Shaping U.S. Policy on Africa:

Pillars of a New Strategy

by Johnnie Carson

Strategic Forum

Africa is in danger of slipping further on

the list of U.S. foreign policy priorities

because of Washington’s preoccupation with Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, and

the war on terrorism. Yet Africa is a growing

source of petroleum and raw materials, an

important trading partner, and an enormous

untapped market for American investment.

The continent faces some serious problems and remains outside the mainstream of

economic globalization and wide digital

connectivity. Failure to address these problems will only increase the need for American assistance and involvement. With more

focused U.S. engagement, Africa can become

a stronger partner in addressing costly regional crises and mitigating global terrorism.

The next administration has an opportunity to refocus U.S. engagement in Africa and

articulate a policy that reflects American

interests, values, and priorities. Such policy

can leverage U.S. influence and enhance its

image in Africa while boosting the continent’s

economic development and political stability.

This policy should rest on seven pillars:

■ strengthening democratic institutions and

the rule of law

■ encouraging economic reform and growth

■ building partnerships in the global war on

terrorism

■ combating the HIV/AIDS epidemic

■ expanding American trade and investment

■ helping to prevent and resolve conflicts

■ fostering regional integration.

It is also critical that Washington’s relationship with various African states and leaders not be viewed narrowly or exclusively

through the prism of the growing U.S. concern

with combating global terrorism. 

In the four decades since most African

states achieved independence, the continent has

never been a foreign policy priority for the

United States. During the early years of American engagement with Africa, Washington focused its attention on preventing communist

countries from gaining major military bases or

monopolistic concessions over any of the continent’s important strategic minerals. Although

the United States provided large amounts of

development assistance and food aid to a number of African states, most American interest and

support was directed toward African countries

and leaders who were regarded as Cold War

allies. In those countries still struggling for

independence, the United States usually supported African insurgents who were pro-Western

and anticommunist in their orientation. In

South Africa and Namibia, Washington generally professed great sympathy for eventual majority rule and independence but largely supported the status quo out of fear that liberation

groups allied with the Soviet Union or China

would win power in any political transition. 

Throughout much of this era, scant

attention was paid to promoting multiparty

democracy, encouraging good human rights

practices, or fighting corruption. With the

appointment of Congressman Andrew Young as

United Nations (UN) Ambassador, President

Jimmy Carter energized America’s engagement

on the continent. With the British government,

the Carter administration pushed for a UNsponsored solution to Namibia’s independence

struggle and a diplomatic settlement of Rhodesia’s 15-year-long unilateral declaration of

independence. President Carter’s creation of a

new Department of State Bureau of Human

Rights also gave greater prominence to the

issue of torture and physical abuses in Africa.

However, notwithstanding these positive developments, protecting America’s pro-Western

partners in Africa (such as Mobutu Sese Seko

in the Congo, Daniel arap Moi in Kenya, and

William Tolbert in Liberia) remained far more

important than promoting democratic values,

good governance, and improved human rights

around the continent.

During the Reagan administration, State

Department officials spent substantial time on

Africa, but the widely contested administration

policy of constructive engagement concentrated

largely on achieving independence for Namibia

and resolving the problems of apartheid in

South Africa in a manner that would limit

Soviet advances in southern Africa. Outside of

southern Africa, Reagan and his successor,

George H.W. Bush, continued to support proWestern states and leaders while giving relatively short shrift to the rest of the continent

and to issues such as democracy, human

rights, and corruption. 

In 1992, Bill Clinton came into office with

a commitment to elevate U.S. involvement and

interest in Africa. With two successful Presidential visits and numerous Cabinet-level trips to

the continent, President Clinton inaugurated a

new focus on Africa and elevated official U.S.

involvement with the continent to a historically

high level. In 8 years, the Clinton administration launched dozens of new programs and

initiatives on the continent, including:

■ creation of the African Crisis Response

Initiative to help train African peacekeepers

■ passage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act

■ a major program for the education of girls

■ implementation of a “Safe Skies for Africa”

aviation and security program

No. 210

September 2004

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points

No. 210, September 2004 Strategic Forum 1
■ expansion of Human Immunodeficiency

Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

(AIDS) prevention programs

■ establishment of bilateral commissions

with South Africa (led by Vice President Al Gore),

the South African Development Coordination

Conference, and the Economic Community of West

African States.

Despite its activism, the Clinton State

Department team was frequently accused of

abandoning its principles in favor of a new

breed of young African leaders, even if these

leaders did not pursue policies of good governance and human rights.

During the past 3 years, the George W.

Bush administration has retreated from the

activism and engagement of the Clinton years.

Although both President Bush and Secretary of

State Colin Powell have visited Africa and met

with dozens of African leaders in Washington,1

the Bush administration has concentrated on

implementing two ambitious programs: one on

the prevention and spread of HIV/AIDS, and the

other on the establishment of a new mechanism for channeling foreign assistance to some

of the poorest nations in Africa—the Millennium Challenge Account. As the Bush administration concludes its term, the evolution and

development of these programs are being

watched, and it is too soon to predict whether

they will be successful or enduring.

Today, we have moved into a new global

paradigm, and the need for an overarching set

of principles that focuses U.S. engagement in

Africa is essential to advance key American

strategic priorities. As the United States approaches the 2004 Presidential election, public

officials and policy thinkers across the political

spectrum have an opportunity to think seriously

about reshaping policy and building it around

seven core values.

Democracy and Law

Africa’s democratic track record has been

spotty throughout much of its postcolonial

history. The absence of democracy and the rule

of law has been a primary reason for the civil

strife, military conflict, and appalling human

rights abuses that have plagued the continent.

In the last decade, Africa has made impressive strides in establishing more responsible

and representative governments. Military coups

and extralegal changes of government have

decreased in frequency, especially in the larger

African states. More than half of the countries

in sub-Saharan Africa now have democratic

governments, and in the last 5 years, 6 major

countries (Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mauritius,

Nigeria, and Senegal) have held successful

multiparty elections that have resulted in

peaceful and orderly changes of government.

The African Union, the continent-wide organization that represents most African states, has

made democracy and good governance a

higher priority and passed a resolution prohibiting the seating of any government that

comes to power through a military coup or

extralegal transfer of power. 

Nevertheless, several large holes remain

in the democratic canvas of Africa, and much

remains to be done to promote and strengthen

democracy on the continent. Far too many

major countries remain outside of the democratic framework. Sudan and the Democratic

Republic of the Congo, two of the largest and

most populous states, are not yet democratic

and are struggling to emerge from long periods of authoritarian rule, civil war, and serious

human rights abuses. In other parts of

Africa—the Republic of Guinea, Togo, Zimbabwe—aging and autocratic leaders hang on

to power. Democratic institutions in Madagascar, Malawi, and Zambia remain fragile and

subject to destructive political manipulation

and coercion. Nigeria, Africa’s most populous

country and its largest democracy, is also

confronted with deep cleavages between north

and south, Christian and Muslim, a relatively

small and politically corrupt elite and a growing number of impoverished and alienated

citizens. Any one of these issues could boil over

and bring Nigerian democracy to the breaking

point. In the pivotal Central African state of

Uganda, a return to full democracy has been

stalled for the last decade because of the reluctance of President Yoweri Museveni to permit a

rapid and complete return to genuine multiparty politics.

Strengthening democratic institutions is

vital. The United States has spent a great deal

of time promoting elections, which, although

essential to the democratic process, are not as

important as a strong and robust judicial

system. The pivotal role of the judiciary in

creating an enabling environment for the

development of democracy can no longer be

ignored or minimized in efforts to promote

democracy in Africa. An effective judiciary

protects the civil liberties and human rights of

individuals and interprets the constitution and

laws. More needs to be done in this area. To

fortify Africa’s democratic gains, additional

money and attention should be directed to

strengthening its weak judicial systems, expanding the training of magistrates and

judges, encouraging professional legal associations, and promoting legal aid societies.

The promotion of democracy, the rule of

law, good human rights practices, and free and

impartial elections should be cornerstones of

what the United States does in Africa, regardless

of other American interests and concerns.

The Economy

Africa is a continent of great mineral

wealth and agricultural potential, but economic growth and prosperity have proven

extremely elusive for most states. According to

the World Bank, Africa remains the poorest

continent and the least integrated into the

world economy—with slow growth rates,

declining levels of per capita income, limited

capital markets, and relatively small international and interregional trade flows. Many of

these deficiencies are the result of bad economic and financial policies, bloated and

inefficient government bureaucracies, and an

overreliance on state-run marketing boards

and cooperatives. In addition, many of the

countries blessed with great mineral and oil

wealth have squandered it. Substantial mineral earnings have frequently resulted in

massive corruption and have often sparked

political conflicts and civil war rather than

economic growth and national prosperity.

Diamonds, for example, have fueled civil wars

in Angola, the Central African Republic, the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sierra

Leone. Great oil wealth has resulted in violent

2 Strategic Forum No. 210, September 2004

Johnnie Carson is Senior Vice President at the National Defense University and formerly served as U.S.

Ambassador to Kenya. Comments may be addressed to carsonj@ndu.edu.

Africa has made impressive strides in establishing

more responsible and representative governments
Continent of Africa

Source: Joint Force Quarterly, No. 29

conflict and recurring political tensions in

Angola, Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria.

In the last decade, many African countries

have started to change, and some critical reforms have been undertaken. A growing number of governments have adopted World Bank

and International Monetary Fund reforms,

privatized inefficient state-owned industries,

floated currencies, and allowed the market to

play a greater role in the economies of their

countries. Governments have also become more

aggressive in seeking better terms of trade,

creating better conditions for their business

communities, and courting foreign investment.

If African countries are to realize long-term

economic objectives, the United States must

continue to encourage their governments to

eliminate corruption and pursue economic

policy reforms while using donor assistance

more effectively.

In a bold and widely applauded move, the

Bush administration in March 2002 announced

a new initiative to double the foreign aid budget

by 2006 and to channel the additional funds

through a new organization called the Millennium Challenge Account (since renamed the

Millennium Challenge Corporation [MCC]).

MCC funds would be directed toward countries

that are governing justly, investing in people,

and encouraging economic freedom. The Millennium Challenge Corporation announced the

first 16 countries eligible for grants in May 2004.

Eight of the 16 countries were in Africa, which

surprised many people given the stiff criteria

that had been put in place. (According to

outside researchers and knowledgeable officials

in the State Department, only 3 African countries came close to qualifying under the 16

No. 210, September 2004 Strategic Forum 3

NIGER

MAURITANIA MALI

NIGERIA

CAPE VERDE

CÔTE 

D’IVOIRE

NAMIBIA

LIBYA

CHAD

SOUTH AFRICA

TANZANIA

CONGO

ANGOLA

ALGERIA

BOTSWANA MOZAMBIQUE

ZAMBIA

GABON

CENTRAL AFRICAN 

REPUBLIC

TUNISIA

MOROCCO

UGANDA

SWAZILAND

LESOTHO

MALAWI

BURUNDI

RWANDA

TOGO

BENIN

GHANA

LIBERIA

SIERRA LEONE

GUINEA

BURKINA FASO

THE GAMBIA

CAMEROON

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

ZIMBABWE

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 

OF THE CONGO

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

SENEGAL

GUINEA-BISSAU

EGYPT

SUDAN ERITREA

ETHIOPIA

DJIBOUTI

SOMALIA

KENYA

MADAGASCAR

Western

Sahara

MAURITIUS

COMOROS

SEYCHELLES

Barrels per day

Nigeria 2,256,000

Algeria 1,520,000

Libya 1,429,000

Angola 742,400

Congo (Brazzaville) 275,000

Sudan 209,100

South Africa 196,200

Equatorial Guinea 181,400

Democratic Republic of the Congo 24,000

Ghana 7,000

Source: The World Factbook 2004 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence

Agency, 2004); available online at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/

factbook>. Production numbers based on 2001 estimates.

Oil Production
specific performance indicators that MCC identified in the first year of the program.)

The Millennium Challenge Corporation is

a valuable new tool, but it is evolving slowly and

will affect only a limited number of countries.

Many development experts are deeply concerned

that its growth and success will mean the decline of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), its funding, and its direct

involvement on the ground in Africa in promoting critical aid programs. Others are concerned

that the Bush administration may never fulfill

its multiyear, multibillion-dollar financial

commitments to the MCC.

To help the majority of African states,

MCC resources should not become a substitute

for USAID and its work. Traditional funding for

that agency must remain in place and not

decline. To accelerate African growth and

development, the United States should also

extend the benefits of the successful African

Growth and Opportunity Act, expand debt

forgiveness programs, and introduce more

regional investment funds to encourage the

growth of the private sector. The United States

also needs to encourage greater trilateral private-public partnerships through the creation

of endowed U.S.–host country development

foundations, especially in those states where

mineral and petroleum companies have a

major stake and can play a vital role.

The road to sustained and long-term

economic growth in Africa will not be found in

donor assistance and development aid alone. A

robust, free market economy, based on equitable

trading relationships and foreign investment,

and coupled with the strategic use of foreign

assistance, is the best way to achieve sustained

economic growth and stability. The United States

should redouble its efforts to encourage African

governments to follow this path.

Terrorism

Global terrorism is the most serious national security threat to the United States and is

one of the problems shared with Africans. The

same terrorist group that destroyed the World

Trade Center struck with equally deadly force in

East Africa 3 years earlier. On August 7, 1998,

U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es

Salaam, Tanzania, were severely damaged in

well-orchestrated al Qaeda attacks. The Nairobi

bombing resulted in over 200 deaths and more

than 5,000 wounded. Since the bombings in

Kenya and Tanzania, new attacks and terrorist

actions have been perpetrated in Africa against

Israeli and other Western interests.

Future terrorism in Africa is almost certain.

Africa is a soft target, and most African states

lack the security necessary to prevent wellcoordinated terrorist attacks. This fact—coupled

with the existence of several failed or weakened

states in various parts of the continent with

significant Muslim populations, the rise of

conservative Islam in northern Nigeria (the

most populous state in Africa and the eighth

largest Muslim state in the world), and the

continued growth and spread of Islam throughout much of west, central, and northeastern

Africa—could see Africa emerge in the months

and years ahead as a new regional battleground

in the war on terrorism. Conservative and sometimes radical Islamic organizations have been

able to make enormous headway among Muslim populations in some African states affected

by poverty, economic deprivation, and political

alienation. This has happened outside of Africa,

and it can also happen on the continent. It is in

the interest of both Africa and the United States

to prevent this, but it can only be stopped

through strong collaborative efforts, not through

unilateral action.

The United States has introduced two new

antiterrorism programs in Africa—the Pan

Sahel Initiative (to help Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger deal with terrorism in West

Africa) and the East African Counter Terrorism

program (aimed largely at helping Djibouti,

Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania). These programs are primarily intended to strengthen the

security forces and border control in the recipient countries. However, preventing and detecting terrorism in Africa will require robust and

successful economic and social programs, not

only new military security initiatives. If the

United States is going to make headway against

emerging terrorism in Africa, it will have to

spend more money to strengthen its development assistance programs, diplomatic representation, and public diplomacy in those states

where radical fundamentalism may take root. 

HIV/AIDS

The most serious challenge facing Africa

is AIDS. If the syndrome is allowed to go

unchecked, Africa will never realize its dream

of economic prosperity and democratic stability. The magnitude of the AIDS problem is

without precedent in the era of modern medicine, and Africa has been hit hardest. With

roughly 700 million people, Africa has only 10

percent of the global population, but it has

nearly two-thirds of the world’s 40 million AIDS

cases. Most of the top 15 countries in the world

affected by HIV/AIDS are African. In Botswana

and Swaziland, HIV infection rates hover close

to 40 percent, and in South Africa, Zambia,

and Zimbabwe, 20 percent or more of the

people are infected. 

The situation in Kenya is not untypical of

many other African countries. As a result of the

AIDS epidemic, it is estimated that 36 Kenyans

die every hour, 864 every day, 6,048 every week,

24,192 every month, and 290,304 every year.2

The situation throughout Africa is equally

grim. On the continent as a whole, nearly

3,000 people die every day because of this

disease, and in some African countries, the

4 Strategic Forum No. 210, September 2004

the road to economic

growth will not be found

in donor assistance and

development aid alone

In billions $US

South Africa 456.70

Nigeria 110.80

Sudan 70.75

Ethiopia 48.47

Ghana 44.49

Uganda 36.10

Democratic Republic of the Congo 35.62

Kenya 33.09

Tanzania 21.58

Mozambique 21.23

Angola 20.59

Namibia 13.72

Chad 10.86

Rwanda 10.11

Liberia 3.26

Source: The World Factbook 2004 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence

Agency, 2004); available online at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/

factbook>.

Gross Domestic Product
sheer size of the problem defies imagination.

The dying frequently leave behind another

burgeoning problem: orphans. More than 11

million orphans live in sub-Saharan Africa,

and that number is expected to double by the

end of this decade.

The United States has taken the lead

among Western governments in providing

funding and assistance to fight AIDS in Africa.

Working through the Centers for Disease Control, USAID, the National Institutes of Health,

and the U.S. Army Medical Research Unit, the

U.S. Government has established a number of

prevention programs built around information,

education, counseling, and voluntary testing.

The Bush administration has launched an

initiative that would provide $15 billion in

additional funding over 5 years to some of the

most severely impacted African and Caribbean

states. This program includes a significant

amount of funding for the purchase of antiretrovirals. It is critical that this program be

fully funded and implemented and that conservative American religious beliefs and moral

attitudes do not limit the fight to stop AIDS.

Focusing on abstention alone will not

succeed. Organizations promoting condom use

as a responsible behavior should be financed as

well. Moreover, while it is extremely important

to make antiretroviral drugs more readily

available at affordable prices, it must be remembered that those countries that have made

progress to date in reducing HIV infection rates

have relied on four principles to do so: strong

leadership from the president, the cabinet, and

other influential national leaders; a broadbased and sustained information and education

campaign; the availability of counseling and

testing centers where people can find out their

HIV status; and a willingness to talk openly

about, and change, fundamental cultural

traditions and habits that may unwittingly

foster HIV/AIDS. The United States can help

African leaders pursue these four principles by

the provision of more antiretrovirals and expanded financing for the global fund for AIDS,

tuberculosis, and malaria. But most importantly, America must remain a strong and

unrelenting partner to all those fighting

HIV/AIDS.

American Trade

The importance of Africa as a critical

economic partner is often denigrated; however, nothing could be further from the truth,

especially in the oil and gas sector. Africa

supplies just over 15 percent of U.S. fuel imports and the majority of its low sulfur

“sweet” crude. African production is expected

to rise dramatically over the next 10 years,

and African petroleum exports to the United

States will increase from 15 to 25 percent.

Output in Nigeria, the largest oil-producing country on the continent, is continuing to

expand, but production in other parts of West

Africa and the Gulf of Guinea are on the

threshold of enormous growth. Angola, for

example, is slated to increase its production

from 750,000 barrels a day to nearly 2 million

in the next 5 years, and Equatorial Guinea,

which produced no petroleum a few years ago,

will shortly become one of the most significant

producers in the region. Many experts argue

that Africa is the hottest oil region in the world

and that with the increasing turbulence in the

Middle East, African crude will become an even

more prized commodity.

While Africa is not one of the largest U.S.

trading partners, commerce with sub-Saharan

Africa is consistently greater than it is with

Russia and the other 14 states of the former

Soviet Union. For American companies that

manufacture products such as airplanes, diesel

locomotives, electric generators, computers,

and high-tech medical equipment, Africa has

been a larger export market than many in

Eastern Europe or some other parts of the

developing world. Approximately 100,000

American jobs are directly linked to exports to

Africa. If Africa continues to grow and prosper

economically, American exports to that continent are also likely to expand. It is important

to ensure that American companies and products are able to get into the market and have a

level playing field when they do.

To promote greater trade and investment

in Africa, U.S. institutions concerned with trade

and commercial finance should increase activities there. The Department of Commerce,

Export Import Bank, and Overseas Private

Investment Corporation must look for more

ways to encourage and support American

commerce through the expansion of trade

missions, commercial offices, and information

and support for American businesses. Despite

the dedicated work of a few individuals in each

of these agencies, none have developed coherent strategies or developed consistent programs

that remain in place from one administration

to the next. The United States should extend

and expand the legislative life of the African

Growth and Opportunity Act and create several

regional investment funds to encourage entrepreneurial activity. An aggressive business

partnership with Africa should go hand in

hand with a meaningful development assistance program.

Conflict

As demonstrated tragically in the Darfur

region of Sudan, political strife and civil conflict continue to plague a number of African

countries, setting back economic development

and causing enormous loss of life and destruction. While the sources of these conflicts are

most often local, the United States and other

members of the international community are

frequently drawn in to provide emergency

assistance, peacekeepers, or conflict mediation

when events spin out of control. Experience has

shown that when early and decisive action is

not taken to help resolve a dispute, the problem

can turn destructive, resulting in the loss of

hundreds and thousands of lives and the expenditure of millions of dollars.

No. 210, September 2004 Strategic Forum 5

Percentage of Population 

Living with HIV/AIDS

Botswana 33.8

Zimbabwe 33.7

Swaziland 33.4

Lesotho 31.0

Namibia 22.5

Zambia 21.5

South Africa 20.1

Malawi 15.0

Kenya 15.0

Mozambique 13.0

Central African Republic 12.9

Cameroon 11.8

Djibouti 11.7

Côte d‘Ivoire 9.7

Liberia 9.0

Source: Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), Report on

the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic (Geneva: UNAIDS, 2002).

The HIV/AIDS Epidemic
Rwanda is a case in point. On April 6,

1994, the President of Rwanda, an ethnic Hutu,

was killed when a missile shot down his plane

shortly before landing at Kigali airport. Government officials and military leaders immediately accused the rival Tutsi ethnic group of

perpetrating the crime. Over the next several

days, senior government officials and the

national radio station fanned the flames of

ethnic hatred, and within weeks, organized

armed gangs swept across Rwanda, killing

Tutsis and moderate Hutus by the thousands.

By mid-June, 800,000 Tutsis had been killed,

and thousands of others injured and displaced.

As Rwanda descended into anarchy, the

United States and the rest of the international

community watched—until the tragedy became

so great that the Cable News Network and British

Broadcasting Corporation made it impossible to

ignore any longer. In late July 1994, the United

States launched the largest humanitarian relief

operation ever undertaken in Central Africa. But

the damage had already been done.

An aggressive policy of conflict mitigation could have stopped the genocide in

Rwanda. When the president’s plane was shot

down, a UN peacekeeping force was in

Rwanda monitoring a fragile cease-fire between rebel Tutsi forces and government

troops. However, when the Canadian UN force

commander asked for reinforcements of several hundred men and approximately 15

armored personnel carriers, the UN Security

Council balked and delayed, largely because

of American maneuvering and reluctance. In

Washington, senior officials, operating in the

shadow of the flawed UN operation in Somalia

and the disintegration of the former

Yugoslavia, held numerous meetings to discuss the financial implications to the United

States of a new UN operation in Central Africa

and to argue, somewhat bizarrely, whether the

events occurring in Rwanda were actually

genocide. In New York, the United States and

other Security Council members delayed the

requests for equipment and reinforcements

while engaging in interminable debates about

“exit strategies” that would limit UN involvement and U.S. engagement.

By the time the United Nations agreed to

send American-made armored personnel carriers to Rwanda, nearly one million people, close

to a tenth of Rwanda’s population, had been

killed. Another two and a half million people

had become refugees in the eastern Congo and

western Tanzania. The genocide also sparked a

regional humanitarian and political crisis. The

movement into the eastern Congo of Rwanda’s

Hutu-dominated military, which had been

responsible for overseeing much of the bloodletting, created a chaotic situation throughout

the Congo and resulted in a massive civil war

involving the armies of over a half a dozen

neighboring or near neighboring states.

The genocide in Rwanda and its aftermath

should serve as a constant reminder of why

conflict mitigation should remain at the center

of the U.S. policy focus in Africa. American

leadership can often make a difference in saving

lives, mobilizing resources, and galvanizing

international support to deal with some of the

most intractable problems on the continent.

The Bush administration has led the effort

to find a peaceful resolution to the long-running conflict between Khartoum and southern

secessionists in the Sudan, backing up a strong

diplomatic campaign with critical financial

and political support. Unfortunately, the spread

of fighting and the emergence of ethnic cleansing have forced the eviction of tens of thousands of local villagers throughout the Darfur

region in western Sudan. The upsurge in violence in Darfur also threatens to imperil

progress along the North-South divide of Sudan

and raises the specter of escalating confrontation between the United States, Khartoum, and

the larger international community. Elsewhere,

the United States engaged tepidly and with

great reluctance in Liberia in 2003, helping to

shore up critical African support for that country and preventing the situation from spinning

totally out of control.

Those are not the only flash points on the

continent today where a trilateral U.S., African,

and UN partnership is required. In Central

Africa, armed conflicts continue to a varying

degree in Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Congo, and northern Uganda. In west

6 Strategic Forum No. 210, September 2004

Number of Percentage

Population Muslims Muslim 

Nigeria 137,253,133 66,940,852 50

Ethiopia 67,851,281 33,278,777 50

Democratic Republic of the Congo 58,317,930 5,662,504 10

South Africa 42,718,530 885,374 2

Sudan 39,148,162 26,679,912 70

Tanzania 36,588,225 12,572,859 35

Kenya 32,021,856 3,163,909 10

Uganda 26,404,543 4,101,247 16

Ghana 20,757,032 3,321,125 16

Mozambique 18,811,731 3,762,346 20

Mali 11,956,788 10,761,109 90

Senegal 10,852,147 10,201,018 94

Chad 9,538,544 4,719,281 51

Sierra Leone 5,883,889 3,439,609 60

Liberia 3,390,653 678,127 20

Sources: The World Factbook 2004 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2004), available online at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>; and

Foreign Affairs 83, no. 1 (January–February 2004), 80.

Islam in Africa

many experts argue that

Africa is the hottest oil

region in the world and

that African crude will

become an even more

prized commodity
Africa, Côte d’Ivoire has been torn apart by

ethnic clashes that remain unresolved. In

Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe has singlehandedly destroyed his country and brought

it to the edge of civil war. The United States

needs to follow through on its professed commitment to help prevent or mitigate regional

conflicts. The National Security Strategy of

the United States of America (September

2002) commits the Nation to working with

European allies, capable countries in Africa,

and regional organizations to address instability and transnational threats. In most of these

situations, however, Washington has remained

largely on the sidelines—watching rather than

employing its diplomatic muscle or working

aggressively in concert with others to mitigate

these disputes. If the United States chooses to

remain on the periphery of these conflicts, the

prospects for future Rwandas, Liberias, and

Sierra Leones are high. New American initiatives and aggressive support for the creation of

the African Union’s standby force and the

establishment of robust (and mobile) subregional peacekeeping units would enhance

African stability and help deter serious conflict.

Integration

Many African states are too small or

geographically disadvantaged to be economically viable. But by establishing broader regional linkages, many of them can reduce

artificial trade barriers, expand financial and

commercial markets, and improve economic

prospects. They also can foster stronger political links and reduce cross-border frictions with

neighbors. This type of integration has been

effective in Eastern and Central Europe in

paving the way for the expansion of the European Union and in linking countries more

closely economically and politically.

The United States is strong politically,

economically, and militarily because 50 states of

various sizes and wealth have been molded into

a single unit. Europe has learned that lesson

and is now fashioning a new, stronger, and more

peaceful continent with over 25 states. At the

root of regional integration is the belief that if

nations communicate regularly in an established forum, they will settle their differences

peacefully and will also look for mutually beneficial ways to improve their countries and the

lives of citizens. The value of regional integration is a useful lesson for Africa to learn and a

good one for the United States to promote.

A number of regional organizations exist

in Africa, such as the Southern African Development Community, the Economic Community of West African States, the Economic Community of East and Southern Africa, and the

East African Community. The United States

needs to nurture and encourage these and

other regional institutions throughout Africa to

help them achieve the economic, social, and

political advantages that have been achieved in

the European community, Canada, and the

United States.

To promote and protect long-term U.S.

interests in Africa and to help encourage a

stronger and more vibrant partnership with

Africa as a whole, Washington must put in

place effective strategies that simultaneously

advance its interests and those of Africa. Equally

important, the mistakes of the past must not be

repeated. No matter how critical the war on

terrorism is, that issue cannot become a litmus

test for the U.S. relationship with key African

states. Nor should leaders who support the

United States in this war be allowed to use that

support to blackmail Washington into overlooking egregious violations of civil liberties, major

shortfalls in good governance, or serious bouts

of corruption. In the war on terrorism, as in the

war on poverty, it is in U.S. interests to encourage and support African states that are moving

toward greater democracy, the rule of law, and

economic growth and openness. Development

assistance programs and funding must be

expanded significantly throughout Africa,

embracing new programmatic models and

partnerships such as foundations and publicprivate partnerships. Support for sound political

principles, robust economic assistance, and

more open markets can help generate political

stability, economic growth and reform, and

better partners in combating transnational

threats, including terrorism. These goals can be

achieved only by establishing a consistent and

comprehensive policy based on both sound

principles and a strong partnership. The seven

pillars presented above do that—for Africans as

well as Americans. 

Notes1

The White House reports that George W. Bush has actually

met with more African leaders than President Clinton over a

comparable period of time. 2

The Daily Nation (Nairobi, Kenya), November 30, 2003.

No. 210, September 2004 Strategic Forum 7

it is in U.S. interests to

encourage and support

African states that are

moving toward greater

democracy

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the

Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can

be accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy

research and strategic gaming organization within the National

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, its

components, and interagency partners. The institute provides

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming

events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of

international security affairs and defense studies. Through an

active outreach program, including conferences and publications,

INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic

challenges and policy options.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Stephen J. Flanagan

James A. Schear Director Robert A. Silano

Director of Research Director of Publications
8 Strategic Forum No. 210, September 2004

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Strategic Forum series

For on-line access to, go to: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/h6.html

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