UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4343

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

PETER BLAKE, a/k/a Senator,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District 

Judge. (1:12-cr-00092-WDQ-1)

Submitted: March 27, 2014 Decided: April 8, 2014

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Andrew C. White, SILVERMAN, THOMPSON, SLUTKIN & WHITE, LLC, 

Baltimore, Maryland for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United 

States Attorney, Peter M. Nothstein, Stefan D. Cassella, 

Assistant United States Attorneys, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Peter Blake appeals from his 240-month sentence, 

entered pursuant to his guilty plea to conspiracy to commit 

murder and kidnapping in aid of racketeering and aggravated 

re-entry after deportation. He avers that his sentence, which 

constituted an upward variance from the Guidelines range, was 

both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We affirm.

The presentence report (“PSR”) calculated Blake’s 

Guidelines range to be 360 months. The district court granted a 

ten-offense-level departure for Blake’s substantial assistance 

under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1 (2012), reducing 

Blake’s Guidelines range to 121 to 151 months in prison. The 

court then imposed an upward variance sentence of 240 months 

based primarily on the gruesome nature of the murder underlying 

Blake’s conspiracy charge. 

We review sentences for reasonableness “under a 

deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This review entails appellate 

consideration of both the procedural and substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. In determining 

procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the district 

court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines 

range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an 

appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)
3

factors, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id.

at 49-51. If the sentence is free of significant procedural 

error, we review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] 

into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51.

When a district court imposes a sentence that falls 

outside of the applicable Guidelines range, we consider “whether 

the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to its 

decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to the 

extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.” United 

States v. Hernandez–Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 

2007). In conducting this review, we “must give due deference 

to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on 

a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 

51.

Blake first challenges the procedural aspect of his 

sentence on the ground that the district court failed to provide 

an individualized assessment when it imposed the variant 

sentence. “Regardless of whether the district court imposes an 

above, below, or within-Guidelines sentence, it must place on 

the record an individualized assessment based on the particular 

facts of the case before it.” Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th 

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court must 

“adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful 

appellate review and to promote the perception of fair 
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sentencing.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. An extensive explanation is 

not required as long as the appellate court is satisfied “‘that 

[the district court] has considered the parties’ arguments and 

has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal 

decisionmaking authority.’” United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 

495, 500 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 

U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). 

In this case, the court’s reasoning demonstrated that 

it listened to and considered the arguments of counsel in 

general, reviewed the PSR, and considered the Guidelines range. 

The district court clearly stated the basis of its 

determination, and as such, even though that basis was not 

presented in a detailed manner, we conclude that it was 

sufficient to demonstrate that the court conducted the 

appropriate review.

Blake contends specifically that the district court 

did not adequately consider the unique and extraordinary nature 

of his cooperation. However, prior to its upward variance, the 

court granted the Government’s motion for a ten-level departure 

under USSG § 5K1.1 based on Blake’s substantial assistance. The 
5

court thus explicitly recognized Blake’s cooperation and 

indicated that it was giving Blake a substantial reward.1

Contrary to Blake’s arguments, the disputed variance 

was based, not on a determination that Blake’s cooperation was 

somehow less important or useful than the parties contended, but 

rather on a determination that the murder in which Blake 

participated was of such a gruesome and violent nature that it 

required a sentence above the Guidelines range. Blake does not 

dispute the district court’s conclusions that the murder was 

deserving of greater punishment, that the murder was especially 

vile, or that an excessively lenient sentence for such a murder 

would lead to societal cynicism, which were the reasons 

proffered by the district court for its chosen sentence.

Instead, Blake contends that the district court did

not consider or address: (1) the Government’s decision to allow 

Blake to plead guilty to a conspiracy charge, thereby limiting 

his exposure to ten years for the murder; (2) the fact that 

Blake voluntarily came forward and cooperated against himself; 

(3) the district court’s assurance to Blake at his guilty plea 

hearing that it had “no information” that would lead to a 

sentence above 135 months; and (4) how a consecutive ten year 

 1 Blake’s final sentence was ten years below the applicable 

Guidelines range before the substantial assistance departure.
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sentence on the re-entry charge was appropriate when that crime 

had no factual connection to the murder. 

First, point one cuts both ways. The fact that the 

Government cut a deal with Blake limiting his exposure was 

clearly a reward for his cooperation. As Blake was 

substantially rewarded for his cooperation in the plea 

agreement, it is unclear whether arguing this point at 

sentencing would have aided or hindered Blake’s argument for a 

still lower sentence.2

 As this issue is not clearly applicable 

to the court’s decisionmaking and, in any event, would have 

required speculation, we find that it was not procedural error 

to fail to mention the plea deal when imposing sentence.

As to point two, while the court did not explicitly 

note that Blake could have walked away from his decision to 

cooperate, this factor was part of the Government’s motion for a 

large substantial assistance departure which was granted in 

full. Regarding point three, while the district court informed 

Blake at the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing that it had no 

 2 According to Blake, Hubert Downer, his co-conspirator,

pled guilty to a substantive murder offense carrying a maximum 

sentence of life in prison. As such, Blake was rewarded for his 

cooperation by the structuring of a plea agreement that capped 

his total exposure at 30 years as well as a substantial 

assistance departure that decreased his sentence to 20 years. 

The court also recognized that Blake might benefit from 

continued cooperation through a Rule 35 motion.
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information that it would impose a sentence above 135 months,3

Blake was clearly informed that the stipulations of the parties 

were not binding and that he could be sentenced up to the 

statutory maximum. As such, the court’s statements (which were 

not raised by the parties at sentencing as a reason for a lower 

sentence) did not impact the statutory factors.

Finally, as to point four, the sentence on the 

aggravated re-entry charge was necessarily increased in order to 

reach the district court’s chosen sentence, because the sentence 

on the conspiracy count was capped at 120 months. While the 

murder was unrelated to the aggravated re-entry, the court 

properly considered Blake’s offenses and history in light of the 

§ 3553 factors as a whole in determining the appropriate 

sentence. That is, the court was required to consider all the 

§ 3553 factors in sentencing Blake on the aggravated re-entry 

conviction, not simply the facts and circumstances of that 

crime. See United States v. Rhine, 637 F.3d 525, 528-29 (5th 

Cir. 2011) (upholding variance sentence over four times longer 

than the top of the Guidelines range as procedurally reasonable 

when court relied on unrelated conduct as part of the 

defendant’s history and characteristics under § 3553).

 3 The parties initially belied that the Guidelines range 

would be 108 to 135 months.
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While the court’s explanation was not lengthy or 

involved, we find that it was sufficient to show that the court 

considered the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for 

its decision. In fact, Blake’s primary argument is not that the 

court’s reasons are hard to discern but rather that he disagrees 

with the court’s conclusion that Blake’s reward for cooperation 

needed to be tempered by a greater recognition of and punishment 

for the crimes that he had committed. This is not a claim of 

procedural error, however. See United States v. Diaz Sanchez, 

714 F.3d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that argument that a 

sentence does not account for or gives too much credit to a 

particular factor is a claim of substantive unreasonableness). 

Accordingly, the court did not commit procedural error. 

Blake next asserts the district court’s imposition of 

an upward variance rendered his sentence substantively 

unreasonable because the court failed to account for his 

extraordinary cooperation. As discussed above, however, the 

district court granted a ten-level departure for Blake’s 

cooperation, directly addressing the factor that Blake asserts 

was ignored. In subsequently imposing a variance sentence based 

upon the extent and type of Blake’s criminal behavior, the court 

emphasized the need to not trivialize Blake’s conduct. In so 

doing, the court noted Blake’s past and underlined the 

particularly gruesome crime, thus explicitly basing the variance 
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on the history and characteristics of the defendant, as well as 

the need to afford adequate deterrence, to protect the public, 

and to promote respect for the law, each of which the court 

explicitly stated as a basis for its decision. 

Blake avers that the Government made a recommendation 

of 135 months on the very same sentencing factors and that the 

Government cannot now argue that 240 months is not greater than 

necessary to comply with the statutory factors. However, we do 

not review a sentence to determine if it is greater than 

necessary; instead, we review a sentence for reasonableness and 

an abuse of discretion, and more than one sentence can be 

substantively reasonable. United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 

92 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation omitted) (“[T]here is not a single 

reasonable sentence but, rather, a range of reasonable 

sentences. Consequently, reversal will result if-and only if-the 

sentencing court's ultimate determination falls outside the 

expansive boundaries of that universe.”). Because there is a 

range of permissible outcomes for any given case, an appellate 

court must resist the temptation to “pick and choose” among 

possible sentences and rather must “defer to the district 

court's judgment so long as it falls within the realm of these 

rationally available choices.” United States v. McComb, 519 

F.3d 1049, 1053 (10th Cir. 2007); see also United States v.
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Carter, 538 F.3d 784, 790 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting substantive 

reasonableness “contemplates a range, not a point”).

Blake also contends that his co-conspirator Downer’s 

identical sentence of 240 months proves that the district court 

did not adequately consider the extent of Blake’s cooperation. 

Specifically, Blake averred that Downer (who was sentenced after 

Blake) was convicted of a charge carrying a maximum sentence of 

life imprisonment and did not come forward to cooperate until 

after he was apprehended. Blake argues that he is entitled to a 

substantially lesser sentence than Downer and that, if Downer’s 

sentence was reasonable, his identical sentence cannot be.

Blake’s contentions are flawed. While he argues that 

both his and Downer’s sentences cannot both be reasonable, this 

assertion again ignores the fact that, in each case, there is a 

range of reasonable sentences. Blake’s assertion that his 

sentence does not fall within the reasonable range is 

unconvincing. Blake’s sentence was individually tailored based 

primarily upon both his cooperation with authorities and his 

participation in a grisly crime. The court provided a specific 

justification for its upward departure, and Blake was sentenced 

to ten years less than the statutory maximum. The court’s 

determination that, even in the light of extraordinary 

cooperation, a sentence of 108 (requested by Blake) or 135 

months (requested by the Government) was insufficient punishment 
11

for a particularly gruesome and violent murder committed by 

someone with a violent past was not unreasonable.

Accordingly, we affirm Blake’s sentence. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED