2003 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
10-17-2003 

# K o or n v . L a cey P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 03-1231

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Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2003 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

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w . v i l l a no va . e du . Re c omme nde d C it at ion

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2003/199NOT PRE CEDENT IAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT


### No. 03-1231

SHAI N KOORN; RAFAELA KOORN ak a RACH AEL KOORN,

Ap pellan ts

v. LACEY TOWNSHIP ; RONALD ST ERLI NG, MAYOR; J OHN PA RKE R; LO UI S A MAT O; WI LL I AM B OE HM; JAMES KNOLLER , C OMMITTE EMEN; LACEY T OWNSHI P DEP ARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT; LOUIS A. D' ARIENZO, DIRECTOR; KENNETH THOMAS, CODE ENF ORCEMENT OFFI CER; LA CE Y T OW NS HIP B OA RD OF HE AL TH ; LAC EY TO WN SH IP POLICE DEPARTMENT; THOMAS R. DARMO DY, CHIEF OF POLI CE; STATE OF NEW JERSEY

App eal from th e Un ited States District Co urt for the Dis tri ct of New Jersey (D.C. Civi l Action No. 01-cv-00079) Distri ct Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson

Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

September 16, 2003 Be for e: A LIT O, AM BR O a nd C HE RT OF F, Circuit Judges (Opinion fi led October

17, 2003)1 For convenienc e, the defendants will be c ollec tivel y r eferred to as “the Township. ” 2 OPI NION

AM BR O, Circuit

Judge : Plaintiffs Shain and Rafaela Koorn brought a seventeen-count com plaint against Lacey Township and various Township officials and departments, 1 alle ging the Township’s enactment of an animalcontrolordinanceviolates thei r constitutional and stat utorycivilright s because i t was motivated by r acialanimus. The United State s District Cou rt for the District of N ew Jerse y granted the To wnsh ip’s motion f or summ ary judgment on all claims, though its written decisi on focused primarily on the Koorns’ sub stan tive d ue p roc ess c laim . Fin din g no erro r, w e af firm

. I. Facts Shain Koorn (who is Afri can-American) and Rafaela Koorn (who is Hispanic) purchased a home and pr opertyin the Township of Lacey, New Jersey, in 1998. Afte r moving in with many dogs ( accordi ng to the Koorns , “l ess than 20”), t hey were s oon informed bythe loc al code enforcement offi cer of a Township ordi nance li miti ng property owners to six dogs. Later, both the Koorns and the Township di scovered t hat what the code enforcement offi cer had bel ieved was an offi cial ordinance was in fact an informal policy . In r esponse t o complaint s from the Koorns’ neighbors , in November2 The Ordinance st ates i n releva nt part : “No person sha ll mai ntain, keep, or harbor . .. or

permit to be maintai ned, kept or harbor ed in or about any dwell ing or dwell ing unit under his cont rol a t otal of

more than si x (6) dogs over seven (7) months of age or whic h possess a set of permanent teet

h.” The Ordinance was passed purs uant to t he Board of Health’s authori ty under N.J. S.A. 26:3- 31 to “pass , al ter, or amend ordinances and make rules and regulations in regard to the publ ic heal th withi n its juri sdiction, for the following pur

poses. ..K. to regul ate, controlor prohi bit t he keeping and s laughte ring of animals. ” 3 2000 the LaceyTownship Board of Health formallyenacted an AnimalControl Ord inanc e (“O rdinan ce”) lim iting the num ber o f do gs tha t may be kept “ in or ab out a dwelling” to si x. 2 It is not necessar

y to describe in detail t

he ongoing dispute between the K oorns, their neighbo rs, and To wnsh ip officials. It suffices that som e of the K oorns’ neig hbors bega n com plainin g to T ow nship offic ials abo ut the K oorn s’ dog s and abou t certain lig hts inst alle d by the Koorns as a sec urity measur e. The Koorns al lege that the enforcement actio ns b rou ght und er lo cal d og- bar kin g an d lig htin g or din anc es w ere h aras sing to th em . As for the enactment of the Ordinance, the relevant additional fact s are the all eged racist statem ents the Ko orns a ttribute to certain Tow nship offic ials w ho w ere ins trume ntal in the Ordinanc e’s enact

ment. One member of the Township Committee—indeed its l iais on to the Boar d of Health, Ronald Sterl ing—was an admitted “moti vating f actor” in the enactment of the Ordinance. The K oorns allege that Sterling made a racist remark—consisti ng of a ly nching ref erence—at a tel evised Township Committee meeting. The Koorns also al lege that the n-Mayor Parker, i n conversation with t he code3 We have jurisdiction p ursuant to 29 U.S.C . § 1291. O ur review of a sum mary

judgment order is de novo , app lying th e sa me stan dar d as the D istrict Co urt. Ideal Da iry Farms, I nc. v. John Labatt , Ltd. , 90 F.3d 7 37, 743 (3 d Cir. 199 6). 4 enf orc em ent o ffic er, m ade a rac ist ref eren ce to the K oor ns. In January 2001, the Koorns fi led a complai nt in t he District Court

alle ging that

the enactment of

the Ordinanc e violated the Constit ution’ s Fourtee nth Amendment (subst antive and procedura l due proce ss), the Ex Post Facto Clause of Arti cle I, Section of the Co nstitution , the Fa ir Ho using Ac t and o ther civ il rights statu tes, and variou s state laws. Theysimult aneouslysought t o enjoin t he Township from enforci ng the Ordinanc e against them. After

the Dist rict Court denie d their

motion for i njuncti on, the Koorns nego tiated w ith the T ow nship for a s tay of en force men t. The y then am ende d their Distri ct Court c omplaint to repl ace the r equest for injunct ive rel ief with a request for damages. I n August 2002, the Township moved for summary judgment, which the Dis trict C our t gra nted

. Ko orn v . Lace y Tow nship , No . 01- 79 ( D.N .J. D ec. 2 3, 20 02)

. The Ko orns a ppea l. 3 II. Discussi on A. Sub st antiv e Du e Pr oc es s Cl ai ms The Koorns argue that the a doption and e nforcement of t he Ordinance vi olate s their Fourteent

h Amendment substantive due proc ess ri ghts. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no St ate shal l “depri ve any pe rson of l ife, liber ty , or pr operty , without

due5

process of

law.” It is wellknown that while , “on i ts face , thi s consti tuti onal provi sion speaks t o the adequacy

of state procedure s, . . . t he clause also has a substantive component.” Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ. , 227 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2000) (ci ting Planned Parent

hood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey , 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992)) . This s ubstantive

com pon ent p rote cts c itizen s fro m a rbitra ry and imp rop erly-m otiv ated gov ern me nt ac tion

. We have previousl y acknowle dged that the “fabric of subs tanti ve due process , as woven by our courts, encompasses at least two verydiffere nt threads.” Id. The first “thread” of substantive due process applies t o legislative acts. A legisl ative act i s, “general ly [,] l aws and broad executive regul ations ” which “applyto large segments of society”— as distin guish ed fro m a n on-leg islative, or exec utive a ct, wh ich “typica lly appl[i es] t o one person or to a li mited number of per sons.” Id. at 139 n. 1. A legi slative act tha t limits a fu ndam ental rig ht w ill survive a sub stantive due p roces s cha llenge only if it is ne ces sary to pro mo te a c om pelli ng g ove rnm enta l inte rest. Id. at 139. When a fun dam ental rig ht is no t at stake , a law mu st be ra tionally relate d to a le gitima te gov ern me nt in teres t in o rde r to su rviv e a s ubs tanti ve d ue p roc ess c halle nge . Id. The second “thr ead” of subst antive due process juri sprudence ana ly zes “nonlegis lati ve,” or e xecuti ve, government acti ons. Non-l egisl ative government act s may not arb itrarily in frin ge o n fu nda me ntal r igh ts pro tecte d by th e C ons titutio n. Id. at 139. And even where non-l egisl ative acti on infri nges on a fundamentalright , only the “ most egregious official cond uct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional sen se.’”6

Bo yanow ski v. C apital A rea Inte rmed iate U nit , 215 F.3d 396, 400 (3d Cir. 2000) (ci ting Co unty of S acram ento v . Lew is , 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (e mphasis i n orginal )). Such abuse of power must “s hock[] the conscienc e.” Id. at 401 (ci ting Lew is , 523 U .S. at 846). 1. Adoption o f the Ordinance d oes not viol ate the Koorns’ subst anti ve due pro ces s rig hts . The Ko orns a rgue that the Distric t Cou rt erred in gran ting su mm ary judgm ent in light of evidence t

hat the Ordinance was ins tigated by and a dopted with t he improper

mo tive of racial an imus . The y apply erron eous ly the seco nd-th read a nalysis, rese rved to

exec utive a ction, to a legisla tive ac t. Rath er, the O rdinan ce’s ad option is prop erly analy zed under the firs t thread of subst antive due process —w hether i t is rati onally related to a leg itimate g over nm ent inte rest, or, if f und ame ntal righ ts are im plicated , nece ssary to pro mo te a c om pelli ng g ove rnm enta l inte rest. Nicholas , 227 F.3d at 139. There is no f

undamental right to keep more than a c ertai n number of dogs in a dwelling uni t, s o the Dist rict Court properly applie d rati onal-bas is scr utiny to eval uate the Or din anc e’s c ons titutio nalit y. See Stern v. Halligan , 158 F.3d 729, 731 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[W ]hen ‘gen eral ec ono mic a nd so cial w elfare legislatio n’ is alleg ed to v iolate substant ive due proc ess, it s hould be st ruck down only when if fail s to meet a minimum rati onalit y st andard, an ‘extr emely diffi cult’ standar d for plai ntiff to meet. ” (quoti ng Knight v. Tape, Inc. , 935 F . 2d 61 7, 627 (3d C ir. 1991 ))). Thu s, to satisf y the ration albasis test, the Ordinanc e need onlybe rati onally related to anylegit

imate government pur pos e. See id. The Ordinance need not be narrowlytail ored to ac hieving t hat4 The Ko orns a rgue that the Ord inanc e’s im prop er pu rpose is evide nced in part b y its

“preempti on” by t

he New Jersey dangerous dog st atute , N.J. S.A. § 4:19- 17–34. The stat ute imposes notice and lic ensing r equirement s on owners of dogs found t o be “potentiall y dangerous” or “vicious” by a municipal court. The statute provides: The provisi ons of thi s act s hall s upersede any law, ordi nance, or

regulat ion concerni ng vicious or potentiall y danger ous dogs, a ny spe cifi c breed of dog, or any other type of dog incon sistent w ith this ac t enacted byany municipal ity , county, or countyor localboard of heal th. Id. § 4:19-36 ( emphasis added) . A board of heal th ordi nance li miti ng the number of dogs a pers on may keep at a dwelli ng is not

inconsi stent

with a st atute imposing requir ements on owners of ce rtai n dangerous dogs. Hence the Koorns are wrong to ar gue that t he O rdin anc e is p reem pted

. 7 legit ima te en d. Id. at 734 (“Mere over - or underinclus iveness will not invali date soci al

we lfare re gulatio n so lo ng as the state action repres ents a r ationa l respo nse to a legitim ate prob lem.”) ; Ro gin v . Ben salem Tow nship , 616 F.2d 680, 689 (3d Cir. 1980) (“The l aw need not b e in ev ery respe ct logic ally consiste nt w ith its aim s to be cons titutional. It is enough that

there i s an evilat hand for correct ion, a nd that i t might

be thought t

hat the parti cular l egisl ative measure was a rat ional wayto corr ect i t.” (quoti ng Willi amson v. Lee Optical Co. , 348 U.S . 483 (19 55) )). Protecting res idents ’ healt h and safety i s a legi timat e inte rest of municipal gov ernm ent. 4 Stern , 158 F.3d at 732 (“P rotecting the hea lth, safety, and general w elfare of township i nhabitants . . . i s plai nly in the publ ic interest .”). Large concentrati ons of dog s can be da nger ous a nd u nsan itary. As a re sult, a m unicip ality may ration ally

conc lude th at limiting the nu mb er of d ogs in any give n dw elling w ill protec t the he alth and safety of i ts re sident s. The Township does not need to prove that t

he number of dogs5 The Koorns appear t o argue that enforc ement acti ons under the Ordinance ( which

would qualif

y as non-legi slative act s) were i mproperly motivat ed as well, but there is no evidence t

hat anysuch enforcement occurred—especial ly in li ght of the negotiated st ay of enf orc em ent b etw een the p artie s. 6 Wh ile they corr ectly poin t out tha t ow nersh ip is a su bstan tive pro perty intere st, DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment , 53 F.3d 592, 600 (3d Cir. 1995), t he Koorns make 8 they chose to al low was any more or less rational than anyother number, distinguish between lar ge and small dogs, addr ess othe r pets such as cat s, or impose sani tati on stan dar ds, a s the Ko orn s alle ge. See Stern , 158 F .3d at 7 34; Ro gin , 616 F.2 d at 6 89. Thus, as pr operlyanaly zed under the firs t thread of subst antive due process , the Or din anc e do es n ot im per mis sibly lim it the Ko orn s’ su bsta ntiv e du e pr oce ss rig hts. 2. The Koorns do not allege that any specifi c non-legi slati ve acts were improperly m otivated by racial animus. Un der the seco nd th read o f sub stantive due p roces s, arbitrary an d imp rope rly motivated n on-legislative acts that directly infringe on a person’s fu ndam ental rights are

unc ons titutio nal. Nicholas , 227 F.3d at 139. As explai ned above, t his anal ysi s does not applyto the l egisl ative act of the Ordinance’ s enactment . Other t han that , the only nonlegis lati ve acts t

hat the Koorns all ege were improperly motivat ed by r acialanimus are t he Mayor’s and Com mitteeman’s alleged racis t remarks. 5 How ever, even if proven, these acts had no d irect , lega l eff ect o n th e K oor ns’ p rop erty rig hts. See Boyanowski , 215 F. 3d at 401 (s lurs and innuendos made bygovernment offi cial did not di rectl y i nfringe on plaint iff’s property right) . Cert ainly theyhad no legaleffect on a requisi te fundamenta l right. 6 Nicholas , 227 F.3 d at 1 40.no case that there is a funda mental pr opertyright to keep more t

han a cert ain number of dogs in o r near a dw elling unit. Nor co uld they have, as w e have p reviously noted: “[W ]e have so far l imit ed non-legi slative subst antive due process review to c ases i nvolving real property ownership.” Nicholas , 227 F.3d at 141 (emphasis added). But regardl ess, the Ordinance fore closes neithe r the Koorns’ real pr opertyownership nor t heir owners hip of dog s; it sim ply res tricts t hem fro m k eep ing mo re th an s ix in or n ear th eir d we lling

. 7 The Koorns cite Bello v. Walker , 840 F.2d 1124, 1129 (3d Cir. 1988), i n support of their argument that “i mproper moti ve” such as “pe rsonal interest or political parti sanship” is suff icie nt to es tabli sh a subst antive due process violat ion. Thei r rel iance on Bello is misplaced for two reasons. First, as the Koorns wo uld have discovered upon the mo st cur sory o f cita tion -ch eck s, Bello has been effect ively overrul ed: We hold that [ County of Sac ramento v. ] Lewis [,523 U.S. 833 ( 1998) (requi ring evi dence of conduct “ shocking t o the consci ence” in or der to fi nd violat ion of subst antive due process )] has s uperceded [si c] pri or decis ions of our Court hol ding that a plai ntiff

assert ing a munici pal land-use deci sion violated substan tive due pro cess need only show th at the mun icipal officers acte d w ith an “im pro per mo tive.” Th us, Bello v. Walker , 840 F.2d 1124 (3 d Ci r. 198 8) , and i ts pr oge ny ar e n o l ong ergoo d l aw. United Arti sts Theater Circui t, I nc. v. Township of Warringt on , 316 F.3d 392, 394 (3d Cir. 2003 ). Seco nd, as evide nt from the ve ry langua ge the Ko orns c hose to exc erpt in th eir brie f, Bello involved an improperl y- motivat ed non-legi slative act , the issuanc e of building permits, which is analyzed under a separate thr ead of substantive due process fro m th e leg islativ e ac t at iss ue h ere. 9 Furthermore, the Koorns do not al lege anyconduct so egregious t hat it “shocks the

con scie nce .” 7 Boyanowski , 215 F .3d at 4 01; see als o Cruz-Erazo v. Rivera-Montañez , 212 F.3d 617, 622–24 ( 1st Cir . 2000) (poli ce officer s’ oral threat s and repeated harassment

(but not physi call y i ntrusi ve or viol ent conduct ) that did not “s tri ke at the basic fabric” of

a protec ted rel ations hip, s uch as the pa rent- child relationshi p, was not suffici ently

egregious as to “sho ck the cons cienc e”); Collins v. Cundy , 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 19 79) (a llegation that she riff lau ghed at and threate ned to hang a priso ner d id10

not state a con stitutiona l claim u nder § 19 83); Sha bazz v. Co le , 69 F. Supp. 2d 177, 200 (D. Mass. 1999) (“W ithout even a suggestion of physi cal injury , [stat e prison librarian’s] verbal abu se and rac ial epithets, although co ntinuing fo r a long period of time, fall short of c ons cien ce s hoc kin g co ndu ct.”). For these reasons, the Dist rict Court corr ectl y gr anted summaryjudgment t o the Tow nship dismissing the Koorns’ substantive due process clai ms. B. Pro ce dur al Due Pro ce ss Cla ims The Koorns assert

that t he Ordinance cr eates a n “irr ebutabl e presumpti on . . . that more than si x dogs, kept ‘in or about’ a dwel ling, creat es a heal th hazar d . . . irr especti ve of any ot her fact ors, without any procedure for

the homeowner to pr ove otherwis e. . . .” Bu t their arg um ent tha t the D istrict Co urt sho uld h ave re cogn ized th is as a v alid pro ced ura l du e pr oce ss cla im is unp ersu asiv e. The Fou rteenth Am endm ent req uires th at the g over nm ent em ploy app ropria te proceduralsafeguards when depriving c iti zens of libertyor property interests recognized und er th e C ons titutio n. See, e. g. , Mathews v. Eldri dge , 424 U .S. 319, 332 -333 (19 76). The Koorns are correct that the stat utes cr eati ng permanent i rrebut able pre sumptions

som etim es v iolat e pr oce dur al du e pr oce ss. E.g. , Vlandis v. Kline , 412 U.S. 441 ( 1973) (state law prov iding th at ma rried stu dents living in Co nnec ticut w ho ap plied to the state univ ersity from outsid e Co nnec ticut w ere irreb utably pre sum ed to b e out-o f-state s tuden ts violated procedura l due proce ss). But the Koorns ar e wrong to suggest that t he Ordinance8 Under the Koorns’ r ationa le, any hea lth- or safety- related regulation t hat imposed som e restrictio n w ould create an irreb utable presu mp tion tha t the restric ted co ndu ct is dangerous or

unhealthy. Under this premise, the Koorns would, one conject ures, argue that the law requiri ng drivers to stop at s top signs violat es their procedural due process right s by c reati ng an “irrebutabl e presumpti on” that not st opping is hazardous, without giving t he Koorns an opportunity to demonstr ate, in a part icular cir cumstance, that not stop pin g is s afe

. 11 creat es a pres umption that more than six dogs c reate s a healt h hazard. Even though the Ordinance i s justifie d by a hea lth and s afetyrati onale, it appl ies t o all dwel lings at which more than si x dogs are kept —not just thos e at which more t han six dogs c onsti tute a health hazard. 8 An d, as disc uss ed a bov e, su ch n arro w ta ilorin g is n ot re qui red

. Stern v. Halligan , 158 F.3d 729, 734 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Mere over- or underi nclusi veness wil l not invali date soci al welfar e regulation s o long as t he state acti on repres ents a r ationa l respo nse to a legitim ate pro blem .”). Th e O rdinan ce do es no t create a n irreb utable pre sum ptio n an d it d oes not vio late th e K oor ns’ p roc edu ral d ue p roc ess r igh ts. C. Ex Pos t Fac to C laim The Ko orns a rgue that the Ord inanc e viola tes the C onstitu tion’s E x Po st Fac to Clause, Art. I , § 9 cl . 3, be cause it imposes re stri ctions on acti vity —the raisi ng of dogs at their home— that was l egal at the ti me they began it . “The ex post facto pr ohibition forbids Congress and the states to enac t anylaw which imposes a puni shment for an a ct which was not punis hable at the ti me it was committed; or i mposes additional puni shment to that then pres cribed. ” Weaver v. Graham , 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981) (i nternalquotati ons omitt ed). Two cri tica l ele ments exis t for a c riminallaw to be ex post facto: “it must

be9 See discus sion at subsection D.3 infra

. 12 retrospecti ve, that i s, it

must apply to events occurri ng before its enactment, and it must disadvant age the offende r affect ed by i t.” Id. at 29 . Th e O rdin anc e is n ot re trosp ectiv e. It do es n ot im pos e an y pun ishm ent f or a ny co ndu ct oc cur ring bef ore its en actm ent. Th eref ore , the D istrict Co urt c orre ctly de nied the K oor ns’ E x P ost F acto Cla use claim

. D. Fai r Ho us in g Ac t a nd OtherCiv ilRig ht s Cl ai ms The Ko or ns arg ue t

hat th e Di stri ctCourt e rr ed i n no t r eco gni zi ng thei r c la ims und er an y of th e Fa ir H ous ing Ac t (“F HA ”), 4 2 U .S.C . § 19 81, a nd 4 2 U .S.C . § 19 82. They “r elysubstant

iall y upon the McD onnell Dougla s presumpti on” 9 with respe ct to those claims. Because the Koorns do not make o ut cognizable claims under these stat utoryprovisi ons and do not qual ifyfor the McD onnell Dougla s presumpti on, the District Court corr ectlygranted the Township’s summ ary j udgment m otion on those claims. 1. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S. C. §§ 3604(a), 3617 Unde r the F ai r Hou si ng Ac t, Title VII I o f the Ci vi l Ri ght s Act of 1 968 , 4 2 U. S. C. §§ 3 604 –31 , it is unlaw ful fo r any pers on to refus e to sell o r other wise mak e una vailab le a dw elling to any pers on o n the b asis of race. 4 2 U .S.C. § 360 4(a). It is also unlaw ful to “coerce, inti midate, threaten, or i nterfe re with any person i n the exer cise or enjoy ment of” that p erso n’s r igh t to h ave a dw ellin g. Id. §§ 3617, 3604. “ Dwelling” means a “bui lding . . . des ign ed f or o ccu pan cy as a resid enc e by o ne o r mo re fa milie s.” Id. § 3602 (b).13 a. Section 3604( a) To make out a clai m under § 3604(a), the Koorns must a ssert , fir st, that t he Tow nship den ied or ma de hou sing unav ailable to them a nd, secon d, that the Tow nship’s actio ns w ere b ase d on the K oor ns’ r ace . Edw ards v. John ston Co unty Health D ep’t , 885 F.2d 1215, 1221 ( 4th Cir. 1989). The Koorns’ FHA claim is defi cient in that (1) Township did not “ot

herwise make unavai lable ” the Koorns’ dwelling, and (2) the Township’s actions were not made “on the basi s of race. ” (i) “Otherw ise make unavail able” The Koorns clai m that the acti ons of Township offici als, “incl uding without limi tati on the enactment of the Ordi nance, were committed with t he deli berate intent

of harassi ng, int

imidating, a nd coerci ng plaint iffs, and to depri ve them of the us e and enjoy ment of thei r home, and for the purpos e of creating such a hos til e livi ng environment

that pl ainti ffs would decide to lea ve thei r home, and perhaps the Town.” However, in li miti ng the number of dogs a person may keep at a dwell ing, t he Ordinance doe s n ot“make una va il ab le ” the Koo rn s’ ri ght to ha ve a d wel li ng i n wh ic h t o r es id e. As

suc h, th e en actm ent a nd e nfo rcem ent o f the Or din anc e do es n ot v iolat e the FH A.

(ii) “On the Basis of Race” “A Title VII I clai m must rest , in t he firs t ins tance, upon a showing that the chall enged acti on by a defe ndant had a r acial ly discriminat ory effect. ” Residen t Adviso ry Bd. v. Rizzo , 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3d Cir. 1977). Dis criminatoryeffect maybe proved by14

showing eit

her “adver se impact

to a part icular minori ty group” or “harm to the community general ly by the perpetuation of segregation.” Huntington Branc h, NAAC P v. Town of H untington , 844 F.2 d 92 6, 93 7 (2 d C ir.), aff’d in pa rt , 488 U.S. 15 ( 1988). The Koorns make no showing that the Ordinanc e affects “a particular minori ty group.” The Ordinance affec ts al l Township cit izens, white and minority alike . Nor is there a ny evid enc e tha t the O rdin anc e is lik ely to a ffe ct the To wn ship ’s citiz ens alon g ra cial lin es. As the District Court

stat ed, “the fact t

hat the firs t pers on an Ordinance affe cts i s a person of color doe s not negate the fact that s uch Ordinance i s a legi timat e governmental exerci se.” Ko orn v . Lace y Tow nship , No . 01-7 9, at 4 (D .N.J. D ec. 23 , 2002 ). As a result, the K oorn s can not su stain a c laim u nder § 36 04(a ) of the Fair H ousin g A ct.

b. Section 3617 The Fair Housing Act a lso makes i t unlawfulto “coer ce, i ntimi date, threaten, or interfere with any per son in the exerci se or enj oyment of

. . . any right gr anted or protected by” vari ous sections of Title VIII, including Section 3604, which secures a pe rs on’ s rig htnot

to be de ni ed a d wel li ng o n the ba si s o f r ac e. 42 U .S .C . § 361 7. As discuss ed above, t

he Township’s enact

ment of the Ordi nance li miti ng the number of dogs that a person may keep at a dwell ing does not interfere with the Koorns’ right to have a dwelling nor

does it discriminat e on the basi s of race. For these same reasons , the Koorns do n ot su cce ssfu lly ma ke o ut a c laim und er § 361 7.15

2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 The Koorns clai m that the acti ons of the Township offi cial s “denied t hem equal benefit s of the l aw in the sec urity of t heir per sons and proper ty , and t o make and enforce contrac ts, under 42 U.S.C. 1981” and “thei r equal rights to own real pr opertyunder 42 U.S .C. § 198 2.” T hey d o no t iden tify a d istinc t claim und er eit her statu te. 42 U .S.C. § 198 1 provide s: “All person s . . . shall have the same right in every State a nd T erritory to m ake a nd en force contra cts, to su e, be p arties, giv e evid ence , and to the ful l and equalbenefit of all laws and procee dings for the security

of persons a nd prop erty as is enjo yed by w hite citize ns. . . .” 42 U.S .C. § 1 982 man dates th at “[a ]ll citizens shall ha ve the sam e right, in every S tate an d Te rritory, as in en joyed by w hite citi zens thereof, t o inheri t, purchase, l ease, s ell, hold, a nd convey real and per sonal property. ” The Ordinance li mits t

he number of dogs that the Koorns can keep at a ny one dwelling. It does not forec lose t hem from owning any number of dogs or from owning any partic ular dw ellings. F or sure the O rdinan ce do es no t affe ct their rig ht to “in herit, purchase, lease, sell , hold, or convey real or personalproperty. ” Nor does it infri nge on the Koorns’ right to make and enforce cont racts . Furthermore, the Ordinanc e does not deny t he Koorns any right

that i s “enjoy ed by white citizens t hereof. ” The Ordinance forec loses w hite citize ns fro m k eepin g m ore tha n six d ogs a t a dw elling, jus t as it forecl oses the Koorns. Thus the enactment of the Ordina nce does not vi olate §§ 1981 or16

198 2. N or do the K oorn s dem onstra te how any othe r acts o f the T ow nship offic ials infringe on their §§ 1981 and 1982 rights. 3. The McD onnell Douglas Presumption The K oorns allege, w ith respect to their FH A, §§ 1 981, 198 2 claims, that they are entitled to t

he burden-s hifti ng presumpti on of McD onnell Dougla s Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973) . A plai ntiff who establi shes a prima faci e case for di scri minatory effect

can shif t the b urd en to def end ants for justif icatio n of acts wit h di scrim inato ry eff ects . Residen t Adviso ry Board , 564 F.2 d at 1 49. A prima faci e case consi sts of pr oof that (1) plaint iffs are in a protected cl ass, (2) they appl ied for a nd were quali fied t o rent or purchase hous ing, ( 3) theywere reje cted, and (4) the housing opportunit y r emained

ava ilabl e. Robinson v. 12 Loft s Realty , Inc. , 610 F.2d 1032 ( 2d Cir. 1979) . While t he Koorns establ ish that the y ar e raci al minori ties and that theyare qual ifie d for the ownership of their home, theyadmit that the thir d and fourth e lements ha ve not been sati sfied. (J. A. at 348). The Ordinance li miti ng the number of dogs t hey maykeep does not reje ct them from their dw elling. A nd ev en if it d id, there is no w ay the K oorn s cou ld pred ict that the ir hou se w ould “rem ain av ailable.” Ac cord ingly, the K oorn s can not rely on the McD onnell Dougla s presu mp tion to e stablish a cau se of action und er the F air Ho usin g A ct or 42 U .S.C . §§ 1 981 , 198 2. E. Cons pi ra cy Cl ai ms The Koorns alle ge that

the Mayor, Committeemen, Township empl oyees , Board of17

He alth, and the co mp laining neigh bors “ cons pired, b y agreem ent tac it or othe rwise , to cause the Board of Health t o enact the Ordinance” and argued that the Dist rict Court err ed in n ot fin din g th is to b e a c ogn izab le cla im u nde r 42 U.S .C. § 198 5(3 ). W e dis agr ee. In order to state a claim under 4 2 U.S .C. § 198 5(3), a plaintiff mu st allege: (1) a

co ns pi ra cy; ( 2) m ot iv ate d b y a r ac ial an im us de sig ne d t o d ep riv e, d ire ctl y or in di re ctl y, any per son or cl ass of per sons to t he equal pr otection of the laws; ( 3) an act in furt herance of the conspiracy ; and (4) an injur y t o person or pr opertyor the deprivati on of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Lak e v. A rnold , 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 199 7). As n oted a lready, the O rdinan ce is a le gitima te socia l welf are leg islation th at is neutralon its face and appli es to al l Township res idents . It does no inj ury to the Koorns or their property. As a result , the Koorns do not have a cognizable § 198 5(3) claim as a matter of law. Thus the Koorns’ cl aim that Township offici als fai led to ha lt a c onspira cy in v iolat ion of 4 2 U .S.C . § 19 86 m ust a lso f ail. See Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp. , 7 F.3d 1085, 1088 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[A] § 1986 cl aim must be pred icated upo n a va lid § 19 85 cla im.”); Grim es v. S mith , 776 F .2d 13 59, 13 63 n .4 (7th Cir. 19 85) (“ [L]ia bility unde r § 19 86 is d erivativ e of § 198 5(3) liab ility; withou t a violation of § 1 985(3), there ca n be no violation of § 1 986.”). Th e District Cou rt

cor rectl y dism issed the K oor ns’ c ons pira cy clai ms .18

F. Pendan t State Claims Fina lly, the Ko orns a rgue that the Distric t Cou rt erred in not rec ogn izing th eir various clai ms under state la w. However, because t he Court properly dismis sed the Ko orns’ f edera l claims , it prope rly refused to exe rcise juris diction over their pe ndan t state claim s. 28 U.S .C. § 136 7(c )(3). III. Conclusion For th e fore goin g reas ons, w e aff irm the Distric t Cou rt’s gran ting the Tow nship

sum ma ry judg me nt o n th e K oor ns’ c laim s.

TO THE C LERK: Please fi le the foregoing Opini on. By the C ourt, /s/ Thomas L. Ambro Circuit Judge