DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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LANDSCAPE
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Cover image: Kim Jong Un inspecting an alleged mockup of a nuclear device. 

Source: AFP PHOTO/KCNA VIA KNS

Information cutoff date, February 2018

DIA-05-1712-016
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY V

GLOBAL NUCLEAR LANDSCAPE

Executive Summary VI

Section One: Russia 8

Section Two: China 15

Section Three: North Korea 19

Annex: 21st Century Cases 25

Contents
VI

Executive Summary

Scope Note

This DIA report was compiled from open source information in response to a request by the House 

Armed Services Committee to provide a document on selected foreign nuclear weapons-related 

capabilities, programs, infrastructure, and doctrine.

Since the end of the Cold War and related reductions of Russian and U.S. stockpiles, the number of nuclear states has 

increased; their stockpiles have grown; new weapons have been built and older weapons improved; and the threshold 

for use has potentially lowered. Nation-state efforts to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their 

delivery systems, or their underlying technologies constitute a major threat to the security of the United States, its 

deployed troops, and its allies. Most nuclear-armed countries see nuclear weapons as a guarantor of sovereignty 

and are unlikely to eliminate their stockpiles. A future use of nuclear weapons probably would bring about significant 

geopolitical changes as some states would seek to establish or reinforce security alliances with existing nuclear powers 

and others would push for global nuclear disarmament.1

Five themes in foreign nuclear development and proliferation are:

1. Increasing numbers or capabilities of weapons in existing programs.

2. Enduring security threats to weapons and material.

3. Countries developing new delivery systems with increased capabilities.

4. Countries developing nuclear weapons with smaller yields, improved precision, and increased range for military or

coercive use on the battlefield.

5. Countries developing new nuclear weapons without conducting large-scale nuclear tests.

Examples of these themes include:

• Russia, China, and North Korea are increasing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and enhancing delivery systems.

• Nuclear use doctrines, smaller nuclear weapons, growing stockpiles, and the movement of additional weapons 

and material increase opportunities for theft or diversion.2

• As multiple countries, particularly those with less established weapons programs, seek to build ever smaller 

and more sophisticated nuclear weapons, their technical ambitions may lead to compromises in safety which, 

taken with the increasing size of stockpiles, could make a weapons accident more likely.3

• North Korea is developing a wide variety of new delivery systems, and China is developing a mobile missile with 

multiple idependently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).4,5

• In order to counter missile defense, countries are developing new categories of weapon systems. China and 

Russia are developing hypersonic glide vehicles, and Russia is probably developing a nuclear-armed, nuclearpowered underwater vehicle.6,7,8

• Since the turn of the century, North Korea has been the only nation to have conducted large-scale nuclear 

tests, but other countries are also developing new nuclear weapons without conducting large-scale tests.9,10,11
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VII

GLOBAL NUCLEAR LANDSCAPE

Selected Nuclear Capable Delivery Systems

Class of Weapon Inventory

RUSSIAN NUCLEAR MILITARY CAPABILITY

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

Short-Range Ballistic Missiles

Close-Range Ballistic Missiles

Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

Antiship Missiles

Torpedoes

Antisubmarine Missiles

Depth Charges

Nuclear-Armed, Nuclear-Powered Underwater Vehicle

Air-to-Surface Missiles

Antiaircraft Missiles

Antiballistic Missiles

Gravity Bombs

CHINESE NUCLEAR MILITARY CAPABILITY

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles

Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

NORTH KOREAN BALLISTIC MISSILES DESIGNED FOR NUCLEAR DELIVERY

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles

Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles

Short-Range Ballistic Missiles

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

Current Stockpile Developmental
8

Overview

Russia is committed to modernizing and adding 

new military capabilities to its nuclear forces. Landbased intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are 

controlled by the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), and 

sea- and air-based strategic systems are managed 

by the Navy and Aerospace Force, respectively.12

Russia plans to upgrade the capacity of its strategic 

nuclear triad by 2020.13 In addition to its strategic 

nuclear weapons, Russia is adding new military capabilities to its large stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear 

weapons (NSNWs), including those employable by 

ships, aircraft, and ground forces.14

• The SRF operates three older ICBM systems for 

more than one-half of its land-based nuclear 

delivery vehicles: the silo-based SS-18 and SS-19, 

which respectively carry 10 and 6 MIRVs, and the 

single-warhead SS-25. These systems will be withdrawn from service and replaced with newer, more 

modern road-mobile and silo-based ICBMs as they 

reach the end of their operational lives by 2021.15,16

• The second element of the nuclear triad is a 

fleet of at least 10 nuclear-powered ballistic 

missile submarines (SSBNs) under Naval High 

Command control.17

• The third element of Russia’s nuclear triad is 

the Russian Aerospace Force's fleet of strategic 

bombers, which forms the core of the LongRange Aviation (LRA) Command.18,19

• Russia currently has an active stockpile of up to 

2,000 NSNWs.20,21,22

RUSSIA Section One

Image Source: Shutterstock Tu-95 Bear Nuclear-Capable 

Strategic Bomber
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 9

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History

Russia’s nuclear weapons program began during 

World War II, accelerated after the bombings of 

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and by 1949 resulted in 

a successful test of a nuclear device. From 1949 

until 1990, the Soviet Union was responsible for 

715 of the world’s 2,079 reported nuclear detonations. Of the 715, 219 occurred in the atmosphere, 

in space, or underwater. The remaining 496 detonations were performed underground. The majority of the testing occurred at two sites: 456 tests at 

Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan and 140 tests on the 

Novaya Zemlya archipelago. The Soviet Union carried out the most powerful explosion conducted 

by any country on 30 October 1961, when it tested 

a 50-megaton thermonuclear bomb nicknamed 

“Tsar Bomb.” Bolstered by the data gathered 

from these tests, the Soviet Union developed the 

largest foreign nuclear weapons program in the 

world, culminating in more than 40,000 nuclear 

warheads in its inventory by 1986.23,24,25

Nuclear Arms Control

Several treaties have placed limitations on Russian 

nuclear explosive testing and weapon stockpiles. 

The Partial Test Ban Treaty, signed by the Soviet 

Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom 

in 1963, prohibited all nuclear explosions in the 

atmosphere, ocean, and outer space. Underground 

testing was subsequently limited to 150 kilotons by 

the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, signed in July 1974 

and entered into force in December 1990. The 

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which 

Russia signed in 1996 and ratified in 2000, banned 

any nuclear explosion in any environment by all 

parties to the treaty upon its entry into force. The 

U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known 

as START I, was signed in 1991 and was the first

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union 

entered into force in June 1988 and eliminated all nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. Since 2014, the Russian Federation 

has been in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test 

a ground-launched cruise missile within these ranges, or to possess or produce launchers of such 

missiles.26 Russia has developed a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) that the United States 

has declared is in violation of the INF Treaty. In 2013, a senior Russian administration official stated 

publicly that the world had changed since the INF Treaty was signed. In addition, Russian officials 

have made statements in the past complaining that the treaty prohibits Russia, but not some of 

its neighbors, from developing and possessing ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 

and 5,500 kilometers.27

Image Source: Shutterstock Model of Soviet 50-Megaton "Tsar Bomb"
10

treaty mandating deep reductions in both countries’ 

deployed strategic nuclear delivery systems. Finally, 

the New START Treaty (NST) was signed by the United 

States and the Russian Federation on 8 April 2010, 

further limiting the number of strategic warheads 

each country can deploy and the number of active 

and inactive strategic delivery systems.28,29,30,31,32

Doctrine

Russia relies on its strategic nuclear forces to deter 

foreign attacks and, should deterrence fail, to 

deliver crippling, responsive strikes. Russia reserves 

the right to use nuclear weapons first if its sovereignty or territorial integrity is threatened.33 Because 

the responsive option imposes the most strain on 

the strategic forces, which must react even after a 

potentially disabling strike, strategic forces, weapons, and battle management systems are designed 

and built to be hardened, stealthy, redundant, and 

reliable even in a WMD-degraded environment.34 

Russia maintains the Perimetr system, which is 

designed to ensure that a responsive launch could 

be ordered when Russia is under nuclear attack.35

Russia plans to complete upgrading the capacity and 

capability of its strategic nuclear triad. Russia’s nuclear 

force upgrade goals include replacing Soviet-legacy 

weapons with modern nuclear weapons, maintaining 

rough parity with the U.S. nuclear arsenal, improving 

the survivability and efficiency of its nuclear weapons, 

and maintaining prestige on the international stage. 

Russia’s nuclear upgrades include both strategic and 

nonstrategic nuclear weapons.36,37,38,39

Russia fears that the speed, accuracy, and quantity of nonnuclear, strategic-range, precision-guided weapons can achieve strategic effects 

on par with nuclear weapons,40 one of the primary 

reasons that, since at least 1993 (and most recently 

reflected in Russia's 2014 Military Doctrine), Russia 

has reserved the right to respond with a nuclear 

strike to a nonnuclear attack threatening the existence of the state.41,42,43 Recent statements on Russia’s evolving nuclear weapons doctrine lower the 

threshold for first use of nuclear weapons and blur 

the boundary between nuclear and conventional 

warfare. Very-low-yield nuclear weapons reportedly could be used to head off a major conflict and 

avoid full-scale nuclear war.44,45

Nuclear Capability/Stockpile

The U.S.-Russia NST entered into force on 5 February 2011. This treaty specifies both sides must meet 

limits on strategic delivery systems and deployed 

warheads by February 2018 and maintain them 

Image Source: DIBMAC Report SS-27 Road-Mobile ICBM

Image Source: Shutterstock Tu-160 Blackjack Nuclear-Capable 

Strategic Bomber
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 11

GLOBAL NUCLEAR LANDSCAPE

through February 2021, with the option for a single extension of 5 years. The aggregate limits of the 

NST restrict the United States and Russia to 1,550 

deployed strategic warheads each. Warheads actually deployed on ICBMs and submarine- launched 

ballistic missiles (SLBMs) count toward this limit 

while each deployed heavy bomber equipped for 

nuclear armaments, whether with gravity bombs 

or air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), counts as 

one warhead. The NST includes an aggregate limit 

of 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, 

SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for 

nuclear armaments. Within that limit, the number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers cannot exceed 700.46 According to New START 

Treaty statements on 5 February 2018, Russia 

declared 1,444 warheads on 527 deployed ICBMs, 

SLBMs, and heavy bombers.47

Nonstrategic nuclear weapons are any nuclear 

weapons not covered by NST. Russia currently has 

an active stockpile of up to 2,000 NSNWs. These 

include air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic 

missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, gravity bombs, 

and depth charges for medium-range bombers, 

tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as 

antiship, antisubmarine, and antiaircraft missiles 

and torpedoes for surface ships and submarines, 

and Russia’s antiballistic missile system.48,49,50,51

Infrastructure

Rosatom is the state corporation in charge of Russia’s nuclear complex. In addition to its civil nuclear 

power responsibilities, Rosatom develops, tests, 

manufactures, and dismantles nuclear munitions 

at the facilities depicted on the map. Rosatom is 

updating its warhead production complex and 

is producing what we assess to be hundreds of 

nuclear warheads each year.52,53 In 2015, Russian 

President Putin claimed that more than 40 ICBMs/

SLBMs would be produced that year.54 Each missile 

can carry 6 warheads, indicating Russia probably 

produced more than 200 nuclear warheads in 2015.

Image Source: Shutterstock Russian SS-18 Heavy ICBM Silo Cover
12

1703-12169 Russia’s nuclear weapons program has been supported by a number of facilities that include production, 

processing, research and development, and testing.

Design

Electronics

Storage

Nuclear test site

Component and tritium production

Warhead production

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

0 400 800 Kilometers

RUSSIA

KAZAKHSTAN

ESTONIA

SWEDEN

FINLAND

NORWAY

BELARUS

Moscow

Snezhinsk

All-Russian Scientific Research

Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF)

Trekhgornyy

Zheleznogorsk

Lesnoy

Sarov

Novaya Zemlya

Ozersk

Mayak Production Association

Instrument Making Plant 

All-Russian Scientific Research

Institute of Automatics (VNIIA)

Mining and Chemical Combine 

Electrochemical Instrument Combine

All-Russian Scientific Research Institute Experimental Physics (VNIIEF)

ARCTIC OCEAN

Barents Sea

Caspian

Sea

Kara Sea

RUSSIA

Russia Nuclear Weapon-Related Facilities
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 13

GLOBAL NUCLEAR LANDSCAPE

Delivery Systems

Russia’s strategic nuclear weapon triad consists of 

the SRF, SSBNs, and the LRA.

Strategic Rocket Forces

The SRF's missile inventories are split between 

road-mobile and silo-based ICBMs. Three Soviet-era ICBM systems account for over half of the 

SRF’s land-based strategic missiles. The oldest 

ICBMs in the arsenal are the silo-based SS-18 

(initial operational capability (IOC) 1988), and the 

SS-19 Mod 3 (IOC 1980). These missiles carry, 

respectively, 10 and 6 MIRVs. The single-warhead 

SS-25 (IOC 1988) was deployed as a road-mobile 

ICBM.55 As these aging missiles approach the end 

of their operational lives, they are being replaced 

with more modern road-mobile and silo-based 

ICBMs. The first of these modern ICBMs is the single-warhead SS-27 Mod 1 (RS-12M1 and 2), fielded 

initially in silos and then as a road-mobile version 

in 2006.56 Russia continues to field a MIRVed version, the SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24, IOC 2010) ICBM.57,58

Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile 

Submarines 

Russia’s sea-based portion of the triad includes at 

least 10 SSBNs under operational control of the 

Naval High Command.59 The current fleet consists 

of the SS-N-18 Mod 1 (IOC 1978) deployed on Delta 

III class submarines, the SS-N-23 (derivative Sineva missile deployed in 2007) deployed on Delta IV 

class submarines, and the new SS-N-32 (IOC 2014) 

deployed on Dolgorukiy class submarines. These 

Image Source: DIBMAC Report Field Deployed SS-27 Road-Mobile ICBM
14

missiles carry three, four, and six MIRVs respectively. The Russian Navy is upgrading its strategic 

capabilities, mainly by building more reliable and 

quiet Dolgorukiy class SSBNs with the new SS-N-32 

SLBMs. The Delta III SSBNs are likely to be retired in 

the next few years.60,61

Long-Range Aviation

Russia’s fleet of strategic bombers constitutes the 

air element of its nuclear triad. The LRA’s main 

strategic assets—Tu-95 Bear and Tu-160 Blackjack 

bombers—are being updated to continue operating beyond their original lifespan. Russia has 

announced that it will resume production of Tu-160 

bombers and complete development of a new-generation bomber (Russian designation PAK-DA) 

within a decade; timelines for both programs may 

slip if financial difficulties arise.62,63

Efforts To Improve Capability

Russia has several development programs underway for its SRF. Russian officials claim a new class of 

hypersonic vehicle, probably called “Object 4202” 

and “Yu-71,” is being developed to allow Russian 

strategic missiles to penetrate missile defense systems. A Russian media outlet claimed a successful 

test of this system from an SS-19 booster occurred 

in April 2016. Russian press reports indicate that 

Russia is developing a new, heavy, silo-based, liquid-propellant ICBM—called the Sarmat—to 

replace the SS-18. Russia is also preparing to field 

the new solid-propellant, mobile, Rubezh strategic 

ballistic missile, at Irkutsk possibly in 2018.64,65

According to a Russian state media report in November 2015, Russia may also be developing a unique 

delivery system known as Status-6. The platform is 

a nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered underwater vehicle. The Status-6 is allegedly a "robotic minisubmarine" capable of 100 knots with a range of 5,400 nautical miles, designed to “destroy important economic 

installations of the enemy in coastal areas and cause 

guaranteed devastating damage to the country's territory by creating wide areas of radioactive contamination, rendering them unusable for military, economic, or other activity for a long time.”66

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons Dolgorukiy Class Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 15

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CHINA Section Two

Overview

China continues to modernize and add new military 

capabilities to its nuclear forces by enhancing silobased ICBMs and adding more survivable mobile 

delivery systems, including four Jin class ballistic missile submarines.67,68,69 China has the most active and 

diverse ballistic missile development program in the 

world. Its ballistic missile force is expanding in both size 

and types of missiles, with China developing advanced 

new mobile, solid-propellant ICBMs.70 The number of 

warheads on Chinese ICBMs capable of threatening 

the United States is likely to continue growing.71

In addition to strategic nuclear forces, China has 

long maintained theater nuclear forces and is in 

the process of improving delivery capabilities for 

these forces.72

History

China began its nuclear weapons program in the 

mid-1950s, successfully detonating its first device 

at the nuclear test site in Lop Nur in 1964. In total, 

the international community detected 45 largescale nuclear explosive tests originating in China, 

the largest of which had an estimated yield on the 

order of multiple megatons.73,74 China continues 

research, development, maintenance, and production of nuclear warheads. Image Source: DIBMAC Report CSS-10 Road-Mobile ICBM 75
16

Nuclear Arms Control

China is party to the Nonproliferation Treaty, but 

is not party to any bilateral arms limitation treaties 

with the United States.76

Doctrine

China maintains a “no-first-use” (NFU) policy consisting of two stated commitments: China will 

never be the first to use nuclear weapons, and 

China will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state or in 

nuclear-weapon-free zones.77,78 An NFU policy is 

consistent with a nuclear force that is modest, 

survivable, and can probably deliver a damaging, 

responsive nuclear strike.79

Although China has frequently reaffirmed its commitment to NFU, most recently with the 2015 

release of “China’s Military Strategy” by the Ministry 

of National Defense, China’s nuclear program has 

consistently relied on opaqueness and uncertainty 

in its deterrence posture.80,81,82 We cannot exclude 

the possibility of circumstances in which China 

would abandon its NFU doctrine, particularly if its 

nuclear forces—and, therefore, responsive capability—or political survival of the country were at 

risk.83,84

Nuclear Capability/Stockpile

China probably maintains an operational nuclear 

warhead stockpile in the low hundreds.85,86 China's highly enriched uranium and plutonium 

are probably sufficient for a potential nuclear 

warhead stockpile in the high hundreds to

low one-thousands.87

Infrastructure

China has the required industrial capacity to enrich 

uranium and produce plutonium for military needs. 

The China National Nuclear Corporation, the largest 

nuclear enterprise in China, operates several uranium enrichment facilities organized under three 

plants (plants 405, 504, and 814)88 that primarily 

support the nation's burgeoning nuclear power 

industry, but China could devote some enrichment 

capacity to support military needs.89 China’s plutonium production reactors (plants 404 and 821) probably ceased operation in the 1980s;90 however, China’s reprocessing facilities at plant 404 can extract 

plutonium from spent reactor fuel if required.91

China’s only nuclear weapon design and production organization—the China Academy of Engineering Physics—is key in developing and maintaining 

China’s nuclear force.92 It has tens of thousands 

of employees, and its scientists are capable of all 

aspects of nuclear weapon design research, including nuclear physics, materials science, electronics, 

explosives, and computer modeling.93,94

Delivery Systems

China has about 75 to 100 ICBMs with nuclear 

missions in its inventory, including the silo-based 

CSS-4 Mod 2 and Mod 3 (Chinese designator DF-5), 

the solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 Mods 1 and 2 

(DF-31 and DF-31A), and the shorter ranged CSS-3 

(DF-4). The CSS-10 Mod 2, with a range in excess 

of 11,000 kilometers, can reach most locations 

within the continental United States. The remainder of China’s nuclear force includes road-mobile, 

solid-fueled CSS-5 (DF-21) medium-range ballistic 

missiles (MRBMs) for regional missions.95

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons The CSS-4 is a silo-based ICBM that can 

reach most locations in the United States.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 17

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China Nuclear Weapon-Related Facilities

MONGOLIA

CHINA

VIETNAM

INDIA

BURMA Taiwan

RUSSIA

Plant 404

Plant 405

Plant 814

Plant 504

Shenyang

Zitong

Mianyang

Chengdu

Beijing

Lanzhou

Hanzhou

Jiuquan

Hepingyizu

Lop Nur Nuclear Test Site

South China Sea

Yellow

Sea

Research and development

Uranium enrichment

Plutonium processing, not operating

Nuclear test site Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

0 300 600 Kilometers

CHINA

1703-12168 China’s nuclear weapons program has been supported by a number of facilities that include production, 

processing, research and development, and testing.
18

Efforts To Improve Capability

China is developing and producing nuclear weapons with new military capabilities to increase its 

survivability, reliability, and ability to penetrate 

missile defenses.96 China is developing and testing offensive missiles, forming additional missile 

units, qualitatively upgrading missile systems, 

and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses. The Chinese nuclear ballistic missile force is expanding in both quantity and types 

of missiles, and the number of Chinese ICBM 

nuclear warheads capable of reaching the United 

States is likely to expand in the near future.97 In 

addition, each of China’s four Jin class SSBNs is 

capable of carrying 12 JL-2 SLBMs, whose estimated range could allow targeting of portions of 

the United States from operating areas near the 

Chinese coast.98,99

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) probably has 

multiple nuclear warhead designs that are decades 

old, and stockpiled weapons probably require ongoing observation, maintenance, or refurbishment to 

maintain confidence in their effectiveness.100 China 

probably continues research, development, maintenance, and production of nuclear warheads given the 

development of new nuclear weapon delivery systems such as the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic 

missile (IRBM), as well as the road-mobile DF-41 ICBM 

with MIRVs.101,102,103,104,105,106 Nuclear weapon development includes launch platforms for new weapon 

systems, such as more-mobile transporter-erector-launcher systems, possible rail-launch platforms, 

and a next-generation SSBN, which will reportedly 

carry the JL-3 SLBM.107,108 China tested a hypersonic 

glide vehicle in 2014, although official statements 

made no reference to its intended mission or its 

capability to carry a nuclear warhead.109,110In 2016, 

the PLA Air Force commander referred publicly to 

the military’s efforts to produce an advanced longrange strategic bomber, a platform observers tied 

to nuclear weapons. Past PLA writings expressed 

the need to develop a “stealth strategic bomber,” 

suggesting aspirations to field a strategic bomber 

with a nuclear delivery capability.111

Image Source: DIBMAC Report DF-26 Road-Mobile IRBMs

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons Jin Class Nuclear-Powered 

Ballistic Missile Submarine
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 19

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Overview

North Korea’s national security strategy revolves 

around two objectives: ensure the Kim regime’s 

long-term security, which is defined as North Korea 

remaining a sovereign, independent country ruled 

by the Kim family, and retaining influence over 

the Korean Peninsula. Since the mid-2000s, North 

Korea's strategy has been to prioritize the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles 

to deliver nuclear weapons to increasingly distant 

ranges while maintaining a conventional military 

capable of inflicting enormous damage to South 

Korea.112 North Korea has demonstrated the capability to produce plutonium and highly enriched 

uranium, conducted nuclear tests, and organized a 

strategic force with units operating SRBMs, MRBMs, 

IRBMs, and ICBMs while developing SLBMs.113,114,115,116

North Korea seeks to achieve nuclear power status, thereby deterring any external attack, and use 

its nuclear and conventional military capabilities 

to compel South Korea and the United States into 

policy decisions ensuring regime survival.117 This 

strategy’s current priorities are reflected in several 

trends observed over the course of Kim Jong Un’s 

leadership to date:

• Increasingly frequent ballistic missile flight 

tests and training launches, many of which 

impact in waters near Japan.118

Image Source: AFP PHOTO/KCNA VIA KNS Previous North Korean Leaders 

Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il

KOREA

NORTH

Section Three
20

• Increasingly frequent nuclear tests.119

• Public emphasis on the linkage between North 

Korea’s nuclear weapons program and its ballistic missiles, along with rhetoric seeking to 

persuade international audiences that North 

Korea has the capability for nuclear-armed ballistic missile strikes against the United States 

and regional allies.120

History

The North Korean nuclear program began in the late 

1950s with cooperation agreements with the Soviet 

Union on research. North Korea's first research 

reactor, supplied by the Soviet Union, began operating in 1967, and North Korea later built a nuclear 

reactor at Yongbyon with an electrical power rating 

of 5 megawatts electrical (MWe). This reactor began 

operating in 1986 and was capable of producing 

about 6 kilograms (kg) of plutonium per year. Later 

that year, high-explosives testing and a reprocessing 

plant to separate plutonium from the reactor’s spent 

fuel were detected. Initial construction of additional 

reactors—a 50-MWe reactor at Yongbyon and a 200-

MWe reactor at Taechon—provided additional indications of a larger-scale nuclear program.121

Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

In 1992, North Korea and South Korea signed a declaration which provided that:

1. South Korea and North Korea shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, 

deploy, or use nuclear weapons.

2. South Korea and North Korea shall use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes.

3. South Korea and North Korea shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium 

enrichment facilities.

Both sides exchanged instruments to bring the declaration into force by 19 February 1992. Implementation actions ultimately became part of the Agreed Framework process, but North Korea 

overtly conducted nuclear reprocessing, uranium enrichment, and nuclear test activities inconsistent with the declaration after the breakdown of the Agreed Framework in 2002.122

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons Yongbyon 5-MWe Nuclear Reactor
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 21

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Nuclear Arms Control

The Nonproliferation Treaty and Agreed Framework. North Korea joined the Nonproliferation 

Treaty (NPT) in 1985, but inspections only started 

7 years later under the NPT’s safeguards regime. 

This gap invited questions about North Korea's plutonium production. In 1994, North Korea pledged 

to freeze and eventually dismantle its plutonium 

programs under the Agreed Framework with the 

United States. At that time, a number of sources 

estimated that North Korea had separated enough 

plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons. North 

Korea complied with the framework, allowed the 

IAEA to place seals on spent fuel from the Yongbyon reactor, and allowed remote monitoring and 

onsite inspections at its nuclear facilities.129 In January 2003, North Korea announced it was withdrawing from the NPT, and the withdrawal from the 

treaty was completed in April 2003.130

Breakdown of the Agreed Framework. In 2002, 

negotiators from the United States confronted 

North Korea with evidence of a clandestine uranium enrichment program, a claim that North 

Korean officials publicly denied. The conflict over 

whether North Korea had a uranium enrichment 

program led to the breakdown of the Agreed 

Framework. The United States reached an understanding with members of the Korean Economic 

Development Organization and stopped shipment 

of heavy fuel oil to North Korea, whose response 

was removing the international monitors and 

seals at the Yongbyon facility and restarting its 

plutonium production infrastructure.131

Doctrine

The steady development of road-mobile ICBMs, 

IRBMs, and SLBMs highlights North Korea's intention to develop a survivable nuclear weapon delivery capability.132 This developing capability, along 

with high-level statements of nuclear usage at the 

first sign of a U.S. strike, suggests potential for usage 

at any stage of conflict when North Korea believes 

itself to be in regime-ending danger.133,134,135

Six-Party Talks and Leap Day Arrangement

Because of concerns about North Korea's covert enriched uranium program following the breakdown, 

Six-Party Talks were held from 2003 to 2007. The talks included North and South Korea, China, Russia, 

Japan, and the United States.123 During the fifth round of talks, North Korea agreed to shut down its nuclear facilities in exchange for fuel aid and steps towards the normalization of relations with the United 

States and Japan.124,125 However, in mid-2009, North Korea’s failed satellite launch triggered condemnation from the UN Security Council and North Korea resumed its nuclear program.126

• Leap Day Arrangement: On 29 February 2012, the United States and North Korea announced a 

"leap day" arrangement that the United States would provide substantial food aid in return for 

North Korea agreeing to a moratorium on uranium enrichment and missile testing and a return of 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to Yongbyon, leading to a resumption of the 

Six-Party Talks. On 6 April 2012, a North Korean satellite failed to enter into orbit, and the launch 

was declared a failure by the United States and South Korea. In addition, the launch was described 

as a provocative test of missile technology, and the United States subsequently announced the 

suspension of food aid to North Korea.127,128
22

Nuclear Capability/Stockpile

North Korea established a Strategic Force (previously 

known as the Strategic Rocket Forces) in 2012 and 

has described this organization as a nuclear-armed 

ballistic missile force. The Strategic Force includes 

units operating SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs, and ICBMs, 

each of which North Korea has stated represents 

a nuclear-capable system class. In 2016, the North 

claimed a Scud class SRBM launch had tested nuclear 

weapon components in a mock attack against a 

South Korean port.136

Infrastructure

North Korea has demonstrated the capability to produce kilogram quantities of plutonium for nuclear 

weapons and has claimed to possess the ability to 

produce enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.137,138

North Korea also admitted in August 2016 that it 

has been producing highly enriched uranium for 

nuclear weapons. This put into context North Korea’s 

revelation in 2010 of an enrichment facility at Yongbyon and the subsequent expansion of the facility, 

and raised concerns about its ability and intention to 

produce uranium-based nuclear weapons.139,140

North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests, one 

each in 2006, 2009, and 2013, two in 2016, and 

one in 2017, according to seismic detections and 

public claims by North Korean media.141,142 North 

Korea has exclusively used the underground 

nuclear test facility in the vicinity of Punggye for 

nuclear tests. Each successive test has demonstrated higher explosive yield, according to seismic data.143

Delivery Systems

North Korea is committed to developing a longrange, nuclear-armed missile that is capable of 

posing a direct threat to the United States. The 4 

and 28 July 2017 Hwasong-14 launches were North 

Korea’s first ICBM flight tests.144 These events represent significant milestones in North Korea’s ballistic 

missile development process—the first flight tests 

of a system capable of reaching the United States. 

Without additional flight tests, the ICBM’s current 

reliability as a weapon system would be low. North 

Korea subsequently launched another new ICBM, 

Hwasong-15, in November 2017. North Korea also 

continues to develop the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2), 

which could reach the continental United States if 

configured as an ICBM but has only been used as a 

space-launch vehicle (SLV). In April and December 

2012 and again in February 2016, North Korea conducted launches of the TD-2 configured as an SLV, 

which used ballistic missile technology.145,146

North Korea has several hundred SRBMs and 

MRBMs available for use against targets on the 

Korean Peninsula and Japan. In the past 2 years, 

North Korea has diversified its ballistic missile force 

to include longer-range, solid-fueled systems. Solid-propellant missiles offer operational advantages 

over liquid-fueled systems, eliminating the time 

required to fuel a missile before firing it.147 In 2017, 

North Korea test-launched a new solid-propellant 

MRBM from a tracked transporter-erector-launcher 

(TEL), describing this system as a land-based variant of its SLBM.148 Following a successful flight test 

of its SLBM from a submerged submarine in September 2016,149 and a second successful launch in 

May 2017, Kim approved deployment of the landImage Source: AFP PHOTO/KCNA VIA KNS Hwasong-13 Road-Mobile ICBM 

displayed in a military parade
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 23

GLOBAL NUCLEAR LANDSCAPE

North Korea Nuclear Weapon-Related Facilities

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center

- 5-MWe Reactor

- IRT-2000 Reactor

- Plutonium Reprocessing Facility

- Uranium Enrichment Facility

0 50 100 Kilometers

Nuclear Facility

Military Demar cation Line

and Demilitari zed Zone

Pyongyang

NORTH KOREA

SOUTH KOREA

CHINA

Punggye Nuclear Test Site

Ministry of Atomic 

Energy Industry

Pyongsan Uranium

Concentration Plant

1703-12171 North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure 
24

based variant.150 In 2016 and 2017, over 40 launches 

of short-, medium-, intermediate-, intercontinental-range, and submarine-launched systems were 

conducted.151 In addition to two Hwasong-14 ICBM 

tests and a Hwasong-15 ICBM launch, these flight 

tests included intermediate-range missile tests over 

Japan in August and September.152,153

Efforts To Improve Capability

Kim’s public emphasis on the missile force has 

continued, highlighted by an April 2017 military 

parade including four previously unseen missile 

systems and their equipment. Included were a 

modified Scud SRBM with a probable maneuvering reentry vehicle on a tracked TEL, a new 

liquid-propellant IRBM on a modified Musudan 

TEL, and launchers for two canister-launched 

probable solid-propellant systems.154,155 One of 

the canister systems was mounted on a modified Hwasong-13 eight-axle TEL, and the other 

canister system was mounted on a semitrailer 

or mobile-erector-launcher with a three-axle 

prime mover.156 Although airframes were not 

displayed, the canister systems can probably 

support IRBMs and ICBMs.157

Image Source: AFP PHOTO/KCNA VIA KNS North Korean SLBM launched 

from an underwater test barge

Image Source: AFP PHOTO/KCNA VIA KNS Kim Jong Un allegedly ordering his 

missile units to be ready to strike

Nuclear Proliferation

North Korea’s demonstrated willingness to proliferate nuclear technology remains one of our gravest 

concerns.158 North Korea provided Libya with uranium hexafluoride (UF6),159 the form of uranium used 

in the uranium enrichment process to produce fuel for nuclear reactors160 and nuclear weapons161, 

through the proliferation network of Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.162 North Korea 

also provided Syria with nuclear reactor technology until 2007.163,164
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25

GLOBAL NUCLEAR LANDSCAPE

Iran

Iran’s overarching strategic goals of enhancing its 

security, prestige, and regional influence led it to 

pursue nuclear energy capabilities and technology 

goals and give it the ability to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, if it chooses to do so.165,166 

Iran has no nuclear weapons and has agreed not 

to seek, develop, or acquire nuclear weapons. The 

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) limits 

Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities until at least 

2026 and requires Iran to redesign its Arak reactor, 

making it more difficult to produce plutonium for 

weapons.Without a sufficient source of weapons-usable fissile material, Iran cannot produce a nuclear 

weapon.167 Iran’s interest in nuclear technology dates 

back to the 1950s, when it began receiving assistance 

through the U.S. Atoms for Peace program, which 

later included the Tehran Nuclear Research Center 

and a 5-megawatt-thermal research reactor. Iran 

signed the NPT as a nonweapons state and ratified 

the agreement in 1970. However, in what may have 

been an attempt to intimidate regional adversaries, the Shah told a French newspaper in February 

1974 that “sooner than is believed,” Iran would be 

“in possession of a nuclear bomb.” The nuclear program continued, and in the mid-1970s, Iran unveiled 

ambitious plans to expand the nuclear power program. These plans, however, did not come to fruition 

because of the 1979 Revolution.168

In the late 1980s, Iran established an undeclared 

nuclear program, managed through the Physics 

Research Center (PHRC) and overseen through 

a scientific committee by the Defense Industries 

Education Research Institute. The PHRC was subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and Armed 

Forces Logistics.169 In the late 1990s, the PHRC was 

consolidated under the “Amad Plan,” Iran’s effort 

to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran’s Project 111 

was an attempt to integrate a spherical payload 

into a Shahab 3 missile reentry vehicle. However, 

Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 

and subsequently announced the suspension 

of its declared uranium enrichment program. 

ANNEX 21st Century Cases
26

Iran also signed an Additional Protocol to its IAEA 

Safeguards Agreement in 2003. The halt was primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny resulting from the exposure of Iran’s previously 

undeclared nuclear work.170 After this halt, and in 

line with its history of poor transparency, Iran continued its efforts to develop uranium enrichment 

technology with gas centrifuges and constructed 

an undeclared uranium enrichment plant near 

Qom, where it began producing near-20-percent 

enriched uranium in mid-2011.171,172 In late 2011, 

a Department of State compliance report found 

Iran to be in violation of obligations under the 

NPT because Iran’s past nuclear activities and its 

failure to report ongoing activities were contrary 

to its Safeguards Agreement. That same year, the 

IAEA began an effort to clarify issues surrounding 

Iran’s lack of transparency dating back to 2002, 

noting that by failing to declare some nuclear activities, including the construction at Qom, Iran was 

not implementing the Additional Protocol.173,174 In 

2015, the IAEA concluded that it had no further 

indications of undeclared work.175,176

In April 2015, a framework was announced to limit 

Iran’s nuclear program that built on the interim 

Joint Plan of Action.177 Under the deal, Iran would 

commit that under no circumstances would it 

seek, develop, or acquire nuclear weapons, and it 

would limit its enrichment program and redesign 

a heavy-water reactor near Arak; in exchange, all 

nuclear-related sanctions against Iran would be 

suspended.178 On 14 July 2015, Iran and the P5+1 

(the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) finalized the JCPOA, 

whereby Iran agreed to curtail its nuclear program 

significantly in exchange for sanctions relief. On 16 

January 2016, the IAEA reported that Iran had taken 

the technical steps required to meet its Implementation Day obligation. As long as Iran adheres to 

the agreement, the JCPOA limits the pathways to 

a nuclear weapon and hampers Iran’s ability to 

conduct activities that could contribute to nuclear 

explosive device design and development.179

Until 2031, Iran must maintain a total enriched uranium stockpile of no more than 300 kilograms of up 

to 3.67 percent enriched UF6 or its equivalent in other 

chemical forms. Under the JCPOA, Iran also reduced 

its low-enriched uranium stockpile of about 8,500 kilograms to below 300 kilograms by shipping the material to Russia and downblending the remaining scrap 

to natural uranium.180,181

Libya

In 2003, Libya negotiated an understanding with the 

United States and the United Kingdom calling for 

complete dismantlement of its nuclear and chemical weapon programs. As part of this understanding, 

Libyan officials turned over a collection of nuclear-related equipment to the United States, most of 

which was supplied to the Libyan nuclear weapon 

program by the A.Q. Khan network.182

• According to the IAEA, from the early 1980s until 

late 2003, Libya pursued a clandestine nuclear 

weapons program with major assistance from 

Pakistani nuclear expert A.Q. Khan’s illicit supplier network. By late 2003, the program had 

achieved only early-stage research and development but had acquired extensive technical 

data and equipment from the Khan network. 

Central to the program was an early-stage 

uranium enrichment effort based on gas centrifuge technology, established with components, technical data, and UF6 centrifuge feed 

material acquired through the Khan network. 

According to press reports, IAEA inspectors 

discovered evidence that North Korea may 

have secretly provided Libya in early 2001 with 

nearly two tons of UF6, which could be used in 

a uranium enrichment program.183

• In addition, the Khan network provided Libya 

with nuclear weapon design documentation 

and related data. Tripoli’s nuclear weapons 

ambitions underwent a radical shift during 

2003-04 as a result of the government’s engagement with the United States and United King-
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 27

GLOBAL NUCLEAR LANDSCAPE

dom. The Libyans claimed to have halted their 

previously undisclosed nuclear weapons program and revealed details of the program’s 

status, scope, and suppliers. Libyan disclosures 

and investigations by U.S.-UK technical teams 

during 2003-04 indicated that Libya had not 

made major progress in assembling a functioning uranium enrichment plant or in developing 

a nuclear weapon capability, and Libya claimed 

that it had never conducted any nuclear weaponization work. After making these claims and 

revelations, Libya took significant steps to terminate its nuclear weapons program:184

- During early 2004, Libya allowed the United 

States and the United Kingdom to remove 

all disclosed key elements of the nuclear 

weapons program, including gas centrifuge 

components and key related equipment, UF6

feed material, and uranium conversion facility equipment.185

- Libya signed an Additional Protocol to its IAEA 

Safeguards Agreement in 2004 and allowed 

IAEA experts to interview Libyan nuclear officials and visit many nuclear, missile, industrial, and academic sites, in parallel with visits 

and interviews by U.S. and UK investigators.186

Since 2004, Libya’s civilian nuclear program has 

focused on basic nuclear research. Libya’s Tajura 

Nuclear Research Center houses a 10-megawatt 

research reactor, which originally was designed to 

use highly enriched uranium but was converted to 

operate on low-enriched uranium. With help from 

the IAEA, Libya began removal of its highly enriched 

uranium in 2004, a task it completed in 2009. 

According to the IAEA, Libya stores 2,263 tons of 

yellowcake at a facility in Sabha.187,188,189

Syria

The most compelling evidence of a Syrian nuclear 

weapon program pursuit was the construction 

of a covert nuclear reactor with North Korean 

assistance known as Al Kibar (aka Dair Alzour) 

at a remote location in eastern Syria. Syria was 

building a North Korean-designed gas-cooled, 

graphite-moderated reactor, which neared operational capability in August 2007. The reactor was 

destroyed in September 2007 before it was loaded 

with nuclear fuel or operated. The reactor would 

have been capable of producing plutonium for 

nuclear weapons; it was not configured to produce 

electricity and was ill-suited for research. Environmental samples taken during an IAEA visit to 

the reactor site in June 2008 contained particles 

of anthropogenic natural uranium, graphite, and 

stainless steel, consistent with the materials in this 

type of reactor.190,191

• Based on IAEA analysis of commercial imagery 

from 2001 to 2007, the dimensions of the building are similar to the 5-MWe gas-cooled graphite- moderated reactor at Yongbyon.192

• Three other locations in Syria were functionally 

related to the reactor site.193

• According to the IAEA, by the end of October 2007, large-scale clearing and leveling 

operations had taken place at the site which 

had removed or obscured the remains of the 

destroyed building.194

• Syria has not been transparent with the IAEA in 

its investigation of the undeclared reactor.195

Currently Syria operates a small nuclear research 

reactor, a light-water-cooled Miniature Neutron 

Source Reactor outside Damascus. A pilot plant 

for the purification of phosphoric acid was constructed and commissioned in 1997 at Homs, Syria, 

with the support of the UN Development Program 

and the IAEA. Yellowcake was also produced as a 

result of the acid purification process. During a July 

2004 visit to the Homs phosphoric acid purification 

plant, IAEA inspectors observed hundreds of kilograms of yellowcake.196
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 29

GLOBAL NUCLEAR LANDSCAPE

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countries/china.html>; 2016; Countries: China

86 26 Apr 16, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Annual Report on 

Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 

China 2016

87 International Panel on Fissile Materials; <http://fissilmaterials.org/

countries/china.html>; 2016; Countries: China

88 Science & Global Security; ISSN: 0892-9882; 23 Oct 2015; China’s Uranium Enrichment Complex

89 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; <http://thebulletin.org/china%E2%80%99s-rapidly-expanding-centrifuge-enrichment-capacity8934>; 7 Dec 2015; China’s rapidly expanding centrifuge 

enrichment capacity

90 Harvard University; China’s Stockpile of Military Plutonium: a New 

Estimate

91 Video, Beijing CCTV News in English; China’s Spent Nuclear Fuel 

Breakthrough

92 Yang Rui, Wang Xinxin; <http://www.cyd.com.cn>; 20 May 2013; 

Zhongguo Qingnian Bao Online; At China’s Only Nuclear Weapons 

Development and Production Unit, More than 7,300 Technical Personnel Act as the Right Hand Men of Scientific Research Personnel 

They Turn Scientists’ Ideas into Reality

93 Yang Rui, Wang Xinxin; <http://www.cyd.com.cn>; 20 May 2013; 

Zhongguo Qingnian Bao Online; At China’s Only Nuclear Weapons 

Development and Production Unit, More than 7,300 Technical Personnel Act as the Right Hand Men of Scientific Research Personnel 

They Turn Scientists’ Ideas into Reality

94 China Academy of Engineering Physics; <www.caep.ac.cn/rlzy/

bsh/21443.shtml>; 10 Jun 2015; 2015 Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics Postdoctoral Careers

95 26 Apr 2016, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Annual Report on 

Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 

China 2016

96 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/12-chinanucleararsenal240315wintro-formatted.

pdf>; 24 Mar 2015; Why is China Modernizing its Nuclear Arsenal?

97 30 Jun 2017, NASIC; <http://www.nasic.af.mil/About-Us/FactSheets/Article/1235024/2017-ballistic-and-cruise-missile-threat-report/>; 2017 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat

98 Chinese Military Review; <https://www.chinesemilitaryreview.

blogspot.com/2011/10/chinese-jl-2-submarine-launched.html>; 

19 Oct 2011; Chinese JL-2 Submarine Launched Ballistic 

Missile (SLBM)

99 15 May 2017, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, page 24

100 SinoDefense; <www.sinodefense.com/rocketry/df4>; Dong Feng4 (CSS-3)

101 China Academy of Engineering Physics; <www.caep.ac.cn/rlzy/

bsh/21443.shtml>; 10 Jun 2015; 2015 Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics Postdoctoral Careers

102 Online Newspaper, The Age; < http://www.theage.com.au/>; 1 

Aug 2014; China Confirms New Generation Nuclear-Capable ICBM 

That Can Target US

103 Online Newspaper, Want China Times in English; <https://www.

wantchiantimes.com/>; 31 Aug 2015; PLA’s DF-26 IRBM is without 

peer, says Sina Military
32

104 Hong Kong South China Morning Post; < http://www.scmp.com/

news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1982950/chinas-successful-new-rocket-launch-signals>; 29 Jun 2016; China’s successful 

new rocket launch signals breakthroughs in nation’s space weaponry

105 China Military Online; <http://english.chinamil.com.cn>; Sep 

2016; Expert: Three Solutions for China’s New-Generation Longrange Strategic Bomber

106 26 Apr 2016, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Annual Report 

on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016

107 Franz-Stefan Gady; <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/china-testsnew-missile-capable-of-hitting-entire-united-states/>; 19 Aug 2015

108 15 May 2017, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Annual Report 

on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017

109 South China Morning Post Online; < http://www.scmp.com/news/

china>; 14 Jan 2014; China Hails First Test Of Hypersonic Nuclear 

Missile Carrier

110 Song Zhongping; < http://www.xinhuanet.com/herald/>; 7 Feb 

2014; Hypersonic Missiles Can Break Through the US Anti-missile 

System

111 15 May 2017, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Annual Report 

on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017

112 5 Jan 2016; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and 

Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea; pp. 9-14

113 3 Apr 2013; Congressional Resource Service; CRS 7-5700; North 

Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues

114 5 Jan 2016; Office of the Secretary of Defense; Military and Security 

Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

115 <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/02/24/26/020000

0000AEN20170224000251315F.html.>; 24 Feb 2017; Accessed 8 

Sep 2017; Yonhap; N. Korea Moving Solidly Toward Second Nuclear 

Strike Capability

116 Yu, Yong-weon;< http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2

016/07/21/2016072100780.﻿html>; 21 Jul 2016; Accessed 

1 Aug 2017; Chosun Ilbo ; N. Korean Missile Launch ‘Practiced 

Pre-emptive Nuke Strike

117 5 Jan 2016; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security 

Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; p. 5

118 5 Jan 2016; Office of the Secretary of Defense; Military and Security 

Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

119 5 Jan 2016; Office of the Secretary of Defense; Military and Security 

Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

120 5 Jan 2016; Office of the Secretary of Defense; Military and Security 

Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

121 3 Apr 2013; Congressional Resource Service; CRS 7-5700; North 

Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues

122 Oct 2011; Nuclear Threat Initiative; Joint Declaration of South And 

North Korea On The Denuclearization Of The Korean Peninsula

123 Jack Kim and Chris Buckley; Reuters World News; North Korea 

Agrees to Nuclear Disarmament Steps

124 Jayshree Bajoria and Beina Xu; 20 Sep 2013; <ForeignAffairs.

com>; Council on Foreign Relations; The Six Party Talks on North 

Korea’s Nuclear Program;

125 13 Feb 2007; World Nuclear News; North Korea Agrees To

Nuclear Disarmament

126 Robert Longley; 2 May 2017; Thoughtco; North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: A Long History of Failed Diplomacy;

127 <http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/03/north-korean-nuclear-progress>; 1 Mar 2012. Accessed 17 Mar 2012; The 

Economist online. North Korean nuclear progress: Leap of faith

128 Choe Sang-hun and Steven Lee Myers; <https://www.nytimes.

com/2012/03/17/world/asia/north-korea-satellite-launch-missile-test.

html?pagewanted=all >;16 Mar 2012; The New York Times; North 

Korea Says It Will Launch Satellite Into Orbit

129 3 April 2013; Congressional Resource Service; CRS 7-5700; 

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues

130 <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron#2016>; 

Accessed 15 Dec 2017; Arms Control Association; Chronology of 

U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy; pg 11

131 3 Apr 2013; Congressional Resource Service; CRS 7-5700; North 

Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues

132 5 Jan2016; Office of the Secretary of Defense; Military and Security 

Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

133 23 Feb 2016; KCNA; Crucial Statement of KPA Supreme

Command approved by OSC for public release as per email 

170921121716

134 6 Mar 2016; KCBS; DPRK National Defence Commission Warns 

of Military Counter-action for Preemptive Attack

135 21 Aug 2016; KCNA; Spokesman for KPA General Staff Clarifies 

Principled Stand on Nuclear War Drill against DPRK

136 Yu, Yong-weon; <http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/20

16/07/21/2016072100780.﻿html>; 21 July 2016; Accessed 

1 Aug 2017; Chosun Ilbo; N. Korean Missile Launch ‘Practiced 

Pre-emptive Nuke Strike

137 3 Apr 2013; Congressional Resource Service; CRS 7-5700; North 

Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues

138 5 Jan 2016; Office of the Secretary of Defense; Military and Security 

Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

139 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/world-digest-aug-17-2016/2016/08/17/c6f0a626-6484-11e6-96c0-

37533479f3f5_story.html?utm_term=.b1c9e3efe277>; Accessed 15 

Dec 2017; Washington Post; World Digest: 17 Aug 2016

140 <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron#2016>; 

Accessed 15 Dec 2017; Arms Control Association; Chronology of 

U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy; pg 11.

141 9 Sep 2016; Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Station; 

DPRK Succeeds in Nuclear Warhead Explosion Test

142 6 Jan 2016; KCNA; DPRK Proves Successful in H-bomb Test

143 3 Apr 2013; Congressional Resource Service; CRS 7-5700; North 

Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues

144 5 Jul 2017; KCTV; Report of the Democratic People’s Republic 

of Korea on the “successful” test-fire of the intercontinental ballistic 

rocket Hwaso’ng-14 type on 4 July
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 33

GLOBAL NUCLEAR LANDSCAPE

145 5 Jan 2016; Office of the Secretary of Defense; Military and Security 

Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

146 11 Feb 2016; KCTV; Korean documentary: Successful Launch of 

Earth Observation Satellite ‘Kwangmyo’ngso’ng-4’ Under Guidance 

of Respected and Beloved Comrade Kim Jong Un.

147 Michael Elleman; <http://www.38north.org/2017/05/pukguksong2_052517/>; 25 May 2017; Accessed 10 Aug 2017; 38 North.

org, U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University; The Pukguksong-2: Lowering the Bar on Combat Readiness

148 <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/02/24/26/02000

00000AEN20170224000251315F.html>; 24 Feb 2017; Accessed 8 

Sep 2017; Yonhap ; N. Korea Moving Solidly Toward Second Nuclear 

Strike Capability

149 Stephen Evans; <http://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-37353956>; 14 September 2017; Accessed 8 September 2017; 

BBC News ; The Alarming Progress of a Nuclear North Korea

150 <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/05/21/020000

0000AEN20170521003552315.htm>; 21 May 2017; Accessed 8 

Sep 2017; Yonhap ; N.K. Says its Leader Oks Deployment of New 

Missiles for Action

151 <https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/dprk/>; Accessed Jan 

2018; CSIS; Missiles of North Korea

152 <https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7924> ; Accessed 8 Sep 2017; 

United Nations; Fact Sheet: Resolution 2371

153 Heavy, Susan and Kim, Jack; <https://www.reuters.com/article/

us-northkorea-missiles/message-from-north-korean-missile-overjapan-loud-and-clear-trump-idUSKCN1B8283>; 28 Aug 2017; 

Accessed 8 Sep 2017; Reuters; Message from North Korean Missile 

over Japan ‘Loud and Clear’: Trump

154 Schilling, John; https://www.38north.org/2017/05/jschilling052417/>; Accessed 8 Sep 2017; May 24, 2017; The Pukguksong-2 Approaches Initial Operational Capability

155 <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/

article/2089839/opinion-north-koreas-huge-military-paradeshows-its-prepared-to-wage-nuclear-war>; 23 Apr 2017; 

Accessed 8 Sep 2017; South China Morning Post; Opinion: 

North Korea’s Huge Military Parade Shows its Prepared to 

Wage Nuclear War

156 <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/04/15/0200000000

AEN20170415003154315.html>; 15 Apr 2017; Accessed 8 September 2017; Yonhap; N. Korea Unveils New ICBM At Military Parade

157 Brad Lendon; <http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/15/asia/north-korea-missiles-parade/>; Date of access 17 April 2017; CNN news 

online; North Korea surprises with display of new missiles

158 Mary Beth Nikitin; http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/207428.pdf>; Date of access: 18 March 2014; Date of publication: 3 Apr 2013; Congressional Research Service; North Korea’s 

Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues; p.28-29

159 <http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/libya/nuclear/>;

February 2011; Nuclear Threat Initiative; Country Profiles: Libya 

Nuclear Overview

160 Mary Beth Nikitin; <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/158477.pdf>; Date of access: 18 Mar 2014; Date of publication: 

2 March 2011; “Congressional Research Service”; Managing the 

Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global Access 

to Nuclear Power; p.10

161 Mary Beth Nikitin; http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/207428.pdf>; Date of access: 18 Mar 2014; Date of publication: 

3 April 2013; Congressional Research Service; North Korea’s Nuclear 

Weapons: Technical Issues; p.10

162 Mary Beth Nikitin; http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/207428.pdf>; Date of access: 18 Mar 2014; Date of publication: 

3 April 2013; Congressional Research Service; North Korea’s Nuclear 

Weapons: Technical Issues; p.9

163 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart; <http://fpc.state.gov/

documents/organization/221261.pdf>; Date of access: 18 March 

2014; Date of publication: 15 Jan 2014; “Congressional Research 

Service”; North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation; p.5

164 Mary Beth Nikitin; http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/207428.pdf>; Date of access: 18 Mar 2014; Date of publication: 

3 April 2013; Congressional Research Service; North Korea’s Nuclear 

Weapons: Technical Issues; p.28

165 8 Nov 2011; IAEA; GOV/2011/65; Implementation of the NPT 

Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council 

resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran; Annex p 1, para 3-5

and 18-24

166 9 Feb 2016, James R. Clapper; ODNI; Statement for the Record 

Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community; pg. 8

167 31 Jul 2015; IAEA; INFCIRC/887; Communication dated 24 July 

received from China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the 

United Kingdom, the United States of America (E3/EU+3) and the 

Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the text of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

168 ISIS; Iran’s Nuclear History from the 1950s to 2005

169 8 Nov 2011; IAEA, GOV/2011/65; Implementation of the NPT 

Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran; Annex p 1, para 3-5 and 18-24

170 Nov 2007; Director of National Intelligence; National Intelligence 

Estimate: Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities

171 16 Nov 2009; IAEA, GOV/2009/74; Implementation of the NPT 

Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council 

resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) 

in the Islamic Republic of Iran; Paragraph 7

172 8 Nov 2011; IAEA, GOV/2011/65; Implementation of the NPT 

Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council 

resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran; Paragraph 20

173 8 Nov 2011; IAEA, GOV/2011/65; Implementation of the NPT 

Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council 

resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran; Section K, para 52

174 Aug 2011; Department of State; Adherence to and Compliance 

with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements 

and Commitments; page 20

175 2 Dec 2015; IAEA, GOV/2015/68; Final Assessment on Past and 

Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme; 

Section F, para 77

176 16 Jan 2016; IAEA; GOV/INF/2016/1; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 2231 (2015); sections 15.9-11
34

177 31 Jul 15; IAEA; INFCIRC/887; Communication dated 24 July 

received from China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the 

United Kingdom, the United States of America (E3/EU+3) and the 

Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the text of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

178 31 Jul 15; IAEA; INFCIRC/887; Communication dated 24 July 

received from China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the 

United Kingdom, the United States of America (E3/EU+3) and the 

Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the text of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

179 31 Aug 2017; IAEA; GOV/2017/35; Verification and monitoring in 

the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council 

resolution 2231 (2015)

180 31 Jul 15; IAEA; INFCIRC/887; Communication dated 24 July 

received from China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the 

United Kingdom, the United States of America (E3/EU+3) and the 

Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the text of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

181 16 Jan 2016; IAEA; GOV/INF/2016/1; Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

182 <http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/libya/nuclear/>;

Feb 2011; Nuclear Threat Initiative; Country Profiles: Libya 

Nuclear Overview

183 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad; 31 Mar 2005; New York 

Times; Using Clues From Libya To Study A Nuclear Mystery

184 12 Sep 2008; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); IAEA 

Board of Governors Report: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 

GOV/2008/39

185 Adam Entous; 15 Mar 2004; Reuters; U.S. displays components 

of Libyan nuclear program

186 12 Sep 2008; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); IAEA 

Board of Governors Report: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 

GOV/2008/39

187 30 Aug 2004; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); IAEA 

Board of Governors Report: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 

GOV/2004/59

188 8 Mar 2004; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Staff Report: Removal of High-Enriched Uranium in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

189 <http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/libya/nuclear/>;

Feb 2011; Nuclear Threat Initiative; Country Profiles: Libya 

Nuclear Overview

190 24 May 2011; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); IAEA 

Board of Governors Report: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards 

Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic GOV/2011/30

191 <http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/syria/nuclear/>; Aug 2014; 

Nuclear Threat Initiative; Country Profiles: Syria Nuclear Overview

192 24 May 2011; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); IAEA 

Board of Governors Report: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards 

Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic GOV/2011/30

193 24 May 2011; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); IAEA 

Board of Governors Report: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards 

Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic GOV/2011/30

194 24 May 2011; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); IAEA 

Board of Governors Report: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards 

Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic GOV/2011/30

195 24 May 2011; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); IAEA 

Board of Governors Report: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards 

Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic GOV/2011/30

196 24 May 2011; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); IAEA 

Board of Governors Report: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards 

Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic GOV/2011/30
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY