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64–141 PDF 

" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

112TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

S. PRT. 

2011

112–10 

AVOIDING WATER WARS: 

WATER SCARCITY AND CENTRAL ASIA’S 

GROWING IMPORTANCE FOR STABILITY 

IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 

A MAJORITY STAFF REPORT 

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 22, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

Available via World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gpo.gov 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v 

Executive Summary ................................................................................................. 1 

Section 1: Water Management in Central and South Asia .................................. 3 

Section 2: Agriculture as a Driver of Water Demand and Tensions in Region .. 7 

Section 3: Growing Concern Over Using Water to Create Energy ...................... 8 

Section 4: Climate Change Exacerbates Water Scarcity ...................................... 9 

Section 5: Current and Future Water Scarcity is a National Security Issue ..... 10 

Section 6: United States Foreign Policy on Water ................................................ 12 

Section 7: Recommendations for Action ................................................................. 13 

Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 21 

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC, February 22, 2011. 

DEAR COLLEAGUES: This report by the committee majority staff 

examines United States policy with respect to water scarcity and 

water management in Central and South Asia. Water plays an increasingly important role in our diplomatic and national security 

interests in the region, and we must ensure that our approach is 

carefully considered and coordinated across the interagency. President Obama’s administration deserves credit for recognizing the 

critical role water plays in achieving our foreign policy objectives. 

As water demand for food production and electricity generation increases, in part as a result of the quickening pace of climate 

change, so too must our efforts to provide water security. While 

much of our focus currently rests on Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

we must also consider the interests in the shared waters by India 

and the neighboring five Central Asian countries—Uzbekistan, 

Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. This report draws on staff travel to the region and the work of experts in 

government, academia, and international institutions. It provides 

significant insight and several key recommendations to advance 

U.S. policy in Central and South Asia with respect to this vital 

transboundary resource. 

Sincerely, 

JOHN F. KERRY, Chairman. 

(V)

(1) 

AVOIDING WATER WARS: WATER SCARCITY AND CENTRAL ASIA’S GROWING IMPORTANCE FOR STABILITY 

IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Water scarcity is often overlooked, underfunded, and undervalued within foreign policy. Yet a government’s ability to provide 

and manage access to water is critical for ensuring political, economic, and social stability. 

In Central and South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the impacts of water scarcity are fueling dangerous tensions 

that will have repercussions for regional stability and U.S. foreign 

policy objectives. The national security implications of this looming 

water shortage—directly caused or aggravated by agriculture demands, hydroelectric power generation, and climate instability— 

will be felt all over the world. 

To its credit, the Obama administration has recognized the critical role water plays in achieving our foreign policy goals and in 

protecting our national security interests. For the first time, the 

United States has elevated water-related issues in its bilateral relationships with priority countries, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Accordingly, the U.S. strategy and foreign assistance budgets 

now include significant investments allocated toward activities that 

promote water security through high-visibility projects, such as expanding water storage capabilities and irrigation. 

However, the U.S. approach walks a fine line with respect to 

water issues and must be tailored to reflect the realities of water 

politics in Central and South Asia. While the focus of the United 

States is appropriately directed toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

it is important to recognize that our water-related activities in the 

region are almost exclusively confined within the borders of these 

two countries. We pay too little attention to the waters shared by 

their Indian and Central Asian neighbors—Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. For example, in 2009 

the United States provided approximately $46.8 million in assistance for water-related activities to Afghanistan and Pakistan compared with $3.7 million shared among all five Central Asian countries for these efforts. 

Providing the right support can have a tremendous stabilizing 

influence, but providing the wrong support can spell disaster by 

agitating neighboring countries. By neglecting the interconnectivity 

of water issues between Central and South Asia, the U.S. approach 

could exacerbate regional tensions. Our activities should be carefully calibrated to address a broad range of needs and encourage 

reluctant state actors to come to the negotiating table. The United 

2 

States must be cautious and recognize that, while regional stability 

will not be determined solely by our efforts to support water cooperation, regional stability can be strongly undermined by misguided support. 

The United States has a historic opportunity to address these issues properly and intelligently. Congress has authorized $1.5 billion annually in foreign assistance to Pakistan, through the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, better known as the 

Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill. The Obama administration still faces 

critical decisions on how it will spend these resources. This report 

will detail several aspects of a coordinated regional strategy for 

allocating those resources. 

This report analyzes how the United States can be more strategic 

in delivering water-related assistance in Central and South Asia to 

maximize its peacekeeping and humanitarian benefits. It also 

makes the following four recommendations to the administration 

with respect to water issues in the region that capture opportunities for enhanced cooperation and coordination: 

1. Provide Benchmark Data to Improve Water Management 

The countries in Central and South Asia, regardless of their level 

of development, lack publicly available access to consistent and 

comparable data on water supply, flow, and usage. This creates 

tension over the management of water by both upstream and 

downstream countries. Providing basic technical information to all 

countries is a constructive way for the United States to help create 

a foundation for bona fide discussion and debate over water management. The United States should support data-related activities 

specific to measuring and monitoring water flow and volume for 

key rivers and river basins. We should also promote technical partnerships in the region to monitor glaciers, track shifts in monsoons, 

and model climatic changes across a range of water flow scenarios. 

2. Focus on Water Demand Management 

The United States can help create space for regional and bilateral negotiations on water by reducing pressure on shared water 

resources. Countries in the region cannot simply engineer their 

way out of growing water scarcity; they must begin by improving 

management of their existing supply. In fact, many experts agree 

that these countries must start shifting their focus from increasing 

the supply of water to decreasing their demand for it. The United 

States should couple its support for activities that reduce demand 

for water with those that increase water use efficiency. Specifically, 

the United States can utilize its expertise in demand management 

and help countries reduce the amount of water consumed by the 

agriculture sector and regulate groundwater withdrawals. 

3. Recognize International Dimensions of Water Issues and Deliver 

Holistic Solutions 

The impact of the United States approach to address water in Afghanistan and Pakistan can extend far beyond each country’s border, as water ignores political boundaries. Moreover, regional water 

management can be an important type of conflict management. 

U.S. assistance should encompass comprehensive activities, such as 

3 

strengthening river basin dialogues and establishing communitylevel water management projects on shared watersheds. 

4. Safeguard Institutions Against Shocks to Water Supply and 

Demand 

Long-term stability requires strong institutions capable of responding to sudden shocks to critical natural resources, such as 

water. When weak institutions are confronted with natural disasters or human interventions that suddenly disrupt water flow, tensions can flare. With decades of experience on water sharing agreements, the United States is well-positioned to support programs 

that build the institutional capacity of government agencies and 

universities in areas such as international water law, dispute resolution, mediation, and arbitration. The United States should also 

invest in institutions that support developing transboundary water 

sharing agreements. 

This report is organized into seven sections. Section 1 provides 

an overview of water management in Central and South Asia. Sections 2 and 3 discuss the demand for water from the agriculture 

and energy sectors. Section 4 describes climate change’s effect on 

water and how this can exacerbate local and regional tensions. Section 5 highlights how, in the aggregate, the demand for a diminishing supply of water portends a significant threat to national security. Section 6 outlines the U.S. foreign policy approach to water 

in the region and Section 7 provides policy recommendations for 

improving water management in conjunction with promoting stability in the region. 

SECTION 1: WATER MANAGEMENT IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA

Accessible Freshwater is Scarce and Must Be Well-Managed 

Water is a fundamental human need; and yet, it is also one of 

the most overlooked aspects in our daily lives. Water is more than 

just what people drink or use to clean or create power; it is also 

embedded in our food and environment. As a result, global water 

use has been growing at a rate more than double that of the world 

population in the last century. 

Even though the majority of our planet is water, most of it is too 

salty or deep to be reached. As little as 0.75 percent of the total 

water available on Earth is accessible fresh water. Given such constraints, the real threat to this limited resource is poor management. 

Poor water management has rendered water unusable and subject to exploitation at a rate faster than it is replenished, directly 

contributing to the growing water scarcity crisis. In 2006, the 

United Nations reported that many of the world’s water problems 

come not from the physical absence of freshwater, but from poor 

governance and lack of investment in basic activities like sewage 

treatment and water efficiency programs. 

Effective water management is difficult because precious freshwater is often not controlled or undisputedly owned by any one nation. In fact, more than 260 major rivers basins are shared by two 

or more countries. Human dependency on these transboundary 

freshwater basins exacerbates this delicate balance; approximately 

4 

40 percent of the world’s population relies on them. This report 

focuses on two such primary water basins: the Amu Darya and 

Indus. 

Weakened Water Management Systems in Central Asia 

There are two main rivers in Central Asia: the Amu Darya and 

the Syr Darya. The Amu Darya is the largest river with a basin 

shared by Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The river is formed by the confluence of the 

Vakhsh and Pyanj rivers. The most important river, the Pyanj, begins near Pakistan’s Northern Territories and forms the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan (see Figure 1). There are also 

several rivers within northern Afghanistan contributing to the 

Amu Darya flow, mainly the Wakhan and Pamir rivers and, to a 

lesser extent, the Badakhshan, Kokcha, and Kunduz. 

Figure 1: Map of Amu Darya and Syr Darya River Basins 

Source: CRS produced using U.S. Department of State, International Land Boundaries,https://www.intelink.gov/basestate/landBHome.asp; U.S. Geological Survey, 

HydroSHEDS, http://hydrosheds.cr.usgs.gov; World Resources Institute, Watersheds 

of the World, http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/water-resources/maps.html; ESRI Data 

and Maps 9.3.1; DeLorme World Vector Data, 1:250,000; IHS World Data, December 

2008. 

Notes: Place names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative. River basin boundaries are approximate and adapted from WRI Watersheds 

of the World and USGS HydroSHEDS databases. 

During the Soviet era, the central government in Moscow controlled the entire network of rivers shared among its republics 

through water-use quotas. This approach meant that the borders 

between the Central Asian republics had little, if any, effect on 

basin management. The Soviet system involved integrated water 

5 

policies where in the summer, the two upstream republics (present 

day Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) released water from their lakes to 

the downstream ones (present day Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and 

Turkmenistan) for irrigation and hydroelectric power generation. 

In return, during the winter when it was not practical to release 

water, the downstream republics provided those upstream with gas 

and coal to generate electricity. 

The collapse of the Soviet Union drastically weakened water 

management in the region. The previous controls broke down and 

national self-interests took hold. The former Soviet republics began 

to function independently, seeking to increase national control over 

water often at the expense of their neighbors. As Kai Wegerich, an 

expert in water policy put it, ‘‘[w]hen administrational boundaries 

became national boundaries in 1991, the Central Asian states were 

left with inequitable water allocation limits and a high level of 

water provision structures interdependences.’’ 1 Recognizing the destabilized system, all five Central Asian countries agreed to keep 

the water quotas from the Soviet era in place and signed the 

Almaty Agreement in 1992. 

In addition, agreements reached over water allocations during 

the Soviet era largely ignored non-Soviet interests, especially those 

of Afghanistan, a weaker neighbor. As a significant outlier in the 

process of developing regional water sharing agreements, Afghanistan’s interests in the waters of the Amu Darya basin have only 

recently gained prominence. This renewed focus on Afghanistan 

derives in part from international reinvestment in the country’s 

agriculture sector following the ouster of the Taliban government. 

However, sparse water data, limited access to collect it, and combat 

conditions have rendered challenging discussions on water between 

Afghanistan and its neighbors. Looking ahead, experts question 

whether and how this region will incorporate growing water consumption and its implications for regional stability. 

Decentralized Water Management in South Asia 

The Indus River Basin hosts a major network of rivers flowing 

between India and Pakistan. It is comprised of six shared rivers: 

Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej (see Figure 2). The 

Indus is one of the world’s longest rivers (1,800 miles long), originating in the Tibetan Himalayas, flowing west through Kashmir, 

then through Pakistan until eventually reaching the Arabian Sea. 

The upper portion of the Indus is fed by snow and glacial 

meltwaters and converges in the Punjab region of Pakistan with 

the five other rivers in the system. 

6 

Figure 2: Map of Indus River Basin 

Source: CRS produced using U.S. Department of State, International Land Boundaries, https://www.intelink.gov/basestate/landBHome.asp; U.S. Geological Survey, 

HydroSHEDS, http://hydrosheds.cr.usgs.gov;World Resources Institute, Watersheds 

of the World, http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/water-resources/maps.html; ESRI 

Data and Maps 9.3.1; DeLorme World Vector Data, 1:250,000; IHS World Data, 

December 2008. 

Notes: Place names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative. River basin boundary is approximate and adapted from WRI Watersheds of 

the World and USGS HydroSHEDS databases. 

Of all the rivers flowing into Pakistan, the Indus is the most essential because of its importance to the agricultural sector. Pakistan’s agriculture relies on the world’s largest contiguous irrigation 

system fed by the Indus waters; in fact, water withdrawals for agricultural irrigation represent almost 97 percent of all withdrawals 

in Pakistan. This irrigation network covers an estimated 83 percent of cultivated land in the country and contributes to nearly a 

quarter of its gross domestic product. Unfortunately, Pakistan has 

almost fully exploited the surface and groundwater that is crucial 

for its irrigation, so improvements in management and efficiency 

are vital. 

Although the headwaters for the Indus originate in China, from 

a long-term planning perspective, it is India’s water management 

of the Indus that merits scrutiny. With a population already exceeding 1.1 billion people and forecasts indicating continued growth 

to over 1.5 billion by 2035, India’s demand for water is rising at 

7 

unprecedented rates. However, water management in India is extremely decentralized and virtually unregulated. Multiple government ministries have established water-use guidelines at the 

national level, but, they have little effect. Water management is 

constitutionally delegated to India’s constituent states, which have 

limited capacity to coordinate among themselves. This has led rapidly to diminishing available surface and groundwater. 

Waters flowing between India and Pakistan, unlike those in Central Asia, are managed within the framework of the Indus Waters 

Treaty (IWT), a long-standing agreement negotiated by the governments of India and Pakistan and the World Bank. Signed in 1960, 

the IWT is considered the world’s most successful water treaty, 

having remained relatively intact for 50 years and having withstood four Indo-Pakistani wars. 

The treaty gives control of the ‘‘western rivers’’ (Indus, Jelum, 

and Chenab) to Pakistan and gives India the ‘‘eastern rivers’’ 

(Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi) up to the Pakistani border. The treaty 

quantifies the amount of water both countries will receive from 

these rivers and serves an important function by managing the use 

of the rivers for hydroelectric power projects. It lays out guidelines 

for hydropower on the eastern rivers, allows Pakistan to object to 

projects, and specifies mechanisms for conflict resolution. 

While the IWT has maintained stability in the region over water, 

experts question the treaty’s long-term effectiveness in light of 

chronic tensions between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region, where a significant portion of the Indus River’s headwaters 

originate. In addition, others question whether the IWT can address India’s growing use of the shared waters and Pakistan’s increasing demand for these waters for agricultural purposes. 

SECTION 2: AGRICULTURE AS A DRIVER OF WATER DEMAND

AND TENSIONS IN REGION

Globally, the agriculture sector is the single largest consumer of 

freshwater, accounting for about 70 percent of the total volume of 

freshwater withdrawals from lakes, rivers, and aquifers. As a primary driver of water scarcity and source of tension within and 

among countries, agriculture policies produce water insecurity 

when they promote water-intensive crops and require unsustainable irrigation. 

Agriculture is one of the chief factors that exacerbate waterrelated tensions in Central and South Asia. 

First, local government policies continue to pursue cotton production in Central Asia, particularly in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 

adding further stress to limited water resources and driving water 

scarcity. The demise of the Aral Sea in Central Asia remains one 

of the most iconic global images of mismanaged agriculture policies 

and highlights the interconnectivity between such policies and 

water scarcity. The Aral Sea was once the world’s fourth largest 

lake. It has shrunk by 90 percent since the rivers that fed the sea 

were diverted for Soviet projects aimed at boosting cotton production, a water-intensive crop. 

Second, the loss of production and farm-level knowledge is exacerbating water scarcity. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 

large collective farms became individualized. This meant that many 

8 

peasant farmers, who only had a single task to perform as part of 

the larger farming process, quickly became responsible for the entire production chain. These farmers lacked knowledge in maximizing productivity, so yields declined, irrigation canals became 

silted, and inefficiencies in water use increased. 

Finally, government policies, including U.S. policies, have increased agricultural productivity by expanding irrigated land area 

without regard for the down-river impacts of those policies. For example, Afghanistan’s 2007 Water Sector Strategy focuses on improving, rehabilitating, and reestablishing irrigated areas. In addition, the United States is investing in increasing Afghanistan’s 

agricultural productivity by rehabilitating and constructing irrigation systems and providing seeds. However, little is known about 

the impacts that expanded irrigation could have on already sensitive rivers, such as the Amu Darya, which flows into Central Asia 

from Afghanistan. Without investments in managing the demand 

for water from irrigation, this solution can create conflicts among 

its users. 

Similarly, proposals to expand irrigated land in India and Pakistan have exacerbated tensions between these neighbors. Water 

mismanagement and increased inefficiencies in the existing irrigation systems, requiring more water for less agricultural returns, 

compound the problem. As the existing agriculture system becomes 

more water-intensive and, in some areas, more inefficient, water 

may prove to be a source of instability in South Asia. 

SECTION 3: GROWING CONCERN OVER USING WATER

TO CREATE ENERGY

A second driver of growing frictions in the region is hydropower 

development. Lacking a coordinated management system, each nation is trying to meet its own energy needs without consideration 

of its neighbors. As many experts note, ‘‘transboundary water conflicts arise not over natural supplies but over human interventions 

to manage them. Dams, irrigation diversions, and other infrastructure alter hydrological relations, affecting the quantity, quality, 

and timing of downriver flows, but also relations between upstream 

and downstream riparians.’’ 2

As of late 2010, three dam projects are under consideration or 

construction in Kyrgyzstan (Kambaratinsk Dam) and Tajikistan 

(Rogun Dam, Sangtuda I and II Dam). The energy produced from 

hydroelectric power constitutes 27 percent of the total energy in 

Central Asia and is expected to grow to 3.5 percent if the proposed 

projects are built. The Rogun and Kambaratinsk dams are the two 

largest dams under consideration and would serve to store water 

in large reservoirs and generate electricity by releasing this water. 

The proposed Rogun Dam on the Vakhsh River in southern 

Tajikistan is relevant because of its potential effects on energy security for Tajikistan and on water availability for Uzbekistan. This 

dam was first proposed in 1959 and construction began in 1976. 

However, the project stalled after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 

In recent years, the Tajik Government restarted the construction 

process. If completed, this dam would likely be the highest in the 

world and generate power not only for Tajikistan but enough to export to Afghanistan and Pakistan. These plans have raised serious 

9 

concerns across the border in Uzbekistan, as the Vakhsh River contributes approximately 25 percent of the water flows in the Amu 

Darya. In discussions with staff, Uzbek officials argue that because 

it could take up to 18 years to fill, the Rogun project will severely 

reduce the amount of water flowing into Uzbekistan. 

The drive to meet energy demand through hydropower development is also occurring in India and Pakistan, two countries that 

lack sufficient access to energy. This is particularly true with respect to India, which faces a rapidly expanding population, growing 

economy, and soaring energy needs. To meet growing demand and 

cope with increasing electricity shortages, the government has developed plans to expand power generation through the construction 

of multipurpose dams. India has 33 projects at various stages of 

completion on the rivers that affect this region. 

The number of dams under construction and their management 

is a source of significant bilateral tension. Currently, the most controversial dam project is the proposed 330-megawatt dam on the 

Kishenganga River, a tributary of the Indus. While studies show 

that no single dam along the waters controlled by the Indus Waters 

Treaty will affect Pakistan’s access to water, the cumulative effect 

of these projects could give India the ability to store enough water 

to limit the supply to Pakistan at crucial moments in the growing 

season. In the difficult 60-plus year bilateral relationship, water 

has not yet been used in this way. However, staff met with some 

experts that argue the treaty’s long-term stability is threatened by 

a lack of trust between these two countries. Any perceived reduction in water flows magnifies this distrust, whether caused by 

India’s activities in the Indus Basin or climate change. 

SECTION 4: CLIMATE CHANGE EXACERBATES WATER SCARCITY

As demand for water from agriculture and hydroelectric power 

generation grows in Central and South Asia, climate change is expected to increase water scarcity. Current Intergovernmental Panel 

on Climate Change (IPCC) projections of rising temperatures and 

sea levels and increased intensity of droughts and storms suggest 

that substantial displacements will take place within the next 30– 

50 years, particularly in coastal zones. As our planet’s climate becomes increasingly unstable, our relationship with water is changing in dangerous and potentially catastrophic ways (see Figure 3). 

Warmer temperatures threaten the cyclical changes to glaciers 

that provide essential water to the rivers in Central and South 

Asia. Glacier melt water is estimated to comprise 30 percent or 

more of the Indus River’s flow, with snow and ice providing up to 

two-thirds more. In Central Asia, a report commissioned by the 

United Nations Development Program’s Water Governance Facility 

noted that in the 20th century, the glaciers of Tajikistan decreased 

on average by 20–30 percent. In Afghanistan, this decrease is as 

much as 50–70 percent. While shrinking glaciers increase the run 

off in the short term, the long-term effect is a decrease in available 

water. 

As the rate of melting increases, flooding could become more frequent and severe, particularly from ‘‘glacial lake outburst floods.’’ 

These floods occur when runoff from glaciers builds up to form 

lakes that can burst and inundate neighboring regions. According 

10 

to a report by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Changing Glaciers and Hydrology in Asia: Addressing Vulnerabilities to Glacier Melt Impacts, there is ‘‘a history of 

outburst floods from Karakoram glaciers involving much larger impoundments by short-lived, unstable ice dams that blocked tributaries of the upper Indus . . . causing outburst floods of exceptional size and destructiveness.’’ Changes in runoff to river basins 

can significantly exacerbate already tense relations over water-dependent sectors, such as agriculture and hydropower. 

Finally, climate change is expected to influence monsoon dynamics that are vital for river systems dependent on their seasonal 

rains. The summer monsoon season is particularly crucial to the 

agriculture, water supply, economics, ecosystems, and human 

health of Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan. A 2009 Purdue 

University study predicted an eastern shift in monsoon circulation 

caused by the changing climate, which today causes more rainfall 

over the Indian Ocean, Bangladesh, and Burma and less rainfall 

over India, Nepal, and Pakistan. This shift raises serious concerns 

for the countries expecting decreased rainfall. For example, summer monsoon rainfall provides 90 percent of India’s total water 

supply. As the effects of climate change become more pronounced, 

agrarian populations in India and Pakistan dependent on monsoons and glacial melt for irrigation will be profoundly affected. 

Figure 3. Illustrative Pathway of How Climate Change May Affect Security 

Source: CRS 

Notes: First two boxes were adapted from S. Smith and J. Vivekananda, A Climate of Conflict (International Alert, Nov. 2007), pp. 10-11, available at http:// 

www.international-alert.org/pdf/A—Climate—Of—Conflict.pdf. 

SECTION 5: CURRENT AND FUTURE WATER SCARCITY

IS A NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE

The national security implications of this looming water shortage—exacerbated and directly caused by agriculture demands, hydroelectric power generation, and climate instability—will be felt 

all over the world. The defense and intelligence specialists focused 

11 

on the region have recognized the threat of conflict stemming from 

ineffective water management within these countries. General 

Anthony Zinni (Ret.), former commander of U.S. Central Command, recently said, ‘‘[w]e have seen fuel wars; we’re about to see 

water wars.’’ It is imperative that the foreign policy community 

heed the warnings from top defense and intelligence experts. The 

United States should not only elevate water issues in foreign policy 

dialogues, but tackle them with a comprehensive approach. 

The danger posed by water scarcity is that it triggers human insecurity, which can intensify potentially explosive tensions among 

neighboring countries or regions. As Dr. Peter H. Gleick, cofounder 

and president of the Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, 

Environment, and Security, wrote, ‘‘[w]here water is scarce, competition for limited supplies can lead nations to see access to water 

as a matter of national security. History is replete with examples 

of competition and disputes over shared fresh water resources.’’ 

As the defense and intelligence community increasingly acknowledge the links between natural resource degradation and national 

security, their views on the sources of future conflict are also evolving. The 2007 Center for Naval Analysis report, National Security 

and the Threat of Climate Change, found that ‘‘environmental crises such as water scarcity, soil depletion, and natural disasters can 

intensify conflict or stress within a country and potentially contribute to national security issues.’’ When the Central Intelligence 

Agency inaugurated its Environmental Indications and Warnings 

program, whose mission is to ‘‘provide intelligence analysts with indications of where societies may experience environmental stress 

that exceeds local capacity to manage and adapt,’’ the first environmental stressor they identified was freshwater availability. The 

Navigating Peace Initiative’s Water Conflict and Cooperation 

Working Group correctly summarized the current state of water 

use by saying, 

. . . water use is shifting to less-traditional sources such 

as deep fossil aquifers and wastewater reclamation. Conflict, too, is becoming less traditional, driven increasingly 

by internal or local pressures or, more subtly, by poverty 

and instability. These changes suggest that tomorrow’s 

water disputes may look very different from today’s.3

Water conflicts can occur both within and across state lines. 

Since 1994, the Pacific Institute has maintained a Water Conflict 

Chronology summarizing historical disputes over water resources. 

The most recent update to this chronology was released in December 2009. It indicates that local and subnational conflicts are increasing in severity and intensity relative to international conflicts, 

noting that ‘‘[a] growing number of disputes over allocations of 

water across local borders, ethnic boundaries, or between economic 

groups have also led to conflict.’’ 4 The National Intelligence Council echoed these concerns in their Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, finding that with ‘‘water becoming more scarce in 

Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water 

resources is likely to become more difficult within and between 

states.’’ 5

12 

Given the important role water plays in Central and South Asia 

as a primary driver of human insecurity, it is important to recognize that for the most part, the looming threat of so-called ‘‘water 

wars’’ has not yet come to fruition. Instead, many regions threatened by water scarcity have avoided violent clashes through discussion, compromise, and agreements. This is because ‘‘[w]ater—being 

international, indispensable, and emotional—can serve as a cornerstone for confidence building and a potential entry point for 

peace.’’ 6

However, the United States cannot expect this region to continue 

to avoid ‘‘water wars’’ in perpetuity. In South Asia, the Indus 

Waters Treaty has been the primary vehicle for resolving conflicts 

over the shared waters between India and Pakistan. It is a prescriptive agreement that has recently been criticized for its inflexibility to adjust to changes in water levels. Experts are now questioning whether the IWT can adapt to these changes, especially 

when new demands for the use of the river flows from irrigation 

and hydroelectric power are fueling tensions between India and 

Pakistan. A breakdown in the treaty’s utility in resolving water 

conflicts could have serious ramifications for regional stability. 

SECTION 6: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY ON WATER

U.S. Policies Beginning to Recognize Water’s Strategic Importance 

To its credit, the Obama administration has recognized the critical role water plays in achieving our foreign policy goals and in 

protecting our national security interests. The United States is now 

addressing water from a political, economic, and diplomatic perspective. 

Politically, senior officials in the administration are integrating 

water considerations into our efforts overseas. U.S. embassies and 

missions have elevated the importance of water in our diplomacy 

and an interagency process has been established to coordinate and 

advance a U.S. policy on water. In a speech delivered on World 

Water Day 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton laid out a new 

‘‘five streams’’ approach to U.S. international water engagement. 

‘‘Five streams’’ refers to five different focus areas that together 

form a comprehensive strategy. The first stream is capacity-building at local, national, and regional levels. This effort seeks to empower key actors at all levels of water management, both nationally and internationally. The second focus is coordination between 

U.N. agencies, international financial institutions, government entities, and other stakeholders. The third element is financial support, whether from the United States through USAID, the World 

Bank, or other international institutions. Science and technology 

form the fourth stream. While it is important to remember that 

technology alone will not be able to solve the world’s water problems, scientific advancements can make enormous differences in 

the developing world. The final input is private sector engagement. 

Public-private partnerships allow the United States to leverage private sector skills and capital to better respond to challenges in the 

water sector. 

Economically, the portion of the U.S. foreign assistance budget 

dedicated to address water issues has slowly increased since 2005. 

13 

The budgets for high-priority countries, such as Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, now include significant funds for water-related assistance, receiving approximately $46.8 million in 2009. The majority 

of this is targeted at efforts in Pakistan, particularly in the aftermath of this summer’s devastating floods. 

Diplomatically, the United States has identified water as a central foreign policy concern with far-reaching effects. For example, 

the U.S. Government’s 2010 Inter-Agency Water Strategy for 

Afghanistan is focused on improving access to safe drinking water 

and sanitation, agricultural irrigation, and water-sector management. A significant portion of U.S. assistance is aimed at rehabilitating the Kajaki dam to provide much needed electric power for 

the country and potentially for future irrigation purposes. Similarly, in November, President Obama and Prime Minister Singh 

agreed to work together on food security cooperation as part of the 

‘‘Evergreen Revolution’’ where water figures in nearly all the components of this effort. 

The United States also elevated water activities in Pakistan by 

launching a multiyear Signature Water Program and establishing 

a water working group within the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue. The Signature Water Program aims to improve Pakistan’s 

ability to manage its water resources and improve water distribution. The first phase of the program focuses on building high efficiency irrigation systems, water storage dams, municipal water and 

services delivery, and dams for irrigation. In the aftermath of the 

floods, these programs are still going forward but with adjustments 

to reflect new needs given that the floods destroyed 30 percent of 

arable land. 

Need to Improve Integrating Water with U.S. National Security 

Interests 

While the United States has appropriately begun to elevate its 

interest in supporting water through ‘‘signature’’ projects in these 

regions, our efforts still lack strategic clarity, unity of purpose, and 

a long-term vision to support our national security interests. The 

next section describes four recommendations focused on encouraging a U.S. foreign policy that strengthens our support in the region and promotes efforts to increase transboundary water cooperation and stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

SECTION 7: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

1. Provide Benchmark Data to Improve Water Management 

The countries in Central and South Asia, regardless of their level 

of development, lack publicly available access to consistent and 

comparable data on water supply, its flow, and use. This paucity 

of data causes friction over the management of water by upstream 

and downstream countries. Providing basic technical information to 

all countries is a constructive way to create a foundation for bona 

fide debate over water management. Specifically, the United States 

should build on its comparative advantages to support the following four data-related activities. 

First, the United States should provide technical trainings on 

how to gather water flow and volume information using remote 

14 

sensing or other related technologies. Scientists in Central and 

South Asia can capitalize on the expertise of U.S. agencies, such as 

the United States Geologic Service, Environmental Protection 

Agency, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, to 

learn how to access and collect such data. This type of data-sharing 

is contemplated in the inaugural strategic dialogues launched this 

year with India and Pakistan, but for Central Asia more work is 

needed. 

For example, the Amu Darya river basin countries do not know 

how much of the river’s flow originates in Afghanistan. Similarly, 

little is known about aquifer recharge rates due to limited data on 

water quality and security issues with collecting on the ground 

data. The United States should support expert exchange programs 

with Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. These programs 

should include support for the development of local and remote 

monitoring capacity through the use of new technologies, such as 

NASA’s Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment. With such 

assistance, the United States can provide the tools necessary to 

develop baseline data on water. 

When staff traveled to Central Asia, they observed that key 

water-dependent neighbors, such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 

lack a common baseline from which to begin discussions over water 

use. In both countries, government officials agreed that climate 

change and water use for energy or agriculture could have a significant effect on water supply, but they lacked sufficient resources 

to meet their research needs. In addition, tensions between these 

two countries continue to escalate as plans to build the Rogun Dam 

move forward without any common baseline for what the impacts 

of the dam are on water flow. Although the Tajik Government 

claims that the dam will have only a minimal impact on river flows 

into Uzbekistan, the Uzbek Government disagrees. According to 

the facts, as both countries see them, they each have compelling 

reasons to support or oppose this dam. 

Second, the United States should support increased technical capacity to monitor changes to glaciers because these changes can 

significantly affect river flows and the livelihoods that depend on 

them. Central Asia and India face critical challenges in monitoring 

glaciers and tracking changes, particularly differences from year to 

year. As USAID’s report Changing Glaciers and Hydrology in Asia: 

Addressing Vulnerabilities to Glacier Melt Impacts noted, ‘‘[t]he review of scientific information about glacier melt in High Asia revealed, first and foremost, a lack of data and information, a lack 

that hampers attempts to project likely impacts and take action to 

adapt to changed conditions.’’ 7 The United States should engage in 

collaborative glacier monitoring programs and those that develop 

local or sub-national water monitoring capacity. In the case of Central Asia, the United States could support bringing back the expertise and data collection that fell into disrepair after the end of the 

Soviet era. For example, Tajikistan has lost almost 38 percent of 

its glacier monitoring stations since 1985.8

Third, the United States should support scientific studies to monitor, track, and analyze changes in monsoon rains that play an important role in food security. Studies on climate change have traditionally focused on temperature increases, sea-level rise, and 

15 

droughts; but for a region like South Asia, it is changes to the monsoons that will be felt the hardest. Early climatic trends show that 

monsoon rains will become more erratic and intense, leading to 

more flooding, less soil absorption, and lower agricultural productivity. The more we understand the changes to the monsoon, the 

better positioned we will be to partner in our efforts to promote 

sustainable agricultural programs. This type of collaboration has 

already begun with the recent signing of the ‘‘Monsoon Agreement’’ 

between the United States and India, which seeks to improve longrange monsoon prediction through collaboration between the 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association and India’s Ministry 

of Earth Sciences. 

Fourth, the United States should support efforts in Central and 

South Asia to model changes to water flow and volume for entire 

river basins across a range of scenarios, from the impacts of climate change to the construction of dams. Understanding these impacts, which generally take the form of reduced or irregular water 

flow, will help governments make more informed decisions on 

water management. Today, most of these basins only have studies 

on the outcomes of individual projects, rather than the cumulative 

impact of multiple projects. Without complete river basin analysis 

for the Amu Darya, Syr Darya, and Indus, countries in Central and 

South Asia are left to negotiate water allocations and usage based 

on either the status quo or their own assumptions, neither of which 

lends itself to finding synergies. The United States should support 

the development of basin-level water modeling and scenario analysis through technical exchanges and partnerships with Central 

Asian and Indian universities. 

Basin-wide modeling is also useful for addressing tensions over 

hydroelectric dam proposals that continue to agitate countries sharing rivers. Dams are often the easiest target for public scrutiny, 

blame, and anger when water flow changes, regardless of whether 

they are the culprit. For the major dam proposals in the region, 

such as Rogun and Kishenganga, there is still no independent analysis of the cumulative impact these projects will have on water 

flow, especially during the low flow season. Providing water flow 

models for a range of construction scenarios to all interested countries can form the basis for discussions on the utility of these 

projects. 

2. Focus on Water Demand Management 

The United States can help create space for regional and bilateral negotiations on water by reducing the pressure on shared 

water resources. This means recognizing that countries in this region cannot simply engineer their way out of growing water scarcity, but should begin managing water resources more effectively. 

In fact, many experts agree that these countries must start shifting 

their focus from increasing the supply of water to decreasing the 

demand for it. Supporting improved demand management is at its 

core a type of conflict management. The two critical areas for U.S. 

engagement are in addressing the agriculture sector’s demand for 

water and in establishing better groundwater management. 

The agriculture sector is the primary user of water globally. Agriculture policies create water security issues when these policies 

16 

promote water-intensive crops, such as cotton and rice. The United 

States can encourage the shift away from water intensive farming 

that drives many of the countries in the region to exhaust their 

water supply by incorporating water-saving projects in its international agricultural activities. 

For example, there are advancements taking place in developing 

integrated and environmentally sound alternative approaches to 

water-intensive crops, such as rice. While it is still being demonstrated on a small scale, the system of rice intensification (SRI) 

is a promising new model of agricultural production centered on 

four components: planting method, water (irrigation) management, 

soil fertility management, and pest/weed control. SRI introduces 

simple changes to specific practices, though the fundamental procedures of rice production remain the same as in conventional systems. Implementing SRI on a broad scale would result in considerable water savings. Water use in SRI is typically 25–50 percent 

lower than conventional paddy systems because fields are not flooded throughout the entire production cycle. 

The United States should also continue to focus on activities that 

result in significant water savings, such as increasing the efficiency 

of irrigation systems in Central and South Asia. While it is important that the United States help ensure Pakistani farmers have the 

ability to replant after last year’s devastating floods, the current 

spend plan for our assistance lacks a comprehensive solution to addressing agriculture needs and water demands. For example, the 

current spend plan for fiscal year 2010 includes providing seeds 

and fertilizer and supporting agricultural extension and cooperatives. However, we must also incorporate, in tandem, repairs and 

improvements to the irrigation systems, efforts to strengthen dykes 

and embankment protections, and water storage through the construction of small to mid-size water storage units and rainwater 

harvesting. 

Staff recently met with representatives from nongovernmental 

organizations in arid regions in Tajikistan, such as the Konibodom 

District in Khujand, Tajikistan, a town near the border of 

Uzbekistan. Staff learned that after the collapse of the Soviet 

Union the water supply system fell into disrepair and the irrigation 

canals became heavily polluted. Nongovernmental groups are now 

working to rehabilitate the water distribution systems. Interestingly, because water remains a scarce resource, these groups are 

establishing water associations to manage and fund water use. For 

this district, once completed, the system will supply 50,000 villagers with 40–50 liters per person per day. 

Second, the United States should focus on the sustainability of 

access to water, not just access. As we have learned from past 

efforts to address water crises, the solutions of today can create the 

problems of tomorrow. For instance, to address India’s growing 

drought crisis, the international community in conjunction with the 

Indian Government has significantly increased the distribution of 

individual tube wells to access groundwater. As Steve Solomon 

notes, ‘‘in 1975, before groundwater pumping became significant, 

India had about 800,000 wells . . . only a quarter century later, 

the nation had an estimated 22 million wells . . . and continuing 

to increase phenomenally, by about 1 million a year.’’ 9 At the same 

17 

time, the Indian Government provided electricity subsidies that 

allowed individuals to run these pumps for several hours a day. As 

a result of this unfettered and exploited access, India is now the 

world leader in groundwater withdrawals, pumping out roughly 

230 cubic kilometers annually, more than a quarter of the world 

total. 

Going forward, the United States should consider integrating 

management of groundwater withdrawals with our efforts to promote access to water. This integration can be done through demand 

driven solutions, such as installing water gauges, collecting groundwater use and recharge, promoting water reuse, improving efficiencies in water delivery, and trainings on how to budget water 

among users. 

Moreover, the United States can share its domestic expertise in 

groundwater management, from monitoring to mapping groundwater resources. For example, the U.S. Geological Survey collects 

data on domestic groundwater, including the Ground Water Atlas 

of the United States, which gives a summary of each principal 

aquifer in each of the 50 States, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin 

Islands. Specifically for this region, the United States can follow 

the model set forth in the Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act 

with Mexico, which authorizes the United States to cooperate with 

the Mexican Government and other organizations to conduct 

hydrogeologic studies and modeling of transboundary aquifers. 

While the United States should continue to focus on improving 

the efficiencies of water delivery, we must also support the development of plans to ensure the long-term maintenance of these systems. If we fail to do so, we may find ourselves with a more formidable challenge in the years ahead caused by water shortages and 

its destabilizing derivative effects. 

3. Recognize International Dimensions of Water Issues and Deliver 

Holistic Solutions 

The impact of our actions to address water extends far beyond 

a country’s border, as water transcends political boundaries. This 

means U.S. actions centered on only one part of a river can have 

unintended consequences either upstream or downstream. For example, water projects are a priority for U.S. assistance in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, if our assistance is managed or implemented poorly, it may increase tensions over water in the greater 

region. Our assistance should target comprehensive activities, such 

as strengthening river basin dialogues and establishing community-level water management projects on shared watersheds. 

U.S. investment in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is twelve 

times greater than what is invested in Central Asia, could have 

significant unintended consequences. Although it is strategically 

important for the United States to keep a laser-like focus on 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially on high-visibility water 

projects that can reduce internal tensions, the United States should 

also consider activities that promote regional cooperation over 

these shared river systems. As noted in the United States Government Accountability Office’s report on U.S. efforts to support the 

Afghan water sector (GAO–11–138), ‘‘[f]our of Afghanistan’s five 

major river basins flow into the territory or boundary waters of five 

18 

of its six neighbors—Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran. The construction of large water storage or diversion 

facilities could affect these countries. The ability of the Government 

of Afghanistan to achieve sustainable and multipurpose use of its 

abundant water resources will depend on its capacity to engage in 

dialogue, negotiate, and establish relationships and agreements 

with its neighbors.’’ The United States should evaluate how it distributes regional assistance and consider supporting transboundary 

capacity-building on water issues. 

In Afghanistan, the United States should support mechanisms 

that integrate U.S. expertise on water management and resource 

allocation within the Afghan Government. This would enable 

Afghanistan’s interests over shared waters to be represented at regional dialogues. It will also foster a process that engages Afghanistan and Pakistan on the management of the Kabul River Basin. 

This basin is important to both countries because it has the potential to provide vital hydroelectric power to energy-poor Afghanistan 

and predictable water flows to key agricultural areas in Pakistan. 

Limited technical capacity within the Afghan Government to negotiate transboundary agreements has meant that no such water and 

energy sharing arrangement exists. However, the United States is 

already on the right track to get these negotiations started. 

For example, U.S. expertise was recently used to improve water 

management data for the Kabul Basin drawing on the United 

States Geographical Survey in collaboration with the Afghanistan 

Geological Survey and the Afghanistan Ministry of Energy and 

Water. This project, supported by the United States Agency for 

International Development, included results from a multidisciplinary water-resource assessment that analyzed how a growing 

population and the potential effects of climate change affect 

water.10 In addition, the United States has supported ground water 

assessments and a hydropower feasibility study in the Kabul 

Basin. With this information, U.S. assistance plans for Afghanistan 

should lay out concrete options for supporting regional activities, 

including those that encourage collaboration among Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, and Central Asia. 

The United States needs a concrete vision and plan to help the 

region tackle its water challenges. Through the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global 

Affairs Maria Otero has seized the initiative by cochairing a water 

working group to examine how to respond to Pakistan’s needs and 

improve U.S. assistance. This working group should now consider 

beginning a process to engage across country borders and supports 

basin-wide efforts. For example, the United States could facilitate 

basin-wide scenario planning, modeling, regional technical workshops, or direct interventions on water around basin-specific dialogues. 

To support confidence building in basin-wide planning, the 

United States should also look for opportunities that create 

transboundary cooperation on smaller rivers. Successful pilot efforts on these rivers can be scaled-up to encompass larger rivers 

and even basins. Specifically, the United States should support 

local, community-based cooperation over shared rivers and watersheds. Staff heard in meetings with nongovernmental organizations 

19 

in Central Asia and India that the closer the solution moves toward 

the community, the more sustainable the solution. By helping create local control over water, the United States will be supporting 

a trust-building conflict management tool that can pay dividends in 

future. 

For example, the United States has successfully engaged with 

water user associations (WUAs). These community-driven water 

management organizations often negotiate water supply agreements between farmers and management administrations and resolve disputes in a transparent and democratic manner. While in 

Tajikistan, staff visited a water user association formed with support from USAID and learned that farms that had previously paid 

collective water fees during the Soviet-era were forced individually 

to attempt to fill their quota on independence. WUAs were created 

to bring all farmers together and reduce conflicts, while also increasing land productivity because everyone received reliable water 

access. This particular WUA collected fees and was responsible for 

maintaining, rehabilitating, and improving the irrigation system. 

The WUA also created a tractor rental program to help increase 

farmers yields, generating revenues for the association to rehabilitate additional canals. Although WUAs typically have been limited 

to domestic portions of rivers, it is worth considering piloting these 

cooperative arrangements on transboundary segments of rivers. 

Another successful water management mechanism has been piloted in Andhra Pradesh, India. This area relies entirely on the 

monsoons to replenish its groundwater resources and the area’s 

particular geological characteristics limit underground storage. 

Those factors force farmers to focus on demand rather than increased exploitation of the groundwater. To accomplish this task, 

they come together to monitor rainfall, calculate available water, 

and decide which crops should be planted. Those meetings culminate in a water budget that is displayed on a wall in the village 

and updated as new information becomes available. Participation is 

voluntary but nearly 1 million people in 650 villages have joined, 

resulting in widespread changes in the variety of local diets and a 

move toward organic fertilizer. In essence, the program turns the 

people most invested in local water management, literally and figuratively, into ‘‘barefoot hydrogeologists.’’ 11

4. Safeguard Institutions Against Shocks to Water Supply and 

Demand 

Transboundary waters by their very definition require international cooperation to avoid conflict. The formation of international institutions is an important way to solidify countries’ commitment to sharing rivers equitably and when needed, resolve 

disputes. Long-term stability requires strong institutions capable of 

adapting and responding to immediate shocks to critical natural resources, such as water. When weak institutions are confronted with 

natural disasters or human interventions that suddenly disrupt 

water flow, tensions can flare. 

The United States can play an important role by building or 

strengthening institutions to facilitate multilateral discussions in 

regions experiencing water scarcity. As a first step, the United 

States should build on the water data called for in the first recVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:49 Feb 17, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\WATER, MELANIE
20 

ommendation of this report and support regional institutions capable of bringing together key stakeholders to discuss water sharing. 

Shared access to accurate data is critical in creating a foundation 

for negotiations. Having water baselines can help these institutions 

integrate the necessary flexibility to adjust to changing water patterns from climate change, hydropower development, and other 

possible changes. 

A small grant by the United States to the United Nations Regional Center for Preventative Diplomacy for Central Asia 

(UNRCCA) is a step in the right direction. In a meeting with 

UNRCCA representatives, staff learned that they are elevating 

water cooperation through seminars, which include representatives 

from the Afghan Government as observers. The success of this institution will turn on its ability to continue to bring together all the 

Central Asian countries, including Afghanistan. 

The United States should also invest in local or regional institutions that can support the development of agreements or treaties 

to address water management. These institutions are critical for 

managing the problems that arise when a dam is proposed or unseasonably low levels of rainfall leave countries searching for someone to blame. Studies found that ‘‘[s]tatistically, the likelihood of 

conflictual interactions over water appears slightly higher in areas 

of high dam density. But this propensity disappears where institutional arrangements such as treaties or river commissions exist to 

mitigate those pressures.’’ 12 Once formed, institutions remain in 

place after disputes are resolved and can transform into tools for 

cooperation that address the needs and concerns of all interested 

states.13

Specifically, if tensions between India and Pakistan related to 

the treaty continue to grow, the United States should back relevant 

supporting institutions that both countries believe can help mitigate conflicts. In conversations with staff, experts expressed concern that over time the volume of water managed by the IWT is 

likely to change due to unsustainable water withdrawals, increased 

population growth, and climate change. The Pakistan Government 

has already alleged misappropriation of water from the Indus by 

India, which the latter denies. India has not made data on water 

volume in the Indus widely available, impeding efforts to build 

trust. Efforts described in the previous recommendations, such as 

improving monitoring of the Indus basin, decreasing water demand 

through efficiencies, and creating flexibility to respond to changes 

in water volume, are possible ways forward to address these concerns. The continued peace, stability, and success of the IWT are 

in the national security interests of all stakeholders, including the 

United States. 

Staff was pleased to learn that the United States has begun to 

support regional discussions. For example, staff learned that the 

International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea invited Afghanistan to 

participate in discussions as an observer, with the possibility of 

joining in the future. The United States has provided the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea with a small grant to the 

support the institution’s technical capacity as well as offering the 

expertise of the United States Geologic Services to its executive 

committee. Similarly, local groups informed staff that they are 

21 

working to establish an Amu Darya river basin dialogue that would 

include Afghanistan. It is precisely these types of inclusive, 

intraregion dialogues to which the United States should continue 

to offer our expertise or other resources. 

Finally, the United States can build stronger institutions and 

lasting agreements by investing in the people who are, and will be, 

responsible for water management, including government officials, 

youth, and farmers. This is already being done through technical 

exchanges between the United States and Central and South Asia, 

but such activities should be expanded to require the development 

of tools needed to reach agreement on water sharing. For example, 

the future water managers in Central Asia could be taught international water law, dispute resolution, or mediation at local universities. Given U.S. expertise in these areas, the United States 

should work to develop more informed water managers, which in 

turn can lead to more sustainable water agreements. 

CONCLUSION

Water scarcity, coupled with how governments address these 

challenges, can exacerbate conflict or promote cooperation. Although it is still too early to determine the impacts of our efforts 

in the broader region, now is the time to begin evaluating waterrelated trends. 

The Obama administration should be commended for recognizing 

the importance of water issues in its unprecedented commitment of 

assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan. For the first time, senior 

government officials are recognizing the critical role that sound 

water management must play in achieving our foreign policy goals 

and in protecting our national security. Providing the right support 

can have a tremendous stabilizing influence in the region. 

The four recommendations laid out in this report focus on encouraging U.S. policies that promote efforts to increase 

transboundary cooperation and stability. These recommendations 

call for targeted assistance that addresses water concerns by considering a broader range of needs and diplomatic consequences. 

Water security is not unique to Afghanistan and Pakistan, but successes there could be replicated in other regions facing similar 

threats. The lessons learned in water management and development in Central and South Asia can help the United States contribute further to diminishing tensions in other volatile and vulnerable regions of the world. 

22 

NOTES

1. Kai Wegerich, ‘‘Hydro-hegemony in the Amu Darya Basin,’’ Water Policy, Vol. 

10 No. 2 (IWA Publishing, 2008), 71–88 at 71. 

2. ‘‘Fresh Water Futures: Imagining Responses to Demand Growth, Climate 

Change, and the Politics of Water Resource Management by 2040,’’ Conference Report prepared by The Stimson Center (May 2010) at 4. 

3. Aaron T. Wolf, Annika Kramer, Alexander Carius, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, 

‘‘Water can be a pathway to peace, not war,’’ Environmental Change and Security 

Program Special Report, Issue 13 (2008–2009), 66–70 at 70. 

4. Heather Cooley, Juliet Christian-Smith, Peter H. Gleick, Lucy Allen, and Michael Cohen, ‘‘Understanding and Reducing the Risks of Climate Change for 

Transboundary Waters,’’ Pacific Institute (December 2009) at 2. 

5. National Intelligence Council, ‘‘Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,’’ 

(November 2008) at x. 

6 Aaron T. Wolf, Annika Kramer, Alexander Carius, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, 

‘‘Water can be a pathway to peace, not war,’’ Environmental Change and Security 

Program Special Report, Issue 13 (2008–2009), 66–70 at 70. 

7. United States Agency for International Development, ‘‘Changing Glaciers and 

Hydrology in Asia: Addressing Vulnerabilities to Glacier Melt Impacts,’’ (November 

2010) at 5. 

8. The World Bank and Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, ‘‘Improving Weather, Climate and Hydrological Services Delivery in Central Asia 

(Kyrgyz Republic, Republic of Tajikistan and Turkenistan),’’ at 14, available at: 

http://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/sites/gfdrr.org/files/publication/GFDRR—ECA— 

Hydromet—Study.pdf. 

9. Steve Solomon, ‘‘Water: The Epic Struggle for Wealth, Power, and Civilization,’’ 

New York: Harper Collins, 2010 at 423. 

10. Mack, T.J., Akbari, M.A., Ashoor, M.H., Chornack, M.P., Coplen, T.B., Emerson, D.G., Hubbard, B.E., Litke, D.W., Michel, R.L., Plummer, L.N., Rezai, M.T., 

Senay, G.B., Verdin, J.P., and Verstraeten, I.M., 2010, Conceptual model of water 

resources in the Kabul Basin, Afghanistan: U.S. Geological Survey Scientific Investigations Report 2009–5262, 240, also available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2009/5262. 

11. ‘‘Making farmers matter: And monitor, budget, manage—and prosper,’’ The 

Economist (22 May 2010), Special Section at 12. 

12. ‘‘Fresh Water Futures: Imagining Responses to Demand Growth, Climate 

Change, and the Politics of Water Resource Management by 2040,’’ Conference Report prepared by The Stimson Center (May 2010) at 17. 

13. Jerome Delli Priscoli and Aaron T. Wolf, ‘‘Managing and Transforming Water 

Conflicts,’’ International Hydrology Series, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 

2009 at 119. 

Æ