29 June 2010

Command and Control for Joint

Land Operations

Joint Publication 3-31
PREFACE

i 

1. Scope

This publication provides doctrine for the command and control of joint land 

operations by a joint force land component commander (JFLCC). It addresses

considerations for forming and establishing a functional land force component with a 

designated JFLCC and for planning, execution, and assessment of joint force land 

operations across the range of military operations. 

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed 

Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency 

coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military 

guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force 

commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It 

provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is 

not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and 

executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the 

accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders 

of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate 

components of these commands, and the Services. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances 

dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the 

contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, 

normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has 

provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of 

a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational 
Preface 

ii JP 3-31 

doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not 

ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational 

command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, 

regulations, and doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

LLOYD J. AUSTIN III

Lieutenant General, USA 

Director, Joint Staff
SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-31 

DATED 23 MARCH 2004 

iii 

 Expands discussion on forming a functional land component and designation 

of the joint force land component commander 

 Reorganizes publication for better continuity by combining Chapters II and 

III into Chapter II, “The Joint Force Land Component Command;” and 

separating the “Planning and Operations” chapter into “Planning and 

Assessment” and “Operations” chapters 

 Adds discussions in the “Command and Control” section on joint security 

area responsibilities, functional command relationships, cross-functional 

staff organization, and interagency coordination 

 Expands planning discourse with new paragraphs on strategic planning 

considerations; support to joint campaign design, planning, and phasing; 

and, conventional/special operations force integration 

 Adds new sections on the assessment process 

 Within the “Operations” chapter, adds information on five forms of 

operations: offensive, defensive, stability, civil support, and types of joint 

military operations 

 Arranges operations under the joint functions of command and control, 

intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment 

 Provides the joint land operations perspective on information operations and 

strategic communication 

 Adds annex on theater-level component planning considerations 

 Modifies the definitions of Army corps, standard operating procedure, and 

land control operations 

 Creates new terms and definitions for Army support area, brigade combat 

team, joint land operations, joint land operations plan, mission command, 

sensitive site, and site exploitation 

 Removes the terms and definitions for armored personnel carrier, Army 

service area, contain, counteroffensive, field army, general staff, mobile 

defense, and sensitive site exploitation 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-31 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

v 

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. ix

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

• Background .................................................................................................................. I-1 

• Joint Land Operations .................................................................................................. I-3 

• Organizing the Joint Land Force .................................................................................. I-5 

• Forming Considerations ............................................................................................... I-8 

CHAPTER II

THE JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMAND

SECTION A. ESTABLISHING THE JOINT FORCE 

LAND COMPONENT COMMAND

• Designated Authorities ................................................................................................II-1 

• Roles and Responsibilities...........................................................................................II-2 

• Designating an Area of Operations .............................................................................II-4 

• Organizing ...................................................................................................................II-5 

• Forming the Staff and Command Element ..................................................................II-8 

• Liaison Requirements ................................................................................................II-13 

SECTION B. COMMAND AND CONTROL 

• Functional Component Command Authority ............................................................II-14 

• Joint Security Area Responsibilities..........................................................................II-15 

• Command Relationships............................................................................................II-15 

• Functional Command Relationships .........................................................................II-19 

• Cross-Functional Staff Organizations .......................................................................II-19 

• Interagency Coordination ..........................................................................................II-23 

• Multinational Operations ...........................................................................................II-25 

• Communication Support Systems .............................................................................II-26 

CHAPTER III

PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT

SECTION A. PLANNING

• Strategic Planning Considerations............................................................................ .III-1 

• Range of Military Operations .................................................................................... III-2 

• Support to Joint Campaign Design, Planning, and Phasing ...................................... III-5 

• Operational Planning Considerations ...................................................................... III-12 

• Joint Land Operations Plan .................................................................................... .III-12 

• Operational Environment ........................................................................................ III-13 

• Conventional/Special Operations Force Integration .............................................. .III-15 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 3-31 

SECTION B. ASSESSMENT

• General .................................................................................................................... III-16 

• Levels of Operations and Assessment ..................................................................... III-18 

CHAPTER IV

 OPERATIONS

SECTION A. FORMS OF OPERATIONS

• General ...................................................................................................................... IV-1 

• Offensive Operations ................................................................................................. IV-1 

• Defensive Operations ................................................................................................ IV-2 

• Stability Operations ................................................................................................... IV-3 

• Civil Support Operations ........................................................................................... IV-7 

• Types of Joint Military Operations ........................................................................... IV-8 

SECTION B. JOINT FUNCTIONS

• General ...................................................................................................................... IV-8 

• Command and Control ............................................................................................ IV-10 

• Intelligence .............................................................................................................. IV-14 

• Fires ........................................................................................................................ IV-15 

• Movement and Maneuver ........................................................................................ IV-21 

• Protection................................................................................................................. IV-23 

• Sustainment ............................................................................................................. IV-26 

SECTION C. OTHER OPERATIONS AND CAPABILITIES

• Information Operations ........................................................................................... IV-29 

• Strategic Communication ........................................................................................ IV-31 

APPENDIX

 A Notional Headquarters Organization ..................................................................... A-1 

 B Theater-Level Component Planning Considerations ..............................................B-1 

 C Joint Land Operation Plan and Order Development. ..............................................C-1 

 D References .............................................................................................................. D-1 

 E Administrative Instructions..................................................................................... E-1 

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ....................................................................... GL-1 

Part II Terms and Definitions .................................................................................. GL-6 

FIGURE

 I-1 Areas of Responsibility with Multiple Joint Force 

 Land Component Commanders........................................................................ I-9 

II-1 Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas ........................................II-6 
Table of Contents 

vii 

II-2 Possible Components in a Joint Force ............................................................II-7 

II-3 Composition of a Notional Joint Force Land Component Command...........II-10 

II-4 Joint Cross-Functional Staff Organizations ..................................................II-20 

II-5 Joint Force Land Component Commander Interface with Other 

 Joint Force Command and Control Mechanisms ..........................................II-22 

III-1 Range of Military Operations ....................................................................... III-2 

III-2 Joint Force Land Component Commander Joint Planning 

 Group Representation.................................................................................... III-8 

III-3 Plans-Operations Relationship .................................................................... III-10 

III-4 Phasing Model ............................................................................................. III-11 

III-5 Visualizing the Operational Environment ................................................... III-14 

IV-1 Types of Military Operations ........................................................................ IV-8 

IV-2 Joint Functions .............................................................................................. IV-9 

 A-1 Notional Joint Force Land Component Organization .................................... A-2 

 A-2 Notional Joint Force Land Component Manpower and Personnel 

 Staff Section ................................................................................................... A-3 

 A-3 Notional Joint Force Land Component Intelligence Staff Section ................ A-4 

 A-4 Notional Joint Force Land Component Operations Staff Section .................. A-7 

 A-5 Notional Joint Force Land Component Logistics Staff Section .................... A-9 

 A-6 Notional Joint Force Land Component Plans Staff Section ........................ A-11 

 A-7 Notional Joint Force Land Component Communications 

 System Staff Section .................................................................................... A-12 

 A-8 Notional Joint Force Land Component Engineering Staff Section .............. A-15 

 A-9 Notional Joint Force Land Component Commander Force Structure

 and Resource Management Staff Section .................................................... A-17 

 A-10 Notional Joint Force Land Component Commander Civil- 

 Military Operations Staff Section ................................................................ A-18 

 A-11 Notional Joint Force Land Component Special and Personal 

 Commander Staff Sections ........................................................................... A-20 
Table of Contents 

viii JP 3-31 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ix

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Provides joint doctrine for the command and control of joint land operations 

• Describes how to form the joint force land component

• Describes command and control of the joint land force

• Discusses planning for the joint land force 

• Covers joint land force operations 

Overview

Scope and Purpose. This publication provides doctrine for the command 

and control of joint land operations by a joint force land 

component commander (JFLCC). It addresses

considerations for forming and establishing a functional 

land force component with a designated JFLCC and for 

planning, execution, and assessment of joint force land 

operations across the range of military operations. It 

sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and 

performance of the Armed Forces of the United States 

in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military 

involvement in multinational operations. 

Introduction

Command and Control. Command and control (C2) of joint land operations 

is fundamental to warfare. Having a land 

component commander (LCC) is not new to the 

Armed Forces of the United States. The Allies in 

World War II successfully employed separate joint or 

multinational LCC headquarters in several theaters. 

These land component commands ensured proper 

coordination with other components and freed the 

multinational force commander to focus on overall 

strategy. 

Joint Land Operations. In the 20th century, joint and multinational operations 

have encompassed the full diversity of air, land, 

maritime, and space forces operating throughout the 

operational area. Advances in capabilities among all 

forces and the ability to communicate over great 
Executive Summary

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distances have made the application of military power 

in the 21st century more dependent on the ability of 

commanders to synchronize and integrate joint land 

operations with other component’s operations. 

Organizing the Joint Land 

Force. 

The manner in which geographic combatant 

commanders (GCCs) organize their forces directly 

affects the C2, responsiveness, and versatility of joint 

force operations. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) 

organize assigned and attached forces to accomplish 

the mission based on the CCDRs’ vision and concept 

of operations (CONOPS) as well as considerations of 

mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and 

support available — time available. Unity of action, 

centralized planning and direction, and decentralized 

execution are also key considerations. CCDRs can 

conduct operations through subordinate unified 

commands, subordinate joint task forces (JTFs), 

single-Service task forces, Service components, 

functional components, or a combination of Service and 

functional components. 

Forming Considerations. Not only can the GCC designate a JFLCC, but each 

subordinate joint force commander (JFC) may also

designate their own JFLCC. Consequently, there may 

be multiple LCCs, each with an organization, duties, 

and responsibilities tailored to the requirements of their 

specific JFC, within a single area of responsibility 

(AOR). Where multiple joint operations areas each 

have land operations being conducted, the JFLCC 

designated directly by the GCC, may also be designated 

the theater JFLCC. The primary responsibilities of the 

theater JFLCC may be to provide coordination with 

other theater-level functional components, to provide 

general support to the multiple JFLCCs within the 

AOR, to conduct theater-level contingency planning, or 

to conduct joint reception, staging, onward movement, 

and integration for the entire joint land force. 

Establishing the Joint Force Land Component Command

Designated Authorities. The JFC has the authority to organize forces to best 

accomplish the assigned mission based on the 

CONOPS. The JFC establishes subordinate 

commands, assigns responsibilities, establishes or 

delegates appropriate command relationships, and 
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xi

establishes coordinating instructions for the component 

commanders. Sound organization provides for unity of 

command, centralized planning and direction, and 

decentralized execution. Unity of command is 

necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized 

planning and direction is essential for controlling and 

coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized 

execution is essential because no one commander can 

control the detailed actions of a large number of units 

or individuals. When organizing joint forces, 

simplicity and clarity are critical; by providing the 

JFLCC as a single commander for joint land 

operations, the JFC has the ability to enhance 

synchronization of operations not only between US 

ground components, but with multinational land 

forces as well. 

Designation of a Joint 

Force Land Component 

Commander (JFLCC). 

The designation of a JFLCC normally occurs when 

forces of significant size and capability of more than 

one Service component participate in a land operation 

and the JFC determines that doing this will achieve 

unity of command and effort among land forces. 

JFLCC’s Responsibilities. The JFLCC’s overall responsibilities and roles are to 

plan, coordinate, and employ forces made available for 

tasking in support of the JFC’s CONOPS. 

Area of Operations (AO). Area of operations (AO) are defined by the JFC for 

surface (land and maritime) forces. An AO does not 

typically encompass the entire operational area of the 

JFC, but should be large enough for the JFLCC to 

accomplish the mission and protect the forces or 

capabilities provided. The JFLCC establishes an 

operational framework for the AO that assigns 

responsibilities to subordinate land commanders and 

maximizes the operational capabilities of all 

subordinate elements. 

AO Command and Control. The JFLCC is the supported commander within the 

land AO designated by the JFC. Within his designated 

AO, the JFLCC integrates and synchronizes maneuver, 

fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this integration and 

synchronization, such commanders have the authority 

to designate target priority, effects, and timing of fires 

within their AOs. 
Executive Summary

xii JP 3-31 

Selecting a Commander. The JFC establishing a functional component command 

has the authority to designate its commander. 

Normally, the Service component commander with the 

preponderance of forces to be tasked and the ability to 

C2 those forces will be designated as the functional 

component commander; however, the JFC will always 

consider the mission, nature, and duration of the 

operation, force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities in 

selecting a commander. In those instances when the 

theater-level Service component commander is 

designated the JFLCC, the JFLCC normally delegates 

as many of the Service component related duties as 

practical to a subordinate Army forces or Marine Corps 

forces headquarters. 

Developing Supporting 

Plans. 

As the JFC develops the CONOPS, the Service and 

functional components develop their supporting plans. 

During this process, the JFC tasks the functional and 

Service components to provide estimates of forces 

required. The JFLCC provides the force estimate in 

terms of capabilities required rather than specific 

units. The JFC, working with the functional and 

Service components, sources the actual forces needed 

by the JFLCC. Based upon JFC guidance, Service 

components designate specific units to report to the 

JFC, which are assigned a command relationship 

with the JFLCC. After the forces are designated, the 

JFC plans and conducts the strategic deployment of 

forces. The JFLCC, like other functional component 

commanders, provides recommended phasing of forces 

to the JFC. The JFLCC does not control the land force 

portion of the time-phased force and deployment data 

(TPFDD). Based on the Service and functional 

component recommendations, the JFC develops the 

integrated TPFDD and assigns required delivery dates. 

Forming the JFLCC Staff 

and Command Element.

The JFLCC staff should, by necessity, be composed 

of personnel from each Service and various 

Department of Defense (DOD) organizations, and 

other supporting agencies. This provides the 

JFLCC with staff members who have the expertise 

and experience to assist in making informed 

decisions. The JFLCC’s staff is organized based upon

the mission and forces assigned and attached. Because 

creating a new staff would be very time consuming and 
Executive Summary

xiii

inefficient, the staff organization will most likely be 

derived from an existing Service command structure. 

The most likely candidates are theater armies, Marine 

air-ground task force (most likely a Marine 

expeditionary force). Ideally, the JFLCC and the 

deputy JFLCC or chief of staff would come from 

different Services. This construct should be replicated 

throughout the staff leadership to ensure an 

understanding of the distinct capabilities of each 

Service to optimize employment of the forces. 

Forming and Integrating 

JFLCC Headquarters. 

The headquarters are organized according to the JFC’s 

implementing directive that establishes the roles and

responsibilities of the JFLCC, and designates the 

mission and forces assigned. Normally, the staff will 

be built around the JFLCC’s Service component 

staff and augmented with members of the other 

Service components or forces. The JFLCC’s staff 

should have key staff billets allocated such that all 

Services are appropriately represented and share 

equitably in staffing tasks. Key here is that these new 

members are not simply liaisons--they are part of the 

JFLCC staff and ensure the synchronized execution of 

joint land operations. Forming the staff in advance, to 

facilitate training and exercising the integrated staff 

before conducting land operations, is critical to mission 

accomplishment. 

Liaison Requirements. The JFLCC’s liaison requirements include, as a 

minimum, liaison with other components of the joint 

force, either functional or Service. The commander 

may require additional liaison with other organizations 

such as joint force headquarters, major subordinate 

commands, and multinational land forces not assigned 

to the command. The liaison teams or individuals 

represent the sending commander to the gaining 

commander and staff. 

Command and Control

Functional Component

Command Authority.

Functional component commanders perform 

operational missions with authority derived from the 

JFC, who may be a CCDR or a subordinate JFC such as 

a JTF commander. Functional components have 

specific delegated authority over forces or 

capabilities made available to them, but this does 
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xiv JP 3-31 

not affect the command relationships between 

Service component commanders and the JFC.

Normally these specific authorities are described in 

an establishing directive or “terms of reference” 

document prepared by the JFC staff. 

Joint Security Area

Responsibilities. 

The JFLCC may be designated as the joint security 

coordinator (JSC) by the JFC. As such, the JFLCC 

designated the JSC will be responsible for coordinating 

the overall protection of the joint security area (JSA) 

among the component commanders in accordance with 

JFC directives and priorities. The JSC is also 

responsible for ensuring that the surface area 

requirements and priorities for the JSA are integrated in 

the overall security requirements of the joint force and 

are coordinated with the area air defense commander 

who is responsible for defending the airspace over the 

operational area. 

Command Relationships

with the Joint Force 

Commander. 

The JFLCC reports directly to the JFC and advises 

the JFC on the proper employment of land forces 

assigned, attached, or made available. The JFC has

the authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and 

direct coordination among subordinate commanders.

JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational 

assets and groupings to function generally as they were 

designed. The intent is to meet the needs of the JFC 

while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity 

of the Service organizations. 

Functional Command 

Relationships. 

Command relationships between Service and/or 

functional component commands are established by 

the JFC. Joint interdependence is established by the 

commander through the deliberate assignment of 

command relationships with clear areas of operations, 

delegated authorities, and assigned responsibilities to 

best integrate the capabilities of the joint force.

Elements of the different Services may be placed 

tactical control or operational control to functional 

component commands while retaining an 

administrative control relationship with their respective 

Service component commander. However, 

supported/supporting relationships may also be used to 

provide the necessary authority and basis for 

interdependence in the contemporary complex 

operational environment. 
Executive Summary

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Planning

Strategic Planning 

Considerations. 

Planning for the employment of military forces is an 

inherent responsibility of command. Joint planning 

integrates military actions with those of other 

instruments of national power and our multinational 

partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve a 

specified end state. Joint land force operational 

planning links the tactical employment of land forces to 

campaign and strategic objectives through the 

achievement of operational goals. The focus of 

JFLCC planning is on operational art — the 

application of creative imagination by commanders and 

staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and 

experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and 

major operations and organize and employ military 

forces. 

Planning Tasks. JFLCC planning tasks include the following:

(1) Preparing and coordinating required land 

component operation plans or operation orders in 

support of assigned JFC missions. 

(2) Coordinating land component planning efforts with 

higher, lower, adjacent, and multinational headquarters 

as required.

(3) Developing land component courses of action

(COAs) within the framework of the JFC assigned 

objectives or missions, forces available, and the 

commander’s intent. 

(4) Determining land component force requirements 

and coordinating land force planning in support of the 

selected COAs. The JFLCC conducts planning using 

the planning processes of the command that forms the 

core of the headquarters. While almost all headquarters 

use the planning cycle described in joint planning 

publications, the specific steps in the process may have 

different names and somewhat different activities. The 

JFLCC’s staff, provided by Services other than the core 

of the headquarters and integrated into the core staff, 

must quickly adapt to the planning processes and battle 

rhythm of the staff they are joining. 
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xvi JP 3-31 

Plans-Operations 

Relationship. 

The JFLCC headquarters orients on three planning 

horizons-short, medium, and long. These correspond 

with current operations, future operations, and future 

plans. Upon completion of the planning products and 

orders, the joint planning group (JPG) (future plans) 

organizes to conduct a plans transition. Once plans 

are prepared and execution begins, the medium 

range JPG focus shifts to planning “what’s next” or 

sequels primarily with higher headquarters, while 

handing-off the plan to the current operations 

directorate of a joint staff for execution and 

preparation of all necessary fragmentary orders 

directing tactical action. This requires an 

organizational procedure to transfer responsibilities and 

products from the long range planners to those 

operators responsible for execution. Key to the success 

of the plans transition is the requirement that the 

organization responsible for execution has enough 

resources, experience, and understanding of the plan to 

effectively execute it. 

Phasing. The purpose of phasing is to help the commander 

organize operations by integrating and synchronizing 

subordinate operations. Phasing is most directly related 

to the “arranging operations” and “lines of operations” 

elements of operational design. Phasing helps JFLCCs 

and staffs visualize and think through the entire 

operation or campaign and to define requirements in 

terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose.

The primary benefit of phasing is that it assists 

commanders in systematically achieving military 

objectives that cannot be attained all at once by 

arranging smaller, related operations in a logical 

sequence. 

Operational Environment. Factors that must be considered when conducting joint 

land operations extend beyond the boundaries of the 

JFLCC’s assigned operational area. The JFLCC’s 

operational environment is the composite of the 

conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect 

the employment of capabilities and bear on the 

decisions of the commander. It normally 

encompasses the physical areas and factors of the 

area and its associated information environment 

(which includes cyberspace). Included within these 
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are the adversary, friendly, and neutral systems that 

are relevant to a specific joint land operation.

Understanding the operational environment helps 

commanders understand the results of various friendly, 

adversary, and neutral actions and how this impacts 

achieving the military end state. 

Assessment

Assessment Defined. Assessment is a process that measures progress of 

the joint force toward mission accomplishment. 

Commanders continuously assess the operational 

environment and the progress of operations and 

compare them to their initial vision and intent. 

Commanders adjust operations based on their 

assessment to ensure military objectives are met and the 

military end state is achieved. The assessment process 

is continuous and directly tied to the commander’s 

decisions throughout planning, preparation, and 

execution of operations. Staffs help the commander by 

monitoring the numerous aspects that can influence the 

outcome of operations and provide the commander 

timely information needed for decisions. 

Operations

Forms of Operations. JFCs strive to apply the many dimensions of military 

power simultaneously across the depth, breadth, and 

height of the operational area. Consequently, JFCs 

normally achieve concentration in some operations or 

in specific functions and require economy of force in 

others. However, major operation and campaign plans 

must feature an appropriate balance between offensive 

and defensive operations and stability operations in all 

phases. Planning for stability operations should begin 

when joint operation planning is initiated. Planning for 

the transition from sustained land combat operations to 

the termination of joint operations and then a complete 

handover to civil authority and redeployment must 

commence during plan development and be ongoing 

during all phases of a joint campaign or major 

operation. 

Offensive Operations. Major operations and campaigns, whether or not they 

involve large-scale ground combat, normally will 

include some level of both offense and defense. 
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xviii JP 3-31 

Although defense may be the stronger force posture, 

the offense is normally decisive in combat. Further, 

protection includes certain defensive measures that are

required throughout each joint operation or campaign 

phase. The relationship between offense and defense, 

then, is a complementary one. 

Defensive Operations. Defensive operations are combat operations conducted 

to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, 

and develop conditions favorable for offensive or 

stability operations. Defense alone normally cannot 

achieve a decision. However, defensive land 

operations enable JFLCCs to conduct or prepare for 

decisive offensive or stability operations. Defensive 

land control operations retain terrain, guard 

populations, and protect critical capabilities against 

enemy attacks and are used to gain time and economize 

forces so offensive tasks can be executed elsewhere. 

Stability Operations. Stability operations encompass various military 

missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the 

United States in coordination with other instruments of 

national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and 

secure environment, provide essential governmental 

services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and 

humanitarian relief. Joint land forces assume that role 

before, during, and after conducting land operations, 

across the range of operations. In doing so, the efforts 

of military forces appropriately focus in support of the 

other instruments of national and international power. 

Stability operations will not only include stability tasks, 

but will often have elements of offense and defense.

For land forces, these efforts are fundamental to the 

conduct of joint operations. 

Civil Support Operations. Military operations inside the United States and its 

territories, though limited in many respects, are 

conducted to accomplish two missions – homeland 

defense and civil support (CS). A JFLCC is often used 

to provide C2 for land operations for CS. CS consists 

of DOD support to US civil authorities for domestic 

emergencies, both man-made and natural, and for 

designated law enforcement and other activities, such 

as national special security events. This includes DOD 

forces when directed by the President or Secretary of 

Defense. 
Executive Summary

xix

Joint Functions

Six Basic Joint Functions. In any joint land operation, the JFLCC and staff plan, 

direct, and coordinate a number of joint functions that 

are critical to the successful execution of joint land 

operations. Joint functions are related capabilities 

and activities grouped together to help JFCs 

integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations 

Functions that are common to joint operations at all 

levels of war fall into six basic groups — C2, 

intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, 

protection, and sustainment. Some functions, such as 

C2 and intelligence, apply to all operations. Others, 

such as fires, apply as required by the mission. 

Command and Control

Function. 

C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction 

by a properly designated commander over assigned and 

attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. 

The ability of the JFLCC or other commander tasked to 

conduct land operations is the result of leadership and 

the ability to control forces and functions in order to 

execute the intent.

Intelligence Function. The JFLCC defines intelligence responsibilities for 

the land component, prioritizes intelligence 

requirements of subordinate land forces, and 

provides representation for the land component and 

its subordinates at the JFC’s daily joint targeting 

coordination board. The staff incorporates and 

synchronizes all intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) efforts, including human 

intelligence and counterintelligence efforts with the 

JFC’s staff. The JFLCC is the JFC’s focal point for 

adversary ground forces intelligence, target 

development, and combat assessment. The JFLCC 

states operational requirements and provides 

continuous feedback to ensure optimum ISR support to 

operations. The first option for filling ISR gaps should 

be to request augmentation from theater and/or national 

assets. 

Fires Function. The JFLCC plans, coordinates, synchronizes, and 

executes joint fires to create lethal or nonlethal 

effects in order to set the conditions for success in 

their AOs. Joint fires are delivered during the 
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xx JP 3-31 

employment of forces from two or more components in 

coordinated action to produce desired effects in support 

of a common objective. The JFLCC’s focus is on 

shaping those opponent formations, functions, 

facilities, and operations that could impact on the 

JFLCC’s AO.

Movement and Maneuver 

Function. 

This function encompasses disposing joint forces to 

conduct campaigns, major operations, and other 

contingencies by securing positional advantages before 

combat operations commence and by exploiting tactical 

success to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

This includes moving or deploying forces into an 

operational area and conducting maneuver to 

operational depths for offensive or defensive purposes.

The JFLCC is responsible for the operational 

movement and maneuver of land forces necessary to 

contribute to the success of the JFC’s campaign and 

directs the land force in performance of operational 

tasks. The JFLCC plans, controls, and coordinates 

land movement and maneuver to gain a positional 

advantage or a mobility differential over the 

adversary. The purpose is to achieve the objectives 

assigned in the theater or subordinate campaign plan.

The objective for operational maneuver is usually to 

gain the positional advantage over an adversary center 

of gravity or decisive point.

Protection Function. As a responsibility of command, not a separate mission, 

the JFC considers all elements of force protection.

Force protection consists of actions taken to prevent or 

mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to 

include family members), resources, facilities, and 

critical information. Protection may also extend to 

friendly forces, however designated. These actions 

conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be 

applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate 

the coordinated and synchronized offensive and 

defensive measures to enable the effective employment 

of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the 

adversary. Force protection does not include actions to 

defeat the adversary or protect against accidents, 

weather, or disease. 

Sustainment Function. Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel 

services necessary to maintain and prolong operations 
Executive Summary

xxi 

until mission accomplishment. Joint personnel services 

include synchronizing and optimizing personnel service 

support to the joint force (mail, religious, and legal 

support, and finance and disbursement services); 

coordinating morale, welfare, and recreation program; 

accomplishing manpower management; strength 

reporting and managing casualty reporting. Core 

logistic capabilities areas are: supply, maintenance 

operations, health service support, transportation, field 

services, general engineering, and operational contract 

support.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides doctrine for the C2 of joint 

land operations by a JFLCC. It addresses 

considerations for forming and establishing a functional 

land force component with a designated JFLCC and for 

planning, execution, and assessment of joint force land 

operations across the range of military operations.
Executive Summary

xxii JP 3-31 

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION 

I-1 

1. Background 

a. Command and control (C2) of joint land operations is fundamental to 

warfare. Having a land component commander (LCC) is not new to the Armed 

Forces of the United States. The Allies in World War II successfully employed separate 

joint or multinational LCC headquarters in several theaters. These land component 

commands ensured proper coordination with other components and freed the 

multinational force commander to focus on overall strategy. After the Allied repulses at 

Kasserine Pass in 1943 due to poor command relationships, General Dwight D. 

Eisenhower restructured his Allied Forces in North Africa. Not only were all air 

elements brought under centralized control, but all land forces were also consolidated 

under General Sir Harold Alexander’s 18th Army Group. This structure was the first 

modern combined organization with coequal land, sea, and air component commanders 

under separate commanders and contributed significantly to the defeat of the Axis in 

North Africa by May 1943. For the Normandy invasion in June 1944, Eisenhower again 

“Modern land warfare is the most conclusive, yet the least exclusive, of 

the geographically focused branches of conflict. Because the belligerents in 

modern strategic history, with only minor and partial exceptions, have been 

territorially defined, victory or defeat on land has been all but equivalent to 

victory or defeat in war.” 

Colin Gray, Modern Strategy

British General Sir Harold Alexander, Lieutenant General George S. Patton, and Rear 

Admiral Alan G. Kirk inspect invasion task force for Operation TORCH off the coast of 

North Africa. Alexander was to become the land component commander of the allied 

forces in March 1943. (Official US Navy photograph) 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-31 

subordinated United States (US) Army forces (ARFOR) under a multinational LCC, 

British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery. 

b. During World War II in the Pacific, US Army and US Marine Corps (USMC) 

land forces habitually operated together. Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, USMC, 

commanded both US Army and USMC forces in the Mariana Islands campaign. Perhaps 

the most notable instance of Army and Marine Corps integration occurred during the 

battle for Okinawa in 1945. Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, US Army 

(Commanding General Tenth Army and Task Force 56), commanded the Joint 

Expeditionary Force with the mission of seizing Okinawa as a shaping operation for the 

eventual invasion of the Japanese home islands. Tenth Army consisted of XXIV Army 

Corps, III Amphibious Corps, and a Tactical Air Force that consisted of the 2d Marine 

Aircraft Wing and Army Air Force Elements under Major General F.P. Mulcahy, USMC. 

The Island Command under Army Major General F.G. Wallace provided Army-level 

enabling troops that also had the primary mission of establishing the base complexes for 

subsequent operations. Joint land operations at Okinawa should have provided the model 

for a joint force land component command.

c. Following World War II, joint land operations became the exception as the 

lessons of World War II were lost. Frequently, officers serving as theater commanders 

attempted with varying degrees of success to also serve as multinational or joint LCCs. 

Campaigns such as in Korea in 1950 and Vietnam during 1965-1972 were fought without 

unifying land operations under a single component commander or headquarters for C2. 

In March 1999 neither a combined nor a joint forces land component command was 

established for either the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Operation 

ALLIED FORCE, or its associated US operation. 

d. Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) 

(Afghanistan and Iraq). In June 1998, General Anthony Zinni, Commander of US 

Central Command (USCENTCOM), designated Lieutenant General Tommy Franks, 

Commander of US Army Central Command (ARCENT) and Third US Army, as his joint 

force land component commander (JFLCC) for any operations that might occur in the 

Middle East. Subsequently, when Franks became the commander of USCENTCOM, he 

similarly designated his replacement as the JFLCC in the war plans as well. 

“General [Sir Harold R.L.G.] Alexander was to become the deputy 

commander of the Allied force. Admiral [Sir Andrew Browne] Cunningham 

was to remain as my naval [chief]. And Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur W. 

Tedder was assigned as the [chief] of the air forces. ... This development 

was extraordinarily pleasing to me because it meant, first and foremost, 

complete unity of action in the central Mediterranean and it provided for 

needed machinery for effective tactical and strategic co-ordination. ... [after 

the Kasserine battle] the ground command on the Tunisian front was placed 

under General Alexander. The latter . . . was able to devote his entire 

attention to daily tactical co-ordination. 

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe
Introduction 

I-3 

Consequently, after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Lieutenant General P.T. 

Mikolashek assumed control of the land operations in the Afghanistan Joint Operations

Area in November 2001 for the conduct of OEF and was designated the coalition force 

land component commander (CFLCC). As such, Mikolashek controlled a unique 

combination of Army, Marine Corps, special forces, and Northern Alliance allies during 

the defeat of the Taliban and their Al-Qaeda allies. 

e. In September 2002, Lieutenant General David McKiernan replaced General 

Mikolashek as the CFLCC. From September through March 2003, he supervised the 

establishment and preparation of CFLCC theater forces, he coordinated with the other 

components and coalition partners, he received in Kuwait almost 300,000 troops, and 

completed the coalition land operations plan. The ARCENT Headquarters was modified 

to include more than 70 Marines and a total of over 150 joint and coalition officers. 

Beginning 20 March 2003, he conducted OIF supervising two large corps-sized forces (V 

Corps and I Marine Expeditionary Force [MEF]) as well as more than 56,000 theaterlevel troops during the defeat of Iraqi Forces. With the fall of Saddam’s regime in May, 

Lieutenant General David McKiernan assumed duties as the commander of Coalition 

Joint Task Force Iraq initially responsible for conducting stabilization and reconstruction 

operations countrywide. From 15 June 2003 to the present, ARCENT has operated from 

Kuwait where it serves as the theater CFLCC responsible for coordinating land planning 

and for ensuring uninterrupted logistic support for simultaneous operations in 

Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the area of responsibility (AOR). Since 2004, 

Multinational Corps-Iraq has served as the de facto CFLCC for Multinational Force — 

Iraq and directly supervises most of the Army, Marine Corps, and coalition land forces 

conducting stability, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq. 

2. Joint Land Operations 

a. In the 20th century, joint and multinational operations have encompassed the 

full diversity of air, land, maritime, and space forces operating throughout the operational 

area. Advances in capabilities among all forces and the ability to communicate over 

great distances have made the application of military power in the 21st century more 

dependent on the ability of commanders to synchronize and integrate joint land 

operations with other component’s operations. 

b. Joint land operations include any type of joint military operations, singly or in 

combination, performed across the range of military operations with land forces made 

“With conflicts increasingly waged among the people as opposed to 

around the people in conventional wars, civilian populations will permeate 

the operational environment . . . As elusive and adaptive enemies rapidly 

distribute themselves in those areas least accessible to us, the norm will be 

sustained operations in tough urban terrain, challenging multicultural 

environments, and increased complexity for leaders.” 

General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army 

October 2008
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-31 

available by Service components in support of the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) 

operation or campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the joint force. 

Joint land operations require synchronization and integration of all instruments of 

national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve strategic 

and operational objectives. Normally, joint land operations will also involve 

multinational land forces.

 c. Joint land operations includes land control operations. These are described as 

the employment of land forces, supported by maritime and air forces (as appropriate) to 

control vital areas of the land domain. Such operations are conducted to establish local 

military superiority in land operational areas. The key to successful land control 

operations is the availability and employment of resources to accomplish the mission. 

 d. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, establishes the JFC’s operational 

environment as composed of the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the 

information environment (which includes cyberspace). Domains are useful constructs to 

aid in visualizing and characterizing the physical environment in which operations are 

conducted. Nothing in the definitions of, or the use of the term domain, implies or 

mandates exclusivity, primacy, or C2 of that domain. C2 is established by the JFC based 

upon the most effective use of available resources to accomplish assigned missions. The 

land domain is the land area of the Earth’s surface ending at the high water mark. The 

land domain shares the Earth’s surface with the maritime domain. 

e. Land operations are often conducted in the complex and diverse terrain of the 

land domain. Numbers of civilians, amount of valuable infrastructure, avenues of 

approach, freedom of vehicular movement, and communications functionality vary 

considerably among land environments creating challenges for the JFLCC. As a result, 

joint land operations require an effective and efficient C2 structure to achieve 

success.

See JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations, for capabilities and tasks that are unique to, or 

significantly challenged by, joint urban operations at the operational level. 

f. It is important to understand that in today’s complex operational environment, 

adversary actions can be delivered on, from, within, and outside of the operational area, 

all with potentially global impacts and influence. To negate those threats, commanders at 

all levels must consider how our space and cyberspace capabilities enhance the 

effectiveness and execution of joint land operations. Furthermore, joint staffs should 

seek out those experts and capabilities which can enhance the effectiveness of land 

operations.

“The only geography that can really be controlled is the only geography 

that lends itself physically to human occupation, the land. . . . it is the very 

character of land warfare to hold at risk . . . civil society...” 

Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy
Introduction 

I-5 

3. Organizing the Joint Land Force 

a. The manner in which geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) organize their 

forces directly affects the C2, responsiveness, and versatility of joint force operations. 

Combatant commanders (CCDRs) organize assigned and attached forces to 

accomplish the mission based on the CCDR’s vision and concept of operations 

(CONOPS) as well as considerations of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops 

and support available--time available (METT-T). Unity of action, centralized 

planning and direction, and decentralized execution are also key considerations. 

CCDRs can conduct operations through subordinate unified commands, subordinate 

joint task forces (JTFs), single-Service task forces (TF), Service components, functional 

components, or a combination of Service and functional components. 

b. Under certain conditions, the JFC may elect to retain control of joint land 

operations within the joint force headquarters and directly integrate these with other 

operations. In those instances, the JFC would retain command authority and 

responsibility for all land forces and use the JFC staff with augmentation, as appropriate, 

to assist in planning and coordinating joint land operations. If the JFC does not choose 

to retain control at the JFC level, there are four primary options available to the 

JFC for organizing land forces from two or more components. The options are listed 

below: 

(1) Subordinate unified command for land operations (available only to a 

CCDR). 

(2) Subordinate JTF(s). 

(3) Service components. 

(4) Functional land component with JFLCC. 

c. Each option has advantages and disadvantages that the JFC and staff must 

consider prior to a decision to organize under a particular option. The following 

advantages and disadvantages are not all-inclusive but highlight some important issues 

that should be considered. 

“Joint force commanders (JFCs) have the authority to establish 

functional component commands to control military operations. JFCs may 

establish a functional component command to integrate planning; reduce 

their span of control, and/or significantly improve combat efficiency, 

information flow, unity of effort, weapon systems management, component 

interaction, or control over scheme of maneuver..... JFCs may elect to 

centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid 

reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces.” 

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States 
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-31 

(1) Subordinate Unified Command

(a) The advantages are: enduring unity of command and effort, joint staff,

and the authority of a JFC including the authority to organize subordinate JTF and/or 

functional components. 

(b) The disadvantages are: separate subunified command commander/staff 

required; and lead-time required to establish headquarters before execution. 

(2) Subordinate JTF

(a) The advantages are: unity of command and effort, joint staff, and the 

authority of a JFC including the authority to organize subordinate functional components. 

(b) The disadvantages are: normally an ad hoc short term headquarters, 

separate JTF commander/staff required, and lead-time required to establish headquarters 

before execution. 

PERSIAN GULF WAR EXAMPLE OF JOINT FORCE COMMANDER RETAINING 

CONTROL OF LAND FORCES 

The Saudis had insisted on commanding all Arab forces. Yet the need to 

maintain unity of command called for establishing a land component 

commander in charge of all ground forces.... Political sensitivities argued 

against placing Arab forces under an American land commander. Technically, 

USCENTCOM [US Central Command] did not control Arab-Islamic forces, and 

[General] Khalid was [General Norman A.] Schwarzkopf’s political equal.... 

Schwarzkopf made the tough decision to retain the land component 

commander responsibility for himself, with [Lieutenant General Calvin A. H.] 

Waller [the USCENTCOM deputy commander] serving as his primary assistant 

for ground combat issues. The decision created numerous challenges and 

difficulties. Though [Lieutenant General John J.] Yeosock [the Third Army 

commander] was clearly charged with commanding the two US corps, 

Schwarzkopf was within his rights as the LCC [land component commander] in 

going directly to the corps commanders with instructions. From the other 

direction, the two corps commanders dealt directly with Lieutenant General 

John J. Yeosock. Lieutenant General Charles Horner, as the joint force air 

component commander (JFACC), could go directly to [Schwarzkopf], whereas 

Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock competed with the Arab command and the 

Marines [I MEF] [Marine Expeditionary Force] for Schwarzkopf’s attention. This 

rather convoluted arrangement certainly went against the principles of 

simplicity and unity of command. That it was made to work as smoothly as it 

did was attributable to the powerful personalities and professionalism of the 

senior commanders. 

SOURCE: Brigadier General Robert H. Scales Jr., Certain Victory: The US 

Army in the Gulf War 
Introduction 

I-7 

(3) Service Components 

(a) The advantages are: simplified C2, requires no change in structure, JFC 

directly integrates land operations with other operations, and easier to establish prior to 

execution. 

(b) The disadvantages are: staff not integrated, liaison only; potential for 

ineffective use of assigned forces due to tasking and mission redundancies; JFC retains 

focus on the land battle; potential for JFC to lose focus on the operational interface; and 

no single focus for land forces, joint land operations, or coordination with other 

functional components. 

(4) Functional Land Component

 (a) The advantages are: unity of effort, integrated staff, single voice for 

land forces and land operations (consolidated picture of land force 

capabilities/requirements to the JFC, staff, boards, and other functional components), 

single concept and focus of effort for land operations (an aspect of the plan rather than a 

function of coordination either horizontally or vertically), synchronized and integrated 

land force planning and execution (prioritization and therefore deconfliction of 

competing land force requirements). 

 (b) The disadvantages are: JFLCC normally retains Service component 

responsibilities to the JFC (requires split focus of the staff), challenge of integrating 

staffs, more lead-time required to establish headquarters before execution, and sourcing 

the staffs. 

d. No matter which option is selected, the JFC must designate responsibility for the 

conduct of joint land operations. Hereafter, the JFLCC will be used in this publication to 

discuss the responsibilities and functions of the commander designated to conduct joint 

land operations. 

“The JFC [joint force commander] also may conduct operations through 

the Service component CDRs [commanders] or, at lower echelons, other 

Service force CDRs.” 

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States

unified action. The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities 

of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve 

unity of effort. (JP 1) 

unity of effort. Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the 

participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization - the 

product of successful unified action. (JP 1) 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-31 

4. Forming Considerations 

a. Not only can the GCC designate a JFLCC, but each subordinate JFC may also 

designate their own JFLCC. Consequently, there may be multiple LCCs, each with an 

organization, duties, and responsibilities tailored to the requirements of their specific 

JFC, within a single AOR. Where multiple joint operations areas (JOAs) each have 

land operations being conducted, the JFLCC designated directly by the GCC, may also 

be designated the theater JFLCC. The primary responsibilities of the theater JFLCC may 

be to provide coordination with other theater-level functional components, to provide 

general support to the multiple JFLCCs within the AOR, to conduct theater-level 

contingency planning, or to conduct joint reception, staging, onward movement, and 

integration (JRSOI) for the entire joint land force. Within a JOA or when there is only 

one JFLCC in an AOR, the JFC forms a functional land component to improve combat 

efficiency, unity of effort, weapons system management, component interaction, or 

control the land scheme of maneuver. Forming a functional land component is a key 

organizational decision, which will significantly influence the conduct of land 

operations. The following are some of the factors to be considered by the JFC in making 

such a decision. See Figure I-1. 

b. Mission. The mission requires that the capabilities and functions of more 

than one Service be directed toward closely related land objectives where unity of 

effort is a primary concern. Land forces are competing for limited joint force assets. 

The JFLCC contributes to the combat efficiency, prioritization and control of joint force 

assets, scheme of maneuver, and joint fires, as the situation requires. The JFLCC 

provides direction and control of land operations. 

c. Scope of Operations

(1) When the scope of joint land operations is large in force size and/or 

operational area, the JFC needs to apportion responsibility among major operations or 

phases of operations and synchronize those operations. It may be advantageous, 

therefore, to establish functionally oriented commanders responsible for the major 

operations. A functional land component may be designated anytime the forces of 

two or more Military Departments operate in the same domain. 

“We can make a land component command arrangement work. There 

will be no more occasions in the Central Command’s area of operations 

where Marines will fight one ground war and the Army fights a different 

ground war. There will be one ground war and a single land component 

commander.” 

General Anthony C. Zinni 

Commander, United States Central Command 

(August 1997-September 2000) 
Introduction 

I-9 

(2) The unity of command offered by a JFLCC may be especially beneficial in 

geographically concentrated land operations as it provides singular focus, expedited 

decisionmaking, and centralized coordination. 

(a) Level of Operations. Regardless of size, when the scope of the 

operation requires an operational level command to directly link land operations to 

campaign or strategic objectives, a JFLCC can provide the linkage. 

(b) Span of Control. The multiple complex tasks confronting the JFC may 

challenge the JFC’s span of control and ability to oversee and influence each task. In 

addition, the commander of a unified command should not act concurrently as the 

commander of a subordinate command, such as a functional component command, 

without the prior approval of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). Having a separate 

JFLCC allows resolution of joint issues at the functional component level and enhances 

AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY WITH MULTIPLE JOINT 

FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDERS

Theater 

Sustainment 

Command

JOA

JFLCC

JOA

JFLCC

Theater 

NETOPS 

Command

Military 

Intelligence

Brigade

GCC

GCC geographic combatant 

commander

JFACC joint force air component 

commander

JFLCC joint force land component 

commander

JFMCC joint force maritime component 

commander

JOA joint operations area

JTF joint task force 

NETOPS network operations

LEGEND

JTF-A JFLCC JFACC JFMCC JTF-B

Figure I-1. Areas of Responsibility with Multiple Joint Force Land Component 

Commanders 
Chapter I 

I-10 JP 3-31 

component interaction at that level. The JFC has other responsibilities in the operational 

area that may require greater focus. If the operation can be controlled by one corps-sized 

unit, either an Army corps commander or a MEF commander could be designated as a 

JFLCC. If the mission requires more than one corps sized unit, the preferred option is for 

the commander of the theater army headquarters to be designated the JFLCC. 

d. Planning. The formation of a functional land component with a JFLCC 

integrates planning beneath the level of the JFC for land operations. In addition, the 

designation of a JFLCC enhances the integration and synchronization of operational 

maneuver with fires by making the JFLCC the supported commander in his area of 

operations (AO). 

e. Duration. Duration of operations must be long enough to warrant establishing a 

JFLCC. The duration of operations must be worth the costs in terms of time, personnel 

and staff training, C2, communications systems, intelligence architectures, and impact on 

flexibility. The decision to constitute a JFLCC should be made early enough in the JFC’s 

planning cycle to facilitate establishment and preparation of the headquarters for land 

operations and allow time for generation of a comprehensive plan for the application of 

land power in support of the JFC. In the case of homeland defense (HD) and civil 

support (CS), the formation of a joint force land component command may become a 

durable requirement as enduring threats to the homeland are both natural and man-made. 

f. Experience. Designating a JFLCC, with an experienced land oriented staff, 

enhances the detailed planning, coordination, and execution of joint land operations.

g. Multinational Operations. Multinational operations are operations conducted 

by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or 

alliance. Designating a multinational LCC provides for unity of effort for land 

operations. See Chapter III, “Planning and Assessment,” for more on multinational 

operations. 

For a more detailed discussion of multinational operations see JP 3-16, Multinational 

Operations, and Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Land 

Operations. 
CHAPTER II

THE JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMAND 

II-1 

SECTION A. ESTABLISHING THE JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT 

COMMAND 

1. Designated Authorities 

a. The JFC has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned 

mission based on the CONOPS. The JFC establishes subordinate commands, assigns 

responsibilities, establishes or delegates appropriate command relationships, and 

establishes coordinating instructions for the component commanders. Sound 

organization provides for unity of command, centralized planning and direction, and 

decentralized execution. Unity of command is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. 

Centralized planning and direction is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts 

of the forces. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can 

control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals. When organizing 

joint forces, simplicity and clarity are critical; by providing the JFLCC as a single 

commander for joint land operations, the JFC has the ability to enhance 

synchronization of operations not only between US ground components, but with 

multinational land forces as well. 

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for additional doctrinal 

guidance on establishing the land component command and designating the JFLCC. 

b. The JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of the functional 

component commanders based upon the CONOPS, and may alter this authority during 

the course of an operation. 

“We can never forget that organization, no less than a bayonet or an aircraft 

carrier, is a weapon of war. We owe it to our soldiers, our sailors, our 

airmen, and our marines to ensure that this weapon is lean enough, flexible 

enough, and tough enough to help them win, if God forbid, that even 

becomes necessary.” 

Congressman Bill Nichols, Hearings for the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986

“The JFC [joint force commander] establishing a functional component 

command has the authority to designate its CDR [commander]. Normally, 

the Service component CDR with the preponderance of forces to be tasked 

and the ability to C2 [command and control] those forces will be designated 

as the functional component CDR; however, the JFC will always consider 

the mission, nature, and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the 

C2 capabilities in selecting a CDR.” 

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces 

of the United States 
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-31 

c. The designation of a JFLCC normally occurs when forces of significant size and 

capability of more than one Service component participate in a land operation and the 

JFC determines that doing this will achieve unity of command and effort among land 

forces. 

2. Roles and Responsibilities 

 Develop, integrate, maintain, and share with the JTF an accurate representation of 

the land common operational picture (COP) (objects and events) within the JFLCC’s 

operational area, as an input to the JTF’s COP. The JFLCC’s overall responsibilities and 

roles are to plan, coordinate, and employ forces made available for tasking in support of 

the JFC’s CONOPS. The responsibilities of the JFLCC include, but are not limited 

to, the following: 

a. Advising the JFC on the proper employment of forces made available for tasking. 

b. Developing the joint land operation plan (OPLAN)/operation order (OPORD) in 

support of the JFC’s CONOPS and optimizing the operations of task-organized land 

forces. (See Appendix C, “Joint Land Operation Plan and Order Development”). The 

JFLCC issues planning guidance to all subordinate and supporting elements and analyzes 

proposed courses of action (COAs). The intent is to concentrate combat power at critical 

times and places to accomplish strategic, operational, and tactical goals. 

c. Directing the execution of land operations as specified by the JFC, which includes 

making timely adjustments to the tasking of forces and capabilities made available. The 

JFLCC coordinates changes with affected component commanders as appropriate. 

d. Coordinating the planning and execution of joint land operations with the other 

components and supporting agencies. 

e. Evaluating the results of land operations to include the effectiveness of 

interdiction operations and forwarding these results to the JFC to support the combat 

assessment effort. 

f. Synchronizing and integrating movement and maneuver, fires, and interdiction in 

support of land operations. 

g. Designating the target priorities, effects, and timing for joint land operations. 

h. Establishing a personnel recovery (PR) coordination cell (PRCC) to coordinate all 

component PR activities, including coordination with the joint personnel recovery center 

(JPRC) and other component PRCCs. Be prepared to establish a JPRC if directed or if 

designated as the joint force supported commander for PR. 

i. Providing mutual support to other components by conducting operations such as 

suppression of enemy air defenses and suppression of threats to maritime operations. 
The Joint Force Land Component Command 

II-3 

j. Coordinating with other functional and Service components in support of 

accomplishment of JFC objectives. 

k. Providing an assistant or deputy to the area air defense commander (AADC) for 

land-based joint theater air and missile defense (AMD) operations and coordination as 

determined by the JFC. 

l. Supporting the JFCs information operations (IO) by developing the IO 

requirements that support land operations and synchronizing the land force IO assets 

when directed, to include cyberspace requirements. 

m. Establishing standing operating procedures (SOPs) and other directives based on 

JFC guidance. 

n. Providing inputs into the JFC-approved joint operational area air defense plan 

(AADP) and the airspace control plan (ACP). 

o. Integrating the JFLCC’s communications systems and resources into the theater’s 

networked communications system architecture, or COP synchronizes JFLCC’s critical 

voice and data requirements. These communications systems requirements, coordination 

issues, and capabilities in the joint planning and execution process. 

For more information on joint C2 planning and utilization of networked capabilities, 

refer to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3155.01, Global 

Command and Control System — Joint (GCCS-J), Operational Framework Policy, and 

CJCSI 3151.01B, Global Command and Control System Common Operational Picture 

Reporting Requirements. 

p. Integrating special operations, as required, into overall land operations. 

q. Performing joint security functions, such as serving as the joint security 

coordinator (JSC), as designated by the JFC. 

See JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, for additional guidance on joint 

security functions. 

r. Supervising detainee operations as designated by the JFC. 

See JP 3-63, Detainee Operations, for additional guidance on detainee operations.

s. Integrate members of interagency partners and intergovernmental organizations 

(IGOs) as part of the staff in order to facilitate stabilization and reconstruction. 

t. Performing the duties of the space coordinating authority (SCA), if 

designated. The JFLCC may also be designated the SCA within a joint force to 

coordinate joint space operations and integrate space capabilities. This responsibility 
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-31 

may entail the coordination and integration of the capabilities of other Services’ and 

national agencies’ space assets in order to maintain space superiority and exploit the 

space domain to create effects across the other domains to achieve JFC objectives. Space 

and cyberspace considerations should be fully integrated with operations in the other 

domains, and should be fully incorporated into COA development, to ensure that the 

JFC’s objectives are met most effectively. 

For further detailed discussion of SCA, see JP 3-14, Space Operations. 

3. Designating an Area of Operations 

 a. AOs are defined by the JFC for surface (land and maritime) forces. An AO does 

not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large 

enough for the JFLCC to accomplish the mission and protect the forces or capabilities 

provided. The JFLCC establishes an operational framework for the AO that assigns 

responsibilities to subordinate land commanders and maximizes the operational 

capabilities of all subordinate elements. 

b. Command and Control in Operational Areas. The JFLCC is the supported 

commander within the land AO designated by the JFC. Within his designated AO, the 

JFLCC integrates and synchronizes maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this 

integration and synchronization, such commanders have the authority to designate target 

priority, effects, and timing of fires within their AOs. 

 (1) Synchronization of efforts within land AO with theater and/or JOA-wide 

operations is of particular importance. To facilitate synchronization, the JFC establishes 

priorities that will be executed throughout the JOA, including within the land force 

commander’s AO. The joint force air component commander (JFACC) is normally the 

supported commander for the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort, while land and 

maritime component commanders are supported commanders for interdiction in their 

AOs. 

 (2) In coordination with the JFLCC, those commanders designated by the JFC 

to execute theater and/or JOA-wide functions have the latitude to plan and execute these 

JFC prioritized operations within the land AO. Any commander executing such a 

mission within a land AO must coordinate the operation to avoid adverse effects and 

fratricide. If those operations would have adverse impact within the land AO, the 

commander assigned to execute the JOA-wide functions must readjust the plan, resolve 

the issue with the JFLCC, or consult with the JFC for resolution. 

c. The JFLCC may subdivide some or all of the assigned AO. These subordinate 

commander AOs may be contiguous or noncontiguous depending on the JFLCC’s 

assignments, missions, and objectives. When the JFLCC’s subordinate commanders are 

assigned contiguous AOs, a shared boundary separates the tactical units assigned to 

those designated subordinate commanders. When subordinate commanders are assigned 

noncontiguous AOs, the tactical units assigned to those designated subordinate 
The Joint Force Land Component Command 

II-5 

commanders do not share a common boundary. Operation JUST CAUSE and 

ENDURING FREEDOM are examples of operations with noncontiguous AOs. The 

intervening area between land forces within the joint force land component AO remains 

the responsibility of the JFLCC. If the Army provides the JFLCC, then an Army 

support area may be established for the conduct of operations and security of theaterlevel troops. This Army support area may also be designated as part of the joint security 

area (JSA). Figure II-1 depicts an example of an AO for the joint force land component 

and subordinate commands with contiguous and noncontiguous AOs. 

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

4. Organizing 

 a. The JFC establishing a functional component command has the authority to 

designate its commander. Normally, the Service component commander with the 

preponderance of forces to be tasked and the ability to C2 those forces will be designated 

as the functional component commander; however, the JFC will always consider the 

mission, nature, and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities 

in selecting a commander. In those instances when the theater-level Service component 

commander is designated the JFLCC, the JFLCC normally delegates as many of the 

Service component related duties as practical to a subordinate ARFOR or Marine Corps 

forces (MARFOR) headquarters. These duties typically include Title 10, US Code 

(USC) support and administrative control (ADCON) of Service forces.

b. Within the JFLCC headquarters, the commander, deputy commander, chief of 

staff, and key members of the staff (manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff 

[J-1] through the communications systems directorate of a joint staff [J-6]) should be 

fully integrated with representation from the forces and capabilities made available to the 

JFLCC. The commander designated as the JFLCC will normally provide the core 

elements of the staff (see Figure II-2). 

See JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations, and CJCSI 1301.01C, Individual 

Augmentation Procedures. 

c. The forces required for the JFLCC to accomplish mission objectives are 

typically identified during the contingency planning process and approved by the 

JFC. The Forces for Unified Commands memorandum assigns forces to the CCDR. 

Guidance for Employment of the Force and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) 

apportions major combat forces to CCDRs for contingency planning. During the crisis 

action planning process, forces are allocated to CCDRs, and may differ from those 

apportioned for the contingency planning process. 
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-31 

d. As the JFC develops the CONOPS, the Service and functional components 

develop their supporting plans. During this process, the JFC tasks the functional and 

Service components to provide estimates of forces required. The JFLCC provides the 

force estimate in terms of capabilities required rather than specific units. The JFC, 

working with the functional and Service components, sources the actual forces needed by 

the JFLCC. Based upon JFC guidance, Service components designate specific units 

to report to the JFC, which are assigned a command relationship with the JFLCC. 

After the forces are designated, the JFC plans and conducts the strategic deployment of 

CONTIGUOUS AND NONCONTIGUOUS 

OPERATIONAL AREAS

Contiguous

Adjacent, subordinate command’s 

operational areas share 

boundaries. In this case, the 

higher headquarters has assigned 

all of its operational area to 

subordinate commands.

Noncontiguous

Subordinate commands receive 

operational areas that do not 

share boundaries. The higher 

headquarters retains 

responsibility for the unassigned 

portion of its operational area.

AO area of operations

ARFOR Army force

JSA joint security area

JSOA joint special operations area

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force

LEGEND

JSOA

ARFOR

AO

MAGTF 

AO

JSA

JSA

ARFOR

AO

MAGTF

 AO

Figure II-1. Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas
The Joint Force Land Component Command 

II-7 

forces. The JFLCC, like other functional component commanders, provides 

recommended phasing of forces to the JFC. The JFLCC does not control the land force 

portion of the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). Based on the Service 

and functional component recommendations, the JFC develops the integrated TPFDD 

and assigns required delivery dates. 

LEGEND

POSSIBLE COMPONENTS IN A JOINT FORCE

OPERATIONAL 

CONTROL (OPCON)

COMMAND 

RELATIONSHIP(S)

DETERMINED BY THE

JOINT FORCE 

COMMANDER

(1) A joint force contains Service components 

(because of logistic and training responsibilities), 

even when operations are conducted through 

functional components.

(2) All Service and functional components are 

depicted; any mix of the above components can 

constitute a joint force.

(3) There may also be a Coast Guard component 

in a joint force.

NOTES:

JOINT FORCE

COMMANDER

ARMY FORCES

ARMY

 COMPONENT

AIR FORCE 

FORCES

AIR FORCE

COMPONENT

MARINE CORPS

FORCES

MARINE CORPS

COMPONENT

FORCES/

CAPABILITY

MADE AVAILABLE

FORCES/

CAPABILITY

MADE AVAILABLE

FORCES/

CAPABILITY

MADE AVAILABLE

FORCES/

CAPABILITY

MADE AVAILABLE

JOINT FORCE 

SPECIAL 

OPERATIONS

COMPONENT

JOINT FORCE 

LAND

COMPONENT

JOINT FORCE 

MARITIME

COMPONENT

JOINT FORCE AIR

COMPONENT

NAVY FORCES

COAST GUARD

FORCES

NAVY

COMPONENT

Figure II-2. Possible Components in a Joint Force 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-31 

For more information on TPFDD development see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) 

Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures). 

5. Forming the Staff and Command Element 

a. The JFLCC staff should, by necessity, be composed of personnel from each 

Service and various Department of Defense (DOD) organizations, and other 

supporting agencies. This provides the JFLCC with staff members who have the 

expertise and experience to assist in making informed decisions. The JFLCC’s staff 

is organized based upon the mission and forces assigned and attached. Because creating 

a new staff would be very time consuming and inefficient, the staff organization will 

most likely be derived from an existing Service command structure. The most likely 

candidates are theater armies, Army corps, or a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) 

(most likely an MEF). Ideally, the JFLCC and the deputy JFLCC or chief of staff would 

come from different Services. This construct should be replicated throughout the staff 

leadership to ensure an understanding of the distinct capabilities of each Service to 

optimize employment of the forces. Appendix A, “Notional Headquarters Organization,” 

depicts a notional JFLCC headquarters organization. The SOPs for the organization from 

which the JFLCC is designated normally form the baseline for the JFLCC’s SOP. 

b. The leader of each primary staff section provides staff supervision of the activities 

and capabilities associated with joint warfare at the operational level while providing 

expertise in the planning, execution, and assessment processes within their core 

functional areas. A primary staff section may be internally organized into six basic 

groups to reflect the following operational tasks: movement and maneuver, intelligence, 

fires, sustainment, C2, and protection. The focused efforts of the primary staff officers in 

these core functions enable the commander and selected staff to maintain situational 

awareness and contributes to sound decisionmaking during the course of the operation or 

campaign. 

c. Forming and Integrating the Joint Force Land Component Headquarters. 

The headquarters are organized according to the JFC’s implementing directive that 

establishes the roles and responsibilities of the JFLCC, and designates the mission and 

forces assigned. Normally, the staff will be built around the JFLCC’s Service 

component staff and augmented with members of the other Service components or 

forces. The JFLCC’s staff should have key staff billets allocated such that all Services 

are appropriately represented and share equitably in staffing tasks. Key here is that these 

new members are not simply liaisons--they are part of the JFLCC staff and ensure the 

synchronized execution of joint land operations. Forming the staff in advance, to 

facilitate training and exercising the integrated staff before conducting land operations, is 

critical to mission accomplishment. 

(1) Split Focus. If the JFLCC retains Service component responsibilities for 

AOR-wide assigned same-Service forces, dual hatting of the staff may burden some staff 

members with focus and time-management dilemmas. The JFLCC either obtains staff 
The Joint Force Land Component Command 

II-9 

augmentation, splits his Service headquarters to establish dual command posts to 

provide exclusive focus on joint operational and Service administrative matters 

respectively, or delegates all or many of the Service component-related tasks to a 

subordinate Service force headquarters.

(2) Staff Organization. The JFLCC staff which will most likely be derived from 

an existing Service command structure should be reasonably balanced as to numbers, 

experience, influence of position, and rank of the Service member concerned. Positions 

on the staff should be divided so that representation and influence generally reflects the 

Service composition of the force and the character of the contemplated operation, the 

number of personnel should be kept to the minimum consistent with the task to be 

performed. The JFLCC is authorized to organize the staff and assign responsibilities to 

individual Service members assigned to the staff as deemed necessary to accomplish the 

mission. See Appendix A, “Notional Headquarters Organization”. 

(a) Traditional Arrangement. A joint staff arrangement normally is 

adopted with directorates for manpower and personnel, intelligence, operations, 

logistics, plans, and communications systems forming the core. Optional directorates for 

IO; engineering; force structure and resource management; liaison officers (LNO)/agency 

representatives; and civil-military operations (CMO) can be established depending on 

the nature of the operation, the operational environment, and the commander’s desires. 

(b) Functional Arrangement. Alternatively, the staff may be organized 

into groups that reflect the joint functions of operational movement and maneuver, 

intelligence, fires, C2, protection, and sustainment. The focused efforts of the staff in 

these functionally organized groupings may enable the JFLCC and senior staff to 

maintain a more logically integrated situational awareness across the operating systems, 

which contributes to sound decisionmaking. As a historical example, during OIF, the 

CFLCC’s staff organized by functions preserved the traditional organization described in 

the previous subparagraph, but fused their efforts to generate a more cohesive, 

synchronized approach to performing the coalition operational functions. 

(3) Forward Deployment. At some point, a significant portion of the theater 

JFLCC headquarters (depending on technological capabilities) may forward deploy to 

plan, coordinate, and conduct JRSOI and other joint land operations in the AO. The 

JFLCC normally will forward deploy as soon as the forward-deployed land component 

staff is operational. It is critical for the JFLCC to get forward to conduct a personal 

assessment and interact with as many military, diplomatic, host nation (HN), and 

nongovernmental organization (NGO) officials in the AO as possible. Early arrival 

of the JFLCC also provides the personal opportunity to begin training a staff 

composed of many new players that will be conducting operational level tasks.

 d. Joint Force Land Component Subordinate Elements. The JFLCC controls 

and coordinates the joint land operations of all subordinate forces (see Figure II-3). 
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-31 

 (1) Alliance and/or coalition forces may be provided to the JFLCC for land 

operations. Major concerns are command relationships/authority, unity of effort, liaison 

requirements, intelligence and information sharing, integration of forces, interoperability 

COMPOSITION OF A NOTIONAL 

JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMAND

LEGEND

AAMDC Army air and missile defense command

ADCON administrative control

ARFOR Army forces

ASCC Army Service component command

BCT brigade combat team

Bde brigades

Cmd command

Div division

GCC geographic combatant commander

JFC joint force commander

JFLCC joint force land component commander

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force

MARFOR Marine Corps forces

MEB Marine expeditionary brigade

MEF Marine expeditionary force

MEU Marine expeditionary unit

MP military police

OPCON operational control

Sig signal

SOC special operations capable

TACON tactical control

TEC theater engineer command

TIB theater intelligence brigade

TSC theater sustainment command

service responsibilties

GCC

* Allied forces may frequently be employed with US joint land forces 

creating a multinational land component command.

MARFOR

MAGTF

MEFs

MEBs

MEU(SOC)s

MultiNational*

Corps 

Divs 

Bde

JFLCC

Theater 

Army 

Forces

AAMDC

TSC, TEC, 

MP Cmd

TIB, Sig Bde

JOINT 

RESPONSIBILITIES

SERVICE 

RESPONSIBILITIES

As determined by 

JFC (normally 

OPCON for same 

Service forces; 

TACON for other 

Service forces)





Title 10

ADCON of 

Respective 

Service Forces

ASCC

ARFOR

Corps

Divs

BCTs

joint responsibilities

Figure II-3. Composition of a Notional Joint Force Land Component Command 
The Joint Force Land Component Command 

II-11 

of equipment, doctrine and procedures, language and cultural factors, mission 

assignment, AOs, rules of engagement (ROE), logistic readiness and capabilities, and 

national direction. When participating as part of a NATO operation, US forces will 

follow AJP that have been ratified by the US.

See JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, for additional guidance on these concerns.

 (2) Same-Service Forces. The JFLCC as a Service component commander 

normally exercises operational control (OPCON) of same-Service forces through 

subordinate Service force commanders. 

 (3) Other Service Forces. The JFLCC will normally be delegated tactical 

control (TACON) of other-Service forces. The JFLCC and staff must understand the 

capabilities and limitations of other Service forces. A MAGTF placed TACON to an 

Army provided JFLCC will normally include Marine tactical air assets. The MAGTF 

commander will retain OPCON of organic air assets. Consequently, commanders 

should specifically address the issue of JFLCC employment of Marine tactical 

aviation (that is, independent functional component air operations) during planning. 

Thus, the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) and Marine liaison to the JFACC 

may need to be coordinated. The JFLCC also must be prepared to receive and coordinate 

with Navy expeditionary forces (e.g., riverine, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and 

Navy construction engineer), the elements of a maritime pre-positioning force (MPF) or 

the equipment of Army pre-positioned stocks (APS) when attached or provided. 

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for more detail on joint C2. 

 (4) Specialized Ground Forces and Capabilities 

 (a) Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC). The JFLCC 

may employ an AAMDC to ensure that tactical defensive counterair (DCA), to include 

ground based theater ballistic missile operations, conducted by land forces are planned,

“The Army also provides forces to other services that enable economies of 

scale across the Department of Defense. For example, the Army provides 

special forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs units to the Marines 

or elsewhere as required by the combatant commander. Similarly, theater air 

and missile defense units extend land-based air and missile defense 

wherever the combatant commander requires it. The same is true for certain 

kinds of support, including processing and securing prisoners of war. The 

Army also provides port-opening, terminal management, and logistics over 

the shore services and . . . common user commodities to all of the services. 

. . . More than 40,000 soldiers either supported the joint team or were 

assigned directly in support of other services.” 

Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degan, and David Tohn, On Point: The United Army in 

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 
Chapter II 

II-12 JP 3-31 

coordinated, and synchronized with the joint AADP of the AADC. The AAMDC is 

normally also placed TACON to the AADC to ensure coordination. 

 (b) Sustainment. The authority to direct logistics is not normally resident 

in the JFLCC’s command authority over other Service forces, unless the JFC delegates 

authority to the JFLCC for a common support capability or capabilities. If so designated, 

the JFLCC should establish a joint sustainment organization to manage land component 

common-user logistics (CUL) support. Army theater sustainment commands (TSCs) and 

expeditionary sustainment commands, as well as Marine logistics groups, may be suitable 

as a basis for augmentation to provide CUL. 

For more information on authority for logistics common support capabilities, see JP 1, 

Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 

 (c) Detainee Operations. While this is an Army executive agent (EA) 

responsibility, the JFC may designate the JFLCC to supervise joint detainee operations of 

either enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) or civilian detainees. US Army military police 

commands or brigades can provide the basis for these organizations. 

See JP 3-63, Detainee Operations, for additional guidance on joint detainee operations. 

 (d) Engineering. If warranted, a US Army theater engineer command 

(TEC) or engineer brigade may be provided to the JFLCC to supervise large scale 

engineering efforts in the JFLCC’s AO. These units could be supplemented by either 

naval construction battalions or US Air Force engineering squadrons. The TEC 

coordinates major construction planning and operations with the engineering staff section 

of a joint staff (J-7), when established, and receives planning and direction from the 

JFLCC’s J-7. 

For additional guidance on engineer doctrine for joint operations, see JP 3-34, Joint 

Engineer Operations. 

 (e) Intelligence. Specialized intelligence capabilities such as 

counterintelligence (CI), unmanned aircraft systems, or joint interrogation and debriefing 

centers may be provided by the Army’s theater intelligence brigade. Additional 

specialized intelligence capabilities may be provided by national and Service level 

agencies and activities. 

For additional information on national level intelligence support, see JP 2-01, Joint and 

National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. 

 (f) Joint Enabling Capabilities Command. United States Joint Forces 

Command (USJFCOM) may provide joint enabling forces to JFCs with immediate 

access to essential JFC capabilities. These capabilities include: joint deployable teams 

with forces in four critical areas — operations, plans, information management, and 

logistics; joint communications support element which provides communications and 
The Joint Force Land Component Command 

II-13 

computer support; joint public affairs (PA) support element with joint media and 

communications capable teams for enhanced, ready PA capability; and intelligence —

quick reaction team with collection and targeting capability. 

 (g) Other Capabilities. The joint force land component may be 

augmented with forces, capabilities, and/or liaison from the Joint Staff, US Army 

Material Command, United States Transportation Command, United States Special 

Operations Command, and Defense Logistics Agency. These forces and capabilities 

will either be provided TACON, as supporting forces, or for coordination of 

specialized tasks and services.

6. Liaison Requirements 

 a. The JFLCC’s liaison requirements include, as a minimum, liaison with other 

components of the joint force, either functional or Service. The commander may 

require additional liaison with other organizations such as joint force headquarters, major 

subordinate commands, and multinational land forces not assigned to the command. The 

liaison teams or individuals represent the sending commander to the gaining commander 

and staff. 

 b. Command relationships and mission accomplishment influence LNO 

requirements. Liaison between the JFLCC and other organizations (i.e., JFC, 

functional/Service components, other government agencies [OGAs], IGOs, and NGOs) is 

an important consideration when determining manning requirements within the JFLCC 

staff. LNOs provide continuous and close liaison to facilitate unity of effort and 

accomplishment of JFC objectives. LNO teams may represent the JFLCC at various 

meetings of joint force and component cross-functional staff organizations. Examples 

include an air component coordination element (ACCE), (joint air component 

coordination element [JACCE] if provided by the JFACC), Army digital liaison 

detachments (DLDs), Marine air/naval gunfire liaison companies, and the BCD. 

The JFACC establishes a JACCE or if a JFACC is not established, the commander, Air 

Force forces establishes an ACCE to interface and provide liaison with the JFLCC. The 

ACCE (or JACCE) assists the JFLCC staff in planning air supporting and support 

requirements. The ACCE (or JACCE) interface includes exchanging current intelligence 

and operational data, support requirements, coordinating the integration of requirements 

for airspace control measures, joint fire support coordination measures (FSCMs), and 

close air support (CAS). The ACCE (or JACCE) is not an air support operations center 

or tactical air control party but can also perform many air support planning functions. 

The BCD is an Army liaison provided by the Army component or force commander to 

the designated air operations center and/or to the component designated by the JFC to 

assist in planning, coordinating, and integrating joint air operations. The BCD processes 

Army requests for air support, monitors and interprets the land battle situation for the 

designated air operations center, and provides the necessary interface for exchange of 

current intelligence and operational data. 
Chapter II 

II-14 JP 3-31 

See JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, and JP 3-30, Command and Control for 

Joint Air Operations, for detailed information on liaison functions.

SECTION B. COMMAND AND CONTROL 

7. Functional Component Command Authority 

 Functional component commanders perform operational missions with authority 

derived from the JFC, who may be a CCDR or a subordinate JFC such as a JTF 

commander. Functional components have specific delegated authority over forces or 

capabilities made available to them, but this does not affect the command 

relationships between Service component commanders and the JFC. Normally 

these specific authorities are described in an establishing directive or “terms of 

reference” document prepared by the JFC staff. 

FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND AUTHORITY 

“Functional component commanders (CDRs) have authority over forces or 

military capability made available to them as delegated by the establishing 

joint force commander (JFC).” 

“Functional component CDRs are component CDRs of a joint force and do not 

constitute a “joint force command” with the authorities and responsibilities of 

a JFC.” 

“The responsibilities and authority of a functional component command must 

be assigned by the establishing JFC. The establishment of a functional 

component CDR must not affect the command relationships between Service 

component and the JFC.” 

“The JFC must designate the forces and/or military capability that will be 

made available for tasking by the functional component CDR and the 

appropriate command relationship(s) the functional component CDR will 

exercise.” 

SOURCE: Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces 

of the United States

COORDINATING AUTHORITY 

“Commanders (CDRs) or individuals may exercise coordination authority at 

any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Coordination 

authority is the authority delegated to a CDR or individual for coordinating 

specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military 

Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of 

the same Service (e.g., joint security coordinator exercises coordinating 

authority for joint security area operations among the component CDRs). 

Coordinating authority may be granted and modified through memorandum 

agreement to provide unity of command and unity of effort.” 

SOURCE: Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces 

of the United States 
The Joint Force Land Component Command 

II-15 

8. Joint Security Area Responsibilities 

a. The JFLCC may be designated as the JSC by the JFC. As such, the JFLCC 

designated the JSC will be responsible for coordinating the overall protection of the JSA 

among the component commanders in accordance with JFC directives and priorities. The 

JSC is also responsible for ensuring that the surface area requirements and priorities for 

the JSA are integrated in the overall security requirements of the joint force and are 

coordinated with the AADC who is responsible for defending the airspace over the 

operational area. 

b. The JFLCC serving as the JSC will establish a joint security coordination 

center. The staff of this center may be part of either the JFLCC headquarters or this 

function may be delegated to a subordinate unit. US Army maneuver enhancement 

brigades are suitable for this function. 

See JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, and Field Manual (FM) 3-37, 

Protection. 

9. Command Relationships 

 Unity of command and effort is a primary consideration when designating a JFLCC. 

Use of the JFLCC is a JFC option for managing the operations of land forces and 

reducing the requirement for the JFC to oversee and influence every task, thereby 

allowing the JFC to focus more on the overall joint effort. The JFLCC must understand 

the relationship with the JFC, the other components (Service and functional), and the 

forces and capabilities made available. The JFLCC may provide support to other 

components and may similarly receive support from other Service or functional 

components. 

a. The JFC establishes the command relationships and assignment of forces to 

accomplish mission objectives. The JFC will also specify the command relationships 

between the functional components and Service components. 

b. The JFLCC is responsible for joint land operations as assigned and 

establishes command relationships for subordinate forces. The JFLCC is responsible 

for planning and executing the land operations portion of the JFC’s operation or 

campaign plan. The JFLCC prepares a supporting plan or order to the JFC’s OPLAN 

that provides JFLCC’s intentions, CONOPS, and details. The JFLCC directs current land 

operations while continuing to plan and prepare for future land operations. 

(1) Command Relationships with the JFC. The JFLCC reports directly to 

the JFC and advises the JFC on the proper employment of land forces assigned, 

attached, or made available. The JFC has the authority to assign missions, redirect 

efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs should allow 

Service tactical and operational assets and groupings to function generally as they were 
Chapter II 

II-16 JP 3-31 

designed. The intent is to meet the needs of the JFC while maintaining the tactical and 

operational integrity of the Service organizations. 

(2) Command Relationships Among Components. The JFC may also 

establish support relationships among components. There are four defined categories of 

support that a JFC may direct over assigned or attached forces to ensure the appropriate 

level of support is provided to accomplish mission objectives. These are general 

support, mutual support, direct support, and close support. The establishing directive 

will specify the type and extent of support the specified forces are to provide. The JFC 

determines not only how to organize the joint force into components, but also how 

each component relates to the others. Support relationships afford an effective means 

to ensure unity of effort of various operations, each component typically receiving and 

providing support at the same time. The effectiveness of these support relationships 

depend on the establishment of personal trust and confidence between the respective 

component commanders that ensure mutual support even when not tasked. 

(3) Functional Component Supporting and Supported Relationships. The 

JFLCC will be the supported commander for operations conducted within the AO 

when designated by the JFC and may be the supporting commander for some 

functions. Similar relationships can be established among all functional and Service 

component commanders, such as the coordination of operations in depth involving the 

JFLCC and the JFACC or joint force special operations component commander 

(JFSOCC). The JFC’s need for unified action dictate these relationships. Close 

coordination is necessary when the JFLCC provides joint suppression of enemy air 

defenses in support of JFACC operations or conducts land operations in the vicinity of a 

joint special operations area. To this end, the JFLCC will normally share the land COP 

of the battlefield with other JTF functional component commanders via the Global 

Command and Control System, if available, to meet the JTF’s reporting criteria for a 

COP of the JOA as outlined in GCC directives and commander, and JTF commander 

amplifying instructions. 

(4) Command Relationships with Forces Made Available. The JFLCC will 

normally be a Service component commander. As Service component commander, the 

JFLCC normally exercises OPCON over its respective Service forces. As a 

functional component commander, the JFLCC normally exercises TACON over 

other forces or capabilities made available for tasking, or receives support as 

determined by the JFC (refer back to Figure II-3). 

(a) Once the JFLCC is designated and forces are made available, the 

operational requirements of subordinate commanders are prioritized and presented to the 

JFC. However, Service component commanders remain responsible for their Military 

Department Title 10, USC, ADCON responsibilities, such as logistic and personnel 

services support, casualty operations, training, and Service intelligence operations. 
The Joint Force Land Component Command 

II-17 

 (b) The JFLCC collaborates with other components and can receive and 

integrate component liaison teams to facilitate support and to coordinate the planning and 

execution of assigned land operations. 

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for more on command and 

support relationships; for further detail on Title 10, USC, responsibilities, refer to Title 

10, USC, Service responsibilities, and Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.1, 

Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components. 

(5) Maritime Pre-positioning Force Considerations

 (a) An MPF enables operations across the range of military operations and 

through any phase. When combined with the forces and their equipment arriving in the 

fly-in echelon, prepositioning programs provide forward-deployed equipment and 

supplies needed to sustain a Marine expeditionary brigade-sized MAGTF for 30 days of 

operations; thus reducing total strategic lift requirements. Close coordination is required 

between a MAGTF and JFLCC staff during all five phases of an MPF operation. 

(b) An MPF provides rapid response to regional contingencies and consists 

of the maritime pre-positioning ship squadron, Navy support element, and MAGTF. An 

MPF is an option for the deployment of land forces made available to a JFLCC. 

The MPF will be assigned to a functional or Service component commander as 

appropriate and perhaps based on the phase of the operation. For example, the 

deployment order may assign the MPF to a joint force maritime component 

commander (JFMCC) or numbered fleet commander during transit and then transfer the 

MPF to the JFLCC upon reaching the port of debarkation within the JFLCC’s AO. 

There is no single formula to incorporate an MPF into a naval, joint, or 

multinational effort; organization depends on mission, force capabilities, tactical 

situation, and phase of the operations. 

(c) The MAGTF commander’s mission becomes the basis for all further 

MPF operation planning and must support the JFC’s overall objectives. The landing 

force’s CONOPS ashore is derived from the assigned mission. The JFLCC must be 

prepared to receive and integrate planning and liaison personnel from both the MAGTF 

commander and the commander, MPF. Without this close coordination between the 

JFLCC and MPF staffs, the MAGTF may not be able to effectively influence the land 

battle upon completion of the arrival and assembly phase of the MPF operation. Once the 

MAGTF commander reports that all essential elements of the MAGTF are combat ready, 

the establishing authority terminates the MPF operation and the MAGTF commander 

executes the assigned mission. 

See also Navy Warfare Publication 3-02.3/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication

(MCWP) 3-32, Maritime Pre-positioning Force (MPF) Operations. 
Chapter II 

II-18 JP 3-31 

(6) Army Pre-positioned Stocks Considerations

(a) APS is the expanded reserve of equipment for Army brigade combat 

teams (BCTs), theater-opening units, port-opening capabilities, and sustainment stocks 

forward deployed ashore or aboard ships. APS operations require airlift of an Army BCT 

with logistic support elements into a theater to link up with its equipment and supplies 

positioned ashore or aboard Army strategic flotilla ships. Their purposes are listed 

below: 

1. To project a heavy BCT to selected forward strategic locations early 

in a crisis that is capable of complementing other early arriving forces. 

2. To project an afloat infantry BCT or supporting elements to a port to 

rapidly reinforce a lodgment established by Army early-entry forces and/or by 

amphibious assault elements, such as an Army airborne BCT or a MAGTF. 

3. To protect key objectives. 

4. To commence port operations to support the introduction of followon forces. 

5. To rapidly provide a BCT or other capabilities to be prepared to 

conduct subsequent operations across the range of military operations. 

(b) During preparation for APS operations, an initiating directive from 

higher authority will specify the command relationships. The theater army commander 

— the senior Army operational-level commander assigned to a combatant command — is 

responsible for planning APS operations. Thus, a theater army commander and staff 

must plan in detail the task organization and activities for each phase of the operation to 

ensure minimal disruption of C2 during phase transition. The theater army commander 

will designate which BCTs participate in the APS program, and make recommendations 

for their employment to the JFC. Upon completion of reception, staging, onward 

movement and integration (RSOI), the BCT will be provided to a JFC, who may 

assign the BCT to a JFLCC. As with the MPF, the JFLCC must receive and integrate 

planners and liaison personnel. 

(c) APS employment focuses on expeditious deployment, assembly, and 

employment of BCTs and other enabling capabilities to meet the supported commander’s 

requirements. It may also include tasks in support of other operations in the objective 

area. The mission order usually delineates the general AO, the required tasks of the BCT 

or other Army elements, the general time period for the deployment, required time for 

operational capability, time constraints on deployment operations — for example, 

availability of aircraft — and the estimated duration of operations. 

See also FM 3-35.1, Army Pre-Positioned Operations.
The Joint Force Land Component Command 

II-19 

10. Functional Command Relationships 

 a. Command relationships between Service and/or functional component 

commands are established by the JFC. Joint interdependence is established by the 

commander through the deliberate assignment of command relationships with clear areas 

of operations, delegated authorities, and assigned responsibilities to best integrate the 

capabilities of the joint force. Elements of the different Services may be placed TACON 

or OPCON to functional component commands while retaining an ADCON relationship 

with their respective Service component commander. However, supported/supporting 

relationships may also be used to provide the necessary authority and basis for 

interdependence in the contemporary complex operational environment. 

 b. The Navy component commander normally establishes a subordinate TF 

comprised of forward Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) elements. These 

elements may consist of riverine squadrons, naval construction battalions, and naval 

logistical units operating ashore. This TF interfaces with and provides liaison to the 

JFLCC. The NECC LNO assists the JFLCC staff in planning naval supporting and 

support requirements. The NECC LNO exchanges current intelligence and operational 

data and coordinates planning requirements, to include coordinating airspace control 

measures, FSCMs, and CAS. A DLD may be used to provide ARFOR/JFLCC liaison to 

the Navy Service component commander/JFMCC and is responsible for synchronizing 

ground operations with joint maritime operations. 

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

11. Cross-Functional Staff Organizations 

The JFLCC may be required to establish a variety of cross-functional staff 

organizations and send representatives to the JFC’s and various other crossfunctional staff organizations (see Figure II-4). How JFLCC interfaces with other 

joint force C2 mechanisms is described in Figure II-5. Some considerations by type are: 

a. Planning. Provide representation in the JFC’s joint planning group (JPG) (or 

equivalent). Participate in the JFC’s time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL) 

development. Provide inputs into the JFC-approved joint AADP and the ACP. 

b. Intelligence. Provide appropriate targeting intelligence support, including target 

intelligence packages, to the other joint force components and the joint targeting 

coordination board (JTCB). Provide and receive support from the theater joint 

intelligence operations center. Actively work to satisfy the JFC’s priority intelligence 

requirements. 
Chapter II 

II-20 JP 3-31 

c. Operations

 (1) Provide representation in the JFC’s JTCB and IO cell. These 

representatives advocate the JFLCC’s desired results/target nominations in the respective 

board or cell meetings (e.g., computer network attack [CNA] targets). This should 

include participation in the JFC’s campaign assessment process. 

JOINT CROSS-FUNCTIONAL STAFF ORGANIZATIONS

*This functionality may be assigned to a subordinate commander

JFLCC

PROVOST

MARSHAL

STAFF JUDGE

ADVOCATE

INSPECTOR

GENERAL

PUBLIC 

AFFAIRS

COMPTROLLER

SURGEON

CHAPLAIN

JOINT 

VISITORS

BUREAU

KEY

Deputy

J-6 J-1

J-5 J-2

J-4 J-3

Chief of 

Staff

LEGEND

CDR commander

J-1 manpower and personnel directorate 

of a joint staff

J-2 intelligence 

J-3 operations 

J-4 logistics 

directorate of a joint staff

directorate of a joint staff

directorate of a joint staff

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff

J-6 communications system 

directorate of a joint staff

JFLCC joint force land component 

commander

JTF joint task force

NETOPS network operations

JOINT INFORMATION

BUREAU

JOINT PERSONNEL

RECEPTION CENTER

JOINT BLOOD

PROGRAM OFFICE

JOINT DOCUMENT

EXPLOITATION CENTER

JOINT NETOPS 

CONTROL CENTER

JOINT PATIENT 

MOVEMENT

REQUIREMENT 

CENTER

JOINT INTERROGATION

AND DEBRIEFING 

CENTER

JOINT INTELLIGENCE

SUPPORT ELEMENT

RULES OF

ENGAGEMENT CELL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

SUPPORT TEAM

INFORMATION 

OPERATIONS CELL CONTRACTING 

OFFICE

JOINT MOVEMENT

CENTER

JOINT DEPLOYMENT 

AND DISTRIBUTION 

OPERATIONS CENTER

JOINT PLANNING

GROUP

JOINT OPERATIONS

CENTER

JOINT CAPTURED 

MATERIAL

EXPLOITATION CENTER

*CIVIL-MILITARY

OPERATIONS CENTER JOINT FACILITIES

UTILIZATION BOARD

*JOINT PERSONNEL 

RECOVERY CENTER

JOINT SECURITY 

SUBAREA COORDINATION CENTER

PETROLEUM OFFICE

LOGISTICS

READINESS CENTER

JTF CDR 

DETERMINES

STAFF 

RELATIONSHIP

AS 

REQUIRED

AS 

RECOMMENDED

JOINT FIRES ELEMENT *JOINT TARGETING

COORDINATION BOARD

JOINT MORTUARY

AFFAIRS OFFICE

Figure II-4. Joint Cross-Functional Staff Organizations 
The Joint Force Land Component Command 

II-21 

 (2) Develop IO requirements and the associated measures of effectiveness 

(MOEs) during the planning process. These capabilities and processes must address 

the entire depth of the campaign and are critical to shaping the operational 

environment before, during, and after operations. MOEs required to assess the 

effects of a range of IO activities and operations may be resource intensive (polling, for 

example), and the related resource requirements must be introduced early for JFC 

validation and force provider planning. 

 (3) The BCD, Navy liaison element, and Marine liaison element members will 

participate in the JFACC’s targeting effects team and air tasking order (ATO) 

development processes. 

JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER INTERFACE WITH OTHER JOINT FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL 

MECHANISMS 

C2 MECHANISM ROLE / FUNCTION JFLCC INTERFACE 

JFC’s Joint Targeting Coordination 

Board (JTCB) 

Meets daily to provide broad targeting 

oversight functions that may include but are 

not limited to coordinating targeting 

information, providing targeting guidance 

and priorities, and refining the joint 

integrated prioritized target list.

 JFLCC Representative Attends JTCB 

Meetings to Represent Land 

Component Interests. 

 JFLCC Targeting Coordination Board 

provides input. 

JFC’S Joint Planning Group (JPG) 

Meets daily or as required to conduct crisis 

action planning (to include course of action 

development and refinement), coordination 

of joint force operation order development, 

and planning for future operations (e.g., 

transition, termination, follow-on). 

 JFLCC Representative Participates in all 

Planning Activities. 

JFC’s Joint Intelligence Operation 

Center 

An interdependent, operational intelligence 

organization at the combatant command or 

joint task force (if established) level, that is 

integrated with national intelligence centers, 

and capable of accessing all sources of 

intelligence impacting military operations 

planning, execution, and assessment. 

 JFLCC J-2 and staff maintain daily 

communication to provide, request, and 

receive intelligence products as needed. 

JFC’s Information Operations (IO) Cell 

Meets daily or as required to integrate and 

synchronize IO core, supporting, and 

related capabilities with other elements of 

the operation plan. 

 JFLCC Representative Participates and 

Coordinates with the JFLCC’s JPG 

Representative and Other JFC Staff 

Members. 

JFC’s Joint Transportation Board 

Communicates JFC’s priorities and 

adjudicates competing requirements for 

intratheater lift assets and helps resolve 

other issues that negatively impact the 

Defense Transportation System. 

 JFLCC Representative Participates. 

JFC’s Joint Movement Center 

Coordinates the employment of all means of 

transportation (including that provided by 

allies or host nations) daily to support the 

concept of operations. 

 JFLCC Representative Participates. 

JFC’s Joint Petroleum Office 

Plans and manages wholesale theater bulk 

petroleum support and develops the 

petroleum logistic support plan. 

 JFLCC J-4 Coordinates and Provides 

Assistance on an as Needed Basis. 

JFC’s Civil-Military Operations Center Meets daily and will coordinate all CMO 

among OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, coalition, and 

 JFLCC Representative Participates. 
Chapter II 

II-22 JP 3-31 

host nation members; and plays an 

integration and synchronization role with 

other elements of the operation plan. 

JFACC’s Targeting Effects Team 

Processes all potential targets to balance 

component priorities with the JFC’s 

objectives. Competing concerns are 

priorities against available assets to 

produce the JIPTL, apportionment 

recommendations, and CAS allocation. 

 Battlefield Coordination Detachment 

(BCD) provides input and participates, 

coordinates with MARLE. 

 MARLE provides input and participates, 

coordinates with BCD. 

JFACC’s Air Tasking Order (ATO) 

Development Processes 

Produces a tasking document transmitted to 

components, subordinate units, and 

command and control agencies on 

projected sorties, capabilities, and/or forces 

to targets and specific missions. The ATO 

normally provides specific instructions to 

include call signs, targets, controlling 

agencies, etc., as well as general 

instructions. 

 Battlefield Coordination Detachment 

provides input and participates, 

coordinates with MARLE. 

 MARLE provides input and participates, 

coordinates with BCD. 

Joint Security Coordination Center 

(JSCC) 

Coordinates and oversees overall security 

operations within the AOR/JOA. Monitors 

emergency service, force protection, 

antiterrorism, physical security, and base 

and base cluster plans. 

 Joint Security Coordinator is the 

designated principle staff officer for the 

planning of Joint Security Operations 

throughout the AOR/JOA 

Joint LOC Security Board Assesses and reports LOC status and 

security capability shortfalls. 

 JSCC lead (or J-3) 

 Transportation representative 

 J-2 rep 

 PMO rep 

Joint Deployment and Distribution 

Operations Center (JDDOC) 

A combatant command movement control 

organization designed to synchronize and 

optimize national and theater multi-modal 

resources for deployment, distribution, and 

sustainment. 

Joint Interagency Coordination 

Group (JIACG) 

Interagency staff group that establishes 

regular, timely, collaborative working 

relationship between civilian and military 

with the capability to coordinate with other 

agencies. 

 JFLCC Representative Participates 

 United States Government Agencies 

and Departments 

LEGEND 

AOR area of responsibility 

C2 command and control 

CAS close air support 

CMO civil-military operations 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff 

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff 

J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff 

JFACC joint force air component commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JFLCC joint force land component commander 

JIPTL joint integrated prioritized target list 

JOA joint operations area 

JSCC joint security coordination center 

LOC line of communications 

MARLE Marine liaison element 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

OGA other government agency 

PMO provost marshal office 

Rep representative 

Figure II-5. Joint Force Land Component Commander Interface with Other Joint Force 

Command and Control Mechanisms 

 d. Sustainment. Participation by the JFLCC’s sustainment elements (logistic, 

personnel, financial management, etc.) in the JFC’s pertinent boards or centers is critical. 

The key logistics higher-level boards and centers are the joint transportation board 

(JTB), joint deployment and distribution operations center (JDDOC), and joint 

movement center (JMC). 

 e. Engineer Boards, Centers, and Cells. If a J-7 staff is formed under the JFLCC, 

recommend establishing the following boards and cell: a joint civil-military engineer 
The Joint Force Land Component Command 

II-23 

board, a joint facilities utilization board, a joint environmental management board, and an 

explosive hazards coordination cell. 

12. Interagency Coordination 

 a. General. JFLCCs are likely to operate with OGAs, foreign governments, NGOs, 

IGOs, and the private sector in a variety of circumstances. The nature of interagency 

coordination demands that commanders and joint planners consider all instruments of 

national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements 

toward the objective. Other agencies may be the lead effort during some operations with 

DOD providing support; however, US military forces will remain under the DOD 

command structure while supporting other agencies. In some cases, a federal agency 

with lead responsibility is prescribed by law or regulation, or by agreement between the 

agencies involved. 

 b. Civil-Military Integration. The increasing complexity of peacekeeping and 

stability operations requires complete civil-military integration within the JFLCC. 

Presidential directives guide participation by all US civilian and military agencies in such 

operations. Military leaders must work with the other members of the national security 

team in the most skilled, tactful, and persistent ways to promote unified action; which is 

made more challenging by the agencies’ different and sometimes conflicting policies, 

procedures, and decision-making processes. Integration and coordination among the 

military force and OGAs, NGOs, IGOs, and the private sector is distinctly different 

from military C2. Military operations depend upon a command structure that is often 

very different from that of civilian organizations. These differences may present 

significant challenges to coordination. Military leaders must work with other members of 

the national security team to promote unified action. In the absence of a formal 

command structure, JFLCCs may be required to build consensus for effective unified 

action to achieve unity of effort. Robust liaison facilitates understanding, coordination, 

and mission accomplishment. 

 c. Formal Agreements. Formal agreements such as memoranda of understanding 

or terms of reference are more common among military organizations and OGAs or HNs 

than between military organizations and NGOs. Although formal agreements may be 

established, commanders should not expect that formal agreements with NGOs exist. 

Heads of agencies or organizations and specifically authorized military commanders 

negotiate and cosign these agreements. 

 d. Information Sharing. Unified action requires effective information sharing 

among DOD, OGAs, and state and local agencies. Accordingly, JFLCCs should develop 

habitual relationships, procedures, and agreements with the individual agencies. For 

example, DOD support to homeland security requires detailed coordination and 

information sharing with the Department of Homeland Security. Implementation of a 

collaborative information environment (CIE) that connects commanders and these 

various organizations, using commonly accessible portals and collaborative tools, 

provides a proven means for effective coordination and information sharing. 
Chapter II 

II-24 JP 3-31 

CJCSM 6715, Joint Collaboration Tools Employment, provides further information on 

the means for CIE implementation. 

 e. Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). The JIACG, an element of a 

GCC’s staff, is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and 

collaborative working relationships between civilians and military operational planners at 

the combatant commands. There is currently no standardized structure for the JIACG. 

Its size and composition depends on the specific operational and staff requirements at 

each combatant command. The JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that 

takes place at the national level through DOD and the National Security Council System. 

JIACG members participate in contingency, crisis action, security cooperation, and other 

operational planning. They provide a conduit back to their parent organizations to help 

synchronize joint operations with the efforts of OGAs. If required a JIACG may be 

formed at JFLCC level. 

 

 f. JFLCC Staff. There are several other means available at the JFLCC level to 

conduct interagency coordination. This coordination can occur in the various boards, 

centers, cells, and/or working groups established within the LCC. The JFLCC and OGAs 

also may agree to form steering groups to coordinate actions. In the case of a DOD 

directed CS mission, the JFLCC can establish a defense coordinating element to conduct 

direct coordination with the federal coordinating officer in the joint field office. 

 g. Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). One method to facilitate unified 

action and conduct on-site interagency coordination for CMO is for the commander to 

establish a CMOC. A CMOC is an organization normally comprised of civil affairs 

(CA), established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of 

the US with indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), the private sector, IGOs, 

NGOs, multinational forces, and OGAs. Through a structure such as a CMOC, the 

JFLCC can gain a greater understanding of the roles of IGOs and NGOs and how they 

influence mission accomplishment. 

For additional guidance on CMOC see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. For 

additional guidance on interagency coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational 

Coordination During Joint Operations. 

h. Other Civil-Military Coordination Mechanisms. In order to ensure a thorough 

integration of cooperation between the military and other civilian organizations, the 

commander may require a number of other centers, including the humanitarian assistance 

coordination center, humanitarian operations center, humanitarian liaison center, and 

humanitarian assistance survey team. These organizations all provide the commander a 

coordination point between military and various civilian partners. 
The Joint Force Land Component Command 

II-25 

13. Multinational Operations 

a. To achieve the most effective C2 and best use the capabilities of the multinational 

land forces, the multinational force commander normally designates a single LCC 

for land operations. Multinational forces may be part of a coalition or an alliance. 

How that structure is organized will be based on the needs, political goals, constraints, 

and objectives of the participating nations. The multinational commander has the option 

of creating a land component command within either an alliance or coalition. 

(1) In alliance operations, such as those conducted by NATO and the United 

Nations, there are normally existing land commands that serve as the JFLCC or alliance 

LCC. 

(2) In coalition operations, the multinational commander can establish a land 

component command from an existing command organization or through establishment 

of a new command made up of various command staffs. 

b. In multinational operations the JFLCC considers many issues with particular 

attention to the following listed below: 

 (1) Command Authority. Higher authority and agreements with participating 

nations will determine the command authority over forces provided to the LCC. Unity of 

effort must be a key consideration with the respective national command elements, or 

the senior element within a multinational command so designated to represent the 

national command channels from its individual nation. The multinational land staff must 

gain the trust of, have rapport with, respect for, develop knowledge of, and have patience 

with all its partners. Liaison and coordination centers will enhance C2. 

(2) Information Exchange Requirements. Information sharing, classification, 

and disclosure issues will require early planning and resolution especially for any 

intelligence requirements. A certain degree of access must be coordinated early on to 

enable adequate secure communication and information sharing. 

(3) Communications. Varying degrees of technological capabilities may 

constrain activities. Countries equipped with older communications technologies will 

require communications systems and equipped LNO teams to support them. 

“Establishing and implementing Coalition command relationships was 

difficult and a matter of great concern for all nations contributing forces to the 

Coalition. National, ethnic, and religious pride, along with politics and public 

perception, played as large a role in determining these relationships as did 

military requirements.” 

Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 

Final Report to Congress 

April 1992 
Chapter II 

II-26 JP 3-31 

(4) Integration of Forces. Understanding the capabilities of multinational 

forces is essential to assigning missions. Government agencies will work with 

multinational commands. 

(5) Rules of Engagement. Differing national laws and treaties will impact 

ROE. Obtaining concurrence for ROE from national authorities should be addressed 

early in the planning process and may require early resolution and consensus building. 

Differences in interpretations need to be reconciled as much as possible to develop and 

implement simple ROE that can be tailored by member forces to their national policies. 

(6) Logistics. Although logistics is normally a responsibility of each 

contributing nation, economy of force considerations requires adaptability and planning 

with centralized control. Funding authorities should be identified early. Each nation 

should have a designated national support element. This is any national organization or 

activity that supports national forces that are a part of a multinational force. Their 

mission is nation-specific support to units and common support that is retained by that 

nation. 

JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, provides further information on multinational C2. 

See also JP 4-08, Logistic Support of Multinational Operations. AJP 3.2, Allied Joint 

Doctrine for Land Operations, provides further information on the doctrine for planning, 

preparing, and executing NATO (alliance or coalition) land component operations.

14. Communications Support Systems 

The CCDR, through the JFC and functional/Service components, ensures effective, 

reliable, and secure communications system services consistent with the overall joint 

campaign plan. As driven by the mission, the foundation of the communications system 

is laid by the C2 organization of forces assigned to the JFC. 

a. The JFLCC provides standardized direction and guidance on communications 

systems matters to the JFLCC subordinate commanders and any other communications 

supporting elements, as these matters affect the operational mission. The JFLCC 

establishes communications systems responsibilities for units assigned, attached, and 

forces made available for tasking. The Service component commands have the overall 

responsibility for providing communications systems to their own forces unless otherwise 

directed. Communications hardware and software is a Service component responsibility. 

b. The JFLCC utilizes existing theater communications systems that are established 

and managed by the GCC. Theater systems may need to be supplemented based on 

operational need. This provides theater-wide voice, data, and message connectivity 

between all components and elements. In addition, these systems and nonstandard 

commercial systems address unique communications connectivity requirements that 

provide for the appropriate interface between land forces and other components, and 

OGA, IGO, and NGO partners, and C2 that permits timely execution of assigned 
The Joint Force Land Component Command 

II-27 

missions. Among the systems the JFLCC should consider are any forms of CIE that may 

have been implemented by the JFC to afford interface of land forces with these traditional 

partners and which may extend even to nontraditional partners. 

c. Communications are established as specified in the OPLAN and/or OPORD 

(generally found in annex K). 

d. The J-6 provides functional expertise to the JFLCC concerning communications 

systems matters. The J-6 focuses on communications systems issues affecting joint land 

operations assigned to the JFLCC and has responsibility for achieving integration of 

those communications systems so as to assure their suitability for use by the JFLCC. 

Routine communications systems management is the responsibility of the JFC and the 

subordinate Service component commands. Appendix A, “Notional Headquarters 

Organization,” provides additional information regarding the organization and 

responsibilities of the J-6 staff. 

See also JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

e. The intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2), operations directorate of a joint 

staff (J-3) and J-6 may establish a prioritized circuit restoration plan that includes preplanned responses, bandwidth reallocation, prevention of network intrusions, and 

recovery from data exchange bottle-necks, in order to meet the commander’s critical 

information requirements (CCIRs). 
Chapter II 

II-28 JP 3-31 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER III

PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT

III-1 

SECTION A. PLANNING

1. Strategic Planning Considerations 

Planning for the employment of military forces is an inherent responsibility of 

command. Joint planning integrates military actions with those of other instruments of 

national power and our multinational partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve a 

specified end state. Joint land force operational planning links the tactical employment of 

land forces to campaign and strategic objectives through the achievement of operational 

goals. The focus of JFLCC planning is on operational art — the application of 

creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, 

and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and 

employ military forces. 

a. Traditional war is a form of warfare between regulated militaries of states, or

alliance of states, in which the objective is to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy 

an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain terrain in order to force a change 

in an adversary’s government or policies. This confrontation typically involves smallscale to large-scale, force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a 

variety of conventional military capabilities against each other in the air, land, maritime, 

and space physical domains and the information environment (which includes 

cyberspace). Military operations in traditional war normally focus on an adversary’s 

armed forces to ultimately influence the adversary’s government. It generally assumes 

that the people indigenous to the operational area are nonbelligerents and will accept 

whatever political outcome the belligerent governments impose, arbitrate, or negotiate. A 

fundamental military objective is to minimize civilian interference in those operations. 

The near-term results of traditional war are often evident, with the conflict ending in 

victory for one side and defeat for the other or in stalemate. 

b. Irregular warfare (IW) has emerged as a major and pervasive form of warfare 

although it is not per se, a new or an independent type of warfare. IW is a violent 

struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the 

relevant population(s). IW favors the indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it 

may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an 

adversary’s power, influence, and will. Adaptive adversaries, such as terrorists, 

“Lack of a Ground Component Commander was a mistake: even absent a 

combat ground offensive, the planning and staffing capabilities that an 

ARFOR [Army forces] would have provided were needed...significant ground 

planning responsibilities were shifted to the JTF [joint task force] staff – that 

was only marginally prepared to handle myriad issues pertaining to Initial 

Entry Force for Kosovo and TF [task force] FALCON.”

Admiral James Ellis, Commander, Joint Task Force NOBLE ANVIL

during Operation ALLIED FORCE in letter correspondence to RAND 

Corporation, December 2000 
Chapter III

III-2 JP 3-31 

insurgents, and transnational criminal networks, as well as states, will increasingly resort 

to irregular forms of warfare as effective ways to challenge conventional military powers. 

Advances in technology and other trends in the environment will render such irregular 

threats ever more lethal, capable of producing widespread chaos, and otherwise difficult 

to counter. These threats are enmeshed in the population and increasingly empowered by 

astute use of communications and technology, such that their impact extends regionally 

and globally. Many of these conflicts are essentially contests for influence and 

legitimacy over relevant populations. 

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and DODD 3000.07, 

Irregular Warfare. 

2. Range of Military Operations 

 a. General. The United States employs its military capabilities at home and abroad

in support of its national security goals in a variety of operations. These operations vary 

in size, purpose, and combat intensity within a range of military operations that extends 

from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis 

response and limited contingency operations, and if necessary, major operations and 

campaigns (see Figure III-1). Any of these military operations, from crisis response and 

limited contingency operations to major operations and campaigns, can take place on 

land. The use of land force capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation, 

and deterrence activities shapes the operational environment and helps to keep the dayto-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while 

maintaining US global influence. Many of the missions associated with crisis response 

and limited contingencies, such as CS and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), may 

not require land combat. But others can be extremely dangerous and may require land 

operations to protect US forces while accomplishing the mission. Major operations and 

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Crisis Response and

Limited Contingency Operations

Major Operations and 

Campaigns

Military Engagement, Security 

Cooperation, and Deterrence

Figure III-1. Range of Military Operations
Planning and Assessment 

III-3 

campaigns requiring significant land forces often contribute to a larger, long-term effort. 

The nature of the security environment is such that the US land forces often will be 

engaged in several types of joint operations simultaneously across the range of military 

operations. For these operations, commanders combine and sequence offensive, 

defensive, and stability missions and activities to accomplish the objective. The 

commander for a particular operation determines the emphasis to be placed on each type 

of mission or activity. 

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for more on range of 

military operations.

b. Joint Land Operations in Major Operations and Campaigns 

 (1) When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national

interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct a major operation or 

campaign involving large-scale combat, placing the United States in a wartime state. 

In such cases, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible, 

conclude hostilities, and establish conditions favorable to the HN and the United States 

and its multinational partners. Establishing these conditions often requires conducting 

stability operations in support of broader stability, security, transition, and reconstruction 

efforts. While Department of State (DOS) is the lead agent for stability and 

reconstruction efforts, stability operations are a core US military mission that help to 

establish order and protect US interests and values. The immediate goal often is to 

provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet 

humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is supporting the DOS and HN to develop 

indigenous capacity for securing essential services, operating a viable market economy, 

and maintaining rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society. This 

requires a coordinated approach with a chief of mission or other designated individual 

developing a country (and possible region/province specific) plan in conjunction with all 

participating agencies and controlling or coordinating all US activities in support of that 

plan. 

 (2) Ground combat — either offensive with the purpose of securing a vital area 

and destroying the adversary defending it, or defensive with the objective to deny a vital 

area to the adversary — is the most difficult and costly type of land operation. All 

aspects of ground combat that have historically extracted a terrible price on attacker, 

defender, and civilian alike remain present today, multiplied by the increased size and 

complexity of modern urban areas and increase in the number of inhabitants. However, 

other types of operations exist in war that may accomplish strategic and operational 

objectives without ground offensive combat. Aviation assets can destroy and disrupt 

adversary forces and functions, and the infrastructure on which they depend. Special 

operations forces (SOF) can accomplish similar missions. Application of IO and 

strategic communication (SC) can lessen popular support for adversary leaders, and/or 

decrease the ability of the adversary leader to effectively direct his forces. If ground 

combat operations are necessary, appropriate shaping of the operational environment and 

application of force may prevent full-scale combat. The JFC should consider forces and 
Chapter III

III-4 JP 3-31 

functions in unusual combinations and relations when conducting joint land operations, 

befitting the nature of the land operational environment. 

c. Joint Land Operations in Crisis Response and Limited Contingency 

Operations

 (1) A crisis response or limited contingency operation can be a single smallscale, limited-duration operation or a significant part of a major operation of extended 

duration involving combat. The associated general strategic and operational objectives 

are to protect US interests and prevent attack or further conflict. A limited contingency 

operation in response to a crisis includes all of those operations for which the joint 

operation planning process (JOPP) is required and a joint OPLAN is developed. The 

level of complexity, duration, and resources depends on the circumstances. Included are

operations to ensure the safety of American citizens and US interests while maintaining 

and improving US ability to operate with multinational partners to deter the hostile 

ambitions of potential aggressors. Many such operations involve a combination of 

military forces and capabilities in close cooperation with OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. 

 (2) Crisis response and limited contingency operations conducted by US forces 

increasingly take place on land and in urban areas. These operations can be conducted in 

a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment. However, in many areas of the world 

stability is tenuous at best, making the threat of some types of hostile action real in nearly 

all operations. As in Somalia in the early 1990’s, some crisis response and limited 

contingency operations began as purely humanitarian operations and ended in urban 

combat. 

 d. Joint Land Operations in Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and 

Deterrence. These ongoing activities are conducted by GCCs to establish, shape, 

maintain, and refine relations with other nations within their AORs. They encompass a 

wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support 

OGAs and cooperate with IGOs (e.g., United Nations, NATO) and other countries to 

protect and enhance national security interests, build partner capacity, and deter conflict. 

These operations usually involve a combination of military forces and capabilities, to 

include joint land forces, as well as the efforts of OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs in a 

complementary fashion. The DOS is frequently the federal agency with lead 

responsibility and nearly always is a principal player in these activities. Consequently, 

the GCC may employ their JFLCCs to conduct these operations and direct them to 

maintain a working relationship with the chiefs of the US diplomatic missions in their 

area. Land commanders and their staffs should also establish contact and maintain a 

dialogue with pertinent OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs to share information and facilitate future 

joint land operations. 

e. Simultaneous Operations. The nature of joint land operations often requires 

different types of operations to occur simultaneously or in rapid sequence, sometimes in 

close proximity. A situation can easily arise where members of the same friendly unit 

may at one moment be feeding and clothing dislocated civilians, at the next holding two
Planning and Assessment 

III-5 

warring tribes apart, and the next fighting a highly lethal battle — all within the same

area. In a larger context, the joint force may have to conduct FHA and other operations 

at the same time and in the same area where land operations are taking place. Such 

action may not wait for the stabilize and enable civil authority phases, but may be an 

integral part of the overall land operation. In addition, joint land operations will 

normally bring with it requirements normally associated with noncombat crisis 

response and limited contingency operations; crisis response and limited 

contingency operations may very well entail joint land operations. 

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

3. Support to Joint Campaign Design, Planning, and Phasing

a. General. JFLCC planning tasks include the following: 

 (1) Preparing and coordinating required land component OPLANs or OPORDs 

in support of assigned JFC missions. 

(2) Coordinating land component planning efforts with higher, lower, adjacent, 

and multinational headquarters as required. 

(3) Developing land component COAs within the framework of the JFCassigned objectives or missions, forces available, and the commander’s intent. 

(4) Determining land component force requirements and coordinating land 

force planning in support of the selected COAs. The JFLCC conducts planning using the 

planning processes of the command that forms the core of the headquarters. While 

almost all headquarters use the planning cycle described in joint planning publications, 

the specific steps in the process may have different names and somewhat different 

activities. The JFLCC’s staff, provided by Services other than the core of the 

headquarters and integrated into the core staff, must quickly adapt to the planning 

processes and battle rhythm of the staff they are joining. 

 b. JOPP is a proven analytical process which provides a seven step orderly approach 

to planning at any level and at any point before or during joint operations. JOPP may be 

used by a JFLCC staff during both contingency and crisis action planning. The focus of 

JOPP is on the interaction between an organization’s commander, staff, and the 

commanders and staffs of the next higher and lower commands. JOPP is also linked with 

the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). JIPOE is the 

analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence 

assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the JFC’s decisionmaking process. The process is used to analyze the physical domains; the information 

environment; political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure 

systems; and all other relevant aspects of the operational environment, and to determine 

an adversary’s capabilities to operate within that environment. 
Chapter III

III-6 JP 3-31 

See JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, and JP 5-0, 

Joint Operation Planning, for more information on JIPOE. 

 c. Commander’s Appreciation and Design. JFLCC planners must first frame the 

strategic and operational problem by developing an appreciation of the situation before 

addressing operational design and ultimately OPLANs. Several cognitive models exist to 

assist JFLCC’s and their staffs as they design, plan, and execute joint land operations 

during campaigns. The goal of conducting an appreciation of the situation is to assist 

commanders and their staffs to develop a shared understanding of the complex 

operational challenges within their commands and design a broad approach for problem 

resolution that focuses on linking strategic objectives or aims to tactical actions.

 (1) Commander’s appreciation focuses on developing a complete understanding 

of the nature and scope of the problem or situation that must be resolved. 

 (2) Developing a commander’s operational appreciation provides for problem 

framing as one method for establishing the context of a situation within which a 

commander and his staff must act to achieve the strategic objectives. The essence of 

problem framing is to examine the “problem” from multiple perspectives and set 

conditions for “learning” about the “problem” throughout the planning and execution of 

military operations. Framing can also support the commander’s discourse with his 

superiors regarding the nature of the problem the commander has been asked to solve. It 

also assists in developing a mutual understanding of the environment within which the 

force will operate.

 (3) Operational Design. Operational design follows the commander’s 

understanding of the situation and problem framing by applying operational art to the 

conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or joint OPLAN

and its subsequent execution. The JFLCC, based upon his experience, intuition, instincts, 

and advised by his staff and other external advisors, employs the creative aspects of 

operational design elements in a logical design process that leads toward COA

development. 

 d. Operational Art. JFLCCs employ operational art — the application of 

creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, 

and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and 

employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means and considers 

risk across the levels of war. Operational art determines when, where, and for what 

purpose major forces are employed and should influence the adversary disposition 

before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or 

withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve 

operational and strategic objectives. JFLCC operational planning addresses some 

activities required for conducting joint/multinational land operations. These activities are 

listed below:
Planning and Assessment 

III-7 

(1) Support the GCC’s effort in conducting deterrence, shaping operations, 

theater security cooperation, and building partner capacity. 

(2) Employment planning which describes how to set the theater and apply 

force/forces to attain specified military objectives.

(3) Sustainment planning which is directed toward providing and maintaining 

levels of personnel, materiel, and consumables required to sustain the levels of combat 

activity for the estimated duration and at the desired level of intensity.

(4) Deployment/redeployment planning that includes the development of the 

TPFDL, monitoring the force flow, and the redeployment of forces from theater at the 

end of the campaign. 

For more information on deployment/redeployment planning see JP 3-35, Deployment 

and Redeployment Operations.

(5) Support the GCC’s effort in conducting stability operations in all phases and 

planning for transitions during the campaign. 

(6) Environmental Considerations. Environmental considerations tied to risk 

management and the safety and health of Service members should be factored into all 

phases of joint land operations. 

 

See JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, FM 5-0, The Operations Process, and MCWP 

5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process, for more details on planning processes.

 e. Joint Planning Group. The primary long range planning element for the JFLCC 

to support the JFC’s campaign planning or to perform contingency planning is the JPG. 

Planners from the JFLCC core headquarters staff element are the nucleus around which 

the JPG is normally built. It includes personnel from each of the primary coordinating, 

functional, and special staff elements, LNOs and, when necessary, planners from the 

JFLCC’s subordinate commands or multinational land forces (see Figure III-2). The JPG 

develops and disseminates staff planning guidance and schedules. It confirms the process 

and products to be developed and delivered to support the JFLCC planning effort. The 

JPG is the planning hub and synchronization center for future plans. The JPG develops 

the CONOPS for each plan. The CONOPS describes how the actions of the joint land 

force and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to 

accomplish the mission, including potential branches and sequels. Using mission-type 

orders, the JPG writes (or graphically portrays) it in sufficient detail so that subordinate 

and supporting commanders understand the commander’s intent, purpose, and any 

specific tasks or requirements and can innovatively develop their supporting plans 

accordingly. During its development, the JPG determines the best arrangement of 

simultaneous and sequential actions and activities to create desired effects and 

accomplish the assigned mission consistent with the approved COA. This arrangement 
Chapter III

III-8 JP 3-31 

of actions dictates the sequencing of forces into the operational area, providing the link 

between joint operation planning and force planning. 

JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER

JOINT PLANNING GROUP REPRESENTATION

J-5

LEGEND

AAMDC Army air and missile defense 

command

ADA air defense artillery

CA civil affairs

FU future

IO information operations

J-1 manpower and personnel directorate 

of a joint staff

J-2 intelligence 

J-3 operations 

J-4 logistics 

directorate of a joint staff

directorate of a joint staff

directorate of a joint staff

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff

J-6 communications system directorate of 

a joint staff

J-7 engineering directorate of a joint staff

J-8 force structure, resource, and 

assessment directorate of a joint staff

J-9 civil-military operations directorate of 

a joint staff

J-35 future operations cell

J-39 information operations cell

LNO liaison officer

OPS operations

PAO public affairs officer

PMO provost marshal office

POTF psychological operations task force

PR personnel recovery

PRCC personnel recovery coordination cell

PSYOP psychological operations

Rep representative

SJA staff judge advocate

SO special operations

SOSE special operations staff element

J-5 FU 

PLANS

J-35

Others

J-3 OPS

J-1 Rep

J-4 Rep

J-2 Rep

J-6 Rep

J-8 Rep

PAO Rep

Legal Rep

PMO Rep

J-9 (CA)

Rep Surgeon

J-39/IO 

Officer

Aviation

Chemical

PSYOP Rep

J-7 (Engineer)

ADA Rep

SO Rep

Fires Rep

PR Rep

POTF

AAMDC

SOSE

Fire Cell

PRCC

PAO

SJA

PMO

Other Service, 

Interagency,

Multinational LNOs, etc.

Figure III-2. Joint Force Land Component Commander Joint Planning

Group Representation
Planning and Assessment 

III-9 

For a more detailed discussion of CONOPS development see JP 5-0, Joint Operation 

Planning.

 f. Plans-Operations Relationship. The JFLCC headquarters orients on three 

planning horizons-short, medium, and long. These correspond with current operations, 

future operations, and future plans. Upon completion of the planning products and 

orders, the JPG (future plans) organizes to conduct a plans transition. Once plans are 

prepared and execution begins, the medium range JPG focus shifts to planning 

“what’s next” or sequels primarily with higher headquarters, while handing-off the 

plan to the current J-3 for execution and preparation of all necessary fragmentary 

orders directing tactical action. This requires an organizational procedure to transfer 

responsibilities and products from the long range planners to those operators responsible 

for execution. Key to the success of the plans transition is the requirement that the 

organization responsible for execution has enough resources, experience, and 

understanding of the plan to effectively execute it. Experience has shown that the current 

operations cell is often too immersed in ongoing operations to plan outside the current 

24-hour period. This may require the organization of a separate future operations cell (J35) for focusing on “what ifs” and branch plans development. (See Figure III-3.) 

See also JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

g. Phasing

 (1) Purpose. The purpose of phasing is to help the commander organize 

operations by integrating and synchronizing subordinate operations. Phasing is most 

directly related to the “arranging operations” and “lines of operations” elements of 

operational design. Phasing helps JFLCCs and staffs visualize and think through the 

entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, 

time, space, and purpose. The primary benefit of phasing is that it assists commanders in 

systematically achieving military objectives that cannot be attained all at once by 

arranging smaller, related operations in a logical sequence. Phasing can be used to gain 

progressive advantages and assist in achieving objectives as quickly and effectively as 

possible. Phasing also provides a framework for assessing risk to portions of an 

operation or campaign, allowing development of plans to mitigate this risk.

 (2) Application. The JFC’s vision of how a campaign or operation should 

unfold drives subsequent decisions regarding phasing. Phasing, in turn, assists in framing 

commander’s intent and assigning tasks to subordinate commanders. By arranging 

operations and activities into phases, the JFC can better integrate and synchronize JFLCC 

and other subordinate operations in time, space, and purpose. Each phase should 

represent a natural subdivision of the campaign/operation’s intermediate objectives. As 

such, a phase represents a definitive stage during which a large portion of the forces and 

joint/multinational capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities. 

Phasing can be used across the range of military operations.
Chapter III

III-10 JP 3-31 

 (3) Number, Sequence, and Overlap. Working within the phasing construct, 

the actual phases used will vary (compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) with the 

joint campaign or operation and be determined by the JFC. During planning, the JFLCC 

may establish sub-phases and conditions, objectives, or events for transitioning from one 

sub-phase to another and plans sequels and branches for potential contingencies. Phases 

are designed and protracted sequentially, but some activities from a phase may continue 

into subsequent phases or actually begin during a previous phase (see Figure III-4). The 

JFLCC adjusts the sub-phases to exploit opportunities presented by the adversary or 

operational situation or to react to unforeseen conditions. 

PLANS-OPERATIONS RELATIONSHIP

Short: 0-3 Days Medium: 3-30 Days Long: 30-90+

J-3 CURRENT 

OPS

J-35 FUTURE 

OPS

J-5

PLANS

CHIEF OF FIRES

Planning Horizons (Vary Based on the Situation) 







Issue OPORDs, 

FRAGORDs, and 

WARNORDs

Monitor Close Fight 

and Controls OPS and 

MVTs

Conduct Operations 

Update and 

Assessment Brief









Refines and Modifies 

OPLANs and OPORDs

Prepares FRAGORDs 

and Branches

Objective Assessment

Determine COA 

Adjustment











Plan Sequels

Campaign Objective 

Analysis

Plan Undeveloped 

Phases and Major OPS

Determine Condition 

Setting Objectives

Look Out to Post 

Hostilities











Synchronize Operational Fires

Produce Army/LCC Requirements for Future ATOs

Monitor ATO Execution

Provide Input to Joint Targeting Process

Information Operations

LEGEND

ATO air tasking order

COA course of action

FRAGORD fragmentary order

J-3 operations directorate of a joint 

staff

J-35 future operations cell

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff

LCC land component 

commander

MVT movement

OPLAN operation plan

OPS operations

WARNORD warning order

OPORD operation order

Figure III-3. Plans-Operations Relationship
Planning and Assessment 

III-11 

 (4) Transitions. Transitions between phases are designed to be distinct shifts 

in focus by the joint force, often accompanied by changes in command relationships. The 

need to move into another phase normally is identified by assessing that a set of 

objectives are achieved or that the enemy has acted in a manner that requires a major 

change in focus for the joint force and is therefore usually event driven, not time driven. 

Changing the focus of the operation takes time and may require changing priorities, 

command relationships, force allocation, or even the design of the operational area. An 

example is the shift of focus from sustained combat operations in the “dominate” phase to 

a preponderance of stability operations in the “stabilize” and “enable civil authority” 

phases. Hostilities gradually lessen as the joint land force begins to reestablish order, 

commerce, and local government; and deters adversaries from resuming hostile actions 

while the US and international community takes steps to establish or restore the 

conditions necessary to achieve their strategic objectives. This challenge demands an 

agile shift in joint land force skill sets, actions, organizational behaviors, and mental 

outlooks; and coordination with a wider range of other organizations — OGAs, 

multinational partners, IGOs, and NGOs — to provide those capabilities necessary to 

address the mission-specific factors.

 (5) Phasing Model. Although the JFC determines the number and actual 

phases used during a joint campaign or operation, use of the phases shape, deter, seize the 

initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority shown in Figure III-4 provides a 

flexible model to arrange smaller, related operations. This model can be applied to 

various campaigns and operations. Operations and activities in the “shape” and “deter” 

phases normally are outlined in a theater campaign plan and those in the remaining 

phases are outlined in JSCP-directed OPLANs. By design, OPLANs generally do not 

PHASING MODEL

STABILIZE

CRISIS

DEFINED

PREVENT

PREPARE

ASSURE

FRIENDLY 

FREEDOM OF 

ACTION/

ACCESS THEATER 

INFRASTRUCTURE

ESTABLISH 

DOMINANT 

FORCE 

CAPABILITIES/

ACHIEVE

FULLSPECTRUM

SUPERIORITY

TRANSFER 

TO CIVIL 

AUTHORITY/

REDEPLOY

ESTABLISH 

SECURITY/

RESTORE 

SERVICES

SEIZE

INITIATIVE DOMINATE

ENABLE

CIVIL

AUTHORITY

SHAPE DETER

Phase 0 Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV Phase V

Figure III-4. Phasing Model
Chapter III

III-12 JP 3-31 

include security cooperation activities that are addressed elsewhere. JFLCCs generally 

use the phasing model in Figure III-4 to link the pertinent OPLAN and activities with that 

of the JFC.

For more information on phasing, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations. For more information on 

intelligence support and planning, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and other JP 2-0 

series publications. For more information on logistic planning, refer to JP 4-0, Joint 

Logistics, and other JP 4-0 series publications. 

4. Operational Planning Considerations 

a. The primary difference between planning for single-Service employment and 

joint land operations is synchronizing the unique capabilities and limitations of each 

force to achieve unity of effort. This requires an understanding of these capabilities and 

limitations across all staff functions, but it is particularly important in the JPG. The JPG 

must have knowledgeable members from each Service in all functional areas. With these 

key personnel and appropriate LNOs from the major subordinate commands in place, the 

planning process provides sufficient consideration of the capabilities of each Service. 

b. Generally the JFLCC will perform deployment planning; however, the 

validating authority for Service component TPFDDs will be the JFC. When the 

JFLCC has been designated in advance of an operation and any associated deployment, 

the JFLCC will influence the deployment process for those units that will be employed by 

the JFLCC upon completion of integration. In practical terms, this influence involves 

analyzing the force generation requirements to determine the required dates for each 

force or capability made available to the JFLCC. Further, priorities may be established 

by the JFLCC to aid the JFC in allocating limited lift or port capabilities in a way that 

best supports the JFLCC’s CONOPS. 

c. When conducted, the force deployment planning performed by the plans 

directorate of a joint staff (J-5) deployment cell must be in concert with the JPG’s 

operational planning. The deployment planners require visibility on the capabilities and 

sequencing priorities associated with a COA or CONOPS to ensure they are transportable 

and the deployment requirements are relayed to the JFC. The JFLCC’s planning staff 

must remember that the timing and sequencing priority may be affected by the JFC’s 

overall concept of deployment. 

5. Joint Land Operations Plan

a. General. JFLCC joint land OPLANs, joint land OPLANs in concept format

(CONPLANs), and OPORDs convey how the land force helps achieve the JFC’s 

mission. The plans developed by the JFLCC describe the intended conduct of joint land 

operations that support the attainment of JFC’s objectives. 

 b. The OPORD describes the synchronization of specific tasks that result in an

effective employment of joint/multinational land force capabilities for a major operation. 
Planning and Assessment 

III-13 

The CONOPS, included in paragraph 3, “Execution,” also provides the concepts of 

movement and maneuver, fires, protection, intelligence operations, and IO. The concept 

of sustainment is included in paragraph 4, while the concept of C2 is in paragraph 5. All 

are included in the final OPLAN or order.

c. OPLANs, CONPLANs, and OPORDs are distributed internally to the land force 

for action and externally to the JFC for approval and Service and functional component 

commands for information. If OPLANs, CONPLANs, or OPORDs describe a branch or 

sequel to the current plan, they are distributed externally to the JFC for approval and to 

the Service and other functional component commanders for information. 

d. Planning products are distributed simultaneously to all JFLCC subordinate 

commanders. This allows them to adequately evaluate the impact of future plans and 

operations from an operational perspective; however, the Service component commands 

must be concurrently involved in order to assess and plan for support to the JFLCC. 

See Appendix C, “Joint Land Operation Plan and Order Development.”

6. Operational Environment 

a. General. Factors that must be considered when conducting joint land operations 

extend beyond the boundaries of the JFLCC’s assigned operational area. The JFLCC’s 

operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and 

influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the 

commander. It normally encompasses the physical areas and factors of the area and 

its associated information environment (which includes cyberspace). Included 

within these are the adversary, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a 

specific joint land operation. Understanding the operational environment helps 

commanders understand the results of various friendly, adversary, and neutral actions and 

how this impacts achieving the military end state (see Figure II-5).

 b. Physical Areas and Factors 

 (1) Physical Areas. The pertinent physical areas in the operational 

environment include the assigned operational area and the associated areas of influence 

and interest described below. Designation of the areas of influence and interest help 

commanders and staffs order their thoughts during both planning and execution. 

 (a) The AOR is the geographical area associated with a combatant 

command within which a GCC has authority to plan and conduct operations. 

 (b) An area of interest (AOI) includes the area of influence, areas adjacent 

thereto, and extends into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned 

operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize 

the accomplishment of the mission. An AOI serves to focus intelligence support for 

monitoring enemy, adversary, or other activities outside the operational area that may 
Chapter III

III-14 JP 3-31 

affect current and future operations. The commander can describe the AOI graphically, 

but the resulting graphic does not represent a boundary or other control measure. 

(c) An area of influence is a geographic area in which a commander can 

directly influence operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the 

commander’s command or control. The area of influence normally surrounds and 

includes the assigned operational area. The extent of a subordinate command’s area of 

influence is one factor the higher commander considers when defining the subordinate’s 

operational area. Understanding the command’s area of influence helps the commander 

and staff plan branches to the current operation that could require the force to employ 

capabilities outside the assigned operational area. The commander can describe the area 

VISUALIZING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

AOR area of responsibility

LEGEND

XXX

ENVIRONMENT INFORMATION

ENVIRONMENT

THEATER OF 

OPERATIONS

AOR AREA OF 

INFLUENCE

AREA OF 

INTEREST

FORWARD 

BASES

CONTINENTAL 

UNITED STATES 

INSTALLATION

OPERATIONAL

Figure III-5. Visualizing the Operational Environment
Planning and Assessment 

III-15 

of influence graphically, but the resulting graphic does not represent a boundary or other 

control measure.

(d) A theater of operations is an operational area defined by the GCC for 

the conduct or support of specific military operations. Multiple theaters of operations 

normally will be geographically separate and focused on different missions. Theaters of 

operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations in depth and over 

extended periods of time. 

 (2) Physical Factors. The JFLCC and staff must consider numerous physical 

factors associated with operations in the operational area. These factors include terrain 

(including urban settings), weather, topography, hydrology, electromagnetic spectrum, 

and environmental conditions in the operational area; distances associated with the 

deployment to the operational area and employment of forces and other joint capabilities; 

the location of bases, ports, and other supporting infrastructure (such as key cyberspace 

nodes); and both friendly and adversary forces and other capabilities. Combinations of 

these factors greatly affect the operational design and sustainment of joint land 

operations. 

c. Information Environment. The information environment transcends the four 

physical domains and is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that

collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The information environment is 

where humans and automated systems observe, orient, decide, and act upon information,

and is therefore the principal environment of decisionmaking. The information 

environment is pervasive to all activities worldwide, and is a common backdrop for the 

JFLCC’s operational environment. The actors in the information environment include 

military and civilian leaders, decisionmakers, individuals, and organizations. Resources

include the information itself and the materials and systems employed to collect, analyze,

apply, disseminate, and display information and produce information related products. 

Cyberspace is within the information environment. It consists of the interdependent 

network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, 

telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 

controllers. 

See JPs 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 

Operational Environment, for more information on the operational environment. See JP 

3-13, Information Operations, for specific information on the information environment.

7. Conventional/Special Operations Force Integration 

a. Conventional force operations and special operations require coordination and 

liaison among all components of the joint force and the JFLCC to ensure that C2, 

intelligence, movements and maneuver, fire support, and sustainment are fully integrated 

and interoperable. The focal point for synchronization of SOF activities with 

conventional joint land operations is the special operations command and control 
Chapter III

III-16 JP 3-31 

element (SOCCE) which collocates with the supported or supporting command element 

of the JFLCC force.

 b. The SOCCE is predominantly an Army SOF element but Navy and Marine SOF 

may form SOCCEs when these forces operate in conjunction with the JFLCC. The 

SOCCE performs C2 and liaison according to mission requirements and as directed by 

the establishing SOF commander (either the theater special operations 

command/JFSOCC or commander, joint special operations TF). The SOCCE can receive 

operational intelligence and target acquisition reports directly from deployed SOF 

elements and provide them directly to the associated JFLCC headquarters. The SOCCE 

remains under the OPCON of the establishing SOF commander, but may be placed in 

direct support to the JFLCC. 

For additional information on SOF, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special 

Operations, and JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Forces Task Force Operations.

SECTION B. ASSESSMENT

8. General

a. Assessment is a process that measures progress of the joint force toward 

mission accomplishment. Commanders continuously assess the operational 

environment and the progress of operations and compare them to their initial vision and 

intent. Commanders adjust operations based on their assessment to ensure military 

objectives are met and the military end state is achieved. The assessment process is 

continuous and directly tied to the commander’s decisions throughout planning, 

preparation, and execution of operations. Staffs help the commander by monitoring the 

numerous aspects that can influence the outcome of operations and provide the 

commander timely information needed for decisions. The commander’s critical CCIR 

process is linked to the assessment process by the commander’s need for timely 

information and recommendations to make decisions. The assessment process helps 

staffs by identifying key aspects of the operation that the commander is interested in 

closely monitoring and where the commander wants to make decisions. Examples of 

commander’s critical decisions include when to transition to another phase of a 

“The successful integration of SOF [special operations forces] and 

conventional forces is one of the great stories of OIF [Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM]. Effective integration took place at every echelon, from A-teams 

(ODAs) to the joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs). Integration 

occurred throughout the length and breadth of the Iraqi Theater of 

Operations — on land, in the air, and at sea. As a result, both SOF and 

conventional forces were more effective and presented the Iraqis with 

significantly more and difficult challenges.” 

Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degan, and David Tohn, On Point: The United Army in 

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
Planning and Assessment 

III-17 

campaign, what the priority of effort should be, or how to adjust command relationships 

between component commanders.

 b. The assessment process begins during mission analysis when the commander and

staff consider what to measure and how to measure it to determine progress toward

accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. During planning 

and preparation for an operation, for example, the staff assesses the joint force’s ability to

execute the plan based on available resources and changing conditions in the operational

environment. However, the discussion in this section focuses on assessment for the

purpose of determining the progress of the joint force toward mission 

accomplishment.

c. Commanders and their staffs determine relevant assessment actions and 

measures during planning. They consider assessment measures as early as mission 

analysis, and include assessment measures and related guidance in commander and staff 

estimates. They use assessment considerations to help guide operational design because 

these considerations can affect the sequence and type of actions along lines of operations. 

During execution, they continually monitor progress toward accomplishing tasks, 

creating effects, and achieving objectives. Assessment actions and measures help 

commanders adjust operations and resources as required, determine when to execute 

branches and sequels, and make other critical decisions to ensure current and future 

operations remain aligned with the mission and military end state. Normally, the JFLCC 

chief of staff, assisted by the J-3 and the J-2, is responsible for coordinating assessment 

activities. The chief of staff is normally also assisted by an assessment special staff 

section composed of operations research and systems analysts (ORSA). For subordinate 

commanders’ staffs, this may be accomplished by equivalent elements within Service 

components. The chief of staff normally facilitates the assessment process and 

determination of CCIRs by incorporating them into the headquarters’ battle rhythm. 

Various elements of the JFC’s staff use assessment results to adjust both current 

operations and future planning. 

 d. Friendly, adversary, and neutral diplomatic, informational, and economic actions

applied in the operational environment can impact military actions and objectives. When

relevant to the mission, the commander also must plan for using assessment to evaluate 

the results of these actions. This typically requires collaboration with other agencies and

multinational partners — preferably within a common, accepted process — in the interest 

of unified action. Many of these organizations may be outside the JFLCC’s authority. 

Accordingly, the JFLCC should grant some organizations authority for direct

coordination with key outside organizations — such as United States Government (USG) 

interagency elements from DOS or the Department of Homeland Security, national 

intelligence agencies, intelligence sources in other nations, and other components — to 

the extent necessary to ensure timely and accurate assessments.
Chapter III

III-18 JP 3-31 

9. Levels of Operations and Assessment

Assessment occurs at all levels and across the entire range of military operations. 

Even in operations that do not include combat, assessment of progress is just as important 

and can be more complex than traditional combat assessment. As a general rule, the level 

at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed should be the level at which such 

activity is assessed. Assessment at the operational and strategic levels typically is 

broader than at the tactical level (e.g., combat assessment) and uses MOEs that support 

strategic and operational mission accomplishment. Continuous assessment helps the 

JFLCC determine if the joint land force is doing the right things to achieve its objectives. 

Tactical-level assessment typically uses measures of performance to evaluate task

accomplishment. The results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature, but also can 

reflect the impact on specific functions and systems. Combat assessment is an example 

of a tactical level assessment and is a term that can encompass many tactical-level 

assessment actions. Combat assessment is composed of three major components: battle 

damage assessment, munitions effectiveness assessment, and reattack recommendation. 

See JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for more information on assessment.
CHAPTER IV

OPERATIONS

IV-1 

SECTION A. FORMS OF OPERATIONS

1. General

JFCs strive to apply the many dimensions of military power simultaneously across 

the depth, breadth, and height of the operational area. Consequently, JFCs normally 

achieve concentration in some operations or in specific functions and require economy of 

force in others. However, major operation and campaign plans must feature an 

appropriate balance between offensive and defensive operations and stability operations 

in all phases. Planning for stability operations should begin when joint operation 

planning is initiated. Planning for the transition from sustained land combat operations 

to the termination of joint operations and then a complete handover to civil authority and 

redeployment must commence during plan development and be ongoing during all 

phases of a joint campaign or major operation. An isolated focus on planning offensive 

and defensive operations in the “dominate” phase may threaten full development of basic 

and supporting plans for the “stabilize” and “enable civil authority” phases and 

ultimately joint operation momentum. Even while sustained land operations are ongoing, 

there will be a need to establish or restore security and provide humanitarian relief as 

succeeding areas are occupied or bypassed. While joint land operations conducted 

outside the United States and its territories simultaneously combine three elements —

offense, defense, and stability; joint land operations within the United States primary 

focus on HD and CS operations in support of civil authorities. 

2. Offensive Operations

a. Major operations and campaigns, whether or not they involve large-scale ground 

combat, normally will include some level of both offense and defense. Although 

defense may be the stronger force posture, the offense is normally decisive in combat. 

Further, protection includes certain defensive measures that are required throughout each 

joint operation or campaign phase. The relationship between offense and defense, then, 

is a complementary one. 

 b. Offensive land operations are combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy 

enemy land forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. Offensive land 

operations impose the commander’s will on the enemy. Against a capable, adaptive 

enemy, the offense is the most direct and sure means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting 

the initiative to achieve decisive results. Executing offensive land operations compels the 

enemy to react, creating or revealing weakness that the entire attacking joint force can 

“. . . no plan of operation can extend with any prospect of certainty, beyond 

the first clash with the hostile main force. Only a layman can pretend to 

trace throughout the course of a campaign the prosecution of a rigid plan, 

arranged beforehand in all its details and adhered to the last.”

Helmuth Graf von Moltke (The Elder), 1800-1891
Chapter IV

IV-2 JP 3-31 

exploit. Successful ground offensive operations place tremendous pressure on defenders, 

creating a cycle of deterioration that can lead to their disintegration. 

c. At the operational and strategic level of war, the Armed Forces of the United 

States must be capable of deploying and fighting to gain access to geographic areas 

controlled by hostile forces. Forcible entry is the seizing and holding of a military 

lodgment in the face of armed opposition. Forcible entry operations are normally joint 

in nature and range in scope from an operation designed as an initial phase of a campaign 

or major operation to a coup de main in which the decisive results are accomplished in 

one swift stroke. Armed Forces of the United States maintain three primary forcible 

entry capabilities or options. These are amphibious assault, airborne assault, and air 

assault. Local air and/or maritime superiority are essential for the duration of the entry 

operation. JFCs typically seek to attain more comprehensive control of the potential 

operating environment, permitting as many such options as possible to frustrate opposing 

defense planning. JFCs may select one entry capability or a combination based upon 

METT-T. JFLCCs may be tasked by the JFC to perform the detailed planning for a 

forcible entry operation. 

For more specifics, see JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations. 

 d. Stability operations cannot occur if significant enemy forces directly threaten or 

attack the local populace. Offensive land control operations destroy or isolate the enemy 

so stability operations can proceed by denying enemy forces the opportunity to seize 

additional terrain, moving them out of population centers of gravity (COGs), and forcing

enemy forces to defend their bases. 

3. Defensive Operations

a. Defensive operations are combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, 

gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability 

operations. Defense alone normally cannot achieve a decision. However, defensive land 

operations enable JFLCCs to conduct or prepare for decisive offensive or stability 

operations. Defensive land control operations retain terrain, guard populations, and 

protect critical capabilities against enemy attacks and are used to gain time and 

economize forces so offensive tasks can be executed elsewhere. 

 b. Joint land forces protect vital military and civilian areas in joint operational areas 

for the JFC that are important to the overall operational success and provide indirect 

support to all joint operations. Joint land forces defend joint lodgments and bases 

ensuring freedom of action to joint air, maritime, and SOF. This defense may consist of 

land based AMD units, chemical, biological, and radiological warning and 

decontamination units, as well as ground forces physically protecting facilities or terrain

using lethal and nonlethal weapons systems. 

c. Defense of the local populace, infrastructure, and vital assets supports stability 

operations and allows joint land forces to receive greater support from the HN. This 
Operations 

IV-3 

protection is vital to joint COIN operations where some facilities have significant 

economic and political value to the local population. 

4. Stability Operations

a. Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities 

conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national 

power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential 

governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. 

Joint land forces assume that role before, during, and after conducting land operations, 

across the range of operations. In doing so, the efforts of military forces appropriately 

focus in support of the other instruments of national and international power. Stability 

operations will not only include stability tasks, but will often have elements of offense 

and defense. For land forces, these efforts are fundamental to the conduct of joint 

operations. 

 b. Stability operations can be conducted in support of an HN or interim 

government or as part of an occupation when no government exists. Stability operations 

must maintain the initiative by pursing objectives that resolve the causes of instability. 

Stability operations cannot succeed if they only react to enemy initiatives. Stability 

operations involve both coercive and constructive military actions. Joint land force 

stability operations are often conducted within the broader context of USG reconstruction 

and stabilization efforts. Joint land forces support these broader efforts by leveraging the 

coercive and constructive capabilities of the force to establish a safe and secure 

environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish or 

restore political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and help transition responsibility 

to a legitimate civil authority operating under the rule of law. This transition is 

fundamental to the shift in focus toward long-term developmental activities where joint 

land forces support broader efforts in pursuit of national and international objectives. 

Success in these endeavors typically requires a long-term commitment by IGOs and 

NGOs and is ultimately determined by the support and participation of the HN

population. 

c. Joint land forces establish conditions that enable the efforts of the other 

instruments of national and international power through unified action. By providing the 

requisite security and control to stabilize an operational area, those efforts build a 

foundation for transitioning to civilian control and eventually to the HN. Stability 

operations are usually conducted to support an HN government or a transitional civil or 

military authority when no legitimate, functioning HN government exists. Generally, 

joint land forces establish or restore basic civil functions and protect them until a civil 

authority or the HN is capable of providing these services for the local populace. They 

perform specific functions as part of a broader response effort, supporting the 

complementary activities of other agencies, organizations, and the private sector. When 

the HN or other agency cannot fulfill its role, joint land forces may be called upon to 

significantly increase their role, including providing the basic civil functions of 

government. 
Chapter IV

IV-4 JP 3-31 

 d. By nature, stability operations are typically lengthy endeavors. All tasks must be 

performed with a focus toward maintaining the delicate balance between long-term 

success and short-term gains. Ultimately, stability operations do not necessarily aim to 

reduce the military presence quickly but to achieve broader national policy goals that 

extend beyond the objectives of joint military operations. The more effective those 

military efforts are at setting conditions that facilitate the efforts of the other instruments 

of national power, the more likely it is that the long-term commitment of substantial joint 

land forces will not be required. 

e. To that end, joint land forces have to operate with other joint forces and the other 

instruments of national power to forge unity of effort through a whole of government 

approach. This approach accounts for a wider range of considerations beyond those of 

the military instrument, ensuring that planning accounts for broader national policy goals 

and interests. For the JFLCC and staff, this may mean planning and executing joint land 

operations within an environment of political ambiguity. As a result, the potentially slow 

development process of government reconstruction and stabilization policy may frustrate 

flexible military plans that adapt to the lethal dynamics of land combat operations. Thus, 

integrating the planning efforts of all the agencies and organizations involved in a 

stability operation is essential to long-term peace and stability.

f. A coherent whole of government approach requires early and high-level 

participation of both national and multinational civilian and military participants. This 

process necessitates active dialog and reciprocal information sharing with IGOs and 

NGOs, the HN government, and the private sector, when necessary. 

g. A primary challenge for integrating civilian and military efforts into a whole of 

government approach is the differing capacities and cultures in civilian agencies 

compared to those of joint military and land forces. A successful whole of government 

approach requires that all actors:

 (1) Are represented, integrated, and actively involved in the process. 

 (2) Share an understanding of the situation and problem to be resolved. 

 (3) Strive for unity of effort toward achieving a common goal. 

 (4) Integrate and synchronize capabilities and activities. 

 (5) Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to 

achieve their goal. 

A whole of government approach is an approach that integrates the 

collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United 

States government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. 

SOURCE: FM 3-07, Stability Operations
Operations 

IV-5 

 h. Unified action is necessary to leverage the capabilities of the disparate partners

present to achieve broad conflict transformation goals and attain a sustainable peace. 

Unlike a whole of government approach, which aims for true interagency integration 

toward those ends, unified action requires a more nuanced, cooperative effort. In unified 

action, partners are not compelled to work together toward a common goal; instead, they 

participate out of a shared understanding and appreciation for what that goal represents. 

Attaining the end state is in the best interests of the participants; the partners recognize 

that fact, which forges the bonds that allow them to achieve unity of effort. Some groups, 

such as NGOs, must retain independence of action. Reconciling that independence with 

the mission requirements may pose specific challenges to unity of effort and must be 

considered throughout the joint operations process. 

 i. Coordination, integration, and synchronization of HN elements, OGAs, and joint 

land forces are enhanced by transparency and credibility. The degree to which the HN

cooperates is fundamental. Commanders at all levels publicize their mandate and 

intentions. Within the limits of operations security (OPSEC), they make the populace 

aware of the techniques used to provide security and control. Actions on the ground 

reinforced by a clear and consistent message produce transparency. This transparency 

reinforces credibility. Credibility reflects the populace’s assessment of whether the force 

can accomplish the mission. Joint land forces require the structure, resources, and ROE

appropriate to accomplishing the mission and discharging their duties swiftly and firmly. 

They must leave no doubt as to their capability and intentions. 

 j. Primary Stability Tasks

 (1) The combination of tasks conducted during stability operations depends on 

the situation. In some operations, the HN can meet most or all of the population’s 

requirements. In those cases, joint land forces work with and through HN authorities. 

Conversely, joint land forces operating in a failed state may need to support the wellbeing of the local populace. That situation requires joint land forces to work with civilian 

agencies to restore basic capabilities. Stability operations may be necessary to develop 

HN capacities for security and control of security forces, a viable market economy, the 

rule of law, and an effective government. Joint land forces develop these capabilities by 

working with USG agencies, multinational partners, IGOs, NGOs, the private sector, and 

the HN. The goal is a stable civil situation sustainable by HN assets without joint land 

forces. Security, the health of the local economy, and the capability of self-government 

are related. Without security, the local economy falters. A functioning economy 

provides employment and reduces the dependence of the population on the military for 

necessities. Security and economic stability precede an effective and stable government. 

 (2) Stability operations require the absence of major threats to friendly forces 

and the populace. As land control operations clear areas of hostile forces, part of the 

force secures critical infrastructure and populated areas. Establishing civil security and 

essential services are implied tasks for land commanders during any combat operation. 

Commanders should act to minimize and relieve civilian suffering. 
Chapter IV

IV-6 JP 3-31 

 (3) Joint land commanders plan to minimize the effects of combat on the 

populace. They inform their higher headquarters of civilian requirements and conditions 

that require attention. As civil security is established, the force may return territory to 

civil authorities’ control when feasible. Transitions to civil authority require coordinating 

and integrating civilian and military efforts. Unified action is crucial. Properly focused, 

effectively executed stability tasks prevent population centers from degenerating into 

civil unrest and becoming recruiting areas for opposition movements or insurgencies.

 (4) The stability tasks are linked to the DOS post-conflict reconstruction and 

stabilization technical sectors. Normally joint land forces act in support of HN and other 

civilian agencies. However, when the HN cannot provide basic government functions, 

joint land forces may be required to do so directly. The DOS organizes conditions related 

to post-conflict stability into five sectors: security; governance and participation; 

humanitarian and social well being; economic stabilization and infrastructure; and justice 

and reconciliation. Army stability tasks support these sectors, which are discussed in 

detail in JP 3-07, Stability Operations. 

 k. CMO are activities that allow a JFC to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit 

relations between military forces, NGOs, IGOs, HN, and the civilian populace in order to 

facilitate military operations and achieve operational objectives. CMO are holistic, 

cumulative, integrative, and synergistic, working in the seams of power and gaps in 

organizations, phases, and processes. CMO need to take into consideration the culture of 

the indigenous population. CMO are about engaging the population and building 

relationships. CMO are inherently joint, interagency, and multinational. At all levels, 

CMO use political bargaining, collaboration, consensus, and relationship-building to 

create conditions for success. 

 (1) JFCs integrate CA forces with other military forces (maneuver, health 

service, military police/security forces, engineering, transportation, and special 

operations), security forces (e.g., national, border, and local police), USG agencies, IPI, 

IGOs, NGOs, HN, and the private sector to provide the capabilities needed for successful 

CMO.

 (2) There are six broad categories of CA functional specialty areas — rule of 

law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare (includes discipline in 

cultural relations), infrastructure, and public education and information. Each is related 

to a certain extent, to every other CA functional specialty, and their interconnecting 

relationships obviate exclusive interest within any functional area. At the same time, 

some of the individual functions impose requirements for specialist personnel in more 

than one skill. 

 (3) These functional specialty areas are fundamental to executing stability tasks. 

CA units and personnel develop detailed area assessments and area studies. These 

include information about infrastructure, civilian institutions, and the attitudes and 

activities of civilian leaders, populations, and organizations. These assessments may 

reveal that a viable HN government does not exist or is incapable of performing its 
Operations 

IV-7 

functions. In such cases, joint land forces may support or exercise governmental 

authority until an HN civil authority is established. 

See JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, and FMs 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, and 

3-05.401, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, for more detail on civil 

affairs doctrine. 

 l. To reach the national strategic end state and conclude the operation/campaign 

successfully, JFLCCs must integrate and synchronize stability operations with other joint 

land operations (offense and defense) within each major operation or campaign phase. 

Stability operations support USG plans for stability and reconstruction efforts and likely 

will be conducted in coordination with, and in support of, HN authorities, OGAs, IGOs, 

and/or NGOs, and the private sector. 

5. Civil Support Operations 

a. Military operations inside the United States and its territories, though limited in 

many respects, are conducted to accomplish two missions – HD and CS. A JFLCC is 

often used to provide C2 for land operations for CS. 

 

 b. CS consists of DOD support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, 

both man-made and natural, and for designated law enforcement and other activities, such 

as national special security events. This includes DOD forces when directed by the 

President or SecDef. Federal agencies or state governors request DOD capabilities to 

support their emergency response efforts by using the request for federal assistance 

(RFA) process (National Guard forces employed under state active duty or Title 32, USC 

status are under the C2 of the governor of their state and are not part of federal military 

response efforts). For CS operations, DOD supports but does not supplant civil 

authorities. DOD resources are normally used only when state and local resources are 

overwhelmed and/or non-DOD resources of the USG are insufficient or unable to meet 

the requirements of local and state civil authorities. 

c. It is important to note that not all CS are provided via the RFA process, and can 

include counterdrug activities, intelligence or investigative support, or other support to 

civilian law enforcement in accordance with specific DOD policies and US law. 

For more information on CS, refer to JP 3-28, Civil Support.

“US Northern Command . . . reorganize(d) his service component 

commands into functional commands, making USARNORTH the standing 

Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC). . . responsible for the land 

domain within USNORTHCOM area of responsibility . . [and] assumed 

operational control of two standing joint task forces, JTF-Civil Support . . . 

and JTF-North.”

Lieutenant General Thomas Turner, Commander, US 

Army North

October 2008
Chapter IV

IV-8 JP 3-31 

6. Types of Joint Military Operations 

The United States employs its military capabilities at home and abroad in support of 

its national security goals in a variety of operations (Figure IV-1). Some operations 

involve only routine, recurring military activities that do not relate directly to either 

traditional war or IW. Other operations, such as COIN, unconventional warfare, and 

combating terrorism, primarily involve IW. Operations such as nation assistance for 

foreign internal defense, security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, 

antiterrorism (AT), DOD support to counterdrug operations, show of force operations, 

and arms control are applied to meet military engagement, security cooperation, and 

deterrence objectives. Major operations and campaigns are typically characterized by 

large-scale combat operations associated with traditional war. All of these circumstances

— each potentially with different root causes and objectives — can exist concurrently 

within a single theater. 

SECTION B. JOINT FUNCTIONS

7. General

a. In any joint land operation, the JFLCC and staff plan, direct, and coordinate a 

number of joint functions that are critical to the successful execution of joint land 

operations. Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to 

help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations (see Figure IV-2.) 

TYPES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS





















Support to Insurgency

Counterinsurgency Operations

Combating Terrorism

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Recovery Operations

Consequence Management

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

Nation Assistance

Arms Control and Disarmament

Routine, Recurring Military Activities





















Major Operations

Homeland Defense

Civil Support

Strikes

Raids

Show of Force

Enforcement of Sanctions 

Protection of Shipping

Freedom of Navigation

Peace Operations

Figure IV-1. Types of Military Operations
Operations 

IV-9 

Functions that are common to joint operations at all levels of war fall into six basic 

groups — C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and 

sustainment. Some functions, such as C2 and intelligence, apply to all operations. 

Others, such as fires, apply as required by the mission. 

 b. A number of subordinate tasks, missions, and related capabilities help define each

function. Some tasks, missions, and capabilities could apply to more than one joint

function. For example, IO core, supporting, and related capabilities, to include SC 

related activities, are applied across the joint functions and independently. 

c. The JFLCC can choose from a wide variety of joint and Service capabilities and 

combine them in various ways to perform joint functions and accomplish the mission. 

JOINT FUNCTIONS

INTELLIGENCE

SUSTAINMENT

JFC joint force commander JP joint publication

LEGEND

Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together 

to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. JP 3-0

ENEMY

PROTECTION

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Movement 

and 

Maneuver

Fires

Figure IV-2. Joint Functions
Chapter IV

IV-10 JP 3-31 

The joint land OPLAN/OPORD describes the way joint land forces and assets are used 

together to perform joint functions and tasks. However, forces and assets are not 

characterized by the functions for which the JFLCC is employing them. A single force or 

asset can perform multiple functions simultaneously or sequentially while executing a 

single task. This section discusses the joint functions, related tasks, and key 

considerations as applicable to joint land operations. The JFLCC and staff must also 

monitor and may coordinate and synchronize the support functions (e.g., logistics, 

personnel support, etc.) that impact joint land operations. 

For a more detailed discussion of joint functions, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and 

CJCSM 3500.04E, Universal Joint Task List. 

8. Command and Control

a. General. C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a properly 

designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the 

mission. The C2 function encompasses a number of tasks including: 

 (1) Communicating and maintaining the status of information and conducting 

joint network operations (NETOPS). 

 

 (2) Assessing the situation in the operational environment. 

 (3) Preparing plans and orders. 

 (4) Commanding subordinate forces. 

 (5) Establishing, organizing, and operating a joint force headquarters. 

 (6) Coordinating and controlling the employment of joint lethal and nonlethal 

capabilities.

 (7) Coordinating and integrating, joint, multinational, OGA, IGO, HN, and 

NGO support. 

 (8) Conducting risk management. 

 (9) Conducting PA activities in the operational area.

 (10) Conducting CMO. 

 b. The ability of the JFLCC or other commander tasked to conduct land operations

is the result of leadership and the ability to control forces and functions in order to 

execute the intent. C2 is supported by an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

(ISR) infrastructure and reliable and secure communications and computer systems. 

These systems process and integrate data and information and pass it to where it is 
Operations 

IV-11 

needed and display it in a useable format in time to be acted upon. This combination of 

C2 and the tools for its implementation is fundamental to the conduct of modern military 

operations. The nature of the operational area accentuates the challenges to the JFLCC 

and offers significant hindrances to effective C2. The integration of intelligence data and 

assessments, shared at the collateral level, with sensor and tactical network data available 

in the joint operations center is a key element in maintaining an accurate picture of land 

operations. 

c. Understanding and shaping the operational area is extremely challenging. The 

key to understanding the land operational environment at all levels is the ability to rapidly 

collect and disseminate information. Critical to shaping this operational environment is 

the ability to convert information into knowledge that can be used to make and then 

implement command decisions. Since any joint land operation contains a great deal of 

uncertainty, and since knowledge is a perishable asset, then speed and precision are 

necessary to convert the right information into knowledge as expediently as possible.

 d. Command and Control Considerations in Land Operations

 (1) The complex physical terrain of the operational area may restrict the 

performance of some technologies supporting C2, including line of sight communications 

and overhead surveillance. Mountains and jungles can present barriers to communication 

systems. Subterranean and interior spaces also make timely knowledge and 

understanding of the urban operational environment even more difficult. 

 (2) The presence of civilians further complicates land C2. The JFLCC must

always consider the effects of operations on civilians, and their presence in large numbers 

will require great attention to areas such as CMO, interagency support, and the public 

affairs officer (PAO). Existing infrastructure such as transportation and communication 

systems can both facilitate and hinder C2. Service infrastructure such as police, fire, and 

medical services may offer control and intelligence opportunities, but its absence will 

certainly add to the requirements of the joint force. 

 (3) As joint land operations tend to become decentralized, mission command 

becomes the preferred method of C2. Mission command is the conduct of military 

operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. Successful 

mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined 

initiative, acting aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission. Essential to 

mission command is the thorough knowledge and understanding of the commander’s 

intent at every level of command. Under mission command, commanders issue missiontype orders, use implicit communications, and delegate most decisions to subordinates 

wherever possible. When joint land operations are decentralized and reliant on mission 

command, coordination of joint operations must be planned with consideration of the 

procedures, measures and resources (including time) required to implement those plans. 

In such conditions the JFLCC and staff must anticipate requirements to identify demands 

for joint support, prioritize among operations or force elements, and communicate 

extensively with other affected components. 
Chapter IV

IV-12 JP 3-31 

 (4) In joint land operations, the CCIR categories of priority intelligence 

requirements and friendly force information requirements must also include pertinent 

information concerning the land environment. Friendly information may include items 

such as anticipated political actions by an HN, the ability of the HN to support civilians, 

or the presence of sufficient precision munitions in the joint force. Although the 

adversary may consist of a traditional armed force, priority intelligence requirements on 

criminal elements, guerrillas, terrorists, and tribal or political factions may be necessary. 

Environmental information requirements may include elements of the environment, such 

as the behavior and needs of civilians or the presence or likelihood of disease or hunger. 

For further information on joint data integration operations, see CJCSM 3115.01, Joint 

Data Network (JDN) Operations.

 (5) In joint land operations, it is imperative that an AO be established that 

includes sufficient area for the JFLCC to achieve its objectives. The AOI should include 

any area from which influence can be exerted on the land AO. Other operational areas 

may be designated outside or inside the JOA. Airspace coordinating measures (ACMs), 

FSCMs, boundaries, and movement control measures must be carefully considered and 

delineated to allow maximum flexibility on the part of subordinate land commanders and 

to prevent fratricide.

 (6) Information-sharing relationships and protocols between the JFLCC, local 

and national authorities, the country team, USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs must be 

established at the earliest stages of planning. 

e. Communications. The nature of joint land operations present certain challenges 

to C2 and particularly to communications. Communications challenges are influenced by 

decentralization, the three dimensional nature of the operational area, urban or complex 

terrain hindrances to radio communications, and often the existence of a local 

communications infrastructure. 

 (1) The decentralization inherent in ground operations requires the ability to 

communicate quickly outside the normal communications patterns. Because of the 

complexity of terrain, situational awareness, a COP, and visualization is very difficult. 

The communications system architecture should support the entire land area — vertical 

and horizontal, surface and subterranean, airspace, and littoral. In addition, the JFLCC 

may need to provide support to, or liaison with, embassy personnel, allied and coalition 

partners, local government personnel, and other components of the joint force. 

 (2) Joint NETOPS are the means by which communications is established 

and maintained throughout the global information grid (GIG). Commander, US 

Strategic Command is the supported commander for global NETOPS, and will 

synchronize planning for cyberspace operations to operate and defend the GIG. As the 

JFLCC’s single control agency for the management and operational direction of the joint 

communications network, the joint NETOPS control center (JNCC) must be 
Operations 

IV-13 

knowledgeable concerning the requirements of communications in the land 

environment, especially in the specific operational area. The JNCC should be aware 

of the capabilities present in the urban area, their potential use, and any problems 

associated with that use. Vital to communications management is the need to support 

planning and execution to include information exchange requirements, radio frequency 

spectrum allocation, communications equipment dispersion, and assessment of 

communications effectiveness.

See JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, for a full discussion of communications 

considerations. See CJCSM 6715, Joint Collaboration Tools Employment, and JP 6-0, 

Joint Communications System, for a full discussion of communications considerations. 

f. Space Capabilities for Command and Control

 (1) Space systems may be employed to monitor land areas before friendly 

forces are established. The JFLCC may request an Army space support team to assist the 

SCA in planning and integration of space operations into joint land operations. 

 

 (2) Space systems provide communications, commercial imagery access, 

early warning, and IO capabilities. Considering the difficulties in communications in 

and around land areas, space systems offers the JFLCC the ability to exchange 

information inside the operational area, between elements of the joint force, and also 

facilitates intertheater and intratheater communications. Space systems may form a 

critical link in the C2 architecture that rapidly passes data and information. This can 

enable taskings and warnings to forces, as well as critical situational awareness and 

location information, in the land domain. Space systems face simultaneous demands 

from many users and require prioritization. 

 (3) The space-based Global Positioning System (GPS) provides a critical 

capability during joint land operations. GPS can provide position, location, and velocity 

for weapon accuracy, ingress and egress, location, silent rendezvous coordination, and 

improved personnel situational awareness. The ability of space systems to provide real 

time terrain information that, enhanced by imagery data, can be used by all components 

of the joint force is especially crucial to the success of ground forces. 

See JP 3-14, Space Operations, for a full discussion of space operations. 

g. Risk Management. Risk management is a function of command and is based on

the amount of risk a higher authority is willing to accept. Risk management assists

commanders in conserving lives and resources and avoiding or mitigating unnecessary

risk, making an informed decision to execute a mission, identifying feasible and effective 

control measures where specific standards do not exist, and providing reasonable 

alternatives for mission accomplishment.

 (1) Safety. High-tempo land operations may increase the risk of injury and 

death due to mishaps. 
Chapter IV

IV-14 JP 3-31 

 (2) JFLCCs and their staffs develop or institute a risk management process 

tailored to their particular mission or operational area. Joint land operations in general 

also tend to produce a significant number of injuries due to the nature of urban and 

complex terrain — falls from buildings or mountains, vehicular accident injuries, injuries 

caused by bodies of water or by weather extremes. Cities pose their own safety hazards 

even in the absence of an enemy. Urban hazards cause injuries not normally seen in large 

numbers in other types of terrain. Command interest, discipline, risk mitigation 

measures, and training lessen those risks. The JFLCC reduces the chance of mishap by 

conducting risk assessments, assigning a safety officer and staff, implementing a safety 

program, and seeking advice from local personnel. Safety considerations could include 

the geospatial and weather data, local road conditions and driving habits, uncharted or 

uncleared mine fields, and special equipment hazards. 

 h. Civil-Military Operations. CMO denotes the activities of a commander that 

establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil 

authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a 

friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area to facilitate military operations. CMO may 

include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the 

responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur 

prior to, during, or subsequent to, other military actions. CMO may also occur, if 

directed, in the absence of other military operations. A JFLCC will normally be 

supported by a US Army CA command or brigade. The command or brigade also has the 

ability to form the nucleus of a joint CMO TF, if directed.

For additional guidance on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

i. Public Affairs. The JFLCC must plan, conduct, and assess PAO. PA is a core 

joint force function and is a critical component of the operational planning and risk 

assessment processes. PA informs key audiences and counters adversary propaganda and 

disinformation by providing a continuous flow of credible, reliable, timely, and accurate 

information to military members, their families, the media, and the public. The PAO 

anticipates and advises JFLCCs on the possible impact of military operations and 

activities within the public information realm and works with the JFLCC and staff to 

mitigate or address potentially compromising coverage. Because PA and IO plan and 

conduct public information activities, including SC-related activities, the JFLCC must 

ensure appropriate coordination to maximize effectiveness and ensure success. 

For additional information, see JP 3-13, Information Operations, and JP 3-61, Public 

Affairs.

9. Intelligence

a. The JFLCC defines intelligence responsibilities for the land component, 

prioritizes intelligence requirements of subordinate land forces, and provides 

representation for the land component and its subordinates at the JFC’s daily 
Operations 

IV-15 

JTCBs. The staff incorporates and synchronizes all ISR efforts, including human 

intelligence and CI efforts with the JFC’s staff. The JFLCC is the JFC’s focal point for 

adversary ground forces intelligence, target development, and combat assessment. The 

JFLCC states operational requirements and provides continuous feedback to ensure 

optimum ISR support to operations. The first option for filling JFLCC ISR gaps should 

be to request augmentation from theater and/or national assets. This is essential: 

 

 (1) To support the commander. 

 (2) To identify, define, and nominate targets. 

 (3) To support operational planning and execution. 

 (4) To avoid surprise and increase understanding of the operational area.

 (5) To assist friendly deception efforts.

 (6) To evaluate the results of operations. 

 (7) To assess opponent’s vulnerability. 

 (8) To coordinate the use of the electronic frequency spectrum for electronic 

attack and communications. 

 (9) For indications and warnings of adversary weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) use and to facilitate actions to conduct operations in chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) environments. 

See Appendix A, “Notional Headquarters Organization,” that describes a notional J-2 

organization.

 b. Offices, Centers, and Teams. While not all of the offices, centers, or teams 

available may be required, a JFLCC may request a national intelligence support team, 

joint interrogation and debriefing center, or joint document exploitation center. 

See JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, JP 2-01, Joint and National Support to Military 

Operations, and JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational 

Environment. 

10. Fires

a. General. The JFLCC plans, coordinates, synchronizes, and executes joint 

fires to create lethal or nonlethal effects in order to set the conditions for success in 

their AOs. Joint fires are delivered during the employment of forces from two or more 

components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common 

objective. The JFLCC’s focus is on shaping those opponent formations, functions, 
Chapter IV

IV-16 JP 3-31 

facilities, and operations that could impact on the JFLCC’s AO. The JFLCC has four 

primary goals associated with these operations.

 (1) Facilitating both operational and tactical maneuver by suppressing the 

adversary’s long range systems, disrupting the adversary’s operational maneuver and 

tempo, and creating exploitable gaps in adversary positions. 

 (2) Isolating the operational area by interdicting adversary military potential 

before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.

 (3) Destroying or disrupting critical adversary C2 capabilities.

 (4) Limiting destruction within the HN and against adversary forces, functions, 

and facilities to the minimum required to achieve both the JFLCC’s and the JFC’s 

guidance and intent, enabling potential exploitation, or use in continuing or future 

operations. 

 b. Fires Synchronization and Coordination. The JFLCC’s primary agency — to

synchronize and coordinate joint fires and their effects — is either an Army fires cell or a 

Marine force fires coordination center (FFCC) or fire support coordination center (FSCC) 

of J-3. The fires cell or center reviews the JFC’s guidance and intent, and makes 

recommendations for the JFLCC to achieve them. The fires cell or center applies this 

guidance as it shapes the operational environment for the land component’s current and 

future fights. 

c. US Army Joint Fire Support Command and Control. Fire support personnel 

are assigned at all levels from company to theater level. At company level, a fire support 

officer (FSO) leads the fire support team. The brigade FSO leads the brigade fires cell. 

The BCT fires battalion commander is the BCT’s fire support coordinator. 

Battalion/squadron level fires cells are led by FSOs. A chief of fires is authorized from 

division to theater level. He is assisted by FSOs and fire support noncommissioned 

officers.

 (1) Chief of Fires. The US Army chief of fires is the senior field artillery 

officer permanently assigned as the full-time fire support staff advisor to division, corps, 

or theater army staffs. The chief of fires performs all the staff functions associated with 

fire support. Additionally, as fires cell supervisor, the chief of fires integrates fire 

support and electronic attack and related capabilities with each other and assists the 

operations officer to integrate fires and maneuver into the unit’s COP. 

 (2) Fires Cell. The fires cell of the theater Army oversees the application of 

joint fire support, artillery, rockets, and electronic attack and related activities. 

Responsibilities include:

 (a) Coordinating and synchronizing all aspects of operational fires with

other component commands, major subordinate commands, and multinational forces. 
Operations 

IV-17 

 (b) Working in direct coordination with the air support operations center 

for CAS or through the BCD to the joint air operations center for air interdiction and 

other air support. It also participates in the JTF JTCB and other JTF joint boards. 

 (c) Identify requirements for fires from other components (air

interdiction/CAS/naval surface fire support). Influence the JFACC’s air apportionment 

recommendation. 

 (d) Review and comment on the JFACC’s air apportionment 

recommendation. 

 (e) Identify assets for JFC allocation (e.g., Army Tactical Missile 

System/attack helicopters), when available. 

 (f) Develop JFLCC targeting guidance and priorities. 

 (g) Integrate and synchronize lethal and nonlethal fires. 

 d. US Marine Corps Joint Fires Command and Control. Depending upon the 

mission, and the decision of the JFC, MARFOR may be employed as the joint force land 

component. 

 (1) Various agencies and elements are established within the MAGTFs when 

designated to form a joint force land component command to assist in the execution of 

their fires responsibilities. The MEF command element organizes a FFCC, which is 

responsible for overall fires coordination. 

 (2) At each level below the MEF command element (division, regiment, and 

battalion), a FSCC is established as an advisory and coordination agency within the 

ground combat element. The FFCC and each FSCC is staffed with representatives of the 

Marine Corps and other component organizations, dependent on the mission.

e. Resources. The JFLCC’s primary means to attack targets are operational fires 

and interdiction. Potential resources available include: Army and Marine Corps ground 

maneuver forces (i.e., regiments, BCTs, divisions), Army and Marine Corps aviation, and 

Army and Marine Corps tactical missile systems. Additional resources that may be made 

available in an OPCON, TACON, or supporting relationship for riverine and surface fire 

support, include Navy or Air Force and SOF. 

See JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, for more information.

 f. Targeting. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and 

matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and 

capabilities. Targeting is executed and applied at all levels within the joint force to 

incorporate the wide variety of capabilities to create desired effects and to support the 
Chapter IV

IV-18 JP 3-31 

achievement of objectives. Effective coordination, deconfliction, prioritization, 

synchronization, integration, and assessment maximize the potential for achieving 

objectives. Decisions to modify missions or direct attacks that deviate from the OPORD 

should be based on the commander’s guidance. These decisions are made with the 

understanding of the perspective and target priorities of other components throughout the 

campaign. The JFLCC must have effective joint targeting procedures that ensure: 

(1) Compliance with JFC’s objectives, guidance, and intent. 

(2) Coordination, integration, synchronization, and deconfliction of actions. 

(3) Rapid response to time-sensitive targets.

(4) Minimal duplication of effort.

(5) Expeditious combat assessment. 

(6) Common perspective of all targeting efforts.

(7) Fratricide avoidance.

(8) Input of theater target priorities within in the AO.

(9) Compliance with the law of armed conflict and ROE. 

 g. Joint Targeting Process. The JFLCC conducts targeting within the joint 

targeting process. A primary consideration in organizing the framework of the joint 

targeting cycle is the requirement to coordinate, deconflict, prioritize, integrate, 

synchronize, and assess joint targeting operations. The structure established by the 

JFLCC must be able to facilitate the joint targeting process throughout the entire 

spectrum of anticipated targeting timelines from long-term to rapidly changing timesensitive situations. In addition, the joint force must react to rapidly changing events. 

Likewise, it should execute all phases of the joint targeting process efficiently and 

continuously. The joint targeting process cuts across traditional functional and 

organizational boundaries. Operations, plans, and intelligence are the primary staff 

participants, but other functional area (e.g., as logistics, weather, legal, and 

communications) subject matter experts also support the joint targeting cycle. Close 

coordination, cooperation, and communication are essential for the best use of JFLCC 

and component resources. The JFLCC develops guidance that directs and focuses 

operation planning and targeting to support the JFC’s CONOPS and complies with 

applicable ROE. In the event of conflict of targeting priorities or ROE, changes may be 

requested from the JFC. 

See JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for more information.
Operations 

IV-19 

h. Targeting Coordination Board. The JFLCC may organize a targeting 

coordination board to function as an integrating center to accomplish targeting 

oversight functions or as a JFLCC-level review mechanism for fires, from lethal and 

nonlethal weapons. In either case, it must be a joint activity with appropriate 

representatives from the other components, subordinate units, and the JFLCC’s staff. 

JFLCC targeting responsibilities are listed below: 

 (1) To retain authority and responsibility to direct target priorities for land 

operations and coordinate subordinate units effort. 

(2) To provide clear guidance and objectives for JFLCC operational planning 

and targeting.

(3) To update JFLCC mission planning guidance, intent, and priority 

intelligence requirements.

(4) To direct the formation, composition, and specific responsibilities of a 

JFLCC targeting coordination board to support land operations. 

(5) To review target selection for unnecessary adverse impacts, such as 

collateral or environmental damage and potential intelligence gains or losses. 

i. Subordinate unit responsibilities are listed below: 

(1) To identify requirements and nominate targets to the JFLCC. 

(2) To provide representation to the JFLCC targeting coordination board. 

(3) To recommend priorities for battle damage assessment collection 

requirements to the JFLCC. 

 j. Other Component Fire Support Coordination Responsibilities. The JFLCC 

and other component commanders (e.g., JFACC, JFMCC, JFSOCC) develop plans to 

accomplish the JFC’s objectives. Synchronization, integration, allocation of 

resources, and matching appropriate weapons to particular targets are essential 

targeting functions for the component commanders. All component commanders 

subordinate to the JFC should have a basic understanding of each component’s mission 

and scheme of maneuver to support the JFC’s campaign plan. Therefore, the JFLCC 

provides a description of the support plan through the liaison elements to the Service and 

functional components and maintains awareness of other component objectives and plans 

that have the potential to affect the availability of other targeting resources. This basic 

understanding promotes unity of effort through the coordination and deconfliction of fires

and targeting efforts between components, multinational forces, and other agencies. The 

JACCE located with the JFLCC provides valuable assistance and liaison from the JFACC 

and assists the JFLCC in planning and synchronizing operational fires and the 

establishment and control of FSCMs. 
Chapter IV

IV-20 JP 3-31 

 k. FSCMs are disseminated electronically by message, database update, and/or 

overlay through both command and joint fire support channels to higher, lower, and 

adjacent maneuver and supporting units. Typically they are further disseminated to each 

level of command, to include the establishing command and all concerned joint fire 

support agencies. Not all measures may apply to a joint operation. However, knowledge 

of the various FSCMs used by each component is necessary for the effective use of joint 

fire support. FSCMs include permissive measures such as coordinated fire lines, fire

support coordination lines (FSCLs), free fire areas, and kill boxes. Restrictive

measures include restrictive fire lines, no-fire areas, restrictive fire areas, and zones 

of fire. 

 (1) Planning and Coordination Considerations. The establishment or change 

of an FSCM established by the JFLCC is typically initiated through the J-3 operations 

cell and ultimately approved by the JFC. FSCMs enhance the expeditious engagement of 

targets, protect forces, populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural 

significance, and set the stage for future operations. Commanders position and adjust 

FSCMs consistent with the operational situation and in consultation with superior,

subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. The operations cell informs 

coordination elements of the change and effective time. Conditions which dictate the 

change of FSCMs are also coordinated with the other agencies and components as 

appropriate. As conditions are met, the new FSCM effective time can be projected and 

announced. Following direction to execute the change, the operations cell should 

confirm with all liaison elements that the FSCM changes have been disseminated. This 

ensures that affected units are aware of new FSCM locations and associated positive 

control measures are being followed, thus reducing the risk of fratricide. 

 (2) Fire Support Coordination Line. FSCLs facilitate the expeditious 

engagement of targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. An FSCL does 

not divide an AO. The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapon 

systems using any type of munitions against surface targets. An FSCL is established and 

adjusted by the appropriate land force commander within their boundaries in consultation 

OPERATION ICEBERG, THE BATTLE OF OKINAWA

The Battle of Okinawa is an early example of the joint force land 

component command in operation. During the battle, several 

innovations, specific to the circumstances of the campaign, were 

implemented. Among these was Tenth Army’s (LCC) reservation of 

“the right to assign target and unit priorities, allocating and/or 

moving assets to where they would have the most beneficial effect on 

the ground campaign.” During the campaign, “Army and Marine 

artillery were used interchangeably.”

SOURCE: Lieutenant Colonel James S. Gavitt, “The Okinawa 

Campaign: A Case Study,” pp. 96-97, Individual Study Project, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1991. 
Operations 

IV-21 

with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. The FSCL is a term 

oriented to air-land operations and is normally located only on land, however in certain 

situations, such as littoral areas, the FSCL may affect both land and sea areas. If 

possible, the FSCL should follow well-defined terrain features to assist identification 

from the air.

11. Movement and Maneuver

a. This function encompasses disposing joint forces to conduct campaigns, major 

operations, and other contingencies by securing positional advantages before combat 

operations commence and by exploiting tactical success to achieve operational and 

strategic objectives. This includes moving or deploying forces into an operational area 

and conducting maneuver to operational depths for offensive or defensive purposes. The 

JFLCC is responsible for the operational movement and maneuver of land forces 

necessary to contribute to the success of the JFC’s campaign and directs the land force in 

performance of operational tasks. The JFLCC plans, controls, and coordinates land 

movement and maneuver to gain a positional advantage or a mobility differential 

over the adversary. The purpose is to achieve the objectives assigned in the theater or 

subordinate campaign plan. The objective for operational maneuver is usually to gain the 

positional advantage over an adversary COG or decisive point. 

b. Key JFLCC movement and maneuver considerations are listed below: 

 (1) The JFLCC normally assumes control of forces from the Service component 

commander upon completion of their JRSOI in theater. The JFLCC must have the 

requisite C2 capability to effectively employ the force.

 (2) The JFLCC must effectively integrate the different capabilities, 

requirements, and limitations of the forces and capabilities assigned. 

 (3) The notional JFLCC’s staff organization (see Appendix A, “Notional 

Headquarters Organization”) provides for the integration of staff officers from each 

Service into each section of the JFLCC’s staff. It is essential that each Service participate 

in the planning process of all movement and maneuver to ensure consideration of 

Service-unique capabilities and limitations.

 (4) A key to maximizing capabilities is to understand the maneuver 

requirements of each assigned force. This requires detailed and continuous coordination 

with other components and careful consideration of FSCMs and boundaries. This also 

requires an understanding of the maneuver environment in which each unit will have to 

conduct operations, to include how the effects of terrain, weather, and possible enemy 

actions (fires, barriers, mines, improvised explosive devices [IEDs], etc.) could impede 

maneuver.
Chapter IV 

IV-22 JP 3-31 

 c. The JFLCC makes recommendations to the JFC on the following: 

 (1) Land force structure and organization for combat. 

 (2) Integration and employment of multinational land forces. 

 (3) Land force scheme of maneuver and fire support to support the JFC’s 

CONOPS. 

 (4) Priorities of effort for land forces. 

 (5) Designating the FSCMs and AO boundaries for subordinate commanders. 

 (6) Intelligence collection priorities. 

 (7) Joint fires to support the land forces. 

 (8) Joint fires to support other components. 

 (9) Space support to the land force. 

 (10) Airspace control requests and ACMs are requested by C2 node to the 

airspace control authority for approval. 

 (11) Interdiction targets or objectives within the JFLCC’s operational area. 

 (12) Special operations support to the land force. 

(13) Land forces continuing operations in CBRN environments during and after 

a CBRN event. 

 (14) Land forces to provide consequence management during the conflict or to 

support WMD elimination operations. 

See JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear, Consequence Management, 

for more information on managing the consequences of a CBRN event, and JP 3-40, 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, for more information on WMD elimination 

operations. 

 (15) Land forces to conduct the site exploitation of any site with political, 

military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, or time 

sensitivity to the United States. 

See JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, for more on the theater air to ground system.
Operations 

IV-23 

12. Protection

a. As a responsibility of command, not a separate mission, the JFC considers all 

elements of force protection. Force protection consists of actions taken to prevent or 

mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, 

facilities, and critical information. Protection may also extend to friendly forces, 

however designated. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be 

applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized 

offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force 

while degrading opportunities for the adversary. Force protection does not include 

actions to defeat the adversary or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. The 

JFLCC will set appropriate force protection condition (FPCON) for his AO equal to 

or more restrictive than the JFC’s baseline FPCON. The JFLCC may form a 

protection cell under the J-3 to synchronize and coordinate protection. US Army 

divisions, corps, and theater army headquarters have a protection cell with a chief of 

protection authorized.

 b. The protection function encompasses a number of tasks, including: 

 (1) Conducting CBRN operations. 

 (2) Providing AMD. 

(3) Conducting AT operations. 

(4) Conducting IO. 

(5) Providing physical security for forces, means, and civilians. 

 (6) OPSEC. 

 (7) Securing and protecting flanks, bases, base clusters, JSAs, and lines of 

communications. 

 (8) Conducting law enforcement measures. 

 (9) Conducting PR operations. 

 (10) Managing the consequences of a CBRN incident. 

 (11) Providing protection to people and equipment from directed energy; laser 

and radio frequency energy. 

 c. CBRN Defense. The JFLCC may need to establish these defensive measures as 

part of force protection. Defensive and detection equipment, intelligence, reporting, 

reconnaissance, decontamination, and personnel requirements will come into play. 
Chapter IV

IV-24 JP 3-31 

 (1) The JFLCC should provide subordinate commanders with information from 

which they can establish appropriate unit defense measures. This system consolidates the 

most current intelligence estimates regarding the adversary’s offensive capabilities, 

intent, and activities; and recommends measures to be employed to combat this threat. 

 (2) The JFLCC’s J-3 establishes the CBRN threat level in coordination 

with the J-2 and JFLCC’s CBRN officer. Once established, the FPCON is 

disseminated via J-2 and J-3 channels. Actions associated with each FPCON are 

recommended, not directive in nature. They are based on current CBRN defense doctrine 

but should be assessed in context of the unit’s situation and mission. 

 (a) CBRN threat level is not synonymous with the mission-oriented 

protective posture (MOPP) levels and/or personal protection equipment levels. Threat is 

only one of the factors commanders consider when determining the appropriate MOPP 

level.

 (b) The JFLCC, in coordination with, and with the approval of, the JFC, 

establishes close relationships with US departments and agencies, multinational partners, 

and IGO and NGO partners operating within its AO. Networks and other means of 

information sharing are established with diplomatic missions, country teams, IGO, and 

NGO partners within the AO. These sources may provide valuable intelligence on the 

likelihood of adversary intent to introduce CBRN material/WMD and related improvised 

devices. They may also produce data on the political and psychological implications, as 

well as military aspects of effectively countering CBRN material/WMD beyond that 

provided by organic or other supporting military intelligence sources. The JFLCC may 

be required to establish search and recovery TF as part of a comprehensive effort to 

locate and secure residual CBRN capabilities. 

For more information on CBRN defense, see JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments. 

d. Site Exploitation. The JFLCC may conduct site exploitation consisting of a

series of activities to recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyze information, 

personnel, and/or materiel found during the conduct of operations in order to protect the 

force and produce an advantage within the operational variables to support tactical, 

operational, and strategic objectives. Site exploitation may be conducted at a sensitive 

site which is a geographically limited area that contains, but is not limited to, biometric 

residue (or remains), adversary information systems, war crimes sites, critical 

government facilities, and areas suspected of containing high value targets.

See also FM 3-90.15, Site Exploitation. 

 e. Defensive Operations for Countering Air and Missile Threats. The JFC 

establishes guidance and objectives to protect against air and missile threats. The 

JFLCC ensures that DCA conducted by land forces are planned, coordinated, and 
Operations 

IV-25 

synchronized with the joint AADP. The JFLCC may employ the AAMDC to perform 

those planning and C2 functions. The AAMDC is an Army C2 headquarters tailored for 

joint operations and is capable of planning, coordinating, and synchronizing joint theater 

missile defense operations. The commander of the AAMDC normally commands its 

subordinate air defense artillery brigades and functions as a special staff officer for the 

ARFOR (or JFLCC, if appointed). For complex DCA operations, the AADC, with the 

approval of the JFC, may appoint the AAMDC commander as the assistant or deputy 

AADC to assist in the integration and synchronization of operations across the joint force 

to effectively counter air and missile threats.

For additional guidance, see JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.

 f. Antiterrorism Measures. A comprehensive JFLCC AT program will seek to 

identify and reduce the risk of loss or damage of personnel and resources which may be 

targeted by terrorists and to develop procedures to detect and deter planned terrorist 

actions before they take place. These measures also encompass the limited response and 

containment by local and military forces. For assets under the control of the JFLCC, an 

appropriate division of responsibilities is coordinated with the JFC. The AT program 

stresses deterrence of terrorist incidents through preventive measures common to all 

combatant commands and Services. The program addresses the following: 

 (1) Threat analysis and threat reduction. 

 (2) Installation or unit criticality and vulnerability assessments.

(3) Threat assessment based on the threat analysis and friendly vulnerabilities. 

(4) Information security.

(5) OPSEC.

(6) Personnel security. 

(7) Physical security.

(8) Crisis management planning.

(9) Employment of tactical measures to contain or resolve terrorist incidents.

(10) Continuous training and education of personnel. 

See also JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

 g. Information Operations. IO integrate and coordinate protection and defense of 

information and information systems (which include communications systems, sensors, 

weapon systems, infrastructure systems, and decisionmakers). Conducted through 
Chapter IV

IV-26 JP 3-31 

information assurance, physical security, OPSEC, counterdeception, counterpropaganda 

operations, CI, electronic warfare, and special IO, IO personnel coordinate IO objectives 

to support the JFLCC’s intent and CONOPS. The JFLCC is responsible for effectively 

integrating IO. 

 h. Physical Security Measures. Physical security measures serve to deter, detect, 

and defend against threats from terrorists, criminals, and unconventional forces. 

Measures include barriers and perimeter standoff space, lighting and sensors, vehicle 

barriers, blast protection, intrusion detection systems and electronic surveillance, and 

access control devices and systems. Physical security measures, like any defense, should 

be overlapping and deployed in depth. 

See also JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, and JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

 i. Operations Security Measures. Effective OPSEC measures minimize the 

signature of JFLCC activities, avoid set patterns, and employ deception when patterns 

cannot be altered. Although strategic OPSEC measures are important, the most effective 

methods manifest themselves at the lowest level. Terrorist activity is discouraged by 

varying patrol routes, staffing guard posts and towers at irregular intervals, and 

conducting vehicle and personnel searches and identification checks on a set but 

unpredictable pattern. 

See also JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

 j. Law Enforcement Measures. The JFLCC may be tasked to assist in the 

prevention, detection, response, and investigation of crimes within the assigned AO. 

Security of high-risk personnel and personnel security are other aspects of force 

protection that will require JFLCC attention.

 k. Personnel Recovery. As a component commander the JFLCC is responsible for 

maintaining a PRCC that coordinates with the JPRC. 

See JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, for more detail.

13. Sustainment 

a. Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to 

maintain and prolong operations until mission accomplishment. Joint personnel services 

include synchronizing and optimizing personnel service support to the joint force (mail, 

religious, and legal support, and finance and disbursement services); coordinating morale, 

welfare, and recreation program; accomplishing manpower management; strength 

reporting and managing casualty reporting (see JP 1-series publications). Core logistic 

capabilities areas are: supply, maintenance operations, health service support, 

transportation, field services, general engineering, and operational contract support. (See 

JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, and other JP 4-series publications.) 
Operations 

IV-27 

See JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations, JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military 

Operations, JP 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations, and JP 1-06, Financial 

Management Support in Joint Operations, for additional information. 

 b. Authority. CCDRs exercise directive authority for logistics (DAFL) and may 

delegate authority for a common support capability. The CCDR may delegate directive 

authority for as many common support capabilities to a subordinate JFC as required to 

accomplish the subordinate JFC’s assigned mission. For some commodities or support 

services common to two or more Services, one Service may be given responsibility for 

management based on DOD EA designations or inter-Service support agreements. 

However, the CCDR must formally delineate this delegated directive authority by 

function and scope to the subordinate JFC or Service component commander. A CCDR’s 

DAFL is not intended to: 

 (1) Usurp Service responsibility for logistic support. 

(2) Discourage coordination by consultation and agreement. 

(3) Disrupt effective procedures, efficient use of facilities, or organization.

For more information on DAFL, see JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 

States.

c. Staff. The JFLCC’s J-1, logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4), and force 

structure, resource, and assessment directorate of a joint staff (J-8) provide critical 

functional expertise to the commander in the areas of personnel services and logistics. 

These staffs focus on key personnel services and logistic issues that may have an adverse 

affect on the land operations portion of the joint campaign. Generally, they manage by 

exception only. Routine administrative, personnel services, and logistic management 

is the responsibility of the JFC and the subordinate Service component commands. 

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and the JP 4-series 

publications. See Appendix A, “Notional Headquarters Organization,” for more 

information on JFLCC’s J-1 and J-4 staff organization and responsibilities.

 d. Responsibilities. Each Service is responsible for the logistic and personnel 

services of its own forces, except when support is by agreement with national agencies, 

multinational partners, or by assignments to common, joint, or cross-servicing. The 

supported CCDR determines if common servicing would be beneficial within the theater 

or designated area. The JFLCC will make recommendations about personnel and 

logistic support to the JFC commensurate with priorities developed for land force 

operations. While each Service retains authority for logistic and personnel service 

support of its forces, the JFC will ensure support is coordinated and integrated throughout 

the operation. 
Chapter IV

IV-28 JP 3-31 

e. Executive Agent. SecDef or the Deputy Secretary of Defense may designate a 

DOD EA and assign associated logistic responsibilities, functions, and authorities within 

DOD. These policy responsibilities influence logistics planning within the AOR. EA 

designations are related to, but not the same as, lead Service designations discussed 

earlier. 

For additional information on EA, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 

United States; for supply commodity related EAs, refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, 

Appendix B, Supply Commodity Executive Agent, and for logistic-related EAs, refer to 

Appendix D, Department of Defense Logistics-Related Executive Agents.

 f. Lead Service. The CCDR may choose to assign specific CUL functions, to 

include both planning and execution to a lead Service. These assignments can be for 

single or multiple common logistical functions, and may also be based on phases and/or 

locations within the AOR. GCC lead Service assignments are normally aligned to Office 

of the SecDef-level EA designations, but this may not always be the case. Service 

component forces, especially the Army, are often required to provide significant levels of 

theater/JOA-wide support to other Service components, multinational partners, OGAs, 

and NGOs. This support and other support directed by GCCs are broadly defined by the 

Army as Army support to other Services. Army theater echelon support units, such as the 

TSC normally provide theater/JOA-wide CUL support requirements, but these are carried 

out by the ARFOR commander and are not a JFLCC responsibility. In some cases, the 

JFLCC may coordinate for lead Service CUL support for the land component, 

however, the authority to direct logistics is not resident in the JFLCC’s OPCON or 

TACON, unless the GCC delegates directive authority for a common support 

capability to the JFLCC. The JFLCC’s J-4 staff ensures that JFLCC-directed CUL 

requirements do not conflict or interfere with GCC-directed lead Service CUL 

requirements. 

See JP 4-07, Common User Logistics During Joint Operations. See JP 1, Doctrine for 

the Armed Force of the United States, and JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, for a definitive 

description on the use of DAFL. 

 g. Contractor Support. Contracted support to military operations is administered 

in accordance with federal law and acquisition regulations. Contracting authority does 

not equal command authority. Contractors are characterized by the type of support they 

provide and by the source of their contract authority. The JFC and planners should 

identify a requirement for a contracted system or capability at the earliest opportunity, so 

all contractors who provide support to the theater requiring transportation can be 

integrated into the TPFDD. Contractor support falls into the three categories discussed 

below: 

 (1) Systems Support Contractors. Systems support contractors logistically 

support deployed operational forces under prearranged contracts awarded by Service 

program managers or by Service component logistic commands. They support specific 

systems throughout their system’s life cycle, including spare parts and maintenance 
Operations 

IV-29 

across the range of military operations. These systems include, but are not limited to, 

weapons systems, C2 infrastructure, and communications systems. 

 (2) External Theater Support. Contractors external to theater support 

contractors, working pursuant to contracts awarded under the command and procurement 

authority of supporting headquarters outside the theater, providing support for deploying 

and deployed operational forces. They may be US or third-country businesses and 

vendors. The contracts are usually prearranged but may be awarded or modified during 

the mission based on the JFCs’ needs. The services provided by these types of contracts 

include, but are not limited to, building roads, airfields, dredging, stevedoring, 

transportation services, billeting and food services, utilities, and decontamination support. 

 (3) Other Theater Support Contractors. Theater support contractors support 

deployed operational forces pursuant to contracts arranged within the mission area or 

prearranged contracts through HN and regional businesses and vendors. Theater support 

contractors provide goods, services, and minor construction, usually from the local 

vendor base, to meet the immediate needs of JFC and subordinate commanders. 

Immediate contracts involve contracting officers procuring goods, services, and minor 

construction, either from the local vendor base or from nearby offshore sources, 

immediately before or during the operation itself. 

See JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support, Department of Defense Instruction 3020.41, 

Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the Armed Forces, and DODD 4270.5, 

Military Construction.

 h. Boards and Centers. The JFLCC is not routinely the lead for JFC-level logistic 

boards and centers. The JFLCC’s J-4 normally participates in selected CCDR/JFC 

boards and centers that are of critical importance to the successful execution of land 

operations. The theater JTB, JDDOC, and/or JMC are transportation-related 

boards and centers that may have significant impact on land operations and are 

examples of higher level joint logistics boards on which the JFLCC may want 

representation. Other boards and centers of significant importance to the JFC include the 

joint material priorities and allocation board and the joint petroleum office. To ensure 

proper focus, the JFLCC participation in these boards needs to be treated as separate and 

distinct from the Service component participation in these same boards and centers. The 

JFLCC will not normally convene separate joint logistics boards and centers except when 

needed to coordinate critical CUL support within the JFLCC’s AO.

SECTION C. OTHER OPERATIONS AND CAPABILITIES

14. Information Operations

IO is the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, 

computer NETOPS, psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), 

and OPSEC, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, 

disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decisionmaking while 
Chapter IV

IV-30 JP 3-31 

protecting JFC controlled assets. With the speed and complexity of today’s operational 

environment, the JFLCC must develop preliminary IO plans prior to the execution of 

operations in an effort to shape the environment, seize the initiative, transition from 

combat to stability operations, and enable transition to civil authority. Considering the 

lethality of the modern battlefield and the multiplicity of participating nations, NGO’s, 

media, and private organizations, the management and distribution of information is 

critical to the success of the nation’s and campaigns objectives. The JFC and subordinate 

commanders must weigh the pros and cons of the release, or withholding, of information 

from select groups will have upon operations and the local civilian population. 

a. While the Army has established a G-7 [information engagement coordinating 

staff element], in joint staffs normally the IO section serves under the J-3 (see 

Appendix A, “Notional Headquarters Organization”). Nonetheless, an IO officer 

should be designated. This officer or an assistant will interface with the joint force IO 

cell to provide component expertise and act as a liaison for IO matters between the joint 

force and the component. These representatives also may serve as members of one or 

more of the supporting organizations of IO, such as the special technical operations cell. 

Since CNA can be used for force application, the JFLCC IO point of contact recommends 

CNA targets for JFLCC approval and, if required, nomination to the joint force IO cell in 

a manner consistent with target nominations for other weapons systems. Service and 

functional components requesting specific IO support from sources internal or external to 

the JFC normally should request such support through the respective joint force 

component headquarters to the JFC IO cell. Service IO organizations (e.g., Air Force 

Information Warfare Center, 1st IO Command [Land], theater IO groups, Navy IO

Command, and the Marine Corps IO Center) also may provide support to the IO cell 

through the appropriate Service component commanders. 

See also JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

 b. Psychological Operations. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce 

foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable to the originator’s objectives. PSYOP have 

strategic, operational, and tactical applications. PSYOP are planned operations to convey 

selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, 

motives, reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, 

groups, and individuals. PSYOP must be integrated into all plans, to include SC 

activities, at the initial stages of planning to ensure maximum effect. The PSYOP 

approval process, consistent with the JSCP, should be addressed and specified early in 

the planning process. Army PSYOP forces assigned to a JFLCC will provide PSYOP 

planning and C2 for PSYOP units that execute PSYOP in support of the JFLCC’s 

mission.

For additional guidance on PSYOP, refer to JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations. 

PSYOP support to non-US military is outlined in DODD S-3321-1, Overt Psychological 

Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short 

of Declared War (U). 
Operations 

IV-31 

 c. Military Deception. MILDEC includes actions executed to deliberately mislead 

adversary military decisionmakers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and 

operations; thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will 

contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly forces’ mission. The intent is to cause 

adversary commanders to form inaccurate impressions about friendly force dispositions, 

capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions; misuse their ISR assets; and/or fail to employ 

combat or support units to their best advantage. As executed by JFLCCs, MILDEC 

targets adversary leaders and decisionmakers through the manipulation of adversary 

intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination systems. MILDEC depends on 

intelligence to identify appropriate deception targets, to assist in developing a credible 

story, to identify and orient on appropriate receivers (the readers of the story), and to 

assess the effectiveness of the deception effort. This deception requires a thorough 

knowledge of opponents and their decision-making processes. During the formulation of 

the commander’s concept, particular attention is placed on defining how the JFLCC 

would like the adversary to act at critical points in the battle. Those desired adversary 

actions then become the MILDEC goal. MILDEC is focused on causing the opponents to 

act in a desired manner, not simply to be misled in their thinking. The MILDEC staff 

officer may be assigned to the J-5. 

For additional guidance on MILDEC, refer to JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.

15. Strategic Communication

The USG uses SC to provide top-down guidance relative to using the informational 

instrument of national power in specific situations. SC is focused USG efforts to 

understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions 

favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use 

of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the 

actions of all instruments of national power. The JFLCC must incorporate the national, 

combatant command, and higher headquarters themes and messages into its actions, in 

order to demonstrate the intended messages. At the JFLCC level, actions will oftentimes 

speak louder than words. In today’s mass media age, it will be the actions of the troops 

assigned to the JFLCC that are transmitted globally by mass media outlets and send 

intended or unintended messages to the citizens of our country and the people of the 

world. 

For additional information on SC, refer to Joint Warfighting Center Commander’s 

Handbook for Strategic Communication. 
Chapter IV

IV-32 JP 3-31 

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX A

NOTIONAL HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION

A-1 

1. General

The JFLCC’s staff is organized based upon the mission and forces assigned and 

attached. Because creating a new staff would be very time consuming and inefficient, the 

staff organization will most likely be derived from an existing Service command 

structure. The most likely candidates are a theater army operational command post, an 

Army corps, and a MAGTF (most likely a MEF). Augmentees from the other Services 

are integrated into the core staff to form the JFLCC’s staff. Ideally, the JFLCC and the 

deputy JFLCC would come from different Services. This construct should be replicated 

throughout the staff leadership to ensure an understanding of the distinct capabilities of 

each Service to optimize force employment. Figure A-1 depicts a notional staff 

organization. 

2. Notional Staff 

While Figure A-1 depicts a notional staff organization, it is not prescriptive. The 

practical assumption is that the actual staff organization is based on the staff organization 

of the theater army, corps, or MAGTF, that forms the core of the staff with some staff 

members being dual-hatted. Therefore, the actual location and specific duties assigned to

certain sections (e.g., engineer) and the specific special staff vary according to the 

organization of the core staff and METT-T. 

3. Manpower and Personnel Staff Section

The J-1 is the principal staff advisor to the JFLCC for personnel management and 

personnel services support and personnel administration issues. The personnel estimate 

and the personnel annex of JFLCC’s OPLANs and OPORDs are prepared by the 

JFLCC’s J-1. The JFLCC’s J-1 accomplishes personnel accountability and strength 

reporting for personnel assigned, attached, or OPCON to the joint force land component 

to the JFC. The J-1 monitors current and projected unit strengths by daily personnel 

status, casualty, and critical personnel shortages in order to determine their impact on 

land operations. These reports would be routinely provided from the ARFOR and 

MARFOR component manpower or personnel staff officer to the JFC with copy 

furnished to the JFLCC’s J-1. The majority of personnel services support and 

administrative actions are accomplished by the Service components through their Title 

10, USC, authority (i.e., pay and entitlements; postal operations; morale, welfare, and 

recreation; casualty operations, personnel performance evaluations; and awards and 

decorations). A notional J-1 organization is provided in Figure A-2. 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-31 

4. Intelligence Staff Section

The primary role of the J-2 is to provide intelligence support to the JFLCC. A 

notional organization of the JFLCC’s J-2 staff is detailed in Figure A-3. The following 

intelligence-related actions are the responsibility of the J-2 staff.

LEGEND

NOTIONAL JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT 

ORGANIZATION

Deputy

Chief of Staff

Personal Staff

Joint Force Land 

Component 

Commander

J-1 manpower and personnel 

J-2 intelligence 

J-3 operations 

J-4 logistics 

directorate 

of a joint staff

directorate of a joint staff

directorate of a joint staff

directorate of a joint staff

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff

J-6 communications system directorate 

of a joint staff

J-7 engineering directorate of a joint staff

J-8 force structure, resource, and 

assessment directorate of a joint staff

J-9 civil-military operations directorate of 

a joint staff

Special Staff

Safety

J-1 Manpower and 

Personnel Staff 

Section

J-9 Civil-Military 

Operations Staff 

Section

J-2 Intelligence 

Staff Section

J-8 Force 

Structure, 

Resource, and 

Assessment Staff 

Section J-3 Operations 

Staff Section

J-7 Engineering 

Staff Section

(Optional)

J-4 Logistics 

Staff Section

J-5 Plans 

Staff Section

J-6 

Communications 

Systems Support 

Staff Section

Figure A-1. Notional Joint Force Land Component Organization
Notional Headquarters Organization 

A-3 

a. Maintaining an intelligence watch in the operations and intelligence (O&I) center. 

b. Coordinating and maintaining technical control over specialty, multidiscipline 

intelligence, and CI support to the commander and subordinate elements. 

c. Establishing an all-source intelligence cell in, or adjacent to, the O&I center. The 

all-source cell is supported, as required, by coalition intelligence assets (if available) that 

remain under national control. 

d. Completing an initial intelligence estimate and maintaining updates as required by 

the operational situation. 

e. Establishing and maintaining an intelligence collection management and request 

for information (RFI) management system.

f. Completing coalition all-source analysis and dissemination. 

LEGEND

J-1 manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff

NOTIONAL JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT 

MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL STAFF SECTION

J-1

Operations

Personnel 

Readiness

Manpower

Plans

Personnel 

Services

Figure A-2. Notional Joint Force Land Component Manpower and Personnel Staff 

Section
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-31 

g. Establishing and maintaining adversary and hostile databases to support 

operations and planning; and, implement a means to share adversary and hostile data with 

J-3. 

h. Acting as central point of contact for intelligence RFIs from subordinate staffs. 

LEGEND

NOTIONAL JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT 

INTELLIGENCE STAFF SECTION

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff

J-2x joint force counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element

Operations

National Intelligence 

Support Team

Intelligence Center

Targeting

Disclosure Cell

Plans

Interrogation

Captured Material 

Exploitation

Special Security 

Office

Meterological and 

Oceanographic

J-2X

J-2

Figure A-3. Notional Joint Force Land Component Intelligence Staff Section
Notional Headquarters Organization 

A-5 

i. Providing the higher headquarters joint intelligence operations center/joint 

intelligence support element with a prioritized list of RFIs. Tracking outstanding RFIs 

and ensuring answers are directed correctly when received from supporting agencies.

j. Coordinating the assignment and tasking of intelligence resources from forces 

made available.

k. Establishing a targeting cell within the all-source cell as necessary to support the 

component deep operations cell. 

l. Assisting other staff in developing and refining priority information requirements. 

m. Planning and coordinating ISR and/or incident awareness and assessment 

operations along with the J-3 staff.

n. Planning and coordinating CI (including combating terrorism) operations. 

o. Developing annex B (Intelligence) to the (land forces) OPLAN/OPORD.

p. Providing regular intelligence summaries and reports, per higher direction, to the 

following: 

(1) Higher headquarters.

(2) Coalition national headquarters and other addressees designated by them (if 

coalition operation). 

(3) Adjacent and subordinate units. 

(4) Any subordinate specialty units. 

q. Coordinating intelligence communications system requirements with the J-6. 

r. Coordinating overall security of the O&I center. Tasks critical to operational 

security are listed below:

(1) Maintaining access rosters from all coalition/US units for all individuals 

authorized access to the O&I center.

(2) Maintaining digital topographic data to support the COP and provide terrain 

analysis in support of the military decision-making process.

(3) Prioritizing the JFLCC’s intelligence requirements, to include reviewing the 

CCIRs to ensure that intelligence requirements for production, collection, and support to 

force protection are identified and processed. 
Appendix A 

A-6 JP 3-31 

(4) Ensuring the intelligence support to targeting and combat assessment is 

performed, to include analyzing the adversary situation to identify, nominate, and assess 

those vulnerabilities that can be exploited by direct military operations. The J-2 provides 

appropriate targeting intelligence support, including target intelligence packages, to the 

JFLCC, JFACC, JFMCC, JFSOCC, JTCB, and other components. 

(5) Developing support operations to include intelligence and CI. 

(6) Supporting force protection. 

(7) Executing intelligence battle handover using established procedures for 

exchange of critical intelligence data.

(8) Providing indications and warnings support to IO. 

5. Operations Staff Section

The J-3 is responsible for the coordination, integration, synchronization, and 

execution of all operations. The J-3 staff assists the commander in the discharge of 

assigned responsibilities for the direction and control of operations, beginning with 

planning and ending when operations are completed. The flexibility and range of modern 

forces require close coordination and integration for effective unity of effort. The current 

operations section must have the ability to look out to at least 72 hours for the upcoming 

commander’s decision points. This will allow future operations to conduct planning from 

the 72 hours out to one week from the current point in time and write the fragmentary 

orders that direct action based on decision criteria as they are modified by an 

understanding of the COP. Failure to achieve this standard will tend to draw everyone 

into the close fight. These sections play an invaluable role during the execution of 

operations by proposing COAs to address adversary actions or to take advantage of 

situations. Figure A-4 depicts a notional J-3 staff organization. Its responsibilities 

include, but are not limited to, the following tasks:

a. Organizing the operational aspects of the headquarters.

b. Recommending land component command organization to the JFLCC. 

c. Recommending ROE.

d. Developing plans and orders and exercising staff supervision or cognizance over 

the conduct of the following: 

(1) Compile an accurate, timely, and complete common land picture for 

submission to the JTF. 

(2) Operational land combat operations. 
Notional Headquarters Organization 

A-7 

(3) Coordination of operational maneuver.

(4) Synchronization and integration of fires. 

LEGEND

NOTIONAL JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT 

OPERATIONS STAFF SECTION

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff

J-35 future operations cell

J-7 engineering engineer staff section

J-9 civil-military operations directorate of 

a joint staff

J-3

Current 

Operations

J-35 Future 

Operations

Information

Operations

Target 

Development

Aviation

Joint Operations Center

*Civil-Military Operations

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and 

High Yield Explosives

Special Operations

Psychological Operations

Space Operations

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Cell ***

Liaison Officer

Air and Missile Defense

Rules of Engagement Cell

**Rescue Coordination Center/Joint Search and 

Rescue Center

* When not established 

as the J-9

** When assigned the 

responsibility for 

Joint Combat Search 

and Rescue

*** J-2 and J-7 may also 

have a counterimprovised explosive 

device cell

Training/ 

Exercise Fires

Figure A-4. Notional Joint Force Land Component Operations Staff Section
Appendix A 

A-8 JP 3-31 

(5) Synchronization and integration of SOF and OGAs. 

(6) Integration of ACCE (or JACCE) into JFLCC staff.

(7) JSA protection and security. 

(8) IO.

(9) Antifratricide measures.

(10) CMO (if not performed by a J-9, civil military staff officer). 

(11) PR to include the establishment of the component PRCC and the 

establishment of the JPRC if directed by the JFC.

(12) Air C2 within a designated AO in accordance with the guidance provided 

by the ACP, the airspace control order, the AADP, and the special instructions located in 

the ATO to assure deconfliction, minimize the risk of fratricide, and optimize the joint 

force capabilities in support of the JFC’s objectives. 

(13) ISR.

(14) Space operations. 

(15) Humanitarian assistance.

(16) Mine warfare operations (land). 

(17) Disaster relief operations.

(18) Counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) operations. 

(19) Establish a component joint data NETOPS cell equivalent within the joint

operations center.

e. Coordinating security of the O&I center. 

f. Coordinating security guards activities. 

g. If established, J-35 (future operations) is responsible for branch plans. 

h. If established, J-7 engineer staff section may be responsible for C-IED operations.
Notional Headquarters Organization 

A-9 

6. Logistics Staff Section

The JFLCC’s J-4 formulates and implements logistic plans within the AO for forces 

assigned or attached to the land force. The J-4 oversees the implementation of logistics

plans by monitoring the logistic requirements of the components and performs analysis 

for logistical impacts on land operations. A notional JFLCC’s J-4 staff organization is 

depicted in Figure A-5. The following actions are the responsibility of the J-4. 

a. Monitoring and coordinating logistic functions and requirements.

LEGEND

NOTIONAL JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT 

LOGISTICS STAFF SECTION

J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants

J-4

Joint Deployment and 

Distribution Center, Joint 

Movement Center, and 

Joint Transportation 

Board

Explosive 

Ordnance 

Disposal

Maintenance

POL and Water

Mortuary Affairs

Material 

Management

Supply/ 

Service Plans Operations Engineer*

* An engineer element under a J-4 directorate is 

recommended when engineering tasks exclusively support 

logistics to bed down a joint task force that requires only 

very minor construction work, or to plan and provide 

materials to support construction by an engineer battalion.

Figure A-5. Notional Joint Force Land Component Logistics Staff Section
Appendix A 

A-10 JP 3-31 

b. Advising JFLCC about logistic matters affecting joint and multinational support 

to land operations. 

c. Preparing and/or assisting the Service component logistics officer on the concept 

of logistic support for the AO and the logistic annexes of JFLCC’s OPLANs and 

OPORDs.

d. Recommending to JFLCC, within the guidelines established by the JFC, priorities 

for the allocation of logistic resources among assigned forces within the AO. 

e. Participating in joint/multinational logistic boards and centers that directly impact 

on land operations. 

f. Maintaining liaison with the other JFLCC staff, agencies, and JFC counterparts to 

stay current with logistics, operational, and intelligence situations.

g. Coordinating designs and missions for construction in the AO. 

 h. Coordination of materiel requirements. 

i. Planning for operational mobility, countermobility, and survivability and 

environmental management. 

j. Theater organization dependent, maintaining liaison with the ARFOR component 

logistics staff officer (G-4) and/or MARFOR G-4, and the Army TSC. 

 

7. Plans Staff Section 

JFLCC’s J-5 operational planning addresses activities required for conducting land 

force operations. The J-5 future plans section retains its focus on future planning during 

the course of the campaign — either the next phase of the operation or the future decision 

points. A notional J-5 staff is depicted at Figure A-6. J-5 responsibilities for the 

employment and sustainment of land forces are listed below: 

a. Employment planning prescribing how to apply force/forces to attain specified 

military objectives.

b. Sustainment planning directed toward providing and maintaining levels of 

personnel, materiel, and consumables required for the planned levels of combat activity 

for the estimated duration and at the desired level of intensity. 

c. Deployment/redeployment planning, including TPFDL development, monitoring 

the force flow, and the redeployment of forces from theater at campaign’s end.

d. Support the JFC’s effort in planning the joint campaign from phase zero through 

termination. 
Notional Headquarters Organization 

A-11 

e. MILDEC and special technical operations planning. 

f. Support to the JFC’s security cooperation planning. 

8. Communications Systems Staff Section 

The J-6 staff coordinates theaterwide voice, video, data, and message connectivity 

between all components and/or subordinate commands. A notional J-6 staff organization 

is depicted in Figure A-7. The following actions are the responsibility of the J-6. 

a. Advises the JFLCC and staff on all communications systems matters.

b. Maintains status of communications to obtain an operational profile of the 

communications systems network to identify problem areas and solutions. 

LEGEND

NOTIONAL JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT 

PLANS STAFF SECTION

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff

J-5

FUTURE 

PLANS

Strategy and 

Policy

Military 

Deception/ 

Special Technical 

Operations

Joint Planning 

Group

Deployment 

Support and Joint 

Operation 

Planning and 

Execution System

Administration

Figure A-6. Notional Joint Force Land Component Plans Staff Section
Appendix A 

A-12 JP 3-31 

c. Oversees the establishment of a NETOPS center to support top-level network 

control and management within the operational area and gives direction and mission 

guidance.

d. Prepares and reviews communications systems plans, policies, annexes, and 

operating instructions, as required, for JFLCC operations. 

e. Requests the necessary communications support resources through the JFC’s J-6. 

f. Identifies communications systems shortfalls to JFC’s J-6 for sourcing. 

g. Tasks subordinate components for communications systems support as required. 

LEGEND

NOTIONAL JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT 

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM STAFF SECTION

J-6 communications system directorate 

of a joint staff

JNCC joint network operations (NETOPS) 

control center

COMM/ELEC communications/ 

electronics

J-6

Plans (Frequency 

Management) Operations

Administration Data Operations

COMM/ELEC 

Maintenance Systems Controls

Communications 

Security JNCC

Figure A-7. Notional Joint Force Land Component Communications System Staff Section
Notional Headquarters Organization 

A-13 

h. Plans, coordinates, and activates, when required, communications systems 

facilities to provide rapid and reliable communications in support of the JFLCC. 

i. Submits request for intertheater communications security (COMSEC) package use 

to the JFC and issues COMSEC call-out message.

j. Validates, consolidates, prioritizes, and forwards ultra-high frequency tactical 

satellite requirements to the JFC for channel allocation.

k. Establishes, supervises, and revises, as necessary, the communications operating 

procedures pertaining to the unique JFLCC communications facilities. 

l. Conducts COMSEC management. 

m. Ensures that sound COMSEC principles are adhered to and ensures in-place 

availability of essential operation codes, authentication systems, and keying materials.

n. Receives, reviews, and advises the JFLCC of COMSEC monitoring reports 

provided by COMSEC monitoring teams. 

o. Develops unique JFLCC signal operating instructions requirements and provides 

to JFC for review/coordination prior to dissemination. 

p. Consolidates and validates radio frequency requirements from 

components/warfighting elements and coordinates requests with the JFC. 

q. Provides guidance and assistance to supporting and assigned forces on all 

telecommunications and data systems matters for which JFLCC’s J-6 has jurisdiction. 

r. Consolidates and validates unique JFLCC telecommunications service 

requirements from components and coordinates with the appropriate agencies. 

s. Directs and conducts exercise/contingency planning. 

t. Determines user communications requirements.

u. Develops critical circuit lists.

v. Develops prioritized listing of systems/circuits for initial activation and provides 

to the NETOPS center for activation management.

w. Develops prioritized list of systems/circuits for initial activation and restoration, 

and provides it to the NETOPS center for management.

x. Maintains understanding of future planning direction. 
Appendix A 

A-14 JP 3-31 

y. Coordinates commercial satellite rights for military systems.

z. Formulates guidance and policy for all communication assets supporting the 

JFLCC not already addressed by the JFC.

aa. Conducts information assurance operations as part of the computer network 

defense program for JFLCC networks. 

 bb. Coordinates and facilitates communication support as required to multinational, 

OGA, IGO, and NGO partners operating within the AO. 

cc. Performs frequency and spectrum management for the command. 

dd. Coordinate matters related to implementation of virtual collaboration capability 

and of the supporting CIE that are not in the purview of the JFC. 

9. Engineering Staff Section (Optional) 

If organized separately, the J-7 coordinates engineering effort between all 

components and/or subordinate commands. A notional J-7 staff organization is depicted 

in Figure A-8. The following actions are the responsibility of the J-7: 

a. Planning for and coordinating the conduct of operational mobility, 

countermobility, and survivability tasks. 

 b. Construction and maintenance of required facilities and lines of communications.

c. Coordination of Class IV materiel requirements.

 d. Environmental management. 

e. Geospatial support in conjunction with the geospatial information and services 

officer.

f. Real estate management.

g. Other specialized engineering support functions. 

 h. Emergency repair of war damage to facilities and infrastructure.

10. Resource Management Staff Section

The J-8 provides resource management support and coordinates finance operations 

support. Finance units and resource management capability is staffed separately. Unit 

placement is within the sustainment community. Each component command establishes 

their resource management component. Finance operations include disbursing, 
Notional Headquarters Organization 

A-15 

commercial vendor (contracts) support, and limited pay. Resource management for 

JFLCC operations comprises fund control, cost capturing, and cost reporting. 

Commanders and planners should consider cash and funding authority as commodities 

needed to support force deployment operations. The supported CCDR will identify the 

designated lead agent for financial management in the joint OPLAN or order.

For information on resource management for CS see JP 3-28, Civil Support. 

a. The JFLCC may designate J-8 with the finance and resource management 

functional responsibilities listed below:

(1) Serves as principal financial management advisor to the JFLCC for finance 

operations and resource management. 

LEGEND

NOTIONAL JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT 

ENGINEERING STAFF SECTION

J-7 engineering directorate of a joint staff

J-7

Facilities and 

Construction 

Division

Facilities and 

Reconstruction Plans

Master Planning 

and 

Environmental 

Management

Operations

Real Estate

Plans and 

Operations 

Division

Figure A-8. Notional Joint Force Land Component Engineering Staff Section 

(If established separately and not part of J-3)
Appendix A 

A-16 JP 3-31 

(2) Ensures the JFLCC exercises appropriate fiscal oversight and control of 

JFLCC resource management. C2 of finance units resides with the TSC. Acts as focal 

point within the land component for all issues related to financial management. 

(3) Represents the JFLCC in identifying JFLCC financial management to the 

JFC, component commands, and Services as appropriate. 

(4) Participates in OPLAN/OPORD development for JFLCC operations. 

(5) Prepares a resource management appendix to OPLANs and orders issued by 

the JFLCC.

(6) Establishes AO resource management responsibilities.

(7) When needed, coordinates specific resource management functions or 

special support requirements. 

(8) Provides estimates of resource requirements to the component commands, 

the Services and the JFC as appropriate.

(9) Maintains positive channels of communication with resource management 

personnel, the financial management center, the JFC, the Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service, and other supporting agencies.

(10) Coordinates funding requirements and finance unit support. 

(11) Establishes positive controls over funding authority received. 

(12) Develops, submits, and validates requirements as necessary in support of 

resource management requirements. 

(13) Develops management internal control processes, controls, and measures 

applicable to component resource managers as well as relevant to internal staff 

procedures. 

See JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations, for additional 

information. 

b. A notional JFLCC’s J-8 organization is depicted in Figure A-9. 
Notional Headquarters Organization 

A-17 

11. Civil-Military Operations Staff Section

The JFLCC may establish a CMO directorate of a joint staff (J-9) (see Figure A-10) 

separate from the J-3 because of the many challenging issues that will arise during 

operations involving CMO, interagency coordination, FHA, HN support, as well as 

coordination with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, HN, IPI, and the private sector. The JFLCC may 

designate a J-9 with the responsibilities listed below:

a. As required, coordinates CMO activities while serving as a conduit for 

information sharing, support requirements, synchronizing activities, compiling 

information of the civil environment, and performing analysis that support the 

commander”s assessment and planning needs.

b. Assists and makes recommendations relating to CMO. 

c. Plans provision of HN support, nation assistance, and makes recommendations for 

foreign internal defense. Participates in OPLAN/OPORD development for JFLCC 

operations and prepares civil affairs operations (CAO) annex. 

NOTIONAL JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT 

COMMANDER FORCE STRUCTURE AND RESOURCE 

MANAGEMENT STAFF SECTION

J-8 force structure, resource, and assessment directorate of a joint staff

LEGEND

J-8

Budget Finance Internal Review

Figure A-9. Notional Joint Force Land Component Commander Force Structure and 

Resource Management Staff Section
Appendix A 

A-18 JP 3-31 

d. Advises the commander and assists major subordinate commands in interaction 

within government agencies and populations. 

e. Recommends policy for CAO and prepares, implements, and supervises the 

execution of CA plans. Prepares estimates and conducts surveys and studies in support 

of CAO. Determines the requirements for resources to accomplish civil-military 

activities to include CA unit(s), personnel, and equipment. 

f. Plans for the conduct of security assistance activities and FHA. In conjunction 

with the J-4, arranges HN sustainment support for land forces or, when directed, other 

services. 

g. When required, plans for civil administration activities to support the restoration 

of civil authority. 

NOTIONAL JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT 

COMMANDER CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

STAFF SECTION

J-9 civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff

CMOC staff -- overwatch

host nation -- coordination

LEGEND

J-9

Civil-Military 

Operations 

Center

(CMOC)

Current 

Operations and 

Integration Cell 

(COIC)

Host Nation

Figure A-10. Notional Joint Force Land Component Commander Civil-Military 

Operations Staff Section
Notional Headquarters Organization 

A-19 

 h. When directed, establishes liaison with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, HN, partner nations, 

private sectors, and IPI that brings these organizations into the realm of planning and 

information sharing. 

12. Special Staff 

The special staff consists of representatives of technical or administrative services 

and can include representatives from OGAs or NGOs. The general functions of the 

special staff include furnishing technical, administrative, and tactical advice and 

recommendations to the JFLCC and other staff officers; preparing the parts of plans, 

estimates, and orders in which they have primary interest; and coordinating and 

supervising the activities for which each staff division is responsible. 

a. Red Team. The red team is an organizational element comprised of trained and 

educated members that provide the commander with an independent capability to fully 

explore alternatives in plans and operations in the context of the operational environment 

and from the perspective of adversaries and others. 

 b. Operations Research and Systems Analysis (Assessment). ORSA assessment 

actions and measures help commanders adjust operations and resources as required, 

determine when to execute branches and sequels, and make other critical decisions to 

ensure current and future operations remain aligned with the mission and military end

state.

c. Command Liaison Officers. An LNO represents the commander or a staff

officer. The task and its complexity determine the required qualifications. At higher

echelons, the complexity of operations often requires an increase in the rank required for 

LNOs.

13. Personal Staff Group of the Commander

The JFLCC’s personal staff performs duties prescribed by the JFLCC and is 

responsible directly to the JFLCC. This group, normally composed of aides to the 

JFLCC and staff officers handling special matters over which the JFLCC wishes to 

exercise close personal control, will usually include a staff judge advocate (SJA), PAO, 

inspector general (IG), chaplain, surgeon, and others as directed (see figure A-11). 

a. Chaplain. The chaplain is responsible for religious support operations. The

chaplain advises the commander on matters of religion, morals, and morale as affected by 

religion, and on the impact of indigenous religions on military operations. 

 b. Inspector General. The IG is responsible for advising the commander on the 

command’s overall welfare and state of discipline. The IG is a confidential adviser to the

commander.
Appendix A 

A-20 JP 3-31 

c. PAO. The PAO is responsible for understanding and fulfilling the information

needs of members of joint force, the DOD, and the public. 

 d. Staff Judge Advocate. The SJA is the commander’s principal legal adviser and 

provides the full spectrum of legal support through direct and reachback capability to 

joint operations across the range of military operations. 

e. Safety. The safety officer is responsible for coordinating safety activities 

throughout the command. 

f. Surgeon. The surgeon is responsible for coordinating health assets and operations 

within the command. Surgeon may also serve as a special staff member.

JFLCC may organize Special and Personal staff as required. 

Some may report directly to the Deputy or Chief of Staff.

NOTIONAL JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT

SPECIAL AND PERSONAL COMMANDER

STAFF SECTION

Deputy

Chief of Staff

Special Staff

Joint Force Land 

Component 

Commander

(JFLCC)

Personal Staff

Staff Judge 

Advocate Red Team

Surgeon Operations 

Research and 

Systems Analysis 

Inspector General

Public Affairs 

Officer

Command

Liaison Officers

Chaplain

Safety

Figure A-11. Notional Joint Force Land Component Special and Personal Commander 

Staff Section
APPENDIX B

THEATER-LEVEL LAND COMPONENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 

B-1 

1. Introduction

 This appendix provides a set of planning considerations for a theater-level JFLCC. 

2. Set the Conditions in the Theater 

The GCC owns the theater but the JFLCC plays a significant role in getting it 

postured to support a wide range of contingencies. The JFLCC typically addresses this 

mission area through the conduct of the GCC’s theater campaign plan strategy as a preconflict activity. Each of the Service components leverages engagement activity to 

strengthen military-to-military and political-to-military relationships, increase the 

military capabilities of friendly countries, and obtain and maintain access to key nodes 

within the AOR. A Service component commander must deal with these even as he is 

transitioning his command to a JFLCC or JTF, conducting detailed mission planning and 

attempting to get key enablers into theater. The JFLCC, however, has additional tasks 

that must be addressed within this mission area. Their accomplishment will ultimately be 

key to the entire joint and multinational force should it be committed. Establishing and 

growing a robust communication systems architecture, positioning Army and joint 

logistics materiel forward for quick access, investing in seaports of debarkation (SPODs) 

and aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) infrastructure in coordination with the host 

countries, and establishing base campplans to facilitate rapid RSOI are but a few of the 

many tasks that the JFLCC should be working to “set the theater.” 

 a. Shaping the information environment has become an essential element of the 

GCC’s theater strategy. The JFLCC must prioritize this effort. IO collectively must be 

considered the main effort for the land component prior to combat operations as it can 

and should shape the environment for joint land operations. SC related and broad 

engagement activities that are grounded in an understanding of the people and institutions 

in the operating area can be significant force multipliers. Use these engagement activities 

LAND COMPONENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 

 Set the Conditions in the theater (Protection, Logistics, Command and 

Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Theater 

“Enables,” Basing/Access/Over Flight...) 

 Build the Joint/Combined Group Campaign 

 Receive and Prepare the Forces (Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, 

and Integration) 

 Fight the Ground Forces 

 Assure “Black End” Campaign Success 

Lieutenant General David McKiernan, Commander Army US 

Central Command and Combined Forces Land Component 

Commander, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM-I 
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-31 

as collection activities to learn as much as possible about the culture and the traditions of 

the indigenous people as well, not just the military organizations.

 b. As the GCC and the components transition to a potential conflict stance, theater 

preparation tasks receive greater priority and resourcing. There will be a growing need to 

support Army Support to other Services tasks that will add complexity and further tax 

limited resources. The lesson from Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa is to work 

these preparation tasks as early as possible, in a sustained manner and in coordination 

with not just the GCC but appropriate interagency and multinational actors as well. 

Resourcing operational tasks to set the theater will be very difficult during non-conflict

periods but it pays big dividends should conditions change (to include supporting rapid

humanitarian relief operations). 

3. Assess the Theater and the Threat

As with setting the theater, the theater and threat assessment is also a continuous 

process. Experience from Iraq and Afghanistan forced the commands to broaden their 

collection and assessment activities beyond typical order of battle analysis focused on 

conventional formations. Infrastructure status, the strength of institutions, tribal and 

ethnic divisions and hierarchies, and the history and culture of peoples in the AOI

become central to JFLCC planning and execution activities. This collective 

understanding informs a well integrated, holistic, IO effort. This collection and 

assessment approach must include the entire land component. It is not a J-2 function 

alone; every soldier and Marine is a collector and there should be a reporting process in 

place to reinforce that. This broader understanding of the mission area is particularly 

important at the operational to strategic level. Accomplish as much of this as possible 

prior to potential conflict and leverage every resource to do so, interagency capabilities, 

multinational formations and liaisons, IGOs, and the observations and reports of 

members of the staff as they move around the theater. Even as the command transitions 

to combat operations, this broad collection and assessment process must continue as it 

should considerably shape post-conflict operations. 

4. Build the Joint Land Operation Plan

a. The JFLCC’s joint land operations plan requires extensive horizontal and vertical 

coordination as the land operations will involve a broad range of organizations, both 

military and non-military. Operations in Iraq have reinforced the importance of 

conducting planning that addresses the complete depth of the joint campaign — well past 

major combat operations. In close collaboration with the CCDR, the JFLCC must 

understand the desired strategic end state and then build the joint land OPLAN to either 

achieve that or facilitate its accomplishment. The joint land operations plan should be 

structured to support a strategic end state, not just a successful military end state. Central 

to the development of this plan is complete understanding of the higher commander’s

intent, priorities, and CONOPS. Equally important is an understanding of the other 

components intent, their priorities and their CONOPS, and the military limitations of 

their forces. The JFLCC should make sure his staff is working the land OPLAN in close 
Theater-Level Land Component Planning Considerations 

B-3 

coordination with not only the CCDR staff, but the other component staffs as well. The 

information environment should be afforded significant energy as well as the JFLCC 

builds the joint land OPLAN. 

 b. Key points for building a joint land operations plan are: 

 (1) A planning staff that has the right competencies represented, especially

logistics planners.

 (2) Flexibility. Do not get wedded to any one plan. Things will change, often. 

 (3) Expect friction with other components fighting for limited theater lift. Make 

sure the planners understand the priorities.

 (4) Get the right interagency and multinational planners and liaison 

representatives in-place early, and use them. 

 (5) Carefully develop the troop list and balance force capabilities — early and 

robust presence of protective and sustainment capabilities securing early operational 

gains and paving the way to strategic success.

 (6) Plan for tactical exploitation opportunities and how best to translate tactical 

success to strategic level success — exploitation creates both opportunity and risk. 

 (7) Establish the respective roles of the future planners (J-5) and the future 

operations planners (J-35), the latter responsible for orders development during 

execution, the former building the joint land operations plan that will be turned over to 

the J-35 planners prior to execution. Timing is important as is task organization between 

the two planning staffs. 

 (8) Treat the information environment as key terrain and shape it accordingly. 

Efforts to influence the operations from the tactical to strategic level must be planned for 

in depth, fully coordinated across multiple organizations, and applied with consistency 

and speed. Use the media to your advantage. Engagement with the press is leader 

business. 

5. Receive the Land Force

JRSOI is the GCC’s responsibility in theater. The entire deploy-employ 

simultaneously construct will likely remain the standard, but it significantly increases risk 

to mission success and makes it even more important that this mission area be carefully 

planned and executed. Compounding the problem is the likelihood that the availability of 

selected APODs and SPODs may not be clear until late in the deployment process. The 

JFLCC and his staff must get involved with the HN, both their military and civilian 

leadership, to work access problems. The “receive the force” mission set is joint in every 

respect and requires a joint and fully coordinated planning and execution effort. Another 
Appendix B 

B-4 JP 3-31 

complication is the addition of multinational formations, many of which will not be 

known until late. The J-4 is normally given responsibility for reception, staging and 

onward movement, and the J-3 for integration. The JFLCC is involved in the entire 

JSROI operation, including directing rehearsals. The communication plan for the JRSOI

plan must be comprehensive and rehearsed as diligently as the movement of troops and 

equipment. Importantly, the plan must integrate and fully consider the capabilities, and 

constraints, of the HN(s). This is a mission area that requires considerable leader 

engagement as the end result is combat power. 

For more information on JRSOI, see JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment 

Operations. 

6. Fight the Land Force

At the JFLCC level, the headquarters conducts shaping operations, setting conditions 

for the corps, MEFs, or major tactical formations to succeed. It requires great discipline 

to stay out of the subordinates fight and that discipline must be translated to the staff as 

well. The JFLCC “fights the land force” by assuring his intent is well understood and by 

shaping the operational area with operational fires (lethal and non-lethal), setting and 

reinforcing key IO objectives and SC themes, and by sustaining the land force as it moves 

to secure operational objectives. Concurrently, the JFLCC is managing the force flow to 

allow for an uninterrupted introduction of additional capability. The JFLCC constitutes a 

reserve and is prepared to commit it to capitalize on exploitation opportunities or prevent 

or minimize setbacks.

a. The JFLCC retains focus on the strategic end state, enabled by the objectives 

achieved by the tactical formations. The JFLCC and the staff should establish a single 

standard for reporting early in the planning process and absorb the host of RFIs that will 

emanate from higher headquarters and elsewhere regarding the conduct of the fight. 

Reporting is key, essential, and requires practice and continuous discipline. There are 

clear differences between Marine and Army reporting practices and even more 

differences between US military and non-US military reporting practices. Establish a

single standard early. 

 b. The commander’s presence on the battlefield is still a significant force multiplier 

and no amount of technical connectivity can compensate for his physical presence. This 

principle is as important at the operational to strategic-level as it is at the tactical-level 

plan to go forward but keep the entourage as small as possible. Fighting the force 

includes leveraging the capabilities made available from across the interagency and 

international organizations that will be present in the operational area, as the JFLCC 

operates in a truly joint, interagency, international, and multinational arena. Maximizing 

the contributions of each to the advantage of the joint land force will be a central task for 

the commander. Given the significant interaction the JFLCC will have with these other

agencies and organizations, it is important that roles and responsibilities between the

GCC and the JFLCC (and their respective staffs) are delineated as each will be engaging 

with many of these same organizations. This becomes particularly important as the 
Theater-Level Land Component Planning Considerations 

B-5 

JFLCC engages with interagency and civil authorities that will assume the lead in the 

post-conflict period. 

7. Contribute to Operation or Campaign Success

Strategic success is achieved on the ground, through the interaction of military and 

civilian entities with the people and their institutions. The JFLCC, supported by the other 

components, must identify both the requirements and the operational approach to setting 

conditions that will allow the JFLCC to seize the initiative; facilitate control of the 

operational area; conduct stability and security; help restore essential services; repair 

critical infrastructure; provide humanitarian relief; and transition authority to civilian 

authorities. The JFC supported by the component commanders plays an integral role in 

determining operational requirements and a coordinated, and where possible integrated, 

approach to achieve transition to civil authorities and achieve the strategic end state. The 

JFLCC must structure a supporting joint land OPLAN that addresses the complete depth 

of the operation, well beyond the largely conventional, major combat operations phases. 

Transition events and stability operations must be fully interwoven into the construct and 

not considered a secondary or sequential piece. Setting end state conditions begins 

coincident with crossing the line of departure.

a. Perhaps the greatest challenge for the JFLCC is to fashion a fires and maneuver 

concept that is at once decisive operationally while equally definitive in setting 

conditions for an effective strategic end state. Very early in the planning process, the

JFLCC must commit a significant amount of time and energy clarifying, with the JFC, 

what the end state should look like. There always exists the possibility that at the policy 

level, the particulars of the desired end state and the conditions on the ground, will not 

have been thought through in any detail. Given this reality, the JFLCC and his staff will 

play a major role in translating broad US strategic objectives into definable, and 

achievable, end state conditions. Ideally the JFLCC will be given the latitude, and in 

some cases the authority, to work with other key interagency and coalition organizations 

in defining and assigning roles and responsibilities for the latter part of the joint 

campaign. Transitions should be carefully planned for with clear articulation of who 

assumes responsibility for what, be it military or civilian led. Work hard to eliminate as

much ambiguity as possible while retaining a degree of flexibility as conditions will 

undoubtedly change during execution. But there are some things the JFLCC can 

probably count on as lead transitions from the military to the civil authorities: significant 

military resources will be diverted to support civil operations, there will be a large 

requirement to provide military staff augmentation to the civilian headquarters, and it will 

take time for the civilian entity to gain sufficient situational understanding to be effective. 

Unity of effort is particularly important in these latter phases of the joint campaign but is 

very difficult to achieve as more and more organizations get involved in the transition 

process. Important to success during transitions is continuity on the military side.

 b. The JFLCC should plan to retain responsibility for land operations well past any 

transition of the lead from military to civil authority — operational experience reinforces 
Appendix B 

B-6 JP 3-31 

the need to absolutely minimize individual and unit rotations in the latter phases of the 

campaign. Additional planning considerations follow: 

 (1) The JFLCC must work to set internal command and support relationships 

that fully leverage other component capabilities throughout the depth of the joint 

operation or campaign — assuring strategic success calls for the support of joint 

capabilities well beyond the major combat phase.

 (2) Fully consider the impact of operational fires on the desired end state, 

ensure supporting commanders coordinate all fires conducted within land component AO

to reduce fratricide, and ensure no adverse impact on future operations. 

 

(3) Consider the threat of IEDs, their impact on operations, and the need to 

stand up a C-IED cell or TF in order to coordinate and conduct IED defeat operations. 

 (4) Carefully consider force composition and capacity with a view toward the 

entirety of the campaign — the complete range of tasks to be conducted. 

 (5) Completely integrate interagency representatives on the staff for planning 

and execution. 

 (6) There will generally be multiple transitions in any campaign, many 

involving other than US military formations. Minimize, to the extent possible, 

overlapping transitions between different organizations and entities. Executing 

operational level military transitions, transfer of authority for example, concurrent with 

hand-off of civil authority from one entity to another should be avoided. Work to get 

absolute certainty on who is in charge on the ground, what the conditions will be to turn 

over lead to a civilian authority, and who has the authority to determine when those 

conditions are met. Transitions, by their very nature, create risk to the force and the 

mission. 

 (7) Aggressively pursue a SC approach that is factual, responsive and holistic. 

Weave the importance of managing the information environment directly into your 

Commander’s Intent.

For more information, see US Army War College JFLCC Commander’s Guidebook. 
APPENDIX C

JOINT LAND OPERATION PLAN AND ORDER DEVELOPMENT

C-1 

1. Purpose

This appendix provides considerations for developing a joint land OPLAN or order. 

SOPs may differ in the degree of detail and emphasis. For formats of actual plans and 

orders, refer to CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, 

(JOPES) Volume II: (Planning Formats).

2. Situation

a. General. The general politico-military environment of the operation that would 

establish the probable preconditions for execution of the plan include tactical information 

for phases of the operation. Refer to command and staff estimates, country studies, or 

related plans. Designate the trigger event that signals execution.

 b. Operational Environment. A summary of information concerning the AO, 

which consists of: 

 (1) A strategic overview of the physical environment, to include climate, 

geography, and topography. Specific localized information about conditions affecting the 

early phases of the operation, especially if a forced entry is anticipated. Include weather, 

key terrain, observation, cover and concealment, obstacles, avenues of approach, drop 

zones, landing zones, and beach and hydrographic data. 

 (2) Civil considerations focus on evaluating the areas, structures, capabilities, 

organizations, people, and events of the human environment. Other considerations 

include, but are not limited to: urban areas, infrastructure, resources, production, and 

other capabilities, that impact combat or post-conflict operations. 

 (3) Specific localized information about conditions affecting the early phases of 

the operation, especially if a forced entry is anticipated. Include weather, key terrain, 

observation, cover and concealment, obstacles, avenues of approach, drop zones, landing 

zones, and beach and hydrographic data. 

 c. Adversary forces. A description of the adversary, which consists of: 

 (1) Strategic and operational factors such as the political roots and objectives of 

adversary activity, personalities, outside support, sanctuaries, logistic capabilities, levels 

of training and combat experience, morale, strategic and operational COGs, and 

vulnerabilities.

 (2) Factors of immediate concern such as locations, strengths, weapons systems, 

tactical capabilities, reserves, mobility, and probable COAs. 

 (3) Information about the military strengths of adversary nations or potential 

parties to the conflict. Include order of battle information, numbers of major weapons 
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-31 

systems, personalities of leaders, levels of training or combat experience, and affiliation 

with major hostile powers. 

 d. Friendly Forces

 (1) Information that may affect the operation. Include mission and applicable 

higher level, joint, or multinational commander’s intent and desired end state. 

 (2) The roles of other forces, commands, agencies, or organizations that may 

affect operations.

(3) The organization of the land forces to support the JFC’s CONOPS and the 

authorities provided by the JFC in respect to forces and capabilities provided to the 

JFLCC (annex A [Task Organization]).

 (4) Tasks of supporting friendly forces, commands, or government agencies. 

 (5) Status-of-forces agreements, constraints, and ROE for the proposed 

operation with the HN, in coordination with DOS and appropriate embassies and country 

teams. 

 (6) For an operation with several phases, any changes in friendly forces by 

phase in annex A (Task Organization) or annex V (Interagency Coordination). 

 (7) Strategic Communications. SC theses and messages applicable to the 

issuing headquarters. (See annex Y)

 e. Assumptions. A summary of the conditions and situations that must exist when 

the plan becomes an order. Include predictions and presumptions concerning the 

following: 

 (1) Conditions within host countries and other nations in the region. 

 (2) US policy for the region such as the application of the War Powers Act. 

 (3) Involvement by hostile powers, both from outside and within the region, in 

the internal affairs of nations in the theater.

 (4) Impact of US actions in the theater on relations with nations outside the 

theater.

 (5) Adequacy of interagency support. 

(6) Bilateral and multilateral consensus on the degree or extent of common 

threats, for example, the narcotics trade and required actions.
Joint Land Operation Plan and Order Development 

C-3 

(7) Availability of resources. 

(8) Warning times, times, and locations of anticipated hostile actions. The 

timing of political decisions in friendly nations, the conditions and timing of the release 

of the use of special weapons. 

f. Legal Considerations 

(1) Determine applicable US and international laws and legal authorities for the 

operation and incorporate into planning considerations early in the planning cycle. 

(2) For domestic operations, such as disaster relief missions, homeland 

security, and home land defense missions, determine applicable domestic law and 

provide legal guidance to commanders and staff. Further, ensure proper coordination 

with relevant federal, state, and local governmental organizations and authorities. 

(3) Any legal constraints or restraints such as provisions of treaties, 

agreements, status of forces agreements, and conventions governing the political, 

humanitarian, and informational limits on the military effort for the proposed operation 

with the HN, in coordination with DOS and appropriate embassies and country teams. 

(4) ROE and/or rules for the use of force proposed for the operation. 

3. Mission

A clear, concise statement of task and purpose that clearly indicates what is to be 

achieved, why, where, when, and by whom for the overall operation. 

4. Execution

a. Commander’s Intent. An expression, in clear and concise terms, of the 

commander’s personal visualization of the purpose and end state of the operation overall. 

This links the mission to the CONOPS and guides all subordinate activities. 

 b. Concept of Operations. The commander’s visualization of how offensive, 

defensive, and stability or CS operations will accomplish the mission. At the operational 

level, the CONOPS is generally broad in nature, with specified tasks to subordinate units 

addressed in paragraph 3c (Tasks to Subordinate Units). The concept may be a single 

paragraph divided into two or more subparagraphs or, if unusually lengthy, prepared as 

annex C (Operations). 

c. When an operation involves two or more clearly distinct and separate phases, the 

concept is prepared in subparagraphs describing for each phase the specified end state so 

that subordinates know the intent for each phase. Though listed sequentially, phases are 

planned concurrently and overlap. The trigger event for the transition between phases is 

normally the achievement of some intermediate goal. This knowledge will permit 
Appendix C 

C-4 JP 3-31 

subordinates to plan branches within their own plans. The subordinate commanders are 

empowered to demonstrate initiative in supporting the achievement of the commander’s 

end state. The commander and subordinates can also execute sequels within and at the 

conclusion of phases, depending on the outcome of battles and engagements. For each 

phase of the operation include the following: 

 (1) Movement and Maneuver. Describe scheme of maneuver, as well as the 

deployment process, to attain initial objectives and the employment of maneuver units. 

Identify the commander’s primary task and purpose during decisive, shaping, and 

sustaining operations when appropriate. Identify the reserve, main effort, and major 

regrouping of forces by phase. Ensure stability or CS tasks are addressed. 

 (a) The scheme for forcible entry of combat elements with necessary C2 

elements and their accompanying support. 

 (b) Changes in the form of maneuver or in the nature of the operation. 

 (c) Mobility and Countermobility. Concept and priorities by phase, unit, or 

area.

 (d) Obscuration. Concept and priorities by phase, unit, or area.

 (2) Fires. The employment of fires necessary to include phased concept of fire 

support to show complex arrangements including priorities of fires and targeting. 

 (a) Targeting priorities and priorities of fire. 

 (b) Air support, field artillery support, and naval surface fire support. 

 (c) Joint interfaces such as the JTCB and the BCD.

 (d) Electronic warfare. 

 (3) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Concept for ISR support 

and objectives, to include priority of effort, by task, unit, or area, (appendix 9

[Reconnaissance] to annex C [Operations]).

 (4) Protection. Describe the concept of protection, to include the priorities of 

protection by unit and area. Address the concept of area security, to include security for 

routes, bases, and critical infrastructure. Identify tactical combat forces and other 

reaction forcers. Use subparagraphs for protection categories such as AMD, EOD, force 

protection posture, CBRN defense, and provost marshal functions, (appendix 15 [Force

Protection] to annex C [Operations]).

 (a) AMD (includes critical asset list/defended asset list by phase of 

operation). 
Joint Land Operation Plan and Order Development 

C-5 

 (b) Concept of operational security, to include security for joint areas, 

bases, lines of communications, and critical infrastructure.

 (c) EOD. 

 (d) Provost marshall/law enforcement activities to include detainee 

operations. 

 (e) Survivability measures. 

(f) CBRN defensive measures.

(g) Force protection postures and conditions. 

(h) Site exploitation operations to include sensitive sites and WMDelimination. 

(5) Information Operations. Describe the concept of IO, to include command 

themes, messages, and talking points. Indentify key leaders and population groups for 

information engagement by priority. Refer to appendix 3 (Information Operations) to 

annex C (Operations) and cross reference with annex F (Public Affairs) and annex Y 

(Strategic Communication). 

(6) Other significant operations conducted by phase to include: annex P (Host 

Nation Support), appendix 12 (Noncombatant Evacuation Operations) to annex C 

(Operations), annex G (Civil-Military Operations); annex N (Space Operations); and

appendix 6 (Essential Stability Tasks) to annex C (Operations), and operations with or in 

support of appendix 4 (Special Operations) to annex C (Operations).

d. Tasks for Major Subordinate Commands. Tasks that encompass two or more 

phases of the major operation for each major subordinate command. Include direct tasks 

for subordinate units not already covered by phases. Include the initial composition, 

location, and tasks for the reserve. 

e. Coordinating Instructions. Instructions appropriate to two or more units or two or 

more phases of the operation. 

(1) Times, events, or situations that signal the transition between phases. 

 (2) CCIRs. 

 (3) Essential elements of friendly information. 

 (4) ROE (appendix 7 to annex C [Operations]).

(5) FSCMs.
Appendix C 

C-6 JP 3-31 

(6) ACMs. Management procedures and formation of an airspace C2 cell and 

its relation with the theater airspace control authority. 

(7) Risk Reduction Control Measures. Force protection guidance. Include the 

MOPP levels, operational exposure guidance, troop-safety criteria, fratricide prevention 

measures, and integration of active and passive defense warning systems to include any 

civil defense requirements. 

(8) PR coordination measures (appendix 5 to annex C). 

(9) Public affairs operations and guidance (annex F). 

(10) Assessment measures and procedures (appendix 11 to annex C 

[Operations]).

5. Sustainment 

Operational sustainment instructions are of primary interest to the elements being 

supported. A JFLCC without an inherent logistic organization will refer to the 

sustainment plan of the Army Service component command or other Service components 

for detailed procedures on how subordinate elements may receive support from Service 

support organizations. The JFLCC describes those support matters necessary to 

accomplish the combat mission of the force. If a support organization, such as an Army 

TSC, is placed under command of a JFLCC, include the detailed information normally 

found in the theater army plan. Even without an integral support organization, the 

JFLCC may choose to include the following subjects: 

a. Logistics (annex D) to include: 

(1) Intermediate staging bases in the target region and repositioning of supplies 

and equipment. 

(2) Priorities of supply and maintenance. 

(3) Submission of materiel status reports.

(4) Controlled supply rate for ammunition (Class V). 

(5) Designations of lines of communications. 

(6) Mortuary affairs.

b. Personnel (annex E) to include: 

(1) Reporting procedures for US military and civilian personnel to include 

contractors.
Joint Land Operation Plan and Order Development 

C-7 

(2) EPW or detainee reporting procedures.

(3) Labor policies (use of EPW, civilian labor).

c. Health Services Support (annex Q) to include: 

(1) Medical evacuation policies.

(2) Medical logistics. 

(3) Location and capacity of theater hospital facilities. 

d. Resource Management to include:

(1) Detailed procedures for making use of labor, transportation, and facilities 

from HN and friendly third countries. 

(2) Contracting and contractor management. 

e. Joint reception, staging, and onward movement of reinforcements. 

6. Command and Control 

a. Command 

(1) Command relationships (annex J). Indicate any major changes by phase 

and conditions/times for shift. Identify any command arrangement agreements and 

pertinent memorandums of understanding/agreement. 

(2) Command post locations to include location of the commander. 

(3) Succession of command. 

(4) Liaison requirements. Establishing liaison with the HN, with the higher 

joint forces command, with other component commands (especially those involved in 

force projection operations), with SOF already in the operational area, and with 

appropriate US agencies, OGAs, and NGOs.

b. Communication Systems (annex K). Communications procedures and priorities 

such as location of key nodes, frequency management, communications-electronics 

operating instructions, codes, and interface with joint or multinational forces.

7. ANNEXES

Joint land operations plan annexes should be written for a functional land domainspecific audience and contain technical details necessary for C2 of all land organizations 
Appendix C 

C-8 JP 3-31 

and capabilities across the joint force. They should contain any details not considered 

appropriate for the relevant section of the main plan. 

A. Task Organization. 

B. Intelligence.

C. Operations. 

D. Logistics.

E. Personnel. 

F. Public Affairs.

G. Civil Affairs.

H. Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations.

J. Command Relationships. 

K. Communications and Information. 

L. Environmental Considerations. 

M. Geospatial Information and Services.

N. Space Operations.

P. Host-Nation Support. 

Q. Medical Services.

S. Special Technical Operations.

V. Interagency Coordination. 

Y. Strategic Communication.
APPENDIX D

REFERENCES 

D-1 

The development of JP 3-31 is based on the following references. 

1. Law, Policy, and Joint Documents 

a. Title 10 and 32, USC, as amended. 

b. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Title 

10, USC, Section 111). 

c. The Nunn -Cohen Amendment to the 1987 DOD Authorization Act (Title 10, USC, 

Section 167).

d. DOD Directive 3000.05, Stability Operations. 

e. DODD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare.

f. DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major 

Components. 

g. DOD Directive 5100.3, Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and 

Subordinate Joint Commands. 

h. CJCSM 3115.01, Joint Data Network Operations. 

i. CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).

j. CJCSI 3151.01, Global Command and Control System Common Operational 

Picture Reporting Requirement. 

k. CJCSM 3500.04E, Universal Joint Task Manual. 

l. CJCSM 6715.01A, Joint Collaboration Tools Employment.

2. Joint Publications 

a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

b. JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations. 

c. JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations. 

d. JP 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations.

e. JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations. 
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 3-31 

f. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

g. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 

h. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

i. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

j. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.

k. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

l. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.

m. JP 3-05, Joint Special Operations.

n. JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations. 

o. JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations.

p. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

q. JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

r. JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations.

s. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.

t. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

u. JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support.

v. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

w. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Environments. 

x. JP 3-13, Information Operations.

y. JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations.

z. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security. 

aa. JP 3-13.4, Military Deception. 

bb. JP 3-14, Space Operations.
References 

D-3 

cc. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

dd. JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations.

ee. JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations. 

ff. JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency. 

gg. JP 3-26, Counterterrorism. 

hh. JP 3-27, Homeland Defense. 

ii. JP 3-28, Civil Support. 

jj. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

 

kk. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 

ll. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

mm. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. 

nn. JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

oo. JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction.

pp. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear, Consequence 

Management.

qq. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

rr. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.

ss. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

tt. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 

uu. JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

vv. JP 3-63, Detainee Operations.

ww. JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.

xx. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

yy. JP 4-07, Common User Logistics During Joint Operations. 
Appendix D 

D-4 JP 3-31 

zz. JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations. 

aaa. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support. 

bbb. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

ccc. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

3. Service, Multi-Service, and Allied Publications and Studies 

a. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1, Air Warfare. 

b. AJP 3.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations.

c. FM 1, The Army.

d. FM 1-02, Army Operational Terms and Graphics. 

e. FM 3-0, Operations.

f. FM 3-07, Stability Operations.

g. FM 3-09, Fires.

h. FM 3-31/MCWP 3-40.7, Joint Force Land Component Commander Handbook. 

i. FM 3-31.1/MCWP 3-36, Army-Marine Integration in Joint Operations (AMCI).

j. FM 3-35.1, Army Pre-Positioned Stocks.

k. FM 3-37, Protection. 

l. FM 3-90.15, Site Operations. 

m. FM (100-7) 3-93, Theater Army Operations.

n. FM 4-0, Sustainment.

o. FM 4-94, Theater Sustainment Command. 

p. FM 5-0, The Operations Process.

q. FM 5-1, Command and Staff Operations.

r. FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces.
References 

D-5 

s. FM 6-01.1, Knowledge Management Section. 

t. FM 7-15, The Army Universal Task List (AUTL).

u. Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting. 

v. MCDP 6, Command and Control. 

w. MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process. 

x. NWP 3-02.3/MCWP 3-32, Maritime Pre-positioning Force (MPF) Operations.

y. COL John A. Bonin, OPR, Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC). 

Primer. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, 

Planning and Operations, Version 3.5, 2 April, 2000. 

z. Joint Forces Land Component Commander ALSA Study, April, 1997. 

aa. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign 

Design. 

4. Articles, Books, and Papers 

a. Appleman, Roy E., James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, John Stevens, United 

States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Okinawa: the Last Battle. Wash., 

DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2000. (First Printed 1948). 

b. Arthur, Stanley R., Sir Peter de la Billière, Walter E. Boomer, Charles A. Horner, 

Bernard E. Trainor, and John J. Yeosock. In the Wake of the Storm. Wheaton, IL: 

Cantigny First Division Foundation, 2000. 

c. Beaumont, Roger A. Joint Military Operations, A Short History. Westport, CT: 

Greenwood Press, 1993. 

d. Bonin, John A. US Army Forces Central Command in Afghanistan and the 

Arabian Gulf during Operation Enduring Freedom: 11 September 2001-11 March 2003. 

Carlisle, PA: Army Heritage Center Foundation, 2003. 

e. Gary L. Bounds, Larger Units: Theater Army — Army Group — Field Army. Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1985. 

f. Casey, George W. “America’s Army in an Era of Persistent Conflict.” Army

(October 2008). 
Appendix D 

D-6 JP 3-31 

g. Center for Army Lessons Learned. Initial Impressions Report, XVIII Airborne 

Corps/Multi-National Corps – Iraq. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combined Arms Center, 

2006. 

h. von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and 

Peter Paret, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976. 

i. Cushman, John H. Command and Control of Theater Forces: Issues in Middle 

East Coalition Command. Boston, MA: Harvard University, Center for Information 

Policy Research, 1991. 

j. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to 

Congress. April, 1992. 

k. Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe. Garden City, New York: Doubleday 

and Company, Inc.1948. 

l. Fontenot, Gregory, E.J. Degan, and David Tohn. On Point: The United States 

Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute 

Press, 2004. 

m. Gavitt, James S. “The Okinawa Campaign: A Case Study.” Individual Study 

Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1991. 

n. Gordon, Michael R. and General Bernard E. Trainor (Ret.), The Generals’ War. 

New York, Toronto, London, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. 

o. Gray, Colin S. Modern Strategy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 

p. Hogan, David W. A Command Post at War: First Army Headquarters in Europe, 

1943-1945. Wash., DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 2000. 

q. Luck, Gary, and Mike Findlay. JTF Level Command Relationships and Joint 

Force Organization, Focus Paper #4. Joint Warfighting Center, United States Joint 

Forces Command, 2007. 

r. Luck, Gary, and Mike Findlay. Joint Operations Insights and Best Practices, 2nd

Edition. Joint Warfighting Center, United States Joint Forces Command, 2008. 

s. Scales, Robert H. Jr., Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War. Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1994. 

t. Swain, Richard M. “Lucky War” Third Army in Desert Storm. Fort Leavenworth, 

KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994. 
References 

D-7 

u. Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith New York, NY: 

Oxford University Press, 1971. 

v. Turner, Thomas R. “US Army North: Strength in the Homeland.” Army (October 

2008). 

w. Weigley, Russell F. Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and 

Germany, 1944-1945. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981. 

x. Yates, Larry. “Some Thoughts on US Interventions Since World War II.” 

Readings, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1993. 

y. Yeosock, John J. “Army Operations in the Gulf Theater.” Military Review

(September, 1991). 

z. US Army War College Joint Land Force Component Commander’s Guidebook. 

aa. Guiding Principles or Stabilization and Reconstruction, United States Institute 

for Peace Press, Washington D.C., 2009. 
Appendix D 

D-8 JP 3-31 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX E

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

E-1 

1. User Comments 

 Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: 

Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments 

should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and 

appearance. 

2. Authorship 

 The lead agent for this publication is the Department of the Army. The Joint Staff 

doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3). 

3. Supersession 

 This publication supersedes JP 3-31, 23 March 2004, Command and Control for 

Joint Land Operations. 

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: HQDA, ATTN: DAMO-SSP 

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDETD// 

 COMUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JW100// 

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Joint 

Force Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 

20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC. 

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this 

publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an 

enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to 

notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this 

publication are initiated. 

c. Record of Changes: 

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS 

____________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix E 

E-2 JP 3-31 

5. Distribution of Publications 

 Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is 

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must 

be in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

 a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET) and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

 b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside 

the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint 

publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the 

local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 

MacDill Blvd., Bolling AFB, Washington, DC 20340-5100. 

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and 

deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications. 
GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

GL-1 

AADC area air defense commander 

AADP area air defense plan 

AAMDC US Army Air and Missile Defense Command 

ACCE air component coordination element 

ACP airspace control plan 

ACM airspace coordinating measure 

ADCON administrative control 

AJP Allied joint publication 

AMD air and missile defense 

AO area of operations 

AOI area of interest 

AOR area of responsibility 

APOD aerial port of debarkation 

APS Army pre-positioned stocks 

ARCENT United States Army Central Command 

ARFOR Army forces 

AT antiterrorism 

ATO air tasking order 

BCD battlefield coordination detachment 

BCT brigade combat team 

C2 command and control 

CA civil affairs 

CAO civil affairs operations 

CAS close air support 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CCDR combatant commander 

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement 

CFLCC coalition forces land component commander

CI counterintelligence 

CIE collaborative information environment 

C-IED counter-improvised explosive device 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

CMO civil-military operations 

CMOC civil-military operations center 

CNA computer network attack 

COA course of action 

COIN counterinsurgency 

COG center of gravity 

COMSEC communications security 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CONPLAN operation plan in concept format 

COP common operational picture 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-31 

CS civil support 

CUL common-user logistics 

DAFL directive authority for logistics 

DCA defensive counterair 

DLD digital liaison detachment 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

DOS Department of State 

EA executive agent 

EOD explosive ordnance disposal 

EPW enemy prisoner of war 

FFCC force fires coordination center (USMC) 

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance 

FM field manual (Army) 

FPCON force protection condition 

FSCC fire support coordination center (USMC) 

FSCL fire support coordination line 

FSCM fire support coordination measure 

FSO fire support officer 

G-4 Army or Marine Corps component logistics staff 

 officer (Army division or higher staff, Marine 

 Corps brigade or higher staff) 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

GIG Global Information Grid 

GPS Global Positioning System 

HD homeland defense 

HN host nation 

IED improvised explosive device 

IG inspector general 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

IO information operations 

IPI indigenous populations and institutions 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

IW irregular warfare 

J-1 manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff 

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff 

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff 

J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff 

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff 
Glossary 

GL-3 

J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff 

J-7 engineering staff section 

J-8 force structure, resource, and assessment 

 directorate of a joint staff 

J-9 civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff 

J-35 future operations 

JACCE joint air component coordination element 

JDDOC joint deployment and distribution operations center 

JFACC joint force air component commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JFLCC joint force land component commander 

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander 

JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander 

JIACG joint interagency coordination group 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

JMC joint movement center 

JNCC joint network operations (NETOPS) control center 

JOA joint operations area 

JOPP joint operation planning process 

JP joint publication 

JPG joint planning group 

JPRC joint personnel recovery center 

JRSOI joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration 

JSA joint security area 

JSC joint security coordinator 

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

JTB Joint Transportation Board 

JTCB joint targeting coordination board 

JTF joint task force 

LCC land component commander 

LNO liaison officer 

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force 

MARFOR Marine Corps forces 

MCDP Marine Corps doctrine publication 

MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication 

MEF Marine expeditionary force 

METT-T mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support 

 available-time available 

MILDEC military deception 

MOE measure of effectiveness 

MOPP mission-oriented protective posture 

MPF maritime pre-positioning force 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-31 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NECC Navy Expeditionary Combat Command 

NETOPS network operations 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

O&I operations and intelligence 

OEF Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 

OGA other government agency 

OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

OPCON operational control 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPORD operation order 

OPSEC operations security 

ORSA operations research and systems analysis 

PA public affairs 

PAO public affairs officer 

PR personnel recovery 

PRCC personnel recovery coordination cell 

PSYOP psychological operations 

RFA request for assistance 

RFI request for information 

ROE rules of engagement 

RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration 

SC strategic communication 

SCA space coordinating authority 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SJA staff judge advocate 

SOCCE special operations command and control element 

SOF special operations forces 

SOP standing operating procedure 

SPOD seaport of debarkation 

TACON tactical control 

TEC theater engineer command 

TF task force 

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data 

TPFDL time-phased force and deployment list 

TSC theater sustainment command (Army) 

USC United States Code 

USCENTCOM United States Central Command 

USG United States Government 

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command 
Glossary 

GL-5 

USMC United States Marine Corps 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 
PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

GL-6 

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions 

found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, will reflect this publication as the source document for 

these terms and definitions.

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land 

and maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire 

operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for 

component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also 

called AO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

armored personnel carrier. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

Army corps. An intermediate headquarters between divisions and the theater army. A 

corps may consist of two or more divisions together with supporting brigades. Corps 

headquarters are capable of serving as either a joint task force or joint force land 

component command headquarters. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

Army service area. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

Army Service component command. Command responsible for recommendations to 

the joint force commander on the allocation and employment of Army forces within 

a combatant command. Also called ASCC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-31) 

Army support area. The specific support area for a theater Army that is outside of a 

division or corps's operational area established primarily for the positioning, 

employment, and protection of theater support units; and where the majority of the 

sustaining operations occur. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

brigade combat team. As combined arms teams, brigade combat teams form the basic 

building block of the Army’s tactical formations. They are the principal means of 

executing engagements. Three standardized brigade combat teams designs exist; 

heavy, infantry, and Stryker. Battalion-sized maneuver, fires, reconnaissance, and 

sustainment units are organic to a brigade combat team. Also called BCT. 

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

close support. That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives which are 

sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination 

of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported 

force. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-31) 

contain. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

counteroffensive. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

field army. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-7 

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed 

of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the 

range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be 

of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 

general staff. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, 

subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing 

commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, 

attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air 

operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The 

joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish 

missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified 

commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant 

command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called 

JFC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 

joint force land component commander. The commander within a unified command, 

subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing 

commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, 

attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating 

land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. 

The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to 

accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called 

JFLCC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

joint force maritime component commander. The commander within a unified 

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the 

establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of 

assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking maritime forces and assets; 

planning and coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such operational 

missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is 

given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the 

establishing commander. Also called JFMCC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a 

unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to 

the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment 

of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and 

assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such 

operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-31 

component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and 

tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFSOCC. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

joint land operations. Land operations performed across the range of military 

operations with land forces made available by Service components in support of the 

joint force commander’s operation or campaign objectives, or in support of other 

components of the joint force. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

joint land operations plan. A plan for a connected series of joint land operations to 

achieve the joint force commander’s objectives within a given time and operational 

area. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

joint operations. A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, 

or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of 

themselves, do not establish joint forces. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

joint security area. A specific surface area, designated by the joint force commander to 

facilitate protection of joint bases and their connecting lines of communications that 

support joint operations. Also called JSA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-10) 

land control operations. The employment of land forces, supported by maritime and air 

forces (as appropriate) to control vital areas of the land domain. Such operations are 

conducted to establish local military superiority in land operational areas. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

land forces. Personnel, weapon systems, vehicles, and support elements operating on 

land to accomplish assigned missions and tasks. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02 with JP 3-31 as the source JP.) 

line of departure. 1. In land warfare, a line designated to coordinate the departure of 

attack elements. Also called LD. (JP 3-31) 2. In amphibious warfare, a suitably 

marked offshore coordinating line to assist assault craft to land on designated 

beaches at scheduled times the seaward end of a boat lane. Also called LOD. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02)

mission command. The conduct of military operations through decentralized execution 

based upon mission-type orders. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

mobile defense. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

multinational force commander. A general term applied to a commander who 

exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two 

or more nations. The extent of the multinational force commander’s command 

authority is determined by the participating nations. Also called MNFC. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-16) 
Glossary 

GL-9 

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by 

forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition 

or alliance. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-16) 

mutual support. That support which units render each other against an enemy, because 

of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and 

their inherent capabilities. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-31) 

sensitive site. A geographically limited area that contains, but is not limited to, 

adversary information systems, war crimes sites, critical government facilities, and 

areas suspected of containing high value targets. (Approved for inclusion in 

JP 1-02.) 

sensitive site exploitation. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

Service component command. A command consisting of the Service component 

commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments 

organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces 

that have been assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate 

unified command or joint task force. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 

site exploitation. A series of activities to recognize, collect, process, preserve, and 

analyze information, personnel, and/or materiel found during the conduct of 

operations. Also called SE. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

standard operating procedure. A set of instructions covering those features of 

operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without 

loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise. Also 

called SOP. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

standing operating procedure. See standard operating procedure. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-10 JP 3-31 

Intentionally Blank 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATION

PLANS SYSTEMS

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to

fill extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of

the development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-31 Operations