COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Baker, Benton, Coleman, 

 Elder, Bray, Fitzpatrick and Overton 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

DAVID ERIC RICHARDSON, s/k/a DAVID HOWELL, 

 a/k/a DAVID RICHARDSON 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2312-95-2 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 SEPTEMBER 2, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

UPON REHEARING EN BANC 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Thomas N. Nance, Judge 

 Felipita Athanas for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 This criminal appeal involves the construction and 

applicability of the "single larceny doctrine." The issue is 

whether the theft of two purses, which thefts occurred at or 

about the same time and from the same room, was a single larceny 

as a matter of law or whether the fact finder reasonably could 

have determined that two larcenies had occurred. 

 David Eric Richardson was convicted of two counts of grand 

larceny and two counts of felonious petit larceny. On appeal, 

Richardson contends that he was guilty of only a single act of 

larceny, not four separate larcenies. A panel of this Court held 

the evidence to be sufficient to prove that four separate 

larcenies had occurred. Richardson v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 

668, 479 S.E.2d 87 (1996). We granted a rehearing en banc to 
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determine whether the theft of two of the purses from a hospital 

nurses' station was a single larceny or separate offenses.1

 

Because the Commonwealth's evidence and the reasonable inferences 

that could be drawn therefrom failed to prove that the two thefts 

were separate and distinct offenses, we hold that the theft of 

the two purses was, as a matter of law, a single larceny. Thus, 

we affirm the grand larceny conviction arising from the nurses' 

station theft; reverse and dismiss the petit larceny charge, 

which is subsumed by the former; and remand the grand larceny 

conviction for purposes of reconsideration of sentence based upon 

the actions taken herein. 

BACKGROUND

 On July 1, 1995, Richardson entered the Medical College of 

Virginia (MCV) hospital complex and stole three purses, a 

backpack, a watch, and a radio from three different locations 

within the complex. The stolen items belonged to four 

individuals and were stolen from three different floors or 

buildings within the complex. As is relevant to the thefts at 

issue, Richardson stole two purses that belonged to different 

employees. The purses were stolen from a nurses' station in the 

bone marrow transplant unit on the tenth floor of the North 

Hospital. One purse was located atop a desk and the other was 

 

 1 The panel unanimously held that the two other thefts from 

separate buildings in the same complex were separate offenses, 

even though they were in furtherance of the defendant's general 

scheme to steal. Accordingly, we do not reconsider the panel's 

holding that those thefts were not part of a single larceny. 
 3 

located behind a cabinet approximately ten feet from the desk. 

The desk and cabinet were separated by a wall containing a "tube 

system" that delivers items, such as blood products and pharmacy 

medications, to and from the tenth floor. The purse located 

behind the cabinet could not be seen from the desk without 

walking around the wall. Because the value of the contents of 

one of the stolen purses exceeded $200, Richardson was convicted 

of grand larceny. For the theft of the other purse, he was 

convicted of felonious petit larceny. The trial judge sentenced 

Richardson to serve five years in the penitentiary for the grand 

larceny conviction, which sentence the judge suspended, and to 

fifty months in jail for the felonious petit larceny conviction, 

to be served concurrently with a fifty-month sentence that was 

imposed for the other felonious petit larceny conviction 

resulting from the theft of a purse from another building in the 

MCV complex. 

 ANALYSIS

 Whether the larceny of multiple items at or about the same 

time from the same general location constitutes a single larceny 

or multiple offenses is an issue that most courts have addressed 

early in the development of their criminal jurisprudence. See

Daniel H. White, Single or Separate Larceny Predicated Upon 

Stealing Property from Different Owners at the Same Time, 37 

A.L.R.3d 1407, 1409-10 (1971); 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny §§ 6-9 

(1995). The concept is commonly referred to as the "single 
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larceny doctrine." The principles are easily stated and 

understood, but application of the doctrine becomes problematic 

when applied to the infinite variety of circumstances that can 

arise. See, e.g., 37 A.L.R.3d at 1407 annot.; 50 Am. Jur. 2d at 

§§ 6-9 nn. 47-79. Wharton's Criminal Law explains that a single 

larcenous taking of property, whether owned by one or several 

individuals, will be treated as a single criminal offense; 

conversely, if different articles are taken from different owners 

at different times, the thief has committed separate offenses. 

Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law §§ 346-47 (15th ed. 

1995). 

 In Alexander v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 809, 20 S.E. 782 

(1894), our Supreme Court explained the "single larceny" 

doctrine: 

 Lord Hale lays it down that if a thief at the 

same time steals goods of A to the value of 

six-pence, goods of B to the value of 

six-pence, and goods of C to the value of 

six-pence, being perchance in one bundle, or 

upon a table, or in one shop, this is grand 

larceny, at common law, because it is one 

entire felony done at the same time, though 

the persons had several properties, and 

therefore if in one indictment they make 

grand larceny. 

Id. at 810, 20 S.E. at 783 (emphasis added). The Court later 

expounded on the doctrine, stating: 

 [A] series of larcenous acts, regardless of 

the amount and value of the separate parcels 

or articles taken, and regardless of the time 

occupied in the performance, may and will 

constitute, in contemplation of law, a single 

larceny, provided the several acts are done 

pursuant to a single impulse and in execution 
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of a general fraudulent scheme. 

West v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 747, 754, 99 S.E. 654, 656 (1919). 

 The overriding principle behind the single larceny doctrine is 

to prevent the state from aggregating multiple criminal penalties 

for a single criminal act. Thus, in West the defendant could not 

be found guilty of separate larcenies for various items she stole 

from a trunk where the evidence failed to prove whether she had 

taken the items on one occasion or on separate occasions over a 

period of time. Where the application and enforcement of the 

criminal law is at issue, any ambiguity shall be resolved against 

the Commonwealth and in favor of the accused. See Bell v. United 

States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955). 

 There is no litmus test that will determine whether a 

defendant's conduct constitutes a single crime or multiple 

crimes. When a prosecutor's policy is to charge as many offenses 

as possible, the inquiry takes on added significance. Is, for 

example, the drug trafficker who has ten packets of cocaine in 

his pocket guilty of one or ten counts of possession with the 

intent to distribute? Is the assailant who shoots his victim 

three times guilty of three malicious woundings or three attempts 

to murder or is that but one offense? As to larceny, is the 

person who successively carries three televisions from a store to 

his van guilty of three larcenies, but the thief who loads them 

from a dolly into his van guilty of but one offense? Is the 

thief who rifles through three drawers of a desk, stealing items 
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from each drawer, guilty of one crime or three? If the thief is 

interrupted briefly after stealing from two drawers, but 

continues his thievery moments later, has he committed two 

crimes? Is the thief who steals numerous items from various 

rooms of a person's home guilty of but one larceny, whereas a 

thief who steals the same items from different offices in the 

same business complex guilty of multiple larcenies? 

 In order for the single larceny doctrine to apply, the items 

stolen may, but do not have to, be part of the same bundle or 

parcel; it is sufficient if they be at the same location -- that 

is on the "same table," or same room, or "same shop," as Lord 

Hale first observed. Alexander, 90 Va. at 810, 20 S.E. at 783. 

When the evidence supports a finding that the thefts were part of 

the same larcenous impulse or scheme and were part of a 

continuous act, a single larceny has occurred. The primary 

factor to be considered is the intent of the thief and the 

question to be asked is whether the thefts, although occurring 

successively within a brief time frame, were part of one impulse. 

 The circumstances to be considered that will bear upon the issue 

are the location of the items stolen, the lapse of time between 

their taking, the general and specific intent of the thief, the 

number of owners, and whether intervening events occurred between 

the takings. Unless the evidence proves that two or more 

separate and discrete thefts occurred at separate times which 

were not part of the same larcenous impulse, then thefts from the 
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same room are but a single larceny. 

 Although the taking of several items belonging to different 

persons from the same general area pursuant to the same larcenous 

impulse will constitute a single larceny, a series of thefts 

committed in rapid succession pursuant to a general scheme to 

steal from distinct locations, such as different shops, stores, 

or buildings, will constitute separate offenses. See, e.g., 

State v. Cabbell, 252 N.W.2d 451, 453 (Iowa 1977). For example, 

a series of thefts in which the thief shoplifts goods valued at 

less than $200 from several mall stores in succession, pursuant 

to a general scheme to shoplift, cannot be aggregated to form a 

single grand larceny; rather, the thefts are and must be 

prosecuted as a series of petit larcenies. A single, general 

scheme to commit a series of larcenies at different times and 

locations does not transform multiple separate and discrete 

crimes into a single offense. 

 As noted in footnote 1, the panel held in this case that 

Richardson's theft of the items from the several floors or 

separate buildings of the MCV complex, although accomplished 

pursuant to Richardson's single general scheme to steal, 

constituted separate larcenies because each was a separate and 

discrete offense and was not part of the same impulse or 

continuous larcenous act at the same location. We leave that 

holding undisturbed. However, the panel's decision as to those 

offenses serves to demonstrate that the controlling factor is not 
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that the evidence proves the thief had a general scheme or intent 

to steal, for example from various stores in a mall or various 

offices in a complex, but rather whether the thief was acting 

under the same impulse to steal at the time of both thefts. The 

evidence must be sufficient for the fact finder to conclude 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the thief formed separate and 

distinct intents or impulses to steal in order to constitute 

separate larcenies. 

 As for the theft of the two purses from the tenth floor 

nurses' station, the evidence was not sufficient to prove that 

Richardson formed separate and distinct intentions to steal or to 

commit two separate thefts even though the purses were separated 

by approximately ten feet. The theft of the two purses occurred 

at approximately the same time, from the same room or location, 

and pursuant to a single impulse or design to steal items from 

that nurses' station. The fact that the purses were separated by 

ten feet and that the thief had to walk around a wall from the 

desk to the cabinet are not circumstances that break the 

continuity of the thief's single and continuing act of thievery. 

 The fact finder could not reasonably infer from this evidence 

that Richardson left the station after stealing one purse and 

returned momentarily to steal the second purse, having formed a 

separate intent to steal or that a significant intervening event 

occurred after Richardson stole one purse, which led to the 

formation of a separate intent to steal the second purse. See
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West, 125 Va. at 754, 99 S.E. at 656. Thus, the evidence is 

insufficient to prove two separate and distinct offenses. The 

only conclusion that a fact finder could reasonably draw from 

this record is that Richardson went to the tenth floor nurses' 

station intending to steal purses or other items of value and 

that he stole two purses during one continuous act or 

transaction. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the grand larceny conviction but 

reverse and dismiss the felonious petit larceny conviction, which 

was subsumed by the single larceny conviction. Although the 

trial court sentenced the defendant to a five year suspended 

penitentiary sentence for the grand larceny conviction, we do not 

know whether the decision to suspend that sentence was, to any 

extent, based upon the trial court's having sentenced Richardson 

to a concurrent term of fifty months in jail for the felonious 

petit larceny conviction that we reverse and vacate. Therefore, 

we remand the grand larceny conviction to the trial court for the 

sole purpose of determining whether our reversal of the felonious 

petit larceny conviction affects the trial court's decision to 

suspend the sentence for the grand larceny conviction. 

Affirmed in part,

reversed in part,

and remanded. 
 10 

Elder, J., with whom Overton, J., joins, dissenting. 

 I dissent for the reasons stated in the panel's majority 

opinion. Richardson v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 668, 479 S.E.2d 

87 (1996).