In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 16-1624L; No. 17-1931L

Filed: October 30, 2018

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REINALDO CASTILLO, et al.,

 

 Plaintiffs,

v. 

UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

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Motions for Reconsideration; 

Rails to Trails; Centerline 

Presumption; Florida State 

Law. 

NELSON MENENDEZ, et al.,

 

 Plaintiffs,

v. 

UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

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Lindsay S.C. Brinton, Arent Fox, LLP, Clayton, MO, for plaintiffs. With her were 

Mark F. Hearne, II, Meghan S. Largent, Stephen S. Davis, Abram J. Pafford, Arent 

Fox, LLP, Washington, D.C.

Davené D. Walker, Trial Attorney, Environment & Natural Resources Section, 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant. With her was Jeffrey H. Wood, 

Acting Assistant Attorney General, Environment & Natural Resources Division, 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 
2

O P I N I O N

HORN, J.

On June 29, 2018, this court issued its Opinion in Reinaldo Castillo, et al. v. United 

States, No. 16-1624L (Castillo),1 and Nelson Menendez, et al. v. United States, No. 17-

1931L (Menendez),2 denying the Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs’ cross-motions for 

summary judgment and granting defendant’s cross-motions for summary judgment. See

Castillo et al.; Menendez et al. v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 707, 742 (2018). The facts 

of the June 29, 2018 Opinion are incorporated into this Opinion with some of the most 

relevant facts repeated below. The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs were landowners in 

Miami Dade County, Florida, who alleged that the United States government effected 

takings of their reversionary interests in a strip of land underlying a railroad line through 

the operation of the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1241 et seq. (2012). On July 

2, 2018, the United States Court of Federal Claims Clerk’s Office entered judgment in 

favor of defendant in both the Castillo and Menendez cases and both cases were 

dismissed. On July 30, 2018, the plaintiffs in both cases filed identical motions for 

reconsideration under Rule 59(a) and Rule 60(b) of the Rules of the United States Court 

of Federal Claims (RCFC) (2018) of the court’s June 29, 2018 Opinion and July 2, 2018 

judgments entered in Castillo and Menendez. 

 

1 The plaintiffs in Castillo were as follows: Gonzalo Padron Marino, Mayda Rotella and 

Julia Garcia, parcel number 01–4002–002–0220; Shops on Flager Inc., parcel number 

01–4002–002–1780; Jose F. and Dora A. Dumenigo, parcel number 01–4002–002–1730; 

Humberto J. and Josefa Marcia Diaz, parcel number 01–4002–002–1720; Luis Crespo, 

parcel number 01–4002–002–1650; Jose Luis and Grace Barsello Napole, parcel number 

01–4002–002–1640; Bernardo D. and Norma A. Manduley, parcel number 01–4002–

002–1630; Danilo A. and Dora Rodriguez, parcel number 01–4002–002–1610; Avimael 

and Odalys Arevalo, parcel number 01–4002–002–1600; Dalia Espinosa, Daniel 

Espinosa and Sofira Gonzalez, parcel number 01–4002–002–1580; Lourdez Rodriguez, 

parcel number 01–4002–001–1370; Alberto Perez, parcel number 01–4002–001–1380; 

Mayra Lopez, parcel number 01–4002–001–1390; Niraldo Hernandez Padron and 

Mercedes Alina Falero, parcel number 01–4002–001–1400; Luisa Palencia and Xiomara 

Rodriguez, parcel number 01–4002–001–1410; Reinaldo F. Castillo, parcel number 01–

4002–001–1430; Hugo E. and Concepcion V. Diaz as Co–Trustees of the Diaz Family 

Revocable Trust, parcel number 01–4002–001–1440; South American Tile, LLC, parcel 

number 01–4002–001–1450; and Gladys Hernandez, parcel number 01–4002–001–

1460.

2 The plaintiffs in Menendez were as follows: Jose Martin Martinez and Norma del Socorro 

Gomez, parcel number 01–4002–002–1710; Nelson Menendez and Osvaldo Borras, Jr., 

parcel number 01–4002–002–1690; and Luis R. Schmidt, parcel number 01–4002–002 –

1660.
3

BACKGROUND

In its June 29, 2018 Opinion, this court analyzed whether the Castillo and 

Menendez plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on their claims that defendant 

took their reversionary interests in a strip of land underlying a railroad line once operated 

by the Florida East Coast Railway (the railroad corridor) without just compensation. See

Castillo et al.; Menendez et al. v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. at 710-11. The Florida East 

Coast Railway acquired property interests in the railroad corridor over time through 

various conveyances, resulting in a railroad corridor “comprised of four unequally sized 

and separate rights-of-way and a strip of land resulting from a written deed, that when 

combined, span 100 feet wide.” Id. at 711. The railroad corridor runs north to the south 

and sits directly west of discrete parcels of land belonging to the Castillo and Menendez

plaintiffs. See id.

The parties in Castillo and Menendez disputed whether any of the plaintiffs owned 

the land underlying the railroad corridor. To ultimately succeed on their takings claims, as 

the moving parties, the Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs had the burden to establish that 

they had a cognizable property interest in the railroad corridor. See id. at 726 (citing Am. 

Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g en banc denied

(Fed Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1139 (2005)). It was undisputed that the Castillo

and Menendez plaintiffs are landowners who each own a parcel of land that is adjacent 

to the railroad corridor. It was also undisputed that majority of the railroad corridor at issue 

was an easement granted to the Florida East Coast Railway.3 Defendant, however, 

attached to its motions for summary judgment in Castillo and Menendez the subdivision 

plats for the two subdivisions in which the Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs each owned a 

discrete parcel of land. Defendant argued that, based on the two subdivision plats, which 

excluded the land underlying the railroad corridor from the legal description of the 

subdivisions, the subdivision developers, who were the Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs’

predecessors-in-interest, did not own any of the railroad corridor and, therefore, plaintiffs 

did not own any of the railroad corridor. The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs argued that, 

because the subdivision plat maps did not sufficiently rebut a presumption under Florida 

State law that landowners adjacent to an easement own to the center of that easement, 

plaintiffs owned to the center of the railroad corridor. The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs 

argued that because they owned to the center of the railroad corridor, they were entitled 

to summary judgment on this issue. 

In its June 29, 2018 Opinion, this court noted that generally under Florida State 

law, there is a rebuttable presumption that a landowner who owns a discrete parcel of 

 

3 There was one portion of the railroad corridor that the Florida East Coast Railway 

obtained through a written deed from Mary and G.F. Holman in 1923. See Castillo et al.; 

Menendez et al. v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. at 710. In its June 29, 2018 Opinion, this 

court found that the Florida East Coast Railway obtained title to this portion of the railroad 

corridor via the 1923 Holman deed, and, thus, none of the Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs 

had a property interest in this portion of the railroad corridor. See id. at 734. The Castillo

and Menendez plaintiffs do not seek reconsideration of the court’s June 29, 2018 holding 

as to the Holman deed.
4

land adjacent to an easement owns to the center of the easement. See Castillo et al.; 

Menendez et al. v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. at 736. The court further discussed that a 

presumption of ownership based on the centerline presumption “can be rebutted, for 

example, by evidence that the grantor did not own the land underlying the easement at 

issue, or, if there was ownership of such land, evidence that the grantor clearly reserved 

title to the land, such that the adjoining landowner would have no interest in the 

easement.” Id. at 738. 

Regarding the takings claims for the nine Castillo plaintiffs who each own a parcel 

of land in the Zena Gardens subdivision, this court stated in its June 29, 2018 Opinion 

that

these nine Castillo plaintiffs took title to their discrete parcel of land with 

reference to the Zena Gardens subdivision plat. Under Florida law, when a 

party takes title by reference to a “recorded plat,” “all restrictions, 

easements, and reserved rights that appear on the plat are incorporated in 

the instruments of conveyance as if though the same had been recited in 

the instruments.” Peninsular Point, Inc. v. South Georgia Dairy Co–op, 251 

So. 2d [690, 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)]; see also McCorquodale v. 

Keyton, 63 So. 2d 906, 910 (Fla. 1953); Miami–Dade County v. Torbert, 69 

So. 3d 970, 973 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 2011) (“If a landowner plats or 

subdivides his land into lots or blocks, lays off streets and other public ways, 

designates portions of the land [as] parks, playgrounds, and similar facilities 

and then conveys lots with reference to the plat, he is bound by the plat and 

representations he has made.”). Thus, the representations made in the 

Zena Gardens plat are applied to the Castillo plaintiffs as if incorporated in 

plaintiffs’ respective deeds.

Castillo et al.; Menendez et al. v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. at 738-39. This court noted 

that the Zena Gardens plat states that Louis and Rebecca Merwitzer are 

owners of the S.E. 1⁄4 of the S.E. 1⁄4 of Section 2, Township 54 South, Range 

40 East, Miami Dade County, Florida, excepting therefrom a strip of land off 

the westerly side [of the Zena Gardens subdivision] which is the right of way 

of the Okeechobee–Miami Extension of the Florida East Coast Railway, 

have caused to be made the attached plat entitled future planting, trees and 

shrubbery there on are hereby dedicated to the perpetual use of the Public 

for proper purposes reserving to the said Louis Merwitzer and Rebecca 

Merwitzer, his wife, their heirs, successors or assigns, the reversion or 

reversions thereof whenever discontinued by law.

Id. at 739-40 (emphasis in original). This court also stated that: 

The plat makes a specific point to “except[ ]” the railroad corridor from the 

description of land platted in the Zena Gardens subdivision, which is the 

same platted subdivision that includes the nine parcels which were each 
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transferred to the nine Castillo plaintiffs. Thus, based on the language of the 

plat, the railroad corridor is not included in the Zena Gardens subdivision. 

Furthermore, as depicted on the Zena Gardens plat, none of the parcels 

belonging to the nine Castillo plaintiffs extend onto the railroad corridor but, 

instead, end at the edge of the railroad corridor. Additionally, there is 

another paragraph in the plat in which the Merwitzers dedicate various 

areas of their subdivision to public use. Notably, this paragraph does not 

reference the railroad corridor. According to Florida State law:

Every plat of a subdivision filed for record must contain a 

dedication by the owner or owners of record. The dedication 

must be executed by all persons, corporations, or entities 

whose signature would be required to convey record fee 

simple title to the lands being dedicated in the same manner 

in which deeds are required to be executed. All mortgagees 

having a record interest in the lands subdivided shall execute, 

in the same manner in which deeds are required to be 

executed, either the dedication contained on the plat or a 

separate instrument joining in and ratifying the plat and all 

dedications and reservations thereon.

FLA. STAT. § 177.081 (2017).

The Zena Gardens’ dedication states:

The Streets, Avenues and Terrace as shown together with all 

existing and future planting, trees and shrubbery there on are 

hereby dedicated to the perpetual use of the Public for proper 

purposes reserving to the said Louis Merwitzer and Rebecca 

Merwitzer, his wife, their heirs, successors or assigns, the 

reversion or reversions thereof whenever discontinued by law.

The Merwitzers explicitly dedicate various areas of their subdivision, which 

are generally used for transportation, such as “Streets” and “Avenues,” for 

public use. The Merwitzers, however, do not mention the railroad corridor, 

which based on the record before the court was in use by the Florida East 

Coast Railway at the time the plat was created. Thus, the absence of the 

railroad corridor in the plat’s dedication confirms that the railroad corridor 

was not intended to be considered part of the subdivision properties which 

were eventually transferred to the nine Castillo plaintiffs.

Castillo et al.; Menendez et al. v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. at 740. This court then 

concluded: 

Because the original Zena Gardens subdivision owners did not include the 

railroad corridor as part of their platted subdivision, the Zena Gardens 
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subdivision owners did not intend to pass title to the railroad corridor to the 

grantees of the subdivision parcels adjacent to the railroad corridor. Thus, 

any potential presumption that the following nine Castillo plaintiffs, (1) 

Lourdez Rodriguez, (2) Alberto Perez, (3) Mayra Lopez, (4) Niraldo 

Hernandez Padron and Mercedes Alina Falero, (5) Luisa Palencia and 

Xiomara Rodriguez, (6) Reinaldo F. Castillo, (7) Hugo E. and Concepcion 

V. Diaz as Co–Trustees of the Diaz Family Revocable Trust, (8) South 

American Tile, LLC, and (9) Gladys Hernandez, who own discrete parcels 

in Zena Gardens, own to the center of the railroad corridor is rebutted.

Furthermore, because the Zena Gardens plat did not include the railroad 

corridor, the nine Castillo plaintiffs’ parcels do not include any of the land 

underlying the railroad corridor. Without a cognizable interest in the railroad 

corridor, the nine Castillo plaintiffs’ takings claim as to the portion of the 

railroad corridor obtained through the four condemnation proceedings in 

1924 by the Florida East Coast Railway fails. See Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. 

v. United States, 379 F.3d at 1372 (“If the claimant fails to demonstrate the 

existence of a legally cognizable property interest, the courts [sic] task is at 

an end.” (citing Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d [1344, 1352 (Fed. 

Cir. 2003)])).

Castillo et al.; Menendez et al. v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. at 740.

Regarding the takings claims for the ten Castillo and three Menendez plaintiffs, 

who each own a parcel of land in the Princess Park Manor subdivision, this court stated 

in its June 29, 2018 Opinion that each of these plaintiffs

own a discrete parcel of land in the Princess Park Manor subdivision and 

took title to their discrete parcel of land in reference to the Princess Park 

Manor plat. Thus, any representations contained within the Princess Park 

Manor plat are applied to the ten Castillo and three Menendez plaintiffs as 

if they were contained in these plaintiffs’ respective deeds. See Peninsular 

Point, Inc. v. South Georgia Dairy Co–op, 251 So. 2d at 693; see also

McCorquodale v. Keyton, 63 So. 2d 906, 910 (Fla. 1953); Miami–Dade 

Cnty. v. Torbert, 69 So. 3d 970, 973 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 2011).

Castillo et al.; Menendez et al. v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. at 740. The Princess Park 

Manor subdivision plat states that Erving and Harriett Moss are the 

owners of the South 1⁄2 of the N.E. 1/4s South of the Canal and East of the 

Florida East Coast Right–of–Way, located in Sec. 2 TWP.54 South, RGE. 

40 East, Dade County, Florida; being the land East of the Florida East coast 

Right–of–Way and between Flagler Street and the Tamiami Canal and 

extending East to Ludlum Road, ALSO The West 1⁄2 of the Northeast 1⁄4 of 

the Southeast 1⁄4 less the Florida East Coast Right–of–Way all in Sec. 2 

Township 54 South RGE.40 East, Dade County, Florida, said Florida East 

Coast Right–of–Way being the right-of-way of the Okeechobee Miami 
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Extension of the Florida East Coast Railway, have caused to [be] made the 

attached Plat entitled “PRINCESS PARK MANOR”

Id. at 741 (emphasis and capitalization in original). This court then reasoned: 

[B]ased on the language of the plat, the railroad corridor is not included in 

the platted subdivision. Furthermore, as depicted on the Princess Park 

Manor plat, none of the parcels belonging to the ten Castillo and three 

Menendez plaintiffs extend onto the railroad corridor but, instead, end at the 

edge of the railroad corridor.

Additionally, the section of the Princess Park Manor plat in which the 

Mosses dedicate various platted streets and alleys to public use, does not 

mention the railroad corridor. In particular, the Princess Park Manor plat 

states that:

The Streets, Avenues, Roads, Terraces, Courts and Alleys as 

shown together with all existing and future planning, trees and 

shrubbery thereon are hereby dedicated to the perpetual use 

of the public for proper purposes, reserving to the said 

ERVING A.MOSS and HARRIETT E.MOSS, his wife, their 

heirs; successors or assigns, the reversion or reversions 

thereof whenever discontinued by law.

(capitalization in original). The Mosses explicitly dedicate various areas of 

its subdivision which are generally used for transportation, such as 

“Streets,” “Avenues,” “Roads,” and “Alleys,” for public use. The Mosses, 

however, do not mention the railroad corridor, which based on the record 

before the court was in use by the Florida East Coast Railway at the time 

the plat was created. Thus, the absence of the railroad corridor in the plat’s 

dedication confirms that the railroad corridor was not intended to be 

considered part of the subdivision properties which were eventually 

transferred to the ten Castillo and three Menendez plaintiffs.

Because the original Princess Park Manor subdivision owners did 

not include the railroad corridor as part of their platted subdivision, the 

Princess Park manor subdivision owners did not intend to pass title to the 

railroad corridor to the grantees of the subdivision parcels adjacent to the 

railroad corridor. Thus, any potential presumption that the following ten 

Castillo plaintiffs, (1) Luis Crespo, (2) Jose Luis and Grace Barsello Napole, 

(3) Bernardo D. and Norma A. Manduley, (4) Danilo A. and Dora Rodriguez, 

(5) Avimael and Odalys Arevalo, (6) Dalia Espinosa, Daniel Espinosa, and 

Sofira Gonzalez, (7) Humberto J. and Josefa Marcia Diaz, (8) Jose F. and 

Dora A. Dumenigo, (9) Shops on Flagler Inc., and (10) Gonzalo Padron 

Marino, Julia Garcia and Mayda Rotella, and three Menendez plaintiffs, (1) 

Luis Schmidt, (2) Jose Martin Martinez, and (3) Nelson Menendez and 
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Osvaldo Borras, Jr., own to the center of the railroad corridor is rebutted. 

Furthermore, because the Princess Park Manor plat did not include the 

railroad corridor, the parcels belonging to these ten Castillo and three 

Menendez plaintiffs do not include any of the land underlying the railroad 

corridor. Without a cognizable interest in the railroad corridor, the ten 

Castillo and three Menendez plaintiffs’ takings claim as to the portion of the 

railroad corridor obtained through the four condemnation proceedings in 

1924 fails. See Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d at 1372; 

Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d at 1352.

Castillo et al.; Menendez et al. v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. at 741-42.

The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs now seek reconsideration of the court’s June 

29, 2018 Opinion pursuant to RCFC 59(a) and of the court’s July 2, 2018 judgments 

entered in Castillo and Menendez pursuant to RCFC 60(b). In their respective motions 

for reconsideration, the Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs challenge “whether this Court 

correctly applied Florida law and, specifically, whether this Court correctly applied the 

centerline presumption and the strips-and-gore doctrine[4] to the facts of this case.” The 

 

4 As the Supreme Court of Florida in Rogers v. United States, 184 So. 3d 1087,1097-98 

(2015) stated:

[a]s applied to a railroad right of way, the “strips and gores” doctrine has 

been explained as follows:

The presumption is that a deed to a railroad or other right of 

way company (pipeline company, telephone company, etc.) 

conveys a right of way, that is, an easement, terminable when 

the acquirer’s use terminates, rather than a fee simple. 

Transaction costs are minimized by undivided ownership of a 

parcel of land, and such ownership is facilitated by the 

automatic reuniting of divided land once the reason for the 

division has ceased. If the railroad holds title in fee simple to 

a multitude of skinny strips of land now usable only by the 

owner of the surrounding or adjacent land, then before the 

strips can be put to their best use there must be expensive 

and time-consuming negotiation between the railroad and its 

neighbor—that or the gradual extinction of the railroad’s 

interest through the operation of adverse possession. It is 

cleaner if the railroad’s interest simply terminates upon the 

abandonment of railroad service. A further consideration is 

that railroads and other right of way companies have eminent 

domain powers, and they should not be encouraged to use 

those powers to take more than they need of another person’s 

property—more, that is, than a right of way. But all this said, 

there is nothing to prohibit a farmer or other landowner from 
9

Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs also argue in their motions for reconsideration that, “to 

the extent this Court believes ‘there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion,’” on 

whether, under Florida State law, the “owners of these plats held title to the centerline of 

the land encumbered by the right-of-way easement,” the plaintiffs ask “this Court to 

consider issuing an interlocutory order to the Federal Circuit with a request that the 

Federal Circuit certify this question to the Florida Supreme Court.” The Castillo and 

Menendez plaintiffs do not seek reconsideration of this court’s finding that the plaintiffs 

lacked a cognizable property interest in the portion of the railroad corridor conveyed to 

the Florida East Coast Railway, the operator of the railroad, by G.F. and Mary Holman 

through a warranty deed in 1923. 

The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs attached two declarations to their motions for 

reconsideration, which the plaintiffs had not previously submitted to the court when 

briefing their motions for summary judgment, which were decided in the court’s June 29, 

2018 Opinion. The first declaration is signed by Dale A. Whitman, a Professor Emeritus 

of Law at the University of Missouri, who notes in his declaration that the “focus of my 

teaching and research for the past 50 years has been property, real estate finance, and 

land use planning.” The second declaration is signed by Christopher Smart, a Florida 

barred-attorney and “chair of The Real Property and Probated Trust Law Section of the 

Florida Bar’s Title Issues and Standards Committee.” The Castillo and Menendez

plaintiffs also attached a copy of three sections of the 2012 Florida Uniform Title 

Standards to their motions for reconsideration, a copy of a deed dated January 16, 1950 

between Erving and Harriett Moss and Princess Park Manor, Inc., a copy of a deed dated 

October 29, 1947 between Louis and Rebecca Merwitzer and Zena Gardens, Inc., and 

copies of what appear to be the same subdivision plats for Zena Gardens and Princess 

Park Manor that the government attached to its earlier cross-motions for summary 

judgment in Castillo and Menendez. As with the two declarations, the sections from the 

2012 Florida Uniform Title Standards and the two deeds attached to the Castillo and 

Menendez motions for reconsideration were not previously submitted by the Castillo and 

Menendez plaintiffs when briefing their motions for summary judgment in the abovecaptioned cases.

Subsequent to filing their motions for reconsideration, on August 6, 2018, the 

Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs also filed identical notices of additional authority in 

support of their motions for reconsideration. Attached to the notices of additional authority 

is the chain-of-title for the parcel of land currently owned by Castillo plaintiff Reinaldo 

Castillo and the chain-of-title for the parcel of land currently owned by Menendez plaintiff 

Nelson Menendez. The plaintiffs, without explanation, did not attach to the notices of 

additional authority the chains-of-title for the parcels of land currently owned by the 

remaining eighteen Castillo plaintiffs and remaining two Menendez plaintiffs in the abovecaptioned cases.

 

selling outright to the railroad a strip of land for the railroad’s 

tracks . . . .

Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Corp. v. U.S. R.R. Vest Corp., 955 F.2d 1158, 1160 (7th Cir. 

1992)). 
10

On August 15, 2018, defendant responded to the Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs’

motions for reconsideration. Defendant argues that the motions for reconsideration 

should be denied because “the court’s rejection of plaintiffs’ legal arguments does not 

constitute ‘manifest injustice’ or ‘clear error’ warranting reconsideration.” Defendant also 

argues that “plaintiffs’ disagreement with the court’s interpretation of the centerline 

presumption under Florida law does not provide a basis for their untimely request for 

certification to the Florida Supreme Court.”

On August 20, 2018, the Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs filed replies in support of 

their motions for reconsideration, reiterating that the court misapplied the centerline 

presumption. The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs also reiterate in their replies that if the 

court “has any doubt about the applicability of the centerline presumption,” that the court 

“should certify this issue for interlocutory appeal and certification to the Florida Supreme 

Court.”

DISCUSSION

Reconsideration of a judgment is not intended to permit a party to retry its case 

when it previously was afforded a full and fair opportunity to do so. The United States 

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated that “[t]he decision whether to grant 

reconsideration lies largely within the discretion of the [trial] court. See Yuba Nat. Res., 

Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied (Fed. Cir. 1990); see

also Carter v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 316, 318, 518 F.2d 1199, 1199 (1975), cert.

denied, 423 U.S. 1076, reh’g denied, 424 U.S. 950 (1976); CanPro Invs. Ltd. v. United 

States, 131 Fed. Cl. 528, 531 (2017); Osage Tribe of Indians of Okla. v. United States, 

97 Fed. Cl. 345, 348 (2011) (discussing RCFC 59(a) and RCFC 60(b)); Oenga v. United 

States, 97 Fed. Cl. 80, 83 (2011) (discussing RCFC 59(a)); Webster v. United States, 92 

Fed. Cl. 321, 324, recons. denied, 93 Fed. Cl. 676 (2010) (discussing RCFC 60(b)); Alpha 

I, L.P. ex rel. Sands v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 126, 129 (2009) (discussing RCFC 54(b) 

and 59(a)); Banks v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 288, 291-92 (2008) (discussing RCFC 

54(b) and 59(a)); Corrigan v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 665, 667-68 (2006) (discussing 

RCFC 59(a)); Tritek Techs., Inc. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 740, 752 (2005); Keeton 

Corr., Inc. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 251, 253 (2004) (discussing RCFC 59(a)); Paalan 

v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 99, 105 (2003), aff’d, 120 F. App’x 817 (Fed. Cir.), cert.

denied, 546 U.S. 844 (2005); Citizens Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 793, 

794 (2002) (discussing RCFC 59(a)).

“Motions for reconsideration must be supported ‘by a showing of extraordinary 

circumstances which justify relief.’” Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1235 (Fed. 

Cir. 2004) (quoting Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 298, 300 (1999)) 

(discussing RCFC 59(a)), reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 826 

(2005); see also Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 279 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 

(“Rule 60(b)(6) is available only in extraordinary circumstances and only when the basis 

for relief does not fall within any of the other subsections of Rule 60(b).” (citing Marquip, 

Inc. v. Fosber Am., Inc., 198 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1999), reh’g denied (Fed. Cir. 
11

2000))); Provident Sav. Bank v. Popovich, 71 F.3d 696, 700 (7th Cir. 1995)); Oenga v. 

United States, 97 Fed. Cl. at 83; Seldovia Native Ass’n Inc. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 

593, 594 (1996) (discussing RCFC 59(a)), aff’d, 144 F.3d 769 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Generally, 

“[t]he cases seem to make [a] fault/no fault distinction the controlling factor in determining 

whether extraordinary circumstances will be found or not. In a vast majority of cases 

finding that extraordinary circumstances do exist so as to justify relief, the movant is 

completely without fault . . . .” 12 JOSEPH T. MCLAUGHLIN AND THOMAS D. ROWE, JR.,

MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.48[3][b] (3rd ed. 2008) (discussing RCFC 60(b)(6)); see

also Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1363 (2008) (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. 

Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993)) (discussing RCFC 

60(b)(6)). 

Courts must address reconsideration motions with “exceptional care.” Carter v. 

United States, 207 Ct. Cl. at 318, 518 F.2d at 1199; see also Global Comput. Enters. v. 

United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 466, 468 (2009) (discussing RCFC 59(a)). “The three primary 

grounds that justify reconsideration are: ‘(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; 

(2) the availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent 

manifest injustice.’” Del. Valley Floral Grp., Inc. v. Shaw Rose Nets, LLC, 597 F.3d 1374, 

1383 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Griffin v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 1, 7 (2010) (discussing 

RCFC 59(a)), mot. to amend denied, appeal dismissed, 454 F. App’x 899 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 

Totolo/King Joint Venture v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 442, 444 (2009) (quoting Stockton 

E. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 497, 499 (2007), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 

rev’d in part on other grounds, 583 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009)) (discussing RCFC 59(a)), 

appeal dismissed, 431 F. App’x 895 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied (2011); Dairyland Power 

Coop. v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 615, 652 (2009) (discussing RCFC 59(a)), recons.

denied, No. 04-106C, 2010 WL 637793 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 22, 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in

part on other grounds, 645 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. June 24, 2011); Matthews v. United 

States, 73 Fed. Cl. 524, 526 (2006) (citations omitted) (discussing RCFC 59); Prati v. 

United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 373, 376 (2008) (discussing RCFC 59(a)), aff’d, 603 F.3d 1301 

(Fed. Cir.), reh’g en banc denied (2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1139 (2011). “Manifest,” 

as in “manifest injustice,” is “understood as clearly apparent or obvious.” Cyios Corp. v. 

United States, 124 Fed. Cl. 107, 113 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Lee v. United States, 130 Fed. Cl. 243, 252 (2017), aff’d, 895 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018);

Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 555, 557 (2002) (discussing RCFC 59), aff’d, 

384 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 948 (2005). “Where a party seeks 

reconsideration on the ground of manifest injustice, it cannot prevail unless it 

demonstrates that any injustice is ‘apparent to the point of being almost indisputable.’” 

Griffin v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. at 7 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 

74 Fed. Cl. 779, 785 (2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 536 F.3d 1282 

(Fed. Cir. 2008)). “A court, therefore, will not grant a motion for reconsideration if the 

movant ‘merely reasserts . . . arguments previously made . . . all of which were carefully 

considered by the court.’” Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. at 557 (emphasis in 

original) (quoting Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 157, 164 (1993), 

aff’d, 50 F.3d 1021 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied, en banc suggestion declined (Fed. Cir. 

1995)); see also CanPro Invs. Ltd. v. United States, 131 Fed. Cl. at 531; Griffin v. United 

States, 96 Fed. Cl. at 7; Bowling v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 551, 562 (discussing RCFC 
12

59(a) and 60(b)), recons. denied (2010); Webster v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. at 324 

(discussing RCFC 59(a) and 60(b)); Pinckney v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 550, 555 

(2009); Tritek Techs., Inc. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. at 752. “A motion for 

reconsideration is not intended . . . to give an unhappy litigant an additional chance to 

sway the court.” Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 469, 475 (2012) 

(internal quotations omitted; ellipse in original). “It is not sufficient for plaintiffs to reassert 

the same arguments they made in earlier proceedings, nor can plaintiffs raise new 

arguments that could have been made earlier.” Lee v. United States, 130 Fed. Cl. at 252; 

see also Cyios Corp. v. United States, 124 Fed. Cl. at 113 (rejecting protestor’s argument 

raised for the first time in its motion for reconsideration); CANVS Corp. v. United States, 

116 Fed. Cl. 294, 300 (2014) (“[A] party may not raise an issue for the first time on 

reconsideration when the issue was available to be litigated at the time the complaint was 

filed.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

In sum, it is logical and well established that, “a motion for reconsideration ‘should 

not be based on evidence that was readily available at the time the motion was heard.’” 

Johnson v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 661, 664 (2016) (quoting Seldovia Native Ass’n 

Inc. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. at 594). “‘Post-opinion motions to reconsider are not 

favored . . . especially where a party has had a fair opportunity to litigate the point in 

issue.’” Wagstaff v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 172, 175 (quoting Aerolease Long Beach 

v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 342, 376, aff’d, 39 F.3d 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994)), aff’d, 595 

F. App’x 975 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the court’s June 29, 

2018 Opinion pursuant to RCFC 59(a), and of the court’s July 2, 2018 judgments entered 

in Castillo and Menendez pursuant to RCFC 60(b), on the ground that the court committed 

“clear error” resulting in “manifest injustice” when the court concluded that both sets of 

plaintiffs do not own any of the land underlying the railroad corridor.5 The Castillo and 

Menendez plaintiffs specifically argue that the centerline presumption was not rebutted in 

the above-captioned cases because “[t]he government did not show that the Merwitzer 

and Moss families ‘clearly reserved title’ to the fee estate in the land under the railroad 

right-of-way.” The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs, however, have already argued in their 

reply briefs in support of their motions for summary judgment, filed prior to the court’s 

June 29, 2018 Opinion, that the government had not demonstrated a “clear intent” by the 

Mosses and Merwitzers to reserve the land under the railroad corridor. In arriving at its 

June 29, 2018 Opinion, however, the court did not find the Castillo and Menendez

plaintiffs’ position persuasive. This court found that the government had sufficiently 

established that the Mosses and Merwitzers did not intend to pass title to their grantees 

to the land underlying the railroad corridor based on the exclusionary language in the 

subdivision plats, which the government had attached to its cross-motions for summary 

judgment in Castillo and Menendez. See Castillo et al.; Menendez et al. v. United States, 

138 Fed. Cl. at 739, 742. In order to succeed on a motion for reconsideration, parties 

cannot simply reassert the same arguments they made in earlier proceedings. See Lee 

v. United States, 130 Fed. Cl. at 252. The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs’ recycled

 

5 The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs’ motions for reconsideration do not differentiate 

regarding their arguments pursuant to RCFC 59(a) or to RCFC 60(b).
13

argument that the government failed to establish that the Mosses and Merwitzers clearly 

intended to reserve title to the railroad corridor does not justify reconsideration of the 

court’s June 29, 2018 Opinion, pursuant to RCFC 59(a), or of the judgments entered in 

Castillo and Menendez on July 2, 2018, pursuant to RCFC 60(b). 

The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs then argue that the chains-of-title for plaintiff 

Reinaldo Castillo and plaintiff Nelson Menendez, which plaintiffs submitted to the court 

after the court issued its June 29, 2018 Opinion, “demonstrate that the Moss and 

Merwitzer families did not ‘clearly reserve title’ to the land under the railroad right-of-way 

easement.” As an initial matter, the chains-of-title are public records and, therefore, were 

available to the Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs when they briefed the motions for 

summary judgment, which led to the June 29, 2018 Opinion, and should not have been 

left for a post-decision motion for reconsideration. As previously stated, “a motion for 

reconsideration should not be based on evidence that was readily available at the time 

the motion was heard.” Johnson v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. at 664 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). To the extent that the court would, however, considered the chains-oftitle, the chains-of-title lend support to the court’s June 29, 2018 conclusion that none of 

the plaintiffs in the above-captioned cases own the land underlying the railroad corridor. 

According to chains-of-title, Louis Merwitzer, predecessor-in-interest to the nine Castillo

plaintiffs, each of whom own a discrete parcel of land in the Zena Gardens subdivision, 

never obtained title to the railroad corridor. In 1945, by written deed, Mr. Merwitzer 

obtained title to the land which now comprises the Zena Gardens subdivision, and, 

notably, the written deed excluded from the conveyance the “strip of land” underlying the 

railroad corridor bordering present day Zena Gardens. The 1945 deed described the land 

conveyed as the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 2, Township 54 

South, Range 40 East:

 Less

That certain strip of land off the Westerly portion of the above described 

property, more particularly described as follows: Said strip being bounded 

on the West by the West boundary line of above mentioned fractional part 

of said section, on the East by a line parallel to and 50 feet East of Center 

line of the Okeechobee-Miami Extension of the Florida East Coast Railway 

as surveyed, and located, and on the North and South by the respective 

boundary lines of said aforementioned fractional part of said Section, said 

strip being 25.33 feet wide at the North end and 1.2 Feet wide at the South 

end, containing in all 0.41 acres more or less

 and subject to

That part off the Easterly portion and the Southerly portion of the a [sic] 

above described land that may have been dedicated previously for street 

or road purposes.
14

(emphasis added). Therefore, because Mr. Merwitzer did not receive title to the land 

underlying the railroad corridor, the nine Castillo plaintiffs, as successors-in-interest to 

Mr. Merwitzer, could not have received title to the land underlying the railroad corridor.

Similarly, Erving Moss, predecessor-in-interest to the ten Castillo plaintiffs and 

three Menendez plaintiffs, each of whom own a discrete parcel of land in the Princess 

Park Manor, never obtained title to the railroad corridor. In 1949, by written deed, Mr. 

Moss obtained title to the land which now comprises the Princess Park Manor subdivision. 

The 1949 deed did not include the land underlying the railroad corridor bordering present 

day Princess Park Manor. The 1949 deed noted that the land conveyed was “East of the 

Florida East Coast right-of-way” and also “[t]he West one-half of the Northeast quarter of 

the Southeast quarter less the Florida East Coast Right-of-Way. . . .” Thus, because Mr. 

Moss was not conveyed title to the railroad corridor, the ten Castillo and three Menendez

plaintiffs could not have been conveyed title to the railroad corridor.

 

The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs also argue that the court incorrectly 

interpreted the excepting language in the Zena Gardens and Princess Park Manor plats. 

The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs argue that “[t]he description of the property 

conveyed in the Zena Garden [sic] and Princess Park Manor plats is rightly understood 

under Florida law and land title standards as a conveyance of the entire fee estate subject 

to the existing railroad easement.” (emphasis in original). The Castillo and Menendez

plaintiffs did not argue that the excepting language in the Zena Gardens and Princess 

Park Manor subdivision plats means that each subdivision is “subject to” the railroad rightof-way in their earlier filed motions for summary judgment and reply briefs which led to 

the June 29, 2018 Opinion of the court. As previously noted, “a party may not raise an 

issue for the first time on reconsideration when the issue was available to be litigated.” 

CANVS Corp. v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. at 300 (internal quotation marks omitted); 

see also Lee v. United States, 130 Fed. Cl. at 252. Thus, the Castillo and Menendez

plaintiffs’ newly raised arguments that the excepting language in the Zena Gardens and 

Princess Park Manor plats means that the subdivision is “subject to” the railroad right-ofway is not a basis for reconsideration of the court’s June 29, 2018 Opinion, pursuant to 

RCFC 59(a), or of the judgments entered in Castillo and Menendez on July 2, 2018,

pursuant to RCFC 60(b). See Cyios Corp. v. United States, 124 Fed. Cl. at 115 (declining 

to consider plaintiff’s new argument on a motion for reconsideration when plaintiff failed 

to make the argument in its motion for judgment on the administrative record). 

Moreover, the Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs do not sufficiently support their 

argument that the excepting language contained in the plats means that the Castillo and 

Menendez plaintiffs’ properties were “subject to” the Florida East Coast Railway’s rightof-way. Instead of citing to Florida State law as support that the exclusionary language in 

the plats means “subject to” an existing right-of-way, the Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs 

cite to paragraph five of the declaration of Christopher Smart, a Florida real estate 

attorney, which was submitted to the court for the first time as an attachment to the 

Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs’ motions for reconsideration. Paragraph five of the Smart 

declaration states that: 
15

[T]he centerline presumption . . . in Florida means that a conveyance by lot 

and block number carries with it the interest in any abutting right of way 

subject to the right of way easement or dedication. When the right-of-way 

easement or dedication is vacated, then the owner of the lot owns to the 

centerline of the right-of-way free and clear of any easement or dedication.

The above-quoted paragraph from Mr. Smart’s declaration regarding the centerline 

presumption, however, does not support the Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs’ proposition 

that the excepting language in the plats means that the land conveyed was “subject to” 

the railroad right-of-way. The above-quoted paragraph from Mr. Smart’s declaration does 

not discuss the meaning of the excepting language in the plats at issue. The Castillo and 

Menendez plaintiffs agree that “[t]his Court must apply Florida property law in the same 

manner Florida’s Supreme Court would apply Florida law. . . . [A] federal court . . . must 

defer to the interpretation of the highest state court.” Any explanation or interpretation 

offered by Mr. Smart as to how the centerline presumption should be applied in the abovecaptioned cases, however, is not binding on this court. It is the role of the court to interpret 

and apply Florida State law in the above-captioned cases, as interpreted by the Florida 

courts. See Chi. Coating Co., LLC v. United States, 892 F.3d 1164, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 

(“[W]e must apply the law of the state where the property interest arises.”); see also Info. 

Sys. & Networks Corp. v. United States, 136 Fed. Cl. 34, 37 (2018) (“[I]t is the role of the 

court and not the role of the experts to opine on the law.”).

The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs also cite to other paragraphs of Mr. Smart’s 

declaration and to the declaration of Dale Whitman, a professor of property law, which 

also was presented to the court for the first time as an attachment to the Castillo and 

Menendez plaintiffs’ motions for reconsideration. Mr. Smart’s declaration states that “[t]he 

provision in the dedicatory language of the Princess Park Manor plat lessing out the rightof-way of the Okeechobee-Miami extension of the Florida East Coast Railway is . . . . an 

expression that the right-of-way is not part of the plat.” Mr. Smart’s declaration further 

states that “[t]he provision in the dedicatory language of the Zena Gardens plat excepting 

the right-of-way of the Okeechobee-Miami extension of the Florida East Coast Railway is 

. . . . an expression that the right-of-way is not part of the plat.” Similarly, Mr. Whitman’s 

declaration notes that “[t]he language in the Zena Gardens plat ‘excepting’ the railroad 

corridor is merely stating that the railroad corridor is not part of the subdivision – which of 

course, it is not.”6 Even assuming the court would have afforded any weight to these 

declarations, which plaintiffs submitted to the court after the court issued its June 29, 2018 

Opinion, the statements made by Mr. Smart and Mr. Whitman do not change the court’s 

June 29, 2018 conclusion. As the court noted in its June 29, 2018 Opinion: 

Under Florida law, when a party takes title by reference to a “recorded plat,” 

“all restrictions, easements, and reserved rights that appear on the plat are 

incorporated in the instruments of conveyance as if though the same had 

 

6 Mr. Whitman’s declaration, without explanation, does not reference or discuss the 

exclusionary language contained in the Princess Park Manor subdivision, the second 

subdivision plat at issue in the above-captioned cases and relevant to the takings claims 

for the majority of the plaintiffs in Castillo and Menendez. 
16

been recited in the instruments.” Peninsular Point, Inc. v. South Georgia 

Dairy Co–op, 251 So. 2d at 693; see also McCorquodale v. Keyton, 63 

So. 2d 906, 910 (Fla. 1953); Miami-Dade County v. Torbert, 69 So. 3d 970, 

973 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 2011) (“If a landowner plats or subdivides his land 

into lots or blocks, lays off streets and other public ways, designates 

portions of the land [as] parks, playgrounds, and similar facilities and then 

conveys lots with reference to the plat, he is bound by the plat and 

representations he has made.”). 

Castillo et al.; Menendez et al. v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. at 738-39. Because all of 

the plaintiffs in the above-captioned cases took title to their individual parcels of land by 

reference to either the Zena Gardens or Princess Park Manor plats, plaintiffs are bound 

by their respective plat’s restrictions and representations as if contained in their respective 

deeds. See id. As Mr. Smart and Mr. Whitman recognized in their declarations, the plats 

at issue excluded the railroad corridor. Therefore, the Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs 

could not have taken title to the land underlying the railroad corridor, which was 

specifically excluded from the subdivision plats. 

The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs then argue that the court’s “premise” “that the 

centerline presumption is inapplicable or is rebutted whenever the relevant boundary is 

described or depicted as the edge (and not the center) of the adjoining right-of-way” is 

“incorrect because it effectively nullifies the centerline presumption and the strip-and-gore 

doctrine.” As an initial matter, although not previously raised by the Castillo and 

Menendez plaintiffs in their earlier motions for summary judgment and only briefly 

referenced in their reply briefs in support of their motions for summary judgment prior to 

the court’s June 29, 2018 Opinion, this court nonetheless addressed the “strip-and-gore 

doctrine” in its June 29, 2018 Opinion and stated, the doctrine:

“has been explained as follows: ‘The presumption is that a deed to a railroad 

or other right of way company (pipeline company, telephone company, etc.) 

conveys a right of way, that is, an easement, terminable when the acquirer’s 

use terminates, rather than a fee simple.’” Rogers v. United States, 184 

So. 3d at 1097-98 (quoting Penn Central Corp. v. U.S. R.R. Vest Corp., 955 

F.2d 1158, 1160 (7th Cir. 1992)).

Castillo et al.; Menendez et al. v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. at 737 n.11. Underlying the 

“strips-and-gore doctrine” is the premise that “[t]ransaction costs are minimized by 

undivided ownership of a parcel of land, and such ownership is facilitated by the automatic 

reuniting of divided land once the reason for the division has ceased.” Rogers v. United 

States, 184 So. 3d at 1098 (quoting Penn Cent. Corp. v. U.S. R.R. Vest Corp., 955 F.2d 

at 1160). The parties did not dispute in their cross-motions for summary judgment in the 

above-captioned cases whether the interest obtained by the Florida East Coast Railway 

was an easement or fee simple. The parties agreed that the Florida East Coast Railway 

only obtained an easement in the railroad corridor through four separate condemnation 

proceedings in Dade County Circuit Court in the 1920s. Thus, even if the Castillo and 
17

Menendez plaintiffs could now raise the “strip-and-gore doctrine,” the doctrine does not 

aid plaintiffs in proving their takings claims.

The court did not conclude in its June 29, 2018 Opinion, as the Castillo and 

Menendez plaintiffs suggest, that “the centerline is inapplicable or is rebutted whenever 

the relevant boundary is described or depicted as the edge (and not the center) of the 

adjoining right-of-way.” The court explained in its June 29, 2018 Opinion, 

under Florida law, the center line presumption can be rebutted, for example, 

by evidence that the grantor did not own the land underlying the easement 

at issue, or, if there was ownership of such land, evidence that the grantor 

clearly reserved title to the land, such that the adjoining landowner would 

have no interest in the easement.

Castillo et al.; Menendez et al. v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. at 738. This court then 

concluded that the centerline presumption was rebutted in the above-captioned cases 

because the original subdivision owners “did not intend to pass title to the railroad corridor 

to the grantees of the subdivision parcels” because the language in the subdivision plats 

excepted the strip of land underlying the railroad corridor from the subdivision. See id. at 

740, 742. This court noted that none of the Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs’ parcels 

extended onto the railroad corridor as support for its conclusion that the subdivision plats 

did not include the railroad corridor. See id. at 740, 741. Thus, the court did not conclude 

that the centerline presumption is rebutted simply because a subdivision plat displays a 

party’s property as extended to the edge of the disputed right-of-way. 

The Castillo plaintiffs also argue that the court “clearly erred when it granted 

summary judgment” in favor of defendant regarding the portion of the railroad corridor 

obtained by condemnation because the government did not move for summary judgment 

as to this portion of the railroad corridor.7In Castillo, defendant moved for summary 

judgment as to the portion of the railroad corridor obtained through the Holman deed and 

not to the portion of the railroad corridor obtained through four separate condemnation 

proceedings in 1924.8 See id. at 721. As a judge of this court explained: 

[A] court may . . . grant summary judgment in favor of the nonmoving party. 

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986) (“[Under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56], district courts are widely acknowledged to possess the power to 

enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on 

notice that [it] had to come forward with all of its evidence”); Massey v. Del 

 

7

In Menendez, defendant moved for summary judgment as to the portions of the railroad 

corridor obtained by condemnation. The Menendez plaintiffs do not raise this argument 

in their motion for reconsideration of the court’s June 29, 2018 Opinion and of the July 2, 

2018 judgment entered in Menendez. 

8

In Castillo, the court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant as to the Holman 

deed. Castillo et al.; Menendez et al. v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. at 734. The Castillo

plaintiffs do not seek reconsideration regarding the Holman deed. 
18

Labs., Inc., 118 F.3d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“In many cases, where 

the factual record has been well developed before the summary judgment 

stage, the grant of summary judgment to the non-movant may well be the 

most efficient manner to decide a case.”); 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur 

R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 (2008). 

Whenever a court believes that the nonmoving party is entitled to judgment, 

the court must first ensure that the original movant has had an adequate 

opportunity to show that there is a genuine issue and that the opponent is 

not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 10A Federal Practice and 

Procedure § 2720. A court will view all inferences drawn from the underlying 

facts in a light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment 

is to be entered. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 

U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

U.S. Sur. Co. v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 306, 309–10 (2008); see also D Three Enters., 

LLC v. SunModo Corp., 890 F.3d 1042, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“So long as the losing 

party was on notice that it had to come forward with all of its evidence, a sua sponte grant 

of summary judgment may be appropriate.” (interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (2018)));9

Parking v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 151, 157 (2006) (granting summary judgment sua 

sponte in favor of plaintiff).

The Castillo plaintiffs moved the court for summary judgment as to the portion of 

the railroad corridor obtained by condemnation, and argued that there was no genuine 

issue of material fact on this issue. Defendant responded to plaintiffs’ motion for summary 

judgment, and argued that the subdivision plats for the subdivisions in which plaintiffs’

parcels were located, and which defendant submitted with its response brief, rebutted the 

centerline presumption. Defendant also argued that

[t]he plain language of the plat stated that the subdivision developers owned 

specific land that did not include the railroad corridor. Therefore, if the 

subdivision developer as the predecessor-in-interest to Plaintiffs did not 

own any portion of the railroad corridor as presented by their plats, then 

Plaintiffs cannot be the current owner of this land, especially since all of the 

Plaintiffs’ deeds refer back to these recorded plats.

 

9 As this court noted in its June 29, 2018 Opinion, “Rule 56 of the United States Court of 

Federal Claims Rules (RCFC) is similar to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

in language and effect.” Castillo et al.; Menendez et al. v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. at 

722. Because RCFC 56 is similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, this court may rely on cases 

interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See Progressive Indus., Inc. v. United States, 888 F.3d 

1248, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“As we have stated before, ‘[t]he precedent interpreting the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies with equal force to the comparable Rules of the 

Court of Federal Claims.’” (quoting Kraft, Inc. v. United States, 85 F.3d 602, 605 n.6 (Fed. 

Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds on denial of reh’g, 96 F.3d 1428 (Fed. Cir. 

1996))).
19

The Castillo plaintiffs argued in their reply brief to their motion for summary judgment that 

the subdivision plats did not overcome the presumption that the plaintiffs owned to the 

center of the land underlying the railroad corridor obtained by condemnation. The court, 

however, disagreed with the Castillo plaintiffs, finding that the subdivision plats not only 

rebutted the centerline presumption, but also established that the plaintiffs could not own 

the land underlying the railroad corridor. See Castillo et al.; Menendez et al. v. United 

States, 138 Fed. Cl. at 740, 742. Even though defendant did not move for summary 

judgment as to the portion of the railroad corridor obtained through condemnation, the 

Castillo plaintiffs had adequate notice and opportunity to argue to the court as to why the 

subdivision plats did not preclude their takings claims. The court’s June 29, 2018 Opinion 

granting summary judgment in favor of defendant regarding the portion of the railroad 

corridor obtained through condemnation was not in error so as to require the court to 

reconsider its June 29, 2018 Opinion, pursuant to RCFC 59(a), or the judgment entered 

on July 2, 2018 in Castillo, pursuant to RCFC 60(b). See U.S. Sur. Co. v. United States, 

83 Fed. Cl. at 310 (awarding summary judgment sua sponte to defendant when plaintiff 

was aware that there was only one legal issue pending before the court and when plaintiff 

argued the very point in its motion for summary judgment).

The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs finally argue in their motions for 

reconsideration that “to the extent this Court believes ‘there is a substantial ground for 

difference of opinion,’” on whether the “owners of these plats held title to the centerline of 

the land encumbered by the right-of-way easement,” this court should “consider issuing 

an interlocutory order to the Federal Circuit with a request that the Federal Circuit certify 

this question to the Florida Supreme Court. This would provide the most judicially-efficient 

manner to obtain a final resolution to this question of Florida state law.” Pursuant to 

Florida State law, it appears correct that this court cannot certify a question of law to the 

Supreme Court of Florida. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.150(a) (2018). Florida State law indicates 

that only “the Supreme Court of the United States or a United States court of appeals may 

certify one or more questions of law to the Supreme Court of Florida if the answer is 

determinative of the cause and there is no controlling precedent of the Supreme Court of 

Florida.” Id. The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs’ request for an interlocutory Order will 

not be granted. The Castillo and Menendez cases are closed, with judgment having been 

entered in both cases on July 2, 2018. The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs have not 

presented this court with any grounds for re-opening those judgments in the abovecaptioned cases. 
20

CONCLUSION

In sum, the Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs have not presented this court with any

proper grounds to reconsider its June 29, 2018 Opinion or the July 2, 2018 judgments 

entered in Castillo and Menendez. Therefore, the Castillo plaintiffs’ motion for 

reconsideration pursuant to RCFC 59(a) and RCFC 60(b) is DENIED, and the Menendez

plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration pursuant to RCFC 59(a) and RCFC 60(b) also is 

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

 s/Marian Blank Horn 

 MARIAN BLANK HORN

 Judge