SAND 98-0505/23

Unlimited Release

November 2001

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty:

The Way Forward?

James Brown

International Security

with Adriane Littlefield

International Security Initiatives

Sandia National Laboratories

P.O. Box 5800

Albuquerque, NM 87085-1371

Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated

by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin

Company, for the United States Department of

Energy under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.
4

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty:

The Way Forward?

Abstract

The debate surrounding the ratification and entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear

Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been focused and multifaceted. An article of faith that has

permeated the international arms control community is the perceived need for the United

States to ratify the CTBT so that the treaty can enter-into-force. This paper examines the

real impact that the United States has on the ratification process of the remaining unratified

States named in Article XIV of the CTBT. Many assume that Washington’s approval will

accelerate the ratification process on the remaining twelve non-ratifiers. This assumption,

however, may not be entirely correct.
5

Contents

1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 7

2. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: ............................................................................................................... 9

3. THE ARTICLE XIV CONFERENCES: .................................................................................................... 11

4. U.S. SENATE REJECTION:....................................................................................................................... 12

5. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION............................................................................................................... 14

6. NATIONAL RESPONSES TO A FUTURE U.S. RATIFICATION:....................................................... 15

6.1. THE CTBT ENDGAME IN SOUTH ASIA: ................................................................................................ 15

6.1.1. The View from New Delhi:....................................................................................................... 16

6.1.2. The View from Islamabad:....................................................................................................... 17

6.2. THE MIDDLE EAST CONUNDRUM: ........................................................................................................ 18

6.2.1. The View from Tel Aviv: .......................................................................................................... 19

6.2.2. The View from Cairo: .............................................................................................................. 20

6.2.3. The View from Teheran: .......................................................................................................... 21

6.3. THE NORTH KOREA CHALLENGE: ........................................................................................................ 22

6.4. CHINA AND THE CTBT:........................................................................................................................ 24

6.5. THE REMAINING FIVE:.......................................................................................................................... 26

7. CONCLUSIONS:.......................................................................................................................................... 27

8. POSTSCRIPT: SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM.................................................. 30

APPENDIX A: ARTICLE XIV OF THE CTBT ................................................................................................... 31

APPENDIX B: COMPLETE LIST OF ARTICLE XIV STATES: ...................................................................... 32

DISTRIBUTION ....................................................................................................................................................... 33

Figures

Figure 1: Article XIV EIF States...................................................................................................................................9

Figure 2: Impact of Ratification on Article XIV States...............................................................................................28
6

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty:

The Way Forward?

Executive Summary

The debate surrounding the ratification and entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear

Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been focused and multifaceted. An article of faith has

permeated the international arms control community where U.S. ratification induces all

remaining Article XIV States to ratify, thus permitting the Treaty to enter-into-force.

Similarly, without U.S. ratification, the remaining states have little incentive to ratify. This

paper examines the real impact that the United States has on the ratification process of the

remaining unratified States named in Article XIV of the CTBT.

The findings of this paper suggest that the United States may have less influence in this

ratification and entry-into-force process than what the “article of faith” would suggest.

Although Washington’s signature is necessary, it is not sufficient to induce all of the other

twelve States to ratify the CTBT. There are regional and domestic factors, as well as

interrelationships, between the twelve States that affect the ratification decision of each

State that are independent of U.S. actions and influence. This paper describes those factors

and interrelationships.

In 1963 and again in 1968 (the PTBT and NPT, respectively), the international community

noted their resolve to “achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons

for all times,” and the CTBT provided the means to monitor and adequately verify a

complete nuclear test ban. However, the merits of the CTBT were not recognized by the

majority of persons in the U.S. Senate, leading to the Treaty’s rejection in October of 1999.

The Senate rejection, and the Bush Administration’s lack of support for the CTBT have no

doubt influenced other States and their ratification process. Analyses and interviews

suggest that Washington is viewed by the international community as the key to the

ratification process, but China also plays a significant role. In fact, an analysis of the

current CTBT ratification environment is remiss without the inclusion of China, the only

other nuclear weapons state excepting the United States to withhold ratification.
7

Acronyms

ACRS Arms Control and Regional Security

BJP Bharatiya Janata Party

BMD Ballistic Missile Defense

BW/CW Biological Weapons/Chemical Weapons

CD Conference on Disarmament

CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

CTBTO Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

EIF Entry Into Force

FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IMS International Monitoring System

JI Jamaat-i-Islami

JUP Jamiat Ulema Pakistan

LWR Light Water Reactor

NFU No First Use

NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

NTM National Technical Means

NWS Nuclear Weapons State

OSI On-Site Inspection

PNE Peaceful Nuclear Explosion

PTBT Partial Test Ban Treaty

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

WMDFZ Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone
8

Intentionally Left Blank
9

Article XIV States – Unratified

Algeria China

Colombia

Democratic People’s Republic of Congo

Egypt Indonesia

Iran Israel

United States Vietnam

Article XIV States – Unsigned

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

India Pakistan

1. Introduction1

The debate surrounding the ratification and entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear

Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been as multifaceted as it is important. In addition to arms

control and nonproliferation elements, it involves scientific and technical disciplines,

military planning, national security strategy and international relations. The focus of this

paper will be on the latter two issues and, in particular, on the States required for

ratification for the CTBT’s entry-into-force.

An article of faith that has permeated the

international arms control community is the

perceived need for the United States to

ratify the CTBT, so that the Treaty can

enter-into-force.2

 More specifically, what is

the real impact on the States that have yet to

ratify the CTBT, if the United States were to

pen its signature of ratification? Will this

action by Washington speed-up the

ratification process of the remaining thirteen

non-signatories or non-ratifiers? What, if

any, linkages exist among the thirteen

unratified States that either divides or unites

them in executing Article XIV?

Figure 1: Article XIV EIF States

2. A Historical Perspective:

In 1963 the parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) noted their resolve “to achieve

the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all times,” and to continue

negotiations to achieve this end. This noteworthy resolution was again remembered in the

preamble to the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). However, the major

obstacle in the prevailing international environment to achieve this end was the lack of

trust existing among the nuclear weapon states (NWS), in their capabilities to monitor and

adequately verify a nuclear test ban.

Ultimately, it was the effort of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts established in 1976

by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) that proposed international cooperative measures

to detect and identify seismic events using a global network of seismic stations, which

actualized the possibility of verifying a ban on nuclear weapon tests.

 

1

 This paper was written prior to the 11 September 2001 tragedy. A postscript has been added to consider the

impact that this calamity will have on the CTBT and Washington’s ratification of this Treaty.

2

 The complete text of Article XIV can be found in Appendix A.
10

In January 1994, the CD was able to give a mandate to its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear

Test Ban to negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These negotiations

received a boost in 1995 when the NPT Review and Extension Conference adopted the

Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament which

recognized that “the completion by the CD of the negotiations on a universal,

internationally, and effectively verifiable CTBT no later than 1996, is important in the full

realization and effective implementation of Article VI,” of the NPT3. Additionally, the full

scope of the CTBT was defined in 1996 when the United States committed to adopting a

true zero-yield CTBT and an absolute ban on testing.

Signatories have differed as to whether the primary goal of the CTBT is nonproliferation

(e.g., the U.S.) or disarmament (e.g., India). The treaty supports nonproliferation by

decreasing the confidence of a signatory state with a clandestine nuclear weapon program

that its weapons function as designed. The treaty supports the goal of nuclear disarmament

of existing weapons states by 1) decreasing confidence that new nuclear weapon designs

will function properly, and 2) making reliability and safety assessment of existing nuclear

weapons more difficult. The latter was a key point in the Senate’s ratification debate in

1999 and the basis for the establishment of the Science-based Stockpile Stewardship

program to maintain the U.S. nuclear stockpile without testing (described in Section 4).

Despite agreement in 1996 by the State Parties on most issues affecting the proposed

CTBT, the CD was unable to reach a consensus on a final text. As a result, 127 States

sponsored a resolution endorsing the draft Treaty, which was then overwhelmingly adopted

by the UN General Assembly on 10 September 1996.4

Specifically, the CTBT decrees a comprehensive ban on any nuclear testing in any

environment for any purpose. Article I sets out the basic obligations:

• Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test

explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such explosion at any place under

its jurisdiction; and,

• Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing,

encouraging or in any way participating in carrying out any nuclear weapon

test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

Because the CTBT had not entered-into-force “three years after the date of the anniversary

of its opening for signatures,” which was September 24, 1996, a conference of the States

 

3

 Article VI of the NPT reads as follows: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue

negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early

date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and

effective international control.”

4

 158 States voted in favor, three against (Bhutan, India and Libya), and five abstained (Cuba, Lebanon,

Mauritius, Syria, and Tanzania).
11

that ratified the CTBT was called to decide what measures should be taken to accelerate

the ratification process and thereby implement Article XIV.

3. The Article XIV Conferences:

In terms of outcome, the 1999 Conference was modest in results and exercised only the

powers of spotlighting, raising awareness and exhortation.5

 Of the 154 States that had

signed the CTBT prior to this meeting, only 92 States attended. Representatives from four

unsigned States, including Pakistan, also attended. India and North Korea did not send

representatives.

It should be noted that it was during the CTBT negotiations in the CD that Russia, China,

Great Britain and Pakistan insisted that the entry-into-force requirements must include all

countries that might develop a nuclear weapon or have test capabilities. This language

primarily was aimed at the five declared nuclear powers, plus India, Israel and Pakistan. It

should also be noted that the latter three States continue to remain outside of the NPT, but

were active participants during the CTBT negotiations. As India pulled away from the

Treaty in 1996, other negotiators inserted this clumsy provision for an “entry-into-force

conference” into Article XIV in the hope that some international action would take place to

keep up the pressure for the test ban.6

In the end, the Article XIV Conference adopted a Final Declaration that avoided

confrontation and no actions were suggested that might be construed as punitive and

isolating. There was an appeal to India and Pakistan, which had earlier indicated they

would not impede the Treaty, to sign and ratify as soon as possible and to “refrain from

acts which would defeat [the Treaty’s] object and purpose.”7 No doubt this was a very

clear call to both India and Pakistan not to conduct any more nuclear explosions. North

Korea was likewise called upon to sign and ratify the CTBT.

Many of the statements made by the delegations were short and to the point. There was

also much talk of the new millennium and frequent reference to the NPT, especially Article

VI and the importance given to the CTBT in the Principles and Objectives decision

adopted together with an indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995.8

Although the Final Declaration avoided any direct reference to the failure of the United

States, Russia9

 and China to ratify in time for the Conference, it called on those states

which had signed and not ratified, and “in particular those whose ratification is needed for

 

5

 The Article XIV Conference was held in Vienna, Austria, October 6-8, 1999.

6

 It is part of the negotiating record that the Conference could neither waive, amend or weaken the entry-intoforce provisions, nor impose sanctions on a country which blocked entry-into-force.

7

 “ CTBT in Crisis,” Disarmament Diplomacy, Number 40, September/October 1999, p. 3. 8 Ibid, p. 4. 9

 The Russian Federation ratified the CTBT on June 30, 2000.
12

its entry-into-force” to “accelerate their ratification processes with a view to their early

successful conclusion.”10

A second entry-into-force conference was scheduled for 25-27 September 2001 in New

York to examine the extent to which Article XIV requirements have been met since 1999,

and to consider and decide by consensus what measures should be undertaken to accelerate

the ratification process. This forum was postponed until a later date, because of the tragic

events in New York City and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001.

This Conference, when it takes place, will be after the United States Senate’s rejection of

the CTBT (October 13, 1999) by primarily a partisan vote of 51 to 48 with only four

Republicans voting for it.11 The Senate’s rejection is noteworthy because it is the first time

that the U.S. Senate has defeated a major international accord since it rejected the 1919

Versailles Treaty.

4. U.S. Senate Rejection:

The failure of the U.S. Senate to approve the CTBT was a severe blow to the ratification

process. The rejection had less to do with the merits of the CTBT than U.S. domestic

politics carried along partisan lines. To understand why the U.S. Senate chose to reject the

CTBT after a brief 13-day period of debate in October 1999, it is essential to understand

the challenges this Treaty faced prior to the months leading to the vote.12

Upon receipt of the transmittal letter, Senator Jesse Helms, then Chair of the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee, demanded that the President also transmit two unrelated

treaties to his Committee before he would move the CTBT forward.13 By late September

1999, after blocking Senate consideration of the Treaty for over two years, and failing to

schedule a single hearing devoted to the CTBT, then Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott

and Helms suddenly reversed course and decided to schedule a vote on the Treaty. This

move precipitated several weeks of intense maneuvering by both the Republican and

Democratic leaderships in the Senate. On October 1, 1999, Senator Lott proposed a “take

it or leave it” offer to President Clinton and the Democratic leadership in the Senate of 14

hours of debate in the Armed Services Committee and a vote as soon as October 12th

.

Acceptance of the offer was motivated in part by the belief that the effect of continued

inaction on the CTBT could be as severe as outright defeat. Compounding the situation

 

10 Disarmament Diplomacy, Op. Cit., p. 6. 11 John H. Chafee of Rhode Island; Jim Jeffords of Vermont; Arlen Spector of Pennsylvania; and Gordon

Smith of Oregon.

12 President Clinton’s transmittal of the Treaty to the US Senate for its “advice and consent” for ratification

took place on September 23, 1997.

13 Senator Helms took the position that “...not until the administration has submitted the ABM Protocols and

the Kyoto global warming treaty... will the Foreign Relations Committee turn its attention to other treaties on

the President’s agenda.” The Wall Street Journal, January 25, 1999.
13

was the fact that President Clinton and his Administration did not launch a high profile

intense campaign to win Senate support of the CTBT until September’s end. It became

quite evident by October 5th that support for the Treaty was not materializing. Suggestions

were made by both sides of the aisle that the vote should be postponed to avoid damaging

U.S. credibility and international security.14 Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM), a senior

lawmaker, urged President Clinton to shelve the accord rather than have it rejected. “There

are international ramifications of killing it,” Domenici said.15

There is no doubt that the limited amount of time for debate in the Senate, and the fact that

the Treaty’s opponents had begun their lobbying efforts weeks earlier, meant that the

Clinton Administration officials should have done their pro-Treaty lobbying efforts well in

advance. Unfortunately this was not the case. Therefore, the defeat of the CTBT was not

only due to the U.S. Senate’s rush to make a judgment after the Treaty had been tabled for

two years, but it was also a consequence of President Clinton’s failure to organize a

sustained effort to build support for it in the months leading up to the vote in October.

Distracted by domestic policy considerations, scandal, and the war in Kosovo, Clinton

failed to heed repeated calls for a group inside his government to focus solely on the task

of the CTBT’s ratification.16

At another level, the rejection of the CTBT was inexplicable to analysts who thought that

the Clinton Administration had prepaid the price for ratification by establishing the

Stockpile Stewardship Program, and in acquiescing to the development of a ballistic

missile effort.

As a result, and in an attempt to salvage the Treaty, President Clinton appointed former

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 2000, John Shalikashvili as Special

Advisor on the CTBT to explore concerns about and build bipartisan support for eventual

ratification of the test ban treaty. In his year long study, Shalikashvili detailed a series of

recommendations that included increasing bipartisan and allied support for

nonproliferation, enhancing U.S. capabilities to detect and deter nuclear testing, improving

stewardship of U.S. nuclear weapons, and addressing concerns about the Treaty’s

indefinite duration through a joint executive-legislative review ten years after the Treaty’s

ratification and at “regular intervals thereafter.” The report concludes that the “advantages

of the test ban treaty outweigh any disadvantages” and calls for bipartisan efforts to forge

an “integrated proliferation strategy for the new century.”

 

14 Just days before the vote, French President Jacques Chirac, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and German

Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder made a highly unusual plea to the US Senate not to reject the CTBT. “Failure

to ratify the [CTBT] will be a failure in our struggle against proliferation. The stabilizing effect of the NonProliferation Treaty, extended in 1995, would be undermined. Disarmament negotiations would suffer,” they

wrote in the October 8, 1999, New York Times op-ed. 15 Senator Domenici ultimately would vote “no” on the CTBT. “Both Parties Seek Graceful Way to Put Off

Nuclear Treaty Vote,” by Eric Smith, The New York Times, October 6, 1999. 16 Op. Cit., Disarmament Diplomacy, p. 12.
14

5. The Bush Administration

The future of the CTBT under President George W. Bush‘s administration is in doubt.

During the campaign, President Bush agreed that “our nation should continue its

moratorium on [nuclear] testing.” He has, however, indicated that he is opposed to the

CTBT, claiming that it “...does not stop proliferation, especially in renegade regimes. It is

not verifiable. It is not enforceable and is fatally flawed. And it would stop us from

ensuring the safety and reliability of our nation’s deterrent, should the need arise.”17

Furthermore, President Bush has not ruled out testing in the future, echoing his father’s

1992 position that testing might be needed to maintain the reliability of the nation’s nuclear

stockpile. This places the United States in a state of test ban policy limbo and,

additionally, it robs itself of the moral, political and legal authority to prod other nations

not to test nuclear weapons.

The Bush Administration seems content to let the rejected treaty, now the legal property of

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,18 languish in the Senate. Jack Mendelsohn of the

Lawyers Alliance for World Security notes that the Bush Administration has three basic

options for dealing with the CTBT. First, it could renounce any intentions of ratifying the

CTBT. This would free the United States from international legal and financial obligations

of the Treaty. No doubt this would provoke serious repercussions both domestically and

abroad. It would place the whole nuclear nonproliferation regime – in particular the NPT –

in jeopardy.

While widespread repudiation of the NPT is not likely in the immediate future, the regime

is vulnerable. Rejection of the CTBT by some states might provide an excuse for a

government that wishes to renounce or thwart its NPT obligations to do so. The actions of

the United States have already complicated efforts to strengthen the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on civilian nuclear programs. Though the CTBT

cannot alone stop the spread and development of nuclear weapons, the international

community cannot effectively pursue a nonproliferation and disarmament agenda without

it.

A second option could be to continue to pay the U.S.’s share (25%) of the Treaty’s

implementation costs and ignore the question of whether the U.S. intends at some point in

the future to ratify the agreement and make no effort to seek Senate reconsideration and

ratification.19

 

17 Arms Control Today, September 2000, pp. 3-7. For a detailed discussion of President Bush’s position and

options on the CTBT see “The Bush Presidency: Reconsidering the CTBT,” by Jack Mendelsohn in

Disarmament Diplomacy, Number 53, December 2000/January 2001, pp. 5-8. 18 “White House Wants to Bury Pact Banning Test on Nuclear Arms” by Thom Shanker and David Sanger,

New Your Times, July 7, 2001.

19 Ibid.
15

Finally, the Administration could reevaluate its campaign stance and reach the conclusion

that the CTBT serves U.S. national security interests,20 resubmit the Treaty and strongly

encourage Treaty support in the Senate.

The seeds for the Administration to reconsider its position have been sown by the study by

General Shalikashvili, the roundtable discussions undertaken by the Lawyers Alliance for

World Security, and the National Academy of Sciences study. All of these efforts contain

serious responses to the technical, political, and economic criticisms that arose during the

ratification debates, and they address the central issues that most concern President Bush:

proliferation value, verifiability, enforceability, and confidence in the stockpile.

The Bush Administration, in the summer of 2001, requested that U.S. nuclear scientists

examine methods to accelerate preparation time for nuclear explosions at the Nevada Test

Site if the government decides to end the nine-year moratorium on nuclear testing. Current

estimates place test preparation time at approximately three years. An advisory committee

of nuclear scientists recommended shortening the time it takes to prepare for testing to less

than a year, and wants to add training for new designers who would produce “robust,

alternative warheads that will provide a hedge if problems occur in the future...within the

current stockpile.” 21

For the time being, however, given that President Clinton signed the Treaty, under

international law, the United States like other signatories is obligated under Article XVIII

of the Vienna Convention on Treaties not to undertake any actions that violates the “object

or purpose” of the Treaty such as conducting a nuclear test explosion.22

6. National Responses to a Future U.S. Ratification:

6.1. The CTBT Endgame in South Asia:

There are a number of indigenous technical and military imperatives, national prestige and

domestic political factors that provide the critical impetus for the nuclear programs of India

and Pakistan. Both countries, up until 1999, tended to go against the admonitions of the

international community in developing their indigenous nuclear weapons programs.

It was not until after the Indian nuclear tests conducted on 11 and 13 May in Pokhran and

the Pakistani tests at Ras Koh on 28 and 30 May 1999, that both governments initiated

steps to sign the CTBT. A Pakistani diplomat noted that when India tested, it forced

 

20 Ibid. p. 6. 21 “Underground Test Speedup Barred,” by Walter Pincus in Washington Post, July 6, 2001, p. A23. 22 The Vienna Convention on Treaties obliges a signatory to refrain from acts that would defer the “object

and purpose” of the treaty it has signed until “it should have made its intentions clear not to become a party to

the treaty...,” Article XVIII (a).
16

Pakistan to test. “It was the ‘heart of the moment, or never again.”23 Moves to convert

informal adherence to the Treaty’s objectives, into formal acceptance of its legal

provisions, has come at an end of a protracted nuclear dialogue with the United States. For

both of these nations, acceptance of the CTBT is conditional, and the conditions that New

Delhi and Islamabad place on their willingness to accept the test ban are quite different.

India has linked its acceptance of the CTBT to the outcome of its nuclear dialogue with the

United States, easing of all sanctions imposed in the wake of its nuclear tests, and the

ratification decisions of other nuclear weapon states. Pakistan, on the other hand, has

pegged its participation in the test ban to India's decision. Overall, both States’ willingness

to ratify the CTBT will most likely be deferred for some time in the future.

6.1.1. The View from New Delhi:

In 1996, India rejected the CTBT on four grounds. First, the CTBT was not linked to timebound nuclear disarmament. New Delhi argued that far from fostering global nuclear

disarmament, the Treaty’s focus shifted to nonproliferation. Further, India also made a

case that the CTBT was not a zero-yield treaty; its scope permitted hydronuclear and subcritical tests.24 These tests, when combined with computer simulations would permit a

nuclear weapon state to refine its weapon and design capabilities. Third, New Delhi

invoked national security concerns for not signing the Treaty. Finally, India strongly

objected to Article XIV, claiming that this article violated its sovereignty.25 All of these

factors led to a national consensus against the CTBT. Over the next several years the

debate within the Indian Government vacillated between the moderates who favored

India’s ratification of the CTBT and the hard-liners who opposed not only ratification of

the CTBT, but who doubted the success of their nuclear tests in 1998 and wanted

additional testing.

With the return to power of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by Atal Behari Vajpayee,

the government adopted measures to build a national consensus to prepare the ground for

India’s eventual acceptance of the CTBT. Likewise and more significantly, Washington

abandoned its policy of attempting to freeze, cap, and roll back nuclear proliferation in

South Asia. There is also clear recognition by the United States that nuclear proliferation

in the region is an inescapable fact, and Washington lacks the leverage to reverse it. As a

consequence, Washington appears to have shifted its focus to institutionalizing nuclear

stability in South Asia at the lowest possible level of weaponization.

In September 2001, the Bush Administration lifted the sanctions imposed on New Delhi

after its nuclear tests in 1999, suggesting that Washington is now less interested in limiting

the spread of nuclear weapons in South Asia. The sanctions were intended to send a

 

23 Interview conducted with a Pakistani official in Washington, DC, September 10, 2001.

24 “India and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” by Dinshaw Mistry in ACDIS Research Reports, Program

in Arms Control and Disarmament, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign, September 1998.

25 Ibid.
17

message to the international community that nuclear proliferation would carry a price. The

result has been that the sanctions mainly serve as obstacles to change, and reduce

Washington’s ability to affect events in India.

Additionally, it would appear that this action by Washington acknowledges India’s security

concerns.26 New Delhi has “legitimate security concerns” when it comes to China. The

1962 Sino-Indian war left India with psychic scars that have been difficult to over come,

but most Chinese regard the conflict as a minor border skirmish.27 From New Delhi’s point

of view, Beijing’s military build-up and its missiles reportedly located in Tibet present a

clear and present danger. This is further compounded by the fact that China has continued,

uninterrupted, to buildup and to modernize its nuclear and missile capabilities. Also,

Beijing supplies missile and nuclear technologies to countries in India’s neighborhood

(Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia), and particularly has assisted Pakistan in developing

its nuclear and missile-related capabilities.

Ultimately, India’s decision on ratification of the CTBT will likely be linked to the

ratification decisions of Beijing and Washington.

6.1.2. The View from Islamabad:

With apparent changes taking place in New Delhi with respect to the CTBT, signs of

change are also stirring in Pakistan. This is because Pakistan has formally tied its position

on the CTBT to India’s course of action.

Unlike India, Pakistan did not oppose the CTBT at the Conference on Disarmament (CD)

in Geneva. In 1996, Pakistan voted in favor of the Treaty after it was brought before the

United Nations to bypass the New Delhi veto. However, Islamabad feared that India

would conduct additional nuclear tests. Since an Indian test program would force Pakistan

to follow suit, Islamabad declined to accede to the CTBT unless India did likewise.28

From 1998 forward, Pakistan came under enormous pressure from the United States and

the international community to accept the CTBT. Washington’s economic sanctions

affected greatly Pakistan’s economy, which resulted in Islamabad delinking accession to

the CTBT from New Dehli’s course of action, and agreed in principle in September 1998

to sign the CTBT. Washington granted partial sanctions’ relief to Pakistan in November

1998. This action paved the way for a resumption of multilateral institutional lending, a

move that was disallowed in India’s case. Nevertheless, Washington failed by the time of

the October 1999 coup d’etat by General Pervez Musharraf to persuade Pakistan to sign the

CTBT.

 

26 “Undue Fears: Pragmatic Approach to Signing the CTBT,” by K. Subrahmanyam, Times of India,

December 13, 1999.

27 “What Threat” by Eric Arnett, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, Vol. 53, No. 2. 28 “Pakistan To Upgrade N-deterrence: Sattar,” by Raja Zulfikar, News International, November 26, 1999.
18

The overthrow of a legitimately constituted government in Pakistan worsened relations

with Washington with the imposition of sanctions by Washington as required under the

Foreign Assistance Act.29 Washington further voiced its displeasure with the coup d’etat

by meting out differential treatment to Pakistan and India.

In the case of Pakistan, the majority of the sanctions remained in force, while India enjoyed

sanction relief.30 This naturally hardened Islamabad’s position against the CTBT. In fact,

during the first press conference given by General Musharraf, he noted that the CTBT was

not a priority issue. Further, he added that before Pakistan could sign the CTBT there was

a need for a national debate and consensus, and formally pegged Islamabad’s acceptance of

the CTBT to New Delhi’s accession.

Reaching a consensus will require the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulema Pakistan

(JUP) political parties to accept the CTBT. They argue that acceptance would compromise

Pakistan’s national interests. Also, elements in the Pakistani military affect this decision

by arguing that acceding to the Treaty retards Pakistan’s nuclear capability. Musharraf’s

government has hinted that it may take financial assistance from Japan to the tune of $1

billion to fund its ailing economy as a consideration for penning the CTBT.

Currently, it does not appear that Pakistan is ready to sign the Treaty. Islamabad is wary

that India will resume testing “down the road.” A Pakistani official said, “If India were to

sign the CTBT, the pressure on us would be considerable.” The official also noted that if

Pakistan gained something substantial from the United States, then perhaps Islamabad

would sign the CTBT, sans Washington’s signature on the CTBT. 31 Opinion is strong in

Pakistan that a decision should wait until after the general election that is scheduled for late

2001. Until then, Pakistan has declared a moratorium on nuclear testing and has indicated

it will not be the first country in the region to resume nuclear testing.32

6.2. The Middle East Conundrum:

The Middle East is one of few regions that has not witnessed a serious arms control

process. In this absence, the region over the years has escalated in the proliferation ladder

in all classes of WMD, especially their delivery systems, both quantitatively and

 

29 “Testimony by Assistant Secretary Karl F. Inderfurth,” in House International Relations Committee, Asia

Pacific Subcommittee, October 20, 1999. 30 Presidential Determination (PD) No. 2000-04, October 27, 1999. Pakistan sanctions have since been lifted. 31 Interview conducted with a Pakistani official in Washington, DC, September 10, 2001.

32 “Japanese PM gets CE's letter,” in Dawn, March 17, 2001.
19

qualitatively.33 In the absence of any type of arms control process for the region, the

proliferation trend has proceeded virtually unchecked.34

Though the Israeli-Arab conflict is greatly responsible for the instability in this region, it

definitely is not the sole culprit. This instability and volatility is also a function of regional

disagreements and rivalries and not totally related to the Israeli-Arab conflict

6.2.1. The View from Tel Aviv:

Israel is not a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty. Israel has not acknowledged that it has

nuclear weapons, but generally is regarded as a de facto nuclear state.35 In order for the

region to have a meaningful arms control policy, Israel argues that it can only begin with

the successful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.36 However, such a settlement is

unlikely in the near future given the issues revolving around the autonomy for the

Palestinian Authority, the continued unrest that persists in the region, the divergence that

exists between Israel and Syria over the status of the Golan Heights, and the enmity of Iran.

On September 25, 1996, Israel signed the CTBT, the only one of the threshold states to do

so. It further co-sponsored the United Nations resolution that opened the CTBT for

signature and was one of the first signatories. Israel states that its decision to sign the

CTBT reflects its long standing policy of supporting international nonproliferation as long

as there is due consideration to the specific characteristics of the Middle East and Israel’s

national security needs.37 Israel expects that arms control agreements have reliable

verification protocols and not be subject to abuse or frivolous requests for information or

inspections. The August 2001 statement by the U.S. at the 15th CTBT Preparatory

Commission meeting that it has no plans to reconsider the Treaty’s ratification has not

changed Israel’s position regarding the ratification of the CTBT.

The following factors are key in Israel’s ratification decision:

• The completion of the essential elements of the CTBT verification regime: the IMS,

the IDC, and the capability to carry out OSI as cited in Article IV of the Treaty.

• The effectiveness and immunity to abuse the verification regime.

 

33 The Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) talks held in the Middle East grew out of the Madrid

peace process with the goal of addressing a broad range of issues. Instead the ACRS agenda focused almost

exclusively on discussions of confidence building measures and information sharing regarding military

exercises. At no time did ACRS negotiations address substantive arms control issues relating to any class of

weapons, WMD or conventional.

34 The only disarmament process that has occurred involves Iraq under the United Nations Resolution 687,

and the results of this whole process are mixed.

35 The estimate of the number of nuclear devices that Israel possesses varies from a low of 50 to as high as

200. A book by Seymour Hersh in 1991, argues that Israel’s arsenal is considerably larger and more advanced

than previous information suggested. He concluded that Israel possess “hundreds” of low-yield enhancedradiation type warheads, many in the form of artillery shells and land mines, as well as full-fledged

thermonuclear weapons.

36 It would appear that this position contradicts the record of arms control during the height of the Cold War.

37 Written interview with Israeli official received November 5, 2001.
20

• The equal and sovereign status of Israel in the Preparatory Commission and policy

making organizations of the CTBTO. One way to prevent an impasse in the Middle

East and South Asia geographical regional grouping in the CTBTO is to grant Israel

a permanent seat on the Executive Council.

• Developments in the Middle East including adherence to the CTBT by other States

in the region.

In spite of India and Pakistan declarations of possessing nuclear weapons in 1998, it is

unlikely that Israel will follow suit or change its policy of nuclear ambiguity. Israel’s

decision-makers continue to hold the view that for as long as adversaries in the Middle

East maintain capabilities to mount large-scale military attacks or threaten Israeli cities

with missiles carrying BW and CW warheads, Israel will need to maintain the nuclear

deterrence option. In addition, the deployment by Israel of an effective ballistic missile

defense will improve its security.

6.2.2. The View from Cairo:

Egypt was also one of the very first signatories of the CTBT. And like Israel, the future

actions Egypt takes regarding the Treaty’s ratification will depend upon the actions of its

neighbor(s). Egypt over the years has been concerned with Israel’s nuclear arsenal. This

preoccupation is not entirely born of the direct threat that these weapons pose on Egypt.

From a historical perspective, Cairo perceives itself as a major regional player, and as a

result, has attempted to set the tone and impose that tone on many of the developments in

the Middle East.

This is especially true concerning the Arab-Israeli peace process. Cairo perceives itself as

the leading voice on nuclear issues, which provides a means to consolidate its leadership

position in the Arab world. This is an important motivation for Egypt, in light of the fact

that many of the Arab states voice their own concerns over Israel’s nuclear capability.

Once a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestine Authority is achieved, Israel will

most likely be Egypt’s primary rival for regional power. Tel Aviv’s technological prowess

and military capabilities raise fears that Israel has hegemonic designs for the region.

These explanations go beyond the nuclear threat to the wider political/regional realm where

Egypt’s interests diverge from those of the other Arab states. In other words, Egypt’s

emphasis on the nuclear issue goes beyond traditional security explanations and that

“nuclear capability” translates for Egypt into very significant political, economic and

regional leadership implications.

In 1994 Egypt proposed within the framework of Arms Control and Regional Security

forum (ACRS) the establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ).

Israel agreed to the principles of establishing a WMDFZ in the Middle East, but Egypt

insisted on including a specific provision that all parties in the region would accept the

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in the near future. Tel Aviv could not adhere to

this. At that time, Egypt’s Foreign Minister Amr Musa noted that “...no future regional
21

scheme can be completed without a security regime that tackles arms control matters, in

particular the establishment of a zone free of all mass destruction weapons in the Middle

East.”38 Israel will not give its blessing for the establishment of a WMDFZ in the Middle

East before a comprehensive peace is achieved with Arab states including Iraq and Iran.

Within this overall Middle East context, Egypt has linked its ratification of the CTBT to

that of Israel’s. In fact, Cairo has no inherent problems with the Treaty, and considers it a

“least relevant document.”39 Egypt further notes that the CTBT is not a disarmament

agreement because it permits vertical proliferation, and does not provide transparency on

Israel’s nuclear stockpile. The perception in Cairo is that if the United States ratifies the

CTBT, Israel would follow suit and thus force Egypt to do so likewise. “We do not want

to be isolated.”40

6.2.3. The View from Teheran:

The future of Iran’s ratification of the CTBT is dependent upon Israel’s actions. Iran, one

of the very first nations to sign the CTBT, indicated that it intended to ratify the Treaty as

soon as possible. However, recent indications from Teheran suggest that this action will

not be forthcoming in the near future regardless of what Washington or Beijing might do.

It is Teheran’s position that Israel’s nuclear program is a security threat to the overall

region. In addition, it advocates the establishment of a WMDFZ in the Middle East, which

would be a step towards comprehensive nuclear disarmament for the region.

Within this context, Iran is driven by three major security objectives: to form an alliance

that includes China, India and Russia to coordinate regional policy as a bulwark against the

United States and Israel; to be able to deter other powers from threatening the country; and

to heighten its military capabilities so as to be in a position to control the Straits of

Hormuz.

To accomplish these elements, Iran has launched a weapons of mass destruction program

with emphasis of developing an indigenous nuclear weapons program centered around the

Bushehr nuclear reactor.41 Further, because it views the United States and Israel as its

primary enemies, Iran has also developed ballistic missiles with the assistance of both

China and North Korea. Teheran view’s these programs as a means to hold Israel at risk,

deter the “Great Satan” from intervening in the Middle East, discouraging Washington’s

European allies from entering into a coalition with the United States, deterring its

neighbors, and preventing the recurrence of an Iran-Iraq war.

 

38 “Egypt and Israel in ACRS: Bilateral Concerns in a Regional Arms Control Process,” by Emily Landau in

Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Memorandum 59, June 2001, p. 66.

39 Interview conducted with an Egyptian official in Washington, DC on September 7, 2001.

40 Ibid. 41 Iran has some capability in the area of chemical and biological weapons. Its nuclear program has at least

some 10 or so locations devoted to nuclear activities. See “Iran’s Nuclear Facilities: a Profile,” Andrew Koch

and Jeanette Wolf, by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1998.
22

Iran would ratify the CTBT, if China and the U.S. did likewise. The key to Iran’s

ratification, however, will depend on Israel’s actions and the overall conditions of Israeli

and Arab relations.

6.3. The North Korea Challenge:

Pyongyang’s engagement with the international community has accelerated in the last two

years, with the country now moving on several fronts to strengthen its ties with former

enemies. For the West, security issues are the priority in dealing with the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), but it is through economic assistance and investments

that this priority can be actualized. To date, easing the tension has been limited to

economic aid provided by Japan, South Korea and the United States.

Since the 1960s, North Korea has consistently allocated a vast proportion of its budget to

its military establishment to the detriment of its population because of the advanced

capabilities of the South Korean and U.S. Forces. Specifically, North Korea has developed

long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction. These combined programs pose,

over time, an enhanced threat to the security of Japan. In addition, the sale of their missiles

and the accompanying technologies to the likes of Iran and Syria is quite vexing.

North Korea tends to be invisible in international arms control fora. Pyongyang first came

into full compliance with its nonproliferation obligations under the NPT in 1994 when the

“Agreed Framework” was signed.

Among the international arms community, it is assumed that Pyongyang has plutonium for

one or two nuclear weapons. The nuclear facility at which the plutonium was produced is

inactive following the agreement North Korea negotiated with the United States in 1994,

known as the “Agreed Framework.” The North traded financial assistance and a freeze on

the facility at Yongbyon for assistance to construct two Light Water Reactors (LWR) to

produce power under IAEA safeguards. As “insurance” the North retained irradiated spent

fuel, which it will dispose of only when the LWRs are completed in about 2008.

The DPRK, under the “Agreed Framework,” further agreed to allow the IAEA to visit

several “undeclared sites” and to resolve inconsistencies in Pyongyang’s declaration.

These visitations will have to be done to the satisfaction of the IAEA, a very important

phrase in the agreement. Furthermore, any steps that North Korea takes to enhance

transparency lessens mistrust and serves as a reliable indicator of Pyongyang’s true

commitment to denuclearization and peaceful intentions. Finally, North Korea could also

rejoin the IAEA. Overall, the “Agreed Framework” was structured to become stronger over

time in constraining the nuclear weapons capability of the DPRK.
23

As Pyongyang engages more broadly and deeply with the West, it may rely more heavily

on China as a diplomatic counterweight.42 For the United States, China’s influence with

the DPRK is a mixed blessing. Although it is not in China’s interest that tensions remain

high on the Korean Peninsula, Beijing is naturally more interested in pursuing its own

agenda than advancing Washington’s.

No doubt, China is an essential interlocutor with Pyongyang in order to obtain leverage

over U.S. policy. Chinese diplomats have sought to persuade North Korea of the dangers

associated with nuclear weapons development and continued missile testing. Some of

North Korea’s recently self-imposed restrictions on missile testing are likely a partial result

of Chinese intervention.43 No doubt the Chinese are very aware that North Korean missile

tests indirectly compromise Chinese security interests by bolstering U.S. and Japanese

support for national and theater missile defense systems.

If the road to Pyongyang runs through Beijing, Washington should expect to be charged a

toll, which might be quite high. For example, as a price for intervening with the DPRK

over ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons and arms control issues – like signing and ratifying

the CTBT – the Chinese might demand some modification in the deployment of the U.S.’s

ballistic missile defense system (BMD). Beijing might view such an intervention as a

reasonable trade-off, since the DPRK’s missile threat has provided the rationale for the

development of a BMD.

At a 1997 international meeting in Katmandu, Nepal, sources indicated that the DPRK

“will adhere to the CTBT contingent upon fulfillment of the “Agreed Framework.”44

Based on its fairly consistent behavior, since 1994, of mitigating its policies for economic

incentives, it can be safely assumed, albeit imperfectly, that Pyongyang will sign and

ultimately ratify the CTBT in exchange for some kind of a compensation package. For

example, Pyongyang suggested in 2000 that it would agree to a halt all missile exports,

freeze all testing, production, and deployment of its missiles and eventually eliminate them

in exchange for financial compensation that would include commercial satellite launches.

China could exercise its influence, if Beijing felt it was in its interest to do so.

 

42 On the whole, the DPRK-Russia economic ties do not look too promising. The Russians complain that the

DPRK still wants to build economic relations along the lines of the old Soviet-DPRK model of “getting things

free of charge.”

43 “Rebuilding Bilateral Consensus: Assessing U.S.-China Arms Control and Nonproliferation

Achievements,” by Evan S. Medeiros in The Nonproliferation Review in Spring 2001. 44 Ninth Regional Disarmament Meeting in the Asia-Pacific Region, February 24-26, 1997, Katmandu, Nepal,

paper presented “Nuclear Disarmament in the Post-CTBT Era-Entry Into Force of the CTBT,” by

Ambassador Hisami Kurokochi of Japan, p 2.
24

6.4. China and the CTBT:

Among the major powers, China, up until 1990, was most removed from arms control and

nonproliferation negotiations and activities. This is in sharp contrast to the United States

and Russia. Beijing was never involved with any of the strategic nuclear discussions and

agreements.

After its first nuclear test in 1964, China gradually developed its nuclear capabilities,

including the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. During this period the

Chinese government’s declaratory policy supported nuclear proliferation as a means of

“breaking the hegemony of the superpowers.”45 During this time, China declared that

China’s nuclear tests and nuclear weapons development were solely for the purpose of

defense and that at no time and under no circumstances would China be the first to use

nuclear weapons (NFU). This is still a basic component of China’s nuclear strategy.46

However, Beijing was reluctant to enter into arms reduction negotiation until the two major

nuclear states had made significant progress in their own disarmament.

Beijing has continued to pursue a program to modernize its aging nuclear force structure.

China presently stands out as the only nuclear weapon state that is increasing the size and

scope of its arsenal. 47 As a Chinese diplomat noted “We could expand by several

folds...we have the money.”48

Furthermore, as the Chinese defense industry and technological sector developed from the

1970s forward, commercial factors became important. This was particularly true with

respect to nuclear and missile-related technologies and their exportability. Technology

transfers by China to Pakistan are the most visible case. These exports have provided

Islamabad the important foundation for Pakistan’s missile and nuclear weapons program.

For China, the Middle East also continues to be another key market for sales of advanced

technologies, and these exports are a major source of revenue.49

 

45 “Chinese Policies on Arms Control and Proliferation in the Middle East,” by Gerald M. Steinberg, in China

and the Middle East by R. Kumaraswamy, 1998, No.3-4. 46 For a detailed discussion see “No-First-Use and China’s Security,” by Liu Huaqiu, The Henry L. Stimson

Center, June 24, 2001.

47 China recently announced it would spend an additional $9.7 billion to upgrade its nuclear forces

modernization program to allow for "a “vigorous counterattack once hegemonists and their military alliance

use nuclear weapons to make a surprise attack on China,” according to General Zhang Wannian of the PLA.

The extent of modernization will undoubtedly be a function of US missile defense plans and how China

evaluates the impact of those plans on its security.

48 Interview conducted with a Chinese diplomat in Washington, DC, September 7, 2001. See also, ‘The Asian

Nuclear Reaction to China,” by Joseph Cirincioni, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 29,

2001.

49 China has exported arms and military technologies to Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and has

political interests in developing closer ties to the Persian Gulf. Beijing views its sales to the states as a form of

retaliation for the US’s arm sales to Taiwan.
25

It appears that in the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, Beijing may

want to reconsider its export policies. These events were a substantial shock to the

nonproliferation regime, and have endangered the future of the NPT. Suddenly, China has

a nuclear rival in its geographic region. Ironically, among the reasons cited by India for its

decision to go nuclear, is the Chinese assistance provided to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons

and ballistic missile program.

The widespread proliferation of missiles and nuclear weapons in South Asia and the

Middle East does not serve China’s interests, and may become a source of concern, leading

to a willingness to curtail exporting these destabilizing arms and technologies.

In the last decade, Beijing has become more centrally and constructively involved in

multinational nonproliferation fora, joining the NPT, the CWC, the Nuclear Suppliers

Group (Zangger Committee) and the CTBT. It has embraced the normative assumptions of

nonproliferation and has institutionalized its obligations through the adoption of national

export control legislation and regulations.

In the case of the CTBT, China was initially quite reluctant to join the negotiations. At

that time (1994), Beijing was in the middle of its first major missile and nuclear

modernization program and had conducted far fewer nuclear tests than any other country.

Chinese participation in the CTBT discussions meant that for the first time Beijing would

adopt real constraints on its military capabilities. Yet, the international pressure increased

on China to join the CTBT and to halt all nuclear testing.

In particular, China’s CTBT concerns were primarily threefold. These included: the scope

of the treaty, and the exception to peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs); verification issues

related to the use of national technical means (NTMs); and, the acceptability of on-site

inspections (OSI). During the end-stage of the CTBT negotiations Sino-U.S. bilateral

discussions reached a peak of exclusivity concerning the OSI trigger mechanism. The

United States wanted a “red light” procedure whereas China wanted a “green light” one.50

Drawing on the Chinese compromise formula, Washington and Beijing agreed upon the

“green light’ procedure requiring 30 votes. U.S. officials viewed China’s serious and

detailed efforts to resolve this impasse as an indication of the positive contributions Beijing

was willing to make to global arms control efforts.51

This bilateral Sino-U.S. effort continued following the India and Pakistan nuclear tests.

The responses of the U.S. and China reflected a mutual recognition of the dangers of overt

vertical proliferation and weaponization in South Asia. In June 1998, Washington and

Beijing jointly initiated the drafting of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172,

which condemned the tests and called upon New Delhi and Islamabad to halt further

 

50 In the CTBT, the “green light’ procedure is one in which the on-site inspection is not automatic and 30

members of the 51 member Executive Committee have to agree for it to go forward; a “red light” procedure is

one in which an inspection is automatic unless prohibited by a vote of the Executive Committee.

51 Op. Cit., in “Rebuilding Bilateral Consensus,” by Evan S. Medeiros, p. 133.
26

testing and to abandon their nuclear programs, and for both to join the NPT and the

CTBT.52

These nascent bilateral relations have somewhat faded in recent years. Beijing’s view is

that Sino-U.S. cooperation should increase and that neither should look at each other as an

enemy.53 However, a couple of challenges loom on the horizon for Washington and

Beijing. First, is the need to rebuild their arms control and nonproliferation dialogue since

the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Other issues include acute

differences that exist over Washington’s deployment of a NMD, and the impact of a NMD

on Beijing’s security concerns. In fact, China has called upon the international community

to “make a concerted effort to conduct fair, reasonable and comprehensive disarmament,”

and emphasized “...the prevention of an arms race in outer space... and an anti-missile

system that will damage strategic stability is the top priority.”54

There is no question that China is concerned that the global strategic environment not be

compromised and that Beijing’s national security interests not be undermined. With the

U.S. Senate’s rejection of the CTBT, compounded by the opposition that President Bush

has to the CTBT, and the declared intention of the Administration to move forward on a

NMD, many issues affect the Sino-U.S. dialogue. In principle Beijing is still very

committed to the CTBT and feels that ‘overall it is a good treaty.” In China’s view the

U.S.’s actions on the CTBT provide for the international community an example and an

impetus “good” or “bad” for other countries to take action. China will in due course ratify

the CTBT. It will not wait for Washington to take this lead. In the case that India ratifies

the CTBT, “this action will not influence our (Chinese) thinking to ratify.”55

From a global perspective, Chinese arms control and nonproliferation policies can be

described as ambivalent if not at times contradictory. On a declaratory basis, Beijing is

formally committed to nonproliferation. This is a marked change from its previous stated

policy of several decades ago, yet it continues to permit the transfer of weapons and dualuse technologies to outcast states.

6.5. The Remaining Five:

The remaining five States that must ratify the CTBT for EIF – Algeria, Columbia, Congo,

Indonesia and Vietnam – are countries that consistently support comprehensive nuclear

disarmament and see the ratification of the CTBT as the first stage in attaining this former

goal through hampering the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. Their

cumulative position is that there is no justification for the maintenance of nuclear arsenals

for the security of a handful of powerful states. In addition, the lack of ratification by the

 

52 Ibid. 53 Interview conducted with a Chinese diplomat in Washington, DC, September 7, 2001.

54 “China Deems World Arms Control, Disarmament “at the Crossroads,” in Peoples Daily, January 28, 2000. 55 Interview conducted with a Chinese diplomat in Washington, DC, September 7, 2001.
27

remaining two nuclear weapon states – China and the United States – is evidence that they

are not fulfilling their obligation under Article VI of the NPT.

More specifically, Algeria and Indonesia, both Muslim states, face domestically strong

Islamic extremist movements. These movements could conceivably undermine the

existing governments if ratification of the CTBT occurred without a comprehensive ArabIsraeli peace plan, and ratification by Tel Aviv of the CTBT. In addition, without the

signatures of ratification of the United States and China, the EIF provisions of the Treaty

become doubtful and call into question the true intent of these nuclear weapon states to the

NPT and to nuclear disarmament.

Vietnam has consistently supported adherence to the NPT and CTBT regimes. Due to

historical concerns over China, Vietnam has used India as a counterweight. This new

relationship is further compounded by India moving closer to Japan (another country

obsessed by China), and also to the United States. Pragmatism prevails in these efforts as

Vietnam and India emerge as strategic partners against Beijing. Unilaterally, under the

present strategic arrangement, Vietnam will not ratify the CTBT. Ratification will occur

only when India, China and the United States pen their names to the instrument. It is

likely, however, that if China and the United States ratified the CTBT, Vietnam would

follow suit. It is unlikely that if India alone were to ratify the CTBT, Vietnam would

follow suit.

Colombia has consistently urged the nuclear weapon states to adopt and ratify the CTBT as

part of the process leading to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. Colombia’s

preoccupation with its domestic political unrest [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

(FARC)] and its war on narcotics has affected its performance in the international arena.

The extent of U.S. support, economically and politically as part of Washington’s war on

drugs, leaves no doubt that if Washington were to ratify the CTBT, Colombia would do

likewise. It cannot afford to alienate Washington and expect its continued support.

Finally, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a basket case, politically, economically

and socially. Civil war, famine, domestic violence and abuse, corruption and a break down

of overall society are all ingredients that do not lend to governing in any orderly manner.

Issues pertaining to nonproliferation and the CTBT are too far down on the list of concerns

of the central government and are not of priority for Congo’s political leaders and decisionmakers.

7. Conclusions:

The rejection of the CTBT by the U.S. Senate was a major setback for the whole

ratification process necessary for the CTBT’s entry-into-force. However, although

Washington’s signature is necessary, it is not sufficient to induce the other twelve States’

to ratify this protocol. Figure 2 illustrates the interrelationships between the thirteen
28

Figure 2: Impact of Ratification on Article XIV States

United States 

India 

Vietnam 

China 

Israel 

Egypt 

Iran 

Indonesia 

DPRK 

Colombia 

Algeria 

Figure 2: Impact of Ratification on Article XIV States 
29

non-ratified States to the CTBT. The analyses and interviews conducted suggest that

Washington is viewed by the international community as the key to this ratification process.

China may ratify the CTBT without waiting for the United States, and when this occurs it will be

at a time of its choosing. A Chinese diplomat noted that U.S. action on ratification provides

other States with the impetus to sign. No doubt if Beijing ratified the CTBT it would also exert

political pressure upon North Korea and Pakistan to also subscribe to the Treaty.

China is an essential interlocutor with North Korea and therefore it has influence on Pyongyang’s

actions. However, it is Washington who can command attention under the “Agreed Framework”.

Economic incentives by the U.S. could greatly hasten Pyongyang’s signature to the CTBT.

In the case of Islamabad, it has linked ratification of the CTBT to New Delhi’s actions.

However, Pakistan would sign the CTBT if the U.S. provides aid. This could happen with or

without Washington’s ratification. I ndia, on the other hand, has legitimate security concerns

when it comes to China, although on the surface it has tied ratification of the CTBT to the actions

of Pakistan. Like Islamabad, the lifting of these sanctions by Washington would enhance the

U.S.’s ability to influence India in signing the CTBT. Moscow is also in a position to assist in

this process. Vietnam might take its cues from New Delhi as to the actions it should take.

Likewise, the United States could play a role in influencing Vietnam.

Without a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel, Egypt, Indonesia and

Algeria will not ratify. It will require Washington’s full diplomatic prowess for this to occur.

Tel Aviv, although a strategic partner of the U.S., exercises significant autonomy from

Washington. Therefore, the influence the U.S. can exert is somewhat limited. Israel has its own

agenda as to how its relationship with its Arab neighbors determines its actions, sans the

influence of Washington.

Iran is a wild card in this mix. Its ratifying the CTBT will basically be dependent on the

maturation of the political climate within Iran and the government’s perceived views of Israel.

China has only limited influence on Teheran in these matters. To ingratiate itself to the

international community, Tehran could ratify the CTBT. This would be done regardless of what

ratification actions Washington took on this matter.

Finally, both Colombia and the Congo face serious domestic problems. In the case of Colombia

it is likely that ratification by the United States would provide the momentum necessary for

Colombia to do likewise. The case of the Congo is less predictable, albeit it would ratify the

CTBT if both Beijing and Washington have penned their signatures to the instrument. In fact, if

the latter were the case, the likelihood for the CTBT’s entry-into-force would be highly

enhanced.

Overall, the United States has significant influence over many of the twelve States that have not

signed or ratified the CTBT. However, there are many other intervening factors that impinge

upon this process. The entry-into-force of the CTBT is multifaceted, with no one State

controlling the outcome.
30

8. Postscript: September 11 and the War on Terrorism

On September 11, 2001, the United States embarked on a new and uncharted course, fighting

terrorism in its own backyard, as well as abroad. The Bush Administration’s priorities and

agenda have been changed. Emphasis on counter-terrorism and homeland defense now far

outweighs all other considerations, domestic and foreign, including arm control issues.

America’s security interests will be foremost in foreign policy decisions. Prior to September

11th, the CTBT was not viewed favorably by the Bush Administration. President Bush had

called the CTBT a flawed treaty and noted that it might be best for the U.S. to opt out of such

defective multilateral treaties. Under U.S. law, the Treaty is under the control of the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee and a majority vote of the Senate is required to transfer control of

the Treaty back to the White House. Such a vote by the current Senate is extremely unlikely.

The administration stated in August 2001 that it had no plans to seek Senate ratification but

would continue to support the development of the International Monitoring System (IMS) by the

CTBT Organization. With U.S. ratification a "non-starter", at least until after the 2004 U.S.

election, the prospects for entry-into-force are extremely poor and the question becomes whether

the CTBTO can remain a viable organization and continue progress in the establishment of the

IMS and the on-site inspection system.56

In the current unsettled domestic and international political environment, an alternate scenario is

possible although it is too early to assess its likelihood. President Bush has organized a coalition

of States, with various points of view, to fight the war on international terrorism. The Bush

Administration now finds itself in the position of having to do a complete turnabout from its

initial policies of unilateralism and disengagement. In spite of its philosophical objections to the

CTBT, administration support for the treaty might grow as part of its efforts to maintain the antiterrorism coalition. Practical international quid-pro-quo considerations might give the CTBT a

new lease on life.

 

56 The United Nations postponed the September 2001 entry-into-force meeting for sometime in the near future.
31

Appendix A: Article XIV of the CTBT

ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of

ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years

after its opening for signature.

2. If this Treaty has not entered into force three years after the date of the anniversary of its

opening for signature, the Depositary shall convene a Conference of the States that have already

deposited their instruments of ratification upon the request of a majority of those States. That

Conference shall examine the extent to which the requirement set out in paragraph 1 has been

met and shall consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law

may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into

force of this Treaty.

3. Unless otherwise decided by the Conference referred to in paragraph 2 or other such

conferences, this process shall be repeated at subsequent anniversaries of the opening for

signature of this Treaty, until its entry into force.

4. All States Signatories shall be invited to attend the Conference referred to in paragraph 2 and

any subsequent conferences as referred to in paragraph 3, as observers.

5. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the

entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of

deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
32

Appendix B: Complete List of Article XIV States:

STATE SIGNATURE RATIFICATION

Algeria 15-Oct-96

Argentina 24-Sep-96 4-Dec-98

Australia 24-Sep-96 9-Jul-98

Austria 24-Sep-96 13-Mar-98

Bangladesh 24-Oct-96 8-Mar-00

Belgium 24-Sep-96 29-Jun-99

Brazil 24-Sep-96 24-Jul-98

Bulgaria 24-Sep-96 29-Sep-99

Canada 24-Sep-96 18-Dec-98

Chile 24-Sep-96 12-Jul-00

China 24-Sep-96

Colombia 24-Sep-96

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Democratic Republic of the Congo 4-Oct-96

Egypt 14-Oct-96

Finland 24-Sep-96 15-Jan-99

France 24-Sep-96 6-Apr-98

Germany 24-Sep-96 20-Aug-98

Hungary 25-Sep-96 13-Jul-99

India

Indonesia 24-Sep-96

Iran, Islamic Republic of 24-Sep-96

Israel 25-Sep-96

Italy 24-Sep-96 1-Feb-99

Japan 24-Sep-96 8-Jul-97

Mexico 24-Sep-96 5-Oct-99

Netherlands 24-Sep-96 23-Mar-99

Norway 24-Sep-96 15-Jul-99

Pakistan

Peru 25-Sep-96 12-Nov-97

Poland 24-Sep-96 25-May-99

Republic of Korea 24-Sep-96 24-Sep-99

Romania 24-Sep-96 5-Oct-99

Russian Federation 24-Sep-96 30-Jun-00

Slovakia 30-Sep-96 3-Mar-98

South Africa 24-Sep-96 30-Mar-99

Spain 24-Sep-96 31-Jul-98

Sweden 24-Sep-96 2-Dec-98

Switzerland 24-Sep-96 1-Oct-99

Turkey 24-Sep-96 16-Feb-00

Ukraine 27-Sep-96 23-Feb-01

United Kingdom 24-Sep-96 6-Apr-98

United States of America 24-Sep-96

Vietnam 24-Sep-96
33

Distribution List

1 MS 0101 C. Paul Robinson, 00001

1 MS 0145 Richard Preston, 09711

1 MS 0415 Keith Almquist, 09811

1 MS 0415 Robert Spulak, 09811

1 MS 0421 Ronald Detry, 09800

1 MS 0423 Linda Branstetter, 09817

1 MS 0423 Randy Watkins, 09817

1 MS 0425 Clyde Layne, 09815

1 MS 0425 Michael Edenburn, 09815

1 MS 0425 Kevin O’Brien, 09815

1 MS 0425 Arthur Payne, 09815

1 MS 0975 Preston Herrington, 05736

1 MS 0975 Eric Chael, 05736

1 MS 0975 James Harris, 05736

1 MS 1138 David Gallegos, 06533

1 MS 1138 Ralph Keyser, 06533

1 MS 1203 Beth Potts, 05302

1 MS 1203 Bob Huelskamp, 05327

1 MS 1211 Teresa Olascoaga, 05301

1 MS 1215 Dennis Croessmann, 05326

1 MS 1215 Bill Chambers, 05326

1 MS 1215 Mark Grohman, 05326

1 MS 1217 Tom Wright, 05913

1 MS 1219 Jack Schendel, 05907

1 MS 1219 Jane Eisenberger, 05907

1 MS 1219 John Taylor, 05907

1 MS 1219 Charles Craft, 05941

1 MS 1219 Adam Slavin, 05941

1 MS 1230 Stan Fraley, 05003

1 MS 1230 Nancy Prindle, 05003

1 MS 1231 Roger Hagengruber, 05000

1 MS 1231 Ron Moya, 05002

1 MS 1363 Larry Walker, 5320

1 MS 1373 Arian Pregenzer, 5320

1 MS 1371 Fred Luetters, 5324

1 MS 1371 Dave Barber, 5324

1 MS 1371 Kent Biringer, 5324

1 MS 1371 Greg Kolb, 5324

10 MS 1371 Adriane Littlefield, 5324

1 MS1371 John Olsen, 5324

1 MS 1371 Mike Vannoni, 5324

1 MS 9103 Paul Rockett, 08120

20 James Brown, 05302
34

60 MS 1373 CMC Library, 5341

1 MS 9018 Central Tech Files, 8945-1

2 MS 0899 Technical Library, 9616

1 MS 0612 Review & Approval Desk, 9612

For DOE/OSTI