J-S40025-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CLIFFORD JOSEPH KAROLSKI 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 80 WDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 31, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-04-CR-0000177-2016, 

CP-04-CR-0000342-2013, CP-04-CR-0000762-2015, 

CP-04-CR-0000765-2012

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED OCTOBER 31, 2019

Because I would find that this appeal should not be quashed pursuant 

to Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), I must respectfully 

dissent.

The trial court entered its “Final Order” on December 31, 2018. This 

single document included a caption referencing four docket numbers, CP-04-

CR-762-2015; CP-04-CR-765-2012; CP-O4-CR-342-2013; and CP-04-CR177-2016. The Final Order provided that “the above-captioned matter” was 

dismissed, and Karolski was “advised of his right to appeal this Order to the 

Superior Court of Pennsylvania within thirty (30) days of this date.”

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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In my view, Walker should not be applied because any defect in 

Karolski’s notice of appeal resulted from a breakdown in court operations. The 

trial court misadvised Karolski in the Final Order that his four docket numbers 

were being treated as a single “matter,” that a single “Order” resolved all of 

his cases, and that he had a single “right to appeal” the Order to this Court. 

The trial court even stated in its 1925(a) Opinion that Karolski’s notice of 

appeal comported with the rules of appellate procedure because the issues 

raised in the appeal pertained to only one docket number. See 1925(a) 

Opinion, 2/26/2019, at 1 n.1.

As we held in Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 303 EDA 2019, at *3 

(Pa. Super. September 5, 2019), a party should not be held responsible for a 

procedural error that flows from a court’s misadvice. See also 

Commonwealth v. Villanueva, 1863 MDA 2018, at *2 (Pa. Super. October 

8, 2019) (unpublished memorandum) (“The trial court’s inaccurate statement 

that Appellant could file a single appeal from the sentences at three different 

dockets constitutes a breakdown of court operations such that the resultant 

defect in the notices of appeal may be overlooked.”); Commonwealth v.

Hackley, 1769 MDA 2018, at *2 (Pa. Super. September. 23, 2019)

(unpublished memorandum) (finding Walker inapplicable because “the trial 

court essentially told [the defendant] that there was one order, and that he 

was entitled to only one appeal.”).
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An alternative basis for my dissent, albeit one that also would result in 

quashing Karolski’s appeal as interlocutory, is the trial court’s failure to 

comport with Pa.R.A.P. 301. In pertinent part, that Rule provides:

Rule 301. Requisites for an Appealable Order.

(a) Entry upon docket below.

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subdivision, 

no order of a court shall be appealable until it has been entered 

upon the appropriate docket in the lower court. Where under the 

applicable practice below an order is entered in two or more 

dockets, the order has been entered for the purposes of appeal 

when it has been entered in the first appropriate docket.

(2) In a criminal case in which no post-sentence motion has 

been filed, a judgment of sentence is appealable upon the 

imposition of sentence in open court.

(b) Separate document required.—Every order shall be set forth 

on a separate document.

In this case, Karolski’s appeal really concerns four final orders – one for 

each docket number on the caption – all of which are set forth on a single 

document. Because the trial court disposed of four different cases in one 

document, the “requisites for an appealable order” under Pa.R.A.P. 301 have

not been met. See also Pa.R.A.P. 341(d) (defining a “final order” subject to 

appellate review). Because there was no appealable order in any of those 

cases, under this rationale, I would quash the appeal(s) as interlocutory and 

remand to the trial court to issue a separate final order for each docket 
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number. Accordingly, I would hold that Walker does not apply1 and 

respectfully dissent.

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1 Walker did not address any of the requisites of appealability under Pa.R.A.P. 

301; nor did it address whether a deficient notice of appeal could be forgiven 

as a result of a breakdown in court operations due to a court’s misadvice.