No. 173, September 2000 Strategic Forum 

ple and the Taiwan Issue. It announced that

China was prepared to use force against

Taiwan if negotiations on unification are

indefinitely postponed. 

Both sides would like to find a way out

of their respective corners. Taipei can go no

further in asserting its separate identity

without risking military action by China. New

President Chen Shui-bian announced that he

would “not push forth the inclusion of the socalled ‘state-to-state’ description in the

[Republic of China’s] Constitution.” At the

same time, as evidenced by Chen’s election,

Beijing’s reliance on the threat of force to

influence events is waning. It seems prepared to wait for some further positive steps

from Chen that would allay continuing suspicions of his commitment to independence.

This post-election period presents Beijing and Taipei with an opportunity to defuse

a potentially explosive situation. They are

carefully seeking openings to reduce the

level of tension between them and to redirect

relations away from confrontation and within

the context of a measured assessment of

their respective strategic interests.

The United States policy of strategic

ambiguity encourages these tendencies and

should therefore be adhered to rigorously. 

without compromising their longer term objectives. In the process, each is being influenced

and constrained by a number of factors related

to politics, economics, and broad strategic

interests. Overall, these factors will provide

incentives to seek a reduction of tensions, at

least in the short term. At the same time, years

of mutual mistrust and the stark and growing

differences between their respective political

and social cultures will continue to affect the

prospects for a mutually acceptable resolution

of the issues separating China and Taiwan.

The Taipei Corner

Taiwan continues to hold the initiative in

relations across the Strait, the terms of which

have been largely defined by former President

Lee Teng-hui. His highly visible political visit to

the United States in 1995, his “pragmatic diplomacy” to develop a network of unofficial relations around the world, and his assertion in

1999 that Taiwan and the Mainland exemplify a

special relationship between two sovereign states

all convinced Beijing that Taiwan was following

a course leading toward independence.

Current President Chen Shui-bian’s stance

on relations reflects the views of his Democratic

mention of the Special Two State Theory is

likely to appear less frequently in Taipei’s

political lexicon, the assumptions inherent in

the formulation will continue to inform thin

ing about relations with the Mainland.

Chen is also a relatively weak president,

having been elected with only 39 percent of t

electoral vote. The DPP lacks a majority in th

Legislative Yuan and is inexperienced in the

business of governance. The political dynam

in the run-up to the Legislative Yuan election

in December 2001 will shape Chen’s shortterm, political environment. Over the longer

term, Chen faces what could be a formidable

challenge from former Taiwan Governor and

Kuomintang (KMT) member James Soong,

current President Chen

Shui-bian’s stance on

relations reflects the

influence of Lee Teng-hu

who in effect articulated

a politically authoritative

definition of “Taiwan

identity”
Shui-bian will deal with the Lee Teng-hui

legacy on Taiwan identity. At this time, there is

virtually no incentive to push the envelope

any further. The next logical step in such a

process would be to declare de jure independence, an action that would provoke a military

response by Beijing, with all of the attendant

negative consequences. It is difficult to imagine that Chen would wish to move in this

direction anytime soon. Instead, as his inaugural address indicated, he will maneuver

within the framework of Lee’s formulation to

reduce the prospects for military action by

China and to garner international support by

seeking to establish some basis for dialogue

with Beijing. A greater willingness to challenge the cross-strait status quo is unlikely to

emerge until after the legislative elections in

December 2001, if then.

The Beijing Corner

The approach of the Mainland has always reflected a mix of military and political

elements. The basis for the political component resides in the one-country-two-systems

model enunciated first by Deng Xiaoping and

reiterated many times over the years by Jiang

Zemin and other Chinese officials. The one

tinued refusal to begin political talks aimed at

eventual reunification would be cause for

military intervention. 

Since the visit by Lee Teng-hui to the

United States in 1995, the military component

of Beijing’s approach has received far more

emphasis than the political dimension. After

that trip, China staged ballistic missile tests

and naval exercises to demonstrate displeasure

with developments across the Strait. Later, in

an effort to influence the Taiwan presidential

election of March 1996, exercises and missile

tests were repeated on a larger scale. 

Despite political initiatives and contacts,

since 1996 Beijing appears to have placed an

increasingly high reliance on the military

component of its overall approach to Taipei. In

recent years, this has been evidenced by the

deployments of short-range ballistic missiles in

Fujian Province opposite Taiwan. In 1995, at

the time of the Taiwan Strait crisis, Beijing

reportedly had deployed 30–50 missiles along

need to be considered. 

Jiang Zemin, like Chen Shui-bian, is a

weak president, albeit for entirely different

reasons. For Jiang and the Chinese Commun

Party (CCP) leadership, the highest priority 

maintaining national unity and internal

stability. Economic development is impossib

to achieve without these two conditions. How

ever, both of these priorities are threatened b

slowed rates of economic growth, widespread

dissatisfaction with government corruption,

rising levels of unemployment, and popular

reaction against the new dislocations that w

inevitably result as the Party implements

reforms to comply with World Trade Organiz

tion standards. 

Use of military force to reunify Taiwan

would clearly raise the risk to the CCP leader

ship. If Beijing uses force and fails to achieve

its objectives, China would not only pay a

heavy political, economic, and strategic cost,

2 Strategic Forum No. 173, September 2

This Strategic Forum is the product of collaboration among Ronald N. Montaperto and James J. Przystup,

both senior fellows in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense Universit

and Captain Gerald W. Faber, USN, senior military fellow in INSS. Dr. Montaperto may be reached by phon

at (202) 685–2358 or by e-mail at montapertor@ndu.edu, Dr. Przystup at (202) 685–2359 or przystupj@ndu.ed

and CAPT Faber at (202) 685–2372 or faberg@ndu.edu. Their common Fax number is (202) 685–3972.
No. 173, September 2000 Strategic Forum 

TAIWAN

Quemoy

Hsiao-chin-men

Tao

Ta-tan

Tao

Tung-ting Tao

Xiamen

Taiwan Stra

(Formosa Strait)

[for Taiwan] “one China” is a condition for the

future. We emphasize that parity and separate

rule characterize the present cross-strait

situation, and the two sides are of a “special

state-to-state relationship.”

— Chi Su, former Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council,

Taiwan’s cabinet-level organization that directs Mainland policy
4 Strategic Forum No. 173, September 2

will undoubtedly continue, it has thus far

consisted mainly of the reiteration of older

themes and contains nothing new. Also, there is

a new willingness to articulate a more nuanced

concept of what is achievable. Increasingly,

Chinese interlocutors acknowledge the great

distances between the lives of the people of

Taiwan and most of the people of China and

admit that reunification is a matter that will

span generations. 

Although Beijing will not give up its calls

for reunification, it appears more willing in the

short term to settle for some demonstrated

assurance that Taipei remains committed to

maintaining the concept of one China in some

form. This is almost certainly the reason for

Beijing’s identifying Taipei’s willingness to

return to the 1992–93 Koo/Wang formulation

of this concept—that both sides recognize that

there is one China but have different views of

what that means—as a bottom line indicator

of Taipei’s intentions. That the two sides have

somewhat different interpretations of what

China’s Wang Daohan and Taiwan’s Koo Chenfu actually agreed upon may not necessarily

pose an insurmountable obstacle to progress

across the Taiwan Strait.

but there is clearly a preference for a different

course. As for Taipei, the new administration

there must have been made aware of Washington’s concerns and dissatisfactions with

certain of the events of the recent past. This

awareness will likely become part of Taiwan’s

emerging consensus against pushing the

limits at this time.

The upcoming American presidential

election is also a significant short-term factor.

Chen Shui-bian’s expressed preference for not

linking the vote on permanent normal trade

relations in Congress with the vote on the

Taiwan Security Enhancement Act undoubtedly

played well in Beijing. Neither Beijing nor

Taipei will have any interest in seeing China,

Taiwan, or cross-strait relations emerge as a

The Strategic Forum series presents original research b

members of the National Defense University as well as

other scholars and specialists in national security affair

from this country and abroad. The opinions expressed o

implied in this publication are solely those of the author

and do not necessarily represent the views of the

National Defense University, the Department of Defense

or any other governmental agency.

NDU PRESS

William R. Bode George C. Maerz

General Editor Supervisory Editor

The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes

books, monographs, and reports on national security

strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy.

For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at:

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produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at:

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INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Stephen J. Flanagan Robert A. Silano

Director Director of Publications

Beijing and Taipei, and not the lack of creati

ideas. It is important to accept that less is

probably better in this case. Washington can

have some impact on the margins, but direc

involvement will not have a positive effect. T

is not to say that U.S. views are unknown to

both sides and these views will be incorporate

into decisions made by China and Taiwan. It 

therefore advisable to maintain a posture of

strategic ambiguity.