October 2005 Defense Horizons 

Defense

Overview

As a member of both the Partnership for Peace and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–Russia Council (NRC), Russia enjoys 

remarkable status in an alliance formed principally to counter Soviet 

aggression. Active participation in one additional element of NATO—the 

Research and Technology Organization (RTO)—would offer unique opportunities to enhance relationships and mutual security. The RTO is the largest organization of its type in the world, has an extremely active program 

of work, and is eager to work with Russia.

Enhanced cooperation between NATO and Russia in defense-related 

research and technology would not be easy. Mistrust is an obstacle, as is difficulty communicating in English and French, the official NATO languages. 

Also, Russian economic weakness impedes consistent participation, particularly in events outside Russia.

NATO could reach out to Russia, offering sequential, specific opportunities and limited funding. These opportunities could include involving young Russian scientists and engineers in selected, defense-related 

research and technology projects; having a special ad hoc senior executive 

group identify a small number of flagship activities and report on progress 

to the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors, the Military 

Committee, and the NRC; and inviting a few mid-level scientists, engineers, 

or technical managers to work directly with RTO staff in Paris, where they 

could assist in defining and providing support for specific elements of the 

RTO program of work.

If NATO vectors toward Russia in this way, Russia must respond 

by vectoring toward the Alliance. The key here is a more consistent and 

cooperative representation by Russia in the forums that are available to 

it. Russian representatives must also become more fluent in English and 

French to achieve meaningful dialogue. This is especially true at the technical, senior executive levels. Finally, Russia must respond promptly to these 

initiatives. The opportunities are there. Now is the time.

Neither the charter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) nor the formal statement by President Harry S. Truman

transmitting the proposed draft treaty to the U.S. Congress for ratiRussia and NATO: Increased Interaction 

in Defense Research and Technology

by Donald C. Daniel and Michael I. Yarymovych

A publication of the

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

Number 49

Horizons

o c t o b e r 2 0 0 5

fication named the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). It

was clear, however, that the principal purpose of NATO was to resist

communist aggression. It should have come as no surprise, then, that

the breakup of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact four decades later

caused an identity crisis for the Alliance. Arguments were made that

NATO had lost its purpose and should be dissolved. Concerns were

expressed that offering membership to former Soviet allies, but not

Russia, might provoke a conflict with Russia. It was obvious to many

that special and very specific attention had to be given to this new

situation.1

Thus, in 1991, almost as soon as the Berlin Wall came down,

NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).

The NACC assembled all the newly liberated countries in Europe,

together with the Soviet Union, to sit around the same table with

NATO nations. As former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson

later recalled, the unprecedented gathering was historic in an unexpected way:

A rather dramatic moment took place at the first meeting of the

NACC in NATO headquarters in Brussels, on the evening of December 20th, 1991. At a certain point in the evening, a messenger came

into the room and whispered in the ear of the representative of the

Soviet Union. He excused himself and left the room. A few minutes

later, he returned. He took his chair, and asked for the microphone.

He announced that he could no longer speak for the Soviet Union,

as the Soviet Union had, in the past few minutes, dissolved. He

would henceforth represent only Russia.2

In an attempt to resolve the uncertainty about the future of

NATO, the Alliance began the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program

in 1994. More than 20 countries, including Russia, joined the program. The PFP provides for joint military planning and exercises

and other activities (including cooperation in defense research and

technology) with NATO members. Over time, many of the Partners

have become members of NATO.3
   Defense Horizons October 2005

The true basis for the development of a strong and durable

partnership between NATO and Russia was provided by the 1997

Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security, which

expressed a joint commitment to build a lasting and inclusive peace

in the Euro-Atlantic area. This act established the Permanent Joint

Council (PJC), where Russia met with all NATO members to discuss

common security concerns, work toward mutual understanding and,

where possible, cooperate. A new phase was opened with the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) at the NATO-Russia

Summit on May 28, 2002, in Rome. This new body, which replaced

the PJC, brought together the 19 member countries and Russia to

identify and pursue opportunities for joint action. Unlike the PJC,

where positions on all issues were coordinated among the 19 members before discussions with Russia, the NRC works on the principle

of consensus. As Lord Robertson observed:

The seating arrangements alone speak volumes. In the old PJC, a

cumbersome troika shared the chair. We called it “19 plus 1.” Russia

called it “19 versus 1” . . . In the new NATO-Russia Council, there

is no “19,” and no “1.” All participants sit as equals, in alphabetical

order­—great powers and small powerstogether. Russia sits between

Spain and Portugal, fully comfortable as one of 20 participating

nations. We meet monthly, in NATO Headquarters—a building that

was on the target list of every Soviet nuclear missile commander.

And I—the Secretary General of NATO—chair the meeting.4

The creation of the NRC, spurred by the tragic events of September 11, 2001, demonstrated the resolve of members to work

closely as equal partners in areas of common interest and to stand

together against common threats. Chaired by the NATO Secretary

General, NRC meetings are held at least monthly at the level of

ambassadors and military representatives, twice yearly at the level of

foreign and defense ministers and chiefs of staff, and occasionally at

summit level. Work focuses on all areas of mutual interest identified

in the Founding Act.

The NRC is both a forum in which military issues can be discussed and a mechanism through which military cooperation can be

intensified to meet new challenges. Under the terms of the Rome

Declaration, military representatives of the NRC meet in Brussels

at least once a month. In addition, chiefs of defense and chiefs of

staff meet twice a year. Practical cooperation has been facilitated

by the establishment of a permanent NATO Military Liaison Mission

in Moscow.

Since 2002, NATO has embarked on a major effort of transformation. In that context, the relationship with Russia has intensified

under the auspices of the NRC. Despite the ebb and flow of political

relations with the events in Iraq and Afghanistan, practical tasks

are being accomplished. In the context of military-to-military cooperation being developed between NATO and Russia, General Harald

Kujat, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, emphasized such areas as the struggle against terrorism, defense reform,

search and rescue at sea, exercises and training, and logistics.

In addition, progress is being made in developing a cooperative

regime in theater missile defense (TMD). In June 2002, the NRC

established the TMD Ad Hoc Working Group at ambassadorial level

as a dedicated body to carry forward the technical work of the

Dr. Donald C. Daniel (danield@ndu.edu) is a distinguished 

research professor in the Center for Technology and National 

Security Policy at the National Defense University and current 

chairman of the NATO Research and Technology Board (RTB). 

Dr. Michael I. Yarymovych (myarymovych@sarspace.com) is an 

aerospace consultant and was the first chairman of the RTB.

Terrorism. Russia and NATO Allies are developing and keeping under review joint assessments of specific terrorist threats in the Euro-Atlantic area. They have

agreed to submit the ideas put forward at these conferences to the "20," to identify concrete proposals for cooperation in this area, moving beyond the theoretical to

the practical.

Defense Reform. [There is] a need to transform our military structures from their bloated Cold War incarnations, equipped for traditional territorial defense, to

smaller, better equipped, more rapidly deployable forces, geared toward responding to terrorism and other contemporary threats. These include expanding the Moscow-based NATO-Russia retraining center, which provides assistance to former Russian military personnel to transition to civilian life; examining areas for defense

industry cooperation; developing a work plan for increased logistics cooperation; sharing experience of force planning aspects of defense reform; establishing a fellowship at the NATO Defence College in Rome for Russian defense planners; setting up a fund to assist with the destruction of landmines; and assisting in the management of Russian military nuclear waste.

Search and Rescue at Sea. Following the loss of the submarine Kursk in August 2000, NATO Allies and Russia intensified joint efforts in the field of search and

rescue at sea. A series of cooperative activities associated with submarine crew escape and rescue were launched, which have fostered extremely positive relationships

and practical results that will benefit submarine operators from NATO member states, Russia, and other nations.

Interoperability. Efforts to enhance interoperability—the capacity for NATO and Russian forces and equipment to work together against shared threats—link

much of the cooperative work in the NRC, from civil emergency planning and response to theater missile defense. Cooperation in training also includes increased

attendance at counterpart defense colleges and educational institutions, language training, and seminars. Greater cooperation on logistics could also enhance interoperability between NATO and Russian forces.

Source: Excerpts from General Harald Kujat, former Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO and the NATO-Russia Council, published in Krasnaya Zvezda, an

organ of the Russian Ministry of Defense, December 25, 2002.

Areas of NATO-Russia Cooperaton
October 2005 Defense Horizons 

TMD cooperation initiative. To better address the many challenges

involved, the work is divided into five areas of activity: terminology, experimental concepts, joint concept of operations, training

and exercises, and systems capabilities. Each of these elements

is addressed by a dedicated Support Working Team composed of

experts from the various countries, military authorities, NATO agencies, and the International Staff in NATO Headquarters.5

Russian Defense Research and Technology 

Russia has a distinctive approach to research and technology

that traces to the evolution and dominance of the Russian Academy

of Sciences. In 1724, an Imperial Academy of Sciences was created

by order of Peter the Great to help modernize and strengthen Russia.

It drew many prominent European mathematicians and scientists,

including Leonard Euler and Nicolas and Daniel Bernoulli, and

remained an intellectual center of international renown through

many regimes and under many names.6The Academy is the leading

center of fundamental research in the natural and social sciences

in the Russian Federation and employs the best scientific minds of

the country. Members enjoy immense prestige and privileges. Unlike

members of many Western academies, the members of the Russian

Academy of Sciences are full-time employees of the Academy.

Funded entirely by the government of the Russian Federation,

the Academy exercises control over the activity of institutes, laboratories, and other bodies in fundamental research and training of scientists. It also is responsible for promoting international cooperation

and coordinating international projects. During the Soviet era, the

Academy was the central scientific organization of the Soviet Union,

with research and development (R&D) capabilities in Russia and the

other 14 Soviet republics. The many research institutes of the Academy were responsible for conducting fundamental research, and the

Academy ran much of the Soviet military R&D effort. Even today,

about half the work of the Academy is devoted to military R&D.

In the first decade after the dissolution of the Soviet Union,

restructuring of the Russian R&D system was driven to a significant

extent by the nation’s deep economic recession. The recession has

contributed to a large decrease in Russian R&D (most of which

is state funded) and a consequent major loss of scientific talent.

About 11,000 to 12,000 scientists and engineers are reported to have

emigrated; a similar number are working under contract outside

Russia.7

Recent shifts in priorities indicate that military R&D is on the

upswing. The external and internal brain drain appears to have

slowed, and new military realities are demanding new investments.

According to then-First Deputy Defense Minister Andrei A. Kokoshin, funding is available only to modernize arms already produced.

A number of plants in the military industrial complex, however, will

receive “guaranteed minimal state orders” for new weapons during

that period. The 1997–2005 arms development program was to provide Russia with the capability to manufacture “weapons that have

no equivalent in the world,” Kokoshin assured members of parliament.8

Thus, it seems that the Russian military R&D establishment

is overcoming the decline from the end of the Cold War and is ready

to reestablish itself at a new and perhaps more efficient level. It

remains to be seen whether a new spirit of openness can overcome

the previous attitude of secrecy so that cooperation with NATO is

possible.

The Research and Technology Organization

Within a few years of its inception in 1949, NATO created its

first organization devoted to collaboration on defense research

and technology, the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and

Development (AGARD). Several years later, the Defense Research

Group (DRG) was created. In 1997, NATO merged the AGARD and

DRG to form the Research and Technology Organization (RTO), the

largest and most technically advanced forum in the world for sharing defense-related research and technology. The RTO consists of a

Research and Technology Board, a Research and Technology Agency

(RTA), 6 technical panels, the NATO Modeling and Simulation

Group, and approximately 150 annual, specific technical activities.9

The technical activities of the RTO reflect the interests and

activities of NATO members. The program of work is formulated

annually by the technical panels for approval by the RTO Board. The

program is then executed by teams of experts. It is noteworthy that

essentially all activities, including personnel costs, travel, and equipment, are funded by member nations. The activities are coordinated

daily through the RTA, which publishes results. The RTA budget of

approximately $6 million leverages more than $15 billion in defense

research and technology invested annually by member nations,

almost all of which is available to NATO.

Russia has been involved in a variety of RTO programs, has

attended RTB meetings open to Partners, and has participated in

numerous RTO-sponsored symposia and other activities. The number of RTO activities open to PFP partners increased steadily during

the initial years of the organization and has reached a steady state

of approximately 90 activities per year; approximately 60 percent of

all RTO activities are open to Russia. Russian participation, however,

The RTO program of work consists of approximately 150 annual activities,

including:

•	 AGARDographs, major publications on a single, clearly defined technical

subject and comprised of material generally agreed to be of lasting interest and

value to the technical and military communities

•	 Cooperative Demonstrations of Technology, which showcase mature technologies in realistic environments primarily for the military communities

•	 Lecture Series, which disseminate state-of-the-art scientific knowledge in

2-day sessions to junior and mid-level specialists, scientists, and engineers

•	 Specialists Meetings, 2- or 3-day events that promote exchange of knowledge among an audience of specialists with selected speakers on an important

scientific or applied topic

•	 Symposia, 3- or 4-day meetings that promote exchange of knowledge among

a wide audience with selected speakers on an important scientific or technical

topic

•	 Task Groups, which bring together technical teams from member nations

to address a particular R&T area over a 1- to 3-year period, concluding with

specific suggestions on the way ahead

•	 Technical Courses are educational activities aimed at transferring practical

knowledge and recent field development through on-site instructor training

•	 Workshops facilitate intensive information exchange and focused discussion over a 2-to 3-day period on a specific topic among a limited number of

invited experts

Annual Activities of the NATO Research and Technology Organization (RTO)
   Defense Horizons October 2005

has not increased similarly. When the RTO has held activities in

Russia, the Russian participation has been significant; when activities have been held elsewhere, Russian participation has been much

more limited. Although a variety of activities—most notably Task

Groups, which are a major growth area—are open to Russia, Russian

participation has been limited almost exclusively to symposia and

educational activities. The impact of restricted participation and the

potential for enhanced interaction will be discussed later.

Opportunities for Cooperation 

Of the 67 new activities initiated by the RTO in 2005, 45

are open to Russian participation through the Partnership for

Peace program. Significant opportunities are especially available

in applied vehicle technology, information systems technology, and

modeling and simulation. It is also significant to note that 23 of the

45 opportunities for cooperation are in task groups, which can be

especially beneficial in strengthening the relationships between

NATO scientists and engineers and their Russian counterparts, and

in providing Russia the opportunity to significantly influence and

contribute to emerging technologies of value to NATO. By its nature,

a task group is the most interactive, sustained activity undertaken

by the RTO. It brings together scientists and engineers from member nations to look at a technical area in depth for 1 to 3 years and

concludes with recommendations on the way ahead for both NATO

and national programs. Some of the 2005 task groups that should be

of particular interest to Russia—and where Russia has significant

expertise—include: micro-electro-mechanical systems applications

to gas turbines; advanced multi-sensor surveillance systems for combating terrorism; infrared/ultraviolet threat-warning sensors; and

distributed learning and simulation to support NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), and the PFP Training and Education

Enhancement Program.

RTO Workshops also offer excellent opportunities for Russia

and NATO. These forums bring together some of the world’s foremost

experts to discuss and debate the state of the art of defense-related

technologies with the aim of significantly broadening and enhancing individual and group knowledge of the subjects. Two workshops

open to Russia in 2005—“Toward Recommended Methods for Testing

and Evaluation of EV” and “ESV Based Visionic Devices and Military

Applications of Multi-Robot Systems”—would benefit from active

Russian participation.

Increased Cooperation in Defense R&T

Before discussing several issues and theway ahead, let uslook at

the context ofthe currentsituation. Several questions arise here:Why

increasecooperationwithRussiaindefense-relatedresearchandtechnology (R&T)? What are the interests of NATO and member nations?

Do NATO and member nations have sufficient common interests with

Russia? Why hasn’t cooperation in defense R&T worked better so far?

	 It is clearly fundamental that NATO wants to cooperate with

Russia across a broad front. One only has to consider the Alliance’s

near-continuous outreach. Because RTO work tends to be on the

levels of basic and applied research, cooperation is relatively nonthreatening, forms a basis for increasing knowledge of all parties

involved, and could form the basis for a more cooperative spirit

among all parties across a broader spectrum of activities. Couple this

with the fact that Russia has clearly retained outstanding capability

in defense-related technologies, and the potential benefit to all parties is apparent.

Applied Vehicle Technology. This panel conducted a symposium on Functional and Mechanical Integration of Weapons with Land and Air Vehicles; a Specialist Meeting

on The Control and Reduction of Wear in Military Platforms; a Lecture Series on Critical Technologies for Hypersonic Vehicle Development; and a Task Group on Health

Monitoring of Munitions.

Human Factors and Medicine. This panel featured a Lecture Series on Personal Active Noise Reduction; a Technical Course on New Issues in Operational Ophthalmology; a Workshop on Battlespace Visualization: Promises and Reality; and a Task Group on Virtual Environments for Intuitive Human-System Interaction.

Information Systems Technology. Topics included a Symposium on Building Coalition Capabilities and C4ISR Architectures; a Workshop on Visualization and the

Common Operating Picture; another Workshop on Enhancing Information Systems Security Through Biometrics; and a Task Group on Network Centric Operations Security.

Sensors and Electronics Technology. This panel sponsored a Task Group on Sensors for Urban Operations; another Task Group on N-Dimensional Eyesafe LADAR

Imaging; a Symposium on High Resolution Radar Signatures for Air Targets; and a Lecture Series on Radar Polarimetry and Interferometry.

Studies, Analysis and Simulation. Topics included a Cooperative Demonstration of Technology on Mission Training via Distributed Simulation; a Task Group on

Exploring New C2 Concepts and Capabilities; and a Lecture Series on NATO Code of Best practice for C2 Assessment.

Systems Concepts and Integration. This panel featured a Task Group on Correlation Between Laboratory Testing and Field Trials of Multi-Spectral Camouflage

Systems; another Task Group on System-Level Integration of Control Plus Automation; a Cooperative Demonstration of Technology in Sensors and Sensor Denial by Camouflage, Concealment and Deception; and a Workshop on Multi-Sensor Fusion Techniques and Architectures for Amphibious Operations.

Modeling and Simulation Group. Activities included a Task Group on Implementation of HLA Compliance Certification within NATO and NATO nations; another

Task Group on Modeling and Simulation Tools for Early Warning Identification of Terrorist Activities; a Symposium on Modeling and Simulation to Address NATO’s New

and Expanding Military Requirements; and a Task Group on Urban Combat Advanced Training Technology.

Selected Activities of the 2004 RTO Program of Work
October 2005 Defense Horizons 

All nations involved, including Russia, will benefit from open

dialogue and discussion on defense-related technologies in the form

of an increased knowledge base. There also will be opportunities for

individual scientists and engineers to become better acquainted over

time, thus building trust. Increased trust can pay off by increasing

understanding of cultures, customs, and thought processes—which

may open new ways of solving technical problems. Over the long

term, individuals involved may also move to positions of increasing

responsibility and have the opportunity to cooperate in other areas,

including political relations.

NATO and Russia clearly have many common interests in

defense-related technologies. Our militaries face common problems,

most notably defense against terrorism and the overall transformation of military forces, doctrine, and tactics from a Cold War model

to one that can be more responsive to current and projected threats.

Cooperation in defense research and technology poses relatively low

risks to the parties, because application of the technologies is longterm in nature and creates no immediate military threat.

There are multiple reasons why better cooperation in defense

research and technology has not occurred to date. Russia still does

not trust NATO and member nations, and the eastward expansion

of NATO exacerbated Russian concerns. Conversely, the newest

members do not trust Russia and show little interest in being more

involved with it under an RTO umbrella. The Russian economic situation also continues to be an obstacle to increased cooperation; the

costs associated with almost all RTO activities are funded directly

by member nations, which presents a particular problem for Russia. Finally, Russian concerns over intellectual property rights and

NATO’s lack of understanding of complex Russian laws, rules, and

regulations in regard to exchanging pre-competitive scientific information can be stumbling blocks that require education of, and by, all

parties involved.

Practical Issues 

More than 40 years of Cold War have left a residue of suspicion

on both sides of the former Iron Curtain. Fortunately, this is less

true of scientists and engineers, especially when purely technical

subjects are being discussed. The technical excellence of Russian

scientists and engineers and their desire to interact with international colleagues are positive forces in building and enhancing dialog

and communication with the NATO nations. Unfortunately, language

is a substantial impediment to cooperation.

Russia lacks consistent ability in English and French, the official languages of NATO, among scientists, engineers, and technical

executives. (And Russian language ability is almost nonexistent

among NATO scientists, engineers, and executives.) The lack of fluency in these languages is particularly awkward when one considers

that the majority of Russians involved with NATO—or perhaps more

importantlythose who could be involved but are not—are senior personnel who are clearly uncomfortable attempting to communicate in

languages in which they have little or no skill.

NATO member nations typically have their most senior defense

research and technology (R&T) authorities serving as members

of the Board, senior executives with significant responsibilities in

national defense laboratories serving on the panels, and senior scientists/engineers serving on symposia, task groups and other level-3

activities. It has been very difficult to get Russia to identify and

make available appropriate senior technical executives responsible

for defense R&T for participation in RTO activities at the Board and

panel levels. Some of the difficulty is perhaps due to a lack of Russian understanding (or acceptance) that the sole interest of the RTO

is defense R&T.

The lack of response is also perhaps due to a defense organizational structure in Russia that not only is dissimilar to the typical

structures in Europe and North America, but also has had limited

stability. RTO activities and the associated costs of salary, personnel, travel, and equipment are funded mainly by member nations.

Unfortunately, Russia continues to struggle with the costs of doing

business with NATO.

The Way Ahead

The Soviet Union had a very strong military technology base,

much of which still exists in Russia. Russian solutions of technical

problems were robust, exceedingly clever, and often based on different choices of technical systems. Recently, Russian leadership has

recognized the need to reverse a decade-long decline, salvage vast

intellectual potential, and increase military R&D investments. Russian strengths certainly include missiles and space launch vehicles,

radar, aircraft, tanks, and submarines. Their abilities in the underlying technologies of materials, structures, aerodynamics, and propulsion are truly outstanding, as is their ability in fundamental mathematics, which is the foundation of information technology. Russian

mathematicians and scientists also have excelled in explaining the

physics of technical phenomena using eloquent mathematical tools

rather than numerical solutions.

Improving relationships between NATO and Russia in defense

research and technology clearly revolves around people and programs. Several steps could be taken now in these areas that have

significant potential for improving the current situation. Recognizing that much of the distrust between NATO and Russia is

generational in nature, efforts should be made by both sides to

identify projects that are amenable to cooperative work by younger

engineers and scientists. To this end, each technical panel within

the RTO could identify at least one activity for a 2006 start (preferably a task group), work closely with the RTA Partnership for Peace

executive to identify appropriate Russian institutions that employ

younger scientists and engineers in the identified technical areas,

and strongly encourage these institutions to make some of their

most capable young people available to participate. Younger Russian

scientists generally recognize the need to learn English because of

their professional exposure to scientific conferences and would be

more comfortable participating in RTO meetings. Recognizing that

a shortage of funds may be a barrier to Russian participation, some

modest funding, especially to support travel of the young scientists

and engineers, could perhaps be made available by NATO.

Assuming that the above activities were successful, the RTO,

working with Russia, could next identify a few flagship activities to

be pursued jointly in the near term. Although a very wide variety of
   Defense Horizons October 2005

possibilities exist, attention might be given initially to information

technology and aerospace medicine. These are areas where Russian

expertise is respected and the RTO program of work is exceptionally

strong. In addition, the work could be of a fundamental research

nature, but with clear defense relevance. Unlike the task groups that

were mentioned earlier for the younger scientists and engineers,

these flagship activities would be broader in scope and would seek

to attract a significant number of mid- and senior-level scientific

and engineering personnel from the NATO nations and Russia. Also,

unlike other RTO activities that are open to Partners, these activities would be specifically tailored to Russian expertise (although

other Partner nations might also participate). A workshop format,

utilizing large and small groups interactively, may be the best format

to enhance dialogue. A clear mandate should be to produce a report

with emphasis on the way ahead.

Finally, following the success of the first two initiatives, the

RTA could perhaps invite Russia to provide a few mid-career scientists and engineers to work with RTA staff for a trial period of 1

year. These individuals could be assigned to work directly for Panel

Executives in technical areas of highest mutual interest to NATO

and Russia. Immersion in the broad scope of RTO activities on a daily

basis could help Russia develop a much better understanding of the

NATO research and technology program and become more active in

it. In addition, NATO could gain a much better understanding of Russian defense research and technology and the institutions involved.

If Russia or NATO judge this broad option to be too large a step, the

Russian personnel could still be identified and assigned, but the

scope of the interaction could be initially limited, for example, to

NATO’s Defense Against Terrorism program, which is of great interest to both parties. Security might also be an issue, since the Russians could not be granted NATO security clearances.

Conclusion 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia have much

to offer each otherin defense-related research and technology. Unfortunately, the pace of cooperation has been erratic and the results

uneven. Proactive stepsmust be taken by both sides.Basic and applied

defense-related R&T is relatively nonthreatening to all parties and

creates cooperative avenues that can be very significant in a world

of asymmetric threats. These activities offer mechanisms to create

more significant political and military cooperative ventures as scientific understandings of new phenomena are created and implemented

into military operations. The opportunities are there. Now isthe time.

Notes

Defense Horizons is published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. CTNSP 

publications are available online at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other 

department or agency of the Federal Government.

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

 Hans Binnendijk

Director

1

“With her nuclear arsenal, her 11 time zones, her 150 million citizens, and her

borders stretching from the Caucasus through Central Asia and the Far East, Russia’s

fate remains vital to the security of the Euro-Atlantic community. Nothing could be

of more long-term benefit to our common security than for Russia to take her rightful

place as a full, trusting and trustworthy member of the Euro-Atlantic community.” “A

New Russian Revolution: Partnership with NATO,” speech by NATO Secretary General

Lord Robertson, Royal Society of Edinburgh, December 13, 2002. 2

Ibid.

3

In 1998, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO. In 2004,

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined, raising

membership to 26. All of the non-Soviet members of the former Warsaw Pact are now

in NATO. 4

Lord Robertson. 5

Robert Bell, Assistant Secretary General, Chairman, NATO Russia Council Ad

Hoc Working Group on Theatre Missile Defense, “Ballistic Missile Threats: A NATORussia Strategic Challenge,” Krasnaya Zvezda, February 27, 2003. 6

It became the Russian Academy of Sciences in July 1917, under the Aleksandr

Kerensky government, then the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1925. In 1934, it moved

from St. Petersburg to Moscow. In December 1991, it regained its pre-Bolshevik name,

the Russian Academy of Sciences. A concise history of the Academy is available on the

Academy Web site at <http://www.pran.ru/eng/history/20021211024821history.html>. 7

William C. Boesman, “Research and Development in Russia: An Important

Factor for the Future” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August

24, 1998).

8

Richard F. Staar, “The Bear Sharpens Its Claws,” Hoover Digest, no. 4 (Stanford,

CA: Hoover Institution, 1997). 9

For a detailed description of the RTO, see Donald C. Daniel and

Leigh C. Caraher, “NATO Defense Science and Technology,” Defense Horizons 24

(Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, March 2003).