alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §596. Contracting and grant making authorities

The Secretary, acting through the Assistant Secretary, in carrying out the responsibilities under section 592 of this title, shall—

(1) operate extramural and intramural programs and distribute funds through grants, cooperative agreements, and other transactions and contracts;

(2) ensure that activities under section 592 of this title include investigations of radiation detection equipment in configurations suitable for deployment at seaports, which may include underwater or water surface detection equipment and detection equipment that can be mounted on cranes and straddle cars used to move shipping containers; and

(3) have the authority to establish or contract with 1 or more federally funded research and development centers to provide independent analysis of homeland security issues and carry out other responsibilities under this subchapter.

(Pub. L. 107–296, title XIX, §1926, formerly title XVIII, §1806, as added Pub. L. 109–347, title V, §501(a), Oct. 13, 2006, 120 Stat. 1935; renumbered title XIX, §1906, and amended Pub. L. 110–53, title I, §104(a)(1), (2), (4), Aug. 3, 2007, 121 Stat. 294; renumbered §1926 and amended Pub. L. 115–387, §2(a)(5), (8), Dec. 21, 2018, 132 Stat. 5163, 5164.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

2018—Pub. L. 115–387, §2(a)(8)(A), in introductory provisions, substituted "Assistant Secretary" for "Director for Domestic Nuclear Detection" and "section 592" for "paragraphs (6) and (7) of section 592(a)".

Par. (2). Pub. L. 115–387, §2(a)(8)(B), substituted "section 592" for "paragraphs (6) and (7) of section 592(a)".

2007—Pub. L. 110–53, §104(a)(4), made technical amendment to reference in original act which appears in two places in text as reference to section 592(a) of this title.
### §1622c. Repealed. Pub. L. 113–79, title X, §10002, Feb. 7, 2014, 128 Stat. 940

Section, Pub. L. 110–234, title X, §10403, May 22, 2008, 122 Stat. 1349; Pub. L. 110–246, §4(a), title X, §10403, June 18, 2008, 122 Stat. 1664, 2111, related to a grant program to improve movement of specialty crops.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of Repeal

Pub. L. 113–79, title X, §10002, Feb. 7, 2014, 128 Stat. 940, provided that: "Effective October 1, 2013, section 10403 of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (7 U.S.C. 1622c) is repealed."
Exhibit 32.2

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Zond-PanAero Windsystem Partners I (the
Partnership) on Form 10-K for the years ended December 31, 2001, 2002 and 2003
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Mary H. Cilia, Chief Financial Officer of Zond Windsystems
Management LLC, as General Partner of the Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 to the best of my knowledge and belief, that:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, except that the Report was not
     timely filed and the Report is a comprehensive Form 10-K for the years
     ended December 31, 2001, 2002 and 2003; and

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
     Partnership.


Date: May 10, 2004
                                   /s/ MARY H. CILIA
                                   ------------------------------
                                   Mary H. Cilia
                                   Chief Financial Officer
                                   Zond Windsystems Management LLC, as General
                                   Partner of Zond-PanAero Windsystem Partners I
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

400 MARYLAND AVENUE, S.W., WASHINGTON, DC 20202-1510

Promoting the efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity of the Department’s programs and operations.

 TO: Assistant Inspector General for Audit

Assistant Inspector General for Investigations

FROM: Inspector General (Acting)

SUBJECT: Redelegation of Authority for Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Administrative 

Appeals On An As Needed Basis

I. DELEGATION 

Under the authority vested in me by delegation EA/EF/193 from the Secretary, certified 

on May 10, 2011, I hereby delegate to you, to anyone acting for you, or anyone 

delegated to perform the duties of your position, the authority to issue decisions on 

administrative appeals of denials of requests for records maintained in the Office of 

Inspector General under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), on an as needed basis,

to the extent that such decisions are consistent with the FOIA, Departmental regulations 

and Executive Orders. Specifically, this authority will apply to those administrative 

appeals for which there is an actual conflict of interest or an appearance of a conflict of 

interest that prevents the Inspector General and Deputy Inspector General (DIG) from 

issuing a decision on an administrative appeal. 

II. RESERVATIONS

Unless otherwise noted in existing or future delegations of authority, the following are 

not delegated:

A. Authority to waive or reduce all or part of any fee is reserved to the Headquarters 

Designated Denial Officer; and

B. Authority to submit reports to Congress or the President unless otherwise provided 

by law is reserved to the Secretary. 

III. REDELEGATION

No further delegation is authorized. 
Page 2 – Redelegation of Authority for Freedom of Information Act Administrative Appeals On An As Needed Basis

IV. CERTIFICATION AND EFFECTIVE DATE

This redelegation is effective upon certification by the Department’s Principal 

Delegations Control Officer. I hereby ratify actions within the scope of this delegation 

taken by the addressee prior to the date of certification. 

_____________/s_______________

_

Sandra Bruce

Date Certified: 6/3/2019

Departmental Delegations Control Officer:Jim Clemmens

Control Number: EF/EFA/202
### §§343f, 343g. Repealed. June 26, 1953, ch. 157, §2, 67 Stat. 86

Sections, act Aug. 28, 1937, ch. 878, §§1, 2, 50 Stat. 881, extended benefits of former section 343c of this title to Puerto Rico, and for such purpose, authorized appropriations, commencing with initial authorization of $88,000 for the fiscal year beginning after August 28, 1937, and on an ascending scale thereafter, until they amounted to $408,000 annually. See sections 341 to 343, 344 to 346, and 347a to 349 of this title.
(39 Misc. Rep. 522.)

#### In re LANE’S ESTATE.

(Surrogate’s Court, New York County.

December, 1902.)

1. Transfer Tax — Legacy to Child. ,

Where the evidence showed that testator occupied for more than 10 years the relation of a parent towards his residuary legatee, and that such relationship began before her fifteenth birthday, a legacy was, under the direct provisions of Laws 1898, c. 88, § 1, subject to a transfer tax of 1 per cent., and no more.

In the matter of the estate of John G. Lane. From an order assessing and fixing the transfer tax, the executor appeals. Modified.

Stephen W. Collins, for appellant.

Edward H. Fallows, for state comptroller.

THOMAS, S.

The fact that the deceased stood toward Elizabeth S. Albertson, the residuary legatee, in the mutually acknowledged relation of a parent, at least from the time of his marriage to her mother, on June 29, 1879, nearly 20 years before his death, is fully established by evidence, and is not disputed. At that time Mrs. Albert-son was about 15 years and 5 months old; and the statute requires, in order that the rate of transfer tax shall be reduced to 1 per centum, that the relationship should have begun at or before her fifteenth birthday. Tax Law 1896, § 221, as amended by Laws 1898, c. 88. For more than 7 years prior to Mrs. Albertson's fifteenth birthday, she and her mother were members of the household of the decedent; and though the proof of specific acts on his part, prior to that time, acknowledging her as his child, is not very full or specific, it is entirely uncontradicted, and is sufficient. For example, George B. Borton and Susan W. Borton jointly affirm “that the said Elizabeth S. Albertson went to live with John G. Lane when she was a small child, and before she was eight years old, and then became a member of his family, and that before her fifteenth birthday the mutual relation of father and daughter existed between them, and that they addressed and introduced each other as such.” The burden of proof rested on the executor, but nothing more was required of him than to establish the fact by evidence prima facie sufficient. The order appealed from will be modified by reducing the tax on the legacy to Mrs. Albértson to 1 per centum of its appraised value.

As to the second ground of appeal, the recent decision of the court of appeals in Matter of Jones’ Estate, 172 N. Y. 575, 65 N. E. 570, is controlling in favor of the state. Order affirmed, except as above modified.

Order modified and affirmed.
#### Brenda A. Samperi, an Infant, by Peter J. Samperi, Her Guardian ad Litem, et al., Respondents, v. Anna Patricola et al., Appellants.

In an action to recover damages for personal injury allegedly caused by the negligence of the female defendant in the operation of a motor vehicle owned by her husband, the other named defendant, both defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated November 13, 1963, which granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and directed an assessment of damages. Order reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment denied without prejudice to renewal upon additional proof, as indicated herein. Although, as properly found by the Special Term, no triable issue exists as to the negligence of the female defendant in causing the accident, it is our opinion that the plaintiffs failed to establish their own freedom from contributory negligence. Under the circumstances they are not entitled to summary judgment *(Nicoletti*v. *Palmer,*16 A D 2d 960; *Gale*v. *City of New York,*18 A D 2d 12). However, inasmuch as plaintiffs’ failure to offer proof in respect of this issue may have been an oversight, they may, if so advised, renew their application for summary judgment upon additional proof that they were not contributorily negligent. Ughetta, Acting P. J., Brennan and Hopkins, JJ., concur; Christ and Rabin, JJ., dissent and vote to affirm the order.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-10753

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

GALEN J WADE

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:03-CR-415-8

Before KING, WIENER, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The attorney appointed to represent Galen J. Wade has moved for leave

to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967). Wade has not filed a response. Our independent review of the

record and counsel’s brief discloses no nonfrivolous issue for appeal.

Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is

excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED.

See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 20, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
#### James Martin, Respondent, v. John W. Lewis et al., Defendants, and Eugene Skinner, Doing Business as S. & S. Paper Co., Appellant.

Judgment in favor of plaintiff-respondent in the sum of $5,220 in an action for personal injuries, reversed, on the law, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, *751and a new trial ordered, with costs to defendant-appellant. Plaintiff-respondent’s assigned reasons for calling as a witness defendant-appellant’s trial counsel are specious. Where, as here, prejudicial testimony is clearly inadmissible, objections to the questions should have been sustained. The subsequent striking of the testimony did not eliminate possible prejudice, which should always be guarded against and here was unnecessarily introduced. Concur — Valente, J. P., McNally and Eager, JJ.; Stevens and Bergan, JJ., dissent and vote to affirm in the following memorandum by Stevens, J.: The trial here was for assessment of damages, summary judgment having been granted by a prior order entered May 25, 1960. There is no prohibition against the calling as a witness by an attorney of his adversary’s counsel. I agree that the questions asked are irrelevant and immaterial and objections thereto should have been sustained. However, in the view I take, there is no showing by defendant of prejudice resulting therefrom. The court may take judicial notice that under chapter 655 of the Laws of 1956 former section 93-b of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (now § 312) required that commencing January 1, 1957 all vehicles have insurance. The accident claimed in the instant case allegedly occurred on May 3, 1957, and even if defendant’s contention is correct (which plaintiff disputes) it is difficult to see how he was prejudiced thereby.
#### 12.211 Technical data.

Except as provided by agency-specific statutes, the Government shall acquire only the technical data and the rights in that data customarily provided to the public with a commercial product or process. The contracting officer shall presume that data delivered under a contract for commercial products was developed exclusively at private expense. When a contract for commercial products requires the delivery of technical data, the contracting officer shall include appropriate provisions and clauses delineating the rights in the technical data in addenda to the solicitation and contract (see part 27 or agency FAR supplements).

[60 FR 48241, Sept. 18, 1995, as amended at 86 FR 61022, Nov. 4, 2021]
### §3604. Criminal offenses

Any person who—

(1) knowingly fails to keep any information, or to submit any report, required under section 3602 of this title;

(2) submits any report under section 3602 of this title knowing that the report or any part thereof is false; or

(3) knowingly violates any rule or regulation issued to carry out this chapter;

is guilty of an offense and upon conviction thereof is punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000.

(Pub. L. 96–236, §4, Apr. 22, 1980, 94 Stat. 337.)
Contacts. With whom outside the FAA hasthis proposal been discussed? Organization Person Contacted Date Response National Business Aircraft Association Eli Coui 

# Ih/o<£ - I~egillllalAirline Asst)ciatioll D~n:eLotten'r 

## 1//4/()f, - Aircraft Owners IIPiloh Association Robert Hacklll:lIl 

# '//I-ilril - ATA Craig Fabian 

# I/;'!/t& -
Page 1 of 3

1737 King Street, Suite 390, Alexandria, VA 22314 (571) 970-3392 Fax (571) 970-3271 

www.vinylinfo.org www.vinylindesign.com

September 24, 2010

Ms. Jodi Howard

U.S. EPA - Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards 

Sector Policies and Program Divisions 

Coatings and Chemicals Group 

Mail Code: E143-01 

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

RE: PVC MACT Rulemaking: Seasonal Production of PVC Resin Manufacturing

Dear Ms. Howard,

During the past year, the Vinyl Institute (VI) and its members, and other stakeholders in 

the PVC industry have expressed concerns to EPA about the seasonal bias in the resin 

sampling, stack testing, and other emissions data submitted in response to the 

Agency’s Section 114 Request in response to the above-referenced rulemaking. To 

further clarify these concerns, the VI has prepared a data table and chart, which depict 

a 3-1/2 year history of monthly production volumes and identifies the period of Section 

114 testing over that period. 

As the chart and table below indicate, testing and sampling conducted in response to 

the Agency’s 114 Request occurred during months when industry production rates and 

volumes ranged from 25 to 34% below the highest production month (May, 2007) of the 

past 3 years. Obviously the economic downturn contributed heavily to the recent 3 year 

period of lower production rates that the PVC industry has experienced. Accordingly, VI 

submits that in utilizing the data submitted in to the Section 114 Request response, EPA 

should consider this seasonal and economic variability in evaluating the PVC industry’s 

rate of production, and in developing the PVC MACT rule. 
Page 2 of 3

1737 King Street, Suite 390, Alexandria, VA 22314 (571) 970-3392 Fax (571) 970-3271 

www.vinylinfo.org www.vinylindesign.com Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

2007 1,190,912 1,112,695 1,277,668 1,288,698 1,305,542 1,289,327 1,300,077 1,305,062 1,199,960 1,151,448 1,096,488 1,087,981

2008 1,250,003 1,124,787 1,068,296 1,160,235 1,248,068 1,229,289 1,284,262 1,150,111 732,379 1,039,394 823,971 678,220

2009 924,192 937,613 948,589 1,122,522 1,174,983 1,083,136 1,126,243 1,160,795 1,125,643 1,161,687 1,014,969 973,739

2010 1,087,233 1,059,797 1,167,451 1,208,803 1,215,795 1,214,017 1,171,760

The data set represents U.S. producers and includes one resin facility located in 

Canada that could not practically be separated out from the reporting results. The

volume from the Canadian plant should be considered as an insignificant amount of the 

total monthly production figures and is believed to track U.S. trends closely. 

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions on this information, if 

you require additional information, or if you need to discuss this further. 
Page 3 of 3

1737 King Street, Suite 390, Alexandria, VA 22314 (571) 970-3392 Fax (571) 970-3271 

www.vinylinfo.org www.vinylindesign.com

Sincerely, 

Richard P. Krock

Technical Director

e-mail: rkrock@vinylinfo.org

phone: 571-970-3392

cell: 571-216-4474
### §3402. Definitions

For the purposes of this chapter:

(a) The term "wheat" means all classes of wheat grains grown in the United States.

(b) The term "processed wheat" means the wheat-derived content of any substance (such as cake mix or flour) produced for use as an ingredient of an end product by changing wheat grown within the United States in form or character by any mechanical, chemical, or other means.

(c) The term "end product" means any product which contains processed wheat as an ingredient and which is intended, as produced, for consumption as human food, notwithstanding any additional incidental preparation which may be necessary by the ultimate consumer.

(d) The term "wheat producer" means any person who grows wheat within the United States for market.

(e) The term "processor" means any person who commercially produces processed wheat within the United States.

(f) The term "end product manufacturer" means any person who commercially produces an end product within the United States, but such term shall not include such persons to the extent that they produce end products on the premises where such end products are to be consumed by an ultimate consumer, including, but not limited to, hotels, restaurants, and institutions, nor shall such term include persons who produce end products for their own personal, family, or household use.

(g) The term "research" means any type of research to advance the nutritional quality, marketability, production, or other qualities of wheat, processed wheat, or end products.

(h) The term "nutrition education" means any action to disseminate to the public information resulting from research concerning the economic value or nutritional benefits of wheat, processed wheat, and end products.

(i) The term "Council" means the Wheat Industry Council established pursuant to section 3405 of this title.

(j) The term "Department" means the United States Department of Agriculture.

(k) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States.

(l) The term "person" means any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other entity.

(m) The term "United States" means the several States and the District of Columbia, including any territory or possession.

(Pub. L. 95–113, title XVII, §1703, Sept. 29, 1977, 91 Stat. 1032.)

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective Oct. 1, 1977, see section 1901 of Pub. L. 95–113, set out as an Effective Date of 1977 Amendment note under section 1307 of this title.
## NUMBER 13
- 19
- 00260
- CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI

– EDINBURG

IN THE INTEREST OF A.A.A. AND J.L.A. JR., CHILDREN

On appeal from the 343rd District Court of Bee County, Texas.



## MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Hinojosa, and Tijerina Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina
Appellant Jose Luis Aguilar filed a notice of appeal from an “Order in Suit for Modification of Support and to Confirm Support Arrearage” issued on April 9, 2019 in

trial court cause number B

- 08

- 1001

- CV

- C in the 343 rd District Court of Bee County,

Texas. We dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution because appel lant has failed to timely file a second amended brief as ordered by this Court

. The clerk’s record was filed on September 9, 2019. On October 11, 2019, this

Court notified a ppellant by letter that there was not a reporter’s record and that2 appellant’s brief was due on or before November 12, 2019. Subsequently, appellant

filed his original brief and then his first amended brief with a motion for leave to file

the brief. On January 6, 2020, this Court notified appellant that his amended brief was not in compliance with the Tex as Rule s of Appellate Procedure

. On January 30, 202 0, we granted appellant’s motion for leave to file the brief

and ordered appellant to file an amended brief on or before March 2, 2020. We advised
appellant that we would not grant any further extensions of time to file the brief “ absent exigent circumstances. ” Nevertheless, more than nine months has passed and a ppellant

has no t filed a second amended brief or a motion for extension for time to file a second

amended brief.

This Court has the authority to dismiss an appeal for want of prosecution or because the appellant has failed to comply with a requirement of the appellate r ules, a court order, or a notice from the clerk requiring a response or other action within a specified time. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 42.3(b),(c); Smith v. DC Civil Constr., LLC , 521 S.W.3d 75, 76 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2017, no pet.). The appellant has failed to comply with the appellate rules or respond to the directives of the Clerk regarding filing an amended brief. See TEX. R. APP. P . 42.3(c). Based on the foregoing, we strike appellant’s first amended, non
- conforming brief, prohibit appellant from filing another, and proceed as if appellant had failed to file a brief. See id. 38.9(a). We dismiss this appeal for want of prosecution and because the appellant failed to comply with the requirements of the ap pellate rules and directives from the Clerk. See id. R. 38.8(a), 38.9(a), 42.3(b),(c); Johnson v. Dallas Hous. Auth ., 179 S.W.3d 770, 770 (Tex.
App.

— Dallas 2005, no pet.).3 JAIME TIJERINA Justice

Delivered and filed the 3rd day of Decembe r, 2020

.