NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-116

STANISLAV PALTIS

vs.

REGINA PALTIS.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Stanislav Paltis (husband), the former spouse of Regina 

Paltis (wife), appeals from a divorce judgment challenging 

certain aspects of the judge's property division. We affirm. 

Background. The parties were married in April 2010, and 

had one child together during the marriage. The husband was the 

primary wage earner and was responsible for managing the 

family's finances, while the wife was primarily responsible for 

raising the parties' child and caring for the home. 

During the first year of the marriage, the parties resided 

together in the husband's property located in Allston which he 

acquired and fully paid for in 1998 prior to their marriage.

The wife, who has "extensive employment experience in interior 

remodeling and design," made improvements to the Allston 

property by designing an extra bedroom and storage space.
2

In March 2011, the parties purchased the marital home 

located in Sharon for $470,000. The down payment on the marital 

home was partially funded with the proceeds from the sale of the 

husband's interest in his family's business. The parties also 

used approximately $30,000 to $40,000 in cash that they had

received as wedding gifts to fund the marital home down payment.

Some of the parties' household expenses were paid by the wife's

rental income from a property that she owned in New Jersey. 

After the wife sold the New Jersey property in 2015, she used a 

portion of the proceeds to fund construction projects for the 

marital home. The wife also used cash gifts from her mother to 

fund house projects, including a $20,000 gift in October 2019 to 

fund a window and siding project.

In June 2020, the husband filed a complaint for divorce. A

two-day trial was held in July 2021. At the time of trial, the 

husband was residing in the marital home and the wife was 

residing in an apartment with the child (the wife received 

primary physical custody). The husband was earning an annual 

income of $211,796; the wife was unemployed, but the judge 

attributed an annual income to her of $70,000.1 The husband was 

ordered to pay $550 per week in child support; no alimony was 

1 The judge found that the wife was capable of earning more with 

reasonable effort, having had recently turned down a job offer 

with an interior design firm for $70,000 per year.
3

awarded. With respect to the property division, the judge 

assigned both the marital home and the Allston property to the 

husband and ordered him to pay the wife (1) $287,406, 

representing one-half of the marital home equity; and 

(2) $111,000, representing one-half of the appreciation in value 

of the Allston property during the marriage.2 The husband 

appealed that decision to this court.

Discussion. In an appeal challenging the division of 

marital property, "[w]e review the judge's findings to determine 

whether she considered all the relevant factors under G. L. 

c. 208, § 34, and whether she relied on any irrelevant factors." 

Zaleski v. Zaleski, 469 Mass. 230, 245 (2014). "We will not 

reverse a judgment with respect to property division unless it 

is 'plainly wrong and excessive.'" Id., quoting Baccanti v. 

Morton, 434 Mass. 787, 793 (2001). 

The husband contends that the judge erred in failing to 

grant him a credit for his contribution to the marital home down 

payment and in awarding the wife one-half of the appreciated 

value of the Allston property, because both originated from his 

2 The Allston property was worth $320,000 when the parties were 

married; the value had increased to $542,000 by the time of the 

divorce trial. At the time of trial, the marital home had a 

fair market value of $815,000 and a mortgage balance of 

$240,188, leaving equity of $574,812.
4

premarital assets that should have been excluded from the 

property division. We disagree.

It is well settled that a judge has broad discretion to 

assign property in a divorce, including premarital property. 

See Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 400 (1977) (judge may assign 

property owned by either spouse "whenever and however 

acquired"). The judge was not required to give the husband a 

dollar-for-dollar credit for his contribution of premarital 

assets to the home's down payment, especially where the wife did 

not receive a credit for her own contribution of premarital 

assets (i.e., the proceeds from the sale of her New Jersey 

property used to fund construction projects for the marital 

home) and funds gifted by her mother. See Baccanti, 434 Mass. 

at 789-792 (affirming equal division of marital estate where 

judge's findings reflected consideration of husband's 

contributions from premarital assets).

With respect to the Allston property, the judge excluded 

its premarital value from the marital estate entirely, only 

assigning the wife one-half of the property's appreciated value

during the marriage. The husband claims that it was error to 

award the wife any portion of the appreciated value because she 

made "minimal contributions" to the Allston property during the 

marriage. The judge found, however, that the wife contributed 

to the Allston property both through her overall contributions 
5

to the marital partnership and through her interior design work 

on the house. The judge therefore was well within her 

discretion to assign the wife a portion of the appreciated value 

of the Allston property. See Moriarty v. Stone, 41 Mass. App.

Ct. 151, 156-157 (1996) (judges permitted to include in marital 

estate for purposes of equitable division both premarital assets 

and assets accruing during marriage). 

The husband also argues that the property division was 

inequitable because the judge failed to appropriately consider 

his greater financial contributions to the marital estate. The 

judge found that the parties made relatively equal contributions 

during the marriage.3 See Moriarty, 41 Mass. App. Ct. at 157 

("The parties' respective contributions to the marital 

partnership remain the touchstone of an equitable division of 

the marital estate"). A judge may "consider the contribution of 

each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or 

appreciation in value of their respective estates and the 

contribution of each of the parties as a homemaker to the family 

unit." G. L. c. 208, § 34. "Section 34 'must be read to apply 

in a broad sense to the value of all contributions of the 

3 The judge found that both parties "applied their income and 

earnings to the marital assets" and made "valuable and 

relatively equal contributions to the marital estate through 

earnings, child-care responsibilities, homemaking, and car[ing] 

for their real estate."
6

respective spouses towards the marital enterprise.'" Adams v. 

Adams, 459 Mass. 361, 391 (2011), quoting Putnam v. Putnam, 5 

Mass. App. Ct. 10, 17 (1977). "[T]he care and maintenance of a 

child by a spouse . . . is a contribution to the marital 

partnership" entitling that spouse to share in assets acquired 

by the other spouse. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 743, 

745 (1996).

The husband's tabulation of each party's contribution to 

the marital enterprise fails to acknowledge the wife's financial 

contributions to the marital home and household expenses, her 

contributions in improving both the Allston property and the 

marital home through her interior design work, and her 

nonfinancial contributions to the overall marital partnership as 

homemaker and primary caretaker of the parties' child.

The judge's findings also reflect consideration of other 

relevant factors under section 34, including the husband's 

conduct in unilaterally withdrawing marital funds during the 

pendency of the divorce proceedings,4 the husband's potential 

future inheritance (the wife's likelihood of inheritance was 

unclear), and the husband's superior earning capacity compared 

4 The judge found that during the divorce proceedings the husband 

withdrew $44,000 from marital accounts, which he then gifted to 

his parents. The judge found that the husband also made several 

other large withdrawals; she did not credit the husband's claim 

that he could not recall what the withdrawn funds were used for.
7

to that of the wife. See G. L. c. 208, § 34 (requiring judge to 

consider each party's conduct during marriage, amount and 

sources of income, and opportunity for future acquisition of 

capital assets and income); Kittredge v. Kittredge, 441 Mass. 

28, 38 (2004) (judge may consider spouse's dissipation of 

marital assets as part of conduct and contribution factors under 

section 34).

The husband disputes the weight afforded by the judge to 

each of the section 34 factors, but this is a matter squarely 

within the judge's discretion. See Ross v. Ross, 385 Mass. 30, 

37 (1982). The judge here considered all the relevant factors 

under section 34 and there is no indication that she considered 

any irrelevant factors. Because the property division here is 

not "plainly wrong and excessive," we will not disturb it. 

Zaleski, 469 Mass. at 245, quoting Baccanti, 434 Mass. at 793.5

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Wolohojian, 

Milkey & D'Angelo, JJ.6),

Clerk

Entered: January 24, 2024.

5 The wife's request for appellate costs and fees is denied. 6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.