alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 720.23 Naval prisoners as witnesses or parties in civilian courts. ( a ) *Criminal actions.* When Federal or State authorities desire the attendance of a naval prisoner as a witness in a criminal case, they should submit a written request for such person's attendance to the Judge Advocate General. The civilian authority should include the following averments in its request: ( 1 ) That the evidence to be derived from the prisoner's testimony is unavailable from any other source:
( 2 ) That the civilian authority will provide adequate security arrangements for the prisoner and assume responsibility for the prisoner while he is in its custody; and
( 3 ) that the civilian authority will assume all costs of transporting the prisoner from the brig, of maintaining that prisoner while in civilian custody, and of returning the prisoner to the brig from which he was removed. The civilian authority should also include in its request an estimate of the length of time the prisoner's services will be required, and should specify the mode of transport by which it intends to return the prisoner. Upon receipt of such a request, authority by the Judge Advocate General will be given, in a proper case, for the production of the requested naval prisoner in court without resort to a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum (a writ which requires the production of a prisoner to testify before a court of competent jurisdiction).
( b ) *Civil actions.* The Department of the Navy will not authorize the attendance of a naval prisoner in a Federal or State court, either as a party or as a witness, in private litigation pending before such a court. The deposition of a naval prisoner may be taken in such a case, subject to reasonable conditions or limitations imposed by the command concerned.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                          5
<MULTIPLIER>                       1,000
       
<S>                                <C>
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                  MAY-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                     JUN-1-1998
<PERIOD-END>                       AUG-31-1998
<PERIOD-TYPE>                      3-MOS
<CASH>                                           1,042
<SECURITIES>                                        0 
<RECEIVABLES>                                   67,529
<ALLOWANCES>                                     5,526
<INVENTORY>                                         0 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    0 
<PP&E>                                         502,118
<DEPRECIATION>                                 199,303
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 435,622
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                               0 
<BONDS>                                             0 
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0 
<PREFERRED>                                         0 
<COMMON>                                        10,449
<OTHER-SE>                                          0 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   435,622
<SALES>                                         10,435
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                72,601
<CGS>                                           12,091
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   62,390
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    0 
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0 
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,853
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  6,358
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,607
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              3,751
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0 
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0 
<CHANGES>                                           0 
<NET-INCOME>                                     3,751
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.15
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.15
        

</TABLE>
#### STATE v. MILLER

No. 413P97

Case below: 126 N.C.App. 832

Petition by defendant for discretionary review pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 denied 2 October 1997.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, January 15, 2020.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, January 15, 2020

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A20I0150. TRIDUUM ASSOCIATES, LLC v. CITY OF HOLLY SPRINGS, GEORGIA.

Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of 

this order. The Clerk of Superior Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record 

transmitted to the Court of Appeals.

LC NUMBERS:

19CVE0900
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Felix Castro, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County, rendered on July 30, 1975, unanimously affirmed. Application by appellant's counsel to withdraw is granted. (See Anders v California, 386 US 738; People v Saunders, 52 AD2d 833.) We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant's assigned counsel that there are no meritorious points which could be raised on this appeal. Concur-Kupferman, J. P., Lupiano, Lane, Sandier and Sullivan, JJ.
OAR Box 1828 

Prepped by Ollie Stewart 

Document Number: 

162) ll-K- (B) -161 

Docket Number: 

A-83-27 

p.i 

Printed 11/12/2008 11:12:53 AM Sheet 162 of 325 
P.2 

ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS, INC. 

1655 NORTH PORT MYER DRIVE ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209 703/528-1900 A-83-27 

March 7, 1985 II-K-(B)-161 

Mr. Robert Short 

Economic Analysis Branch 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

Mail Drop-12 

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711 

Subject: EPA Contract No. 68-02-4202, Work Assignment #3 

Calculation of Levelized Industrial Fuel Prices 

Dear Robert: 

The attached table presents an example of the procedure used to 

calculate a levelized fuel price. A levelized fuel price is the 

product of a capital recovery factor and the sum (present value) of 

discounted fuel prices. 

TH/ce 

Enclosure 

cc: Dr. A. Wehe (EPA) 

F. Porter (EPA) 

B. Read (Radian) 

Sincerely, 

/ JU**. KPT^4^-m 

Tim Hogan 

MANAGEMENT / ECONOMICS / ENGINEERING 
P.3 

t.-^ 

EXAMPLE DERIVATION OF A LEVELIZED FUEL PRICE* 

(1982 $/MMBtu) 

t 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

Year 

1987 

1988 

1989 

1990 

1991 

1992 

1993 

1994 

1995 

1996 

1997 

1998 

1999 

2000 

2001 

Price 

4.86 

4.97 

5.09 

5.20 

5.32 

5.45 

5.58 

5.71 

5.84 

5.99 

6.14 

6.30 

6.46 

6.63 

6.80 

Discounted 

price0 

4.42 

4.11 

3.82 

3.55 

3.30 

3.08 

2.86 

2.66 

2.48 

2.31 

2.15 

2.01 

1.87 

1.75 

1.63 

42.00 

Reference case fuel price scenario. Federal region 5, Midwest 0.8 percent 

sulfur residual fuel oil. Levelized fuel price = 42.00 * 0.13147 = 5.52 

($ 1982/MMBtu). The capital recovery factor, 0.13147, is based on a 10 

percent interest rate and a 15-year period. 

°Price/(l.l)t.
§ 845.3 Responsibility. ( a ) Requests for provision of counsel, provision of bail, or payment of expenses will ordinarily be made by the defendant or accused through appropriate channels to the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over him. This officer shall determine whether the request meets the criteria prescribed herein and, based upon such determination, shall take final action approving or disapproving the request. Within their geographical areas of responsibility, major commands in the interest of obtaining prompt and effective legal service may appoint as approval authority, instead of the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction, any subordinate officer having responsibility in a particular country for personnel subject to foreign criminal jurisdiction.
( b ) Notwithstanding the criteria prescribed below, an officer exercising approved authority may, in his discretion, deny a request for the provision of counsel, provision of bail or payment of expenses, where the otherwise eligible requestor is in an absent without leave or deserter status at the time of the request, or otherwise is not then subject to United States military control, and there is no reasonable basis for the belief that the requestor will return to United States military control at the conclusion of the proceedings of service of an adjudged sentence, if any.
### §811. Authorization of appropriations

There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this title 1 and the amendments made by this title for the administration and operations of the Agency—

(1) for fiscal year 2008, an amount equal to the amount appropriated for fiscal year 2007 for administration and operations of the Agency, multiplied by 1.1;

(2) for fiscal year 2009, an amount equal to the amount described in paragraph (1), multiplied by 1.1; and

(3) for fiscal year 2010, an amount equal to the amount described in paragraph (2), multiplied by 1.1.

(Pub. L. 109–295, title VI, §699, Oct. 4, 2006, 120 Stat. 1462.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

This title, referred to in text, is title VI of Pub. L. 109–295, Oct. 4, 2006, 120 Stat. 1355, known as the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. For complete classification of title VI to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 701 of this title and Tables.

1 See References in Text note below.
EXHIBIT 23

            Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

We consent to the  incorporation  by  reference in the  Registration  Statements
(Forms S-3, No. 333-138417, 333-15533, 33-58736, 33-60229, 33-78760, 33-72170,
33-68542) and (Forms  S-8,  No.  33-45348,  33-75466,  33-88826,   333-87153,
333-89308  and 333-123712) of Enzo Biochem, Inc. and in the related  Prospectus
of our report dated October 5, 2006, with respect to the consolidated financial
statements and schedule of Enzo Biochem, Inc., included in this Form 10-K/A for
the fiscal year ended July 31, 2006.



/s/ Ernst & Young LLP
Melville, New York
March 28, 2007
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 01-7152

JOHN HENRY JOHNSON, Petitioner - Appellant, versus JOSEPH M. BROOKS, B.O.P., Warden, Respondent - Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District Judge. (CA-01-292-3) Submitted: October 4, 2001 Decided: October 12, 2001 Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. John Henry Johnson, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* The claim under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), lacks merit because Johnson’s 220-month sentence is less than the maximum sentence authorized under 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 2001). See United States v. Promise , 255 F.3d 150, 156 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 2 PER CURIAM: John Henry Johnson appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) petition. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm substantially on the reasoning of the district court. Johnson v. Brooks , No. CA-01-292-3 (E.D. Va. July 3, 2001). * We grant the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
§ 776.41 Expediting litigation. ( a ) A covered attorney shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation or other proceedings consistent with the interests of the client.
( b ) [Reserved]
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 21-2806

___________________________

Roderick G. Talley

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

City of Little Rock, a municipality; Kenton Buckner, individually, et al.

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central

 ____________

Submitted: January 23, 2023

Filed: January 26, 2023

[Unpublished]

____________

Before LOKEN, BENTON, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Roderick Talley appeals the district court’s1 grant of summary judgment

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that Little Rock police officers

1The Honorable James M. Moody, Jr., United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.
violated his constitutional rights in searching his apartment pursuant to an invalid noknock search warrant and the City is liable for this unconstitutional conduct.

Upon careful review, we agree with the district court that, even without false

statements in the warrant affidavit regarding what the officers personally observed

during an informant’s controlled drug buy, the affidavit provided sufficient probable

cause that drugs would be found in Talley’s residence based on what the informant

told the officers and other information the officers received that Talley was involved

in drug activity on the premises. Nor did the officers rely on a no-knock warrant that

“was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official

belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Kiesling v. Holladay, 859 F.3d 529,

533 (8th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). Because we conclude there was no

underlying constitutional violation, the City cannot be liable. See Furlow v. Belmar,

52 F.4th 393, 406 (8th Cir. 2022).

Accordingly, we affirm. 

______________________________

-2-
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-10879

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LEWIS EDWARD MARTIN, a/k/a

Robert North, a/k/a Mike Tomaz,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:96-CR-017-A

_________________________________________________________________

March 19, 1997

Before KING, JOLLY, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Lewis Edward Martin has appealed the sentences imposed

following entry of his guilty pleas to counts 1 and 3 of an

indictment charging him with conspiracy to commit mail fraud and

with mail fraud and aiding and abetting. 

The district court’s findings as to the amount of the

intended loss were not clearly erroneous. United States v.

Ismoila, 100 F.3d 380, 396 (5th Cir. 1996). “The court need only

make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available
2

information.” United States v. Chappell, 6 F.3d 1095, 1101 (5th

Cir. 1993)(internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 510 U.S.

1183 (1994), and cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1184 (1994). Martin

introduced no evidence showing that he intended to limit the

scope of the conspiracy. See United States v. Gray, ___ F.3d

____ (5th Cir. Jan. 29, 1997), 1997 WL 33622 at *11. The alleged

impossibility of completion of the attempted offense does not,

under the facts of this case, provide a basis for reversal. 

Ismoila, 100 F.3d at 396-97.

Martin argues that the district court abused its discretion

in failing to award him an adjustment in offense level for

acceptance of responsibility. Although the district court

characterized the issue as a close question, it held that Martin

had failed to carry his burden of proof and adopted the probation

officer’s recommendation. This conclusion was not clearly

erroneous. See United States v. Maldonado, 42 F.3d 906, 913 (5th

Cir. 1995). 

AFFIRMED.
* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited sircumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________

No. 98-30996

_______________________

BRENDA B. CAMPBELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

NORMAN R. GORDON & ASSOCIATES; NORMAN R. GORDON; JEFFREY S. COX,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

(97-CV-1467)

_________________________________________________________________ August 6, 1999

Before JONES, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The court has carefully considered this appeal in light

of the parties’ briefs and oral argument and pertinent portions of

the record. We reach the following conclusions.

First, assuming arguendo that a claim exists for

pregnancy harassment in violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination

Act, appellant has not adduced facts demonstrating that her

supervisor’s conduct rose to the level of actionable harassment

according to Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
,

_____ U.S.
_____, 118

S.Ct. 2275, 2283-84 (1998). That is, the alleged harassingconduct, cons isting of harangues and complaints by appellant’s

supervisor and requirements for doctors’ excuses for her absences,

was not so severe and pervasive as to alter the terms or conditions

of appellant’s employment.

Second, appellant has not produced evidence to raise a

genuine issue of material fact that she endured disparate treatment

because of her pregnancy rather than because of her unreliable

attendance and difficulties keeping up with her job.

Third, appellant’s claims of termination, retaliation,

and intentional infliction of emotional distress are not supported

by relevant summary judgment evidence.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

.
### §511f. Reinspection and appeal inspection; certificate as evidence

The Secretary shall provide for such reinspection or appeal inspection of tobacco as he may deem necessary for the confirmation or reversal of certificates issued under this chapter. Each inspection certificate issued under this chapter, unless invalidated or superseded in accordance with the regulations of the Secretary, shall be received in all courts and by all officers and employees of the United States as prima facie evidence of the truth of the statements therein contained.

(Aug. 23, 1935, ch. 623, §7, 49 Stat. 733.)
### §2009cc–12. Injunctions and other orders

#### (a) In general

#### (1) Application by Secretary

Whenever, in the judgment of the Secretary, a rural business investment company or any other person has engaged or is about to engage in any act or practice that constitutes or will constitute a violation of a provision of this subchapter (including any rule, regulation, order, or participation agreement under this subchapter), the Secretary may apply to the appropriate district court of the United States for an order enjoining the act or practice, or for an order enforcing compliance with the provision, rule, regulation, order, or participation agreement.

#### (2) Jurisdiction; relief

The court shall have jurisdiction over the action and, on a showing by the Secretary that the rural business investment company or other person has engaged or is about to engage in an act or practice described in paragraph (1), a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order, shall be granted without bond.

#### (b) Jurisdiction

#### (1) In general

In any proceeding under subsection (a), the court as a court of equity may, to such extent as the court considers necessary, take exclusive jurisdiction over the rural business investment company and the assets of the rural business investment company, wherever located.

#### (2) Trustee or receiver

The court shall have jurisdiction in any proceeding described in paragraph (1) to appoint a trustee or receiver to hold or administer the assets.

#### (c) Secretary as trustee or receiver

#### (1) Authority

The Secretary may act as trustee or receiver of a rural business investment company.

#### (2) Appointment

On the request of the Secretary, the court shall appoint the Secretary to act as a trustee or receiver of a rural business investment company unless the court considers the appointment inequitable or otherwise inappropriate by reason of any special circumstances involved.

(Pub. L. 87–128, title III, §384M, as added Pub. L. 107–171, title VI, §6029, May 13, 2002, 116 Stat. 399.)
Exhibit 10.15


Salaries and Bonuses of Named Executive Officers


The
following table sets forth for each person identified as a Named Executive
Officer in the Company’s Proxy Statement for its 2006 Annual Meeting of
Stockholders the discretionary bonuses for 2005 and annual salaries effective January 1,
2006 approved by the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors in December 2005
and paid in January 2006:




	
  Name of Executive Officer

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  Bonus for 2005

  	
   

  	
  Salary for 2006

  	
   

  
	
  Leonard P.
  Shaykin

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  100,000

  	
  (1)

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  370,350

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Martin M. Batt

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  20,000

  	
  (2)

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  270,000

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Patricia A. Pilia

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  235,000

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Gordon Link

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  16,667

  	
  (3)

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  240,000

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Kai P. Larson

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  11,667

  	
  (4)

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  220,400

  	
   

  	
   

  










(1)          Does not include an
additional $100,000 which is contingent upon the Company closing a significant
equity financing.


(2)          Does not include an
additional $40,000 which is contingent upon the Company closing a significant
equity financing.


(3)          Does not include an
additional $33,333 which is contingent upon the Company closing a significant
equity financing.


(4)          Does not include an
additional $38,333 which is contingent upon the Company closing a significant
equity financing.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

February 18, 2022

No. 04-21-00195-CR

Guillermo MORALES III,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 451st Judicial District Court, Kendall County, Texas

Trial Court No. 7388

Honorable Kirsten Cohoon, Judge Presiding

ORDER

The State’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief is GRANTED IN PART. The 

state’s brief is due on March 16, 2022.

_________________________________

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 18th day of February, 2022.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court