alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Editorial Note on Part 724
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 724 appear at 65 FR 62616, Oct. 19, 2000.

§ 724.224 Court-martial specifications, presumption concerning. ( a ) Relevant and material facts stated in a court-martial specification, shall be presumed by the NDRB Panel as established facts. With respect to a discharge or dismissal adjudged by a court-martial case tried under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the action may extend only to change in the discharge or dismissal for purposes of clemency. This policy only applies to cases filed with the discharge review board after December 6, 1983.
( b ) Relevant and material facts stated in a court-martial specification, in the face of which the applicant requested a discharge for the good of the service to avoid trial by court-martial, shall be considered in accordance with the following: ( 1 ) If the applicant/accused was required to admit the facts contained in the charge sheet, or if the discharge authority was required to find that the stated facts were true, then the NDRB can presume the truth of such facts, unless there is a substantial credible evidence to rebut this presumption; or
( 2 ) If the discharge in lieu of court-martial only required a valid preferral, the NDRB may presume that the signer either had personal knowledge of, or had investigated the matters set forth, and that the charges were true in fact to the best of the signer's knowledge and belief.[1] The weight to be given this presumption in determining whether the facts stated in the charge sheet are true is a matter to be determined by the NDRB. To the extent that the discharge proceeding reflects an official determination that the facts stated in the charge sheet are true; that the applicant/accused admitted the facts stated in the charge sheet; or that the applicant/accused admitted guilt of the offense(s), then the presumption is strengthened. In accordance with paragraph B12f of enclosure
( 3 ) to 32 CFR part 70 the presumption may be rebutted by “substantial credible evidence.”
Footnotes -
724.224
[1] Charges may be preferred by any person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The charges must be signed and sworn to before a commissioned officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall state that the signer has personal knowledge of, or has investigated the matters set forth therein; and that the charges are true in fact to the best of the signer's knowledge and belief. 10 U.S.C. 830 (1976) (Art. 30 Uniform Code of Military Justice).
(May 26, 1964)

#### In the Matter of Frank J. Caffery, Appellant, v. James R. Lawley et al., Constituting the Board of Elections of Erie County, and Patricia A. Griffin et al., Respondents.

Order unanimously reversed, without costs of this appeal to any party, and respondents Commissioners directed to place upon the primary ballot the name of Frank J. Caffery, one of the persons designated to the position of Member of the State Assembly, Fourth Assembly District, Erie County, State of New York, to be voted for at the Democratic primary election to be held on June 2, 1964. Memorandum: While other issues were litigated at Special Term the sole question presented upon this appeal is whether the designating petition substantially complies with the requirements of section 135 of the Election Law as to designation of the public office to be sought at a primary election. The petitions described the public office as “Member of State Assembly 4th Assembly District”. Objection thereto was filed upon the ground that “the form is not in accordance with the Election Law”. When spelled out the complaint was that the words “Erie County” were omitted from the description. The objection was sustained by the Board of Elections and this determination was in substance confirmed by Special Term and appellant’s petition dismissed. We conclude that such holdings took a much too narrow view of the mandate of section 135 of the Election Law that a petition should be in “substantially” the form prescribed therein. It appears that Erie and Monroe Counties are the only counties outside of the metropolitan area having four or more Assembly Districts. The purpose of requiring reasonable precision as to the form of such petitions is to avoid confusing or deceiving the Board of Elections or party voters who propose *750to sign such petitions. (Cf. *Matter of Pearson*v. *Board of Elections,*284 App. Div. 649.) Moreover, *“*enrolled voters who seek to designate candidates should be given effect if possible, and not frustrated by technical objections relating to matters not of a vital and mandatory nature.” *(Matter of Carusone*v. *Varney,*277 App. Div. 326, 328, affd. 301 N. Y. 669.) We are unable to visualize how any enrolled voter or public official could possibly have been confused or deceived into believing that appellant was seeking any public office except Member of Assembly in the Fourth Assembly District of Erie County. Noonan, J., not participating. (Appeal from order of Erie Special Term dismissing the petition.) Present—■ Williams, P. J., Bastow, Henry, Noonan and Del Veeehio, JJ.
Exhibit 32.1



BULOVA TECHNOLOGIES GROUP, INC. Certification Pursuant to18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as Adopted Pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Bulova Technologies Group, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K/A for the year ended September 30, 2013, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Stephen L. Gurba, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





| | (1)                         |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                               
| | --------------------------- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |                            
| | (2)                         |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| |                             |  |                                                                                                                                                     
| |                             | 
| | /s/ Stephen L. Gurba        | 
| | Stephen L. Gurba            | 
| | Principal Executive Officer | 
| | July 20, 2015               |
#### 1239.101-73 Policy.

The contracting officer will ensure all documents involving the acquisition of products or services supporting the development or maintenance of DOT software applications, systems, infrastructure, and services contain the appropriate clauses as may be required by Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and other Federal authorities, in order to ensure that information system modernization is prioritized accordance with Federal law, OMB Guidance, and DOT policy.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
   THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM SEC FORM
10-K AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               JAN-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                    JAN-31-1999
<CASH>                                         5,581
<SECURITIES>                                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  7,062
<ALLOWANCES>                                     660
<INVENTORY>                                        0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              14,544
<PP&E>                                         9,020
<DEPRECIATION>                                 6,986
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                19,712
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          6,538
<BONDS>                                            0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              0
<PREFERRED>                                        0
<COMMON>                                         137
<OTHER-SE>                                    12,710
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  19,712
<SALES>                                       22,741
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              27,939
<CGS>                                          3,808
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 18,629
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               8,328
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 493
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (3,854)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (3,854)
<DISCONTINUED>                                     0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    0
<CHANGES>                                          0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (3,854)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (0.29)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.29)
        


</TABLE>
### §61. General regulations, investigations, tests, etc., by Secretary

For the purposes of this chapter the Secretary of Agriculture shall cause to be promulgated such regulations, may cause such investigations, tests, demonstrations, and publications to be made, including the investigation and determination of some practical method whereby repeated and unnecessary sampling and classification of cotton may be avoided, and may cooperate with any department or agency of the Government, any State, Territory, District, or possession, or department, agency, or political subdivision thereof, or any person, as he shall find to be necessary.

(Mar. 4, 1923, ch. 288, §10, 42 Stat. 1519.)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                       3,738,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               49,388,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                 1,344,000
<INVENTORY>                                 90,383,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           164,174,000
<PP&E>                                     477,541,000
<DEPRECIATION>                             161,574,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             519,004,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      119,336,000
<BONDS>                                    410,001,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       149,000
<OTHER-SE>                                (79,073,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               519,004,000
<SALES>                                    189,165,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           189,165,000
<CGS>                                      142,547,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              142,547,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               526,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          21,373,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (20,356,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                 (947,000)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (19,409,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (19,409,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (1.31)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.31)


</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Carlos Colon, Appellant.

[833 NYS2d 605]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (Loehr, J.), rendered June 15, 2005, convicting him of a course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, the plea is vacated, Superior Court information No. 05-0126 is dismissed, and the matter is remitted to the County Court, Westchester County, for further proceedings on the felony complaint.

The defendant was charged, by felony complaint, with criminal sexual act in the first degree in violation of Penal Law § 130.50 (4), a class B violent felony *(see*Penal Law § 70.02 [1] [a]), on the basis of an act that allegedly took place sometime between November 1, 2004 and November 24, 2004. The superior court information upon which the defendant ultimately pleaded guilty instead charged course of sexual conduct against *662a child in the first degree in violation of Penal Law § 130.75 (1) (b), also a class B violent felony *(see*Penal Law § 70.02 [1] [a]), based on acts committed between September 10, 2002 and September 10, 2004.

The single count contained in the superior court information was clearly not the single “offense for which the defendant [had been] held for action of a grand jury” (CPL 195.20). In addition, the single crime charged in the superior court information did not constitute a lesser included offense thereof *(cf. People v Menchetti,*76 NY2d 473, 475 [1990]). This is true aside from the fact that the chronologies set forth in the two instruments seem to exclude any possibility that they were based on the same criminal conduct.

Thus, it is clear that the superior court information upon which the defendant’s plea was based did not “include at least one offense that was contained in the felony complaint” *(People v Zanghi,*79 NY2d 815, 818 [1991]). It follows that the superior court information was jurisdictionally defective *(see People v Zanghi, supra; People v Goforth,*36 AD3d 1202 [2007]; *cf. People v June,*30 AD3d 1016 [2006]). The defendant’s right to appellate review of this defect as a matter of law was not forfeited by his failure to raise a timely objection on this ground in the County Court or by his plea of guilty *(see People v Zanghi, supra*at 817; *People v Boston,*75 NY2d 585, 589 [1990]; *People v Menchetti, supra*at 475; *see also People v McClain,*24 AD3d 1271 [2005]; *People v Kohl,*19 AD3d 1155 [2005]; *People v Harris,*267 AD2d 1008 [1999]). The defendant’s right to review of this issue similarly survived his waiver of his right to appeal *(see People v June, supra; People v McClain, supra).*

In light of our disposition, we need not address the defendant’s remaining contentions. Crane, J.P., Krausman, Covello and Garni, JJ., concur.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

March 29, 2011 

p0321 

Order 

 

March 29, 2011 

142447 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v SC: 142447 

 COA: 293746 

Leelanau CC: 08-001599-FC 

MICHAEL DOUGLAS LIGHT, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 23, 2010 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
#### ESTATE OF SMITH v. UNDERWOOD

No. 437P97

Case below: 127 N.CApp. 1

Motion by plaintiff to dismiss denied 6 November 1997. Petition by defendant (Underwood) for discretionary review pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 denied 6 November 1997.
### SUBCHAPTER III—BARRIERS TO EXPORTS
NNSA's Warhead Dismantlement Process

Published on National Nuclear Security Administration (http://nnsa.energy.gov)

Home > Media Room > Fact Sheets > NNSA's Warhead Dismantlement Process

NNSA's Warhead Dismantlement Process

Release Date: 

June 01, 2006 

http://nnsa.energy.gov/print/mediaroom/factsheets/warheaddismantle (1 of 2)4/23/2012 11:15:31 AM
NNSA's Warhead Dismantlement Process

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Source URL (retrieved on Apr 23, 2012): http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/factsheets/

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### §5624. Barter of agricultural commodities

#### (a) In general

The Secretary or the Commodity Credit Corporation may provide eligible commodities in barter for foreign products under such terms and conditions as the Secretary or the Corporation shall prescribe.

#### (b) Eligible commodities

Unless otherwise specified, eligible commodities shall include—

(1) agricultural commodities acquired by the Commodity Credit Corporation through price support operations; and

(2) agricultural commodities acquired by the Secretary or the Commodity Credit Corporation in the normal course of business and available for disposition.

#### (c) Barter by exporters of agricultural commodities

#### (1) Purpose

The Secretary or the Commodity Credit Corporation shall encourage exporters of agricultural commodities to barter such commodities for foreign products—

(A) to acquire such foreign products needed by such exporters; and

(B) to develop, maintain, or expand foreign markets for United States agricultural exports.

#### (2) Eligible activities

The Secretary or the Commodity Credit Corporation may provide eligible commodities to exporters to assist such exporters in barter transactions.

#### (3) Technical assistance

The Secretary or the Commodity Credit Corporation shall provide technical advice and assistance relating to the barter of agricultural commodities to any United States exporter who requests such advice or assistance.

#### (d) Transfer of foreign products to other Government agencies

The Secretary or the Commodity Credit Corporation may transfer any foreign products that the Secretary or such Corporation obtains through barter activities to other Government agencies if the Corporation receives assurances that it will receive full reimbursement from the agency within the same fiscal year in which such transfer occurs.

#### (e) Corporation authority not limited

Nothing contained in this section shall limit the authority of the Commodity Credit Corporation to acquire, hold, or dispose of such foreign materials as such Corporation determines appropriate in carrying out the functions and protecting the assets of the Corporation.

#### (f) Prohibited activities

The Secretary or the Commodity Credit Corporation shall take reasonable precautions to prevent the misuse of eligible commodities in a barter or exchange program, including activities that—

(1) displace or interfere with commercial sales of United States agricultural commodities that otherwise might be made;

(2) unduly disrupt world prices of agricultural commodities or the normal patterns of commercial trade with recipient countries; or

(3) permit the resale or transshipment of eligible commodities to countries other than the intended recipient country.

(Pub. L. 95–501, title II, §204, as added Pub. L. 101–624, title XV, §1531, Nov. 28, 1990, 104 Stat. 3676; amended Pub. L. 102–237, title III, §320, Dec. 13, 1991, 105 Stat. 1857.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1991—Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 102–237 amended heading and substituted "Government" for "government" in text.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTEDPURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002.

The undersigned officer of FieldPoint Petroleum Corporation (the"Company") hereby certifies that:

     i.     theaccompanying Amendment No. 2 to the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of the Company for the fiscal year ended December 31,2004 (the "Report") fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

     ii.     theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated:  June 23, 2005

/s/ RayReaves                              Ray ReavesChief Executive Officer andChief Financial Officer
Appeal No. 75-32.

#### Arthur L. Duffy, Jr., Arthur L. Duffy, Jr., and Carl T. Ohrn, Jr. *v.*R. I. State Pilotage Commission.

*Martin Malinou,*for plaintiffs. *Julius C. Michaelson,*Attorney Gen-' eral, *Allen Rubine,*Special Asst. Attorney General, for defendant.

Motion of defendant to amend the notice of appeal to a petition for writ of certiorari is granted without prejudice to the right of plaintiffs to raise at the time of oral argument the issue of the improvidence of the grant.
#### (A) In the Matter of Sports Arena Employees, Local 263, International Hod Carriers, Building & Common Laborers Union of America, A F L, Petitioner, v. New York State Labor Relations Board, Respondent. (B) Claudia Bradley, Respondent, v. Anne Frazier, Appellant. Claudia Bradley et al., Respondents, v. Anne Frazier et al., Appellants.

[In each action] Appeals dismissed, without costs, unless appellants shall file and serve record, brief and note of issue for the September 1962 Term on or before August 1, 1962, in which event motion denied. Present — Coon, J. P., Gibson, Herlihy, Reynolds and Taylor, JJ.
1

The Honorable Henry L. Jones, Jr., United States Magistrate Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by

consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 97-4266

___________

Herbert Phillip Malone, *

 *

Appellant, *

 *

v. *

* Appeal from the United States

Steve Walton, Infirmary * District Court for the

Administrator/Manager, Arkansas * Eastern District of Arkansas.

Department of Correction; PHP *

Healthcare Corporation, (Originally * [UNPUBLISHED] 

sued as P.H.P. Medical Group), *

 *

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: May 6, 1999

 Filed: May 11, 1999

___________

Before WOLLMAN, Chief Judge, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and BEAM, Circuit

Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Herbert P. Malone appeals the judgment of the district court1

 dismissing his 42

U.S.C. § 1983 action following a bench trial. Because Malone did not provide a trial
-2-

transcript, we cannot review the court’s factual findings, Malone’s claim of judicial

bias, or the denial of his evidentiary motions, including his motions to call witnesses.

See Fed. R. App. P. 10(b); Van Treese v. Blome, 7 F.3d 729, 729 (8th Cir. 1993) (per

curiam). Based on the district court’s factual findings, we conclude the court properly

rejected Malone’s medical indifference claim. See Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d

1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
place

stamp

2011 Ride The Rockies route on shaded-relief mosaic of here

USGS Landsat 7 satellite images, north-central Colorado.

The USGS serves the Nation by providing reliable scientific information to 

describe and understand the Earth; minimize loss of life and property from 

natural disasters; manage water, biological, energy, and mineral resources; 

and enhance and protect our quality of life.

GIP 127