Filed 10/26/22 In re L.S. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re L.S. et al., Persons 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B319078

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 19CCJP02139A–B)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.D.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Tamara Hall, Judge. Affirmed.
2

Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy 

Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________________________

I. INTRODUCTION

R.D. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her 

parental rights over her children, older child (born in 2008) and 

younger child (born in 2009). Mother seeks a reversal and 

remand for compliance with the inquiry and notice requirements 

of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 

et seq.) and related California statutes (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 

et seq.).1 We affirm.

II. BACKGROUND2

La.S. is older child’s presumed father and F.H. is younger 

child’s alleged father. Mother has another child, L.K. (born in 

1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.

2 Because the sole issue on appeal concerns the juvenile 

court’s and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and 

Family Services’s (the Department) compliance with ICWA and 

related California law, we limit our recitation of facts to those 

relevant to that compliance issue, except as is necessary for 

context.
3

2002), who resided in Atlanta, Georgia with her father, whose 

whereabouts were unknown.

On April 4, 2019, the Department filed a dependency 

petition for the children. At the detention hearing on April 5, 

2019, mother filed a Parental Notification of Indian Status form 

(ICWA-020), which indicated that she may have Cherokee 

ancestry through maternal grandmother and Cheyenne ancestry 

through maternal grandfather.

On May 23, 2019, the Department interviewed maternal 

grandmother about mother’s claim of Indian ancestry. The 

Department included the information it obtained from her in the 

ICWA-030 notices that it sent to the Secretary of the Interior, the 

Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the three Cherokee and two 

Cheyenne tribes in the Federal Register. Those notices included 

information about the names, birthdate, places of birth, dates 

and places of death, and tribal identifications for maternal 

grandmother, maternal grandfather, two maternal greatgrandmothers, and two maternal great-grandfathers.

On May 24, 2019, older child’s presumed father appeared at 

the adjudication hearing and filed an ICWA-020 indicating that 

he was “not sure” whether he had Indian ancestry on paternal 

grandmother’s side. The Department subsequently contacted 

older child’s paternal grandmother, who reported having no 

knowledge of any Native American ancestry and no knowledge of 

anyone who could provide further information. The Department 

then sent additional notices to the Secretary of the Interior, the 

Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the three Cherokee and two 

Cheyenne tribes in the Federal Register.

Younger child’s alleged father’s whereabouts were

unknown and the Department was unable to contact him.
4

On July 19, 2019, the juvenile court declared the children 

dependents of the court under section 300, subdivisions (a) and 

(b)(1), and removed them from parental custody.

Mother appealed. (In re L.S. (Mar. 10, 2020, B299673) 

[nonpub. order].) Her sole contention in that appeal was that the 

Department had failed to notice the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe.

The Cheyenne River Sioux was a Sioux, not a Cheyenne, tribe. 

While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court ordered the 

Department to provide notice to the Sioux tribes and this court 

dismissed the appeal as moot. (In re L.S., supra, B299673.)

On March 25, 2020, the Department sent ICWA notices to 

the Sioux tribes.

On September 28, 2020, the juvenile court terminated 

reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 

hearing.

By July 2021, all but one tribe had responded, indicating 

that the children were not tribal members or eligible for 

membership, and that ICWA did not apply.

As to the remaining tribe, the Oglala Sioux, on 

July 1, 2021, a tribal representative orally reported that none of 

the family members was enrolled with the tribe but explained 

that the tribe, which was still in the process of responding to 

2018 inquiries, would not be providing a written response. The 

Department also re-sent the ICWA-030 notices to the Oglala 

Sioux, but did not receive a response.

On March 11, 2022, the juvenile court found that ICWA did 

not apply.

On March 11, 2022, the juvenile court held the section 

366.26 hearing and terminated mother’s parental rights. Mother 

timely appealed.
5

III. DISCUSSION

Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the Department 

did not comply with its duty of initial ICWA inquiry under 

section 224.2, subdivision (b). Specifically, mother contends that 

the Department did not adequately interview maternal 

grandmother, older child’s paternal grandmother, the children’s 

sibling L.K., and younger child’s alleged paternal grandmother 

and relatives.

The Department’s inquiry duties under ICWA are well 

established. Section 224.2 “‘“creates three distinct duties 

regarding ICWA in dependency proceedings. First, from the 

[Department]’s initial contact with a minor and his family, the 

statute imposes a duty of inquiry to ask all involved persons 

whether the child may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (a), 

(b).) Second, if that initial inquiry creates a ‘reason to believe’ the 

child is an Indian child, then the [Department] ‘shall make

further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child, 

and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.’ (Id., subd. 

(e), italics added.) Third, if that further inquiry results in a 

reason to know the child is an Indian child, then the formal 

notice requirements of section 224.3 apply. [Citations.]” 

[Citation.]

“‘At the first step, “[s]ection 224.2, subdivision (b) specifies 

that once a child is placed into the temporary custody of a county 

welfare department, such as the [Department], the duty to 

inquire ‘includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, 

legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, 

others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting 
6

child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian 

child.’” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]

“We review claims of inadequate inquiry into a child’s 

Indian ancestry for substantial evidence. [Citation.]” (In re H.V.

(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 433, 437–438.)

We first consider mother’s contention that the Department

failed adequately to interview maternal grandmother about the 

children’s Indian heritage. A social worker interviewed maternal 

grandmother on May 23, 2019, and obtained information that led 

to the Department’s sending of detailed notices to the Cheyenne, 

Cherokee, and Sioux tribes, the Secretary of the Interior, and the 

Bureau of Indian Affairs. All tribes responded that the children 

were not Indian children and would not qualify for Indian tribal

membership. To the extent mother contends that 

notwithstanding maternal grandmother’s information about the 

children’s possible Indian heritage, the Department was required 

to further ask about other available relatives and then 

presumably interview them, we conclude that the duty of inquiry 

does not require such a rote and exhaustive process particularly 

where, as here, maternal grandmother’s information about 

possible Indian heritage resulted in the Department sending 

numerous notices to tribes, which included information about 

maternal grandmother, maternal grandfather, two maternal 

great-grandmothers, and two maternal great-grandfathers. (See 

In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 323 [“ICWA does not 

obligate the court or [the Department] ‘to cast about’ for 

investigative leads”].)

We also reject mother’s next contention that a remand is 

appropriate because the Department did not interview the 

children’s sibling, L.K. Mother does not explain how L.K. would 
7

have any more knowledge about the children’s Indian ancestry 

than mother or maternal grandmother or why the failure to 

interview L.K. rendered the Department’s already meaningful 

and thorough inquiry deficient.

Similarly, we reject mother’s contention that the 

Department, after learning from older child’s paternal 

grandmother that she did not know of any other relatives who 

would have knowledge of Indian ancestry, should nonetheless 

have obtained contact information for other unnamed yet 

purportedly “available extended family members.” (See In re 

A.M., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 323 [“There is no need for 

further inquiry if no one has offered information that would give 

the court or [the Department] reason to believe that a child might 

be an Indian child. This includes circumstances where parents 

‘fail[] to provide any information requiring followup’ [citations] or 

if the persons who might have additional information are 

deceased [citation], or refuse to talk to [the Department]”].)

Finally, as to mother’s contention that the Department was 

required to interview younger child’s alleged paternal relatives, 

we disagree. Younger child’s alleged father was not present 

throughout these proceedings. He did not acknowledge or 

establish paternity and, according to alleged paternal 

grandmother, younger child’s alleged father had refused to accept 

younger child as his child. Under ICWA, “extended family 

member” is defined as the “child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, 

brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, 

first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2).) 

Here, the Department had no obligation to interview the alleged 

father’s relatives as they were not “extended family members” 

within the meaning of ICWA. (See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) [excluding 
8

from the definition of “parent” unwed fathers whose “paternity 

has not been acknowledged or established”]; § 224.1, subd. (c) 

[adopting federal definition of “parent”]; see also In re Daniel M.

(2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 703, 708–709 [describing methods for 

unwed fathers to establish or acknowledge paternity].) 

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that 

the Department complied with its duty of initial inquiry under 

ICWA.

IV. DISPOSITION

The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM, J.

We concur:

RUBIN, P. J.

MOOR, J.