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TRAINING AND EQUIPPING AFGHAN SECURITY

FORCES: UNACCOUNTED WEAPONS AND STRATEGIC CHALLENGES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 12, 2009

Serial No. 111–115

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

PETER WELCH, Vermont

BILL FOSTER, Illinois

JACKIE SPEIER, California

STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio

JUDY CHU, California

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois

RON STROMAN, Staff Director

MICHAEL MCCARTHY, Deputy Staff Director

CARLA HULTBERG, Chief Clerk

LARRY BRADY, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

PETER WELCH, Vermont

BILL FOSTER, Illinois

STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska

ANDREW WRIGHT, Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on February 12, 2009 ....................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Gimble, Thomas, Principal Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Department

of Defense ...................................................................................................... 24

Johnson, Charles Michael, Jr., Director of International Affairs and

Trade, U.S. Government Accountability Office .......................................... 10

Schneider, Mark, senior vice president, International Crisis Group ........... 50

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Flake, Hon. Jeff, a Representative in Congress from the State of Arizona,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 7

Gimble, Thomas, Principal Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Department

of Defense, prepared statement of ............................................................... 26

Johnson, Charles Michael, Jr., Director of International Affairs and

Trade, U.S. Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of ... 13

Schneider, Mark, senior vice president, International Crisis Group, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 53

(1)

TRAINING AND EQUIPPING AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES: UNACCOUNTED WEAPONS

AND STRATEGIC CHALLENGES

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN

AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room

2157, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, Maloney, Murphy, Welch, Foster, Driehaus, Lynch, Cuellar, Kucinich; Flake, Duncan, and Jordan.

Also present: Representative Towns.

Staff present: Dave Turk, staff director; Andy Wright, counsel;

Alexandra McKnight, Pearson Foreign Affairs fellow; Margaret

Costa, intern; Thomas Alexander, senior counsel; Dr. Christopher

Bright, senior professional staff member; Adam Fromm, minority

chief clerk and Member liaison; and Glenn Sanders, contractor, Department of Defense;

Mr. TIERNEY. Good morning, everybody. A quorum being present,

the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs hearing entitled, ‘‘Training and Equipping Afghan Security Forces: Unaccounted Weapons and Strategic Challenges,’’ will come to order.

I want to acknowledge our new ranking member, Jeff Flake from

Arizona and congratulate him. We continue to look forward to

working with you. We appreciate also his cooperation and the

staff’s cooperation in putting together the oversight plan for the

111th Congress, which was accepted on Tuesday.

It has also been our experience in the past that all of these are

good witnesses today and their organizations have been very helpful to Congress as we try to do our oversight function. GAO and

the IG’s office have always done a tremendous job in helping us

perform our duties, and also independent non-governmental agencies like Mr. Schneider’s have been very effective, and we have

worked with them on many occasions. So we want to thank each

of our witnesses and their staffs for their related reports today as

well.

Before we begin today, I want to say that we intend to have a

very robust oversight hearing schedule with respect to Afghanistan,

and I think that we will all find that there are a lot of other things

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we want to put on the plate as well, but this is one subject—given

particularly the opportunity that we have to look at a new strategic

view of what is going on in that region, it will be an opportunity

for us to work on this.

As you can tell by the fact that we scheduled our first hearing

here today, we are all going to be working on an expedited basis.

I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and the ranking

member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening statements. Without objection, so ordered.

And I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept

open for 5 days so that all members of the subcommittee be allowed to submit a written statement for the record. So ordered.

And I understand that we have been graced with the presence

of our chairman of the full committee, Mr. Towns, and I want to

recognize you, with Mr. Flake’s assent on that, and thank you for

joining us in this particular hearing. Would you like to make a

statement, Mr. Towns?

Mr. TOWNS. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. I am pleased

to be here for the first hearing of the Subcommittee on National

Security and Foreign Affairs.

Oversight of Defense and National Security issues is a priority

for the committee this year, and we are fortunate to have two experienced and thoughtful Members in Mr. Tierney and Mr. Flake

leading this important subcommittee. We are pleased with that.

Last month the GAO issued a high-risk list which included more

than a dozen DOD- and Defense-related programs. I joined with

Mr. Issa in a letter to Secretary Gates notifying him and DOD’s

high-risk areas of a top priority for the committee and asking Secretary Gates to meet with us on his plans for fixing these problem

areas.

Today’s hearing finding inadequate control of weapons issued to

Afghanistan, of course, and to Afghan Security Forces, is a good example of the types of issues we will address. We need to make sure

that DOD has systems and policies in place that reduce risk to our

national security and our troops. There is no question that our men

and women in uniform are America’s greatest asset, but too often

DOD’s management practices have been inadequate to meet the

challenges that our troops and our Nation face.

I hope today’s hearing is the first of many that identify and fix

the deficiencies in our national security operations. I look forward

to working together with all of you as we move forward.

And I yield back to Chairman Tierney, and of course I commend

Chairman Tierney and ranking member Flake and their staff for

this hearing, and of course I look forward to working with you as

we fix some of the problems that we know exist. Thank you so

much and I yield back.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

During the last Congress, this subcommittee sent three congressional delegations to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we held seven

related oversight hearings. This Congress certainly intends to continue our rigorous oversight. In fact, I led another congressional

delegation to Afghanistan and Pakistan that returned just last

week, and joining me were subcommittee Members Chris Van

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Hollen, Peter Welch, and Chris Murphy, as well as Representatives

George Miller and Ron Kind.

The overriding takeaway from that fact-finding trip, whether it

was meeting with President Karzai or President Zardari or U.S.

Ambassadors or General McKiernan or with the NGO’s and other

experts, is that we are in a unique moment in time to ask fundamental questions about the U.S.’ efforts in both of those countries.

What are we trying to accomplish, what are we willing to do to

get to that point, whether we as a government have the capacity

and the resources and the will to achieve, and most important, as

a public servant, what will Members say when they look into the

eyes of the parents who sacrificed their son or daughter to this effort?

I am encouraged that President Obama’s new administration is

conducting a top to bottom review of the U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, and it is my hope that the congressional

committees will also be actively involved. I can assure that this

subcommittee will be. We will be asking tough questions and examining, among other issues, aide accountability and efficacy, including use of private contractors, U.S. targeting procedures, the capacity of various U.S. Government agencies and departments to carry

on needed activities, and the development of the rule of law and

justice sectors in these respective countries.

In July 2007, the Government Accountability Office reported

about the shortcomings of the U.S. military’s efforts to account for

weapons involved in the Iraq train and equip program. The Inspector General’s Office also filed a report. In January 2008, Congress

passed a law requiring that no defense articles be provided to Iraq

until the president certifies that a registration and monitoring system has been established and that law then listed what the systems would include.

It was our hope that lessons learned in that conflict would inform policies in other conflicts. To assure that this happened, the

subcommittee, together with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, requested the Government Accountability Office review the

accountability for weapons that the Defense Department obtained,

transported, stored, and distributed to the Afghan National Security Forces. As it happens, the Department of Defense had also

asked the Inspector General to file a similar report, and Mr.

Schneider’s International Crisis Group was working on the same

area.

We asked the Government Accountability Office to investigate

whether the Defense Department could account for the weapons intended for the Afghan army and police. We also asked to what extent has the U.S. military ensured that the Afghan National Security Forces could properly safeguard and account for weapons and

other sensitive equipment issued to them.

The Government Accountability Office report released today answers those questions, and what they uncovered is disturbing. The

International Crisis Group recently put the importance of the Afghan police this way. They said: ‘‘Policing goes to the very heart

of state-building. A trusted law enforcement institution would assist nearly everything that needs to be achieved in Afghanistan.’’

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A Rand Corp. study commissioned by the Secretary of Defense on

counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan even placed the importance of the police ahead of the army. Building the police in a

counterinsurgency should be a higher priority than the creation of

the army because police are the primary arm of the government in

towns and villages across the country, they have close contact with

local populations in cities and villages, and will inevitably have a

good intelligence picture of insurgent activity.

The issue we address in detail today, weapons accountability,

serves as an important and tangible harbinger of how we have

been doing so far with United States and international efforts to

train and equip the Afghan police.

The GAO concludes, ‘‘That accountability lapses occurred

throughout the supply chain, including by the U.S. military, who

didn’t maintain complete records for about 87,000, or 36 percent,

of the 242,000 U.S.-procured weapons shipped to Afghanistan. By

not being able,’’ ‘‘to provide serial numbers for about 46,000 of

those weapons and by not maintaining reliable records for about

135,000 weapons that the U.S. military obtained for the Afghan

National Security Forces from 21 other countries.’’

We will hear from the leader of that investigation, Mr. Johnson.

We will also hear about the Defense Department’s Inspector General’s parallel investigation that found similar accountability lapses

in training and equipping Afghan National Security Forces. The

Department of Defense Inspector General’s report concluded that,

‘‘the accountability control and physical security of arms, ammunition, and explosives could be compromised and vulnerable to displacement, loss, or theft.’’

In August 2008, the Undersecretary for Defense for Intelligence

put it this way for what is at stake. ‘‘The security for conventional

arms, ammunition, and explosives is paramount, as the theft or

misuse of this material will gravely jeopardize the safety and security of personnel and installations worldwide.’’

If we go back to the families of the U.S. soldiers who pay the ultimate price for our security, what if we had to tell those families

not only why they were in Afghanistan, but why their son or

daughter died at the hands of an insurgent using a weapon purchased by the U.S. taxpayers? But that is what we risk if we were

to have tens of thousands of weapons that we provided washing

around Afghanistan off the books.

The Defense Department has acknowledged these serious shortcomings, it has concurred with all three of the Government Accountability Office’s recommendations, and it appears to be taking

concrete steps to bring together greater accountability in transfers

of arms to the Afghan army and police.

General Formica, the commander of the Combined Security

Transition Command, Afghanistan [CSTC–A], put it this way.

When we met with him in Kabul last week, he said, ‘‘we have to

get better because of the Government Accountability Office report.’’

But there is a huge amount of remaining work to be done, something General Formica also admits.

And it is not just weapons and ammunition that we are talking

about. Specifying sensitive defense items such as night vision devices poses special danger to the public and the U.S. forces if they

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fall into the wrong hands. Yet CSTC-A began issuing 2,410 such

devices to Afghan National Army units in July 2007 without establishing controls or conducting enhanced end-use monitoring. It was

some 15 months before an end-use plan was developed, and some

10 devices remain unaccounted for to this day.

This subcommittee will be watching intently. The stakes are simply too high to get this wrong. But even beyond keeping track of

the weapons we give to the Afghan army and police, there are more

fundamental problems, especially with the efforts to ramp up the

Afghan police. For instance, the training of the Afghan police continues to lag significantly behind that of the army.

In order to examine these broader challenges in training and

equipping the Afghan police, we will hear today about a recently

released International Crisis Group report entitled, ‘‘Policing in Afghanistan: Still Searching for a Strategy.’’ This report found that

too much emphasis has continued to be placed on using the police

to fight the insurgency rather than crime.

In addition, the deteriorating security situation and political

pressure for quick results has continued to obscure longer term

strategic planning, and there needs to be much more coherence of

approach in streamlining of programs.

Last year the State Department Inspector General’s office

warned, ‘‘confidence that the government can provide a fair and effective justice system is an important element to convincing warbattered Afghans to build their future in a democratic system rather than reverting to one dominated by terrorist warlords or narcotic

traffickers.’’ After 30 years of conflict and 7 years of U.S. participation, the patience of the Afghan people is being sorely tested.

A recent poll by the Asia Foundation found that 38 percent of Afghans think the country is headed in the right direction—that is

down from 64 percent in 2004—while 32 percent feel that it is moving in the wrong direction, compared to 11 percent in 2004. These

findings are reinforced by the ABC News poll released on Monday

showing that 40 percent of Afghans think their country is headed

in the right direction compared to 77 percent in 2005, while 38 percent believe the country is headed in the wrong direction compared

to 6 percent in 2005.

As we contemplate a new strategic overview about to be adopted

by the new administration, the condition of the Afghan National

Security Forces will be of paramount concern. Included in that concern is the ability of those forces to operate, to secure territory

gained and weapons afforded to them, and how this all relates to

the broader U.S. efforts and plans in Afghanistan.

Let us be perfectly blunt to the American people about the difficulty of the challenges ahead. The reports highlighted at this

hearing as well as the subcommittee’s recent meeting with General

Formica in Afghanistan indicate serious impediments, poor security

for stored weapons, illiteracy hampering efficient operations, corruption, high desertion rates, and unclear guidance.

The Defense Department has particularly noted significant shortfalls in the number of field and embedded trainers and mentors,

which currently serves as a primary impediment to advancing the

capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces. CSTC-A officials reported in December of last year that they only had 64 perVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:21 May 23, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\64912.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
6

cent of the 6,675 personnel required to perform its mission overall

and only about half of the 4,159 mentors that they require.

As we listen to today’s testimony, I trust it will help inform

whether Congress needs to legislate procedures to safeguard weapons in Afghanistan, as we did in Iraq, or to take other action in

this field. The challenges are immense, but this is just too important not to get right.

As I said at our hearing last year on efforts to train and equip

the Afghan police, 7 years after the invasion of Afghanistan, the

stakes here remain enormous. Put simply, effective and honest Afghan police and a well-functioning justice system are critical to the

future of Afghanistan and to the security of all Americans. We simply must do better and time is of the essence.

I now would like to yield to Mr. Flake for his opening remarks.

Mr. FLAKE. I thank the chairman and want him to know how excited I am to be on this subcommittee, and I look forward to the

hearings that will be held.

I am pleased that we are starting with this hearing. Obviously

these are troubling reports about what is going on in Afghanistan.

I just returned from Afghanistan in December of last year, and this

was not on our radar screen when I went there, but it will be

henceforth.

I would like unanimous consent to issue my statement for the

record.

Mr. TIERNEY. No objection.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Jeff Flake follows:]

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Mr. FLAKE. But let me just say this is a committee on oversight

and reform. I am pleased that recommendations have been made.

It would be nice to have members of the administration and Department of Defense and perhaps State to let us know what plans

are being made to implement these recommendations and how long

they think that will take, and I assume that we will followup in

this subcommittee to make sure that these recommendations are

being implemented.

That said, it is extremely troubling to find that the Department

of Defense cannot account for up to one third of the weapons that

have been issued to Afghan forces. That is reason enough right

there to hold a hearing and to hold people to account for what has

gone on, so I look forward to the testimony and thank all the witnesses who have come, and appreciate the subcommittee taking up

this important issue.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Flake.

Just in relation to one of the comments that you made, I agree

with you it would be nice to have the Department of Defense here.

They have a policy, however, that they don’t choose to sit on panels

where there are non-governmental officials there and we are only

having one panel at this hearing. So they were given the opportunity to come and state their policy.

At some point we will take that up with the chairman. Maybe

we ought to start just subpoenaing witnesses, and then we will decide our own panels the way we want and have the Congress run

congressional hearings and the Department of Defense will have an

opportunity to participate.

We did meet with General Formica and all of his staff over there

who are running CSTC-A, and we got that while we were in there,

and at the back of the reports, you will see the response from the

Department of Defense as well. But the comments are well taken,

thank you.

At this point in time, we will hear from our witnesses, and we

will go in order of the way that they are seated on that.

Let me just introduce, if I could, Mr. Charles Michael Johnson,

Jr. Mr. Johnson is the director of the International Affairs and

Trade Division at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. He

has had an extremely distinguished 27 year career with the Government Accountability Office, having won numerous awards, including a special commendation award for outstanding performance, leadership, management, and high congressional client satisfaction.

I should also add that this subcommittee has kept Mr. Johnson

and his team very busy over the past 2 years. As I noted earlier,

we greatly appreciate the extensive efforts by you and all of your

team.

Mr. Thomas Gimble is the Principle Deputy Inspector General of

the Department of Defense. Before his current position, he was the

Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence. He is a Vietnam veteran

and a recipient of the bronze star and purple heart. He has also

received the Secretary of Defense medal for exceptional civilian

service. We thank you for your continued service to the country,

Mr. Gimble, and for testifying today.

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Mr. Mark Schneider is the Senior Vice President of the International Crisis Group. He has also had a long career as a public

servant. Before coming to the ICG, Mr. Schneider was the Director

of the U.S. Peace Corps. He was also Assistant Administrator for

Latin America and the Caribbean for USAID. He has also been a

vital resource for the subcommittee during my tenure as chairman

and others as well, and I want to thank him for testifying today.

It is the policy of the subcommittee to swear all of you in before

you testify, so I ask you to please stand and raise your right hands,

and if there is any person who will be assisting you in your testimony, I ask that they also stand and raise their right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TIERNEY. Your full written statements will be put on the

hearing record, I think as experienced with people testifying, you

know this to be the case. So we ask that you testify within a 5-

minute period if you can. We will try to be lenient with that to the

extent that we can, but I know that members of the panel here are

anxious to ask questions. They have probably all read your reports

thoroughly, were impressed by them, and they probably instigated

a number of thoughtful questions, and we want to get to that when

we can.

So Mr. Johnson, if you could be kind enough to give us your remarks.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES MICHAEL JOHNSON, JR., DIRECTOR

OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the

subcommittee.

I am pleased to be here to discuss the report GAO released today

on accountability for small arms and light weapons that the United

States has obtained for Afghan National Security Forces, that is

the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. This

hearing is particularly timely given the unstable security situation

in Afghanistan which increases the potential risk of death and loss

of weapons.

My testimony today will focus on three issues: the types and

quantity of weapons that the Department of Defense has obtained

for the Afghan National Security Forces, whether Defense can account for these weapons, and the extent to which the Afghan Security Forces can account and safeguard these weapons.

With respect to the first issue, from fiscal year 2002 to 2008, the

United States has spent over $16.5 billion to train and equip the

Afghan National Police and Army. As part of this effort, Defense,

through the U.S. Army and Navy, purchased over 242 small arms

and light weapons at a cost of about $120 million. As the figure

shows, a variety of small arms and light weight weapons were purchased: rifles, pistols, machine guns, mortars, and grenade launchers.

In addition, Defense has reported that 21 other countries, as the

chairman has noted, provided about 135,000 weapons through the

Department of Defense. These weapons were obtained between

June 2002 and June 2008, and the international community valued

these weapons at about $103 million. This brings the total number

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of weapons that Defense obtained for the Afghan Security Forces

to over 375,000.

Before I address accountability, I would like to note that the

CSTC-A, the Combined Security Transition Command, Afghanistan, which is located in Kabul, is primarily responsible for training and equipping the Afghan Security Forces. CSTC-A is also responsible for receiving, storing, and distributing weapons to the Afghan Security Forces and for monitoring the use of the U.S.-procured weapons and other sensitive equipment.

As for weapons accountability, we found that lapses in accountability occurred at all phases of the supply chain, including when

the weapons were obtained, transported to Afghanistan, and stored

at two central storage depots in Kabul. While we found that Defense has accountability procedures for its own weapons—our own

U.S. weapons, including serial number registration and reporting of

routine physical inventories of weapons stored in depots, Defense

did not provide clear guidance to U.S. personnel in Afghanistan,

CSTC-A in particular, regarding what procedures apply when handling weapons obtained for Afghanistan Security Forces.

As such, the U.S. Army and CSTC-A did not complete records for

over one-third of the 242 weapons the U.S. procured and shipped

to Afghanistan. Specifically, for about 46,000 weapons, the Army

and CSTC-A did not record and maintain serial numbers to uniquely enable us or anyone else to identify those weapons. For about

41,000 weapons with the serial numbers recorded, CSTC-A did not

have any records of their location or disposition.

Furthermore, CSTC-A did not maintain reliable records, especially serial numbers, for any of the 135,000 weapons that were obtained through the international donors.

Overall, there was a lack of systematic accountability for over

half of the weapons that CSTC-A and that the U.S. Government

had obtained for Afghan Security Forces, about 200,000 weapons.

During transport to Afghanistan accountability was also compromised. For example, Defense and contractors sometimes shipped

weapons to Afghanistan without corresponding shipping manifests

that CSTC-A needed to verify receipt of weapons. At the central

storage depot facilities in Afghanistan, CSTC-A did not maintain

complete and accurate inventory records for weapons and allowed

poor security to persist.

In addition, CSTC-A did not begin tracking all weapons stored at

the depot by serial numbers and did not conduct routine physical

inventories until July 2008. The inventories revealed a theft of 47

pistols.

On a related matter, since July 2007, Defense has issued over

2,400 sensitive night vision devices to Afghan National Army. For

these extremely sensitive devices, Defense guidance calls for enhanced monitoring of their end use. We found, however, that

CSTC-A did not begin monitoring these specific devices until October 2008, about 15 months after they issued them. CSTC-A has reported in December 2008 that all but 10 of the sensitive devices

have been accounted for.

And with respect to the Afghan Security Forces capability, despite U.S. training efforts, Afghan units cannot fully safeguard and

account for weapons, placing these weapons at particular risk of

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theft and loss. In February 2008, CSTC-A acknowledged that it had

issued weapons to Afghan Security Forces without proper training

and accountability procedures being in place.

Recognizing a need for improved accountability, CSTC-A and the

State Department deployed hundreds of U.S. mentors and trainers

to, among other things, help Afghan Army and Police Forces be

able to improve their accountability over weapons.

The statement I am submitting for the record details a variety

of factors that have reportedly contributed to deficiencies in Afghan

Security Forces’ ability to account for weapons. Among them, lack

of functioning property book operations, unclear guidance, illiteracy, and poor security. It also provides additional details on

shortfalls and the number of U.S. personnel needed to train and

mentor Afghan Security Forces and to advance the capability to

safeguard and account for weapons.

In summary, we have serious concerns about the accountability

of weapons that Defense obtained for Afghan Security Forces and

have made several recommendations to help improve accountability.

In particular, we have recommended that the Secretary of Defense establish clear accountability procedures for weapons while

they are in the control and custody of the United States, including

tracking all weapons by serial numbers and conducting routine

physical inventories. Second, we have recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct CSTC-A to specifically assess and verify

each Afghan Security Force’s capacity to safeguard and account for

weapons unless a special waiver is granted. Finally, we have also

recommended that sufficient and adequate resources be devoted to

CSTC-A’s effort to train and equip Afghan Security Forces.

Defense has concurred with our recommendations and has taken

some steps to implement them. Those specific steps are detailed in

the statement which I will submit for the record.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes

my opening and prepared statement. I would be happy to answer

any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.

Mr. Gimble.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS GIMBLE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY

INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. GIMBLE. Chairman Tierney, distinguished members of the

committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this

morning and discuss our report on the assessments of arms, ammunition, explosives, and controlled accountability, also security assistance, and the sustainment of the Afghan National Security

Forces.

Early in 2008, the Inspector General assembled a team to return

to Iraq and Afghanistan to determine the status of the corrective

actions resulting from our report on munitions accountability and

control. We also made a decision to focus on Afghanistan because

our military there is facing similar challenges with respect to providing effective accountability and control for equipment being supplied to the Afghanistan Security Forces.

While in Afghanistan we also assessed security assistance program processes, Afghanistan Security Forces logistics sustainability, and the development of an Afghanistan military healthcare

system.

As our team redeployed out of Afghanistan, we outbriefed the

field commanders, enabling the command to initiate some immediate corrective actions. While CSTC-A was making progress on accountability, we recommended that the CSTC-A issue policy guidance specifically for accountability control and physical security of

munitions at the——

Mr. LYNCH. Could the gentleman pull the mic a little bit closer

to him?

Mr. GIMBLE. Further, we recommend that CSTC-A——

Mr. LYNCH. Is your mic on?

Mr. GIMBLE. It is.

Mr. LYNCH. OK.

Mr. GIMBLE. Further, we recommend that CSTC-A develop a formal strategy with detail implementing guidance for mentoring Afghanistan Ministries of Defense and Interior on accountability and

control, physical security of U.S.-supplied munitions. CSTC-A also

needed to ensure that the weapons’ serial numbers had been recorded accurately and then reported to the DOD Small Arms/Light

Weapons Serialization Program.

The U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program has historically functioned as a peacetime security assistance program. However, in Afghanistan, the United States is using FMS as the principle means

to equip, expand, and modernize the Afghan Security Forces during

wartime conditions. Commanders have noted that progress had

been made in improving the responsiveness of the FMS process in

support of Afghanistan.

However, we recommended that a wartime FMS process and ties

will be established. In addition, we recommend that the number of

personnel assigned to the CSTC-A security assistance office and

the rank of the leadership be increased to be commensurate with

the mission, size, and scope of the FMS effort in Afghanistan.

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The ability of the Afghan Security Forces to operate independently partially relies on developing adequate logistical support for

fielded military and police units. To accomplish this, we recommend a single integrated logistics sustainment plan be developed in coordination with the Afghanistan Ministries of Defense

and Interior that links tasks, milestones, and metrics to those offices responsible for each action. Further, a formal mentoring strategy for achieving Afghanistan Security Forces logistics sustainability also needs to be developed.

Independent Afghanistan Security Force operations also depend

on the healthcare system that provides field-level combat casualty

care, evacuation of casualties, rehabilitation support, and long-term

care for disabled personnel. To help accomplish this, we are recommending the development of a comprehensive, integrated, multiyear plan to coordinate U.S. efforts to build a sustainable Afghanistan Security Forces healthcare system. Also, the medical mentoring teams needed to be fully resourced, adequately trained, and

supported with the interagency reach back capability.

In response to our assessment, the U.S. Central Command and

CSTC-A did initiate a number of corrective actions. A few examples

would be the Central Command issued formal guidance enhancing

munitions accountability and control within its area of responsibility. CSTC-A updated its standard operating procedures on munitions accountability and control.

It also initiated formal procedures to ensure that serial numbers

of weapons provided to Afghan Security Forces are recorded in the

DOD Small Arms/Light Weapons Serialization Program. Central

Command has initiated action to increase the number of personnel

within the security assistance office.

Finally, CSTC-A has developed a strategy to improve the logistics, mentoring, communication, and coordination by linking the

support of the Afghan Security Forces at the tactical, operational,

and strategic levels. CSTC-A and the Central Command also

agreed to support improved training for medical mentors that are

going to be deployed to Afghanistan.

We are trying to send the assessment team back to Afghanistan

in March to review the status of the corrective actions undertaken

as a result of our report. We also plan to assess the efforts to train,

equip, and mentor the expanding Afghan Security Forces.

Finally, I would note that General Petraeus requested that we

continue assessing the area of weapons accountability in a letter to

us in January this year.

I thank the committee for the opportunity to discuss our ongoing

efforts and be prepared to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gimble follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you Mr. Gimble.

Mr. Schneider, if we might hear from you, please.

STATEMENT OF MARK SCHNEIDER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I want to thank

you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the International Crisis Group, but even more for your continuing focus on

these key issues relating to Afghanistan and Pakistan, because

they will determine whether or not we will succeed or fail in combating Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

If I might, I would like to begin, if I could, with just a brief comment about the final phrase in the title of today’s hearings, strategic challenges, because the international community does face strategic challenges in building competent and effective security forces

and in stemming the increasing ability of the Taliban and the Al

Qaeda allies who threaten the lives of the Afghan people and the

security of Afghan state institutions, as we tragically saw yesterday, and thus once more pose a direct danger to the United States

and the West.

Strategic incoherence and inadequate coordination, here in

Washington, in Kabul, within the U.S. military, between the military and civilian government agencies, and between the United

States and its international partners in Kabul are fatal to success

in confronting the Taliban insurgency. The results of that strategic

chaos have played out across Afghanistan over the past 7 years.

Just this last month, actually, the Security Council returned for

a trip to Afghanistan and it reiterated a report that some 7,000 security incidents had occurred in the first 10 months of 2008. That

compared to 508 in 2003.

The U.N. also reported that in September, 13 districts were

under the control of the Taliban. Another 90 were under extreme

risk. Extreme risk means that neither the U.N. nor the Afghan

government can undertake reconstruction activities in those districts at all. Now there are an additional 90 that are—additional

number that are at high risk—I think there is a map.

This was the situation in 2003. All of the blue were low risk

areas where you could carry out, independently, reconstruction activities. The yellow were medium risk and the salmon were high

risk. And then if we can see, that—no, go back to that following

map to show quickly the difference. The second map, please.

That one. That shows you the difference. All of the salmon colored districts are now dubbed extreme risk, meaning no reconstruction activities can be independently carried out there, and the light

pink go back to the high risk. The U.N. had to divide high and extreme risk because of the increased inability to carry out activities.

And the fact is that at this point, every international observer,

every U.S. military commander from General Mullen to Secretary

Gates has agreed that the situation is deteriorating.

In fact, General Petraeus said a few weeks ago that the situation

has deteriorated markedly in the past 2 years, and the reason is

worsening security, escalating corruption, and higher levels of

opium trafficking. And that is why it is crucial—you said in your

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beginning statement—that we begin to get a clear overall unifying

strategy.

General Fields, the new Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, said that there is no overarching, unified

strategy for Afghanistan. Unless we have that strategy that covers

security, governance, reconstruction, with transparent benchmarks,

there is no way that we are going to be successful in helping the

Afghan government achieve the level of security and reconstruction

necessary to essentially defeat a still very active, very well financed

insurgency.

Now let me just note if I could, Mr. Chairman, that we do have

information that there are, as you have heard, three reports under

way to put together a strategy, and I gather that the president has

asked the Security Council to coordinate a single report and set of

recommendations from those three, and I think that is crucial. We

think that is absolutely essential, to have a single overarching

strategy with benchmarks and that the Afghan government buys

into and that we all are held accountable for.

Now if I could, I will just turn quickly to the police report that

you mentioned and that we wanted to focus on, and I will discuss

our findings. You have heard some of them mentioned here today.

Our first report in August 2007 indicated total collapse of all the

efforts to produce a functioning Afghan National Police. The GAO

conducted an excellent study last year which noted that despite the

appropriations of $6 billion, none of the 433 police units at that

point were fully capable of stand alone performance.

The good news, I understand, is at the end of this year, that first

column, which indicates the various units—that is the uniform police districts, the border police battalions, civil order police battalions, counter-narcotics units, a total of 433—at the time that the

first study was done, none were fully capable. Now I understand

that some 18 are. But even so, we are talking about 18 out of 433,

and very few at the district level. That is mostly ANCOP, that is

the civil order battalions.

Now let me just add here that while there have been positive developments, you have a new Interior Minister, a new Attorney General, a new European Union Police Commander, and you have the

Focused District Development Program, which I think has some

chance of succeeding if the resources necessary are brought to bear

in order to carry out that program.

Just this last month, the U.S. Commander said that he lacks,

with respect to the police, 2,300 trainers and mentors. That is at

least more than a third of what he needs to carry out the task of

training the police. And I think it is important, as you have heard

from my two colleagues, if you don’t have effective command and

control over those police forces and you don’t have systems in place,

those weapons are simply not going to be able to be secured.

And let me just note one other point here. This is, again, in our

last report. There are 80,000 police names on the roster that are

being paid, mostly by the United States, but by the international

police fund. On any given day, 20 percent of those supposed 80,000

police officers are absent from duty. Another 17 percent listed on

the rolls are actually the names of dead or wounded police officers

as a means of providing pensions and benefits to the family.

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The question is, of those who are—let’s say somewhere in the

neighborhood of 20,000 to 30,000 police who are not there—the

U.N. actually says there are about 55,000 police in the field—the

question of where those weapons of those police went is a significant question. There is one other question. The reports that have

been done refer to the Afghan Security Forces. What about the

auxiliary police, the 11,000 that were started up 2 years ago, only

3,000 of whom currently are found, and I mean found. Were they

given weapons? If so, where are they?

And finally, there is a proposal now to startup a new community

guard program outside of the structure of the police in the Pashtun

areas. Without going to the question of the rationale for doing that

as opposed to devoting your resources to in fact staff up, train, and

mentor and equip the Afghan National Police effectively, the question is are those weapons being given to those guards and those

communities—are they being monitored and controlled? I should

also note they are actually getting paid more than the local Afghan

police. We have serious questions about that program.

So what do we say in terms of what needs to be done? First, the

fundamental issue is focusing on police as police, not as war fighters. Their role is to uphold the law and fight crime, not to fight

wars. Putting police in the front lines against the Taliban has resulted in three times more police than army troops killed last year.

That not only hurts morale, but it obviously hurts recruitment. It

makes it very difficult to maintain a successful police force.

The basic requirements for reversing these conditions begin with

ensuring that police reform occurs within the larger state-building

effort, that you clearly define and respect the roles and responsibility of the police, military, intelligence agencies, that you ensure

that the international police and coordination board, which is

shared by the Ministry of Interior with international involvement,

including us, that it does—is permitted to coordinate policy and

that there is parallel reforms in justice as well.

This is essential. If we don’t build the police, we are not going

to have a rule of law, we are not going to have an effective government, and we are not going to succeed in confronting the insurgency.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Schneider, thank all of the witnesses for your testimony. We are going to proceed at this point in

time to questions from the panel.

For all of you, it seems that—we certainly thought that the lessons of Iraq would be carried over to Afghanistan without much

difficulty. It seemed to be common sense that you would want to

make sure you knew where your weapons were going.

And I note that on the Government Accountability Office report,

Mr. Johnson, you say that in January 2009, just earlier this year,

Defense directed the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to lead

an effort to establish a weapons registration and monitoring system

in Afghanistan consistent with controls mandated by Congress for

weapons provided to Iraq.

So if they follow through on that, you would think that at least

that portion, of which the United States has direct control over the

weapons, can be rectified and taken care of. Weapons flown into

Kabul would then get the serial numbers at that point in time,

monitor the transportation, which was not being done—monitor the

transportation from the airport to the two storage facilities, one for

the army and one for the police, maintain it securely, and keep an

inventory and do regular inventory checks while they are there,

and then when they are distributed, I think that becomes the problem. Would you agree?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I think if that was implemented, that goes a

long way toward what we have called for. What is missing, though,

from our interpretation of the NDA requirements is that there is

no requirement for routine physical inventory. We think that is significant, that needs to be done to deal with the issue of port security and potential theft and loss of those weapons out of the storage

depots.

Mr. TIERNEY. So taking inventory periodically during the time

that they are stored in those depots? Makes sense.

Mr. JOHNSON. Correct, that is the one additional thing.

Mr. TIERNEY. And I think we should be able to do that. In conversations with General Formica and his staff, they seem to be on

that and ready to implement, even though they do run into difficulties there in terms of staffing, and they weren’t able to give us any

assurances that they would continue to have adequate staff to do

that.

And then we run into the problem of the Afghan forces. If they

are going to supplement that, we run into illiteracy problems and

numeracy problems on that, problems of people not showing up for

work, people leaving after they have been trained, corruption. We

noticed in I think Mr. Schneider’s report as well as others that oftentimes it was the police chief that was mentioned of the logistics

officer locally that was mentioned in corruption reports. So weapons may be going out the door for monetary compensation at that

level.

As Mr. Schneider says, people are leaving after they have the

weapons, just leaving the force and taking the weapon with them.

We had incidents reported to us, a cultural thing I suspect, is that

when people came in with their AK–47, throw it on a pile, go have

lunch, come back out, take any AK–47. So it is a little tough to

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check the serial numbers that were on that, because that is a way

that they are done.

So knowing that we have all those difficulties and difficulties in

securing the weapons once they are in the police’s and army’s

hand, corruption, etc., what are your prospects? What do you think

the prospects are for getting a handle on this to gain assurance

that weapons can be accounted for all the way through, and what

timeframe do you think is going to be involved in getting to that

point in time?

Mr. JOHNSON. If I may—and I think my colleagues would agree,

but they can weigh in—I think the key to success or some progress

in this area is the fulfilling of the military personnel shortages. I

think until that is addressed, I really don’t think that CSTC-A, in

terms of its ability to complete its objective or training or mentoring the Afghan Security Forces in getting this done could be accomplished.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well like so much else, I’m interrupting your question, Mr. Gimble, here on that. But like so much else, we had testimony last year that told us that they were 2,500 short, at least,

on mentors, and much more when it came to trainers. They were

all in Iraq, like so much else had been diverted instead of having

a focus on Afghanistan. Do we see any signs of that changes, of

those numbers increasing with any systematic approach to it?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well we do understand, and we do have some ongoing work underway looking at the efforts to reform the Afghan

National Police in particular. And we know that currently the situation is that there are really no dedicated resources for the training

of the police. They are taking resources from the efforts to train the

army to actually undertake the efforts to train the police.

So obviously I think with the plans going forward, that is a policy decision in terms of where these additional resources that are

slated to come to Afghanistan are going to be put. We do know that

CSTC-A has made a request for specific forces to fill these particular positions.

Mr. TIERNEY. And CSTC-A envisions, from what they were telling us, some 14 to 16 mentors and people out in each team with

each district police department as they go out to mentor and stay

there for security purposes so they can do the policing work, and

they were well short of that.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. So Mr. Schneider, that leads me to the question.

You mentioned in your testimony that we are not doing an effective

job of looking through our National Guard troops for people who

are police and do have some background in law and order and sort

of integrating them or transferring them to these positions. Do you

see any movement in that area?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Well I must admit, Mr. Chairman, that I have

asked several people in the military about this. They all agree, obviously. There are some 675,000 civilian police around the United

States in different places. A good 10 percent, at least, they estimate, if not more, are in the Reserves or in the National Guard.

But they are not formed in police training units. They have

signed up for doing other things in their Reserve, whether it is

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er or not they would have to change their contract. And I suggested

that—the President of the United States said that if this is important for national security, that some way would be found for the

contracts to be changed. But there is no way this is going to succeed if you don’t get those trainers and mentors out there.

Mr. TIERNEY. Russia spent 10 years in Afghanistan trying to do

the same thing we are trying to do, buildup the Afghan National

Security Forces, and they failed. What are the prospects, on a zero

to 100 scale, each of the witnesses, quickly, you think that we have

to succeed in the next 3 to 5 years? Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, we were here last June and we reported on the limited numbers. One—I think it was two for the Afghan National Army being fully capable and none, as Mr. Schneider has mentioned, for the police. We are aware that there has

been some progress made in both the areas. So under some of the

revised training efforts like the Focused District Development Program, which you seem to be aware of when you mentioned the police mentor teams, they are making progress.

But again, I go back to the point that unless those military personnel are provided to success and continued success in terms of

furthering—make progress in their area, it will be a challenge.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Gimble.

Mr. GIMBLE. I would agree with Mr. Johnson. But I think the

challenge will be is that there can be progress, there will be

progress made. Now when you put it in absolute terms of 100 percent success, I am not prepared to have an opinion on that at this

point. But I do think there is increased emphasis and I think that

is good, and there are just going to be a lot of challenges ahead.

Mr. JOHNSON. If I may jump back in again, one other point.

Again, going back to when we made this point in June when we

did the work for your subcommittee then, we made a specific matter for congressional consideration, and that dealt with the fact

that we felt like there needed to be a coordinated, detailed plan between the U.S. Department of Defense and State Department to

make sure that we have sufficient milestones and benchmarks to

measure progress, and we have not seen that. Again, I think that

is still an integral part of going forward that needs to be addressed.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Mr. Schneider.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I’m afraid I’m going to be even more pessimistic.

Unless there is a major change—because you are not going to be

able to—even if you get the trainers, you are not going to be able

to succeed in establishing an effective police force if the rest—if it’s

alone. It has to be part of an overall process of expanding the capacity of the government. If you just have the police and judges

throw out everybody that they arrest and—it is not going to work.

So it needs to be part of a rule of law.

Now do I think it is possible to increase that number on the

board from, let’s say, 18 to 100? Yes, I think it is. And I think that

we need to find a way to have a benchmark, sort of a critical path

that says ‘‘In 3 years we want to be here. What do we have to do

to get there?’’ And if that means 3,000 police trainers and mentors

on the ground 3 months from now, then we have to figure out how

to do it.

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much. Thank all of you. Mr. Flake,

you are recognized.

Mr. FLAKE. I thank the chairman and the witnesses.

Mr. Johnson, you mentioned the importance of inventory with

the depot, saying we don’t seem to have a problem with the munitions and the arms as they go from transport to the depot, and you

recommend inventory that we haven’t been doing. Does that inventory just apply to the arms there in the depot or in those warehouses, or an inventory of those that have gone out and that they

can keep track of?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well a couple points in response to that.

One, there is actually a problem before it even gets to the source

depot. The equipment is flown in to Kabul, and what we discovered—and the team that went there, what we discovered was that

once it gets in Kabul, there is no shipping manifest of CSTC-A to

actually do inventory to make certain that it received what it

should have received. So even before it gets to the storage depot

there is a weakness there.

In addition, the U.S. basically hands over custody, or the Afghan

forces actually deliver the equipment to the storage depot. So we

basically do not retain custody, even though I believe at that

point—correct me if I’m wrong, counsel—we have title of the equipment. We give it over to the Afghan security force to actually transport it to the source depot, which we are managing the source

depot even though it is intended for the Afghan Security Forces to

benefit.

So there are a couple of things here where we see some gaps and

weaknesses. Yes, there is a critical point, but we think it needs to

be at least checked when it comes in country as well as full inventory done routinely at the storage depot.

Mr. FLAKE. But in terms of inventory once it goes out in the

field, this inventory you are talking about doing, that would entail

keeping track of those that are in the field through serial numbers,

that at a certain point, a certain date, they have to account for

those as well?

Mr. JOHNSON. At a minimum, what should be known as a record

of the location and disposition of those items. If you deliver it to

the Afghan Security Forces or somewhere else, then at least having

a record of where it went to is important, and that did not exist.

In addition, when we talk about sensitive devices such as the

night vision devices we mentioned earlier, there was no inventory

of those. There is an enhanced end-use monitoring requirement for

those specific devices because they have sensitive technology, and

that was not done prior to us coming to Kabul.

Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Schneider mentioned the auxiliary forces, different units completely, and that there is no accounting for the

weapons that were issued there. Do you have any idea?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well we did not specifically look at it by unit, by

police unit. In particular, we do know, sort of—somewhat of an update, that there were plans—again, I mentioned that we have

someone going to look at reform of the police. The auxiliary police

forces are being folded within the rest of the Afghan National Police Forces through a vetting process that they are going through.

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So specifically with respect to their specific equipment, we cannot

look at it by unit, but as a whole.

Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Schneider, you mentioned that the attrition rate

for the Afghan police was 21 percent or so, another 17 percent on

the rolls that may or may not be active. What is the attrition rate

for the Afghan army?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I don’t have that——

Mr. FLAKE. I seem to recall when I was there that was a similar

figure, in the 20 percent range.

Any, I would think, serious inventory would require a lot of coordination with the Afghan government, obviously, and cooperation. Do you see that imminent? You don’t seem to be very optimistic that is coming.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think that you have identified one of the fundamental issues here, which is that there has to be an absolute

marriage between our efforts to stand up and to train and equip

the Afghan National Security Forces, police and military, and the

Afghan government in terms of their goals and their determination

to have an independent, non-corrupt police force. And as the chairman mentioned, until we get the satisfaction that they are not

naming police chiefs who are linked to drugs, as one example, this

is not going to work.

And I should just add on that point, there is a body which was

designed and agreed to by the Afghan government and the international community called the Senior Appointments Review Commission, I believe, and that was designed to, in a sense, have an

opportunity to weed out these individuals before they are named.

That body has been almost defunct. That is the kind of institutional mechanism that we need to say ‘‘If we are going to continue

providing this support, that has to be there, and it has to be acting

to prevent corrupt police chiefs from being named.’’

Mr. FLAKE. If you will indulge me, Mr. Gimble, what should the

remedy be if we don’t get that cooperation and we still find that

we are unable to account for the weapons that are issued? What

should the remedy be? What are our choices?

Mr. GIMBLE. Well my version of the accountability goes like this.

There are a couple of levels.

The part that Mr. Johnson talked about is the chain of custody

from receipt in the country to the depot, and I totally agree with

his analysis of that. The breakdown is there, but I think the issue

of the weapons that have already been issued out, what we have

to do there is we have to train our mentors out there to have the

Afghans determine their own system of accountability, and we need

to have a record of where we turned the weapons over to an Afghan

unit.

But we also have a responsibility to have the Afghans to have

their own accountability system for trying to develop their capabilities, the army or the police, and that will be one of the parts of

the plan. And we talked about the strategic plan, and I’m going to

be a little bit more narrow focused than that.

But in the CSTC-A arena, we had been critical in our report of

October that there was no central plan for logistics, sustainment,

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ommended that they get a single integrated plan that would bring

this together.

What part of that plan would be, as we have done in Iraq when

we looked at weapons accountability there, we have actually gone

back down and followup and go down to the units when there was

handoff in inventory to the Iraqi storerooms to see what kind of accountability they had. We have a team going back into theater in

March, and one of the tasks will be hopefully that we can get down

to some Afghan units to see how well we are encouraging them to

develop their own accountability systems.

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you Mr. Flake. Mr. Driehaus, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DRIEHAUS. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

I got to tell you, as a new member of this committee, I am very

disturbed by this report, and I think the average American would

be very disturbed by this report. You would think that given the

experience in Iraq, we would certainly have the systems in place

to track these weapons.

I guess I have a couple of questions. First of all, give me the

worst case. I’m sure we are all looking at this from the worst case

scenario. Are these weapons falling into the hands of the Taliban

or Al Qaeda, and is there any evidence to suggest that in fact has

happened? Despite all the various concerns we have in terms of

tracking and monitoring, do we have any evidence that in fact

these weapons are getting into the hands of hostile forces?

Mr. JOHNSON. There are reports that we have looked at, some of

the mentor reports, the contract mentor reports that are done when

they actually do some of the assessments of the Afghan Security

Force’s capability to account for things. Some of those reports have

had some allegations that reported the theft of weapons and potentially weapons being sold to enemies.

Mr. DRIEHAUS. I guess given that, when I look at this tracking

system as it has been described, is there a better way to do this?

Not just in accounting and putting the necessary personnel in place

to make sure that we are monitoring and accounting for the weapons as they move forward given the serial numbers. But, you know,

we all have cell phones here that can be tracked quite easily using

sophisticated technology. Is there better technology that the military could be using in order to track their weapons rather than the

serial numbers that they are currently using?

Mr. GIMBLE. I’m not aware of a better one. I think there has to

be discipline in the system. And if you go back and compare the

U.S. military and how they track the serial number and what have

you, it works very well, there is accountability control.

What we have here in this—and part of the challenge here was

that—and going back, when you talk about Iraq and Afghanistan,

some of the reasons that we didn’t learn the lessons and carry

them over to Afghanistan, because they were happening at the

same time. And the problems that you had in Iraq with weapons

accountability, you had the same problems happening in Afghanistan at the same time.

So I think the other part of the challenge is a lot of these weapons that we are getting the serial control on, is there was never

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agreement. There was a lack of understanding on the part of the

folks in theater that the DOD accountability rules applied.

And you mentioned, Chairman, in your opening remarks about

the Undersecretary of Defense’s letter of August 2008. Well that actually was a result of our first report, and what that really says,

in my view, is that he is telling the people in theater that the DOD

policies and procedures that we go by apply to all the weapons that

we buy with U.S. moneys. And that was kind of a point of misunderstanding up until then. As a result of that, now we have been

able to start moving forward with the good policies.

There is a next challenge to that. Now you can have a great policy, but you got to have implementation. One of the challenges in

Afghanistan, when I was over there, was that they did have what

they called a core INS, a cell phone tracking system. The problem

there was it wasn’t being very well input and there was no quality

assurance that you didn’t have duplicate numbers.

There is another challenge. A large number of these weapons

coming in are Eastern block weapons, AK–47s, and they don’t have

the serialized discipline that the U.S. arms manufacturers have.

You have a lot of duplicate numbers, non-number characters that

the systems won’t pick up, so part of the challenge of getting control of this is determining how to best deal with those kinds of

issues too.

So it is a real challenge to get back out and recreate this. But

I think there is efforts on the way, and we are hoping to go back

in March and see some progress in that area.

Mr. DRIEHAUS. I think, finally, Mr. Chairman, that we all understand the necessity to be arming the security forces and the police

forces in Afghanistan, but there is, I think, a very real question as

to whether or not we should continue given the problems that you

have identified. It doesn’t make sense that we would continue to

deliver weapons into the country without having these systems in

place, and should we stop delivery of weapons for a certain period

of time until we are assured and the taxpayers are assured that

in fact the systems are in place?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think the plan going forward is actually to do

that. Defense has agreed to implement our recommendation, has

already taken steps to do so. We are aware that in 2008 there was

a recommendation that more needs to be done by the commanding

general.

There was a policy implemented for the police in particular that

no weapons could be issued to the police without assurance that

they are able to properly account for and safeguard those weapons.

We have not went back in to specifically test that, but that was

their new policy.

And under their new Focused District Development Program,

their training effort, that is a part of that whole effort, where they

are training as a unit and then trying to ensure that they have sufficient controls in place to safeguard and account for weapons.

Mr. DRIEHAUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. If I might just ask something.

Congress passed a law regarding Iraq, asking for a certification

before the arms went out, as to the status on that. Has anybody

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been back, either the Inspector General’s Office or the GAO to see

how that is going in Iraq?

Mr. GIMBLE. We had a number of those recommendations. You

passed the legislation, I think, when we had come back from a—

let me just give you kind of an update on what we saw last year.

When we went in in 2007, we made recommendations to list the

serial numbers of weapons on the outside of the cases, have the

manifest that Mr. Johnson was talking about provided into the receiving area.

So last May we were able to—I actually led the team back over

there. We went out an inventoried weapons at Abu Ghraib. We

looked at the serial numbers on the outside of the case, opened

some of the cases and counted them, had a pretty good accuracy

rate.

We went down also—we back into the Iraqi areas like in Baghdad Police College and some of the police colleges up in Kurdistan

and inventoried weapons on hand there both in the arms rooms

and then also in the—in Baghdad Police College there is a central

storage place for the police. And while they weren’t perfect, there

was a lot of progress being made, and there was some accountability being established. Now we intend to go back again to followup

on those by going back into the things.

Our Afghanistan part of that trip was initially—well actually we

went to Depot 1 and 22 Bunkers. We did not, on that trip, get to

go down to any of the Afghan units. That is what part of this issue

will be when we go back next month is we want to go down—go

back out to 22 Bunkers, Depot 1, and then also go to some of the

forward deployed units to see what kind of accountability——

One, do you have accountability when it is in U.S. possession as

it is turned over to the Afghans, and then what kind of revisions

are we making to have them establish some kind of accountability

and control, recognizing there has to be—well a good way of doing

business, but there should be some thought of accountability for

the weapons and munitions that we provide.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you Mr. Gimble.

Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Duncan. You are recognized

for 5 minutes.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

According to the Congressional Research Service, we have spent $173 billion in Afghanistan since 2001, and as far as I’m concerned,

it is pouring money down a rat hole. It is a complete waste. I think

if there are any fiscal conservatives left in the Congress, they

should be horrified by the waste that is going on over there.

General Petraeus said in an article in the Washington Post 3

days ago that the situation in Afghanistan, despite all this money,

has deteriorated markedly in the past 2 years—those are his

words. And he said this, he said Afghanistan has been known over

the years as the graveyard of empires, and if we are not careful,

it is going to help be the graveyard of our empire as well.

Professor Ian Lustick of the University of Pennsylvania wrote recently and said—he talked about the money feeding frenzy of the

war on terror and he wrote this, ‘‘Nearly 7 years after September

11, 2001, what accounts for the vast discrepancy between the terrorist threat facing America and the scale of our response? Why,

65

absent any evidence of a serious terror threat is the war on terror

so enormous, so all-encompassing, and still expanding?’’

‘‘The fundamental answer is that Al Qaeda’s most important accomplishment was not to highjack our planes but to highjack our

political system for a multitude of politicians, interest groups and

professional associations, corporations, media organizations, universities, local and state governments, and Federal agency officials,

the war on terror is now a major profit center, a funding bonanza,

and a set of slogans and soundbites to be inserted into budget,

project, grant, and contract proposals. For the country as a whole,

however, it has become a maelstrom of waste.’’

And I just don’t see where the national debt of $11,315,000,000,

an incomprehensible figure—and now the GAO tells us over $55

trillion in unfunded future pension liabilities—it is just not going

to be long at all before we are not going to be able to pay all of

our Social Security and Medicare, veteran’s pensions, and all the

things we have promised our own people if we don’t stop spending

money in ridiculously wasteful ways. And of course, what does the

Defense Department tell us, just as they always do, what they

want is more money to spend over there and more troops.

Bruce Fine, who was a high ranking official of the Reagan administration wrote just a few days ago in the Washington Times

that it is ridiculous that we have troops in 135 countries and approximately 1,400 military installations. And he said we should redeploy our troops to the United States. He said no country would

dare attack our defenses and our retaliatory capability would be invincible. Esprit de corps would be at its zenith because soldiers

would be fighting to protect American lives on American soil, not

Afghan peasants. The redeployment within the U.S. casualties in

Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, it would end the foreign

resentments our enemies created and intended killing of civilians

and the insult to pride excited by foreign occupation.

At the end of this column, he is saying the American empire

should be abandoned and the republic restored. The United States

would be safer, freer, and wealthier. And I can tell you, I agree

with him.

It is just like this stimulus that we are dealing with. There are

a lot of good things in that stimulus package, but I can tell you

this, we can’t afford it. I wish every family in this country could

have a million dollar mansion and drive a new Cadillac or Mercedes, but they can’t afford it. And we are on this addiction to

spending, and we go in for these short term fixes that will satisfy

for a while, but they are going to cause us serious trouble later on.

If a family is deeply head over heels into debt, they don’t go out

and just immediately double or triple their spending, or they get

in even worse trouble.

And I hate to say it, because I’m not a pacifist and I consider myself to be very pro-military, but the Defense Department has

turned into the department of foreign aide, and has become the

most wasteful department probably in the entire Federal Government. And fiscal conservatives should be the ones most upset about

that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

66

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you Mr. Duncan. You will be pleased to

know that we intend to look into many of the matters that you

mentioned this year. I don’t think that there is widespread disagreement amongst members of this panel at least.

And we see it as part of our oversight responsibility, taking a

look at those 150,000 bases and their mission and their impact on

that as well as all the procurement issues that the Government Accountability Office reported on last year, $275 billion for potential

waste in contracts over schedule and over budget. So we will be

doing all of that and appreciate your cooperation with that.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Lynch, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the ranking member as well, and I appreciate the witnesses for helping us

with our work.

Mr. Gimble, we had a similar problem a couple years ago, as you

mentioned, in Iraq. I think we had 191,000 weapons go missing,

most of them small arms. But in response to that problem, myself,

Mr. Platts, a number of investigators from this subcommittee, actually, want in to Taji weapons depot in Iraq, and basically DOD had

a good program in place.

As the Iraqi security forces were coming out of training, they had

a building there at Taji, when they were assigned a weapon, the

serial number was recorded—they had four laptop computers in the

central facility there at Taji. The individual, whether it was a soldier or it was a security officer or police officer, they had their picture taken with their weapon and it did a pretty good job. A little

late, but it did a good job.

Why don’t we have this system in Afghanistan? It seemed to be

very cost effective, and let’s face it: Afghanistan is a lot poorer than

Iraq. Most of these young men—that is basically what we are talking—and older men are getting assigned a weapon that is probably

as valuable as anything that they own in their household, and we

have some corruption issues, some big corruption issues there, as

you well know. Not as much with the ANA as we do with the police, but you have all these issues here. It is almost a certainty we

are going to have a problem here unless we put something in place

to address it.

So I’ve got to ask you, why didn’t we just take the good system

that you have going on in Iraq and apply it to Afghanistan?

Mr. GIMBLE. As a matter fact, that is a good question. We hope

to address some of those issues when we go back in March.

I would just add, though, on the Iraqi side, they also put in some

provisions that if you lost a weapon such as a glock, they would

actually fine the people about a year’s salary.

Mr. LYNCH. Right.

Mr. GIMBLE. That was the Iraqi government doing that.

I think it has to be a joint effort between the Afghan government

and the United States, and I think a lot of that comes back to those

mentoring teams that we need to have out there. I agree that the

process—we need to put that in, and we will look at that. But that

Iraq process has been a huge step forward.

67

Mr. LYNCH. Yes. Well I will be back in Taji in a little bit and

I will be in Afghanistan in a little while as well. I’m going to look

for some type of accountability to be inserted.

Remember, one of the problems that—we got it right in Iraq

eventually, and we got it right now. And you have to remember

that CPA 3, that Coalition Provision Authority Rule 3 allows every

Iraqi to have a weapon in their home for self defense, and the

weapon of choice was an AK–47. So that is a pretty steep problem

there, and they got that under control.

There is no reason from a cost or a technology view here that we

shouldn’t be able to put some type of very responsible and exact

system in place that will track these weapons. And with the expectation that our troop levels are going to be increased substantially

there, the risk is even greater.

Let me ask you, do we have a central weapons depot facility in

Afghanistan that we are using or do we have multiple sites?

Mr. GIMBLE. We actually have two primary ones, 22 Bunkers and

then Depot 1.

Mr. LYNCH. Where are they sir, I’m sorry.

Mr. GIMBLE. Kabul.

Mr. LYNCH. Kabul. Are all of them in Kabul?

Mr. GIMBLE. They are both in Kabul, yes sir.

Mr. LYNCH. OK, that simplifies things a little bit.

Mr. GIMBLE. Let me go back to Taji just for a moment. There is

another part of the issue. When you were having the issuance of

the weapons to the basic trainees coming out of their training facility, they also have a huge weapons storage over there and they

have the captured weapons. There were some challenges with accountability on captured weapons. But we were able to go back in

and inventory the supply side of the weapons over there last May

and saw some pretty good accountability and some systems being

developed and automating some of the what I call wholesale level

weapons accountability, the warehouse operations.

But the truth of it is that the Afghanistan process is much more

primitive, in my personal opinion, than in Iraq.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I yield back.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Mr. Foster you are recognized for 5

minutes.

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am also a new member

of this committee, but this is a matter of some personal interest to

me for actually two reasons.

In the mid-1970’s, my parents spent a year in Afghanistan where

my father was responsible for the first and for a long time the only

advisor on Afghan legal proceedings. He spent a year riding circuit

in a Land Rover trying to actually get an appreciation for the rule

of law and the value of actually writing down court decisions, and

came away with it sort of skeptical, thinking that we were generations away from actually having what is needed from a cultural

point of view of having a real appreciation of the rule of law. And

I would be interested in your reactions whether we have made

progress in the last 30 years when the government there was

wiped out first by the Russians and then the subsequent war.

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And the second reason is that the largest National Guard deployment coming out of my district, actually out of Illinois, is responsible for the training and mentoring of the Afghan National Police,

and I want to make sure that these kids are kept as safe as we

can.

I would like to push a little bit. I guess this is for Mr. Schneider

and Mr. Gimble, as to the question of whether there may be some

technological fixes or improvements. On the sort of fundamental

level you can easily imagine that if you are not sure that a policeman is out doing his rounds, that if he is carrying a cell phone, he

can sit there and take a picture every 10 minutes, and it can be

monitored by our wonderful European collaborators. And there is

no reason why some simple thing like that can’t make sure that we

at least know who is doing their job as a policeman out on the beat.

And there are more advanced technological things that you can

imagine, everything up to and including having smart guns where

this technology recognizes the owner and the gun will not fire unless it has been programmed to the owner. That would make it

really hard to steal a gun and abuse it. And just intermediate

things such as GPS tracking devices, something that alerts by a

radio signal when the gun is fired.

And I was wondering, is there, to your knowledge, even a research program that would get this technology field testable, and

do you think it is promising?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think Afghanistan remains, I think, 174 out of

177 poorest countries in the world. The access to basic technology

is pretty limited outside major cities. At this stage, I’m not sure

that you would be able to use cell phones at all. Now Kabul is another issue. There might be an ability in some of the major cities.

But I think your point is well taken. You need to look at all of

these issues in relation to what is going to be possible to use to

bring up the capacity of effectiveness of the Afghan National Police

and the monitoring and oversight.

One of the points that I made is that we are currently—if we

train the police as their plan, it is 2 months of training. Even in

Haiti we have 7 months of training required.

The other is that you mentioned your father and the question

about the rule of law. This is a civilian police force. It has to be

seen as part of the rule of law. They are doing very little—I think

still the government of Italy is responsible for the lead in the area

of the judiciary and justice, and there is a lot more that needs to

be done there. It all doesn’t have to be Federal courts, but you need

to have some mechanism like riding a circuit with Afghans who relate to those local districts.

There is a program underway that you are aware of, the National Solidarity Program, and there is a new effort at the local

government effort that is focused on the economic side and community action, but that needs to be linked to the local district police

and local judiciary as well, and that still has yet to be done.

Can I just make one other point, Mr. Chairman? And that is that

in relation to this, that this is all being done—led by the military.

The military is running civilian police in terms of the training. In

an ideal world, it would not be the military responsible for civilian

police training. It would be civilian police.

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We don’t have the capacity in the U.S. Government to deal with

the rule of law internationally in post-conflict situations in any

kind of comprehensive fashion that would deal with civilian police,

justice, corrections. Cops, courts, corrections. We can’t do it all together, and we can’t do it from the civilian side where we have the

expertise.

Mr. JOHNSON. If I may point out, I do want to note that the GAO

is currently—probably in about 3 weeks we are going to issue a report on the efforts to reform the Afghan National Police, so we will

be touching on some of the issues that you are addressing.

But I would like to note that there is an effort on the way to provide each police office with a biometric ID card that has a smart

chip in it.

Mr. FOSTER. Is there any kind of cashless electronics funds transfer or economy in Afghanistan? I understand that, for example, in

Africa, that is a significant part of the economy and it must be very

powerful in reducing the corruption or at least identifying where it

is happening. And I was wondering since we control a large fraction of the money that is going into the economy whether we could

actually make progress along those lines.

Mr. JOHNSON. Some of those things you mentioned, use of cell

phones, those are things that are being considered, but we will

probably address that in more detail in the report that is tentatively due on March 9th.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. If I could add to that. There is an effort in the

pay reform program to send money for the individual police officers

to accounts that they would have access to rather than to their

commander, who obviously traditionally skims off a substantial

amount. So there is an effort along those lines.

Mr. TIERNEY. Except that there are now reports of a lot of commanders accompanying the individual police officers to the bank.

Mr. FOSTER. One last quick question. You mentioned, I think it

was 17 percent of the salaries being drawn are actually for dead

or wounded policeman. Is there a plan to actually make a pension

program? This sounds like money that maybe is not being

misspent, but it would be very nice just in terms of knowing what

the actual force is. Is that going to be separated out into some sort

of pension program?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. My understanding is that is an issue that has

not yet been dealt with. They have discussed the need for that, but

so far as I know, there is not a formal program.

Mr. FOSTER. OK, thank you. I yield back.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. We are going to do another round if

you want to stick around for that.

Mr. Schneider, the point was made several times here about

‘‘Why can’t we just do in Afghanistan what we now think we are

doing in Iraq on this?’’ I want to make two points and ask you to

respond to that.

One is there seems to be a wholly different level of corruption in

Afghanistan permeating the society like something we have never

seen in Iraq or elsewhere. And secondarily, we have a much higher

degree of illiteracy and innumeracy in Afghanistan than we have

in Iraq, which is a fairly educated and capable population.

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So without overcoming those obstacles, we are probably not ever

going to be able to get the kind of inventory and security for weapons that we really want to have. Is that your read as well?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I mean that is clearly one major factor, but another one as well is the fact that you have a very thriving opium

industry in Afghanistan that finances corruption right across the

board. And until you do something more effective in dealing with

the opium—particularly the trafficking side, that is the processing

and the trafficking, where the real money is, it is going to be very

difficult to eliminate the corruption that continues to exist.

I mentioned a positive meeting with the new Minister of Interior,

and I just note that when he was appointed, which was just in October, I mean he basically said administrative corruption in the

Ministry of Interior and the police leadership is irrefutable. Jobs

are being bought and the poor people are paying the price. And

part of the reason is because those are the places where the drug

traffickers need assistance to move their product.

And I will say that we need to see within this overall strategy

a much more coherent kind of a drug program than we have today,

and it needs to be focused at the top of the pyramid, if you will,

not at the poor farmer. It needs to be focused at interdiction of the

convoys, the processing, the labs, as opposed to the Afghan farmer

who is either forced to by poverty or forced to by the threat of being

killed by the Taliban.

If you remember that map that showed—the last map—in fact it

should be in the back of your testimony—my testimony. But it had

big brown circles, and they were generally in the same area where

that extreme risk existed. Those brown circles are where opium is

grown and processed, and that is the linkage. There it is. That

whole salmon area is extreme risk because the Taliban is either

there on a permanent basis or can get there whenever it wants,

and the brown circles are where the narcotics exist.

Mr. TIERNEY. When you say Taliban, I think you might use that

a little loosely. We are not just talking Taliban, we are talking insurgents, warlords, and drug dealers, some of whom the Taliban

hook up with because it is a way to get income and some whom

don’t.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, exactly.

Mr. TIERNEY. And I think it does little to no good for the general

populace, in terms of their morale and belief in their government

when they drive down the street and see a mansion owned by a

drug baron next to the slums where they are living. And when you

buy a police chief’s job for $100,000 to get paid $200 a month because you know you can make up the difference in graft and corruption.

And one other point is we have met with the Minister of Commerce, who indicated that if you take pomegranates from one area

in the south and you try to drive it through the country and out

the other side, it may cost you as much as $485 if you get stopped

27 times—27 times—by warlords, local villagers, police in the municipal area, on that basis. It is less costly to send a container of

pomegranates from there to California. So the problems are huge,

and I think we have to address how we are going to do that.

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If I could just talk a second about the Focused District Development Plan, which is the latest in the Combined Security Transition

Command, Afghanistan, CSTC-A’s approach to that is to take a

community, a district, take all the police out that the community

is upset because they are corrupted, and bring them over to the

academy for training, replacing them with the Afghan National

Corps, which is already highly trained, more well trained that the

regular police. And for an 8-week period that goes on and then you

bring back the trained unit from the local area, ostensibly with

some mentors and other people and that, but not always. If we do

that on the pace they are at right now, it will probably take us 15

to 20 years to get all the districts in this country developed.

I think it is an interesting idea, but it is hard to see how that

is going to solve the problem of that, particularly when we had reports of up to 40 percent attrition in some units. You get them all

trained up and 40 percent of the people drop off somewhere on

that.

I would just like to hear the comments that people might have

about what they see as the future of that particular program, and

am I right in my assessment it could take us forever to get to a

point where you—they are already going back to retrain some of

the six that they did.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I guess my view is at this point, that is the best

we got. We don’t have enough of them and we don’t train them for

a long enough period of time. In other words, I would much rather

see those units going out and being trained for 4 to 7 months and

coming back and keep the end ANCOP there, buildup more

ANCOP to do that. But you are going to need more training centers. We now have I think six regional training centers. You are

going to need more of those, you are going to need more trainers

and mentors, a substantial number more.

The question is how serious do we believe this links up to the

ability to confront the insurgency. And if we think it is crucial to

have an effective police force to do that, then we have to commit

the resources. I mean there is no other—this can’t be done on the

cheap. And the effort at the auxiliary police, 10 days training, here

is a gun, that was a disaster.

And now the new idea of taking, in the Pashtun area, taking militias, providing them with weapons, giving them a substantial

amount of authority, but not within the command structure of the

Afghan——

Mr. TIERNEY. I want to explore that a little bit more with you,

but I want to give Mr. Flake an opportunity to ask questions as

well.

Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Johnson, for the record again, we know the controls aren’t there, the recommendations have been made, there is

some evidence that those are being implemented already and we

will see. I believe you are going back in March, is it? It would be

nice for our committee to made aware of any analysis that you

have after that time.

But right now, we have no hard evidence that these weapons are

ending up in the hands of the Taliban. We haven’t had our forces

go out and do a raid and find our own weapons being used by the

Taliban, is that correct?

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Mr. JOHNSON. We have no firsthand accounts on our own, and

nor have we seen any Department of Defense-specific military

forces reporting that. But, however, some of the contractors who

are working on behalf of the U.S. Government have reported in

some of their assessment reports that they have allegations of theft

and reports of the enemy actually receiving some of the weapons.

Mr. FLAKE. But we haven’t seen evidence yet that they have been

used against our forces?

Mr. JOHNSON. No sir, we have not.

Mr. FLAKE. When I finished my first round, I asked what remedies there are. Obviously with our own controls that we have put

in, we can enforce those and make sure that no additional weapons

are given out unless there are proper controls there. But when you

are dealing with partners that may not come through, but you have

to rely on, there is no other choice.

What kind of remedies can we have to ensure that the Afghans

maintain or cooperate and implement their side of the controls that

they need to? What can we do to ensure that happens, realizing

that we can’t simply say we are just not going to deal with the Afghan forces anymore? They have to be equipped. They are certainly

not useful if they are not. What can we do there?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think one control we can put in place is the routine monitoring of the weapons that are being provided. Routinely,

as we go out to some of the units, checking, since we do have mentors who are embedded with the units to check on the weapons and

to maybe to random inventory checks.

Mr. FLAKE. Those recommendations were made as well.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is, from what I believe, a part of what their

plans in the future may be, to include some of that in there.

Mr. FLAKE. OK.

Mr. GIMBLE. We have actually made those recommendations.

Mr. FLAKE. I’m sorry?

Mr. GIMBLE. I said we have actually made those recommendations.

Mr. FLAKE. You have made those recommendations, alright.

Mr. Schneider, you mentioned that unless we get a hold of the

poppy production and deal with that, do you see evidence with the

recent kind of change in focus by NATO forces, allowing them to

involve themselves more closely, do you see that as helping at this

point yet or just the potential that it might be of help down the

road?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think that if it is implemented, it will clearly

be of help. There is something that we called for—I went to Afghanistan in 2003 the first time and at that time, no one, neither

NATO nor the U.S. forces, were willing to do anything about the

opium poppy trafficking. If they found it on the road, they would

let it go.

And I think that now this new order which permits them to go

after the processing centers and the labs, at the request of the Afghan government, is quite positive. If you begin to place some additional risk there into the system and at the same time provide the

farmers some alternatives in terms of credit for licit crop production and the access to services, you begin to have a chance at dealVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:21 May 23, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\64912.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
73

ing with the problem. And if you begin to deal with corrupt officials

at the top level.

Mr. FLAKE. It is interesting. You mentioned that there didn’t

seem to be the focus early on in 2003. I visited Afghanistan for the

first time, I think it was 2003, or just after Karzai was put in

place.

And he mentioned—I went back to my notes when we met him

this last time just 2 months ago—I went back to my first notes and

he said ‘‘The biggest battle we have is on poppies.’’ He called it the

mother of all battles.

This time, I saw a decidedly less committed approach and denial

it seemed that poppy production was actually aiding the enemy or

financing terrorism. He in fact claimed that it wasn’t. And there

are people who say ‘‘Well, that is because he is unwilling to followup on corruption charges for family members and everything else,’’

but you see it differently.

Do you see the Afghans themselves, or just more of a focus on

our efforts? Are the Afghans following up in that regard or not?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. At this point, it is very hard to see—except for

the naming of the new Minister of Interior and the new Attorney

General. Those are positive steps because the Ministry of the Interior was—even though it was responsible for police, it in fact was

a place where there was a significant amount of corruption and

linkage to drug trafficking.

I’m hopeful that means that there is a willingness on the part

of the Afghan government to take serious action. Without that, you

can throw money at the problem, and it is not going to work. You

have to demonstrate there is political will at the top to go after

drug traffickers.

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Schneider, let me just ask a couple final questions here. The European Union is supposed to be deeply involved

in this training of police and the law and order justice situation on

that, and have been missing in action largely on that. They have

a new representative there as well. They are doubling the size of

their commitment to the international aspect on that. Do you see

any hope on that or is that all mirrors and smoke?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No, I mean I think that—they together with

NATO I think recognize now that the—creating a functioning, effective police force is part of—an essential part of the security problem in Afghanistan.

And so I’m hopeful that, as you note, those initial actions will be

followed by substantial new contributions of trainers. They also—

remember, as I said, I have the numbers of the United States, but

we know in Europe there are substantial numbers of civilian police

available. They put hundreds of police into the Balkans in the

aftermath of the conflict there, so much more can be done, and I

hope it will be.

Mr. TIERNEY. Last, let me just ask about—you mentioned briefly

and I want to just explore that a little bit, this new concept that

it seems that CSTC-A and the United States may at least be tacitly

allowing it to go forward if not fully endorsing it. And that is to

have a local council nominate young men from their village to be

a security force of sorts, who would then get vetted, ostensibly, by

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the Afghanis and by our forces to check and see the best they can

if they have any record of involvement with insurgents, and then

they would be involved with security while the police would be involved for policing within that.

Will you tell us about some of the inherent risk in that and your

assessment of whether or not that is a good way to move forward?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. We see three risks. The first, obviously, is that

if they are paying these individuals more than they are paying the

police on the beat, it is going to create problems for the police. Second is whatever resources you are devoting to that are not resources you are devoting to creating an effective Afghan National

Police Force. And finally, if they are not under the direct command

of the local—of the Afghan National Police, you are creating the potential for a difficult situation there.

But finally, nationally, if you are only arming Pashtun tribal militias, whatever you want to call them, then you are exacerbating

the North/South political divide in the country and you are going

back and setting in motion the reverse trend of re-arming local militias. And it is very hard to think that the other ethnic groups, the

Tajiks and others, who have been disarmed to some degree under

programs that the United States and NATO have financed, it

seems to me very hard to say ‘‘Sorry, your tribes and your local

communities can’t do the same thing.’’ And they are probably going

to get as much money from their warlords as we provide to them,

the Pashtuns.

Mr. TIERNEY. I want to thank the ranking member, obviously, for

his participation and the committee members, but I want to thank

our witnesses most of all. You have been very helpful with your reports, and your staff, their work on that, and with your testimony

here today.

This is a perplexing sub-part of a much larger perplexing problem that we have that has international implications and questions

as to what our strategy going forward is, and it is going to have

to encompass this aspect as well as some broader strategy aspects.

I personally think that we are going nowhere unless we start including other nations in these conversations, and that includes Iran

and Russia and China and India and the Stans, all of whom, in

some instances, have more risks than we have. A lot of these acts

that have been going on with the poppy, of course, and the opium

goes to mostly Europe, and they have a high interest there. There

is concern that some of the insurgents spreading from the Taliban

would in fact go through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and

Uzbekistan and those places, and on up into Russia.

So I think that we have to start realizing that everybody has a

stake in this and start looking strategically in a much broader way,

and also, as we do that, come down and focus on these very real

and particular issues and make sure that we are not arming the

very insurgents that we are trying to suppress on that basis.

So thank you for all of your assistance. You know that we look

forward in asking for your assistance again, and we appreciate all

the help you have given us.

Meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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