### I N THE UNI T ED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FI F TH CI RCUI T

No. 12-30234

DENNIS PRICE; ROBERT SHOLAR,

Plaintiffs - Appellees-Cross-Appellants,

v. PCS NITROGEN FERTILIZER, L.P.,

Defendant - Appellant-Cross-Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana USDC No. 3:03–CV–153

Before REAVLEY, PRADO, and ELROD, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * This is an employment retaliation c ase. Robert “Doc” Sholar and Dennis Price (collec t i v e l y, “Plaintiffs”) sued PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer, L.P. (“PCS”), alleging that PCS s upervisors retaliated against them in violation of Louisiana’s environmental whistleblower statute. See La. R.S. § 30:2027. A j ury returned

a verdict for Plaintiffs and, after denying PCS’s post-verdict motion for jud g ment U n i t e d S t a te s C o u r t o f A p p e al s

F i f t h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Aug ust 20, 2013 Ly l e W . Cay ce Clerk

* Purs uant to 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5, the court has determ ined that this op inion s hould not be p ublis hed and is not p reced ent excep t und er the lim ited circum s tances s et forth in 5 T H C I R

. R. 47. 5. 4. Case: 12-30234 Document: 00512347459 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/20/2013No. 12-30234

as a matter of l a w , the district court entered judgment on the verdict. PCS appeals the district court’s j udgme n t on sufficiency of the evidence g rounds. Plaintiffs appeal t h e district court’s denial of their request for t reble d a mages as well as attorneys’ fees and pre-judgment interest on t hos e d a m a g es. We AFFIRM. Plaintiffs’ challenge t o the distr i c t court’s damages ruling turns on a question of statutory construction that we review de novo
. See Carder v
. Cont’l Airline s , I

n c
. , 6 36 F.3d 172, 174 (5th C i r
. 2011) ( citation omitted). We also review de novo t he district court’s denial of PC S ’ s m otion for judgment as a matter o f law, SMI Owen Steel C o. v. Marsh USA, Inc. , 520 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2008), but the “standard of review w ith respect to a jury verdict is especially deferential.” Brown v. B ryan Cnty., Okla. , 2 19 F.3d 4 5 0, 456 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). We will render judg m e nt for PCS only if “the facts and inferences point so strongly in favor of the movant that a rational jury could not reach a contrary verdict.” S MI , 520 F.3d at 437 (quoting Pineda v
. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 360 F.3d 4 83, 486 (5th Cir. 2004)); see also Ellis v. W easler Eng’g Inc. , 258 F .3d 326, 337 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that we “must r eview all of the evidence in the r ecord, draw a ll reasonable i nferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and may n ot make credibility determinations o r weigh the e vidence” (citations omitted)). PCS contends that Plaintiffs did not adduce legally sufficient evidence for the jury to find a causal connection between their protected activity—reporting environmental violations to law enforcement authorities—and the employment decisions at issue. It argues that no rational j ury could h ave found the requisite causal connection because Plaintif f s ’ s u p e r v i s o r s t e s t i f

i ed that, when making the employment decisions at issue, they did not know that Plaintiffs had engaged
2 Case: 12-30234 Document: 00512347459 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/20/2013No. 12-30234

in the p rotected a ctivity. The jury, h owever, could h a v e ( and apparently did) disbelieve this testimony. It is the jury’s p rovince to m ake precisely such credibility determinations. See, e.g. , Guillory v. Domtar Indus. Inc. , 95 F.3d 1 3 2 0 , 1 334 ( 5th Cir. 1 996) (upholding jury findings that “were based upon credibility c alls which are completely within th e p r ovince of the jury”). Considering the totality of the evidence before the jury, we conclude that it could have rationally i nferred that PCS knew of Plaintiffs’ prot ected activity. Thus, we reject PCS’s challenge to the jury’s verdict. We l ikewise r eject Plaintiffs’ challenge to the district court’s ruling on damages. U n d e r the p lain text of the whistleblower s tatute, a plaintiff m ay

recover triple his or her pecuniary losse s , but any emotional damages are awarded “in addition to” trebled wage-type losses, if any. See § 3 0:2027. 2 Here, Plaintiffs had no pecuniary losses a nd t h e i r a rguments to refute the statute’s plain text are unavailing. 3 Accordingly, the district c ourt c orrectly determined the damages award. AFFIRMED.

2 The s tatute s tates , in relevant p art: “D am ages ” to be tri

p l ed p urs uant to P aragrap h B( 1) of this Section s hall be f or the p eriod of the d am age, but not to exceed three years , and s hall includ e but not be lim ited to los t wages , los t anticip ated w ages d ue to a w age increas e, or los s of anticip ated w ages w hich w ould have res ulted f rom a los t p rom otion, and if the p eriod of the d am age exceed s three years , the em ployee s hall thereaf ter be entitled to actual d am ages
. I n a ddi ti on t o the ab o v e , “ d a m a ges ” s hall als o includ e any p r o p e r ty los t as a res ult of los t w ages , los t benef its , and any p hys ical or em otional d am ages res ulting theref rom
. § 30: 2027( B) ( 2) ( b) ( em p has is ad d ed )

.

3 Becaus e w e conclud e that Plaintif f s m a y not recover trip le their non- p ecuniary d am ages und er the w his tleblow er s tatute, w e need not d e cid e w hether they should recover ad d itional attorneys ’ fees and p re- jud gm ent interes t on trebled d am ages
. 3 Case: 12-30234 Document: 00512347459 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/20/2013