alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### George P. SHULTZ, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO-CLC (District 19), Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 69-919.

United States District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania.

May 12, 1970.

Louis Weiner, Regional Solicitor U. S. Dept, of Labor, Philadelphia, Pa., and Richard L. Thornburgh, U. S. Atty., by Thomas A. Daley, Asst. U. S. Atty., Pittsburgh Pa., for plaintiff.

Michael H. Gottesman, Washington, D. C., and Carl B. Frankel, and A. E. Lawson, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant.

John W. Mcllvaine, and Paul A. Simmons, Monongahela, Pa., for William J. Hart, intervenor.

Benj. W. Haseltine, Jr., Pittsburgh, Pa., for Adam Wisniewski, intervenor.

OPINION AND ORDER

MARSH, Chief Judge.

This is an action under Title IV of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 482, to declare void the February 11, 1969 election of the District Director of United Steelworkers of America, District 19. We have previously granted the motion of William J. Hart, the incumbent whose election is challenged, to intervene as an individual defendant. Shultz v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC (District 19), 312 F.Supp. 1044 (W.D.Pa.1970). Adam Wisniewski the union member whose complaint with the Secretary of Labor led to the institution of the action, has filed a motion to intervene as a plaintiff.

Rule 24(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., provides:

> “Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the *550action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.”

In our opinion, the motion should be denied. “The statutory scheme envisages the Secretary as the only person capable of prosecuting a Title IV action so that interference with union elections and management might be kept at a minimum.” Shultz v. United Steelworkers of America, *supra,*at 1044. See: Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140, 85 S.Ct. 292, 13 L.Ed.2d 190 (1964); Mamula v. United Steelworkers of America, 304 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1962). “There being no way for * * * [Wisniewski] to prosecute this type of action by original suit, he cannot be permitted to do so by intervention * * Stein v. Wirtz, 366 F.2d 188, 189 (10th Cir. 1966). *Cf.*Wirtz v. National Maritime Union of America, 409 F.2d 1340 (2d Cir. 1969); Wirtz v. Local Union No. 1377, Int. Bro. of Elec. Workers, 288 F.Supp. 914 (N.D. Ohio 1968).

We can see no unfairness in allowing Hart to intervene and not Wisniewski, where Hart meets the requirements of Rule 24 and Wisniewski is precluded by the statute from intervening.

An appropriate order will be entered.
#### § 770.8 Reports.

Upon killing a deer or turkey, a hunter must attach the appropriate tab from his big game license to the carcass before moving the game from the place of kill. The game will then be taken to the Game Checking Station where the tab will be exchanged for an official game tag. All other game, not requiring a tag, killed on the Reservation will be immediately reported to the Game Warden when checking out at the end of a hunt.

[41 FR 22345, June 3, 1976, as amended at 48 FR 23206, May 24, 1983; 65 FR 53592, Sept. 5, 2000]
This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports.

Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum

opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain

computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of

Appeals and does not include the filing date. 

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

3 Plaintiff-Appellee,

4 v. NO. 34,125 

5 TITO A. RODRIGUEZ,

6 Defendant-Appellant.

7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF EDDY COUNTY

8 Raymond L. Romero, District Judge

9 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General

10 Margaret McLean, Assistant Attorney General

11 Santa Fe, NM

12 for Appellee

13 Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender

14 Santa Fe, NM

15 Debra Lautenschlager, Assistant Public Defender

16 Carlsbad, NM

17 for Appellant

18 MEMORANDUM OPINION
2

1 WECHSLER, Judge.

2 {1} Defendant appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss

3 the charge of commercial burglary. Defendant entered a conditional plea reserving for

4 appeal the issues raised in his motion to dismiss. [RP 111-21, 132] On the basis of this

5 Court’s opinion in State v. Archuleta, ___-NMCA-___, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 32,794,

6 Oct. 27, 2014), cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-___ (No.

7 35,005, Jan. 26, 2015), we issued a notice of proposed summary

8 disposition, proposing to reverse. The State has responded with an objection to our

9 notice and a request to hold this appeal in abeyance or provide the State with a

10 reasonable opportunity to seek guidance from the New Mexico Supreme Court on all

11 pending appeals controlled by our opinion in Archuleta. [MIO 1-2] We have provided

12 the State with such an opportunity, and the Supreme Court has denied the State a stay

13 or other remedy that would suspend the precedential value of Archuleta. Thus,

14 pursuant to Rule 12-405(C) NMRA, we apply Archuleta. See Rule 12-405(C) (“A

15 petition for a writ of certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 12-502 NMRA or a Supreme

16 Court order granting the petition does not affect the precedential value of an opinion

17 of the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court.”).

18 {2} In its response to our notice, the State simply objects to our proposed

19 disposition without elaboration. [MIO 1] We continue to believe that there are no
3

1 material factual distinctions to remove this case from the control of our opinion in

2 Archuleta. For the reasons stated in our notice, we reverse Defendant’s conviction for

3 commercial burglary.

4 {3} IT IS SO ORDERED.

5 ________________________________

6 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge

7 WE CONCUR:

8 ________________________________

9 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge

10

11 ________________________________

12 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
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[FR Doc. 2021-00075 Filed 1-7-21; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555-01-P
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A15A2299. JOHNNY MORGAN v. THE STATE.

The above appeal was docketed in this Court on August 10, 2015. Pursuant to

the Rules of this Court, appellant’s enumeration of errors and brief were due on

August 30, 2015. See Court of Appeals Rule 23.

Appellant was ordered to file on September 24, 2015. Thereafter, on October

5, 2015, appellant was granted an extension of time causing his brief to be due on or

before October 23, 2015.

It appearing appellant’s brief and enumeration of errors have not been filed as

of the date of this order, it is hereby ordered this appeal be DISMISSED. See Court

of Appeals Rules 7 and 13.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

11/03/2015

November 03, 2015
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John Buddy Lawrence, Appellant.

In a *coram nobis*proceeding, defendant appeals from an order of the former County Court, Queens County, dated April 26, 1961, which denied after a hearing his application to vacate a judgment of said court, rendered October 27, 1939 on his plea of guilty, convicting him of robbery in the second degree, and imposing sentence. Order reversed on the law and proceeding remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, Criminal Term, for a new hearing and for a determination *de nova.*No questions of fact were considered. While there was sufficient proof on which the court below could have properly rested its determination, nevertheless it committed reversible error when, upon the denial of defendant’s application, it indicated that it was relying on its own personal knowledge of certain facts, which were not proper subjects for judicial notice (see *People*v. *Weiss,*19 A D 2d 900; cf. *People*v. *Low,*3 A D 2d 979; *City of Buffalo*v. *Beck,*205 Mise. 757; *Costello*v. *Cassidy,*210 N. Y. S. 2d 46; Richardson, Evidence [8th ed.], p. 6). Beldock, P. J., Brennan and Hopkins, JJ., concur; Kleinfeld and Hill, JJ., dissent and vote to affirm the order on the ground that the record amply supports the determination and that, under all the circumstances, it may not be said that the comments of *900the trial court resulted in substantial prejudice to the defendants; hence, the error, if any, should not affect the judgment of this court (Code Crim. Pro., § 542).
No. 7997.

#### The Luhrig Coal Co. *v.*Allison.

(Decided December 8, 1903.)

Error to Circuit Court of Athens county.

*Messrs. Burch & Johnson; Mr. W. E. Peters*and *Messrs. Grosvenor, Jones & Worstell,*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. Lawrence T. Neal*and *Messrs. Jewett & Wood,*for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Spear, Shauck, Price and Crew, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Eddie Gordon, Appellant.

— Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered July 29, 1977, convicting him of manslaugh*932ter in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal also brings up for review the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress certain physical evidence. Judgment affirmed. The record shows that at the suppression hearing defense counsel either conceded the identity and reliability of the telephone caller who informed the police of defendant’s address, or waived the potential issue with respect thereto. The police had probable cause to enter the apartment where the defendant was found and arrested and, under the circumstances, did not violate defendant’s constitutional right.to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures (see *People v Payton,*45 NY2d 300). The motion to suppress physical evidence was thus properly denied. We have considered the other contentions raised by defendant and find them to be without merit. Mollen, P. J., Damiani, Margett and Martuscello, JJ., concur.
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</TABLE>
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 October 4, 2019

p1001

Order 

Clerk

October 4, 2019

159415 & (24)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 159415

COA: 346169

St. Clair CC: 13-001620-FC

MICHAEL SHAWN POOLE,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 28, 2019 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). The 

motion to remand is DENIED.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JACOB MATTHEW SCHULTE, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. No. 85055



# FILED AUG 22 2022 ELIZABETHA. BROWN CLERK OF SUPREMECOURT BY DEPUTYCLEVe

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA
(0) I q47A ORDERDISMISSINGAPPEAL

This is an appeal from an amended judgment of conviction. EighthJudicialDistrict Court, Clark County;JasminD.Lilly-Spells, Judge.

Initial review of the notice of appeal revealed a potential jurisdictional defect. The order revoking probation and amendedjudgment of conviction was entered on May 29, 2022. The notice of appeal was not filed in the district court until July 15, 2022, well after expiration ofthe 30- day appealperiod prescribed by NRAP 4(b). Accordingly, this court ordered appellant to show cause whythis appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In response, appellant concedes that the notice of appeal was untimely filed. To the extent appellant suggests that a motion for reconsideration tolled the time to file the notice of appeal, this contention lacks merit. NRAP 4(b)(3) sets forth the tolling motions in criminal appeals—a motionfor reconsideration is not amongthose motions. Seealso Phelps v. State, 111 Nev. 1021, 900 P.2d 344 (1995). This court lacksjurisdiction over an untimely notice of appeal. Lozada v. State, 110 Nev.

349, 352, 871 P.2d 944, 946 (1994).Accordingly, this court

ORDERS this appeal DISMISSED.

Hardesty
J. Stiglich

Herndon

cc: Hon. Jasmin D. Lilly-Spells, District Judge The Matian Firm, APC Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

1.1PREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) I947A
### §450c. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 450c was editorially reclassified as section 2204–1 of this title.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 5.0.3

Eastern Division

Henry Espejo, et al.

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 1:11−cv−08987

Honorable Charles P. Kocoras

Santander Consumer USA, Inc.

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Tuesday, December 4, 2012:

 MINUTE entry before Honorable Charles P. Kocoras:Status and motion hearing

held on 12/4/2012. Defendant's motion (Doc [38]) for reassignment of 12 C 9431 (Judge

St. Eve) to Judge Kocoras as related to 11 C 8987 is granted. Hearing on said motion, set

for 12/5/2012, is stricken. Status hearing continued to 2/6/2013 at 9:30 a.m.Mailed

notice(sct, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.
#### Gary Avedikian et al. *v.*Thomas J. Meskill et al.

*Bernard F. McGovern,*assistant attorney general, for the appellees (defendants).

*Igor I. Sikorsky,*for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Argued December 3

decided December 3, 1974

The defendants’ motion to dismiss the appeal from the Superior Court in Hartford County is granted.
#### DKH CORP. v. RANKIN-PATTERSON OIL CO.

No. 353PA97

Case below: 126 N.C.App. 634

Fetition by plaintiff for discretionary review pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 allowed 2 October 1997.
§ 536.93 Claims not payable under the Non-Scope Claims Act. Under this subpart, a claim is not payable that: ( a ) Results in whole or in part from the negligent or wrongful act of the claimant or his or her agent or employee. The doctrine of comparative negligence does not apply.
( b ) Is for medical, hospital, or burial expenses furnished or paid by the United States.
( c ) Is for any element of damage pertaining to personal injuries or death other than as provided in § 536.93(b). All other items of damage, for example, compensation for loss of earnings and services, diminution of earning capacity, anticipated medical expenses, physical disfigurement and pain and suffering are not payable.
( d ) Is for loss of use of property or for the cost of substitute property, for example, a rental.
( e ) Is legally recoverable by the claimant under an indemnifying law or indemnity contract. If the claim is in part legally recoverable, the part recoverable by the claimant is not payable.
( f ) Is a subrogated claim.
( g ) In some circumstances some claims may be partially payable. See DA Pam 27-162, paragraph 5-4 for more information on claims that may be partially payable.
### §418. Rule of construction of special provisions

The special provisions under section 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 416, or 421 of this title relate only to the establishment named in such section and no inference shall be drawn from the presence or absence of a provision in any such section with respect to an establishment not named in such section or with respect to a designated Federal entity as defined under section 415(a) of this title.

(Pub. L. 117–286, §3(b), Dec. 27, 2022, 136 Stat. 4247.)

| Revised Section | Source (U.S. Code) | Source (Statutes at Large) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 418 | 5 U.S.C. App. (IGA §8J) | Pub. L. 95–452, §8J, formerly §8F, as added Pub. L. 100–504, title I, §105, Oct. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 2525; renumbered §8G and amended Pub. L. 103–82, title II, §202(g)(1), (5)(B), Sept. 21, 1993, 107 Stat. 889, 890; renumbered §8H, Pub. L. 104–208, div. A, title I, §101(f) [title VI, §662(b)(3)], Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009–314, 3009–380; Pub. L. 105–206, title I, §1103(e)(3), July 22, 1998, 112 Stat. 709; renumbered §8I and amended Pub. L. 105–272, title VII, §702(b), Oct. 20, 1998, 112 Stat. 2415; renumbered §8J, Pub. L. 108–7, div. L, §104(b)(2), Feb. 20, 2003, 117 Stat. 529; Pub. L. 114–317, §6(6), Dec. 16, 2016, 130 Stat. 1604. |

Section
Order filed May 16, 2019 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-19-00259-CV

____________

BILL FONTENOT AND FELICIA FONTENOT, Appellants

V.

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY AND MATTHEW 

GOLDEN, INDIVIDUALLY, Appellees

On Appeal from the 190th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2016-19005

ORDER

No reporter’s record has been filed in this case. The official court reporter for 

the 190th District Court informed this court that appellant had not made 

arrangements for payment for the reporter’s record. On April 10, 2019, the clerk of 

this court notified appellant that we would consider and decide those issues that do 

not require a reporter’s record unless appellant, within 15 days of notice, provided 

this court with proof of payment for the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(c). 

Appellant filed no reply. 
Accordingly, we order appellant to file a brief in this appeal within thirty days 

of the date of this order. If appellant fails to comply with this order, the court will 

dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b). 

PER CURIAM