PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

Nos. 21-3032 and 21-3119

____________

ZURN INDUSTRIES, LLC,

 

v.

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, individually and as 

successor in interest to

Northbrook Excess and Surplus Insurance Company

(formerly Northbrook Insurance Company); TRAVELERS 

CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY,

individually and as successor in interest to the Aetna Casualty 

and Surety Company formerly known as THE AETNA 

CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY;

FIRST STATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a subsidiary of

The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. doing business 

as Arrowhead Indemnity Company

formerly known as Royal Indemnity; NEW ENGLAND 

INSURANCE COMPANY, a subsidiary of The Hartford 

Financial Services Group, Inc.; AMERICAN HOME 

ASSURANCE COMPANY; GRANITE STATE 

INSURANCE COMPANY

NEW ENGLAND INSURANCE COMPANY,

a subsidiary of The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc.;

FIRST STATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
2

a subsidiary of The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc.,

 Third Party Plaintiffs

v.

GRANITE STATE INSURANCE COMPANY;

LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY;

AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY;

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

 Third Party Defendants

 American Home Assurance Company,

 Appellant in 21-3032

Zurn Industries, LLC.

 Appellant in 21-3119

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 1-18-cv-00299)

District Judge: Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter

____________

Argued on June 15, 2023

Before: PORTER, FREEMAN and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: July 28, 2023)

Robert L. Byer ARGUED

Thomas E. Sanchez

Duane Morris
3

625 Liberty Avenue, Suite 1000

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Gavin Fung

Liberty Mutual Insurance Company

175 Berkley Street

Boston, MA 02117

Ralph J. Luongo

Kennedys CMK

1600 Market Street

Suite 1410

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Appellant American Home Assurance Co. 

in No. 21-3032 and Appellee Granite State Insurance Co. in 

No. 21-3119

Patrick J. Murphy ARGUED

Quarles & Brady LLP

411 East Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 2400

Milwaukee, WI 53202

Counsel for Appellant Zurn Industries, LLC in No. 21-

3032

Robert R. Anderson, III ARGUED

Christopher A. Johnson

Margaret Truesdale ARGUED

Hughes Socol Piers Resnick & Dyn

70 W Madison Street, Suite 400

Chicago, IL 60602
4

Timothy R. Smith

Pion, Nerone, Girman, Winslow & Smith

1500 One Gateway Center

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Counsel for Appellee Allstate Insurance Co. 

Myles D. Morrison ARGUED

James P. Ruggeri

Ruggeri Parks & Weinberg

1875 K Street NW, Suite 600

Washington, DC 20006

Michael A. Shiner

Tucker Arensberg

One PPG Place

Suite 1500

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Counsel for Appellee First State Insurance Co. and

New England Insurance Co. 

____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

____________

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

Zurn Industries, LLC is a manufacturer of plumbing 

products and accessories. For over a decade, it has faced a 

litany of lawsuits in which claimants allege bodily injury or 

wrongful death caused by asbestos in its products. To cover 

litigation costs, Zurn used various insurance policies issued by 

various insurance companies. Eventually, Zurn was told by its 

primary and umbrella insurers that Zurn had exhausted the 
5

limits of liability under those policies. So Zurn turned to its 

excess insurance policies for coverage. When Zurn’s excess 

policy insurers refused to pay, Zurn filed suit in federal court. 

Among other relief, Zurn sought a declaratory judgment that it 

had exhausted the limits of liability under its primary and 

umbrella policies and that Zurn’s excess policy insurers had a 

duty to defend and pay defense costs in the underlying asbestos 

suits. The excess policy insurers responded with counterclaims 

seeking declaratory judgments to the opposite effect. After 

discovery, the parties filed numerous partial summary 

judgment motions regarding pure questions of law and issues 

of contract interpretation. The District Court addressed some 

of the motions, interpreting the meaning of various primary, 

umbrella, and excess policies, and determining the scope of 

some duties insurers have under them. Dissatisfied with the 

District Court’s interpretation of the policy it issued to Zurn, 

one excess policy insurer—American Home Assurance 

Company—appealed several of the partial summary judgment 

orders. In response, Zurn cross-appealed to challenge different 

portions of the District Court’s orders interpreting the terms of 

other excess policies Zurn held. We conclude American Home 

does not challenge orders that are functionally equivalent to an 

injunction; thus, we lack the power to review its appeal. And 

because Zurn’s cross-appeal is jurisdictionally dependent on 

American Home’s, we also lack jurisdiction to review it.

I.

A. Factual History

Zurn Industries, LLC is the defendant in numerous 

underlying suits in which claimants allege the company’s 

products exposed them to asbestos and caused bodily injury or 

wrongful death. To cover the costs of defending itself against 

these suits and paying any resulting judgments, Zurn invoked 

the defense and indemnity coverage of its insurance policies. 
6

As relevant here, Zurn maintained several layered policies 

providing it coverage throughout the 1970s and 1980s. During 

that time, Zurn’s first layer of defense and indemnity coverage 

(its primary policies) came from Liberty Mutual Insurance 

Company (April 1974 to April 1980) and Travelers Casualty 

and Surety Company (April 1980 to April 1986). Its second 

layer of defense and indemnity coverage (its umbrella policies)

came from Liberty Mutual (April 1974 to April 1978 and April 

1979 to April 1980), Northbrook Insurance Company (April 

1978 to April 1979)1, and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company 

(April 1980 to April 1986). Finally, Zurn maintained several 

excess policies which provided a third layer of defense and 

indemnity coverage that kicked in when underlying primary 

and umbrella policies were exhausted. Relevant to these 

appeals, the following companies provided excess policies to 

Zurn: American Home Assurance Company (December 1974 

to December 1977), Granite State Insurance Company 

(December 1977 to April 1979), Northbrook (April 1979 to 

April 1983), Royal Indemnity Company (April 1983 to April 

1984), New England Insurance Company (April 1984 to April 

1985), and Lexington Insurance Company (April 1985 to April 

1986).

For many years, Zurn tendered the asbestos suits to its 

insurers and obtained coverage under its primary and umbrella 

policies. When Zurn’s primary and umbrella insurers notified 

Zurn that certain policies’ liability limits had been reached, 

Zurn turned to its excess policy insurers for coverage. The

excess policy insurers refused. 

1 Zurn and Allstate characterize this Northbrook policy 

as an umbrella policy, while the District Court simply stated it 

was excess to the primary policy. We make no holdings as to 

the type or scope of coverage provided under the policy.
7

B. Procedural History

In response, Zurn filed suit against its insurers: 

Travelers2, Allstate Insurance Company3, American Home, 

Granite State, First State Insurance Company4, and New 

England. Zurn sought a declaratory judgment that its primary 

and umbrella policies had been exhausted and that each of its

excess policy insurers had a duty to defend Zurn and pay 

defense costs in addition to the excess policies’ limits of 

liability. Zurn also alleged breach of contract and bad faith 

against Allstate. The insurers responded with their own 

counterclaims, seeking declaratory judgments about the fact 

and scope of their obligation to defend and indemnify Zurn as 

well as the allocation of defense and indemnity costs if 

coverage were triggered.

After discovery, the District Court permitted any party

to submit “dispositive motion[s] whose resolution depends 

solely on matters of contractual interpretation and/or pure 

questions of law.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 171. Summary judgment 

motions poured in. Zurn moved for partial summary judgment 

on its claims for declaratory relief regarding insurers’ duty to 

defend and pay defense costs in addition to liability limits 

under each excess policy. American Home moved for partial 

summary judgment, arguing that it did not have a duty to 

defend or pay defense costs. Several other excess policy 

insurers moved for summary judgment, asking the Court to 

declare the limits of liability under American Home’s policy,

2 Travelers is the successor in interest to the Aetna

policies.

3 Allstate is the successor in interest to the Northbrook 

policies. 

4 First State is the successor in interest to the Royal 

policy.
8

as did American Home. And other primary and excess policy 

insurers also moved for partial summary judgment on similar 

issues including: the limits and exhaustion of policies; whether 

defense costs must be paid in addition to liability limits under 

certain excess policies; and how defense costs ought to be 

allocated among insurers. Finally, Liberty Mutual moved for 

partial summary judgment that its primary and umbrella 

policies were fully exhausted. 

In October 2021, the District Court resolved many of 

the legal issues raised by the parties. Relevant here, the Court 

denied American Home’s partial summary judgment motion 

for a declaration that it owed Zurn no duty to defend or pay 

defense costs in the underlying asbestos suits. Simultaneously, 

the Court granted in part and denied in part Zurn’s partial 

summary judgment motion. Specifically, the Court granted 

summary judgment “with respect to Count VI . . . insofar as 

Zurn seeks a declaration that American Home Assurance 

Company must pay defense costs in addition to policy limits 

under [the relevant] American Home policy.” App. 52. The 

Court also granted partial summary judgment and entered 

declaratory relief “with respect to Count VII . . . insofar as 

Zurn seeks a declaration that Granite State Insurance Company 

is required to pay defense costs in addition to policy limits” 

under its policy covering December 1977 to April 1978. App. 

52. However, the Court denied declaratory relief to the same 

effect for Granite State’s excess policy covering April 1978 to 

April 1979 and Northbrook’s umbrella and excess policies 

covering April 1978 to April 1983. The Court entered 

corresponding orders on First State’s and New England’s joint

motion, which sought partial summary judgment for 
9

declaratory relief largely identical to the declarations Zurn had 

requested.5

After the District Court issued its opinion and orders, 

American Home appealed. It challenges three orders: the order 

denying American Home’s motion for partial summary 

judgment on defense and defense costs; and two orders 

granting partial summary judgment, one in favor of Zurn and 

the other in favor of First State and New England, regarding 

the scope of defense costs under American Home’s excess 

policy. We will call the former order the declaration-denying 

order and the latter two orders the declaration-granting orders 

for short. Zurn cross-appealed, challenging the District Court’s 

orders regarding the scope of costs under Northbrook’s and 

Granite State’s excess policies.6

II.7

As a threshold matter, we must address the parties’ 

dispute about our jurisdiction to review the District Court’s 

partial summary judgment orders. We always have jurisdiction 

to determine our own jurisdiction. United States v. Kwasnik, 

55 F.4th 212, 215 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2022). And we exercise 

plenary review over the issue. Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. 

Co., 814 F.3d 660, 665 (3d Cir. 2016). American Home argues 

5 Several summary judgment motions remain 

outstanding, such as whether Liberty Mutual’s and Travelers’ 

primary and umbrella policies have been exhausted, and 

whether limits on certain excess policies, including American 

Home’s, apply annually or aggregately.

6 Thus, Zurn’s cross-appeal impacts the rights and 

obligations of insurers other than American Home. 

7 The District Court exercised jurisdiction over the 

cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Our jurisdiction is at 

issue on appeal. 
10

we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)

because the District Court’s orders are the functional 

equivalent of an injunction. Zurn disagrees, arguing that the 

District Court neither practically nor literally granted 

injunctive relief because the orders merely resolved American 

Home’s policy obligations in general. We agree with Zurn and 

conclude we do not have jurisdiction.

A.

“The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, ‘established the 

general principle that only final decisions of the federal district 

courts would be reviewable on appeal.’” Abbott v. Perez, 138 

S. Ct. 2305, 2319 (2018) (quoting Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 

450 U.S. 79, 83 (1981)). Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which grants 

us jurisdiction over final orders from district courts, is our

primary source of appellate jurisdiction. Over time, however, 

several limited exceptions developed to the final-decision rule. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1292; Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 

(2006) (discussing collateral order doctrine). One exception 

grants appellate courts jurisdiction over “[i]nterlocutory orders 

of the district courts of the United States . . . granting, 

continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or 

refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1292(a)(1). Our Court has recognized that this exception 

extends to orders that expressly grant or deny injunctions as 

well as those that “have the practical effect” of doing so. Def. 

Distributed v. Att’y Gen. of N.J., 972 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 

2020) (quoting Rolo v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 949 F.2d 695, 702 (3d 

Cir. 1991)). Even so, to ensure the exception does not “swallow 

the final-judgment rule,” we construe § 1292(a)(1) “narrowly.” 

In re Pressman-Gutman Co., 459 F.3d 383, 392 (3d Cir. 2006)

(quoting Hershey Foods Corp. v. Hershey Creamery Co., 945 

F.2d 1272, 1276 (3d Cir. 1991)).
11

To determine whether an order is injunctive, “we must 

look past labels to consider functional effects.” Hope v. 

Warden York Cnty. Prison, 956 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2020); 

see also Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of

N.J., 867 F.2d 1455, 1466 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc) (“label put 

on an order by the district court” not dispositive). Under a 

functionalist approach, an order is an injunction if it is 

“directed to a party, enforceable by contempt, and designed to 

accord or protect ‘some or all of the substantive relief sought 

by a complaint’ in more than a [temporary] fashion.” Cohen, 

867 F.2d at 1465 n.9 (quoting Wright, Miller, Cooper & 

Gressman, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3922, at 29 

(1977)).

The parties identify two cases that fall on opposite sides 

of the dividing line under Cohen’s functionalist approach: 

American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 

879 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1989), and Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield 

Insurance Co., 814 F.3d 660 (3d Cir. 2016). In the former case,

we concluded jurisdiction was lacking under § 1292(a)(1); in 

the latter, we held that we had jurisdiction under the statute. To 

determine which side of the line this case falls, we discuss 

American Motorists and Ramara in detail. 

We begin with American Motorists. There, an insured 

party, Levolor, sought coverage for certain claims asserted 

against it by the United States Environmental Protection 

Agency. Am. Motorists, 879 F.2d at 1167. Levolor’s insurer, 

American Motorists, declined coverage. Id. American 

Motorists then filed suit in federal court, seeking a declaratory 

judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Levolor. 

Id. at 1166. Levolor counterclaimed for a declaration that

American Motorists did have a duty to defend and indemnify 

and sought damages for breach of contract. Id. Both parties 

moved for partial summary judgment. Id. The district court 
12

held that American Motorists had a duty to defend Levolor,

subject to outstanding disputes of material fact about an 

exception to the policy’s coverage known as the pollution 

exclusion. Id. at 1167–68. American Motorists appealed the 

judgment, though it was not certified as final under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) until over a month later. Id. at 

1168.

We declined to exercise jurisdiction over the appeal due 

to the “nonfinal character of the determination of the duty to 

defend.” Id. at 1169, 1172–73. Admittedly, the bulk of our 

analysis in American Motorists dealt with the lack of finality 

under Rule 54(b). We reasoned that while the district court’s 

order placed “the initial burden to defend” on American 

Motorists, the order was not final because it “was subject to 

termination when the court made a final determination on the 

applicability of the pollution exclusion.” Id. at 1170 (“[I]f 

[American Motorists] is successful in advancing the pollution 

exclusion,” the duty to defend order will be “effectively altered 

and revised” and American Motorists’ “obligation will no 

longer exist.”). Then, sua sponte, the Court considered and 

rejected jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to § 1292(a)(1). 

Id. at 1172 (stating § 1292(a)(1) jurisdiction was “not 

mentioned by the parties”). Guided by Cohen’s functional 

approach and the requirement under the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure that injunction orders must be specific, we 

concluded that the district court’s order was not akin to an 

injunction because it “did not direct [American Motorists] to 

do anything.” Id. at 1172–73; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). 

The order recited only that Levolor’s motion “with respect to 

the issue of the obligation [of American Motorists] to provide 

a defense is granted.” Am. Motorists, 879 F.2d at 1173. Though

the district court “effectively defin[ed]” American Motorists’ 
13

duty, it “did not order [American Motorists] to undertake the 

defense.” Id.

On the other side, we have Ramara. There, an injured 

employee of a subcontractor filed a tort suit against Ramara, a 

parking garage owner. Ramara, 814 F.3d at 664–65. Ramara

tendered its defense to its insurer, Westfield, who declined to 

extend coverage. Id. at 665. So Ramara filed suit in federal 

court to obtain declarations about Westfield’s duties under the 

policy. Id. at 668. Upon the parties’ motions for partial 

summary judgment on the issue, the district court held that 

Westfield had a duty to defend Ramara in the underlying tort 

suit. Id. The district court then entered a supplemental order 

that “quantified judgment in favor of Ramara against 

Westfield,” id. at 665 (citation omitted), and “directed that 

‘[p]rospectively, Westfield shall provide defense to Ramara in 

the underlying [tort] action,’” id. at 669. 

Westfield appealed the supplemental order, and we held 

that we had jurisdiction to review it on appeal. Id. Critical to 

our decision was the fact that, in addition to deciding the 

parties’ rights and duties, the district court “direct[ed] 

Westfield to defend Ramara prospectively in the [underlying 

tort] lawsuit.” Id. at 671. The supplemental order granted

“forward-looking relief” that constituted the sort of “equitable 

relief [that is] immediately appealable.” Id. at 672; see also 

Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 765 F.3d 350, 356–57

& n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding district court’s order directing a 

party to pay another party’s legal fees and expenses 

“periodically as they are incurred going forward” constituted 

immediately appealable equitable relief (citation omitted)). 

B.

With that background in mind, we turn to the three 

orders American Home challenges on appeal and conclude 

they are far closer to the order in American Motorists than the 
14

one in Ramara. In the declaration-denying order, the District 

Court simply stated, “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, for the 

reasons set forth in the Memorandum Opinion to be filed

forthwith, that [American Home’s] motion is DENIED.” App. 

51. In the declaration-granting orders, the District Court stated, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, for the reasons set 

forth in the Memorandum Opinion to be filed 

forthwith, that the motion is GRANTED in part 

and DENIED in part as follows: . . . The motion 

is GRANTED with respect to Count VI of the 

Amended Complaint insofar as Zurn seeks a 

declaration that American Home Assurance 

Company must pay defense costs in addition to 

policy limits under [the relevant] American 

Home Policy . . . .

App. 52; see also App. 49 (ordering same regarding First 

State’s and New England’s joint motion on the issue). 

The declaration-denying order is clearly not an 

injunction. Similar to the order in American Motorists, which 

merely “granted” summary judgment on the issue of American 

Motorists’ “obligation . . . to provide a defense,” 879 F.2d at 

1173, the order here merely “denied” American Home’s 

motion regarding its obligation to defend and pay defense 

costs. Without more, the order simply reflects the District 

Court’s decision to decline relief, as a matter of law, before 

trial. For that same reason, the District Court’s order falls well 

short of imposing forward-looking equitable relief like in 

Ramara. 814 F.3d at 672.

Though the declaration-granting orders are a closer call, 

they are more akin to the order in American Motorists than the 

one in Ramara. We accept that the orders “effectively 

defin[ed]” at least some of American Home’s duties under the 

contract. Am. Motorists, 879 F.2d at 1173. But American 
15

Motorists tells us that is not enough; the District Court must 

have directed American Home to do something. Id. at 1172–

73. The declaration-granting orders do not. Instead, the orders 

grant relief “insofar” as Zurn and others seek “a declaration 

that American Home Assurance Company must pay defense 

costs in addition to policy limits” under the relevant American 

Home policy. App. 49, 52. Far from directing American Home 

to act now and pay Zurn’s defense costs or take up Zurn’s 

defense, the orders simply clarify the scope of American 

Home’s potential future duty, if and when that duty is 

triggered. 

No part of the declaration-granting orders compels

American Home “to undertake the defense” of Zurn. See Am. 

Motorists, 879 F.2d at 1173. Nor are they accompanied by a 

supplemental order, like the one in Ramara, see 814 F.3d at 

670, or any other similar directive towards American Home to 

prospectively defend Zurn. American Home even recognizes 

as much when it concedes that the District Court’s orders “did 

not direct American Home to take over the defense of Zurn in 

the underlying asbestos suits.” Am. Home Br. 28. Without a 

directive, there is no injunction or functional equivalent for us 

to review. And it is the very lack of directive that critically 

distinguishes this case from the collection of published and 

unpublished out-of-circuit cases American Home cites to 
16

support our jurisdiction.8In short, we decline to extrapolate 

injunctive-like directives from a district court’s summary 

judgment order that merely interprets parties’ rights and duties 

under a contract in the abstract, nothing more.

And unlike an injunction, the District Court’s 

declaration-granting orders cannot be enforced by contempt. 

How could they? They are unspecific about what act is required 

or restrained, and they are subject to a host of outstanding 

issues. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d) (requiring injunctions to be 

stated in specific terms and “act or acts restrained or required” 

to be “describe[d] in reasonable detail”); cf. Am. Motorists, 879 

8 See W Holding Co. v. AIG Ins. Co.-Puerto Rico, 748 

F.3d 377, 383 (1st Cir. 2014) (exercising jurisdiction over 

district court order “requiring defense-cost advancements”);

Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 370 F. App’x 563, 

566–68 & n.6 (6th Cir. 2010) (exercising jurisdiction over 

district court order stating “[insurer] is hereby ORDERED to 

advance payment”); Gon v. First State Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 863, 

866 (9th Cir. 1989) (exercising jurisdiction over district court 

order “direct[ing] [insurer] to pay defense expenses in [a 

particular] litigation as they were incurred”); Church Mut. 

Ins. Co. v. Ma’Afu, 657 F. App’x 747, 750 (10th Cir. 2016)

(exercising jurisdiction over district court order stating insurer 

“must defend . . . and reimburse” insured); Pac. Ins. Co. v. 

Gen. Dev. Corp., 28 F.3d 1093, 1095–96 (11th Cir. 1994)

(per curiam) (exercising jurisdiction over order “directing 

[insurer] to ‘pay the Insured Defendants’ defense costs as 

they are incurred’” (citation omitted)); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. 

Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Sahlen, 999 F.2d 1532, 1535 (11th 

Cir. 1993) (exercising jurisdiction over order that effectively 

dissolved previous order that “required [insurer] to pay the 

Insureds’ defense costs in the underlying suits”).
17

F.2d at 1169–71 (reasoning order regarding insurer’s duty to 

defend was not final because related factual issues remained 

unresolved). For example, American Home’s duty may be 

delayed or unrealized depending on the resolution of currently 

pending motions before the District Court on issues regarding 

exhaustion and how to measure limits to liability. We agree 

with Zurn that the District Court’s orders are not transformed 

into the functional equivalent of an injunction simply because 

Zurn acted pursuant to certain rights recognized in them.

“[W]hat counts is what the court actually did,” not how the 

parties reacted to it. See Ramara, 814 F.3d at 669. A mere 

declaration of Zurn’s rights does nothing to compel American 

Home to act or refrain from acting pursuant to them. 

Ultimately, we conclude that none of the District 

Court’s orders is the functional equivalent of an injunction;

therefore, we do not have jurisdiction to review them. 

We also decline to exercise jurisdiction over Zurn’s 

cross-appeal, challenging the District Court’s orders denying 

declaratory relief regarding the scope of defense costs under 

Northbrook’s and Granite State’s excess policies. Notably, 

Zurn does not press an independent basis for jurisdiction over 

its cross-appeal; rather it relies on the doctrine of pendent 

appellate jurisdiction to justify our review. That doctrine 

permits “us discretion to review orders if they either (1) are 

‘inextricably intertwined’ with appealable ones or (2) must be 

reviewed with them to ‘ensure meaningful review.’” United 

States v. Brace, 1 F.4th 137, 142 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Reinig 

v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 912 F.3d 115, 130 (3d Cir. 2018)). But

we do not have jurisdiction over American Home’s appeal. 
18

And without a proper underlying appeal, pendent appellate 

jurisdiction is of no use.9

For these reasons, we will dismiss the appeals for lack 

of jurisdiction.

9 Because we lack jurisdiction over Zurn’s crossappeal, we are precluded from considering the substance of 

the cross-appeal or implications of the District Court’s orders 

on other insurers impacted by the same.