[Cite as State ex rel. Youngstown Professional Firefighters IAFF Local 312 v. Youngstown, 2021-Ohio-539.]

Atty. Brooks Boron, and Atty. Ryan Lemmerbrock, Muskovitz & Lemmerbrock, LLC, 1621

Euclid Avenue, Suite 1750, Cleveland, Ohio 44115, for Relators and 

Atty. Jeffrey Limbian, City of Youngstown Law Director, and Atty., Jeffrey Moliterno, 

Senior Assistant Law Director, 26 South Phelps Street, Youngstown, Ohio 44503, for 

Respondent.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MAHONING COUNTY

STATE EX REL. YOUNGSTOWN PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS IAFF 

LOCAL 312 ET AL., 

Relators, 

v. 

CITY OF YOUNGSTOWN, 

Respondent.

 

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Case No. 20 MA 0089

 

Writ of Mandamus 

BEFORE: 

David A. D’Apolito, Gene Donofrio, Cheryl L. Waite, Judges. 

JUDGMENT: 

Writ of Mandamus Dismissed. Damage Claim Continued. 
2 

Case No. 20 MA 0089

Dated: February 23, 2021 

PER CURIAM. 

{¶1} On August 24, 2020, Relators, Youngstown Professional Firefighters, IAFF 

Local 312 (“Union”), Union President Charles Smith, and Firefighter Patrick Holcomb filed 

this original action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Respondent, City of 

Youngstown (“City”) to appoint an “independent, neutral investigator” to conduct a “true 

and fair investigation” into a complaint filed by Holcomb against Fire Chief Barry Finley, 

and for the City to proceed with the issuance of discipline, if so warranted, following the 

conclusion of the investigation. The verified complaint in mandamus further sought to 

compel the City to fulfill a public record request, filed by Relators on June 18, 2020, for 

any and all documents related to the City’s previous investigation of Holcomb’s complaint, 

and for statutory damages and attorneys’ fees resulting from the City’s failure to provide 

the investigative report within a reasonable period of time. 

{¶2} On August 31, 2020, one week after this original action was filed, the City 

provided a copy of the investigative report to Relators. As a consequence, on September 

21, 2020, Relators filed an amended verified complaint for mandamus seeking to compel 

the City to appoint an independent, neutral investigator, but limiting its public records 

request to an award of statutory damages and attorneys’ fees. 

{¶3} The City filed its answer to the amended verified complaint on October 2, 

2020. In a mandamus action, the pleadings have the same effect and must be construed 

in the same manner as in civil actions. R.C. 2731.09. 

{¶4} Having reviewed sua sponte the amended verified complaint and the 

attachments thereto, we find that Relators do not have a clear legal right pursuant to 

section 163.63 of the Youngstown Codified Ordinances (“YCO”) to the appointment of an 

independent, neutral investigator, or that the City has a clear legal duty pursuant to YCO 

163.63 to appoint such an investigator. Accordingly, the writ, to the extent that it is 

predicated upon the appointment of an independent, neutral investigator, is dismissed. 

{¶5} With respect to the timeliness of the City’s response to the public records 

request, the City asserts in its answer that the investigation was delayed due to Holcomb’s 

objection to the contents of his interview summary, which was a part of the investigative 
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Case No. 20 MA 0089

report. The City has attached two affidavits to the pleading to establish Holcomb’s failure 

to return an amended copy of his statement. 

{¶6} In essence, the City argues in favor of dismissal of the mandamus to the 

extent that it is predicated upon the public records. However, as the City has attached 

the affidavits to the pleading, we construe that part of the pleading to be a motion for 

summary judgment on Relator’s claim for statutory damages and attorneys’ fees. 

Accordingly, Relators shall file a response to the City’s motion for summary judgment 

within thirty days of the issuance of this memorandum opinion. A reply brief may be filed 

by the City in accordance with Ohio Civ.R. 6(C)(1). 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶7} The facts are taken from the amended verified complaint and the

attachments thereto, which include the investigative report and the various statements 

taken during the City’s investigation. “Where documents are attached or incorporated 

into the complaint, the face of the complaint to be evaluated includes those documents.” 

Adlaka v. Giannini, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 05 MA 105, 2006-Ohio-4611. “[M]aterial

incorporated in a complaint may be considered part of the complaint for purposes of 

determining a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.” State ex rel. Crabtree v. Franklin Cty. 

Bd. of Health, 77 Ohio St.3d 247, 249, fn. 1, 673 N.E.2d 1281 (1997)(various articles and 

public health studies attached to the complaint were considered in Rule 12 motion); see 

also State ex. rel. GMS Mgt. Co., Inc. v. Vivo, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10 MA 1, 2010-

Ohio-4184, ¶ 14 (written correspondence attached to the complaint considered for the 

purposes of motion to dismiss). 

{¶8} At a Fire Department B turn meeting at the Youngstown Fire Department 

on October 16, 2019, Chief Finley announced a measure passed by the Safety 

Committee reducing the number of Battalion Chiefs from six to four. Chief Finley 

explained that the Mayor had agreed to the measure and City Council had voted to 

implement the reduction. (Finley Interview, ¶ 2.) 

{¶9} According to Chief Finley, the firefighters in attendance reacted 

disrespectfully to the announcement. (Id., ¶ 3.) At some point, Holcomb raised his hand, 

in order to attract Chief Finday’s attention, then stated, “My mom knows every judge and 
4 

Case No. 20 MA 0089

every attorney and if I get hurt I’m going to own you, the fucking Mayor and the fucking 

City.” (Id., ¶ 3.) 

{¶10} Captain Dave Cook was in attendance at the B turn meeting. Although 

Captain Cook did not hear the substance of Holcomb’s comment, he opined that 

Holcomb’s “loud speaking” was “clearly out of line.” (Cook Interview, ¶ 2.) Later that day, 

Cook encouraged Holcomb to apologize to Chief Finley for the outburst. (Id., ¶ 3.) 

{¶11} Holcomb attempted to meet with Chief Finley the day after the meeting, 

ostensibly to apologize, however, the Chief refused to speak with him. (Holcomb 

Interview, ¶ 3.) Based on Holcomb’s behavior at the B turn meeting, Chief Finley charged 

Holcomb with insubordination. (Finley Interview, ¶ 6.) 

{¶12} Chief Finley, Holcomb, Battalion Chief Fred Beehler, and Smith attended 

the predisciplinary meeting on the insubordination charge held on October 28, 2019. Chief 

Finley expressed disappointment in Holcomb’s outburst based on their professional and 

personal relationships. Holcomb was one of Chief Finley’s firefighters before Finley was 

appointed to Chief, and Finley had also worked with Holcomb’s father and knew the 

family. Chief Finley acknowledged that Holcomb was a good person and a good firefighter 

despite his outburst at the B turn meeting. (Holcomb Interview, ¶ 4, Finley Interview, ¶ 8.) 

{¶13} Smith lobbied Chief Finley to impose a verbal rather than a written 

discipline, citing Holcomb’s effort to apologize the day after the meeting. Smith reasoned 

that the matter could have been resolved but for the Chief’s refusal to speak with 

Holcomb. Chief Finley responded to Smith that if he had talked with Holcomb the day 

after the B Turn meeting, he would have “put him through a wall.” (Finley Interview, ¶10.) 

{¶14} Chief Finley’s response relates back to an incident in February of 2012, 

when then-Captain Finley entered into an agreed discipline after he assaulted a 

subordinate, by physically removing the subordinate from a chair and throwing him into a 

wall. The force employed by Finley was so great that the subordinate ricocheted off one 

wall then perforated the drywall of another. (Am. Verified Complt., ¶ 9.) The agreed 

discipline reads, in pertinent part, “[Finley] is subject to termination for any aggressive 

conduct (including but not limited to hostile physical contact, threat, threatening behavior 

or intimidating words or acts) engaged in by him against co-workers, employees or the 

public over the next ten years.” (3/14/12 Agreed Discipline, p. 2.) 
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Case No. 20 MA 0089

{¶15} According to Chief Finley, the expression “putting someone through a wall” 

has been parodied at the fire department in the years following the 2012 discipline. For 

instance, when Chief Finley installed an air conditioner for Holcomb, Holcomb joked that 

the Chief would “put him through a wall” if Holcomb did not compensate him. (Finley 

Interview, ¶10.) 

{¶16} Battalion Chief Beehler concurred with Chief Finley’s characterization of the 

phrase, citing a previous interaction between Finley and another member of the fire 

department where the phrase was invoked in jest. Beehler further stated that Finley’s 

statement at the predisciplinary meeting did not sound threatening. (Beehler Interview, ¶ 

8-9.) 

{¶17} Holcomb ultimately agreed to a written reprimand. (Holcomb Interview, ¶ 5.) 

Chief Finley and Holcomb shook hands at the conclusion of the predisciplinary meeting, 

and Chief Finley said, “fuck you,” which Holcomb interpreted to mean “something like ‘you 

know better.’” Holcomb believed that the matter had been resolved. (Id., ¶ 6-7.) 

{¶18} However, at some point after the meeting, Chief Finley refused to sign an 

application for a scholarship for firefighter training for Holcomb. Holcomb filed a grievance 

based upon the Chief’s refusal to sign the application, which was ultimately withdrawn. 

(5/30/20 Investigative Report, p. 16.) Further, on the sole occasion when Holcomb saw 

Chief Finley after the predisciplinary hearing and the two were not involved in the 

performance of their duties, Holcomb greeted the Chief but the Chief did not respond. 

(Holcomb Interview, ¶ 11.) 

{¶19} On December 4, 2019, December 30, 2019, and January 17, 2020, the 

Union sent written requests to the City for a neutral third-party investigation of the events 

of October 28, 2019. (Am. Verified Compl., ¶ 12-14; 1/17/20 Letter, p. 3.) The January 

17, 2020 correspondence reads, in relevant part, “Given the Law Department’s public 

statement of support for Chief Finley after the FF Holcomb complaint was made (see your 

letter dated December 12, 2019, re: ‘City of Youngstown Response to Vote of No 

Confidence’), [the Union] renews its request that a neutral third-party conduct the 

investigation.” (1/17/20 Letter, p. 3). Neither the December 12th letter nor Holcomb’s 

complaint is attached to the amended verified complaint. 
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Case No. 20 MA 0089

{¶20} On January 24, 2020, City Law Director Jeffrey Limbian appointed Assistant 

City Law Director Terry Grenga to conduct the investigation. Grenga administered the 

investigation within the framework codified in YCO 163.63, captioned, “Violence and 

Bullying in the Workplace Policy, which reads, in pertinent part: 

(a) The City [ ] is committed to maintaining a workplace that is free from 

bullying, violence and/or threats of violence. Any violent behavior that 

creates a climate of violence, hostility or intimidation will not be tolerated, 

regardless of its origin. 

(b) This policy includes but is not limited to the following behaviors: 

* * * 

(2) Direct or indirect threats. 

* * * 

(8) High levels of conflict or tension within a work unit. 

* * * 

(h) The City will promptly and thoroughly investigate all reports of threats 

of violence or incidents of actual violence and of suspicious individuals or 

activities. The identity and confidentiality of the individual making a report 

will be protected as much as possible. To maintain workplace safety and 

the integrity of its investigation, the City may suspend employees suspected 

of workplace violence or threats of violence, either with or without pay, 

pending investigation. If it is determined that threatening behavior has been 

exhibited or acts of violence were committed, the City will initiate an 

appropriate response. Anyone found to be responsible for threats of or 

actual violence or other conduct that is in violation of these guidelines will 

be subject to prompt disciplinary action up to and including termination of 

employment. 
7 

Case No. 20 MA 0089

{¶21} Grenga also relied on certain procedural provisions in YCO 163.53, 

captioned “Sexual Harassment Policy and Procedures,” and reads, in relevant part: 

(e) Sexual Harassment Internal Investigation Procedure 

(1) The information alleging sexual harassment or improper behavior shall 

be given to a Department Head and the City Law Department. 

(2) The City Law Department shall: 

A. Notify the person accused of engaging in improper activity that 

the issue has been brought to the attention of the City Law 

Department; and 

B. Notify the person bringing forth the issue that a prompt 

investigation will be conducted by an individual employed outside of 

the accused’s department, to be selected by the City Law 

Department. 

(3) The investigator will: 

A. Conduct an interview with the person who brought the matter to 

the attention of management; 

B. Interview the person who is alleged to have engaged in the

improper activity. That person will be given an opportunity to explain 

his/her recollection of the matter, along with any other information 

which that person wishes to provide; 

C. Interview persons who have been identified as having some 

relevant information concerning any aspect of the occurrence(s); 

D. Prepare written statements containing the information obtained 

in each interview. This information will be provided to each person 

interviewed. The person interviewed will be asked to review the 
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Case No. 20 MA 0089

accuracy and completeness of the statement and return a signed 

copy to the investigator. 

* * * 

{¶22} Relators concede that the investigation was delayed while the Union and 

the City debated whether a union representative could accompany Holcomb to his 

interview. After the Union and the City exchanged a series of letters addressing the 

subject, Holcomb appeared without union representation at an interview conducted on 

February 11, 2020. Chief Finley was interviewed on January 29, 2020, Captain Cook 

was interviewed on February 20, 2020, with the interviews of Smith, and Battalion Chief 

Beehler (by telephone) conducted on February 24, 2020 and March 3, 2020, respectively. 

{¶23} According to all present at the predisciplinary meeting, Chief Finley stated 

that he would have “put Holcomb through a wall” if he had spoken to him on October 17, 

2019. In response to the foregoing statement, Holcomb told Grenga that he 

acknowledged to Finley that he had the right to be angry about Holcomb’s conduct at the 

B turn meeting, but that Finley “should not have said [he would have put Holcomb through 

a wall if he spoke to him the following day].” (Holcomb Interview, ¶ 5.) However, Holcomb 

conceded that he thought “everything was resolved and clear” after the meeting. (Id., ¶ 

8.) 

{¶24} Nonetheless, during his interview with Grenga, Holcomb stated that he felt 

intimidated and harassed by Chief Finley’s words at the predisciplinary meeting. Holcomb 

further stated that he feels intimidated “since Finley does not speak to him.” (Holcomb 

Interview, ¶ 12-13.) 

{¶25} Grenga prepared summaries of each interview and provided a copy for 

review by each of the respective interview subjects. The interview summaries were a part 

of the investigative report, and each summary includes a cover page requesting that the 

interview subject review the attached summary for accuracy and completeness and return 

a signed copy to the Law Department. The interview summaries in the investigative report 

from Cook and Smith are signed, however, the interview summaries of Holcomb, Chief 

Finley, and Battalion Chief Beehler are not. 
9 

Case No. 20 MA 0089

{¶26} The investigative report was issued on May 30, 2020. Grenga 

recommended dismissal of Holcomb’s complaint, as she opined that Chief Finley did not 

violate YCO 163.63. 

{¶27} According to Grenga’s affidavit, which is attached to the City’s amended 

answer, she notified Holcomb that his interview summary was complete and ready for his 

review on February 28, 2020. Holcomb retrieved the interview summary from the Law 

Department, but did not sign and return it as requested. On May 30, 2020, Grenga 

completed her investigation and prepared it for review. 

{¶28} On June 3, 2020, Holcomb contacted Grenga to inform her that he objected 

to certain portions of his interview summary. Grenga instructed Holcomb to return the 

interview summary with his objections noted. Holcomb never returned his interview 

summary. (Grenga Aff., ¶ 12-19.) 

{¶29} On June 4, 2020 and June 18, 2020, counsel for the Union sent 

correspondence to the City requesting an update on the status of the investigation. 

Included in the Union’s June 18th letter is a request, pursuant to RC. 149.43, for copies 

of: 

1.) All correspondence (emails, memoranda, letters, etc.) to or from City 

officials concerning the investigation of intimidation and harassment 

of [Holcomb and Chief Finley], including any correspondence to or 

from [Chief Finley] concerning the alleged intimidation and 

harassment. 

2.) All witness statements and/or documents in the City’s possession 

concerning the investigation of intimidation and harassment of 

[Holcomb] by [Finley]. 

3.) Any investigative report or summary prepared concerning the 

investigation of intimidation and harassment of [Holcomb] by [Chief 

Finley]. 

(6/18/20 Letter, p.1, Am. Verified Compl., Exhibit 4.) 
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Case No. 20 MA 0089

{¶30} Grenga and City Law Director Jeff Limbian aver that the copy of the 

investigative report sent in response to Relators’ public records request was delayed due 

to Holcomb’s failure to return his interview summary. (Id. at ¶ 18, Limbian Aff., ¶ 9-12). 

On August 31, 2020, after the original verified complaint for mandamus was filed in this 

original action, the City provided the investigative report and attachments thereto via 

electronic mail to counsel for Relators, despite the failure of Holcomb to return a signed 

copy of his interview summary. (Limbian Aff., ¶ 12.) 

{¶31} In a letter from the City to counsel for the Union dated August 31, 2020, 

Limbian explains that Grenga’s investigation was stalled when Holcomb notified her that 

he objected to portions of his interview summary, but he failed to return the interview 

summary with his objections. Limbian observes that City has “inferred” from the 

mandamus action “that the Union (and [Holcomb]) is acquiescing to Holcomb’s [interview 

summary] as prepared by [Grenga].” (8/31/20 Letter, p. 2, Am. Verified Compl., Exhibit 

5.) Limbian continues: 

While the City had previously not released the investigation due to 

Holcomb’s failure to act, the City hereby releases the report as it was 

prepared and ready to send out [sic] in late May. Although the City did not 

release the investigation previously out of an abundance of caution and a 

consideration of fairness to argue right to review and sign his [interview 

summary], the City now releases the investigation due to the Union ‘s filing 

of a Mandamus action against the City seeking its release. 

* * * 

The City also attaches and releases all of the requested documents you 

sought in your June 18, 2020 public records request. While these 

documents are now available, it would of course have been impossible to 

release these records during a pending investigation in which the records 

themselves were not yet public or final. 

(Id.) 
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Case No. 20 MA 0089

{¶32} In the amended verified complaint, Relators assert: 

The City attempts to blame [Holcomb] for its untimely production of the 

properly requested records. However, [Holcomb] is not responsible for the 

City’s production of public records. Additionally, the City never previously 

acknowledged the receipt of the public records request and could have 

provided the records regardless of [Holcomb’s] actions. 

(Am. Verified Compl., ¶ 38.) 

ANALYSIS 

{¶33} We have jurisdiction to hear an original mandamus action pursuant to Article 

IV, Section 3(B)(1) of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2731.02. Entitlement to a writ of 

mandamus requires the relators to demonstrate: (1) they have a clear legal right to the 

relief, (2) the respondent has a clear legal duty to provide that relief, and (3) relators have 

no adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Taxpayers for Westerville Schools v. Franklin 

Cty. Bd. of Elections, 133 Ohio St.3d 153, 2012-Ohio-4267, 976 N.E.2d 890, ¶ 12. 

Realtors carry the burden to establish the elements by clear and convincing evidence to 

obtain the writ. State ex rel. Doner v. Zody, 130 Ohio St.3d 446, 2011-Ohio-6117, 958 

N.E.2d 1235 (2011). A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which should be 

exercised with caution and issued only when the right is clear. State ex rel. Brown v. 

Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Elections, 142 Ohio St.3d 370, 2014-Ohio-4022, 31 N.E.3d 596, ¶ 

11. 

{¶34} The Rules of Civil Procedure are generally applicable in original actions for 

extraordinary writs. State ex rel. Sautter v. Grey, 117 Ohio St.3d 465, 2008-Ohio-1444, 

884 N.E.2d 1062, at ¶ 11. A court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte and without notice 

when the complaint is frivolous or the claimant obviously cannot prevail on the facts 

alleged in the complaint. State ex rel. Allen v. Goulding, 156 Ohio St.3d 337, 2019-Ohio858, 126 N.E.3d 1104 (2019), reconsideration denied, 155 Ohio St.3d 1458, 2019-Ohio1759, 122 N.E.3d 218 (2019), citing State ex rel. Brooks v. O'Malley, 117 Ohio St.3d 385, 

2008-Ohio-1118, 884 N.E.2d 42, ¶ 5. 
12 

Case No. 20 MA 0089

{¶35} YCO 163.63 provides, in relevant part, “[t]he City will promptly and 

thoroughly investigate all reports of threats of violence or incidents of actual violence and 

of suspicious individuals or activities.” Relators do not dispute that an investigation of 

Holcomb’s complaint was undertaken by the City. Accordingly, we need not consider and 

do not decide whether Relators have a clear legal right to an investigation, or the City has 

a clear legal duty to conduct an investigation. 

{¶36} Relators’ sole contention is that they have a clear legal right to the 

appointment of an independent, neutral investigator. Relators argue in the amended 

verified complaint that Grenga’s investigation “was not a true or fair investigation, as 

evidenced by the investigative report.” (Am. Verified Compl., ¶ 50.) The amended verified 

complaint continues, “Without an independent, neutral investigator, the City cannot 

adhere to requirements established in [YCO] 163.63.” (Id., ¶ 52.) 

{¶37} Conspicuously absent from the plain and unambiguous language of YCO 

163.63(h) is a clear legal right to or a clear legal duty to appoint an independent 

investigator. “‘In construing a statute, we may not add or delete words.’” State ex rel. 

Cincinnati Bell v. Pub. Util. Comm., 105 Ohio St.3d 177, 2005-Ohio-1150, 824 N.E.2d 68, 

at ¶ 32, quoting State v. Hughes, 86 Ohio St.3d 424, 427, 715 N.E.2d 540 (1999). The 

writ may not be issued to compel the observance of laws in general, but only to command 

the performance of a specific act specially enjoined by law to be performed. State ex rel. 

Stanley v. Cook, 146 Ohio St. 348, 66 N.E.2d 207 (1946), paragraph seven of the 

syllabus. Accordingly, Relators are not entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in 

mandamus. 

{¶38} Ohio's Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, requires a public office, upon 

request, to make public records available for inspection or to provide copies of the records 

within a reasonable period of time. R.C. 149.43(B)(1). A “public record” is a record “kept 

by any public office.” R.C. 149.43(A)(1). Mandamus is an appropriate remedy by which 

to compel compliance with the Public Records Act. R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(b); State ex rel. 

Physicians Commt. for Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 

Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6. 

{¶39} Relators initially brought this suit to compel the City to respond to the 

Union’s public-records request. The City eventually provided the records of the 
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Case No. 20 MA 0089

investigation to the Union. This aspect of the case is therefore moot. State ex rel. 

Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Dupuis, 98 Ohio St.3d 

126, 2002-Ohio-7041, 781 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 8 (“In general, the provision of requested 

records to a relator in a public-records mandamus case renders the mandamus claim 

moot”). 

{¶40} The only issue raised by the Union in the amended verified complaint with 

respect to the public records request is its entitlement to statutory damages and attorneys’ 

fees based upon the City’s alleged failure to produce the records within a reasonable 

period of time. R.C. 149.43(B)(1) requires a public office or official to promptly prepare all 

responsive records “within a reasonable period of time.” “Statutory damages may be 

awarded if the public record has not been provided promptly.” State ex rel. Cincinnati 

Enquirer v. Deters, 148 Ohio St.3d 595, 2016-Ohio-8195, 71 N.E.3d 1076, ¶ 22; R.C. 

149.43(C)(2). 

{¶41} The phrase “reasonable period of time” is not defined in R.C. 149.43, “but 

‘the determination of what is “reasonable” depends upon all the pertinent facts and 

circumstances.’ ” State ex rel. Kesterson v. Kent State Univ., 156 Ohio St.3d 13, 2018-

Ohio-5108, 123 N.E.3d 887, ¶ 16, quoting Deters at ¶ 23. When a public official makes 

records available for the first time after a mandamus suit is filed, but before a court issues 

an order, the court may sometimes be called upon to determine whether the official acted 

in bad faith. But that determination is relevant only to awards of attorney fees, R.C. 

149.43(C)(3)(b)(iii), and court costs, R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(a)(ii), not to statutory damages. 

State ex rel. Stuart v. Greene, -- Ohio St.3d --, 2020-Ohio-3685, -- N.E.3d, --, ¶ 9. 

{¶42} Although the City captions its pleading “ANSWER to Amended Complaint 

for Writ of Mandamus to Compel Compliance with R.C. 149.43 and [YCO] 163.63,” the 

pleading argues that the public records request is moot, as the requested documents 

were provided. In the alternative, the City argues that Relators’ public records request 

was fulfilled within a reasonable time period, based on the averments in the two affidavits 

attached to the pleading. 

{¶43} A court may rely on the caption of a pleading when ruling on it, but also has 

the discretion to construe it based on its contents. Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. JCA 

Rentals, L.L.C., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 12 MA 56, 2013-Ohio-863, ¶ 19. Because the 
14 

Case No. 20 MA 0089

City argues that any delay in fulfilling the public records request was due to Holcomb’s 

failure to return his amended statement to Grenga, based on the averments in the Grenga 

and Limbian affidavits, we construe that part of the answer to be a motion for summary 

judgment. We have previously observed: 

[A] motion to dismiss is a procedural tool which tests the sufficiency of the 

complaint, not the sufficiency of the evidence. Tests of the sufficiency of the 

evidence are handled utilizing motions for summary judgment under Civ.R. 

56. It is permissible for a trial court to convert the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to 

a motion for summary judgment, but it must do so using the parameters 

established by Civ.R. 56. Further, as this court has previously held, “where 

the motion to dismiss, which relies on evidence outside of the complaint, is 

granted without conversion and notification, the dismissal is reversible.” 

Scardina v. Ghannam, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 04-MA-81, 2005-Ohio-3315, 

at ¶ 18. 

Pfalzgraf v. Miley, 7th Dist. Monroe No. 19 MO 0006, 2019-Ohio-4920, ¶ 13. Having 

construed the latter portion of the City’s answer to be a motion for summary judgment, 

we are obligated to notify the parties as well as provide an opportunity to Relators to 

respond to the evidence presented by the City. 

CONCLUSION 

{¶44} In summary, Relators do not have a clear legal right pursuant to section 

163.63 of the Youngstown Codified Ordinances (“YCO”) to the appointment of an 

independent, neutral investigator, and the City does not have a clear legal duty pursuant 

to YCO 163.63 to appoint such an investigator. Accordingly, the writ, to the extent that it 

is predicated upon the appointment of an independent, neutral investigator, is dismissed. 

{¶45} The City seeks dismissal of the sole remaining issue – the timeliness of the 

City’s response to the public records request – based on affidavits that are beyond the 

face of the amended verified complaint. As a consequence, we have construed the latter 

part of the City’s pleading to be a motion for summary judgment. 
15 

Case No. 20 MA 0089

{¶46} Accordingly, Relators shall file a response to the City’s motion for summary 

within thirty days of the issuance of this memorandum opinion. A reply brief may be filed 

by the City in accordance with Ohio Civ.R. 6(C)(1). 

 
16 

Case No. 20 MA 0089

Waite, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part. 

{¶47} While I agree with my colleagues that the underlying writ of mandamus 

seeking appointment of an investigator must be dismissed, I respectfully dissent from the 

conclusion that the request for damages should not also be dismissed. According to R.C. 

149.43(B)(1), public records must be provided “within a reasonable time.” As noted by 

the majority, the term “reasonable time” is not defined, and this term has become a fact 

specific analysis in the law. It is clear, however, the requestor bears the burden of 

demonstrating that the public records request response was unreasonably delayed. State 

ex rel. Kesterson v. Kent State Univ., 156 Ohio St.3d 22, 2018-Ohio-5110, 123 N.E.3d 

895, ¶ 19, State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Johnson, 106 Ohio St.3d 160, 2005-Ohio4384, 833 N.E.2d 274, ¶ 44. 

{¶48} The following facts are already in this record and are relevant to this 

analysis. On February 28, 2020, Attorney Grenga informed Holcomb that his statement 

summary was complete and ready for his review and signature. (9/15/20 Answer to 

Amended Complaint, Grenga Aff.) Holcomb picked up the statement, however, he failed 

to return it with his signature. Attorney Grenga, still without Holcomb’s signed statement, 

concluded the investigation and prepared the (incomplete) report for review on May 30, 

2020. On June 3, 2020, Holcomb informed Attorney Grenga that he objected to portions 

of his statement summary, which had been in his possession since approximately 

February 28, 2020. Attorney Grenga instructed Holcomb to note his objections and 

requested changes on the statement and return it to her. Holcomb failed to do so. 

Attorney Grenga averred that she delayed release of the investigation report due to 

Appellant’s failure to return his signed statement. On June 18, 2020, the Union sent a 

public records request for all correspondence related to the incident, including the 

investigative report. On August 24, 2020, the Union filed the instant action. At the time 

the action was filed, Holcomb still had not complied with Attorney Grenga’s instruction to 

return the signed statement with his noted objections so that she could complete the 

report. Despite Holcomb’s continued failure to comply, the records were released on 

August 31, 2020, one week after the action was filed. 

{¶49} The Union acknowledges that Holcomb did not comply with Attorney 

Grenga’s request. The Union argues, however, that Holcomb is not responsible for the 
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production of public records and that the City “could have provided the records regardless 

of Firefighter Holcomb’s actions.” (9/21/20 Amended Complaint, p. 9.) Attached to the 

amended complaint is a letter from the City of Youngstown to Holcomb’s counsel. 

(9/21/20 Amended Complaint, Exh. 5.) In the letter, the City explained that the report had 

not been released as of that date due to Holcomb’s failure to return his signed statement. 

The letter states that on May 30, 2020, Attorney Grenga prepared a draft of the 

investigation report without Holcomb’s signed statement. However, on June 3, 2020, 

Holcomb contacted Attorney Grenga and noted his objection to portions of his statement 

summary, a summary he had received on February 28, 2020. “Attorney Grenga 

instructed Holcomb on what he would need to do in reference to this or any other 

disagreements he had with the statement summary. She directed Holcomb to review the 

summary statement and return it to her. Attorney Grenga, therefore, held off on releasing 

the investigation until Holcomb had reviewed and returned the statement summary.” 

(9/21/20 Amended Complaint, Exh. 2.) 

{¶50} Due to the filing of the instant action, the City released the report that it 

drafted on May 30, 2020 and noted that it “did not release the investigation previously out 

of an abundance of caution and a consideration of fairness to Holcomb’s right to review 

and sign his statement summary, the City now releases the investigation due to the 

Union’s filing of a Mandamus action against the City seeking its release.” (9/21/20 

Amended Complaint, Exh 5, p. 2.) 

{¶51} Thus, the Union’s own exhibit establishes that the City was prepared to 

complete and release the report months earlier, if Holcomb had provided his signed 

statement. As soon as Holcomb advised the City that he had objections or proposed 

changes to his statement, months after he initially received it, Holcomb was immediately 

advised how to note his objections or corrections in order to complete his statement. He 

does not dispute that he failed to take those steps. While Holcomb and his Union now 

claims that the City could have released the investigative report without his signed 

statement, it is apparent from the record before us that Holcomb understood Attorney 

Grenga was waiting for his signed statement in order to fully complete the report. 

Because Holcomb’s own actions prevented the City from completing the report, based on 
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the information already in this record it cannot be said that the City’s delay was 

unreasonable. 

{¶52} As the Union addressed all the facts necessary to fully decide this matter, 

especially in Exhibit 5 attached to their amended complaint, and the City responded to 

these in its answer to the amended complaint, there is no need to convert the request for 

damages into a motion for summary judgment. Based on the record here, sufficient 

evidence exists to dismiss the writ of mandamus in its entirety. 

APPROVED: 

CHERYL L. WAITE, JUDGE 

 
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{¶53} Costs taxed against Relator. Final order. Clerk to serve copies of this 

decision and judgment entry pursuant to the civil rules. 

 

JUDGE DAVID A. D’APOLITO 

JUDGE GENE DONOFRIO 

JUDGE CHERYL L. WAITE