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*********************************************** 
JENNIFER MOORE v. JUSTIN MOORE

(AC 44278)

Elgo, Moll and Suarez, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dissolved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

denying his postjudgment motion to modify alimony and child support.

At the time of dissolution, the dissolution court deviated from the child

support guidelines and did not award child support to either party,

concluding that it was in the best interests of the minor children and

the parents that no child support be awarded. The defendant’s motion

for modification claimed that modification of the alimony and child

support orders was warranted because the circumstances between the

parties had changed substantially because the marital home had been

sold, the parties were no longer cohabitating, and the parties’ income

and expenses had changed, and, additionally, that the parties’ current

circumstances warranted child support to be paid per the child support

guidelines. Held:

1. The trial court improperly denied the defendant’s motion to modify the

child support order solely on the basis that it did not find a substantial

change in circumstances, that court having failed to address the defendant’s additional and distinct claim as to whether the motion should be

granted on the ground that the child support order substantially deviated

from the child support guidelines in the absence of the requisite findings:

in issuing its child support order, the dissolution court acknowledged

that it was deviating from the child support guidelines but did not make

an explicit finding that applying the presumptive amount as provided

by the guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate and, in the

absence of a specific finding that a deviation was inequitable or inappropriate, the child support order was continually subject to modification

on the ground that it substantially deviated from the guidelines; in the

present case, the court should have determined the presumptive amount,

thereafter determined whether it would have been inequitable or inappropriate to rely on that amount and, if so, explained which deviation

criteria the court was relying on in order to justify its deviation; accordingly, the case was remanded for the purpose of holding a new hearing

on the motion with respect to the modification of child support.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly

denied his motion to modify the alimony order, which was based on

his claim that the court erred in concluding that he had not proven a

substantial change in circumstances: the court, having found that, since

the dissolution, the marital home had been sold, as had been anticipated

by the court at the time of the dissolution, the parties’ financial circumstances had not significantly changed, and, although the parties’ incomes

had fluctuated since the dissolution, there had not been a substantial

change in circumstances as contemplated by the applicable statute

(§ 46b-86), properly concluded that the alleged change in circumstances

did not warrant modification.

Argued March 7—officially released October 25, 2022

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, where the court, Gould, J.,

rendered judgment dissolving the marriage and granting

certain other relief; thereafter, the court, Gould, J.,

denied the defendant’s motion to modify alimony and

child support; subsequently, the court, Gould, J., denied

the defendant’s motion for reargument and reconsideration, and the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed
in part; further proceedings.

Richard W. Callahan, for the appellant (defendant).

Jennifer Moore, self-represented, the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The defendant, Justin Moore, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court denying his postjudgment motion to modify the alimony and child support orders that were entered following the dissolution

of his marriage to the self-represented plaintiff, Jennifer

Moore. On appeal, the defendant argues that the court

improperly denied his motion to modify these orders.

We agree with the defendant that the court improperly

denied his motion insofar as he sought a modification

of the child support order and, accordingly, reverse the

judgment of the court with respect to this claim and

remand the case for a new hearing with respect to the

motion to modify the child support order. With respect

to the court’s denial of the motion insofar as the defendant sought a modification of the alimony order, we

affirm the judgment of the court.

The following facts, as found by the court or as undisputed in the record, and procedural history are relevant

to this appeal. The plaintiff and the defendant were

married on July 27, 2002. During the marriage, the plaintiff and the defendant had three children. On June 1,

2018, the plaintiff commenced a dissolution action

against the defendant. On November 7, 2019, following

a hearing at which both parties were self-represented,

the dissolution court dissolved the marriage of the parties and issued orders from the bench. In so doing, the

dissolution court made several factual findings. The

dissolution court found, inter alia, that the plaintiff was

employed at Sikorsky Aircraft earning $2346 per week.

The dissolution court also found that the defendant

owned a painting and power washing business from

which he earned $1000 per week.

The dissolution court subsequently issued the following orders: ‘‘The parties shall have joint legal custody

of the minor children. They shall have shared residential

custody. The primary address for school purposes will

be with the plaintiff . . . .

‘‘The court adopts the proposed parenting agreement

of the defendant, which is dated November 7, 2019, and

incorporates that herein.

‘‘The court will deviate from an award for child support due to the shared custodial arrangements, such

that no child support will be awarded at this time. The

court notes that the statutory guidelines would call for

a numerical award. The court believes it’s in the best

interest of the minor children and in the best interest

of the parents that no child support be awarded for the

reasons indicated, and shall deviate therefrom. . . .

‘‘The plaintiff shall provide health insurance for the

minor children. Any unreimbursed medical and/or

extracurricular activity expenses shall be paid in the

following manner: 76 percent by the plaintiff; 24 percent

by the defendant.
‘‘The parties shall alternate tax credits for the minor

children with the plaintiff taking the odd years, [the]

defendant taking the even years, starting with the tax

year 2019 . . . .

‘‘The plaintiff is ordered to pay $100 per week [in]

alimony to the defendant for a period of seven years.

That is nonmodifiable as to duration. It is modifiable

as to amount.

‘‘The marital residence is located at 54 Monroe Street

in Shelton, Connecticut. It has a current value of

$290,000. It is encumbered by a mortgage in the amount

of $248,000, yielding equity in the amount of approximately $42,000.

‘‘The parties may remain in the residence until the

closing. . . .

‘‘The property shall be listed at $314,000. And when

sold, the proceeds will be split between the parties.

‘‘Each party shall keep his or her individual bank

accounts, retirement accounts, and shall be solely

responsible for their own liabilities, as listed in their

respective financial affidavits, and shall hold harmless

and indemnify the other regarding each.

‘‘The plaintiff shall retain the 2013 Yukon; the defendant shall retain the 2016 Dodge, each holding the other

harmless and indemnifying the other from any and all

expenses and claims regarding those vehicles.

‘‘Each party shall maintain life insurance in the

amount of $300,000 per year, naming the children as

beneficiaries. Proof of insurance shall be exchanged by

the parties each year.

‘‘The defendant shall maintain 100 percent interest

in his business, and shall hold harmless and indemnify

the plaintiff therefrom.’’ The court ultimately ordered

that the marriage of the parties be dissolved.

Following the sale of the marital residence pursuant

to the judgment, the plaintiff moved to Seymour in order

to reside at her parents’ vacant home. The defendant

rented a residence in Shelton.

On July 6, 2020, the defendant filed a postjudgment

motion for modification requesting that the court (1)

designate his address as the children’s primary residence for school purposes, (2) order that the plaintiff

pay the defendant weekly child support pursuant to the

child support guidelines, and (3) increase the plaintiff’s

weekly alimony payment to the defendant. The defendant claimed that modification of the alimony and child

support orders was warranted because the circumstances between the parties had ‘‘changed substantially’’ since the time of the dissolution because the

marital home had been sold, the parties were no longer

cohabitating, and the parties’ incomes and expenses

had changed. Beyond relying on changed circum-
stances, the defendant claimed that ‘‘[t]he current circumstances warrant child support to be paid per the

[child support] guidelines . . . .’’

On August 17, 2020, the court held a remote hearing

on the defendant’s motion for modification. At the hearing, the parties addressed only the modification of alimony and child support because the issue of the primary

residence of the children had been resolved by the

plaintiff’s purchase of a home. At the conclusion of the

hearing, the court stated that it had listened carefully

to the sworn testimony of the parties, was aware of

the statutory requirements regarding the motions for

modification, and had reviewed the documentation,

including but not limited to the financial affidavits filed

by the parties. The court concluded that it could not

‘‘find a substantial change in circumstances.’’ The court

then denied the defendant’s motion for modification

from the bench. On that same day, the court also issued

a written order in which the court stated that it was

denying the motion because it did not find a substantial

change in circumstances.

On August 20, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to

reargue or reconsider the court’s denial of the motion to

modify the child support order. Therein, the defendant

again argued that the evidence established a substantial

change in circumstances. Alternatively, the defendant

argued that, in its denial of the motion for modification

of child support, the court failed to address the issue

of whether modification was warranted because the

support order entered on November 7, 2019, substantially deviated from the child support guidelines and

that the dissolution court, in entering the support order,

failed to make findings on the record related to the

deviation, as required by law. The court summarily

denied the defendant’s motion to reargue or reconsider

on September 1, 2020. This appeal followed.1

On October 26, 2020, after this appeal was filed, the

defendant, pursuant to Practice Book § 64-1,2 moved

for the trial court to issue a memorandum of decision

concerning the denial of his motion for modification.

On November 5, 2020, the court issued a memorandum

of decision.

On December 4, 2020, the defendant sought an articulation from the court as to its findings of fact and legal

conclusions, which the court summarily denied on

December 9, 2020. Among the requests for articulation,

the defendant asked the court to explain ‘‘what facts

supported the trial [court’s] decision to not order child

support in accordance with the guidelines on August

17, 2020, when it heard the defendant’s postjudgment

motion to modify . . . .’’ The defendant also noted that,

in his motion to reargue or reconsider, he had again

relied on what he believed to be an improper deviation

from the guidelines, and argued that this issue had not

been addressed by the court.
The defendant then filed with this court a motion for

review of the court’s denial of his motion for articulation

pursuant to Practice Book § 66-7.3In his motion for

review, the defendant argued, in part, that he was entitled to relief because the court, in denying the motion

for modification of child support, had not addressed

his argument that modification was proper because the

child support order issued by the dissolution court

improperly deviated from the child support guidelines.

This court granted the motion for review and ordered

the trial court ‘‘to articulate with respect to its . . .

denial of the [defendant’s] motion for modification . . .

by stating the factual basis for its finding that there

was no substantial change in circumstances, including

therein a discussion of the evidence put forth by the

parties . . . .’’

On September 22, 2021, the trial court issued an articulation of its memorandum of decision pursuant to this

court’s order. In that articulation, the court stated that

‘‘[t]he defendant’s instant motion to modify the alimony

order alleges a substantial change in circumstances,

pursuant to the requirements of . . . General Statutes

§ 46b-86 . . . .

‘‘Within his motion, the defendant . . . alleged that

the substantial change in circumstances included the

fact that the parties’ marital home was sold, the parties

no longer live together, the plaintiff’s income has

increased and her expenses have decreased, the defendant’s income is more inconsistent and unstable and

his expenses have increased.

‘‘Thus, the defendant requested an increase in the

plaintiff’s alimony order and an order of child support

pursuant to the state guidelines.

‘‘At the time of their dissolution, the plaintiff had

gross weekly income of $2346, and net weekly income

of $1763; and the defendant had gross weekly income

of $1000, and net weekly income of $827, according to

the parties’ financial affidavits filed at the time. The

presumptive weekly child support at the time was $460

for the plaintiff, and $216 for the defendant.

‘‘In addition, the plaintiff alleged weekly expenses in

the amount of $1475, and the defendant alleged weekly

expenses in the amount of $650, including $600 to the

plaintiff for a share of the expenses on their marital

residence.

‘‘At the time of the instant hearing, the defendant, a

house painter, had gross weekly income of $629, and

net weekly income of $554. In addition, he had weekly

expenses in the amount of $949. He lost some work

due to circumstances surrounding the [COVID-19] pandemic. Since the time of the original order, he also

received a total of $13,000 from the sale of the parties’

marital residence. The plaintiff did not receive any

money from the sale of that residence. The plaintiff, at
the time of the instant hearing, had gross weekly income

of $2388, and net weekly income of $1644. In addition,

she had weekly expenses in the amount of $1904. In

addition, the parties were continuing with their shared

custodial arrangement regarding their minor children.

‘‘In determining whether there has been a substantial

change in circumstances, a court is permitted to compare the circumstances at the time of the last court

order of alimony with [the] circumstances at the time

that a party seeks a modification of that order. Relatively minor fluctuations in income alone will not be

enough to overcome the substantial change in circumstances threshold.

‘‘Even where the court finds a substantial change

in circumstances, it must then consider the statutory

criteria in . . . General Statutes § 46b-82 in determining whether a modification is warranted. However, its

inquiry is necessarily confined to a comparison between

the current conditions and the last court order. To permit the trial court to reconsider all evidence dating from

before the original divorce proceedings, in determining

the adjustment of alimony, would be, in effect, to undermine the policy behind the well established rule of

limiting proof of the substantial change in circumstances to events occurring subsequent to the latest

alimony order—the avoidance of relitigating matters

already settled. . . .

‘‘A comparison of the defendant’s financial affidavit

at the time of the dissolution and original alimony and

child support orders, in addition to the testimony of

the parties at the instant hearing, shows that the defendant’s net weekly earnings decreased from $827 to $554,

while, at the same time, he received $13,000 from the

sale of the marital residence. Further, as noted above,

the parties continue to have shared residential custody

of their minor children.

‘‘For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that there

has not been a substantial change in circumstances as

contemplated by . . . [§] 46b-86. Further, even if the

court were to find a substantial change in circumstances, a review of the statutory criteria in . . . [§]

46b-82, as applied to the plaintiff and the defendant

in the instant case, does not warrant modification.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Before turning to the defendant’s claims, we set forth

the standard of review that applies. ‘‘[W]e will not disturb the trial court’s ruling on a motion for modification

of alimony or child support unless the court has abused

its discretion or reasonably could not conclude as it

did, on the basis of the facts presented. . . . Furthermore, [t]he trial court’s findings [of fact] are binding

upon this court unless they are clearly erroneous in

light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record

as a whole. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
when there is no evidence in the record to support it

. . . or when although there is evidence to support it,

the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Budrawich v. Budrawich, 200 Conn.

App. 229, 245–46, 240 A.3d 688 (2020), cert. denied, 336

Conn. 909, 244 A.3d 561 (2021). ‘‘In determining whether

a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic

relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . Trial

courts have broad discretion in deciding motions for

modification.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Giordano v. Giordano, 200 Conn. App. 130, 135, 238

A.3d 113, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 970, 240 A.3d 286

(2020).

I

The defendant first claims that the court erred in

denying his motion for modification of the child support

order. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court

erred in (1) concluding that there was not a substantial

change in circumstances and (2) not modifying the

order based on the fact that the dissolution court substantially deviated from the presumptive child support

amount without making the requisite findings. We agree

with the defendant that the court did not properly consider his motion for modification because it did not

address whether the motion should be granted on the

ground that the child support order substantially deviated from the guidelines in the absence of the requisite

accompanying findings.4

Before turning to the merits of the defendant’s claim,

we discuss some governing legal principles. Although,

as we stated previously in this opinion, the trial court

is vested with broad discretion in domestic relations

matters, with respect to child support ‘‘the parameters

of the court’s discretion have been somewhat limited

by the factors set forth in the child support guidelines.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Colbert v. Carr, 140

Conn. App. 229, 240, 57 A.3d 878, cert. denied, 308 Conn.

926, 64 A.3d 333 (2013). General Statutes § 46b-84 (a)

provides in relevant part that ‘‘the parents of a minor

child of the marriage, shall maintain the child according

to their respective abilities, if the child is in need of

maintenance. . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-215a provides in relevant part for a commission to oversee the

establishment of child support guidelines, which must

be updated every four years, in order ‘‘to ensure the

appropriateness of criteria for the establishment of

child support awards . . . .’’ ‘‘In support of the application of these guidelines, [General Statutes] § 46b-215b

(a) provides: ‘The . . . guidelines issued pursuant to

[§] 46b-215a . . . shall be considered in all determinations of child support amounts . . . . In all such determinations, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that
the amount of such awards which resulted from the

application of such guidelines is the amount to be

ordered. A specific finding on the record that the application of the guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate in a particular case . . . shall be required in

order to rebut the presumption in such case.’ . . . This

exception to the application of the presumptive guideline amount is reiterated in § 46b-86 (a), which governs

the modifiability of support orders. Section 46b-86 (a)

provides in relevant part: ‘[A]ny final order for the . . .

payment of . . . support . . . may, at any time thereafter, be . . . modified by the court . . . upon a showing that the final order for child support substantially

deviates from the child support guidelines established

pursuant to [§] 46b-215a, unless there was a specific

finding on the record that the application of the guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate.’ ’’

(Emphasis in original.) Righi v. Righi, 172 Conn. App.

427, 435–36, 160 A.3d 1094 (2017).

Moreover, ‘‘[§] 46b-215a-5c (a) of the Regulations of

Connecticut State Agencies provides in relevant part:

‘The current support . . . contribution amounts calculated under [the child support guidelines] . . . are presumed to be the correct amounts to be ordered. The

presumption regarding each such amount may be rebutted by a specific finding on the record that such amount

would be inequitable or inappropriate in a particular

case. . . . Any such finding shall state the amount that

would have been required under such section and

include a factual finding to justify the variance. Only

the deviation criteria stated in . . . subdivisions (1) to

(6), inclusive, of subsection (b) of this section . . .

shall establish sufficient bases for such findings.’5

‘‘Our courts have interpreted this statutory and regulatory language as requiring three distinct findings in

order for a court to properly deviate from the child

support guidelines in fashioning a child support order:

(1) a finding of the presumptive child support amount

pursuant to the guidelines; (2) a specific finding that

application of such guidelines would be inequitable and

inappropriate; and (3) an explanation as to which deviation criteria the court is relying on to justify the deviation.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote in original.) Id., 436–

37.

‘‘Absent such a finding, the order is modifiable pursuant to § 46b-86 (a) because the final order for child

support substantially deviates from the child support

guidelines . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 441. ‘‘[O]nce the court enters an order of child support that substantially deviates from the guidelines, and

makes a specific finding that the application of the

amount contained in the guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate, as determined by the application

of the deviation criteria established in the guidelines,

that particular order is no longer modifiable solely on
the ground that it substantially deviates from the guidelines. By the same token, in the absence of such a

specific finding, the order is continually subject to modification on the ground of a substantial deviation from

the guidelines. Such specific finding, therefore, has very

real and meaningful consequences and must be made

by the court anytime the court enters a child support

award that deviates from the child support guidelines.’’

(Footnote omitted.) McHugh v. McHugh, 27 Conn. App.

724, 728–29, 609 A.2d 250 (1992).

This court’s decision in Righi v. Righi, supra, 172

Conn. App. 427, is instructive. In Righi, the facts of

which are similar to the present case, the dissolution

court found that, as for the presumptive child support

amount pursuant to the guidelines, ‘‘the defendant

would have had to pay $111 per week to the plaintiff

if the children primarily lived with the plaintiff, and the

plaintiff would have had to pay $256 per week to the

defendant if the children primarily lived with the defendant.’’ Id., 429. After noting the presumptive amount of

child support, the dissolution court, at the request of

the defendant, deviated from the presumptive amount

and ordered that neither party pay child support to the

other. See id., 429–30. The dissolution court did not

expressly find that applying the presumptive amount

would be inequitable or inappropriate under the circumstances. Id. The dissolution court noted that it felt that

‘‘the agreement is fair and equitable under all the circumstances and in the best interests of the two minor

children . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 430.

The defendant in Righi subsequently filed a postjudgment motion to modify the child support order on the

ground that, since the time that the dissolution judgment was rendered, there had been a substantial change

in circumstances. Id. The court found that there had

not been a substantial change in circumstances since

the time the dissolution judgment was rendered but

nevertheless granted the motion for modification. Id.

The court noted that the original order, which did not

provide for any child support payments to either party,

represented a substantial deviation from the child support guidelines. Id., 430–31. The court also noted that

the dissolution court did not make a finding as to

whether it would be inequitable or inappropriate to

apply the presumptive guidelines support amount. Id.,

431. Even though the defendant requested a modification on the basis of a substantial change in circumstances, the court instead granted the modification on

the basis of the dissolution court’s substantial deviation

from the child support guidelines. See id., 430–31.

On appeal, the plaintiff in Righi claimed that the court

(1) had improperly granted the defendant’s motion to

modify child support after determining that there had

not been a substantial change in circumstances, and
(2) had erred by finding that the dissolution court, in

creating the original child support order, failed to make

a finding that applying the presumptive support amount

set forth in the child support guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate in light of the fact that the dissolution court found that the agreement was ‘‘fair and equitable . . . .’’ Id., 428–29, 434. First, this court held that

the trial court was not required to find a substantial

change in circumstances in order to grant the defendant’s motion to modify child support because a court

has the power to modify a child support order on the

basis of a substantial deviation from the guidelines,

independent of whether there has been a substantial

change in the circumstances of the parties. See id.,

433–34. Second, this court held that, in order to properly

deviate from the child support guidelines, the court

must make an explicit finding that following the guidelines in a given case would be inequitable or inappropriate. See id., 434–41.

It is not in dispute that, in its November 7, 2019 oral

decision, the dissolution court stated that ‘‘[t]he court

will deviate from an award for child support due to

the shared custodial arrangements, such that no child

support will be awarded at this time. The court notes

that the statutory guidelines would call for a numerical

award. The court believes it’s in the best interest of the

minor children and in the best interest of the parents

that no child support be awarded for the reasons indicated, and shall deviate therefrom.’’ Although the dissolution court, in issuing the child support order, acknowledged that it was deviating from the child support

guidelines for the reasons stated, it did not make an

explicit finding that, in the present case, applying the

presumptive amount as provided by the guidelines

would be inequitable or inappropriate.6

When the court in the present case considered the

defendant’s motion to modify child support, it denied

the motion solely on the basis that it did not find a

substantial change in circumstances. In so doing, it

failed to address the defendant’s additional and distinct

claim with respect to the propriety of child support

relative to the guidelines. As we explained in our discussion of the procedural history of this case, this issue

was raised by the defendant in his motion to modify,

his motion to reargue or reconsider, his motion for

articulation, and his motion for review. In the absence

of a specific finding that a deviation is inequitable or

inappropriate, as determined by the deviation criteria

established in the guidelines, the child support order

was continually subject to modification on the ground

that it substantially deviates from the guidelines. See

Righi v. Righi, supra, 172 Conn. App. 433–41; McHugh

v. McHugh, supra, 27 Conn. App. 728–29. Accordingly,

we conclude that it was improper for the court to fail

to consider, as the defendant alleged, whether modification was warranted on the ground that the child support
order deviated from the presumptive amount as determined by the guidelines, in the absence of the requisite

findings. The court should have determined the presumptive amount and, thereafter, specifically and

explicitly determined whether it would have been inequitable or inappropriate to rely on that amount and, if

so, explained which deviation criteria the court was

relying on to justify its deviation. Because the court

failed to do so, we conclude that it abused its discretion

in denying the defendant’s motion for modification with

respect to child support. The proper remedy is for this

court to reverse the judgment in part and remand the

case for the purpose of holding a new hearing on the

motion for modification of child support.

II

The defendant next claims that the court erred in

denying his motion to modify the alimony order. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court erred in concluding that he had not proven a substantial change

in circumstances to warrant modification. We are not

persuaded.

We begin by setting forth the applicable legal principles. ‘‘[Section] 46b-86 governs the modification or termination of an alimony or support order after the date

of a dissolution judgment. When, as in this case, the

disputed issue is alimony . . . the applicable provision

of the statute is § 46b-86 (a), which provides that a final

order for alimony may be modified by the trial court

upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party. . . . Under that statutory provision, the party seeking the modification bears the burden of demonstrating that such a change has occurred.

. . . To obtain a modification, the moving party must

demonstrate that circumstances have changed since

the last court order such that it would be unjust or

inequitable to hold either party to it. Because the establishment of changed circumstances is a condition precedent to a party’s relief, it is pertinent for the trial court

to inquire as to what, if any, new circumstance warrants

a modification of the existing order. . . .

‘‘Once a trial court determines that there has been a

substantial change in the financial circumstances of

one of the parties, the same criteria that determine an

initial award of alimony . . . are relevant to the question of modification. . . . More specifically, these criteria, outlined in . . . § 46b-82, require the court to

consider the needs and financial resources of each of

the parties and their children, as well as such factors

as the causes for the dissolution of the marriage and

the age, health, station, occupation, employability and

amount and sources of income of the parties. . . . The

power of the trial court to modify the existing order

does not, however, include the power to retry issues

already decided . . . or to allow the parties to use a

motion to modify as an appeal. . . . Rather, the trial
court’s discretion includes only the power to adapt the

order to some distinct and definite change in the circumstances or conditions of the parties. . . .

‘‘Thus, [w]hen presented with a motion for modification, a court must first determine whether there has

been a substantial change in the financial circumstances

of one or both of the parties. . . . Second, if the court

finds a substantial change in circumstances, it may

properly consider the motion and, on the basis of the

§ 46b-82 criteria, make an order for modification. . . .

The court has the authority to issue a modification only

if it conforms the order to the distinct and definite

changes in the circumstances of the parties.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Budrawich v. Budrawich,

supra, 200 Conn. App. 246–47.

‘‘Because the establishment of changed circumstances

is a condition precedent to a party’s relief, it is pertinent

for the trial court to inquire as to what, if any, new

circumstance warrants a modification of the existing

order. In making such an inquiry, the trial court’s discretion is essential.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Dan v. Dan, 315 Conn. 1, 9, 105 A.3d 118 (2014). ‘‘A

conclusion that there has been a substantial change

in financial circumstances justifying a modification of

alimony based only on income is erroneous; rather, the

present overall circumstances of the parties must be

compared with the circumstances existing at the time

of the original award to determine if there has been a

substantial change.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Donnell v. Bozzuti, 148 Conn. App. 80, 87–88,

84 A.3d 479 (2014).

After a careful review of the record, we conclude

that the court did not abuse its broad discretion when

it determined that there had not been a substantial

change in the parties’ circumstances since the last court

order. In the present case, the last court order was the

judgment of the dissolution, which was rendered on

November 7, 2019. At that time, the dissolution court

ordered that the parties would have joint custody of

the children, ordered that the marital home be sold and

that the parties may reside together until the marital

home was sold, and ordered alimony to be paid from

the plaintiff to the defendant in the weekly amount

of $100.

In his motion for modification dated July 6, 2020, the

defendant asserted that there was a substantial change

in circumstances since the dissolution of the parties’

marriage in November, 2019, because the marital home

had been sold, the parties no longer cohabitated, and

the parties’ income and expenses had changed. In its

September 2, 2021 articulation, the court found that the

marital home had been sold, as was anticipated by the

court at the time of the dissolution on November 7,

2019, and that the parties continued to share residential

custody of their minor children. The court further found
that the parties’ financial circumstances had not significantly changed since the time of the dissolution,

approximately eight months earlier. Specifically, the

court found that at the time of the dissolution, the

plaintiff had a gross weekly income of $2346 and a net

weekly income of $1763. The defendant had a gross

weekly income of $1000 and a net weekly income of

$827. At that time, the plaintiff had weekly expenses

in the amount of $1475, and the defendant had weekly

expenses in the amount of $650, $600 of which was

paid to the plaintiff for the shared expenses of the

marital residence. At the time of the hearing on the

motion for modification, the plaintiff had a gross weekly

income of $2388 and a net weekly income of $1644. In

addition, she had weekly expenses in the amount of

$1094. At the time of the hearing on the motion for

modification, the defendant’s income had decreased.

He then had a gross weekly income of $629 and a net

weekly income of $554. He also had weekly expenses

in the amount of $949. The court noted that some of

the loss of the defendant’s income was attributable to

a loss of work during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Although, since the time of dissolution, the defendant’s net weekly earnings decreased from $827 to $554,

he also received $100 weekly in alimony. The court

found that, although there was a fluctuation in the parties’ incomes since the time of the dissolution, there

had not ‘‘been a substantial change in circumstances

as contemplated by . . . [§] 46b-86.’’ Moreover, even

though the court did not find a substantial change in

circumstances, it nevertheless reviewed the statutory

criteria set forth in § 46b-86, and concluded that the

alleged change in circumstances as applied to the plaintiff and the defendant in the present case did not warrant modification.

On appeal, the defendant argues that, ‘‘[l]egally, the

undisputed facts constitute a substantial change in circumstances.’’ Beyond referring to the undisputed facts,

the defendant does not cite to any legal authority that

is tailored to the present or similar facts in support of

this bald legal assertion. To the contrary, our review

of relevant precedent reflects that there is no rigid mathematical formula for us to follow in order to determine

whether a change in circumstances is significant

enough to warrant consideration of the factors set forth

in § 46b-86. See, e.g., Schwarz v. Schwarz, 124 Conn.

App. 472, 477–79, 5 A.3d 548, cert. denied, 299 Conn.

909, 10 A.3d 525 (2010); Crowley v. Crowley, 46 Conn.

App. 87, 93–95 n.9, 699 A.2d 1029 (1997). Having

reviewed the record and the court’s ruling, and allowing

every reasonable presumption to be made in support

of the court’s determination, we are not persuaded that

the court could not reasonably conclude, as it did, that

the change in the parties’ circumstances did not amount

to a substantial change warranting consideration of the

factors set forth in § 46b-86. The court applied the cor-
rect legal standard and did not abuse its discretion by

denying the motion to modify the alimony order.

The judgment is reversed only as to the denial of

that portion of the defendant’s motion for modification

seeking to modify child support and the case is

remanded for a new hearing on the defendant’s motion

for modification with respect to the child support order;

the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

In addition to the defendant’s claims with respect to the motion for

modification, the defendant also argues on appeal that the court erred in

denying his motion for reargument or reconsideration. Because we ultimately reverse the judgment of the court denying the defendant’s motion

for modification of child support and remand the case for a new hearing

thereon, we need not separately address the defendant’s claim with respect

to the motion for reargument or reconsideration.

2 Practice Book § 64-1 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The trial court shall

state its decision either orally or in writing . . . in making any . . . rulings

that constitute a final judgment for purposes of appeal under Section 61-1,

including those that do not terminate proceedings. The court’s decision shall

encompass its conclusion as to each claim of law raised by the parties and

the factual basis therefor. . . .’’

3 Practice Book § 66-7 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any party aggrieved by

the action of the trial judge regarding rectification of the appeal or articulation under Section 66-5 may, within ten days of the issuance of notice by

the appellate clerk of the decision from the trial court sought to be reviewed,

file a motion for review with the appellate clerk, and the court may, upon

such a motion, direct any action it deems proper. . . .’’

4

In light of our conclusion, we do not address whether the court erred

in concluding that there was not a substantial change in circumstances

warranting a modification of the child support order. This issue is left to

the trial court on remand as necessary.

5

‘‘The criteria enumerated in § 46b-215a-5c (b) of the regulations are: ‘(1)

Other financial resources available to a parent . . . (2) [e]xtraordinary

expenses for care and maintenance of the child . . . (3) [e]xtraordinary

parental expenses . . . (4) [n]eeds of a parent’s other dependents . . . (5)

[c]oordination of total family support . . . [and] (6) [s]pecial circumstances. . . .’ Shared physical custody is considered a ‘special circumstance’

that justifies deviation when ‘(i) such arrangement substantially: (I) reduces

expenses for the child, for the parent with the lower net weekly income,

or (II) increases expenses for the child, for the parent with the higher net

weekly income; and (ii) sufficient funds remain for the parent receiving

support to meet the needs of the child after deviation; or (iii) both parents

have substantially equal income.’ Id., § 46b-215a-5c-(b) (6) (A). The ‘[b]est

interests of the child’ is also considered a special circumstance that justifies

deviation. Id., § 46b-215a-5c (b) (6) (D).’’ Righi v. Righi, supra, 172 Conn.

App. 436 n.3.

6 As stated previously in this opinion, the dissolution court found that it

was in the ‘‘best interest of the minor children and in the best interest of

the parents that no child support be awarded . . . .’’ To the extent that the

dissolution court relied on the ‘‘best interest of the parents’’ as a deviation

criterion, it is not among the criteria that may justify a support order different

from the support amounts calculated under the child support guidelines, as

set forth in § 46b-215a-5c (b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. See footnote 5 of this opinion.