NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0779n.06 F iled: Novem ber 6, 2007 No. 06-2212 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. DANI ELL EE L ACASSE, Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E WE STE RN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN O P I N I O N

BEF OR E: NO RRIS, G IBBO NS, and R OG ER S, C ir c uitJudg e s. ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge. Def endant Da niel L ee L aCasse c halleng es the sente nce imposed after

he plea ded g uilty

to being a fe lon in possession of a fire arm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g ). He contends that the district c ourt err ed whe n it enhance d his sentenc e under the Armed Caree r Criminal Act (“ ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) , based upon thre e prior c onvictions f or either dr

ug offe nses or violent felonies. He argues that the de finition of “violent felony” r ender s the ACCA void for
v ag ueness or , in the alternative, that his prior conviction under Michig an’s “ flee ing a

nd eluding”
s t a tu t e , M i c h
. C o mp . L aw s , § 7 5 0
. 4 7 9 a , d o e s n o tqu a l i f y a s a v i o l e n tf e l o n y. I. This pr osecution was trig g ere d when defe ndant’s g irlfriend, while intox icated, c rashe d the
car in which the couple was driving . Off i ce rs of the Me nominee County Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment responde d and def

endant a sked off

icer s for a ride home from the scene . Although they indicated that- 2 -

he wo uld be su bje c t to a se arc h f or we a po ns , h e c on se nte d. Th e se arc h unc ov e re d a B ryc o A rm s,

. 3 8 0 ca l i b er

p i s t o l
. De fe n d an twa s arre s t edat t h e s ce n e f o r c a r r y i n g a c o n ce al edwe ap o n , b ei n g a felon in posse ssion of a firea rm, possessing of a firea rm while intox icated, and car ry i n g o pen intox icants while in a m o t o r v eh i cle. The county prosec utor’s off

ice r efe rre d this case to fe dera l authorities, re sulting in a sing le-c o u n t indictment for beinga fe lon in possession of a fire arm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1). Def endant e ntere d into a plea ag ree ment with the gover nment. The a g ree ment left open the possibili ty that defe ndant could be subj ect to the enhanced pe nalties of the ACCA, which pr ovides for a minimum s entence of f ifteen y ear s of incar cer ation for f elons who have three previous convictions for a

“violent fe lony

or a se rious drug offe nse.” 18 U .S.C. § 924(e) (1). Amongother things, “ violent felony ” mea ns a cr i m e t h at is “burg lary , arson, or extorti on, involves the use of explos ives, or oth e rwi

se inv olv es c on du c t tha t pr ese nts a s e rio us po te nti al r isk of p hy sic al i nju ry to another .” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2)( B) (ii) (e mphasis added)
. Wit h respe ct to defe n d an t ’s prior fle eing and eludingconviction, the ag ree ment rea ds as fo llo ws : I n 2001, the Def endant wa s convicted in the 41st Circuit Court, Menominee County , M ic hig an, of

fl e e ingand

e lud inga

po lic e of

fi c e r i n th e 3r d d e g re e , in violation of Mich. Comp. L . § 750.479a(3) , with a sentenc ing e nhance ment for be ing a habitual of

fende r, in violation of Mich. Comp. L
. § 769.11(1)( a). The De fenda nt rec eived a

sentenc e of 3 to 10 y ear s for this off ense. This offense is punishable by up to 10 y ear s in prison and qualifies as a “cr ime punishable by imprisonment for a term excee ding one y ear ,” as that phrase is de fined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 921(a) (20).- 3 -

Prior to sentencing , d e f

e n s e c o unsel filed a me morandum ar g uing that the flee ing a nd eluding conviction does not c onstitut e a crime of violence f

or purpose s of the ACCA. Counsel repe ated he r po sit ion a t th e se nte nc inghe ari ngand a lso c on te nd e d tha t the de fi nit ion of “ vio le nt fe lony ” wa s v oid for va g ueness. The district court re jected both of

these positions be fore sentenc ing de fenda nt to 188
mon ths of

imp ri so nme nt. II. Th is c ourt

re vie ws de novo the le g a l qu e sti on of wh e the r a

prio r con vict ion

c on sti tut e s a “cr ime of violence” under the ACCA. Un ite d S tat es v . M ar tin , 378 F.3d 578, 580 (6th Cir. 2004). I n tw o d e c isi on s, we have c on sid e re d whe the r M ic hig an’ s f le e in g an d e lud ingstatut e repr esen t s a crime of violence f or purpose s of the ana logous c are er of fende r enha

nceme nt of the SentencingGuidelines, U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.1, 4B 1.2, which u s es the same “ serious potential risk of phy sical injury ” lang uag e as the ACCA. I n Martin this court conclude d that a third-de g ree flee ing andelu di ng con vi cti on con st it ut es a c ri me o f vi ol ence b ecaus e th e add it io nal fact ors requ ir ed t o rai se th e o ff en s e to third-deg ree from four th-deg ree –to wit, if the violation results in a collision or
acc ident, or if a por

tion of the violation occurr ed in a 35 miles-pe r-hour or less spee d zone—satisfy the re quirement that the of fense prese nts a “ser ious pote ntial risk of phy sical injury .” 378 F .3d at 583-84.We subsequen t l y limit ed Ma rti n to case s involving third-de g ree flee ing a nd eluding convictions, howeve r. United States v. Fore man , 4 3 6 F. 3 d 6 3 8 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ). I ns et t i n g t h e s t age for its discussion, Foreman provides the f ollowing thumbnail sketch of the appr opriate a

pproac h: The Supreme Court has provided some guidance as t o h o w t o deter mine whether an off ense ma y be conside red a crime of violence. I n Taylor v. United States ,- 4 -

495 U.S. 575, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 109 L
. Ed. 2d 607 (1990), the Court a ddresse d what evidenc e a tr ial court may consider in a

nsweringthe question. The Court conc luded that we must take a ca

teg orica l approa ch and f

irst consider the statutory

definition of the offe nse. Id. A cate g orica l a pproac h require s this Court to look at “the fa ct of the conviction and the statutory defi n i t i o n of the pre dicate of fense ” but not the “under ly ing f

acts re g ardingthe offe nse.” Un ite d Stat es v . M ar tin , 378 F.3d 578, 581 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . A rn old , 58 F.3d 1117, 1121 (6th Cir. 1995)). This approa ch “a

voids subsequent evidentiar y enquiries into the fa ctual basis for the ear lier convic tion,” preve nting the de fenda nt from h av ing to r e-de fend pr evious conduct which may not ha ve been f ound true by

the pre vious jury
. Shepard v. U nited States , 544 U.S. 13, 125 S. C t. 1254, 1259, 161 L . Ed. 2d 205 (2005). Howeve r, should this initial inquiry under the cate g orica l approa ch fa il to be de te rmin ati ve, a

c ourt may c on sid e r “ the statut or

y de fi nit ion , c ha

rg ingdo c ume nt, written plea ag ree ment, transcr ipt of plea colloquy , and any expli cit fac tual finding by the tr ia l jud g e to wh ic h the de fe nd ant a sse nte d” in de te rm ini ngwh e the r t he c ri me was a cr ime of violence
. Id. at 1257. Alt houg h both Shepard and Tay lor addre ssed whe th e r b u r g la r y c o u ld b e c o n s id e r e d

a v io le n t f e lo n y u n d e r th e A r me d Ca r e er Criminal Act, the application of these rules to the definition of “c rime of violenc e” under the Sentencing Guidelines has become an acc epted pr actice in this C ircuit. See Un ite d S tat es v . A rn old , 58 F.3d 1117, 1121- 22 (6th Cir.1995). Id. at 640-41 (c itation omit ted). Ultimately , Foreman held that “the c ategorical appr oach is not deter minative of whe ther four th deg ree flee ing a

nd eludin g i s a ‘crime of violenc e,’” and thus
r e m an d e d t o a l l o w t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtt o c o n s i d e r t h e s o u r c e s a

p p r o v e d b y Sh e pa rd
. Id. at 643. Whil e the district cour

t in t h is case disc ussed the under ly ing f acts of the case during the sentenc ing he aring , it ulti mately made c lear that it based its holding on the categ orica l approa ch take n by this court in Ma rti n . The followingexchang e betwe en the c ourt and the a ssistant United St ates
a tto rn e y (“ AU SA” ) r e so lve s any

a mbi g uit y wi th r e sp e c t to thi s p oin t: AUSA: [I ]t ’s the g overnme n t ’s p o s i t i on in this case that, base d on Ma rti n , . . . thi s flee ing and eluding third, whether it’s involving an ac cident or in a n are a with a spe ed limit less than 35 miles an hour, just as a g ene ra l m at t er , would qualify as a violent felony under the 924(e) , reg ardle ss of the fa cts of the c ase.- 5 -

THE COURT: Yes. And I ag ree with y ou, and .
. . that’s what I have he ld, and that’s wh a t I do ho ld, if

Ihave n’ t sa id s o. I jus t ma de the ob se rv a tio n that the fa c ts are pr e tty e g re g iou s in

thi s c a se , b ut I ’m

no t ba sin g my

de c isi on on that. Def ense c ounsel takes the position that, bec ause the flee ing a nd eluding statute ca

n be violated wi tho ut g ivi ngri se to any se ri ou s p ote nti a l r isk of ph y sic a l ha

rm to a no the r, it c ann ot b e c a te g or ic a lly
c on sid e re d a c ri me of

vio le nc e . Sh e re c og nize s, of c ours e , th a t Ma rti n held to the contra ry and asks us to disti ng uish that case be cause it was dec ided base d upon the Sent en ci n g Gu i d eli nes’ c are er offe nder e nhance ment, not the ACCA. The Ma rti n pa ne l recognized

that de fe nd ant h a d s ome potential relief

under the Guidelines, which c ounsel contends make s a diffe renc e: Had the district c ourt believe d that the ca lculation of Mar tin’s criminal history cate g ory under the Guidelines resulted in an inequitable sente nce, § 4A 1.3 would have pe rm itt e d a

do wnwa rd a dju stm e nt. Ma rti n , 378 F.3d at 584. The ACCA contains no such pr ovision, which means that any judicial “fa ct fi nd ing ” wi th r e sp e c t to the natur e of pr ior c on vic tio ns a ssume s hei g hte ne d impo rt anc e and sh ou ld be discoura g ed. The possibili ty of a dow nwar d depar

ture unde r the Sentenc ing G uidelines does not mean that inter

pretations of what constitutes a “c rime of violenc e” unde r the SentencingGuidelines may not be followed in c onstruing whether a crime is a “violent felony” under the ACCA. See, e .g., Un ite d Stat es v. S

awy e rs, 409 F.3d 732, 740 n.9 (6 Cir. 2005) (using Guidelines to interpre t ACCA); th United States v. Taylor , 489 F.3d 1112, 1113 ( 1 1 Cir. 2007) (“We have also he ld that our ca ses th int e rp re tin g ‘c ri me of

vio le nc e ’ u

nd e r § 4B 1. 2 p ro vid e imp or tant guid anc e in d e te rm ini ngwh a t is a ‘violent felony ’ under

the ACCA ‘bec ause the definition for both terms a re vir t u al l y

identical.’” (c itatio n o mit te d) ); Un ite d S tat es v . La dwi

g , 432 F.3d 1001, 1005 n.9 (9 Cir. 2005) (noting that the th court c an consult ca ses construing§ 4B1.2 of the SentencingGuidelines when consideringwhether- 6 -

a cr ime is a violent felony un d er t h e AC CA beca

use the de finition of “violent felony” under the AC CA is ide nti c a l to the de fi nit ion of ‘c ri me of vio le nc e ’ und e r t he Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s) ; United States v. Johnson , 4 1 7 F
. 3 d 9 9 0 , 9 9 6

- 9 7 ( 8 C i r . 2 0 0 5 ) ( “ T h e s t a tu t o r y d e f i n i t i o no f ‘ v i o l e n tf e l o n y’ th is v ie wed as inte rc ha

ng e a ble wi th t he g uid e lin e s d e fi nit ion

of ‘c ri me of

vio le nc e .’ Th e re fo re , in deter mi n ing w hether

a def endant qua lifies as an a

rmed c are er c riminal under the A CCA, we ar e bound by case law def

ining a crime of violence unde r § 4B 1.2.” (inter nal citations omitted)). I n our view, the district cour

t’s conclusion that Michig an’s third -d eg ree flee ing a nd eluding conviction constituted a cr ime of violence unde r the ACCA is fully consistent with Shepard and Ma rti n and we
a ff ir m on that ba sis
. Def endant a lso contends that the provision of the ACCA which defines a violent felony

as one that “involves conduc t that presents a serious potential risk of phy sical injury to another” is void for
v a g u e n e s s . T h e S u

p r e m e C o u rtr e c e n t l y h e l d t h a ta t t e mp t e d

b u r g l ar y qu a l i f i e d a s a “ v i o l e n tf

e l o n y” under the ACCA’s residual provision f or cr imes that prese nt “serious potential risk of phy sical injury to another.” Jame

s v. United States , 127 S. Ct. 1586, 1590 (2007). In dissent, J ustice Scalia took the positio n t h at t h e re sidual provision must either be interpr eted c ohere ntly “so that it applies in a relatively predic table and administrable fashion to a sm aller subset of crimes” or be deemed void for vag ueness. Id. at 1609. The ma jority addre sses the vagueness contention, albeit i n a footnote, be fore reje cting it. Id. at 1598 n.6. Althoug h not contested in that ca se, we are u n wi l l i ng to find the provision void for vagueness whe n the Supreme Court so re cently declined a

n invitation to do s o. III . Th e jud g me nt i s aff

irm ed
.