Present: All the Justices 

EARL CONRAD BRAMBLETT 

 OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 

v. Record Nos. 981394 February 26, 1999 

 981395 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROANOKE COUNTY 

Roy B. Willett, Judge 

 Near 4:30 a.m. on Monday, August 29, 1994, Dorothy Ross 

McGee was operating a vehicle through the Town of Vinton in 

Roanoke County en route to her place of employment. As she 

drove past a two-story residence located at 232 East Virginia 

Avenue, a white pickup truck operated by a white male, who was 

alone, pulled onto the street from the area of the residence, 

followed her briefly, and then "shot" past her, exceeding the 

35-mile-per-hour speed limit. 

 About the same time, Robert Scott Arney, travelling on 

Virginia Avenue past the home, "noticed a large cloud of smoke 

coming across the highway, very thick." He determined the 

residence was on fire and, using a radio, reported the fire to 

authorities. 

 Firefighters and police responded to the scene. Upon 

entering the burning residence, the authorities found four 

bodies. In the downstairs living room, the body of Teresa Lynn 

Fulcher Hodges, an adult, was on a couch. She had died from 
ligature strangulation and had been doused with gasoline; the 

body was still burning when discovered. 

 The body of William Blaine Hodges, an adult, was on the bed 

in an upstairs bedroom. He had died from a gunshot to the left 

temple. His body was not burned. 

 The bodies of two children were on a bed in another 

upstairs bedroom. Winter Ashley Hodges, 11 years of age, had 

died from two gunshots to the head; the muzzle of the weapon had 

been pressed against the skin when fired. Winter's body had not 

been burned. 

 The body of Anah Michelle Hodges, three years of age, was 

in the same bed with her sister. She had died from two gunshot 

wounds to the head; the muzzle of the weapon was within inches 

of the skin when fired. Anah's body was "covered with soot" and 

had sustained "mild burns." 

 The mother and her daughters died during the early morning 

hours of August 29 and before the fire. Blaine, the children's 

father, died "many hours before the female victims died," 

probably during the afternoon of Sunday, August 28. 

 On July 30, 1996, appellant Earl Conrad Bramblett, 54 years 

of age, was indicted for the following offenses: Capital murder 

of Winter as part of the same transaction as the murder of Anah, 

Code § 18.2-31; the murders of Anah, Blaine, and Teresa, Code 

§ 18.2-32; arson, Code § 18.2-77; and three counts of using a 

2
firearm in the commission of the murders, Code § 18.2-53.1. 

Apprehended on July 30 in Spartanburg, South Carolina, the 

defendant waived extradition. He was brought to Virginia and 

held in the Roanoke County jail. 

 Upon pleas of not guilty, the defendant was tried by jury 

during 14 days in October and November 1997. In the guilt and 

penalty phases of the trifurcated trial, 98 witnesses testified. 

 The jury found defendant guilty of all charges, and during 

the penalty phase of the capital proceeding, fixed defendant's 

punishment at death based upon the vileness and future 

dangerousness predicates of the capital murder sentencing 

statute, Code § 19.2-264.4. 

 On December 16, 1997, following a post-trial sentencing 

hearing during which the trial court considered a probation 

officer's report, the court sentenced defendant to death for the 

capital murder. The court also imposed sentences in the 

noncapital cases in accordance with the jury's verdicts as 

follows: For each of the three first degree murder convictions, 

life imprisonment and a $100,000 fine; for the arson conviction, 

life imprisonment and a $100,000 fine (the court suspended the 

fine); and for the three firearms convictions, imprisonment for 

13 years. 

 The death sentence is before us for automatic review under 

former Code § 17-110.1(A) (now § 17.1-313(A)), see Rule 5:22, 

3
and we have consolidated this review with defendant's appeal of 

the capital murder conviction. In addition, by order entered 

July 13, 1998, we certified from the Court of Appeals of 

Virginia to this Court the record of defendant's appeals in the 

noncapital convictions (Record No. 981395). The effect of the 

certification is to transfer jurisdiction over the noncapital 

appeals to this Court for all purposes. Former Code § 17-

116.06(A) (now § 17.1-409(A)). We have consolidated those 

appeals with the capital murder appeal. 

 As required by statute, we shall consider not only the 

trial errors enumerated by defendant but also whether the 

sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, 

prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and whether the 

sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed 

in similar cases. Former Code § 17-110.1(C) (now § 17.1-

313(C)). 

 Initially, we shall dispose of two appellate issues that 

require no extended discussion. First, defendant contends the 

trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the capital 

murder indictment on the grounds that Virginia's death penalty 

statute is unconstitutional facially and as applied. He argues 

the statute dealing with the capital sentencing proceeding is 

unconstitutional because the aggravating factors "are vague and 

do not adequately channel the discretion of the jury." There is 

4
no merit in this contention; we previously have rejected it in 

other cases and will not revisit the issue here. See e.g., 

Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 474-79, 248 S.E.2d 135, 146-

49 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). 

 Second, defendant contends the trial court erred "by 

failing to dismiss the indictments due to prosecutorial 

misconduct." According to Bramblett, the prosecutor withheld 

evidence in violation of court orders and asked questions during 

the trial "which he knew were objectionable." This assignment 

of error is procedurally defaulted because defendant did not ask 

the trial court to dismiss the indictments on the foregoing 

grounds. We do not entertain such issues that are raised for 

the first time on appeal. Rule 5:25. 

 A proper understanding of the remaining issues raised by 

defendant requires a brief summary of the facts. The evidence 

bearing upon the commission of these crimes is undisputed. 

During the guilt phase of the trial, Bramblett, who did not 

testify, presented only four witnesses. According to settled 

principles of appellate review, we will draw all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible from the proven facts in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth. 

 The witness Arney, upon discovery of the fire, found 

handwritten notes on the rear and side doors of the home. The 

5
note on the side door read "Had an emergency. Back late Sunday, 

early Monday. Teresa." 

 Upon arrival, the firefighters found fire throughout the 

structure. Subsequent examination of the premises revealed the 

presence of petroleum accelerants and gasoline in various areas 

of the home. Investigators also found that the telephone line 

had been cut. 

 Blaine and Teresa Hodges had attended an Amway conference 

in Charlottesville on the previous Friday night, leaving their 

children with a relative. Blaine picked up the children on 

Saturday. A friend spoke with Blaine by telephone about 5:00 

p.m. on Saturday. Later on Saturday, a friend telephoned the 

Hodges' residence but no one answered and an answering machine 

did not activate. About 4:30 p.m. on Sunday, Teresa left a 

telephone message with a friend to arrange for the children's 

carpool on Monday, the first day of the school session. The 

friend returned the call and talked with Teresa at a number 

Teresa furnished, which was for a public pay telephone located 

at a gas station on Virginia Avenue. 

 On Sunday, a neighbor saw Bramblett with Teresa and the 

children. Bramblett, Teresa, and the children were seen 

together in a nearby national forest on Sunday afternoon; the 

forest ranger who saw them noted a black tailgate on Bramblett's 

white truck. 

6
 Another friend went to the Hodges' home at 7:15 p.m. on 

Sunday; he found the note on the door. Two other friends went 

to the Hodges' home at 8:45 p.m. on Sunday; they also found the 

note on the door. They observed the Hodges' two motor vehicles 

parked nearby, and the home was dark except for a light burning 

in the basement. They telephoned the house but received no 

answer and the answering machine did not take the call. 

 When the witness McGee observed the pickup truck with a 

"dark" tailgate leave the Hodges' home about 4:30 a.m. on 

Monday, she thought the truck's color was "sort of pinkish red." 

The jury was shown a video reenactment of a truck leaving the 

area where McGee had seen the truck; the reenactment included 

the burning halogen street lights present when McGee saw the 

truck. Referring to the video, McGee identified the truck as 

pinkish-red; that truck actually was white in color.*

 At the time of these crimes, Bramblett, an acquaintance of 

the Hodges family for years, drove a 1972 model white pickup 

truck with a black tailgate. On the morning of the fire, 

Bramblett, an expert in silk screening, arrived at his workplace 

at 5:08 a.m. The workplace is 4.7 miles from the Hodges' home, 

a 12-minute drive in the early morning. Although defendant told 

 

*

 The defendant assigns error to the trial court's action in 

admitting the video into evidence. The defendant did not object 

at trial to the playing of the video, and that failure to 

present the claim below bars review upon appeal. Rule 5:25. 

7
his supervisor he had slept in his truck, his hair was neatly 

combed, he was freshly shaven, and his clothes were clean. 

 Bramblett drove past the Hodges' house at 8:30 a.m. on the 

morning of the fire; he did not stop. Later, he told his exwife about the fire and his belief that the police would "blame 

it on me." 

 A year prior to the fire, Bramblett had mailed two packages 

to his sister, who lives in Indiana. When these packages were 

opened, with the sister's permission, they were found to contain 

photographs of the Hodges children and 62 audiotapes of 

Bramblett's voice. On the tapes, Bramblett expressed a sexual 

interest in Winter Hodges and his belief that the child's 

parents were trying to "set him up" or entrap him in a sexual 

act with her. 

 A firearms expert testified about weapons, bullets, and 

casings found at the crime scene, and cartridges found in 

Bramblett's truck and a storage room he had rented. The expert 

opined that all the bullets recovered from the bodies had been 

fired from the same weapon, and that the rifling characteristics 

were consistent with weapons manufactured by QFI Arminius; an 

Arminius handgun, its barrel removed, was found in Blaine 

Hodges' bedroom. The fact that the barrel had been removed made 

it impossible for the expert to determine whether the pistol had 

fired any of the recovered bullets. The expert further opined 

8
that one cartridge retrieved from the pistol at the scene and 

one found in Bramblett's truck were fired by the same firearm 

"to the exclusion of any other gun." 

 Another forensic scientist analyzed the chemical 

composition of the bullets recovered. He testified that two of 

the bullets retrieved from the victims had the identical 

composition as a bullet found in the storage room. A cartridge 

found on steps in the home was "analytically indistinguishable" 

from a cartridge found in defendant's truck. 

 A single pubic hair, described as a "characteristically 

Caucasian pubic hair," found on the bed between the two 

children, was determined to microscopically match a sample of 

Bramblett's pubic hair. Bramblett is white, as were the 

victims. DNA testing of the hair matched Bramblett. 

 Tracy Turner, a convicted felon who had been incarcerated 

with defendant at the Roanoke County jail testified about 

conversations he had with Bramblett about their addictions. 

Turner was addicted to drugs, and Bramblett said he was 

"addicted to young girls." 

 They discussed the charges the two men faced. Bramblett 

"said that he had been caught with that girl, the young girl, 

and that he was caught downstairs with her and that the mother 

sent them upstairs — sent her upstairs and that he had choked 

the life out of her." According to Turner, Bramblett said he 

9
"walked around for a little bit and then he went upstairs. He 

said he went first to the man's room and then he went to the 

girls' room and he finished the business, took care of his 

business." 

 Bramblett also told Turner about a "forensic science book" 

from which he learned that "if you burn a house that it takes 

the rifling off of bullets, destroys hair samples and things 

like that." According to Turner, Bramblett said "that's the 

reason" he set fire to the Hodges' home. Bramblett told Turner 

his defense would be to suggest that the murders were "a drug 

hit." The defendant offered evidence that in the late 1980s, 

Blaine and Teresa Hodges consumed cocaine supplied by one 

Michael Fulcher, Teresa's half-brother. During that period 

Fulcher, who is presently incarcerated, was an undercover 

"cooperative witness" for the federal Drug Enforcement 

Administration. Blaine Hodges, a discharged postal service 

employee, was about to begin serving a six-month jail sentence 

in September 1994 for embezzlement of postal funds. 

 Initially, the police believed they were confronted with a 

murder/suicide, mainly because of the location of the weapon 

beside Blaine's body. This theory was abandoned quickly, 

however, when the results of the autopsies showed Blaine died 

hours before the rest of his family. The investigators also 

10
quickly concluded that the fire was not accidental but was "a 

set fire." 

 The investigators wanted to talk to Bramblett because of 

his friendship with the Hodges family. About 5:00 p.m. on the 

day of the crimes, Bramblett came to the Vinton Police 

Department in response to a telephone request from Sergeant Mark 

A. Vaught, an investigator. Vaught told defendant the Hodges 

family had been killed in a fire. He did not mention how the 

victims died. At that point, defendant "seemed to appear to cry 

for a period of time." Vaught saw no tears. Bramblett then 

became angry and struck a file cabinet with his fist. A few 

minutes later, after Vaught had been joined by Barry Keesee, 

Special Agent, Virginia State Police, Bramblett, during a 

discussion "just about some general things" said, "Are you going 

to charge me with murder?" 

 Near 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday, August 31, William F. Brown, 

Jr., Assistant Chief of Police for the Town of Vinton, 

accompanied by Blaine Hodges' brother, talked with defendant at 

the nearby Apple Valley Motel, where Bramblett had rented a 

room. At first, Bramblett was calm and then he "became . . . 

very emotional. He started crying, shaking real bad. He 

blurted out, 'Go ahead and arrest me for murder.'" He said that 

he thought about suicide and that he actually had written a 

suicide note, according to Brown. After defendant "calmed 

11
down,” he promised to meet Brown at twelve noon at the Vinton 

Police Department, but he failed to appear. 

 We shall now turn to the remaining issues defendant raises 

on appeal. He contends the trial court erred by denying his 

pretrial motion for a change of venue, claiming extensive media 

coverage of the crimes and the charges against him. At 

Bramblett's request, the trial court took the motion under 

advisement pending selection of a jury. After the jury was 

selected, the court denied the motion. The court did not err. 

 There is a presumption a defendant will receive a fair 

trial in the jurisdiction where the crimes are committed. To 

overcome the presumption, a defendant must establish that the 

citizens of the jurisdiction harbor such prejudice against him 

that it is reasonably certain he cannot receive a fair trial. 

Kasi v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407, 420, 508 S.E.2d 57, 64 

(1998). The decision whether to grant a motion for a change of 

venue lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Id.

 Here, 68 potential jurors were questioned. Only seven 

persons were excused because of fixed opinions about Bramblett 

that would have impaired their ability to serve impartially. 

The remaining persons were either unaware of media reports about 

the crimes or clearly stated their ability to put aside any 

information they may have heard or read. 

12
 The defendant did not overcome the presumption that he 

could receive a fair trial in Roanoke County. There was no 

abuse of discretion by the trial court, especially given the 

ease with which the jury was selected. See id. at 420-21, 508 

S.E.2d at 64-65. 

 Next, defendant contends the trial court erred by finding 

that Bramblett was competent to stand trial. We do not agree. 

 In November 1996, Dr. Evan S. Nelson, a clinical 

psychologist, was appointed by the trial court to serve as 

defendant's mental health expert for sentencing. After Dr. 

Nelson interviewed Bramblett in jail, he became concerned about 

Bramblett's competency and suggested "that someone else perform 

an evaluation." 

 In January 1997, defendant filed a pretrial motion, 

pursuant to Code § 19.2-169.1, seeking a competency evaluation. 

The statute provides for such an evaluation if "there is 

probable cause to believe that the defendant lacks substantial 

capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist 

his attorney in his own defense." 

 The court then appointed Dr. Joseph I. Leizer, a clinical 

psychologist, to conduct a competency examination and 

subsequently ordered defendant examined by Dr. Leigh D. Hagan, 

another clinical psychologist. 

13
 In May 1997, the trial court heard the testimony of the 

three psychologists and found that Bramblett was competent 

stating, "I have no question about his competency." 

Elaborating, the court said that "as a factual matter," the 

defendant "has substantial capacity to understand these 

proceedings against him, and he has substantial capacity to 

assist his Attorneys in his own defense." These findings are 

fully supported by the record. 

 Dr. Leizer diagnosed Bramblett with a "delusional disorder, 

persecutory type." He testified defendant had "paranoid 

delusions about how evidence is being manufactured against him." 

 The witness had interviewed Bramblett, listened to many of 

Bramblett's audiotapes, and read some of the many letters 

defendant had written. Defendant told the witness that the 

police had been "following him for years on end and looking for 

reasons to arrest him." Bramblett also believed, according to 

the witness, that the Hodges family "were involved in an 

undercover Police sting aimed at him" and that Winter was 

working undercover for the police, being "used by her parents 

for that purpose." 

 Dr. Leizer disagreed with Dr. Nelson's conclusion that 

Bramblett was incompetent. Dr. Leizer said that Bramblett was 

intelligent, witty, charming, verbal, and articulate; that he 

was able to relate information to his attorneys; that he 

14
understood the charges facing him and the adversarial nature of 

the proceedings; and that he felt his attorneys were working 

hard for him, acting in his best interest. 

 Dr. Hagan agreed that Bramblett had a delusional disorder 

of the persecutory type. However, he considered Bramblett 

"meets the criteria for competence." He opined that defendant 

"is keenly motivated to work vigorously" with his attorneys on 

his defense, even though there are disagreements about "the 

principal focus of the defense." Dr. Hagan agreed that even 

though Bramblett "may have this paranoid delusion problem," it 

"does not render him incompetent or unable to cooperate with his 

Attorneys." 

 Next, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying 

his motion to suppress the audiotapes seized in Indiana and by 

admitting the tapes and their contents into evidence. When 

Bramblett's sister received the two packages in August or 

September 1993, she placed them, unopened, in a cabinet. 

Bramblett called his sister in 1993 and asked her to keep the 

boxes for him. He said, "In case anything happens to me, you'll 

have these." 

 On September 2, 1994, defendant arrived at the sister's 

home about 7:30 p.m. and left about 2:30 the next morning. He 

told the sister the police had questioned him about the crimes 

"and he felt that they were going to arrest him." 

15
 Bramblett related "he was with the mother and the two 

children and that they had gone for a long drive" the Sunday 

afternoon before the fire. When they returned to the Hodges' 

home from the drive, Teresa thought Blaine was not at home and 

"she wondered where he was at," according to Bramblett. 

Bramblett told his sister that he stayed at the Hodges' home 

until twelve midnight on Sunday. 

 The sister overheard Bramblett talking with another sister 

on the telephone; he stated that a Roanoke lawyer "had advised 

him since he hadn't been charged with anything to leave town and 

stay away from the police." Bramblett left the Indiana home 

abruptly when the sister thought she "saw a policeman outside." 

 After Bramblett left, the sister was reminded by her 

daughter about the boxes, which defendant had not mentioned. 

She "was afraid to keep the boxes" and "wanted to put these 

boxes in the hands of someone I could trust," according to the 

sister's testimony. The local sheriff was called. The sister 

and her husband executed a form consenting to the search of the 

boxes. She opened the boxes; the sheriff inventoried and 

photographed the contents. 

 In a pretrial motion, defendant moved to suppress the items 

obtained from the boxes. He asserted the sister lacked 

authority to deliver the packages to the police and that the 

police were required to obtain a warrant before opening the 

16
boxes and examining the contents. Defendant notes that the 

"tapes contain inculpatory evidence, i.e., Bramblett's 

inappropriate sexual thoughts and comments concerning Winter 

Hodges, and reflect Bramblett's belief that Blaine Hodges was 

involved in some sort of a conspiracy to frame Bramblett for 

something." 

 The trial court denied the motion, ruling there was "no 

evidence . . . to find a basis for unlawful search or seizure." 

The trial court was correct. 

 The sister had boxes addressed to her in her exclusive 

possession. Bramblett imposed no restrictions with respect to 

the contents. Thus, he had no remaining expectation of privacy 

in the items. 

 The Fourth Amendment does not restrict the authority of the 

police to accept evidence volunteered by private citizens. See

Ritter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 732, 739, 173 S.E.2d 799, 804 

(1970) (package addressed to son voluntarily surrendered by 

mother in lawful control of it). The sister's consent to the 

search of the boxes was clearly sufficient to authorize the 

sheriff's actions. 

 Next, the defendant contends the trial court erred by 

failing to grant his motion to suppress evidence obtained from 

the Apple Valley Motel and by admitting the evidence at trial. 

We do not agree. 

17
 When Bramblett failed to keep his twelve noon appointment 

at the Vinton Police Department on Wednesday, August 31, the 

police "had some concerns about his safety," given his earlier 

statements about suicide. Two officers returned to the motel, 

saw defendant's truck parked outside, knocked on the door to his 

room, and received no response. Then, they directed the owner 

to open the door to defendant's room. When the door was opened, 

one officer "stepped into the doorway" of the small room while 

the other officer stood "beside the door." Neither officer 

actually entered the room. At that time, Bramblett arrived in a 

taxicab and the officers "talked to him briefly." 

 Later that same day, two brothers of Blaine Hodges decided 

to go to the motel to talk with Bramblett, believing the police 

might "clear Earl." One of the men wore "a wire" at the 

suggestion of the police. While in the room, one brother "saw a 

.22 caliber bullet in the crease of [a] chair." The defendant's 

room was searched the next day pursuant to warrant. 

 The trial court found that the officers saw nothing as they 

were standing at the doorway to the room and that the 

warrantless opening of the motel room door was not grounds for 

suppression of the evidence seized pursuant to the later search 

warrant. The trial court ruled correctly. 

 Even assuming one of the officers briefly entered the room, 

as the defendant argues, no search was conducted and no evidence 

18
was seized. The subsequent search was conducted pursuant to 

warrant, which Bramblett never challenged. 

 Thus, the items seized under the warrant (certain writings, 

a detective magazine, a .22 caliber revolver, cartridges, and 

cartridge cases) were properly admitted in evidence. Also, 

there is no merit to defendant's claim that the brother who wore 

the "wire" became "an agent of the Commonwealth." 

 Next, defendant contends the trial court erred by 

permitting Tracy Turner to testify at trial. We reject this 

contention. 

 The prosecutor learned in January 1997 about Bramblett's 

statements to the felon Turner and planned to use him as a 

rebuttal witness at trial. In October 1997, the prosecutor was 

advised that Bramblett "had figured out" Turner was going to 

testify. Because of this development, the prosecutors believed 

Turner's "value as a rebuttal witness" was "diminished." On 

"Thursday or Friday" before Turner testified on Wednesday, 

October 29, the prosecutor decided to call Turner as part of the 

Commonwealth's case-in-chief. The prosecutor immediately 

disclosed Turner's name and his criminal record to the 

defendant. 

 Prior to Turner's testimony, defendant moved the court to 

bar Turner from testifying in the Commonwealth's case-in-chief 

because of late disclosure of Turner's criminal record. The 

19
trial court overruled the motion, stating the cross-examination 

would be delayed if the defendant chose, thus giving defendant's 

court-appointed investigator an opportunity to investigate 

Turner. 

 Immediately following Turner's testimony, defendant moved 

for a mistrial or for an instruction to the jury to disregard 

the testimony. Defendant asserted the prosecutor's failure to 

disclose Turner's criminal history violated the court's prior 

discovery orders and due process. The prosecutor had 

interpreted the discovery order to require disclosure of 

criminal histories of only case-in-chief witnesses, an 

interpretation endorsed by the trial court. 

 The trial court denied defendant's motion, accepting the 

prosecutor's representation concerning Turner. The court found 

that the prosecution "acted in a rather timely manner" in 

providing the criminal history to defense counsel. The court 

repeated its offer to grant defendant a delayed crossexamination "if you learn more" about Turner. 

 Of course, defendant was entitled to disclosure of 

exculpatory evidence, including evidence that impeaches the 

credibility of a prosecution witness, under Brady v. Maryland, 

373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Robinson v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 

150, 341 S.E.2d 159, 164 (1986). Evidence of the prior 

convictions of a witness is impeachment evidence under Brady. 

20
See Correll v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 454, 465, 352 S.E.2d 352, 

358, cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987). 

 A defendant is entitled to "sufficient time to investigate 

and evaluate the evidence in preparation for trial." Lomax v. 

Commonwealth, 228 Va. 168, 172, 319 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1984). 

Here, the defendant had five or six days to investigate Turner's 

background. The defendant did not take advantage of the court's 

offer to postpone cross-examination, and he has not demonstrated 

any specific prejudice from the timing of the disclosure. If 

exculpatory evidence is obtained in time for it to be used 

effectively by the defendant, and there is no showing that an 

accused has been prejudiced, there is no due process violation. 

Read v. Virginia State Bar, 233 Va. 560, 564-65, 357 S.E.2d 544, 

546-47 (1987). Hence, we hold the trial court did not err in 

its various rulings connected with Turner's testimony. 

 Next, Bramblett argues the pubic hair should not have been 

admitted into evidence because, first, "the evidence was not 

relevant," and, second, "the prejudicial effect of the evidence 

far outweighed any probative value." 

 There is no merit to this argument. The evidence was 

relevant to establish Bramblett's presence in the room where the 

children's bodies were found. This legitimate probative value 

far outweighed any incidental prejudice to defendant, and the 

21
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

evidence. 

 Next, defendant argues "the evidence was insufficient to 

support a conviction." We disagree. 

 The evidence supporting the convictions was overwhelming. 

It was gathered as the result of outstanding police work by 

town, county, state, and federal authorities. 

 A further recitation of the evidence we already have 

summarized is unnecessary. Indeed, we have not recited many 

facts pointing to defendant's guilt. It is sufficient to point 

out that Bramblett admitted to a jail inmate that he killed the 

victims and set the house on fire to destroy evidence. His many 

statements to police and others clearly show his guilty 

knowledge of the circumstances of the murders. He was with the 

Hodges family just prior to the murders. A truck closely 

resembling Bramblett's truck was observed leaving the scene as 

the fire was discovered. Bullets, shell casings, and cartridges 

found in Bramblett's possession matched similar items found in 

the home. Defendant's audiotapes and writings demonstrate the 

motive for the killings. His clothing, found at his workplace, 

was stained with the same accelerants used in the arson. A 

pubic hair matching Bramblett was found in the same bed as the 

children's bodies. Clearly, the jury was fully justified, based 

22
on the evidence, in concluding defendant was the killer of the 

Hodges family and that he set their house on fire. 

 Finally, we have considered Bramblett's remaining 

assignments of error, and summarily reject them. He contends 

the trial court should have directed a verdict of life 

imprisonment during the penalty phase of the capital murder 

proceeding because the jury was misinformed about his prior 

record in several respects. Also, he contends the evidence was 

insufficient to support a finding of vileness and/or future 

dangerousness, and that imposition of the death sentence was 

arbitrary. 

 None of these contentions has any merit. We will respond, 

however, to defendant's claim that during the penalty phase "all 

of the factors used by the Commonwealth to enhance punishment 

concern events that occurred two decades before the current 

offenses and thus cannot be properly used as evidence of future 

dangerousness." 

 Defendant is referring to the testimony of women who lived 

in the Bedford-Roanoke area during the late 1970s. They 

testified they knew Bramblett during that period, when they were 

in their early teens. Each testified that Bramblett furnished 

them alcohol and drugs, after which he engaged in sexual 

intercourse with them, and that he required them to perform 

various sex acts upon him. The "time gap" of decades affected 

23
only the weight to be accorded the evidence, not its 

admissibility. George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 273, 411 

S.E.2d 12, 18 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 973 (1992). 

 Moreover, the factual basis for defendant's contention is 

inaccurate. There was abundant other evidence presented on the 

question of future dangerousness including his recent conduct 

with 11-year-old Winter Hodges as well as his extensive and 

long-term planning and execution of the murders, all of which 

established his dangerousness. 

 Upon the question of disproportionality and excessiveness, 

we determine whether other sentencing bodies in this 

jurisdiction generally impose the supreme penalty for comparable 

or similar crimes, considering both the crime and the defendant. 

Kasi, 256 Va. at 426, 508 S.E.2d at 68. See former Code § 17-

110.l(C)(2) (now § 17.1-313(C)(2)). In determining whether a 

sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate in a case 

like this, we examine the records of all capital murder cases 

previously reviewed by this Court in which the death sentence 

was based upon both the vileness and future dangerousness 

predicates, including capital murder cases where a life sentence 

was imposed. Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 462, 423 

S.E.2d 360, 371 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1036 (1993). 

 Based upon this review, we hold that defendant's sentence 

is not excessive or disproportionate to penalties generally 

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imposed by sentencing bodies in the Commonwealth for similar 

conduct. Generally, the death sentence is imposed for a capital 

murder when, as here, the defendant is convicted of a senseless 

murder of a young child, Clozza v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 124, 

138, 321 S.E.2d 273, 282 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230 

(1985), and when the defendant is also convicted of killing 

other persons. See Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 469, 470 

S.E.2d 114, 132, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996). 

 Therefore, we hold the trial court committed no reversible 

error, and we have independently determined from a review of the 

entire record that the sentence of death was properly assessed. 

Thus, we will affirm the trial court's judgment in both the 

capital murder case and the noncapital cases. 

Record No. 981394 — Affirmed. 

Record No. 981395 — Affirmed. 

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