RENDERED: MAY 5, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-0460-MR

TONY L. HALE APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 20-CR-00864

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION

REVERSING AND REMANDING

**   **  **

BEFORE: EASTON, LAMBERT, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: Tony L. Hale appeals the Fayette Circuit Court’s judgment 

convicting him of a second or greater offense of trafficking in a controlled 

substance, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. We 

reverse and remand for the reasons stated herein.
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BACKGROUND

On August 18, 2020, Detective Brendan Hazelwood and other 

detectives of the Lexington Police Department were conducting surveillance in

areas of reported drug activity in east Lexington. While seated in his unmarked 

vehicle, Detective Hazelwood observed a white GMC SUV operated by Hale, an 

individual unknown to him, stop at the corner of 7th and Jackson Streets during the 

late afternoon or early evening daylight hours. An unknown male subject 

approached Hale’s vehicle, entered the front passenger side for a short period, and 

then exited the vehicle. The unknown male subject then conversed with Hale by 

the vehicle’s side for a short time before Hale drove away. 

Detective Hazelwood and the other detectives followed Hale to 

Barksdale Drive where Hale parked his vehicle and was observed entering a 

residence. While inside the residence, Hale remotely locked his vehicle multiple 

times using his key fob and, after a short stay, proceeded back into his vehicle and 

left. Based on these observations, Detective Hazelwood became suspicious Hale 

was engaged in drug-related activity. At approximately 7:00 p.m., Detective 

Hazelwood radioed for an available patrol unit to initiate a traffic stop on Hale’s 

vehicle. Officer Dan Hempel and Officer Zachary Flowers received the call and 

initiated a stop on Hale’s vehicle for failure to use a turn signal while changing 

lanes on southbound Interstate 75. 
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A K-9 unit was requested by an unknown officer to come to the scene 

of the stop while Officer Hempel and Officer Flowers issued a citation. Detective 

Hazelwood took a nearby exit and remained off scene while maintaining radio 

contact. Soon after Hale’s vehicle was pulled over, Officer Hempel approached to 

inform Hale he was stopped for a lane change violation. When asked where he 

was coming from, Hale indicated his parents’ house on Linton Road. At some 

point thereafter, Officer Hempel observed Hale to appear nervous and to be 

exhibiting shaking hands. Due to Hale’s inability to produce proof of insurance, 

Officer Hempel returned to his patrol unit to generate a traffic citation for a lane 

change violation and no proof of insurance. Detective Hazelwood radioed Officer 

Hempel and told him to “take [his] time” generating the citation as the K-9 unit 

was enroute. 

Ultimately, Officer Hempel returned to Hale’s vehicle, provided the 

citation, and informed Hale he was “free to go.” Officer Hempel walked back 

toward his patrol unit and conversed with Officer Flowers who reminded him they 

had an ongoing narcotics investigation. This prompted Officer Hempel to return to 

Hale’s vehicle for additional questioning. When again asked where he had come 

from, Hale indicated he came from his parents’ house on Linton Road. After some 

follow up questions, Officer Hempel then informed Hale to “hang on a second.” 
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Shortly thereafter, Hale found proof of his insurance, and Officer Hempel agreed

to void the no insurance charge and re-issue the citation. 

Officer Hempel walked back to his patrol unit to begin reissuing a 

new citation, and the K-9 unit, which recently arrived on scene, ultimately 

conducted a sniff search of Hale’s vehicle. While Officer Hempel worked on

reissuing the citation, the K-9 unit alerted to the presence of drugs and a search of 

Hale’s vehicle resulted in the discovery of cocaine, marijuana, and $3,000.00 in 

cash. 

Hale was indicted on October 13, 2020, and a motion to suppress 

evidence from the vehicular search was filed on February 26, 2021. Hale argued 

the police stopped his vehicle without sufficient cause to initiate a traffic stop, and 

in the alternative, unlawfully prolonged it to conduct a drug investigation. A 

suppression hearing was held on June 29, 2021, during which Detective 

Hazelwood, Officer Hempel, and Officer Flowers testified. Video produced from 

body cameras worn by Officer Hempel and Officer Flowers was played at the 

hearing. 

The Fayette Circuit Court denied the motion to suppress and entered

oral findings stating that observed lane change violations provided cause for the 

traffic stop, and its extension was justified based on occurrences after the stop. 

The trial court found Hale’s nervousness and statements regarding his prior 
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whereabouts provided the officers with reasonable suspicion during the stop when 

combined with Detective Hazelwood’s prior observations. On July 6, 2021, the

trial court entered a written order denying the motion to suppress for the “reasons 

stated on the record.” On October 22, 2021, Hale filed a motion to reconsider the

denial of his motion to suppress citing Commonwealth v. Clayborne, 635 S.W.3d 

818, 821 (Ky. 2021), which was finalized on October 20, 2021. On January 28, 

2022, the trial court denied the motion to reconsider finding the facts of Clayborne

to be distinguishable.

On February 25, 2022, Hale preserved his right to appeal the denial of 

suppression and entered a conditional guilty plea to a second or greater offense of 

trafficking in a controlled substance, possession of marijuana, and possession of 

drug paraphernalia. Hale was sentenced to ten years in prison on April 14, 2022. 

This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A review of a denial of a motion to suppress involves a twofold 

determination of whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by 

substantial evidence along with a de novo review of the trial court’s legal 

conclusions. Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth, 427 S.W.3d 178, 180 (Ky. 2014). If 

the trial court’s fact findings are supported by substantial evidence, they are 

conclusive. Id. “Substantial evidence is evidence, taken alone or in light of other 
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proof, that a reasonable mind would find sufficient to support a conclusion.” Cox 

v. Commonwealth, 641 S.W.3d 101, 113 (Ky. 2022) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). The Commonwealth bears the burden of proof by a 

preponderance of the evidence at a suppression hearing. Cook v. Commonwealth, 

826 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Ky. 1992). 

ANALYSIS

Police can stop and briefly detain a person, or a vehicle, to investigate 

potential criminal activity if the officer has reasonable suspicion. Commonwealth 

v. Blake, 540 S.W.3d 369, 373 (Ky. 2018) (citation omitted). While requiring less 

than a probable cause showing, “reasonable suspicion is more than an 

unparticularized suspicion or hunch” and “requires at least a minimal level of 

objective justification for making the stop” based on articulable facts. Bauder v. 

Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 588, 591 (Ky. 2009) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Priddy, 184 S.W.3d 501, 505 (Ky. 2005). 

When scrutinizing these investigatory detentions, often dubbed Terry1stops, a 

reviewing court should review the totality of the circumstances with a “wide lens” 

when determining if they establish reasonable suspicion. Bauder, 299 S.W.3d at 

591; Priddy, 184 S.W.3d at 511 (citation omitted).

1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
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On appeal, Hale asserts three challenges to his detention. First, there 

was insufficient cause to initiate a traffic stop. Second, if it was a lawful traffic 

stop, it was prolonged past the point it concluded or should have concluded. Third, 

it was prolonged without independent reasonable suspicion to await the arrival of 

the K-9 unit. We examine each argument individually. 

A. There was Probable Cause for the Traffic Stop.

“It has long been considered reasonable for an officer to conduct a 

traffic stop if he or she has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has 

occurred.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 291 (Ky. 2016) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Hale argues the police did not have 

sufficient cause to initiate a traffic stop on his vehicle for a lane change violation. 

For support, Hale points to the absence of any body camera video supplied at the 

suppression hearing capturing any violation and argues the officers’ testimony 

asserting they personally observed the violation is unreliable. 

We will note the original body camera video played at the suppression 

hearing was not formally submitted and admitted into the record before us nor was 

it played in its entirety. Therefore, we can only rely on the video segments played 

during the suppression hearing. We must further rely on contextualizing testimony

concerning certain segments played due to some difficulty in discerning the audio. 
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Officer Hempel and Officer Flowers both testified that in accordance 

with departmental policy, their body cameras are not activated until their 

emergency lights are turned on. Officer Hempel additionally testified, upon 

activation, the body cameras undergo a “buffering mode” during which they “don’t 

capture everything.” The trial court found this explanation was sufficient, and the

record does not demonstrate anything undermining the officers’ credibility. We 

defer to the trial court’s finding the officers observed the violations and had cause 

to initiate a traffic stop. See Pitcock v. Commonwealth, 295 S.W.3d 130, 132 (Ky. 

App. 2009) (citation omitted) (“At a suppression hearing, the ability to assess the 

credibility of witnesses and to draw reasonable inferences from the testimony is 

vested in the discretion of the trial court.”).

B. The Traffic Stop was Prolonged.

“A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that 

violation.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614, 

191 L. Ed. 2d 492 (2015) (emphasis added). Traffic stops are more analogous to 

Terry stops, and “the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop 

context is determined by the seizure's ‘mission’ – to address the traffic violation 

that warranted the stop . . . and attend to related safety concerns.” Id. (citations

omitted). The authority for the seizure ends when the related tasks are completed 

or should have been completed. Id. There are no exceptions for de minimis
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prolongments, and a sniff search for drugs falls outside the scope of routine traffic 

law enforcement because it is purposed for detecting evidence of criminal activity. 

Commonwealth v. Lane, 553 S.W.3d 203, 206-07 (Ky. 2018) (citation omitted).

However, unrelated investigative inquiries are permitted so long as they occur 

“simultaneously” while “completing the purpose of the stop.” See Commonwealth 

v. Mitchell, 610 S.W.3d 263, 270 (Ky. 2020). Such inquiries must not add time to 

the stop. Commonwealth v. Conner, 636 S.W.3d 464, 474 (Ky. 2021).

Hale contends the traffic stop was prolonged by Officer Hempel 

delaying the write-up of the original citation to allow time for the K-9 unit’s arrival 

and further detaining him after the original citation was provided to him. The 

Commonwealth counters that the traffic citation and the drug investigation were 

pursued concurrently without any prolongment since the K-9 unit’s alert and the 

subsequent vehicular search occurred while Officer Hempel was reissuing the 

traffic citation to void the no proof of insurance charge. 

As proof of prolongment, Hale points to the disparity in time between 

the original and the reissued citations noting it took approximately 16 minutes to 

complete the original and eight minutes to finish the reissued citation.2 The trial 

2

In its brief, the Commonwealth states it took twenty-two (22) minutes to complete the original 

citation. We presume the Commonwealth is including the time it took to gather Hale’s 

information whereas Hale is only factoring in the time it took to complete the write-up. 

Additionally, Hale asserts, “Instead of diligently pursuing the writing of the [original] citation, 

Officer Hempel accessed Google several times.” The original copies of the body camera video
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court was unpersuaded and determined the reissued citation was quicker to 

complete because Hale’s information had already been entered and Officer Hempel 

only needed to make a modification. This was supported by Officer Hempel’s 

testimony. 

However, the situation is complicated by Detective Hazelwood’s

radioed statements to Officer Hempel to “take [his] time” while writing the 

original citation. During Detective Hazelwood’s testimony, the trial court directly 

inquired whether he meant for Officer Hempel “to go slow so the K-9 could get 

there.” Detective Hazelwood replied, “Yes, ma’am, that’s what I said. I was 

implying that, like, there’s no, there’s no rush to, to get everything done with since 

it’s a narcotics investigation.” The detective’s own testimony explicitly

acknowledged, at this moment, the purpose of the stop was in furtherance of a drug 

investigation. See Clayborne, 635 S.W.3d at 824 (citation omitted) (emphasis in 

original) (“[A] stop is extended when an officer pursues purposes or tasks 

unrelated to his or her main objective of addressing a traffic violation and that new 

pursuit adds time to the stop.”). When comparing body camera footage 

timestamps identified by the prosecution at the suppression hearing, we can 

were not submitted into the record, and no facts or evidence of this was presented during the 

suppression hearing. Therefore, we decline to consider this assertion on appeal. See Heltsley v. 

Frogge, 350 S.W.3d 807, 811 (Ky. App. 2011) (citation omitted).
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approximate seven minutes elapsed between Detective Hazelwood’s statement and 

the moment after Officer Hempel informed Hale he was “free to go.”

3

 We cannot 

conclude with confidence there was not at least a de minimis delay in the citation’s 

completion based on the detective’s own clear testimony and this passage of time. 

See United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651, 662 (6th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added)

(“Because a crafty officer . . . may simply delay writing a ticket for the initial 

traffic violation until after she has satisfied herself that all of her hunches were 

unfounded, we also treat the unreasonable extension of a not-yet-completed traffic 

stop as a seizure.”).

Hale further maintains once Officer Hempel handed him the original 

citation, the traffic stop’s purpose definitively concluded, and the actions thereafter 

were a clear prolongment. Citing Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 135 S. Ct. 

530, 190 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2014), and Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 

126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006), the Commonwealth argues Officer 

Hempel “forgot about the ongoing narcotics investigation” and “made a mistake” 

informing Hale he could leave. 

3 The prosecution stated the body camera footage containing Detective Hazelwood’s statement 

was taken approximately 17 minutes into the stop while video of Officer Hempel walking away 

after handing Hale the original citation occurred around 24 minutes. 
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In Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S. Ct. 781, 788, 172 L. 

Ed. 2d 694 (2009), the United States Supreme Court stated a traffic stop “begins 

when a vehicle is pulled over” and “[n]ormally, the stop ends when the police have 

no further need to control the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they 

are free to leave.” A detention occurs when “in view of all of the circumstances 

surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not 

free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 

1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980). After Hale was given the original citation, it is not 

in dispute Officer Hempel told Hale he was “free to go,” and the record 

demonstrates Officer Hempel walked away from Hale’s vehicle. At this moment,

we hold that a reasonable person would conclude he was no longer being detained, 

and as a result, the traffic stop was no longer occurring contemporaneously with a 

drug investigation. 

Officer Hempel’s “mistake” and the subjective intent of the other 

officers are not relevant, and regardless, Officer Hempel testified it was his intent 

to allow Hale to leave. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S. Ct. at 1877 n.6

(stating that the subjective intention of a federal agent to detain a subject was 

irrelevant except insofar as that may have been conveyed to the detainee). Once 

Hale received the citation, there was no longer cause to continue a traffic stop even 

if the officers intended to. Hale’s later discovery of his proof of insurance is
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immaterial because it occurred after the original citation was completed, and 

Officer Hempel was not obligated to reissue another citation. 

This situation is not unlike Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412 

(Ky. 2013), wherein a Kentucky State Police trooper initiated a traffic stop, and

after conducting a field sobriety test and verifying the driver’s documentation, told 

the driver to “have a good night.” The Kentucky Supreme Court held that, upon 

bidding the driver “good night,” the purpose of the traffic stop concluded, and the 

trooper’s subsequent questioning and search prolonged the detention. Id. at 422. 

In accordance with this holding and considering Detective Hazelwood’s testimony, 

we conclude Hale’s traffic stop was prolonged.

C. The Commonwealth Failed to Prove Reasonable Suspicion was 

Developed Prior to Prolongment.

While an officer may perform certain unrelated checks during a lawful 

traffic stop, it may not be done in a manner that prolongs the stop “absent the 

reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.” 

Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. Otherwise, “subsequent discovery 

of contraband is the product of an unconstitutional seizure.” See Commonwealth v. 

Conner, 636 S.W.3d 464, 473 (Ky. 2021) (footnote omitted). Consequently, once 

the stop was prolonged, Officer Hempel and Officer Flowers were required to 

possess reasonable suspicion of drug activity to further detain Hale to await the K9 unit’s arrival. See Turley, 399 S.W.3d at 421 (internal quotation marks and 
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citation omitted) (“[A]n officer cannot detain a vehicle’s occupants beyond 

completion of the purpose of the initial traffic stop unless something happened 

during the stop to cause the officer to have a reasonable and articulable suspicion 

[of] criminal activity . . . .”). As a result, it is important to examine the sequencing 

of the events and how each contemporaneously observed factor related to one 

another when weighing the totality of the circumstances. 

Up to the initiation of the traffic stop, the trial court concluded there 

was no reasonable suspicion Hale was involved with drug activity. It is undisputed

the traffic stop was initiated at Detective Hazelwood’s request to assist a drug 

investigation. See Blake, 540 S.W.3d at 373 (“[I]n determining whether reasonable 

suspicion exists, the collective knowledge of all the law enforcement officers 

involved in the stop may be taken into consideration.”); Mitchell, 610 S.W.3d at 

269 (citation omitted) (“[A]n officer’s subjective motivations for the stop are not 

relevant . . . .”). Detective Hazelwood witnessed Hale make two brief stops in 

areas associated with drug activity during daylight hours. During these stops, Hale 

was respectively observed speaking with an unknown male subject, both inside and 

outside of his vehicle, and later entering a residence wherein he repeatedly locked 

his vehicle. While conceding he did not witness anything transactional, Detective 

Hazelwood testified the short nature of Hale’s stops was consistent with drug 

trafficking activity in the area and based on his experience as narcotics 
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investigator. Additionally, Hale’s repetitive locking of his vehicle was viewed by 

Detective Hazelwood as “odd” and “not a common thing to do.” 

The trial court concluded the emergence of additional factors after the 

stop created reasonable suspicion to justify shifting the stop’s purpose from a 

traffic citation to a drug investigation. Officer Hempel testified that during the 

stop, although Hale was very polite, he was nervous to the point he was fumbling 

with and nearly dropped his wallet while retrieving his driver’s license. Officer 

Hempel also testified that, when asked where he was coming from, Hale stated he 

was coming from his parents’ house on Linton Road. See Carlisle v. 

Commonwealth, 601 S.W.3d 168, 177 (Ky. 2020) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted) (“[G]enerally, questions about travel plans are ordinary inquiries 

incident to a traffic stop.”). Based on this, Officer Hempel testified Hale was lying

because it conflicted with Detective Hazelwood’s observations of Hale at the 

intersection of 7th and Jackson Streets as well as Barksdale Drive.

When weighing their totality, “a reviewing court should not view the 

factors relied upon by the police officer(s) to create reasonable suspicion in 

isolation but must consider all of the officer(s) observations and give due regard to 

inferences and deductions drawn by them from their experience and training.” 

Baltimore v. Commonwealth, 119 S.W.3d 532, 539 (Ky. App. 2003) (footnote 

omitted). However, a combination of factors, which are otherwise innocent when 
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viewed in isolation or subject to significant qualification, cannot add up to 

reasonable suspicion absent concrete reasons for such an interpretation. See Stepp, 

680 F.3d at 665 (citations omitted); United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 594 (6th 

Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

We agree with the trial court that Detective Hazelwood’s prior 

observations of Hale did not amount to reasonable suspicion of drug activity. 

Hale’s observed behavior was not inherently indicative of criminality, and the only 

factor which provided some indicia of criminality was the fact it occurred in an 

area of suspected drug activity. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S. Ct. 

673, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000). However, even in this context, it is insufficient.

In Hale’s motion to reconsider the denial of suppression, he cited

Clayborne, 635 S.W.3d 818, but we instead cite to this Court’s unpublished 

decision in Jones v. Commonwealth, No. 2018-CA-001181-MR, 2019 WL 

2321654 (Ky. App. May 31, 2019), due to its more similar circumstances.

4

 In 

Jones, a Lexington Police officer observed a white van containing three unknown 

occupants around 12:50 a.m. at the intersection of East 7th Street and Maple Street 

which was identified as a “high narcotics area.” An individual standing outside 

was observed approaching the van and leaning into the vehicle to speak with the 

4

Jones is cited only as persuasive authority pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure 

41(A).
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driver. When the observing officer pulled his vehicle closer to the intersection, the 

van pulled away which prompted the suspicions of the officer. The officer 

followed the van, ran the license plate number, and learned it was registered to an 

individual in his forties which did not match the apparent ages of the van’s 

occupants. The officer initiated a traffic stop and later observed the driver’s 

nervous hand shaking while one of the passengers avoided making eye contact. 

The officer identified the subjects and, after learning both had prior narcotics and 

violent crime charges, requested dispatch of a K-9 unit to the scene. The K-9 unit 

ultimately detected the presence of drugs, and a search of the van uncovered 

synthetic marijuana and a set of digital scales. Id. at *1. This Court held these 

factors were insufficient to justify prolongment of the stop to await the K-9 unit. 

Id. at *4.

Likewise, Officer Hempel and Officer Flowers required intervening 

circumstances to tip the balance in the weighing of these factors. While 

nervousness can be a contributing factor, it is not the tipping point in this scenario

just as this Court determined it was not with the very similar circumstances 

presented in Jones. 2019 WL 2321654, at *4; see also Moberly v. Commonwealth, 

551 S.W.3d 26, 32 (Ky. 2018) (“Heightened nervousness is common among 

drivers detained by a police officer for a traffic violation.”). 
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This brings us to the remaining factor in this analysis which is Hale’s 

untruthfulness regarding his previous whereabouts. Hale argues this too is

insufficient. Although not discussed at the suppression hearing, Hale concedes in 

his appellate brief that the first mention of his prior whereabouts occurred one

minute and 23 seconds after the start of footage taken from Officer Hempel’s body 

camera, which began to record prior to Hale’s vehicle being pulled over.

5

 Despite 

this, Hale proclaims the alleged untruthful nature of this information “was not

completely elicited . . . until after he was illegally detained” when “Officer Hempel 

reengaged him to ask him exactly where he was coming from.” 

We must first determine whether Hale’s dishonesty occurred 

contemporaneously with a diligent pursuit and prior to the prolongment of the 

traffic stop. When relying upon the underdeveloped record before us concerning

this key point, we are again unable to conclude with confidence this factor 

sufficiently presented itself prior to the stop’s prolongment, and as a result, it is 

ultimately unnecessary to answer whether this served as the clinching factor.

The trial court’s written order contains no other findings apart from 

those verbally stated on the record at the conclusion of the suppression hearing. 

5 Hale asserts a Google Maps search demonstrates Linton Road is “a mere three (3) miles away 

from the area in which he was first observed by the Lexington Police.” Nothing relating to this

was presented at the suppression hearing, and we decline to consider it on appeal. See Heltsley, 

350 S.W.3d at 811.
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The trial court’s oral findings reasoned the officers secured reasonable suspicion 

from “the moment they observed [Hale] being nervous and from the moment he 

started lying,” and as a result, the “extension” of the stop was permissible. While 

not specifically articulated on the record, it is clear the inference was that Hale was 

attempting to conceal he had just left an area associated with drug activity. See 

United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1109 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[C]onflicting 

answers about where one is traveling to or from may give rise to a suspicion of 

drug activity because most drivers know the answers to these questions and 

because the driver may be trying to hide the fact that he is going to or coming from 

a known drug-source state.”). However, the trial court did not indicate the specific 

moment it believed Hale was being willfully misleading relative to the stop’s 

prolongment.

For reasons already stated, we must rely on segments of body camera 

footage presented at the suppression hearing along with any relevant testimony. 

The only footage presented by the Commonwealth capturing Hale’s explicit 

mention of Linton Road or any discussion by the officers regarding this at the 

scene was filmed after the original citation’s conclusion. The Commonwealth 

argues Hale “lied by omission” for failing to mention he had been at the corner of 

7th and Jackson Streets as well as Barksdale Drive, but the only clear questioning 

we can observe in the presented footage on the matter occurred after Officer 
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Hempel gave the original citation to Hale. While Hale’s brief concedes he was 

asked where he was coming from shortly after being pulled over, it does not 

concede the officers had specifically yet asked him if he made any other stops. 

Additionally, Hale’s brief indicates the questioning eliciting this information 

occurred within a three-second window. We will note that the citation contained in 

the record lists Linton Road as Hale’s residential address. Thus, we cannot infer 

based on the facts conceded that Hale was misleading the officers at this specific 

point.

The testimony concerning this factor was largely conclusory and does 

not sufficiently indicate exactly when or if Hale’s untruthfulness manifested prior 

to the stop’s prolongment. When questioned by the trial court concerning his

statements to Officer Hempel to “take [his] time” while writing the original 

citation, Detective Hazelwood testified as indicated below:

Trial Court: So, Detective, are you saying that it was 

your belief that . . . you all could keep this man as long as 

you wanted to at this point?

Detective Hazelwood: Yes, ma’am.

Trial Court: And why is that?

Detective Hazelwood: Um, because I was conducting 

basically a Terry stop for purposes of a narcotics 

investigation. I believed that he was, uh, engaging in 

narcotics trafficking.
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Trial Court: And that’s because of what you saw at the, 

on the street and at the house?

Detective Hazelwood: Yes, ma’am.

After the conclusion of Detective Hazelwood’s direct examination, 

the trial court further questioned: 

Trial Court: So, if this was a Terry stop, uh, could you 

have kept him for a long time and just waited for the K-9 

to get there?

Detective Hazelwood: Yes ma’am.

Trial Court: Okay. So, and I think it was you that said 

on the tape, “take your time, not sure if the K-9 will 

make it?”

Detective Hazelwood: Yes, ma’am.

Trial Court: Okay so if you could just wait until the K-9 

got there, why would you have to say, “take your time, 

not sure if the K-9 will make it?”

Detective Hazelwood: Just to make sure that the officers 

understood that we had, we had time to wait. That there 

wasn’t a rush to go up there and, uh, give a traffic 

citation and cut the, the occupant loose.

In its findings, the trial court expressed it was “concerned” and 

“troubled” by Detective Hazelwood’s testimony. We share those concerns 

particularly when Detective Hazelwood could not provide an answer reconciling

this inconsistency. Detective Hazelwood testified he maintained radio contact with 

the officers for updates during the traffic stop, and the information regarding 
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Hale’s prior whereabouts was communicated to him by the officers at the scene. 

Detective Hazelwood further testified Hale’s dishonesty was a factor justifying

detention on suspicion of drug trafficking but never indicated exactly when this 

was obtained. The inconsistency presented by Detective Hazelwood’s testimony

cannot simply be ignored when nothing in the record can support at least a 

reasonable inference Hale’s deception presented itself prior to Detective 

Hazelwood’s radioed statements to Officer Hempel. 

Therefore, we hold the trial court’s finding that reasonable suspicion 

was secured prior to the traffic stop’s prolongment is unsupported by substantial 

evidence and clearly erroneous. We reverse the trial court’s ruling and hold that all

evidence seized from Hale’s vehicle must be suppressed.

CONCLUSION

Warrantless searches and seizures are presumed unconstitutional 

absent a recognized exception, and it is the burden of the Commonwealth to prove 

such an exception. The Commonwealth did not meet its evidentiary burden to 

overcome the presumption Hale’s detention and the subsequent warrantless search 

were unconstitutional. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s

findings and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Russell J. Baldani

Whitney D. Rowe

Lexington, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Matthew F. Kuhn

Solicitor General

Rachel A. Wright

Assistant Solicitor General

Frankfort, Kentucky