alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §2247a. Farm or food products; sale of samples, practical forms, etc.

The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to sell samples, illustrations, practical forms, or sets of the grades recommended or promulgated by him for farm or food products, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, and the receipts therefrom shall be deposited in the Treasury to the credit of miscellaneous receipts.

(Sept. 21, 1944, ch. 412, title IV, §401(a), 58 Stat. 738.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section was formerly classified to section 415e of this title prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as this section.

#### Prior Provisions

Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in the following Department of Agriculture appropriation acts:

June 28, 1944, ch. 296, 58 Stat. 454.

July 12, 1943, ch. 215, 57 Stat. 421.

July 22, 1942, ch. 516, 56 Stat. 688.

July 1, 1941, ch. 267, 55 Stat. 431.

June 25, 1940, ch. 421, 54 Stat. 555.

June 30, 1939, ch. 253, title I, 53 Stat. 968.
### §2009m. Electronic transfer

The Secretary shall transfer funds in accordance with this subchapter through electronic transfer as soon as practicable after April 4, 1996.

(Pub. L. 87–128, title III, §381N, as added Pub. L. 104–127, title VII, §761, Apr. 4, 1996, 110 Stat. 1147.)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON, DC

------------------------------------------------------------

MESA AIRLINES, INC. -----------------------------------------------------------

NOTICE OF REGISTRATION OF TRADE NAME

On August 21, 2013, Mesa Airlines, Inc. (“Mesa”), a U.S. certificated air carrier,1

requested that the Department register the trade name “American Eagle” for use in 

certain air transportation operations.

Part 215 (14 CFR Part 215) of the Department’s regulations provides that any air carrier 

wishing to use an alternative trade name must first register that name with the 

Department. The rule further states that the Department may register such name after the 

air carrier gives notification to similarly named air carriers of the proposed use of the 

name. Part 215 also recognizes that the Department may intervene in the registration of a 

trade name should there be evidence of a significant potential for, or of actual, public 

confusion.

Mesa states that it has been authorized by American Airlines, Inc. (“American”) and 

American Eagle Airlines, Inc. to use the American Eagle trade name in conjunction with 

its code sharing relationship with American. In addition, Mesa states American 

acknowledges that any applicable disclosures of the identity of the operating air carrier 

and trade name in accordance with the provisions of Part 257 of the Department’s 

regulations (14 CFR Part 257) will be made.

Since Mesa has complied with the requirements of Part 215 and based on the facts here, 

we acknowledge the registration of the trade name “American Eagle” for use in Mesa’s 

operations, effective as of the closing of the merger between American Airlines, Inc. and 

US Airways, Inc. (“Effective Date”).

This authorization is effective for one year from the Effective Date, and is conditioned on 

Mesa’s agreement that, prior to the expiration of the one year term, it will confer with the 

Department to discuss whether there is any public confusion in connection with the use of 

 1 Mesa’s interstate certificate was last reissued by Order 98-7-6, on July 8, 1998.
2

the trade name of “American Eagle” by one of the American Eagle carriers and whether 

an extension of the authorization is needed or warranted.

Dated at Washington, D.C., November 27, 2013.

TODD M. HOMAN

Director

Office of Aviation Analysis

An electronic version of this document is available on the World Wide Web at:

http://www.regulations.gov
Attachment A 

SERVICE LIST FOR MESA AIRLINES, INC.

 MR ROBERT E COHN 

 MR PATRICK R RIZZI

 COUNSEL FOR MESA AIRLINES, INC 

 HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

 COLUMBIA SQUARE

 555 THIRTEENTH STREET NW

 WASHINGTON DC 20004

 

OFFICE OF AIRLINE INFORMATION

DOT/RSPA/BTS E-36

1200 NEW JERSEY AVE SE

WASHINGTON DC 20590

 MR STEVEN D. D’URSO

 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

MR MARK MAZOR

CERTIFICATION MANAGER

FAA AFS-900

45005 AVIATION DRIVE SUITE 131

DULLES VA 20166

MR PETER LYNCH 

ASST CHIEF COUNSEL FOR ENFORCEMENT 

FAA/AGC-300

800 INDEPENDENCE AVE SW

WASHINGTON DC 20591
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.
MIKILONI MOLI,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 18

- 10085

D.C. No. 1:17

- cr

- 00334

- DKW

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii Derrick Kahala Watson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 17, 2018 **

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and McKEOWN Circuit Judges.

Mikiloni Mol i appeals from the district c ourt’s judgment and challenges the

170

- month sentence imposed following his guilty

- plea conviction for conspiracy to

distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and cocaine, and

distribution of methamphetamine and cocaine, all in viol ation of 21 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

DEC 21 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 18

- 10085

§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

affirm.

Moli contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing

to address his non

- frivolous arguments for a downward variance

. We review for

plain error, see United States v. Valencia

- Barragan , 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir.

2010), and conclude that there is none. Contrary to Moli’s contentions, t he record

demonstrates that the district court considered Moli’s post

- arrest admissio ns to law

enforcement about distributing additional quantities of methamphetamine as

evidence of his co operation with law enforcement and treated it as a mitigating

factor

. The record also demonstrates that the court considered Moli’s arguments
regarding his 2010 assault case and simply was not persuaded by them

. Under the

circumstances, the district court was not required to do more. See United States v.

Sandoval

- Orellana , 714 F.3d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir. 2013) (“ If the record ‘makes

c lear that the sentencing judge listened to each argument’ and ‘considered the
supporting evidence,’ the district court’s statement of reasons for the sentence

. . . will be ‘legally sufficient.’” (quoting Rita v. United States , 551 U.S. 338, 35 8
(2007)) )

.
Moli also contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The

district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38,
51 (2007). The below

- Guidelines sentence of 170 months is substantively3 18

- 10085

reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of
the circumstances, including the large quantity of drugs Moli distributed, his

history of poly

- substance abuse, and the need for deterrence. See Gall , 552 U.S. at

51.

AFFIRMED.
#### Bank of United States, appellee, v. B. Munves, appellant.

Gen. No. 29,576.

Action in conversion. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. George B. Holmes, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.

Reversed.

Opinion filed May 11, 1925.

Julius N. Heldman and William E. Rafferty, for appellant.

Sehoenbrod & Rosengard, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Johnston

delivered the opinion of the court.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Three-Five
Systems, Inc. (the "Company") for the quarter ended June 30, 2003 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Jeffrey D. Buchanan, Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer,
Secretary, Treasurer, and Director of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
                  U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)); and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.

                                          /s/ Jeffrey D. Buchanan
                                          --------------------------------------
                                          Jeffrey D. Buchanan
                                          Executive Vice President,
                                          Chief Financial Officer, Secretary,
                                          and Treasurer and Director

July 31, 2003

                                       3
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v James Clayton, Respondent.

[834 NYS2d 320]—

Appeal by the People from an order of the County Court, Suffolk County (Braslow, J.), dated January 30, 2006, which granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1) (a).

Ordered that the order is affirmed.

On February 8, 2005, the defendant was arraigned on a felony complaint that had been filed against him the previous day. At the arraignment, the court dismissed the felony complaint as insufficient and jurisdictionally defective.

More than six months later, an indictment was filed against the defendant which contained the same charges as those underlying the felony complaint. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1) (a), and the County Court, which found that the defendant had been deprived of his right to a speedy trial, granted the motion and dismissed the indictment.

The six-month period within which the People were required to be ready for trial is to be measured from the date of filing of the felony complaint, and not from the date of filing of the indictment, even when, as here, the complaint was dismissed *(see People v Osgood,*52 NY2d 37, 41-45 [1980]; *People v Lomax,*50 NY2d 351, 355-356 [1980]). Since the record shows that the People were chargeable with more than six months of delay after the filing of the felony complaint, the County Court correctly granted the motion and dismissed the indictment *(see*CPL 30.30 [1] [a]). Miller, J.P., Ritter, Covello and McCarthy, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 24

POWER OF ATTORNEY

Each person whose signature appears below hereby authorizes Peter B. Knepper, as attorney-in-fact and agent,
with full powers of substitution, to sign on his behalf, individually and in the capacities stated below, and to file any and all amendments to this Form 10-K, and other documents
in connection therewith, with the Securities and Exchange Commission, granting to said attorney-in-fact and agent full power and authority to perform any other act on behalf of
the undersigned required to be done in the premises.

Signatures

Title

Date/s/RICHARD J. DAHLRichard J. Dahl

Chairman of the Board

September 15, 2008/s/JACK O. VANCEJack O. Vance

Director

September 15, 2008/s/ROCHUS E. VOGTRochus E. Vogt

Director

September 15, 2008/s/JAMES D. PLUMMERJames D. Plummer

Director

September 15, 2008/s/ROBERT ATTIYEHRobert Attiyeh

Director

September 15, 2008/s/THOMAS A. LACEYThomas A. Lacey

Director

September 15, 2008/s/MARY B. CRANSTONMary B. Cranston

Director

September 15, 2008/s/OLEG KHAYKINOleg Khaykin

Director and Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)

September 15, 2008


---



QuickLinks
### §348. Rules and regulations

The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary for carrying out the provisions of this subchapter.

(May 8, 1914, ch. 79, §9, formerly §8, 38 Stat. 374; June 26, 1953, ch. 157, §1, 67 Stat. 85; renumbered §9, Aug. 11, 1955, ch. 798, §1(b), 69 Stat. 684.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1953—Act June 26, 1953, substituted provisions for rules and regulations for provisions empowering Congress to alter, amend, or repeal sections 341 to 343 and 344 to 348 of this title at any time.
§ 776.4 Attorney-client relationships. ( a ) The executive agency to which the covered USG attorney is assigned (DoN in most cases) is the client served by the covered USG attorney unless detailed to represent another client by competent authority. Specific guidelines are contained in § 776.32 of this part.
( b ) Covered USG attorneys will not establish attorney-client relationships with any individual unless detailed, assigned, or otherwise authorized to do so by competent authority. Wrongfully establishing an attorney-client relationship may subject the attorney to discipline administered per this part. See § 776.21 of this part.
( c ) Employment of a non-USG attorney by an individual client does not alter the professional responsibilities of a covered USG attorney detailed or otherwise assigned by competent authority to represent that client. Specific guidance is set forth in subpart E.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                         561,883
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                5,018,653
<ALLOWANCES>                                   106,890
<INVENTORY>                                  1,960,708
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             7,909,400
<PP&E>                                       7,910,605
<DEPRECIATION>                               4,610,173
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              11,451,945
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,320,680
<BONDS>                                      1,331,445
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       425,115
<OTHER-SE>                                   5,956,069
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                11,451,945
<SALES>                                     10,250,728
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            10,250,728
<CGS>                                        6,692,690
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                6,692,690
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              81,946
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                944,591
<INCOME-TAX>                                   361,300
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            583,291
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   583,291
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .13
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .13
        

</TABLE>
#### § 766.3 Authority.

Section 1107(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1507, 1508) states that “Air navigation facilities owned or operated by the United States may be made available for public use under such conditions and to such extent as the head of the department or other agency having jurisdiction thereof deems advisable and may by regulation prescribe.” (See § 766.13 for restrictions imposed by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.)
### §2036c. Annual State report on verification of SNAP participation

#### (a) Annual report

Not later than 1 year after the date specified by the Secretary during the 180-day period beginning on February 7, 2014, and annually thereafter, each State agency that carries out the supplemental nutrition assistance program established under the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (7 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) shall submit to the Secretary a report containing sufficient information for the Secretary to determine whether the State agency has, for the most recently concluded fiscal year preceding that annual date, verified that the State agency in that fiscal year—

(1) did not issue benefits to a deceased individual; and

(2) did not issue benefits to an individual who had been permanently disqualified from receiving benefits.

#### (b) Penalty for noncompliance

For any fiscal year for which a State agency fails to comply with subsection (a), the Secretary shall impose a penalty that includes a reduction of up to 50 percent of the amount that would be otherwise payable to the State agency under section 16(a) of the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (7 U.S.C. 2025(a)) with respect to that fiscal year.

#### (c) Report of pilot program to test prevention of duplicate participation

Not later than 90 days after the completion in multiple States of a temporary pilot program to test the detection and prevention of duplicate participation by beneficiaries of the supplemental nutrition assistance program established under the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (7 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate a report assessing the feasibility, effectiveness, and cost for the expansion of the pilot program nationwide.

(Pub. L. 113–79, title IV, §4032, Feb. 7, 2014, 128 Stat. 817.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

The Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (c), is Pub. L. 88–525, Aug. 31, 1964, 78 Stat. 703, which is classified generally to this chapter. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 2011 of this title and Tables.

#### Codification

Section was enacted as part of the Agricultural Act of 2014, and not as part of the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 which comprises this chapter.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Definition of "Secretary"

"Secretary" means the Secretary of Agriculture, see section 9001 of this title.
EXHIBIT 99.1

 

Structured Asset Trust Unit Repackagings (SATURNS) 

Series 2002-8 Trust 

To liquidate its assets and terminate

| CUSIP:  | 80410D206 |
|---------|-----------|
| Symbol: | MJZ       |

 

**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:**

January 30, 2007

NEW YORK, NEW YORK – Structured Asset Trust Unit Repackagings (SATURNS), AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. Debenture Backed Series 2002-8 Trust (the “Trust”) (New York Stock Exchange Ticker Symbol “MJZ”), announced today that a “Trust Wind Up Event” has occurred under the terms of the Trust Agreement governing the Trust and that the Trust will liquidate its assets and terminate. Settlement of a sale of the securities held by the Trust is expected to occur, and a liquidation distribution is expected to be made with respect to the Units of the Trust on or about February 7 , 2007. 

The Trust Wind Up Event and requirement for termination of the Trust arose after AT&T Mobility LLC, the guarantor of the securities held by the Trust withdrew from listing on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) certain of its previously listed bonds which had given rise to reporting obligations for AT&T Mobility LLC under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”). AT&T Mobility LLC subsequently terminated its reporting obligations under the Exchange Act. As a result, the Depositor of the Trust would be unable to meet its Exchange Act reporting obligations in relation to the Trust, which circumstance constitutes a Trust Wind Up Event.

Contact:

    LaSalle Bank National Association                                  Andy Streepey, ABS Trust Services, 312-904-9387

 

 

|   |   |   |
|--------|--------|--------|
#### Ingrid Arzeno et al., Respondents-Appellants, v Brodie M. Mack, Jr., Appellant-Respondent, and Travelers Casualty Company et al., Respondents.

[833 NYS2d 480]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Janice L. Bowman, J.), entered February 21, 2006, which denied the motion of defendant Mack for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against him, granted summary judgment and dismissed the complaint as against defendants Travelers Casualty, Pepe and Farnan, and denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, unanimously modified, on the law, Mack’s motion granted and the complaint dismissed as against him, and, upon a search of the record, summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against defendants Zelanka and Wanderman as well, and otherwise affirmed, without costs. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

This is an action for, inter alia, false arrest and malicious prosecution. Although an indictment charging plaintiffs with insurance fraud and offering false instruments for filing was ultimately dismissed, probable cause existed for their arrest and prosecution based on extensive investigation, including forensic tests of the vehicle’s ignition cylinder. Such probable cause constituted a complete defense to a claim of false arrest, under both state and federal standards *(see Marrero v City of New York,*33 AD3d 556, 557 [2006]; *Weyant v Okst,*101 F3d 845, 852 *342[2d. Cir 1996]). The claim of malicious prosecution also fails because of the existence of probable cause as well as the absence of actual malice *(see Smith-Hunter v Harvey,*95 NY2d 191, 195 [2000]). Mack investigated the underlying criminal case as an employee of the New York State Police at the White Plains office of the Bureau of Criminal Investigation Special Investigations Unit, Auto Theft. Since probable cause existed and Mack’s actions were reasonably based, no bad faith was shown and he was entitled to qualified immunity *(see Arteaga v State of New York,*72 NY2d 212, 216 [1988]; *see also Weyant,*101 F3d at 857-858).

As this Court has the authority to grant summary judgment to defendants even in the absence of a cross appeal *(Merritt Hill Vineyards v Windy Hgts. Vineyard,*61 NY2d 106, 110 [1984]), such relief should be granted, upon a search of the record, to Assistant District Attorneys Zelanka and Wanderman for the same reasons as set forth above. These prosecutors were also entitled absolute immunity, as they were acting “within the scope of [their] official duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution and in presenting the State’s case” *(Shapiro v Town of Clarkstown,*238 AD2d 498, 500 [1997], *lv denied*90 NY2d 807 [1997]).

The court properly dismissed the complaint as against Travelers Casualty and its investigators, Pepe and Farnan, based on their showing of entitlement to summary judgment *(Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

We have considered plaintiffs’ arguments on cross appeal and find them without merit. Concur—Tom, J.P., Mazzarelli, Friedman, Williams and Sweeny, JJ.