PCN18507

Embedded in Bayer’s argument about the power of international law 

enforcement networks is a powerful critique of the intelligence establishment and its approach to countering terrorism. Bayer identifi es the 

mismatch of an intelligence strategy that is founded on a Cold War model 

which fails to distinguish security risks posed by states from threats 

posed by terrorists.

Jacqueline Ross

 Professor of Law

University of Illinois

 

Institutionally, it is clear that the “war on terror” bolstered the military 

approach to counterterrorism at the expense of other and alternative 

methods, including those devised by law enforcement. As the careful 

and sensitive study of Michael Bayer shows, however, law enforcement 

institutions are not only useful but oftentimes indispensible in countering 

the terrorist threat of today. 

 Mathieu Defl em

 Associate Professor 

Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina

On the basis of his rich experience, Mike Bayer argues in an authoritative 

and persuasive manner that the control of transnational organised crime 

and terrorism can only be successful if informal information exchange is 

acknowledged as a necessary asset which can complement formal law 

enforcement bureaucracies. 

 Monica Den Boer

Academic Dean

Police Academy of the Netherlands

Visit the NDIC Press at www.ndic.edu

GPO 008-000-01036-6
Th e Blue Planet

Informal Internationa

Police Networks and 

National Intelligence

The views expressed here are those of the participants and do not refl ect the offi cial po

position of any branch of the U.S. Government.

Michael D. Bayer

NDIC Research Fellow

NATIONAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE

WASHINGTON, DC

February 2010
Th e National Defense Intelligence College supports and encourages 

research on intelligence issues that distills lessons and improves Intellige

Community capabilities for policy-level and operational consumers.

Th e Blue Planet: Informal International Police Networks and

National Intelligence, Michael D. Bayer

Michael Bayer is a former chief of the Department of State’s (D

transnational criminal investigative offi ce. Bayer’s book addresses the q

tion of how the United States can engage international partners more e

tively to address worldwide manifestations of destabilizing violence, o

indiscriminately labeled “terrorism.”

Bayer researched and wrote this book while participating in 

Research Fellows Program under the Center for Strategic Intelligence Rese

(CSIR) at the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC), Washington, 

He received much support and assistance from two CSIR editors, Dr. Wil

Spracher and Dr. Russell Swenson.

Th e goal of the NDIC Press is to publish high-quality, valuable, 

timely books on topics of concern to the Intelligence Community and the 

government. Books published by NDIC Press undergo peer review by se

offi cials in the U.S. government as well as from civilian academic or busi

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Th e views expressed in this publication are those of the author 

do not necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy or position of the Defense I

ligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. governm

organization. Clearance by the public aff airs offi ces of DIA and DOS does 

imply endorsement of factual accuracy or opinion. Authors of NDIC P

publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose 

sifi ed information, jeopardize operational security, or misrepresent offi 

U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to off er new and so

times controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on 

issues. Th is volume is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 

105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.

ii
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request a complimentary copy by contacting us at: press@ndic.edu. 

eral public may purchase a copy from the Government Printing Offi c

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Editor, ND

Center for Strategic Intelligence 

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ISBN 978-1-932

iii

v

CONTENTS

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Dr. Jacqueline Ross

COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Dr. Monica den Boer

COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 Dr. Mathieu Defl em

AUTHOR’S PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CHAPTER 1: An Orbital View of the Blue Planet . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CHAPTER 2: Th e Co-Evolution of Transnational Crime,

Terrorism, and Policing: A Brief Pre-History of the

Blue Planet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CHAPTER 3: Analyzing Impediments: A Core

Sample of the Blue Planet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CHAPTER 4: Comparing Apples, Oranges, and

Lemons on the Blue Planet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CHAPTER 5: Tales of the Blue Planet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CHAPTER 6: Emergence of the Blue Planet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

vii

FOREWORD

Jacqueline Ross 

Professor of Law

University of Illinois

Mike Bayer’s book, Th e Blue Planet: Informal International Po

works and National Intelligence, makes a powerful argument for why th

States needs to make better use of its federal law enforcement agencie

as an integral part of our national counterterrorism strategy. Bayer’s bo

cizes the primacy of the military/intelligence model in our foreign co

telligence strategy, arguing that the counterterrorism role reserved fo

makes insuffi cient use of the global networking capabilities of our ma

American law enforcement agencies abroad. Bayer’s book makes an im

contribution to the literature on international governmental network

the work of Anne-Marie Slaughter and Kal Raustiala, describing th

ability that informal networks of cooperating law enforcement agen

to collect information about local conditions and local communities 

prove crucial in identifying terrorist threats and preventing terrorist a

Bayer argues that such networks have proven immensely succ

investigating organized crime, but that these capabilities have been un

against international terrorist networks. By virtue of their omnipresenc

the globe, police are “natural anticipatory collectors” of vast amounts 

mation. Th ey are for that reason well-placed to detect suspicious ac

particularly given the overlap between terrorist cells and criminal n

Law enforcement personnel have a unique ability to draw on trust an

mon culture with their counterparts in other countries, resulting in 

informal interchange of useful information. Building on the work of 

Defl em, Bayer recognizes the particular advantage that the police enjo

tue of their professional autonomy and relative independence from 

ters of political decision-making. Th e same forces that insulate them p

facilitate close, albeit informal, cooperation between law enforcement 

from such vastly diff erent legal systems as those of the United State

China, and Indonesia. Informal police cooperation thrives because it 

not only powerful countries like the United States, which depend on 

tion fl ows from a large variety of cooperating countries, but also relativ

police entities seeking to increase their professionalism and autono
viii

their own political centers. Given their special access to sources of intellig

not easily exploitable by the intelligence establishment, law enforcement a

cies could play a much more important role than they currently do as full p

ners in a comprehensive American counterterrorism strategy.

Embedded in Bayer’s argument about the power of international 

enforcement networks is a powerful critique of the intelligence establishm

and its approach to countering terrorism. Bayer identifi es the mismatch o

intelligence strategy that is founded on a Cold War model which fails to 

tinguish security risks posed by states from threats posed by terrorists. H

Bayer builds on the work of Richard Posner and Melvin Goodman. One sy

tom of this mismatch is the over-reliance of the American intelligence c

munity on the classifi cation of intelligence, and its tendency to overvalue se

sources of information, in contrast with the relatively unfettered fl ow of in

mation among cooperating law enforcement agencies. Bayer sees the tende

to over-classify intelligence as a form of turf protection by military and i

ligence agencies, aimed to forestall feared encroachments by law enforcem

agencies. Ironically, however, classifi ed intelligence may be particularly p

to exploitation and manipulation by those with personal agendas, and m

prone to leaks—in part because intelligence agencies enjoy less autonomy f

political pressure compared to the relatively less centralized American 

enforcement agencies. Th us, Bayer argues that consignment to less sens

categories of classifi cation may actually make intelligence safer, as eviden

by the success of the Witness Security Program, the security of which has n

been breached, or the achievements of the Drug Enforcement Administra

based largely on informal, trust-based networks of international contacts

contrast, classifi cation of intelligence tends to defeat the free fl ow of infor

tion and impede its critical evaluation. Bayer illustrates these points with s

ing examples of successful law enforcement cooperation that depended on 

confi dential exchange of unclassifi ed but sensitive information.

Like Defl em, Bayer argues for the importance of building internati

cooperation around a vision of terrorism as primarily a criminal phenome

closely linked to organized crime. Th us he questions the tendency to treat 

rorism information as national security intelligence rather than crime d

Law enforcement networks enjoy unique advantages as investigators by vi

of their access to a variety of law enforcement databases, such as record

criminal histories and border crossing information. Th eir international p

ence makes law enforcement agencies ideally suited to play a leadership ro

the investigation and prevention of terrorism. Using examples drawn from 

own wealth of experience with the State Department and Diplomatic Secu

Bayer illustrates and documents his claim that terrorism is not only its
ix

crime but also draws support from criminal networks and a range of 

activities, including credit card fraud, visa fraud, arms smuggling, hum

fi cking, extortion, and bribery. Terrorists draw on criminal networks 

infrastructure and logistical support, and they also commit crimes 

their terrorist activities.

In this vein Bayer builds on the work of Jones and Libicki as wel

Block, Rob McKusker, and Tamara Makarenko in criticizing the artifi cia

tion between terrorism and organized crime. Law enforcement agen

special techniques in detecting and countering these types of activities. Th 

have a greater local presence, better local knowledge, a special ability to 

cooperation by doing favors for locals (including national law enforcem

cies), and greater transparency and accountability than intelligence 

making it more likely they will gather information in formats and thro

cedures that render it usable as evidence in a criminal prosecution. Th 

argues that the U.S. government can and should make much more routi

its own overseas law enforcement capabilities to combat international t

and to assess the criminal activities that support terrorist activity.

Bayer backs these arguments up with impressive examples of 

ful law enforcement cooperation that resulted in the arrest of a notori

dealer (by the DEA) and of Indonesian terrorists (by Diplomatic S

Each of these examples involved the investigation of crimes such as v

and arms traffi cking that are typically associated with organized cr

that led to the identifi cation and arrest of terrorists. At the same tim

shows that law enforcement agencies have investigative skills which t

their expertise in making criminal cases, to wit, an expertise in co

surveillance that has permitted American law enforcement agencies 

to anticipate and prevent terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies and di

personnel. Precisely because of their local implementation, law enfo

agencies can obtain intelligence in less targeted ways than their cou

in the intelligence community, identifying persons of interests and a w

other preventive information (or “actionable intelligence”). For Bayer, 

links with national police abroad are the basis of this local presence

access it aff ords American law enforcement to information provided 

erating law enforcement agencies’ own informant base. Once police 

have started to cooperate on common enemies such as counterfeite

smugglers, and manufacturers of false documents, law enforcement 

the foundation for successful cooperation against terrorists as well—

larly given the dependence of terrorists on weapons dealers, forgers, a

members of organized crime.

xi

COMMENTARY

Monica den Boer

Academic Dean, Police Academy of Th e Netherlands

Professor of the International Police Function

VU University Amsterdam

Under the shield of Th e Blue Planet, law enforcement prof

and academics will discover an intricate web of arguments and cases c

ing the continuing need for informal international police networks

basis of his rich experience, Mike Bayer argues in an authoritative 

suasive manner that the control of transnational organised crime an

ism can only be successful if informal information exchange is ackno

as a necessary asset which can complement formal law enforcement 

cracies. Notwithstanding current developments in the direction o

gence-led policing, Mike Bayer observes persistent myopia when it c

conceptions about the separation between information and intellige

latter fi eld of activity is steadily being cultivated as typically belongi

realm of intelligence agencies and secret services. Hence, intelligenc

labeled as “classifi ed” and not capable of being disclosed.

As police offi cials have their grassroots in the local communi

are in the position to sensor information which may be decisive whe

cerns structural signs of embedded crime or ideological radicalization

by using the potential of community-based police offi cers, more eff e

effi cient use can be made of a huge reservoir of live information. Even 

tries where intelligence-led policing has become part and parcel of the 

enforcement routine, creeping controversies thrive and turf battles ar

over intelligence priorities and protocols. Now that several Western E

countries are heading for a multilateral style of policing—which emb

idea that several public and private agencies should cooperate in order 

mize their eff ectiveness—the question is whether hitherto erected 

between police and secret services will eventually be torn down.

To underpin his argument about the need for more apprec

international law enforcement networks, the author has found inspi

recent theories concerning transnational governance, most of which 

size the vast capacity for the formation of fl exible epistemic and i

tion networks. Notwithstanding the value of international law enfo
xii

bureaucracies—such as Interpol and Europol—informal networks rem

essential for the daily business of transnational crime control. Future rese

will have to be devoted to questions concerning the good governance of in

national law enforcement networks: despite their practical value, are 

suffi ciently accountable and do they generate reliable information that 

lead to solid evidence in court? Can we make sure that police liaison 

cers who work in a foreign jurisdiction abide by the rules of that jurisdict

Are judges in national courts in the position to verify the sources of in

mation that has been generated by informal networking? Th ese are pres

questions which are frequently expressed by citizens and their parliamen

representatives.

Polities like the European Union have discovered the rich potenti

cross-border law enforcement networks and seek to encourage and facil

direct information exchange between police offi cers through the princip

mutual recognition. While the prevailing practice is that nation-states 

tinue to claim sovereignty rights over international intelligence exchange, 

realize they have to consider new avenues for settling their uncomfort

relationship with networked law enforcement cooperation. Very promi

are the new networked type of intelligence architectures, in which intellig

from a range of agencies is shared, validated, and operationalized, under 

regime of a joint protocol. Gradually, this may lead to the establishment 

series of good practices, which can be exchanged between law enforcem

cultures across the “blue planet.” Bayer’s valuable book tickles and inv

interested parties to refl ect on future perspectives on the governance of in

national police networks.
xiii

COMMENTARY

Mathieu Defl em

Associate Professor

Department of Sociology

University of South Carolina

Th e contemporary dynamics of international cooperation in 

of intelligence and policing work have historical origins that trace bac

into the 19th century. To be sure, the era of globalization that we ex

today is unprecedented in intensity and scale, but it would also not 

to view law enforcement from a historical viewpoint that would disre

gains and pains in the development of law enforcement. Th us, Micha

observations on the relevance of informal networks in international 

are all the more to be taken seriously because they are thoroughly r

the history of law enforcement and related security and intelligence 

Indeed, the development of a professional police culture, in which law 

ment is conceived in terms of effi ciency considerations, may count am

most critical aspects of the historical transformation of policing. Info

in police work, therefore, is not just something to be taken at will; on 

trary, it is framed in a long history of development.

Th e role of informalism in international law enforcement ac

heightened at times when international crime problems have moved to 

ground. Since the events of September 11, 2001, our world cannot be 

of outside the concerns posed by terrorist organizations and indivi

this fi ght against terrorism, which is no doubt to be approached from 

perspectives, it is clear that the role of law enforcement has grown c

ably in recent years. It is, however, equally to be observed that the pa

by law enforcement institutions in the broad constellation of countert

has not yet been suffi ciently analyzed and understood. Th is relativ

of the police function in counterterrorism is not only intellectually 

but also shortsighted from a policy-oriented viewpoint that seeks to 

sound and eff ective strategies against terrorism.

Institutionally, it is clear that the previous years of the “war o

have primarily involved a de-metaphorization to bolster the military a

to counterterrorism at the expense of other and alternative methods, i

those devised by law enforcement. As the careful and sensitive study of 
xiv

Bayer shows, however, law enforcement institutions are not only useful 

oft entimes indispensible in countering the terrorist threat of today. Un

dered by the restrictions that can mark formal collaboration across bord

informal international police networks can be most eff ective. At the same t

as civilian institutions, they also forego an enemy-oriented wartime appro

in favor of a more permanent methodology aimed at tracking suspects. In v

of the enduring nature of the terrorist threat, international police network

no mere sideshow, but ought to be recognized as an invaluable resource. 
xv

AUTHOR’S PREFACE

A fundamental doctrine of the United States is the system o

and balances, a system wherein political power is dispersed among 

governmental elements so that no particular interests or segments ca

nate the government—or the people. One of the most strident criticis

former Bush-Cheney administration has been that in the time of c

immediately aft er, and in the years following the 9/11 terror attack

tive (presidential) authority had been greatly expanded during the 

response to those attacks and was, according to some, abused—there

ing our revered system of checks and balances.

Certain segments of governments are acknowledged to be 

political power—particularly subject to political infl uences. In th

States the military is exceptionally susceptible to the political desig

President and the administration because he is their direct-line Com

in Chief. It is also widely acknowledged that intelligence services ar

the political epicenter of governments, because they too are a vitally im

direct-line tool of national leadership. As it happened, these are the 

ments of our government that benefi ted most, in terms of power, mis

funding, from the prosecution of the United States’ Global War on Te

In fact, it had been asserted by former Vice President Cheney on U.S. 

television (FOX) that the war on terrorism was an eff ort to be waged by 

military and the U.S. intelligence services and not law enforcement.

Th is book maps out how bureaucratic maneuvering in the a

of 9/11 led to the U.S. military/intelligence apparatus assuming prim

garnering near exclusivity in the international aspect of U.S. countert

policy. Th is ultimately resulted in the fundamental exclusion of som

most powerful components of the vast international resources at the fi 

of U.S. law enforcement. 

Th e book argues that allowing this to happen was a big mista

an unnecessary one at that. Th e existing networks of international law 

ment are powerful in their own right, but globalization and con

worldwide reconfi guration of national sovereignty have greatly em

inter-governmental networks (such as those of international law enfor

Th is book asserts that law enforcement is especially conducive to th

tages aff orded to international networks because the “culture of th

provides an immediate basis of trust and commonality to build upon
xvi

monality that can transcend borders, politics, religion, ethnicity, and other 

egories of segregation. Furthermore, some international policing scholar

asserts that law enforcement entities seek their own autonomy away from 

ters of political power by striving to fi nd better, more effi cient ways to serve 

state and the public (corruption infl uences notwithstanding) and in so d

are given the leeway to do so. One way they do this is by engaging in infor

means of doing business—seeking one-on-one interaction with foreign co

terparts rather than going through multiple layers of bureaucracy and gov

ment. Th ose who work in international law enforcement understand impli

and explicitly that using informal networks is how most international po

business is accomplished—especially in this day and age of e-mail and 

phones.

But it is not the power of the network alone that brings value ad

to transnational policing. It is the sheer volume of numbers of police tha

dispersed throughout nearly every nation in the world—and who live 

work at all levels of societies, from the back alleys and villages from w

terrorism breeds to the wealthiest levels, from where political/religious ter

ism is fi nanced. It is the numbers of police combined with their mandate

gather and acquire information—whether for investigative or public secu

purposes. Police have always had a vested interest in gathering and trac

information about local troublemakers and criminal activity in order to m

tain public order and, as such, are a natural resource of acquiring terro

information—particularly in regard to cells which might be fi nancing or 

erwise supporting operations through criminal activity. It is the ability to 

duct their business among multiple levels of societies and within populat

at large which makes international law enforcement very likely the largest 

most potent counterterrorism network on the face of the earth. Hence, the 

of this work—Th e Blue Planet. 

Th e worldwide network of police is a formidable asset—made 

more formidable by the investigative and arrest authorities bestowed upon 

law enforcement and its foreign counterparts. Th is book will demonstrate 

the willful disregard of such a spectacularly valuable asset was not only f

hardy, but also served to deny the American public the measure of nati

security they would have been entitled had the process been honestly 

kered and strategically considered. Instead, in spite of the best of intenti

the parochial interests of the most powerful agencies prevailed at the exp

of our own citizens.

Police can and do cooperate with one another internationally to c

bat transnational crime. Organizations such as Interpol and Europol exis

this purpose—but those organizations, while valuable, bring with them 
xvii

burdens and ineffi ciencies of their own diplomatic formalities, rul

lations, and procedures along with the accompanying bureaucracie

ticipating member governments. Informal policing has been around 

longer than formal arrangements, and evolved as an effi cient mean

with the internationalization of crime. Transnational terrorism is an 

form of international crime, but it is very oft en supported by other 

organized criminal activity such as drug traffi cking, weapons trading, 

ument fraud.

One of the main objections from abroad of the U.S.’s condu

war on terrorism has been the perceived disregard for the “rule of law,” 

larly among our European allies. While some critics might fi nd the w

unifi cation of law enforcement cause for concern, this work will argue 

potential for human rights abuses are far more likely under war condit

intelligence operations than by globally enabled police. While the 

for human rights abuses certainly exists, national law enforcement 

respecting their own “rule of law” and the laws of counterpart nations 

the means to cooperate within existing legal frameworks. Th is work 

argue that international police cooperation is one way that weak nat

serve to build their own governmental infrastructures and contribute 

tive way to international relations.

Th ere will be those who will assert that the current manner 

the United States deals with gathering terrorism information from o

ent intelligence posture provides adequate worldwide coverage of the 

But even a cursory analysis of the numbers of sources available to w

police networks versus rational estimates of intelligence assets will sh

assertions to be implausible.

Th ere are also those who might argue that international police 

tion is problematic because police are an instrument of force and are 

with powers that can be abused. Th is concern is valid in that abuse 

powers can readily impact human rights. Th e idea of informal inte

police relationships that are unregulated and therefore lack accountab

seem a slippery slope. However, the trend since 9/11 has been to at

integrate law enforcement with functions of intelligence services—

occurred in the United States with the FBI. Th is linkage is gaining ac

and is being implemented throughout Europe but it is implicitly far m

pery. Th e intelligence service/law enforcement dichotomy is primari

legal versus extra-legal constructs. Intelligence services are extra-leg

unconstrained by legality and matters of sovereignty—and they too 

and oft en are, instruments of force. When the two are integrated, th

rule of law becomes moot because of the extra-legal prerogatives o
xviii

gence services—“poisoning” the law enforcement function and therefore 

rule of law. It is no coincidence that one of the hallmarks of a police state i

convergence of the legal policing and extra-legal intelligence functions.

Law enforcement, on the other hand, is legally sanctioned and ge

ally permitted to exercise its authorities for the benefi t of the greater good. 

work advocates solely for the legal and legitimate exercise of the rule of 

through international police cooperation, whether through formal chan

or through the much more powerful and eff ective informal networking. 

nation’s laws forbid informal police cooperation, so be it. But national gov

ments should recognize the positive role that international police coopera

can serve—not the least of which is serving the right of the people (or 

people of other nations) not to be exploited, molested, or harmed by exte

criminal forces.

Th is book was not written with ill will toward any agency or gov

mental community. Th e people who work in our traditional power agen

are, by and large, dedicated public servants and are true believers in t

ability to combat challenges to our national security. I am proud to call t

friends and colleagues. Th e problem, however, lies in the nature of bureau

cies, the quest for funding and infl uence, and over-affi liation with organ

tional cultures that foster a misguided sense of competition and exclusiv

Th is tendency, when combined with over-reliance on time-honored way

doing business, organizational structures designed for diff erent times and 

cumstances, unimaginative strategic policy and leadership fi xated on pop

myths of what intelligence agencies are capable of, makes for a deadly com

nation—especially when confronted by a strategically adept enemy that t

advantage of the rapid changes associated with globalization and adva

ments in technology and applies that knowledge toward attacking nati

infrastructure vulnerabilities.

Eight years later we are still experiencing the aft er-eff ects of the 

attacks. When the consequences can be nuclear, biological, or chemical, e

cially in these precarious times, can we aff ord to deny our public the ben

of such a powerful instrument of counterterrorism—the informal netw

made available to U.S. law enforcement? 
xix

DEDICATION

To my lovely wife Suzanne, for evenings forsaken. To my son 

games of catch foregone. To my daughter Ingrid, for stories unread an

games unplayed. To our Border Collie Gracie, for Frisbee throws un

xxi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My heartfelt thanks to those who made this book possible

Russell Swenson for your guidance, wisdom, and tireless hard work

Paul Swallow for your mentoring and friendship. To Dr. Jacqueline 

your expertise, solid help, and sound judgment. To Dr. Monica den B

Dr. Mathieu Defl em for your pioneering works and thoughtful sup

Dr. Phil Williams for some excellent advice. To Dr. William Spracher 

dedication and perseverance when the going grew diffi cult. And t

good cops and special agents out there who help make the world 

place...

1

CHAPTER 1

An Orbital View of the Blue Plane

As the tragic events of 11 September 2001 recede into histor

fortunate that since that day there has not been a signifi cant attac

United States, many of the original al-Qaeda hierarchy (and thou

extremists) have been killed and captured, and terrorist plots in th

States, Europe, Asia, and Africa have been discovered and thwarted. 

ing uncertainties endure. Al-Qaeda remains active and, worse, man

same problems and conditions that affl ict the U.S. intelligence and 

enterprise remain stubbornly entrenched.1

In their haste to respond to the events of 9/11, the Bush admin

and Congress acted quickly, creating in the process a jury-rigged, mas

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and accompanying count

ism strategic policy mishmash.2 Under those challenging circumstan

not surprising that some viable strategies were pushed aside or inad

considered. Th is study shows how one viable strategy—the law enfo

community’s use of its informal international intelligence networks t

pate, identify, and respond to counterterrorism threats in a detailed 

lored fashion—has been undersold and, in the end, neglected.

A War of Words

In the view of key observers, the U.S. government’s post-9/11 

War on Terror” has conferred primacy to its military/intelligence ap

1 “Today, we are still vulnerable to attack because—as on 9/11—we are still not a

nect the dots.” The Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Inform

Nation At Risk: Policy Makers Need Better Information to Protect the Country (March 200

see: Amy Zegart, Spying Blind (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 13

2 James B. Steinberg, Erasing the Seams: An Integrated, International Strategy to C

rorism (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 3 May 2006), 1; Melvin A. Goodman

Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2

Zegart, Spying Blind, 172-175, 177. For a detailed critique of the convoluted forma

Department of Homeland Security, see Richard A. Clarke, Your Government Failed Yo

the Cycle of National Security Disasters (New York, Harper Collins Publishers, 2009), 

3 Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism, Freedom and Security: Winning without War (Camb

The MIT Press, 2003), 28. Heymann does not claim that intelligence is part of the 

military primacy. The present author has developed the term “military/intelligence 

from his interpretation of the work of Conetta, Goodman, and Flournoy and Brim

works are cited below.
2

Th e present study begins from the position that this primacy has had the e

of limiting the formal U.S. federal law enforcement role in counterterroris

what amounts to domestic security. U.S. federal law enforcement does pl

signifi cant international counterterrorism role, but primarily through bo

control systems, and formal protocols such as mutual legal assistance tre

(MLATs), memoranda of understanding (MOUs), letters rogatory, diplom

notes, and agreements with international entities like Interpol and Euro

Th e Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has taken a pro-active role inte

tionally but bills itself as a hybrid intelligence and law enforcement agency 

indeed it is a formal member of the Intelligence Community.4 Th is appro

has some clear benefi ts in that it enables the FBI to offi cially interact 

foreign intelligence entities, but it also has some drawbacks in that cer

foreign law enforcement elements now identify the FBI as a full-fl edged in

ligence agency and harbor a strong reluctance to coordinate with it for 

reason.5 Regardless, as the FBI has aligned itself with the Intelligence C

munity, and as that Community has asserted primacy on the internati

counterterrorism front, it will be clear from the present study that other 

law enforcement assets have been dissuaded from international activity

the detriment of U.S. national security.

Th is study will explain how this unfortunate state of aff airs has c

about, and how circumstance, earnest intent, agency power plays, and 

existing legislation have combined to slow the development of one of the m

powerful and readily exploitable of counterterrorism resources: the relat

ships and networks of the international law enforcement community.

Since 9/11, the U.S. government has been trying to reinvent itse

cope with the problem of global terrorism (or global insurgency) as a thre

its national security and as a direct menace to its citizenry. In response to 

attacks, and as a means to contain what they perceived to be a growing th

the administration and Congress created the Department of Homeland S

rity, enacted the USA PATRIOT Act and related legislation, instituted s

intelligence reforms, moved to enhance security at U.S. facilities abroad, d

the Taliban from Afghanistan, and invaded Iraq. Th e government also 

lined its national counterterrorism strategy in a series of formal publicati

4 Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Branch, available at http://ww

gov/hq/nsb/nsb_integrating.htm. See also, Richard Gid Powers, Broken: The Troubled Pas

Uncertain Future of the FBI (New York: Free Press), 429; original citation, FBI, The FBI’s Co

terrorism Program Since September, 2001, Report to the National Commission on Terrorist A

upon the United States, 14 April 2004, 14, 37.

5 This discomfort has been articulated to me on numerous occasions by foreign police 

tacts and by other U.S. federal law enforcement officials as I have carried out duties as cri

investigator and Regional Security Officer.
3

All of these measures, collectively, refl ect national security policy. H

some powerful national agencies have managed to retain traditional p

of prominence when a fresh approach to international security relat

might prove more appropriate. A critical observer notes that, ov

post-9/11 division of labor among government agencies largely per

the allocation of powers and authorities that had evolved aft er Worl

to wage the Cold War.6

Th e fi rst order of U.S. post-9/11 business abroad, the initially 

ful rout of the Taliban in Afghanistan, set the stage for the preeminen

military/intelligence apparatus in counterterrorism strategy.7 Th e P

Act (2001) was designed to equip law enforcement (particularly th

deal with domestic threats – aft er all, the nineteen 9/11 hijackers h

living and plotting against us in our own backyard. Th e PATRIOT 

also supposed to help break down the barrier between law enforcem

intelligence by dismantling the so-called “wall” that had long restr

enforcement use of classifi ed, intelligence-derived information for 

criminal investigation or prosecution. But other factors operated to 

wall standing in some areas. Th e Posse Comitatus Act (1867) eff ecti

vents U.S. military entities from engaging in domestic law enforcem

National Security Act of 1947, which created the CIA, along with the 

Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, the Church/Pike Committee h

the Levi Guidelines, and United States Signals Intelligence Directives 

tively preclude intelligence agencies from conducting intelligence 

in the United States or targeting U.S. citizens.8 Th e implementation 

laws has, in eff ect, demarcated the line between foreign and domest

gence—and has led intelligence and military agencies to think of th

domain as their “turf ” because they are fundamentally precluded fr

ing a domestic role. At the same time, law enforcement agencies h

restricted to the domestic arena.

In the immediate aft ermath of 9/11, U.S. military and intellig

vices were invigorated and eager to contribute their particular talent

the newest threat to our collective well-being—international terroris

within our borders. Th e nation’s “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT) 

was craft ed to redirect the U.S. military’s resources toward the inter

6 Amy Zegart, Spying Blind, 65.

7 James B. Steinberg, Erasing the Seams: An Integrated, International Strategy to C

rorism (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 3 May 2006), 7, available at http://

ings.edu/papers/2006/0503terrorism_steinberg.aspx.

8 Richard A. Best, Jr., Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnationa

the U.S., CRS Report for Congress RL30252 (Washington, DC: The Library of Co

January 2001), 9.
4

terrorism threat, which came to be described in terms of a global Isla

insurgency.9 Th is counterterrorism “war” led to heavy military deploym

in Afghanistan and Iraq, and had the positive eff ect of engaging the mili

intelligence apparatus on a massive scale. But it also had the negative 

sequence of misdirecting some resources that could have been better u

elsewhere. Th is view was articulated in a 2006 assessment of the War on 

ror: “Th e absence of an eff ective counterterrorism strategy has led to an o

utilization of military and covert action tools and a notable under-utiliza

of other instruments of national power that are vital to success against a d

gerous ideology.”10 A 2008 RAND Corporation Report put it more succin

“Aft er 11 September 2001, the U.S. strategy against al-Qaeda centered on 

use of military force. Indeed, U.S. policymakers and key national secu

documents referred to operations against al-Qaeda as the War on Terror

Other instruments were also used, such as cutting off terrorist fi nancing, 

viding foreign assistance, engaging in diplomacy, and sharing informa

with foreign governments. But military force was the primary instrumen

While it has been famously documented that the Departmen

Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency were at odds over how be

wage the war on terrorism, they both had—and continue to have—signifi 

roles in the eff ort, each with its share of successes and failures. Even as infi 

ing continues, these two entities have become increasingly interdepend

mainly because the Department of Defense controls over 80 percent of 

Intelligence Community’s budget. In the bid for primacy, the military 

intelligence communities are inextricably tied together in their new gl

war.12

As former CIA analyst Melvin Goodman points out, “Th e appo

ment of general offi cers (Hayden, McConnell, and Clapper) to the three m

important Intelligence Community positions [respectively, Director of 

Central Intelligence Agency, Director of National Intelligence, and Un

Secretary of Defense for Intelligence] points to the militarization of ov

9 Steinberg, Erasing the Seams, 7.

10 Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, “U.S. Strategy and Capabilities for Winnin

Long War,” in Five Years after 9/11: An Assessment of America’s War on Terror, Julianne Smit

Thomas Sanderson, eds. (Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 2006), 43.

11 Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism, Freedom and Security, 9-10. Noting the limitations of 

national law enforcement, “The President responded by expanding the notion of internat

war, previously limited almost exclusively to conflict among states, to reach foreign non

groups that wanted to harm the United States—and invoking the expanded use of the 

‘war’.”

12 Melvin A. Goodman, Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA (Lanham

Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 331-332.
5

national security policy.13 Th e trend toward militarization began in 

ton administration when the President’s lack of military service and 

experience led to great deference toward the military and was fully 

in the Bush administration’s designation of the Global War on Terror

similar note, Carl Conetta of the Project on Defense Alternatives not

Th e 9/11 attacks may have stupefi ed the US policy debate, render

narrow, reactive, and timid—but there is a more fundamental an

ger-standing problem. Since the end of the Cold War, much of th

policy community has been mesmerized by the advent of US m

primacy and the advantages it supposedly conveys. Th is circums

seemed to provide the leverage with which the United States migh

ther enhance its security, extend its position of world leadership

advance an American vision of world order—a “new rule set.” Th e 

Quadrennial Defense Review and US National Security Strategy w

step further, construing military primacy as essential to US global 

ership and security—not just a fortuitous thing, but a necessary 

Th us, primacy became a security end in its own right and the co

stone of our global policy.15

Former Deputy Attorney General Philip Heymann argues th

ing the situation we face as “war” strongly suggests that our prim

ance will continue to be on military force, even aft er our military 

in Afghanistan and Iraq. If use of the military was in fact the most 

ing avenue to deal with the variety of forms of terrorism that thr

there would be nothing really misleading (although nothing very 

about describing the situation we face as “war.” However, the term 

implies the primacy of military force. According to former National 

Advisor Lieutenant General (Ret) Brent Scowcroft , U.S. Governmen

ship declared a “war” on terrorism to invoke the resources of the 

in counterterrorism eff orts, “but it had the eff ect of fundamentally r

expansion of our international law enforcement options from the equ

Homeland security commentator Donald Reid likewise states the fo

“In labeling its post-9/11 eff orts the ‘war’ on terror, the United States 

13 President Obama appears to be continuing this trend with the designation 

Dennis Blair as Director of National Intelligence and General (Ret) James Jones a

Security Advisor. The appointment of Leon Panetta as Director of the Central I

Agency could also be construed as a testament to the political foundation and rol

gence services. This will be an important point—to be addressed further in chapter 

14 Goodman, Failure of Intelligence, 335.

15 Carl Conetta, “A Prisoner to Primacy,” Project on Defense Alternatives, Brie

#43, 5 February 2008, 3.

16 Interview of Lieutenant General (Ret) Brent Scowcroft by the author in Wash

10 July 2007.
6

a specifi c metaphor to galvanize the national eff ort. In doing so it has tied 

cess or failure to the doctrinal rules of war.”17 Reid maintains that this ch

of terminology is problematic because, although 

it allows national leaders the fl exibility to defi ne and redefi ne success i

ways that suit political purposes, it also has potential drawbacks. From 

an operational perspective, it potentially leads to lack of clarity an

understanding, and thus lack of focused national eff ort along with it

attendant risk of failure. Th e very phrase “war on terror” lacks defi n

tion, and therefore presents the United States with a strategic issue tha

inhibits its eff orts to prosecute the war eff ectively. As multiple source

have indicated, “terror” is not the enemy. In the “war” on terror, neithe

terror nor terrorism can be defeated since terror is a method and terror

ism is a tactic. From this perspective, neither terror nor terrorism take

on the characteristics of entities that can be defeated in the traditiona

sense.18

For much of the history of the United States, we have turned to our m

tary to address grave dangers. In the Cold War, when nuclear war threatened

relied more heavily on intelligence, through a predominantly military/intellig

apparatus, for security.19 If the preponderant fl ow of resources to the mil

instrument of power continues undiminished, the demand for military tran

mation to fi ght this “war of words”—war predicated on semantics—will gro

Already, with military and intelligence institutions essentially conjoined, t

seems to have been no better place to invest in security. Although we have alw

relied on law enforcement to provide domestic security, we have increasingly c

to rely on the military intelligence structure to protect us from external threats

this appears to have been the direction of thinking behind the formulation of 

present counterterrorism strategy.21 Noted scholar James Sheptycki refers to 

U.S. military and other secret institutions as representing the dominant intellig

paradigm of U.S. national security since before the Cold War—a dominance 

seen by critics as an overly persistent doctrinal and operational approach.22

17 Donald Reed, “Why Strategy Matters,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 3 (October 2

6 http://www.hsaj.org/?article=2.3.10.

18 Reed, “Why Strategy Matters,” 6.

19 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge University Press, 1

and Intelligence Services in the Information Age (London: Taylor and Francis, 2001), espe

Chapter 9, “The Cold War: Did Intelligence Make a Difference?” 159-163.

20 Bruce Berkowitz, The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century 

York: The Free Press, 2003).

21 Heymann, Terrorism, Freedom and Security, 28.

22 James Sheptycki, “Policing, Intelligence Theory and the New Human Security Parad

Some Lessons From the Field,” in Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates, Peter Gill

phen Marrin, and Mark Pythian, eds. (Routledge: New York, 2009), 166-185.
7

Military and Intelligence Primacy in U.S. 

Counterterrorism Policy and Strategy: A Marr

of Convenience

In Th e Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration, N

Times reporter James Risen asserts that the Bush administration simply 

the capabilities of law enforcement and favored the Intelligence Com

particularly the CIA, to prosecute the “Global War on Terror.”23 Dana 

the Washington Post asserted that the CIA had taken the lead on count

ism operations worldwide.”24 Former senior CIA analyst Goodman 

that, aft er 9/11, “the Bush administration boasted of a ‘marriage’ bet

Pentagon and the CIA, which indicates its support for an intelligen

munity subordinated to Pentagon priorities.”25 According to GAO in 

interagency report, “While the level of funding for intelligence activiti

sifi ed—and included with DOD funding to prevent the disclosure of 

data—recent unclassifi ed statements by the Director of Central Intellige

vide information on the magnitude of increases in intelligence program

to terrorism. According to the Director, intelligence funding to comb

ism tripled between fi scal years 1990 and 1999. Th e Director also said 

percent of the CIA’s budget dedicated to combating terrorism increa

less than 4 percent in fi scal year 1994 to almost 10 percent in fi scal year 

Th ese circumstances lead to the obvious conclusion that there exist

primacy assigned to the military and intelligence community that 

directly from the White House. In the chapters to come, this work wi

this primacy as the (presidential) military/intelligence apparatus.

Enduring Dichotomies: Foreign vs. Domestic/

Intelligence vs. Law Enforcement/Classifi ed vs

Unclassifi ed/Covert vs. Overt

Th e division of labor between intelligence and law enfo

having evolved over time from policy, habit, legislation, and int

maneuvering, dictated that “intelligence” is foreign and “law enfor

23 James Risen, State of War, The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administr

York: The Free Press, 2006), 3.

24 Dana Priest, “Bush’s War on Terror Comes to a Sudden End,” Washington Pos

ary 2009, A1. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp.dyn/content/article/200

AR2009012203929_pf.html1.

25 Goodman, Failure of Intelligence, 331.

26 General Accountability Office, “Combating Terrorism: Interagency Fram

Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat,” May 2003. 
8

is domestic. Th is evolution seems likely to have been exacerbated by 

establishment of military/intelligence primacy in the post-9/11 era—in 

of comments from some of the most prominent subject matter expert

national security. Th e dichotomies of foreign versus domestic, and in

ligence versus law enforcement, were declared unnecessary and obsolet

early as 1995 in a seminal book, U.S. Intelligence at a Crossroads.

27 Likew

former Deputy National Security Advisor and current Deputy Secretar

State James Steinberg observed that: “In 2002, the Congressional Joint Inq

into intelligence community activities detailed in a report the problems o

‘wall’ between various agencies, stating that it ‘was not a single barrier, b

series of restrictions between and within agencies constructed over sixty y

as a result of legal, policy, institutional, and personal factors.’ Walls sepa

foreign from domestic activities, foreign intelligence from law enforcem

operations, the FBI from the CIA, communications intelligence from o

types of intelligence, the Intelligence Community from other federal agen

and national security information from other forms of evidence.”28 A 2

Congressional Report echoed Steinberg: “Closely coordinating the eff 

of law enforcement agencies and the Intelligence Community (along

the State and Defense Departments) presents ... signifi cant challenges

three knowledgeable observers have written: “Th e law enforcement/nati

security divide is especially signifi cant, carved deeply into the topograph

American government.”29 Steinberg, too, recently wrote that “eff orts to 

have not adequately redressed one of the most serious fl aws of U.S. co

terterrorism strategy: its bifurcation into domestic and foreign compone

and “Th e problem of disconnect between foreign and domestic intellig

collection and analysis has been the heart of post 9/11 analyses of ‘what w

wrong.’”30 Th e 9/11 Report also follows this line of reasoning—that the 

eign/domestic divide must be overcome if we are going to defeat the thre

transnational terrorism.31

Th e separation between law enforcement and national security in

tutions and procedures, evident from before 9/11, and targeted for el

nation by the PATRIOT Act, lives on. In March 2002, the U.S. Departm

of Justice (USDOJ), in coordination with the International Associatio

Chiefs of Police (IACP), convened a Criminal Intelligence Sharing Sum

27 U.S. Intelligence at a Crossroads, Roy Godson and others, eds. (Washington, DC: Bras

1995).

28 Steinberg, Erasing the Seams, 8.

29 Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Phillip Zelikow, “Catastrophic Terrorism: Tacklin

New Danger,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 1998), 82.

30 Steinberg, Erasing the Seams, 6.

31 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report (2004), 400.
9

that called for the creation of a nationally coordinated criminal int

eff ort.32 In the words of Jim Sullivan, the former Director of the U.S. 

Central Bureau (USNCB) of Interpol,33 that pivotal meeting set the 

U.S. federal and domestic counterterrorism law enforcement.34 Acco

some prominent attendees, the original intention of the meeting wa

cuss all sources of information, to include the coordination of inter

law enforcement information, inclusive of that obtained from police 

overseas, but enthusiasm for that prospect waned as the conference n

its focus to U.S. domestic distribution of terrorism and criminal int

information to law enforcement.35 Participants speculated that this 

tion was due to the infl uence of the CIA and/or the FBI, which o

wanted to maintain control of overseas sources of information.36 F

convocation of federal, state, and tribal law enforcement, the Nationa

nal Intelligence Sharing (NCIS) Plan was formed.37 Th e goal of the N

to provide a means for all levels of U.S. law enforcement elements 

terrorism-related information in order to protect the U.S. general 

Th e aim was to have a coherent means of coordinating and dissem

criminal intelligence information on a national scale. What was ov

was the role of international law enforcement as a source of criminal 

tion and information related to terrorism—along with a means to co

such data. 

Some at the DOJ event had spoken grandly of a Global Intelligen

mation Sharing Initiative, but one that would be strictly and fi rmly gro

domestic U.S. law enforcement. However, no mention is made of inte

police coordination in the fi nal report of that meeting, nor in the 200

version of the NCIS Plan, despite the event being co-sponsored by the 

tional Association of Chiefs of Police. Naturally, aft er 9/11 it was critica

U.S. achieve coordination among its diverse domestic law enforcemen

tion and the intelligence and national security apparatus, but to have 

with the conspicuous omission of a potentially valuable asset seems m

32 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A N

for Intelligence-Led Policing at the Local, State and Federal Levels (Alexandria, VA: IACP

33 Interpol is administered through “national central bureaus” of Interpol mem

tries. The U.S. National Central Bureau is at this time administered through a joint 

between the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Homeland Sec

34 Telephone interview with Jim Sullivan, U.S. Marshall, U.S. Virgin Islands, 23 M

35 Sullivan interview.

36 Sullivan interview.

37 Bureau of Justice Assistance, United States Department of Justice, in collabo

the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, The National Criminal Intelligence S

(Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance, revised June 2005).

38 Bureau of Justice Assistance, The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan.
10

In a May 2007 interview with the author, the President’s former National S

rity Advisor for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security, Frances Towns

acknowledged as much: “In the post 9/11 period, by any measure, we’ve d

pretty well—but we’ve had to be careful. Th is was a new kind of threat we w

facing and there was a fear of unintended consequences. We have derived e

mous benefi t from how we do things, but now we are at a point where we 

ask, ‘How can we get more out of the system?’”39

U.S. Federal Law Enforcement Loses Out on the 

“War,” but the FBI Gets Its Due

In 2003, as part of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

President directed that U.S. law enforcement entities “expand and imp

39 Interview with Frances Fragos Townsend, former National Security Advisor to the 

dent for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security, Washington, DC, 7 June 2007.

Most Wanted Terrorists and Rewards Offered for Their Capture.

Source: State Department, with permission.
11

their relations with their foreign counterparts.”40 Apparently, howe

Presidential Directive went largely unheeded, because in May 2007 a 

Accountability Offi ce (GAO) report found, from even before 9/11, 

lack of guidance for U.S. federal law enforcement engagement with 

counterparts in combating terrorism. Specifi cally, the GAO report fo

“with the exception of the FBI, U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEAs) 

been given clear guidance; they lacked clearly defi ned roles and resp

ties on helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terr

Th e GAO further explained that although the President issued a 

national strategies providing broad direction for overseas U.S. law 

ment eff orts toward counterterrorism, “most LEAs have not been 

clear directives. Th ey generally lacked (1) clearly articulated roles and 

sibilities to assist foreign nations; (2) guidance on setting funding p

and providing resources; (3) performance monitoring systems to as

progress; (4) formal structures to coordinate LEA operational and 

cal assistance to foreign nation LEAs; and (5) comprehensive count

assessments to tailor LEA technical and operational assistance to spe

eign nation needs.”42

Similarly, in 2005, the GAO submitted a report to Congr

ing that the United States lacked a strategic plan to deliver countert

fi nancing training and technical assistance abroad.43 Th en, in Mar

the GAO published a report critical of the federal government’s info

sharing policies between intelligence and law enforcement.44 Th is rep

six previous reports that had addressed the challenges associated wi

mation sharing within the federal government.45 Likewise, in April 20

set out a detailed strategy to marshal combined U.S. LEA resources to 

40 This was to be done alongside similar efforts of the U.S. Intelligence Comm

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, DC: White House, 2003), 16-

www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf.

41 General Accountability Office (GAO), “Combating Terrorism, Law Enforcemen

Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terro

Highlights, May 2007.

42 GAO, “Combating Terrorism,” May 2007, 3.

43 GAO, “Combating Terrorism,” May 2007, 2.

44 GAO, Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies and 

for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but Unclassified Information (Washington, D

March 2006), 11-13.

45 In May 2008, the White House issued a Presidential memorandum, Memoran

Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Subject: Designation and Sharing of Contro

sified Information, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/05/20

html, providing guidelines for sharing “sensitive but unclassified” information. Althou

gram does put in place a means for sharing unclassified information, it does not a

problem of over-classification. That issue will be addressed in the fourth chapter of t

work.
12

international organized crime, yet no strategy exists for LEAs to combat tr

national terrorism.46 Despite Presidential Directives and GAO criticisms

low level of non-FBI, U.S. federal law enforcement participation in over

counterterrorism coordination indicates, at the very least, its low priorit

Washington.47 Th e responsibility for this unhelpful approach can be assig

to the “military-intelligence apparatus of the United States.”48 In this con

the “wall” between the law enforcement and national security communiti

still very much in place.

Further evidence of the primacy of the military/intelligence appar

over the “foreign” domain and the relegation of non-FBI, U.S. law enfo

ment assets to a domestic role lies in what is, and what is not, include

other publications designed for public consumption. Th e National Strateg

Information Sharing (2007) seems carefully worded to avoid the mentio

international law enforcement agency sharing of information among th

selves.49 While some attention is given the international sharing of infor

tion between governments, sharing of information between foreign and 

law enforcement agencies is not directly mentioned (although Interp

obliquely referenced).

What is mentioned as a “foundational element” in the text, howe

is essentially a declaration of the primacy of the Intelligence Community 

the foreign information-sharing spectrum and over U.S federal law enfo

ment assets:

46 U.S. Department of Justice, Overview of the Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat In

tional Organized Crime (Washington, DC: DOJ, April 2008). Also see GAO, “Combating T

ism, Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives...” The DOJ report incidentally iden

international crime as a support mechanism for terrorism.

47 U.S. law enforcement does participate in the fight against terrorism in the sense tha

enforcement mechanisms, particularly border control instruments, criminal databases

warrant notice systems, are routinely employed. However, the GAO report in particular p

out how the contribution of U.S. law enforcement to counterterrorism has been hamstru

the international arena.

48 It is perfectly understandable that any competent agency or instrument of power w

defend what it perceives to be its turf. It is also perfectly understandable for the military/

ligence establishment to believe that the foreign information and intelligence arena is its “

especially given the long history of animosity between U.S. federal law enforcement an

U.S. intelligence services, and that U.S. legislation effectively precludes the military/intellig

apparatus from participating in domestic security. For a comprehensive account of the h

of FBI/CIA antagonism, see Mark Riebling, Wedge: From Pearl Harbor to 9/11: How the S

War between the FBI and CIA Has Endangered National Security (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1

Also see John Miller and others, The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Fai

Stop It (New York: Hyperion, 2002). For practitioner perspectives, see Improving the Law En

ment-Intelligence Community Relationship: Can’t We All Just Get Along? Timothy Christenso

(Washington, DC: NDIC Press, 2007), available at http://www.ndic.edu/press/5463.htm.

49 The White House, National Strategy on Information Sharing: Successes and Challeng

Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing (October, 2007), 3.
13

Th e instruments of our national power have long depended on the 

bilities of the Intelligence Community to collect, process, analyz

disseminate intelligence regarding our adversaries and enemies

eff orts to combat terrorism depend on enhancing those intelli

capabilities, while enabling other Federal departments and age

responsible for protecting the United States and its interests to reg

share information and intelligence with other public and private 

ties in support of mission critical activities. Information sharing 

Federal level has improved signifi cantly since September 11, but 

lenges still remain that must be addressed before our strategic vis

realized.50

Translated, this means that the Intelligence Community wi

terrorism information from overseas, and the U.S. law enforceme

munity may disseminate it (appropriately, of course, aft er it is sanit

declassifi ed). To drive this point home, this 40-page national strat

ument mentions law enforcement domestic dissemination of info

(through state, local, and tribal channels) over 220 times but mentio

national law enforcement sharing of information only once—and t

in the context of engaging Interpol. On the other hand, a 2008 DOJ 

for combating international organized crime speaks freely and open

interagency cooperation and coordination with its own foreign pa

combat transnational organized crime.51 Ironically, many academ

other experts consider transnational terrorism a form of internation

nized crime. Clearly, there are factors and interests at work that hav

seded common sense and overlooked the logic of employing the full 

counterterrorism tools to carry out U.S. strategic counterterrorism p

Th e Blue Planet

“We Are the World...”

Commissionaire Emile Perez, of the French National Police 

rent Chairman of the Board of the College of European Policing (C

estimates that between ten and fi ft een million law enforcement offi c

worldwide.52 Nearly every country on earth has a police force of so

or another. Th e United States has nearly one million police offi cer

50 National Strategy on Information Sharing, 6.

51 U.S. DOJ, Overview of the Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International 

Crime, 12.

52 Interview in Paris with Commissionaire Emile Perez, French National Polic

2008.
14

1.2 million; China, 1.5 million; and although the numbers in many o

countries are diffi cult to know with certainty, they are likely quite larg

Th e world over, police are ubiquitous and are very oft en powerful elem

of the governments and societies they serve. In referring to U.S. law enfo

ment, criminal intelligence analyst Deborah Osborne points out that “l

law enforcement offi cers, given their numbers, collect an enormous amo

of information. Untold, untapped quantities of information exist within t

reports that, if analyzed, could help solve many crimes, help direct eff or

prevent crime, and possibly help fi nd and/or connect some of the dots to 

prevent terrorist acts in the United States.”54 When all the nations of the w

are factored in, the value of international police cooperation will be e

mous.55 Th e sheer numbers of police in the world, with the information 

hold, with the contacts they have, is a mind-boggling resource. Osborne 

tinued with this irrefutable logic: “Th e more people you know outside of y

agency, the more access you have to information. In brief, it is not only 

you know, but as important, who they know.”56

Because police and other branches of law enforcement hold “prer

tives for the legitimate use of force,” and hold authorities for investigat

search, detention, and arrest, they are entrusted by society and governm

to wield these powers judiciously. Th ese authorities make the police a p

erful component of a nation’s security. Police, because they are so entrus

use their powers to protect the general public. Th eir powers provide po

and law enforcement access to the most sensitive information in their h

societies, including insight into the lifestyle and conduct of private citiz

Unquestionably, great care needs to be taken in using such powers, but 

greater sin, from the perspective of national strategic interests, would b

not using these powers to full, legal advantage against so clearly a uni

sal problem as transnational terrorism. Law enforcement agencies have 

exercised the ability to coordinate with their international counterpart

a variety of criminal enforcement issues, including international organ

crime, drug traffi cking, human smuggling, illegal arms trading, and fug

location, to name but a few.

53 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, World Factbook of Crimina

tice Systems, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/wfcj.htm.

54 Deborah Osborne, Out of Bounds: Innovation and Change in Law Enforcement Intellig

Analysis (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, now National Defense Intellig

College, 2006), 2. Available at http://www.ndic.edu/press/2201.htm.

55 Malcolm Anderson, Policing the World: Interpol and the Politics of International Polic

operation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), briefly addresses the relationship of national 

ligence agencies to respective national police institutions.

56 Osborne, Out of Bounds, 58.
15

Police and law enforcement elements inhabit virtually eve

of government and society. In any given country, there may be fe

national police, state or provincial police, local and municipal police

marshals or their equivalent, border and immigration police, custom

coastal and river police, military police, inspectors general, gendarm

and revenue police, narcotics police, fi sh and wildlife police, park 

constables, gaming and gambling police, traffi c police, highway poli

ing police, transportation police, religious police, counterterrorism 

vice police, court police, agricultural police, beach patrols, campu

diplomatic police, presidential police, security police, facility polic

police and guards, postal police, aviation police, treasury police, min

securities police, tourism police, consumer protection police, anima

police, crossing guards, high police, low police, and an unending v

regulatory police with quasi-law enforcement powers.

Police and law enforcement therefore are present in villag

alleys, and other areas in which rural and urban terrorists operate—

are oft en present in large numbers.57 By the nature of their work, p

ments are oft en intimately in tune with what is going on in their n

hoods, precincts, districts, and patrol routes. As noted in a RAND re

Local police, in particular, live with the community and tend to re

in local areas, unlike military units that, in many countries, are rec

throughout the nation and move frequently, which in turn inhibits 

ability to develop intimate knowledge of local conditions. Th e 

tend to be permanently located in specifi c areas. Th ey have the o

tunity to learn who the “bad actors” are in a region—including w

groups may be politically motivated terrorists as opposed to com

criminals.58

Law Enforcement as Intelligence Source and 

Resource

Contrary to the apparent thinking of pundits and experts, p

other law enforcement entities do not restrict their professional act

ongoing or open criminal investigations only. In fact, police are am

most natural, anticipatory collectors of information of their surro

57 Richard Clarke advocates an increased level of support for community-based 

an international scale—to be piloted by the U.S. State Department through its in

police assistance programs. See Clarke, Your Government Failed You, 196-197.

58 David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV, War by Other Means: Complete and Bala

bilities for Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: RAND, 2008), 186. Available at http://

org/pubs/monographs/MG595.2/.
16

and are, by far, the best suited for recognizing suspicious activity.59 Furthe

the words of former CIA analyst Paul Pillar,

[S]ome of the most unquestioning cooperators with the United State

on counterterrorism are the less developed countries. Th ey oft en worr

less about procedural niceties than do counterparts in more develope

states and are more inclined to work quickly with less red tape. Th ey ar

also likely to have acquired less of the institutional baggage that oft e

accumulates in larger and older liaison relationships and that some

times impedes cooperation between even close allies.60

Gathering information about what is happening in their own are

responsibility is what police do as a function of professionalism—it is t

job to know what is going on, and who is doing what, even if it is mere

suspicion.61 Even corrupt and inept police understand the value of gat

ing local information. For this reason, police are the consummate and o

nal collectors of intelligence—not “spy” intelligence or classifi ed intellige

but local information that can become the basis for criminal intelligence 

national security intelligence—especially when the information pertain

terrorist cell activity.62 Long-term observers note the considerable ove

between criminality and terrorist cells:63

Both crime syndicates and terrorist groups thrive in the same subterra

nean world of black markets and laundered money, relying on shift in

networks and secret cells to accomplish their objectives. Both group

have similar needs: weapons, false documentation and safe houses.6

Terrorist activity stretches across a bewildering variety of cultures, loca

59 Gombert and Gordon, War by Other Means, 189.

60 Paul Pillar, Terrorism and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2003), 186.

61 Policing scholar James Sheptycki avers that intelligence (information gathering) i

police sector is of long standing and is used for a variety of strategic purposes separate 

the direct investigation of crime. Sheptycki, “Policing, Intelligence Theory and the New Hu

Security Paradigm,”167.

62 Within the last several years, the term “intelligence-led policing” has become ubiqu

The New Jersey State Police defines intelligence-led policing as “a collaborative philosophy 

starts with information gathered at all levels of the organization that is analyzed to create 

ful intelligence and an improved understanding of the operational environment.” See New 

sey State Police, Practical Guide to Intelligence-Led Policing (Center for Intelligence-Led Po

at the Manhattan Institute, September 2006), 3. Available at: http://www.cpt-mi.org/pdf/

liceGuide.pdf.

63 For example, see Siobhan O’Neil, Terrorist Precursor Crimes: Issues and Options for 

gress, CRS Report for Congress, RL34014 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Se

24 May 2007). Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34014.pdf.

64 David Kaplan, “Paying For Terror,” U.S. News & World Report, 5 December 2005.
17

tions, languages, criminal linkages, support networks, and fi na

mechanisms.65

Th e Culture of the Badge...

Law enforcement, like many other vocations, has a culture al

To those in the business, it is the “culture of the badge,” “the thin blue 

in the context of this work, “Th e Blue Planet.” Th e infl uence of this c

the badge is well documented, although oft en in its negative sense, 

popular dramas “Serpico” or “Prince of the City.” Th e positive side 

culture can be seen in a professional attitude of wanting to do the rig

of public service, of a desire to do good, of wanting to help those in tr

those who have been wronged.66 Another positive aspect is the unity 

by the culture:

Cultures can support both positive and negative dynamics in o

zational behavior. For instance, the culture of police fraternity, w

police offi cers across the profession view each other as a family of 

rades, can be a powerful element for creating unity.67

Policing sociologist Defl em refers to this phenomenon as “the q

professionalism” and cites it as a driving force behind internation

cooperation.68

Th e international culture of police fraternity, according 

ing scholar Anthony Balzer, is primarily based on a heightened wo

sciousness within law enforcement, punctuated by the notion o

the world over “fi ghting a common enemy” and in that fi nding a c

cause for which to cooperate.69 It is this quality, the culture of th

65 Thomas Sanderson and Mary Beth Nikitin, “International Cooperation,” in Five 

9/11: An Assessment of America’s War on Terror, Julianne Smith and Thomas Sande

(Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 2006), 33.

66 Mathieu Deflem, Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International P

eration (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2002), 96, quotes criminologist Cyr

“An international brotherhood of police was formed that developed into ‘a fraternity,

it had a moral purpose, a mission to fulfill for the good of society.”

67 A.R. (Rod) Gehl, “Multiagency Teams: A Leadership Challenge” The Police Ch

10 (October 2004), 142, available at http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/maga

cfm?fuseaction+display_arch&article_id+1395&issue_id+102004.

68 Mathieu Deflem, “Bureaucratization and Social Control: Historical Foundatio

national Police Cooperation,” Law and Society Review 34, no. 3 (2000), 616. Article a

http://www.cas.sc.edu/socy/faculty/deflem/zinsoco.htm.

69 Anthony J. Balzer, “International Police Cooperation: Opportunities and Obs

Policing in Central Asia and Eastern Europe: Comparing Firsthand Knowledge with Expe

the West (Slovenia: College of Police and Security Studies, 1996). Available at http://

gov/policing/int63.htm.
18

that gives international law enforcement a benefi t not available to o

governmental counterterrorism instruments. Th ose of us in law enfo

ment, particularly in international law enforcement, know very we

intuitively—that the culture of the badge transcends borders, national

ethnicity, race, politics, religion, and even blood-tie familial bonds

Anthony Cordesman notes,

Th is kind of cooperation has value at all levels, but particularly when 

cuts across religions, cultures and political systems. It builds trust an

eff ectiveness at a very diff erent level from the public, but this kind o

trust is just as important.70

Trust is very real among law enforcement and it contributes to 

power of police relationships and networks. Naturally, police and other 

enforcement entities rely on one another for support in dangerous circ

stances. Although trust at one level is a matter of self-preservation, it 

serves to advance professional interests. As the author’s friend, Klaus He

senior international liaison offi cial with the German Bundeskrimalimt (B

the German equivalent of our FBI), declares, “the badge gets you in the d

the trust you have to earn,” suggesting that although there is a certain amo

of trust implicit in holding the badge, the really good, productive relat

ships come later aft er delivering on requests.

Th is trust among police elements also holds value for national in

ligence services. Trust is not known as a virtue/asset/benefi t in the intellig

or spying profession. In contrast, trust plays a major role in the eff ectivene

international policing, and its value for intelligence lies in providing a m

and a basis for verifi cation and as an incentive to deliver on a request. B

on 20+ years of international law enforcement experience, the author sugg

that a willingness to cooperate, predicated upon the symbol of the badge, 

a common culture that provides access to the informal networks and relat

ships of the international police community, can yield great dividends in 

realm of both internal and international security.

Perhaps more than any other counterterrorism tool, the trust 

common culture that law enforcement personnel bring to the internati

stage can open a path to real cooperation in the battle against terrorism

valuable as formal institutions may be for carrying out the counterterro

mission, informal, expert collaboration actually occurs at a distance f

conventional diplomats, political fi gures, and contracted experts who are 

key players in formal liaison relationships.

70 Anthony Cordesman, “The Lessons of International Cooperation in Counterterror

Address to the RUSI Conference on Transnational Terrorism, A Global Approach, 18 Ja

2006, 5.
19

Formal Relationships Are Helpful; Informal 

Relationships Are Powerful

Th ose who work in international law enforcement know th

mal police relationships are the primary means of facilitating inter

police business. Business is accomplished through phone calls or e-

occasionally through a mutually acquainted third party. Formal p

like mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs), Interpol, Europol, an

governmental letters rogatory (formal requests between government

enforcement assistance) are the last resort for those professionals wh

get their work done expeditiously—especially if they are on a hot cas

Formal, bureaucratic channels require days or weeks, as req

written, then cleared by supervisors and attorneys, stamped and app

other offi cials, transmitted, received, considered, discussed, debate

ined, parsed, approved or disapproved, and if approved, the reques

out. If a police facilitating agency such as Interpol or Europol is involv

the process can take even longer as those bureaucracies are encumbe

their own procedures, levels of vetting and approvals, and other sor

tape. Because police oft en need to work quickly, to move before a t

cold or before a suspect harms someone, the preferred method of co

cation is through a phone call, oft en lasting less than ten minutes. In t

of the German Klaus Heil: “Th ere is no substitute for the effi ciencies 

to cop interaction can bring about in the international law enforcem

munity.” He added, “I can get more done with one phone call, than a 

diplomats could armed with a mutual legal assistance treaty.”71 Unles

cally prohibited by national laws, police can and do communicate 

another routinely on an informal basis. In the author’s experience a

Diplomatic Security’s international criminal investigative liaison sec

were seldom engaged by our foreign counterparts through formal pr

and channels. We generally received and gave assistance as reques

places generating the most resistance to informal requests were those 

most highly developed bureaucracies (or existing MLAT treaties) in 

Europe, along with former British colonies of the Far East, and th

regulated societies like Saudi Arabia and other monarchies in the Ara

Persian Gulfs. Most surprising were our successes with places not n

seen as friendly to the United States or as open to cooperation, such 

Vietnam, Cambodia, Tunisia, and China.

71 Interview with Klaus Heil and Stephan Krause, German Embassy BKA Liaison 

tatives, 31 July 2007, Washington, DC.
20

Most of our successes did come from places where police are relati

autonomous—South and Central America, Africa, and Asia. Some of t

locations host terrorist-related criminal enterprises, which, ironically, seld

attract attention from international law enforcement, let alone from Wes

intelligence services. Even among tightly regulated governments, police a

cies generally rely on informal methods to accomplish their goals and re

to formal pathways only when absolutely necessary or when legal proc

ings (collection and establishment of a chain of evidence, conduct of for

interviews, validation of documents for court records and administrat

and the like) become a factor. My own experience in the successful explo

tion of informal international police relationships parallels those spelled 

by international policing scholar Mathieu Defl em.

Author’s Professional Observation Supported by 

Scholarship

Defl em argues that police almost anywhere, through eff ective 

effi cient performance of their mission, can earn a signifi cant measur

autonomy from their central government.72 My own experience indicates 

informal international police networks and relationships can be astonishi

eff ective precisely because of the relative autonomy enjoyed by partic

national police entities, to include those in the U.S. Because informal meth

are much more effi cient than formal methods, autonomous, eff ective poli

naturally favors informal pathways. Clearly, greater effi ciency leads to gre

eff ectiveness. Th e author will present cases that showcase the versatility 

effi ciency of informal policing. In extending Defl em’s fi ndings, these cases 

show that police not only become more eff ective but also more autonom

as a function of effi cient policing. Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter of Princ

University comments repeatedly on the effi ciencies provided by governm

networks, particularly regulatory networks, of which law enforcement is a 

part.73

First, national police entities oft en need to improve and overc

their own weaknesses and defi ciencies. According to the May 2003 G

report, already cited, institutional shortcomings in foreign countries 

72 Mathieu Deflem, “Europol and the Policing of International Terrorism: Counter-Terro

in a Global Perspective,” Justice Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2006), 338-339. Available at http://

cas.sc.edu/socy/faculty/deflem/zeuroterror.htm.

73 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal Demo

Order,” in Democratic Governance and International Law, Gregory H. Fox, ed. (Cambridge

Cambridge University Press, May, 2000), 214, 217, 223-225. Also see Anne-Marie Slaug

“Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks,” in Role of Law in Interna

Politics, Michael Byers, ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), 179-180.
21

der federal eff orts to combat the spread of international terrorism a

transnational crimes. Local police and the judicial systems in many c

in which terrorists and terrorist organizations operate are ineff ecti

lack adequate resources, have limited investigative authorities, or are 

by corruption. Th e working group reported that many countries h

dated or even nonexistent laws involving extradition, immigration, 

zure, anti-money laundering, computers, and antiterrorism. Accordi

interagency working group, 

many countries simply do not have adequate resources, training, e

ment, expertise, or the political will to carry out complex, sust

investigations of international terrorism or to conduct countert

ism operations. Terrorists and terrorist organizations take adva

of these institutional limitations and weaknesses to fi nd and est

sanctuaries, while governments and law enforcement remain 

strained by national boundaries.”74

If Defl em and Slaughter are correct, then weak police ent

increase their overall professionalism, competence, and effi ciency by 

coordinating with international police counterparts. In this manner, 

international law enforcement elements can bolster national and inter

counterterrorism security eff orts. In short, international police colla

can serve respective national interests, and the international interests 

terterrorism. Even as weak national police entities and their gove

can benefi t from participating in international police cooperative n

so strong nation-states, under siege from random acts of terrorism 

emanate from sanctuaries anywhere, can also benefi t from a widesp

work of international contacts and infl uence. Furthermore, Slaugh

that informal international governmental networks can bypass “a g

of cumbersome and formal international negotiating procedures.”75 

tional law scholar Kal Raustiala borrows a concept from economic t

he refers to the network eff ect phenomenon, whereby networks serv

ment and build upon themselves as they multiply and fl ourish.76

Policing authority Monica den Boer goes so far as to say th

national policing is dependent on informal relationships: “Law enfo

74 GAO, Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to A

Overseas Threat for Combating Terrorism, May 2003, 28.

75 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Governing the Global Economy through Government Netw

76 Network effect—the phenomenon whereby a service becomes more valuab

people use it, thereby incorporating ever-increasing numbers of adopters. See h

marketingterms.com/dictionary/network_effect/. See also Kal Raustiala, “The Arch

International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of Internat

Virginia Journal of International Law 43, no. 1 (Fall 2002), 9, 63-64.
22

agencies view information and intelligence as a precious commodity.” Trust 

reciprocity are thus essential for success in cross-border investigations. Stu

in the fi eld of international police cooperation show that informality is a pre

uisite for trust: “without the consolidation of an informal network, police co

eration will not succeed.”77 Intelligence-led policing scholar, former Assis

U.S. Attorney, and University of Illinois law professor Jacqueline Ross adds

Police also have abilities in dealing with locals that extend far beyon

the abilities of the intelligence world... Th e fact is that terrorists ten

to be very wary of including outsiders (infi ltrators) in their network

but they do have to deal with outsiders—oft en members of organize

crime—when fi nancing their activities (e.g., through drug sales), laun

dering the funds, or even purchasing arms. Th us, police access to meth

ods previously associated with intelligence agencies, and their greate

eff ectiveness in using them to penetrate networks that interact wit

terrorists, is one of the advantages of using informal police network

against terrorists.78

Finally, and ironically, international policing critics Peter Andreas 

Ethan Nadelmann powerfully tie together the effi ciency of informal poli

with the effi cacy of the “culture of the badge” in their landmark book:

One signifi cant outcome of the regularization of law enforcement rela

tions across borders has been the emergence of an international law 

enforcement community, with its own distinct expertise, understanding

and subculture. Th e common sentiment that a cop is a cop, no matte

whose badge is worn, and a criminal a criminal regardless of citizenshi

or where the crime was committed, serves as a sort of transnational valu

system that can override both political diff erences and formal procedure

It provides the oil and glue of international law enforcement.79

Although these authors intended to portray this sort of international coopera

as a vice, they very eff ectively substantiate the advantages that internati

police cooperation can convey. Th e concept of an international law enforcem

community and subculture exists as a tailor-made tool in law enforcem

counterterrorism arsenal.

77 Monica den Boer, “Law Enforcement Cooperation and Transnational Organized Cri

Europe,” in Transnational Organized Crime & International Security, Mats Berdal and Monica 

rano, eds. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 111. Den Boer adds that informal methods 

to be supported by accountability. She adds that, because police are allowed the applicati

force, their standards of conduct should be higher than other governmental entities. Den 

Bayer e-mail, 22 February 2009.

78 Jacqueline Ross, e-mail interview, March 2008.

79 Ethan Nadelmann and Peter Andreas, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime 

trol in International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 232. 
23

Formality Is All Well and Good, but...

Invariably, the U.S. government, like every government, ha

tionalized formality and displays a refl exive propensity toward form

to address its problems. Formalization, institutionalization, an

making, aft er all, are basic governmental functions—especially in the 

tional realm.80 U.S. international outreach in the law enforcement r

depended on formalized processes, agreements, and relationships. Th 

GAO report documents this tendency:

Th e Department of State negotiates formal bilateral agreemen

strengthen law enforcement cooperation with other individual 

tries. For example, there are a number of law enforcement-related 

ties negotiated by the Department of State, in conjunction wit

Department of Justice, related to legal assistance and extradition. 

agreements promote increased cooperation with foreign law en

ment authorities for the exchange of evidence and apprehension 

rorist suspects.81

“Real” Work Is Done Informally

Much of the counterterrorism literature, even work main

for the federal government, springs from individuals who harbor 

familiarity with the law enforcement frame of reference. Respect

mentators such as former DOJ offi cial Philip Heymann, federal Jud

ard Posner, and former CIA offi cials Michael Scheuer, Paul Pillar, E

Rindskopf, and Henry Crumpton all erroneously characterize inter

law enforcement as oriented solely toward a legal process, whose 

nists are hamstrung by a concern for carefully orchestrated crimina

gation and prosecution.82 None of these commentators is a law enfo

offi cer, and thus none has an adequate frame of experience on whic

these claims.

80 Slaughter, “Governing the Global Economy,” 189-192.

81 GAO, Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to A

Overseas Threat for Combating Terrorism, 129.

82 Examples of this unfortunate form of groupthink can be found in Philip Hey

rorism, Freedom and Security: Winning without War (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 200

Richard Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11 

Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 173-180; Henry Crumpton, “Intelligence 

land Defense,” in Transforming U.S. Intelligence, Jennifer L. Sims and others, eds. (W

DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 207-210; Michael Scheuer in Imperial Hub

West is Losing the War on Terror (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2004), 197-199

Pillar, in Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Pre

79-92.
24

Th e present author, on the other hand, with over twenty years 

U.S. federal law enforcement offi cer in the Foreign Service, thinks and o

ates primarily from the law enforcement frame of reference. Not once 

the author been prohibited from discussing or obtaining criminal, secu

or counterterrorism information from foreign counterparts for any rea

Even the normally rigid FBI and its Legal Attaché network understand 

liaison relationships become subject to legal process concerns only as ne

sary for the procedural requirements of individual casework. Casework re

sents only a small portion of international law enforcement interaction. 

enforcement elements are adept at gathering information and intelligenc

security purposes, for criminal investigation, but also for acquiring crim

intelligence information, to include the crime of terrorism and we are 

limited to discussing these matters in the context of casework and crim

investigations. Because police operate all over the world, the military 

intelligence communities would be better served not to view police and o

law enforcement elements as competitors, or even as restricted partners

rather as potentially powerful partners with access to important, overt sou

of unexploited intelligence.

Th e BIG Question

Th is work therefore poses the question: How can the United St

engage international partners more eff ectively to address the worldw

manifestations of destabilizing violence, which is oft en indiscrimina

labeled “terrorism”? In view of this principal question, can we overcome 

entrenched parochial interests of the most powerful agencies (law enfo

ment, intelligence, and military) to bring greater coordination to the 

of combating this violence and thus bring to bear the benefi ts and ad

tages of individual agencies and local police departments? And, espec

how can U.S. law enforcement eff ectively harness the power of internati

informal police networks without destroying them by adopting formal

procedures?83

83 Formalization involves governmental processes that can introduce political influe

into the equation—to include those with territorial or parochial interests in asserting co

over policing entities.
25

CHAPTER 2

Th e Co-Evolution of Transnationa

Crime, Terrorism, and Policing:

A Brief Pre-History of the Blue Pla

Terrorism relies on violence and fear for advantage and pow

Dershowitz argues that, since 1968, when the Palestine Liberation O

tion hijacked an Israeli airliner, international terrorism’s success is 

able and monumental.84 What methods or approaches have been ad

recent years to confer tactical advantage to such groups?

Al-Qaeda brought terrorism to a new tactical sophistication 

porating knowledge gleaned from 1,400 years of violent confl ict.85 

Lewis observes that aft er the decline of Islam, for the Islamic leader

question arose—is it permissible to imitate the infi dels? Th e answer o

gious authorities was that it is permissible in order to more eff ectiv

against them.86 Lewis’ thesis explains Islamist embrace of technology 

grand strategy, as he notes, “Even the most extreme and most anti

fundamentalists nowadays accept the need to modernize and indeed 

the fullest use of modern technology, especially the technologies o

and propaganda.”87 Prominent authorities on al-Qaeda agree on the 

Former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer suggests that al-Qaeda’s most im

action since the 11 September attacks has been its expansion into the In

and terrorism authority Bruce Hoff man makes clear that al-Qaeda doe

Internet for intelligence gathering purposes and targeting.90 Th e Inter

the only tool of the technological revolution adopted by terrorists, acc

84 Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Respon

Challenge (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 36.

85 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Colum

sity Press, 2002), 6.

86 Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response 

and London: Oxford University Press, 2001), 43.

87 Lewis, 73.

88 Louise Shelly, “Organized Crime, Terrorism and Cybercrime,” in Security Sec

Institutions, Society and Good Governance, Alan Bryden and Phillip Fluri, eds. (Bad

Germany: Nomos Verlagsgeleelschaft, 2003), 302-312; Brynjar Lia, Globalisation an

of Terrorism: Patterns and Predictions (New York: Routledge, 2005), 175.

89 Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (W

DC: Brassey’s Inc. 2004), 78.

90 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2
26

Peter Bergen: “Th e head of the secretive U.S. National Security Agency said 

bin Laden has better technology for communications than the United St

Th e Saudi militant’s followers communicate by fax, satellite phone, and e-m

Th ey encrypt memos in their Macintosh and Toshiba computers.”91 Al-Q

messages are downloaded to cell phones and MP3 players.92 In June 200

the Washington Post’s Craig Whitlock observed:

Th e war against terrorism has evolved into a war of ideas and propa

ganda, a struggle for hearts and minds fought on television and th

Internet. On these fronts, al-Qaeda’s voice has grown much more pow

erful in recent years. Taking advantage of new technology and mistake

by its adversaries, al-Qaeda’s core leadership has built an increasingl

prolifi c propaganda operation, enabling it to communicate constantly

securely and in numerous languages with loyalists and potential recruit

worldwide.

He continues, “Some U.S. offi cials acknowledge that they missed e

opportunities to disrupt al-Qaeda’s communications operations, whose inte

security has since been upgraded to the point where analysts say it is ne

bulletproof.”93 Th eir video producers are “outfi tted with some of the 

technology available. Th ey use ultra light laptops and top-end video cam

Files are protected using PGP, or Pretty Good Privacy, a virtually unbreak

form of encryption soft ware that is also used by intelligence agencies aro

the world.”94

Al-Qaeda fully embraces other aspects of globalization. Al-Q

in Europe allegedly fi nances operations through credit card fraud, obt

ing up to $1 million a month. Th ey access and copy information from 

magnetic strips on stolen cards, and have purchased credit card manufac

ing machines.95 Gunaratna maintains that al-Qaeda has adopted the m

legitimate aspects of globalization as well, involving themselves in imp

ing-exporting, construction, manufacturing, banking, and charities. Be

characterizes al-Qaeda as a multinational corporation ideally suited for in

national confl ict and Osama bin Laden as the epitome of a very capable 

balized CEO (chief executive offi cer) of terror.96 As Hoff man says, “Cle

91 Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc. (New York, NY: The Free Press, 2001), 28.

92 Associated Press, “Al Qaeda Deploys Cell Phone Video Downloads,” 6 January 2

Available at: http://www,msnbc.msn.com/id/22526746/.

93 Craig Whitlock, “Al Qaeda’s Growing Online Offensive,” Washington Post, 24 June 2

A01.

94 Whitlock, A01.

95 Gunaratna, 87.

96 Bergen, 30-31.
27

terrorism and the media are bound together in an inherently symbi

tionship, each feeding off and exploiting the other for its own pur

It is ironic that a society that created Madison Avenue and invente

manipulation and subliminal seduction remains unable to turn the 

logical warfare tables against homicidal religious zealots.98 Former 

of the CIA and current Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has decla

are miserable at communicating to the rest of the world what we a

as a society and a culture. It is just plain embarrassing that al-Qaeda 

at communicating its message on the Internet than America.”99 In 

ment that mirrored Gates, the State Department’s then-incoming 

public diplomacy, James Glassman, said, “Our enemies are eating o

in terms of getting the word out in digital technology.”100 Bruce H

(quoting media trendsetter Tina Brown) says, “Th e conjunction of 2

tury Internet speed and 12th century fanaticism has turned our wor

tinderbox.”101 We can ask whether Lenin’s aphorism, “Capitalism w

the rope with which we will hang them,” now applies to Islamist extr

Globalization Begets Smart Globalized Terrori

How can we hope to counter the well-educated and technic

fi cient terrorists of al-Qaeda? Th e question’s importance is reinforce

idea that A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb and centr

in its proliferation to other states, remains at least a tacit ally of al-Q

the Taliban, and like them, subscribes to pan-Islamist beliefs. For

Director George Tenet allegedly said that Khan was “at least as dang

Osama bin Laden.”102

Just as al-Qaeda exhibits good understanding of shock tactic

lated attacks for maximum damage, and media manipulation, it also p

a strategic understanding of the power of networks and the result

butes of globalization.103 Th is notion resonates with Gombert and G

97 Hoffman, 183.

98 In the words of Scheuer, is it “Arrogance (or is it racism?) because the eli

believe a polyglot bunch of Arabs wearing robes, sporting scraggly beards, and 

around campfires in Afghan deserts and mountains could pose a mortal threat to 

States,” Imperial Hubris, 198.

99 Ann Scott Tyson, “Gates Urges Increased Funding for Diplomacy,” Washingt

November 2007.

100 Charley Keyes, “U.S. Enemies Eating Our Lunch Online,” http://www.conn.c

POLITICS/01/30/internet.pr.failure/index.html.

101 Hoffman, 198.

102 David Albright and Corey Hinderson, “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future P

Networks,” The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 2 (Spring 2005), 112.

103 John Arquilla, “It Takes a Network,” Los Angeles Times, 25 August 2002.
28

Groups and persons who are dissatisfi ed with the nation-states i

which they live identify with transnational communities, such as th

global Muslim “nation of one billion,” or Ummah. Globalization ca

give insurgents extended reach and access to destructive know-how an

materials, enabling them to directly threaten those they blame for th

suff ering of the people they claim to be defending. Th e spread of jihad

ism, the speed with which it can acquire energy in a given country, an

the dispersal of inspirational messages, fi ghters, money, and method

are facilitated by global connectivity and mobility.104

In contrast, a 2007 GAO report asserts that in its current form 

U.S. National Strategy for Homeland Security and the other national strate

do not provide authority for directing the various federal agencies to w

in synchronization in prosecuting the war on terror,105 making it diffi cu

adopt a network-based approach to combating the globalized opponent. 

the vast, globalized, and networked resources of international law enfo

ment confront al-Qaeda in its own arena of expertise and innovation? 

enforcement has been adapting and adjusting to the habits of internati

crime for a long time—and terrorist organizations use the same pathways 

methods of operation as do criminal enterprises.

Globalization Also Begets Transnational Crime a

Globalized Police

In many ways, the internationalization of crime foreshadowed

at least mirrored, what we have now come to know as globalization. Pi

evolved along with the establishment of trade routes and has been around 

at least 3,000 years.106 Transnational organized crime has followed immi

tion patterns. Lia notes that ethnic groups brought particular licit and i

talents to lands in which they settled, and continued to maintain old tradit

and close contacts with their countries of origin. In this way, smuggling ro

to new lands emerged, and from that the development of the usual repert

of services attributed to organized crime—black markets, extortion, pro

tion rackets, prostitution, hijacking, burglary, gambling, and so on. As t

activities became entrenched, they grew to be accepted and adopted into 

host societies and associated with specialized, ethnic-based, organized cr

104 Gombert and Gordon, War by Other Means, xxviii.

105 GAO, Information Sharing.

106 H.A. Ormerod, Piracy in the Ancient World (Liverpool, UK: University of Liverpool P

1978). Originally published in 1924. Pirate historian Douglas Burgess interestingly has eq

piracy with terrorism. See Douglass R. Burgess, Jr., “Piracy is Terrorism,” International H

Tribune, 6-7 December 2008, 8.
29

groups. New pathways were created as alliances between various ethn

nal groups were formed and connected back to the old countries.10

affi rms that technological developments in the early part of the 20th 

particularly improvements in transportation (trains and automobi

ated opportunities for criminals to seek refuge in foreign countries be

jurisdictions of national police forces.108 In the post-Cold War era, 

tional organized crime prospered as globalization gained momentum

earlier technological advances enabled the fi rst major steps toward t

nationalization of crime, the changes brought on by rapid globalizati

past twenty years provided impetus for traditional organized crime g

modernize their weapons traffi cking and drug traffi cking in the ne

order.109

Evolving alongside globalization are troubling new incarn

long-established or nearly extinct crimes that can be attributed to the 

logical revolution. Identity theft and Internet scams like phishing a

schemes are reinventions of confi dence crimes, and computer viru

as a form of e-vandalism.110 Over the centuries, as crime internati

so too did the police, or their equivalent. Mathieu Defl em traces 

gins of organized international policing to the mid-19th century, w

German territories of Prussia, Sachsen, Hanover, Baden, Wurttemb

Bavaria consolidated into the Police Union of German States in 1851

the Russian Government established headquarters for its “vast” po

works with a police Foreign Bureau in Paris—to counter revolutiona

ity against the Russian Empire.111 Interestingly, according to Defl em

those early days of established international police cooperation, terro

a concern. Th e International Association of Chiefs of Police was fou

1893 as the world’s fi rst informal international police network.112 In 

antiterrorism conference took place—the International Conference 

for the Social Defense against Anarchists—with delegates from 21 c

In 1901, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Denmark agreed on a “Se

tocol for the International War on Anarchism.”113

107 Brynjar Lia, Globalization and the Future of Terrorism (New York: Routled

126-127.

108 Deflem, Policing World Society, 95.

109 Jonah Alexander, ed., Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries (Ann 

versity of Michigan Press, 2002), 5-6.

110 Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe (London: Oxford 

Press, 2006), 57.

111 Deflem, Policing World Society, 64.

112 Deflem, Policing World Society, 100-101.

113 Deflem, Policing World Society, 64-68.
30

Soon, the International Criminal Police Commission was establishe

1923 at the International Police Congress in Vienna. Later it was renamed 

International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO-Interpol) in 1956.114 To

Interpol comprises 186 member countries and is dedicated to facilitating in

national police, cross-border cooperation. A similar organization, Europol, 

established in 1992 to deal with the specifi c needs of the European constitue

Defl em maintains that the development of criminal identifi ca

systems, such as the bertillonage system from which information coul

transmitted by telephone or telegraph, and the advancement of fi ngerprin

techniques which could by broken down into numeric expression and tr

mitted by telegraph, have been central to the development of internati

police cooperation from the middle of the 19th century.115 Over time, in

national police cooperation expanded to the level it holds today. Andreas 

Nadelmann credit advances in technology and the creation of criminal d

bases as the most important factors contributing to the internationalizatio

law enforcement.116 Appendix A shows some of the databases available to 

worldwide counterterrorism and international police community.

Many other countries have comparable databases and many of t

can also be shared with Interpol. Generally, almost every country has a

reports and records that can be made available to law enforcement for in

tigative purposes. All over the world, border and passport control datab

are shared with Interpol computer systems and are set up to fl ag transnati

fugitives and terrorists in transit.117 According to criminologist James S

tycki, “the great concentration of databases on criminals and criminal act

has come about out of a perceived need to build in economies of scale an

facilitate transnational communication.”118

As technology has expanded the geographical reach of transnational c

and terrorism, it has also made the world a much smaller place for the police. 

advent of computer databases and the ability for these databases to interface o

international scale is a principal example of the globalization and successful t

nological innovation of transnational policing. Th e near future holds even m

114 Deflem, Policing World Society, 124-152.

115 The bertillonage system was developed by French anthropologist Alphonse Ber

which “classified the identification of criminals on the basis of certain measurements of 

of their head and body and the color of their eyes, hair, and skin.” See Deflem, Policing 

Society, 67-68, 93-94, 108-109.

116 Nadelmann and Andreas maintain that crime transnationalized itself as a result of 

nological advancements as well. See Nadelmann and Andreas, Policing the Globe, 125-126

117 Some systems, of course, are better than others.

118 James Sheptycki, “Transnational Policing and the Makings of a Postmodern S

British Journal of Criminology 35, no. 4 (Autumn 1995), 629-630.
31

signifi cant promise. Th e Washington Post recently reported the FBI’s plan 

duce a vast database of biometrics called Next Generation Identifi catio

will hold digital images of faces, fi ngerprints, palm patterns, and will e

contain iris patterns and face shape data. According to the report, “if a

planned, a police offi cer making a traffi c stop or a border agent at an airp

run a 10-fi ngerprint check on a suspect and within seconds know if the 

on a database of the most wanted criminals and terrorists. An analyst c

palm prints lift ed from a crime scene and run them against the expanded 

Intelligence agents could exchange biometric information worldwide.”119

Th e FBI system is being designed to standards shared by Grea

Canada, Australia, and New Zealand and will interface with the National 

Identifi cation Center (NCIC) database. Th e U.S. Department of Justice has 

opment an integration of databases of the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Ad

tion, the U.S. Marshals Service, the Bureau of Prisons, and the Bureau of 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives.120 Interpol, too, recognizes the im

of information technology and is positioning itself as a central clearingh

police data. It has databases designed to interface with those of member 

for international terrorism, fi ngerprints, DNA profi les, lost and stolen tra

ments, child sexual abuse images, stolen works of art, and stolen motor 

Interpol also plans to employ a system that will incorporate biometric 

tion into all of the above databases. Systems, databases, and controls now 

and the more advanced ones being developed, constitute a worldwide, n

“dragnet,” designed to capture or positively identify persons of interest, 

terrorists, and their associates. Dragnets, as a police tactic, are designed 

wide a net as possible and winnow out those who are of interest to law 

ment. It does not matter if those persons are international jewel thieves, s

ers, organized crime fi gures, or terrorists. Th e systems are designed to ens

identify suspicious persons.

Th e dragnet approach has resulted in an increase in issuances o

notices for wanted individuals and persons of interest. Th e Interpol web

December 2007 shows 4,556 wanted notices in 2006, a 60 percent incre

2005; for 2007, 5,146 total issuances were recorded, a 13 percent increase 

previous year. Likewise, Interpol notes an increase in 2006 in arrests of 

who were the subjects of notices, up 20 percent from the previous yea

increases have appeared in the number of U.S. Marshals and Diplomatic 

Service overseas fugitive “locates, apprehensions and returns” from ov

119 Ellen Nakashima, “FBI Prepares Vast Database of Biometrics,” Washingto

December 2007.

120 Dan Eggen, “Justice Dept. Database Stirs Privacy Fears,” Washington Post, 26 Dece

121 Professional files of the author.
32

Incarceration rates in the United States have been rising at an increasing rat

the past three decades—attributable to improvements in policing.122

122 Stephen D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Freakanomics: A Rogue Economist Explor

Hidden Side of Everything (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), 123.

Interpol Notice Procedures.

Source: Interpol, with permission.
33

International policing in the globalized age is not just abo

bases. Forensic investigation techniques, the introduction of DNA m

as evidence, application of link analysis, state-of-the-art surveillanc

ment, electronic sensing equipment for explosives and drugs, a

Interpol Notice Procedures.

Source: Interpol, with permission.
34

secure communications networks, Regional Information Sharing Syst

(RISS), and the like are in play. Just as transnational criminals and ter

ists can use the Internet to exploit the unwary and advance their goals

enforcement can exploit the policing of cyberspace.123 As al-Qaeda has 

video to propagandize the Islamic world, police have used video surveill

to identify and capture al-Qaeda-associated perpetrators of the London 

way bombings.124 Policing the Globe describes the use of surveillance pl

and advanced radar systems to counter narcotics traffi ckers, and of soph

cated X-ray technology to examine cargo trucks and containers. Presently

U.S. Department of Justice is working on fast-capture fi ngerprint techno

that can obtain full-palm and ten-fi nger prints in a matter of seconds. In w

might be the ultimate level of civilian law enforcement use of military 

tems, the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol has acquired squadrons of Pred

B unmanned drone aircraft .125

Although law enforcement plays an integral role in U.S. and w

counterterrorism actions, for the United States the intelligence and mil

apparatus remains the primary actor, and law enforcement has been restri

to what amounts to a domestic security role.126 As a result, what may be on

the most potent tools in the counterterrorism arsenal, the worldwide netw

of police, has been largely overlooked as a resource for the execution of 

counterterrorism strategy.

Th e Power of Networks

Ummah—“Th e Network of the Faithful” 

Globalization abets the power and importance of international netw

Th ese networks are not limited to computer and communications networks; 

include banking and fi nancial networks, professional, corporate, and trade 

works. All of these networks are facilitated and empowered by the Web, and m

have been expressly engendered by Internet technology. According to a re

123 Andreas and Nadelmann, Policing the Globe, 172-173. See also Sheptycki, 628.

124 Letta Tayler and Colby Itkowitz, “Names Put to Video Faces,” Newsday, 26 July 2

125 Jeff Wise, “Civilian UAVs: No Pilot, No Problem,” Popular Mechanics, April 2007.

126 Brent Scowcroft, Lieutenant General (Ret), interviewed by the author on 10 July 2

thinks “We made a big mistake in calling this a ‘war’ on terrorism. Sure we did that so we 

invoke the resources of the military—but it had the effect of fundamentally removing expa

of our international law enforcement options from the equation. It also harmed us in our 

ligence relationships. Countries that did not like our actions in Iraq made life difficult fo

intelligence assets. This happened even in countries that we consider to be our allies.” Als

GAO, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nati

Identify, Disrupt and Prosecute Terrorists, GAO-07-697, 4 October 2007. Available at: http://

gao.gov/new.items/d08144t.pdf.
35

RAND study, “insurgencies are increasingly skilled on higher planes; inf

and cognition. Using Western network technology and infrastructure, 

operate and infl uence eff ectively while remaining distributed and slipper

Islam holds as one of its central precepts the concept of Umm

worldwide community of Muslims or “Th e Community of the Faithf

presented by the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC: “Islam 

a religion and a total way of life. It prescribes order for individual soci

governments and codifi es law, family relationships, matters of busi

quette, dress, food, hygiene, and much more. Th e Ummah, or comm

believers, is unifi ed across national boundaries by its conscious accep

the oneness of God and its dedication to the teachings of Islam.”129 In 

Islam is a religion whose foundation is predicated upon its own abso

work. In eff ect, Islam itself is a network—a religious network of the 

and inclined to spawning networks. For instance, the culturally em

ancient Hawala banking system acts as a networked extension of th

sense of community. Th e Hawala system (originally Chinese) is based 

and is designed to transfer money. It remains unregulated by governm

accountable only to the parties involved. According to Rohan Gunar

Hawala system is responsible for the infl ux of $2.5 to $3 billion into 

each year versus only $1 billion by formal banking mechanisms.130 A

uses Hawala extensively to transfer funds for operations.131

Gombert and Gordon in quoting John Mackinlay and A

Baddawy make the point that military primacy in combating an en

perverts the Ummah is counter-intuitive: “Th e existence of a global 

community that has a personality in the world arena challenges 

strategic concept of a war on terror that narrowly seeks military o

while ignoring the hostility it may engender in that larger commu

Th ey continue: “Th e jihadist formula of selling the story of Muslim

attack while also provoking attack is brilliant. Because the story h

globalized—spanning the Ummah—an attack on Muslims anyw

127 David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV, War by Other Means: Building Comple

anced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: RAND, 2008), xxxv.

128 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 127. 

129 www.saudiembassy.net/Country/Islam/IslDetail3.asp. Accessed 11 Septemb

130 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 84. He attributes this number to a CIA estimat

not cite the source of the information.

131 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 84.

132 David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV, War by Other Means, 8, quoting John 

and Alison al-Baddawy, Rethinking Counterinsurgency—A British Perspective: RAND Co

gency Study Paper 5 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, OP-177-OSD, forthcomi
36

both justify global jihad and bolster the commitment of local insurg

continents away.”133

Osama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri attempt to unite all M

lims to rise against the West under their tutelage. In al-Zawahiri’s words, 

battle is not the battle of a group or organization, but is the battle of the en

Ummah. Th erefore, it is imperative that we break the chains of partisansh

the groups, parties, and organizations which stand between the sincere 

and their eff ective participation in the fi ghting against the trespasser enem

of Islam, and that we rush before the opportunity passes us by, to stan

the column of Jihad against the Zionist-Crusader aggression.”134 Gunar

characterizes bin Ladin’s global jihadist philosophy in terms of pan-Islam

tracing it back to bin-Ladin’s mentor, Abdullah Azzam, stating that “it 

Azzam who steered toward creating a multinational organization based 

the idea of uniting the vanguard of the believers, irrespective of their 

graphic origin.”135 Michael Scheuer attests to the relative success of this s

egy: “[T]he oppression of Muslims outside the Arab heartland—in Kash

Chechnya, India, and Xinjiang—has become a gut issue for Muslims th

to bin Laden’s rhetoric and even more, the pervasive presence of real-

Muslim-owned satellite television.”136

In my role as a federal law enforcement offi cer (special agent) with 

Diplomatic Security Service, I can attest to the intense networking envi

ment among Muslims, and to the international manifestation of that netw

ing.137 In my experience as a (non-Muslim) criminal investigator and Regi

Security Offi cer, I have had a number of devout and not-so-devout Muslim

informants and contacts in the United States and abroad (i.e., informant

criminal investigations in the United States; professional contacts, acqu

tances, and friends—but no informants—overseas). In my investigatio

have spent a great deal of time with Muslims whom sociologists would 

sider examples of the disaff ected masses of Islam. I have gone to their hom

shared meals, joked among them and had long talks with them, as well as 

their friends and relatives. I have held their children on my lap, argued 

them, and come to regard many of them with a great deal of aff ection 

133 Gompert and Gordon, War by Other Means, 65.

134 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Realities of the Conflict Between Islam and Unbelief,” availab

http://www.lauramansfield.com/j/zawahiri_12206.asp.

135 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 116.

136 Scheuer, Imperial Hubris, 212.

137 For example, investigations of one incident can quickly involve leads in widesp

locations such as Togo, Senegal, Egypt, and Mali. For a recent analysis of Muslim behav

“natural” (familial) and “imagined” communities (p. 42), see Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam

Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
37

admiration. I have seen the community of Islam come to life before m

has been a fascinating thing to behold—something I envied in a way

I could be part of something so “friendly.” With due respect to scho

experts who off er various insights into the world of Islam, I would lik

a thought of my own: Among Muslims, the concept of community m

itself, in some ways, in a fashion close to what we Americans and W

ers might call “hanging out.” Th e Muslims with whom I have come i

tact, a representative cross-section of the Islamic world, visit and “h

with one another—a lot. Th ey drop in on one another, usually unan

and uninvited, and are always welcomed. By all appearances, they 

appreciate one another in ways very distinct from those in the We

sub-Saharan West Africa to Pakistan to Turkey, for me, this phenom

been nearly universal. I think I was relatively successful as an invest

these cases because “hanging out” is something that I fi nd comfortab

Normally, I would not endorse hanging out as an investigative techn

for a white, Roman Catholic federal agent dealing with West African 

Asian Muslim informants, it seems to have worked pretty well.

Policing Networks: Th e “Ummah” of the Cops

It takes networks to fi ght networks. Governments that want to d

against netwar may have to adopt organizational designs and stra

like those of their adversaries. Th is does not mean mirroring the a

sary, but rather learning to draw on the same design principles that 

already learned about the rise of network forms in the informatio

Th ese principles depend to some extent on technological innovatio

mainly on a willingness to innovate organizationally and doctrinally

haps especially by building new mechanisms for interagency and 

jurisdictional cooperation.138

As suggested here, the international law enforcement com

is also an enormous network bound together by a common cultu

common mission. In many ways, it is an “ummah” itself and, becau

networked nature and the “brotherhood of the badge,” it has the 

transcend nationalism, borders, ethnicity, and religion. Like Islam, i

mal and informal components and, furthermore, the informal aspec

far the most powerful. Th e diff erence is that our strategically incline

saries have discovered the power of the informal networks—and we 

to do so. According to Gombert and Gordon of RAND, “Th e U.S. gov

has not adopted the requisite principles, practices, skills, reforms, an

138 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and NetWars: The Future of Terror, 

Militancy (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2001), 16.
38

to exploit networking and ... the U.S. counterterrorism/counter-insurge

eff orts are not organized to take advantage of networking.”139 Th ey add 

the more prompt and capable the United States is in using civil means 

is, law enforcement] the more likely local security services will be adeq

and obviate the need for U.S. deadly force. Th eir recommended reengagem

strategy for U.S. federal law enforcement assets overseas, and exploitatio

potential, informal networks, reinforces the theme of the present work.

Defl em highlights the importance of international policing 

counterterrorism instrument, emphasizing the effi ciency of existing 

potential international police cooperation, which is a function of internati

police culture—the “Blue Planet.” He argues that the evolution of a comm

police culture fosters counterterrorism policing that is based on professio

ism, expertise, and cooperation, and is signifi cantly removed from the po

cal motivations that beset the military and other branches of governmen

Defl em characterizes international police organizations as a collaborative 

work among police of diff erent nations which establish systems of comm

cation and information exchange and create other institutions of cooperat

such as central headquarters, through which information can be routed

this measure, police agencies of nation-states are “affi rmed as partner

cooperation.”141 While acknowledging the defi ciencies of Interpol, De

also extols its values: “A central advantage is that Interpol has manage

attract cooperation from police agencies that are ideologically very div

and not always on friendly terms politically,” and further suggests that a

able “evidence shows that the fostering of internal cooperation primarily t

place by establishing direct means of communication among police.”142

Law Enforcement: Part of a Wider International 

Governmental Community

Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of P

lic and International Aff airs at Princeton University, has written extensi

139 Gompert and Gordon, War by Other Means, summary, iv, 42.

140 Mathieu Deflem, “Social Control and the Policing of Terrorism: Foundations for a 

ology of Counter-Terrorism,” The American Sociologist 35, no. 2, 84.

141 Mathieu Deflem, “Police and Counter-Terrorism: A Sociological Theory of Interna

Cooperation” paper presented at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, 6-8 December 2007

forthcoming as a chapter in a book on intelligence sharing.

142 Deflem, “Police and Counter-Terrorism,”16. 
39

on the proliferation of governmental networks.143 She argues that t

mation-technology revolution and the related phenomenon of g

tion empower individuals (within government) and is steering gov

toward decentralization and the diminishing of its centralized autho

maintains that these circumstances are creating opportunities and in

for individuals at working levels to create their own professional n

domestically, internationally, and at the sub- and supra-state level

also suggests that trans-governmentalization now exists as a mode 

national governance and that “dissagregated institutions acting quasi

mously with their counterparts abroad are generating a growing body 

and understandings that stand outside traditional international law 

nevertheless constitute a dense web of obligations recognized as bi

fact. Th e result is a new generation of international law—transgover

law.”145 Like Slaughter and Defl em, policing scholar Anthony Balz

ments on the importance of a “common enemy” in international poli

eration: “Would-be leaders such as athletic coaches, politicians, a

offi cials have long employed the ‘syncretism’ principle—that is, the th

common enemy and the focus of a shared goal—to unify and motivat

of people. Transnational crime appears to be assuming the role of a 

enemy to the whole world.”146 Defl em goes further in defi ning law 

ment’s unifying common enemy: “Legal and moral consideratio

[even] a vague conception of terrorism becomes a powerful and hig

sequential basis for police work.”147

Slaughter even proposes that international networks ca

come the foreign versus domestic divide that continues to plagu

governmental cooperation (in the United States):

143 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal D

Order.” Also see Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Breaking Out: The Proliferation of Actors i

national System,” in Global Prescriptions: The Production, Exploration, and Importatio

State Orthodoxy, Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, eds. (Ann Arbor: University o

Press, 2002) and her “Governing the Global Economy through Government Network

of Law in International Politics, M. Beyers, ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 

finally, Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Zaring, “Networking Goes International: An U

Annual Review of Law and Social Science 2 (December 2006), 211-229, available at ht

nals.annualreviews.org.

144 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Government Networks,” 200; Mathieu Deflem, “Bur

tion and Social Control: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation,” 

Society Review 34, no. 3, 601-640. Deflem would refer to this as equivalent to th

professionalism and expertise in policing.

145 Slaughter, “Government Networks,” 201.

146 Anthony J. Balzer, “International Police Cooperation: Opportunities and Ob

Policing in Central Asia and Eastern Europe: Comparing Firsthand Knowledge with Expe

the West (Slovenia: College of Police and Security Studies, 1995), 4. See http://www

policing/int63.htm.

147 Deflem, “Social Control and the Policing of Terrorism,” 86.
40

Th e unifying framework that has emerged to understand all these ent

ties is the network. Although defi ned diff erently depending on th

writer and the context, networks may be understood as informal inst

tutions linking actors across national boundaries and carrying trans

governmental form. Th ese networks exhibit “patterns of regular an

purposive relations among like government units working across th

borders that divide countries from one another and that demarcate th

domestic from the international sphere.” Th ey allow domestic offi cial

to interact with their foreign counterparts directly without much super

vision by foreign offi ces or senior executive branch offi cials, and fea

ture “loosely-structured, peer-to-peer ties developed through frequen

interaction rather than formal negotiation.”148

It’s the Network, Stupid

Counternetwar may thus require very eff ective interagency approache

which by their nature involve networked structures. It is not necessary

desirable, or even possible to replace all hierarchies with networks in gov

ernments. Rather, the challenge will be to blend these two forms skillfully

while retaining enough core authority to encourage and enforce adher

ence to networked processes. By creating eff ective hybrids, governmen

may become better prepared to confront the new threats and challenge

emerging in the information age, whether generated by ethnonationalist

terrorists, militias, criminals, or other actors.149

As a network, international law enforcement has numerous ad

tages over current, militarized counterterrorism instruments. Military f

has rarely been the primary reason that the reign of specifi c terrorist gro

comes to an end.150 Th is suggests that, where terrorist groups cannot or 

not make a transition to nonviolence, policing is usually most eff ectiv

defeating them.

Of indigenous security services, none is more critical than police. B

maintaining neighborhood safety and enforcing the rule of law wit

minimal necessary force, police can be both more eff ective and mor

legitimate than combat troops, especially if combined with fair, effi cien

and transparent justice and penal systems. Even if they are not enamore

with the state itself, Muslims who are concerned about family security

as most surely are, may accept and even cooperate with well-trained

148 Slaughter and Zaring, “Networking Goes International,” 215.

149 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and NetWars, 16.

150 Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Q

(Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2008), 31-32.
41

well-led, well-behaved, and even-handed police. In comparison, 

tary force, being inherently clumsier and more lethal, may intim

more than reassure the population, especially when insurgents ar

den in urban areas, as is oft en the case in Islamist insurgency.151

Th e advantages that greater reliance on law enforcement sources of op

intelligence confer over military, technical sources to address countert

and counterinsurgency are summed up by Donald Reed:

Th e emerging information age paradigm is a network-centric app

based on the premise that a fundamental shift in power has occ

from industry to information. It is rooted in information-age con

that focus on nonconventional, asymmetrical threats and resp

and non-hierarchical command and control. It expands beyon

geographical base of territory and space. Its standard for defendin

United States against both internal and external threats is a unive

networked defense across the operational domains that compri

information-age global commons—the physical, information, c

tive, and social domains. Network-centric operations seek to cre

information advantage and translate it into an operational adva

Th is approach accepts that military force, while essential, may b

ther the fi rst nor the most signifi cant line of defense.152

If law enforcement: represents a superior source of huma

intelligence (HUMINT), especially in the realm of counterterror

counterinsurgency; off ers an exemplary worldwide networking ins

has worldwide population coverage; enjoys legal access to registratio

nal history and border crossing databases; enjoys legal (regulated) 

personal information; and taps the supportive culture required for 

network exploitation, why would it not be used to its fullest potent

story is the subject of the following chapter.

151 Gompert and Gordon, War by Other Means, 81.

152 Donald Reed, “Why Strategy Matters,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 3 (Octo

17. Available at http://www.hsaj.org/?article=2.3.10.

43

CHAPTER 3

Analyzing Impediments:

A Core Sample of the Blue Planet

Th e terrorists exploited deep institutional failings within our governm

—Th e 9/11 Commission Report (p

For many Americans, the 9/11 attacks were personal. Th e atta

so utterly evil that those of us in public service wanted to be a part of 

fi ght to set things right. We all wanted to be the one to catch bin L

became more than just a cause; it was a calling.

In the chaos and confusion that followed 9/11, our leaders 

want to rely on new strategies, or depart radically from proven 

(although the tried and true had already apparently failed us). Acco

Amy Zegart, “decision makers operate in a world where rationality i

or bounded. Confronted with an unknown future, incomplete info

and cognitive constraints, organizational leaders do the best they can

for options that appear “good enough” but may in fact be nowhere cl

We have visited Mathieu Defl em’s argument that law enfo

enjoys some unique benefi ts as a function of its culture, its political i

dence, its “us versus them” group mentality, its ability to transcend 

and barriers (in politics, ethnicity, and religion), and its profession

ciency. We can also judge from Anne-Marie Slaughter’s work that o

ments of government, not just law enforcement, aim toward profess

at the international level. Although professional expertise and effi cien

course generally positive aspects of bureaucracy, they may also have 

tive eff ect on the implementation of some strategic counterterrorism 

Human Nature as Impediment

Michael Turner refers to a phenomenon that placed some 

agencies in the Intelligence Community in positions of prominen

post-9/11 power realignment. Consistent with their emphasis on 

and professionalism, “Intelligence offi cials reinforce their absolute 

the exceptionalism of intelligence with a “can-do” attitude. Th is v

153 Zegart, Spying Blind, 51.
44

U.S. intelligence can accomplish any task successfully, is a refl ection of 

broader American cultural ideal of Americans as doers who can accomp

any task set before them better than anyone else. Th is attitude also der

from the assumption that imagination, daring, and persistence will yield 

ful intelligence about national security threats.154 But this “can-do” attit

though a positive quality, can be insidious. As Wilson notes: “Ideally, a 

ernment bureau would like to be the only organization in town curing 

cer [or catching Bin Laden] and would like to have no limitations on ho

goes about achieving that cure.”155 Although Wilson maintains that the

no evidence that bureaucracies universally seek to expand and grow, the

a universal sense in government that separate bureaucracies are all compe

for funding.

156

Federal government employees are evaluated, and judge themse

in relation to their peers, on the monetary size of the programs they con

Th e reality of competition for funding, and “can-do” bravado, appears in 

strategic response to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanza

In the 9/11 Commission report, James Pavitt, the head of the CIA’s Direc

ate of Operations, said, “if there’s going to be money spent on going aft er 

Laden, it should be given to him...My view Richard Clarke’s, was that he 

had a lot of money to do it and a long time to do it and I didn’t want to 

good money aft er bad.”157 Th e CIA was, and still is of course, not the 

agency looking for terrorism funding. Th e FBI received a boost in fun

despite signifi cant failings: “FBI Director Robert Mueller ... heard sharp c

plaints from lawmakers about the bureau’s past failures, but found no opp

tion to plans for a big budget increase.”158 Conventional wisdom in the fed

government, especially among non-FBI federal agents, is that whenever t

is a signifi cant newsworthy event, the FBI asks for, and receives, massive a

tional funding—seemingly without fail. And the story is the same for the 

budget, which aft er 9/11, “has been increased to match the increases in 

defense budget. Th e State Department’s entire current budget is smaller t

the CIA’s.”159

154 Michael A. Turner, Why Secret Intelligence Fails (Washington, DC: Potomac Books

2006), 45.

155 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (

Books, 1989), 181. 

156 Wilson, Bureaucracy, 180.

157 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report (2004), 184.

158 Terry Frieden, CNN, 1 April 2008 http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/04/0

counterterrorism/index.html.

159 Goodman, Failure of Intelligence, 272. Goodman also points out that the State De

ment’s budget has been steadily reduced in recent years.
45

In the same manner that many of us in public service felt 

desire or calling to participate in the fi ght against terrorism, it is onl

to presume that those in positions of power and authority in the “

security agencies felt the same way. It is not good bureaucratic pr

point out to Congress, or to the President, that “others” (in smaller, 

represented agencies) “are doing pretty good work—let’s give som

to them!” It has not gone unnoticed that the bravado of agency cul

associated “lack of imagination” have contributed to an ineff ectual 

response to the threat of transnational terrorism.160 Th ese factors co

inhibit innovation in how we respond to any crisis.

“Bureaucrazy”—Organizational Pathologies as 

Impediment to Engaging Worldwide, Informa

Networks of Law Enforcement

Th e premier counterterrorism agencies are easy to identify. 

the ones we hear about on the news—the FBI, the CIA, and the Depar

Defense. A General Accountability Offi ce report reinforces the idea:

Th e Department of Justice has the lead in law enforcement and c

nal matters related to terrorism—both domestically and overseas

“the FBI leads Department of Justice eff orts to investigate interna

terrorism. Specifi cally, the FBI is responsible for the apprehensio

rendition of foreign terrorists who are suspected of violating U.S

utes. According to the FBI, it also has the primary responsibility t

lect foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information, incl

that related to terrorism, within the United States.”

GAO’s report continues: “DOD Department of Defense is the lea

for military operations against terrorist organizations and states that 

them”; and “the CIA has the lead for gathering, analyzing, and disse

intelligence on foreign terrorist organizations.”161

In the U.S. federal universe, the term “lead” connotes “turf ”—

erful word, and a synonym for “funding.” Wilson devotes an entire c

the subject.162 Even U.S. presidents cannot override this bureaucra

er.163 Agencies have carved out niches for themselves, and no agen

160 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, 344.

161 United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional R

COMBATING TERRORISM: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address th

Threat (Washington, DC: May 2003), 55-56, 58-60. Upper case in title added by the 

162 Wilson, Bureaucracy, 179-195.

163 Zegart, Spying Blind, 57.
46

to cede turf to any other agency. Th e author has been, and to a degree sti

an active and exuberant participant in turf battles of every sort, at a varie

levels. Certainly, turf wars can be exhilarating, especially when one “wins

Wilson maintains that organizations crave and strive for autonomy, w

means “undisputed jurisdiction,”165 an even stronger concept than “turf.” 

son further says that, in the quest for autonomy, “the best a government age

executive can do is minimize the number of rivals and constraints.”166

Wilson’s concepts explain why non-FBI U.S. federal law enforcem

agencies have not been able to use their resources and contacts as a so

of overt counterterrorism information. Again, a GAO report supports 

assertion.167 Bureaucratic temperament explains how and why nomin

“international” and “global” counterterrorism law enforcement confere

can focus exclusively on domestic U.S. counterterrorism coordination iss

Undisputed jurisdiction means that lead agencies will not share the stage 

other agencies. Th is situation perseveres despite the guidance provided by 

2003 National Strategy for Counterterrorism.168

In the author’s experience, the most contentious arena among 

counterterror agencies is within the foreign domain169—perhaps becaus

the implications for foreign relations. Typically, U.S. state or local agencie

not play at all in this arena.170 At the same time, and problematically, by ex

ing control over information from the foreign arena, our premier nati

164 My impressions stem from experience in the past ten “terrorism” years, after the 

robi and Dar es Salaam Embassy bombings, and on through 9/11. An embassy’s Reg

Security Office only rarely loses a security dispute—even against formidable counterpart

embassy executives want to be called to testify before Congress to explain why they disrega

the guidance of the security officer. Embassy management will generally defer to their in

for self-preservation and rule in favor of caution—with a nod toward security.

165 Wilson, Bureaucracy, footnote on p. 183.

166 Wilson, Bureaucracy, 188.

167 U.S. GAO, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assis

eign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists, GO 07-697 (Washington, 2007). h

www.gao.gov/new.items/d07697.pdf.

168 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2003, 16-17. “Our regional partners are 

better poised than the United States to gain access to information and intelligence. Ther

the intelligence and law enforcement communities will continue to expand and improve 

relations with their foreign counterparts in an effort to take better advantage of their s

reporting.”

169 The author once had a disagreement at a U.S. embassy overseas in which a U.S. ag

chief asserted control over all foreign sources of information—including those cultivated b

author in his role as chief of embassy security. The author strongly objected to this asse

and the matter was adjudicated in the author’s favor by the Ambassador.

170 Although some city-level U.S. law enforcement agencies, notably the New York 

Police Department, have an overseas presence for coordination purposes, domestic p

departments overwhelmingly maintain a predominantly domestic focus. See Brian Nussb

“Protecting Global Cities: New York, London, and the Internationalization of Municipal Po

for Counter-Terrorism,” in Global Crime 8, no. 3 (August 2007), 228.
47

agencies can control the actions of domestic agencies and departm

receive the information and which are charged with acting on it. 

Organizational theory asserts that bureaucracies resist chan

son similarly argues that organizations resist innovation.171 But on

vation will allow us to deal with the threat of transnational terror

9/11 Commission Report emphasizes: “It is therefore crucial to fi n

of routinizing, even bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination.”

the turf master himself, Donald Rumsfeld, said “improving our eff 

likely mean embracing new institutions to engage people around th

and “we need to consider the possibility of new organizations and p

that can serve a similarly valuable role in the war on terror.”173 Given 

cracy’s tendency to resist change, in the period of adjustment aft e

would certainly have been innovative to include all of the instrument

ernmental power in our nation’s strategic counterterrorism response, 

those of the premier agencies.174 To paraphrase National Security 

Frances Townsend—we went with what we were familiar with at t

“because we had a fear of unintended consequences.”175

Th e FBI and CIA have in common a strong sense of mission

are also renowned for their pursuit of “unrestricted jurisdiction”; tha

share a reputation for being militantly turf-conscious.177 In a ch

“Fighting Osama One Bureaucrat at a Time,” Amy Zegart writes: “

faced a number of cultural pathologies, chief among them were a de

sense of agency parochialism, resistance to change, and a belief in t

riding importance of security, captured by the phrase ‘need to know

continues:

[Th e CIA] was built and designed to operate in secret, with strict 

governing contact between individuals, even those within the age

171 Zegart, Spying Blind, 45; Wilson, Bureaucracy, 221.

172 9/11 Report, 344.

173 Brian Michael Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strength

selves (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 122. Original source: Donald 

“War in the Information Age,” Los Angeles Times, 23 February 2006.

174 Hence the 9/11 Commission’s plea to include all instruments of governme

in the fight against international terrorism. The 9/11 Commission Report, 401.

175 Interview with Frances Fragos Townsend, Washington, DC, 7 June 2007: “

new kind of threat we were facing and there was a fear of unintended consequence

derived enormous benefit from how we do things, but now we are at a point where w

“How can we get more out of the system?”

176 For the FBI, see Wilson, Bureaucracy, 107. For the CIA, see Michael Turner, 

Intelligence Fails, 45 and, Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of 

(New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974).

177 Mark Riebling, Wedge.

178 Zegart, Spying Blind, 67
48

classifi cation system designed to protect information rather than share i

and a host of other security measures separating the agency from the res

of the outside world. Th is isolation not only made oversight and learn

ing diffi cult, it made internal social norms, habits and cultural values a

the more important in daily agency life. Left alone, agency offi cials grew 

more attached to the internal bonds that kept them working together.

Time, fi nally, made everything worse. For any organization, chang

becomes harder with time, as habits and policies and cultures becom

ingrained. For the CIA, the demand for change came aft er 40 years—a

entire organizational lifetime—of fi ghting the same enemy.179

As for the FBI, Zegart maintains that it was incapable of transfo

ing its culture. She notes that, aft er 9/11, the nature of organizations, rati

self-interest, and the fragmented structure of the federal government m

adaptation to the challenge of international terrorism all but impossible 

the FBI.180 If, as Wilson, Zegart, and others claim, institutions are resis

to change, there is little reason to presume that any of these agencies h

changed even eight years aft er 9/11.181

Th e 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by a new, ruthless, strategi

oriented, thoroughly networked, intelligent adversary that demanded, 

continues to demand, innovative and creative new ideas and methods of co

tering it. Th e United States needs the capability to combat a new adversar

a completely new arena. However, if we continue to shoehorn the problem 

international terrorism to suit the bureaucratic intransigence of our most p

erful agencies, then the very disturbing implication is that our strategic co

terterrorism policy is hostage to bureaucratic and organizational pathology

Resistance to Organizational Change

Riebling examines how the FBI and CIA structured themselve

response to the Soviet threat and their interagency, cultural war.182 Ze

adds that “When the cold war ended, the CIA did not emerge a blank slat

legislative origins had lasting eff ects, crippling the agency’s ability to man

179 Zegart, Spying Blind, 90.

180 Zegart, Spying Blind, 155.

181 For a historical account of the FBI’s tendency to view other intelligence and law enf

ment agencies as rivals and their reluctance to cooperate as a still-applicable defining ch

teristic, please see Powers, Broken, 97-100.

182 In the Borzoi edition of Mark Riebling’s Wedge (1994), an editor notes that “Ove

past two decades there have been eleven White House reform directives attempting to co

the unhealthy and destructive relations between CIA and FBI.” Wedge places the fervent 

terintelligence debate in a historical context and vividly describes the fascinating and dis

ing world of American espionage.
49

an expanding set of intelligence agencies, and erecting jurisdictiona

aries, particularly between domestic and foreign intelligence, that h

with time.183 Th e FBI, in her view, suff ers from a similar history:

• For the CIA, adapting to terrorism meant doing the job diff er

the FBI it meant doing a diff erent job entirely. Like the CIA

did not succeed;

• Like the Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI was hob

weaknesses in organizational structure, culture and incentive

• [For the FBI] “the problem came when the Cold War en

counterterrorism required a radically diff erent approach;”

• By 1991, the Bureau’s law enforcement mission, procedure

incentive, and culture had set like stone.184

As for the Intelligence Community as a whole:

• Six years aft er the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks

Intelligence Community’s worst problems endure. Although l

executive, and internal agency initiatives have made many ch

U.S. intelligence agencies, most have created halting progress. S

made matters worse;

• We believe that many within those agencies do not ac

conclusion that...the Community needs fundamental chan

to confront the challenges of the 21st century;

• It is fair to say U.S. intelligence agencies since 9/11 have ma

headlines than progress;

• It is now sixteen years since the end of the Cold War and 

Intelligence Community is still struggling to develop the rudi

building blocks to combat terrorism;

• Although al Qaeda has not attacked the U.S. homeland sin

there is little evidence to suggest that eff ective intelligen

reason. As one Congressional Intelligence Committee la

noted in the fall of 2005, “We still stink at collecting. We stil

analysis...all the problems we set out to correct are still the

• Th e CIA and FBI failed to adapt before 9/11...eff ective int

is unlikely even now, years aft er the terrorist attacks. Th e n

organizations, rational self interest, and the structure of the A

government are not going anywhere anytime soon.185

183 Zegart, Spying Blind, 69.

184 Zegart, Spying Blind, 120, 121, 125, 148.

185 Zegart, Spying Blind, 182. 182, 193, 195, 197, 44.
50

Resistance to Procedural Change

It is not only organizationally related, cultural attributes that cont

to refl ect a Cold War mentality. Procedural areas, where one might reason

expect more rapid change to occur, have not seen that change. Accordin

former Congressman Lee H. Hamilton, “Current classifi cation policy wa

in 1982 by President Reagan.”186 Th is procedural guidance was a creatur

the Cold War.

Chief among the negative eff ects of using Cold War practices in 

United States’ conduct of the war on terror is the over-reliance on and ab

of procedures for the classifi cation of information. Although protectio

information, sources, and methods is absolutely critical to national secu

a classifi cation system designed nearly seventy years ago and growing ou

military and wartime necessity187 clearly appears inappropriate for a prob

perpetrated primarily by stateless actors in the criminal arena.

Th e U.S. government exhibits an almost universal tendency to o

classify information. As an embassy Regional Security Offi cer (RSO), 

thus the custodian and protector of the classifi ed information held in em

sies, the author saw evidence of this phenomenon every day—particu

with respect to terrorism information. U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Rich

A. Posner notes that “Critics contend plausibly that the intelligence com

nity, and government generally, have a fetish for secrecy.”188 Riebling refe

the attraction of “Everyman’s fascination with forbidden knowledge, a w

know what no one else knows.”189 Jennifer Sims concludes that, because 

most of their existence U.S. intelligence agencies worked against the So

Union, a particularly secretive state, it is not surprising that secret source

even now almost instinctively the most prized.190 A fi xation on secret sou

now amounts to a debilitating cognitive bias. A number of U.S. adversarie

less secretive than the Soviet Union was, and Sims suggests that they do 

necessarily know how to keep their actions out of the public eye.

186 Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, “Government Secrecy after the Cold War,” Congressional Re

1 April 1992. Available at http://fas.org/irp/congress/1992_cr/h920401-spy.html.

187 Timothy L. Ericson, “Building Our Own ‘Iron Curtain’: The Emergence of Secre

American Government,” American Archivist 68 (Spring/Summer 2005), 18-52. He finds 

“Executive Order 8381, signed by Franklin Roosevelt on March 22, 1940, probably mark

beginning of the modern executive order era as related to classification of government info

tion.” Available at: http://www.archivists.org/governance/presidential/ericson.asp.

188 Richard A. Posner, Uncertain Shield: The U.S. Intelligence System in the Throes of R

(Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 16.

189 Reibling, Wedge, 382.

190 Jennifer Sims, “Understanding Ourselves,” in Transforming U.S. Intelligence (Was

ton, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 37.
51

Al-Qaeda is not the Soviet Union. Treating terrorism informa

thought of as criminal intelligence information—the domain of the p

a state secret defi es common sense. However, defi ning terrorism in 

national security can confer primacy on both the presidential and 

intelligence domain. Posner argues that “the problem of over-classifi 

exacerbated by a failure to distinguish between the diff erent security r

sented by foreign states and by terrorists. Foreign states have their o

ligence agencies that can steal secrets by pooling and analyzing scatt

of information obtained from leaks or moles. Terrorist groups have 

less elaborate intelligence apparatus.”191

Th ose defending the current classifi cation guidelines might a

terrorism is an exceptionally violent and risky business, and that sou

providers of information are at an extremely elevated risk of being 

Under the national security classifi cation guidelines, information cla

“Confi dential” would cause damage to national security if disclosed; 

tion classifi ed as “Secret” would cause serious damage to national s

disclosed; and information classifi ed as “Top Secret” would cause gr

ger to national security if disclosed.192 It is diffi cult to imagine a sce

which information disclosing a source on a criminal terrorist acti

damage national security, unless the source were part of a network th

thwart an attack on the U.S.—for example, if a source were about to 

information on an impending catastrophic attack on the United St

was suddenly exposed and thereby rendered useless.

191 Posner, Uncertain Shield, 215.

192 While the standard classification guidelines call for foreign information and 

of sources to be “considered” for classification, the classifying individual has disc

the level of classification or whether to classify at all. The White House, Executive O

Amendment to Executive Order 12958, as Amended, Classified National Security Informat

www.archives.gov/isoo/policy-documents/eo-12958-amendment.html.
52

Th e U.S. Foreign Service’s Foreign Aff airs Manual (FAM) prov

guidelines for the use of Sensitive But Unclassifi ed (SBU) information.193 

guidance cites as an example of SBU information: law enforcement infor

tion or information regarding ongoing investigations.194 Th is designatio

intentional—law enforcement information oft en needs to be shared—

other law enforcement elements, with prosecuting and defense attorney

trial, or, in some cases, to pass along for public safety purposes. As sh

below, the Foreign Aff airs Manual also provides standards for the classi

tion of information, in so doing tacitly confi rming that classifi cation a

does take place, and in what form the abuse takes place.195

12 FAM 516 STANDARDS

12 FAM 516.1 Classifi cation

c. Do not classify information unless its disclosure reasonably 

could be expected to cause damage to the national security. 

Information may not be classifi ed to:

(1) Conceal violations of law, ineffi ciency, or administrative 

error;

(2) Prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or 

agency;

(3) Restrain competition; or

(4) Prevent or delay the release of information that does not 

require protection in the interest of national security.

Abuse and misuse of the classifi cation system is not new.196 Me

Goodman, a former intelligence professional, alleges: “One of the gre

193 Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information is information that is not classifie

national security reasons, but that warrants/requires administrative control and prote

from public or other unauthorized disclosure for other reasons. SBU should meet one or 

of the criteria for exemption from public disclosure under the Freedom of Informatio

(FOIA), which also exempts information protected under other statutes, 5 U.S.C. 552, or s

be protected by the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a. Foreign Affairs Manual, 12 FAM 540, SENS

BUT UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION (SBU), 12FAM 54, Scope note.

194 Foreign Affairs Manual, 12 FAM 540, SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED INFORMA

(SBU), 12FAM 541, Scope note.

195 Foreign Affairs Manual, 12 FAM 516 STANDARDS, 12 FAM 516.1, Classification.

196 Turner, Why Secret Intelligence Fails, 102. 
53

scandals within the intelligence community is the over-classifi cation 

ernment documents in order to keep important information out of t

of the American people... documents are oft en classifi ed to hide 

rassing political information, not secrets.”197 Even more insidious 

exist to over-classify: reasons associated with protecting turf and neu

erstwhile competitors. Considering terrorism information in nation

rity terms, rather than as crime data, allows the premier military a

ligence agencies to assert control over an extended domain.

Protecting turf, concealing mistakes and embarrassments, a

mizing rivals represent expected bureaucratic behavior.198 French 

Police Commissionaire Emil Perez agrees matter-of-factly with thi

ment: “Information does not get classifi ed to protect information

classifi ed to keep out the competition.”199 Th e author’s own publish

is that: “Law enforcement and the IC have repeatedly stymied one 

Law enforcement invokes privacy concerns and investigative case s

protect its information. Th e IC invokes ‘sources and methods’ to p

capabilities... Th ere are good reasons to maintain case control and 

sources; but there are many occasions when cooperation can work 

these issues.”200 Cooperation between the IC and national law enfo

agencies is not unknown, but remains unusual. Th e combination o

zational turf wars and procedural problems with classifi cation cont

the negative inertia that might support cooperation, and to an explan

how and why the instruments and capabilities of international law 

ment have been excluded from the Global War on Terror.

Can the Problems Get Worse?

De facto politicization, combined with the abuse and inhere

nesses of the classifi cation system, endangers sources more than 

tects them. Classifi cation is typically a political decision and not a t

action.201 Harry Howe Ransom’s conclusion is compelling: “Intell

subject, object and instrument of power politics.”202 Georgetown Un

197 Melvin A. Goodman, Failure of Intelligence, 345.

198 Posner, Uncertain Shield, 16.

199 Interview with Commissionaire Emile Perez, Paris, France, 7 March 2008.

200 Mike Bayer, “Commentary,” in Improving the Law Enforcement-Intelligence 

Relationship: Can’t We All Just Get Along? viii, available at http://www.ndic.edu/press/5463

201 Goodman, Failure of Intelligence, 345.

202 Harry Howe Ransom, “The Politicization of Intelligence,” in Intelligence and 

Policy in a Democratic Society, Stephen J. Cimbala, ed. (United States: Transnational 

Inc., 1987), 23.
54

resident intelligence expert, Jennifer Sims, is equally forceful: “Th e infl u

of American political culture on U.S. Intelligence is pervasive.”203

Politicization of intelligence, paired with the lust for the secret 

forbidden, makes for a deadly combination. Politicization circumvents 

fundamental and basic precepts of classifi cation by providing those 

do not necessarily “need to know” with the ability to access and manipu

classifi ed information.204 Th e reverence for the secret, the quest for for

den knowledge, and the idea that “knowledge is power” attract the atten

of those in positions of authority and those who are well-connected. Th 

individuals include those who have security clearances and who work in 

White House and Congress, as well as political appointees who reside in 

and all agencies. Sims alleges that “confusion of the sensitivity of the so

or method with the quality or importance of the information is subtly r

forced by the intelligence community’s inclination to prioritize the disse

nation of its most highly classifi ed information according to the recipi

respective ranks and prior clearances rather than on the basis of their res

tive needs...”205

Selective leaks of sensitive or classifi ed information to satisfy o

political or ideological ambitions are one manifestation of politicization. 

alleged CIA “secret prison leaks” were supposedly ideologically or mo

motivated, but may have been perpetrated in an eff ort to damage the B

administration.206 Th e Washington Post speculated that “bitterness within 

agency the CIA about allegations that the administration misused intellig

resources and reports in connection with the war” may have been a motiva

for the alleged leaker. Leaks about illegal NSA monitoring also purport

resulted from moral and ideological diff erences—but with strong overt

of political motivation. Th omas Tamm, the Justice Department attorney 

allegedly divulged information about the NSA program, was quoted in N

week saying that he was “pissed off ” at the Bush administration, and tha

contributed money to the Democratic National Committee in 2004—the 

he allegedly leaked the story. Tamm concedes he was also motivated by 

anger at other Bush administration policies at the Justice Department, inc

ing its aggressive pursuit of death penalty cases and the legal justifi cat

for “enhanced” interrogation techniques that many believe are tantamoun

203 Jennifer Sims, “Understanding Ourselves,” in Transforming U.S. Intelligence, 40.

204 As what allegedly occurred in the justifications to wage the war in Iraq.

205 Jennifer Sims, “Understanding Ourselves,”39.

206 R. Jeffrey Smith and Dafina Linzer, “CIA Officer’s Job Made Any Leaks More Delic

Washington Post, 23 April 2006, A01.
55

torture.207 Th e “anonymous” author of Imperial Hubris, former CIA t

analyst Michael Scheuer, writes, “Leaking classifi ed intelligence to jou

even the most highly classifi ed, has long been common among se

government offi cials, politicians, civil servants and senior military offi 

Scheuer goes on to say:

Leaks are a major factor limiting the eff ectiveness of U.S. eff o

defeat Osama bin Laden, et al. Th e fi rst serious leak about al Q

was in the Washington Times aft er the 20 August 1998 U.S. cruise 

sile attack near Kwost, Afghanistan. Th e attack was in response 

bombing of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania thirteen days e

In the 24 August Times article, “senior” U.S. Department of De

offi cials revealed that precise U.S. targeting of the camps was bas

electronically intercepting bin Laden’s conversations. “In the two 

following the Aug. 7 attacks, against the U.S. embassies in Keny

Tanzania,” Ernest Balzer wrote in his “Inside the Ring” column

United States reaped an intelligence bonanza from intercepted t

ists’ radio and telephone calls.” Th e senior leaker told Balzer the

not leaked sooner because “it was hoped that terrorists would 

use their compromised networks to rally in the wake of the Toma

[cruise missile] attacks. Said one U.S. offi cial: ‘We want to see who 

using the same cell phone numbers.’” Apparently these genius le

had decided it was time to make sure the terrorists would not u

phone again. Well, as night follows day, the intelligence communi

this priceless advantage when bin Laden and his men stopped usin

phones. A direct trail leads from the leak that caused the loss of a

to bin Laden’s planning conversations to the surprise attack on 11 

tember 2001.209

Many individuals in federal law enforcement, the author i

consider classifi cation an inadequate means of protecting sources an

ods and, in fact, consider classifi cation of our case information to b

plicating factor in protecting sensitive information because it pro

avenue for exploitation and manipulation by those with personal 

Some years ago, the author was the lead investigative agent for a majo

traffi cking case that involved Eastern European (Czech), Russian, 

ian organized crime groups. Th e case centered around a Czech o

207 Michael Isikoff, “The Fed Who Blew the Whistle: Is He a Hero or a Criminal?” 

22 December 2008. http://www.newsweek.com/id/174601; and Greg Simmons, NS

Could Lead to New Leak Probe, FoxNews.com, 29 December 2005. http://www.fox

story/0,2933,180149,00.html.

208 Anonymous (Michael Scheuer), Imperial Hubris, 192.

209 Anonymous (Scheuer), Imperial Hubris, 193-194.
56

crime gang that contrived to lure young jobless Eastern European wo

into the New York City illicit sex industry with the promise of legitimate w

as waitresses and models—but in reality the women were forced to wor

peepshow dancers and prostitutes. Th e case coincided with a major W

House/State Department/Department of Justice initiative to combat traffi 

ing in women and children.210 As I was preparing to take the case into its 

stages with search warrant-backed raids on the peepshows, business offi 

and homes of the principal subjects, I began receiving calls from the Dep

ment of Justice informing me that there was high-level interest in the case 

extended to the White House and that then-Attorney General Janet Reno 

requesting daily updates on the progress of the case. Th e evening before 

raids I received a phone call from a senior executive in my own organiza

informing me that there was high-level interest in the case and that I sh

consider allowing press to be on-site to fi lm the arrests and raids—whi

respectfully declined. On the day of the raids, as we walked out of the bu

ing with bags of evidence, documents, cash, and our material witnesses 

subjects in tow, we were nearly blinded by the lights of the television cr

fi lming the proceedings. I still do not know who leaked the information to 

press about the raids.

While this case did not involve classifi ed information, it is indica

of what can happen when political interests come into play. In my case 

press attention ultimately did not negatively aff ect the outcome of the ca

although it easily could have. For example, as part of the case strategy

knew that many of the women were being held and forced to work aga

their will, and that many of them would be willing to testify against the ga

ringleaders—the principal subjects. Indeed, we “fl ipped” about fi ft een po

tial witnesses. Upon their arraignment, the arrested women (witnesses) w

released of their own accord. On the day of the arrests, we also arrested 

of the gang’s ringleaders but other gang leaders could not be immedia

located. Because the press cameras fi lmed the arrests of the traffi cked wom

the remaining organized crime gang leaders knew who the potential 

nesses against them would be. Sure enough, in short order two of our prim

witnesses called, complaining of harassment and death threats. Soon th

aft er, my two prime witnesses disappeared. It is diffi cult to describe the 

210 The raids occurred on 12 March 1998. The day before, President Clinton issue

Executive Memorandum on “Steps to Combat Violence Against Women and Trafficki

Women and Girls,” ordering DOJ and the State Department to focus their resources to co

the trafficking of women and children—with emphasis on the sex industry. See The W

House, Executive Memorandum: Steps to Combat Violence Against Women and Traffick

Women and Girls, 11 March 1998, available at The American Presidency Project, http://

presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/indx.php?pid=55607.
57

of panic that accompanies the realization that two witnesses, for w

are responsible, might be dead—and that this development would so

to be explained (through channels) to the Attorney General and prob

to the President of the United States. My concern for the young wo

equaled (or surpassed) by my concern for my own career and well-be

turned out, however, the two witnesses had wisely gone underground 

preservation purposes, and resurfaced shortly thereaft er. Upon reest

contact, we placed them immediately into protective custody. Subs

we turned the tables on the gang hierarchy by enlisting one of th

ened witnesses to “wear a wire” and meet with the subjects who h

the source of the death threats. Th is operation was also successful

arrested four more gang members for witness tampering, as well as t

ringleader. A year later, a U.S. Marshal and I re-arrested the gang’s b

he had gone fugitive. In the end, my agency, the Diplomatic Securit

(DSS), and the White House’s “traffi cking in women and children” 

received some positive press coverage. Aft er the case was resolved, 

the principals in jail, it was featured on television’s America’s Most Wa

was the subject of a major story in New York’s Newsday.

211

Defl em argues that politicization of law enforcement info

occurs far less oft en than that associated with the national intelligence 

Th e reason, he suggests, is that law enforcement remains for the most 

centralized than national intelligence, and enjoys greater autonom

human traffi cking case outlined here represents an anomaly because 

ing coincided with a political interest on the part of the White Hous

Although every system and mode of protecting informat

advantages and disadvantages, none is perfect. Th e very act of cl

information compounds the problem in a number of ways—not th

which is that classifi ed information attracts those who seek to exp

hence the preponderance of spy cases and the problems associated w

ical interference.213 Nor should classifi cation be considered an idea

211 Graham Raymond, “Stripped of Their Dignity,” Newsday, 21 March 1999. Af

press coverage is generally acceptable and even desirable, but press presence an

during case operations can be disastrous. The case was also reported in the New 

Chicago Times, Los Angeles Times, and the Prague Post the day after the arrests.

212 Mathieu Deflem, “Global Rule of Law or Global Rule of Law Enforcement? In

Police Cooperation and Counter-Terrorism,” The Annals of the American Academy of P

Social Science, vol. 603 (2006), 240-252. Also see Deflem, Policing World Society an

cratization and Social Control.”

213 Alleged State Department spy Kendall Meyers is said to have been direc

Cuban government to seek positions that would give him access to classified infor

higher and higher classified clearance levels. Associated Press, “Couple Accused of 

Cuba,” Washington Observer-Reporter,” 6 June 2009. Available at: http://www.observ

com/OR/StoryAP/06-06-CUBA-SPY-CHARGE-7.
58

for protecting sources and methods at the tactical level. How many lives h

been lost in connection with recent U.S. spy cases is incalculable but, by 

of example, CIA spy Aldrich Ames is thought to be responsible for up to 

dozen deaths of American intelligence assets in the Soviet Union.214 FBI 

tor Robert Hanssen is widely considered to have been responsible for at 

three executions of American spies in the former USSR, the exposure of 

Soviet offi cials recruited to spy for the United States, and for making avail

to foreign agents information on at least fi ve Soviet defectors to the Un

States.215 According to an Offi ce of the Inspector General (OIG) rep

“Hanssen liked working in the Soviet Analytical Unit in FBI Headquar

because he found it, ‘overwhelmingly attractive’ because of the extrem

broad access to sensitive information it off ered.”216 CIA renegade Phillip A

is said to have been responsible for exposing up to 250 covert CIA offi 

with several deaths attributable to him—including an alleged CIA Sta

Chief in Athens, Greece.217 In what might be the fi rst infi ltration into the 

intelligence system by a terrorist-related group, illegal alien Nada Prouty, 

worked for both the FBI as a Special Agent and the CIA—she had obta

a security clearance and FBI Special Agent credentials, was caught illeg

accessing classifi ed fi les and information on Hezbollah. Prouty’s own tie

Hezbollah, and what she may have compromised, continue to be the sub

of speculation.218

In what might be considered a twist of irony, many of us in U.S. 

eral law enforcement consider the use of less sensitive categories of classi

tion, such as Sensitive But Unclassifi ed or Law Enforcement Sensitive, t

a superior means of protecting sensitive information, sources, and meth

First, use of unclassifi ed/sensitive designations encourages the use of op

214 Tim Weiner, “Betrayer’s Tale—A Special Report: A Decade as a Turncoat: Aldrich Am

Own Story,” New York Times, 28 July 1994. Also in The International Spy Museum, A

Ames—Dozens Exposed, www.spymuseum.com/pages/agent-ames-aldrich-html.

215 Glen A. Fine, Office of the Inspector General (OIG), A Review of the FBI’s Performan

Deterring, Detecting, and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen, 14 A

2003. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/hanssen.html. 

216 Fine, A Review of the FBI’s Performance in Deterring, Detecting, and Investigating the E

nage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen.

217 Jamie Glazer, “Symposium, the Death of a Traitor,” Front Page Magazine.com, 29 F

ary 2008. Available at http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.asp.aspx.

218 Clark, Your Government Failed You, 148.
59

tional (or operations) security219—which is what really protects info

and discourages the false sense of security imparted by over-classifi c

Second, unclassifi ed but sensitive categories convey responsibility to 

vidual case agents for whom the best interests of protecting informa

vail—no law enforcement offi cer wants to have a case blown to which 

and sometimes years of work have been dedicated (or that might resul

to a valued informant). Th is is why law enforcement offi cers strive to 

stringent case control and zealously guard case and law enforcement 

tion. Th ird, law enforcement information is protected under the um

the law by the Privacy Act, making public disclosure of personal info

a crime. Fourth, most federal law enforcement cases are prosecuted u

grand jury process as a powerful investigative tool. Th e grand jury p

even more highly protected under the law, and violations of grand jur

mandates are much easier to prove than unauthorized disclosures of 

information. A case in point: Lewis “Scooter” Libby was neither cha

convicted for disclosing the (alleged) classifi ed “secret” identity of CI

Valerie Plame—he was convicted of perjury (lying to a grand jury), 

tion (of justice), and lying to the FBI (false statements).221

A shining example of the effi cacy of law enforcement eff ecti

tecting its own information—information that is highly coveted by m

ruthless dispositions and virtually unlimited resources—is the U.S. M

Service’s Witness Security Program (WitSec). Th e Service’s Witnes

tion Program (WPP) has kept secret the identities of over 18,000 h

federal witnesses and their families—to include those who have 

219 The Interagency Support OPSEC Support Staff defines “operations securit

systematic, proven process by which a government, organization, or individual ca

control, and protect generally unclassified information about an operation/activit

deny or mitigate an adversary’s/competitor’s ability to compromise or interrupt s

tion/activity (NSC 1988). 2. OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information 

quently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activ

identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems, (b) 

indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted 

together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries, and (c) 

execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities 

actions to adversary exploitation (DOD JP 1994; JCS 1997), available at http://ww

docs/definitions.html#o.

220 The U.S. classification system is essentially a procedural security exercise, 

by physical security in the form of building access controls, physically secure sto

such as Controlled Access Areas (CAAs), secure containers (such as safes), and com

rity systems. It is highly dependent on those with access not to discuss classified i

outside of secure areas, to remove documents from secure areas, or to transfer class

rial over non-secure computer systems.

221 Al Shapiro, “Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby Found Guilty of Lying,” All Things C

National Public Radio (NPR), 6 March 2007. Available at http://www.npr.org/templ

story.php?storyid=7738465.
60

against traditional, extremely violent organized crime enterprises (suc

the Italian “Mafi a,” Russian and Eastern European organized criminal 

fi ts), drug cartels, transnational gangs (Asian and Latino), and terrorist 

narco-terrorist groups.222 In over 30 years of operation, the Marshal’s Wit

Protection Program has not lost a single witness.223 With a record like 

those in the Intelligence Community might presume such sensitive infor

tion that might endanger some of the most high-risk subjects in the w

would need to be highly classifi ed in order to properly protect it. Such is 

the case; WitSec information remains unclassifi ed and under the informa

handling caveat of “Law Enforcement Sensitive.”224

Few agencies are more heavily protective of sources and meth

because of direct, dangerous, and life-threatening consequences, than 

DEA.225 Few agencies are more eff ective at doing so. Yet DEA chooses no

classify its most sensitive information.226 DEA is primarily a law enforcem

agency and requires that information be “developed” to a level of acceptab

for courtroom use.227 Like national security intelligence agencies, DEA r

heavily on informant information—or what would be known to the In

ligence Community as human intelligence, or HUMINT. Th e drug busi

is extremely dangerous and informants can and do occasionally get hur

killed. However, DEA has managed to be successful despite the dangers. D

in coordination with international partners, dismantled the Medellin, C

222 In April 2009, a Deputy U.S. Marshal serving on the WitSec program was convicte

leaking information about a witness to an alleged organized crime associate. Accordi

press reporting, the incident did not result in any harm to the witness and a consensus a

the U.S. Marshals is that the Deputy was more careless than malicious. See Mike Robi

“Deputy US Marshal, Guilty of Leaking Secrets to Mob,” Associated Press, 28 April 2009. 

able at http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=7452819.

223 The caveat restricting the applicability of this statement is “of those who have s

with the program,” because several who had left the program of their own accord met an unt

and unnatural demise. For a detailed account of one such unfortunate individual, Brenda 

see Darren Brisco, “The New Face of Witness Protection,” Newsweek, 2 May 2005, availa

http://www.newsweek.com/id/51906. For an account of mobster Mario “Sonny” Riccobene

Marcus Baram, “Start Snitching: Inside the Witness Protection Program,” ABC News, 26 Oc

2007, available at http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/Story?id=3781361&page=1.

224 Telephone interview with Thomas Wight, Deputy Assistant Director, Witness Sec

Division, United States Marshals Service, 5 December 2008.

225 Although the DEA is one of the 16 members of the Intelligence Community, 

facto inclusion is on an infrequent, ad hoc, “as tasked” basis. That is, the DEA does not a

a member of the Community unless requested to do so for a specific purpose. DEA doe

generally serve as, nor consider itself to be, an intelligence agency. Interview with DEA Dir

of International Operations Kevin Whaley, 7 June 2007.

226 Gloria Freund, “Unmasking Networks: Drug Enforcement Administration Tradecra

the Intelligence Community,” in Improving the Law Enforcement-Intelligence Community Rel

ship: Can’t We All Just Get Along? Timothy Christenson, ed. (Washington, DC: NDIC Press, 2

21-39, available at http://www.ndic.edu/press/5463.htm.

227 Freund, “Unmasking Networks,” 21.
61

and North Coast cocaine cartels.228 As of this writing, the illicit drug 

in the throes of another signifi cant change because of DEA’s successfu

Press reporting indicates that the cocaine drug trade is switching e

from marketing the cocaine product in the United States to Europe

because of DEA’s successful interdiction eff orts between South and 

America to the United States.229 Has DEA won the War on Drugs? C

not, but it has had signifi cant gains for being a relatively small age

has done so by working closely with international partners—its forei

counterparts. DEA has successfully harnessed the power of both for

informal international police networks, which have become an exce

potent force multiplier for it. It has accomplished this feat largely by 

own informal, international trust-based networks.230 And it has done 

out resorting to over-classifi cation.231

Yes, a Bit Worse

Th e biggest criticism about classifying and over-classifying 

tion is that it renders information very diffi cult to work with. Informa

is shared freely allows trends to be discussed, notes to be compared, a

of all cases and facts can be related to one another so that identifi c

recovery of dispersed data points is not stifl ed. Furthermore, as Gom

Gordon suggest, “Th e fi rst step toward defeating terrorism is for the 

ernment, especially the military and intelligence establishments, to st

ing information as the property of those who originate it and start 

information as a vital resource of those who need it.”232 Stacked requ

for appropriate security clearance and “need to know” designation in

free fl ow of information to and from the large and diverse communi

evant federal, state, local, and private sector actors.233

228 Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw (New Yo

Monthly Press, 2001). The author was stationed in Colombia within a few weeks afte

of Pablo Escobar and was present and participated in U.S. efforts that led to the d

the Cali Cartel. The author knows many of the principals portrayed in Bowden’s bo

attest to many of the facts contained therein.

229 Sebastian Rotella, of the Los Angeles Times, in a question and answer semi

the U.S. Embassy in Paris, 22 April 2008.

230 Gloria Freund, “Unmasking Networks,” in Improving the Law Enforcement-

Community Relationship, 21-39. The DEA makes a practice of carefully vetting the 

bring into their inner circle in the countries where they do business.

231 Freund, “Unmasking Networks,” in Improving the Law Enforcement-Intelligence 

Relationship, 21.

232 Gompert and Gordon, War by Other Means, 130, 125.

233 James B. Steinberg, Mary Graham, and Andrew Eggars, Building Intelligen

Terrorism—Policy Brief 125 (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, September

http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb125.htm.
62

Yet another disturbing application and abuse of classifying infor

tion, in addition to merely protecting turf and indulging political aims 

egos, is that classifi ed information can be manipulated to feed even m

insidious bureaucratic and parochial ambitions. For example, Amy Ze

asserts that “EPA Environmental Protection Agency offi cials may not be 

juring up ways to gain advantage over other agencies, but national secu

bureaucrats are.”234 According to Zegart, because national security age

bureaucrats operate in an environment of overlapping and competing in

ests—including those of agencies involved with diplomacy (the State Dep

ment), economic policy (State, Commerce, and Treasury Departments)

of force (military and law enforcement), and intelligence (other intellig

agencies)—they therefore see reform as a “zero-sum battle” for infl uence 

power (and presumably, funding).235 Th at is, gains made by any one of 

national security interests represent losses of status and power for the ot

in the category, thereby reducing and weakening the competition.

Posner suggests that secrecy is the only way in which an agency 

assert a form of “intellectual property” right over its data and analysi

Presidential Executive Order (EO) 12958 (as amended by EO 13292),237 

forth standards for classifying, declassifying, and safeguarding national s

rity information. Th e EO provides that

[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, this order, directives imple

menting this order, or by direction of the President, classifi ed informa

tion originating in one agency shall not be disseminated outside an

other agency to which it has been made available without the consen

of the originating agency.” Th is provision, which has been referred t

as the “third agency rule,” requires an authorized recipient of classifi e

information to obtain originator approval for the further disseminatio

of such information to a third agency.

As a law enforcement offi cer, the author has kept other agencies f

using his own work by resorting to the application of law enforcement provis

in the Privacy Act, the third-agency rule, grand jury secrecy rules,238 and crim

case non-disclosure prohibitions. Among Intelligence Community agencies

CIA is well known for its practice of protecting sources and methods by classif

information and then relying on the ORCON (Originator Controlled) desi

234 Zegart, Spying Blind, 58.

235 Zegart, Spying Blind, 58.

236 Posner, Uncertain Shield, 17.

237 Presidential Executive Order (EO) 12598, Classified National Security Informatio

amended), 17 April 1995.

238 Otherwise known as invoking Rule 6(e). For a detailed critique of the abuse of Rule 

protections, please see Powers, Broken, 22.
63

tion to enforce its intellectual property claims within the Community and 

Again according to Gombert and Gordon (quoting David Kaplan, Kevi

law, and David Shedd), “Th ey tend to refl exively stamp information O

Originator Controlled—meaning that no other agency can access it 

explicit permission. It is this kind of information that deprives users and 

power of information... ORCON is slapped on virtually everything. Th e 

mentality contradicts basic principles of collaboration and access...”239

Th e Intelligence Community claims to promote informati

ing through its “Information Sharing Environment” (ISE). Th is prog

forth a seemingly well-intentioned plan in which classifi ed informa

be disseminated down to appropriate working levels of government. 

“streamlines” and regiments the use of unclassifi ed but sensitive 

tions—possibly rendering them more diffi cult to work with because 

els of sensitivity occur within the unclassifi ed but sensitive category. 

is still out on the eff ectiveness of the ISE, and it may in the end impro

mation availability for working-level offi cials.240 However, ISE furthe

originators to control the information that ostensibly belongs to them 

ther regulating the dissemination of information, and in so doing en

continued dominance of the military/intelligence community over th

fi ghting agencies. Furthermore, the grand ISE plan does not address p

associated with the initial over-classifi cation of information.

If We Build It, Th ey Will Come

I think the—fi rst of all, you’ve got to remember that what we did 

9/11 was make a judgment that the terrorist attacks we were faced 

was not a law enforcement problem.241 

 —Vice President Dick C

Engaging the Blue Planet through underutilized, national, 

assets, including those local police agencies with strong internatio

239 Gompert and Gordon, War by Other Means, 131. David E. Kaplan and Kevin 

“Remaking the U.S. Intelligence Community: Playing Defense,” U.S. News and World 

November 2006. Available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/061

intro.htm; Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Chief Information Officer Dale 

quoted in Kaplan and Whitelaw, “Remaking the U.S. Intelligence Community”; DN

Staff David Shedd, quoted in Kaplan and Whitelaw, also in “Remaking the U.S. I

Community.”

240 ISE Program Manager, Feasibility Report for the Congress of the United Sta

2008. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/ise/feasibility.pdf and http://www.d

bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA484227&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.

241 Transcript: Vice President Cheney on Fox News Sunday, FoxNews.com, 22 

2008.
64

such as the New York and Los Angeles Police Departments, would pro

an opportunity for the worldwide, formal, and informal networks of 

enforcement to connect the entire world with a vetted, relatively non-po

cized, trustworthy network. Defl em explains, “While ideological sentime

political responses, and formal laws on terrorism can be very diverse in 

world, the target of terrorism at the level of police bureaucracy is defi ne

a language that can be shared among police institutions across the world

With specifi c attention to international police cooperation in counte

rorism, Defl em adds, “Th e criminalization of terrorism by police has 

aspirations. Th e net of social control is wide, it’s mesh thin. Legal and m

considerations aside, a vague conception of terrorism becomes a powe

and highly consequential basis for police work.”243 Defl em sends the p

home with these words, “From the worldwide police viewpoint, terrorism 

crime and is to be responded to accordingly. For police, ‘the war on terro

no war at all.”244 U.S. federal law enforcement agencies are in a unique p

tion to engage the Blue Planet because U.S. law enforcement has been 

dominant infl uence in international policing and has led to an “American

tion of police practices in foreign nations.”245 In short, according to Defl 

“Unlike the insularity that marked U.S. police work until the earlier half o

20th century, police organizations from the United States, especially tho

the federal level, have a very signifi cant international presence.246

Because of the United States’ great infl uence in international poli

over the years, U.S. federal law enforcement is in a unique position to pl

leadership role in international counterterrorism eff orts.247 While no one 

deny that the FBI has taken a strong leadership role in international eff 

aft er 9/11, there is much more to U.S. federal law enforcement than this 

organization. One need only look at the numbers: In 2007, 164 FBI sp

agent/legal attaches lived and worked outside the U.S.248 At the same t

according to the GAO’s Combating Terrorism report, 696 DEA agents w

assigned abroad, along with 298 Immigration and Customs Enforcem

(ICE) attaches, 590 DSS Regional Security Attaches, 943 Customs and 

242 Deflem, Social Control and the Policing of Terrorism, 85.

243 Deflem, Social Control and the Policing of Terrorism, 86.

244 Deflem, Social Control and the Policing of Terrorism, 87. In this passage, Deflem 

referring to international police work.

245 Mathieu Deflem, “International Policing,” The Encyclopedia of Police Science, Third 

tion, Jack R. Greene, ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 701-705, 2007), 704.

246 Mathieu Deflem, “International Policing,” 703. Italics inserted by the author for emph

247 Ideally in coordination with European and other world policing leadership.

248 Michael A. Mason, Executive Assistant Director for Criminal, Cyber Response and 

vices Branch—FBI, 2007 Worldwide Personnel Recovery Conference, 10 January 2007, Power 

presentation. Available at http://proceedings.ndia.org/7040/12%20brief%by%20Mason.pdf
65

der Patrol (CBP) offi cers, 54 Secret Service agents, fi ve Alcohol, Toba

Firearms agents, and 28 U.S. Marshals, for a total of 2,614 non-FBI, 

eral agents assigned overseas.249 As the FBI declares in its 2004-2009 

Plan, “Partnerships are essential if the FBI is to eff ectively address 

threats that are too complex or multi-jurisdictional for one agency 

dle alone.”250 According to the New York Times and former CIA offi 

number of that agency’s offi cers assigned overseas amounted to few

1,100 persons in 2004, which is about the same number of FBI agent

its New York fi eld offi ce alone.251 Even if these numbers have now in

any engagement with non-FBI, U.S. federal law enforcement agenci

have to be directed from above, because no individual agency would 

the perceived turf of the behemoth agencies that have been aff ord

terterrorism primacy. Nonetheless, the possibility exists for U.S. law 

ment (not exclusively the FBI) to pool its overseas resources and f

a massive, police-based counterterrorism criminal intelligence net

intelligence and law enforcement ends alike. Th e U.S. is a law enfo

leader in mainstream crime and organized crime; it can also be a w

leader in combating the crime of terrorism, a crime that is oft en supp

criminal networks and criminal activities. Even today, if decision-m

the U.S. government were to allow U.S. federal law enforcement ag

unleash their potential, the foundation exists for a powerful, strateg

sive, global counterterrorism network.

Terrorist Networks Are Organized + Terrorism 

Crime = Terrorism Is Organized Crime

U.S.-based international law enforcement has had signifi c

cess against international organized crime, against other network-

transnational criminal enterprises, and against criminal/terrorism n

DEA has been largely behind the dismantling of the Medellin, Cali, an

Coast Colombian cocaine cartels and is having signifi cant success ag

Mexican drug gangs.252 DEA interdiction eff orts are currently bei

ited for a massive diversion in cocaine traffi cking routes to West A

249 GAO “Combating Terrorism, Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to 

eign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists,” 7-10, and Michael A. Ma

Point presentation.

250 Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Strategic Plan 2004-2009 (Washingto

2004), 8. Available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/strategicplan/strategicplantext

251 Douglas Jehl, “Abundance of Caution and Years of Budget Cuts are Seen to 

New York Times, 11 May 2004.

252 Interview with Sam Houston, DEA Country Attaché, Paris, France, 12 Septem

According to Houston, the current violence along the Mexican border is attributab

part to DEA interdiction efforts which have placed enormous pressures on the gang
66

into Europe. Th e FBI, in partnership with vetted Italian police elements

NYPD, and other local jurisdictions, has crippled Italian Mafi a operation

the U.S.253 U.S. Marshals, in tandem with the Diplomatic Security Serv

have succeeded in locating and eff ecting the arrest and return of record n

bers of fugitives from overseas. On the terrorism front, DEA again has b

instrumental in infl icting serious damage on the Colombian rebel gr

the FARC. Th e Bureau of Diplomatic Security has had remarkable succe

with its Rewards for Justice program, which pays rewards for informa

that results in the capture of designated terrorists or averts terrorist att

(Ramzi Yousef, Qusay and Uday Hussein, Mir Amal Kansi, Muhsin Kh

al-Khafaji, Khamis Sirhan al-Muhammed, Zacarias Mousawi, and Abu 

iff group’s leaders, Khadafy Janjalani, Hamisiraji Marusi Sali, Toting C

Hanno, and Abu Solaiman).254 DSS has also had signifi cant successes aga

travel document fraud rings—which terrorists can use to enter the Un

States illegally, and a number of which had defi nable ties to terror groups 

cells.255 A recent RAND report concluded: “For terrorist groups that can

or will not abandon terrorism, policing is likely to be the most eff ective s

egy to destroy terrorist groups. Th e logic is straightforward: Police gene

have better training and intelligence to penetrate and disrupt terrorist o

nizations. Th ey are the primary arm of the government focused on inte

security matters.”256

A debate continues within the academic world as to whether ter

ism constitutes organized crime.257 What is certainly not in debate in th

253 Larry McShane, “Italian Mobsters in Widespread Decline,” USA Today, 10/25/2007

Available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-10-25-2782988282_x.html, and 

Reputed Mobsters Rounded Up in U.S. Italy, CNN.com, 02/07/2008, available at http://www.c

com/2008/CRIME/02/07/gambino.arrests.ap/index.html.

James B. Jacobs, Coleen Freil, Robert Raddick, Gotham Unbound: How New York City Was 

Liberated From the Grip of Organized Crime (New York: NYU Press, 2001); James B. Jacobs

Christopher Panarella, and Jay Worthington, Busting the Mob (New York, NY: NYU Press, 

1996).

254 Michael Bayer, “Operation Global Pursuit: In Pursuit of the World’s Most Dangero

Fugitives and Terrorists,” The Police Chief magazine 72, no. 8 (August 2008), 35-37. See 

Rewards for Justice, available at http://www.

rewardsforjustice.net/index.cfm?page=success _stories&language=english.

255 A case study documenting this success appears in Chapter 5 of the present work

256 Jones and Libicki, “How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida,” 

257 Conversation with organized crime scholar Professor Phil Williams of the Univers

Pittsburgh, in Pittsburgh, PA, 22 March 2007.
67

circles is that terrorism is, in fact, a crime. It may be helpful from a 

tion standpoint that terrorism be considered organized (which it u

and a crime (which it certainly is) to make it defi nable as organiz

(regardless of whether the ultimate gain is fi nancial or ideological). 

the criminal aspect of terrorism that is crucial to the questions pres

this book. Transnational crime expert Louise Shelly argues that terro

transnational crime have converged to the point where terrorism has 

A Who’s Who Lineup of Global Terrorists and the Rewards for Justice Pro

Source: State Department, with permission.
68

become “organized crime.” Others hold the line by merely affi rming the c

inal aspect of terrorism, and terrorism’s reliance on criminal enterprise 

activity for funding and acquiring the tools of their trade. According to D

Kaplan of U.S. News, “Both crime syndicates and terrorist groups thrive in 

same subterranean world of black markets and laundered money, relyin

shift ing networks and secret cells to accomplish their objectives. Both gro

have similar needs: weapons, false documentation and safe houses.”258 An

once again quote Sanderson and Nitikin: “Terrorist activity stretches acro

bewildering variety of cultures, locations, languages, criminal linkages, 

port networks, and fi nancing mechanisms.”259 A June 2005 report suppo

by a DOJ grant pooled together the work of some of the most well-respe

scholars of transnational crime, international organized crime, and terror

Th e report addresses the convergence of organized crime and terrorism:

Th ere are striking similarities between terrorists and individuals engage

in organized crime. Both traffi c in drugs and human beings. Both extor

intimidate and bribe. Both do business in the legitimate economy, too

Both use subterfuge to conceal their real purpose. Granted their motive

appear diff erent: organized crime focusing on making money and terror

ism aiming to undermine political authority. But the perpetrators hav

similar profi les, and are oft en the same individuals.260

Th e report endorses the idea that police attention be directed at 

most basic levels—at the local levels where terrorism originates and att

and operations are planned:

At a practical level, security planners are increasingly aware of the way

in which terrorists and organized crime cooperate, such as terrorist

involvement in money laundering and narcotics traffi cking. But the

fail to analyze that interaction in order to detect terrorist planning.261

A continuation of that logic would indicate that international 

enforcement should be interacting at the levels where these types of activ

take place—at the local police levels. Th is logic is supported by the follow

remarks:

258 David Kaplan, “Paying For Terror,” U.S. News and World Report, 5 December 2005, 

able at: http://www.usnews.com/usnews/articles/051205/5terrror.htm. The present a

would add money/funding to this list.

259 Thomas Sanderson and Mary Beth Nikitin, “International Cooperation,” in Five 

After 9/11: An Assessment of America’s War on Terror, Julianne Smith and Thomas Sande

eds. (Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 2006), 33.

260 Louise Shelly, John Picarelli, et. al., Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between T

national Organized Crime & International Terrorism (Washington, DC: National Institute of 

tice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, 23 June 2007), 10.

261 Shelly, et. al., Methods and Motives, 10.
69

In developing countries, criminals and terrorists tend to spawn 

collaborative relationships that are closer knit, whereas in the d

oped world, organized crime is more likely to co-exist with terr

through arms length business transactions. Terrorists in deve

countries may, however, use crime to support their activities.

Terrorism investigators at U.S. federal, state, and local agencies ar

urally inclined to focus on evidence of possible attacks in the U

States, or the activities of groups operating overseas that are k

to be hostile to the U.S. Yet the evidence given above suggests 

study of the structure and nature of this cooperation overseas is n

relevant. Indeed, it may be more fruitful than avenues of investig

focused too narrowly on the United States.262

Th e fact that law enforcement exists specifi cally to combat c

has evolved to combat international crime makes it an ideal vehicle to 

transnational terrorism, specifi cally if it is a crime. Scholar Tamara 

enko argues that “in many respects, the rise of transnational organiz

in the 1990s, and the changing nature of terrorism, have produced 

ditionally separate phenomena that have begun to reveal many op

and organizational similarities. Security as a result, should now be v

a cauldron of traditional and emerging threats that interact with one 

and at times converge. It is in this context that the crime-terror co

exists.”263 Other scholars maintain that the diff erence between crime 

rorism is so vague that there is no longer a point in making a distincti

that law enforcement would be well served to acknowledge this poi

Block of the Vrjie University in the Netherlands writes:

Th e conclusion that the line between political and criminal viole

oft en blurred, is therefore nothing new. In that perspective, it is h

to realise that the line between terrorism and organized crime 

a legal construct. It would be naïve to expect terrorists and crim

to stay within conceptual boundaries that were constructed ind

dently of their reality.264

262 Shelly, et. al., Methods and Motives, 12.

263 Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interpla

Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism,” in Global Crime 6, no. 1 (February 2

264 Ludo Block, “Terrorism-OC Links: A Contemporary Issue?” ECPR Standin

Organised Crime Newsletter, vol. 5, no. 2 (May 2006), 14.
70

Rob McKusker of the Australian Institute of Criminology adds that “the key i

for law enforcement agencies is that the traditional separative method of poli

organized crime and terrorism, respectively, is no longer applicable.”265

Th ese ideas further the concept of the basic “dragnet” strategy of 

enforcement—that a “holistic” (whole Earth) approach to international 

enforcement that provides avenues to combat all types of international cr

will bear fruit in the identifi cation of terror cells and operations in progre

at planning stages because terrorism is identifi able as a crime and oft en 

or requires criminal activities to support its operations. Shelly and Pica

conclude that “the fi ght against terrorism is being undermined by a cri

lack of awareness against terrorists’ links with organized crime. Crime an

sis must be central to understanding the patterns of terrorist behavior 

cannot be viewed as a peripheral issue. Furthermore, resources taken a

from the transnational crime arena in the post 9/11 era are giving crimin

greater chance to operate and even provide services to terrorists.”266

It has been asserted that in the immediate aft ermath of 9/11 a d

sion was made at the highest levels of the U.S. government that the thre

international terrorism was too much for our law enforcement assets to 

tend with. Th erefore, the administration granted primacy to the military 

intelligence) communities in U.S. counterterrorism eff orts.267 A May 2

GAO report affi rmed that law enforcement agencies still lacked directive

engage their international resources toward counterterrorism. A June 2

DOJ organized crime strategy paper implored U.S. law enforcement agen

to pool their resources to combat organized crime, yet no such call to ac

had ever been made to (non-FBI) U.S. law enforcement agencies to do 

same toward counterterrorism. An inconvenient truth is that what shoul

an obvious, common sense, strategic approach to counterterrorism eff ort 

not come to pass.

A Foregone Conclusion

Th is chapter argues that over-classifi cation is commonplace and 

agencies in the Intelligence Community over-classifi cation is a refl exive, 

terned behavior. Experts agree that the classifi cation system can be abu

and manipulated to advance bureaucratic interests and minimize perce

265 Rob McKusker, “Organised Crime and Terrorism: Convergence or Separation?” 

Standing Group on Organised Crime Newsletter 5, no. 2 (May 2006), 3.

266 Shelly and Picarelli, Methods and Motives, 54.

267 Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism, Freedom and Security: Winning without War (Camb

MA, The MIT Press, 2003), 10. Also, interview by author with Lt Gen (Ret) Brent Scowcr

Washington, DC, 10 July 2007.
71

rivals. Classifi cation under the current U.S. system is not particular

and, in fact, can be counter-productive in protecting sources and m

Law enforcement employs operational and tactical security to prote

mation and the identities of informants who are at extreme risk, wh

same time allowing for information to be shared eff ectively and leg

trustworthy foreign counterparts. Scholars maintain that police entiti

more autonomous from the political centers of government than cou

national intelligence services, are less likely to be compromised or 

lated by political forces.

Although not completely immune to the complicating and so

corrupting infl uences of politicization, law enforcement professiona

ally steer away from such factors. On the other hand, intelligence agen

the military, as powerful instruments of political power, are the cou

resort for (aggressive) political bodies (such as presidential adminis

and are ideally placed to garner positions of primacy in times of nati

sis. Because intelligence agencies, and to a lesser extent the military, 

cenary, competitive, and insular, they are predisposed to wield an

tools (classifi cation procedures included) at their disposal to weaken 

ceived) competition. What we see as the phenomenon of over-clas

is, in fact, a manifestation of these assertions of primacy and cons

a loss of the potential value of fully engaging the collaborative ca

of international law enforcement through all of our law enforceme

“Can-do”-oriented instruments of political power, such as the (p

tial) military/intelligence apparatus, have advantages in gaining pos

primacy. While some applications of these forceful instruments of 

power are entirely appropriate in the fi ght against terrorism, this is n

the case. Th ese “exceptions” will be the subject of the next chapter.

73

CHAPTER 4

Comparing Apples, Oranges, and 

Lemons on the Blue Planet

Military, intelligence, law enforcement, and diplomatic resou

be used to counter terrorism. Each discipline or instrument has its s

its advantages, its weaknesses, and its failings; and each applies 

measures of success and failure. Shortcomings of one instrument 

compensated for and complemented by the particular strengths o

very much as the holistic concepts of yin and yang interact with ea

Th is principle justifi es having in place the distinct instruments of 

power and social control, and explains why it is strategically impor

all instruments of national power be fully engaged in countering th

faceted problem of terrorism.

As we have seen, a serious contest over turf and jurisdictio

between U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the inter

realm.268 Fundamentally, this is a disagreement over sources. Th e 

not recommending that U.S. law enforcement agencies seek out th

“informants” overseas. Th is would be tantamount to espionage—if do

out coordination with host-country authorities or accomplished in 

ner inconsistent with national laws and sovereignty. However, it sh

the duty and responsibility of U.S. federal law enforcement agents 

attaches) assigned outside the U.S. to liaise with host-country police 

parts to acquire terrorism-related, or terrorist-support, information. 

be accomplished by collaborating with the host-country police force

gaining access to information provided by their informants or eve

access to the informants themselves.

Advantages of Applying Intelligence Practices 

Resources toward Counterterrorism

Th e resources of the Intelligence Community can reach far 

the scope of “legal” entities such as law enforcement and diplomac

the strength of the Intelligence Community as an instrument of co

268 Mark Riebling’s Wedge: The Secret War between the FBI and CIA presents 

accounting of U.S. misadventures in this regard.
74

rorism. Beyond its own collection and analysis capabilities,269 one of the m

potent tools the Intelligence Community has at its disposal is a wealth of 

son, coordination, cooperation, and joint operations activities with for

intelligence services.270

 A great advantage of intelligence services is the ability to operate 

side of the confi nes of laws, international protocols, and diplomacy. As for

CIA analyst Michael Scheuer writes, “CIA information ... is best acqu

clandestinely—by physical or electronic theft , or by persuading a forei

to commit treason—and it is most useful when the originating countr

group does not know it has been collected.”271 Military and civilian Int

gence Community successes since 9/11 underscore the usefulness of o

intelligence services—notably in the success of Predator drones claiming 

of top al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan,272 and the near elimination of al-Q

in Iraq (AQI).

Bringing a Knife to a Shotgun Battle: Disadvantag

of U.S. Intelligence Practices against the Network

World of Terrorism

Despite the foregoing acknowledgment that some inherent ad

tages exist for intelligence agencies as they engage in counterterrorism ac

ties, the special aptitudes and capabilities of law enforcement personnel 

their organizations also merit attention. Outside experts and governm

practitioners alike note the diffi culty that intelligence services fi nd in gai

access to terrorist cells, specifi cally those aligned with al-Qaeda. A Wash

ton Post article symptomatic of this problem reads: “A decade aft er al-Q

issued a global declaration of war against America, U.S. spy agencies h

had little luck recruiting well-placed informants and are fi nding the up

reaches of the network tougher to penetrate than the Kremlin during the C

War.”273 Two former CIA employees explain why. Goodman maintains 

the CIA rarely is able to recruit major foreign assets: “It is very diffi cu

269 Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 5th ed. (Boulder, CO: Wes

Press, 2008).

270 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 118. Also see Richelson, The U.S. Intellig

Community, 341-360. See also Michael V. Hayden, Statement for the Record, Senate S

Committee on Intelligence, 11 January 2007. Available at https://www.cia.gov/news-inf

tion/speeches-testimony/2007/statement_011107.htm.

271 Anonymous (Michael Scheuer), Imperial Hubris, 187. 

272 David Ignatius, “A Quiet Deal with Pakistan,” Washington Post, 4 November 2008, 

See also Karen DeYoung and Joby Warrick, “Pakistan and U.S. Have Tacit Deal on Airstr

Washington Post, 16 November 2008, A01.

273 Craig Whitlock, “After a Decade at War With West, Al-Qaeda Still Impervious to S

Washington Post, 20 March 2008, A01.
75

collect against the so-called “hard targets” with CIA operatives; the c

[results] by such assets are a very small part of the intelligence pie an

most unreliable.”274 Turner claims that the system of assessment, p

recruitment by the United States does not work particularly well with t

and that bureaucratically entrenched agencies like the CIA continue 

making appropriate adjustments to the realities of our newest adver

Al-Qaeda expert Peter Bergen follows a similar line of reasoning by 

that the U.S.’s “traditional tools of intelligence gathering, which wo

once been deployed against a rival like the Soviet Union, are not terri

tive against al-Qaeda.”276 In the face of these problems, a RAND study 

that “it is more important and more cost eff ective for the United Stat

ate local capacity to develop and manage reliable HUMINT than it i

agencies to mind and manage agents directly.277 Th e former National 

nator for Security and Counterterrorism, Richard Clarke, also devote

pages of his latest book to the intelligence agencies’ limited ability to 

terrorist elements and the inherent diffi culties associated with ind

selecting espionage targets in terror organizations.278

Law Enforcement vs. Intelligence, or Oranges 

Lemons

Because of law enforcement’s historical and professionally dr

pensity for international cooperation, it off ers an ideal vehicle for de

local capacity for overt, criminal intelligence or HUMINT, of whic

ism information is an inextricable part.279 International law enfo

can overcome defi ciencies of Cold War intelligence agencies’ source 

tion practices, as well as some of the other natural limitations of inte

Because U.S. law enforcement has the ability to work closely with 

police forces from headquarters to even the most local police units, 

to fi ne-grained sources of information (informants, friends, family, n

274 Goodman, Failure of Intelligence, 341.

275 Turner, Why Secret Intelligence Fails, 94-95.

276 Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (Ne

The Free Press, 2001), 228.

277 Gombert and Gordon, War by Other Means, 231.

278 Clarke, Your Government Failed You, 106-119.

279 Perhaps better terminology would be “CRIMINT,” or “INFORMINT,” to avoid 

with the secret/covert employment of spies by the Intelligence Community.
76

hood sources, knowledge of criminal activity in areas of responsibility, ac

criminal cases) are oft en already established.280

Th e cultural affi nity that police have for one another sets the stag

coordination between foreign police agencies and U.S. federal law enfo

ment organizations. In counterterrorism, the most valuable coordina

occurs at the lowest levels, corresponding to the out-of-the-way places w

terrorism breeds. Police in any country have a broad selection or rang

available sources of information because criminal activity is ubiquitous, 

also because police remain a recognized (if sometimes corrupt) compone

society. Furthermore, police off er coverage that is both numerically and 

graphically better than that of the intelligence services, known in many s

eties as the secret police. Police also tend to network and talk to one ano

as they compare notes on trends and cases.281

Astute U.S. law enforcement offi cers assigned overseas who 

trained to know what questions to ask of local police, and who unders

what crimes are known to support terrorism (document fraud, credit 

fraud, weapons dealing, drug traffi cking, and theft s of explosives, among 

ers), can become potent conduits for overt terrorism intelligence infor

tion.282 In Muslim societies, “Even if they are not enamored with the 

itself, Muslims who are concerned about family security, as most surely 

may accept and even cooperate with well-trained, well-led, well-behaved, 

even-handed police.283 Generally speaking, overseas U.S. law enforcem

elements are welcomed as they coordinate criminal intelligence informa

with local police because it is professionally expedient for both sides. A 

eign (U.S.) intelligence service ostensibly seeking similar information f

280 In my 20+ years of experience, foreign police counterparts sometimes allow acce

their informants. This observation extends to my federal colleagues in the internationa

enforcement arena, and is especially true for DEA, according to an interview with DEA-F

Country Attaché, Robert “Sam” Houston, 18 September 2008, Paris, France.

281 Unless they are cooperating on criminal cases, police agencies will speak only in 

eralities about particular cases. However, if circumstances warrant, more detailed dat

shared.

282 Unfortunately, we know from GAO reporting that (non-FBI) U.S. law enforcemen

ments assigned overseas are at present not well-trained in many of these areas. See GAO

Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives, May 2007.

283 Gombert and Gordon, War by Other Means, 81.
77

host-nation sources may be less welcome.284 It has been the experien

author that coordination with Muslim foreign police offi cers is no 

from coordinating with other categories of foreign police.

As noted earlier in the present work, former Assistant U.S. 

and now University of Illinois law professor Jacqueline Ross sees 

enforcement’s ability to deal with locals extends far beyond that o

intelligence organizations if one compares their ability to penetrate t

related networks.285 Policing involves the use of intelligence units t

information on terrorist groups, penetrate cells, and arrest key memb

fact that law enforcement is integral to the everyday comings and g

societies, especially the mundane aspects of daily life, makes penet

local criminal or terrorism networks easier. Th ey are participants, rat

only observers—which aff ords them advantages in gathering informa

even infi ltration: Th ey know the local characters, the common sche

scams and patterns of both community and criminal behavior. Furth

a law enforcement approach brings a public safety voice to legislativ

sions of antiterrorism laws, oft en leading to criminalization of the 

that are necessary for terrorist groups to function, such as raising m

recruiting openly.286

Intelligence Agency Liaison as an Asset Multip

As is the case with law enforcement, host-nation intelligence 

are of course far more adept at obtaining threat information within t

societies than are foreigners.287 One of the noteworthy developmen

so-called war on terrorism is that the U.S. Intelligence Community h

eff ective use of liaison relationships with foreign intelligence servic

inveterate CIA critic Melvin Goodman acknowledges the value o

intelligence services in this amorphous confl ict.288 In his overview 

intelligence services, Jeff rey Richelson devotes an entire chapter to 

284 In Imperial Hubris, 186-187, former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer declares t

gence vital to national defense will not be given to us in a liaison relationship with fo

ligence or police services. That information must be stolen or acquired from a tra

CIA.” Author’s note: This might be so if terrorism intelligence is targeting the host-na

country terrorism information developed locally would likely be shared freely—as 

practice when State Department Regional Security Officers visit their host-nation 

tacts. As a Regional Security Officer, I have often been given information on terroris

targeting the host-nation by counterterrorism police contacts. Furthermore, outs

United States, terrorism information is rarely considered to be national defense 

security information.

285 Jacqueline Ross, e-mail interview, March 2008.

286 Jones and Libicki, How Terrorism Ends, 11.

287 Gombert and Gordon, War by Other Means, 81.

288 Goodman, Failure of Intelligence, 341.
78

ject. Th e chapter begins with the observation that “Despite the huge inv

ment in technical and human intelligence activities, the United States r

on liaison arrangements and cooperative agreements with foreign intellig

and security services for a signifi cant portion of its intelligence.”289 Riche

in particular notes that the French are especially cooperative, and that for

President Jacques Chirac ordered French intelligence services to place no 

its on the terrorism information it would share with the United States. Ric

son also identifi es Jordan as a particularly important partner with the CIA

Finally, former CIA Director Michael Hayden acknowledged the import

of foreign liaison in his early 2007 statement to Congress.291

Intelligence Agency Liaison and Asset Depreciati

Although the United States has enjoyed some success with inte

tional intelligence agency cooperation, all is not well in this domain. 

requirements placed on national intelligence organizations dictate tha

the international arena, friends and allies are inconstant, and duplicity 

subterfuge become virtues. Th e highly experienced (and now deceased) W

liam Odom observed that cooperation does not come naturally in clandes

operations.292 Th e use of “covers” and “covert operations” makes intellig

agencies inherently and necessarily dishonest. One may even suggest th

is the job of intelligence offi cers to be deceitful—lying is what they “d

their “tradecraft .”293 One does not need a top secret security clearance to 

duplicitous activities of intelligence services playing out around the world

subscription to a good newspaper suffi ces.294

With their more direct ties to political power, intelligence serv

are not only susceptible to political infl uences, but they are also, as Ran

says, object and instrument of the political power structure of central 

ernments.295 Th e fact that they can operate outside the confi nes of the 

289 Richelson, The U.S. Intellgence Community, 341.

290 Richelson, The U.S. Intellgence Community, 355.

291 Michael V. Hayden, Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intellig

11 January 2007.

292 Odom, Fixing Intelligence, 148.

293 Former National Security Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism Richa

Clarke details this conundrum in his latest book, Your Government Failed You, 110-113.

294 See, for example, Mark Mazzetti, “When Spies Don’t Play Well With Their Allies,” 

York Times, 20 July 2008; “A Wild Frontier,” The Economist, 20 September 2008, 55; Ron Mo

and Mark Hosenball, “Pakistan’s Dangerous Double Game,” Newsweek, 22 September 2

Joby Warrick, “U.S. Officials: Pakistani Agents Helped Plan Kabul Bombing,” Washington 

1 August 2008, A1; Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 52; and Steve Coll, The Taliban-Pa

Alliance, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/interviews/coll.html, post

October 2006.

295 Ransom, “The Politicization of Intelligence,” 23.
79

and are steeped in the art of deception, means that intelligence serv

manipulate counterpart intelligence services through misdirection 

terfuge.296 For example, although the United States considers man

present governments in the Middle East to be its allies in the war ag

rorism, many of them do benefi t when terrorist acts drive up the pri

In a very real sense, terrorism does benefi t them.

297 It would be naïve 

that, even though they are ostensibly our friends, they will act in 

interests over their own. Th is becomes a problem around the world 

this region tends to spawn and train international terrorists.

Th e U.S. Intelligence Community’s prosecution of the war o

has also purportedly caused friction with some erstwhile allies: “Th e 

ting hostility U.S. intelligence agencies face from broad sections of t

pean political spectrum aff ects both operational capabilities and t

U.S. diplomatic eff ort, and the reputation of U.S. intelligence in ma

of the world where we must operate and fi nd cooperation is worse th

ever been.”298 Th e conventional wisdom that U.S. intelligence agen

tinue to have problems sharing information and have the reputatio

playing well with others compounds the problem.299 Th ese are condi

conducive to collecting detailed information on future, very real thre

Fortunately, other counterterrorism instruments, especi

enforcement, are much more straightforward and less subject to 

As a function of their autonomy, normally at some distance from th

cal centers of government, they will display at least the perception 

worthiness in counterterrorism coordination. A savvy U.S. strategic 

counterterrorism policy would take into consideration that, with int

services of allied countries likely having hidden agendas, law enfo

elements can provide other “safe” avenues for combating terrorism a

ering information. On the other hand, to the degree that counterpa

gence services have the well-being of their own country’s eff ective gov

in mind, the opportunity exists for international intelligence service 

tion to identify and mitigate the eff ects of any law enforcement corru

296 Bill Gertz alleges that a number of U.S. “friends” and allies are secretly 

advance their own interests. See Bill Gertz, Treachery: How America’s Friends an

Secretly Arming Our Enemies (New York: Crown Forum, 2004).

297 Although there may also be incentives to cooperate, it is all a matter of deg

this regard, it is the cooperating (helping) intelligence service that calls the shots. 

however, a United States with a destroyed infrastructure benefits no one but extremis

a diminished United States, paying high oil prices, might be an ideal circumstance.

298 Lewis and DeRosa, “Intelligence,” in Five Years After, 30. See also Goodman

Intelligence, 195.

299 Gombert and Gordon, War by Other Means, 75.
80

other potential drawbacks that might accompany international law enfo

ment cooperation.

Just as the United States experiences confl icts between intellig

and law enforcement, the author has observed that the syndrome occur

most other countries as well. For example, the need for intelligence to 

tect its sources and methods can disrupt the normal judicial process for 

enforcement and, conversely, the judicial process can impede intellig

operations, at least in the domestic arena. Th is can be a good thing bec

thorough integration of law enforcement and intelligence is a defi ning c

acteristic of a police state. In the author’s experience, except for North Ko

Iran, and Myanmar, and former republics of the Soviet Union, some l

of dissension between law enforcement and intelligence has been the 

Because of their association with the political centers of government, in

ligence services generally have a higher profi le than police services. Howe

police personnel outnumber those in intelligence services and occasion

even in national militaries.

Endemic discord between police and intelligence functions extend

U.S. operations outside the U.S. For example, foreign law enforcement serv

will limit their cooperation if they are aware of intelligence involvement 

particular case. Th is causes intrinsic problems for the FBI, which, altho

traditionally a law enforcement agency, now advertises its intelligence fo

as well.300 Th e author has learned from foreign police representatives that 

fi nd it philosophically and even legally diffi cult to work with the FBI becau

its intelligence role.301 In this role, the FBI at times unavoidably interacts 

host country intelligence services because of formalized agreements betw

them. Presently, the FBI maintains its network of law enforcement attach

only 70 countries, whereas other U.S. federal law enforcement agencies, m

oft en DEA and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, are established in alm

all of the world’s 250 or so political entities.

Because law enforcement attaches do not cover the globe in a m

ner that focuses on terrorism, many criminal hot spots are covered by 

tively few agencies—the broadest representation is by the State Departm

Bureau of Diplomatic Security, operating in every U.S. Embassy and ne

every U.S. Consulate in the world in locations such as Mauritania, whic

300 Federal Bureau Of Investigation, statement on Integrating Intelligence and Inve

tions, available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/nsb/nsb_integrating.html.

301 A well-known authority on criminal intelligence analysis, interviewed for this 

laments the “intelligencification” of the FBI (source requested confidentiality).
81

experiencing issues with radical Islamization;302 Sierra Leone, whi

history of harboring Islamist militants;303 South Africa, where a nasc

mist radical movement is forming;304 India and Bangladesh, wher

movements are fairly well established;305 Azerbaijan, dealing with 

extremism;306 Tajikistan, experiencing problems with Islamic radic

as well as in those places experiencing Islamist insurgencies such 

land, Indonesia, and the Philippines; and in places where the threat o

ist activities is high, as in the South Malaccan Straits;308 the Caribbea

where al-Qaeda is making inroads;309 and Guyana, with a growing 

with Islamic radicalism—Guyana, being the point of origin for the “

Six” plot in the U.S.310 In the period aft er the Dar es Salaam and 

bombings in Africa, there were threats made against U.S. embassies t

over.311 In South America, Bolivia appears to be a center of Islamist e

activity.312 Islamist terrorist activity or presence occurs in nearly eve

try on earth, and the only way to track or detect it may be through 

pices of international law enforcement. U.S. federal law enforcemen

represented the world over but, in contrast with the FBI, it has not 

engaged in a routine, constructive way to combat international terro

302 Anour Boukars, “The Challenge of Radical Islam in Mauritania,” in Unmaski

Global Review of Terrorist Activities, Vol. III (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundat

243-247.

303 Donald Temple, “Sierra Leone: An Obscure Battlefield in the War on Ter

Unmasking Terror, 248-252.

304 Anneli Botha, “PAGAD: A Case Study of Radical Islam in South Africa,” in 

Terror, 253-258.

305 Aminesh Roul, “Student Islamic Movement of India: A Case Study,” in Unm

ror, 320-323, and Andrew Holt, “Islamists Pose a Growing Threat to Stability in Bang

Unmasking Terror, 324-326. Also see David Montero, “Are Terror Groups Finding 

Bangladesh?” Christian Science Monitor, 17 June 2009. Available at http://www

com/2009/0617/p99s01-duts.html. 

306 Anar Valiev, “Al-Qaeda in Azerbaijan: Myths and Realities,” in Unmasking Terror, 

307 Igor Rotar, Resurgence of Islamic Radicalism in Tajikistan’s Ferghana Valley, 

ing Terror, 348-352.

308 Zachary Abuza, “A Breakdown of Southern Thailand’s Insurgent Groups,” in 

Terror, 354-360; Peter Chalk, “The Indigenous Nature of the Thai Insurgency,” in 

Terror, 361-365; Abu Dujana, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s New Al-Qaeda Linked Leader,” 39

Noor Huda Ismail, “The Role of Kinship in Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyah,” in Unmas

403-409; Zachary Abuza,” MILF’s Stalled Peace Process and its Impact on Terrorism 

east Asia, in Unmasking Terror, 410-143; and Catherine Zara Raymond, “The Threat o

Terrorism in the Malacca Straits,” in Unmasking Terror, 370-374.

309 Chris Zambelis, “Al-Qaeda’s Inroads into the Caribbean,” Terrorism Monito

(21 October 2005), 475-480. Available at http://www.jamestown.org.

310 Chris Zambelis, “The Threat of Religious Radicalism in Guyana,” Terrorism 

no. 15 (4 August 2006), 487-491. Available at http://www.jamestown.org.

311 Recollections of the author.

312 Nora Zimmett, “Bolivia Becoming a Hotbed of Islamic Extremists, Report C

Fox News, 16 June 2009. Available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933.52675
82

Law enforcement international coordinating elements, generally 

ignated as “country attaches,” have the benefi t of a common culture and 

sion and are also generally adept at assessing criminal activity which 

be used to support terrorist activities. U.S. intelligence services are alre

multi-tasked and undermanned and are insuffi ciently prepared to deal 

the nuances of criminal activity with local police elements.

Suspects in the 1998 Bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzan

Source: State Department, with permission.
83

Th e urgency and confusion that characterized the aft ermath of 

vided a climate for those in advisory roles to advance the cause and agend

own agencies. Aft er 9/11, following the initial success of military and in

eff orts in Afghanistan, those instruments achieved not merely primacy i

counterterrorism eff orts but, with the addition of the FBI as an Intelligen

munity agency, something approaching exclusivity.

313 It seems unlikely, 

importance both the 9/11 Report and national security authorities attrib

foreign-domestic divide,

314 that the exclusion of non-FBI U.S. federal law 

ment agencies from contributing to counterterrorism eff orts overseas i

dent or an oversight. What is troubling from a law enforcement perspect

our strategy appears to be a product, not of clever strategic planning, th

insight, or careful consideration, but of organizational maneuvering.

Military vs. Law Enforcement—Apples and 

Oranges in Counterterrorism

“One of the great tragedies of the United States federal government 

it doesn’t understand all the resources it has at its disposal.”315

Authoritative studies show that military action is rarely s

against terrorists316 and that police work, as a counterterrorism ins

has had greater success, especially given today’s greater focus on law 

ment intelligence to reinforce the application of this instrument

enforcement organizations are better suited to counterterrorism be

their mission; that is, international law enforcement has specifi cally 

313 Some recent initiatives by the U.S. military admittedly and forthrightly e

advantages previously only afforded to international law enforcement. So too, mi

engage the resources of law enforcement to track and investigate evidence obtaine

“pocket litter” of deceased insurgents as well as other material seized from the 

Although these are positive steps in support of U.S. interests, these examples pale i

son with the benefits that could be brought by open, overt coordination of wor

enforcement networks.

314 As noted in Chapter One, the foreign-domestic divide has its roots in the Nat

rity Act of 1947, in which the CIA was effectively prohibited from conducting do

operations. The FBI held responsibility for domestic counterintelligence operations, 

tributed to an already bitter rivalry between the FBI and the CIA. Later legislation

directives from the Department of Justice, further contributed to the institutionalizat

wall” between domestic and foreign operations and information gathering. Ac

national security expert James Steinberg, the “disconnect between foreign and dom

ligence collection and analysis has been at the heart of post-9/11 analysis of 

wrong.’” See Steinberg, “Erasing the Seams”; Reibling’s Wedge; and the 9/11 Rep

353, 357, 400, 409. 

315 Interview with Frank Urbancic, then Deputy Coordinator for Counterterroris

U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, 13 June 2007.

316 Gombert and Gordon, War by Other Means, summary, xlviii.

317 Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End, 27-29, and Osborne, Out of Bo

139, 153, 155.
84

to avert and combat external transnational threats, especially the netwo

aspects of transnational criminality, through securing borders and trac

criminals and their networks—which strive to remain hidden. Internati

law enforcement is especially attuned to dealing with networks—smugg

networks, organized crime networks, drug traffi cking networks, human sm

gling networks, and now terrorism networks—even if it were not regarde

a “crime.” Law enforcement is designed to implement the “dragnet” strat

that is, cast a “net” (typically at a border control point—or, more locally, 

a busy street) which will intercept international or local movements of pe

and allow a system to sort out those who are up to no good or who ar

interest to the police. Militaries do tend to be more eff ective against insur

organizations that are large and well-armed, such as those in Afghanistan 

Iraq. Police actions are more eff ective when the mission involves counte

rorism because “unlike the military, the police usually have a permanent p

ence in cities, towns, and villages; a better understanding of local groups 

the threat environment in these areas; and better intelligence.”318

In contrast with law enforcement groups, neither the intellig

nor the military communities are set up to take advantage of the globali

networked structure and activities of al-Qaeda and other terrorist/insur

groups.319 Th eir insularity, elevation of secrecy, and outmoded means of 

tecting information, along with an overall obsession for security, places 

Intelligence Community and particularly the CIA at a disadvantage w

dealing with networks. Like a closed-circuit TV system, intelligence serv

are restricted to their own isolated means of communicating and sha

information. Obscured from their view are the myriad other networks 

operate, comingle, and interact freely without interference or obstruction

According to Slaughter and Raustiala, ideal “government netw

are characterized by extensive sharing of information, coordinating enfo

ment eff orts, and joint policy making activities. Th ese activities plau

exhibit network eff ects: the more regulatory agencies that participate in c

dinating and reciprocating enforcement eff orts for example, the better off 

all the other agencies.”320 Sharing and coordinating are not traits typi

shared by military and intelligence networks. Furthermore, again accor

to Slaughter, government networks, “can spring up overnight, address a 

of issues and form ‘mega-networks’ that link existing networks.”321 Perh

318 Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End, 60.

319 Gombert and Gordon, War by Other Means, 42.

320 Slaughter, “Sovereignty and Power,” 297, and Raustiala, “The Architecture of Int

tional Cooperation,” 64.

321 Slaughter, “Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks,” 179.
85

one of the best examples of these mega-networks is precisely what t

is presenting: the formal and informal networks of worldwide law 

ment with its common mission, common adversaries, common cul

the vast number of individuals linked together. An example of th

linkages that can be formed might be Diplomatic Security’s (DS) 

ship of the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC)—a fede

sory panel through which DS, as a security and law enforcement ag

formed an alliance with the American international corporate com

In this capacity, OSAC becomes a vehicle to communicate security 

and advice to U.S. corporations with an overseas presence.322 By est

OSAC, Diplomatic Security created a network of American busine

common international security concerns and linked them together w

embassies through its Regional Security Offi ces. Th e signifi cance o

is that is has connected law enforcement networks with corporate n

and vice versa, although, thus far, OSAC has been used almost ex

for communicating security information from the U.S. federal gov

to the U.S. international corporate community. Representing acces

haps millions of foreign employees, the international business com

has been opened up by OSAC as yet another possible unexploited s

transnational crime and terrorism information. Not only has OSAC 

up networks of communication with federal law enforcement, but a

the rest of the U.S. federal government system—to include U.S. inte

by proxy through the RSO in U.S. embassies and the U.S. Departmen

Th e OSAC model has proven so successful that it has spawned a 

U.S. version run by the FBI: the Awareness of National Security Is

Response (ANSIR) program,323 and has generated a British gov

counterpart, Security Information for Business Overseas (SISBO).3

has also attracted the interest of countries like France and Australi

have expressed an interest in forming their own version. OSAC ha

alliance with the International Security Managers Association (ISMA

connects the U.S. government and law enforcement with the remaind

international corporate community—and all of their employees. Like

FBI has a close relationship and partnership with the American So

Industrial Security (ASIS), which connects it and the federal governm

the U.S.-based American corporate community. In this manner netw

beget mega-networks precisely as Slaughter predicts. It is diffi cult to 

322 OSAC is structured by a central U.S. council and is divided into individual cou

cils coordinated through embassy Regional Security Offices. The author is present

gram manager for the OSAC-France Country Council. 

323 FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/congress01/ansir040301.html.

324 See http://www.sisbo.org.uk. SISBO is now officially partnered with OSAC.
86

that the military/intelligence apparatus of the United States would have ac

to such open networks.

Gombert and Gordon eff ectively tie together the phenomenon of 

rorism and insurgency by characterizing Islamist-based terrorism as a 

and tactic embedded in a merger of “global-religious extremism with lo

political confl icts” manifest in a worldwide, global Islamist insurgency

their estimation, “terrorism cannot be defeated unless the insurgencie

which it is embedded are successfully countered.”325 Th ey repeatedly note 

effi cacy of police as a tool against insurgency (and therefore terrorism) 

decry over-reliance on the military as a counterterrorism instrument.326

Conversely, the military community is specialized to the point 

its network interactions are with other military and military intelligence 

works, with very limited corporate interaction. Militaries are accustome

fi ghting militaries, not networks. Reed expects that future wars will m

away from the principles of traditional warfare into the realm of “state 

non-state entities organized as networks (author’s emphasis) along social, 

nomic, criminal, terrorist, gang, special interest, and ethnic lines, to name 

a few.327 It will take on the characteristics of war without national boun

ies, where the distinctions between public and private, government and p

ple, military and civilian—i.e., combatants and non-combatants—will a

become blurred as they were prior to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

Th e “cultish” nature of law enforcement bears many parallels to inte

tional terrorism networks, fi rst because international law enforcement has evo

alongside international terrorism and transnational crime, and also because 

networks are based on the foundation of a common mission, a common pro

sion, common enemies, common problems, common dangers, common cau

and ultimately upon trust.328 Although there is a commonality among mem

of rival and allied intelligence services, and it too has famously been portrayed 

cult,329 the relationships of intelligence personnel are not, should not, and can

be based on trust because of the nature of the business; it rests instead on mist

Military personnel also can share cultural and organizational bonds based on c

mon goals and common dangers (in the trenches), but such bonds are reserve

comrades in arms (esprit d’corps). Although military relationships can transc

some borders, really close international partnerships are reserved for coun

325 Gombert and Gordon, War by Other Means, 3-7.

326 Gombert and Gordon, War by Other Means, 186, 296, 289, and Jones and Libicki

Terrorist Groups End, Preface, v.

327 Reed, Why Strategy Matters, 15.

328 Slaughter, “Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order,” 288, 290.

329 Victor Marchetti, CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Dell, 1989).
87

whose civilian leaders see political value in alliances. Law enforcement 

cannot only transcend borders and other barriers, but they can also del

into “human terrain” that other counterterrorism instruments would fi n

James Sheptycki states that “the broad scope of human security is both 

cally comprehensible and practically realistic when encompassed by de

policing means, whereas the broadening security agenda is simply incoh

unrealistic to a mind-set beholden exclusively to military ones.” 330

Drawbacks of Law Enforcement in Internation

Counterterrorism Eff orts

Although this study advocates an expanded overseas law 

ment role in the fi ght against terrorism, this is by no means a pan

has a number of potential drawbacks. Th ose drawbacks can be off set 

counterterrorism instruments in a fully-rounded, well-considered 

terrorism strategic policy. Nonetheless, because of imperfect strateg

backs are persistent and include:

• Th e perception (with its kernel of truth) that law enforcement r

are fi xated on legal process and investigative pretexts t

information, or to initiate counterterrorism eff orts and acti

has especially been true for the FBI, whose by-the-book repu

legendary. It is a less accurate description of hybrid security 

like the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and the civilianized 

law enforcement services (Air Force Offi ce of Special Inves

(AFOSI), the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), 

Army’s Criminal Investigation Division (CID), all of which 

security mandates to coordinate and liaise with foreign police 

and do not require an investigative pretext to compare no

foreign police counterparts).

• National police forces can be closely tied to the politica

of individual countries and may be diffi cult to work with 

national police forces in general trend away from political c

government). Th is is especially true if the police and the 

intelligence services are one and the same.

• National police forces can be corrupt and/or incompetent. 

make them unreliable and diffi cult to work with. Howev

though corrupt, some police agencies can be very eff ective 

corruption aspect can give them inroads and contacts that 

exist with legitimate police agencies. Working with corru

agencies requires extreme caution.

330 Sheptycki, “Policing, Intelligence Theory and the New Human Security Parad
88

• Law enforcement forces would not be eff ective on a military-

battlefi eld. Th is is especially so in the border areas of Afghanistan 

Pakistan, and places where armed confl ict is the norm—such as 

Caucusus, Chechnya, Ossetia, Dagestan, etc. Gombert and Gor

nevertheless suggest that law enforcement can be eff ective even w

insurgents are active.331

• Law enforcement operations would not be eff ective in situat

where covert (not just clandestine) operations are necessary.332 

enforcement cannot overthrow governments, cannot illegally mon

communications, and cannot conduct black operations; this is 

domain of intelligence services.

• Law enforcement operations are limited by international law and 

rule of law.

• Police can be hated as much if not more than “secret police” by 

local populace. Th is is as true in Los Angeles as in Moscow. How

police in many locations of counterterrorism interest to the Un

States do not just work among the poor and disaff ected; they are 

of the poor and disaff ected—and not all of them are corrupt. 

• Worldwide police networks, unencumbered by soverei

constraints, can be dangerous to individual freedoms because 

lack mechanisms for accountability—there is no way to regulate w

police elements do or what they share. However, Slaughter asserts 

such concerns are “overblown” and government networks have spe

properties that are highly conducive to self-regulation.333 Th e poin

be made that if unleashing government law enforcement networ

so potentially powerful that it causes worry and consternation am

the intelligentsia, then it could also be a formidable counter-bal

to the advantages held by the global networks of extremist insurge

and terrorism.

Illustrative examples of these points will be presented in the following chap

331 Gombert and Gordon, War by Other Means, 186, 289.

332 According to the Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, a covert operation is an oper

that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of, or permit plausible denial b

sponsor. A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation in that emphasis is plac

concealment of the identity of the sponsor, rather than on concealment of the operati

clandestine operation is synonymous with law enforcement’s undercover operation. See: h

www.ioss.gov/docs/definitions.html. 

333 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Governing the Global Economy through Government Netwo

180; Anne- Marie Slaughter, “Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order,” Stanford 

nal of International Law 40, (2004), 311.
89

Unintended Benefi ts

Th e strategic engagement of law enforcement networks, e

informal law enforcement networks, can deliver benefi ts beyond w

be immediately discernible. Slaughter maintains that because of 

in communications and technology, and the forces of globalization 

eral, the traditional dynamics of diplomacy and international relat

are migrating to the middle, operational (sub-state) levels of governm

which the author and his international law enforcement colleagues a

From these increasingly effi cient and potent relationships, new pow

tures are emerging.334

From the perspective of the author, it is easy to see how the

structures can come about. As Branch Chief of Diplomatic Securit

national Criminal Investigative Liaison program (CIL), I was in c

a section that would take (and usually accommodate) requests for 

tional investigative assistance from other federal law enforcement 

and U.S. police departments. Being in a position to assist others in 

ness seemed to make me a somewhat valuable commodity in law enfo

circles. Aft er a time it became apparent that I was being specifi cally so

by not only my peers but by those far senior to me in rank. In othe

I was valuable, and therefore powerful—far beyond my pay grade—

of the international relationships at my disposal.335 My superiors als

nized this disproportionate allotment/odd displacement of “juice.” W

Deputy Director of DSS tried and failed to secure a liaison position 

newly formed Homeland Security Department’s (DHS) Bureau of I

tion and Customs Enforcement (ICE), he asked me to see what I c

knowing that I had ties at relatively high levels throughout U.S. fed

enforcement. With a phone call and a few personal visits to hamme

details, the position was secured—to the mutual benefi t of Diploma

rity and ICE. 

Slaughter argues that such sub-state interactions are redefi 

just traditional notions of sovereignty but sovereignty itself. In the 

international criminal investigative liaison, this interaction manifest

“informal” law enforcement. Because CIL is not a “formal” pathway 

ducting international criminal investigations, nearly every lead ru

every contact made, nearly every action taken would necessarily 

preted as informal. Th e reader should not, however, confuse infor

334 Slaughter, “Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order,” 283-327.

335 I must confess that, having moved on from that branch chief position, I d

being in the thick of the international liaison and investigative community. 
90

illegal. As viewed by Defl em and den Boer, informal pathways are the con

for the lion’s share of international police, “cop-to-cop” business. Formal p

ways are those conducted under the prescribed and negotiated treaties 

procedures of the state; they are under the auspices of sovereignty. As Slau

ter indicates, “Government networks bypass a great deal of cumbersome 

formal, international negotiating procedures.”336 In other words, they by

the conventions of sovereignty. Th is was, and is, CIL’s stock in trade.

CIL has acquired a reputation within the international law enforcem

community that allows it to accomplish in a few hours, or a few days—by w

ing the informal police networks—what it would take Interpol or more 

ditional agencies weeks or even months to fulfi ll. Th ere is no legal agreem

more representative of the assertion of sovereignty than an extradition tr

usually contained within a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) betw

countries. CIL, in coordination with the U.S. Marshals Service, pioneered 

use of a legal procedure which enables the return of American fugitives f

overseas if extradition treaties prove unworkable or if there is none in p

While the details are operationally sensitive, U.S. fugitives hiding overseas 

be subject to expulsion or deportation from other countries if properly coo

nated. Because Diplomatic Security is present in nearly every country and 

investigative resources and close ties with host-nation police services the w

over (because of their security mandate to protect U.S. embassies and fa

ties overseas), DS’s Regional Security Offi cers (who are fully authorized fed

special agents for investigations and arrests) are perfectly oriented to en

their police contacts to locate, arrest, and deport American citizen fugit

While this tactic does not work everywhere (particularly where MLAT t

ties are followed to the letter—and particularly in Western Europe), it w

in a large part of the world and has revolutionized the fugitive return pr

dure for the U.S. federal government. CIL is able to accomplish similar feats 

“circumvent cumbersome international protocols” for almost any type of in

tigation. Instruments of governmental networks like CIL can serve to “pi

the shell of sovereignty,” as Slaughter observes.337 CIL has become so profi c

and effi cient that it has become the “discovery” of other results-oriented 

progressive federal investigative agencies. Over time, partnerships and allia

have been formed with agencies like the U.S. Marshals, which partnered 

DSS for its international fugitives program;338 DHS-ICE, which success

336 Slaughter, “Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks,” 18

should be noted that Slaughter is referring to government networks generally and is not sin

out law enforcement. It is not solely law enforcement that is bypassing sovereignty.

337 Slaughter, “Government Networks,” 227-229.

338 Secured by a Memorandum of Understanding, at the Marshals’ request, DSS 

permanent Special Agent position in the International Investigations Office of the Marsha
91

teamed up with DSS to bring international muscle to “Operation Pred

the U.S. Postal Inspector;340 the Secret Service, to address the explosive 

in transnational fi nancial fraud; and even the FBI, to assist with its nea

whelming overseas caseload.341

Some scholars of international policing have expressed conce

potential encroachment by police on national sovereignty and the im

of Western ideas on the rest of the world through policing practices. S

portrays this as a disadvantage of governmental networks, that the

seen as an “eff ort to insulate the decisions of the powerful from the 

the weak,” and in an international context that “many countries, bo

oped and developing, may see government networks as a device 

the most powerful countries penetrate the defenses of national sov

to impose their policy templates on everyone else.”342 Th is is prec

point Andreas and Nadelmann make in Policing the Globe. Th ey as

the “moral entrepreneurs” of the Western powers have contrived exte

policing as a means of imposing their moral and emotional convictio

rest of the world—particularly in the realm of drug and narcotics pol

narcotics regimes.343 According to Andreas and Nadelmann,

Th e underlying impetus of all international criminal law enforce

activities is the initial fact of criminalization by the state. New law

once-legal cross-border activities into criminal activities, resultin

sudden and sometimes dramatic overall increase in transnational c

And new criminalizations oft en inspire and justify the creation o

international law enforcement capabilities, which in turn can 

additional laws and other initiatives. Th us criminalization has b

powerful motor for state expansion—and based on current trend

can expect it to be an even more important source of growth 

years ahead. Th e policing face of the state is becoming more and 

prominently displayed, with its gaze increasingly extending be

national borders.344

339 “Operation Predator is a comprehensive initiative designed to protect you

from child pornographers, alien smugglers, human traffickers, and other predatory 

(under the provisions of the 2003 Protect Act).” Sources: http://www.ice.gov/pi/pred

releases.htm and http://www.ice.gov.pi/news/factsheets/operationpredator.htm

340 The Postal Inspectors fund a position in the CIL office at DSS headquarters 

Virginia.

341 DS’s second biggest client in the fugitive return business, after the Marshals, 

342 Slaughter, “Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks,

343 Andreas and Nadelmann, Policing the Globe, 223-226.

344 Andreas and Nadelmann, Policing the Globe, 225.
92

Slaughter maintains that these concerns are overblown. Howe

the present author considers that the forces of globalization (rather than 

imperatives of “moral entrepreneurs”) are tectonic in nature and that the 

dencies for international governmental cooperation, of which internati

policing remains but a small part, are too monumental to be contai

Slaughter maintains that governments increasingly must “intervene” in 

another’s aff airs because “fundamental threats to their own security, whe

from refugees, terrorists, the potential destabilization of an entire region, 

miasma of disease and crime may well have their origins in conditions o

thought to be within a state’s exclusive jurisdiction.” Slaughter sums up 

position by declaring that “States can only govern eff ectively by actively co

erating with other states and by collectively reserving the power to interv

in other states’ aff airs.”345

Dragnetworking: Strategic Advantages of Federal 

Law Enforcement Networks

Based on his experience, the author agrees with Slaughter that 

ernmental and, in particular, international law enforcement networks, ca

fast, fl exible, and very economical. As Chief of Diplomatic Security’s Crim

Investigative Liaison Branch in Washington from 2003 to 2006, it amazed 

that I could authorize and coordinate criminal investigative operations on 

other side of the world which could be happening in real time. Cell pho

and e-mail made communication easy and eff ective. Investigative requ

from U.S. domestic police departments and federal law enforcement agen

long hampered by formal procedures and other sorts of international red t

could be carried out in a matter of hours or a few days. As strong and w

nations alike fi nd and acknowledge “non-military” ways to wage war, the 

tegic canvas will be redone. Further, this development will not be limite

nation-states; it will be employed by networks, including super-empow

individuals and groups.346 Under these conditions, the United States w

be well-served to fully leverage the best counterterrorism instruments, s

ing with U.S.-led, international law enforcement networks.

Because military and intelligence networks are hindered by t

insularity and their propensity to control information, they are unlikel

enjoy the potential benefi ts of government networks.347 On the other h

international law enforcement—a “trust-based,” effi ciency-driven gov

345 Slaughter, “Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order,” 285.

346 Reed, Why Strategy Matters, 17.

347 Gombert and Gordon, War by Other Means, 79.
93

mental network—can do just that. Just as police are driven by the 

professionalism, so can diverse national governments enjoy the fu

benefi ts of an enhanced capability to confront common, fl uid inter

threats.348 It is not military and intelligence networks but law enfo

networks that are cited as paragons of international networking.349 S

marvels at the fl exibility and the effi ciency with which government n

can now accomplish their goals through informal means.350 Her se

are echoed by another observer:

Law enforcement agencies view information and intelligence as 

cious commodity. Trust and reciprocity are thus essential for succ

cross-border investigations. Studies in the fi eld of international 

cooperation show that informality is a prerequisite for trust: w

the consolidation of an informal network, police cooperation w

succeed.351

As Andreas and Nadelmann say, “Th e sentiment that a cop 

no matter whose badge is worn, and a criminal a criminal regardles

zenship or where the crime was committed, signals the emergence o

national value system that can override both political diff erences an

procedures. It provides the oil and glue of international law enforcem

Among policing scholars, a metaphorical transnational state 

to exist where policing fi ts into “interstitial spaces” between governed 

ries. Th ese spaces are “grey areas” where national laws and procedur

necessarily exist and where normal international protocols and othe

of sovereignty do not necessarily apply.353 Th e author believes it is 

even likely, that this is where the sub-state transactions that Slaughter 

are taking place, and it is here that mid- to high-level governmental m

are fi nding functionality and success.354 If these processes are indeed 

ing sovereignty, then this is an area for national leaders and strateg

international law enforcement) to exploit these “economies of circum

toward combating terrorism. In other words, the new circumstances 

348 Deflem, “Bureaucratization and Social Control,” 760; Slaughter, “Government 

224.

349 Gombert and Gordon, War by Other Means, summary, iv.

350 Slaughter, “Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks,” 

351 Monica den Boer, “Law Enforcement Cooperation and Transnational Organ

in Europe,” in Transnational Organized Crime & International Security, Mats Berdal a

Serrano, eds. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 111.

352 Andreas and Nadelmann, Policing the Globe, 232.

353 Author’s interpretation of Sheptycki’s construct. James Sheptycki, “Transnatio

and the Makings of a Postmodern State,” British Journal of Criminology, vol. 35, no. 

1995), 629-630.

354 Slaughter, “Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order,” 288.
94

now appearing as a consequence or by-product of globalization—the 

that inexpensive international phone service and even cheaper e-mails en

direct international communications for the functional levels of governm

to coordinate mutual interests with one another and form these “interst

spaces”—present an opportunity for motivated decision-makers to cou

the network advantages long since held by criminal and terrorist eleme

Th ese network and cyberspace advantages which have been the hallmark 

masterstroke of transnational Islamist terrorist groups like al-Qaeda have 

been the subject of much consternation and criticism in terms of our 

failure to capitalize on systems that we pioneered. By overcoming outmo

assertions of turf and conferring the substate and interstitial advantage

government networks to the particular talents of U.S.-led international 

enforcement, we can fi nally confront the threat of transnational terrorism 

the arena of its strength.

Andreas and Nadelmann refer to the emergence of terrorism a

international global prohibition regime—that is, terrorism is on its wa

being nearly universally recognized as a “common” crime—in the same 

as the United States has managed to identify international narcotics traffi 

ing. Th rough “regularization” of international policing “police have sough

cut through red tape, to avoid diplomatic imbroglios, and to obtain more 

better assistance from foreign colleagues. Th eir cumulative progress has b

substantial. No longer do police plead in vain, as they did just a few dec

ago, to be allowed to communicate directly across borders instead of via 

eign ministries and consulates.”355

Th e author believes that the adoption of a global regime against 

rorism is as attributable to the steady progress toward a globalized civiliza

as to the imposition of a global hegemony by the “great Satan.” Aft er all

United States was attacked on 9/11 much to the horror of the “civilized” wo

It was not the hegemony of any nation that drove the civilized world to ab

genocide aft er the holocaust—it was, and is, the force of civilized society—

unstoppable force of civilization; the force that drives us to do better, t

better, to improve the collective lot of the human inhabitants of this pla

Policing is a civilizational construct—true, it can be, and is, abused and 

rupted, but it remains an irreplaceable force to advance the greater good.

Andreas and Nadelmann are correct in observing that “what di

guishes the contemporary era is the relatively greater transnational nature 

reach of some terrorist networks and the growing fear of catastrophic cr

nality involving the use of weapons of mass destruction by non-state ac

355 Andreas and Nadelmann, Policing the Globe, 232.
95

As the technologies to create such weapons become more diff used, res

governments have little choice but to coordinate their control and enfo

eff orts ever more eff ectively. As with other types of transnational cri

deviant or “outlaw states” and government agents represent a major p

law enforcement challenge.356 For better or worse, it is a fact that th

States holds a leadership role in international policing—just as in the 

international diplomacy and international policy. But this role of th

States can be a force for civilizational hegemony in the fi ght against ter

Parallel Universes 

In the same way that globalization has created opportunity 

rorism networks to grow toward a worldwide insurgency, globaliza

and is providing opportunities for long-established, well-organized 

of national governments to evolve into ultra-effi cient and eminently 

sive entities in their own right—with potential benefi ts that have y

imagined and realized. No matter what the concerns are, the appli

the power of international law enforcement has to be preferable t

and other dubious practices to which the forces of intelligence and 

tary have resorted. In this sense, the negative aspects of effi cient inter

policing are the lesser evil.

Th us, the networks of law enforcement are ideally suited to co

networks of worldwide terrorism and insurgency, and are the best 

instrument to fi ght networks with networks. Unfortunately, the clo

works of intelligence and military forces are not conducive to takin

tage of rapidly evolving and mutating networks of international terro

to the present, the talents of informal law enforcement networkers in 

have lain mostly dormant. Acknowledging and acting on the advanta

ferred by U.S. international law enforcement can bring an entirely 

much-needed dimension to U.S. counterterrorism strategy, a strateg

in danger of stagnating. Informal law enforcement networks can b

added benefi t of providing neutral pathways for cooperation from U

and non-allies alike that may fi nd our military and intelligence prac

even our policies objectionable. In the end, by following this path

have what amounts to a shrewd and genuine counterterrorism strate

356 Andreas and Nadelmann, Policing the Globe, 233.

97

CHAPTER 5

Tales of the Blue Planet

Th e Practitioner’s World—Beyond Academic 

Discourse 

My time as Branch Chief of the Department of State’s Inter

Criminal Investigations Section (CIL) prepared me to appreciate the 

ship between the concepts set forth in the previous chapters and t

ties of everyday diplomatic service. In this chapter I will highlight, 

examples drawn from personal experience, best practices that reson

the concerns and exhortations of academic discourse.

Th e cases and scenarios to follow are representative of th

took place during my time as Chief of CIL and of cases I became aw

Chief of the U.S. Embassy’s Regional Security Offi ce in Paris, as wel

interaction with colleagues. In all likelihood, they are not dissimilar 

encountered at other posts. Th ese cases are selected for demonstr

particular arguments and academic points raised in this book, but 

not otherwise extraordinary in terms of what Diplomatic Security a

federal law enforcement agencies encounter on a daily and weekly ba

ing my time in CIL we processed, as a yearly average, over 3,000 req

overseas assistance originating from U.S. domestic police departm

other federal law enforcement agencies. Additionally, we coordinate

three overseas fugitive locates, arrests, and returns (to the U.S.) per w

reader should not presume that because Diplomatic Security is a 

small and not so well-known agency that we do not receive “the cream

criminal investigative international work. Th e reader will see that DS

very oft en deal with “the worst of the worst” of the world’s criminals 

rorists, and it is because of DS’s broad representation the world ove

are sought out by our fellow agencies. One might suggest that smal

cies such as DS, in part because of their relative obscurity, possess an 

adapt and adjust quickly to confront new problems.

In previous chapters we have identifi ed the following be

international law enforcement networks and, more specifi cally, the 

networks.
98

1. Law enforcement entities are fl exible, accustomed to everchanging, mutating aspects of crime, including international 

crime.

2. Informal law enforcement networks can adapt, adjust, and 

act quickly to address issues that require immediate action. 

3. Th e culture of law enforcement can, and does, transcend 

borders, politics, religion, nationalism, and other impediments to cooperation.

4. A global capability to “connect the dots” is possible if the 

devices of law enforcement are strategically enabled.

5. Law enforcement agencies, particularly in their interactions with each other, trend toward autonomy and away 

from the eff ects of political infl uence.

6. Law enforcement is ubiquitous, worldwide, and agencies 

are legion.

7. Law enforcement’s sphere of infl uence and ability to 

obtain information extends from the most basic levels of 

civilization (the villages and back alleys) to the highest levels 

of industrialized society.

8. Law enforcement can take advantage of emerging, substate international governmental networks, which are presently revolutionizing relationships and rendering obsolete 

the traditional pathways of sovereignty.

9. Informal networks of law enforcement can be spectacularly powerful and successful.

10. U.S. law enforcement is in a unique position to lead and 

coordinate international law enforcement counterterrorism 

eff orts.

11. International law enforcement networks can empower 

agencies in weaker states—especially through exercising 

“soft power.” 
99

12. Th e crime of terrorism, insofar as it is internationally recognized, provides a powerful incentive for law enforcement to 

cooperate internationally.

13. Law enforcement agencies commonly work with one 

another, including with foreign counterparts, and share 

information in a manner consistent with privacy considerations, national laws, and operational security.

14. Law enforcement, particularly U.S. law enforcement, is 

accustomed to working with sensitive information and is 

successful at protecting what the Intelligence Community 

refers to as “sources and methods,” without the need to resort 

to unreliable and overly restrictive classifi cation practices.

15. Law enforcement networks have a great deal of experience with, and signifi cant successes against, international 

networks, which makes them ideally suited to combating the 

network aspects of al-Qaeda-style transnational terrorism.

16. Th e technological aspects of law enforcement and border control are already a big factor in worldwide counterterrorism eff orts, which can be exponentially more eff ective 

if other aspects of globalized law enforcement can be further 

engaged and coordinated. 

Law Enforcement Entities Are Flexible, Accustomed t

the Ever-Changing, Mutating Aspects of Crime, Inclu

International Criminal Networks and Enterprises, an

Not Subject to Cold War-Era Procedures and Tactics

A telling example of the benefi ts conferred by law enforcem

works over those of the Intelligence Community and other countert

instruments was the recent apprehension of Victor Bout, the so-call

chant of Death”—a weapons dealer renowned for his lack of disc

choice of clients. Bout’s exploits were fi ctionalized in the 2005 movie 

of War, starring Nicolas Cage. He specialized in providing arms fo

Th ird World confl icts and was widely rumored to have supplied clien

ied as the Taliban and warlord-turned-dictator Samuel Taylor in Lib
100

one occasion, Bout was alleged to have air-dropped 10,000 AK-47s into P

that passed to Colombia’s narcoterrorist insurgent group the Revolution

Armed Forces of Colombia, better known as the FARC.357 Bout was captu

in a sting operation in Th ailand engineered by the U.S. Drug Enforcem

Administration. For this operation, DEA employed informants and w

established connections with foreign law enforcement to lure Bout in

bogus arms sales agreement with what he thought were representatives o

FARC.358 Th ai police arrested Victor Bout on 6 March 2008. He had be

thorn in the side of the United States for quite some time, and had em

rassed the U.S. by allegedly working as a subcontractor for such well-kn

fi rms as Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) and Federal Express, ferrying 

plies into Iraq for the Iraqi war eff ort.359 According to Bruce Falconer, wri

in the non-profi t investigative journal Mother Jones, the DEA sting op

tion was to take place in Romania, but Bout became concerned about b

arrested there and wanted to change the location.360 DEA, taking advan

of the fl exibility of its international networks, successfully switched the ve

to Th ailand, a country where it has especially powerful ties.361 According 

senior DEA offi cial, “We were asked to go aft er Bout. We DEA accomplis

in six months what the Intelligence Community could not do in over e

years.”362

Informal Law Enforcement Networks Can Adapt, Adjust

and Act Quickly to Address Issues that Require Immedia

Action

In July 2004, as I arrived in the offi ce, one of the CIL special ag

grabbed my arm to relate a story she had heard on the local news segm

of the Today show, reporting that a local Maryland man, Th omas Kou

an admitted molester of over 300 underaged boys, had fl ed the country 

being released on $3,000 bond from a Virginia courthouse. I told the agen

start making some phone calls to see where the fugitive investigation st

Upon consultation with the U.S. Marshals and the Northern Virginia F

357 Bruce Falconer, “Victor Bout’s Last Deal: How an Elite DEA Unit Brought Dow

World’s Most Notorious Arms Dealer,” Mother Jones, 18 March 2008. Available at: http://

motherjones.com/news/feature/2008/03/viktor-bout.html.

358 Falconer, “Victor Bout’s Last Deal.”

359 Falconer, “Victor Bout’s Last Deal.”

360 Falconer, “Victor Bout’s Last Deal.”

361 Interview with a senior DEA Official, 25 August 2008.

362 Interview with a senior DEA Agent, 25 August 2008. Although the DEA is a formal m

ber of the Intelligence Community, it is solely a “taskable” relationship. DEA cannot take u

eral action in intelligence operations—it must be tasked by the Intelligence Community. 

an interview with DEA Director of International Operations, Kevin Whaley, 7 June 2007.
101

tive Task Force, it had been determined that Koucky had fl ed to Gu

with a friend who was a Guatemalan native. Investigation determi

the friend, a waiter in a Virginia restaurant, was from a particula

borhood outside of Guatemala City. Th e fugitive task force asked C

could help. We replied that we would try and requested a photo of 

ject. Within a few hours, a local Foreign Service National Investigato

for the Regional Security Offi ce in Guatemala City spotted the fug

poor neighborhood on the outskirts of the city—the same neighborh

the investigation had determined Koucky’s friend to be from. By e

ning, the Regional Security Offi cer had developed an operations plan 

Guatemalan National Police, and the RSO requested authorization to 

with the operation—which I gave. At 6:00 a.m. the next morning, po

rounded the building in which Mr. Koucky was staying, and by 7:00 

was in custody. At the airport in Guatemala City, Guatemalan author

custody of Koucky to the RSO, who escorted him back to the Unite

By 6:00 p.m. that day, Diplomatic Security special agents, U.S. Mars

Arlington County Police offi cers marched Koucky into the Arlington 

Jail. Less than 36 hours aft er learning of the case, DSS agents had lo

fugitive, coordinated the arrest, and returned a notorious criminal to 

tice. Koucky had been in Guatemala less than ten days, and by Gu

law this fact allowed the immigration authorities to deport him as a

sirable person without further procedure. Koucky received a senten

years in a Virginia prison. International police resources in this case 

the Arlington County, Virginia, Police Department, the U.S. Marshal

gration and Customs Enforcement of the Department of Homelan

rity (DHS-ICE), the Diplomatic Security Service, the Guatemalan 

Police, and Guatemalan immigration authorities. Th e Koucky case i

how spectacularly fast and fl exible governmental/law enforcement n

can be. Furthermore, the speed of the case precluded lengthy court 

ings on extradition—in support of Slaughter’s claim that intergover

networks can also be “economical.”

Th e Culture of Law Enforcement Can Transcend Bord

Politics, Religion, Nationalism and Other Impedimen

Cooperation

Cuba

Few relationships in the annals of international aff airs have 

acrimonious as that between the United States and Cuba in recent 

Th e United States has not had diplomatic relations with Cuba since 
102

1961.363 Th is acrimony extends well beyond severed diplomatic ties into 

economic realm, involving a trade embargo and travel restrictions. Cuba’s 

dain for the United States is apparent in speeches made at the United Nat

and in aggressive, hostile intelligence activity against the United States b

domestically and abroad.364

On 13 September 2002, U.S. Postal Inspectors and Miami Po

arrested Angel Rafael Mariscal for producing child pornography. Mar

was accused of producing, starring in, and distributing pornographic 

eos featuring him and others engaging in sex acts with children. Th e Po

Inspector’s investigation determined that more than 100 minors had b

sexually abused on camera, the youngest a 7-year-old girl. Mariscal 

amassed over 500 hours of pornographic footage involving sex acts with 

dren. Aft er painstaking investigation, offi cials ascertained that the vi

had been fi lmed in Cuba. Although the prospects for conducting any so

investigation in Cuba seemed remote, postal inspectors and police conta

Diplomatic Security to see if any assistance was possible. Diplomatic Secu

worked within the State Department to obtain special dispensation to w

with the Cuban police to locate the child victims in this case. With approv

hand, DSS Regional Security Offi cer Pat Durkin, assigned to the U.S. Inte

Section in Havana,365 contacted the local Cuban police hierarchy regar

the case. Aft er expressing initial astonishment at the request, the horr

Cuban authorities agreed to help, and soon began a monumental eff or

locate the victims.366 Th e DSS Regional Security Offi cer, who as a U.S. Fed

Special Agent had investigative and arrest authorities, was granted per

sion to interview the abused children, whereupon he provided written rep

and photographs of the locations where the abuses took place—and au

rized the documentation as evidence. In addition, investigators learned 

Mariscal was HIV-positive and had infected at least seven of his child vic

in Cuba.

363 See Department of State Fact Sheet, “U.S.-Cuba Relations,” at www.state.gov/p/

rls/fs/2001/2558.htm.

364 Stephane Lefebvre, “Cuban Intelligence Activities Directed at the United S

1959-2007,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 22, no. 3 (Fall 2

452-469.

365 The United States has a rudimentary presence in Cuba under the diplomatic um

of the Swiss Embassy in Havana, an office known as the U.S. Interest Section. Although wi

an official diplomatic role, that entity does work with U.S. citizens who have familial and 

issues in Cuba.

366 According to then-Regional Security Officer Pat Durkin, Cuban authorities coope

out of self-interest. Kevin Whitelaw, “DS Gets Its Man,” Foreign Service Journal (Septe

2005), 40, also available at http://www.afsa.org/fsj/sept05/whitelaw.pdf. See also Bayer, “

ation Global Pursuit,” 34-35.
103

At his trial, the government presented evidence that Mari

traveled to Cuba and Ecuador frequently over a 7-year period to 

child pornography. He distributed his CD-ROMs and VHS tapes thr

the United States by mail and Federal Express. In November 2004, 

received a sentence of 100 years in prison for his crimes.367

Many themes of this book are represented by this case—the 

trust-based common culture that transcends politics and ideology; 

cept of a “common enemy”—in this case pedophiles; and the idea tha

a highly regulated society like Cuba’s, the police can have a signifi c

sure of autonomy, even if cooperation is self-serving—as it usually is

sequent instances of collaboration between U.S. law enforcement, thr

Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and Cuba have occurred, all with the 

and supervision of the U.S. Department of State. 

On 30 September 2006, David Ray Franklin stole a Cessna 1

XP airplane at the Marathon, Florida, Airport and fl ew to Cuba with h

son—of whom he did not have legal custody—in a case of parenta

tion.369 On 27 October, through the intervention and cooperation of 

Government of Cuba returned David Franklin to U.S. custody. On 10 

ber, the Cuban government also allowed Diplomatic Security special 

enter Cuba to seize the plane as evidence and fl y it back to Florida.37

In another recent case, Friday the 13th of June 2008 was a ba

Leonard Auerbach—it was the day he was returned to the United Sta

Cuba, where he had fl ed to avoid prosecution on child pornograph

es.371 On 14 November 2008, Auerbach was sentenced to 15 years for 

ing child pornography. Th e DHS-ICE press release cites fi eld and coor

work by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security as instrumental in the 

Auerbach had been on DHS-ICE’s list of top-ten most wanted fugitiv

In these cases, because they are oft en the only U.S. law enfo

representation in country, Diplomatic Security offi cers engage their 

enforcement contacts for assistance. Even in countries like Cuba an

367 Whitelaw, “DS Gets Its Man,” 2005, 40. See also Bayer, “Operation Global Purs

368 Although it is likely that the Cuban police had high-level approval to coopera

Diplomatic Security, the Cuban police did manage to convince the Cuban governme

chy that cooperation was in their best interests.

369 As the FBI has jurisdiction over all abduction cases, this case was coordinat

Bureau.

370 See “Diplomatic Security Special Agents Return Stolen Cessna From Cuba,

www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/75855.htm. Also see “Suspect in Parental Kidnapping Retu

Cuba,” at http://www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/75281.htm.

371 See http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/0811/081114oakland.htm.

372 See http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/080616miami.htm.
104

Diplomatic Security RSOs will necessarily have police contacts to carry 

their security directives—because it is almost always the national police 

provide the fi rst layer of defense for embassy security.373 RSOs universally 

to establish friendly relationships with national police elements, fundam

tally because embassy security is a matter of life and death.

China

In a particularly heinous case, international fugitive and accu

child rapist and pornographer Kenneth John Freeman was returned to 

United States from China on 18 October 2007. Freeman, a former compet

bodybuilder, was charged with one count of producing child pornogra

one count of transporting child pornography, three counts involving tr

porting a minor across state lines and producing child pornography, t

counts of fi rst degree rape of a child, and one count of bail jumping. Free

had fl ed the United States in March 2006, and had been placed on the 

Marshals’ 15 “Most Wanted Fugitives” list, as well as DHS-ICE’s top-ten f

tives listing.374 A break in the case came when the U.S. television show Am

ica’s Most Wanted aired a segment in which Freeman’s abused daughter 

her story. Soon aft er, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Child

(NCMEC) received telephone calls which linked the girl to Internet vid

posted some years earlier. A team of investigators from the federal Mars

Offi ce, ICE, the Benton County Sheriff ’s Offi ce, and the Diplomatic Secu

Service tracked Freeman as he moved through China—where he alleg

had been traveling on business. Julie Meyers, then-Assistant Secretary 

Homeland Security, Immigration, and Customs Enforcement said of the c

“Th e arrest of this accused child molester proves the global reach of our 

enforcement partnership.”375

Not only does the Freeman case demonstrate extraordinary coop

tion between U.S. law enforcement elements and a country not tradition

known for law enforcement cooperation, it also demonstrates how netw

can build upon themselves to form mega-networks, as Slaughter asser

In this case a television network (FOX) and the networks associated wit

373 In a related case, Diplomatic Security assisted the U.S. Marshals Service in effe

the return of a fugitive who had been hiding out in Cuba—for more than 40 years—after a 

viction on fraud charges. See Alfonso Chardy, “Cuba Sends Fugitive to Face U.S. Justice A

Decades,” Miami Herald, 26 April 2007. Available at http://newsgroups.derkeiler.com

Archive/Soc/soc.culture.cuba/2007-04/msg01127.pdf.

374 U.S. Marshals Service, Former Lawman and Accused Child Rapist Returned to Washi

State to Face Charges. Available at www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/93721.htm.

375 National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), “NCMEC Applauds U.S

shals and ICE for Capture of Nation’s Most Wanted Accused Child Pornographer.” Available at ht

www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=3
105

NGO (non-governmental organization)—NCMEC—all contribute

successful conclusion of an exceptionally disturbing fugitive case.

A Global Capability to “Connect the Dots”

In the movie Th e Lord of War, a character portrays the sadistic s

ruthless president—armed with a gold-plated AK-47—and terrorizes 

enemies and the people of his country. Th is is the fi ctionalized represen

“Chuckie Taylor,” the U.S.-born son of the brutal Liberian warlord-tur

tator Charles Taylor. Th ere was no need to embellish Chuckie’s exploi

cinema; his real-life series of atrocities is legendary. He was allegedly 

in killings, rapes, beatings, and torture. According to an Associated Pre

torture victims were held in water-fi lled holes in the ground, beaten a

ally abused, and forced to drink urine and eat cigarette butts:376

It was July 2002 and civil war had been rampaging through Liber

13 years, transforming one of Africa’s oldest democracies into a g

ish landscape. Drugged-out militias manned checkpoints decorated 

human intestines and severed heads. Small children were forced 

battle by the thousands. Women were raped and turned into sex 

known as “bush wives.” Enemies were disemboweled, cooked and c

balized. All told, human rights groups estimate, more than 600,000 

rians were murdered, raped, maimed or mutilated in the confl ict.

In the midst of this reign of terror, Chuckie was among the most-f

men in the country. Only 25, he created and commanded the Ant

rorist Unit (ATU), the president’s personal security force—a sou

such pride that Chuckie had the group’s emblem, a crest of a h

cobra and a scorpion, tattooed on his chest. In the capital, he cut 

rifying fi gure, scattering crowds as he raced through traffi c in a 

Cruiser with a license plate that read “demon.” When he appear

public, he was almost always fi tted out in black or camoufl age fat

a well-built fi gure strapped with a 9mm, a cigar in hand. His face

dark eyes, the round cheeks, the neatly trimmed beard—was im

ately familiar to Liberians who had endured the long civil war. No

because of menacing reputation but because of the man he so c

resembled, his father, Charles Taylor, the president of Liberia, wh

set the region ablaze with four devastating wars over the span o

decades.377

376 Curt Anderson, “Activists Want Charles Taylor’s Son Tried for War Crimes

Associated Press, 5 August 2006.

377 Johnny Dwyer, “The All-American Warlord,” The Observer, 23 November 2008

able at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov23/liberia-war-crimes-chucky-taylo
106

On 29 March 2006, the Regional Security Offi cer in Port of Sp

Trinidad, received an urgent phone call from an agent with DHS-ICE requ

ing immediate assistance in determining the existence of a passport in 

name of Charles McArthur Emmanuel. Emmanuel was known to have g

by another name—Charles “Chuckie” Taylor. Whenever RSOs receive requ

from other agencies, the proper procedure is to vet the request through 

CIL and then the Branch Chief (at that time, the author) determines whe

to render assistance.378 In this case, passport information is considered p

leged, “privacy act” information. Caution must be exercised in releasing 

information to another agency. Examination of the passport records indic

possible passport fraud; the passport application appeared to have been 

sifi ed to conceal the fact that Charles Taylor was his father.379 To share 

passport application with ICE, DSS opened a passport case on Chuckie, 

passed the lead for further action on to ICE.380 On 30 March 2008 Cha

“Chuckie” Taylor was charged with passport fraud upon his entry into 

United States from Trinidad. On 30 October 2008 he was found guilty of 

ture and related crimes. Th is brought the fi rst conviction under the U.S. 

ture Prevention Act of 1994.381

In law enforcement, investigative leads can open a window on pro

ative interrelationships. Chuckie had ties to Israeli arms trader Leonid Mi

Chuckie’s father was one of the primary customers of Victor Bout. Cha

Taylor has been accused of harboring members of al-Qaeda. Victor Bout a

edly supplied arms to the Taliban. He is also alleged to have smuggled d

in empty planes returning aft er dropping off arms shipments, like Minin. 

illustrates the many tendrils of international crime and criminal enterpr

It is in this manner that the resources of law enforcement can provide in

mation about the larger picture of terrorist and other illicit networks. W

it is the responsibility of intelligence agencies to track such information, 

fi xation on “secret” information as the only “valuable” data precludes a 

and thorough accounting of the overall intelligence picture.382

378 Sometimes requests are outlandish, illegal, or otherwise beyond the capacity of 

over-tasked Regional Security Offices. As a headquarters element, CIL can recommend p

and legal measures to accomplish investigative goals.

379 An Associated Press article stated, “Prosecutors say he lied on his passport applic

about the identity of his father, who was arrested the day before...” See Curt Anderson, “

ists Want Charles Taylor’s Son Tried for War Crimes, Torture,” Associated Press, 6 August 2

Available at http://www.prosecutions.org/news/archives/002607.html.

380 Source: Professional files and recollections of the author.

381 DHS-ICE–Bayer e-mails dated 7 December 2006 and 30 October 2008. See 

Amnesty International, “Chuckie Taylor Convicted of Torture,” 31 October 2008. Availab

http://www.amnestyusa.org/doctument.php?id=ENGNAU200810317933&lang=e.

382 Interview with an intelligence agency supervisory analyst who requested confident

Ironically, this source desired confidentiality because he feared professional retribution.
107

Law Enforcement Agencies Trend Toward Autonomy 

Away from the Eff ects of Political Infl uence

Th e U.S. relationship with Pakistan is complicated—par

between our respective intelligence services. In many other countrie

as in the United States, intense rivalries exist between intelligence 

and the national police. Such is the case in Pakistan.383 During th

search for Daniel Pearl in the days and weeks following his kidnapp

rivalry may have played to the advantage of RSO Randall Bennett in 

According to Pearl’s journalist wife Mariane, Bennett led the Karac

U.S. investigation in the hunt for Pearl and his kidnappers.384 By secu

cooperation of the Pakistani National Police through a longtime trus

tact, Tariq Jamal, the Deputy Chief of the Karachi police, Bennett wa

establish a trusting relationship with the man who would lead the i

tion to locate Pearl and bring his kidnappers (and in the end, murd

justice. Although ultimately unsuccessful in rescuing Daniel Pearl b

was killed, the investigation exposed a sophisticated terror cell whos

precautions were overcome, resulting in their arrest shortly aft er Pea

was found. Signifi cantly, the Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI) was 

complicit in protecting the kidnappers.385 Daniel Pearl had written 

that likely irritated and embarrassed the ISI, giving it an incentive, at 

to cooperate with the police search.386

Th e duplicity and political motives of the Pakistani Intellige

vice are a recurring theme in Mariane Pearl’s book. Of the ISI’s ro

investigation, she writes “Where is the ISI’s national pride? Why has 

such minimal interest in the kidnapping? Th e agency leaves its mark 

aspect of Pakistani politics; you would think that even for appearan

it would want its presence known.”387 When she is speaking of th

suspect’s ability to remain free, even though some Pakistani authorit

where he was, she writes, “Someone has been protecting him. Som

between corrupt politics and false preachers, Omar found a shelter

ISI’s adversarial role with respect to U.S. interests may be limited t

383 E-mail correspondence with the Regional Security Officer in Pakistan, Stev

December 2008.

384 Mariane Pearl, A Mighty Heart (New York: Scribner, 2003).

385 Pearl, 182.

386 Pearl, 149-150. 

387 Pearl, 141.

388 Pearl, 160.
108

extremist elements within the ISI, but it is diffi cult to tell who is who, and 

own intelligence agencies suff er from not knowing.389

On the other hand, Pearl speaks very favorably of the police, altho

recognizing some corruption. She writes that Bennett considered his po

contacts in Karachi to be “trusted brothers.”390 Later in the book she n

“I recall Randall’s reference to Tariq Jamil as his brother, and the respec

showed Captain. It reassures me to see that all these men seem to consider 

Bennett a real friend.”391 Th e one military intelligence offi cer who worked 

the police on the Pearl case had his career destroyed and he ultimately bec

a police offi cer.392 Th e lead police investigator she knew as “Captain” came 

unscathed and was even honored for his role in the case—despite the po

ful infl uence of the ISI. Th ese developments off er good evidence of the po

cal autonomy of police.

Even in such politically volatile environments as Pakistan, the po

(and other intergovernmental networks) can assume positions of auton

and even mild opposition to political forces. Th ese dynamics occur con

uously in our counterparts’ countries, although Pakistan may seem a 

nounced example. It appears wise to take advantage of the opportun

brought by the professional autonomy of police agencies.

Th e Forces of Law Enforcement are Ubiquitous, Worldwi

and Agencies Are Legion

In the province of law enforcement, little things can mean a lot. Po

are accustomed to focusing on minute details—they know that they can 

to big breaks. Recall that Timothy McVeigh was originally arrested on a w

ons possession charge aft er a traffi c stop 90 minutes aft er the Oklahoma 

Murrah Federal Building bombing.393 Would-be millennium bomber Ah

Ressam was arrested aft er a routine customs inquiry.394 D.C. Beltway sni

John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo were arrested by Maryland S

Troopers aft er a citizen noticed their car parked at a rest stop and called 

389 Mark J. Roberts, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State wit

State? Joint Force Quarterly 48 (2008), 104-110; see also Richard A. Clarke, “Plans of Att

Washington Post, 7 December 2008, B01.

390 Pearl, 35.

391 Pearl, 98.

392 Pearl, 226.

393 Nolan Clay, “Lawman who caught Timothy McVeigh speaks of arrest,” The Oklaho

29 August 2008. Available at http://newsok.com/article/3290630/.

394 Lisa Meyers, Foiling Millennium Attack was Mostly Luck, MSNBC, 29 April 2004. 

able at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4864792.
109

emergency number 911.395 Intelligence elements, oft en relatively few 

ber, need to “target” their eff orts. Implicit in that goal is the presump

certain amount of foreknowledge—the need to know just what info

they require and from whom they can obtain it. Little room exists f

nor can the agent expect felicitous happenstance or chance. Law enfo

on the other hand, has the ability to cast a wide net (dragnet) to iden

sons of interest and important information before or aft er an even

have seen in the vignettes here, such information oft en turns out to be 

tive; that is to say, it is “actionable intelligence.” Both instruments can 

tive, but each has diff erent approaches and particular talents. A balan

intelligent counterterrorism strategy would wholly incorporate the t

both and benefi t from the contributions of each.

Law Enforcement’s Sphere of Infl uence and Ability to 

Obtain Information Extends from the Most Basic Lev

Civilization (the Villages and Back Alleys) to the High

Levels of Industrialized Society

In the fall of 2007, DHS-ICE and the Regional Security Offi ce 

collaborated on a sexual predator case that originated in Bangladesh—

ing a retired AID (Agency for International Development) offi cer 

allegedly been sexually abusing young boys in that country. One of t

realities of the Th ird World is that in places like Bangladesh an oppo

pedophile with a little cash can buy nearly anything, including the com

children. Th is former AID offi cer had a detailed knowledge of the cou

was able to accommodate his proclivities. Pedophiles, however, are 

arily reviled even in a poor country like Bangladesh. While the inve

was underway, the subject left the country and disappeared for a time

a year later, the U.S. Embassy in Lomé, Togo, had some interaction w

mer AID offi cer who had established a residence on a mountaintop 

village in a remote region of Togo. As time went on, some at the Em

Lomé expressed bewilderment as to why this person was living on 

taintop in the middle of Togo. At an embassy social event, several 

were discussing the odd man who lived on the mountain and the 

Security Offi cer happened to overhear the conversation. When the RS

the name of the man on the mountain, it sounded familiar. Aft er som

ing, and some very high-quality dot-connecting, the RSO determined 

man on the mountain was the same man as the one wanted in Ban

Upon this discovery, the RSO immediately notifi ed DHS-ICE, and 

395 CBS News, “Trucker: I’m no Hero,” 25 October 2002. Available at http://ww

com/stories/2002/10/25/earlyshow/main526939.shtml. 
110

was on. Within a week, the Regional Security Offi ce and ICE had formulat

plan. RSO would gather a force of local Gendarmerie and they would ven

into the remote mountains, where the Gendarmerie would arrest the sub

ICE would simultaneously make accommodation for some special agen

fl y to Togo to escort the subject back to the United States to face prosecut

Th e RSO and his deputy, the Assistant Regional Security Offi cer, assem

their force and went into the mountains.

Upon arriving at the village, the Gendarmerie asked a man wal

along the street where they might fi nd the white man who lived among 

villagers. Th e man was hesitant to answer but, aft er some time and a paym

of a few loaves of bread, he pointed to a road that led to a modern-style h

that sat above the village. Perched on top of the house were enormous s

panels and large water tanks. It occurred to the offi cials that the subject 

providing clean water and electricity to the villagers. Th is could get sticky

they would need to act quickly. Th e original plan to take the time to re

noiter the subject’s residence had to be abandoned because the RSOs real

he could be tipped off by the villagers and he could disappear. Th ey dec

that the Assistant RSO would speak to the subject and inform him of the 

warrant for his arrest and that the Gendarmerie was there to take him 

custody. While this was going on, word spread quickly throughout the vil

that the Americans were there to kidnap their white chief. While the po

and the RSOs were taking the subject into custody, an angry mob of appr

mately 100 people surrounded the front of the house, blocking the offi 

vehicles. As the RSOs assessed the situation and tried to calm the local ch

the crowd grew to approximately 250 angry persons, now armed with b

and arrows, spiked clubs, guns, and machetes. As the crowd grew even m

agitated, they began aggressive movements. Th e situation was explosive. 

RSOs succeeded in calming the crowd enough so their ace card could e

the fray. Th ey called in their Foreign Service National Investigator (FS

nicknamed Big John—a chief well-known in his own right and whose 

and voice carried an air of authority and gained respect among the cro

Initially, the RSOs had decided that Big John would wait and monitor 

situation from off site, in deference to the Gendarmerie—in eff ect, let

them handle the situation. When the situation escalated to the point w

the Gendarmerie and the RSOs were being shoved and pushed about, 

John stepped in. Within a short period of time, the crowd had calmed and 

tribal chiefs directed the crowd that the Gendarmerie and the RSOs shoul

able to leave with the subject in custody. Th e rapid turn of events meant 

the subject would be expelled from Togo earlier than anticipated and that 

agents would miss the deportation if they travelled all the way to Togo. O
111

again, in timely response to changing events, one tired Assistant RS

fresh FSNI escorted the subject to France, from where he was return

United States by appreciative ICE agents.

Th is case demonstrates just how small the world can be w

enforcement agencies collaborate. From a casual conversation at an 

cocktail party to a mountaintop rural village in Togo where a neigh

chieft ain calms an angry mob, law enforcement is everywhere, wher

counterterrorism instruments are not. It is this distinction that c

a diff erence in a world where causing mass loss of life and destruc

become a political strategy. As a branch chief in CIL, I encouraged 

assist other agencies and their host-nation counterparts with crimi

whenever they could. Th e fi rst reason is because it engenders good

trust among counterpart agencies—and we might need them for a 

some point. Second, it helps keep the RSO apprised of what criminal 

rorism activity is taking place in his assigned country. Th ird, it keeps 

apprised of the activities of other law enforcement agencies, which 

sary for coordination purposes. Fourth, and most important, it places 

closer contact with their host-country police counterparts, in the real

the host-nation police are most comfortable—dealing with criminal 

When RSOs deal with host-nation police on a multitude of levels, 

better able to relate to police at any particular level. Th is close work

tionship can result in critical information being passed at the right t

a security offi cer at a high-value target like a U.S. embassy, this can m

diff erence between life and death for members of the embassy comm

Law Enforcement Can Take Advantage of Emerging, 

State, International Governmental Networks

Slaughter maintains that intergovernmental networks can cir

cumbersome bureaucratic procedures and red tape. As chief of CIL, 

tried to exploit the informal networks of law enforcement, under

their effi ciency. Ironically, I found that the most diffi cult countries 

with were those which were ostensibly our allies—countries with w

United States had formal Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. Th ese 

tend to turn law enforcement cooperation into a bureaucratic exer

requests and responses going through diplomatic channels. Very oft 

interactions would be processed with very little human interaction a

one country refused to honor a request for whatever reason, be it a te

ity or opposition to the death penalty, the answer was oft en fi nal. 
112

particularly true with countries in Western Europe, which sometimes see

almost spiteful in their reluctance to cooperate.396

In France, the notorious Ira Einhorn case exemplifi es the situation

this case, a well-known counter-culture radical of the 1960s and early 1

was accused of murdering his girlfriend, then hiding out in Europe and 

mately in France. It required a monumental eff ort, and a promise not to imp

the death penalty in Pennsylvania, to ultimately gain Einhorn’s extradition

Even now, it is a painstaking and time-consuming exercise to obtain ex

ditions and other types of offi cial cooperation. But law enforcement offi 

are resourceful—particularly in the same Western European countries w

policing, and informal policing in particular, were pioneered, accordin

Defl em, den Boer, Andreas, and Nadelmann. Th e United States has an M

with France, for example, and it does indeed restrict what we have com

know as informal policing. But there is very oft en some wriggle room, 

one need only look for it.

In November 2006 the San Francisco District Attorney’s O

requested Diplomatic Security’s assistance with the diffi cult prosecutio

a violent, multiple-charge rape case. Th e accused rapist in that case had b

charged with sexually assaulting two women. Th e prosecution alleged tha

defendant had gone to a home shared by the two female roommates, a

with some of their friends. Aft er the friends had left for the evening, the de

dant regained entry to the apartment under the pretext of having left his 

and cell phone behind. Upon reentering the apartment the defendant 

lently physically assaulted and raped the terrifi ed women using a corksc

as a weapon. Th e case presented diffi culties for the prosecution because 

charges were predicated almost solely on uncorroborated verbal testim

of the women and some minimal circumstantial evidence. During the in

trial, police investigators discovered that the defendant had a previous 

viction for rape in France. Prosecutors moved to introduce that convic

as evidence, but the presiding judge refused based on the defendant’s righ

face his accuser. Th e judge allowed the prosecution to attempt to locate 

victim and convince her to testify. Because of the need for quick action on 

case, the French Foreign Ministry agreed to allow U.S. authorities to atte

to locate and convince the French rape victim to testify. Desperate, the 

trict Attorney’s offi ce and the San Francisco Police Department appeale

the Regional Security Offi ce in Paris for help. Immediately, the RSO enga

396 Craig Whitlock, “Extradition of Terror Suspects Founders,” Washington Post, 21 

December 2008, A01. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/

AR2008122002096.html?hpid%3Dtopnews&sub=AR.

397 CNN, “France Postpones Extradition of U.S. Fugitive,” CNN.com, 12 July 2001. h

archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/07/12/einhorn.france/index.html.
113

his FSNIs398 to locate the French victim. Unfortunately, the victim 

to testify, fearing that the defendant would not be vigorously prosec

would be able to harm her for her role in testifying against him. 

ended in a hung jury. Aft er the trial, the prosecutor told the investiga

he would be willing to re-try the case if the French victim could be co

to testify. Once the witness was relocated, the RSO, over a period o

weeks, gently persuaded the frightened witness to testify.399 Th e San F

District Attorney’s offi ce paid for the victim to be fl own to San Fran

February 2007, based on the testimony of the French victim, the d

was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, fi rst-degree burglary 

intent to commit a sex off ense, and using a deadly weapon in the com

of sex off enses. On 9 November 2007 the defendant was sentenced to 

secutive life terms of 35 years each, with a minimum of 70 years to b

and $30,000 in fi nes and restitution of $5,000 per victim.

Without such intervention and assistance, a brutal rapist w

walking free. Th e French victim was ecstatic about the conviction—h

ant had been given a minimal sentence for her rape and assault in 

thus prompting her fear of a similar outcome in the California tria

day, the French witness remains in contact with the RSO and recen

veyed her intention to travel to San Francisco to meet with the othe

victims for empathy and support from their common harrowing exp

She recently delivered her fi rst child.

Th is case demonstrates that, even in highly restrictive and r

environments, intergovernmental networks of informal policing ca

over established and rigid formal systems.

Informal Networks of Law Enforcement Can Be 

Spectacularly Powerful and Eff ective

In October 2004 the Pennsylvania State Police called the auth

headquarters in Washington to request assistance to solve an 11-year

case murder investigation. In December 1993 deer hunters discovered 

body of an unidentifi ed woman in a wooded area near South Middleto

sylvania. Th e woman had been raped and then brutally murdered, h

abused. In June 2004 DNA evidence from her attacker was matched 

dore John Solano—a convicted sex off ender who had served prison tim

398 Foreign Service National Investigators are hired by Regional Security Offices 

security investigations on behalf of U.S. embassies abroad. Generally, FSNI positions 

coveted positions among retired, high-level police officials of the host country. Thes

often give RSOs an extraordinary amount of clout and access in the host nation.

399 With the permission of the French National Police.
114

tribution of child pornography. Police tracked Solano to Canon City, Color

where they interviewed him. Under questioning, Solano provided police 

the name of a woman with whom he had a “marriage of convenience.” In

tigation led police to believe that the woman was Natalia Andreevna Mill

young Russian who had immigrated to the United States in hopes of ma

ing an American man and gaining U.S. citizenship. But since the police c

not positively establish the identity of the body, they were unable to charge 

prime suspect—Solano. Even though they had a considerable amount of 

cumstantial evidence against him, without a positive ID on the body they c

not adequately tie Solano to the murder. Th e state trooper’s investigation le

a family that had hosted Natalia, and some possible names of the girl’s par

plus the information that they were likely from the area of St. Petersburg, 

sia. Th e DSS lead agent assigned to the case informed the Pennsylvania P

that there was an excellent chance that DSS could locate them. Within a 

of the initial phone call to CIL, and based on the names provided, the A

tant Regional Security Offi cer Investigator400 in St. Petersburg engaged 

Russian police contacts—who quickly located the parents. Th e parents eag

came to the U.S. Consulate to provide blood samples, which were sent to 

headquarters and, through an evidentiary chain, on to the Pennsylvania S

Police. DNA analysis confi rmed the identity of Jane Doe as Ms. Miller and, 

December 2004, police arrested Solano. “It was a real-life episode of Cold C

Files,” Cumberland County District Attorney Skip Ebert observed. “What 

can bring to the table is fantastic—I never knew these folks existed before.”

What was once an 11-year-old cold murder case was resolved by 

tenacity of the Pennsylvania State Police, the County Coroner, the deve

ment of DNA technology and, importantly, the ongoing, real-time ev

tion of intergovernmental networks—the informal networks of internati

policing. No mutual legal assistance treaty, letters rogatory, or diplom

demarches were required for this case—only cops talking to cops. On 4 Ja

ary 2008 Solano pleaded no contest to third-degree murder for the strang

tion death of Miller and will serve 17 to 40 years in state prison.402

400 Diplomatic Security has Assistant Regional Security Officer Investigators in part

posts overseas whose sole function is criminal investigation. They serve there in addition t

Regional Security Officer. DSS has added 50 ARSO-I positions for 2009.

401 Bayer, “Operation Global Pursuit,” 34. See also Tiffany Pakkala, “‘Jane Doe’ Su

Nabbed,” The Sentinel, 4 December 2004, available at http://www.cumberlink.com

cles/2004/12/04/news/news01.prt, and Erik Harkreader, “Murder Suspect in Court,” The 

tinel, 1 December 2005, available at http://www.cumberlink.com/articles/2005/12/01/n

news01.txt.

402 Matt Miller, “Husband Sentenced in ‘Jane Doe’ Murder,” The Patriot-News, 4 Ja

2008. Available at http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2008/01/_if_olga_shugar

html.
115

U.S. Law Enforcement Is in a Unique Position to 

Lead and Coordinate International Law Enforcement 

Counterterrorism Eff orts

Presently, in matters of transnational crime, the United States 

almost universally accepted leadership role in international law enforce

Th e Americanization of international law enforcement is a matter o

record, and is recognized by scholars. As the most widely represented nat

enforcement assemblage on earth, the United States is positioned to be 

in counterterrorism initiatives as well. In counterterrorism, leading the c

the United States in law enforcement is the FBI; it is, without question, 

be reckoned with and it is indeed a positive force. Few law enforcement 

tions can muster a fraction of the FBI’s resources, investigative skill, and 

know-how. But by this agency’s own admission, it cannot succeed alon

know from the May 2007 GAO Combating Terrorism Report that, with t

tion of the FBI, U.S. federal law enforcement capabilities have not been ad

engaged. We also know from that report that, as a practical matter, the num

worldwide geographic distribution of the non-FBI, U.S. federal law enf

presence overseas are greater than the overseas representation of the FB

United States is in a position to be a more eff ective leader if U.S. law enf

is more completely engaged in counterterrorism activity. Th e following c

cates just how eff ective this leadership can be.

Operation Triple X—Diplomatic Security Serv

Operation Triple X was an international, criminal undercover oper

by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security in partner

the Indonesian National Police. Th e investigation revealed that organized 

syndicates in Indonesia were conspiring to perpetrate a massive manipulat

U.S. government’s visa issuance process to facilitate traffi cking in women 

dren to work in the sex industry, drug traffi cking, weapons traffi cking, p

networks, and money laundering. Some of these criminal syndicates were 

with Jamaah-al Islamiya (JI), a ruthless and deadly terrorist group. Th e l

of JI had sworn allegiance to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda and was re

for the bombings in Bali in 2003 which killed 202 people, and the 2004 

403 European policing looms large in this equation as well. See Mathieu Deflem

tional Policing,” 703; also Andreas and Nadelmann, Policing the Globe, 241-245, w

Americanization of international law enforcement as a means of imposing Amer

mony. Kal Raustiala, “Architecture of International Cooperation,” 24-25, also accepts 

that networks tend to “strengthen the power of the already powerful, and favor strong 

actors such as the U.S.”

404 FBI Strategic Plan 2004-2009, 8. 

405 GAO, Combating Terrorism Report.
116

of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta that killed at least 12. In 2003, JI was behi

potentially devastating plot to bomb U.S. diplomatic facilities in Singapore and 

military bases in the South Pacifi c. Additionally, the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta 

the U.S. Consulate General in Surabaya were closed several times in 2005 and 2

because of similar terrorist activities. Th e investigation yielded 84 arrests and 

4,800 fraudulent documents, including Indonesian passports, U.S. passports 

visas, Indonesian national identifi cation cards, marriage, birth, and family reco

vehicle registrations, and drivers’ licenses. More than 8,000 individuals were i

tifi ed as having engaged the services of these criminal syndicates for the pur

of getting into the United States. Th e potential for serious violence became 

when one of the syndicate’s clients was arrested for attempting to smuggle autom

weapons from Indonesia into Los Angeles.

Operation Triple X—An Indonesian Passport, an Identification Card, 

and the Marketing of Fraudulent Documents.

Source: State Department, with permission.
117

BJBS, one of the main Indonesian front companies for the 

fraud network, was raided by police. Th e raid uncovered a direct link 

criminal syndicates producing fraudulent documents and JI. Accord

article in Police Chief magazine, “One JI operative brought $30,000 

to pick up three complete sets of counterfeit identifi cation docum

undercover offi cer working inside overheard the would-be terrorist 

‘I am a member of JI—now I’m going overseas.’” An important link 

Surabaya’s fraudulent document brokers and terrorists arose on 9 Ju

when Indonesian police arrested JI’s Arif Syarifuddin. Arif Syarifud

alleged JI member who specialized in providing false documentati

houses, and safe passage for JI operatives, and was considered a ri

among the JI leadership. Syarifuddin was arrested by an elite In

antiterrorism task force called “Detachment 88,” for which DS has 

antiterrorism training for many years.406 Th ese cases have succeede

the basis of national strategic policy—but because of the profession

the law enforcement entities involved—both on the U.S. side and th

international partners. Th ese cases have succeeded not because of our 

policy (of the previous U.S. administration); they succeeded in spi

because overseas information coordination for terrorism has been v

the domain of the Intelligence Community.

Th e massive scope of the investigation, as troubling as it is, 

more troubling because DS’s Surabaya offi ce is relatively new. If it 

established operations in Surabaya, this chain of fraud would likely 

tinuing unabated, and a lethal terrorist group would have a reliable 

for travel directly to the United States. Although DS is the most bro

resented U.S. law enforcement agency worldwide, it very likely still 

operate everywhere it is needed—as the 9/11 Commission reported, 

rorists, travel documents are as important as weapons”407—who kn

many more Surabaya(s) remain in the world?

Th e eff ective application of several layers of the “soft power” 

ing, as illustrated here, places federal U.S. law enforcement agencies in 

position to become a much more eff ective leader in the international 

against terror. Peter Chalk, an analyst with the RAND Corporation, 

406 Richard J. Griffin, “Operation Triple X: Hitting Hard at Illegal Document T

Police Chief 74, no. 10 (October 2007). Available at http://www.policechiefmagazine

zine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=1295&issue_id=102007.

407 The 9/11 Commission Report, 385. Available at http://www.9-11comm

report/911Report.pdf.
118

that “Jakarta’s decision early on to assign police, rather than the militar

take the lead gave crucial legitimacy to the terrorism crackdown.”408

Operation Triple X was also successful because of the developm

of informal, personal relationships among the law enforcement participa

According to the former Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, Rich

A. Griffi n:

One good tip, some old-fashioned police work, and a solid partnershi

with a host of law enforcement authorities around the world was a

it took to shut down more than two dozen document counterfeitin

operations in Indonesia, enhancing U.S. national security. It is wort

noting here that DSS achieved such success with Operation Triple X 

even though its personnel have no law enforcement authority in othe

countries, outside of the actual U.S. diplomatic facilities. How, then, di

DSS special agents achieve such tangible results against criminal opera

tions? Besides good and thorough investigative work, perhaps the mos

signifi cant element for success in any international investigation—o

indeed, any investigation involving more than one agency—is to estab

lish trust and confi dence through good working relationships with a

partners at the managerial, investigative, and operational levels. It is 

lesson that DSS learned long ago, applied in Operation Triple X, an

successfully puts into practice every day throughout the world.409

In this case, the tip came from a group of counterfeiters that the In

nesian police had rounded up. Th e Indonesian police permitted Regi

Security Offi cer Kevin Whitson to interview them (through the powe

informal, trust-based networking capability of law enforcement). Th e co

terfeiters never thought they would face prosecution, so they arrogantly sp

freely to Whitson.410

Th is case exemplifi es the importance of having an ability to con

the dots in an unrestricted manner. In this instance, an important vul

ability in U.S. national security was discovered and rectifi ed—a vulnerab

which could have enabled al-Qaeda-affi liated Jamaah al-Islamiyah access 

entry to the United States—a vulnerability which, in this instance, was 

408 Alex Kingsbury, “Lessons from the Near-defeat,” U.S. News & World Report, 28 Oc

2008. Available at http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/world/2008/10/28/lessons-from

near-defeat-of-a-once-feared-al-qaeda-affiliate-in-indonesia.html.

409 Griffin, “Operation Triple X.”

410 Griffin, “Operation Triple X.”
119

rected through criminal investigation.

411 DSS followed national secu

State Department policy by not classifying information—case inform

available to all who have a legitimate interest—including foreign law 

ment.412 If DSS had classifi ed this information, important leads wo

been suppressed and unavailable to those who would fi nd it useful.

Law Enforcement Networks Can Empower Weaker St

Especially through “Soft Power” 

According to some of the premier experts in the fi eld, inte

mental networks can empower weaker states.413 As Defl em argues, p

ments, as participants in intergovernmental networks themselves, w

toward effi ciency, professionalism, and expertise—through which 

achieve a signifi cant measure of autonomy from the political cent

state. States tolerate a measure of autonomy by the police because com

411 As noted earlier in this book, law enforcement and security officers do n

restrict their interactions with host-country security elements only to criminal cases

and should, discuss trends, ongoing cases, if appropriate, or simply matters of s

and suspicion.

412 The unfortunate flip-side of this point may be that, because the information 

sified, it may not be considered as important as classified information by some in 

gence Community.

413 Raustiala, “Architecture of International Cooperation,” 24-25; Slaughter, 

the Global Economy,” 203.

Operation Triple X— Indones

Officers with Masses of Conf

Fraudulent Documents.

Source: State Department, with 

permission.
120

in a police force reinforces public confi dence and serves to combat crim

a parasitic infl uence on any country. Because international police netwo

especially informal police networks, empower police by improving effi cie

international police networks can empower weaker states. Because it is o

in the interest of weaker states to tolerate intergovernmental networks, 

also in their best interests to tolerate autonomy from their police—becau

ultimately benefi ts the state. Th is is why police entities are oft en formid

adversaries of intelligence services;414 it is also why police networks are 

ally suited to deal with another formidable network, the networks of Isla

terrorism and insurgency.

Just as international police networks have limited some activitie

Jamaah al-Islamiyah and other groups in Southeast Asia, international p

ing eff orts are fi nding success in another part of the world, the narcoterr

stronghold of Colombia.415 Th e following observations from a Washin

Post article by Kevin Whitelaw are telling: 

Once the most visible symbols of Colombia’s troubles and a key revenu

source for the nation’s guerrillas, kidnappings, have plummeted from 

high of 3,572 victims in 2000 to 521 in 2007, according to the Ministr

of Defense. Th e sharp drop has been driven by several factors, includ

ing much larger security forces that have put the guerrillas on the run

414 Police are formidable because they possess power in their own right—separate 

the political state. Police are literally a “force” of numbers, authority, and autonomy and 

represent competition or even a threat to intelligence services vying for influence within go

ments and states.

415 While Indonesia and Colombia are examples of U.S.-led law enforcement interna

network successes, they are successes in spite of current U.S. counterterrorism policy

point will be addressed further in Chapter Six.

Colombian Official 

Pointing to GAULA 

Operating Areas.

Source: State Departm

with permission.
121

“In the past, there were some areas with no police presence, so F

the prime kidnappers, had areas where they could keep 20 peop

time, like a hotel,” says Col. Umberto Guatibonza, the comman

the police wing of the elite anti-kidnapping forces known as GA

GAULA is the Spanish acronym for Unifi ed Action Groups for Per

Liberty. “We occupied those areas.”

Colombian offi cials also credit an important but little-known pro

run by the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security

has trained more than 600 GAULA members. Th e DSS training, o

under its Anti-Terrorism Assistance program, has focused in part

on rescuing hostages. “Before, there was the will and the people, bu

want to turn it into something professional, especially for how y

a careful rescue,” says Colombian Vice-Defense Minister Sergio 

millo. “When it gets to the nitty-gritty, you need expertise.”

Th e $3.4 million ATA Anti-Terrorism Assistance eff ort is only 

part of the broader Plan Colombia, the U.S. aid program that ha

neled some $5 billion in aid to Colombia since 2000 under the ae

the U.S. war on drugs. [Funding for] Plan Colombia, the bulk of w

goes toward the Colombian military, has a decidedly mixed r

when it comes to fi ghting drugs (overall production has remained 

tively steady). “For the United States, it was always about narc

says Arlene Tickner, who teaches at the National University of C

bia. “For the Colombian government, the interest was born ou

need to combat an insurgency.”

And indeed, the aid eff ort has helped the Colombians turn th

against the FARC guerrillas. U.S. offi cials estimate that FARC, w

numbered some 40,000 fi ghters at its peak, has dwindled to about 

What only recently looked more like an intractable civil war now s

perhaps, manageable. “Th e Colombia of 2008 might as well be 

ferent country on a diff erent planet in a diff erent galaxy,” says W

Brownfi eld, the U.S. ambassador to Colombia.416

416 Kevin Whitelaw, “Inside Colombia’s War on Kidnapping,” U.S. News & World 

February 2008. Available at http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/world/2008/02/

colombias-war-on-kidnapping.html.
122

ATA is not the only means at Diplomatic Security’s disposal for e

cising soft power. Its Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program has contributed to 

cause as well.417 In October 2003 a “concerned” individual saw a 60 Minut

story on three Americans who had been kidnapped by members of the FA

aft er their plane had crashed in the Colombian jungle earlier that year. 

individual, along with two associates, contacted the Government of Col

bia and the U.S. Embassy in Bogota concerning the location of the camp 

by Edgar Navarro, a FARC commander believed to have been involved in 

kidnapping. Th e three sources hiked through the jungle to lead the Col

bian security forces to Navarro’s camp site. On 19 October 2003, the Col

bian forces entered the campsite to arrest Navarro and his unit. A gun b

ensued, killing Navarro and 11 of his bodyguards. Th e sources receiv

reward of $300,000 each—a reasonable price to deliver a serious setback 

deadly terrorist/insurgent group.

Of course, the biggest successes of U.S.-led law enforcemen

Colombia do not belong to the Diplomatic Security Service; that distinc

goes to DEA. DEA has been at the forefront of assisting the governmen

Colombia fi rst rid itself of the Medellin Cartel, the Cali Cartel, and the N

Coast Cartel, and most recently, the narcoterrorist group the FARC.418 D

is also seeing success with interdiction eff orts that are diverting drug s

417 For more on ATA’s successes see Jeffrey W. Culver, “Stronger Partners: Program 

brates 25 Years of Fighting Terrorism, State Magazine, December 2008, 14.

418 To be fair, other counterterrorism instruments have been very active in many of 

actions in Colombia, but it is the efforts of law enforcement and the “umbrella” of law enf

ment that has provided the impetus for the modest successes thus far achieved in Colom

Colombian GAULA 

Troops and Their Spe

Equipment.

Source: State Departme

with permission.
123

ments away from the United States and toward Europe—to ports tha

quite so risky for traffi ckers.419

A principal factor contributing to the nearly unprecedented 

ity of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has been his government’s s

against the FARC.420 2008 saw the demise of two of the FARC’s f

members (one by natural causes, the other by an unnatural cause)

rescue of 11 hostages, to include Ingrid Betancourt, a former candida

Colombian presidency along with three U.S. defense contractors. It 

these circumstances that international police eff orts are paying off by 

ering weaker states. Andreas and Nadelmann maintain that U.S.-l

national drug enforcement eff orts are one of the many ways that th

States imposes its own policies and morality on other states—thereby 

ing its own hegemony.421 At the same time, other states are benefi 

defeating terrorist groups or violent insurgencies, and are professio

their police forces to boot.422

419 Interview with senior DEA official, 3 November 2008. See also, Joseph Kirs

Coke Coast: Cocaine and Failed States in West Africa,” World Politics Review, 9 

2008. Available at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=2629.

420 Anastasia Moloney, “Colombia’s Uribe at Six Years: A Positive but Fragile Leg

Politics Review, 21 August 2008. Available at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.c

aspx?id=2589.

421 Andreas and Nadelmann, Policing the Globe, 242.

422 Of course, corrupt national police forces are a hindrance, but over time, as 

in examples presented here, police forces are capable of professionalizing themselv

international cooperative policing efforts.

Colombian Counterterrorism A

Her Work Station.

Source: State Department, with p
124

Th e Crime of Terrorism Provides a Powerful Incentive fo

Law Enforcement to Cooperate Internationally

In the wake of 9/11 the United States experienced worldwide sym

thy and support. In that context, the U.S. attack on Afghanistan was lar

seen as justifi ed by the rest of the world. It has since become conventi

wisdom that the U.S. lost a signifi cant share of that support by choosin

invade Iraq. Also disturbing to the rest of the world was the perception 

the United States had abandoned its principles as a champion of justice 

human rights in favor of militarism and political intolerance. Th e Un

States can regain some of the goodwill that has been lost by re-adoptin

emphasis on the “rule of law” in its counterterrorism policies and endeav

If terrorism is a “unifying” force for police, then an approp

means of exploiting that force is through the already potent networks of 

enforcement. Policing scholar Anthony Balzer asserts that one of the unif

aspects of police culture is a common cause, the notion of “fi ghting a c

mon enemy.”423 Althhough Operation Triple X is a fi ne example of how po

have cooperated in counterterrorism eff orts, perhaps the best way to exp

the idea of the “common enemy” is to step out of the context of terror

Th e reader may have noticed that, in the case studies examined above, c

oft en involve pedophiles. It has been the author’s experience that no o

category of criminal activity engenders so much international cooperatio

crimes against children. In 2004, DSS located and participated in the ap

hension and return of 108 American fugitives from overseas. Of those

were fugitives wanted for sex crimes committed against children—the 

highest category of fugitives were those wanted for narcotics traffi cking 

16, followed by those wanted for murder with 11.424

In 2004, shortly aft er my assignment as head of CIL, I was bri

on a case where an astute parent in the American expatriate communit

Tunisia felt uncomfortable about an American child psychologist who h

practice there. Th e parent knew the psychologist was from the Chicago 

and asked that his name be checked against a sex off ender registry. Th e m

name popped up as a pedophile who had adopted an 8-year-old boy and 

423 Anthony J. Balzer, “International Police Cooperation: Opportunities and Obstacle

Policing in Central Asia and Eastern Europe: Comparing Firsthand Knowledge with Experience 

the West (Slovenia: College of Police and Security Studies, 1996). Available at http://www.

gov/policing/int63.htm.

424 In 2005, out of 114 DSS fugitive locates and assisted apprehensions and return

were pedophilic in nature; in 2006, there were 23 pedophile cases out of 123 total DSS fu

returns; in 2007, out of 105 total fugitive returns, 31 were pedophile cases—with pedo

cases far outnumbering other categories of fugitive crimes. Source: Author’s professiona

and DS/CIL.
125

allegedly sexually assaulted him until he was 14 years old. Th e parent 

the man to the RSO who referred the case to CIL. Aft er meticulou

gation, CIL located a Chicago-area warrant for the man.425 Further 

revealed that the subject had absconded before his trial on child mo

charges and that he had been convicted in absentia in 1993. CIL then 

work. According to RSO Tunis, the Tunisian police were eager to rem

subject from their country, but lack of an extradition treaty with th

States posed an impediment to cooperation. Th e police volunteered, 

that they could consider an Interpol Red Notice a warrant under th

and if we somehow obtained one then they could conceivably eject 

ject. Because CIL has agents working at Interpol headquarters in Lyo

the National Central Bureau in Washington, DC, we were able to pres

receive an expedited Interpol Red Notice. Upon its issuance, the RS

the Tunisian police to deport the subject to the United States. Th ey a

do so, but they went further than that: Th ey considered the crime to h

so reprehensible that they arranged for the deportation order to be s

President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Th e Tunisians considered the r

the subject to be an extradition, while the United States considered h

to be a deportation. Regardless, according to a DOJ Offi ce of Inter

Aff airs (DOJ-OIA) attorney at the time, the exchange was unpreced

no fugitive had ever been returned from Tunisia to the United States 

that point.426 Upon his return to the United States, aft er more than a 

the subject, John Pierre Bourgignon, was sentenced to 24 years in pr

Th is case demonstrates that particular crimes (and types of cr

can and do serve as a motivation for police to cooperate—and in so

exceedingly so. Defl em argues that recognizing terrorism as a crimin

can produce many similar examples.

Law Enforcement Agencies Are Accustomed to Work

Together and with Foreign Counterparts—and Share 

Information in a Manner Consistent with Privacy 

Considerations, National Laws, and Operational Secu

Th e discipline involved in preparing cases for trial tends 

police fi nely attuned to the demands of proper procedure and legal 

However, even the most meticulously conducted and carefully laid o

425 The warrant had not been placed in the national criminal indexes and had to 

ally tracked.

426 As recollected by the author. See also Frank Main, “Tunisia Returns Longtim

in Sex Abuse Case,” Chicago Sun-Times, 25 January 2004, 3A, and Matt O’Connor, 

Sex Case Brought Back to City,” Chicago Tribune, 25 January 2004, Section 4, 3.
126

tigations can fall victim to unanticipated technicalities or nuances of law 

result in what the press might cavalierly refer to as a “botched investigat

Potentially worse is the notion that cases that have involved countless h

and sometimes years of eff ort can be squandered when a case is “blow

especially when it is for reasons deemed avoidable. Generally speaking, w

law enforcement are used to playing by the rules and operating under cer

constraints. Some of us would never admit it, but constraints such as Mira

warnings in the U.S. can strengthen the credibility of cases. Informa

that passes investigative muster is said to be “vetted.” Fluid communicat

between law enforcement agencies and police departments both dom

cally and internationally permit sharing and cross-checking in a way tha

tight controls on dissemination of intelligence and classifi ed information 

vent.427 So too, law enforcement entities work well on a reciprocity basis, 

“one good turn deserves another.”428 In fact, the principle of mutual reco

tion is the basis of police and judicial cooperation in the European Union

Such are benefi ts and constraints of the “rule of law.”

But even operating under the rule of law there is “wriggle room

accomplish goals. DSS uses CIL as an instrument of goodwill among our 

law enforcement agencies to encourage communication and cooperatio

support of our primary security mission to protect U.S. personnel and fa

ties overseas. We also try to assist foreign police whenever possible with t

requests to the degree that such requests are legal and reasonable. DSS un

stands that law enforcement is reciprocal in nature,430 and we may need to 

in a favor to protect our interests overseas.

A few years ago, a police liaison offi cer with the German Embass

Washington, DC, called me to assist him with a security issue at his consu

in Los Angeles.431 Th e liaison offi cer, who later became my good friend K

explained that a German national living in Los Angeles had made threa

bomb the German consulate there. Th e man making the threats was wa

in Germany for having sent a live bomb to the German Parliament build

Although the man was in DHS custody, he (Klaus) was having diffi culty 

vincing the U.S. Attorney’s Offi ce in Los Angeles to extradite or deport 

fugitive back to Germany. I told Klaus that I would do what I could to h

Aft er calling the DSS section responsible for protecting foreign missio

427 E-mail discussion between Jacqueline Ross, Professor of Law, University of Illinois

Mike Bayer, 25 November 2008.

428 Ross – Bayer e-mail, 25 November 2008.

429 Monica den Boer – Bayer e-mail attachment, 20 February 2009.

430 Ross – Bayer e-mail, 25 November 2008.

431 Diplomatic Security oversees security for all foreign embassy missions in the U

States.
127

called the Assistant U.S. Attorney handling the case and persuaded 

explaining that we relied on our foreign counterparts to protect our 

overseas and that it was important that we cooperate with them if we 

them to cooperate with us. Aft er some complaints about being squeez

State Department, the Assistant U.S. Attorney complied. Aft er lengt

fi lings and appeals, the subject was ultimately deported back to Germ

Klaus and I worked this case, with its delicate internationa

and diplomatic implications, because we both knew and unders

implications. Klaus had to be careful about his own country’s legal pr

and privacy laws, and I had to be aware of them as well, yet be able to 

convince an overworked U.S. Attorney’s Offi ce that it was in the best 

of the U.S. government to accommodate the German’s request.

Th is case highlights the reciprocal nature of police work. Kla

established a relationship based on trust. I helped him because he is 

law enforcement offi cer and because he asked me. Th at is all he need

Now, if I ever need a favor from the German police, I know he will 

eff ort to try to help me. Likewise, he knows he can ask me a favor ag

though he “owes me one,” and I too would spare no eff ort to help. Suc

unwritten rules of law enforcement—and their power is proved daily

Law Enforcement, Particularly U.S. Law Enforcement

Accustomed to Working with Sensitive Information

Hand in hand with understanding how “the system” works 

ing how to protect information. As mentioned earlier, law enforcem

cers have a strong, vested interest in sharing information for cross-

and verifying information and establishing connections to other c

crimes, but at the same time protecting the information so a case is n

or an informant hurt or killed—or worse, from our standpoint, the i

tor harmed. Th e previous example showed not only how the system 

worked, but the importance of trust and how it is established betw

enforcement offi cers. Trust is a small but important part of the vet

protection process and it is essential if informal law enforcement netw

to be eff ective. One of the arguments against engaging law enforceme

international problem is the wild card of police corruption. Law enfo

offi cers experienced in international law enforcement know that co

is a fact of life with some police entities, particularly in the Th ird W

we also know that there are ways to overcome problems associated w

ruption. Sound operational security practices are one way of overcom

obstacles.
128

In May 2004 the Department of Justice’s Offi ce of Internati

Aff airs (OIA) sought the assistance of the Regional Security Offi cer in K

pala, Uganda, in a fugitive fraud case in which over 4,000 U.S. persons w

alleged to have been defrauded of more than $200 million. Two subjects, 

A. Brink (aka Gilbert Zeigler) and Douglas Ferguson, were alleged to h

used their ill-gotten gains to purchase an organic vegetable farm in Ore

and luxury homes in Oregon, Nevada, Grenada, and a “palace” in Ugand

In the United States, Van Brink and Ferguson faced charges of money la

dering, mail fraud, and wire fraud, among others. Th e two men had alleg

fl ed the island nation of Grenada just ahead of law enforcement author

aft er the failure of two banks they had started and controlled. Th e RSO 

Kampala, responding to a DOJ request, began to ask questions about the 

and was told that the two men had friends at the highest level of the U

dan government—it was asserted that they lived in Idi Amin’s old palace. 

RSO worried that the men, or their friends in high places, would be tippe

if he investigated through normal channels. Th rough his trusted police 

tacts, the RSO knew that there was an especially vetted anti-corruption 

within the Ugandan police department. His contacts arranged for him t

to them for assistance. Th ey agreed to help and DOJ-OIA notifi ed the FBI 

an apprehension operation was underway.433 Within a few weeks, the U

dan Police and the RSO had developed a plan of action for the apprehens

Meanwhile, the FBI sent a team of special agents to escort Van Brink and 

guson to the United States for trial. No one else knew of the operation—

the RSO’s trusted contacts nor anyone in the hierarchy of the governm

Th e RSO warned CIL that the apprehension might be a little tricky, g

that Brink and Ferguson’s compound was protected by armed guards. 

RSO informed CIL that the vetted unit was genuine and that he truste

unconditionally. Based on the RSO’s assertions, CIL advised him to pro

with the operation but to stay out of any gunfi ghts. Indeed, as the raid 

underway, a gun battle erupted and one of Brink and Ferguson’s guards 

killed. Th e next day, FBI agents escorted a stunned Brink and Ferguson b

to the United States. While awaiting trial, Van A. Brink, aka Gilbert Zei

died of natural causes. On 27 August 2007 Ferguson, age 74, was senten

432 Caribbean Net News, “FBI Arrests Former Grenada Bank President,” 2 June 2004. 

able at http://www.caribbeannetnews.com/2004/06/02brink.htm.

433 The Van Brink and Ferguson case “belonged to” the FBI. DSS does not presum

assume jurisdiction when honoring assistance requests from other agencies.
129

to four years in prison and was ordered to pay $26 million in restit

Every aspect of the apprehension and return of the fugitives was done 

informal police channels and methods.

Th is case demonstrates the effi cacy of information securit

police circles, even in the international arena. DEA’s profi ciency 

tecting its own sources (informants) and measures (methods) has be

earlier. Th e sensitive U.S. Marshals’ Witness Security Program, wh

on unclassifi ed operational security methods to protect identities an

mation, remains a prized program. Th e case discussed in this section 

strates how operational security at the international level can remain 

eff ective, and relatively easy to implement. A potentially deadly situ

all involved was avoided because of situationally-oriented operation

rity. Information was not classifi ed, but remained uncompromised. 

idea that a police unit could fearlessly pull off an operation that mig

powerful members of a central government lends credence to Defl em

tions that police elements may drift away from the political centers o

ment—and perhaps with the informal approval of that very governm

Law Enforcement Networks Have a Great Deal of 

Experience and Signifi cant Success against Internatio

Criminal Networks, Which Makes Th em Ideally Suite

Combat Highly Networked, Transnational Terrorism

Dealing with criminal networks, including terror networks, 

part of what law enforcement units do, especially as they operate 

informally. As this chapter was being written, Italian police were 

out mass arrests of Sicilian Mafi a in Palermo. Italian police maintain 

operation “decapitated” the Mafi a in Sicily.435 In Chapter Th ree th

observed that the FBI and the New York Police Department (NY

managed to cripple the Mafi a in New York and that law enforcemen

have contributed to the downfall of the Medellin, Cali, and Nor

drug cartels in Colombia. In the present chapter, the author has d

how law enforcement eff orts appear to have been instrumental in w

the Colombian FARC and the Southeast Asian al-Qaeda-affi liated Ja

Islamiyah and Abu Sayif Groups. Operation Triple X was still anoth

434 Van Brink and Ferguson’s accomplices were also ordered to pay restitution i

$80 million. See Joseph B. Frazier, “2 Plead Guilty in Grenada Bank Scam,” FOXNe

March 2007; CBC News, “Canadian Gets 6 Years in Scam that Netted Millions and a 

August 2007. Available at http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2007/08/28/offshore.scam

435 “Sicilian Mafia ‘Decapitated’ by Mass Arrests, Say Police,” CNN.com/

December 2008. Available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/12/16/

italy/index.html.
130

ple of the takedown of an organized criminal enterprise through infor

police collaboration.

In my own experience, the case of traffi cking in women invol

the Czech Republic had strong elements of organized crime throughout

much so that the case was prosecuted out of the Eastern District of New Y

organized crime section—the same section that prosecuted John Gotti 

countless other mob fi gures. Th is case began in 1996 when I was a crim

investigator for Diplomatic Security’s Visa Fraud Branch. Th e case starte

a simple employee malfeasance, visa fraud case. In August 1996 I receiv

referral from the State Department’s Fraud Prevention Program Offi ce (F

It was alleged that a female Czech national employee of the Consular 

tion at the American Embassy in Prague had been screening visa applic

for processing and had cleared an inordinate number of visa application

18- to 24-year-old female applicants. Th e number of clearances was fl ag

as a defi nitive fraud indicator, because this category of applicant, young a

females, typically had a diffi cult time qualifying for visas—usually bec

they lacked suffi cient ties to their homeland to guarantee their return ho

I set the case aside for attention later in the busy day. Within an hou

two, I received a call from the Regional Security Offi cer in Prague. Th e R

explained that he had been visited by a Czech police inspector who wa

to inform him that a U.S. Embassy employee may be collaborating with 

organized crime group that they were investigating. Th e scenario the RSO 

out matched the case I had on my desk. Th e RSO explained that the C

police investigation revealed that a female Czech national visa screener at 

embassy was in league with a criminal enterprise in the Czech town of 

dubice that had been obtaining visas for young Eastern European women 

had been sending them to the United States to work in the sex indust

mostly in the New York City area but also in Miami, Florida, and Hous

Texas. Th e RSO explained that the criminal enterprise had ties with R

sian organized crime and had a strong presence in New York City. Th e R

also related that the Czech police believed that a NYPD detective migh

involved with the gang. Th e RSO sent by overnight delivery the transl

transcripts of gang conversations mentioning the name of a NYPD de

tive. For a criminal case, the possibility of a bad cop can be a deal-bre

because, with police departments, that case becomes a priority. Regardle

was duty-bound to bring the bad news to the NYPD, so I set up a trip to N

York and made an appointment with its Internal Aff airs Division. I had an

pated meeting with one or two detectives, but found myself sitting among 

eral high-level NYPD offi cials. It was clear they were taking this matter 

seriously. I explained the scenario to them, passed them copies of the C
131

police transcripts, and articulated that I had no intention of getting 

in an internal aff airs case. I informed them that I would wait until 

ished with their investigation before I continued on with mine. Th ey 

relieved to hear that I would leave them alone to conduct their own 

investigation. Th e NYPD offi cials then told me that there had been 

in the Queens section of New York City that bore remarkable simil

some of the elements in my case. Th ey gave me the number of a NY

detective who had made the arrest and advised me to call him. Later 

I received an urgent message to call the RSO in Prague. Upon calling, 

related to me that the Czech police had monitored more conversat

it became clear that the NYPD detective discussed in the fi rst transc

been attempting to help some young women escape from the gang 

York. He had not been in league with them at all. I immediately rela

information to the NYPD. In relief and gratitude, they off ered me ful

with my investigation. Soon aft er, I met with the vice detective who e

that he had arrested a young Czech woman for prostitution. He said 

young woman had run away from the Czech gang that brought h

U.S., and was in fear for her life because the gang was known to be 

He gave me the address and phone number of the young woman. She 

my informant and provided me with names and information on oth

women from the Czech Republic and other countries in Eastern Eu

the gang had brought to the United States. My informant told me th

of the young women had been duped into coming into the U.S. think

would become lingerie models or waitresses. With that information 

uled a trip to the Czech Republic.

Th ere, I met with my counterpart investigator. We compar

and determined that the gang had all the hallmarks of a tradition

or organized crime gang. Th ey specialized in dealing stolen cars, dr

weapons, and they were deeply involved in traffi cking women and 

tion. Th ey had also been known to take contracts for murders. I s

that if the Czech police could help me with the investigation of the 

employee, perhaps she would inform or testify against the gang in th

Republic. Together, we concocted a plan to use a young, attractiv

police offi cer to come to the embassy to pose as a last-minute visa a

sponsored by the gang. Aft er the operational plan was approved in W

ton, we proceeded with the undercover sting operation. It worked. Th 

woman admitted to the scheme, named her accomplices, and agreed 

erate in the investigation—to the elation of my Czech police coun

Based on her information, the Czech police arrested all the membe

Czech gang in Pardubice. Th ese were dangerous and bad men and t
132

were glad to be rid of them. I asked the police if they would help me 

down the other half of the gang in New York. Th ey agreed.

First, they took me to meet a young woman who had manage

escape the gang in New York. She shared the harrowing tale of how 

responded to a newspaper ad and had been recruited to work as a ling

model in New York. She said she found herself in a peepshow the fi rst 

there. She also said she and her family had been threatened with harm if 

did not do as she was told. She said she cried the entire fi rst day at the p

show, and refused to participate at all aft er that. As the gang became m

frustrated with her the threats became more heated. She planned an es

with another young woman who had been duped. Th ey arranged to purc

airline tickets and get replacement passports from the Czech Consulat

New York, as the gang had confi scated theirs. When the gang discovered 

women missing, they sent out a search party to fi nd them. Th ey located 

young women as they were getting into a taxi with their suitcases. Th e wo

spotted the gang members at Kennedy Airport aft er they had checked t

bags and sprinted through the gate before the gangsters could react. Unfo

nately for them it was not over. Th ey spotted more men waiting for them a

baggage claim area at the Czech airport so they left their bags and departe

a taxi while the gang waited for them. She became my second informant.

With names, information, and patterns of travel, I was able to 

hundreds of visa applications related to the gang’s prostitution and peep s

enterprise. With the help of my informant in New York, I was able to fi nd 

eral more disgruntled witnesses and informants. NYPD helped me fi nd 

eral more. On the day of the raids in New York, I had the assistance of NY

and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS, now DHS-ICE). O

150 police offi cers and special agents took part in the raids. We eventu

arrested all principal gang members and received convictions. All told

raids netted 45 arrests in the United States and six in the Czech Republic. 

peep shows in New York City are well known to have been controlled by 

Colombo and Gambino Italian crime syndicates—which by the 1990s w

in league with Russian organized crime groups.436 One of the key coope

ing witnesses from the peep show business was alleged to have been invo

with Russian organized crime and had served as a go-between for the Cz

Russian, and Italian organized criminal groups. Th e two ringleaders were 

tenced to fi ve years each for Mann Act violations and two others were 

tenced to six months and time served for witness tampering.

436 Bill Berkely, “Code of Betrayal, Not Silence, Shines Light on Russian Mob,” New 

Times, 19 August 2002. Available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E00

103DF93AA2575BC0A9649C8B63.
133

Th is case exemplifi es how even routine criminal cases can g

complex cases involving international criminal networks. It also 

strates how well law enforcement agencies can deal with such netw

how rapidly they can adjust to changing situations and scenarios—ev

nationally. One of the reasons that I pursued this case so aggressive

show just how vulnerable our visa issuance process was and how, if 

networks could exploit the system, so too could terrorists. Prior to 

exhortations in this regard had fallen on deaf ears.

According to former Assistant Secretary of State for Diploma

rity Richard Griffi n:

• Th e 19 9/11 attackers applied for 23 visas and obtained 22. T

conspirators obtained visas but did not participate in the atta

• Th e 19 hijackers managed to conceal their identities by u

aliases, fraudulent entry/exit stamps, and altered passports.

• Over the course of 21 months, the conspirators attempted to 

United States 34 times through nine airports. Th ey succeede

once.

• Th rough these fraudulent means, the 9/11 terrorists obtained l

passports and tourist visas, entered the United States, and ca

the worst terrorist attack in U.S. history.437

U.S. international law enforcement eff orts were not well coordinate

9/11. According to the GAO they still are not. Perhaps this is a good 

start.

Th e Technological Aspects of Law Enforcement and 

Border Control Are Firmly in Place in Worldwide 

Counterterrorism Eff orts, but Can Be Exponentially M

Eff ective if Other Elements of Globalized Law Enforc

Can Be Further Engaged and Coordinated

On 22 May 2007, as a result of “the most far fl ung and exo

tive investigation ever conducted by the U.S. Marshals Service,” fugit

molester Rabbi Alan Horowitz was arrested at the Newark, New Jer

port, having been escorted from India by a Diplomatic Security Servic

agent. Horowitz had been spotted loitering near a school in Mahaba

India, by a local man who was suspicious of his intentions. Th e lo

found out that Horowitz was a rabbi, so he spent some time research

437 Griffin, “Operation Triple X.”
134

off ender rabbis on the Internet until he came across Horowitz’s photograp

an America’s Most Wanted website. Th e man immediately notifi ed the nea

U.S. Consulate, whereupon Diplomatic Security became involved. DSS n

fi ed local police and coordinated Horowitz’s apprehension and deporta

through the U.S. Marshals Service. When Horowitz fl ed the United St

the U.S. Marshals petitioned Interpol to issue a Red Notice on Horow

Th e Indian government agreed to deport Horowitz based on the Red No

which they recognize as an international arrest warrant.

Interpol Red Notices are tied into a number of databases—usu

border-crossing databases will fl ag fugitives unwise enough to use their 

identities. Th e Interpol notice system can be linked with criminal his

indexes which can also fl ag wanted persons when they are arrested. Inte

member countries can now subscribe to a worldwide lost and stolen data

in which all reported lost and stolen passports are listed. Persons attemp

to use those passports as false identifi cation can be detained until identifi 

Just as with the Horowitz case, diff erent methods, factored toge

can result in policing successes. If international informal policing is per

ted to fl ourish, it can add yet another dimension to what is rapidly becom

a technology-driven worldwide dragnet. Whether ensnaring a terrorist 

criminal, or fi nding a missing person, the technological dragnet enhances 

enforcement’s ability to fi nd who it is looking for—and sometimes fi nd 

sons of interest who have not before raised suspicions. Informal network

policing deliver the person-to-person, intangible benefi ts that technology 

never replicate. Together they make up a potent counterterrorism tool.

Th e Beginning of the End

Th rough the real-world applications presented here, a clearer pic

emerges of the versatility of U.S. law enforcement and its worldwide, collabor

networks. It is abundantly clear that U.S. federal law enforcement can deliver 

efi ts that other counterterrorism instruments cannot. Yet, the powerful advant

of informal international policing have not been engaged to their fullest poten

Th e next chapter will advance the argument that a greater range of governme

counterterrorism instruments can be engaged without harming or diminis

any agency or element that has contributed to the war on terrorism thus far. I

are fi nally able to combine the particular talents of all our instruments, we m

fi nally adopt the best course to contain and even defeat this worldwide scour
135

CHAPTER 6

Emergence of the Blue Planet

Th e U.S. government has access to a vast amount of information. 

databases not usually thought of as “intelligence,” such as custo

immigration information are included, the storehouse is immense.4

In earlier chapters, the author drew on professional experie

frame of reference for the observations of scholars and other prac

In that light, he can confi rm the validity of the recent GAO report, 

ing Terrorism: Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives 

Foreign Nations (May 2007). As noted in the report, law enforcem

security offi cers in the fi eld really do lack the implementing direct

would guide the exertion of counterterrorism leadership. What we 

tribute, we achieve on our own, sometimes isolated, initiatives as law 

ment and security offi cers.439 Leaders seeking to implement these d

should be cognizant that there is an inherent danger in over-mana

enforcement. As discussed at length in this work, law enforcement 

professionalize through autonomy. Government directives impose 

tions and constraints which may aff ect effi cacy. Leaders, in an eff ort 

their own positions (and agency turf), may not be able to resist the 

tion to impose those restrictions upon law enforcement relationsh

eff ort to control information and power—much like what happens n

traditional-power agencies. In eff ect, attempting to control informal 

ships serves to politicize the entire process, rendering it inoperable. E

implement directives should encompass the autonomy that law enfo

needs to remain eff ective.

Th e 9/11 Report pointedly asks the question: Who is the quar

Th e answer has always been, of course, the traditionally entrenched p

interests of the most powerful counterterrorism agencies—those th

through the Cold War.

Earlier in the report we detailed many missed opportunities to t

the 9/11 plot. Information was not shared, sometimes inadverten

438 9/11 Commission Report, 416-417.

439 The U.S. State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism, General Dell D

with this point. Most of us in law enforcement do our best, but there is no un

approach or training. If there is no personal willingness for an RSO or other sp

assigned overseas to coordinate with foreign police counterparts, there is nothing 

that person to do so. Interview, 31 July 2008. 
136

because of legal misunderstandings. Analysis was not pooled. Eff ectiv

operations were not launched. Oft en handoff s of information were los

across the divide separating the foreign and domestic agencies of th

government.

However the specifi c problems are labeled, we believe they are symp

toms of the government’s broader inability to adapt to how it manage

the problems of the 21st century. Th e agencies are like a set of specialist

in a hospital, each ordering tests, looking for symptoms and prescribin

medications. What is missing is the attending physician who ensure

they work as a team.

One missing element was eff ective management of transnational opera

tions. Action offi cers should have drawn on all available knowledge i

the government.

440 Th is management should have ensured that infor

mation was shared and duties were clearly assigned across agencies, an

across the foreign-domestic divide.441

Critics as diverse as Amy Zegart, Michael Turner, and the 9/11 C

mission point out that these heralded Cold War agencies, namely the FBI 

the CIA, were slow to adapt to the post-Cold War universe—which led 

variety of intelligence failures and ultimately to 9/11. Th ese critics main

that those same conditions still exist today—primarily because entrenc

agencies resist change and wish to retain their positions of power and pro

nence. Th e way in which we deal with terrorism information is a case in p

A clearly ineff ective classifi cation system for protecting terrorism informa

is routinely used—and inappropriately—to deal with a problem that, acc

ing to our own established guidelines, should not normally require such m

sures. It appears to be more than coincidental that this same classifi ca

system is acknowledged, again by our own guidelines, to be a source of ab

for agencies to retain control and maintain power. It is also not accidental 

newly introduced reforms for the information-sharing environment pre

the appearance of facilitating the sharing of information but, in fact, may 

serve the status quo.442 It is not only information classifi cation systems 

refl ect a misappropriation of counterterrorism resources; rather it is en

structures and infrastructures of agencies that were created for one purpo

to oppose the nation-state adversaries of the Cold War—which now fac

enemy they are not structured to confront. Th e irony is that federal resou

are in place and ideally suited to confront that very enemy. 

440 Italics inserted by the author.

441 9/11 Report, 353.

442 And, by adding additional levels of sensitivity to unclassified designations, may 

ally enhance these agencys’ ability to control information.
137

Th e 21st century has brought a new and fl uid enemy in Islam

worked terrorism. Th is enemy was driven to near oblivion in 2002

regrouped and morphed into a new and more insidious entity in th

ally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan. According to the New Yo

al-Qaeda’s resurgence has been facilitated by “years of missteps in W

ton and Islamabad, as well as by sharp policy disagreements and tu

among American counterterrorism agencies.443

How Can We Solve a Problem Like al-Qaeda? How C

Catch a Cloud and Pin It Down?

Th e 2007 National Intelligence Estimate: Th e Terrorist Th reat t

Homeland, expected the U.S. homeland to face a persistent and evol

rorist threat and asserted that al-Qaeda will remain the most serious t

For good measure, and adding yet another threat to the mix, then-H

Security chief Michael Chertoff noted that “Hezbollah makes al-Qa

like a minor-league team.”445 Even as our current national security 

talk up the ongoing threat of Islamist extremism, the academic world 

the “real” threat posed by Islamist, extremist-based terrorism. On on

the academic debate are those who argue, like Bruce Hoff man, that 

is “alive, well, resurgent, and more dangerous than it has been in 

years.”446 On the other side is Mark Sageman, a scholar-in-residence 

NYPD, who maintains that the main threat no longer comes from a 

ized al-Qaeda, but from radicalized individuals who meet and plot 

neighborhoods and on the Internet. Sageman refers to them as “bu

guys”—who have carried out locally-based terrorist attacks such as 

and subway attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005. Hoff m

al-Qaeda as still a very dangerous organization that is resilient and 

being defeated.447

For the forces of international policing, disagreement over a

capabilities is moot. If permitted to “take the gloves off ,” empowered 

443 Mark Mazzetti and David Rohde, “Amid U.S. Policy Disputes, Qaeda Grows in 

New York Times, 30 June 2008. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/200

washington/30tribal.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ref=todayspaper.

444 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate: 

ist Threat to the U.S. Homeland, Washington, DC, 17 July 2007. http://dni.

releases/20070717_release.pdf.

445 Fox News, “Chertoff: Hezbollah Makes al-Qaeda Look Like a Minor-League 

May 2008. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,359594,00.html.

446 Elaine Scolino and Eric Schmitt, “A Not Very Private Feud Over Terrorism,

Times, 8 June 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/08/weekinreview/08scioli

447 Bruce Hoffman, Commentary: Al Qaeda Isn’t Dead Yet,” CNN.com, 9 Septem

http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/09/09/hoffman.alqaeda/index.html#cnnSTCTe
138

tional law enforcement networks and dragnets will catch what they catc

al-Qaeda is resurgent and morphing, the strengthened networks will cat

portion of that upsurge. If the organization is weakened and fading, the n

harnessed international policing networks could cripple them even fur

If terrorism is structured from the top down, international policing netw

will be targeting cell activity. If they are structured from the bottom up, po

networks will again be targeting cell and operational activity. Whatever 

state of al-Qaeda and/or Islamist terrorism, if the (informal) forces of in

national law enforcement are enabled and relatively unfettered, there wi

more plots uncovered, more terrorists located and arrested, and more cr

nal support activity disrupted than now.

From the perspective of the author, those who maintain that gro

such as al-Qaeda are on the wane, or have been nearly defeated, are not b

constructive—especially when there is so little known about these adver

ies.448 Th e author has experienced the damage caused by prematurely as

ing a diminished security threat in his time with the Bureau of Diplom

Security. In 1987, as a result of the Inman Commission study, DSS was cre

to focus on State Department security. Car bomb attacks on the U.S. Emb

in Beirut in 1983 and 1984, and the attack on the Marine barracks in Be

in 1983, exposed the Department’s inattention to security.449 My fi rst se

years with the Department were salad days for the newly created DS. H

ever, in the mid-1990s, as the State Department underwent serious fun

cutbacks, DSS was one of the components of the Department that took 

most serious hits. Wilson would likely attribute this, at least in part, t

organizational culture that does not see security as its main mission, there

making it an expendable program. Because there had not been an attack 

an embassy in nearly 10 years, cutbacks in security were seen as justifi able 

necessary.450 However, on 7 August 1998 two massive truck bombs explo

in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam killing over 200 and injuring thousands.45

April 1999, the then-president of the American Foreign Service Associat

448 For another example see Peter Bergen, “Commentary: WMD Fears are Overbl

CNN.com. http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/12/05/bergen.wmd/index.html#cnnSTCT

449 Wilson, Bureaucracy, 91.

450 Interview with Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer trans

“Searching for Answers,” PBS Online NewsHour, 10 August 1998. Please see http://www

org/newshour/bb/africa/july-dec98/bomb_8-10.html. See also Fred Burton, “The Boom 

Bust Cycle in Counterterrorism Spending,” Stratfor.com, 28 March 2007, available at h

www.stratfor.com/boom_and_bust_cycle_counterterrorism_spending.

451 In Nairobi, 200 Kenyan citizens and 12 U.S. diplomats were killed, and over 4

Kenyans were injured. In Dar-es-Salaam, 11 Tanzanians were killed and 85 persons 

injured, to include two Americans. See the Special Report, “African Embassy Bombings,” 

Online NewsHour, at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/embassy_bombing/map/htm
139

in a statement to the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Co

Justice, State, and the Judiciary, declared:

Over the years, our leaders have focused on embassy security only 

a tragedy. We saw it in the 1970s aft er Khartoum. We saw it in the 

aft er Beirut. We see it again today in the wake of Nairobi and D

Salaam. However, as the memory of each loss fades, attention w

Commitment declines. Funding is diverted until a new tragedy en

For some embassy security is an academic issue. For us, literally 

matter of life and death.452

Extrapolate what happened at the State Department to what is ha

now—equivocation about the threat of terrorism in the press and aca

and we have the fi rst steps toward letting our guard down. Th is is not to 

overspending for homeland security and counterterrorism does not 

that a wise reallocation of resources is not called for.

Th e Criminal Commons

Because most terrorist acts involve supportive criminal activ

can we change the current U.S. political and security landscape towar

eff ective vision that gives fuller play to the security contribution of 

tional law enforcement? We can now outline a low-cost, low-impac

correct this anomaly.

According to a respected source, the attacks of late 2008 i

bai were supported by the notorious organized criminal syndicate of 

Ibrahim—which had joined forces with Lashkar-e-Taiba in pullin

assault. Th is source asserts that the Ibrahim group sold blueprint

city’s hotels to the Lashkar terrorists.453 According to other reporting

seeking the extradition of Ibrahim from Pakistan for his role in the a

Chapter Th ree documented extensively the convergence of terroris

national crime and, ultimately, organized crime. If the Ibrahim gro

involved, this adds further credence to such convergence and to t

ment for full inclusion of international law enforcement resources in 

452 Daniel F. Geisler, “Statement of Mr. Daniel F. Geisler, President, American F

vice Association, to the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, 

the Judiciary, 15 April 1999,” available at http://www.afsa.org/congress/041599test

After 1998, spending for security remained relatively constant until 11 September 2

additional funding was made available.

453 Mansoor Ijaz, “Zardari and Mumbai,” Forbes.com, 6 December 2008. A

http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/05/zardari-mumbai-laskar-oped-cx_mi_1206ijaz.htm

454 Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan Offers to Help Investigate Mumbai Terror Attack,” VOA

2 December 2008. Available at http://www.voanews.com/english.2008-12-02-voa31
140

Another news report on Ibrahim claims he played a crucial role in the 1

Bombay (Mumbai) serial bombings by engineering “the smuggling into I

of tons of explosives provided by Pakistan’s spy agency, the Directorate 

Inter-Services Intelligence.”455 Th e 1993 Mumbai bombings featured a se

of 15 bomb explosions which targeted the Bombay Stock Exchange, ho

offi ces, and banks, killed 257, and injured 1,400.456 Ibrahim has also b

linked to the 2005 New Delhi bombings in which 60 were killed.457 Ibra

has also been associated with the Mumbai rail blasts of 2006 in which 209 

sons were killed and over 300 were injured.458 According to the BBC, Ibra

is linked to both al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba, and is involved in “large s

shipment of narcotics in the UK and western Europe.”459 Kaplan asserts 

“crime syndicates and terrorist groups thrive in the same subterranean w

as black markets and laundered money, relying on shift ing networks 

secret cells to accomplish their objectives. Both groups have similar ne

weapons, false documentation and safe houses.”460

Meanwhile, on 25 September 2007, then-Director of National Int

gence Mike McConnell told the Senate Judiciary Committee that the gre

threat [to the U.S.] is from al-Qaeda; that it could be training operative

move explosives into the U.S. by exploiting the United State’s visa program

In so doing, McConnell tacitly acknowledged the need to engage the wo

wide resources of international law enforcement for our counterterro

eff orts. Th e terrorism advisor for President-elect Obama also weighed in 

an assessment that U.S. policymakers have been inattentive: our counte

rorism setup “lacks a sheriff to lead the posse.”462

455 “A Godfather’s Lethal Mix of Business and Politics,” U.S. News and World Repo

November 2005. Available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/051205/5terror.b.ht

456 NationMaster, “1993 Mumbai Bombings,” NationMaster.com, available at http://

nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/1993-Mumbai-bombings.

457 “A Godfather’s Lethal Mix.”

458 Dow Jones, “Al-Qaeda Link to Mumbai Blasts,” 11 July 2006. Available at http://

news24.com/News/0,,2-10-1462_1966228,00.html. The Indian police were also said to 

blamed the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence, operating in collaboration with Lash

Taiba. The 209 deaths statistic came from a CNN article—which is the source of the I

police attribution: CNN, “India Police: Pakistan Spy Agency Behind Mumbai Bombings,” 

com, 1 October 2006. Available at http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/09/30/

bombs/idex.html?section=cnn_world#.

459 BBC, “Profile: India’s Fugitive Gangster,” BBC News, 12 September 2006. Availa

http://www.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4775531.stm.

460 David Kaplan, “Paying For Terror,” U.S. News and World Report, 5 December 2005

461 CNN, “Terrorists Could Exploit Visa Program, Intelligence Chief Warns,” CNN.com

September 2007. Available at http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/25/dni.alqaeda.threat/

html.

462 Mark Mazzetti, “Behind Analyst’s Cool Demeanor, Deep Anxiety Over American Po

New York Times, 26 December 2008. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12

washington/27reidel.html?_r=1&ref=todayspaper.
141

Who’s Driving Th is Bus?

According to the 9/11 Report, “national intelligence is still o

around the collection disciplines of the home agencies, not the joint 

Th e importance of all-source analysis cannot be overstated. Withou

not possible to ‘connect the dots.’ No one component holds all the 

information.”463 Also, according to the 9/11 Report, by engaging th

wide resources of international law enforcement, we not only imp

“whole earth” intelligence capability, but we vastly improve and incr

chances of “getting lucky” or, more accurately, of fi nding the key lead 

vents a terrorist attack on U.S. soil, or the soil of our allies in the war o

Unfortunately, according to the Government Accountability Offi ce:

almost 6 years aft er the 9/11 attacks, the United States lacks clear i

menting guidance for integrating the variety of overseas LEA act

to help foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorist

found that, because most LEAs have not been provided clear direc

they generally lacked (1) clearly articulated roles and responsib

to assist foreign nations; (2) guidance on setting funding prioritie

providing resources; (3) performance monitoring systems to asses

progress; (4) formal structures to coordinate LEA operational and 

nical assistance to foreign nation LEAs; and (5) comprehensive co

needs assessments to tailor LEA technical and operational assista

specifi c foreign nation needs.464

According to the latest all-star panel on national security 

“When knowledge is compartmentalized—as in the infamous ‘unco

dots’ preceding the 9/11 terrorist attacks—it is diffi cult for the nationa

system to adjust its behaviors appropriately in order to meet system g

Time for a change?

How can we get more out of the system?466

Th e new U.S. President, elected to eff ect change, has at his d

“sleeping giant” counterterrorism instrument in the underutilized n

of U.S. federal law enforcement. Th is instrument can:

463 9/11 Report, 425.

464 GAO, “Combatting Terrorism: Law Enforcement Lacks Directives,” 3.

465 James A. Locher III, et. al., Project on National Security Reform: Forging a 

(Arlington, VA: Project on National Security Reform), November 2008, 200.

466 Frances Fragos Townsend, former National Security Advisor to the Presiden

terterrorism and Homeland Security, interview in Washington, DC, 7 June 2007.
142

1. Open an untapped reserve of overt terrorism intelligence 

information—a “whole earth” intelligence resource based on the r

and scope of international law enforcement.

2. Create new international pathways of exchanging and sharing 

only overt terrorism intelligence but also intelligence on other t

of transnational criminal activity that can also aff ect our nati

security.

3. Create an innovative means of engaging super-effi c

international, inter-governmental networks.

4. Create a pathway for a national security entity that can step bey

politicization and can “naturally” professionalize itself and incr

stability in weaker states.

5. Create another constructive pathway for exerting “soft pow

through law enforcement’s international, intergovernme

networks.

6. Create a means to work around the crushing parochialism 

bureaucratic constraints that hinder our counterterrorism eff 

and our standing as a leader in promoting the “rule of law.”

Harnessing law enforcement networks can open up an 

untapped reserve of overt terrorism intelligence and 

information—a “whole earth” intelligence resource based 

on the reach and scope of international law enforcement.

As discussed in Chapter Five, law enforcement’s domain stret

from the richest levels of a society or country to the poorest levels; in fact

enforcement is an ever-present participant in the comings and goings of 

Further, international law enforcement channels can be tapped inform

whether for normal investigative activity, collecting information on terr

trends, or for patterns of behavior that indicate the presence of terrorist c

Th is power is available to savvy leadership, which can harness its pote

without destroying it through formalization, regulation, or over-bureau

tization. A “whole earth,” overt intelligence resource is waiting to be fi n

engaged.
143

Harnessing law enforcement networks can create new 

international pathways of exchanging and sharing no

through overt terrorism intelligence but also intellige

other types of transnational criminal activity that can 

aff ect our national security.

As part of a “whole earth,” overt intelligence capability, law 

ment networks can create pathways to enhance cooperation on o

crime, identity theft , credit card fraud, 419 fraud scams, and counter

U.S. and world levels—activities that aff ect the well-being and ultim

survival of U.S. citizens. With this capability in play, U.S. intelligence 

themselves, whether for criminal investigative or national security p

can monitor patterns of international criminal activities for potentia

to the United States, including the traffi cking of nuclear materials 

shipments of illegal weaponry.

While present U.S.-based investigative methods might prov

insight as to the type of crimes that support terrorism overseas and 

cells within the United States—terrorism information generated u

auspices of criminal investigations is a matter of “getting lucky”—t

an activity is noticed by law enforcement to the degree that it gen

criminal investigation, then it can lead to the “uncovering” of terroris

activity. However, much suspicious behavior does not meet courtro

dards of generating a criminal case. Local police, and sometimes fede

cies, have a public safety and national security mission/mandate th

necessarily reliant on courtroom standards of criminal investigation

a beat cop might take note of a new face in the neighborhood as a 

source of trouble, there are activities that can, and should, genera

ries that are not necessarily criminally investigative in nature, but ma

der suspicion of U.S. law enforcement—particularly overseas. Many 

activities are not necessarily criminal in other countries that are c

the United States—document fraud, weapons trading, and money 

ing, to name but a few (and all can be used to support terrorism)—an

sell to present to U.S. attorneys to prosecute in U.S. federal courts. 

more, if U.S. law enforcement lacks leadership directives to pursue a

information on this type of activity that probably does not meet i

tive or prosecutorial standard, then critical information (overt inte

can be lost. If U.S. law enforcement has been cut out of the countert

equation overseas—as had been asserted by former Vice President 

then U.S. strategic policy has disregarded an important source of t

information/intelligence.
144

Without better international police cooperation, overseas criminal a

ity that supports terrorism—that can directly impact the United States (or 

allies)—oft en remains hidden from us. If not for the wherewithal of the Regi

Poster Urging the American Public to Help Stop the Financing of Terrorist Act

Source: State Department, with permission.
145

Security Offi cer in Surabaya, Indonesia, Operation Triple X would 

transpired—he had no directive to concentrate on document fraud; h

of the case was based solely on his own determination to do so—anoth

assigned to Surabaya would likely not have pursued such an endeavor

larly if he/she had limited criminal investigative experience. DS, like o

federal agencies, receives no direction, and therefore no funding, from 

policymakers to concentrate on overseas activities that could lead to th

tion of terrorism information (or criminal cases) from overseas police 

that could be of value in the big picture of intelligence analysis.467 Law 

ment does gather information for public safety or for generation of 

cases—an activity possibly misnamed by the relatively new term of “inte

led policing.”468 Th is is true overseas, and information is legally accessible 

our numerous law enforcement attaches posted overseas. U.S. law enfo

personnel assigned overseas routinely report to their headquarters on 

tion relevant to their investigative authorities and mandates, and there 

need to be a prohibition on acquiring and reporting potentially valuable 

tion to law enforcement (or ultimately intelligence consumers) on ove

acquired, basic criminal information. Hybrid law enforcement/intellig

ments, like the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), can be the 

analysis element for information acquired in this way (as it was estab

do). Underemployed coordinating elements like the State Department’s 

Counterterrorism (S/CT), in conjunction with the National Security Cou

be the ultimate arbiter of just how this information is handled.

Law enforcement networks, particularly informal one

can create an innovative means of engaging super-effi 

international, intergovernmental networks.

Princeton’s Anne-Marie Slaughter469 describes intergover

networks as being fast, fl exible, and economical. Informal law enfo

467 Diplomatic Security does, however, manage a successful program to gathe

tion pertaining to U.S. travel documents to attempt and identify terrorist activity—bu

not generally entail the continuing or immediate engagement of the extensive infor

networks available to Regional Security Officers overseas. The establishment of 

Passport Security Program within the Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic 

designed to safeguard the integrity of U.S. travel documents. The program is require

and disrupt terrorist travel and includes the following four components: Analysis o

Identification of Individuals and Documents, Identification of Foreign Countries Nee

tance, and Inspection of Applications. For more information on this program, please 

www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/rpt/c.s0978.htm.

468 Law enforcement has practiced this art since long before it was named inte

policing.

469 Anne-Marie Slaughter is now Director of Policy and Planning for the U.S. D

of State.
146

networks might be the ultimate example of that argument. Th e cases expl

in Chapter Five demonstrated just how fast, eff ective, and econom

informal law enforcement networks can be. Th e diff erence between 

enforcement networks and other types of intergovernmental networks is 

law enforcement authorities enjoy the operational fl exibility that other in

governmental entities lack. So too, law enforcement authorities can apply 

practices without engaging bureaucratic processes that require endless le

of approvals and justifi cations.470

Law enforcement networks create a pathway for a nation

security entity in any country that can step beyond 

politicization and can “naturally” professionalize itself an

increase stability in weaker states.

According to Mathieu Defl em, whose work contributed to the p

ent study, law enforcement gravitates toward professionalism and effi cie

Promoting effi cient law enforcement networks (informal ones being the m

effi cient) creates a cycle of autonomy that further promotes the quest for 

fessionalism and effi ciency. As explained in Chapters Th ree and Five, bec

they empower police by improving effi ciency and encouraging auton

from political centers, international police networks can also bureaucrati

empower weaker states by engaging them in productive, effi cient relat

ships. Because it is oft en in the best interests of weak(er) states to tole

intergovernmental networks, it is also in their best interests to tolerate au

omy among their police force—in the present study, we have found tha

autonomous police force is the midwife to meaningful intergovernme

security arrangements.

By preferentially employing military and intelligence agencie

counterterrorism eff orts, the United States has inadvertently limited its ca

ity to make itself more fl exible and effi cient—because these agencies do 

seek autonomy from the central government; rather, they are an integral 

of the central government. Th eir resistance to change will be challenge

reintroducing law enforcement into national security information gathe

and exploitation.

470 Apparently, even the formalistic FBI has recognized the need for its agents to 

more autonomy. See Carrie Johnson, “Rule Changes Would Give FBI Agents Extensive New 

ers,” Washington Post, 12 September 2008, A02. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp/con

article/2008/09/11/AR200891103306_pf.html; also see Eric Lichtblau, “Terror Plan W

Give F.B.I. More Power,” New York Times, 13 September 2008. http://www.nyt

com/2008/09/13/justice.html?ref=us.
147

Engaging law enforcement networks can create a 

constructive pathway for exerting “soft power” throug

enforcement’s international, intergovernmental netwo

Commenting on his national security team, President-elec

declared that “Th ey share my pragmatism about the use of power, 

sense of purpose about America’s role as a leader in the world... N

than ever, we have a stake in what happens across the globe.”471 Th is a

suggests his intention to apply the principles of soft power that h

important throughout the Cold War.

International legal scholar Kal Raustiala, in a much-referenc

asserts that in international, intergovernmental networks “common 

predominate” and it is soft power rather than hard power that is a

that in these network relationships it is persuasion and attraction rat

coercion and compulsion that prevail.472 Th e author fi nds that, in hi

ence, this has been the case with the informal networks of internati

enforcement.

Engaging international law enforcement networks 

can create a means to work around the crushing 

parochialism and bureaucratic constraints that hinde

counterterrorism eff orts and our standing as a leader 

promoting the “rule of law.”

Reengaging U.S. law enforcement assets in relation to natio

rity sends a message to allies who have taken issue with a policy domi

the military/intelligence apparatus: that the United States has resum

which respects the “rule of law.” An expert advisory panel has conclu

“Th e basic defi ciency of the current national security system is that p

departmental and agency interests, reinforced by Congress, paraly

agency cooperation even as the variety, speed and complexity of e

security issues prevents the White House from eff ectively controlling 

tem ... aft er more than seven years, the U.S. government has proved u

integrate adequately the military and nonmilitary dimensions of the 

war on terror.”473

471 David E. Sanger, “Obama’s Advisers to Back Soft Power,” International Herald 

December 2008. http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/12/01/america/obama.php#top

472 Raustalia, “The Architecture of International Cooperation,” 24.

473 Walter Pincus, “Experts’ Report Urges Changes in National Security System

ton Post, 4 December 2008, A06. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dy

article/2008/12/03/AR2008120303382.html.
148

Engaging the devices of international law enforcement as a sourc

overt criminal and terrorism intelligence will be a prudent means of i

grating an element that had been conspicuously absent. A means wil

needed to deconfl ict overlapping eff orts as they are identifi ed, but crea

what amounts to a new, overt intelligence source presents an obligation 

intelligence agencies to analyze the data. As they do so, a further measu

integration will take place. So too, national security policymakers will h

another asset at their disposal, even as that asset naturally seeks distance f

political processes, manipulation, and bias.

Th e Final Frontier: A New and Blue World

Th is work has addressed the question: How can the United St

engage international partners more eff ectively to address the worldw

manifestations of destabilizing violence, which is oft en indiscrimina

labeled “terrorism”?

Answer: By bringing to bear the full potential of U.S. federal 

enforcement’s international policing networks—particularly its demonstr

eff ective, informal international law enforcement networks. Th rough invo

a war on terrorism, U.S. leadership precluded the international (foreign) 

ticipation of non-FBI, U.S. federal law enforcement capabilities. Because 

law enforcement agencies are recognized as leaders in international poli

eff orts and are represented the world over, coordination can be widespr

International law enforcement enjoys a professionally cooperative culture

identifi able target in the criminal commons of terrorism, strength in n

bers, and access to all levels of societies the world over.

In view of this principal question, can we overcome the entrenc

parochial interests of the most powerful agencies (law enforcement, in

ligence, and military) to bring greater coordination to the task of com

ing this violence and thus to bring to bear the benefi ts and advantage

individual agencies and local police departments?

Answer: Yes, through the will of political leadership of the Un

States, and by creating a “dual track” approach that will accommodate the 

ticular talents of all counterterrorism instruments—without disrupting 

cesses, relationships, and methods that are already in place and that have b

successful in keeping us free from an attack on U.S. soil since 2001.

An eff ective national security strategy will recognize that in a 

society there will always be a dichotomy between law enforcement and in

ligence that manifests as the diff erence between legal and extralegal. For 

reason, there will always be a perceived “wall” between law enforcement 

intelligence. Full integration of intelligence and law enforcement not 
149

implies a police state; it is the very manifestation of a police state. 

does not mean “the wall” cannot be porous.

We can assert that the vast majority of terrorism informa

nothing to do with national security and should not be classifi ed. A 

distinct “law enforcement track” would provide a means for overt, 

tional criminal and terrorism information developed through the 

works of formal and informal law enforcement to be collected, tran

analyzed, and ultimately shared through unclassifi ed, but controlle

nels. Reporting procedures would follow procedures for the transm

unclassifi ed, law enforcement sensitive information that are already 

Information that contains personal data can be sanitized or approve

it can be shared. As a result of the USA PATRIOT Act, there now 

ments and procedures through which this information can be evalu

shared. Ultimately, however, if this track is implemented, as we have 

parochial interests of the most powerful, “premier” agencies will b

because they have lead investigative or lead response authorities on a

mation generated by this track.

An “intelligence track” would continue to employ classifi e

dures for processing information. No current methods or operation

be disrupted, and all “secret” information will stay secret. 

As it stands, then, the only way to activate an eff ective d

mechanism is through the will of the present administration—wi

tives, funding streams, missions, and mandates for the law enforcem

clearly articulated and supported. Only then can a pristine law enfo

track develop and fl ourish to support the overall intelligence and law 

ment missions.

Another Question: What Will Th is Cost Us?

Answer: Potentially very little. Th e means and tools already 

engage U.S.-based international law enforcement networks at almos

ther cost. U.S. federal law enforcement is already represented at e

around the world. Most of these agencies maintain host-country law 

ment contacts for the investigative mission, and can expand that m

include a counterterrorism component. Th at expansion might requ

time pay for a 50-hour work week. Various means of transmitting info

securely from overseas already exist and can easily accommodate w

information might be forthcoming—if they are properly funded and 

with the power and authority to do what they were set up to do. Th e 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was created to evaluate and interp
150

information.474 Furthermore, other agencies with counterterrorism auth

ties and mandates have analysis assets in place. It is possible that, if this 

tiative generates a great deal of terrorism information, the national secu

interests of the United States will be the benefi ciary and more analysts wi

hired. It is also conceivable that additional Special Agents would need t

hired to provide coverage in areas that are notably defi cient in representat

most notably the Caribbean region. It is a certainty that additional fundin

training U.S. law enforcement attaches overseas must be in place to pro

a uniformity of eff ort and a comprehensive means of coordinating and s

ing information with foreign counterparts. Most agencies already have an

training conferences for their overseas attaches, and most necessary trai

could be integrated at reasonable cost into that curriculum.

According to the Government Accountability Offi ce, “Below 

Executive Offi ce of the President, the State Department is the lead fed

agency for U.S. government activities to combat terrorism overseas.” 

Coordinator for Counterterrorism—an ambassador-rank position—h

the State Department’s eff orts to combat terrorism.475 Th is is one asset 

would certainly require additional funding, as it holds the authority for in

mation coordination and deconfl iction eff orts, but cannot adequately d

because it is grossly underfunded.476

In particular, how can U.S. law enforcement eff ectively harness 

power of international, informal police networks without destroying th

by adopting formalized procedures?

Answer: By leaving law enforcement elements alone to do what 

do best, just as they are doing now under their own mandates and invest

tive authorities. Trust them to evaluate what they fi nd out and to report w

is relevant. Provide training and instruction to law enforcement attac

before they travel overseas, on how to acquire terrorism information in 

474 Unfortunately, the National Counterterrorism Center is widely regarded as not h

fulfilled its potential and mandate—as a result of the parochialism of Intelligence Comm

agencies. According to the Project on National Security Reform report, published in Dece

2008, “Existing national structures like interagency committees or even recent specialized 

high-priority institutions like the NCTC cannot overcome the basic rigid structure of the na

security system, which favors the independence of the functional departments and agenc

the expense of integrating mechanisms.” Guiding Coalition of the Project on National Sec

Reform, Project on National Security Reform: Forging a New Shield (Center for the Study o

Presidency, November 2008), 239.

475 GAO, “Interagency Framework for Combating Terrorism.”

476 GAO, Combating Terrorism, “Law Enforcement Lacks,” 35, declares: “A 2006 r

from State’s Office of Inspector General found that State lacked adequate resources to me

mandate to coordinate all U.S. counterterrorism assistance abroad, and was too underfu

to provide advice, coordination, and action on counterterrorism issues to its embassies.”
151

open and forthright manner—just as they would acquire informatio

their present authorities and agency mandates. Th en turn them loos

Th e Blue Planet: Value-Added or Zero-Sum

While these measures might sound deceptively simple to im

and make unequivocal common sense, making these practices a re

require careful and dedicated marshalling by deft and knowledgeab

at the National Security Council level. Appeals that proclaim “don’t 

isn’t broken” (a claim cashiered by the argument in the present w

promote obfuscation will create tremendous pressures to “stay the 

on the path of current military/intelligence exclusivity. Likewise, rat

tions that current counterterrorism eff orts work well, even though 

to the public by secrecy, or that law enforcement eff orts will disrup

international intelligence relationships and operations, fail to take i

sideration that deconfl iction is to be carried out by the NCTC and 

Department’s Offi ce of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Th ese 

arguments also fail to take into consideration the vast scope and scale 

national law enforcement networks and the unique value that full inc

these assets will bring.

National Security Council oversight, direction, and leade

this initiative will send a positive message to law enforcement agen

their contributions are valued—and will encourage enthusiastic p

tion. National Security strategists—or individuals at the State Depa

Offi ce of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism—could provide gui

the fi eld to target specifi c groups or specifi c areas of interest, all the w

to the neighborhood level. Th ese eff orts could deconfl ict initiatives 

“clandestine” side of the eff ort. Nonetheless, it will take time to reo

international police networks toward counterterrorism—building 

pathways and new relationships does not happen overnight.

By carefully incorporating the contributions of U.S. law enfo

(and consequently worldwide law enforcement) into a comprehensive 

security counterterrorism strategy, the National Security Council ca

formidable “new” counterterrorism instrument. As this approach is 

we will no longer need to confront the manifest threat to U.S. citiz

and abroad with only a part of our information arsenal.

153

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173

INDEX

A

Agee, Phillip 58

Air Force Offi ce of Special Investigations (AFOSI) 87

Al-Khafaji, Khardr 66

Al-Muhammed, Khamis Sirhan 66

Al-Zawahiri, Ayman 36, 153

Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) 65

“America’s Most Wanted” 57, 104, 134, 181

Ames, Aldrich 58, 169, 171

Andreas, Peter 22, 30, 91, 93, 94, 112, 123, 153, 164

Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) 87

Australian Institute of Criminology 70

Azzam, Abdullah 36

B

Bergen, Peter 26, 75, 154

Bertillonage system 30

Bin Laden, Osama 26, 27, 36, 43, 44, 55, 115, 154

BKA (German Bundeskrimalimt) 18, 160

Block, Ludo ix, 69, 155

Bout, Victor 99, 100, 106, 157

Brink, Van A. (see Gilbert Zeigler) 128

Brown, Tina 27

C

Cage, Nicolas 99

Cartels—Colombia 60, 61, 65, 129

“Can-do attitude” 43, 44, 71

Central Intelligence Agency 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 16, 25, 27, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 5

59, 62, 65, 74, 75, 77, 78, 84, 136, 159, 160, 161, 163, 164, 166, 169

Chertoff , Michael 137, 158

Chirac, Jacques 78

Clarke, Richard 44, 75, 155

Classifi cation (Top Secret, Secret, Confi dential) 50, 51, 59, 78

“Connecting the dots” 109

Corruption, corrupt police xvi, 21, 79, 87, 108, 127, 128

Cover 78

Credit card fraud ix, 26, 76, 143
174

INDEX (Continued)

Criminal Investigative Liaison Program (CIL) 19, 89, 90, 91, 92, 97, 101, 

111, 113, 114, 124, 125, 126, 128, 181

Crumpton, Henry 23

Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) 34, 65

D

Defl em, Mathieu vii, viii, xiii, xxi, 17, 20, 21, 29, 30, 38, 39, 57, 64, 90, 112, 

125, 146, 156, 157

Department of Defense (DOD) 4, 7, 45, 55

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 1, 2, 90, 101, 103, 106, 109, 126, 

Dershowitz, Alan 25, 157

Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) 31, 36, 57, 65, 66, 89, 90, 91, 97, 101, 

103, 104, 106, 114, 115, 118, 119, 121, 122, 124, 126, 133, 134, 138

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) viii, ix, 31, 60, 61, 64, 65, 66

100, 122, 157, 160, 171

DS/CIL (see Criminal Investigative Liaison Program)

Dual-track approach 148, 149

E

Espionage 73, 75, 158

Executive orders: E.O. 12958, E.O. 13292 62, 166, 171

F

Falconer, Bruce 100, 157

FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) 66, 100, 121, 122, 123, 

Ferguson, Douglas 128

Foreign Bureau in Paris—Russia 29

Fraud Prevention Program (State Department) 130

G

Gates, Robert 27, 169

General Accountability Offi ce (GAO) 7, 11, 12, 20, 23, 28, 46, 47, 70, 115, 

135, 170

Glassman, James 27

Global War on Terror, War on Terror xvii, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 28, 34, 36, 47, 50

64, 77, 79, 134, 141, 147, 148, 158, 166, 167, 172

Gompert, David C. 27, 35, 37, 61, 63, 86, 88

Goodman, Melvin viii, 4, 7, 52, 74, 77, 159

Gordon, John 27, 35, 37, 61, 63, 86, 88
175

INDEX (Continued)

Gotti, John 130

Gunaratna, Rohan 26, 36, 159

H

Hamilton, Lee 50, 159

Hanssen, Robert 58, 158

Hawala system 35

Hayden, Michael V. 4, 78, 160

Heymann, Phillip R. 5, 23, 160

Horowitz, Alan 133, 134

HUMINT (Human Intelligence) 41, 60, 75, 78

Hussein, Uday 66

Hussein, Qusay 66

I

Ibrahim, Dawood 139, 140

Imperial Hubris (book) 27, 55, 77, 167

Information Sharing Environment (ISE) 63, 136, 161

India 13, 36, 81, 133, 139, 140, 154, 155

International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) 8, 9, 29, 161

International Conference of Rome 29

International Criminal Police Commission 30

International Criminal Police Organization 30

International Police Congress 30

International Security Managers Association (ISMA) 85

Interpol xii, xvi, 2, 9, 12, 13, 19, 30, 31, 32, 33, 38, 90, 125, 134, 15

Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 107, 108, 140, 166

“Interstitial spaces” 93, 94

Iran 80

Islamization 81

J

Janjalani, Khadafy 66

Jordan 78

K

Khan, A.Q. 27, 153

Kansi, Mir Amal 66

Kaplan, David 63, 68, 140, 161, 162
176

INDEX (Continued)

L

Lashkar-e-Taiba 139, 140

Law enforcement agency (LEA) 2, 11, 12, 60, 80, 85, 117, 141

Leaks viii, 51, 54, 55, 169

Legal Attache (LEGATT) 24

Lewis, Bernard 25, 59, 162

Lia, Brynjar 28, 162

M

Makarenko, Tamara ix, 69, 163

Mackinlay, John 35, 162

Mahabalipuram, India 133

McConnell, Mike 140

McKusker, Rob ix, 70, 163

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 2, 90

Mousawi, Zacarias 66

Mueller, Robert 44

Mumbai 139, 140, 155, 157, 159, 160, 165

Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) 2, 19, 90, 112

Myanmar 80

N

Nadelmann, Ethan 22, 30, 91, 93, 94, 112, 123, 153, 164

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 145, 149, 150, 151

National Criminal Identifi cation Center (NCIC) 31

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 9, 170

Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) 87

Next Generation Identifi cation (NGI) 31

Newsday, New York, Long Island 57, 166, 169

New York Police Department (NYPD) 66, 129, 130, 131, 132, 137

Nikitin, Mary Beth 167

North Korea 80

O

Odom, William 78

Offi ce of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (Department of State) 15

Operation Predator 91

ORCON (Originator-Controlled) 62, 63

Organizational pathology 48
177

INDEX (Continued)

Over-classifi cation 11, 51, 53, 59, 61, 63, 70, 71

Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) 85

P

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 25

Pardubice, Czech Republic 130, 131

PATRIOT Act (USA PATRIOT Act) 2, 3, 149

Pavitt, James 44

Picarelli, John 70, 167

Pillar, Paul R. 16, 23, 165

Piracy 28, 157, 165

Police Union of German States 29

Politicization of intelligence 53, 54, 142, 166

Posner, Richard viii, 23, 50, 51, 62, 166

Predator drones 34, 74

Pretty Good Privacy 26

Prouty, Nada 58

R

RAND Corporation 4, 15, 35, 37, 66, 75, 117, 153, 159, 161, 162

Ransom, Harry Howe 78, 166

Raustalia, Kal 166

Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) 34

Regional Security Offi ce (RSO) 36, 50, 85, 90, 97, 101, 102, 104, 106, 

110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 118, 125, 128, 130, 131

Reagan, Ronald (President) 50

Red Notices (Interpol) 134

Reno, Janet 56

Rewards for Justice (RFJ) 66, 67, 122, 166

Richelson, Jeffrey 77, 78, 166

Rindskopf, Elizabeth 23

Ross, Jacqueline vii, xxi, 22, 77

S

Sageman, Mark 137

Sali, Hamisiraji Marusi 66

Sanderson, Thomas 68, 158, 167

Scheuer, Michael 23, 25, 27, 36, 55, 74, 77, 167

Shedd, David 63

Shelly, Louise 68, 70, 167

Sheptycki, James 6, 16, 30, 87, 167, 168
178

INDEX (Continued)

Sims, Jennifer 50, 54, 168

Slaughter, Anne-Marie vii, 20, 21, 38, 39, 84, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 104, 

168

Solaiman, Abu 66

Sovereignty xii, xv, xvii, 73, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 98, 168

Soviet Union (former) 50, 51, 58, 75, 80

T

Taliban 2, 3, 27, 99, 106, 156, 169

Taylor, Chuckie 105, 106, 153

Taylor, Samuel 99

Tamm, Thomas 54

Tenet, George 27

Third Agency Rule 62

Toting, Craft Hano 66

Tradecraft 78, 158

Turner, Michael 43, 75, 136, 169

U

Ummah, 28, 34, 35, 36, 37, 167

U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) 31, 59, 90, 133, 134, 171, 172

U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 10, 46, 164

U.S. National Strategy for Homeland Security 28

USA PATRIOT Act (see PATRIOT Act) 2, 3, 149

V

Visa Fraud Branch (Diplomatic Security) 130

W

War on Terror (see Global War on Terror) xvii, 10, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 28, 34, 36

50, 53, 64, 77, 79, 134, 141, 147, 148, 158, 166, 167, 172

Whitlock, Craig 26, 171

“Whole Earth” 70, 141, 142, 143

Wilson, James Q. 44, 45, 46, 48, 138, 172

Washington Post 7, 26, 31, 54, 74, 120, 155, 157, 160, 161, 165, 169, 171, 17

Witness Security Program (WitSec) viii, 59, 60, 129

Y

Yousef, Ramzi 66
179

INDEX (Continued)

Z

Zegart, Amy 43, 47, 48, 62, 136, 172

Zeigler, Gilbert (see Van A. Brink) 128

181

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Michael D. Bayer is a 22-year veteran of the U.S. Foreign Service and 

eral law enforcement system. As a Special Agent for the U.S. Depar

State’s Diplomatic Security Service, he has served as a regional security 

American embassies overseas, as chief of a transnational criminal inv

section, as a criminal investigator, and as a bodyguard for former Sec

State James Baker.

Th roughout his long career in security and law enforcement, Mike ha

extensively and intimately with all elements of the U.S. national secur

ture—to include U.S. (and foreign) intelligence agencies, the inte

diplomatic corps, U.S. military and Department of Defense eleme

international police and law enforcement entities. In 1999 he won 

acclaim as a criminal investigator for having taken down an internatio

nized crime ring, for which his work has been featured on the televisi

“America’s Most Wanted.” Mike was further recognized that year by th

Law Enforcement Offi cers Association (FLEOA) as a criminal invest

the year—with an award for investigative excellence. As Chief of Di

Security’s Criminal Investigative Liaison Branch (CIL) from 2003 to 

directed the location, apprehension, and return to the United States of 

(oft en notorious) American fugitives from overseas. He has served m

tours in Bogota, Colombia; Istanbul, Turkey; and most recently Paris

His next assignment will be Special Agent in Charge of the Denver Fie

beginning in the summer of 2010. Th rough the years, Mike has worke

the world on various duty assignments and investigations.

In 2006 the author was nominated as a Research Fellow to the Nationa

Intelligence College (NDIC), working in its Center for Strategic Int

Research (CSIR). Th is book is a product of that fellowship. In August 2

authored an article, “Operation Global Pursuit: In Pursuit of the Wor

Dangerous Fugitives and Terrorists,” for Th e Police Chief magazine.

Th e author holds bachelor’s and master’s degrees from Duquesne Uni

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and is presently pursuing a Ph.D. in law and 

tional terrorism on a scholarship from the University of Wollongong in A

Mike is a native of Pittsburgh. He and his wife Suzanne have two 

Ingrid and Gus, and a sweet Border Collie named Gracie. All are av

burgh Steelers football fans.