[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 16-10560

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cv-02335-AKK

KIM A. MASON, 

an individual, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 versus

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO INC, 

a foreign corporation, 

d.b.a. UPS, 

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC.,

a foreign corporation, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(January 10, 2017)

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2

Before HULL, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Plaintiff-Appellant Kim Mason appeals the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”) in 

her employment discrimination suit filed pursuant to the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Mason also claims that the district court erred in 

denying her motion to strike certain errata sheets. After review, we affirm.1

After Mason was injured on the job, her doctor imposed certain lifting 

restrictions that made her ineligible for the delivery truck driver position she held 

with UPS at the time of her injury. This case involves whether Mason, as a union 

member, could have, with or without reasonable accommodation, performed the 

essential functions of certain other union positions within UPS, all of which also 

had lifting requirements. Therefore, we begin by setting forth a detailed account of 

the undisputed evidence.

I. BACKGROUND

A. UPS’s Operations

UPS is a package delivery company, moving millions of packages each day. 

UPS runs its operations through a network of package centers. UPS’s larger 

 1

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the facts and drawing all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Holly v. Clairson Indus., LLC, 492 F.3d 

1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

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package centers are automated, but “conventional” package centers—like the one 

in Huntsville, Alabama where Mason worked—are not fully automated, meaning 

that some operations are done manually. The nearest automated building to 

Huntsville is in Memphis, Tennessee. 

The majority of UPS employees, especially those working at package 

centers, are covered by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between UPS 

and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. When a union position becomes 

available at a package center, UPS will put up a bid sheet. Union employees who 

are interested in the position sign the bid sheet. The position is then offered to the 

employee on the bid sheet with the highest seniority. If that employee refuses the 

position, it is offered to the employee with the second-highest seniority, and so on. 

All union positions are filled through this bidding process. 

Seniority for purposes of bidding on open union positions is determined by 

the employee’s seniority date within their package center. In other words, if a 

union employee like Mason were to move to a new package center, she would 

enter as the employee with least seniority. The CBA prohibits employees from 

bumping or displacing other employees from the union jobs they occupy. While 

there is an exception to UPS’s bidding-seniority system for accommodations under 

the ADA, Mason told UPS that she only wanted to be considered for positions in 

and around Huntsville. 

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B. The MAPP Process

At all relevant times, employees who sought management positions at UPS 

were required to go through the company’s “Management Assessment and 

Promotion Process” or “MAPP.” To start the process, the employee was required 

to submit a written letter of interest to UPS, and this letter had to be submitted for 

every year that an employee wished to be considered for a management position. 

Letters of interest expired every December 31. 

After an employee submitted a letter, the employee’s supervisor would 

conduct an initial assessment, which involved scoring the employee’s performance 

in a number of relevant areas. If an employee passed the initial assessment, the 

employee would progress through a number of steps in the MAPP process. Only 

employees who successfully completed the MAPP process could be placed in the 

“promotion pool for that calendar year” and be eligible for consideration for 

promotion from a union position to a non-union management position. 

C. Mason’s Employment with UPS

In 1994, Mason began working for UPS as a “pre-loader,” a part-time 

position that entails loading packages onto UPS’s delivery trucks. Mason always 

worked at UPS’s Huntsville Package Center and was always a union employee. In 

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the early 2000s, Mason became a full-time delivery truck driver. Mason has never 

held a management position at UPS. 

On March 22, 2011, Mason fell off the back of her delivery truck and 

injured her wrist. Dr. James Martens, the doctor who performed surgery on 

Mason’s wrist, concluded that she reached maximum medical improvement 

(“MMI”) in October 2011. 

D. ADA-Accommodation Process

In early 2012, at UPS’s invitation, Mason requested accommodation for her 

alleged disability under the ADA.2

 In January 2012, Dr. Martens completed a 

“Request for Medical Information” form, which indicated that Mason was not able 

to perform all the functions of her current driver position. Dr. Martens’s form 

noted that Mason was unable to: “(1) lift, lower, push, pull, leverage and 

manipulate equipment and or packages weighing up to 70 pounds[,] (2) [a]ssist in 

moving packages weighing up to 150 pounds[, and] (3) [l]ift packages to heights 

above the shoulder and lower to foot level.” Dr. Martens determined that Mason 

had a permanent 25-pound lifting restriction, but that she could lift 10 pounds 

occasionally. Those restrictions have not changed. 

On February 10, 2012, as part of UPS’s ADA-accommodation process, 

Mason met with Tammy Butler and Doreen Ingle, both from UPS’s Human 

 2

UPS has an “established ADA procedure” to handle employee requests for reasonable 

accommodation, and Mason’s request was handled in accordance with this process. 

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Resources (“HR”) department, and Lois Forsmo, an occupational health nurse with 

UPS. This is commonly known as a “checklist meeting” because the employee is 

asked to complete an accommodation checklist form. 

As part of that meeting, Mason filled out Part A of UPS’s “Accommodation 

Checklist.” On that form, Mason stated that she could be accommodated by 

obtaining a position without the requirement of lifting “heavy” packages, 

specifically noting management, training, and package center supervisor positions. 

As to other jobs Mason believed she could do with or without accommodation, 

Mason identified the following: “air driver, customer counter, clerk, office, safety, 

preload, spa, decap, dispatch, local sort smalls, overgoods, office clerk, porter[,]

car wash, misloads, hazmat.” Mason described her prior 17-year work experience 

at UPS and noted she had previously done most of the jobs listed. 

On behalf of UPS, Ingle3 filled out Part B of the Accommodation Checklist 

form.4 With respect to Mason’s current job as a delivery truck driver, Ingle 

identified the “proposed accommodation[s]” of (1) no lifting of packages weighing 

more than 25 pounds, (2) no lifting above the shoulder, and (3) no lifting or 

 3

At that time, Ingle was the company’s Area HR Manager assigned to Mason’s ADA 

accommodation request. 

4

While Butler attended the meeting in person with Mason, Ingle and Forsmo participated 

via telephone. Accordingly, Mason testified that she did not see Part B of the form at the 

checklist meeting. 

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lowering packages weighing up to 70 pounds. Ingle indicated that, for these

restrictions, no means existed to make the requested accommodation. 

Next, Ingle identified these potential positions, to which Mason could be 

reassigned, as an accommodation: air driver, customer counter, preload, smalls, 

porter, carwash, office, and clerk. Ingle noted that (1) Mason had the “education, 

skills, and experience” (“ESE”) for all of the positions, but (2) none of these 

positions were currently open or would be vacant within a reasonable period of 

time. The form asked: 

Does the employee preliminarily appear capable of performing the 

essential job functions (“EJF”) of this position with or without 

reasonable accommodation?

Under EJF, Ingle put “Yes” as to each position and underlined the word “with” in 

the form question. Ingle underlined the word “with” because it was her 

preliminary determination that Mason could perform the essential functions of 

these jobs with reasonable accommodations. In her declaration, Ingle stated that 

she “completed Section B to indicate that Ms. Mason preliminarily appeared 

capable of performing the essential job functions of certain positions . . . but this 

was not a final conclusion.” 

On the checklist form, Ingle also identified additional accommodations not 

identified by Mason, specifically noting that Mason could work in supervision, 

“once qualified.” Ingle noted that means existed to make this accommodation, 

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once Mason was qualified, and that it would not conflict with the CBA. Ingle 

stated that she had explained the MAPP process to Mason.

5

 

After the meeting, Ingle sent the checklist form to Forsmo. According to 

Forsmo’s declaration, “[t]hereafter, it was determined that, based on Ms. Mason’s

restrictions as reported by Ms. Mason and her doctor, there were no positions 

available for which Ms. Mason was qualified and capable of performing the 

essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation.” This 

determination was made by UPS’s ADA committee, and was not a final decision 

made by Ingle alone.

On April 3, 2012, Ingle sent Mason a letter informing Mason that UPS was 

not aware of “any available position at UPS at this time for which you are qualified 

and capable of performing the essential job functions with or without reasonable 

accommodation,” and stating that UPS would continue to look for such a position 

for up to six months. During the next six months, Ingle “periodically” inquired as 

to whether there were any available positions at the Huntsville facility that Mason 

could perform with her physical restrictions. But no such positions became 

available during that six-month period. 

In her deposition, Mason stated that, after she received the April 3, 2012

letter, she spoke with Ingle on “[n]umerous” occasions “on a pretty regular basis” 

 5

Mason had submitted letters of interest to initiate the MAPP process in several years 

prior to 2012, but her paperwork was not current at the time of the checklist meeting. 

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to ask if UPS had found any available positions and/or to inform Ingle of a 

potential position. Ingle reminded Mason several times about the MAPP process 

and that all employees needed to complete this process to be eligible for 

management positions. According to Ingle, Mason asked her at one point about 

available Clerk and Customer Counter Clerk positions at the Huntsville center, but 

Ingle informed her that these positions required lifting “well in excess of her 

medical limitation of 25 pounds.” 

On September 13, 2012, Mason sent Ingle two letters. One was Mason’s 

request to be considered for the MAPP process. The second was a letter noting the 

history of the case and stating that:

Since April I have contacted you several times, by phone, to inquire if 

there have been any positions open and to suggest positions that were 

open or changing that I may be eligible for. To date I still have not 

received any suggestions for reasonable accommodations in 

accordance with the [ADA] from [UPS].

Mason also stated that there were two positions currently open at the Huntsville 

facility for “Package Center Clerks” that “do not handle packages” and were listed 

on the Accommodation Checklist. 

According to UPS, however, these two positions were not union positions 

but were, rather, management positions. As Mason had not completed the MAPP 

process, and was not in the “MAPP pool” of candidates, Mason was not qualified 

to be considered for these positions. 

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In October 2012, Mason underwent an initial assessment as part of the 

MAPP process, where her supervisor, Jeff Hill, assessed her performance. Hill

gave her a score of between 2 and 3, and a score of 3.5 was required to pass the 

initial assessment. Because Mason did not complete the MAPP process, Mason 

was never eligible for consideration for promotion to a supervisory position in 

2012. In her deposition, Mason accused Hill of discriminating against her on the 

basis of her disability by giving her a low score on the initial assessment. Hill 

denied this accusation. To this Court’s knowledge, Mason remains an inactive 

employee of UPS. 

E. Jobs that Came Available at the Huntsville Package Center During the

Relevant Time Period

From February 2012 to April 2013 (the “Relevant Time Period”)6

, the 

Huntsville facility had three openings for union positions: (1) preloader, (2) clerk,

and (3) air driver. 

Preloaders are responsible for moving packages through the package centers 

and loading those packages onto delivery trucks. The written job description 

requires preloaders to push and pull packages weighing 21 to 50 pounds 

unassisted, lift and carry packages weighing 21 to 70 pounds unassisted, and move 

packages weighing up to 150 pounds. 

 6

In its “Supplemental Response to Plaintiff’s Discovery,” UPS identified this as the 

“Response Period.” Mason has not disputed this. The record reflects that Mason filed a 

grievance with the union, which was denied in April 2013. 

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Customer Counter Clerks staff the front counter and are responsible for 

receiving and processing packages from customers. Center Clerks handle damaged 

packages, rewrap and repackage damaged packages, and correct labeling errors. 

The written job description for both clerk positions requires the employee to 

(1) lift, lower, push, pull, leverage and manipulate equipment and/or packages 

weighing up to 70 pounds; (2) assist in moving packages weighing up to 150 

pounds; (3) lift packages to heights above the shoulder; and (4) lower packages to 

foot level. 

Air Drivers pick up and deliver next-day air packages. The written job 

description for this position also requires the employee to (1) lift, lower, push, pull, 

leverage and manipulate equipment and/or packages weighing up to 70 pounds; 

(2) assist in moving packages weighing up to 150 pounds; (3) lift packages to 

heights above the shoulder; and (4) lower packages to foot level. 

Additionally, a UPS official stated that “[m]anipulating and lifting packages 

are core functions of [all these] positions . . . all of which entail the constant 

handling of packages throughout the workday.” The Huntsville facility is one of 

UPS’s smaller package centers, and it is “leanly staffed.” Therefore, “[i]f an 

employee is unable or refuses to perform all of his or her required job functions, 

including lifting packages without assistance within the weight requirements of the 

position, the operation could be interrupted, resulting in potential service failures.” 

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UPS does not have permanent light-duty work assignments. In short, the stated 

lifting requirements for all three jobs fell outside Dr. Marten’s assessment of 

Mason’s lifting restrictions. 

In addition to these positions, Mason listed these jobs on her 

Accommodation Checklist: office, safety, spa, decap, dispatch, local sort smalls, 

overgoods, porter, car wash, misloads, and hazmat. Most of these are not discrete 

positions but are, instead, tasks performed by other employees.7

 Porter and Car 

Wash are, however, discrete union positions. But neither of these positions 

became available during the Relevant Time Period. 

In her declaration, Mason averred that “[s]ome of the positions [she listed on 

the checklist form] do not even require lifting heavy packages even though the 

essential functions of the job may indicate that, including small sort and customer 

clerk, and clerk.” Mason also stated that she was “personally aware of employees 

receiving help lifting packages that are heavy[,] including the positions of 

customer clerk and clerk positions [sic].” Mason claims that she requested those 

 7

For example, “small sort” is a function performed by the Loader/Unloader. At the 

Huntsville facility, Loaders/Unloaders who work on the small sort operation must be able to lift, 

manipulate, and carry containers or bags, and the containers and bags typically weigh more than 

25 pounds. “Spa” and “misloads” refer to two of the functions Loaders/Unloaders and 

Preloaders can perform. A Loader/Unloader, Preloader, or Clerk who is certified to do so may 

also handle hazardous materials (“hazmat”). A Clerk may also handle overgoods, a reference to 

package contents that have been displaced from the package in some way. “Office” duties are 

typically performed by management, as are “dispatch” and “safety” duties. Mason testified that 

she did not remember what she meant by “decap.” 

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positions specifically because they do not “actually require” heavy lifting or 

because she would receive help in lifting packages. 

Martha Pender filled the open clerk position that became available at the 

Huntsville facility during the Relevant Time Period. Pender executed a declaration 

stating that she “sometimes” has to move “heavy” packages as part of her job. 

Pender stated that she can move these packages by doing a “team lift” with other 

people, pushing them out of the way so that other workers may move them, or 

getting assistance from other employees to move the packages. In addition, 

customers with heavy packages will place the packages directly on the counter, and 

hand trucks are “readily available for assistance with heavy packages.” Pender 

claimed that “[o]ther clerks also receive assistance with heavier packages as 

needed.” According to Pender’s experience, the positions of clerk and customer 

clerk do not “typically require lifting heavy items,” and they may obtain assistance 

when heavy lifting is required. Pender also claimed that the position of “small 

sorter” also does not require heavy lifting. 

During the Relevant Time Period, the Huntsville facility had two non-union 

supervisory positions become available. Because no current UPS employees at the 

Huntsville facility, including Mason, had successfully completed the MAPP 

process, UPS hired two outside candidates. 

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F. Mason’s ADA lawsuit

On December 27, 2013, Mason filed this complaint, alleging that UPS 

discriminated against her based on her disability, in violation of the ADA.8

 Mason 

alleged that UPS refused to accommodate her and failed to contact her with “any 

offers or suggested openings within the company which were available or 

potentially available.” 

Following discovery, UPS moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, 

that Mason’s ADA claim was barred because she was not a “qualified individual” 

under the statute. Mason filed a motion to strike the deposition errata sheets of 

White, Ingle, and Butler, arguing that the attorney-authored “clarifications” 

violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e). 

The district court granted UPS’s motion for summary judgment and 

dismissed the case with prejudice.9

 While UPS had conceded that Mason is 

disabled under the ADA, the district court determined that she was not a “qualified 

 8

Mason also raised claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent 

infliction of emotional distress, age discrimination, and gender discrimination. The district court 

dismissed the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 

noting Mason’s concession that that it is not a cause of action under Alabama law. The district 

court dismissed Mason’s age and gender discrimination claims without prejudice, based on a 

joint stipulation by the parties. Finally, the district court granted summary judgment to UPS on 

Mason’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. On appeal, Mason does not argue that 

the district court incorrectly ruled on these claim and, thus, she has waived any such argument. 

See Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2012).

9

As Mason had admitted that she was never an employee of the named defendant United 

Parcel Service Co., Inc., the district court granted summary judgment to that defendant as well. 

On appeal, Mason does not dispute the grant of summary judgment as to that separate defendant. 

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individual” under the statute because there was no genuine issue of material fact as 

to whether Mason could perform the essential functions of the positions that 

became available at the Huntsville facility during the Relevant Time Period, with 

or without reasonable accommodation. 

The district court also denied Mason’s motion to strike the deposition errata 

sheets because (1) the errata sheets complied with Rule 30(e)’s requirement to “list 

the changes and the reasons given by the deponent for making them”; (2) UPS 

acknowledged that certain positions became available during the relevant period; 

and (3) in any event, the district court explicitly stated that it did not rely on “the 

employees’ testimony here when making its determination on the motion for 

summary judgment.” 

II. RELEVANT LAW

Under the ADA, an employer may not discriminate against a qualified 

individual with a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To establish a prima facie case 

of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) she is disabled; (2) she 

is a qualified individual; and (3) she was subjected to unlawful discrimination 

because of her disability. Holly v. Clairson Indus., LLC, 492 F.3d 1247, 1255-56 

(11th Cir. 2007). In the district court, the parties agreed that Mason was disabled, 

but contested the second and third elements of the prima facie case.

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A “qualified individual” is one who, “with or without reasonable 

accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position 

that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). In other words, the 

plaintiff must show that she “can perform the essential functions of [her] job 

without accommodation, or, failing that, show that [she] can perform the essential 

functions of [her] job with a reasonable accommodation.” Davis v. Fla. Power & 

Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000). If the plaintiff cannot perform 

the essential functions of her job even with an accommodation, by definition she is 

not a qualified individual under the ADA. Id.

We evaluate whether a function is essential on a case-by-case basis by 

examining a number of factors. Holly, 492 F.3d at 1258. An essential function is 

a fundamental job duty of a position, and does not include marginal functions of 

the position. Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365-66 (11th Cir. 2000), see 

also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). In determining if a task is an essential function, 

relevant evidence may include: (1) the employer’s judgment as to what functions 

are essential, (2) a written job description, (3) the amount of time spent on the job 

performing the function, (4) the consequences of not requiring the employee to 

perform the function, (5) the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, (6) the 

work experience of past employees in the position, and (7) the current work 

experience of employees in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). We give

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substantial weight to an employer’s judgment about which functions are essential, 

although this factor alone is not conclusive. Holly, 492 F.3d at 1258.

As to the discrimination prong, discrimination under the ADA includes the 

failure to make a reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental 

limitations of the individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Holly, 492 F.3d at 1262 

(explaining that “an employer’s failure to reasonably accommodate a disabled 

individual itself constitutes discrimination under the ADA, so long as that 

individual is ‘otherwise qualified,’ and unless the employer can show undue 

hardship”).

The plaintiff bears the burden both to identify an accommodation and show 

that it is reasonable. Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 284-86 (11th Cir. 

1997). Once the plaintiff has met her burden of proving that reasonable 

accommodations exist, the defendant-employer may present evidence that the 

plaintiff’s requested accommodation imposes an undue hardship on the employer. 

Id. at 286.

Accommodations are “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work 

environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position . . . is 

customarily performed . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). The ADA, however,

does not require an employer to accommodate an employee in the manner she 

desires, nor is the employer required to “transform the position into another one by 

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eliminating functions that are essential to the nature of the job as it exists.” Lucas 

v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Stewart v. 

Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 1997).

III. DISCUSSION

The district court correctly determined that Mason did not meet her burden 

to show a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA and, thus, the court 

properly granted summary judgment for UPS. See Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1255. The 

parties agree that Mason is disabled under the ADA. The only union positions that 

became available during the Relevant Time Period were the preloader, clerk, and 

air driver positions. But, critically, Mason failed to establish that she is a 

“qualified individual” under the ADA because she did not demonstrate that she 

could perform the essential functions of these positions with or without reasonable 

accommodation.10 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Davis, 205 F.3d at 1305. 

According to Dr. Martens, Mason’s medical restrictions prohibited her from 

lifting packages above the shoulder or lowering them to foot level. Mason was 

 10Mason does not contest that her lifting restrictions foreclosed her continued 

employment as a delivery truck driver. Moreover, to the extent that Mason argues that UPS 

should have awarded her a non-union supervisory position, it is undisputed that Mason did not 

qualify for such a position through the MAPP process. “The ADA does not mandate that 

employers promote disabled employees in order to accommodate them.” Lucas, 257 F.3d at 

1257 (citation omitted). Additionally, the other union positions that Mason listed on the 

Accommodation Checklist either did not exist as an independent position or did not become 

available during the Relevant Time Period. See Willis, 108 F.3d at 284 (citation omitted)

(“Reassignment to another position is a required accommodation only if there is a vacant 

position available for which the employee is otherwise qualified.”).

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allowed to occasionally lift 10 pounds, but was prohibited from lifting more than 

25 pounds. It is undisputed that, according to UPS’s lists of essential job 

functions, each of these positions required frequent or occasional lifting of weights 

outside of Mason’s stated limitations. The determination by UPS that these are 

essential functions of the positions is entitled to substantial weight. See Holly, 492 

F.3d at 1258. To circumvent this problem, Mason relies on two pieces of 

evidence. 

First, Mason points to Ingle’s determination on Part B of the 

Accommodation Checklist form that Mason could perform the essential functions 

of the positions identified with reasonable accommodation. However, Mason 

ignores that the form itself states that the determination is preliminary. Moreover, 

the record establishes that Ingle’s determination was not final and she did not have 

the sole authority to determine whether Mason was eligible for a reasonable 

accommodation. Thus, Mason’s argument that Ingle’s preliminary determination 

was never “altered, amended, adjusted, or otherwise modified”11 misses the mark 

because UPS made a final determination that Mason’s lifting restrictions made her 

unable to perform the essential functions of the positions, with or without 

reasonable accommodation. UPS timely informed Mason of this final 

 11Mason repeatedly complains about Ingle’s purported failure to notify Mason that her 

preliminary assessment was altered or changed. But Mason was not aware of Ingle’s notations 

on Part B of the checklist form until approximately five months after UPS notified her in April 

2012 of its final determination regarding her ADA accommodation request. 

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determination and continued to search for jobs she could perform. For these 

reasons, Ingle’s preliminary determination is insufficient to create a genuine 

dispute of material fact.

Second, Mason relies on Pender’s declaration (supplemented by Mason’s

own declaration) to contend that lifting packages outside Dr. Marten’s stated 

restrictions was only a “marginal” and “infrequent” function of the clerk position, 

and that Mason could receive assistance from other employees for packages above 

her lifting restrictions.12 

As the district court properly found, Mason has presented no evidence

rebutting the written job descriptions’ requirement that clerks must lift packages 

above their shoulders or lower them to foot level, two actions that Dr. Martens 

determined Mason could not do because of her impairments. Beyond that, the 

district court correctly pointed out that neither Mason nor Pender defined what 

constitutes a “heavy” package. While we must draw all reasonable inferences in 

Mason’s favor, Holly, 492 F.3d at 1255, it is not reasonable to infer that “heavy” 

encompasses all packages over Mason’s maximum lifting limit of 25 pounds. And 

the ADA does not require UPS to place Mason in a clerk position and remove the 

 12Because Pender’s declaration only pertains to the clerk position and Mason provides 

only one line of argument in her brief regarding the preloader position (and no argument 

whatsoever regarding the air driver position), this Court will deem any argument regarding the 

preloader and air driver position to be abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th 

Cir. 2008). In any event, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is unrebutted that 

UPS’s written job description for both of these functions require lifting outside of Mason’s stated 

restrictions.

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duty to lift packages weighing more than 25 pounds or to assist in moving 

packages over 150 pounds, as that would essentially transform the position into 

another one by eliminating essential functions of the job as it exists. See Lucas, 

257 F.3d at 1260.

Mason’s purported reliance on other UPS employees to assist with “heavy” 

packages and her contention that her lifting restrictions would not significantly 

disrupt the package center are also unavailing. Mason’s restrictions would require 

her to leave every package weighing more than 25 pounds and some packages 

weighing between 10 and 25 pounds for other employees to deal with. Given that 

evidence in the record reflects that the Huntsville center is small and leanly staffed, 

and requires all employees to perform their functions, Pender’s testimony is again 

insufficient to create a genuine factual dispute regarding the impact requiring 

another employee to assist Mason with any package weighing more than 25 

pounds would have on the package center’s operations. Thus, this requested 

accommodation is not reasonable.13 See Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1260; Willis, 108 F.3d 

at 284-86.

 13To the extent Mason argues that UPS has not shown that accommodating her would 

cause it “undue hardship,” the burden shifts to UPS only after the plaintiff has met her burden of 

proving that reasonable accommodations exist, which Mason has not done. Willis, 108 F.3d at 

286. Mason’s allegations that UPS failed to “engage in a bone fide ‘interactive process’” are 

also unfounded. The record evidence demonstrates that UPS invited Mason to enter into an 

ADA-accommodation process and followed its procedures in evaluating her restrictions and 

determining whether or not it could offer her a position, with or without reasonable 

accommodation, within those restrictions.

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Ultimately, Mason has not established a genuine dispute of material fact as 

to whether she could fulfill the essential functions of the jobs that came available 

during the Relevant Time Period with or without a reasonable accommodation. 

See Davis, 205 F.3d at 1305. Without this showing, she is, by definition, not a 

qualified individual under the ADA, and the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of UPS was appropriate. See id. 

We also affirm the district court’s denial of Mason’s motion to strike the 

deposition errata sheets because its conclusion was not an abuse of discretion. See

Benson v. Tocco, Inc., 113 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 1997) (reviewing a decision 

regarding a motion to strike evidence for an abuse of discretion). The district 

court’s determination that the errata sheets were merely “clarifications” was not a 

clear error in judgment, as the changes were consistent with other evidence 

presented by UPS, which noted in several instances that three positions came open 

during the Relevant Time Period, but none were positions that Mason could 

perform with or without reasonable accommodation. See id. Moreover, the 

district court explicitly stated that it did not use the changed answers in making its 

summary judgment determination.

AFFIRMED.

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