[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 17-14089

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:16-cv-00230-WKW-GMB

PONCE D. HOWARD, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 versus

HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING ALABAMA, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

________________________

(October 26, 2018)

Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Ponce D. Howard appeals, pro se, from the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to his former employer Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama 

(“Hyundai”) in his race discrimination lawsuit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). On appeal, he argues that the 

district court erred in concluding that he failed, in stating his prima facie case of 

racial discrimination, to identify a similarly situated comparator outside his

protected class who was treated more favorably or to show that Hyundai’s 

termination of him for workplace violence was pretext for race discrimination.

At all times relevant to this appeal, Hyundai operated an automobile 

manufacturing facility in Montgomery, Alabama. In June 2012, Hyundai hired 

Howard to work as a paint inspector. In February 2015, Hyundai terminated 

Howard’s employment following an investigation stemming from a workplace 

confrontation involving Howard and one or more of his coworkers.

Howard, who is black, alleged in his complaint that Hyundai discriminated 

against him on account of his race when it terminated his employment. In his 

complaint, Howard alleged the following facts surrounding a February 2015 

incident between himself and a white coworker, Josh Denham. Denham began 

verbally attacking him for taking sick leave due to an illness and then gave Chris 

Arnold, a white supervisor, a broken tool to give to Howard as a part of the

harassment. Denham continued the harassment, telling Howard that he would have 

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him fired and that Arnold and another white supervisor, Jeff Todd, would serve as 

his witnesses to the argument. Arnold then went to inform the Team Relations 

Department about the incident and, upon his return, pulled Todd and Denham to 

the side to tell them what to say when reporting the incident to Team Relations. 

Then, “one by one,” they reported the incident to Team Relations, saying what 

Arnold had told them to say. There were eight black people who witnessed the 

argument, including Irvin Smith and Carmen Paschal. Howard was ultimately 

discharged due to the argument after a meeting with Team Relations. While a 

white manager was present at the meeting, neither his black manager, nor his black 

supervisor was present. Additionally, he was not given a hearing prior to his 

termination, as required by Hyundai’s Human-Resources manual. Denham was 

not fired, and was instead transferred to “Hyundai Transformer.” Howard also 

attached his Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge of 

discrimination.

After conducting discovery, Hyundai filed a motion for summary judgment, 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, arguing, of relevance, that Howard failed to state a 

prima facie case of racial discrimination and that all of its actions were taken for 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and non-pretextual reasons. Hyundai asserted that, 

as a result of its investigation of the 2015 incident—during which it interviewed 

numerous individuals in addition to Arnold, Howard, and Denham—it had 

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determined that Howard had twice thrown a tool at Denham and made threatening 

statements and gestures towards Denham, which violated its Workplace Threats 

and Violence Policy and its Serious Misconduct Policy. Hyundai asserted that, at 

the time of Howard’s violation, he had been subject to a probationary Serious 

Misconduct Letter (also known as a Letter of Conditional Employment), which had 

been issued in response to his prior violation of the Workplace Threats and 

Violence Policy in August 2013, such that his new violations warranted 

termination. Hyundai further indicated that Denham was also terminated after an 

investigation of him related to the 2015 incident concluded that he had violated its 

Harassment Policy and Serious Misconduct Policy. Hyundai asserted that Denham 

was not “transferred” to another job within the Hyundai Motor Manufacturing 

Alabama company, and that Hyundai Power Transformers (“HPT”) was a 

completely different company. Accordingly, Hyundai argued that Howard could 

not meet his burden to show that it did not actually believe he engaged in 

workplace violence and instead intended to discriminate against him, as he had 

merely argued with the conclusions of Team Relations and Human Resources, and 

offered no basis upon which to believe that its decision to terminate him was a 

product of discrimination.

Also in support of its summary judgment motion, Hyundai submitted 

numerous exhibits, including (1) Howard’s deposition; (2) the declaration of Rick 

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Neal, the Senior Vice President of Human Resources and Administration, who was 

white; (3) the declaration of Robert Clevenger, the Manager for Team Relations; 

and (4) all referenced exhibits. The following facts were set out by Clevenger’s 

and Neal’s declarations, Hyundai’s internal investigation memoranda relating to 

the 2013 and 2015 incidents, Hyundai’s official disciplinary policies, and 

Howard’s Letter of Conditional Employment. According to Hyundai’s official 

policies, Serious Misconduct Offenses—which include, for example, harassment 

and workplace violence—were punished outside of the normal process and 

resulted in either termination or a Letter of Conditional Employment. The Letter 

remained active for three years and required the employee to remain incident-free. 

After an investigation into the 2013 incident, Team Relations found that Howard 

made derogatory and threatening remarks to a black coworker, concluded that he 

had violated the Workplace Threats and Violence Policy and engaged in Serious 

Misconduct, and issued him a Letter of Conditional Employment instead of firing 

him.

On the day of the 2015 incident, both a black supervisor and Denham 

separately made complaints against Howard about the incident. Team Relations 

investigated the incident by interviewing and taking statements from employees 

who witnessed the incident, including Denham, Arnold, Smith, and Paschal. They 

made the following statements. Denham stated that Howard had twice thrown the 

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tool at him, hitting him in the leg one time, that Howard then got in his face and 

made fists and told him that he would beat him up, and that he made a gesture in 

the shape of a gun and said, “I’m going to come to your house and boom” and “I’ll 

be in prison, but you’ll be in the grave.” Arnold stated that, after he gave the tool 

to Howard, he turned his back to walk away and then heard them start to argue. 

Arnold stated that he saw Howard approach Denham’s work area to intimidate him 

and heard him threaten to beat Denham up, but that he did not see Howard make 

any gestures towards Denham. Howard’s statement was similar to the allegations 

from his complaint, adding that he threw the tool “up the line towards the upgrader 

station” upon realizing that it was broken, that Denham cursed at him, and that he 

never threatened Denham. Smith corroborated the story that, after teasing and 

provocation by Denham, Howard twice threw the tool toward Denham and made 

threatening statements and gestures at him. Paschal stated that she had tried to 

calm Howard down and that Denham had been regularly harassing him.

Based on these interviews, Team Relations found the following: (1) Denham 

gave Arnold a broken tool to give to Howard; (2) Howard twice threw the tool in

Denham’s direction; (3) Denham told Howard “you are gone[;] that’s your job”; 

(4) Howard walked over to Denham, made a fist gesture at him, and threatened to 

beat up and kill Denham; and (5) Denham instigated the incident and had harassed

Howard on a daily basis. Team Relations also compared Howard’s actions with 

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others who had been separated for Workplace Violence infractions to ensure 

consistency of punishment. Neal was the ultimate decision-maker as to whether 

Howard would be fired. Upon review of the investigation and Howard’s 

disciplinary history, Neal determined that Howard’s actions during the 2015 

incident amounted to workplace violence, which was a Serious Misconduct 

Offense, and decided to fire Howard. Neal’s decision was not influenced by 

Howard’s race, and no one in the Employment Review Committee disputed the 

investigatory findings or termination decision.

Neal also conducted an investigation of Denham related to the 2015 incident

and fired him because Denham also had previously been issued a Letter of 

Conditional Employment and his actions during the 2015 incident amounted to 

workplace violence, a Serious Misconduct Offense. Finally, HPT was not a 

subsidiary, affiliate, or parent of Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama, and the 

two did not transfer employees.

Howard testified in his deposition to the following. At the time of the 2015 

incident, he was on the Letter of Conditional Employment based on the 2013 

incident, which he conceded had nothing to do with race. As to the 2015 incident, 

Denham and Todd were harassing him, and Arnold stood by, laughing. Arnold 

handed him the tool, which he threw in the trash can upon realizing that it was 

broken. He did not curse at, or threaten, Denham. Arnold went to Team Relations, 

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and then pulled Denham and Todd aside. Howard believed that Arnold, Denham, 

and Todd collaborated to tell Team Relations the same story against him, but 

conceded that he did not actually hear them do this and just made an assumption 

because their stories matched. Nothing was said about his race on this occasion. 

While Denham had made derogatory racial remarks to him, no one else at Hyundai 

had ever done so. Further, he agreed that he had no reason to believe that any of 

the individuals listed on the 2015 investigation memorandum prepared by Team 

Relations—including Neal and Clevenger—disfavored him because he was black. 

After Howard’s termination, Denham started working for HPT, which he assumed 

constituted a transfer because both companies had “Hyundai” in the name. He 

believed that his termination was based on his race because he was fired and 

Denham was not, and because his white supervisors did nothing about Denham’s 

harassment of him.

Howard responded to Hyundai’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that 

he could establish a prima facie case of race discrimination and that Hyundai’s 

proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination. In relevant part, he argued that 

he could establish pretext by arguing with the conclusions of Team Relations as to 

the 2015 incident and did so by adamantly denying that he committed workplace 

violence against Denham, and by claiming that he was not fired on the basis of his 

second Serious Misconduct Offense because Denham was not fired even though he 

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had at least five prior reports of workplace violence and harassment. He asserted 

that swifter and stronger action was brought against him after the 2015 incident 

than after the 2013 incident because the 2015 incident involved a white victim and 

the 2013 incident involved a black victim.

In support, Howard submitted declarations from himself, Smith, and 

Paschal. His declaration largely set out his prior allegations, adding that he 

believed that Denham attacked him during the 2015 incident because of his race, 

and that he had testified in his deposition that he had no reason to believe that two 

particular supervisors with whom he was familiar disfavored him because he was 

black, but that he did not know the other listed supervisors, including Clevenger 

and Neal. Smith declared that he saw Howard throw the tool “up the line,” but did 

not see him throw the tool at Denham, and that Denham and his two friends 

regularly made derogatory statements to Howard. In addition to the statements she 

provided in her investigatory interview, Paschal declared that she did not observe 

Howard taking any threatening actions against Denham during the 2015 incident, 

and that Denham had a history of making derogatory statements to coworkers and 

was only disciplined once.

Upon review, a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation 

(“R&R”), recommending granting summary judgment in favor of Hyundai and 

dismissing Howard’s complaint. More specifically, the R&R concluded that (1) 

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Howard failed to state a prima facie case of racial discrimination because he failed 

to show that he was treated less favorably than a similarly situated individual 

outside of his protected class, and (2) even so, Hyundai had proffered a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for his termination, and he failed to submit sufficient 

evidence suggesting both that its proffered reason was pretextual and that its true 

motivation was based on race.

Howard objected to the R&R, arguing that it erroneously: (1) failed to focus 

on the overwhelming evidence that Denham had a long history of harassing 

Hyundai employees, which Hyundai failed to respond to; (2) weighed the evidence 

in Hyundai’s favor and made improper credibility determinations; and (3) found 

that Hyundai’s objections to his declaration should be sustained. The district court 

overruled the objections, adopted the R&R, and granted its summary judgment

motion and dismissed with prejudice Howard’s complaint. Howard filed a motion

entitled “Motion for reconsideration and to alter order and judgment,” reiterating 

his argument that the district court erred in adopting the R&R because it 

misapplied the summary judgment standard by crediting Hyundai’s allegations 

over his own and relying on disputed evidence as to whether he committed 

workplace violence during the 2015 incident and whether he suffered 

discrimination. The district court construed Howard’s motion as being brought 

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pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and denied the motion because he failed to 

present any newly discovered evidence or show any manifest error of law or fact.

Howard appealed and moved for leave to proceed on appeal in forma 

pauperis (“IFP”), which the district court denied. Howard then moved this Court

for leave to proceed on appeal IFP. We denied his motion on grounds that any 

appeal in this case would be frivolous. Howard paid his court costs, and this 

appeal followed.

I.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying 

the same legal standards as the district court. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, 

Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010). “We will affirm if, after construing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, we find that no 

genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law.” Id. at 1263–64. A plaintiff must present more than a mere 

scintilla of evidence, and cannot rest his contentions on speculation or conjecture. 

Paylor v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 1117, 1122 (11th Cir. 2014).

Briefs submitted by pro se litigants are construed liberally. Timson v. 

Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Notwithstanding this liberal 

construction, however, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed 

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abandoned, and we do not address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se

litigant’s reply brief. Id.

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to “discharge . . . or

otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 

race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A plaintiff may establish discrimination 

through direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or statistical proof. Alvarez, 

610 F.3d at 1264. When evaluating a discrimination claim based on circumstantial 

evidence, we primarily apply the framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. 

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 

450 U.S. 248 (1981).1

 Id. Under this framework, a plaintiff is first required to 

establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. To establish a prima facie case 

of discrimination, a plaintiff may show that (1) he is a member of a protected class; 

(2) who is qualified for the position; (3) but was subject to an adverse employment 

decision; and (4) a similarly situated employee who is outside the protected class 

was treated more favorably. Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1264.

If the plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the 

defendant to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 

 1 This Court has noted that establishing the elements of the McDonnell Douglas 

framework is not the only way to survive summary judgment in an employment discrimination 

case, and that a plaintiff may also present “a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that 

would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Smith v. LockheedMartin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).

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action. Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1264. If the defendant produces such evidence, the 

burden shifts then back onto the plaintiff, who must produce evidence that the 

employer’s proffered reason is actually a pretext for discrimination. Id. “[T]he 

ultimate burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff to show that the defendant 

intentionally discriminated against [him].” Id.

If the defendant’s proffered reason is one that would motivate a reasonable 

employer to take the adverse action, the plaintiff “must meet that reason head on 

and rebut it,” and cannot prove pretext by recasting the defendant’s reason or by 

substituting his business judgment for the defendant’s. Id. at 1265–66 (noting that 

the pretext inquiry focuses on the employer’s and not the employee’s belief). 

A plaintiff can show that an employer’s justification of his termination based 

on his violation of a work rule is arguably pretextual by submitting evidence that: 

(1) he did not violate the work rule, or (2) if he did violate the rule, other 

employees outside the protected class who similarly violated the rule were not 

similarly treated. Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 

1363 (11th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff must show both that the proffered reason was 

false, and that discrimination was the true reason for the adverse action. Smith v. 

Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2011).

II.

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The district court properly granted summary judgment because Howard 

failed to state a prima facie case of racial discrimination. In applying the 

McDonnell Douglas framework, we note that there is no dispute regarding the first 

three elements of our analysis. Howard is a member of a protected class because he 

is black. Hyundai does not allege he was not qualified for his position as a paint 

inspector. Finally, Howard was subject to an adverse employment decision when 

Hyundai terminated his employment following the 2015 incident. It is with respect 

to the final element of the analysis—the presence of a comparator outside the 

protected class who received more favorable treatment—that the parties differ.

Taken as a whole, Howard’s pleadings raise the prospect of three potential 

comparators: Denham, Todd, and Arnold. Hyundai responds by arguing that each 

of Denham, Todd, and Arnold is not an appropriate comparator because he is not 

similarly situated to Howard (Denham, as best we can tell, because his disciplinary 

history differs slightly from Howard’s, and Todd and Arnold because they played 

no significant role in the 2015 incident). With respect to Denham, we can assume 

arguendo that he is an appropriate comparator.

Todd and Arnold, on the other hand, are not appropriate comparators. When 

determining whether employees are similar for purposes of the Title VII “similarly 

situated” analysis, this Court considers “whether the employees are involved in or 

accused of the same or similar conduct . . . .” Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 

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1562 (11th Cir. 1997). Although not dispositive, “[m]aterial differences in ranks 

and responsibilities are relevant for considering whether an employee is a proper 

comparator.” Cyprian v. Auburn U. Montgomery, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1282 

(M.D. Ala. 2011) (citing Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1280–81 (11th

Cir. 2008)). The disciplinary histories of the plaintiff and the proposed comparator 

also are relevant to our inquiry. See Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 

F.3d 1313, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding two employees to not be similarly 

situated where one employee’s documented history of misconduct was “much 

worse . . . in both number and nature”).

We are ultimately persuaded that Todd and Arnold are not appropriate

comparators because they are not accused of conduct that is the same or similar to 

Howard’s. In fact, the record indicates only that Arnold handed Howard a nonfunctioning tool as part of a practical joke and later laughed as events unfolded. 

As for Todd’s part in the encounter, Howard speculates that Todd told Denham 

and Arnold what to report to Team Relations about the event, but Howard also 

admits that he did not hear a word that any of Denham, Arnold, or Todd spoke 

during their huddle. Importantly, there is no indication in the record of either 

Arnold or Todd using profane language, threating anyone, or throwing objects 

towards their coworkers. Howard even admits that other than their limited 

involvement in the 2015 incident, Arnold and Todd essentially ignored him. 

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Moreover, Todd is not even mentioned in the Team Relations memorandum 

interviewing witnesses to the 2015 incident, and neither Todd nor Arnold appears 

to have been subject to any Letter of Conditional Employment at the time of the 

2015 incident. As the magistrate judge’s R&R properly emphasized, “Todd’s and 

Arnold’s relevant conduct amounts to ignoring Howard, giving him menacing 

looks, huddling to speak with Denham following the incident . . . , and otherwise 

failing to stop Denham’s harassment of Howard.” Because Denham is the only 

proper comparator, we proceed to determine whether he received treatment that 

was more favorable than that afforded Howard.

In relevant part, Howard argues that Hyundai treated Denham more 

favorably following the 2015 incident because Hyundai (1) did not fire Denham 

promptly after the incident occurred, (2) assisted in arranging Denham’s transfer to 

HPT, which Howard believed to be a related company, and (3) failed to 

appropriately address the earlier harassment Denham inflicted on Howard and 

other employees. Hyundai responds by noting that it also terminated Denham for 

his part in the 2015 incident shortly after terminating Howard; that Hyundai and 

HPT are unrelated corporate entities that do not transfers employees to one 

another; and that Howard never properly notified Hyundai of Denham’s earlier 

harassment.

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Even construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Howard, we find 

that Denham was not treated more favorably than Howard after the 2015 incident. 

To begin, it is clear that Hyundai also fired Denham shortly after the 2015 incident. 

Once Hyundai concluded its investigation of Howard, Neal, Hyundai’s Senior Vice 

President of Human Resources and Administration, ordered an investigation of 

Denham’s role in the incident. Hyundai then undertook an investigation of 

Denham that, as in Howard’s case, culminated in the development of a detailed

memorandum describing the company’s findings. The memorandum is dated 

March 2, 2015, only six days after the Howard memorandum. Like the Howard 

memorandum, the Denham memorandum detailed relevant witness testimony from 

many of the same witnesses who were present during the incident. It reached 

written conclusions where facts were supported by the testimony of two or more 

witnesses. It recounted Denham’s disciplinary history, including the fact that he 

was subject to an active Letter of Conditional Employment. Finally, it presented 

the Hyundai policy at issue. After reviewing the findings, and without any notice 

that Howard might file an EEOC complaint or lawsuit, Neal determined that 

Hyundai should terminate Denham’s employment, which it ultimately did.

We also disagree with Howard’s assertion that Hyundai treated Denham 

more favorably by aiding in his “transfer” to HPT. It is uncontroverted that

Hyundai and HPT are separate legal entities. Howard does not dispute Hyundai’s 

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claims that neither entity is a subsidiary, affiliate, or parent of the other and that the 

two entities do not share or transfer any management or employees, so we accept 

them as true. Most importantly, we find no evidence in the record that Hyundai 

actually transferred Denham or otherwise assisted him in obtaining employment 

with HPT.

2

 Consequently, we find no disparate treatment on this ground.

Lastly, we find no disparate treatment in Hyundai’s alleged failure to 

address Denham’s earlier harassment. First and foremost, Howard testified in his 

deposition that he never formally reported any harassment or discrimination, 

involving Denham or otherwise, before the 2015 incident. Given this, it is hard to 

conclude that Hyundai should be faulted for failing to take action regarding 

Denham’s earlier alleged misbehavior. See Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 

208 F.3d 1290, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that an employer cannot be said 

to be on notice of alleged harassment unless it is reported to individuals designated 

in its anti-harassment policy). Additionally, a review of Denham’s documented 

disciplinary history as set forth in the March 2, 2015 Team Relations memorandum 

reveals a series of relatively minor infractions and two incidents of Serious 

 2 We also refuse Howard’s invitation to take judicial notice of the fact that, in most 

employment situations, an applicant is required to submit the name of his or her last employer to 

the new employer. Apart from the fact this this is not the kind of thing about which courts 

ordinarily take judicial notice, see Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211, 214 (11th Cir. 1997)

(describing well-known scientific facts, matters of geography, and matters of political history as 

typical examples of judicially noticeable information), we note that during his deposition 

Howard himself admitted to leaving two of his prior employers off the employment application 

he submitted to Hyundai. Moreover, Howard also failed to show us any similar case so 

extending the doctrine of judicial notice, and we decline to do so here.

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Misconduct involving an altercation and, separately, inappropriate behavior 

towards other Team Members. Denham received Letters of Conditional 

Employment on each occasion, the first of which was inactive by the time of the 

2015 incident. All in all, we take this as evidence that Hyundai was doing its best 

to fairly manage a difficult employee, but nothing in the record suggests that 

Hyundai departed from its documented procedures and afforded Denham any 

special treatment it did not later afford Howard. In particular, the record does not 

reveal that Denham committed any Serious Misconduct while subject to an active 

Letter of Conditional Employment and was permitted by Hyundai to keep his job. 

Accordingly, we find no evidence of disparate treatment on this ground either. 

Ultimately, we agree with the magistrate judge and the district court that 

Howard has not met his burden of demonstrating that a similarly situated employee 

outside his protected class was treated more favorably. As a result, he has failed to 

establish a prima facie case of race-based employment discrimination, and the 

district court did not err in granting Hyundai’s motion for summary judgment.

III.

Although our analysis could end with the finding that the district court did 

not err in granting summary judgment because Howard failed to establish a prima 

facie case of race discrimination, we write briefly to address his argument that 

Hyundai’s proffered work-rule-violation reason was pretext for discrimination. 

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Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Howard established a prima facie case of 

race discrimination, Hyundai has articulated and produced evidence of a 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its termination of him—its determination 

that he had violated its Workplace Threats and Violence Policy and its Serious 

Misconduct Policy while he was already subject to a Letter of Conditional 

Employment. See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1264; Jones, 874 F.2d at 1540. Because 

violating established policies by engaging in workplace violence twice within a 

three-year period would motivate a reasonable employer to fire an employee, the 

burden shifted back to Howard to produce evidence that Hyundai’s proffered 

reason was actually pretext for discrimination. See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1264.

However, Howard has failed to prove that Hyundai’s proffered work-ruleviolation reason was pretext for discrimination. While he claimed both that he did 

not violate any policies during the 2015 incident and that Denham was not 

similarly punished for his violations of those same policies, Howard has produced 

no evidence showing that Hyundai’s true reason for firing him was based on race. 

See Damon, 196 F.3d at 1363; St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 

(1993) (noting that it must be “shown both that the reason was false, and that 

discrimination was the real reason”). Rather, he largely relied on his conclusory 

opinions and beliefs that Denham attacked him during the 2015 incident because of 

his race, that he received harsher treatment after the 2015 incident because the 

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victim was white and not black, and that he was ultimately fired because of his 

race. See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1264–65. Further, these conclusory opinions and 

beliefs are contradicted by: (1) his testimony that race was not mentioned during 

the incident; (2) his testimony that no one else from Hyundai other than Denham 

had ever made derogatory racial statements toward him; (3) his testimony that he 

had no reason to believe that at least some of the individuals listed on the Team 

Relations memorandum disfavored him because he was black; and (4) his failure to 

testify or otherwise produce any evidence that the remaining individuals listed on 

that memorandum did disfavor him because he was black.

In his arguments on appeal, Howard makes much of his own testimony that 

he did not actually threaten anyone or throw the worn-down tool at Denham during 

the 2015 incident. He argues that, because Hyundai’s Team Relations 

memorandum reached different conclusions, there is a dispute of fact that should 

have precluded summary judgment. Hyundai responds by noting that the law does 

not require its conclusions regarding workplace misconduct to be free from error;

instead, it only requires an employer’s conclusions to be honestly made and free 

from evidence of unlawful discriminatory animus. Hyundai is correct.

We have said many times that we are not a “super-personnel department,” 

and it is not our role to second-guess employers, “no matter how mistaken the 

firm’s managers.” Id. The fact that an employer’s legitimate belief is or may 

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potentially be incorrect is immaterial so long as the employer’s decisions were not 

ultimately shown to be motivated by unlawful discriminatory animus. See id. at 

1266 (“The question to be resolved is not the wisdom or accuracy of [the 

employer’s] conclusion that [the Title VII claimant’s] performance was 

unsatisfactory, or whether the decision to fire her was ‘prudent or fair.’”); Damon, 

196 F.3d at 1363 n.3 (“An employer who fires an employee under a mistaken but 

honest impression that the employee violated a work rule is not liable for 

discriminatory conduct.”); Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989) 

(“The law is clear that, even if a Title VII claimant did not in fact commit the 

violation with which he is charged, an employer successfully rebuts any prima 

facie case of disparate treatment by showing that it honestly believed the employee 

committed the violation.”); Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1256 

(5th Cir. 1977) (“Even if [the employer] wrongly believed that [the Title VII 

claimant] violated this policy, if [the employer] acted on this belief it was not 

guilty of racial discrimination.”). At the end of the analysis, our “sole concern is 

whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivated the decision.” Alvarez, 610 

F.3d at 1266 (quotation marks omitted).

After a careful review of the entire record, we are convinced that Hyundai 

decided to terminate Howard based on its honest belief that he violated its 

Workplace Threats and Violence Policy and its Serious Misconduct Policy while 

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subject to an active Letter of Conditional Employment. But even if Hyundai’s 

conclusions regarding Howard’s conduct during the 2015 incident were wholly or 

partially mistaken, it cannot be held liable for discriminatory conduct because 

Howard has also failed to point to any evidence that unlawful discriminatory 

animus actually motivated Hyundai’s actions. Aside from the fact that Denham—

who did not have the authority to terminate Howard’s employment and played no 

part in Hyundai’s decision to do so—had previously made derogatory racial 

remarks to Howard, and Howard’s reference to his own skin color during the 2015 

incident, the record presents no evidence that race actually played a part in any of 

the events leading to Howard’s termination. 

Further, Howard’s failure to show any evidence that Hyundai’s true reason 

for firing him was discrimination means that he also failed to show a “convincing 

mosaic of circumstantial evidence” raising a reasonable inference that Hyundai 

intentionally discriminated against him based on his race. See Smith, 644 F.3d at 

1328.

IV.

We hold that the district court properly granted Hyundai summary judgment 

and dismissed with prejudice Howard’s complaint because he failed to establish a 

prima facie case of racial discrimination, and, even if the burden did shift to 

Hyundai, he failed to show that Hyundai’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

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reason for his termination was pretextual and that racial discrimination was the real 

reason for his termination.

AFFIRMED.

3

 3 Howard’s motion to seal the record on appeal is hereby DENIED.

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