ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 306 1 

China’s latest round of military reforms is driven primarily by Xi Jinping’s ambition to reshape the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to improve its ability to win informationized [xinxihua, 信息化] wars 

and to ensure that it remains loyal to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 

The reforms are unprecedented in their ambition and in the scale and scope 

of the organizational changes. Virtually every part of the PLA now reports to 

different leaders, has had its mission and responsibilities changed, has lost or 

gained subordinate units, or has undergone a major internal reorganization. The 

relationships between and among the Central Military Commission (CMC) 

departments, offices, and commissions, the services, and the theater commands 

(TCs) have all changed.1 The reforms established new joint command and control mechanisms and thus have important implications for how the PLA conducts operations within and beyond China’s borders.

This paper first discusses the strategic drivers of PLA efforts to improve 

the Chinese military’s ability to operate beyond China’s borders. Deploying and 

supporting troops beyond China’s land borders require different types of weapons and troops, new logistics capabilities, longer range command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 

support, and appropriate training and doctrine to support power projection missions. Efforts are under way to build these capabilities. The next section provides 

a framework of the different types of operations the PLA may be required to 

conduct in the coming years.

The paper then explores which parts of the reorganized PLA have responsibility for command and control of different types of operations. The post-reform 

PLA organizational structure is intended to give the TCs primary responsibility 

for operations and to focus the services on force-building. However, a number 

Beyond Borders: PLA 

Command and Control of 

Overseas Operations

By Phillip C. Saunders

STRATEGIC FORUM

National Defense University

About the Author

Dr. Phillip C. Saunders is Director of the 

Center for the Study of Chinese Military 

Affairs, Institute for National Strategic 

Studies, at the National Defense 

University.

Key Points

◆ Expanded Chinese economic interests and the higher priority given 

to maritime interests are driving 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) efforts to develop power projection 

capabilities.

◆ The reorganization of the Chinese 

military in late 2015 explicitly 

sought to give the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the 

theater commands responsibility 

for conducting operations and 

to relegate the services to forcebuilding. However, the services 

are trying to maintain operational 

responsibilities, including for overseas operations.

◆ The precise division of responsibilities and coordination mechanisms between the CMC, which 

controls nuclear weapons and 

likely other strategic capabilities, 

and the theater commands, which 

control ground, naval, air, and conventional missile forces, remains 

unclear, especially for large, highintensity combat operations.

◆ Existing command and control 

mechanisms are workable for 

now, but are likely to prove inadequate if PLA overseas operations 

become larger, require joint forces, 

last for extended periods of time, 

or occur in nonpermissive environments where deployed forces face 

significant threats from hostile 

state or nonstate actors.

July 2020

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF CHINESE MILITARY AFFAIRS
2 SF No. 306 ndupress.ndu.edu

of gaps and areas of overlapping responsibility exist that 

muddy this picture and raise questions about how the 

PLA will plan and execute different types of operations. 

The paper concludes that the post-reform command 

and control mechanisms are workable for now but are 

likely to prove inadequate if PLA overseas operations 

become larger, require joint forces, last for extended periods of time, or occur in nonpermissive environments 

where deployed forces face significant threats. The final 

section considers how the PLA might create new joint 

command and control arrangements to better support expeditionary operations, identifying five potential 

models. Some of those options would require significant 

additional reforms to command and control structures, 

especially if the PLA envisions conducting joint warfare 

in the far seas.

Drivers of PLA Power Projection

A broad trend in the PLA that predated the latest 

round of reforms is an increasing interest in power projection well beyond China’s borders and the First Island 

Chain. David Finkelstein has described the resulting developments as contributing to an “incipient expeditionary 

PLA.”2 A number of drivers are supporting this effort.

First, economic interests outside China’s borders have 

increased as a result of China’s opening up and expanding 

trade and investment ties around the world. This situation has produced new dependencies on foreign markets 

and foreign sources of raw materials and energy, as well 

as a significant overseas presence for Chinese companies 

and People’s Republic of China (PRC) nationals, some in 

unstable places. This led Hu Jintao to articulate the “New 

Historic Missions” for the PLA in 2004, which gave the 

military responsibility for protecting China’s economic 

development.3

 In practical terms, this translates into the 

need for the military to be able to protect China’s sea lines 

of communication (SLOCs) against threats by state and 

nonstate actors, rescue PRC citizens at risk in unstable 

environments, protect China’s overseas investments, and 

ensure stability in countries and regions important to 

China’s economic and security interests.4

Second, China’s leadership has given heightened attention to China’s unresolved territorial claims, including Taiwan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East 

China Sea, and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The substance of these claims has not changed 

significantly, but previous reform-era Chinese leaders 

were prepared to downplay them in pursuit of a stable 

regional environment that supported economic development. A richer China, and one where CCP leaders rely 

more heavily on nationalist credentials as a source of legitimacy, has resulted in a higher priority on defending 

Chinese claims—with Xi Jinping telling the U.S. Secretary of Defense that China cannot lose “even one inch of 

territory”—and in expanding China’s effective control of 

disputed maritime territory.5

Third, the PLA’s services are in increasing competition to develop long-range weapons and expeditionary 

capabilities. The New Historic Missions, originally drafted by the CMC General Office’s research arm, give the 

services political justification to develop new capabilities 

and the doctrine to support them.6 For the navy, this includes development of aircraft carriers and an expansion 

of the marines while adding “far seas protection” to its 

“near seas defense” mission.7 For the air force, this includes development of long-range strike capabilities and 

a new strategic bomber, and a shift to offensive operations and training over water.8

 For the army, this includes 

greater emphasis on mobility and the ability to deploy 

and sustain forces outside normal operating areas.9 For 

the Rocket Force, this includes developing long-range 

conventional missile systems and weapons such as the 

DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM).10 Such capabilities not only are necessary for the PLA to project 

power beyond China’s land borders but also reflect the 

modernization goals of the individual military services as 

well as guidance from CCP leaders.

Fourth, China’s civilian and military leaders have 

sought to expand the PLA’s ability to contribute global 

public goods, such as regional stability and humanitarian 

assistance, and to support positive relations with other 

countries and regions. Chinese leaders have highlighted 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 306 3 

the PLA’s positive contributions to regional stability such 

as participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations, counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and 

participation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts. This represents an effort to portray 

expanding Chinese defense budgets and PLA capabilities in a less threatening manner and to make the case for 

power projection capabilities as necessary for the PLA to 

contribute to regional and global stability.11 China has 

also significantly expanded its efforts to use military diplomacy to engage other militaries and support broader 

Chinese foreign policy goals.12

These four drivers, and the resulting modernization of Chinese military capabilities that they have supported, are producing a PLA that is increasingly active 

outside China’s land borders.13 Chinese naval activity 

has increased in the South China Sea, East China Sea, 

and Indian Ocean, including training deployments of 

the aircraft carrier Liaoning.

14 The PLA Navy has also 

maintained counterpiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden 

since December 2008. The PLA Air Force has increased 

its training over water in the South China Sea and the 

East China Sea, including stepped up operations of 

H-6 bombers and maritime surveillance aircraft in the 

Western Pacific, South China Sea, and Sea of Japan.15

The PLA has established its first overseas base in Djibouti, participates in nine United Nations peacekeeping 

operations, and is conducting active military diplomacy 

efforts that include port calls and a range of bilateral and 

multilateral military exercises with countries in the IndoPacific and in other regions of the world.

This increasing volume of military activity beyond 

China’s borders is placing new demands on PLA command and control mechanisms. The 2013 edition of the 

Science of Military Strategy called for using both cooperative and confrontational military activities to expand 

China’s strategic space overseas; it also noted the need 

to establish a new joint command system to provide effective support for these activities.16 The military reforms 

adopted in 2016 established new national- and theaterlevel joint command mechanisms and nominally removed the services from an operational command role.

Types of Overseas Operations

Before discussing the reforms in detail, it is useful 

to outline potential PLA overseas operations. These can 

be grouped conceptually into four broad categories: border contingencies, near seas operations and contingencies, “theater plus” contingencies, and far seas operations 

and contingencies. Border contingencies involve potential 

conflicts with countries sharing land borders with China; 

each theater command conducts planning and training 

for those contingencies within its area of responsibility. 

Border contingencies may involve interventions or major combat operations in neighboring countries; the term 

does not connote only skirmishes over disputed borders. 

Near seas operations and contingencies take place in the 

South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Yellow 

Sea. The Southern, Eastern, and Northern TCs conduct 

near seas operations within their respective areas of responsibility. Theater plus contingencies lie primarily within 

one theater command’s geographic area of responsibility, 

but either require significant assets not under the theater 

commander’s control or supporting operations that take 

place outside that area of responsibility. The latter case 

may involve multitheater operations, such as would be 

needed in a Taiwan contingency. Far seas operations and 

contingencies take place beyond the First Island Chain and 

thus appear to lie beyond the areas of responsibility of the 

TCs.17 These include traditional blue water navy missions 

such as protection of SLOCs as well as a range of smaller 

nontraditional security missions. In addition to these 

larger operations and contingencies, the PLA conducts 

military operations other than war that involve regularly 

deploying smaller quantities of military forces outside 

China’s borders, both within and beyond the Indo-Pacific region. These include conducting military diplomacy, 

peacekeeping operations, HA/DR, and noncombatant 

evacuations. The table summarizes command and control 

responsibilities for each type of overseas operation.
4 SF No. 306 ndupress.ndu.edu

Table. PLA Overseas Operations

Type of Operation Command and Control Operational Forces Examples

Border Contingencies TCs; CMC retains control over 

PLARF nuclear and strategic 

capabilities; service HQs for 

strategic capabilities (for 

example, aircraft carriers, 

bombers, paratroopers, 

ASBMs)

TC armies; TC navies; 

TC air forces; PLARF 

conventional forces

The four TCs with land 

borders plan and train 

for specific contingencies 

within their geographic 

areas of responsibility

Near Seas Operations 

and Contingencies 

TCs; coast guard HQ; PLAAF 

HQ for bomber operations?

TC navies; TC air forces; 

coast guard; maritime 

militia

Southern TC controls 

South China Sea 

operations; Eastern TC 

controls East China Sea 

operations; Northern 

TC controls Yellow Sea 

operations

“Theater Plus” 

Contingencies

TCs for main effort; CMC and/

or Service HQs for “plus” part 

of large-scale operations? 

CMC for commanding 

multitheater operations

TC armies; TC navies; 

TC air forces; PLARF 

conventional forces; 

service strategic 

capabilities (aircraft 

carriers, bombers, 

paratroopers, ASBMs)

Western Pacific and Far 

Seas aspects of a Taiwan 

contingency (Eastern TC 

has lead for main effort); 

naval aspects of an India 

contingency (Western TC 

has lead for main effort)

Far Seas Operations and 

Contingencies

Navy HQ; CMC JSD Navy; other services 

and SSF in supporting 

roles

Counterintervention 

operations; SLOC 

protection; counterpiracy 

deployments and port 

calls; Djibouti base

Military Diplomacy CMC Training and 

Administration Department 

(joint exercises); service HQs 

(single-service exercises); 

CMC Office of International 

Military Cooperation (liaison)

Army; navy; air force Chinese participation 

in Russian Vostok 2018 

joint exercise; PLAN and 

Russian Navy Joint Sea 

combined naval exercises

PKOs; HA/DR; NEOs CMC/JSD Overseas 

Operations Office (current 

PKOs, HA/DR, and NEOs);

Chinese Ministry of National 

Defense Peacekeeping Affairs 

Office (PKOs);

air force HQ (2011 NEO);

navy HQ (2015 NEO)

Army; navy; air force PLA engineer, medical, 

and infantry units 

and observers have 

deployed to UN PKOs in 

Africa and the Middle 

East; China delivered 

supplies and provided 

assistance to Indonesia 

after a September 2018 

earthquake and tsunami; 

PLA evacuated 35,000 PRC 

nationals from Libya in 

2011; PLAN evacuated 600 

PRC citizens from Yemen 

in 2015

Key: ASBM = anti-ship ballistic missile; CMC = Central Military Commission; HA/DR = humanitarian assistance/disaster relief;

HQ = headquarters; JSD = Joint Staff Department; NEO = noncombat evacuation operation; PKO = peacekeeping operation; PLA = People’s 

Liberation Army; PLAAF = People’s Liberation Army Air Force; PLAN = People’s Liberation Army Navy; PLARF = People’s Liberation Army 

Rocket Force; SLOC = sea lines of communication; TC = theater command; UN = United Nations.
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 306 5 

Division of Labor in a 

Reorganized PLA

In order to improve the PLA’s ability to conduct 

joint operations, the reforms revised the division of labor 

within the PLA, with the CMC providing “general management” [junwei guan zong, 军委管总], the TCs focusing on operations [zhanqu zhu zhan, 战区主战], and the 

services managing force-building [junzhong zhu jian, 军

种主建].18 In principle, operations should be conducted 

either using the new national-level joint command and 

control mechanism under the CMC’s Joint Staff Department ( JSD) or using theater-level joint command 

and control mechanisms.

In practice, however, there appears to be more diversity in which organizations command PLA operations, 

with different organizations taking the lead for different types of operations. The CMC retains control over 

nuclear and some nonnuclear strategic capabilities, likely 

exercising this authority through the JSD and its Joint 

Operations Command Center in the Western Hills. 

Some overseas operations, such as Chinese units participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations, appear to be under the supervision of the JSD Overseas 

Operations Office [haiwai xingdong chu, 海外行动处]. 

Other operations, such as Chinese anti-piracy operations 

in the Gulf of Aden, appear to remain under the control 

of the relevant service headquarters—in this case, navy 

headquarters. The services likely also retain responsibility 

for planning and executing exercises with foreign militaries under the supervision of the CMC Office of International Military Cooperation. Unlike the other services, 

the PLA Rocket Force and the Strategic Support Force 

(SSF) combine both operational and force-building responsibilities in a single organization.19

TCs: Playing Well with Others?

The new theater commands play a central role in the 

PLA’s new joint command and control arrangements, 

but uncertainties about how much authority the theater 

commanders will exercise may limit their effectiveness for 

some geographically dispersed and higher end contingencies. Each TC has responsibility for a specific set of contingencies, which includes planning and joint training in 

peacetime and commanding operations in wartime. The 

new theater joint command and control structure, with 

the TCs exercising control of ground, naval, and air forces 

through service-specific theater component headquarters, 

rectifies a major problem with the pre-reform command 

and control structure, where the military region headquarters did not have peacetime command of naval, air, 

and missile units within its area of responsibility.20 The 

new construct should be much better suited to joint planning, training, and operations. There have been significant 

growing pains as the TCs and their components adjust 

to new command relationships and learn how to work 

together, but the basic joint command structure appears 

to be workable.

The shift from seven military regions to five TCs 

has helped clarify responsibilities for border contingencies and near seas operations. For example, in the prereform system, the Jinan and Shenyang Military Regions 

both had responsibilities in a Korea contingency, and the 

Guangzhou and Chengdu Military Regions had responsibility for different parts of Southeast Asia. In the postreform PLA, each theater command has responsibility 

for specific contingencies based on geography. The Eastern TC has responsibility for Taiwan, Japan, and the East 

China Sea; the Northern TC has responsibility for Korea 

and the Yellow Sea; the Western TC has responsibility 

for India and Central Asia; and the Southern TC has responsibility for Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. 

The Central TC, now commanded by an air force officer, 

would have responsibility for defending the capital in a 

conflict and would serve as a source of reserve forces to 

support other theater commands.21

For most border or near seas contingencies, the relevant TC would have command of PLA forces operating inside and across China’s borders in executing the 

war plan. However, it is not clear how far each theater 

command’s area of responsibility extends beyond the 

border or whether the theater commander would have 
6 SF No. 306 ndupress.ndu.edu

command of geographically dispersed support operations. The Southern TC’s responsibility for the South 

China Sea already requires conducting near seas air and 

naval operations that extend far away from mainland 

China. However, in the event of a Taiwan contingency, 

the PLA Navy may be tasked to operate even farther 

into the Western Pacific (what this paper calls a theater 

plus contingency). It is not clear whether the Eastern 

TC, PLA Navy headquarters, or the CMC JSD would 

have operational control over naval forces operating 

far out in the Western Pacific. Similarly, if China was 

concerned about U.S. military intervention in a Korea 

conflict, Beijing might deploy naval and air forces into 

the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan to deter and defend 

against U.S. naval and air forces. A Chinese conflict with 

India would likely entail naval operations in the Indian 

Ocean, but the Western TC has no naval component to 

take charge of the naval fight.22 Presumably, navy headquarters or the CMC JSD would take on those responsibilities, challenging the principle of unity of command 

and raising the issue of how the PLA would coordinate 

land and naval operations in different theaters.

The reforms established joint command and control 

structures at both the national level under the CMC JSD 

and at the theater level for assigned ground, naval, and 

air force units. However, important questions remain 

about the relationships between the CMC JSD and the 

TCs and about how theater commanders will tap nuclear 

and nonnuclear strategic capabilities that remain under 

CMC control. The precise division of labor and the willingness of the CMC to delegate assets and decision authority to the theater commander in wartime remains 

unclear. The Rocket Force reportedly has at least 100 officers assigned to the five TCs, and theater commanders 

will have operational control over conventional Rocket 

Force units in their theaters in wartime.23 However, the 

CMC will retain decision authority over nuclear weapons and will likely also exercise tight control over longer 

range systems with strategic impact, such as ASBM.24

The SSF will provide strategic space, cyber, electronic 

warfare, and psychological warfare support to TCs, but 

the planning mechanisms and operational command relationships through which this support will be delivered 

are unclear.25 One hint is a reference to an SSF eastern 

theater base, which suggests that the SSF might establish 

support bases in each theater,26 similar to the Joint Logistic Support Force ( JLSF) model.27

Will the JSD, acting on behalf of the CMC, view 

its role primarily as providing supporting strategic capabilities—such as ASBMs, intelligence derived from 

space and cyber systems, counterspace and offensive cyber capabilities, and long-range precision strike—to help 

a theater commander execute the war plan?28 Or will the 

JSD, run by a CMC-member grade officer senior to the 

theater commanders, attempt to micromanage the theater’s operations? The prevailing PLA organizational culture emphasizes caution and deference to authority rather 

than taking responsibility for actions not fully vetted with 

more senior leaders.29 The notion of empowering military 

officers to exercise initiative to carry out the intent of their 

commanders (known in U.S. parlance as mission command), which is integral to some Western militaries, is 

not culturally accepted in the PLA at present.30 Integrated communications systems and a common operational 

picture provide both opportunities for timely support 

with national-level strategic capabilities and temptations 

to intervene in the decisions of subordinate commanders. The need to control escalation in a conflict—what the 

PLA calls war control—and the need to integrate operations in other theaters to support the primary theater may 

provide incentives for the JSD to assert its authority over 

the theater commander leading the conflict.31

Service Headquarters: Keeping a 

Hand in Operations?

Another question concerns the role of the services. In 

principle, the reforms removed the service headquarters 

from operations, but in practice all of them have held onto 

some operational command responsibilities, including 

some relevant for overseas operations. Army headquarters 

retains responsibility for border and coastal defense; navy 

headquarters supervises the counterpiracy patrols in the 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 306 7 

Gulf of Aden; air force headquarters retains centralized 

control of bomber, transport, and airborne operations; and 

the Rocket Force has operational control over strategic 

forces. Moreover, all the services are using service training 

requirements, including single-service, multitheater exercises, as a means of asserting a continued operational role. 

The TC army, navy, and air force component commanders 

report to both the TC headquarters for operations and to 

their service headquarters for administration and servicespecific training requirements. How they will reconcile 

competing demands remains to be seen.32

There is ample evidence of interservice rivalry and 

competition for missions and resources relevant to overseas 

operations. Ian Burns McCaslin and Andrew Erickson 

discuss how the higher priority accorded to the maritime 

domain by Xi Jinping has prompted efforts by the air force, 

Rocket Force, and even the army to develop and showcase 

capabilities relevant to near and far seas maritime operations.33 Similar trends are evident in long-range precision 

strike, where the navy, air force, and Rocket Force all have 

systems that perform similar missions.34 Especially in an 

environment where military budgets are growing more 

slowly, interservice competition over missions and resources may impede operational cooperation and complicate efforts to rationalize command and control relationships.35

This may also be the case in the nuclear domain as the PLA 

Navy’s submarines equipped with nuclear-armed ballistic 

missiles become operational and if the PLA Air Force develops and deploys nuclear capabilities.36

There is a real tension between the desire of the services to maximize their budgets and independent capabilities and the needs of theater commanders for trained 

forces that can work jointly. Will the removal of the service commanders from the CMC eventually allow that 

organization to become a genuine joint staff that can 

override parochial service considerations in order to maximize PLA joint operational capabilities?37 Or will established service cultures and organizational interests lead 

the services to resist pressure for greater jointness and 

impede the development of a joint force that maximizes 

PLA combat effectiveness?

Command and Control in a Future 

Expeditionary PLA

One future requirement that the recent PLA reforms 

did not fully address is the potential need to command 

and support a broader range of military operations beyond 

China’s borders, including theater plus contingencies and 

large-scale far seas operations. In the last several decades, 

PLA overseas operations have been limited to participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations, counterpiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden (since December 2008), 

short-term deployments to participate in international 

military exercises and conduct HA/DR operations, and a 

few noncombatant emergency evacuations.

The PLA is devoting considerable effort to developing power projection capabilities, doctrine, and political 

justifications that would support expeditionary operations well beyond China’s land borders and outside the 

Second Island Chain.38 The new logistics base in Djibouti 

improves the PLA’s ability to sustain peacetime naval operations in a permissive environment and provides a nascent capability to support other types of operations that 

may involve a combat role.39 These operations are justified 

domestically by the need to protect China’s overseas interests and internationally by the claim that the Chinese 

military can provide public goods and contribute to international stability.40

The TCs are better equipped to respond to a range of 

border and near seas contingencies than was possible under the pre-reform military regions. However, their ability to plan and execute operations has geographic limits 

depending on their areas of responsibility and the specific contingencies they are assigned.41 The exact nature of 

those assigned areas is unknown; the official map of the 

TC areas of responsibility shows no boundaries outside 

Chinese land territory.42 Unlike the U.S. military, which 

assigns every part of the world to a geographic combatant command responsible for contingency planning and 

operations within its respective region, the PLA has gaps 
8 SF No. 306 ndupress.ndu.edu

where potential operations fall outside the designated areas of responsibility of the five TCs. The PLA does not 

appear to have established a standing or ad hoc joint task 

force mechanism to command such operations.

To date, most PLA far seas operations—such as 

the evacuation of Chinese citizens from Libya in 2011 

and Yemen in 2015—have been small, of short duration, 

and in relatively permissive environments.43 These types 

of operations are currently assigned either to the CMC 

JSD or to one of the service headquarters, depending on 

the nature of the operation. However, these mechanisms 

are likely to prove inadequate if PLA far seas operations 

become larger, require joint forces, last for extended periods of time, or occur in contested environments with 

threats from hostile state or nonstate actors.44 Conducting 

multiple simultaneous overseas operations would further 

stress the PLA’s ability to command overseas operations.45

If the PLA begins to regularly conduct such operations, 

new joint command and control mechanisms will likely 

be necessary.

There are at least five potential solutions: allow the 

service headquarters to continue commanding far seas 

operations, extend TC areas of responsibility to fill gaps, 

establish a new “global command” to handle the rest of 

the world, strengthen JSD operational command capabilities, or develop new joint command and control 

mechanisms along the lines of U.S. ad hoc and standing 

joint task forces. These options are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

◆ Allow service headquarters to command far seas 

operations. The path of least resistance would be to allow 

the service headquarters to maintain command responsibilities for far seas operations that lie outside the areas 

of responsibilities of the TCs. This appears to be the current PLA practice, with navy headquarters in charge of 

counterpiracy deployments in the Gulf of Aden and China’s logistics base in Djibouti. The advantage is that the 

navy already has some experience and the communications hardware necessary to command these operations.46

However, this solution runs counter to the logic of the 

reforms and is not well suited to conducting operations 

that involve multiple services or that require significant 

deployments of ground forces far from China’s borders.47

Moreover, the other services are likely to resist navy dominance of an overseas mission set likely to expand in the 

future.

◆ Extend TC responsibilities. The PLA could follow 

U.S. practice and assign every country and region in the 

world to one of its TCs. This would clarify responsibilities and allow the theaters to gradually extend their joint 

command and control and communications capabilities 

farther from China’s borders.48 However, the TCs are 

relatively new entities that appear to have their hands 

full dealing with their existing responsibilities. Moreover, 

this arrangement would require duplicating C4ISR capabilities across the TCs and risk creating seams across the 

expanded theater command areas of responsibility that 

would complicate global operations.

◆ Establish a new global command. An alternative 

would be a new global command that would handle far 

seas contingencies and other overseas operations that 

lie outside TC areas of responsibility.49 This could build 

on lessons learned from the TCs, avoid duplication of 

costly long-range C4ISR capabilities, and—if based in 

Beijing—potentially reap synergies and ease coordination challenges with the Foreign Ministry and other 

government agencies, Chinese intelligence services, and 

strategic airlift and sealift capabilities controlled by the 

service headquarters. A global command would require a 

significant investment in terms of personnel, equipment, 

and facilities. Unlike the TCs, a global command might 

not have service component headquarters or permanent 

forces assigned, which could be an impediment to training and to effective operations.

◆ Strengthen JSD operational capabilities. Another solution would be to strengthen the JSD’s ability to 

command multiple and larger scale far seas operations. 

This would require a significant expansion of the size 

and staffing of the Joint Operations Command Center. The advantage is that this capability could expand 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 306 9 

incrementally as the pace of PLA overseas operations 

grows. Disadvantages include potential overload, possible interference with JSD responsibilities to command 

national-level assets in a major war, and questions about 

whether the Joint Operations Command Center is well 

suited to exercise tactical command and control over operations halfway around the world.

◆ Develop new joint task force mechanisms. Another 

solution would be to follow U.S. practice and develop new 

ad hoc and standing joint task forces. This is a flexible 

solution that allows for assigning ongoing responsibilities to a standing task force in order to take the burden 

off the JSD and its Joint Operations Command Center 

and for establishing and disestablishing ad hoc joint task 

forces as necessary. One obvious obstacle is that the PLA 

officer corps is new to joint operations. It is not clear how 

many senior PLA officers would be capable of effectively 

commanding a joint task force or how many midlevel officers could serve as capable staff. This problem may ease 

over time as the PLA gains more experience planning and 

conducting joint operations at the theater level.

Conclusion

Xi Jinping’s ambitious organizational reforms constitute a “remaking of the PLA” that has changed how the 

military is organized and how the different parts of the 

post-reform PLA interact with each other.50 Although the 

reorganization is largely complete, the reforms are still a 

work in progress, with the CMC, TCs, services, and support elements—such as the SSF and the JLSF—working 

out how they will operate together in practice. Some prereform practices, such as the navy’s command of Gulf of 

Aden counterpiracy missions, are continuing even though 

they are at odds with the organizational logic of the reforms. The current diversity of command and control arrangements may reflect conscious decisions, transitional 

arrangements that may change in the future, or a struggle 

between different parts of the PLA over roles and missions. There are a number of gaps and areas of overlapping 

responsibility that raise questions about the PLA’s ability 

to achieve unity of command.

The pace of PLA modernization continues to accelerate, and past constraints on overseas operations are 

eroding. At the same time, the political, economic, and 

strategic demands for the PLA to operate beyond Chinese borders to protect and advance Chinese interests are 

increasing as projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative 

are implemented. The next transformation of the PLA 

will involve integrating power projection capabilities 

such as carrier battle groups, amphibious and expeditionary forces, long-range transport and strike capabilities, 

C4ISR, advanced logistics support, and overseas bases 

into a still-emerging concept of global operations. As the 

PLA begins conducting larger and more sophisticated 

joint operations and expands the range and scope of its 

overseas operations, experience will likely reveal the need 

for additional adjustments to joint command and control 

mechanisms to fully support China’s growing military 

ambitions and increasingly global PLA operations.

Notes 1 For a comprehensive analysis of the reforms, see Phillip C. 

Saunders et al., eds., Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese 

Military Reforms (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2019), available 

at <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Books/Chairman-XiRemakes-the-PLA/>.

2 David Finkelstein, Commentary on China’s External Grand Strategy (Arlington, VA: CNA, January 2011), 6–7.

3 Daniel Hartnett, Toward a Globally Focused Chinese Military: The 

Historic Missions of the Chinese Armed Forces (Arlington, VA: CNA, June 

2008).

4 Mathieu Duchâtel, Oliver Bräuner, and Zhou Hong, Protecting 

China’s Overseas Interests: The Slow Shift Away from Non-Interference 

(Stockholm: SIPRI, 2014).

5 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Steven Lee Myers, “China Won’t 

Yield ‘Even One Inch’ of South China Sea, Xi Tells Mattis,” New York 

Times, June 27, 2018, available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/

world/asia/mattis-xi-china-sea.html>.

6 Hartnett, Toward a Globally Focused Chinese Military.

7 Christopher H. Sharman, China Moves Out: Stepping Stones 

Toward a New Maritime Strategy, China Strategic Perspectives 9 

(Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2015).

8 Mark R. Cozad and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, People’s 

Liberation Army Air Force Operations over Water: Maintaining Relevance 

in China’s Changing Security Environment (Arlington, VA: RAND, 

2017).

9 See John Chen, “Choosing the ‘Least Bad Option’: Organizational Interests and Change in the PLA Ground Forces,” in Saunders 

et al., Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA, 85–124.
10 SF No. 306 ndupress.ndu.edu

ployment of National-Level PLA Assets in a Contingency: A CrossStrait Conflict as Case Study,” in The People’s Liberation Army and 

Contingency Planning in China, ed. Andrew Scobell et al. (Washington, 

DC: NDU Press, 2015), 135–158.

29 Roger Cliff, “Chinese Military Reforms: A Pessimistic Take,” 

Joint Force Quarterly 83 (4th Quarter 2016), 53–56.

30 Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission 

Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies (Stanford: Stanford 

University Press, 2011).

31 Thanks to Michael Coullahan of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command 

for highlighting this point.

32 Wang Weixing [王卫星] argues that the power of U.S. geographic combatant commanders to override Service personnel assignments and to appeal directly to the Secretary of Defense for resources 

and authorities is an important source of U.S. military operational 

success, implicitly arguing for empowering theater commanders over 

the services. See “Improving Operating Effectiveness of Joint Command and Control Mechanisms” [联合作战指挥体制如何高效运

行], Xinhua Online [新华网], December 3, 2015, available at <www.

xinhuanet.com/mil/2015-12/03/c_128495581_2.htm>.

33 See Ian Burns McCaslin and Andrew Erickson, “The Impact 

of Xi-Era Reforms on the Chinese Navy,” in Saunders et al., Chairman 

Xi Remakes the PLA, 125–170.

34 See Phillip C. Saunders and Erik Quam, “Future Force 

Structure of the Chinese Air Force,” in Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army, ed. Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, 2007).

35 See Phillip C. Saunders, “A ‘World-Class’ Military: Assessing 

China’s Global Military Ambitions,” Testimony Before the U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission, June 20, 2019.

36 For an analysis of possibilities, see David C. Logan, China’s 

Future SSBN Command and Control Structure, INSS Strategic Forum 

299 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, November 2016).

37 See Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, “Conclusion: Assessing Chinese Military Capabilities,” in Saunders et al., Chairman Xi 

Remakes the PLA, 711–728.

38 Kristen Gunness and Oriana Skylar Mastro, “A Global People’s 

Liberation Army: Possibilities, Challenges, and Opportunities,” Asia 

Policy 22 ( July 2016), 131–155.

39 See Erica Downs, Jeffrey Becker, and Patrick deGategno, 

China’s Military Support Facility in Djibouti: The Economic and Security 

Dimensions of China’s First Overseas Base (Arlington, VA: CNA, July 

2017); Jeff Becker, “What Does China Want in Djibouti?” National 

Interest, December 27, 2017, available at <https://nationalinterest.org/

feature/what-does-china-want-djibouti-23827>. 

40 See The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces.

41 See Scobell et al., The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency 

Planning in China.

42 See the map available at “Recent Big Moves at Theater Commands: 34 New Personnel within One Month” [战区近来动作不小 1

个月内34人履新], Sohu, August 21, 2016, available at <http://news.

sohu.com/20160821/n465257915.shtml>. Thanks to Joel Wuthnow for 

this point.

43 The Libya noncombatant evacuation operation rescued about 

35,000 Chinese citizens, but the PLA Air Force role was relatively 

limited. See Michael S. Chase, “The PLA and Far Seas Contingencies: 

Chinese Capabilities for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations,” in 

Scobell et al., The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in 

China, 301–319.

10 See David M. Logan, “Making Sense of China’s Missile 

Forces,” in Saunders et al., Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA, 393–436.

11 The 2013 defense white paper is an excellent example of Chinese efforts to connect expanded PLA capabilities with a greater ability 

to contribute to stability. See The Diversified Employment of China’s 

Armed Forces (Beijing: State Council Information Office of the People’s 

Republic of China, April 16, 2013).

12 Kenneth Allen, Phillip C. Saunders, and John Chen, Chinese 

Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and Implications, China Strategic Perspectives 11 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, July 2017).

13 See Joel Wuthnow et al., eds., The PLA Beyond Borders: Chinese 

Military Operations in Regional and Global Context (Washington, DC: 

NDU Press, forthcoming).

14 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018 (Washington, DC: Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, 2018), 30–32.

15 Ibid., 118–120.

16 Academy of Military Science Strategy Research Department, 

Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Military Sciences Press, 

2013), 120, 249.

17 It is not clear whether operations in the Philippine Sea, which 

lies between the First and Second Island Chains, are the responsibility 

of Southern Theater Command (TC), PLA Navy headquarters, or the 

Central Military Commission’s Joint Staff Department.

18 “Central Military Commission Opinion on Deepening 

National Defense and Armed Force Reforms” [中央军委关于深化国

防和军队改革的意见], Xinhua, January 1, 2016, available at <http://

news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-01/01/c_1117646695.htm>.

19 See John Costello and Joe McReynolds, “China’s Strategic 

Support Force: A Force for a New Era,” in Saunders et al., Chairman 

Xi Remakes the PLA, 437–518.

20 See Edward Burke and Arthur Chan, “Coming to a Theater 

Near You: Command, Control, Forces, Etc.,” in Saunders et al., Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA, 227–256.

21 Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, Chinese Military 

Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications, 

China Strategic Perspectives 10 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, March 

2017), 17–18.

22 The Western TC had no naval officers assigned to its staff prior 

to 2018, but at least one PLA Navy officer was recently assigned to the 

TC staff. Personal communication from a U.S. Navy officer, May 2019.

23 Zhang Hui, “PLA Rocket Force Names 100 Officers to Commands,” Global Times (Beijing), April 12, 2016, available at <www.

globaltimes.cn/content/978291.shtml>.

24 See Phillip C. Saunders and David C. Logan, “China’s 

Regional Nuclear Capability, Non-Nuclear Strategic Systems, and 

Integration of Concepts and Operations,” in James Smith and Paul 

Bolt, eds., China as a 21st-Century Strategic Power (Washington, DC: 

Georgetown University Press, 2020).

25 See Costello and McReynolds, “China’s Strategic Support 

Force,” in Saunders et al., Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA, 437–519.

26 Ibid.; John Chen, Joe McReynolds, and Kieran Green, “The 

Strategic Support Force in Organizational Context: How the SSF Fits 

into China’s Overall Plans for Joint Warfare,” in Wuthnow, The PLA 

Beyond Borders.

27 See LeighAnn Luce and Erin Richter, “Handling Logistics 

in a Reformed PLA: The Long March Toward Joint Logistics,” in 

Saunders et al., Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA, 257–292.

28 For a pre-reform discussion of what these capabilities are and 

how they might be applied in a contingency, see Mark Stokes, “Em-
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 306 11 

44 For a discussion of what these future far seas operations might 

look like, see Joel Wuthnow, Phillip C. Saunders, and Ian Burns McCaslin, “PLA Joint Operations in the Far Seas,” paper presented at the 

Naval War College, May 6–7, 2019. 

45 See Joel Wuthnow, System Overload: Can China’s Military 

Be Distracted in a War over Taiwan? China Strategic Perspectives 15 

(Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2020), available at <https://ndupress.

ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/2232369/system-overload-can-chinasmilitary-be-distracted-in-a-war-over-taiwan/>.

46 For an argument that the Navy is best equipped to develop and 

operate the advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance necessary for far seas 

operations, see Zhu Dangming and Tai Daguo [朱党明,秦大国], 

“Building a Sea and Space Versatile Battlefield Situation Picture” [海

天一体战场通用态势图构建], Journal of Equipment Academy [准备学

院学报] 28 (April 2017), 46–51.

47 The discussion of such operations in the 2013 edition of the 

Science of Military Strategy envisions the other services only playing minor roles in supporting naval operations. See chap. 10, sect. 2, 215–216.

48 For one article by a Southern TC officer advocating an expanded TC role in far seas operations, see Li Jianwen [李建文], “Making the Leap: From Near Seas to Far Seas” [跨越:从今海到远海], 

Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], October 13, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/

jfjbmap/content/1/2016-10/13/04/2016101304_pdf.pdf>.

49 For a PLA analysis of U.S. and Russian command arrangements and the argument that TCs should be based around China’s 

strategic needs, see Li Meili and Liu Xiaoliang [李美丽,刘孝良], 

“Explaining Joint Command Mechanisms in Foreign Militaries” [解

码外军联合指挥机构], Xinhua Online [新华网], October 10, 2018, 

available at <www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-10/09/c_129967764.

htm>. The article notes that changing strategic needs could require new 

organizations, citing the U.S. establishment of U.S. Africa Command 

as an example.

50 See Saunders et al., eds., Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA.

The Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs 

(CSCMA) within the Institute for National Strategic Studies serves as a national focal point and resource center 

for multidisciplinary research and analytic exchanges on 

the national goals and strategic posture of the People’s 

Republic of China. The center focuses on China’s ability to 

develop, eld, and deploy an effective military instrument 

in support of its national strategic objectives.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by 

members of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security affairs from the United States and 

abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 

expressed or implied within are those of the contributors 

and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Defense 

Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. Visit NDU Press online at ndupress.ndu.edu.

Phillip C. Saunders

Director

CSCMA

William T. Eliason

Director

NDU Press

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Laura J. Junor

Director for Research

and Strategic Support

The author thanks MAJ Ryan Neely, Melodie Ha, 

and Jonah Langan-Marmur for research assistance 

and Elizabeth Hague, Michael Coullahan, Dr. Joel 

Wuthnow, and Dr. T.X. Hammes for helpful comments on previous drafts.
12 SF No. 306 ndupress.ndu.edu

System Overload: Can China’s 

Military Be Distracted in a War 

over Taiwan?

by Joel Wuthnow

(CSCMA Strategic Perspectives 15, June 2020)

China's Other Army: The 

People's Armed Police in an Era 

of Reform

by Joel Wuthnow

(CSCMA Strategic Perspectives 14, April 2019)

China’s Strategic Support Force: 

A Force for a New Era

by John Costello and Joe McReynolds

(CSCMA Strategic Perspectives 13, October 2018)

Chinese Perspectives on the 

Belt and Road Initiative: 

Strategic Rationales, Risks, and 

Implications

by Joel Wuthnow

(CSCMA Strategic Perspectives 12, September 2017)

Chinese Military Diplomacy, 

2003–2016: Trends and 

Implications

by Kenneth Allen, Phillip C. Saunders, and 

John Chen

(CSCMA Strategic Perspectives 11, July 2017)

Chinese Military Reforms in 

the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, 

Challenges, and Implication

by Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders

(CSCMA Strategic Perspectives 10, March 2017)

China Moves Out: Stepping 

Stones Toward a New Maritime 

Strategy

by Christopher H. Sharman

(CSCMA Strategic Perspectives 9, March 2015)

Red China’s "Capitalist Bomb": 

Inside the Chinese Neutron 

Bomb Program

by Jonathan Ray

(CSCMA Strategic Perspectives 8, January 2015)

“Not an Idea We Need to 

Shun”: Chinese Overseas Basing 

Requirements in the 21st Century

by Christopher Yung and Ross Rustici, with 

Scott Devary and Jenny Lin

(CSCMA Strategic Perspectives 7, October 2014)

China’s Forbearance Has Limits: 

Chinese Threat and Retaliation 

Signaling and Its Implications 

for a Sino-American Military 

Confrontation

by Paul H.B. Godwin and Alice Miller

(CSCMA Strategic Perspectives 6, April 2013)

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