U.S. Army Research Institute a

Table 2

What We Know
About Desertions
and What It Means

for Army Leaders

13



U.S. Army Research Institute @

unconvicted military deserters, and through interviews of applicants conducted by
mental health professionals.’ By far the most frequent answer given for deserting was
personal, family, or financial problems (40-50% of program participants). This was
followed by problems adjusting to Army life (approximately one quarter) and reasons
related to Vietnam (12%). Other reasons mentioned included Army leadership and
administration, and drug/legal issues.

The Special Discharge Review Program (SDRP) was initiated in 1977 to allow
Vietnam-era deserters to turn themselves in and receive an undesirable discharge. It
also permitted individuals who received undesirable or general discharges during this
period to apply to have them upgraded. Analysis of the reasons given for desertion by
these soldiers showed that they varied greatly by whether the individual stayed in the
USS. or resided as a fugitive in a foreign country.® The former group was quite similar
to those who were interviewed under President Ford’s clemency program: 33% cited
family/marital/financial reasons for deserting, 19% said they had problems adjusting to
the Army, and 17% gave reasons related to Army leadership and administration. On the
other hand, Vietnam was the factor cited by the majority of those who chose to live ina
foreign country (62%). This latter group was also demographically quite different from
their counterparts (e.g., more educated and higher aptitude).

More recently, the Personnel Control Facility (PCF) at Fort
Knox, KY collected information from 12,277 deserters
over calendar years 1997-2001.’ Although the categories
created to summarize the reasons for leaving were somewhat
different, the results are remarkably consistent with the earlier
findings:

+ Family problems (33%)

+ Failure to adapt (31%)

+ Issues with chain of command (19%)

+ Financial problems (12%)
+ Other (5%)

Putting these results together forms a consistent picture of the major stressors that lead
soldiers to desert. These include personal problems (family, marital, financial), an
inability to adapt to the Army way of life, and leadership and administrative issues.

Another factor that may come into play in a soldier’s decision to desert is that of
opportunity. As an example, data from the SDRP indicated that 39% of participants
departed when they were on leave or convalescent status, while another 15% went
AWOL while in transit from one unit to another. Similar results have been found in
other studies, suggesting that many deserters are inspired at least in part by the fact
that they are separated from their units, thus making it easier to simply remain absent.
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that desertions may coincide with soldiers receiving
their paychecks, given that they then have the resources to expend on travel and other
necessities.



@ What We Know About AWOL and Desertion

Executive Summary

Study Requirements:

The study’s purpose was to determine why Army desertion has increased so
dramatically over the last eight years (i.e., from 1,284 in FY93 to 4,795 in FYO1) and
to provide Army managers with tools and policy options for better managing the
desertion process. The specific tools include survey instruments the Army can use

to better understand why desertion is occurring and which soldiers are most likely to
leave. To the extent possible, the study will provide recommendations for prevention
and apprehension of deserters. It will also study the characteristics and experiences of
deserters who are adjudicated and then returned for duty.

Procedure:

The study involves four phases: (1) review of the professional literature on desertion, (2)
field interviews to gather issues, lessons learned and recommendations that arise out

of the operation of the current desertion management system, (3) construction of
psychometric instruments to measure characteristics and experiences of deserters, and
(4) construction of surveys to measure unit views of the desertion process and what can
be done to improve it. This report is based on the first two activities.

Findings:

Army research from 1973 to the present shows a fairly consistent story. Prior to

entry, deserters are somewhat different from other soldiers (i.e., they tend to be less
educated, lower aptitude, to be from broken homes, and to have engaged in delinquent
behavior). In the Army, they are more likely to be younger, lower in rank, and in
combat-related military occupational specialties. Their reasons for leaving tend to
center around family, personal or financial problems and/or an inability to adjust to
Army life. The desertion is more likely to occur when there is an opportunity to leave
(i.e., when the soldier is in transit, on leave, or convalescing). Attempts to prevent
Absence Without Leave (AWOL) (and possibly desertion) led to increases in AWOL
rates through some sort of scapegoating or self fulfilling prophecy mechanism that was
associated with the “treatment” (i.e., leaders were attempting to reduce AWOL behavior
via efforts to counsel soldiers who were identified as being high risk trainees). Initial
interviews with unit leaders suggest that among “Dropped from Rolls” soldiers, the
best candidates for reintegration into the unit are those who left for a “good” reason
(e.g., an unresolved family problem), returned voluntarily, were gone less than a year
and wanted to “soldier” even in the face of stiff punishment for their past mistakes.
Unfortunately, this type of deserter is in short supply. Furthermore, too little time has
passed to tell whether these characteristics are indeed predictive of success.

Utilization of Findings:

The review of the draft version of this report by representatives of the Army G-1, U.S.
Army Forces Command and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command suggests that
it meets an Army need among reenlistment non-commissioned officers and company
grade leaders to understand the desertion process and to formulate better ways to
address it.


@ What We Know About AWOL and Desertion

14

' Briefing prepared by DAPE-MPE, 4 February 2002. Original source SIDPERS December 2001.

2 Bell, D. B. (1979). Characteristics of Army deserters in the DoD Special Discharge Review Program
(Research Report 1229). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute; Office of the Secretary

of Defense (n.d.) Active Duty Enlisted Personnel, 1789 Through Present. Retrieved March 13,
2002, from http://web1.whs.osd.mil/MMID/M01/sms213r.htm

3 Bell, D.B. (1979). Characteristics of Army deserters in the DoD Special Discharge Review Program
(Research Report 1229). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute.

4 Bell, D.B. (1976). The Vietnam era deserter: Who is he? Paper presented at the convention of the
American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C.

5 Bell, D.B., & Houston, T. J. (1976). The Vietnam era deserter: Characteristics of unconvicted Army
deserters participating in the Presidential clemency program (Research Problem Review 76-6).
Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute.

© Bell, D.B. (1979). Characteristics of Army deserters in the DoD Special Discharge Review Program
(Research Report 1229). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute.

7 Briefing (n.d.) prepared by the U.S. Army Personnel Control Facility, Ft. Knox, KY.

8 Bell, D. B. (1979). Characteristics of Army deserters in the DoD Special Discharge Review Program
(Research Report 1229). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute.

° United States General Accounting Office (2001). Major management challenges and program
risks: Department of Defense (GAO-010244). Washington, DC.

10 Briefing (n.d.) prepared by the U.S. Army Personnel Control Facility, Ft. Knox, KY.
"| Briefing (n.d.) prepared by the U.S. Army Personnel Control Facility, Ft. Knox, KY.

22 Department of Defense (1978). Status of Vietnam era veterans: Report on military status.
Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and
Logistics.

'? See, for instance, Jones, N.T. (1973). The gravity of administrative discharges: A legal and
empirical evaluation. Military Law Review, 59, 1-25.

'4 Bell, D.B. (1979). Characteristics of Army deserters in the DoD Special Discharge Review Program
(Research Report 1229). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute.

5 Bell, D.B., & Holz, R.F. (1975). Summary of Army Research Institute research on military
delinquency (Research Report 1185). Alexandria, VA: U. S. Army Research Institute.

'6 Santos, R. L. (n.d.). The Army needs men: An account of the U.S. Army rehabilitation center at
Turlock, California. Retrieved March 12, 2002, from http://wwwlibrary.csustan.edu/bsantos/
army.html.

17 Briefing (n.d.) prepared by the U.S. Army Personnel Control Facility, Ft. Knox, KY.


U.S. Army Research Institute 3.)

In more recent times, less emphasis has been placed on rehabilitation efforts. According
to data provided by the PCE, Ft. Knox, KY, of the 12,277 cases of desertion that were
documented in calendar years 1997-2001, only 783 (6%) were returned to their units or
reassigned.'’ As mentioned previously, by far the most common outcome in desertion
cases is the release of the soldier from the Army with a less-than-honorable discharge
(94% in calendar years 1997-2001). However, the World War II experience, in
combination with the previously mentioned expert judgment that one-third of the
SDRP desertions could have been avoided, suggests that it is possible to take steps to
head off absences or return soldiers to duty after they have left.

Asa preliminary step in the current project, researchers interviewed company
commanders at Fort Hood, TX and Fort Lewis, WA on the subject of desertion. A
primary focus of these discussions was the potential for returning AWOL soldiers
to productive service in the Army. Because this was not a representative sample, the
feedback received can only be considered suggestive. However, there were a variety
of individual and situational characteristics that these leaders indicated might be
associated with soldiers who can be successfully reintegrated. These include:

+ having a good pre-desertion record

+ left for a “good” reason (e.g. an unresolved family problem)

+ returning voluntarily (as opposed to being apprehended)

+ wanting to remain in the Army

+ accepting punishment for unauthorized absence

+ no (other) military or civilian infractions

+ relatively short absence

+ sufficient time remaining in term to be properly reintegrated

One goal of this study is to determine if there is widespread consensus that soldiers
fitting this pattern are, in fact, more likely to be successfully returned to Army
service, and if the available data support this view. This knowledge may then be used
to focus repatriation efforts on those soldiers whose circumstances suggest a greater
chance of success.

IX. Summary

in order to effectively curtail it, let us summarize what the research cited here
tells us. Much of this information is displayed in Table 2 along with a brief
statement of its implications.

B efore considering what it is we need to learn about the phenomenon of desertion

+ Deserters tend to be less educated and have a lower aptitude than their
counterparts.

+ Deserters are more likely to have come from broken homes and taken part in
delinquent behavior prior to entering the Army.

11



U.S. Army Research Institute @

Ill. What is current Army policy in handling
cases of desertion?

dealing with AWOL/DER cases. Note that there are some slight variations based

on where the absence occurs (e.g., reception station, unit of assignment, in
transit), and other particulars of the situation. Refer to AR 630-10 (August 31, 2001)
for complete details.

r ~ he following discussion provides a broad overview of the current procedures for

When a soldier is reported missing, an inquiry is undertaken to attempt to ascertain
his/her location and the possible reasons for the absence. At the same time, relevant
personnel (e.g., the Provost Marshal) are notified of the absence and necessary
reports are filed. Next of kin are informed that the soldier is missing within specified
time frames. After 30 consecutive days of absence, the soldier is classified as DFR.
Necessary forms are completed (e.g., DA Form 4187, DD Form 553, DD Form 458)
and assembled in a deserter packet which, is forwarded to the U. S. Army Deserter
Information Point at Ft. Knox, KY.

A soldier is considered Returned to Military Control (RMC) when he/she surrenders to
military authorities, is delivered to authorities, is detained by civilian law enforcement
personnel, is found in a civilian medical facility in such condition that he/she cannot
be returned to military authorities, or has entered another branch of the United States
military. Absentees under civilian control are returned to military authorities as soon as
possible. Soldiers who took absence from a training unit are returned to the Personnel
Control Facility (PCF) at Fort Knox, KY or Fort Sill, OK. Those who have left
operational units in the continental. United States are returned to the unit from which
they took absence. Soldiers in transit or DFR from overseas are no longer considered to
be assigned to the gaining unit, and will be returned to the PCF at either Fort Knox or
Fort Sill.

Upon RMC, the unit commander interviews the soldier to determine the cause for the
absence, and what can be done to mitigate those circumstances. This information is
also used to classify the leave as authorized/unauthorized and to determine the proper
resolution of the case. This can include release or repatriation to the unit.



5) What We Know About AWOL and Desertion



U.S. Army Research Institute @

Table of Contents

I. Background and purpose .....sssssssssssssssssseceseecssssessnnnnnnnmmseeseesesseeessssssnnanssnsseees 1
II. What is a deserter? ........sssssssssssssssessseesssccsneesnecsnecsnsesnnesnnesssecssnesssnsessessnecssnesses 2
III. What is current Army policy in handling cases of desertion? ........ssssseeeen 3
IV. How large a problem is desertion?........sccssssssssssesssessesecsnnescessnnserecessssseseenses 4
V. How do deserters differ from other soldiers? .....ssssssecssssescsssessssssesessneeeesneesees 5
VIL Why do soldiers desert? .....ssssssssssssssesssssssssssssssssnssecsssssnseesesesnnnsececnennsesensennss 6

VII. What are the consequences of desertion for the Army and the
individual soldier? .......sssssssssssssssessssssessssssssssvecssseesssssesssssessssnecsssssessssecsssnessssaneessee B

VIII. What can be done to prevent desertion and/or reclaim the soldier
who has taken this step?....sssssssssssssecssssescsssescssssecsssnecessncessnseessaseccennsecenneesssnneesens 9

TX. SUMIMALY...esscsessssssessceseeccssnecsessseccssseecssneccssusecsssneccsenseessaseessaneecceneesssatesssnes LD

X. What else do we need to learn? ......sesssesssssssssssseessesssseesseesseessneseseeenecenneesseesee 12



3) What We Know About AWOL and Desertion

12

X.

Deserters tend to be younger when they enlist and to experience other
delinquencies prior to deserting.

Deserters are somewhat more likely to be in combat-related MOS, and to have
relatively less time in service and lower ranks.

Family and personal problems are the primary reasons given for
deserting, followed by failure to adapt to the Army, and administrative/leadership
problems.

Desertion most often occurs when there is an opportunity to leave (e.g., when a
soldier is in-transit, on leave, or convalescing).

Desertion is a costly problem for the Army and can be problematic for the
individual soldier on both a practical (e.g., obtaining employment) and personal
(e.g., loss of self esteem) basis.

Prior to deserting, most soldiers attempt to work out their issues in the system.
Evidence also suggests that taking the proper action to deal with a soldier’s
problems may prevent desertion.

Although attempts to identify potential deserters prior to the event have met with
some success, there is a problem in that many “non-deserters” are typically also
identified through this process.

To date, research has indicated that counseling soldiers who are deemed at risk for
desertion can actually increase the incidence of delinquent behavior.

What else do we need to learn?

enon of desertion that will help to alleviate the problem? Here are a few of

W ith this background in mind, what more can we learn about the phenom-

the questions we hope to be able to shed light on through the current project.

Are there new or emerging reasons for desertion that can help explain recent
increases in the phenomenon?

Are leaders still getting advance warning that a soldier is likely to desert and, if
so, what are the quality and quantity of the signals sent?

In cases where leaders are aware that desertion is a possibility, what steps do they
take to alleviate the problem(s) and to what degree are they successful?

Are there existing or possible programs/policies that could be (better)
implemented to address the issues that cause soldiers to desert, and how can such
ideas be disseminated Army-wide?

What impediments are there to soldiers obtaining the help they need to perform
successfully in the Army?

What do soldiers/leaders think it would take to transform a deserter who is RMC
into a successful soldier?



5.) What We Know About AWOL and Desertion

ll. What is a Deserter?

Currently, any soldier who has taken an unauthorized leave from his/her

training or duty station is considered AWOL. On the 31st day of AWOL, this
status is officially changed to Dropped From Rolls (DFR), or desertion. This can be
called the “administrative” definition of the term. From a legal standpoint, individuals
are considered deserters when they have been convicted of the crime through a
court martial. In reality, most desertion cases do not come to this. Instead, the
overwhelming majority of soldiers who desert are released from the Army with less-
than-honorable discharges. (For instance, in Calendar Years 1997 - 2001, 94% of the
approximately 12,000 soldiers who deserted were released from the Army.) In this
paper and project, the focus is on deserters as defined administratively.

r 1 he criteria by which a soldier is classified as a deserter have varied over time.



1 \ U.S. Army Research Institute

a
f : 5 . } Special Report 51
J NV. } August 2002

, cw,
if

What We Know About
AWOL and Desertion:

A Review of the Professional
Literature for Policy Makers
and Commanders

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for Public Release -
Distribution Unlimited

Peter F. Ramsberger
D. Bruce Bell

20021105 or



U.S. Army Research Institute @

V. How do deserters differ from other soldiers?

determine if there are differences between them and non-deserters in terms

of background characteristics and/or experiences in the Army and prior to
enlisting. Such information can be valuable in two ways. For one, it can be used to
identify youth whose admission into the Army may be less than desirable based on the
fact that their pre-service experiences or background information suggest that they are
a higher risk for unauthorized absences. Information on differences between deserters
and non-deserters can also be useful to Army leadership by suggesting which soldiers
may require more attention, either in general or in response to specific circumstances
that have been found to be related to AWOL/desertion (e.g., family problems). Such
information can allow leaders to be proactive in helping to resolve situations/problems
that might otherwise lead to an unauthorized absence.

O ne of the primary motives behind studying soldiers who desert is to

It should be noted that the outcomes of research aimed at identifying differences
between deserters and non-deserters are stated in relative terms. In no instance do
the results show with absolute certainty that someone who enters the Army with a
given characteristic or experience will take unauthorized leave or desert. Rather, the
data indicate that soldiers with certain background characteristics and experiences
are relatively more likely to experience this outcome. Moreover, the vast majority of
soldiers who fit this profile are not going to desert.

With this caveat in mind, research on the characteristics of deserters has yielded
clearly consistent results. This is true across services and over time. These outcomes
are summarized in Table 1.3 The question marks indicate that the data are simply
not available or have not been analyzed to determine whether a particular variable is
characteristic of deserters from that era.



3) What We Know About AWOL and Desertion

Figure 1
Number of Army
Enlisted Desertions
by Fiscal Year,
1990-2001

IV. How large a problem is desertion?

the past six years.' It should be noted that as a percentage of the overall enlisted
Army force, these figures are still quite small, ranging from about 3/10 to 8/10
ofa percent. (By contrast, over the years 1968-1971, during the Vietnam War, the
number of deserters as a percentage of the enlisted Army force averaged around
5%.?) However, with the number of desertions reaching nearly 5,000 in FY 2001 and
apparently continuing to increase, this is a problem that cannot be ignored.

A s seen in Figure 1, the number of desertions has been steadily increasing over



U.S. Army Research Institute (5)

What We Know About
AWOL and Desertion

|. Background and Purpose

he problem of soldiers taking unauthorized leave from their units has
been recorded throughout history. It has also been experienced by the

United States Army from its inception at the time of the Revolutionary War.
Obviously, soldiers being absent without leave (AWOL) and deserting is a troubling
phenomenon whenever it occurs. But the fact is that the Army has seen substantial
increases in this regard over the past several years (see Section IV, below). In response
to this, a study has been initiated that will seek to update and expand upon what we
already know about desertion in order to inform efforts to prevent it from happening
and increase positive outcomes in cases where it does occur (e.g., reclaim individuals as
successful soldiers). This paper is intended to provide an overview of what is currently
known about desertion. It is organized around the following topics:

+ What is a deserter?

+ What is current Army policy in handling cases of desertion?
+ How large a problem is desertion?

+ How do deserters differ from other soldiers?

+ Why do soldiers desert?

+ What are the consequences of desertion for the Army and the
individual soldier?

+ What can be done to prevent desertion and/or reclaim the soldier
who has taken this step?

+ What do we need to learn, and how do we hope to do so through
the current study?



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

4. REPORT DATE (dd-mm-yy)
21 March 2002

2. REPORT TYPE
Interim Report

3. DATES COVERED (from. . . to)
1/16/02 ~ 10/15/02

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
What We Know About AWOL and Desertion: A Review of the
Professional Literature for Policy Makers and Commanders

5a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER
DASW01-98-D-0047

5b. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

665803
6. AUTHOR(S) 5c. PROJECT NUMBER
Peter F. Ramsberger (Human Resources Research Organization) and D730
D. Bruce Bell (U.S. Army Research Institute) 5d. TASK NUMBER
280

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

13, SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
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14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words):

Enlisted desertion rates in the U. S. Army have been increasing in recent years. A study has been undertaken to
examine this issue to shed light on why soldiers desert and what can be done to intervene and lessen its occurrence.
As a first step, the literature on desertion was reviewed and summarized. The topics covered in this report include
how desertion is defined and handled currently, how deserters differ from other soldiers, the reasons for desertion
found in previous research, the consequences of desertion, steps that can be taken to prevent this outcome, and what
needs to be learned to assist Army decision makers and commanders as they seek to deal with this problem.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Desertion, Absent Without Leave (AWOL)

2 19. LIMITATION OF

ABSTRACT

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U.S. Army Research Institute @

Foreword

he Army G-1 requested a Fiscal Year 2002 study of Absence Without Leave

(AWOL) and prolonged absence (which the Army defines as desertion) as a

way of developing more focused efforts to lessen the impact of these chronic
problems for the Army. Specifically, the Army wants to learn what is known about
prevention, apprehension, and rehabilitation of deserters. This is the first report to
provide policy makers and field commanders with the findings from that study: a quick
summary of what is known about the topics of Absence Without Leave (AWOL) and
desertion, based on research during the last 30 years.

Although the problem of AWOL/desertion is fairly constant, it tends to increase in
magnitude during wartime - when the Army tends to increase its demands for troops
and to lower its enlistment standards to meet that need. It can also increase during
times, such as now, when the Army is attempting to restrict the ways that soldiers can
exit service through administrative channels.

The rich information contained in ARI studies of this topic over the years is remarkably
consistent in the findings, which gives us confidence that this information will be
helpful to the intended audience: military policy makers and field commanders.

ana Amucliss

ZITA M. SIMUTIS
Acting Technical Director



3] What We Know About AWOL and Desertion

VII. What are the consequences of desertion for
the Army and the individual soldier?

replacing the individual who left. These costs are obviously dependent on

when the desertion occurs. As a soldier goes through the recruiting, out-
fitting, and training process, the associated fiscal outlays grow. The “payback” to
the Army is represented by performance on the job. So one can conceive of these
costs as being defrayed the longer the soldier remains in service. The United States
General Accounting Office estimates that it costs the Services $38,000 to replace a
fully-trained member. According to the PCF, Fort Knox, KY, 71% of deserters leave
before completing their first year of service.'° In order to provide a general idea of the
magnitude of the financial costs of this phenomenon to the Army, if we assign the full
replacement costs to the 71% of deserters who left in their first year in calendar year
2000, this amounts to some $85,256,800 (.71 x 3,160 deserters x $38,000).

T he most immediate and concrete costs of desertion for the Army are in

But there are also less tangible costs to the Army. Chief among these is the impact

on morale and cohesion when soldiers desert. Although there are few if any formal
studies on the effect of desertion in this regard, it is not unreasonable to assume that
unauthorized absences represent a concrete sign of disaffection within the units, and
likely lead to an increased workload for those left behind until a replacement is found.

The consequences for soldiers who choose to desert can also be classified as more or
less tangible. Concrete results include the possibility of punishment, such as prison
time, depending on the circumstances surrounding the desertion (e.g., war or peace-
time). In truth, at present most soldiers (approximately 94%) who desert are simply
released from the Army with less-than-honorable discharges.'' But this, too, has its
effects. Typically it means forfeiting federal education benefits, federal home loans, and
any opportunity to obtain a job with the federal government. It can also make the
process of finding a job with non-government employers difficult. For instance, a
Department of Defense report on Vietnam-era veterans" cites several studies that were
conducted on the impact of less-than-honorable discharges on those who received
them.” The results of this body of research indicated that employers of all sorts pre-
ferred honorably discharged veterans; and preferred other applicants to veterans with
less-than-honorable discharges. However, only about one quarter of the employers
questioned said they asked to see discharge papers. The report also cites some evidence
that veterans with less-than-honorable discharges may have problems entering profes-
sions (e.g., unions) or obtaining loans from financial institutions. These negative effects
were not universal, however, and it is difficult to translate these outcomes to today’s
very different environment (e.g., all volunteer force, military held in higher esteem).

But individual soldiers are also likely to experience intangible effects from desertion.
These include the loss of self esteem and confidence that results from knowing one has
chosen a certain path and failed to meet the necessary requirements and/or sustain
the fortitude to meet those requirements. This may also be accompanied by the
embarrassment and even shame when admitting to friends and family that one was


@ What We Know About AWOL and Desertion

10

of these experts, 42% of the individuals could not have been prevented from leaving
either because they were unable to make their situation clear enough to be dealt with or
because they simply wanted out of the Army. In 24% of the cases, the officials could not
make a decision based on the information provided. This means that they felt one-third
of these desertions could have been prevented if the proper steps had been taken.

Several studies have addressed the desertion-prevention issue by examining a more
proactive approach, generally involving a two-step process.'* The first was to find
some means of identifying soldiers who are at risk for becoming deserters prior to the
event. This involved the use of questionnaires that seek to identify personality and/or
background characteristics that have been shown to be more common among soldiers
who desert (e.g., lower aptitude, less educated). Such attempts have met with varying
degrees of success, but all have one major problem in common. Even when researchers
can demonstrate that they are able to identify a significant number of soldiers who do
eventually experience problems in their Army service, it is also true that many other
soldiers are singled out who experience no delinquencies. This might not seem terribly
problematic, except for one additional finding.

In these pilot programs, soldiers who were identified as
being “at risk” for desertion were referred for interviews
with their company commanders. After doing follow-

ups, researchers discovered that this process had the
unintended effect of actually increasing instances of failure
among this group (e.g., desertion, AWOL, other recorded
punishment). For instance, in one experiment researchers
found that the proportion of those who received negative
ratings from their superiors and/or who were the targets
of disciplinary actions was 10% higher among soldiers
who were interviewed as compared to non-interviewed
soldiers who scored similarly on the screening instrument.
Researchers explained this outcome in terms of scapegoating
and/or self-fulfilling prophesy. In the former case, it was suggested that leaders who
were aware which soldiers had been singled out as possible failures treated those men
more harshly based on this expectation. It was also possible that the confidence of
the men was undermined when they realized that they had been identified for special
treatment (e.g., interview with commanding officer). Whatever the explanation, the
fact remained that attempts at early intervention to prevent delinquency had, in many
cases, just the opposite result.

Finally there is the question of whether soldiers who have deserted can be rehabilitated
and restored to duty. During World War II, the Army established rehabilitation centers
for deserters and soldiers who committed other transgressions in the hopes of restoring
as many as possible to duty in a time when manpower was at a premium. The programs
were aimed at instilling a sense of discipline in the men, as well as providing them with
training to facilitate their return to duty. From 1942 to 1946, a total of 29,944 soldiers
were the subject of such rehabilitation efforts, of which 17,450 (58%) were actually sent
back to their units.'* Unfortunately, there are no readily available data to indicate the
success rates of these soldiers, although anecdotal evidence suggests that many went on
to serve their country well.


@ What We Know About AWOL and Desertion


| & ) What We Know About
\ AWOL and Desertion:

A Review of the Professional
Literature for Policy Makers
and Commanders

ARI Special Report 51, August 2002

Peter F. Ramsberger
Human Resources Research Organization

D. Bruce Bell
U.S. Army Research Institute

| U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
5001 Eisenhower Avenue + Alexandria, VA 22333-5600
Internet site: http://wwwari.army.mil



@ What We Know About AWOL and Desertion

Table 1

A Comparison of
Deserters and Non-
Deserters on Key
Variables

Lower rank

One finding that is not relevant to today’s environment, but which is interesting
nonetheless, is that during the era of the draft, there was a higher incidence of desertion
among volunteers than among soldiers who were drafted.* The reason for this seemingly
counter intuitive finding is that those who volunteered for service were more likely to
evidence the characteristics seen in Table 1 (e.g., less educated and lower aptitude).

VI. Why do soldiers desert?

he subject of why soldiers desert has also
T been the subject of some research in the

past. Understanding the reasons behind
the action is critical to learning what steps can
be taken to ameliorate the problem. As with the
characteristics of deserters just discussed, there
is a good deal of consistency in the reasons given
by soldiers for their absence. For instance, in
1974, President Ford instituted a clemency
program though which Vietnam draft evaders
and deserters could return to American society
under certain conditions (e.g., reaffirm allegiance
to the United States, perform periods of alternate
service). Data on why these soldiers deserted
were collected through the Joint Alternate Service
Board, the DoD body created to deal with



U.S. Army Research Institute @

unable to “make the grade” in the Army. Feelings such as these are particularly difficult
for young people to overcome as they are forced to find new goals to pursue and new
paths to travel.

VIII. What can be done to prevent desertion and/
or reclaim the soldier who has taken this step?

( } an steps be taken to prevent soldiers from
deserting, or at least lessen the frequency
with which this happens? Perhaps the

most direct evidence addressing this question

comes from the study mentioned earlier con-
ducted as part of the SDRP.“ Deserters who
applied to have their status changed from DFR

to undesirable discharge and individuals who

sought to upgrade general/undesirable discharges

were asked (a) if they had sought help with their problem(s) prior to deserting and

(b) what they thought might have been done that would have prevented them from

deserting. About one-third of the program participants stated that they did not seek

help. Over half (57%) sought relief through administrative channels (e.g., hardship
discharge), while just under half (49%) looked to the chain-of-command for assistance.

Finally, 43% said they sought help from avenues outside the chain-of-command, such

asa chaplain. So, to the extent that these results are indicative, they suggest that most

soldiers do take steps to address their problems before leaving their units.

When asked to cite one thing that could have been done to prevent them from deserting,
SDRP participants gave a variety of answers:

+ Discharge (31%)

+ No overseas assignments (19%)

+ Treat individuals better (12%)

+ Correct an administrative problem (10%)
+ Provide help in adjusting (8%)

+ Grant/extend leave (4%)

+ Assign to another unit (3%)

+ Allow a change of MOS (3%)

+ Other (9%)

Most of these responses would have resulted in the individual staying in the Army if

the desired action was feasible. There is some indication of feasibility from the officials
who conducted the SDRP interviews. They were asked to make a judgment in each case
as to whether, based on what they heard, the AWOL was preventable. In the opinion