IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCSC-97

No. 222PA21-1

Filed 19 August 2022

CHARLOTTE POPE MILLER, Administratrix of the Estate of the Late JOHN 

LARRY MILLER

v.

CAROLINA COAST EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, LLC; HARNETT HEALTH 

SYSTEMS, INC., d/b/a BETSY JOHNSON REGIONAL HOSPITAL; and DR. 

AHMAD S. RANA

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision 

of the Court of Appeals, 277 N.C. App. 449, 2021-NCCOA-212, affirming in part, 

reversing in part, vacating in part, and remanding an order entered on 9 November 

2015 by Judge Stanley L. Allen, an order entered on 17 January 2017 by Judge Gale 

M. Adams, and orders entered on 23 April 2019 and 4 October 2019 by Judge Claire

V. Hill in Superior Court, Harnett County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 11 May 

2022.

Hedrick Gardner Kincheloe & Garofalo LLP, by Patricia P. Shields and Linda 

Stephens, and Brent Adams & Associates, by Brenton D. Adams, for plaintiffappellee Charlotte Pope Miller.

Yates, McLamb, & Weyher, L.L.P., by Maria P. Wood and Madeleine M. 

Pfefferle, for defendant-appellant Harnett Health Systems, Inc. d/b/a/ Betsy 

Johnson Regional Hospital.

EARLS, Justice.

¶ 1 To bring a medical malpractice claim in North Carolina, a plaintiff must 
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comply with Rule 9(j) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 9(j)

provides in relevant part that a plaintiff’s pleadings must “specifically assert[ ] that 

the medical care and all medical records pertaining to the alleged negligence that are 

available to the plaintiff after reasonable inquiry have been reviewed by a person who 

[(1)] is reasonably expected to qualify as an expert witness under Rule 702 of the 

Rules of Evidence and [(2)] who is willing to testify that the medical care did not 

comply with the applicable standard of care.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j)(1) (2021). The 

question in this case is whether a trial court must dismiss a complaint that facially 

complies with Rule 9(j) when it is subsequently determined that the plaintiff’s Rule 

9(j) witness is unwilling to testify that the defendant in a medical malpractice action 

violated the applicable standard of care in one (but only one) of the numerous ways 

alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint.

¶ 2 When a defendant files a motion to dismiss a complaint that facially complies 

with Rule 9(j), the dispositive question is whether, taking the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff, it was reasonable for the plaintiff to believe that at 

the time the complaint was filed the witness would be willing to testify against the 

defendant. See Preston v. Movahed, 374 N.C. 177, 189 (2020). The inquiry is 

necessarily focused on the information available to the plaintiff at the time the Rule 

9(j) certification was tendered, not information that came to light after the complaint 

was filed. In this case, there is ample evidence in the record to support the conclusion 
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that the plaintiff, Charlotte Pope Miller, reasonably believed that her Rule 9(j) 

witness was willing to testify that defendant Harnett Health Systems, Inc. (Harnett 

Health) violated the applicable standard of care in the ways alleged in her complaint. 

Therefore, we hold that the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court’s denial 

of Harnett Health’s motion to dismiss for failure to comply with Rule 9(j). The Court 

of Appeals also utilized the correct standard of review in examining the trial court’s 

grant of Harnett Health’s motion to exclude another witness under Rule 702 of the 

North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of 

Appeals.

I. Background

¶ 3 On 8 March 2010, John Larry Miller complained of a painful, distended 

stomach and being unable to urinate. John’s wife, Charlotte, drove him to the 

emergency room at Betsy Johnson Regional Hospital in Dunn. At the time, Betsy 

Johnson Regional Hospital was operated by Harnett Health. At the hospital, John 

was seen by Dr. Ahmad S. Rana, an emergency room physician, who examined John 

and ordered placement of a catheter and a urinalysis. Dr. Rana prescribed antibiotics 

and discharged John that evening, against Charlotte’s wishes. The following evening, 

John was still experiencing significant pain and remained unable to urinate, so 

Charlotte called an ambulance to take him back to Betsy Johnson Regional Hospital, 

where he was again seen by Dr. Rana. Dr. Rana ordered blood work, which indicated 
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renal failure. John was pronounced dead at midnight. Throughout John’s stay at the 

hospital, Charlotte took handwritten notes documenting her view of the treatment 

Dr. Rana and emergency room nurses provided to her husband. 

¶ 4 On 30 September 2011, Charlotte Miller filed a medical malpractice complaint 

as the administrator of John’s estate against Harnett Health, Dr. Rana, and Carolina 

Coast Emergency Physicians, LLC. Plaintiff took a voluntary dismissal and timely 

refiled the complaint underlying these proceedings on 6 February 2014. In her 2014 

complaint, plaintiff certified that all relevant materials had been reviewed by “a 

person who is reasonably expected to qualify as an expert witness under Rule 702 of 

the Rules of Evidence and who is willing to testify that the professional care rendered 

by the defendants to [John] did not comply with the applicable standard of care and 

that such failure to comply with the appropriate standard of care was a cause of the 

death of [John].” That person was subsequently identified as Dr. Robert Leyrer, a 

board-certified emergency medicine physician then practicing in Florida.

¶ 5 In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that Harnett Health violated the standard 

of care applicable to John at the time he was treated through its employment of 

nurses who “failed to exhibit the knowledge and skill and experience of practitioners 

with similar training and experience practicing in the Dunn, North Carolina 

community.” The complaint also alleged that Harnett Health was negligent in various 

other ways not relating to its nursing staff. For example, plaintiff alleged that 
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Harnett Health also violated the applicable standard of care through its employment 

of Dr. Rana as an apparent agent of Harnett Health and by “fail[ing] to insure 

through its policies and procedures that [John] receive[d] the requisite degree and 

standard of hospital care and treatment regularly experienced at similar hospitals,”

among numerous other assertions. In an affidavit submitted shortly after the 2014 

complaint was filed, Dr. Leyrer attested that before the complaint was filed, he had 

spoken with plaintiff’s attorneys and “expressed [his] opinion that the Defendants 

violated the appropriate standard of care in the ways specified in the Complaint.” In 

the affidavit, Dr. Leyrer also stated that he had communicated his “willingness to 

come to NC and testify in this case as to the negligence of the Defendants and the 

various violations of the appropriate standard of care by the Defendants which are 

set out in the Complaint, and copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by 

reference.” 

¶ 6 Dr. Leyrer sat for a deposition on 29 May 2015. During the deposition, Dr. 

Leyrer explained why he believed Dr. Rana’s treatment of John fell short of the 

applicable standard of care. Dr. Leyrer was not specifically asked for his opinion 

regarding the adequacy of the treatment rendered by Harnett Health’s nursing staff. 

However, at various times during the deposition, Dr. Leyrer indicated that his 

criticisms of the treatment John received were limited to his criticisms of Dr. Rana. 

When counsel for Harnett Health asked Dr. Leyrer whether “outside of what you told 
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me with regard to the care and treatment provided by Dr. Rana . . . the remaining 

treatment would have been within the standard of care, correct?”, Dr. Leyrer 

responded that “[a]t this time I can’t think of anything else, correct.” When asked 

whether he would “agree . . . that with regard to the other care and treatment set 

forth in the medical records for March 9 that care and treatment was within the 

standard of care outside of the deviations that you described for us,” Dr. Leyrer 

replied that “[a]t this time I believe it was.” Dr. Leyrer also disclosed that he did not 

consider himself “an emergency nursing expert.” Elsewhere, Dr. Leyrer agreed that 

he had not previously “expressed any opinions to Plaintiff’s counsel outside of those 

[he had] just listed [concerning Dr. Rana] . . . regarding deviations from the standard 

of care[.]”

¶ 7 Following the deposition, Harnett Health filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 

Rule 9(j), asserting that plaintiff “could not have reasonably expected Dr. Leyrer to 

qualify as an expert witness against Harnett Health” and that Dr. Leyrer “is also not 

willing to testify that the care rendered by Harnett Health did not comply with the 

applicable standard of care.” Specifically, Harnett Health argued that dismissal was 

warranted because Dr. Leyrer “testified that he did not have any opinions regarding 

any care provided by nurses or other personnel at Harnett Health.” 

¶ 8 As part of its response in opposition to Harnett Health’s motion to dismiss, 

plaintiff’s counsel submitted an affidavit stating that “prior to filing the initial 
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complaint,” Dr. Leyrer communicated to counsel “his ability and willingness to testify 

that the defendant hospital did not comply with the appropriate standard of care and 

that the violation of this standard of care by the defendant hospital caused the death 

of the late John Miller.” On 9 November 2015, the trial court denied Harnett Health’s 

motion to dismiss based on its determination that 

[a]t the time [plaintiff’s attorney] made his original 9(j) 

Certification in his filing of the complaint on September 30, 

2011, and his filing of the subsequent complaint on 

February 6, 2014 . . . [plaintiff’s attorney] exercised 

reasonable care and diligence and reasonably expected Dr. 

Leyrer to qualify as an expert witness under Rule 702 . . . 

and . . . he reasonably expected Dr. Leyrer to testify in court 

that the medical care rendered to the plaintiff’s decedent 

by the defendant hospital did not comply with the 

applicable standard of care.

The trial court later granted Harnett Health’s motion to exclude Dr. Leyrer’s 

testimony on the grounds that he failed to express standard of care opinions against 

Harnett Health and was not sufficiently familiar with the relevant medical 

community at the time John was treated.

¶ 9 In addition to Dr. Leyrer, plaintiff also designated Dr. Gary B. Harris as an 

expert on the topic of emergency medicine. Dr. Harris was a practicing emergency 

room physician who had experience supervising and instructing nurses. Prior to his 

deposition, Dr. Harris signed an affidavit detailing his efforts to become familiar with 

the medical community in Dunn and the facilities at Betsy Johnson Regional 

Hospital. According to Dr. Harris, these efforts included reviewing demographic data 
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for Harnett County from 2010 to 2015, reviewing Betsy Johnson Regional Hospital’s 

renewal application completed in 2010 which contained information regarding 

hospital staff, facilities, and its patient population, and establishing and maintaining 

professional contacts with emergency physicians who practice in communities similar 

to Dunn. In his deposition, Dr. Harris testified that he was familiar with the standard 

of care for nurses and emergency room physicians practicing in Dunn, and that Dr. 

Rana and the nurses who treated John when he visited Betsy Johnson Regional 

Hospital violated that standard of care in multiple ways.

¶ 10 Harnett Health moved to disqualify and exclude Dr. Harris “on the grounds 

that [he] do[es] not qualify as [a] standard of care expert[ ] under Rule 702 of the 

North Carolina Rules of Evidence and N.C.G.S. § 90-21.12.” In the same motion, 

Harnett Health requested an order granting judgment in its favor and dismissing 

plaintiff’s case against Harnett Health with prejudice “in its entirety.” On 4 October 

2019, the trial court granted Harnett Health’s motion, finding that Dr. Harris was 

“unqualified under Rule 702(a) to render an opinion in this case . . . because [he] has 

not sufficiently demonstrated through his depositions or affidavits that he is familiar 

with the local standards at the time of this incident as required by [N.C.G.S.] § 90-

21.12.” In addition, the trial court noted that Dr. Harris “did not review the plaintiff’s 

handwritten notes, certain EMT records, or certain prior medical records before 

forming his opinions in this case. Additionally, he had not reviewed the documents 
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prior to his depositions.” Based on its conclusion that there existed “no genuine issues 

of material fact . . . as to the applicable standard of care, liability, proximate 

causation, plaintiff’s contributory negligence, damages and agency,” the trial court 

entered summary judgment in favor of Harnett Health and dismissed all claims 

against Harnett Health with prejudice. 

II. The Court of Appeals opinion

¶ 11 Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s order excluding 

Dr. Harris and granting summary judgment in Harnett Health’s favor. Harnett 

Health subsequently gave notice of cross-appeal from the 9 November 2015 order 

denying its motion to dismiss on Rule (9)(j) grounds.1 In a unanimous opinion, the 

Court of Appeals affirmed the order denying Harnett Health’s motion to dismiss and 

reversed the order excluding Dr. Harris’s testimony. See Miller v. Carolina Coast 

Emergency Physicians, LLC, 277 N.C. App. 449, 2021-NCCOA-212. 

¶ 12 With respect to the motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals explained that 

consistent with Rule 9(j)’s function as “a gatekeeper . . . to prevent frivolous 

malpractice claims . . . trial courts determining compliance with Rule 9(j) should 

examine the facts and circumstances known or those which should have been known 

 

1 Plaintiff also filed timely notice of appeal from various other orders entered by the 

trial court throughout the proceedings, including orders adjudicating motions filed by Dr. 

Rana. Although the Court of Appeals resolved questions arising from these orders, only the 

order denying Harnett Health’s motion to dismiss and the order granting Harnett Health’s 

motion to exclude Dr. Harris are presently before us. Accordingly, our summary of facts and 

the proceedings below is limited to the facts and legal issues relating to these two orders.
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to the pleader at the time of filing.” Id. ¶ 46 (cleaned up) (emphasis in the original). 

The question before the court was whether “considering the facts and circumstances 

at the time Plaintiff filed her Complaint—viewed in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiff . . . she reasonably believed Dr. Leyrer was willing to testify against Harnett 

Health.” Id. ¶ 50–51. In the court’s view, notwithstanding the “reservations” Dr. 

Leyrer ultimately expressed at his deposition, there existed “no evidence indicating 

Dr. Leyrer informed counsel that [he] was unwilling to testify against Harnett Health 

prior to his pre-deposition affidavit.” Id. ¶ 51. Thus, based in part on plaintiff’s

counsel’s affidavit “asserting Dr. Leyrer stated he was willing to testify against all 

Defendants in a phone conversation prior to filing the 2011 Complaint,” the court 

concluded that “the Record indicates at the time Plaintiff filed her Complaint, she 

reasonably believed Dr. Leyrer was willing to testify against Harnett Health.” Id. 

¶ 13 With respect to the motion to exclude Dr. Harris, the Court of Appeals 

concluded that the trial court “misapplied Rule 702(a).” Id. ¶ 77. Specifically, the 

Court of Appeals held that in excluding Dr. Harris “because he had not reviewed 

Plaintiff’s notes, Decedent’s EMT records, and Decedent’s ‘certain prior medical 

records,’ ” the trial court had erroneously “concluded Dr. Harris could not satisfy Rule 

702(a)(1)’s requirement [that] his testimony be based on sufficient facts or data.” Id. 

¶ 79. According to the court, the fact that Dr. Harris had not reviewed certain 

information “affect[ed] only the weight to be assigned [his] opinion rather than its 
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admissibility.” Id. (quoting Pope v. Bridge Broom, Inc., 240 N.C. App. 365, 374 

(2015)). Therefore, the court held that the trial court “erred in concluding Dr. Harris’s 

opinions were inadmissible” because “questions as to the weight to be given to his 

opinions should be resolved by a jury.” Id. ¶ 80. Separately, however, the court 

affirmed the order granting Harnett Health’s motion to exclude Dr. Leyrer’s 

testimony as against Harnett Health directly. Id. ¶ 86.

¶ 14 Subsequently, Harnett Health filed a petition for discretionary review 

pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31. On 14 December 2021, this Court issued a special order 

allowing review as to the following issues: Whether the Court of Appeals (1) “err[ed] 

in affirming the trial court’s order denying Harnett Health’s Motion to Dismiss 

pursuant to Rule 9(j)” and (2) “err[ed] in applying a de novo standard of review 

instead of an abuse of discretion standard in its exclusion of Dr. Harris.”

III. Harnett Health’s motion to dismiss on Rule 9(j) grounds

¶ 15 Rule 9(j) provides in relevant part that:

Any complaint alleging medical malpractice by a health 

care provider pursuant to [N.C.]G.S. 90-21.11(2)a[ ] in 

failing to comply with the applicable standard of care under 

[N.C.]G.S. 90-21.12 shall be dismissed unless:

(1) The pleading specifically asserts that the medical 

care and all medical records pertaining to the 

alleged negligence that are available to the plaintiff 

after reasonable inquiry have been reviewed by a 

person who is reasonably expected to qualify as an 

expert witness under Rule 702 of the Rules of 

Evidence and who is willing to testify that the 
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medical care did not comply with the applicable 

standard of care . . . .

N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j). The rule “serves as a gatekeeper, enacted by the 

legislature, to prevent frivolous malpractice claims by requiring expert review before

filing of the action.” Moore v. Proper, 366 N.C. 25, 31 (2012). “Because Rule 9(j) 

requires certification at the time of filing that the necessary expert review has 

occurred, compliance or noncompliance with the Rule is determined at the time of 

filing.” Id. When a defendant later files a motion to dismiss a complaint that facially 

complied with Rule 9(j), “a court should look at ‘the facts and circumstances known 

or those which should have been known to the pleader’ at the time of filing.” Id. 

(quoting Trapp v. Maccioli, 129 N.C. App. 237, 241, disc. rev. denied, 348 N.C. 509 

(1998)). An appellate court reviews a trial court’s allowance or denial of a defendant’s 

motion to dismiss de novo, taking “the evidence . . . in the light most favorable to [the] 

plaintiff.” Preston v. Movahed, 374 N.C. 177, 186 (2020).

¶ 16 Harnett Health raises two arguments in support of its contention that the 

Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s denial of its motion to dismiss. 

Their first argument is that plaintiff has failed to comply with Rule 9(j) because Dr. 

Leyrer stated in his deposition testimony that he was unwilling to testify to the 

quality of the care rendered by nurses employed by Harnett Health. As a predicate to 

this argument, Harnett Health asserts that a reviewing court conducts one inquiry 

when evaluating compliance with Rule 9(j)’s first requirement (the requirement that 
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the plaintiff identify a person who is “reasonably expected to qualify as an expert 

witness under Rule 702”) but a different inquiry when evaluating compliance with 

Rule 9(j)’s second requirement (the requirement that the plaintiff identify a person 

who is “willing to testify that the medical care did not comply with the applicable 

standard of care”). According to Harnett Health, when assessing compliance with the 

first requirement, the question is whether the plaintiff had a “reasonable belief” that 

the person would qualify as an expert witness under Rule 702; when assessing 

compliance with the second requirement, the question is whether the person is or is 

not presently willing to testify that the defendant’s medical treatment failed to 

comport with the applicable standard of care. 

¶ 17 This argument is untenable in light of the precedent we established in Preston.

In that case, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 9(j), asserting 

that the plaintiff had failed to identify a person “willing to testify against defendant 

at the time of filing.” 374 N.C. at 185. On review, and quoting extensively from Moore, 

we expressly adopted the same analytical approach utilized to review a challenge to 

a plaintiff’s compliance with the “reasonably expected to qualify as an expert witness” 

requirement. See id. at 183 (“While the Rule 9(j) issue in Moore . . . focused specifically 

on whether the plaintiff’s expert was reasonably expected to qualify as an expert 

witness, we conclude that the analytical framework set forth in Moore applies equally 

to other Rule 9(j) issues in which a complaint facially valid under Rule 9(j) is 
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challenged on the basis that the certification is not supported by the facts.” (cleaned 

up)).

¶ 18 We then explained that:

[W]here, as here, a defendant files a motion to dismiss 

under Rule 12(b)(6) challenging a plaintiff’s facially valid 

certification that the reviewing expert was willing to testify 

at the time of the filing of the complaint, the trial court 

must examine the facts and circumstances known or those

which should have been known to the pleader at the time of 

filing, and to the extent there are reasonable disputes or 

ambiguities in the forecasted evidence, the trial court 

should draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party at this preliminary stage.

Id. at 183–84 (cleaned up) (emphasis added). Preston conclusively establishes that 

courts analyze a motion to dismiss on Rule 9(j) grounds in the exact same way when 

a defendant challenges a plaintiff’s compliance with Rule 9(j)(1)’s first requirement 

as when a defendant challenges a plaintiff’s compliance with Rule 9(j)(1)’s second 

requirement. In evaluating the second requirement, just as with the first Rule 9(j) 

requirement, what matters is what was known or what reasonably should have been 

known at the time of the filing. The dispositive question is whether “taking the 

evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the factual record . . . demonstrates 

that . . . [the Rule 9(j) expert] was willing at the time of the filing of the [complaint] to 

testify against [the] defendant . . . . on the basis that [the] defendant failed to meet 

the standard of care[.]” Id. at 190 (emphasis added).

¶ 19 Nonetheless, Harnett Health contends that the test set forth in Moore and 
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Preston does not control because “[a]s specified by the language of the statute, the 

‘reasonable belief’ language modifies the proposed expert’s qualifications under Rule 

702, not the proposed expert’s willingness to testify.” Harnett Health appears to be 

referring to the legislature’s use of the phrase “reasonably expected to qualify” in 

describing the first Rule 9(j) requirement; the legislature uses the phrase “is willing

to testify” in describing the second. But the reason courts assess compliance with Rule 

9(j) based on what a plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known at the time the 

complaint was filed is not the fact that the legislature used the phrase “reasonably 

expected.” Instead, courts assess Rule 9(j) compliance at the time a complaint is filed 

because “the legislature intended Rule 9(j) to control pleadings in medical malpractice

claims.” Thigpen v. Ngo, 355 N.C. 198, 203, (2002) (emphasis added); see id. (“The 

legislature specifically drafted Rule 9(j) to govern the initiation of medical 

malpractice actions and to require physician review as a condition for filing the 

action.” (emphasis added)). Moreover, the statutory reference in Rule 9(j)(1) to “is 

willing to testify,” when read in context, clearly refers to a witness who has reviewed 

the pleading prior to the time of filing rather than to a witness who is testifying in a 

subsequent deposition or trial. It is illogical to assess a plaintiff’s compliance with 

Rule 9(j) based on what a proposed expert witness says months or years after a 

complaint is filed. We decline Harnett Health’s implicit invitation to overrule Preston

and depart from Moore.
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¶ 20 Harnett Health’s second argument is that even if plaintiff’s compliance with 

Rule 9(j) should be assessed at the time her complaint was filed (as it must), plaintiff 

“could not have reasonably believed when she filed her Complaint that Dr. Leyrer 

was willing to testify against Harnett Health.” This argument is unavailing for 

multiple reasons.

¶ 21 At the outset, this argument ignores evidence in the record that plainly 

supports the conclusion that Dr. Leyrer was willing to testify that Harnett Health 

violated the applicable standard of care at the time plaintiff filed her complaint. 

Contrary to Harnett Health’s assertion that “the source of Plaintiff’s belief that [Dr. 

Leyrer] was willing to testify [against Harnett Health] remains unclear,” the record 

is clear: the record contains an affidavit signed by Dr. Leyrer shortly after the second 

complaint was filed stating that he had “examined all medical records pertaining to 

the negligence of the defendants, Carolina Coast Emergency Physicians, LLC; 

Harnett Health Systems, Inc., d/b/a Betsy Johnson Regional Care and Dr. Ahmad S. 

Rana” and “[t]hat on the 26th day of September, 2011, I had a telephone conversation 

with [Charlotte’s counsel] during which I expressed my opinion that the Defendants 

violated the appropriate standard of care in the ways specified in the complaint, a copy 

of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference.” In the same affidavit, Dr. 

Leyrer also recounted that “[s]ometime prior to the second complaint being filed, I 

again expressed my willingness to come and testify in this case as to the negligence 
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of the Defendants which are set out in the complaint.” Although Dr. Leyrer later 

indicated he would not be willing to testify that Harnett Health violated the standard 

of care with respect to its nursing staff, this does not negate the evidence in the record 

establishing that Dr. Leyrer told plaintiff’s counsel he was willing to testify that 

Harnett Health “violated the appropriate standard of care in the ways specified in 

the complaint” on multiple occasions prior to the filing of plaintiff’s amended 

complaint. 

¶ 22 It may be possible that Dr. Leyrer misunderstood the allegations contained in 

plaintiff’s complaint, failed to thoroughly vet the complaint, misrepresented what he 

was willing to testify to, or intended to communicate only that he was willing to testify 

to the negligence of the defendants other than Harnett Health. But Dr. Leyrer was a 

qualified emergency room physician with decades of professional experience. There 

is no evidence in the record suggesting plaintiff had reason to doubt Dr. Leyrer’s 

competence, thoroughness, or honesty at the time of filing. Absent such evidence, it 

would have been unreasonable for plaintiff’s counsel to presume that Dr. Leyrer 

meant something other than what he said in multiple pre-filing conversations with 

counsel as documented in Dr. Leyrer’s affidavit. When Dr. Leyrer told plaintiff’s 

counsel he had reviewed the relevant medical records and was willing to testify that 

the defendants named in the complaint had violated the applicable standard of care 

in the ways set forth in the complaint, plaintiff’s counsel formed “a[ ] reasonable 
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belief” that Dr. Leyrer would be willing to testify against Harnett Health “based on 

the exercise of reasonable diligence under the circumstances.” Preston, 374 N.C. at 

188 (quoting Moore, 366 N.C. at 31). Regardless, even if we were to credit Harnett 

Health’s contention that the meaning of Dr. Leyrer’s affidavit is ambiguous because 

he “only expressed willingness to testify against ‘the Defendants’ generally and 

lacked any criticisms of Harnett Health specifically,” we reiterate that “to the extent 

there are reasonable disputes or ambiguities in the forecasted evidence, the trial 

court should draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party at this 

preliminary stage.” Id. at 189 (quoting Moore, 366 N.C. at 32). 

¶ 23 Furthermore, Harnett Health’s assertion that Dr. Leyrer’s deposition 

testimony demonstrates he “was never critical of Harnett Health” overstates the 

significance of Dr. Leyrer’s deposition testimony. At most, Dr. Leyrer’s deposition 

testimony revealed that he would be unwilling to testify that the nurses who treated 

John violated the applicable standard of care. Harnett Health does not dispute the 

fact that Dr. Leyrer’s deposition testimony included numerous detailed criticisms of 

the treatment provided by Dr. Rana. And Harnett Health acknowledges that 

plaintiff’s 2014 complaint “asserts liability against Harnett Health based on . . . 

liability for Dr. Rana’s alleged negligence as an apparent agent.” Thus, as Harnett 

Health implicitly concedes, the record establishes that Dr. Leyrer has at all times 

during this litigation remained willing to testify that Harnett Health violated the 
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standard of care in a manner consistent with at least one of the theories set out in 

plaintiff’s complaint.

¶ 24 Finally, Harnett Health contends that plaintiff’s complaint should be 

dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 9(j) for a separate reason: because the record 

demonstrates that plaintiff could not have reasonably believed that Dr. Leyrer would 

“qualify as an emergency nursing expert under Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules 

of Evidence.”2 Once again, Harnett Health relies primarily on its characterization of 

Dr. Leyrer’s deposition testimony. As explained above, the salient question is what 

plaintiff reasonably believed at the time the complaint was filed. As the Court of 

Appeals correctly noted, “ ‘[t]he preliminary, gatekeeping question of whether a 

proffered expert witness is reasonably expected to qualify as an expert witness under 

Rule 702 is a different inquiry’ than whether the witness [ultimately] qualifies.”

Miller, 2021-NCCOA-212, ¶ 52 (quoting Moore, 366 N.C. at 31). 

¶ 25 North Carolina Rule of Evidence 702(d) provides for the qualification of a 

 

2 It is not entirely clear if Harnett Health intended to bring this question before the 

Court. In its opening brief, Harnett Health argues that “even if Plaintiff could have 

reasonably expected that Dr. Leyrer was willing to testify against Harnett Health, which is 

expressly denied, she could not have reasonably expected that [Dr.] Leyrer would qualify as 

an emergency nursing expert under Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.” Yet 

in its reply brief, Harnett Health states that “[n]otwithstanding that the reasonableness of 

Plaintiff’s expectation of Dr. Leyrer’s qualification is not at issue in this Discretionary 

Review, Plaintiff-Appellee raises this issue in their response brief.” Regardless, because the 

special order allowing discretionary review could fairly be read to encompass this question, 

and because the parties both provide arguments in support of their respective positions, we 

assume this question is properly before the Court.
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physician “who by reason of active clinical practice . . . has knowledge of the applicable 

standard of care for nurses, nurse practitioners, certified registered nurse 

anesthetists, certified registered nurse midwives, physician assistants, or other 

medical support staff . . . with respect to the standard of care of which he is 

knowledgeable of . . . .” N.C.G.S § 8C-1, Rule 702(d) (2021). In this case, the record 

indicates that at the time plaintiff filed her complaint and certified compliance with 

Rule 9(j), she was aware that Dr. Leyrer was a practicing emergency room physician 

who had served for more than two decades as the Director of Emergency Medicine at 

a regional medical center. Thus, as the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, plaintiff 

reasonably expected Dr. Leyrer to qualify as an expert witness under Rule 702 

because “Rule 702(d) only requires that a physician have knowledge of the standard 

for nursing care by means of the physician’s clinical practice [and] Dr. Leyrer was a 

practicing emergency physician at the time Plaintiff filed the Complaint.” Miller,

2021-NCCOA-212, ¶ 52. Accordingly, we uphold the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of 

the trial court’s denial of Harnett Health’s motion to dismiss on Rule 9(j) grounds.

IV. The standard of review on appeal from a Rule 702 decision

¶ 26 In addition to challenging the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding its motion 

to dismiss on Rule 9(j) grounds, Harnett Health also challenges the Court of Appeals’ 

decision to reverse the trial court’s order excluding Dr. Harris, plaintiff’s other expert 

witness, under Rule 702. As defined in its petition for discretionary review and this 
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Court’s special order allowing the petition in part, this challenge is limited to the 

question of whether the Court of Appeals utilized the correct standard of review in 

examining the trial court’s order. Specifically, Harnett Health contends that the 

Court of Appeals “erroneously applied a de novo standard of review . . . despite 

longstanding precedent requiring adherence to the abuse of discretion standard.” 

¶ 27 Rule 702(a) provides that 

If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will 

assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 

determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 

by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 

testify thereto in the form of an opinion, or otherwise, if all 

of the following apply:

(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or 

data.

(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles 

and methods.

(3) The witness has applied the principles and 

methods reliably to the facts of the case.

N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a). In reviewing the trial court’s order excluding Dr. Harris 

under Rule 702, the Court of Appeals explained that

[g]enerally, we review a trial court's ruling on a motion to 

exclude expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. 

Crocker v. Roethling, 363 N.C. 140, 143 (2009). “However, 

when the pertinent inquiry on appeal is based on a 

question of law—such as whether the trial court properly 

interpreted and applied the language of a statute—we 

conduct de novo review.” Da Silva v. WakeMed, 375 N.C. 1, 

5 (2020). 
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Miller, 2021-NCCOA-212, ¶ 68. This is an entirely correct statement of the law. The 

trial court’s determination that “proffered expert testimony meets Rule 702(a)’s 

requirements of qualification, relevance, and reliability . . . will not be reversed on 

appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.” State v. McGrady, 368 N.C. 880, 893 

(2016). But the trial court’s articulation and application of the relevant legal standard

is a legal question that is reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Nay v. Cornerstone Staffing 

Sols., 380 N.C. 66, 2022-NCSC-8, ¶ 26 (“In the event that the issue before the Court 

is whether the [lower tribunal’s] determination rests upon a misapplication of the 

applicable legal standard, that determination is . . . a question of law subject to de 

novo review.”). And, whatever the standard of review, “an error of law is an abuse of 

discretion.” Da Silva, 375 N.C. at 5 n.2.

¶ 28 Of course, the fact that the Court of Appeals accurately described the standard 

of review does not necessarily mean the Court of Appeals actually utilized the correct 

standard of review. If the Court of Appeals had accurately described the standard of 

review but proceeded to assess the merits in a manner flatly inconsistent with its 

description, Harnett Health’s arguments might have some force. That is not what 

happened in this case. Here, after accurately describing the standard of review, the 

Court of Appeals utilized that standard of review in reaching the conclusion that the 

trial court erred when it “excluded Dr. Harris because he had not reviewed Plaintiff’s 

notes, Decedent’s EMT records, and Decedent’s ‘certain prior medical records.’ ” 
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Miller, 2021-NCCOA-212, ¶ 79. 

¶ 29 The record demonstrates that Dr. Harris was a practicing emergency room 

physician who worked alongside of and was familiar with physicians who practiced 

in communities similar to Harnett County. Dr. Harris also undertook an extensive 

review of facts and data elicited from various sources to develop an understanding of 

the standards of care and standards of practice at Betsy Johnson Regional Hospital 

in 2010. In addition, Dr. Harris “examined the medical records from Harnett Health 

for the two hospital visits in question as well as at least some of Decedent’s prior 

medical records. In fact, Dr. Harris was familiar with Decedent’s medical history and 

certain medical conditions relevant to his care on the days in question.” Miller, 2021-

NCCOA-212, ¶ 80. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, Rule 702(a) requires that 

expert testimony be based upon “sufficient facts or data,” not upon all the facts or 

data in existence at the time a putative expert testifies. Id. ¶ 79. Thus, even if Dr. 

Harris did not review certain documents produced during John Miller’s treatment 

that might have been relevant to assessing Harnett Health’s negligence, Dr. Harris’s 

testimony was still “based upon sufficient facts or data,” including John’s medical 

records.

¶ 30 Similarly, the Court of Appeals did not err in reviewing the basis for Dr. 

Harris’s familiarity with the medical community in Harnett County. As we have 

previously explained, “[n]othing in our statutes or case law . . . prescribe[s] any 
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particular method by which a medical doctor must become ‘familiar’ with a given 

community. Many methods are possible, and our jurisprudence indicates our desire 

to preserve flexibility in such proceedings.” Crocker v. Roethling, 363 N.C. 140, 147 

(2009). Certainly, a physician like Dr. Harris whose knowledge comes from “his [or 

her] equivalent skill and training, familiarity with the equipment and techniques 

used by [the allegedly negligent doctor], first-hand investigation of [the community 

where the treatment occurred] and its hospital, and his testimony as to the similarity 

in the communities where he has practiced and [the community where the treatment 

occurred]” can satisfy the requirements of Rule 702(a). Pitts v. Nash Day Hosp., Inc., 

167 N.C. App. 194, 199 (2004), aff’d per curiam, 359 N.C. 626 (2005). The Court of 

Appeals’ ultimate conclusion that Dr. Harris did enough to familiarize himself with 

the Harnett County medical community in no way suggests that the Court of Appeals 

utilized the wrong standard of review.

¶ 31 In light of our precedents establishing the nature and quantity of information 

necessary to satisfy Rule 702, the trial court either abused its discretion in choosing 

to disregard the uncontroverted record evidence detailing Dr. Harris’s professional 

background and the steps he undertook to familiarize himself with Harnett County, 

or the trial court committed an error of law in imposing a requirement not found in 

Rule 702 that putative experts review all potentially relevant facts or data. In either 

case, the Court of Appeals did not err in how it approached the question of whether 
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the trial court’s exclusion order warranted reversal. We affirm the Court of Appeals’ 

reversal of the trial court’s order granting Harnett Health’s motion to exclude Dr. 

Harris.

V. Conclusion

¶ 32 Rule 9(j) was introduced by the General Assembly as part of legislation entitled 

“An Act to Prevent Frivolous Medical Malpractice Actions by Requiring that Expert 

Witnesses in Medical Malpractice Cases Have Appropriate Qualifications to Testify 

on the Standard of Care at Issue and to Require Expert Witness Review as a 

Condition of Filing a Medical Malpractice Action.” Act of June 20, 1995, ch. 309, 1995 

N.C. Sess. Laws 611. This legislative intent as expressed in the text of Rule 9(j) 

demands that complaints alleging medical malpractice “receive strict consideration.” 

Thigpen, 355 N.C. at 202. Nevertheless, Rule 9(j) need not and cannot be interpreted 

in a manner that precludes litigants who have complied with all statutory 

requirements from bringing colorable medical malpractice claims. An overly 

expansive interpretation of Rule 9(j) would leave patients who have been wronged 

without a legal remedy and confer a judicially created immunity upon hospitals and 

medical staff. It would override the General Assembly’s careful judgment regarding 

how to balance the competing interests of protecting competent healthcare 

professionals from frivolous lawsuits and ensuring just compensation for patients 

wrongfully injured by the negligent acts of those they have entrusted with their lives.
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¶ 33 Here, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court’s denial of 

Harnett Health’s motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals utilized the correct 

standard of review in examining the trial court order allowing Harnett Health’s 

motion to exclude one of plaintiff’s expert witnesses. Accordingly, we affirm the 

decision of the Court of Appeals.

AFFIRMED.
Justice BARRINGER dissenting.

¶ 34 At issue in this case is whether this Court will enforce North Carolina Rule of 

Civil Procedure 9(j)—the gatekeeping rule enacted by our legislature “to prevent 

frivolous malpractice claims by requiring expert review before filing of the action,”

Moore v. Proper, 366 N.C. 25, 31 (2012)—and whether the Court of Appeals applied 

the undisputed standard of review, abuse of discretion, to a trial court’s exclusion of 

expert testimony for failing to satisfy North Carolina Rule of Evidence 702(a). The 

plain language of Rule 9(j) provides that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action

must have an expert witness willing to testify that each defendant health care 

provider breached the statutory standard of care. Further, to find that a trial court 

abused its discretion in excluding testimony under Rule 702(a), an appellate court 

must examine whether the decision was manifestly unsupported by reason. Since the 

trial court did not examine whether plaintiff’s selected expert was willing to testify, 

the case should be remanded for a proper application of Rule 9(j). In the alternative, 

since the Court of Appeals did not apply proper abuse of discretion review, the case 

should be remanded to the Court of Appeals for a correct analysis. I respectfully 

dissent.

I. Analysis

A. Rule 9(j) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure

¶ 35 Rule 9(j) requires, in pertinent part, that
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[a]ny complaint alleging medical malpractice by a health 

care provider pursuant to [N.C.]G.S. [§] 90-21.11(2)a. in 

failing to comply with the applicable standard of care under 

[N.C.]G.S. [§] 90-21.12 shall be dismissed unless:

(1) The pleading specifically asserts that the medical 

care and all medical records pertaining to the 

alleged negligence that are available to the plaintiff 

after reasonable inquiry have been reviewed by a 

person who is reasonably expected to qualify as an 

expert witness under Rule 702 of the Rules of 

Evidence and who is willing to testify that the 

medical care did not comply with the applicable 

standard of care[.]

N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j) (2021).

¶ 36 Harnett Health moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for not complying with 

Rule 9(j) because Dr. Leyrer was not willing to testify against Harnett Health. Yet 

neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals addressed Harnett Health’s argument 

that the complaint should be dismissed because Dr. Leyrer was not actually willing 

to testify. The trial court’s findings, for instance, simply stated:

[Plaintiff’s counsel] exercised reasonable care and diligence 

and reasonably expected Dr. Leyrer to qualify as an expert 

witness under Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence and that 

he reasonably expected Dr. Leyrer to testify in court that 

the medical care rendered to the plaintiff’s decedent by 

[Harnett Health] did not comply with the applicable 

standard of care.

Likewise, the trial court’s conclusion stated:

That prior to making the Rule 9(j) Certifications in 

the complaint filed September 30, 2011 and in the 

subsequent complaint filed February 6, 2014 the plaintiff’s 
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counsel . . . exercised reasonable care and diligence to 

satisfy himself that those certifications were true and that 

his expectations set out in the Rule 9(j) Certifications in 

both complaints were reasonable.

As for the Court of Appeals, though it acknowledged Harnett Health’s argument that 

“Dr. Leyrer was not willing to specifically critique Harnett Health,” it still affirmed 

the trial court’s order because “the [r]ecord indicates at the time [p]laintiff filed her 

[c]omplaint, she reasonably believed Dr. Leyrer was willing to testify against Harnett 

Health.” Miller v. Carolina Coast Emergency Physicians, LLC, 277 N.C. App. 449, 

2021-NCCOA-212, ¶¶ 50–51 (emphasis added).

¶ 37 Rule 9(j)’s requirement that an expert be willing to testify is not dependent on 

plaintiff’s reasonable belief that the expert is willing to testify. Instead, Rule 9(j) 

contains two distinct requirements. First, the medical care and all medical records 

pertaining to the alleged negligence must “have been reviewed by a person who is 

reasonably expected to qualify as an expert witness under Rule 702 of the Rules of 

Evidence.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j). Second, that expert witness must be “willing to 

testify that the medical care did not comply with the applicable standard of care.” 

N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j).

¶ 38 “When the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty 

of this Court to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute . . . .” Diaz v. Div. of 

Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387 (2006). In addition, “[o]rdinary rules of grammar apply 

when ascertaining the meaning of a statute.” Dunn v. Pac. Emps. Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 
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129, 134 (1992). Here, the term “reasonable expectation” is absent from the 

dependent clause of the second requirement: the expert must be someone “who is 

willing to testify that the medical care did not comply with the applicable standard 

of care.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j)(1). In contrast, the dependent clause of the first 

requirement includes the qualification “reasonably expected”: the expert must be 

someone “who is reasonably expected to qualify as an expert witness under Rule 702 

of the Rules of Evidence.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j)(1) (emphasis added).

¶ 39 When a legislative body “includes particular language in one section of a 

statute but omits it in another section of the same [a]ct, it is generally presumed that 

the legislative body acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 

exclusion.” Russello v. U.S., 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983); see also N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. 

Graybar Elec. Co., 373 N.C. 382, 390 n.3 (2020) (per curiam). This Court has also 

recognized that it must “give every word of the statute effect, . . . ensure that . . . two 

questions are not collapsed into one,” and not ignore terms the legislature chose to 

use in the statute. Moore, 366 N.C. at 31 (cleaned up). Here, if the legislature wished 

the term “reasonable expectation” to apply to both requirements, it would have 

positioned it to modify both clauses, for instance: “a person who is reasonably 

expected to qualify as an expert witness and testify that the medical care did not 

comply with the applicable standard of care.” Instead, the legislature, placed the term 

“reasonable expectation” within its own individual clause modifying a distinct 
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prepositional phrase—a person “who is reasonably expected to qualify as an expert 

witness”—and then included an entirely new clause, with a different distinct 

prepositional phrase—“and who is willing to testify that the medical care did not 

comply with the applicable standard of care”—that did include the term “willing” but 

not “reasonably expected.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j)(1) (emphasis added).

¶ 40 In accordance with these instructions, Rule 9(j)’s requirement that an expert 

be willing to testify does not depend on plaintiff’s reasonable expectation but rather

simply requires that plaintiff’s proffered witness actually be willing to testify.

Discerning whether an expert is qualified to testify requires the exercise of 

professional judgment; determining whether an expert is willing to testify does not. 

Rather, it is simply a matter of yes or no.

¶ 41 The requirement that a proffered witness actually be willing to testify is an 

important statutory element of Rule 9(j). As we have previously recognized, Rule 9(j) 

“operates as a preliminary qualifier to ‘control pleadings’ rather than to act as a 

general mechanism to exclude expert testimony.” Id. To “avert[ ] frivolous actions,” 

Rule 9(j) “preclude[s] any filing in the first place by a plaintiff who is unable to procure 

an expert who both meets the appropriate qualifications and, after reviewing the 

medical care and available records, is willing to testify that the medical care at issue 

fell below the standard of care.” Vaughan v. Mashburn, 371 N.C. 428, 435 (2018).

¶ 42 Accordingly, the courts of this State should uphold their gatekeeping role and 
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dismiss actions covered by Rule 9(j) when the plaintiff’s proffered expert was not 

willing to testify at the time the complaint was filed. Certainly, when analyzing 

whether an expert was actually willing to testify at the time the complaint was filed,

the trial court must examine the facts and circumstances 

known or those which should have been known to the 

pleader at the time of filing, and to the extent there are 

reasonable disputes or ambiguities in the forecasted 

evidence, the trial court should draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party at this 

preliminary stage.

Preston v. Movahed, 374 N.C. 177, 189 (2020) (cleaned up). But this standard of 

review does not change the text of the statute itself, which requires that an expert be 

willing to testify at the time the complaint is filed, nor does it make that inquiry 

dependent on a plaintiff’s “reasonable expectation.”

¶ 43 Since the trial court did not examine whether Dr. Leyrer was actually willing

to testify against the remaining defendants at the time the complaint was filed, this 

case should be remanded for the trial court to properly apply the second requirement 

of Rule 9(j).

¶ 44 Yet even if Rule 9(j) only requires a plaintiff to reasonably expect that an expert 

is willing to testify, plaintiff’s attorney should have known that Dr. Leyrer was not 

willing to testify against Harnett Health. In determining whether the requirements 

of Rule 9(j) are met, courts look to “the facts and circumstances known or those which 

should have been known to the pleader at the time of filing.” Preston, 374 N.C. at 189 
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(emphasis added). As the pleader’s representative, it is the responsibility of plaintiff’s 

attorney to confirm that the selected expert focused on every cause of action in the 

complaint and is willing to testify regarding each of the claims. “A complaint facially 

valid under Rule 9(j) may be dismissed if subsequent discovery establishes that the 

certification is not supported by the facts.” Moore, 366 N.C. at 31. Here, subsequent 

discovery revealed that plaintiff’s attorney should have known Dr. Leyer was 

unwilling to testify.

¶ 45 A close reading of the record demonstrates that Dr. Leyer made known his 

reservations to plaintiff’s attorney before either of the complaints were filed. Dr. 

Leyer testified under oath that he conveyed his opinions to plaintiff’s counsel in 

telephone conversations shortly after being contacted and that his opinions, which 

did not include any standard of care opinion concerning health care providers other 

than Dr. Rana, had not changed. Specifically, the deposition transcript of Dr. Leyer 

reflects the following:

Q I take it that you’re not offering any standard of care 

opinions as to any other health care providers other than 

Dr. Rana; is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q So you’re not offering any standard of care opinions 

as to the nurses or any other personnel from the hospital 

or anyone associated with Carolina Coast Emergency 

Physicians, LLC; is that correct?

A That is correct.
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Q And I take it you’ve never had any such opinions 

against anyone else other than Dr. Rana prior to today; is 

that correct?

A In this case, no.

Q Is that correct?

A Yes.

. . . .

Q Back on the record.

Dr. Leyrer, in finishing up I just have a few 

questions for you. I just want to clarify earlier when you 

were giving us dates you said you were initially contacted 

about the case at the end of August of 2011 and then after 

your review of some records you received shortly thereafter 

you would have had several telephone conversations with 

[p]laintiff’s counsel in September; is that correct?

A Correct.

Q And it was during those telephone conferences that 

you provided your opinions in this case to [p]laintiff’s 

counsel; is that correct?

A Correct.

Q And your opinions have not changed since that time, 

correct?

A Correct.

¶ 46 Even in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the record at best demonstrates 

that any statements made by Dr. Leyrer to plaintiff’s counsel indicating that he would 

testify against Harnett Health referred only to the actions of Dr. Rana, which were 
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allegedly attributable to Harnett Health through a theory of respondeat superior. In 

contrast, Dr. Leyrer’s subsequent deposition made clear that he never expressed a 

willingness to testify against Harnett Health for the actions of its nurses. Plaintiff’s 

counsel, as the pleader’s representative, bore the responsibility of ensuring Dr. Leyrer 

was willing to testify to every claim against every defendant. Plaintiff’s counsel failed

to do so. Therefore, plaintiff cannot meet the standard in Preston because plaintiff 

should have known that Dr. Leyrer was not willing to testify against Harnett Health.

¶ 47 Thus, though this case should be remanded to the trial court for a proper 

application of Rule 9(j), even under a reasonable expectation standard, plaintiff’s 

attorney should have known that Dr. Leyrer was not willing to testify.

B. Rule 702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence

¶ 48 Furthermore, regardless of the Rule 9(j) issue, the Court of Appeals applied 

the wrong standard of review to the trial court’s exclusion of Dr. Harris1 pursuant to 

Rule 702(a).2 Rule 702(a) provides that:

 

1 While the trial court excluded the testimony of both Dr. Leyrer and Dr. Harris, the 

trial court’s exclusion of Dr. Leyrer is not before this Court.

2 This Court only allowed review of two of the issues listed in Harnett Health’s 

Petition for Discretionary Review:

Issue I – Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the 

trial court’s order denying Harnett Health’s Motion to Dismiss 

pursuant to Rule 9(j) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil 

Procedure when [plaintiff‘s] Rule 9(j) expert testified that he 

had never been critical of Harnett Health; and,
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(a) If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge 

will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 

determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 

by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 

testify thereto in the form of an opinion, or otherwise, if all 

of the following apply:

(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or 

data.

(2) The testimony is the product of reliable 

principles and methods.

(3) The witness has applied the principles and 

methods reliably to the facts of the case.

N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a) (2021).

¶ 49 In ruling on plaintiff’s motion to exclude Dr. Harris, the trial court found and 

concluded that:

Dr. Harris did not review the plaintiff’s handwritten notes, 

certain EMT records, or certain prior medical records 

before forming his opinions in this case. Additionally, he 

had not reviewed the documents prior to his depositions. 

Further, he has not rendered any causation opinions 

considering the events and actions as set forth [in] those 

documents. Therefore, he is unqualified under Rule 702(a) 

to render an opinion in this case. Furthermore, I find that 

because Dr. Harris has not sufficiently demonstrated 

 

Issue II – Did the Court of Appeals err in applying a de 

novo standard of review instead of an abuse of discretion 

standard in its exclusion of Dr. Harris.

However, this Court did not allow review of the additional issues in the petition, including 

whether “the Court of Appeals err[ed] in reversing the trial court’s exclusion of Dr. Harris 

under Rules 702(a) and 702(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.” Thus, to the extent 

the majority affirms the outcome of the Court of Appeals’ Rule 702 analysis, it addresses an 

issue not properly before this Court.
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through his depositions or affidavits that he is familiar 

with the local standards at the time of this incident as 

required by N.C.[G.S.] § 90-21.12, he is not qualified to 

render standard of care opinions in this case.

¶ 50 Yet in this case, the Court of Appeals’ analysis did not address why the trial 

court’s conclusion on Rule 702(a) was manifestly unsupported by reason. Nor did it 

conclude that no evidence supported the trial court’s finding. Instead, the Court of 

Appeals appears to have conducted a de novo review and reached its own conclusion.

As the trial court excluded Dr. Harris because he had not 

reviewed [p]laintiff’s notes, Decedent’s EMT records, and 

Decedent’s “certain prior medical records,” it would appear 

the trial court concluded Dr. Harris could not satisfy Rule 

702(a)(1)’s requirement [that] his testimony be based on 

sufficient facts or data. [A]s a general rule, questions 

relating to the bases and sources of an expert’s opinion 

affect only the weight to be assigned that opinion rather 

than its admissibility.

. . . . Dr. Harris examined the medical records from 

Harnett Health for the two hospital visits in question as 

well as at least some of Decedent’s prior medical records. 

In fact, Dr. Harris was familiar with Decedent’s medical 

history and certain medical conditions relevant to his care 

on the days in question. Therefore, the trial court 

misapplied Rule 702(a) by concluding Dr. Harris’s opinions 

were not based on sufficient data when his opinions were 

supported by evidence in the Record. Consequently, the 

trial court erred in concluding Dr. Harris’s opinions were 

inadmissible and, instead, questions as to the weight to be 

given to his opinions should be resolved by a jury.

Miller, ¶¶ 79–80 (cleaned up).

¶ 51 By freely substituting its own interpretation of the evidence, rather than 
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determining if the trial court’s interpretation of the evidence and the conclusions 

drawn from it were manifestly unsupported by reason or that there was no evidence 

to support the trial court’s finding, the Court of Appeals failed to apply a true abuse 

of discretion analysis. See State v. Moore, 245 N.C. 158, 164 (1956) (“[T]his Court has 

uniformly held that the competency of a witness to testify as an expert is a question 

primarily addressed to the [trial] court, and his discretion is ordinarily conclusive, 

that is, unless there be no evidence to support the finding, or unless the judge 

abuse[d] his discretion.”).

II. Conclusion

¶ 52 The legislature has established specific requirements around the filing of a 

medical malpractice suit to preclude frivolous actions. See Vaughan v. Mashburn, 371 

N.C. 428, 434–35 (2018). It is the duty of this Court to uphold those requirements, in 

accordance with the text the legislature chose to enact. See State v. Bell, 184 N.C. 

701, 705 (1922) (“Scrupulously observing the constitutional separation of the 

legislative and the supreme judicial powers of the government, we adhere to the 

fundamental principle that it is the duty of the Court, not to make the law, but to 

expound it, and to that end to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the 

Legislature . . . .”).

¶ 53 The second requirement of Rule 9(j) is clear: at the time of filing, a plaintiff 

must have secured an expert willing to testify that each defendant health care 
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provider breached the statutory standard of care. That requirement does not depend 

on a plaintiff’s reasonable expectation. The trial court and Court of Appeals failed to 

properly apply that requirement. Thus, this case should be remanded to the trial 

court for a proper application of Rule 9(j).

¶ 54 The Court of Appeals also applied the wrong standard of review to the trial 

court’s decision to exclude Dr. Harris pursuant to Rule 702(a), violating this Court’s 

“uniform[ ]” holdings that abuse of discretion applies. See Crocker v. Roethling, 363 

N.C. 140, 143 (2009). As a result, I respectfully dissent.

Chief Justice NEWBY and Justice BERGER join in this dissenting opinion.