### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON SE PT E MB E R 2 1, 200 4 S es sio n CELLCO PARTNERSHI P d/b/ a VERI Z ON WI RELES S, ET AL 

### . v. SHEL BY

COUNTY, TENNES SEE, ET AL 

### . Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. CT-005905-01 K ay S. Robil io, Jud ge

No. W2003-02942-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Janu ary 12, 2005

I n this case we are asked to construe se vera l instruments related to a pa rce l of rea l property . I n 1976, She lby Cou nty ob ta ine d ti tle to a

pa rc e l of pr op e rty c on ve y e d o ut o f a

larg e r tr a c t and pr oc e e de d to constru c t a w a te r to w e r o n th e p r o p e r ty

. F r o m 1 9 7 6 to 1 9 8 2 , Sh e lb y Co u n ty u s e d a g r avel r oad trave rsing the adjac ent lot retaine d by the orig inal g rantor to g ain ac cess to the water towe r. In 1982, the orig inal g rantor proce eded to e x ecute a document purporting to gr ant Shelby Countyan ea sement over t h e gra v el road. Theorig inal g rantor subse quently convey ed the a djace nt parc el to a third party , Hig hway

64 Partners. I n 1995, Shelby County enter ed into a lea se ag ree ment with Verizon, allowing Verizon t o install a cellular c ommunications antenna on the wa t er t o wer and g rante d Verizon an easeme nt over the g rave l road. Hig hway 6 4 P ar t n ers protested Verizon’s use of the g ra ve l roa d. Ve ri zon fi le d a dec laratory jud g me nt ac tio n see kin g a de c laratio n of the pa rt ie s’ ri g hts r e g ar d i n g t h e g r a v e l r o a d

. T h e tr i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d s u m m ar y j u d g m e n t t o V e r i z o n a n d S h e l b y C o u n t y, and denie d summary

judgme nt to Highway

64 Partners. We a ffirm.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed
A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.
E d w ar d M

. B e ar m a n , M e m p h i s , T N , f o r A p p e l l a n t , H i g h w a y

6 4 P ar t n e r s , LLP Shelby R. Grubbs, Ry an A. Kurtz, C hattanoog a, for Appellee C el l co P artne rship d/b/a Verizon Wir e le ss
Gordon B . Olswing , Memphis, TN, for Ap p e ll e e s , Shelby County , Tenne ssee and the Light, Ga s And Water Division of the City of Memphis, TNC o n stru c tio n o n the S to n e b rid g e W a te r T o w e r b e g a n in 1 9 7 6 , an d the p ro je c t wa s c o m p le te d in 1 9 7 8

. 1

W he n S he l b y C o un t y acq uired t he p ro p erty, the lan d w as b o rd ere d o n the n o rth b y Int erstate 4 0 ; o n the e ast 2 by l and n ow occupi ed by St onebri dge G ol f C our s e; and on t he s out h and wes t by t he r emai nder of t he propert y r et ai ned b y S to n e b rid g e , no w o w n e d b y A p p e llan t. -2- OP IN ION
I.
F actual Background and Proc edural History This appea l involves certa in rea l property orig inally

owned by Stonebridg e Ve nture, Limited (“ S t o n eb ri d ge” ) , l o c a t ed i n S h el b y C o u n t y , T en n es s ee
. On S ep t em b er1 6 , 1 9 7 6 , S t o n eb ri d ge convey ed, by

war ranty deed ( here inafter

ref err ed to as t h e “1976 De ed”) properly rec orded in the She lby Cou nty Re g ist e r’ s O ff

ic e un de r n umb e r L 6 5 07 6, a po rt io n of a lar g e r p arc e l of la ndto She lby Cou nty . T he 19 76 De e d p ro vid e d, in r e le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s:
TO HA VEAN D T O H OLD the a fo re sa id re a l e state tog e the r w itha ll the appurtenanc es and he reditame nts t h ereunto belong ing or in any wi se app e rt a ini ng un to the sa id pa rty of the se c on d pa

rt , its hei rs, succe ssors and assig ns, in fee simple forev er, as long as said premises is used as a water storage tank or for public util ities , in the event that sa id p ro pe rty

sh a ll b e aba nd on e d for

said p ur po se s, it s ha ll r e ve rt

to the g rantor, and this deed shall bec ome forf ei t ed and the pr emises here in describe d and all the ri gh t s h erein convey ed shall at onc e re ve rt to andre ve st i n a nd be c ome the pr op e rty of g ranto r, his succe ssors or assig n without a ny decla ration of f orfe iture or a ct of re

entry , and without any

other a ct by

g rantor to be perf

ormed. . . .
I n addition, the 1976 Dee d purported to g rant Shelby Countywhat a m o u n t ed to, in essence , three ease ments; two “Pipe L ine” easeme nts and a “tempora ry construction ea sement” se t to “expire and te rm inate up on inst allati on of e a se me nt i mpr ov e me nts or thr e e (3 ) y e ars fr om the date of thi s ins trume nt w hic he ve r c ome s f ir st. ” Sub se qu e nt t o a c qu ir ing the la nd , She lby Cou nty pr oc e e de d to b u i l d a w a t e r t o w e r ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e rr e d t o a s t h e “ S t o n e b r i d g e W a t e r T o w e r ” ) o n t h e p r o p e r t y
. In 1 addition, the Shelby

CountyFire Depa

rtment installed a communications antenna on the towe r.
At the time of convey ance , and at all times the rea fter, the subject prope rty acquir ed by

Shelby County was landlocked. After acquiring the property in 1976, Shelby County g ained acce ss to the 2 parc el b y u t iliz ing a

g rave l road (he reina fter r efe rre d to as the “G rave l Acce ss Road”) whic h trave rsed that portion of the Stonebridg e prope rty not convey ed in the 1976 De ed.-3-

On September

10, 1982, Stonebridg e executed a document entitled “Ea sement” ( here inafter ref err ed to as the “ 1982 Easeme nt”), whic h Stonebridg e re corde d in the Shelby CountyReg ister’s Offic e under

number T5 6633. The 1982 Easeme nt contained the f ollowing r eleva nt lang uag e: WHEREAS, bywar

ranty deed e ntere d into the 16 t h day of Se pte mbe r, 19 76 a nd re c or de d a s in str ume nt L 6 5 07 6 .

. . g rante d to Shelby County , Tenne ssee certa in rea l estate for t he construc tion of an ele vated water stora g e tank; and WHEREAS, this deed failed to g rant a rig ht-of-w ay ease ment g ivi ng a c c e ss t o s a id t a nk fo r the pu rp os e of

its ma int e na nc e ; NOW, THEREFORE, f

or and in consideration of Ten Dollar s ($10

. 0 0 ) cash in hand paid, the re ceipt of w hich is here by a c k n o w l e d g e d , S t o n e b r i d g e h e r e b y g r a n t s t o S h e l b y C o u n t y a pe rp e tua l e as e me nt ov e r tha t po rti on of gr an tor ’s lan d whi c h it is
nece ssary to use as a right-of-way easem ent for the maintenance and repair of said wat er tank

. . . .

. . . . Whic h e a se me nt sh a ll r

un wi th g ranto r’ s landa ndthe tit le there to, and be binding on the g rantor and its heirs and succ essors and any person who shall here afte r acquire tit le t o g rantor’ s property

. . .

. The 1982 Ea sement we nt on t o d es cr i b e, in essence , the Gra vel Acc ess Road utiliz ed by Shelby Countysince a cquiring the prope rty in 1976. Only

the pre sident for Ston eb ri d ge s i gned the 1982 Ea se me nt. She lby

Cou nty de nie s e ve r a sse nti ng to the 19 82 Ea se me nt or be ing bo un d by its te rm s.
On Marc h 26, 1985, Stonebridg e convey ed to H ighw ay 64 Partners (“H ighway 6 4 ") , by war ranty deed (her einaf

ter re fer red to a s the “1995 De ed”) rec orded in the Shelby CountyReg ister’s Offic e under

number W4 0979, the property adjac ent to the par cel at issue, over whic h the Gra vel Acc ess Road trave rsed, and which Stonebridg e pre viously convey ed to Shelby

County

. The 1985 Dee d contained the following rele vant lang uag e:

An d th e sa id pa

rty of the fi rs t pa

rt do e s he re by c ov e na nt wi th the sa id party of the sec ond part that it is l awf ully seized in fee the afor edesc ribed re al estate ; that it has a g ood rig ht to sell and convey the sa me ; tha t th e sa me is u ne nc umb e re d, e xce pt f or
. . . e a se me nts , if any for public utilit ies serving the Property , easem ents of record as I nstruments Nos. E2 1385, L6 5076 [t he 1976 De ed], a n d T56 6 33 [t he 1982 Ea sement] in the ShelbyCountyReg ister’s Of fice

. . . .Cel l co P ar t ner s hi p, d/ b/ a V er i zon W i r el es s ( “ V er i zon”) , became t he s ucc es s or i n i nt er es t t o M emp hi s Cel l ul ar 3 T el ephone C om pany by ac qui r i ng i t s r i gh t s an d ob l i gat i ons un der t he l eas e. -4- On Au g us t 22 , 199 5, She lby Cou nty e nte re d into a L e a se Ag re e me nt ( he re ina ft e r r e fe rr e d to as the “ Verizon L ease ”) w ith Memphis C ellular Tel ephone Company (her einaf ter re fer red to a s “Ve rizon”) which contained the following rele vant lang uag e:

3 WHEREAS, L essor, re prese nts that it i s the owner of the re al pr op e rty on wh ic h th e Sto ne bridg e -a re a wate r t ow e r i s lo cat e d in She lby County , Tenne ssee, be ing the trac t describe d in I nstrument #L 6 5076 [1976 De ed], of rec ord in the Reg ister’s Of fice of Shelby County , Tenne ssee. . . . WHEREAS, L essor ha s ag ree d to lease to L essee the fo llo w i n g : ( a ) t h e r i g h ta n d l i c e n s e t o e r e c ta n e w r a dio communications tower located (i) on or near the top of th e w ater tow e r lo c a te d o n th e L a n d , o r

( ii ) ina c ir c u la r f a s h io n o n th e w a te r tower support structure ( tube), or ( iii) on a separ ate monopole towe r adjac ent to the wate r tower ; (b) the B uilding Sit e, and (c) a nonexc lusive easem ent ( the “Easement”) for ingress, egress and utilit ies
as de sc rib e d o n “E

x hib it A ,” (the sa id ri g ht an d lic e ns e , B uil din g Site and easement being refe rre d to collectively here in as the “Prope rty ”); and

. . . . NOW, THEREFORE, f or valua ble consider ation, the su ff ic ie nc y of wh ich is h e re by

a c kn ow le dg e d, the pa

rt ie s e nte r i nto this L ease upon the terms and mutual c ovenants a s set forth her ein:

. . . . 4. War

ranty of Ti tle : L e sso r r e pr e se nts a nd wa rr a nts that it is seiz ed wi th good and marke table title to the Property , that except as set forth in this section, the same is unencumbered, and that theL e sso r h a s f

ull auth ority

a ndri g ht to e nte r i nto a nde xec ute thi s L e a se . L e sso r f

urthe r r e pr e se nts a ndwa

rr a nts that the re are a ndwi ll be no enc umbranc es, liens or impediments of title or clouds upon the title of the Property which would interf ere with the L essee ’s intended
u s e o f t h e P r o p e r t y g e n e r a l l y. 5

. C o m m u n i c a t i o n s E q u i p m e n t :
. . . . L e s s o r h e r e b y further g rants to L essee a no n ex clus ive e aseme nt for ingress and
e gre ss to th e Pr

op e rty , to the e xten t tha t suc h doe s not u nr e a so na bly int e rf e re wi th L e sso r’ s norma l bu sin e ss o pe ratio ns , s e ve n ( 7) day s a wee k, tw e n ty

f o u r ( 2 4 ) h o u r s a

d a y , o n f

o o t o r b y mo to r v e h ic le , inc lud ing truc ks , f

or the ins ta llatio n a ndma int e na nc e of uti lit y wi re s, cable s, conduits , and pipes ove r, under or along a rig ht of way rea sonabl y

satisfac tory

for L essee ’s use a nd extending fr om theFro m 19 7 6 t o present , Shelby C o unt y and i t s success o r, M LG W , ha ve co nt i nued to m ai nt ai n t he Stoneb ri d ge 4 W at er T ower on t he propert y
. C har l es P i cke l ( “ M r
. P i cke l ”) , a manag er for M emp hi s Li gh t , G as & W at er , t es t i f i ed t hat t he Stoneb ri d ge W at er T o wer i s ser vi ced onc e o r t wi ce a m o nt h.

U lti m a te ly, o n D e c e m b e r 2 9 , 2 0 0 0 , H igh w a y 6 4 e x e c u te d a lea se gr a n ting P o w e rte l a r igh t-o f- w a y o v e r its 5
p ro p e rty. -5-

ne are st pu bli c ri g ht of way to the Pr op e rty
. L e sso r fu rthe r a g re e s to e xec utesu c h inst

ru me nts or

e a se me nts fo r the be ne fi t of the Pr op e rty a t a ny tim e du ri ng the ter m hereof wh ic h L e sse e ma y

re a so na bly re qu e st t o p ro vide i ngre ss ande g re ss t o a ndfr om the Pr op e rty nece ssary to construct, maintain or ope ratethe Communications Eq uip me nt and , if

L e sse e de e ms n e c e ssa

ry , for th e prov isi on of

a ll nece ssary utilit ies to serve the Communications Equipment without additional consideration. . . .

. . . . 7. L iabilityand Indemnity : Eac h of L essee and L essor a g ree to use and occupy their re spective pr operty

at their own respe ctive risk and he reby rele ase the other fr om all claims for a ny damag e or injury

suffe red by

it. . . .
Att ac h ed t o the Verizon L ease was “ Ex hibit A” containing a docume nt entitled “Desc ription of Easeme nt,” which pur

ported to set the e aseme nt gr anted to Ve ri z o n as fol lows: “Be ing a 20 foot wide rig ht-of-w ay

ease ment acr oss the Hig hway 64 Partner s property

as re corde d in I nstrument Number T5-6633 [t he 1982 Easeme nt] . . . .” Af ter installing a

cellular communications antenna on the Sto ne bridg e Wat e r To we r in 19 95 , Ve ri zon uti lize d the Gr a ve l A c c e ss R oa d a c ro ss the pr op e rty now owned by

Hig hway 64 to service the antenna

. The initial term of the Verizon L ease was five y ear s, and Ve rizon ag ree d to pay Shelby County$1,600.00 per month over the term of the lease

. I n 1999, Memphis Light, Gas & Water (“ML GW”) purcha sed the Stonebridg e Water Tow er from Shelby

County , al t h o u gh S h elbyCountycontinues to be listed as the ow ner of rec ord of the parc el of land in que stion. As a result, M L GW as s u m ed all the rights a nd obligations of Shelby Countyunder the Ve ri z o n L ease . Tog ether , Shelby Countyand ML GW have utiliz ed the Gr avel Acc ess Road continuously from 1976 to pre sent in rea ching the Stonebridg e Water Tow er. 4

I n 2 0 0 0 , P o we rt el , an o t h erce l l u l ar co m m u n i ca t i o n s p ro v i d er , co n t ac t ed M i ch ae l Gr ee n b er g, CEO of a Me mphis real estate company acting as ag ent for H ighw ay 64, seeking to place a

cellular antenna on the Stonebridg e Water Tow er. H ighw ay 64 and Powertel beg an neg otiating ana g r e e me nt conce rning an ea sement ac ross Hig hway 64' s property

. During these ne g otiati o ns, Hig hway 64 5 learned that Verizon had ins talled cellular equipment on the S tonebridg e W ater Tower . Hig hway 64 notified Verizon of i ts finding s and accuse d Verizon of trespassing , and Hig hway 64 attempted to r e a c h a n a g re e me nt w ithVe ri zon on c omp e ns a tio n f or us ing the Gr a ve l A c c e ss R oa d. Whe n th e se neg otiations proved fruitless, Hig hway 64 threatened to file suit ag ainst Verizon.-6-

On S eptemb e r

2 4 , 2 0 0 1 , V e r iz o n f

il e d a c o mp lain t a g a in s t S h e lb y Co u n ty , M L G W, a nd Hig hway 64 in the Circuit Court of Shelby County seeking the following : ( 1) a decla ratory judgme nt that Verizon has the right t o u se the Gr avel Ac cess Road or , in the alternative, a dec laratory j u d gm en tt h atS h el b y

C o u n t y an d/ o r M L GW m u s tp ro v i d e V er i z o n wi t h ac ce s s t o t h e S t o n eb ri d ge Water Towe r; (2) a

judgme nt in favor of Verizon pay able by Shelby Countyand/or ML GW to cover amounts paid, if any , to Hi gh wa y64 in maintaining a cce ss to the Stonebridge Water Towe r; (3) i n d emnity

from Shelby

Countyand/or ML GW to cover a ny liabilityVerizon i ncurr ed fr om third parties a s a re sult of a bre ach of the Verizon L ease ; and (4) an injunction preventing Hig hway 64 from interf

ering with Verizon’s use of the Gra vel Acc ess Road. Hig hway 64 fi l ed an answ er to the c omplaint along w ith a counter claim ag ainst Verizon seeking damag es for

trespass a nd injunctive relief to preve nt further

trespass by

Verizon. On J anuary 21, 2003, Hig hway

64 filed a motion for summary judgme nt ag ainst Verizon seeking a ruling that Verizon’s use of the Gra vel Access R oad constit uted t respa ss. On April 7, 2003, Verizon s ubmitted its c ro ss- mot ionfo r s umm ary jud g me nt a g a ins t H ig hw a y 64 a sking that H ig hw a y

64 ' s c ou nte rc la im be d i s m i s s e d

. O n A p r i l 1 1 , 2 0 0 3 , V e r i z o n f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r p ar t i a l s u m m ar y

j u d g m e n ta g a ins t Shelby Countyand ML GW seeking a ruling that Verizon had a rig ht to i n d em n i t yfrom Shelby Countyand/or ML GW. On May 20, 2003, Shelby

Countyand ML GW filed a cro s s -m otion for su mma ry jud g me nt s e e kin g a n o rd e r that V e ri zon ’s us e of theGr a ve l A c c e ss R oa d d id n ot c on sti tut e trespass; Hig hway

64 is not entitl ed to damag es; and Shelby County , M L GW , and Ve rizon are entitled to use the Gra vel Acc ess Road to rea ch the Stonebridg e Water Tow er.
The c ircuit court conducte d a hearing on the parties’ motions on J uly 22, 2003. On Octobe r 31, 2003, the trial court issued i t s fi n d i n gs of fa ct and c onclusions of law followe d by an orde r en t er ed o n De ce mb er2 , 2 0 0 3 , wh i ch co n t ai n ed , i n re l ev an t p ar t , t h e f

o l l o wi n g ru l i n g:
1. The motion for summary judgme nt filed on beha lf of Ve rizon seeking a dec laration and ruling that it is entit l ed to use, without compensation to or separate ag ree ment with H ighw ay 64, the portion of Hig hway 64' s property previously used byShelby County , ML GW and Verizon, the description of which is more or less the same a s that ease ment described within the certain ease ment do cu ment rec orded as Instrument Number T5- 6633 in the Shelby CountyReg ister’s Offic e (“ Easeme nt”), is g rante d. 2. The motions for summary judgme nt filed on beha lf of Shelby Cou nty a nd ML GW se e kin g a ru lin g that Sh e lby

Cou nty , it s le sse e s, assig ns and succ essors (inc luding ML GW and Verizon), are e ntitled to use the Easeme nt w ithout compe nsation to or a sepa rate ag ree ment with Highw ay

64, is gr anted. 3. The motion for summary judgme nt filed on beha lf of Hig hway 64 ag ainst Verizon seeking a ruling that Ve ri z o n ’s us e of the Ease ment constitutes a trespa ss is denied. 4. The motion for partial summary judgme nt filed on beha lf of-7- Ve ri zon se e kin g ind e mni fi c a tio n f ro m Sh e lby Cou nty a nd

ML GW i s denied.

. . . . 6

. V e r i z o n , a s l e s s e e , a s s i g n e e o r s u c c e s s o r

o f S h e l b y C o u n t y (pursua nt to the terms of the ce rtain lea se ag ree ment dated Aug ust 22, 1995 by and betwe en Memphis Cellular Te lephone Com p anyand Shelby County ), is entitled to use the Ease ment, without co mp e n s a ti o n to o r s e p ar a te a g r e e me n t w ith H ig h w a y 6 4 , for the purpose of ingr ess and eg ress to the rea l pr operty convey ed to Shelby Countyas m o re p ar t i cu l ar l y d es cr i b ed i n I n s tru m en tNumber L 6-5076 in the Shelby

CountyReg ister’s Of

fice

. 7. Hig hway

64' s counterc laim is dism issed with prejudice

. Hig hway 64 filed a timely

notice of a

ppeal to this Court presenting the fol lowing issue f or our revie w:
I

. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in awa rding summary

judgme nt to V er i z o n an d Shelby County /ML GW, while deny ing summary judgme nt to Highway

64.
We a re a lso a sk e d to re vie w the fo llo wi ng a lte rn a tiv e iss ue raise d b y Ve ri zon Wir e le ss o n a

pp e a l:
I I

. I n th e e v e n t th is Co u r t d e te r mi n e s th a t Sh e lb y Co u n ty d id n o t p r o p e r ly c o n v e ya rig ht of acc ess t o the S tonebridg e W ater Tower to Verizon, whether

the trial court erre d in deny ing Verizon a declar atory

order setting f orth Shel b y

County ’s obligations under the Ve rizon L ease
. F or the re a so ns se t f

orth h e re in, we a ff

ir m th e ru lin g of

the tria l c ou rt

. II.
Stand ard of Review
The fac ts in this c ase are undisputed, and the issues prese nted to this Court primarily involve the interpre tation and construction of written instruments. “I ssues relating to the inter pretation of written instruments involve leg al rathe r than fac tual issues.” The Point, LLC v. Lake M

gmt. Ass’n, Inc ., 50 S.W. 3d 47 1, 47 4 (T e nn . Ct. App . 200 0) . Ac c or din g ly , s umm ary jud g me nt i s a n a

pp ro pria te means of r esolving such leg al issues. Id

. When we re view a g rant of summary judgme nt by

a lower court, we apply

the following standard of

revie w:
The standa

rds g overning an appe llate court’s revie w of a mot i o n for summary

judgme nt are well settled. Since our inquiry-8- inv olv e s p ur e ly

a qu e sti on of

la w, no pre su mpt ionof c or re c tne ss a tta c he s to the low e r c ou rt ’s jud g me nt, a ndou r t a sk is c on fi ne d to revie wing the re cord to de termine whe ther the require ments of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have be en met. Cow de n v
. So v ra n B an k /Ce ntr al S ou th , 816 S.W .2d 741, 744 (Tenn. 1991). Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03 provides that summary

judgme nt is appropriate wher e: (1) there is no g enuine iss ue wi th r e g ard to the ma te ri a l fa c ts re le va nt to the c la im o r d e fe ns e contained in the motion, By rd v . H all , 847 S.W .2d 208, 2 10 (Tenn. 1993); and (2) the m oving pa rty is entitled to a judgme nt as a matter of l aw on the undisputed facts. Anderson v. Standard Register Co. , 857 S.W .2d 555, 559 (Tenn. 1993). The moving party has the burde n of proving that its mot ion satisfies these req uirements. Downen v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 8 11 S.W. 2d52 3, 52 4 (T e nn . 199 1)

. Whe n th e pa rty seeking summary

judgme nt makes a properly supported motion, the bu rd e n s hif

ts t o th e no nmo vi ng partyto s e t f orth s pe c if

ic fa c ts establishing the exis tence of disputed, material fac ts which must be resolved by

the trier of

fac t. By rd , 847 S.W .2d at 215.
Ba in v . W e lls , 936 S.W .2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997)

. III
. Sum m ar y J udgm e nt
A. Const ruction of the 1976 Dee d

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

fo un d th a t th e 19 76 De e d c on ve y e d to She lby Cou nty a fe e simple int e re st i n the subject prope rty . On appe al, Hig h wa y 6 4 argue s that the 1976 Dee d did not provide Shelby Cou nty un re stric te d o wn e rs hip of the pr op e rty . Rathe r, She lby Cou nty obtain e d a

fe e simple determinable limited by

the lang uag e in the dee d.
“The overriding pur

pose of a ny

d e e d in ter p retation is the determination of the g rantor’ s intent of the c onvey ance .” Ha ll v . H all , 6 0 4 S

. W

. 2 d 8 5 1 , 8 5 3 (T en n
. 1 9 8 0 ) ( ci t i n g Colli ns v. Smithson , 585 S.W. 2d59 8 ( Te nn . 1 97 9) ); see also Quarles v. Arthur , 231 S.W .2d 589, 591 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950). I n asce rtaining the g rantor’ s intent, we beg in with the lang uag e of the deed itself and the circ umstances surr ounding its cr eation. Hutchinson v. Bd. , 250 S.W. 2d82 , 8 4 ( Te nn . 1 95 2) ; LaRue v
. G r e e n e Co u n ty Bank , 166 S.W .2d 1044, 1048 (Tenn. 1942) . I n construing the lang uag e in a written instrument, “the words expressing the party ’s intention should be g iven the usual, natural and ordin ar y m ea n ing.” Ballard v. N. Am. Life & Casualty Co. , 667 S.W .2d 79, 82 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1 9 8 3 ) ( ci t i n g Moore v . Life & Casualty Ins. Co. , 1 6 2 T e n n
. 6 8 2 , 4 0 S

. W

. 2 d 4 0 3 ( T e n n
. 1 9 3 1 ) )

. In determining what estate the de ed purports to convey , we attempt to constrain our ana ly sis to the four-9-

corne rs of the instrument without re g ard to the te chnica l and forma l divisi ons contained the rein. Mountain City Missionary Baptist Church v. W

agner , 249 S.W .2d 875, 876 (Tenn. 1952)

. Th e 19 76 De e d p ro vid e s th a t Sh e lby Cou nty sh a ll t ake the su bje c t p rop e rty “ in f e e simple fore ver, a s long a s said premises is use d as a water storag e tank or for public utilit ies, in the event that said property

shal l be aba ndoned for

said purposes, it shall reve rt to the g rantor.” “A de ed c on ve y s a ll o f a

g ranto r’ s e state or

int e re st i n p ro pe rty

un le ss i t c le arl y

e xpre sse s an i nte nt t o li mit the estate or intere st being convey ed.” Cap sh aw v . Ci ty of Coo k e v ill e , No. 01-A- 01-9209-CH00359, 1993 Tenn. App. L EXI S 300, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr . 21, 1993); Tenn. Code A nn. § 66-5- 101 (2003). A fee simple de terminable is an estate which (1) c reates an e state in fee simple and (2) provides for

its ex piration upon the happe ning of an eve nt stated within th e dee d. Y arbrough v. Y arbrough , 2 69 S.W. 36 , 3 7– 38 (T e nn . 1 92 4) ; see also Powe ll v

. Sumner County Bd. of Educ ., No. 01-A-01- 9005-CH-00190, 1990 Te nn. App. LEXI S 795, at *3–4 (Tenn. Ct. App

. No v
. 7, 1990). When the event stated occurs, t he estate reve rts to the g rantor. Y arbrough , 2 69 S.W. a t 38 ; Mi tc he ll v. Je rrolds , No. 1, 1991 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 201, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar . 26, 1991).
Whil e specific wording is not require d to cre ate a fee simple determinable, Ba ile y v . I nte rMountain Tel. Co., Inc ., 303 S.W .2d 726, 728 (Tenn. 1957), use of the above cited lang uag e sig nifies an intention by

the g rantor to c reate such a n estate. See Capshaw , 1993 Tenn. App. LEXI S 300, at *7 –8 ; Mountain City Missionary Baptist Church , 249 S.W .2d at 876; 26A C.J .S. Dee ds § 246 (2001) (noting that a fe e simple determinable is usually signifie d by

use o f wo rd s s uch as “ so long a s,” “until,” “during,” etc.) . Hig hway 64 conce des, and w e ag ree , that t h e 1 976 Dee d g rante d Shelby Cou nty a fe e simplede te rm ina

ble

. “ Suc h ‘d e te rm ina

ble fe e ’ wh ile it c on tin ue s, ha s a ll the inc ide nts of a f ee-s i mple estate, e x cept insofa r as these incidents are expressly restric ted by

the limitation over.” Mountain City Missionary Baptist Church , 249 S.W .2d at 876.
B. The Easem ent Created by the 1976 Dee d
Our re view of the rec ord must beg in with the 1976 Deed, w here by Stonebridg e conve y ed t h e p ar ce l i n q u es t i o n t o S h el b y C o u n t y
. T h e t ri al co u rt m ad e t h e f o l l o wi n g fa ct u al fi n d i n gs reg arding the prope rty

at issue: (1) the pr operty cont aini ng the Stonebridg e Water Tow er and the a d j o i n i n g p r o p e r t y n o w o w n e d b y H i g h w a y 6 4 w e r e p ar t o f a s i n g l e tr a c t o f l a n d o w n e d b y a common g rantor, Stonebridge , and (2) when Stonebridg e conve y ed the pa rce l containi ng the Stonebridg e Water Tow er to Shelby County , said property

was landloc ked. In turn, the trial court conclude d that, pursuant to the 1976 Dee d, Shelby County obtained an e aseme nt to use the Gra vel Acc ess Road trave rsing the prope rty previously

owned by

Stonebridg e and now owned by Hig hway 64. Although it is not entirely cl ear from the tria l court’s c onclusions of law, the tria l court appar ently

relie d on sever al leg al theorie s to justi fy its finding that the 1976 De ed cr eate d an ease ment in favor of

Shelby County

. T h es e included, as we pe rce ive them, the following : (1) theT h e trial c o u rt m a d e the fo llo w ing c o n c lus io n o f l a w : 6

“ T enn es s ee C our t s , i n g i vi ng l ega l cons t r uct i on t o dee ds, and i n det er mi ni ng wh at
r i g h t s a n d i n t er es t s a r e con v ey ed by t h e g r an t or or t o t h e g r an t ee pu r s u an t t o a de ed, h a v e c o n siste n tly a n d c o n tinu a lly fo u n d th a t a d e e d to a p a rtic u la r tra c t o f p ro p e rty i ncl ud es an eas em ent i n grant o r’ s adjoini ng pro p ert y
. I n m aki ng s uch f i nd i ngs, t he C o u rts h a v e fo u n d tha t wh e n e v e r o n e c o n v e ys p ro p e rty b y d e e d , he a lso c o n v e ys to the gr a n te e a ll a p p a re n t an d ne c e ssa ry e a se m e n ts. L a R u e v . G re e n [ e ] C o u n ty Bank , [ 1 6 6 ] S .W .2 d 1 0 4 4 (T e n n . [1 9 4 2 ]) ; W al l and Co. v
. Cl oud , 22 T enn. [( 3 H u m) 181, 182 ( 1842) ] ; a n d Th e Poi nt e , L LC [v. Lak e M gm t

. As s ’ n, Inc
. , 50 S. W

. 3d 4 7 1 , 4 7 4 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 2 0 0 0 )]

. It a p p ears as t ho ugh the t ri al c o urt b ased i t s co ncl usi o n o f law p art i al l y o n the exis t ence o f a n e xp res s easem ent in t he d e e d b y re lying u p o n the la n g u a g e in t h e h a b e n d u m c la u se o f the 1 9 7 6 D e e d , w h e re the gr a n to r c o n v e ye d “the a fo re sa id
r eal es t at e t oget her wi t h a l l t he ap pu r t e nances .” (emp hasi s ad d ed ). “ La nd do es not as a general rul e p ass unde r a c o n v e ya n c e a s a n a p p u rte n a n c e to lan d .” 2 6 A C .J .S

. D ee ds § 239 ( 2001)

. T enness ee reco g n i ze s t h e cr ea t i on of
e a se m e n ts b y e x p re ss g ra n t, re se rv a tio n , i m p lica tio n , p re sc rip tio n , es to p p e l, a n d e m ine n t d o m a in. Pev earv
. H unt , 924 S. W

. 2d 114, 115–16 ( T en n
. 1996)

. T h e ca s es r el i ed on by t he t ri al c ou r t , w h i l e r ec og n i zi n g t h at a n e as eme n t c an be ap p urt enant t o t he l and co nveyed, s p eak o f s uch easem ent s i n one of t he fo rms m ent i o ned i n Pev ear
.

-10- ease ment became an a

ppurtena nce nece ssary

to Shelby

County ’s use a nd enjoy ment of the pa rce l 6
c o n v e ye d , ( 2 ) c r e a t i o n o f a n e a s e m e n t b y i m p l i c a t i o n , a n d ( 3 ) c r e a t i o n o f a n e a s e m e n tb y n e c e s s i t y.
“An e aseme nt is a rig ht an owner has to some law fu l u s e o f t he re al prope rty of anothe r.” Pev ear v. H

unt , 9 2 4 S

. W

. 2 d 1 1 4 , 1 1 5 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g Brew v. Van De man , 53 Tenn. (6 He isk ) 4 33 (1 87 1) ). Ea se me nts ma y take ma ny

dif fe re nt fo rm s, wh ic h thi s Cou rt su mma ri zedin Pev ear a s f oll ow s:
Easeme nts can be cre ated in seve ral way s in Tenne ssee, including : (1) express g rant, (2) rese rvation, (3) implication, (4) pre scription, (5) estoppel, and (6) eminent domain. Easeme nts can be divided into two broad c lasses, ea sements appurte nant, and ease ments in g ross. I n an ease ment appurte nant, ther e ar e 2 trac ts of land, the dominant te ne me nt, a ndthe se rv ie nt t e n e m e n t

. T h ed o m inant t e ne me nt b e ne fi ts in s omeway

fr om the us e of t he ser vien t te ne me nt. Ea se me nts in g ross are simplya per sonal interest or rig ht to use t he land of another which does not b enefit another pr operty , or dominant estate, thus ease me n ts ing r o s s u s u a ll y in v o lv e o n ly

o n e p ar c e l. A n e a s e ment app urte na nt t o landis f a vo re d o ve r an e a se me nt i n g ro ss i n Tenne ssee.
Id

. at1 1 5

– 1 6 (c i t i n g Goetz v. Knoxv ille Power & Light C o. , 29 0 S.W. 40 9 (T e nn . 1 92 6) ); se e als o The Point, LL C v. Lake Mgm t. Ass’n, Inc ., 50 S.W .3d 471, 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
I t is clear f

rom revie wing the re cord that the 1976 Dee d does not expressly g rant S helby Countyan ea sement over the Gra vel Acc ess Road. Ther efor e, in determining whe ther a n ease ment was ne verthe less cre ated, we m ust resort to alternative theories. “ An ea sement by implication arises upon sever anceof a sing le pieceof land into separ ately owned parts as an infe renc e of the intention-11-

of the pa rties to the conve y ance .” Ba rre tt v . H ill , No. 01A01-9806- CV-00295, 1999 Tenn

. App. LEX I S 87 9, a t *5 (T e nn . Ct . A pp
. Oc t. 7, 19 99 ). “ Ea se me nts by imp lic a tio n
. . . aree xce pti on s to the g ener al ru l e that ease ments must be cre ated by either an express g rant or by presc ription.” Ba rre tt , 19 9 9 Tenn. App. L EXI S 879, at *6 (citations omitted). The law doe s not favor suc h ease ments, and the courts of this state have expressed a policy in f avor of restric ting the use of the doctrine. Cole v. Dy ch , 535 S.W .2d 315, 318 (Tenn. 1976) ; see also L ively v . Noe , 460 S.W .2d 852, 854 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970) ( citations omitt ed). In any event, their

use has been long rec og nized by the courts of this state. Liv e ly , 460 S.W .2d at 854. I mplied ease ments are g rounded in the policy “that a g rantor intends to include in a conve y ance whateve r is nece ssary for the be nefic ial use and enjoy ment of t he property convey ed.” Adcoc k v. A dcock , No. 01-A-01- 9505-CH-00220, 1995 Tenn. A p p
. LE X I S 7 4 1 , a t * 9 ( T e n n
. Ct

. A p p
. N o v
. 1 5 , 1 9 9 5 ) ( c it in g 2 5 A m. Ju r . 2d Easeme nts and Licenses § 2 4 ( 19 66 ); LaRue v. Gre ene County Bank , 166 S.W .2d 1044, 1049 (Tenn. 1942) ). “The Statute of Fr auds does not prohibit the creation of an im plied ease ment beca use such se rvitudes ar e considere d to arise by

operation of law or to be pa rt of a w ritten conve y ance betwee n the parties.” M.C. Headrick & Son Enters., Inc. v . Preston , No. 124, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXI S 277, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 1989).
“An implied e aseme nt a

ppurtena nt should only arise wher e it is of such nece ssity that we may presume it was within the contemplation of the pa rties to a conve y ance .” The Point, LL C v. Lake Mgmt. Ass’n, Inc ., 50 S.W. 3d47 1, 47 8 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 0) ; see also LaRue , 166 S.W .2d at 1049. I n o rd e r t o f

indthe e xiste nc e of a n e a se me nt by imp lic a tio n, the fo llo wi ng e le me nts mus t bepr e se nt: (1) A se paration of the title; (2) Nec essity that, befor e the se paration takes place , the use which g ives rise to the e aseme nt shall have be en long established and obvious or m anife st as t o show that it was meant to b e pe rm a ne nt; a nd(3 ) N e c e ssi ty that th e e a se me nt b e e sse nti a l to the bene ficial en

joy ment of the land g rante d or re tained. Another essential is sometimes added to these — namely , that the servitude be c on tin uo us , a s d ist ing uis he d f ro m te mpo ra

ry or oc c a ssi on a l.
Johnson v. H

eadrick , 2 37 S.W. 2d56 7, 57 0 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 19 48 ) ( c itatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o W igh tm an v . Cl ou se , No. E2002-00318-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXI S 225, at *2–3 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. Ma

r. 20 , 2 00 3) ; The Po int

, LLC , 50 S.W .3d at 478; Ba rre tt , 1999 Tenn. App. L EXI S 879, at *7 (re cog nizi ng the fourth element as essential to e stablishing an ease ment by nece ssity ). The party seeking to establish an easement by implication, in this case Shelby Countyand its succe ssor ML GW, be ars the bu rd e n of sh ow ing the e xiste nc e of a ll the e sse nti a l e le me nts

. Line v. Miller , 309 S.W. 2d37 6, 37 7 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 95 7) ; see also Fowler v . W ilbanks , 48 S.W .3d 738, 741 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 20 00 ); The Po int , LLC , 50 S.W .3d at 478.
The re cord r evea ls, and the parties do not dispute, that the first eleme nt, reg arding separ ation of title, has been satisfied si nce Shelby County obtained ti tle to the parc el at issue out of a larg er tra ct previously

owned by

Stonebridg e. See 28A C.J .S. Ea se me nts § 64 (1996). Turning to the se cond el em en t , S h el b y

C o u n t y an d M L GW n ee d ed t o es t ab l i s h t h e f o l l o wi n g:-12- I n order to show that the pree x isting use wa s permane nt, the o wn er o f the dominant estatemust prove that the common owne r used the pre mises i n an alter ed condition long enoug h before the
c o n v ey a n ce
. Th e ow ne r o f the do min a nt e state is n ot r e qu ir e d to prove that h i s u s e of the claimed e aseme nt occur red be fore the commo n o wn er sever ed the e states to show the permanenc y of the claimed e aseme nt. Appare nt or obvious use in this connection does not mean ac tual visibil ity , but rather susceptibilityof asc er t ainment o n re asonable inspection by persons ordina

rily conver sant with the su bje c t.A me r e te mp o r ar y p r o v is io n o r arr a n g e me n t ma d e f o r the convenie nce of

the entire estate w ill not co n s titute that deg ree of perma nency require d to bur den the property with a continuance of the us e wh e n d ivi de d o r s e pa rate d b y c on ve y a nc e to d if

fe re nt p art ie s. I n determinin g whether

a permanent quasi e aseme nt exi sted at the time of seve ranc e, it is permissible to look at the intendment of thepa rt ie s at the time of seve rance
. 28A C.J .S. Ea se me nts § 66 (1996) (emphasis added)

. The “obvious” aspec t of this element may be shown by establishing there was “something upon the trac t w hich was e ither visible or in the nature of a pe rmane nt artificial str u ct u re .” 28A C.J.S

. Ea se me nts § 67 (1996). To show the use wa s

“ c on tin uo us ,” “ theprior

us e mu st hav e be e n ine xiste nc e a t th e tim e of se ve ranc e a ndsu c h a

us e must have bee n continued af ter the se verance.” 28A C.J .S. Ea se me nts § 68 (1996). Up o n re v i ew i n g t h e r ec o rd , we n o t e t h a t t h e t ri al co u rt m ad e n o s p ec i fi c f ac t u al fi n d i n gs reg arding this element, other than to c onclude that “[t] he grant of way acr oss the grantor’s adjoining pr op e rty is p re su me d a s a

ma tte r o f la w to ha ve be e n int e nd e d by the pa rt ie s to the 19 76 War

ranty Dee d.” The rec ord reflec ts that both the parties and the trial court were preoc cupied with the use of the Gra vel Acc ess Road by Shelby County subsequent to obt aining title to the parce l at issue in 1976. A per functory

statement of use after the conv eyanc e is not enoug h.
Unlike express ease ments, [i mplied e aseme nts] take into ac count the prior use made of conve

yed land . They

ordain the pe rpetuation of that use on the g ener al principle that property is usua lly passed a long wi th i ts b ur de ns a ndthat th e pa rt ie s, a s ev id enced by

the ir a c tio ns , understood that their pr operty was thus conve y ed.
Ba rre tt v . H

ill , N o. 01 A0 1- 98 06 -C V- 00 29 5, 19 99 Te nn . A pp . L EX I S 87 9, a t *6 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . O c t. 7, 19 99 ) (c itatio ns omi tte d) (e mph a sis a dd e d) ; see also Rhoade s v. Taylor , No. M2001-00643-COAR3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. L EXI S 177, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar . 4, 2003).
The trial c ourt infer

red an intent on the part of the g rantor to cre ate an implied easeme nt by re fe rring to the 19 85 De e d, wh ic h la be le d th e 19 76 De e d a n eas eme nt

. Any re fe re nc e toA com mo n l aw eas ement by nec es s i t y i s not t o be conf us ed wi t h a s t at ut ory ea s ement by ne ces s i t y provi ded 7 fo r u n d e r T e n n e sse e L a w . T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 5 4 -1 4 -1 0 1 (2 0 0 3 ); s ee al s o B arge v
. Sad l er , 7 0 S.W

. 3 d 6 8 3 , 6 8 8 (T enn. 2 0 0 2 ). W hi l e t he l egi sl at ure po ss ess es t he p l enary po wer t o ab rogate t he co m m o n l aw b y s t a tuto ry e n act m ent , t he exi st ence o f

a st at ut e i n a nd o f

it sel f w i l l no t rep eal a c o m m o n law ri ght a b sent a cl ear l egi sl at i ve st at em ent exp res si ng a n inte n t t o d o so
. Lav i n v
. J or don , 16 S. W

. 3d 362 , 368 ( T enn
. 200 0). Sect i on 54- 14

- 10 1 of t he T enn es s ee C od e does
n o t c o n ta in su c h a leg islativ e d ire c tive

. See P ow el l v. M i l l er , 785 S. W

. 2d 37, 39 (Ark

. 199 0) ( i nt er pret i ng t he A r kan s as v e rs io n o f sec tio n 5 4 -1 4 -1 0 1 o f t h e T e n n e sse e C o d e a n d sta ting tha t “[t]h e lan g u a g e o f t h e sta tute he re d o e s n o t i n d ic a te tha t i t wa s inte n d e d to o v e rr u le the c o m m o n law re m e d y o f gra n ting a ‘wa y o f ne c e ssity’”) . O u r c a se la w s u p p o rts th is
c o n c lus io n , re c o g n iz ing the e x isten c e o f a c o m m o n law e a se m e n t b y ne c e ssity in T e n n e sse e
. Page v

. Fuchs , N o. W 1999- 00 70 2- C O A

- R 3- C V , 200 0 T enn
. Ap p. LE X I S 37 5, at * 12 –1 3 (T enn
. Ct

. Ap p. Ju ne 6, 200 0) ( not i ng t he di f fer enc es b et ween a co m m o n l aw easem ent by necess i t y and a s t at ut o ry easeme nt by necess i t y ). -13- subsequently

executed instruments in order to gle an the g rantor’ s intent at the time of conve y ancing was in er ror. See 28A C.J .S. Ea se me nts § 66 (1996) (stating that the intent of the g rantor at the time of seve rance is the determinative fac tor reg arding the second element)

. “The require ments for the establishment of an ease ment by implication must be strictly adher ed to.” 28A C.J.S

. Ea se me nts § 63 (1996). It may

very well be that the Gr av el Ac ce s s Road exist ed y ear s prior to the 1976 De ed c on ve y ing the su bje c t pa

rc e l to She lby

Cou nty . It is jus t a s li ke ly , h ow e ve r, that the Gr a ve l A c c e ss Roa d, ba se d o n th e re c or d b e fo re thi s Co urt, wa s c on str uc te d th e day

prior to the 19 76 De e d. It is no t ou r p ro vin c e to p re su me fa c ts w he re no ne e xist inthere c or d. Ac c or din g ly , a ny arg ume nt that, pursuant to the 1976 De ed, Shelby Countyand its succes s o rs i n i ntere st obtained an e aseme nt by imp lic a tio n to us e theGr a ve l A c c e ss R oa d mu st f a il. Com pa re Pe ac h v . M

e dli n , No. W2003-02152- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 4 T e nn . A pp . L EX I S 30 2, a t *2 3– 24 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . Apr . 28, 20 04 ) (r e fu sin g to find an easement by implication wher e the rec ord reveale d “no evidence to indicate the use of the road prior to separ ation of t he ti tle was ‘so long continued and obvious or manif est as to show that it wa s meant to be permanent’” ) with Buck v. Av ent , No. W2003-00934-COA-R3-CV, 2004 Te nn. App. LEXI S 637, at *28–29 (finding an easement by implication where testimonywas pre sented showing prior continued use of the ease ment in question), Rhoades v. Taylor , No. M2001-00643- COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 1 7 7 , at *10–11 (affirming the trial court’s finding of an ease ment by

implication where testimonyat trial established prior use), and Fowler v. W ilbanks , 48 S.W .3d 738, 741 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) ( noting the c reation of an ease ment by implication where pa rty e sta bli sh e d th e parc el was la nd loc ke d a ndte sti mon y sh ow e d “ the dis pu te d r oa d h a s b e e n in exis tence for 35 y ear s”).
Neve rtheless, our inquiry does not end he re. “ A common law way of nec essity

is a type of ease ment by

implication and ‘re sts on the implication that the pa rties intended and ag ree d to provide for suc h a way .’” Go wan v . Cr awf or d , 5 9 9 S o
. 2 d 6 1 9 , 6 2 1 (A l a. 1 9 9 2 ) ( q u o t i n g Bull v. Salsman , 7 435 So.2d 27, 29 (Ala. 1983)) . As opposed to an e aseme nt by implication, which require s proof of a pre -existi ng route of a cce ss at the time o f s ev er an ce , an ea sement by nece ssityallows for the establishment of an easeme nt of way wher e one previously never exis ted. Burdess v. United States , 55 3 F . Su pp . 6 46 , 6 50 (E. D. Ar k. 19 82 ); se e als o 28A C.J .S. Ea se me nts § 91 (1996). “ The i m p l i c a t i o n o f

a n e a s e m e n to f

n e c e s s i t y i s a n ap p l i c a t i o n o f t h e ru l e th a tw h e r e v e r

o n e c o n v e ys property he also c onvey s whateve r i s nece ssary for its bene ficial use and enjoy ment, and re tains whateve r is nece ssary for the use of the land reta ined.” 28A C.J.S

. Ea se me nts § 9 1 ( 19 96 ); se e als o LaRue v. Gre ene County Bank , 16 6 S.W. 2d 10 44 , 1 04 9 ( Te nn . 1 94 2) ; W all & Co. v. Cloud , 22 Tenn.-14-

(3 Hu m) 18 1, 18 3– 84 (T e nn . 1 84 2) . T his Cou rt ha s r e c og nize d th a t a c c e ss t o o ne ’s pr op e rty is s o essential to t h e fu l l en

j oy ment of that prope rty

that “a c lear

presumption [arises] i n favor [of the g rante e ] as the ow ne r o f s a id r e ma ini ng tr a c t of la nd

. . . th a t su c h e a se me nt w a s o f s uc h n e c e ssi ty that an implied rese rvation there of m ust be presumed t o have been within the contemplation of the parties at the time of said convey ance .” Harris v. Gray , 188 S.W .2d 933, 935 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1945).
I n o rd e r t o f

indthec re a tio n o f an e a se me nt by ne c e ssi ty , Sh e lby

Cou nty a ndML GW m us t s h o w t h e f

o l l o wi n g: The pre requisites to the cr eation of an ease ment by nece ssityare : 1) the titles to the two tracts in question must have bee n held by one person; 2) the unity

of title must have bee n sever ed by a conve y ance of one of the trac ts; 3) the ease ment must be nece ssary in order f or the ow ne r of the do min a nt te ne me nt to us e his la nd with th e nec e ssi ty exis ting both at the time of the seve ranc e of title and the tim e of e xer c ise of

thee a se me nt.
Powell v. Miller , 7 8 5 S

. W

. 2 d 3 7 , 3 9 (A rk

. 1 9 9 0 ) ( ci t i n g Burdess v. United States , 553 F. Supp. 646, 64 9– 50 (E .D . A rk . 1 98 2) ); see also Morris v. Simmons , 909 S.W .2d 441, 444 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). Th e fi rs t a ndse c on d e le me nts are satis fi e d inthi s c a se sin c e the pa rc e l no w o wn e d b y

She lby Cou nty orig inated by

deed f rom a lar g er tra ct pre viouslyowned by Stonebridg e.
The third ele ment, reg arding nece ssity , arises w hen the c onvey ance results in the dominant parc el becoming landlocked. 28A C.J .S. Ea se me nts § 9 3 ( 19 96 ); se e als o Tho mp so n v . H uls e , No. E1999-02474-COA- R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXI S 31, at *15–16 (Te nn. Ct. App. J an. 26, 2000); Morris v. Simmons , 909 S.W .2d 441, 444 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993); W hit we ll v . W hite , 529 S.W .2d 22 8, 23 2 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 97 4) . On a pp e a l, H ig hw a y

64 arg ue s th is e le me nt i s n ot s a tis fi e d inthi s case beca use, following the delivery of the 1976 De ed, Shelby Countydid not obtain a landlocked parc el. I n support of this contention, Hig hway 64 direc ts our attention to the lang uag e in the 1976 Dee d itself, wher e Stonebridg e expressly g rante d Shelby

Countytwo “p i p eli ne” e aseme nts and a “construc tion” ease ment. Hig hway 64 acknow ledg es t hat t hese ex press easements, accor ding to the deed’ s lang uag e, we re to e x pire in 1979. Howeve r, Hig hway 64, relying on the deposition testimony of Mr . Pi c ke l sh ow ing he us e d th e se e a se me nts , a rg ue s th e se e a se me nts e sta bli sh that Sh e lby

Cou nty did n o to b t a i n a

l a n d l o c k e d p ar c e l

. F i n a l l y , s i n c e t h e s e e a s e m e n t s w e r e c r e a t e d b y e xp r e s s g ra nt, Hig hway 64 notes that “the pa

ramount rule obta ins that the intention of the parties is contr olling as that inte n ti o n is f

o u n d to b e e v id e n c e d b y th e lan g u a g e o f

th e d e e d a n d th e c ir c u ms ta nces surrounding the conve y ance .” Ly nn v . Tu rp in , 2 15 S.W. 2d 79 4, 79 6 (T e nn . 1 94 8) ; see also Foshee v. Brigman , 129 S.W .2d 207, 208 (Tenn. 1939)

. Tenne ssee doe s not r equire the exis tence of strict nece ssity , and we may find the existence of a n e a se me nt b y

ne c e ssi ty wh e re su c h e a se me nts is “ of su c h r easo nab le nec e ssi ty to the fu ll enjoy ment of the dominant tene ment.” LaR u e v
. G r e e n e Co u n tyBank , 1 6 6 S.W .2d 1044, 1050 (T e nn . 1 94 2) ; see also Harris v. Gray , 188 S.W .2d 933, 934–35 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1945). H oweve r,-15-

“[t] he deg ree of nec essity must be more than mer e conve nience .” Riffle v. W orthen , 939 S.W .2d 2 9 4 , 2 9 8 (A rk

. 1 9 9 7 ) ( ci t i n g B r a n de n b u r g v
. B ro oks , 5 7 6 S

. W .2d 196 (Ark. 1979) ). “Away of ne c e ssi ty wi ll n ot b e imp lie d wh e re c la imant ha s a no the r re a so na ble or pr a c tic able mod e of ing re ss and eg ress.” 28A C.J .S. Ea se me nts § 97 (1996).
I n the instant case , we f

ind that the 1976 Dee d cre ated an ease ment by nece ssityin the subject p arc el, there by

permitting Shelby

Countyan ea sement of way over the Gra vel Acc ess Road for i n gre s s an d egr es s
. T h e n ee d t o u s e t h e G ra v el Ac ce s s R o ad t o o b t ai n ac ce s s t o t h e S t o n eb ri d ge Water Towe r constitutes more than a matter of mere convenie nce. The easements in the 1976 Dee d only provided a

temporary

means of acc ess t o the property , and they did not provide a convenie nt and ade quate outlet to a public stre et. Se e Cityof W hit we ll v . W hite , 529 S.W .2d 228, 234 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974). The re cord supports our decision on this issue. A t the time of the 1976 De ed, the g olf course adjac ent to the par cel in question wa s under c onstructi on. There fore , the g rantor w as awa re that, once the g olf course was completed, the ease ments set forth in the deed w ould no longe r provide a n adequate means of ingr ess and e g ress. This is evidenc ed b y t he dee d itself, which provides the e aseme nts were set to expire in 1979. Mr. P ickel did testify in his deposition that he used the e aseme nts ex pressly provided for

in the 1976 Dee d, howeve r, he did so in the further ance of his duties at ML GW, which require d him to ex amine and inspe ct the installation and construc tion of the wate r ma in be ing ins ta lle d a c ro ss the e a se me nts . E ve n th ou g h M r. Pic ke l te sti fi e d th a t hedid no t be g in to us e theGr a ve l A c c e ss R oa d u nti l 19 78 or 19 79 , th e re c or d r e ve a ls that Sh e lby Cou nty us e d th e Gr a ve l A c c e ss R oa d to g a in a c c e ss t o th e Sto ne bridg e Wat e r T ow e r i n 1 97 6 w he n it acquir ed the pr operty . Acc ording ly , Shelby Countyob t ai ned an e aseme nt by nece ssityover the Gra vel Acc ess Road to rea ch the Stonebridg e Water Tow er. C. The Le ga l Ef fe c t of the 19 82 Eas e ment
The trial c ourt found that the 1982 Ea sement “[did] not diminis h or defeat the rights of the parties pr eviously

obtained pursua nt to the 1976 Warranty Dee d.” I n fac t, the trial court c oncluded that the 1982 Ease ment failed to c omply with the statute of fr auds bec ause Shelby Countydid not sig n the do c ume nt. Con ve rs e ly , H ig hw a y 64 c on te nd s th a t th e 19 82 Ea se me nt g ov e rn s a ndse ts f orth the pa r a m e t e r s o f

t h e r i g h to f

w a y a ti s s u e
. I n a d d i t i o n , H i g h w a y 6 4 ar g u e s t h e s t a t u t e o f

f r au d s, while applica

ble, has been complied with beca use t he party to be charg ed, S tonebridg e, sig ned the instr u me n t. Sh e lb y

Co u n ty a n d V e r iz o n ar g u e th e p ar ty to b e c h ar g e d is Sh e lb y Co u n ty s inc e Hi gh wa y 6 4 i s at t em p t i n g t o en fo rc e t h e e as em en taga i n s tt h em
. S i n ce S h el b y C o u n t y d i d n o ts i gn the instrument, Verizon and Shelby County arg ue the statute of fr auds applies making the document of no e ff e c t.
I t is well settled that an express ea sement, being an intere st in land, m u s t co mply with the statute of fr auds, codifie d at sec tio n 29-2-101 of the Tenne ssee Code. Daugherty v . Toomey , 222 S.W. 2d19 7, 20 1 ( Te nn . 1 94 9) ; Nunnelly v. S. Iron. Co. , 29 S. W. 3 61 , 3 65 –6 6 ( Te nn . 1 89 4) ; Miller v. Stree t , 6 63 S.W. 2d79 7, 79 8 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp
. 19 83 ). Th e statut e pr ov ide s th a t “ [n]o a c tio n s ha ll be br ou g ht .

. . [u]po n a ny c on tr a c t fo r the sa le of la nd s .
. . un le ss the pr omi se or a g re e me nt .

. . sh a llD uri ng oral argument, co unsel fo r H i ghway 64 dir ect ed our at t ent i o n t o the f act t hat t he 1 9 8 2 E asem ent 8 i d en t i f i es the S he l b y C o un t y A t t o rne y’ s O f f i ce as the p rep are r o f

t he d o cu m en t

. T he 1 9 8 2 E ase m en t p ro vid es: T h is In stru m e n t P re p a re d B y: B r i t t t on L a mb # 7 7 7 1 6 0 N . M id A m e ric a M a ll M emph i s , T en n es s ee 38103 E ven as s umi ng t hi s were true , t he re co r d i s devoi d of an y ment i on of

t hi s f act dur i ng t he procee di ng s bel ow. A c c o rd ing ly, w e d e c line to c o n sid e r h o w th is fac t affe c te d the va lid ity o f t h e 1 9 8 2 E a se m e n t f o r th e fi rs t t im e o n a p p e a l. See Ci t y of Co okevi l l e v
. H um ph r ey , 1 2 6 S .W .3 d 8 9 7 , 9 0 5

– 0 6 (T e n n . 2 0 0 4 ); N o rto n v . M c C a sk ill , 12 S. W

. 3d 789, 795 (T enn. 20 0 0 ). -16- be in writing , and sig ned by the par t y t o b e charg ed.” T enn. Code Ann. § 29- 2-101 (2003)

. Reg arding the “pa

rty to be cha rg ed,” “ [o] ur statute

. . . has been construed by this court to mean the owner of the re alty

rathe r than the pa

rty attempted to be char g ed or held liable in an ac tion based on the memora ndum.” Lusky v. Keise r , 1 64 S.W. 77 7, 778 (Ten n. 19 13 ) ( c itatio n o mitte d) ; se e als o W atson v. McCabe , 5 2 7 F. 2 d 2 8 6 , 2 8 8 (6 t h C i r 1 9 7 5 ) ( q u o t i n g Irwin v. Dawson , 273 S.W .2d 6, 7 (Tenn. 1955) ) (“ Tenne ssee c ourts have construed the statute in this manne r for the re ason that the statut e ‘w a s a do pte d a nd e na c te d in Te nn e sse e fo r the pr ote c tio n of the pe op le , wh o ow ne d the tit le to r e a l e state .’ ” ); Hi lla rd

v . Fra nk lin , 41 S.W.3 d 106 , 1 12 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 0) ; Pa tte rso n v . D av is , 192 S.W .2d 227, 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1945).
“Ac ceptance of

an ea sement may

be pre sumed if the conve y ance is benefic ial to the g rante e, and ther e does not ha ve to be a n express unconditional acc eptanc e of the ease ment to rende r it valid.” 28 A C .J.S. Ea se me nts § 56 (1996). We presume that Shelby Countyacc epted the 1982 E aseme nt in l ig ht o f the fa c t that the 19 95 Ve ri zon L e a se sp e c if ic a lly me nti on s the 19 82 Ea se me nt w he n, in turn, describing the e aseme nt gr anted to Ve rizon. This fact evidence s an acquie scenc e by Shelby Countyto be bound by the 1982 Easeme nt. Acc ording ly , the trial court err ed by finding , as a matter of law, that the 1982 Easeme nt violated the statute of frauds. Stonebridg e, the party to be cha rg ed, signe d the 1982 Ease ment, and it did not have to be si g ned by Shelby Countyin order to ha ve leg al 8 eff ect. See Van W

inkle v. City of L aVergne , No. M2000-01784-COA- R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXI S 717, at *15–17 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2001).
At the moment the 1982 Easeme nt took effe ct, the ea sement by nece ssityobtained by

Shelby County , p u r s u a n t to th e 1 9 7 6 D e e d , w a s ab o li s h e d

. A n e a s e me n t b y n e c e s s ity c o n ti n u e s u n ti l the nece ssityg iving ri s e to t he ea sement no long er e x ists. Morris v. Simmons , 909 S.W .2d 441, 445 (T e nn . Ct . App . 199 3)

. At the mom e nt She lby Cou nty ob ta ine d an oth e r la wf ul way to g a in a c c e ss to the Stonebridg e Water Tow er, the ease ment by nece ssityterminated. See 28A C.J .S. Ea se me nts § 120 (1996). The ref

ore, subse quent to 1 9 8 2 , Shelby Countyhad an e x press e aseme nt acr oss the Gra vel Acc ess Road which it could use to a cce ss the Stonebridg e Water Tow er. Shelby Countyarg ues that the langua g e in the 1982 Easeme nt, which provide s that Shelby County has an ease ment to use the Gra vel Acc ess Road “as a rig ht-of-w ay ease ment for the ma int e na nc e a ndsu pp ort of sa id w a te r t a nk ,” op e rate s to re stric t it s f e e simple int e re st. I n c on tr a st, She lby Cou nty po int s to thela ng ua g e in the 19 76 De e d, wh ic h p ro vid e s that She lby Cou nty ha s a-17-

“fe e simple fore ver, a s long a s said premises is used as a water storag e tank or for public utili ties.” As with other instruments, “[i] n the construc tion of instruments creating e aseme nts, it i s the duty of the court to ascertain and g ive ef fec t to the i n t en t i o n o f t he parties.” 28A C.J .S. Ea se me nts § 57 (1996). Ge nera lly , “[w]here the lang uag e is unambig uous, other matters may not be consider ed, as an ea sement spec ific i n its terms is decisive of its limi ts.” 28A C.J .S. Ea se me nts § 5 7 ( 19 96 ); see also Foshee v . Brigman , 1 2 9 S

. W

. 2 d 207, 208 (Tenn. 1939) (“I f the e aseme nt is claimed under a g rant, the e x tent of the ease ment is de termined by the lang uag e in the g rant.” ). “In any event, whe re the me a nin g of

the ins trume nt i s d ou btf

ul, theri g hts of

thepa rt ie s ar e to be de te rm ine d b y the ru le of rea son rathe r than by some technica l r ule of property law, and in suc h a ca s e t h e c o u rt may consider the surrounding circ umstances at the time the instrument was executed, the situation of the pa rt ie s, a nda ny

pr a c tic a l c on str

uc tio n o f the ins trume nt g ive n b y thepa rt ie s th e ms e lve s in determining their intention.” 28AC.J .S. Ea se me nts § 146 (1996).
Whil e the g rantor may choose to pla ce restric tions on the use of the e aseme nt, “[t] he rule s and re g ulations so made may not limit the ease ment g rante d to the owner of the dominant estate nor inf ri n g e o n h i s p r o p e r t y r i g h t s , b u t t h e y m a y m e r e l y r e g u l a t e t h e m a n n e r o f t h e e n j o y m e n t of

his ease ment.” 28A C.J.S

. Ea se me nts § 1 59 (1 99 6) . Wh e n s e e kin g to r e c on c ile the 19 82 Ea se me nt w ith the 1976 Dee d, it is necessary that we c onsider both instruments. See 28A C.J .S. Ea se me nts § 57 (1996). Unde r the 1976 De ed, Shelby Countymay

utiliz e the pr operty

to ere ct a water

storag e tank or fo r pu bli c uti lit ie s, wh ic h is muc h br oa de r than the la ng ua g e us e d in the 1982 Eas eme nt. There fore , to the extent the 1982 Easement see ks to lim it these two uses of the subject parc el, the 19 82 Ea se me nt w ou ld h a ve no e ff e c t. We thi nk the be tte r int e rp re ta tio n to be that Sto ne bridg e did no t in te ndsp e c if

ic a lly to r e stric t th e us e of

the e a se me nt, a s arg ue d by Hi g hw a y 64 , b ut m e re ly to solidify the purpose in g ranting such ea sement; to allow acc ess to the par cel c onsistent with the 1976 Dee d. To hold otherwise w ould preve nt Shelby Countyfrom exerc ising its fee simple interest in the subject prope rty

to the fullest extent permitted by the 1976 Dee d.
D. V e riz on’s U

se of the Eas e ment
Pursuant to the 1 9 9 5 Veriz on L ease , Shelby Countypurported to c onvey to Verizon an ease ment over the Gra vel Acc ess Road to rea ch the Stonebridg e Water Tow er. The trial court f ound that this was valid beca

use, as a n appurte nant easement, i t was fr eely transfe rable . Rely ing on c ases fr om s ist e r s ta te s, thetr ia l c ou rt sta te d th a t “ [t]he op e rativ e qu e sti on in de te rm ini ng wh e the r the us e of an e aseme nt by a thi rd party is inconsistent with the purpose for which the easement wa s g rante d is w he the r the thi rd -p arty

us e r i s u sin g the e a se me nt i n a ma nn e r i n w hic h th e e a se me nt o wn e r i tse lf could use the e aseme nt. Se e He nle y v
. Con t’ l Cab le v isi on of S t. L ou is Cou nty , 692 S.W .2d 825, 828 (M o. Ct. Ap p. 19 85 ); Jollif v. Hardin Cable Television Co. , 2 6 9 N

. E

. 2 d 5 8 8 , 5 9 1 ( O h i o 1 9 7 1 )

. ” In turn, the trial court ruled that Ve rizon’s use of t he Gravel Acce ss Road did not increase the burde n on the servie nt estate he ld by Hig hway 64.
The trial c ourt corr ectly

conclude d that Shelby

Countycould provide Ve rizon an ease ment over the Gra vel Acc ess Road, but the court re ache d this conclusion by apply ing an incorre ct leg al-18-

standard. T he prec ise issue of whe ther the dominant landow ner may lease or provide use of a right of way to a third party

under the circ umstances involved in this case is a matter of first impression in this state. We be g in our analy sis by noting that “[t] he rang e of permissible uses of any particula r ease ment is in the first instance defined by the circ umstances surr ounding the cre ation of that ease ment; its use is limit ed to the purposes for which it wa s cre ated.” 28A C.J .S. Ea se me nts § 159 (1 99 6) . O ur

c a se la w a do pts thi s g e ne ra l pr op os iti on , p ro vid ing that:
“The use of an easement must be confined st rictly to the purposes for wh ic h it wa s g rante d or re se rv e d. A p ri nc ipl e wh ic h u nd e rl ie s th e us e of a ll e asem ents is t

hat th e ow ne r o f an e a se me nt c a nn ot m a te ri a lly incre ase the burden of it upon the servient estate or impose thereon a new and additional burden.” 17 Am. J ur. 996, sec . 98.

. . . . I n other words, an easement appurtenant to a dominant tenement can be used only

for the pur

poses of that tene ment; it is not a pe rs o nal ri gh t , and cannot be used, e ven by the dominant owner , for a ny pu rp os e un c on ne c te d wi th the e njo y me nt o f h is e state . T he pu rp os e of this rule is to preve nt an increase of t he burde n upon the servie nt e state , a ndit a

pp lie s w he the r the e a se ment is c re a te d b y

g rant, rese rvation, pre scription, or implication.” 9 R.C.L ., 786, sec. 43; J ones on Ease ments, secs. 99 a nd 100. “A principle which underlies the use of a ll easeme nts is that the owner there of cannot materially incre ase the burden of it upon the servient e state, nor impose a new and additional burden thereon. . . . I t m a y b e s a i d i n g e n e r a l t h a t i f a n e a s e m e n t i s p u t t o a nyus e incons i s t en t with the purpose f or which it wa s g rante d, the g rante e become s a trespa sser to the extent of the unauthorized use.” 9 R.C.L ., 790, sec. 47; Jones on Easements, sec s. 99 and 100.
Ad am s v . W inn e tt , 156 S.W. 2d35 3, 35 7 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 94 1) ; se e als o Mc Cam mo n v . M e re dit h , 830 S.W .2d 577, 580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). Finding no Tenne ssee c ases dire ctly on point, we turn to the decisions rea ched by our sister state s w he n a dd re ssi ng sim ila r i ssu e s.
Pursuant to these courts, the determination of w hether an ea sement holder c an assig n a portion of its rig hts to a thir d party depends on whether the ea sement i s “exclusive” or “ non-exclusive.” The Missouri Court of Appea ls explained “it is well settled that wher e the servient owner reta ins the privileg e of sharing the benef it c o nfer red by the ea semen t , it is said to be ‘common’ or non-e x clusive, and there fore not subje ct t o apportionment by the ea sement owne r.-19- Con ve rs e ly , if the ri g hts g rante d a ree xclu siv e of

the se rv ie nt o wn e rs ’ participation therein, divided utiliz atio n o f t he rig hts gr anted a re presumptively

allowable. T his principle stems from the c oncept that one who g rants to another the rig ht to use the g rantor’ s land in a pa rt ic ula r m a nn e r f

or a sp e c if ie d pur po se bu t w ho re ta ins no int e re st in exercising a

simil ar right himsel f, s u s t ains no loss if, within t he specific ations expressed in the gra nt, the us e is share d by the g rante e wi th o the rs
. Ontheoth e r h a nd , if the g ranto r i nte nd s to pa

rt ic ipate in the use or privileg e g rante d, then his r etained rig ht may be diminished if the g rante e shar es his rig ht with others.” Zhang v. Omnipoint Communications Enters., Inc

. , N o
. C V 0 1 0 3 8 0 0 9 5 S , 2 0 0 2 C o n n
. S u p e r
. LE X IS 3460, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2002) ( citi n g Hen ley v. Co nt’ l Ca ble v isi on of S t. L ou is County, Inc ., 69 2 S.W. 2d 82 5, 82 7– 28 (M o. Ct. Ap p. 19 85 )) . “ An e a se me nt o f g rant i s to be stric tly c on str ue d, a ndit i s g e ne ra lly

he ld that the g rant mus t be take n mo st s tr on g ly a g a ins t th e g ranto r, in case s of doubt, and in fa vor of the g rante e[.] ” 28A C.J.S

. Ea se me nts § 57 (1996).
In t h e 1 9 8 2 E a s e m e n t , S t o n e b r i d g e , t h e g r a n t o r , p u rp o r t s t o g r a n t“ t o S h e l b y C o u n t y a perpe tual ease ment over that portion of g rantor’ s land which it is nece ssary to use as a right- of-way ease ment for the maint enanc e and r epair of said water tank.” Further, the g rant of an ease ment provides: “TO HAVE A ND TO HOLD all and sing ular the pr emises, tog ether with the ap p u rt enances, unto g rante e and its succ essors for ever .” The term “e x clusive” doe s not mean “conf ined to use by

the g rante e alone .” Am . Te l. a nd Te l. Co. of Ma ss. v . M

cDo na ld , 173 N.E. 502, 50 2– 03 (M a ss. 19 30 ). “ Cle arl y g ue sts , in vit e e s an d te na nts are among those whose use of a r oad or way permitting a cce ss to a property would normally

be, in the absence of a spe cific restriction , considere d incidental to the owner ship or use of the property .” Go we n v . Co te , 875 S.W .2d 637, 641 (Mo

. Ct

. A p p
. 1 9 9 4 ) ( e mp h a s is a d d e d )

. T h e g e n e r a l ru le r e g ar d in g th e p e r mi s s ib le u s e of an e a se me nt c a n b e state d a s f oll ow s:
Whil e a private way

may not be used by

the public g en er ally

or by any one having no better right than the g ener al public, the owne r of such a way is not limit ed to its use by himself, but it may

be used by his family , by

pets, by te na nts oc c upy ing the lan d wi th h is a uth or ity , by his servants, ag ents, or employ ees in c onducting his business, by persons transactin g b usiness with him, or by g uests for soc ial pu rp os e s, e xce pt in c a se s wh e re the ri g ht of way is c re a te d b y

e xpre ss a g re e me nt and the user is restricted by the terms of the agree ment

. 28A C.J .S. Easements § 164 (1996) (empha sis added).
I n construing the lang uag e of the 1 9 8 2 E a s e me nt to determine whe ther it g rante d an exclusive e a se me nt t o Sh e lby

Cou nty , w e are min df

ul that:-20- Tenne ssee r ecog nizes the doctrine of e jus de m g e ne ris . J ustice Burn et t i n an opinion on petition to rehea r in City of Knoxville v. Br own , 195 Tenn. 501, 510, 260 S.W .2d 264, 268 (1953), state s the fo l l o wi n g: The “ doctrine of Ej us de m G e ne ris ” is no t a ru le of la w b ut i s mere ly an aid to the judicial mind in the interpretation of a statute or other writing. “T he doctrine of Ej us de m G e ne ris ba se d o n th e ma xim
ex pre ssi o u niu s e st e

x c lus io a lte riu s is: that, wher e g ener al words a re used, follo wed by

a desig nation of particular thing s or subject to be included o r ex cluded a s the ca se may be, the inclusion or e x clusion will be presumed to be re stricted to the particular thing or subject. . . . L iterally

translated, the phrase , ex pre ssi o u niu s e st e

x c lus io alterius , means: the e x pression of one thing is t h e ex clusion of another (of the same kind). Whilst the rule is more fre quently applied to the c on str

uc tio n o f s ta tut e s a ndwi lls , it equ allyis a

pp lic able to o t h eri n s tru m en t s o f w ri t i n g. Shipley v. Sofc o Erectors, Inc ., Nos. 743 and 790, 1988 Te nn. App. LEXI S 311, at *17–18 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. May

16 , 1 98 8) (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see also Costa v. Clayton , No. E2000-02627- COA-R3- CV, 2001 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 453, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. J une 22, 2001) (applying the doctrine to the int e rp re ta tio n o f an e a se me nt) . T he Oh io S up re me Cou rt , in de c idi ng a n is su e fa c tua lly sim ila r t o the one pr esently

befor e this Court, stated:
We theref ore must study

the deeds to see if the l ang uag e used c a sts lig ht o n th e qu e sti on of the app ortion abil ity

of thee a se me nts g rante d there in. I n th e de e ds , th e gr a nto rs c on ve y e d to Oh io P ow e r, “ its succe ssors and assig ns fore ver, a rig ht of way

and ea sement with the ri g ht, privi le g e a ndauth ority to s a id p arty of the se c on d p arty [Oh io Pow e r], its su c c e sso rs , as si gn s, le sse e s, a ndte na nts to c on str uc t, e re c t, o pe rate a ndma int a in a lin e of po le s and wi re s for thepu rp os e of transmitting e lectric or other pow er, inc luding the te legr aph or telephone w ires.” The c rucia l words of the g rants which are determinative of the intention of the g ra n tors are “succ essors, assig ns, lessees, and te na nts .” (E mph a sis a dd e d. ) Th e wo rd s “ le sse e s a ndte na nts ” indicate, pa

rticularly , that it was clea

rly intended by

the parties to the g rants that O hio Pow e r c ou ld l e a se so me po rt ionof its int eres t to thi rdpa rt ies . Su c h lang ua g e (“ its le sse e s” ob vio us ly me a ns “ its su ble sse e s, ” in the abs e nc e of a ny re stric tiv e de fi nit ionof “ le sse e ” in the easements—and there is none) is open to no other interpre tation.-21-

Jolliff v. Hardin Cable Television Co. , 269 N.E.2d 588, 590 (Ohio 1971). I n this case , we note the absenc e of spe cific la ng uag e indicating the “se rvient owne r re tains t h e p ri v i leg e of sha ring the benef it confer red by the ea sement,” the reby

evidenc ing a

lack of intent by S t o n eb ri d g e to pre vent Shelby Countyfrom apportioning its ease ment. See Zhang , 2002 Conn. Super. L EXI S 3460, at *11. Acc ording ly , we f

in d Stonebridg e did not intend for the 1982 E aseme nt to be “non-e x clusive,” there fore , Shelby

County , having obtained an exclusive e aseme nt, c ould pr operly provide Ve rizon an ea sement to the Stonebridg e Water Tow er ove r the Gr avel Ac cess Road.
T h e f ac tt h at t h e 1 9 7 6 De ed p ro v i d ed t h att h e p ro p er t y wa s t o b e u s ed “a s a w at ers t o ra ge tank or for public util ities ” does not chang e the result. W e re cog nize that, “[w] hile the common law rec og nizes that certain e aseme nts may be assigned or apportioned to a thi rd party , the t hird party ’s use cannot exceed the rights ex p re s sly convey ed to the orig inal ease ment holder.” Ma rc us Cab le Assocs., L.P. v. Krohn , 90 S.W .3d 697, 700 (Tex. 2002). “In particula r, the manne r, fr equenc y , and intensityof an e aseme nt’s use may chang e over

time to accomodate technolog ical deve lopment[ ,] . . . [b] ut such cha ng es must fall within the purposes for which t h e ea s em en t was created, as determined by the gra nt’s terms.” Id . at 70 1 ( c itatio n o mitte d) ; see also 28A C.J .S. Ea se me nts § 166 (“Theowner

of an exclusive e aseme nt is entitl ed to the fr ee and undisturbed use of his prope rty for the purposes of

the ea sement, eve n as ag ainst the owner of the fe e.”)

. As stated above , Shelby Countyand ML GW may use the Gr avel Ac cess Road a s an ea sement of way consis t ent wit h the purposes set f

orth in the 1976 Dee d; “a water stora g e tank or for public u t i l i t i es .” Likewise, the Verizon L ease betwee n Shelby Countyand Ve rizon could onlyconvey those rig hts held by

Shelby Countyunder the 1982 Easeme nt. Se e Og g v . M e dia c om , L. L.C. , 142 S.W .3d 801, 809 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). A “public utility ” is define d as “[a] company that provides necessary service s to the public, su c h a s telephones , e le c tr ic ity , a ndwate r. ” B la c k’ s L a w D ic tio na ry 15 44 (7 th e d. 19 99 ) ( e mph a sis added) . We find the servic es provided by Verizon to be within the meaning of “public utility ” as that term is used in t h e 1 9 7 6 De ed. In Bi sh op v . Ci ty of F ay e tte v ill e , 97 S.W .3d 913 (Ark. Ct. App. 2 0 0 3 ) , o u r s i s t e r s t a t e d e c i d e d a c a s e w i t h f

a c t s s i m i l ar

t o t h e c a s e p r e s e n t l y

b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t

. In Bishop , th e app e lla nt’ s p re de c e sso r i n ti tle g rante d a n e a se me nt to the c ity fo r t wo dis tin c t pu rp os e s: “laying utilities on the ea sement an d providing acc ess to adjoining land the city owned.” Bishop , 97 S.W

. 3 d at 9 1 6

. T h e citysubsequently built a water

tower on its prope rty

adjac ent to the land owned by appellant’ s prede cessor in interest. Id

. I n 19 94 , the c ity e nte re d int o a n a g re e me nt w ith a c e llu lar c ommun ic a tio ns c omp a ny , th e re by pe rm itt ing the c omp a ny to att a c h w ir e le ss communications equipment to the city ’s water tower. Id . I n addition, the city lease d to the company its easement f

or ing ress a nd eg ress ove r the servient tenement. Id . F oll ow ing sim ila r a g re e me nts e xec ute d b y

the city wi th o the r c omp a nie s, the app e llant s ue d f or tr e sp a ss, nu isanc e , a ndinv e rs e condemnation, arg uing that the city and the c ellular c ommunications c ompanies had exceede d the scope and intent of the ea sement. Id . at 917.
I n framing the a

rg uments on appea l, the court stated:-22- Appellants conte nd that t h e r i gh t -o f- wa y gra n tu n am b i gu o u s ly

limit ed its us e to p ur

po se s r e la tin g to w a te r u til iti e s a nddi d no t permit its a ssi g nme nt fo r the pu rp os e s of c on str uc tin g a nd se rv icin g w ir e le sscommunications towers and equipment. I n response , appellee s arg ue that th e jud g e c or

re c tly c on str ue d th e g rant a s unam bi g uo us ly c on ve y ing tw o d if

fe re nt rig ht s— a uti lit y

e a se me nt and

a n a c c e ss driveway unrestric ted in the purposes f or which it can be used.
Id . at 918. I n aff

irming the trial court’s g rant of summary judgme nt to the city , the appe llate court stated:
Onou r r e vie w o f the re c or d, we do no t be lie ve that a re a so na ble pe rs on c ou ld c on str

ue the de e d a s limit ing the ri g hts c on ve y e d to uses re lating onl y t o wa t er utilities, and we the ref ore hold that the tr ia l ju dg e wa s c or

re c t in fi nd ing the g rant to be un a mbi g uo us a ndin c on str uin g it a s c on ve y ing a n u nr e stric te d ac c e ss of ri g ht o f w a y

in a dd iti onto a

uti lit y e a se me nt. Nor do we believe the trial judg e er red in fi n d i n g that the City ’s and its assig n’s use of the ease ment fo r acce ss to the Cit y ’s property was within the scope of t he g rant. The owner of an ease ment may

make u s e of the ease ment compatible with the auth orize d u se so lon g a s th e us e is r e a so na ble in lig ht of a ll the fa c ts and cir cumstance s of the ca se. . . . [T] he telec ommunications e qu ipm e nt w a s n ot p la c e d on the e a se me nt, bu t on la ndbe lon g ing to t h e C i t y.
Id . at 919. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the tria l court’s ruling in all respe cts. As a re sult, we do not need to d e c ide thea lte rn a tiv e iss ue raise d b y Ve ri zon on app e a l.
IV. Conclusion
F or there a so ns se t f

orth h e re in, we a ff

ir m the ru lin g of the tr ia l c ou rt in a ll r e sp e c ts. Cos ts of this appea l are taxed a g ainst the Appellant, Hig hway 64 Partners, L .L .P., and its surety , for whic h execution may

issue if nec essary
.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE