

and a new chapter of Libya’s transition begins, mobilized 

Libyans as well as other international actors, namely 

Russia and Turkey. 

Russia has long used Libya’s slow-burning conflict to 

advance its relationships with Egypt and the UAE, while 

simultaneously expanding its influence on Europe’s 

southern border and its access to Libya’s natural resources. 

Sensing an international vacuum and an opportunity 

to leverage its influence in a petroleum-rich country 

in the southern Mediterranean, Russia pulled a page 

from its Syria playbook to prop up a weak and isolated 

authoritarian leader in a conflict most global actors 

wanted to avoid.13 In September of 2019, Russia began 

to deploy an estimated 800-1,200 Russian mercenaries 

through the Wagner Group led by Yevgeny Prighozin, 

the same outfit that Russia has deployed to conflicts in 

Ukraine, the Central Africa Republic, Mozambique, and 

Mali. The Russian deployment tilted the balance of the 

conflict in Haftar’s favor.14 Destabilization and conflict in 

Libya created opportunities for mischief, growing Russian 

influence in the region, and ensuring Russia played a role 

in any settlement. 

Turkey has long maintained an interest in Libya as an 

economic partner where it holds over $20 billion in frozen 

contracts that, if resumed, might boost its otherwise 

worsening economy. Moreover, the success of the Haftar 

project would cement Emirati and Egyptian influence in 

North Africa and present a serious obstacle to Turkish 

prospects in the region.

Haftar’s assault on Tripoli forced Turkey to either move 

against or acquiesce to the UAE/Egyptian/Russian gambit 

to claim Libya. It also provided Turkey an opening to 

advance its eastern Mediterranean interests. Following 

the February 2018 discovery of significant gas reserves in 

the eastern Mediterranean, a coalition between Greece, 

Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt began to develop security and 

economic infrastructure, which Turkey viewed as a direct 

threat to its economic interests and dominant security role 

in the region.15 The desperation of Libya’s GNA and the 

apathy of the West toward stopping Haftar gave Turkey 

the leverage it needed. By the end of November 2019, the 

besieged GNA readily signed an agreement that delineated 

maritime borders between Libya and Turkey and created an 

exclusive economic zone covering key gas fields in exchange 

for Turkish military support. With Turkish troops deployed 

and air support in place, the GNA was able to reclaim several 

strategic towns in western Libya in April 2020. Haftar’s 

forces have subsequently been forced to retreat to rear bases 

around Tripoli such as the town of Tarhouna. 

The sudden and sharp growth of Turkish and Russian 

involvement since late 2019 has been happily absorbed by 

Libyan actors who are desperate not to lose. The military 

prowess of both countries has quickly led to them being 

key actors on the ground while impinging on European 

interests and potentially shutting the West out of any 

peace settlement. 

The temporary truce declared on January 12, 2020, during 

a meeting in Moscow, highlighted these fears. The rapid 

announcement of the Berlin conference set for January 19, 

following months of high-level meetings, was Europe’s 

attempt to maintain relevance. At the end of March 2020, 

Europe launched a revamped naval operation, IRINI 

(Greek for “Peace”), to enforce the UN arms embargo in 

place since 2011. The formalization of Operation IRINI, 

“

unless nonaligned states can protect 

and support the UN to launch a 

genuine political process, the external 

actors engaged in Libya’s civil war 

will continue escalating
Africa Security Brief No. 37 7

however, has laid bare divisions within the European 

Union (EU) as Greece pushed for the mission to focus 

on disrupting Turkey’s naval resupply routes with the 

presumably larger aim of killing the Turkish-Libyan 

maritime and security agreement. In addition, enforcing 

a maritime arms embargo without a simultaneous 

blockade of arms coming overland from the UAE would, 

in effect, help Haftar. This calculation no doubt factored 

into Turkey’s decision to take matters into its own hands. 

It remains to be seen whether the EU, through the likes 

of Germany, will be able to use Operation IRINI to 

facilitate holding all embargo violators accountable, or if 

European divisions will ultimately cause the operation to 

be ineffective. 

ESCALATION AHEAD ON THE EASTERN FRONT

The war in Libya is set for a dramatic escalation. Given 

Haftar’s disadvantages in western Libya and the 

considerable Turkish support therein, Haftar is unlikely 

to make further gains and is already growing increasingly 

reliant on artillery just to maintain his positions. As the 

situation in western Libya worsens for him, he is likely 

to refocus his remaining offensive capacity on the de 

facto eastern front between the cities of Misrata and Sirte. 

However, further east, where Turkish air defenses are not 

present, he will likely remain unbreachable and comfortably 

absorb attacks by a GNA that is desperate to regain the 

country’s oil terminals.

As the war drags on, Europe has become more anxious at the 

potential destabilizing consequences of an internationalized 

conflict in its immediate backyard, potentially precipitating 

a new surge of refugees.16 The active role of France, however, 

blunts the multilateral instruments—the EU and UN—that 

Europeans are most comfortable using. Meanwhile, the 

United States, which Europe is accustomed to depending 

on for any force projection, appears unwilling to engage in 

another intractable conflict, let alone one where allies such 

as the UAE and Turkey are in direct opposition. 

It is almost inevitable that the UAE will seek to regain the 

upper hand through further deployments of mercenaries 

and weapons shipments. More crucially will be its 

attempts to regain aerial superiority from Turkey, which 

could involve importing Israeli air defenses following the 

inability of Russia’s Pantsir system to effectively neutralize 

Turkey’s drones.17 Further severe losses could lead to the 

introduction of advanced Emirati and Egyptian aircraft. 

This would be a dangerous escalation that Turkey already 

seems to be preparing for with training drills involving its 

own F-16s in the Mediterranean. 

All these developments point to an escalation of the 

increasingly destructive conflict. The removal of Haftar 

from western Libya may begin a new and perhaps more 

difficult campaign to dislodge the LNA from Libya’s 

oil fields in the south and oil terminals along its eastern 

coastline. More worrying for Libya’s future would be if 

Haftar moves to deepen the partition of the country in 

response to his military weakness. This could be done by 

trying to once again sell oil illicitly if he believes there will 

be no international pushback this time around.

Unless nonaligned states can protect and support the UN 

to launch a genuine political process, the external actors 

engaged in Libya’s civil war will continue escalating their 

attempts to seize control of this desert country that promises 

much yet delivers little more than squandered resources 

and frustration to its would-be overseers. 

SUPPORTING THE UN AND AVOIDING 

PROTRACTED CONFLICT

At its core, Libya’s war has been driven by the aspirations 

of regional powers, following their hijacking of the Libyan 

transition. These actors are now vying to reshape the region 

in their own image in a dangerous race to the bottom. 

Following are priority areas for policy action to reverse 

this trend and avoid an extended conflict in Libya.

Recognize the UN as the best honest broker. The escalation 

of the conflict by external actors means there are more 

interests and reputations at stake than there were previously. 

Given the relatively low costs each of these actors is incurring 

by supporting proxies, they have the means and incentives to 

continue escalation. By recognizing the UN as the best body 

to facilitate a de-escalation and negotiated settlement, all 

sides will have greater assurances that their interests will be 

considered. This reduces the “winner-take-all” undercurrent 

that has been driving the geostrategic aspects of this conflict. 

It is also the only option whereby Libyans will have the 

opportunity to reassert their sovereignty rather than existing 

as a vassal state to other regional actors.
8 Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Stop treating Haftar as a viable alternative. The 

impossibility of Haftar winning this war and being capable 

of ruling Libya has been made painfully clear with the 

GNA’s April 2020 offensives led by Turkey. Even before that, 

the scale of the mobilization triggered against him, his lack 

of a strong domestic constituency, absence of legitimacy, 

and his reliance on foreign mercenaries, equipment, and 

aircraft indicates that Haftar’s best case scenario would be 

a prolonged urban war that would destroy Tripoli and only 

set him up for further conflicts in cities like Misrata.

Having scuttled previous efforts by the UN and then 

launching an assault on the capital after agreeing to a 

power-sharing deal with Sarraj in February 2019, Haftar 

has proven himself an unreliable negotiating partner. 

Moreover, he has made his ambition to be Libya’s next 

authoritarian leader abundantly clear on multiple occasions 

and violated every ceasefire offered, including the terms of 

the January 2020 Berlin Conference. 

Haftar, accordingly, seems to be the ultimate spoiler to deescalation and stabilization in Libya. While Haftar is often 

treated as an essential part of a solution, in fact, a resolution 

to the conflict would be far easier by not treating him as the 

governing equivalent of the GNA. Better prospects can be 

realized by engaging those under him in order to enforce a 

ceasefire and build a joint security institution. 

Display a unified European policy for the conflict in 

Libya. The lack of a unified European position on Libya has 

enabled Russia to gain leverage and expand its influence 

on Europe’s southern flank. This poses a far more serious 

threat to Europe than any intra-European differences. 

Russia’s deepening involvement in Libya, accordingly, 

should be a rallying point for EU and NATO members. 

This does not necessitate partisan involvement in Libya’s 

war, but rather a common policy position from the West 

that enforces the UN arms embargo, defends international 

norms, upholds the integrity of Libya’s National Oil 

Corporation as the sole legitimate seller of Libyan oil, and 

ring-fences the UN process as the only game in town. This 

would significantly constrain Russia’s operation enacted 

through mercenary groups, arms transfers, and attempts 

to help Haftar sell oil illicitly. Not only would this make 

Russia’s involvement more costly for Moscow but it could 

also block further Russian expansion and counter the 

inroads Russia has already made.

Political Agenda Force Deployment Stakes

Supporters of General Khalifa 

Haftar and the LNA

United Arab 

Emirates

Expand regional influence; Support autocratic 

governance; Libya as client state

Equipment and training for militias; Drone 

and air support for the LNA

Political influence over MENA regional order; 

Economic gains; Domination of commercial 

thoroughfares; Oil diversification

Egypt Promote Sisi model through Haftar; Libya as a 

client state; Gain access to natural resources

Arms, supplies, intelligence, and funds 

through eastern Libya for LNA

Security on western border; Economic gains; 

Expanded regional influence

Russia Gain regional influence; Support autocratic 

governance; Gain access to natural resources

Wagner Group mercenary forces; Arms, 

equipment, supplies, and parallel currency 

Economic gains; Access to southern 

Mediterranean; Enhanced posture as great 

power

France Redefine relationship with Libya Security assistance through Egypt and UAE Expanded economic partnership; 

Counterterrorism in Sahel; European policy

Supporters of the Government of 

National Accord

Qatar Expand regional influence; Support Islamist 

opposition

Equipment and training for revolutionary 

militias

Political influence over MENA regional order

Turkey Secure the 2019 Maritime and Security 

Agreement; Expand regional influence; Block 

Emirati expansion and Russian influence; 

Maintain economic interests 

Drones, air support, ground forces; 

Equipment, training, and other military 

resources

Economic partnerships; Maritime border 

disputes; Access and influence in MENA

Italy Maintain political and economic ties with 

Libya under GNA; Curtail irregular migration 

and refugee flows

Field hospital in Misrata; Intelligence and 

security assistance 

Regional stability; Economic partnerships; 

European policy

European 

Union

Reaffirm commitment to sovereign Libya; 

Block Russian expansion in Mediterranean; 

Curtail irregular migration and refugee flows

Naval deployment to enforce arms embargo 

through maritime routes

Regional stability; European unity; Russian 

aggression; Economic partnerships

United 

Nations

Enforce Libyan Political Agreement; Uphold 

international law; Ensure regional stability

UNSMIL; Arms embargo International order; Member state 

sovereignty

TABLE 1. EXTERNAL FORCES IN LIBYA’S CIVIL WAR
Africa Security Brief No. 37 9

Enforce international norms to stop the escalations.

The violations of the UN Security Council-mandated arms 

embargo on Libya are a central driver of the conflict and 

allow Libyan belligerents, especially Haftar, to ignore 

calls for a ceasefire with impunity. Using assets such as 

the EU’s Operation IRINI as well as other satellite and 

aerial monitoring is a quick way to gather evidence on all 

violations that can be used to enforce the arms embargo 

in an unbiased fashion. If trying to hold violating states, 

such as the UAE, accountable is considered too politically 

sensitive, or if the Security Council is too divided to act, 

then other options remain available. A clear message can 

still be sent through unilateral sanctions on the private 

companies used by the UAE and others to send arms. 

Additionally, those who run private military contractors 

such as Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group could also be 

sanctioned in an attempt to create an environment in Libya 

that is more conducive to peace. 

A pressure campaign of this sort can also be applied to 

Libyan belligerents who seek to undermine the UN 

process. Similar sanctions in 2014 against the heads of 

rival parliaments and governments were considered key 

to facilitating the talks that birthed the Libyan Political 

Agreement and the GNA. Libyan actors and external 

governments that are attempting to undercut the UN 

process persist in doing so because they bear little cost to 

themselves. Moving to end this culture of impunity would 

be a relatively peaceful way of altering behaviors.

Make a national ceasefire more resilient through local 

ceasefires. The decentralized nature of Libyan society and 

the various militias that comprise both rival coalitions 

means that a national ceasefire can only be made 

resilient by engaging the communities actually fighting. 

Focusing on “local ceasefires” between directly warring 

communities such as Misrata and Tarhouna is a key step 

toward preventing the reemergence of conflict and starting 

to construct truly national security institutions in Libya. 

Working from the local level up is vital to alleviating the 

insecurities of communities that otherwise create openings 

for nefarious foreign involvement and building resilient 

institutions that can better resist foreign influence.
NOTES

1 “Libya Situation Report,” United Nations Office for the Coordination 

of Humanitarian Affairs, April 29, 2020.

2 United Nations Security Council, United Nations Support Mission in Libya: 

report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/41 (January 15, 2020).

3 “Oil Blockade Continues to Ravage Economy,” Economist Intelligence 

Unit, March 4, 2020.

4 Tarek Megerisi, “Libya’s Global Civil War,” Policy Brief (London: 

European Council of Foreign Relations, 2019).

5 Anouar Boukhars, “The Maghreb’s Fragile Edges,” Africa Security Brief 

No. 34 (Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2018).

6 Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli, eds., “Foreign Actors in Libya’s 

Crisis,” Atlantic Council and ISPI Report (Milan: Italian Institute for 

International Political Studies, 2017).

7 Mirco Keilberth and Fritz Schaap, “A Warlord Rebuilds Benghazi in 

His Own Image,” Spiegel International, September 13, 2019.

8 Libyan Political Agreement, as signed on December 17, 2015, in Skhirat, 

Morocco, available on the UNSMIL website at <https://unsmil.

unmissions.org>.

9 David D. Kirkpatrick, “A Police State with an Islamist Twist: Inside 

Hifter’s Libya,” New York Times, April 14, 2020.

10 “Evidence points to war crimes by Libyan National Army forces,” 

Amnesty International, March 23, 2017. “UN says it is concerned about 

LNA siege of Derna,” Libya Herald, August 6, 2017. “Situation in Libya: 

ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I issues a warrant of arrest for Mahmoud 

Mustafa Busayf AL-WERFALLI for war crimes,” press release ICCCPI-20170815-PR1328, International Criminal Court, August 15, 2017.

11 Claudia Gazzini, “Making the Best of France’s Libya Summit,” Briefing

No. 58, International Crisis Group, May 28, 2018.

12 Wolfram Lacher, “Who is Fighting Whom in Tripoli? How the 2019 

Civil War is Transforming Libya’s Military Landscape,” Briefing Paper 

(Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2019).

13 Joseph Siegle, “Recommended US Response to Russian Activities in 

Africa,” in “Russian Strategic Intentions,” Nicole Peterson, ed., Strategic 

Multilayer Assessment (SMA) White Paper (Boston: NSI, 2019).

14 Frederic Wehrey, “With the help of Russian fighters, Libya’s Haftar 

could take Tripoli,” Foreign Policy, December 5, 2019.

15 Michael Tanchum, “A Dangerous policy of Turkish containment in the 

Eastern Mediterranean,” Jerusalem Post, July 10, 2019. 

16 Tarek Megerisi, “Why the ‘ignored war’ in Libya will come to haunt a 

blinkered west,” Guardian, March 24, 2020.

17 Anna Ahronheim, “Is an Israeli air defense system shooting down 

Israeli drones in Libya?” Jerusalem Post, April 12, 2020. 

Kate Almquist Knopf, Director

National Defense University

Fort Lesley J. McNair

Washington, DC 20319-5066

+1 202-685-7300

www.africacenter.org

Africa Security Briefs

Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

Director of Research

sieglej@ndu.edu

+1 202-685-6808

ISSN 2164-4047

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies is an academic institution established by the U.S. Department of Defense as an objective

forum for research, academic programs, and the exchange of ideas. The Africa Security Brief series presents research and

analysis with the aim of advancing understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 

expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Africa Center.