Electronic Comba

Support for an

Expeditionary Air F

The Lessons of History

James C. Rentfrow

Lieutenant Commander, USN

Air Command and StaffCollege

Wright Flyer Paper No. 15
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Electronic Combat Support for an Expeditionary Air Force

The Lessons of History

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34
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE


AIR UNIVERSITY


Electronic Combat Support


for an


Expeditionary Air Force


The Lessons of History


JAMES C. RENTFROW 

Lieutenant Commander, USN 

Air Command and Staff College 

Wright Flyer Paper No. 15 

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA 

June 2001 
This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series 

are available electronically at the Air University 

Research Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil 

under “Research Papers” then “Special Collections.” 

Disclaimer 

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US 

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. 

ii 
Foreword 

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright 

Flyer Papers series. In this series, Air Command and Staff 

College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes the “best of the 

best” student research projects from the prior academic 

year. The ACSC research program encourages our students to move beyond the school’s core curriculum in their 

own professional development and in “advancing aerospace power.” The series title reflects our desire to perpetuate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier generations 

of airmen. Projects selected for publication combine solid 

research, innovative thought, and lucid presentation in 

exploring war at the operational level. With this broad perspective, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic range 

of doctrinal, technological, organizational, and operational 

questions. Some of these studies provide new solutions to 

familiar problems. Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind in pursuing new possibilities. By making these 

research studies available in the Wright Flyer Papers, 

ACSC hopes to encourage critical examination of the findings and to stimulate further research in these areas. 

John T. Sheridan, Brig Gen (Sel), USAF 

Commandant 

iii 
Preface 

I began this paper a few months after a US F-117 was 

shot down over Belgrade, Yugoslavia, wondering to myself 

“why?” Why was the United States Air Force (USAF) so resistant to the idea of dedicated suppression of enemy air 

defenses and electronic countermeasures support for its 

strikers? Why had they given the electronic combat (EC) 

mission almost entirely to the Navy? Was the technology of 

stealth really the driving force, or was there more? 

While studying for an Air Command and Staff College 

examination, I literally stumbled over the answer. As I suspected, it wasn’t just money—although that had a lot to do 

with it. As a naval officer flying EA-6Bs, I had never heard 

of the “bomber will always get through” controversies of 

the 1930s or the initial failure of unescorted daylight 

bombing during World War II. As I studied these things, I 

began to get a sense of the organizational culture of the 

USAF. I saw how the external and internal environment 

that influenced the US Army Air Corps of the 1930s had 

been responsible for the problems of early World War II. 

Moreover, I saw this same organizational culture at work 

in the late eighties and nineties, leading to what I perceived 

as a shortfall in EC capability. The names had changed, 

but the elements were the same. People had ideas and theories of their service and how it could radically change the 

history of modern warfare. They needed money and technology to make them work. In short, I found the four elements of the model I propose in this paper. 

v 
Abstract 

The United States Air Force (USAF) currently faces a 

shortfall in the type and number of electronic combat (EC) 

aircraft capable of operating with an Aerospace Expeditionary Wing (AEW). This has a direct impact on the 

USAF’s global attack core competency and undermines the 

combat power of any deployed AEW. Why have EC assets 

been allowed to deteriorate to this state? 

The answer begins with people, who have a flawed understanding of the theory of airpower. Because the theory 

is not understood correctly, money is not dedicated to the 

needed technology. Because the technology isn’t developed 

or is lacking, that community—if you will—fails to get representation at the higher levels of leadership. This cycle of 

organizational behavior repeats itself over and over until 

acted upon by an outside force—in this case the shootdown of a US F-117 during the Kosovo action. 

This is not the first time that the USAF has been through 

this cycle of organizational behavior. The almost exact same 

scenario played out in the famous pursuit versus bombers 

debates of the 1930s. Pursuit lost out and thereby lost 

money, technology, and people in key leadership positions. 

It was not until the horrific bomber losses of 1943 that 

leaders fully realized the mistake they had made. 

This paper explores the connection between the two stories, looks at the current state of EC, and offers some suggestions for the future. 

vii 
Introduction 

To say that having command of the air means to fly in the face 

of an enemy who has been prevented from doing likewise 

means to have the ability to fly against an enemy so as to injure 

him, while he has been deprived of the power to do likewise. 

—Giulio Douhet 

The Command of the Air 

As the twenty-first century begins, the United States 

(US) faces an unprecedented limitation on its ability to 

project combat airpower worldwide. That limitation is not 

the number of aircraft available to drop bombs but the 

number of aircraft and crews available to provide suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). Constrained by budget 

decisions, force structure, and improper paradigms, the 

electronic combat (EC) capabilities crucial to perform effective SEAD are barely sufficient to support and protect 

US strike forces adequately in one regional conflict. A second simultaneous regional conflict would be nearly impossible to fully support.1 

What has allowed joint airpower to reach this point? 

Why are its capabilities and utilization now driven by the 

force structure of the EC community? This paper attempts 

to gain some insight into those questions. 

The theory behind the application of airpower—at least 

as it involves the suppression and/or destruction of enemy 

air defenses (SEAD/DEAD)—is flawed. The proven mindset of offensive, one of the nine principles of war, has given 

way to a passive view of the electronic battlefield. According to current theory, stealth gives the attacker the ability 

to strike without fighting for and winning command of the 

air. This misguided view—combined with an organizational 

culture that favors fighters and bombers at the expense of 

support aircraft—has led to the budget, procurement, and 

personnel decisions that have left joint airpower in its current vulnerable state. 

The following definitions of electronic warfare (EW) terms 

are found in EW Definitions by the Association of Old Crows.2 

Electronic warfare (electronic combat). Any military 

action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack 

the enemy. The three major subdivisions within electronic 

1 
2 ELECTRONIC COMBAT SUPPORT 

warfare are electronic attack, electronic protection, and 

electronic warfare support. 

Electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. 

Electronic protection. That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, 

and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or 

destroy friendly combat capability. 

Electronic warfare support. That division of electronic 

warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, 

identify, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of 

immediate threat recognition. 

Suppression of enemy air defenses. Involves neutralizing, destroying, or temporarily degrading enemy air defense systems through either physical attack or electronic 

warfare.3 

Background 

Would Douhet have supported the use of airpower assets 

to perform SEAD in the pursuit of command of the air? That 

is the fundamental question that faces students of the subject today. After all, though a small amount of controversy 

exists on exactly who influenced whom and when, the theories underlying the US use of airpower are still his.4 

Most readers remember Douhet for his staunch advocacy of a single type of aircraft, the strategic bomber, and 

fail to remember that he also argued for the achievement 

of air control—or command of the air as he phrased it—by 

destroying the enemy air force on the ground.5 Only “after 

achieving air superiority,” could the bombers then “wreck 

the enemy’s vital centers.”6 

Douhet’s strength lies, not in execution, but in his simple verbalization of some of the basic foundations of the 

employment of airpower. To understand Douhet’s work, 

one has to understand that air superiority is made up of 
RENTFROW 3 

two equally important halves: the ability to injure the 

enemy and the ability to keep from being injured by the 

enemy. The history of US airpower is a study of newer and 

better ways to fly against an enemy and injure him. What 

has often been neglected until conflict was already under 

way is the ability to deprive the enemy of the power to injure friendly forces. 

A Framework for Study 

Organizational culture has been defined as “the common 

set of assumptions, beliefs, and values that has developed 

within the organization to cope with the external and internal 

environment” (emphasis added).7 If one looks at the development of airpower theory with an eye to the external and internal environment of the Air Force, a pattern forms. 

There is a natural flow to the development of any theory, 

war fighting or otherwise. It starts with the people, who 

want something. They may want to win the next war, win 

a game of football, or make more money. In order to 

achieve their goals, someone comes up with a theory. 

These theories are no good, however, without money, so 

the people have to procure some. Maybe they need money 

to buy equipment, maybe they need to pay other people, or 

maybe they need to develop a new asset or technology. Regardless, money is necessary. Once money is secured, the 

people can develop technology, which they then use to 

apply and refine their ideas, create new ideas, request 

more money to improve their technology, and so on. 

People drive this process, and it is a pretty healthy one 

so long as there are no shortages. Plenty of people turn out 

plenty of theories which, combined with plenty of money, 

produce plenty of technology, and so on. A shortage in any 

one area, though, causes shortages throughout the model, 

often with unanticipated results. As a shortage in one factor causes a corresponding shortage in the next and so on, 

the entire loop begins to neck down. This continues until 

a decisive external event shakes up the model and forces 

input of new theories, people, money, or technology to 

make the model grow back to its proper size. That is the 

story of this paper (fig.1). 
4 ELECTRONIC COMBAT SUPPORT 

People 

Theory 

Money 

Technology/ 

Assets 

Figure 1. From People to Technology 

This model will be used as a lens through which two 

case studies in US airpower theory are discussed—the use 

of long-range escort for strategic bombers during World 

War II and the use of EC assets to escort strike aircraft 

during recent contingencies. Though 50 years separate the 

two case studies, the principles of airpower remain the 

same. The fighter threat has given way to surface-to-air 

missiles (SAM); but the attacking force must have a plan, 

even for a short period of time, to establish air superiority 

so that the bombers can do their job. 

“No Escort Needed” 

We believe that a bombardment unit, worth its salt, is imbued 

with determination that it will penetrate any pursuit force in 

the world. 

—Capt Ralph Snavely 

Bombardment Course 

Air Corps Tactical School, 1939 

Books have been written about the famous bomber versus pursuit debates of the interwar period. Presenting yet 

another report on that controversy is not necessarily the 
RENTFROW 5 

focus of this paper. However, when used as a lens to view 

the rise and fall of EC capabilities in the post–Vietnam Air 

Force, the similarities are fascinating. 

Why did the Air Corps leadership allow their service to 

enter World War II utilizing the tactic of unescorted longrange bombing? The simple answer is that they believed 

that the technology embodied in the four-engine strategic 

bomber was unmatched by any threat, either in pursuit 

aviation or antiaircraft artillery.8 But the real answer is 

more complex. Referring to our model, it involves people, 

ideas, money, and technology. 

People 

Any business school will teach you that the kind of people you bring into an organization has a direct impact on 

the culture and doctrine of that organization. “Human resources provide the creative spark in any organization . . . 

Without effective people, it is simply impossible for an organization to achieve its objectives.”9 By the late 1930s, 

the objective of the US Army Air Service was autonomy. 

The vehicle for this objective was the strategic bomber, and 

people were the driving force. Unfortunately, while pursuing the objective of autonomy, the people in question 

skewed the otherwise sound theory of airpower toward 

bombardment at the expense of all other forms of aviation. 

They ultimately controlled the money and technology available to the Army Air Corps as the United States entered 

World War II. 

During the interwar period, the focal point of US airpower research and theory was the Air Corps Tactical 

School (ACTS). What began as a relatively balanced debate 

between pursuit and bombardment advocates gradually 

gave way to the “Bomber Mafia.” Officers such as Robert 

Olds, Kenneth Walker, Donald Wilson, Harold Lee George, 

Robert Webster, Haywood Hansell, Laurence Kuter, and 

Muir Fairchild filled key positions on the faculty and espoused Gen William “Billy” Mitchell’s theories of an independent air force founded on bombardment aviation.10 

Each of these officers was destined to become an influential 

general during and after World War II. With the leadership 
6 ELECTRONIC COMBAT SUPPORT 

of the Army Air Corps firmly dedicated to bombardment, 

other forms of airpower had insufficient advocacy to command any sort of attention when the time came to divide 

up the budget for research and development (R&D). This 

underrepresentation would ultimately prove disastrous for 

the prosecution of high-altitude daylight precision bombing. 

Leading the fight to recognize the contributions of pursuit aviation was Claire L. Chennault. As a senior instructor in fighter tactics at ACTS, he waged a valiant—but ultimately fruitless—battle for the development of pursuit 

that eventually forced him into early retirement. “With the 

retirement of Claire Chennault from the Air Corps in 

1937,” writes Hugh G. Severs, “the pursuit advocates lost 

their leader and staunchest spokesman.”11 Severs further 

states, “With Chennault gone, the Air Corps’ focus turned 

towards bombardment, and the pursuit advocates, perhaps recognizing that the future of the Air Corps and its officers was linked to strategic bombardment, were unwilling 

or unable to change this focus.”12 

The Bomber Mafia spilled over into the establishment of 

the General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force in 1935. The 

first commanding officer of GHQ Air Force was Gen Frank 

M. Andrews, a bombardment advocate who brought a 

group of bomber-minded officers with him to form his 

staff. By 1941 even Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold noted that 

“frankly, fighters have been allowed to drift in the doldrums.”13 It would take a war to force the Army Air Corps 

to rethink its position on the theory of airpower. 

Theory 

After World War I, theorists began to debate the relative 

merits of the different uses of airpower. In particular the 

works of Douhet and Mitchell are exceptional. 

General Douhet of Italy represents perhaps the extreme 

view of the bomber advocate. He was a former artillery officer who became convinced of the decisiveness of airpower. He postulated that war centered on “command of the 

air.”14 Command of the air, of course, implied destroying the 

enemy’s air forces.15 His idea of establishing command of 
RENTFROW 7 

the air was through the use of strategic bombers to strike 

and destroy the enemy’s aviation facilities on the ground.16 

The first edition of his book—The Command of the Air published in 1921—made allowances for the existence of pursuit squadrons to perform a secondary role of homeland 

defense.17 By 1927, in the preface to his second edition, 

Douhet admitted that he had only included the pursuit 

aircraft in his original work in an attempt to avoid alienating the rest of the Italian military. He was sure that heavily armed bombing aircraft could prevail over what he considered to be ineffective ground defenses.18 

Back in the United States, US Army Air Corps’s General 

Mitchell was formulating his own theories of airpower. 

Much as Douhet, Mitchell’s initial position recognized a 

need for a balanced force of pursuit and bomber aircraft; 

but he later changed his position, calling for an air force 

based largely on bombardment.19 Two factors drove this 

reversal: the fight for an independent Air Force and 

money.20 

Money 

In the post–World War I US military, the fight for funding 

was literally a fight between the US Army (USA) and the US 

Navy (USN) for the survival of their war-fighting capabilities. 

For aviation, the first part of the four-part people-theorymoney-technology loop to face a shortage was money. 

In 1923 the Lassiter Board recommended a 10-year expansion of the USA air arm, a balanced force of attack, and 

pursuit and bombardment aircraft that would cost a total of 

$90 million a year.

21 This outrageous request for more than 

one-third of the Army’s budget was, of course, impossible to 

fully fund. Between attack, pursuit, and bombardment, 

something would have to give. As the influence of the bombardment advocates grew at ACTS and throughout the Air 

Corps, what little money there was for R&D began to flow towards heavy bombers. Maj Robert Eslinger—in his paper 

“The Neglect of Long-Range Escort Development during the 

Interwar Years (1918–1943)”—notes that “the battle between 

the bomber radicals and the handful of fighter advocates 

grew more bitter as the competition for money got stiffer.”22 
8 ELECTRONIC COMBAT SUPPORT 

As a result, the development of pursuit aviation began to go 

wanting. It was decided—conveniently as it turned out for 

the bomber advocates—that a single-engine pursuit aircraft 

could never catch, outgun, or outperform a heavy bomber. 

“Fighters Are Obsolete” proclaimed the Office of the Chief of 

the Air Corps. To them funds spent on pursuit aircraft were 

a waste, and so their development and procurement were 

greatly restricted.23 

Technology 

This decision led to the restriction of the third phase of 

the model—technology. By the late 1930s, the advent of 

the monowing and all-metal construction had led to the 

development of the XB-299, which would become the famous B-17. By contrast, pursuit development had stagnated somewhere around the P-26 and P-39—both allmetal monowing fighters—but both underpowered, 

underarmed, and unprepared to meet the threats they 

would face in the skies of World War II. What money was 

available for pursuit research became bogged down in an 

unproductive subcontroversy concerning multiseat versus 

single-seat fighter aircraft.24 

Summary 

By the eve of World War II, then, the Air Corps had come 

full circle. People (Mitchell and others) with a vision (an independent Air Force) espoused theories (“the bomber will 

always get through”) that drove money decisions (develop 

bombers, not pursuit aircraft) and influenced the development of technology (progressive bombers versus inferior 

fighters). This, in turn, led to more prestige for the people 

involved in bombardment, which led to enhanced theories 

of strategic bombing (daylight precision) and so forth. The 

closed loop of the airpower model was about to be acted on 

by some outside influences, namely the air defenses of the 

Luftwaffe. 

Probably the biggest shortcoming of Douhet’s theory 

was the failure to take into account the development of 

radar. Radar gave an opponent the capability to find the 
RENTFROW 9 

bomber formations and position his pursuit aircraft accordingly. Once this “domino” fell, others followed. Fighter 

aircraft finally developed engines and armament that allowed them to climb, chase, and fight successfully with the 

heavy behemoths. Antiaircraft weaponry developed proximity fuses for their shells, which made them deadly to the 

bomber formations. 

By 1939 even General Arnold was pressing for the development of a long-range escort fighter for bomber formations, but by then it was too late.25 Eighth Air Force 

bombers would have to sustain heavy losses before the Air 

Corps could deliver them fighters capable of protecting 

them from the enemy defenders. 

One would think that these lessons, written in blood, 

would be an example of what was to be avoided in the future—a template of how not to close the minds of the service to pragmatic viewpoints; but it was not to be. The organizational culture that had been built on the theory of 

strategic bombing was unable to define itself in any other 

terms. As soon as the war ended, US Army Air Forces leadership began to put distance between themselves and the 

fact that the unescorted strategic bomber had met with 

only limited success, at the cost of very heavy casualties. 

In The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys, among the 

exuberant proclamations of the success of airpower, the 

reader finds one tiny paragraph that mentions that fighter 

aircraft might have been a problem: “Until then it had been 

believed that unescorted bombers, heavily gunned and flying in well designed formations, could penetrate this 

deeply [into Schweinfurt] over the Reich. At least, so far as 

a small force was concerned, this was proven wrong” (emphasis added).26 

The advocates of “the bomber will always get through” 

theory managed to qualify the strategic bombing surveys, 

making it sound like larger, heavier formations would have 

worked. The lesson that command of the air has to be aggressively established for bomber aircraft to do their job 

would have to be learned again. The people-theory-moneytechnology model would come into play again 45 years 

later, advancing and countering the same arguments. 
10 ELECTRONIC COMBAT SUPPORT 

Air Superiority through Stealth? 

Stealth aircraft do not require fighter escorts and defense suppression aircraft and electronic warfare aircraft to reach their 

targets. 

—Sen Kay Bailey Hutchison 

Senate B-2 debates 

30 June 1994 

There was nobody at the table to argue [for electronic combat]—and there is a huge debating society that argues priorities and argues relative importance and argues for ideas and 

for resources . . . The natural consequence of that was for the 

resources to go away, and we’ve made a serious misstep. I 

don’t know how to build that back. 

—Gen Michael J. Dugan, USAF, Retired 

Stealth offered the first real change in airpower doctrine 

and thinking since World War II. For the first time, the development of radar—the “eye in the sky” that helped the defender detect bombing formations and place their defending 

fighters—was possibly a moot point. If this was true, then 

the bomber really could get through. It was déjà-vu. 

People 

By the early 1980s, a revolution of sorts was taking 

place within the USAF. The Bomber Mafia of World War II 

and the postwar Strategic Air Command (SAC) was being 

overtaken and replaced by the highly decorated fighter 

combat veterans of the Vietnam War. 

As we look at the rise of the fighter generals,27 it is interesting to note how many of them had any kind of experience in EC. As is suggested by the data in table 1, only 

seven of the 208 rated generals on active duty in 1997 had 

any operational experience in the field of EC. Assuming for 

a moment that each of these seven generals was a die-hard 

supporter of SEAD and EC capabilities (a stretch, to say 

the least), that would leave them with only 3.4 percent of 

the service’s rated general officers. By comparison let us 

assume that the service’s bomber generals were all firmly 

in support of the development of the theory of stealth and 

the B-2. Their combined 31 voices (14.9 percent of all 

rated general officers) were certainly louder than the SEAD 
RENTFROW 11 

advocates. A further assumption that the 59 percent who 

fly fighters would give their support to the development of 

the F-22, at the expense of other programs, could certainly 

explain how that fighter became the Air Force’s number 

one funding priority. EC, as a whole, ranked 17th.28 

Table 1


Rated General Officers—1997


Fighters Bombers 

Transport/ 

Helicopters/ 

Other 

EC 

Operational 

Experience 

Any 

EC-Related 

Exposure 

Pilots 121 30 52 7 16 

Navigators/ 

EWO 2 1 2 0 1 

Total/% of 

Total Rated 123/59.1% 31/14.9% 54/28.4% 7/3.4% 17/8.2% 

Source: Official Biographies of USAF General Officers, Air Force Personnel Command, 1997. 

A brief discussion about methodology is appropriate 

here. Of the 314 general officers on active duty in the 

USAF in 1997, 208 of them were rated (i.e., pilots or navigators). For the sake of this paper, the assumption is made 

that nonrated officers would not have the operational experience one way or another to be effective advocates or 

detractors from tactical EC. Therefore, only the 208 rated 

officers are considered in the table. To have EC operational 

experience, an officer had to have on his or her record an 

operational tour flying an EC aircraft, namely an F-4G 

Wild Weasel, EF-111 Aardvark, or an F-16CJ. By expanding that category somewhat the “any EC-related exposure” 

generously gives EC credit to any officer whose record 

mentions that the officer has flown in, been checked out in 

as a wing commander, or otherwise somehow been around 

any electronic aircraft. 

The original hypothesis of the survey of general officers 

was that it would uncover a significant deficiency in the 

numbers of generals who had had operational experience 

in EC. The null hypothesis, of course, would be that there 

would exist high-ranking generals who had flown EC or 
12 ELECTRONIC COMBAT SUPPORT 

SEAD aircraft. The hypothesis was found to be only partially correct. 

The numbers were, in fact, small. As noted, only 3.4 

percent of the rated general officers had had operational 

EC tours. However, the small numbers were compensated 

for by the importance of some of the EC alumni. For instance, then head of the Air Combat Command, Gen 

Joseph W. Ralston, was an F-105 Wild Weasel pilot. Additionally, an assistant vice chief of staff, Gen David L. 

Vesely, was commander of an EF-111 squadron. One 

would think that these two officers would have had some 

input into, say, the decision to retire the EF-111. It is almost as if the organizational vision of a time when stealth 

aircraft could attack targets with impunity was so tantalizing, it could cause years of experience to fall by the wayside. In his book, Setting the Context: Suppression of 

Enemy Air Defenses and Joint War Fighting in an Uncertain 

World, Lt Col James R. Brungess makes an impassioned 

argument for development of a joint SEAD capability. But 

even this veteran EF-111 electronics warfare officer manages to note that “by being ‘invisible’ to radar and infrared 

detection, the F-117 pilot needs only know where the target is in order to attack it.”29 In the early nineties, stealth 

was more than technology; it was a mind-set. So, while 

Gen Michael J. Dugan’s comments that EC was not well 

represented at the top are partially true, there would seem 

to be more pieces of the puzzle for the researcher to find. 

A good place to begin is the theory behind stealth precision engagement. 

Theory: Stealth Meets Douhet 

EC can be thought of as a triad, consisting of support 

jamming, lethal SEAD, and platform self-protection.30 As 

authors John Knowles and Zachary Lum noted in the Journal of Electronic Defense: “Similar in concept to the nuclear 

triad, the EW triad relies on redundancy to defeat the 

evolving nature of threat systems . . . when threat technology progresses to where it can defeat one particular 

capability, such as platform self-protection, technology 
RENTFROW 13 

developments in another capability, such as support jamming or lethal SEAD, will serve to defeat the threat.”31 

As decision-making personnel within the Air Force became more and more convinced that the new (stealth) 

bomber would always get through, less attention was paid 

to the support jamming and lethal SEAD corners of the 

triad. The radical thing about stealth is that it negated the 

years of work that had been done to develop ways to 

achieve command of the air during an air strike. Attacking 

aircraft were, supposedly, no longer vulnerable to radar 

and integrated air defense systems (IADS). This had obvious money implications. If one no longer needed to spend 

money on EC and SEAD aircraft or the crews who flew and 

maintained them, mountains of money could be made 

available for the development of projects that would ensure 

the primacy of the USAF into the next century. Immediately, theory began to be restricted and even changed. Air 

Force thinkers began to clamor for a new doctrine based 

on the fact that US forces no longer had to establish air superiority in order to prosecute an attack. As Maj Kevin 

Kennedy noted in 1992: 

Air Force doctrine says “aerospace control assures the friendly use 

of the environment while denying its use to the enemy.” Broken 

down into two components this says first, our aircraft will be able 

to use the environment as they desire. This means the enemy is not 

able to stop us from using it as we desire. The second component 

of aerospace control is denying this free use to the enemy. This 

means we have the ability to physically hinder his air operations. 

With stealth aircraft we have free use of the environment; the first 

half of the aerospace control equation. (Emphasis added)32 

Remember that one of the nine principles of war is offensive. In the past US forces had gained command of the 

air through offensive means—finding enemy radar and 

missile sites and either jamming their frequencies or attacking them with ordnance. This new theory essentially 

gives up the aggressive-minded offensive means to establish air superiority. No longer would a strike lead have to 

build a sanctuary and then fly in it, air defenses would be 

unable to keep the stealth aircraft from prosecuting their 

attacks. Notice how this thinking mirrors the “bomber will 

always get through” theories of the interwar Bomber Mafia. 
14 ELECTRONIC COMBAT SUPPORT 

Money 

If the above theory was true, it had enormous financial 

possibilities, especially in the lean budget years of a protracted defense drawdown. In the same way that the Air 

Corps of the lean 1930s chose not to develop the fighter, the 

Air Force of the 1990s would no longer have to devote resources to the development and procurement of EC aircraft, 

either for support jamming or lethal SEAD. That money 

could be poured into the more popular bomber and fighter 

programs, particularly the F-22.33 It was an invitation to a 

party that few top Air Force officials could not afford to attend. By February 1991, Secretary of the Air Force Donald 

B. Rice was claiming to Congress that eight F-117s with 

precision-guided munitions “could do the work of 75 nonstealthy planes.”34 His inference, of course, was that no 

strike package was necessary to help the bomb droppers 

fight their way into the target. This effectively conceded air 

superiority to the enemy, while relying on stealth to enter 

their territory, execute the mission, and retire safely. 

In an eerie repeat of the “Fighters Are Obsolete” slogan 

of the 1930s, Air Force planners began to do everything in 

their power not to have to spend money on EC so that they 

could fund their favorite programs.35 Part of that attempt 

was the decision to retire both the F-4G Wild Weasel and 

the EF-111 Aardvark. A 1996 warning by the General Accounting Office that “DOD’s planned actions in the next 

few years will have a negative impact on SEAD capabilities 

and may need to be reversed in the future, at much greater 

expense and effort” fell on deaf ears.36 

Technology 

By 1997 the only SEAD assets that the USAF owned 

were the modified F-16CJs which carried the admittedly 

inferior high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM) targeting 

system.37 The gamble was that nonstealthy USAF aircraft 

could rely on the USN EA-6Bs for jamming support until 

such time as the preponderance of the USAF assets would 

be stealthy and would not require any EC support. 

The original F-4G follow-on was supposed to be a SEAD 

version of the F-15 Eagle. Called the F-15PDF (Precision 
RENTFROW 15 

Direction Finding), it would have been armed with the 

HARM and deployed in great quantities with the capability 

to do both reactive and preemptive SEAD. Unfortunately, an 

intercommunity squabble over whether the new aircraft 

should have one or two crew members eventually detracted 

enough from the program that it was ended in 1994.38 

Again, organizational culture impeded the development of 

theory, flow of money, and purchase of assets and technology. In place of the F-15PDF, the decision was made to procure the F-16CJ. A quick-reaction, interim, low-cost solution that was originally supposed to be a stopgap measure 

while the F-15PDF program reached maturity, the F-16CJ 

instead became the Air Force’s only remaining chance to 

have a SEAD aircraft.39 “It’s not perfect, but it’s good 

enough,” was literally the reaction of the division chief of Air 

Force policy and requirements in the Pentagon at the time.40 

Summary 

As the United States prepared for conflict in Kosovo in 

1999, the Air Force had come full circle. People (the fighter 

generals or stealth advocates) with a vision (Global Reach— 

Global Power) espoused theories (stealth equals air superiority) that drove money decisions (retire F-4G, EF-111 without 

replacements) and ultimately influenced technology development (stealth). This, in turn, led to more prestige for the people involved in stealth programs, which led to enhanced theories of the use of stealth (precision/effects-based targeting, 

etc.) and so forth. 

If this sounds like a word-for-word repeat of a previous 

summary, you are right. The model had played out exactly 

as it had in the late 1930s; and like the Bomber Mafia of 

World War II, the stealth advocates were about to have 

their assumptions tested in the crucible of combat. 

“Into the Readiness Gap” 

Until then [future SEAD developments], it’s just the F-16 HTS, 

the EA-6B, and luck. 

—Journal of Electronic Defense 
16 ELECTRONIC COMBAT SUPPORT 

By February 1997 the last F-4G Wild Weasel and EF111s were gone from the active USAF inventory. In their 

place was an innovative joint initiative to rely on F-16CJs 

and Navy EA-6Bs to provide defense suppression.41 At the 

same time, the Air Force agency responsible for acquiring 

EC hardware, the Headquarters Electronic Combat Division, was disbanded; its duties were assimilated into the 

Common Systems Division.42 This decision would prove 

disastrous for the USAF’s future electronic force structure. 

Meanwhile, providing the new joint EC capability were 

four new EA-6B squadrons, called expeditionary 

squadrons. Partially funded by the Air Force and staffed 

with four USAF officers each, these squadrons together 

with the four US Marine Corps (USMC) Prowler squadrons 

would cover the three traditional forward deployment sites. 

EC would be continuously available in Atsugi, Japan; Incirlik, Turkey; and Prince Sultan Air Base (AB), Saudi Arabia. Or at least that was the theory. 

There are two problems with the current arrangement. 

First, the 24 EF-111s in service during the Persian Gulf War 

were admittedly overtasked, showing their importance to 

USAF strike planning.43 Replacing them with only 20 EA6Bs was a negative equation to start with. Moreover, in the 

evolving SEAD doctrine of the Gulf War, not all strike packages required jamming support. The loss of Scott O’Grady’s 

F-16 in 1995 and the loss of an F-117 during the 1999 

Kosovo conflict have changed that. Today, no strike package 

goes into hostile territory without EC escort.44 The 20 

Prowlers thus substituted into an environment where commander in chief (CINC) tasking now requires EC support for 

all aircraft—including stealth—are simply not enough. 

Second, after the agreement was settled between the 

USAF and USN, a fourth forward deployment site was 

added to the list: Aviano AB, Italy. Covering three sites 

with eight squadrons was conceivably an achievable goal, 

but the eight squadrons (four USN/USAF and four USMC) 

cannot support four deployment sites continuously. By 

mathematical calculation, this would result in a deployment every six months for each squadron. Obviously, this 

cannot be done while remaining within Department of 

Defense personnel tempo guidelines. The answer, therefore, is to substitute fleet EA-6B squadrons, who would 
RENTFROW 17 

otherwise be engaged in interdeployment training at their 

home bases, into coverage gaps at the different deployment 

sites. This has resulted in unacceptable operations tempo 

for the tasked fleet squadrons. In retrospect, one could say 

that the Air Force paid for four squadrons and received 14. 

This has led to a sort of shell game of EA-6B squadrons 

attempting to cover the forward deployment sites. VAQ132’s schedule in 1999 is an illustrative example. Flying 

out of Prince Sultan in early 1999, VAQ-132 was covering 

one of the gaps in the forward deployment bases. This was 

in addition to their normal workup and deployment rotation with their aircraft carrier. The squadron was scheduled to come home after 56 days at Prince Sultan AB. 

(Anything 57 days and over is counted as a deployment; 56 

days and under is simply a detachment.) Because of 

Kosovo, the USMC was unable to support its scheduled deployment to Incirlik in support of Northern Watch/Provide 

Comfort. To cover the gap, VAQ-134, 132’s replacement at 

Prince Sultan AB, was sent to Incirlik instead. VAQ-132 

was extended on station indefinitely. Meanwhile, VAQ-136, 

the EA-6B squadron based in Japan as part of the forward-based Kitty Hawk battle group, was pulled off the 

Kitty Hawk and sent to Prince Sultan AB to relieve VAQ132. VAQ-132 eventually made it home with 70 days of deployment on the books, only to begin preparing for their 

“real” cruise. All of this left the forward-deployed naval 

force without any EA-6Bs. One wonders what they would 

have done if a crisis had broken out in Korea. As the EA6B wing requirements officer put it: 

During peak operations of Allied Force, 26 EA-6B aircraft—nearly 

one third of all operational EA-6B aircraft at the time—were deployed in support of Operation Allied Force. At the same time, EA6Bs continued to support Operations Northern and Southern 

Watch over Iraq, the North Korean contingency, and three carrier 

deployments. As a result, the EA-6B community was tasked well 

beyond the typical deployment schedule, creating significant demands on aircraft, aircrews, and squadron personnel alike.45 

Obviously, this pace could not continue. With the shootdown of an F-117 and the subsequent CINC requirement 

for EA-6B support of all strike packages, the newly declared Expeditionary Air Force suddenly found its combat 

power tied to the availability of about 96 to 104 (on a good 
18 ELECTRONIC COMBAT SUPPORT 

day) 15- to 20-year-old Navy aircraft.46 Something would 

have to be done differently. 

Future of Electronic Combat 

There has to be “a balance between stealth . . . jamming . . . 

and info warfare. They all play a role in this force-protection 

business.” 

—Gen Michael E. Ryan, USAF 

Chief of Staff 

After a slow start, the joint community is beginning to realize that the capabilities of the EA-6B will have to be improved upon and eventually replaced. Dependence on the 

internal qualities of strike aircraft (stealth, self-protection) 

has been shown, at least at the current level of technology, 

to not work as completely as designers had hoped. Success 

in future conflicts and command of the air will depend on 

developing and strengthening all three legs of the EC triad: 

lethal SEAD, support jamming, and aircraft self-protection. 

“The idea that stealth could solve all problems was abandoned in favor of an active mix of stealth technology, active 

air-defense suppression, and electronic suppression.”47 

So, what is being done? First, the USAF has become very 

serious, very quickly about EC. A classified RAND report 

on Air Force capabilities is currently making the rounds at 

senior levels in Washington, D.C. It is said to recommend 

major changes to the way the USAF approaches EC. If the 

recommendations are carried out, EW will be elevated to 

an organizational level with stealth—the offices responsible for setting operational requirements for EW will be reinstated (they were slashed in the early 1990s)—and an 

EW acquisition office parallel to the stealth acquisition office will be created.48 

Second, Congress is now actively encouraging the Pentagon to get serious about augmenting and/or replacing 

the EA-6B. The establishment of a fifth joint Air Force/ 

Navy expeditionary squadron was announced.49 The new 

squadron will be made up of aircraft from existing assets 

in the training or depot (maintenance) pipeline.50 

Meanwhile, just after the Kosovo conflict, Congress included $10 million in the fiscal year 2000 budget for an 
RENTFROW 19 

analysis of alternatives to assess follow-on designs to replace the EA-6B Prowler by 2010. Basically, there are five 

alternatives that are said to be on the table. New EA-6Bs 

could be built, incorporating the new Improved Capabilities (ICAP) III suite of jammers and transmitters. A smaller 

version of the ICAP III system could be placed in an existing tactical airframe, such as the F-18F, MV-22, Joint 

Strike Fighter (JSF), F-22, or F-15E. An entirely new aircraft, such as an EC version of the JSF could be considered. An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) containing an EC 

payload is being considered. Miniature airborne electronic 

attack munitions could be delivered into the battle space 

by such systems as the Army tactical missile system or the 

Navy’s Tomahawk.51 

A “Designed from Scratch” Aircraft 

Documents from both the USAF and USN suggest that 

the idea of building a new aircraft from scratch is not being 

considered seriously. Lack of funding and the urgency of 

the requirement are the main arguments against this. 

“There is not sufficient funding available in the time of 

concern to build an airborne platform and integrated system from scratch.”52 This would seem to rule out either reopening the long-defunct Grumman EA-6B production line 

(option one) or marrying into a new airframe initiative (option two). That leaves putting a system on an existing airframe, UAVs, or devices carried on munitions. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

The EC mission profile would seem to lend itself to the 

use of UAVs. EA-6Bs generally fly out ahead of the strikers 

and establish a jamming orbit that covers the striker’s inbound and outbound routes of flight. Flying a UAV into the 

battle space and setting up a loiter pattern while the strikers hit their targets makes some sense. Thus, the relevant 

question: “Is the technology there yet?” The development of 

EC payloads for UAVs faces three obstacles: priority, size, 

and adaptability. 
20 ELECTRONIC COMBAT SUPPORT 

There are six UAV programs at various stages of development within the US military. They are controlled by the 

Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO).53 The 

name of the organization controlling the development of 

UAVs should give the reader a sense of the current priorities for UAV utilization. Within the military, the CINCs interact with DARO to voice their equipment needs.54 In the 

words of one senior US military official: “They’re gonna 

want pictures. Pictures, pictures, pictures.”55 Overall, 13 

different payloads have been identified as having potential 

to be placed in a UAV. They run the gamut from electrooptical/infrared and surveillance approach radar reconnaissance and imaging to communications or data relay 

and laser designating or range finding.56 Of the six UAV 

programs, only two are currently being developed with an 

EW variant, and these only in terms of signals intelligence, 

not active jamming.57 The current focus certainly seems to 

rest on reconnaissance, although EW proponents are 

working to change that. 

Another barrier to the use of UAVs to perform SEAD is 

the size of the payload that the relatively small airframes 

are able to carry. Jamming a radar, literally overwhelming 

its signal with your own stronger one, takes a lot of power 

generation capability. The jamming pods that currently 

hang on an EA-6B weigh almost 1,000 pounds each. In 

contrast, the maximum payload that can be carried by 

Predator is 450 pounds. Even the larger Global Hawk, 

which can carry up to 1,960 pounds, cannot keep up with 

the EA-6B, which routinely carries 3,000 pounds of jamming transmitters in addition to its internal receivers and 

signal processing equipment. Equal to the task, leading 

companies have been working to overcome this limitation. 

Northrop Grumman is developing a tactical radar jammer 

(TRJ) as an electronic attack payload to be placed on the 

Hunter, one of the smaller UAV programs, currently active 

only for demonstration and testing purposes. With its 100­

pound size, TRJ is able to operate with as little as one kilowatt of input, allowing it to be powered by most UAV engines.58 Ultimately, Northrop Grumman is working to 

integrate the TRJ with a sensor package.59 That would 

then approximate the capabilities of the EA-6B. As the 

Hunter is too small for this combined package, another 
RENTFROW 21 

platform will have to be found. The Global Hawk has been 

mentioned in connection with this concept. 

The final barrier to the EC use of UAVs is flexibility. 

Human intervention is what makes the EA-6B unique. The 

ability to listen to, display, and evaluate or analyze electronic signals in real time is what gives the electronic 

countermeasures officers in an EA-6B the crucial edge in 

combat. This human interaction protects friendly systems 

from fratricide, ensures compliance with applicable rules 

of engagement, and enables rapid reaction to the everevolving conditions of combat. There is some debate over 

whether or not a system that is flexible enough to cope 

with the immediate demands of EW has been perfected yet. 

Nonetheless, UAVs seem to be the preferred plan of the 

future for the USAF, as it does not involve diverting aircraft 

development money from the F-22. “I don’t see another airplane,” a senior official said. “We will do something less expensive. I think you will see a decoy or an unmanned aircraft.”60 Current development is taking place at the Air 

Force UAV Battlelab. There, Air Force developers work to 

“leverage upon the UAVs strengths of endurance and survivability to perform all aspects of the non-lethal SEAD 

mission.”61 

Existing Aircraft 

The option that has had the most proven success is the 

modification of an existing airframe to perform the EC mission. Past aircraft that were originally designed for different purposes but proved to be effective war fighters in an 

EC configuration include the EF-111A, the F-4G, and the 

EA-6B.62 

This option has several advantages. It is substantially 

cheaper, as it builds on a platform that already has a production line open. It is also a known quantity. The manned 

tactical EW aircraft have proven combat records. With the 

state of the world today, it might not be the best time to experiment with unproven EW concepts. 

This option also has the advantage of timing. Its readyto-go airframe is beginning to come off the production 

lines. The US Navy’s F-18F—the two-seat version of the 
22 ELECTRONIC COMBAT SUPPORT 

Navy’s new multipurpose fighter––lends itself to being 

crewed with a pilot and an ECO. Indeed, McDonnell Douglas has already built a mock-up, the proposed F-18G. 

From the reviewed concept briefings, this appears to be the 

USN’s alternative of choice, which would comply with the 

Navy’s traditional advocacy of manned EC assets. Navy officials—such as Rear Adm John Nathman, director of Air 

Warfare—continue to insist that everything is on the table 

until the 18-month analysis of alternatives is completed.63 

A survey of recent coverage in various journals, however, 

will quickly show the reader that the Navy is talking about 

almost nothing but the F-18G. A joint Air Force/Navy buy 

of this aircraft, similar to the joint development of the F-4 

Phantom II in the 1960s, would solve many problems for 

both services. 

SEAD Munitions 

Imagine if instead of sending aircraft into the battle space 

to suppress enemy air defenses, friendly forces could launch 

a series of missiles, either from aircraft flying well out of 

threat range or from a ground-based system. These missiles 

would autonomously search for, detect, identify, attack, and 

destroy SAM systems.64 That is the idea behind the low cost 

autonomous attack system (LOCAAS). These munitions 

would, in effect, become miniature Wild Weasels loitering 

while strike aircraft prosecute their targets, ready to pounce 

on any SAM system that becomes active. 

As envisioned, LOCAAS has a standoff range of more 

than 90 miles, a search area of 33 square miles, and a 

turbojet engine capable of powering the munition for 30 

minutes.65 On 17 December 1998 the Air Force Research 

Laboratory awarded Lockheed Martin a $32 million contract to produce an advanced technology demonstration of 

the LOCAAS. The expected contract completion date is 10 

December 2001.66 

There are concerns with this approach. The idea of 

launching an autonomous weapon that seeks out and attacks its own target raises the specter of fratricide. The 

contract with Lockheed Martin specifies that “the system 

will be capable of discriminating between classes/types of 
RENTFROW 23 

targets and between targets and non-combatants.”67 How 

they propose to accomplish that in a coalition environment 

where the enemy may very well be operating some of the 

same weapons systems as friendly forces remains to be 

seen. Assuming that the selectivity issue could be worked 

out, a fielded capability is (optimistically speaking) several 

years away. 

Summary 

The hodgepodge of platforms and systems that represent the future of EC and SEAD suffers from a lack of 

funds and attention. While most of the attention over the 

last decade has been lavished on the USAF’s number one 

funding priority, the F-22, EC as a whole has languished 

at number 17.68 Which of the five programs considered 

will represent the future of EC? No one is seriously considering reopening the EA-6B production line. The design is too old and only marginally survivable in today’s 

battle space. Building a new airframe as an EC platform 

is almost entirely out of the question, both for the USAF 

and the USN. UAV programs are so overly concerned 

with getting good film footage for CINCs and their commanders that EC payloads are almost an afterthought. 

SEAD munitions are years away from any sort of operational capability. 

The most likely scenario involves a two-tiered approach: near term and long range. In the near term, modification of an existing airframe to produce a new combat 

aircraft capable of both jamming and firing antiradiation 

missiles is the only option that is going to alleviate the 

current critical shortage of assets. Joint development is a 

must. The armed forces of the twenty-first century no 

longer have the luxury of simultaneously developing their 

own programs, as with the EF-111 and EA-6B. The USAF 

and the USN will have to work together to field a platform 

that can quickly fill crucial joint power projection shortfalls. But the long-range options should not be ignored. 

The era of cruise missiles and zero-casualty warfare demands further development of the unmanned options. 
24 ELECTRONIC COMBAT SUPPORT 

The future of EC almost certainly lies in UAVs and smart 

munitions. 

Conclusions 

I think we all agree it’s time for a fundamental review of our 

electronic warfare posture. 

––Gen John P. Jumper, USAF 

US Air Forces Europe 

By 1941 the Air Corps leadership knew they had a problem. At that point it was too late to do anything about it, 

and the Eighth Air Force eventually paid the price. Chennault later remarked, “It is in time of peace that we must 

develop our technical equipment and train our personnel. 

We cannot do these things after the beginning of hostilities 

nor can we suddenly shift from one type of vital technical 

equipment to another after the fighting starts. Our leaders 

in peacetime should have sufficient imagination, vision, 

and experience to direct technical development and personnel training upon sound lines.”69 The challenge before 

the USAF is to recognize the problem that exists today with 

EC force structure and capabilities and act to “direct technical development and personnel training” before a tragedy 

is allowed to occur. 

According to Capt Kenneth Krech, USN, there are three 

realities in today’s force structure: “First, the level of military presence overseas has not decreased. Second, the 

need for SEAD has also increased. Finally, the ‘savings’ of 

decreased support-jamming requirements are not being 

realized.”70 Change needs to occur (fig. 2). Looking at the 

model of people, theory, money, technology, the place 

where change has to begin is theory. Change will not come 

easy. The organizational culture of the Air Force is such 

that it is difficult to admit that technology cannot overcome defenses. Airmen must understand that command of 

the air is vital. It is not something that can be passively 

taken for granted, it must be fought for each time a US aircraft flies into hostile territory. 

As this paper has shown, World War II and the recent 

events in Kosovo have both highlighted the importance of 

command of the air. US forces must “deprive the enemy 
RENTFROW 25 

People Command of the 

air necessary for 

power projection. 

Need EC. 

New EC 

platform 

EC moves up from #17 

on the priorities list. 

Theory 

Money 

Technology/ 

Assets 

Figure 2. How Change Could Occur 

of the power to injure,” to put it in Douhet’s terms. A 

strong balance of capabilities must include being able to 

shoot down the enemy’s aircraft, destroy them on the 

ground, or destroy his SAM batteries. Only then can 

strike aircraft effectively carry out their mission. In order 

to leverage the combat power available in the F-117, B-2, 

and F-22, effective EC capabilities will have to be paid for 

and utilized. These EC capabilities must include R&D of 

all three sides of the EW triad: support jamming, lethal 

SEAD, and self-protection. 

Once the people involved are able to overcome the paradigm of stealth and return to the real meaning of command of the air, the theory will change. That has already 

started. General Ryan’s remarks show how the Air Staff is 

beginning to consider this issue. As Congress continues to 

take an interest in this issue, money will become available. This will lead to new technology. In the near term, 

the USAF and USN must work together to field an aircraft 

that will ensure that US forces will be able to aggressively 

take command of the air. Long-term goals should include 

a renewed effort to utilize UAVs and smart munitions. Regardless of the technology eventually developed, it is the 

theory that is important, not the platform. Nothing less 

than the US power projection capability in the twenty-first 
26 ELECTRONIC COMBAT SUPPORT 

century depends on a correct interpretation of a theory 

from the 1920s: Douhet’s command of the air. 

Notes 

1. Robert Holzer, “Pentagon Seeks Successor to the Prowler,” Navy 

Times, 27 December 1999, 18. 

2. Association of Old Crows, EW Definitions, n.d., n.p., on-line, Internet, 20 November 1999, available from 

http://jedonline.com/updir/shelf/ewdef.html. 

3. Combat Air Power: Funding Priority for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses May Be Too Low, General Accounting Office (GAO) report (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1996). 

4. Col Phillip S. Meilinger, ed., The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of 

Airpower Theory (Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air University Press, 

1997), 98. 

5. Ibid. 

6. Ibid. 

7. D. J. Fritzsche, Business Ethics: A Global and Managerial Perspective (New York: McGraw–Hill, 1997), 110. 

8. Meilinger, 218. 

9. George T. Milkovich and John W. Boudreau, Human Resource Management, 8th ed. (Boston: Irwin/McGraw–Hill, 1997), 2. 

10. Meilinger, 216. 

11. Hugh G. Severs, “The Controversy behind the Air Corps Tactical 

School’s Strategic Bombardment Theory: An Analysis of the Bombardment versus Pursuit Aviation Data between 1930–1939,” Research Report 

no. 97-0126 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College [ACSC], 

1997), 30. 

12. Ibid. 

13. Claire Chennault, Way of a Fighter (New York: G. P. Putnam’s 

Sons, 1949), 20. 

14. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (1942; 

new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983). 

15. Ibid. 

16. Ibid. 

17. Ibid. 

18. Ibid. 

19. Meilinger, 95. 

20. Ibid. 

21. Robert A. Eslinger, “The Neglect of Long-Range Escort Development during the Interwar Years (1918–1943),” Research Report no. 97­

1026 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: ACSC, 1997), 8. 

22. Ibid., 16. 

23. Ibid. 

24. Ibid., 18. 

25. Ibid., 23. 
RENTFROW 27 

26. The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys, Summary Report 

(European War), 30 September 1945 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University 

Press, 1987), 16. 

27. R. Michael Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals: The Problem of Air 

Force Leadership (1945–1982) (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 

1998). 

28. Craig Hughes, “Achieving and Ensuring Air Dominance,” Research Report no. 1998-04, Appendix T (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: ACSC, 1998). 

29. James R. Brungess, Setting the Context: Suppression of Enemy Air 

Defenses and Joint War Fighting in an Uncertain World (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: 

Air University Press, 1994), 108. 

30. John Knowles and Zachary Lum, “Into the Readiness Gap,” Journal 

of Electronic Defense, March 1996, n.p., on-line, Internet, 1 January 2000, 

available at http://www.jedonline.com/jed/html.new.mar96/feature.html. 

31. Ibid. 

32. Kevin J. Kennedy, “Stealth, A Revolutionary Change to Air Warfare” (master’s thesis, Naval War College, 1992), 22. 

33. Cmdr Kenneth Krech, “The Navy Must Suppress Enemy Air Defenses,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1995, 76. 

34. Bruce A. Auster, “The Myth of the Lone Gunslinger,” U.S. News 

and World Report, 18 November 1991, 52. 

35. Hal Gershanoff, “Weakened Spirits,” Journal of Electronic Defense, 

June 1999, n.p., on-line, Internet, 3 December 1999, available at 

http://www.jedonline.com/jed/html/new/jun99/speak.html. 

36. Combat Airpower. 

37. Hughes, 27. 

38. Knowles and Lum. 

39. Ibid. 

40. Ibid. 

41. Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Navy, 

United States Marine Corps, United States Air Force, and the Joint Staff on 

EA-6B Support, Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Washington, D.C., 19 February 1997. 

42. Association of Old Crows, “Washington Report: Air Force Headquarters EC/EW Group Incorporated into a Common Systems Division,” Journal 

of Electronic Defense, October 1996, n.p., on-line, Internet, 17 March 2000, 

available at http://www.jedonline.com/jed/html/new/oct96/wash.html. 

43. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey 

Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 

197. 

44. Kernan Chaisson, “Washington Report,” Journal of Electronic Defense, December 1999, 15. 

45. Capt David S. Levenson, Lt Cmdr Michael J. Coury, and Capt 

Kenneth G. Krech, (USN), “SEAD: Operation Allied Force and Beyond,” 

Journal of Electronic Defense, January 2000, 53. 

46. CNN News Report, “Shortage of Radar Jammers Strains Navy, 

Marines,” 26 September 1999, n.p., on-line, Internet, 1 October 1999, 

available at http://cnn/US/9909/26/prowler.pinch.ap/. 

47. Kernan Chaisson, “EW Big Winner in Kosovo,” Journal of Electronic Defense, December 1999, 15. 
28 ELECTRONIC COMBAT SUPPORT 

48. Kernan Chaisson, “RAND EW Report Pending,” Journal of Elec­


tronic Defense, November 1999, 15.


49. Peter J. Skibitski, “Pentagon to Create Additional EA-6B Prowler


Unit to Meet Demands,” Inside the Navy, 30 August 1999, n.p., on-line,


Internet, available at


http://ebird.dtic.mil/Aug1999/e19990830pentagon.htm.


50. Ibid.


51. Holzer.


52. Briefing, Naval Air Systems Command, subject: Airborne Elec­


tronic Attack (EA-6B Replacement) Proposed Analysis of Alternatives,


1999, 2.


53. John Knowles, “EW and UAVs: Payloads That Pay Off,” Journal of


Electronic Defense, July 1996, n.p., on-line, Internet, 17 March 2000,


available at http://www.jedonline.com/jed/html/new/jul96/cover.html.


54. Zachary Lum, “UAV Sensor Scrabble: When Will It Spell EW?” Jour­


nal of Electronic Defense, June 1997, n.p., on-line, Internet, 17 March 2000


available at http://www.jedonline.com/jed/html/new/jun97/cover.html.


55. Ibid.


56. Ibid.


57. Ibid.


58. Ibid.


59. Ibid.


60. David A. Fulghum, “Modernization Funds Grow, But Not Enough


for Military,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 11 January 1999, 428.


61. Briefing, USAF Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Battlelab, subject: Active


SEAD, 1998, on-line, Internet, 15 January 2000, available at 


http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uav98/afuavbl/tsld006.htm.


62. Briefing, subject: Airborne Electronic Attack.


63. David Brown, “Leaner and Meaner: The New Aviation Plan,” Navy


Times, 6 March 2000, 18.


64. Military Analysis Network, “Low Cost Autonomous Attack System


(LOCAAS) Miniature Munition Capability,” n.p., n.d., on-line, Internet, 19


March 2000, available at


http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/locaas.htm.


65. Ibid.


66. Ibid.


67. Ibid.


68. Hughes, 69.


69. Chennault, 24.


70. Levenson, Coury, and Krech, 55.