alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## NO. 12

- 14

- 00268

- CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

IN RE:
CARL WADE CURRY,

RELATOR §
§
§ ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM Relator, Carl Wade Curry, has filed a petition for writ of mandam us requesting an order directing the trial court to dismiss two misdemeanor complaints filed on March 25, 2010, and June 14, 2010, respectively. He alleges that he has filed a motion to dismiss the complaints, but the county attorney opposes the motion. 1 To be entitled to mandamus relief in a criminal case, a relator must establish that he has no adequate remedy at law to redress his alleged harm, and what he seeks to compel is a ministerial act, not involving a discretionary or judicial decision. State e x rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at Texarkana , 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding). A defendant seeking to compel the dismissal of a misdemeanor has an adequate remedy at law because he can file a pretrial ap plication for habeas relief in a misdemeanor prosecution. See T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. A NN

. art. 11.09 (West 2005). Therefore, Relator cannot satisfy the first prerequisite to mandamus. Accordingly, we deny Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus. Opinion delivered November 5, 2014. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.
( DO NOT PUBLISH )

1 Relator did not file an appendix or a record with his petition. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 5 2.3(k); 52.7(a). Consequently, we do not have a copy of any documents pertaining to this proceeding.

## COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

NOVEMBER 5 , 2014

NO. 12

- 14

- 00268

- CR

CARL WADE CURRY, Relator V. HON. RICHARD SANDERS,

Respondent

O RIGINAL P ROCEEDING ON THIS DAY came to be heard the petition for writ of mandamus filed by C ARL W ADE C URRY , who is the relator in Cause No. 2010

- 0425CC , pending on the docket of
the County Court of Henderson County, Texas. Said petition for writ of mandamus having been
filed herein on September 11 , 20 14 , and the same having been duly considered, because it is the opinion of this Court that a w rit of m andamus s hould n ot i ssue, it is therefore CONSIDERED,
ADJUDGED and ORDERE D that the said petition for writ of mandamus be, and the same is, hereby D ENIED

. By per curiam opinion

.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J

.
#### James T. McGee, Jr., v. Board of Education of the City of New York.

Motion by plaintiff-respondent for leave to appeal this court’s order reversing the judgment, vacating the verdict, and dismissing the complaint, denied, with $10 costs to defendant-appellant. Plaintiff appealed this court’s *527order to the Court of Appeals, purportedly as of right. Judgment on the order was later entered, but no appeal was taken from it, and the limitation period expired. The appeal from the order was dismissed, as the order did not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution. Now plaintiff seeks permission to appeal the order. Only the judgment entered on the order, and not the order itself, is appealable, either as a matter of right or with permission. Plaintiff’s reliance on section 592 (subd. 5, par. [b], cl. [i]) of the Civil Practice Act is not well-founded. While that section provides for an application for permission to appeal following dismissal of an appeal taken as of right, it requires that the court be otherwise authorized to grant permission to appeal. (Civ. Prae. Act, § 591; *Shemm*v. *City of New York,*7 N Y 2d 971; Cohen and Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals [rev. ed.], p. 112; but see, CPLR, § 5512, eff. Sept. 1, 1963.) Concur — Breitel, J. P., Rabin, Eager and Steuer, JJ.
§ 60.4 Policy. It is DoD policy to: ( a ) Provide a safe and secure environment for DoD personnel and their families by promoting the prevention, early identification, and intervention in all allegations of child abuse and neglect in accordance with DoD Directive 6400.1, “Family Advocacy Program (FAP)” (see *http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/640001p.pdf*).
( b ) Promote early identification and intervention in allegations of extrafamilial child sexual abuse in accordance with DoD Directive 6400.1 as it applies to DoD-sanctioned activities.
( c ) Provide a coordinated and comprehensive DoD response through the deployment of the FACAT to assist the Military Department upon DoD Component request to address allegations of extrafamilial child sexual abuse in DoD-sanctioned activities.
( d ) Foster cooperation among the DoD, other Federal agencies, and responsible civilian authorities when addressing allegations of extrafamilial child sexual abuse in DoD-sanctioned activities.
( e ) Promote timely and comprehensive reporting of all incidents covered by this part.
( f ) As appropriate, actively seek prosecution of alleged perpetrators to the fullest extent of the law.
( g ) Ensure that personally identifiable information, to include protected health information collected, used, and released by covered entities in the execution of this part is protected as required by DoD 6025.18-R, “DoD Health Information Privacy Regulation” (see *http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/602518r.pdf*) and 5 U.S.C. 552a as implemented in the Department of Defense by 32 CFR part 310.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 19
- 00088
- CR

Matthew James Farrell, Appellant

v. The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE 433RD DISTR ICT COURT OF COMAL C OUNTY NO. CR2015
- 006, THE HONORABLE DIB WALDRI P, JUDGE PRESIDING

O R D E R A N D M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

PER CURIAM

Matthew James Farrell seeks to appeal the district court’s order concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to grant Farrell’s requested judicial

- clemency relief in his “Motion to Set
Aside Convi ction and Dismiss Charges

. ” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.701 (f)

. However,

t he clerk’s record does not contain the necessary standardized form that judges “must use” when discharging a defendant under article 42A.701. See id

. art. 42A.701(f

- 1) ( “A judge discharging a defendant under this article must use the form adopted under this subsection.”). 1

1 The Office of Court Administration of the Texas Judicial System (OCA) adopted a standardized form for use after December 1, 2017, by courts discharging a defendant under article 42A.701. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.701(f

- 1) ; see also Off. Ct. Admin. Tex. Jud. Syst., “ Order of Early Discharge F rom Community Supervision (Probation) under Article 42A.701, CCP , ” available at http://www.txcour ts.gov/rules

- forms/forms/ . The form is posted in Word form at on OCA’s website. See “ Order of Early Discharge from Community Supervision2 Accordingly, we abate this appeal and remand the cause to th e district court for completion of the standardized form required by the Texas Code of Crimi nal Procedure

. See id

. A supplemental clerk’s record containing the completed form shall be filed with this Court no
later than May 6 , 2019. See Tex. R. App. P. 34.5(c)(3).

It is ordered April 5, 2019.

Before Justices Goodwin, Baker, and Triana
Abated and Remanded
Filed: April 5, 2019
Do Not Publish

(Probation) , ” available at https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1439810/discharge

- order

- early

termination.docx

.
#### 1032.770-2 Definition.

“Continuing Resolution” means an appropriation, in the form of a joint resolution, that provides budget authority for federal agencies, specific activities, or both to continue operation until the regular appropriations are enacted. Typically, a continuing resolution is used when legislative action on appropriations is not completed by the beginning of a fiscal year.
### -82 -80 -78 -76

36 38 40 

## ★

▲ ▲ ▲ ▲



## ★ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ 

### 500 1000 1500 1000 18 12 06 00 08/25 

## NOAA HYSPLIT MODEL 

# Backward trajectory ending at 2300 UTC 25 Aug 07

EDAS Meteorological DataSource★at 38.50 N 76.81 WMeters AGL
Nos. 779 and 780.

#### United States *v.*National Surety Company.

April 19, 1920.

*The. Solicitor General*and *Mr. Assistant Attorney General Spellaey*for the United States.

*Mr. S. W. Fordyce*and *Mr. Thomas W. White*for respondent.

Petition for writs of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000032312
<NAME> EMCEE Broadcast Products, Inc.

<S>                                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                       1,303,356
<SECURITIES>                                 1,783,484
<RECEIVABLES>                                  520,746
<ALLOWANCES>                                    44,000
<INVENTORY>                                  3,502,569
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             7,786,317
<PP&E>                                       2,889,040
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,217,013
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               8,951,993
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          559,259
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                        73,084
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                   7,886,228
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 8,951,993
<SALES>                                        812,425
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               812,425
<CGS>                                          705,012
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,237,066
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (26,164)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 9,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              18,864
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (398,477)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (98,150)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (300,327)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (300,327)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (.08)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.08)


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 13.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Avino Silver & Gold Mines Ltd. (the “Company”) on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2016 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Malcolm Davidson, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge and belief:



(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





|                     |     |                                               | 
|-------------------- | --- | --------------------------------------------- | 
|Date: March 10, 2017 | By: | /s/ Malcolm Davidson                          | 
|                     |     | Malcolm Davidson, Principal Financial Officer |
**Exhibit 31.1**
**CERTIFICATION OF PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**
I, Jack L. Saltich, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Three-Five Systems,Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows ofthe registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrantand have:
 a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known tous by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;  b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the endof the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’smost recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter inthe case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting; and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of theregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):
 a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the designor operation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability torecord, process, summarize and report financial information; and  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting.
Date: May 7, 2004         /s/   Jack L.Saltich  Jack L. Saltich   President and Chief Executive Officer
Order entered November 10 , 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 15
- 00475
- CR No. 05
- 15
- 00476
- CR
EUGENE ANTHONY LYNCH , Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . F13
- 51985
- Q , F14
- 000063
- Q



### O RDER The Court has before it appellant’s pro se motion to compel the trial court for production of records and documents under the Michael Morton Act. Appellant’s attorney filed a motion t o withdraw as counsel and an Anders brief in support of the motion. Appellant’s response to the motion is due by December 23, 2015. Appellant has been provided the trial court record and may not raise issues outside of the record. Accordingly, we DENY a ppellant’s November 9, 2015 pro se motion. On September 29, 2015, we ordered the trial court to file certifications of appellant’s right to appeal from the hearing on the motions to adjudicate guilt within ten days. To date, wehave not received the certi fications, nor have we received any correspondence regarding the

status of those certifications. Accordingly, we ORDER the Honorable Tammy Kemp, Presiding Judge of the 204th Judicial District Court, to file the certifications of appellant’s right to appea l from the hearing on the motions to proceed to adjudication of guilt by WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2015

. We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order to the Honorable Tammy Kemp, Presiding Judge, 204th Judicial District Court and to counsel for all parti es. We DIRECT the Clerk to send a copy of this order, by first

- class mail, to Eugene Lynch, TDCJ No. 623845, Neal Unit, 9055 Spur 591, Amarillo, Texas 79107. /s/ ADA BROWN JUSTICE
#### Manuel R. Reyes, as Administrator of the Estate of Victor R. Reyes, Deceased, et al., Appellants, v. Donato Gagliardi et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant.

In an action to recover damages for personal injury and wrongful death, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, entered January 25, 1963 after a jury trial, as dismissed the complaint against the defendants Donato Gagliardi and Pasquale Gagliardi, at the close of plaintiffs’ ease, for failure of proof. Judgment, insofar as appealed from, affirmed, without costs. No opinion. Ughetta, Acting P. J., Christ and Rabin, JJ., concur; Kleinfeld and Hill, JJ., dissent and vote to reverse the judgment and to grant a new trial, with the following memorandum: The infant decedent fell through a space of 16 to 17 inches between 2 horizontal porch railing pipes, not protected by balusters or mesh work. The lower pipe was 16 inches high. Vertical posts were 5 feet apart. There is no dispute that decedent was where he had a right to be. In our opinion, under all the circumstances, the unprotected space constituted a dangerous condition; the defendants should have anticipated the likelihood of a child falling through the space; and hence the defendants should have installed adequate safeguards against the happening of such an accident. A prima facie case of liability on the part of the defendants was established. It was error to dismiss the complaint.
#### § 720.47 Report.

The report requirement in this instruction is exempt from reports control by SECNAVINST 5214.2B.
#### SHACKELFORD v. CITY OF WILMINGTON

No. 561PA97

Case below: 127 N.C.App. 449

Petition by petitioners for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals allowed 5 March 1998.
### March 18,2010 Memorandumto theNorthDakota SIP File DocketID # 

### EPA-R08-0AR-2009-0556 Subject: July 6,2009Correspondence from theNorth DakotaDepartmentof Health (SIP Revision)
From: Gail Fallon, Environmental Engineer Environmental Protection Agency, Region 8

This is to document that EPAreplaced pages in the original SIP submittal as requested perthe subject correspondence. Attachedto this memorandum are the two pages containing errors whichwere removed. A copy ofthe subject correspondence and corrected pages is included inthe docket.Ozone 

### 0.075 parts per million 

### (147 micrograms per cubic meter of air) daily maximum a-hour average concentration. The standard is met when the average of the annual fourth-highest daily maximum 8-hour average concentration at an ambient air quality monitoring site is less than or equal to 

### 0.075 ppm, as determined in accordancewith 

### 40 CFR 

### 50. Appendix I. Nitrogen Dioxide 

### 0.053 parts per million 

### (100 micrograms per cubic meter of air), maximum annual arithmetic mean Lead 

### 1.5 micrograms per cubic meter ofair, maximum arithmetic mean averaged over a calendar quarter
Historv: Amended effective December 

### 1. 1994: Aoril 

### 1. 2009.



# -14. Any major source to which a national emission standard for hazardous air pollutants for source categories (40 CFR 63) would apply.



# -
FILE COPY

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

NO. 13-0095

IN THE INTEREST OF L.K. AND D.K. 

## F8-E0 IN COURT OF APPEALS §j 2th CourtofAppeais District 

### § r § § § rYLfcM



### CATHY S. LUS 

### )VoodCounty, 12th District.

April 5, 2013 

### Petitioner's petition for review, filed herein in the above numbered and styled case, having been duly considered, is ordered, and hereby is, denieddenied.

•••*•••*•• 

### I, BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas, do hereby certify that the above and attached is a true and correct copy of the orders of the Supreme Court of Texas in the case numbered and styled as above, as the same appear ofrecord in the minutes of said Court under the date shown. 

### The Court, noting that petitioner has filed an affidavit attesting to the inability to pay costs herein expended, hereby waives payment ofcosts. 

### WITNESS my hand and seal ofthe Supreme Court ofTexas, at the City of Austin, this the 15th day ofMay, 2013. Blake A. Hawthorne, Clerk .At.m. -> By Kathy Sandoval, Deputy Clerk
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Alex Mystek, Respondent, v Harold J. Smith, as Superintendent of the Attica Correctional Facility, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously modified insofar as it ordered relator released on parole and a new parole revocation hearing directed. (See *People ex rel. Gaskin v Smith,*55 AD2d 1004.) (Appeal from judgment of Wyoming Supreme Court-habeas corpus.) Present-Moule, J. P., Cardamone, Simons, Dillon and Hancock, Jr., JJ.
#### Rose Santos, Respondent, v. Eugene Santos, Appellant.

In an action to recover alimony and support in arrears under a separation agreement, the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief: (a) from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings -County, entered September 20, 1962, in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of $4,584,50; and (b) from so much of an order of said court entered September 13,1962, as granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, upon which order the judgment was entered. Judgment and order modified by reducing the amount of the recovery by the sum of $450, plus the interest charged thereon, for the period August 8, 1961 to December 11, 1961, and by severing the claim for such period from the balance of the action; order further modified by adding a provision directing an immediate hearing to determine the amount due to plaintiff for the said period; and action remitted to the Special Term for the entry of a partial summary judgment accordingly. As so modified, judgment and order, insofar as *839appealed from, affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements to plaintiff. The separation agreement upon which this action is brought provided, *inter alla,*for payments by the husband of $150 per week alimony for the wife and support for the younger of their two sons. It also provided that in the event the older of their sons should not reside at a school away from home, but resides with the wife, then the husband should pay $175 per week to his wife for her support and the support of the children. The motion papers present a triable issue of fact as to whether the elder son resided with the wife from August 8, 1961 until December 11, 1961. If he did, the wife is entitled to payments of $175 per week for this 18-week period. If he did not, then only the base amount of $150 per week is due. Accordingly, there is a factual dispute concerning plaintiff’s right to recover $450 of the total sum of $4,350 demanded in the complaint and summary judgment should not have been granted for the full amount. Summary judgment was properly directed in respect of the balance of plaintiff’s claim, however. The prior judgment for arrears obtained by the wife in the former Municipal Court of the City of New York is *res judicata*of the validity of the separation agreement, and bars defendant’s present claim that the agreement was induced by plaintiff’s fraud. *(Beneduce*v. *Beneduce,*18 A D 2d 1.) Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim for the $450 in dispute is severed from the balance of her claim as to which there is no factual dispute and a hearing is directed to determine plaintiff’s right under the agreement to payments of $175 per week for the period from August 8,1961 to December 11,1961. (Former Rules Civ. Prae., rule 113, subd. 3; rule 114; CPLR, rule 3212, subds. [e], [e].) Ughetta, Acting P. J., ICleinfeld, Christ, Brennan and Hopkins, JJ., concur.