www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 260 1 

I

n Iraq and Afghanistan, the use of contractors has reached a level unprecedented in U.S. military operations. As of March 31, 2010, the United States 

deployed 175,000 troops and 207,000 contractors in the war zones. Contractors represented 50 percent of the Department of Defense (DOD) workforce in Iraq and 59 percent in Afghanistan.1

 These numbers include both armed 

and unarmed contractors. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, the term contractor includes both armed and unarmed personnel unless otherwise specified. The 

presence of contractors on the battlefield is obviously not a new phenomenon 

but has dramatically increased from the ratio of 1 contractor to 55 military personnel in Vietnam to 1:1 in Iraq2

 and 1.43:1 in Afghanistan.3

This increase is the logical outcome of a series of decisions going back decades. Force structure reductions—ranging from the post-Vietnam decisions that 

moved most Army logistics support elements to the Army Reserve and Guard4

to the post–Cold War reduction that cut the Army from 18 to 10 divisions with 

corresponding cuts in support forces—greatly reduced the Services’ ability to support long-term operations. Next, a series of decisions in the 1990s led to the employment of contractors in the Balkans for tasks ranging from traditional campbuilding to the new concept of “force development” that saw contractor MPRI 

training the Croatian army. Finally, the decision to invade Iraq with minimum 

forces left the United States with too few troops in-theater to deal with the disorder that resulted from the removal of Saddam Hussein. Thus, it is understandable 

that the immediate, unanticipated need for large numbers of logistics and security 

personnel, the shortage of such troops on active duty, and the precedent for using 

Private Contractors 

in Conflict Zones: 

The Good, the Bad, and 

the Strategic Impact 

by T.X. Hammes

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

Center for Strategi

ReSE

About the Auth

Dr. T.X. Hammes, a retired U.S. Marine

Corps officer, is a Senior Research

Fellow in the Center for Strategic

Research, Institute for Nation

Strategic Studies, at the National

Defense University. Comments and 

questions may be directed to thomas.

hammes@ndu.edu.

Key Points

◆ The United States has hired recor

numbers of contractors to serve 

in the conflict zones of Iraq and

Afghanistan but has not seriously

examined their strategic impact.

◆ There are clearly advantages t

using contractors in conflict zones, 

but they have three inherent 

characteristics that have serious 

negative effects during counterinsurgency operations. We cannot 

effectively control the quality of 

the contractors or control their 

actions, but the population holds 

us responsible for everything the 

contractors do, or fail to do.

◆ Contractors compete with the 

host government for a limited 

pool of qualified personnel and 

dramatically change local 

power structures.

◆ Contractors reduce the political 

capital necessary to commit U.S. 

forces to war, impact the legitimacy of a counterinsurgency effort, 

and reduce its perceived morality. 

These factors attack our nation’s

critical vulnerability in an irregular war—the political will of the 

American people

November 2010
2 SF No. 260 www.ndu.edu/inss

contractors in the Balkans caused the Pentagon to turn to 

contractors to fill the immediate operational needs. However, the subsequent failure to conduct a careful analysis 

of the wisdom of using contractors is less understandable. 

The executive branch has conducted numerous investigations into fraud, waste, and corruption in the contracting 

process. Congress has held hearings and established the 

Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet the U.S. Government has not systematically 

explored the essential question: Does using contractors in 

a conflict zone make strategic sense?

This paper explores that question. It examines the 

good, the bad, and the strategic impact of using contractors 

in conflict zones. It concludes with policy recommendations for the future employment of contractors and outlines 

additional actions needed to understand and cope with the 

rapidly expanding use of armed contractors worldwide.

The Go

Contractors provide a number of advantages over 

military personnel or civil servants—speed of deployment, continuity, reduction of troop requirements, reduction of military casualties, economic inputs to local 

economies, and, in some cases, executing tasks the military and civilian workforce simply cannot. This section 

examines each of these advantages in turn.

Speed of deployment—the ability to quickly mobilize and deploy large numbers of personnel—is particularly important when a plan fails to anticipate problems. Since the Pentagon had not planned to keep large 

numbers of troops in Afghanistan or Iraq for any period 

of time, it had not planned for the required logistics 

support. The Pentagon also failed to anticipate the rethere has been little investigation 

by the U.S. Government into the 

strategic impact of contractors in 

conflict zones

quirement for large numbers of security personnel to 

protect all U.S. activities (including political and reconstruction activities) once the Afghan and Iraqi governments were toppled.

By tapping into databases, running job fairs in the 

United States, and contracting for labor from Third World 

companies, contractors were able to quickly recruit, process, 

and ship personnel to run base camps, drive trucks, and 

perform the hundreds of housekeeping chores required to 

maintain both combat forces and civil administrators spread 

across Iraq and Afghanistan. More challenging was finding qualified personnel to provide security for the rapidly 

growing U.S. presence in both nations. Private companies 

managed to find people, hire them, and move them into 

the country—all without the political problems inherent 

in mobilizing additional U.S. military forces to execute the 

same tasks. The combination of speed and a low political 

profile made contractors an attractive choice to provide the 

resources for which the administration had failed to plan. In 

addition, the use of contractors aligned with previous decisions and the administration’s faith in the efficiency and 

effectiveness of private business compared to governmental 

organization. Both inside and outside Iraq and Afghanistan, contractors replaced the tens of thousands of soldiers 

normally required to move, stage, marshal, and transport 

personnel and supplies into conflict zones.5

Continuity is a second major advantage of contractors. While the U.S. military has a policy that ensures the 

vast majority of personnel rotate every 6 to 12 months, 

contractors are often willing to stay for longer periods. 

For key billets, companies can offer significant bonuses to 

personnel who stay. The companies know that they will 

reap commensurate savings due to the personnel continuity, and employees see an opportunity for significantly 

increased pay. Sometimes, moreover, longevity leads to a 

greater understanding of the situation. This can lead to 

more effective decisionmaking to include an understanding of the political impact of the contractor’s decisions.

The most highly prized attribute of private contractors is that they reduce troop requirements by replacing 

military personnel. This reduces the military and political 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 260 3 

resources that must be dedicated to the war. At the height 

of the surge in April 2008, DOD stated it had 163,900 

contractors supporting 160,000 troops in Iraq.6 Without the presence of contractors, the United States would 

have had to provide literally twice as many troops. The 

U.S. Armed Forces struggled to maintain 160,000 troops 

in Iraq; it is doubtful that they could have supported the 

320,000 needed if contractors were not employed. While 

the vast majority of contractor personnel were involved in 

noncombatant logistics tasks, DOD estimated there were 

over 20,000 armed contractors in Iraq during 2007. Other 

organizations have much higher estimates.7 Even using 

the Pentagon’s lower estimate, contractors provided three 

times more armed troops than the British. It should also 

be noted that in Iraq and Afghanistan, many unarmed, 

logistic support personnel functioned in what the military 

would define as a combat role. The drivers were subjected 

to both improvised explosive devices and direct fire attacks. 

This combination of drivers willing to run the gauntlet of 

ambushes and armed contractors replaced at least two full 

combat divisions. Given the very low support-to-operator 

ratio that contractors maintain, it is not unreasonable to 

estimate they actually replaced three divisions.

The contractors not only provided relief in terms of 

personnel tempo but also reduced military casualties. Contractors absorbed over 25 percent of the killed in action 

in Iraq, which reduced the political resources required to 

maintain support for the conflict. By the end of 2009, contractors reported almost 1,800 dead and 40,000 wounded in 

Iraq and Afghanistan.8

 As the fighting in Afghanistan gets 

worse, contractors are now suffering more deaths than U.S. 

forces: “In the first two quarters of 2010 alone, contractor 

deaths represented more than half—53 percent—of all fatalities. This point bears emphasis: since January 2010, more 

contractors have died in Iraq and Afghanistan than U.S. 

military soldiers.”9 For practical purposes, these casualties 

were “off the books” in that they had no real impact on the 

political discussions about the war. As Peter Singer noted:

There was no outcry whenever contractors were called 

up and deployed, or even killed. If the gradual death 

use of contractors aligned with 

the administration’s faith in 

private business compared to 

governmental organization

toll among American troops threatened to slowly 

wear down public support, contractor casualties 

were not counted in official death tolls and had no 

impact on these ratings. . . . These figures mean that 

the private military industry has suffered more losses 

in Iraq than the rest of the coalition of allied nations 

combined. The losses are also far more than any single 

U.S. Army division has experienced.10

Contractor casualties are not reported via the Pentagon, but only through the U.S. Department of Labor. 

Its Web site notes that these are not comprehensive statistics but only represent those injuries and deaths that 

resulted in insurance claims.11 Thus, it is difficult if not 

impossible to determine how many additional casualties 

were suffered by other nations’ contractors in either Iraq 

or Afghanistan.

Replacing these contractors, both armed and 

unarmed, would have required additional major 

mobilizations of Reserves or a dramatic increase 

in Army and Marine Corps end-strength. In effect, 

the mobilization of civilian contractors allowed the 

United States to engage in a protracted conflict in 

Iraq without convincing the U.S. public of the need 

for additional major mobilizations or major increases 

in the Active Armed Forces. The decision to hire 

contractors can be taken out of view of the public 

while decisions to increase troop strength are usually 

subject to intense debate. Opponents of contractors 

point out that this makes it easier for U.S. political 

leaders to commit forces to protracted conflicts 

precisely because it reduces uniformed casualties.12

Whether the tendency of contractors to reduce the 
4 SF No. 260 www.ndu.edu/inss

political cost of operations is a good thing depends 

upon one’s view of the particular conflict.

Another advantage frequently cited by proponents of 

the use of contractors is that of cost. According to their 

calculations, contractors are much cheaper to use than government employees. In fact, the actual costs remain a point 

of contention. The Congressional Research Service reported that the “relative cost advantage of the contractors can 

vary, and may diminish or disappear altogether, depending on the circumstances and contract.”13 Determining 

actual costs is extremely difficult due to the large number 

of variables involved—some of them currently impossible 

to document. For instance, with over 40,000 U.S. contractors wounded to date, we are unable to estimate potential 

long-term care costs to the U.S. Government. While contractors may claim their insurance covers those costs, the 

government, in fact, paid for that insurance through the 

contract, and if the coverage proves insufficient, the government may well end up paying for the continued care 

through various governmental medical programs. In short, 

long-term costs associated with employing contractors in a 

conflict environment are essentially unknowable.

However, one cost benefit of contractors is indisputable. As soon as the need goes away, they can be let 

go when the contract expires. Thus, unlike military or 

government employees who continue on the payroll or 

return to Reserve status, contractors are simply paid off 

and sent home.

Another useful aspect of contracting is that it can 

provide economic inputs to local economies by hiring 

locals to provide services. Creating jobs and stimulating the economy are key aspects of population-centric 

counterinsurgency. In the Balkans and Afghanistan, 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have 

hired large numbers of local personnel to conduct both 

armed and unarmed tasks. Carefully targeted contracts 

can be used to co-opt local power structures to support 

the government.

General David Petraeus, ISAF commander, 

specifically tasked his commanders to be aware of 

both the benefits and dangers of contracting in 

Afghanistan. He ordered them to monitor their 

contracts carefully to ensure they are contributing to 

the counterinsurgency campaign.14

A final, critical advantage is that contractors can 

execute tasks that U.S. military and civilian forces simply cannot. Some tasks, such as providing large numbers 

of interpreters, are obvious and widely applicable. Others are situation-specific. For instance, in Afghanistan, 

we lack the forces to secure our primary supply lines 

to Pakistan because they run through areas controlled 

or heavily contested by either the Taliban or bandits 

and police who charge for use of the road. Furthermore, if history is any guide, even a heavy presence of 

U.S. troops would not guarantee the delivery of supplies. Fortunately, Afghan contractors display the mix 

of force, personal connections, and negotiation skills to 

maintain our supply lines. 

The Ba

When serving within conflict zones, particularly 

during a counterinsurgency, contractors create a number 

of significant problems from tactical to strategic levels. 

Three inherent characteristics of contractors create problems for the government. First, the government does not 

control the quality of the personnel that the contractor 

hires. Second, unless it provides a government officer or 

noncommissioned officer for each construction project, 

convoy, personal security detail, or facilities-protection 

unit, the government does not control, or even know 

about, contractors’ daily interactions with the local population. Finally, the population holds the government responsible for everything that the contractors do or fail 

to do. Since insurgency is essentially a competition for 

the mobilization of civilian 

contractors allowed the 

United States to engage in a 

protracted conflict in Iraq
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 260 5 

legitimacy between the government and insurgents, this 

factor elevates the issue of quality and tactical control to 

the strategic level. In addition to these inherent characteristics, there are numerous other negative outcomes 

that flow from using contractors. Contractors compete 

directly with the host nation for a limited pool of educated, trained personnel. Their presence and actions can 

dramatically change local power structures. They fragment the chain of command. And when they fail to perform, contractors can be difficult to fire.

Quality control is a well-publicized issue. Repeated 

reports of substandard construction, fraud, and theft 

highlight the problems associated with unarmed contractors. As noted above, these incidents are being investigated. In addition, the U.S. Government is working 

hard to refine contracting and oversight procedures to 

reduce these types of problems. Despite their best efforts, however, contracting officers cannot control how 

contractors treat their local employees. Poor treatment, 

lack of respect for local customs, skills, and methods—

and even physical abuse to include sexual exploitation—

have been recurrent problems with unarmed contractors.

Unfortunately, the problem is just as prevalent with 

armed contractors. While high-end personal security 

details generally are well trained, less visible armed contractors display less quality. When suicide bombers began striking Iraqi armed forces recruiting stations, the 

contractor responsible for recruiting the Iraqi forces subcontracted for a security force. The contractor was promised former Gurkhas. What showed up in Iraq a couple 

of weeks later were untrained, underequipped Nepalese 

villagers.15 Not only did these contractors provide inadequate security, the United States armed them and authorized them to use deadly force in its name.

Since the government neither recruits nor trains individual armed contractors, it essentially has to trust the 

contractor to provide quality personnel. In this case, the 

subcontractor took shortcuts despite the obvious risk to 

the personnel manning the recruiting stations. Even if 

the government hires enough contracting officers, how 

can it determine the combat qualifications of individuals 

and teams of armed personnel? The U.S. military dedicates large facilities, major exercises, expensive simulations, and combat-experienced staffs to determine if U.S. 

units are properly trained. Contractors do not. We need 

to acknowledge that contracting officers have no truly 

effective control over the quality of the personnel the 

contractors hire. The quality control problems are greatly 

exacerbated when the contractor uses subcontractors to 

provide services. These personnel are at least one layer 

removed from the contracting officer and thus subject to 

even less scrutiny.

In reality, it is virtually impossible to determine the 

actual effectiveness of any contractors—armed or unarmed—until they begin to operate in theater (and only 

then if a member of the U.S. Government can observe 

the contractors as they operate).

Compounding the problems created by lack of quality control, the government does not control the contractors’ daily contact with the population. Despite continued 

efforts to increase government oversight of contractor 

operations, nothing short of having sufficient numbers 

of qualified U.S. Government personnel accompanying 

and commanding contractors will provide control. This 

lack of control usually means we may get poorly wired 

buildings, malfunctioning computer systems, and unfinished projects. However, too often, it includes incidents 

of bullying, abuse, intimidation, and even killing of local 

civilians such as the DynCorp employee who ran a child 

sex ring in the Balkans or the September 2007 Blackwater shootings in Nisour Square, Baghdad.

This lack of quality and tactical control greatly 

increases the impact of the third major problem: the 

United States is held responsible for everything the 

contractors do or fail to do. Despite the fact the United 

contractors can execute tasks 

that U.S. military and civilian 

forces simply cannot
6 SF No. 260 www.ndu.edu/inss

States has no effective quality or operational control 

over the contractors, the local population rightly holds 

it responsible for all contractor failures. Numerous 

personal conversations with Iraqis revealed a deep disgust with the failure of many contractors to provide 

promised services despite being well paid. There was 

even more anger with the actions of armed contractors. Iraqis noted the United States gave the armed 

contractors authority to use deadly force in its name. 

While Iraqis were not confident that American forces would be punished for killing Iraqis, they believed 

it was at least a possibility. However, the Iraqis were 

convinced that contractors were simply above any 

law. The Iraqi perception that it will be impossible to 

prosecute a contractor is reflected in a Congressional 

Research Service report that required 17 pages simply 

to outline the various legal structures under which a 

contractor might be prosecuted. The paper indicated 

that there was no clear legal precedent for prosecuting 

contractors, and it noted none had been prosecuted up 

through August 2008.16

These perceptions can seriously undercut the legitimacy of both the host nation and U. S. Government. A 

key measure of the legitimacy of a government is a monopoly on the use of force within its boundaries. The very 

act of hiring armed contractors dilutes that monopoly.17

Legitimate governments are also responsible for the actions of their agents—particularly those actions taken 

against their own populations. Despite efforts to increase 

the accountability of contractors, the Congressional Research Service noted the widespread perception that contractors who commit crimes against host nation people are 

outside the legal reach of both the host country and the 

United States.18 Contractors, armed or unarmed, could be 

quickly flown out of the country if their company believed 

they violated a law. And while the United States has laws 

criminalizing certain activities, the cost and difficulty of 

trying a contractor for crimes that occurred overseas in a 

conflict zone have so far deterred U.S. prosecutors. In over 

7 years of activity in Iraq, no contractor has been convicted 

in a U.S. court of a crime against Iraqi citizens.

Exacerbating the legitimacy issue, contractors of all 

kinds are a serious irritant to the host nation population. 

Armed contractors irritate because they are an unaccountable group that can and does impose its will upon 

the population in many daily encounters: forcing locals 

off the road, using the wrong side of the road, and pointing weapons at civilians. Even unarmed contractors irritate the population when they take relatively well-paying 

jobs that local people desperately need while at the same 

time driving up prices. Contractors, when they do hire 

locals, often treat them with a lack of respect and trust. 

Furthermore, the complete control over who works on 

projects combined with the disrespect shown those locals 

that are hired reinforces local perceptions of the United 

States as an occupying power.

In addition to undercutting government legitimacy, 

the use of contractors may actually undercut local government power. In Afghanistan, security and reconstruction contracts have resulted in significant shifts in relative 

power between competing Afghan qawms19 as well as allegations of corruption. Dexter Filkins, writing in the New 

York Times, notes that the power structure in Orugzan 

Province, Afghanistan, has changed completely due to the 

U.S. Government’s selecting Matiullah Khan to provide 

security for convoys from Kandahar to Tirin Kot:

With his NATO millions, and the American 

backing, Mr. Matiullah has grown into the 

strongest political and economic force in the region. 

He estimates that his salaries support 15,000 people 

in this impoverished province. . . . This has irritated 

some local leaders, who say that the line between Mr. 

Matiullah’s business interest and the government 

it is virtually impossible to 

determine the effectiveness of any 

contractors until they begin to 

operate in theater
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 260 7 

has disappeared. . . . Both General [Nick] Carter 

[commander of ISAF South] and Hanif Atmar, 

the Afghan interior minister, said they hoped to 

disband Mr. Matiullah’s militia soon—or at least 

to bring it under formal government control. . . . 

General Carter said that while he had no direct 

proof in Mr. Matiullah’s case, he harbored more 

general worries that the legions of unregulated 

Afghan security companies had a financial interest 

in prolonging chaos.20

Thus, an unacknowledged but serious strategic impact of using contractors is to directly undercut both the 

legitimacy and the authority of the host nation government. In this case, the shortage of ISAF troops and sheer 

difficulty of maintaining security along this route mean 

that there is currently no feasible alternative. That makes 

it more important than ever that the U.S. Government 

takes specific actions to minimize the negative strategic 

impacts of this operational necessity. Contracting actions 

must be seen as an integral part of the campaign rather 

than simply treated as a logistics function.

Contracting also has a direct and measureable impact on the local economy. When the U.S. Government 

passes its authority to a prime contractor, that contractor 

then controls a major source of new wealth and power in 

the community. However, the contractor is motivated by 

two factors: maximizing profit and making operations run 

smoothly. This means that even if he devotes resources to 

understanding the impact of his operations on society, his 

decisions on how to allocate those resources will differ 

from those of someone trying to govern the area. For instance, various contractors’ policies of hiring South Asians 

rather than Iraqis angered Iraqis during the critical early 

phases of the insurgency. Desperate for jobs, the Iraqis saw 

third country nationals getting jobs that Iraqis were both 

qualified for and eager to do.21 While there were clear 

business and security reasons for doing so, the decision 

was a slap in the face of Iraqis at a time of record unemployment. In Afghanistan, the contractor can literally 

shift the local power structure by picking one qwam over 

another to execute the contract. The winning qwam gains 

rich resources and access to both U.S. and Afghan officials.

In contrast, the U.S. Government in the form of a 

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) commander or a 

unit commander writes contracts specifically to influence 

the political and security situation in the area. Commanders see the contracts themselves as a campaign tool. 

While such contracts are limited by the cultural understanding of the commander and are often less efficient 

for the specific project, this system can be much more 

effective in the overall counterinsurgency campaign.

A related problem is the perception of the local 

population concerning how these contracts are managed. 

In Afghanistan, many Afghans are convinced that some 

contracts expend up to 80 percent of the funds on management. The Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan 

Relief states that 40 percent of nonmilitary aid goes 

straight to corporate profit and salaries. Profit margins 

run as high as 50 percent, and full-time expatriate consultants cost between $250,000 and $350,000 per year.22

Many of the contracts run through multiple subcontracting companies before the aid reaches the Afghan people; 

each subcontractor takes a percentage for administrative 

overhead.23 These confirmed cases of misuse of development funds further reduce the weak legitimacy of the 

Afghan government as well as ISAF efforts.

There are also a number of indirect consequences of 

employing armed contractors. First, this practice opens the 

door for local organizations to build militias under the cover 

of being a security company. It is difficult to object to other 

elements of a society hiring security when the government 

is doing so. This is particularly true when the government is 

hiring both locals and foreign nationals to provide security. 

even unarmed contractors irritate 

the population when they take jobs 

that local people need while at the 

same time driving up prices
8 SF No. 260 www.ndu.edu/inss

If the government needs private contractors to feel safe, the 

citizens, local businesses, or even local political organizations can certainly argue that they do, too. This fact has created significant problems for ISAF in Afghanistan:

Because PSCs [private security companies] are 

under the control of powerful individuals, rather 

than the Afghan National Security Forces, they 

compete with state security forces and interfere 

with a government monopoly on the use of force. 

There is growing pressure from ISAF and within 

the Afghan government to reform and regulate 

these companies. Major General Nick Carter, the 

commander of Regional Command–South, recently 

briefed that ISAF was developing a strategy to 

regulate PSCs as part of the Kandahar Operations 

unfolding in summer 2010.

24

In addition, private security companies can compete directly with host nation attempts to recruit and 

retain military and police personnel. In January 2010, 

Major General Michael Ward, Deputy Commander Police, NATO Training Mission Afghanistan, stated that

Afghanistan’s government was considering capping 

the pay of private security firms because Afghan police were deserting in large numbers for the better pay 

and working conditions associated with private companies.25 This has created significant problems for ISAF. 

General Carter told reporters:

[P]rivate security companies and militias are a 

serious problem. . . . this is, of course, something that 

is of our own creation to a degree . . . where we 

contracted out everything to the civilian market, 

has created these private security companies. 

And of course they are paid a great deal more 

than our Afghan security forces, which in itself is 

counterproductive because, of course, the temptation 

for a soldier in the ANP [Afghan National Police] 

is to go across to a private security company because 

he might earn double in pay.26

Contract hiring of unarmed personnel also competes directly with the host nation civil government. In 

both Iraq and Afghanistan, educated professionals took 

jobs as drivers or clerks with contractors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) simply because the jobs 

paid more than they could earn working for their own 

governments. In effect, ISAF and NGO hiring has created an internal “brain drain.” This is of particular concern 

in Afghanistan where human capital is a major limitation on the ability of the government to function.

On August 16, 2010, President Hamid Karzai decreed that all private security contractors must cease 

operations in Afghanistan within 4 months.27 Unfortunately, currently ISAF and most humanitarian agencies rely on armed contractors to provide security for 

essential operations, and neither ISAF nor the Afghan 

Security Forces is prepared to execute those missions. 

At the time of this writing, it is too early to evaluate 

the impact of President Karzai’s announcement, but it 

does highlight the political complications that such contractors inject into counterinsurgency campaigns.

Contractors, both armed and unarmed, also represent a serious military vulnerability. In the uprising in 

Iraq during the spring of 2004, both Sunni and Shia 

factions conducted major operations against coalition 

forces. The insurgents effectively cut Allied supply 

lines from Kuwait. U.S. forces faced significant logistics risks as a result. Despite the crisis, U.S. officials 

could not morally order unarmed logistics contractors to fight the opposition. The contractors lacked the 

training, equipment, and legal status to do so. Had the 

supply line been run by military forces, it would have 

using contractors directly 

undercuts both the legitimacy 

and the authority of the host 

nation government
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 260 9 

been both moral and possible to order them to fight 

through. Despite this demonstrated operational vulnerability, the fact that unarmed contractors are specifically not obligated to fight has not been discussed 

as a significant risk in employing contractors rather 

than military logistics organizations. Furthermore, 

while military logistics units can provide their own 

security in low-threat environments, unarmed contractors cannot. The government must either assign 

military forces or hire additional armed contractors to 

provide that security.

The substitution of unarmed contractors for Soldiers and Marines creates yet another vulnerability: lack 

of an emergency reserve. In the past, support troops 

have been repeatedly employed in critical situations 

to provide reinforcements for overwhelmed combat 

troops. Contractors are simply unable to fulfill this 

emergency role. This limitation, as well as the unarmed 

contractor’s inability to fight, is even more significant in 

conventional conflicts than in irregular war.

Contracting also takes key elements of the counterinsurgency effort out of the hands of the commander. 

In the spring of 2010, ISAF determined that DynCorp 

had failed in its contract to train and mentor the Afghan 

police.28 ISAF then put the contract out for competition. 

General Stanley McChrystal, then-commander of ISAF, 

stated that the police were one of the most critical elements of his campaign plan, so the contracting process 

was accelerated. Not surprisingly, DynCorp did not win 

the new contract. Since time is critical in Afghanistan, 

plans were made to rapidly transition the contract to a 

new provider to ensure that the Afghan police could play 

their part in the counterinsurgency campaign. However, 

DynCorp successfully protested the contract award.29

Thus, it retains the training contract and will retain it 

until all legal processes are exhausted. In short, the commander lost control of one of the critical elements of 

his counterinsurgency campaign at a critical time—and 

there was nothing he could do about it. Despite DynCorp’s documented failure, at the time of this writing, it 

remains in charge of police training and mentoring with 

the full knowledge that as soon as possible ISAF will get 

rid of DynCorp.

Contracts also fragment the chain of command. All 

military units in a theater are under the command of a 

military officer, but contractors are not. While both contractors and the government have worked hard to resolve 

coordination issues, the fact remains that contractors are 

not under military command. Complicating any attempt 

to create unity of effort is the fact that contractors are in 

direct competition with each other and treat a significant 

portion of the information concerning their operations 

as proprietary information, which they will not share 

with the government or their competitors.

Strategic Impac

Despite the numerous problems articulated above, 

contractors will have an important and continuing role 

in U.S. operations—both domestic and overseas. There 

are currently numerous important functions that the U.S. 

Government is incapable of performing without contractor support. This is not a new phenomenon. DOD—

particularly the Air Force and Navy—has long relied on 

contractors to fill niche requirements such as maintaining and, sometimes, even operating the newest hightechnology equipment. More recently, contractors have 

been hired to execute many of the routine housekeeping 

tasks at permanent U.S. military facilities.

However, despite conducting almost 9 years of combat operations supported by contractors, the United States 

still has not conducted a substantial examination of the 

strategic impact the use of contractors has in counterinsurgency. This does not mean contracts and contractors are 

not being studied. Congress formed the Commission on 

private security companies can 

compete directly with host nation 

attempts to recruit and retain 

military and police personnel
10 SF No. 260 www.ndu.edu/inss

Wartime Contracting specifically “to assess a number of 

factors related to wartime contracting, including the extent of waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement of wartime contracts.”30 Focused on improving the efficiency of 

wartime contracting, the commission did not discuss the 

strategic impact of using contractors in its 2009 Interim 

Report.31 This author hopes that the commission will include the strategic impact in its final report in 2011.

Within the executive branch, DOD and the Department of State are conducting studies on how to reduce 

fraud and increase the efficiency of contractors. The Joint 

Staff is running a major study to determine the level of 

dependency on contractor support in contingency operations. Various Department of Justice investigations are going over past contracts for everything from fraud to abuse 

of prisoners to inappropriate use of deadly force. Yet none 

of these studies is looking at the fundamental questions 

concerning the strategic impact of contractors in combat.

Contractors clearly can have a strategic impact on 

the success of counterinsurgency operations in a variety of ways. The most important include reducing the 

political capital necessary to commit U.S. forces to war; 

potentially reducing the legitimacy of a counterinsurgency effort; and damaging the perceived morality of the 

war effort. Rather than automatically defaulting to hiring contractors as a relatively quick, easy, and politically 

benign solution to an immediate problem, the United 

States should first answer several key strategic questions.

First, what is the impact of contractors on the initial 

decision to go to war as well as the will to sustain the 

conflict? Contractors provide the ability to initiate and 

sustain long-term conflicts without the political effort 

necessary to convince the American people a war is 

worth fighting. Thus, the United States can enter a war 

with less effort to build popular consensus. Most wars 

will not require full-scale national mobilization, but 

rather selective mobilization of both military and 

civilian assets. Both proponents and opponents admit 

that without contractors, the United States would 

have required much greater mobilization efforts to 

generate and support a force of 320,000 in Iraq (the 

combined troop and contractor count) or a force of 

over 210,000 in Afghanistan. The use of contractors 

allowed us to conduct both wars with much less 

domestic political debate.

But is this good? Should we seek methods that 

make it easier to take the Nation to war? That appears 

to be a bad idea when entering a protracted conflict. 

Insurgents understand that political will is the critical 

vulnerability of the United States in irregular warfare. 

They have discussed this factor openly in their online 

strategic forums for almost a decade.32 Ensuring that 

the American public understands the difficulty of the 

impending conflict and is firmly behind the effort 

should be an essential element in committing forces to 

the 10 or more years that modern counterinsurgencies 

require for success. Thus, while the use of contractors 

lessens the extent of political mobilization needed, it 

may well hurt the effort in the long term.

Second, as discussed earlier in this paper, contractors can undermine the legitimacy of both U.S. 

and host nation counterinsurgency efforts in a variety of ways. Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency, 

states that the conflict is a competition for legitimacy 

between the counterinsurgent and the insurgent.33

Widespread use of contractors can directly undercut 

a central theme of counterinsurgency doctrine. Under 

certain conditions, we may choose to use contractors 

in spite of the negative impact on legitimacy, but we 

should not do so in ignorance of that impact. Any decision to use contractors in a conflict zone should be 

carefully considered for its impact on the strategy that 

while contractors and the 

government have worked hard to 

resolve coordination issues, the fact 

remains that contractors are not 

under military command
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 260 11 

we have chosen and the campaign plan we are using to 

execute that strategy.

A third area that needs strategic consideration is the 

morality of using contractors. What are the moral implications of authorizing contractors, qualified or not, to 

use deadly force in the name of the United States? What 

about hiring poor Third World citizens to sustain casualties in support of U.S. policy? What is the U.S. responsibility for wounded and killed contractors—particularly 

those from the Third World? While these sound like theoretical questions, they are in fact practical ones. Maintaining long-term domestic popular support for conflict 

requires that U.S. actions be both legitimate and moral.

Recommendation

Currently, the Commission on Wartime Contracting (www.wartimecontracting.gov) is examining a broad range of issues concerning wartime 

contracting and will present its final report in 2011. 

Of particular interest will be the report’s findings on “inherently governmental” functions that 

should not be done by contractors. Even as the 

commission continues its work, the manpower requirements of the current conflicts mean that, for the 

near term, the United States will continue to employ 

a large number of contractors in war zones. In fact, as 

our forces draw down in Iraq, the State Department 

has stated its requirement for security contractors will 

increase significantly.34

Near-term operational imperatives and the potential negative strategic impacts discussed above highlight 

the need for clear guidelines about when and how the 

U.S. Government should employ contractors. This question should be a central part of our post-Afghanistan 

force structure discussions. The size and type of force 

that we build for the future depend on a clear concept 

of how the United States plans to use contractors, both 

armed and unarmed, in present and future conflicts. 

This discussion cannot wait until the commission’s report is finalized and approved. The Secretary of Defense 

is already pushing the department to reduce its budget 

significantly. The debate about future force structure is 

well under way.

A number of factors are putting major pressure on 

force structure planners. The primary pressure will be the 

falling budgets that Secretary Robert Gates has clearly 

warned the Services to expect. In addition, as U.S. forces 

begin to withdraw from Afghanistan, force planners 

will have to decide how to allocate limited resources to 

position the Armed Forces to deal with future conflicts. 

There is an intense, ongoing debate about which types 

of conflicts should take priority and then how the forces 

should be structured, equipped, and trained to deal with 

those contingencies. A tempting way to avoid tough 

decisions will be to assume contractors will provide major 

services across the spectrum of conflict, thus dramatically 

reducing the force requirements for logistics and security. 

In the past, we have often sacrificed force structure to 

save weapons systems. Planning to use contractors in 

future conflict zones would reinforce this tendency.

Any force planning documents should clearly state 

what assumptions have been made concerning the functions of the contractors who will support the force. The 

following guidelines should be employed in considering 

when and how to use contractors in the future.

The U.S. Government’s default position should 

be no contractors “outside the wire” in a conflict zone. 

Contractor presence outside secure facilities places 

them in direct contact with the population. Contractors 

can undercut the legitimacy of the host nation government, reduce the accountability of the U.S. Government 

for actions taken in its name, irritate the population, 

compete directly for the most competent local personnel, fragment the chain of command, provide an excuse 

for forming local militias, and are difficult to fire—even 

widespread use of contractors can 

directly undercut a central theme of 

counterinsurgency doctrine
12 SF No. 260 www.ndu.edu/inss

when ineffective. Given these issues, the United States 

should strive to keep contractors out of conflict zones. 

This will not always be possible but should be the standard. Most of the problems highlighted in this paper 

occurred in conflict zones. The unique stresses on the 

contractors combined with the severe limitations on 

the government’s ability to oversee their performance 

resulted in repeated actions that reduced operational effectiveness and undercut the U.S. strategic position. The 

cost savings of using contractors are uncertain at best. 

In contrast, the strategic and operational problems that 

arise from using them in a counterinsurgency are clear 

and documented.

The U.S. Government is unlikely to have enough 

government employees to perform the numerous housekeeping functions—mess, laundry, cleaning, and so 

forth—that are an integral part of any operation. Therefore, the default position should remain that we hire contractors only for those functions that take place within a 

secure facility and require minimum contact with host 

nation personnel. This means that DOD must be able 

to provide security for other U.S. Government organizations working in conflict zones until such time as they 

can hire and train sufficient government security personnel. Exceptions to this rule should be closely examined. 

This position must be an explicit factor in force structure 

planning. The one consistent exception to this rule will 

be interpreters since the U.S. Government simply cannot maintain sufficient linguistic capability for the wide 

range of possible future commitments.

If U.S. Government capacity is exceeded, the default 

position should become using host nation organizations 

first and host nation contractors next with U.S. or foreign contractors being a choice of last resort. As noted, 

even with a default position of not hiring contractors in 

conflict zones, some elements of the government would 

most likely hire contractors, including armed contractors, 

in future conflicts. Some agencies could determine that 

they cannot achieve an assigned task without contractors and would be unable to get other U.S. Government 

partners to take the mission. To minimize the negative 

impact of contractors in irregular war, policy should give 

strong preference to the host nation providing the services—even if they have to be funded and supported by 

the United States.

Examples where local contractors should be first 

choice are inside secure facilities and as fixed point security. Many of the jobs contractors perform inside facilities—meal preparation, cleaning—can easily be done 

by local labor. Since local contractors would commute to 

and from work, hiring them would require more effort 

be dedicated to security than the current practice of importing South Asian laborers and keeping them on base. 

However, hiring local laborers provides economic stimulus. In addition, the fixed point security mission may well 

be appropriate for local personnel because these jobs require little training and, because they are in a fixed position, are easier to supervise. The primary effort should be 

to train local personnel to execute such jobs with those 

security personnel transitioning to the appropriate host 

nation government authority as soon as possible. Transitioning supervision of these personnel to local governments could be easier than doing so with regular army 

or police. However, caution must be exercised whenever 

considering armed contractors because the very act of the 

government hiring contractors legitimizes the private use 

of force. If a government needs to hire armed protection, 

then it is difficult to deny businesses, political parties, 

and other entities the right to hire armed contractors. In 

both Iraq and Afghanistan, this dynamic led to private 

militias that work for local strongmen rather than a local 

community. NGOs, who often have been forced to hire 

contractors as the security situation deteriorates, would 

the size and type of force that 

we build depend on a clear concept 

of how the United States plans to 

use contractors in present 

and future conflicts
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 260 13 

continue to insist on protecting their people. Thus, a major focus of the initial effort must be to replace contract 

security with government-provided security.

In cases where the host nation lacks the necessary 

capacity, local companies and personnel should receive 

strong preference. In irregular war, it is important that 

these jobs be assigned to the local population both to 

stimulate economic growth and provide alternatives to 

insurgent employment for local males. While such contracts may be necessary, maximum effort should be made 

to ensure that responsibilities are transferred to the host 

nation government personnel as early as possible. Even 

as host nation government capacity grows, there may be 

some jobs that require local security contractors. In Afghanistan, escorting logistics convoys from Pakistan to 

Afghanistan falls into this category. The historical record 

indicates ISAF or the Afghan government would require 

massive forces to accomplish the mission. The Afghan 

“security companies” have succeeded at this task, but operate outside ISAF rules of engagement, upset local power structures, and can create additional enemies. Future 

use of local security companies for such missions must 

be carefully balanced against their negative side-effects 

and employed only when there is no other solution. If 

President Karzai enforces his order that contract security 

cease operations by December 2010, this may provide a 

valuable case study in how government forces can replace 

armed contractors or the negative impacts if they attempt 

to replace contractors but lack the capacity to do so.

The default position should be to hire contractors or 

U.S. Government civilian employees to fill those billets 

requiring deployment to locations outside the conflict 

zone. One of the greatest problems the U.S. military 

faces in protracted war is personnel tempo—the period 

Service personnel spend away from home. By hiring 

contractors to fill jobs overseas but outside the conflict 

zone, the United States can reduce the personnel tempo 

of the uniformed forces. Our current use of contractors 

in Kuwait is a good example of this approach. While 

deployments to Kuwait to support the effort in Iraq are 

not dangerous, they do increase the personnel tempo of 

the uniformed Services. Thus, DOD has filled most of 

these billets with contractors, who have compiled a very 

good record running the training, maintenance, and 

transit facilities in Kuwait. This type of well-defined, 

repetitive administrative task is ideal for contractors 

particularly in a forward-deployed, nonconflict location. Furthermore, the contractors, like all expatriates 

working in the country, are subject to Kuwait’s legal 

system, and thus, the local population sees them as accountable to Kuwait authority.

Aggressive efforts should be made to use either 

DOD civilian employees or contractors to fill nondeploying military billets. As stated, personnel tempo is a 

major problem for the Services. Yet the Defense Business Board noted that, despite 9 years of conflict, fully 

40 percent of Active-duty personnel have not deployed 

to a conflict zone, and an additional 30 percent have deployed only once.35 While a significant number of these 

nondeployers are first-term personnel who have not yet 

received sufficient training to deploy, the number of career force personnel who have not deployed is still high. 

These personnel are filling nondeploying billets. Rather 

than hiring contractors to fill billets inside the conflict 

zone, we need to examine which of these nondeploying 

billets can be filled by contractors, freeing uniformed 

personnel to deploy.

If contractors are required, they must be under the 

direct supervision of a U.S. Government employee. While 

the government is making strenuous efforts to increase 

the number of contracting officers and to become more 

specific in writing contracts, the fact remains that the 

government cannot control contractor actions without 

direct supervision. Unless it has direct supervision, the 

if a government needs to hire armed 

protection, then it is difficult to 

deny other entities the right to hire 

armed contractors
14 SF No. 260 www.ndu.edu/inss

government will remain unaware of contractors whose 

actions alienate the local population or fail to meet U.S. 

standards. The degree of supervision will vary with the 

type of work being done. Routine maintenance work in 

a secure facility would require only normal contracting 

oversight. Armed escorts or drivers who are in regular 

contact with civilian populations would require constant 

supervision in the form of a government employee riding with each vehicle and commanding each convoy. This 

would give rise to a number of problems such as having a 

government employee making less money but taking the 

same risks as a contractor or having a less experienced 

government employee supervising a more experienced 

and often older contractor. However, these are minor 

problems compared to those created by the population’s 

perception of unsupervised contractors.

Long-term Requiremen

This paper has focused on the current U.S. use of 

contractors in conflict zones, but the use of armed contractors is on the rise around the world. Led by the United States, many nations have reintroduced armed contractors to conflict zones. In addition, the lack of security 

in undergoverned areas has led NGOs, international organizations, private companies, and even nation-states to 

hire armed contractors to provide security and unarmed 

contractors to deliver services. In some cases, it is difficult to tell if contractors are part of a private firm or 

are hired by a government that does not wish to send official government personnel. The most serious potential 

problems arise from the fact that large numbers of armed 

contractors are being injected into an international security arena that lacks recent experience in regulating them.

Armed contractors are having a global impact well 

beyond that of the two irregular wars America is fighting. 

Armed contractors introduce a new element into 

international relations. Current international law and 

international organizations such as the United Nations 

have developed protocols and procedures for dealing 

with the use of the armed forces of nation-states as well 

as insurgents. However, these same organizations have 

a paucity of experience in dealing with the introduction 

of armed contractors into a conflict zone whether those 

contractors are hired by a private firm or a nation-state. 

This leads to a final recommendation.

The United States must develop policies and procedures to deal with the presence of armed contractors in conflict zones. Because these armed entities 

are generally outside the experience and mandate of 

current international organizations and mechanisms, 

they will continue to have unforeseen impacts. Thus, 

the United States must work with other states, NGOs, 

and international organizations to develop policies, 

procedures, and institutions to deal with the presence 

of armed contractors in conflict zones. The Montreux 

Document is an example of such an effort and deserves the support of the United States.36 However, it 

is only the first step in learning to manage these new 

players in the international arena.

Note

1 Moshe Schwartz, Department of Defense Contractors in 

Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis (Washington, DC: 

Congressional Research Service, July 2, 2010), 5.

2 Congressional Budget Office, “Contractors Support of U.S. 

Operations in Iraq,” table 2, available at <www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/96xx/

doc9688/MainText.3.1.shtml>.

3 Schwartz, 5.

4 Peter W. Singer, “The Dark Truth About Blackwater,” 

Salon, October 2, 2007, available at <www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/10/02/blackwater/print.html>.

5 Dan Baum, “Nation Builders for Hire,” The New York Times, 

June 22, 2003, available at <www.informationclearinghouse.info/

article3905.htm>.

6 “Wising up, moving out,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 1, 2009, 29.

7 Steve Fainaru, “Private War: Convoy to Darkness,” The Washington Post, July 29, 2007, 1.

8 See <http://icasualties.org> and <www.propublica.org/series/

disposable-army>.

9 Steven L. Schooner and Colin D. Swan, “Contractors and the 

Ultimate Sacrifice,” Service Contractor, September 2010, 17.

10 Singer.

if contractors are required, they 

must be under the direct supervision 

of a U.S. Government employee
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 260 15 

11 Department of Labor, Office of Workers Compensation 

Programs, available at <www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/lsaboutdbareports.

htm>.

12 David Isenberg, Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand 

Strategy (Oslo, Norway: International Peace Research Institute, January 2009), 5.

13 Jennifer K. Elsea, Moshe Schwartz, and Kennon H. Nakamura, Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, 

and Other Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

updated August 25, 2008), 49.

14 David H. Petraeus, “COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency (COIN) 

Contracting Guidance,” Kabul, Afghanistan, September 8, 2010.

15 Author’s experience while serving on Coalition Military Assistance Training Team in Iraq during early 2004.

16 Elsea, Schwartz, and Nakamura, 15–31.

17 There are a limited number of cases where armed contractor 

action can increase the legitimacy of a government—for instance, 

protecting a hospital or refugee camp. However, even in these benign 

cases, the presence of contractors shows the government cannot 

protect its people and opens the door for any business or association 

to hire its own armed guards—in essence a private militia.

18 Elsea, Schwartz, and Nakamura, 13–14.

19 Afghans identify themselves by qawm, rather than by tribe 

or nationality. A qawm identity is based on kinship, residence, and 

sometimes occupation. Although qawm is sometimes translated 

into English as tribe, the qawm relationship may cross tribal or even 

ethnic boundaries. The qawm is the basic unit of social community 

in Afghanistan, but the relationships involved can vary from ethnic 

group to ethnic group.

20 Dexter Filkins, “With U.S. Aid, Warlord Builds Afghan Empire,” The New York Times, June 6, 2010, available at <www.nytimes.

com/2010/06/06/world/asia/06warlords.html>.

21 Nicholas Pelham, “Contractors in Iraq Accused of Importing Labor and Exporting Profit,” Financial Times, October 14, 2003, 

available at <www.commondreams.org/headlines03/1014-01.htm>.

22 Matt Waldman, “Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan,” available at <www.acbar.org/ACBAR%20Publications/

ACBAR%20Aid%20Effectiveness%20(25%20Mar%2008).pdf>.

23 Roya Wolverson, “Not So Helpful,” Newsweek, November 24, 

2007, available at <www.newsweek.com/id/72068>.

24 Carl Forsberg and Kimberly Kagan, “Consolidating Private 

Security Companies in South Afghanistan,” Institute for the Study 

of War, May 28, 2010, accessed at <www.understandingwar.org/files/

BackgrounderPSC.pdf>.

25 “Afghan-Cda Security Firms,” The Canadian Press-Broadcast 

Wire, January 25, 2010, document BNW0000020100126e61p00011.

26 Major General Nick Carter’s Defense Department briefing via 

teleconference from Afghanistan, May 26, 2010.

27 “Afghan Leader to Ban Security Contractors,” August 16, 

2010, available at <www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/08/16/world/

main6776999.shtml>.

28 Pratap Chatterchee, “DynCorp Oversight in Afghanistan 

Faulted,” available at <www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50477>.

29 Government Accountability Office Press Summary, “Decision on Bid Protest by DynCorp International Regarding U.S. 

Army Contracts in Afghanistan,” available at <www.gao.gov/press/

dyncorp_2010mar15.html>.

30 The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, available at <www.wartimecontracting.gov>.

31 Ibid., “At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and 

Afghanistan,” June 2009, available at <www.wartimecontracting.gov/

docs/CWC_Interim_Report_At_What_Cost_06-10-09.pdf>.

32 Middle East Media Research Institute, “Bin Laden Lieutenant Admits to September 11 and Explains Al-Qa’ida’s Combat 

Doctrine,” February 20, 2002, available at <www.memri.org/report/

en/0/0/0/0/0/0/607.htm>.

33 Field Manual 3–24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 

3.33–5, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, December 2006), 1–1.

34 William Matthews, “U.S. Contractor Use in Iraq Expected to 

Rise,” Defense News, July 12, 2010, available at <www.defensenews.

com/story.php?i=4704826>.

35 Defense Business Board, “Reducing Overhead and Improving Business Operations. Initial Observations,” accessed at <http://

defensenewsstand.com/showdoc.asp?docid=5192010_may19a>.

36 See The Montreux Document (Geneva, Switzerland: International Committee of the Red Cross, August 2009), available at 

<www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/montreux-document170908/$FILE/ICRC_002_0996.pdf>.

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

unified combatant commands through studies, reports, 

briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

research and analysis in the areas of strategic and regional studies and engages in independent and leading-edge 

research and analysis in related areas.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

specialists in national security affairs from the United 

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndupress.edu.

Christopher J. Lamb

Director

Center for Strategic Research

Phillip C. Saunders 

Director of Research

Center for Strategic Research

Dr. Hans Binnendijk 

Director

INSS

Institute for National Strategic
16 SF No. 260 www.ndu.edu/inss

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