PERRY CENTER OCCASIONAL PAPER

FARC During the Peace Process

By Mark Wilson 

NOVEMBER 2020

WILLIAM J. PERRY CENTER 

FOR HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE STUDIES

National Defense University
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and are not an official policy nor position of 

the National Defense University, the Department of Defense nor the U.S. Government.

Editor-in-Chief: Pat Paterson

Layout Design: Viviana Edwards

About the author: Mark is a postgraduate candidate in the MSc Conflict Studies program at the London School of 

Economics. He is a former William J. Perry Center intern, and the current editor of the London Conflict Review. His 

research interests include illicit networks as well as insurgent conflict in Colombia specifically and South America more 

broadly.

Cover photo caption: FARC leaders Iván Márquez (center) along with Jesús Santrich (wearing sunglasses) announce in 

August 2019 that they are abandoning the 2016 Peace Accords with the Colombian government and taking up arms again 

with other dissident factions.

Photo credit: Dialogo Magazine, YouTube, and AFP.
WILLIAM J. PERRY CENTER

FOR HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE STUDIES

PERRY CENTER OCCASIONAL PAPER

NOVEMBER 2020

FARC During the Peace Process

By Mark Wilson 

3

Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

FARC During the Peace Process

By Mark Wilson

Introduction

The 2016 Colombian Peace Deal marked the end of FARC’s formal military campaign. As a part of 

the demobilization process, 13,000 former militants surrendered their arms and returned to civilian life 

either in reintegration camps or among the general public.1

 The organization’s leadership were granted 

immunity from extradition for their conduct during the internal armed conflict and some took the five 

Senate seats and five House of Representatives seats guaranteed by the peace deal.2

 As an organization, FARC announced its transformation into a political party, the Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria 

del Común (FARC). With strong incentives to comply with the terms of peace, this should have ended 

FARC’s military threat.

However, the development of dissident organizations whose membership is estimated to number 

nearly 2,500 has cast doubt on the effectiveness of the peace process. The failure of FARC to achieve 

democratic success and the subsequent defection of many members of FARC’s senior leadership have 

severely undermined the credibility of the FARC party. The academic literature published since the 

signing of the 2016 Peace Deal neglects FARC’s potential backsliding, choosing instead to prioritize 

emerging armed groups. Nevertheless, FARC’s commitment to the peace process and the potential for 

its members to rejoin violent conflict will be defining issues for Colombia’s security landscape.

This paper provides an overview of the activities of FARC and its dissident groups in the period 

from the signing of the 2016 Peace Deal to August of 2020. The central conclusion of this paper is 

that FARC poses a continuing threat to the Colombian state both because (1) its dissident factions are 

growing and are in real danger of reunifying and (2) its legal political organization is behaving at odds 

with the peace process. This paper is intended to encourage and assist future research on the subject of 

FARC’s ongoing security threat to the Colombian state which is de-prioritized in the existing academic 

literature. 

The primary research question that this paper will answer is: Has FARC fully demobilized or does 

it and/or its constituent parts continue to pose a security threat to the Colombian state? The answer to 

1 Juan Diego Posada, “Major Implications of Former FARC Leadership Returning to War,” InSight Crime, August 29, 2019. 

Link: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/major-implications-of-farc-leadership-returning-to-war/; Redacción 

Colombia, “El fin de los espacios de reincorporación, ¿cuál será el futuro de los excombatientes?,” El Espectador, February 

6, 2019. Link: https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/pais/el-fin-de-los-espacios-de-reincorporacion-cual-sera-elfuturo-de-los-excombatientes-articulo-857613/. 2 Presidencia de la Republic, “Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace,” Especiales 

Presidencia, November 11, 2016. Link: http://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/20170620-dejacion-armas/acuerdos/

acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf.
4 Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

this question will be structured into three areas of analysis: First, this paper will examine the democratic 

failure of FARC’s formal leadership. Second, it will analyze the development of dissident organizations, in particular the potential or unification among different dissident factions. Finally, it will look at 

FARC’s former and current financial and economic infrastructure. There is a limitation in fully answering this research question - a great deal of information is either publicly unavailable or only known to 

a select group of actors. The conclusions presented in this paper are approximations based on the best 

available evidence.

Methodologically, this paper relies on the journalistic research of publications and NGOs that 

operate on the ground in Colombia, including El Espectador, Insight Crime, El Tiempo, and Fundación 

Ideas de la Paz (FIP). Sources are selected from articles published between November of 2016 and 

August of 2020 based on their relevance to the areas of analysis identified previously. Evidence from 

major international news sources like the BBC, NPR, or Reuters will supplement and corroborate these 

local publications.

The structure of this paper is as follows: First, it will review the existing literature on FARC’s 

post-peace deal development, including both sources published before the signing of the deal and afterwards. Second, it will outline its methodology with regards to source selection. Third, it will provide an 

analysis of FARC’s development in three key areas: its formal party organization, its dissident organizations, and its funding sources. Finally, it will offer a summary of the most likely future scenarios and 

their implications.

Literature Review

This section provides an overview of the existing literature on FARC’s development after the signing of 

the 2016 Peace Deal. It includes predictive research published before the implementation of the Peace 

Deal and is designed to focus the scope of this research paper. This literature review will begin with research published prior to 2016 and then move on to research published after the Peace Deal that covers 

both the outcome of the Peace Deal both generally and with specific reference to FARC.

The largest body of research focusing on the relationship between FARC and the 2016 Peace 

Deal was published prior to the signing of the deal itself. This literature seeks to evaluate the prospects 

for peace in advance. Some researchers focus on the potential for external groups to compete for the 

profits of narcotrafficking and other illicit activities that FARC has left behind, in particular, Maher and 

Thompson identify paramilitary forces as potential spoilers in the peace process.3

 Others focus on the 

potential for sub-sections of FARC to either remilitarize or resist demilitarization all together.4

 There is 

3 David Maher and Andrew Thomson, “A Precarious Peace? The Threat of Paramilitary Violence to the Peace Process in 

Colombia,” Third World Quarterly, 39: 2142 – 2172, 2018. Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.

2018.1508992; Matt Ince, “Filling the FARC-Shaped Void,” Potential Insecurity in Post-Conflict Colombia, 26-34: 26 - 34,

2013. Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2013.847708. 4 Ernesto Cardenas, Krisitain Skrede Gleditsch, and Luis Carlso Guevara, “Network Structure of Insurgent Groups and the 

Success of DDR Processes in Colombia,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, 29: 754 - 775, 2018. Link: https://www.tandfonline.

com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2018.1488416; Enzo Nussio and Kimberly Howe, “What if the FARC Demobilizes,” 

Stability Journal, 1(1): 58 - 67, 2012. Link: https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.aj/.
5

Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

a limited focus on the potential for the main force of FARC to undermine peace. One exception to this 

is Spencer, who argues using an examination of FARC’s conceptual approach that the leadership may 

seek to use its democratic participation as a way of achieving its insurgent aims - much like the Bolivian insurgency.5

After the signing of the 2016 Peace Deal, there was a trend in the literature to deprioritize the 

study of FARC itself and instead focus on the effectiveness of the government’s implementation of this 

deal. A number of papers argue that policies relating to demobilization have been implemented effectively, but that the socio-economic provisions of the Peace Deal have been neglected.6

 Haugaard and 

Aponte note that this is particularly true of measures designed to support and protect Afro-Colombian 

and indigenous ‘communities’.7

 There are also a meaningful number of projects that have researched 

5 David Spencer, “FARC’s Transformation: The Combination of All Forms of Struggle,” A Great Perhaps? Colombia: 

Conflict and Divergence, 2016, London: Hurst Publishers. 6 Lisa Haugaard and Andrea Fernández Aponte, “FARC Guerrillas Turn in their Weapons: An End to Fifty Years of War,” 

Latin America Working Group, 2017. Link: https://www.lawg.org/farc-guerrillas-turn-in-their-weapons-an-end-to-fiftyyears-of-war/; Andrés Eduardo Fernández-Osorio, “La Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz con Las FARC-EP: un Estudio 

Comparado desde La Experiencia Internacional,”Análisis Político, 2019. Link: https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/anpol/

article/view/80977. 7 Lisa Haugaard and Andrea Fernández Aponte, “FARC Guerrillas ...,” 2017.

Photo caption: Thousands of FARC soldiers have surrendered their weapons and demobilized following the 2016 peace 

accord with the Colombian government. 

Photo credit: International Crisis Group.
6 Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

the implementation disparities across territories8 Rios Sierra and Gago Anton conduct a quantitative 

analysis of violence across six different regions in Colombia and find a disproportionate burden on 

local governments for combating structural violence. In a similar vein, Mesa Bentacur finds that the 

Peace Deal has failed to improve the institutional capacity of local governments as promised.9

 Other 

papers have focused on more specific aspects of Peace Deal implementation. Illera and Luiz analyze 

the role of the civil-military relations as a source of tension that has hindered the full implementation 

of the Peace Deal (2018). Masse and Le Billion argue that the Peace Deal has failed to prevent illegal 

mining in Colombia.10 Although these papers vary in scope and perspective, there is broad agreement 

that the implementation of the Colombian peace deal has failed to live up to the standards of the deal 

in a variety of ways.

While there has been limited research on FARC itself in the years since the signing of the Peace 

Deal, there is a sparse body of literature that focuses on the impact of the 2016 Peace Deal on FARC’s 

development. These projects are of particular relevance to this paper but tend to also analyze FARC 

primarily as a vacuum that is filled by other organizations or by dissident groups. Blahova and Hladka 

examine the process of demobilization and argue that it has significantly reduced violence, however 

they argue that there is no strong sponsor to enforce the demobilization of the remaining insurgents - 

who will be critical to securing peace in the future.11 Salazar, Wolff, and Camelo analyze a case study 

analysis of the municipality of Tumaco and conclude that enduring illicit networks encouraged the 

creation not only of criminal organizations but also of competing dissident groups in the aftermath of 

demobilization.12 Two papers argue that FARC is operating in a similar way to the Bolivian insurgency 

- formal political participation while leaders operate in illegal activities and maintain their insurgent 

base.13 Torrijos Rivera and Abella Osorio use a qualitative analysis of FARC’s strategic behavior to 

argue that their current activity is a continuation of their insurgent behavior and that it is unlikely that 

democratic participation will moderate FARC. This is at odds with Phelan’s conclusion that the terms of 

8 Jerónimo Ríos Sierra and Egotiz Gago Antón, “Realidades y Desafíos de la Paz Territorial en Colombia,” Revista de 

Sociologia, 2, 2018. Link: https://www.lawg.org/farc-guerrillas-turn-in-their-weapons-an-end-to-fifty-years-of-war/; 

Xamara Mesa Betancur, “Capacidades Institucionales para la Implementación Local del Acuerdo de Paz con las FARC: 

El Punto Sobre Participación Política en el Municipio de Ituango, Colombia,” Gobernar, 3(4), 2019. Link: https://orb.

binghamton.edu/gobernar/vol3/iss4/5/. 9 Mesa Betancur, 2019.

10 Frédéric Massé and Philippe Le Billion, “Demobilisation of the Colombian Guerillas: FARC-EP and ELN,” Third World 

Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 3, 2018. Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23802014.2017.1362322. 11 Pavlína Bláhová and Malvína Krausz Hladká, “Demobilisation of the Colombian Guerillas: FARC-EP and ELN,”Vojenské 

Rozhledy, 2019. 12 Luis Gabriel Salas Salazar, Jonas Wolff, and Fabián Eduardo Camelo, “Towards Violent Peace? Territorial Dynamics of 

Violence in Tumaco (Colombia) before and after the demobilization of the FARC-EP,” Conflict, Security, and Development, 

19(5): 497 – 520, 2019. Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14678802.2019.1661594. 13 David Spencer, “Security Challenges of the New Colombian Administration,” PRISM, 8(1), 2019. Link: https://cco.ndu.edu/

News/Article/1767355/security-challenges-of-the-new-colombian-administration/; Vicente Torrijos and Juan David Abella 

Osorio, “El Comportamiento de las FARC Tras la Firma de los Acuerdo de La Habana,” Revista Científica General José 

María Córdova, 16(24): 31 - 60, 2018. Link: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328473758_El_comportamiento_de_

las_FARC_tras_la_firma_de_los_acuerdos_de_La_Habana.
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Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

the peace deal provide strong incentives for FARC to pursue its political strategy peacefully.14

Reflecting the trend away from researching FARC as the primary security threat in Colombia, 

there are a small number of papers that have focused on the consequence of FARC’s “vacuum.” A few 

papers have identified groups that are likely to “take the place” of FARC after its demobilization. There 

is a particular emphasis on the activities of Clan Del Golfo.15 

The Formal FARC Leadership and Party

The 2016 Peace Deal began the transition from FARC as a militant organization to a political party. 

Although the demobilization process has seen a large number of combatants turn in their arms, FARC as 

a political organization has not seen the success that its members would have hoped for. Dismal results 

in democratic elections and numerous defections have raised questions about the viability of the current leadership and FARC as a democratic political movement. This section argues that FARC political 

leaders are losing control of the organization, and that there is reasonable, if inconclusive, evidence of 

duplicity and continuing criminal activity on the part of FARC’s formal political leaders. This section 

will focus on the issues of political weakness and duplicity, in turn.

The demobilization process seems to have been a success in terms of the number of combatants 

who returned to civilian life. Exact estimates vary, but the number of demobilized FARC members 

ranges from 11,000 to 13,000.16 This includes the roughly 3,400 FARC members who are living in 

government reintegration camps as of June 2019.17 Demobilized FARC members have been the targets 

of violence, with the UN Mission to Colombia verifying a total of 190 killings between 27 December 

2019 and 26 March 2020, the majority of which were perpetuated by armed groups.18 A number of reintegration camps have been abandoned, with combatants claiming the inability or unwillingness of the 

government to protect them as the reason for their abandonment.19

The dismal failure of the FARC party to achieve democratic success has undermined FARC’s 

current leaders and led to division. In its first ever elections, FARC only achieved only 0.21 and 0.34 

14 Alexandra Phelan, “Engaging Insurgency: The Impact of the 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement on FARC’s 

Political Participation,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 42(9): 31 - 60, 2018. Link: https://www.researchgate.net/

publication/328473758_El_comportamiento_de_las_FARC_tras_la_firma_de_los_acuerdos_de_La_Habana. 15 James Rochlin, “Re-imagining Colombia’s New Security Landscape in the Wake of the FARC Peace Accord,” Small Wars 

and Insurgencies, 31(1): 181-203, 2020. Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2020.1672972; G. 

Perilla, J. Carlos, and A. Herrera, “Clan del Golfo: Una Amenaza Para Los Procesos Políticos En Colombia,” In: 9th Congreso 

Latinamericano de Ciencia Política, Lima.

16 Juan Diego Posada, “Major Implications of Former FARC Leadership Returning to War,” InSight Crime, August 29, 2019. 

Link: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/major-implications-of-farc-leadership-returning-to-war/; El Espectador, 

“El fin de los espacios....,” February 6, 2019.

17 Juan Camilo Pedraza, “Mayoría de ex-FARC Rehacen sus Vidas Espacios Territoriales,” El Tiempo, June 12, 2019. Link: 

https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/mayoria-de-exguerrilleros-de-las-farc-rehacen-sus-vidas-fuera-de-laszonas-de-reincorporacion-374848. 18 United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, “Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations Security Council, 

March 26, 2020. Link: https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/en_n2007152.pdf. 19 Redacción Colombia, “Los Espacios de Reincorporación de las FARC con más Amenazas,” El Espectador, July 9, 2020. 

Link: https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/pais/los-espacios-de-reincorporacion-de-las-farc-con-mas-amenazas/.
8 Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

percent of the vote in the lower and upper houses respectively.20 It returned no seats aside from those 

that were guaranteed by the Peace Deal.21 The only meaningful electoral success of FARC was the election of three mayors in a more recent election. Most notable is Guillermo Torres, who won his office by 

a margin of 20%.22 However, it was reported by the Christian Science Monitor that Torres won on the 

basis of anti-corruption campaigns rather than adherence to FARC’s political messaging.

FARC’s democratic losses are the product of its inability create a political group that was meaningfully distinct from the militant organization. The party elected to fill its allocated senate seats with 

former guerrillas.23 It has also failed to issue a public apology for its participation in violence, which 

20 Luke Taylor, “Colombia: Why did the FARC ‘fail’ its First Electoral Test?”, Al Jazeera, March 14, 2018. Link: https://

www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/180314113957392.html. 21 Congressional Research Service, “Colombia’s 2018 Elections”, Congressional Research Service, July 12, 2018. Link: 

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10817.pdf. 22 Megan Janetsky, “Yesterday, He Sang for Guerrillas. Today, He’s One Town’s Mayor.” Christian Science Monitor, January 

22, 2020. Link: https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2020/0122/Yesterday-he-sang-for-guerrillas.-Today-he-s-onetown-s-mayor; Lia Miranda Batista, “Alcalde de Turbaco dice sí a equipos que ofrece Maduro para detector el COVID-190”, 

El Universal, April 7, 2020. Link: https://www.eluniversal.com.co/regional/bolivar/alcalde-de-turbaco-dice-si-a-equiposque-ofrece-maduro-para-detectar-el-covid-19-GB2650901. 23 Redacción Colombia, “Estos Son Los Nuevos 10 Congresistas del Partido FARC”, El Espectador, March 11, 2018. 

Link:https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/politica/estos-son-los-nuevos-10-congresistas-del-partido-farcarticulo-856410. 

Photo caption: Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos signs a peace accord on behalf of the Collombian government 

with the head of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) on September 26, 2016. To the left of President 

Santos is the head of the FARC Rodrigo Londono Echeverri, also known as Timochenko.

Photo credit: Gobierno de Chile.
9

Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

undermined its electoral viability.24 The emergence of dissident groups and the failure of the government to comply fully with the Peace Deal have forced FARC to run a “defensive campaign” focused on 

questions of its legitimacy that failed to inspire Colombian voters.25

The distrust of electoral politics among Colombian leftists is, according to Cepeda-Castro, the 

product of the organizational memory of the Unión Patriótica (UP), FARC’s previous foray into party 

politics.26 The UP operated in tandem with FARC’s militant elements and narcotrafficking operations, 

and 4,153 UP members, including a presidential candidate, were killed (or disappeared/kidnapped) 

by cartels and paramilitary organizations.27 This historical memory is particularly relevant given the 

violence visited upon demobilized FARC members during the peace process, although the scale of this 

recent violence is dramatically smaller with 190 verified killings.28

FARC’s leaders are weak not only because of electoral losses, but also because of deep divisions 

in the party over the peace process. FARC was divided on the peace process from its inception, and, 

Iván Márquez, the second most influential FARC leader before his defection from the peace process, 

had publicly criticised the leadership.29 Some FARC leaders, including Timochenko, Pablo Catatumbo, 

Pastor Alape, and Carlos Antonio Lozado have cooperated with Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) 

hearings,30 while Márquez, Jesus Sántrich, and other significant leaders have failed to appear for these 

hearings. These fractures have been worsened in recent years by public divisions over the state’s failure 

or unwillingness to fully implement the terms of peace, legal violations by senior leaders in the party, 

and the loss of democratic elections.31

Márquez and his supporters have since rearmed, but divisions persist within the democratic party. 

In addition to the rearming of many within FARC’s senior leadership, there have been significant resignations of notable FARC rank and file members - for example, Martín Batalla and dutch FARC guerrilla 

Tanja Nijmeijer.32 A foiled assassination attempt on “Timochenko’s” life, allegedly ordered by FARC 

dissidents, further demonstrates the intensity of this split.33 It should be noted that the exact details of 

this incident are unclear, and the claim that “dissidents” carried out the attack is largely based on re24 Luke Taylor, “Colombia: Why ....”, March 14, 2018.

25 Luke Taylor, “Colombia: Why ....”, March 14, 2018.

26 Iván Cepeda Castro, “Genocidio Político: El Caso de la Unión Patriótica en Colombia”, Rev ista Cejil, 2006, 1(2): 101 - 

112. Link: https://mronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/r24797.pdf. 27 Jeremy McDermott, “The Future of the Ex-FARC Mafia”, InSight Crime, November 11, 2019. Link: https://www.

insightcrime.org/investigations/future-ex-farc-mafia/; Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, “Todo Pasó Frente A Nuestros 

Ojos: El Genocidio de la Unión Patriótica 1984 - 2002”, Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2018. Link: http://

centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/INFORME_UP_completo.pdf. 28 United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, “Report of...,” March 26, 2020. 29 Tristan Clavel, “Is the FARC Political Experiment Dead in the Water?,” InSight Crime, September 4, 2018. Link: https://

www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/farc-political-experiment-dead/. 30 El Espectador, “Por que el Partido FARC no Despega,” El Espectador, March 13, 2019. Link: https://www.elespectador.

com/colombia-2020/debate/por-que-el-partido-farc-no-despega/. 31 El Espectador, March 13, 2019.

32 El Espectador, “Por que se.......,” January 22, 2020. 33 BBC, “Colombia Foils Attempt to Assassinate ex-FARC Leader Timochenko,” BBC, January 12, 2020. Link: https://www.

bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-51086526.
10 Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

ports from the police. This assassination attempt is the only overt example of violence against FARC by 

FARC dissidents, which may be an indication that this division is not irreparable. 

In addition to the weakness of their political position, there is also some evidence that FARC’s formal leaders continue to behave in at least a legal grey area, if not criminally. While he was a designated 

FARC senator, Jesús Sántrich was accused by the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) of coordinating 

a drug deal with members of the Sinaloa Cartel.34 FARC senator and vice president of the Senate of the 

Republic, Sandra Ramírez, stated that narcotrafficking was present in FARC’s ranks, drawing a comparison to narcotrafficking in the Colombian army.35 She specifically named Gentil Duarte and John 40, 

FARC dissidents who have rearmed, but her observation likely applies to the formal FARC structure as 

well. It is naive to assume that the former leaders of a narcotrafficking organization have all left their 

lives of crime behind them. 

Another distinct possibility is that FARC’s apparent division is, in fact, an attempt by members of 

the FARC leadership to maintain insurgent and democratic operations simultaneously.36 This strategy 

would be consistent with the historic example of the Unión Pátriotica (UP) and FARC’s strategic coexistence during the 1980s until the UP was violent suppressed.37 As an approach, it has many regional 

precedents in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Suriname.38 At least two of 

FARC’s most important advisors have pursued this strategy, namely, the Farabundo Martí Communist 

Party Front (FMLN) in El Salvador and the Ortega Wing of the Sandinista National Liberation Front 

(FSLN) in Nicaragua.39 The strategic purpose of this approach could, in the future, include significant 

political unrest supported by insurgent groups for the benefit of political groups and the funding of 

democratic politics by criminal means. 

Based on the evidence presented in this section, it is possible to make two conclusions about 

FARC’s formal leadership. First, they are in a politically weak position in which it is difficult for them 

to credibly claim to represent FARC as an organization. This, in turn, makes it difficult for them to hold 

FARC members to the terms of the peace process and to negotiate on behalf of FARC with the Colombian government. Second, it is a plausible possibility that they are themselves involved in criminal 

activities that violate the terms of peace and are in communication with dissident forces.

34 JEP, “JEP Decreta Pruebas en el Case de Seuxis Paucias Hernandez Solarte,” Jurisdiccion Especial de Paz, October 

25, 2018. [link: https://www.jep.gov.co/Sala-de-Prensa/Paginas/JEP-decreta-pruebas-en-el-caso-de--Seuxis-PauciasHern%C3%A1ndez-Solarte.aspx]; InSight Crime, “Seuxis Pausias Hernandez, alias ‘Jesus Santrich’,” InSight Crime, 

August 18, 2020. Link: https://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/seuxis-pausias-hernandez-aliasjesus-santrich/. 35 El Tiempo, “Por ‘Jesus Santrich’, Sandra Ramirez Suma Otra Polemica,” El Tiempo, July 27, 2020. Link: https://www.

eltiempo.com/politica/congreso/sandra-ramirez-no-hay-pruebas-que-vinculen-jesus-santrich-con-narcotrafico-522670. 36 David Spencer, 2016.

37 David Spencer, 2016.

38 Vicente Torrijos and Juan David Abella Osorio, 2018. 

39 Vicente Torrijos and Juan David Abella Osorio, 2018. 
11

Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

FARC’s Dissident Factions

Throughout the peace process, dissident factions of FARC have emerged, which continue its illicit 

and, on occasion, political activities. While some fronts have common allegiances, others operate as 

fragmented criminal networks. For the purpose of analysis, this paper will discuss FARC dissidents in 

three broad groups: primarily criminal groups, fronts affiliated with “Gentil Duarte”, and the “Segunda 

Marquetalia” - the dissenting senior FARC leadership allied with Iván Márquez. The core conclusion of 

this section is that FARC dissidents are more than just criminal actors and have a reasonable chance of 

reunifying to a significant extent.

The majority of demobilized FARC members have not rearmed yet. FARC dissidents are a numerically significant minority whose numbers are growing. There is a lot of conflicting information about 

the exact number of active FARC dissidents. One intelligence report from December of 2018 places 

the number at 1,74940 while a different report released two months prior places the number between 

2,500 and 3,000.41 InSight Crime estimated their number to be 2,500 in May 2018 and 3,000 in October 

40 El Tiempo, “Los ejércitos ilegales que enfrentará la nueva cúpula militar,” El Tiempo, December 21, 2018. Link: https://

www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/los-ejercitos-ilegales-que-enfrentara-la-nueva-cupula-militar-305714. 41 Noticias Caracol, “Disidencia de las FARC estarían en más de 10 departamentos, según informe de inteligencia militar,” 

Noticias Caracol, October 12, 2018. Link: https://noticias.caracoltv.com/colombia/disidencia-de-las-farc-estarian-en-masde-10-departamentos-segun-informe-de-inteligencia-militar.

Photo caption: Some FARC dissident groups have moved across the Colombian border into neighboring Ecuador, Peru, 

and Venezuela. These former FARC guerrillas were arrested in Putamayo, Peru.

Photo credit: Ministerio de Defensa del Perú.
12 Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

2019.42 This suggests that FARC dissidents are a fraction of the 13,000 demobilized FARC members, 

but that they likely rival the ELN’s estimated 2,500 membership.43 These data points also suggest that 

their numbers are growing.

42 InSight Crime, “Colombia and Venezuela: Criminal Siamese Twins,” InSight Crime, May 21, 2018. Link: https://www.

insightcrime.org/investigations/colombia-venezuela-criminal-siamese-twins/; InSight Crime, “Ex-FARC Mafia,” InSight 

Crime, October 27, 2019. Link: https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/evolution-ex-farc-mafia/. 43 InSight Crime, “ELN,” InSight Crime, May 4, 2020. Link: https://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/

eln-profile/.

Graph caption: FARC dissidents are reportedly operating in the border areas of Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela presenting 

Colombia with sovereignty issues with neighboring countries. 

Graph credit: Instituto Geografica Agustin Codazzi (IGAC)
13

Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

Some FARC dissident groups, especially those operating along the Ecuador-Colombian border 

and in the Pacific region, have become narcotrafficking organizations with limited political interests. 

The former 48th Front contests territory in Putumayo with the former 1st Front, and operates criminal 

networks into Ecuador with limited political affiliation with other FARC groups.44 The United Guerrillas of the Pacific also operates in this region, and is characterized by an El Espectador investigation 

as “pure narcotrafficking.”45 The most notable group in this region is the Oliver Sinisterra Front (FOS) 

led by the now deceased Walther Arizala, also known as “Guacho”. There is some economic integration 

between the FOS and other, more politically motivated, dissident groups with the FOS providing intelligence, drug trafficking logistics, and chemical precursors to the fronts affiliated with Gentil Duarte.46

There is little evidence to indicate that this relationship is anything other than economically expedient. 

Furthermore, the defection of “Guacho” from the peace process in 2017 was largely motivated by territorial control - namely, the incursion of the GUP in the Alto Mira y Frontera area.47 It appears unlikely 

that the FOS or other dissident groups in the region are motivated by more than an attempt to control 

lucrative trafficking networks. They pose significant problems for the Colombian state, but are unlikely 

to reignite civil conflict.

As a result of this activity, the Ecuadorian border has experienced a significant surge in violence 

since the Peace Deal. This violence is typified by the kidnap and murder of two journalists in the Esmeraldas province town of San Lorenzo on April 13, which drew international attention.48 FOS has been 

key in the growing instability of the Ecuadorian border, as the collapse of agreements between local Ecuadorian authorities and “Guacho” is believed by some sources to have been the catalyst for the recent 

violence.49 These dissident groups are undoubtedly a dangerous, destabilizing force, but they lack the 

political potential of the fronts discussed in this section from this point onwards.

Over the past few years, a loose confederation of fronts under the influence of Gentil Duarte and 

his allies has developed. Duarte is joined by two other major dissidents - Iván Mordisco and Jhon 40 

- and the dissident factions that they represent. The “Gentil Duarte” dissidents operate along the Venezuelan-Colombian border, with territory divided among the leaders.50 Iván Mordisco commands 400 

44 El Tiempo, “El narcotráfico enciende la guerra entre las disidencias en Putumayo,” El TIempo, February 16, 2020. 

Link:https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/conflicto-y-narcotrafico/disidencias-se-disputan-el-control-del-narcotrafico-enputumayo-462814. 45 El Espectador, “Entre Disidentes de al Paz y Reincidentes de la Guerra,” El Espectador, August 1, 2019. Link: https://www.

elespectador.com/colombia2020/pais/entre-disidentes-de-la-paz-y-reincidentes-de-la-guerra-articulo-878787/. 46 InSight Crime, “Ex-FARC Mafia, Venezuela and the Current International Climate,” InSight Crime, November 11, 2019. 

Link: https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/ex-farc-mafia-venezuela-international-climate/. 47 El Espectador, “Los Encadenados de “Guacho” y el Acuerdo de Paz con las FARC,” El Espectador, April 15, 2018. 

Link: https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/opinion/los-encadenados-de-guacho-y-el-acuerdo-de-paz-con-las-farccolumna-858731. 48 El Universal, “Campaña de solidaridad sin precedentes en Ecuador por secuestro de periodistas,” El Universal, April 

12, 2018. Link:https://www.eluniversal.com/internacional/4703/campana-solidaridad-precedentes-ecuador-secuestroperiodistas. 49 InSight Crime, “Ex-FARC Mafia, Venezuela......,” November 11, 2019. 50 Natalia Herrera Duran, “Las Disidencais de ‘Gentil Duarte’ e ‘Ivan Mordisco’,” El Espectador, April 15, 2018. Link: 

https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/territorio/las-disidencias-de-gentil-duarte-e-ivan-mordisco-articulo-856534/.
14 Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

dissidents in the regions of Guaviare and Vaupés.51 Jhon 40 leads the “Acacio Medina Front”, which 

operates in the Colombian region of Guainía and which has established bases in the neighboring Venezuelan region of Amazonas.52 Gentil Duarte himself operates in the Colombian departments of Gavaire, 

Meta, Vichada, and Guainíá, as well as in the Venezuelan region of Apure.53 In a dossier presented to 

the United Nations by President Duque, the Colombian government highlighted the significance of dissident training facilities in Venezuela which are overseen primarily by Jhon 40.54

This confederation of dissidents appears to have the political objective of furthering unifying 

FARC’s dissident factions. To accomplish this goal, it is seeking to revive the Venezuelan and Eastern 

Bloc criminal links that FARC operated prior to demobilization. Duarte and his allies have expanded 

their territorial control rapidly by forming links with former combatants operating in regions like Caquetá, Nariño, and Cauca.55 Iván Mordisco, with control over the first front, has been leading unification 

efforts in Northern Colombia.56 Jhon 40 has been tasked by Gentil Duarte with directing the 33rd Front 

and recovering drug trafficking routes to Venezuela.57

Despite this apparent coordination, the FIP stresses in its report that Iván Mordisco and Jhon 40 

are behaving a much more territorially towards other FARC dissident groups than Gentil Duarte.58 They 

conclude based on this behavior that Mordisco and Jhon 40 are less politically motivated by Duarte, 

although this information is now two years old. A large amount of criminal infrastructure has been 

created with the intention of supporting the efforts of the 16th Front. Gentil Duarte, Jhon 40 and other 

former Eastern Bloc leaders established the Acacio Medina front for this purpose.59 The Gentil Duarte 

dissidents have mobilized along the Guaviare River, an area strategically located between Meta and 

Guaviare for the purpose of coordinating with the 16th Front.60

There is evidence to suggest that the “Gentil Duarte” dissidents are coordinating with FARC’s 

formal leaders. In 2017, FIP concluded that Gentil Duarte’s struggle remained a “plan B” for FARC 

should the peace process fail. This was based on his unusually sudden desertion from the peace process 

and his status as a very senior figure and ideologue within FARC.61 In their 2018 report, however, they 

51 InSight Crime, “Nestor Gregorio Vera Fernandez, alias ‘Ivan Mordisco’,” InSight Crime, October 27, 2019. 52 InSight Crime, “Ex-FARC Mafia, Venezuela......,” November 11, 2019; InSight Crime, “Colombia and Venezuela...,” 

May 21, 2018.

53 InSight Crime, “Ex-FARC Mafia, Venezuela......,” November 11, 2019; Natalia Herrera Duran, “Las Disidencias....”, 

April 15, 2018; InSight Crime, “Colombia and Venezuela...,” May 21, 2018.

54 Semana, “Duque en Naciones Unidas: Las Pruebas de la Alianza entre Venezuela, el ELN y las Disidencias,” Semana, 

September 26, 2019. Link: https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/las-pruebas-de-la-alianza-entre-venezuela-el-eln-ylas-disidencias/633469. 55 InSight Crime, “Ex-FARC Mafia, Venezuela......,” November 11, 2019. 56 InSight Crime, “Miguel Botache Santillana, alias ‘Gentil Duarte’,” InSight Crime, October 27,2019. Link: https://www.

insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/miguel-botache-santillana-alias-gentil-duarte/. 57 InSight Crime, “Miguel Botache...,” October 27, 2019.

58 Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, “Trayectorias y Dinamicas Territoriales de Las Disidencias de las FARC,” Fundacion Ideas 

para la Paz, April 2018. Link: http://ideaspaz.org/media/website/FIP_Disidencias_Final.pdf. 59 InSight Crime, “Ex-FARC Mafia, Venezuela......,” November 11, 2019. 60 Natalia Herrera Duran, “Las Disidencias....,” April 15, 2018.

61 Fundación Ideas para la Paz, “Trayectorias y Dinamicas....,” Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, April 2018.
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found no evidence to suggest that the Duarte faction is an armed rearguard of the formal FARC party.62

Yet, there are still significant links between the members of the various FARC dissident factions as well 

as the demobilized membership because the membership of these groups have overlapping familial and 

social networks.63 Critically, six people with links to the “Gentil Duarte” dissidents who had recruited 

young people to carry out vandalism during the 2019 National Strike, suggesting a high degree of political motivation and possible coordination with FARC.64

The Gentil Duarte dissidents have been successful in building their criminal network partly because of their credibility as former members of the FARC leadership. Gentil Duarte was a member of 

the FARC Central General Staff65 and Iván Mordisco spent 25 years in the guerrilla movement and 

commanded the First front.66 In particular, Jhon 40 managed all of the finances for the Eastern Bloc and 

led the 43rd front, which operated in the territory that the Gentil Duarte dissidents now control.67 As a 

result, he is uniquely well suited to developing this group’s connections with Venezuela and Brazilian 

drug gangs.

These dissident groups have a strategic alliance with the ELN. The ELN also operates within 

Venezuelan territory, with roughly 1,000 militants - or around half its full force - and 50 facilities across 

the border.68 Twenty of these facilities are in the regions of Apure, Bolivar and Amazonas, in which the 

Gentil Duarte dissidents also operate. The ELN and the Gentil Duarte dissidents are dividing profits 

from drug trafficking, contraband and extortion.69 It is clear that this cooperation is at least economic, 

it is also possible that the ELN shares political objectives with Gentil Duarte and his allies. The combination of ambition, credibility, and key strategic allies makes the “Gentil Duarte” dissidents the most 

likely route to a resurgent, militarily active FARC.

The third group of dissidents are the recently dissenting senior members of the FARC leadership, 

who have been branded the “Segunda Marquetalia”. Iván Márquez, El Paisa, and Jesús Sántrich are attempting to frame themselves as the legitimate leadership of FARC, and appeared in a public video in 

which they announced a new stage in the armed conflict.70 The leaders made reference to Marquetalia, 

the historic home of FARC and included a number of FARC symbols such as a FARC flag and photos 

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 El Espectador, “A la cárcel, los seis acusados de infiltrar las marchas en Bogotá,” El Espectador, February 7, 2020. 

Link:https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/la-carcel-los-seis-acusados-de-infiltrar-las-marchas-en-bogotaarticulo-903454/. 65 InSight Crime, “The Evolution of the Ex-FARC Mafia,” InSight Crime, November 11, 2019. Link: https://www.insightcrime.

org/investigations/evolution-ex-farc-mafia/. 66 InSight Crime, “The Evolution....,” November 11, 2019; Natalia Herrera Duran, “Las Disidencias....”, April 15, 2018.

67 El Tiempo, “Qué hay en dossier de pruebas que Duque presentó en ONU contra Maduro,” El Tiempo, September 25, 2019. 

Link:https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/pruebas-de-nexos-de-nicolas-maduro-con-eln-y-disidenciaspresentadas-en-oea-411262; InSight Crime, “Colombia and Venezuela...,” May 21, 2018. 68 El Tiempo, “Qué hay en.....,” September 25, 2019. 69 InSight Crime, “Ex-FARC Mafia, Venezuela......,” November 11, 2019. 70 Santiago Torrado, “El disidente de las FARC Iván Márquez anuncia que retoma las armas en Colombia,” El Pais, 

August 29, 2019. Link: https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/08/29/actualidad/1567065255_850419.html.
16 Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

of FARC heroes and martyrs.71 Márquez stated in his public video that he would like to join Duarte and 

Mordisco as well as the ELN.72

Despite the public statements of Márquez and his allies, they are not in control of the FARC dissidents. The “Gentil Duarte” faction has grown in power and any attempt at unification would require 

significant compromises from both groups. Márquez’s allies likely have influence over some active 

fronts - the 18th Front, the Teofil Mobil that owes loyalty to El Paisa and some members of the 33rd

Front who are loyal to Enrique Munoz - but they are smaller in number than the fronts under Duarte’s 

control.73 According to an FIP report, the dissident leadership has been in contact with representatives 

from a number of different FARC dissident factions, which the FIP argues could lay the groundwork for 

building a common structure.74 The Colombian Foreign Ministry documented two meetings between 

the representatives of the “Segunda Marquetalia”, the ELN, and the Venezuelan government in a presentation to the UN. On the 28th of August, Márquez and another leader, “Romaña”, met with members 

of the Venezuela Military Directorate and “Pablito”, the primary military leader of the ELN.75 Given 

the cooperative relationship between Gentil Duarte and both Venezuela and the ELN, it is possible that 

these common contacts could serve as a medium for communication.

The immediate significance of the defection of Márquez and his allies is that it will undermine the 

credibility of the formal FARC party. These were important leaders of the demobilized FARC, with Iván 

Márquez and Jesus Sántrich being designated FARC senators.76 El Paisa commanded the elite Teófilo 

Forer Mobile Column, which was tasked with protecting the “despeje” (safe areas) granted to FARC 

during the peace negotiations.77 Rodrigo Londoño, “Timochenko”, publicly denounced these leaders 

and stressed that FARC continues to exist as a peaceful movement despite the remilitarization of some 

of its leaders.78 However, the operating FARC dissident groups make it clear that there is a military presence composed of its former members and claiming to inherit its mantle.

Venezuela is a key actor in the operations of both the Gentil Duarte dissidents and in the politi71 Santiago Torrado, “El disidente de ....,” August 29, 2019; InSight Crime, “The Tipping Point: Ivan Marquez Deserts 

the Peace Process,” InSight Crime, November 11, 2019. Link: https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/ex-farc-mafiamarquez-deserts-peace-process/. 72 Santiago Torrado, “El disidente de ....,” August 29, 2019. 73 InSight Crime, “The Tipping Point.....,” November 11, 2019; Javier Alexander Marcias, “Disidentes del Frente 18 Aceptan 

a Marquez Como Su Jefe,” El Colombiano, September 26, 2019. Link: https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/paz-yderechos-humanos/disidentes-del-frente-18-aceptan-a-ivan-marquez-como-su-comandante-GA11664929; Juan Carlos 

Garzon Vergara, Angela Maria Silva Aparicio, Lorena Zarate Martinez, Paula Andrea Tobo, and Angie Duran Guerrero, “El 

anuncio de Iván Márquez y las “nuevas” FARC: implicaciones y posibles impactos,” Fundación Ideas de la Paz, August 29, 

2019. Link: http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/1782. 74 Juan Carlos Garzon Vergara, Angela Maria Silva Aparicio, Lorena Zarate Martinez, Paula Andrea Tobo, and Angie Duran 

Guerrero, “El anuncio de...,” August 29, 2019. 

75 El Tiempo, “Qué hay en.....,” September 25, 2019.

76 InSight Crime, “The Tipping Point.....,” November 11, 2019. 

77 InSight Crime, “The Tipping Point.....,” November 11, 2019. 

78 El Espectador, “La ‘Nueva Guerrilla’ de ‘Ivan Marquez’, un Anuncio que era ‘Inminente’, Segun Expertos,” El Espectador, 

August 29, 2019. Link: https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/la-nueva-guerrilla-de-ivan-marquez-un-anuncioque-era-inminente-segun-expertos/.
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cal associations of the dissident FARC leadership. Some political leaders, especially Sántrich, are believed to be living in Venezuela. The Colombian Foreign Minister Trujillo has publicly stated, that both 

Márquez and Sántrich are being sheltered by the Venezuelan government.79 Márquez is known to have 

connections in Venezuela and was famously photographed in the country in 2013.

80 The U.S. Department of Justice has linked these dissident FARC leaders with the Venezuelan government since 1999, as 

stated in a New York court indictment.81 Sántrich lived along the border with Venezuela and served as a 

key negotiator for FARC with the Chavez regime in 2007.82 In addition to its evidence that Sántrich is 

currently based in Venezuela, InSight Crime reports that he has maintained contact with Gentil Duarte 

and Jhon 40.83

Sántrich’s connections to both Duarte and Venezuela are likely to shape the formation of this dissident senior leadership and of FARC dissidents overall. The Colombian Government has long argued 

that both FARC dissidents and the ELN receive logistical, training, and weapons support from the 

Maduro government. According to a Semana investigation, FARC dissidents are also sharing intelligence efforts with the Venezuelan government, including the identification of potential Colombian 

military targets.84 The common relationship with Venezuela and the ELN could serve as a potential 

channel of communication between the Gentil Duarte dissidents and the dissident senior leadership. 

As both of these factions are interested in consolidating power and potentially reunifying, the question 

that remains is whether both groups are able to navigate their political differences well enough to accomplish their goal.

Funding Sources and Criminal Activity

FARC has a long history of criminal activity. Since the demobilization of the majority of FARC militants, dissident groups and other criminal organizations have sought to take over the illicit networks 

operated by FARC. The demobilized FARC has also been plagued by financial controversy, especially 

over the accounting of its surrendered assets and the alleged drug trafficking activity of a number of its 

members. Two key conclusions can be made based on the available financial information: 1) FARC is 

concealing a significant number of their assets and a meaningful number of its members are engaged in 

criminal activities and 2) dissident groups are expanding their criminal operations in a way which both 

increases their power and suggests a significant profit motive.

Prior to demobilization, FARC produced an annual revenue of $580 million, roughly $300 million of which was actually retained as income by the organization - the rest was likely stolen by various 

79 El Tiempo, “Qué hay en.....,” September 25, 2019. 80 El Espectador, “La ‘Nueva Guerrilla’....,” August 29, 2019.

81 El Tiempo, “¿Por qué Márquez y Santrich aparecen en proceso contra Nicolás Maduro?,” El Tiempo, March 26, 2020. Link: 

https://www.eltiempo.com/unidad-investigativa/marquez-y-santrich-aparecen-en-proceso-contra-nicolas-maduro-477450. 82 InSight Crime, “Seuxis Pausias....,” August 18, 2020. 83 InSight Crime, “Seuxis Pausias....,” August 18, 2020. 84 Semana, “Las Pruebas de la Alianza entre Venezuela, el ELN y las Disidencias, ” Semana, September 26, 2019. Link: 

https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/las-pruebas-de-la-alianza-entre-venezuela-el-eln-y-las-disidencias/633469. 
18 Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

members.85 Of the $580 million, approximately $267 million came from narcotrafficking and “impuestos” on narcotrafficking organizations.86 The remainder came from a combination of kidnapping, extortion, and illegal mining.

In 2017 and as a part of the peace process, FARC surrendered a list of assets valued at more than 

$300 million to the Colombian State to aid with victim reparation.87 Given an annual income of $580 

million USD, it would be surprising if the total FARC assets really numbered only $300 million, even 

assuming very high operating costs. FARC claims that the value of these assets exceeded $1.1 billion 

USD, but several government officials, including Colombian chief prosecutor Martinez, have accused 

FARC of inflating their value by surrendering useless assets.88

Since all assets were supposedly surrendered, Colombian authorities have made numerous seizures of assets illegally held by FARC members. Colombian authorities seized $234 million in FARC 

assets, including five companies, 60 supermarkets, 70 bank accounts in a single operation that took 

place in February 2018, after the demobilization.89 The Prosecutor’s office also froze $3 million in real 

estate belonging to a former member of the Teofilo Front Unit - which the former guerrilla claimed had 

fallen from an airplane. In another incident, Colombia’s prosecutor claims that it seized roughly $6.4 

million USD worth of assets from “El Negro Antonio”, the former commander of the 42 Front.90 It is 

unclear if, in these cases, personal assets had been reported to the FARC leadership or if they were personally concealed. Critically, FARC Commanders were robbing the organization and retaining a portion 

of the organization’s income as private wealth throughout its history.91 Either way, the FARC leadership 

is either guilty of concealing assets illegally or of significant negligence regarding the honesty of their 

membership.

Many of FARC’s former assets have fallen into the hands of dissident or criminal groups as they 

were located in areas not effectively controlled by the Colombian state. This is an especially pernicious 

problem across the eastern plains, a large territory now controlled by the Gentil Duarte dissidents.92 In a 

85 Jeremy McDermott, “The Future of......,” November 11, 2019. 86 Jeremy McDermott, “The FARC’s Riches: Up to $580 Million in Annual Income,” InSight Crime, September 6, 2017. 

Link: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/farc-riches-yearly-income-up-to-580-million/. 87 El Espectador, “Los Bienes de las FARC: Una Listado Irrisorio?,” El Espectador, August 24, 2017. Link:https://www.

elespectador.com/noticias/politica/los-bienes-de-las-farc-un-listado-irrisorio/. 88 El Espectador, “La Pelea por los Bienes de las FARC,” El Espectador, August 17, 2017. Link: https://www.elespectador.

com/colombia2020/pais/la-pelea-por-los-bienes-de-las-farc-articulo-855681/. 89 Parker Asmann, “Colombia Asset Seizures Raise Doubts About FARC Peace Deal Compliance,” InSight Crime, February 20, 

2018. Link: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/colombia-asset-seizures-raise-doubts-farc-peace-deal-compliance/; 

Fiscalia de La Nacion, “Caen Testaferros de la Antigua Guerrilla de las FARC, con Red de 60 Supermercados y Otros 

Bienes,” Fiscalia de La Nacion, Colombia, February 19, 2018. Link: https://www.fiscalia.gov.co/colombia/extincion-dedominio/caen-testaferros-de-la-antigua-guerrilla-de-las-farc-con-red-de-60-supermercados-y-otros-bienes/. 90 El Tiempo, “Incautan bienes por $ 20 mil millones que Farc no declararon,” El Tiempo, April 7, 2019. Link: https://

www.eltiempo.com/justicia/delitos/incautados-bienes-a-testaferros-de-alias-el-negro-antonio-exjefe-del-frente-42-de-lasfarc-346796. 91 InSight Crime, “The FARC’s Riches: Millions Apparently Lost to Dissidents,” InSight Crime, September 4, 2017. Link: 

https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/the-farc-riches-millions-apparently-lost-dissidents/. 92 InSight Crime, “Colombia Seizes First Assets Linked to Ex-FARC Mafia,” InSight Crime, October 1, 2018. Link: https://

www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/colombia-seize-first-assets-linked-ex-farc-mafia/.
19

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specific case in the town of Paz de Ariporo, Casanare department, the government seized a supermarket 

and other commercial properties belonging to the 28th Front of dissidents.93

Dissident groups are not only seizing former FARC assets, they are also building criminal networks that extend beyond Colombia’s borders. The Gentil Duarte dissidents have developed criminal 

networks along the border between Colombia and Venezuela. This border is particularly profitable because the environment is highly suited to the production of coca, and gasoline, another important component of cocaine production, is very cheap due to Venezuelan subsidies.94 Dissident groups operating 

in this region include the 10th Front, the 1st Front, the Acacio Medina Front, and the 33rd Front. The 

1st front in particular has developed new trafficking routes through the north of the department of Amazonas, in the area of Puerto Córdoba and La Pedrera, where the Apaporis and Caquetá rivers meet.95

Particularly key to the trafficking of drugs across the Venezuelan border is the relationship between the 

various dissident fronts and the ELN, which also cooperates in Venezuela on the illegal mining of gold 

and coltan.96 The same routes are also used by dissidents for the trafficking of other goods, including 

rubber and precious metals.97

Ecuador’s border with Colombia has also become a critical location for illicit networks. Specifically, the department of Nariño is a key area of contention among criminal gangs due to its status as the 

largest producer of coca in Colombia; the FOS is competing with the United Guerrillas of the Pacific 

and Los Contadores, which was formerly a financial operator for FARC.98 The FOS cooperates with a 

dissident faction of the 29th Front along the Ecuadorian border.99 Dissidents from the 48th Front also 

operate in this region, and have an agreement with the paramilitary organization La Constru to share 

drug trafficking in Putumayo.100

Although narcotrafficking comprises a significant source of revenue for dissident groups, it is important to note that these organizations also operate diverse portfolios of criminal activities that includes 

illegal mining, kidnapping, and extortion, among other activities. The 36th Front gains revenue from 

illegal mining in Antioquia. In Cauca, the Jaime Martinez Front manages illegal gold mining along with 

other dissident groups.101 “Impuestos” (taxes) or “vacunas” (vaccines) are a common funding strategy 

for both FARC prior to demobilization, and dissident groups operating currently. These were most commonly applied to drug production on trafficking operations in territory controlled by FARC. Dissidents 

are also applying “impuestos” to other industries: the 10th Front in Apure, Venezuela (alongside the 

93 Ibid.

94 Venezuela Investigative Unit, “Colombia and Venezuela....,” May 21, 2018.

95 InSight Crime, “The Criminal Portfolio of the Ex-FARC Mafia”, InSight Crime, November 11, 2019. [link: https://www.

insightcrime.org/investigations/criminal-portfolio-ex-farc-mafia/]; Natalia Herrera Duran, “Las Disidencias....”, April 15, 

2018.

96 Venezuela Investigative Unit, “Colombia and Venezuela....,” May 21, 2018.

97 Natalia Herrera Duran, “Las Disidencias....”, April 15, 2018.

98 InSight Crime, “The Criminal Portfolio of the Ex-FARC Mafia”, InSight Crime, November 11, 2019. Link: https://www.

insightcrime.org/investigations/criminal-portfolio-ex-farc-mafia/. 99 InSight Crime, “The Criminal Portfolio...” November 11, 2019.

100 InSight Crime, “The Criminal Portfolio...” November 11, 2019. 101 InSight Crime, “The Criminal Portfolio...” November 11, 2019.
20 Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

ELN) charges a toll on all river transportation and on public works that generates about $175,000 in 

revenue.102

Current FARC dissidents are operating criminal trafficking networks that generate substantial 

profit. In the opinion of InSight Crime, more revenue than would be necessary to achieve their political aims and cover operational costs. This is based on an accounting of the dissidents’ various revenue 

sources and on evidence that many of these groups are fighting against each other to control over these 

revenue sources.103 It suggests that profit is a significant motivating factor for dissident organizations. 

In some cases, it may be an objective that overshadows political objectives to a significant degree.

Possible Future Developments

The previous sections of this paper have outlined FARC’s development from the signing of the 2016 

Peace Deal to the present. This section identifies possible future scenarios based on this analysis and 

highlights their implications. Despite historical precedents, the future structure of FARC as an organization is far from predetermined and there are certainly more than three possible outcomes.

Scenario 1: FARC Dissidents splinter into criminal organizations; 

FARC Party stays its democratic course.

In this scenario, efforts at unification among FARC dissidents fail. Some form of militant activity 

is likely to continue, but the primary objective of these groups would be criminal profit. 

There are clearly actors who wish to see the FARC dissidents united, namely the “Gentil Duarte” 

faction and the “Segunda Marquetalia”.104 However, even among these actors, there is significant disagreement over what the leadership and structure of a united dissident front should look like; these differences could prove impossible to overcome.105 There are also many FARC factions with no apparent 

motivation to reunify and an even greater number which would likely prioritize economic gains over 

shared political objectives.106

If FARC dissidents fail to unify, then the prospects for democratic success for the FARC Party 

- not good in any scenario - are marginally better. It would be much easier to claim that the dissident 

movement is separate from the FARC Party and would make it hard for dissident leaders to further 

undermine “Timochenko” and the FARC Party. This outcome would pose security problems for the 

Colombian state but is unlikely to represent the kind of existential threat that a nationally coordinated 

insurgency could. In this scenario, Venezuela likely continues to play its current role of providing logis102 InSight Crime, “The Criminal Portfolio...” November 11, 2019. 103 InSight Crime, “The Criminal Portfolio...” November 11, 2019. 104 Santiago Torrado, “El Disidente de las FARC.....,” August 29, 2019; InSight Crime, “Miguel Botache...,” October 27, 

2019. 

105 Ibid; InSight Crime, “The Criminal Portfolio...” November 11, 2019. 106 InSight Crime, “The Criminal Portfolio...” November 11, 2019.
21

Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

tical and intelligence support to Dissident organizations.107

Scenario 2: FARC dissidents organize independently of the FARC Party

In scenario two, FARC dissidents are able to form a coherent political and criminal movement 

under a relatively centralized leadership structure. This could either be under the leadership of Iván 

Márquez and his allies, under Gentil Duarte’s control, or with some combination of the two. They 

would continue to operate separately from the FARC Party, but the rebirth of armed struggle would 

severely undermine the FARC Party.

The key catalyst for this outcome would be some form of agreement between the two primary 

leadership structures of the dissident groups - Gentil Duarte and Iván Márquez. This would require 

concessions. Most likely, Iván Márquez, Santrich, and El Paisa who would need to acknowledge the 

de facto power - evidenced by the number of fronts under their influence - of their former subordinates 

in exchange for a role in Duarte’s movement. Venezuelan communication and support for both groups 

offers the best opportunity for this to happen.108

Due to its role as a middleman and source of support, the Venezuelan regime would wield a high 

level of influence in an organized FARC dissident group. Much of the logistical and criminal networks 

107 El Espectador, “La ‘Nueva Guerrilla’....,” August 29, 2019. 108 El Tiempo, “Que Hay en.....,” September 25, 2019.

Photo caption: Ivan Marquez and Gentil Duarte are two of the highest ranking former members of the FARC who have 

abandoned the peace accords of 2016 and returned to illicit activities. 

Photo credit: La Semana news.
22 Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

under the control of Gentil Duarte operate along Venezuela’s porous border.109 Venezuela may even be 

motivated in this scenario to provide backing for a dissident group as an attempt to destabilize their 

neighbor; the support of a foreign, bordering nation would make it very difficult for the Colombian 

military to conclusively defeat this force.110 For similar reasons, the ELN would probably have an increased role in the development of an autonomous dissident faction.111

If FARC dissidents unify independently of the FARC Party, it will severely undermine the formal 

leadership of FARC. The likely perception would be that they have lost control of their own political 

party and cannot make credible guarantees of security to the Colombian government. The willingness 

of the Colombian government to offer concessions to FARC’s leadership in the past was predicated on 

the belief that they could credibly end FARC’s violent campaigns.112 If they cannot secure this, then the 

Colombian government is unlikely to feel an obligation to uphold their commitments to the FARC lead109 Natalia Herrera Duran, “Las Disidencias....”, April 15, 2018. 110 Bruce J. Reider, “External Support to Insurgencies,” Small Wars Journal, 2014. Link: https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/

art/external-support-to-insurgencies. 111 El Tiempo, “Qué hay en.....,” September 25, 2019. 112 Congressional Research Service, “Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, 

November 29, 2019. Link: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43813.pdf.

Photo caption: Colombian Army soldiers on patrol during operations against FARC dissidents and other organized armed 

groups. 

Photo credit: Dialogo Magazine.
23

Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

ership.113 Additionally, if they lack credibility among their own guerrilla base and as a peaceful alternative to the broader Colombian population, it is unclear how they will ever secure democratic success.

Scenario 3: FARC dissidents organize and coordinate with the FARC Party

In the third scenario, FARC dissidents are able to organize into a coherent political group either in 

coordination with the formal FARC leadership or at its direction. Although less supported by publicly 

available evidence than the previous two possible outcomes, this outcome has historical precedents in 

the region and is far from impossible. If realized, it would pose a dramatic security threat to the Colombian state and must therefore be considered carefully.

The differences between the FARC dissidents and their former counterparts are clear, but they are 

not irreconcilable. Aside from a potential attempt on “Timochenko’s” life, FARC dissidents have not 

perpetrated violence against the formal FARC organization.114 Instead, they have primarily aired frustrations with the failure of democratic politics and perceived failures to implement the peace deal.115 If 

the party does not gain ground in elections and/or its members are threatened with prosecution from the 

Colombian state, then the formal party may reach the same decision as the dissenting senior leadership. 

It is also not impossible that there is some existing coordination between the FARC leadership and the 

dissident groups in the style of both the Bolivian insurgency and the Unión Patriótica.

This scenario would mean the complete end of the peace process and would present a significant 

threat to Colombian national security. The key question within this scenario is whether FARC’s political party remains formally separate from the FARC dissidents and continues to participate in elections. 

If it does, then the actions of FARC dissidents either through demonstrations or intimidation may be 

designed to strengthen the party’s election prospects.

Conclusion

Over the course of the peace process, FARC has transitioned from a coherent paramilitary structure into 

a dispersed organization with many centers of power. The majority of FARC’s armed members have 

demobilized and are currently living as civilians in one form or another. The formal FARC leadership 

maintained centralized control over the FARC political party. Partially as a result of the democratic failures of the FARC Party, many splinter dissident groups have emerged that continue militant activity and 

claim to be the legitimate leadership of FARC. The most notable among these are those dissident factions allied to Gentil Duarte and the dissenting senior leadership, led by Iván Márquez and others, who 

have left the FARC party. Both groups of dissidents are attempting to unify various dissident factions.

The primary conclusion of this paper is that FARC represents a significant continuing threat to 

the Colombian state. Its dissident factions are growing in number, power, and organization. They have 

113 El Tiempo, February 3, 2020. 114 BBC, “Colombia Foils Attempt ....,” January 12, 2020. 115 Santiago Torrado, “El Disidente de.....,” August 29, 2019.
24 Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

varying levels of political motivation that operate in tandem with their often more immediate economic 

motivations. If reunification occurs - either with or without the support of FARC’s formal leadership - it 

will represent a significant threat to the security and stability of the Colombian state.

Secondly, it is unclear that FARC’s formal political leaders are either innocent or distinct from the 

threat posed by dissident groups the boundaries between dissident factions and the formal FARC party 

appear to be blurred. Illicit financial activities are conducted by both dissident groups and potentially by 

individual members of the FARC political party. Additionally, the examples of Iván Márquez, El Paisa, 

and Jesús Santrich demonstrate that it is conceivable for even high-level actors to switch allegiances 

between the various FARC factions.

Due to a lack of evidence, it is difficult to accurately evaluate the exact level of communication between various FARC dissidents and the formal FARC leadership. Venezuela and the ELN are 

common contacts among the various FARC dissident factions, and it is likely that both actors will be 

involved in efforts at reunification.

Above all else, this paper concludes that more research into FARC’s post-peace deal development 

is merited. The academic literature has primarily moved on to focus on other security questions both 

within Colombia and without. The abundance of unanswered questions about FARC’s current condition 

and the significance of those questions for Colombia’s security landscape justify academic attention.
25

Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020

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Perry Center Occasional Paper, November 2020
WILLIAM J. PERRY CENTER 

FOR HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE STUDIES

National Defense University

Abraham Lincoln Hall

260 5th Ave. Bldg. 64

Washington, DC 20319-5066