No. 12357 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1973 

TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN 

and HELPERS, LOCAL 7'145, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

CASCADE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, 

Defendant and Respondent, 

MONTANA PUBLIC EMPT,OYEES ' ASSOCIATION, 

INC . , a Montana corpora tion, 

Intervener and Appellant. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

Honorable Pau 1 G. Hatfield, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Intervener and Appellant: 

Cannon and Garrity, Helena, Montana 

Ross Cannon argued, Helena, Montana 

For Defendant and Respondent: 

J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana 

Michael T. Greely, argued, Deputy County Attorney, 

Great Falls, Montana 

For Plaintiff and Appellant : 

Amicus Curiae 

Hilley and McKittrick, Great Falls, Montana 

D. Patrick McKittrick argued, Great Falls, Montana 

Submitted: May 30, 1973 

Filed : 

'2 \y$! 1 ; 198 Decided : i 13 j97' 
Mr. Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This appeal is from a declaratory judgment in the district 

court of Cascade County, declaring that the members of plaintiff's 

union and intervener's association are not entitled as a matter 

of right to the vacation benefits enumerated in section 59-1001, 

R.C.M. 1947. 

This action was submitted to the district court on an 

agreed statement of facts. Plaintiff's members and intervener's 

members are employed by defendant Cascade County School District 

No. 1 on a full time basis in nonteaching capacities. These 

employees receive vacation benefits under administrative regulations of the school district as part of contract negotiations, 

rather than pursuant to the provisions of section 59-1001, R.C.M. 

The main issue for review is whether full time employees 

in nonteaching capacities of defendant School District are entitled 

as a matter of right to the vacation benefits enumerated in section 59-1001, R.C.M. 1947. The secondary issue is whether they 

are entitled to these benefits retroactive to the date of their 

employment. 

In 1949, the Montana legislature passed an Act providing 

annual vacation leave for state, county and city employees. 

Chapter 131, Laws of 1949, now codified as section 59-1001, et 

seq., R.C.M. 1947. The pertinent sections are: 

"Section 59-1001(1). Each employee of the state, 

or any county or city thereof, who is in continuous employment and service of the state, county 

or city thereof, is entitled to and shall earn 

annual vacation leave credit from the first full 

calendar month of employment. However, employees 

are not entitled to any leave with full pay until 

they have worked continuously for a period of 

twelve (12) calendar months. Vacation credits 

shall be earned in accordance with the following 

schedule: * * *. 
"Section 59-1007. The term 'employee,' as used 

herein, does not refer to or include elected 

state, county, or city officials, or schoolteachers." 

The district court concluded and defendant now contends 

that the "schoolteachers" referred to in the Act are those 

teachers who work for the State Department of Institutions or 

other schoolteachers employed by the state of Montana, rather 

than schoolteachers employed by the various school districts. 

Therefore, the school district concludes that the exclusion of 

schoolteachers in section 59-1007, R.C.M. 1947 does not imply 

inclusion of all other school district employees. The district 

court further concluded that plaintiff's members and intervener's 

members cannot be included by implication. We do not agree. 

It is a basic principle of statutory construction that 

the intention of the legislature is controlling. Section 93- 

401-16, R.C.M. 1947; Dunphy v. Anaconda Co. 151 Mont. 76, 438 

P.2d 660. In construing legislative intent statutes must be 

read and considered in their entirety and legislative intent 

may not be gained from the wording of any particular section or 

sentence, but only from a consideration of the whole. Home 

Bldg. & Loan v. Bd. of Equalization, 141 Mont. 113, 375 P.2d 

312. 

On the other hand, where the words of the statute are 

plain, unambiguous, direct and certain, the court is not at 

liberty to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has 

been inserted. Section 93-401-15, R.C.M. 1947. 

In the instant case, we hold that school district employees other than teachers are entitled to vacation benefits 

under section 59-1001, R.C.M. 1947. In doing so, this Court has 

given effect to a long line of this Court's decisions holding 

that a school district is a political subdivision and instrumentality of the State. Longpre v. School Dist. No. 2, 151 
Mont. 345, 443 P.2d 1; Fitzpatrick v. State Bd. of Exmrs., 

105 Mont. 234, 70 P.2d 285; State v. Cooney, 102 Mont. 521, 59 

P.2d 48; State v. Holmes, 100 Mont. 256, 47 P.2d 624. 

The legislature used the term "employeesf' in its generic 

sense to include all employees of the state or employees of 

state agencies of which a school district is included. This interpretation is given further support by the language of section 

59-1007, R.C.M. 1947,wherein schoolteachers are specifically 

excluded. The nonteaching school district employees are included by the definition of employees as used in section 59-1001, 

R.C.M. 1947. 

We cannot accept the limited interpretation sought by 

the defendant School District. The court's function is to 

construe the language of the statute in accordance with its 

usual and ordinary acceptance. County of Hill v. County of 

Liberty, 62 Mont. 15, 203 P. 500. Schoolteachers in its common 

usage refers to those teaching at district schools as well as 

in the State's system of higher education. Thus we conclude 

that nonteaching school district employees are employees of an 

agency of the state government and entitled to the vacation 

schedule set forth therein. 

The second issue presented for review is whether the 

plaintiff's members and the intervener's members are entitled 

to the benefits of section 59-1001, R.C.M. 1947, retroactive to 

the date of their employment. 

While the question of whether school district employees 

other than certified teachers are governed by this Act is here 

before this Court for the first time, the Attorney General has 

rendered several opinions supporting this position. This Court 

is not bound by these opinions but they will be given consideration, especially when determining if this decision should be 

applied retroactively. 

- 4 - 
As early as 1950rt,he Attorney General for the State of 

Montana issued opinions declaring that noncertified employees 

of school districts are entitled to the benefits of section 59- 

1001, R.C.M. 1947. In 23 Opinions of the Attorney General 345, 

346, it was stated: 

"Since a school district is a political subdivision 

of the State it is only reasonable to assume that 

the Legislature intended that the employees of a 

school district were included in the category of 

State employees as provided in the Act. That 

assumption is strengthened by the language of 

Section 7 of Chapter 131 wherein the Act specifically excludes school teachers from the operation 

of the Act. Since the law makers deemed it necessary to specially withhold the benefits of the Act 

from school teachers, it follows therefrom that it 

was their intention that the remaining employees 

of the school districts should be entitled to 

vacation leave." 

This conclusion has been reemphasized several times since then. 

See 25 Op. Att'y Gen. 123 (1954); 27 Op. Att'y Gen. 184 (1958), 

28 Op. Att'y Gen. 133 (1960), 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 31 (1966). 

Due to the fact that several opinions of the Attorney 

General have been issued on this or related matters and that 

this Court has long held that a school district is a political 

subdivision of the State, we see no reason why the school district was unaware of the application of the statute to their 

nonteaching employees. 

Additionally eleven sessions of the State legislature 

have not seen fit to change this interpretation of the Attorney 

General and the previous decisions of this Court. Our decision 

does not take away or impair a vested right or create any new 

obligation upon the school district. Butte & Superior Min. Co. 

v. McIntyre, 71 Mont. 254, 229 P. 730. It merely enforces the 

rights which were created by the 1949 legislature. 

Plaintiff's members and intervener's members are entieled 

to the vacation benefits of section 59-1001, R.C.M. 1947,retroactive 

to the date of their employment subject to the two year statute 
of limitation placed upon a liability created by statute (Section 

93-2607, R.C.M. 1947) and reduced by the vacation benefits received under contract negotiations or administrative regulations. 

For these reasons the judgment of the district court 

is reversed and the cause remanded to the district court for entry 

of judgment in accordance with this opinion. 

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Associate Justice