2007 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
9-4-2007 

# M etro Li fe Ins C o v

. P rice
P r e c e de nt i al or N on-P r e c e de nt i al : P r e c e de nt i al D ocke t N o . 05-2927

F o llow thi s and a dd it ion al work s at : http://d i git alc ommon s .l a w . vi ll anova . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2007

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou ght t o you for f r e e and ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i ll anova U nive r sity S choo l of L a

w Di git al Reposit ory

. It h as be e n a c c ept e d for inclusion in 2007 D e c i sion s b y an authori z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i ll anova U nive r sity S choo l of L a

w Di git al Reposit ory

. F or mor e inform at ion, p le as e c ont a ct Be n j amin . C arl s on@l a

w . vi ll anova . e du
. Re c omme nde d C it at ion

" M e tr o L i fe In s C o v

. P ric e " (2007). 2007 D e cisio n s . P ape r 358. http://d i git alc ommon s .l a

w . vi ll anova . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2007/358P RE CE DE NT I AL UN I TED STATES CO UR T OF A PP EALS F O R T H E T H IR D C IR C U IT

____________ N o. 05- 2927

____________ M E T RO P OL I T AN L I F E I NS UR ANC E CO M P ANY, A p p e llan t,

v. SAN DR A PRI CE; SHA NN ON PRI CE; AN DR E PRI CE.

___________ O n A p p ea l from the U n it ed S tat es D istri ct C o u rt

forthe D i s tr i ctof N ew J er s ey ( N o. 04- cv- 05044) D istri ct Ju d g e: H o n o rab le F aith S
. H o ch b erg Subm i t t ed U nderT hi r d C i r cui tL A R 34. 1( a) T hur s day , J anuary25, 2007 Bef or e : SCI RI CA , Chi e f J ud ge , FU EN TES and CH A G A RE S,

C irc u it Judg es.

____________ ( Fi l ed Sept ember4, 2007) R andi F. K nepper , E s q. M c El r o y , Deu t s c h , M u l v a n e y& Ca rp e n t e r , LLP 1300 M ountK embl e A ve. P. O
. B ox 2075 M orr i s t ow n, N J 07962- 20752 C ouns el forA ppel l ant

_________

OPI NI ON O F THE COURT

____________ C H A G A R E S , C irc u it J udge. A ppel l antM etr opol i t an Li fe I ns u r ance C om pany (“ M et L if e ” ) is th e c laim s f

id u c iar yo f

a n “ e m p lo y e e w e lf

a re b e n e f it pl an. ” See Em pl oy ee Ret i r em en t I ncome Secur i tyA ctof 1974 (“ E R IS A ”) § 3 (1), 29 U
. S
. C
. § 1 0 0 2 (1). A fter o n e o f th e p lan’s part i ci pant s di ed, M et L i fe r ece i ved compet i ng clai m s t o the d e c e d e n t’s li f

e -in su ra n c e b e n e f

its. It res p o n d e d b yf ili n g th is i nt erpl eade ract i on agai ns tthe compet i ng cl ai m ant s . T he D i s tr i ct C our tr ai s ed the i s s ue of s ubj ect m att erj ur i s di ct i on su a sp o n te and di s m i s s ed. In o u r v ie w , how ever , the D i s tr i ctC our thad fe der al q u e s tio n ju ri s d ic tio n . A c c o rd in g ly, w e w ill v a c a te a n d re m a n d

. I
. T he N ew J er s eyT r ans i tC orpor at i on s pons or s a B as i c Li fe Pl an forthe bene fi tof i t s empl oy ees . T he pl an i s funded thr ough a group l i f

e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c yi s s u e d b yM e t Li f e t o New J e r s ey T r ans i t
. M et L i fe i s the pl an’ s “cl ai m s fi duci ary . ” Paul Pr i ce w as a part i ci panti n the pl an. H e w as a bus dr i ver w i th N ew J er s ey T r ans i t and had enr ol l ed for $20, 0 0 0 in l i fe i ns ur ance benef

i t s . I n M ay20 0 2 , P au l pa s s ed aw ay . H e w as s u r v i ve d b yh i s wi d o w, S a n d r a P r i c e , a n d h i s c h i l d r e n f r o m a p re v io u s m a rr ia g e , S h a n n o n a n d A n d re P ri c e . A ft erPaul ’ s death, hi s w i dow and hi s ch il d r en s ubm i t t ed compet i ng clai m s forthe l i fe i ns ur ance benef i t s . M et L i fe inv esti g ated the m att er a n d d isco v ere d that, in o r aro u n d F eb rua ry 2 0 0 0 , P a u l d e s i g n a t e d h i s w i d o w a s th e p r i m a ry b e n e f i c i a ry. M et L i fe then i nform ed the chi l dr en’ s att orneythat i tw as deny i ng th e ir c laim s. M e tL if

e e x p lain e d th a t it h a d a f id u c iar yd u ty“ to admi ni s t ercl ai m s i n acc or dance w i th E R I SA and the t erm s of theA dom es t i c r el at i ons or der is a Q D R O i f i tm eet s the 1 req u ir em en ts of

2 9 U
. S
. C
. § § 1 0 5 6 (d)(3 )(C ) & (D ). U n d er §

3 pl an. ” A ppendi x ( “A pp. ”) 62- 63. A s such, i thad t o “paythe p ro c e e d s to th e n a m e d b e n e f ic ia ry o n ly.” Th e c hi l d r e n ’ s a t t o rn e yr e q u e s t e d a r e v i e w o f th e c l a i m. Paul ’ s fi r s tm arr i age ha d ended i n 1995 w i th a fi nal j udgm entof di vor ce i n N ew J er s eySupe ri o r C our t
. Par agr aph 11 of that j udgm ents peci fi cal l yr efe r ence d Paul ’ s l i fe i ns ur ance : T h e H u sb a n d c u rre n tlyh a s lif e in su r a n c e u p o n h is life . T h e H u sb a n d sh a ll am e n d th e se p o lic ie s in or dert o n am e the chi l dr en of the mar r i age a s irrev o ca b le be n ef

ici aries u n ti l suc h ti m e a s A n d re Pr i ce, the s on of the mar r i age[ , ] i s emanci pat ed. T he H us band s hal l name t he W i fe a s trus t ee. A pp. 69. S ince A ndr e r emai ned unemanci pat ed atthe t i m e of Paul ’ s death, the chi l dr en cl ai m ed theyw er e the r i ght ful b e n e f ic ia ri e s u n d e r t h e d iv o rc e ju d g m e n t’ s p la in te rm s . T h i s l eftM et L i fe i n a quanda ry . U nderE R I SA , i thad a dutyt o admi ni s t er cl ai m s “i n acc or dance w i th the document s and instrum en ts go v ern ing the p lan.” 2 9 U
. S
. C
. § 1 1 0 4 (a) (1 )(D ). T h ese d o cu m en ts i n stru cted M etL ife to p ay the b en ef it s to P au l’ s des i gnat ed bene fi ci ary
— h i s wi d ow . U nderthe N ew J er s eydi vor ce ju d g m e n t, ho w e v e r , t h e c h il d r e n w e r e to b e d e s ig n a te d “ ir r e v o c ab le benef i ci ar i es . ” N or m al l y , E R I SA pr eempt s any s t at e l aw that“r el at e[s ] t o” an empl oy ee be nefi t p lan. 29 U
. S. C
. § 1144( a) ; E gel hoff v. E gel hoff, 532 U
. S. 141, 147- 48 ( 2001)

. H ow ever , E R I SA ( as am ended bythe R et i r ementE qui tyA ctof 1984) cont ai ns an exce pt i on fr om thi s gener al rule for “ qual i fi ed domest i c r el at i ons o rde rs” (“Q D R O s”). 29 U
. S
. C
. § § 1 1 4 4 (b)(7 ), 1 0 5 6 (d)(3 )(B )-( E ); s e e Bo g g s v . Bo g g s , 5 2 0 U. S
. 8 3 3 , 8 4 6- 4 7 ( 1 9 9 7 )

. A QD RO “a ssign s to a n alt e rn a te p ay ee the righ t t o . . . rec eive all o r a por t i on of the bene fi t s pay abl e w i th r es pectt o a part i ci pantunder a p lan.” 2 9 U
. S
. C
. § 1 0 5 6 (d)(3 )(B )(i ). 11 0 5 6 (d)(3 )(C ), the d o m esti c re l at i ons or derm us t“cl ear l ys peci f[y ]” the fol l ow i ng: (i) th e n a m e a n d th e las t k n o w n m a ili n g a d d r e ss (if any ) of the part i ci pantand the n am e and mai l i ng addr es s of ea ch al t ernat e pay ee, (i i) the am o u n t o r p erc en tage o f th e p a rti cipa n t’ s b e n e f its to b e p a id b yth e p lan to e a c h su c h a ltern a te pay ee, orthe manneri n w hi ch s uch amountor per cent age i s t o be det erm i ned, ( i i i ) the numberof paym ent s or per i od t o w hi ch s uch or derappl i es , and (i v) each p l an to w hich such o rderapp l i es. § 1056( d) ( 3) ( C )

. A nd under§ 1056( d) ( 3) ( D ) , a domest i c r el at i ons o rd e r w ill b e c o n sid e re d a Q D R O “ o n lyif ” it: ( i ) does notr equi r e a pl an t o pr ovi de anytyp e or form of b enef

i t , or any o p t i on , no totherw i se pr ovi ded underthe pl an, ( i i ) does notr equi r e th e pl an t o pr ovi de i ncr eas ed b en ef it s (de term ined o n the b asis o f a ctua ri al va lue), and ( i i i ) does not r equi r e the paym ent of benefi ts t o an a lt ernat e pay ee w hich ar e requi red t o b e paid to a n o th e ra l t e r n a t e p a y e e u n d e ra n o th e ro r der p re v io u slyd e te r m in e d to b e a q u a lifie d d o m e stic relati o n s o rde r. § 1 0 5 6 (d)(3 )(D ). E v e ryC o u rt o f

A p p e a ls to a d d re ss th e q u e s ti o n h a s h e ld 2 th a t “th e § 1 1 4 4 (b )( 7 ) e x c e p tio n to E R IS A p re e m p tio n a p p lies to 4 M et L i fe i nform ed the compet i ng cl ai m ant s thati tcoul d not t el l “w hethera cou rtw ou l d find t hat th[e] d iv orce decree i s a Q D R O
. ” A pp . 73
. Itno t ed thati f t he N ew Jer se y j ud gm ent i s a Q D R O , then i n al l l i kel i hood the chi l dr en shoul d getthe $20, 000. Itfu rth er n o ted th at i f th e jud g m en t i s n o t a Q D R O , then P ri ce ’s w i dow i s ent i t l ed t o the money

. M et L i fe s t ated thati f the 2a ll Q D R O s , w h e th e r t h e yin v o lv e e ith e r p e n s io n o r w e lf a re p la n s .” M etro. L if

e Ins. C o . v . B igelo w , 2 8 3 F
. 3 d 4 3 6 , 4 4 0 n . 3 (2d C ir

. 2 0 0 2 ) ; M e tro . L if

e In s. C o . v . P e tti t, 16 4 F .3 d 8 5 7 , 8 6 3 n .5 (4 th C ir. 1 9 9 8 ); M e tro . L if

e In s. C o . v . M a rsh , 1 1 9 F .3 d 4 1 5 , 4 2 1 (6 th C i r . 1997) ; M etr o. L ife I ns . C o. v. W heat on, 42 F. 3d 1080, 1083- 84 ( 7th C i r . 1994) ; C ar l and v. M etr o. L i fe I ns . C o. , 935 F. 2d 1 1 1 4 , 1 1 1 9 -20 (10 th C ir

. 1 9 9 1 ). 5 c laim a n ts d id n o t r e so lv e th e m a tter a m ica b ly , itw o u ld b rin g su it. Pr i ce’ s w i dow and the chi l dr en negot i at ed, buttheyfai l ed t o r eac h a n a g re e m e n t. T h e c h il d r e n ’s a tto rn e yth e n a sk e d M e tL if e to
“ [ k ]i n d ly in itia te a n in te rp le a d e r a c tio n .” A p p . 7 5
. M et L i fe obl i ged, br i ngi ng thi s s ui ti n the U ni t ed St at es D i s tr i ctC our tforthe D i s tr i ct of N ew J er s ey . O n i t s ow n m ot i on, the D i s tr i ct C our t r ai s ed the i s s ue of s ubj ect m att erj ur i s di ct i on and di s m i s s ed. T hi s appea l fol l ow ed. W e r evi ew de novo the D i s tr i ct Cou r t ’ s d i s mi s s a l f

o r l a c k o f s u b

j e c t ma t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n . I FC I nt er cons ul t , A G v. Safegua r d I nt ’ l Par tner s , L L C , 438 F. 3d 298, 3 0 9 (3 d C ir . 2 0 0 6 ). II. T he equi t abl e rem ed yof i nt erpl eade ral l ow s “a pe r s on hol di ng prop erty to j oi n i n a s i ngl e s ui ttw o orm or e per s ons as s ert i ng cl ai m s to thatpr operty . ” N Y L i fe D i s tr i b. , I nc. v. A dher ence G r oup, I nc. , 72 F. 3d 371, 372 n. 1 ( 3d C i r . 1995)

. T he p lain tiff in a n in terp lea d e r a c tio n is a sta k e h o ld e r th a t a d m its it i s liab le to o n e o f

th e c laim a n ts, b u t f

e a rs th e p ro sp e c t o f

m u lti p le l i abi l i ty . I nt erpl eade ral l ow s the s t akehol dert o fi l e s ui t , depos i tthe pr operty w i th the court , and w i thdr aw fr om the pr ocee di ngs . T he comp eti n g cl ai m ant s ar e l eftt o l i t i gat e betw een themsel ves . See Z echa r i ah C haff

ee, J r . , T he Feder al I nt erpl eade rA ct of 1936: I , 45 Y al e L. J
. 963, 963 ( 1936)

. T he re s ul t i s a w i n- w i n s i tuat i on. T he sta k e h o ld e r a v o id s m u lti p le lia b ili ty . T h e c laim a n ts se ttl e th e ir di s put e i n a s i ng le p roce edi ng, w i thouthavi ng t o s ue the s t akehol derfi r s tand then fa ce “ the di ffi cul t i es of fi ndi ng as s et s and le v y in g e x e c u tio n .” Id . a t 9 6 4
. T h ere are tw o m et ho ds for bri ng i ng an i nterpleade r in6 f e d e ra l c o u rt . T h e f

ir s t i s th e in te rp le a d e r s ta tu te , 2 8 U .S .C . § 1 3 3 5 . D istric t C o u r ts h a v e su b jec t m a tter ju risd ictio n u n d e r th is p rov isi o n if th ere is “m inim al div ersity ” b etw ee n tw o o r m o re adver s e cl ai m ant s , an d i f the amounti n contr over s yi s $500 or m or e. See St at e Farm Fi r e & C as . C o. v. T as hi r e, 3 8 6 U
. S. 523, 530- 31 ( 1967)

. T he s econd i s Feder al R ul e of Ci vi l Pr ocedur e 22. U nl i ke i t s s t atut orycount erp art, rul e i nt erpl eade ri s no m or e than a pr ocedur al devi ce; the pl ai nt i ff m us tpl ead a nd pr ove an i ndepende ntbas i s for s ubj ect m att er j ur i s di ct i on. See N Y L i fe, 72 F. 3d at372 n. 1; C om m er ci al U ni on I ns . C o. v. U ni t ed St at es , 999 F .2 d 5 8 1 , 5 8 4 (D .C . C ir . 1 9 9 3 ). I n thi s cas e, M et L i fe does not r el y on th e interpl eade r st atute, no r coul d it , as the adverse cl ai m ants are al l N ew Jer sey ans. R ather , i thas sty led i t s l aw s ui tas a rul e i nt erpl eade ract i on. M et L i fe a r gues thatj ur i s di ct ion exi s t s underthe fe der al ques t i on s t atut e, 28 U
. S. C
. § 1331, and E R I SA ’ s j ur i s di ct i onal pr ovi s i on, 29 U .S .C . § 1 1 3 2 (e ). A fede r al ques t i on i nt erpl eade ri s a r ar i ty . Se e 7 C har l es A l an W r i ghtetal

. , F ed er al Pr act i ce & Pr ocedur e § 1710 ( 3d ed. 2 0 0 1 ); se e a ls o D o n a ld L . D o e rn b e rg , W h a t’s W ro n g w ith th is Pi ctur e?: R ul e I nt erpl eade r , the A nt i

- I nj unct i on A ct , I n Per s onam J ur i s di ct i on, and M

. C
. E s cher , 67 U
. C ol o. L
. R ev. 551, 565 n. 56 ( 1996) ( “The d ea rth of r eport ed ca s es i nvol vi ng i nt erpl eade rand fede r al ques t i on j ur i s di ct i on i m pl i es thatal though s uch case s can ar i s e, theyw i l l be a s m al l pr opor t i on of al l fede ral i nt erpl eade r a c tio n s.” ). S tatu to ry“ a risin g u n d e r” ju risd ictio n re q u ire s th a t a fede r al ques t i on appea ron the fa ce of the pl ai nt i ff’ s w el l

- pl eade d c ompl a i nt
. Se e Loui s vi l l e & N a s hv i l l e R. R. v. M ott l e y , 21 1 U. S. 14 9 , 1 52 ( 1908)

. T hi s r equi r ementpos es a pr obl em for a n i nt erplead er p l ai nt i ff, as al l the compl ai nts eeks i s an or der re lea sin g a n d d isc h a rg in g th e p lain tiff f ro m liab ili ty . It i s d if

f icu lt to c h a ra c ter ize su c h a re q u e st “ a s a ss e rtin g e it h e r f e d e ra l o r sta te r i ght s . ” M or ongo B an d o f M i s s i on I ndi ans v. C al

. St at e B d. of E qual i zat i on, 858 F. 2d 1376, 1383 ( 9th C i r . 1988) ( quot i ng B anco de Ponce v. H i ns dal e Superm arketC orp. , 663 F. Supp. 8 1 3 , 816 ( E
. D
. N
. Y
. 1987) )

. T hus , atl eas tatfi r s tbl us h, i ti s har d t o s ee how a re q u e s t f

o r i n te rp le a d e r c o u ld ra is e a f e d e ra l q u e s tio n .T hi s s o- cal l ed “c r eat i on t es t ” i s “[t ] he mostfami l i ar 3 defini t i on of th e st atutory‘ar i si ng un der’ l i m i t at i on . ” F ranchi se T ax, 463 U
. S. at8- 9; s ee A m er i can W el l W or ks C o . v. L ayne & B ow l erC o. , 241 U
. S. 257, 260 ( 1916) ( H ol m es , J
. ) ( “A s ui tar i s es u n d e r th e l a w th a t c r e a t e s th e c a u s e o f a c t i o n . ” )

. Howeve r , as J udge Fr i endl y famousl y poi nt ed out , “[i ] t has come t o be r eal i zed thatM r . J us t i ce H ol m es ’ form ul a i s m or e usef ul fori ncl us i on than forthe exc l us i on forw hi ch i tw as i nt en d ed

. ” T
. B
. H arm s C o. v. E lisc u , 3 3 9 F .2 d 8 2 3 , 8 2 7 (2 d C ir. 1 9 6 4 ). Ju risd ictio n a lso e x ists w here “som e subst anti al , dis pu t ed q u e sti on of f ederal l aw i s a necessaryel em ent of .

. . [a] w el l -pl eaded st at e cl ai m []. ” F ranchi se T ax, 46 3 U
. S
. at13
. A nd i f fed eral l aw co m p lete lypreem pts a s t at e cl ai m , “the r es ul t i s t o convert compl ai nt s purpor t edl ybas ed o n t he pr e e mpt e d s t a t e l a w i n t o c o mp l a i n t s s t a t i n g f e d e r a l c l a i ms fr om thei ri ncept i on. ” I n r e C m ty . B ank of N

. V a. , 418 F. 3d 277, 290 ( 3d C i r . 2005) ( quot at i on m arks om i t t ed) ; s ee, e. g. , M etr o. L i fe In s. C o . v . T a y lo r, 4 8 1 U .S . 5 8 , 6 6 -6 7 (1 9 8 7 ). F o r p u rp o se s o f th is c a s e , J u s tic e H o lm e s ’ r u le o f in c lu s io n is s u f

f ic ie n t. 7 B ut on l yatfi rs tblush. S om e i nterpleader act i on s do rai se fede r al ques t i ons . I ndeed, ours i s t ercourts of a ppeal s have r ecogni zed thatan i nt erpl eade r“ar i s es under” fe d era l l aw w hen br oughtbyan ER I SA fi duci aryagai ns tcompet i n g c l a i ma n t s t o pl an benef i t s . See, e. g. , M etr o. L i fe I ns . C o. v. B i gel ow , 283 F. 3d 436, 439- 40 ( 2d C i r . 2002) ; A etn a L ife I ns . C o. v. B ay ona, 223 F. 3d 1030, 1033- 34 ( 9th C i r . 2000) ; M etr o. L i fe I ns . C o. v. M ar s h, 119 F
. 3 d 4 1 5 , 4 1 8 (6th C ir

. 1 9 9 7 ). W e a g r e e wi th th e s e c o u rt s . Fe d e r a l q u e s t i o n j u r i s d i c t i on exi s t s w hen the pl ai nt i ff’ s w el l

- pl eade d compl ai ntes t abl i s hes that “fe der al l aw cre ates the ca us e of a ct i on. ” Fr anchi s e Tax B d. v. C o n str
. L ab o rers V ac ati o n T rust, 4 6 3 U
. S
. 1 , 2 7 -28 (19 8 3 ). 3 M et L i fe br i ngs thi s s ui t under s ect i on 502( a) ( 3) of E R IS A , 29 U
. S. C
. § 1132( a) ( 3)

. T hatpr ovi sion c r eat es a ca us e of a ct i on for fi duci ar i es “t o obt ai n . . . appr opr i at e equi t abl e r el i ef .

. . t o enfor ce anypr ovi s i on s o f t hi s s ubchapt erorthe t erm s of the pl an. ” 29 U
. S. C
. § 1132( a) ( 3) ( B ) ( i i )

. A s court s have not ed , “[t ] he interc o n n ec ti o n b etw ee n the b asis o f th e D istri ct C o u rt ’s j ur i s di ct i on— E R I SA

— an d the el ement s of [a n] E R I SA cl ai m [] m akes i teas yt o confus e the ques t i on of the court ’ s s ubj ectm att erE v e n a p a r tf r o m M e t L i f

e ’ s c a u s e o f

a c t i o n a s a f

i d u c i a ry, 4 th e re m a yb e a n a d d iti o n a l b a sis f o r su b jec t m a tter ju risd ic ti o n in thi s cas e. A rul e i nt erpl eade ri s qui t e s i m i l art o a dec l ar at o ry 8 j ur i s di ct i on w i th the ques t i on of the p la i nt i ff’ s abi l i tyt o s t at e a cl ai m . ” C ar l s on v. Pr i nci pal Fi n. G r oup, 3 2 0 F
. 3 d 3 01, 307 ( 2d C i r . 2003)

. T he t es t w e m us t appl y i s a fami l i ar one. For ju risd ictio n a l p u rp o se s, th e iss u e is n o t w h e th e r M e tL if e w ill ul t i m at el ybe su cces s ful i n s us t ai ni ng i t s caus e of a ct i on under sec ti o n 5 0 2 (a)(3). Se e B ell v . H o o d , 3 2 7 U
. S
. 6 7 8 , 6 8 1 -82 (19 4 6 ). R at her, “[d]i sm i ssal for l ack o f subject -m at t er j uri sdi ct i on becau se of the i nadequa cyof the fe der al cl aim is pr operonl yw hen the cl ai m i s ‘ s o i ns ubs t ant i al , i mpl a u s i b l e , f o r e c l o s e dbypr i ordeci s i ons of [the Supr eme] C our t , orotherw i s e compl et el ydevoi d of m er i tas n o t to inv o lve a fe d era l con tr o v ersy . ” S teel C o . v . C it izen s fo r a B ett erE nv’ t , 523 U
. S. 83, 89 ( 1998) ( quot i ng O nei da I ndi an N ati on of N

. Y
. v. C ountyof O nei da, 414 U
. S. 661, 666 (19 7 4 )); se e a lso P rim a x R e c o v e rie s, In c . v . G u n ter , 4 3 3 F .3 d 5 1 5 , 5 1 9 (6 th C ir. 2 0 0 6 ) (“ A n E R IS A c laim c a n b e n o n -f riv o lo u s (o r su f

f icie n tly s ubs t ant i al ) even i f i ti s uns ucce s s ful an d pos s i bl yver gi ng on the fool har dyi n l i ghtof pr ior pr ece dentbarr i ng the r el i ef s ought

. ”) (qu o tat ion m ark s o m itted); C em en t M aso n s H ea lth & W e lfare T rust F u n d fo r N
. C a l. v . S ton e, 19 7 F
. 3 d 1 0 0 3 , 1 0 0 8 (9th C ir

. 1 9 9 9 ) (“ [ D ]ism iss a l o f a n E R IS A c laim u n d e r § 1 1 3 2 (a )(3 ) is pr oper l ya di s m i s s al on the mer i t s r atherthan a di s m i s s al forw ant o f s u b je c t m a tte r j u ri s d ic tio n .” ). H e re , M e tL if

e b rin g s su it a s a f

id u c iar y , an d it ad e q u a tely i nvokes the D i s tr i ct C our t ’ s s ubj ectm att erj ur i s di ct i on bys eeki ng “ a p p ro p ria te e q u itab le r e lief

. . . to e n f

o rc e a n yp ro v isio n s o f

th is s ubchapt erorthe t erm s of the pl an . ” ER I SA § 502( a) ( 3) , 29 U
. S
. C
. § 1 1 3 2 (a)(3). Sp ec ifi ca lly, M etL ife se ek s interplea d er, w hi ch i s a form of “e qui t abl e r el i ef. ” See U
. S. Fi r e I ns . C o . v. A sb e sto sp ra y , In c ., 1 8 2 F .3 d 2 0 1 , 2 0 8 (3 d C ir. 1 9 9 9 ). T h ro u g h its i nt erpl eade ract i on, M et L i fe s eeks t o en fo rce the pr ovi s i ons of E R I SA an d the pl an byens ur i ng thatfunds ar e di s bur s ed t o the pr operbenef

i ci ary . See A etna Li fe, 223 F
. 3 d at 1 034. M et L i fe thus pr es ent s a s ubs t ant i al , non- fr i vol ous cl ai m fo r re l i ef unde r s ect i on 502( a) ( 3)

. T h is is enough t o confe rs ubj ectm att er j ur i s di ct i on underE R I SA
. See B el l , 327 U
. S. at681- 82. 4ju d g m e n t ac tio n . B o th th e d e c lar a to ry ju d g m e n t sta tu te a n d R u le 22 ar e pur el y pr ocedur al

. See N Y L i fe, 72 F. 3d at 372 n. 1; A etna L i f e I n s . Co. v . Haworth , 3 0 0 U. S. 2 2 7 , 2 4 0 ( 1 9 3 7 )

. Nei th er pr ovi s i on enl ar ges the s ubj ect
- m att erj ur i s di ct i on of the fe der al court s . C om par e Fed. R
. C i v. P. 82 ( “These rul es s hal l n o tbe cons trued t o ext end .

. . the j ur i s di ct i on of t he U ni t ed St at es di s tr i ct co u rt s . . . . ”), w ith 2 8 U
. S
. C
. § 2 2 0 1 (au tho ri zing a f ed era l cou rt t o is sue a de cla ra to ryj ud gm ent “[i ]n a case of actual con trovers y w i thi n i t s j ur is di ct i on ” ) (e m p h a sis a d d e d )

. R a th e r, b o th sim p ly p ro v id e p la in tif

f s w ith a m e a n s t o “ a n tic ip a te a n d a c c e le ra te
. . . coer ci ve ac t i on[s ] by

. . . defe ndant [s ]
. ” B el l & B eckw i th v. U ni t ed S t at es, 7 6 6 F .2 d 9 10 , 91 4 (6t h C i r. 19 85 ). B ased on these si m i l ari t i es, som e cou rt s have h el d that the jur i sdi ct i on al t est a p p lica b le in d e c lar a to ryju d g m e n t ca se s a p p lies e q u a lly to a ru le i nt erpl eade r . See, e. g. , C om m er ci al N at ’ l B ank of Chi cago v. D em os, 18 F
. 3d 48 5, 48 8 (7t h C i r. 19 94 ); C om m erci al U nion Ins. C o. v. U ni t ed St at es , 999 F. 2d 581, 585 ( D
. C
. C i r . 1993) ; M or ongo B and of M i s s i on I ndi ans v. C al

. St at e B d. of Equal i zat i on, 858 F. 2d 1376, 1384 ( 9th C i r . 1988) ; B el l & B eckw i th, 766 F. 2d at913- 14. I n the dec l ar at ory j udgm ent cont ext , “[f ] eder al court s have r egul ar l y t aken or i gi nal j ur i s di ct i on over . . . s ui t s i n w hi ch, i f the d e c lar a to ryju d g m e n t d e f e n d a n t b ro u g h t a c o e rc iv e a c ti o n to enfor ce i t s r i ght s , thats ui t w o u ld nece s s ar i l ypr es enta fe der al q u e s t i o n . ” F r a n c h i s e T a x , 4 6 3 U. S
. a t1 9 ; s e e a l s o Ri c h a r d H. Fal l on, J r . , et. al, H art& W echs l er ’ s Feder al C our t s 900 ( 5th ed. 2003) ( s t at i ng that Fr anchi s e T ax “appe ar s t o endor s e” a n appr oach th a t “w o u ld u p h o ld ju risd ictio n o v e r a d e c lar a to rya c tio n if j ur i s di ct i on w oul d exi s ti n a hypothet ical nondecl ar at oryact i on b ro u g h t b

y e ith e r p a rty a g a i n s tth e o th e r . ” ) ; b u ts e e Text r on L y comi ng R eci pr ocat i ng E ngi ne D i v. , A vco C orp. v. U A W , 523 U
. S
. 6 5 3 , 6 5 9 -60 (19 9 8 ) (ex p ressing d o u b t abo u t w h ethe r a “ d e c l a r a t o ry -

j udgm entcompl ai ntr ai s i ng a n o n fede ral defe ns e t o an ant i ci pat ed f

eder alc la im

. . . w o u ld confe r§ 1 3 31 j ur i s di ct i on”) ( emphasi s i n or i gi nal )

. I f t he pra ct i ce de s cr i bed byFr anchi s e Tax i s corr ect , and i f the pr i nci pl e ext ends t o rul e i nt erpl eade r , then j ur i s dict i on exi s t s w heneve rone of “ the coe r ci ve ac t i ons ant i ci pat ed bythe [i nt erpl eade r ] compl ai nt w o u l d ar i s e under fede r al l aw . ” M or ongo, 858 F. 2d at1385. M et L i fe’ s i nt erpl eade rcompl ai ntant i ci pat es coer ci ve 9act i ons byboth Pr i ce’ s w i dow and hi s chi l dr en. B oth hypothet i cal cl ai m s w oul d s eek t o r ecove r “bene fi t s due .

. . under the t erm s of [a] pl an, ” 29 U
. S. C
. § 1132( a ) ( 1 ) ( B ) , and w oul d nece s s ar i l ypr es ent fede r al ques t i ons . See Tay l or , 481 U
. S. at66- 67. T hus , the a p p ro a c h a d o p ted b y o u r sis ter c o u rts o f a p p e a ls in c a se s lik e B e ll & B eckw i th and M or ongo m i ghtprov i de an a l t ernat i ve bas i s for s ubj ectm att erj ur i s di ct i on. N onethel es s , i n l i ghtof our d eterm ina t i on thatfede r al l aw cr eat es M et L i fe’ s caus e of a ct i on, w e n e e d n o t ta k e a p o s itio n o n th e p ro p ri e ty o f th o s e d e c is i o n s . 10 III
. P res um ably , the D i stri ctC ou rtagreed thatM et L i fe’s cause of ac t i on ar i s es under fede r al l aw . I t s j ur i s di ct i onal i nqui ryfocus ed on a di ffe r enti s s ue: exhaus t i on. “Excepti n l im i t ed ci r cumst ance s , ” w e have hel d, “a fede r al court w i l l notent ert ai n an E R I SA cl ai m unl es s the pl ai nt i ff ha s ex haus t ed the r emedi es a v a ila b le u n d e r t h e p la n .” H a rr o w v . P r u d e n t ia l I n s . C o . o f A m ., 279 F. 3d 244, 249 ( 3d C i r . 2002) ( quot at i on om i t t ed)

. R el y i ng on thatrul e, the D i s tr i ctC our tnot ed thatM et L i fe “ as s ert [ed] fede r al j ur i s di ct i on underE R I SA des pi t e . . . h avi ng m ade no i ni t i al det erm i nat i on aboutw hi ch pot ent i al pl an bene fi ci ar i es s houl d be p aid.” D is tr ictC o u rtO rde r at 1. Itrea so n ed that a f ed era l cou rt “s i t s i n r evi ew of a deci s i on of a pl an adm i ni s tr at or , ” and “i ti s the pl an admi ni s tr at or ’ s dutyt o m ake i t s ow n i ni t i al det erm i nat i on r egar di ng w ho shoul d be pai d. ” I d. at1- 2. A bs ents uch a d eterm ination , there w as “ n o ad m inistrati v e reco rd f o r th [e ] C o u rt t o r evi ew . ” I d. at 2. T hus , the D i s tr i ctC our thel d thatj ur i s di ct i on w as l acki ng. T he D i s tr i ctC our t ’ s gl os s on the exha us t i on r equi r em ent raises tw o q u esti o n s. F ir st, sh o u ld co u rt s lab el E R IS A ’s ex h aust i on r equi r ementas a j ur i s di ct i onal pr er equi s i t e t o fede r al cou rtadjudi cat i on ? S econ d, l abels a sid e , i s there a “revers e exhaus t i on” r equi r ementthatl i m i t s a fi duci ary ’ s abi l i ty t o br i ng an i nt erpl eade ract i on? W e addr es s thes e ques t i ons i n turn.11 A
. A r ece nt s er i es of S upr eme C our tdeci s i ons pr ovi des hel pful gui dance on the us es and mi s us es of t he w or d “j ur i s di ct i on. ” S ee B ow l es v. R us s el l , 551 U
. S.

- - - , 127 S. C t
. 2360 ( 2007) ; A rbaugh v. Y & H C orp. , 546 U
. S. 500, 126 S. C t
. 1235 ( 2006) ; E berhartv. U ni t ed St at es , 546 U
. S. 12 ( 2005) ( per cur i am); K ontr i ck v. R y an, 5 4 0 U. S
. 4 4 3 ( 2 0 0 4 )

. Th e s e c a s e s c l a r i f yth a tn o n s t a tu t o ryc l a i mpr oces s i ng rul es ar e notpr oper l y la bel ed “j ur i s di ct i onal

. ” True “j ur i s di ct i onal ” l i m i t at i ons ar e s etbythe C ons t i tut i on and by C ongr es s , notbyrul es of pr ocedur e orj udge- m ade doc tr i ne. See K ontr i ck, 540 U
. S. at452 ( “O nl yC ongr es s m aydet erm i ne a l ow er fede r al court ’ s s ubj ect
- m att er j ur i s di ct i on. ”) ; s ee a l s o B ow l es , 127 S . C t. at 2 3 6 4 -6 5 & n .3 (sa m e ). N o n sta tu to ryru les , “ e v e n if u n a ltera b le o n a p a rty ’s a p p lica tio n , c a n n o n e th e les s b e f o rf e ited if the partyas s ert i ng the rul e w ai t s t oo l ong t o r ai s e the poi nt
. ” See K o n tr ic k , 5 4 0 U .S . a t 4 5 6
. A s i t ex pl ai ned thes e pr i nci pl es , the Supr eme C our tnot ed that it s o w n p ast d ec isi o n s h ad so m eti m es m isl ab eled n o n statu tory rul es as “j ur i s di ct i onal

. ” The C our tdes cr i b ed thes e ca s ual i nvocat i ons o f the t erm as “dr i ve- byj ur i s di ct i onal rul i ngs that s houl d be ac cor ded no pr ece dent i al eff ect on the ques t i on w hether th e f e d e r a l c o u rt h a d a u th o ri ty to a d ju d ic a te th e c la im in s u it.” A rba u g h , 1 2 6 S
. C t. at 12 4 2 -43 (qu o tat ion m ark s o m itted). Inform ed b ythe S up rem e C ou rt ’s i nst ruct i on , w e m ust a ss e ss w h e th e r E R IS A ’s e x h a u stio n d o c trin e is a “ ju risd ictio n a l” m andat e. C ert ai nl y , i t i s an i m por t ant l egal rule. W e have re c o g nized that r equ i ri ng exh aust i on of p l an rem edies helps t o “ ‘ r e d u c e th e n u m b e r o f f riv o lo u s la w su its u n d e r E R IS A ; to pr om ot e the cons i s t enttr eatm ent of cl ai m s forbenef i t s ; t o pr ovi de a nonadve r s ar i al m ethod of cl ai m s ett l ement ; and t o m i ni m i ze the cos t s of cl ai m s s ett l ementforal l conce rned. ’ ” H arrow , 279 F. 3d at 24 9 (qu o ti n g A m ato v
. B ern ard , 6 1 8 F
. 2 d 5 5 9 , 5 6 7 (9th C ir

. 1980) )

. I n addi t i on, exhaus t i on enhanc es the abi l i tyof fi duci ar i es “‘ t o expert l yand ef

fi ci ent l ym anage thei rfunds bypr event i ng pr ematur e j udi ci al i nt ervent i on i n thei rdeci s i on- m aki ng pr oces s es . ’ ” I d. ( quot i ng A m at o, 618 F. 2d at567)

. I t al s o has the s al ut aryeff

ectof “r efi ni ng and def i ni ng the pr obl em” forfi nal12 ju d ic ia l r e s o lu tio n . A m a to , 6 1 8 F .2 d a t 5 6 8
. B u t as i m p o rt an t as th e ru le m ayb e, “E R IS A n o w h ere m ent i ons the exha us t i on doctr i ne. ” I d. at5 6 6
. It is a j udi ci al i nnovat i on fas hi oned w i th an ey e t ow ar d “s ound po li cy . ” I d. at 5 6 7 . W e h a v e n o t re q u ire d e x h a u s tio n w h e re th e c laim se e k s to en fo rce a statuto ry r i ghtunder E R IS A
. Z i pf v. A T & T , 799 F. 2d 8 8 9 , 8 9 1 -9 2 (3 d C ir. 1 9 8 6 ). In a d d iti o n , the f a ilu re to e x h a u st w ill b e e x cu sed in ca ses w h ere a f ac t- sen sit ive b alan cing o f f a c tors r evea l s t hatexhaus t i on w oul d be fut i l e. See H arr ow , 279 F. 3d at 2 4 9 -5 0
. T hi s i s notthe s tuff of

a j ur i s di ct i onal rul e. C o n gr es s has e x p r e s s l yp r o v i d e d f

o rj u r i s d i c t i o n o v e rERI S A c a s e s i n 2 9 U. S
. C. § 113 2( e )

. N e i the rtha tpr ov i s i on no ra nyothe rpa r tof ER I SA cont ai ns an exha us t i on r equi r ement
. T hus , as a j udi ci al l y - cr aft ed d o ctri n e, e x h au sti o n p lace s n o li m it s o n a c o u rt ’s ad jud icatory pow er . See A rba u g h , 126 S. C t
. at1245; K ontr i ck, 540 U
. S. at 452; s ee a l s o Paes e v. H art for d L i fe & A cci dentI ns . C o. , 449 F. 3d 435, 445 ( 2d C i r . 2006) ( “[ER I SA exhaus t i on] i s pur el ya j udgem ade c onceptthat devel oped i n the abse nce of s t atut oryl anguage demonstr at i ng thatC ongr es s i nt ended t o m ake [ i t ] a j ur i s di ct i onal r equi r ement
. ”) ; C hai l l and v. B r ow n & R oot , I nc. , 45 F. 3d 947, 950 n .6 (5 th C ir . 1 9 9 5 ) ( s a m e ). F u rth erm o re, e v e n asid e f rom the S u p rem e C o u rt ’s i nstru ct i on, ourow n cas es car eful l ydi s t i ngui s h “betw een prudent i al exhaust i on and j ur i s di ct i onal exhaus t i on. ” W i l s on v. M V M , I nc. , 475 F. 3d 166, 174 ( 3d C i r . 2007) ; s ee a l s o Z i p es v. T r ans W or l d A i r l i nes , I nc. , 455 U
. S. 385, 393 ( 1982)

. Prudent i al exhaus t i on “i s gener al l yj udi ci al l y cre ated. ” W i l s on, 475 F. 3d at 174. I tr efl ect s a j udi ci al des i r e t o “r es pect [] agenc yaut onom yby a llo w in g it t o c o rre c t it s o w n e rro rs.” Id . U n lik e a rig id ju risd ictio n a l ru le, p ru d e n tia l ex h a u stio n p ro v id e s f lex ib le ex ce p ti o n s fo r “w aive r, esto p p el, toll ing o r fu ti li ty
. ” Id. E R IS A ’s exhau s t i o n r equi r ement bear s al l t he hal l m ar ks of a nonj ur i s di ct i onal prudent i al rul e. I n addi t i on t o bei ng j udge- m ade, the doct r i ne’ s fut i l i tyexce pt i on i nvol ves a di s cr et i onarybal anci ng of i nt er es t s . J udi ci al prudence , not pow er , governs i t s appl i cat i on in a g iv e n c a s e .See, e. g. , Pet er s on v. C ont ’ l C as . C o. , 2 8 2 F. 3d 112, 117 5 ( 2d C i r . 20 0 2 ) (“[A ] bs enta det erm i nat i on bythe pl an a d m in istra to r, f

e d e ra l c o u rts a re w ith o u t ju risd ictio n to a d ju d ica te w he the ra n e mpl oy e e i s e l i gi bl e for be ne fi t s un de ra n ERI SA pl an. ”) ; D uffi e v. D eer e & C o. , 111 F. 3d 70, 72 n. 2 ( 8th C i r . 1997) ( percuriam ) ( r efe r r i ng t o “the j ur i s di ct i onal ar gum entthat[the claim an t] fa il ed to ex h au st his rem ed ies”); W h it e v . Jac o b s E n g ’g G ro u p L o n g T e rm D isa b ili tyB e n e f it P lan , 8 9 6 F .2 d 3 4 4 , 3 4 6 (9 th C i r . 1990) ( “[A ] ppel l ant di d notexhaus thi s admi ni s tr at i ve re m e d ies , an d ju ri s d ic tio n in th e d istric t co u rt w a s im p ro p e rly g ra n te d .” ). 13 I n r eac hi ng thi s concl us i on, w e have notoverl ooked the s e v e ra l c a s e s th a t r e f

e r to E R IS A e x h a u s tio n a s “ ju ri s d ic tio n a l.” 5 T w o ar e part i cul ar l ynot ew or thy

. I n W ol f v. N at i onal Shopm en Pens i o n F u n d , 728 F. 2d 182 ( 3d C i r . 1984) , w e des cr i bed our anal y s i s as a “j ur i s di ct i onal i nqui ry ” a n d clas s i fi ed exha us t i on as a n ec essa ryp red icate to “ fe d era l j u ri sd ict ion

. ” Id

. at 18 6 -87
. In addi t i on, the l eadi ng cas e i n thi s ar ea, A m at o v. B ernar d, 618 F. 2d 5 5 9 (9 th C ir. 1 9 8 0 ), re f

e rre d to th e e x h a u stio n o f p lan re m e d ies in “jurisdicti o n [a l] ” term s. Id. at 56 6
. N eith er c ase , h o w ev er, expl ai ned w hy or how a doct r i ne borne of “s ound pol i cy ” qual i fi ed a s “ ju risd ictio n a l.” A m a to , 6 1 8 F .2 d a t 5 6 8 . T h e o p in io n s s im p ly s pr i nkl ed thei ranal y s es w i th offha nded r efe r ence s t o the t erm . See A rbaugh, 126 S. C t
. at1242- 43. T heydo notal t erourconcl us i on t hatERI SA’ s e x h a u s t i o n d o c tr i n e p l a c e s n o l i mi t s o n a f e d er al c o u rt ’s s u b

je c t m a tte r j u ri s d ic tio n . M etL ife b r oughtthi s i nt erpl ea d er a cti o n ag ains t Pa u l Price’s w i dow and hi s ch il dr en. B efor e the w i dow and the chi l dr en eve r fi l ed a r es pons i ve pl eadi ng, the D i s tr i ctC our tact ed i n the name of subjectm at t e r ju ri sdi ct i on and dis m i ssed on e xh aust i on groun ds. T hi s w as err or . T he exhaus t i on r equi r ement i s a nonj ur i s di ct i onal aff i r m at ive d ef

ens e. See Paes e, 449 F. 3d at446; cf. W i l l i ams v. R u n y o n , 1 3 0 F
. 3 d 5 6 8 , 5 7 3 (3d C ir

. 1 9 9 7 ). B
. T he q uest i on rem ain s w hetherthe af fi rm at i ve d efen se of exhaus t i on bar s M et L i fe’ s i nt erpl ea deract i on. A s not ed above , our14 c a se s h o ld th a t p e rso n s c laim in g p la n b e n e f its m u st g e n e ra lly “exha us tth ei radmi ni s tr at i ve r emedi es befor e s eeki ng j udi ci al reli ef

. ” B erg er v . E d g ew ater S teel C o . , 9 1 1 F
. 2 d 9 1 1 , 9 1 6 (3d C ir

. 19 90 ). O f cou rs e, M et L i fe i s n ot a person cl ai m i ng plan ben efi t s. Iti s a fi du ci ary at t em pti ng t o int erpl ead the com peti ng cl ai m ants
. T her e i s no T hi r d C i r cui tpr ece dent addr es s i ng the appl i cabi l i tyof e x h a u stio n p rin c ip les in th is c o n tex t. T h e q u e stio n f o r u s, th e n , is w hethera s o- cal l ed “r ever s e exhaus t i on” r equi r ementbar s a pl an fi du ci aryfrom bri ng i ng an int erpl eader act i on w i tho ut fi rs t devel opi ng a r ecor d and r ender i ng a fi nal benef i t s deci s i on. T he cons ens us vi ew i s that a fi duci ary need notm ake a fi nal benef i t s deci s i on. M anycourt s have a l l o w ed the us e of i nt erpl eade r i n E R I SA benef i t s cas es . See, e. g. , A ll i ant T echs y s t ems, I nc. v. M arks , 465 F. 3d 864 ( 8th C i r . 2006) ; M etr o. L i fe I ns . C o. v. Par ker , 436 F. 3d 1109 ( 9th C i r . 2006) ; G uar di an L i fe I ns . C o. of A m . v. Fi nch, 395 F. 3d 238 ( 5th C i r . 2004) ; M etr o. L i fe I ns . C o. v. B i gel ow , 283 F. 3d 436 ( 2d C i r . 2002) ; A etna Li fe Ins. C o. v. B ay on a, 22 3 F. 3d 10 30 (9th C i r. 20 00 ); M et ro. L i fe Ins. C o. v. M ar s h, 119 F. 3d 415 ( 6th C i r . 1997)

. A l m os t none of them even ment i on the pos s i bi l i tyof us i ng exhaus t i on pr i nci pl es t o bar in terp lea d e r a c tio n s. T h e p re v a ili n g v iew is th a t “[ i]n terp lea d e r is a val uabl e pr ocedur al devi ce f orE R I SA pl ans w ho ar e conf r ont ed w i th confl i ct i ng m ul t i pl e cl ai m s upon the pr o ceeds of an i n d i v i d u a l ’ s b e n e f

i tp l a n . ” Tr us t e e s o f

Di r e c t o r s Gu i l d o f

Am. Pr oducerPens i on B enef i t s Pl ans v. T i s e, 234 F
. 3 d 415, 426, as am en d ed u p o n d en ial o f re h ’g, 2 5 5 F .3 d 6 6 1 (9th C ir

. 2 0 0 0 ). If c o u rts d e m a n d e d a f

u llyd e v e lo p e d re c o rd a n d a f in a l b e n e f

its d e c isio n , E R IS A p lan s m ig h t f a c e e x p o su re to m u lti p le la w s u its f ro m d i sappo i nted cl ai m ants
. M ostcou rt s al l ow fi du ci ari es to a v o id th is q u a n d a ry b yf ilin g a n in te rp le a d e r c o m p la in t. S e e id

. B utther e ar e th ree report ed dec i s i ons that , t o vary i ng d e g r e e s , s u p p o r ta r e v e r s e - e x h a u s t i o n r e q u i r e me n t i n a tl e a s ts o me in terp lea d e r ca se s. T h e f irst i s L if e In su ra n c e C o m p a n yo f N o rth A m e ri c a v . N e a rs , 9 2 6 F . S u p p . 8 6 (W .D . L a . 1 9 9 6 )

. T h e re , a part i ci pant i n tw o E R I SA

- contr ol l ed l i fe- i ns ur ance pol i ci es fai l ed t o d e s i g n a t e a b e n e f

i c i a ry . W h e n p r e s e n t e d wi th c o mp e t i n g c l a i ms t o the bene fi t s , the i ns ur erbr oughtan i nt erpl eade ract i on. O ne of the pol i ci es cont ai ned a “fa ci l i ty of paym ent ” cl aus e. I ts t at ed that15 “[a ] nyamount of y our. . . benef i t s for w hi ch t her e i s no des i gnat ed

. . . benef i ci ary w i l l be pai d, at [the i ns ur er ’ s ] opt i on, t o anyof y our fol l ow i ng l i vi n g rel at i ves : s pous e, m other , father , chi l d, or chi l dr en, ort o the exe cut or s oradmi ni s tr at or s of y our es t at e. ” Id. at89. B eca us e the pl an di d not “r ank the cl as s es of r el at i ves i n any or der or pr efe r ence , ” t he cour t “dec l i ne[d] t o i m pos e i t s s ubj ect i ve pr efe r ence . . . w her e the ins u r erha[d] cl ear l ycontr act ed forthe di s cr et i on t o exer ci s e i t s ow n j udg m en t
. ” I d. T he courtthus d e n i e d th e m o t i o n f

o ri n t e rp l e a d e ra s t o th a tp o l i c y. F o rcie r v . F o rcier, 4 0 6 F
. S u p p . 2 d 1 3 2 (D

. M ass. 20 0 5 ), al s o i nvol ved compet i ng cl ai m s t o a l i fe- i ns ur ance pol i cy w i th no desi gn at ed benef

i ci ary . T he court no t ed thatsi nce ex hau st i on i s a prer equ i si t e t o clai m s for plan ben efi t s, “[a]r gu ably

. . . the inverse sh o u ld be true” f

or i nterpleaders broug ht byplan fi du ci ari es: “ a b se n t g o o d c a u se , ins u re rs o r p lan a d m in istra to rs w ith d isc re tio n a ryp o w e r u n d e r E R IS A p lan s s h o u ld b e re q u ire d to exer ci s e thatdiscret i on, and make a dec i s i on, befor e s eeki ng j ud i ci al rel i ef. ” Id. at14 0-41. Th e cou rtst ate d th a t this “revers e exhaus t i on appr oach ha[d] cons i der abl e super fi ci al appea l

. ” I d. at 141. T he i ns ur er had cont r act ed t o m ake a bene fi t s deci s i on “under a pol icythati tw r ot e and thati tadmi ni s t er [ed]

. ” I d. H avi ng a f e d e ra l co u rt “ ste p in to th e sh o e s o f th e in su r e r ” m ig h t w e ll
“ im p e d e c o st-e f

f e c tiv e a d m in istra tio n .” Id . B u t d e sp ite th is con cern, the co urtdecided thatrever se exha ust i on w as m ere ly “pr efe r abl e, ” notm andat ory . I d. I nt erpl eade r , i tr eas oned, s erved the i nt er es t s o f both part i ci pant s and bene fi ci ar i es byens ur i ng p rom p t, fa irreso luti o n s o f co m p eti n g claim s. Id. at 14 2
. T h e c o u rt d e ter m in e d th a t to d ism iss o n re v e rse -e x h a u stio n g ro u n d s w o u ld onl ypr ol ong di s put es , as di s appoi nt ed cl ai m ant s w oul d l i kel ys eek re v ie w in f

e d e ra l c o u rt . Id

. O n ap peal i n F orci er, the C ou rtof A pp eal s for the F i rs t C ir cu itd ec li n ed to ad d ress the rev erse -ex h aust i on i s s ue bec aus e the part i es had notr ai s ed i t
. See For ci er v . M etr o. L i fe I ns . C o. , 469 F
. 3 d 1 7 8 , 1 8 2 (1 s t C ir

. 2 0 0 6 ). P are n theticall y , tho u g h , the c o u rt not ed that“on a goi ng- forw ar d bas i s ” i t m i ght not “l ook w i th favor up on i nterpleader act i on s broug h t b yi nsurer s w ho , i n the l ast anal y s i s , ar e s eeki ng t o s hi ftthei rr es pons ibil it ies t o the di s tr i ct courtw i thout an ycl eardemonstr at i on of a ne ed fori nt erpl eade r16 r el i ef. ” I d. at182 n. 3. I n our vi ew , the ana l y s es of both the N ear s opi ni on ( w hi ch endor s ed a l i m i t ed form of r ever s e exha us t i on) an d the C our tof A ppeal s forthe Fi r s t C i r cui t ’ s opi ni on i n For ci er( w hi ch r emai ned uncomm i t t ed) ar e per s uas i ve. N onethel es s , w hat ever the mer i t s of these opi nions’ reas on i ng , bo th ar e i nap po si t e. In b o th c ases, part i ci pant s fai l ed t o des i gnat e bene fi ci ar i es , and the pl ans ves t ed the fi duci ar i es w i th br oad di s cr et i onaryauthor i tyt o di s tr i but e the pr ocee ds

. See For ci er , 469 F. 3d at185 ( “M et L i fe c ontr act ed foran extr emel y fr ee hand i n deci di ng t o w hom

. . . the pol i cy ’ s pr ocee ds w ou l d b e paid i n the absence o f a de si gn at ed b enef i ci ary . ”); N ears , 926 F. Supp. at89 ( “[T] he insur erhas cl ear l ycontr act ed forthe di s cre ti on t o exer ci s e i t s ow n j udgm ent
. ”)

. T he s ound j udi ci al pol i cythatani m at es the exha us t i on doctr i ne appl i es w i th part i cul ar for ce w hen fi duci ar i es ar e exe r ci s i ng di s cr et i on gr ant ed bypl an document s. C o u r t s r evi ew s uch dec i s i ons underthe def er ent i al arbi tr ary and capr i ci ous s t andar d. See Fi r es t one Ti r e & R ubberC o. v. B ruch, 489 U
. S. 101 , 1 1 5 (19 89) ; M cLeod v. H art for d L i fe & A c c id e n t I n s. C o ., 3 7 2 F .3 d 6 1 8 , 6 2 3 (3 d C ir. 2 0 0 4 ). T h is defe r e n c e i n s u l a t e s th e d e c i s i o n f r o m un d u e j u d i c i a l s e c o nd gu essi ng a n d incr eases the li keli ho od that exhau st i on (orrever se exhaus t i on) w i l l w eed outfr i vol ous cl ai m s , “‘pr om ot [i ng] the cons i s t enttr eatm entof cl ai m s forben efi t s , ’ ” and e ncour agi ng non a d v e r s a r i a l c l a i m s e t t l e me n t
. Se e Harr o w, 2 7 9 F. 3 d a t249 (qu o ti n g A m ato, 61 8 F
. 2 d at 56 7 ). U nl i ke the di s cr et i onaryques t i on at issue i n N ear s and For ci er , M et L i fe’ s deci s i on i n thi s cas e w oul d r ece i ve no defe r ence f ro m a f e d e ra l co u rt. T h e d isp u te b e tw e e n P ric e ’s w id o w a n d h is chil dren turns on w hetherthe N ew Jer seydivorce j ud gm ent i s a Q D R O
. T hati s a ques t i on “of s t atut ory co n stru ct i on overw hi ch re v iew in g c o u rts e x e rc ise d e n o v o re v iew .” F iles v . E x x o n M o b il Pe ns i on Pl a n, 42 8 F. 3d 47 8, 48 6 ( 3d Ci r . 20 05 ) , c e r t
. de ni e d 1 26 S. C t
. 2304 ( 2006)

. I n l i ght of t hats t andar d, the pol i cycons i der at i ons under l y i ng the exha us t i on doctr i ne do not appl y . Fi r s t , m andat i ng r ever s e exha us t i on w oul d do l i t t l e t o r educe fr i vol ous l aw s ui t s . See H a rro w , 2 7 9 F .3 d a t 2 4 9
. P e rso n s w ith f riv o lo u s c laim s c o u ld still get a pl enary“secon d look” in fede ral cou rt
. S econ d, rever se exhaus t i on in thes e ci r cumst ance s i s unl i kel yt o pr oduce a17 sig n if ica n t re d u c tio n in c o sts o r an in c re a se in n o n a d v e rsa ria l cla im s ett l ement
. See i d. O n the contr ary , w i th pl ena ryr evi ew i n the o f f in g , the d is a p p o in ted c laim a n t w ill h a v e e v e ryin c e n tiv e to cont i nue the batt l e i n fede r al court
. T hi r d, l i t t l e i s gai ned byhavi ng fi duci aries “ r efi n[e] and def i n[e] the pr obl em” forfi nal j udi ci al reso luti o n . S ee A m ato, 61 8 F
. 2 d at 56 8
. Q u esti o n s o f statuto ry i nt erpr et at i on fal l w i thi n the “pe cul i arexpert i s e” of the court s , and the fi duci ary ’ s pos i t i on on the mat t erw i l l be of l i m i t ed ut i l i ty . C f. Z ip f v . A T & T , 7 9 9 F .2 d 8 8 9 , 8 9 3 (3 d C ir. 1 9 8 6 ). In sh o rt, ev e n if “s ound pol i cy ” s uppor t s the i m pos i t i on of a re v er s e- exhaus t i on r equi r ementi n s om e ca s es , thatpol i cydoes not ap p l yw hen the q u e s tio n c e n te rs o n th e e x is te n c e o f a Q D R O
. Po l i c y a s i d e , l i t i g a n t s i n a t l e a s t o n e c a s e h a v e a r gued t hat 2 9 U
. S
. C
. § 1056( d) ( 3) ( G ) ( i ) ( I I ) pr ohi b it s interplea d ers f il ed b ef o re an ini t i al Q D R O d e c isi on bythe fiduciary . S ee M et ro. L i fe Ins. C o. v. B i gel ow , 283 F. 3d 436, 442 ( 2d C i r . 2002)

. Sect i on 1 0 5 6 (d)(3 )(G )(i )(I I) st ates that “w ith in a re aso n ab le pe ri o d af ter” re c e iv in g a d o m e stic re latio n s o rd e r, “th e p lan a d m in istra to r sh a ll det erm i ne w hethers uch o rderi s a qual i fi ed domest i c r el at i ons or derand n ot i fythe part i ci pantand ea ch al t ernat e pay ee of s uch d e ter m in a tio n .” T h e C o u rt o f A p p e a ls fo r th e S e c o n d C irc u it h e ld th a t b rin g in g a n in ter p lea d e r c o m p lain t is a n a c c e p tab le w a yto “det erm i n[e] ” an or der ’ s Q D R O s t atus . B i gel ow , 283 F. 3d at442. W e agr ee. A pl an adm i ni s tr at or ’ s i nt erpr et at i on and appl i cat i on of the s t atut oryQ D R O r equi r ement s i s no m or e author i t at i ve ( and no l es s fi nal ) than that of the compet i ng cl ai m ant s . A n interpl eade r c o mp l a i n te f

f e c tu a t e s a p r o mp t , f

i n a l d e t e r mi n a t i o n o f

th e QDRO iss u e . A s the C o u rt o f A p p e a ls fo r th e S e c o n d C irc u it p o in ted o u t, cutt i ng off the us e of i nt erp le ader“w oul d as s i s tnone of the i nt er es t ed part i es . ” B i gel ow , 283 F. 3d at442. I tw oul d al s o m ake itfa r m o re d iff

ic u ltfo r ad m inistrators to “ d eterm in[ e]” c o n c lu s iv e ly a n o rd e r’ s Q D R O s ta tu s “ w ith in a re a s o n a b le p e ri o d .” Se e § 105 6( d) ( 3) ( G ) ( i ) ( I I )

. W e the r e fo r e ho l d t ha tne i the rER I SA n o r the prudent i al doctr i ne of e xhaus t i on bar s M et L i fe ’s i nt erpl eade ract i on. I V. In su m , the D istri ct C o u rt erred w h en itd ism issed M etL ife’s18 c o m p lain t f

o r w a n t o f

su b jec t m a tter ju risd ictio n . M e tL if e ’s w e llpl eade d compl ai ntes t abl i s hes thati t s caus e of a ct i on ar i s es under E R I SA
. T h e exhaus t i on r equi r ementi s a nonj ur i s di ct i onal af firm ati v e d ef

en se, an d that af

firm ati v e d e f

e n s e d id n o t r eq u ir e M et L i fe t o m ake a dec i s i on on the Q D R O i s s ue bef or e s eeki ng interplea d er in f

ed era l cou rt
. W e w ill v ac ate the D istri ct C o u rt ’s ju d g m e n t an d re m a n d f o r f u rth e r p ro c e e d in g s c o n sis ten t w ith th is opi ni on.