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IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT 

IN THE NEW CENTURY 
IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT 

IN THE NEW CENTURY 

The American Edition, Published m Cooperation with 

the Center for Naval Analyses 

and the 

Royal United Services Institute 

HAP, LAN K. ULLMAN 

1995 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

WASHINGTON, DC 
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American edition: First printing, March 1995. ISBN 0-16-045593-6 
"IN IRONS" 

The term "in irons" has several usages, each of which entails a 

measure of constraint. The most common meaning of "in irons" is 

to be put in chains, as to shackle a prisoner or captive. But the 

appropriate metaphor for this book is nautical and the distinctive 

cases are instructive. On one hand, "in irons" is to lose the wind 

temporarily, either through a mistaken sailing maneuver or through 

a stilling of the air. On the other hand, the more sinister meaning 

of "in irons" is that of becoming completely becalmed when the 

wind or current simply disappears. In the days of sail, the consequences of this entrapment could be desperate and even fatal if, on 

a lengthy ocean passage, there was no wind for days at a time. The 

hapless crew of a ship in this form of irons suffered the agonies of 

slow death as food and water ran out and as disease and the elements, usually heat, exacted a deadly toll. The only escape from 

"in irons" was a freshening and lasting breeze that would carry the 

ship and crew to safety. 
IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT 

IN THE NEW CENTURY 

CONTENTS 

FOREWORD ........................................ XV 

PROLOGUE ........................................ 1 

INTRODUCTION ..................................... 5 

PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE 

THE BREEZE To BLOW" ............................. 11 

CHAI~rER ONE: THE RECORD OF PRIOR AMERICAN 

DEFENSE REDUCTIONS ............................. 11 

THE TRUMAN REDUCTIONS--THE FIRST DEMOBILIZATION ...... 12 

THE EISENHOWER REDUCTION.~ ......................... 19 

THE POST-VIETNAM NIXON--FORD-CARTER REDUCTIONS ....... 23 

THE FOURTH AND CURRENT BUILD-DOWN ................. 40 

CHAPTER TWO: STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY ................ 48 

CHAPTER THREE: DOMESTIC PREOCCUPATION ............. 62 

CHAPTER FOUR: GOVERNANCE AND THE FUTURE 

COMMON DEFENSE ................................ 73 

PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" ....... 91 

CHAPTER FIVE: STRATEGY ........................... 93 

THE LEGACY ....................................... 93 

WHAT NEXT? ...................................... 107 

CHAPTER SIX: FORCE STRUCTURE AND BUDGETS ........... 110 

CHAPTER SEVEN: COMMITMENTS, DEPLOYMENTS, 

AND PRESENCE ................................... 129 

CHAPTER EIGHT: INFRASTRUCTURE ..................... 154 

BASES AND RELATED INFRASTRUCTURE .................... 158 

THE RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD COMPONENT ........... 160 

THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASZ ........................ 164 
x In Irons." U.S. Military Might in the New Century 

CONTENTS (CONTINUED) 

THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY BASE ...................... 174 

INDUSTRIAL BASE S~Y AND CONSEQUENCES ........... 175 

THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROCESS .................... 180 

FINAL THOUGHTS ON INFRASTRUCTURE .................. 185 

PART III: SOLUTIONS~"WITH A GOODLY COMPANY" ....... 187 

C~R NINE: THE CHOICES EXAMINED .............. 190 

CHAPTER TEN: NEW STRATEGIC ALLIANCES ............. 202 

CHAPTER ELEVEN: ASSURING THE BEST MILITARY 

IN THE WORLD .................................. 216 

STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL DEI~NDS ................. 218 

How MANY MRCs? ................................ 221 

MISSIONS OTHER THAN WAR--NEw WAYS OF DO~G Bvsn~ss ... 225 

NEW ORGANIZATION ................................ 228 

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES ......................... 233 

CHAPTER TWELVE: REFORM AND CONSOLIDATION ......... 238 

BASES AND SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE ................ 240 

THE RATE OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION ............... 242 

THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE ....................... 248 

THE ACQUISITION PROCESS ........................... 249 

RESERVE AND GUARD FORCES ......................... 252 

FINAL THOUGHTS ON INFRASTRUCTURE REVISITED .......... 252 

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: INCENTIVES FOR ACTION ........... 253 

STEADY AS You Go ................................ 253 

FUND THE FORCE .................................. 254 

READJUST AND CHANGE ............................. 254 

ONE INCENTIVE ................................... 255 

THE READJUST AND CHANGE CHOICE: A SUMMARY 

OF THE REVIEW BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE ................ 257 

EPmOGUE: THE COSTS OF FAmURE .................... 263 

INnEX ........................................... 267 
Contents xi 

TABLES 

1. GNP, FEDERAL BUDGET, AND DOD BUDGET 

FOR SELECTED YEARS ............................... 28 

2. COMPARISON OF DEFENSE SPENDING AND MANPOWER ......... 31 

3. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANPOWER ................... 32 

4. FEDERAL OUTLAYS FY 1945-1994 ..................... 34 

5. DEFENSE EXPENDITURES BY PERCENTAGE OF ANNUAL BUDGETS .,. 35 

6. COST OF INDMDUAL WEAPON SYSTEMS ................... 35 

7. REDUCTION OF V.S. FORCE STRUCTURE .................. 41 

8. FORCE STRUCTURE PAST AND FUTURE .................... 41 

9. V.S. FORCE STRUCTURE---1999 ........................ 44 

10. CLINTON PLAN: DEFENSE DISCRETIONARY FUNDING ......... 44 

11. GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS DEFICIT REDUCTION 

ACT--PROJECTED AND ACTUAL ANNUAL DEFICITS ........... 66 

12. ALLOCATION Of GNP/GDP OVER TIME .................. 67 

13. PERSONAL CONSU~VmTmN--1970 AND 1990 ............... 67 

14. GROWTH OF V.S. DEBT--PUBIIC AND PRIVATE AND DEBT SERVICE .... 68 

15. CLINTON DEFENSE BUDG~VI~S .......................... 75 

16. CHANGES IN DEFENSE SPENDING OVER TIME ............... 75 

17. AREAS OF KNOWN UNDERFUNDING ...................... 78 

18. PROSPECTS FOR V.S. MILITARY MIGHT ................... 88 

19. SUMMARY OF ASSUMPTIONS AND TOOLS THAT EACH OF 

20. 

21. 

SIX AD~ONS USED TO PRODUCE ITS FORCE STRUC2X;RE ..... 115 

THE UNIVERSE OF FUTURE V.S. MILITARY MIGHT ............ 127 

A COMPARISON OF MAJOR TACTICAL UNITS OF THE ARMY 

AS OF JULY 1, 1948, AND JUNE 30, 1949 ............... 131 
xii In Irons: US. Military Might in the New Century 

TABLES (CONTINUED) 

22. A COMPARISON OF MAJOR TACTICAL UNITS LOCATED 

IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES AS OF 

JULY 1, 1948, AND JUNE 30, 1949 .................... 131 

23. A COMPARISON OF MILITARY PERSONNEL---- 

JUNE 30, 1967, AND JUNE 30, 1968 ................... 132 

24. U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN FOREIGN AREAS-- 

FY 1981 TO FY 1992 ............................. 133 

25. DOD DEFENSE MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND PROPERTIES 

USED BY V.S. FORCES IN FOREIGN AREAS, SEPTEMBER 1991 ... 136 

26. OPTEMPO HISTORY BY FLEET ........................ 139 

27. CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE FORMER USSR ................ 151 

28. NORTHWEST PAC~C ................................. 151 

29. NON-REGIONAI.f'GLOBAL" ISSUES ......................... 152 

30. BRAC ACmEVEMENTS .............................. 159 

31. COMPONENTS OF THE SELECTED RESERVE ................ 161 

32. RESERVE]GUARD CHOICES VS. FORCE STRUCTURE CHOICES ..... 163 

33. U.S. EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR FORCE .................... 169 

34. OPTIONS FOR CHANGE IN THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY 

INDUSTRIAL BASE ................................. 176 

35. THE UNIVERSE OF U.S. FUTURE MILITARY MIGHT ............ 223 

36. CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE FORMER USSR ................ 231 

37. NORTHWEST PACIFIC ................................. 232 

38. NON-REGIONAI~'GLOBAL" ~......................... 232 

39. DOD RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, AND EVALUATION .... 247 

40. GROWTH IN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ..................... 250 
Contents xiii 

FIGURES 

1. DOD EXPENDITURES FOR MILITARY FUNCTIONS ............ 21 

2. NOMINAL ARMY READINESS .......................... 37 

3. COMPOSITE OF NAVY AND AIR FORCE READINESS .......... 37 

4. FLUCTUATIONS IN V.S. DEFENSE SPENDING, 1948-1984 ..... 39 

5. INTEREST BURDEN OF NONFINANCIAL CORPORATE BUSINESS . . . 68 

6. HOUSEHOLD DEBT PAYMENTS ......................... 69 

7. FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICIT ........................... 70 

8. FEDERAL DEBT ................................... 71 

9. NET INTEREST ON THE FEDERAL DEBT ................... 71 

10. UNITED STATES COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ...... 134 

11. BASE SITE ESTABLISHMENT DATES: EUROPE .............. 135 

12. BASE SITE ESTABLISHMENT DATES: ASL~PACrFIC .......... 135 

13. LOCATION OF MAJOR NAVY AND MARINE CORPS UNITS ....... 137 

14. DEPLOYMENT OF V.S. DMSIONS ...................... 138 

15. INFRASTRUCTURE CATEGORIES ........................ 155 

16. INFRASTRUCTURE DRAIN 1962--1980 ................... 156 

17. INFRASTRUCTURE DRAIN 1980--1998 ................... 157 

18. DEFENSE EMPLOYMENT AS PERCENT OF TOTAL LABOR FORCE . . . 169 
FOREWORD 

THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE V.S. MILITARY IS IN THE MIDST OF A 

reduction in size and manpower strength, the dimensions and rate 

of which have been the subjects of discussion since the end of the 

Cold War. But is this reduction merely a postwar adjustment to 

newly emerging regional threats, or is it the start of a precipitous 

decline in overall strength that will leave the United States a second rate power sometime early in the 21st century? 

The haunting possibility that U.S. military power might be lapsing into strategic decline is the driving concern of this study by the 

distinguished military analyst, Harlan I~ Ullman. What disturbs 

Ullman most is the possibility that this decline may be the result of 

inattention and neglect, rather than a deliberate if unfortunate, in 

his judgment--strategic contraction of U.S. power. Thus, his first task 

is to convince the reader that the current reduction is, in fact, critically and historically different from other postwar decreases. This 

task is complicated because, on balance, most agree that the U.S. 

Armed Forces are today unchallenged by any credible opponent anywhere in the world. But there is cause for concern, as Ullman ably 

demonstrates, before going on to suggest specific remedies. 

Wherever one stands, this study deserves to be read as a serious contribution to the great strategic debate about the future of 

U.S. military power. The NDU Press is pleased to be able to offer 

its readers the American edition of this study, which is being 

copublished in Great Britain by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. We especially appreciate the opportunity 

offered to us by the Center for Naval Analyses in the United States, 

to present this timely and thoughtful analysis of one of the central 

defense questions of our time. 

ERVIN J. ROKKE 

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force 

President, National Defense University 
IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT 

IN THE NEW CENTURY 
PROLOGUE 

This book is about the future condition of America's military 

might. The message is sobering, unsettling, and, for the moment, 

unheeded. Despite the best intentions of government, U.S. fighting strength is being steadily and perceptibly eroded. Unless the 

nation takes powerful remedial action, or is very lucky, before the 

end of this century, this erosion in military power will lead to profound decline, decay, or worse. '%Vorse" means that the debilitating 

form of"in irons" will become inevitable. 

As will be shown, the reasons for this accelerating and downward defense spiral are now predominantly structural, domestic, 

and embedded in the way the United States Government does and 

will do business in a world that possesses but a single superpower. 

The larger questions of whether a dramatic cut in U.S. military 

capabilities and in the ability to project force on a timely and effective 

operational basis will matter and will harm U.S. national security 

are, currently, less precisely answerable. However, any message of 

warning is sure to be muffled and muzzled by measures of disinterest 

and complacency naturally arising from the public's attention on almost exclusively non-defense issues and from the immediate and 

overwhelming superiority of today's U.S. military forces that seemingly contradicts any forecasts of despair. 

The most likely response by the administration and Congress 

to this warning will be to dismiss any alarm with the assertion 

that the current defense program seems largely in balance--which 

it is. Future problems and funding shortfalls always can arise. 

But, despite occasional reports to the contrary by watchdog organizations and the press, elected and senior appointed officials will 

promise with vigor and emotion that the Federal Government is 

not going to allow America's military might to atrophy as it did during the 1970s. Hence, overcoming this understandable reluctance to 

view the condition of America's future military might as a serious 

and looming problem is a daunting task. 

The thrust of this book is prescriptive. Yet, sufficient care must 

be taken to show the evidence, signs, and reasons for alarm. As a 

nation, we may choose to accept even a precipitous contraction in 

U.S. military power. However, we would be irresponsible if that 
2 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

choice were made by default or by chance and even more irresponsible if 

alternatives that could prevent this decline or enhance the manner in which we provide for the common defense were left 

unexamined. 

The metaphor for this book was described nearly two centuries 

ago by Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Based on the suggestion of my 

wife Julian, appropriate phrases from The Rime of the Ancient 

Mariner appear as section headings. I hope they serve as cautions 

and not accurate forecasts. Whatever parallel may be drawn 

between the albatross that adorned the ancient mariner and the 

portrayal of the more debilitating and consuming aspects of the 

enormous "infrastructure" supporting the defense establishment 

that will follow is not accidental. 

In this endeavor, the lesson of Sir Norman Angell occasionally 

provided grounds for second thoughts. Writing in 1911, Sir Norman 

argued powerfully, persuasively, and entirely wrongly that economic 

interdependence in Europe made future war among industrial 

states simply too expensive to contemplate. Three years later, 

Angell's The Great Illusion was exploded at Sarajevo, and the Great 

War wrecked much more than the Nobel Prize winner's thesis and 

reputation. My own view is that the ingredients for Angell's optimism may well exist today, at least regarding the western and 

industrialized world. The analogue may be closer to 1815 and a 

century of relative if not perfect stability and not 1914 followed by 

three decades of revolution and conflict. The prospect of strong 

antireform movements present in the Russian elections of December 1993, as well as examples of civil strife as close to home as 

Mexico, does not yet constitute the grounds for reversing this view. 

No matter which historical example applies, it is still imperative 

that we deal with the common defense in pragmatic, hardheaded, 

effective ways. The first step, however difficult, is recognizing 

where we are headed. Next, a course of action must be taken 

and acknowledged even if that decision means permitting or tolerating U.S. military power to erode substantially. 

The evidence, alarm, and solutions that follow are mine alone. 

However, many colleagues and supporters were invaluable in helping me to undertake this effort. Principally, an enormous debt of 

gratitude and thanks go to Robert Murray, President of The CNA 
PR OL 0 a UE 3 

Corporation, who sponsored this work, and to my colleagues, 

especially Bill Bell and Jamil Nakhleh, vice presidents at CNA, 

and Robin Pirie, now at DOD. I am especially grateful to many 

others. I recognize, particularly: former Secretaries of Defense 

Frank C. Carlucci, Robert S. McNamara, and James R. Schlesinger; 

former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffGeneral Colin L. Powell, 

USA (Ret.), Admiral Huntington Hardisty, USN (Ret.), former Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Pacific, and last, but far from least, David 

Bolton, until of late, Director of the Royal United Services Institute, 

one of the book's co-publishers. I also owe huge thanks to former 

shipmate and friend Commander Don Ditko for helping me set the 

numbers record straight. And to J. C. Owens of CNA who typed the 

original manuscript; Linda Dennis, who is an enormously able editor; 

and Sylvia Wiener, who produced the final design and layout, there 

was never better support. Any flaws or errors are my responsibility 

entirely. And, as the reader turns to In Irons, I leave this thought 

from Coleridge published as part of the complete poem in 1796: 

Down dropt the breeze, the sails dropt down, 

"Twas sad as sad could be; 

And we did speak only to break 

The silence of the sea. 

Harlan Ullman 

Washington, DO 

Summer 1994 
INTRODUCTION 1 

In his State of the Union address on January 25, 1994, President Bill Clinton pledged to the American public that the U.S. military"will remain the best-equipped, best-trained, and best-prepared 

fighting force on the face of the earth." These remarks, or ones like 

them, have been made by a succession of presidents. However, if 

this particular pledge is to be honored as intended, strong actions 

well beyond simple rhetoric will be required. 

During the Cold War, the condition and health of U.S. military 

posture were defined by the simple formula that connected and 

matched "strategy, force structure, and budget." Strategy was derived from the military requirements to deter and contain the Soviet Union and, until 1972, China. Force structure was designed to 

meet the strategy. And the budget was to provide the necessary 

resources. 

Mismatches often arose. Perhaps the most publicized mismatch 

led to the "hollow force" of the 1970s. "Hollow" describes a force 

that was largely unready and unprepared to fight and win at short 

or no notice. To deal with these mismatches, we changed strategy, 

force structure, and budget. But there was never any automatic or 

axiomatic corrective method in place. What made life easier was 

the unmistakable connection between this formula and the 

seemingly permanent threat of the Soviet Union. Threat was inseparable from the equation, and its connection assured bipartisan consensus and support for national defense. 

Today, however, the post-Cold War world has denied us the 

luxury of an implacable adversary to underwrite defense planning. 

As a result, the traditional formula of strategy, force structure, and 

budget has been replaced by a far more complex interaction that 

combines two new ingredients. The first new ingredient is "threat" 

To aid the reader, footnotes are kept to a minimum. Most figures, data, 

and reference material were drawn from the Annual Reports of the 

Secretary of Defense to Congress required by the 1947 National Security Act; the Federal Budget documents by year; and open-source government publications. Other sources are noted. 
6 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIOIIT IN TIIE NEW CENTURY 

or, more precisely, its absence. The second is "infrastructure," 

originally arising from the needs of World War II and the Cold War 

and including the military bases to house, train, and support the 

forces; the defense industrial base; logistical and support facilities; 

and new, quasi- or non-defense-related programs whose cost is borne 

by the Department of Defense. 

The decoupling of threat and strategy have resulted in a 

pronounced and understandable uncertainty about future enemies. 

This uncertainty removes the long-standing basis for maintaining 

a permanent and broad public consensus for defense. Public support 

and interest must inevitably become diluted as long as the lack of 

a real threat or danger persists. 

The infrastructure issue, which is also defined to include the 

process by which we select and acquire our forces and weapons, 

has been magnified and distorted by threat and its absence. Clearly, 

infrastructure must be reduced. But, despite sound attempts and 

rationale for these reductions, the "downsizing" of any large entity 

is inherently difficult. 

The book uses the "threat, strategy, force structure, budget, and 

infrastructure" formula for organizing the presentation of evidence, 

analysis, and prescriptions. In a more abstract sense, this formula 

is representative of three broader categories that are useful in establishing the context and logic for the analysis. The categories 

are "strategic uncertainty," "domestic introspection and preoccupation," and the "extraordinary expense of governance." These categories are defined ahead and each serves as a specific chapter. 

But their consequences are important to note in advance. 

"Strategic uncertainty" will contribute to the lack of a fundamental 

and credible argument sufficient to form or hold a defense consensus. "Domestic preoccupation" will lead to the substitution of domestic priorities for those of defense and national security. The 

"extraordinary expense of governance" means that the impact of 

those dollars spent on defense will suffer from growing inefficiencies in obtaining fair value and from demands by non- or quasidefense programs funded under the DOD budget. 
INTRODUCTION 7 

The fiscal consequences of these three broad categories can be 

summarized in terms of substantial future underfunding for defense; 2 a growing and gross disparity between spending for military "teeth" and "tail" in which "tooth" is being devoured by "tail"; 3 

and imbedded "cost creep," which means no constant level of military power can be maintained unless annual defense spending is 

increased well above the rate of inflation. 4 

Taken together, these fiscal consequences will be profound. 

Between now and the end of the century, the spending shortfall for 

defense is likely to be $200 or $300 billion from a projected fiveyear plan of $1.3 trillion. Given the other inefficiencies, this means 

that for every dollar DOD is planning to spend, effectively it will 

receive only 70 to 75 cents. The obvious conclusion must be a fundamental reduction in U.S. military might. 

This impending and potentially huge mismatch leaves three 

basic policy choices for the nation. First, the nation can accept the 

consequences of a less capable future military that could become 

"hollow" or worse. The arguments supporting this choice emphasize the lack of immediate threat to the nation and the necessity of 

2 Refer ahead to page 78 for the table that lists the extent of likely 

underfunding. Included are shortfalls due to future pay raises, inflation, 

potential cuts, program overruns, costs of health care and environmental 

cleanup, defense conversion, assistance to the former Soviet Union, and 

misestimates in savings from base closings. 

3 Generally, a "ready" force should receive about half of the budget or 

more; 1987 was the last time "teeth" and "tail" had equal budget shares. 

"Tail" now receives more than 3/5 and the trend is growing worse. See 

the graphs on pages 156 and 157. 

4 As will be shown, the costs of weapon modernization, the all-volunteer 

force, and operations have increased each year by at least 2 percent and 

usually 3 to 5 percent above the rate of inflation. See Chapter Four. 
8 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN TIIE NEW CENTURY 

sustaining the economy by redirecting spending priorities. Defense 

would be refocused toward more substantial capabilities for reconstitution should a new Soviet-like threat arise. Fewer federal resources 

would be spent on defense, allowing them to be used elsewhere. 

Defense would also support the domestic economy by preferential 

funding of civilian-related employment, some of it at the highest 

levels of technology. 

Second, the current force, specified by the Clinton 

administration's Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of military needs conducted 

in 1993, can be maintained. This force will require substantial 

increases in defense resources either through more spending or 

through imposing major reforms and efficiencies that will free up 

resources already headed for defense. The arguments underlying 

this choice rest on the notion that maintenance of current U.S. military strength is vital to stabilizing and reassuring an otherwise 

dangerous and changing world. 

Third, the United States could embark on a major revision of 

its security needs and redefine its objectives, strategy, forces, and 

budget in keeping with what appear to be the realities and uncertainties of the post-Cold War world. 

As this new and uncertain terrain is traversed, there are two 

particular pitfalls. If defense is allowed to atrophy without full 

and open recognition of this condition and its possible consequences, 

the legitimacy and authority of the political process may ultimately 

emerge more damaged than U.S. military might. And, if reform is 

not imposed to correct many of the more extreme diseconomies and 

inefficiencies, without major and frequent increases in spending, it 

will be impossible to keep defense at any constant level of capability. 

This book is structured and organized to present both the evidence 

for alarm and the alternative choices for responding to these realities 

and dangers. Part I assesses each of the four defense build-downs 

since the end of World War II. The first three build-downs provide 

interesting and a few contrarian insights that are applicable to the 

current round of reductions. The consequences and challenges posed 

by strategic uncertainty, preoccupation with domestic issues, and the 

extraordinary costs of governance are examined as they affect and 

influence our security needs and put in place the dynamics that would 

drive U.S. military power toward the condition of"in irons." 
INTRODUCTION 

Part II establishes a range of alternative choices and policy 

prescriptions that set the realistic boundaries for defining the size, 

composition, and rationale for future military might. The range of 

choices and solutions focuses on the fundamental issues that shape 

the new century and influence our preparation for it, including the 

key components that cumulatively make up the common defense. 

These components expand on the balance of"threat, strategy, force 

structure, budget, and infrastructure" and include specific policy 

questions that will shape future military power--for example, the 

commitments to be undertaken by military forces; how ready those 

forces must be; and where to strike the balance between and among 

readiness, modernization, and acquisition of new and potentially 

"leap ahead" technologically driven weapon systems. 

Part III contains a cost-benefit analysis of the three basic policy 

choices facing us: accept a weaker military; spend more or free up 

more resources; or revise our strategy. From these evaluations, 

specific solutions are offered. If there is a single "bottom line," 

it is that many of the inefficiencies and extraordinary costs of 

continuing to do the business of defense as we have in the past 

must be redressed and eliminated or reduced. 

Without decisive and fundamental action, the long-term consequences of the current trends for DOD could result in an active-duty 

force of about 1 million (or about a third less than today's force of 

1.5 million), largely unready to undertake many military tasks and 

no longer cushioned by the superior technology and training put into 

place in the 1980s and early 1990s. Worse, the expense and inefficiencies of the process will multiply those deficiencies in capability, 

making recovery more difficult and certainly far more expensive. 

This appears to be our fate. Whether this condition proves truly 

injurious to the nation is, for the moment, beyond our knowledge. 

But, if we are bold and decisive, we can avoid a future condition of 

military decay and ensure the retention of a military force that is 

both the proper size and the finest in the world. And, in this process, if we take further action, large savings could possibly accrue. 

The vital question is whether government will react appropriately 

to these circumstances and opportunities. 
PART I: BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE 

THE BREEZE To BLOW" 

CHAPTER ONE: THE RECORD OF PRIOR 

AMERICAN DEFENSE REDUCTIONS 

Since 1945, there have been four distinct periods of significant 

reduction in the military might of the United States. Each series 

of reductions followed in the wake of the build-ups for various "wars" 

that have been waged by the United States over the past six decades. The Truman administration demobilized the country after 

the unconditional victory of World War II and eliminated immeasurable amounts of military power made redundant by the defeat 

of Germany and Japan. That demobilization lasted five years until the onset of the Korean War became the last straw in a series of 

provocative actions by the USSR that made American rearmament 

and a countervailing response inevitable. 

The Eisenhower administration embarked on a cautious and 

partial demobilization beginning in 1953 (and after an armistice 

halted the fighting in Korea) that emphasized U.S. superiority in 

nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and delivery systems while it 

simultaneously decreased the money spent on defense in order to 

support the higher priority of strengthening the domestic economy. 

The third and, as it turned out, the least well-conceived reduction 

technically began in 1969 with the reversal of the Vietnam buildup and steps ultimately to end the conflict in Southeast Asia. This 

drawdown persisted over three presidencies, and, by the late 1970s, 

U.S. military power had inadvertently eroded despite the intent of 

these administrations to avoid the so-called '~hollowing" of the forces. 

The fourth and current series of reductions began with the ending of the Cold War in 1989 and 1990 and the design of a "base 

force" that proposed, over time, to reduce active-duty strength by 

25 percent and annual defense spending by 10 percent. This series 

of reductions is continuing to evolve as we move into the new century. Although conventional wisdom has been highly critical of 

each of the nation's defense build-downs thus far, a careful review 
12 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGIIT IN TIIE NEW CENTURY 

of the record suggests that much of this criticism is misplaced. This 

unconventional view, when combined with the context, content, and 

consequences of each of the earlier reductions, offers some interesting lessons for the current drawdown. 

THE TRUMAN REDUCTIONS--THE FIRST DEMOBILIZATION 

Japan's unconditional surrender to the Allies ending World War 

II took place on board the battleship USS Missouri anchored in 

Tokyo Bay. As General of the Army Douglas McArthur closed the 

proceedings, squadrons of Navy fighter airplanes flew overhead. 

The symbolism was obvious. On that day in September 1945, the 

United States was not only a superpower. The United States was 

the power, perhaps even more dominant than Greece, Rome, and 

England had been during their golden years. With 12 million men 

and women in uniform, with nuclear weapons technology, with a 

vast arsenal of tanks, combat aircraft, and ships, and with an 

economy and industrial base of unprecedented size and breadth, 

the United States stood alone in virtually every category of power 

and prestige. 5 For better or for worse, as it had after World War I, 

the United States acted to demobilize this enormous military capacity and transform wartime America back to a normal, peacetime 

basis with a standing military force of about 1.5 million. Although 

that force numbered about 10 percent of the World War II military, 

in historical terms, it was the United States' largest standing peacetime Army and Navy. At the time, few Americans disagreed with 

the decision to demobilize, and the priority was to return the 

United States to peacetime as rapidly as possible. 

The context of this demobilization was dear. The enemy was gone 

and the United States was now occupying Japan and Germany, as 

5 The U.S. Navy in September 1945 consisted of nearly 2,000 ships, including 96 aircraft carriers of all sizes. The U.S. Army consisted of 91 divisions. In 1994, the U.S. Navy is moving towards a fleet of fewer than 

300 ships and 10 aircraft carriers, and the Army to 10 active divisions. 

While numbers are often misleading, this comparison suggests how much 

the United States had mobilized for World War II. 
PART I: "TIIE BZaD TO SLAYTHAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 13 

well as parts of Austria and Trieste. Restoring a peacetime society 

was the order of the day. In the Truman view, part of that restoration necessitated a balanced budget, if not one in surplus, to pay off 

the $250 billion national debt incurred to finance the war. This 

conservative fiscal policy, it was argued, would also serve to check 

or reduce the inflationary pressure arising from the release of pentup consumer demand and the transition of this gargantuan wartime production base to civilian and peacetime consumption. 

Publicly, while shedding vast amounts of capability, the administration voiced the determination, if not a specific plan, to maintain sufficient military strength to protect the nation. Remember, 

though, that the first years of Truman's administration were chaotic. Truman was roundly attacked as a little man unsuited for the 

presidency. His tenacity, courage, and common sense carried the 

day. However, only in retrospect is he seen as a great leader. In 

the early months of the post-war world, a coherent view of that 

world and a supporting strategy were far from in place. 

As events that coalesced the hardening of the Cold War progressed--the Greek-Turkish communist insurgencies in 1947; the 

communist coups in Eastern Europe in 1948; the first Berlin Crisis 

in 1948; the communist victory in China in 1949; and, perhaps 

most troubling, the Soviet Union's acquisition of the "bomb"--the 

Truman administration sensed or believed that strategy, diplomacy, 

and economic strength were more useful instruments in assuring 

the nation's common defense than a large or expanded military 

and accompanying large defense expenditures. And Truman was 

growing into the job and acquiring the knowledge of international 

affairs denied him under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. 

James Forrestal, the first secretary of defense, recognized and 

underscored these beliefs in his first annual report to Congress 

dated June 30, 1948: "As a primary precaution against war, we 

must strive to prevent its inception anywhere. We must do everything we can to bring order out of chaos wherever it exists and to 

eradicate the evils and injustices which cause war." The instruments for organizing this stability were largely non-military. 

A year later, Forrestal's successor, Louis Johnson, reaffirmed 

in his annual report to Congress that: "Our defense policy will 

consist of mustering the maximum of strength, within the limits of 
14 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

our economy and our democracy, to back up that foreign policy and 

make America secure by discouraging any potential aggressors." 

At the time, the defense budget was about $12 billion per year, 

and about 1.4 million active-duty personnel were in service. However, Washington was awash in political bloodletting, and a form of 

bureaucratic absolute war was being waged over defense. The level 

of dissention and turmoil within the Pentagon and echoed in Congress over the National Security Act of 1947, which "unified" the 

national military establishment and created a Department of Defense in the 1949 amendment, was extraordinarily high, and indeed contributed to the suicide of Secretary Forrestal in 1949. As a 

result, the furor over reorganization and draconian defense budgets, and white-hot debate over roles and missions and service responsibilities for those tasks, produced the most extreme form of 

internecine warfare among the U.S. military services in our history. By contrast, the interservice rivalry of later years and so 

oi~en discussed in the media was of a kinder variety when compared to the fratricide of the late 1940s. Given the turbulence of 

both the domestic and international environments, few presidents 

and administrations have faced periods of parallel tumult. 

In retrospect and as seen at the time, the content of the Truman 

demobilization was uncomplicated. The most important national 

security priority was restoring the economy. The "remainder 

method" of calculating defense budgets was in vogue in which the 

budget estimates for all non-defense spending were subtracted from 

the projected ceiling and the remainder put to defense needs. Defense rested in a standing force that would be reinforced by mobilization in time of war. Hence, an emergency production base and a 

huge system and network for stockpiling "critical" materials and 

goods were established. Truman pursued a program of"universal 

military training" that would complement mobilization, but it was 

rejected by Congress. Finally, research and development were accorded high priority in the national security hierarchy, with appropriate organizations and funding. 

The administration continued to believe that Soviet ambitions 

stopped well short of war. Despite the international crises that 

were leading to extreme chill in the Cold War and the first 

Berlin Crisis in 1948 that came precariously close to a hot war, the 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAYTHAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 15 

administration principally relied on strategy, diplomacy, and aid 

as the key instruments for protecting U.S. security. The Truman 

Doctrine, the massive European Recovery Plan known as the 

Marshall Plan, and substantial emphasis on military and foreign 

assistance formed the operational instruments for conducting U.S. 

policy. The creation of NATO in 1949 was a further indication of 

the extent to which the Truman administration relied on strategic 

and diplomatic efforts supported by a modest national wallet to 

underwrite a defense aimed at containing or eliminating the causes 

of conflict rather than fighting one. 

The consequences of the Truman demobilization are less clear. 

It is unknowable whether U.S. military restraint and its strong 

anti-communist stand encouraged or discouraged Soviet actions in 

Europe and elsewhere. By early 1950, the government was examining rearmament through the vehicle of the now famous NSC-68 

study. 6 But Truman remained as resistant to increasing defense 

and defense spending as he had been in 1949 when General 

Eisenhower was recalled to serve as de facto Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs and given the task of determining an appropriate military 

budget. Ike did just that, and Truman rejected it as too costly. 

The Korean War ended American military restraint towards 

rearmament. As North Korean forces drove into South Korea on 

June 24, 1950, Washington time, the United States was faced with 

two strategic questions. The first was how or whether to respond. 

After all, there was no treaty with Korea, and the few U.S. forces in 

Korea, about 750, were part of a military assistance group. These 

factors did not automatically mandate a declaration of war. The 

second question was what was to be done about both the fear and 

the expectation that the Soviet Union would intervene militarily, if 

not in Korea, then elsewhere. Answers to these questions might or 

might not deal with the fact that Korea was not then seen as a 

vital American interest. 

6 In late 1949, a group of senior government officials looked at the need 

for U.S. rearmament. Led by Paul H. Nitzc, thc group produced the landmark report known by its document number, NSC-68. 
16 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT 1N THE NEW CENTURY" 

Once the decision had been made for a military response and 

that it would be under a UN mandate, the U.S. military was ordered to fight in a region for which there had been no preparation 

or planning. There was a general lack of readiness for war in the 

U.S. forces, as well as shortages in ammunition that would cost 

U.S. lives. The initial bloodying of the U.S. Army's Task Force Smith 

by the North Koreans is usually cited as the price of this unpreparedness. But, for all its ill preparation, the United States was able 

to respond quite effectively. Forced into the very southeast corner 

of South Korea called the Pusan perimeter where U.S. and UN forces 

hung on for dear life, the United States mobilized in less than three 

months after the initial attack. By September 1950, the U.S. was 

about to seize the offensive. Confidence was not lacking as the U.S. 

senior leadership was the team that won World War II. George 

Marshall was the newly installed secretary of defense; McArthur, 

of course, commanded the forces in Korea and the Pacific; Ike was 

Supreme Allied Commander in Europe; and Omar Bradley was 

Chairman of the JCS. 

The Inchon Landing that September was one of the most brilliant maneuvers in military annals, and the North Korean army 

was routed. 7 The U.S. military, in a period of weeks, was converted 

from an underfunded, "un-combat-ready" peacetime force into an 

effective fighting force. Indeed, had the United States not demobilized after World War II and retained a standing force of many millions and if North Korea still attacked south, it is debatable whether 

the outcome of the war would have been much different. The strategic blunders that followed, drawing China into the war that fall, 

and led to a bloody stalemate do not contradict the actual military 

performance of U.S. forces and the rapid conversion to wartime 

footing. An anecdotal piece of evidence supporting this resilience 

is relevant. 

7 Although many analysts consider the Korean War and even its early 

successes with less than admiration for U.S. prowess, the reader might 

dwell for a moment on comparing the build-up and attack in the Persian 

Gulf War in 1990-91 and the first four months of the Korean War in 1950. 
PART I: "THE B1aD TO SLAYTHAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 17 

Soviet T-34 tanks deployed by North Korea were virtually 

invulnerable to World War II 2.36-inch (i.e., the diameter of the 

rocket projectile fired by the weapon) "bazookas," which simply 

lacked the punch to penetrate the armor plating. In less than two 

months, the U.S. was able to produce and ship to Korea the more 

effective and larger 3.5-inch bazooka with sufficient stocks of ammunition. The newer weapon had been in testing, and, as the 

U.S. would experience 40 years later in another war, the ability to 

move rapidly from testing to combat use is significant. 

The Korean War propelled the U.S. into a major rearmament 

and a determined effort to confront and defeat Soviet aggression 

on a worldwide basis. Thus, the militarization of the Cold War 

began in earnest. The Truman policies of putting the economy first, 

emphasizing mobilization and research and development, and relying on alternatives to using U.S. military might such as military 

assistance and foreign aid and thus keeping defense spending to 

the minimum--although quite effective if measured against the 

military performance of the first five months of the Korean War-- 

would be reordered. Reliance on a standing force in excess of 3 million troops, large deployments overseas not for reasons of post-war 

occupation or assistance but for actual defense of friends and allies, and an active military competition with the USSR became the 

new priorities for policy. The U.S. also made the decision to develop thermonuclear weapons. Because of their vast destructive 

capacity that could destroy a society, thermonuclear weapons would 

revolutionize strategy by making the deterring of war rather than 

its waging the most vital national strategic priority. 

As defense industries were rejuvenated and a domestic defense 

infrastructure made more robust, the post-World War II structural 

changes in the characteristics of the economy were introducing the 

first signs of what would become significant "cost creep" in defense. 

In other words, the economies of scale that may have been present 

during World War II in acquiring and producing vast numbers of 

weapons of war were being reversed. These cost comparisons illustrate the first signs of this post-war phenomenon of "cost-creep" 

and are taken from the annual defense reports of the period. 

At the end of World War II and in then-year dollars, a P-51 

fighter cost $54,000; B-17 and B-29 bombers $218,000 and $680,000, 
18 IN 1RONS: V.S, MILITARY MIGHt ZN THE NEW CENTURY 

respectively. A World War II Pershing tank cost $81,000 and a 

Fletcher-class destroyer $7 million. In 1949, the cost of an F-86 fighter 

was $500,000; a B-36 bomber $3.5 million; a Patton tank $200,000; 

and the new class of "destroyer leaders" $20 million each. While 

the shift from reciprocating to jet engines, from guns to missiles, from 

TNT to thermonuclear explosives, and other technological advances 

that produced greatly increased or order-of-magnitude advances in 

operational performance were obvious, the relative costs of these improvements began exponential growth far above the rate of inflation. 

We will return to this subject later. 

Part of Truman's emphasis on research and development was 

the decision to embark on a program to develop thermonuclear 

weapons. Too often, the historical myth or misperception of the 

alleged "revolutionary" impact of nuclear weapons was created by 

confusing the destructive power of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. 

Prior to thermonuclear weapons with explosive capacity extending 

into the megaton range, fission weapons had yields of between 10 

and about 100 kilotons, or the equivalent of 10,000 to 100,000 tons 

ofTNT. A nuclear weapon, despite its destructive capacity, was to 

a thermonuclear weapon in nearly the same ratio as a double-ought 

buckshot is to an 8-inch artillery round. 

Two single bombs destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but thousands of conventional bombs had imposed more damage and killed 

more people on raids over Tokyo, Haruna, Dresden, Berlin, and 

other World War II targets. Prior to thermonuclear weapons, the 

military view was that atomic weapons were important but not 

strategically decisive. In 1950 and after Russia obtained the "bomb," 

the Joint Chiefs noted that Soviet delivery of 100 nuclear weapons 

on U.S. targets would do only "serious damage." And, despite the 

so-called nuclear monopoly, the U.S. had only a handful of these 

weapons: 9 in 1946, 13 in 1947, and 50 in 1948. It was not until the 

advent of thermonuclear weapons and the first detonation in 1952 

of an "H-bomb" that fusion weapons would eventually be seen as 

playing a decisive strategic role. 

After the post-war demobilization and the hardening of the Cold 

War, the foundations for future U.S. national security policy were 

put firmly in place. The philosophy of "containment" of the threat 

was the principal basis for that policy. A series of alliances and 
PART [: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 19 

security arrangements were being assembled to that end, with primary 

focus on NATO Europe. Economic strength was essential, and only 

in crisis would defense spending be allowed to consume large portions of the nation's resources. As nuclear and thermonuclear 

strength grew, "deterrence" would emerge as the bedrock for national security. Emphasis on exploiting both the littoral advantages of geography in surrounding and containing the USSR 

through systems of alliances and the advantages of technological 

superiority became permanent fixtures on the national security 

landscape and policy of the United States. 

Finally, despite the temptation to use the national security argument either to limit political debate or to impose autocratic decisions 

on government or the public, Truman was exceedingly careful to consult at length with Congress on these matters. The reality that Congress was dominated and disciplined by relatively few powerful 

leaders and strict seniority and party systems no doubt simplified 

Truman's success and effectiveness in these security matters. But, 

the experiences of World War II and the emergence of another "totalitarian" threat meant that foreign policy was viewed as genuinely bipartisan, and the executive branch took great pains to ensure the 

continuity of that relationship. Although secrecy was important, 

public trust and confidence in government were sufficiently credible to permit major and formidable policies to be put in place and, 

more importantly, sustained. 

THE EISENHOWER REDUCTIONS 

U.S. forces mobilized to fight in Korea. By the time of the presidential elections in 1952, the United States was spending more 

than the equivalent of 250 billion of today's dollars on defense, and 

the forces totalled over 3 million men and women in uniform. The 

fact that, for political and strategic reasons, the Korean War was a 

stalemate did not resonate well among the U.S. public, who were 

expecting another unconditional and total victory, as in 1945. Thus, 

in the presidential elections, General of the Army Dwight David 

Eisenhower not only promised that he was the right man for the 

country at this "time for change," he also assured voters he would 

end the war, which he did in 1953. 
20 1g IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

The context of Eisenhower's view of defense was conditioned by 

his experiences in World War II, his understanding of the Soviet 

Union, and his instinctive grasp of the importance of preserving 

and nurturing national economic strength. In a sense, politics and 

personalities aside, the similarities and consistencies with Truman's 

view are striking. Although the Soviet Union was America's military, political, and ideological adversary, Ike felt certain that Soviet ambitions did not envisage world war. He also believed that 

the American thermonuclear advantage could and should be translated into policy actions and specific strategies to exploit those advantages. Hence, the shift to the strategic "new look," as it was 

called, followed, with emphasis on a doctrine of"massive retaliation" and U.S. technological superiority. 

The new look assumed that Soviet conventional military power, 

which Eisenhower probably felt was exaggerated anyway, could be 

ultimately contained and checked by the threat of a U.S. massive 

thermonuclear weapons response. The implication followed that 

fewer U.S. conventional forces would be required, replaced as they 

were by the destructive power of the atom, which would lessen longterm costs of defense. In this case, nuclear weapons were not only 

more effective than manpower, they were less expensive. The military was cut back, a popular step with the ending of the Korean War, 

and a second but premeditated post-war build-down began. 

The new look placed continuing emphasis on research and 

development and a further broadening of the effort to exploit technology and U.S. technical advantages, particularly as nuclear targeting and delivery systems required a new generation of improved 

capabilities. Although the non-nuclear or conventional capability 

of the U.S. military was reduced, including the actual readiness to 

fight, the integration of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons was 

seen by the administration as more than compensating for any erosion in conventional strength. 

This emphasis on R&D was made permanent by the 1958 

amendment to the National Security Act that, among other actions, 

established both the directorate for research, development, and engineering within DOD and the Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (DARPA), since renamed ARPA. The combination of less 

spending on defense and more emphasis on R&D was probably good 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAYTHAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 21 

for the economy--although the U.S. economy was robust enough 

then, even in recession, that the absolute contribution of shifting 

resources from defense to the private sector was impossible to calculate. 

The content and structure of this second post-war build-down 

were well planned and well executed. Defense budgets and force 

levels were cut and force structure was recast to reflect this strategic new look. Figure 1 shows the breakdown of the new look in 

terms of the budget. 

Figure 1. DOD expenditures for military functions (1951-1959) 

"5 

=: 

41.2 

40t- 39.0 

30 

25 

__ 19.8 

38.4 39.1 

35.5 

45 I-- 43_.7.. 

40:3 

15 ~: 

1 

0 ~ 1951 1952 1953 954 1955 956 1957 1958 1959 

Fiscal year 

~--" Military personnel [] Army 

[~ Operations and Maintenance ~ Navy 

[] Major Procurement [] Air Force 

[] Military public works [] OSD etc. 

[] Other 

As was the case under Truman, Eisenhower's demobilization 

made certain assumptions that were not without long-term 

flaws. These shortcomings would have serious future political 
22 1N IRONS: U.S, MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

consequences. The strategy of nuclear superiority could be defeated 

or neutralized if and when the USSR caught up and deployed comparable strategic forces. If the U.S. were engaged in conflict against 

other, non-nuclear adversaries outside the Soviet protective 

sphere, conventional and not nuclear force would be the only 

usable military instrument, s To be sure, this was a longer-term 

consideration but not one to be ignored. Finally, emphasis on R&D 

could lead to a permanent institutionalization of a military industrial complex with a long-term and powerful claim on resources 

and, as this industrial base grew stronger, a potential bureaucratic 

check on innovation that was not in keeping with the innovative 

assumptions of the new look. 

Thus, in the fifteen years after World War II ended, U.S. 

national security policy had dramatically shifted from wartime 

demobilization and traditional reliance on a small standing force. 

A muscular R&D program, a strong mobilization and stockpile base, 

a strong reserve, the need for mobilization in crisis, and an active 

foreign assistance and aid program, including alliances, were products of the Cold War. Thermonuclear deterrence, militarily strong 

alliances, and containment, all underwritten by a large standing 

force and a strong and mobilizable industrial base with robust R&D 

programs to exploit U.S. technological superiority, had become the 

new foundations for security. 

Like the Truman administration, the Eisenhower team sought 

and maintained a bipartisan approach to foreign and defense policy. 

There were few substantive differences in the nature of Executive 

and Congressional relations in these matters or in the control of 

power and authority within Congress. As a result and despite the 

crises of the era---Suez, Hungary, Sputnik, Lebanon, and the U-2 

shootdownwthe constitutional questions and tensions over the foreign policy and commander-in-chief responsibilities were relatively 

minor. It is also important to note that Eisenhower used personal 

diplomacy with Chairman Khrushchev to improve U.S.-Soviet 

8 In 1954, the U.S. chose not to consider the use of nuclear weapons in relieving 

the Viet-Minh siege of French forces trapped in Dienbienphu. This refusal, correct as it was, revealed both the strategic and military inapplicability ofthe"new 

look" to actual non-Soviet, non-nuclear conditions of war. 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO B~ow" 23 

relations. The "Spirit of Geneva," the "Open Skies" proposal for 

arms inspection, and steps towards nuclear testing moratoria were 

a very real part of the foreign policy agenda. And trust and confidence between government and the governed, the horror of 

McCarthyism withstanding, were still in partial bloom. 

THE POST-VIETNAM NIXON-FORD--CARTER REDUCTIONS 

Less than two decades after World War II ended, the United 

States was engaged in another land war in Asia, this time in IndoChina. From the war in Korea until the conflict in Vietnam began 

in earnest, U.S. defense policy had rapidly matriculated from 

Eisenhower's "new look" to Kennedy's "flexible response." The "new 

look" of the 1950s was based on nuclear and thermonuclear superiority and a policy of"massive retaliation" that placed a premium 

on nuclear and not conventional forces. "Flexible response," on the 

other hand, while maintaining a strong industrial and mobilization flavor, aspired to fight not only on conventional and nuclear 

levels of conflict but also in unconventional and guerrilla forms of 

warfare. This versatility across the entire spectrum of conflict was 

presumed to be the best means to prevent conflict. In this sense, 

as the personal views of Truman and Eisenhower had shaped U.S. 

defense policy, John F. Kennedy also had strong views on the need for 

a strong defense as the best means to prevent Soviet aggression. 9 

Ike had trimmed military spending following the armistice in 

Korea on the grounds of seizing strategic and fiscal advantages by 

emphasizing strategic nuclear forces and by deemphasizing conventional force. The Kennedy administration came to office highly 

critical of what it saw as Eisenhower's failure to keep pace with 

alleged advances in Soviet military power and convinced of the need 

to spend a great deal more on defense. Not only was the so-called 

9 In this regard, Kennedy was no doubt influenced by his experiences in 

Europe in 1939 as the world moved to war. Kennedy feared that a 

democracy's weakness was waiting too long to rearm in time of danger. 

And, as he wrote in 1940 in Why England Slept, he was not about to 

repeat that error. 
24 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

"missile gap" a strategic chasm that had to be closed, but the 

Eisenhower administration's preoccupation with nuclear forces, in 

Kennedy's view, had atrophied U.S. conventional might to dangerously low levels. Notwithstanding what would turn out to be a 

fundamentally mistaken assessment of Soviet military capability 

and intent by the new team, U.S. defense expenditures soared during 

first the Kennedy and then the Johnson years. Certainly, Vietnam 

proved a significant factor for these increases, but the Soviet Union 

remained the prime reason for increasing U.S. defense expenditures. 

During the transition from the "new look" to "flexible response," 

the Kennedy administration adopted and upgraded planning scenarios 

for rationalizing and defining force structure. The so-called "2-1/2 

wa~' scenario that began in the late 1950s was reinforced by extensive analysis in which the U.S. planned on simultaneously being able 

to fight the USSR, China, and a"1/2 war" elsewhere. As will be noted 

in Chapter Six, the assumptions and criteria on which planning was 

based were vital. And this need for rigor in planning forces in turn 

led to a preoccupation with "analysis." It was also clear that, at all 

times, a substantial and probably unclosable gap existed between what 

forces would be needed in those scenarios for 2-1/2 wars and what 

forces and capabilities were actually bought by the budgets. 

One of the so-called revolutions of this period was Secretary of 

Defense Robert McNamara's use of and reliance on quantitative 

analysis. McNamara then believed every problem had a solution 

that, in turn, was resolvable through some form of analytical appraisal. This fascination with and dependence on analysis would 

have two long-term consequences. The first was the assumption 

that all (or even many) military problems were resolvable by analysis. Simply because a numerical response could be calculated to 

what it might take to defeat, say, a Soviet attack into Europe did 

not mean that answer was valid or even relevant, lo Yet, analysis 

became an enduring legacy of the decision-making process. 

10 For example, in 1982, the Naval War College in Newport was asked to 

"wargame" on its computers the 1942 Battle of Midway in which a vastly 

numerically inferior U.S. force decisively beat a much larger Japanese 

naval force. The one result that this gaming did not produce was a U.S. 

victory--the actual outcome. 
PART I: "THE BZR9 TO SLAY THAT MADE THE, BREEZE, TO BLOW" 25 

Second, the military services quickly realized that the only way 

to become relevant in the decision process was to acquire analytical capabilities at least equal to those of the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense (OSD). This the services did and were eventually able 

to "out-analyze" a series of different future OSDs. 

But even when a real, quantifiable threat existed, the limits of 

analysis were severe if not always deemed to be so. Faith in the 

enduring application of analysis is not necessarily useful in a world 

of nonspecific threats for which analysis may have less or little 

use. And relating military solutions to politically driven problems 

simply may not work. 

The debate over whether Vietnam would have become a debacle had Kennedy lived is moot. Lyndon Johnson assumed 

Kennedy's promise to "pay any price and bear any burden," and 

within months of Kennedy's assassination, the United States was 

building up its forces and escalating the war in Vietnam. In August 1964, a series of North Vietnamese attacks against U.S. Navy 

warships, since disputed and shown to be exaggerated by the U.S., 

precipitated the Tonkin Gulf Resolution--a nearly unanimous act 

of Congress that Johnson would use as authorization, if not de facto 

declaration, to carry on the war. 

The history of the Vietnam War is well known and beyond the 

scope of this text. However, several of the legacies of that war were 

vitally important in shaping the contemporary political environment and mood of the nation. Most importantly and tragically, a 

crisis of confidence and trust between the public and its government and between the White House and Congress tore apart much 

of American society. The extraordinary and frequent protests and 

riots, accompanied by many Congressional hearings and, ultimately, 

the War Powers Act that limited executive power and required Congressional approval for deployment of U.S. forces into combat (or 

pseudo-combat) conditions, were expressions of this crisis. Despite 

its opposition, Congress never shut offfunding for the war until aider 

the U.S. withdrew, which was one sure way to end the conflict. 

The consquences were clear and tragic. Not only could an administration no longer be trusted; public expectation and cynicism 

routinely assumed that government would prevaricate and could 

not be trusted to tell the truth. The war in Vietnam that would kill 
26 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NF.W CENTURY 

nearly 60,000 Americans and unknown numbers of Vietnamese, 

combined with its mismanagement, pressurized and exacerbated 

the fundamental constitutional tensions over war powers and foreign policy. 

The war also cast the military into the role of villain. To the 

politicians, the military was seen as incompetent because it could 

not win a war against a small, ill-armed, largely primitive foe. To 

much of the public, with television images of U.S. forces burning 

Vietnamese villages and wantonly killing enemy and civilians alike 

thrust on the evening news, the military was held in contempt and 

vilified as "warmongers." 

To the military, who saw the war as unwinnable as long as political constraints prevented invading the north or massively destroying the many dams, bridges, and other targets that would 

cripple North Vietnam, the oath to obey civilian leadership became 

the larger escape mechanism for repressing frustration and anger 

and living with the consequences of defeat. In fact, no flag or general officer resigned in protest of that war largely on the grounds 

that such an act would have had no effect. But the situation was 

untenable for the military. Implicitly and over time, veterans of 

that war individually came to the recognition that in future conflicts there would have to be specific, achievable, and supportable 

military objectives. Otherwise, "new Vietnams" were too likely to 

occur. Two decades later, these bloody and painful lessons coalesced into the so-called Weinberger Doctrine that set six principles 

for the decisive deployment of U.S. forces in harm's way---each one 

a legacy and reminder of Vietnam. 

The vast antagonism between Congress and the presidency over 

Vietnam, which was even more vitriolic than the interservice wars 

of 1947-1950 in the Pentagon, effectively ended the era of bipartisanship and unleashed any lingering constraints on the constitutional tensions between the branches. The military, as well as 

future political leaders, vowed never again to be trapped between 

the Scylla ofunachievable military objectives and the Charybdis of 

applying insufficient force. 

In November 1968, President-elect Richard Nixon was charged 

by the U.S. public to end the most unpopular war in American history, a mandate that would take nearly seven years to complete. 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 27 

This charge implicitly meant that a third post-war build-down in 

U.S. military capability was inevitable. As in the case of Ike's reductions, there was the enticement that by cutting defense expertditures American economic health could be improved. 

Simultaneously, the nation ended the dra~ and put in place an 

all-volunteer military force. But, unlike the defense demobilization of 1945-46 (and more like Eisenhower's build-down--during 

which Nixon served as vice president), this reduction entailed continuing to meet the military threat of a superpower while waging a 

bloody and protracted war in Vietnam. Following the direction set 

in the Eisenhower administration, but with a Nixonian twist, the 

U.S. partly relied on its technological advantagesmparticularly in 

strategic nuclear systems, which were readily seen by the Soviet 

Union as representing the most valuable military currency of the 

realmmto compensate for lower overall defense expenditures. 

During and partially because of America's painful and humiliating withdrawal from Vietnam, the Nixon administration implemented the highly innovative and simple strategy of moving China 

from the category of U.S. enemy to one of de facto strategic friend. 

This transition was part of a fundamental reassessment of national 

security policy undertaken for President Nixon by his National 

Security Advisor Henry Kissinger in 1969. This was the last time 

any administration embarked on both a sweeping review of and 

sweeping changes in national security. This review led the U.S. to 

move from planning for 2-1/2 wars to a 1-1/2 war plan, with the 

USSR as the single adversary under the umbrella of the Nixon 

Doctrine in which regional states would assume larger responsibilities for their security. 

The intent of playing the so-called and misnomered China"card" 

was to induce the USSR to improve strategic and political relations with the West and moderate its hostile and belligerent policies. Arms control agreements with the Soviet Union would follow 

and strengthen the sense of detente and the success of the Nixon 

foreign policy. The net result of these broader strategic actions 

permitted the United States to continue reducing defense expenditures and to build down the size of its non-nuclear forces. Table 1 

shows the budgetary comparisons of these three post-conflict defense reductions. 
28 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CRN77)'RY 

Table 1, GNP, federal budget, and DOD budget for selected years (in billions of 

current-year dollars) 

FY GNP 

1950 

1953 

1961 

1964 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1970 

1971 d 

1971 

Changes 

Lowest year since 

World War II b 

Korea peak b 

Last prewar year 

Southeast Asia 

peak b 

Last actual year 

Johnson budget 

Current estimate 

Budget estimate 

In 1964 dollars 

1964 to 1971 

1969 to 1971 

j DoD 

Federal budget I outlays as 

outlays ; percent of: 

Net Federal 

total DOD Other Offsets a GNP budget 

$11.9 

47.7 

44.6 

50.8 

78.0 

78.7 

81.6 c 

77.0 

71.8 

54.6 

+21.0 e 

-6.9 

$31.2 

29.1 

55.7 

70.7 

NA 

NA 

-2.~ = 

-2.s 

105.5 -4.6 

111.0 -5.1 

119.4 -5.7 

127.0 -6.1 

135.6 -6.6 

+64.9 

+24.6 

-3.7 

-1.5 

$263.3 $43.1 

358.9 76.8 

506.5 97.8 

612.2 118.6 

822.6 178.9 

900.6 184.6 

960.0 195.3 

960.0 197.9 

1,020.0 200.8 

+407.8 +82.2 

+119.4 +16.2 

4.5 

13.3 

8.8 

8.3 

9.5 

8.7 

8.5 

8.0 

7.0 

27.7 

62.1 

44.5 

41.8 

42.5 

41.5 

40.6 

37.7 

34.6 

a These amounts are undistributed intragovemmental transactions deducted from government-wide 

totals. They include government contribution for employee retirement and interest received by 

trust funds. 

b Measured in terms of defense outlays as a percentage of GNP and federal budget. 

c Includes the $2.6 billion cost of the July 1, 1969, pay raise. The pay-raise costs were not shown in 

the agency totals, but were included in a government-wide contingency estimate in the FY 1970 

Johnson budget. 

d Lowest percent of GNP since 1951; lowest percent of federal budget since 1950. 

e 5.2 percent of the GNP growth during this period, and 24.4 percent of the increase in the federal 

budget. 
PART I: "THE BZRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 29 

The Nixon administration had managed to reduce the top line 

for defense spending in real terms by about 30 percent in four years. 

A strong but less costly military was still viewed as essential to 

guarding national security. However, because of cost creep and 

accumulating growth in the overhead and infrastructure costs of 

defense, a powerful erosion in U.S. military might was taking place. 

These costs and inefficiencies reduced what a dollar could purchase 

as well as distorted how spending directly contributed to effective 

military output. 

The war in Vietnam, the role of the presidency in waging that 

war, and the subterfuge, real or imagined, symbolized the so-called 

"imperial presidency" in which the White House was seen as responsible to no one. In that perspective, the Watergate fiasco became 

a political nuclear blast detonated by an act of supreme executive 

misconduct. Congressional and public reaction to this scandal was 

more than profound. Aside from nearly impeaching Richard Nixon 

and driving him out of office, the actual and perceived power, 

prestige, and influence of the presidency plummeted to unprecedented 

depths. The War Powers Act, passed in 1973, required specific 

Congressional approval for deploying U.S. forces for more than three 

months to serve in regions where conflict was likely or occurring. 

About the same time and partly motivated by the Vietnam backlash, the 

seniority system in Congress was overturned, further diffusing both the 

political power and self<lisciplining mechanisms of government. 

One consequence of this crisis in trust, confidence, and failure 

by the executive branch was an activist Congress that led to a proliferation of its staffs and committees and increasing involvement 

in the oversight and regulation of the executive branch. The crisis 

over the handling of Vietnam was exacerbated by the excesses of 

Watergate, and public wrath turned against the president and his 

White House. In many ways, Congress became an instrument of 

this wrath, and tensions over constitutional prerogatives continued to worsen as Congress attempted to redress a balance of power 

swung too far in the direction of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. 

The Carter administration took office in 1977, promising, among 

other things, a president who "would always tell the truth to the 

American people" and a commitment to continue progress in improving relations with the USSR. Detente was extended. Arms 
30 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

reduction negotiations continued. By then, the United States was 

well out of Vietnam, and a principal focus on "human rights" was a 

hallmark of the new administration. Like the Nixon team in 1969, 

the Carter administration attempted a "zero-base" review of national security. Unlike the Nixon team, however, the Carter conclusion was to continue along the same track, including further, 

modest reductions to defense. 

The Brezhnev Doctrine to maintain Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the seizure of 

the U.S. Embassy and staff in Tehran by so-called Irani "students" 

were seen as direct challenges to U.S. leadership and to the Carter 

presidency. Despite the success of the Camp David Accords that 

produced peace between Egypt and Israel, the Carter administration was seen by its critics as "soft" or weak in foreign policy. The 

failed raid to free the U.S. hostages in Tehran in 1980 was perhaps 

the last straw that would break the administration's chances for 

reelection by perpetuating the perception of a weak White House. 

Meanwhile, the quantitative trend in diminished readiness of 

the armed forces continued well into the late 1970s even though, 

after 1978, defense spending was increased every year through the 

mid 1980s. The most publicized and unintended consequence of 

this implicit or de facto military build-down was the "hollow force," 

that is, a military that was judged by its uniformed leadership to 

be largely unready to carry out both its peacetime and wartime 

missions. A series of real and alleged U.S. military failures in the 

1970s and early 1980s reinforced this perception of unreadiness and 

has been well documented in the Congressional record and by many 

narratives and studies of the reasons for this standard of performance. 

The causes of this "hollowness" were driven by shortfalls in 

spending or, put another way, by a broader inability to meet the 

financial demands needed to sustain the forces on hand at appropriate levels of combat readiness. Not enough quality recruits were 

entering service; not enough quality personnel were being retained 

in service; not enough money was going to training; and not enough 

money was being applied to maintain combat systems at acceptable levels of operational readiness. Thus, although it is clear that 

the long-term effects of this third build-down were never premeditated and may have had little strategic consequence, the costs of 
PART I: "T~E BIRD TO SLAY THAT M,~gZ THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 31 

reversing this condition would prove enormous. The consequences 

were the condition of"in irons" through gradual decay of the forces 

rather than a catastrophic single military failure. 

Comparing these three instances of earlier defense reductions 

across categories of budget, force size, and industrial base capacity 

measured by employment, we see the results shown in tables 2 

through 4. Table 2 compares defense spending and military manpower for selected years; table 3 displays uniform and civilian DOD 

manning for selected years; and table 4 provides a selective breakdown of federal spending for outlays from 1945 through 1994. 

Understanding the breakdown of defense expenditures provided 

further insight into the effects of the changing social and economic 

structure of the nation on military capability (table 5). 

Furthermore, it is useful to compare the changing costs of individual weapon systems during this period (table 6). A]though the 

capabilities and technologies in newer systems reflected major and 

often extraordinary improvements in performance, the relative and 

absolute cost increases have grown far greater than inflation. 

Table 2. Comparison of defense spending and manpower a 

Truman Eisenhower Johnson Nixon-Ford Reagan 

FY 1945-47 FY 1955 FY 1965 FY 1975 FY 1988 

Defense $120 billion $208 billion $199 billion $190 billion $290 billion 

outlays 

Active-duty 

strength 

Selected 

reserves 

1.4 million 3.0 million 2.7 million 2.1 million 2.2 million 

N/A 1.0 million 1.2 million 0.9 million 1.2 million 

estimated 

a In FY 1988 dollars. 
32 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Table 3. Department of Defense manpower (endstrength in thousands) 

Active-duty military a 

Full-time 

Marine Air Guard and Total 

FY Army Navy b Corps Force c Reserve military 

1940 218 161 28 51 -- 458 

1941 1,310 284 54 152 -- 1,801 

1945 5,984 3,320 470 2,282 -- 12,056 

1948 554 418 85 388 -- 1,444 

1950 593 381 74 411 -- 1,459 

1953 1,534 794 249 978 -- 3,555 

1960 873 617 171 815 -- 2,475 

1966 1,200 745 261 887 __d 3,094 

1967 1,442 751 285 897 __d 3,377 

1968 1,570 765 307 905 __d 3,548 

1969 1,512 776 310 862 __d 3,460 

1970 1,322 692 260 791 1 3,066 

1971 1,123 623 212 755 1 2,715 

1972 811 588 198 726 1 2,323 

1973 801 564 196 691 1 2,253 

1974 783 546 189 644 1 2,162 

1980 777 527 188 558 13 2,063 

1985 781 571 198 602 55 2,206 

1986 781 581 199 608 64 2,233 

1987 781 587 200 607 69 2,243 

1988 772 593 197 576 71 2,209 

1989 770 593 197 571 72 2,202 

1990 751 583 197 539 74 2,143 

1991 725 571 195 511 75 2,077 

1992 611 542 185 470 72 1,880 

1993 572 510 178 445 71 1,750 

1994 540 471 174 426 68 1,611 

a Active-duty military includes the activation of 25,652 National Guard and 

Reservists in FY 1990 pursuant to sections 673b, Title 10 U.S.C.; 17,059 

National Guard and Reservists in F'Y 1991; and 954 National Guard and 

Reservists in FY 1992 pursuant to sections 672 and 673, ]3fie 10 U.S.C. 

to support Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. 

b Navy reserve personnel on active duty for Trainingand Administration of 

Reserves (TARS) are included in the active Navybefore FY 1980 ano in 

the full-time Guard and Reserve thereafter. 

c Air Force civil service employment is included in the Army before 1948 and 

identified separately thereafter. 

d Indicates less than 500 full-time National Guardsmen and Reservists. Data 

before 1966 not available. 

(Continued on next page) 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 33 

Table 3. (Continued) 

DOD civilian work force a 

Total 

Navy, Defense DOD 

including Air agencies Total manFY Army Marines Force and other civilians power 

1940 137 119 -- 

1941 329 227 -- 

1945 1,881 747 -- 

1948 303 347 152 

1950 261 293 154 

1953 884 470 382 

1960 473 365 355 

1966 450 367 336 

1967 516 416 349 

1968 510 429 339 

1969 531 438 349 

1970 480 388 328 

1971 452 362 313 

1972 446 353 300 

1973 406 334 288 

1974 409 335 289 

1980 361 309 244 

1985 420 353 264 

1986 413 342 263 

1987 418 353 264 

1988 393 348 253 

1989 403 354 261 

1990 380 341 249 

1991 365 329 233 

1992 334 309 214 

1993 294 285 202 

1994 293 269 201 

D 

1 

2 

2 

2 

69 

76 

75 

72 

68 

63 

60 

72 

75 

77 

92 

94 

98 

96 

99 

103 

117 

149 

156 

160 

256 

556 

2,628 

804 

710 

1 738 

1 195 

1 222 

1 357 

1 352 

1 390 

1 264 

1 189 

1,159 

1,099 

1,108 

990 

1,129 

1,112 

1,133 

1,090 

1,117 

1,073 

1,045 

1,006 

937 

923 

714 

2,357 

14,684 

2,248 

2,170 

5,293 

3,671 

4,316 

4,733 

4,900 

4,849 

4,330 

3,904 

3,482 

3,352 

3,270 

3,053 

3,335 

3,345 

3,376 

3,299 

3,319 

3,216 

3,122 

2,886 

2,763 

2,608 

a Beginning in 1953, the civilian work force figures include both U.S.and foreign 

national direct hires and the foreign national indirect-hire employees that support 

U.S. forces overseas. 
34 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Table 4. Federal outlays FY 1945--1994 (FY 1987 dollars in billions) 

Federal unified budget 

Veterans, Undist. 

National Space, Net Social & Agency offset. Grand 

FY defense Internat'l interest economic total receipts total 

1945 714.6 18.0 23.6 61.4 817.6 -16.3 801.3 

1948 64.9 32.4 22.4 74.3 194.0 -12.2 181.8 

1950 94.6 72.8 24.2 71.0 262.6 -12.5 250.1 

1953 315.2 31.6 23.6 78.7 449.1 -23.2 425.9 

1960 217.9 34.3 26.6 133.8 412.6 -23.1 389.5 

1966 229.6 60.8 32.3 200.8 523.5 -26.2 497.3 

1967 274.6 59.9 34.2 226.4 595.1 -28.7 566.4 

1968 299.5 54.3 35.5 254.1 643.4 -29.8 613.6 

1969 283.4 50.3 38.7 250.2 622.6 -27.5 595.1 

1970 264.4 48.5 41.6 271.0 625.5 -27.7 597.8 

1971 238.4 47.2 40.8 303.5 629.9 -28.9 601.0 

1972 220.3 49.1 40.5 333.9 643.8 -25.5 618.3 

1973 197.2 48.1 43.1 364.4 652.8 -32.5 620.3 

1974 185.3 51.1 49.6 377.1 663.1 -37.7 625.4 

1980 187.1 54.1 74.4 545.0 860.6 -28.5 832.1 

1985 261.2 52.4 137.3 584.7 1,035.6 -34.3 1,001.3 

1986 276.4 48.8 140.1 586.0 1,051.3 -34.0 1,017.3 

1987 282.0 45.4 138.7 574.3 1,040.4 -36.5 1,003.9 

1988 283.3 46.4 146.5 586.7 1,062.9 -35.8 1,027.1 

1989 285.9 45.8 156.4 604.1 1,092.2 -34.3 1,057.9 

1990 272.3 47.9 163.1 659.3 1,142.6 -32.4 1,110.2 

1991 238.4 50.7 165.2 752.7 1,207.0 -33.2 1,173.8 

1992 253.0 51.6 164.6 752.0 1,221.2 -32.1 1,189.1 

1993 240.6 53.4 162.4 808.3 1,264.7 -29.7 1,235.0 

1994 223.6 54.7 166.7 828.1 1,273.1 -29.1 1,244.0 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 35 

Table 5. Defense expenditures by percentage of annual budgets 

Procurement 

Personnel Operations, (including 

(salaries, maintenance, military Research and 

benefits) and training construction) development 

Truman 47 31 19 3 

(1946-1950) 

Eisenhower 34 26 32 8 

(1953-1960) 

Nixon/Ford/Carter 34 30 27 9 

(1969-1979) 

Table 6. Cost of individual weapon systems (all figures in FY 1988 dollars) 

Nuclear 

Fighter attack Surface 

Tanks aircraft submarines warships 

1945 M-48 F-51 -- DD-692/710 

$400,000 $540,000 $20 million 

1965 M-60 F-4 SSN-594 DDG-2 

$800,000 $7 million $250 million $150 millio.n 

1990 M-1A1 F-15C/D SSN-688 CG-47 

$2.3 million $40 million $700 million $1.1 billion 

In comparison, there are important observations and conclusions 

from these three periods of demobilization and military reductions. 

Among the significant observations, it is clear that the Truman 

demobilization, the Eisenhower partial demobilization, and the 

Nixon reductions were well planned and were based on similar 

premises: namely, downsizing of threat assessment; reliance on 

technology, alliances, foreign aid and assistance, and diplomacy as 

national security tools rather than on overwhelming force; 

recognition of the vital role of a healthy and expanding economy; 

and the sense that bipartisanship within the branches of the government would overcome any inefficiencies or roadblocks of constitutional tensions over national defense responsibilities. The last 
36 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

stages of the third defense drawdown in the 1970s produced a 

"hollow force" that was never the objective or intent of any administration and highlights both the pernicious nature of the factors that 

induce this condition as well as the long-term vulnerability of any 

level of military capability to this type of atrophy. 

Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Nixon had strong views 

about national security and strong convictions over drawing down 

defense. No doubt, as in other areas, strong presidential leadership 

remains the vital factor. Indeed, on the build-up side, Presidents 

Kennedy and Reagan had very strong views on enhancing defense. 

Although the Kennedy and Reagan views may have been strategically flawed or mistaken, during their terms of office, those same views 

were largely responsible for inducing two build-ups that, on purely 

tactical and operational criteria, strengthened U.S. military might. 

More important are the conclusions to be drawn from this comparison of the three post-World War II defense reductions. First, in 

each case, there was always a superpower threat to be countered and 

the perception that the military advantages of the West over the East, 

especially in advanced and nuclear systems, were at least being closed 

by the Soviet Union. The Soviet military threat was also vital in 

shaping the size and contours of the U.S. defense budget, whether 

spending was waxing or waning, and provided a quantitative as well 

as qualitative basis for defending and justifying U.S. force structure. 

Second, in each case, the perceived (and probably actual) readiness of the forces to carry out their military missions suffered and 

declined. There have been, however, no objective or quantitative 

measures to determine the exact level of military readiness in place 

at a given time, and the subjective nature of this art makes it 

unlikely that this lack of objectivity will change. 11 Yet, in qualitative 

terms, during times of budgetary constraints, the universal view 

has been one of injury to the forces. Figures 2 and 3 show this 

trend between drawdowns and readiness. 

11 For example, in his FY 1979 report, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 

noted that we have no exact means to determine readiness: 'We have not 

yet developed the methodological tools to show the precise sensitivity of 

readiness to changes in our commitment of resources. But loss of readiness 

is a cumulative process that takes time as well as money to reverse." p. 10. 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 37 

Figure 2. Nominal Army readiness 

"5 

LU 

World World 

War I War II 

Kasserine 

Pass 

I I I 

1919 1943 1946 

The Wall 

Just Cause 

Korea Desert Storm 

Vietnam ., 

Trend towards 

,~ "hollowness" 

Task 

Force 

Smith 

I I 

1954 1971 1991 

Year 

Figure 3. Composite of Navy and Air Force readiness 

"O 

.e 

t- 

._m 

4=: 

.o 

(1) 

13- 

100 - 

90 - 

80 

7O ! 

60 - 

50 

40 

3O 

20 

10 - 

0 1 I 

78 79 80 

"'-"" 

V 

...,..,,.~j7 ~ Nuclear deterrent and 

-._ .,~" ,/ nuclear attack submarines 

" I! ....... Surface ships 

~.Jt"__ ----- Tactical aircraft squadrons i ," 

' Reporting system change 

I i I I I I I I I I I I 

81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 

Fiscal year 

Third, in every budget expenditure category, whether for people 

or weapons, unit costs have increased by multiples over inflation. In 

the case of personnel, the end of the draft in 1973 and the higher pay 

levels needed for maintaining a volunteer force explain cost growth 
38 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

in this account. Similar built-in cost drivers apply to the other 

categories of defense goods and services as well. To keep pace with 

these inherent cost drivers that rise well above the rate of inflation, 

either annual defense spending had to be increased sufficiently or 

capability was reduced accordingly even if spending was adjusted only 

for inflation. The point is that no long-term steady-state level of military capability is sustainable unless annual spending is increased or 

the inefficiencies and cost drivers are decreased. 

Fourth, through the late 1970s, the system of military bases 

and installations put in place to fight and win World War II was 

still largely functioning three-and-a-half decades later. By 1945, 

the U.S. had over 12 million troops in uniform out of a population 

of about 150 million. In 1979, there were 2.2 million in uniform 

out of a population of 225 million, and roughly 90 percent of the 

World War II installations remained in service. 

Fifth, during the Eisenhower and post-Vietnam reductions, the 

domestic budget realities were far different. Transfer payments, 

federal liabilities, and non-discretionary accounts were much 

smaller, and domestic programs had none of the built-in pressures 

for annual growth as in the 1980s and beyond. Federal debt was 

still a consequence of the world war and was becoming a smaller 

and smaller percentage of GDP. Annual federal deficits were relatively small, and the issue was never "guns or butter" but balancing priorities within a federal budget that had fiscal flexibility. None 

of these conditions obtains in the shadow of the new century. 

Sixth, and rather sensibly, the U.S. tried to exploit its technological superiority as an offset to Soviet numerical and geographical advantages. In the first instance, nuclear and thermonuclear improvements in weapons were married up with the "triad" of land- and seabased missile and bomber forces. As conventional force became more 

relevant, advanced technology across virtually all systems was put to 

use to give the U.S. "qualitative" superiority over Soviet numerical 

advantage. Thus, for example, a U.S. nuclear submarine force of fewer 

than 100 attack boats was acceptable even though the Soviet Union 

maintained two or three times that number on the grounds that 

U.S. superior technology, namely quietness of the ships and better 

torpedoes, counterbalanced numerical inferiority. 

Seventh, although the demobilization in 1945-46 sustained a 

force that, in three months, reversed the gains of the surprise North 

Korean attack in 1950 (but may not have been able to repel a 

Soviet invasion of Europe), diplomatic, economic, and strategic 
PART" I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 39 

initiatives were successfully protecting the security of the West vis 

avis the USSR. This use of instruments to complement U.S. military forces, in conjunction with a sensible build-down, could form a 

relevant model for the future. 

Finally, and outside the above analysis, regulations concerning 

the acquisition and oversight of goods and services for defense, while 

increasing in costs and other impositions placed on the system, 

were in check in the sense these were manageable and affordable. 

This suggests nothing about the extent of procurement fraud or 

criminality and loss to the government by illegal actions. But in 

1947, for example, there were about 2,000 pages of government 

procurement and regulatory procedures. And every dollar spent 

on buying goods and services cost about 2 to 5 cents to administer. 

In 1979, the rules and regulations grew to about 20,000 pages, and 

the costs of regulation increased to about 10 cents on the dollar. 12 

The effect of these cost drivers and other factors that escalated 

defense expenses is manifested in figure 4, which displays U.S. 

defense spending from 1948 to 1984 in then-year dollars. 

Figure 4. Fluctuations in U.S. defense spending, 1948-1984 

m 

O "O 

"5 

(D 

e- 

.9 

O 

(D 

tO 

80- Personnel 

-- -- - Operations and Maintenance /. 

Procurement /.~' 

60 ........ RDT&E ////' 

'// 

Z ,/ 

40-- Y / 

1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 

Year 

Source: The U.S. Government, The Budget of the United States, Appendix, 

1948-1985 

12 The use of simple numbers is metaphoric and not analytical. In fact, 

the regulato.ry drain was probably more expensive and buraensome than 

this comparmon suggests. 
40 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Note that beginning in about 1978, U.S. defense spending begins 

an asymptotic increase well above the inflation rate even though the 

actual increases in force size and capability were relatively modest. 

Some of this growth was due to the costs of the volunteer force. Much 

was not. It is this phenomenon that underscores the effect of the 

growing expense and inefficiency of governance. 

The conclusions drawn from these earlier instances of defense 

downsizings highlight the extent of the current structural problems that must be resolved if U.S. future military might is to be 

maintained at levels and standards of readiness and capability 

likely to be needed in protecting the nation's interests. 

THE FOURTH AND CURRENT B~LD-DOWN 

In late 1989, largely if not entirely in response to the political 

and physical destruction of the Berlin Wall and the prospect of the 

Germanys being unified (and the new state remaining in NATO), 

the then new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin 

Powell began a major review of military posture and strategy. 

Through sheer strength of personality, the chairman was able to 

persuade not only his colleagues in the Pentagon but also, most 

importantly, President George Bush that the Cold War was over 

and the U.S. must respond appropriately. The development of what 

became known as the "Base Force 1989-1992" was well documented 

in a study conducted by the Joint History Office of the Office of the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OCJCS). 13 

The "base force" envisaged reducing American active-duty 

military strength from 2.2 million to 1.6 million, or by about 25 percent, and the budget by 10 percent over a five-year period. Force 

structure was to be gradually reduced as shown in table 7. 

The Bush "base force" was projected to be supported by budgets 

that grew slightly from $288.4 billion in FY 1993 to $300.6 billion 

in FY 1997. To allow a comparison with the last year of the Carter 

administration, table 8 shows the size and structure of U.S. forces 

for the past decade and a half. 

13 See Lorna S. Jaffee, The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992, 

published by the OCJCS. Perhaps the most revealing statement in that 

study was, "The Chairman would have preferred greater reductions...but 

he did not wish to increase resistance to his proposals." 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAYTHAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 41 

Table 7. Reduction of U.S. force structure 

Forces FY 1990 FY 1993 Base force 

Army 

Active divisions 18 14 12 

National Guard division equivalents 10 6 (+2 Cadre) 6 (+2 Cadre) 

Navy 

Aircraft carriers 15 + 1 13 + 1 12 + 1 

Active/Reserve air wings 13 / 2 11 / 2 11 / 2 

Ships 546 447 429 

Air Force 

Active fighter wings 24 16 15.3 

Reserve fighter wings 12 12 11.2 

Marine Corps 

Active endstrength 197,000 185,000 170,000a 

Reserve endstrength 44,000 42,000 35,000 

Strategic nuclear forces 

Ballistic missile subs 34 22 18 

Strategic bombers (PAA) 301 201 180 

ICBMs 1,000 787 550 

a USMC endstrength is scheduled to reach 159,000 in FY 1997 under the base force. 

Table 8. Force structure past and future 

FY 

Marine Navy Annual 

Endstrength Army Corps ships/ USAF budgets in 

(act/res, divisions divisions aircraft tac ftr wings then-year 

in 000s) (act/res)a (act/res) carriers (act/res) dollars (BA)b 

1980 2,050/851 16/8 3/1 479/13 26/11 142.3 

1985 2,152/1,088 17/10 3/1 541/14 25/12 286.8 

1987 2,174/1,151 18/10 3/1 568/15 24.5/12 279.4 

1990 2,069/1,128 18/10 3/1 545/15 24/12 292.9 

1991 2,002/1,138 16/10 3/1 526/15 22/13 290.9 

1992 1,808/1,114 14/10 3/1 466/14 16/14 286.3 

1993 1,746/1,080 14/8 3/1 447/13 16/12 288.4 

a Active/reserve. 

b BA = budget authority. 
42 IN IRONS: V.S, MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

The Bush "base force" was put into effect. Despite significant 

events such as the Gulf War waged throughout 1990 and ending in 

an overwhelming 100-hour victory in 1991 and, more importantly, 

the failed Soviet coup followed by the demise of both the USSR and 

the Warsaw Pact in August 1991, the base force remained largely 

unchanged. In the fall of 1991, following the failed coup, the Bush 

administration attempted to develop a new and bold arms-reduction initiative and seek major cuts across nuclear and conventional 

forces of both superpowers. However, Bush and Defense Secretary 

Dick Cheney were uncomfortable with the timing, and, as a result, 

the only forces that were cut back were theater nuclear. 

To the degree that the base force had any industrial policy implications, the thrust was to let the market determine winners and losers. Government played little or no role in shaping the direction of 

the industrial base other than through its procurement expenditures. 

Thus, the first stages in this fourth downsizing would lead to a gradual 

reduction in manpower by about 400,000 active personnel and 300,000 

reserves and to annual defense spending at just under $300 billion. 

The Clinton administration assumed office in January 1993 but 

took a long time to settle in. Regarding defense, the first crisis was 

over the president's campaign pledge to end discrimination against 

homosexuals serving in uniform. Whatever individual views on 

that issue may have been, the Pentagon was seized in a huge controversy over social and legal matters and not the business of producing a first-rate plan for defending the nation. 

At the time, the White House gave the new secretary of defense 

Les Aspin virtually no guidance on its view of defense policy or 

specific strategic objectives. Because very few of the top civilian 

positions were then filled in the Pentagon, the few senior OSD appointees had to rely on the Joint Chiefs and the Chairman for help. 

In practice, the reexamination of the nation's defenses, which became known as the Bottom-Up Review, would turn out more as a 

series of internal negotiations within the Pentagon than as a topdown presidentially directed mandate. 14 

For a number of understandable reasons, without political 

direction from the White House, the uniformed military was not 

14 Discussions with many senior civilian and uniformed officials in DOD 

involved with the Bottom-Up Review revealed to the author the extent of 

this process of internal negotiations. 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 43 

prepared to embark on a unilateral dismantlement of the Bush 

base force and cut the level of military power it believed was required to protect the nation's interests. The continued absence of 

any political guidance from the White House hardened this view. 

The unsettling nature of the world at large was taken as strong 

evidence for preserving U.S. military strength. Years of working 

with Congress had yielded the experience that making major concessions without any quidpro quo from Capitol Hill was not smart. 

The result would be a de facto military strategy and force posture 

accepted by the White House and Congress, largely by default, and 

without serious debate and examination of alternative policies in 

an appropriate interagency government forum. 

Put in its public form, the Bottom-Up Review 15 focused on answering 

two questions. First, how should the armed forces be structured for the 

future? Second, how much defense is enough in the post-Cold War era? 

The answers to those questions were used to define the strategy, force structure, modernization programs, industrial base, and 

infrastructure needed to meet new dangers and seize new opportunities. The new dangers were ordered in four broad categories: 

• Dangers posed by nuclear weapons and other weapons of 

mass destruction to include proliferation 

• Regional dangers leading to instability and conflict 

• Dangers to democracy and reform principally in the FSU 

and Eastern Europe 

• Economic dangers. 

Furthermore, the review specified three guiding principles for 

sustaining the forces: U.S. forces must be ready to fight, they must 

maintain the quality of their people, and the U.S. must maintain 

technological superiority. 

The planning for the future forces was based on the demands of 

meeting two illustrative contingency scenarios, one in the Gulf and 

the other in Korea, on a near-simultaneous basis. In addition to the 

forces required to win two major regional conflicts or contingencies 

(MRCs), other missions for peace enforcement and intervention and 

15 Refer to The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era, September 1, 

1993, Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
44 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

overseas presence were assessed to derive estimated numbers of forces 

needed for those roles as well. The conclusions led to requirements 

for an active-duty force of about 1.4 million and a force structure as 

shown in table 9. Defense budgets were as shown in table 10. 

Table 9. U.S. force structure--1999 

Army 

Navy 

Air Force 

Manne Corps 

Strategic Nuclear 

Forces (by 2003) 

• 10 divisions (active) 

• 5+ divisions (reserve) 

• 11 aircraft carriers (active) 

• 1 aircraft carrier (reserve/training) 

• 45-55 attack submarines 

• 346 ships 

• 13 fighter wings (active) 

• 7 fighter wings (reserve) 

• Up to 184 bombers 

• 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces 

• 174,000 personnel (active endstrength) 

• 42,000 personnel (reserve endstrength) 

• 18 ballistic missile submarines 

• Up to 94 B-52H bombers 

• 20 B-2 bombers 

• 500 Minuteman III ICBMs (single warhead) 

Table 10. Clinton plan: Defense discretionary funding (current-year dollars in billions) 

FY 

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 

January 1992 Bush baseline 

BA (Budget Authority) 288.4 289.3 292.8 295.2 300.6 -- 

Outlays 291.0 285.0 289.4 294.2 298.6 -- 

Proposed Clinton level 

BA 274.3 263.7 262.8 253.8 248.4 254.2 

Diff. from Bush -11.8 -15.2 -24.5 -36.2 -39.2 

Cum. diff. from Bush -11.8 -27.0 -51.5 -87.1 -126.9 

Outlays 294.3 277.7 272.6 264.9 249.1 252.7 

Diff. from Bush -6.7 -11.7 -19.7 -37.4 -36.3 

Cure. diff. from Bush -6.7 -18.4 -38.1 -75.5 -111.8 
PART I: "THE BXRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 45 

The Bottom-Up Review also identified new initiatives to deal 

with the four dangers and promised to address the issues of readiness, acquisition reform, and infrastructure. Finally, although no 

formal statement on an industrial policy was released, the decision was made to preserve the nuclear submarine (SSN) and nuclear 

carrier (CVN) industrial base at least for a few years through award 

of a contract for a new SSN to the Electric Boat Shipyard and a 

contract for another CVN to Newport News. 

In addition to the explicit rationale for the BUR found in both 

public and internal DOD documents, other broad geostrategic reasons supported the Pentagon's conclusions. Whether or not the world 

is a more dangerous place, the reality and presence of American military strength have been traditionally viewed as stabilizing and reassuring, particularly by U.S. friends and allies. As uncertainty abounds, 

collapsing or weakening this long-standing international pillar of 

strength and security can be argued as a most unwise step. 

Furthermore, because of the complex and ponderous nature of 

the U.S. political process, finetuning a structure as large and diverse as DOD is difficult. Attempts at imposing major change, especially in downsizing DOD, can face formidable obstacles. Thus, 

a structural argument can be made for a consistent glide slope for 

reductions that is steep, but not too steep. These broader and implicit arguments can be debated and challenged. However, they 

also form perhaps the stronger and more useful way to make this 

military case to Congress, by appealing to judgment and emotion 

as well as to a quantitative and reasoned formula. 

Despite the attempts to devise a framework for determining 

force structure and the intent of undertaking comprehensive 

solutions that would encompass issues across all defense sectors from acquisition reform to reducing social inequalities, the 

BUR had several serious flaws. These flaws stemmed largely 

from the absence of policy guidance from the White House and 

the inherent limitations of DOD trying to supply surrogate 

answers to questions the president should have been asking 

or answering himself. 

Conceptually, although the four principal dangers may indeed 

define much of the new national interest, it is difficult to show why 

dangers to the economy, to reform in Russia, and even the threat of 
46 IN IRONS: US. M1L~rARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

proliferation 1G should be the major missions for the DOD. Certainly 

the MRCs and fighting wars are the principal DOD function. Countering or preventing proliferation is a subset of those tasks. However, 

the BUR established new roles and objectives that exceeded both the 

authority and capacity of DOD to address in effective and comprehensive ways. 

Second, the BUR was underfunded. Before his resignation in 

January 1994, and pressed by the military, who saw the 

underfunding in the many tens of billions of dollars, Secretary Aspin 

finally admitted publicly to a shortfall of $50 billion. Evidence 

that follows shows this shortfall will grow to hundreds of billions of 

dollars. In the summer of 1994, Deputy Secretary of Defense John 

Deutch released a memo cautioning the services that the future 

funding gaps could require delaying or canceling major programs 

across DOD. Although no action has been taken yet, many analysts regard this memo as the first acknowledgement of a much 

larger funding problem than has been previously admitted. 17 But, 

no matter the actual size of the shortfall, the BUR is simply not 

fiscally maintainable as is. is 

Third, U.S. military capabilities were perhaps understated, 

threats overstated, and the role of allies and mobilization certainly 

underplayed. In other words, the requirements of the MRCs may 

16 For example, regarding proliferation of nuclear weapons, the case will 

be made that a more important objective for the U.S. is to prevent the use 

of nuclear weapons should nonproliferation efforts fail. And, 

antiproliferation ultimately must reside in planning for the MRC. 

17 Reported in the Washington Post, August 22, 1994, p. A1. 

18 For a critique of the BUR as well as evidence of underfunding, see Andrew F. Krepinevich '~The Bottom-Up Review: An Assessment," Defense 

Budget Project, February 1994, 63 pp.; and Anthony Cordesman, "A Critique of the BUR," a presentation to the Center for Naval Analyses, May 

1993. A report by the General Accounting Office released in August 1994 

put the underfunding at $150 billion. The DOD has not publicly objected in 

strong terms to that estimate as of this writing but in private disagrees with 

the amount. 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAYTHAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 47 

have exaggerated the necessary capabilities, and fewer forces, 

provided they were well-trained, perhaps could suffice. 19 In any 

event, the general scenario was predicated on U.S. unilateral action even though, politically, allies would have to be brought aboard. 

As a result, unless action is taken to redress these flaws, the 

BUR force is headed to a condition of"in irons." As will be shown, 

the only questions are when this will happen and how badly capability will erode. Sadly, the question of whether this downward 

spiral will occur no longer applies. In addressing these flaws in 

the BUR, it also might be in the broader public interest to engage 

in a major debate over national security that so far has been deferred or dismissed as an unnecessary or fruitless exercise given 

what are seen as more vital national issues. 

19 See Krepinevich and C. Bowie et al. The New Calculus (Santa Monica, 

CA: The Rand Corporation, 1993). 
48 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

CHAPTER TWO: STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY 

The Constitution of the United States of America commands 

the government "to provide for the common defense." Congress, in 

Article I, Section 8, is assigned the power "to raise and support 

armies" and "to provide and maintain a navy. "2° The President, in 

Article II, Section 1 is vested "The Executive Power" and in Article II, 

Section 2, is assigned the title and responsibility of "commander in 

chief" of the armed forces. 

The presumption, then as now, was the need to specify the separate and unique function of government to protect the nation and 

its security from military threats. The persisting tensions and irreversible but premeditated contradictions over Article I and II 

powers between the legislature and the e:~ecutive and the abutment of political (and economic and social) challenges onto the national military domain have not softened over the past 200 years. 

Indeed, the structural inefficiencies mandated by the system of 

checks and balances are only likely to worsen in an era without a 

single powerful enemy and with far greater demands on an everconstrained and contested national expense account. 

The Founding Fathers were entirely purposeful in sacrificing 

the efficiency of government in order to maximize the liberty and 

freedom of the individual from excessive imposition and intervention of government. Because military security 200 years ago was 

viewed in terms of direct military aggression and attack against 

the nation and the individual states themselves, the inherent constitutional contradictions that ensured permanent tension among 

the branches of government could be relaxed in time of crisis. Subordinated by a clear and apparent danger, presumably in the form 

of invasion and direct attack, a unified government would be led 

by the commander in chief for the duration of the crisis. It also 

proved true that because of the fabulous resources possessed by 

this country, the ability to spend our way clear of past dangers was 

20 The Constitution also specifies that, for armies, "no appropriation of 

money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years." No such 

stricture applies to the Navy. 
PART I: "THE B~RD TO SLAY TgnT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 49 

both practical and possible. Strategic misjudgment or inaction could 

be remedied by the expenditure of additional and available resources. 

The classic comingling, in later years, of a unifying and heinous threat and expending virtually unlimited resources was inadvertently and inexorably assured when the first of Yamamoto's 

torpedo bombers lifted off the Japanese aircraft carrier Akagi on 

December 7, 1941, en route to attacking Pearl Harbor. That "day of 

infamy" instantly transformed American apathy towards fascism 

and the war in Europe into anger, outrage, and determination, 

making the ultimate outcome of World War II inevitable. 

Subsequently, the Soviet Union (and, before 1972, China) provided the unifying threat that enabled so-called bipartisan coalitions of Republicans and Democrats to forge a stable foreign and 

national security policy and, at least in this one area, mitigate the 

tensions between both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. Although it 

is too early to tell how bipartisanship will work in the post-Cold 

War world, the similarities between the Bush and Clinton foreign 

policies suggest that the executive branch is likely to maintain a 

certain continuity across different administrations on many vital 

international issues. Whether Congress responds in a bipartisan way 

to this "threatless" or less threatening world will very much determine how well or how badly the nation will deal with the post-Cold 

War environment. 21 

It is exceedingly unlikely, however, that the coalescing of threat 

and massing of resources will or could recur either as dramatically 

as in December 1941 or, for that matter, during much of the Cold 

War. This lack of a coalescing or unifying threat poses a fundamental problem for the United States. On one hand, Americans 

have learned from hard experience that isolation and withdrawal 

from foreign affairs are both temporary and shortsighted international postures. Although the euphemism of "keeping one's powder dry" is not inapplicable, Americans appreciate the need to have 

a strong, ready military force of the right size. 

21 The term post-Cold War world (and new world order) is in need of replacement, because the honeymoon of the collapse of communism and the USSR is 

over. My response is to use the phrase "era of strategic uncertainty." 
50 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

On the other hand, there is little agreement on what the "right 

size" is for military forces, especially ai%er making careful consideration of the real dangers and financial costs of defense. Further, 

while agreeing in principle to the need for a strong defense, when 

choosing between that objective and the loss of a job because of 

base closings or cuts in procurement programs that shut down factories, most Americans understandably will opt to protect themselves and not the larger public good. 

In sum, most Americans don't object to having a strong military or to paying for it when necessary. But, without a palpable 

and plausible threat, maintaining a sizable and consistent level of 

defense spending will remain among the most elusive of national 

objectives. Furthermore, in this competition for increasingly scarce 

federal dollars, domestic programs will command far more public 

support than defense. 

The strategic quandary of how to shift from a threat-specific 

basis for defining national security to other criteria is not easily or 

quickly resolvable. If daunting military thrcats to U.S. security 

are unlikely to arise for some time to come, what are the conditions 

and uncertainties that may lie ahead that require the actual or 

putative use of U.S. force to protect or advance the interests of 

America and the world at large? In answering these questions, we 

must define the characteristics of a world regime no longer dominated by an intense, bipolar, geostrategic struggle. 

A commonly held view in the United States is that although 

the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact are forever gone, the world still 

remains a dangerous place. But, basing a strategy on obtaining 

public or political consensus as to what does or does not constitute 

a "dangerous place" in times of strategic uncertainty and ambiguity is exceedingly risky for reasons that are both logical and pragmatic. This dilemma is exacerbated by the observation made by 

former National Security Advisor Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski that although "there may be dangers ahead, there are no obvious disasters." 

Regarding the former Soviet Union---in the first place, while it 

is impossible to predict how it and its republics will evolve, a rejuvenated antiwestern or anti-imperialist state emerging in Russia 

or in other former republics is not going to occur quickly. There are 

too many pressing domestic issues, most of which revolve around 
PART [: "THE BIRD TO SLAYTHAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 51 

the economy. The report of the decision by Russia to mothball three 

of its five aircraft carriers on the grounds of austerity reinforces 

this point. 22 The absolute danger posed by the USSR has vanished; 

the residual nuclear weapons possessed by four former republics 

are vexing but not yet threatening; and the former conventional 

might of Soviet forces has decayed enormously. Indeed, military 

spending is among the lowest of Russian political priorities except 

to the degree that the defense budget is providing income and sustenance for a substantial part of the population still in uniform. 

The conclusion is clear. The United States and its western partners must remain vigilant regarding the former Soviet Union; 

massive or total disarmament would be ludicrous. Whatever dangers or uncertainties may lurk within the ten time zones of the 

FSU, they are of political, economic, and social dimensions. The 

response of Boris Yeltsin in crushing the revolt of the Russian 

Parliament in October 1993 and keeping his country on a democratic course reinforces optimism over the long term. The rise of 

Vladimir Zhirinovsky--and, worse, perhaps one day a more competent version of this extremist--remains a concern. 

If those problems in the FSU are left to fester, the consequences 

could have a serious military dimension. Unless the West is 

dimwitted, the risks from the former Soviet Union do not automatically contribute to making the world a more dangerous place 

as far as the United States is concerned, Soviet arms sales to world 

markets withstanding. Sale or theft of Soviet nuclear weapons is a 

separate issue considered later. 

Second, given the absolute passage of the Soviet threat and no 

matter the likelihood of a possible Russian military rejuvenation, 

it is exceedingly difficult to envisage a serious geostrategic threat 

emerging by the end of and even well into the new century remotely 

as capable or potentially dangerous as the USSR was. A rearmed 

Germany or Japan, while theoretically possible, seems entirely 

unlikely and certainly not in the foreseeable future. For those who 

correctly note that it took Hitler a half decade to remilitarize Nazi 

22 The Washington Post, February 15th, 1994, p. A20. It turns out these 

ships were in such bad shape they were scrapped instead. 
52 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Germany, the analogy to the present is misplaced. The political, 

economic, and military conditions of the 1990s are profoundly and 

irreversibly different from those of the 1930s, not the least of which 

is an internationally engaged United States replete with an arsenal of thousands of nuclear weapons and the most capable military 

forces in the world. 

Third, new threats such as an aggressive China, India, Brazil, 

or other emerging power are equally difficult to imagine as plausible grounds for establishing a coherent, overarching U.S. security strategy. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations have 

recognized these realities and, as a result, have argued for military forces designed to deal with contingencies more likely than 

not to occur where conflict or tension is already present in the 

region. Korea and the Persian Gulf are the two obvious cases in 

this regard, although it is extremely difficult to argue that North 

Korea or Iraq could pose a threat to Western and allied interests 

remotely close to that of the former Soviet Union. 

In the case of Korea, the south has double the population of the 

north, an immeasurably larger GDP, and a highly trained army of 

650,000 in well-defended positions supported by U.S. forces and 

U.S. advanced systems. It is hard to see how the United States 

could let the strategic balance swing in favor of the north unless it 

chose to do so. Despite occasional reports that Saddam Hussein is 

rebuilding Iraq's army, does it seem possible that another Desert 

Storm operation could produce a substantially different outcome? 

Just because no society-menacing threats are likely to arise in 

the world of the new century, that condition does not mean U.S. 

military power is nonessential or unimportant. Nor does it mean 

the United States can or should take a more relaxed view of its 

security, because, although the absolute danger is less, the complexity and uncertainty in this new era are greater, and U.S. leadership seems no less a contributor to global stability than in the 

past. This condition of strategic uncertainty does demand, however, 

that an especially careful and rigorous assessment be made of the 

level of military capability deemed necessary and, in particular, 

that the judgments and assumptions underlying these conclusions 

are clearly and coherently put. Because there is no unambiguous 

or obvious threat, the only basis for these findings must rest on 
PARr I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 53 

judgment and experience. If the world is indeed a "more dangerous 

place," the questions are where is the world more dangerous, for 

whom is it more dangerous, what does this mean for the U.S., and 

what can be done about reducing or isolating the real dangers and 

threats to the U.S. and its interests? 

Some in the United States argue that although military conflict and local privation or instability make the world more deadly 

for Bosnians, Somalis, Kurds, and Sudanese, among others, the 

direct foreign dangers to Americans at home are minuscule. The 

real dangers to Americans, in this view, reside within these shores: 

crime, violence, drugs, and matters that pertain to law enforcement. Resolving such problems is not a traditional task for 

national defense. In June 1993, when federal and state lawenforcement agencies arrested a group of terrorists suspected of 

plotting to destroy vulnerable sites in New York and assassinate 

federal and state elected officials, sixteen people were gunned down 

or murdered in Washington, DC, over the same two-day period. A 

dangerous place must be defined in relative terms. 

To the degree that national security is viewed increasingly in 

terms of economic security and well-being, a measure of international stability among trading partners is an obvious necessity. That 

stability has several components: economic in the sense that financial, trade, currency, and associated markets function well; political in the sense that civil unrest or civil war does not spill across 

borders or cut off access to key resources and markets; strategic in 

the sense that threats or crises do not disrupt this order; and conceptual in that the notion of collective or cooperative security has 

continuing if not increasing relevance. 

There are obvious potential threats and challenges to this system of western stability that come from within and outside the 

network of advanced states. Regional problems like Bosnia challenge stability on three grounds. The first is that ethnic hostility 

and civil war could spread, perhaps uncontrollably, to parts of the 

FSU or become the catalyst for expanding regional violence such 

as through direct intervention into Bosnia by Greece, Turkey, or 

another external state. The second is exposing the inability of the 

West's major security instrument--NATO--to cope with the first 

post-Cold War security problem that, parenthetically, is occurring 
54 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

in Europe. The third is to lay bare the extent of policy tools available 

to restoring order, giving rise to the fear that preventing or containing regional conflict as in the former Yugoslavia is beyond the 

ability of any outside state that may see it in its interests to take 

some form of action. 

Regional bullies or bad actors beyond a militant Iran, Iraq, or 

Libya could prove disruptive to this order. But these situations, 

exemplified by Haiti and U.S. attempts to remove its military dictatorship, are likely to pose problems that are inherently domestic 

in nature and not strategic. Haiti offers no conceivable threat to 

international order. Yet two American administrations tried 

unsuccessfully to resolve the Haitian situation, although, as this 

book goes to press, U.S. intervention seems inevitable. 

Two of the most discussed and publicly worried about threats 

to U.S. security have been the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction and terrorism (and, indeed, the possible connection 

between the two). The revelation that South Africa secretly possessed the '%omb" reinforced legitimate worries about an Iran, Iraq, 

or North Korea obtaining even one nuclear weapon. But there is 

also the tendency to exaggerate the extent of this threat. In this 

case, "nuclear paranoia" is not new. Four decades ago, the prospect 

of a Soviet Union or China armed with nuclear weapons provoked 

debate over preemptive elimination of that threat and, later, led to 

a policy of"massive retaliation" that would have destroyed Soviet 

society in the event of a world war. But, because nuclear war was 

avoided then, when fear was both justified and exaggerated, does 

not mean the same calculus will always apply in the future. 

On the one hand, simply because the East-West conflict never 

led to world war--partly because vital interests never were at issue and partly because the balance of terror wrought by nuclear 

weapons made war an avoidable option--does not guarantee that 

powers armed with a relatively few bombs would immutably conform to this standard. On the other hand, even if an Iraq or a 

North Korea were to acquire nuclear weapons, the overwhelming 

superiority of U.S. military power should not be assumed away. 

And, were Iraq or North Korea bent on doing real harm to the 

United States, courses of action that do not involve nuclear weapons 

are available, including the use of biological agents to contaminate or 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MAD~ THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 55 

kill large segments of the U.S. population. Perhaps miraculously, 

biological agents have not been widely used by any state or subnational 

grout>--thus far. 

The point is that potential vulnerability to weapons of mass 

destruction can never be entirely eliminated. Since major powers 

are not likely to attack each other with nuclear weapons, the actual use of mass destruction weapons seems remote, particularly 

if intelligence and law-enforcement agencies remain fixed on this 

potential problem. Should these mass destruction agents be used 

or threatened, the role of military power would be to deter, preempt, or retaliate. But, on the basis of countering proliferation 

alone, when the would-be proliferators are not first-rate powers, 

justifying a very large and expensive standing military force would 

be extremely difficult. 

Terrorism presents a parallel danger. Ironically, the best leverage that terrorists possess within the United States is through the 

protection of the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution. Acts of 

terrorism against Americans--the destruction of Pan American 

Flight 103 and the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York 

withstanding--while tragedies to those affected, have been relatively unusual. Yet the publicity has been vast and the media coverage extensive perhaps well in excess of the actual acts because 

of the rarity of such occurrences. And, terrorists benefit not only 

from the First Amendment; the rights of due process also apply, 

even in absentia. The remedy, when specific evidence is available 

and the perpetrators are safe from U.S. prosecution, is force. The 

military instrument is usually applied bluntly and forcibly. Very 

rarely, as in the capture of the AchiUe Lauro hijackers, it is applied 

in a highly discrete and precise way. 

A final aspect of this threat assessment can be addressed in 

terms of a double paradox. One part of this paradox applies to the 

international environment where U.S. force might be used. The 

other part of the paradox applies to the nation itself that must 

support or tolerate future uses of U.S. force. The irony is that this 

double paradox arises from the relative and absolute increase in 

U.S. military strength occasioned by the end of the USSR. 

Internationally, and despite fears of spreading ballistic missile 

technology and associated agents of mass destruction, the level of 
56 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

potential military threat facing the United States has declined 

dramatically. Thus, instead of large, Soviet-style military forces 

massed against NATO across the plains of central Europe, likely 

adversaries will be equipped with fewer and less sophisticated 

weapons. Tactics such as urban or "hit and run" warfare will fit 

these situations and not necessarily be suited for the strengths of 

American military might. Applying the most formidable U.S. military capabilities--namely, intense, highly accurate, mobile, massed 

firepower from the battlefield dimensions of sea, air, and land-- 

will be far harder against an adversary lacking these means to 

conduct war. 

At the same time, these more modestly equipped adversaries 

will have access to extraordinarily advanced intelligence-gathering systems ranging from CNN and other real-time media networks 

to the most sophisticated space photographic products now on the 

open market. Sold by Russian and French outlets, these products 

make use of national surveillance satellites. This access to advanced systems can generate political advantages by providing both 

information for and coverage of the actual targeting of U.S. forces. 

The first paradox is this inversion of military capabilities and possible operational consequences in which "superior" force may not 

work or may not be relevant. 

The second paradox arises partly from U.S. military competence 

and partly from the U.S. declaratory policy that force would not be 

used except ~overwhelmingly or decisively"; that there would be 

explicit and obtainable military objectives; that these objectives 

would be supported by the public; and finally that military force 

would work rapidly, with minimal casualties to ourselves and with 

minimal "collateral damage." Hence, while U.S. military force has 

increased in both relative and absolute terms, the very conditions 

that are likely to determine whether force will be used in anger 

impose substantial constraints. These constraints may not be in 

keeping with the realities of the post-Cold War world, namely that 

~decisiveness" may be not relevant or obtainable, and sustaining 

even a handful of injuries or deaths to ourselves or to inhabitants of 

the region where force is used may preclude taking otherwise appropriate action. Learning to deal with this double paradox may 

not be an easy matter. 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 57 

The sum and substance of this review of threats lead to the 

conclusion that while there are legitimate grounds for maintaining strong and ready forces to assure military and physical security, the extent of real and potential dangers to the nation can be 

exaggerated, especially in light of the collapse of the huge military 

challenge of the USSR. Without a concrete threat, the strategic 

uncertainties of the new century are likely to prove divisive, resulting in varying opinions on what may or not be needed regarding U.S. military might. Furthermore, the huge political pressures 

generated by the gap between national resources and obligations 

and liabilities manifested in a permanently (or long-term) unbalanced federal budget will intensify the tension inherent in the 

checks and balances of Articles I and II of the Constitution. The 

result must exacerbate the differences in the policies and preferences 

of the commander in chief and the protectors of the public purse no 

matter which party dominates the collective houses of government. 

The president also has constitutional responsibility for conducting the nation's foreign policy. The Senate has the specific 

responsibility for approving treaties and ambassadors, and the 

whole Congress the responsibility for all government spending 

and for declaring war. Congress also regulates commerce. Under all 

circumstances, Congress represents its constituents and the 

electorate with its overwhelmingly domestically oriented agenda. 

Collision between national and local interests and between constitutional responsibilities is inherent to the process of government. 

But without some basis for ensuring consensus on means and ends, 

protracted warfare over domestic and national security in the budget process is too likely to produce even greater government 

"gridlock" and greater inefficiency in using our resources. Decisions--on how to cut defense-related infrastructure, for example-- 

will be delayed or diluted and, without a clarifying or unifying 

theme, as will be shown, the current military build-down risks suffering from the similar ills of past reductions. 

An indication of the power and longevity of gridlock is that partisan politics over administration policy towards Somalia and Haiti 

have been displaced by more traditional conflict over constitutional 

prerogatives between Congress and the president. Congress, led 

by a majority of the president's own party, saw their prerogatives 
58 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

being ignored. First it was the obscenity of a dead U.S. serviceman 

paraded through Mogadishu and then a U.S. warship driven out of 

Port-au-Prince by Haitian thugs that engaged Congress. The debate on Haitian intervention was an obvious clash over constitutional authority. 

This pessimism over governmental impotence and its particular effect on security and defense, however, is neither inevitable 

nor immutable. There are powerful grounds for making the case 

for strong and ready forces and overcoming many of these governmental standoffs. The defense debate will continue over the size, 

shape, and composition of the forces, and the focus will be the level 

of spending and spending priorities within that context. Put another way, the question of the 1960s made famous by former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara of"how much is enough" will 

be recast. Few Americans would vote for a weak military, and bromides like "second to none" will be smoke screens for making do 

with less. But, there may be a minimum level of military force 

below which the nation will not be prepared to go, although defining this level will prove elusive. 

There are specific and highly legitimate roles and uses for military force. Understanding these roles and uses can sustain a consensus of public and governmental support, certainly as far as what 

those uses are, even if agreement cannot be reached on how many 

forces we need or how much of the nation's resources should be put 

into defense. The first and most important use for U.S. military 

force is as guarantor and principal agent for maintaining order: to 

underwrite U.S. commitments to its allies; to maintain international stability; and to provide a responsive and appropriate capability for contingencies and crises that may occur. 

A corollary assertion is that, as the sole remaining superpower, 

the United States is obligated to maintain military forces reflecting 

that status. However, although this assertion may have psychological and rhetorical value, the actual strategic or political benefit 

of superpower status is no longer quite so obvious or inherent. To 

our friends, whom we are unlikely to attack and who are unlikely 

to threaten us militarily, "superpower" signifies little because there 

is no longer any leverage with which to apply this status now that 

the Soviet menace is gone. To our most likely foes, who are relatively 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 59 

weak, superpower status has little direct relevance outside a 

military confrontation and provides the inducement of offering a 

small state the opportunity to be seen standing against the U.S. 

bully. This caveat of single superpower status aside, the United 

States will still be able to exercise global leadership and influence, 

if not set broad direction for the international community, and indeed continue in this responsibility. Military forces are among the 

most visible and perhaps most symbolic policy instrument to manifest this commitment and intent. 

It would prove quite shortsighted and probably dangerous for 

the United States to withdraw substantially or entirely, for example, 

from Europe, Korea, or Japan. Presence is essential for the political 

message it sends and for underwriting the leadership role the 

United States must accept if it is to promote international stability 

and safeguard its own well-being. Yet, showing definitive proof or 

evidence of the value of presence is extremely difficult even though 

judgment, instinct, and experience can be used to validate its utility. The proper questions for this examination must be what is an 

appropriate or acceptable level of commitment, how much force 

and presence are necessary to affirm this degree of commitment, 

and what combat capability needs to be deployed or stationed in 

these regions. 

The second use for U.S. military force is to be ready and able to 

deal with conflicts likely to be regional in nature. Criteria need to 

be set and agreed to over the types and intensity of those conflicts 

in terms of levels of U.S. commitment that may be required and the 

degree to which we could or would respond to these conflicts simultaneously or consecutively. 

The third use for U.S. military force is to serve with international coalitions, perhaps in conjunction with the United Nations. 

Peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-imposing roles would constitute the most likely tasks. However, as the U.S. would present a 

prime political target, as will be argued, we might best provide 

strategic "sinews" and support to other states who assume the roles 

ofpeacekeepers on the ground. In other words, rather than becoming the world's "911 force" in emergency, the U.S. would be a 

permanent "411 force," assuring the availability of support and 

success in the form of strategic sinews. 
60 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

These sinews include transportation, lift, and logistics; the vast 

C3I network; and military muscle should it be needed. Indeed, 

given the visibility of U.S. presence in peacekeeping and the cultural, emotional, and domestic constraints imposed by American 

society, namely a reluctance to tolerate any losses, the U.S. would 

be well-advised to examine exactly what roles and at what levels it 

should play. And contingencies or conflicts noted above could be 

dealt with through some form of international coalition. 

It should be clear that this hierarchy of roles and uses is a significant departure from the Cold War taxonomy that stressed the 

need for deterring conflict or containing it. The argument will be 

presented that the deterrent-based calculus of the Cold War, originally rooted in strategic and theater nuclear weapons and the ability 

to threaten massive and instant destruction, is not broadly relevant 

to this world of strategic uncertainty. It is likely that, despite the 

existence of substantial numbers of weapons of mass destruction in 

general and thousands of nuclear weapons in particular, the conduct 

of international politics and the role of force in that context have 

returned to the centuries old and traditional non-nuclear basis for 

protecting and advancing national interests. If the nuclear threat 

of massive societal destruction no longer conditions international 

politics, the strategic vocabulary and grammar that served the 

past four decades will have to be revised. 

In sum, the world of the new century may in fact not be as 

dangerous a place as some suggest regarding absolute or relative 

risks to the United States. Although serious harm and damage 

could be done to the nation by terrorists or hostile states relying on 

surprise to employ mass destruction agents or to target important 

U.S. facilities with conventional explosives, these instances are 

likely to be rare. And, barring the highly improbable rejuvenation 

of a militarized and aggressive Russia, a world war among advanced 

states is beyond comprehension, perhaps for decades. This analysis 

suggests that while U.S. force must be sustained at appropriate 

levels and kept at appropriate standards of readiness to be effective, there is no objective reason why that level could not be well 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 61 

below the current BUR force. In any event, whatever level is 

determined appropriate, without adequate funding that force will 

not be able to carry out its assigned duties. 

That aside, it would be folly to believe that the U.S. will not 

have to use force to protect itself, perhaps frequently and in substantial amounts. It is interesting that since the Berlin Wall came 

down and the Cold War ended, the United States has employed 

force rather substantially: in Panama, in Desert Storm, in Somalia, in Macedonia, and in the former Yugoslavia, and in a variety of 

humanitarian and retaliatory roles in the Persian Gulf. Since German reunification in 1989, for example, the U.S. Army has awarded 

over 600 Purple Hearts to its personnel killed or wounded in 

action. We should not assume that the international order will 

become simpler or more peaceful. That notion must underlie the 

national consensus on the need for force and on the way force may 

have to be used. 
62 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN TIIE NEW CENTURY 

CHAPTER THREE: DOMESTIC PREOCCUPATION 

In the shadow of the new century, if polls are to be believed, the 

mood of the nation is one of uncertainty and concern about the 

future. There is deep and continuing, if not building, disillusionmerit with the Federal Government. Despite the actual state of 

the economy, national confidence is low regarding the likelihood 

that a major and sustained economic recovery will maintain or increase the standard of living and quality-of-life indices enough to 

meet public expectations. Indeed, there is increased recognition 

that the national standard of living is unlikely to rise and may well 

shrink. When issues such as health care, education, and public 

safety are considered, frustration and pessimism about the future 

are widespread. 

Moods obviously change and can change rapidly. However, at a 

time when the international structure has been in profound flux, 

the reaction of many Americans will be to insist that sorting out 

domestic priorities must assume precedence over many or most 

international issues. Thus, a fundamental task of U.S. political 

leadership, if the U.S. is to remain effectively engaged abroad, must 

be to educate and convince itself and the public of the need to maintain an effective and balanced posture towards international security. That task will become more difficult. 

Over the past four decades, the United States voluntarily 

and premeditatively entangled itself within the constraints of 

socio-economic expectations and promises that had been awarded 

legal, regulatory, and budget status. This led to national obligations and liabilities with line items in the federal budget. These 

"non-discretionary" or mandatory payments are vast and continue 

to grow within a strained budget. This demand for resources must 

have negative consequences for future defense spending unless the 

national debt and annual deficit are allowed to grow even more. 

Similarly, overall spending on defense--including the employment 

created, the technology and industry stimulated, and other positive contributions--must be balanced against the opportunity costs 

of using a portion of defense resources elsewhere and the negative 
PART I: "THE BIRo TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 63 

economic effects arising from keeping a relatively large standing 

military force and supporting infrastructure in place at a time of 

national fiscal austerity. 

There is, of course, no magical formula to calculate a precise or 

optimum level for defense spending. Indeed, using the entire annual defense appropriation to balance the federal budget will not 

necessarily close the deficit in any given year and will not pay off 

the debt. Only a rigorous imposition of ceilings and cuts on all 

discretionary and non-discretionary programs (and perhaps a further tax increase) can balance the budget. But, without an overwhelming external threat to justify defense spending, assessing 

how the economy would be helped or hindered by various levels of 

defense spending is an exercise in politics and judgment and unlikely to be determined by precise quantitative analysis. 

One of the largest and most difficult problems facing the nation 

involves making more efficient and effective use of its vast resources 

in both the public and private sectors. The issue is not so much one 

of outright stupidity or ineptness as it is the nonproductive ways 

in which too many of the nation's dollars are wasted or spent without compensating return. A huge "overhead structure" that grows 

much faster than the rate of inflation has been embedded across 

American society. This structure is expensive, and the '~¢alue added" 

is questionable and even negative. 

In part, some of this "overhead" goes to pay the huge debt-service bill for both private and public sector borrowers. The total 

interest payments for both government and private debt continue 

to grow and siphon off a goodly share of the GDP. Part goes to the 

escalating expenses for huge local, state, and federal bureaucracies; for large and growing bureaucracies in the private sector 

required by government regulation, decree, or other factor; for administering health care; for litigation disproportionately higher 

than in any other advanced state; and for other administrative functions that, in many ways, provide little added value to the nation 

and its productivity while costing dearly. 

In 1993 and 1994, about 2/5 of the GDP was spent on a combination of health care (1/7); debt servicing for all private and public liabilities 

(1/6 or more); and the c~sts of conforming with super-regulation (1/10). 
64 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY WI'IGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

These percentages have more than doubled in 30 years. What they 

suggest is declining value added for the nation and less discretionary income for investment and savings. 

The other side of the inefficiency coin has to do with the inability of government to live within its financial means. This inability 

goes beyond "gridlock" in which the Federal Government appears 

trapped by the checks and balances and by the ultimately partisan 

nature of the political system. Government inherently aspires to solve 

or alleviate the fundamental problems and dangers confronting the 

electorate. Despite the best motives and intentions, governmental 

solutions too oi'cen exacerbate rather than resolve problems at hand. 

Two examples demonstrate how government can turn good intentions into huge and unexpected costs that ultimately must be borne 

by the taxpayer. In late 1979, recognizing that the nation's savings 

and loan industry was being steadily bankrupted by high interest 

rates and inflation, Congress took bipartisan action to remove the 

strict regulation on areas where these banks could conduct business. 

These so-called "thrills" had been originally chartered to provide lowcost mortgages and therefore allow more Americans to purchase their 

own homes. Set up during the Great Depression, the thrifts were 

granted certain tax advantages that reduced operating expenses and 

translated into lower mortgage rates for borrowers. These banks were 

prevented by law from expanding into other business and bantdng 

areas to guarantee that their competitive advantage lay only in 

supplying lower-cost home loans. However, in the late 1970s, doubledigit inflation pushed interest rates to unprecedented levels of 20 percent and more. The S&Ls simply could not survive by loaning at low 

rates while inflation and the interest rates at which they had to pay 

investors climbed steeply. 

At about the same time, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was legally authorized by Congress to raise its 

coverage to $100,000 per individual account--meaning the government insured each account for any loss up to that figure. Or, as 

it would turn out, this expanded coverage would become an unintended insurance policy for the S&Ls to invest deposits at no apparent risk to themselves or to their depositors. The government 

had guaranteed any and all losses. 

In 1981 and 1982, Congress passed a major overhaul of the tax 

system that included large tax cuts and tax incentives for business. Huge amounts of money became available for investment by 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 65 

the private sector and helped to fuel the so-called "junk bond" or 

leveraged buy-out (LBO) and real estate markets. S&Ls, now that 

deregulation of these banks became law, sought to maximize returns 

and, in many instances, jumped into these new markets. More olden 

than not, S&L management had neither the knowledge nor the experience in these areas of new business permitted by the law. 

In time, real estate tax credits were withdrawn, tax rates were 

increased, credit and the money supply shrank, and the economy 

faltered. By the mid 1980s, many of the S&Ls found themselves 

overextended as these once seemingly attractive and no-risk investments began to fail. And fail they did, in vast numbers. At the 

end of the day, the savings and loan industry cost the U.S. taxpayer 

about half a trillion dollars in the form of FDIC insurance to bank 

depositors whose funds had been lost or squandered away by the 

thrift managers. 

Thus, despite the best intent, the collective action of the U.S. 

government to address a significant problem posed by the S&Ls 

turned out to be a fiscal catastrophe, and another half trillion or so 

dollars was piled on top of the national debt. It is arguable how 

much of that expense served any productive use or benefited the 

nation as a whole. Still, the nation will pay for this excess. 

The second example of government's capacity to do unintended 

harm to the nation was in the Great Budget Compromise of 1990. 

A Republican president and a Democratic Congress were at an 

impasse over how to deal with an exploding fiscal deficit. In 1985, 

Congress passed the once-famous Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act that mandated ceilings on federal spending and 

promised a balanced budget by 1990. But, none of the original 

Gramm-Rudman deficit targets was ever met. Instead, Congress, 

in collaboration with the White House, chose to move the budget 

ceilings ever upwards, so as not to trigger large, automatic cuts in 

federal programs and, no doubt, massive public reaction against 

this form of enforcing federal fiscal discipline. The annual deficit 

and total debt rose and rose. 

In the summer of 1990, with a Congressional election pending 

that fall, the presidential race two years off, and the Gramm-Rudman 

law poised to shut down government through sequesters, time had 

run out and political agreement had to be reached on dealing with the 

budget deficit that seemed uncontrollable. The result was a combination of limiting growth in federal spending and a significant increase 
66 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

in revenues through new taxes. On the grounds that this compromise 

would produce a balanced budget by 1996, President Bush broke his 

pledge on "no new taxes." To the degree that Mr. Bush's abrogation of 

his most sacred campaign promise cost him the election, there can be 

debate. There can be no debate, however, on what happened to federal deficits, as table 11 shows. 

Table 11. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act---projected and actual 

annual deficits (billions of dollars) 

Odginal 1987 1990 

FY 1985targets amendment amendment Actual 

1986 171.9 -- -- 221.0 

1987 144.0 -- -- 149.8 

1988 108.0 144.0 -- 155.2 

1989 72.0 136.0 -- 152.5 

1990 36.0 100.0 -- 221.4 

1991 0 64.0 327.0 269.5 

1992 -- 28.0 317.0 290.4 

1993 -- 0 216.0 254.7 

1994 -- -- 108.0 234.7 

1995 -- -- 83.0 165.1 

(est.) 

(est.) 

The point of these examples is that government has the capacity to impose unintended damage on the nation, even when the 

intent is pure. No senior government official would responsibly 

argue for downsizing defense in a chaotic or injurious manner. 

However, there is no sign that government is better or even as 

well-equipped as in the past to reduce defense and military power 

effectively, strategically, and practically. 23 

23 To its credit and to try to take the politics out of base closings, in 1988 

Congress established the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission. BRAC is bipartisan and covenes biannually (1991, 1993, and 1995). 

See footnote 55 ahead. In this process, the president submits to Congress a 

list of military facilities to be closed or reduced recommended to him by this 

Commission. The intent of the process was to provide a mechanism for 

taking politically difficult actions. Hence, the entire list can be accepted or 

rejected only as a whole. Assessment of the BRAC follows. 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE, BREEZE TO BLOW" 67 

The change in the socio-economic structure of the nation is 

another factor that will affect how well or how badly defense 

downsizing occurs and is a corollary of the growing expense of both 

the overhead glut and the administration of the nation's needs. 

The comparisons in tables 12 through 14 and figures 5 and 6 illustrate the evolution of how national resources (GNP and GDP) have 

been allocated over time and how debt and its service costs have 

grown. It is these costs and expenses that ultimately will force 

defense spending down or require increases in the national debt. 

Table 12. Allocation of GNP/GDP over time 

1850 1970 1990 

GNP/GDP $2.8 billion $1,300 billion $3,500 billion 

(1990 dollars) 

Agriculture 20.5% 2.7% 2.4% 

Sales, retail commerce 27.4% 16.4% 16.4% 

Construction 5.3% 5.1% 4.9% 

Manufacturing/industry 15.7% 26.7% 18.9% 

Transportation, 11.9% 8.6% 8.9% 

communications, 

public utilities 

Services 19.2% 11.3% 19.3% 

Finance, insurance 11.2% 17.5% 

Government 15.0% 11.7% 

Tsble 13. Personal consumption--1970 and 1990 

1970 1990 

Durable goods 13.4% 13.8% 

Non-durable goods 42.2% 32.8% 

Services 44.4% 53.4% 
68 IN IRONS: US. MILrrARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Table 14. Growth of U.S. debt--public and private and debt service a 

Fiscal year dollars 

1970 1980 1989 

GNP 990.2 2,670.6 

Total debt (public and private) 1,596.9 4,657.8 

Federal debt 380.9 908.5 

Total interest paid as percent of GNpb 10-12% 20-22% 

5,151.3 

12,389.1 

2,866.2 

24-28% 

All dollar amounts in billions. Taken from Federal Government debt (Budget of the 

United States Government, 1991). 

Interest calculated using average of prevalent long- and short-term interest rates in the same 

proportion as the average life of the total debt. 

Figure 5. Interest burden of nonfinancial corporate business (percent 0[ cash flow) 

28 

24 

~ 0 o20 ~ ~ 

n 16 _ 1960.1979 Avirai e 

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 

Year 

Source: The Budget of the United States Fiscal Year 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 69 

Figure 6. Household debt payments (percent of disposable personal income) 

20 ~- 

fCD 

12_ 

18[ 

12 

0 1985 

r 

1986 1987 1988 

Year 

J 

1989 1990 1991 1992 

Source: The Budget of the United States Fiscal Year 1995 

This broader allocation of GDP is matched by the changes to 

the spending patterns and allocations of the federal budget. In 

the comparison of percentage of allocations by category over the 

past forty years, several trends hold obvious implications for future defense spending. First, non-discretionary or mandatory 

spending--that is, accounts the government is legally obligated to 

pay, such as entitlements and interest--have grown to about 70 percent of the $1.5-trillion annual federal budget. Of the remaining 

third of the budget that is discretionary, about 60 percent goes to 

defense and the remaining 40 percent goes to discretionary entitlement programs that are virtually all domestic in nature. Before the 1993 Budget Reconciliation Act froze discretionary nondefense spending programs, the rate of annual growth that reflects 

built-in cost escalators of discretionary social programs was running 30 times greater than the average annual increases in defense since the Carter-Reagan build-up began in 1979. 

Second, the "walls" between and among domestic, defense, and 

international programs built in 1990 have come down. Although 

defense is being cut by about 5 percent per year in real terms, the 
70 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT 1N THE NEW CENTURY 

inherent growth in other entitlement programs and the collapse of 

those budget walls mean that unless no attention is paid to restraining 

deficits, the only place from inside the budget where discretionary funds 

are available to meet other needs is the National Defense Account. 

Third, the impact of the latest tax increases on the economy, on 

revenues for the government, and on the deficit has yet to be felt. 

Should these consequences exacerbate future budget deficits by 

declining revenues, defense is certain to absorb some of these fiscal 

shortfalls through large cuts. 

Figures 7 through 9 portray the fiscal constraints to be faced. 

The implications of this survey of the state of the nation reinforce 

the concern that the process ofdownsizing defense is likely to evolve 

through inaction or deferral until such time that the unintended 

damage done to U.S. military might demands remedial action. Of 

course, it is not entirely impossible that a new, frightening threat 

could develop to coalesce public support for at least maintaining 

defense spending at or near current levels. But if the international analysis presented earlier is correct, this probability is so 

low as to be of no consequence. 

Figure 7. Federal budget deficit (percent of GDP) 

8 April baseline 

----- April policy 

-- -- - Current projection without A 

6 - health care reform /\ 

....... Current projection with health / ~ ~ 

care reform . I ~ f \ ~ f 

m f 

J 

-2 f J I I r I I I 

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 

Year 

Source: The Budget of the United States Fiscal Year 1995 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAYTHAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 71 

Figure 8. Federal debt (percent of GDP) 

70 -- ~ April baseline 

----- April policy / 

....... Current projection / 6O 

~ so 

30 

0 I I I I I I I I 

1960' 1985 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 

Year 

Source: The Budget of the United States Fiscal Year 1995. Note that although 

federal debt is expected to level out through 1998, its percent of GDP may not. 

Figure 9. Net interest on the federal debt (percent of GDP) 

4 - 

"E 

o m 

I I I I I 

1980 1985 

Year 

1960 1965 1970 1975 

Source: The Budget of the United States Fiscal Year 1995 

I I I 

1990 1995 1999 
72 IN IRONS: g.s. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Certainly strong presidential leadership could force focus on 

the challenges to defense and avert any spiral of major decline. 

Emphasizing his responsibility and authority as commander in 

chief, the president could persuade the nation and the Congress to 

keep defense on a reasonable and adequately funded course. However, an enormous expenditure of political capital would be required 

to succeed in this effort. Because the issue of defense is overshadowed by far more pressing political, economic, and social priorities 

at home that consume the attention of the White House, there is 

little incentive or political pressure for any president to embark on 

this course, barring an extraordinary event. Indeed, the White 

House is likely to focus on those aspects of defense that have greatest domestic political significance, particularly jobs and "big ticket," 

highly visible weapons programs that directly affect the industrial 

base, and the pertinent social agenda, in this case expanding the 

role of women in uniform and ending discrimination against homosexuals in the service. 

To the degree that defense might be insulated from the political and budget process much as the Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission sought to do, a powerful argument could arise citing 

this attempt as a means to bypass constitutional prerogatives. Even 

the warning about the dangers of a "hollow tbrce," while inducing 

sympathetic rhetoric, is not strong enough to impel action. Hence, 

if the constitutional tensions of checks and balances cannot be reduced and if maintaining strong military forces is a national priority, the only means of avoiding these impasses is through creation 

of an incentive that is powerful enough to gain political acceptability without straining the Constitution. One such incentive follows 

in subsequent pages. 
PART I: "THE BIRV TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 73 

CHAPTER FOUR: GOVERNANCE AND THE FUTURE 

COMMON DEFENSE 

A traditional question that has shaped much of the post-war 

debate over national defense is, "How much is enough?" Implicit 

in that question was the requirement to defend against the USSR 

and a specific, highly capable strategic military threat. In this 

world of strategic uncertainty, the emerging question that should 

be central to a needed-defense debate is, "Defending against what?" 

Absent obvious, overt, highly credible specific threats and a substantive foundation for defining national security, this question will 

prove difficult to answer short of relying on theological determinations and explanations. 

The differences between the Bush and Clinton administrations 

in articulating answers to "defending against what" are not great. 

This comparison should not be surprising because, political preferences aside, presidents tend to see foreign and defense policy 

through the same lens. The buffer effect of this continuity is appropriate if radical change is unwise and harmful if decisive alternatives are desperately needed. 24 Absent a specific threat, only so 

many generalities can apply to satisfying the rationale for defense. 

As a result of the absence of a specific and dangerous threat, a 

principal and obvious objective for the nation's strategy and accompanying military power today is "reconstitution," that is, the 

ability to regenerate sufficient military capability in sufficient time 

to deal with a reconstituted Russian or other "Soviet style" threat. 

Depending upon subjective assessment of how and how quickly this 

reconstituted threat would emerge, the conclusions (or hunches) 

can be transferred to structuring U.S. forces. The dilemma is obvious: There is no objective basis for projecting whether any threat 

will ever be manifested by Russia or another contender. Hence, 

24 Perhaps ironically, the best example of this continuity of presidential 

"lenses" is U.S. policy towards Somalia. The seemingly"liberal," once antiVietnam members of the Clinton administration have been taken to task 

for using many of the same arguments offered by the Johnson and Nixon 

administrations to justify enlarging the war in Vietnam as the grounds 

for shaping U.S. actions in Somalia. 
74 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

the future range of possible U.S. military options for a reconstituted 

threat that has no certainty of arising is as broad as those individuals with views on what may or may not happen. This is not a 

particularly powerful foundation on which to base both resource 

requirements and full justification for funding defense. 

The most useful cases for structuring U.S. forces deal with 

regional conflicts, crises, and contingencies. Intuitively, this is sensible; however, as both Bush and Clinton planners have discovered, developing scenarios for regional contingencies that are both 

plausible and politically acceptable is not easy. The Bush DOD 

was ridiculed for scenarios that envisaged U.S. forces reinforcing 

Poland against Russian attack. The Clinton DOD was criticized 

for allegedly succumbing to using slogans such as "win-hold-win" 

as surrogates for strategic concepts. But the real issue was producing a credible, threat-based scenario. Like the reconstitution 

issue, much of the debate was reduced to beliefs about what might 

or might not happen in this world of strategic uncertainty. 

Thus, another Desert Storm-type operation is postulated on the 

basis that Iraq could rearm or Iran could intervene against its oilrich neighbors in the Gulf. North Korea could attack South. Yet, 

for every scenario like these, to paraphrase Sir Isaac Newton, there 

is at least an equal, opposite force that will argue this planning 

contingency is either misguided or will not happen. 

Similarly, both the Bush and Clinton administrations took 

strong views on preventing or countering the dangers of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the spread of advanced 

military technological capabilities. The Clinton administration has 

specified antiproliferation as one of the four major mission areas 

for the DOD. But translating this antiproliferation requirement 

from policy to programs and budget does not follow any easy mathematical formula or model. Indeed, it can be argued that preventing the use of these mass destruction weapons is a more important 

objective than preventing their proliferation. At the end of the day, 

short of using force, the United States has few policy tools that will 

guarantee success in stopping the spread of these weapons. 

Finally, the Clinton administration has explicitly noted "democratization" as a fourth role for the DOD in promoting and assisting 

emerging democracies. Part of this formulation applies to assisting 

in the conversion of former Soviet military power to more benign 
PART I: "THE BZRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE "1"0 BLOW" 75 

uses. Part of this role responds to humanitarian missions and to 

new peacekeeping tasks in line with an expanding portfolio of responsibilities for the U.N. Yet, no matter how compelling the rationale is for this role, translation into specific forces and capabilities 

is exceedingly difficult. 

As noted, the administration completed its Bottom-Up Review. 

From this review, strategy, policy, budgets, and force structure were 

put into a single, unified framework. Underwriting this strategic 

review is the defense budget. Clinton defense budgets were projected as shown in table 15. 

Table 15. Clinton defense budgets (billions of dollars) 

FY FY FY FY FY FY 

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 

Budget authority 274.3 263.7 262.8 253.8 248.4 254.2 

Outlays 294.3 277.7 272.6 264.9 249.1 252.7 

To appreciate what these projections suggest for the size and 

capability of future forces that can be supported, an understanding of where and how money is spent, what costs and expenditures 

may have been understated or mistakenly calculated, and where 

real savings can be made is essential. Note in table 16 how defense 

spending has changed across the major accounts. 

Table 16. Changes in defense spending over time (FY 1994 constant dollars 

in millions of TOA a) 

Research & 

Personnel Operations Procurement development 

1970 113,556 82,132 73,590 26,972 

1980 86,112 75,386 58,449 22,706 

1993 77,230 92,275 56,783 39,047 

1997(pr~.) 71,250 86,494 55,521 34,704 

a TOA = Total obligational authority. 
76 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT 1N THE NEW CENTURY 

In order to deal with the possibility of underfunding, Secretary 

Aspin directed the Defense Science Board to review the FY 1994- 

99 Bush Future Years' Defense Program with regard to five areas: 

• The Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD) savings 

and their accuracy 

• The realism of major weapons cost projections 

• Adequacy of operations and maintenance (O&M) funding 

• Adequacy of funding for DOD health care and environmental 

programs 

• The possibility of any significant procurement "bow-wave" 

beyond the FYDp.25 

The report (called The Odeen Report after the chairman 

Phil Odeen) concluded that the Bush FYDP was $12 billion to 

$15 billion underfunded. This did not include health care, environmental clean-up, and other areas to be covered in later reports. 

The funding shortfalls noted below vary considerably with these 

earlier findings. The reasons for these differences are not necessarily 

the result of fault or error in either the BUR or Odeen Report. The 

BUR had been completed before Congress took final action on the 

FY 1994 budget that added further cuts and reinstituted a pay raise 

not planned for or proposed by the administration. And the results of 

program and force-level changes made by the BUR took time to 

register on the future funding projections. However, it also must be 

restated that the following figures (as well as those of the Odeen 

Report) are estimates. Because of the vast number of programs and 

different accounting systems in the Pentagon, exact and timely data 

are extremely difficult to find. Instead, the following data provide a 

qualitative view of what the shortfalls are likely to be. In practice, to 

the degree history applies, these estimates are more likely to understate the shortages than not. 

Several existing miscalculations and underestimates for projected defense spending lurk within DOD budgets. Total funding 

25 See The Defense Science Board Special Task Force Report of May 1993. 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY TIIAT MADE TIIE BREEZE TO BLOW" 77 

for current service acquisition and readiness programs may already 

be short by $20 billion to $30 billion for the FYDP. Health care in 

DOD is at least $10 billion in the red. The BUR projects $13 billion more in spending than the president's top line permits. A major 

OSD program review in 1993 suggests that the larger service 

procurement programs are underfunded by at least $10 billion. 

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the defense budget for 

FY 1994 was already $3 billion underfunded in outlays due to differing assumptions on pay and benefits. The decision by Congress 

to approve pay increases adds an unplanned $20 to $30 billion in 

obligations that must come from within DOD's budget. The costs 

of defense conversion in the U.S. and FSU, as well as aid to the 

FSU, are now part of the DOD budget and are included under the 

defense spending cap. This $2.5 billion in current outlays, while 

funded by Congress in 1993, is now a DOD responsibility and a 

future competitor for DOD dollars. Furthermore, the services have 

based out-year planning on achieving large cuts and savings 

through the BRAC, estimates that are far more optimistic than the 

record suggests. This basing discrepancy is likely to run in the 

billions of dollars. The Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF), 

the DOD "checkbook," is in disorder and underfunded by several 

billion dollars or more. Finally, DOD will not be fully reimbursed 

for contingency operations in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti that have 

already cost several hundreds of millions of dollars or more. 

On other levels, likely cost overruns of current programs, inflation, the effects of the tax package and health care reform, and the 

costs of environmental cleanup of DOD sites are uncertain but are 

likely to exact a large or enormous price tag on DOD spending. All 

told, the current five-year budget is already over $100 billion 

underfunded in outlays. And that does not include any cuts likely 

to be made in future defense spending by the administration or 

Congress. Table 17 summarizes the known areas ofunderfunding. 

As an additional indication of the magnitude of possible 

underfunding, over the past twenty years or so, the general rule of 

thumb was that maintenance of a well-trained force at consistent 

and high levels of manpower, readiness, and modernization required 

annual real growth of at least 3 to 5 percent. The reasons were 

increases in inflation for manpower, new and better weapon systems, 

and operational and maintenance costs. Certainly, this shorthand is 
78 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

inexact and subject to caveats, but, for the Clinton FYDP, if this rule 

applies, it would equate to a further $70 to $90 billion shortfall. 26 

Table 17. Areas of known underfundinga 

Item 

Estimated impact 

on underfunding 

during the FYDP 

Military pay increase 

DOD health care 

Difference between the BUR and president's budget 

Differences/discrepancies over BRAC savings 

Major procurement program shortfalls 

Defense conversion and aid to the FSU 

DBOF shortages 

Unfunded contingency operations 

Accounting and other cBscrepancies of reprogramming 

Environmental cleanup 

Future cuts, inflation, other areas of underfunding, and 

the Exxon-Grassley Act that would assign defense 

a larger share of any future budget cuts 

Total underfunding 

$20-30 billion 

$10 billion 

$13 billion 

$1-? billion 

$10 billion (and certain to rise) 

$5-15 billion 

$3-? billion 

$1-? billion 

$3-? billion 

$3-? billion (and could be huge) 

? However, barring a new threat, 

the most likely outcome will be 

further spending cuts of 2 or more 

percent per year--possibly a total 

of around 10 percent or more over 

the FYDP, or $50-100 billion. 

$120-$250 billion 

a Figures are taken from the public record and unclassified documents and material made available 

to the author by DOD personnel. Refer also to footnote 18 for other references. 

26 A historical review of real cost growth in all DOD accounts since World 

War II is revealing. The cost of new weapon systems grew at about 7 percent per year. On a compounded basis, this means a doubling in costs, in 

real terms, every ten years. Manpower costs have increased by about 

3 percent per year, and operations and maintenance have increased by 2 

to 4 percent. As noted, health care, environmental cleanup, and regulatory enforcement have enormous and probably unknown costs associated 

with each category. 
PARr I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 79 

The magnitude of this cost growth problem is suggested by a 

single but telling comparison. In 1948, the first Annual Defense 

Report of the Secretary of Defense was published. It sold for 

55 cents. In current dollars, 55 cents in 1948 is now equivalent to 

about $6.00 (or an annualized 7-percent rate of inflation). The 1993 

Defense Report, printed on glossy paper and filled with well-prepared 

charts and photographs, sold for $15.00. 27 This equates to a real cost 

growth of 250 percent. And, the material in each report is comparable. 

Against an annual defense budget of $250 to $270 billion and a 

five-year budget of $1.3 trillion, the impact of a $20 billion per year 

or a total five-year $100 billion cut in outlays would seem relatively small. Note that the Clinton five-year plan was a total of 

about $129 billion less than the Bush plan and would reduce forces 

by about 200,000. Reality is somewhat different. Because of the 

need to gain immediate savings to deal with outlay cuts, the only 

accounts that provide that fungibility are personnel, operations, 

and training. People can be cut, which frees up saving through 

salaries forgone. Operations and training can be cut, which permits 

savings by not replenishing fuel, ammunition, and other 

consumables that are expended on a routine basis. 

Long-term spending for procurement and research and development 

does not provide a source for immediate savings if and when cut. 

Generally, outlay savings in procurement programs are minimal 

for the current year even if a huge program is eliminated. Savings 

occur in future years. Therefore, because of this bias towards equating outlay cuts with personnel and training accounts, these are the 

accounts that will suffer disproportionately to the outlay shortfalls. 

For example, an outlay cut of $10 billion in one year, if applied to 

only personnel, would lead to a reduction of about 200,000 uniformed 

personnel, or nearly a seventh of the current base force of 1.4 million. 2s A cut of $20 billion would mean a personnel reduction of nearly 

27 We were unable to obtain sufficient information on how DOD or the 

printing office calculated this figure other than by dividing total costs by 

copies published. 

28 This assumes average savings of $50,000 per service person, which may be a 

bit high. If that is the case, more rather than fewer personnel would be cut. 
80 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

400,000. That is in a single year. To be sure, those personnel costs 

would not be carried over into future years so that if the $10 billion outlay shortfall persisted, it would be largely covered by 

the manpower cuts. However, what this approximate analysis suggests is that to maintain a future force as ready and as well-equipped 

as today's, a steady-state active-duty count of about 1,000,000 men 

and women is perhaps the upper limit that can be sustained. 

Clearly, with future cuts in spending and cost overruns almost certain facts of life, optimism for a condition of unchanged U.S. military strength should not be high. 

Under the Reagan/Bush defense plans, U.S. military forces 

topped off at about 2.2 million active-duty personnel distributed 

among 18 active Army divisions, 3 active Marine Corps divisions, 

26 tactical fighter wings (TFWs), and 15 carrier battle groups 

(CVBGs). Included in the reserves were 6 Army and 1 Marine Corps 

division and 10 tactical fighter wings. The Bush '%ase force" planned 

to reduce the total numbers to 1.6 million active-duty personnel divided among 12 active Army divisions, 3 active Marine Corps divisions, 22 TFWs, and 12 CVBGs. The Clinton "base force" is projected 

at 1.4 million active-duty personnel, 10 Army and 3 Marine Corps 

active-duty divisions, 20 TFWs, and 11 CVBGs. For the time being, 

strategic nuclear forces will be determined by START agreements 

and headed towards a level of 3,000-5,000 warheads distributed among 

the SSBN, land-based missile, and land-based bomber forces. 

The practice, thus far, has been to maintain a more or less consistent, overall level of U.S. commitment overseas. Although the number of troops stationed in Europe is likely to decline to 100,000 or less, 

the U.S. continues to maintain a robust series of worldwide operational deployments and substantial presence. In fact, given deployments to Somalia, the Persian Gulf, and the Adriatic and to support 

U.N. peacekeeping operations, the operational tempo and accompanying demands on service personnel have remained relatively consistent over the past decades even though the principal threat for which 

that presence was conceived and rationalized has disappeared. 

Additionally, the Clinton administration has pledged not to return to a 'qaollow force" and has made readiness among its highest 

priorities. Then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin established a special readiness task force inthe spring of 1993. Consisting of former 
PART I: "THE BIRD "1'0 SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 81 

senior military officers of all services and chaired by former Army 

Chief of Staff General E. C. Meyer, who coined the term "hollow 

force" during his tenure as chief, the task force's purpose was to 

underscore the importance of readiness, giving the secretary and 

public an objective, outside assessment of the impact "downsizing" 

has had on the force's readiness to carry out its missions. 

Although the panel concluded that today's readiness was "acceptable in most measurable areas," it found "pockets" of unreadiness. 

These "pockets" were sufficiently worrying for the task force to note: 

"However, we observed enough concern that we are convinced that 

unless the Department of Defense and the Congress focus on readiness, the armed forces could slip back into a 'hollow' status. "29 

For the time being, the significance of these administration actions is the intent to keep all or at least the bulk of the active-duty 

forces "ready." Thus, substantial funds will be required fbr training, operations, and maintenance of equipment to meet these standards of readiness. And recruiting quality personnel is no less a 

challenge even with a smaller force. That, too, is expensive. All of 

these expenditures fall into the outlay category, meaning they are 

the most sensitive to budget cuts. 

If these budget and shortfall fbrecasts are correct, the Clinton 

administration is headed for a collision between an active-duty force 

too large for the budget and readiness requirements and actual 

capabilities far below expected and planned levels. Furthermore, 

the interaction among threat, strategy, force level, budget, and infrastructure must shii% the bias increasingly against military power 

as domestic factors dominate or overwhelm strategic and operational arguments. 

As the Bush administration conducted its downsizing and produced its base force and the Clinton administration completed its 

Bottom-Up Review, the four services were actively reassessing and 

refining their own view of what active and supporting forces were 

required and what infrastructure and industrial base capacities 

should be maintained. Although service efforts were conducted in 

coordination with and in subordination to OSD and JCS decisions, 

29 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness, Office 

of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, June 

1994, p. i. 
82 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MICHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

nonetheless, service actions and attitudes are crucial to making 

downsizing work. The services and service secretaries, by law, are 

charged with the training and equipping of the forces, and the 

military services constitute the organization for carrying out the 

directives of higher authority. 

For several reasons, during 1992-1993, the Department of the 

Navy was the most visible of the services in responding to changed 

circumstances and, for better or worse, the service most visibly affected by the issues reflecting the current and new political landscape at home and abroad. 30 First, the disappearance of the USSR 

meant that U.S. interests would shift to the world's littorals and 

regions adjacent to the sea. This meant the Navy and Marine Corps, 

because of geography, the ocean medium, and their basic military 

capabilities and uses, were likely to be the forces of choice or the 

forces on hand in most crises or contingencies. 

Second, a series of events shocked the Navy to its roots. Although the Navy was an active and important participant in the 

Gulf War to liberate Kuwait, it received little public praise and 

much media criticism for its performance. The Army, Air Force, 

and Marine Corps, with a stunning 100-hour victory over Iraq's 

ground forces, were popularly perceived by most Americans as the 

real war winners. The Navy was seen in a supporting role and not 

helped by frequent media reports of an apparent unwillingness and 

inability to participate in genuinely joint and combined operations. 

Thus, even though much of the criticism was offthe mark, the Navy 

moved quickly to repair the operational and internal deficiencies 

that were exposed during that war. 

Just after the war ended, the "Tailhook" symposium met in 

Las Vegas, Nevada, in the fall of 1991. Tailhook was the annual convention for naval aviation. Although a private association outside 

30 This in no way diminishes the steps the Air Force and the Army have 

taken in responding to the new cra. Since 1991, the Air Force has streamlined its organization, cut back dramatically on officer personnel, moved 

to decentralize authority, drafted a new policy paper Global Reach, Global Power, and changed its uniform. The Army has reintensified and 

streamlined its organization to support the new battlefield requirements 

and made large cuts in its active and reserve structure. The Navy example 

is used because it is more recent and covers a broader range of issues. 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 83 

government, Tailhook had the blessings and support of the Navy and 

was considered a quasi-official event. Generally understood to 

be raucous, the 1991 convention got out of hand. There were numerous charges of sexual assault, harassment, and conduct unbecoming 

officers. For better or worse, the Senate hearings on the nomination 

of Clarence Thomas as associate justice to the Supreme Court 

occurred that same October. Anita Hill and sexual harassment issues 

were thrust prominently into American society and public interest. 

The Navy, unfortunately, was fated to mishandle aspects of 

Tailhook. Given the sensationalism of the Thomas hearings, sexual 

harassment took on a momentum of its own, putting the Navy in 

an untenable position. On the one hand, the behavior at Tailhook 

was unacceptable, intolerable, perhaps including possible criminal 

misconduct, and the incident was surely exaggerated by the ThomasHill affair. On the other hand, the Navy rightly wanted to keep the 

matter in-house and deal with Tailhook as discreetly and quietly as 

possible. A collision was inevitable. In the summer of 1992, ai~r the 

DOD Inspector General had been summoned to undertake the investigation the Navy started and relinquished, the Secretary of the Navy 

was forced to resign when Navy Lieutenant Paula Coughlin, one of 

the attendees at Tailhook and a naval aviator, went public with her 

allegations of what transpired at Las Vegas and her charge that the 

Navy failed to act on her complaints and those of others. 31 

The effects of the Gulf War and the public perception of the 

Navy's ancillary role and the explosive aftermath of the Tailhook 

31 Regrettably for the Navy, the Tailhook affair refused to die. Coughlin 

herself is in a legal battle that includes sworn statements contradicting 

her allegations. In 1993, after reviewing the record, the new Secretary of 

the Navy recommended that the Chief of Naval Operations be dismissed 

on thc grounds of responsibility for the mishandled investigation. He 

was overruled by the Secretary of Defense. In February 1994, a military 

judge ruled that the CNO had been untruthful in his testimony at a 

Tailhook military tribunal. Although the evidence very much supported 

the CNO, in the wake of all this turbulence, Admiral Frank Kelso elected 

to retire early. The debate in the Senate over whether to retire Kelso with 

four stars lasted six hours and ended with a small majority voting in 

favor of the higher rank. This incident perhaps will mark the end of the 

Tailhook affair, although the legacy and bad taste are likely to linger. 
84 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

affair were profound. The most cathartic result was a Navy that 

realized times had changed and that it must change with them. 

Stung by severe criticism, the Navy also recognized another disturbing problem. 

During the Reagan years, the Navy had relentlessly pursued 

its goal of 600 ships. To support those ships, a homeport and basing 

scheme had been approved to increase the number of these shore 

facilities accordingly. During the first two rounds of the BRAC in 

1988 and 1991, the Navy fought to protect those shore facilities. 

Indeed, one of the early commissioners (and a former Navy Secretary) was extremely critical of the Navy's refusal to appreciate the 

drain the bases placed on the rest of the Navy and the Navy's "stonewalling" of the BRAC. By 1992, however, the Navy understood 

that its infrastructure was vastly in excess of both what was needed 

and what future budgets could afford. In fact, the basing structure 

was threatening the health of the forces and their readiness because of the resources it devoured. 

By 1992, the cumulative effects of these events coalesced and 

led to a series of fundamental responses by the Department of the 

Navy (DON). The Navy and Marine Corps drafted a document 

called ...From the Sea in which the sea services adopted the primary mission of influencing and affecting events ashore in and 

around the ocean littorals. To that end, the Navy and Marine Corps 

began a serious and thorough integration of both services, focusing 

first on naval aviation. However, the depth of and commitment to 

this integration are deep and will be powerful factors influencing 

future budget priorities. At the same time, the Navy reorganized 

its staffin Washington and abolished the so-called air, surface, and 

submarine platform "barons." The significance of this reorganization cannot be understated, because, for the first time since 1945, 

warfare requirements rather than needs of the individual platform 

barons were to dominate budget priorities. This reorganization 

also coincided with the Navy's commitment to "joint operations" 

and learning from the errors of the Gulf War. 

During the 1993 BRAC, the Navy took an extremely aggressive 

stance in recommending bases to be closed. In part, the Navy had 

little choice because of its refusal in the past to rid itself of excess 

bases. But, more importantly, the Navy recognized that this 
PARr I: "THE BIRD TO SLAYTHAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 85 

excessive infrastructure was harming operational capability and 

adversely affecting the Navy's ability to perform its missions. 

In social terms, although the disastrous effects of Tailhook may 

never fully heal until a younger generation of officers moves into 

senior ranks, the Navy has taken the lead in opening combat and 

seagoing assignments to women. Finally, the Navy has taken a 

hard-headed view of likely budget levels and, for the moment, set 

the size of the future Navy at about 300 to 350 ships, perhaps the 

most visible sign of understanding the new realities. 

The irony in all this will prove striking. Although the Navy 

and Marine Corps have made remarkable progress in adapting to 

change and the realities of the post-Cold War world, that adaptation is likely to be only the first step. Less visible but certainly as 

profound actions are likely to be needed to deal with conditions 

that will be driven almost exclusively by the domestic political process and debate. Having taken measures that are fundamental 

departures from the past, instead of having the luxury of only refining those measures, the likelihood is very high that far more 

change will be needed. Reacting to and anticipating these future 

pressures, now that the more visible and overarching actions have 

been taken, could prove even more demanding intellectual and 

imaginative tests than those of the past several years. 

Against this interplay among strategic change, budgetary reality, 

and future force structure is a political and decision-making process 

of great complexity and inefficiency. The growth of Pentagon and 

Congressional staffs is a well-known fact. But the issue is far deeper 

than staff bureaucracy or personalities. The issue at hand in determining how well or how badly this downsizing will be carried out 

concerns both constitutional and cultural prerogatives. 

The conflict between Article I and Article II of the Constitution 

regarding the "providers" for the forces (the Congress) and the commander in chief (the president) remains. Given the need to make 

and stick by tough decisions with real life-and-death consequences 

for those forces sent into action, compromise is not necessarily the 

best or most effective solution in fielding the military. 

Yet, if it is to function, the political system must rely on compromise. As a result, for those who view the military as simply an 

instrument for delivering or threatening to deliver decisive force and 

not as a social or welfare agency, the failure of the political process to 

cut overhead such as militarily unnecessary bases represents the worst 
86 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT 1N THE NEW CENTURY 

extreme of this compromise. For those who view the military as an 

extension of society, bases and their link with the civilian community 

are important despite the fact that military readiness or capability 

may be impaired. And, for most Americans, since all "politics are 

local," when confronted with the choice of supporting a strong military or losing their jobs or income through a defense build-down, it 

is obvious which preference wins out. This dilemma remains persistent. As such, the effectiveness and efficiency of downsizing, 

from a military perspective, will be eroded. 

To a degree, the same dilemma applies to the National Guard 

and reserve forces. The Constitution gives the states their own 

militia. Indeed, the Second Amendment guarantees the right of 

these militias "to keep and bear arms." (Note that this right does 

not extend to the people except through the militia.) Hence, the 

debate over active versus reserve force mix is not only emotional 

and economic, it has constitutional roots. 

The political culture and current standards of so-called "political correctness" are other aspects of the process that are obstacles 

to enhancing effectiveness and efficiency. The legal restrictions 

and obstacles to entry into senior government service by civilians, 

ranging from full disclosure of family assets to forfeiting many rights 

to subsequent civilian employment on the grounds of potential conflict of interests, not only delay the selection and confirmation of 

senior appointees, they also discourage many of the best from serving. The fear of unwittingly being subject to the public microscope 

and the degree to which relatively minor or insignificant trespasses 

are magnified under this inspection are further restraints to public service. The Clinton administration has been criticized for failing to fill many senior appointments quickly enough, but the fact 

is that the entire process does not allow either speed or the full 

range of qualified personnel from which to choose. 32 

Where are we headed? 

Barring an extraordinarily unlikely crisis, the DOD budgets 

projected by the Clinton administration are an absolute top line. 

32 The Clinton administration has a larger number of lawyers and former 

Congressional staffers than usual because both categories generally have 

fewer conflict-of-interest problems arising from past or future employment. Indeed, it would be interesting to see how earlier cabinets under 

Presidents Eisenhower or Kennedy would have fared under the current rules. 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 87 

Analysis shows an underfunding shortfall of $100 billion and 

probably double or more will arise during FY 1995-1999. One can 

only guess at the size of future defense reductions to be imposed on 

DOD spending by the executive branch, Congress, or both. Those 

cuts will be determined by the state of the economy, the size of the 

deficit, and the popular perception of the balance between international and domestic priorities. But, if the tax and economic package passed by Congress and signed into law by the president in 

August 1993 does not close the deficit, it is virtually certain that 

the defense budget must be the primary target for expenditure cuts. 

By the end of the century, if no threat or genuine crisis emerges, 

total defense underfunding is likely to amount to $200 to $300 billion. This underfunding will be exacerbated by "cost creep," by 

inefficiencies in the process, and, as will be shown, by the prodigious appetite of infrastructure "tail" to devour military "teeth." 

Determining the specific impact of as yet unspecified spending 

shortfalls and reductions in the defense budget on force structure 

is, at best, a first approximation. The largest consideration, after 

estimating the size and pace of spending cuts, is to determine the 

strategic prioritization among the many funding categories that 

support force levels, overseas presence and deployments, readiness, 

procurement, and research and development. 

For example, the funding decision may be made to maximize 

the numbers of active- duty forces at the expense of readiness, 

procurement, and research and development accounts that would 

suffer the majority of spending cuts. Alternatively, the funding 

priority could be to maintain the readiness and capability of those 

forces already in service at high levels that would require compensating and major reductions in overall numbers and in procurement of weapon systems. Or, the priority could rest on the decision 

to identify a "core force" constituting a certain percentage of the 

overall force and ensure that this force is kept in suitably high 

states of readiness and modernization. The remaining forces outside this core force would absorb the necessary budget cuts and, in essence, would end up as a 'Torce-in-being" or a strategic reserve at much 

lower levels of readiness. Table 18 summarizes the more likely 
88 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

prospects for U.S. military might later this decade. Note that 

only the best case assumes a combination of full funding and 

effective reforms. 

Table 18. Prospects for U.S. military might 

Force 

Case levels Budget Readiness 

BUR maintained 1.4 million $270 billion High. This assumes either full 

(best case, assumes active funding and/or imposition of 

full funding) effective reforms. 

BUR not fully funded 1.3-1.4 million $240-250 

(most likely) active billion 

BUR not fully funded 1.2-1.4 million $2(X)-225 

(worst case) active billion 

The bulk of the force is "hollow." 

Morale will be low and maintenance and replacement 

backlogs large. This assumes 

effective reforms or corrective 

actions are not taken. 

The force will be "hollov~' or 

worse. This is an unready, 

unhappy military probably in 

worse condition than anytime 

since World War II. 

The most likely outcome, if history is relevant and negative practices in downsizing are repeated, is that DOD will wage a powerful 

rear-guard effort to resist cuts in spending, cuts in force levels, and 

cuts in readiness. It is very likely that spending among the services 

will continue to be prorated around current budget shares and that 

"balance" and "compromise" will be the policies on which resource 

priorities will be made. Should all this take place, U.S. military forces 

will atrophy over time. Force levels will be too large for likely budgets 

to sustain them at high levels of readiness and modernization. 

The nation can avoid this condition in several ways if an unforeseen threat does not intervene to change the strategic equation 

or if spending is not increased to fund the full BUR force. First, the 

nation can simply be stoic and unworried by a lack of military readiness 

and capability. The argument and rationale for this position are 
PART I: "THE BIRD TO SLAY THAT MADE THE BREEZE TO BLOW" 89 

clear. Given an absence of clear and apparent dangers and 

emphasis on domestic priorities, DOD would be directed to make 

do with those resources it was assigned without protest. From a 

strictly U.S. national security perspective, the world would not be 

viewed as a more dangerous place. In all likelihood, enough strategic 

warning time should be available to permit adequate action to be 

taken in the future. Even with an active-duty force of a million or 

less, armed with nuclear and advanced weapons, the U.S. would 

still have the most formidable military in the world. There are no 

genuine threats to the nation's actual survival for the foreseeable 

future. In this regard, if these arguments are accepted, the Truman 

demobilization provides the best model for downsizing in which 

forces were cut dramatically and, despite the Korean conflict, the 

nation still managed to survive quite well. 

Second, the administration can provide sufficient resources to 

support the BUR force, which will require some combination of increasing defense resources. Spending increases are one means although the political chances of adding to the defense budget are 

realistically zero. Reforms could be imposed to free up resources 

already assigned to defense. The Clinton administration has promised reform. As of 1994, the results have not been significant despite the promise of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 

1993 to impose some reform. 

Third, the nation can revise and adjust its national security 

policy. Objectives, strategy, forces, and budgets, along with infrastructure, can be defined in keeping with the post-Cold War era. 

However, without reform, it must be repeated that the system and 

process will not permit the maintenance of a constant level ofmilitary capability without spending more money. 

Unfortunately, each choice has certain flaws. The most likely 

outcome will be a much weaker and much less capable military 

force than needed to deal with future circumstances that remain 

unpredictable and uncertain. Hence, promoting the requisite support for that capability will prove elusive. 

The decision to accept or tolerate an erosion in military power 

assumes that ample warning time will be available and that the 

nation will muster the capacity to act. Obviously, in this case, the 
90 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

attributes of high readiness and high probability of success in the 

initial stages of conflict are downgraded. That could prove 

politically unwise or disastrous. 

The choices of freeing up resources and revising strategy have the 

decided disadvantage of depending upon future Congresses to honor 

and support any deal over time. Given the broad expansion ofconstitutionally imposed limits of appropriations to two or three years and 

the reality that new Congresses are not legally obliged to accept all 

agreements or arrangements made by earlier Congresses, legal and 

political issues of fundamental importance are at stake. 

At the same time the fiber and muscle of the active forces will 

be tested by budget and political realities, the infrastructure will 

also be squeezed. The defense industrial base will continue to contract, and, as the Odeen Report observed in May 1993, "cost creep" 

will only worsen: 

The rapid loss of the defense business base is likely to lead to 

significant increases in the overhead and [general and administrative] rates of defense suppliers. As demonstrated in 

the F-22 program last year, this could lead to unexpected and 

largely unavoidable cost increases in existing programs.... 33 

Indeed, F-22 could even be canceled due to budgetary reasons. All 

these factors beg for the need to invoke a public hearing on the 

future of defense. Although it is unprovable that deferring such a 

debate and examination will do absolute damage to the nation, 

there is no reason to take the risk. And, in the process, perhaps 

some good can be done by strengthening the way in which we do 

provide for our security. 

33 ~Defense Science Board Task Report on FY 1994-99 Future Years' Defense Plan," May 1993, p. 2. On January 18, 1994, Flight International 

reported that even while cutting the buy of F-22s from 648 to 442, the total 

of the program costs was likely to grow and that at least an ll-month delay 

has been incurred for the first flight test. In the late summer of 1994, there 

were suggestions by OSD that the entire program might be delayed for fiscal reasons. 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH 

WIND STII,I. Bl. W" 

The evidence strongly suggests, but cannot irrefutably show, 

that defense faces a continuing downward spiral driven by funding 

gaps already in place, by the likelihood of greater reductions in 

future appropriated budgets, by the escalating costs of overhead 

and infrastructure that also exacerbate inefficiencies, and by the 

political reality in which decisions will conform more with domestic than with strategic or operational priorities. Concurrently, some 

of the supporting infrastructure, ranging from bases to the defense 

industrial network, will also contract. In dealing with the consequences and challenges of these trends and realities, the Department of Defense has several tactical alternatives it can follow in 

fulfilling its responsibilities. 

First, DOD can accept without much protest whatever resources 

are allocated and do its best. The Bottom-Up Review, in this case, 

provides the general framework fbr fbrce design and the intellectual structure for its rationalization. The BUR is, as its principal 

drafters noted, a "sporty track" with very ambitious plans for force 

improvement as well as substantial overhaul of the acquisition 

system as an objective. Clearly, force levels will shrink around the 

conceptual justification. Inherent in this policy choice is the realization that U.S. military power will contract; that the forces will 

become fewer in number and, if the earlier analysis is correct, less 

ready to carry out their tasks; and that the strategic environment 

will allow enough warning time to respond to new and powerful 

threats should they arise. Finally, the presumption could be that 

the stronger domestic economy that would result will provide the 

wherewithal to reconstitute those forces needed to deal with a 

future crisis. 

Second, DOD can opt to resist these trends to the point of 

provoking a clash within government. Following the approach used 

by former Reagan defense secretary Caspar Weinberger, DOD can 

use all its influence and credibility to oppose any and all cuts to its 

basic programs. The problem with this approach is that DOD is 

likely to be beaten down and overwhelmed by a president or a Congress 
92 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

bent on bringing the department to heel. The risks would be 

possible draconian measures passed by Congress to cut or alter 

DOD priorities in fundamental ways. 

Third, DOD can adjust and change. This tack includes the possibility of making sweeping changes to U.S. military posture to deal 

with the demands of likely resource realities, in part through imposing reforms to generate efficiencies and to leverage the economies of smart and lean program management. Change can be accomplished either around and within the framework of the Bottom-Up Review or through a new framework. However, as in the 

other tactical approaches, this one, too, has certain risks and problems and cannot be implemented within a vacuum or within only 

the domain of DOD. As the BUR suffered from the lack of White 

House guidance, any revision of U.S. strategy will be successful 

only if it is mandated and directed by the president and supported 

by Congress. 

Part II examines the principal components of future U.S. military might and derives alternatives and options for consideration, 

debate, and implementation. 
PART II: "ANt~ THE GOOt~ SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 93 

CHAPTER FIVE: STRATEGY 

THE LEGACY 

For nearly five decades, U.S. national security strategy remained remarkably consistent in its objectives, logic, basic assumptions, and identification of the principal enemy. To the degree there 

was a strategic debate, it was generally over means and not ends. 

The powerful and multifaceted threat presented by the Soviet Union 

ultimately was contained and deterred through a network of political, military, and economic alliances and instruments, including a large measure of foreign and military assistance, and assured 

by the strength and determination of the United States to act as 

the "leader of the free world" as well as the source of much of the 

globe's economic power. 

The guarantee of Cold War deterrence ultimately rested on the 

threat of massive and presumably fatal nuclear and thermonuclear 

retaliation should the Soviet Union attack the United States or its 

allies, although mobilization offered an insurance policy if world 

war were to be fbught only on the conventional level. Over the 

years, the original notion of nuclear deterrence was extended to 

include the concept of flexible response and other forms of military 

initiatives, many of which lay well beyond the nuclear boundaries, 

in order to match or counter new Soviet weapons, doctrines, and 

technologies. This societally threatening aspect of deterrence and, 

presumably, the unprecedented speed and certainty with which 

nuclear and thermonuclear weapons could devastate an intended 

victim's homeland made this Cold War relationship different from 

all others in history. 

Furthermore, containment was manifested in a series of alliances among seemingly like-minded states to deter and encircle 

the USSR to prevent its ambitions from overflowing its borders. In 

NATO, for example, an attack against one member was viewed as 

an attack against all. Sustained and nurtured by a U.S. economy 

that appeared limitless in performance, that would be mobilized in 

war, and that maintained a technological supremacy that seemed 

insurmountable, the U.S. and its chief allies also assumed an almost 

spiritual belief in the superiority of democracy and capitalism over 
94 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

communism and autocracy. Hence, the combination of containment, 

thermonuclear deterrence, alliances, economic and technological 

superiority, wartime mobilization, and ideological optimism served 

to underwrite U.S. and Western security for four decades. 

From these foundations flowed the operational planning factors that were central to strategy and force design. Warning and 

mobilization time were clearly critical factors because from them 

came the requirements for troops and material and deployment 

schedules to bring reinforcements to bear. The enemy order of battle 

was also critical, as was the amount of war materials (such as ammunition, fuel, and spares) to be kept on hand before mobilization 

kicked in new production. These criteria could change and could 

be debated, but they did perform the vital function of providing a 

measure, rightly or wrongly, of how much was enough. 

The end of the USSR and, for all practical purposes, communism as a political alternative to democracy removed the basis for 

the world order that existed throughout the Cold War. As the 

post-Cold War world ages, the extent of the real and perceived consequences of the demise of the USSR will play out. Thus far, however, U.S. national security strategy has not changed profoundly, 

nor has the U.S. chosen to demobilize as it did after the end of 

World War I and World War II. 

To be sure, the U.S. is determined not to fall into the trap of 

demobilization or excessive disarmament. That is a noble intent. 

But it is both puzzling and interesting that neither the Bush administration nor, so far, the Clinton administration has embarked 

on a profound review or reappraisal of U.S. security in this new 

era. Thus, where the U.S. may be at risk is in i~nding or inventing 

the new basis for its future national security and its national 

security strategy in a world no longer dominated by the bipolar 

nature of that earlier geostrategic era. 

The objectives, logic, and assumptions that shaped the Cold 

War are unlikely to be relevant (or even helpful) in this different 

and strategically uncertain world. Without an intellectual or political basis for policy and strategy, sustaining both a consensus 

and even close to current budgets for U.S. military power will be 

extremely difficult. More to the point, the lack of rationale for defense mandates even further reduction in strategic and operational 

priorities visa vis domestic needs. 
PART I1: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH ~tND STILL BLEW" 95 

In the United States, the classical and academic approach to 

determining strategy is no secret. First, the nature of the world 

and threats to U.S. security are identified or assumed. Second, 

U.S. interests are specified and threats to U.S. interests are matched 

against a range of protective instruments for which military force 

has been the ultimate arbiter. Third, the amount of military force 

deemed to be sufficient or necessary to protect the nation is determined by the judgment of the executive branch tempered by its 

assessment of the attitudes of Congress, the public, and relevant 

international actors. Finally, these judgments are presented to 

Congress through the annual budgeting process and thrust into 

the political debate over allocating national resources and determining national priorities. 

The dilemmas of determining any strategy in this uncertain 

world, now driven increasingly if not entirely by domestic politics, 

are obvious when set in perspective. Identifying real or possible 

threats to U.S. security of a level of danger or risk remotely close to 

that posed by the USSR leads to a simple conclusion. There are 

none. Specifying U.S. interests that must be protected produces 

banal platitudes that, although no doubt valid in an absolute sense, 

seem less than relevant when matched against likely threats and 

possible dangers. 

Thus, planning factors are difficult to create given ambiguous 

and uncertain threats, and no firm quantitative basis for rationalizing the strategy and forces is easily produced. Because of this 

uncertainty, lack of specificity, and an accompanying lack of 

universal planning criteria, arguments with more or less equal 

plausibility can be made for fielding military forces of the current 

1.6 million level, fbr a level of 1 million, for a level of half a million, 

or virtually any number within this boundary. In other words, without a real threat, there may be no satisfactory strategic answer to 

the question of how much is enough. 

These dilemmas extend to applying the intellectual basis of the 

Cold War strategy to the current and future worlds. The concepts 

of containment and deterrence were directed at a single and powerful threat. That threat straddled Eurasia and cast its shadow on 

a world in which the threat of nuclear war could not be eliminated 

from national policy considerations of either side in the Cold War. 

Geostrategy therefore mattered and a system of behavior was 
96 IN IRONS: U.~. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

established along with "rules of the game." Both the U.S. and USSR 

and their allies could operate under these rules in the nuclear age 

without recourse to world war. 

Current American rhetorical replacement themes for the threat 

of the former USSR echo the need to maintain "regional stability" 

and contain regional crisis or conflict. In other words, the implicit 

attempt thus far by the United States has been to transfer the 

geostrateg~c concepts and objectives of containment and deterrence 

to regional rather than global settings without fully determining 

whether these concepts fit. The current, unstated assumption appears to be that containing or deterring threats and regional instabilities is conceptually independent of the size or nature of the threat 

and independent of any serious threat of nuclear retaliation. That 

assumption is not necessarily relevant. 

It can be argued that non-nuclear containment and deterrence 

have worked in the case of Libya's Qaadafi, seen as a direct threat 

to the United States. American retaliatory strikes against Libya 

in 1986, backed up by an embargo of sorts, have restrained Libyan 

actions against U.S. interests. On the other hand, despite what 

may or may not have transpired in the days just before Iraq's August 

1990 invasion of Kuwait, containment and deterrence visibly failed 

against Iraq. Saddam Hussein disregarded the rituals of U.S. signalling before and during the occupation of Kuwait, and it took the 

force of arms to expel him. Bosnia seems an unsolvable tragedy 

immune to all forms of containment and deterrence. Furthermore, 

because containment requires at least consensus among a few states 

over who is to be contained, gaining that consensus is difficult when 

the terms allies and adversaries are often interchangeable. 

Above all, deterrence developed from the nuclear realities of a 

bipolar geostrategic world and the power of technological superiority. The United States also believed that nuclear superiority over 

the USSR translated into political capital as well as into the offset 

to Soviet conventional numerical military strength. As the Soviet 

Union increased its nuclear forces, nuclear deterrence was extended 

along almost theological lines as this side attempted to exploit its 

qualitative technological advantages and the other side relied more 

on larger, more powerful warheads until its technology could close 

the gap. This deterrence was extended in non-nuclear areas and to 
PARr II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 97 

such regions as the Middle East where formal alliances with either 

superpower did not exist. 

Deterrence between the superpowers ultimately rested in the 

capacity of each to threaten the total destruction of the other's society. There is now only one superpower and the Cold War nuclear 

balance is behind us. The question for the future is whether classical deterrence and the threat of massive or complete destruction 

has relevance and application in conditioning the attitude and behavior of potential, non-superpower adversaries. For example, it 

is extremely unlikely that the United States would do to Iraq or 

Iran what it threatened and promised to its allies it would do to 

the USSR with nuclear weapons in the event of an attack. Even if 

a nuclear device were detonated on a U.S. target by a would-be 

adversary, the relevance of a nuclear-based scheme of deterrence 

and the total destruction of the offending society through the use 

of U.S. nuclear weapons seem doubtful or useful constructs. 

On the other hand, if the use of U.S. conventional military force 

can be extended beyond the requirement of defeating an enemy's 

armed force to threatening or causing the destruction of the enemy's 

society with non-nuclear weapons, deterrence as defined in the bipolar nuclear age could be relevant. In other words, mass killing of 

a seemingly innocent society through use of retaliatory nuclear 

weapons may be out of the question. However, the ability to shut 

that society down without much loss of life to the enemy may have 

deterrent value. The example of the UN war against Iraq in 1990- 

91 may be instructive. 

The evidence in that war suggests that the "instant thunder" 

air campaign of Operation Desert Storm eliminated or destroyed 

the electrical, communications, transportation, and other vital networks of Iraqi society, effectively shutting down that nation in a 

matter of hours. It may well be that less advanced and even economically backward states could be enormously vulnerable to 

conventional attacks against primitive and therefore highly vulnerable networks. If that vulnerability exists, a non-nuclear form of 

deterrence, in which the U.S. has the conventional capability to 

destroy an adversary's military and literally destroy or incapacitate the adversary's society for as long as the U.S. required, might 

have relevance. Whether the U.S. could muster sufficient political 
98 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

resolve or callousness to embrace this version of deterrence against 

the nearly certain backlash of international reaction remains an 

open question. 

A subset of this post-Cold War variant of deterrence could also 

be relevant to addressing a current nightmare scenario of U.S. defense plannerswthe case where the U.S. has already intervened or 

is about to intervene militarily against an adversary possessing 

one or a few nuclear weapons either openly or covertly. The worst 

case in this scenario, as was the scenario of all-out nuclear war in 

the days of the East-West conflict, relates to a U.S. expeditionary 

force eviscerated under a nuclear cloud. How and why the U.S. 

would stumble into such a debacle are arguable questions, but the 

contingency of the U.S. being deterred itself by a nuclear weapon 

or two cannot be dismissed out of hand. A concept based on a conventional capability that can destroy an adversary's military power and 

also threaten destruction of that society may be worthy of further 

examination as either an explicit or implicit doctrine and strategy. 

Of the other assumptions central to U.S. Cold War strategy, their 

application to today and tomorrow is as questionable as that of 

deterrence rooted in nuclear threat. Containment was maintained 

by a network of alliances. NATO, SEATO, the Rio Pact, ANZUS, 

CENTO, and the bilateral U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Korea, and U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaties were products of that era. 34 The 

central questions for the surviving alliances are whether and how 

to maintain threat-based alliances after the threat has passed. 

NATO is the most obvious and most important case regarding the 

future role of alliances within or without a security context. 

Through significant and unprecedented effort, NATO transformed its strategy and force requirements to respond to the collapse of communism. Catalyzed by German reunification and the 

failed Soviet coup in August 1991, the objectives of maintaining 

stability and containing crises were ratified in November 1991 at 

the Rome summit of NATO heads of state as the new rationale for 

the alliance. Yet, the difficulty of transferring these objectives into 

34 SEATO--Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; ANZUS---Australia, 

New Zealand, United States; CENTO--Central Treaty Organization. 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 99 

practical actions was magnified by the civil war raging in the former 

Yugoslavia, and the decision by the NATO states not to take an 

active or interventionist role in resolving that conflict until 1994 

severely hurt NATO's credibility. Critics carp that, without practical application, what good is this new basis for alliance? Without a 

good basis, what good is the alliance? 

On the European side of NATO, there is intuitive and implicit 

strategic understanding for the need to maintain NATO. Explicitly, the Europeans want the U.S. engaged for many reasons. Transatlantic trade and economic harmony remain vital. U.S. presence 

reassures against possible instability in the East, whether civil war 

spilling over or resurgence of a Russian threat reemerging to challenge Europe. Furthermore, U.S. leadership is a nice balance to 

possible aspirations or ambitions of Germany, France, and the U.K. 

in which the U.S., as primus inter pares, can prevent future interNATO rivalries from getting out of hand. 

On the U.S. side, there is little popular strategic appreciation 

for maintaining a viable NATO. The end of the Warsaw Pact for 

many Americans ended the raison d'etre for NATO. And, to these 

same Americans, any replacement or substitute threat for the USSR 

as the new basis for the alliance is a hollow exercise. Regardless of 

the future viability of NATO, the demise of the USSR certainly has 

challenged the United States' ongoing assumption of the need to 

maintain alliances as central tenets of a security strategy. 

Korea is perhaps the one alliance where both a sense and reality of threat remains. Whether or not North Korea acquires nuclear 

weapons, most Americans agree with maintaining the commitment 

to guarantee South Korea's security through a military alliance. 

U.S. force levels in Korea will no doubt decrease, yet Korea is perhaps the one example rather than the general rule where the reality of a threat-based alliance exists. 

Japan forms possibly the most complex test for the notion of 

alliance. The U.S.-Japanese Mutual Defense Treaty has been in 

place for nearly three and one-half decades. That treaty was based 

on the general proposition that nonaggression could be a permanent 

fixture of Japanese behavior and was in the best interest of both 

Japan and its neighbors. The United States accepted the role of 

guarantor and, indeed, of custodian of Japan's national security, 
100 IN IRONS: US, MILITARY MIGHT IN THE N~W CENTURY 

principally against the USSR and China. And Japan pledged a 

national policy of nonaggression and self-defense, with its military 

forces purposely constrained by limits on defense spending of about 

1 percent of GDP; by limits on the types of weapon systems acquired; and by limits on the overall command-and-control structure that made "offensive" operations literally impossible. 

From the Japanese perspective, the implicit assignment of key 

Japanese national security responsibilities to the United States 

allowed that debate on rearmament not to take place within Japan, provided a credible reason to justify America's surrogate role 

existed---e.g., the Soviet threat. From the U.S. perspective, the strategic advantages of having Japan as the world's largest aircraft 

carrier directly athwart Soviet Pacific military power and the assurance that Japan had permanently foresworn the ambitions of 

the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere of the 1930s were enormous. 

As a result of geopolitics and geoeconomics, Americans and Japanese alike saw the U.S.-Japanese relationship as America's most 

important bilateral arrangement. And, there were no reasons to 

test that proposition as long as the Cold War persisted. 

The end of the Cold War and of the USSR, growing economic 

disputes and differences between Japan and the United States, and 

enormous political corruption that has led to the electoral defeat 

for the first time ever of the Liberal Democratic Party are representative issues that are altering and challenging the U.S.-Japanese relationship. Concurrently, the demise of Soviet power does 

not end the entire threat to instability in the region, and the balance among and between the states of Northeast and Southeast 

Asia is by no means in perfect harmony. 

The upshot of these factors is an enormous dilemma for the 

United States. On strategic grounds, a continued and viable 

U.S.-Japanese relationship is essential. Physical U.S. military 

presence and U.S. guarantees for Japanese security remain the best 

instruments for ensuring stability. The U.S. is an accepted (and perhaps expected to be) power for good, and the U.S. and strong U.S. 

presence are seen as vital by states in the region and with interests in 

the region. U.S. presence remains the best restraint on potential Japanese ambitions (even if there were no likelihood of revanchist actions), 

thereby serving as a vital strategic insurance policy. 
PAnT II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 101 

On economic grounds, however, U.S. domestic critics have a valid 

point. If the Japanese can have both their security and economic 

cakes, as it were, why should they change their policies? Moreover, 

why should the U.S. accept a double hit in its GDP, underwriting 

both Japan's security and its economy? Hence, if strategic considerations obtain, U.S. policy is relatively clear. If domestic economic 

considerations obtain, new policies are likely. On a rational basis, 

balancing strategic and domestic considerations should be straightforward; however, given the nature of the U.S. political process, 

there is no certainty that rationality will win out. 

Finally, the long-standing assumption and assertion that the 

U.S.-Japanese relationship is the most important bilateral partnership in the world must be questioned now that the joint threat 

has passed. The different conclusions reached by strategic and 

narrower economic analyses are evidence of the need to reexamine 

this question. How this relationship evolves could prove to be the 

largest uncertainty of them all. 

In this review, the last international arrangement that can be 

categorized as a quasi-alliance pertains to the UN and its emerging roles in the world. The end of the East-West conflict removed 

one of the greatest constraints to the U.S. more actively soliciting 

UN involvement where force was required--namely, the Soviet veto. 

The example of a UN coalition fighting Desert Storm and forces 

under a UN mandate providing "peacekeeping-like" functions in 

Somalia and Bosnia are relevant. Certainly, from a U.S. perspective, 

international action by the UN in regions of crisis or instability 

provides certain political and strategic advantages, including the 

not insignificant values of political cover and alternatives for U.S. 

unilateral intervention. 

In its first year, the Clinton administration looked to the UN for 

both multilateral action and political cover while keeping the option 

of unilateral intervention open. But the UN relies on a 'qowest common denominator" approach, reflecting the need to obtain a Security 

Council resolution. This is not always in the U.S. interest. The commitment of international military force by the UN also implies, 

ultimately, an accounting to determine whether the UN can remain and be supported as the instrument of choice. The credit the 

UN received for Desert Storm and for a variety of peacekeeping 
102 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

operations has reinforced its credibility and authority. However, the 

tenacious and perhaps unresolvable problems in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda have been debits to the value of UN intervention. Without some positive measures of UN success over the long 

term, the tendency to rely on the UN for these international roles 

pertaining to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and restoring stability 

is likely to be dampened and reduced. Hence, the potentially negative aspects of using the UN and international cooperation as a 

principal policy instrument must be well understood. 

Against this Cold War background of containment, deterrence, 

and alliance-driven security considerations, the U.S. assumed that 

its economy was the engine of growth for the West and for the developing world. Implied in this assumption of economic dominance 

were unshaken beliefs in the superiority of U.S. technology and in 

the comfort that most problems could be overcome with money. 

American largesse in its many aid and assistance programs was 

made possible by this economic vitality. And, for three or four decades after World War II, this assumption and its supporting beliefs were verified by results. America was the world leader in 

virtually all technological areas. In the 1960s, both the Great Society 

programs for providing solutions to social ills and the Vietnam War 

were undertaken simultaneously on the grounds the economy could 

afford both. Foreign aid and assistance continued to be generous, 

but the economy could not stand up to these larger demands as, 

over time, the financial burdens grew and grew. 

Domestically, the war against poverty and the larger programs 

of the Great Society put in place entitlement programs that would 

have appetites for growth beyond anyone's expectation. Internationally, the countries ravaged by the Second World War reconstituted themselves, and so the various Italian, German, French, and, 

most visibly, Japanese economic miracles came to fruition. The extraordinary economic advantage the U.S. possessed after World War 

II was impossible to sustain over the long term, and, as other states 

could simply grow at faster GDP rates, U.S. dominance had to erode. 

In the early 1980s, the notion of supply-side economics and its 

ancillary policy of stimulating growth through capital expansion 

dominated official U.S. political and economic policy. And, while no 

doubt creating larger holders of wealth, both the private and public 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 103 

debts were multiplied. Spurred by a quadrupling of the federal debt 

in less than a decade from $1 trillion to $4 trillion, the total amount of 

public and private debt jumped to about $15 trillion in 1993. 

The combination of powerful economic rivals, a general sputtering of world economies in the early 1990s, and a huge debt position of its own that siphoned away large percentages of GDP for 

debt service made it clear that the U.S. would have to take a more 

realistic view of its own economic strengths and limitations. Fur~ 

thermore, as was shown earlier, the seemingly permanent imbalances in the structure of the federal budget, the inability to control 

either entitlement or mandated spending, 35 and the difficulty in 

stimulating economic growth have combined to dash the dream of 

perpetual American economic dominance. The future consequences 

are far from dismal provided the gap between American expectations 

over ever-increasing standards of living and the reality of likely 

long-term economic performance can be spanned. 

Concurrently, the notion of U.S. technological superiority has 

been displaced as U.S. advantages have been narrowed or overtaken. 

As microelectronic technology has diffused worldwide and as the revolution in information technology has created and opened vast new 

markets, the U.S. is one of many competitors in these areas and not 

necessarily the leader. For the foreseeable future, however, the 

U.S. is likely to remain dominant in one sector--military technology. 

The end of the USSR has removed the only power with the military resources and capacity to challenge the U.S. Although our 

NATO allies and Japan could match the U.S. on a selective or single 

military system basis, without the appropriate stimulus, there is 

no reason why any one state would seek to overtake the U.S. across 

the full spectrum of military technology. In all areas, from nuclear 

weapons to system integration, the U.S. has huge and probably 

near-permanent advantages. Indeed, one ability in particular is 

unmatched--the ability to integrate multidimensional and enormously 

advanced systems with sensors tens of thousands of miles in space 

35 Mandated spending refers to federal legislation that directs states 

and local authorities to pay ibr enacted programs without any funds 

from the Federal Government. 
104 IN ]RONS: US. MILITARY MZGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

and linked to fixed and mobile earth-based surveillance platforms 

and targeting networks each, in turn, capable of directing precision-guided weapons through command, control, communications, 

computers, and intelligence (C4I) technology from stealth aircraft 

to highly accurate cruise missiles and large numbers of tactical 

aircraft. Thus, even as America's relative economic position visa 

vis other states declines, in the area of military technology, the 

rate of closure is vastly lower, if it indeed is closing. 36 

The final assumption on which U.S. strategy has been built was 

the perception of the superiority of democracy and capitalism over 

all rivals. On one hand, the evaporation of authoritarianism and 

communism as available and serious potential alternatives would 

prove the correctness of that assumption. On the other hand, the 

lack of relevance of liberal democracy to many or most of the world's 

states suggests that attempts to overlay the U.S. model will not 

work. Capitalism has defeated Soviet communism or, more precisely, outlasted it. Arrogance on America's part would not seem 

well-advised. Whether capitalism and democracy can really work 

in Somalia, Panama, or Iraq, for example, is another matter. 

Given the demise or erosion in relevance of these Cold War assumptions, it is no surprise that planning assumptions for defense 

have also changed. While warning time, mobilization, and enemy 

orders of battle have been used in evaluating requirements for the 

MRCs in the BUR, these criteria are only as plausible as the scenarios they represent. Hence, these planning factors are unlikely 

to prove as enduring as in the days of the Cold War when there was 

but one large threat. 

Because the principal assumptions that have underlain U.S. 

security strategy have been overtaken by current reality or made 

obsolete by Soviet Russia's demise, what foundations should form 

36 Futurists raise a caveat here. The long-term impact of 

"nanotechnology," which is based on the speed of information technology 

and the manipulation of subatomic particles to build complete structures and even systems, could, someday, conceivably produce a rival to 

the U.S. While this may seem like science fiction and not reality, it 

cannot be entirely dismissed. 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 105 

the basis for future U.S. security? Or, given the uncertain and 

diaphanous nature of threats to U.S. security, can a specific strategy with specific objectives be fashioned that has enough credibility and plausibility to be taken seriously? If a specific strategy is 

unobtainable, can U.S. strategy be sustained on a broad, general 

basis? And, finally, does any of this strategic debate make a difference? As the sole superpower, engaged internationally by virtue of 

experience, tradition, economic or business, security, and humanitarian interests, is it reasonable to believe the United States could 

or would withdraw? If that is the case, then aside from a few generalities and basic objectives, does the United States really need a 

highly articulated or precise strategy? And, with or without a 

precise strategy, what level of military power will be needed and 

can be sustained? 

As of 1994, the Clinton administration has chosen to defer the 

matter of developing an overarching, rigorous, and explicitly documented U.S. national security strategy and associated foreign policy. 

In a striking way, the similarities and continuities between the 

Bush and Clinton administrations are real and deep. U.S. strategy 

and policy towards the FSU, trade (GATT and NAFTA), Iraq, NATO, 

and China, among others, have remained remarkably consistent. 

And the DOD, under Mr. Clinton, aside from moderating explicit 

prohibition on permitting homosexuals to serve in uniform, has 

developed a plan that bears striking similarities to the "base force" 

advanced by Mr. Bush. The tendency of different governments in 

general and the executive branch in particular to maintain relatively consistent policies across administrations suggests the more 

likely case of how development of future strategy will play out. 37 

If there is no sweeping and real attempt to recast U.S. national 

security policy, other than through asserting that change has occurred, the United States is most likely to preserve the basic conceptual structure of the Cold War. This approach risks resisting or 

ignoring the many opportunities and alternatives created by the 

37 Restating the similarity of pronouncements and criticisms over U.S. 

engagement in Somalia or Haiti and the debate over Vietnam in the 1960s 

underscores this con si~tency and continuity within the branches of government. 
106 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

end of the USSR, and, instead, replaces the specific threat of 

Soviet aggression with generalized worries about instability, regional 

conflict, proliferation, and terrorism. But, without a credible intellectual foundation for national defense, the chances are high that severe 

compression and contractions in military might are inevitable. 

No matter what approach is taken in constructing a vital national security policy, the fundamental question that underlies the 

issue of strategic formulation is whether the United States can 

identify its major interests and objectives with sufficient precision, 

clarity, and plausibility to justify the strategy and budget that must 

follow. If that cannot be done, is there another means of determining what the public would support or tolerate in terms of general 

levels of military might on an instinctive or judgmental basis only? 

In other words, without sufficient threats or dangers to menace 

U.S. interests in a significant way, without specific reasons to show 

how force serves or advances U.S. objectives, or without explicit or 

implicit public support, any strategy risks being hollow or flawed. 

We all know that, conceptually and practically, potential dangers to U.S. security mandate retaining substantial military force. 

However, in a different security context, that is why police forces 

and law-enforcement agencies are necessary as protective instruments. Yet, there is no "strategy" per se for police forces, and police 

chiefs need not wax eloquent on the need for a strategy. So, one 

answer to this strategic question is that, absent a specific threat or 

apparent danger to U.S. security, we need not get upset about lacking a carefully constructed strategy. 

The obvious danger of a lack of strategic specificity is that it 

will not generate enough public support either to maintain the level 

of military capability that is likely to be needed or to provide enough 

political clout to administration officials to permit a sensible 

downsizing of military power to occur. Americans in general and 

Congress in particular have become so used to annual posture statements, 

elaborate testimony, and dependence upon a national security strategy statement that any recognition of the need to maintain forces 

just because it is sensible to do so will be lost in the pubhc debate 

over defense spending. Yet, whatever strategy is produced is likely to 

fall short of the interests and objectives test just noted above. 
PAR'~' II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 107 

WHAT NEXT? 

A variety of strategies could be implemented, including ones 

that represent extreme change. One extreme case would be to abandon any overarching strategy or military rationale and simply allocate a certain percentage of GDP to defense. This approach would 

be the equivalent of having military power for an insurance or police-like rolc. Another extreme case would be for the U.S. to adopt 

a minimalist strategy in which we would largely demobilize, keep 

a small standing force, and perhaps pursue an aggressive R&D 

policy searching for new, leap-ahead systems that would provide 

us with permanent military advantage. Although selective aspects 

of these extremes are not entirely ignored in these discussions, there 

are only three realistic choices: 

• Steady as you go (i.e., take no action) 

• Fund the Bottom-Up Review force (i.e., free up the resources 

needed) 

• Readjust and change. 

"Steady as you go" maintains the objectives, strategy, and force 

structure set by the Bottom-Up Review. The requirements for winning two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies and maintaining substantial military presence overseas remain the building 

blocks. However, the erosion in U.S. military capability that would be 

wrought by insufficient defense spending would be tolerated or 

accepted. The arguments supporting this choice are straightforward. 

Even a force of 1.4 million active-duty personnel that was largely 

unready by today's standards would remain the most formidable 

military in the world. With dominant nuclear and advanced conventional weapons in place, the United States could still mobilize 

in time of crisis. Given a paucity of adversaries presenting mortal 

challenges to American interests, it would be a long time before a 

threat of that scale emerged. Hence, there would be a warning time. 

The maintenance of constant objectives and strategy would be 

seen as reassuring to friends. The absolute decline in military power 
108 IN TRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

would be offset by a remaining capacity to use some level of force in 

a convincing manner. And, there would have to be a credible expression of commitment as well as action in responding to any new 

adversary in the future. 

Defense spending would decline. Lesser resource demands by 

defense would relieve other pressures on the federal budget from 

competing domestic programs and from the need to redress the 

permanent annual deficit. The cumulative effects would, in theory, 

contribute to rebuilding and strengthening domestic capacity. Social as well as economic priorities and gains would fall into this 

category. Futhermore, since defense is viewed increasingly as a 

lesser important need, expenditure of political capital would be directed where the public wishes it--to domestic issues. 

Little action would be required by the president or Congress. 

In the best of all worlds, the White House should recognize the 

military consequences of this choice and accept them. The 

argument that the international situation permits this focus on 

domestic issues may prove wrong in time, but it's a reflection of the 

attitude of most Americans. 

"Fund the BUR force" means that both the construct and the 

resources to keep those forces at high levels of both numbers and 

readiness will be maintained. The resources necessary to this end 

could come from either more defense spending or through making 

major reforms that will free up an equivalent amount of money. 

The rationale for this choice is likewise clear. 

Although there is no dramatic threat present, uncertainty persists. If the U.S. were to allow its military might to decay, there is 

no guarantee it would redress that condition when and if required 

by a future adversary. Furthermore, U.S. military power is seen as 

a stabilizing factor. Eroding this capacity could lead to an erosion 

in the structure underpinning international security. 

Given a GDP in excess of $6 trillion, additional resources of 

even $50 billion a year for sustaining defense are economically affordable. Domestic programs will not be affected significantly, if at 

all, by a redirected expenditure of resources amounting to about 

eight-tenths of 1 percent of GDP. Hence, the domestic and economic arguments against this choice are based more on emotion 

than analysis. Whether reform could be imposed to gain this level 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 109 

of freed-up resources that would obviate more spending, however, 

is an unknown. 

Finally, the U.S. can "Readjust and change." The arguments for 

choosing this approach rest on two propositions. First, the world 

has changed so significantly that the United States has the opportunity or responsibility to follow suit. Second, experience has shown 

that major imbalances between strategic and operational objectives 

and actual military capabilities tend to cause more instability than 

when there is better balance. Put another way, if the use of military force is to be effective when the time comes, the required capabilities must fit the strategic objectives of the exercise. 

Before examining each of these choices further, it is useful to 

take a closer look at the components that make up the common 

defense. "Threat" has already been assessed, as have the economic 

and political aspects of the "budget" and the "strategy." This leaves 

force structure and its direct link with the budget, commitments 

and deployments, and, of course, infrastructure. From the many 

alternatives and options within each of these components, larger 

decisions relating to which of the broader choices to follow can be 

better informed. 
110 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

CHAPTER SIX'- FORCE STRUCTURE AND BUDGETS 

Force structure means more than the design and organization 

of the forces, the basic building blocks from which they were derived, and the source or basis for generating this fighting power, 

such as tanks, ships, and aircraft. The qualitative and intrinsic 

values of morale, spirit, and tradition are inseparable yet difficult 

to measure. As John Paul Jones observed, "Men are more important than guns in the rating of a ship." 

In the abstract, and independent of any strategic preference, 

the shape of future force structure encompasses a nearly unbounded 

universe. This universe contains countless combinations and permutations for force structure, considering the different variables 

and components that could bear legitimate scrutiny, such as: 

• The Budget, i.e., different spending levels and how much or 

how little money goes to defense 

• Different priorities regarding how forces are based on sea, 

air, land, and space 

• Different weapon systems and constructs for organizing 

fighting power 

• Different priorities between forward-deployed and homebased capability 

• Different levels of readiness 

• The degree of dependence on reconstitution, reserves, and 

mobilization 

• Different emphasis on modernization 

• Different rates of pursuit of advanced technology 

• Different degrees of reliance on allies and other policy instruments, including international organizations. 

Because none of these variables is all-exclusive or all-inclusive, 

another dimension or level of review is necessary that examines 

their interaction. 

To narrow these boundaries that relate possible future U.S. fbrce structure to national security policy and to the composition, organization, 
PART II: '~AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 111 

design, and capabilities of that structure, addressing (if not 

fully answering) three sets of questions is vital: 38 

• What forces are needed strategically and operationally; how 

does that structure incorporate the many independent and 

dependent variables of choice; and what are the assumptions and criteria underwriting each choice? 

• What level of capability and what types of force structure 

are politically and economically sustainable and justifiable 

in this era of strategic uncertainty? 

• How do we safely, sensibly, and affordably get from today's 

force structure and capability to that of tomorrow and properly balance the threat strategy, force structure, budget, and 

infrastructure relationships? 

To determine where we might or should be headed in the 

future, it is generally useful to appreciate where we have been 

regarding force structure. In this case, the term force structure 

not only must include the fighting forces but also must be linked 

with and balanced against the logistical, supporting, and industrial 

infrastructure that produces and sustains the goods and services 

needed for defense. 

38 No one has put this issue better than Dr. William W. Kaufmann in his 

Planning Conventional Forces 1950-80, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1982, p. 24: "Do these difficulties mean that conventional 

force planning has been off on a wild goose chase for the last twenty 

years? It is all well and good to compare U.S., allied, and opposing tanks, 

antitank weapons, artillery pieces, helicopters, aircraft, and warships. 

But such comparisons are not a sufficient basis for force evaluation and 

planning or judgments about the military balance. In fact, no one yet has 

devised a serious planning substitute for (a) the development and analysis for plausible but hypothetical campaigns in specific theaters, (b) the 

determination of the forces needed to bring about the desired military 

outcomes in those specific theaters, and (c) difficult judgments about the 

number of contingencies for which US. conventional forces should be prepared. [Italics are mine.] What is more, when careful analyses are done 

and sober judgments are made, they strongly suggest that current conventional threats can be contained by conventional means at costs that are 

quite bearable to the United States and its allies." 
112 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIO~T IN THE N~W CENTURY 

There is a striking and highly relevant consistency pertaining to 

the "structure" and basic building blocks for military forces. Throughout history and despite the effects of technological, strategic, and operational revolution, the organization of military forces has remained 

remarkably consistent. And, over the past century, even the nature 

of the most important weapon systems has shared this consistency. 

War and combat were restricted by science and gravity first to 

the dimensions and environments of land and sea and, in this century, to the atmosphere above. As a result, armies were fielded to 

wage war in the ground environment and, since Napoleon, have 

been traditionally organized around brigades, divisions, and corps 

or field armies. Navies fought on the seas and contiguous areas 

with key organizational units--the capital ship, battle group, and 

fleet. As air forces evolved, the medium of the air permitted access 

to the ground and sea environments as well as to strategic campaigns designed to destroy the will of the adversary and usually 

targeted against the homeland. 

In part because of these obvious consequences of geography and 

physics, and in part because of the time and expense it took to 

field, train, and equip forces, changes in force structure had 

elemental bias toward evolutionary and not revolutionary alterations 

except when some profound external factor intervened. Thus, it comes 

as no surprise that the tank (and armored personnel carrier) and 

artillery for the Army, the capital ship for the Navy, and aircrai~ and 

helicopters for each of the services have been around for a long time 

and are likely to continue their roles, technology withstanding. 

In the case of the United States, since the end of World War II 

and the highly traumatic implementation of the National Security 

Act of 1947, major or sudden change to U.S. force structure invariably took the form of numerical increases or decreases from the 

force levels then in being. Even given the impact of important 

technologies such as nuclear weapons and nuclear power, ballistic 

missiles, surveillance and detection from space, precision-guided 

munitions, and exponential advances in computational power, 

change tended to be incremental. There was never a serious and 

lasting attempt by either the White House or the Congress to overhaul or to revise the basic organization or design of U.S. ibrce structure and the means to apply military force. 

Nor was the divisive, bitter, and explosive debate over the "roles 

and missions" of the services reopened except on the margin aider the 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 113 

shattering experiences of the late 1940s and early 1950s in which 

"unification" of the military establishment into a single Department 

of Defense, the creation and separation of the Department of the Air 

Force, and the internecine service warfare over air power and strategic bombing threatened to wreck the flesh and fiber of the forces. 

Thus, despite the impact of nuclear weapons and associated 

delivery systems, the force structure under the Truman administration was simply a decimated version of the World War II design. 

Although Eisenhower's "new look" featured a "pentomic" 

(or penatomic) design for the Army and great emphasis on nuclear 

deterrence, that force was an evolutionary product bearing close 

resemblance in function and unit organization to the forces of 1945, 

even with the advances in weaponry and jet propulsion. Over the 

years, this consistency and continuity in U.S. force structure were 

maintained. The "roles and missions" endured the passage of time, 

and, as a partial result, more or less proportional and equitable division of resources among the services continued such that the Army, 

Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps were never threatened by extinction or by complete absorption into a competing organization. 

By the mid 1960s, force structure as viewed by each of the services became wedded to the demands of deterring and, if deterrence failed, prevailing in conflict against the Soviet Union. By 

the mid 1960s, the so-called "2-1/2 war" planning scenarios and the 

contingency of simultaneous conflict against the USSR and China 

and a '"half war" elsewhere provided the basic yardstick for establishing and building or maintaining the force structure. Part of those 

measures included specific criteria that, depending on where the measure was set, held obvious consequences for force structure planning. 

Each of the services responded to Title 10 requirements of the 

U.S. Code to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations within 

its warfare dimension. For example, in responding to the threat of 

Soviet and Warsaw Pact ground attack into Europe, the Army used 

warning time, that is, the amount of advanced alertment; mobilization time to reinforce, resupply Europe, and restart wartime production; the amount of prepositioned wartime materials and stocks to be 

on hand; and certain analytical models to evaluate force-on-force 

wargaming to permit identification of capabilities needed in Europe 

as the hooks or foundations on which plans for forces, logistics, 

reserves, support needs, and other contingencies rested and were 

related to the rationalization and justification of budget programs. 
114 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN rile NEW CENTURY 

The Navy defined and built its force structure to deal with the 

demands of sea lane defense, sea control, and power projection 

ashore in the same type of war against the USSR. Depending upon 

the development of Soviet forces and the degree to which 

U.S. doctrine emphasized nuclear or conventional means, the Navy 

regulated emphasis on its wartime missions with conclusions for 

its particular budgetary programs. Indeed, the Navy force structure 

of 1994, for all its advances, bears striking resemblance to the design 

of the force in place in 1947. The Marine Corps planned on 'Torcible 

entry" through amphibious assaults a la World War II on the ~flanks" 

of NATO and wherever else those capabilities were necessary. 

The Air Force remained divided between its pursuit of strategic 

missions whether in nuclear war or in strategic bombing campaigns 

and its support for the Army on the ground through a mixture of air 

control or superioriW, interdiction of the battlefield, and close air support. 

In addition to using the scenario of war against the Soviet Union 

to drive military planrgng, the services also had to account fbr other 

tasks, including peacetime presence, forward deployment, and crisis 

response in which the USSR might or might not have been involved. 

The transition during the Nixon administration to the "1-1/2 waft' 

scenario that eliminated China as a military threat did not alter 

the earlier construct for defining force structure. Both the Carter 

and Reagan administrations maintained the same "1-1/2 war" scenario for identifying force structure, specifying that the "1/2 war" 

would be a Persian Gulf scenario, with the Soviets intervening to 

control access to oil. The Reagan administration expanded the 

"1 war" requirements and built up accordingly, including plans for 

a 600-ship Navy. But, in practice, the organization and design of 

"force structure" continued to be remarkably consistent over time, 

conforming with continuing reliance on tanks, artillery, capital 

ships, and aircraft as the basis for fighting power. 

As noted, the Bottom-Up Review, while eliminating the Soviet 

threat, substituted the two major regional conflicts or contingencies as the basis for much of the planning for future forces. And, 

although the former USSR did not constitute the threat, ground 

and air campaigns were envisaged against Soviet-style adversaries 

(Iraq and North Korea). The Navy, because there is no real threat 

to controlling or commanding the seas, shifted to its new strategy 

of littoral warfare. Although in the Navy's case it can be argued 

that the end of the Soviet submarine threat translated into a 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 115 

dramatic reduction in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities-- 

namely, reducing the U.S. submarine force by half or more and 

decommissioning a majority of ASW-only ships and patrol aircrai~-- 

the force structure is really only smaller and is still organized 

around capital ships, battle groups, and aircraft for projecting 

naval forces and power ashore. 

A last point on this discussion of the evolutionary nature of 

changing force structure: analysis and modeling are helpful but 

are not authoritative. Paraphrasing Voltaire, "figures lie and liars 

figure." No model or analytical technique replaces good seasoned 

judgment. Analysis is indeed important, but is also limited in accuracy and predictability and should not be seen as a surrogate for 

decisions. Determination of any future force structure must recognize these limits. Finally, it is useful to summarize the basic assumptions and tools each administration used to produce the force 

structure of its time. Table 19 contains such a summary. 

Table 19. Summary of assumptions and tools that each of six administrations 

used to produce its force structure 

Administration Comments 

Tmman 1945-1950 

1950-1952 

Eisenhower 1953-1960 

Kennedy/Johnson 1961-1968 

NixordFord 1969-1976 

Carter 1977-1980 

Reagan/Bush 1981-1992 

Small standing force of World War II design 

with emphasis and mobilization. 

Larger force to deal with the threat of Soviet 

aggression, mostly in Europe. 

The "new Ioo1¢' emphasized nuclear and thermonuclear weapons against the backdrop of 

massive retaliation; a "2-1/2 war" planning scenario was the general but unmeant guideline. 

Flexible response with both nuclear and conventional emphases. Greater use of analysis 

to support '"2-1/2 war" planning scenario. 

Shift to the "1-1/2 war' planning scenario with 

increasing emphasis on "flexible targeting" 

for nuclear weapons. 

As above, specifying the "1/2 war" as a 

Persian Gulf contingency. 

As above with the Reagan build-up to make 

more robust the "1 war' scenario against the 

USSR. In 1990, the base force was developed 

for regional contingencies. 
116 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGttT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

To address the three sets of questions noted above that ultimately 

will provide the basis for any future force structure, the highly specific and often technical building blocks that cumulatively make 

up defense must be examined. These components, in fact, define 

the manner in which monies will be spent and priorities established to implement the broad planning implied by shorthand terms 

such as "2-1/2 war," "1-1/2 war," or "2 MRC" criteria. Because these 

specific components are so interactive, no attempt is made to rank 

their importance vis a vis the others: 

• Budget--Clearly, the amount and rate of reduction or addition to defense spending will hold great influence over future force structure both in terms of the quantity or numbers and the quality or actual combat capability of the forces. 

Four long-term, stable levels for annual defense spending 

set this boundary: what it will take to fund the BUR force 

fully (about $270 billion); $250 billion, which is the current 

Clinton plan and represents the ceiling; $200 billion, which 

is a possible mid-term and sustainable long-term level; and 

$150 billion, which is the lowest level likely to be politically 

plausible and below which it is virtually impossible to see 

defense budgets drop this decade. 

• Near-term and long-term readiness--The readiness of the 

forces to fight is a complicated matter that includes not only 

the level of preparedness of active-duty forces but the degree of reliance on reserve forces, on mobilization, or on reconstitution and how these factors are balanced. Additionally, the active-duty forces can be structured at different 

levels of readiness in which, for example, a "core force" is 

kept at a permanently high condition of readiness; a 

"tranche" at a lower condition requiring an arbitrary period 

of time x to be brought back to operational standards; and a 

third tranche requiring a time 2 or 3x to return to fully operational status. Supplies of spare parts and ammunition 

can be included as part of this category. 

• ManningwAs a corollary to readiness, manning can determine force structure through emphasis on active or reserve 
PART II: '~AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 117 

and mobilization forces and on whether to continue the allvolunteer force or to return to some form of draft and required 

military service. Also, manning can be a surrogate or shorthand for aggregate capability. In the various choices offered, 

three aggregate levels of manning will be examined: 1.4 million 

active duty, or the BUR; 1.0 million; and 750,000. This boundary of 750,000 to 1.4 million is likely to cover the future range 

of manning. Similar ranges for reserve forces are also offered. 

Modernization and technical innovation--The pace of and 

degree to which weapon systems are updated or replaced 

and the rate of reliance on technological innovation form 

another category that affects both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of force structure. On one extreme, policy 

could be to withhold modernization in favor of awaiting the 

technological breakthroughs that "leap ahead" and make 

current systems obsolete. The other extreme could be a 

policy for more rapid but incremental modernization. 

Functional assignment and balance of forces39--In the past, 

U.S. practice has generally been a proportional or equitable 

and balanced distribution of resources and capabilities 

among the services and naval, ground, air, and space-based 

forces. That balance can be continued. Or, priority can be 

placed on naval forces, with appropriate reductions in other 

capabilities to fit budget constraints, or on land-based or 

"garrison forces," with ground and air capabilities cutting 

other forces appropriately. Last, there is the reconstitution 

option that gives low priority to standing forces and emphasizes remobilization and reconstitution. A subset of this category is to reexamine and possibly redefine roles and missions. 

39 It is tempting to cast this category as redefining roles and missions, 

particularly as Congress has mandated a commission on this very issue. 

Because the roles and missions debate will focus principally on tactical 

aviation and its relationship to strike, air defense, and ground support 

and on the balance between the Army and Marine Corps, my organization is broader. However, roles and missions are included as a subset. 
118 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

• Basing andpresence--Force structure could be designed on 

the degree of priority given to home or overseas basing and 

to presence. Although this category could be a subset of 

functional balance, the geographic determination of where 

to station forces and in what numbers could be a means of 

choosing force structure beyond which types of forces would 

be preferred. The role of allies and alliances and reliance 

on both form a further subset for choice. 

• New missions--Force structure could also be modified by 

pursuit of new missions that require reshaping of the force. 

Peacekeeping and peacemaking are two of the more widely 

debated roles for military forces. But as the domestic focus 

increases, missions that are more civil in nature to include 

policing-like functions, drug control, nation- and city-building, and education could be advanced as grounds for redefining force structure. 40 

• New organization--Force structure can be revised on the 

basis of changing the organization and assigned equipment 

down to the unit level. Because the aggregate capability of 

U.S. fighting power has increased considerably in both relative and absolute measures, the notion of reducing the size 

and equipment levels of military units bears review. For 

example, the Navy long held to the position that the carrier 

air wing should number about 80 to 90 aircraft. The new air 

wing will number about 50 to 55 aircraft. An Air Force fighter 

squadron (or wing) might be similarly reduced, as well as an 

Army tank or artillery battalion. In other words, to the degree quality counts, cannot quality be proportionally affected? 41 

40 Although I am opposed to this approach and advise caution in adopting 

many of these "newer" roles, it would be a mistake to ignore these tasks. 

41 To be fair, the opposite view, namely, increasing equipment such as in 

a supercarrier with 300 to 400 aircraft, should be investigated. At the 

same time, reducing the size of troop strength in a division from today's 

20,000 to what was seen in World War II as the optimum size of 12,000 to 

14,000 should also be reviewed. 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 119 

A final aspect of these force structure considerations deals with 

the pursuit of "flexibility" on the basis that, particularly in an era 

of strategic uncertainty, this flexibility allows coping with surprise 

and the unexpected. All things being equal (perhaps the exception 

rather than the rule), military commanders will invariably seek 

flexibility in capabilities as a high priority. The reason is clear-- 

war and the outcome of battle are uncertain. Inherent flexibility 

enables forces to deal with the unforeseen even though the costs of 

obtaining flexibility do not usually come cheaply. 

The aircraft carrier is among the best examples of how flexibility can apply to both changing strategic and operational applications as well as to the pressures that lead to evolutionary change. 

The destruction of "Battleship Row" at Pearl Harbor was the final 

and unexpected event to signal the carrier's ascendancy, even though 

the operational virtues of sea-based airpower were understood years 

earlier. But, from that day in December 1941, the aircraft carrier 

became the centerpiece of U.S. naval power and arguably remains 

more so today. 

In the nearly fifty years since the war ended, U.S. strategy has 

evolved from variants of "massive retaliation" and the threat of 

nuclear strike, to "flexible response" with a balanced conventional 

and theater and strategic nuclear emphasis, to the "countervailing" 

and "horizontally escalating" notions of the 1980s in which imaginative uses of military force were meant to deny the Soviet Union 

certain wartime military and geographic advantages. In the strategy of "massive retaliation," the principal role of the aircraft carrier was to deliver nuclear retaliatory or "second" strikes against 

the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies. As the doctrine of"flexible 

response" was established, the carrier resumed more traditional 

roles of sea control, protection of sea lanes, and conventional strike. 

Vietnam and Desert Storm were clear examples of using carriers 

in these more traditional roles and in this type of strategy. 

In the late 1970s and throughout the early 1980s, the notion of 

"maritime superiority" became a driving phrase in naval strategy. 

Translated into English, this meant that the U.S. Navy would be 

required to defeat or neutralize Soviet maritime power even in 

Soviet homewaters. The term homewaters was crucial because it 
120 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

authorized the Navy to plan on conducting certain offensive wartime 

tasks that were central to designing its force structure. 

First, the countervailing concept of threatening the Soviet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force was legitimized. This task 

demanded that U.S. forces, nuclear submarines (SSNs) in particular 

but aircraft carriers for defensive cover and support of submarine 

operations as well, would have to operate inside Soviet bastions 

against enemy SSBNs. Second, the aircraft carriers would have to 

be able to survive for days at a stretch under continued assault 

from powerful Soviet attacking forces operating near their homeland. Fortunately, the strategy was never put to the test, but the 

strategic and operational flexibility of aircraft carriers enabled these 

forces to fill many roles, a number of which were far different from 

when these hulls were first launched. 

To the degree that an understanding of"strategic uncertainty" 

can be translated into the actual design of weapons, flexibility would 

seem an essential characteristic for shaping a substantial part of 

future U.S. military might to include both qualitative and quantitative criteria. But, as in the case of the aircraft carrier, the expense 

of obtaining flexibility is likely to lead to buying fewer numbers of 

more capable, expensive platforms and, if readiness remains a priority, of fielding fewer well-trained forces. 

The method for deriving future force structure choices is clearcut. First, answers to the three broad questions are bounded by 

the fiscal and political realities. These constraints in turn bound 

the realistic and practical universe for choice. 

Second, within these boundaries, a range of options and alternatives within each set of the eight components of force structure 

can be identified. Specific options and alternatives can be married 

up and matched across all eight components. Depending upon which 

priorities and preferences are set, the products can be combined 

into separate force structures. 

Third, these separate force structures can be analyzed on a costbenefit, risk-reward basis. Part of this analysis must include not 

only what missions or tasks can be successfully undertaken and at 

what costs, but also what missions must be forgone, diminished, or 

ranked as uncertain. 

The strategic and operational rationale for force structure can 

be sensibly based on a combination of historical experience and the 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 121 

assumptions of the Bottom-Up Review. During the Cold War, the 

United States waged three "hot wars," all in concert with at least a 

few allies. In Korea in 1950, Vietnam during the late 1960s, and 

the Persian Gulf in 1991, the United States deployed about half a 

million active-duty personnel. With the demise of the USSR, it is 

logical and commonsensical to assume that any crises for the foreseeable future will be regional and that deployment of a half million or so troops seems an upper limit. The BUR specified two 

nearly simultaneous crises for planning purposes. For the moment, 

whether the U.S. could or could not "win" such a simultaneous requirement is a secondary issue. For example, depending upon the 

necessary military power to achieve the aims of the campaign, a 

second crisis could be tied to mobilization, the commitment of allies, and some form of Congressional action authorizing those steps. 

Hence, in this view, the criterion of half a million troops or less and 

some means, either direct or indirect, to deal with a second crisis 

offers a starting point for defining force structure. 

The level of capability and force structure that is politically 

and economically sustainable and justifiable is principally a 

function of the level of defense spending the nation will pay either 

grudgingly or willingly given its other priorities. This amount is a 

political expression reflecting the general perception of external 

threat and the economic consequences of the budgetary and fiscal 

state of affairs of the nation. Even if large deficits persist indefinitely, the economics of GDP and the budget suggest that a certain 

level of annual defense spending will be sustainable. Common sense 

suggests the same logic applies to maintaining some military capability. The public understands that the nation needs substantial 

military forces. It also appreciates that defense spending has already been cut nearly in half from the Cold War level--one of the 

only federal programs to endure real spending reductions and not 

just limits to the rate of growth. For the moment, the Clinton administration assumes (as did the Bush administration) that the public 

will support defense spending at no more than the 4-percent range 

of GDP. This suggests that $150 billion to $250/270 billion (in 1994 

dollars) per year in defense spending is an appropriately realistic and 

likely future boundary for defense, assuming no crisis intervenes. 

A further measure of this spending boundary is derived from 

the implicit and inherent judgment of the public and Congress about 
122 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

how much military might is needed. Too low a level, as in the late 

1970s, and the public will register its concern. Too high a level and 

the public will not support that amount of might, absent a crisis. 

Bush determined a base force of 1.6 million; Clinton selected a force 

of 1.4 million. Since 1990, a number of polls and public samplings 

have attempted to construct how little military might the nation 

would tolerate and what general level it would support. In line 

with the other criteria, these findings suggest and reinforce spending of $150 billion to $250 billion per year, or about 2.5 to 3.5 percent of GDP. 42 However, the choice of fully funding the BUR must 

also be considered as the upper boundary. 

From this fiscal boundary of annual spending levels and, 

depending upon the force structure selected, as noted, an active-duty 

force structure of between 750,000 and 1.4 million personnel seems 

a plausible, affordable, and realistic range for further assessment. 43 

Against these fiscal and manning boundaries, alternative division of resources among sea-, land-, air-, and space-based forces 

and among the eight specific, technical components can be analyzed and set. Because several of the eight criteria can be used as 

further subsets of the broader force structure choices, to avoid a 

circularity in analysis, the most relevant start point is to set the 

"functional assignment and balance of forces." This can crudely be 

called the degree to which we choose between or balance garrison 

or land-based and maritime or sea-based forces. 

There are four basic approaches to force structure. First is a 

continuation of the BUR force structure as prorated among the 

services, called the BUR force extended. The structure is predicated on responding to the MRCs, as is the current plan. Second is 

a "garrison force," largely land based in the United States and, selectively, overseas. These land-based forces, mostly Army and Air 

Force, would be deployed out of their garrisons in Europe, the Middle 

East, and elsewhere in times of crisis. A smaller Navy and 

42 These measures were first documented in my book In Harm's Way: 

American Seapower in the 21st Century (Bartleby Press, 1991, p. 280). 

43 Part III addresses the third question, regarding the safe and and sensible transition from today's force structure to that of tomorrow. 
PART II: "~A.ND THE, GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 123 

Marine Corps would be required and used in a supporting role as 

there would be minimum threats to sea lines of communication, 

and the prospect of large-scale amphibious assault would be replaced by friendly and secure land-based facilities into which to 

deploy land forces. Strike against the shore could be handled primarily by the Air Force and advanced precision weapons, with the 

Navy largely in a supporting role. 

The fundamental shortcoming of the garrison force is inflexibility. 

Permanent land-based deployments to new or other regions would 

require an extensive and expensive infrastructure, certainly well 

above what is currently available in Europe, the Persian Gulf, and 

Korea. If emphasis on "heavy" land forces continued, combined 

with land bases likely to be exclusively within the United States, a 

"muscle-bound" garrison military dependent on these bases could 

easily result. For critics who wish to prevent future administrations from succumbing to the evils of misapplying military force, a 

"muscle-bound" garrison might make sense. However, if military 

power is to serve as a real policy tool, this type of inflexibility would 

probably not be in our interest. Hence, a posture that creates and 

exploits flexibility seems preferential. 

The third approach is the maritime force with principal reliance 

on naval forces supported by land-based forces. The flexibility 

of maritime forces, their independence from many of the umbilical cords of shore basing, the likelihood that many or most crises will not occur in areas where substantial numbers of land forces 

are based or can be swiftly inserted, and the prospect that the uncertain future will not and should not require the U.S. to deploy 

much more than a full corps (100,000 personnel) constitute the 

principal arguments for this option. 

The maritime force, while perhaps more logical and intuitively 

obvious given the changed circumstances of this era of strategic 

uncertainty, would require major changes within DOD in reallocating priorities. This could lead to a stifling interservice rivalry 

and pernicious results for the nation. 

The fourth force structure is based on reconstitution. In this case, 

the U.S. would retain a smaller or even residual "base force" with 

limited capability but sufficient to deal with most crises on a consecutive or one-at-a-time basis. Larger or multiple crises would require 
124 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CzNr~" 

mobilization. The arguments for this choice rest on the grounds that 

the likelihood of one or even two major future contingencies occurring 

is slim, there is likely to be sufficient warning time, and the savings 

that would accrue from defense would provide a larger amount of 

public good to the nation. 

The reconstitution choice could be seen as an example of 

American retrenchment. Geostrategically and geopolitically, the 

consequences would tend to exacerbate uncertainty and possibly instability with the demise or decay of U.S. leadership. 

An additional variant is noted although, for reasons that follow, is not recommended. Analysts have suggested that the U.S. 

posture a significant part of its forces for peacekeeping and related 

tasks. In other words, if a 2 MRC scenario were maintained, the 

second MRC could entail peacekeeping functions. Given the enormity of those tasks if Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda required U.S. forces, 

the total numbers of U.S. troops involved could reach into the hundreds of thousands. 

Little discussion, thus far, has focused on nuclear force levels. 

The reason is straightforward. The United States has so many 

nuclear weapons and systems in place that the question is not one 

of numbers. The nuclear issue rests in maintaining a nuclear production facility for sustaining current and future systems and in 

dismantling large numbers of unnecessary systems. The subject is 

best handled as part of the industrial and technical base. 

Within these boundaries of budget, numbers, and assignment 

and balance of mission and forces is the broader issue of readiness. 

There are three basic approaches to readiness. The first is to continue to keep high levels of readiness across most of the active-duty 

forces and, selectively depending upon mobilization assumptions, in 

reserve units. The notion underlying this policy is that high readiness throughout creates a more effective force. Operationally, forces 

are better trained and can be replaced or rotated with minimum 

negative effects. Esprit de corps and morale would be enhanced by 

the knowledge that there is only a first team. And, from experience, this has been an effective way to ensure the best operational 

return from the forces. 

The major problem with maximizing readiness is that budget 

realities and constraints are likely to make this outcome the most 
PARr If: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 125 

difficult to achieve. Force levels are unlikely to be cut enough to 

pay for maximizing readiness, and an ever-tightening spiral of reductions exacerbating reductions could follow. 

The second approach is a"staggered" readiness system in which 

forces are made selectively ready depending upon operational tasking. In this case, for example, a third of the forces would be close to 

fully ready. These forces would be both deployed and immediately 

deployable. A third or so would be at the 50- to 75-percent level 

requiring three to six months to be brought to full readiness. These 

forces would constitute an immediate strategic reserve. The last 

third would be at only low levels and require six to twelve months for 

rejuvenation. After twelve months, the reserves would be called on. 

This concept of staggered readiness has a further variant. From 

within the active forces, a "core force" could be established. The 

definition for this force is the absolute minimum below which military leaders would not go in terms of having an operationally 

deployable and effective force. The remaining forces outside the 

"core" would be kept at whatever levels of readiness the budget 

would afford and therefore form the "fiscally flexible" part of the 

force that would absorb shortfalls in spending. 

Staggered readiness, although highly rational, would require 

extraordinary planning and incentives to overcome the rigid system of high readiness imposed on the ethos and psyche of the forces. 

Third is to adopt a reconstitution strategy that would pursue a 

"force-in-being" in which the overall readiness levels are kept fairly 

low with a few exceptions for emergency or rapid-reaction situa~ 

tions. A larger force and infrastructure could be maintained under 

this option. Reconsitution is feasible only if and when there is no 

sense of danger and the nation is prepared to accept fewer forces in 

favor of such a strategy. 

Finally, "roles and missions" requires serious examination. The 

"roles and missions" issue has a long, highly controversial, provocative, and emotional history within the Department of Defense. 

In Congress, however, given the end of the Soviet threat, "roles and 

missions" provides both a sensible framework on which to assess 

the merits and demerits of a proposed defense budget and a bureaucratic means of attempting to impose control over the future 

direction of DOD. The areas within roles and missions that have 
126 I.~ IRONS: US. MILITARY MmHr IN TnZ NEW C~NTVRY 

usually evoked the greatest difficulty and debate have been strategic 

bombardment, tactical aviation, air defense, and the distinctions between the Army and the Marine Corps. A common criticism of Congress, notably echoed by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn, for example, is the charge that the U.S. really has 

four air forces--one each for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and, of 

course, the Air Force. 

As General Colin Powell noted in his report to Congress on reviewing roles and missions in 1992, complementarity should be 

preserved and redundancy eliminated. In other words, if air defense over the battlefield is necessary, it makes little sense to change 

the uniforms of the personnel whose job it is to achieve that mission. If the fleet requires air defense at sea, what is the value of 

keeping that mission but assigning it to another service? At the 

time of this book's publication, Congress has directed the establishment of a roles-and-missions commission to offer recommendations for continuity and for change. 

While restructuring roles and missions will have the most profound implications for force structure, that approach is not used 

here. First, the disciplines required in assessing force structure 

based on choices favoring garrison forces, maritime forces, and reconstitution forces and on budgets at $200 billion and $150 billion 

per year will resolve many of the possible redundancies that may 

exist in roles and missions but from a different perspective. Second, in my judgment, the roles-and-missions review is best served 

by close examination of the requirements of the battlefield and of 

crisis situations. If large or smaller sectors like air defense or forcible entry can be reduced or should be strengthened, those findings 

are relevant to determining what will be funded and what will not. 

As will be shown, this appears to be a more realistic means ofimplementing an effective and affordable force structure. 

Taken together, the results of the earlier analyses show the 

range of possible force structures measured against funding, manning, readiness, and basing alternatives, as shown in table 20. 

Against this table and the range and boundaries of choices and 

realities, the levels or rates of sustainability, modernization, forward 

deployment, and dependence on international organizations or alliances will be injected. This will provide a comprehensive and integrated set of options and alternatives that ultimately will form 

whatever future force structure results either by choice or default. 
PART II: "AND TEE. GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 127 

Table 20. The universe of future U.S. military might 

h BUR force fully funded at $270-280 billion per year (current dollars) 

1.4 million active-duty force (approximate numbers) 

• Army 450,000 15 divisions 

• Navy 420,000 12 carriers, 340350 ships 

• Marine Corps 179,000 3 expeditionary forces 

• Air Force 400,000 20 tactical fighter wings and up to 184 bombers 

II, Alternative Choices and Budgets 

Annual budget: $150 billion $200 billion $250 billion 

Active forces: 0.75 million 1 million 1.2 million 

BURforce extended • Army 225,000 

(assumes • Navy 220,000 

maximum • Marines 90,000 

readiness) • Air Force 215,000 

Garrison force • Army 280,000 

(assumes • Navy 180,000 

maximum • Marines 50,000 

readiness) • Air Force 240,000 

Maritime force • Army 180,000 

(assumes • Navy 280,000 

maximum • Marines 120,000 

readiness) • Air Force 170,000 

• Army 310,000 • Army 370,000 

• Navy 290,000 • Navy 350,000 

• Marines 130,000 • Marines 140,000 

• Air Force 270,000 • Air Force 340,000 

• Army 400,000 • Army 450,000 

• Navy 220,000 • Navy 250,000 

• Marines 80,000 • Marines 100,000 

• Air Force 300,000 • Air Force 400,000 

• Army 220,000 • Army 290,000 

• Navy 400,000 • Navy 450,000 

• Marines 150,000 • Marines 180,000 

• Air Force 230,000 • Air Force 280,000 

• Staggered 

readiness 

• Reconstitution 

For each of the spending levels, forces would be placed in one of 

three categories: fully ready; partial; and reserve. For example, 

Fully ready: 50% of the force 

Partial readiness: 25% of the force 

(i.e., 3-6 months to bring to full readiness) 

Reserve readiness: 25% of the force 

(i.e., more than 6 months to bring to full readiness) 

or some combination of the above 

Since.the bulk of the force structure would be dependent upon 

reconstitution, no attempt is made to show a quantitative assignment of 

forces to any categories either by service or degree of readiness. 
128 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY M1C, HT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Several initial conclusions flow from the above and the interaction 

between and among these defense components. First, perhaps the 

most vital is identifying what each force structure can reasonably 

expect to achieve operationally and what it cannot. Indeed, in this 

decision-making process of defining a future force, it is strategically wisest to focus first on determining both the ability and inability to conduct tasks. From that consideration, one can work 

back to the appropriate force structure. 

Second, in all cases of the garrison and maritime forces, assuming the "core force" concept applies, there would be sufficient 

capability to respond to a single Desert Storm, MRC type of action. 

Depending upon the magnitude of a second contingency and the 

degree of simultaneity required, the maritime force at all budget 

levels provides more capability, with one exception: if the garrison 

force has stationed forces in large numbers where the second contingency occurred, the outcome is about the same. 

Third, the differences among these four force options are clear. 

The BUR force extended makes the most sense if the assumption 

is to preserve the traditional balance and distribution of resources 

among the services. The garrison force makes greatest sense if the 

guess is correct and forces are predeployed to the regions of crisis. 

The maritime force fits the era of strategic uncertainty best when 

flexibility in responding to crises is paramount. The reconstitution force fits best when warning or lead time is great and when 

the nation is prepared to respond over the long term. 

Finally, these force structures must be matched, mixed, and 

compared against the other ingredients that make up the threat, 

strategy, force structure, budget, and infrastructure balance. 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 129 

C~ SEVEN: Co~, D~LOYM~, AND PRESENCE 

Commitments are the obligations of any state, tacit or otherwise, to make good on protecting, demonstrating, or advancing its 

interests. Interests are usually defined by need, tradition, declared 

doctrine, law, and treaty, and broadly encompass matters of national security and foreign policy. Deployments are the physical 

means of sending or stationing forces abroad either on a permanent or part-time basis as required by commitments or the broader 

national interest. Presence is the principal military mechanism 

for demonstrating, underwriting, and symbolizing these commitments. While requiring the physical deployment or stationing of 

forces "overseas," the success or failure of presence generally depends on perceptual and even metaphysical measures of how well 

or badly political and military influence are exerted or neutralized. 

During the Cold War, the commitments of and by the United 

States were defined by the broad concepts and accompanying collective security arrangements designed to deter and contain the 

threat and spread of communism. Technically and legally, these 

security alliances and the establishing treaties could not bypass 

Congress and automatically commit the United States to war in 

the event of direct Soviet or communist military attack. A formal 

and legal declaration of war by the U.S. Congress was still required. 

However, the American commitment symbolized by the presence 

of U.S. forward-based and deployed military forces was a compelling guarantee and assurance that more than compensated for any 

lack of automaticity in going to war. 44 The challenge and dilemma 

for policy, then and now, continues to rest in converting commitments 

into credible and appropriate physical guarantees and terms that 

can be expressed in the currency of military force. 

There never has been and never will be any formula to convert 

these commitments and obligations into absolute guarantees or 

precise numbers of troops or military capabilities. The process for 

making this conversion is therefore inexact, normally arcane, and 

often circular as interests, commitments, and force requirements 

44 Given what happened in August 1914 when a series of secret treaties 

automatically made war inevitable through guaranteed declarations to 

fight, this was not a bad arrangement. 
130 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

become interchangeable and, more frequently, drive each other, 

sometimes in conflicting directions. The absence of a major threat 

or any single basis for establishing national security needs is the 

greatest limitation to using interests and commitments as yardsticks for defining appropriate levels of necessary military force. 

In the United States, the responsibility for converting many of 

these commitments into specific requirements for forces, force structure, and overseas deployments and presence begins with the major 

military commanders in the field. These commanders in chief must 

estimate their wartime needs--today measured against abstract or 

nominal threats rather than the more folznidable and concrete Soviet 

order of battle and set peacetime requirements to deal with routine 

and contingency operations, all against the background of what the 

political realities in Washington might accept or reject. These operational requirements are passed through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

Chairman, and Secretary of Defense and coordinated with the other 

pertinent departments, including State, Justice, and the intelligence 

community. The White House may formally interject itself to change 

or set particular needs, such as ordering more naval ships into the 

Indian Ocean aider the Tehran embassyhad been seized in 1979. Normally, however, the Defense Department determines the forces needed 

to meet the commitments. In any event, the annual defense budget 

becomes the ultimate and de facto approval mechanism for the commitments by funding or not funding the level of forces for carrying out 

these operational responsibilities. 

It is useful to note in snapshot form how U.S. commitments, 

deployments, and presence have varied over the years. Between 

July 1, 1948, and June 30, 1949, about 252,000 Army personnel 

were stationed overseas and about 400,000 were stationed in the 

U.S. (tables 21 and 22). Twenty years later, and obviously affected 

by the war in Vietnam, U.S. military overseas presence and deployments were as shown in table 23. 45 Table 24 shows deployments 

and overseas presence during the past decade. 46 

45 SecDefAnnual Report 1968, p. 514. 

46 SecDefAnnual Report 1949, p. 142. Naval forces were also forward 

deployed at about the same ratio. 
PART II: "AND THE, GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 131 

Table 21. A companson of m~orta~icalunits ofthe Army as of July 1,1948, 

and June 30,1949 a 

July 1, 1948 June 30, 1949 

10 divisions (7 overseas) 

3 infantry regimental combat teams 

(2 overseas) 

5 infantry regiments (all overseas) 

1 armored cavalry group 

(in U.S.) 

1 engineer special brigade (in U.S.) 

13 antiaircraft battalions (11 overseas) 

United States constabulary 

(in Germany, Austria) 

10 divisions (5 overseas) 

5 infantry regimental combat teams 

(3 overseas) 

2 infantry regiments (both overseas) 

4 armored cavalry regiments 

(3 overseas) 

1 engineer special brigade (in U.S.) 

43 antiaircraft battalions (14 overseas) 

United States constabulary 

(in Germany, Austria) 

a No formal alliance outside the western hemisphere and the Rio Pact was in place, 

and presence was largely through the occupation of the defeated enemies during 

the process of democratization. The most important major changes were the buildup of the General Reserve, the movement of troops within and from the Far East 

command, the reorganization of the constabulary, and the designation of United States 

Forces, Austria, as a separate command. 

Table 22. A comparison of major tactical units located in the continental 

United States as of July 1, 1948, and June 30, 1949 

July 1,1948 June 30,1949 

82d Airborne Division 

2d Infantry Division 

2d Armored Division (1 combat 

command only) 

7th Infantry Regimental Combat Team 

3d Cavalry Group 

2d Engineer Special Brigade 

2 antiaircraft battalions 

82d Airborne Division 

11th Airborne Division 

(less 1 regiment) 

2d Infantry Division 

3d Infantry Division 

2d Armored Division 

14th Infantry Regimental 

Combat Team 

3d Armored Cavalry Regiment 
132 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Table 23. A comparison of military personnel--June 30, 1967, and June 30, 1968 

(percentages listed in parentheses) 

Department Marine Air 

of Defense Army Navy Corps Force 

Shore activities: a 

June 30, 1967 3,027,902 1,442,498 410,505 277,405 897,494 

(89.7) (100.0} (54.6) (97.2) (100.0) 

June 30, 1968 3,277,018 1,570,343 452,108 299,717 904,850 

(91.0) (100.0) (59.1) (97.5) (100.0) 

Continental U.S.: 

June 30, 1967 1,868,339 766,414 317,689 170,144 614,092 

(55.3) (53.1) (42.6) (59.6) (68.4) 

June 30, 1968 2,029,079 890,546 345,562 193,622 599,349 

(57.2) (56.7) (45.2) (63.0) (66.2) 

Outside continental U.S.: 

June 30, 1967 1,159,563 676,084 92,816 107,261 283,402 

(34.4) (46.9) (12.3) (37.6) (31.6) 

June 30, 1968 1,197,939 679,797 106,546 106,095 305,501 

(33.8) (43.3) (13.9) (34.5) (33.8) 

Afloat and mobile activities: 

June 30, 1967 348,978 -- 341,114 7,864 

(10.3) (45.4) (2.8) 

June 30, 1968 320,884 -- 313,349 7,535 

(9.0) (40.9) (2.4) 

Total: 

June 30, 1967 3,376,880 1,442,498 751,619 285,269 897,494 

(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 

June 30, 1968 3,547,902 1,570,343 765,457 307,252 904,850 

(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 

a Includes Navy activities temporarily based ashore. 
PART H: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 133 

Table 24. U.S. military personnel in foreign a~ 1981 to FY 1992 (in thousands) 

81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 a 

Germany 

Other Europe 

Europe, afloat 

South Korea 

Japan 

Other Pacific 

Pacific, afloat 

(including 

Southeast Asia) 

Latin America/ 

Caribbean 

Miscellaneous 

248 256 254 254 247 250 251 249 249 228 203 168 

64 67 70 73 75 75 73 74 71 64 62 58 

25 33 18 25 36 33 31 33 21 18 20 17 

38 39 39 41 42 43 45 46 44 41 40 39 

46 51 49 46 47 48 50 50 50 47 45 47 

16 15 15 16 16 17 18 17 16 15 9 8 

25 33 34 18 20 20 17 28 25 16 11 16 

12 11 14 13 12 13 13 15 21 20 19 20 

27 23 27 25 20 26 27 29 13 160 b 39 20 

Total c 502 528 520 511 515 525 524 541 510 609 448 393 

a AS of March 31, 1992. 

b Includes 118,000 shore-based and 39,000 afloat in support of Desert Storm. 

c Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding. 

In general, these deployments, certainly since the late 1950s, 

reflected U.S. commitments to deal globally with the USSR and 

Chinese threats and conformed with the alliance arrangements 
134 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEw CENTURY 

shown in figure 10. 47 This chart dates back to 1959. Although the 

ANZUS Pact and the treaty with the Republic of China are no longer 

in force, U.S. commitments have conformed with and continue to 

conform with this structure of the Cold War. 

Figure 10. United States collective security arrangements 

I I U.S, and countries with which 

it has mutual defense treaties 

~ Communist bloc 

• North AtlsnticTreaty 

United States, Canada, Iceland. Norway. United Kingdom. 

Nethedar~s, Denmark. BeJgium, Luxambourg, Portugal, 

France, Italy. Greece, Turkey, Spain (Signed Apdl 4. 1949) 

O U.S. bilateral treaties with 

O Republic of Chula (Taiwan) (Defunct) 

O PhUippinee 

O Republic of Korea 

O Japan 

• Japanese Treaty 

United States, Japan (Signed Jan. 19, 1960) 

• Repubtlc of KoreaTreaty 

• ANZUSTreety United States, Republic of Korea (Signed Oct. 1, 1953) 

United States, New Zealand, Australia (Signed Sept. 1, 1951: • RIoTreaty 

as of Sept. 17, 1986, the United States suspended treaty United States, Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican RepubJic, 

obligations between the United States and New Zealand.) Honduras, Guatemala, El Saivador, Nicaragua. Costa 

Rica, Panama, Coloml~a. Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, 

• Phnlpplne Treaty Brazil. Bolivia. Paraguay, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, 

United States. Philippines (S~gned Aug. 30, 1951) Trinidad and Tobago, Bahamas (Signed Sept. 2, 1947) 

• Southeast AsleTraaty 

United States, United Kingdom, France, New Zealand, 

Australia, Philippines, Thailand (sig,"~:l Sept. 8, 1954) 

Figures 11 and 12 and table 25 show the number and location 

of major overseas U.S. bases since World War II and serve as an 

approximation of the quantitative extent of U.S. commitments, 

47 SecDefAnnual Report 1959, p. 80. 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WSND STILL BLEW" 135 

deployments, and military presence over those years. 4s The last 

charts in this series (figures 13 and 14) show the location of major 

U.S. units that follow from the BUR. 

Figure 11. Base site establishment dates: Europe 

(fJ 

~9 

.C} 

"6 

E 

Z 

800 - 

800 - 

400 

200 

[] WWII 

[] After 1947 

i • 

1947 1949 1953 

/ 

~lll/ 

711/~ 

..... "i'//,~ 

(~((( ..... 

~11~ i/ill 

1957 1967 

Year 

ii#11 

"1111., 

~/I/, 

))))9 

///// 

lil/i 

1975 

r 

lllil 

~llll 

11111 

iiiii 

ilill 

i1~11 

7///I 

i1#11 

11111 

1985 

////i 

///// 

Y///~ 

1988 

Figure 12. Base site establishment dates: Asia/Pacific 

O9 

(D 

~9 

o 

E 

Z 

400 -- 

300 

2O0 

100 

i 

1947 

/ 

i 

1949 1953 1957 1967 

Year 

[] wwll 

[] After 1947 

1975 1985 1988 

48 James R. Blaker, United States Overseas Basing, Praeger, New York, 

1970, pp. 40 and 41. 
136 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT fN THE NEW CENTURY 

Table 25. DOD defense military installations and properties used by U.S. forces 

in foreign areas, September 1991 

Army Navy Air Force Marines Total 

Australia 0 1 1 0 2 

Belgium 1 0 0 0 1 

Bermuda 0 1 0 0 1 

Canada 0 1 0 0 1 

Cuba 0 1 0 0 1 

Diego Garcia 0 1 0 0 1 

Germany, Federal Republic of 15 0 8 0 23 

Greece 0 0 1 0 1 

Greenland 0 0 1 0 1 

Iceland 0 1 0 0 1 

Italy 2 2 2 0 6 

Japan 2 6 3 3 14 

Korea, Republic of 4 0 2 0 6 

Netherlands 1 0 1 0 2 

Panama 1 2 1 0 4 

Philippines 0 3 0 0 3 

Portugal 0 0 1 0 1 

Spain 0 1 1 0 2 

Turkey 2 0 4 0 6 

United Kingdom 1 3 10 0 14 

Total 29 23 36 3 91 
PARr II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH ~IND STILL BLEW" 137 

Figure 13. Location of major Navy and Marine Corps units (as of Oct. 1, 1992) 

I Total Force 417 ships I 

3 Marine Expeditionary Forces 

3 Maritime Prepositloning 

Squadrons 

Underway: 175 (42%) 

5 aircraft carriers 

6 helicopter-carrying amphibiou~ ships 

Deployed: 87 (21%) 

3 carrier battle groups 

4 Amphibious Ready Group~J4 Marine 

Expeditionary Units 

12 excercises ongoing with 14 countries and 

port visits to 10 countries 

.-1 .Mari.ne E_xpeditl<?r)ary Fo=rce 

Counterdrugs 

7 ships 

4 combatants 

I sub 

2 surveillance 

ships 

Atlantic 

70 ships 

3 carriers 

1 Marine 

Expeditionary 

Unit 

25 combatants 8 am~ibs _ 

(incluc~ng z 

helo carrying) 

17 subs 

17 support u~ts 

"MPS 1 

Mediterranean 

19 ships 

I carrier 

8 combatants 

4 subs 

6 support units 

::~ Indian Ocean/ 

Red Sea/ 

Arabian Gulf 

25 ships 

1 carrier 

2 Marine 

Expedil~onary 

Units 

9 combatants 

8 amphibs 

(inclu~ng 2 

helo carrying) 

1 sub 

Pacific 

54 ships 

1 Marine 

Expeditionary 

Force 

1 Marine 

Expeo~onary 

U~ 

14 combatants 

12 amphibs 

(including 2 

halo carrying) 

13 subs 
138 IN IRONS: V.8. i~:~ILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Figure 14. Deployment of U.S. divisions (as of January 1, 1993) 

~y, MA 

Ft. Oral, 

.me, NO 

I~'" L2) Red .~ 

[Y:. ~ Oktnawa, (A) I e: L=j japa~ 

[ T~:~. deployed~n Hawaii 

Army 

(~ Active 

National Guard 

Marine 

[] Active 

~ Reserve 

~barracks 

Divisions 

Armor ~ Air Assault 

Mechanized ~ Airborne 

~ Infantry ~; Marine 

Europe ,;~: ;;!~ :;~. '~t 

~'~<:Y4:~'~ :~'~ , '~ " ~'~ "I 

NOTE: Indicates official inactivations/activations/conversions as of January 1, 

1993. 

One consequence of the current regime of commitments and 

the resulting operational requirements for deployments and presence is the enormous demand on the forces to fill these requirements. Even though the USSR is gone, the "operations tempo"-- 

that is, the time units are deployed or are on active service away 

from home bases--is about as high as any time during the Cold 
PART I1: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH "~IND STILL BLEW" 139 

War outside of specific crises. This pace of operations can have 

debilitating effects of the first order on morale, retention, and "hollowness" as personnel are frustrated, bored, or worn down by spending so much time away from home without the obvious reason as to 

why such demands are vital to defending the country. Hence, the 

current high tempo of U.S. operating forces is a symptom of a progression to a future condition of "in irons." Using the Navy as an 

example, and recognizing that the size of the Navy is shrinking, 

the days under way per quarter (120 days) over the past 20 years 

are an indication of these operational demands (table 26). 

Table 26. OPTEMPO history by fleet (days under way per quarter) 

2nd 3rd 6th 7th 

FY (East Coast) (West Coast) (Mediterranean) (Pacific) 

75 26.0 27.0 40.0 45.0 

76 26.0 24.0 44.0 45.0 

77 28.0 27.0 45.0 45.0 

78 31.1 27.0 47.8 45.0 

79 28.5 27.0 47.8 48.3 

80 30.2 27.6 57,1 55.8 

81 31.0 25.9 61.0 53.9 

82 31.0 27.0 61.1 54.1 

83 28.8 25.2 59.9 51.0 

84 30.7 25.2 67.4 52.6 

85 29.7 25.1 52.9 54.2 

86 26.1 27.6 50.6 50.4 

87 28.1 25.9 52.8 53.5 

88 28.6 24.4 51.8 54.7 

89 28.7 27.5 53.8 53.4 

90 29.1 27.2 55.1 53.3 

91 30.4 27.3 58.7 54.9 

92 28.7 30.1 51.2 55.8 

Fundamental questions and issues must be addressed in defining future requirements for U.S. commitments, deployments, and 

presence. Strategic uncertainty and the end of the USSR have 

circumvented the sharpness and clarity of earlier rationale for establishing the criteria for the numbers and location of U.S. forwardbased forces. Without a threat as powerful and obvious as the FSU, 

new security frameworks embraced by such slogans as the "new 
140 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

world order" and thc "dangers" of regional instability have thus far 

proven hollow in advancing a politically acceptable rationale for 

national security. The reasons for this disconnect between strategic rationale and policy action extend beyond the absence of a single, 

plausible threat. 

First, the rationale for national security and accompanying 

military needs built on only an implicit (or commonsensical) basis 

will simply not be either credible or acceptable unless there is adequate public support and consensus for those conclusions. The 

public and Congress intuitively question the need to maintain what 

appears to be a largely Cold War posture now that the Cold War is 

history. Indeed, even within the two most recent U.S. administrations, many have voiced concern over the level of U.S. commitments, deployments, and presence. And, as events in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti have underscored, U.S. military presence in those 

regions is unpopular both here and there and is not flush with stories of success. 

Second, geostrategy and power politics mattered in the Cold 

War. Because of the breadth of the Soviet threat and its vast military capability, U.S. geostrategic responses could not ignore Russian and Warsaw Pact numbers. The size of any response counted, 

and the U.S. reckoned that commitments, deployments, and presence had to be both large enough and seen as such by allies and 

adversaries alike to be credible deterrents to Soviet ambitions. 

Rarely, as in the British experience of the 19th century, would a 

single gunboat suffice when, perhaps months after a misdeed, the 

full force of the fleet could be brought to bear on a miscreant. Furthermore, the realities of geography that placed Russia astride 

Europe and Asia and made America distant from its allies shaped 

the nature of U.S. commitments, deployments, and presence. Thus, 

many Americans were stationed and deployed overseas during the 

Cold War. But those days are over. 

Third, in the post-Cold War world, there is neither the popular 

consensus yet for defining specific commitments, deployments, and 

presence nor political agreement on how much or how little military 

capability is necessary and credible to underwrite a future regime 

for U.S. military overseas activities. Continuation of the Cold War 

order and security structure but with fewer U.S. forces appears to 
PA~'~" II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 141 

be the policy. Thus, NATO has been "redefined and refocused," and 

U.S. military forces stationed in NATO countries cut from 300,000 

or 400,000 during the Cold War to 100,000 or less. Whether that 

level is politically and strategically sustainable and what 

U.S. commitments and force levels are needed in other regions remain open questions. The relevance of military force in resolving 

inherently non-military or immediately unsolvable problems further confuses the attempt to define U.S. commitments, deployments, 

and presence in a politically or strategically satisfactory manner. 

During the Cold War, the U.S. commitment to protect and defend 

friends and allies ultimately meant war if direct Soviet aggression or 

attack took place. Today, where is a U.S. commitment leading to war 

likely to occur? To be sure, a rejuvenated Russian military threat 

could return NATO to its earlier raison d'etre. And an attack by 

North Korea into the South most certainly would involve the United 

States in that conflict. However, the ultimate commitment by the 

U.S. to a real war as opposed to a military intervention seems to be 

decidedly less relevant or likely in a world without a Soviet threat. 

The question of whether the U.S. might or might not go to war to 

prevent or contain nuclear proliferation is perhaps the single caveat, and North Korea could prove to be the test case. 

Deployments, of course, conform to national commitments. 

Permanent deployment of ground and air forces (even though troops 

are rotated in and out) and robust deployment of mobile forces-- 

usually maritime, but, as in the case of the annual NATO reinforcement exercise "Reforger" and the "Bright Star" exercises in 

the Middle East, sometimes including ground and air forces--were 

givens during the Cold War. Commitments set the general requirements 

for war and peace and were manifested through these permanent 

and rotational deployments culminating in presence. This physical presence was meant to demonstrate and symbolize intent and 

interest while possibly exerting or denying political influence. Indeed, the Clinton administration has explicitly set "presence" as 

one of the major requirements to be met by U.S. forces. 

The ideas behind military presence are not obscure. Physical 

presence is meant to be reassuring to friends and, up to a point, 

frightening to adversaries. The symbolism of presence and whatever advantages accrue from having forward-deployed forces ready 
142 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

and available for the unforeseen remain central supporting components 

of this argument. With forces present on station, in general terms, 

a quick-reaction response to problems either in or near the region 

is available. And military force has often been used by the United 

States in many so-called post-war "crises" or instances where 

U.S. forces had been pre-deployed. However, despite these advantages, the costs of maintaining forward presence are not small. 

Among these costs are the domestic political considerations of convincing a majority of Americans that overseas presence is as good 

a use or an even better use of dollars that could be spent at home. 

The Clinton administration has explained that U.S. foreign 

policy is one of "engagement" and that it is based on extending 

"partnership" arrangements to new and old friends, particularly in 

the FSU. What these terms will mean in practice is uncertain. 

Current U.S. foreign policy remains largely an extension and continuation of the Bush foreign and security policy that, despite the 

"base force" and"bottom-up" reviews, still retains much of the structure of the Cold War. 

Commitments, deployments, and presence must be regulated 

by the larger strategy and strategic choices and, obviously, by the 

resources and force structure that are provided for and are available to the nation's defense. It is demonstrably unwise to maintain an extensive set of commitments unrelated to strategy and 

unconnected to the forces necessary to honor those commitments. 

On the other hand, too much silence on the issue of commitments, 

even with overwhelming force available, does not always lead to 

good policy. 49 Because it is entirely unlikely and impractical for 

the United States to retreat into a "fortress America," U.S. commitments and capabilities must rest on careful and purposeful balance of interests, strategic objectives, and available resources. 

The three broad choices posited earlier are useful departure points 

for defining future requirements for commitments, deployments, and 

49 It can be argued that Secretary of State Dean Acheson's public statement in January 1950, which did not specifically mention Korea within the 

U.S. security shield, provided the wrong message and signal to the North 

Korean government in its deliberation of whether to attack South Korea. 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 143 

military presence. "Steady as you go" and "Fully fund the force" 

will demand a future security structure and deployment pattern 

with emphasis on Europe, the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and 

the Pacific. At this stage, it is too soon to know whether and how 

NATO membership will be extended east, thereby extending U.S. 

commitments. Also, the Clinton administration does not seem particularly anxious to reduce overall U.S. commitments, and, under 

the UN mantle, there may be more rather than fewer U.S. military 

personnel involved, particularly if thousands of U.S. troops are required as part of a peace settlement in Bosnia. However, meeting 

these commitments under the funding shortfalls that will occur either will be impossible or will impose fundamental changes elsewhere. 

The "Readjust and change" choice could lead to a wholesale reexamination of U.S. commitments, deployments, and military presence. One possible extreme is for the U.S. to assume a "minimalist" 

posture. In this regard, the United States would retain its bilateral and multilateral treaty arrangements, but, in the post-Cold 

War world, it would reduce the overseas bases and forces it maintains on deployed status. In Europe, a minimalist posture would 

mean the United States could reduce its forces in NATO to a 

symbolic and "trip-wire" level measured in the tens of thousands. 

So too, large-scale presence in Japan and Okinawa would be reduced. Korea could be the subject of negotiations with the North 

in order to link substantial U.S. military withdrawal with assurances for stability and perhaps even more urgent movement 

towards unification or denuclearization. 

A second possibility in making change is for the United States 

to pursue a selective posture for its commitments and deployments. 

In this case, unlike the minimalist posture that leads to reductions 

everywhere, selectivity would be used to emphasize the most important and vital U.S. interests. If the Pacific region were viewed 

as increasing in priority, NATO forces could be reduced to maintain what is presently in place or required in Asia. A Eurocentric 

vision would reverse that priority. Should the U.S. see its interests 

increasing in South America, the Middle East, or under UN mandates, downsizing other commitments would follow to support those 

of higher priority. 
144 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Finally, a changed strategy could still call for an aggressive 

posture of"active engagement." In this regard, U.S. commitments 

could expand to include a NATO with North Atlantic Cooperative 

Council members and peacekeeping tasks in Bosnia or in the Middle 

East as part of the Israeli-PLO peace agreement, and the U.S. would 

expand overseas deployments and presence even at the expense of 

downsizing forces based at home. The logistics of supporting and 

maintaining a policy of "active engagement" would mandate the 

restructuring and redesign of forces as well as changing the stationing policies if a larger percentage of UoS. forces were to be sent 

abroad. The rotation base, that is, the personnel for relieving deployed with non-deployed forces, would be reduced, thereby lengthening service abroad. The members of Congress would have to be 

convinced to support expanded overseas presence while decreasing U.S. basing and spending at home. 

If a policy of default occurs and fully funding the BUR force 

proves impossible, the U.S. faces an inevitable reduction in its military might. In this case, the questions that must be addressed 

deal with balancing future commitments, deployments, and military presence with fewer forces and forces perhaps deployed differently. This leads to three possibilities: 

• Downsize commitments, deployments, and military presence 

to fit the resources 

• Downsize the forces, leaving gaps with the current requirements 

• Innovate or change. 

In the first possibility, both the operational requirements for 

and the commitments themselves would be downsized to fit the 

forces. At the end of the day, this means that fewer U.S. military 

personnel will be stationed abroad on a routine or permanent basis. 

The second possibility is to cut the forces and leave the current 

commitments, deployments, and presence requirements in place, 

depending on mobilization or reconstitution to fill these gaps. However, a series of unchanged requirements reflects permanent objectives and, therefore, offers plausibility and assurance as the size of 

the response is tailored to meet a smaller or larger threat. 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 145 

Third, perhaps the most interesting and most difficult possibility 

is that of innovation or change and, of course, is applicable to each of 

the three broader choices. Innovation can cover parts of the minimalist, 

selective, or active engagement postures noted. Among the prospects 

for innovation are alterations in how we consider the nature and 

modality of deployments and presence (i.e., whether they are permanent, part-time, or flexible); the means (i.e., the types of land, sea, or 

air forces to be used); and new regional frameworks and structures 

for building military cooperation in training, exercising, communicating, and perhaps peacekeeping or crisis-management tasks. With 

the exceptions of future peacekeeping missions perhaps in concert 

with the Israeli-PLO peace arrangement, Haiti, and Bosnia, it is 

unlikely that new, permanent commitments for future deployment 

and presence requirements will be needed. Hence, part-time or 

flexible grounds for innovation appear the most fertile. 

For example, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific could be operated and organized 

around a series of staggered or flexible deployments that are variable both in duration and in the composition of the deployed units. 

This notion of flexible deployments is not new. Alternating or rotating the deployment of sea, land, and air forces is another possibility. 

Suppose a carrier battle group or naval units had been deployed 

to region A for duration Y. In turn, they could be replaced for a 

period of time by a squadron or wing of aircraft operating from 

appropriate facilities and supported by a company or battalion of 

land forces. In this case, the type of force deployed may be less 

important than the fact that some form of military force is being 

used. If the "threat," for example, is seen largely as that of a ballistic missile, assignment of a defensive counter like Patriot might 

provide an appropriate sign of commitment and presence. The logistics 

and difficulties in implementing this type of flexible option cannot be 

ignored, but are not grounds for discarding the concept either. 

Regional frameworks and structures also provide opportunities for innovation. For example, in NATO, the successful 

standing naval forces squadrons for the Atlantic and on-call for 

the Mediterranean could be replicated within the various NATO 

regions. These standing forces could, in essence, be no more than 

permanent staff and unit organizations into which actual forces 
146 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

could be rotated. Presence would be maintained through assignment 

of personnel to these staffs and the actual, though less frequent, 

rotation of sizable forces. The key will be in reducing the size of all 

NATO staffs first and then introducing additional tasks. 

In the Pacific or elsewhere, bilateral or multilateral training 

staffs could be created for the same purpose. On a regularized and 

more frequent basis, forces could be deployed or rotated through 

these regions principally for training but also as nascent peacekeeping forces in which military cooperation and attendant communications would be precursors for actual use or for creation of a 

more formal regional structure. The types of forces to be used in 

this training or exercise structure are far less important than the 

existence of these structures. 

The modalities of alternating or rotating deployed and presence forces must finally rest on an examination of what presence 

can and cannot actually achieve and what presence is meant to 

achieve. For years, particularly in naval circles, presence has had 

a semi-mysterious quality that has been viewed as inherently and 

inarguably useful. In 1970, for example, presence was elevated by 

then head of the Navy Admiral E. R. (Bud) Zumwalt to equal status with the Navy's other three primary missions--deterrence, sea 

control, and power projection. And, in 1993, reinforcing these views 

on presence, the Bottom-Up Review defined the need for forces for 

the presence roles above those required to conduct two MRCs. 

In an era of strategic uncertainty, the qualities of presence may 

or may not prove to be national advantages. Presence provides onscene forces, access to regions of crisis, basic familiarity with these 

regions, certain perhaps preconceived expectations on the part of 

U.S. decision-makers, and attitudes or reactions of states in the 

region to this presence that may or may not exaggerate the role the 

U.S. would assume in crisis. Surely, access and regional familiarity are usually positive factors. However, the presence of on-scene 

forces may still be insufficient for military purposes in time of crisis and could lead to or provoke a military failure; presence may 

require or precipitate a political response simply by virtue of forces 

being there when a response may not be necessary; presence may 

generate expectations of usefulness in the minds of political leaders 

beyond what is possible; and presence may provoke as well as 

reassure local states. 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 147 

There is no formula to prove or guarantee the utility or risk of 

presence in advance, but representative instances of presence and 

crises suggest the range of what might be expected in the future 

regarding utility and risk. In January 1968, North Korea hijacked 

USS Pueblo, then on patrol in international waters off the Korean 

coast. Though conceivably an act of war and with U.S. forces present 

in large numbers nearby in South Korea and Japan but preoccupied by the Vietnam imbroglio, no firm action was taken and the 

presence of U.S. forces provided little value. In May 1975, the 

American-owned ship SS Mayaguez was seized by Cambodian gunboats offthe Cambodian coast. U.S. forces in the region were quickly 

summoned, and two days later, with substantial loss of American 

lives, a U.S. Marine force successfully recaptured the ship and freed 

the crew. Initial U.S. air strikes had convinced the Cambodian 

government to liberate the ship but, sadly, not in time to forestall 

the recapture operation. 

From October 1979 through January 1981, the United States 

increased its presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in 

retaliation for and because of the seizure of the U.S. embassy in 

Tehran. It is doubtful this presence had much salutary effect on 

Iran and the Khomeni leadership. On the other hand, in January 

1991, Somali rebels were threatening the capital of Mogadishu, 

and evacuation of the U.S. embassy was ordered. In a daring night 

rescue, U.S. Marines and Navy Seals from U.S. units distantly 

present in the region as part of Operation Desert Shield flew nearly 

500 miles to effect this evacuation.50 

These three examples are broadly representative of more than 

200 instances of the use of naval force in response to international 

events and crises since 1946 and suggest the limits of what presence can and cannot achieve. Because the U.S. was unwilling or 

unable to apply massive use of force either to recapture or liberate 

Pueblo and its crew or American hostages in Tehran, presence provided 

50 For a review of all incidents of this type since 1986, see Adam B. Siegel, 

The Use of Naval Forces in the Post-War Era: U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine 

Corps Crisis Response Activity, 1946-1990 (Center for Naval Analyses: 

Alexandria, Virginia, Feb 1991). This most useful publication describes 207 

instances of naval use. 
148 IN IRONS: V.S. MZLrrARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

no leverage or utility. In relatively small or minor actions like 

Mayaguez and the Somali evacuation, the presence of U.S. forces 

created additional options for the U.S. Government to consider. 

However, the U.S. casualties and the negative public reaction to 

the Mayaguez raid were indicators of the risks and costs that can 

multiply quickly if military and operational success is not convincingly achieved. Regarding Somalia, despite the skill with which 

the evacuation was made, had no U.S. forces been present, it is 

arguable that other, perhaps more risky escape routes still existed. 

The point is that presence is no guarantor of success, and the occasions in which presence really counts in crisis and in the first stages 

of crisis are relatively few. On the other hand, when the stakes or 

risks are large, the use of forces immediately on hand through presence is almost certainly tempered by caution, and, in most cases, there 

will be time to consider options and to bring other forces to bear.51 

On a routine basis, an argument can be made that presence as 

reassurance is useful. Training, exercises, and port visits no doubt 

can serve positively as adjuncts to presence, but the actual ability 

of presence to exert the intended influence is more difficult to determine. Without concrete proof of either merits or demerits, the 

debate over presence becomes a debate over advocates who assert 

or assume benefit and critics who assert otherwise or question the 

value presumed. 

On top of these considerations, the double dilemma posed earlier 

by domestically driven criteria in using U.S. force and the potentially non-military or inherently unresolvable situations where force 

51 Proponents of presence will cite other examples as better and more 

representative demonstrations of its utility. The presence of the Sixth 

Fleet in the Mediterranean, it can be argued, makes the case, and a large 

number of past instances can be used as evidence. For example, in the 

1980s, presence permitted the U.S. to take a number of forceful actions 

in situations ranging from retaliating against Libya in 1981 and 1986 to 

capturing the hijackers of the cruise ship Achille Lauro in 1985. In most 

of these cases, a combination of enough time to react and other alternatives provided compensating weight to the need for continued presence. 

On the other hand, as Napoleon remarked about wishing to have generals possessing luck, good fortune is entirely unpredictable. 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 149 

might be used as a last or only resort will complicate the presence 

issue. Thus, three policy actions should be taken regarding presence: 

• First, we should understate the explicit and crisis utility of 

presence, focusing instead on the more easily understood 

necessity of presence to underwrite or symbolize U.S. commitments. This approach makes no promises on what presence may or may not achieve outside this primary role of 

representing U.S. commitments. 

• Second, the U.S. no doubt still needs great regional understanding and familiarity as the world grows no less complex a place and more, often newer, actors play larger roles. 

Presence is extremely useful in this regard. The consequence 

is that area specialists will be needed with education and 

training on more countries and on more cross-cutting issues that migrate from geostrategy to geoeconomics than 

were needed during the Cold War when there were relatively few potential adversaries and those were largely conditioned and constituted by the East-West conflict. 

• Third, a major analytical effort, using as much data and as 

many viewpoints as is responsibly possible, should address 

the issues of what advantages and utility come of presence; 

what the disadvantages and risks are; where presence might 

be effective or ineffective; and what the grounds and assumptions are for making these evaluations. 

A more useful concept in shaping future considerations for presence relates to access. Access is the ability to gain and sustain 

entry either peacefully or forcefully. To obtain access, as an alternative or complement to presence, a network of access "enablers'-- 

basing and landing rights, overflight rights, communications and 

logistics systems, and pre-positioned supplies--needs to be established and maintained. The use of the Indian Ocean island base of 

Diego Garcia as a means for enabling access is an example of the 

type of structure needed. And, being able to use these networks 

when and where necessary without obtaining someone else's approval is likewise vital. 
150 IN IRONS: US, MILITARY MIGItT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

For example, during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, fearing 

a retaliatoryArab oil embargo, America's NATO allies refused landing rights for U.S. resupply flights to Israel. The U.S. was able to 

conduct its resupply by air with great difficulty and cost occasioned 

by extensive rerouting and inflight refueling, and probably could 

have forced the allies to change their minds if the crisis and response demanded. During the 1990-91 Gulf War and build-up, 

had NATO states not permitted and not actively helped with the 

flow of war materials through and over their various borders, deployment of the necessary UN forces and equipment to Saudi Arabia 

would have been virtually impossible. 

This establishment of access enablers as an important policy 

component has direct relationship with and perhaps lineal descent 

from the Cold War. The United States purposely maintained the 

strategic nuclear umbrella, the overhead intelligence collection, 

strategic command-and-control capabilities, and strategic lift assets for the alliance in other words, the critical networks or strategic sinews that could not and need not be duplicated by other 

partners. Access can be approached in the same way. The United 

States would continue to assume the role of keeper and provider of 

these networks and sinews that enable the maintenance and exploitation of access where and when that may be required. 

Access is not a new concept; it has served as the basis for prior 

policy action. However, as U.S. overseas military presence contracts, as U.S. commitments to stability and global security continue, maintaining sufficient access to ensure timely insertion of 

forces as may be required is essential. To that end, contingency 

planning must continue to test and identify strong and weak points 

in the ability to generate access and, within resource limits, to ensure that supporting steps are taken to reinforce the necessary 

basing, landing, and overflight rights, and that other logistical and 

communications capabilities are in place. 

The most useful way to relate these choices is to identify the 

objectives that underwrite the various commitments and the accompanying levels of deployments and presence; tables 27 through 

29 address these issues for central Europe and the former USSR, 

the northwest Pacific, and globally. 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 151 

Table 27. Central Europe and the former USSR (objectives, commitments, 

deployments, and presence) 

Objectives Commitments Deployments Presence 

Current 

Support democratization SALT, ABM, CFE N/A N/A 

and open market reform START, INF treaties 

Support aid and assistance Funding -- -- 

Reduce nuclear and Advisory personnel -- -- 

conventional armaments 

Defense conversion "Partnership" -- -- 

Alternatives and additions 

Extend NATO Defense of FSU, Central U.S. forces Part-time (?) 

"partnership" Europe Low-level 

Extend NATO membership Defense of FSU U.S. forces Full-time 

Extend economic Treaties, agreements, -- Low to 

partnership funding medium level 

Peacekeeping in Bosnia Impose peace U.S./NATO Up to 25,000 

forces 

Table 28. Northwest Pacific (objectives, commitments, deployments, and presence) 

Objectives Commitments Deployments Presence 

Assure U.S. engagement 

Promote stability 

Promote trade, economic 

development 

Reduce grounds for conflict 

Broaden security framework 

through CSCE-type 

mechanism 

Seek arms control agreements Treaties 

Seek alliance, nonaggression Treaties 

treaties 

Current 

Treaties (U.S.-Japan; Seventh Fleet All U.S. 

Korea) military forces 

U.S. in Korea 

Peace 

U.S. in Okinawa Full-time 

Security and stability Robust 

Exercises 

Troop presence 

Restraining N. Korean 

nuclear proliferation 

Alternatives end additions 

As above Greater military Probably 

cooperation larger 

and exercises 
152 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Table 29. Non-regionalf'globai" issues (objectives, commitments, deployments, 

and presence) 

Objectives Commitments Deployments Presence 

Promote democratization and 

open market reforms 

Free/fair trade 

Antiproliferation 

Antiterrorist 

Promote human rights 

Promote humanitarian 

actions 

Provide a UN force/make 

the UN the ultimate 

arbiter of international 

disputes 

Current 

GATT, IMF, international In concert with In concert 

agreements other objectives Selective 

Selective, i.e., 

Kurdish, Somalia 

UN relief 

MTCR; nonproliferation treaty ? 

Maintain access 

"enablers" 

Alternatives and additions 

To subsume national ? 

authority and autonomy 

to UN decision 

Against this backdrop of choices, certain preliminary conclusions can be drawn regarding commitments, deployments, 

and presence. At the outset, it is imperative to identify the basic objectives of national security, defense, and foreign policy 

that are to be translated into commitments and the deployment 

of forces. However, identifying objectives that can be achieved, 

sustained, and credibly matched by appropriate force requirements is not simple. Otherwise, this process would have been 

more effective. 

Commitments are founded in national obligations, intentions, 

and interests. They are expressed both in concrete terms of military forces, signed treaties, and other documents with the authority of law and in less concrete terms marked by declaratory 

statements, mutual trust and confidence, and implicit actions 

that may not require demonstrable uses of physical and visible 

instruments but nonetheless signal a certain message and meaning. 

From these commitments, judgments about appropriate levels 

of military force for underwriting these obligations are made and 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 153 

become the basis for operational or military requirements. However, 

the lack of a universally acceptable measure to show that one response is more effective or more appropriate than another must be 

addressed by logic, strategic design, or some other plausible analytical means. 

The absence of specific and massive threats suggests that qualitative 

rather than numerically driven responses have more relevance. For 

example, the commitment to defend NATO from Soviet attack required a plausible and reasonable military response. But, today and 

into the future, ensuring European stability does not necessarily 

have any quantitative military solution. In other words, numbers 

of troops above a certain level may yield no real advantage. 

Finally, as requirements regarding future U.S. commitments 

and accompanying military needs are considered, access, as a key 

criterion and determinant and an end in itself, may provide a formidable means of defining and fashioning policy tools and instruments for dealing with the demands of strategic uncertainty. 
154 IN IRONS: US. M1LITARY MIGHT IN THE NEw CENTURY 

CHAPTER EIGHT: INFRASTRUCTURE 

Of all the major defense-related issues, perhaps none is more 

politically charged, highly complicated, and less conducive to solution than that of infrastructure. Defined in this book as the vast, 

supporting network of facilities that provide vital services for the 

military forces, infrastructure includes: the bases and facilities to 

house, train, homeport, and sustain the military; the Reserve and 

National Guard components; the civilian and military defense industrial base; the technology base where it may differ from the 

defense industrial base; and the acquisition process. Because of 

the nature and composition of infrastructure, it falls squarely between the executive branch and Congress in terms of responsibilities and authority--a situation inherently and explicitly laden with 

the best and worst characteristics of the political process. 

Because the infrastructure is both so vast and so extraordinarily complicated, no attempt is made to conduct highly detailed and 

specific analysis, which is probably beyond the capacity of any single 

individual. Instead, through historical and first-principle types of 

analyses, the largest issues and choices are abstracted to as broad 

a level as possible for the express intent of laying out an appropriate range of future options. Also, the caveat applies that for every 

general rule or proposition regarding infrastructure, no doubt large 

numbers of specific exceptions exist that contradict, or at least appear to contradict, the broader view. 

Few issues are in as much inherent conflict and tension as that 

of the infrastructure reflecting the collision of prerogatives and 

responsibilities between Congress and the White House. The president and his DOD are concerned with obtaining the best defense 

for the nation at large. The criteria of matching strategy and forces, 

of maintaining high levels of operational capability, and of achieving efficiency and effectiveness in program management are fundamental objectives for defense. No Congressman would argue 

against the general efficacy of those criteria. But Congress views 

its responsibility for assuring national well-being side by side with 

representing constituent interests. 

The budget is the mechanism for dealing with competing national and local claims on defense resources. Employment, the flow 

of funds and federal spending into local districts, and natural 

disagreements between Congress and the president are major 
PART H: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 155 

forces at work. Any steps necessary to improve either the efficiency 

of managing the infrastructure or its downsizing will meet some 

natural resistance from Congress. In many cases, this interaction 

has led to cuts in or skewing of the defense budget to sustain or 

protect much of that infrastructure. 

Base closings, shrinking of the industrial base, reductions in 

reserve and guard forces, and other actions seen as mandatory by 

DOD to preserve military fighting power are likely to be resisted 

by Congress to protect jobs and to reflect legitimate arguments to 

sustain specific portions of the infrastructure that may not otherwise serve a useful military purpose. Rarely has Congress moved 

on its own to cut fundamentally or substantially the interests of 

the constituents it rightfully represents. Nor is it obvious when or 

where the DOD was prepared to sacrifice military capability on 

the grounds of protecting local, non-defense interest except when 

or where politics provided no other option. 

The Clinton administration, through the Bottom-Up Review, 

defines infrastructure as the "foundation on which our military 

strength is built," and estimates its total costs for FY 1994 as 

$160 billion, or about 59 percent of the DOD total obligational authority. Figure 15 shows the breakdown of these costs. 

Figure 15. Infrastructure categories (percentage of $160 billion in FY 1994 

budget) 

Installation 

support 

(17%) 

Force management 

(1 ,'3 o/. ~ 

;tics 

,) 

Acqui,' 

manage 

(8%) Personnel Medical 

(7%) (9%) 
156 IN IRONS: U,S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

As will be shown, from 1989 to 1993 and including the actions 

of the first three Base Closure and Realignment Commissions, the 

defense budget has been cut by nearly 30 percent in real terms, 

force structure by about 35 percent, and the infrastructure by less 

than 17 percent. Because the infrastructure still included many 

facilities that date back to World War II, these reductions and realignments have been modest at best even though the political pain 

and consequences have been quite high. 

In terms of infrastructure, figures 16 and 17 depict graphically, 

how the DOD budget has shii~ed over the past four decades in terms 

of actual spending. Although funding for strategic forces has dramatically and understandably declined from the build-up of the early 

1960s, categories that are generally representative of infrastructure 

have shown the opposite tendency. The future trends depicting the 

growing disparity between "teeth" and "tail" take into account the 

actual and projected savings made through the BRAC process. 

Figure 16. Infrastructure drain 1962-1980 

E 

.o 

13. 

7° r 

6O 

50 

40 

f 

• ffff~ 

3C ' I 1 I I I ~ I I I ~ 1 I I 

62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 

Fiscal year 

Note: All figures taken from Office of the Comptroller, the DOD, May 1993, pp. 62-63. "Teeth" included 

strategic and general-purpose forces, and air- and sealift "Tail" included the other accounts. 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" i57 

Figure 17. Infrastructure drain 1980-1998 

6O 

~ 50 

4O 

70- 

f 

~ -. Tail ..... / 

..°°°o°'° 

°.°°°°°-°*°° 

Projected 

"°°°°°°.° ..... 

*°°Ooo 

94 95 96 97 98 

3C 1 I I ~ i I I ! I I I 

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 

Fiscal year 

Note: All figures taken from Office of the Comptroller, the DOD, May 1993, pp. 62--63. "Teeth" included 

strategic and general-purpose forces, and air- and seaiift. "Tail" included the other accounts. 

• "Teeth," measured by strategic and general-purpose forces, 

have shrunk from about half of the budget to less than twofifths. The trends between "teeth" and "tail" are diverging 

rapidly in favor of infrastructure. 

• Intelligence and communications funding has increased, in 

real terms, by more than double. 

• Air and sealift funding has increased by nearly half. 52 

• Guard and reserve funding has increased by nearly two-thirds. 

• Research and development funding has increased by almost half 

• Training, medical, and administration have increased, particularly in relation to the reduction of one million activeduty service members since 1962. 

52 Lift clearly contributes to fighting power as well as parts of other budget 

accounts, but it is the size of the differential that is suggestive of the trend. 
158 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

BASES AND RELATED INFRASTRUCTURE 

The need for military bases is more than obvious, but reducing 

bases that have become redundant or obsolete is a difficult and 

often painful process. From the early 1960s and through the 1970s, 

various secretaries of defense initiated actions to close relatively 

large numbers of bases and installations dating from the war in 

order to obtain economies and to reduce overhead costs. In 1977, 

anxious to protect constituent interests and base-related constituencies, Congress enacted a statute requiring DOD to notify Congress when and if an installation became a candidate for closure or 

realignment. The law also required time-consuming environmental impact assessments that effectively blocked further closures. 53 

By the late 1980s, an increasingly bloated base structure threatened the readiness of the forces and, in turn, collided with the politics resistant to closures. The result was the first Base Realignment and Closure Commission or "BRAC" created in 1988. 54 In 

1990, when Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announced further 

base closings, Congress protested that process, charging it was "politically influenced." In its stead, Congress created an independent, 

five-year Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission to 

meet in 1991, 1993, and 1995. 55 This BRAC was to provide an 

independent review of closures proposed by the secretary of defense 

and forward its recommendations to the president. The president 

either approved or disapproved the entire list without exception and 

forwarded the package to Congress. Congress then passed or rejected 

the recommendations without introducing any changes or riders. 

Base closings and realignments took place in 1989, 1991, and 

1993. The next and last commission under present law will convene in 1995. The achievements of the first three commissions are 

53 See Section 2687, Title 10, USC and p. 3-1, Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment Commission 1993 Report to the President, dated July 1, 1993. 

54 Ibid. The 1988 BRAC recommended closure of 86 facilities and realignment of 59 others. 

55 See Public Law 101-510, as amended, under Title XXIX USC. Even 

though the title of the law reverses "closure" and "realignment" from the 

1988 statute, the commission is still called the BRAC. 
PART 1I: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH "WIND STILL BLEW" 159 

important, principally in the political acknowledgment that bases must 

be shut or reduced. The law provided a mechanism that bypassed the 

normal political process by requiring one up or down vote in each house 

on the entire package and by barring all amendments and riders to the 

basic bill. On the debit side, the first two BRAC commissions encountered resistance among the services, and, therefore, the first rounds of 

cuts were not sufficient to offset the decline in force levels and spending, 

creating even greater overhead costs in infrastructure. 

The 1993 BRAC was more ambitious, but the total reductions 

made to date in infrastructure are less than a fifth of the bases and 

facilities in service and proportionally much less than the cuts in 

manpower and budget levels. It is also likely that the savings projected for the first three rounds of BRAC will greatly exceed what 

dollars are actually saved--although the value of achieving savings 

should be lower in priority than reducing the drain on budgets 

imposed by this infrastructure. Finally, because Congress must 

approve all money for base closings, failure to fund these accounts 

fully will delay or prevent the actions of the BRAC. Hence, the 

impact of this infrastructure drain has not been compensated for and 

still poses an enormous problem for maintaining a ready fighting force. 

Table 30 gives an idea of what each BRAC achieved. Note that little 

or no distinction is made in the size of the base or facility affected. 

Table 30. BRAC achievements 

Percent of 

Bases affected domestic 

Projected bases 

Year Closed Realigned savings a affected 

1988/89 86 16 

1991 34 48 

1993 130 45 

$500-700 million per year 3 

Long-term $1.5 billion per year 5 

Long-term $2.3 billion per year 8 

In 1989, the commission projected long-term annual savings of $500 million. In 1991, 

net savings of $2.3 billion and recurring savings of $1.5 billion after a one-time cost of 

$4.1 billion was projected. In 1993, a one-time cost of $7.43 billion was projected, 

with about $3.8 billion in savings from 1995-1999 and $2.33 billion in annual savings 

thereafter. 
160 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MmHr IN THE NEw CENTURY 

At the same time that it is obvious that the basing structure 

must be substantially reduced not only for reasons of economy but 

also because that structure is absorbing scarce resources at the 

expense of military capability, many vital facilities and functions 

that would harm military muscle if shut have migrated to or are 

located on these bases. Hence, realignment and downsizing of bases 

rather than outright closing may be an appropriate response. The 

Philadelphia Navy Shipyard is a good example. 

The Navy argues that the Philadelphia Shipyard is no longer 

needed for ship construction or repair, but three essential facilities 

collocated there provide essential services the Navy cannot lose. 

Relocation would prove expensive. These facilities are the largeship propeller manufacturing and repair facility vital for aircraft 

carrier maintenance; the boiler and gas turbine laboratory vital to 

supporting all the Navy's propulsion systems; and the reserve or 

mothballed fleet facility. The propeller facility is the only one of its 

kind and therefore crucial to the maintenance, repair, and construction of aircraft carriers because there is no alternative source for 

these propellers. The boiler and turbine laboratory represents about 

$500 million in investment--a unique and vital asset. As long as 

ships are kept in mothballs, relocation would be expensive. Thus, 

while much of this shipyard could be shut, there are strong arguments for retaining specific facilities. This situation applies to each 

of the services and large parts of the basing structure. 

To a large degree, there really are no distinct "choices" for dealing with the basing structure. Failure to rationalize and reduce 

basing will prove excessively costly and militarily wasteful. The 

issue is over the pace and timing of these realignments and reductions. One useful alternative is to embark on major consolidation 

and collocation of forces at a few "megabases." In the case of the 

Navy and Marine Corps, establishment of one megabase on each 

coast (and Hawaii), with major reductions to that end, and retention of smaller, satellite facilities that possess unique functions or 

are required by logistical, operational, and practical reasons provide a model for further consideration. 

THE RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD COMPONENT 

The reserve component of the armed forces is as old as the republic and has formed an integral part of American military tradition 
PART H: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 161 

and might. Designated in the Constitution as the militia and protected 

by the Second Amendment as "necessary to the security of a free state" 

the purposes and functions of the reserve have naturally evolved over 

time. However, no serious challenge to the existence of the reserve and 

guard has been mounted despite the operational and budgetary realities 

that might suggest the efficacy of such an approach. 

Up until the end of the Second World War and except in time of 

emergency, the United States maintained a small standing Army and 

Navy. The National Guard fell under the authority of the individual 

states and their governors unless summoned by the Federal Government "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and 

repel invasions." The notion and mystique of the "citizen-soldier," answering the call to arms in crisis and tending to business and work in 

peace, were embedded in the social fabric of the United States. 

For the post-Cold War period, U.S. military might in time of 

war was ultimately dependent on mobilization and recalling reserve and National Guard forces. To be precise, these mobilized 

forces included the Army and Air Force National Guards under the 

normal, peacetime authority of the 50 states, and the Army, Navy, 

Marine Corps, and Air Force Reserve. Typically, these forces have 

numbered in total from post-war highs of about 1.8 million in the 

1950s to the current levels of about 900,000 (table 31). 

Table 31. Components of the Selected Reserve a 

Fiscal year 

83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 

ARNG 417.2 434.3 440.0 446.2 451.9 455.2 457.0 437.0 441.3 426.5 422.7 344.5 

Army 266.2 275.1 292.1 309.7 313.6 312.8 319.2 299.1 299.9 302.0 279.6 230.2 

Reserve 

Naval 109.1 120.6 129.8 141.5 148.1 1495 151.5 1494 150.5 142.3 133.7 117.2 

Reserve 

MC 42.7 40.6 41.6 41.6 42.3 43.6 43.6 44.5 44.0 42.2 42.3 36.9 

Reserve 

ANG 102.2 105.0 109.4 112.6 114.6 115.2 116.1 117.0 117.6 119.1 119.2 118.9 

Air Force 67.2 70.3 75.2 78.5 80.4 82.1 83.2 80.6 84.3 81.9 82.4 81.9 

Reserve 

Total 1004.6 1045.9 1088.1 1130.1 1153.9 1158.4 1170.6 1127.6 1137.6 1114.0 1079.9 929.6 

a In thousands. 
162 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Each reserve component has been designed to support the active 

forces but in different ways peculiar to the needs of each service. The 

Army, with about a half-million reserve component, has assigned vital functions of combat support and combat service support that are 

largely logistics related to the reserves. The Air Force Reserve are 

organized around squadrons; they are well trained and can be recalled to active duty with relatively little training. The Navy Air Reserve is similar to that of the Air Force; a number of ships, mostly 

frigates and minesweepers, are in the Naval Reserve and manned by 

Reservists. But in general, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force 

depend less on reserves than does the Army. Army Reserve forces, on 

balance, would require the longest time for mobilization. 

Indeed, Army force structure after the 1970s was purposely 

designed to be highly dependent on reserve forces for understandable political reasons. Mobilization would be required for major 

contingencies. Hence, future Vietnam-like conflicts could not be 

waged by the Army without reliance on reserve forces. The president was authorized by Congress to mobilize up to 200,000 Reservists in 

crisis. Beyond that point, Congressional approval is mandatory. 

This role of the reserve and guard forces meant that political consensus would be and still is required to send large numbers of 

U.S. forces into action. 

Four main points continue to define the debate over the guard 

and reserve. The first point is the constitutionally protected right 

of the states to maintain a militia. The existence of the National 

Guard is therefore nonnegotiable, although the size, the shape, and 

the matter of who pays for it are not constitutionally fixed. Second, the notion of"citizen-soldier" is as old as the republic. The 

guard and reserve fill this function and properly use this tradition 

as legitimate justification for existence. The third point is the role 

of the guard and reserve, the relationship or mix with the active 

forces, and the degree of dependence of one on the other. Fourth, 

and finally, is the level and quality of the readiness and capability 

to be required of the reserve component. 

Of the first two issues, the only significant question that can be 

addressed is how much the federal and state governments should 

each pay for the guard and reserve. The Federal Government bears 

the costs for the reserve and 95 percent of the costs of the guard. 
PART II: "AND TIlE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 163 

Given that the states administer the National Guard in peacetime, 

there is an argument to be made that the states should bear a 

greater financial responsibility, especially for disaster or crisis relief. Despite the potentially explosive nature of this question as it 

would play out in Congress, which is the natural ally and supporter 

of the reserve and guard in representing the states, it is still one 

that should be addressed in the context of serving as the incentive 

for producing change. 

Regarding the two other issues, before his departure as secretary of defense, Les Aspin began reducing the size of the reserve 

component and focused its attention on two principal missions: preparing for major conflict in support of the active forces and assisting in domestic disasters and crises. There is, however, one basic 

set of choices for the reserve component relating to size and responsibilities. As the active force is reduced, the fundamental issue is the degree to which the reserve and guard components will 

share in those reductions or in augmentation and reconstitution if 

a strategy of regeneration is selected. Table 32 reflects the possible options against the range of force structure choices presented 

earlier if we continue to do business as usual. 

Table 32. Reserve/guard choices vs. force structure choices 

Force structure Reserve/guard choices 

BUR continued 

Garrison force 

Maritime force 

Reconstitution 

Reduction in kind with selected augmentation to replace or 

complement active force 

Reduction to support active force or greater emphasis on naval 

reserve (i.e., more naval capability in reserve) 

Reduction to support active force or strengthening of reserve 

component of garrison forces 

Enlarged reserve component 

It is also appropriate to evaluate objectively the benefits the 

guard and reserve actually contribute to the nation in terms of 

supporting combat operations for the resources expended. Making 

an objective evaluation will be very difficult for the reasons cited 

earlier dealing with tradition, mystique, and the close relationship 

with Congress. But, given the reality of the resource constraints 
164 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

ahead, it would be less than responsible not to consider a military 

posture with minimal reserve and guard capacity. 56 

THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE 

Among the most vexing infrastructure issues is the industrial base 

question. In an environment within a free market economy that has 

but a single customer for products and that customer is the government, the conditions are ripe for uncertainty, confusion, and, indeed, 

chaos. In the United States, substantial government ownership of 

the industrial capacity for producing armaments and related services 

has been eschewed for economic, political, and ideological reasons. 

Private-sector ownership, whether through publicly traded or privately 

held companies, must therefore deal with the uniquely difficult 

problems posed by a system in which government is the absolute 

customer and regulator. The conflict between this inordinately regulated defense economy and an otherwise free enterprise system poses 

problems that can be fundamentally unresolvable. 

For example, when there is no market-driven mechanism to set 

price, profit, and supply and demand, the substitute criteria are 

often value- or belief-driven standards set by government. The 

government sets profit margins and imposes a huge regulatory 

regime that is distinct from the civilian economy and requires 

distinct and separate rules, accounting systems, personnel, and 

standards. Indeed, one side of this regulation, compounded by 

government actions to eliminate the scandal of "waste, fraud, and 

abuse," has been the growing criminalization of misdeeds and mistakes. Errors and violations of the civil code have led to attempts 

at, and successful, criminal prosecutions. 

56 This may prove the most controversial statement in the book. Despite 

the strongest rhetoric in support of the reserve and guard offered by 

every administration and the quality of their personnel, the nation must 

look seriously at whether we can continue to rely as heavily on this capacity in the future as in the past. A largely negative answer would 

mean a dramatic reduction in the reserve and a return of responsibility 

for the guard, especially funding, to the respective states. 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 165 

Furthermore, there can be no long-term arrangements to set 

some modicum of certainty or incentive for the manufacturer or 

contractor to stay in business for the long haul. Finally, competition, or at least the goal of ensuring or managing competition, has 

become enmeshed and insinuated through legislation particularly 

well represented by the 1984 Competition in Contracting Act. But 

when there is only one customer and trends toward industry consolidation and growing numbers of single or dual producers across 

the defense sectors become obvious, competition can become fiction although the law demands it. 

As a result of these factors and impelled by declining budgets, 

appropriate levels of defense industrial base capacity are o~en argued for in terms of national security needs. Rather obviously and 

logically, some form of self-sufficiency is required to sustain unique 

and irreplaceable production capabilities that, if lost, could jeopardize national security. The shipbuilding, aircra~, ordnance, electronics, and nuclear industries, among others, have oi~n been accorded 

this national security label of protection. And, Congress' representation of the defense industrial base intensifies the politics and 

difficulty in addressing these important issues. 

To be sure, there are certainly areas where national security 

demands autarky; nuclear weapons production is one such area. 

But the number of areas where national security would indeed be 

jeopardized by the elimination of a production capacity or asset 

needs serious review. At the same time, the criterion of competition 

and the reach of antitrust and monopoly prevention laws also must 

be examined if any rational solution to the industrial base issue is 

to be reached. 

There are three basic choices regarding the defense industrial 

base. First, there can be a policy of laissez-faire in which the market determines the winners and losers or the survivors and victims 

through a form of economic Darwinism and the survival of the fittest. Second, there can be a strict government industrial policy in 

which significant and even dominant government intervention determines the survivors and victims in the private sector. Third, 

government can elect to nationalize the defense industrial base or 

at least a significant portion of it. 
166 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGIIT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

The laissez-faire choice assumes the market is the ultimate 

mechanism for adjudicating the industrial base, which means the 

fittest generally will survive, and the fittest are usually the largest. Competition in the broadest sense can be squeezed out, particularly as consolidation forced by less and less defense spending 

continues. The result can be a situation with concurrent monopsony 

and monopoly with one buyer and one seller and where value for 

spending would be determined not by market factors but by the 

state of affairs between industry and government. Given the merger 

between Northrop and Grumman and the proposed merger between 

Lockheed and Martin-Marietta, consolidation is a timely issue and 

one to be examined in subsequent pages as it may affect competition. 

Industrial policy requires the government to make difficult and 

far-reaching decisions about winners and losers. In this regard, 

the Janus-like quality of divided government does not assure that 

a single, coherent industrial policy follows. Nor does an industrial 

policy necessarily guarantee that an efficient or effective industrial base will follow. 

Nationalization of the defense industrial base would put all or 

most private ownership in government hands. Nationalization 

would be hugely expensive, certainly initially, as substantial 

compensation would be mandated under virtually all conditions. 

And, if history is a guide, many of the efficiencies and economies of 

scale of private companies would be lost. 

In the past, because of the robustness and redundancy of the 

industrial base, the U.S. Government has had the luxury of deferring tough choices and of using variants of these choices concurrently. Administrations have adopted a formal laissez-faire policy 

at the same time they pursued limited forms of industrial policy 

(that subsidizes or underwrites noncompetitive industries) and 

policy variants of nationalization in which the government continues to own certain means of production. A good example is that of 

the government simultaneously maintaining private shipyards, 

Navy shipyards, and a public-private mix of nuclear shipyards. 

For nearly two centuries, shipbuilding capacity has been argued 

for on the grounds of national security. The country, as an island and 

seagoing nation in this argument, could not allow itself dependence 

on foreign sourcing for either commercial ships or warships. Foreign 
PAnT II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTII WIND STILL BLEW" 167 

sourcing could always be cut off. Thus, the U.S., as with other great 

powers, elected to build both its own warships and its own merchant fleet. The need for autarky in warship construction was obvious. Construction of merchant ships was another matter. 

For private shipyards to stay in business building and selling 

merchant ships, government-paid construction subsidies were required to keep up with the costs of production and to keep the price 

of commercial ships competitive. Indeed, the Jones Act of 1920 

mandated that all shipping used in domestic U.S. waters had to be 

U.S.-built, U.S.-owned, and U.S.-flagged. Shipbuilding and shipping (i.e., merchant marine) were generally lumped together in the 

single category of maritime industry even though the first was really heavy construction and the second transportation. 

In 1981 and impelled in part by ambitious plans for the 600-ship 

Navy that would give warship construction work to many private 

shipyards, theoretically reducing the financial pressure to build 

ships for civilian use, the Reagan administration ended the 

construction differential subsidies that the U.S. Government had 

provided to U.S. commercial shipbuilders in order to maintain competitive price equivalence visa vis foreign yards for merchant ships. 

The argument then (and now) was that foreign yards had government support as well as lower hourly wages in building merchant 

ships. 57 Without federal subsidy, the U.S. commercial shipbuilding 

playing field was never "level." National security rationale formed 

the basis for having a strong merchant marine and commercial 

shipbuilding industry, as well as autarky in constructing men-of-war. 

In fact, those Cold War national security arguments relating to 

the merchant marine were largely hollow. There were plenty of 

commercial ships of all types in service, and many were owned and 

operated by NATO allies. To believe in wartime that our allies who 

would be fighting with us in their own backyards would not make 

their commercial ships available for transportation, resupply, and 

sealift strains credulity. Whether the U.S. had both the capacity to 

build merchant ships and to own and operate substantial numbers 

57 Current trade negotiations are attempting to eliminate government 

shipbuilding subsidies in the U.S. and European industrial states. 
168 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

of its merchant fleet was not relevant. More than enough ships 

were available through allies or through direct impressment to meet 

any wartime exigencies. Even in conflicts that were fought outside 

the alliance, such as Vietnam or Desert Storm, lack of shipping 

was never a limiting factor. 

As a result of these business and political factors, both the U.S. 

commercial shipbuilding and shipping industries have rapidly 

contracted from the heydays of the 1960s. U.S. shipbuilding is now 

virtually on a military footing. Even with operating subsidies, the 

U.S.-flag fleet remains quite small. The point is that from a national security perspective, this contraction in maritime capability 

has been neither unhealthy nor an economically bad thing to have 

happened to the nation at large despite the pain to those in the 

industry. The same parallel can be extended to other sectors of 

defense-related production. 

This analysis and review lead to an obvious conclusion if strategic and economic rationality are dominant considerations. The 

size of the required defense industrial base should be singularly 

determined by the level and direction of federal defense spending. 

Should defense companies choose either to market abroad or to 

expand their business through so-called "dual-use" products that 

have both military and consumer application, that is the choice of 

the private sector and should be independent of the Federal Government. This assumes all laws and government regulations are 

correctly followed in these sales. 

From a political and economic perspective, another conclusion 

can be reached. Defense corporations can rightly argue that they 

and their employees have loyally served the national security interests of the United States as well as their shareholders. Because 

experienced and qualified people are vital to these defense industries and because there is no obvious and easily accessible market 

to which these employees can rapidly migrate during budget drawdowns, the government must assume some responsibility for and 

therefore share the expense of minimizing these peaks and valleys 

between hirings and layoffs. This argument, which carries great 

weight in Congress, translates directly into some form of government funding or subsidy that will underwrite these industries during periods of defense reduction. 

Figure 18 and table 33 show the historical progression of the 

size of the defense industrial base measured by employment. 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 169 

Figure 18. Defense employment as percent of total labor force 

45 

40 35 1 I !" ,, 

I 

J 30 I 

25 t 

20! 

15 

10 

5 

0 

40 42 

DOD total 

.... DOD plus defense-related industries 

I I I I I I I l I I I I I i I I I I I I ] I I I I I I 

44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 

Year 

Table 33. U.S. employment and labor force (endstrength in thousands) 

FY 

Defense- Total 

Military DOD DH Total related defense- Total 

active civilian DOD industry related labor 

duty work force a manpower employment employment force 

1940 458 256 714 314 1,028 55,890 

1941 1,801 556 2,357 2,500 4,857 56,855 

1942 3,859 1,284 5,143 10,000 15,143 58,880 

1943 9,045 2,193 11,238 13,361 24,599 62,470 

1944 11,452 2,239 13,691 12,600 26,291 65,300 

1945 12,056 2,628 14,684 11,000 25,684 65,670 

1946 3,025 1,416 4,441 1,168 5,609 63,135 

1947 1,582 859 2,441 786 3,227 60,956 

1948 1,444 804 2,248 958 3,206 62,132 

1949 1,614 821 2,434 732 3,166 62,197 

1950 1,459 710 2,170 713 2,883 63,548 

1951 3,249 1,201 4,551 2,400 6,851 62,505 

1952 3,636 1,308 4,944 3,600 8,544 63,020 

1953 3,555 1,304 4,859 4,118 8,977 63,898 

1954 3,302 1,183 4,485 2,975 7,460 64,178 

1955 2,935 1,160 4,095 2,500 6,595 65,461 

1956 2,806 1,151 3,958 2,500 6,458 67,886 

1957 2,795 1,132 3,927 2,850 6,777 68,258 

1958 2,600 1,069 3,668 2,800 6,468 68,875 

1959 2,504 1,049 3,553 2,700 6,253 69,704 

(Continued on next page) 
170 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN TIIE NEW CENTURY 

Table 33. (Continued) 

FY 

Defense- Total 

Military DOD DH Total related defense- Total 

active civilian DOD industry related labor 

duty work force a manpower employment employment force 

1960 2,475 1,018 3,493 2,460 5,953 71,460 

1961 2,463 1,012 3,495 2,600 6,095 72,464 

1962 2,808 1,039 3,848 2,725 6,573 72,071 

1963 2,700 1,019 3,719 2,550 6,269 73,398 

1964 2,688 997 3,684 2,280 5,964 74,901 

1965 2,656 986 3,641 2,125 5,766 76,335 

1966 3,094 1,093 4,187 2,640 6,827 77,629 

1967 3,377 1,235 4,612 3,100 7,712 79,021 

1968 3,546 1,233 4,781 3,174 7,955 80,088 

1969 3,460 1,275 4,735 2,916 7,651 82,357 

1970 3,066 1,161 4,227 2,399 6,626 84,051 

1971 2,714 1,093 3,808 2,031 5,839 84,968 

1972 2,323 1,049 3,372 1,985 5.357 88,055 

1973 2,253 997 3,250 1,850 5,100 90,414 

1974 2,162 1,013 3,175 1,860 5,035 92,547 

1975 2,128 989 3,117 1,800 4,917 94,013 

1976 2,082 959 3,041 1,690 4,731 96,115 

1977 2,074 938 3,013 1,730 4,743 97,684 

1978 2,062 935 2.997 1,765 4,762 100,838 

1979 2,031 916 2,947 1,860 4,807 103,374 

1980 2,063 916 2,979 1,990 4,969 107,261 

1981 2,101 940 3,041 2,085 5,126 109,910 

1982 2,130 945 3,075 2,290 5,365 111,446 

1983 2,162 980 3,142 2,415 5,557 112,884 

1984 2,184 1,000 3,184 2,735 5,919 114,701 

1985 2,206 1,043 3,249 2,980 6,229 116,689 

1986 2,233 1,027 3,260 3,315 6,575 118,947 

1987 2,243 1,049 3,292 3,665 6,957 121,088 

1988 2,209 1,010 3,219 3,450 6,669 122,927 

1989 2,202 1,037 3,239 3,295 6,534 125,046 

1990 2,143 b 997 3,140 3,150 6,290 126,343 

1991 2,077 b 974 3,051 3,125 6,176 126,730 

1992 1,880 b 945 2,825 3,000 5,825 128,200 

1993 1,705 915 2,714 2,725 5,439 129,500 

1994 1,611 876 2,565 2,500 5,065 131,700 

The DOD direct hire (DH) civilian work force figures include both U.S. and foreign national 

direct hires. Foreign national indirect hire (FNIH) employees that support DOD forces overseas are not included. 

The FY 1990 active-duty military includes 25,652 National Guardsmen and Reservists activated pursuant to sections 673b, T'~le 10 U.S.C. FY 1991 active-duty military includes 17,059 

National Guardsmen and Reservists. and FY 1992 active-duty military includes 954 National Guardsmen and Reservists activated pursuant to sections 672 and 673, T~tle 10 U.S.C., 

in support of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. 
PART H: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH ~IND STILL BLEW" 171 

The Clinton administration made a preliminary decision on 

industrial policy as it relates to defense by choosing to protect national nuclear shipbuilding capacity. Electric Boat in Connecticut 

was awarded a construction contract for another ship in the new 

class of submarine, the SSN-21 Seawolf, and Newport News in Virginia was awarded a construction contract for another nuclear aircraft carrier. These awards will keep both civilian shipyards in 

service at least for a few years. The latest SSN-21 award is also 

considered as a "bridge," that is, the last ship in this class while the 

Navy designs a new, smaller, less expensive ship to deal with the 

non-Soviet threat. 

These first policy actions focus the key issues on the debate 

over the industrial base. There is no question that the United States 

must have nuclear-capable shipyards for repair and overhaul of 

the large nuclear fleet, a fleet that will remain in service for decades. However, given that antisubmarine warfare is a low naval 

priority today (and probably for a long time to come) and that the 

Navy's current and planned submarine fleet is very young and inordinately more capable than that of any potential foe, the question of why new nuclear submarines are needed immediately must 

be addressed. Arguments for sustaining both the nuclear design 

and production capability have obvious merit. However, maintaining the bare minimum of necessary nuclear skills without the need 

to construct a new submarine every year or so does not seem to be 

an insurmountable policy alternative. 

Furthermore, regarding the new nuclear aircraft carrier, given 

that the Navy has 12 to 13 in service already and that most of 

these ships still have years of life left, the need to build another 

replacement at this juncture is not clear. Indeed, an alternative 

could have been to consolidate nuclear construction and repair at a 

single private yard in this case, Newport News as that is the only 

yard that can construct both CVNs and SSNs--and let Electric 

Boat wind down. It should also be noted that both Britain and 

France have maintained a small but sufficient nuclear shipyard 

capacity to support a handful of nuclear warships, a lesson not to 

be ignored by the United States. 

The fundamental considerations that underlie these issues and perrain as well to the other components of the industrial base concern the 
172 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE, NEw CENTURY 

degree of autarky to be obtained or foregone; where reliance on a 

single production source without competition is satisfactory; and 

at what rate the exploitation of technological superiority should be 

pursued. From a strategic, operational, and national perspective, 

it is on these considerations that the future industrial base should 

rest. Based on these factors, in 1994, Congress added $150 million 

to the defense budget for the purpose of maintaining B-2 "Stealth" 

bomber construction capability for another year. 

Regarding the degree and balance of autarky and competition, 

there is one potential solution to overcoming the short-term focus 

of the annual debate on the defense budget in which rational or 

economical choices are not always taken. At some stage, the executive branch should propose a plan specifying those defense sectors that can be autarkic and where competition can be lifted or 

put on a different footing through some type of incentive for singlesource suppliers. In fact, the DOD initiative to repay contractors 

some costs of merger and consolidation from future savings that 

may realized is an excellent incentive. Futhermore, although "dualuse" products and technologies with potential in defense and private markets are useful concepts to pursue, with certain specific 

products such as munitions, tanks, missiles, advanced combat aircraft, and warships, there is no civilian or commercial application 

other than military sales to foreign customers. From this starting 

point, Congress can choose to deal with these recommendations 

annually or possibly in a manner similar to BRAC that would avoid 

a permanent and ongoing debate while downsizing is completed. 

Another attempt at reconciling the dilemmas and conflicts 

within debate over industrial policy has been the notion of"roll-over." 

"Roll-over" means that companies would perform only the research 

and development and prototype production phases for a given system. Full-scale production would be deferred indefinitely unless 

or until needed. The advantages of "roll-over" reside in maintaining the cutting edge of industry and in developing new designs. 

The disadvantages are in costs or subsidies necessary to sustain 

an advanced base where profit has been in production and not R&D; 

making the transition to this newer system with these inappropriate profit incentives and their associated accounting systems; and 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 173 

the costs of retooling in crisis. As such, the disadvantages of 

"roll-over" seem far greater than the conceptual attraction. 

The rate and pace of pursuing advanced technology, however, is 

a separate issue that may be prime for alternative policy choices. 

The seemingly urgent call to exploit technology on an immediate 

basis has been a simple and universal objective for U.S. defense 

planning. The exploitation of technology and technological superiority, implicitly as a high priority, has been seen as a sensible, supposedly less expensive and operationally attractive way to offset 

the prowess, strength, and advantages of U.S. adversaries. The 

Truman administration was the post-war pathfinder for many of 

these arguments and policies. And, American technology has been 

extremely impressive. 

The major weapon systems of the late 1980s and 1990s--the MIA1 

main battle tank; the Aegis cruisers and destroyers; the SSN fleet; 

combat aircraft from the stealthy F-117 and B-2 to the F/A-18 and 

F-16; precision-guided munitions; and the command, control, targeting, and intelligence networks extending from the far reaches of space 

to the depths of the ocean--are all in classes by themselves when 

compared with competing systems. But none of these systems came 

free of charge. Given the relative and absolute advantages created 

fbr the U.S. lead in weaponry by the end of the USSR, the U.S. is and 

must be seen as the strongest, virtually unrivaled military power in 

the world with the world's best-performing weapons. 

Because of these absolute and relative military advantages, the 

urgency or rate at which the United States deploys and develops 

advanced technology is surely subject to review and change. It 

would be folly to abandon exploiting technological superiority on 

the grounds of our current and projected future advantages, and 

no serious analyst would suggest that. On the other hand, it would 

be nearly as unwise if the opportunity to alter the scale and scope 

of this exploitation were ignored in this post-Cold War world. 

At the same time, because U.S. weapon systems carry such advantage over most competing systems, this might be the opportunity to assess how many systems should be assigned to operational 

forces and individual units in their equipping. For example, when 

the U.S. Army replaced the M60 series tank with the M-1 series, 
174 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

the number of tanks per battalion was reduced from 63 to 55. But, 

in the same way that the Navy has reduced the size of its carrier 

air wings from about 90 to about 55 aircraft, does the actual combat superiority of the M-1 mean that its numbers per unit can also 

be reduced? Those reductions in platforms per unit would be 

reflected in aggregate totals that could also be reduced while leaving the number of formations and units unchanged. And, in the 

case of tanks, the surplus or remainder not needed by this new 

equippage standard could be assigned to a reserve or cadre status 

in the event reconstitution were needed. 

The United States can certainly afford to reduce the urgency 

and rate of exploiting technology. While achieving "leap-ahead" 

results remains a worthy objective, economies, efficiencies, and 

emphasis, and obtaining value for money spent should become 

higher priority criteria. Given the superiority of U.S. combat 

systems, there also may be excellent potential in scaling back 

the amount of equipment per unit to reflect these advantages. 

THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY BASE 

Sectors of the defense technology base extend beyond only the 

"defense industrial base." Of principal concern is the defense 

nuclear establishment needed for the design, testing, production, 

maintonance, storage, and security of atomic and thermonuclear 

weapons. The United States is physically losing the ability to produce nuclear weapons. Facilities both for the production of fissile 

material and for construction and maintenance of weapons are being 

closed. The reasons for many of these closures are related to laws 

and regulations that protect the "environment" and people from 

the consequences of nuclear radiation and hazards and have been 

impelled by the collapse of the strategic competition with the USSR. 

Remediation of contamination and destruction of fissile materials and 

weapons now have higher priority than production and maintenance. 

As the U.S. is moving to reduce and consolidate this nuclear 

capacity, the ability to produce tritium and deuterium, the hydrogen isotopes necessary in enhanced or boosted fission weapons and 

central to thermonuclear weapons, is disappearing. Thus, at some 
PART II: "CAND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 175 

point in the future, the U.S. could unilaterally reduce or eliminate 

its own nuclear capability simply by losing the ability to produce 

the necessary components. 

In the past, to ensure competition in designing nuclear weapons, the United States established and maintained two separate 

national design laboratories: Los Alamos National Laboratory in 

New Mexico and Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in California. 

In addition, the United States maintained a vast complex of 

laboratories and facilities vital to the production, overhaul, 

and testing programs for nuclear weapons. These facilities 

were managed by the Department of Energy and funded under the national defense account. 

The allegations and accusations of mismanagement, contamination, and other abuses have been epidemic. But, regardless of 

the merits or errors in these allegations, the U.S. still spends about 

$15 billion a year on the nuclear weapons complex. 58 Given that 

the demands for nuclear weapons have been vastly diminished, 

consolidation and downsizing of the nuclear base must be a wise 

move. Reexamining the premise that two design labs are necessary is an excellent beginning for this consolidation. 

INDUSTRIAL BASE SUMMARY AND CONSEQUENCES 

Against the specific industrial base choices that include laissezfaire, explicit industrial policy and nationalization, and means to 

alter the pace of and dependence on urgent exploitation of advanced 

technology, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment offered a menu of policy options in 1991. Table 34 reproduces those 

options. 59 

58 In 1993, the Department of Energy was authorized $17.3 billion, of 

which $12.1 were designated for ~atomic energy defense activities." DOD 

spent another $3-4 billion on related areas. Budget of the United States 

Government for FY 1994, p. A-81. 

59 Redesigning Defense: Planning the Transition to the Future US. Defense 

Industrial Base, Office of Technology Assessment, July 1991, pp. 14--15. 
176 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Table 34. Options for change in the Defense Technology Industrial Base 

"Tiers of the base 

Prime Subcontractor Supplier 

-lo 

rra 

t- 

._o 

o 

a_ 

(D 

-_= 

Current base 

Desired future 

base 

f Current base 

Desired future 

base 

Current base 

Desired future 

base 

Emphasis on systems Subsystem R&D 

development for funded through 

production production contracts 

from primes 

Emphasis on technology 

demonstration, prototyping, 

and potential production 

Subsystem R&D funded 

through government or 

commercial development 

Excess capacity, rapid 

production to field new 

systems and minimize 

unit costs 

Respond to subsystem 

requirements from 

primes for new platforms 

Reduced overall capacity, Respond to subsystem 

low rates of production to requirements for retrofit 

maintain warm base and of current platforms and 

and personnel skills new platforms 

Essential but limited in- Maintenance of 

volvement in maintenance subsystems 

Increased involvement Same as above 

in maintenance 

R&D generally driven 

by civil requirements 

Same as above 

Extensive integration 

with civilian base, 

concern over increasing 

internationalization of 

the supplier base 

RaOonalize supplier base 

to protect against 

potential vulnerabilities 

Not applicable 

Not applicable 

(Continued on next page) 
PART II: "AND THE, GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 177 

T~,ble 34. (Continued) 

Ownership 

Private GOCO a GOGOb 

~ ~.ICurrent base 

~o ,~ Desired future 

base 

(/" Current base 

o 

~- / Desired tuture 

base 

Scaling back on 

investment in R&D 

Explicit government 

funding of military-unique 

R&D; greater access to 

dual-use technologies 

Largest element;, operates 

competitively in a 

relativelyhigh-risk 

environment 

Reduced risk through 

multi-year contracting 

and more rational application of competition 

I Current base Essential but limited 

involvement in 

maintenance 

,) Desired luture Increased involvement 

"~ ( base in maintenance to 

maintain production \ capability 

Isolation trom civil 

sector 

More integration of 

commercial technologies 

and technology transfer 

Limited competition and 

reduced capital requirements; government 

moderates risk by providing some facilities and 

tools and gains eff¢iency 

of private management 

Relatively more reliance 

on GOCOs as a result 

of reduced peacetime 

production roquiroments 

and to meet surge targets 

for theater conflict 

Fragmented lab structure, 

lack of R&D strategy 

Consolidate labs to 

become world-oiass 

developers of specific 

military technologies 

Preserve unique military 

technologies that would be 

too costly or risky to produce in the private sector 

Same as above 

Maintenance of nuclear 

weapons primarily 

Major element of maintenance base, now undergoing consolidation 

Increase use of GOCOs Relatively reduced use, 

to reduce business risk, with sufficient depots to 

provide greater manage- maintain core 

ment efficiency capabilities 

a Government-owned/Contractor-operated. 

b Government-owned/Government-operated. 

Source: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991. 

(Continued on next page) 
178 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

T,~ble 34. (Continued) 

Industrial sectors 

Defense Combat 

electronics vehicles 

~-E~oa) e.)>(~o. ~ f Current base 

rr~ Desired future 

base 

Commercial sector Military-unique, 

dominates geared toward 

production 

Greater use of 

commercial 

developments 

Greater use of prototype 

development that may or 

may not lead to production 

"{3 .o 

13- 

Current base 

Desired future 

base 

Strict military requirements 

and specifications have isolated defense from civil 

sector 

Modified requirements 

and changed procurement 

procedures to allow increased use of civil sector 

Tremendous ovemapacity, 

anticipated trough in 

production 

Size plants for smaller, 

more realistic 

production rates 

( Current base 

E 

:~ Desired future 

base 

Maintenance performed 

mainly by services 

New designs decrease 

maintenance requests 

Maintenance performed 

mainly in service depots 

Competition between 

service depots and 

private sector 

(Continued on next page) 
PARr H: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 179 

Table 34. (Continued) 

Industrial sectors 

Shipbuilding Aerospace Ordnance 

~E 

o 

n-O 

2 

O. 

c 

Current base 

Desired future 

base 

Current base 

Desired future 

base 

Current base 

Desired future 

base 

Defense sector 

dominates, 

commercial sector 

not competitive 

Same as above 

Inadequate demand 

to maintain 

competition 

among shipyards 

Increased reliance 

on single sources for 

production of warships and submarines 

Maintenance pedorrned 

in beth public and 

private shipyards 

More private sector 

maintenance 

Robust, but largely 

focused on system 

development for 

production 

Shift in emphasis 

toward a more 

deSPerate 

development 

strategy and use of 

technology 

demonstrators 

Overcapacity, 

anticipated trough in 

produclJon 

Less frequent 

modernization, with 

retro|its and upgrades 

of existing platforms 

Maintenance pedorrned 

mainly in serwce depots 

Increased competition 

between service depots 

and private sector 

Military-unique, geared 

toward production 

Greater use of prototype 

development that may or 

may not lead to production 

Overcapacity, including 

mothballed munitions plants, 

yet questionable surge 

cepab~ty in many systems 

Reduced capacity, improved surge capability 

for selected items 

Maintenance pedormed 

mainly by services 

Same as above 
180 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROCESS 

Perhaps no single area within the defense establishment, and 

that includes Congress, is in need of more sweeping overhaul than 

the process by which the government obtains the goods and services for providing for the common defense. 60 That process is a 

mess that costs far too much, takes far too long, and imposes too 

many unnecessary roadblocks to reform. 

Acquisition spans items from ice cream to intercontinental ballistic missiles. Although the basic issues central to the acquisition 

process are simple namely deciding what to buy and how to buy 

it--few other sectors of enterprise are as overregulated, excessively 

managed, and scrutinized by layers of oversight as defense. 

Clinton's second secretary of defense, Dr. William J. Perry, has suggested that the cost of all this regulation and oversight amounts to 

about $20-30 billion a year. 

That the United States has become laden with an extraordinarily 

complex, overly regulated, costly acquisition process is no accident. 

The public wants U.S. forces to be equipped with the best weapons at 

a fair or reasonable price. However, ensuring value for money, including the effective testing and operation of these systems has been an 

elusive objective. The consequences have been a permanent contest 

between government and business that unfortunately has led to the 

current condition of super-regulation, oversight, and excessive expense. 

Literallyhundreds of'~orror" stories provide anecdotal evidence about 

the nature of the process. Six-hundred-dollar toilet seats and manythousand-dollar coffeepots were representative of the 1980s and 

allegations of DOD mismanagement. In truth, these two items 

were billed as required and demanded by the cost accounting system and not instances of fraud or illegality, even though attempts 

to criminalize these anomalies have grown. Regrettably, the system itself has been responsible. And the system has not improved. 

60 For perhaps the most comprehensive examination of this topic, see 

U.S. Defense Acquisition: A Process in Trouble, Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, 1987. 
PART H: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 181 

During the Desert Shield portion of the Gulf War, the Army 

had an immediate operational need to buy 6,000 handheld radios. 

Because of the 1984 Competition in Contracting Act, DOD would 

have had to seek a competitive bidding process for the radios. As 

there was no other manufacturer, one would have had to be created. Thus, the radios would not have been legally procured within 

months, let alone in time for the war. Instead, the Japanese government bought the radios and donated them to the United States. 

The list of these tales is endless. 

Today, the resulting process is one in which the time it takes to 

field weapon systems grows longer and longer. Time and money 

are directly proportional, and procurement costs continue to escalate above inflation. Oversight and regulation have increased dramatically. The tendency to prosecute mistakes under the criminal 

code has intensified. To avoid criticism of any program, fault-free 

or zero-defect procurement standards have been set that have complicated the process and have not worked. For example, during 

test and evaluation when an objective is to push systems to the 

limit and beyond to make them fail, that failure can be cited as 

evidence for ending the system. Hence, the very essence of test 

and evaluation can be corrupted by the politics of the process. 

In addressing the '%vhat to buy" question, the Department of Defense has increasingly relied on and formalized joint requirements 

established by military commanders in the field to determine program selection, particularly on those systems with application 

across the services such as command and control, targeting, and 

advanced munitions. By and large, the services have had the lead 

for service-specific systems such as ships or armored vehicles. 

Obviously, the secretary of defense retains the responsibility and 

authority for ultimate approval. 

In 1986, the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense 

Reform, named the Packard Commission after its chairman and 

former deputy secretary of defense, recommended that an under 

secretary of defense for acquisition be established. Through that 

under secretary, acquisition would be managed across the services, 

with responsible program executive officers reporting ultimately 

to this person. Whether this organizational change has helped or 
182 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

hindered the process is subject to debate, but certain realities must 

still be addressed regardless of organization: 

• First, operational needs and requirements must be translated into actual weapon systems. In this translation, if the 

specifications for the system are relatively sparse, the theory 

is that industry can be more efficiently and less expensively 

tasked to develop an appropriate program. If the specifications are detailed, government theoretically has more control of the program even though the costs associated with 

ensuring the detail is obtained can be vast. 

• Second, as the defense budget declines, fewer and fewer 

major systems are being acquired. For the first time in 

nearly 70 years, for example, the Navy has not a single newdesign aircraft in the development or production stage. 

• Third, with the collapse of the USSR and even with the requirement of the MRC as a foundation for planning, the 

availability of plausible and realistic scenarios for evaluating operational requirements and needs leading to system 

acquisition is problematic. 

• Fourth, the time it takes from concept inception to program 

production continues to increase, generally increasing costs. 

• Fifth, despite all the attempts at acquisition reform, improvemerit has been marginal at best, and, thus far, all attempts to 

bring Congress into any solution for reform have failed. 

The "how to buy" aspect of acquisition is perhaps in more serious difficulty than the "what to buy" aspect. Part of the problem 

includes a vast, overly complicated, and often contradictory regime 

of acquisition laws, rules, and regulations. Reform of these regulations, despite many attempts by many administrations, has failed 

even in the executive branch. The vice president's commission on 

"reinventing government" produced many useful recommendations 

on this account. However, in 1993, when the DOD tried to raise 

the threshold of contract bids to alleviate micromanagement, the 

Labor Department successfully intervened on the grounds that such 
PART II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH WIND STILL BLEW" 183 

a step, while producing efficiencies, would run counter to the 

Davis-Bacon legislation regarding minimum wage and therefore could not be sustained. 

To get value for dollar and to protect taxpayers, a huge system 

of oversight and inspection has been put in place. Armies of auditors, accountants, and quality-control personnel were unleashed 

by government and had to be matched by industry to create an 

appropriate interface for all this regulation and oversight. The 

result has been a huge increase in the cost of doing business. 

There is no single accounting system in government, and the 

cost accounting standards, particularly in addressing overhead 

charges, have led to erroneous pricing. Hence, many products in 

the commercial world costing a few dollars have been priced in the 

hundreds and thousands of dollars. These pricing anomalies have 

contributed to beliefs about the extent of"waste, fraud, and abuse" 

in defense contracting, even though virtually every example of these 

excesses was done as required by the rules. 

Each type of contractual arrangement, whether a version of 

firm fixed-price, in which the price is agreed to in advance, or costplus, in which any legitimate increases are borne by government, 

has certain advantages and disadvantages. These contractual realities must be understood and the proper vehicle used. For example, a firm fixed-price contract, i.e., when the price is set and 

fixed by both the buyer and seller, makes sense when the product 

is well established and efficient production rates can be achieved. 

Research and development and new programs where uncertainty 

abounds are generally the worst candidates for fixed-price contracts. 

The Navy's A-12 stealth attack fighter, which was canceled by Defense Secretary Cheney, suffered in large measure from a fixedprice contract that guaranteed failure by ensuring underfunding. 

On the other hand, political sensitivity to cost overruns makes this 

type of contracting quite attractive to government. 

In cost-plus contracting, the government pays the costs of design, 

development, and construction plus a certain percentage fee to the 

contractor. The "plus" is the profit. Although there are ranges of 

incentives and measures to control costs and regulate the "plus" or 

profit accordingly, the problem is that the government does not 

have the same guarantee of setting a spending ceiling in advance 
184 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

as with a fixed-price contract. These basics aside, if a program is 

badly managed or technically cannot meet performance specifications, the type of contract is not relevant. 

The inherent irony of the test and evaluation process was noted 

earlier. Weapons need to be tested and pushed to the limit; however, failure even in testing can be controversial or fatal to the program. Explaining this irony in simple political terms is not easy. 

Finally, Congress bears fundamental responsibility and accountability for its role and actions in the acquisition process. As noted, 

Congressional involvement and oversight have expanded dramatically. The reasons for this involvement are both good and bad and 

understandable. The net result has been an enormous cost and price 

imposed on the process. If any efficiencies of a substantive nature 

are to be achieved, Congress must become part of the solution. 

Even though all prior attempts at acquisition reform have had 

few positive and often negative results, the Clinton administration 

embarked on an ambitious program to reverse this impasse. During the first year and despite strong rhetoric for reform based on 

dual-use technologies, commercial specifications, and privatization 

where feasible, change has come slowly. The resignation of 

Secretary Aspin and the installation of Secretary Perry have not 

changed this rate of progress yet. ~1 

There is no alternative to pursuing effective acquisition reform. 

The costs are simply too great to continue unchecked. Specific recommendations follow in Part III. 

61 See Les Aspin's memo of November 16, 1993, on acquisition reform. 

He outlined twelve specific actions. However, Congress' failure to undertake Congressional reform and the abandonment of that reform effort 

suggests a rough road lies ahead for acquisition reform. (Aspin's first 

reform recommendations included: socio-economic and small business 

and simplified acquisition thresholds; commercial items; defense acquisition pilot program; military specifications and standards; contract formation; contract administration; major systems and testing statutes; 

defense trade and cooperation; intellectual property rights; contracting 

for commercial activities; service-specific acquisition laws; and standards 

of conduct.) 
PA~r II: "AND THE GOOD SOUTH ~rIND STILL BLEW" 185 

FINAL THOUGHTS ON INFRASTRUCTURE 

Downsizing any large organization from General Motors to the 

Department of Defense presents the most enormous difficulties that 

span economic, emotional, political, and personal considerations. 

That DOD is the largest business in the world was put in perspective years ago by Herman Kahn. To paraphrase Kahn's views, he 

brooded that the defense business was the only corporation in the 

world with 535 highly independent directors [the Congress], many 

with agendas inimical to the CEO and CO0 [President and Secretary of Defense]; whose budget was formulated usually at the last 

minute and good only for a year at a time; and whose success or 

failure was measured at the time, place, and choosing of a competitor who would break into our shops, stores, and outlets, kill as many 

of our employees as possible, and then proceed to loot and pillage. 

The underpinnings for this business are the infrastructure, and 

the infrastructure, constructed initially for the Second World War 

and then for the Cold War, is far in excess of what is needed for 

support of fighting capability and is far in excess of what can be 

sustained by future budgets if military muscle is to be maintained. 

Ideally, a single plan for downsizing this infrastructure would seem 

sufficient. Unfortunately, the political process has had great difficulty in addressing an issue of that magnitude in a single forum. 

Thus, the first step must be selling the need and urgency for a 

comprehensive approach and solution. 

During the 1980s when trust and confidence among the 

branches of government and the defense industries were at a low 

ebb, reform of acquisition was next to impossible to achieve because of the suspicions and animosities that aroused this mutual 

mistrust. In fact, public sentiment was so distrustful that 

criminalization of any wrongdoing became an expected outcome. 

The spectacular results of Desert Storm, combined with efforts by 

the Pentagon to downsize and a progressive reduction in defense 

spending, have cleared away some of the bad atmosphere that had 

poisoned relations through this period of intensified mistrust. 

In the 1990s, the mood is different. Opinion polls continue to 

show the public's negative and cynical view toward Washington 

and the inability of Federal Government to take effective action in 
186 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

redressing the basic problems this nation faces. No doubt the 

public still wants a strong defense and views its military with favor, but reductions to the infrastructure that are vital to keeping a 

strong defense directly attack local pocketbooks. Downsizing will 

intensify the need for good and better stewardship of resources. 

Errors and wrongdoing will become even less tolerable and more 

conducive to criminalization charges as this atmosphere worsens. 

Above all,jobs and economic security and well-being are threatened. Thus, the key in making sensible and necessary reductions 

in the infrastructure while dealing as fairly and humanely as possible 

with those who will be hurt in this process demands that appropriate and sufficiently attractive incentives are created to this end. 

Without such incentives, the effort to pare back the infrastructure 

in keeping with a ready force will not work. Sounding alarms about 

"hollow forces" and desiccated military morale, in light of possible 

base closings and job losses, simply will not carry the day. Thus, 

one of the principal recommendations of this book addresses the 

critical need for proper incentives to facilitate this process of 

downsizing and to make it work. 
PART III: SOLUTIONS, '~ITI-I A 

GOODLY COMPANY 

Within the spectrum of responsible political opinion, it would 

be difficult to find any Americans, outside of determined pacifists, 

who would take issue with the proposition that the United States 

needs a strong military capability. Indeed, a large majority of all 

Americans believes that the United States still requires the best or 

most capable military force in the world. But, beyond that basic 

belief and this broad consensus view, there is far less understanding of and agreement on what should constitute "best" or "most" 

and how much money is required to buy, maintain, and support 

the necessary level of military might. 

Part I examined the record of earlier post-war defense builddowns, including the current and continuing effort to reduce U.S. 

military power in an orderly and rational manner. It identified 

and analyzed the principal challenges and risks to the U.S. national security using three broad categories--strategic uncertainty, 

domestic introspection, and the extraordinary expense of the process. The practical consequences of these categories as they will 

affect defense will be to unbalance badly the new threat, strategy, 

force structure, budget, and infrastructure equation. 

The alarm was sounded that, without adjustment, the current 

U.S. defense program will prove fiscally unsustainable. The consequences of this impending fiscal mismatch will lead to a military 

force insufficient to meet the demands of the strategy, too large to 

be adequately supported by the budget, and devoured by the resource claims of a surviving and excessively large infrastructure. 

In all likelihood, although that force may be declared the world's 

most formidable, it is certain to suffer more than only "pockets" of 

hollowness, and its aggregate capability could be a third or so less 

than it was in 1994. 

Part II used the three broad policy choices of "Steady as you 

go," "Fund the force," and "Readjust and change" to establish the 

boundaries for examining the more specific components that make 

up defense. It then identified and assessed a comprehensive set of 

alternative military capabilities. These alternatives were derived from 
188 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

different mixes of the strategy, force structure, budget, and infi'astructure 

components. From this examination, plausible and realistic boundaries for defining future defense capabilities ~ere established. 

Part III conducts a cost-benefit analysis of the three broad 

choices. It then proposes specific solutions to deal with this seemingly inevitable spiral towards less and less military power. In 

general, these solutions will apply to the implementation of any or 

each of the three policy choices, although the most interesting and 

unusual case is that of readjustment and change. In all cases, however, the solutions will redress the imbalances between and among 

threat, strategy, force structure, budget, and infrastructure. 

The proposed solutions will, in the first instance, demand strong 

and enduring presidential leadership, action, and commitment if 

they are to succeed. But, because defense is only a small fraction 

of both the nation's current priorities and allocations of GDP, political reality will be to force the focus on the issues making up the 

other 96 percent of the budget. Should the president be unwilling, 

unable, or unpersuaded to take a strong stand in forcing action 

regarding defense, Congress becomes the court of last resort. But 

Congress is not designed or organized to replace the chief executive. 

Despite the inherent problems with a Congressionally mandated response to the issues of defense, without strong presidential leadership, there may be no alternative, even if the record of Capitol Hill 

taking charge of issues of importance is far from perfect and this 

attempt could also fail. 

The recommended actions also include an expanded and 

reengineered set of strategic alliances and relationships applicable 

no matter which choice for defense is taken. Consolidation of the 

infrastructure is vital if any significant efficiencies are to be 

achieved and if an affordable steady state of military capability is 

to be realized. Finally, if the choice of readjustment and change is 

made, successful implementation will require sufficiently attractive incentives to strike the right balance and match among threat, 

strategy, force structure, budget, and infrastructure. This new and 

future balance could be set so as to assure the best and most formidable military that is kept highly trained but at lower total levels 

of manning and at lower levels of defense spending. The incentive 

necessary to achieve this new balance is likely to be measured in 
PAaT III: SOLUTIONS--"WITH A GOODLY COMPAAry" 189 

terms of hundreds of billions of dollars that can be saved. Any 

lesser measure is unlikely to work 

But, no matter which of these paths is ultimately taken, there 

is one highly irresponsible outcome, namely that the future condition of U.S. military capability could be left to chance, deferral, or 

default. That unhappy condition, which will lead to "in irons," must 

not be allowed to happen, especially without full recognition and 

understanding of the consequences. 
190 I~ IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT ,[.V THE NEW CENTURY 

CHAPTER NINE: THE CHOICES EXA~'~ED 

For reasons that are analytical and commonsensical, future 

U.S. military might will be defined by one of the three choices. 

Each choice has risks and rewards, advantages and flaws. Each 

choice also will benefit from the proposed reforms and recommendations that apply regardless of policy preference. In fact, in all 

cases, real reform is essential if an affordable, steady-state level of 

military might is to be maintained. 

The most likely outcome will be "Steady as you go," probably 

through a path of least political resistance. Regardless of how this 

choice occurs, the objectives, strategy, and foundation specified by 

the Bottom-Up Review would be largely maintained. Defense 

spending would not keep up with the needs of the forces. The 

result would be a continuing and, at some stage, perhaps debilitaring erosion in U.S. military power. Because this hollow condition will not be fully manifested for several years and may not 

then prove catastrophic, complacency over these future consequences now is not without certain appeal. 

There is no dangerous, mortal threat to the nation that demands immediate attention. Despite the occasional specter of a 

second Korean war or some other international event becoming a 

flashpoint, the United States will concentrate predominately on 

domestic matters. Because it may be several years before the signs 

of military decay become unmistakable, this hiatus allows time 

for the U.S. economy to improve, meaning that more resources may 

be available when future remedial action is taken. 

Because downsizing both infrastructure and defense must be 

achieved through the political process, the prospect of major conflict 

between the White House and Congress is real. Issues such as health 

care and crime that are perceived as, and may be, more significant 

could be held hostage to the process of negotiating defense drawdowns and base closures. Thus, taking tough or unpopular steps to 

protect or reform defense could lead to unhappy consequences in 

these more politically visible or important matters. Given the general paucity of political capital, the smarter tactical decision could 

be to leave well enough, meaning defense, alone. 

The choice of "Steady as you go" has three major weaknesses 

and flaws even if it is undertaken with full recognition of the 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--aWITH A GOODLY COMPA~\~T '' 191 

consequences for military power. First, a degraded military posture 

may in fact prove harmful to the national interest. This possibility 

is unprovable in advance and may not occur. It is still a risk. 

Second, the opportunity for imposing change or reform may be 

wasted, dissipated, or simply lost. If the international realities 

were such that undertaking a major readjustment made great strategic and economic sense now and no action were taken, it may be 

extremely difficult to exploit a similar condition in the future if it 

continued. Indeed, it could be shortsighted to expect significant 

change would not occur. 

Third, failure to act or even to recognize these disturbing trends 

could be irresponsible in fact and seen as such as military might 

degraded. This failure could further delegitimize the authority of 

government as far as the public is concerned. Trust and confidence would be shaken and weakened. Although measuring the 

psychological impact of declining credibility and authority of government is a difficult or impossible task, it should not be assumed 

that no damage will be done. 

To summarize, the virtues of "Steady as you go" are that this 

choice follows the path of least political resistance; it emphasizes 

the primacy of domestic issues as seen by the electorate; and it is 

likely that some period of grace will be available for future corrective action to be made. The weaknesses of "Steady as you go" are 

largely conjectural. There is no evidence that even a significant 

decline in military power will matter. If no crisis intervenes, nothing much may have been lost cxcept the opportunity to shift substantial resources from defense elsewhere to other problems. 

Alternatively, there is the choice to "Fully fund the BUR force." 

Funding, in this case, means spending more money or imposing 

reform that frees up additional defense resources, or some combination of the two. The advantages of this choice reside in the degree to which stability and peace are assured or guaranteed by 

maintaining current levels of U.S. military strength, along with 

commitments and overseas presence. If there is a direct correlation between U.S. force capability and future security and stability, 

a failure to fund to that level will result in negative consequences. 

The amount required to correct the shortfall would be between 

$20 billion and $50 billion per year, moving toward the larger figure in later years; in any case, the total could be in the hundreds of 

billions of dollars before this century ends. 
192 I~ IRONS: US. MILITARY .~/IIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

The difficulties associated with this choice are principally 

political and economic. These difficulties are directly opposite to 

the virtues of "Steady as you go." By not precipitating political 

controversy over defense, other agenda items may be protected. 

By forcing debate on defense, these other and perhaps more important priority issues may be put at risk. 

Third is the choice to "Readjust and change." The risks and rewards are a magnification of those associated with the second choice. 

The principal advantage is seizing the opportunity to size U.S. defense capability by bringing threat, strategy, force structure, budget, 

and infrastructure into a new balance. Like the other choices, this 

choice will benefit from reform and indeed is dependent on reform. 

Another and singular major advantage of successfully administering 

this choice is the possibility of freeing up a substantial amount of 

resources, perhaps upwards of hundreds of billions of dollars over 

time, and using these resources to resolve other problems. 

Aside from generating intense debate, there is the question of 

whether less U.S. military power, no matter how rationally achieved, 

is in the country's best interest. Those who favor the Bottom-Up 

Review force will argue that this is the level of military power 

below which the United States cannot and should not descend. As 

noted, however, the BUR force has substantive strategic and conceptual problems worth repeating. 

If the earlier analysis is correct, the Bottom-Up Review force is 

currently and probably fatally underfunded. Regardless, to some 

critics, the BUR force structure cannot carry out now the objectives of the two major regional conflict scenarios and therefore is 

flawed for operational reasons. To other observers, the BUR force 

exceeds the nation's genuine needs. No matter whether either of 

these or even another view is correct, the criticism remains that an 

imbalance of one sort or another exists among funding realities, 

force capabilities, and planning objectives. While this criticism suggests that little may have changed from the days of the "2-1/2 war" 

and the "1-1/2 war" scenarios regarding a "force-budget mismatch," 

what is different today is that the harm done by the structural 

erosion of military might has become far worse. Without the real 

threat, with growing demands on the defense share of the budget 

by non-defense priorities, with growing "cost creep," and, t~nally, 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--"I~rITH A GOODLY COM'PANY" 193 

with an unhealthy disparity between "teeth" and "tail," the new 

mismatch will prove far more challenging to military power than 

perhaps any time in the nation's history. 

After Les Aspin's resignation as secretary of defense, President 

Clinton has held firmly to supporting the rationale for and the conclusions of the BUR. Aspin's replacement, William Perry, was a 

key member of the team that conducted the BUR. Thus, it is unlikely that complete abandonment of the BUR will occur in this 

administration even though a "BUR II" reappraisal seems likely 

and may alter or revise some of the orginial construct. 

Second, only one of the four dangers that provided the foundation for the BUR is fully relevant to defense as a principal mission. 

The need to wage war in line with the MRCs is clearly the principal and legitimate responsibility of the DOD. However, what seems 

as the equal status of the other three dangers to national security 

should be questioned as the continuing basis for DOD planning. 

There is no doubt that the failure of democratization in the FSU is 

a real danger. There is more than doubt over the question of whether 

this should be a principal foundation for DOD planning or should 

rest, instead, elsewhere in the government. 

Economic security and the danger of its failure are vital matters in framing national objectives. This danger is not, however, a 

principal objective for DOD. The Congress, NEC, Treasury, Federal Reserve, and other financial institutions are more centrally 

concerned with economic security than is DOD. To be sure, defense conversion is important, as is maximizing the military value 

gained for the defense dollar spent. But on the grounds of the size 

of the economic impact of defense (i.e., less than 4 percent of GDP) 

and relevance, economic security should not be principally a DOD 

concern or function. 

Finally, the dangers of proliferation of advanced weapons and 

weapons of mass destruction are, of course, real. However, the 

implications of these dangers for the DOD should be more properly 

viewed as subsets of the MRCs and not as principal or stand-alone 

responsibilities for setting overarching DOD policy. For example, 

eliminating an adversary's air force or armor may be first-order 

wartime priorities, but neither is the overriding objective in establishing DOD priorities. Surely, as with arms control and foreign 
194 IN IRONS: US. ~'~ILITA.RY M1GHT IN rile NEW CENTURY 

military assistance, DOD has a substantive but secondary role to 

play. The same should be true of proliferation. 

This discussion leads to several important conclusions for DOD 

and its principal responsibilities. First, from a management and 

resource perspective, DOD must be primarily concerned with organizing, equipping, and training the forces to fight and win across 

a range of wars and conflicts. The MRCs provide the criteria and 

the operational requirements that rightly should guide and determine DOD programming and budget decisions. 

Second, the planning assumption of two MRCs must be reexamined 

in terms of how many MRCs are enough and what is needed to win 

an MRC. As currently envisaged, the requirements posed by the MRCs 

will exceed the planned force capabilities if the budget shortfalls are 

not closed and if full simultaneity (i.e., meeting both MRCs at the 

same time) is not achieved. On the other hand, U.S. capabilities may 

have increased since 1991 as many more of the systems that helped 

win Desert Storm have entered service. Indeed, the demands of the 

M_RCs may well have been set in excess of what could prove to be 

operational reality as a safeguard to ensure that enough U.S. military 

capability was available to win decisively. 

Third, requirements for forces outside those generated by the 

MRCs to carry out missions of presence, forward basing, and overseas deployments must be carefully assessed as to whether they 

are additive (or additional) or should be met by the force levels and 

capabilities established only by the MRCs. 

Fourth, to obtain broad understanding, consensus, and support for 

U.S. military power not only at home but also overseas, a basic and understandable framework for articulating the strategy for and use of these 

forces must be developed beyond responding to only MRCs. This articulation becomes more important if the four dangers posited by the administration and underpinning the DOD rationale are revised and more vital 

as domestic priorities dominate strategic and operational considerations 

giving rise to worries about American retrenchment. 

In the past and during periods of danger and turmoil, the United 

States was able to make do with relatively small standing armies, 

relying on other policy tools for protecting U.S. security. From the 

onset of the Cold War, the general and more recent strategy was to 

deter and contain the USSR from aggressive or hostile actions, and 
PARr III: SOLUTIONS--"~ITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 195 

the use of force was always vital yet symbolic and political in that 

sense. In practice, only against other states or actors did the U.S. 

actually apply force in anger. In the post-Cold War world, the concept seems to be to extend the role of deterrence and containment 

to a regional basis. Yet, deterring or containing regional instability, the new rationale for U.S. strategy, lacks the specificity for 

defining future military capability and perhaps the plausibility for 

generating domestic consensus on that strategy. 

Before moving to solutions, the actions of three previous presidencies are relevant, perhaps surprisingly so, to the challenges facing 

us. These examples are drawn from three presidents not normally 

associated or grouped together--George Washington, Harry Truman, 

and Richard Nixon--regarding foreign and strategic matters of their 

day. 62 Spanning nearly the full life, thus far, of the nation, the sweep, 

scope, and reasoning for their actions offer an interesting perspective 

from which to address the issues of today and tomorrow. 

America, during the last quarter of the 18th century and well 

into the 19th century, was in a most precarious form of isolation. 

The fate of the republic literally rested in the hands of England 

and France and was modulated by other European states, principally Spain and Holland. American diplomacy of that period, conducted by Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, 

John Jay, James Madison, and others, was both sophisticated and 

finely balanced. During the War of Independence, cajoling and keeping France as an ally was vital. After the Treaty of Paris ceded 

independence to the colonies, one of George Washington's major 

tasks was to protect and nurture a small and weak United States 

as a separate, independent country by maintaining this delicate 

perch between Britain and France. 

62 The lessons of George Washington as well as arguments supporting a 

complementary approach to foreign policy based on objectives similar to 

my own are found in the exceptionally useful book A Breakfast for 

Bonaparte written by Dr. Eugene Rostow and published by The National 

Defense University in 1993. 
196 IN IRo,vs: US. MZLXrA~.Y MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

That George Washington is invariably misquoted in his famous 

farewell address delivered at Frauncis Tavern in New York in March 

of 1797 is suggestive of the failure to understand the nature of 

these policies. Washington is alleged to have counseled to "steer 

clear of foreign entanglements." What he said, in fact, was to avoid 

"permanent alliances." What he meant was the need for the United 

States to remain agile and flexible in its security, balancing the 

appetites and interests of larger more powerful states against each 

other. The result was a highly sophisticated diplomacy that simultaneously protected the United States from possible foreign domination 63 and would facilitate its extraordinary growth largely 

through future purchases and acquisition of the bulk of the continent that would lead to and assure prosperity and greatness. 

The skill and flexibility of security policy under presidents 

Truman and Nixon were described earlier. From Truman comes 

the lesson of relying on non-military instruments of policy and less 

on raw military power during times of momentous and unsettling 

change. From Nixon comes the value of strategic vision using the 

rapprochement with China and the Nixon Doctrine as the basis for 

the transition from planning for "2-1/2 wars" to planning for "1-1/2" 

wars. While slogans and shorthand expressions are no substitute for 

sound strategic thought and plans, the lessons and applications are 

obvious and instructive in using flexibility, agility, common sense, and 

strategic vision. The implications hold for future U.S. security. 

Constructive U.S. leadership and engagement in international matters remain vital. The United States provides stability, continuity, and 

reassurance in an otherwise turbulent world with perhaps greater 

emphasis on regional rather than global events. However, a greater 

degree of dexterity and agility is required in these unfolding times 

of turbulence. The lesson from George Washington underscores 

the value in balancing the interests of others against the interests 

of the United States. This is more than a simple balance-of-power 

model or a condition trivialized by the view that my neighbor's 

neighbor is my ally and is my neighbor's foe. The geostrategic era 

63 During the first, infant decades of the United States, the nation fought 

Britain after the Revolution in the War of 1812 and fought an undeclared 

war with France in 1801-1803. 
PARr III: SOLUTIONS--"~'~rITH A GOODLY COMPA.NY ~ 197 

with emphasis on military force and great power interaction has 

receded, perhaps indefinitely. Skill and subtlety in advancing security and geoeconomic interests are the orders of the new day in which 

regional tensions and conflict may be assuming more relevance. 

The Truman legacy is one of grace under fire and the realization that rationality and common sense are essential, particularly 

when events are transpiring against U.S. interests. But the obverse is also true when events are conspiring to advance 

U.S. interests. Imagination and pragmatism can reinforce or multiply these advantages and opportunities, especially when applied 

across the many instruments of policy. 

The Nixon legacy is a mixture of the actions of the first and the 

thirty-third presidents. Dexterity and flexibility combined with 

strategic imagination and common sense can yield new frameworks 

for security. These became the Nixon Doctrine. By adapting relevant aspects of each of the legacies, a framework of new and rejuvenated strategic alliances, based not on the quantitative or 

numerical level of U.S. involvement measured in military force 

but instead on qualitative criteria that combine strategy, diplomacy, 

imagination and common sense, can better and more effectively 

respond to the fundamental challenges posed by strategic uncertainty. 

In developing any policy or strategy, there first needs to be a 

basic formulation of objectives. National security objectives can be 

translated into foreign policy goals, and the two sets of criteria can 

serve as the framework for defense policy, defense strategy, and 

the operational requirements that define force structure and employment. In November of 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher 

outlined the major priorities for U.S. foreign policy before the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee. These priorities specified economic 

security; support for political and economic reforms in Russia and the 

newly independent states (NIS); Europe and NATO; Asia and the 

Pacific; the Middle East; non-proliferation; and other global issues. 64 

64 The best formal statement of U.S. national security and foreign policy 

views is contained in the President's Budget of the United States for Fiscal Year 1995. See Chapter Six. 
198 IN IRONS: US. MxLrrARY .L~IIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

In general, the Clinton administration has pursued these goals 

through highly specific and visible single issues such as assistance 

for the FSU, NAFTA, GATT, and the American-Pacific Economic 

Cooperation Conference. However, unlike George Washington, 

Harry Truman, and Richard Nixon and their presidencies, there is 

no broad framework or design for integrating and implementing 

these priorities as part ofa grander national security strategy and 

policy. Instead, the Clinton administration has chosen to react serially to events attempting to allow solutions to each to form the 

texture of broader policy. 

Creating such a framework is not inherently difficult. For 

example, the United States is vitally committed to peace and 

security and to the rule of law and order in international politics 

and diplomacy. The demise of the USSR has consigned to the United 

States the role of single superpower and the opportunity as global 

superpower of applying its good offices to ensuring peace and security and the rule of law where and how that may be appropriate. 

This responsibility is real, readily understood, and generally supported by most Americans. 65 

In this role, the U.S. simply does not have (and probably never 

did have) the resources in treasure, blood, and national interest 

to envisage itself as the global cop. Arrogance aside, certain 

physical limitations cannot be dismissed. Hence, the commitment to 

peace, stability, and the rule of law cannot and should not be 

matched with a policeman's uniform or with a strong declaratory preference for morality and human rights that may prove 

unachievable or unenforceable. 

While human rights are noble and important objectives, in many 

cases unfettered pursuit of this goal is simply counterproductive. 

Not every state has the same view of human rights as we do. Indeed, 

had China the oil capacity of the Gulf states, perhaps U.S. actions 

on human rights in both regions would be vastly different. The 

U.S. record at home is not without blemish. As long as careful 

65 Note that this responsibility is not to become the world's policeman 

nor to enshrine human rights or a related moral preference as the key or 

major criterion for basing U.S. policy. Certainly this point on the place of 

human rights is not without controversy, but the discussion on both points 

is short and, beyond this discussion, outside the boundaries of this book. 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--"WITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 199 

choice must be made as to where and when the U.S. should intervene 

on behalf of human rights and as long as the U.S. is unable to show 

a pure or perfect record itself, the use of human rights as an enforceable policy must be tempered. Indeed, there are cases where 

national interests far outweigh considerations of human rights. The 

World War II alliances against Hitler are most relevant in which 

autocratic and repressive Russia and China were staunch partners with the democratic West. 66 

Consequences for foreign and defense policy must flow from 

this general policy framework of commitment to peace, stability, 

and the rule of law. Here, the legacies of the three presidents are 

relevant. The U.S. must be engaged internationally in a manner 

that combines elements of flexibility and reassurance and, in many 

cases, as a facilitator in pursuing peace and security. Commitment 

to this new regime for policy, as in the Nixon Doctrine, must place 

more responsibility on regional states and partners buttressed by 

the "qualitative" support of the United States. That qualitative 

support includes but is not limited to the United States' good ofrices, its strategic "sinews," and military strength, including interlocking communications and intelligence networks, logistics and 

lift capacity, and, of course, trade and economic relationships. 

All this suggests that the United States should be fashioning a 

worldwide network of positive interactions, building in some cases 

on its vital alliances such as NATO and through new regional 

security mechanisms created for discussion, debate, and, as appropriate, action in pursuit of peace, security, and the rule of law. 

In parallel, there must be a series of major domestic actions at 

least equivalent to this reformulated foreign policy framework. These 

actions must deal with the consequences of introspection and preoccupation with domestic policy as they affect the broader security and 

correcting the extraordinary cost and expense of governance. 

To make this work, there needs to be a considerable expenditure 

of courage, endurance, and political capital. Opponents, critics, and 

skeptics will abound on the need and ability for making substantial 

66 On the other hand, the strategic use of human rights as employed against 

the FSU had an important objective. The distinction, however, was between 

strategic and moral purposes, a distinction not to be ignored. 
200 IN IRON'S: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

changes in national security and defense. Many will raise powerful 

objections and reasons why this cannot be done. Uncertainty about 

the future of reform in Russia and the occasional presence of autocrats and neo-fascists will be alleged as hard evidence to mitigate 

major defense policy shifts. Economic fears over the loss of military and military-related employment and the diminishment of the 

industrial and technical base are only likely to grow and to be used 

as counters to downsizing. Predictions occasioned by defense reductions will flow about the irreversible damage likely to be done 

to the perception of a strong and actively engaged United States by 

allies and adversaries alike. Last, some may argue that President 

Clinton's record on the Vietnam War and his lack of military service will become greater political liabilities if defense is reduced 

much further. But, on balance, these and related arguments will 

prove largely off the mark. 

U.S. military power is certainly going to be reduced, and perhaps substantially, by the very nature of the political process that 

will cut spending while possibly imposing additional operational 

tasks or assignments and by the corrosive factors long in place that 

attack efficiency and effectiveness in using resources wisely. Something must be done. If corrective actions are taken to avoid the 

syndrome of"in irons," then, even at a certain fraction of its current power, the U.S. military will still be the most formidable and 

the most capable force in the world. Concurrently, with this passage of strategic eras, there is the unique but temporary opportunity to reexamine and adjust many of the assumptions on which 

our security has been based. These assessments can lead to defining 

more concise and relevant strategic and infrastructure objectives and, 

ultimately, to the smaller, right-sized force to serve our needs. 

To complete the arguments for implementation of actions made 

possible and desirable by strategic change is the issue of the future 

role of force and how much will be enough. Regional instability 

and civil and ethnic strife are endemic and, for better or for worse, 

are part of global politics. It is very difficult to see, however, how 

force can be directly and effectively applied to ending all these civil 

instabilities except at levels of loss and cost that are unacceptable 

certainly to the U.S. public. 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--"WITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 201 

Suppose, for example, reform fails in Russia and an autocratic 

or despotic regime seizes power. Whether the U.S. has one million 

or five million people under arms is not immediately relevant to 

preventing the failure of democracy in Russia unless direct U.S. or 

Western intervention was contemplated. Should that same regime 

look outwardly to expand or to lean on its neighbors at a future 

point, appropriate counteractions would have to be taken. But, it 

is hard to imagine at this hypothetical time in a future that may 

never transpire, that the situation would be more perilous than it 

was in 1946, 1947, or 1948, when the U.S. had demobilized its forces 

and NATO and other alliances still remained largely gleams in 

various strategic eyes. 

Admiral Arleigh Burke, who served as U.S. Chief of Naval Operations from 1955 to 1961, provided the appropriate and prophetic 

metaphor for describing how we should proceed in this new era. 

Confronted then by debate and intent to build thousands and thousands of nuclear systems, in his view beyond our needs and beyond 

what could be strategically useful, Burke remarked of his childhood in Colorado. As a boy, he was alive at a time when there were 

still lots of cowboys alive and well in the West. They all wore "sixguns." But, observed Burke, "you never saw a cowboy with three 

guns. Two were usually enough." Indeed, in this new era, the 

equivalent of two six-guns is certainly enough. 
202 IN IRONS: U.S, MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

CHAPTER TEN: NEW STRATEGIC A, LLIANCES 

The challenges of strategic uncertainty for national security 

rest in the inability to predict the future and the unknowable longterm consequences of the end of a single massive and unifying threat 

around which a suitable strategy and sustainable accompanying 

level of military force could be built, maintained, and justified. Regardless of which of the broader choices may be taken, one means 

of strengthening U.S. security and defense is through rejuvenating 

old strategic alliances and creating new frameworks. This approach 

is independent of force levels and is applicable in virtually every 

case. What is required, however, is commitment to putting in place 

a more rigorously defined and articulated policy framework to draw 

together the many distinct and oi~en loose threads that characterize the current condition of U.S. national security. 

Assume for the moment that the United States accepts and 

articulates as its major security objectives the commitment to safeguard or advance security, peace, and the rule of law in conjunction 

with its interests and those of its friends, allies, and partners. In 

other words, the United States is expressing the need for cooperative or collective security in which it is prepared to play a significant and even dominant role provided a sense of partnership can 

be sustained. That "partnership" can be defined in different ways 

across different regions and different strategic needs dependent 

upon the different circumstances. 

For example, the NATO alliance would be regarded in this view 

as the closest form of partnership bound by treaty, history, and 

nearly fifty years of unparalleled success. Partnership with Central Europe and the FSU would be defined in different terms but 

with the ultimate objective of bringing those states into NATO or a 

NATO-like security arrangement. In Asia, partnership through 

bilateral treaty arrangements with Japan and Korea could be 

complemented by new frameworks that could include even North 

Korea. Nor should Africa be exempt. 

The thrust of these actions would be to construct the equivalent of a "new Nixon Doctrine" or at least a modified version of one. 

Responsibility for regional security would rest largely with regional 

states. In some cases, the U.S. role would be vital and central, such 

as in NATO. In other cases, the U.S. role need not always be so 

essential or visible as leader. The United States would provide the 
PART III: SOLUTIONS~"WITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 203 

strategic framework and, perhaps more importantly, the "strategic 

sinews" in the form of its vast communications and logistics and its 

economic capacity. In other words, the U.S. would be the facilitator 

and provider of capabilities not available in the region. The 

majority of military forces would come from within the region. 

The combination of these contributions would serve as reassurance for security, peace, and the rule of law. Regional states would 

assume specific responsibility perhaps for peacekeeping and other 

initiatives that may be required. 

Peace and security would be defined and measured in broad 

strategic, economic, social, and military terms, but not necessarily 

with a universal or absolute bias. In other words, any U.S. ideology or conviction about what defines peace and security would be 

muted and would not be automatically applicable in each case or 

region. And, the role of the United Nations would be appropriately 

integrated or modulated. How would this work? 

The most vital alliance for the United States and for global stability among industrial states remains NATO. NATO is the linchpin for assuring security and stability throughout Europe and, with 

skill, perhaps could assume a broader role throughout Eurasia. 

While fundamentally and overwhelmingly an alliance based on 

mutual defense of its membership, NATO has the flexibility to adapt 

to a changing future, as it demonstrated at the 1991 Rome 

Summit. The future condition, health, and construct of 

NATO, however, have yet to be defined, certainly in irreversible terms. Specific realities, challenges, and issues will inescapably bound that definition and direction. 

NATO is, above all, a threat-based military alliance. This simple 

proposition was a great strength during the Cold War. In the future, 

the issue around which NATO's relevance will rest is how well or how 

badly NATO makes the transition from what was a single threatbased military alliance to "something else." The first steps were 

begun at Rome in 1991 and continued at the Brussels Summit in 

January 1994. This "something else" will be a function of many overlapping, sometimes competing, and occasionally contradictory factors. 

There are four concentric groupings of states and regions with 

interests and security concerns of direct relevance to NATO. The 

first grouping is the alliance itself and includes the competing interests and differences, as well as the common interests, of member states 

on both sides of the Atlantic. The second is the former Soviet Union. 
204 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

The third comprises the Eastern and Central European states outside 

the FSU. Fourth are the so-called "out of area" regions, principally 

the Middle East and Persian Gulf, which are of immediate interest 

to NATO as an alliance and to its membership. Each of these four 

groupings will and must be affected by and will affect whatever 

course of action NATO follows. Unlike during the Cold War, there 

are no East-West constraints or bipolar forces that mitigate the 

impact of oblique, colliding, or diverging interests from complicating future action by NATO. 

Within NATO, certain powerful centrifugal forces are at work. 

These forces tend to be exacerbated by normal economic competition, 

particularly at times when economies are retrenching or receding. 

There continues to be erosion in the strength of the transatlantic link. 

The end of the Warsaw Pact has been the obvious contributing factor. 

However, differences over policies and responsibilities to resolve the 

conflict in Bosnia have been serious. Unless and until there is more 

clarity in defining NATO's needs and responses regarding alliance 

expansion eastward, this erosion will not be reversed. 

Concurrently, national political and domestic economic concerns 

of NATO member states cast darker shadows over the broader interests of the alliance. The growing trend towards regionalization 

of and preoccupation with subregional and proximate security concerns is not abating. Declines in defense expenditures continue in 

all of NATO's members and certainly in the non-Russian states of 

the former Warsaw Pact. Current estimates suggest that, during 

the remainder of this decade, European NATO states will reduce 

their military forces by half or more from the levels that existed 

during the waning days of the Cold War. 

In light of these perspectives, it is not surprising that intuitive 

understanding and support of NATO by its publics vary considerably on both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe, there is inherent 

appreciation of the continuing need for NATO and for active American 

leadership and participation. Two world wars and one cold war 

this century are ample reasons for these beliefs. The alliance, with 

strong U.S. engagement, offers reassurance and insurance. 

Furthermore, only the United States can act as a restraint or ultimate arbiter should tensions among European NATO partners 

escalate to dangerous levels. Serious and even seemingly irreconcilable differences over particular policy issues such as whether 

and how to intervene in Bosnia and how or how quickly to extend 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--aWITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 205 

membership eastward may come and go. However, from a European 

perspective, these divergences can be balanced by the realization 

that there is no alternative to strong U.S. leadership and involvement in a NATO that is at least relatively vibrant. 

The U.S. public, on the whole, does not appear to share this 

level of intuitive understanding, interest, and support for NATO. 

The end of the USSR, in the view of many Americans, has ended 

the rationale and need for NATO. The prospect of expanding 

U.S. commitments eastward to include possible defense of former 

Soviet republics as distant as Kazakhistan is not credible. The 

threat of an expansionist or remilitarized Russia is not sufficiently 

daunting to much of the U.S. public as justification for continuing 

the size and expense of current commitments to NATO. Perhaps 

emergence of a serious and dangerous neo-fascist leader could 

change these views. 

The current U.S. proposal for NATO that was unanimously approved by the membership in January 1994 is the Partnership for 

Peace (PFP). The purpose of the PFP is "to deepen NATO's engagement with the East and draw the new democracies to the 

West. ''67 The partnership is open to all European countries, including the states of the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. 

The PFP is an "evolutionary...and step by step" process that, with 

NATO approval, could lead, over time, to expanded membership. 

Active partners will have representation at NATO headquarters 

in Brussels, and military cooperative efforts will ensue. In crisis or 

imminent threat to the "territorial integrity, political independence, 

or security of any partner state, it will have the right to consult 

and engage in intense political dialogue with alliance members. ''6s 

There is a purposeful vagueness about the PFP that offers the 

promise of security to the East while not forcing or rushing any 

timetable. The details will evolve and will have to be worked out 

over time. By deferring specific action now, events in Russia and 

Central Europe will have the opportunity to run their course and 

perhaps be sorted out. All in all, the PFP could be successful once 

67 See Warren Christopher, "NATO Plus," the Washington Post, January 9, 1994, p. C7. In June 1994, Russia accepted membership in the PFP. 

68 Ibid. The article by the U.S. secretary of state is perhaps the most 

concise discussion of the PFP available. 
206 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

a set of long-term conditions and criteria for NATO expansion can 

be defined and approved. 

There are, however, inherent problems likely to arise from any 

set of long-term objectives for the alliance and the PFP. The 

dilemma posed by the transition from a threat-based alliance to 

something else is the most obvious. Because nurturing "reform 

and democracy" are purposes of the PFP, the vision or outcome of 

all this would seem to be a more stable, more economically viable, 

and presumably peaceful western, central, and eastern Europes, 

including the FSU. But that outcome directly contradicts the purpose and core mission of NATO, which is defense of the alliance. In 

this happy case of future success, what is to be defended against? 

The logic of success appears to be Marxist: a withering away of the 

alliance as the grounds for its existence evaporate. 

Should the PFP lead to expansion of NATO membership, the 

question of extending commitments and security guarantees eastward is non-trivial. Ultimately, the incorporation of all former 

members of the Warsaw Pact into NATO, however remote the prospects are, could obviously transform the character of the alliance 

into a mini-UN or some other large and perhaps unwieldy organization more appropriate to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Western European Union (WEU). 

Incorporation of some but not other or all European states into 

NATO could establish political boundaries and divisions that foment and do not alleviate tension. Thus, the future of the PFP is 

not without certain difficulties and cannot be assumed, as yet, as 

an automatic cure. Indeed, in 1994, the impact of the PFP on future Pentagon plans is still an embryo. 

For the moment, NATO has deferred taking decisions on resolving and defining the specifics of the PFP and what could become the irreconcilable issue of expanded membership. On the 

U.S. side, there will be grave reservations about expanding U.S. 

commitments eastward that would have to be met by some level or 

promise of U.S. military capability. In a bizarre situation where 

perhaps Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine applied for and were 

granted NATO membership, if any of those states were threatened 

or attacked by Russia, conceivably, U.S. forces could be sent as part 

of a NATO response. Or, indeed, the threat of nuclear escalation 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--"WITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 207 

could reemerge perhaps with ten or more instead of the original 

four nuclear states. On the other hand, without dealing seriously 

with changed conditions in European security, NATO could be signing it own death warrant. 

NATO has had long and successful experience in dealing with 

and resolving seemingly intractable or irreconcilable dilemmas. Greece 

and Turkey have been at each other's throats for centuries, and Cyprus 

has been an island of contention and spilled blood between these erstwhile allies. In October 1956, the alliance was nearly fractured by 

the Suez Crisis and an Arab-Israeli war. British, French, and Israeli 

troops seized the canal and occupied a substantial part of Egypt. They 

were forced to withdraw by the United States, verbally supported by 

the Soviet Union then in the midst of a bloody suppression of the 

Hungarian revolution. Despite the most bitter feelings among the 

most important allies, the NATO alliance survived. 

The most difficult strategic dilemma for the alliance, however, 

was probably over the tension between nuclear weapons and conventional forward defense in Europe. European members of NATO 

favored a strong dose of U.S. nuclear deterrence in which the battlefields were likely to be the superpower homelands at the receiving 

end of a nuclear exchange. Hence, this threat of strategic nuclear 

war would be sufficient to deter the USSR and, ultimately, to lead to 

less rather than more spending on conventional forces--a variant of 

Eisenhower~s "new look" and, for the Europeans, defense on the cheap. 

In the mid to late 1960s, as "massive retaliation" capabilities were 

being matched by the Soviet Union, the United States began to favor 

enhanced forward conventional defense in Europe that would blunt 

any Soviet conventional attack at the border--or so the theory went. 

In many ways, U.S. and NATO Europe views on this issue were seemingly irreconcilable. The solution was "flexible response," not only a 

military concept but, indeed, a brilliant political solution to an otherwise intractable problem. 69 

69 Flexible response was fully described in Chapters One and Two. To 

review for the reader, the idea was to have a full spectrum of capabilities 

from strategic nuclear to conventional. Under this umbrella, the European allies could focus on strategic nuclear deterrence with their publics; the U.S. on forward defense. 
208 IN IRONS: U.S. M1LITARY MIGHT IN TtIE NEw CENTURY 

Whether the PFP will have the same positive political effect 

that "flexible response" had is a good question. There is always the 

risk that PFP could become merely a slogan with no real basis for 

implementation. 70 The most important means for assuring success is to establish basic objectives and visions of where a future 

Europe ought to be headed. Then, the PFP and other policy instruments can be brought to bear to achieve those aims. 

At a minimum, U.S. and NATO Europe objectives should entail 

a stable and secure Europe. NATO remains the best insurance 

policy to that end. At the same time, the fact that the preponderant military might in the world remains vested in NATO and the 

NACC suggests that there should be ongoing military ties and arrangements that could facilitate the deployment of some of these 

forces through this system and network of integrated and cooperative 

military structures. This means that NATO, acting as an expanded 

alliance or as individual members acting in their own interests as in 

Desert Storm, can call on these cooperative arrangements and associated facilities, experiences, and integrated command and logistic military structures to deploy forces when or as needed. 

Thus, in the case for a "minimalist" NATO in which stability 

and security in European and the former Warsaw Pact states 

approach the level that exists in NATO today, a formal alliance 

structure would remain in place as insurance, and the military 

relationships would continue so that the capacity to deploy force in 

crisis was always present. To repeat, these are the minimum criteria on which NATO would have to operate while remaining an 

enduring and effective alliance. This still leaves unresolved the 

broader centrifugal pressures affecting NATO. 

Addressing and containing the centrifugal forces can draw on 

the wisdom and lessons of Washington, Truman, and Nixon and 

apply a "qualitative" rather than "quantitative" approach. Qualitative simply means that ideas, concepts, and alternative policy 

actions rather than reliance on raw numbers of military forces and 

other exact measurements of power have greater relevance to the 

viability of the alliance. As a starter, the alliance can minimize 

hand-wringing and complaining about declining defense budgets 

70 The cynic is reminded of the "search and destroy" policy in Vietnam-- 

a slogan that really failed in every respect. 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--"'WITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 209 

and requirements to keep specific levels of forces in hand. By moving 

towards cooperative task forces and increasing military-to-military 

relations, the most important sinews for training and employing 

forces will be protected. 

Large numbers of standing forces, to a point, are not vital to 

training and preparing for contingencies. For example, in the 1930s 

when the Wehrmacht was very small and ill-equipped, its training 

and maneuvers were nonetheless predicated on corps and army 

levels of deployments. Thinking large while perhaps being relatively small in numbers must become the order of the day. This 

also means that innovation will be at a premium, and NATO should 

tailor its military capabilities against what is affordable at national 

levels rather than exacerbate alliance tensions by setting unnecessary and unreachable spending goals across its membership. 

To deal with the issue of restoring transatlantic cohesion and 

averting potential crises within the alliance, the first step should 

be to take the numbers of U.S. forces permanently stationed in 

Europe out of play as a political issue. In other words, a future 

boundary or floor ought to be set at around the 50,000-100,000 troop 

level so that the question of cost is below the political threshold of 

pain in the U.S. Indeed, NATO should set what looks like its likely 

aggregate of national capability as the five-year projection for NATO 

needs. Although that U.S. number will lead to a militarily significant 

force of a few brigades or a division, and will be well under the stated 

military objective of maintaining a deployable three-division corps, 

those military consequences can be addressed through other means 

such as mobilization and reliance on allies. Most importantly, the 

pressure to withdraw or reduce U.S. engagement in NATO for domestic political and cost issues will be largely neutralized. 71 

71 These reductions will also serve to deal with the dilemmas attached to 

extending memberships east. To the degree Russia has genuine concerns over NATO's military might, the reduction of U.S. forces in Europe 

is symbolic of NATO's defensive character. Of course those forces could 

be replaced or returned in crisis, but surely Russia understands that a 

severe crisis would be necessary for a redeployment of that magnitude. 

Hence, U.S. force reductions in Europe would respond strategically both 

to U.S. and Russian political realities. 
210 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

To deal with the most important military and operational 

issues and the regionalization of security concerns within NATO, 

there should be greater emphasis on regional command structures. 

The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), just approved by NATO, 

will enable European NATO members to act on their own in crises 

outside NATO with military force through a NATO structure. At 

the risk of seeming to introduce undue complexity, this CJTF concept should be expanded so that the "flanks" (NATO North and 

NATO South) and perhaps the Standing Naval Force Atlantic would 

have CJTF staffs focusing on matters of both regional and broader 

NATO concerns. These staffs could be extensions of current staffs 

with new responsibilities for contingency planning, coordination, 

and training for potential new or different uses of NATO forces. 

Instead of using these responsibilities to increase the size of 

NATO's bureaucracy, however, the reverse is important. There must 

be cuts, and perhaps a five-year goal of reducing NATO staff and 

bureaucracy by about 50 percent should be established. The reason, as with the U.S. case, is national domestic unhappiness with 

retaining large military staffs when the threat has changed. In other 

words, preemptive cuts might make for the best political outcome. 

Employing the parallel of"flexible response" to reconcile other 

difficult and major divergences leads to some interesting solutions 

to the question of expanded membership. Assuming criteria and 

timetables for new NATO membership can be fashioned and accepted, one operational and political problem will be the effect of 

seeming to draw new "lines" in Europe as some states enter NATO 

and others do not or must wait to join. Using the military-to-military 

links that will be constructed through the PFP for both member 

and non-member states, it may be expedient to establish certain 

security "baskets" or categories by region and then address their 

absorption into NATO through these "baskets" and regions rather 

than on a state-by-state basis. To be sure, this may be viewed as a 

guise to obscure the drawing of'qines." However, these "lines" are 

transparent, porous, and temporary and no less visible than the current lines distinguishing NATO members from their neighbors. 

One further step could be through the introduction of security 

zones or de facto local alliances. In this approach, for example, the 

four Visegrad states could be loosely formed into a security basket. 

NATO would extend military cooperation and training to provide 
PARr III: SOLUTIONS~"WITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 211 

the basis for a defensive capability. Then, this "bloc" could engage 

in agreements with NATO for friendship and, ultimately, security 

in concert with the PFP. An external attack on this bloc, rather 

than an attack on a single state, would form the basis for further 

responses. And, this organization would remove the confusion and 

complications of ethnic conflict among the members as a casus belli 

for NATO. In other words, ethnic factions in Slovakia attacking 

Hungary would not be tantamount to an attack by Poland, Russia, 

or some other power. 

This arrangement would be simultaneously extended east. 

Russia could be either an independent state or part of the CIS. 

Bloc-to-bloc relations and military agreements would complement 

the PFP, would still permit the establishment of military-to-military relationships, and would remove the bizarre consequences of 

aggression against a former and distant Soviet republic becoming 

the unlikely trigger for unleashing a crisis over Article 4 and 5 

commitments in the NATO treaty over defending member states. 

In conjunction with this security arrangement, and as part of an 

inducement to overcome Russian recalcitrance and sensitivity to seeing itself surrounded by an expanded alliance or a new system of 

security blocs, a more substantial aid and assistance package should 

be put in place. The problems, so far, with Western efforts at aid have 

been too little, too slowly. Unlike Germany and Japan forty-five years 

ago, market reform in Russia will occur or fail without foreign occupation. The U.S. tendency to replicate its own systems elsewhere (i.e., 

the 'q~ietnamization" of Russia) is also unlikely to work. Yet, something needs to be done both to ensure some stability in Russia and to 

build a potentially huge, new market economy. 

On the Russian side, centuries of autocratic rule, a bloated 

bureaucracy, corruption, and the absence of a civil code, banking system, and currency convertibility, among other impediments, have 

resisted the reform effort. Thus, only a very large program with 

tens and hundreds of billions of dollars in the offing is likely to 

provide the actual means for ensuring reform and the incentives to 

make reform work. A double security track is therefore essential if 

NATO is to remain the centerpiece in Europe and the thorny issues of 

European security and stability are to be resolved successfully. 
212 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIOHr IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Thc implications of these actions on U.S. defense planning are 

clear. Through formal resolutions, declarations, or other means, the 

U.S. would restate its commitment to NATO and Europe. The longterm goal would be a safe, secure, and stable Eurasia (i.e., NATO plus 

NACC), and the minimum structure and role for NATO would be as a 

military insurance policy and a military alliance capable of deploying 

the forces of the collective or smaller units as the situation dictates. 

In terms of U.S. force planning, the number of U.S. service personnel permanently stationed in Europe would be flexible and probably much lower. Because it is unlikely that the U.S. public will 

continue indefinitely to pay for 100,000 of its troops in Europe, 

that level can be reduced to eliminate many of these legitimate criticisms. 72 What is more interesting is the effect of the PFP on MRCs. 

If, through the PFP, NATO is to become the de facto means of 

deploying military force in many or most circumstances, whether 

collectively or unilaterally, then the perspective of the MRCs alters substantially. For example, if war were to break out in Iraq or 

Korea, very much as was the case in Desert Storm, the U.S. could 

deploy forces both directly and through the NATO network. This 

reality reinforces the need for focusing on "qualitative" solutions 

and instruments to facilitate future possible uses of force. Rather 

than restricting U.S. options, the NATO instrument can be very 

useful in expanding those options. However, there will have to be 

great care, sophistication, and balance in implementing the actions to make this work. Washington and Truman would be proud 

and Nixon approving. 

Where a new mechanism or regional framcwork can and must 

be fashioned is in the northeast Pacific. U.S. bilateral treaties with 

Japan and Korea must be maintained. However, for the moment, 

72 The cost of keeping U.S. troops in Europe has already been estimated 

by members of Congress as more than what the U.S. will spend on beefing up local police forces. Politically, the assertion that the U.S. is spending more on forces stationcd in Germany than on protecting its citizens 

from crime by enlarging police forces could be devastating. 
PART III: SOLUTIONS~"WITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 213 

there is no serious mechanism for incorporating the maj or regional 

powers into some effective forum. The Conference on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), nearly twenty years old, provides 

a useful model. A Pacific Conference organized along the lines of 

CSCE and initially including the U.S., China, Japan, Russia, and 

South Korea, should be formed. The principal areas of common 

interest for this "CSCP" are regional stability and economic development. Specific issues for more immediate discussion could include 

discussions to resolve the Japanese-Russian territorial dispute over 

the northern territories occupied by the USSR after World War II and 

means to secure arms reductions in the Korean peninsula. 

A third regional framework needs to be developed for the Middle 

East and Persian Gulf. The agreement between the PLO and Israel offers an opportunity for expanding this breakthrough. A CSClike mechanism is a relevant and appropriate model in this region. 

Along with the U.S., the Gulf states, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, 

and Israel would be initial members. As with the CSCP, discussion 

would be the principal mechanism for beginning the relationship. 

Finally, the U.S. ought to look towards establishing a similar 

type of security framework for Africa. This perhaps could be administered through the UN with the U.S. providing strategic sinews. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), perhaps in collaboration with the UN, would provide peacekeeping for tragedies like 

Rwanda and Sudan. The U.S. would contribute the sinews. 

In parallel with these structures and engagement to promote 

security, peace, stability, and the rule of law, there needs to be a strategic concept for reward, penalty, and enforcement beyond the standard run of commitments and treaty obligations and the ultimate 

sanction of applying military force. Deterrence, as argued, was unique 

to the thermonuclear, bipolar age when both superpowers had the 

power to destroy each other and, thus, the strongest disincentive to 

war. That condition no longer obtains politically, but the punitive 

basis for deterrence may have future relevance. 

If regional states with interests inimical to ours become the 

potential sources of conflict, would the threat of societal incapacitation or destruction be limiting or deterring? To make good any 

such threat, it is clear that thermonuclear weapons possess the 

necessary destructive characteristics. It is less certain but arguable 
214 IN IRONS: US, MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

that advanced conventional munitions offer an alternative through 

destroying the infrastructure and networks on which the functioning of society rests while killing relatively few civilians. Whether 

this threat, manifested in either form, is credible and whether the 

United States would actually impose this type of punishment are 

vital questions. A further question is whether it is the vulnerability of any society to obliteration as a functioning entity or the 

vulnerability of the population to annihilation that is the point of 

applying successful leverage in any construct of deterrence. 

Return to the example of North Korea. Without direct outside 

military intervention, and with enough of its own determination 

and competence, North Korea cannot effectively be denied a nuclear 

weapon. Assuming the case that current U.S. antiproliferation 

policy does not work and North Korea builds one or more nuclear 

weapons, what are the likely policy options for the U.S.? They would 

include a range of sanctions and steps aimed at isolating North 

Korea politically and economically. The military option, if nonproliferation fails, is not very likely because of the cost and risk of 

another Korean War. 

Suppose, however, the U.S. applies a doctrine of selective deterrence to North Korea. Should North Korea either threaten or use 

weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. would be prepared to respond by destroying that society's ability to function as well as attempt to eliminate the nuclear capacity. That threat could entail 

targeting the networks and infrastructure of Korean society, the 

population, or both. This threat of retaliation is specific in that it 

relates only to being triggered by the use of weapons of mass destruction, yet ambiguous in that it leaves open which strategic objectives would be used, which targets would be hit, and with what 

type of weapons. But there would be no gradualism or escalating 

ladder of response. As far as the potential target is concerned, the 

response would be total, massive, and devastating. 

Under these circumstances of selective intent, the reaction of 

major powers such as Russia, China, and Japan is likely to be muted. 

The prospect of North Korea reacting as the Soviet Union did by 

developing a large nuclear deterrent force of its own is difficult to 

imagine and is beyond Korea's capability for a very long time if not 

forever. And, with positive steps such as the CSCP, this selective 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--a~VITH A GOODLY COMPANY J' 215 

deterrence doctrine need be only a fall-back position. The 

application of selective deterrence, of course, could extend beyond 

North Korea to other potential problem states. 

One implicit assumption underwriting the use of new strategic 

structures to address the consequences of strategic uncertainty is 

that fewer U.S. military forces will be needed and that their employment and deployment can be carried out in different forms. A 

long-standing assertion has been that numbers count and substantial U.S. military contraction or withdrawal will create adverse 

political and strategic perceptions and conditions for us among allies and adversaries alike. In many ways, this prediction has meant 

to be self-fulfilling as the best prevention to U.S. disengagement. 

However, as the role and utility of military force have less strategic 

importance to our major allies and adversaries, this forecast of 

automatic adversity needs to be reexamined. 

At some point, there surely is a level of military strength below 

which the United States can no longer remain or be seen as a military 

superpower. It is hard to imagine that at a level of a million or so 

active-duty personnel and with an arsenal of the world's most capable weapons, this condition of non-superpower status would apply. The devil is in the detail, but common sense surely suggests 

that innovative ways to demonstrate and symbolize commitment, 

leadership, and engagement exist. Thus, by shifting more to qualitative rather than quantitative actions, this new framework can 

effectively deal with the rigors of strategic uncertainty. 
216 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

CHAPTER ELEVEN: ASSURING THE BEST MILITARY 

IN THE WORLD 

Whether we admit it or not, as with solutions to most issues of 

national importance, ultimately, the size, shape, rationale, and condition of U.S. military might has been and will be determined by the 

complex and often orthogonal interaction of politics and judgment 

occasionally tempered or influenced by analysis. Judgment, shaped 

or informed by politics, and politics, shaped or informed by judgment, have set the basic assumptions on which U.S. strategy and 

military capability have broadly rested. On this sometimes clear, 

sometimes ambiguous foundation, analysis was supposed to provide specific direction as well as justification for underwriting the 

military forces. To repeat, this analysis never had a universal formula or law that inspired absolute solutions. To advance on solutions to these issues, however inexact, three questions were posed 

earlier as vital to this process of determining what should and should 

not constitute responsible levels for future U.S. military might: 

• What forces are needed strategically and operationally? 

What level of capability and what types of force structure 

are politically and economically sustainable and justifiable 

for the long term? 

How do we safely, sensibly, and affordably get from today's 

forces to those of tomorrow and properly balance the threat, 

strategy, force structure, budget, and infrastructure relationships? 

These questions, in turn, lead to a three-part answer. 

The first part of the answer rests in the examination and debate 

of, and ultimate agreement on, the objectives, criteria, strategy, and 

policy that must define U.S. military might. These answers form the 

assumptions, valid or otherwise, that set the qualitative and quantitative measures for deriving the entire threat, strategy, force structure, budget, and supporting infrastructure equation. From these 

assumptions and measures for that equation, the mix of combat 

systems and capability can be assessed against expectations of what 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--"WITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 217 

can be achieved operationally, what cannot be achieved, and where 

there is uncertainty. 

The second part of the answer rests in those actions for reforming this process and generating more effective and efficient use of 

our resources. It would be the height of folly if, in seeking to retain 

a highly capable force, we purposely chose to impose reductions in 

the hopes of balancing smaller budgets with reduced operational 

needs and, instead of sustaining a future military of highest quality 

and capability, ended up with a smaller but more hollow residual version of what is in place today. In other words, without dealing with 

the root causes of the growing costs and expense of the process of 

governance as they affect U.S. military might, the spiral towards fewer, 

less ready, and less capable forces becomes inevitable. 

The third part of the answer rests in assuring we get safely 

from today's force to tomorrow's. This means properly balancing 

the interplay among threat, strategy, force structure, budget, and 

infrastructure. To implement the necessary remedial actions, there 

needs to be sufficiently compelling incentives to generate public 

and political support and then to permit navigating the dangerous 

rocks and shoals that endanger any safe passage of policy. 

The three parts of this or any answer are indivisible and are 

necessary and sufficient conditions to assuring the best military in 

the world. 

No matter the declaratory style, U.S. national security has been 

and will be articulated on the partial basis of contributing to global 

peace and stability as we Americans perceive these measures. Some 

level of force will be required to assure that end. This means the 

U.S. must have the ability to bring to bear, or to threaten credibly, 

the necessary force to resolve the issue at hand to our satisfaction. 

In this regard, the use of the MRC in the Bottom-Up Review 

must be correct. The obvious and most demanding sizing scenario 

in this era of strategic uncertainty continues to be the major regional conflict. This is the most (or only) plausible and logical scenario in which the United States would bring substantial military 

force to bear. From this point, specific determinants for future force 

structure can be introduced. 
218 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

In dealing with the planning consequences of a generic MRC, 

three specific considerations must matter most: the demands of 

the MRC--specifically, strategic and operational threat assessments 

based on enemy capabilities and intentions; the number of MRCs 

to be dealt with by the forces or other policy instruments; and the 

degree of simultaneity or seriality to be pursued in dealing with 

more than one MRC, as well as the other policy tools that might be 

brought to bear in the case of a second contingency. These other 

instruments include allies, mobilization, and perhaps even threatening or using nuclear weapons to compensate for any conventional 

military weakenesses. The Bottom-Up Review also defined presence as a basis for setting the level of military forces beyond what 

was needed for the MRCs. 

STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL DEMANDS 

Prudence suggests and history shows that occasions of a second 

crisis igniting during a first international crisis are surprisingly more 

frequent than might be expected. 73 There would be little popular 

dissent with the proposition that the U.S., at a minimum, must be 

able to cope with one MRC. Given the dangers and risks posed by an 

overlapping second MRC, the United States cannot entirely dismiss 

or ignore retaining some countervailing or contingency capability, if 

only to serve as a potential deterrent to a second conflict. Three MRCs 

occurring simultaneously have no recent historical precedent and 

would seem simply not plausible short of world war. Whether or not 

the BUR requirements for two MRCs are sustained, few would argue 

with the proposition that the U.S. must plan for at least one MRC. 74 

73 For an excellent discussion of the record of second crises during much 

of the Cold War, see Jonathan T. Howe, Multicrises: Seapower and Global Politics in the MissileAge (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1971), 412 p. 

74 The BUR calls for dealing with two MRCs "nearly simultaneously." During World War II, there were, in essence, two MRCs--the war in Europe 

against Hitler and the war in the Pacific against Japan. U.S. strategy was 

clear: win in Europe first and hold in the Pacific. As in that war, either 

consecutive or simultaneous operations may unfold regardless of the declaratory policy issued in advance of the conflict. And, allies and mobilization may provide the ultimate means for bringing sufficient force to bear. 
PARr III: SOLUTIONS--"WITH A GOODLY COMPANY ~' 219 

The second MRC and forces required for presence will form central 

topics for debate and for determining how much is enough. 

Regarding a single MRC, the Bottom-Up Review concluded that 

about 500,000 U.S. personnel would be required to fight and win. 

These forces would be divided among 4 to 5 Army divisions, 4 to 

5 Navy carrier battle groups, 1 to 2 Marine Expeditionary Forces, 

10 Air Force tactical fighter wings, 100 bombers, and sufficient logistics and supply support. They would be deployed to the MRC in 

three to six months. This force was designed to fight an Iraqi or 

North Korean type of enemy with military strength comparable to 

each of those countries. However, using the predictive outcome of 

any hypothetical military action as the basis for planning is bound 

to have inherent failings. Indeed, the case can be made that U.S. 

capabilities, for the time being, are both relatively and absolutely 

greater than they were during the Gulf War, meaning fewer forces 

might be sufficient to win an MRC. This argument, however, poses 

a certain contradiction. 

How is it that U.S. military power can be evaluated as both 

more capable now than during the Gulf War and at the point of 

approaching a future state of"in irons" or worse? The answer is 

vital to understanding the fragility of our current condition and 

the dangers of complacency. 

As of 1994, the U.S. maintains both enormous relative and absolute advantages in its military capabilities and in its ability to employ 

them decisively against any would-be adversary. However, as resources 

and defense budgets are cut, the actual operational capabilities of 

these otherwise superior weapon systems will erode as maintenance, 

overhaul, and repair parts needed to keep those systems up and ready 

diminish. At the same time, the personnel to operate and maintain 

these systems will suffer from these same budget cuts. Training and 

morale will plummet. Retention will decline. Overall capability then 

will fall off precipitously. This vicious circle becomes more vicious, 

and a hollow force or worse must result as it did in the 1970s. We 

have entered the first steps of decline. 

Despite this impending decline and before its effects are fully felt, 

there is substantial evidence that shows or suggests the extent of U.S. 

military superiority today. Regarding air warfare, the United States 

has the best and most capable combat aircrai~ in the world with the 

best command-and-control systems. AWACS, the airborne warning 

and control system, is a premier example. U.S. electronic warfare 
220 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

capabilities include the most advanced active jamming, decoys, homing, 

antiradiation missiles, and standoff weapons. The U.S. has stealthy 

and virtually undetectable aircraft and cruise missiles in large 

numbers. B-52 and B-1 bombers have the capacity for conducting saturation bombing. U.S. fighters will dominate air space. 

And, these assets have been improved since the Gulf War, in 

some cases from the lessons learned during that conflict. 

In the "air-land" battle, the U.S. continues to improve its impressive ground and maneuver warfare advantages. During Desert 

Storm, not a single M1A1 tank was lost to enemy fire. With thermal imaging sights, the M1 has killed the formidable (former Soviet) T-72 tank at ranges of 3,500 meters. U.S. attack helicopters, 

Bradley fighting vehicles, and the most advanced artillery, including the Multiple-Launched Rocket System (MLRS) with 

smart and scatterable submunitions are further examples of this 

superiority. The Advanced Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) 

will increase this advantage as will Hellfire II anti-tank weapons and better integrated C4I. 

At sea, no other state is capable of even the most limited contest 

over command of the oceans. These ocean-going combat capabilities are in the hands of highly professional, enormously well-trained 

U.S. forces. Since the Gulf War, the U.S. has more rather than 

fewer capabilities in place as more systems have continued through 

the production pipeline. These include nearly 500 F/A-18 aircraft 

now equipped with laser guidance systems. 

This is a brief summary not a quantitative analysis of why current U.S. military advantage may be greater than we think. If this 

assessment is correct, then perhaps fewer than 500,000 U.S. forces 

may be required for a single MRC. The number could be as low as 

350,000-400,000, provided these operational advantages are maintained. This means keeping the force fully funded or at least a 

sizable "core" portion sustained with sufficient resources to maintain high states of readiness to win an MRC. 

It may be assumed that for the United States to respond (nearly) 

simultaneously to a second MRC, regardless of forces on hand, the 

full support, commitment, and concurrent deployment of forces by 

at least a few allies will be forthcoming, and whatever mobilization is 

needed by the U.S. will be carried out at home. This assumption is 

vital because it means that for the U.S. to engage fully in a second 

MRC, real stakes and real interests are involved and are seen to be 
PART III: SOLUTIONs--"WITH A GOODLY COMPA.&r~" 221 

involved. By definition, if neither allies nor domestic support is available, 

the grounds for categorizing the crisis as an MRC evaporate. For an 

aggressor who bets on a combined failure of allied and U.S. domestic support before embarking on what could be a second MRC, there 

is no absolute guarantee he will be proven right. On the other hand, 

the threat of a response, given the extraordinary military capability 

of the U.S., must be taken very seriously. In fact, without domestic 

support, U.S. response to a first MRC is highly questionable. 

It follows that in order to meet the operational demands of either one or two MRCs that are likely to occur with minimal warning, a substantial portion of the active-duty force must be ready for 

service in all respects. While assumptions about warning and preparation time in responding to any MRC are as vital in planning for 

future contingencies as they were during the Cold War, it would be 

a most unlikely stroke of good fortune if another Desert Storm conflict were refought. In Desert Shield and Desert Storm, months of 

uncontested buildup and preparation time took place in a region 

with among the world's best logistic bases. Replaying these formidable advantages should not be seen as axiomatic. Also, given the 

political visibility and volatility in the U.S. of applying even small 

amounts of military force, that force must be seen to operate competently, decisively, and with minimum losses. This reality, in turn, 

reinforces the assumption of high readiness. 

How MANY MRCs? 

If the United States follows a course of "Steady as you go," 

two MRCs will remain the objective. Given the degradation in military power likely to occur, except in worst-case conditions, from an 

operational perspective, the U.S. should still be able to deal with 

one MRC. This means a second MRC would be consigned to some 

sort of sequential operation, presumably with heavy reliance on 

allies and mobilization. Perhaps nuclear deterrence or a variant 

might find application in this case as well. 

If the United States chooses to'~Fully fund the BUR force," it should 

be able to deal with two nearly simultaneous MRCs. Whether that 

capability is worth the cost remains a vital but separate question. 

If the United States chooses to"Readjust or change," several prospects are possible. If the advantage in military superiority is as large 

as suggested earlier and is sustained, perhaps a force of 350,000 to 
222 IN ]RONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

400,000 would be enough to deal with a single MRC. Working 

backwards, that means that an overall military force of about 1 million, as opposed to the planned 1.4 million, might be enough. 

On the other hand, the United States could opt for a singleMRC requirement or a "one plus" MRC planning basis. The notion 

here would be to deal with a second MRC much as we dealt with 

World War II. The "plus" capability could be defined as the ability 

to deploy, simultaneously to a second MRC, a corps of about 100,000 

elsewhere. Working backwards, these requirements for a "one" and 

"one plus" MRC also lead to a force of a million or less. 

Using largely arbitrary criteria based on the projected erosion of 

capability, evaluation of each of the three policy choices leads to this 

assessment regarding possible outcomes in dealing with the MRCs: 

Predicted outcomes 

Choice 

"Steady as you go" 

"Fully fund" 

"Readjust" 

1 MRC 

Sufficient 

Sufficient 

(with excess) 

Sufficient 

Conflict scenarios 

1 MRC 

"plus" 

Marginal 

Sufficient 

Sufficient 

2 MRCs 

(BUR) 

Not 

sufficient 

Sufficient 

Marginal 

(or possibly 

sufficient) 

Likely annual 

budgets 

$250 billion 

$270 billion 

$200 billion 

To allow a comparison of this MRC analysis with the basic 

force options discussed in Chapter Six, table 20 is repeated here 

as table 35. 

The $150 billion option is omitted from further discussion on 

the grounds that it and the 600,000 personnel force are simply not 

large enough for the American public. The reconstitution choice, 

while conceptually feasible and possibly valid, is deferred on the 

grounds that a substantially sized and highly ready force must be 

on hand whether or not large-scale combat contingencies occur. The 

global leadership position of the United States and the international 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--"WITH A GOOT)/.Y COMPANY" 223 

Table 35. The universe of future U.S. military might 

I. BUR force fully funded at $270-280 billion per year (current dollars) 

1.4 million active-duty force (approximate numbers) 

• Army 450,000 

• Navy 420,000 

• Marine Corps 179,000 

• Air Force 400,000 

15 divisions 

12 carriers, 340-350 ships 

3 expeditionary forces 

20 tactical fighter wings and up to 184 bombers 

II. Alternative Choices and Budgets 

Annual budget:. $150 billion $200 billion $250 billion 

Active forces: 0.75 million 

BUR force extended • Army 225,000 

(assumes • Navy 220,000 

maximum • Marines 90,000 

readiness) • Air Force 215,000 

Garrison force • Army 280,000 

(assumes • Navy 180,000 

maximum • Marines 50,000 

readiness) • Air Force 240,000 

Maritime force • Army 180,000 

(assumes • Navy 280,000 

maximum ° Marines 120,000 

readiness) • Air Force 170,000 

1 million 1.2 million 

• Army 310,000 • Army 370,000 

• Navy 290,000 • Navy 350,000 

• Marines 130,000 • Marines 140,000 

• Air Force 270,000 • Air Force 340,000 

• Army 400,000 • Army 450,000 

• Navy 220,000 • Navy 250,000 

• Marines 80,000 • Marines 100,000 

• Air Force 300,000 • Air Force 400,000 

• Army 220,000 • Army 290,000 

• Navy 400,000 • Navy 450,000 

• Marines 150,000 ° Marines 180,000 

• Air Force 230,000 • Air Force 280,000 

• Staggered 

readiness 

• Reconstitution 

For each of the spending levels, forces would be placed in one of 

three categories: fully ready; partial; and reserve. For example, 

Fully ready: 50% of the force 

Partial readiness: 25% of the force 

(i.e., 3-6 months to bring to full readiness) 

Reserve readiness: 25% of the force 

(i.e., more than 6 months to bring to full readiness) 

or some combination of the above 

Since the bulk of the force structure would be dependent upon 

reconstitution, no attempt is made to show a quantitative assignment of 

forces to any categories either by service or degree of readiness. 
224 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

responsibilities it must accept mandate that U.S. military power 

be constituted in usable and deployable ways, certainly over the 

short term. U.S. domestic realities mandate that whenever U.S. 

force is used, it must be as ready, effective, and capable as we can 

make it. Of course, if these assumptions about readiness are rejected, reconstitution as well as other options can be justified. 

Geography suggests that the garrison force is likely to prove 

too inflexible. 75 The U.S. must be able to project power, often at 

great distance and often with alacrity. The future strategy preference should stress agility, in keeping with needs of an uncertain 

world. Agility would also be reinforced by the network of new and 

rejuvenated alliances that should be created and the need to respond perhaps quickly to a range of unpredictable events abroad. 

Garrison forces inherently lack this agility. This does not mean 

the U.S. will not and should not selectively rely on garrison army 

and air forces stationed in Europe, Korea, or the United States, 

but those land-based forces would be counted as part of the total 

allocation for each service and not be used as "force-builders" in 

driving the overall force structure design. 

This means force design will follow either the "BUR force extended" or the "maritime force" construct. The BUR extended has 

the advantage of being the least bureaucratically difficult to implement since each of the services must equitably share and support 

the reductions. The disadvantage would reside in whatever loss in 

strategic and operational agility occurs from maintaining a large 

land-based component of the force structure. 

The maritime force has the advantage of strategic agility. Indeed, to the degree that additional land-based air power assets could 

be incorporated into this force design, it is perhaps a more attractive alternative than the BUR extended. In this case, the function 

of air power could be to blunt initial attacks in an MRC and to 

support ground operations as well as to conduct a strategic campaign 

75 Moving large numbers of land-based forces to regions that lack basing 

facilities is a time-consuming and expensive proposition. That said, it 

also should be noted that the largest amphibious invasions during World 

War II, like Normandy, were conducted by the Army. In the future, however, we simply may not have the time to mount such an operation. 
PART III: SOLUTIONs--aWITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 225 

from the air. The lessons of the Gulf War are relevant. The 

disadvantage is that, bureaucratically, it would be more difficult 

to implement because ground forces would absorb a disproportionately large share of the cuts. Depending upon the assumptions 

that underwrite the strategy and objectives, U.S. presence and commitments could be redefined, physically reduced, and augmented 

through an expanded framework of regional alliances and security 

arrangements and through emphasis on qualitative rather than 

quantitative means to underwrite U.S. commitments. This approach 

would reduce demand on the numbers of forces needed in service 

and to carry out obligations of presence and commitments. 

In other words, the Cold War characteristic of automatically 

associating commitments with some (generally high) level of military force could be replaced with a more flexible regime that restructures, reconfigures, and, in some cases, reduces the need for 

U.S. military presence and overseas deployments. The new objective for this regime would be based on preserving access. Access, 

in turn, requires more than only presence and offers flexibility and 

relief in maintaining constant deployments. Regional familiarity, 

logistical support, overflight and basing rights, and other characteristics of preserving access follow. 

MISSIONS OTHER THAN WARnNEW WAYS OF 

DOING BUSINESS 

The term "missions other than war" is becoming more prevalent in defense discourse. Presence and peacekeeping-related tasks 

are two of the most widely discussed missions. However, these 

new tasks should be more closely examined before they are adopted 

into new and expanded formal U.S. military roles and missions. 

The BUR has specified "presence" as a sizing factor for forces 

beyond the MRC requirements. But presence as defined in this 

sense still carries a Cold War connotation and currently imposes 

operational demands on the forces that, for the longer term, will 

hurt morale and probably are not sustainable for other reasons 

relating to funding cuts. Reductions in the size of the force, combined 

with unrelenting demands for maintaining U.S. forces on deployed 

status, have led to high levels of operational tempo equivalent to 
226 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY Mzc~Ir IN THE NEW CENTURY 

the most intense days of the Cold War. Without compelling reason, 

it will prove difficult to convince the forces that this stress is in the 

country's best interest. At this point, traditionally, morale and retention begin to suffer. 

The hard-nosed assessment must be that the military demands 

of the MRCs should be the basic sizing factors for U.S. forces. Forces 

for presence will be drawn from this aggregate and cannot be regarded as additive because higher numbers of forces will prove 

neither strategically necessary nor politically and economically affordable. To reduce the operating tempo and the operational demands that, ironically, put as great or greater requirements for 

deployments on our forces now as existed during the Cold War, 

readjustment must be made to current commitments, deployments, 

and presence objectives. 

If presence is removed as a criterion for rationalizing and establishing force levels, other "new missions" may be contenders 

for this force-building function. Among the most visible and perhaps most tempting of publicly discussed "new missions" for 

U.S. forces is the family of so-called peacekeeping tasks. Peacekeeping is used in a broader sense as shorthand for using military 

forces not only in specific missions embodied by the symbol of the 

UN's "blue hats and helmets" but also in more expansive, related 

nation-building assignments. Peacemaking, peace-imposing, and nation-building are inexact phrases that suggest the boundaries for a 

range of these possible new missions. For example, should a peace 

settlement be reached in Bosnia, the U.S. has pledged a peacekeeping force of 25,000 to 35,000. That size force requires a pool of 

about 75,000 to 100,000 to support such a deployment on the standard planning rule of "two back for every one forward." This 

peacekeeping requirement would require nearly 20 percent of the 

current U.S. Army if it were dedicated to this single task. If these 

roles were assumed, the implications for force planning could easily reach the numerical equivalent of a single MRC. 

Although there is an obvious and understandable need for 

organizations or nations to catty out these broader tasks, it does 

not follow necessarily that peacekeeping-related missions should 

be a principal U.S. responsibility or a U.S. Department of Defense 

assignment. Peacekeeping requires absolute neutrality, great 

endurance and patience, and an ability to bring ambient political 

temperature to as low a point as possible. Culturally, politically, 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--"WITH n GOODLY COMPANY ~' 227 

and emotionally, this would prove to be an extremely arduous task 

for America and Americans. Largely but not exclusively for domestic reasons, the U.S. is not well-disposed to take up a posture of 

absolute neutrality. In Bosnia, for example, while atrocities have 

been committed by all three factions--Serbs, Bosnians, and Muslims--Bosnian Serb radicals have been by far the guiltiest parties. 

It would be extremely testing, given America's sense of fair play, 

not to see U.S. peacekeepers lose the required sense of neutrality 

and favor, even subjectively, the most aggrieved party. 

Americans are also results oriented. Endurance and staying 

power, especially when human lives and substantial costs are involved, are not our long suits. To be sure, the U.S. stayed and remains in Europe, Korea, and Japan. But this forward basing is not 

peacekeeping, and the important reasons for continuing U.S. presence are well understood. 

Americans also make among the best political targets for radical or terrorist groups. Given American visceral disapproval of 

taking casualties, this understandable and commendable trait is 

the final reason why broader peacekeeping missions should not be 

our cup of tea. This does not mean there are no new missions or 

areas where the U.S. should intensify its efforts to identify relevant 

tasks for military forces. Two bear scrutiny. 

The first relates to support of peacekeeping. The United States 

does maintain the most formidable training; logistics; command, 

control, communications, and intelligence; and lift capabilities in 

the world. These are strategic "sinews." Where the U.S. and the 

U.S. military should be prepared to play a role is in providing these 

strategic sinews to support the peacekeeping family of missions 

carried out by other states. As the Swiss were known for centuries 

as the most reliable guards in Europe, the U.S. could become the 

principal support component to these peacekeeping-related tasks 

through its strategic sinews. 76 

76 Alternatively, if the United States determines it must play a major role 

in peacekeeping and station large numbers of peacekeepers abroad, consideration can be given to establishing a separate "peacekeeping" organization, perhaps under the State Department and outside DOD. DOD 

might provide the military protection. However, this alternative would 

relieve some of the problems of associating peacekeeping with combat 

forces and deserves further review. 
228 IN IRONS: V.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE N~v CENTURY 

Second, to cope with the tasks of preventing both potential 

proliferation and MRCs from starting in the first place, the U.S. 

should examine the new mission of extending selective deterrence 

through purely countervalue means against would-be Third World 

adversaries. The ability to defeat an opponent's armed forces is 

part of the MRC responsibility. However, the ability to threaten 

that society, either with nuclear or conventional weapons, may be one 

method of appropriately limiting proliferation in general and the use 

of weapons of mass destruction specifically against us or our friends. 

NEw ORGANIZATION 

If caution is suggested in the rush to embrace certain missions 

other than war, quite the opposite approach is advocated in exploring new ways to employ forces through organizational change. 

There are two types of organizational change to be investigated. 

The first is through "jointness," that is, drawing on the capabilities 

of each of the services to complement, multiply, or create higher 

levels of military effectiveness. The second is to structure traditional units differently. 

Regarding "jointness," given the resource constraints and the 

need to operate the forces in the demanding new environment, there 

is no reason traditional service responsibilities and capabilities cannot be more broadly shared. For example, why could there not be 

an automatic, standing, operational, organizational structure in 

which the ground commander assumed control of naval forces that, 

in turn, had Air Force units flying off its ships or perhaps even 

Army ATACMS loaded in the vertical launch tubes of surface combatants or some equally innovative variant? Another term for this 

type of highly flexible organization is "adaptive." 

The first commander in chief of the new U.S. Atlantic Command, Admiral Paul D. Miller, and the Vice Chairman of the JCS, 

Admiral William A. Owens, have been proponents of "adaptive joint 

force packages." The concept embellishes General Powell's metaphor of designing a "tool box" of forces for field commanders by 

repackaging sea, air, and land forces into appropriate operational 

units tailored for specific missions. The innovative configuration 

of the U.S. aircraft carriers in the Haitian intervention, replacing 

air wings with soldiers, is a relevant example. 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--"WITH A GOODLY COMPANY ~' 229 

Although this seems an obvious and uncomplicated idea with 

great merit, the coordination and effort needed to continue along 

these lines are considerable. There is resistance, which is understandable. Operational commanders may think they need force 

packages different from the ones beiag provided. Hence, the traditional approach is seen as satisfactory. But, exploring these operational changes in organization is essential and offers great potential 

in maximizing the way in which force can be effectively deployed 

and used, especially when budgets make the old, tried-and-true 

system unaffordable or less affordable. 

The second approach is to reexamine the organization and equipment of the basic unit building blocks for the force the carrier air 

wing, the Army battalion, and the Air Force squadron or wing. The 

argument here is that, given U.S. absolute military superiority, the 

amount of equipment--specifically aircraft, tanks, artillery, and 

other large systems--might be reduced in each unit. The reduction of the carrier air wing from about 90 to 60 aircraft is the example that could become the rule. Whether this applies to other 

units in the Army and Air Force needs to be closely examined. 

To summarize, future U.S. force structure should be constructed 

on the operational requirements posed by the MRC. In "Steady as 

you go" and "Fully fund," two MRCs would be the driving requirement. In the first case, the requirements would be objectives (partially) unmet by the capabilities. In the second, the forces would 

meet the mark. 

Should the "Readjust and change" choice emerge as policy, overall reductions in force levels from the planned 1.4 million to about 

1 million in active-duty strength would be made over a period of 

three to five years. These or any reductions will be hotly contested 

by many, including those who argue that there is a certain critical 

mass in the size of the force below which it will be fractured or 

broken. The current Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan, 

argues vehemently that the U.S. Army, for example, cannot descend 

below a level of about 495,000. If it does, General Sullivan believes 

and warns the Army will be "broken" and will become incapable of 

carrying out its current roles. 

The notion of force fragility and the attendant concern that size 

is crucial beyond or above a certain point cannot be lightly or easily dismissed. This issue is one of military judgment, and, aside 
230 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NZW CENTURY 

from parochial service preferences that are understandable and 

legitimate, the nation can ill-afford to make significant cutbacks 

that ultimately will lead to shattering the surviving force. 

On the other side of the coin, there is no hard evidence that 

forces cannot be substantially reduced. It is obvious that if forces 

are reduced in a callous or unplanned manner, if operational demands and deployments are not accordingly reduced, and if readiness and maintenance are degraded, the morale and fighting fiber 

of the soldiers, airmen, and sailors and marines will suffer grievously. Indeed, although there is a large degree of unfairness in the 

following comparison because of significant overhead, infrastructure, organizational, and operational differences, some would argue there is already a land force in the United States a third the 

size of the U.S. Army. It is the Marine Corps. Although the Marine 

Corps lacks the armored punch of the Army and the associated 

heavy capabilities for waging long-term high-intensity conflict, it 

numbers about 175,000, showing that a smaller ground force can 

be both sustained and kept at high levels of readiness. 

The arguments that total numbers as large as 500,000 are 

needed so as not to shatter the Army rest on several assumptions. 

The rule of thumb is that for every forward-deployed division three 

are needed for rotational purposes. With over 100,000 soldiers deployed, this requirement quickly builds the numbers. In the Army, 

the argument arises that there are two forces: one that is trained 

and one that is in training. Thus, in this view, large numbers are seen 

as vital to sustain a given endstrength if the force is to be effective. 

The Navy, however, would seem to be less affected by this notion 

of shattering. Because the bulk of naval striking power rests in a 

relatively small number of ships (the carrier, Aegis-class destroyers and cruisers, and nuclear submarines), a 250-ship Navy need 

not be much less capable than a 500-ship Navy provided the right 

ships were kept and the operational needs and deployments sized 

accordingly. Twelve carriers with enough Aegis escorts are maintainable at both the 250- and 500-ship level. The difference is that 

with the end of a major threat at sea, the Navy can and has slimmed 

down in total numbers. At the same time, reductions in amphibious 

capability could be mitigated by retaining the big-deck LHAs and 

other large ships that carry substantial numbers of Marines. 
PARr III: SOLUTIONS--"WITH A GOODLY COMPANY J" 231 

The response to those who see the risks of a shattered force as 

real will never be entirely convincing. However, given the trends, 

the U.S. military seems irreversibly headed in the direction of a 

much smaller and weaker force if a 1.4-million active-duty strength 

cannot be fiscally sustained. Hence, if reforms are not made to 

deal with the efficiency and cost issues, it is a matter of time until 

a shattered force or, certainly, a desiccated one occurs. Reforms 

also must be highly innovative in promoting new or alternative 

organizations for enhancing fighting power. For better or worse, 

the Army attempted major strategic and organizational change in 

the 1950s when no less a military general than Eisenhower presided over the strategic "new look" and the pentomic Army. 

If the change is, in fact, made, under either the BUR extended 

or maritime force choice, how might commitments and presence 

requirements be tailored? Tables 27, 28, and 29 showing that tailoring are reproduced here as tables 36, 37, and 38. 

Table 36. Central Europe and the former USSR (objectives, commitments, 

deployments, and presence) 

Objectives Commitments Deployments Presence 

Current 

Support democratization SALT, ABM, CFE N/A N/A 

and open market reform START, INF treaties 

Support aid and assistance Funding -- -- 

Reduce nuclear and Advisory personnel -- -- 

conventional armaments 

Defense conversion "Partnership" _ w 

Alternatives and additions 

Extend NATO Defense of FSU, Central U.S. forces Part-time (?). 

"partnership" Europe Low-level 

Extend NATO membership Defense of FSU U,S. forces Full-time 

Low to 

medium level 

U.S./NATO Up to 25,000 

forces 

Extend economic 

partnership 

Peacekeeping in Bosnia 

Treaties, agreements, 

funding 

Impose peace 
232 IN IRONS: US. M/LZTA~ZY MIGHT IN THZ NEW CENTURY 

Table 37. Northwest Pacific (objectives, commitments, deployments, and presence) 

Objectives Commitments Deployments Presence 

Current 

Assure U.S. engagement Treaties (U.S.-Japan; Seventh Fleet All U.S. 

Korea) military forces 

Promote stability U.S. in Korea 

Peace 

Promote trade, economic U.S. in Okinawa Full-time 

development Security and stability Robust 

Exercises 

Reduce grounds for conflict Troop presence 

Restraining N. Korean 

nuclear proliferation 

Alternatives and additions 

Broaden security framework As above Greater military Probably 

through CSCE-type cooperation larger 

mechanism and exercises 

Seek arms control agreements Treaties ? ? 

Seek alliance, nonaggression Treaties ? ? 

treaties 

Table 38. Non-regional/'globar' issues (objectives, commitments, deployments, 

and presence) 

Objectives Commitments Deployments Presence 

Promote democratization and 

open market reforms 

Free/fair trade 

Antiproliferation 

Antiterrorist 

Promote human rights 

Promote humanitarian 

actions 

Provide a UN force/make 

the UN the ultimate 

arbiter of international 

disputes 

Current 

GATT, IMF, international In concert with In concert 

agreements other objectives Selective 

Selective, i.e., 

Kurdish, Somalia 

UN relief 

MTCR; nonproliferation treaty 

Maintain access 

"enablers" 

Alternatives and additions 

To subsume national 

authority and autonomy 

to UN decision 

? ? 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--"WITH A GOODLY COMPAA~" 233 

In general, the key assumption for this particular type of tailoring is 

that the U.S. would structure its deployments on the basis of maintaining access to a particular region. The degree of access would 

be in keeping with commitments and with the needs for responding to contingencies or special circumstances relating to that region. In Europe, the 100,000 U.S. troop level most likely would be 

reduced to about 50,000 to 75,000 as a means of preventing or preempting politically driven pressures in the U.S. from making that 

number even lower. In the Mediterranean, the U.S. would keep a 

full-time presence, but one that was flexible and need not always 

include an aircrai% carrier. Instead of a carrier on station about 

75 percent of the time, that figure could be reduced to a third or 

half time on station. Flexible deployments and alternatives, such 

as sending a mix of air and ground units on short deployments to a 

region, would complement maritime presence. 

The same regime of operational flexibility and tailored deployment patterns would be expanded globally to other regions where 

presence is to be maintained and access assured. Development of 

these types of innovations, as well as the concurrent and specific 

practical actions, must be left to the JCS, the CINCs, and the military staffs who have the expertise necessary for implementation. 

Under this arrangement, the tempo of operations would be reduced 

in large part to prevent wearing out people and machines. To the 

degree that allies could join in these deployments, as well as through 

cooperative training and exercising, for example, as envisaged in 

the PFP, powerful complementary mechanisms for demonstrating 

U.S. engagement and commitment will be put in place or reinforced. 

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 

Regarding strategic nuclear offensive forces, with the demise 

of the USSR, the longstanding strategy, doctrine, targeting, and, 

indeed, purposes of these forces have been immutably changed. As 

long as nuclear and thermonuclear weapons exist and guarantees 

for their permanent elimination are less than absolute, the United 

States must retain some of these forces for the reason of prudence. 

Beyond this single reason, establishing consensus or policy on what 

nuclear strategy and forces are required must rely on intuitive factors 
234 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

and judgment. There are, however, a few indicators of possible 

future direction. 

At the same time that the U.S. and Russia move towards reducing 

total strategic nuclear warhead inventories to 3,500 or less, it is imperative to understand what the new basis should be for rationalizing and maintaining these weapons. Default in fully addressing this 

case is possible and risks implementing actual or formal policies before they have been well thought out. But we know the following. At 

a minimum, France, Britain, and China will possess substantial 

nuclear arsenals numbering in the hundreds of warheads. Pakistan, 

India, Israel, and North Korea, if all those states are or go "nuclear," 

will possess handfuls of nuclear weapons. These systems will be 

nuclear and not thermonuclear. Furthermore, the residual FSU republics are likely to reduce or eliminate their nuclear arsenals and, 

for planning, can be considered added together with Russia. And the 

distinction in destructive capacity between nuclear and thermonuclear 

weapons should not be dismissed. 

What is the purpose of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons? 

Strategic nuclear deterrence could be seen as nothing more than a 

relic of the Cold War. And enough U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons will remain as insurance against a future confrontational situation that could be no worse than the Cold War standoff if Russia 

were to become a threat again. Beyond that, there are other purposes for these nuclear systems. 

First, it would be a good idea for the United States to be able to 

prevent potential adversaries or proliferators from threatening the 

U.S. with weapons of mass destruction (in addition to a very distant 

future when super-conventional weapons conceivably could cripple 

a society by destroying its infrastructure). Until such time as those 

nuclear threats are eliminated, the U.S. must maintain a thermonuclear and nuclear arsenal that is perceived as one of overwhelming superiority. In other words, the ability to obliterate potential 

adversaries should not be dismissed or assumed away. Such an 

arsenal would require perhaps hundreds or even a thousand or so 

warheads and weapons. This also means that targeting has to expand to include a range of potential adversaries, and retargeting 

options and capabilities as well must be enhanced or put in place. 

To ensure cooperation and mutual understanding among the 

major nuclear states regarding the role of these weapons, perhaps 

a Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) type of arrangement, as exists in 
PARr III: SOLUTIONS--"W1TH A GOODLY COMPANY' 235 

NATO, ought to be set up, with nuclear states as members. The 

principal purpose would be to demonstrate that the old Western 

and Eastern blocs are not targeting each other as has already been 

agreed by Russia and the U.S. The assignment, say, of U.S. and 

Russian officers to the strategic nuclear forces of the other is a 

wise step. Because one state's potential target may be someone 

else's ally (i.e., North Korea), this NPG could focus on how to prevent or respond to proliferation and the use of or threats of use of 

weapons of mass destruction. 

In this future arrangement, the U.S. would move almost certainly to a largely sea-based deterrent force. The remaining bombers--the B-l, B-2, and older B-52s--would be assigned principally 

to non-strategic non-nuclear roles. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), consistent with strategic arms agreements, should 

be reduced. A minimum of ICBMs, perhaps numbering well under 

100, should be retained. The vast bulk of capability should reside 

in the submarine force, with ships that can patrol while staying in 

American homewaters or in port, as the reach and accuracy of the 

D-5 missile is sufficient for most target coverage. 

The area where the U.S. should persist, although at responsible and 

appropriate levels, is in improving ballistic missile defense. Because 

these implications for U.S. force structure are modest in affecting 

design, size, or the level of defense spending, missile defense is 

noted as a significant area but beyond this particular study effort. 

Once agreements with the FSU can be reached on descending 

below the 3,500-warhead limit, movement towards the sea-based, 

more flexible force supported by NPG-type arrangements will form 

the future capabilities. The purpose remains to provide an overwhelming counter to any state that uses or threatens to use massdestruction weapons. The implications for the nuclear defense industrial base are more significant and follow. 

To summarize, the United States faces three basic choices regarding future military might. "Steady as you go" will result in a 

military that retains as its objectives the requirements set by two 

MRCs. For reasons noted, over time, without full funding, the force 

will lose perhaps a third or more of its aggregate capability. It will 

become largely "hollow." 
236 IN 1RONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

If this choice is made, whether by default or design, the underlying 

reasons are clear. The lack of threat, the amount of warning time 

likely to be available if a dangerous threat were to arise, and the 

primacy of domestic issues provide the rationale for maintaining 

course, speed, and the inevitability of decline. For those who disagree with this judgment and potentially abhor the consequences, 

perhaps the more open and public manner in which this choice was 

deliberated and debated would mitigate some of these concerns. 

If, however, a hollow force resulted because Congress and the 

president chose either not to recognize or to defer the consequences 

of this case, that would be irresponsible. But, it could happen. 

"Fully funding the force" will produce a balance between the 

requirements of two MRCs and military capability sufficient to meet 

those needs. It is arguable whether more money will be spent on 

defense or whether reform will free up the necessary resources to 

fund this force fully. However, this choice is reasonable and responsible if it can be carried out. If not, the flaws and inherent 

shortcomings of the first choice apply. 

"Readjust and change," by far the most ambitious choice, requires change both in structure and in process. The ability to impose reforms in both of these areas could be impractical or impossible. The siren song of avoiding a "hollow force" is unlikely to be 

powerful enough to overcome the enormous political inertia and 

opposition. Incentives will be vital. The specific design and composition of the readjust and change choice would best be reflected 

by either the BUR force extended or the maritime force. However, 

as noted, savings and efficiencies and creation of incentives to that 

end must be implemented. 

The United States could maintain the current active force 

planned at 1.4 million. Either more money would be spent every 

year or reforms would be imposed to overcome the consequences of 

the excessive inefficiencies and insatiably growing costs. With reforms, steady-state defense spending and capability could be maintained, but, given the choice between an active force of 1.4 million 

that is "hollow" and one of 1.0 million that is ready, it is obvious 

that military leaders strongly support the latter. 

The argument has been presented that, as Arleigh Burke noted, 

"two guns are enough," and a highly capable force of about a million 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--~WITH A GOODLY COMPANY ~ 237 

should prove sufficient. The provisos are that this force must be 

kept ready and capable; a new strategic framework must be put in 

place to facilitate the engagement of the United States internationally on a qualitative basis; and reforms must be made on the 

excessive costs imposed by the process and, specifically, by the defense infrastructure. 

To answer Mr. McNamara's question, in my view, the recommended definition of "enough" is an active-duty force of about 

one million and an annual budget of about $200 billion. Designed 

around a "one-plus" MRC requirement, a full second MRC could 

conceivably be handled with the remaining forces on hand. Should 

more capability be required, a mix of allies, mobilization, sequential operations, and perhaps a selective nuclear deterrent strategy 

would follow. However, no matter which of the three choices is 

made, both a rejuvenated network of international alliances and 

structures and repair and reform of the process are necessary and 

attainable steps to be taken. 
238 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

CHAPTER TWELVE: REFORM AND CONSOLIDATION 

The defense infrastructure poses among the most inordinately 

complex, incestuously interrelated, and inherently political set of 

challenges, obstacles, and problems for assuring the common defense. 

As with Siamese twins, it is unambiguously clear that U.S. military 

might is irrevocably attached to and dependent on this infrastructure for its life's blood. However, in this case, the infrastructure 

twin is consuming an ever greater share of increasingly scarcer 

nourishment at the expense of military might. The trends and 

graphs presented earlier show how much the "tail" of infrastructure is exacting greater and greater percentages of the DOD budget at the expense of"teeth." The divergences are increasing. The 

consequences are predictable: less and less military capability. 

The defense infrastructure correlates largely with the political 

and constituent or civilian side of the DOD budget. In crass terms, 

this translates into jobs and bases. Hence, the practical impact of 

the politics of infrastructure is to make inseparable its link with 

the larger question of how much is enough. Strategic and operational logic is a vital ingredient in any defense considerations, but 

it is not enough. Politics will and must intrude--a measure not of 

cynicism but of the legitimate and reasonable representation of 

constituent interests by members of Congress. The result, however, will 

always skew this interaction, often at the expense of combat power and in 

favor of the other side of this equation--the infrastructure. 

The natural ascendancy of infrastructure over military power 

is further distorted and exaggerated by the actual structure of the 

budget, the annual budget process, and the phenomenon of escalating cost growth. Because defense represents the majority of all 

discretionary federal spending, it is likely to receive the largest 

and even disproportionately greatest share of future budget cuts. 

Because these cuts must ultimately be realized in outlays or current spending, it is the manpower, training, operations, and readiness accounts 

that are most greatly affected. These characteristics and realities 

of the budget and the process bias against fighting power and towards preserving infrastructure. The cumulative effects of these 

bureaucratic and process-driven costs and inefficiencies across 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--"WITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 239 

government were spelled out in the remarkable Report of the 

National Performance Review, chaired by Vice President A1 Gore 

in 1993. 77 

The phenomena of escalating (unit) costs and cost growth have 

been well documented. President Coolidge is credited for remarking on the perils of cost growth some 70 years ago. At some stage, 

the United States would end up with one ship, one aircraft, and 

one tank. The generals and admirals, according to Coolidge, would 

take it in turn to drive or fly the single unit in service. With the 

current costs of the major weapon systems as high as they are today, Coolidge's complaint may come true. The price of a nuclearpowered aircraft carrier and air wing is about $8 billion. The B-2 

bomber, originally programmed for a purchase of 100 aircraft and 

later cut to 20, will cost over $2 billion a copy as the costs of R&D 

and other expenses are prorated against only one-fifth of the intended buy. The experience with the new F-22 fighter, for which 

the order was reduced from about 650 to 450, showed both that the 

program total costs grew due to "stretching out" the buy, and that 

unit costs increased to over $100 million. 

In parallel to these trends, the costs of the acquisition process 

have continued to increase. The instability of an annually approved 

budget process virtually guarantees continuing changes to the number 

of weapon systems to be procured. Almost any program change 

outside cancellation or major reduction, whether adding or cutting, 

increases the total costs of that program. The contracting, pricing, 

and accounting systems are so extensive, different, and filled with 

cost anomalies that inefficiency is the general rule. 

Last but not least, the failure of trust and confidence in government has imposed a most extraordinary regulatory, oversight, audit, and micromanagement regime. The combination of all of these 

factors probably consumes 20 or 25 percent of the total defense 

budget. If this 20 or 25 percent, or perhaps some $50 billion to 

77 See "Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less," Report of the National Performance Review, (Washington, DC; GPO: September 7, 1993) 168 p. 
240 IN IRONS: US. MZLITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

$75 billion a year, can be seen as the price of defeating"waste, fraud, 

and abuse," that price is unaffordable. 7s 

The first conclusion must be that reforms, if they are to work, 

have to be made on the process and structure rather than on individual programs, because, unless and until these structural and 

inherent inefficiencies and cost-drivers are redressed, broad reform 

won't work. The 1994 legislation on procurement reform, while 

containing some useful and unexceptional provisions, was only a 

step in this direction. It is not enough. Sadly, however, this legislation may be the best that can be expected. 

At the same time, antitrust and competition regulations must 

be carefully reviewed in light of consolidation of defense industries. 

The government has formidable means to demand and achieve fair 

value for dollar spent even through sole sources of supply. However, public education and information on how DOD will deal with 

a "monopsonic-monopolistic" business environment is vital if trust 

and confidence are to be maintained. 

BASES AND SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE 

Both the executive branch and Congress recognized the necessity for closing or realigning military bases. The BRAC was empowered by law to that end. The last round of this current BRAC 

will take place in 1995. But, since this process started, there has 

been an ominous, significant, and understandable reaction in Congress. 

The "up or down" single vote in Congress was meant to take the 

politics out of base closings. This format provided political cover 

for members of Congress to use when local bases were shut. As a 

result, much but not all of the politics of base closings had been 

removed. Because of the two-year window between these closings, 

the uncertainty of what bases would go or stay in the next round 

78 It is, of course, very difficult to calculate with precision the costs of 

governance and inefficiency. The Packard Commission and the CSIS 

Defense Acquisition Study in 1987 estimated that, depending upon which 

reforms were taken, $25-50 billion a year could be saved. The most extensive study on cost reductions was done by Honeywell. That analysis 

showed that without major reform DOD could take safe actions and reduce the costs of buying virtually all systems by about 17 to 20 percent. 
PARr III: SOLUTIONS~"WITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 241 

has practically and inadvertently placed more pressure on Congress by 

constituents rightfully anxious to know their future status. 

What happened is that Congress has not always appropriated 

the full amount of money required to carry out the base closings as 

previously approved. If this trend continues, the BRAC process 

will be delayed, rendered less ineffective and perhaps impotent. 

Furthermore, a constitutional challenge to the BRAC 1990 Law 

was made by Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania. Specter's 

argument was clear. The Navy, he asserted, withheld information 

regarding the value of the Philadelphia Naval yard. Therefore, in 

his view, the yard was put on the closure list illegally. Under these 

circumstances, because DOD offered no relief, the law must be subject to judicial review; otherwise, it is unconstitutional. 

Even though the Supreme Court agreed with the government 

and sustained the lower court decision rejecting the suit, this precedent is not likely to remain unique. If these types of suits increase, any rational form of downsizing the nation's defenses will 

be made increasingly more difficult. On the other hand, Specter's 

suit and argument over the constitutionality of forgoing judicial 

review are strong and with merit. Thus, the original departure 

point of legislating around roadblocks and impasses of the 

political system is called into question. The tragedy is that 

there may be no alternative. 

On the other hand, there is no serious alternative to a rigorous, 

comprehensive, and enduring base realignment and closure program. 

With 1995 the year of the last round of BRAC, this may be a final 

opportunity to downsize the supporting bases in line with operational needs. Three actions are required and are proposed. 

First, the DOD should specify as its highest priority the maintenance of an effective, ready combat force. Against that directive, 

the services should be ordered to propose, in a coordinated, combined, and consolidated plan, a bare-bones minimum of bases to be 

kept in service, closing or realigning the remaining facilities accordingly. However draconian the nature of this process, if military power is to be preserved, the BRAC recommendations must 

be carried out without exception. 

Second, the BRAC recommendations must be part of a broader 

and more comprehensive national defense plan that encompasses 
242 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

the entire range of DOD responsibilities from strategy and force 

structure to budgets and infrastructure. These broader findings 

will focus the BRAC, and, once recommendations are made by the 

commission, the broader defense plan can be adjusted to meet these 

findings. The comprehensive plan and the BRAC recommendations, once approved by the president, would be sent to Congress 

as part of one package. The point is to coordinate a comprehensive 

defense plan in advance to reduce the impact of another, Specterlike constitutional challenge. 

Third, Congress must agree, preferably by law or other 

binding measure, to fund fully the recommendations of BRAC 

that it approves. 

It is also very desirable, if not essential, that the DOD present 

to Congress its assessment of what failure to address the base closing issue effectively and comprehensively will mean for the readiness and fighting power of the forces. In essence, Congress must 

be presented with the military consequences of two base closing 

conditions--taking effective action and taking insufficient or ineffective action. Congress cannot be allowed to ignore or defer these 

future prospects. 

THE RATE OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 

One of the greatest pressure points concerning research, development, testing, and evaluation programs is the rate at which 

technology and technological innovation are pursued. In a sense, 

the word "rate" is misleading. It suggests that there can be a quantifiable expression against which to measure technology and to 

establish the priority for allocating resources. 

In a hypothetical case, for example, an innovation rate of A might 

equate with X dollars. A rate of 2A might equate with a multiple of 

X. Because an explicit and high-priority objective of DOD has been 

to exploit technology, the emphasis has generally been on the urgent side. Thus, we have chosen to spend more rather than less to 

support this emphasis. However, because it may take 15 to 20 years 

or more to move from system conceptualization to full-scale production, it can be argued either that urgency is of the essence to 

keep this period as short as possible, or that urgency is not relevant, 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--~'WITH A GOODLY COMPANY ~" 243 

also because of time--namely, over two decades it may be more 

cost-efficient to spend at a lower rate. 

During a competition or conflict with a known adversary, there 

may be no substitute for urgency. America's determination to field 

nuclear weapons before Nazi Germany did is a virtually incontrovertible example of where urgency was and is a necessity. Now 

that the Cold War is over, the insistence on maintaining such a 

rapid and expensive pace to assure technological superiority is subject to review. For the moment, any linkages between various rates 

of pursuing technology and spending shares of the budget to achieve 

that objective are deferred. Also and from the outset, the issue is 

not whether to pursue technology but rather how and how quickly. 

The first stage of assessing the degree of dependence on and the 

rate at which to pursue technology must rest in understanding the 

relative strengths, weaknesses, advantages, and potential vulnerabilities of the U.S. and its technologies visa vis potential 

adversaries. Such an assessment would require volumes to ensure complete and specific coverage of myriad systems and technologies and is beyond the intent of this book. However, a less 

comprehensive but satisfactory alternative for assessment exists. 

Indeed, the larger and mandatory effort is presumably under way 

on a continuing basis by the relevant offices of government, especially the intelligence community. 

This broader evaluation is expedited by placing technology in 

one of two categories--it is either "known" or it comes as a "surprise." "Known" covers the obvious universe; "surprise" has two 

subsets: a known technology used in an innovative or unexpected 

way to achieve operational surprise, or a new or different technology that presents itself for the first time. Precision-guided munitions and mines are examples of known technologies that can be 

used unexpectedly and can achieve tactical surprise. Vulnerabilities of current weapon systems to countermeasures, whether electronic or mechanical, are part of this subset. German V-2 rockets 

and the atomic bomb constituted technologies of surprise. These categories should form the methodological bases for ongoing assessments. 

From this methodology, the area of principal concern should 

focus on potential vulnerabilities of U.S. systems, doctrine, and tactics 

rather than on the emergence of new and surprise technologies. 
244 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Because no other state assigns as large a share of resources to 

military R&D as the United States, and because the more likely 

threats and adversaries possess far less technological capability 

than the United States, the major military risks are likely to lie in 

countering U.S. systems with operational means as opposed to "wonder weapons." 

Finally, because the relative and absolute military advantages 

possessed by the United States are so great, it is difficult to see 

how even relatively short-term, step-function improvements in 

these capabilities will add much more utility or effectiveness. Hence, 

although the U.S. must still be vigilant regarding "breakthrough" 

technologies, it should be able to draw on its huge superiority and 

consider alternative means to exploit technology. 

There is, at present, discussion and anticipation of the "revolution in military affairs" (RMA) or "military technical revolution" 

(MTR). The hypothesis is that the operations and organization of 

military forces have been or will be profoundly affected by advancing or new technology. Precision, in the form of information and 

target location data, combined with great weapon accuracies and 

instant or near-instant communications, is asserted as the mechanism that will dispel much or most of the "fog of war." These technological revolutions, so the argument goes, will enable the side 

possessing these capabilities to have as close to perfect knowledge 

of the enemy as possible. The conduct and organization of forces 

and operations will be redesigned accordingly. If this argument 

proves correct, Desert Storm and the intensity, lethality, and decisiveness of the air and land campaigns were precursors of things 

to come. By focusing on this MTR, the U.S. would simply build on 

its already superior operational advantages. 

There are, of course, many sides and facets to this debate. The 

objectives of this new "military revolution," if it exists, are far from 

new. The means, of course, are relatively new, with further systems 

and technologies presumably to be invented and fielded. However, to 

those who have fought in war or who understand the "fog of war," 

prudence and common sense suggest caution for several reasons. What 

happens if and when both sides attained a similar or equivalent capability, as was the case in the Cold War standoff?. Alternatively, if the 

United States is assumed (with its allies) as the sole possessor of these 
PARr III: SOLUTIONS "WITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 245 

types of military-technical advantages, what would keep a '1lave-not" 

adversary from neutralizing that advantage through a different 

strategy or tactic as happened in Vietnam? 

A lesson driven home in Vietnam is that technological superiority 

is never the only guarantor of victory. More to the point, cultural 

arrogance is a recurring fragility. As Stanley Hoffmann pointed out 

three decades ago, the problem with Americans is often that we expect adversaries to reason as we do or to be in need of education to 

bring them up to our standards. This cultural arrogance may prove 

to be a more formidable problem than technological surprise. 

The conclusions are mixed. On the one hand, experience shows 

that many more revolutions in military affairs have been predicted 

than have occurred. On the other hand, technology can provide powerful and invincible countervailing force whether French knights in 

armor being slaughtered under the fire of English longbows at Crecy 

or, centuries later, Iraq's tanks being pulverized by enormously superior U.S. weapons in the 1991 "100-hour war." The issue becomes one 

of balance, which suggests an intellectual or conceptual rather than a 

resource-driven approach simply because there are too many technological avenues through which to spend money. 

In this case, the "roll-over" model suggested for acquisition may 

prove useful in assessing rates of innovation. The "roll-over" model 

would conduct the R&D and produce a working prototype ready to 

enter full-scale production. There would be no need for the latter 

unless or until crisis or changed conditions intervened. In essence, 

the prototype would be kept funded at a minimum sustainment 

level pending further and future use, which might never be required. 

What the United States should do in this regard becomes clear. 

In the past, a common practice of government and industry has 

been to form "red teams" to take part, any way they could, in critiquing a particular plan or system. In some cases, these "red teams" 

or red cells would pose alternative choices or designs. But the notion was akin to providing "a devil's advocate" and a contrarian 

view to test and challenge the program or plan under review as 

rigorously as possible. This process should be expanded and 

institutionalized. Indeed, at a time when most staffs and programs 

in DOD are shrinking, analytically enshrining a permanent 

"red team" within the bureaucracy runs counter to this trend. 
246 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Across both the operational command and OSD/service organizational 

structures, two trends have emerged. The notion of "jointness," 

that is, using the strengths of a particular military capability regardless of service ownership, has become both mantra and modus 

operandi. The role of doctrine, largely to reinforce the benefits of 

jointness and largely to respond to the changed strategic and operational environments, has been thrust on the unified commanders. 79 

These matters are being taken very seriously and have the full 

support of the chain of command. The test is that new doctrine and 

jointness requirements are setting budget and program priorities. 

Against this background, a technology"red cell" program should 

be institutionalized and given the highest priority. The aims of 

this program are uncomplicated. First, U.S. doctrine and operational concepts must be examined with a rigorous, ruthless, and 

uncompromising perspective to adduce weaknesses and potential 

vulnerabilities. Second, the steps that could be taken to defeat, 

neutralize, offset, or counter U.S. military capabilities and employments by possible adversaries should be posited. Finally, other 

steps (some technological, others strategic, still others tactical)that, 

while not operational, to the best knowledge under consideration 

could pose similar obstacles to using U.S. force successfully should 

be created or identified. 

These "cells" would appear, nominally, on unified and specified 

command staffs, on the Joint and OSD staffs, and on service staffs. 

The results of their assessments would often highlight specific technologies and operational characteristics that require special evaluation. In some cases, the "roll-over" model might be appropriate. 

In others, design and plans rather than actual hardware or software would suffice. And, in still other cases, it might be sufficient 

to draft only the blueprint for designing the means to apply and 

test the particular technology. 

The meaning and rationale for this approach are unambiguous. Too often the United States has tended to spend its way clear 

of danger. Now, stringent budgets must place a premium on other 

resources, in this case ones of intellect. The message for this era of 

79 In or near Norfolk, Virginia, for example, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command and the Navy's new Joint Doctrine School both report to the 

Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command. 
PART III: SOLUTIONs--"WITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 247 

strategic uncertainty is the necessity to think rather than spend 

our way clear of many dangers. 

Quantitative analysts and technicians are unhappy with this 

type of solution. However, given the way the budget for technology 

is structured, there is no alternative. In FY 1994 and 1995, the 

DOD budget for research, development, and testing and evaluation (RDT&E) is as shown in table 39. 

Table 39. DOD research, development, testing, and evaluation 

(budget authority in billions of dollars) a 

1994 1995 

Technology 

Basic research 1.2 1.2 

Applied research 2.7 3.0 

Advanced technology development 

Ballistic missile defense 2.6 1.2 

Other technology development 3.6 3.9 

Total science and technology 10.1 9.3 

System development 

New systems 10.1 12.7 

Modifications for existing systems 11.4 10.9 

Total 21.5 23.6 

R&D management support 3.2 3.3 

Total RDT&E 34.8 36.2 

a The Budget of the United States for FY 1995, p. 228. 

Although $34.8 and $36.2 billion are substantial sums, the 

six program areas shown consist of hundreds of thousands or more 

of specific items and contracts that make up the whole. Determining the actual number of programs is perhaps impossible. The point 

is that the bulk of these items are relatively small in funding. Because 

they are relatively small and are in the million, hundred thousand, 

and tens of thousands of dollars categories, even a small reduction 

could effectively terminate the contract. Hence, across-the-board 

reductions, given how those cuts would be carried out, are likely to 

prove extremely inefficient and wasteful. 
248 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

There are, however, two means for improving the efficiency of 

allocating R&D resources. First, the overhead costs of administering, managing, auditing, and providing oversight can be reduced 

through changes to the overall process. These will be discussed 

shortly. Second, using the "red cell" approach, the total number of 

individual projects, programs, and contracts can be reduced. This 

means elimination of some or many rather than arbitrary reductions 

imposed across the entire account. Only through these actions can 

efficiencies, economies, and actual cost savings be achieved. 

THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE 

As discussed in Chapter Eight, there are three basic paths for 

dealing with the defense industrial base. Laissez-faire will let the 

market determine survivors and victims. "Nationalization" will 

shii~ the ownership of the base to government. "Industrial policy" will 

navigate between the two with a hybrid type of future industrial base. 

The constraints and realities that largely will determine how 

this industrial base issue unfolds are also straightforward. The 

unyielding discourse over competition and monopoly and how much 

competition is enough is powerful politically and ideologically. The 

survival instincts of the industries and facilities that compose the 

base are strong and not suicidal. And the question of autarky and 

the argument that national security justifies maintaining certain sectors 

and capacity regardless of economic costs will not be dismissed. 

Because these constraints and realities are as old as the republic and run to the core of the nation, there may not be any solution 

that appears rational, economic, or efficient. To the degree that 

defense becomes a surrogate for jobfare or welfare, the nation may 

be faced with a permanent and costly infrastructure that exceeds 

all likely needs, imposes a great drain on the budget, and consumes 

resources at the direct expense of military might. Conversely, from 

a strategic, operational, and economic perspective, the defense industrial base must be rationalized, compressed, and consolidated. 

Reforms to the acquisition system are an essential part of this 

process. Relief from competition and antitrust laws and regulations 

must be granted on a case-by-case basis. Finally, redundant 

capacity in the industrial base and in certain areas, such as between private and public overhaul or production facilities, must be 

eliminated or reduced. All these actions will require the most powerful incentive; otherwise, there is virtually no chance that any of 

them will be implemented. 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--"~ITtl A GOODLY COMPANY" 249 

The starting point is a comprehensive and relatively stable 

overarching defense plan that will be made reliable and credible 

through the long-term manner in which it is enacted into law. 

Downsizing defense, combined with the turbulence guaranteed by 

yearly approval and debate and changes to the budget, makes assurance of any semblance of an orderly transition for planning virtually impossible. 

Attaining stability in planning will require collaboration between government and industry that heretofore has been missing. 

Government must be able to specify what it proposes to spend and 

to buy for a period of at least three and perhaps five years and 

stick to it. Industry, armed with this information that is reliable 

and relieved of some of the antitrust and competition requirements, 

can respond through mergers, acquisitions, and other suitable business transactions to reshape and downsize itself. For those facilities and organizations, government and civilian, that will be dosed 

and for those jobs eliminated, there must be some better incentive 

than only unemployment insurance or welfare. Chapter Thirteen 

details such a plan. 

As the "red team" approach was applied to the area of technology and technology investment, the BRAC process should be 

expanded for determining the future industrial base. Specific companies cannot and would not be targeted, but sectors like defense 

electronics, aerospace, shipbuilding, weapons, armored vehicles, and 

artillery would be assigned aggregate levels of industrial capacity 

that stem from projected budgets. It would be up to the private 

sector to respond. Government would facilitate, adjudicate where 

necessary, and provide certain incentives to ease this transition. 

Without this type of approach, there is no likely alternative. The 

result will be a continuously bloated infrastructure and a military 

placed "in irons." 

THE ACQUISITION PROCESS 

Despite all the studies, commissions, and attempts at reform, 

the process of acquiring the goods and services for defense remains 

excessively costly, wasteful, and inefficient. It simply takes too 

long and costs too much to acquire weapons of war. Remarkably, 

the process of super-regulation, micromanagement, and extraordinary 

oversight withstanding, the United States still turns out the best systems 

of the world. At this stage, however, the costs are becoming unaffordable. 
250 IN IRONS: U.S. MIrZTARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Responsibility and blame for past and current excesses in the 

broader sense no longer apply. The executive branch, Congress, 

and the private sector, willingly or inadvertently, have all contributed to the present situation. From an American perspective, the 

issue is not who is at fault; the issue is correcting this condition. 

Thus, reforms must be taken by the executive branch, Congress, 

and the private sector. Thus far and to be fair, although the executive branch and private sector have been the exclusive targets of 

reform, reform has not worked. Congress must be part of the solution. If not, no solution or reform will work. 

Table 40 illustrates the growth of government. By extension, 

this growth and intrusion of government have created a series of 

bureaucracies, rules, laws, oversight, and procedures that are strangling any hope of achieving economies or efficiencies. The National 

Performance Review, noted earlier, records that nearly 10 percent 

of GDP, or more than $600 billion a year, is required to meet the 

regulatory and oversight demands of all levels of government. 

Table 40. Growth in Federal Government 

Executive branch 

Legislative Judicial 

Independent branch branch 

and 

Cabinet Executive emergency Civilian Civilian Civilian 

Year President positions agencies agencies employment employment employment 

1789 George Washington 5 0 0 >4,000 >200 -- 

1850 Zachary Taylor 7 0 0 26,000 386 177 

1900 William McKinley 8 0 0 232,000 5,690 2,730 

1940 Franklin Roosevelt 10 4 59 1,023,000 17,019 2,468 

1950 Haw/Truman 9 6 60 1,934,000 22,896 3,772 

1960 Dwight Eisenhower 10 7 65 2,371,000 22,886 4,992 

1970 Richard Nixon 12 11 69 2,944,000 30,869 6,887 

1980 Jimmy Carter 13 10 108 2,821,000 40,000 17,000 

1990 George Bush 14 14 101 3,067,000 38,000 22,000 

The executive and legislative branches, therefore, must undertake a series of reforms to correct as many of these excesses as 

possible. These reforms, specified below, must concentrate on rationalizing the excesses of the process; the bureaucracies; the rules, 

regulations, and oversight; and the inherent political tensions between Congress and the presidency. 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--"WITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 251 

• First, the current budget process should be streamlined and 

compressed. The annual and redundant budget, authorization, and appropriation bills should be turned into a single bill 

and a single review process. This will mean reducing committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction over defense, s0 

• Second, a two-year appropriation bill should be adopted. 

Congress would pass the bill in year one and provide a review and oversight function in year two. 

• Third, acquisition rules, regulations, and laws must be 

streamlined and codified by statute. 

• Fourth, wrongdoing and misdeeds must be dealt with using 

the appropriate legal code so that the tendency to criminalize 

all or most offenses is limited to criminal and not civil offenses. 

To ensure these functions are effectively carried out, Congress 

should establish a Joint Committee on National Security and Defense. 

The long-term purposes of this committee would be to replace the 

current system of overlapping committees and to induce the executive branch to develop a basic outline for the revised defense plan. 81 

If the president were reluctant to act or chose to defer taking action, 

this Congressional committee could, in the last instance, serve as a 

surrogate and produce its own plan. Given some of the bad results 

that have taken place when Congress has acted to redress problems, such as the S&Ls, this approach is neither recommended nor 

desired. But, there must be some backup and even threat if the 

president is unwilling to fulfill the responsibilities as commander in 

chief. These items would include for vote into law matters pertaining to U.S. alliances, strategy, force structure, defense spending, 

80 The current annual budget cycle has three phases. The budgeting phase, 

overseen by the respective budget committees, sets overall spending limits 

now defined by the 1993 Omnibus Law. The armed services committees 

oversee authorizations, that is, the intent to fund programs. Finally, the 

appropriations committees approve what will be spent each year in the form 

of 13 separate appropriations bills to be voted on by both houses. 

Sl A simple majority vote would be required to approve any plan. Hence, 

unless the two-party system no longer obtained, no matter which parties 

controlled the White House and each house in Congress, a majority vote 

would always be forthcoming if voted along party lines. 
252 IN IRONS: U.S. MZLITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

commitments, deployments and presence objectives, rationalizing 

the infrastructure (including acquisition reform), and other appropriate topics. Congress would approve or reject this plan without 

amendment and by a one-time vote in each house. Each year, or every 

two years with the budget, this plan could be resubmitted. 

RESERVE AND GUARD FORCES 

Reserve and guard forces would be part of any comprehensive 

plan. Under the arguments and strategic plans advanced in this 

book, reserve and guard forces would be restructured and reduced 

to conform with the new requirements for the MRCs that specified 

the presence of allied forces and mobilization. This would mean 

moving from about 900,000 reservists to about 650,000 to 700,000 

or even less over a three- to five-year period, s2 

FINAL THOUGHTS ON INFRASTRUCTURE REVISITED 

The infrastructure is not inherently the villain or albatross draped 

around the neck of America's fighting forces. Without an appropriate 

infrastructure, there could be no fighting power. The issue is 

downsizing the infrastructure to a level that fully supports the fighting forces with minimum demand on the available resources. 

The broadest issue facing the nation regarding defense rests in 

governance and the ability of the process to withstand and to respond 

to the extraordinary demands of a complex, fractionated, 21st-century, post-industrial society. The defense infrastructure is a direct 

outgrowth and subset of this larger issue. The solution, if there is 

one, is inherently political and not entirely strategic or operational. 

Many metaphors and analogies can describe the role of the infrastructure. The Siamese twin analogy is accurate only in that 

this irrevocable joining means that separation of the two would 

prove to be fatal, at least to the weaker twin. In this case and in 

the worst of worlds, or if trends continue, unless action is taken, 

we will be left with a large and insatiable twin in the form of infrastructure and a frail, undernourished, and, in a sense, dying twin 

of military might. This specter or the logic of the case will not 

magically change this forecast. Incentives will. 

82 Obviously, if a reconstitution strategy were chosen, reserve and guard 

forces could be increased. The point is that the reserve and the guard must 

be part of a comprehensive approach. 
PART III: SOLUTIONS~"WITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 253 

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: INCENTIVES FOR ACTION 

Change is generally motivated by responses to some combination of factors that can be characterized in terms of incentives and 

disincentives. The latter obviously will arise from crisis or failure 

and derive their motivating power in those cases largely for fearinduced reasons. That fear can be as basic as the threat of losing 

one's life, livelihood, or liberty, or more complicated as less clearcut values are at stake. 

Regarding the common defense, although the issue is anything 

but trivial, defense just does not register as a concern or even as a 

topic of interest to the vast majority of Americans. The disincentive raised by the alarm that U.S. military power is headed towards 

a future state of"in irons" not only will fail to penetrate the body 

politic; the alarm will simply not be heard, and left to future generations to heed. Hence, if the future of defense is to be put on a 

track other than one of deferral, sufficiently strong incentives are 

vital both to forcing attention and to motivating different behavior-that is, assuming a war or real crisis does not intervene first. 

Given the political conditions and priorities in the United States 

in the 1990s, are there any feasible incentives that might be applied to the business of defense? Or, are those incentives likely to 

be ones of only rhetorical, intrinsic, or spiritual value, such as those 

based on honor, duty, and patriotism, and therefore without tangible 

reward and benefit? In blunt terms, it is perhaps only economic and 

monetary rewards that, in the first instance, can provide an incentive 

powerful enough to induce the political system to deal with defense in 

a different light. Of course, as one moves down the political hierarchy 

of authority from the chief executive and Congress to the military 

forces that must be prepared to fight and win, other incentives no 

doubt must be created to motivate any change. 

How might incentives be created or assigned to each of the three 

policy choices facing the nation and its government? This assumes, 

of course, that the disincentive of stumbling into a future crisis or 

catastrophe remains uncompelling as an inducement for change 

and not really relevant to the defense debate. 

STEADY AS YOU Go 

If a process of default or neglect occurs and the White House 

and Congress choose to defer, dismiss, or ignore the trends towards 
254 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

a hollow force, the incentive is the politics of following the path of 

least resistance. By deferring this defense issue, other more important priorities and problems can be addressed without the dilution or division caused by another controversy or political fight. In 

fact, this incentive is really in the form of not provoking other disincentives that could complicate or impede progress on what are 

seen as more significant non-defense matters. 

Alternatively, if the White House were to recognize the impending defense condition and voluntarily elect to allow that state to 

unfold on the grounds that the international environment has created a breathing space such that a substantial decline in military 

power will not be harmful to the nation, the incentive is much different. Truth and candor would be seen as rallying political support for 

the current agenda. Of course, many would argue that increasingly 

permitting military power to decline significantly was irresponsible. 

FUND THE FORCE 

If the White House and Congress agree to fund the force fully, 

the incentive would be derived from the political and geostrategic 

benefits arise from maintaining the objective and the ability to fight 

two MRCs. The actual merits and demerits would be subjective 

and extremely difficult to measure regarding what that level of 

military power does for U.S. security. Although the hundreds of 

billions of dollars needed for this funding would be marginal when 

compared against the nation's GDP over those years, the social, 

political, and economic opportunity costs of non-defense programs 

forgone would be argued by some as enormous. This, however, would 

also be done on a subjective basis. 

If some of the resources for funding the force came down from 

reform of the process, that would be a substantial incentive in itself. Making government perform more effectively and efficiently, 

without changing the nature of that government, inherently must 

be of value. Of course, the political costs of imposing reform create 

very strong disincentives. 

READJUST AND CHANGE 

If the White House and Congress agree to readjust and change 

the nation's military posture, the largest potential incentive rests 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--aWITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 255 

in reducing the resources that go to defense provided national security is appropriately and adequately protected. If less defense is 

appropriate (for example, the "one plus" MRC strategy), it is imperative that reforms are also implemented to ensure that a steadystate level of capability can be maintained, or provisions made to 

fund that level as may be necessary. Assuming the "one plus" MRC 

could be maintained at $200 billion per year, over the next fiveyear defense plan of $1.2 or 1.3 trillion, several hundreds of billions of dollars could be available for other national purposes. 

The disincentives of this approach rest in the political costs of 

making this significant change, and in dealing with the many service personnel and civilian constituents whose employment depends 

upon defense and who would become redundant. Within the military, further downsizing could easily harm morale and the esprit 

necessary to maintain any effective fighting force. Thus, incentives to 

mitigate or revise these disincentives must be created and must provide 

satisfactory and sufficient transition and employment options as well. 

ONE INCENTIVE 

How might this incentive work assuming the nation avoided 

the path of political default? 

First, the president must take a strong stand on defense in his 

capacity as commander in chief. There is no alternative to this, no 

matter how strong the magnetism of the domestic agenda may be. 

He can either direct his national security team to produce major 

and comprehensive alternatives, reflecting the choices that lie 

ahead, or he can establish a Presidential Commission on National 

Security and Defense to achieve the same purpose. These results-- 

perhaps done best with liaison with Congress, or, more precisely, 

its leaders during the process--would then be presented to Congress along with the defense budget for that year. As with the 

BRAC, perhaps a legislative exception can be made, and Congress 

would approve or disapprove the entire package through an up or 

down vote in both houses. Amendments or resolutions would not 

be permitted on the basic bill. 

The results of this NSC or Commission effort would be a range 

of alternatives representing the three policy choices, or ones like 
256 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

them, and possibly a recommended course of action. Specifically, 

the general content of each alternative would include: 

Threat: the nature of general and specific threats to the 

security of the U.S. over the next ten years or so, and a 

statement of the instruments to deal with these threats that 

include old and new alliances; the role of international organizations; diplomatic and aid initiatives; the role of military force, 

including a statement of U.S. commitments, deployments, and 

presence requirements; and arms control, arms transfers, and 

other related matters. 

Strategy: the definition of U.S. strategy that specifies 

objectives, relates policy issues to objectives, specifies the 

MRC and other military objectives that set military requirements, and shows how the strategy will be argued to both 

domestic and international audiences. 

Force structure: the definition of the size, shape, and composition of U.S. active and reserve forces to meet the strategy, its objectives, and the ensuing requirements. Also specified will be the criteria for setting standards of readiness, 

training, maintenance, operational tempo, and other related 

criteria. 

Budget: the statement of the actual costs of maintaining the 

force at a steady-state level of capability and readiness. 

Infrastructure: the definition of what size and shape infrastructure is needed to support the forces. 

Plan of action for change and reform: the definition of 

how to move from the current structure to the proposed 

choice over the next three to five years, including a costbenefit analysis of the risks and rewards. 

Incentives: the definition of what is required to make any 

change or reform work. 

The president would make his choice and send the complete 

package to Congress for approval. 
PART III: SOLUTIONs--"WITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 257 

Let us assume the first NSC Review or Commission on 

National Security and Defense convenes in FY 1996. It is fairly 

clear how such a review would respond to the first two choices. 

The most interesting case is that of readjust and change. The recommendations made by the NSC or the Commission on the choice 

of"Readjust and change" could be summarized as follows. 

THE READJUST AND CHANGE CHOICE: A SUMMARY OF THE 

REVIEW BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON NATIONAL 

SECURITY AND DEFENSE 

• Threat: Direct dangers and military threats to the 50 U.S. 

states will be isolated and limited almost exclusively to terrorism or to limited use of weapons of mass destruction. 

Absent mass destruction weapons, the direct threat to the 

physical security of the 50 states is minuscule and will be 

so for some time to come. 

Abroad, regional conflicts remain the basis for major contingencies and therefore the only basis for organizing, planning, and justifying the bulk of U.S. military power. A "one 

plus" MRC is deemed the appropriate planning basis for 

these forces. 

Threats can and must also be dealt with using allies; old 

and new security frameworks; international organizations; 

diplomacy and traditional quasi-military instruments; economic and trade incentives; and common sense. 

• Strategy: U.S. military might will be postured to meet the 

requirements of the "one plus" MRC scenario. Approximately 500,000 troops, dispatched and deployed over three 

to six months, set the upper limits for the single MRC; 

100,000 troops constitute the "plus." The support of allies 

and mobilization at home will be assumed as occurring or 

available in any crisis. The ultimate U.S. objectives in the 

MRC would be to "win" through defeating the adversary as 

decisively and quickly as feasible. 

U.S. commitments, deployments, and presence would be readjusted 

accordingly in line with such other instruments as new or 
258 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY Mrc,~r IN THE N~w CENTURY 

rejuvenated alliances. Flexibility in substituting different 

types of deployed forces for presence would occur. 

• Force structure: An active-duty force of about 1 million 

and a reserve component of about 700,000 would be required. 

The composition would be either the BUR force extended or 

the maritime force. High levels of operational readiness 

would be maintained across virtually all of the forces in a 

deployed or deployable (i.e., ready) status. 

• Budgets: About $200 billion per year is required. If reform is imposed, that figure could be lower. If reform is not 

imposed, annual real increases of about 3 percent will be 

needed to keep a steady-state level of capability. 

• Infrastructure: Infrastructure must be consolidated and 

streamlined by a total of about 50 to 60 percent. Realignment and reduction, rather than outright closing, are probably the preferred alternatives. Another BRAC-like process will be part of these recommendations and result in 

these changes. The specifics would follow in the report. 

The specific plan of action for making this transition is best left 

to DOD. The details obviously are crucial and require expert input. In addition to the obvious incentive of reducing defense expenditures, incentives to facilitate this transition are vital. 

Balance among threat, strategy, force structure, budget, and infrastructure was set to carry out a "one plus" MRC requirement. This 

leads to an active-duty force of about 1 million and an annual defense 

expenditure of $200 billion. This transition will take three to five 

years if it is to be done without destroying the fiber of the forces. But, 

to make this transition politically acceptable, incentives for military 

and civilians and local communities must be created. These incentives would include programs like "GI education bills," retraining and 

re-education, financial support, and continuation of health insurance. 

Funds for these new expenses would be derived by starting with the 

current plan to spend about $1.3 trillion on defense over the next fiveyear period. The differential between that level and the actual monies expended on the smaller force would make up the account from 

which these incentives would be funded. 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--"WITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 259 

At the end of the five-year period, presumably with the defense 

spending level at $200 billion, whatever resources were lei~ from this 

$1.3 trillion account would be available for other public uses. To achieve 

this endpoint, the annual procedures would be roughly as follows: 

• Congress, with a biannual appropriation would approve 

$200 billion a year for two years for defense--a total of 

$400 billion. 

• For FY 1996, Congress would establish an off-budget"defense 

escrow account" in which it would appropriate $100 billion. 

These funds would be used only for defense transition. 

• For FY 1997, perhaps an additional $50 billion would be 

appropriated to this fund. 

• For FY 1998, 1999, and, if necessary, 2000, more funds would 

be added if required, up to $50 billion. 

If the process went smoothly, funds remaining in the "defense 

escrow account" would be returned to the treasury. In any event, 

the total expenditure would be $1.2 trillion at most. And annual 

defense spending would be steady at the $200 billion. Obviously, 

the rates of supplying and using this escrow account would require 

detailed analysis. There would also be scrupulous control of this 

account through a joint DOD-Congressional oversight committee. 

To give this incentive teeth, these appropriations and spending 

levels would be binding and relaxed only in the event of national 

emergency or by a 2/3 (or super--i.e., 60 percent) majority vote in 

both houses of Congress to grant relief. The defense plan would be 

approved concurrently, which would provide an unprecedented level 

of stability for planning. 

For the White House, this plan would lead to retaining the finest military in the world at the right level and the right expenditure. If all went well, substantial savings could be realized as well. 

For the DOD, there would be longer-term certainty and agreement on 

strategy, force structure, funding, and planning, and the knowledge that 

the future force, although smaller, would be the best in the world. 

For Congress, there would be these same rewards plus the credit 

for legislating a defense downsizing plan that worked efficiently 

and fairly. This would also free up resources for other programs. 
260 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

For individuals and communities that were transitioned out of 

the defense work force, there would be sufficient financial and psychic incentives to make that change with minimum pain. 

There are, of course, counter-arguments to a plan like this at 

least as truculent as the arguments against making further reductions to defense. The chance of Congress moving to a two-year 

defense budget is remote. The reasons why Congress or DOD would 

stick to these spending levels are disingenuous. The incentive would 

be to do otherwise. The experience with the Gramm-RudmanHollings Deficit Reduction Act proves the rule. Incentives for the 

transition could require a new bureaucracy. Administration of benefits would be ripe for fraud. And so on! 

On the other hand, given, in essence, a clean slate, government 

has the opportunity to make major and vital changes to defense 

and national security. If there is no consensus or movement to 

change, the U.S. military force will evolve by default. This is the 

nature and result of the democratic process as it exists today. But 

that is not the best excuse for failing to impose the vital reforms to 

defense without which no steady-state level of a ready military capability can be sustained. 

In addition to the military incentive of maintaining a high and 

steady-state level of capability, further incentives will be required 

to sustain esprit and fighting power while drawing down. Fewer 

rather than more deployments and reduced operating tempo will 

be needed. One incentive applies to innovation. 

Despite the advance of technology and the embrace and institutionalization of the highest standards of military professionalism and competence, as forces are downsized, the understandable 

tendency will be to preserve "core" capabilities. "Core" capabilities 

could relate both to systems and to specific military formations 

and units. It is unlikely that the services will renounce their equivalent of the capital ship or the current basic design of military formations. Although these preferences and conclusions may be 

absolutely justified, true innovation may be stifled. 

Two initiatives bear scrutiny and comparison with the current 

organization and design. The first is to rely far more heavily on 

"jointness," especially through new organizational structures. 

Jointness means, in part, exploiting the fungibility of service 
PART III: SOLUTIONS--"WITH A GOODLY COMPANY" 261 

capabilities. The uses of adaptive joint force packages and far more 

integrated and cross-service oriented task forces were cited as examples of this approach. 

Pursuit of jointness and the advantages that may accrue can 

be accomplished through detailing the very best officers to the appropriate command tasked with this responsibility. For the time 

being, this responsibility is assigned to the (new) Atlantic Command. The capacity and spirit to look innovatively at new ways to 

carry out both old and new tasks must be reinforced and nurtured 

by the most senior leadership in DOD. 

The second initiative deals with how we will fight, and the alternative is derived from what the British called the military style 

of fighting practiced by "Easterners." Easterners served in places 

like the Gulf, Malaysia, and Burma, whore conditions such as topography or remoteness demanded different means of fighting. Generally cordigm~ as light or special forces, Easterners used stealth, cunning, and mobility in lieu of heavy, mechanized systems. Lawrence of 

Arabia and Field Marshal Slim of Burma come to mind. s3 

The opposite style of war, called by the British after the socalled "Westerners," was based on traditional, heavy, armored forces 

supported by heavy firepower. Montgomery and the "Desert Rats," 

who defeated Rommel's Afrika Corps, are representative of this 

school. "Westerners" reflect the more traditional, long-standing 

approach to war--and the 1991 Desert Storm campaign is the most 

current example. 

The Easterners initiative would place the focus of warfare 

through this less conventional lens. The obvious consequences of 

this form of warfare would dramatically change the style, systems, 

and designs for military formations, especially if stealth, cunning, 

and high degrees of mobility were adopted as chief criteria supported by firepower from advanced weapon systems. These changes 

would reflect the type of future adversaries and conflicts the U.S. 

would likely fight. Of course, the tried, true, and traditional approach of the Westerners may prove more relevant and convincing. 

83 I am indebted to John Barry of Newsweek magazine for calling attention to this most useful distinction. 
262 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

A further variant of both styles of waging war involves heavier 

reliance on signature management. Signature management is the 

ability to control or regulate those visible signals or signs seen, 

heard, or detected by an adversary. This goes well beyond stealthy 

aircraft invisible to radar or infrared detection, s4 

Suppose, for example, an Army platoon could alter its "signature" 

to look like a division, or even a carrier battle group or amphibious 

group if close to the sea. Or suppose a division could disguise itself 

as a platoon or even smaller unit. The ability to adapt or readapt 

to a tactical situation and apply force accordingly could have decisive impact. Because the technologies and procedures for those 

approaches are presumably closely held, signature management is 

not discussed in greater detail. However, the concept offers some 

interesting possibilities. 

Taken together, emphasis on innovation and actively seeking 

out new ways to deal more effectively with both traditional and 

nontraditional tasks are exciting. This excitement and challenge 

can form a stimulating incentive within the military. 

The choice is ours. If, in this rather small but vital sector that 

is about 4 percent of GDP, government can be made to work more 

effectively and efficiently, the prospects for applying that success 

to the larger issues are brighter. If, at the bleaker end of the scale, 

no reform or progress is made, the consequences are almost certain. We can change the direction of the Ship of State and sail with 

ample winds and calm seas. Or, we can merely trim the sails and 

hazard the risk of finding ourselves placed "in irons." 

84 I am indebted to former senior DOD official Dr. James P. Wade, Jr., for 

the basic idea for this approach. 
EPILOGUE: THE COSTS OF FAlLURE 

For well into its second century of existence, the United States 

narrowly interpreted the constitutional directives "to maintain a 

navy" and "to raise an army." As a result, the nation kept only a 

small standing military force. The Civil War years of 1861-1865 

were exceptions. Indeed, after World War I ended in 1918, the 

United States demobilized and returned to the traditional posture 

of a relatively small standing armed force. World War II, the Cold 

War, and, now, the era of strategic uncertainty have reversed that 

traditional posture. For the foreseeable future, the United States 

will maintain a large standing military force and an annual defense budget probably in excess of what the rest of the world collectively spends on armed might. 

Two ironies underscore the difficulties ahead as well as the 

important consequences for the condition of the future U.S. military 

establishment. The relative and absolute advantages in military 

capabilities possessed by the United States were arguably never 

greater. Yet, exploiting or using these advantages to national benefit is easier said than done. The powerful influence of geoeconomics 

and regional concerns further complicates exploiting the utility of 

American military force. 

Although most Americans continue to prefer having the best or 

most capable military force in the world, those preferences cannot 

be isolated from the absence of genuine military threats to the 

nation's security and the preoccupation with problems at home that 

impose increasing demands on limited national resources. 

The second irony stems from success. Public expectations of 

cost-free and decisive, quick success in applying American force on 

every occasion have been intensified by political and social conditioning of the past decade. It is quite possible this cultural pattern 

could become disabling to future policy needs by setting military 

requirements that could not be met or fully guaranteed even though 

the use of force was justified. 

It is therefore not inconceivable that in a decade or two, because 

of these factors, the United States could return to the more traditional posture of maintaining only a relatively small standing force. 
264 IN IRONS: US. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

This condition could occur naturally, by default, or through a 

dramatic change in policy. Today, although history has shown it 

would be exceedingly unwise for America to disarm either structurally or premeditatively, there can be no absolute conclusion about 

what such a condition would mean for America's future well-being. 

In the mid 1990s, the prospect of a militarily weakened America 

is not registering very high on any list of national concerns. However, simply because the symptoms are not visible does not mean 

the pathology is automatically benign or, in certain ways, not highly 

destructive and dangerous to the body politic. To specialists in 

national security, quite the opposite diagnosis of damage is likely. 

Today, the common defense is threatened not by clear and apparent dangers abroad, but by conditions, events, and politics largely 

within these shores. The absence of a worthy and credible enemy 

replete with awesome and frightening weapons of war poses a fundamental challenge to any chief executive of the nation. How can 

the defense of the nation be based on a threat that is quite small 

and, over time, becomes less and less clear or apparent? 

At the same time, the extraordinary expense of governance, manifested in diseconomies and inefficiencies long imbedded in the political process and the soaring costs of administering society's overhead 

in which there is little value added and probably a lot forgone for the 

resources expended, will and must erode whatever level of military 

power the nation retains unless change and reform occur. 

Finally, it is clear that the Cold War structure of international 

politics has been irreversibly and fundamentally changed. The view 

or sense of what kind of a replacement structure, if any, will fill 

this vacuum is not only unclear, it is opaque. 

That the arguments and forecasts presented in this book may turn 

out to be absolutely accurate is preempted by the issue ofrelevance. Why 

should a president of either party when confronted with issues of 

burning domestic importance such as health care and welfare reform, public safety, and economic recovery expend precious time 

and even more precious political capital in responding to a diaphanous, dynamic, and, at this point, unpredictable regime for national 

security? One answer is that without the incentive or fear posed by 

a major crisis or new threat, any president would not. 

On the grounds of logic, politics, and the demands of the Constitution, it has been and will be exceedingly difficult to argue, 

except in crisis, that providing for the common defense is a more 
EPILOGUE: THE COSTS OF FAILURE 265 

important priority than safeguarding the general welfare and the 

domestic tranquility of the nation. For those who correctly may 

argue that defense is of a different texture because the fate of the 

entire nation is concerned and defenders may be called upon to 

shed their own blood in answering the call to arms, there is the 

response that reflects a grimmer reality. Increasingly, the domestic community and society at home are placing Americans in harm's 

way. Hence, the patriotism and service often associated with defending one's country are arrested by the cynical changes in American society at large. 

There are, however, two islands of refuge for a president wishing to put national defense on a better and more solid footing. The 

first is the political judgment and historical experience that the 

United States has no alternative except to be well defended by a 

powerful and capable military able, when necessary, to destroy or 

neutralize the will and capacity of potential enemies to oppose us. 

The second is the courage to recognize that a combination of factors exacerbated by political expectations that exceed economic 

means, a political process not easily disciplined to make tough decisions, and understandable complacency--has become a dagger 

inadvertently pointed at many vital national organs, including the 

heart of military capability. By returning that dagger to a protective scabbard, the president can preserve this military structure. 

By imposing reforms and remedial actions to this relatively limited 

sector of national interest, the president can do more than only 

reduce the demand on crucial resources. These initiatives make a 

much larger and important point. 

Many observers believe the United States has reached a crucial juncture in its history. The pessimists see decline as inevitable, a result of the end of America's greatness. The absence of 

any recent major successes by government in redressing major 

American problems contributes to this pessimism. Perhaps the 

military establishment represents one small sector where decline 

and disarray can be prevented. If that is the case, this example of 

success may have broader benefit and relevance. But, only time 

will tell whether U.S. military might in the new century is the best 

and most formidable in the world or whether it is consigned to a 

fate of"in irons." 
INDEX 

A 

Access, 150, 153 

Acheson, Dean, 142 n 

Achille Lauro hijacking, 55, 148n 

Acquisition process 

and infrastructure, 180-184 

and reforms, 248-249, 249-252 

and regulations, 39 

Adams, John, 195 

Adaptive organization, 228 

Advanced Tactical Missile System 

(ATACMS), 220 

Aegis cruisers and destroyers, 173 

Afghanistan 

Soviet invasion, 30 

Africa, 202 

Afrika Corps, 261 

A~lity, 224 

Air Force 

force structure, 114 

readiness, 37 

Airborne warning and control 

system (AWACS), 219 

Ak~, 49 

Alliances 

See Strategic alliances 

American-Pacific Economic 

Cooperation Conference, 198 

American Revolution, 195 

Analysis, 24 

Angell, Sir Norman, 2 

Antiproliferation, 74 

ANZUS Treaty, 98, 134 

Arab-Israeli war, 207 

Army 

comparative size, 12n 

new organization, 230 

Army readiness, 37 

ARPA 

See Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (DARPA) 

Asia, 202 

Aspin, Les, 42, 46, 76, 80-81, 

163, 184, 193 

Austria, 13 

B 

B-1 bomber, 220 

B-2 "Stealth" bomber, 172, 173 

B-17 bomber, 17 

B-29 bomber, 17 

B-36 bomber, 18 

B-52 bomber, 220 

Balance of forces 

and force structure, 117 

Barry, John, 261n 

"Base force," 40, 42 

Base Realignment and Closure 

Commission (BRAC), 66n, 158-159 

and infrastructure, 241-242 

See also Defense Base 

Realignment and 

Closure Commission 

(BRAC) 

Bases 

and related infrastructure, 158- 

160 

site establishment dates, in 

Asia/Pacific, 135 

site establishment dates, in 

Europe, 135 

and supporting infrastructure, 

240-242 

See also Infrastructure 

Basing 

and force structure, 118 

Battle of Midway, 24n 

Battleship Row, 119 

Bazookas, 17 

Bell, Bill, 3 

Berlin, 13, 18 

Berlin Wall 

destruction of, 40 

Biological agents, 55 
268 IN IRONS: U.8. MIL1TARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Blaker, James R., 135n 

Bolton, David, 3 

Bosnia, 53, 77, 96, 101, 102, 204 

Bosnians, 53 

Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New 

Era (BUR), 8, 42, 43, 45-46, 

75, 76 

and force structure, 114 

and infrastructure, 155 

and strategic and operational 

demands, 218-219 

and tactical alternatives, 91-92 

and underfunding, 77 

Bowie, C., 47n 

BRAC 

See Base Realignment and 

Closure Commission (BRAC) 

and Defense Base 

Realignment and Closure 

Commission (BRAC) 

Bradley, Omar, 16 

Breakfast for Bonaparte, 195n 

Brezhnev Doctrine, 30 

Brookings Institution, 111n 

Brnwn, Harold, 36n 

Brussels Summit, 203 

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 50 

Budget formula 

See Strategy, force structure, 

and budget formula 

Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 

69, 251n 

Budgets, 256 

and force structure, 116 

recommendations, 258 

See also Defense budgets; 

Federal budgets 

Build-downs 

See Defense reductions 

BUR force extended, 122, 127, 

128, 223, 224 

Burke, Arleigh, 201, 236 

Bush, George H.W. 

and base force, 40, 42, 80 

and military demobilization, 11- 

12, 40-47 

and tax pledge, 66 

C 

Cambodia, 147 

Camp David Accords, 30 

Capitalism 

and military strategy, 104 

Carlucci, Frank C., 3 

Carter, Jimmy 

and military demobilization, 11, 

29-30 

Center for Naval Analyses, 46n, 

147n 

Center for Strategic and 

International Studies 

(CSIS), 180, 240n 

Central Europe 

and U.S. military objectives, 

commitments, deployments, 

presence, 151, 231 

Central Treaty Organization 

(CENTO), 98 

Cheney, Dick, 42, 158, 183 

China, 13, 16, 234 

card, 27 

and Nixon, 27 

as unifying force, 49 

Christopher, Warren, 197, 205n 

Citizen-soldier, 161, 162 

Clinton, Bill 

and defense budgets, 75 

and discretionary spending plan, 

44 

foreign policy priorities, 197-198 

on the military, 5, 42 

Clinton administration 

"base force," 80 
APPENDIX 269 

and defense budget shortfall, 81 

and democratization, 74-75 

and military demobilization, 11- 

12, 40-47 

and military strategy, 105 

and policy on Somalia, 73n 

CNA Corporation, 2-3 

CNN (Cable News Network), 56 

Cold War 

end of, 40 

geostrategy and politics, 140-141 

militarization of, 17 

products of, 22 

and U.S. strategy, 93-96 

Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 2, 3 

Collective security arrangements, 

134 

Combined Joint Task Force (C~TF), 

210 

Commitments, 129 

in Central Europe, 151, 231 

conclusions, 152-153 

in former USSR, 151, 231 

and "global" nonregdonal issues, 

152, 232 

in Northwest Pacific, 151, 232 

Communists 

in China, 13 

in Eastern Europe, 13 

Greek-Turkish, 13 

Competition in Contract Act of 1984, 

165, 181 

Conference on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe 

(CSCE), 206, 213 

Congress 

and the common defense, 48 

Constitution 

and the common defense, 48 

Consumption, personal, 67 

Containment, 18, 19, 22, 93-94, 

95, 96, 98 

Contracting, 183-184 

Coolidge, Calvin, 239 

Cordesman, Anthony, 46n 

"Core" capabilities, 260 

Core force, 87, 125 

Cost-benefit analysis, 9, 188 

"Cost creep," 7, 17, 87, 90, 192 

Coughlin, Paula, 83 

Crecy, 245 

Cynicism, public, 62 

and military capability, 265 

and regulatory burden, 239 

and Vietnam War, 25 

See also Trust, public 

Cyprus, 207 

D 

Debt 

federal, 71 

growth of, public and private, 68 

household, payments, 69 

Debt service 

growth, 68 

Defense acquisition process 

See Acquisition process 

Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency 

(DARPA), 20 

Defense Base Realignment and 

Closure Commission (BRAC), 158 

See also Base Realignment and 

Closure Commission (BRAC) 

Defense budgets 

and GNP, 28 

under President Clinton, 75 

and remainder method, 14 

for research, development, 

testing, evaluation, 247 

See also Underfunding 

Defense Business Operating Fund 

(DBOF), 77 
270 IN IRONS: U.8. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Defense discretionary spending 

See Discretionary spending 

Defense escrow account, 259 

Defense industrial base and 

infrastructure, 164-174, 

175-179 

policy choices, 165 

Defense reductions 

under President Clinton, 40-47 

under President Eisenhower, 19- 

23 

under President Truman, 12-19 

after Vietnam, 23-40 

Defense spending 

changes in, over time, 39, 75 

and manpower, 31 

for military functions, 21 

as percent of annual budget, 35 

See also Defense budgets; 

Underfunding 

Defense technology base 

change options, 176-179 

and infrastructure, 174-175 

Deficit Reduction Act, 66 

Deficit, annual 

actual and projected, 66 

in federal budget, 70 

Demobilization, 94 

Democracy 

and military strategy, 104 

Democratization, 74-75 

Dennis, Linda, 3 

Department of Defense (DOD) 

creation of, 14 

finetuning, 45 

responsibilities, 193-194 

Department of Energy, 175 

Deployments, 129-153 

in Central Europe, 151, 231 

conclusions, 152-153 

in former USSR, 151, 231 

and "global" nonregional issues, 

152, 232 

in Northwest Pacific, 151, 232 

possibilities, 144-145 

of U.S. divisions, 138 

"Desert Rats," 261 

Desert Storm, 261 

See also Operation Desert Storm 

Destroyer leaders, 18 

Deterrence, 19, 22, 93-94, 95, 96- 

97, 98, 213, 214-215 

Deutch, John, 46 

Development of the Base Force 1989- 

1992, 40n 

Diego Garcia, 149 

Dienbienphu, 22n 

Disarmament, 94 

Discretionary spending 

Clinton plan, 44 

and defense spending, 69 

Ditko, Don, 3 

Doctrine, role of, 246 

Domestic preoccupation, 6, 62-72 

and military capability, 265 

and national security, 187 

"Downsizing," 6 

Draft 

end of, 27 

Dresden, 18 

E 

East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, 

i00 

Eastern Europe, 13 

"Easterners ~' military style, 261 

Egypt, 30 

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 15, 16 

and military demobilization, 11, 

19-23, 35, 36 

Electric Boat Shipyard, 45, 171 

Employment, defense-related, 169- 

170 
APPenDIX 271 

as percent of total labor force, 

169 

See also Labor force, defenserelated 

Environmental concerns, 174 

Epilogue, 263-265 

Eurasia, 212 

Europe 

and strategic alliances, 204-205 

See also Central Europe 

European Recovery Plan, 15 

Extraordinary expense of 

governance, 6, 187 

F 

F-16, 173 

F-22, 90 

F-86 fighter, 18 

F-117, 173 

F/A-18, 173, 220 

Failure 

cautions, 263-265 

Federal budgets, 28 

deficit, 70 

See also Federal spending 

Federal debt, 71 

and net interest, 71 

Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation (FDIC), 64 

Federal Government 

growth, 250 

Federal spending, 34 

See also Federal budgets 

Fission weapons, 18 

Fletcher-class destroyer, 18 / 

Flexibility 

and force structure, 119 

"Flexible response," 23, 119, 207, 208 

"Fog of war," 244 

Force-in-being, 87, 125 

Force structure, 256 

and administration assumptions, 

115 

analysis and modeling, 115 

basic approaches, 122-126 

and budgets, 110-128 

choice derivation, 120-122 

consistencies, 113 

future, 41 

guiding questions, 111, 116-119 

in 1999, 44 

nuclear levels, 124 

past, 41 

recommendations, 258 

reduction, 41 

and Reserve/Guard options, 163 

See also Strategy, force 

structure, and budget 

formula 

Ford, Gerald 

and military demobilization, 11 

Forrestal, James, 13, 14 

France, 171, 195, 196n, 234 

Franklin, Benjamin, 195 

Frauncis Tavern (New York), 196 

• . . From the Sea, 84 

Fusion weapons, 18 

G 

Garrison forces, 117, 122-123, 

127, 128, 223, 224 

GATT, 198 

GDP 

See Gross Domestic Product 

(GDP) 

General Accounting Office 

on undeffunding, 46n 

Germany, 12 

reunification, 40 

"Global" nonregional issues 

and U.S. military objectives, 

commitments, deployments, 
272 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGIIT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

presence, 152, 232 

Global police, 198 

Global Reach, Global Power, 82n 

GNP 

See Gross National Product 

(GNP) 

Gore, Al, 182, 239 

Governance, expense of 

See Extraordinary expense 

of governance 

Governance and the common 

defense, 73-90 

Government 

See Federal Government 

Government intervention policy, 

165, 166 

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit 

Reduction Act, 65, 66, 260 

Great Britain, 171, 195, 234 

Great Illusion, 2 

Great Society, 102 

Great War, 2 

Greece, 13, 207 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 

allocation, over time, 67 

Gross National Product (GNP), 28 

allocation, over time, 67 

Grumman, 166 

Gulf War, 42 

and Navy contribution, 82 

See also Persian Gulf War 

H 

H-bomb, 18 

Haiti, 54, 77 

Hardisty, Huntington, 3 

Haruna, 18 

Hill, Anita, 83 

Hiroshima, 18 

Hitler, Adolf, 51-52, 199, 218n 

Hoffmann, Stanley, 245 

Holland, 195 

"Hollow force," 5, 30, 36, 80, 81, 219, 

235, 236 

Homewaters, 119-120 

Homosexuals in uniform 

and Clinton administration, 105 

discrimination against, 42, 72 

Honeywell, 240n 

Household debt payments, 69 

Howe, Jonathan T., 218n 

Human rights 

and Jimmy Carter, 30 

and U.S. intervention, 198-199 

Hungary, 22, 207 

Hussein, Saddam, 52, 96 

I 

Imperial presidency, 29 

In Harm's Way: American 

Seapower in the 21st 

Century, 122n 

Incentives for action, 236, 253-262 

fully fund the BUR force, 254 

presidential commission, 255- 

258 

readjust and change, 254-255 

steady as you go, 253-254 

Inchon Landing, 16 

India, 234 

Indo-China, 23 

Industrial base 

See Defense industrial base 

Industrial policy, 248 

Infrastructure, 6, 154-186 

and albatross, 2 

categories, 155 

consolidation and reform, 238- 

252 

defense acquisition process, 180- 

184 

defense industrial base, 164-174, 
APP.~'DIX 273 

175-179 

defense technology base, 174-175 

drain 1962-1980, 156 

drain 1980-1998, 157 

recommendations, 258 

and reform, 252 

related, and bases, 158-160 

Reserve and National Guard, 

160-164 

supporting, and bases, 240-242 

See also Threat, strategy, force 

structure, budget and 

infrastructure formula 

Innovation 

and incentive, 260 

See also Technological 

innovation 

"Instant thunder," 97 

Interest 

on federal debt, 71 

and GDP, 63 

Interest burden, of nonfinancial 

corporate business, 68 

Iraq 

and strategic uncertainty, 52, 

54-55 

"In irons," 1, 8, 31, 47, 139, 200, 

219, 249, 253, 262, 265 

Israel, 30, 234 

J 

Jaffee, Lorna S., 40n 

Japan, 12 

and alliance, 212-213 

and strategy, 99-101 

Jay, John, 195 

Jefferson, Thomas, 195 

Johnson, Louis, 13-14 

Johnson, Lyndon B., 24 

and military demobilization, 25 

"Jointness," 228, 246, 260-261 

Jones, John Paul, 110 

Jones Act of 1920, 167 

K 

Kahn, Herman, 185 

Kaufmann, Wilham W., 111n 

Kelso, Frank, 83n 

Kennedy, John F. 

and enhancing defense, 36 

and military demobilization, 23- 

25 

Khrushchev, Nikita, 22-23 

Kissinger, Henry, 27 

Known technology, 243 

Korea 

and alliance, 212-213 

and strategic uncertainty, 52, 

54-55 

and strategy, 99 

See also Korean War; North 

Korea; South Korea 

Korean War, 15, 17, 19, 121 

Krepinevich, Andrew F., 46n, 47n 

Kuwait, 82, 96 

L 

Labor force, defense-related, 169-170 

See also Employment, defenserelated 

Laissez-faire policy, 165, 166, 248 

Lawrence of Arabia, 261 

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory 

(California), 175 

Lebanon, 22 

Libya, 96 

Lockheed, 166 

Los Alamos National Laboratory 

(New Mexico), 175 
274 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT iN THE NEW CENTURY 

M 

MIA1 tank, 173, 174, 220 

Macedonia, 61 

Madison, James, 195 

Major regional conflicts or 

contingencies (MRCs), 43-44 

determining how many, 221-225 

and planning assumptions, 194 

and strategic and operational 

demands, 218-221 

Manning 

and force structure, 116-117 

Manpower, DOD, 32-33 

and defense spending, 31 

Marine Corps 

force structure, 114 

new organization, 230 

unit locations, 137 

Maritime force, 123-124, 127, 128, 

223, 224 

Madtime superiority, 119 

Marshall, George, 16 

Marshall Plan, 15 

Martin-Marietta, 166 

Mass destruction weapons, 55, 74 

Massive retaliation, 20, 54, 119 

McArthur, Douglas, 16 

McNamara, Robert S., 3, 24, 58, 237 

Mexico, 2 

Meyer, E.C., 81 

Military bases 

See Bases 

Military commitments 

See Commitments 

Military deployments 

See Deployments 

Military infrastructure 

See Infrastructure 

Military installations 

in foreign areas, 136 

Military might 

how to determine, 216-217 

in the future, 127, 223 

prospects for, 88 

Military objectives 

See Objectives 

Military personnel 

compared, 1967, 1968, 132 

in foreign areas, FY 1981 - FY 

1992, 133 

Military presence 

See Presence 

Military readiness 

See Readiness 

Military strategy 

See Strategy 

Military technical revolution 

(MTR), 244 

Miller, Paul D., 228 

"Missile gap," 24 

Missions 

new, and force structure, 118, 

226 

other than war, 225-228 

Mobilization time, 94 

MogadJshu, 58, 147 

Montgomery, Bernard Law, 261 

MRCs, 43-44 

See also Major regional conflicts 

or contingencies (MRCs) 

Multicrises: Seapower and 

Global Politics in the 

Missile Age, 218n 

Multiple-Launched Rocket System 

(MLRS), 220 

Murray, Robert, 2-3 

N 

NAFTA, 198 

Nagasaki, 18 

Nakhleh, Jamil, 3 

Nanotechnology, 104n 
APPENDIX 275 

Napoleon, 112, 148n 

Nation-building, 226 

National Defense University, 195n 

National Guard, 86 

and force structure options, 163 

and infrastructure, 160-164 

and reform, 252 

National Security Act of 1947, 5n, 

14, 112 

National Security Act 

amendment, 20 

Nationalization, 165, 166, 248 

NATO 

See North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) 

Naval War College (Newport), 24n 

Navy 

comparative size, 12n 

force structure, 114 

new organization, 230 

readiness, 37 

unit locations, 137 

New Calculus, 47n 

New look, 20, 207 

New world order, 139-140 

Newport News, 45, 171 

Newsweek, 261n 

Newton, Sir Isaac, 74 

Nitze, Paul H., 15n 

Nixon, Richard M., 

and military demobilization, 11, 

26-29, 35, 36 

and strategy, 195, 196, 197 

Nixon Doctrine, 27, 196, 197, 202- 

203 

Nondiscretionary payments, 62, 69 

Normandy invasion, 224n 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), 15, 53-54, 98-99, 

134, 203-212 

North Korea, 15, 147 

and nuclear proliferation, 214, 

234 

See also Korea 

Northrop, 166 

Northwest Pacific 

and U.S. military objectives, 

commitments, deployments, 

presence, 151, 232 

NSC~8 study, 15 

Nuclear forces, strategic, 233-237 

Nunn, Sam, 126 

O 

Objectives 

in Central Europe, 151, 231 

in former USSR, 151, 231 

and "global" nonregional issues, 

152, 232 

in Northwest Pacific, 151, 232 

Odeen, Phil, 76 

Odeen Report, 76, 90 

Office of Technology Assessment, 175 

"1-1/2 war" scenario, 27, 114, 196 

"Open Skies" proposal, 23 

Operation Desert Shield, 147 

Operation Desert Storm, 97 

See aL~o Desert Storm 

Operational demands, 218-221 

Operations tempo, 138-139 

OPTEMPO 

history by fleet, 139 

Organization, new, 228-233 

and force structure, 118 

Organization of African Unity 

(OAU), 213 

Overhead, 63 

Owens, J.C., 3 

Owens, William A., 228 

P 

P-51 fighter, 17 
276 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Pacific 

See Northwest Pacific 

Packard Commission, 181, 240n 

Pakistan, 234 

Pan American Flight 103, 55 

Partnership, 202 

Partnership for Peace (PFP), 205-206 

Patriot, 145 

Patton tank, 18 

Peace-imposing, 59, 226 

Peacekeeping, 59, 101, 225-227 

See also United Nations 

Peacemaking, 59, 226 

Pearl Harbor, 49, 119 

Psnatomic design, 113 

Pentomic design, 113, 231 

Perry, William J., 180, 184, 193 

Pershing tank, 18 

Persian Gulf War, 121 

and Korean War, 16n 

See also Gulf War 

Personnel 

See Employment, defenserelated; Labor force, 

defense-related; Military 

personnel 

Philadelphia Navy Shipyard, 

160, 241 

Philippine Treaty, 98, 134 

Pirie, Robin, 3 

Police forces, 106 

Policy options 

fully fund the BUR force, 8, 9, 

89-90, 91-92, 108-109, 143, 

187, 191-192, 221, 229, 236, 

254 

readjust and change, 8, 9, 89-90, 

92, 109, 143, 187, 192, 221- 

222, 229, 236, 254-255 

steady as you go, 7-8, 9, 88-90, 

91, 107-108, 143, 187, 190- 

191, 221, 229, 235-236, 253- 

254 

Political correctness, 86 

Port-au-Prince, 58 

Powell, Colin L., 3, 40, 126, 228 

Precision, 244 

Presence, 129, 146-149, 225-226 

in Central Europe, 151, 231 

conclusions, 152-153 

and current deployments, 141- 

142 

and force structure, 118 

in former USSR, 151, 231 

and "global" nonregional issues, 

152, 232 

in Northwest Pacific, 151, 232 

President 

as commander in chief, 48 

defense incentive, 255-258 

and leadership, 72 

recommendations for, 265 

Presidential Commission on National 

Security and Defense, 255-258 

recommentions, 257-258 

Prologue, 1-3 

Public Law 101-510, 158n 

Public microscope, 86 

Purple Hearts, 61 

Pusan perimeter, 16 

Q 

Qaadafi, M., 96 

Quantitative analysis 

and Robert McNamara, 24 

R 

Radio sales, 181 

Readiness 

Air Force, 37 

approaches to, 124-125 

Army, 37 
APPKNDIX 277 

and defense reductions, 36 

determining, 36n 

and force structure, 116 

Navy, 37 

See also Unreadiness 

Reagan, Ronald 

and enhancing defense, 36 

Reconstitution, 73-74, 123-124, 

127, 128, 223, 252n 

Red cells, 245, 246, 248 

Red teams, 245 

Reform action plan, 256 

Regional conflicts, 74 

Regional stability 

and strategy, 96, 204 

Reinventing government, 182, 239 

Reorganization 

of Navy and Marine Corps, 84- 

85 

See also Organization, new 

Report of the National 

Performance Review, 

239 

Republic of Korea Treaty, 134 

Research, development, testing, 

evaluation budget, 247 

Research and development 

and Eisenhower, 20 

Reserves 

and force structure options, 163 

and infrastructure, 160-164 

and reform, 252 

selected, components of, 161 

Revolution in military affairs 

(RMA), 244 

Rime of the Ancient Mariner, 2 

Rio Pact, 98, 134 

Roles and missions, 125-126 

Roll-over, 172-173, 245, 246 

Rome Summit, 203 

Rommel, Erwin, 261 

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 13 

Rostow, Eugene, 195n 

Rotation base, 144 

Royal United Services Institute, 3 

Russia 

alliance options, 211 

and market reform, 211 

1993 elections, 2 

See also Soviet Union, former; 

USSR, former 

Rwanda, 102 

S 

S&Ls, 64, 65 

Sarajevo, 2 

Saudi Arabia, 150 

Schlesinger, James R., 3 

Search and destroy policy, 208 

Security arrangements, collective, 

134 

Security baskets, 210 

Selectivity, 143 

Sexual assault, 83 

Sexual harassment, 83 

Siegel, Adam B., 147 

Signature management, 262 

Field Marshal Slim of Burma, 261 

Somalia, 73n, 77, 101, 102, 147, 148 

South Africa, 54 

South Korea, 15 

Southeast Asia Treaty (SEATO), 

98, 134 

Soviet Union, former, 234 

and the "bomb," 13 

coup, failed, 42 

and defense spending, 24 

and Eisenhower, 20 

and Nixon, 27 

and strategic alliances, 203 

and strategic uncertainty, 50-51 

as unifying force, 49 

See also Russia; USSR, former 
278 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

Spain, 195 

Specter, Arlen, 241 

"Spirit of Geneva," 23 

Sputnik, 22 

SSN-21 Seawolf, 171, 173 

Staggered readiness, 125, 127, 223 

Strategic alliances, 202-215 

Strategic demands, 218-221 

Strategic nuclear forces, 233-237 

Strategic sinews, 59-60, 227 

Strategic uncertainty, 6, 48-61 

and advanced intelligence 

systems, 56 

and Constitutional powers, 48- 

49, 57 

and economic well-being, 53 

"era of," 49n 

and force structure, 120 

and mass destruction weapons, 

54, 55 

and national security, 187 

and new alliances, 215 

and new threats, 52-54, 55 

and political gridlock, 57 

and regional problems, 54 

and roles and uses for military 

force, 58-60 

and former Soviet Union, 49-52, 

6O 

and terrorism, 54, 55 

and urban warfare, 56 

Strategy, 93-109, 256 

and capitalism, 104 

containment, 93-94, 95, 96, 98 

demobilization, 94 

and democracy, 104 

determining, 95 

deterrence, 93-94, 95, 96-97, 98 

disarmament, 94 

and domestic concerns, 102-103 

future, 107-109 

history, 93-106 

and Japan, 99-101 

and Korea, 99 

mobilization time, 94 

and NATO, 99 

planning factors, 95 

and policy options, 107-109 

recommendations, 257-258 

regional stability, 96 

warning, 94 

See also Strategy, force 

structure, and budget 

formula 

Strategy, force structure, and 

budget formula, 5, 216 

See also Threat, strategy, force 

structure, budget and 

infrastructure formula 

Suez crisis, 22, 207 

Sullivan, Gordon, 229 

Surprise technology, 243 

T 

T-34 tanks, 17 

T-72 tanks, 220 

Tactical alternatives, 91-92 

See also Policy options 

Tactical units 

Army, in 1948, 1949, 131 

in continental U.S., 1948, 1949, 

131 

"Tail and teeth," 7, 87, 156, 157, 

193, 238 

Tailhook incident, 82-83 

Tax reform, 64-65, 70 

Technological innovation, 242-248 

and force structure, 117 

rate, 242-243 

Technological competition, 103-104 

Technology 

and Eisenhower, 20 
APPENDIX 279 

See also Defense technology base 

"Teeth" 

See "Tail and teeth" 

Tehran 

seizure of Embassy, 30, 130, 147 

Terrorism, 53, 54, 55, 227 

Thermonuclear weapons, 18, 22, 213 

Thomas, Clarence, 83 

Threat, 5-6, 256 

recommendations, 257 

See also Threat, strategy, force 

structure, budget and 

infrastructure formula 

Threat, strategy, force structure, 

budget and 

infrastructure formula, 

6, 216 

See also Strategy, force 

structure, and budget 

formula 

Thrifts, 64 

Tokyo, 18 

Tokyo Bay, 12 

Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 25 

Treaties, 134 

Treaty of Paris, 195 

Trieste, 13 

Truman, Harry S 

and military demobilization, 11, 

12-19, 35, 36 

and strategy, 195, 196, 197 

Truman Doctrine, 15 

Trust, public, 19, 23 

crisis in, 25 

and regulatory burden, 239 

See also Cynicism, public 

Turkey, 13 

"2-1/2 war" scenario, 24, 113, 196 

U 

U-2 shootdown, 22 

Ullman, Harlan IL, 122n 

Ullman, Julian, 2 

Underfunding, 46, 77, 78, 87 

United Nations, 101-102 

United States Overseas Basing, 

135n 

United States of America 

and military future, 265 

as sole power, 12 

as sole superpower, 58-59 

and strategic alliances, 204-205 

"Universal military training," 14 

Unreadiness 

pockets of, 81 

U.S. Defense Acquisition: A Process 

in Trouble, 180 

U.S.~Japanese Mutual Defense 

Treaty, 99, 134 

Use of Naval Forces in the PostWar Era: U.S. Navy 

and U.S. Marine Corps 

Crisis Response Activity, 

1946-1990, 147n 

USS Mayaguez, 147, 148 

USS Missouri, 12 

USS Pueb/o, 147 

USSR, former 

and U.S. military objectives, 

commitments, 

deployments, presence, 

151, 231 

and world order, 94 

See also Russia; Soviet Union, 

former 

V 

Viet-Minh siege, 22n 

Vietnam War, 102, 121 

Visegrad states, 210 

Voltaire, Francois, 115 

Volunteer military force, 27 
280 IN IRONS: U.S. MILITARY MIGHT IN THE NEW CENTURY 

W 

Wade, James P., Jr., 262n 

War of 1812, 196 

War Powers Act, 25, 29 

Wargame, 24n 

Warning, 94 

Warsaw Pact, 42, 99, 204 

Washington, George 

farewell address, 196 

and strategy, 195 

Watergate, 29 

Weapon systems 

costs, 35 

Weinberger, Caspar, 91 

Weinberger Doctrine, 26 

Western European Union 

(WEU), 206 

"Westerners'" military style, 261 

Why England Slept, 23n 

Wiener, Sylvia, 3 

Women in the military, 72 

assignments in Navy, 85 

World Trade Center bombing, 55 

Y 

Yamamoto, 49 

Yeltsin, Boris, 51 

Yugoslavia, former, 61 

Z 

Zhirinovsky, Vladimir, 51 

Zumwalt, E.R. (Bud), 146 

*U.S.G.P.O.:1995-387-330:20003 
IN IRONS 

U.S. MILITARY MIGHT 

IN THE 

NEW CENTURY 

Composed in New Century Schoolbook type 

Text design and layout by Sylvia L. Wiener, 

Center for Naval Analyses 

Cover design and art by Juan Medrano, 

National Defense University 
.@ 

For the past decade, Harlan 

K. Ullman has divided his 

professional life between the 

worlds of public policy and 

business. A member of two 

prestigious research 

organizations--the Center 

for Naval .Analyses and the 

Center for Strategic and 

Int6rn~tiona[ Studies--he 

also e0risults and advises 

industry and government on a frequent basis.: ::~A 

veteran of both the U.S. and Royal navies, he served 

extensively at sea in command and combat 

assignments. At the National Defense University in 

Washington, DC, Dr. Ullman::ser~/~d on the faculty of 

the National War College. ' He!:i~ widely published and 

appears regularly on~t~levision as anii~xpCrt on defense 

and national security issues. For several years, he 

hosteda current events pro~ onJapari,s NHK-~. 

Founder and managing dire~6r of an American high 

technology company, Dr. Ullman has served On the 

boards of directors of various public and private 

companies. His lastbook, In~Harm's Way: Amei'ican 

~ Seapower and the 21st Cen~t~, " was judged one of the 

best in its field in 1991. 

National Defense University 

Washington, DC 

Press