Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

PNC Bank, National Ass’n v. Pattermann, 2016 IL App (3d) 150568

Appellate Court 

Caption

PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

STEVEN M. PATTERMANN, STEVEN M. PATTERMANN, as 

Trustee of the Steven M. Pattermann Revocable Trust Instrument 

Dated April 3, 2002 for Benefit of Steven M. Pattermann, HARRIS 

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Successor by Merger to Harris Bank 

Naperville, RIVER RUN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, THE 

LAW OFFICE OF EDWARD R. JACQUAYS, PANOS & 

ASSOCIATES, LLC and PNC BANK, NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION, Defendants (Gina Pattermann, IntervenorAppellant).

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-15-0568

Filed September 23, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 10-CH-4508; the 

Hon. Daniel Rippy, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Certified question answered.

Counsel on

Appeal

Timothy J. Somen, of Somen Law Firm, LLC, of Inverness, for 

appellant.

Frank P. Andreano, of Castle Law, of Joliet, for appellee.
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Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion.

Justices Holdridge and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 Intervenor, Gina Pattermann, filed an interlocutory appeal from a grant of partial summary 

judgment disposing of her homestead interest in mortgaged property in a foreclosure action 

brought by PNC Bank against several defendants, including Gina’s ex-husband, defendant 

Steven Pattermann. 

¶ 2 FACTS 

¶ 3 Steven and Gina Pattermann were married on August 14, 1998. Prior to the marriage, 

Steven held title to the property that is the subject of these proceedings, which was a vacant lot 

at that time. On or about February 2, 2001, Steven and Gina agreed to take out a mortgage from 

HSBC Mortgage Corporation to finance the building of the marital residence on the property. 

The property remained titled in Steven’s name alone, and Steven executed a mortgage and a 

promissory note to finance the construction. At that time, Gina executed a waiver of her 

homestead interest. 

¶ 4 On April 3, 2002, Steven created the “Steven M. Pattermann Revocable Trust” (the Trust), 

and transferred title to the subject property to the Trust. The quitclaim deed expressly stated 

that Steven was married to Gina and provided: “Per the Attached [ ] hereby releasing and 

waiving all rights under and by virtue of the Homestead Exemption Laws of the State of 

Illinois.” It was only signed by Steven and contained only a notarization of Steven’s signature. 

¶ 5 On September 2, 2003, Steven, as trustee of the Trust, signed a new mortgage and note for 

the subject property with the lender MidAmerica Bank, FSB, the predecessor in interest of the 

plaintiff, PNC Bank. The proceeds from this note paid off the original loan from HSBC 

Mortgage Corporation. Gina was not a party to the MidAmerica Bank transaction, and she did 

not reexecute a waiver of homestead. Thereafter, on June 24, 2005, Steven, as trustee of the 

Trust, borrowed additional monies from MidAmerica Bank, signing another promissory note 

and a junior mortgage. 

¶ 6 On August 24, 2005, Steven filed for divorce from Gina. In the divorce proceedings, the 

circuit court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage that disposed of the marital assets 

of Steven and Gina. With respect to the subject property, the marital residence, the circuit court 

found that the vacant lot had been Steven’s nonmarital property but that it was transmuted to 

marital property because the home was built with nonmarital and marital funds and maintained 

by marital funds. The circuit court found that the fair market value of the marital residence was 

$900,000 and the equity in the residence was to be determined by subtracting the first 

mortgage from that amount. The circuit court further ruled that the junior mortgage, a home 

equity loan, was the sole responsibility of Steven. Upon refinancing of the mortgage and 

payment by Gina to Steven of sums due pursuant to the division of marital assets, Steven was 

ordered to deliver to Gina a quitclaim deed, conveying the property to Gina. The circuit court 

order stated that if Gina was unable to refinance with six months of the judgment, then the 
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marital residence should be sold and the net proceeds divided in accordance with the judgment. 

Commencing on July 1, 2008, Gina was to be responsible for the payment of the mortgage, real 

estate taxes, and expenses of the marital residence. The circuit court did not address Gina’s 

homestead interest. Gina appealed the dissolution judgment but did not raise any issue with 

respect to the marital residence other than to challenge its value as a marital asset when it was 

encumbered by the first mortgage. See In re Marriage of Pattermann, No. 3-09-0472 (2011) 

(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). 

¶ 7 During the pendency of the dissolution appeal, on July 28, 2010, PNC Bank filed the 

current foreclosure action. PNC Bank alleged that the first mortgage was in default and that the 

balance due at that time was $506,587.20. On July 10, 2014, PNC Bank filed a motion for 

partial summary judgment, seeking an order that Gina did not possess a homestead right in the 

subject property following the dissolution of marriage. The circuit court granted the motion, 

finding that Gina no longer possessed a homestead interest pursuant to GMAC Mortgage, LLC 

v. Arrigo, 2014 IL App (2d) 130938. Gina’s motion for reconsideration was denied. However, 

the circuit court certified the issue to the appellate court and entered an appropriate Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010) order. Gina filed an application for leave to 

appeal pursuant to Rule 308(b), which was allowed. 

¶ 8 ANALYSIS 

¶ 9 Gina argues that the circuit court erred in holding that her homestead interest was 

extinguished by the divorce judgment. The question certified for review is whether a former 

spouse loses her homestead exemption in property arising pursuant to section 12-901 of the 

Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/12-901 (West 2012)) by virtue of divorce where 

the divorce decree grants the former spouse specific formal rights in the property, effects a 

self-executing present conveyance of those rights, and does not otherwise address or dispose of 

the former spouse’s homestead interest in the property. PNC Bank argues that the certified 

question is purely hypothetical in this case but, in any event, Gina’s homestead rights 

terminated upon her divorce. Our review of this issue is de novo. In re M.M.D., 213 Ill. 2d 105, 

113 (2004). 

¶ 10 The estate of homestead is one of statutory creation. GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Arrigo, 

2014 IL App (2d) 130938, ¶ 15. Section 12-901 of the Code is the homestead exemption 

statute and provides: 

“Every individual is entitled to an estate of homestead to the extent in value of 

$15,000 of his or her interest in a farm or lot of land and buildings thereon, a 

condominium, or personal property, owned or rightly possessed by lease or otherwise 

and occupied by him or her as a residence, or in a cooperative that owns property that 

the individual uses as a residence.” 735 ILCS 5/12-901 (West 2012). 

¶ 11 “A homestead is a possessory estate, requires actual possession by a householder, and 

some right in the property to which the homestead attaches.” Rice v. United Mercantile 

Agencies of Louisville, 395 Ill. 512, 515 (1946). “[I]t is not necessary that the householder have 

a fee title upon which to predicate his homestead estate.” Rice, 395 Ill. at 515. The question, 

then, is what right in the property, less than a fee title, is sufficient for a homestead right to 

attach? 

¶ 12 In concluding that Gina did not have a right in the property to which homestead could 

attach, the circuit court relied on GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Arrigo, 2014 IL App (2d) 130938. 
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In Arrigo, the Second District concluded that the wife of the titleholder to property, where the 

wife maintained her primary place of residence, could not claim the homestead exemption 

because she held no formalized interest in the property. Id. ¶ 12. In that case, the husband held 

title to the property where both the husband and the wife maintained their primary place of 

residence, but the wife did not own or lease the property. Id. ¶ 17. In reaching its conclusion 

that the wife could not claim a homestead exemption, the Arrigo court relied on In re Belcher, 

551 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2008), a bankruptcy case wherein the Seventh Circuit, applying Illinois 

law, concluded that a husband, whose name was not on the title or the mortgage and who did 

not have any other formalized interest in the property, could not claim a homestead exemption. 

Id. at 689. In reaching its decision, however, the Seventh Circuit noted that a nontitled spouse 

had a potential equitable interest in the marital home under Illinois divorce and probate laws, 

but neither of those situations were triggered in Belcher where both spouses were still alive and 

married at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed. Id. at 691; Arrigo, 2014 IL App (2d) 

130938, ¶ 19; see also In re Smith, 811 F.3d 228, 243 (7th Cir. 2016) (recognizing the potential 

interest of a divorced spouse or a surviving spouse despite lack of title). 

¶ 13 In this case, though, one of those situations noted in Belcher was triggered in that the 

dissolution proceedings preceded the foreclosure proceedings. Under the Illinois Marriage and 

Dissolution of Marriage Act, Gina had a potential equitable interest in the marital home. See 

750 ILCS 5/503(b)(1) (West 2012) (“For purposes of distribution of property ***, all property 

acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before a judgment of dissolution of marriage 

or declaration of invalidity of marriage *** is presumed marital property.”). In the dissolution 

proceedings, the circuit court determined that the marital home was marital property and made 

rulings with respect to the marital home without any mention of the homestead exemption. 

PNC Bank argues that the circuit court conclusively determined all interests Gina may have 

had in the property, including any homestead interest, in the dissolution judgment, even though 

the judgment made no mention of homestead. 

¶ 14 Section 12-905 of the Code provides that “[i]n case of a dissolution of marriage, the court 

granting the dissolution of marriage may dispose of the homestead estate according to the 

equities of the case.” 735 ILCS 5/12-905 (West 2012). Gina contends that, while the circuit 

court had the authority to adjudicate the parties’ respective homestead interests, it was not 

required to do so. PNC Bank cites In re Marriage of Naguit, 104 Ill. App. 3d 709 (1982), 

wherein the Appellate Court, Fifth District, found that a wife could not raise the issue of her 

homestead exemption for the first time on appeal from a divorce judgment. Id. at 723. The 

marital home in that case, though, was found to be nonmarital property belonging to the 

husband, resulting in the extinguishment of any equitable or formalized interest of the wife in 

the home at the time of the dissolution judgment. Id. Conversely, in this case, the marital home 

was ruled to be marital property. It is possible that the circuit court, in determining the 

disposition of the marital home, disposed of Gina’s homestead estate. But the statutory 

language that the circuit court “may” do so did not require it to do so. 735 ILCS 5/12-905 

(West 2012). 

¶ 15 Thus, we answer the certified question in the negative. A former spouse does not, as a 

matter of law, lose her homestead exemption in property by virtue of a divorce decree that 

grants her an interest in the property but does not address or dispose of the former spouse’s 

homestead interest in the property. 
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¶ 16 CONCLUSION 

¶ 17 Certified question answered.