Collision Avoidance: U.S.-Russian

Bilateral Relations and Former

Soviet States

by Eugene B. Rumer

Strategic Forum

R

elations between the United States and

Russia are entering a delicate phase.

American involvement on the Russian

periphery is reaching unprecedented proportions even as a consensus has emerged in

Russia that these areas constitute its exclusive sphere of influence.

U.S. efforts in the former Soviet states

are simply an extension of the global war on

terrorism and are intended to provide security and stability to countries still struggling

with independence.

But to many Russians, the U.S. military

presence in Central Asia and security assistance to many former Soviet states seem to

be deliberate attempts at encirclement. This

perception creates an atmosphere ripe for

miscalculation and even confrontation.

To avoid a collision, Washington and

Moscow should initiate a dialogue on their

respective activities in former Soviet lands to

develop tacit rules in pursuing their interests.

This effort should eschew any inclination to

divide former Soviet lands into spheres of

influence. Rather, both governments should

give each other ample warning of their activities and seek solutions to their differences.

Russian support for or noninterference

with American endeavors in former Soviet

states would enhance their chances for success. But Moscow can also undermine these

efforts, a turn of events that could seriously

damage bilateral relations. 

The year 2003 was a difficult one in U.S.-

Russian relations, and 2004 promises to be

even more challenging. Disagreements between

Washington and Moscow over Iraq were the

most visible in a series of events that also

included American concerns about Chechnya,

the authoritarian tilt in Russian domestic

politics, Russia’s fading media freedom, selective prosecution of independent-minded businessmen, and meddling in the internal affairs

of its neighbors. Together, these events add up

to a trend that spells trouble for the ambitious

U.S.-Russian strategic framework inaugurated

by President George W. Bush and President

Vladimir Putin in 2002. Yet rarely if ever has

the need for greater cooperation between the

two countries been more urgent than it will be

in 2004 and the years to come.

The need for cooperation is dictated by

two converging trends. The first is the unprecedented American involvement in countries and

regions on the Russian periphery, which many

Russians have come to view as their country’s

sphere of influence. The second is the emergence of a powerful consensus among Russian

politicians of all parties about the need to

consolidate Russia’s neighborhood into its

exclusive sphere of influence. Each of these

trends is a pillar of the two countries’ respective

national security strategies. Unless the United

States and Russia make a deliberate and determined effort to work with each other, collision

appears unavoidable. Cooperation is the only

option, for an all-out competition for influence

in the former Soviet lands between the two

nations would hurt the interests of both and—

most importantly—undermine the fragile

gains the region has made since independence.

Compete or Cooperate?

Geographically, the agenda of U.S.-Russian relations is limited largely to the Russian

periphery. Moscow’s current reach rarely exceeds its borderlands—an area of growing U.S.

military presence and concern. American

presence has been expanding throughout these

lands since the day the Soviet Union collapsed,

and U.S. recognition of former Soviet lands as

sovereign independent states nearly 12 years

ago set in motion a series of policies that are

still in effect.

From the time of the Soviet breakup and

all through the 1990s, American engagement

focused on immediate U.S. concerns, such as

securing the Soviet nuclear legacy, and on

helping new states consolidate their independence and sovereignty by linking humanitarian

relief assistance with economic and political

reform. As former Soviet states cleared the first

hurdles of independence, the United States

added a new dimension to its ties with them

through security. This has meant first and

foremost integration into the transatlantic

security framework through participation

since the early 1990s in regular security dialogues with countries in the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as practical military and political-military cooperation

in the context of the NATO Partnership for

Peace program.

Yet despite their apparent consistency and

complementarity, American efforts in former

Soviet lands have been marked by one major

internal contradiction: the duality of the U.S.

relationship with Russia. On the one hand,

American policies on the Russian periphery

No. 207

April 2004

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points

No. 207, April 2004 Strategic Forum 1
were not intended to encircle the country or

undermine security. To the contrary, these

efforts were aimed to include Russia in cooperative activities that the United States undertook

bilaterally and multilaterally with its neighbors.

On the other hand, Russia has never abandoned its great power aspirations in these lands.

Soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union,

Moscow sought explicit recognition of its special

status in former Soviet states from the international community. No other major power—not

China, Iran, or Turkey, and certainly not any

European country—has laid claim to the

strategic independence and sovereignty of former Soviet states to the same degree that Russia

has; its ties to those states were obviously much

stronger than those of China or Turkey. But as a

result, U.S. support for independence and sovereignty of these states became U.S. support for

their independence from Russia. U.S. policy

toward the former Soviet Union—including

Russia—had to reconcile the need for a cooperative U.S.-Russian relationship with growing

American ties to Russia’s neighbors, seeking U.S.

support for their independence from Russia.

The result was ambiguity in U.S.-Russian

relations, in American policy toward former

Soviet states, and in Russia’s role as a partner

in or an obstacle to American efforts to provide

for the security and stability of the states. The

United States was pursuing its policies not quite

against Russia, but certainly not with Russia’s

support and endorsement.

All the while, Russia’s bark often 

exceeded its bite. Its great power ambitions 

did not match its vastly diminished capabilities to act on those ambitions. By virtue of its

size, historical and economic ties, and geographic position, it retained considerable

influence in the lands surrounding it. But it

had neither the finances, nor the military

might, nor the political will and strategic

vision to take on the task of security manager

in former Soviet states, many of which were

threatened by widespread poverty, underdevelopment, and the specter of state failure.

Throughout the 1990s, the United States

was reluctant and Russia was unable to assume

the full burden of being the security manager in

the region that ranges from Southeast Europe to

Central Asia. The prospect of stepped-up U.S.

involvement in the security affairs of former

Soviet states always risked antagonizing Russia,

which kept a jealous eye on what the sole

remaining superpower was up to in its strategic

backyard. In the absence of a compelling reason

to pursue a more vigorous security policy

around Russia’s periphery, the United States took

Russian sensitivities into account.

New Agenda and Hopes

All of this changed on September 11,

2001. Ambiguity was no longer an option for

the United States, which was handed compelling reasons for a significantly heightened

security presence in Russia’s soft underbelly—

from Eastern Europe to Central Asia. The

requirements of the U.S. military campaign in

Afghanistan called for continuous access to and

presence in Central Asia. The requirements of

the war on terrorism more broadly called for

increased U.S. involvement in the former Soviet

lands, which could not manage their own

security and whose security could no longer be

overlooked or left for others (including Russia)

to manage. This meant an unprecedented

expansion of U.S. and U.S.-led security assistance efforts in the former Soviet Union from

Ukraine to Uzbekistan.

In essence, U.S. efforts in former Soviet

states were the same as before September 11:

support for their declared aspirations to establish themselves as sovereign, independent states.

After September 11, terrorism, state failure, and

Islamic militancy—not Russian encroachment—emerged as the main challenges to

their goals, as well as key threats to their and

others’ security. Defeating these threats became

a far more important concern for the United

States than countering Russian influence or

catering to Russian sensitivities. In response to

the new challenge, the United States expanded

its presence in the former Soviet lands not as a

counterweight to, but regardless of, Russia.

The war on terrorism remains an openended proposition. U.S. military presence and

security assistance programs in former Soviet

states are proceeding accordingly. Furthermore,

U.S. plans—as yet unpublished—for a new

and fundamentally revamped global military

presence have generated widespread expectations

in former Soviet states, including Russia, of new

U.S. military deployments in the Caucasus, as

well as elsewhere on the periphery of Russia.

In the aftermath of September 11, Russian acquiescence to U.S. military deployments

in Central Asia, security assistance to Georgia,

and a stepped-up security relationship with

Ukraine made it easier for the United States to

pursue all these undertakings. But President

Vladimir Putin’s endorsement of American

actions overshadowed the fact that the Russian

political establishment has not come to terms

with the notion of long-term U.S. and NATO

military presence in countries and regions

long considered by Moscow to be its exclusive

sphere of influence.

The difference between President Putin’s

position and that of the Russian political elite

became obvious immediately after the September 11 attacks, when virtually all of Putin’s

advisers rejected the idea of Russian support for

or endorsement of U.S. military presence in the

former Soviet lands. Subsequently, Putin overruled his advisers and reacted calmly to the

heightened U.S. security assistance program to

Georgia and personally set the positive tone for

NATO–Russian relations, thereby acquiescing

to the NATO invitation to the three Baltic states

to join the alliance.

Same Wine, New Bottle

However, recent trends in Russian domestic

politics lead to serious doubts about Putin’s

willingness to buck the conventional wisdom of

Moscow pundits, his advisers’ prescriptions, and

the opinion of the country’s political elite at

large. These trends have manifested themselves

most clearly in the parliamentary election in

December 2003.

The most significant news from the election to the Duma was the Russian people’s

support for the nationalist revanchist agenda.

Vladimir Zhirinovskiy’s Liberal Democratic Party

doubled its share of the vote to 12 percent. Given

Zhirinovskiy’s eccentric personality, his victory

could be dismissed as a quirk. But the showing,

far better than expected, of the other political

party with a serious revanchist agenda—the

2 Strategic Forum No. 207, April 2004

Eugene B. Rumer is senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense

University. Please address questions or comments to his attention at ndu-inss-research@ndu.edu.

U.S. involvement in the

security affairs of former

Soviet states always

risked antagonizing

Russia
Motherland movement—suggests that this is an

important political trend.

In terms of Russian domestic policy, the

revanchist idea can be summarized as restoration of state control over key sectors of the economy, state supervision over them, and expansion

of the redistributive functions of the state. In

terms of foreign policy, revanchism means first

and foremost restoration of Russian influence in

former Soviet lands and establishment of an

exclusive Russian sphere of interests in the

territories of the former Soviet Union.

Unlike Zhirinovskiy’s Liberal Democrats

with their leader’s propensity for theatrics, the

Motherland movement has the credibility that

gives the revanchist idea in Russian politics an

undeniable patina of respectability. Its roster of

Duma deputies boasts solid experience in the

upper echelons of government and advanced

academic degrees. With Motherland’s impressive showing in the December 2003 Duma

election, Russian voters—lamenting the loss of

the old superpower and yearning for its return,

but repulsed by Zhirinovskiy’s clown-like qualities—have finally been presented with the

decent, respectable alternative: revanchism

with a human face.

Neoimperialist Consensus

Long before 2008, the revanchist trend in

domestic politics will pose problems for U.S.

policy in former Soviet states and bilateral

relations. The idea of an exclusive Russian

sphere of interest throughout the territories of

the former Soviet Union enjoys support across

the entire political spectrum.

The very term neoimperialist is laden with

negative connotations and may elicit puzzlement from a Russian reader who has been

watching a steady progression of U.S. economic,

political, and military power and influence pass

by Russia’s doors, deep into the heartland of

Eurasia where no outside power, save Russia

itself, had been allowed to set foot for well over

a century. This advance has occurred against

the backdrop of equally steady Russian retreat

from regions and countries in Europe and Asia

where for centuries Russian presence had been

an essential element of political, economic, and

military life. Thus, many Russians will most

likely bridle at the term neoimperialist and

wonder who is the real imperial power and who

is calling the kettle black.

Nonetheless, the fact remains that a growing number of Russian political figures hope to

expand and consolidate influence over domestic

and foreign policies of the many countries that

once were part of the Russian empire—the

same places where United States is currently

building a network of political, military, and

economic relationships. Thus, regardless of how

one feels about Russian ambitions to rebuild

the old empire, the term neoimperialist accurately describes the mindset of the Russian

foreign policy establishment.

The most striking and unmistakable sign

of this phenomenon came from Anatoliy

Chubays, the prominent Russian reformer and

a leader of the Union of Right Forces, who

recently argued for the (re)establishment of the

Russian empire in the former Soviet lands. In

the midst of the Duma election campaign in

October 2003, Chubays defined Russia’s mission in the 21st century as the creation of a

liberal empire in the territories of the former

Soviet Union. That, he argued, would be the

answer to the crisis of vision and ideology that

Russia has been unable to resolve. This vision

of a Russian liberal empire, according to

Chubays, would help mobilize the Russian

people and consolidate the nation.

Chubays’ version of a liberal empire is

designed to propagate virtue throughout the

neighboring states and instill liberal values in

their inhabitants, including support for democratic values and institutions. But Chubays’

liberal imperialism is also intended to promote

Russian business, protect its interests, spread

Russian culture, and protect the rights of

Russophone populations in the neighboring

countries. Remarkably, in its essence, the

liberal brand of imperialism articulated by the

leader of Russian liberals is no different from

the more explicit, muscular, and illiberal brand

of neoimperialism embraced by Russian

nationalist politicians of the Motherland wing.

What is a powerful message for Motherland

presents a quandary for Putin, who undoubtedly

has noticed the Motherland’s appeal to Russian

voters. Challenging the revanchists on their

message is not an attractive proposition, given

the apparent popularity of the message with the

voters. Nor is ignoring the message a good

option, because the Kremlin probably is loath to

let Motherland monopolize and exploit an

important and politically attractive theme. But

embracing or usurping Motherland’s message

could subject Putin to international criticism

and tarnish his reputation as a world leader.

Colliding Trajectories

The neoimperialist renaissance in Russian

politics comes at a vital moment in U.S. relations with Moscow’s neighbors. At the NATO

Istanbul Summit in June, the three Baltic states

once occupied by Russia—Estonia, Latvia, and

Lithuania—will be present as full members of

the Alliance. Meeting in Istanbul, the Allies will

no doubt reaffirm their endorsement of

Ukraine’s aspirations for full NATO membership and reiterate the NATO “Open Door”

policy. The Allies are also most likely to use the

Istanbul Summit as an opportunity to address

the desires of Georgia and Azerbaijan to join

the Alliance. U.S. plans for global realignment

of its military deployments hold out the strong

probability of American military presence

moving closer to Russia’s western borders. And,

last but not least, American military deployments in Central Asia and U.S. security assistance to the countries of Central Asia and

South Caucasus show no signs of abating.

Indeed, looking beyond the Istanbul Summit, American and NATO military and security

activities in the former Soviet lands are likely to

intensify. This is a product of several factors:

■ the desire of Russia’s neighbors for integration in the Euro-Atlantic security structures

■ the inability of Russia and other regional

powers to fill the security vacuum in the former

Soviet lands

■ the U.S. interest in anchoring the ex-Soviet

lands in the Euro-Atlantic security structures to

promote independence and sovereignty and to

combat a variety of pre- and post-9/11 threats, such

as terrorism, smuggling, proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction, and transnational crime.

All three of these are long-term trends.

Russia’s former colonies have sought a place

under the U.S. and NATO security umbrella

since the Soviet breakup. They have done so to

protect themselves against Moscow’s propensity

to assert itself at the expense of its neighbors, to

help fill the security vacuum in the region after

No. 207, April 2004 Strategic Forum 3

a growing number of

Russian political figures

hope to expand and

consolidate influence

over domestic and

foreign policies
4 Strategic Forum No. 207, April 2004

Russia pulled out, and to define their own place

in the international system. They are unlikely to

alter this course in the foreseeable future.

All the while—for well over a decade—

Russia has not been able to reestablish itself as

the security manager in former Soviet lands. Its

own meager means, lack of power projection

capabilities, and dearth of economic and military staying power have effectively kept in check

its ability to act on its neoimperialist leanings

or to serve as the pillar of stability and security

in the region. Despite Russia’s rebound from its

internal troubles in recent years, its military is

still struggling, while its economy has yet to

generate sufficient income to address the most

pressing domestic social needs. This situation is

unlikely to change in the near term.

Against this background, the U.S. policy of

extending the Euro-Atlantic security framework

into the former Soviet lands is highly unlikely

to change either. Support for the independence

and sovereignty of the ex-Soviet states is a staple

of the American post-Cold War vision for

Europe and Eurasia. The war on terror and its

attendant ills is the cornerstone of U.S. national

security policy. Neither of these two appears

even remotely likely to change in the foreseeable future. The extension of the Euro-Atlantic

security framework into the former Soviet states

meets both the U.S. commitment to them and

the requirements of the global war on terror.

Thus, U.S. and Russian policies and

interests are on a collision course. This need

not derail the entire relationship, but the situation does call for a reassessment.

A (Non)Partnership

The idea of U.S.-Russian cooperation in

securing and stabilizing the former Soviet lands

has been embraced by several U.S. administrations since 1991, albeit with limited success. In

the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, hopes for more productive U.S.-Russian

cooperation were spurred by Putin’s endorsement of U.S. military deployments to Central

Asia, U.S. security assistance to Georgia, Russian cooperation with the United States in combating terrorism, renewed Russia–NATO cooperation, and the Kremlin’s silence about Ukraine’s

decision to seek membership in NATO. From an

American perspective, U.S.-Russian cooperation

in the war on terror held out the possibility of a

collaborative relationship to shore up the security and stability of the vast region around

Russia’s periphery and root out and defeat

terrorism there.

These hopes and prospects have not

materialized. U.S.-Russian cooperation may

proceed in the context of the global war on

terrorism, including in former Soviet states,

but U.S. and Russian visions for that part of

the world are very different. The prevailing

U.S. view is that the interests, security, and

stability of these countries would be best served

by their achieving full independence and

sovereignty and integration in the EuroAtlantic security structures. The prevailing

Russian view is that Russia has a certain droit

de regard, an inalienable right of oversight

throughout its former colonies, which in effect

provides Moscow with an exclusive sphere of

influence throughout its neighborhood.

This stance clearly contradicts the prevailing American view of the situation not only

because it runs counter to the strong U.S.

commitment to former Soviet states, but also

because Russia is seen as lacking the requisite

means, vision, and capabilities to manage

such a sphere of influence. Thus, the task for

the United States and Russia is not to forge a

broad partnership in the former Soviet states

but to minimize and manage their differences,

as well as to keep their disagreements from

disrupting those efforts where cooperation is

necessary and ongoing.

New Rules of the Road

The situation calls neither for another

partnership nor an appeal to resuscitate the old

one, but rather for reaching an understanding

of each other’s interests and priorities and for

developing the rules of the game that will keep

U.S. and Russian policies in former Soviet

lands from colliding.

Such an understanding about the rules of

the game is necessary because the alternative—

increasing tensions between the United States

and Russia, perhaps leading to a collision over

the two countries’ pursuits in former Soviet

lands—is in neither of their interests. Russia,

despite its limited means and capabilities, wields

considerable influence around its periphery for

reasons of history, geography, culture, and

politics. It controls the critical transportation

routes in and out of landlocked Central Asia; it is

an export market for the economies of Central

Asia, the Caucasus, and Ukraine; it is the key

destination for millions of migrants in search of

work from these countries, as well as the source

of vital remittances from migrant workers to

their families. The Russian military may still be

reeling from the impact of economic and political reforms of the 1990s and the social, economic, and geographic dislocations of that era,

but it remains the most potent armed force in

the region with substantial presence on the

territory of the former Soviet Union. All these

give Russia considerable capacity for mischief in

its former colonies. While Russia does not have

the means to bring stability and security to states

of the former Soviet Union, its support for, or at

the very least acquiescence to, the efforts of

others to do so is the necessary precondition for

success in such a difficult undertaking.

At the same time, Russia is hardly in a

good position to escalate tensions with the

United States over its involvement in former

Soviet states. Despite widespread irritation at

the American presence in Central Asia, as well

as its assistance to Georgia, involvement in

Ukraine, and criticism of Russian policies in

Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, few in Russia

would advocate a course of overt confrontation

with the United States over any of these issues.

U.S. presence and policies in former Soviet

states may be an irritant for many Russian

politicians, but Russian foreign policy and

national security analysts also understand that

the United States helps fill the vacuum in a

region where Russia has failed to do so for well

over a decade. If the United States were to

curtail its presence and activities on the periphery of Russia, Russian security would suffer.

For President Putin, an obvious escalation

of tensions with the United States over Georgia,

Moldova, or some other former Soviet state is

not desirable. He has staked much of his reputation on the idea of a U.S.-Russian partnership and a positive personal relationship with

President Bush. He has done so against the

apparent advice of many in the Russian foreign

policy establishment. A major setback in U.S.-

Russian relations would most likely be seen in

Russia as President Putin’s personal failure.

Russia wields considerable influence around its

periphery for reasons of

history, geography,

culture, and politics
Moreover, a return to U.S.-Russian tensions would fuel the fire being stoked by the

newly resurgent revanchist wing in Russian

politics. The Kremlin sponsored the Motherland

movement as an antidote to the Communists in

the 2003 Duma elections, but its emergence as

an independent political force presents Moscow

with a difficult challenge: what to do with its

own unruly creation. So far, the Kremlin

appears wary of the Motherland, having concentrated the decisionmaking power in the

hands of the obedient pro-Kremlin United

Russia. The upcoming presidential campaign,

with the election scheduled for March, will offer

President Putin an opportunity to promote his

own moderate message and marginalize the

revanchists. Hopefully, the Russian president

and his political advisers will not want to make

themselves hostages to the presidential ambitions of the Motherland movement leaders.

Dialogue and consultations appear the

only feasible course for Russia and the United

States to pursue as they move toward a new and

unprecedented relationship focused on the

territory of the former Soviet Union. This dialogue and—ideally—shared understanding

about the rules of the road need not, and should

not, be interpreted as an attempt by Russia and

the United States to carve the former Soviet

lands into spheres of influence. Rather it should

be a process, a forum for consultations about

each other’s concerns, interests, and activities.

In engaging in this dialogue with Russia,

the United States can afford to be candid and

transparent about its interests, underlying

principles, and policies. To do otherwise would

only lead to miscommunications and misperceptions—of which there is no shortage in any

event—and complicate what is bound to be a

sensitive process.

Avoiding Red Lines 

The basic enduring principles of U.S.

involvement in former Soviet states can be

summarized as follows:

■ The objectives should be stability, security,

and continuity in the progress toward full independence, sovereignty, and integration in the international community.

■ Cooperation with third parties in pursuit of

aforementioned objectives is desirable but should

not impinge on independence and sovereignty.

■ No other nation should have oversight over

its neighbors.

At the same time, the United States needs

to recognize that Russia also has legitimate

concerns and interests around its periphery—

traditionally beginning with the fate of fellow

ethnic Russians dispersed throughout the former Soviet lands. But increasingly, Russian

businesses are looking to expand into the

neighboring countries, as has been the case in

Georgia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Russian

business ventures have elicited concerns about

strategic penetration of the neighboring states,

especially where commercial transactions were

conducted in a nontransparent manner and

focused on major industrial or infrastructure

projects. Such concerns may be well founded,

but the primary responsibility for these deals

rests with the host countries themselves. Unless

there is evidence that Russia is exercising undue pressure in or on the host country, criticism

of Russia is misdirected in such circumstances,

especially when there were no competing bids

from an American or other company.

Furthermore, the United States needs to

recognize that Russia has legitimate security

interests in the states surrounding it. For example, Russia does have a real concern about the

security and stability of Georgia. As is often the

case, U.S. and Russian prescriptions for how to

achieve those are likely to differ, but dialogue

and consultations are the only way to close the

gap between U.S. and Russian perceptions.

Russia will have to come to terms with

American interest in and commitment to

Georgian independence and, ultimately, territorial integrity and sovereignty. The United

States will have to be creative about dealing

with the extremely sensitive issue of the continuing Russian military presence in Georgia

and strong Russian resistance to U.S. and

other international pressures to withdraw its

troops, a move that would be highly unpopular in Russia itself.

Creativity, persistence, and reliance on a

variety of tools available to U.S. diplomacy will

be essential for the United States and Russia to

address such thorny problems as Russian military presence in Georgia and Moldova, where

pressure and confrontation are likely to only

aggravate the situation. The task of negotiating—again—Russian withdrawals from Georgia and Moldova warrants a close look at the

experience of negotiating and implementing

Russian military withdrawal from the Baltic

states. Although most likely to be anathema to

the Russians for fear of Georgia and others

following the Baltic footsteps to NATO, that

experience may offer a number of useful lessons.

One possibility is to offer Russia financial

assistance for redeploying its troops from Georgia to bases in Russia. Another option to explore

is to seek to internationalize Russian military

presence and bases in Georgia and Moldova

under the aegis of the NATO program of Partnership for Peace (PFP). By reflagging Russian

bases as PFP training facilities, Russia would

legitimize its military presence in the eyes of the

international community; the United States and

other Allies and partners would gain access to

Russian facilities; a degree of international

oversight over Russian presence and activities in

Georgia and Moldova would be established; and

Georgia and Moldova would gain assurances

that the Russian military presence on its

territory would not serve as a tool of occupation

and subversion. In the end, such a scheme

No. 207, April 2004 Strategic Forum 5

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the United States needs

to recognize that Russia

also has legitimate

concerns and interests

around its periphery
Other recent Strategic Forums from the author

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Central Asian Leadership Succession: When, Not If

Eugene B. Rumer

(No. 203, December 2003)

In the next 10 years, leadership succession will emerge as the most important political issue in Central Asia. With the exception of Tajikistan, where a protracted and bloody

civil war in the 1990s followed the death of its first post-Soviet president, Central Asia

has been ruled by Soviet-era leaders. They have proven to be neither competent reformers nor popular politicians. They are likely to be remembered for their firm hold on

power, but that hold has yet to translate into a long-term legacy of stability. The challenge for the next generation of Central Asian leaders—of assuring stability and security

through systemic change—promises to be greater than it is today.

Flashman’s Revenge: Central Asia after September 11

Eugene B. Rumer

(No. 195, December 2002)

Central Asia will have to contend with poor governance, widespread corruption, and

authoritarian regimes, with all the ensuing consequences for U.S. efforts to promote

economic and political modernization. Balancing short-term stability against considerations of long-term political and economic reform will further complicate these efforts.

The roles of partner, security manager, and advocate of reform are not easily reconciled

in Central Asia. Still, the events of September 11 have left the United States with no

alternative but to address these issues.

could lead to genuine multilateral cooperation

on critical security issues—cooperation borne

out of necessity.

In the long run, the NATO umbrella and

the auspices of PFP and the NATO–Russia

Council hold out the possibility of useful and

constructive dialogue about future problems

that might arise as the United States and Russia

pursue their interests and activities in former

Soviet states. This possibility underscores the

enduring value of the NATO–Russia Council

and PFP, especially if the post-9/11 spirit of

cooperation goes out of the relationship

between Russia and the United States.

The course of action outlined here is

based on no illusion about U.S.-Russian partnership. Rather, it rests on an assessment of

U.S. and Russian interests, means available to

both sides for achieving them, and areas where

such interests may overlap. The United States

and Russia cannot afford to find themselves on

the path of collision, while collusion remains

out of the question. The answer then is patience; consultations and transparency about

interests, motives, and policies; clarity about

the “red lines”; and compromise where core

interests are not at stake.

6 Strategic Forum No. 207, April 2004