IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex

rel. Shaun Bentley Lucas,

Petitioner,

v.

NEDRA CHANDLER, Warden, Dixon

Correctional Center,

Respondent.

Case No. 11 C 9111

Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before this Court is Shaun Bentley Lucas’ (hereinafter, the

“Petitioner” or “Lucas”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons stated herein, the

Petition is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

In April 1999, Lucas entered into a negotiated plea agreement

in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, to one count of

predatory criminal sexual assault stemming from a sexual

relationship he had with a minor. Pursuant to that agreement, the

trial court imposed a twelve-and-a-half year sentence. In

addition, the Court admonished Lucas that he would also be

subjected to three years of mandatory supervised release (“MSR”):

The nature of the charge, the age of the

complainant, and your age, makes this a

Class X felony under Illinois law. It’s a

minimum of 6 years to a maximum of 30 years in
the state penitentiary, a nonprobational

offense. After you serve the penitentiary

sentence there’s something called [MSR], it’s

commonly known as parole. And that would be

for 3 years. That’s the penalty of what could

happen in terms of the maximum penalty.

ECF No. 1 at PageID #12-13 (emphasis added). Lucas acknowledges in

his Petition that he received this admonishment. Id. at PageID #8

(“[The court] explained that 3 years of mandatory supervised

release [MSR], commonly known as parole, could happen.”).

Lucas later sought to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds

it was coerced. The trial court denied Lucas’ petition to do so,

and on November 20, 2000, the Illinois Court of Appeals rejected

his arguments and affirmed his conviction and sentence. Lucas did

not file a Petition for Leave to Appeal (“PLA”) to the Illinois

Supreme Court.

In November 1999, Lucas filed a postconviction petition

pursuant to 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/122-1, et seq., in Illinois

state court claiming that the statute establishing the sentencing

range for his crime violated the Illinois Constitution’s singlesubject rule. The Illinois trial court dismissed that petition on

February 15, 2000, and it appears that Lucas did not appeal that

decision.

Ten years later, in March 2009, Petitioner filed another

petition in Illinois state court, this time for relief from

judgment pursuant to 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-1401. In that

petition, he attacked his MSR term on several grounds, including:

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(1) the addition of the MSR term violated his due process rights;

(2) the trial court’s admonition regarding the MSR term was

ambiguous; (3) the imposition of MSR constituted double jeopardy

and a breach of contract law. The Illinois trial court denied that

petition in May 2009, and Lucas appealed, again arguing that the

addition of the three-year MSR term to his negotiated sentence

violated due process. In May 2011, the Illinois appellate court

affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief from judgment.

Lucas then filed a PLA in the Illinois Supreme Court on in

August 2011, again arguing that his sentence was vague, the MSR

term violated his rights under the state and federal constitutions,

and that the trial court’s admonitions regarding MSR led him to

believe he could earn up to a three year early release from prison. 

The Illinois Supreme Court denied Lucas’ PLA on November 30, 2011.

Lucas then filed his habeas Petition in this Court on

December 17, 2011. In it, he alleges three grounds for relief: 

(1) that he was not informed by the trial court that he would be

subject to a three-year MSR term as part of his negotiated

sentence; (2) that the MSR term is void because it was imposed by

prison officials without a judicial hearing; and (3) that despite

the state court rulings, he is entitled to the benefit of his plea

bargain. Lucas’ MSR term expired on January 20, 2012, just a month

after he filed the present habeas Petition. Respondent answered

the Petition on March 29, 2012. Lucas did not reply.

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II. ANALYSIS

Respondent claims that Lucas’ Petition must fail for three

reasons. First, Respondent argues that Lucas’ Petition is moot. 

Second, he claims that it is untimely. Third, he claims that

Lucas’ MSR contentions are meritless.

A. Lucas’ Petition Is Not Moot

Lucas’ MSR term ended in January 2012. Respondent argues that

because his MSR term has already concluded, Lucas’ Petition is moot

because the Court cannot grant him the only relief he seeks: the

elimination of, or a reduction in length of, his MSR term. See,

e.g., Kashula v. Manier, Civ. No. 08—413-MJR-CJP, 2010 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 50003 at *3 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2010) (finding that because

petitioner attacked only the validity of an MSR term that “has

expired, there is no relief that this Court could give to

Petitioner, and the case is moot”). However, the “collateral

consequences” doctrine provides an exception to the mootness

doctrine. 

“The Supreme Court has held that the ‘collateral consequences’

that flow from a criminal conviction, such as the loss of certain

civil rights, transforms a case that would be moot into an

otherwise justiciable controversy.’” United States v. ChavezPalacios, 30 F.3d 1290, 1293 n.3 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Sibron v.

New York, 392 U.S. 40, 49 (1968)) (finding appellant’s appeal not

moot because it could affect a two-year term of supervised

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release). Respondent argues that “petitioner has not identified

any collateral consequences of the expired MSR term that would

prevent this case from becoming moot.” Resp’t Answer at 8, ECF

No. 14. 

Although the pro se Petitioner did not use the specific phrase

“collateral consequence” in his Petition, he has listed at length

certain restrictions he faces as a registered sex offender: 

Illinois law requires me to register as a

child sex offender for 10 years, beginning

within 3 days of my release from prison. 

Under the Illinois Sex Offender Registration

Act and the Illinois Sex Offender Community

Notification Act, I will be restricted in

where I live, work and associate. The jobs I

cannot work are too numerous to list. While

registering as a child sex offender in

Illinois: I’m obligated under time constraints

to personally appear at specific law

enforcement offices, profusely, to notify

those offices of both permanent and

impermanent residence locations/changes, job

location/changes, any intention to leave the

State and where I intend to go, pay $100 fees

regularly, and any additions/changes of my

identifying information (such as tag numbers

of newly registered vehicles); similar to a

prisoner, I suffer a lesser expectation of

privacy as a constitutional right due to my

obligation to report my identifying

information to the public; I’m restricted from

associating with unescorted unrelated children

in public, from contracting with the State for

profit, from changing my name, and even from

being present in certain public areas at

certain times or under certain variable

circumstances. Failure to meet these

obligations and/or obey these restrictions,

and more, is a felony crime in Illinois.

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Pet’r’s Facts in Supp. of All Grounds at 4, ECF No. 1, PageID #8. 

Petitioner contends that, as a result of what he views as an

unconstitutional extension of three years to his incarceration,

these ten years of mandatory restrictions will also necessarily

extend three years beyond the point when they otherwise would have

expired. The Court is not convinced Petitioner’s exact date

calculations are correct, but the premise is sound: if Plaintiff

had gotten out of prison three years earlier, his ten-year sex

offender registration requirements would expire three years earlier

as well. The Supreme Court has held that such restrictions,

including restrictions on potential employment, do constitute

“collateral consequences” that preclude a case from being

considered moot. See, e.g., Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234,

237-38 (1968) (limitations on the types of business in which

petitioner can engage stemming from a conviction constitute

collateral consequences that render a case not moot).

The Court recognizes its obligations to construe a pro se

habeas petition liberally. See, Wyatt v. United States, 574 F.3d

455, 459 (7th Cir. 2009). As such, it finds that while Lucas

failed to use the specific phrase “collateral consequences,” he has

argued that he may suffer such potential consequences in the

future. As such, the Court finds that his Petition is not moot. 

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B. Lucas’ Petition Is Untimely

While Lucas’ Petition may not be moot, it is untimely. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244, there is a 1-year statute of

limitations for filing an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 

Id. § 2244(d)(1). The limitation period runs from the latest of:

(1) the date the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2)

the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action; (3) the date on which the

constitutional right asserted was recognized initially by the

Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized and made

applicable retroactively; or (4) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim presented could have been discovered through

the exercise of due diligence. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A-D).

Lucas does not allege any facts indicating a state-created

impediment to filing his application, nor does he identify a newly

recognized and retroactive constitutional right. The statute of

limitations for his Petition thus runs from the later of his

judgment becoming final by the conclusion of direct review or the

date on which the factual predicate could have been discovered. 

The Court will first examine which scenario provides Lucas with the

later accrual date.

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As the Respondent points out, the Illinois Court of Appeals

affirmed Lucas’ conviction and sentence on November 22, 2000. 

Under Illinois law at that time, Lucas had twenty-one days to file

a PLA in the Illinois Supreme Court. See. Ill. Sup. Ct.

R. 315(b)(West 2000). He failed to do so. The Supreme Court has

made it clear that when a habeas petitioner chooses not to appeal

to a state’s highest court, “his judgment became final when his

time for seeking review with the State’s highest court expired.” 

Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 654 (2012). As such, Lucas’

conviction became final on December 13, 2000. Pursuant to § 2244,

his habeas Petition would thus be due in this Court on December 13,

2001.

Section 2244(d)(1)(D) does not provide Lucas with a later

deadline. Lucas states in his Petition that “[i]n January of 2009,

I was informed by other IDOC officials that I could never be

eligible for parole under Illinois law, and moreover, I was

required to serve 3 more years called MSR after serving my full 12

1⁄2 years at 85%.” Pet. at 9. Lucas may argue that this revelation

should provide him with a later start date to his statute of

limitations. Under these circumstances, however, it does not.

As noted earlier, when § 2244(d)(1)(D) applies, the

limitations period commences “on the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim . . . presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.” Id. The Seventh Circuit

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has explained that under this provision, “[t]ime begins when the

prisoner knows (or through diligence could discover) the important

facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.” 

Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000). It is clear,

based on the record before the Court, that the “important facts”

were known to Lucas well before 2009. As noted earlier, the trial

judge admonished Lucas a decade earlier in April 1999 that “[a]fter

you serve the penitentiary sentence, there’s something called

mandatory supervised release, it’s commonly known as parole. And

that would be for 3 years.” ECF No. 1 at PageID #12-13. Lucas

does not contest this, admitting that the court “explained that 3

years of mandatory supervised release [MSR], commonly known as

parole, could happen.” Pet. at 8.

The postconviction petition Lucas filed just a few months

later, in November 1999, also indicates he was aware that an MSR

term would follow his sentence. Indeed, in that petition, Lucas

attacked Public Act 80-1099 on the grounds that the legislation

violated Illinois’s single subject rule. See, Resp. Ex. E at

C000113-14. Specifically, Lucas contended that Public Act 80-1099

was unconstitutional for violating the single subject rule, and

that he was sentenced under unconstitutional provisions of the

statute. Id. Lucas argued that the Act encompassed too many

different provisions into a single bill, and cited as an example of

an unrelated provision that part of the Act that “modifi[ed] the

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length of parole and mandatory supervised release.” Id. Ex. E at

118. Indeed, Public Act 80-1099 created MSR. See, People v.

Anderson, 838 N.E.2d 978, 979 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).

In light of the trial judge’s admonishment regarding the MSR

term, as well Petitioner’s challenge just months later of the very

legislation that created MSR, the Court concludes that Lucas’

contention that he was unaware of important facts until IDOC

officials informed him of the MSR term in January 2009 is not

likely or credible. Lucas was aware of the important facts

regarding his claim as far back as April 1999 and at the latest in

November of 1999. Since both of those dates are earlier than when

Lucas’ conviction became final on December 30, 2000, that date

provides the starting date for the one year statute of limitations. 

See, 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1).

Lucas’ Petition may still be viable if there were either

statutory or equitable bases for tolling the statute of

limitations. A review of the record, however, shows no such

grounds. It is true that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) tolls the

limitations period while a “properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending. . . .” Id. However, the

proceedings on Lucas’ postconviction petition ended in February

2000 when the Illinois trial court dismissed that petition and

Lucas chose not to appeal it. Thus, the relevant state

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postconviction proceedings had terminated before Lucas’ habeas

limitation period had even commenced. The state court petition

Lucas filed in March 2009 does nothing to help him, either, as by

that time the limitations period had been expired for more than

seven years. The Seventh Circuit has made it clear that state

court proceedings that commence after the habeas limitations period

do not “reset the federal clock.” De Jesus v. Acevedo, 567 F.3d

941, 943 (7th Cir. 2009). “[W]hat [§ 2244(d)(2)] does is exclude

particular time from the year, not restart that year. . . . It

follows that a state proceeding that does not begin until the

federal year has expired is irrelevant.” Id. Lucas thus has no

statutory basis to toll the limitations period set forth in § 2244.

The Court finds no equitable basis for tolling the statute,

either. The Supreme Court has held that § 2244(d) is subject to

equitable tolling. See, Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562

(2010). However, “[e]quitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy

and so is rarely granted.” Obriecht v. Foster, 727 F.3d 744, 748

(7th Cir. 2013). A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling

only if he shows “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in

his way” and prevented him from filing timely. Holland, 130 S.Ct.

at 2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). 

The Court finds that Lucas meets neither requirement for equitable

tolling. Lucas cannot be said to have pursued his rights

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diligently when he waited years after being admonished of his MSR

term to file his petition challenging it. See, Pace, 125 S.Ct. at

1815. The Court also sees nothing in the record or Lucas’ detailed

Petition that would constitute “extraordinary circumstances” for

tolling purposes.

The Court thus concludes that, pursuant to § 2244, the

limitations period for Lucas to file a habeas petition challenging

his MSR term was due to be filed in this Court on December 13,

2001, one year after his conviction became final. Lucas’ Petition

is thus untimely, and as such, the Court dismisses it. Having

reached a resolution of the Petition based on its untimeliness, the

Court declines to examine or rule with respect to the merits of its

arguments.

C. Certificate of Appealability

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides

that the district court “must issue or deny a certificate of

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the

applicant.” U.S.C. § 2254 Cases R. 11. When a petition is

dismissed as untimely, a certificate of appealability should issue

only if reasonable jurists would find the petition’s timeliness

‘debatable.’” Page v. Anglin, No. 13 C 4298, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

162810 at *9-10 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2013) (quoting Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Because the untimeliness of

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Lucas’ petition is not debatable, a certificate of appealability is

denied. Id.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to § 2254 is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge

United States District Court

Date: 3/3/2014

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