ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 302 1 

I

n November of 2017, the European Union (EU) officially launched the 

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project, its latest attempt to 

deepen defense cooperation among EU members. Earlier that same year, 

the EU approved two other important initiatives designed to strengthen defense 

cooperation: the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). Shortly after the launch of PESCO, many U.S. 

defense officials expressed skepticism about its value.1 This is not surprising; U.S. 

officials have reflexively opposed European defense initiatives such as PESCO 

since the end of the Cold War. U.S. opposition to these initiatives reflects its 

fear that they could lead the EU to become a competitor to the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) for European security issues and resources, and in 

so doing reduce U.S. influence in European security.

The United States has not always been so skeptical of European defense 

initiatives. In the early 1950s, the United States was actually a staunch supporter 

of Europe’s first, and to this day most significant, attempt at defense integration, 

the European Defence Community (EDC). One of the reasons for such strong 

U.S. support of the EDC was its desire for Europe to share more of the burden 

for its own security, a sentiment that continues today.

Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has taken several steps to deepen 

defense cooperation and integration. The United States has tended to look at 

these efforts through two contradictory lenses. On the one hand, the United 

States has consistently urged Europe to increase its capabilities and do more for 

its own defense. On the other hand, concerns about losing influence in European security affairs and the implications of European strategic autonomy have 

tempered U.S. support for such efforts.

The European Union’s 

Permanent Structured 

Cooperation: Implications for 

Transatlantic Security

by Jonathan Dunn

STRATEGIC FORUM

National Defense University

About the Author

Colonel Jonathan Dunn, USA, is a 

Russian and Eurasian Foreign Area 

Officer and the Army Attaché at the 

U.S. Embassy Moscow. During the 

2018–2019 academic year, he was a 

student at the National War College 

and a U.S. European Command Scholar 

in the Institute for National Security 

Studies at the National Defense 

University.

Key Points

◆ Many U.S. defense officials expressed concern over the European 

Union’s (EU) November 2017 launch 

of its Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). They fear that a 

more capable EU would make it a 

competitor to the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) for 

European security issues, and in 

so doing reduce U.S. influence in 

European security.

◆ Concerns about diminished U.S. 

influence and EU divergence from 

NATO as a result of PESCO are misguided. Rather than be concerned 

about the remote possibility of 

European strategic autonomy, the 

United States should throw its full 

support behind the PESCO initiative 

and other attempts to strengthen 

European defense.

◆ That said, the United States has an 

interest in the direction that the 

EU takes with PESCO and should 

therefore attempt to shape it constructively. First, the United States 

should insist that there be tight 

cooperation between EU and NATO 

capabilities development planning. 

Second, the United States should 

continue to pressure the EU about 

the issue of third country participation in PESCO projects. Third, the 

United States should open its own 

procurement processes to competition from European firms.

January 2020

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH
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Of these three EU initiatives, the EDF has the potential to be the most controversial because actual European Commission money is at stake. Concerns about diminished U.S. influence and EU divergence from NATO 

as a result of PESCO, together with CARD and EDF, 

are misguided, however. Previous attempts at European 

defense cooperation have shown that such projects tend 

to be limited by the will of European countries themselves, and PESCO is no different. Rather than be concerned about the remote possibility of European strategic autonomy, the United States should throw its full 

support behind the PESCO initiative and these other 

attempts to strengthen European defense. The success of 

these initiatives advances U.S. interests because they will 

strengthen the European arm of NATO.

Defense Integration in the Post–

World War II Era

In the early 1950s, Europe had to solve the question 

of German rearmament—whether to allow it and, if so, 

when and how. Not every country was in favor of German rearmament, given the scar tissue that still remained 

after two world wars in the preceding 35 years. At the 

same time, it was not clear what sort of demand signal 

there would be from Germany to participate in broader 

European defense structures.2

The Truman administration was adamant that the 

“common defense” of Europe include a plan for the rearmament of Germany.3

 Just as the Americans saw the 

Marshall Plan as a temporary means for Europe to become economically self-sufficient, they likewise envisioned Europe eventually carrying more of the burden 

for its own defense. The answer that Europe developed 

was an ambitious EDC concept.

The EDC would have transformed European defense structures in ways that are almost unimaginable 

today. Specific articles called for common armed forces, a board of commissioners accountable to supranational institutions rather than national governments, 

an assembly, and a council.4

 Other significant features 

of the EDC treaty included a mutual defense clause 

that mirror imaged NATO’s Article V and a protocol governing relations between the EDC and NATO 

that emphasized avoiding any duplication of functions 

or responsibilities.5

Current U.S. defense officials might be surprised 

to learn how vigorously the United States supported a 

project like EDC that sought to deepen European defense integration outside the auspices of NATO. Upon 

its inauguration, the Eisenhower administration made it 

clear that it “wholeheartedly” supported the success of 

EDC.6 Despite the strong support of the Americans, the 

EDC treaty ultimately failed when it was rejected by the 

French parliament on August 30, 1954.

Several factors contributed to the failure of the 

EDC. Despite strong U.S. support for the EDC, including threats of pulling financial support for European defense, the EDC project did not get off the ground. The 

most important reason was that the EDC represented 

too much supranationalism too soon for the French. Despite the efforts of some French proponents of European 

integration, such as Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, 

the federal concept they envisioned for Europe proved 

less acceptable in France than many thought.7

The rise and fall of the EDC project is the earliest 

example that demonstrates the limits of European community defense initiatives. Ultimately, the success of EU 

initiatives depends on the ability of all member states to 

agree on the depth and breadth of them. The requirement for consensus is even more complicated today in a 

union of 28 countries.

Defense Integration After the 

Cold War

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of 

the Warsaw Pact caused many politicians and political 

scientists to reconsider the nature of European security. 

Indeed, many observers on both sides of the Atlantic 

openly questioned the need for NATO’s existence. There 

were many ways that Europe could have adjusted to the 

so-called new world order. Regardless of the ultimate 

form of a new European security structure, it was clear 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 302 3 

that the international community would expect more out 

of Western Europe.8

Throughout the Cold War, the United States would 

often harangue its European allies about burden-sharing. The post–Cold War environment was no different, 

as many in Washington sought to cash in on the “peace 

dividend.” For its part, many European leaders sought 

greater independence from Washington on security issues and saw an opportunity to leverage the new security 

environment to that end.

NATO itself issued a new strategic concept in 1991 

in light of the changed security situation in Europe. Significantly, this new strategic concept acknowledged that 

the

enhancement of the role and responsibilities of 

the European members of the Alliance is positive 

and reinforcing. The development of a European 

security identity and defence role, reflected in the 

strengthening of the European pillar within the 

Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the 

European states but also reinforce the integrity and 

effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.9

The European Union interpreted NATO’s new strategic concept as a signal of Alliance and, more importantly, American endorsement to strengthen European 

defense structures. This effort ultimately led to the inclusion of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 

in the Maastricht Treaty, which was signed in 1992 and 

entered into force in 1993. Subsequent strategic concepts 

in 1999 and 2010 doubled down on the notion that a 

stronger, more capable EU defense capability is in NATO’s interest because it furthers Alliance capabilities.10

The United States was suspicious of CFSP, despite 

its previous support for the new NATO strategic concept. Its primary concern was the development of EU 

capabilities that would ultimately lead to a reduction in 

the importance of NATO, and hence U.S. influence in 

European security matters.11 The United States was angry, almost bitter, over what it perceived as its marginalization in European security affairs. In the so-called 

Bartholomew memorandum of February 1991, the 

United States made clear that it was concerned about 

any efforts to strengthen the European pillar that would 

weaken NATO’s structure or redefine and limit its role.12

As it turned out, however, the CFSP was more aspirational than actionable in practice.

Nowhere were the shortcomings of the CFSP clearer than in the European Union’s inability to adequately 

respond to the crisis in the Balkans during the violent 

disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.13 Based on its 

demonstrated weakness in responding to the crises in the 

Balkans, the EU realized that it would need to develop 

some form of military capacity in order to be able to have 

a foreign policy with any teeth. Momentum for such an 

endeavor received an enormous boost when the United 

Kingdom (UK) and France issued the Saint-Malo Declaration on December 4, 1998, which stated that the European Union “must have the capacity for autonomous 

action, backed by credible military forces, the means to 

decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to 

respond to international crises.”14

The Saint-Malo Declaration marked the first time 

since the proposed European Defence Community in 

the 1950s that the United Kingdom supported deeper 

European defense integration outside of NATO’s architecture. The UK’s acceptance of the need to increase EU 

defense capabilities paved the way for the launching of 

the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 

1999.15 ESDP represented the first successful concrete 

steps to develop an autonomous military capability within the European Union.

It is important to note that the authors of ESDP 

wanted to make it clear that they had no intent for the 

European Union to replace NATO as the primary guarantor of European security. They explicitly stated that the 

EU would act militarily only where NATO as a whole 

was not engaged and that it would not create unnecessary duplications.16 With these principles, the EU hoped 

to placate the American understandable and often stated 

concerns regarding any military capabilities developed 

outside of NATO.
4 SF No. 302 ndupress.ndu.edu

Observations from Previous 

EU Defense and Foreign Policy 

Integration Efforts

What conclusions can be drawn from Europe’s attempts to deepen defense and foreign policy integration 

in the past, from the EDC project of the 1950s through 

the end of the Cold War and the ongoing war on terror? 

In each case, both internal and external drivers drove Europe’s efforts to deepen its defense integration. In both 

cases, the external drivers were the changing security 

landscape in Europe and the preferences of the United 

States. The internal driver was Europe’s consensus that 

it needed to increase its contribution to the continent’s 

own defense.

The United States was a critical factor in both cases, 

but for different reasons. In the 1950s, the United States 

was adamant that Europe shoulder more of the burden 

for its own defense, and was equally convinced that rearming Germany was critical to that end. In the period 

after the Cold War, European NATO members were 

concerned that the United States might lose interest in 

transatlantic security and sought to hedge against that 

possibility.

The reasons for failure of the 1950s attempt to 

launch the EDC and the limitations of post–Cold War 

EU common foreign and security policy are also similar. 

In both cases, factors internal to the EU were the limiting factor of these efforts to deepen defense integration. 

The successive attempts in the post–Cold War period 

have also been limited by the complexities of securing 

EU consensus in defense and security policy.

PESCO: The Latest Initiative

Permanent Structured Cooperation is undertaken 

on a voluntary basis by those member states whose military capabilities are sufficiently developed and who agree 

to meet more binding defense spending and capability 

commitments. PESCO was originally included in the 

EU’s Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed in December 

2007 and entered into force on December 1, 2009. The 

treaty was necessary to provide structural changes in the 

wake of the EU’s expansion after the Cold War. It also 

reflected EU recognition of a need to play a stronger international role. To this end, one of the treaty’s objectives 

was to improve the coherence of EU foreign affairs.17

The launch of PESCO was met by two predictable 

reactions from American and, to a lesser extent, European security experts. Some effectively dismissed the initiative out of hand as simply another grandiose EU idea 

that suffers from a deficit of substance to match its ambition. Others saw PESCO as a not-so-subtle indicator of 

Europe’s desire to shift the focus of security from NATO 

to the EU. While the jury is still out regarding the former assertion, there is almost zero risk of the latter.

Part of a Larger EU Effort to Improve Defense Capabilities. The European Union officially launched PESCO in December 2017, when the Council of the European Union adopted a decision in accordance with the 

requirements called for in the Lisbon Treaty. Twentyfive of the 28 EU members joined the PESCO initiative, 

with only the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Malta 

opting out. The council decision also established a list of 

ambitious and more binding commitments agreed to by 

the participating member states, the governance structure for PESCO, and an initial draft list of 17 projects.

The binding commitments that participating member states agreed to meet include increasing defense 

budgets, increasing defense investment expenditure to 

20 percent of total defense spending, and establishing a 

regular review to ensure participating states are actually 

meeting these commitments.18 It is important to note 

that these binding commitments closely parallel NATO 

commitments—an early indication that the authors of 

PESCO intended for it to complement and be in synch 

with NATO.

The council deferred decisions on two important areas that remain under discussion. First, the rules regarding the participation of third countries in PESCO were 

not decided, largely due to the ongoing Brexit negotiations. Second, the standards by which the council would 

assess the degree to which participating member states 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 302 5 

are in fact meeting their binding commitments were also 

not determined.

As mentioned, PESCO should not be considered as 

a standalone EU initiative. Before PESCO was formalized, the EU approved two other important initiatives 

to strengthen defense cooperation. In May of 2017, the 

council established the Coordinated Annual Review on 

Defence and in June the same year launched the ambitious European Defence Fund. These two initiatives 

should be viewed as part of a broader EU effort, together 

with PESCO, to strengthen the EU’s Common Security 

and Defence Policy (CSDP).19

The intent of CARD is to fulfill the 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS) call for the “gradual synchronisation and mutual adaptation of national defence planning 

cycles and capability development practices” in order 

to enhance EU member states’ strategic convergence.20

Working through the European Defence Agency, which 

serves as its secretariat, CARD constitutes the basis of 

EU defense cooperation initiatives aimed at improved 

defense capabilities. CARD assesses defense cooperation 

in the EU and then identifies opportunities for further 

cooperation.21 These opportunities for cooperation then 

manifest themselves in the form of concrete PESCO 

projects.

The purpose of the EDF is to provide funds to support the collaborative projects developed through the 

CARD process. It provides incentives for EU member 

states to cooperate on joint development projects by offering grants for collaborative research projects.22 Thus, 

for the first time, European defense firms can receive 

funding from the EU budget to finance joint development projects. According to the European External Action Service, after 2020, the EU budget will provide up 

to 1.5 billion euros annually for collaborative European 

research and technology.23 In order to receive co-funding, 

collaborative projects must have at least three participating member states that commit to buying the final product. Projects developed under the auspices of PESCO 

can receive up to 30 percent co-financing, versus 20 percent for those developed outside of PESCO.24

When considered in combination with each other, 

CARD, PESCO, and EDF are complementary initiatives aimed at increasing EU defense capabilities. The 

Lisbon Treaty specifically established PESCO as a possible means for deeper cooperation when it entered into 

force in 2009. Although CARD and EDF do not have 

the same treaty foundation, they were clearly designed 

with the same goal: to strengthen CSDP by providing 

credible capabilities to operationalize the political ambitions contained in the EU’s 2016 global strategy.

Defining the Strategic Context. Despite its inclusion 

in the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union did not formally launch PESCO until December 2017. It is logical 

to ask what changed by 2017 that provided enough impetus to move forward. Three factors combined to create a perfect storm. First, there is European-wide agreement that the security environment has fundamentally 

changed, for a variety of reasons. Second, the UK vote to 

leave the European Union in June 2016 was effectively a 

threat to some countries and an opportunity for others. 

Lastly, the election of Donald Trump in November 2016 

reinforced the momentum of the first two factors.25

The changed security environment was the root 

cause at the heart of the EU decision to launch PESCO 

in 2017. There are several events and trends that caused 

the EU to reassess the security environment within and 

beyond Europe. Russia’s invasion and subsequent annexation of Crimea in 2014, together with its support 

for separatists in eastern Ukraine, forced the EU to take 

action. Russia’s willingness to alter borders and violate 

the sovereignty of a neighboring country by force shook 

the EU to its core. Germany was particularly affected by 

Russia’s actions and has been a leader in the push for 

continued sanctions against Russia.

Major terrorist attacks in France, Germany, Norway, 

and several other European countries have made the EU 

realize that security of its citizens requires engagement 

beyond its borders. The increased concerns from the 

threat of terrorism magnified the impact of the migration crisis. In 2015 and 2016, the European Border and 

Coast Guard Agency detected more than 2.3 million 
6 SF No. 302 ndupress.ndu.edu

illegal crossings into the European Union.26 Germany 

alone took in over 1 million migrants in 2015.27 Citizens 

demanded that the EU and their national governments 

take action to protect them against the burgeoning threat 

from migration.

EU reassessment of the security environment led to 

the publication of the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy. Much 

had changed since the last publication of an EU strategy in 2003. The EUGS identified the need to “nurture 

the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European 

Union,” as the EU’s High Representative for Foreign 

Affairs and Security Policy noted in her foreword to the 

strategy.28 This theme has been persistent in EU member 

state thinking. As recently as the summer of 2018, the 

European Union explicitly linked the increased funding 

available through EDF as a means to increase the EU 

role as a security and defense provider.29

Brexit was effectively the “proximate cause” of PESCO’s launch. The potential of an EU without the United 

Kingdom is a threat for two principal reasons. First, it 

calls into question the fundamental nature and vision 

of the European project as a whole. Second, the loss of 

the UK would mean the loss of the EU’s most capable 

military member. In 2016, the UK accounted for nearly 

25 percent of all EU defense spending.30 The loss of the 

UK would seriously impede the EU’s efforts to translate 

its political ambition as stated in the 2016 EUGS into 

actual credible capabilities to implement it.

Despite these downsides, some countries—France 

in particular—viewed the potential loss of the United 

Kingdom as an opportunity. The UK has historically 

served as a brake on efforts to deepen EU defense cooperation. With London out of the way, those countries 

that have always sought to develop strategic autonomy 

in Europe would be able to develop deeper defense and 

security cooperation free from British obstructionism.

The election of Donald Trump as President in November 2016 served to reinforce the momentum that 

was already in place after the launch of the EUGS and 

Brexit vote in June of 2016. During his campaign, President Trump openly questioned the value of NATO and 

implored the European members of the Alliance to increase their defense spending. Famously, he even insinuated that the invocation of Article V, heretofore considered sacrosanct among NATO allies, would become 

conditional based on members’ ability to meet their 

commitment to increase defense spending to 2 percent 

of gross domestic product.

How Does PESCO Differ from Previous Initiatives? Similar to the European Defence Community effort in the 1950s and the launch of the EU’s common 

foreign and security policy in the 1990s, both external 

and internal drivers explain the EU’s decision to launch 

PESCO. A change in Europe’s security environment is 

once again the primary external driver, or root cause, of 

PESCO, and the EUGS is the manifestation of how the 

European Union assesses its new security environment. 

A critical difference between the previous cases and the 

present one is the impact of the United States.

In previous cases, the United States pressed Europe 

to increase its burden-sharing, but there was never any 

doubt about America’s interest and role in European 

security, primarily through NATO. Indeed, it was keen 

U.S. interest in NATO that has historically caused it to 

be suspicious of EU efforts to deepen European defense 

and security cooperation. The rhetoric from the current 

U.S. administration has caused some European officials 

to openly question the U.S. commitment to and interest 

in European security.31

The internal drivers that led to PESCO’s launch are 

in some ways similar but in other ways unique to previous EU efforts to deepen defense cooperation. As with 

the EDC project in the 1950s and post–Cold War efforts, a consensus that the EU needs to develop its military capabilities is a critical internal driver. The difference 

in the present case, however, is that the EU has broader 

ambitions than the narrow territorial and collective defense vision of the 1950s, and even ambitions beyond 

its European neighborhood compared to its immediate 

post–Cold War scope.

The broad internal and external drivers explained 

herein influenced each of the 25 PESCO participating 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 302 7 

countries in varying degrees. Some countries, such as 

Germany, were shaken by the Brexit vote and were motivated at least in part to help shore up solidarity within 

the EU. Some countries, led by France, were motivated 

solely by a desire to make the EU a more relevant international actor by strengthening both its capabilities and 

willingness to use them. Lastly, some countries simply 

joined PESCO almost by “default,” due to their desire to 

support EU initiatives that Germany favors.32 Of course, 

not all countries fit neatly into just one of these three 

categories.

One of the key differences between PESCO and 

previous EDC initiatives is the role of the defense industry. The defense industry is not directly involved in 

PESCO, but the impact of EDF and how it interacts 

with PESCO is an important development for European defense cooperation. Previous EU efforts were 

more focused on defense and foreign security policy initiatives rather than concrete projects for military hardware. Nearly half of the current 34 PESCO projects are 

designed to develop and produce tangible military end 

items to strengthen EU defense capabilities.

PESCO itself does not have a European defense 

industry development imperative, but it cannot logically 

be separated from other major EU defense initiatives, 

namely CARD and EDF. The European Union’s stated 

purpose for launching the EDF was to better coordinate 

European defense research and spending so that EU 

member states can spend their defense budgets more 

wisely. The EDF will not be fully operational until 2021, 

and in the interim, the EU will provide funds to collaborative defense development projects via the European 

Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP). 

EDIDP is essentially a test run for the EDF, and the EU 

plans to invest roughly 500 million euros in projects via 

the program. From 2021 to 2027, the EU plans to invest 

roughly 13 billion euros in research and development of 

new defense projects.33

The European Commission has described the EDIDP as an “industrial program of the EU aiming at supporting the competitiveness and innovation capacity of 

the Union’s defense industry.”34 Thus, while the EU’s 

stated goal may be to better coordinate member states’ 

defense spending, there is no doubt that there is a broader goal of supporting the European defense industrial 

base. It is precisely this desire that has both U.S. Government officials and U.S. defense industry representatives 

most concerned about objectives the EU has in mind for 

PESCO and funding for it via the EDF.

Prospects for the Success of PESCO. EDC efforts 

in the 1950s and post–Cold War efforts to deepen EU 

defense integration or cooperation were both ultimately 

limited by internal factors, particularly French reservations about timing. In the post–Cold War efforts to 

deepen cooperation, EU member states clearly preferred 

that foreign and defense policy remain primarily at the 

intergovernmental level, and in so doing limited the 

broader political ambitions of the EU.

The success or failure of PESCO will largely be 

determined by internal EU dynamics. Specifically, the 

success of PESCO rests on the EU’s ability to ensure 

the completion of the projects that have already been approved. Because there is significant EU funding available 

via the EDF, there is the risk that PESCO-participating 

countries focus more on proposing projects to support 

their respective defense industries than the development 

of necessary capabilities.

Many previous EU efforts undertaken under the 

auspices of its security and defense policy, such as the EU 

Battlegroup concept, were big on rhetoric but ultimately 

unsuccessful in the delivery of actual results. The EU 

launched PESCO with much fanfare. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 

Federica Mogherini called the signing of the PESCO 

agreement a “historic moment in European defense.”35

The hype surrounding the launch of PESCO has perhaps created unrealistic expectations about what it can 

ultimately deliver.

So far, there is a mix of cautious optimism and outright skepticism about the prospects for PESCO’s success. The “integrationists” are optimistic that PESCO 

truly does represent a historic step forward for European 
8 SF No. 302 ndupress.ndu.edu

defense and that it will successfully complete the projects 

already approved, thereby bringing increased capabilities 

to EU member states. Some of the nuances of PESCO 

that make it different from previous EU defense cooperation initiatives have the integrationists bullish on its 

potential for success.

One of the aspects of PESCO that makes it fundamentally different from previous EU efforts is the 

fact that the commitments participating member states 

agreed to—such as regularly increasing defense spending 

and committing 20 percent of their defense spending to 

research and development—are legally binding.36 Additionally, the tight coordination between EU and NATO 

defense planning ensures that PESCO will be complementary to rather than duplicative to NATO. Lastly, 

PESCO is focused on developing concrete capabilities 

rather than establishing separate EU strategic structures.

Skeptics believe that PESCO is just the latest incarnation of an EU defense cooperation initiative that 

is not truly new and will not deliver necessary capabilities. They see many of the projects approved thus far 

by PESCO as simply projects that were already in the 

works under previous initiatives.37 Additionally, critics 

argue that the most important defense projects in the 

next decade—such as the next generation fighter aircraft 

and main battle tank—will be done outside the scope of 

PESCO on a bilateral or trilateral basis. Ultimately, according to this argument, countries will decide to cooperate simply due to calculations of interest, not because 

they are motivated by PESCO. Lastly, skeptics believe 

that the PESCO participating states may have rushed to 

failure in approving the initial 34 projects.38 Eager to deliver a success, the projects were approved without going 

through the CARD process that would identify actual 

capabilities gaps.

How Should the United States 

Approach PESCO?

Either one of the outcomes predicted by the initial 

reactions to PESCO’s launch identified would be detrimental to U.S. security interests if it actually came to 

fruition. Fortunately, early indications are that PESCO 

fits neither of these typical caricatures of EU defense initiatives. Concerns that increased EU military capabilities 

of the European Union will foment strategic autonomy 

from NATO are not well grounded.

The strategic context today is significantly different 

than the immediate post–Cold War time period or even 

in the post-9/11 environment. In the 1990s, there was a 

legitimate and serious debate about the future of NATO 

after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although the EU 

launched its common foreign and security policy largely 

in response to the crises within Europe that Europeans 

could not address themselves, the concern about the EU 

developing into a strategic competitor or even replacement for NATO was legitimate because of the uncertainty surrounding the future strategic direction of the 

Alliance.

The threat of NATO being undermined by a stronger, more cohesive EU is almost nonexistent today. After 

Russia’s aggression in Ukraine in 2014, which continues 

to this day, the value of the Alliance has never been clearer to the European members. EU members of NATO do 

envision the EU developing some semblance of strategic 

autonomy, but this should not be construed as a threat 

to NATO’s raison d’être or to U.S. interests.39 Among 

European countries that are members of both NATO 

and the EU, there is wide consensus that the Alliance is 

the cornerstone of their collective defense. The development of strategic autonomy by the EU is therefore not a 

threat to NATO but instead would actually advance U.S. 

strategic interests.

In an era of renewed great power competition, the 

United States has no better ally and partner than Europe. As the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy accurately describes the relationship, “the United States 

is safer when Europe is prosperous and stable, and it 

can help defend our shared interests and ideals.”40 The 

United States should publicly and privately support the 

PESCO initiative because a stronger and more capable EU will also strengthen the European arm within 

NATO.
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 302 9 

PESCO’s success would also directly support U.S. 

European Command objectives as outlined in its 2019 

posture statement.41 It is focused on increasing member 

state capabilities and thereby would increase allies’ ability to increase both its contributions to NATO missions 

as well as develop specific capabilities that the Alliance 

needs. Because the defense budgets of individual European countries are small, PESCO is a critical means for 

NATO members to be able to collaboratively develop significant increases in capabilities.42 While member states 

pledged to increase their spending long before PESCO 

was formally launched, it can only help generate support 

for sustaining defense spending and generating greater 

capabilities by members of both NATO and the EU.

Support for PESCO would demonstrate the sincerity of U.S. calls for increased burden-sharing by our 

European allies. Continued criticism of Europe for inadequate defense spending and thus insufficient defense 

capabilities, while on the other hand opposing an initiative that is designed to allow Europe to do precisely 

that, would be hypocritical. The United States should not 

simply provide blind, unconditional support, however, 

because it does have an interest in the direction that the 

EU takes with PESCO. In fact, there are three conditions the United States should seek.

First, the United States should insist that there be 

tight cooperation between EU and NATO capabilities 

development planning. Indeed, cooperation between the 

two has never been greater, and the United States will 

want to ensure that this cooperation and coordination 

continues. Defense spending in Europe will almost certainly never have the same level of support that it typically does in the United States. It is imperative that Europe 

spends its resources wisely and avoids any duplication 

with NATO as well as redundancy among European 

countries.

Second, the United States should continue to pressure the EU about the issue of third country participation 

in PESCO projects. France has been the most reluctant 

about broadening the scope of third country participation. Cynics, both within and beyond Europe, believe it 

is simply an effort by France to protect its defense industry. There are many more EU member countries that 

favor widening the scope of third party participation, 

both to ensure the UK remains engaged in Europe after 

Brexit and to maintain close ties with the United States. 

The United States can leverage these countries to ensure 

its defense industry does not suffer reduced access to the 

European market.

Third, and perhaps most controversial, the United 

States should open its own procurement processes to 

competition from European firms. One of the most often heard critiques from European allies regarding the 

development and procurement of defense projects is the 

real or imagined firewall preventing European firms from 

fairly competing in the U.S. market. One way to maximize the likelihood of U.S. participation as a third country in PESCO projects is to afford the same opportunity 

to European defense firms in the U.S. market. There are 

intellectual property challenges to be overcome, but this 

is an opportunity to further deepen the U.S.-European 

defense relationship. Given that the U.S. share of worldwide research and development spending is significantly 

lower than it was 25 to 50 years ago, joint European and 

U.S. military development projects could make a lot of 

sense for both sides of the transatlantic alliance.

There is a remote possibility that as the European 

Union develops its defense capabilities and some semblance of strategic autonomy, it could slowly drift away 

from its transatlantic allies. The risk of this happening 

is quite small for two reasons. First, Europe is so far 

from being able to ensure its collective defense outside 

of NATO that it would take years for it to be completely self-sufficient regarding collective defense. Second, 

countries that are members of both the EU and NATO 

are unequivocal in their view that the Alliance is the ultimate guarantor of European security.

Moreover, the United States shares so many values 

with its European allies that should the EU ever truly 

develop strategic autonomy, it would actually help the 

United States more than it would hurt. A European 

Union less willing to defer to the United States yet able 
10 SF No. 302 ndupress.ndu.edu

to act autonomously would be a tradeoff worth making. 

Since EU members that belong to NATO continually 

stress the importance of the Alliance for their collective 

defense, it is unlikely such a tradeoff would ever be necessary. Instead, a stronger, more autonomous Europe is 

more likely to strengthen the transatlantic relationship 

than weaken it.43

It is worth noting the evolving impact that the rivalry between the United States and China is having on 

some Europeans’ support for the idea of strategic autonomy. The challenge or even threat from China had little 

role in the launch of PESCO, CARD, or EDF—or the 

EU Global Strategy that underpins all of these initiatives. However, as the relationship between the United 

States and China has become increasingly contentious, 

many in Europe are concerned about getting caught 

uncomfortably between the two. There is a recognition 

that reduced security dependency would allow Europe 

to more comfortably manage its position between the 

United States and Russia.

There is also the risk that the U.S. defense industry will be shut out of the possibility to participate in 

PESCO projects, or lose control of intellectual property 

working within the program. U.S. Government officials 

have recently articulated these concerns to the EU.44

These issues are genuine but can be overcome in implementation, and U.S. policymakers should recognize that 

preserving the European defense industrial base is an 

imperative for its allies, too. This risk is more likely than 

strategic drift between the EU and NATO or the United States. However, it would also be worth the tradeoff 

if it means a far more capable EU, and thus a far more 

capable European arm within NATO. Even if it were 

excluded from PESCO projects, the U.S. defense industry would not necessarily be cut out of the European 

market entirely. Many countries choose to buy major 

American end items not only because of the quality of 

the product but also to secure a strategic bilateral relationship with the United States. Even if U.S. companies 

were completely cut out of many PESCO projects, the 

U.S. defense industry will be fine given the magnitude of 

U.S. defense spending vis-à-vis Europe.45

PESCO’s failure would have far more negative repercussions for U.S. interests than its success ever would. 

A strong, stable, and unified Europe is in the U.S. national interest. The EU feels threatened by the possibility 

of fault lines within it. Citizens have been frustrated by 

the EU’s inability to handle the euro crisis and the migration crisis, and they now face the possibility of losing 

the United Kingdom. Many EU countries face increasingly powerful populist parties that question the reason 

for continuing the European project.46 The future of the 

European Union does not hang in the balance based on 

the success or failure of PESCO. However, success in an 

initiative like PESCO could go a long way toward building momentum for developing EU military capabilities.

Conclusion

Analysis of European efforts to deepen defense and 

security cooperation over the past half century demonstrates that both external and internal drivers explain the 

timing and desire for deeper cooperation among European countries. In each case, the success of such efforts 

has been limited by factors internal to Europe. PESCO 

is not likely to be any different.

The root cause that drove the EU to launch PESCO 

in December 2017 was the new security environment 

facing the EU. The British referendum in June 2016 to 

leave the European Union served as the proximate cause, 

while the rhetoric from the current U.S. administration 

amplified the changes that were already afoot. 

Given that the alliance is a core interest, the United 

States should leverage the opportunity that PESCO 

presents for EU countries to develop their defense capabilities. Therefore, the United States should throw its 

support behind PESCO in public and in private. The risk 

of strategic drift between the EU and NATO is incredibly remote and mitigated by the strong preference of the 

EU members of NATO to have the Alliance continue 

to be the provider of Europe’s collective defense. If the 

United States is to be successful in the era of great power 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 302 11 

competition, it will need the support of strong allies and 

partners. Strong support for the PESCO initiative is a 

low-risk, high-reward approach for the United States to 

strengthen its most important partnership.

Notes

1 Gabriela Marin Thornton and Tobias Oder, “Europe Wants 

American Support for a Common Security Policy,” The National 

Interest, March 6, 2018, available at <https://nationalinterest.org/

feature/europe-wants-american-support-common-security-policy-24773>.

2 Edward Fursdon, The European Defense Community: A History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), 64.

3Renata Dwan, “Jean Monnet and the European Defense Community, 1950–54” Cold War History 1, no. 3 (2001), 144–145.

4 Fursdon, 153–157.

5 Ibid., 153, 179.

6 Kevin Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defense 

Community: Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European 

Defense, 1950–55 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 41–42.

7 Ibid., 158.

8Reinhardt Rummel, “West European Cooperation in Foreign 

and Security Policy,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 531, no. 1 (January 1994), 112.

9 “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, Agreed by the Heads 

of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North 

Atlantic Council,” November 7, 1991, available at <www.nato.int/

cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm>.

10 See “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” NAC-S(99) 65, April 

24, 1999, paragraph 30, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/

official_texts_27433.htm>; and “Strategic Concept for the Defence 

and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,” n.d., paragraph 32, available at <www.nato.int/lisbon2010/

strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>.

11 Patricia Kaplanova, “European Union as a Foreign Policy 

Actor in International Relations,” Innovative Issues and Approaches in 

Social Sciences 8, no. 2 (May 2015), 55.

12 Trevor C. Salmon and Alistair J.K. Shepherd, Toward a European Army: A Military Power in the Making? (Boulder, CO: Lynne 

Rienner Publishers, 2003), 152.

13 Ibid., 2.

14 Michael Quinlan, European Defense Cooperation: Asset or 

Threat to NATO? (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 

2001), 28.

15 Kaplanova, 51.

16 Marc Otte, “ESDP and Multilateral Security Organizations: 

Working with NATO, the UN, and OSCE,” in The EU’s Search for 

a Strategic Role: ESDP and Its Implications for Transatlantic Relations, ed. Esther Brimmer (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic 

Relations, 2002), 44.

17 Mark Furness and Stefan Ganzle, “The Security-Development 

Nexus in European Union Foreign Relations after Lisbon: Policy 

Coherence at Last?” Development Policy Review 35, no. 4 (July 

2013), 475.

18Council of the European Union, “Council Decision 14866/17: 

Establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and Determining the List of Participating Member States,” Brussels, 

December 8, 2017.

19 Upon entry into force in 2009, the Lisbon Treaty 

changed the name of the European Security and Defense 

Policy to the Common Security and Defense Policy.

20 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe; A 

Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (Brussels: European Union, June 2016), 20–21.

21 European Defense Agency, “Fact Sheet on Coordinated 

Annual Review on Defense Cooperation (CARD),” available 

at <www.eda.europa.edu>.

22 “Defending Europe: The European Defense Fund,” 

available at <https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/defence_

fund_factsheet_0_0.pdf>.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Several European officials in the course of numerous 

discussions between September 2018 and April 2019 identified 

at least one of the three reasons listed here. Many often identified two, and in some cases all three.

26 “Asylum and Migration in the EU: Facts and Figures,” 

European Parliament News, available at <www.europarl.

europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78630/eumigrant-crisis-facts-and-figures>.

27Rick Noack, “Germany Welcomed More Than 1 Million Refugees in 2015. Now, the Country is Searching for Its 

Soul,” Washington Post, May 4, 2016.

28 Shared Vision, Common Action, 4.

29 “EU Budget: Stepping Up the EU’s Role as a Security 

and Defence Provider,” European Commission Press Release, 

June 13, 2018.

30 Alexandre Mathis, “Defence: Member States Spending,” special briefing prepared at the request of the European 

Parliament Policy Department D: Budgetary Affairs, May 

2018, 1.

31 “Merkel Says Europe ‘Must Take Our Fate into Our 

Own Hands,’ After Tough G-7, NATO Meetings,” CNBC, May 

28, 2017, available at <www.cnbc.com/2017/05/28/merkelsays-europe-must-take-our-fate-into-our-own-hands-aftertough-g-7-nato-meetings.html>. See also Steven Erlanger, 

“Macron Says NATO Is Experiencing ‘Brain Death’ Because 

of Trump,” New York Times, November 7, 2019, available at 

<www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/world/europe/macron-natobrain-death.html>.

32Claudia Major of the German Institute for International 

and Security Affairs describes these different motivations for 

joining PESCO as the “integrationist,” “defense,” and “default” countries, respectively.

33 “2019 Calls for Proposals: European Defence Industrial 

Development Programme,” European Commission, March 19, 

2019, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/2019-

calls-proposals-european-defence-industrial-developmentprogramme-edidp_en>.

34 Ibid.

35 Quoted in Steven Erlanger, “E.U. Moves Closer to a 

Joint Military Force,” New York Times, November 13, 2017, 

available at <www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/world/europe/eumilitary-force.html>.

36 “PESCO—Member States Driven: Binding Commitments,” Pesco.europa.eu, available at <https://pesco.europa.eu/

binding-commitments/>.
12 SF No. 302 ndupress.ndu.edu

37 Tomáš Valášek, “The EU’s New Defense Pact: Marginal 

Gains,” Carnegie Europe, Brussels, November 16, 2018, available at 

<https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/74760>; Andrew Michta, 

“Without the U.S., the U.S.-European Defense Will Fall to Pieces,” 

American Interest, October 23, 2019, available at <www.the-american-interest.com/2019/10/23/without-the-us-european-defense-willfall-to-pieces/>.

38 Sebastian Sprenger, “European Union’s Defense-Collab Push 

Could Fizzle, Report Warns,” Defense News, May 14, 2019, available at 

<www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/05/14/european-unionsdefense-collab-push-could-fizzle-report-warns/>.

39 The European Commission’s budget proposal for 2021–2027 

includes 13 billion euro for the express purpose of increasing the 

EU’s strategic autonomy in order to increase the EU’s ability to “step 

up as a security and defense provider.” See European Commission, 

“EU Budget: Stepping Up the EU’s Role as a Security and Defense 

Provider,” press release, June 13, 2018, available at <http://europa.eu/

rapid/press-release_IP-18-4121_en.htm>.

40National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington 

DC: The White House, December 2017), 48.

41 See “2019 Senate Armed Services Committee Opening 

Statement and Full Transcript as Delivered by General Curtis 

Scaparrotti,” March 5, 2019, available at <www.eucom.mil/medialibrary/transcript/39547/2019-sasc-opening-statement-and-full-transcript-as-delivered-by-general-curtis-scaparrotti>.

42 Sven Biscop, “Don’t Be Too Shy About PESCO,” Egmont 

Royal Institute for International Relations, September 6, 2018, available at <www.egmontinstitute.be/dont-be-too-shy-about-pesco/>.

43 Alina Polyakova and Benjamin Haddad, “Europe Alone: What 

Comes After the Transatlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 4 

(July/August 2019), 119.

44 Valerie Insinna, “U.S. Officials Threaten Retribution for 

European Union’s Restrictions on Defense Fund,” Defense News, 

June 19, 2019, available at <https://defensenews.com/digital-showdallies/paris-air-show/2019/06/19/us-officials-threaten-retributionfor-european-unions-restrictions-on-defense-fund/>; Guy Chazan and 

Michael Peel, “U.S. Warns Against Joint Military Project,” Financial 

Times, May 24, 2019, available at <www.ft.com/content/ad16ce08-

763b-11e9-bbad-7c18c0ea0201.

45 In 2017, the United States spent nearly $686 billion on 

defense, which equates to over 70 percent of the $956 billion spent 

by the entirety of NATO. If the United Kingdom ultimately does 

leave the European Union, non-EU NATO allies would account 

for approximately 80 percent of all NATO defense spending. For 

data on NATO defense spending broken down by country, see Niall 

McCarthy, “Defense Expenditures of NATO Members Visualized,” 

Forbes, July 10, 2018, available at <www.forbes.com/sites/niallmcThe Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

unified combatant commands through studies, reports, 

briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

research and analysis in the areas of strategic and regional 

studies and engages in independent and leading-edge research and analysis in related areas.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by 

members of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security affairs from the United States and 

abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 

expressed or implied within are those of the contributors 

and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Defense 

Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. Visit NDU Press online at ndupress.ndu.edu.

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carthy/2018/07/10/defense-expenditure-of-nato-members-visualizedinfographic/#67f53fa114cf>.

46Christian Lemke, “Challenging the ‘Ever Closer Union’: 

Political Consequences of the Eurozone Crisis,” American Foreign 

Policy Interests 36, no. 1 (2014), 22.