NO. 96-453 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1997 

STATE OF MONTANA: 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

EDWARD C. BEAUDRY, 

Defendant and Appellant 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District; 

In and for the County of Fallon, 

The Honorable Joe L. Hegel, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Lorraine A. Schneider; Simonton, Howe & Schneider, Glendive, 

Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Cregg Coughlin, 

Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

John Huntley, Fallon County Attorney, Baker, Montana 

Submittcd on Briefs: January 23, 1997 

APR 15 1997 Decided: April 15, 1997 

Filed: 

CLERK Of SUPIITME COURT 

STATE OF MONTANA 
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Edward C. Beaudry (Beaudry) appeals from the judgment entered by the Sixteenth 

Judicial District Court, Fallon County, on his guilty plea to the felony offense of possession 

of dangerous drugs, having reserved the right to appeal the court's denial of his motion to 

suppress evidence. We affirm. 

The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in denying Beaudry's motion 

to suppress evidence discovered during a warrantless search of his residence by his probation 

officer. 

Beaudry was convicted of three counts of felony burglary, two counts of felony theft 

and one count of misdemeanor theft in 1993. He received a three-year deferred sentence, and 

was placed on probation, in February of 1994. Beaudry's probation included conditions 

prohibiting him from using alcohol and using or possessing dangerous drugs and from 

entering bars. It also required him, upon "reasonable cause," to submit to a warrantless 

search of his person, vehicle or residence by his probation officer. 

John Hodge (Hodge) was Beaudry's supervising probation officer. During the time 

leading up to the search of Beaudry's residence which is at issue in this case, Hodge learned 

of numerous probation violations, as well as additional potential violations, by Beaudry. 

Four urine samples taken from Beaudry in 1994 and 1995 indicated that he was using drugs. 

Beaudry admitted to Hodge on four occasions between March 8,1994 and June 22,1995 that 
he had consumed beer, and Hodge saw Beaudry at bars on two other occasions. In addition, 

Beaudry was charged with shoplifting in June of 1995, and subsequently pleaded guilty. 

Moreover, Hodge learned that Beaudry had stolen and pawned a .44 caliber handgun. Fallon 

County Sheriff Tim Barkley also informed Hodge that a second .44 caliber handgun had been 

stolen and that Beaudry was a suspect in that theft. 

On October 24, 1995, Hodge conducted a warrantless search of Beaudry's residence 

in Baker, Montana, with the aid of a law enforcement officer. Beaudry was not present at 

the time of the search and did not consent to it. Hodge discovered dangerous drugs during 

the search. 

On November 21, 1995, the State of Montana (State) charged Beaudry with criminal 

possession of dangerous drugs, a felony. Beaudry pleaded not guilty to the charge. 

Beaudry moved to suppress all evidence seized during Hodge's warrantless search of 

his residence on the basis that the search violated his constitutional right to privacy and to 

freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. The State acknowledged that the search 

was conducted without a warrant, but argued that Hodge had "reasonable grounds" to 

conduct the warrantless search. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court made 

findings relating to the information Hodge possessed at the time of the search; those findings 

indicated that Hodge had evidence of drinking, drugs and theft by Beaudry. On that basis, 

the court determined that Hodge had reasonable cause to search Beaudry's residence and 

denied Beaudry's motion to suppress. 
Beaudry subsequently withdrew his not guilty plea and pleaded guilty to the charged 

felony offense of criminal possession of dangerous dmgs, reserving the right to appeal the 

denial of his motion to suppress. Thereafter, the District Court entered judgment, deferring 

imposition of sentence for one year subject to specified terms and conditions. Beaudry 

appeals. 

Did the District Court en in denying Beaudry's motion to suppress evidence 

discovered during a warrantless search of his residence by his probation 

officer? 

We review a district court's denial of a motion to suppress to determine whether the 

court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. We also review whether the findings were 

correctly applied as a matter of law. State v. Burchett (Mont. 1996), 921 P.2d 854, 856,53 

In this case, the District Court denied Beaudry's motion to suppress based on facts and 

findings largely undisputed by Beaudry. Specifically, the District Court found that Beaudry's 

conditions of probation included prohibitions against entering bars, using alcohol and using 

or possessing illegal drugs. The court also found that: 

On June 22, 1994, a sample of Mr. Beaudry's urine tested positive for 

cannabinoids. On June 9, 1995 a sample of Mr. Beaudry's urine tested positive 

for camabinoids. On June 9,1995, Mr. Beaudry was charged with shoplifting. 

He subsequently plead guilty. On October 24, 1995, Mr. Beaudry was charged 

with the theft of a .44 caliber revolver. He subsequently plead guilty. Prior to 

October 24, 1995, Mr. Beaudry had told [Hodge] on more than one occasion 

that if he were drinking or using [drugs] that he would shoplift or steal. His 

history appears to support that statement. Although as of the time of the 

search [Hodge] knew the .44 caliber revolver Mr. Beaudry had stolen from the 

Gun Runner Gunshop, had been pawned by Mr. Beaudry, Mr. Hodge also 
knew that law enforcement also had a report of a second stolen .44 caliber 

revolver in Baker. . . . 

The record also reflected that Hodge knew that Beaudry had consumed beer and been in bars 

on several occasions. Accordingly, the District Court determined that this underlying factual 

foundation 

gave this probation officer sufficient grounds to believe that Mr. Beaudry was 

back to drinking and doing drugs and stealing to support those activities. It is 

not too big of [a] stretch to conclude that evidence of such activities would be 

found at Mr. Beaudry's residence. The demonstrated, dynamic correlation of 

Mr. Beaudry's thefts with his drug and alcohol use gave this officer reasonable 

cause to search his residence for evidence. 

It is well-established in Montana that a probation officer may search a probationer's 

residence without a warrant so long as the officer has reasonable cause for the search. 

Burchett, 921 P.2d at 856 (citations omitted). This "reasonable cause" standard, while 

substantially less than the probable cause standard required by the Fourth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution, results from the probationer's diminished expectation of privacy 

and the probation officer's superior position in determining what level of supervision is 

necessary to provide both rehabilitation of the probationer and safety for society. Burchett, 

921 P.2d at 856 (citations omitted). "The probation officer must be able to supervise the 

probationer, and upon his judgment and expertise, search the probationer's residence. . . ." 

State v. Burke (1988), 235 Mont. 165, 171,766 P.2d 254,257. 

As noted above, Beaudry does not challenge the bulk of the District Court's findings. 

Indeed, he concedes that Hodge had reasonable cause to believe he had violated the 
conditions of his probation at various times during the twenty-month period immediately 

preceding the search. His sole contention is that there was an insufficient relationship 

between his activities and his residence to provide reasonable cause for Hodge's warrantless 

search of the residence. We disagree. 

For purposes relevant to the issue before us, the facts of the present case are similar 

to those we recently addressed in State v. Boston (1995), 269 Mont. 300, 889 P.2d 814, 

involving the warrantless search of a parolee's residence and storage garage based on the 

lesser "reasonable grounds" standard required for such searches. There, parolee Monte 

Chalmers Boston was subject to a "reasonable cause" warrantless parole search identical to 

Beaudry's condition of probation. Boston, 889 P.2d at 81 5. Boston's parole officer, John 

Kelly, became aware of evidence linking Boston to an arson fire at the National Center for 

Appropriate Technology and indicating Boston's first-hand knowledge of an earlier arson fire 

at the Mormon Church. Boston, 889 P.2d at 815. 

Kelly authorized a warrantless search of Boston's residence. After learning that 

Boston rented a storage garage separate from his residence, Kelly authorized a search of the 

garage as well. Boston, 889 P.2d at 815. 

Boston subsequently was charged with burglary, theft and arson. Boston, 889 P.2d 

at 815. He moved to suppress all evidence taken during the warrantless searches of his 

residence and storage garage. Relying on Kelly's testimony about the circumstances 
surrounding his decision to authorize the searches, the district court determined that Kelly 

had reasonable cause to authorize the searches. Boston, 889 P.2d at 816. 

On appeal, we reiterated the considerations underlying the "reasonable grounds" 

standard for warrantless searches by probation and parole officers, observing that 

probationers and parolees have conditional liberty and a reduced privacy interest. 

Boston, 889 P.2d at 816-17 (citations omitted). Moreover, a probation or parole officer must 

be allowed to determine the supervision required and, " 'upon his judgment and expertise, 

search the probationer's [or parolee's] residence. . . .' " & Boston, 889 P.2d at 817 (quoting 

Burke, 766 P.2d at 257). Kelly had evidence linking Boston to two arsons and, therefore, 

"Kelly clearly had reasonable grounds to suspect parole violations which justified the 

warrantless searches of Boston's home and storage garage." Boston, 889 P.2d at 817. We 

concluded that substantial evidence supported the district court's "reasonable grounds" 

finding and affirmed the denial of Boston's motion to suppress. Boston, 889 P.2d at 817. 

Here, we are presented with a record of known, as well as reasonably suspected, 

probation violations by Beaudry. These undisputed facts, combined with Hodge's expertise, 

continued experience with Beaudry and awareness of Beaudry's established and admitted 

pattern of stealing and substance abuse, provided Hodge with reasonable grounds to believe 

he would find evidence of dmg- or alcohol-related probation violations at Beaudry's 

residence. Thus, as in Boston, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the District 

Court's finding that Hodge had reasonable cause to search the residence. 
Beaudry repeatedly posits that a relationship must exist between the facts constituting 

reasonable cause for the search and the place to be searched, citing to a number of cases from 

other jurisdictions which--on various factual scenarios--require such a relationship. He 

seems to argue &om this starting point that some concrete set of parameters--some "bright 

line testu--has been, or must be, established against which the facts of each and every case 

involving a warrantless probation search under the "reasonable cause" standard can be 

measured with precision to determine whether the search is valid. 

While our discussion above reflects our agreement with Beaudry that the facts 

justifying the search must bear some relationship to the place searched, that relationship 

exists in this case. Assuming that evidence of drug- or alcohol-related probation violations 

by Beaudry actually existed, what more--or even equally--likely place for it than at his 

residence? No case cited by Beaudry or located by this Court requires that evidence of 

probation violations be seen by the probation officer--or by any other person--at the 

probationer's residence before a search of the residence can be upheld under the reasonable 

grounds test. 

Furthermore, with regard to Beaudry's implicit argument that a "bright line test" be 

applied to "reasonable cause" warrantless searches, the argument misperceives both the 

nature of the reasonable cause test and the rationale for the reasonable cause exception to the 

usual warrant requirement for a valid search. The reasonable cause test is, itself, a factdriven test inasmuch as the search "should be permitted only if there is an underlying factual 
foundation justifying the search[.]" m, 766 P.2d at 257. Indeed, the reasonable cause 

standard is substantially similar to the "reasonable grounds" language contained in tj 61-8- 

403(4), MCA, and we have indicated that determination of whether "reasonable grounds" 

exists is a finding of fact based on the totality of circumstances. See Anderson v. State Dept. 

of Justice (1996), 275 Mont. 259, 263, 912 P.2d 212, 214. In the context of a motion to 

suppress, the district court is the trier of fact and we review the district court's findings under 

the clearly erroneous test. See Burchett, 921 P.2d at 856. 

Moreover, the rationale for the reasonable cause exception to the usual Fourth 

Amendment warrant requirement is that the probation officer's expertise and experience with 

the probationer puts the officer in a superior position to determine what level of supervision 

is necessary to provide rehabilitation to the probationer and safety for society. Burchett, 921 

P.2d at 856. To establish an arbitrary rule of law setting a "floor" against which reasonable 

cause searches would be measured would negate the very considerations underlying the 

reasonable cause exception to the warrant requirement in the first instance. Burchett, 

921 P.2d at 856; Boston, 889 P.2d at 816-17; &, 766 P.2d at 256. Whether reasonable 

cause existed is, and must remain, primarily a fact-driven test to be determined by district 

courts on a case-by-case basis. 

Having concluded above that substantial evidence supports the District Court's finding 

that Hodge had reasonable cause to search Beaudry's residence, we further conclude that the 

finding is not otherwise clearly erroneous and that the court's findings were correctly applied 
as a matter of law. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err in denying 

Beaudry's motion to suppress. 

Affirmed. 

We concur: 

Justices 
Justice W. William Leaphart, specially concurring. 

I concur in the result reached in this case. However, I write separately to clarify what 

I believe is an important distinction in the context of probation searches. In addressing 

Beaudry's argument that there must be a relationship between the violation alleged and the 

place to be searched, the Court states: 

While our discussion above reflects our agreement with Beaudry that the facts 

justifying the search must bear some relationship to the place searched, that 

relationship exists in this case. Assuming that evidence of dmg- or alcoholrelated probation violations by Beaudry actually existed, what more--or even 

equally--likely place for it than at his residence? 

In the above passage, the Court seems to hold that the necessary "relationship" exists 

between the alcohol related probation violations and the place to be searched, that is, the 

home. I query whether the alcohol related violations provide a sufficient "relationship" to 

justify a search of the home. As the Court points out, the probation officer knew, prior to 

conducting the search, that Beaudry had consumed beer and had been in bars on several 

occasions. Accordingly, he already had sufficient evidence to revoke Beaudry's parole for 

alcohol consumption. 

By way of example, if a probationer were to violate the conditions of his probation 

by leaving the state, that infraction would not, in my view, provide "reasonable cause" to 

search his home. The nature of the violation is such that it does not bear fruit necessitating 

a search. Likewise, one need not conduct a search of a probationer's home to substantiate 

that he has been drinking in bars. There is no nexus between the offense and the place 

11 
searched. 

On the other hand, theft is an offense for which there is "fruit;" in this case, the second 

.44 caliber revolver which had been reported stolen in the Baker area. As the Court points 

out, a probation search must be based upon "reasonable cause." State v. Burchett (1996), 277 

Mont. 192, 195,921 P.2d 854,856. Further, "reasonable cause" for a probation search, like 

"reasonable grounds" for a traffic stop under 3 61-8-403(4), MCA, is a finding based upon 

the totality of the circumstances. See Anderson v. State Dept. of Justice (1996), 275 Mont. 

259,263,912 P.2d 212,214. "Reasonable cause" is thus an objective rather than a subjective 

standard. Anderson, 912 P.2d at 214. Accordingly, although the probation officer did not 

specifically focus on the missing revolver as justification for his search, the probation 

officer's knowledge of the second stolen revolver was one of many pieces of information 

comprising the "totality of circumstances" known to the officer. Knowledge of the missing 

revolver must be viewed as part of the larger collection of information which led the officer 

to believe that Beaudry was in violation of his probation, thus giving the probation officer 

reasonable cause to search Beaudry's residence. See Oregon v. Gulley (Or. 1996), 921 P.2d 

396,401. I would find the requisite nexus in the fact that Beaudry had stolen one gun in the 

Baker area and that another .44 caliber revolver had been reported stolen. In light of the 

totality of the circumstances, the search was objectively reasonable. 

Justice 1