THE NEW GREAT GAME

Chinese Views on Central Asia

Central Asia Regional Security Issues, 

Economic and Political Challenges 

Edited by 

Charles Hawkins and Robert Love 

Foreign Military Studies Office 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

2006
 ii 
 iii 

THE NEW GREAT GAME

Chinese Views on Central Asia

Central Asia Regional Security Issues, 

Economic and Political Challenges 

Proceedings of the Central Asia Symposium 

Monterey, California 

August 7-11, 2005

Sponsored by the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Intelligence, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 

Fort Monroe, Virginia 

. 
 iv 
 v 

The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports 

are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent 

the official policy or position of the Department of the 

Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 

FMSO is an open-source research and analysis center 

using foreign language publications and contacts to stay 

abreast of military developments outside of the USA. 

FMSO analysts are military and academic linguists with 

extensive backgrounds in the countries they cover. 
 vi 
 vii 

Table of Contents 

Preface....................................................................................................... ix 

Acknowledgments.................................................................................... xi 

Chapter One 

The New Great Game in Central Asia/South Asia: 

Continuity and Change............................................................................. 1

Feroz Hassan Khan 

Part I 

A Framework of Understanding

Chapter Two 

China’s Central Asia Policy ................................................................... 17

Zhou Huasheng 

Chapter Three 

The Security of Central Asia and Its Impact on China....................... 29

Sun Zhuangzhi 

Chapter Four 

Strategic Adjustments and Countermeasures against Extremist 

Forces of Central Asian Countries after 9/11....................................... 47

Dong Xiaoyang, Su Chang 

Chapter Five 

Recent Development and Prospects of Relations Between China 

and the Central Asian States.................................................................. 83

Shi Ze 
 viii 

Part II

Issues and Concerns

Chapter Six 

Analysis of Relations between Interests of China 

and India in Central Asia....................................................................... 95

Yang Shu 

Chapter Seven 

The Role of Multilateral Anti-terror Mechanism in Central Asia.. 107

Pan Guang 

Chapter Eight 

SCO and China-India Relations in Central Asia............................... 117

Zhang Guihong and Jaideep Saikia 

Chapter Nine 

Competition for Caspian Energy Development 

and Its Relationship With China......................................................... 137

Yu Jianhua 

Part III

The Way Ahead

Chapter Ten 

China’s Policy and Image Building in Central Asia: 

A Perspective on Cultural Communication........................................ 159

Ni Jianping 

Chapter Eleven 

The Common Interests of the U.S. and China, and Prospects for 

Cooperation ........................................................................................... 171

Fu Yong 

About the Contributors........................................................................ 189 
 ix 

Preface 

The importance of Central Asia to three major powers—the United States, 

China and Russia—is well understood but not widely recognized or discussed. 

Involvement in the region by the United States has been spotty and uneven 

over many years but since 9/11 has taken on renewed importance in the 

Global War on Terrorism. Russia views the region as its traditional sphere of 

influence, and the many strong ties between Russia and countries in Central 

Asia, especially Kazakhstan, reinforce this view. China has had a presence in 

the region via trade routes for centuries but has only recently made a 

concerted effort to apply its influence. 

Key issues for the region include: terrorism; transnational crime; drug 

trafficking; energy resources (oil and gas); trade; stable governance; border 

disputes; the role of cooperative security organizations, mainly the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Commonwealth of Independent 

States (CIS), but there are many others; and, particularly, cooperation by the 

major powers. 

The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) has engaged Russia’s civilian 

and military experts over security concerns in this area often during the past 

decade. The August 2005 Central Asian Symposium, held in Monterey, 

California, was a way for FMSO to gain a different and uniquely Chinese 

perspective on the area’s problems and potential solutions. The timing and 

topic of the symposium are important, for China is growing more interested in 

Central Asia and its resources by the day. The region is less contentious than 

the Taiwan issue, however, and this factor increased the level of open 

discussion and value of the symposium dramatically. FMSO invited several 

top-level Chinese researchers and analysts to attend the symposium, as well as 

younger analysts/researchers with fresh perspectives on the region. 

I hope the reader will enjoy the papers and discussion points included in 

this book. We highly value the contributions made by our Chinese guests and 

look forward to working with them again in the near future on aspects of the 

same topic. 

 March 10, 2006 

 Jacob W. Kipp 

 Director 

 FMSO 
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 xi 

Acknowledgments 

The primary sponsor for this work was Dr. Jacob Kipp, director of the 

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, a 

subordinate unit of the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC). The symposium’s goal was to engage and network with Chinese 

scholars, researchers and analysts on a region of great interest to the U.S. and 

China—Central Asia. Ten Chinese Central Asian scholars agreed to attend 

and contribute chapters to this volume. The eleventh contributor, Brigadier 

General (retired) Feroz Khan of the Pakistan Army, currently a senior fellow 

at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), graciously allowed his 

symposium keynote address to be included as the first chapter in this work. 

This symposium was hosted by FMSO at the Hilton Hotel in Monterey, 

California, from August 7-11, 2005. 

The event’s success is attributable not only to FMSO but also to the 

contributions of the event’s Chinese and American participants. Special 

recognition is owed to several senior Chinese researchers and officials. Mr. 

Zhuang Jianzhong, secretary general of the Center of Pacific Rim Studies, 

provided access and introductions to important individuals at the Shanghai 

Academy of Social Sciences (SASS), including the head of the Central Asian 

and Russian Studies Department, Dr. Pan Guang. Mr. Rong Ying, vice 

president of the prestigious China Institute for International Studies (CIIS) in 

Beijing, helped ensure the attendance of Dr. Yang Shu, vice president and 

professor at Lanzhou University, and Mr. Shi Ze, a senior fellow at CIIS. 

Long-standing contacts with Dr. Dong Xiaoyang and Dr. Sun Zhuangzhi at 

China’s Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in Beijing gave the symposium 

access to their expertise. Finally, the compilation of this volume would not 

have been possible without the excellent translation work of Mr. Zhang 

(Tiger) Zhexin, a professor of English at Heilongjiang University in Harbin 

and a Ph.D. student at Fudan University in Shanghai. 

U.S. special recognition is accorded to the able services of panel 

moderators Mr. William O’Malley, Mr. Richard Giragosian, and Mr. Les 

Grau. Captain Randal Quan (USAF) of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) 

helped modify travel arrangements for Chinese scholars, offered Chinese 

language support, and assisted with several administrative details. Professor 
 xii 

James Wirtz of the Naval Postgraduate School helped behind the scenes to 

arrange for BG Khan’s keynote speech and one of his students, Mr. Colin 

Lober, assisted with a variety of issues, including arranging a local tour of 

Monterey. Major Nicholas Reisdorff, an assistant Army attaché at the U.S. 

Embassy in Beijing, hosted dinner on the opening day of the symposium. 

Translators Professor Bao Chuanyun and Dr. Ling Lau provided superb 

simultaneous translation services, enhanced by the excellent audio technical 

services of Mr. John Bevan. Ms. Anna Donnelly of TRADOC was 

instrumental in assisting with funding issues; Ms. Erica Nelson of the Hilton 

Hotel ensured that all local administrative details were put in order; Mr. 

Robert Love of FMSO edited the final version of the proceedings; Mr. 

Timothy Thomas of FMSO generously shared his advice and experience in 

preparing the book for publication; Mr. Hommy Rosado of FMSO designed 

the cover art for the book and performed other technical magic; and Ms. Alice 

Mink of FMSO arranged flight itineraries, travel orders, and travel claims for 

all conference participants and served as the symposium’s on-site coordinator. 

I wish to thank all of these people for their support and encouragement. 

 Mr. Charles Hawkins 

 Co-Editor/Symposium Organizer 
 1 

 

Chapter One 

The New Great Game in Central Asia/South Asia: 

Continuity and Change 

Feroz Hassan Khan 

Introduction 

In early June 2005 at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s (SCO) 

foreign ministers meeting, India, Pakistan and Iran were recommended for 

SCO “observer” status. Final SCO approval for the three countries will be 

considered at the next SCO heads-of-state meeting to be held on July 5-6, 

2005 in Astana, Kazakhstan.1 This is a major step, which accommodates each 

of the SCO member states’ interests and the position of the SCO to further 

support a multi-polar world. This paper seeks to address specifically what is 

driving India and Pakistan’s interest in joining the SCO. In order to answer 

this question, one must have an understanding of the SCO and its members. 

The SCO is comprised of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 

and Uzbekistan. During the SCO’s evolution, other countries in the region 

including Mongolia, Iran, India, Pakistan, and more recently the post-Taliban 

Afghan government, have expressed interest, to varying degrees, in 

participating in this emerging regional forum.2

The SCO is an emerging regional organization in Central Asia, but during 

its short history it has largely remained an enigma. It has been characterized as 

a security organization, a regional forum, and an anti-terrorism coalition. 

1

 For coverage see: Valery Agarkov and Oral Karpishev, “Russian Spokesman: India, Iran, 

Pakistan To Join SCO as Observers,” Moscow ITAR-TASS in English, 4 June 2005, FBIS 

Document ID: CEP20050604029012; “China Supports Pakistan, Iran, India Becoming 

SCO Observers,” Beijing Xinhua in English, 7 June 2005, FBIS Document ID: 

CPP20050607000132; and “Transcript of PRC FM Spokesman News Conference on 7 

Jun 05,” Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China WWWText in Chinese, 7 June 2005, FBIS Document ID: CPP20050607000171. 2

 As of the 2004 SCO meeting, only Mongolia has been granted “official observer” status, 

while Pakistan and Iran had later officially requested “observer” status. Pakistan and 

Iran’s application status may be may be realized at the July 2005 SCO meeting in Astana, 

Kazakhstan. See Valery Agarkov, “Pakistan, Iran Apply for Observer Status in SCO,” 

Moscow ITAR-TASS in English, 25 Feb 2005, FBIS Document ID: CEP20050225000340.
 2 

 

Another common characterization of the SCO is as a Russian- and Chineseled alliance created to counter U.S. hegemony. These explanations of the SCO 

have their shortfalls and provide little insight into the primary motivations and 

interests driving the SCO’s evolution. While analysis of this larger question is 

important, this paper seeks to examine the possibilities and implications of 

India, Pakistan, or both joining the SCO as a full-fledged member. In order to 

answer this paper’s research question, it is also important to understand the 

current geopolitical and geoeconomic relations between Central and South 

Asia. What bilateral relations currently exist between India/Pakistan and 

Russia, China, and the Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan)? What barriers or tensions may bar future full 

membership? Is India more likely to be offered entry over Pakistan or vice 

versa? Which SCO member states support or oppose India’s or Pakistan’s 

future membership and why? Finally, what do the answers to these questions 

tell us about the nature of the SCO itself? Is the SCO an alliance? Is it a 

regional economic forum? Or is it a modern-day “concert” of Central Asia? 

The Security Environment 

Central and South Asia were historically linked through politics, culture 

and trade. Despite geographical hurdles, interaction continued until these links 

were broken off when the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva came under 

Russian control during the mid-nineteenth century. Since the collapse of the 

Soviet Union in 1991, changes to the regional political map have once again 

led to speculation as to whether past historical ties will be revived and how far 

old patterns of relations will be restored. The current security environment in 

Central Asia presents both challenges and opportunities for India and Pakistan 

to influence regional affairs.3

 India and Pakistan tend to balance one another 

in their regional economic and security policies. However, one’s failure does 

not necessarily equate to future predictions of the other’s success. 

3

 Dianne L. Smith, Central Asia: A New Great Game? (Washington D.C.: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996), 15. 
 3 

 

According to Juli A. MacDonald, “India and Pakistan squandered 

opportunities to develop closer relations with the new Central Asian states in 

the early 1990s.”4 In the months leading up to September 11, 2001, both 

countries adjusted to fundamental changes in their strategic environment. 

India and Pakistan recognized that Central Asia was to play a critical role in 

their foreign-policy calculations. India and Pakistan faced similar challenges 

regarding development of their regional policies in Central Asia. First, there 

are peer competitors in the region. Indian political elites have increasingly 

referred to Central Asia as part of “their ‘extended strategic neighborhood’ 

and as a region with which they share a range of strategic interests,”5 while 

Pakistani political elites view Central Asia as “important because it gives 

Pakistan what they refer to as ‘strategic depth’.”6 Second, Central Asia is 

viewed “as an arena that is critical to larger geopolitical competitions and 

realignments” in the post-Cold War environment.7 For India this aspect is 

based on perceived threats, whether from Chinese encirclement or regional 

instability generated by the Afghan Taliban government. India also views the 

potential lack of access to a new east-west economic corridor—replacing the 

Cold War north-south orientation—as troubling. Finally, Central Asia 

represents an area for potential cooperation and conflict with the U.S. over 

state interests (e.g., countering Chinese influence or energy development and 

transportation routes). A third aspect of India’s and Pakistan’s thinking toward 

Central Asia concerns non-energy related economic interests and increased 

trade relations.8

 Finally, MacDonald contends that energy resources (e.g. oil, 

gas, and hydropower) and pipeline politics will be a major driving force in 

relations between Central and South Asia.9

4

 Juli A. MacDonald, “South Asia” in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Reorientations, 

Internal Transitions, and Strategic Dynamics,” October 2002. Available from Columbia 

International Affairs Online <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/dod122/index.html> (accessed 

23 May 2005). 5

 Ibid. 

6

 Ibid. 

7

 Ibid. 

8

 For India this involves IT, pharmaceuticals and hotels. For Pakistan this represents its goals 

under the auspicious of the ECO, by reducing trade barriers and offering the landlocked 

Central Asian states a viable means to the Arabian Sea. 9

 MacDonald, “South Asia.” 
 4 

 

India 

India’s “interest in the Central Asia region comes from a mixture of 

politico-strategic concerns and, perhaps to a lesser extent, perceived 

commercial prospects.”10 India’s initial reaction to the newly independent 

states of Central Asia, was like China’s, largely defensive in nature. The rapid 

growth of Pakistan’s, Iran’s and Turkey’s influence in Central Asia generated 

a growing “concern and resentment in Indian nationalist circles.”11 The Indian 

political elites saw Pakistan’s rapid rapprochement in Central Asia as an 

attempt to establish a bloc of Islamic states.12 Anthony Hyman argues that 

some Indian political elites interpreted the independence of the Central Asian 

states “in an alarmist fashion, as a highly unwelcome strengthening of 

Pakistan’s regional position, with five potential new allies.”13 Of particular 

note were the reports claiming Pakistan had acquired enriched uranium from 

Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, while India’s own efforts to acquire the same 

material from Kyrgyzstan, under International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) safeguards, had languished.14 However, Indian nationalists and media 

discussions and reporting largely overplayed fear of a new Muslim 

fundamentalist belt. 

In time, “India’s government took a more sanguine view” toward the 

Central Asia regimes. It came to an understanding “that none of the republics 

wanted the Islamic factor to count in their foreign relations, and that India 

quite as much as Pakistan could keep or gain further influence with these 

essentially secular-minded governments.”15 Anita Inder Singh argues that 

10 Anthony Hyman, “Central Asia’s Relations with Afghanistan and South Asia,” in The New 

States of Central Asia and their Neighbors, ed. Peter Ferdinand (London: Royal Institute 

of International Affairs, 1994), 81. 11 Ibid., 85. 

12 Ross H. Munro, “Security Implications of the Competition for Influence Among 

Neighboring States: China, India, and Central Asia,” in After Empire: The Emerging 

Geopolitics of Central Asia, ed. Jed C. Snyder (Washington D.C.: National Defense 

University Press, 1999), 132. 13 Hyman, “Central Asia’s Relations with Afghanistan and South Asia,” 81. 14 Ibid., 85. 

15 Ibid., 81-82. 
 5 

 

India’s positive re-engagement with the Central Asian states emerged due to 

new international and geopolitical realities. For Singh, India’s attempts to 

establish “good relations with them is a matter of pragmatism as India’s 

neighbors and rivals, Pakistan and China, are interested in the region.”16 India 

was able to capitalize on its past ties with the Soviet Union to press its 

advantage in Central Asia. India’s prestige can largely be attributed to its 

culture, general goodwill and “as an old and trusted friend from the Soviet 

era.”17

Today, India is turning to the SCO not for security purposes but for 

economic motivations. India’s interest in Central Asia and the SCO, by and 

large, is the result of its existing bilateral economic agenda. According to 

Singh, “India regards economic cooperation as the best way to counter 

Pakistan’s influence in Central Asia.”18 The lynchpins of India’s Central 

Asian regional economic policies have been Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 

During the 1990s, “the actual volume of Indian trade with Central Asia 

remained modest.”19 India was able to secure both economic and security 

agreements with Uzbekistan.20 India was also able to increase cooperation 

16 Anita Inder Singh, “India’s Relations with Russia and Central Asia,” International Affairs

71, no. 1 (January 1995), 78. 17 Hyman, “Central Asia’s Relations with Afghanistan and South Asia,” 82. Hyman contends 

that the key to Indian prestige in the region derives not from “politics, fine arts, nor 

historical links, but instead from mass culture, in the form of the immensely popular Hindi 

film industry centered on Bombay, and the pop songs it spawns.”55

18 Singh, “India’s relations with Russia and Central Asia,” 79. 19 Hyman, “Central Asia’s Relations with Afghanistan and South Asia,” 83. The most 

significant trade agreement from this period was a $75M deal signed between India and 

Uzbekistan in January 1992. Also see: FBIS 1/31/99-2/3/92 20 The 1992 India-Uzbekistan treaty ‘on the principles of interstate relations and bilateral 

cooperation’ was similar to the 1993 India-Russian treaty. While neither treaty referenced 

direct military cooperation, they did have similar language concerning cooperation in 

fighting against terrorism, arms and drug trafficking and extremism. This language is 

similar to later documents associated with the SCO members’ goals for the organization. 

See: Atul Aneja “Daily: India, Uzbekistan Holding Talks to Counter Terrorism,” Chennai 

The Hindu in English, 27 April 2000, p. 13, FBIS Document ID: SAP20000427000066; 

Atul Aneja, “India Uzbekistan Sign Treaties To Fight Terrorism,” Chennai The Hindu in 

English, 3 May 2000, p 13, FBIS Document ID: SAP20000503000033; “Indo-Uzbek 

Relations,” Varanasi Aj in Hindi, 4 May 2000, p 6, FBIS Document ID: 

SAP20000509000033; “Uzbek President on Ties With India,” Tashkent Uzbek Television 
 6 

 

with Kazakhstan in the areas of technology exchanges and participation in 

space programs associated with the Baikonur cosmodrome.21 India also 

offered $5 million in trade credits to both Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. 

Finally, India increased cooperation with Tajikistan despite the latter’ internal 

instability. However, it was set back in its attempts to open an embassy in 

Dushanbe. Overall India was received well by the newly independent Central 

Asian states but returned home with little to show for their efforts. A major 

constraint on India’s efforts was that it had little funds to back up the goodwill 

visits. The “cash-strapped Indian Government, its budget vetted by the 

International Monetary Fund, could offer only training programs and, in some 

cases, trade credits.”22 Despite these government limitations, “Indian private 

companies were reportedly looking closely at Tajikistan’s investment 

potential in silver, pharmaceuticals, coal, granite and leather goods for joint 

ventures.”23

Despite its good standing and strong bilateral relationship with Russia,

Ross H. Munro contends, “[i]n the final analysis, it was the overall weakness 

of India’s economy, and not just the budgetary straits the New Delhi 

government was in, that limited India’s ability to make an impact on the new 

republics.”24 China was able to displace India by “offering cheaper and better 

quality consumer goods, including Hong Kong-designed and Chinese-made 

First Channel in Russian, 4 May 2000, FBIS Document ID: CEP20000505000218; 

“Indian Foreign Minister Visits Uzbek Aviation Plant,” Tashkent Uzbekistan Television 

First Channel in Russian, 19 May 1999, FBIS Document ID: FTS19990519001882; 

“India's Singh Holds Wide-Ranging Talks With Uzbek Leaders,” Calcutta The Telegraph

in English 19 May 1999, p 5, FBIS Document ID: FTS19990520000643; “Defense Ties 

With Uzbekistan,” Chennai The Hindu in English 20 May 1999, p 10, FBIS Document 

ID: FTS19990521000609; and “Uzbekistan Seeks India's Help in Tackling Religious 

Extremism,” New Delhi Hindustan Times (Internet Version-WWW) in English, 17 July 

2000, FBIS Document ID: SAP20000717000026. 21 On February 24, 1992, India began expressing interests in space cooperation with 

Kazakhstan’s Baikonur cosmodrome, just as the cash-strapped Russian government was 

mothballing its Buran space shuttle. 22 Munro, “Security Implications of the Competition for Influence Among Neighboring 

States: China, India, and Central Asia,” 132. 23 Anthony Hyman, “Central Asia’s Relations with Afghanistan and South Asia,” 85. 24 Munro, “Security Implications of the Competition for Influence Among Neighboring 

States: China, India, and Central Asia,” 132. 
 7 

 

garments, to the five republics.”25 That is a position China still maintains 

today.26 By 1992, India’s economic ambitions were stymied, and its political 

elites became less concerned about the region. 

Pakistan 

Pakistan’s ambitions to form an Islamic bloc failed to materialize.27 During 

the 1990s, Pakistan targeted the Central Asian states for better relations, but it 

did not yield the results initially sought. Pakistani political elites’ visions of 

forming “a Muslim security belt stretching from Turkey to Pakistan with 

Central Asia as the ‘buckle,’ to provide both ‘strategic depth’ and needed 

allies in her policy struggles over Afghanistan and Kashmir,” were quickly 

dashed.28 Pakistan’s support for the Taliban is a lingering source of friction 

between the Central Asian states. Fear of a spillover into the Tajik civil war 

and Taliban support from the Uzbekistan Islamic Movement (IMU) in 

Uzbekistan, only further isolated Pakistan from Central Asia.29 In addition, 

the Central Asian states reestablished their ties with Russia as their main 

security partner in the region through the May 1992 CIS collective security 

agreement. During the 1990’s, Pakistan was forced to shift its focus in Central 

Asia to establishing bilateral economic and cultural ties and offering 

assistance on regional issues, such as counter-narcotics. 

Pakistan’s initial forays into Central Asia emphasized the economic 

dimension of its foreign policy goals. The primary bilateral mechanism used 

by Pakistan was the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO),30 which 

25 Ibid., 132-133. 

26 India’s latest recourse is to offer information technology exchanges for further cooperation. 

27 Munro, “Security Implications of the Competition for Influence Among Neighboring 

States: China, India, and Central Asia,” 133. 28 Smith, Central Asia: A New Great Game? 12. 29 See Melissa Iqbal and Teresita C. Schaffer, “Pakistan, the Middle East and Central Asia,” 

The South Asia Monitor no. 30 (1 February 2001). Available from The Center for 

Strategic and International Studies <http://www.ciaonet.org> (accessed 24 April 2005). 30 The ECO was established in 1985 as a successor to the 1964 Regional Cooperation for 

Development (RCD) consisting of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. For Russian reactions to the 

ECO, see: Vyacheslav Ya. Belokrenitskiy, “Russia and greater Central Asia,” Asian 
 8 

 

sought to create a common market for goods and services, as well as to 

develop capital and financial markets between Muslim countries.31 Pakistan 

wanted access to Central Asia’s energy resources and natural materials while 

offering to export textiles, machinery and telecommunications equipment. The 

process was started with high-level delegation visits to Central Asia between 

November-December 1991. The result was $30 million in credit offers 

tendered to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan “to establish joint ventures 

in cotton, textiles, garments, pharmaceuticals, engineering goods, surgical 

instruments, telecommunications and agro-industry.”32 In the summer of 

1992, Pakistan was also able to seal agreements with Uzbekistan “for the 

establishment of a satellite communications link, construction of highways, 

joint production of telecommunications equipment and the manufacture in 

Pakistan of rolling stock for Central Asian Railways.”33

According to Dianne L. Smith, “Pakistan has had mixed success in 

bringing these bilateral agreements to fruition. They reflect the gap between 

intent and capability.”34 Smith attributes these constraints to a lack of direct 

geographic access to the region, regional instability, Pakistan’s LOC 

infrastructure, and its lack of financial resources.35 The final blow to 

Pakistan’s early economic aspirations in Central Asia was the establishment of 

the Shanghai Five in 1996, followed by the creation of the SCO in 2001. 

21st Century Foreign Policies and Strategic Incentives toward Central 

Asia and the SCO 

The SCO has severely limited Pakistan’s aspirations in Central Asia. The 

SCO has curtailed Pakistan’s attempts at establishing “strategic depth” by 

Survey 34, no. 12 (December 1994): 1093-1108. Available from JSTOR

<http://www.jstor.org/> (accessed 24 April 2005). 31 Tahir Amin, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Central Asian States,” in The New Geopolitics 

of Central Asia and its Borderlands , eds. Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner 

(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1994), 221. 32 Ibid. 

33 Ibid., 222. 

34 Smith, Central Asia: A New Great Game? 14. 35 Ibid. 
 9 

 

seeking new Islamic allies in a collective security arrangement. The SCO also 

has offered regional non-Islamic powers that are in a more favorable 

geographic position, such as Russia and China, the opportunity to exploit the 

regions’ energy resources. Joining the SCO may offer Pakistan the best 

channel to revisit its 1990s objectives and goals in Central Asia. 

India’s “Look East” foreign policy orientation seeks to enhance economic 

and military ties with countries in Southeast Asia. While its “Look West” 

policy, which is directed toward the Middle East and Central Asia, has not yet 

developed into a coherent strategy. India’s demand for energy resources is 

largely driven by three factors: the rapid growth of its economy; the status of 

its domestic energy sector; and its attempts at diversifying its oil and gas 

imports.36 If India is serious about increasing its access to energy resources in 

Central Asia and the Middle East, it will have to come to a political 

arrangement with Pakistan.37 However, this foreign policy track of economic 

interdependence may compete with India’s future regional goals and lingering 

security concerns. 

India’s 21st century ambition to be a global power has one major 

consequence. Its aspiration to “rise to a global status would be to leave 

Pakistan trailing behind as a minor regional power that could no longer 

threaten India's vital interests.”38 Joining the SCO would build on India’s 

36 For energy cooperation and competition in Central Asia, see: Ibragim Alibekov, “India Set 

to Expand Presence in Central Asia,” 3 December 2003, Available from Eurasianet.Org

<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav120303.shtml> (Accessed 

23 May 2005); and Nikola Krastev, “Central Asia: Strapped for Energy Resources, China 

and India Look for Alternatives,” 22 April 2004. Available from Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/4/E62756BE-A943-

41F1-B03E-86D920CB1188.html> (Accessed 23 May 2005). 37 For an analysis of how India and Pakistan can increase cooperation in the energy sector, 

see: C. Raja Mohan, “Indian Analyst Emphasized Need for ‘Larger’ Vision of ‘Look 

West’ Policy, Chennai The Hindu (Internet Version-WWW) in English, 17 June 2004, 

FBIS Document ID: SAP20040617000014. 38 Stephen Blank, “India’s Grand Strategic Vision Gets Grander,” Asia Times (25 December 

2003). Available from Asian Times Online 

<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EL25Df09.html> (accessed 23 May 2005). 

Also see Stephen Blank, “India’s Continuing Drive into Central Asia,” Central Asia and 

Caucasus Analyst (14 January 2004): 8-9. Available from The Central Asia Caucasus 
 10 

 

existing bilateral economic and military ties with the Central Asian states and 

Russia. Improving military logistics with Iran, Tajikistan,39 Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan40 and Uzbekistan41 is critical to India’s strategic vision. Joining 

the SCO may also make establishing a permanent, stable relationship with 

China more likely.42 However, the events of September 11, 2001, may impact 

India’s long-term regional calculus.43

Institute <http://www.cacianalyst.org/issues/20040114Analyst.pdf > (accessed 13 June 

2005). 39 For details of India’s military engagement in Tajikistan, especially information regarding 

the Farkhor/Ayni airbase and plans to conduct joint exercises, see: Saikat Datta, “India 

Gets Military Partner in Central Asia,” New Delhi The Indian Express (Internet VersionWWW) in English, 13 February 2003. FBIS Document ID: SAP20030213000018; P. 

Jayaram, “India Sets Up Military Base in Tajikistan,” New Delhi Hindustan Times 

(Internet Version-WWW) in English, 16 August 2002, FBIS Document ID: 

SAP20020816000045; “Indian Defense Ministry Denies Military Base Set Up on TajikAfghan Border,” New Delhi Hindustan Times (Internet Version-WWW) in English, 16 

August 2002, FBIS Document ID: SAP20020816000099; and Justin Burke, “Russia, 

China, India stress good ties with Tajikistan,” (Jan 05 2004). Available from 

Eurasian.Org, 

<http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/tajikistan/hypermail/200401/0000.shtml > (accessed 

25 April 2005). 40 For details see: Justin Burke, “Visiting Kyrgyz president vows to boost cooperation with 

India,” (Nov 11 2003). Available from Eurasian.Org, 

<http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200311/0017.shtml> 

(accessed 25 April 2005). 41 For details on India’s military interests in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, see the following: 

Sudha Ramachandran, “India Revels in New Diplomatic Offensive,” Asian Times (22 

November 2003). Accessed from Asian Times Online 

<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EK22Df05.html> (accessed 23 May 2005); 

“Uzbekistan’s Aviation Industry Booms,” BBC News, (18 December 2001). Accessed 

from BCC Online <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1716939.stm> (accessed 23 May 

2005); and K. R. Jawahar, “India and Kazakhstan,” SAPRA Articles and Factsheets, (24 

February 2002). Available from SAPRA

<http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/research/centralasia/articles/ca_article_20020224a_

html.html> (accessed 23 May 2005).

42 For the prospects of Chinese-Indian cooperation and competition, see: Tshering Chonzom, 

“China-India Relations in a Regional Perspective,” New Delhi Institute of Peace and 

Conflict Studies WWW-Text in English 11 December 2004, FBIS Document ID: 

SAP20041216000089. 43 One former Indian officer provides a detailed analysis of why India should wait on the SCO 

and makes a good case for continuing bilateral relations with the SCO members and 

additionally focusing on Afghanistan instead of aggressively pursuing SCO membership. 

See Brig Arun Sahgal (Ret.), “India Should Re-evaluate its Desire to Join Shanghai 
 11 

 

Post September 11th, India’s diplomatic charge into Central Asia has 

largely been driven by its future energy requirements.44 Strategic 

repositioning also weighs in India’s security calculations since the Taliban 

government was ousted from Afghanistan.45 According to Rahul Bedi, the 

U.S.’ continued presence in the Central Asian region and the Chinese-India 

nuclear rivalry are “also fueling New Delhi’s ‘forward’ Central Asian 

policy.”46 Although “India remains powerless to engineer or overtly influence 

the ‘New Game,’ its size, military and nuclear capability make it a not 

altogether insignificant part of the complex jigsaw” puzzle.47

Russia fully supports India’s entry into the SCO as a full-fledged member. 

Russia and India share a “broad congruence on a whole range of strategic 

issues. But it is the defense and military-technical cooperation which is the 

lynchpin of the strategic partnership.”48 Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev 

Cooperation Organization,” New Delhi Force (Internet Version-WWW) in English, 14 

April 2005, FBIS Document ID: SAP20050414000053. 44 For general trends and demands of India’s energy sector, see: “Economic Trends and 

Prospects in Developing Asia: South Asia,” in Asian Development Outlook 2004. 

Available from Asian Development Bank Website

<http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2004/ADO2004_PART2_SA.pdf#page=13

,120> (accessed 23 May 2005): 120-125; “India Country Analysis Brief,” October 2004. 

Available from Energy Information Agency Online

<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/india.html#back> (accessed 23 May 2005); and 

“India’s Share from Foreign Oil Fields To Go Up,” 30 October 2003. Available from 

Rediff.com <http://www.rediff.com/money/2003/oct/30oil.htm> (Accessed 23 May 2005). 

For broader coverage of Russian and Chinese military cooperation with India and 

Pakistan, see: Scott Baldauf, “Selling Arms to India and Pakistan: Explosive Business,” 

The Christian Science Monitor 27 November 2002, 7. Available from ProQuest

<http://proquest.umi.com/login> (accessed 24 April 2005). 45 Sergei Blagov, “Russia Seeking to Strengthen Regional Organizations to Counterbalance 

Western Influence,” 04 December 2002. Available from Eurasian.Org 

<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav120402a_pr.shtml> (accessed 

25 April 2005). 46 Rahul Bedi, “India and Central Asia,” Frontline 19 no. 19, (14-27 September 2002). 

Available from Frontline <http://www.flonnet.com/fl1919/19190600.htm> (accessed 23 

May.2005). 47 Ibid. 

48 Ashok K. Mehta, “India-Russia: Life after Defense,” New Delhi The Pioneer (Internet 

Version-WWW) in English, 04 December 2002, FBIS Document ID: 

SAP20021204000068. For more on Russia-India ties, see: J.N. Dixit, “Vajpayee in Russia 

and Central Asia: Meaningful Revival of Equations,” 17 November 2003. Available from 
 12 

 

also has openly supported India’s inclusion in the SCO, as well as its 

becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council.49 Nevertheless, 

India may be having second thoughts on joining the SCO with Russia and 

China as a “strategic triangle” promoting a multi-polar world. India’s growing 

strategic partnership with the U.S. might “likely put Delhi in an awkward 

situation if it did indeed join the SCO, given the organization’s revised, albeit 

unstated, charter of containing Washington’s burgeoning influence in the 

region.”50 New Delhi is also extremely cautious about joining any security 

forum, especially with China as a leading player, especially if China’s military 

and nuclear partner Pakistan is also a likely member.51 A senior Indian 

diplomat commented that until “SCO membership rules are finalized we 

cannot assess whether joining it will be advantageous or not for India.”52 The 

officials further indicated “that the key to India’s relations with the Central 

Asian Region depended largely on China’s response to the U.S. military 

presence in the region.”53

Post September 11th, Pakistan has found a new ally in Central Asia and a 

strong supporter for its membership in the SCO. Uzbekistan seems ready to 

move past the Pakistani government’s former support for radical Islamic 

groups in Central Asia.54 Security issues and increased bilateral economic 

Indian News Online <http://news.indiamart.com/news-analysis/vajpayee-in-russia-a432.html> (Accessed 23 May 2005). 49 See "Kazakhstan shares India's concerns on terrorism," Mumbai The Times of India 

(Internet Version-WWW) in English, 13 February 2002, FBIS Document ID: 

SAP20020213000031. 50 Bedi, “India and Central Asia.” 

51 For more Indian commentary on the merits for a proposed Russia-China-India alliance, see: 

“Triangular Cooperation,” Chennai Dinamani in Tamil, 04 December 2002; FBIS 

Document ID: SAP20021205000032; "The Russians are here," New Delhi The Indian 

Express (Internet Version-WWW) in English 04 December 2002; FBIS Document ID: 

SAP20021204000026; and Jasjit Singh, “Putin the right perspective,” New Delhi The 

Indian Express (Internet Version-WWW) in English, 04 December 2002, FBIS Document 

ID: SAP20021204000012 52 Rahul Bedi, “India and Central Asia.” 

53 Ibid. 

54 For press coverage of Presidents Islam Karimov and Pervez Musharraf’s news conference 

and details of areas for increased cooperation on security issues and economic ties, see: 

“Uzbekistani, Pakistani Presidents Discuss Counterterrorism Cooperation,” Tashkent Uzbek 

Television First Channel in Uzbek, 06 Mar 2005, FBIS Document ID: CEP20050307000151.; 
 13 

 

cooperation were on the agenda during a recent meeting in Tashkent. 

Presidents Islam Karimov and Pervez Musharraf both see a common threat 

from extremism, terrorism, organized crime and narcotics trafficking. Both 

leaders want to destroy the root causes of terrorism. Economically, Uzbekistan 

is interested in gaining access to Pakistan’s major Indian Ocean ports of 

Karachi and Gwadar. Despite this latest goodwill, the specter of Islamic 

radicals who fled Uzbekistan and sought refuge in Pakistan remains a 

“delicate issue.”55 One may speculate as to whether a new regional NorthSouth axis is forming between Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, all 

strong political and military allies of the U.S.’ Global War on Terrorism. If 

this is the case, Pakistan’s bid to become a member of the SCO may have 

strong implications on the overall SCO orientation, potentially creating a proU.S. support bloc. In this case, the Indian elites which have historically 

suspected a U.S.-Pakistan-China strategic triangle aimed at limiting India’s 

rise to a great power status might well pursue a counter policy by establishing 

an India-Iran-Tajikistan triangle. Regardless of myth or fact, one should 

expect a continued game of “one-upmanship” as India and Pakistan seek 

greater security and economic ties in Central Asia. 

“Pakistan's Musharraf Meets Uzbekistan's Karimov, Sign Anti-Terror Agreement,” Tashkent 

Uzbek Radio 1 in Uzbek 06 Mar 2005, FBIS Document ID: CEP20050307000011.; and “FYI 

-- Musharraf Says Pakistan, Uzbekistan To Cooperate Against Terrorist Groups,” Tashkent 

Uzbek Television First Channel in Uzbek 06 Mar 05, FBIS Document ID: 

CEP20050306000079. 

55 President Karimov cited in “Uzbekistani, Pakistani Presidents Discuss Counterterrorism 

Cooperation,” Tashkent Uzbek Television First Channel in Uzbek 06 Mar 05, FBIS 

Document ID: CEP20050307000151.
 14 
 15 

Part I 

A Framework of Understanding 
 16 
 17 

Chapter Two 

China’s Central Asia Policy 

Zhao Huasheng 

China’s View on the Situation in Central Asia 

China and Central Asian states share the same borders, similar cultures, 

and a long history of communication. China must pay close attention to 

Central Asia, where it has important national interests. 

Since their independence, due to their special geopolitical position and 

various problems during the transformation period, Central Asian states have 

been a victim of growing international terrorism, national separatism and 

religious extremism, as well as smuggling, drug trafficking and arms dealing, 

which also pose serious threats to the surrounding nations, including China. 

Most Central Asian states are confronted with grave domestic problems, 

such as a fragile political structure, serious internal conflicts, poverty and 

huge social gaps. For example, the civil war lasted nearly five years in 

Kazakhstan, a country with a population of only 5 million, since its 

independence, which brought about great losses and trauma in the country. 

Although Central Asian states are on their way to stability, unstable factors 

still exist. China expects to see the long-term peace and stability, rather than 

political turbulence, in Central Asia. 

Despite the long historical connections in politics, economy, nationalities, 

religion, society and culture, Central Asian states are facing various conflicts 

in nationalities, religion, territory, and natural resources, etc., which often 

cause discord and clashes among these states. For example, Ferghana, the 

small yet densely populated basin, belongs to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 

Tajikistan, with indefinite borders between them, as well as mixed population 

of Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyzs, which has already brought about many 

nationality clashes in history. China hopes that all the Central Asian states are 

friendly to each other and solve their problems by negotiation, instead of 

hostility or even force. 
 18 

Although the economy of the Central Asian states is becoming more stable 

since 1995 and has begun to recover since the late 1990s, it still faces many 

difficult problems such as unemployment, poverty and widening social gaps, 

which may not only lead to political instability and social turmoil, but also 

help foster the three forces of smuggling, drug- and arms-trafficking. 

Meanwhile, China-Central Asia economic cooperation can hardly proceed 

without the steady growth of the Central Asian economy. Therefore, China 

expects the development and prosperity of the Central Asian economy, which 

will provide a favorable environment for their economic cooperation. 

Under the post-Cold-War geopolitical milieu, not only is the strategic 

position of Central Asia noticeable again, but the region is also considered as 

a major base for energy in the 21st century. Thus, many large powers have 

begun to engage themselves in the region, competing with each other for more 

interests: the U.S. began its engagement through NATO’s Partnership for 

Peace, as well as financial aid and investment, and set up military bases after 

9/11, while Russia maintains its traditional influence over the region. As a 

neighbor of Central Asia, China hopes it does not turn out to be a battlefield 

for competition among great powers that may add to its instability. 

Despite the improvement in the political and economic situations in the 

region, the development of Central Asia is still quite uncertain in many 

respects, such as the precarious foundation of state power, serious economic 

problems, the widening gap between the rich and the poor, complicated social 

problems, as well as the powerful religious forces that lead to political and 

social rupture. Moreover, in the complicated surrounding environment, 

Central Asia is troubled by the three forces of smuggling, drug trafficking and 

arms dealing; there are also many disputes among Central Asian states on 

such issues as religion, politics, water, and other resources, etc. The 

intervention of the large powers has also further complicated the situation in 

the region. The political conflicts caused by the congressional election in 

Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 and the turmoil in Anjijon, Uzbekistan, in May 

both indicate the possibility of further turbulence in Central Asia. Due to such 

uncertainties, the development of the region, as well as its future policies, is 

also hard to predict. 
 19 

Current Status of China’s Engagement in Central Asia 

Since the independence of the Central Asian states, China’s influence over 

the region has remained very strong, and this is easy to understand. One 

reason is geographical proximity: China shares the same borders of over 3,000 

kilometers with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and is very close to 

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In fact, China is the country closest to Central 

Asia, as well as the one that borders the most Central Asian states. Another 

important issue between China and the Central Asian states is border 

definition. Negotiations on border issues were in progress between China and 

the Soviet Union when the Central Asian states obtained their independence. 

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, most of its western borders with 

China become borders between China and three Central Asian states that 

decided to stand on Russia’s side to continue negotiations with China. Even 

after the resolution of border disputes, the common pursuit of border security 

keeps joining China and Central Asia together. A third reason is the 

connections between the minority nationalities in northwest China and Central 

Asia in ethnic groups, religion, culture, history and tradition. Finally, the rich 

legacy of long historical connections in the region, though concealed over the 

past one and a half centuries, has resumed its effect in China-Central Asia 

relations. For the aforementioned four reasons, China has been a country with 

great influence over Central Asia since its independence from the Soviet 

Union.

Central Asian states are less developed than most other former Soviet 

states. The disintegration of the Soviet Union witnessed the collapse of the 

planned economy and universal economic recession, while the Central Asian 

states suffered even more due to their poor economic foundations. Under these 

circumstances, cheap but durable Chinese goods poured into the region as the 

main source of daily commodities for the residents with low purchasing 

power. Therefore, the development of border trade is another means for 

China’s engagement in Central Asia. 
 20 

With the Taliban’s seizure of state power in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, 

Central Asia, Russia and China were all subjected to the threats of terrorism, 

separatism and extremism to different degrees. For further cooperation and 

attacking terrorism, the “Shanghai Five-State Organization” was founded in 

1996 by China, Russia and three Central Asian states after their border 

negotiations, and is not only an important mechanism for China to safeguard 

its own security, but also the major means for China’s engagement in Central 

Asian security affairs. In 2001, the “Shanghai Five-State Organization” 

became the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” or SCO, a mechanism for 

regional cooperation, which marks a breakthrough in China’s diplomacy in 

Central Asia. The significance of the SCO to China is that it provides China 

with a security-safeguarding mechanism and an institutionalized means for 

China’s engagement in Central Asian affairs, as well as a platform for overall 

cooperation between China and Central Asian states. The establishment of the 

SCO also indicates that China and Russia have compromised with each other 

and reached a strategic balance in Central Asia, as well as acknowledged each 

other’s interests in the region. In contrast, most Western media tend to take 

SCO as the joint attempt of China and Russia to prevent the U.S. and NATO 

from entering Central Asia. Generally speaking, through SCO, China has 

begun to demonstrate its strong position and potential in Central Asia. 

After 9/11, the U.S. military force entered Central Asia, resulting in the 

collapse of the Taliban regime and great changes in the security situation and 

geopolitics of Central Asia, especially seen from the unexpected cooperation 

between Russia and the U.S., the pro-American tendency of Central Asian 

states in politics, and the growing U.S. influence in Central Asia, all of which 

affect China’s position in the region. Many analysts think that 9/11 diminished 

the importance of the SCO in the security guarantee system of Central Asia 

and constrained the development of China’s engagement in the region. 

Although Central Asia’s post-9/11 geopolitical situation is unfavorable to 

China in some sense, its impact on China is not as strong as many foreign 

media believe it to be, and China’s assessment of its own situation is not as 

pessimistic either. The major reason for this gap of perceptions is that foreign 

media tend to observe China-U.S. relations from geopolitical perspectives, 
 21 

emphasizing their competition and opposition, whereas China does not take 

the U.S. as a natural competitor or enemy, or take every U.S.-China encounter 

as confrontation; further, foreign media may have misperceived China’s 

strategic goals in Central Asia as aiming to control the region. As a matter of 

fact, because China has never attempted to control Central Asia, its strategic 

position in Central Asia is not as seriously frustrated as reported by most 

Western media; the China-Russia relationship is not much changed with the 

improvement in Russia-U.S. relations, while the relationship between China 

and Central Asian states is not obviously impaired either; the SCO has also 

survived the change, rather than collapsing as many analysts predicted. Hence, 

in spite of the new challenges China must face in the post-9/11 geopolitical 

situation in Central Asia, its strategic position in the region is not seriously 

weakened. 

Foundation for China’s Engagement in Central Asia 

Two major means, multilateral and bilateral, are adopted to develop ChinaCentral Asia relations. The SCO, the major multilateral means at present, 

serves as a solid platform for the development of China-Central Asia 

relations; it provides an institutionalized framework that engages China in the 

political, economic and security process of Central Asia, so that all can pursue 

their common interests. The bilateral means—the bilateral relations between 

China and Central Asian states—has the same importance as, but is even more 

fundamental than, the multilateral means. Given their respective functions and 

features, both means should be adopted to complement each other for the best 

implementation of China’s Central Asia policy. As the Chinese saying goes, 

“we must walk with both legs.” The SCO and the many bilateral relations, as 

they were, are the two legs with which China can stand firmly in Central Asia.

In fact, China enjoys many distinctive diplomatic resources in Central 

Asia. China’s large size and its proximity to the Central Asian states are 

undoubtedly China’s geopolitical advantages in the region, which naturally 

makes China one of the lasting and important factors in Central Asian issues. 
 22 

In addition, direct flight connections, together with many roads and railways, 

have increasingly facilitated the communication between people and goods 

across their borders. 

For Central Asia, China is an irreplaceable partner in border security, as 

well as a guarantor of regional security. The security of the 3,000-km-long 

borders between China and three Central Asian states depends on their 

cooperation alone, where no other country can replace the position of China. 

Moreover, China is one of the safeguards for Central Asian security by means 

of bilateral cooperation and the SCO. 

As a large nation and a balancing power among the major powers in 

Central Asia, China is crucial to the “balancing diplomacy” and “multidirectional diplomacy” of the Central Asian states. In the meantime, China’s 

diplomatic culture appeals very much to the Central Asian states: China does 

not seek hegemony or bully small states, neither does it intend to interfere in 

the domestic affairs of other countries; instead, it treats each Central Asian 

state equally and is willing to solve all problems through just negotiations. 

This “soft power” is playing an ever more important part in China’s Central 

Asia policy. 

Nonetheless, China’s biggest advantage in Central Asia is its economy, 

which is not only China’s greatest potential political and diplomatic resource, 

but also holds the greatest appeal to Central Asia. China has already become a 

massive economic entity, and its economy is expected to continue growing 

rapidly, which will exert more and more influence on the Central Asian 

economy and render China a closer economic partner with the region. It can 

be predicted for certain that China will become an important trading partner, 

investor, and financial-aid provider for Central Asia, as well as a large market 

for Central Asian energy and mineral products, and an important outlet for 

Central Asian transportation. However, we must also note that the growth of 

the influence of China’s economy is ongoing and will not take place over 

night. 

China also has many disadvantages in Central Asia: due to many years of 

separation between China and the Central Asian states, both have a quite 
 23 

limited understanding of each other, especially in Central Asia, where 

depictions of the old image of China still endure; current Chinese investment 

and economic activity are comparatively limited; China’s political and social 

cultures do not appeal much to the young generation in Central Asia; 

moreover, the long borders between both sides are likely to generate more 

disputes or conflicts while facilitating their communication. 

Economic Relations between China and Central Asia 

At present, there is no serious political problem between China and Central 

Asian states; their border disputes have been resolved and their cooperation on 

border security has been institutionalized; in addition, China maintains good 

relations with every Central Asian state. Therefore, their economic relations 

are the crucial factor that determines the further development of their 

relations. In other words, the further development of China-Central Asia 

relations mainly depends on the enhancement of their economic cooperation.

Economic relations between both sides have developed rapidly over the 

past decade: the total trade volume between China and all four Central Asian 

states (Turkmenistan not included) in 1992 was only a little more than $500 

million; it reached $2.3 billion in 2002, and $5 billion in 2004. Trade between 

both sides is also expected to increase at a faster rate in the coming years. 

However, with the change in the trade environment, China faces new 

challenges. The major form of trade between both sides over the past decade 

has been of daily commodities, especially by people-to-people trade on a 

crude level. People-to-people trade—mainly buying and selling of low-end 

goods in big public markets—emerged under the specific circumstances at the 

time of the independence of Central Asian states, and played a crucial role in 

helping poor families to survive the hard times. Yet this form of trade cannot 

continue enhancing China-Central Asia economic cooperation any longer, due 

to its growing limitations. On the one hand, with more restrictions from the 

government and the need for standardization, Chinese goods that enter the 

Central Asian market by this means will cost more, and thus lose their price 
 24 

advantage; on the other hand, with the gradual improvement of Central Asian 

economy, personal incomes will increase too, resulting in the decreased 

demand for low-end Chinese goods. For these two reasons, Chinese goods 

may have a smaller share in the Central Asian market for a certain period of 

time. As people-to-people trade is the major form of China’s engagement in 

the market, a smaller share of the market will affect China’s economic 

engagement in Central Asia on the whole. This tendency is similar to China’s 

engagement in the Russian market, except that it develops more slowly than in 

Russia. China should take active measures to stop the tendency. 

China’s rapid economic growth has manifold meanings to Central Asian 

states. On the one hand, it is a good opportunity for them; on the other, 

however, because of the relatively weak economic foundation as well as less 

developed industry and technologies, they are afraid of being economically 

marginalized as only a supplier of raw materials for China. Indeed, China is 

not the cause for the weak industrial foundation and large proportion of rawmaterial industry in the economic structure of Central Asian states; neither is 

China the only country that mainly needs Central Asian raw materials, as 

Western investment in the region is also centered on the fields of energy and 

raw materials. Nevertheless, this is still a big problem that China must face in 

developing its relations with Central Asian states. 

Need for China’s Readjustment of Its Economic Policy in Central Asia 

In view of the current problems and the changing situation, China should 

readjust its economic policy in Central Asia in order to better conduct its 

economic cooperation with Central Asian states. 

While developing people-to-people trade with Central Asian states, China 

should place more emphasis on other means of economic cooperation, 

especially investment and joint ventures, in order to further enhance ChinaCentral Asia economic and political cooperation. In reality, such types of 

cooperation are more needed and welcome in Central Asian states; therefore, 

China should attend to their needs and interests in the cooperation for mutual 
 25 

benefit. Many difficulties exist in the development of bilateral cooperation 

between both sides in investments and joint ventures: for China, there are 

obstacles in the management system and policies, and for Central Asia, the 

problem of the environment for investment. Due to the complicated 

environment at present, investment in Central Asia entails great risks. Further, 

China is not yet a large country in capital output. Nonetheless, with its rapid 

economic development and its overseas investment policy becoming more 

flexible, China is beginning to invest more in other countries. Thus, more 

Chinese investment in Central Asia can be expected in the future, with the 

amelioration of the environment for investment and management in the 

region. During past China-Central Asia economic cooperation, the 

government tended to supervise Chinese enterprises with administrative 

orders, which has proven unsuitable for the law of economy and the markets, 

and thus very inefficient. Except for large-scale joint ventures between states, 

the main function of the government should be guiding enterprises, providing 

them with information, consultation, recommendations and other necessary 

services, as well as helping them avoid risks. 

In order to further enhance its economic cooperation with Central Asia, 

China should encourage the participation of more private capital, especially 

from the coastal provinces in the east and the south. With a more flexible and 

efficient capital mechanism, Chinese private enterprises are more adaptive to 

the transforming economic environment of Central Asia. Frontier provinces in 

China are the leading player in China-Central Asia economic cooperation, 

with their irreplaceable advantages in geography and culture, while the coastal 

provinces possess more capacities in science and technology, as well as 

investment. Thus, it is necessary to make more use of the technologies and 

capital in east China. 

Another important task for China in its economic cooperation with Central 

Asia is to establish the reputation of Chinese products. The large amount of 

poor-quality Chinese products that entered the Commonwealth of Independent 

States (CIS) market in the early 1990s seriously damaged the reputation of 

Chinese products, a situation can only be remedied through strenuous efforts. 

Above all, it is necessary to distinguish the quality of a product from its grade: 
 26 

different products have different grades according to different costs and 

quality standards, yet low-grade products do not necessarily mean poor 

quality; as long as they pass a certain quality standard, they should be 

accepted for their price. At present, most Chinese products in the Central 

Asian market are low-end for the following reasons: 1) China is the leading 

country in the production of low-end products for the low costs of Chinese 

labor; 2) the Central Asian market has great demands for low-end products for 

its comparatively low purchasing power; and 3) it is easy for small businesses 

in China to join in the market for relatively easy access across the border. In 

general, Central Asian consumers tend to accept Chinese low-end products, 

instead of high-tech products, which have already had a certain share in the 

European and American markets for their good quality and advantage in price. 

Thus, it can be said that the difficulty of Chinese high-tech products in the 

Central Asian market is mainly rooted in the bad image of Chinese products 

as a whole. In order to raise its economic cooperation with Central Asia to a 

new level, China should strive to create a new image for Chinese products and 

eliminate the negative effects of the old one. 

Furthermore, China is also likely to encounter a new problem in bilateral 

relations, i.e., how to develop its relations with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 

respectively. China maintains the same policy regarding each Central Asian 

state, and tends to develop a friendly and cooperative relationship with each 

one while trying to keep an overall balance among them. Kazakhstan and 

Uzbekistan are two large states in Central Asia, both maintaining good 

relations with China. The current problem, however, is that the growth of 

common interests between China and Kazakhstan is much faster than between 

China and Uzbekistan; there is a tendency toward imbalance in the 

development of their national relations. 

Kazakhstan is not only the largest neighbor state of China in Central Asia, 

with the longest common border and sharing the most ports with China, but 

there are also over one million of Kazakhs living in Xinjiang, China. As a 

result, private communication between both countries is the easiest and most 

frequent, with the most active trade and closely intertwined interests. Yet from 

another perspective, such close communication also brings about more 
 27 

problems than between China and other states, such as immigration issues and 

disputes over water resources, among others. 

Kazakhstan is of crucial importance to China, as most of China’s interests 

in Central Asia are reflected in Kazakhstan: the first is in border security, 

because they share a common border of more than 1,700 kilometers, or more 

than half of the total that China shares with Central Asia; the second is in antiterrorism, for Kazakhstan is both the major stage for the “East Turkistan 

Movement” and the main passage for the connections of the Movement with 

international terrorist forces; the next is in their economic cooperation, since 

Kazakhstan is China’s biggest partner for trade in Central Asia, with their 

trade volume in 2004 exceeding $4 billion, far ahead of that between China 

and other Central Asian states; lastly, Kazakhstan is the most important 

Central Asian partner in energy; an important breakthrough in their energy 

cooperation is very likely that China’s oil imports from Kazakhstan may reach 

four million tons in the coming few years, which will substantially strengthen 

China’s interests in Kazakhstan. 

Uzbekistan is another large state in Central Asia that has also shared a good 

relationship with China. Yet unlike with Kazakhstan, common interests 

between China and Uzbekistan center on politics, regional security and antiterrorism. On the one hand, the fact that there is no common border between 

both countries saves a lot of problems for them, such as disputes over water or 

border issues, and the responsibility for environmental pollution, etc; on the 

other hand, transportation between both countries is not convenient enough 

for their further cooperation. Their economic cooperation, for example, is 

developing comparatively slowly: in 2003, their total trade volume was only 

little more than $300 million, almost 1/10 of that between China and 

Kazakhstan. Moreover, despite the potential oil and natural gas reserves in 

Uzbekistan, there is not yet a large-scale joint program between both countries 

for energy exploitation. All the abovementioned factors lead to a stark contrast 

between China-Kazakhstan relations and China-Uzbekistan relations, which 

may be even sharper once the China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline is constructed. 

At that time, Kazakhstan will hold a much more important position in China’s 

diplomacy and economy, whereas Uzbekistan’s position will become even 
 28 

less important, resulting in a certain imbalance between China’s relations with 

these two states. 

How to maintain the relative balance between relations with Kazakhstan 

and Uzbekistan is a difficult task for Chinese diplomacy. While developing its 

relations with Kazakhstan, China needs to pay more efforts to its economic 

cooperation with Uzbekistan. To achieve this goal, railway and road 

transportation is of special significance. It is estimated that trade volume 

between both countries may easily double with the solution of the railway 

transportation problems. Meanwhile, China should identify the growth points 

and potential of its economic cooperation with Uzbekistan according to the 

characteristics of Uzbek economy. 

Furthermore, China needs to enhance its economic cooperation with 

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well. In view of the fact that there are few oil 

and natural gas resources in the two countries, China should look for areas in 

which their cooperation can be conducted. Because both Kyrgyzstan and 

Tajikistan are relatively small economic entities with no ambition to compete 

with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, China’s relations with both states are less 

subject to the influence of external factors, thus remaining rather stable. 
 29 

Chapter Three 

The Security of Central Asia and Its Impact on China 

Sun Zhuangzhi 

With an area of about four million square kilometers and a total population 

of 56 million, Central Asian security is confronted with many serious threats 

and practical problems, a fact that directly affects the stability and 

development of northwest China, especially Xinjiang, China. 

Complexity of Central Asian Security 

Although the original rule of security based on bipolar confrontation was 

shattered with the end of the Cold War, its remaining effect keeps troubling 

West Asia and South Asia, among other regions. The Palestine-Israel 

conflicts, India-Pakistan confrontation, as well as the civil war in Afghanistan, 

are doomed to last, while the disintegration of the Soviet Union facilitates the 

infiltration of external unstable factors, resulting in a “shattered security zone” 

in some frontier areas of the former Soviet Union. Central Asia lies right in 

the zone. Due to their limited power and rather weak national security system, 

as well as many difficulties in the political and economic development, the 

five Central Asian states are facing a difficult security situation. 

Two factors are the key to the stability of the newly independent states, 

namely stability of the border and identity of residents of all nationalities with 

the new state, both extremely difficult to achieve for Central Asian states. 

According to Russian scholars, there are at least 19 disputed areas in Central 

Asia, which will bring about many conflicts in the future. There are also over 

100 nationalities living in the region, and violent conflicts between some 

nationalities happened in the Soviet times; the emigration tide after the 

independence of Central Asian states indicates the lack of trust between the 

nationalities; many minority nationalities worry about, or are discontented 

with, the policies of the new states. 
 30 

Nevertheless, the real threats to Central Asian security are the 

nontraditional factors: many nontraditional security problems have plagued 

the region since the end of last century, terrorism as the most serious one; the 

Central Asian security environment is further complicated by such issues as 

extremism, drug dealing, arms smuggling, epidemics and ecological problems. 

Conspicuously, most of the problems are transnational, with universal harm to 

all Central Asian states. 

Persistence of Transnational Crime 

A crucial factor threatening Central Asian security is the problem of 

transnational drug and arms smuggling. The drug output in Afghanistan in 

2002 reached 3,400 tons, 65 percent of which were transported across the 

Tajikistan-Afghanistan border, and then to Europe and Russia via Central 

Asia, but only 10 percent of the transportation can be intercepted by lawenforcing sectors of Central Asian states. Meanwhile, as the wild opium 

poppies in the region can be made into 30 tons of opium, Central Asia itself 

has become one of the four largest drug-producing regions in the world, and is 

called “the Golden Crescent Zone” together with Afghanistan, Pakistan and 

Iran. The booming drug business leads to an increase in the number of drug 

addicts and drug-related crimes in the region. 

Another important financial resource for local terrorist organizations is the 

smuggling of arms and military technologies. Moreover, Central Asia is an 

important passage for the transportation of arms to Afghanistan. For example, 

Russian frontier forces have confiscated 1,500 illegal weapons on the 

Tajikistan-Afghanistan border since 1992.

The Expanding “Three Forces” 

In the political context in the late 1980s, extremist forces in Central Asia 

began to spread. First, due to the ideological confusion in the late years of the 

Soviet Union, they grew very fast in Central Asia, a region with many 
 31 

religious and ethnic problems; second, the political pluralism gave rise to 

many extremist organizations with political colors; next, extremist forces 

abroad took advantage of the occasion and began to infiltrate into Central 

Asia; lastly, the situation in Central Asia was once out of control at the time of 

the disintegration of the Soviet Union, so that extremist forces made a few 

attempts to seize the state power in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, both with a 

long Islamic tradition. Taking the densely populated Ferghana Basin as their 

base, they attempted to spread to other areas. 

The Tajik civil war broke out in March 1992. The scheme of the extremist 

forces, including the Islamic Restoration Party, to seize the state power by 

force, was opposed by most areas. Thus, they were soon expelled from the 

capital, Dushanbe, and fled to the mountainous areas and the border areas of 

Afghanistan. In autumn 1993, the extremists of Tajikistan established a new 

religious party, the Islamic Restoration Movement (IRM), in Afghanistan, and 

in 1996, the Uzbekistan Islamic Movement (IMU). Apart from support it 

receives from international terrorist organizations, the IMU is also engaged in 

such crimes as drug smuggling and kidnapping, and has set up some military 

bases and training camps in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan. With the 

recovery of the Central Asian economy and the forceful striking of all state 

governments, the influence of religious extremism among the residents has 

been declining. Under this circumstance, Central Asian religious extremist 

forces set their base in Afghanistan and continually destabilize the political 

situation through force and terrorist actions, a means adopted by extremist 

national separatists as well.

By 1999, extremist, terrorist and separatist forces had grown to be a serious 

practical threat to the whole of Central Asia, mainly as a result of the 

changing Afghan situation. With the complicated relations among different 

nationalities, strong religious tradition, an underdeveloped economy, the poor 

living standard of the local residents, and mismanagement of the government 

in some areas, extremist forces have subjected Central Asia to their constant 

threat. With the support of external forces, extremists caused much disruption 

in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan: they set up bases in 

Afghanistan and the mountainous areas of north Tajikistan, and launched 
 32 

many actions; in most Central Asian states, especially in Kyrgyzstan and 

Tajikistan, armed extremists crossed borders, attacked villages and took 

hostages, arousing broad international concern.

Extremist organizations in Central Asia remain active to this day. Not only 

do the Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HT) and IMU continue their actions, but there 

have also emerged new organizations that are even more radical, similar to 

those in the Middle East and Chechnya. A series of terrorist attacks were 

launched in Tashkent and Buhala of Uzbekistan in 2004, and the riot in 

Anjijon, Uzbekistan, in May 2005 was related to extremist forces as well. 

What deserves special attention is, after both terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan in 

2004, a terrorist group named “Jihad” claimed responsibility on its website, 

which suggests that extremist and terrorist organizations have been 

internationalized and become more difficult to control. Although such major 

extremist forces as the IMU and HT were split after several defeats and will 

not be able to regroup in the short term, the “three forces” will grow rapidly 

given a new opportunity.

The Worsening Ecological Environment 

In the Salt Sea areas, the ecological environment keeps deteriorating, and 

the water resources are unevenly distributed. The Salt Sea Crisis is one of the 

most wretched ecological tragedies in the 21st century, directly affecting 

nearly 35 million residents. Over the past 30 years, the water reserve in the sea 

has decreased from 1.064 million cubic meters to less than 400 thousand, and 

the water level has dropped 20 meters, causing such disasters as abnormal 

climates, soil degradation, as well as sand and salt storms. Statistically, the 

many sand storms have brought nearly 100 million tons of salt dust in the Salt 

Sea to the nearby areas, producing a high saline-alkali effect on 80 percent of 

all arable land in Turkmenistan and a 30 percent reduction of agricultural 

products in Uzbekistan. Other ecological problems, such as pollution of 

radioactive materials, exhaustion of water resources, and air pollution, are 

becoming more serious. For example, a large uranium production base was 
 33 

established in the Ferghana Basin during Soviet times, and a large amount of 

nuclear waste was buried right underground, prone to leaking at any time. 

Regrettably, the international community has not yet shown enough concern 

for the disastrous ecological problems in Central Asia. At the Consultation 

Meeting of Nations Aiding Kyrgyzstan held in Bishkek on October 8, 2002, 

Kyrgyz President Akayev warned that if timely precautionary measures were 

not taken in connection with the nuclear waste in the country, then a serious 

ecological disaster might well occur in the Ferghana Basin and nearby areas at 

the intersection of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

The Burden of Population Explosion 

In view of the large proportion of young people in the Central Asian 

population, the growth rate of the population will remain high. The scale of 

population in most Central Asian states has actually exceeded their economic 

and environmental load, and has generated such problems as surplus labor, a 

disorderly flow of the population, and serious unemployment. As predicted by 

the World Bank, the total population of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan alone will 

reach 60 million in 2015, while that of all five of the Central Asian states may 

approximate 90 million. Another problem is the extremely uneven population 

distribution. At present, the population density of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 

has surpassed the world’s average standard, 54.0 and 43.2 people per square 

kilometer, respectively. The population pressure is further amplified by the 

poor geological and climatic conditions and lack of water resources. In 

contrast, Kazakhstan, which has the best natural conditions among all Central 

Asian states, is witnessing a population shortage from population drainage; its 

population was merely 14.9 million, with a density of only 5.5 people per 

square kilometer. Moreover, the problems of immigrants and refugees keep 

plaguing the Central Asian states, and even affect their domestic relations as 

well as national relations. For example, diplomatic disputes on immigration 

exist between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan; the active smuggling on the borders 

of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is also related to illegal 

immigration.
 34 

In addition, the Central Asian states are facing an increasingly serious 

situation in their economic security. First, their economy depends heavily on 

Western countries; foreign loans of most states have surpassed safe levels. 

The net foreign loans of Kyrgyzstan reached $1,655 million in 2002, 110 

percent of the total GDP, while those of Tajikistan reached $1,016 million at 

the end of 2001. Even Kazakhstan, the most developed among all Central 

Asian states, has a heavy burden of foreign loans, which reached $24 billion at 

the beginning of 2004, 75 percent of its GDP. Next, many Central Asian states 

face serious food and energy security problems. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 

lack such strategic resources as oil and natural gas, while food production 

cannot suffice Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Finally, new conflicts over water 

resources continually arise between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in the upstream 

area and the downstream Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. As most large rivers in 

Central Asia run across more than one state, disputes over the distribution of 

water are extremely difficult to resolve.

It can be seen that challenges to Central Asian security are rooted in 

various aspects, most of which are new, dormant and internal. A Tajik scholar 

categorized all the threats to Central Asian security into seven types: 1) a 

politically radical tendency caused by economic and social crises; 2) 

geopolitical confrontation and competition over energy and spheres of 

influence; 3) religious extremist and terrorist tendencies; 4) conflicts among 

Central Asian states over territory and resources; 5) the ever increasing drug 

threat; 6) new perturbation caused by the Iraq crisis, and; 7) the development 

and internationalization of such organizations as the HT. The complicated 

security situation in Central Asia is closely related to the change in the 

peripheral or international security situation, thus the issue can hardly be 

resolved by the efforts of a single or a few Central Asian states.

Pressure On the Security Situation In Central Asia 

The stability of Central Asia has long been subject to various traditional 

and nontraditional threats. Three security crises have occurred in the Central 

Asian states since their independence, namely, the Tajik civil war in 1992; the 
 35 

invasion of extremist forces in 1999; and the turmoil in Kyrgyzstan and 

Uzbekistan in 2005. All three were regional issues, and none caused largescale chaos or conflicts, but they clearly indicated the severe security situation 

of Central Asia. In view of the comprehensive, urgent, and complicated 

characteristics of Central Asian security, the Central Asian states call for a 

multilateral cooperation mechanism to safeguard the security and stability of 

the region. 

The Tajik civil war was more or less a result of the political disorder during 

the later Soviet years, as well as the change of the political situation in Russia, 

which also caused an agonizing top-level political struggle in other Central 

Asian states. A direct result of such struggle is the political weakness of the 

newly independent states. Most Central Asian states had managed to walk out 

of the quagmire by 1995, with the strengthening of presidential power and the 

expanding control over the society; compromise among different nationalities 

in Tajikistan was also partly reached in 1997. Many terrorist attacks plagued 

Central Asia in 1999. Influenced by the changing Afghan situation and the 

occupation of the Afghani-Central Asian borders by the Taliban, Afghan 

extremists invaded the mountainous areas in south Kyrgyzstan, causing much 

turmoil in the area. In 2000, the IMU based in Afghanistan continued to 

disturb the regional security situation. After 9/11, the U.S. anti-terrorist 

actions in Afghanistan have to a certain extent reduced the external pressure 

on Central Asian security. However, because many extremists and terrorists 

hid themselves in Central Asia, and such extremist organizations as the HT 

keep increasing their power, the Central Asian states have fallen into a new 

security dilemma. 

Despite the decreasing external threat to Central Asia since the end of the 

anti-terrorist war in Afghanistan, Central Asian states are facing even more 

complicated internal problems, including economic and social instability, 

conflicts over land and water resources, population explosion, potential 

clashes between nationalities, border disputes, restrictions on each other’s 

trade and cross-border transportation, religious extremism, corruption, and the 

ever more serious ecological crisis. All have but proved that Central Asia still 

confronts various security challenges. 
 36 

A result of the anti-terrorist war in Afghanistan is U.S.’s military presence 

in Central Asia and the subsequent intensification of geopolitical competition. 

The U.S. and its allies signed agreements with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 

Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan respectively on the use of some of their airports; 

they also decided to set a long-term lease on the use of the Hanabad Airport of 

Uzbekistan and the Manas Airport of Kyrgyzstan. In mid-December 2001, 

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Jones said to the Committee on Central Asia 

and the Caucasus of the U.S. Congress that, the U.S. would not withdraw from 

Central Asia after the Afghanistan War. In addition, he expounded three major 

U.S. interests in Central Asia, i.e., preventing the expansion of terrorism, 

safeguarding political and economic reform and legal institutions in Central 

Asia, and ensuring the safe and transparent exploitation of Caspian resources. 

Many Russian and Central Asian scholars believe that the U.S. aims to “kill 

three birds with one stone,” i.e., to exert influence on south Russia, energytransportation routes, and Xinjiang of China. More specifically, the U.S. aims 

to use the springboard to control the Caspian region, manipulate the stability 

of northwest China, curb, or even exclude, Russian and Iranian presence in 

Central Asia, manipulate the future development of Central Asian states, and 

set up a pro-American alignment in the region and a pro-American regime in 

Afghanistan. 

Russia held a rather pragmatic attitude toward the U.S.’s entry into Central 

Asia, a region long considered as Russia’s “strategic backyard,” and made 

many unexpected concessions. Russian President Putin said that Russia would 

not worry about the overall development of U.S.-Central Asia relations, 

should substantial changes happen to Russia-U.S. security relations. Based on 

the general objective of Russian diplomacy and the development of the 

situation, the Russian gesture demonstrates Russia’s intention to substantially 

improve its relations with Western countries with the Central Asian states as 

its cards to play. Meanwhile, Russia becomes more active in the CIS, striving 

to maintain its superiority in the region. Both the expansion of U.S. influence 

in Central Asia and the strategic adjustments of Russia directly affect the 

security structure of the region. Russia also continues to strengthen its military 

presence in Central Asia. By setting up a new base in the Kent Military 
 37 

Airport in Kyrgyzstan, Russia aims to pin down the U.S. troops stationed at 

the Manas Base of Kyrgyzstan. In May 2003, Russia signed an agreement 

with the Tajik government on establishing a military base in Tajikistan, which 

was to be expanded on the basis of the original Russian 201 Motorized 

Brigade; its final goal was to set up a multi-service force, including an 

airborne branch. In October 2003 and October 2004, Russia formally 

established a military base in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan respectively. 

In March 2005, related to the promotion of “democratization” by the U.S. 

in CIS regions and its encouragement for political dissidents to seize state 

power, the parliamentary election in Kyrgyzstan gave rise to a political crisis 

and large-scale turmoil. President Akayev fled, leaving the state out of 

control. Later in May, Anjijon, Uzbekistan, witnessed prison riots, 

demonstrations, and even riots in which governmental sectors were overtaken 

by violence, further indicating the imminence of internal threats that have long 

been subdued by the “large-power game.” The systemic weaknesses, retarded 

economy and widening social disparities led to the eruption of the 

accumulated conflicts. As presidential elections are going to be held in other 

Central Asian states, extremist forces and political dissidents in these states, 

encouraged by the “3/24 Incident,” may cause more instability or even turmoil 

in Central Asia. The main reasons are as follows: 

 Defects in the regimes themselves and the intensification of a power 

struggle. 

The authoritarian regimes in the five Central Asian states inherited some 

Soviet problems, including the massive bureaucracy and serious corruption, 

generating more and more social discontent. Moreover, the political structure 

of the Central Asian states and the parliamentary system are undergoing 

constant changes, which accrues strong power into the hands of the presidents. 

However, the long-term control of power by the presidents, as well as of 

groups with vested interests, may well lead to the suppression of other 

political parties, thus driving political disputes to the extreme. 

 Unsuccessful economic reform and the poor living standard for 

ordinary people. 
 38 

The huge gap between the rich and the poor, the unjust distribution of 

social wealth, and the high rate of unemployment gave rise to sharp social 

confrontation. In 1998, the number of people living in poverty in the Central 

Asian states was 28 million, more than half of the total, among whom 

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan constituted 30-35 percent, Turkmenistan 50 

percent, Kyrgyzstan 60 percent, and Tajikistan over 70 percent. These 

statistics are very little changed today. Thus, the unbalanced development in 

the Central Asian economy rendered many areas destitute, especially the 

mountainous areas, which provides the foundation for the expansion of antigovernment actions and religious extremist forces. Kazakh President 

Nazarbayev, worried about the social and economic situation in Central Asia, 

pointed out that the root of terrorism is poverty, and that globalization is 

causing more security problems in the region. 

 Unsolved nationality and religious issues as “powder kegs.” 

The Ferghana region is characterized by its complicated relations among 

nationalities, a backward social economy, and conflicts among nationalities 

across the borders. Located at the crossing of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 

Tajikistan, the Ferghana has a population of more than 10 million, including 

half the population of Kyrgyzstan, 20 percent of whom are Uzbeks, 27 percent 

of the population of Uzbekistan, and 1/3 of the population of Tajikistan (31 

percent of whom are Uzbeks)—altogether 8.3 million Uzbeks. The region also 

has a long Islamic history. Therefore, extremist forces keep causing trouble in 

the region, in the name of revitalizing the traditional culture and protecting the 

interests of the minority nationalities. 

Geopolitical Factors 

With many countries’ concerns about Central Asia’s unique geographical 

position and rich resources, as well as various clashes of large-power interests, 

the geopolitical situation in Central Asia is very complicated, which is a main 

source of threats to regional security. In this situation, maintaining their 

position in the large-power competition and avoiding being drawn into 

international disputes is a big challenge for Central Asian states. 
 39 

With the change in the regional situation, many other countries besides 

Russia and the U.S. attempt to expand their influence in the region as well, 

especially China, the EU, Japan, Turkey and India. Not only do they compete 

with Russia and the U.S., but they all have their own strategic goals; and they 

all hope to play a role in the security structure of Central Asia. At present, the 

security situation of Central Asia is still vague, while domestic problems and 

non-traditional threats in the Central Asian states are emerging more rapidly. 

In addition, cooperation led by large states is increasingly active. 

Despite the severe security situation in Central Asia, it is still possible to 

maintain the long-term stability of the region, if the following conditions are 

met: 

The Central Asian states stabilize and develop their economies gradually. 

As we know, most of them have serious economic problems and low living 

standards for most people, apart from the excessive population growth, huge 

social gaps, corruption and nationality conflicts. 

Despite the severe security situation in Central Asia, it is still possible to 

maintain the long-term stability of the region, if the following conditions are 

met: 

 The Central Asian states stabilize and develop their economies 

gradually. As we know, most of them have serious economic problems 

and low living standards for most people, apart from the excessive 

population growth, huge social gaps, corruption, and nationality 

conflicts. 

 The geopolitical situation is ameliorated. Central Asian stability will 

be destroyed if the situation in Afghanistan again worsens, or new 

international disputes arise over Caspian issues, or the Chechen War in 

Russia endures, or acute conflicts erupt between India and Pakistan. 

 International cooperation is conducted smoothly in the region. It will 

be very conducive to regional peace if mutual understanding and 

cooperation can resolve disputes on the borders over water resources 

and environments. Otherwise, the consequences will directly harm 

regional stability. Moreover, effective international cooperation should 

also be continued to combat regional extremism and terrorism. 

 Large-power relations can be readjusted to a more peaceful paradigm. 

As Central Asia has its distinctive position in the global and regional 
 40 

strategies of large powers, the power structure and competition over 

interests will influence the stability of the region from outside. 

However, domestic political and economic development in Central Asian 

states will experience more ups and downs in the future. The authoritarian 

institution gathers too much power in the hands of the president, which might 

lead to a successor crisis or a lack of political elites; the burgeoning corruption 

will harm social stability; nationality and religious problems will continue to 

plague Central Asian states; and the incumbent regimes will not receive 

support from the majority of people, due to the large social gaps. Considering 

that the international environment cannot be improved over a short period, 

Central Asia’s economic prospects are not very promising. Furthermore, there 

are the problems of increasing foreign debt burdens and very dated 

technologies, etc. Therefore, it can be predicted that over the coming ten 

years, the domestic situation in the five Central Asian states can hardly be 

substantially improved, and may even grow worse. Should that be the case, 

regional stability would be the first to suffer. 

There are but three prospects for Central Asian security, namely, enduring 

stability; mixed stability and disturbance; and lasting conflicts. The 

prerequisites for the first prospect are the maintenance of stability in the 

political situation of the five Central Asian states, effective control of the 

Afghan situation and international terrorism, as well as the absence of new 

armed clashes in surrounding areas. The second prospect is actually the 

continuation of the status quo, in which most Central Asian states will remain 

stable, with occasional disturbances to a certain state or region from the 

unstable periphery or extremist forces. In the third prospect, acute conflicts 

will break out again in Afghanistan and involve Central Asian states, or will 

lead to constant regime changes and protracted warfare, with the 

intensification of domestic nationality opposition and political struggle. Even 

worse, various political and economic crises may arise because of the 

engagement of external forces and the seizure of state power by religious and 

national extremist forces. 

In the short run, the Central Asian states will not witness a conspicuously 

improved international environment, but a somewhat worse one, due to many 
 41 

factors: economic conditions in these states cannot be improved completely; a 

final peace in Afghanistan is still a far-away dream; international terrorism 

and religious extremism may well thrive again in Central Asia; opposition 

among different nationalities, as well as national relations in the region, are 

still very complicated; in addition, the five states still lack the ability to resist 

external forces. Therefore, the possibility of maintaining the status quo is the 

most conceivable over the coming five years. 

In the mid- and long run, or over the next five years, Central Asia’s 

security situation will improve, mainly for the following reasons: with the 

increasing power of China and Russia, the Central Asian economy will be 

promoted as well, apart from the amelioration of the external environment; 

moreover, out of their own interests, both China and Russia will expect to 

maintain stability in Central Asia; the institutionalized SCO will play a larger 

role, while Central Asian states will more effectively combat trans-border 

crime, with the help of the U.S., Russia, China and Europe; the long-term 

strategic relations between China, Russia and the U.S. will also help resolve 

various conflicts in the region by peaceful means, and the five Central Asian 

states will undertake more global or regional responsibilities accordingly. 

There exists also a possibility that the chaos seen in the Middle East in the 

20th century will appear in Central Asia, as both share many unfavorable 

conditions, including complex national and religious issues, the very slow 

development of social economy, overdependence on the exportation of 

resources, the competition of large powers in the regions, and the difficulty of 

controlling the geopolitical situation, and so on. Extremism has continued to 

threaten Central Asia since the end of the 20th century. Given their proximity 

to the Middle East and Afghanistan, the Central Asian states can hardly stay 

away from this threat. Central Asia’s future security will still be dominated by 

large powers, especially the global powers and important nation blocs. As 

regional actors, the five states will have a long way to go before they can form 

a united national bloc, thus they will remain passive and subordinate in 

international and regional affairs for the foreseeable future. It can be predicted 

that for the next ten years, the counter and balance of various forces in Central 
 42 

Asia will endure, with the common influence of internal and, more important, 

external forces. 

Central Asian Influence on China’s Security 

Central Asia has long been of great significance to the stability of 

northwest China. During the Han and Tang Dynasties, as Chang’an (Xi’an) 

was the political and economic center of China, a defense zone was founded 

in northwest China to protect the city. Defense of the area was even more 

focused in the Qing Dynasty, as the emperors believed that “its defense is the 

foundation of stability,” and that “if the defense of the northwest can be 

integrated into the general defense system, China will not worry about any 

foreign invasion.” Therefore, Central Asian security is crucial to the security 

of Chinese borders and the strategy of the Great West Development. 

Historically, all the prosperous periods of China fall in the times when 

China’s surrounding regions, Central Asia included, remained relatively 

stable. As China’s close neighbor, Central Asia shares a long history of 

communication with China. The stability of the region played a critical role in 

the foundation of the “Silk Road” and the prosperity of northwest China. 

During the West Han period, a Chinese delegate named Zhang Qian visited 

the region and saw a strong Iranian kingdom in Central Asia, which, “as the 

biggest kingdom in the region, possesses hundreds of cities, and covers 

hundreds of miles, with very convenient transportation to other kingdoms by 

the Amu River.” Chinese silk was first exported to the Roman Empire through 

this kingdom, and Buddhism in the region was brought to China during the 

East Han Dynasty. During the 1st century B.C., the Kuishuang Kingdom was 

founded, which governed the south of Central Asia. To ensure the safety of 

the Silk Road and the stability of northwest China, both Han Dynasties set up 

military offices in the region, which deepened the communication between the 

region and inland China, and promoted the economic development of the 

region. 
 43 

The Silk Road opened the gate for the communication of goods and 

cultures between the east and the west, in which both northwest China and 

Central Asia played a crucial role. Almost two millennia later, communication 

via the Silk Road had been determined by peace in Central Asia and the 

development of northwest China. In the mid-7th century, the Tang Dynasty 

defeated West Turkistan, and all small states in Central Asia surrendered to 

China. Tang’s capital, Chang’an, thus became the largest and most prosperous 

international metropolis at the time, while the economy in the area was 

booming. After the Arabian Empire conquered Central Asia, the Silk Road 

stayed busy, exchanging goods as well as cultures. Just as Chinese President 

Jiang Zemin commented, the ancient Silk Road “is not only a road of trade 

and civilizations, but a road of friendship and cooperation, which closely 

connects the Chinese people and the Central Asian people.” 

After the Song Dynasty, the center of Chinese economy and politics had 

been moving east; northwest China faced severe security threats from foreign 

invasions and regional instability. Therefore, the Silk Road went into decline. 

The Ming emperors placed more emphasis on the east, having little interest in 

the development of the northwest or in the connections with Central Asia. Due 

to the relative peace in Central Asia, the Qing Dynasty inherited the strategy 

of “migration to the less developed frontiers” and “cultivating the lands by 

stationing troops” of the Han and Tang dynasties, starting to exploit the region 

on a large scale and exercising effective management there. 

The disturbance of Central Asia in the past century also threatens the 

stability of northwest China. The aggressive ambition of the tsar after 

annexing Central Asia seriously harmed the border security and territorial 

integrity of northwest China. After Russia’s violent suppression of the antitsar national rebellion in 1916, tens of thousands of Central Asian refugees 

poured into Chinese Xinjiang and placed excessive pressure on Xinjiang 

security. After the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, Central Asia turned out to be 

a battlefield for the Red Army and the Belarus Army, the latter fleeing to 

Xinjiang after their military defeat and threatening Xinjiang security seriously. 

Since the independence of Central Asian states, they have adopted a 

friendly policy towards China, which to a certain extent relieved the military 
 44 

pressure long placed on the northwest Chinese frontiers and improved China’s 

external security environment. However, it also brought about various 

problems, such as the influence of the political and economic conflicts in 

Central Asian states over Chinese Xinjiang, as well as the threats to the 

integrity and stability of China. Therefore, China must remain on guard 

against all these unstable factors in the complicated Central Asian security 

situation. 

First, the unstable factors directly affect the development of bilateral 

relations between China and the five Central Asian states. Their total trade 

volume reached nearly $6 billion in 2004; they also signed many agreements 

for cooperation in such important programs as energy exploitation, rawmaterials processing, as well as pipeline and railway construction, and so on. 

A lack of guaranteed of security in the region will greatly impede the 

completion of these programs, thus affecting the realization of their mutual 

benefits and the development of economic cooperation for west China. 

Secondly, the unstable factors harm the stability and security of northwest 

China, especially Xinjiang. With over 3,000-km common borders and many 

common cross-border nationalities, northwest China and Central Asia have 

both benefited from their communication. The long-term stability of the 

region will create a favorable environment for the development of west China, 

especially Xinjiang, as well as for the restoration of the ancient Silk Road and 

friendship of all nationalities in the region. In addition, the economic 

development of west China needs more foreign investment, which can hardly 

be conceivable without a stable and safe environment. 

Furthermore, due to the proximity of west China and Central Asia, almost 

all factors that affect Central Asian security will more or less affect west 

China. Joint actions by both sides are necessary to resolve many common 

security issues, especially in the nontraditional fields, such as combating 

transnational crime and a reasonable distribution of water. There are dozens of 

Uigur political organizations in Central Asia that scheme to separate Xinjiang 

from China in the name of religion, organizing such terrorist attacks as riots, 

explosions and homicide. Some organizations, such as the East Turkistan 

Islamic Movement, keep close ties with the religious extremist forces in 
 45 

Afghanistan and have launched many terrorist attacks in the past few years: in 

June 2002, the Chinese consul to China’s embassy in Kyrgyzstan was 

assassinated; in March 2003, a Chinese international bus from Bishkek to 

Kash of Xinjiang was raided and burned, with all 21 passengers killed. Thus, 

how to combat the three forces, including the East Turkistan separatists, has 

become one of the major issues in the security cooperation between China and 

Central Asian states. China has already signed several bilateral agreements 

with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and has made some progress over the past. 

Finally, the future development of the SCO and its role in Central Asia is a 

function of the unstable factors. As the first China-initiated regional 

cooperation organization, the SCO has witnessed China’s unique role and has 

proven crucial to the achievement of China’s strategic interests. The changed 

security situation in Central Asia, such as the U.S. military presence, has 

posed additional challenges to the SCO. Many Central Asian states have 

adjusted their foreign policy and security strategy, thus depending less on the 

SCO. 

Conclusions 

Central Asia is a region with many security challenges and unstable 

factors, both external and internal. The security structure of the region has 

transformed since 9/11, leading to a new round of geopolitical competition, 

though the fundamental security relations between countries in the region 

have not been totally reshaped. Facing old and new challenges, Central Asia is 

in a more complicated security situation. It is natural for China, a neighbor to 

Central Asia and a country holding many economic and security interests, to 

be engaged in Central Asian issues. 

Central Asia faces an even more severe security situation, which will be 

further complicated by the competition between various powers and the 

widening gaps of their security policies and interests. Kazakh President 

Nazarbayev predicted that the next ten years will be “the critical decade” for 

Central Asia, with more pressing issues of terrorism, extremism, drug 
 46 

trafficking, Caspian energy and collective security waiting to be resolved. The 

possibility that the chaotic situation of the 20th-century Middle East could be 

transplanted to Central Asia should not be ignored. The future security 

structure of the region will still be dominated by large powers, especially 

global powers and important nation blocs. Whether China can play an active 

role in the structure is still unknown. 

The transformation of the Central Asian security structure directly 

influences the border security and economic development of west China; 

some factors are favorable while others are detrimental. Favorable factors 

include the new development of transnational security cooperation, progress 

in anti-terrorism in the region, deepening security cooperation between China 

and Central Asian states, and the broad acknowledgement of China’s “New 

Security Outlook.” Unfavorable factors include the increasing nontraditional 

threats to Central Asian security, the widening gap in Central Asian 

geopolitics, Western infiltration that impairs China’s long-term mutual trust 

with Central Asian states, as well as the chronic separatist forces. As the 

stability and development of northwest China is closely related to Central 

Asian security, China should show more concern over the region in the future.
 47 

Chapter Four 

Strategic Adjustments and Countermeasures against 

Extremist Forces of Central Asian Countries after 9/11 

Dong Xiaoyang, Su Chang 

All Central Asian countries made strategic adjustments after 9/11. First, 

with their traditional strategy of depending on Russia revised to different 

degrees, they began to open up to more countries, and to some extent allowed 

for the intervention of great powers; secondly, they either supported or 

acquiesced in U.S. military presence in Central Asia for the sake of antiterrorism, with whose assistance they expected to maintain their own security; 

thirdly, they adopted “strategic balancing diplomacy” between the U.S. and 

Russia, as well as other great powers; fourthly, they attempted to develop their 

economy with the help of great powers. For example, Kazakhstan managed to 

widen its oil export channels with the aid of Western countries. These 

strategic adjustments, together with the influence of international and regional 

factors, gave rise to the shrinkage of traditional Russian strategic space in 

Central Asia. 

After the “Color Revolution” in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, 

Central Asian countries are confronted with another round of strategic 

adjustments, which are yet too early to assess or predict. 

Many causes led to the strategic adjustments of Central Asian countries 

after 9/11. This paper focuses on one of the major factors—concern about 

anti-terrorism. 

I. After 9/11, Central Asia has become the major base for operations and 

development of extremist forces. 

Although the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was seriously struck 

after 9/11, the reorganized extremist forces have launched as many terrorist 
 48 

 

attacks as before. Dispersed terrorists keep reminding Central Asian 

governments of their “existence” with small-scale attacks. Obviously, 

religious extremist forces in Central Asia are far from being eradicated. 

Furthermore, due to the many conflicts arising with the development of the 

economy and society, the social foundation for extremist and terrorist forces 

still exists and is even likely to expand. 

1. The traditional IMU is separated and reorganized to launch new 

terrorist attacks, mirrored by Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb ut-Tahrir 

al-Islami, shortened as the HT in this paper). 

Many facts since 9/11 suggest that the IMU is still a potential threat to the 

security of Central Asia. Its members are now scattered in many areas: 1) in 

Pakistan, where they remain active on the borders of Pakistan and 

Afghanistan; 2) in the mountain areas of Afghanistan, where they can launch 

terrorist attacks with anti-U.S. forces56; 3) some of them have returned to 

Central Asian countries to join the HT; and 4) others have returned to 

Uzbekistan to surrender to the government. At present, IMU is still an active 

terrorist force on the Pakistan-Afghanistan borders, and their training camps 

in the Tajik mountains remain largely intact. The IMU is not yet completely 

erased in Afghanistan, either, and is still threatening the peace of the local 

areas with the remnant Taliban forces. The top leader of IMU in Pakistan near 

Afghanistan borders is still Yuldashev; his son-in-law, Hazeiyev, is the second 

leader, in charge of IMU finance, while Harricov, another Namanghani, is in 

charge of hatching terrorist actions. They keep contact with international 

terrorist organizations and some illegal organizations, and launch guerrilla 

wars together with anti-U.S. forces on the borders and mountain areas of 

Afghanistan. Through international terrorist and other illegal organizations, 

Yuldashev has bought such arms as portable antiaircraft cannons, planning to 

destroy the air-defense system of the U.S. in Afghanistan. 

56 Последователи Джумы Намангани ждут сигнала к выступлению, Век, 13.09.2002, с. 5, 

Николай Артемов, 14 September 2002. 
 49 

 

A most dangerous tendency, however, is the increasing interaction between 

extremist and terrorist forces in Central Asian countries. At the beginning of 

2002, the scattered IMU and Taliban forces began to rally again by uniting 

other extremists and separatists in Central Asia. Since Islamic extremists in 

Central Asian countries, Tatarstan and Trans-Caucasian countries joined the 

IMU, the new IMU is divided into groups of 25 to 30 people, and sets up 

training camps in Pakistani mountains. As Kazakh President Nazarbayev said 

in July 2002, there were still over 80,000 armed Taliban members within the 

borders of Afghanistan, and international terrorists were far from being 

eliminated, all of which posed serious threats to Central Asian security. The 

IMU forces in Uzbekistan and other countries are not to be underestimated. 

According to Russian sources, there are still 500 to 600 IMU armed members 

in Afghanistan, 1,500 in the Tajik mountains, and about 3,000 IMU activists 

hidden in Ferghana of Uzbekistan.57

2. The Islamic Liberation Party (the HT)—a new kind of terrorism arises 

as the major characteristic among religious extremist forces in Central 

Asia. 

In 1952, Tachi Nabakhani, a member of Muslim Brotherhood, established 

the HT in Jordan, or Kuduus in the Middle East, whose predecessor was a 

branch of the Muslim Brotherhood established in Egypt in 1928, with its first 

members from Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. This organization was deemed as 

illegal in all Arab countries, and its followers were closely monitored and 

politically suppressed, due to its radical claims, terrorist tendency, and, 

especially, its intransigent attitude towards other organizations. Its aim is to 

join all Muslims in the world together to found a united Caliph nation. At the 

beginning of its foundation, this ideal was widespread among young people in 

Palestine. Before long, the party was banned for its radical and terrorist 

political aims, its members suppressed or even arrested. Later, the party found 

its haven in rather tolerant European countries. Headquarters located in 

57 “Facing the Forked Road of Geopolitical Strategy,” Independent Military Observer

(Russia), Vol. 14, 2002.
 50 

 

London, its members mainly act in the Middle East, Europe and the U.S. 

Some countries have already settled disputes on the nature of the HT. For 

example, the party is condemned in Russia as a religious extremist 

organization with a terrorist tendency58; in the U.S., it is also considered as a 

religious extremist organization.59

The HT advocates that a united Islamic Caliph nation be established with 

all Muslims from countries of different social institutions. The major objective 

of the HT is to fight against infidels, overthrow the present constitutions and 

institutions in different countries, and seize political power. The HT believes 

that the most important goal for all Muslims in the world is to establish a 

united Caliph nation, governed by an elected Caliph. It also believes that all 

kinds of constitutions, congresses, presidential elections, as well as laws that 

moderate social relations, belong to paganism. Thus, all modern Muslim 

countries, including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Jordan, are disloyal to Islamic 

doctrines. The organization features its firm structure, clear guidelines and 

detailed political agenda. Its ultimate goal is to seize national power, for 

which purpose three steps are designed. The first step is to publicize the 

doctrines and claims of the HT by distributing files and pamphlets, as well as 

establishing basic organizations called “Halekas,” each made up of five 

members. After each Haleka is established, its members set out to found more 

Halekas, thus developing the organization in a geological order. In the second 

step, the HT prepares its members to participate in political warfare by further 

advocating its doctrines and informing its members of world affairs. Finally, 

the party prepares for the seizure of the political power. 

The HT keeps claiming in its propaganda materials that it is a political 

party rooted in Islam. The actions of HT have a clearly political aspect, 

instead of merely preaching or admonishment. 

58Виталий Пономарев: Дело активиста "Хизб ут-Тахрир" Юсупа Касимахунова, 

Правозащитный Центр "Мемориал,” 27 February 2004. 59 Можно ли одними репрессиями победить «Хизб-ут-Тахрир»?, IWPR, Галима

Бухарбаеа, Артур Самари, 30 April 2002. 
 51 

 

The HT opposes the establishment of a secular nation constituted by law, 

with civil freedoms. Instead, it believes that only Allah (True God) has the 

right to stipulate laws and grant them to human beings. 

The HT maintains contact with Hamas, Jihad, Wahhabi, the Muslim 

Brotherhood, the Armed Islamic Group, and Al-Qaeda led by Bin Laden. On 

October 9, 2001, after 9/11, in order to support the Taliban’s international 

terrorism, the party announced that “the U.S. and the U.K. Declared War on 

Islamism and Muslim.” 

The HT insists that countries all speak Arabic, rather than using their 

mother tongues. 

Since the disintegration of U.S.S.R., the Islamic Liberation Party (HT) 

has spread into Central Asia. 

In 1992, the HT entered Ferghana, Anjijon and Tashkent of Uzbekistan; in 

1995--Kyrgyzstan; in 1998--Tajikistan.60 The first HT branches were founded 

in Ferghana, Anjijon and Tashkent during 1992 and 1994, spread to many 

states in Uzbekistan in a very short time, and reached Tajikistan and 

Kyrgyzstan during 1995 and 1998. It is also present in Kazakhstan. 

In the spring of 1991, Yesomu Abu Muhammad, a Jordanian citizen and 

representative of the Emir (Chairman) of the HT, Abudulakalim Zalum, went 

to Tashkent to establish a branch. There he met a Saudi-Arabian student 

named Yesomu, and went with him to the residence of a man named 

Abudulashed Kachemov in Anjijon, where he met several people hostile to the 

Uzbek constitution and institutions. After this meeting, A. Kachemov pledged 

loyalty to the HT and became the leader of the newly founded underground 

HT. Subsequently, with the support of Arab students in Tashkent, Yesomu 

Abu Muhammad, Abudulashed Kachemov, Mulhod Uzmotov, and Hafezolo 

60 Абдунаби Сатторзода, “Проблемы интеграции исламских организаций в

Евроазиатское политическое пространство; О совместимости политического ислама

и безапасности в пространстве ОБСЕ,” Душанбе 2003, c. 247. 
 52 

 

Nohyulov together founded HT branches in Ferghana, Tashkent, Jizzakh, 

Sulhanhe Province, and the Xirhe Province. 

After the arrest of the top HT leaders in Uzbekistan, party leaders decided 

to establish organizations in the Sulkin Province of Tajikistan. Abuduzhalir 

Yusupov and Abuduhorik Muloyev from Wenji Village, Gafrov District of 

Sulkin Province, joined the party after brief religious training in Anjijon, the 

former in charge of publicizing the party’s doctrines. By meeting laid-off 

young people aged 18 to 25, as well as poor market vendors, they managed to 

recruit a large number of people into the party, thus setting up many HT 

primary organizations in some districts of Sugegin Province. 

The HT undergoes rather rapid development in Central Asia. 

The International Crisis Commission estimates the number of HT members 

in Central Asian countries to be between 15 and 20 thousand,61 mainly in 

Ferghana, southern Kyrgyzstan, southern Kazakhstan, as well as southern and 

eastern Tajikistan. The rapid growth of the party largely depends upon its 

well-disciplined primary organizations named Haleka (meaning “chains”), 

which is made up of five people, each of whom is to recruit their relatives and 

friends. The lowest-ranking Haleka members know only members of their 

groups and nothing about other groups, and liaison between Halekas is 

conducted only through Haleka leaders, five of whom are organized into a 

bigger Haleka, with its own leader. The HT exerts its influence over the public 

through two classes of people: Islamic religious personnel, especially those 

considered posterity of the Prophets; and religious teachers. According to the 

investigative bodies of Kyrgyzstan, the HT is good at disseminating its ideas 

through teachers who have joined the party; their students and some vendors 

are subject to their conversion. 

The party is mainly composed of young dissidents from the 

underprivileged class, and more and more people are beginning to support the 

61Даниил Щипков:"Хизб ут-Тахрир" стремится обратить в ислам весь мир,” 

Независимая газета-Религии, 21 April 2004, http://news.ferghana.ru. 
 53 

 

party. The development of the party in Central Asia can be divided into three 

periods: the completely non-violence period (from independence to 1996), 

during which time only religious extremist ideas were spread by passing 

pamphlets and the preaching of imams in Mosques; the co-existing violence 

and non-violence period (between 1996 and 2001), while the party was 

separated into three parts—the HT, Herzban-Nuzla, and Aklamia, the latter 

two both very radical, believing that Islamization should speed up in 

Uzbekistan due to complicated internal factors and the government’s 

increasing strikes; the third period starts from 2001 as the party gradually 

resorts to terrorism. 

The HT is a war-like, radical and extremist religious organization. 

Its ideas originate from Pan-Islamism, and can be summarized into the 

following points: 1) the ideal of unification; 2) opposition to democracy, 

believing that “democracy is evil Western goods and a sinful institution”; 3) 

opposition against secular regimes, with pamphlets declaring that “all of us 

were originally Muslims, but secular regimes separated us into Uzbeks, Tajiks 

and Kyrgyzs”; and 4) calling for just social institutions and equality among all 

people, which especially appeals to a large number of Central Asian residents 

living in poverty.62

The HT is a religious extremist organization evolving from radicalism to 

terrorism. 

Books and pamphlets of the HT reveal that the party must undergo three 

steps to achieve its goal. In the first and second steps, non-violent means are 

to be adopted for spreading ideas and establishing branches. In the third step, 

the party’s goal is to overthrow secular regimes through violent means. Major 

62Мухиббин Кабири: “ПИВТ и 'Хизб ут-Тахрир': совместимость и различия; О

совместимости политического ислама и безапасности в пространстве ОБСЕ,” 

Душанбе 2003.C211-223. 
 54 

 

books for spreading the party’s ideas include The Islamic Institutions; The 

Evil Democracy; Islamic Politics; The Islamic Society; The Islamic Structure;

Islamic Perspectives; Road of the HT; and The Organizing Power of Islamism, 

which are all translated into many languages and widely disseminated.63

3. Central Asian extremist organizations and terrorist organizations tend 

to unite, joining terrorism to political actions, which poses serious threats 

to the stability of Central Asia. 

As reported in autumn 2002, the Central Asian Islamic Movement was 

founded on the basis of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), made up 

of IMU members, some members of the Uzbekistan Liberation Party, Islamic 

extremists in Tajikistan, Chechen militants, and “East Turkistan” separatists in 

China.64 In addition, according to the security agencies of Kyrgyzstan, IMU 

members in Central Asia, fundamentalists in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as 

well as Xinjiang separatists, founded a new religious extremist organization 

named the Central Asian Islamic Movement.65 Its goal, the same as that of 

IMU, is to found an Islamic nation with a much broader territory than “a 

nation in Ferghana areas” as designed by previous religious extremist 

organizations, including the whole of Central Asia and Northwest China.66

The headquarters of Central Asian Islamic Movement are located in the 

mountain areas of Badakhshan Province in Northeast Afghanistan, with rather 

inconvenient transportation. The Movement’s leader is still Yuldashev, leader 

63 Рахматилло Зойиров, «Стратегия поведения по отношению к 'Хизб ут-Тахрир'; О

совместимости политического ислама и безапасности в пространстве ОБСЕ,” 

Душанбе 2003.С224-245. 64 Website of the Institute of Strategic and Regional Studies directly responsible for the 

President of Uzbekistan, http://www.uzstrateg.inf, Sept. 10, 2002, quoted from O. 

Luzhaliyev, “Features of the Islamic Movement in Uzbekistan,” Central Asia and Caucasus 

(Sweden), Vol. 3, 2004. 

65 Бахтияр Ахмедханов: “Исламское движение Центральной Азии заявило о себе,” 

Время МН, 9 October 2002. 66 Bachgar Ahmedhanov, “Central Asian Islamic Movement,” Time (Russia), 9 October 2002. 
 55 

 

of IMU, and Al-Qaeda continues to support the Movement, as Bin Laden 

reportedly helped the organization conceive terrorist attacks.67

A new terrorist agenda was soon set after the Central Asian Islamic 

Movement was founded: [spreading to] southern Kyrgyzstan by the end of 

2002, and some other Central Asian countries by spring and summer of 2003--

so far without success for some reason. The Central Asian Islamic Movement 

also targets foreigners living in Central Asia to prove that Central Asian 

countries are unable to protect the safety of foreigners. According to the 

Stratford Research Center in the U.S., the Central Asian Islamic Movement is 

hatching a new plan for large-scale attacks.68 Despite the doubts of many 

specialists that the Central Asian Islamic Movement exists, it is undeniable 

that extremists in Central Asia have been reorganized and armed, posing new 

threats to the stability of all countries. 

On July 11, 2003, with regard to the view that “there is no soil for 

international terrorism in Kazakhstan,” N. Dutbayev, Chairman of the 

Kazakhstan National Security Committee, held a press conference in his 

headquarters at Astana on the recent security situation of Kazakhstan. 

As to the issue of terrorist forces, Dutbayev said that in May 2003 

Kazakhstan had unearthed the Almaty branch of the international radical 

organization, the East Turkistan Islamic Party, and found large stocks of 

ammunition, as well as home-made explosive equipment confiscated from 

three arrested members. It was ascertained that they kept contact with other 

members of the party in many other countries, including Afghanistan, Iran, 

Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Islamic activists of Uzbekistan attempted to 

legalize themselves in Kazakhstan. Members of the organization were almost 

as well trained as the special arms in Kazakhstan. HT propaganda leaflets 

uncovered by Kazakhstan indicate that the organization aims to found an 

Islamic Caliph country in Central Asia, causing Kazakh authorities to took 

prompt measures against proselytizers in Kalaganda State and Manjistao State 

who advocated a “Pure Islamism,” under whose influence some Kazakh 

67 Ибрагим Алибеков: “ИДУ расширяется и готовится к нанесению ударов по Западным

мишеням,” EURASIANET, 31 October 2002. 68 Ibid. 
 56 

 

citizens joined the Taliban. Four Kazakh citizens are still in custody in 

Guantanamo Bay as POWs, where they told interrogators that they entered 

Afghanistan only to further appreciate the religion, and that they were 

engaged only in purely economic business while they were in the Taliban 

army, or more accurately, in the IMU. At present, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of 

Diplomacy is negotiating with the U.S. about the future of these Kazakh 

citizens. 

II. The HT presents the greatest terrorist threat to the stability and 

development of Central Asia. 

The party is an ever-increasing extremist force in Central Asia. 

The HT was first founded in Palestine in the 1950s, with the goal of 

recovering the Islamic way of life and establishing a united Islamic nation, 

and then founding a united Islamic nation worldwide. The party has become 

increasingly radical, especially since 9/11, when they called for a “holy war” 

against the West. The party spread very rapidly in Central Asia, setting up 

branches in many areas, and advocating the overthrow of current regimes and 

the founding of an Islamic nation in Central Asia. After the disintegration of 

the U.S.S.R. in 1991, the HT expanded very rapidly in Hamagan, Ferghana 

and Tashkent of Uzbekistan, established its first base in Sugeda on the Tajik 

border one year later, and soon developed in a few states in Kyrgyzstan. 

Currently, there are over 100,000 members in Uzbekistan alone, and more 

than 4,000 in Kyrgyzstan, not to mention the larger number of supporters. 

Because it was deemed responsible for the terrorist explosions in March and 

July of 2004, the HT resorts more to violence. Many members propose to 

overthrow Central Asian regimes by more radical means, such as launching a 

“holy war.”69 The party’s activists are mostly young people with little 

education and no jobs, thus very discontented with the government. They are 

also active in recruiting soldiers in Russia and the Chechen areas. On October 

69 «Вечерний Бишкек». 
 57 

 

9, 2001, they declared their support for the Taliban, believing that “the antiterrorist war under the leadership of the U.S. and UK is a declaration of war 

against Muslims and Islamism.”70 The second top leader of Al-Qaeda, alZarqawi, who was once a member of the HT in Jordan, later brought the ideas 

of the party to Iraq. Another leader of Al-Qaeda, Muhammad, kept close ties 

with the party; another person named Muhammad, who killed U.S. journalist 

Daniel Pearl, was also influenced by the ideas of HT.71

Violent incidents involving the HT are increasing. 

The HT is attracting more and more attention. Although it claims to reject 

violence, the party has turned out to be a conspicuous religious extremist 

organization in Central Asia. On June 9, 2003, while arresting members of the 

party, the Russian authorities uncovered a large number of explosives, 

grenades and detonators;72 in 2000, terrorists related to the party caused an 

explosion in a Protestant church for Koreans in Dushanbe of Tajikistan, 

killing 9 and wounding 30; the terrorists conducted a chain of assassins in 

2001, including of a Vice-Minister for Internal Affairs, the Minister of 

Culture, and another high-ranking government official; in April, they killed 

several policemen in the east. 

Central Asian countries have begun to take measures against the party. 

Leaders of some Central Asian countries have expressed their strong 

resolve to fight against religious extremist forces. 

70 Бахтиёр Бабаджанов: Религиозно оппозиционные группы в Узбекистане; 

Религиозный Экстремизм в Центральной Азии: проблемы и персрективы; 

Организация по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе, Миссия в Таджикистане; 

Материалы конференции Душанбе, 25 апреля 2002г., c. 55-56. 71 “Дорога от Ташкента до Талибан: группа исламских террористов пытается

дестабилизировать союзника США,” The National Review Online, Зейно Баран, 6 

April 2004. 72 Hong Liang, “121 Terrorists Arrested in Russia,” Global Times, June 11, 2003, p. 6. 
 58 

 

Kazakh President Nazarbayev maintains that drugs, terrorism and limited 

water resources are major threats to the stability of Central Asia. Thus, he 

proposes establishing a CIS anti-terrorism center. On February 9, 2001, at the 

First Plenary Conference of the Army of Kazakhstan, he noted that the 

greatest threats to national security include terrorism, extremism, invasions by 

small bandit gangs, as well as drug-related crimes.73

In April 2002, Uzbek President Karimov announced that Uzbekistan would 

take more severe measures against the HT. He said the party could not be 

legalized in Uzbekistan due to its radical and religious extremist nature, and 

that the Uzbek government would not change its policy on the party, because 

it violated Uzbek laws. 

On May 31, 2002, at the conference on “striking terrorism and religious 

extremism,” held by the Tajik government, in looking back at the situation 

with terrorism during the previous three years, President Rakhmonov urged all 

departments of the country to cooperate in the fight against terrorism. The 

Central Asian countries have taken various measures to strike religious 

extremist forces. Prior to the explosion in Tashkent on February 16, 1999, and 

the Hostage Incident in Batkent, Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian countries had 

mainly adopted a strategy of containment and small-scale raids. 

Since 1999, the Central Asian countries have been endeavoring to fight 

against domestic extremists.74 Despite the strong measures recently taken by 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to stop actions of extremists of the 

HT, extremist forces in Central Asia develop very rapidly and are becoming 

increasingly active. High-tech printing equipment was discovered in northern 

Tajikistan, with the number of captured books and pamphlets alone as large as 

31,000; some branches of the party were also set up in southern Kazakhstan. 

73 Zhao Changqing, “Kazakhstan: A Blessed Year in a Favorable Situation,” 2001 Almanac of 

Russia, Eastern European, and Central Asian Countries, Contemporary World Press, p. 58. 74 “Hаджот,” No 33, 2002г. 
 59 

 

Many Central Asian countries rely on laws and international laws to fight 

against terrorism and the HT. 

In August 2000, the Uzbek Congress passed the draft Anti-Terrorism Act, 

first stipulating anti-terrorism in its law; on October 21, 1999, the Act on AntiTerrorism was issued in Kyrgyzstan, which clarifies anti-terrorist laws and 

organizations, as well as their different agendas; in July 2001, the President of 

Kyrgyzstan ratified the National Security Law, according to which Kyrgyzstan 

will support the joint efforts in global and regional security to strike 

international terrorism, extremism, and sabotage of transportation in Central 

Asia as well as other regions of the world;75 the Tajik government believes 

that under no circumstance should terrorism be appeased, and in 2003, it 

passed 12 agreements in total on cooperation with the U.N. in the fight against 

terrorism. 

Among all Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan took the strongest measures 

against religious extremist forces. After the Tashkent explosion in February 

1999, the government closely checked members of IMU and HT nationwide, 

and tried the terrorists engaged in the 2/16 Incident, sentencing six to death; in 

2004, Uzbek police caught Zjizibek Kalimov, who created an explosion in the 

Obilun Market of Bishkek on December 27, 2002, and later sentenced him to 

death; in January 2005, the Uzbek authorities conducted investigations on six 

suspects of the explosion in July 2004.76 

Uzbekistan is trying to put the HT on the Terrorist Blacklist issued by 

Washington, D.C., after 9/11. According to the Uzbek government, the party 

is recruiting people for terrorist organizations outside Central Asia. At a 

regional security conference in December 2002, Yeslomov, a representative of 

Uzbek Ministry of Diplomacy, claimed that the HT carries out extremist 

75 Tchemilayev, “National and Regional Strategies, Actions, and Cross-border Cooperation of 

Kyrgyzstan in International Anti-terrorism,” Collection of the International Symposium on 

“International Anti-terrorism Situation and Cooperation,” China International Strategic 

Society & Hong Kong He Dong Society of International Relations, May 2004. 76 “B Ташкенте продолжается судебный процесс над организаторами июльских

взрывов,” ИА Фергана.Ру, Радио Гранд (Ташкент), 21.01.2005 09:18 

http://news.ferghana.ru/detail.php?id=599&mode=snews. 
 60 

actions in most Central Asian countries and poses a threat to Central Asian 

security. 

The security agencies of Tajikistan support Uzbekistan’s claims by 

providing sound proof of the party’s terrorist actions. The Tajik government 

set up official propaganda branches in areas where the party is active, and 

exchanges ideas with local residents on the party. On Jan. 4, 2001, the 

Municipal Court of Khuzhan in central Sugeda of Tajikistan sentenced 14 HT 

members to eight and 18 years imprisonment respectively, with a charge of 

engaging in underground activities and fomenting religious and national 

hatred, and attempting to change the national polity with violence; during 

1999 and 2002, 108 HT members were tried in Tajikistan. In 2001, Tajikistan 

took stronger measures against terrorists, and arrested over 100 HT members, 

two of whom were later sentenced to death. In addition, Tajikistan endeavored 

to eliminate domestic extremist forces while the U.S. and other Western 

countries were attacking the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Up to 2003, Tajik law 

enforcement agencies had captured several hundred HT members and 

prosecuted more than 100. Since January 2003, the security agencies of 

Tajikistan have been searching Ferghana, and banning unregistered Islamic 

schools. Over the past 4 years, Tajikistan has arrested 120 radical HT 

members; 63 clergies were investigated for administrative violation of law at 

the end of 2002 alone. 

Kyrgyzstan adopts milder policies toward the HT than Uzbekistan and 

Tajikistan. 

Although there are over 4,000 members of the party in Kyrgyzstan, very 

few were actually tried in court. Natalia Shadelova, Vice Chair of the Kyrgyz 

Committee on Religious Affairs, said that it is dangerous to put the party on 

the blacklist and suppress it, for the party would only be pushed further to the 

extreme and made better able to recruit more Muslims. As disclosed by 

Kyrgyz newspapers on Jan. 19, 2003, only 20 HT members were arrested in 

Kyrgyzstan. 
 61 

 

Kazakh police caught about 40 HT members during a rally in a large 

mosque in Almaty.77

The party keeps close ties with other extremist forces. Its ties with the 

Xinjiang Independence Movement are especially notable. 

According to the security agencies of Uzbekistan, many HT members in 

Central Asian countries are also members of more notorious international 

extremist organizations. Shalipov, Vice-Minister of the Tajik National 

Security Ministry, has stated that there is sufficient evidence to suggest 

cooperation between the HT and the infamous Aum Supreme Truth. 

The HT is not only engaged in terrorist actions, but also in political 

agitation and riots. 

As reported by Russian media, the party played a role both in the Tulip 

Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 and the riot in Anjijon, Uzbekistan. 

The party in Uzbekistan is also suspected of engaging in drug dealing in 

Afghanistan. After 9/11, Afghanistan turned out to strengthen its position in 

drug dealing. The amount of narcotics smuggled from Afghanistan has 

increased 40 times since the end of the Afghanistan War.78 Ferghana will 

become a dangerous spot for terrorism and extremism, as well as a passage 

route for drug smuggling. 

According to some Western analysts, however, the Uzbek government is 

trying to legalize its cruel suppression of the HT and disguise its large-scale 

violations of human rights domestically, under the guise of combating 

international anti-terrorism. Representatives of the Human Rights Society of 

Uzbekistan assert that the Uzbek government has been persecuting people 

77 В Алма-Ате задержаны сторонники исламской организации "Хизб-ут-Тахрир," ИА

Фергана.Ру, Радио Свобода, 21 January 2005, 08:39 

http://news.ferghana.ru/detail.php?id=596&mode=snews. 78 Website of Truth (Russia), www.pravda.info, 24 March 2005. 
 62 

suspected as members of the party over the past four years, and that even 

relatives of those people sometimes suffer from severe repression. They worry 

that Uzbekistan will persecute all banned religious groups and political 

dissidents even more severely, once the party is put on the blacklist. Professor 

Cornell of Washington University opposes blacklisting the party, for he thinks 

it will bring more credit to the party, and thus attract more young people to 

join its ranks. 

As reported by Russia’s Independence on Nov. 11, 2000, no Western 

countries have banned the HT, which is declared illegal in Arab and Central 

Asian countries. The party holds activities openly in the Tokinhash District of 

London. The leader of the party in UK is a Syrian named Umar Bahari 

Muhammad, who was arrested by Saudi authorities in 1996 for publicizing 

religious extremist thoughts and later fled to UK. One of his goals is to 

establish an Islamic government in the UK. 

As reported by Panorama of Kazakhstan on July 11, 2003, the 

International Crisis Commission does not think the HT is engaged in terrorist 

actions; it contends that the suppression of the party in Uzbekistan is to “find 

excuses for its refusing political and economic reform,” thus likely to render 

the party more radical. Western specialists believe that for Western interests, 

influence has to be exerted on the Central Asian countries, especially 

Uzbekistan, to force them to improve the atmosphere for the existence of the 

HT. 

III. The result of strategic adjustments in Central Asian countries is 

stronger anti-terror cooperation. 

Central Asian countries take constant measures against religious extremism 

and terrorism mainly to maintain political and social stability, which not only 

lays a solid foundation for the cooperation of these countries in this field, but 

also makes it possible for cooperation between them and other countries and 

organizations. During the first phase, Central Asian countries such as 

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan mainly depended on Russia. Later, some countries 
 63 

turned to China for help, as was shown in the Japanese Hostage Incident in 

Kyrgyzstan. Since 9/11, Central Asian countries began to cooperate with the 

U.S. while also strengthening cooperation with other countries. Efforts of 

Central Asian countries against terrorism have become national, and the 

traditional strategy of depending on one country has become one of seeking 

help from many countries. 

Cooperation with the United States 

The U.S. has been a most important security partner for Central Asian 

countries, who regard the powerful U.S. military force as the key, both to the 

security of Central Asia and to the balance of influence from such countries as 

Russia. The U.S. holds clear attitudes toward Central Asian religious 

extremist forces. The U.S. firmly condemned the terrorist attacks on 

Uzbekistan and southern Kyrgyzstan in August 2000; later, it named Central 

Asia as an “anti-terrorist security zone,” pledging to undertake responsibility 

for its security; in December 2000, the U.S. blacklisted the IMU, banning all 

kinds of aid from American citizens to the organization, prohibiting its 

members from entering the U.S., and freezing its funds in the U.S. Since their 

independence, Central Asian countries have benefited from the fast-growing 

military and security cooperation with the U.S. Their cooperation on 

combating religious extremist forces is mainly seen in the following aspects. 

1. High-level military officials visited each other frequently and signed a 

number of agreements on military cooperation. 

The agreements include yearly cooperation plans, cooperation on military 

techniques, memos of acknowledgement and cooperation between military 

departments, plans on helping transform military industries into civil 

industries, helping Central Asian countries train military officers, and 

providing military aid and funds, etc. On April 29, 2002, Nazarbayev, 

President of Kazakhstan, met with the visiting U.S. Secretary of Defense 
 64 

Rumsfeld, and discussed anti-terrorism, among other issues; in August 2002, 

Gen. Tommy Franks, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. troops in the Middle East 

and Central Asia, visited Kazakhstan; on Oct. 12, 2001, Uzbekistan and the 

U.S. jointly announced that the two countries will establish new relations “in 

order to maintain the long-term security and stability of the region.” The 

announcement states that both governments deem international terrorism a 

serious threat to global and regional stability. Therefore, they signed an 

agreement on cooperating to combat terrorism on October 7. On March 11, 

2002, Uzbek President Karimov visited the U.S. and, with G.W. Bush, signed 

the Uzbekistan-U.S. Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Cooperation, 

which ensures joint efforts by both countries to combat all kinds of 

transnational criminal organizations that threaten national security. In the 

same year, the Chairman of U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice-Chair of the 

Joint U.S. Armed Forces Committee, and Commander of the U.S. Central 

Command, Gen. Franks, all visited Uzbekistan. 

2. The U.S. provides aid to the military development of Central Asian 

countries. 

Since 2002, the American Academy of Military Science has begun to train 

Uzbek military officers, and the Ministries of Defense of both countries have 

begun cooperation. The U.S. cancelled limitations on military sales to Central 

Asian countries and exported to them a large quantity of arms, mostly at 

favorable prices and by means of loans. 

3. The U.S. provides military aid to Central Asian countries. 

The U.S. has provided much military aid to Central Asian countries to 

combat religious extremist forces. In April 2000, U.S. Secretary of State 

Albright visited Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and offered them 

from 3 million to 10 million USD respectively. In 2002, the U.S. provided 

military equipment worth tens of millions USD to Kazakhstan. That same 
 65 

 

year, the U.S. helped Uzbekistan work out a plan on “export inspection and 

border security,” and provided aid of 18 million USD, 14 million of which is 

used to experiment on an “air sanction” project aiming to strike terrorism and 

maintain border security. From 2002 to 2003, the U.S. provided Uzbekistan 

with aid totaling 420 million, 25 million of which is used to improve the 

combat capability of Uzbek troops.79

4. The U.S. and other countries held a joint military exercise. 

In August 2002, U.S. and Kazakh troops held a joint military exercise 

coded as “Balance-Snow Leopard” in Almaty. 

5. Central Asian countries support U.S. efforts to strike the Taliban in 

Afghanistan. 

First, leaders of Central Asian countries announced their intentions to 

“support U.S. actions against terrorists.” Secondly, some Central Asian 

countries allowed land routes for U.S. troops to conduct operations in 

Afghanistan. For example, Kazakhstan offered to open its air to the U.S.; 

Uzbekistan opened to U.S. troops its airports, air passages and military 

facilities; Tajikistan opened its military bases and air space, as well as 

providing field hospitals; Turkey offered land and air passages for the U.S. to 

transport rescue resources to the Afghan people. Furthermore, some Central 

Asian countries provided military bases for the U.S. In October 2001, 

Uzbekistan opened three air bases to the U.S., namely Hanabad, Keked, and 

Kahgan. At the beginning of November, Tajikistan and the U.S. drew up an 

agreement by which U.S. troops could use the Khujand, Kulyab and KurganTyube air bases near the Afghan borders. In December, Kyrgyzstan and the 

79Роман Стрешнев, “США, Европа и Россия--стратегии в Центральной Азии,” Красная

звезда, 17 August 2004, 

http://news.ferghana.ru/detail.php?id=3565132771133.3,103,4115536 . 
 66 

 

U.S. signed an agreement that the former should provide Manas International 

Airport for the U.S. as a military base. 

Cooperation with Russia 

Since 9/11, because Central Asian countries still consider Russia an 

important key to their security, they have enhanced their cooperation on 

combating religious extremist forces, which is based on their mutual needs: 

first, Central Asian religious extremists have strong ties with Chechen bandits, 

posing threats to the security of both Central Asia and Russia; second, Russia 

is Central Asia’s next-door neighbor; traditional relations between them 

naturally makes Russia a strong security partner of Central Asia. Uzbek 

President Karimov said that Russia holds long-term strategic interests in this 

region, and that it is playing an important role in the geopolitics of Central 

Asia.80 

Security cooperation between Central Asian countries and Russia mainly 

includes the following points. 

1. They maintain the same standpoint on combating religious extremist 

forces and supporting each other. 

On August 20, 2000, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 

and Uzbekistan met with Ivanov, Secretary of the Russian Federal Security 

Council, and issued a joint declaration on taking firm measures to fight 

terrorism. They believe that terrorism and extremism represent a blatant 

invasion of Central Asia and a shameless violation of the constitutions and 

democratic principles of the Central Asian countries. On Nov. 29, 2001, 

Russian President Putin held informal talks with Tajik President Rakhmonov 

to discuss the cooperation between the two countries on anti-terrorism. 

80 “Сотрудничество и региональная интеграция отвечают интересам наших народов,” 

Народное слово, 2004.6.5. 
 67 

2. Signing contracts on security cooperation. 

In December 2002, Russian President Putin and Defense Minister Ivanov 

made consecutive visits to Kyrgyzstan and signed the Bishkek Declaration

and Russia-Kyrgyzstan Agreement on Security Cooperation, etc. On June 16, 

2004, Putin visited Uzbekistan and both leaders signed the Russia-Uzbekistan 

Agreement on Strategic Partnership on the joint actions of both countries to 

establish an effective security system in Central Asia, granting to each other 

Most Favorable Nation treatment in trade, Russia’s providing Uzbekistan with 

military supplies, as well as Russia’s privilege to use Uzbek military facilities 

when necessary, and so on. 

3. Holding meetings to discuss security measures. 

At the informal Russia-Central Asia Summit held in July 2002, leaders of 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan met with Putin, and 

consulted with him about the security situation of Central Asia and 

international counter-terrorism. 

4. Augmenting military bases in Central Asia and maintaining national 

security together with Central Asian countries. 

In December 2002, Russia built an air base at the Kent Airport near 

Bishkek of Kyrgyzstan. In addition, Russian border troops participate in the 

defense of the border areas of Tajikistan, in order to combat religious 

extremists on the Tajikistan-Afghanistan borders and maintain the security of 

Tajikistan’s borders. 
 68 

 

5. The Security agencies of both countries cooperate in tracking down 

religious extremists. 

Russia and Uzbekistan cooperate efficiently in fighting against the HT. On 

Feb. 14, 2003, the Supreme Court of Russia declared the party to be a terrorist 

organization.81 On Feb. 13, 2004, security agents of both countries captured 

one of the leaders of the party, Yusubo Kasimahonov, in Moscow.82

According to the security department in Russia, the HT exploits many 

“terrorist tools” of the IMU and maintains contact with Al-Qaeda by sending 

some members for training in the training camps of Al-Qaeda. 

Generally speaking, cooperation between Russia and the Central Asian 

countries is yet to develop on combating religious extremist forces. After 

religious extremists attacked Central Asian countries massively in 1999, 

Russia began to strengthen its cooperation with Central Asian countries in 

striking religious extremist forces. Despite the close cooperation between the 

U.S. and Central Asian countries during the U.S.’ Afghanistan operation, 

these countries have realized that Russia is still a trustworthy backup in 

maintaining regional security. On the other hand, through closer cooperation 

with Central Asian countries, Russia has consolidated its influence in Central 

Asia. 

Cooperation with China 

China and the five Central Asian countries have reached a consensus on 

maintaining regional security and combating religious extremist forces. As to 

the terrorist attack in Central Asia in August 2000, China immediately 

announced its condemnation and its support for Central Asian countries. Both 

China and these countries are willing to further their military cooperation and 

take joint measures against religious extremist forces. There are more than ten 

East Turkistan Independence organizations of different sizes in Central Asia, 

81“Дело активиста “Хизб ут-Тахрир” Юсупа Касимахунова,” Правозащитный Центр

“Мемориал,” Витали Пономарев, 27 February 2004. 82“В Москве арестован один из лидеров организации 'Хизб ут-Тахрир’,” Время

новостей, Интерфакс, 17.02.2004. 
 69 

some of which were founded by Islamic extremists, such as the East Turkistan 

Islamic Movement that has been declared a terrorist organization by the U.N. 

In recent years, Xinjiang separatists keep contact with Central Asian religious 

extremist forces and frequently created incidents targeting Chinese citizens, 

seriously threatening the security of Northwest China. Therefore, striking 

religious extremist forces is a mutual requirement for both sides. China and 

Central Asian countries mainly cooperate in the following aspects. 

1. Signing agreements on joint actions to combat terrorism. 

From December 22 to 25, 2002, Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev visited 

China and signed with Chinese leaders the Agreement on Cooperation in 

Striking Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, and the Agreement on 

Preventing Dangerous Military Actions. 

2. Holding joint military exercises. 

On October 10 and 11, 2002, China and Kyrgyzstan held a military 

exercise on their borders. 

3. China provides anti-terrorism aid for Central Asian countries. 

After the terrorist attacks in Central Asia in 2000, China provided three 

million RMB in military aid for Uzbekistan, and in October 2003, China 

provided the security department of Kyrgyzstan with one million USD and a 

significant amount of computer equipment. 
 70 

 

4. Central Asian countries aid China in striking East Turkistan 

Independence members. 

In August 2003, the Judiciary Minister of Kyrgyzstan, Osmanov, stated 

that Kyrgyzstan keeps close watch on East Turkistan Separatism for its ties 

with the IMU and attempts to destroy the stability of the country. In December 

2003, Kulman, First Vice Premier of Kyrgyzstan visited China and held 

discussions with Chinese leaders on combating East Turkistan Separatism. On 

Jan. 21, 2004, the Kyrgyz government announced that it would deport several 

East Turkistan separatists recently caught in Kyrgyzstan to Xinjiang China. In 

November of the same year, the Supreme Court of Kyrgyzstan declared the 

Free East Turkistan Organization, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, and 

the East Turkistan Islamic Party to be illegal organizations.83 

Cooperation between Central Asian countries 

Central Asian countries maintain that they should work together to counter 

threats from religious extremist forces in order to preserve the stability of the 

region. In April 1999, leaders of the five Central Asian countries insisted in a 

joint declaration that they would adopt measures to maintain regional peace 

and security. On April 21, 2000, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 

Tajikistan signed an accord on striking religious extremism, terrorism, 

transnational organized crime, and other actions that threaten regional stability 

and security; in August 2000, the presidents of the four countries made a joint 

declaration on seeking closer ties against international terrorism; in the same 

month, leaders of the law-enforcement departments of Uzbekistan, 

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan met in Kyrgyzstan to formulate specific measures 

to strike international terrorists; on Jan. 5, 2001, four national leaders of the 

Central Asia Economic Community held a conference in Almaty and 

proposed measures to prevent international terrorists from causing further 

damage in Central Asia. 

83“Преследования уйгуров на территории Киргизии лежит на совести Китая,” 

Eurasianet, Бакыт Ибраимов, 30 January 2004, http://www.eurasianet.org. 
 71 

 

After 9/11, the Central Asian countries continued their cooperation on 

striking religious extremist forces, believing that remnant IMU members still 

threaten Central Asian security. They also began to focus on striking the HT. 

Tajikistan proposed that all Central Asian governments sign an agreement on 

jointly striking the party.84 Central Asian cooperation primarily involves the 

following means. 

1. Holding conferences on regional security. 

On Feb. 28, 2002, leaders from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 

Tajikistan attended a conference of the Central Asian Cooperation 

Organization in Almaty to discuss further cooperation on security and 

stability. On June 4, the first Leadership Conference of the “Yatsin 

Conference” was held in Almaty, at which the presidents of Kazakhstan, 

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as leaders of other nations, 

published the Almaty Papers and the Declaration on Eliminating Terrorism 

and Promoting Dialogue between Civilizations, both aimed at enhancing 

Asian peace, security and stability. From June 6 to 7, an informal summit of 

member nations in the Central Asian Cooperation Organization was held in 

Aktau, Kazakhstan, mainly concerning Central Asian security and stability. 

2. Improving the regional security cooperation system. 

On Feb. 28, 2002, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 

founded the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, whose predecessor was 

Central Asian Economic Community. The new organization focuses on 

cooperation on security and regional issues. On Dec. 27, 2002, leaders of the 

four member-nations held a conference in Astana, Kazakhstan, and declared 

that they will endeavor to cooperate comprehensively to fight drug trafficking 

84 Рахматилло Зойиров, “Стратегия поведения по отношению к 'Хизб ут-Тахрир’, О

совместимости политического ислама и безапасности в пространстве ОБСЕ,” 

Душанбе 2003, s. 224-245. 
 72 

and cut off this major financial resource for international terrorist 

organizations. 

Cooperation under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 

Since the founding of the SCO, cooperation of all member-countries has 

grown rapidly on striking religious extremism, as manifested in the following 

ways: 

1. The member-countries signed many legal documents on anti-terrorist 

cooperation and established a new outlook on security, laying the legal 

basis for joint anti-terrorist actions. 

A new security outlook based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and 

cooperation forms the basis for the SCO. After 9/11, the SCO began to 

strengthen cooperation on security issues and signed a series of legal 

documents to improve mutual trust in the military arena and enhance 

cooperation. On June 15, 2001, leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, 

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed The Shanghai Pact on Striking 

Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism, which has proven a key step in 

furthering cooperation among these countries, and provides a legal basis for 

maintaining regional security and stability, as well as combating the “three 

forces” [of terrorism, extremism and separatism]. On June 7, 2002, they also 

signed the Charter of the SCO and the Agreement on Regional Anti-Terrorist 

Organizations, expressing their resolve to fight against all forms of terrorism, 

separatism and extremism. 
 73 

2. Improving the multilateral anti-terrorist cooperation system. 

Departments of National Security and Defense of all member states meet 

periodically to discuss measures against terrorism. 

In May 2002, leaders of security agencies in the SCO countries held a 

routine meeting in Astana, proposing starting a regional anti-terrorist 

institution as soon as possible and broadening their cooperation with specific 

measures. In the same month, defense ministers of SCO countries met in 

Moscow and exchanged views on further developing military cooperation. 

The multilateral anti-terrorism cooperation system is also improving. 

In January 2004, the SCO Secretariat was established in Beijing; the SCO 

Regional Anti-terrorist Implementation Committee was founded in Tashkent 

in June, which means that the multilateral organization has begun to function 

in its true sense. 

3. Holding military exercises to accumulate experience for joint antiterrorist actions. 

The SCO has successfully held bilateral and multilateral joint military 

exercises for more vitality and practice. In October 2002, China and 

Kyrgyzstan held an anti-terrorist exercise coded “01” on their borders; in 

August 2003, troops from SCO members held an exercise coded “United2003” in Kazakhstan and China, which indicates the resolve of SCO countries 

in fighting religious extremism. 
 74 

 

Cooperation within the framework of Commonwealth of Independent 

States (CIS) 

1. CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization 

In order to maintain regional stability, most Central Asian countries bolster 

the security cooperation system led by Russia and play an active part in the 

CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization, which is considered crucial in 

ensuring the security of the southern CIS borders.85

During the U.S. air attack on Afghanistan on Oct. 8 and 9, 2001, as 

suggested by Tajikistan, the secretaries of the security conference of members 

of CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization held a meeting on antiterrorism in Tajikistan’s capital, Dushanbe, and passed a joint declaration on 

the common standpoint of the countries on counter-terrorism, as well as 

specifying their counter-terrorist measures. It was stated in the declaration that 

the social foundation of international terrorism must be uprooted, the 

economic foundation being the first. Participants of the meeting decided to 

enhance cooperation between the intelligence agencies of these countries in 

the exchange of intelligence about terrorist bases and their active areas.86

On Nov. 28, 2001, a Conference of Foreign Ministers for membercountries of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization was held in 

Moscow, at which it was proposed that a widely represented government be 

established in Afghanistan to eradicate terrorist bases and eliminate organized 

and drug-related crime. In April 2002, the CIS Counter-terrorist Center 

conducted a military exercise in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan coded “SouthAnti-terrorism-2002” joined by troops from Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 

and Kazakhstan, in order to strengthen their cooperation and reaction 

capacities to international terrorist attacks. 

85 China News Agency reports from Almaty, Sept. 17, <http://online.cri.com.cn/772/2002-9-

18/68@93269.htm>. 86 “Representatives of CIS Collective Security Treaty members held consultations,” Reports 

on Foreign Affairs (Russia), November 2001, Vol. 11. 
 75 

On May 14, 2002, the Council of CIS Collective Security Treaty 

Organization passed a resolution in Moscow that changed CIS Collective 

Security Treaty to the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. The 

presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as leaders of 

other countries, attended the conference and decided to further military 

cooperation among members of the organization by establishing a joint 

military administrative institution and a collective force for prompt reaction to 

terrorist attacks. On Nov. 20, the group’s member-countries decided to 

increase their military forces in Central Asia. In December, the Fifth 

Conference of Security Secretaries of Contract Members was held in Bishkek, 

mainly discussing the enhancement of military force in Central Asia and the 

improvement of a joint mobile force. Russian Security Secretary Luzayelo 

said that Russia has taken a series of joint measures with Central Asian 

countries to heighten their cooperation in counter-terrorist and anti-drug 

efforts. 

2. Counter-terrorist military exercises within the Framework of the CIS. 

Despite the many problems confronted by CIS in its own development and 

the difficulty in its integration, the CIS still has a key part in maintaining 

security. On Oct. 7, 2002, a CIS Summit Conference was held in Chisinau, 

capital of Moldova, at which a memo for a joint counter-terrorism program 

was signed, specifying cooperation on the borders of the member-countries, 

planning on their joint actions to fight crime between 2003 and 2004, as well 

as reaching an agreement to enhance the air-defense system of CIS members. 

From June to August 2003, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and 

Tajikistan joined in a CIS joint air-defense exercise coded “Fighting 

Coordination-2003,” the second phase of which was held in Kazakhstan and 

Uzbekistan. The CIS counter-terrorist center has also held a series of counterterrorist exercises in Central Asia. In summer 2003 too, Kazakhstan, Russia, 

and Ukraine held a military exercise named “2003 Calling for Counterterrorism.” 
 76 

3. Counter-terrorist issues are actively studied within the framework of 

the CIS. 

On Nov. 10 and 11, 2003, as proposed by the Kazakhstan National Security 

Council, an International Symposium on Joint Anti-terrorism was held in 

Almaty, joined by staff from the CIS Counter-terrorist Center, staff of security 

agencies from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia and 

Ukraine, staff of the State Security Council, Presidential Security Bureau, 

National Security Council, and Department of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan, 

as well as political scientists specializing in anti-terrorist studies. 

At the symposium, causes for the development of terrorism were explored, 

while means of surveillance of international terrorists and extremists, as well 

as measures to counteract them, were discussed. Attendees also exchanged 

views on maintaining the security of strategic targets, improving CIS antiterrorist measures, and enhancing cooperation among the security agencies of 

CIS members. 

The symposium approved cooperation among CIS-member security 

agencies. With the example of the capture of a terrorist active in Central Asia 

and Turkey through the joint efforts of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as 

the example of the cooperation of Kazakhstan and Russia in detaining 

Chechen terrorists, Vice-Chairman of Kazakhstan National Security Council 

Borek emphasized the necessity of their cooperation. He disclosed that 

Kazakhstan was making a list of terrorist organizations in the country, and 

that Kazakhstan has increased funding to enhance the protection of key targets 

and facilities. 

Mr. Sachekov, head of the CIS Anti-terrorist Center, noted the many 

explanations for terrorism, for which a definition committee was established 

in the center. He pointed out that the task of the center has been to coordinate 

the counter-terrorist actions of security agencies of all countries, analyze 

security conditions for CIS and the world, coordinate actions of the U.N. Anti-
 77 

terrorist Committee, publicize the anti-terrorist experience of other countries 

in the CIS, as well as to train CIS security agents. 

IV. Factors that may cause Central Asia to readjust their strategies. 

Central Asian countries are in a transitional period in politics, the economy 

and society, all of which are seeing rapid changes. The dynamics poses real 

and potential challenges to the stability and development of Central Asian 

countries. Hence, it is necessary to adjust policies and strategies accordingly. 

After the Color Revolution of Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan 

sent a strong signal for the readjustment of their strategy by asking the 

U.S. and NATO to set a timetable for withdrawing their troops. 

Many factors may cause Central Asia to readjust its strategies, which can 

be classified into those concerning extremist and terrorist forces, and those 

concerning the Color Revolution, both of which are quite active in Central 

Asia. 

Factors concerning extremist and terrorist forces: 

After the Color Revolution in Ukraine, Georgia, and especially 

Kyrgyzstan, Islamic terrorists took the opportunity to seize political power, 

grow and become active. For example, the HT participated in the Color 

Revolution in Kyrgyzstan through some radical actions. According to Uzbek 

and Russian sources, the HT also joined in the riot in Anjijon, Uzbekistan. 

The problem now is, if extremism and terrorism cannot be uprooted by the 

U.S., NATO, CIS Collective Security Treaty members, or the SCO, then 

opportunities remain for extremism and terrorism to become active again; 

further, the Central Asian countries may well lose their patience in 

international cooperation. 
 78 

As stated above, the biggest real and potential threat to Central Asian 

security is the HT. The following conditions may cause the HT’s further 

development: 

1. Because the Color Revolution in Central Asian countries has just begun, 

extremist and terrorist forces can play a role in attacking the present regimes. 

2. The U.S. and other Western countries have not yet decided on the nature 

of the HT, which leaves room for the development of such organizations. 

3. Extremism and terrorism are closely connected with drug smuggling. As 

seen from above, drug production and smuggling increased many times after 

the Afghanistan War as a financial guarantee for extremists and terrorists, 

while the U.S. troops in Afghanistan focus on fighting against terrorist 

organizations, unable to stop drug smuggling in this area efficiently. 

Therefore, Central Asia has become a major passage route for drug 

smuggling, and drug dealers garner total yearly profits as high as 2.2 billion 

U.S. dollars. 

4. Through drug smuggling, extremist and terrorist forces may have 

controlled Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan, and the whole Ferghana and its 

surrounding areas, and they may even build a second base for drug production 

and transportation after Afghanistan, moving the Afghanistan base 1,000 km 

northward. If the need arises, such a base could be used for terrorists and 

extremists. 

5. The regionalizing and internationalizing tendency of the HT makes it a 

big threat to Central Asian countries and even surrounding areas. The party is 

transnational and trans-regional, whose aim is to Islamize the whole of Central 

Asia and found a united Islamic nation. The party is active in other countries 

of the world too, such as founding its headquarters in London, setting up 

branching in Xinjiang China and engaging in sabotage, as well as acting in 

Laganda and Manjistao of Kazakhstan. Therefore, such extremist and terrorist 

organizations as the HT should not be studied only in the context of one 

country. 
 79 

Factors concerning the Color Revolution: 

Because the U.S. and some other countries are not satisfied with the 

democratization process of Central Asian countries, they encourage these 

countries toward political transformation by supporting or acquiescing in 

rather radical means of change and the Color Revolution. 

Conflicts arising during the transformation of Central Asian countries are 

the social foundation for the Western encouragement of the Color Revolution. 

Such conflicts include the huge proportion of poor people in the society 

(constituting 30 percent or even higher in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and 

Uzbekistan), serious unemployment, corrupt officials, nepotism, a crisis of 

national identity, and the slow improvement of public living standard, etc. 

Meanwhile, the opposing forces in Central Asian countries continue to seek 

support from abroad. 

Next, let’s examine the countries in which the Color Revolution has taken 

place. 

1. Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan have not completed revising their 

Russian policy, by which they will continue to depend on Russia. 

2. The political institutions of the three countries have not yet changed with 

the Color Revolution to be more democratic. 

3. Because these countries may remain unstable during the transition 

period, the U.S. interests in the region can hardly be fully realized with the 

shift of regimes, as in the examples of Latin America and Africa. U.S. 

intervention even caused the separation and instability of Latin America. 

4. Unlike that in Ukraine and Georgia, the Color Revolution in Kyrgyzstan 

happened in a violent way, and resulted in a parliament that had led to the 

revolution previously, which gave rise to confusion and frustration in the 

society. Further, riots may happen any time in Kyrgyzstan because of its 

social and political instability. The imbalance of interest redistribution after 

the revolution may also cause new conflicts. Furthermore, the political 
 80 

institution of Kyrgyzstan has far to reach U.S. democratic standards, even 

after Akayev’s departure. 

If the Color Revolution proceeds in other Central Asian countries, which is 

very likely at present, then more elections will be seen in Central Asia, 

supported by the opposing forces and other forces, and the revolution may 

well come about through violence or riots. At least from present perspectives, 

the violent mode is hard to avoid, which poses the following threats and 

challenges: 

1. Central Asian countries have universally become cautious toward the 

Color Revolution; some countries have even adopted control measures to 

maintain their [current] political institution and the interests of the authorities. 

Will that lead to a readjustment in the political transformation strategies of 

Central Asian countries? 

2. Many national and tribal conflicts exist in Central Asian countries, 

which may cause violent clashes in a violent transformation mode. 

3. Central Asian countries are very sensitive to external influence. Will 

they be forced to turn to Russia for protection if they resist U.S. and Western 

support of the Color Revolution? 

4. The Moldova Mode. Challenged by the Color Revolution, Moldova 

chose to seek further help from the U.S., without changing its original 

institution. Yet Central Asian countries are not very likely to adopt this mode, 

because they can hardly control the process if the Color Revolution happens, 

and violence will be bound to dominate. 

In the context of the Color Revolution, the abovementioned two factors 

may interact with each other, or even integrate, the result of which would pose 

serious challenges to Central Asia, the surrounding nations, as well as to the 

U.S. and the West. 
 81 

It has been seen from the Color Revolution in Kyrgyzstan that the previous 

regime can be overthrown by street democracy and violence, yet what will be 

the new institution like? 

Extremism and terrorism may revive in Central Asia, not only in the 

society, but also within the regime, i.e., extremist and terrorist regimes may 

arise in Central Asia. 

Consider the situation in Uzbekistan. The Anjijon case can almost be 

regarded as a preview of the Color Revolution in Uzbekistan. Although there 

are no mature opposing forces in the country, terrorist organizations and 

extremist forces exist in Uzbekistan. If the authorities cannot control the 

situation, then extremist and terrorist forces are very likely to seize the power. 

What will be the consequences? 

Unlike the radical democratic reform and transformation expected by the 

U.S. and the West, the result will be the seizure of power by terrorist and 

extremist forces in Central Asia. 

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan will then become the second and the third 

Afghanistan and Taliban, while Central Asia and Afghanistan will be united, 

and Afghanistan will be controlled by another Taliban-like regime. If so, 

Central Asia will become a new base for international terrorism, which 

threatens not only U.S. and Western interests in Central Asia, but also Russian 

interests and the security of West China. 

Therefore, Central Asia is likely to readjust its strategy. The advance of the 

Color Revolution may not benefit the U.S. and the West; neither can it 

immediately generate democratic institutions as expected by the U.S. and the 

West. On the contrary, it may bring about instability and riots, and even 

control by extremism and terrorism. 

A few conclusions: 

Central Asian countries are in a period of social transformation and have 

their own political and cultural characteristics. The transformation process 
 82 

must abide by the general laws of social transformation; no radical means can 

guarantee expected results. 

Stability and development are most important to Central Asia and are 

essential to regional security. The major threats to Central Asia remain 

extremism and terrorism, which should be the top concern of the international 

community. Extremist and terrorist forces may start turmoil and riots by 

exploiting street politics and the Color Revolution, which may lead to largescale Islamic revolution. As we know, revolution in Iran led to an Islamic 

regime, while that in Afghanistan brought about the Taliban. 

In order to eliminate extremism and terrorism, it is necessary to promote 

stability and development, improve the living standard of the people, and 

further press for reform by law, giving full consideration to the characteristics 

of the social institutions of Central Asia. 

The stability and development of Central Asia are beneficial to China and 

other major powers that maintain influence in the region, as well as to the 

security of Central Asia.
 83 

Chapter Five 

Recent Development and Prospects of Relations 

Between China and the Central Asian States 

Shi Ze 

Surrounding west China, Central Asia has grown to be an important new 

geopolitical region since 9/11. Despite the rapid changes in the geopolitical 

situation in the region during the previous years, the relationship between 

China and the Central Asian states has developed steadily in all fields, which 

is among the credits of China’s diplomacy with surrounding nations. 

China’s Central Asia Policy 

The Central Asian states respond actively to China’s foreign policy of 

“Friendship, Stability and Mutual Prosperity with Neighboring Countries,” 

and their mutual political trust has been further strengthened. 

First, summit meetings and communication in various fields have been 

institutionalized between China and the Central Asian states. Leaders of both 

sides have visited each other frequently in the past years: President Hu Jintao 

and Premier Wen Jiabao visited Central Asia and attended the summit 

meetings of the SCO each year; Kazakh President Nazarbayev visited China 

twice last year [2004]; Uzbek President Karimov visited China not long ago; 

and each year, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing visited Central Asian states and 

met with foreign ministers of other states at the Conference on Interaction and 

Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and the SCO. In general, both 

sides have kept close contact with each other in such fields as diplomacy, 

trade, culture and security, coupled with the growing interaction between the 

congresses, parties, local governments and peoples of China and Central 

Asian states. 

Second, on the basis of reciprocity and mutual understanding, the two sides 

have successfully resolved their border disputes. Since the settlement of 

China-Kazakhstan border disputes, China has signed an agreement with 
 84 

Kyrgyzstan on border definition. China also signed The Supplementary 

Agreement on Border Definition with Tajikistan, which was ratified by both 

countries last year. By now, the 3,300-km borderline between China and the 

Central Asian states has been completely defined. 

Third, China has signed treaties of friendship and cooperation with most 

Central Asian states, further strengthening the legal foundation for the 

development of their relations. After the signing of the China-Kazakhstan and 

China-Kyrgyzstan treaties, President Hu visited Uzbekistan in June 2004, and 

signed with Uzbek President on The Joint Declaration on Further Developing 

and Deepening the Friendly Partnership between Both Countries, changing 

their past “friendly relationship” into “friendly partnership,” and they signed 

The China-Uzbekistan Peaceful and Friendly Cooperation Treaty when the 

Uzbek President visited China in May 2005. 

Last, both sides have begun to highlight and develop their cooperation in 

the realm of security. In recent years, China has signed cooperation 

agreements with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on 

striking the “three forces” [of terrorism, separatism and extremism], for better 

coordination of their actions and for sharing intelligence. Within the 

framework of the SCO, China and the Central Asian states have held several 

joint military exercises targeted at terrorist forces and strengthened 

cooperation on such non-traditional security issues as striking transnational 

crime and drug dealing. In July 2005, all SCO members signed The 

Compendium on Cooperation in Striking the Three Forces at the Astana 

Summit Meeting. Moreover, communication and cooperation between China 

and the Central Asian states also tend to be further enhanced. 

Mutual Advantages 

The geopolitical advantage of China and Central Asia, as well as the 

potential for complementary economies, is becoming manifest. 

The biggest advantage for both sides in developing relations is their close 

proximity. After the successful resolution of the border disputes between 
 85 

China and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, as well as Tajikistan, the 3,300-km 

borderline has turned out to be a crucial link between them, whose 

transportation conditions are also rapidly improving. Direct flights to the 

capitals of all five Central Asian states have been opened, while there are 

several flights to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan each week; direct 

flights to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan ended the period of history when 

transportation had to pass through a third country. Moreover, the ChinaKazakhstan railway, as well as the China-Kyrgyzstan and China-Tajikistan 

roads, undertake an increasing amount of transportation, with road conditions 

improving. Compared with the 5 million tons of transportation through the 

Alas Mountain Port between China and Kazakhstan only a few years ago, the 

current transportation capacity has reached 10 million tons, but it still cannot 

meet the needs of the sharply increasing amount of goods. While inspecting 

the port not long ago, Kazakh President Nazarbayev suggested raising the 

transportation capacity to 15 million tons by 2010. With China’s aid of 60 

million RMB, the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Road has 

been started in Kyrgyzstan. Further, China and Kazakhstan have a plan to 

construct a standardized railway that connects Europe with both countries. 

Also notable is the opening of the Karasu Port between China and Tajikistan 

on the Pamir Highland in May 2004, which opened the long-closed window 

between China and the southern part of Central Asia. Compared with 10 years 

ago, China and the Central Asian states are witnessing improved conditions 

and doubling amounts of transportation, as well as an accelerated flow of 

goods, people and information, which greatly promotes communication and 

cooperation between both sides. With the improvement of transportation 

conditions, cooperation between China and the Central Asian states in recent 

years is on its way to transforming the complementary potential of their 

economies into practical implementation of their respective advantages. 

A Growing Economy 

The improvement of Central Asia’s economy is providing new 

opportunities to expand economic and trade cooperation between both sides. 
 86 

A hindering factor in China-Central Asia economic and trade cooperation 

had been the enduring economic depression of the Central Asian states since 

their independence. In the late 1990s, the GDP of most Central Asian states 

was less than half of that before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Such a 

phenomenon has now changed greatly over previous years. 

First, the economy of the Central Asian states has continued to recover 

over the past few years. The global economic recovery and the rising price of 

energy, and especially the conspicuous improvement of the Russian economy, 

have provided a much better environment for the economic development of 

Central Asian states than a few years ago. Meanwhile, the relatively stable 

domestic political situation and consistent transformation in these states also 

contributes to their economic growth. The growth rate in most states was over 

10 percent in 2003, while that of Turkmenistan even exceeded 20 percent. The 

total GDP of the five states has reached $58 billion, $27 billion of which was 

contributed by Kazakhstan alone. These states also are witnessing a rapid 

growth of financial revenues and gold reserves, which are $5 billion for 

Kazakhstan and $4 billion for Turkmenistan. Further, the average income in 

all the states has also increased (by more than $2,000 in Kazakhstan), 

resulting in a higher living standard for the populace. 

Second, the environment for investment in Central Asia has further 

improved. At present, the Central Asian economy is at a turning point between 

recovery and development, thanks to the accelerated process of reform and 

improvements in the legal system. All the states have formulated a long-term 

strategy for development: The New Investment Law and The Land Law in 

Kazakhstan; Strategy for Political, Economic and Cultural Development by 

2020 in Turkmenistan; and Strategy for Economic Development by 2015 in 

Tajikistan. Furthermore, a large amount of foreign investment is introduced 

into these states; such international financial institutions as the World Bank, 

the Bank of Asia and the Bank of the European Union also provide many 

loans. With the improved economic environment, as well as new opportunities 

arising from the new strategy for development of Central Asian states, 

transnational companies are also planning to increase their investment in the 

region. 
 87 

Third, the volume of trade between the Central Asian states and other states 

has been rising. In record-setting 2003, the trade volume of Kazakhstan 

reached $21 billion, an increase of 30 percent, while that of Turkmenistan also 

reached $6.1 billion; trade volume of other Central Asian states also increased 

considerably. With the large amount of foreign investment, many large- and 

middle-scale joint projects have been started with satisfactory benefits. 

The positive changes in the Central Asian economy greatly promote 

economic cooperation between China and these states. Statistics show that 

trade between both sides has increased by more than ten times over the past 12 

years, from $0.47 billion in 1992 to $4 billion in 2003, and to $5 billion in 

2004, $4.5 billion of which was between China and Kazakhstan. In addition, 

China’s exports to Central Asian states have exceeded its imports after many 

years of an adverse balance of trade. 

Because of the change of the export structure, economic cooperation has 

been expanded from the field of trade only to the fields of techniques and 

investment. China’s investment in Central Asia has reached $1 billion to date, 

and many joint programs have been, or will be, completed: the ChinaKazakhstan joint construction of the Atasu-Alas Mountain Pass Oil Pipeline 

started on September 28, 2004, and is to be completed at the end of 2005, 

while both countries are planning to construct another pipeline for natural gas, 

which will also promote their energy cooperation; China and Uzbekistan 

cooperate well on such programs as electric locomotives, tractors and gas 

meters, and during the visit of the Uzbek President to China this year, both 

sides signed an agreement on energy cooperation, by which China is to invest 

$600 million in Uzbekistan in various programs; the joint paper mill of China 

and Kyrgyzstan has also begun to run, and last September [2004], leaders of 

both countries signed The 2003—2004 Compendium on Cooperation, which 

lays a good foundation for their further cooperation; China’s irrigation 

techniques and telephone-network upgrading program in Tajikistan produced 

good results too. In addition, China has exported a lot of petroleum-producing 

machinery to Turkmenistan over the years, and they have begun to cooperate 

on restoring oil wells. Trade between China and Central Asia exceeded $5 

billion in 2004, only 1/12 of the $5.8 billion total trade volume of Central 
 88 

Asia, thus indicating great potentials for their further cooperation. The 

continuous development of the Central Asian economy will undoubtedly lay 

an even more solid foundation for the further development of their trade and 

friendly relations, especially after the visit of Chinese Vice-Premier Wu Yi to 

four Central Asian states at the end of last July. 

SCO Outreach 

The SCO has strongly promoted China’s cooperation with Russia and the 

Central Asian states. 

As a new multilateral cooperation mechanism designed to overcome the 

limitation of bilateral cooperation, the SCO was created by China and other 

member states through many years’ exploration under rapidly changing world 

conditions. Since its founding, it has greatly promoted the general relationship 

between China and the Central Asian states. All its member states favor the 

“Shanghai Spirit” of mutual trust and mutual benefit, cooperation on an equal 

footing, respect for diverse cultures, common development, the new security 

outlook and new modes of international relations and regional cooperation. 

Having accomplished its initial foundation tasks, and focusing on economic 

and security cooperation, the SCO has begun its overall development and 

substantial cooperation in combating the “three forces” and on economy and 

trade, thus contributing very much to the peace, stability and prosperity of the 

region. At the Bishkek Summit Meeting last September, all member states 

passed the Plans on Measures to Implement the Compendium of Cooperation 

on Economy and Trade, which concerns their cooperation in 127 programs in 

11 fields, including transportation, energy, telecommunications and 

agriculture. The viable cooperation mechanism and forward-looking designing 

of the SCO has already demonstrated its significance. Reality shows that the 

SCO accords with the interests of all member states, who, by effective 

cooperation, have also strengthened their friendly relationship. 
 89 

Prospects of Relations between China and the Central Asian States 

Since the establishment of formal relations between China and the Central 

Asian states, their relationship has been developing steadily, mainly because 

of their broad consensus and common interests. 

In terms of politics, first, both sides put their emphasis on economic 

construction and creating a favorable international environment for their 

domestic economies; next, each regards the other as a friend, and each pursues 

the policy of equality, mutual respect for each other’s choice, non-interference 

in each other’s domestic affairs, friendly consultation, mutual trust and 

tolerance, by which they have managed to solve long-standing border 

disputes; thirdly, both China and the Central Asian states advocate 

establishing a just and democratic multilateral order based on wellacknowledged international laws; they both strive to promote the 

democratization of international relations and the diversification of modes for 

development, as well as the stable and harmonious development of Central 

Asia. 

In the economic field, each side has market demands on the other, and the 

sides complement each other, with great potential for their further 

development: China’s “West Development and Outreach [‘Going-Out’] 

Strategy” is quite compatible with the Central Asian states’ economic 

development strategy. China is more advanced in light industry, machinery, 

techniques and agriculture, while the Central Asian states are rich in energy 

and other resources, as well as in husbandry. As inland states, Central Asian 

states need to enter the Asia-Pacific market with China’s help, while 

promoting their economies using China’s techniques and capital. Similarly, 

with the rapid economic development, China needs to import more energy and 

other resources from Central Asia, as well as to have a greater share in the 

Central Asian market. With the completion of China-Central Asia 

transportation and the construction of more ports in subsequent years, a 

transportation network that connects China and Central Asia from north to 

south is to be established through the joint efforts of both sides, which will 
 90 

further enhance their economic cooperation and the prosperity of the regional 

economy. 

In the security arena, both sides are also further strengthening their 

cooperation. Above all, both sides are confronted with the common threat of 

international terrorism, national separatism and religious extremism, as well 

as drug dealing, arms smuggling and illegal immigration. Thus, they need to 

combine their efforts to meet the severe challenge. Further, the various 

bilateral cooperation mechanisms and the multilateral SCO will further 

guarantee their security cooperation, though they must remain cautious about 

the challenges of the ever-changing Central Asian situation. 

 As Central Asian states face a large number of political, economic and 

social problems during the transformation period, they are very likely 

to encounter to internal conflicts. The presidential system is the basis 

for the stability of Central Asian states, which largely depends on the 

personal authority of the president alone. Once a president loses power 

due to certain contingent factors, the political situation in the region 

may well move out of control, especially when external forces provoke 

conflicts between the authorities and political dissidents. 

 Although Islamic extremist forces are currently well contained, they 

may still expand their influence in Central Asia during elections or in 

times of Central Asian economic depression. 

 Competition among major powers, especially over Caspian energy, 

seriously affects the stability and development of Central Asia and 

complicates the relations among Central Asian states. 

 Latent conflicts between Central Asian states in religion, nationality, 

border definition, and the distribution of resources will continue to 

affect the development of their relationships quite far into the future 

and add much uncertainty to the future development of the regional 

situation. 

In a word, all the four abovementioned factors might affect the 

development of relations between China and the Central Asian states. 
 91 

Conclusion 

Looking into the future, we must note that, despite the many risks and 

challenges, China-Central Asia relations are seeing more opportunities. 

Maintaining regional stability is a common pursuit of China and these states, 

and it is also prerequisite for the region’s prosperity. With the many common 

interests and broad consensus, there is every reason to believe that ChinaCentral Asia relations will develop steadily. China’s foreign policy of 

“Friendship, Stability and Mutual Prosperity with Neighboring Countries” has 

been widely acknowledged by the Central Asian states and has had a positive 

effect. Central Asia’s prosperity cannot be achieved without China, while 

China also needs Central Asia to sustain its own growth. Therefore, we 

believe that China-Central Asia relations based on friendship, equality and 

mutual benefit will continue to grow, bringing prosperity to both sides. 
 92 
 93 

Part II 

Issues and Concerns 
 94 
 95 

Chapter Six 

Analysis of Relations between Interests of China and 

India in Central Asia 

Yang Shu 

In spite of the fact that Central Asia is composed of several moderate and 

small countries, this region, due to its unique geographical position and rich 

natural resources, has increasingly appealed to external powers, which has 

brought about a pluralistic power structure in the region. With the continuous 

discoveries of energy resources in the Caspian Sea and the anti-terrorist war in 

Afghanistan, Central Asia has grown to be an ever more important strategic 

spot in the world. China and India, both as strong regional powers, are paying 

closer attention to Central Asia, and their influences in this area are expanding 

as well, which may either lead to their cooperation on their common goals or 

give rise to conflicts between their different interests. This paper aims to give 

a brief analysis of the relationship between the interests of China and India in 

Central Asia. 

China-India Relationship in Terms of Energy 

Both China and India are giving more strategic consideration to the Central 

Asian energy, due to the severe energy security situation they must face. As it 

is generally believed, oil, an irreplaceable form of energy, has become the 

blood vessel of the modern economy. There are reportedly abundant energy 

resources, especially oil and natural gas in the Central Asian area, in which 

the discovered oil reserves reach 200 billion barrels, and natural gas 8 trillion 

cubic meters. Consequently, Central Asia has become a target of competition 

among various external forces. Because of the common intention of India and 

China to cooperate in oil exploitation in Central Asia, both countries should 

strive to improve their cooperation and avoid opposition in the field of energy. 
 96 

 India’s consideration of the energy resources in Central Asia 

Since the 1990s, the exploration of oil and natural gas in India has reached 

a stalemate, and no great discovery was ever made. However, the rapid 

development of India’s economy demands a rapidly growing supply of oil, 

and the gap between this supply and demand is gradually growing wider. 

India’s demand for oil is increasing at the fastest rate in Asia, according to 

The Director of the Marketing Department of the International Energy 

Organization, who spoke at the 4th Annual Asian Oil and Natural Gas 

Conference held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 2004. In 2001, India 

produced 640,000 barrels while consuming 1.9 million barrels per day. Its net 

import has reached nearly 60 million tons, with a dependent rate on oil import 

as high as 58 percent. It is estimated that India’s oil consumption will increase 

from 1.9 million barrels per day in 2001 to 34 million barrels per day in 2010. 

Considering the current energy reserves in India, only 760 million tons of oil 

and less than 700 billion cubic meters of natural gas are exploitable, which 

can last 20 years at the most at the current speed of exploitation. India’s 

Petroleum Minister Ram Naik Mani Shankar Aiyar revealed in a written 

report to the Parliament that, of the total Indian demand of 100 million tons, 

70 percent depended on oil import, and that India imported 78.7 million tons 

of crude oil and one million tons of oil products between 2001 and 2002 

alone, while the energy demand was still increasing. In 2001, the total Indian 

demand for oil was about 115 million tons, but it is expected to exceed 200 

million tons in 2010, by which time India’s oil self-sufficiency rate will be 

only 30 percent at the best. Although India’s imported oil mainly comes from 

the nearby Gulf regions, excessive dependence on oil import from a certain 

area will lead to the increasing fragility of its energy security. Therefore, it is 

necessary for India to multiply its sources of energy supply and seek a stable 

and inexpensive source of oil and natural gas in Central Asia. Especially after 

the Iraq War, in order to avoid the threat to its oil supplies, India worked out a 

plan for crude-oil import in times of crises, in which India’s interest in Central 

Asian energy rose greatly. Therefore, from the perspectives of energy and 

economic security, Central Asia is of great strategic significance to India, 
 97 

which has been expanding communication and cooperation with the oilsupplying countries in the Persian Gulf and in Central Asia as well. 

 China’s demand for energy in Central Asia 

At present, China ranks third in world energy production and second in 

energy consumption. In 2004, it imported 122.7 million tons of crude oil, with 

a dependent rate on import as high as 40 percent. It is estimated that China 

will increase its crude-oil import by 10 to 15 million tons each year by 2010. 

According to relevant studies, when a country’s oil import exceeds 50 million 

tons, its national economy will be subject to influence of the international oil 

market; when the oil import exceeds 100 million tons, it must take diplomatic, 

economic or military measures to ensure its energy security. Seen from its 

industrializing process, China will witness an even bigger gap between oil 

production and demand, thus facing a dangerous situation of energy security. 

According to statistics by relevant departments, about 65 percent of China’s 

imported oil comes from the Middle East, most of which is transported 

through the Malacca Strait, which is famous for its crowded traffic and many 

pirates. To ensure safe passage for the transportation of oil and natural gas, it 

is wise for China to construct a pipeline and import a certain amount of oil 

and natural gas from Central Asia. Therefore, China should pay continuous 

efforts to widen the supply channels for its national strategic reserves by 

actively participating in the exploration and exploitation of oil and natural gas 

in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. 

 Possibility of China-India cooperation in the field of energy 

The common concern between China and India over Central Asia naturally 

generates certain conflicts between their interests in energy exploitation in the 

area. However, in view of the various forces in the political realm of Central 

Asia, China and India should cooperate well on energy in Central Asia, 

especially on the construction of oil pipelines. 
 98 

It can be found from a broad view of Xinjiang, Central Asia and India that 

it is feasible to construct a pipeline from Kazakhstan to India via Xinjiang of 

China. The pipeline can first stretch to northern Xinjiang from Kazakhstan, 

then to southern China, and finally reach India. With regard to China’s “West 

Gas to the East Project,” whose pipeline runs from the south to the north and 

to the inland areas, this proposal will prove beneficial to both China and India. 

More specifically, a pipeline from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang can be built 

first. In reality, the pipeline has already been in construction since September 

2004. The agreement signed between the Kazakh Ministry of Energy and 

Mineral Resources, and the China Petroleum and Natural Gas Corporation on 

September 24, 1997, described in detail the direction of the 2,797-km pipeline 

with an oil-transporting capacity of 20 million tons a year, and its duration for 

construction was expected to be 4 years. After this pipeline is constructed, a 

new one is to be constructed from Zepu County of the Tarim Basin in 

Xinjiang to Kashmir along No. 219 National Highway, and two more 

pipelines to India and Pakistan respectively will be constructed. 

After the completion of both pipelines, the oil and natural gas transported 

to inland China from the south through northern Xinjiang can be transported 

to Pakistan and India in exchange for the oil and gas transported to northern 

Xinjiang from Central Asia. To be specific, oil and gas will be transported to 

inland China by the two pipelines: 1) Tarim—Korla—the Turpan Basin—

inland China; and 2) Kazakhstan—the Zhun’ge’er Basin—the Turpan Basin—

Inland China. The pipeline to India will run from Tarim to Zepu to Kashmir, 

and reach India and Pakistan. This proposal not only reduces the distance of 

China’s “West Gas to the East Project” in Xinjiang, but also provides another 

option of oil import for India. 

From the economic perspective, this proposal can save a lot of costs, and 

from the political perspective, it can promote political cooperation between all 

relevant parties as well, especially political dialogue between China and India, 

as well as between India and Pakistan. Despite the comparatively smaller 

number of influencing factors in nationalities, religion and politics for this 

proposal, the terrorist forces in Kashmir will be the most threatening factor 

requiring the joint efforts of all participating countries. 
 99 

China-India Relationship in Regional Security 

In addition to the mutual demand for energy in Central Asia, China and 

India share a common goal of maintaining stability in the region. 

Central Asia is of special strategic significance to India due to its proximity 

to Pakistan, a country on bad terms with India. Since the separation of the two 

countries, India and Pakistan have been involved in countless conflicts over 

Kashmir. The vacuum of power in Central Asia after the disintegration of the 

Soviet Union provided an opportunity for Pakistan to obtain more strategic 

space than for India, which has been worried about the expanding Pakistani 

influence in Afghanistan as well as in parts of Central Asia since the 1980s. 

Particularly, India believes that Pakistan has always provided aid for terrorists 

in their actions in Kashmir, which seriously threatens the national security and 

domestic stability of India. Under these circumstances, India expects to 

compress the strategic space of Pakistan by developing relations with the five 

Central Asian states, thus preventing Pakistan from obtaining more strategic 

space in Central Asia and, as a further step, completing a strategic 

encirclement around Pakistan in some sense. Moreover, terrorist forces in 

South Asia and Central Asia have joined together, which requires the joint 

efforts of India and the Central Asian states for the cause of regional security. 

The instability caused by Islamic fundamentalism and cross-border terrorism 

is not only likely to bring about political turbulence in India, but will also 

impede the development of democratic institutions in Central Asia. If the 

Central Asian states aim to continue their secularization process, they must 

cooperate with India in combating Islamic fundamentalism; India must also 

rely largely on the Central Asian states to contain terrorism in Kashmir. As the 

five Central Asian states and India are all victims of Islamic fundamentalism 

as well as cross-border terrorism, only well-organized cooperation between 

both sides can strike terrorist actions effectively, especially those in the 

Ferghana Basin and Garm area that are intertwined with Kashmir issues. 
 100 

On the one hand, in the geopolitics of Central and South Asia, the collapse 

of the Taliban regime deprives Pakistan of an important source of rear 

support, thus India has taken a more advantageous position in its confrontation 

with Pakistan; on the other hand, this situation impels Pakistan to turn to 

Central Asia for greater strategic space. Hence the increasing demands for 

India’s security in the Indian Ocean and Central Asia. As an Indian scholar 

said, “In order to protect its own security interests, India still has to focus on 

Afghanistan and Central Asia...India needs to take necessary measures to 

make sure that it will not be excluded from Central Asian politics, and that it 

will not become a helpless bystander in an area so critical to its own security.” 

Besides the goal of obtaining new energy bases in Central Asia, China also 

intends to prevent extremist forces from disturbing its domestic stability by 

enhancing regional cooperation. The security of west China requires its 

cooperation with the Central Asian states as well as with India. Among all the 

international factors that are likely to influence west China, the changes and 

development of the states along China’s northwest borders are most 

important. Therefore, it has become one of China’s key strategic goals to 

maintain the stability in west China and the entire Central Asian region. 

Xinjiang adjoins Central Asia geographically. The separatist and terrorist 

forces in Xinjiang, with aid and training from international terrorist forces 

headed by Al-Qaeda, pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability 

of China and Central Asia. In order to combat terrorism more effectively, 

China has signed The Shanghai Pact on Striking Terrorism, Separatism and 

Extremism with four Central Asian states and Russia, which is an important 

step for China and Central Asian states in enhancing their cooperation in 

security. 

Security and stability in northwest China and Central Asia are closely 

related. With diverse cultures, religions and nationalities, Central Asia is a 

unique and complicated region, while Xinjiang separatists in China, whose 

support mainly comes from Central Asia, are increasing the conflicts between 

different nationalities in Xinjiang. In the long run, it is both necessary and 

urgent for China and the Central Asian states to cooperate in striking 

terrorism. It is also a most pressing task for China to prevent Central-Asia-
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based extremist forces from threatening the stability and security of northwest 

China. 

At present, the drug problem has become a most perilous threat to the 

world. Central Asia has grown to be one of the leading drug producing and 

transporting centers. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the amount of narcotics 

transported via Central Asia has increased by dozens of times. It is estimated 

that over 60 percent of all drugs produced in Afghanistan flow into Central 

Asian states, and then enter the world drug market together with drugs 

produced in Central Asia. Most of the drugs are transported to Europe and 

Russia, while some are sold to India and Pakistan, causing great harm to the 

local society. According to an official of the U.N. Anti-Drug Organization 

who is working in Russia, more than 30 countries or areas have become drug 

markets, the largest of which include Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Brazil, India, 

China, and Russia. Apparently, cracking down on drug smuggling has become 

another important mission for China and Central Asia. Otherwise, illegal-drug 

activity will not only cause instability in Central Asian states, but will also 

impair the development of regional cooperation. 

In a word, China and India share common security interests in striking 

Islamic fundamentalism and drug smuggling, as well as maintaining the 

regional security and stability in Central Asia. It is to be admitted that Central 

Asia itself is rather fragile in the face of Islamic fundamentalism, whose 

influence will grow with serious economic or political crises in the region, and 

that does not accord with the basic interests of India, China, and Central Asian 

states as well. 

China-India Economic and Trade Relations 

Historically, close economic ties existed along the route of Central Asia—

Afghanistan—Pakistan—India. These ties were severed by a series of 

incidents that occurred in the 19th and 20th centuries. It will be of great 

geopolitical appeal to revitalize transportation from Central Asia to Pakistan 

and India. Soon after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Pakistan realized 
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the importance of Central Asia in geopolitics, and believed that “the window 

to Central Asia must be opened.” Thus, India and Pakistan began to compete 

in Afghanistan. According to the Tajik Ministry of Economy and Trade, in 

order to promote regional economic cooperation between Central Asia and 

South Asia, the Ministers of Traffic and Trade from Afghanistan, Pakistan, 

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan met in early August 2003 at the 

headquarters of the Asian Development Bank in Manila, capital of the 

Philippines, and signed an agreement on usage of the “South-North Passage” 

that links the Central Asian states with ports in Pakistan on the basis of mutual 

benefits. 

Meanwhile, India was highly concerned about Pakistan’s intention to open 

the passage to Central Asia, as it might consolidate Pakistan’s strategic 

position in geopolitics. India has always attached great importance to the 

Central Asian market and the regional economic cooperation between South

Asia and Central Asia. Due to the frequent conflicts between India and 

Pakistan, however, there is little possibility for India to be economically 

connected with Central Asia and Russia through Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

Goods from India must be transported to Iran by sea first, then on to the 

Central Asian states. Thus, Iran is not only a gateway to Afghanistan, Central 

Asia and Europe for India, but it also connects Central Asia with the world 

market. At present, New Delhi and Teheran are joining their efforts to 

construct a passage that links India and the above areas via Iran.87 Once 

completed, this passage will witness a reduction of transportation fees and an 

opening of new markets, which will not only promote trade between India and 

the Central Asian states, but will also overcome the negative impact on India 

by the new passage between Pakistan and theses states. In this process, 

Afghanistan will be an important gateway for India to get connected with 

Central Asia. India maintained close relations with the former Northern 

Alliance during Taliban times, and four ministers of the Afghan Interim 

government have visited New Delhi to discuss the issue of reconstructing 

Afghanistan. However, the successful construction of the passage still 

87 Shahin, Sultan, “Who Supports Iran’s Development of Nuclear Weapons in the Dark?” 

Asian Times (Thailand), September 1, 2003. 
 103 

depends on active cooperation from the Central Asian states. As far as the 

Central Asian states are concerned, they are striving for economic integration 

within their own region, and some phased achievements have been achieved. 

Because of the relationship between India and the former Soviet Union, it is 

easier for India to participate in the economic integration of Central Asia and 

to establish trade relations or other joint programs with the five Central Asian 

states. India and Central Asia may develop their economic cooperation 

through joint ventures in such fields as banking, insurance, agriculture, 

information technology and the pharmaceutical industry. India has supplied 

nearly one third of the total pharmaceutical demand in Central Asia, and at an 

industry exposition held in Almaty in 2004, Indian companies received orders 

worth 28 million U.S dollars for its home products. Both of these facts 

indicate the great prospects for India-Central Asia economic cooperation. 

From China’s perspective, as northwest China shares more than 3,000 

kilometers of common borders with Central Asian states, as well as many 

transnational ethnic groups, languages, customs and traditions, China and 

Central Asia have enjoyed a long history of contact. Therefore, west China’s 

development is closely related to the five Central Asian states. Since the 

1990s, trade between China and the five states has increased more than three 

times, from $460 million in 1992 to $1,509 million in 2001. The abundant 

natural resources in Central Asia and the processing capacity in China provide 

a supplementary economic opportunity of for both sides. In addition, China 

and most Central Asian states are members of the Shanghai Cooperation 

Organization (SCO), which is even more beneficial to the development of 

their cooperation in economics and trade. Currently, Chinese goods in Asia 

mainly include textiles, foodstuffs, up-scale beverages, fruit and vegetables, as 

well as medical products and daily commodities. From 80 to 90 percent of all 

business between China and Central Asia is conducted via Xinjiang. In May 

2004, while meeting with more than 130 business people from China and 

Kazakhstan, Kazakh President Nazarbayev said, “Xinjiang is one of the fastest 

growing areas in economic activity. In the total $3-billion trade volume 

between China and Kazakhstan, about $2.5 billion is done here. The impact of 

Xinjiang on Kazakhstan is sure to grow into the future.” However, a large 
 104 

proportion of goods exported via Xinjiang come from Central and East China, 

which actually increases the costs of trade. Fortunately, the Great 

Development of the West in China provides more opportunities for trade 

between Xinjiang and Kazakhstan, which reportedly reached $1.88 billion in 

the first half of this year—good evidence of the importance of Central Asia to 

foreign trade in Xinjiang. 

With the economic development of the Central Asian states, consumer 

power is increasing too. China should revise its low-level means of trade of 

the past while maintaining its current market share and stepping up the class 

of its goods, thus better adapting to the changed Central Asian market. 

It is undeniable that, both as developing countries at similar levels of 

development and with similar economic structures, China and India will 

continue to compete over their share of the Central Asian market, especially in 

mid- and low-end products, thus involving themselves in certain conflicts in 

trade and economic activity, as well as in attracting foreign funds, investing in 

other countries, and engaging in diplomacy. Under this circumstance, China 

and India should strive to develop their own strong fields, complementing 

each other with their respective advantages. It is proposed that an economic 

community, such as a free-trade zone, be established between both countries. 

Conclusion 

It can be found from the above analysis that, whether from the perspective 

of economic interests or from regional security, the development of relations 

between both China and India with Central Asian states is of great 

importance. To be specific, India and China share common interests in 

combating extremist forces. Further, as cooperation in energy is key to 

balancing relationships between large powers and maintaining regional 

stability, China and India should try to find more common interests while 

engaging themselves more actively in energy cooperation. It must be noted 

that the rich energy reserves in the Central Asian states not only serve as a 

foundation for their economic development, but they are also a major factor 
 105 

that may lead to instability of the region, due to ever more intense competition 

and conflicts over energy. In view of that, China and India should make the 

best use of their geopolitical advantages and expand their cooperation in 

Central Asia, so as to fulfill their mutual interests in the region. 

In general, India and China have their own advantages in their cooperation 

in Central Asia. India’s advantages concentrate on its culture, religions and 

social system. Specifically speaking, India and Central Asia share a long 

history of close contacts in culture and religion; the Central Asian states all 

believe in Islam, while India has the largest Muslim population (120 million) 

in the world. These traditional cultural and religious ties provide strong 

ideological support for the development of their relations. In terms of a 

political system, India has grown to be a democratic nation, while the Central 

Asian states are still in the process of democratization, to which India’s 

experience is of great referent value. 

By comparison, China’s advantages are mainly geopolitical and economic. 

China, especially Xinjiang, shares with Central Asian states extensive 

common borders as well as great potential for economic cooperation. In 

addition, China’s great economic achievements have been taken as a model by 

Central Asian states, which provides a solid foundation for further cooperation 

between both sides. 

Moreover, the SCO can help institutionalize China-India cooperation in 

Central Asia. Originating from the Shanghai 5-Nation Organization founded 

in 1996, the SCO is a regional multilateral organization for cooperation whose 

original goal was to establish mutual military trust, resolve border issues, 

combat extremist-terrorist forces, and maintain regional security. When 

Kazakh President Nazarbayev visited India in February 2002, he suggested 

that India join the SCO, which, he believed, would enhance the strength of the 

organization; Russia also publicly invited India to join the SCO. It is quite 

likely that India may join the SCO in the near future. In June 2005, India 

became an observing nation in the SCO, which will undoubtedly promote 

cooperation between India and the Central Asian states. However, it is not yet 

time for India to join the SCO at present. As for China, although it played a 

crucial role in the initiation of the organization, its influence in Central Asia is 
 106 

now far behind that of Russia and the U.S. Therefore, China should endeavor 

to play a more active part in Central Asian issues. 

It should be pointed out that due to the special relationship between India 

and Russia, these two countries are most likely to form an alliance among all 

participating powers in the cooperation and competition in Central Asia. 

China should give sufficient attention to this possibility: from the positive 

perspective, China should strive to cooperate with both countries in various 

fields; from the negative perspective, it should try to prevent the countries 

from jointly compressing China’s space for development in Central Asia. 

To sum up, China-India cooperation in Central Asia is the stronger 

tendency, though competition in certain fields is inevitable as well. At present, 

Central Asia has become a spot over which various regional and global 

powers try to exert the greatest influence. The energy and security interests of 

both China and India depend on the security and stability of the area. Thus, it 

is the common goal of China, India and the Central Asian states to maintain 

the stability of Central and South Asia. As two important balancing forces on 

the political stage of Central Asia, China and India tend to expand their 

engagement in Central Asian issues gradually. Because of the cultural 

similarity between India and the Central Asian states, India is playing an ever 

more important role in balancing various political forces in the region, thus 

beneficial to the “balancing diplomacy” of the five Central Asian states. 

During the process, both China and India should adopt a “win-win” strategy, 

pursuing their respective national interests through cooperation and positive 

interaction. One thing is certain: whatever forms of competition exist in 

Central Asia, the stability of this region accords with the interests of every 

country. 
 107 

Chapter Seven 

The Role of a Multilateral Anti-terror Mechanism 

in Central Asia 

Pan Guang 

Anti-terror Situation in the Hinterland of Eurasia Following the Iraq 

War 

In the new surge of terrorist attacks sweeping the world following the Iraq 

War, the formation of the “terrorist arc belt” stretching from the Middle East, 

Central Asia, South Asia to Southeast Asia is a most disturbing development. 

This arc belt, which has its west end in the Middle East, goes eastward to the 

Caucasian region that connects the Middle East and Central Asia, and then 

goes further eastward and southward as well to its middle part, which is 

Central Asia and South Asia. The east end of the belt is Southeast Asia that 

has recently become a risky area of frequent terrorist acts. The terrorist 

organizations and activities in Central Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia 

originate from, or closely relate to, the situation in the Middle East, 

particularly so in terms of the intellectual connections, organizational 

networks, approaches to activities, etc. That is why it is believed by not a few 

that there is now formed a high-risk terrorist arc belt of the Middle East—

Central Asia—South Asia—Southeast Asia. 

With the United States stranded in Iraq, its military and financial resources 

are moving westward to the Middle East, thus weakening the anti-terrorist 

capabilities in Central Asia. The security situation in Central Asia, once 

improved considerably, has become serious again in the wake of a new wave 

of terrorist attacks following the Iraq War. Afghanistan has witnessed the 

resurgence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, which have, in their new offensives, 

not only controlled some mountainous areas bordering Pakistan and 

Afghanistan, but also organized several attacks involving thousands of people 

within Afghanistan, and masterminded a series of bombings in large cities like 

Kabul and Kandahar. More severely, the Uzbekistan Islamic Movement, 

Hizb-ut-Tahrir (the Islamic Party of Liberation) and other extreme groups 
 108 

have become active again, making Uzbekistan a main target of their 

offensives. On March 29, 2004, there occurred a suicide bombing in central 

Tashkent, capital of Uzbekistan, which was the first suicide bombing in 

Central Asia. Then on July 30, suicide bombings attacked the American and 

Israeli embassies in Tashkent, as well as the Uzbekistani Chief Prosecutor’s 

Office. What is disturbing to us is that the Chinese have also come under 

terrorist attacks. On May 3, 2004, Chinese engineers working in the Pakistani 

Gwadar Port were attacked by car bombs, which left three killed and nine 

wounded. On June 10, 2004, a group of Afghan terrorists attacked a 

construction site near Kunduz where the Chinese were helping with the 

reconstruction, causing the death of eleven Chinese workers and the injury of 

four. In October 2004, two Chinese engineers were taken hostage, and one of 

them was finally killed in this terrorist act committed by al-Qaeda, as later 

confirmed by Pakistani officials. 

What merits our special attention is that terrorist groups in Central Asia are 

now adjusting their strategies, with some resorting to new approaches and 

putting up new appearances. Certain groups unknown before are cropping up 

and expanding their organizations by enlisting members from the 

disadvantaged masses. The abovementioned Hizb-ut-Tahrir is becoming very 

influential in Central Asia, though it was established in Jordan and Saudi 

Arabia in 1953. This party, which seeks to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate, 

maintains close connections with al-Qaeda with its plank focused on 

subverting the existing order. Even though it has not been listed as a terrorist 

group by the Central Asian states, this organization has not been allowed to 

make legal registration as a political party, thus remaining in a basically 

underground state. Increasing its membership through philanthropic activities 

and pyramid-selling-like means, the party is fast winning support in Central 

Asia, particularly in the poverty-stricken Ferghana countryside where the 

unemployment rate reaches 80 percent, and it is now claimed that Hizb-utTahrir has hundreds of thousands of members in Uzbekistan alone. 
 109 

Developing a Multilateral Anti-terror Mechanism in Central Asia: The 

Case of SCO 

Just as the terror network in Central Asia is cross-border in nature, so also 

should counter-terrorism strategy rely on multilateral and international 

cooperation. Indeed, this became one of the driving forces of the “Shanghai 

Five”- Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) process. Of course, this 

process had its origin in the Sino-Soviet negotiations on their border issues. 

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the negotiations came to 

involve “two sides but five countries,” i.e., China on the one hand and Russia, 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the other, and the interactions 

among them finally led to the creation of a stable mechanism in Shanghai in 

April 1996. The early priority of the multilateral mechanism was security 

cooperation, which included the resolution of border problems left over from 

history, and the campaign against terrorism. When the border problems came 

to be solved, the anti-terror campaign rose to the top of the security agenda, 

and the mechanism became five parties. On June 15, 2001, the mechanism 

was upgraded to the SCO that extended its membership to Uzbekistan and 

expanded its cooperation beyond the security field. 

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has increased its role in 

anti-terror cooperation in Central Asia in the wake of the Iraq war. This has 

come as a result of the policy adjustment on the part of the U.S. and the 

strengthening of the anti-terror function on the part of the SCO. 

As the U.S. sinks further into the quagmire in Iraq, huge American military 

and financial resources are being diverted from Central Asia to the Middle 

East. The correspondent reduction of troops and equipment stationed in 

Central Asia makes it very difficult to face up to the stern challenges in 

Central Asia. The U.S. has, in this context, fine-tuned its Central Asian 

policies. Firstly, NATO and American allies are called upon to make greater 

military and financial commitments in Central Asia, and Afghanistan in 

particular, so as to share the burden on the US. Secondly, attempts are made to 

make contacts with the SCO for security and anti-terror cooperation in the 
 110 

hope of leveraging the SCO for “assisting” the U.S. in containing terrorism in 

Central Asia. There have been several different opinions on the part of the 

U.S. in viewing the SCO since its inception as the Shanghai Five. The first 

opinion identifies the SCO as a potential threat to the and believes that it 

should be placed under tight restrictions. The second opinion ignores the 

SCO, believing that the SCO, after all, will not operate properly as expected. 

The third opinion holds that the SCO, as a regional organization of 

multilateral cooperation, can become a partner of the U.S. in one way or 

another, and this opinion has strengthened its position since 9/11, and even 

more so since the Iraq war. People holding the last opinion argue that, given 

the fact that it cannot deal with issues in both the Middle East and Central 

Asia simultaneously, the U.S. should focus on sorting out the matters in Iraq 

and the Middle East first. Based on this consideration, they further argue that 

the SCO should be encouraged and supported to play a bigger role in Central 

Asia, particularly in Afghanistan. It is right in this context that America and 

the SCO begin to explore the possibility of cooperation. It has been proposed 

that both sides, as the first step in their common efforts, send each other 

liaison officers, invite military observers from the other side to observe one’s 

own anti-terror exercises, and promote joint research and training for antiterrorism purposes. Some others have suggested that the SCO start 

cooperation with American NGOs and firms on certain specific projects 

regarding environmental protection and poverty reduction in order to facilitate 

economic development in Central Asia. As a matter of fact, there is already 

some basis for anti-terrorism cooperation between the SCO and America, 

since all the six SCO members have respectively set up some bilateral 

structure of anti-terror cooperation. It can well be expected that the 

intersecting and overlapping of these pluralistic cooperation arrangements 

will, through more conscious efforts, grow into a more formal structure of 

anti-terror cooperation between America and the SCO as a whole. 

Meanwhile, the SCO has stepped up its own consolidation following 9/11 

and the Iraq war, the most substantial measure being the establishment of a 

regional anti-terrorism mechanism, which has upgraded the level and intensity 

of anti-terror cooperation. The official launch of the Executive Committee of 
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the SCO Regional Antiterrorism Structure (RATS) was obviously the most 

remarkable event at the SCO Tashkent summit on June 17, 2004, representing 

another major step taken in facilitating the security and anti-terror cooperation 

within the SCO framework. The recent Astana summit meeting of the 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) achieved remarkable results, 

demonstrating that this multilateral organization is now showing a more active 

posture in safeguarding security and promoting economic development in the 

region, caring about the situation in areas around Central Asia, and 

participating in the world affairs. 

The Astana summit meeting first of all reviewed the previous documents 

signed among SCO members, keeping a special interest in the implementation 

of the official measures taken so far. Secondly, the Astana summit took the 

initiative in shouldering a chief responsibility for safeguarding the security in 

Central Asia. The heads of state decided to increase significantly their security 

cooperation on the basis of the achievements made so far, including 

particularly these following aspects: promoting close cooperation among the 

diplomatic, foreign economic, law-enforcement, national defense and specialmission authorities of the member states; working out effective measures and 

institutions to respond collectively to those developments that threaten the 

regional peace, security and stability; coordinating the security-ensuring laws 

and regulations in the member states; cooperating in researching and 

developing new technologies and equipment for coping with new challenges 

and threats; establishing new effective structures in mass media to deal with 

new challenges and threats; combating the smuggling of weapons, 

ammunition and explosives, as well as drugs, and fighting organized 

transnational crime, illegal immigration and mercenary-troop activities; giving 

special attention to preventing terrorists from using weapons of mass 

destruction and their launching vehicles; taking precautionary measures 

against cyber-terrorism; and drafting uniform approaches and standards for 

monitoring financial flows relating to suspect terrorist individuals and 

organizations. Thirdly, the recent summit meeting stressed that security 

cooperation be put on the basis of comprehensive security. The heads of state 

pointed out, “Such common efforts should be of a comprehensive nature, and 
 112 

be able to assist the member states to protect effectively their territories, 

citizens, livelihoods and key infrastructure sectors, so that they are free from 

new challenges and threats, thus creating the necessary preconditions for 

sustainable development and poverty elimination.” The leaders believed that, 

in preventing and eliminating those various technical disasters that have 

become significant components of the new threats, it has become increasingly 

urgent to protect and further develop infrastructure, particularly the 

transportation infrastructure. They also believed that SCO member countries 

should construct multilateral structures to monitor possible disasters and their 

consequences, exchange information and analysis, and create the necessary 

legal and institutional conditions for joint recovery efforts, including 

promoting interoperability in terms of personnel training, agent dispatching 

and equipment deployment. The heads of the states also declared, “The 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization will make a constructive contribution to 

the international efforts to safeguard the land, sea, air and space security.” The 

London bombings that occurred just two days after the summit meeting 

testified once again to the importance of the consensus reached by the SCO 

leaders in Astana. 

Especially conspicuous were the following words quoted from the 

Declaration of the Heads of the States Participating in the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization: “Today, we are noticing the positive changes made 

in stabilizing the domestic political situation in Afghanistan. A number of 

SCO members provided their ground infrastructure for the temporary 

stationing of allied forces, as well as their territorial and air space for military 

transit in the interest of the anti-terror operation. Considering the completion 

of the active military stage of anti-terror operation in Afghanistan, SCO 

members believe it necessary that respective states of the anti-terror coalition 

set a final timeline for the temporary use of the abovementioned infrastructure 

facilities and the stationing of the military forces on the territories of SCO 

states.” This is the first time the SCO has demonstrated its position to the 

whole world that it endorses international participation in anti-terror 

cooperation in Central Asia, yet at the same time, believes that Central Asian 

security should be chiefly the responsibility of countries in the region, notably 
 113 

that of SCO countries. It should be emphasized that, firstly, these remarks are 

not specifically targeted at the US, but more broadly at “those parties to the 

anti-terror alliance,” i.e., all those countries and international organizations 

that use the infrastructure facilities of SCO countries or station their troops in 

SCO countries; secondly, the SCO has voiced its views and suggestions, while 

any final arrangements will have to be worked out through multilateral or 

bilateral consultations between SCO states and those relevant parties; and 

thirdly, issues like the military presence or use of infrastructure facilities by 

one SCO state in another, for example, the use of the military base in 

Kyrgyzstan by Russia, may be sorted out through coordination within the 

framework of SCO or CIS either multilaterally or bilaterally. 

Afghanistan: Still a Crucial Focus 

Afghanistan is still a crucial focus for anti-terrorist campaigns, primarily 

for the following three reasons: Firstly, Afghanistan was the first main 

battlefield for the war on terrorism after 9/11. If the anti-terror war in 

Afghanistan cannot achieve a thorough victory, terrorist groups in 

Afghanistan and Central Asia may stage a comeback at any time, which is 

obviously going to be a major setback for the anti-terror coalition. Secondly, 

now that the leading core of al-Qaeda is still very active between Pakistan and 

Afghanistan, and almost all the key figures of Central Asian terrorist groups 

have grown up from the Jihad in Afghanistan, Afghanistan remains the 

spiritual pillar of terrorism. Thirdly, the production and transaction of 

narcotics in Afghanistan have provided the terrorist groups in Central Asia 

with significant funds that support their terrorist activities. 

It is worth adding that those perpetrators of the recent London bombings 

just emerged from the spiritual base of extremism that once nurtured the 

Taliban. This reminds us once again that the mountainous regions between 

Central Asia and South Asia remain the spiritual cradle of global terrorism. 

For the moment, two things are especially pressing: firstly, assisting the 

Afghan government in containing drug production and transaction; and 
 114 

secondly, cutting off the channels whereby terrorist groups reap profits from 

drug transactions. As disclosed by a recent UN report, the opium and heroin 

production in Afghanistan makes up 87 percent of the world total. Mr. 

Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the United Nations Office of 

Drugs and Crime, is quoted as saying, “Political progress has been made in 

Afghanistan. However, on drug issues, no progress has been made. Indeed, the 

situation is worsening.” Apparently, without the external support, the Afghan 

government can hardly live up to its commitment to curbing drug production 

and transaction. The SCO states, as neighbors of Afghanistan, can take a host 

of measures within the UN framework. For the international community, the 

real issue at the moment is implementation. A good starting point in this 

regard might be providing technical assistance, exchanging information and 

intelligence, setting up regular structures of coordination and collaboration, 

and the like. Mr. Mark Steven Kirk, the U.S. Congressman, has remarked 

following his field investigations that al-Qaeda could reap up to $28 million 

annually from drug trafficking, a large part of which could be spent on Bin 

Laden’s flight, the salaries of his bodyguards, and the buying of warlords and 

chieftains in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is evidently a 

very pressing issue that relevant parties strengthen cooperation for cutting off 

the financial chains of terrorist organizations. The SCO can also play an 

important role in this regard, as shown by the fact that this was discussed by 

SCO and Afghan leaders during the SCO Tashkent summit meeting. The 

Astana summit meeting stressed that the SCO should specifically step up its 

participation in the international anti-drug belt built around Afghanistan in 

order to help with the stabilization of the socio-economic and humanitarian 

situation in the country. 

It was also decided that the SCO security-meeting mechanism look into the 

execution of such cooperation agreements, and, for the deepening of the 

cooperation, formulate a comprehensive document on coping with such new 

threats and challenges as “trafficking of firearms and ammunition, explosives, 

toxic, harmful and radioactive substances, and mercenaries as well.” It is 

probable that international cooperation in combating drug production and 

transaction may well develop into an overall cooperation endeavor for dealing 
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with all the non-conventional security threats in Central Asia, including 

establishing a nuclear-free zone in Central Asia, certainly also an initiative of 

strategic significance in itself. 

Conclusion 

First, the anti-terror policy should be based on multilateral and 

international cooperation, rather than on unilateralism. In fact, the war on 

terrorism has provided us with an excellent opportunity for cooperation with 

the various multilateral regimes involving Central Asia. We should seize this 

chance to promote the spirit of international and multilateral cooperation. 

Second, anti-terrorism is surely among the top priorities of the world today. 

However, one should never link all other problems in this world to terrorism, 

or even further, one should not simplify all other issues into a matter of antiterrorism. 

Third, any war on terrorism should not be waged by military means alone. 

Military means, while indispensable in quite a few cases, can never be a cureall. We should also focus on the political, economic and social roots that have 

given rise to terrorism in the first place, and this broadened perspective 

reveals that, besides military means, economic, political and social measures 

must be taken as well for any long-term solution. If the root causes of 

international terrorism cannot be eradicated by comprehensive means, it is 

highly probable that ten or even one hundred Bin Ladens will grow up to 

follow suit. This is extremely important to Islamic Central Asia, especially 

post-war Afghanistan. 
 116 
 117 

Chapter Eight 

SCO and China-India Relations in Central Asia 

Zhang Guihong and Jaideep Saikia 

If 9/11 and the subsequent US-led war on terror are generally deemed to be 

the beginning of a new alliance against terrorism, the fact that is overlooked in 

most quarters is that regional cooperation such as the Shanghai Cooperation 

Organization (SCO) had proclaimed their union against terror well before the 

al Qaeda-led attack on the United States. Indeed, such multilateral 

collaboration against terrorism cannot be said to be the result of the events of 

September 11, 2001 – in all probability such cooperation was perhaps 

discussed much earlier, in order to keep the United States from decisively 

entering the region. Led by the Peoples’ Republic of China, the SCO has been 

ably addressing not only the question of terrorism but has also forged a 

coalition of states that have common security and economic concerns. 

However, criticism about the effectiveness of the SCO has been voiced in 

certain quarters because of the non-inclusion of important nations such as 

India in the coalition. Such criticism gains in degree when one considers that 

India is a country that has been a victim of cross-border terror for a relatively 

longer period than most of the present SCO members. Moreover, the reported 

Sino-Russian concern that it would be difficult to keep Pakistan out of the 

SCO were India to be admitted meets skepticism because of the recognized 

sponsorship of not only anti-India terror which Pakistan is providing, but also 

because of the Islamic republic’s emergence as a fountainhead of Islamist 

terror in the region. 

This paper is aimed at understanding both the Chinese and Indian 

perspective about competition and cooperation in Central Asia, as perceived 

by the two most important countries in Asia. It also attempts to address three 

conceptual questions: (1) what are China’s main interests and what brand of 

function does China play in the SCO? (2) What are India’s principal interests 

and goals in Central Asia and how does it perceive the SCO? And (3) what are 

the factors that stand behind the cooperation and competition between the two 

Asian giants in Central Asia? 
 118 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an intergovernmental 

organization founded in Shanghai on 15 June 2001 by six nations: China, 

Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Its member states 

cover an area of over 30 million square kilometers, or about three fifths of 

Eurasia, with a population of 1.455 billion, or about a quarter of the world’s 

total population. As the principal architect of the SCO, China plays a leading 

role in its functioning and aids the crystallization of the common interests that 

brought the six countries together in order to form the SCO. 

The earlier incarnation of the SCO was the Shanghai Five, a mechanism 

that originated and grew as a result of an endeavor by China, Russia, 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The primary goal of the apparatus 

was to strengthen confidence building and disarmament in the border regions. 

In 1996 and 1997, the heads of state of the five aforementioned nations met in 

Shanghai and Moscow respectively and signed the “Treaty on Deepening 

Military Trust in Border Regions and the Treaty on Reduction of Military 

Forces in Border Regions.” Thereafter, the annual meetings became a 

customary practice and were held alternately in the five member states. The 

issues that were raised and discussed in the meeting gradually extended from 

building up trust in the border regions to mutually beneficial cooperation in 

the arena of politics, security, diplomacy, economics, trade and such other 

areas. 

On the fifth anniversary of the Shanghai Five, which fell on 15 June 2001, 

the heads of state of its members and the President of Uzbekistan met in 

Shanghai, the birthplace of the mechanism. The convening heads of state 

signed a declaration admitting Uzbekistan as the sixth member of the 

Shanghai Five apparatus and jointly issued a “Declaration on the 

Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” The document 

announced that for the purpose of upgrading the level of cooperation more 

effectively, to seize opportunities and deal with new challenges and threats, 
 119 

the six nations had decided to establish a Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

on the basis of the Shanghai Five mechanism. 

In June 2002, the heads of the SCO member-states met in St. Petersburg, 

Russia, and signed the “SCO Charter,” which clearly expounded the purposes 

and principles of the mechanism, its organizational structure, form of 

operation, cooperation orientation and external relations, marking a tangible 

institution of this new organization within the bounds of international law. 

According to the “SCO Charter” and the “Declaration on the Establishment 

of the SCO,” the main purposes of the SCO are: (a) strengthening mutual trust 

and good-neighborliness and friendship among member states (b) developing 

their effective cooperation in political affairs, economy and trade, science and 

technology, culture, education, energy, transportation, environmental 

protection and other fields (c) working together to maintain regional peace, 

security and stability, and (d) promoting the creation of a new international 

political and economic order featuring democracy, justice and rationality. The 

SCO also abides by the following basic principles: (a) adherence to the 

purposes and principles of the “Charter of the United Nations” (b) respect for 

each other’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, mutual non-use or threat of use of 

force (c) equality among all member states (d) settlement of all questions 

through consultations (e) non-alignment and no directing against any other 

country or organization, and (f) opening to the outside world and willingness 

to carry out all forms of dialogues, exchanges and cooperation with other 

countries and relevant international or regional organizations. 

The SCO stands for and acts on a new security concept secured on mutual 

trust, disarmament and cooperative security; a new state-to-state relationship 

with partnership instead of alignment at its core, and a new model of regional 

cooperation featuring concerted effort by countries of all sizes, and mutually 

beneficial cooperation. In the course of development, a “Shanghai spirit” 

gradually took shape, a spirit characterized by mutual trust, mutual benefit, 

equality, cooperation, respect for diversity and common development. 
 120 

The SCO institutions consist of two parts, the meeting mechanism, and the 

permanent organs, as follows: 

SCO institutions 

Institutions Main functions 

The Meeting Mechanism 

Council of 

Heads of State 

• To identify priority areas and give basic directions to SCO 

activities; 

• To determine matters of principle concerning SCO internal 

set-up and operation; 

• To decide on matters of principle of SCO cooperation with 

other countries and international organizations; 

• To study pressing international issues. 

Council of 

Heads of 

Government 

• To adopt SCO budgets; 

• To study and determine the principal matters of 

cooperation in specific areas within the SCO framework, 

especially in the economic field. 

Council of 

Ministers of 

Foreign Affairs 

• To study and resolve major issues of current SCO 

activities, including preparing for the meeting of the Council 

of Heads of State, implementing SCO decisions, and holding 

consultations on international issues. 

Conference of 

Heads of 

Agencies 

• To study and resolve specific questions of cooperation in 

specialized areas, such as law enforcement, defense, the 

economy, commerce, transportation and culture as well as 

heads of law-enforcement, security, emergency and disasterrelief. 

Council of 

National 

Coordinators 

• To coordinate and manage SCO routine activities. 
 121 

The Permanent Organs 

Secretariat The SCO’s standing executive body is based in 

Beijing. 

• To provide organizational and technical support 

for SCO activities; 

• To participate in the study and implementation 

of SCO documents; 

• To put forward suggestions for SCO annual 

budget making. 

Regional Anti-Terrorism 

Structure (RATS) 

SCO permanent organ is based in Tashkent. 

• To coordinate SCO member activities against 

terrorism, separatism and extremism. 

At present, SCO cooperation has covered wide-ranging areas such as 

security, the economy, transportation, culture, disaster relief and law 

enforcement, with security and economic cooperation being the priorities, 

which has been widely acknowledged as a new model of regional 

cooperation.88

 

88 On 17-18 August 2004, China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS) and 

Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAF) co-sponsored an international academic symposium 

themed “Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): A New Model of Regional 

Cooperation” in Beijing, China. More than 50 participants including research fellows, 

diplomats and experts from nine countries of both member states (China, Russia, 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan) and non-member states (Mongolia, 

Germany, South Korea), attended the symposium. For more detail, see “International 

Academic Symposium on SCO Jointly sponsored by CIISS and KAF,” in International 

Strategic Studies (Beijing), No.4, October 2004, pp. 82-86. 
 122 

 

China’s Interests 

The most important consideration the Peoples’ Republic of China had for 

taking the lead in establishing the SCO was security. As the deputy director of 

the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 

Studies, Johns Hopkins University, states, “China is aiming for the long haul.” 

Writing about China’s Central Asian interests, he writes, “While the collapse 

of the USSR has added an element of unease for Beijing–in the light of the 

threat to the security of China’s borders–it also provided notable 

opportunities. The two most significant developments were the removal of 

control over the region exercised by a hostile power, the USSR; and 

increasing Chinese access to the natural resources of Central Asia. China has 

been worried about the region opening up to international presence and the 

increasing activities of the United States and the NATO in Central Asia, 

including the Partnership for Peace exercises in Kazakhstan in 1997. These 

worries, as well as an increasing realization of a common interest with 

Moscow to minimize Western influence in Central Asia, led China to take the 

lead in transforming the Shanghai 5 group.”89 According to a Chinese scholar, 

this interest can be categorized into three stages: a) protecting the territorial 

integrity and national unity of China, b) combating transnational crime and 

stabilizing the northwest of China, and c) safeguarding border security.90

The major threat to the national unity and territorial integrity of China 

comes from separatist activities represented by the “Taiwan Independent 

Force” in the east and the “Eastern Turkistan Movement” in the northwest. 

Since the national separatist activities in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region 

(XAR) are closely connected with the region, China finds it necessary to 

89 Svante E Cornell, “Regional Politics in Central Asia: The Changing Roles of Iran, Turkey, 

Pakistan and China,” in Indranil Banerjie, ed., India and Central Asia, United Kingdom: 

Brunel Academic Publishers, 2004, p. 170. 90 Zhao Huasheng, “Security Building in Central Asia and the Shanghai Cooperation 

Organization,” in Tabata, Shinichiro & Iwashita, Akihiro (eds.), Slavic Eurasia's 

Integration into the World Economy and Community, Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 

Hokkaido University, 2004, p.293, also available online at http://srch.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no2_ses/4-2_Zhao.pdf. 
 123 

counter the “Eastern Turkistan Movement” through multilateral cooperation 

instead of unilateral action. The SCO provides the unique conduit for such 

cooperation. 

The main challenge to the stability of China’s northwest frontier is nontraditional threat, such as transnational crime, illicit drug trafficking, weapons 

smuggling, illegal immigration, etc. The addressing of such transnational 

threats, which are non-conventional in nature, necessitates the mustering of 

transnational and joint efforts. Political, administrative and judicial 

cooperation among members of the SCO has contributed considerably to 

reducing such transnational crime and increasing the peace and stability of the 

northwest region of China. 

The original objective and fundamental function of the SCO was to 

maintain the sanctities of the borders and preserve regional stability. Indeed, 

the Shanghai Five mechanism had begun as a forum to resolve the boundary 

questions between China and the former Soviet Republics. While “The Treaty 

on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions” that was signed in 1996 had 

focused on confidence-building measures, “The Treaty on Reduction of 

Military Forces in Border Regions” signed in 1997 was aimed at increasing 

transparency and mutual trust. Now the two treaties have become the 

foundation of border security. The “Shanghai Spirit” embodied in the treaties 

constitutes the guideline of cooperation among the members. 

The SCO also indicates the growing importance of China’s strategic 

economic interests. The fast pace of acceleration in economic growth has 

made oil and natural gas the principal strategic interests of China, and in 1993 

China became a net oil-importing nation. It is estimated that China will import 

100 million tons of oil in 2004, and this figure will be doubled by 2010. At 

present, half of the oil imports come from Middle East, and only 10 per cent 

from Central Asia and Russia. Moreover, 90 per cent of the imported oil have 

to be transported by ship from the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, through 

the Straits of Malacca and South China Sea, and finally to China’s coastal 

areas. This oil route is one of the busiest in the world, rendering it insecure. 

China is not a strong naval power and consequently is not in a position to 

safeguard its shipping lanes. In this context, the possibility of tapping the 
 124 

 

energy reserves in Central Asia means a closer and safer source of oil and gas 

for China. The energy reserve in Central Asia, which is said to be next only to 

Middle East, adjoins the western region of China and the Russian energy base 

in Siberia. China, therefore, has a stake in protecting its economic security in 

this region.91 In addition, China’s demand for diversity of energy import is in 

line with the Central Asian countries’ interests in diversifying their oil 

exports. China also believes that effective security cooperation within the 

SCO framework may sooner or later be translated into the convenience of 

economic exchange with Central Asian countries. 

The SCO has also been the basic channel of multilateral cooperation 

among China, the Central Asian countries and Russia. The emergence of the 

Central Asian Republics from the former Soviet Union brought not only three 

new neighboring countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) for China 

but also newer border issues. Initially, China negotiated on the border problem 

with Russia and the three neighboring Central Asian Republics bilaterally. On 

26 April 1996, heads of these five states met in Shanghai to discuss the 

security of the borders and the border areas among them. They also signed the 

“Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions” and decided to 

continue such meetings annually. This multilateral forum was known as the 

Shanghai Five. Because of growing concern about increasing threats from 

internal and external terrorism, separatism and extremism, the Five agreed to 

discuss the three aspects as the main theme for the Almaty Summit of 1998. 

Since then, the focus of the Five has been transformed from border issues to 

confronting international terrorism, national separatism and religious 

extremism. The year 2001 witnessed not only the change of Shanghai Five 

from a forum to an Organization (the SCO), but also provided new impetus 

for the member states. Three months after the birth of the SCO, the heads of 

six member states signed two documents to promote trade and economic 

exchange. Security collaboration and economic cooperation have been the two 

legs of the SCO, issues from which China benefits immensely. 

91 According to Ariel Cohen, a well-known scholar at the US-based Heritage Foundation, the 

region has possible deposits of 170.5 billion barrels, while gas is estimated at 15.3 trillion 

cubic meters. The Scottish firm, Wood Mackenzie, estimates the proven reserves at 26.01 

billion barrels and 58.64 billion barrels of possible oil reserve. 
 125 

 

In general, from China’s standpoint, the SCO provides a perfect political 

and economic mechanism. As a leading Chinese expert on Central Asia points 

out, “China’s cooperation with the Central Asian states in the framework of 

the SCO promotes the integration of the economies in the region, and resolves 

the common problems of defense and development. It offers broad 

perspectives for close collaboration between China and the Central Asian 

states.”92 As the chief initiator of the SCO, China’s role in the mechanism is 

unique. 

India’s Interests 

Indian policy towards Central Asia is to a considerable extent determined 

by China and Pakistan. Whereas India fought a border war with China in 

1962, the remnants of which continue to determine dialogue (and growing 

détente) between the two countries, Pakistan has repeatedly sought to hurt 

Indian interests internally and in the region. With the rise of Islamist terrorism 

in the region, and Pakistan emerging as the main progenitor of such a 

movement, India is deeply convinced of the importance of the independent 

republics in Central Asia. As a scholar writes, “The basic underlying aim was 

to ensure that the heart of Asia does not turn hostile to India. Indian policy 

makers knew it was in their interest to see that these countries also do not end 

up helping hostile forces or falling prey to the ravages of militant Islam...The 

thought that the violence in Kashmir was becoming part of a much wider PanAsian pattern was extremely disturbing because it suggested that secular India 

was facing a much larger and widespread threat.”93 

Moreover, India’s interest in Central Asia stems from the desire to ably 

trade and develop economic linkages with the region. However, the absence 

of traditional links with the republics of Central Asia has been a stumbling 

block. Indeed, as Indranil Banerjie writes, “The absence of significant people92 Sun Zhuangzhi, “Economic Collaboration in Central Asian Region and the SCO,” in K. 

Santhanam and Ramakant Dwivedi, eds., India and Central Asia: Advancing the Common 

Interest, New Delhi: Anamaya Publishers, 2004, p.149. 93 Indranil Banerjie, “Introduction,” in Indranil Banerjie, ed., India and Central Asia.
 126 

 

to-people contacts between Indians and Central Asians during the Soviet 

period meant that the new relationship had to be policy- and not peopledriven...The first imperative was to open diplomatic relations and convince 

the republics of the need to open missions in India. This was done fairly 

quickly. The second issue was how to chart a safe physical route to the region. 

The land routes were out, even though they were the shortest. Air links existed 

and were increased. But this was the expensive route. The shortest way from 

New Delhi to Tashkent is via Pakistan and Afghanistan. The second route is 

through Chinese Xinjiang. But neither of these two routes was safe. India thus 

exploited its growing relations with Iran to develop a land-sea corridor that 

could be used to connect India to Central Asia and beyond into Asiatic 

Russia...Indian industry is also beginning to get a piece of the action on the 

energy front. Central Asia’s hydrocarbon resources have been much written 

about and touted. Some of the largest oil exploration, drilling, and pipeline 

projects of recent times have been signed in this region.”94 It is in this context 

that India seeks an energy convergence with Central Asia. After all, with 

energy consumption in India growing at an annual 6 percent and oil imports 

accounting for about 60 percent of the country’s total oil consumption, the 

story of India’s energy needs cannot be overemphasized. Indeed, if the Indian 

interest in Central Asia is perceived in the light of the Chinese interests, the 

commonalities are quite evident. 

India’s interest in the SCO is, therefore, a natural corollary of not only the 

commonality of goals with China, but also the fact that SCO member states 

like Kazakhstan has advocated India’s membership. During a visit by the 

former Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, to Kazakhstan, the 

Kazakh President had stated, “Kazakhstan with its substantial hydrocarbon 

resources could become an important source of energy to India, which is 

expected to become one of the largest energy consumers in the world.” 

Kazakhstan has proven oil reserves to the tune of 3 billion tons, apart from 

having 2 trillion cubic meter deposits of natural gas. The Kazakh leader had 

also pointed to India’s proximity to Central Asia, as well as its international 

94 Ibid. 
 127 

 

standing, exhorting that New Delhi’s membership of the SCO “would add to 

the strength of that organization.”95 Analysts are also of the opinion that the 

SCO can benefit not only from India’s oil consumption, but also from its 

experience in combating terrorism. Indeed, certain aspects of terrorism as 

have been felt by India find resonance in the Chinese experience. Writing 

about the matter, a strategist has written, “The problem of terrorism/religious 

extremism faced by China in Xinjiang has certain similarities with that faced 

by India in the Punjab in the past and in J&K presently. The first similarity 

relates to the role of some members of the diaspora in fomenting terrorism. In 

India, Sikh terrorism in the Punjab was initially started by some members of 

the Sikh diaspora in Canada, the USA, the UK and other Western countries, 

with the encouragement of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the 

USA’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) during the Nixon Administration, 

but it could never gather much support among the Sikh population of Punjab. 

This facilitated the counter-terrorism operations of the Punjab Police. On the 

contrary, terrorism in J&K was initially started by indigenous elements with 

the support of the Kashmiris in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), with very 

little involvement of the Kashmiri (essentially Mirpuri) diaspora in the West. 

In Xinjiang, the role of the Uighur diaspora in the Central Asian Republics 

(CARs), Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the West in fomenting terrorist violence 

and political destabilization has been as considerable as in the case of the Sikh 

diaspora in the Indian Punjab. The second similarity relates to the external 

causes of aggravation of the terrorist violence in Xinjiang. While the ethnic 

separatist elements have been the beneficiaries of sympathy and support from 

the US, Taiwanese and Turkish intelligence agencies, the religious 

fundamentalist elements have been in receipt of support from the Inter 

Services Intelligence (ISI) backed jihadi organizations in Pakistan, the Taliban 

and bin Laden's International Islamic Front For Jihad Against the USA and 

Israel.”96 As a matter of detail, it would be noteworthy to understand that 

95 “India asked to join Central Asian Grouping,” The Hindu, 13 February 2002. 96 B. Raman, “Counter Terrorism: India-China-Russia Cooperation,” paper prepared for 

discussion at a non-governmental India-Russia-China trilogue on security-related 

issues held at New Delhi on November 6 and 7, 2003, under the auspices of the Institute 

for Chinese Studies. 
 128 

 

India and China have an already established cooperative mechanism for 

combating terror, which has been fortified not only by statements and 

declarations by both the countries’ leadership, but also by instituting bilateral 

meetings in the matter of counter-terrorism. 

Indo-Chinese Cooperation in Central Asia 

Central Asia attracts the attentions of major powers not only because of its 

geo-strategic location and rich natural resources, but because of its unique 

position in the global counter-terrorism campaign as well. It is important to 

examine the Indo-Chinese matrix in the context of counter-terrorism from the 

perspective of regionalism and functionalism. 

Regional Perspective 

There is an argument in academia that China and India as two neighboring 

regional powers are geopolitically poised “natural competitors.” According to 

an American India-China hand, John Garver, “geopolitical conflict has 

dominated relations between India and China,” and “there have been five 

stages of Indo-China rivalry for status and influence among the developing 

countries since 1949.”97 Similarly, one Indian China analyst opines, “China 

and India straddle a common geopolitical space across the Himalayas and 

South, Southwest, and Southeast Asia. This makes for strategic and 

geopolitical competition.”98 Ma Jiali, a well-known Chinese India expert 

wrote that “the prominence of India’s strategic position will to a certain extent 

weaken China’s strategic influence, particularly in the third world, and 

97John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, London: 

Oxford University, 2001, p.5 and pp.110-111. 98Sujit Dutta, “China’s Emerging Power and Military Role: Implications for South Asia,” in 

Jonathan D. Pollack and Richard H. Yang eds., In China’s Shadow: Regional 

Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development. Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 1998, p.94. 
 129 

 

degrade China’s strategic role and complicate China’s strategic relations with 

big powers.”99

However, when a closer look at the sub-regions is undertaken, varying 

situational imperatives are found in South, Southeast and Central Asia in the 

context of Indo-China relations. 

India and China constitute an inalienable part of the strategic environment 

in South Asia. While China is South Asia’s largest neighbor, India holds a 

position of preeminence in the region. Although Indian scholars are 

increasingly of the opinion that China “has gradually moved away from its 

initial politico-strategic concerns to a pragmatic approach of economic 

engagement,”100 policy-makers in New Delhi may continue to argue that 

China constitutes the most important strategic concern for India. There are 

three factors, among others, that egg on India’s misgiving about China’s 

intention in South Asia. First, China continues to maintain its strategic 

relations with Pakistan,101 as “the strategic and security cooperation between 

Pakistan and China can have a negative impact on the regional security 

environment from India’s point of view.”102 Furthermore, as an Indian 

strategic analyst points out, “India hopes to ‘surround’ Pakistan–its 

“immediate” adversary–and to “contain” China, its “long-term” security 

threat.”103 Secondly, China is said to be enlarging and deepening its security 

relations with smaller countries in South Asia. Third, China’s possible 

military presence and influence in the Indian Ocean is perceived to be a 

99Ma Jiali, Guanzhu Yindu: jueqi zhong de daguo [Focus on India: Emerging Power], 

Tianjing: Tianjing Renming Chubanshe [Tianjing People’s Press], 2002, p.14. 100 Swaran Singh, China-South Asia: Issues, Equations, Policies, New Delhi: Lancer’s Books, 

2003, p.12. 101 Most Chinese think-tank leaders and strategists that Jaideep Saikia met during his tour of 

the Peoples’ Republic of China were of the opinion that Pakistan no longer plays an 

important role for China, and India is increasingly becoming the more important country 

of the two in strategic thinking. Questioned about Chinese help to augment the Pakistani 

nuclear arsenal, most strategists opined that such aid has stopped. 102 J. N. Dixit, India’s Foreign Policy 1947-2003, New Delhi: Picus Books, 2003, p.439. 103 Rahul Bedi, “China and the South Asia Circle,” Asia Times, 29 April 2003. 
 130 

 

challenge to New Delhi.104 Hence, South Asia tends to be seen more from the 

point of view of competition rather than cooperation between India and China. 

In sharp contrast to the perceived positions of both countries over South 

Asia, China and India have no overt territorial dispute over Tibet or in 

Southeast Asia. However, the region, also known as “Indochina” has come to 

be a natural area of competition between New Delhi and Beijing. If India is 

suspicious about China’s intention in South Asia, then China seems concerned 

about India’s activities in Southeast Asia. China’s concerns are not only 

related to its unresolved disputes in the South China Sea with some ASEAN 

countries, but also to the implication of India’s activities in Southeast Asia, 

particularly in the context of Japan and Taiwan. Notwithstanding the presence 

of such irritants, the fact of the matter is that there are no fundamental 

strategic conflicts between India and China in Southeast Asia. Competition in 

Southeast Asia is, therefore, one that can be characterized as healthy.105

As part of India’s strategic interest area, Central Asia is the “immediate and 

strategic neighborhood.”106 The importance of Central Asia for India is not 

only cultural and historical but also geopolitical and economic. Meanwhile, 

China is a rising and active factor in the new “Great Game” in Central Asia. 

According to two U.S. scholars, “the Chinese policy-makers see their state as 

a rising power globally and regionally, with an expanding menu of interests in 

Central Asia that demand an enhanced presence.” They add, “Energy, trade, 

and multilateral efforts to address common security concerns dominate 

104 For details, see John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth 

Century, London: Oxford University, 2001, Chapter 10, “The Indian Ocean in Sino-Indian 

Relationship.” 105 The “healthy competition” between China and India in Southeast Asia was first proposed 

by former Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, see The Hindu, and the Indian 

Express, 9 November 2002. 106 “India and Central Asia in the Emerging Security Environment,” speech delivered by 

Indian (former) External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha at the third India-Central Asia 

Regional Conference in Tashkent during November 6-8, 2003, in K. Santhanam and 

Ramakant Dwivedi eds., India and Central Asia: Advancing the Common Interest, New 

Delhi: Anamaya Publishers, 2004, p.7. 
 131 

 

China’s approach to the region.”107 Compared to South and Southeast Asia, 

China and India have more potential for cooperation and less competition in 

Central Asia. In addition, both India’s and China’s interests in Central Asia 

are important but limited. In other words, neither New Delhi nor Beijing has 

an ambition to dominate Central Asia, considering that Russia is attempting to 

recover its traditional influence in its “backyard” and the U.S. is seeking to 

expand its presence in the region. In the economic field, some scholars have 

predicted the possibility of a joint effort to build an “oil highway” connecting 

Central Asia with Western China and Northern India. Therefore, it is 

reasonable to say that there will be more cooperation than competition 

between China and India in Central Asia. 

Functional Perspective 

As the new model for regional cooperation, the SCO has achieved credible 

results in functional cooperation in both the security and economic arenas. 

SCO security cooperation focuses on counter-terrorism, separatism and 

extremism. The SCO was among the first international organizations to 

advocate explicitly the fight against the aforesaid three forces. On 15 June 

2001, the day when the SCO was founded, the “Shanghai Convention Against 

Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism” was signed, clearly defining for the 

first time terrorism, separatism and extremism. It outlined specific directions, 

modalities and principles of the concerted fight against the triple menace, thus 

helping to lay a solid legal foundation for SCO security cooperation. At the 

June 2002 St. Petersburg Summit, the “Agreement of the SCO Member States 

on Counter-Terrorism Regional Structure” was signed. China and Kyrgyzstan 

conducted a bilateral joint anti-terrorism military exercise within the SCO 

framework in October 2002, and the SCO member states held a successful 

multilateral joint anti-terrorism military maneuver in August 2003. At the 

107 Kathleen Collins and William C. Wohlforth, “Central Asia: Defying the ‘Great Game’ 

Expectations,” in K. Santhanam and Ramakant Dwivedi , eds., India and Central Asia: 

Advancing the Common Interest. New Delhi: Anamaya Publishers, 2004, p.40. 
 132 

conclusion of the annual summit held in Tashkent on 17 June 2004, the 

leaders signed a document titled the Tashkent Declaration. The declaration 

summarized the outcome of the SCO’s work since it was set up, evaluated the 

activities of the organization’s agencies, and set new goals. They also signed 

agreements on cooperation in fighting drug trafficking and on the protection 

of secret information in the framework of the SCO anti-terrorist agency. 

There are common interests and similar attitudes with regard to Central 

Asian security. Both China and India face the threat from terrorism, 

separatism and extremism. According to the “Patterns of Global Terrorism” 

released by U.S. Department of State on 29 April 2004, India suffered more 

“significant terrorist incidents” than any other country in 2003. In the time of 

the globalization of terror, this kind of threat has cross-border linkages. For 

example, reports indicate that the Eastern Turkistan terrorists, the main threat 

to China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region, intend to infiltrate from West and 

Central Asia into South Asia. It is also reported that these terrorists may 

establish bases on the Indian Subcontinent and attack Chinese diplomats and 

citizens in South Asian countries. This would constitute a new factor of 

instability in India, which continues to reel from protracted insurgencies and 

terrorism in Kashmir and the Northeast. Moreover, unlike the dual standards 

that characterize, for instance, U.S. and western perception of terrorism, India 

and China are of the view that “there is no difference between so-called good 

and bad terrorists.” 

However, the Central Asian issue between the two giants is not entirely 

without difference. Indeed, some of these can be spelled out in the following 

manner: (a) while China focuses on multilateral cooperation in Central Asia, 

India devotes more attention to bilateral cooperation with Central Asian 

countries; a press report on 30 September 2004 indicated that India plans to 

have its first-ever military base on foreign soil, an air base located near the 

Tajik capital of Dushanbe, which is to be ready by the end of 2004; (b) China 

has more concerns about the U.S. military presence in Central Asia. India, in 

contrast, is willing to have a security relationship with the U.S. and will not 

seriously oppose the U.S. presence in Central Asia. Such concerns about 

Indian proximity to the U.S. could to some extent affect ties between India 
 133 

and China. In this context, it would be pertinent to note that many Chinese 

scholars whom Jaideep Saikia met during his visit to China had expressed 

their concern over the joint Indo-U.S. military exercises that are being 

conducted. 

Economic cooperation is a key and relatively new area of cooperation for 

the SCO and serves as the material foundation and guarantee for SCO’s 

smooth development. The heads of government of the six member states held 

the first meeting in Almaty on 14 September 2001 to discuss regional 

economic cooperation and signed the “Memorandum Between the 

Governments of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

on the Basic Objectives and Orientation of Regional Economic Cooperation 

and the Launching of a Process of Trade and Investment Facilitation.” The 

year 2002 saw the establishment of mechanisms for economic activity and 

trade, as well as transportation ministerial meetings, as initial attempts to 

explore avenues of substantive cooperation in trade, investment, 

transportation, energy and other areas. The SCO heads of government met in 

Beijing for a second time on 23 September 2003 and adopted a plan for 

multilateral economic and trade cooperation of the SCO member states, in 

which priority areas, main tasks and implementation mechanisms of 

economic-trade cooperation between the six SCO member states were 

identified. The Tashkent Declaration, signed by the top leaders of the SCO 

member states in Tashkent on May 17, 2004, expanded the scope of the SCO 

to issues concerning economic cooperation, poverty eradication and trade. To 

this end, the SCO members established five specialized working groups to 

deal with e-commerce, customs, investment promotion, and so on. An 

agreement on the measures to bolster trade in the region and formulate 

legislation that supports the free flow of goods, capital, services and 

technology was also part of the SCO’s agenda. All these imply that the SCO 

will move into a new stage of its development.

As two rising economies, China and India need more imported oil and gas 

to meet their rapid economic growth and social development, which could be 

translated into both cooperation and competition between them in Central 

Asia. In sum, as both China and India are set to increase their influence in 
 134 

 

Central Asia, it is time for New Delhi and Beijing to factor in the other side in 

their Central Asia policies. 

Conclusion 

Even as India’s and China’s Central Asian policies grow to include newer 

aspects of cooperation, the question that remains to be understood is once 

again the membership of India in the SCO. Several factors may complicate 

India’s entry into the SCO at this stage. First, the focus of the SCO in the near 

future is most likely to be to strengthen its internal institution and cooperation 

and not to enlarge its membership. Secondly (as was elucidated at the 

beginning of the paper), it seems that there are nay-sayers in China and Russia 

who are of the opinion that SCO membership is not necessary for India at this 

point in time. The question is also asked whether it is India or Pakistan that 

should be first considered. Unfortunately, this dilemma continues to rule 

sundry opinion in China and Russia, even though Pakistan is a known 

promoter of terrorism in the region. Thirdly, while some Indian officials and 

scholars have expressed India’s interest in joining the SCO at one time or 

another, others, however, are of the opinion that since “the US-led war against 

terrorism has completely demolished the relevance of the SCO,” and “the 

focus now appeared to have shifted from fighting Islamic fundamentalism to 

that of dealing with the U.S. presence in Central Asia,”108 it is not wise to join 

the SCO at this juncture. The Indian position vis-à-vis the SCO seems to have 

turned from one of “eagerness” to one of “watchful waiting.” Be that as it 

may, the time has come for the strategic community in India to realize that 

Indian membership in the SCO would only entail greater cooperation and 

participation with the member nations, most of whom have to be at any rate 

cultivated by India in order to ensure its security and economic needs. Indeed, 

these can be better served as a result of the multilateral confluence that can be 

108 Ibid., pp. 350-351. 
 135 

engineered in the SCO. The official Indian position for membership in the 

SCO, on the other hand, would find more enthusiasm were sundry opinion in 

China and Russia to cease equating Pakistan with India. History has clearly 

testified that whereas India is a nation that is committed to peace and 

harmony, Pakistan stands with states that are not only opposed to such ideals, 

but have determinedly sought–time and again–to promote terror, the 

combating of which is an avowed goal of the Shanghai Cooperation 

Organization. 
 136 
 137 

 

Chapter Nine 

Competition for Caspian Energy Development and Its 

Relationship with China 

Yu Jianhua 

Since ancient times, various forces have coveted Central Asia, located at 

the hinterland of Eurasia, as a bridge between Southeast Europe, the Middle 

East and the Far East, as well as between North Asia and South Asia. Britain 

and Russia started their “great games” over Central Asia, Iran and 

Afghanistan at the turn of the 20 Century. The famous British geopolitician 

Mackinder pointed out that Central Asia is the 

th

“world island”—heartland of 

Eurasia, and he asserted, “whoever seizes the heartland will control the world 

island; whoever controls the world island will be the master of the world.”109

A century later, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Central Asia once 

again becomes a “vacuum” for many global and regional powers, especially 

along the Caspian ring with abundant oil and natural gas resources. On the 

basis of an analysis of the factors for the persistent competition over energy in 

the Caspian area during the past decades, this paper aims to explore the new 

development of international competition in the area at the beginning of the 

new century, especially since 9/11. 

Intense International Competition over Caspian Energy Resources 

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Central Asia has witnessed 

intense competition among major powers of the world, not only because of its 

strategic position in the world, especially in Eurasia, but also because of its 

rich oil and natural gas resources in the Caspian Sea. 

The Caspian Sea, with a total area of 390,000 km , is the largest inland 

basin in the world. Its rich resources played an important role in Soviet 

economy. Before oil was found in the Middle East, this area had been a major 

2

109 Halford John Mackinder, Geographical Links from a Historical Perspective, Commercial 

Press, 1985, p. 13. 
 138 

 

supplier in the world oil market: as early as 1901, the output of crude oil in the 

Caspian region reached 11 million tons, 50 percent of the total output of the 

world; the Caspian sea constituted 30 percent of the world trade in oil; in 

1940, the output in Azerbaijan alone was 22.5 million tons, 71 percent of the 

total in the Soviet Union, and Baku was thus named the “City of Oil.” After 

WWII, however, the oil output in this area began to decline, and it was only 

11.7 million tons at the disintegration of the Soviet Union.110 Since the 

independence of the Central Asian and Caucasian states from the former 

Soviet Union, thanks to significant foreign funds, exploration of oil and 

natural gas in this area has produced quite stimulating results; this area is 

considered the third largest energy base in the world, only after the Persian 

Gulf and Siberia: the total prospective oil reserve approaches 16 percent of the 

world, and the prospective natural gas reserve reaches 21 trillion cubic meters, 

35 percent of the world reserve. Energy reserves in the Caspian area are 

mainly located along the seacoasts of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and 

Turkmenistan, as well as Russia and Iran; Uzbekistan is also rich in oil and 

natural gas, especially the latter. Therefore, the Caspian Sea was once called 

“the Second Persian Gulf” or “the Middle East in the 21st Century.” 

From the beginning of the 1990s, large-scale energy exploration has been 

conducted by various global and regional powers, as well as local oilproducing states. Many famous international oil companies have established 

offices in the area, signed agreements with relevant states on joint exploration 

of energy, and helped design routes for oil and natural gas exportation. Instead 

of weakening with the advent of the new century, global competition over 

energy in the area is developing into a new stage after 9/11, as well as the 

subsequent Afghanistan War and Iraq War. 

Why, then is this competition lasting till today, and still intensifying? The 

author believes the answer lies in the following factors: 

110 Shu Yang and Wang Jingguo, “The Caspian Oil and Energy for China,” Journal of 

Lanzhou University (Social Sciences), 2001, Vol. 4. 
 139 

 

 The widening gap between the sharp increase of global demand for oil 

and the supplies thereof. 

Energy is the foundation for economic development in all countries. In the 

global structure of energy consumption in 2003, oil constituted a leading 37 

percent, followed by gas energy (24 percent), coal (26 percent), hydroelectric 

power (7 percent), and nuclear energy (6 percent). For the three leading 

energy-consuming regions, namely North America, Europe and the AsiaPacific region, oil accounts for 40 percent and 32 percent of all non-recyclable 

energy consumed in North America and Europe respectively, and gas, 25 

percent and 31 percent; only in the Asia-Pacific region does the consumption 

of coal (45 percent) exceed that of oil (32 percent) and gas (10 percent).111

Undoubtedly, oil is the major form of energy for today’s world. Although the 

total amount of world oil and natural gas resources can meet the basic longterm global demand, the regional imbalance between demand and supply is 

increasing sharply. Within the “heart zone of global oil and natural gas” that 

stretches from North Africa to the Persian Gulf, and to the former Soviet 

Union, oil reserves in the Persian Gulf alone constitute 2/3 of all explored 

world reserves, 1/3 of the total output, and 2/3 of total sales. However, the 

Caspian region, with its rich oil reserves and huge potential for oil export, has 

become the second largest base of energy for all major powers in the world in 

consideration of their energy security and the diverse channels of oil import. 

Meanwhile, the oil-producing Caspian states have begun to pursue an 

economic development strategy based on their oil and natural gas reserves. 

 The worrisome security situation in the Middle East. 

Although the five bloody Middle East Wars between Israel and the Arabian 

world have long become history after the Cold War, the Middle East remains 

a most turbulent spot on the map of the world: the peace-regaining process in 

the Middle East has been in a stalemate since Sharon became Prime Minister, 

and Pakistan-Israel relations are backsliding once in a while; anti-U.S. and 

111 Statistics done by the end of 2003, British Petroleum 2004 Statistical Review of World 

Energy, 2004. 
 140 

 

anti-Israel terrorist attacks by Islamic extremist forces continue; though the 

U.S. won the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War after 9/11, the anti-U.S. tides 

in the Islamic world in the Middle East are even higher due to U.S. hegemonic 

actions, such as dramatizing the “clash of civilizations,” demonizing the 

Islamic civilization, “preemptive” military actions, and the “democratic 

reforms” pushed forth in the Middle East; Iraq remains a dangerous place after 

the Saddam regime was overthrown; the Iran nuclear crisis remains a threat to 

the security of the Persian Gulf. Therefore, compared with the Middle East 

and the Persian Gulf that are “always in the center of storm,” Central Asia is 

naturally a better choice for energy exploitation. 

 Geopolitical competition among major powers in Eurasia after 9/11. 

The demise of the Cold War witnessed a world structure of “one 

superpower plus many strong powers.” As Eurasia is a key target for the U.S. 

on its way to world leadership, the U.S. takes all efforts to avoid a rival that 

can challenge its position while preventing the formation of any allies against 

it. Therefore, the U.S. has to keep the initiative on the European-Asian 

chessboard, where France, Germany, Russia, China and India are five 

geopolitical rivals, while Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Korea, Turkey and Iran are five 

strategic points.112 This idea by Brzezinski not only guided the U.S.’s strategy 

in Europe and Asia during the Clinton years, including the strategy for 

competition over Caspian energy, but it has also been developed even further 

by the Bush administration. Under the favorable international conditions after 

9/11, through the Afghanistan War at the end of 2001 and the Iraq War in 

spring 2003, the U.S. has not only realized its long-dreamed military existence 

in Central Asia and fostered pro-American regimes in the two countries, but 

also obtained a more favorable position in clearing the European-Asian 

strategic passage and controlling the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea—the 

two biggest energy bases in the world. In consideration of their own strategic 

goals and energy security, other global or regional powers are also joining in 

112 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic 

Imperatives, Shanghai People’s Press, 1998. 
 141 

this international geopolitical and economic game in this crucial spot of 

Eurasia. 

 The skyrocketing international oil price. 

All through the 1990s, the international oil price basically remained 

between $12 and $25 a barrel, except during the Persian Gulf War in 1991. At 

the end of 1999, the price oil began to increase rapidly to $31.8 a barrel on 

March 1, 2000. Although it dropped again due to the worldwide economic 

depression after 9/11, it rose again after the 2003 Iraq War. On October 18, 

2004, the international futures price of crude oil reached a height of $55 a 

barrel, and the Brunt average price of crude oil was $38.27 per barrel in 2004. 

On April 5, 2005, the futures price of clean crude oil for September on the 

New York Commodity Exchange reached $60.65 per barrel, a new record 

over the past two decades. If it is correct that the relatively low oil price in the 

1990s was the major restricting factor for the exploitation of Caspian energy 

at the time, then the skyrocketing oil price in the past several years was 

undoubtedly a strong market force behind the new international competition 

over Caspian energy. 

 Development of knowledge about the potential energy reserves in the 

Caspian Sea. 

Even though estimates for oil and gas reserves differ sharply between 

various countries, due to the incomplete exploration of the oil and natural gas 

reserves on the Caspian seabed and on surrounding lands, an international 

consensus is being reached. It can be found from the following chart that the 

confirmed oil and natural gas reserve rate in the Caspian region is still very 

low, especially for oil, which is only about 10 percent, compared to the 40 to 

60 percent of confirmed rate in well-explored areas in the world. This 

indicates that although the Caspian region can hardly become “the Second 

Persian Gulf,” it still has huge potential for new discoveries of large or superlarge oil fields. A good example is the discovery of the Kashaghan Field in the 
 142 

northeast Caspian Sea in Kazakhstan in July 2000, whose oil reserves are as 

high as seven billion tons, not to mention the rather small population of the 

area and the limited energy-consuming market, which means most oil and 

natural gas can be exported. All these factors naturally lead to the promotion 

of the strategic position of the Caspian region and the intensification of 

international competition over its resources. 

Fig. 1 Data of Oil and Natural Gas Resources in the Caspian Region

Oil (in million tons) Natural Gas (in 100 million cubic 

Countries meters) 

Confirmed 

Reserves 

Potential 

Reserves 

Total 

Reserves 

Confirmed 

Reserves 

Potential 

Reserves 

Total 

Reserves 

Kazakhstan 736.56 12,548.80 13,285.36 18,406.05 24,918.96 43,325.01 

Turkmenistan 8.184 10,912.00 10,993.84 28,600.17 45,024.03 73,624.2 

Azerbaijan 163.68 4,364.80 4,528.48 1,245.948 9,910.95 11,156.898 

Russia 368.28 1,909.60 2,277.88 —— —— —— 

Iran 1.364 2,046.00 2,059.64 —— 3,144.87 3,144.87 

Total 1,364.00 31,781.20 331,454.20 48,252.168 82,968.81 131,220.978 

Notes: Data for Russia and Iran only refer to their territories along the Caspian coasts. Data 

originally from American Oil and Gas Reporter, edited by APEA (American Public Energy Agency), 

quoted by Xia, Jinghua, “A View on the Competition of Pipeline Construction from the Disputes over 

the Exploitation of the Caspian Sea Energy,” Technology and Economy of Petroleum Chemistry, 2004, 

Issue 1. 

New Developments in the Competition 

Due to all the abovementioned factors, global and regional powers are 

competing among one another even more intensely over Caspian energy in the 

new millennium. Although competition is still focused on ownership, 

transportation rights and exploitation rights, it has taken on a new look quite 

different from ten years ago. 

 Disputes over the partition of ownership of Caspian energy. 

Despite the many bilateral and multilateral negotiations over more than 10 

years, the five states around the Caspian Sea have quarreled bitterly about the 
 143 

ownership of the continental shelf and oil/natural gas resources on the seabed 

since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The participants of the quarrel 

remain Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Iran, but their 

original standpoints have changed dramatically. At the beginning, supported 

by the U.S. and the West, the “Sea Party”—Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, who 

possessed most of the Caspian energy—proposed dividing the Caspian Sea, 

while the “Lake Party”—Russia, Iran and Turkey—claimed that the Caspian 

energy is the common property of all nations around the Sea, and that any 

kind of energy exploitation must be based on a unanimous agreement, or at 

least negotiation of all the five countries. The main consideration of the “Lake 

Party,” especially Russia and Iran, was that they possess rich oil and natural 

gas reserves in their countries, and that they were cautious about large-scale 

exploitation by Western countries headed by the U.S. Therefore, over quite a 

long time, they tried very hard to prevent Western petroleum companies from 

exploiting oil in disputed areas. 

However, since the late 1990s, with regard to the cooperation between 

Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan with international petroleum companies, Russia 

has changed its stance from “non-division of the Sea” to “limited division of 

the Sea,” and has actively facilitated negotiations between countries around 

the Caspian Sea. Based on the principle of “dividing the seabed and sharing 

the waters,” Russia signed an agreement with Kazakhstan in July 1999, 

dividing the north Caspian seabed in the middle; two years later, they signed 

another agreement specifying their undersea boundaries and the division of 

undersea resources; in January 2001, Russia and Azerbaijan reached an 

agreement on their undersea boundaries; in November 2001, Azerbaijan and 

Kazakhstan also signed an agreement to divide their undersea resources in the 

middle; Iran and Turkmenistan, in comparison, insist that all parties should 

jointly use the Caspian resources or divide them equally among the five 

countries, and that all exploration should be stopped before a new coastline is 

decided. Recently, Turkmenistan is changing its position. On April 23, 2002, a 

summit conference of the five countries was held in Ashgabat, capital of 

Turkmenistan, on the division of Caspian oil and gas resources, which ended 
 144 

 

without any achievement due to the huge gap in their positions. 113 Since 

2004, Russia has been encouraging all other countries to sign a pact on the 

legal status of the Caspian Sea. Nevertheless, due to the manifold interests 

involved and the intervention of external forces, the disputes seem able to 

endure for a long time. The only lesson so far is that a peaceful solution 

through political consultation is the most beneficial to all parties. 

 Competition over the construction of pipelines for Caspian energy. 

Ever since their independence in 1991, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 

Turkmenistan, which possess most of the Caspian energy, have adopted the 

strategy of “development based on oil and natural gas.” Because these 

countries are located inland, without direct access to world oil market, their 

choice of pipeline construction has been a key issue in the competition over 

the past decade: on the one hand, the countries through which the pipeline 

passes can charge a hefty passage fee; on the other hand, the issue is 

concerned with the geopolitical and strategic intentions of all involved parties. 

In the past, most Caspian oil was exported through pipelines running from 

Baku in Azerbaijan, through Russia, to ports on the Black Sea, or from west 

Kazakhstan, through Russia, to ports on the Black Sea. However, due to the 

limited transportation capacity of the pipelines (100,000 to 160,000 barrels per 

day) and the high passage fee charged by Russia, these countries, as well as 

the international oil companies that investment in them, have begun 

considering different options for pipeline construction. Out of their own 

economic and strategic interests, various parties have been involved in a 

smokeless war of pipeline construction. At present, pipelines are under 

construction at different speeds towards the east, west, south and north, driven 

by the different interests of related countries. 

Among all the plans, Russia most favored the “north route,” which will 

maintain Russia’s traditional influence over the Caspian Sea region and 

Central Asia. Thus, it has been trying to have the pipeline laid through 

113 “Heads of the Five Caspian Nations Explored Resolutions to Disputes over Oil and Natural 

Gas Resources,” the Petroleum Economy Website, 26 April 2002. 
 145 

Russian territory. On December 6, 1996, Russia and Kazakhstan signed an 

agreement on constructing an oil pipeline from Katinziz [Tengiz] to 

Novorossiisk, while maintaining the old one. Funded by the Caspian Pipeline 

Corporation (CPC), this project was first put into operation in October 2001. 

By the end of January 2005, a total of 50 million tons of oil has been 

transported through the new pipeline, and the transportation capacity is 

expected to reach 32 million tons in 2005, and 67 million tons per year in the 

future. 

Meanwhile, the “west route” favored by the West is catching up. Despite 

the high cost of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the various obstacles set 

by Russia, the U.S. and other related countries started its construction in 

September 2002 and completed it in spring 2005, which will become the main 

route for the transportation of Caspian oil to the Western market. In order to 

break the blockade of the U.S., Iran has reached the first agreement with 

Kazakhstan based on an “exchange mechanism” that the Caspian states export 

oil to north Iran, and Iran exports the same amount of oil from the Persian 

Gulf. In addition, in spite of strong opposition from the U.S. and Russia, both 

Iran and Turkmenistan are constructing a pipeline for the transportation of 

natural gas. Another southern route runs from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, and then to the Arabian Sea. Its construction was once halted in the 

shadow of civil war in Afghanistan but was resumed after the U.S. won the 

anti-terrorist war and helped found a pro-American regime. On May 30, 2002, 

with the efforts of the U.S., the countries of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and 

Pakistan signed an agreement on the construction of a natural gas pipeline. 

In addition, in view of the prospective East Asian energy market and for 

more exporting channels, Central Asian states such as Kazakhstan and 

Turkmenistan, as well as international oil groups, are attempting to build the 

“east route,” a “Pan-Asia Land Bridge for Energy” to China, Japan and Korea 

in the Far East. In recent years, China has been actively promoting 

international cooperation for that purpose. 

Though Caspian energy exploitation is destined to continue, problems exist 

with all the routes. The best option for the Central Asian states is to construct 

all the routes at the same time. As the U.S. petroleum analyst Simonberry 
 146 

 

pointed out, “Central Asia and the Caspian have enough oil and natural gas 

reserves for many pipelines. Besides, the U.S. should not attempt to control all 

of them, but it should work together with Europe, Japan, as well as all other 

Asian allies, to jointly explore energy for the future.”114

 International competition over the Caspian energy exploitation 

strategy. 

Although international exploitation of Caspian energy was not as active in 

the late 1990s as before, due to the global recession and the decline in the 

price of oil caused by the 1997 Financial Crisis in Asia, competition has 

become intense again in the new millennium, especially because of the 

skyrocketing oil price in the past two years, in which the U.S. and Russia are 

still the leading actors. 

The strategic goals of the U.S. include protecting the interests of U.S. 

petroleum companies, making the Caspian Sea region a new supply base for 

U.S. energy, supporting the independent tendency of the newly independent 

states from Russia, and restricting Iranian influence. In order to achieve these 

goals, the U.S. is making every economic, political, and diplomatic effort to 

play a leading role in Caspian energy exploration, distribution, exploitation 

and exportation. With the support of the U.S. government, large American oil 

corporations have been very active in Caspian energy exploitation since the 

mid-1990s. ExxonMobil Chemical, Chevron Texaco, and other corporations 

have invested more than 30 billion dollars in new production facilities. Up to 

2003, U.S. companies have obtained control of 16 percent of the oil and 11.4 

percent of the natural gas resources; the U.S. and the U.K. together have 

control over 27 percent of the oil and 40 percent of the natural gas resources 

in the Caspian region. 115 The events of 9/11 reminded the U.S. of the strong 

anti-U.S. tide in the Islamic world; a big fissure also began to appear between 

the U.S. and the world’s leading oil supplier, Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the 

114 Weimin Wang, “A Brief Analysis of the Competition over Petroleum at the Turn of the 

Century,” Contemporary International Relations, 1998, Issue 3. 115 (Russia) The Red Star, September 9, 2003. 
 147 

 

U.S. has begun to turn to Central Asia and the Caspian Sea for a new overseas 

oil source. On December 13, 2001, American Assistant Secretary of State 

Jones emphasized that the U.S. will continue to pursue important long-term 

interests in three aspects: 1) preventing the expansion of terrorism; 2) helping 

Central Asian states in their economic and political reforms and the 

establishment of a legal system; and 3) ensuring safe and fair exploitation of 

Caspian energy.116 Guided by such ideas, the U.S. entered Central Asia by 

way of the Afghanistan War in 2001, set up military bases in Iraq in 2003, and 

actively encouraged the “Color Revolution” in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan 

recently, which not only helped the U.S. establish hegemony over Caspian 

energy, but also linked the Middle East and Central Asia—a big step for the 

U.S. to control the two world energy bases. 

Facing these forceful U.S. offensives, Russia is making every effort to 

achieve its strategic goal of “returning to Central Asia,” which includes using 

its geopolitical advantage and traditional influence to strengthen political, 

economic and military cooperation with the Central Asian states, expanding 

Russia’s share in energy exploitation, as well as ensuring Russia’s control 

over the exportation of Caspian energy, especially in Kazakhstan, 

Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. On April 10, 2003, the next day after the U.S. 

capture of Baghdad, the Presidents of Russia and Turkmenistan signed a 25-

year agreement on trade and natural gas exploitation in Turkmenistan, as well 

as discussing the construction of new natural gas pipelines between both 

countries. In so doing, Russia also consolidated and even expanded its 

interests in Central Asia. Moreover, the Putin government, together with 

Turkmenistan, is advocating the establishment of the “Caspian 5-Nation 

Confederation,” which aims to enhance the superiority of Russia and its allies 

over the global energy market and deter the U.S. and its Western allies in their 

energy security by forming a “Second OPEC” led by Moscow. 

Japan, one of the largest energy-consuming countries, “regards oil as life,” 

and is also joining in the competition, as it depends almost totally on imports 

116 A. Elizabeth Jones, “U.S.-Central Asian Cooperation,” Testimony to the Subcommittee on 

Central Asia and the Caucasus, Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, 13 December 

2001, p. 9. 
 148 

 

for oil and natural gas, of which 81.4 percent of all its crude oil import was 

from Middle East in 2003.117 In order to lower its oil dependence upon the 

world “powder keg”—the Far East—and achieve diversified energy sources, 

the Hashimoto Cabinet proposed in July 1997 a “diplomatic strategy for 

Eurasia” that aims at Central Asia and the Caucasus, in which the Prime 

Minister emphasized the vital importance of the Caspian region to Japan’s 

diversified energy supplies, and that Japan should “promote dialogues and 

mutual trust with the region, and enhance cooperation for its prosperity.” 

Later, Japan put forward a “Caspian Oil Strategy” based on “Dollar 

Diplomacy,” by which Japan will cooperate more actively with the region in 

oil and natural gas exploitation, as well as pipeline and infrastructure 

construction. Guided by the proposal of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi to 

strengthen cooperation with the Central Asian states along the “Silk Road,” 

Japan launched a “Silk Road Energy Initiative” in July 2002, sending 

politicians, entrepreneurs and scholars to these sates to discuss cooperation in 

oil and natural gas exploitation. In August 2004, Japanese Foreign Minister 

Machimura visited Central Asia, starting the “Central Asia + Japan” dialogue 

mechanism to promote cooperation on energy;118 in 2005, Japan is preparing 

to hold a Foreign-Minister-level conference with Central Asia; in addition, 

Kazakhstan has approved the cooperation project of Japanese petroleum 

corporations in the Kashaghan Oil Field. Considering Japan’s actions since 

the Afghanistan War and the Iraq War, it is easy to find that Japan expects to 

win a share in the competition over the Caspian energy as an important U.S. 

partner in confining the influence of Russia, China and Iran in the region. 

In spite of the lower degree of enthusiasm shown by the EU in this 

competition, it has begun to engage itself more actively in this competition. 

The EU supports the Caspian states’ independence from Russia and their 

westernization reforms, not only because the Caspian region can serve as 

another important energy base for the European market in the 21st century, but 

because the EU considers the international exploitation of the Caspian energy 

117 Tomoko Hosoe, “Japan’s Energy Policy and Energy Security,” FACTS Energy Advisory, 

Issues 296, December 2004. 118 Fengying Chen and Zhao Hongtu, eds., Chessboard of Global Energy, Current Affairs 

Press, 2005, pp.245-6. 
 149 

 

as “a best opportunity for Europe to demonstrate its economic power and 

management experience, as well as to fulfill its long-term responsibilities.”119

In 1992, the U.K., France, Italy, Holland, Norway and the U.S., together with 

Kazakhstan, founded the “Caspian Petroleum Consortium;” Gas British 

participated in the exploitation of the Karachaganak Oil Field in Kazakhstan; 

a French company invested $700 million to construct a large natural gas 

processing factory in Turkmenistan; Daudale Petroleum Company of France 

even signed an agreement on oil exploitation with an Iranian company, 

regardless of the D’Amato Law of the U.S.; the British government 

encourages investment in Central Asia with a national guarantee; the EU 

provides many supports to the construction of the Caucasus-Black Sea-Europe 

pipeline. Dozens of the world’s leading transnational petroleum corporations 

in France, Britain, Germany and Holland, etc., have invested a great deal in 

the exploration, exploitation, refinement, and transportation of Caspian 

energy, and their influence is growing gradually. Furthermore, after the Iraq 

War, in order to resist a U.S. monopoly over Persian Gulf energy, especially 

that of Iraq, such large EU powers as France, Germany and Italy are devoting 

greater effort to cooperation with the Central Asian states. 

Besides the U.S., Russia, Japan, the EU, Iran, Turkey and Korea, the sixth 

largest energy-consuming country, India, is also an ever more active player in 

this international competition. India started its military cooperation with the 

Central Asian states after 9/11 with unprecedented enthusiasm. In 2002, India 

established its first overseas military base in Tajikistan; later, it helped to train 

personnel for the Kazakh Caspian Fleet; in September 2004, India consulted 

with Pakistan on the construction of natural gas pipelines from Iran to India 

via Pakistan; by the end of the same year, it reached an agreement with Russia 

on jointly exploiting energy in Kazakhstan; at present, India has already held a 

large share in two Kazakh oil fields. Meanwhile, India is actively engaged in 

the construction of pipelines from the Caspian region: in Kazakhstan, the 

India Petroleum and Natural Gas Company offered to participate in the 

119 Aniwar Amuti and Zhang Shengwang, eds., Petroleum and National Security, Xinjiang 

People’s Press, 2003, p.69. 
 150 

 

construction of the China-Kazakhstan Pipeline;120 in India’s “Three Pan-Asia 

Natural Gas Pipelines Project,” in addition to the “west line” from Iran to 

India, and the “east line” from Burma and Bangladesh to India, a “north line” 

(Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) is also being considered. 

At the same time, despite the ongoing disputes over ownership of Caspian 

energy, the Caspian states have long since started international cooperation in 

energy exploitation for foreign aid and advanced techniques. In view of the 

intense competition of various powers in the region, the Caspian states are 

conducting “energy diplomacy” based on their oil and natural gas resources. 

Although they differ in the means and primary goals of cooperation with other 

countries, these states have so far shared a common intention: at first, they 

tried to balance Russian influence with that of the U.S., and later, balance the 

U.S. and Russia with “third forces” such as China, India and Japan. 

Evidently, since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Caspian energy has 

caused lasting international competition among various powers, in which the 

U.S. and Russia are leading players, though the former seems to have an edge 

over the latter. Both conflict and cooperation exist between the involved 

parties. For example, Russia no longer opposes Western investment in the 

Caspian region—the U.S. oil company Chevron-Texaco holds a 15 percent 

share in the Caspian Pipeline Group, where Russia and Kazakhstan hold most 

shares. As stated in a report by the Institute of Foreign Affairs at Georgetown 

University in November 2002, the U.S. has already realized its limited power; 

for common interests, it must strive for more tolerance for, and cooperation 

with, other major powers such as Russia, and it sometimes must restrain itself 

to a certain degree, to avoid acute conflicts. 

Caspian Energy Exploitation and China 

Undoubtedly, this trans-century international war over energy not only 

bears on the economic, political and diplomatic development of the Central 

120 Yudong Tan and Zhang Kang, “Prospects of China-India Cooperation in Energy,” 

International Petro-economy, 2005, Issue 2. 
 151 

Asian and Caspian states, but it is also influencing the geopolitical and 

economic competition among major powers, including China. 

As the second largest energy-consuming and oil-importing country, China 

also faces the widening gap between oil supply and demand. International 

energy specialists predicted in 1998 that 1/3 of the 300 million tons of oil 

demand by China will depend on import in 2010, but the reality is even 

graver: by 2004, China’s crude oil import had already reached 122.8 million 

tons, with a dependent rate of 41.2 percent. According to conservative 

estimates, in 2010 China’s crude oil import will exceed 150 to 200 million 

tons, and in 2020 China’s dependence on natural gas import will reach 25 to 

40 percent. 

In addition to its heavy dependence on import, China is also confronted 

with limited import sources and the threats to oil passage. In 2004, of China’s 

total crude oil import, 45.4 percent came from the Middle East and 28.7 

percent from Africa, both of which are turbulent areas with persistent 

skirmishes. Moreover, most oil transport from both areas must traverse the 

dangerous Malacca Strait. 

In view of the strong Western control over Persian Gulf oil, China has to 

consider the possibility that the U.S. might deter China by threatening to cut 

off its oil import from the Persian Gulf in times of crises. Meanwhile, China’s 

oil import from the Middle East will be seriously threatened if a war breaks 

out across the Holmes Strait, or if the Malacca Strait is blocked, not to 

mention times of crisis in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait. 

Therefore, besides efforts to maintain stability and security of the Middle 

East and the Persian Gulf, as well as full preparation for any contingency, 

China should endeavor to diversify oil import channels and control the 

proportion of Persian Gulf oil in the total China oil import. As China is not 

able to build a blue-water navy in the near future that would be strong enough 

to protect its energy passage from Latin America and Africa, Central Asia 

obviously offers a more reliable inland energy base, other than that of the Far 

East. 
 152 

In fact, China established formal relations with the Caspian states soon 

after their independence from the former Soviet Union, and has started 

communication and cooperation with them in oil and natural gas exploitation 

as well as pipeline construction. 

In June 1997, China Petroleum and Natural Gas Company bought 60.3 

percent of the shares in the Akzubin Project in Kazakhstan, which marks a 

good beginning of China’s engagement in the international exploitation of 

Caspian energy; in August of the same year, Chinese companies defeated 

AMOK of the U.S. and other competitors in the international bidding for the 

second largest oil field in Kazakhstan, the New Uzine Oil Field; in 2002, 

Chinese companies signed contracts to invest in Turkmenistan, K&K of 

Azerbaijan, and the east basin of Kazakhstan bordering the Caspian Sea; in 

the same year, the daily production of crude oil in China’s Kazakh project 

exceeded 13.7 thousand tons, and one million tons were transported back to 

China; in June 2003, China and Kazakhstan renewed the Akzubin agreement, 

increasing China’s share of the oil field to 85.6 percent; from January to June 

2003, China signed many contracts with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan; in June 

2004, China Petroleum and Natural Gas Company signed an agreement with 

Uzbek National Petroleum and Natural Gas Corporation; in October, China 

and Iran signed an agreement on oil cooperation with a value as high as $70 

billion; in January 2005, China Petro-chemistry Company completed the 

integration of the First International Petroleum that China bought from the 

U.S. in March 2004, and began to conduct full-scale exploration in its oil 

fields in Kazakhstan; on May 25, 2005, visiting Uzbek President Karimov 

signed an agreement with Chinese leaders on their long-term cooperation in 

the exploration and exploitation of Uzbek oil. 

Meanwhile, with China’s efforts in helping construct the “east line,” the 

China-Kazakhstan pipeline has been completed. In 1997, China and 

Kazakhstan agreed to lay an oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea to Xinjiang, 

i.e., from the west Kazakh seaport Atlau to Du Shan Zi of Xinjiang through 

the Alas Mountain Pass. The western part of the project—from Atlau to 

Kentiyak—was funded by both countries and completed in December 2002, 

connected to the original Atlau-Samara (Russia) pipeline. At present, its 
 153 

transportation capacity is 6 million tons. Later, according to two agreements 

signed by both countries in June 2003 and May 2004, the construction of the 

Atasu-Alas Mountain Pass Pipeline started on September 28, 2004, with its 

completion expected in two years, with an annual transportation capacity of 

10 million tons. As the last part of the 3,000-kilometer China-Kazakhstan 

pipeline, the Kentiyak-Atasu pipeline is to be completed in 2011, with a 

transportation capacity of 20 million tons and an optimal capacity of 50 

million tons in the future. Moreover, China is planning to sign more 

agreements with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on further 

cooperation in oil and natural gas. 

Despite the many achievements in China’s cooperation with the Caspian 

states, China is still facing many obstacles: 

First, compared with the traditional Russian influence and the wealth of 

Western multinational oil tycoons, China’s energy industry is lacking both in 

experience and in funds. The total capital of the three biggest Chinese oil 

companies—namely CNPC, CPCC, and CNOOC (China National Offshore 

Oil Corporation)—is less than 1/3 that of Exxon Mobil. China is also far 

behind international oil firms in techniques and equipment, as well as 

management experience. 

Secondly, the environment for Caspian energy exploitation is not very 

favorable: the great majority of exploration and exploitation is conducted 

under rugged natural conditions; the Caspian states are undergoing social and 

economic transformation, with a fragile economic foundation, an 

underdeveloped infrastructure, a deficient market mechanism, persistent 

bureaucracy and corruption, an immature financial system, changing policies 

and legislation, and a poor investment environment. Further, as these states 

are located far inland, transporting their energy is very costly. For example, 

the pipeline from the Caspian Sea to the east coast of China runs over 8,000 

km, and is costing over $22 billion to build, the funding of which is difficult 

for both China and Kazakhstan. What is worse, the construction of the 

pipeline and the future transportation of energy are subject to the influence of 

ethnic conflicts and territorial disputes in the transit areas, the unstable 

Chechen and Afghanistan situations, the “three forces” (terrorism, extremism 
 154 

and separatism), as well as various forms of regional instability and 

transnational crime. 

Third, China’s active engagement in the Caspian region has aroused the 

attention and opposition of the West. A good example is that in March 2003, 

despite CNOOC’s agreement with British Gas International Corporation, a 

subsidiary corporation of British Gas, to purchase 8.33 percent of the stock of 

the Kashaghan Oil Field owned by BG, the eight shareholders, including 

Royal Dutch/Shell of Holland, Exxon-Mobil of the U.S. and Dodale of 

France, decided to exercise their purchasing priority, and notified China in 

May of the cancellation of its agreement with BG. Obviously, some Western 

forces reject China’s engagement in Caspian energy exploitation and try all 

possible means to prevent China’s rapid economic growth. 

As the Caspian region will prove crucial to China’s strategy of diversified 

oil and natural gas import sources, China must have a clear knowledge of its 

advantages and disadvantages, seize opportunities and rise to the challenge. 

Specific measures are as follows: 

 Maintain a long-range view on Caspian energy. 

Although the Caspian region is hardly a “Second Middle East” according 

to existing data, it is by all means an important energy base for the future 

world. The cooperation between China and Central Asian states is based on 

mutual benefits and out of their own willingness. Despite the limited shortterm benefits from the cooperation due to the abovementioned obstacles, 

China must keep a long-term perspective on its cooperation with the Central 

Asian states and regard this region as its strategic focus for diversified energy 

sources. 

 Develop cooperation steadily and gradually. 

Because China has just started its engagement in the exploitation of 

Caspian energy, it lacks the necessary funds, techniques and experience, as 

well as domestic accommodations. Therefore, China should participate 

actively in the all-round cooperation in the exploitation, processing and 

transportation of Caspian energy on the one hand, and work out a long-term 

development plan, on the other. The present focus should go to cooperation 
 155 

with Kazakhstan on oil exploitation and pipeline construction. With the 

development of the Central Asian situation, China can further cooperate with 

Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan on energy, including natural gas 

exploitation and pipeline construction. In a word, only by developing 

gradually and steadily, can cooperation between China and Central Asia on 

energy avoid severe losses caused by sudden up-and-down surges. 

 Work out flexible guidelines and pragmatic policies. 

China should not engage itself too deeply in the disputes of the five 

Caspian states over the sovereignty of the Caspian Sea and ownership of 

energy resources. Instead, it should hold a detached attitude on the principle of 

promoting the political consultation of various parties. In terms of competition 

over pipeline construction, China should make every effort to speed up the 

construction of the China-Kazakhstan Pipeline, while striving to link the line 

to Russian oil pipelines, so that Russian oil can also be transported to China. If 

conditions permit, China can also consider the possibility of another land 

passage for oil from South Asia by joining in the construction and 

management of pipelines from Turkmenistan and Iran to Pakistan and India 

via Afghanistan. In the exploitation of Caspian energy, China should make the 

best use of its comparative advantages, learn from Russia’s realistic policies, 

and abide by the international rules of market economy, participate in the 

international competition with fair actions. At the same time, China should 

also seize opportunities to cooperate with international oil firms on an equal 

basis. Furthermore, cooperation with the Caspian states must be based on 

mutual benefits, or even greater benefits for them; China’s actions must 

accord with these states’ strategy of “basing development on energy” and 

“development to the east.” 

 Consolidate the foundation for further cooperation. 

First, all departments and relevant enterprises in China should cooperate 

with each other and provide enough funds to set a good model for further 

cooperation with the Caspian states; China should build domestic 
 156 

accommodations with the development of international cooperation on 

energy, and prepare various emergency plans and contingency plans for acute 

crises. 

Second, China should make the best use of the CIO [Caspian Initiative] 

mechanism to develop economic and energy cooperation with other member 

countries, as well as coordinating and developing their cooperation in the 

exploitation of Caspian energy. 

Finally, China should make equal efforts in promoting cooperation with the 

Caspian states on economic activity and on security. With regard to the 

transformation period of the Caspian states and the threats of the “three 

forces,” as well as Western pressure on the promotion of the “Color 

Revolution,” China should further cooperation with these states to help 

stabilize the regional situation, deal well with various conflicts of interests in 

the region, and help these states solve their practical problems in order to 

promote friendship and consolidate the foundation for further cooperation. 

Conclusion 

The exploitation of Caspian energy has bearing on China’s energy security, 

which is the basis for sustainable growth. Hence, China should endeavor to 

seek and gradually expand common interests with various parties with a more 

active and pragmatic attitude. 
 157 

Part III 

The Way Ahead 
 158 
 159 

Chapter Ten 

China’s Policy and Image Building in Central Asia: A 

Perspective on Cultural Communication 

Ni Jianping 

China and the Central Asian nations fostered close ties through the “Silk 

Road” by learning from each other as early as the 2nd century BC. The 

traditional friendship opened a new chapter in the past decade when the two 

sides further developed neighborly friendship, based on equality and mutual 

benefit, and expanded cooperation in various fields. While China’s relations 

with the great powers remain a cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy, the 

launch of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001 marked 

a new era in relations between China and the countries of Central Asia. 

Beijing's intensified diplomatic activity in the region was highlighted in 2004 

when Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Kazakhstan as part of his first 

foreign trip as head of state. And the recent inclusion for the first time of three 

major nations in the region--India, Pakistan and Iran--as observers of the 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) looks set to broaden the grouping's 

influence. It gave new stimulus to the development of the SCO and to further 

development of relations between China and the countries of the Central Asia. 

Nevertheless, in Central Asia’s dynamic and multi-polar strategic 

environment, there is a heightened potential for interstate conflict. One reason 

for this lies in the different ways in which state and non-state actors interpret 

and respond to the myriad challenges and opportunities of a much more 

turbulent regional context. These differences in interpretation and response are 

largely rooted in differences in culture, for it is culture that forms the subconscious set of shared meanings that guide group behaviors, perceptions and 

actions in the world. Understanding culture in terms of the deep, underlying 

assumptions and shared mindsets held by both state and non-state actors is 

critical for effective conflict avoidance and resolution. In this paper, the 

author uses the definition of culture by Geertz (1973) to describe the strategic 

implications of culture and cultural interplay in a changing regional context 

and its implications for current and future US-China relations. The author then 
 160 

applies the concept to analyze the limitations for China’s cultural 

communication in Central Asia. Through this analysis, the author reveals 

important differences in cultural communication between China, Russia and 

the U.S., and argues that although the relationships among the ten states are 

not well developed, the concept of cultural communication is a useful 

analytical device. The analysis attempts to shed light on emerging patterns in 

international politics in the unpredictable region. A firm strengthening of 

China-Central Asia relations will have to be attributed to China's successful 

cultural cultivation of Central Asia, as well as political and economical 

cultivation. 

Interplay of Four Cultures in Central Asia 

In a globalized world, the political abstractions known as nations are 

becoming increasingly irrelevant, while the symbolic systems known as 

cultures are continually in flux. Within the range of theorists of international 

communication, it is the social and cultural context in which all cross-cultural 

communication arises. Culture is typically defined as a symbolic system, 

which includes issues of perception, cognition and understanding. Culture is 

not merely an abstract set of folk practices, nor a collection of touristy 

festivals. Rather, as Geertz (1973) defines it, it is a set of symbolic systems 

that serves not only to define and identify the culture and social structures, but 

also to articulate the synthesis of two essential parts of human culture, ethos 

and world view. Communication theorists have long understood that culture is 

inherently a symbolic system, and that it is thus a close scrutiny of the nature 

of symbols, their transformation, and their impact that best prepares one to 

understand the ways in which these forces shape and alter our symbolic 

understandings of our lives. Moreover, it is from within this framework that 

we are perhaps best suited to document and analyze the salient issues of 

communication consumption in a cross-cultural, cross-national, wired world. 

The cultural influence on communication behavior is central to our field of 

study, and by any account, telecommunications, cyberspace, and other 

emerging media forms are becoming increasingly popular modes of 
 161 

communication. Equally, over the past decade mass media have played a very 

prominent role in the information and cultural communication of foreign 

policy as cultural industries, and communication technologies have become 

central to regional politics in Central Asia. 

In today’s Central Asia, cultural communication plays an increasingly 

important role in state-to-state relations. The interplay of China, Russia, the 

United States and the Central Asian nations will be dominated increasingly by 

the topic of this project: the four cultures in Central Asia. For example, 

Central Asians are learning English at an accelerated rate, not as an act of 

deference to the United States, but as a recognition of new international 

realities. And, over the years, the U.S. mainstream media’s direct involvement 

in expanding the new culture of “democracy” in Central Asia is also 

undeniable. From this standpoint, it is not particularly useful to think of 

Central Asia as a politically significant region. The battlefield of international 

politics has shifted from the geographical and physical to the cultural and 

socio-economic levels. We are witnessing the contours of four cultural forces 

that will shape the course of history in the region for the 21st century. 

The states of Central Asia may be conceived of as simply a subordinate or 

satellite system of Russia. Not only is this a matter of historical continuity, but 

also it is arguably a recognition of contemporary reality. Nevertheless, 

Russia’s role is receding, especially on the cultural level, as well as politically 

and economically. This is a result of all the problems Russia faces internally, 

such as depopulation, social crisis and lagging industrial reform, even though 

Russia remains omnipresent in the region in terms of history and immediacy. 

Although Russia is at present relatively weak, it is the one country that not 

only has an abiding strategic interest in controlling Central Asia, but also the 

capacity to do so. During the Soviet period (from the 1920s to independence 

in 1991), Russian culture was highly influential. Unlike in the Baltic States of 

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania--where Russians were seen as occupiers--most 

Central Asians viewed Russian culture as progressive compared to local 

culture. Here it was considered prestigious to send one's children to Russianlanguage schools, and in the main cities, many people spoke Russian and did 

not even know their native language--indeed, they often took pride in this. 
 162 

While the number of Russian Orthodox and Lutherans has now stabilized after 

the mass migration of Slavs and others of European origin out of Central Asia, 

the number of Protestants and Catholics, although small, continues to rise. 

There is also the growing influence of American culture in particular. 

Western culture has now replaced Russian culture as the dominant outside 

influence, especially American culture. Speaking English is regarded as 

prestigious. Many local women, even Muslim women, dream of marrying an 

American or a European. Without much fanfare, exchange programs funded 

by the U.S. government are starting to have a tangible impact on civil society 

development in Central Asia. Since 1991, there has been significant growth in 

educational exchanges between the United States and the countries of the 

former Soviet Union, roughly 55,000 exchange students. Participants in 

exchanges range from high-school students to post-graduate professionals. 

Perhaps the most prominent government-funded exchange is the Department 

of State’s Fulbright Program. But other less publicized initiatives, such as the 

Future Leaders Exchange (or FLEX) and the Community Connections 

Programs, are also flourishing. Established in 1993 under the Freedom 

Support Act, FLEX focuses on bringing high-school-age students to the 

United States and having them spend an academic year with a host family. 

Meanwhile, the Community Connections Program of the Bureau of 

Educational and Cultural Affairs, offers three- to five-week professional 

internships for citizens of the former Soviet Union. Participants are placed 

with a wide variety of companies, ranging from family-run businesses to 

multinational corporations. 

The path also goes in the other direction, but to a lesser extent: about 800 

U.S. students during the current fiscal year are spending time in former Soviet 

states conducting research. In addition, about 2,000 Peace Corps volunteers 

are working in the FSU. Over time, these exchanges have strengthened the 

social capital of former Soviet states. In the case of Central Asia, hundreds of 

exchange-program alumni have returned home and established strong new 

social networks. There are now over 8,000 young people in the FLEX alumni 

association. Since 1998, the United States has launched a variety of initiatives 

to strengthen and expand alumni networks. For example, a group of Tajik 
 163 

alumni are in the process of forming an NGO called Youth for Democratic 

Development. Evidence of the success of the US-government exchanges 

comes in the form of imitation. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have 

all started their own exchange programs modeled on those created by the U.S. 

government. In Uzbekistan, for instance, several hundred students per year 

participate in such educational exchanges. Over the coming decades, U.S. 

exchanges could end up similarly influencing future generations of Central 

Asia’s political elite. The programs’ quiet success generates hope that despite 

Central Asia’s current backsliding towards authoritarianism, the region’s 

longer-term prospects for the expansion of political and economic pluralism 

remain positive. 

Although Russia continues to enjoy a decisive cultural advantage in 

Central Asia, Islamic culture is playing increasingly significant roles in 

Central Asia’s political and religious development. And many more traditional 

people are angered by the spread of Western mass culture, especially sexually 

explicit movies. Islam has certainly taken root in culturally diverse locales in 

Central Asia, but the globalized future presents a different set of challenges. 

As a worldview, Islam might very well provide a welcome bed of stability in a 

world of change (Ahmed, 1992). As a cultural practice, however, 

globalization has introduced tensions into Islamic societies, such as allowing 

youth access to vastly different worldviews, creating a tension within 

traditional Muslim societies. Apart from the legacy of Russian culture, most 

states in Central Asia are invariably under cultural pressure from their 

citizens’ rising expectations, which tend to outpace both growth and 

distribution. The intensely competitive cultures more often than not assume an 

ethnic character with transnational ramifications. Societies under cultural 

stress may also be drawn toward religious fundamentalism, which too tends to 

spill across state and regional borders. There is abundant scope in Central 

Asia for developments of this sort. 

Commensurate with China's rise as an economic and political power, there 

has also been a weak concurrent rise in China's soft power in Central Asia. 

China is emerging now as the most powerful and dynamic, immediate 

neighbor of Central Asia. Nevertheless, Chinese culture is not yet dominant in 
 164 

any country, or even comparable either to the Russian culture by tradition and 

history, or to the very visible and captivating presence of American culture. 

Chinese culture, cuisine, calligraphy, cinema, art, medicine and fashion fads 

have been weak in strengthening the region's culture. It is growing, because 

new routes of trade, such as pipelines, highways, and railroads are linking 

Central Asia to the world and are having the effect of increasing China’s 

involvement and physical presence, which is already quite evident when one 

visits the market places in major Central Asian cities. Meanwhile, China's 

flagship consumer brand names have not been popular in Central Asia. This 

branding of Chinese goods upwards in Central Asian markets will have 

positive soft power and imaging effects on Central Asia societies. 

Overall, the American culture is in a relatively favorable position because 

the influence of Chinese culture in Central Asia likely will be gradual, 

skillfully executed, and would not precipitate conflict. Also, the Chinese 

culture is to “go westward” by insisting the government as a leading force 

encourage cultural enterprises to operate in accordance with international 

practices. China’s cultural influence in Central Asia wanes as it moves further 

from China’s borders. More important, the American culture has become an 

influencing force on par, if not greater than the Russian, due to the ongoing 

realities of the War on Terrorism. Thus, Chinese culture represents only one 

of the influences for the societies in Central Asian states, limiting Beijing’s 

ability to play an essential or irreplaceable role in the region. And there is the 

lingering Chinese fear of strategic encirclement by American forces and a 

view that the American presence in Central Asia is inherently threatening. It 

would help if the U.S. would be more transparent and reach out to China as a 

partner in stabilizing Central Asia. The U.S.-China dialogue on terrorism can 

only improve the larger bilateral relationship. Overall, the American culture, 

by and large, is probably benefiting from the fact that instead of monolithic 

control over the region, it is going to have a more complicated interplay 

between an expanding, indirect influence of Chinese culture and a receding 

but less threatening Russian culture. 
 165 

Limitations for China’s Cultural Communication 

Insofar as China represents only one of a number of markets and sources of 

capital for the Central Asian states, its ability to play a vital and irreplaceable 

role of culture throughout the entire region is still limited. There are certain 

inherent challenges against Chinese culture, as well as some disadvantages in 

terms of China’s intercultural communication, in particular, in the region. 

Four major factors will constrain China’s cultural influence in the Central 

Asian nations. 

First is the lingering perception of China as a threat to the region. Over the 

past decade, Beijing has developed friendly relations with Central Asian 

neighbors Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, cooperating on a range of 

political, economic and security issues. But some Central Asians continue to 

see China as a potential threat to the region. These fears come despite the 

friendly relations that have developed between regional governments. And the 

Chinese government and Chinese officials are extremely worried about the 

perception in the wider world that China poses any kind of threat. China 

officially disavows any belief that it is seeking hegemony in the region and 

has repeatedly stressed that it wants to offer cooperation, not domination. But 

such assurances have not kept Central Asians from worrying about the longterm consequences of a Chinese superpower. Central Asia's fears about China 

are rooted both in history and concerns about future jobs and regional 

influence. And for some Central Asians, the SCO is a guarantee against any 

kind of regional threat from Beijing, though it has expanded its focus to 

include the fight against terrorism, extremism and separatism, as well as the 

promotion of economic cooperation. 

The second problem concerns the limited resources China can commit to 

cultural communication in Central Asia. China achieves all it needs through 

political and economic diplomacy, but Central Asia is still not a top priority 

for decision makers in Beijing. China’s prospects for safeguarding its cultural 

interests in Central Asia are well served by its current counterterrorism policy. 

Like language, religion has an atavistic appeal that captures the imagination of 

the insecure. It can become the driving force of political mobilization and 
 166 

power in societies striving to combine economic growth with participatory 

politics. It is true that the conflicts in Central Asia are largely among Muslims, 

but that does not diminish the power of Islam to unify specific groups against 

others, as is evident in Tajikistan. And this region’s stronger ethnic affinity 

and economic orientation toward Russia also render it less susceptible to 

Chinese cultural domination. Therefore, many difficulties remain as to how 

China will approach the transnational appeal of Islam in such a way as to 

avoid conflicts in the region. 

Different sources of regional instability, namely, separatism and the rise of 

fundamentalist Islam, especially when it is linked to separatist activity, as well 

as the terrorism, are the third factor limiting the potential growth of Chinese 

cultural influence in the region. Moreover, the roots of these problems still 

remain, even after 9/11. Imminent leadership change, as many of Central 

Asia’s founding presidents leave their posts (by choice or not), is also a source 

of instability. The political stability of the Central Asian states themselves will 

clearly play a role in how Chinese cultural influence there evolves. It should 

be evident by now that these three forces have important implications at the 

foundational level for intercultural communication theory, namely, our very 

understanding of culture, society, and communication in Central Asia. 

Chinese counterterrorism efforts provide added weight to the SCO’s role and, 

therefore, afford China a better opportunity to communicate its cultural 

interests in the region. However, China can now better pursue its policies 

regarding outside influence in Xinjiang by having greater attention paid to 

border security and the movement of Central Asian extremists. 

Last, China faces the task of establishing conditions conducive to the 

cultural communication. These conditions include not only political and legal 

institutions, but also a fresh vision of how the values of traditional and modern 

Chinese cultures can be fused into a long-term, coherent vision of political 

morality that serves China’s national interest. The traditional Chinese culture 

based on Confucianism instills in people such virtues as filial piety, fraternal 

love, loyalty, and sincerity, and reminds them that rights are only a last resort 

for protecting their interests. The traditional Chinese values seem a logical aid 

to help build a contemporary Chinese ethos. China is moving along this very 
 167 

path, and hence a conscious effort to revitalize cultural and spiritual values to 

counteract these challenges is both necessary and desirable. Without such an 

effort, these values may slowly disappear, leaving a moral vacuum to be filled 

only by other cultures, with their accompanying narrow and limited 

vocabulary. In short, we now have a new opportunity for a more accurate 

appreciation of the strengths and limits of the traditional Chinese culture. 

Cultural Communication: China’s Image Building 

Along with the international community, China is willing to renew its 

efforts to preserve stability and promote development in Central Asia. China’s 

primary interest in Central Asia derives from its overall foreign-policy 

strategy of seeking a peaceful environment. With a continuous development 

of China’s engagement with the European Union, the region acts as a transcontinental link, not only in a geographical sense, but also in a cultural, as 

well as a political sense. The Chinese government is committed to projecting 

itself as a peace-loving nation, and stressing that everyone in the region can 

benefit from China's peaceful rise. 

China is burnishing its image as a cooperative player and a stabilizing force 

in the region. And for China, national image building through cultural 

communication is useful in three ways. First, it throws light on the foreign 

policies of China’s response to a changed geopolitical landscape. Second, it 

enhances our knowledge of the ways in which geopolitical change affects the 

behavior patterns of states, for instance, the ways in which they reformulate 

self-images or extend competition to new arenas (India-Pakistan). Finally, the 

new pattern of interstate politics also emphasizes a more fundamental cultural 

continuity in state behavior. Clearly the cultural stuff of national image is still 

power and national interest and all the strategic and tactical games that go 

with them. And diplomatically, the Chinese are always keen to project an 

image of international cooperation rather than confrontation, and they're very 

keen to be seen as good neighbors within the region. But culturally, what 

China most needs to do is learn much more about cross-cultural 
 168 

communication in the region, and the effects of China’s cultural 

communication still leave much room for improvement, especially compared 

with those of Russia and the U.S. 

China’s fundamental interests in the region are the basis for carrying out 

Chinese cultural communication. China should launch some major cultural 

projects in the region. These projects should be coordinated with important 

diplomatic and comprehensive activities, including a Chinese culture year, 

culture week, and culture day, and create a good cultural atmosphere. Only the 

convergence of China's rise in economic, political and soft power, Central 

Asia’s softened threat perception of China, and the rise of ethnic Chinese 

culture in Central Asia will presage healthy future development and growth in 

China-Central Asia relations. By extension, it is communication skills, both in 

sending and receiving, that determine how well an individual, an organization, 

an industry, or a nation, does in acquiring and applying knowledge, thus 

broadening the chances for successful cross-cultural communication. 

Certainly, the ability to negotiate effectively the cultural issues inherent in 

communication gives a more competitive edge in a globalized world. 

Also, China should make greater efforts to promote cultural 

communication and dialogue among different civilizations, playing an 

increasingly greater role in international affairs. The central government 

should encourage and support exchanges in the fields of culture, media, 

academia and tourism. First, China should launch a variety of initiatives to 

boost high-level cultural contacts, improve the cooperation mechanism in the 

field, and provide support on major issues related to cultural exchanges. For 

example, more translations of classic Chinese works should be available in 

Central Asian nations, as well as an intensified cultivation of China hands in 

the universities and institutes in those nations, so that they help to diminish the 

prejudice against China prevailing among Central Asians. Second, the local 

Chinese embassies in Central Asia should make greater efforts to educate and 

take care of the local Chinese for projecting a preferred national image, since 

the Chinese themselves are just the vehicles of cultural communication. Third, 

China should make a greater investment in Chinese learning and broadcasting 

programs in Central Asian nations and improve pragmatic cooperation in the 
 169 

field of cultural exchanges, such as setting up websites for a wider coverage of 

the young people, so that a louder and louder China voice could be heard in 

the region. 

Conclusion 

In a geopolitically transformed region of Central Asia, new analytical 

frameworks can yield an improved understanding of altered strategic 

relationships. This paper shows that each of the four cultures in Central Asia 

has substantial strategic relevance for the others. This is less evident from the 

existing patchwork of political, economic, and other interactions among the 

countries in Central Asia nations. Given the significant impact of the interplay 

of four cultures in Central Asia, the potential for political instability, and the 

Central Asian nations’ current backsliding towards different cultures, crosscultural communication in the region will remain vital for an integrated 

politics and for the region’s longer-term prospects for the expansion of 

political, economic and cultural pluralism. 

The author’s goal in this essay has been to provide some initial probes into 

the role of cross-cultural communication in national image projection. Given 

the transforming effects of globalization and informatization in the social and 

cultural worlds, it is imperative for scholars of cross-cultural communication 

to begin to understand how these forces will affect not only the foundational 

theoretical assumptions of our scholarship, but also the significant impact of 

these trends on the actual practice of cross-cultural communication. The twin 

forces of globalization and informatization can perhaps be best explained from 

within a framework provided by cross-cultural communication theorists, as 

from its earliest days the discipline has been concerned with the development 

of global consciousness, the overcoming of the conceptual and behavioral 

defaults provided by culture, and how communication changes individuals, in 

particular the policy makers. 

Central Asia today represents for China both a potential market for China’s 

growing economy and a source of strategically important raw materials. 
 170 

China’s strategy towards Central Asia remains to seek influence over the 

developing economic life of the region and to maintain political stability 

through mutual cooperation. Over the coming years, China will continue to 

engage Central Asia and exert an increasing, though limited, amount of 

cultural influence over the region. And the Central Asian countries are also 

eager to continue their cooperation with China on the principle of mutual 

interests. 

References 

1. David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood—Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1965). 

2. Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, "Introduction," in Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, eds., The New 

Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University 

Press, 1994). 

3. Eurasia Insight, “Exchange Programs Having Quiet Impact In Central Asia,” by David Mikosz 

3/07/01, Posted March 7, 2001, Eurasianet http://www.eurasianet.org/. 

4. Eurasia Insight, “Central Asia: China’s Mounting Influence,” by Jeremy Bransten 11/23/04 A 

EurasiaNet Partner Post from RFE/RL, http://www.eurasianet.org/. 

5. “Prospects for China’s Influence in Central 

Asia,”<http://www.csis.org/china/030205_ce_forum01.pdf>. 

6. Freeman Chair in China Studies, Event Summary, China’s Emergence in Central Asia: Security, 

Diplomatic, and Economic Interests, Forum One: The Current State of China – Central Asia Diplomacy 

and Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy, Wednesday, February 5, 2003, 

http://www.csis.org/china/030205_ce_forum01.pdf. 

7. Shanghai group aims to keep U.S. in check, by Sergei Blagov, http://www. atimes.com. 

8. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973. 

9. Zhuang, Xiaodong, Cultural communication: History, Theory, and Reality. Beijing: People’s Press, 

2003. 

10. http://www.acjournal.org/holidays/vol3/Iss3/specl/Kluver.htm#Ahmed.
 171 

Chapter Eleven 

The Common Interests of the U.S. and China, and 

Prospects for Cooperation 

Fu Yong 

The strategic position of Central Asia is increasingly important after the 

disintegration of the Soviet Union, arousing the continuous concern of various 

global and regional powers. China and the U.S., among others, share many 

common interests as well as conflicts in this region, which renders their 

relationship a mixture of cooperation and competition. However, the 

difference in their respective interests and order of focused issues may impede 

the further development of their relationship, and even impair their existing 

relations carefully built over the past decade. Through an analysis of the 

respective interests and order of focused issues of the U.S. and China in 

Central Asia, this paper illustrates both countries’ misperceptions of the 

other’s interests, and thus points out their common interests for better 

cooperation in Central Asia. 

This paper is divided into three parts: the first mainly analyzes China’s 

deepening understanding of U.S. influence in Central Asia, especially the 

different focal points of both countries on U.S. interests in the region, 

including the development of U.S.-Central Asia relations before 9/11, the U.S. 

military presence in Central Asia after 9/11, and the U.S.’ role in the recent 

“Color Revolution” in the region; the second part of the paper analyzes the 

U.S. perception of China’s strategic goals in Central Asia and emphasizes its 

different understandings of China’s interests in the region, including the U.S. 

view on the SCO, cooperation between China and Central Asia on energy 

exploitation, as well as the geopolitical significance of China’s peaceful rise in 

the region; the third part discusses both countries’ common interests in 

Central Asia and fields for their cooperation, especially in non-traditional 

security and regional security, including anti-terrorism and combating 

transnational crime, cooperating on energy, maintaining regional stability, and 

avoiding conflicts between large powers. The paper also explores the 
 172 

possibility of U.S.-SCO cooperation and ways to establish a mechanism for 

U.S.-China mutual military trust, as well as other cooperation in the broad 

field of non-traditional security. Finally, the paper draws a brief conclusion 

that some conflicts between the interests of China and the U.S. are caused by 

misperceptions, and others by the influence of their general relationship, and 

that if both countries have a better understanding of each other’s interests as 

well as their common interests in Central Asia, they can conduct better 

cooperation in the region, which will prove conducive both to the stability of 

the region and to the further development of China-U.S. relations. 

China’s Perception of U.S. Interests in Central Asia 

Central Asia lies in the hinterland of Eurasia, linking the Middle East to 

Eurasia. It remains a flashpoint for global powers after the Cold War, due to 

its geopolitical position on the map, which was described by the geopolitical 

analyst Mackinder as an “island of the world,” with Central Asia as its 

“heartland.” The importance of Central Asia also lies in its abundant resources 

of oil and natural gas. As estimated by the U.S. Department of Energy, oil 

reserves in the Caspian Sea are between 90 and 200 billion barrels, which 

accounts for 8 percent of the world’s total oil reserves; natural gas reserves of 

the Caspian Sea comprise around 14 trillion cubic meters, 4.3 percent of the 

world’s total reserves. Therefore, in a certain sense, whoever controls Central 

Asian energy is likely to dominate the 21st-century global energy market, and 

even to manipulate the economic development of many countries. Further, this 

region has become a major battlefield against international terrorism and 

transnational crime since 9/11 and the Afghanistan War, in which all major 

powers hold crucial security interests. 

U.S. interests in Central Asia include the abovementioned three aspects, 

namely, geopolitics, energy, and international anti-terrorism, but the order of 

their priority has been adjusted since 9/11 and the Afghanistan War. The U.S. 

interests in Central Asia from the disintegration of the Soviet Union to 9/11 

focused on geopolitics and energy, reflected in the 1997 “New Central Asia 
 173 

Strategy,” with which the U.S. changed its policy of largely ignoring the 

Central Asian states in the early 1990s, and began to put Central Asia into its 

own sphere of interest. By supporting the Central Asian states’ independence 

from Russia and weakening Russian influence in the region, the U.S. has 

gradually turned the region into another place of strategic interest and to a 

great extent established U.S. influence in Central Asia. Meanwhile, the U.S. 

aims to turn the region into another energy base by encouraging U.S. 

companies to participate in energy exploitation, and by expanding connections 

with Central Asian states in politics, economic activity, and the military, 

among other fields. However, anti-terrorism has become the priority for the 

U.S. in Central Asia since 9/11, which to a great degree altered the traditional 

U.S. security outlook as well as its global security strategy. 

China acknowledges that the U.S. holds important interests in economic 

activity, geopolitics and security in Central Asia, but Chinese scholars and 

policy-makers have different understandings of the order of U.S. strategic 

priorities in the region. For the U.S., the order of its focal concerns may be 

anti-terrorism—energy—geopolitics, while for China the order may be quite 

the opposite. Compared with energy and anti-terrorism, China, in 

consideration of the new strategic situation in Central Asia and general U.S.-

China relations, is more concerned with the U.S. factor in the geopolitics of 

Central Asia, especially since the U.S. military force entered the region after 

9/11. As the sole superpower after the Cold War, the U.S.’ Central Asia 

strategy is only part of its global strategy, which aims to maintain its victory 

of the Cold War and prevent any regional power or other forces from 

challenging U.S. supremacy, as demonstrated both by its containment of 

Russia and China before 9/11 and by its military attacks on international 

terrorism after 9/11. Therefore, China pays greatest attention to the 

geopolitical significance of the development of U.S.-Central Asia relations 

and the geopolitical influence of the U.S. military presence in the region, as 

well as the U.S. role in the “Color Revolution” of the Central Asian states. 
 174 

 U.S.-Central Asia relationship before 9/11 

Traditionally under the control of Russia and as the strategic backdoor 

neighbor of China, Central Asia is distant from the U.S. in geography, and 

there were few, if any, connections between the two countries in history. Yet 

after the Cold War, the U.S. began to show great interest in developing 

relations with Central Asian states, not only because of the region’s rich 

energy resources, but more important, because of its important geopolitical 

position. The major target of U.S. containment in the region is not China, but 

Russia. The U.S. believes that successful control of Central Asia and the 

Caspian region will press on Russia’s strategic space and reduce China’s 

influence in Central Asia, as well as control the situation in Afghanistan and 

improve U.S. energy security. In order to achieve this goal, the U.S. has 

adopted many specific measures: 

First of all, it helps Central Asian states overcome economic difficulties 

through investment, loans and grants, so as to reduce their economic 

dependence on Russia; further, it encourages these states to organize an 

economic cooperation mechanism without Russian participation, the 

Economic Community of Central Asia, and advocates the construction of the 

Baku-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline that does not pass through Russia, both aiming to 

attenuate Russia’s control over energy exportation in Central Asia. 

Second, the U.S. is exerting more influence over leaders of Central Asian 

states though summit visits and by signing treaties or agreements, while 

promoting “democratic reform” and “free economy” in these states, so as to 

prevent them from returning to the track of Russia. 

Next, the U.S. is trying to “Americanize” the military forces in Central 

Asia through military aid, communication and cooperation with the region, as 

well as with the help of NATO. At present, all five Central Asian states are 

participants in NATO’s “Peaceful Partnership for Peace” program; 

meanwhile, the U.S. continues to expand the size and area of the “Central 

Asian Peacekeeping Exercise” in order to strengthen its military presence and 

ensure its security interests in Central Asia. 
 175 

In a word, the essence of the so-called “Silk Road Strategy” concerning the 

overall security of energy, trade, geopolitics and Central Asia, is to contain 

Russia and China, as well as to secure U.S. economic and strategic interests, 

through active engagement in the energy exploitation and cooperation with the 

Caucasus and Central Asia. 

 U.S. military presence in Central Asia after 9/11 

The priority in U.S. strategic concerns has changed over the past years. 

Before 9/11, the major U.S. strategic concern was China and Russia, its 

prospective rivals, while after the incident, international terrorism has become 

the biggest threat to U.S. security. With the common interests of antiterrorism, China and Russia become partners of the U.S. in striking terrorism 

in Central Asia, and both support, or at least acquiesce, to the entry of U.S. 

troops into the region. So far, military bases in three Central Asian states have 

been leased to the U.S. 

Despite the positive impact of the U.S. military presence on anti-terrorism 

in the region, its negative effect, especially after the U.S. victory in the 

Afghanistan anti-terrorist war, has been increasingly noticeable. Regardless of 

its repeated pledges to withdraw its troops from Central Asia in the shortest 

possible time, and the formal declaration of the SCO to call for a withdrawal 

deadline, the U.S. has no intention of withdrawing its troops from Central 

Asia in the foreseeable future. Although from the U.S. perspective, its military 

presence in Central Asia is not aimed at Russia or China, the geopolitics of the 

region has become more favorable for the U.S. with the simple fact that U.S. 

troops are stationed right on the Chinese and Russian borders. The U.S. has 

become an ever more important player on the Eurasian “chessboard” 

described by Brzezinski. With its security connections with Uzbekistan, 

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, not only can the U.S. monitor and contain China 

and Russia more easily, but Iranian influence in Central Asia can also be 

downplayed. As it unfolds, the U.S. military engagement is bringing back a 

“zero-sum” air to the security competition in the region, and even diverting 
 176 

the original major security concern, striking the “three forces” of terrorism, 

extremism and separatism. 

The U.S. military presence in Central Asia poses a great challenge, if not 

yet a direct threat, to the geopolitical milieu for China’s development. Above 

all, some U.S. military bases in Central Asia are next to Xinjiang, which may 

threaten the security of west China; moreover, the U.S. military actions after 

9/11—entering South Asia, returning to Southeast Asia, launching the Iraq 

War, and strengthening the U.S.’ status on the Middle East issues, etc.—have 

begun to affect China’s strategic space, whether out of the practical need for 

anti-terrorism or out of the goal of containing China in the long run. China 

worries that Central Asia, its backdoor neighbor, would become a frontline 

battleground if any drastic changes were to take place in China-U.S. relations. 

Therefore, China tends to interpret U.S. actions in Central Asia into more than 

simply anti-terrorist concerns, even more so with the U.S. vacillation on its 

Xinjiang policies. For example, on the one hand, the U.S. admits that the 

“East Turkistan Liberation Movement” is a terrorist organization; on the 

other, it continues to provide financial aid to the Uyghur Association in 

America, an organization that advocates “the independence of Xinjiang,” and 

the U.S. State Department declined China’s request to extradite the Uigur 

prisoners in Guantanamo, with the excuse of worrying these prisoners might 

be maltreated or sentenced to death by China. 

 The U.S. role in the “Color Revolution” in Central Asia 

Although the recent political turbulence in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan 

resulted mainly from their domestic political, economic and social problems, 

the U.S. cannot be ignored as a factor. Since the disintegration of the Soviet 

Union, the U.S. has been trying to transform the Central Asian states with 

such values as democracy, freedom and human rights, and by means of 

financial aid primarily. However, it will not unconditionally support the 

“autocratic” governments of these states, but it has been urging them to 

implement economic and political reform and improve the status of human 

rights. 
 177 

After 9/11, the U.S. “peaceful transformation” policy for Central Asia has 

been revised, which connects the democratic development of the region with 

U.S. security. The U.S. believes that the autocratic regimes in Central Asia are 

fertile soil for the development of Islamic extremist and terrorist forces, which 

will in turn threaten U.S. security; to eradicate terrorism, the U.S. must make 

efforts to promote U.S. democracy throughout the world, while Central Asia 

is, for now, the key to the global democratization plan of the U.S. 

China is quite apprehensive that the Central Asian situation might turn out 

to be unfavorable for China, as either domestic instability of the Central Asian 

states or regional turbulence brought about by major power competition will 

pose serious threats to China’s security: on the one hand, the overthrow of 

existing governments by political dissidents with the help of external forces 

may engender an “expansion effect”; on the other hand, the policies of the 

political dissidents after they have assumed power may shake the existing 

security and cooperation mechanisms, thus affecting China’s role in Central 

Asia. 

Further, China is worried about the increasing uncertainty and instability in 

the region led by the Russia-U.S. competition behind the “Color Revolution.” 

Generally speaking, during the process of the political transformation of 

Central Asia, Russia tends to support the existing regimes, while the U.S. 

tends to support political dissidents to accelerate the political transformation. 

However, the U.S.’s efforts have more often than not pushed some Central 

Asian states to turn to Russia for help, as they consider the U.S. a key factor 

that causes the political turbulence and instability of the region. 

The U.S. Perception of China’s Strategic Goals in Central Asia 

As China and the U.S. differ greatly in the focus of strategic concerns in 

Central Asia, the U.S. also has a different understanding about China’s 

strategic goals in the region. With the rapid growth of Chinese economic 

activity in recent years, the U.S. believes that economic interests, especially 

the demand for Central Asian energy, are the major concern for China in 
 178 

developing its relations with Central Asia. Since China became an oilimporting country in 1996, especially since it became the second oilconsuming country last year, China’s dependence on imported oil has kept 

increasing, and China’s oil companies have been seeking new energy markets 

in the world, including Africa, South America, the Middle East, and Central 

Asia. The construction of the China-Kazakhstan Oil Pipeline can partly meet 

China’s demand for energy, overcome the fragility of sea transportation, and 

reduce China’s dependence on the Middle East oil. 

Further, the U.S. thinks that China’s engagement in Central Asia is also out 

of consideration of its geopolitical strategy. China is on its way to becoming a 

global power, and is very likely to face challenges from the U.S., Japan and 

Europe during the process, thus it has to develop a friendly relationship with 

Central Asian states, in order to foster a stable and conducive environment for 

its development. 

Furthermore, ensuring border security and the stability of Central Asia is a 

more profound component of China’s Central Asia strategy. Because acute 

conflicts in Central Asia might pose a threat to the security of Xinjiang, the 

stability of Central Asia means the security of China. In a word, China also 

holds important security interests in the region. 

It can be seen from the above analysis that the order of U.S. priority of 

concern over China’s interests in Central Asia is energy—geopolitics—

security. Such an order is in a sense reasonable, for China’s demand for 

energy will remain a key issue in China’s economic development in the 

foreseeable future, as well as an import component of China’s foreign policies 

in recent years. However, different from the U.S. concern of the global 

strategy in Central Asia, China’s major interests in the region lie in regional 

security, and its order of concerns is very clear too, i.e., regional security—

energy—geopolitics. The biggest threat to the security and stability of west 

China is the “East Turkistan” separatists, as well as the “three forces” in 

Central Asia. Therefore, China’s primary concern in the region is to ensure its 

stability. In terms of energy and economic interests, China is taking measures 

to strengthen economic ties with Central Asia, ensure China’s access to 

Central Asian energy, another important source of oil import for China. As to 
 179 

its geopolitical interests, China is endeavoring to prevent Central Asia from 

being monopolized by any single power in terms of its politics, economy and 

security. Neither does China expect any traditional big-power competition in 

Central Asia, nor does it expect the emergence of any hostile force against 

China in the region. 

 From the Shanghai 5-State Organization to the SCO 

Initially, because both Russia and China expressed their serious concern 

over the eastward expansion of NATO before the founding of the SCO, 

worrying that NATO might further extend to Central Asia, the U.S. had a 

rather incomplete understanding of the impact of the Shanghai 5-State 

Organization and the SCO on regional security, regarding them as only a tool 

for China to expand its influence in Central Asia, or for both China and Russia 

to jointly prevent the U.S. and NATO from entering Central Asia. However, 

9/11 happened less than three months after the founding of the SCO, whose 

member states all gave their active support in the U.S. anti-terrorist war in 

Afghanistan, which indicates that the SCO is not only aimed against the U.S., 

but it also has many common interests with the U.S. in anti-terrorism and 

regional security. Gradually, the U.S. came to realize the significance of the 

SCO to Central Asia and began its communication and cooperation, so as to 

maintain regional security with their joint efforts. 

China believes that security interests are not only a strong driving force 

behind the Shanghai 5-State Organization and the SCO, but are a major 

concern for China in developing its friendly relations with Central Asian 

states. As China shares over 3,000 kilometers of borders with Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as many common ethnic groups, China’s 

national interests are closely related to the situation in Central Asia, not only 

in history, but in reality as well. Among the factors that might affect security 

and stability in Central Asia, the most pressing issue for China used to be 

border disputes with Central Asian states. Thus the primary goal of Shanghai 

5-State Organization was to complete the border division between China and 

these states, as well as Russia, and to demilitarize the border areas. In April 
 180 

1996, heads of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 

attended their first meeting in Shanghai and signed the Agreement on 

Strengthening Mutual Military Trust in the Border Areas; in April of the 

following year, they signed the Agreement on Joint Reduction of Military 

Forces in the Border Areas in Moscow. After the solution of border security 

issues, the five states put combating “the three forces” at the top of their 

agenda; later, the anti-terrorist military exercises held by SCO members, as 

well as the establishment of the SCO Counterterrorism Center and the SCO 

Rapid-Response Counterterrorism Troops, aimed only at preventing the 

actions of the “three forces” in Central Asia. 

China also expects to seek solutions to the “East Turkistan” issues through 

cooperation with other SCO members. The “East Turkistan Liberation 

Movement” has had many connections with Central Asia in history, ethnic 

groups, culture, language and religion. With the drastic change in Central 

Asian geopolitics after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Movement 

has been increasingly influenced by extremist and terrorist forces: its members 

set up bases in Central Asia, receive terrorist training in Afghanistan, and 

receive spiritual support and material aid from other international terrorist 

organizations, thus forming an active terrorist zone from Chechnya to Central 

Asia, and then to Xinjiang. Therefore, combating the “East Turkistan” 

separatist forces, confining their actions to Central Asia, and preventing 

terrorist forces from entering China, will be the primary goal of China’s 

Central Asia strategy well into the future, for which the SCO has been, and 

will continue to serve as, an important mechanism. 

China-Central Asia Cooperation on Energy 

The U.S. has kept close watch on the energy cooperation between China 

and the Central Asian states, especially with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 

According to a report by the Committee on U.S.-China Economy and Security 

Assessment of the U.S. Congress, China’s rapidly increasing demand for 

energy, especially its dependence on imported oil, will pose challenges to the 
 181 

U.S. in economic activity, the environment and geopolitics. The U.S. believes 

that the greater the amount of Central Asian oil that is exported to China, the 

less will be exported to the U.S. and Europe, and it is even afraid of the 

possibility of U.S.-China conflicts over energy in the future. 

China has regarded enhancing cooperation with Central Asian states on 

energy as an important strategic goal, yet due to the relatively small size of 

China-controlled oil fields and its limited production capability, China does 

not obtain very much energy from the region each year, thus posing no threat 

to the U.S.’s strategy for Central Asian energy. The construction of the ChinaKazakhstan Oil Pipeline began in September 2004, but will not be completed 

until 2011, with an expected annual import of 20 million tons. However, for 

lack of oil sources, the already-constructed “Pakeye Pipeline” that passes 

through Azerbaijan must transport at least 20 million tons of Kazakh oil each 

year to maintain its normal functions, while Kazakh oil output can hardly 

meet the demands of China-Kazakhstan pipeline, the Pakeye pipeline, and the 

Russian pipeline at the same time. Hence the possibility of competition 

between the China-Kazakhstan pipeline and the Pakeye pipeline. 

 The geopolitical significance of China’s peaceful ascendancy in 

Central Asia 

As a major regional rising power, China must regard the stability of its 

border areas as a prerequisite for its development, for which purpose China 

must enhance cooperation with the Central Asian states. Nevertheless, the 

U.S. attaches great geopolitical significance to China’s Central Asia strategy 

and occasionally expresses serious concern over China’s increasing influence 

in the region, as well as over the geopolitical changes brought about by 

China’s economic ascendancy. 

From China’s perspective, Central Asia’s greatest significance for China’s 

geopolitical strategy is that the region could become a stable back zone of 

China. Current security pressures on China, as well as China’s strategic tasks, 

mainly come from the southeast, including the Taiwan Strait crises, acute 

China-Japan conflicts, and the competition over resources in South China Sea. 
 182 

Thus, the security and stability of the western borders is crucial to China’s 

overall security strategy. Moreover, China’s strategy is to balance the powers 

of Russia, the U.S. and the European Union in Central Asia, to prevent any 

single power from monopolizing the region, and to avoid traditional largepower competition. China’s rise does not threaten the Central Asian states, 

and nor will it harm their interests, not only because the development of 

China’s economy will promote Central Asia’s economic development, but 

because the Central Asian states can learn much from China’s experience. 

Further, China-Central Asia relations are developing within the framework of 

the SCO. And after Iran, India and Pakistan became observers of the SCO, 

almost all strong regional powers related to Central Asia have participated in 

the organization, which to a large extent confines the settlement of any issue 

concerning regional security and economy. 

Common Interests of the U.S. and China, and Prospective Fields of 

Cooperation 

Based on the above analysis of the respective focal concerns of the U.S. 

and China, it can be concluded that there are no essential interest conflicts 

between the two nations: China actively supports the U.S. in its primary 

concern of counter-terrorism, while China’s primary concern—the geopolitics 

of Central Asia and security interests—is not a focal concern of the U.S. 

Neither poses a challenge to the other’s essential interests in Central Asia. 

In terms of the overall development of U.S.-China relations, despite their 

disagreement on such issues as energy and U.S. troops stationed in Central 

Asia, China and the U.S. are generally enjoying rather good political, military 

and economic relations, and neither country intends to involve the other in 

conflicts in Central Asia. On the contrary, both countries share many common 

interests in the region, including counter-terrorism, combating transnational 

crime, energy exploitation and cooperation, as well as regional security, 

among others. 
 183 

 Common interests of the U.S. and China in Central Asia 

Although terrorism ranks differently in the security agendas of the U.S. and 

China, its presence poses a common threat to both countries in Central Asia. 

As a neighbor of Central Asia, China has suffered greatly from the “East 

Turkistan” separatist forces in Xinjiang, who have been threatening the 

security and stability of west China with the aid of terrorist organizations in 

Central Asia. Since the U.S. military attacks on the Taliban in Afghanistan 

after 9/11, Central Asia has moved to the forefront in the battle against 

international terrorism. Therefore, combating terrorism and maintaining 

regional security are the most important commonly shared interests of China 

and the U.S. after 9/11; counter-terrorism in Central Asia not only accords 

with U.S. global strategy, but it also helps China contain the “East Turkistan” 

separatist forces. 

The U.S. needs China’s support in its counter-terror actions in Central Asia 

because of China’s good relations with Pakistan and its influence in the 

Central Asian states. Meanwhile, China needs the U.S.’ understanding and 

cooperation in combating “East Turkistan” terrorist forces, which, in turn, 

contributes to U.S.’s interests in Central Asia. Therefore, both countries have 

started cooperation since 9/11 on such issues as exchanging information on 

counter-terrorism, cutting off the financial sources of terrorist organizations, 

as well as tracking down their money-laundry activities. Moreover, both 

countries share common interests in fighting transnational crime. Much 

organized crime, including drug smuggling, arms proliferation, and illegal 

immigration, is closely related to terrorist forces, and Central Asia is the major 

passageway for drug smuggling from Afghanistan, which is not only an 

important source of funds for terrorist organizations, but also relates to arms 

proliferation. Hence, it is in the interests of both the U.S. and China to combat 

religious extremist forces in Central Asia, stop their connections with 

international terrorist forces, block their access to weapons of mass 

destruction, and prevent their predominance in Central Asia. 
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Another shared interest between the U.S. and China in Central Asia is to 

maintain stability and development in the region. The universal political, 

economic, religious, ethnic and social problems in the Central Asian states not 

only make it difficult for the states to control terrorism and extremism, but 

also provide the soil for their growth. Any turmoil in Central Asia can be 

exploited by terrorist and extremist forces to threaten the security interests of 

the U.S. and China, thus both countries should help maintain security and 

enhance prosperity in the region: on the one hand, a stable Central Asia will 

serve as a better milieu for China’s development, and both will benefit in the 

end; on the other hand, avoiding large-scale turmoil and containing any form 

of extremism in the region will greatly help guarantee U.S. interests in Central 

Asia. 

Maintaining stability in Central Asia is the responsibility of both the 

Central Asian states and all other concerned countries. Key internal factors 

that affect the stability in the region also include territorial disputes and 

conflicts over water resources. As there were no border lines between Central 

Asian states in Soviet times, and existing lines have only symbolic meaning, 

territorial disputes are universal among Central Asian states. For example, in 

Kyrgyzstan, seven lands belong to minority nationalities of other states, five 

of which are connected to Uzbekistan and two to Tajikistan, which might lead 

to bitter disputes or even acute conflicts between these states. Further, many 

conflicts exist in Central Asia over ecological and other resources, especially 

over water. The two upstream states, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, practically 

dominate the economic lifeline of downstream states by controlling reservoirs 

constructed upstream. Recently, Turkmenistan rapidly increased its use of 

water from the Amu River, resulting in a severe shortage of water in some 

areas of Uzbekistan. Under such pressures, Central Asian states are calling for 

help from global and regional powers while also trying to avoid being under 

the control of any single power. Therefore, China and the U.S. need to join 

other strong powers in the pursuit for ways to maintain stability in Central 

Asia. 

China and the U.S. also share important common interests in Central Asian 

energy. It is a common wish of both countries to share oil and natural gas in 
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the region, as well as to avoid conflicts over energy. With the steady 

economic development of both countries, China and the U.S. both need stable 

and accountable sources of energy. Thus, their energy cooperation will not 

only deepen their understanding of each other’s energy policies and enhance 

their communication in the field of energy, but will also promote their 

cooperation on certain energy projects. 

 Field of cooperation between China and the U.S. in Central Asia 

China’s rising influence in Central Asia does not pose a practical threat to 

U.S. interests in the region, as China has been endeavoring to set up 

constructive relations with the U.S. on Central Asian and other security issue 

in the surrounding areas, so as to create a favorable environment for China’s 

development. However, China and the U.S. differ in their opinions of the 

political transformation, economic development and energy exploitation in 

Central Asia, as well as of the U.S. troops in the region. Hence, both countries 

should further enhance their communication and cooperation, dissolve their 

misperceptions of each other’s strategic goals, and gradually establish mutual 

military trust. China hopes to expand U.S.-China cooperation in such fields as 

strengthening the SCO-U.S. ties, establishing strategic mutual military trust 

with the U.S. to the greatest possible extent, as well as expanding their 

cooperation in non-traditional security fields. 

 The SCO and the U.S. 

Due to the complex relationships between the interests of major powers in 

Central Asia, any attempt to strengthen bilateral relations might have negative 

effects; only with multilateral cooperation mechanisms that engage all major 

powers can their cooperation be more effective and transparent. Currently, 

there exist three important multilateral cooperation organizations in Central 

Asia, namely the NATO Partnership mechanism, the CIS Collective Security 

Treaty Organization, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: the first 

involves the U.S., Russia and the Central Asian states; the second involves 

only Russia and the Central Asian states; and the third involves China, Russia 
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and the Central Asian states—none engages China and the U.S. at the same 

time. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the U.S. has been playing 

an active role in Central Asian issues: not only has it started its cooperation 

with Central Asian states through the NATO Partnership for Peace plan, but 

they have also strengthened their relationship through joint counter-terrorist 

actions in the Afghanistan War. The SCO is the most important platform upon 

which China plays its role in Central Asia. Over the past five years, SCO 

members have managed to establish mechanisms for multilateral mutual trust, 

as well as cooperation in regional security, and they are expanding their 

economic cooperation at present. China expects to promote its cooperation 

with the U.S. on the basis of the SCO. 

Because of important U.S. interests and influence in Central Asia, the 

future development of the SCO must take the U.S. into account. Under current 

conditions, two means can be adopted to start SCO-U.S. cooperation: one is 

cooperation between the two regional international organizations, NATO and 

the SCO; the other is between the SCO and the U.S. alone. However, the SCO 

does not match NATO in its functions, bodies, and scale; the issue of the 

U.S.’s becoming an SCO observer is also to be further discussed, as the 

organization has been joined by three new observers: India, which is regarded 

by the U.S. as a strategic partner; Pakistan, a U.S. counter-terrorism ally; and 

Iran, a standing foe of the U.S. Nevertheless, limited U.S. participation in 

SCO actions would certainly help increase the position and influence of the 

SCO. 

 The establishment of mutual military trust 

There are three anti-terrorist centers now in Central Asia: the U.S. airbases 

in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan; the Russian airbases in Kyrgyzstan and 

Tajikistan, and; the SCO Counter-terrorism Center in Uzbekistan. Not only 

are the three centers relatively independent in military command, but China 

and Russia have also already begun to worry about the U.S. troops long 

stationed in Central Asia. Hence the importance of establishing mutual 

military trust between the U.S. and the SCO members. So far, China and 
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Russia have successfully established mutual military trust within the 

framework of the SCO and have begun to conduct a few military exercises to 

combat the “three forces” and achieve mutual security. Only on the basis of 

mutual military trust can the U.S. troops stationed in Central Asia be regarded 

as an important force to maintain regional security, instead of a threat. 

Due to their different political systems and for ideological reasons, China 

and the U.S. have not yet established strategic mutual trust. However, the 

most direct way to establish and consolidate mutual trust is always to continue 

strengthening military communication and cooperation. Since 9/11, 

cooperation between the military forces of both countries has begun in the 

exchange of anti-terrorist intelligence; academic communication is being 

conducted between their military institutions; both have begun to send 

observers to the other’s military exercises. Moreover, it is necessary to create 

a crisis-management system in Central Asia, to inform each other before 

military exercises in Central Asia, as well as to set up hotlines to avoid 

conflict escalation in times of crisis. Through proper military cooperation and 

communication, the U.S. and China can develop a better understanding of 

each other, and gradually establish an effective and transparent cooperation 

mechanism. 

 Cooperation in non-traditional fields 

Apart from military communication and cooperation, China and the U.S. 

share additional prospects in non-traditional security fields. In terms of 

energy, they can conduct cooperation on information exchange, energy 

policies and strategy development, as well as on techniques and planning. 

Other economic and social cooperation is also helpful Central Asia’s social 

stability and economic development, such as helping remove land mines along 

the borders of Central Asian states, preventing AIDS, improving the 

infrastructure of Central Asia, as well as setting up schools, hospitals and 

vocational training centers. 
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A Brief Conclusion 

National interests are the foundation of a country’s foreign policies. Mutual 

respect of each other’s national interests is a prerequisite for the 

acknowledgement of mutual interests, which are the basis for cooperation. 

The better China and the U.S. understand each other’s objectives and policies, 

the more they will benefit from their bilateral cooperation. 

China and the U.S. share a large number of common interests in most 

fields, which lays a good foundation for their further cooperation, and that, in 

turn, will enhance their mutual trust. Both countries should try their best to 

avoid conflicts, with a constructive attitude. We believe that, compared with 

the fields in which U.S.-China cooperation can be conducted, the fields where 

they cannot cooperate are rather few, so it is unwise to extend their conflicts 

in a certain field to other fields where they can cooperate well otherwise. 

Some conflicts between China and the U.S. are caused by misperceptions 

of interests, and others are caused by the influence of their general 

relationship. Yet compared with Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and even 

South Asia, Central Asia is the region where both countries share the most 

common interests and prospects for cooperation. If both countries have a 

better understanding of each other’s interests as well as their common 

interests in Central Asia, they can conduct better cooperation in the region, 

which will be helpful both to the stability of the region and to the further 

development of China-U.S. relations.
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About the Contributors 

Dong Xiaoyang is a professor of Russian studies and deputy director of the 

Institute of Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies at the Chinese 

Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in Beijing. A graduate of Jilin 

University, Beijing University Law School, and Moscow University, Mr. 

Dong was a visiting professor at Harvard University Russian Research Center 

in 1990, and the Russian Research Center of Toronto University in 1991. In 

1996 before assuming his current position with CASS he was a senior 

researcher at the Embassy of China in Moscow. His co-author, Su Chang, is 

assistant professor, Institute of Russian/East European and Central Asian 

Studies at CASS. 

Fu Yong received her Ph.D. in international politics from Fudan 

University, School of International Studies, in Shanghai in 2005. She is a 

member of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS), working in the 

Institute of Eurasian Studies. She received a B.A. and M.A. degree in world 

history from Changchun University, and has studied at the Center for Chinese 

and American Studies at Johns Hopkins-Nanjing University. 

Brigadier General (retired) Feroz Khan served with the Pakistani Army 

for 30 years. He served domestically and abroad with numerous assignments 

in the United States, Europe and South Asia. He has experienced combat 

action and command on active fronts on the line of control in Siachin Glacier 

and Kashmir. Most recently, he held the post of Director, Arms Control and 

Disarmament Affairs, within the Strategic Plans Division, Joint Services 

Headquarters. Among his academic degrees, General Khan holds an M.A. 

from the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. 

Since the mid 1990`s General Khan has been making key contributions in 

formulating and advocating Pakistan's security policy on nuclear and 

conventional arms control and strategic stability in South Asia. He has 
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produced recommendations for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 

represented Pakistan in several multilateral and bilateral arms control 

negotiations. He has written and participated in several security-related 

national and international conferences and seminars and has also been 

teaching as a visiting faculty member at the Department of the Defense and 

Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. 

For the past two years, General Khan has held a series of visiting 

fellowships at Stanford University's Center for International Studies and Arms 

Control; the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; the 

Brookings Institution; the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies at the 

Monterey Institute of International Studies; and the Cooperative Monitoring 

Center, Sandia National Laboratory. General Khan is now a visiting professor 

of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. 

Ni Jianping is a post-doctoral research fellow at the School of Journalism, 

Fudan University in Shanghai, is a research associate at the Shanghai Institute 

of American Studies, and lectures as an adjunct professor at East China 

Normal University, School of Communication. He received his Ph.D. in 

international relations from Fudan University in 2001. He has studied 

overseas at Hong Kong Baptist University in 1998, and the Elliott School of 

International Relations, George Washington University in Washington D.C. in 

2000. He has also studied at the Schiller Institute in Germany, and at Moscow 

State University. 

Pan Guang is the director and professor of the Shanghai Center for 

International Studies, and the Institute of European and Asian Studies at the 

Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences; director of the SCO (Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization) Studies Center in Shanghai; and dean of the Center 

of Jewish Studies Shanghai (CJSS) and vice-chairman of the Chinese Society 

of Middle East Studies. He is professor of History and Political Science, and 

the Walter and Seena Fair professor for Jewish and Israeli Studies. He is an 

International Council member of the Asia Society in the USA, senior advisor 
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of the China-Eurasia Forum in the USA, and an advisory board member of the 

Asia Europe Journal in Singapore. He has traveled and lectured widely in 

North America, East Asia, Russia, Europe, the Middle East and Australia. 

Shi Ze graduated from the Russian Department of Xi’an Foreign Language 

Institute. From 1980 to 1983 he studied for a master’s degree in world history 

in the History Department of Peking University. He was director of the Soviet 

Union and Eastern Europe Division and the Division of International Politics, 

and vice-president of the China Institute for International Studies. He served 

as first secretary in the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union and Russia, and 

as political counselor of the Chinese Embassies in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. 

His research areas cover relations between great powers, issues on Europe and 

Asia, Russia and Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, as well as Chinese 

western peripheral security. Mr. Shi enjoys the government’s “distinguished 

contributor” specialist allowance. 

Sun Zhuangzhi is director of the Central Asian Department of the Institute 

for East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies, and secretary-general 

of the Center for Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies, at the Chinese 

Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in Beijing. He studied for his bachelor’s 

and master’s degrees in history at Nankai University in Tianjin, and received 

his Ph.D. in international relations from the Graduate School of CASS in 

2000. He has been a visiting scholar at Tashkent University in Uzbekistan, 

and a senior visiting scholar at Baku State University in Azerbaijan. 

Yang Shu is vice president of Lanzhou University, director of its Institute 

for Central Asian Studies, and a professor in the Department of International 

Politics. He received his bachelor’s and master’s degrees in geology from 

Lanzhou University in 1982 and 1984. From 1988 to 1991 he was second 

secretary, Department of Education, Chinese Embassy to the Soviet Union. 

He also holds the post of vice-president of the Chinese Society of East 

European, Russian and Central Asia Studies and is director of the society’s 
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Center for Central Asian Studies. He also consults to the China Academy of 

Social Sciences on Central Asian issues. 

Yu Jianhua is currently professor and deputy director of the Institute of 

Eurasian Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS). In 1988 he 

received is master’s degree in history from the Department of History, East 

China Normal University. He studied world history and international politics 

at the Institute of History and Institute of Eurasian Studies, SASS, prior to 

becoming a visiting exchange fellow at the International Institute for Asian 

Studies, the Netherlands, in Spring 2002. He received his Ph. D. from the 

College of Law and Political Science, ECNU. His other positions include: 

Dean of the Center of Nontraditional Security Studies (SASS), Standing 

Council member of the Chinese Association for World Ethnic Studies, general 

secretary of Shanghai Society of World History Studies, Standing Council 

member of Shanghai Society of International Relations Studies and the 

Committee member of Shanghai Youth Federation. His major research fields 

are: issues in the Middle East and Central Asia; nationalism and ethnic 

conflict; international energy politics; terrorism; and international security. 

Zhang Guihong is associate professor of international relations, director of 

the Program on International Organization and Security (PIOS), and deputy 

director of the Institute of International Studies, Zhejiang University 

(IIS/ZJU), Hangzhou, China. He has a Ph.D. from the Center for American 

Studies, School of International Studies, Fudan University (CAS/SIS/FDU), 

Shanghai, China. He participated in the Sino-U.S. Summer Workshop on 

International Security (1996, 1997, 2002); the International Workshop on 

International Political Economy and Regionalism in the Asia Pacific (1998, 

2000) supported by the Program for International Studies in Asia (PISA); the 

Ninth Workshop on Defense, Technology and Cooperative Security in South 

Asia (2002) organized by Regional Center for Strategic Studies (RCSS), Sri 

Lanka; and the International Visitor Program (2003) sponsored by U.S. 

Department of State. He has also been a visiting scholar at the Henry L. 
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Stimson Center, Washington D.C., USA (2002-2003); and ASIA Fellow at 

School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (SIS/JNU) as 

well as Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India 

(2004-2005). His major areas of research are Sino-US-Indian relations and 

Asia-Pacific security. His co-author, Jaideep Saikia, is a fellow scholar from 

New Delhi, India. 

Zhao Huasheng is director of the Center for Russia and Central Asia 

Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. He specializes in Russian foreign 

policy and security, Sino-Russian relations, Sino-Central Asian relations, and 

the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. He has twice been a visiting scholar 

at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, and has written extensively 

on Russian foreign policy. Recent publications include “China and America in 

Russia's Foreign Policy,” in Contemporary International Relations, and “The 

Situation in Central Asia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” in East 

Europe and Central Asia Studies. He was previously director of Russian and 

Central Asian Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) 

and is currently a senior advisor for the China-Eurasia Forum. 
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