October 2005 Defense Horizons 1

Defense

The Department of Defense (DOD) has entered the information age with a concept of network-centric warfare that relies on 

incorporation of state-of-the-art information technology (IT) in military systems. From major computer centers vital to managing the 

routine business of the department to frontline battlefield communications and automated, networked weapons systems, the demands 

for affordable, state-of-the-art IT products and services continue 

to increase. Much of the cutting edge of the IT sector is now found 

in the commercial world. Commercial research and development 

(R&D) investment is huge, and new products emerge every 12–18 

months. To stay abreast of IT developments, DOD must take advantage of commercial information technology (CIT). Moreover, given 

other budget requirements, it makes little sense for DOD to fund the 

R&D necessary to meet all of its system development needs. Rather, 

it should focus R&D resources on military applications and rely on 

industry to the maximum extent possible to fund IT technology that 

can be adopted or adapted for defense use. 

But doing business with the CIT industry has proven to be complicated. The industry is geared to a market of commercial business 

enterprise and consumers that dwarfs the defense market in both 

size and ease of doing business. Leading IT companies have limited 

incentives to do business with DOD, unless the department is willing to accept standard products without modification. And if DOD 

finds suitable technology, procurement is hampered by an acquisition system out of synch with commercial business practices. In the 

mid-1990s, DOD tried to increase procurement of CIT. Instruction 

5000.2, the guide for DOD acquisition, was modified to state that 

defense systems will “make maximum use of commercial off the shelf 

technology.” Numerous policy statements, speeches, and articles by 

high-level defense officials have emphasized this point. 

Progress is being made, but more can be done. No one questions 

that DOD is doing a good job in applying CIT to enterprise and infrastructure requirements. Commercial products (telecommunications, 

computers, software, network servers, and routers) for virtually all 

DOD business enterprise requirements are procured rapidly and 

Overview

Sweden, a nation of only 9 million people with a political 

climate that has fostered a posture of nonalignment for over half 

a century, has nevertheless maintained highly credible, modern, 

and high-technology military forces. Sweden has expanded the 

mission of forces originally designed for the Cold War to include 

international peacekeeping. The focus of this study is the Swedish formula for achieving the high-technology military capabilities that successfully compensate for a small standing force. 

What policies and processes enabled the Swedish military to take 

advantage of leading-edge producers of commercial information 

technology (CIT)? What lessons does the Swedish model hold for 

the U.S. Department of Defense?

A National Defense University case study examined the 

Swedish experience, policy, process, and government-industry 

relationships to determine ways to improve America’s ability to 

capitalize on the use of CIT in military systems. The case study 

included a review of published Swedish policies, regulations, and 

reports but is based predominantly on meetings and interviews 

with Swedish industry and government officials.

The case study found more similarities than differences 

in Swedish and American policies and processes for acquiring 

commercial technology for military systems. Perhaps the most 

significant difference is that in Sweden, government and industry 

participants in the acquisition process have embraced the policy 

for maximum utilization of CIT, whereas Americans still debate 

whether commercial technology can do the job in warfighter or 

other defense applications. Furthermore, Sweden has initiated 

an acquisition process that routinely examines all requirements 

to determine the potential to do the job with CIT and then performs tradeoff analyses to determine acceptance. 

Sweden’s Use of Commercial 

Information Technology for

Military Applications

by Franklin D. Kramer and John C. Cittadino

A publication of the

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

O C T O B E R 2 0 0 5

Number 50

Horizons

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2 Defense Horizons October 2005

cost-effectively. On the military side—the information technology 

products that go into battlefield command, control, communications, 

computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 

systems or are imbedded in weapon platforms—the process slows 

down. Even tradeoff studies to determine the acceptability of commercial products to do the job are resisted. If CIT is not captured at a 

faster pace, DOD runs the risk of being unable to afford the capabilities required to complete missions and the further risk of losing the 

U.S. technological lead to any threat nation or group with the money 

to develop or buy the latest commercial products.

This issue was raised by Congress in fiscal year (FY) 2004 

legislation that directed DOD to perform a study aimed at maintaining and improving the technological lead of the U.S. military by 

doing a better job of harnessing 

CIT in a timely, systematic fashion. Congress also asked whether 

the department could find ways to 

accelerate the acquisition of CIT. 

DOD subsequently commissioned the Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

(CTNSP), an arm of the National 

Defense University (NDU) in 

Washington, DC, to undertake the 

study. Franklin D. Kramer, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

International Security Policy, was selected to chair the effort. 

The objectives of the study were to examine the potential of 

CIT to meet military requirements, especially for products that must 

survive the harsh conditions of the battlefield; to determine the 

impediments to acquisition of acceptable CIT and search for ways 

to remove those impediments; and to examine the DOD acquisition 

process and recommend how it can be improved to provide a better 

climate for CIT. 

The study, which was conducted from February to September 

2004, featured wide participation by government acquisition and 

program management personnel, academics, and representatives 

of defense and commercial industries. A 2-day workshop at NDU 

brought these experts together to discuss the issues and make 

recommendations. The final report, which includes the findings, 

conclusions, and recommendations from the effort, has been briefed 

to senior leadership in the department. DOD has asked CTNSP to 

conduct a follow-on study in FY05, and that effort is under way.

Why Sweden?

In developing the methodology for the study, the team raised 

the question of how other allied or coalition nations addressed 

the utilization of CIT in military systems. Preliminary analysis had 

shown that although the United States is unquestionably the recognized global leader in IT, other industrialized nations were making 

rapid advances, as evidenced by such metrics as patents granted, per 

capita ownership of mobile phones, and use of e-commerce. It was 

generally agreed that the experience of other countries, especially 

the more technologically advanced countries of Europe that support 

standing military forces, could yield lessons applicable to improving the DOD process. The chairman approved a recommendation 

to examine other national programs, but limitations on time and 

resources restricted the analysis to a single country, Sweden.

A useful case study could have been drawn from several European countries. Certainly the United Kingdom, the closest of our 

allies, came to mind, as did Italy, France, and Germany. Despite drastically reduced defense budgets, each of these North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) allies has 

invested in modern information 

technology to upgrade the command, control, communications, 

and intelligence of their national 

forces. However, it was the sense 

of the study team that these countries had been slow to adopt the 

concept of net-centric warfare and 

initiate development to achieve 

the requisite capabilities, and that 

their defense acquisition establishments had not been strong proponents of military use of commercial information technology.

In the next tier of smaller countries, Sweden stands out for 

its commitment to NCW, which Swedes call network-based defense 

(NBD). Sweden has had a major development program since 2001 

to put network architecture in place, and Swedish acquisition policy 

requires that commercial technology be used in military systems 

wherever possible.

For a small nation, Sweden has a remarkable number of highly 

sophisticated and innovative CIT companies. According to the 2003 

study Facts about Information and Communications Technology in 

Sweden by the Swedish Institute for Transport and Communications 

Analysis, at the end of 2000, 16,600 Swedish companies were designated as IT companies. They ranged in size from globally recognized 

giants such as Ericsson and Saab to startups with 1 to 5 employees. 

In general, they have proven to be leaders in technical innovation, 

are highly competitive internationally, and have benefited from 

government policies and support that have allowed them to flourish. 

In March 2000, the Parliament passed legislation establishing the 

objective that Sweden be the first country to become “an information society for all.” The bill included an action plan for reaching 

that goal, including emphasis on IT education in the Swedish university system and broad investments to build a solid, sustainable 

foundation for continued growth of the Swedish IT industry. In 2003, 

the World Times Information Society Index designated Sweden the 

world’s leading information economy for the fourth straight year. The 

ranking was based on a comprehensive index of statistics including 

personal computer and Internet usage, e-commerce, telecommunications infrastructure, broadband and wireless subscribers, and 

Franklin D. Kramer (kramerf@ndu.edu) is a Distinguished Research Professor education levels.

at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. John C. Cittadino 

(JohnCit@aol.com) is President, JCC Technology Associates, Inc.

Swedish acquisition 

policy requires that 

commercial technology be 

used in military systems 

wherever possible

DH_50.indd 2 10/6/05 12:26:
October 2005 Defense Horizons 3

Swedish Armed Forces

With fewer than 9 million people, Sweden has had to rely on 

a combination of mandatory service and advanced technology to 

maintain a capable military force. In peacetime, the Armed Forces 

have approximately 20,000 personnel on duty, augmented by about 

16,000 “conscripts” in training. This standing force is backed up by a 

home guard of approximately 100,000 men and women who could be 

mobilized if needed.

A 1999 review of defense policy and the military concluded that 

the Swedish homeland was not, for the foreseeable future, under 

danger of invasion, but nevertheless faced the same grave threats as 

other highly industrialized, affluent nations. The Parliament revised 

the direction of defense policy and announced that the Armed Forces 

should organize and equip to meet four strategic objectives: 

■ defend Sweden against armed attack

■ uphold territorial integrity

■ contribute to international peace and security

■ strengthen society in the event of severe peacetime strains 

and emergencies.

The 1999 Parliamentary decision put the Swedish Armed 

Forces on a path of modernization to counter lack of manpower with 

sophisticated technology, mobility, and adaptability to meet new and 

unforeseen threats. Such a strategy is not unlike the U.S. approach 

to military transformation. At a national conference in Sälen, on 

January 21, 2004, the newly appointed Supreme Commander of the 

Armed Forces, General Håkan Syrén, stated that the threat picture 

has changed totally during the last decade. Old threats have 

dissolved and have been followed by very real threats emanating from large-scale terrorism and proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction. These are threats that definitely cannot be 

neglected. To me, it is absolutely 

clear that from now on we need 

to be able to use military power 

to meet these types of threats 

and actions. The primary focus 

of the Swedish Armed Forces in 

the near term should be to adapt 

and increase its capability to 

contribute to international crisis 

management tasks.

Our aim should be to create 

capabilities that are suited 

both for international tasks 

and national territorial defense 

tasks. We must not build separate capabilities for national 

and international tasks. Along with the immediate tasks, we 

have to maintain a long-term direction aiming at a capacity to 

understand and adapt to the military requirements of tomorrow. The network-based approach is an important part of this. 

We therefore also have to create units and prototype systems 

that are not necessarily needed or demanded in the short run. 

Their role is, instead, to increase our preparedness to manage 

unpredictable developments. 

The Swedish defense system is in the process of radical renewal 

and modernization. The fundamental reason for this is the prevailing security situation, both internationally and in the vicinity of 

Sweden. Technological developments and the increased focus on 

international crisis management also are important factors in Swedish restructuring and reorientation.

Network-Based Defense

The network-based approach promoted by General Syrén has 

become a foundation for the restructuring of the Armed Forces. The 

Swedish Parliament, in 2001, passed a bill (2001/02:10 “Continued 

Renewal of the Total Defense”) establishing that the “Armed Forces 

are to be developed according to the concept of network-based 

defense” and calling for a major development program to provide the 

network capability to implement the concept. Manuel W. Wik, Chief 

Engineer/Strategic Specialist of the Defense Materiel Administration (Försvarets Materielverk [FMV]), stated in a report entitled 

Network Based Defense for Sweden: Latest Fashion or a Strategic 

Step into the Future? that network-based defense (NBD) “has initiated the greatest change of the Swedish national defense in modern 

times. It is considered that the development in communications 

and information technology has opened up possibilities for a radical 

change of how military forces can be shaped and act.” 

NBD, like U.S. network-centric warfare, combines the application of communications and information technology to manage 

the acquisition and distribution of information across a military 

network to achieve the information superiority necessary to support 

a more flexible, dominant force. The military network is similar to 

the commercial Internet, with the addition of such requisite military features as priority, security, 

and restricted access. The analogy with the Internet becomes 

especially noteworthy when one 

recognizes that both the U.S. and 

Swedish programs are being developed largely using internationally 

accepted commercial standards 

and protocols contained in the 

DOD Joint Technical Architecture 

(JTA). The JTA is mandatory for 

all aspects of the Global Information Grid (GIG), which provides 

the network infrastructure to support U.S. network-centric operations. The Swedish NBD program 

is developing the equivalent of the 

GIG for the Swedish Armed Forces and has chosen to use the U.S. 

JTA as the starting point to define standards and protocols. Hence, 

the two networks probably will have a high degree of compatibility 

when access is authorized.

both the U.S. and 

Swedish programs are 

being developed using 

internationally accepted 

commercial standards 

contained in the DOD Joint 

Technical Architecture

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4 Defense Horizons October 2005

Developing an infrastructure to support military networks 

of the magnitude of the GIG or NBD is a major undertaking that 

demands an evolutionary system-of-systems approach. Recognizing 

that development of the NBD requires a high level of experimentation and simulation, Sweden has established a national battlelab, 

also known as the Armed Forces C4ISR Development and Experiment Center, at Enkoping. The battlelab is essentially an integration 

and concept development test bed. The heart of the center is its 

simulation capability, which is capable of technical simulations and 

of generating a wide variety of military/homeland security scenarios. 

It includes cells for army, navy, air force, and civil personnel, who 

participate in scenario-based missions to demonstrate the capabilities of the evolving network to assess and refine network services. 

The facility can remotely integrate military and civil command centers as well as military platforms such as tanks, ships, 

and planes to provide a wide capability for live and constructive 

simulation. It also acts as the hub for a network that ties more 

than a dozen locations throughout Sweden into the battlelab for 

remote participation in the experiments and demonstrations. The 

remote locations include industry sites, military bases, and government and university research centers. The remote nodes can use 

the battlelab to resolve integration issues as soon as they develop 

services and products for the NBD. The facility also allows widespread participation in the annual NBD demonstrations, which are 

the major function of the center. 

The annual demonstrations are designed to measure progress 

and identify problems as the focus of the NBD “build a little, test a 

little” development philosophy. To date, there have been three of 

these demos. Complexity has increased from 6 participating military 

systems utilizing the 9 types of network services developed in 2002 to 

16 systems utilizing some 33 types 

of service that had been developed 

by the 2004 demo. 

In addition to its value as 

a technical support tool in the 

development process, the battlelab 

provides important inputs to refining service doctrine, concept of 

operation, tactics, techniques, and 

procedures, as well as the basis for 

new training curricula.

Swedish Government Views 

The acquisition process for Sweden is centralized within the 

FMV. In this respect, it differs substantially from the American 

system, which delegates acquisition authority to the individual services and defense agencies, such as the Defense Logistics Agency. 

Given the smaller size of the Swedish military and the strongly joint 

approach of the Armed Forces Headquarters Staff, FMV is able to 

function as the “cradle to grave” manager of defense material. In 

this role, FMV has the responsibility to identify, define, and develop 

cost-effective solutions to meet military requirements. (In R&D, 

FMV works in close cooperation with the Swedish Defense Research 

Agency, the counterpart to the U.S. Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency.) FMV translates military requirements into system 

specifications for the development and procurement of individual 

systems. It also performs the role of systems architect by developing 

overall systems views and defining the role of individual material 

systems within the architecture as well as the requirements for 

integration. In carrying out this role, the FMV staff requires technical expertise, including an in-depth knowledge of the capabilities 

of the Swedish defense industry, as well as commercial capabilities 

(especially in IT) on an international scope.

The Swedish policy with respect to the application of CIT products and services to meet military requirements is virtually identical 

to DOD policy. As Birgitta Böhlin, Director General of FMV, stated in 

the 2002 FMV Annual Report:

The restructuring of the Armed Forces is founded on what is 

known as Net Centric Warfare (NCW). NCW is concerned with 

information superiority, where systems have to be compatible 

with other systems so that relevant information can be gathered and sent quickly. NCW affects most materiel projects in 

progress due to new demands being made on operational and 

future systems. The result of the major Command and Control 

System Technology project provides an important foundation 

for the development of NCW. We also see a need for changed 

procurement strategies, where civil technology will be used to 

an ever-greater extent, resulting in new suppliers and increased 

international co-operation.

A 2003 FMV directive stated that commercial-off-the-shelf 

(COTS) technology shall be used whenever it meets the military 

requirements and compromises neither safety of personnel nor the protection of classified information. 

Lieutenant Colonel Mikael 

Lindbergh, the Deputy Program 

Manager for the NBD Program, 

confirmed that it was necessary to 

examine CIT because the information services are the core of his 

program. He pointed out that a 

key to integration of CIT into NBD 

is the utilization of commercially 

based standards. He cited the use of the JTA, which is based primarily on internationally accepted commercial standards, as the basis 

for the program standards. He also referred to General Syrén’s stated 

objective of a larger role for Sweden in international missions and 

the accompanying need to achieve coalition interoperability. He 

believes that as more nations adopt the JTA approach, the problems 

inherent in coalition interoperability will diminish. 

Interviews conducted with representatives of the Armed Forces 

Staff, FMV, and the Swedish Embassy in Washington confirmed wide 

acceptance within the Swedish defense establishment that affordable costs and rapidly advancing technology in the civil or commercial domain mandate the use of CIT wherever practical. 

The users, as represented by the Armed Forces Headquarters 

Staff, appear to fully support and encourage the use of CIT. A unit 

within the headquarters, the Joint Command, Control, Communicaaffordable costs and rapidly 

advancing technology in 

the civil or commercial 

domain mandate the use of 

CIT wherever practical

DH_50.indd 4 10/6/05 12:26:
October 2005 Defense Horizons 5

tions, Computers, and Intelligence Directorate, under Lieutenant 

Colonel Sten-Ake Larsson, has been established to monitor all Swedish development programs to determine their potential to utilize 

CIT. In programs where CIT is not evident and headquarters staff 

believes that there is potential for 

that particular project, the FMV 

and/or the responsible contractor 

is asked to show where CIT failed 

to meet requirements and set up 

a review process to reconsider the 

design approach. 

Furthermore, where the 

establishment finds—for instance, 

in the case of a commercial software program—that the application does not conform to the established military way of carrying out missions and tasks, Larssen’s 

office has the option of initiating a study to determine if the way of 

doing business should be brought into line with a more modern and 

efficient way of doing the job that is inherent in the methodology of 

the commercial software.

Implementation of the policy to use CIT starts with the release 

to industry by FMV of a request for proposal (RFP). Wherever 

appropriate, the RFP is based on commercial specifications instead 

of military specifications. Vendors are encouraged to propose commercial solutions. 

In the Swedish acquisition process, the norm is to conduct 

tradeoff analyses at the outset of system development to determine 

the risk/reward ratio of utilizing commercial technology versus initiating new development. Any evaluation includes a determination of 

whether the CIT can be used as is, or whether it requires modification or adaptation to do the job. Areas that are examined are the 

degree to which the CIT meets each facet of the requirement, including performance, security, safety, and the so-called “-ilities” (reliability, maintainability, sustainability, and so forth). When the CIT 

meets a subsystem requirement within a larger system, the issues 

of integration and testing of the technology are examined. These 

tradeoff studies include a life-cycle cost analysis of the specific CIT 

to form a basis to determine the cost-effectiveness of the approach 

versus a dedicated military development. 

The Swedish process recognizes the potential shortcomings 

of CIT products in areas of reliability, maintainability, and sustainability. The tradeoff studies address these issues and search out 

solutions or workarounds. When the reliability of a CIT product 

fails to meet the military objective, answers are sometimes found in 

adapting the product to the military environment by embedding it in 

a protective package or case. As stated by one FMV engineer, “When 

the reliability is not up to standard, it is sometimes possible to buy 

two and still save money.” 

The Swedes are also coming to grips with the need to rethink 

how they maintain their systems as more and more commercial technology is accepted. Direct support from commercial contractors is 

increasing. Training in the use and maintenance of CIT is also under 

study. However, those interviewed are of the opinion that military 

personnel are becoming more technology-literate and more adept at 

grasping the inherent, intuitive training provided by companies for 

the civil marketplace.

Sustainability refers to maintaining a capability in service for 

the required time frame, which, in the case of the military, could be 

decades. Two facts associated with 

CIT are that commercial companies are introducing new product 

lines every 12–18 months, and the 

industry is volatile, with a relatively high number of failed companies each year. The Swedes state 

that this simply has not yet become 

a major problem for them. They are 

relying on a basic premise that the 

commercial industry will retain a 

high level of backward compatibility to satisfy its commercial customer base so that, as new products 

become available, for the most part, they will be plug-and-play into 

the NBD system. They recognize that they must remain aware of the 

commercial market, including the stability of the companies they 

plan to buy from. The FMV continually reviews CIT products and 

companies and publishes descriptions on its Internet site so that the 

information is available to everyone in the process.

The consensus Swedish assessment of the success or failure 

of the policy to use CIT is that it is too early to tell. This is easy to 

understand, given the newness of the policy and the early stages of 

the NBD program. Several examples of success were noted, such 

as the use of commercial hardware and software (the Windows 

operating system) for command and control (C2) by the Swedish 

Implementation Force deployed to Bosnia, the use of ruggedized 

commercial computers and commercial software for logistics and 

message-handling on deployments to East Timor and Liberia, and 

the deployment of an Ericsson mobile cellular system with a commercial satellite communications reach-back to Kabul, Afghanistan, 

to support United Nations operations. 

Discussions with Swedish officials indicated that there are 

more similarities than differences between the American and 

Swedish processes to evaluate and acquire CIT for the military. 

Probably the most noteworthy difference is that the Swedish system 

of tradeoff analysis appears to be routinely applied in Sweden, where 

the policy to use CIT is widely accepted at the working level, whereas 

the United States has a much less consistent approach, with less 

than enthusiastic acceptance of the policy by both government and 

defense contractor personnel. 

Swedish Industry Views 

Interviews were conducted with a representative group of 

Swedish industry, including major defense integrators Saab (both 

the military aircraft and command, control, communications, and 

intelligence divisions) and Ericsson, and smaller companies, such as 

Sectra (a supplier of cryptographic systems), SweDish (a supplier of 

commercial satellite communications terminals), and Effnet (a small 

commercial company specializing in network software). All of the 

companies voiced solid support for the government policy to use CIT 

there are more similarities 

than differences between 

the American and Swedish 

processes to evaluate and 

acquire CIT for the military

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6 Defense Horizons October 2005

whenever practical. Where they differed was in a view expressed by 

small companies that the “big companies support the policy publicly, 

but they are all too often trying to make more money by developing 

things on their own.” (It should be noted that similar concerns were 

voiced by one or two government officials about the willingness of the 

larger integrators to avoid costly developments through the acceptance of COTS technology.)

Saab (Command, Control, and Communications Division) and 

Ericsson, which, along with Boeing and IBM of Sweden, make up 

the team developing the NBD system of systems, tended to discuss 

CIT in terms of NBD. Goran Kristoffersson of Saab reemphasized 

the vital role played by international commercial standards 

and protocols. Both companies complimented the government’s 

encouragement to use CIT and cited FMV willingness to examine CIT tradeoff studies. Saab 

representatives estimated that 

their company’s recent experience in developing C2

 systems 

showed that approximately 50 

percent of the software used was 

commercial. Ericsson executives 

commented that, in their work on 

NBD software, all of the operating systems are commercial and 

75 percent of the middleware is commercial. In the area of communications products and services, Ericsson stated that the military 

uses 100 percent commercial technology everywhere except for 

tactical operations. There has been no decision to accept other 

than military specification radios and communication devices at 

the tactical level, but Ericsson stated, without providing details, 

that there have been signs that this position may change in the 

near future.

Robin von Post of Sectra echoed this view and commented that 

he saw more of a willingness to take on the risk of CIT in Sweden 

than in the United States. He went on to say that “RFPs out of FMV 

invariably include statements encouraging commercial solutions,” 

and that FMV is a very flexible buyer that is always willing to listen 

to challenges to requirements in the hope of finding a more costeffective solution.

Johan Kihl, former Vice Chief Staff of the Armed Forces and 

currently a consultant to Ericsson, stated that “in today’s world, 

where the threat of high-intensity warfare is no longer imminent, 

but a myriad of low-level threats are just waiting to happen, we 

can no longer afford, nor do we need, the pure military solution. 

We must look to commercially based solutions as the norm, not 

the exception.” He mentioned that, to stay abreast of commercial 

developments, Sweden has initiated a structure of committees with 

representatives from the Armed Forces, the Swedish R&D establishment, and industry that meets 3 or 4 times a year.

Anders Lange, General Manager for Business Development at 

Ericsson, mentioned that the FMV is learning to act as a buyer in the 

commercial world and that perhaps DOD has to learn to do the same. 

When asked to expand, he offered the following:

I am referring to business practices in the commercial telecoms 

industry. Operators (the buyers) and vendors (the suppliers) 

alike all take active part in standardization of functions and 

interfaces. Once standards have been settled, vendors compete 

for contracts. Since telecommunications are global, operatorspecific solutions are practically nonexistent. The way operators 

influence the vendors (and exercise some amount of control) 

is through standardization, price pressure, and release date 

constraints. What I am aiming at for DOD is to take part in this 

(commercial process) on equal terms with the telecoms industry, i.e., participate in standardization work, actively drive standardization areas such as security (for the benefit of society at 

large), and then perform purchases much in the way operators 

do (frame agreement contracts, long-term relations with one or 

two vendors). Where military modifications/reinforcements are 

needed, these should be implemented without altering any of 

the agreed international standards.

The policy to optimize the utilization of CIT has been extended 

to state-of-the-art weapons systems in a big way. Given the fact 

that high-performance weapons 

systems require very high subsystem reliability, one might expect a 

reluctance to employ CIT in these 

applications. This expectation was 

quickly dispelled in a meeting with Anders Pettersson, Program 

Director of Research and Technology for Saab Aerosystems’ new 

Gripen Mark 3, a high-performance fighter aircraft. Pettersson 

walked through a block diagram of Gripen subsystems, pointing out 

those that employed CIT. Some examples were: a fair amount of software, including Windows NT as the operating system for the mission 

control computer, commercial processors (INTEL and Power PC) 

and central processing unit boards in the flight system and mission 

control systems, replacement of the military specification data bus 

with a local area network using a commercial Internet protocol, and 

commercial laptop computer display technology in the cockpit. 

Ericsson Microwave, the manufacturer of state-of-the-art radar 

systems for the Gripen as well as other tactical air, maritime, and 

ground applications, reported the same wide use of CIT products in 

these systems. Again, it was made clear that industry takes very seriously the mandate to use CIT wherever practical.

Pettersson also pointed out that commercial companies normally do business with the government through the prime contractors (usually Saab or Ericsson) on purely commercial terms. It 

then becomes the responsibility of the primes to do the necessary 

integration and testing to receive government certification that the 

system/equipment is acceptable for operational use. 

The Swedish application of CIT in modern, high-performance 

weapons systems has parallels in the United States. For example, 

the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, proclaimed as the 

largest DOD acquisition program since the Manhattan Project, 

utilizes considerable CIT in its development. The Integrated Core 

Processor (ICP), the central computer system for the JSF, is being 

implemented in an open-system architecture designed to maximize 

the use of commercially available products and standards. The ICP 

supports all of the embedded computing elements for multiple 

the policy to optimize the 

utilization of CIT has been 

extended to state-of-the-art 

weapons systems

DH_50.indd 6 10/6/05 12:26:
October 2005 Defense Horizons 7

aircraft subsystems, including the digital signal processing for the 

sensors and cockpit displays.

According to Bob Coultas, hardware program manager for 

the ICP for JSF prime contractor Lockheed Martin, “Incorporating 

COTS technology into an open-system architecture throughout the 

F–35 will enable frequent technology updates at low cost . . . opensystem architecture is based on the use of commercial, standard 

interfaces that enable the program to take advantage of commercial 

technologies for more supportable, lower-cost designs. Affordability 

is the cornerstone of the F–35 program, and has been designed into 

the F–35 aircraft from day one.”

Emergency Management 

The Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) is the 

equivalent of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

and its relationship with the Swedish Armed Forces is similar to the 

DHS relationship with the U.S. military; each has its discrete areas of 

responsibility but is prepared to work closely with the Armed Forces 

under certain circumstances, such as an external terrorist attack.

In late 2002, SEMA initiated development of a national emergency radio communication network called RAKEL at an estimated 

cost of 2.3 billion Swedish kroner (approximately U.S. $700 million). 

Under the overall management of SEMA, the network will be used 

by local fire, police, and ambulance services, and the Coast Guard, 

Customs Department, and Armed Forces. (When queried about the 

relationship between RAKEL and the communications envisioned 

for the NBD system, SEMA officials indicated that it was too early 

to predict what role the radio network might play.) In March 2003, 

FMV, which also serves as the acquisition agency for SEMA, issued 

an RFP that did not define a technical solution or include a technical specification. Rather, it contained a nontechnical description 

of user needs. Proposals were received for a number of technical 

approaches, including commercial cellular systems from Ericsson 

and Nortel.

In March 2004, following evaluation of numerous proposals, FMV awarded a contract to a consortium of Saab, Nokia, and 

Eltel Networks (formerly Swedia Networks) to build the RAKEL 

network, which will provide coverage to 85 percent of the country 

and 99 percent of the population. The Saab approach, which will 

require between 2,000 and 2,500 base stations, is based on the 

European commercial radio standard known as terrestrial trunked 

radio (TETRA). 

A factor in the choice of a TETRA-based solution was interoperability with first responders in neighboring countries. TETRA has its 

roots in a 1996 NATO decision to release a number of frequencies in 

the ultra-high frequency (UHF) band for the purpose of establishing 

a trans-Europe frequency band for public safety emergencies. These 

released frequencies are found in three slots in the UHF band (380–

400, 410–430, and 450–470). The European Telecommunication 

Standards Institute picked up on the NATO decision and developed 

the TETRA standard, based on time division, multiple access specifically to support emergency and public service needs. TETRA offers 

services for direct mode (direct calls between terminals), standard 

switched calls, group calls, priority control, and fast-through connect. TETRA handheld and vehicular sets are capable of 4-channel 

operation, with each channel transmitting up to 7.2 kilobits of data. 

The vehicular sets also can act as automatic relays to maintain network connectivity. The air interface is encrypted, using the TETRA 

Encryption Algorithm 2. Public safety organizations throughout 

Europe quickly saw the advantages of TETRA, and Nokia, MarconiSelenia, Motorola, and other manufacturers developed communications products to meet the demand.

When relating the Swedish approach to RAKEL to the situation 

in the United States, the overriding lesson to be learned is not in the 

TETRA technology being employed, nor in the use of primarily commercial technology, but in the fact that all organizations within Sweden (local, regional, and national) responsible for responding to an 

emergency or crisis will use common, interoperable communication 

equipment—and that sister organizations in neighboring countries 

will be using the same system. Contrast this with the United States, 

where communication systems are bought at the local level. Given 

little if any coordination even among departments in the same city, it 

is easy to understand how “lack of interoperable communications” is 

identified as a major deficiency by every study dealing with security 

readiness since September 11, 2001.

Because of the separation of national, state, and local governments in the United States, an amendment to the Constitution might 

be necessary to adopt the Swedish model and require a single system 

for all users nationwide. However, DHS could work with DOD on a 

set of open standards for a national communication system for all 

emergency organizations. Industry undoubtedly would respond to 

a national market by developing competitive, interoperable equipment, as happened in the case of TETRA in Europe. At the state and 

local level, legacy systems could be replaced as budgets permit with 

the assurance that neighboring organizations could join a network of 

interoperable systems as they are upgraded. 

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Swedish approach to military use of commercial information technology cannot simply be transplanted to the United States. 

For one thing, Swedish policies in this area are new, and Sweden is 

still learning how to acquire CIT and how to do business with companies on commercial terms. The government believes it has evolved a 

process to sort out the limitations of CIT, make the necessary adaptations, and integrate CIT into military warfighting systems, but does 

not yet have much experience with the results. Also, Sweden enjoys 

many advantages over the United States in procurement innovation: 

the nation and its military forces are small, and fewer and smaller 

programs simplify monitoring for CIT applicability and performing 

tradeoff studies to ascertain acceptability. Also, acquisition is centralized, and a small (20-person) headquarters staff can ensure that the 

policy of employing CIT is being followed to the highest degree practical. Moreover, many of Sweden’s military systems are procured internationally. Nevertheless, several recommendations can be derived 

from Swedish successes to date.

Establish a center of excellence to monitor the status of CIT 

and publish information online for all DOD developers. The Swedish FMV has found that capitalizing on the benefits of CIT requires 

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8 Defense Horizons October 2005

staying current with commercial products and the emerging standards that precede new products. With the help of Swedish industry, 

the FMV maintains surveillance and publishes online CIT information useful to industry and government engineers and managers. A 

similar service could be performed by a U.S. Center of Excellence 

for CIT. Such a center could be established at U.S. Joint Forces 

Command in conjunction with its C4ISR test-bed capability.

Establish a methodology to be used by all DOD acquisition centers to review new developments and major upgrades for applicability of CIT to meet requirements. The vast size of the U.S. system, with 

thousands of individual programs, requires visibility at the service and 

agency acquisition centers to assure that CIT utilization is optimized. 

This would present an opportunity for DOD to develop a standard 

methodology that would require the development of a CIT tradeoff 

analysis to be used throughout the department. Such a methodology 

could be developed at the Defense Acquisition University.

Include in the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) process a 

requirement to present tradeoff analysis on CIT considered to meet 

program requirements. One of the major hurdles within the DOD 

acquisition process has always been the necessity to introduce a 

certain degree of discipline to insure that department policies are 

carried out uniformly (unlike Sweden, where the acquisition community, both government and industry, appears to be implementing 

CIT policy uniformly). Within DOD, the DAB process has established 

a checklist methodology for those 

development/acquisition programs 

that meet certain criteria for size, 

dollar value, priority interest, and 

so forth. It would appear (given 

the development of the methodology discussed above) that the DAB 

checklist should include tradeoff 

analysis of the utilization of CIT in 

major programs.

Rather than develop a new 

system (primarily software) to 

meet the way the organization has always done business, encourage the user to consider changing the way of doing business when a 

CIT product implements a more efficient/effective way. Historically, 

one of the failures of DOD’s efforts to automate at all levels, from 

tactical computers on the battlefield to business enterprise systems 

that manage finance and personnel, results from the demand that 

contractors automate manual methods of doing business. Only after 

decades of inefficient operation was it realized that re-engineering 

of processes is required to allow automated systems to optimize 

productivity. The business community has recognized this for many 

years, and it is reflected in the commercial software on the market to 

improve business functions of every type. The Swedish Armed Forces 

have also accepted that the real benefits of commercial software for 

many applications lie not in the lower initial cost of the software but 

in the increased productivity that results from adapting the military 

process to capture improved functionality; now they change traditional methods of operation to capture the increased productivity 

offered by commercial software. DOD would do well to issue a policy 

directive encouraging this approach. Indeed, there are indications 

that DOD is moving in this direction. A recently released Army RFP 

on the General Financial Enterprise Business System states that the 

system will use commercial software and that the users are prepared 

to change their traditional processes to accommodate the model of 

the chosen software.

Introduce more flexibility in acquisition by providing a statement in all RFPs that use of CIT is encouraged and that tradeoffs, 

including the opportunity to challenge specifications, are invited.

This is the practice in Sweden, and it has been employed sporadically 

in DOD requests for proposals. Such a statement in RFPs would at 

least give the acquisition authority a better understanding of what the 

government is paying for certain specification requirements.

Explore methods of motivating defense contractors, especially 

the major system integrators, to use more CIT versus tailored 

development. There was little evidence that the FMV provides any 

extraordinary motivation to Swedish prime contractors to optimize 

the use of CIT. This is attributed to the perception that the working relationship between Swedish industry and the government is 

one of close cooperation and that industry has fully endorsed the 

FMV policy on CIT. In the United States, the motivation of defense 

primes appears to be dominated by the bottom line; if a company 

can increase profit by avoiding CIT in favor of tailored development, 

it usually follows the dollars. An examination of the pros and cons 

of applying various motivational tools available to U.S. contracting 

officers certainly appears to be in order.

Take a more proactive role 

in international standards organizations to influence and stay 

abreast of commercial standards 

that drive new technology. The 

suggestion to play a more proactive role on standards bodies came 

from Swedish industry. The view 

was expressed several times that 

the key to seamless utilization of 

CIT is to promote an open architecture based on commercial standards. This is certainly the approach of the U.S. GIG and the Swedish 

NBD. But the rate of technology turnover requires constant monitoring of the commercial standards process to avoid obsolescence. 

Furthermore, certain attributes required in a military network, such 

as information assurance and priority of service, do not necessarily 

have high priority in the commercial world. Without participation in 

these international bodies to argue for military features to be embedded in standards, down the line the military will face products that 

either do not meet their needs at all or require costly adaptation. 

the real benefits of 

commercial software lie in 

the increased productivity 

that results from adapting 

the military process 

Defense Horizons is published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. CTNSP 

publications are available online at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other 

department or agency of the Federal Government.

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

 Hans Binnendijk

Director

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