alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §466. Sense of Congress reaffirming the continued importance and applicability of the Posse Comitatus Act

#### (a) Findings

Congress finds the following:

(1) Section 1385 of title 18 (commonly known as the "Posse Comitatus Act") prohibits the use of the Armed Forces as a posse comitatus to execute the laws except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress.

(2) Enacted in 1878, the Posse Comitatus Act was expressly intended to prevent United States Marshals, on their own initiative, from calling on the Army for assistance in enforcing Federal law.

(3) The Posse Comitatus Act has served the Nation well in limiting the use of the Armed Forces to enforce the law.

(4) Nevertheless, by its express terms, the Posse Comitatus Act is not a complete barrier to the use of the Armed Forces for a range of domestic purposes, including law enforcement functions, when the use of the Armed Forces is authorized by Act of Congress or the President determines that the use of the Armed Forces is required to fulfill the President's obligations under the Constitution to respond promptly in time of war, insurrection, or other serious emergency.

(5) Existing laws, including chapter 13 of title 10 (commonly known as the "Insurrection Act"), and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.), grant the President broad powers that may be invoked in the event of domestic emergencies, including an attack against the Nation using weapons of mass destruction, and these laws specifically authorize the President to use the Armed Forces to help restore public order.

#### (b) Sense of Congress

Congress reaffirms the continued importance of section 1385 of title 18, and it is the sense of Congress that nothing in this chapter should be construed to alter the applicability of such section to any use of the Armed Forces as a posse comitatus to execute the laws.

(Pub. L. 107–296, title VIII, §886, Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2248; Pub. L. 115–232, div. A, title XII, §1204(a)(1), Aug. 13, 2018, 132 Stat. 2017.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, referred to in subsec. (a)(5), is Pub. L. 93–288, May 22, 1974, 88 Stat. 143, which is classified principally to chapter 68 (§5121 et seq.) of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 5121 of Title 42 and Tables.

This chapter, referred to in subsec. (b), was in the original "this Act", meaning Pub. L. 107–296, Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2135, known as the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 101 of this title and Tables.

#### Amendments

2018—Subsec. (a)(5). Pub. L. 115–232 substituted "chapter 13" for "chapter 15".
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.

SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Wayne J. Conner, Vice President, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
of Elgin National Industries, Inc., certify that:



| | 3. | This quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Elgin National Industries, Inc. fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 4. | The information contained in this quarterly report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Elgin National Industries, Inc.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/    WAYNE J. CONNERWayne J. ConnerVice President, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer




Date: March 10, 2005
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

CertificationPursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

asAdopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

 

Inconnection with the quarterly report of Educational Development Corporation(the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending May 31, 2010, asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),the undersigned certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1) TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| Date:  | July 15,  2010 |   | By     | /s/  Randall W. White                         |
|--------|---------------------|--------|--------|-----------------------------------------------|
|   |                |   |   | Randall  W. White                             |
|   |                |   |   | President  and Chief Executive Officer        |
|   |                |   |   |                                          |
|   |                |   |   |                                          |
| Date:  | July 15,  2010 |   | By     | /s/  Marilyn R. Pinney                        |
|   |                |   |   | Controller  and Corporate Secretary           |
|   |                |   |   | (Principal  Financial and Accounting Officer) |

 

----
§ 935.100 Bail. ( a ) A person who is arrested on Wake Island for any violation of this part is entitled to be released on bail in an amount set by a Judge or Clerk of the Court, which may not exceed the maximum fine for the offense charged. If the defendant fails to appear for arraignment, trial or sentence, or otherwise breaches any condition of bail, the Court may direct a forfeiture of the whole or part of the bail and may on motion after notice to the surety or sureties, if any, enter a judgment for the amount of the forfeiture.
( b ) The Chief Judge of the Wake Island Court may prescribe a schedule of bail for any offense under this part which the defendant may elect to post and forfeit without trial, in which case the Court shall enter a verdict of guilty and direct forfeiture of the bail.
( c ) Bail will be deposited in cash with the Clerk of the Court.
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.

SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Fred C. Schulte, Chief Executive Officer of Elgin National Industries,
Inc., certify that:



| | 1. | This quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Elgin National Industries, Inc. fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in this quarterly report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Elgin National Industries, Inc.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/    FRED C. SCHULTEFred C. SchulteChief Executive Officer




Date: August 5, 2005
#### BARKLEY v. HOLT.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

November 18, 1903.)

1. Agency—Authority to Lease.

An agent’s authority to lease premises and collect rents does not imply authority to accept surrender of a lease.

Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Seventh District.

*958Action by Charles R. Barkley against Joseph A. Holt. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Argued before FREEDMAN, P. J., and BISCHOFF and BLANCHARD, JJ.

Wilmer & Caufield, for appellant.

Jellenik & Stern, for respondent.

BLANCHARD, J.

The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant upon a written lease to recover a month’s rent of certain premises. The defense was a surrender of the lease by the defendant and its acceptance by the plaintiff. The evidence in the case does not sustain the contention of the defendant. On the contrary, the documentary evidence tends to show, and we think does show, presumptively, at least, that the plaintiff refused to accept the surrender of the lease. Admitting the conversation between the agent of the premises and the defendant as testified to by the defendant and the witness called to corroborate him to be in all respects true, it fails to establish a legal surrender of the lease and its acceptance by the plaintiff. There is no evidence in the case that the plaintiff’s agent had any authority to accept a surrender of the lease. A mere authority to lease and collect rents does not imply authority to accept surrender of a lease. Stilwell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 72 N. Y. 385. See, also, Wallace v. Dinniny, 11 Misc. Rep. 317, 32 N. Y. Supp. 159.

The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide event. All concur.
#### IN THE MATTER OF: THE APPEAL OF SPRINGMOOR, INC. and AMMONS, INC. from the Denial of Applications for Exemption by the Wake County Board of Equalization and Review for 1994

No. 79PA97

(Filed 16 October 1997)

ORDER

Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1-260, “[i]n any proceeding which involves the validity of a . . . statute, ordinance or franchise . . . alleged to be unconstitutional, the Attorney General of the State shall also be served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard.” Accordingly, the Court directs the Attorney General’s Office to submit a brief addressing only the constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 105-275(32). The Attorney General’s Office shall have 30 days in which to file a brief. All remaining parties shall have 20 days from the filing of the Attorney General’s brief in which to file reply briefs.

By order of the Court in Conference, this 16th day of October, 1997.

Orr, J

For the Court
### Surficial geologic map of the Dillingham quadrangle, southwestern Alaska

By: Frederic H. Wilson**

                            https://doi.org/10.3133/sim3388

#### Links

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- Download citation as:  RIS                         |                         Dublin                            Core

#### Abstract

First posted May 14, 2018

**For additional information, contact:**
Director,Alaska Science CenterU.S. Geological Survey4230 University DriveAnchorage, Alaska 99508

 The map area, part of Alaska that was largely not glaciated during the late Wisconsin glaciation, has a long history reflecting local and more distant glaciations. Late Wisconsin glacial deposits have limited extent in the eastern part of the quadrangle, but are quite extensive in the western part of the quadrangle.  Limited new field mapping in the area was conducted as part of a bedrock mapping project in the northeastern part of the quadrangle; however, extensive aerial photographic interpretation represents the bulk of the mapping effort.

#### Suggested Citation

Wilson, F.H., 2018, Surficial geologic map of the Dillingham quadrangle, southwestern Alaska: U.S. Geological Survey Scientific Investigations Map 3388, 15 p., scale 1:250,000, https://doi.org/10.3133/sim3388.

ISSN: 2329-132X (online)

#### Study Area

Part or all of this report is presented in Portable Document Format                        (PDF). For best results viewing and printing PDF documents, it is recommended that you download                        the documents to your computer and open them with Adobe Reader. PDF documents opened from your                        browser may not display or print as intended. Download the latest version of Adobe Reader, free of charge. More information                        about viewing, downloading, and printing report files can be found at the common download problems FAQ.
**MEMORANDUM**

TO:       Federal Student Aid Chief Financial Officer

FROM:          The Secretary

SUBJECT: Delegation as Program Accountable Official Under EO 13520

I. DELEGATION

Under the authority vested in me by Section 3 of Executive Order 13520 of November 20, 2009, Reducing Improper Payments, I hereby designate you as the Department's Program Accountable Official for Federal Student Aid programs.  I delegate to you, or to your successor in function, or to anyone serving for you in an acting capacity, the authority for the activities required by Section 3 of the Executive Order, Agency Accountability and Coordination, as they pertain to Federal Student Aid programs. 

Unless otherwise noted in future delegations of authority, amendments to the authority cited herein are included within the scope of this delegation.

II. RESERVATIONS

Unless otherwise noted in existing or future delegations of authority, the following are not delegated:

A. the authority to sign Federal Register documents;

B. the authority to appoint, and fix compensation of, members of advisory councils; and

C. unless otherwise provided by law, the authority to submit reports to Congress or the President.

III.REDELEGATION

This authority may not be redelegated. 

IV.CERTIFICATION AND EFFECTIVE DATE

This delegation is effective upon certification by the Department’s Delegations Control Officer and supersedes all previous delegations of this authority.  I hereby ratify actions within the scope of this delegation taken by the Federal Student Aid Financial Officer prior to date of certification.

 -------------------------------------

                                                                       Arne Duncan

OGC Concurrence and Date:  Michael Taylor, 6/23/11

**Certification Date**:  6/27/11

**Certified by Departmental Delegations Control Officer:**/s/ Bruce L. Monblatt****

**Control Number**:   EA/ENJ/76
§ 720.44 Responsible officials. The following officials are designated responsible officials for acting on requests to return or to take other action affecting members, employees or family members to the United States. ( a ) The Chief of Naval Personnel (CHNAVPERS) for requests involving Navy members and their family members who are not employees. The CHNAVPERS may delegate this authority within his headquarters, not below the 0-6 level for routine matters and not lower than the flag officer level for decisions to deny the request for return.
( b ) The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) for requests involving Marine Corps members and their family members who are not employees. The CMC may delegate this authority within his headquarters, not below the 0-6 level for routine matters and no lower that the general officer level for decisions to deny the request for return.
( c ) The local commanding officer or officer in charge for requests involving employees and their family members who are not active duty military members.
( d ) The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (ASN(M&RA)) for requests not covered by §§ 720.44 (a) through (c).
(May 7, 1964)

#### In the Matter of the Accounting of Howard Phipps and Others, as Trustees of the Trust Created by Helen Martin. Esmond B. Martin et al., Appellants; Howard Phipps et al., Respondents.

Order and decree confirming Referee’s report unanimously modified on the facts, and as a matter of discretion to reduce the Referee’s fee to $75,000; to reduce the fee of the special guardian to $100,000; and, as so modified, affirmed, with costs of this appeal to the successor guardian only based upon a 50-page brief payable out of the estate. We find no error prejudicial to the appellant in the order of Special Term confirming the report of the Referee. No discussion of the questions raised is in order except as to the respects in which the order is being modified. *647While the complex o£ trusts which formed the background of the controversy involved very large amounts, the particular trust in question was of more moderate dimensions. Even so, the size of the estates cannot increase the value of the services. If the size of the estate is limited, compensation to a Referee or guardian may be less than what the services would otherwise command. A sizable estate permits adequate compensation but nothing beyond that. On this basis we find that the time spent by the Referee in hearings, consideration and reporting would be adequately compensated at $75,000. The special guardian was obliged by causes beyond his control to relinquish representation of his wards before the proceedings were completed. While these services were spread over seven years, there is no claim that they occupied all, or even a substantial part of, the guardian’s time. Exactly what time was involved does not appear in the affidavit of services. We believe that $100,000 would provide adequate compensation for such time as would necessarily be consumed. This amount would include disbursements. Included in the latter is an item for the fees of an accountant. The guardian tells us that his accountant has asked for a fee of $35,000. While the amount of the fee is a matter between the guardian and his accountant, we do not, by including disbursements in the guardian’s fee, mean to indicate that we approve of the accountant’s demand. The detailed accounts which were available to the accountant and which obviated any necessity of laborious investigation limited the latter’s work to correlation and advice from the conclusions reached. It is our opinion that a substantially reduced fee would be in order. Settle order on notice. Concur—Botein, P. J., Breitel, McNally, Stevens and Steuer, JJ.
### UNPUBLISHED



# UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT



#  U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA ,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 01-4787



# 
D AVID T ERRELL J OHNSON ,

Defendant-Appellant. 

# 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. Jerome B. Friedman, District Judge.

(CR-01-50) Submitted: March 14, 2002 Decided: March 26, 2002 Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL Stephen A. Hudgins, Newport News, for Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Toby M. Jesson, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).OPINION
PER CURIAM: David Terrell Johnson pled guilty to assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6) (1994), and was sentenced to a term of forty-six months imprisonment. He seeks to appeal, alleging that his sentence was disproportionately harsh. We find that Johnson waived his appeal rights and, therefore, dismiss the appeal.In his plea agreement, Johnson waived the right to appeal a sentence within the statutory maximum. This provision of the agreementwas brought to his attention by the district court during the plea colloquy, and Johnson stated that he understood the waiver and affirmed his intention to waive his appeal rights. A defendant may waive the right to appeal if the waiver is knowing and intelligent. United States v. Broughton-Jones , 71 F.3d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir. 1995). We find that Johnson’s waiver was knowing and voluntary and effectively bars review of his challenge to the district court’s imposition of sentence.Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument, because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presentedin the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED 2 U NITED S TATES v. J OHNSON
#### § 845.1 Purpose.

This part establishes criteria and assigns responsibility for the provision of counsel, for the provision of bail, and for the payment of court costs and other necessary and reasonable expenses incident to representation in civil and criminal proceedings, including appellate proceedings, before foreign courts and foreign administrative agencies, which involve members of the Armed Forces, civilian personnel and dependents. Payment of fines is not authorized hereunder.
Exhibit 23.1 

 

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in this Registration Statement on Form S-8 of our reports dated April 29, 2005, relating to the financial statements and financial statement schedule of Nortel Networks Corporation (“Nortel”) and management’s report on internal control over financial reporting (which report on the financial statements expressed an unqualified opinion and includes a separate report titled Comments by Independent Registered Chartered Accountants on Canadian-U.S. Reporting Differences referring to changes in accounting principles that have a material effect on the comparability of the financial statements; and which report on internal control over financial reporting expressed an unqualified opinion on management’s assessment of the effectiveness of Nortel’s internal control over financial reporting and an adverse opinion on the effectiveness of Nortel’s internalcontrol over financial reporting because of material weaknesses) appearing in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Nortel for the year ended December 31, 2004. 

 

/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP

 

Toronto, Canada

June 30, 2005