M C H A~ R ~A I? ~ 

! 50 

obilizing 

U.S. Industry 

in 

World War II 

Alan L. Gropman 

r 
A popular Government, 

without popular information or the means of 

acquiring it, 

is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or 

perhaps both. 

Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; 

And a people who mean to be their own 

Governors, 

must arm themselves with the power which 

knowledge gives. 

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY 

August 4, 1822 
MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY 

IN WORLD WAR I1: 

MYTH AND REALITY 

Alan L. Gropman 

McNair Paper 50 

August 1996 

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ISSN 1071-7552 
CONTENTS 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................... v 

1. INTRODUCTION ..................... 1 

2. MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES BEFORE PEARL 

HARBOR DAY ...................... 9 

3. EDUCATION FOR MOBILIZATION ....... 15 

4. INTERWAR PLANNING FOR INDUSTRIAL 

MOBILIZATION ..................... 19 

5. MOBILIZING FOR WAR: 1939TO 1941 ... 31 

6. THE WAR PRODUCTION BOARD ....... 55 

7. THE CONTROLLED MATERIALS PLAN .. . 69 

8. THE OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION 

AND RECONVERSION ............... 83 

9. U.S. PRODUCTION IN WORLD WAR II . . . 93 

10. BALANCING MILITARY AND 

CIVILIAN NEEDS ................... 107 

11. OVERCOMING RAW MATERIAL 

SCARCITIES ...................... 115 

12. MARITIME CONSTRUCTION ........... 123 

13. PEOPLE MOBILIZATION: 

"Rosie the Riveter" . ................. 127 

14. CONCLUSIONS .................... 139 

APPENDIX A: Production of Selected 

Munitions Items .................... 141 

APPENDIX B: The War Agencies of the Executive 

Branch of the Federal Government ....... 147 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR .................. 167 

iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

I was most fortunate to be assisted by many people while writing 

this account of World War II U.S. Industrial Mobilization. Five 

people in particular stand out. Dr. Gary E. Weir of the Naval 

Historical Center provided very wise counsel. Mr. Terrance J. 

Gough of the Anny's Center of Military History was especially 

supportive in his analysis of all of the drafts, continually 

broadening my research anti making me reevaluate my inquiry. 

I also received essential help from Ms. Sarah Mikel's ace 

reference librarian, Rosemary Marlowe-Dziuk, of the National 

Defense University Library. Ms. Marlowe-Dziuk llas that 

indispensable quality common only to great librarians---curiosity. 

All my research problems became hers. I also owe a debt of 

gratitude--as even the most casual reader will notice--to the 

graphics office at the National Defense lJniversity. Don Barry 

and Alex Contreras assigned Ms. Nancy Bressi to assist me in 

developing the visual aids in this numbers-reliant essay. Ms. 

Bressi has the soul of an artist and the temperament of Job. My 

chief adviser in this effort was Mr. Thomas Candon, a young 

graduate student wise and mature beyond his years. Mr. Candon 

read and critiqued every draft and checked all the data displayed 

in the numerous charts. Without Mr. Candon's wise advice and 

assistance, this treatise would have been markedly inferior. 

Of course, I bear responsibility for all errors of fact and 

judgment--probably arising because I failed Io heed the sage 

advice of Dr. Weir and Mr. Gough and the sagacious suggestions 

of Mr. Candon. 

V 
MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY 

IN WORLD WAR I1: 

MYTH AND REALITY 

• 

INTRODUCTION 

At a dinner during the Teheran Conference in December 1943, 

Joseph St;din praised United States manufacturing: 

I w,'mt to tell you from the Russi~m point of view, what the 

President ;rod the United States have done to win the w~tr. 

The most import;rot things in this war are machines. The 

United States has proven ttutt it c;m turn out from 8,000 to 

10,000 airpl~mes per month. Russia c~m only turn out, at 

most. 3,000 airpl~mes a month .... The United States, 

therefore, is a country of machines. Without the use of 

those machines, through Lend-Le&se, we would lose this 

wal-. 1 

It was more than airplaJ~es, of course. The Soviets received, in 

addition to thousands of tanks and airplanes, hundreds of 

thousands of trucks from the United States, which vastly 

enhanced the mobility of the Soviet ground forces. The United 

States also supplied St',din's factories wilh millions of tons of raw 

materials and thousands of machine tools to assist the Soviet 

Union in manufacturing trucks and all the other implements of 

modem war including tmlks. 2 

World War II was won in largest part because of superior 

allied am~aments production, s The IJnited States greatly 

outproduced all its "allies and "all its enemies and, at its output 
2 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

peak in late 1943 and early 1944, was manufacturing munitions 

almost equal to the combined tt)t',d tff both its friends mid 

adversaries. The prodigious arms manufacturing capability of the 

United States is well known by even casual readers of World 

War II history, if its decisiveness is not as well understood. But 

myths provoked by sentimentality regarding United States 

munitions production have evolved in the half century since the 

war ended, and these have become a barrier to comprehending 

the lessons of that era. 

When viewed in isolation the output is indeed impressive. 

United States Gross National Product grew by 52 percent 

between 1939 and 1944 (nmch more in unadjusted dollars), 

munitions production skyrocketed from virtually nothing in 1939 

to unprecedented levels, industrial output tripled, and even 

consumer spending increased (unique among all combatants). 

But United States industrial production was neither a "miracle" 

nor was its output comparatively prodigious given the American 

advantages of abundant raw materials, superb transportation and 

technological infrastructure, a large and skilled labor force, and, 

most importantly, two large ocean barriers to bar bombing of its 

industries. 4 Germany, once it abandoned its Blitzkrieg strategy, 

increased its productivity more than the United States, Britain, 

mad the Soviet Union, and despite German attacks on Britain and 

the Soviet Union, these states performed outstandingly too. 5 

This is not to say that United States logistics grand strategy 6 

was not ultimately effective. The United States anti its allies 

were, of course, victorious, and we lost far fewer lives than m~y 

of our adversaries and fewer than our main "allies. Stalin was 

correct when he hailed American production. But the halo that 

has surrounded the era needs to be examined because there were 

enormous govenunental, supervisory, labor-management 

relations] and domestic politicai frictions that hampered the 

effort--and there is no reason to think that these problems would 

not handicap future mobilization efforts. With enormous threats 

looming in the mid 1930s and increasing as Europe exploded into 

war at the end of the decade, the United States was in no way 

unified in its perception of the hazards, nor was there any unity 

in government or business about what to do about it. 8 In the end, 

America and its allies were triumphant, and logistics played the 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 3 

decisive role, but the mobilization could have been more efficient 

and America could have produced more munitions more quickly 

and perhaps have ended the war sooner. A nostalgic look at 

United States industrial mobilization during World War 11 will 

not make future mobilizations of any size more effective. 

Certainly none of the major World War II adversaries was 

less prepared for war in 1939 than the United States. There were 

fewer than 200,000 men in the Army, only 125,200 in the Navy, 

and fewer than 20,000 in the Marine Corps. Those troops on 

maneuvers in 1939 and 1940 used broomsticks to simulate rifles 

and trucks to represent tanks. 9 Despite war orders from Britain 

and France in 1939 and 1940 and Lend-Lease shipments to 

Britain, the Soviet Union, China and elsewhere ",ffter Lend-Lease 

took effect in March 1941, there were still five million 

Americans unemployed at tile end of the year. ~° Hitler's Germany 

had long since absorbed its unemployment by building arms and 

German infrastructure. In the United States, great progress had 

been made by the time production peaked in late 1943, compared 

with the situation in 1941, but output could have been even 

higher. The fact that it took from August 1939, when the first 

federal agency designed to analyze mobilization options--theWar 

Resources Board--was inaugurated, to May 1943, when the final 

supervisory agency was put in place--the Office of War 

Mobilization--should be instructive. Because it had been less 

than effective in World War I, industrial mobilization was studied 

throughout the interwar period--a fact that should be sobering. 

Certainly the interwar planners hoped to improve on the World 

War I experience with industrial mobilization and they believed 

because of their efforts the next round would be more efficiently 

and effectively executed. They were wrong. 

NOTES 

1. Stephen Donadio, Jo,'m Smith, Sus,'m Mesner, Rebecca 

Davison, eds., The New York Public Library Book of Twentieth-Century 

Quotations (New York: Warner Books, 1992) 184. The Lend-Lease 

Act, a controversi,'d law, authorized the president to send munitions or 

other supplies to ,any country that he deemed "vital to the defense of the 

United States." The law at once gave essential munitions ,and supplies 

(~md raw materials) to our future ,allies to fight ,and also deprived the 

United States ,'u'med forces of needed materiel. Lend-Lease was a 
4 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

major part of United States gr~md strategy. The bill was passed by the 

Senate on 9 March 1941 and signed on 11 M~u'ch by President Fnutklin 

D. Roosevelt. Jerome Peppers argues that the "survived of m~my of the 

Allied nations is a direct result of [Lend-Lease] support." In operation 

9 months before the United States entered the w,'u', it "permitted the 

early war to be carried on in great proportion by the Allies since the 

United States was, by law, unable (unwilling?) to participate then." 

Well before the law was passed, the British (~md French until their 

surrender) prodigiously purchased munitions. Until Lend-Lease was 

passed, however, the president could not send the British, by then 

ahnost flat broke, munitions without payment. Lend-Lease, Peppers 

asserts, often permitted the allies to do more them their share of the 

combat. It also created a high degree of ,allied munitions 

st~mdardization, simplifying logistics and slimulated United States 

industrial production. Finally, it enhanced United States leverage over 

allied strategy ~md policy. Jerome G. Peppers Jr., History of United 

States Military Logistics 19;~5-1985 (Huntsville: Logistics Education 

Foundation Publishing, 1988), 24-25. See also David C. Rutenberg 

,and J~me S. Allen, eds., The Logistics of Waging War: American 

Logistics 1774-1985 Emphasizing the Development of Airpower (Gunter 

Air Force Station: Air Force Logistics M:magement Center, 1986), 81- 

82. More them $48 billion worth of supplies were furnished, ,and 

aircraft ~md parts ~unounted Io more th,'m 16 percent of that total. About 

two-thirds of the tot:d went to the British Empire, and most of that went 

to the United Kingdom. 

2. Aircraft were probably the most valuable item in the LendLease catalog. More them 15 percent of the aircraft in 1943 ,and more 

them 16 percent in 1944 (a ye~ in which more them 96,000 aircr~fft were 

produced) were sent to allies. Over the war, 34,500 airpl;mes went 

overseas to the allies. But there is more to the story. During World 

War II, the United Kingdom produced about one-third the number of 

airplanes produced in the United States (about I(X),000 airpl~mes), ,and 

most of the raw materials to build thai number ~md much of the 

petroleum to fuel them c,'une from the United States. See Donald M. 

Nelson, Arsenal ~" Democracy (New York: Harcourt, Brace ,and Co., 

1946), 237. 

3. Alum Milward writes, "The w~tr was decided by the weight of 

ann~unents production" [War. Economy and Society: 1939-1945 (Los 

Angeles: University of C:difornia Press, 1979), 75]. World War II was 

extraordinarily different tYom World War I, given that only 20 ye,'u's 

separated them. A typical U.S. Army division in WW II required the 

support of 400,000 mechanical horsepower to keep it moving, versus 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 5 

3,500 for one of General John J. Pershing's divisions, ,and a WW II 

division was less them half the size of a WW I similar unit. 

Considering the relative sizes, a WW II unit required 228 times the 

mech,'mical horsepower of the one 20 years earlier, thus the dem,'md on 

industry in World War II WItS truly striking. See Jiunes L. Abrahamson, 

The American Home Front (WiL~hington, DC: National Defense 

University Press. 1983), 132. 

4. Milw,'u'd, 73-74. The United States "had adv~mtages in terms 

of size of labour force ,and raw material supply that were shared only 

by the Soviet Union. or would have been had not so much of Russia 

been in German h,'mds. Nor was there imy active interference by the 

Axis powers in the workings of the United States economy apart from 

sinking its ships ;rod killing its citizens, whereas a considerable amount 

of industri~d plant in the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom were 

reduced to rubble by the Gennlm ~unned forces." 

5. Paul A.C. Koistinen is probably the most assertive ,and coldeyed revisionist de,fling with U.S. WWII industri,'d production. 

Koistinen sees utterly nothing miraculous about Americ:m munitions 

manufacturing. See his "Warfare ~md Power Relations in America: 

Mobilizing the World W,'u II Economy," in J,'unes Titus, ed., The Home 

Front and War in the Twentieth Century: The American Experience in 

Comparative Perspective: Proceedings of the Tenth Air Force Academy 

Military ttistory Symposium (Witshington, DC: Office of Air Force 

History, 1984), 101. For ~m opposing view, see in the s,'une volume 

Robert D. Cuffs commentary on Koistinen's essay (Cuff, 112-115). 

Cuffexplicates President Franklin D. Rooseveit's problems ,and cites the 

president's "politic,'d constraints inside ,and outside the administration." 

Given the nature of Americ~m business ~md politics, Roosevelt had little 

wiggle room in the late 1930s ~md into the early yelu's of the war. 

"Private business decision-makers in the United States had already 

demonstrated unpar,'dleled ability to retain prerogatives notwithstimding 

economic :rod wartime crises. And they continued to exact a price for 

their private pertonnimces .... Henry L. Stimson caught the essence of 

it in the early stages of American war mobilization: 'If you are going to 

try to go to war or to prepare for war in a capitalist county, you've got 

to let business make money out of the process or business won't work.'" 

6. Milward, 4(1. The I J.S. strategy for WW II was openly based 

on logistics. Roosevelt had no desire to squ~mder lives as they had been 

wasted in WW I. He expected to win the war "through industrial 

production. The strategic assumption was that over a long period of 

time the United Suites must be ultimately victorious if war c,'u'ne to a 

battle of prtxluction." 
6 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

7. Labor was generally discontented during the war, ,and there 

were numerous strikes despite no-strike pledges ,and legislation barring 

strikes. Wages rose from $.64/hour in 1939 to $.81/hour in 1944 ,and 

there were g~dns from overtime work, but taxes ,and "voluntary" bond 

allounents drove some of these wage gains down. At the height of the 

war, however, corporate profits (after taxes and in constant dollars) 

were up more th,'m 100 percent (vice labor's 21 percent gain). Farmers 

income went up even more. Business, moreover, benefited from 

government building of factories ,and generous tax credits if it invested 

in plants (Koistinen, 106-109). Alan Milward estimates that industrial 

profits rose by 350 percent before taxation, ,and 120 percent ,after 

taxation while wages rose by only 50 percent before taxation and prices 

rose by 20 percent (Milward, 63-72). 

8. Koistinen, 107-108. He ,argues the United States economic 

mobilization was fragmented because "public opinion was not only 

confused ,and contradictory during the war, but ~dso m,'mifested a 

callous, selfish ,and uncaring stre~ik." Mobilization was also seen by 

Koistinen as inefficient because of Roosevelt's approach to 

administration and the special interests of the military ,and industry. 

"No doubt," he writes, "the vast majority of Americans accepted victory 

and security as primary goals during the war. But they divided 

acrimoniously along interest groups and class lines about how those 

aims could best be achieved" (Koistinen, 92). See ,also in the same 

volume John Morton Blum's essay, "United Against: American Culture 

and Society during World War II," 5-14. "During the war the American 

people united against those enemies in a measure greater than they 

united for ,'my other wartime or post war purpose. Tlutt unity was never 

complete. Periodic exhortations to refresh it drew, as one cabinet 

officer put it, on 'nodfing inspiration~d,' nothing 'Wilsonian'." Rather the 

American people responded to their viscer~d hatreds .... In the spring 

of 1942 surveys indicated that some seventeen million Americans 'in 

one way or another' opposed the prosecution of the war." After a series 

of defeats in the Pacific in 1942, "public morale sagged." Blum does 

assert, however, "Americ~m troops.., united against their foe with less 

need for artificial stimulation them was the case with their countrymen 

at home." Blum is critical of the West Coast Japanese-Americ~m 

internment, because he believes it was raciaUy based, ,and is even more 

critical of the antiblack outrages during the war, which c,annot be 

rationalized by the attack on Pearl Harbor. Blum finds racism to be the 

basis of these abominations: the war did not create "~mtisemitism, antilabor attitudes, segregation and hostility to racial minorities," but neither 

did "it subdue them." In the United States, as elsewhere, "the war at 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 7 

once aroused and revealed the dark, the naked, and shivering nature of 

ma/l." 

9. Jerome G. Peppers, Jr.. History of United States Military 

Logistics, 1935-1985, A Brief Review (Huntsville: Logistics Education 

Foundation Publishing, 1988). 6. Peppers has written ,an orthodox 

history of World War II industri,'d mobilization. See also Nelson, 41. 

In 1940. according to Nelson, who was Chairman of the War 

Production Bo,'trd, the Army had on hand 900,000 Springfield rifles 

from World War I ,and 1200,000 British Enfields, ,all obsolete, and only 

50,000,000 pounds (not tons) of fresh powder ,and 48,000,000 pounds 

left over from WW I. 

10. Peppers, 19 
1 

MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES 

BEFORE PEARL HARBOR DAY 

Despite the fact that World War I had been raging for 32 months 

when the United States declared war, despite the large numbers 

of war orders received by U.S. industry to arm the French and 

the British, and despite the National Defense Act of 1916,1 

which, among many other things, established a mechanism for 

mobilizing industry, United States ground and air forces that 

fought in World War I were largely supplied with French and 

British munitions. 2 Industrial mobilization had been so inept that 

Congress passed legislation soon after World War I ended to 

build an apparatus to ensure that if the United States went to war 

again it would be better mobilized industrially. 

The National Defense Act, June 4, 1920 (41 Statute 764), 

explicitly outlined responsibilities in the Office of the Secretary 

of War that streamlined procurement for that day's military and 

also planning for future wars: 

The Assistant Secretary of War, under the supervision of the 

Secretary of War, shall be charged with the supervision of 

the procurement of all military supplies and other business 

of the War Department pertaining thereto and the assurance 

of adequate provision for mobilization of materiel and 

industrial organizations essential to wartime needs .... 

There shall be detailed to the office of the Assistant 

Secretary of War from the branches engaged in procurement 

such numbers of officers and civilian employees as may be 

authorized by regulations approved by the Secretary of War. 

• . . Chiefs of branches of the Army charged with the 

procurement of supplies for the Army shall report direct to 

the Assistant Secretary of War regarding all matters of 

procurement. 3 
10 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT OF 4 JUNE 1920 

• Charged the Assistant Secretary of War with supervision of the 

procurement of all military supplies and other business of the War 

Department to assure adequate provision for mobilization of materiel 

and industrial organizations essential to wartime needs 

• Detailed to the office of the Assistant Secretary of War officers and 

civilian employees from the branches engaged in procurement, as 

authorized by regulations approved by the Secretary of War 

• Directed that all chiefs of branches of the Army to report directly to 

the Assistant Secretary of War regarding all matters of procurement 

The Assistant Secretary of War now had under his control 

something that had been lacking in the Army for 150 years a 

more unified procurement apparatus and a directive to plan for 

future industrial mobilization. In October 1921 in his first 

memorandum orders the Assistant Secretary established a 

Procurement Division to supervise "the procurement of all 

military supplies and other business of the War Department... 

and the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of 

material and industrial organizations essential to war time needs." 

This Division was further subdivided into a Planning Branch and 

a Current Supply Branch. From the start, the Planning Branch 

was under the direction of a full colonel, signifying its 

importance in those days of spare rank. He was accountable for 

planning for wartime procurement and industrial mobilization and 

was also the agent who dealt with the Navy Department and all 

other government departments on "all matters pertaining to the 

allotment of industrial facilities and materials required for war." 

The Planning Branch was further subdivided into 10 sections, 

including Industrial Policy, Purchase, Production Allocation, 

Labor, Finance, Foreign Relations, Transportation, and Storage. 

It survived into World War II, and for more than a decade was 

the only agency engaged in industrial mobilization planning. 4 

People who worked in the Assistant Secretary's office, 

however, received no respect from members of the General Staff, 

and throughout the 1920s and 1930s there was friction between 

the logisticians and the operators. At times the relationship 

became sulfurous, for example when General Charles P. 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 11 

Summerall, Army Chief of Staff from 1926 to 1930, "forbade his 

subordinates to cooperate with" the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of War, "which he recommended be abolished." He 

called the Assistant Secretary's Executive Officer, Brigadier 

General George Van Horn Mosely, a logistician, a "traitor" and 

a "scoundrel. ,,5 

S'r~E 

FG4:~E ~ N POUCY 

pUR(~SlE 

PLANNING BRANCH 

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 

I W.rDepartment J 

I 

I I:~ocurement Division J 

I 

I I 

FINANCE I 

I I 

n~MI~ITS I 

In addition to the Planning Branch in the Assistant 

Secretary's office, there was another logistics entity: the Army 

and Navy Munitions Board, created in 1922 to coordinate "the 

planning for acquiring munitions and supplies required for the 

Army and Navy Departments for war purposes and to meet the 

needs of any joint plans." This Board was also charged with 

developing "a suitable legislative program" to be put into effect 

at the appropriate time to "enable the procurement program to 

be" established. Unlike the procurement and planning duties 

assigned to the Assistant Secretary, the Army and Navy 

Munitions Board had no specific legislative sanction and no 

appropriation until 1 July 1939, when President Franklin D. 

Roosevelt directed that this organization and several other joint 

boards come under the direct supervision of the president. Prior, 

the Board included the Assistant Secretaries of the Army and 

Navy and whomever they designated to serve with them and 
12 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

whatever staff they hired. The Army segment of the Board's 

staff came from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. 6 

It was clearly understood that the Army and Navy Munitions 

Board was not subordinate to the Army and Navy Joint Board, 

mainly an operational planning organization, but parallel to it. 

Through the early 1930s there was little life and no power in the 

Board because of interservice problems. The Army G-3 did its 

planning for troop mobilization without reference to the Navy, 

and the Planning Branch did its industrial mobilization planning 

similarly oblivious to the Navy's potential needs. In 1932, 

however, the Board was reorganized to include the Director of 

the Planning Branch and similar personnel from the Navy 

logistics community. A secretary was authorized and eight 

divisions formed dealing with such items as price controls, 

contracting, commodities, power, etc. In that year the Board 

was charged with coordinating and controlling the national 

industrial effort in an emergency, and coordinating plans for 

wartime procurement. The next year the Board took over 

sponsorship of the industrial mobilization plans and began to 

compile lists of strategic and critical materials. 7 

NOTES 

1. Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of 

Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945 

(Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Army, 1955), 192-194. 

2. J.M. Scammell, "History of the Industrial College of the 

Armed Forces 1924-1946," unpublished manuscript (National Defense 

University Library), 5. Scammell quotes David Lloyd George's 

memoirs thusly" "it is one of the inexplicable paradoxes of history, that 

the greatest machine-producing nation on earth failed to turn out the 

mechanisms of war after 18 months of sweating and hustling .... 

There were no braver or more fearless men in any Army, but the 

organization at home and behind the lines was not worthy of the 

reputation which American business men have deservedly won for 

smartness, promptitude and efficiency" (Scammell, 4). The author 

quotes General John J. Pershing similarly: "It seems, 'odd' that with 

American genius for manufacturing from iron and steel, we should find 

ourselves after a year and a half of war almost without these 

mechanical contrivances which had exercised such a great influence on 

the western front in reducing infantry losses" (Scammell, 4). 

3. Kreidberg and Henry, 493. 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 13 

4. Kreidberg and Henry, 496-497. How to prepare Army 

officers for this responsibility, when knowledge of industry was absent 

in the military, became a problem early on. This difficulty led to the 

creation of the Army Industrial College (Scammell, 18, 19). 

5. Terrence J. Gough, "Soldiers, Businessmen and US Industrial 

Mobilization Planning Between the World Wars, " War&Society 9, no. 

1 ( May, 1991): 68, 69. Gough writes: "important elements of the 

army continued to give short shrift to the critical role of procurement 

in the 20s and 30s." George Marshall himself was criticized by a 

logistician for paying insufficient attention to supply planning. There 

was so much acrimony between G-3 (Operations) and the logisticians 

that there was a lack of coordination between G-3 and the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of War throughout these two crucial decades. 

6. Kreidberg and Henry, 499-502. 

7. Kreidberg and Henry, 499-502. 
n 

EDUCATION FOR MOBILIZATION 

When the Planning Branch was formed in 1921 and tile Board in 

1922, however, there was no formal schooling for the people who 

joined the st',fffs of each organization. That was rectified in 1924 

with the establislunent of the Army Industrial College. Staff 

officers in the Assistant Secretary of War Office recognized from 

the start that fortnal education was needed if those who worked 

in the Planning Branch were to be effective. In 1924 the War 

Department issued a general order establishing the College: "A 

college to be known as the Army Industrial College... for the 

purpose of training Army officers in the useful knowledge 

pertaining to the supervision of all military supplies in time of 

war and to the a~ssurance of adequate provisions for the 

mobilization of materiel and industrial organizations essential to 

war time needs." The College was assigned to the Assistant 

Secretary for supervision rather than the General Staff, which 

supervised all other general service schools. The first course 

lasted 5 months and had only 9 officers in its student 

complement, but SOOl~ after the College was established a small 

number of Navy and Marine officers began attending. From the 

beginning, the focus was on general logistics and not just on 

procurement. In the 1920s the prestige of the school wzts low, 

but over time it improved, although probably no officer--and 

certainly no combat arms officer--saw it equal in importance to 

the Army War College. ~ 

The motivations of the schoors founders--field grade 

officers in the Plaiming Branch--went beyond .just understanding 

the mechanics of procurement and industrial mobilization. They 

hoped to educate military officers about industry to the point that 

such educated people could control industri~ mobilization and in 

fact direct the war industries. These officers believed it had been 

15 
16 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

a mistake to leave control of war industries in lhe hands of 

financiers and industrialists like Bernard Baruch during World 

War I and thought that military control would yield efficiency. 

"llae officers in the Pkuming Branch who conceived of the Army 

Industrial College though! their "professional interests diverged 

from the ambitions of businessmen" in conducting industrial 

mobilization. "Neither side viewed the other primarily as a 

partner in a mutu~ly beneficial endeavor." The two sides were 

in competition with each other. 2 

The staff officer most involved in/~stering the creation of 

the College, James H. Bums, wrote: "While actual production 

was essentially the task of industry, plamling and control--in the 

broad sense-~)f the production of War Department supplies.. 

• were primarily military responsibilities." He argued that the 

"anthority" to plan aa~tl control "should not be surrendered" to 

agencies outside of the War Department, and that the Anny 

"should organize" to supervise industry. He believed that the 

War Department "should not only have a plan worked out, but 

that military men should be thoroughly trained in the plan so that 

they could maJ~ key positions in lime of war." Once war 

production was starled "these men could be replaced by 'Captains 

of Indu.'try S ' working a~s part of the War Department 

orgmfization." Thus the Army Industri',d College was to provide 

logistical officers with the expertise to ensure their dominance 

over civilians in mobilization. The Assistant Secretary of War in 

1924, Dwight F. Davis, shared this view aJld saw the Army 

Industrial College as a school to "fit officers for the mobilization 

and direction of the industrial Ix)wet of this country. ''~ 

The notion of tile Anny directing industry in the United 

States strikes one as naive at best, bul it is most symbolic of the 

attitude of soldiers and their view of businessmen--the former 

dedicated to their mission and to victory for which they would 

sacrifice their lives if necessary, aJltl tile latter dedicated to 

improving the bottom line. The notion that somehow soldiers 

(sailors and marines, too, since they became Industrial College 

students soon after the school opened) could master industry after 

a 5-month and later a 10-month program is, of course, 

preI~)sterous, and General Hugh Jolmson, a World War I 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 17 

manpower and industrial mobilization authority, wrote so in 1938 

and again in 1939: 

The Army lndustri~d College is a get-rich-quick course in 

which professiomd Army officers are taught, in a few 

months, all about running the industries of this country by 

milit:u'y instructors, most of whom never even ran a peanut 

stand. I ~un not knocking its purpose or its personnel in the 

least. It is highly necessary to have some officers in the 

Army who have at least a bowing acquaint~mce with our 

economic ,and industri~d problems. The average officer lives 

a life as remote from our day-to-day business struggle as a 

cloistered monk. 

The executive assist~mt to the Assistant Secretary of War 

is quoted.., as having said: 'An Army Industri:d College 

is now training about 60 Army :rod Navy officers each ye~u" 

to direct the mobilization of industry.' No cr,'unming course 

in 'inth,stry' and nothing he can read out of any books can 

make the average officer fit for business 

administration--much less to 'direct the mobilization of 

industry.' The War Deparunent itself has no business 

whatever 'directing' industry in war. That is a m~unmoth and 

viud task--~ts great ~md vital as fighting a win. The Army 

already has the latter task. It should not jimmy up the works 

by taking on :mother just as big the moment the guns begin 

to roar.., it would be just as absurd :rod disastrous to use 

them on this job as it would be to elbow all the generals 

aside ,and put industri:d leaders in comm~md of ,'uqnies. Put 

annies under soldiers :rod industri~d mobilizers under 

industrialists ~md let all shoemakers stick to their I~tsts. 4 

By December 1941, the College had trained about 1,000 

officers of whom 15 percent were l'rom the Navy and Marine 

Corps. Many of these Anny graduates worked in the Planning 

Branch and Anny and Navy Munitions Board. During World 

War II there were about 25,000 officers in Anny procurement, 

and no more than 2 percent of these could have been Industrial 

College graduates. -~ The students of the Industrial College 

studied industry inlensely, exmnined the activities of the War 

Industries Board and other Wnrld War I mobilization agencies, 

and analyzed mobilization problems from that war. They "also 
18 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

provided analytic',d support to the Plmming Branch and to the 

Army and Navy Munitions Board when these organizations wrote 

the various Industrial Mobilization Plans. 6 

NOTES 

1. Marvin A. Kreidberg ,and Merton G. Henry, History of Military 

Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945 (W;tshington, DC: 

Headqu,'trters, U.S. Army, 1955), 497-498. 

2. Terrence J., Gough, "Origins of the Army Industri,al College: 

Military Business Tensions After World War I," Armed Forces & 

Society 17, no. 2 (Winter, 1991): 270-271. 

3. Gough, "Soldiers, Businessmen, And US Industri~d 

Mobilization," 70. Gough cites works published by Burns ,and Davis. 

His view is supported by Jo~mne E. Johnson, "The Army Industrial 

College ,and Mobilization Planning Between the Wars," unpublished 

executive research paper (Wa:;hington, DC: Industrial College of the 

Armed Forces), 1-43. Johnson used ,archival sources often different 

from Gough's to come to the szune conclusion. 

4. The former quote was from the Washington News, 1 

November 1938, ~md the latter from the Philadelphia Inquirer, 5 May 

1939; both ,are cited in Johnson, 20-21. This demonstrates that the 

belief that the War Deparunent ,and soldiers in it would run industry 

permeates the thinking throughout the period. 

5. Gough, "Soldiers, Businessmen trod US Industrial 

Mobilization," 72. 

6. Johnson, 1-43. Donald Nelson wrote that the lndustri,al College 

produced a "reserve of practical experience ,and research," but that it 

was not used by the e,'u'ly groups Roosevelt appointed to m~mage 

industri,'d mobilization (Don:dd M Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy 

(New York: Harcourt, Brace ~md Co., 1946), 92). 
11 

INTERWAR PLANNING FOR 

INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION 

The National Defense Act of 1920 (which was the foundation for 

the Planning Branch, the Amly and Navy Munitions Board and 

Army Industrial College) directed that the Assistant Secretary of 

War prepare an industrial mobilization plan to prevent the 

fumbling that occurred during World War I. 1 During the interwar 

period there were four plans developed. The first, in 1922, 

written in the Plmming Branch, was really an outline of a plan to 

be prepared in three volumes that later became an Industrial 

Mobilization Basic Plan in 1924---but which still lacked detail. 

The latter "plan," or the 1924 "plan," recognized the need for an 

industrial mobilization superagency to be "established by act of 

Congress or by the President, under congressional authority for 

the purIx)se of coordinating, adjusting anti conserving the 

available agencies for resources so as to promptly and adequately 

meet the maximum requirements of the military forces and the 

essential needs of file civilian population." This was basically a 

procurement plan. The keystone of the 1924 plan and all those 

that followed was a hypothetical Mobilization Day (M-Day), the 

date of the first day of mobilization, considered simultaneous 

with a declaration of war. The officers in the Plarming Branch 

(and subsequent authors) found it inconceivable "in the light of 

American practice and thinking" that the "United States would 

ever begin mobilizing before the outbreak of war. ''2 As it 

actually happened, Roosevelt indeed began to plan for mobilizing 

industry even before Germany invaded Poland, and legislation to 

assist mobilization was passed well before 7 December 1941. 

Four mobilization agencies were tried and ",all failed before the 

Japanese bombed Pearl harbor. M-Day thinking w~Ls a mistake. 

19 
20 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

The next plan, written in 1930, had additional flaws, all of 

which were carried through in subsequent Industrial Mobilization 

Plans. One was the assertion that existing executive ~md other 

govenunent agencies should not be used a,s any of tile 

O" .I ~,ovemments tools for industrial mobilization. This prow~ked 

hostility in the senior departments. ,M~other was the failure to 

recommend a branch to collect, assess mid distribute statistics. 

Most significant was the failure to recognize thal the United 

States would probably have Io assist in arming its "allies. 3 The 

1933 Plan's preface summarized the thinking behind all of the 

interwar industrial mobilization planning: 

Complicated weapons and machines are used up rapidly in 

war. Armies and Navies must not only be weli supplied 

initially, but mainten~mce must be adequate ~md continuous. 

Thus, the success of a modern fighting force, is directly ~md 

immediately dependent upon the ability of the Nation's 

resources to satisfy promptly its requirement in munitions.. 

•. War is no longer simply a battle between armed forces in 

the field--it is a struggle in which each side strives to bring 

to bear against the enemy the coordinated power of every 

individual ~md every malcrial resource at its command .... 

The following comprise the essentials of a complete plan for 

mobilization of Industry: 

a. Procurement planning 

(1) Determination of requirements 

(2) Development of Plans for the procurement of such 

requirements 

b. Plums for control of economic resources ~md mobilization of 

industry 

(1) Determination of the measures to be employed to 

insure the proper coordination and use of the Nation's 

resources. 

(2) Development of plans for the org:mization :rod 

administrative machinery that will execute these control 

ine~L,~ures. 4 

The Plan was approved by both tile Secretary ot' War and 

Secretary of the Navy (lhe first to be approved by both and the 

first written by lhe Army and Navy Munitions Board). Only 102 

pages long, it czune with an appendix of proposed industrial 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 21 

mobilization bills dr',d~ed for congressional consideration. This 

plan called for the apptfintment, by the president, of an 

"Achninistrator of War Industries. ''5 

Tim Army and Navy Munitions Board prepared a plan for 

a transition organization to implement industrial mobilization 

during tile period immediately after a declaration of war and 

beff)re file War Industries Administration was fully formed. StMf 

officers wrote in a memorandum of 19 July 1934: "In order to 

make the War Industries Administration reslxmsive to the needs 

of file Army and Navy, it is proposed to lake from the Army and 

Navy Munitions Board and from the Amly and Navy 

Departments a limited number of seasoned officer personnel.. 

• to assist file Administrator of the War Industries Administration 

and to act as advisors to him." Tile memo also suggested that 

the Army and Navy Munitions Board "conform its structure to 

that pla~med for the War Industries Administration." This meant 

that at the outset of the war the country's economy would be 

controlled by Army mad Navy officers.* 

The 1936 plan, a further revision of the 1933 plan (which 

was a revision of the 1930 plan) was only 75 pages long, 

including suggested legislation! v This plan called for a War 

Resources Administration and War Resources Administrator, an 

individual with powers similar to those that Bernard Baruch had 

in 1918 as head of the War Industries Board and James F. 

Bymes was to get in May 1943 ms Director of the Office of War 

Mobilization. Baruch, who was asked to review this plan, was 

critical of it because it tailed adequately to consider file 

production needs of the civilian population. He was also 

insistent that industrial mobilization be implemented under 

civilian control mid that specific plans ff~r the use of industry 

should be made by civilian industria.l experts in the respective 

fields. He ffmnd intolerable the degree of involvement in 

industrial mobilization of the Anny and Navy Munitions Board. ~ 

The 1939 plan was even shorter than the 1936 revision, only 

18 pages (although there were more than 100 pages of almexes 

dealing with commodities, facilities, labor, power, fuel, prices, 

transporlation, finance and trade). Similar to the 1936 edition, 

the new plan called R)r aa~ Administrator of War Resources to be 

at the top of the entire mobilization apparatus. All other agencies 
22 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

formed to mobilize the country's industries were to assist the War 

Resources Achninistrator. 9 This plml was published after 

Germany invaded Poland and it was not used. The muddling that 

had accompanied World War I mobilization was being repeated. 

Given the eagerness expressed by the Assistant Secretary of War 

and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, why'! 

For one reason, the plans were fllin--the last being only 18 

pages--and therefore superficial. One reason for this 

superficiality was the number of staff officers who could be in 

Washington either on the Anuy General Staff or in the Assistant 

Secretary's Oft]ce was severely limited by Congress. There were 

simply too few staff officers to perl'onn significant industrial 

mobilization pla~ming at the smue time as operational planning 

and other staff functions. Congress, moreover, was "always leery 

of expanding fl~e powers of the executive and never more so than 

in a period when file country was at peace. Representatives anti 

senators were especially concerned that the president might drag 

the country into an um~ecessary war. The disillusionment and 

resentment that followed World War I hamstrung the president 

because it was deeply reflected in Congress and file decisions of 

that body) c' 

Although perhaps better than nothing, ma(i certainly better 

than anything on tile sllelf in April 1917 when Congress declared 

war on Germany, the Industrial Mobilization Plans were flawed. 

They were prepared entirely by military agencies with some 

knowledge of industry but no real depth. They were, moreover, 

rigidly based on the M-Day concept and lacked the flexibility 

needed ff)r adaptation to a gradual mobilization. The 

mobilization planners, moreover, assumed a one-front war like 

the one they had experienced in World War I. The Army and 

Navy Munitions Board, funhennore, wa~s unwilling to work with 

existing goverlunental departments. Most importantly, President 

Roosevelt could not possibly abide a plan that put so much 

power in the hands of the uniffmned military, it The 

implementation of such a plan in 1939 when Poland was 

conquered or even June 1940 when France fell would be out 

of the question politically. It was not even possible when the 

Soviet Union was invaded in June 1941. And Rt~)sevelt was still 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 23 

not ready to put direction of the economy under the military 

when the United States was attacked on 7 December 1941.12 

In addition to political problems perceived by the president, 

internal difficulties existed within the Amly. The rancor between 

the General Staff and the Assistant Secretary's office was ech(e,d 

in the lack of c(~rdination between the logistics element (G--4) 

and the operations element (G-3) on the general staff. The 

operations plans drawn up by G-3 and various joint planning 

elements were logistically unrealistic. With the 1933 Industrial 

Mobilization Plan and a survey of industry in hand (by 1940 the 

Planning Branch and other planners had surveyed 30,000 

industrial firms that supplied 70,(R.)0 different items the Army 

required13), the G4 wrote in 1936 that the forces to be mobilized 

in the first 30 days after M-Day could be fed, transported, and 

sheltered in a "reasonably satisfactory manner" and could also be 

"supplied with required equipment from storage or procurement 

except (emphasis added) R~r airplmles, tanks, combat cars, scout 

cars, antiaircraft guns, searchlights, antiaircraft fire control 

equipment, .50 caliber machine guns, pontoon equipment .... gas 

masks, radio and telephone equipment and equipment R~r medical 

regiments. ''~" 

In addition to the political climate militating against 

implementation, superficial planning, and disharmony between 

operators and logisticians, the United States business world was 

not too keen on being mobilized until the president and Congress 

and the people were behind it. Although the attitude of business 

toward mobilization warmed as the military situation in Europe 

darkened in 1941, the real change in perspective did not occur 

until the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Fifteen years of contact 

between the military and industry had not improved the attitude 

of businessmen. ~s They were hurt by the boom mad bust cycle of 

World War I and were not to be hurt willingly again. 

Ultillmtely it came down to Roosevelt. He did indeed 

scuttle the Industrial Mobilization Plan of 1939, only to be driven 

back to its "essential R~nn in 1943 after years of wasted 

administrative motion." Why? Because in the period from 1939 

to 1941 he saw himself bound to his IX~litical base. He had to 

rally and sustain a "New Deal lx~litical coalition for reelection" 

and a country for a "united world war effort." He simply had to 
24 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

avoid confrontation with "maJor power groups both inside and 

outside of Washington." In tile end, the president rejected the 

Industrial Mobilization Plan because "he could not afford 

politic',)Jly to be seen to support a plan that orgmfizcd labor and 

agricultur',d spokesmen and influential New Dealers opposed, 

even if he had wanted" to himself. Big industrialists, 

furthennore, were opposed to govenunenl control, had been 

hostile to much that Roosevelt had done during the New De'd, 

and had "demonstrated unparalleled ability to retain prerogatives 

notwithstanding economic and wartime crises. Anti they 

continued to exact a price for their private performances." The 

president "had to bargain" with tile industrialists, "and bargaining 

means joint decision m',tking and shared power. ''~6 In other 

words, the president was not at all a free agent in this matter, or, 

at least, he (lid not see himself as one. 

It is not that the Anny Industrial College, the Planning 

Branch, and file Anny and Navy Munitions Board accomplished 

nothing. Their procurement recommendations were followed, 

although not immediately, and their surveys of industry helped 

the service procurement agencies. This was significant because 

the Planning Branch and Army and Navy Munitions Board 

retained procurement authority throughout the war. More than 90 

percent of the ordnance contracts that were negotiated during 

World War II went to fire, s that had been surveyed in the 1920s 

and 1930s. The vast bulk of the work for SignaJ, Engineer, Army 

Air Forces, anti Chemical Warfare procurement went to surveyed 

finns. And during 1942, the Amly aJad Navy Munitions Board set 

priorities for all contracts t~)r the Army, Navy, Maritime 

Commission, the Coast Guard, m~d even some Lend-Lease orders. 

The Army and Navy Munitions Board was the medium through 

which the services presented their requirements to the War 

Production Board. In late 1942, Board members were directly 

transferred to the industry divisions of tile War Production Board, 

ending this role. ~7 

Surely the president was aware of the general planning 

processes that produced the Industrial Mobilization Plan, because 

in August 1939, on the initiative of Assistant Secretary or War 

Louis Johnson, he permitted appointments by the Secretary of 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 25 

INTERWAR MOBILIZATION PLANNING: 

THE FOUR PLANS 

• The 1930 Plan 

- Set forth the general principles which the Assistant Secretary of 

War would follow in wartime procurement policies 

- Created plans for priorities, price controls, commandeering, trade 

with foreign countries, and government corporations 

- Proposed a "War Cabinet to be composed of the Secretaries of 

Army and Navy, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations 

and the officials of four superagencies: Director of War Industries, 

Director of the Selective Service, Director of Public Relations, 

and Administrator of Labor (The next three plans used the 1930 

plan as a model.) 

• The 1933 Plan 

- Redesignated key superagency the War Industries Administration 

and centralized internal organization 

- Provided for a Federal labor organization in wartime which was 

to be highly centralized 

- Contained a "Legislative Appendix" listing seven bills deemed 

necessary, should war break out 

• The 1936 Plan 

- Called for War Resources Administration (formerly the War 

Industries Administration) to be established at outset of war which 

would assume all functions destined for other superagencies until 

they could be organized. (Administration still lacked coordinating 

control over the other superagencies.) 

• The 1939 Plan 

- Called for an Administrator of War Resources to be at the top of 

the entire mobilization apparatus 

- All other agencies formed to mobilize the country's industries 

were to assist the War Administrator 

- Published after German invasion of Poland and was not 

implemented 

Source: Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry. History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 

1775-1945 (Washington. DC: Headquarters, U.S. Army. 1955). 511-40. 
26 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

War to the War Resources Board--Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 

Board Chairman of United States Steel, and four prominent 

industrialists, educators, or investment bankers tt) study the plan 

and recommend adoption or revision. TM Louis Johnson apparently 

hoped that Roosevelt was about to implement the Industrial 

Mobilization Plan when he appointed members to the War 

Resources Board, because Jolmson welcomed the inembers of the 

Board (with Assistant Secretary of the Navy Thomas Edison) on 

9 August 1939 with an announcement that in the event of an 

emergency or war, the Board would become a superagency 

analogous to the War Industries Board in World War I. Before 

it went out of business in November 1939, the board endorsed 

most of the 1939 Industrial Mobilization Plan, but it was 

disbanded by the president mad its report was classified. ~9 

Why'? For one thing, Board membership included no one 

from either labor or agriculture. For another, the plan 

contemplated speedy enactment of a full range of legislation 

required to pennit a War Resources Administration to control 

prices, profits, wages, labor allocation, imports, exports, etc. But 

the president, who did not see the Board's likely metamorphosis 

in the same light as Louis Jolmson, was not ready to ask for this 

legislation because he believed Congress was not ready to pass 

it. The president was fully aware of the vocal criticism of the 

plan--that it was a scheme to drive the United States into war 

and also to put control of the economy in the hands of the 

military. At that time Roosevelt was "also not primed to turn over 

the domestic economy to sucl~ an entity as the War Resources 

Board. Finally, Roosevelt had not tested die board and was 

unsure about the members' political loyalties, competence, and 

agendas. A combination of domestic politics and Roosevelt's 

personality forced the demise of the War Resources Board, the 

Industri',d Mobilization Plan, and the War Resources 

Administration. 2° 

NOTES 

1. Marvin A. Kreidberg ,and Merton G. Henry, History of Military 

Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945 (W,'kshington, DC: 

Headquarteres, U.S. Army, 1955), 692-693. 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 27 

2. Kreidberg ,and Henry, 5112-51)4. These Industri,-d Mobilization 

Ph'ms (192211924, 1930, 1933, 1936, 1939) can be found in the National 

Archives. The 1933, 1936, ~md 1939 ph'ms (,all published by the 

Government Printing Office) c~m ,also be found at the Nation~d Defense 

University Library Archives. Kreidberg ~md Henry rely very heavily in 

this section of their massive work on mobilization on Harold W. 

Thatcher, "Pl~mning for Industrial Mobilization 1920-1940 (Washington, 

DC: Office of the Quartenn~u,;ter General, 1948). There is a circulation 

copy of this work in the National Defense University Library collection. 

3. Kreidberg ~md Henry, 516-517. Given the situation in World 

War I, this seems like :m odd lapse. 

4. Industri~d Mobilization Plum, Revised 1933. vii-xi, National 

Defense University Library Archives. 

5. Industri~d Mobilization Plum, 1933, 18. See the cover for the 

dates of approved by both service secret;tries. The Ge~tld P. Nye 

Committee (Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry) 

was highly critical of this plum because it did not sufficiently control 

war profiteering ~md because the Committee saw a threat of press 

censorship in the public ~fffairs parts of the pl,'m. 

6. Kreidberg ~md Henry, 518-525. 

7. Industrial Mobilization Plum, Revised 1936 (W~u~hington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1936). Av~filable in National Defense 

University Library Archives. 

8. Kreidberg ~md Henry. 529-530. 

9. Industri~d Mobilization Plum, Revision of 1939 (Washington, 

DC: Government Printing Office, 1939) 1-18, ,and Annexes to 1939 

I.M.P.[Industri,'-d Mobilization Phm]. Available in the Nation~d Defense 

University Library Archives. 

10. Kreidberg ~md Henry, 581,593. Wimess the passage of the 

draft extension bill on 12 August 1941 by just one vote, with Germ,my 

about to invade Polmld ,and with Jap~m deep into ~m 8-year w~u with 

Chimt. See also Emergency Management of the National Economy: Vol 

XIX Administration of Mobilization WWII (Washington, DC: Industrial 

College of the Armed Forces, 1954), 67-68 (hereafter referred to ,as 

ICAF) for Roosevelt's trials with a wary ,'rod suspicious legislature. 

Only 93 Army General Staff Officers were permitted to be assigned in 

W~shington, ~md that did not change until legislation passed on 2 July 

1940, increased it. 

11. Kreidberg :rod Henry, 692-693. highlight the reasons for the 

failure to implement the Industrial Mobilization Plan. The Special 

Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program studied 

the failure too :rod found that "public opinion prior to the outbreak of 
28 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

the war was stutrply divided its to the role this country should play in 

the Europe~m conflict." The Senate committee also blamed the 

Congress for not suspending competitive bidding, a time wasting 

process in ~m emergency and permitting the W,tr ,and Navy Departments 

to negotiate prices as had been recommended by the vltrious Industrial 

Mobilization Plums. See Kreidberg ~md Henry, 692-693. Kreidberg and 

Henry argue that the planning was not a total waste, however, because 

the War lind Navy Departments did get permission, on 2 July 1940, to 

negotiate prices, but were still competing some contracts 4 months into 

the war. The procurement recommendations embodied in the viuious 

pl,'ms were followed. ~md the military did learn a great deal about 

industry in the process of studying it since 1924 (Kreidberg ~md Henry, 

689-691). See also Director of the Service, Supply, ~md Procurement 

Division, War Department General Staff, Logistics in World War 1I: 

Final Report of the Army Service Forces (reprint) (Witshington, DC: 

Center for Military History, 1993), 5. Public policy wits "confused" and 

as long as that was tn~e, nothing as bold a,s implementing the Industrial 

Mobilization Pllm could be accomplished. 

12. For all that, the United Suites was far better prepared for a 

World War in 1941 them it was in 1917. Defense spending was 

mounting rapidly in 1941 before the Japanese attack on Pearl H,'trbor. 

While war expenditures were about one-tenth of nonwar expenditures 

in 1939, they became one-fifth in 1940 lind ahnost half in 1941 (they 

were 16 times grealer in 1943 ~md ahnost 20 times greater in 1944). 

From Jimuary 1941 to December 1941, munitions production increased 

225 percent. There were two million men in the Army and Navy by the 

end of 1941. Lend-Lease wits im ongoing operation supplying our 

future allies with vital munitions, raw materials, and food. In sum, the 

foundation had been laid for the prodigious buildup that followed the 

attack on Pe,'u'l Harbor. Allm Milward, War, Economy and Society: 

1939-1945 (Los Angeles: University of C~difornia Press, 1979), 63-72. 

13. Domdd M. Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy (New York: 

Harcourt, Brace lind Co., 1946), 35. 

14. Kreidberg lind Henry, 468. 

15. Gough, "Soldiers, Businessmen and U.S. Industrial 

Mobilization," 81-83. 

16. Robert D. Cuff, comment:u'y in James Titus. ed., The lfome 

Front and War in the Twentieth Century: The American Experience in 

Comparative Perspective: Prm:eedings of the Tenth Air Force Academy 

Military History Symposium (Wa.~hington, DC: Office of Air Force 

History, 1984),112-115. A history of this era written for the Industrial 

College of the Armed Forces states that it "was necessary to induce 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 29 

manufacturers to accept defense contracLs" because of negative past 

experiences. Industry feared being left with excess capacity ~md was 

reluct~mt to build new plants even for fat contracts. Before Pearl 

Harbor was attacked "private enterprise was.., reluct~mt to invest its 

money in plants to produce weapons for a war that might not come," 

and through that era this country seldom invested public funds in 

manufacturing facilities. But on 25 June 1940 Roosevelt secured 

legislation that authorized the Reconstruction Fimmce Corporation "to 

make loans, to... purchase capital stock in any corporation (a) for the 

purposes of producing, acquiring, ~md carrying strategic and critical 

materials as defined by the President, ~md (b) for plaint construction, 

exp,'msion and equipment." 54 Statute 573, cited in ICAF, 21-23. 

17. Kreidberg and Henry, 689-691. 

18. Industri~d College of the Armed Forces, 12. 

19. Kreidberg and Henry, 682-683. 

20. Henn~m M. Somers, Presidential Agency: The Office of War 

Mobilization and Reconversion (C,'unbridge: Harv,'u'd University Press, 

1950), 6-7; Kreidbcrg ,and Henry, 682-683. 
i 

MOBILIZING FOR WAR: 

1939 to 1941 

With the defeat of Poland 0J3d the onset of the Sitzkrieg (between 

October 1939 and May 1940) during the so-called Phony War 

period, there was little bureaucratic momentum in Washington 

affecting industrial mobilization, although the General Staff, the 

Office of the Assistan! Secretary of War, and the Joint Board 

were busy. There was no "referee of claims made by either 

armed service except the Army and Navy Munitions Board. ''~ 

With the attack on the Low Countries and France, however, 

several key industrial mobilization decisions were made. On 25 

May 1940, Roosevelt established by Executive Order the Office 

of Emergency Management inside the Executive Office of the 

President. This new organization helped c(n)rdinate and direct 

emergency agencies that were begi~ming to proliferate, and it 

spawned a number of important war organizations like the 

National Labor Relations Board, Office of Civilian Defense, 

Office of Defense Transportation, War Food A&ninistration, War 

Manl~)wer Commission, National Housing Agency, and Office 

of Price Administration--all of which germinated in the Office 

of Emergency Management, headed by William H. McReynolds, 

as Liaison Officer for Emergency Management. He was to assist 

the president in informalion clearance and to maintain liaison 

between the chief executive and the Council of National Defense 

and its Advisory Commission, which was reestablished 3 days 

later, also by Executive Order, and any other agencies, public or 

private, the president might direct to meet the demands ~ff an 

emergency. 2 

Immediately after creating the Office of Emergency 

Management, Roosevelt resurrected the Council of National 

31 
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ALAN L. GROPMAN 33 

Defense anti its Advisory Commission. The Office of Emergency 

Manageinent served as a secretariat for the Advisory 

Commission. 3 These bodies had been sanctioned by legislation 

in 1916, and Congress had never repealed the authorization. The 

president, therefore, could recreate these agencies without 

congressional approval, tua important element in Roosevelt's 

political tactics. The Council was made up of key cabinet 

officials: Secretaries of War, Navy, Commerce, Interior, 

Agriculture, and LaborIlhOse departments essenli',d to 

mobilizing for war--but the Advisory Commission "made no 

pretense of reporting to the Council. ''4 Its seven civilian leaders 

(chosen with "politic~ astuteness" by Roosevelt)--Edward R. 

Stettinius, Jr., (advisor for industrial materials matters), William 

S. Knudsen (advisor for industrial production), Sidney Hillman 

(labor), Leon Henderson (price stabilization), Chester C. Davis 

(agriculture), Ralph Budd (transporlation), and Harriet Elliot 

(consumer protection)--reported individually and directly to 

Roosevelt. The National Defense Advisory Commission 

(emphasis on the third word in the title) did meet often, but it 

had neither a chairman nor decisio~unaking authority. 5 

The members of the Commission orgaafized into many 

divisions and subdivisions to be productive. Knudsen's industri~ 

production element had subdivisons run by senior, experienced 

industrialists: W.H. Harrison (of American Telephone anti 

Telegraph) advised on construction, Harold S. Vance (()f 

Studebaker) on machine tools and heavy ordnance, Dr. George 

Mead (inventor of the Wasp aircraft engine) on aircraft, E. F. 

Jolmson (retircd executive from General Motors) on small arms 

and ammunition, Rear A~hniral Emory S. Land (chairman of the 

Maritime Commission) on shipbuilding, and George M. Moffett 

(of the Corn Products Refining Company) on food anti chemicals. 

Stettinius, who ran the Industrial Materials Division had three 

subdivisions: mining mad mineral products, chemical and allied 

products, and agricultural anti forest products, "all o1' which were 

run by big businessmen. ~ 

However it was divided and subdivided, and no matter the 

caliber of the people in il, the Advisory Commission was not the 

agency to supervise industri',d mobilization--it had no formal 

leader (critical in an organization with powerful men who see 
34 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

themselves as equals), and more importantly, no authority. And 

it is indicative of Roosevelt's frame of mind anti approach to 

bureaucracy and domestic lx~litics that this organization existed 

for more than a year] even ",after subsequent organizations were 

founded. This is not to say, however, that the Advisory 

Commission accomplished nothing. 

Airplanes, especially bombers, were central to Roosevelt's 

strategic viewpoint, and the president turned to a key member of 

the Commission, Willianl Knudsen, to help him generate the 

facilities that would eventually lead to construction of the greatest 

air armada in history, before or since. Purchases by the British 

and French before 1940 and by the British after 1940 helped lay 

the foundation for the unprecedented growth in the aviation 

industry, but Knudsen's work on the conversion of the automobile 

industry for aircraft production was certainly essenti',d. 8 Creative 

funding to build the necessary aircraft manufacturing plants was 

also ,an initiative of the Advisory Commission. Unlike Germany, 

the United States mobilized by building armaments in depth 

rather than in width by first spending money and allocating 

resources to build factories. By contrast the Germans pushed 

more arms out of existing facilities by "allotting materials for 

manufacture of munitions. 9 Leon Henderson, a commission 

member, and Don',dd M. Nelson, an adviser to the Commission, 

came up with a 5-year amortization scheme to permit 

industrialists to write off plant construction costs if these were 

expended for building munitions. ICmudsen carried the ball in 

testimony before the Senate Finance committee where it passed 

11 to 10 in July 1940, spurring new construction at a critical 

time. ~° After Pearl Harbor was atlacked, the govenunent 

generated the funds for most factory construction, ~ but 

Roosevelt would have found it impossible to get this kind of 

funding in 1940. There was more to the Commission, though, 

than gearing up industry. 

The Advisory Commission, perhaps because Sidney Hillman 

was a commissioner, perhaps because the industrialists were 

sensitive to labor anyway, made a pronouncement on labor to the 

president, who sent it to Congress on 31 August 1940. The 

Commission called for fair treatment of labor during the 

emerging crisis and for using the emergency to sop up 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 35 

unemployment. It insisted on a 40-hour week with overtime pay 

for extra work; demanded compliance with the Walsh-Healy Act, 

the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Labor Relations Act; called 

for adequate housing for the lalx~r force, and asserted the need 

for nondiscrimination in the lalx~r force on the basis of age, race, 

or gender. The Commission understo(~l the relationship between 

a happy labor force and efficiency. 12 

Thtmgh the Commission industrialists could advise the 

president and cajole industry, especially their own, the group 

failed because Roosevelt would give them neither the authority 

to succeed nor, in many cases, even the infommtion they needed. 

The president, t~r example, called in 1940 for industry to tool up 

to build 50,000 airplanes per year (in 1944 the United States 

produced 96,000, but at the time of R(~)sevelt's call 50,000 

seemed out of reach). But nobody told the Commission what 

kinds of airplanes m produce or the numbers of each model. 

Everybody knew that tanks would be needed in great numbers 

after Germany's lightning war in Poland and France, but nobody 

told the Commission what kind of tanks to build. ~3 

Notx~dy was satisfied with the results of the Advisory 

Commission--neither its members nor the president nor 

mobilization gurus like Bemard Baruch] 4 Congressional 

dissatisfaction was reflected in Senator Robert Taft's 21 

November 1940 announcement that he would introduce a bill in 

the legislature to create a War Resources Board under a single 

administrator. Others outside of govermnent were also disturbed. 

Alfred P. Sloan, Jr, Chairman of the Board at General Motors, 

called in late November for a single person to direct a National 

Defense Board, and several weeks later National Association of 

Manufacturers president J.W. Prentis made a strong plea for a 

single civilian leader with decisiorunaking authority. ~5 

This general dissatisfaction led Roosevelt to create, by 

Executive Order on 7 January 1941, the Office of Production 

Management, a "curiously blended compromise of many 

pressures" designed to stimulate production. Knudsen was 

appointed Director General, a logical choice it appeared at the 

time, and because labor support was essential to winning the 

battle of production, Sidney Hillman was made Associate 

Director General. Presumably the president thought that two 
36 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

heads were better than one. The Secretaries of War and Navy 

were members of tile Office of Production Management policy 

council, but Knudsen m~d Hilhnan were to run tile office, 

rationalize war production, and coordinate tile many other 

government agencies involved in producing for rearmmnent. 16 

Ti~e office was chartered to increase and regulate the 

production and supply of defense materials, equipment and 

factories. It was also to analyze and summarize tile requirements 

of the two services as well as foreign govenm~ents, now a major 

demand. The office also was charged with ensuring tile supply 

of raw materials, fonnulaling plans to mobilize defense facilities 

further, and planning for tile future creation of industrial plants. 

The office was to establish a priorities mechanism, but file 

Director General could ~nly advise the president on industrial 

priorities and "all other mobilization matters. Once again, because 

Roosevelt created this office as only an advisory N~dy to the 

president, it was doomedJ 7 

The office had three functional divisions: purchases, 

production, and priorilies, and two staff divisions: a Bureau of 

Research and Statistics and a Production Plzuming Board. But 

fllere was extensive overlap in these functional and staff 

divisions, which caused friction, zmd "also much duplication 

between the Office of Production Management and a proliferation 

of liaison groups. "Businessmen, industriM representatives, and 

Army and Navy procurement officers seeking decisions were 

shunted back and forth from division to division, sometimes for 

days and weeks. '':~ It was ineffective from the start mad la,sted 

only about a year. 

Tile key problem with this new office was similar to the 

central difficulty with the Advisory Comlnission--the lack of 

clear authority. To inake matters worse, sever',.d parts of tile 

Advisory Commission were spun off as independent entities, such 

as the Office of Defense Transportation and the Office of Price 

Administration. These operated as equals to the Office of 

Production Management. There were other agencies established 

by the president that had not been a part of the Advisory 

Commission. The Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense, 

for example, was established in May 1941 and run by White 

House insider Harold lckes. Tilts was only the first of the many 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 37 

parallel entities created by Roosevelt) 'J There developed factions, 

frictions, prejudices, and parochialisms, and Knudsen and 

Hilhnan were not able to cope with tile resultant clashes, 2° 

perhaps because Roosevelt did not give his suplx,rt when these 

inevitable disputes occurred. Another crucial problem was this 

new office never had control over civilian production, 2~ and from 

tile time tile Office of Production Management was founded, 

munitions production competed fiercely with manufacturing items 

for the civilian population. Industry would rather produce for 

civilians than for the govenunent. 22 

Even Rt~)sevelt's declaration of an unlimited national 

emergency on 27 May 1941 did nothing to improve Knudsen's 

lot. That act oil tile part of the president was supposed to create 

a merger of the Amly and Navy Munitions Board and the Office 

of Production Management, but nothing like that occurred. 2~ 

However, some progress was made. On 22 March the Office of 

Production Management issued Order M-I requiring that 

producers of aluminum give preference to defense orders and 

specified tile sequences in which nondefense orders should be 

filled. In the following months copper, iron, steel, cork, certain 

chemicals, nickel, rayon, rubber, silk and other nmterials were 

brought under similar controls. The office also prohibited the use 

of affected materi',ds for less essenti',d purposes. While the Army 

and Navy Munitions Board was permitted to give priorities to 

military products, the Office of Production Management could 

assign ratings to indirect defense and essential civilian products. 

Although this system did not cover the entire industrial system, 

and broke down in time, it demonstrates where tile Office of 

Production Management fit in early 194 I. 24 

Additionally, tile office began to survey industry (luring this 

period to explore what production capacity existed. For example, 

Merrill C. Meigs, chair of the Joint Aircraft Committee ff,r the 

Office of Production Management surveyed the aircraft industry 

to explore its potential output. Meigs also began to examine 

standardization potentialities so that something like mass 

production could be achieved in an industry that heretofore had 

resisted such approaches. Meigs, like other industrialists, ffmnd 

that the most serious shortage conffmnding defense production 

was rite scarcity of machine tools. 25 
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ALAN L. GROPMAN 39 

MOBILIZATION PLANNING BETWEEN THE WARS 

Chronology 

1920 

4 June 

1921 

October 

1922 

29 June 

1922-1939 

1924 

25 February 

1939 

9 August 

1940 

25 May 

28 May* 

1941 

7 January 

March 

11 April 

June 

28 August 

National Defense Act of 1920 (amendments to Act of 

1916) 

Establishment of Procurement Division in the War 

Department, included in which is the Planning Branch 

Army and Navy Munitions Board created 

Four Industrial Mobilization Plans written and revised 

Army Industrial College founded 

War Resources Board formed 

Office of Emergency Management established within 

the Executive Office of the President 

Advisory Commission to the Council of National 

Defense reestablished 

Office of Production Management founded 

National Defense Mediation Board created 

Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply 

established 

Committee on Fair Employment created 

Supply Priorities and Allocations Board formed 

* Reeslablishment o( the Adv=soty Commission rooted in the National Defense Act of 1916. 
40 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

As defense production was accelerating, moreover, 

manufacturers began to c()mplain that riley faced training 

problems anti labor discontent. New skills were needed. Labor 

leaders tried to use the looming emergency to bid up wages. 

Roosevelt appointed a National Defense Mediation Board in 

March 1941 to settle controversies between employees and 

employers. This 1 l-melnber board had Rmr representatives each 

from labor and management and 3 appointed by the Federal 

Govermnent. The agency was instructed to act when the 

Secretary of Labor certified that a dispute threatened production 

or transportation of equipment or materials essential to national 

defense that could not be adjusted by a conciliation connnission 

inside the Department of Labor. =~ As an example of Roosevelt's 

management style and his penchant for creating competing 

institutions, the Office of Production Management was not a 

partner to this Mediation Board, nor were its successor 

organizations. This struclure plagued the war effort until 27 May 

1943, when the Office of War Mobilization wa~s founded, and the 

president decided to support its director explicitly. Until then 

disputes between agencies like the Office of Production 

Management (or the War Production Board later) anti any oilier 

significant organization could only be settled by Roosevelt 

himself, and he was too busy trod burdened before Pearl Harbor 

to adjudicate disputes between powerful deparlments, bureaucrats, 

or personalities. Alter Pearl Harbor, such an effort by the 

President was out of the question. 

The Office of Production Management was obviously 

concemed about the labor pool and initiated large retraining 

progrtuns. Also, in Augusi 1941, the office urged manufacturers 

to employ women and entreated women to enter the lalx)ring 

ff)rce. Roosevelt made public a/ltl private statements to help 

ensure that minorities received a fair deal from industry and labor 

unions. In June 1941 he created the Committee on Fair 

Employment Practices to investigate and redress grievances 

growing out of departures tram his policy against employment 

discrimination on grounds of race, creed, color or national 

origin. 27 This was more than political, however; it was 

pragmatic. If the United States was to be the Arsenal of 

Democracy, it needed to eliminate barriers to employment. 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 41 

Typical of Roosevelt, in April 1941 he established an 

organization that had, within its porlft~lit~, elements the leaders of 

the Office of Production Management believed properly belonged 

|O [heln. Under Leon Henderson, a New Dealer bureaucrat and 

not an industriMist, Roosevelt established the Office of Price 

Administration and Civilian Supply. This newest entry was 

responsible for recommending procedures to dampen inflation 

and also to ensure that civilian needs received adequate attention. 

Civilians were not to have priority during the defense buildup; at 

the stune time they were not to be neglected, because to do so 

could destroy morale and weaken health and s',ffety standards. 

But they could not be pampered. Unemployment, while still 

high, was in sharp decline, and many people had money to spend 

at a time when industry was supposed to be gearing up for war. 

Henderson, c',dlcd an "all-outer" because he believed in an all-out 

war effort, one that paid attention to victory before considering 

business profits and civilian discomfi~rls. Henders(m believed he 

hal the power to curtail civilian production, in order to promote 

industrial conversion. But the Office of Production Management 

thought it had this authority. The latter was staffed by 

industrialists who wanted to produce for the civilian market. 

Henderson was disturbed by widescale automobile manufacturing 

and production of appliances that were consuming steel anti other 

materials needed for the war effort. In July 1941, when he took 

the initiative zul(l ordered curlailment in fulure production of raw 

material devourers like automobiles, the Office of Production 

Management forced Roosevcll Io mediate. In August Roosevelt 

ruled that the civilian supply function was to be broken off from 

Henderson's office and given to the Office of Production 

Management. 28 It was all a matter of priorities, and clearly the 

business leaders who predominated in the Office of Production 

Management had different priorities from Henderson and perhaps 

even the president. The political moment had not yet arrived for 

Roosevelt when he could ask civilians and their suppliers for 

sacrifices. 

Establishing grand priorities was essential in the summer of 

1941 because it wa~s during this period, on 9 July 1941, that 

Roosevelt directed the War trod Navy Deparlments to collaborate 

on a report "on the munitions and mechmfical equipment of all 
42 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

types which.., would be required to exceed by an appropriate 

amount that available to our potential enemies. From your relxJrt 

we should be able to establish a munitions objective indicating 

the industrial capacity which this nation will require." On 30 

August he told the services to factor Lend-Lease requirements 

into their analysis and wanted a final answer in 10 days. 29 

The War Deparrmem's answer, the "Victory Plan," called for 

61 armored divisions and 61 mechanized divisions, but the Army 

created only 16 of the former and none of the latter, although 

American infantry divisions were, by comparison to any other 

country's, lavishly mechaaaized. The requirements of Lend-Lease 

frustrated this. The Army estimated that the United States sent 

enough equipment to the United Kingdom and other parts of the 

British Empire, the Soviet Union, France, It',dy after it switched 

sides, China, ,and other allied and associated states to create 101 

United States type divisions. Because of Lend-Lease it was 

impossible for the War Depamnent to create as many United 

States armored divisions as the Victory Plan demanded. Where 

the Victory Plan called for 215 Army divisions of all kinds, only 

89 were created. 3° 

Remarkably, however, the size of the Army the Victory Plan 

called for was close to the number actu',dly mobilized. The 

Victory Plan called for an Army of 8.8 million (reaching 8.3 

million at its peak), a ground force of 6.7 million (which peaked 

at 6 million) and an Air Ft~rce of 2 million (which peaked at 2.3 

million). The Victory Planners were assisted by Army Air Force 

planners, who determined that the United States would need 

6,680 heavy bombers, 3,740 very heavy bombers, and 13,038 

bombers for replacements. They "also c.',lled for 8,775 fighters 

and an equal number of replacement fighters. 3~ The Navy had 

been building since the mid 1930s and had a two-ocean Navy 

that dwarfed Hitler's (except for submarines) and Mussolini's and 

was larger than Japan's. It was not until 17 December 1941 that 

the Bureau of Ships presented its first "Master Plan for Maximum 

Ship Construction," which became the guiding document for the 

president and his agencies devoted to munitions productionY 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 43 

Victory Actual 

Plan* 31 May 1945" 

DIVISIONS 

Armored 61 16 

Infantry 71 66 

Infantry, mechanized 61 0 

Airborne 10 5 

Mountain 10 1 

Total 213 89** 

STRENGTH 

Total 8,795,658 8,291,336 

Ground Forces 6,745,658 5,980,900 

Air Forces 2,050,000 2,310,436 

*Different sources list different numbers. 

*'This number has been rounded up. 

Sour(e: Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, Histo/y of Mobitizaffon in the United States Arm~, 1775. 1945 

(War~ington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Army, Ig55), 623. 

By this time, however, Roosevelt and his advisors believed 

that the Office of Production Management was failing. 

Production was not accelerating as necessary, ~ltl the most 

nagging problem was establishing priorities--what was to be 

built first, to whom would il g~ (domestic or overse,as military) 

and for which armed service in the United States, what essential 

civilian items were to be manufactured, who got which raw 

materials and when? The office had limited priority-setting 

authority, although after August it could set military priorities 

above producing civilian goods. Bemard Baruch and the Director 

of the Bureau of the Budget called for the creation of a single 

agency to centralize priority authority over "all production, civil 

and military. Because of such advice, Rc~sevelt created the 

Supply Priorities and Allocations Board, under the leadership of 

Donald Nelson, a key member of the Office of Production 

Management, as Executive Director. Vice President Henry 

Wallace was Chaimlml of the Board and there were other 

powerful people on the Board, like Harry Hopkins. But Nelson 

was in charge. 
44 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

This new Board was to be both a part of tile Office of 

Production Management and superior to it in matters of allocating 

resources and setting priorities. Thus William Knudsen's 

subordinate, Donald Nelson (Knudsen's Director oI' Purchases anti 

later Director of Priorities) was now his superior in the most 

importmlt control element: establishing priorities and allocations. 

The Executive Order establishing this new agency was explicit: 

"to assure unity of policy and coordinate consideration of all 

relevant factors involved in the supply and allocation of materi',ds 

and commodities among the various phases of the defense 

program mid c~mpeting civilian demands.' Tile Board could "also 

"determine policies and m'ake regulations governing allocations 

and priorities with respect to the pn~curement, production, 

transmission, or transportation of materials, articles, power, fuel, 

and other commodities zunong military, economic defense, 

defense aid, civilian and other major demands of the total defense 

program." But tllere were odler agencies that had been granted 

similar responsibilities. Not oldy were fllere entanglements with 

other departments not subordinate to the Board--for two critic'a.l 

exmnples, the War and Navy Departments--but the relationship 

of the Board to the Office of Production Management was 

snarled. 33 The Board's first meeting was on 2 September 1941 

and its last on 13 January 1942 (when it was absorbed in the War 

Production Board). In thal time production indeed increased. 34 

The Supply Priorities and Allocations Board recognized early 

that efficiency lay ill establishing an allocation system versus 

spending time on priorities. Trying to establish priorities 

corrupted the system, because everybt~y wanted everything now 

and certainly ahead of everyone else. Because too many systems 

received A-1 ratings, the Office of Production Management 

established a higher raring, A-I-A. Then too many systems got 

that rating, so a new priority rating system was established that 

rated materiel from A- I-A through A- l-J. And when that system 

became clogged, an AA band had to be superimposed. Then the 

system broke down. It took time for the Board to become 

cognizant of the fullest dimension of tile priorities program 

breakdown, and then to understand completely the availability (or 

really, the unavailability) ~.~f raw materials. 35 Many agencies were 

in the business oI' establishing requirements and tile order in 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 45 

which they would be manufactured. The Joint Chiel~,; of Staff, of 

course, played a major role and beneath them the Anny and 

Navy Munitions Board. But the Army and Navy, which did their 

own procuring, might not always agree with the decisions of dae 

chiefs. Other powerful agencies were also inw,lved in this 

process: the Maritime Commission, Lend-Lease, and the War 

Production Board. The last was, "in theory, empowered to make 

decisions on reductions if its Plaaming Committee indicated the 

necessity for such a step. Because of its composition, however, 

the Board itself could rarely agree on such matters, and it never 

claimed authority to determine the order of strategic necessity." 

Grand strategy was supposed to he the governor, the province of 

the Joint Chiefs, which would send its munitions priorities to the 

War Production Board based on it. s6 

The Board's task was enormous. Once the needs for the 

military and the civilian economy were known, and of course 

these essentials changed, how much steel, aluminum, copper, 

rubber, and dozens of other materials was needed to build the 

millions of weapons and other necessities? It was crucial not to 

mmaufacmre too much of a munition, because with the people 

anti facilities stretched tight, superfluous production would cost 

money, effort, energy, and most importantly time. All the money 

in the world will not buy time. Sequencing was also critical; 

there was no sense in allocating steel for aircraft engines if there 

is insufficient aluminum to build airframes. The board, like the 

Office of Production Management, found that the estimates of the 

Army and Navy Munitions Board of raw material requirements 

were "practically worthless." For example, the Munitions Board 

estimated the requirement for copper for the first 2 years of the 

war to support a 4-million person am~y was 25,0t~ tons, when 

tile real requirement mined out to be nearly 1 million tons. The 

Navy had been no more realistic in its estimation of raw 

materials, s7 

The Anny and Navy were not comfortable with civilians 

responsible for prioritization and allocation, and in November 

1941 made a move to put a super priorities committee above 

Nelson's Supply Priorities and Allocations Board. The military 

constructed this new agency in such a way that uniformed people 

would be dominant, but President R(~)sevelt rejected the idea. 
46 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

As the president got increased funding from Congress in summer 

and fall 1941, Nelson's Board began in August 1941 (effective 30 

November that year) to reduce pr(~luction for civilian goods. 

Automobiles were first to be cut back) s On 9 October, 

nonessential building and construction was stopped so that the 

Board could allocate building materials to war plant construction. 

On 21 October manufacturers were told to stop using copper in 

almost all civilian products. The Board sharply limited the 

production of refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, metal office 

fumiture, and other "nonessential" pr(.Kluclk¢;. 39 On Pearl Harbor 

Day, Nelson and other principals from the Supply Priorities and 

AUocations Board agreed that complete conversion of the 

automobile manufacturing industry was the "first and biggest 

item" on their agenda. 4t~ 

In the end, the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board also 

failed to solve the problem. Adding it to the Office of 

Production Management in tmmy respects made decision-making 

more difficult than it had been in the past, but the bigger problem 

was getting decisions once made to stick without further appeal 

to deparunent secretaries mad, ultimately, the president. This 

problem was not solved until May 1943, and only then because 

Roosevelt allowed it to be solved. Herman Somers wrote: "From 

the beginning, the ever resounding demm~d for reform centered 

around the absence of c(~rdination, centralized authority, and 

central policy-making--all facets of the same problem. TM 

Unfortunately, the War Production Board was to suffer from the 

same fatal flaw. 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 47 

NOTES 

1. Donald M. Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy (New York: 

Harcourt, Brace ;rod Co., 1946), 87-88. 

2. Marvin A. Kreidberg ~md Merton G. Henry, History of military 

Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945 (Washington, DC: 

Headquarters, U.S> Army, 1955), 683: Bureau of the Budget, The 

United States at War, Development and Administration of the War 

Program by the Federal Government (Washington, 19(2: Goverrunent 

Printing Office, 1946), 22. The~ weak institutions, such as the Office 

of Emergency M~magement ~md the National Defense Advisory 

Conunission, did not b~tr the president or Congress from actions. In the 

last h~df of 1940, for ex,'unple, Congress appropriated $10.5 billion for 

munitions contracts, nine times the total expenditures for both the Army 

,and Navy for fiscal year 1937 (which ended on 30 June 1938) (Somers, 

9). 

3. Nelson, 87-88. 

4. Kreidberg ,and Henry, 683-684; Nelson, 20-21. Nelson 

underscores the point that in May 1940, "business was fe,-u'ful, labor 

was ,anxious" of ~m extensive increase in government power ,and 

authority. 

5. Kreidberg ~md Henry, 683-684; Nelson, 66; Emergency 

Management of the National Economy: Vol. XIX Administration of 

Mibilization WWII (W~tshington, DC: Industrial College of the Armed 

Forces, 1954), 29 (hereafter cited as ICAF). The seven advisors did 

more th,an just counsel the president; they helped adv,ance mobilization 

by solving problems as facilities, machine tools, ~md materi,'ds became 

tight. Unemployment was evaporating, ,and people with jobs w,anted to 

spend money. Businessmen w,anted to manufacture for this market ,and 

were reluctant to expand production facilities for munitions work when 

there might be no war. Labor also w,anted to be rewarded in the tighter 

employment m,'uket. Sidney Hillman, a key labor leader, on 2 July 

1940, about 5 weeks after being appointed to the Commission, 

established a Labor Policy Advisory Committee with representatives 

from the Americ~m Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial 

Organizations, ,and the raihoad brotherhoods. (One of these men, 

Joseph D. Keerum, later bec;une a vice chainn,an of the War Production 

Bo,'u'd). Hilhnan ~md his pa_rtners worked successfully to solve labor 

relations problems before they bec,'une issues. They helped prevent 

strikes by removing trouble spots before breakdowns occurred. There 

were strikes during this period, but fewer th,an there would have been 

had Hillman not worked his powers of persuasion on ~m increasingly 

milit,ant labor force (Nelson 308-311). Nelson reports elsewhere that 
48 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

Roosevelt deliberately failed to appoint a chainn~m, thinking he could 

direct the Advisory Commission, ~md when the president chaired 

meetings, infrequently as it turned out, progress was made, but in his 

absence little could be jointly ~tccomplished (Nelson 82-86). 

6. Nelson, 92-93. The Commission understood the intimate 

relationship between raw materials and industry ~md soon after being 

formed drew up a list of 14 strategic ~tnd 15 critical materials, some of 

which were not available (or b~u'ely so) in North America -for ex,'unple 

rubber, silk, tin, manganese, quinine, magnesium (Nelson, 94-97). 

7. Herman M. Somers, Presidential Agency: The Office of War 

Mobilization and Reconversion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 

1950), 14. 

8. Nelson, 46, 48, 82-86. 

9. The common policy of the Uniled States, United Kingdom, ~md 

Soviet Union on the verge of the war was to "follow a much more 

'intensive' reann~tment r~tther them the approach adopled by Genn~my, 

which stressed a rehttively high level of allocations to mechanization 

and reequipment, compared with the Genn,'m policy of creating a large 

fighting force based on only limited milit,'u'y stockbuilding .... The low 

proportion of Genn~m military stockbuilding to armed forces personnel 

reflected ~m essenti~d weakness of Genn,'my's war preparations .... 

After 1940 Germ~m munitions production rose only slowly where,as 

Allied production multiplied. As a result, when Genn~m production 

finally accelerated in 1943-4, it was already too late to close the gap." 

Even with the reverses in 1941 ~md 1942 the Genmm number of work 

hours were virtually unchanged from that of 1939. While the 

percentage of Genn:m women in t~tctories was already higher them it 

would be in Britain, it did not rise between 1939 ,and 1943. Mark 

Harrison, "Resource Mobilization for World War II: The U.S.A., U.K., 

U.S.S.R., ,and Genn~my, 1938-1945," in Economic History Review XLI, 

no. 2 (1988): 175-177, 187, 190. 

10. Nelson, 106, In 1940, Nelson, a senior Sears executive, was 

seconded to the Department of the Tre~tsury where he was acting 

director of the Procurement Division. Here he was authorized to make 

purchases for ,all government departments except the Army ,and Navy. 

He soon bec,'une associated with the Advisory Commission as 

Coordinator of National Defense Purchases (~md later Director of Small 

Business Activities), but he was not a member at the outset [Nelson, 82- 

86, and Emergency Management of the National Economy: Vol. XIX 

Administration of Mobilization ~4q¥11, hereafter cited as ICAF 

(W,a.,~hington, DC: Industri:d College of the Armed Forces, 1954), 20]. 

Coordination of purchases was desir:tble to prevent goverrunent agencies 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 49 

from competing with one ,another lor supplies, and thus bidding up the 

price. By this time orders were pouring in from overseas, the ,armed 

services were spending more. Consumers had more money in their 

pockets ~md were eager to buy. There were also standardization 

problems. In 1940 Douglas aircr:fft comp~my was making seven 

different variations of one aircraft for seven different customers, 

creating major production problems (Peppers, 32-35). 

11. ICAF, 24 

12. ICAF, 23-25. Of course, none of these recommendations c~une 

without debate. The authors of the Industri~d College study argue that 

the "process of getting the counta'y squlu'ed away for reann~unent was 

accompanied by prolonged and vitriolic debate over the terms on which 

various interests would participate in the defense progr,'un." Labor 

seriously distrusted management--with good reason, assert the 

authors---and m~magement was suspicious of labor. "Business was 

accused by labor ,and politicilms, ,and by others of conducing a 'strike of 

capital' until they were able to get contracts on their terms. Everybody 

was ch'unoring for the Government to "knock he~tds together, i.e. other 

people's heads." 

13. Nelson 99, 105. Nelson brought much organizational 

capability, expertise, and additional personnel with the right skills to this 

group, added a statistical section in October 1940, and must h~tve 

seemed like the superst,'u bec~tuse it was he who eventu~tlly bec~une the 

industriid mobilization "czar" (although he, too, was to be chopped 

down well before the end of the war). 

14. Bnruch, who w~mted industrial committees (there were 57 on 

the War Industries Board during World War I), saw the lack of a 

priority setting apparatus in the Advisory Commission ,as a major 

problem, and perceived the failure to establish a mechanism for 

controlling prices ,'k~ critical. In general, he saw as crucial the lack of 

,'m individ~tl with re:d authority to make decisions in this critical 

period. See Nelson, 90-91. 

15. Somers, 14. 

16. Kreidberg and Henry, 684-685. 

17. Nelson, 117-118. 

18. Kreidberg and Henry, 684-685. Nelson wrote that the Office 

of Production Management wits ready for the "oxygen tent" by midsummer of 1941. Nelson, 139. 

19. Somers, 16-17. The Office of Production M~magement ,also 

had ,an oil unit, but it could not control this basic industry because of 

competition from Ickes. The Federal Power Commission was also a 

competitor. When the Office of Production M~magement tried to 
50 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

control power for defense purposes, the Federal Power Commission 

,argued back that only it had statutory authority to allocate electricity. 

Only the president could resolve such disputes. Even the services 

sabotaged the efforts of the Office of Production Management by 

providing Knudsen with "unrealistically small, inadequately calculated, 

,'rod internally inconsistent" figures, ~dthough this was done out of 

incompetence rather than m:diciousness. 

20. Nelson, 124. 

21. ICAF, 52. 

22. Paul A. C. Koistinen, "Warf~tre ,and Power Relations in 

America: Mobilizing the World War II Economy," in J,'unes Titus, ed., 

The Home Front and War in the Twentieth Century: The American 

Experience in Comparative Perspective: Proceedings of the Tenth Air 

Force Academy Miltiary History Symposium (Washington, DC: Office 

of Air Force History, 1984), 93. "Desiring to exploit growing civili~m 

markets, fearful of creating excess capacity or disturbing intra-industry 

power patterns.., doubtful or distrustful of the president's foreign ,and 

domestic policies, industri~d America set the terms for cooperating with 

the Roosevelt administration." Koistinen x~serts that the Advisory 

Commission and Office of Production IVlarmgement were a "facade of 

broad interest group representation," but were "actmdly dominated by 

industry." Decisions that were made by the "dollar a year men" in these 

organizations "reflected the attitude of their Finns ,and organizations. " 

Koistinen notes that the "nation's gi~mt corporations" received the 

"overwhelming percentage of defense and w~tr contracts." True enough, 

but where else would one turn in a national emergency? W~s this the 

time to remake industri~d relations, or to win the war'! 

23. Somers, 17. The most severe critic of the infighting that went 

on in Washington in this era is Bruce Catton (who may have ghosted 

Nelson's book). Catton was an eyewimess to the infighting ,and 

recorded the disple:tsures of those who were responsible for making the 

Office of Production Management ,and the W,'u" Production Bo,'ud work. 

He found throughout the war that the industri,'d sector remained 

undemocratic and that only ~tn "armed truce" existed between American 

industry ,and the government on one h,'md ,and management ,and labor on 

the other. He cites one ex,'unple that will serve for m~my. Business put 

up a terrific fight over establishing joint management/labor committees 

to suggest ways to enh~mce production. Manufacturers called this a 

ph'm to "Sovietize American industry." Catton ,argues that there were 

many good suggestions that c~une out of this partnership, but that poor 

relations between labor ,and management limited the potenti,'d. See 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 51 

Bruce Catton, The War Lords of Washington (New York: Harcourt, 

Brace ,and Co., 1948), 150, 147-148. 

24. ICAF, 56-58. 

25. Nelson, 123, 139. Machine tool production exp~mded more 

than six times during the war (Peppers, 63-65). The surveying done by 

the Office of Production Management was considered less th,'m 

superfici,'d by Bruce Catton. He writes about a meeting chaired by 

Knudsen soon after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in which the 

industrialist tells automobile manufacturers that he needed to know 

where war production would come from. Catton quotes Knudsen 

regarding machine guns: "We w~mt to know if you can make them or 

w,'mt to try ,and make them. If you can't, do you know ~my who can?" 

Catton remarked: "Here we were eighteen months after the beginning 

of the defense progr~un and a full month ,after Pearl harbor; ,and the 

'Office of Production Management' which had been set up to marsh,'d 

the nation's industri,'d strength, was desperately asking, 'Who can make 

what (Catton, 107)?'" Carton was hardly unbiased in these matters, but 

all sources agree that the Office of Production M,'magement was a 

failure ~md so was Knudsen (with Sidney Hilhnan) as its Associate 

Director. 

26. ICAF, 58. 

27. ICAF, 59. 

28. Koistinen, 93-94; ICAF, 68-75. 

29. Kreidberg ~md Henry, 621-623, 625. See also Charles E. 

Kirkpatrick, An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the 

Victory Plan of 1941 (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 

1990), 52-53. In the case of the Army the resulting effort was called 

the Victory Pl~m which bec,'une the blueprint for both the general 

mobilization of the Army as well as the concept by which the United 

States would fight the war. The leader of the Army's effort was Major 

Albert Wedemeyer, ,an officer well schooled in the Genn,'m art of w,'u-. 

To him it w,'ts more than a logistical question. To ,answer it properly 

he believed he had to discern the national objective, the military 

strategy to achieve it, the military forces required to execute the 

strategy, ,and the equipping ,and training of those forces. See 

Kirkpa~ck, 1, 60-61. 

30. Kirkpatrick, 107-108. Compare with Kreidberg ,and Henry, 

623. 

31. Kreidberg ,and Henry, 625, ,and James C. Gaston, Planning the 

American Air War, Four Men and Nine Days in 1941 (Washington, DC: 

Nation,'d Defense University Press, 1982), 9. The Army Air Force 

planners thought that 17,550 fighters would do the job, but built ,almost 
52 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

that m,'my P-47 Thunderbolts (15,863), 14,686 P-51 Mustangs, ~md 

33,000 P40s, P-38s, lind P-39s. The number of Very Heavy Bombers 

(3,740) clune close to the number of B-29s built (3,898), but the total 

of heavy bombers, about 20,()()() w~u,~ less them two-thirds of the toud B24s ,and B-17s actually built 30,882). See R. Elberlon Smith, The Army 

and Economic Mobilization (Wlushington, DC: Center of Military 

History, 1985), 27. As it turned out the ground force was barely large 

enough to fight the war, and at the end of the war there were no more 

combat troops in the United States to send ~mywhere. All of the Anny's 

ground forces were committed to battle by May 1945 (a total of 96 

percent of all tactical troops were in overseas theaters). The Army had 

dispatched the lasl of its new divisions from the United States in 

February, 1945, 3 months before V-E dlty. No new units were in the 

United States or were being formed. There wits no strategic reserve 

(Kirkpatrick, 113)! The War Production Board, responsible for 

producing the Arsen,'d of Democracy, saw the problem this way: "By 

late 1944, the manpower recruitment drive wits It race in a squirrel cage. 

Men were desperately needed not only in the textile mills lind lumber 

clunps ,and coal mines and steel mills, but also in the tire plaints, lead 

mines and smelters, ship repair y~trds, rocket ,and shell loading plants, 

foundries, many chemical pllmts, most of the aircraft pllmts, lind 

elsewhere. By early 1945, ~md after the Germ~m offensive in the 

Ardennes ~md the step-up in Selective Service withdrawals of previously 

deferred indusuild workers, there wits scm'cely im industry which w~Ls 

not short of manpower or afraid it was about to lose its skilled workers. 

The Gennim collapse staved off what might have been a desperate 

mlmpower shortage" FWar Production Board, Wartime Production 

Achievements and the Reconversion Outlook, (Washington,DC: 1945), 

8-91 

32. Dunclm S. Ballantine, U.S. Naval Logistics in the Second 

World War (Priaiceton: Princeton University Press, 1947), 56. Of 

course this, like all of the plans, was modified ,as the war progressed. 

The Navy's plan was short of landing craft ~md destroyer escorts (and 

the Army Air Force's pl,'m wits short of escort fighters). The Navy had 

received a big boost in construction funding and authorization a year 

previously when the president signed the Two Ocean Navy Exp~msion 

Act on 19 July 1940, which authorized a vas! increase in ship 

construction ~md up to 15,0{){) airphmes. At this point the Navy w~u~ 

authorized 35 battleships, 20 aircraft cltrriers, ,and 88 cruisers in addition 

to hundreds of destroyers and other smaller ships. Peppers, 13-14. See 

also Robert H. Connery, The Naw and the Industrial Mobilization in 

World War 11, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), 11-30 for 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 53 

the Navy's logistics orglmization, 31-54 for nav:d pllmning, 76-111 for 

industrial mobilization before Pearl H~ubor was attacked, ~md 154-178 

for revitalizing the Army ~md Navy Munitions Bolu'd. 

33. ICAF, 68-75; Nelson, 155-156, 159-160, 162-163. Nelson is, 

of course, a key source tbr writing on the Supply Priorities ,and 

Allocation Board. His work there was as effective as Rooscvelt's 

tortured administration allowed it to be, ~md his reputation clune out of 

this period and position quite high. So much so that he was made the 

"czar" of war production in the next phase. I tend to see his writing 

here its objective. When he writes about his experiences, ~md especially 

his fights, when he was Chairman of the War Production Board, I sun 

more skeptical. See also Kreidberg ~md Henry, 685-686. 

34. ICAF, 75; Nelson 162-163. 

35. Nelson, 163. See ~dso War Production Board, 13-14. Nelson 

later in his volume charged the Army with im attevnpt from 1942 

onward to "gain control of our national economy." Their establishing 

of priorities was a tool in their approach. Nelson, 362-367. In the end, 

however, with the initiation of the Controlled Materials Plan in fall 

1942, the military, Idong with the commander in chief, did secure their 

priorities. The Controlled Materials Pllm wits indeed administered by 

the War Production Board, but the armed services received the raw 

materials to be distributed as they saw fit to their prime contractors 

based on the priorities they deemed strategic. 

36. Somers,. 113-114. "Iflmy single issue const,'mtly loomed larger 

thlui ~my of the rest, it was that of priorities." Somers writes that the 

priority machinery broke down very early in the war ~md that it wits 

reformed often. See also Nelson, 107-109. 

37. ICAF, 76-77. Regarding the relationship between money ~md 

time, Nelson wrote: "The hardest lesson for us to le~un in 1941 was that 

a lot of money wits not enough" (Nelson 152-153). 

38. United States manufacturers produced 4.7 million automobiles 

in 1937, ,and virtually none in 1942. The capacity to build that many 

automobiles (more th:m the entire rest of the world combined, in fact 78 

percent of the c:u's produced in the world and 64 percent of the trucks 

lind buses) was an asset beyond rational value once converted. The 

output of aircraft was tiny by comparison. Only 3,100 aircraft were 

produced in the United States in 1937. About 30 times that number 

would be produced in 1944. See Bureau of the Census, Statistical 

Abstract of the United States, 1941 (Washington, DC: Government 

Printing Office, 1942), 900. See Nelson, 53, for the statistics on world 

automobile output. 
54 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

39. ICAF,78-80. Koistinen comments on the frictions between the 

Supply Priorities ~md Allocation Board and the Army ,and Navy 

Munitions Board (which now wits an executive agency under the 

president). He writes that the uniformed milit,'u'y on the Munitions 

Board bult a parallel structure to Nelson's board so that the military 

could an~dyze and dispute and fight for their view of a proper 

prioritization. The leader of the Munitions Board, Ferdin,'md Eberstadt, 

was trusted by the uniformed military ~md by their service secretaries. 

Whenever he could, his board prioritized production ~md construction 

through its contracting authority. Eventually bad bh~d developed 

between Eberstadt ,and Nelson, with the former joining the War 

Production Board ostensibly to work for Nelson, who eventually fired 

him ( Koisfinen, 95). 

41). Nelson, 184. Conversion was indeed the issue because the 

United States had a negligible munitions industry in 1939, but it was the 

m~mufacturing center of the world. In automobiles, steel, and petroleum 

products, no country c~une close to the United States (Nelson, 35). 

41. Somers, 42-46. 
1 

THE WAR PRODUCTION BOARD 

Roosevelt tapped Nelson to be Chairman of the War Production 

Board in mid January 1942. Certainly of "all the civilian advisers 

the president had axsembled, Nelson seemed best to appreciate 

the production problem. Probably nobody had a better 

background--for more than a decade he was the chief 

merchandising executive of the world's largest distributing finn, 

Sears. Perhaps nobody in America knew better where almost 

everything in the United States was manufactured, "how much 

and how weU. ''4z Nelson was given a charter by the president to 

draft the Executive Order that would establish his new 

organization, 43 and Roosevelt set the tone nationaUy in an address 

to the country on 6 January 1942 in which he described the 

production task at hmld: 

The superiority of the United States in munitions ,and ships 

must be... so overwhehning that the Axis nations can never 

hope to catch up with it . . . to attain this overwhehning 

superiority, the United States must build planes ,and hanks ~md 

guns ,and ships to the uunost of our national capacity. We have 

the ability ,and capacity to produce arms not only for our own 

,'tuned forces, but aiso for the annies, navies ,and air forces 

fighting on our side... This production of ours.., must be 

raised far above its present levels, even though it will mean the 

dislocation of the lives ,and occupations of millions of our own 

people. We must raise our sights ,all ,along the production line. 

Let no m,-m say it cannot be done. 

I have just sent a . . . directive to the appropriate 

deparunents and agencies.., ordering that immediate steps be 

taken: 

To increase our production rate of airph'mes so rapidly that we 

sh,'dl produce 60,000 planes, 10,000 more than the go,'d set a 

55 
56 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

year ,and a half ago. This includes 45,000 combat 

planes--bombers, dive bombers, pursuit planes. The rate of 

increase will be continued so that next year, 1943, we shall 

produce 125,000 airpkmes. 

Only this all-out scale production will hasten the ultimate allout victory. Speed will count. Lost ground can always be 

regained--lost time, never. Speed will save lives: speed will 

save this nation which is in peril; speed will save our freedom 

~md civilizationIand slowness has never been an AJnerican 

characteristic,. *~ 

The Roosevelt aircraft figures (he called for an enormous 

increase in tank, artillery, and merchant shipping too) are cited to 

give an idea of his extravagant thinking and to underscore the 

nature of his grand strategy. We kJlow tYom the Victory Program 

that such numbers were not contemplated, but in 1944 the United 

States did produce nearly 100,iX)0 aircraft, dwarfing all "allies and 

adversaries. 

Roosevelt's Executive Order establishing the War Production 

Board on 16 January 1942, granted Nelson tcs Chairman broad 

powers: to exercise general direction over the war procurement 

and production progran~s, to detennine policies, plans, procedures 

and methods of the several federal departments and agencies in 

regard to war production and procurement, to grant priorities ff)r 

construction, and to allocate vital materials and production 

facilities. Aald while Nelson was the "Chairman" of the War 

Pr~nluction Board, tile rest of the board only existed to advise 

him. He could accept or reject its advice. 4s Nothing in Nelson's 

charter indicates he was to be involved in grand strategy 

ff~rmulation. Nelson did not want to know anything about war 

plans. He limited himself to filling tile materiel requests of those 

reslx)nsible for Rmnulating grand strategy. It the services' plans 

called for a specified quantity of a system that industry could not 

produce, however, Nelson would inff~m~ tile leaders. 4~ 

This board grew into a bureaucracy of 20,000 people 47 and 

remained in existence through the war and even into the post-war 

period under another name (Civilian Production Administration). 

Although the media pronounced Nelson the "arms czar" and 

"dictator of the economy" and "the man who had to tackle the 

biggest job in all history" the organization was superseded in 16 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 57 

months when its authority was severely diluted by the creation of 

the Office of War Mobilization. Roosevelt did not give Nelson 

the support he needed to succeed, Nelson was not strong enough 

to demand both the president's support and noninterference from 

competing agencies (especi',dly the Army and Navy), and he 

refused to seize "all of the levem of power he needed in order to 

flourish. 48 

THE WAR PRODUCTION BOARD 

Established by Executive Order 16 January 1942 giving 

Chairman Donald Nelson power to 

- Exercise general direction over the war procurement and 

production programs 

- Determine policies, plans, procedures and methods of the 

several federal departments and agencies in regard to war 

production and procurement 

- Grant priorities for construction 

- Allocate vital materials and production facilities 

His charter was to keep the economy strong while he 

nlobilizcd American industry to produce to win the war as 

quickly as possible. There were two parts to the job --.to build up 

materiel production and, where production could not be achieved 

quickly enough, to divide the shortages so that the least iml~)rtant 

elements would receive the least support. There were three basic 

problems that occupied Nelson and his staff' throughout the war 

as they ffmght to increase production: 

• Supplying raw materials from which the war materiel and 

essential civilian products were made 

• Providing the plants and equipment in the factories to 

maJmfacture the tools of war 

° Staffing the plants with enough people with the right 

skills. 

"There was never a time" during World War II "when material 

supplies, plant facilities, and manpower were in perfect 

balRllce. ''49 
0 

e. 

e 

E~ 

~,__e 

z 

-1~1 

I~_~I 

/0~o-I 

,._ i 

I I1~1 

O>-Z 

I0~.~ ~ ~ 

, ..., ~ 

I 

I~I wu" I 

i,~ i o 

' J~l /i l 

......... -1 E~ I ~ 

/~Ol 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 59 

Having inherited the people and the organization of the 

Office of Production Management, the Supply Priorities and 

Allocations Board, and even the National Defense Advisory 

Commission, Nelson organized the War Production Board in 

similar fashion. Sidney Hilhmm, for example was chief of the 

Labor Division; the Production Division was put under William 

H. Harrison; the Industry Operations Division was under James 

S. Knowlton (president and chief executive officer of SKF 

Industries); the Statistics Division was run by Slaty May, etc. 5'' 

The Board "also had divisions responsible for monitoring specific 

war industries and "also had large numbers of people in the 

geographic regions of the country collecting data, providing 

advice, assisting plants, negotiating ccnuracts, etc. s~ 

If America was to become the Arsenal of Democracy, it had 

first to convert its civilian-based industry to the task of producing 

war materiel. Nelson recognized that aspect of his 

responsibilities immediately, and the main industry to be 

converted was automobile manufacluring. This American 

enterprise was equal to the total industry of most of the countries 

in the world. In AJnerica the automobile industry was spread 

over 44 states and 1,375 cities. The primary contractors 

numbered more than 1,000, and there were tens of thousands of 

subconlracto~. More llama 500,PA)0 workers produced aulos and 

trucks when the United States entered the war---one of every 260 

Americans. And 7,000JXO0 others---one out of every 19 

Americmls--were indirectly employed in the industry. 

Automobiles made Americans machine minded and made 

American industry oriented to mass production teclmiques. They 

consumed 51 percent of the country's mmual production of 

malleable iron, 75 percent of plate glass. 68 percent of 

upholstery leather, 80 percent of rubber. 34 percent of lead, 13 

percent of copper, and abc~ut 10 percent of aluminum. One of 

Nelson's first orders was to cut off car production, and the last 

automobile to come off the production line during World War II 

did so on 10 February 1942. Tiffs was an essential move because 

during the war, General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Packard and a 

few other automobile manufacturers produced more than 50 

percent of all aircraft engines. 33 percent of all machine guns, 80 

percent of "all tanks and tank parts, one-half the diesel engines, 
60 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

and 100 percent of the trucks tile Army moved on. This industry 

also produced airplanes by tile tens of thousmlds. Most of the B24s, the most heavily produced airplmm in the United States 

inventory, were manufactured by what had been tile automobile 

industry mM most of those were manufactured at one factory, 

Willow Run. About 20 percent of total U.S. production came 

from the automobile industry. 52 In addition to taalkS, jeeps, and 

trucks, "motor vehicle manufacturers were the largest single 

group of suppliers to aircraft mmmfacturers." The automobile 

industry produced more thm~ $11 billion worth of aircraft, 

sub&ssemblies, mid parts, or about 39 percent of the dollar value 

of all military production by tile automotive industry. It 

m:mufactured 455,522 of a total of 812,615 aircraft engines grad 

255,518 of a total of 713,717 propellers. The industry also 

produced 27,000 complete aircral't. ~ 

Of course, more than the automotive industry converted to 

war. One of the most striking examples is International Silver, 

which at tile begimling of the war made tableware. By the end 

of the war this medium-sized finn was producing surgical 

instruments, Browning automatic rilles. 20-ram shells, cartridge 

mid shell brass ff~r mm~y calibers of weapons, machine-gun clips 

and cartridge belts, magnesium bombs, g~,~oline bombs 

(3,0(X),O00 of them monthly at peak production), adapter casings, 

combination tools, large and small rotors, contact rings, spring 

assemblies, forgines,~ comlecting rods, trit,==er pins, lock bolls h)r 

all pins, flange mad tube assemblies, front-sight forgings ff~r guns, 

etc.54 

In addition to the shortages of time, plaint, materials, and 

people, the War Prt~luction Board also suffered from unrealistic 

demands by the president, the Secretaries of War and Navy and 

various service chiefs. Through 1942 and 1943, the grm~d 

strategists set goals that were well above what could actually be 

produced given the status of Americm~ industry. Ill time tile 

output was prodigious, growing almost geometrically into 1944. 

But in the first 2 years of effort, the overestimation of capacity 

by those not responsible for producing materiel was frustrating 

to those called on to produce it. ss Some of the demands, 

however, were not unrealistic, and Nelson underestimated the 

capabilities of American industry. For example, the president 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 61 

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to expand tile military to a 

higher level Ihzul Nelson thought could be adequately supplied. 

The president amlounced a 10.8 million peak strength less than 

6 months after Nelson became the Board chainnan, and Nelson 

demurred. In time, more than an extra million men were added 

to that figure, and they were well supplied indeed. -~¢' 

Almost from the start, because the president and warrior 

chiefs expected more production than the Board seemed to be 

able to deliver, there was dissatisfaction with the War Production 

Board and Chairman Nelson. Nelson's sharpest present-day critic 

is Paul Koistinen (but, then, every serious student of the War 

Production Board is a critic except Nelson's public relations 

officer, Bruce Catton), who argues thai Roosevelt deliberately 

chose Nelson because he was not likely to be a strong leader and 

that the president never intended to place full confidence in 

Nelson's management. Koistinen also argues that Nelson faced 

three tests at the outset if he wanted to achieve dominance over 

the wartime economy, and he failed them "all. From the start he 

needed to get "tough with the industriMists who were coming to" 

his new organization from the Office of War Production and the 

Supply Priorities and Allocations Board. These businessmen, to 

Koistinen, were more eager to protect their narrow interests than 

to "harness the economy for war." Nelson, to win, also had to 

"bend the military which had grown powerful and practically 

independent to the bomd's will." Many comlnentalt~rs agree wifll 

Koistinen's first two i~ints. His third is that Nelson should have 

given "labor, New De'tiers, and small business a meaningful 

voice in mobilization matters so that the" War Production Board 

"involved broad-based, not simply big business, planning, and 

thus tapped the nation's full economic potential." Koistinen's 

criticism of the entire mobilization effort is slanted in this 

direction, and this third argument does not find resonance. 57 

Senator Harry S Truman's (D-Missouri) Senate Special 

Cormnittee Investigating National Defense reported alx)ut a year 

after the Board was established that Nelson, with the expressed 

Ix)wers Roosevelt granted him, could have "taken over all 

military procurement," bul he chose not to do so. Truman's 

committee argued that had Nelson indeed taken procurement 

from the Army and Navy "many of the difficulties with which he 
62 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

has been confronted in recent months might never have arisen. 

Instead, Mr. Nelson delegated most iff his powez,-s to the War m~d 

Navy Departments, m~d to a succession oI' so-called czars. This 

made it difficult for him to exercise the functions I'or which he 

was appointed. At the same time, none of the separate agencies 

had sufficient authority to act alone. ''ss Other commentators 

agree that Nelson's Board was fat',ally undermined within in its 

first trimester by w)luntarily yielding "to the Anned Services both 

priorities power and the right to clear military contracts before 

the contracts were let to suppliers." With Gener',d Administrative 

Orders 2-23 m)d 2-33 in March and April 1942, Nelson 

"surrendered direcl decision-making authority over the great bulk 

of fl~e finished output needed for war. ''s9 This was certainly 

costly to the power of his influence ml¢l his freedom of action, 

but he may have had no other realistic options. 

The reader nmst consider here what battles might have 

ensued had Nelson decided to acquire for the Armed Forces. 

Surely the Truman Colnmitlee statement minimizes tile turbulence 

that would have developed had Nelson fought the Amly mid 

Navy over acquisition of weapons systems. The service 

departments had been procuring for themselves for more than two 

centuries ;ui¢l would not have seen the wisdom of altering their 

practices abruptly and fundmnentally in wartime. In addition lo 

objecting to a War Production Board made up of manufacturers 

making key equipment procurcmen! decisions, the departments 

would have opposed central and essential systems decisions being 

made by civiliims not involved in the fighting. Arguing that 

Nelson should have procured for the Army and Navy ix one 

thing; m',tking such asystem work is something entirely different. 

The War Department, however, was alnmst certainly too 

generous with itself, mad the lmmber of contracts it let were 

enormously inflated. There were plants that the War Department 

ordered built that were superfluous, ml(l given tile limited mnount 

of materials and construction workers, a surplus in one area 

meant a shortage in another. Locon~otive plants went into tmlk 

production, "when locomotives were more necessary" than t',mks. 

Truck plants "began to produce airplzmes," which produced 

"shortages of trucks later on. ''6° Alan Milward makes a similar 

point, and b&ses his criticism on the lack of firm priorities. 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 63 

"Completely new factories," he writes, "were built with 

gover[utlent help when there was no possibility that they would 

ever get the necessary raw materials to sustain their planned 

production. ''6~ 

One should not, however, make the mistake of believing that 

the War Production Board was impotent. It had the power to 

compel acceptance of war orders by any producer in the country, 

and it could requisition any property needed for the war effort. 62 

Advertising this potency meant that the Board's fullest rights did 

not have to be exercised too often. And Nelson's Board also 

controlled the supply of raw ntaterials. 

NOTES 

42. Don;dd M. Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy (New York: 

Harcourt, Brace ,and Co., 1946), 35. 

43. Nelson, 18-19. 

44. Nelson, 186. Nelson ;rod vice president Henry Wallace were 

called to the White House on 15 January 1942 to discuss war strategy 

and deficiencies in war production organizations, Rt×)sevelt ,assured 

both men that when he had promised that the United States would be 

the "ArsenM of Democracy," he had not merely been making a phrase, 

and when he outlined the amounts of munitions and ships he was not 

exaggerating. The president made clear that "our fate ,and that of our 

Allies---our liberties, our honor.., depended upon American industry." 

Nelson, 16-17. 

45. Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry. History of Military 

Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945 (W;L~hington, DC: 

Headqu,'uters, U.S. Army, 1955), 686-687; Emergency Management of 

the National Economy: Vol. XIX Administration of Mobilization WWII, 

hereafter cited ~ ICAF (W;,.shington, DC: Industri,'d College of die 

Anned Forces, 1954), 1()0-I04; Paul A. C. Koistinen, "Win'fare and 

Power Relations in America: Mobilizing the World War It Economy," 

in J,'unes Titus, ed., The Home Front and War in the Twentieth Century: 

The American Experience in Comparative Perspective: Proceedings of 

the Tenth Air Force Academy Military History Symposium (W~Lshington, 

DC: Office of Air Force History, 1984), 95-96). 

46. ICAF, 100-101. 

47. David Robertson, Sly and Able: A Political Biography of James 

F. Byrnes (New York: Norton, 1994), 316. Harold G. vatter, The 

United States Economy in World War I1 (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 1985), 67, writes that the War Production Board 
64 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

inherited 6,000 employees in J~muary 1942 from the Office of 

Production Management and the Supply Priorities ~md Allocations Board 

,and employed 18,000 people just 6 months later. During World War 

II, the federal civil service more than tripled during the war, from 

940,000 when Genn~my invaded Pol~md to 3,126,(X~) at its peak in mid1943. The War Production Board was only one of dozens of newly 

created war boards that consumed civil serv~mts. The War ,and Navy 

Departments had re:my times the number employed by Donald Nelson 

,and his successors (in fact between them more them two million 

civilians). Jerome G. Peppers. Jr., History of United States Militatw_ 

Logistics 1935-1985 37-38. 

48. See Nelson, 194, for media expectations; Kreidberg ~md Henry, 

686-687; Koistinen, 95-96; J~unes F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New 

York: Harper Brothers, 1947), 15-16. Byrnes writes that he told 

Roosevelt on 12 J,'muary 1942 that Nelson "will last only as long as it 

is recognized that he has your complete confidence." Byrnes was ,an 

associate justice of the Supreme Court at that moment ,and had been a 

new dealer congressm~m ~md senator from South Carolina. He was ~m 

intimate of Bernard Baruch ~md also a close ally, friend, ~md confid~mt 

of Roosevelt's. 

49. War Production Board, Wartime Production Achievements and 

the Reconversion Outlook (Washington, DC: 1945), 7. Nelson's policy, 

followed by his successors, was to avoid overregulation, to impose only 

those controls within their authority that would signific,'mtly speed 

victory, ,and not to impose restrictions that added little. He promptly 

dropped those restrictions that proved "unworkable or outlived their 

usefulness" (War Production Board, 13). 

50. Nelson, 204-205. 

51. Nelson, 211. On 3 March 1942 Nelson directed that con~tcts 

were not to be competed for, but rather negotialed. This saved ~m 

enormous amount of time (Nelson, 369). Cost-plus fixed-fee contracts 

were the norm. These had a legal limit of 7 percent fee, but most often 

the fee was only 5 percent, :rod the Army Air Forces usually paid only 

4 percent (Nelson, 79). This award system, of course, does not 

encourage controlling cosls, since pn~fits are directly tied to costs. 

52. Nelson 212-224. The aircraft industry expanded more than 4 

times during the w,'u" from fewer th:m 500,000 people to more them 2 

million, but production exploded by ahnost 50 times (Nelson, 227-228, 

235-236). 

53. Vatter, 13. 

54. Nelson, 277-289. 

55. War Production Born'd, 10-13. 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 65 

56. Herman M. Somers, Presidential Agency: The Office of War 

Mobilization and Reconversion (C:unbridge: Harvard University Press, 

1950), 159. 

57. Koistinen, 95-96. Nelson admits that small businesses were 

slighted during the war ,and did not get their fair share of the contracts. 

Many small firms, because they could not get an allocation of raw 

materials, were bankrupted. But Nelson ,argues that he did not have the 

manpower to go to the 184,000 m,'mufacturing finns in existence at the 

outset of the war. About I(+~) giants received the vast bulk of the 

contracts, and the subcontracting was left to big industry. Nelson's 

justification was that time was the issue, that winning the war was the 

goal. Nelson's orders on 23 February 1942 ~md 5 May 1942 that 

stopped production of more than 400 civili~m products using iron and 

steel further added to the suffering of m~my small firms that could not 

convert to war production (Nelson 269-271). See Kreidberg and Henry, 

686-687, for a critique of Nelson. They assert that "either MJ. Nelson 

was the wrong man Ik~r the job or else the [War Production Board] was 

created so late that it was impossible for its chainmm to successfully 

challenge existent, entrenched agencies which were made subordinate 

to [Wm" Production Board]." Further: "The frequent reorganizations of 

[the War Production Board], together with the t~mgled maze of its 

relationships with other agencies, continued to delay, har~tss, ,and anger 

businessmen who needed decisions. [The W~tr Production Board] was 

so fully occupied with directing the flow of materials that by 1943 it 

had relinquished overall control of economic mobilization." The 

Industrial College Study noted that "ahnost from the beginning" 

Nelson's authority was challenged by other agencies, most notably the 

War Department. Before the Win" Production Board was 6 months old, 

the Army ~md Navy Munitions Bo~u'd "ahnost succeeded in a coup to 

require its concurrence in the principal actions by the War Production 

Board." The report cited a "nmning fight" between the military ,and the 

Board fought out in the media by spokesmen from each. The War 

Department "belittled the princip~d offici:ds of" the War Production 

Board ",and challenged its technical ability. Under cover, other efforts 

were made to bring about the removal of' board officials [Emergency 

Management of the National Ecommzy: Vol. XIX Administration of 

Mobilization WWII, hereafter cited as ICAF (Washington. DC: Industrial 

College of the Armed Forces, 1954), 10[)- 101, 1 ()4]. Somers argues that 

Nelson had been given the powers the president had been granted by the 

Congress under Title III of the War Powers Act, but Nelson did not 

seize ,all be could, ~md the president himself "diluted ~md diffused the 

powers given to Nelson" (24). 
66 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

58. Kreidberg ,and Henry, 686-687. Nelson deliberately refused to 

procure for the Army ,and Navy, arguing that had he done so the 

warriors would have been critic~d of such a move because people 

associated with the War ProductinBoard from industries producing the 

tools of war would have been buying systems from their former 

industries, and ,as importantly, it would have taken too long to tndn War 

Production Board civili,'ms in these arts (Nelson, 196-199). The War 

Production Bolu'd history asserts, however, that it wits not without 

influence here, but that its approach w~t~ to collaborate ,and coordinate, 

but never to dicutte. The board "assisted other agencies, or enlisted 

their heip"--two nondyn~unic verbs. The board said that it "cooperated" 

freely with agencies all over the hmd ,and was careful not to take ,any 

"impo~mt actions which would affect the field of jurisdiction of 

,another agency without prior consuluLtion with that agency .... For 

ex~unple, in contrast to the British policy of centralizing munitions 

procurement in civilian hands, procurement in this country was handled 

by the military services, which received direct appropriations from 

Congress. But procurement policies were determined cooperatively by 

the Procurement Policy Bolu'd, on which [the War Production Bo~d] sltt 

with the Milit~u'y. Through this Board, the [War Production Bo,'ud] 

made specild efforts to secure such distribution of both prime ,and 

subcontracts as would promote maxhnum use of the nation's materials, 

labor and facilities." Regarding people, a vital concern to the W,'u" 

Production Board in order to maximize production, the Board worked 

with the War Manpower Commission to guide labor to where it was 

most needed through its Production Urgency List--which was 

frequently updated--and also collaborated with Selective Service to 

determine which workers in war industries were actually essential and 

should therefore be exempt from the draft. The Board ~dso certified to 

the War Labor Board when and where wage incre,~es were justified to 

attract an adequate labor supply (War Production Board, 15-17). 

59. Vatter, 72-73. According to Vaner, Administrative Order 2-23 

gave the services just what they wanted, the right to "direct production 

themselves." It stipulated that the War Department, through its Services 

of Supply and the Army Air Forces, was to carry on "its supply 

functions of research, design, development, progr~unming, purchase, 

production, storage, distribution, issue, maintenance, and salvage." (The 

Navy's order was 2-33 in April.). The Secreutries and their flag officers 

were thus armed "with a hunting license.., to freely trespass upon the 

territory the President had ,assigned to the War Production Bo,'u'd." 

There ensued a "running fight" between the W,'u Department and the 

W,'u" Production Board that ktsted until Nelson was removed. Vatter 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 67 

agrees that a "rough division of labor emerged where the Services of 

Supply assumed the ultimate decision-making power over all finished 

goods, leaving more or less to the [War Production Board] the domain 

of vital raw materials ,and semifinished products." Vatter ,argues tluLt 

money ~md time could have been saved ,and less money ,and time wasted 

had Nelson stood his ground. Vatter does not note th:lt Administrative 

Order 2-33 stipulated that the War Department wits to cluxy out these 

functions in accordance and compliance with the policies ,and directives 

of the "War Production Board." So, the War Production Bo,'trd 

"surrender" that Vatter refers to was not an unconditional one. The War 

Depitrunent, however, took it that way lind pushed their prerogatives to 

the limit. 

60. Vatter, 72-73. 

61. Alim Milward, War, Economy and Society: 1939-1945 (Los 

Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), 122-123. "Locomotive 

factories were turned into lorry factories in spite of the fact that within 

a year Americ,an locomotives would be required in many parts of the 

world." Later: "The best efforts of the W,'u" Production Board... could 

not enforce priority decisions when so high a proportion of the 

progr,'unmes emanating from industry ,and the ~tnned forces were 

unrealistic in their conception." Milward cites other problems, in 

addition to the unrealistic estimates of raw materials needs, the chief 

one Ireing suategic shortsightethless. The services "fought strenuously 

against ,all mw materiid ,allocations to the Soviet Union." ['When 

keeping the Soviet Union in the war was literaUy viud to the cause.] 

And, for one gross example that will stand for many. the navy "insisted 

on aluminum being made available for furniture on its ships instead of 

being ,allocated to aircraft manufacture." 

62. Nelson, 206, wrote: "It wasn't up to me... to tell industry 

how to do its job: it was our function to show industry what had to be 

done, ,and to do everything in our power to enable industries to do it, 

placing our chief relilmce on the limitless energy ,and skill of Americ~m 

manufacturers." Nelson finnly believed that whatever he did had to be 

done "within the fr~unework of Americ~m tradition." Not just defeat the 

enemy, but do it "in our own way." He believed that the United States 

"had to prove that.., our system of political ~md economic freedom 

was in fact more efficient, more productive, more able to respond to the 

demands of a great emergency than the dictatorial system of our 

enemies. If we failed to do this, we might win the war in a military 

sense yet lose everything that we had fought for." Nelson 

acknowledged that he had vast powers but w~mted not to use them. The 
68 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

one he used mos! often w~Ls to order industry to end production of less 

import'rot materiel in fitvor of producing essentials (Nelson 208-209). 
11 

THE CONTROLLED 

MATERIALS PLAN 

Nelson's major task, as it turned out, was administration of the 

Controlled Materials Plan--the allocation of raw materials to the 

specific industries that produced the weapons systems. Nelson 

wrote, in an oversimplification, that war production could be 

broken down into three sections, only one of which was truly his. 

First was establishing requirements. What kind of and how many 

of the munitions were needed by each armed service and ally. 

The president and the joint chiefs and the combined chiefs 

determined the requirements, and the War Production Board 

translated those decisions into production requisites. Once that 

was known, the Board had to decide how much of what systems 

the economy was capable of producing. And with that known, 

the next task was balancing resources against demands. Balmice 

was critical. Everything could not be produced at once; raw 

materials had to be carefully apportioned because to overproduce 

one munition would mean that another would be underproduced. ~ 

To ensure that production was tightly balanced, the War 

Production Board centralized control of raw materials. To ensure 

that the British were operating under the stone plans as the 

Americans, Roosevelt established a Combined Raw Materials 

Board in late January 1942. z 

The Controlled Materials Plan replaced the Production 

Requirements Plan (a November 1941 voluntary program) that 

had permitted manufacturers to state production material 

requirements for government orders. The Controlled Materials 

Plan, administered by the Production Executive Committee, 

chaired by Charles E. Wilson of the War Production Board, was 

a "vertical allocation plml, under which allomlents were made by 

progrmns mad passed down through the chain from procurement 

agency [i.e., the armed services] to prime contractors to sub- and 

69 
70 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

sub-sub-contractor, whereas in the [Production Requirements 

Plan] direct applications had been received from all levels in the 

subcontracting plan." The Controlled Materials Plan was a "more 

accurate" and "more equitable and more effective distribution of 

materials." It was announced on 2 November 1942 to become 

effective in the second quarter of 1943 and fully effective in the 

next quarter. It was certainly superior to the Army and Navy 

Munitions Board priorities system in rationalizing the distribution 

of materials. 3 

In reality the Controlled Materials Plan was a method of 

forcing "all consumers of raw materials to plan for themselves. 

No order for raw materials could be accepted until the Production 

Executive Committee had in hand an exact statement of raw 

materials requirements. The allocations were made quarterly and, 

for the first time in the war, the Armed Forces procurement 

agencies were forced to consider their future demands within the 

"context of long-tem~ strategy. ''4 Controllecl materials planning 

was a massive undertaking. Two streaans of paper carded 

requirements and allotments information through the "interlocked 

industrial and govemment',d structure:" 

The first stre,'un of paper, leading up the supply-demand 

bal~mce for the total economy determined each calendar quarter 

by the War Production Board Requirements Committee, begum 

at the lowest layer of m,'mufacturing subcontractors. Bills of 

materials (deutiled schedules of ~unounts of each controlled 

material required to make one unit of a fabricated product) 

were transmitted up the manufacturing ladder to the assemblers 

of end products ,and other prime contractors. There they were 

accumulated, each prime contractor combining his own ,'rod his 

subcontractors' material requirements, and transmitted to the 

procuring claiming agency. From bill-of-material information 

,and other sources, each claimant agency prepared estimates of 

controlled-materials requirements in total ~md by progr~un detail 

,and submitted the estimates to the [War Production Board] 

controlled-material branches (steel, copper, ,'rod aluminum)and 

the Requirements Committee staff.... The second stre~un of 

paper began at this point with the allounent of materials to 

each claimant agency representing its share of the ,anticipated 

supply of each controlled material available for purchase 

directly by the agency and by its prime and subcontractors... 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 71 

the claimant agency distributed allotments (authorizations to 

purchase) to its prime contractors. The prime contractors 

retained that part of the Mlotments necessm'y to cover their 

own direct procurement from the metal mills and reallocated 

the remainder to their suppliers, s 

Although the literature usually speaks of three raw materials 

in the Controlled Materials Plan--steel, copper. ",dmninum--there 

were actually 13 categories of carbon steel and 10 o1' steel alloy 

to be allocated separately, and 4 classes of copper-based ,alloy 

products, 3 classes of copper shapes, and wire mill anti foundry 

products. Aluminum products crone in 21 classes of shapes anti 

alloys. But the revolutionary step in the Controlled Materials 

Plan was not in these refined allocations. It resled rather on the 

principle that the delivery of materials were "not affected by 

preference ratings." Meaning once the Requirements Committee 

"detennined the distribution of steel, copper and aluminum which 

in its judgment was best calculated to meet war, export, and 

essential civilim~ needs, "all approved progrmns had equal 

validity. ''~ To the War Production Board, that is. Certaitfly the 

War and Navy Departments (and other claimants like Lend-Lease 

Administration, Maritime Commission, Office of Civilian Supply, 

and even other agencies later in the war) did not think that -all 

approved programs had "equal validity." At times different 

systems had higher priorities, like the necessity of accelerating 

the building of landing craft in 1942 and 1943, and especially in 

the first half of 1944 for Operation Overlord and amphibious 

assaults in the Pacific. 7 The Controlled Materials Plan forced a 

strict accounting on "all users of steel, copper and zduminum, but 

the key civilian agency turned over most of these precious 

materials to the military for their further ",allocation based on 

grand strategy. 

The Controlled Materials Plan worked well Io solve a 

nagging problem--controlling what was built and when by 

releasing or withholding raw materials--but it consumed many 

thousands of people and much time. Nelson was in the sorry 

position of simply not being able to satisfy everybody "all the 

time. "He was battered, abused, and cajoled by other agencies" 

of the govenmmnt. Instead of being the interwar planners' ideal 

of a wise man ~urveying the war from an umnatched viewpoint 
72 MOBILIZING U.S, INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

and apporlioning economic strength where it would do the most 

good, he was thoroughly inside the turbulent milieu, a "much 

abused referee of a free-for-all fight aJnong agency heads who 

knew no rules and were nol above loading their gloves with 

Congressional blocs, pressure groups, and an occasional chit 

initialed by Roosevelt at their urging. ''~ 

Nelson's two biggest problems, and thus those of his 

organization, were Roosevelt's unwillingness to support him in 

his inevitable disputes with tile plethora of wartime agencies and 

Roosevelt's continued penchant for creating potentially rival 

agencies. There were powerful prewar New Deal agencies like 

the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (which added to its 

authority the Defense PlaJ~t Corporation, Defense Supplies 

Corporation, Metals Reserve Company, Rubber Reserve 

Company) whose role might conflict with Nelson's Board. And 

there were venerable institutions like the War and Navy 

Department that had been created in the 18th century that might 

see activities of the War Production Board as usurping their 

authority. Many (~lher war agencies were founded before file 

War Production Board--like the Board of Economic Warfare, the 

Office of Lend-Lease (with the powerful Harry Hopkins in 

charge initially), the Office of Defense Transportation--that had 

charters that overlapped Nelson's. Other agencies founded after 

Nelson's, such as the Petroleum Administration for War, Rubber 

Development Corporation, War Mm~power Commission, and 

dozens of others, had charters th~it seemed to authorize powers 

that the War Production Board ~dso possessed. Soon after Nelson 

was appointed chainnan, the War Shipping Administration and 

National Housing Agency were l'ounded, and Nelson failed to 

move quickly to have these subordinated to him. He willingly 

gave away rationing authority to the Office of Price 

A(hninistration. Probably his most serious lapse (other than 

permitting the services to procure their own munitions) was 

pennitting tile War Manpower ConmlissiOll to be independent of 

him. This agency, created on 18 April 1942 to "assure the most 

effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's 

manpower in lhe prosecution of the war," was offered to him by 

Roosevelt. However, Nelson pemfitted it to be independent. 9 All 

tiffs might have been manageable if R(~sevelt were a manager, 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 73 

which he was not; and if he had appointed a person to run the 

War Production Board whonl he trusted explicitly, which he did 

not; and if Nelson were more aggressive bureaucratically. Nelson 

was ineffective, thus the industri',.d mobilization effort suffered. 

The military never saw itself as Nelson's parlner and involved 

itself in "every facet of the home front war prograan." When 

there was a problem such as with deliveries of finished goods, 

the military would intrude in the transportation business. If there 

were a labor problem, manufacturers would deal with the military 

rather than to the War Labor Board to solve it--turning to the 

agency paying the bills. It was easy to turn to the military to 

solve problems in time of a total war. It might not have been 

wise over the long term, or even efficient, but it was easy 

because the militar3, had enomlous prestige. The military was 

seen at least as equ~ to the War Production Board in power and 

influence, and that perceplion helped the military outmaneuver 

the ChainnaJl of the War Production Board. '° 

Philosophic~d differences also marred the relationship. 

Nelson's concern ff)r the civilian population, those who worked 

in the factories trod operated the fanns, was interpreted by some 

in the Army as "pampering" civiliaJ~s. Nelson complained about 

"bitter fights" with the Army over maamfacturing tractors or spare 

parts for cars, washing machines, refrigerators, etc. ~ Nelson, 

from the begilming of the war well into the peace that followed, 

insisted that /lie economy had to be controlled by civilians. He 

argued flint "military men are bound to place above everything 

else the needs of specific munitions progra3ns." If they (lid gain 

complete authority over the country's resources, Nelson 

maintained, they "would inevitably produce disorder, and 

eventually balk their own efforts by undercutting the economy in 

such a way that it could not meet their demands." He saw other 

dangers. He had a bitter and "Ring-drawn-out" argumen! with the 

Army over allocation of newsprint to newspapers. "Since the 

demand for paper was so much greater than the supply, we had 

to limit each publisher to a certain mnount of newsprint .... But 

reducing the anlount of paper a publisher may have is one thing, 

and telling him whal he may do with it is quite another. The 

Army vigorously maintained that we should adopt the latter 

course." The Army was especially eager to stop publishing of 
74 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

comic strips. Nelson asserted that a govenunent that uses "its 

control of newsprint to R~rbid the printing of comic strips is in 

tile publishing business. If it can stop the printing of comic 

strips it canIand inevitably will forbid the publication of 

cartoons and other material, perhaps ultimately of certain classes 

of editorial matter, which, in its opinion represents a wa~ste of 

newsprint." His rmming battle got into tile press, much to his 

chagrin. "The Anny had at its disposal and freely used many 

unfair methods of needling anyone who stood in its way .... 

Very soon alter I had made, and stuck to" the decision on 

making spare paris for appliances and automobiles, U.S. factories 

were no longer producing in order to keep these laN)r-saving 

machines in some working order. "articles began appearing in the 

press stating that i,500 plants making munitions of war were 

going to have to shut down because they could not get materiais. 

War Depamnent officials in high places were feeding out those 

[false] stories. ''~2 

The Amly leaked similar stories regarding Nelson's decision 

to produce synthetic rubber for civilian automobiles, trucks, and 

buses. The press R~llowing the Army's lead reported that 

bombing operations would soon be stopped because Nelson was 

diverting materials for civilians. Of course, bombing operations 

did not stop. To Nelson at least, the Navy Department seemed 

more attuned to the needs of civilians--after "all how would 

workers get to factories or shipyards without automobiles and 

buses, and how productive would they be if their needs were 

neglected'? But the "top men in the Army's supply setup . . . 

consistently opposed giving any consideration to even the most 

essential civilian needs." A major example was their fight 

against "allocating material or machinery for the production of 

farm machinery, insisting that the farmer could use his old 

equipment and did not need anything new." General Brehon 

Somervell, Chief of Anny Services of Supply, "insisted that 

repair parts were not needed, not even for co',d-mining 

machinery" and insisted that a inajor coal mining machinery 

manufacturer be forced to make nlunitions. ~3 

Nelson began this battle be/ore the U.S. declaration of war. 

In 1940, the Amly Air Forces stopped the building of 40 aircraft 

by Douglas Corporation that were slated for civilian airlines to 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 75 

divert Douglas' effort to the military, but Nelson recognized 

something the Anny Air Forces could not or would not see--all 

airplane construction could not go to the mili.,:ary because some 

airplanes had to be used to move passengers and cargo around 

the United States quickly. This myopia on the part of the 

services frustrated Nelson to the point that he petitioned 

Roosevelt to let him return to Sears. Nelson at this time was 

working ff)r the National Defense Advisory Commission and 

believed that making the Commission non-advisory would change 

everytlling. As it turned out, he was wrongJ 4 

Nelson writes that Roosevelt told him lhat both he and the 

President had to beware ()f the Army acquiring "t(x) much 

power." In a democracy, the president argued, the economy 

"should be left in charge of civilimis." Roosevelt told Nelson "to 

fight for" his rights when "such issues" as civilian versus military 

control arose. Nelson was proud of the fact that "no other outfit 

in the world ever fi)ught lhe Anny of the United States to a 

standstill more frequently than the intrepid patrol of the [War 

Production Board]". ~5 Pundits 50 years later can draw their own 

conclusions about the Nelson vs. Somervell (et ",d.) conflicts. 

Civilian patriotism coexisted with opportunism within the same 

breast, and both the Army and the Navy wanted to promote and 

exploit the former and dampcn the latter. They wmated to ensure 

that the latter did not hurt their mission of wimfing the war as 

quickly as possible with a nfinimum loss of Americml life. 

Most serious students c)f the period agree that the Amly 

wanted to direcl the economy in wartime, something it had 

desired because it was wary of the motivations of big business 

during a war. Somers notes that, soon after the War Production 

Board was formed, General Brehon Somervell madc a play to put 

the new Board under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By 

permitting Somervell and his Navy counterparts to control 

procurement, Nelson undermined his own position of civilians 

controlling the economy. Somers writes: "The Army and Navy 

came to regard Nelson and the [War Production Board] as 

",~:Ivocates of a comfortable civilian economy, which would resist 

to the end curtailments to expand military production." Somers 

observed that the dispute with the Army and Navy became 

rancorous. L6 We have seen, however, that Nelson wanted to 
76 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

convert the autonlobile industry Io nmnitions production well 

before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, and tllat his first 

action as chainnan was to do just that. 

In addition to leaving military procurement to the Navy and 

War Departments, Roosevelt did not give Nelson the authority 

(nor, apparently did Nelson insist on it) or the tools to control 

inflation, which increased as the large pool of unemployed 

workers dried up. The president recognized that wages, prices, 

and rents had to be stabilized if the politic',dly costly boom-andbust experience that followed World War I was to be avoided. 

In September 1942, Roosevelt asked Congress for the powers 

necessary to fix wages and prices, including agricultural prices. 

Congress yielded on 2 October, gr~mting the president authority 

to issue a "general order slabilizing prices, wages, anti s',daries 

affecting the cost of living, ~md empowering the president to 

create the Office of Economic Stabilization. On 3 October 1942, 

Roosevelt appointed James F. Bymes as Director. 

The ultimate insider, Bymes quickly resigned from the 

Supreme Court and began his new job on 15 October. He had 

blanket authority "relating to control of civilian purchasing 

power, prices, rents, wages, salaries, profits, subsidies, and "all 

related matters." The Director of the Office of Economic 

Stabilization was to be the final judge of any jurisdictional 

disputes among the various wartime agencies and within the 

president's executive office regarding econolnic policy. Bymes 

was to the civilian economic strategy what Roosevelt was to the 

war's grand strategy. Very significantly, Bymes was able to set 

up his office in the White House. Roosevelt told Bymes: "Your 

decision is my decision, and . . . there is no appeal. For "all 

practic',d purposes you will be assistant President. ''~7 Had he said 

th~tt to Nelson (or had Nelson demanded and received such 

power), tile War Production Board might have turned out to be 

the supreme mobilization agency the interwar planners c',dled for. 

Might have, rather lhall would have, because it is not clear 

that Nelson's personality was up to usin,,~, such a full grant of 

authority. Somers argues that Nelson, a mm~ of "great abilities 

and character," was "probably not tempermnentally suited to the 

onerous job he undertook . . . He was mild mam~ered and 

intellectual, not given to quick decisions. He was not adept at 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 77 

and did not welcome the 'infighting' or the power struggles 

involved in high administration" jobs for "high stakes." Somers 

concludes Ihat Nelson was "too nice a guy for the job. ''18 

The dispute bctween thc Army and Nelson that drove him 

out of office was over industrial reconversion. Reconversion has 

always been badly handled in the United States; indeed, the 

Woodrow Wilson administration mishandled it in the late teens 

(causing heightened unemployment) and cost the Democrats 

control of the Congress and White House in 1920. Nelson 

wanted to begin reconverting industry as stem as feasible, and 

many in Congress were eager to have factories in their districts 

and states reconvert, too. Nelson directed one of his key 

assistants to study reconversion in April 1943, m',.tking clear that 

he intended to move into this controversial area. War production 

peaked in November 1943, although for some items, like 

airplanes, 1944 was a bigger year. 

There was a sharp decline in war orders in 1944. But the 

Army wanted no reconversion of industry because it might lead 

to a slackening of the war effort. The Amw would have been 

happy if there were pools of unemployed workers forced to seek 

positions in war industries and unable to opt for better paying or 

more secure jobs in factories producing for the civilian market. 

Truman is on record calling for "an orderly resumption of civilian 

production in areas where there is not manlx~wer shortage and 

with materials not required for war production." Nelson began 

to reconvert slowly, but the Army was powerful, and some 

business leaders also fought reconversion because they were tied 

to war production and did not want competitors to get a leg up 

in the potential market. The Anny forced Nelson's removal in 

summer 1944.19 By the time R(~sevelt sent Nelson to China on 

assignment to get him out of town, the president had ",.dready 

established, on 27 May 1943, an agency that superseded the War 

Production Board: the Office of War Mobilization, the last of the 

series that began with the War Resources Board in August 1939. 

Significantly, tile president installed James F. Bymes to run this 

new organization. 
78 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

NOTES 

1. Don;dd M. Nelson, Arsenal ofl)emocracy (New York: Harcourt, 

Brace ~md Co., 1.946), 2()()-202. 

2. Nelson, 205-2()6. 

3. Wartime Production Achievements and the Recom, ersion Ozttlook 

(Washington, DC: War Production Bo:u'd, 1945), 14- ! 5. This method 

of :dlocation lasted tlu'ough 10 qum'terly periods, essentially until the 

end of the win" [Herman M. Somers, Presidential Agency: The OfJ)'ce ~ 

War Mobilization and. Recom, ersion (C,'unbridge: H:u'vard University 

Press, 1950), 116; Paul A.C. Koistinen. "Warf~tre and Power Relations 

in American: Mobilizing the World War II Economy," in J~uncs Titus, 

The Home Front and War in the Twentieth Century: The American 

Experience in Comparative Perspective: Proceedit~gs of the Tenth Air 

Force Academy Militwy History ,~ymposit~m (Washington, DC:Office 

of Air Force History, 1984) 97.98]. Koistinen, ever critical, sees the 

Controlled Materials Plan ;t'; an approach that "served to increase the 

hold of the military ~md the corporate gi~mts on the [War Production 

Board] ;rod the economy" (Koistinen, 97). Others found that the 

Production Requirements Plum failed for two basic re~L,;ons: it was 

poorly administered. ;rod the armed services objected to the key role 

played by the War Production Board in controlling production. Under 

the new pl;m, the services were allocated the materials by the War 

Production Bo~u'd then to be reallocated based on milit~u'y priorities. 

See David Novick, Melvin Anshen, and W.C. Truppner Wartime 

Production Controls (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), 

129, 133,165. "The fund;unental objectives of the Controlled Materials 

Plan were clear fiom the sutrt. They were (1) to assure a balance 

between supply and demand for the principal production materi~ds 

designmed under the plan as 'controlled materials'---carbon ~md alloy 

steel, br~tss [really copper], and aluminum: (2) to Secure that balance by 

a coordinated review of military export, and essenti,'-d civilian progr:uns 

in terms of their controlled material equivalents, and by adjusunents, 

wherever necessary, to yield that total commitment of our production 

resources calculated to secure maximum output tk~r world military 

victory: (3) to schedule production for each approved end product 

progr~un i.n order to st'.cure the maximum level of balanced output at all 

levels of production from metal mill to final assembly plant; (4) to 

mainudn continuing control over production ,and over the distribution of 

materials required to support itpproved production levels in ,all parts of 

the economy: and above, all (5) to cut down the size of the total arms 

production program to realistic proportions by expressing all projects in 

addable currency common to virtually all progr~unsisteel, copper, ,and 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 79 

:aluminum . . . The original group of claiming agencies was . . . 

composed of the W,'u Deparunent, Navy Deparunent, Maritime 

Commission . . . Aircraft Resources Control . Lend Leltse 

Achninistration, Board of Economic W,'u'fare, ,and Office of Civilian 

Supply .... The Controlled Materials Plan was the most complex piece 

of administrative machinery created during the perltxl of the war 

emergency." 

4. Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society: 1939-1945 (Los 

Angeles: University of Califomia Press, 1979), 123-124. 

5. Novick, Anshen, and Truppner, 167-170. 

6. Novick, Anshen, and Truppner, 169-17{I. Nelson wrote that 

there wits no single "vital to victory" war pn~gram. "We had a dozen 

or more, ~md all of them had to go along together. For ex~unple, steel 

plate was needed by merchlmt ships, but steel plate wits also needed by 

the Navy for its wltrships, by the Army for its tanks, by Lend-Lease for 

the requirements of our Allies; it was essentild, too, for the building of 

high-octane gasoline plants, rubber plants, ~md for the expimsion of our 

overall industrial capacity." Nelson wrote of the complicated nature of 

the Controlled Materials Plan. One yard needed each month no fewer 

them 763 different kinds of steel plates and 455 different steel shapes. 

Many of the components cane from subcontractors who received their 

materials from the primes. There were 6,000 subcontractors in the 

merctumt shipbuilding business supplying thousands of parts. Nelson, 

249-251. 

7. Nelson, 251-256. Nelson cites Roosevelt for raising the priority 

of landingcrafl to the Navy's "most urgent category." The president in 

1942 saw the need before the Navy did, because the latter was focusing 

on destroyers ,and other anti-submarine cr:fft for the Battle of the 

Atlantic. Nelson notes that landing craft explmsion cut into many other 

shipbuilding programs, and there were still never enough limding craft. 

8. Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 113. 

9. Somers, 26-27. Nelson was also supine in front of the v,'u-ious 

synthetic rubber agencies. Kreidberg and Henry, 687-689, found the 

War Manpower Commission to be ineffective because it had no power 

to draft, assign, or punish civili~m workers. "M:mpower procurement 

and allt~ation activities Were divided among a host of operating 

agencies, including the Anny, Navy, Selective Service System, 

Dep~tmnent of Labor. Department of Agriculture, the Federal Security 

Agency, Civil Service ;rod the [War Production Board]. Among the War 

Manpower Commission's successes was ensuring that too many dentists, 

physici;ms ~md veterinarians were not drafted, thus seeing that civilians 

were adequately covered." 
80 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

10. Somers, 109-112. Nelson, on the other hand, despite the 

implications in Koistinen that the War Production Board Ch~linn,'m had 

to fight both big business ,and the military, ,asserts that his authority was 

rarely challenged by industry. Nelson, 211. Moreover, Nelson's great 

defender, Bruce Catton, puts the onus on the military for weakening 

Nelson ~md the War Production Board. Although he does see big 

business allying itself with the military over the reconversion fight. 

Catton also recognized something that Koistinen -~,sserts-----Nelson had 

difficulty controlling the membership of his W,'u" Production Board. 

There were m~my strong personalities on the Board, some with different 

agendas. Routine tensions also helped make it ,an unhannonious 

agency. Bnlce Cam)n, The War Lords of Washington (New York: 

Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1948),196-273, 80, 73. 

11. Nelson, 167-170. 

12. Nelson, 359-362. 

13. Nelson 357-359 

14. Nelson, 107-109, 112 

15. Nelson, xvii-xviii. 

16. Somers, 29-31. 

17. David Robertson, Sly a,d Ahle : A Political Bio,eraphy of James 

F. Byrnes (New York: Norton, 1994), 316-321. Byrnes already had 

been indispensable to Roosevelt. While in the Senate he had drafted 

;rod helped move key war powers ,and other emergency legislation, ,and 

even while ;m Associate Justice he continued to draft ~md expedite 

legislation. Attorney General Fr,'mcis Biddle reported to Roosevelt on 

9 Janu,'try 1942 that "all defense legishttion is being cleared by the 

deparunents ~md then through Jimmy Byrnes, who takes care of it on 

the Hill." Bymes had been the "behind the scenes" sponsor of the first 

,and second W~u" Powers Acts passed in M~uch 1942, that gave 

Roosevelt enormous powers to conduct the w~tr without seeking 

additional legislation. Byrne.s was so central to the president that the 

Chief Justice lightened his workload on the Supreme Court to give him 

the time he needed to a.,~sist Roosevelt. Byrnes' biographer asserted that 

Byrnes was not happy on the bench, ~md that he thoroughly enjoyed his 

new position, responsibilities :rod authority. This appointment, however, 

obviously undercut Nelson. Letter from Biddle ,and other comments 

cited in Robertson, 312-314. Byrnes h:~d been the floor manager for 

Roosevelt's Lend-Lease Act, certainly the most controversial piece of 

emergency legislation to that point, and it is a testimony to Byrnes' skill 

~md reputation in the Senate that Roosevelt won (Robertson, 296-297). 

Bymes c~une to the t&,~k with enthusi~u,~m--he openly favored aid to 

Britain and was a committed internation:dist (Robertson, 294-295). 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 81 

18. Somers, 38-39. Bruce Catton took it one step further declaring 

that the "firing of Nelson m,'u'ked a defe~tt lot the people." Catton, 289. 

i9. Nelson, 32, 391-415. 
m 

THE OFFICE OF WAR 

MOBILIZATION 

(AND RECONVERSION) 

In early 1943 the president w~s being pushed to establish a war 

mobilization office by Senator Harry Trumm~ oald his coumlittee. 

Tmman's committee and other congression',d investigative 

committees were dismayed by the lack of unity in the industrial 

effort and demanded a single civiliml-directed procurement 

agency for "all Army, Navy, Maritime Commission, and LendLease needs. Truman knew that Nelson had much more authority 

than he exercised and therefore called for a War Mobilization 

Board, stating that he would create one by legislation if 

Roosevelt did not take the initiative) Other efforts "also fostered 

the establishment of the Office of War Mobilization. 2 

For its part, the Senate Military Affairs Committee 

recognized the weaknesses in the War Production Board. There 

were too many agencies with a say in too many parts of the 

economy for efficiency. The press was also vocal in its criticism. 

Roosevelt either sensed the pressure or understood the necessity, 

or both, and created by executive order the new office, 

designating a handful of govermnent officials as advisers 

(Nelson was one of the five), and chartered the Office of War 

Mobilization to "develop unified programs and to establish 

policies for the maximum use of the Nation's natural and 

industrial resources for military and civilian needs, for the 

effective use of the national manpower not in the armed forces, 

for the maintenance and stabilization of the civilian economy, and 

for the adjustment of such economy to war needs and 

conditions." 

The key to the Executive Order wins in this sentence: "To 

unify the activities of the Federal agencies and departments 

83 
84 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

engaged in or concerned with production, procurement, 

distribution or transportation of military or civilian supplies, 

materi',ds, m~d products m~d to resolve and determine 

controversies betwccn such agencies or departments." The new 

office could issue "directives and policies" Io carry out its 

charter, and "it shall be the duty of all such agencies aJad 

departments to execute these directives, and to make to the Office 

of War Mobilization such progress reports as may be required. ''3 

James F. Bymes drafted the Executive Order and wrote the 

language to make the new agency effective. From the start he 

was ca.Lled Assistm~t President, zmd I know of no others with that 

title. The ottly things missing in Jmnes Bymes portl'olio were 

foreign affairs talc! military grand strategy. + 

Before May 1943 and his appointment to the new office, 

Bymes had become contplelely immersed in economic planning 

mad manipulation and thereby enormously powerful. As Director 

of the Office of Economic Stabilization he was intimately 

concerned with all major segments of the economy because his 

office was charged with eliminating inflation. No similar office 

had been established during World War l, aJ~d as a result, 

consumer prices rose and the national debt b',dlooned. The Office 

of Economic Stabilization was not able to eliminate infiation, but 

it did dmnpen il, and in the process Bymes learned a great de',d 

about the economy and how segmenls of it--agriculture, industry, 

etc.--worked to profit or benefit their narrow interests rather than 

the general welfare. 5 Bymes' powe~ were exlensive. The 

Executive Order establishing the Office of Economic 

Stabilization pennilted him: 

to formulate ,and develop a comprehensive national economic 

policy relating to the control of civili~m purchasing power, 

prices, rents, wages, salaries, profits, rationing subsidies, ,and 

all related matter.~--all for the purpose of preventing avoidable 

incre~uses in the cost ol + living, cooperating in minilnizing the 

unnecessm'y migration from one business, industry or region to 

,'mother, and facilitating the prosecution of the war. To give 

effect to this comprehensive national economic policy the 

Director sh~dl have power to issue directives on policy to the 

Federal departments ~md agencies concerned. 6 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 85 

Interestingly, the Office of Economic Stabilization did not 

disappear with the creation of the Oll'ice of War Mobilization. 

Fred M. Vinson, a fonner congressman mid appeals judge (and 

later Chief Justice) replaced Bymes, aJld his office was 

subordinate to Bymes's new one. (Vinson eventually became 

Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, its 

new title ",flier October 1944.) The arrangement worked well 

because the men knew each other mid had worked together in the 

past. Further, Vinson clearly understood Bymes's relationship 

with the president. 7 

OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION 

• Established by Executive Order 27 May 1943. James F. Byrnee 

was appointed director. 

- Directed to unify activities of all Federal agencies and 

departments involved in mobilization effort and to resolve 

disputes between these agencies 

- Given authority to issue "directives and policies" to carry out 

its charter 

Soon after taking office, Bymes wrote to the chiefs of a.ll the 

procuring agencies trod pointed out his duties as prescribed by the 

president. He put everytx)dy on notice that he intended to 

scrutinize all procurement. He called for eslablishing, within and 

at the top of each agency, a procurement review board that would 

include a representative of the Office of War Mobilization. Some 

offices, notably Lend-Lease ~md the Maritime Commission did so 

immediately, but the Army had to be told a second time and the 

Navy only did what it was told when the president insisted they 

follow orders. The Navy dragged its feet for months trying to 

subvert Bymes's authority. Bymes wrote the president that 

General George C. Marshall was cooperating and that billions of 

dollars were saved through this cooperation, but that the Navy 

was recalcitrant. The Navy, counting on its speci',d relationship 

with Roosevelt, tried to go around Bymes, but the president 

forwarded their memoranda to Byrnes for answering. 8 
86 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

The Office of War Mobilization was certainly in a position 

to rationalize industri'al mobilization, but what should be its role 

vis-a-vis the Joint Chiefs of StalT? Bymes was indeed more 

powerful than any civilian cabinet member, for he had 

jurisdiction over "all agencies, bureaus and departmems, 9 but the 

Joint Chiefs were in another re'tim. Some in Bymes's office 

thought that he should sit with the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that 

grand strategy mad procurement would be harmonized. But the 

services, especially the Navy, resisted civilian participation in 

military affairs, especially war plmming. Bymes established 

within the Joint Chiefs of Staff a Joint Production Survey 

Committee, with representation from the Office of War 

Mobilization. a compromise between full integration of 

procurement and military strategy; previously, Nelson's War 

Pr~nluction Boanl was not represented on Joint Chiefs of Staff 

committees. Bymes still did not consider his relationship with 

the Joint Chiefs to be satisfactory. The Chiefs still wanted a 

great deal of the say regarding industri',d mobilization, but Bymes 

was able to establish his authority over the Joint Chiefs on 

matters of supply, "although doing so was not easy. ~° 

He informed the Chiefs at the outset that he grad the Office 

of War Mobilization were responsible for the balance that must 

be maintained between civilim~ and military production, and 

therefore he had to k3~ow what was being procured by the 

services. Moreover, he had to kmow that the amounts being 

procured were not excessive. For exmnple, he set up a 

procurement review board for the Anny, which found it needed 

some testimony concerning military matters. The Army refused 

to show any such data to civilizuls, and Bymes told the Chief of 

Staff that he would take Ihe Anny's refusal to the president. The 

Army gave in." 

Prior to the creation of the Office of War Mobilization there 

was no synchronizing of grand strategy and production. 

Although the new Office was an imperfect mechanism ff~r 

effecting this synchronization, it did have the president behind it, 

plus Bymes's extensive experience, keen inteUigence, mid high 

colmnon sense. The problem was the active competition for 

limited resources that kept agencies in pennanent conflict. 

Bymes's approach was to exercise control by listening to 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 87 

arguments from disputing agencies after conflicts had developed 

and making tile necessary decisions. This is, more or less, the 

role tile industrial mobilization plans had reserved for tile War 

Resources Administrator, except that the pla~mers hoped that this 

bureaucrat would resolve conflicts before they occurred. Bymes 

did not need a big stal'f to do that job; in fact, he kept his staff 

tiny (ten initially, 16 ill November 1944, 80 in June 1945, and 

146 in May 1946 during the height of reconversion, compared 

with 20,000 in the War Production Board). ~2 He used the staffs 

of the various agencies to provide him with tile information he 

needed. Bymes deliberately safeguarded the autonomy of the 

agencies he dealt with, acting as a disinterested decisiomnaker-- 

in effect a judge. 13 Moving the decisiomnaking power to the 

Office of War Mobilization diminished Nelson's authority and 

prestige aJad also that of tile War Production Board. There was 

only one authority higher than Bymes, and the president was 

adamant thai Bymes' decisions would stick. Even the War 

Department tended to accept Bymes' decisions as final. TM 

Rc~)sevelt loved it, even telling a friend that "since appointing 

Jimmy Bymes to [tile Office of War Mobilization] he, for rite 

first time since the war began, had the leisure 'to sit down and 

think.'" ~ 5 

Bymes took on the dispute with rite Joint Chiefs flint had 

caused Nelson to be fired: reconversion. As a politician who was 

painfully aware of the costs to his party for failing to implement 

an ordered demobilization after World War I, he was sensitive to 

the demand. His aim (and that of civilians in the war agencies) 

was to prevent unemployment and severe industrial dislocation 

with rite ending ol + war production. Ahnost all agreed on rite 

objective, but timing was everything. For at lea+st 18 months 

before the end of the war in Europe, a large proportion of 

Bymes' time and that of people ill numerous agencies like the 

War Production Board was dew+ted to the problem of 

reconverting industry. Two actions were involved: early planning 

for the changeover that wouhl occur after victory and a gradual 

resumption of peacetime enterprise while the war was still going 

16 

on. 

Some aspects of demobilization plaJming came easily, like 

agreement on how to clear away govenunent property and how 
88 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

to settle cancelJed contracts. "The sharp policy questions . . . 

were over how much, if any, resuntption of nonn',d civilian 

activity" could be undertaken with the war going on. "The heat 

engendered caused a greater wave of name-c',dling in Washington 

than any other contlict." Nelson and his supporters were accused 

of being willing to prolong the war to give certain business 

interests an early advantage. Big business lined up on both sides 

of the issue, as did government agencies and even people on the 

War Production Board; where people stood on the issue 

depended very much on where they sat. For example, the War 

Manpower Commission sided with the inilitary because 

manpower was so tight--it was the major bottleneck by the time 

this issue becmne promii~ent. The Cfmuuission wanted no 

freedom for workers to opt for civilian products employment 

while fllere were still lmading craft and other tools of war to be 

built. The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion was 

"indispensable" in adjudicating this issue because it was superior 

to "all the competing agencies and departments, and when it made 

reconversion decisions it was "never seriously claallenged." In 

August 1944, it sanctioned limited reconversion. It slowed 

reconversion drmnaticaUy in December 1944 during the Battle of 

the Bulge, but it reopened the gates ill March 1945. "From early 

1944 to the end no agency ln;atle ally policy decisions in the 

reconversion field without clearing with [file Office of War 

Mobilization and Reconversion]. ''~7 Make no mistake, however-- 

reconversion was not a factor until munitions production actu',dly 

peaked. The unremitting drive was for output, and the system 

produced anus prodigiously. 

NOTES 

1. Herman M, Somers, Presidential Agency: 17w Office of War 

Mobilization and Reconversim~ (Cmnbridge: H,'uvard University Press, 

1950), 35. 

2. One of these was Roosevelt himself. Herman Somers ,argues 

that the creation of the Otfice of War Mobilization was neither driven 

by persomdity conflicts nor by milit,'uy-civilian rivalry. It was that no 

one short of the president could make decisions across so many 

agencies and deparunents, therelore :m assist,'mt president who could do 

so was essentkd if Roosevelt w~Ls tO fOCUS on grand strategy. "The 

government lacked a place where, within a reasonable time, a synthesis 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 89 

could emerge from the struggle" (Somers 38-40). Koistinen argues that 

Roosevelt created the Office of War Mobilization because he was 

suffering heat l'rom the [John H.] Tolan Committee (House Select 

Committee Investigating Natit~nal Defense ~md the[James E.] Murray 

Committee (Senate Special Committee to Study and Survey the 

Problems of Amcric~m Small Business). These ctmunittees called for 

centralization of the mobilization process. Koistinen, without 

documentation, asserts that Byrnes's "most import~mt task bec~une that 

of guarding the industry-milit~u'y production rerun that had come to 

dominate the [War Production Bo~u'd]. This protective role was clearly 

evident in two ~u'eas: the mobilization of m~mpower ~md the controversy 

over rec~nversion." In the ca.,ce of the former, Koistinen ,argues, 

Byrues acted to ensure that "industry ~md the ~mned services needs 

would be ,net without a I~uge labor intluence," :rod on the latter Bymes 

generally sided with the military to delay it as long as possible [Paul A. 

C. Koistinen, "W~u'f~u'e and Power Relations in America: Mobilizing the 

World War It Economy," in James Titus, ed., 7Tze Home Front and War 

in the Twentieth Century: The American Experience in Comparative 

Perspective: Proceedings of the Tenth Air Force Academy Military" 

Ilistory Symposium (W~L~;hington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 

1984), 99]. 

3. Emergency Management of the National Economy: Vol. XIX 

Administration (f Mobilization WWII, hereafter cited as ICAF 

(W~shington, DC: Industrial College of the Anned Forces, 1954), 119- 

123. On 25 May 1943 the New York 7~mes editorialized: "Intrmnural 

bickering ~md inter-bureau politics ~ue moving to a new high point in 

bitterness with energy that might be devoted to outdoing the Axis being 

turned by subordinate officials to undoing one ~mother" (Somers, 33, 

34). Nelson underwent the humiliation of one of his division heads, 

Joseph Weiner, Civili~m Supply Division, testifying before a 

congression~d committee against Nelson's leadership ~md administration. 

Nelson had recently fired one his most senior officials, Ferdinand 

Ebcrstadt who had come to the W~u Production Board from the Army 

and Navy Munitions Board, ~md re:my people from the War Production 

Bo,'u'd resigned in sympathy with Eberstadt (who was seen by Nelson 

,as undermining his position by favoring military control of industrial 

mobilization). Somers continues, by mid-1943 "the conflicts ~unong 

agencies.., reached the stage of public scandal." 

4. The siluation dem:mded the creation of the arms czar that 

Roosevelt had avoided since August 1939. It was not the president's 

style to appoint :m assistant presidenl, and the Congress usually avoided 

permitting such powers to unclected officials, but when the Office of 
90 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

W,'u" Mobilization was created, most people applauded because the need 

for this type of authority had become widely recognized (Somers, 5). 

Roosevelt wrote Bymes in J~muary 1944 in answer to a request by 

Byrnes to have his powers augmented by being permitted to take over 

the War Production Board. The president turned him down, but told 

him: "As you know you ~u'e indispensable on the handling ~md the 

actual settling of scores of problems which are const~mtly ,arising." 

[David Robertson, Sly and Able: A Political Biography ~f James F. 

Byrnes (New York: Norton, 1994), 322: Executive Order 9347, 27 May 

1943, cited in Somers, 47-51]. 

5. ICAF, 104-110. Bymes wrote: "The fight to hold wages ~md 

prices was a bitter struggle. It was a struggle ag~dnst the desires of the 

producers to obtain increased prices and of workers to win increased 

wages. Senators, representatives, labor leaders, businessmen, fanners, 

~md spokesmen for groups of all kinds would present their special case. 

Whenever they could, they would go to the President to present their 

complaint" [J,'unes F. Bymes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper 

Brothers. 1947), 19]. The Bureau of the Budget was heavily involved 

in economic policy too, and its powers were vastly expanded during the 

war. See lndustri~d College of the Armed Forces, 93-97. But the 

relationship between the Office of Economic Stabilization ,and the 

Bureau of the Budget was not friction free. Bymes inevitably engaged 

in formulating policy that, prior to his appointment, was the province of 

the Budget Bureau, ~md Bureau Director Harold D. Smith challenged 

Byrnes's authority. But Bymes had proximity--being located in the 

White House. He was also a long-time Roosevelt confid,'mt--one who 

Roosevelt liked to call a BC--that is, a Roosevelt suplx~rter for the 

Democratic party nomination for president Before the 1932 national 

democratic convention in Chicago. 

6. Somers, 35. Quote is fi'om the Bymes dr~ffted Executive Order 

9250, 3 October 1942. Bymes, 17. Bymes succeeded in that inflation 

was dampened better them in previous wars. While the cost of living 

had risen rapidly in the first year of the war, from April 1943 to 

September 1945 it rose only ~mother 4.g percent. Koistinen notes that 

farmers ~md industrialists greatly benefited flonn the war, but that 

laborers made the least gains. Koistinen 98, 99. Byrnes w&s really at 

home in this venue. He had overseen the legislative passage of the 

Administrative Reorg~mization Act of 1939 which permitted Roosevelt 

to establish dozens of agencies ~md bureaus like the Office of Economic 

Stabilization, the W,'u" Production Board and the Office of W~u" 

Mobilization before :rod during World War II. The law removed from 

congressiongd oversight ~md centralized within the Executive Office 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 91 

agencies essenti,'d for the war effort. See David Robertson, Sly and 

Able: A Political Biography of James F. Byrnes (New York: Norton, 

1994), 290. 

7. Somers, 66-70. 

8. Somers, 118-121. 

9. Somers, 47-51. 203-233. 

10. Somers, 70-75. 

11. Somers, 63-64. 

12. Somers, 51-54, 80-81; Marvin A. Kreidberg ~md Merton G. 

Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Arrny. 

1775-1945 (W~L';hington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Army, 1955), 687. 

13. Somers, 65. Milw~ud ,argues that decisions to be made on 

priorities were decisions of extreme signific,'mce, ~md these could only 

be made by "possessors of great politic:d power." To make such 

decisions one had to have lull lmowledge of the circumst~mces leading 

to a priorities dispute, one h~td to have under one's control the 

administrative machinery to c,'u'ry out a priorities decision, ,and one had 

to have the will to make such essenti~d decisions. Byrnes had ,all these. 

He was indeed the "supreme umpire over the powerful" [Alum Milward, 

War, Economy and Society: 1939-1945 (Los Angeles: University of 

C~difomia Press, 1979], I I()-113. Byrnes's biographer notes that he 

received from the president "additional authority to ~ubitrate without 

further presidenti~d appeal any disputes ~u'ising ,'unong the numerous w,'u" 

production agencies and other civilian defense agencies headquartered 

in Wa.shington .... [~md Roosevelt was] happy to be relieved of the 

politic,'d ~md logistical responsibilities of the home front .... " Byrnes 

intended the Office of W~u" Mobilization to be a "one man show" 

(Robertson, 327). 

14. Somers, 137: H~trold G. Vatter, The United States Economy in 

World War 11 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 82-83, 

Herm~m Somers, the scholar most knowledgeable about the Office of 

W,'u" Mobilization. thinks that the "allegation that the military wished to 

'take over' the economy" is "questionable" ~md that Byrnes with the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained a "cle,'u" civilian domin~mce over all 

home front issues." Somers cites a dispute between Byrnes and the 

Navy late in the war (March 1945) over the number of aircraft that 

were needed to complete the war. The Army Air Forces had reduced 

their demand by ahnost 44,000 airplanes, saving more them $7.5 billion, 

but the Navy cut very little. Both Byrnes ,and Vinson found the Navy's 

insistence untenable (Somers 122-124, 133-134). The Joint Chiefs in 

J,'muary 1945 dem~mded 40 additional tankers. The Joint Production 

Survey Committee said the number of tankers requested was excessive. 
92 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

The Joint Chiet~ overruled the Joint Production Survey Committee, but 

the Office of War Mobilization denied the Chiefs' petition. Somers, 

130-132. In April 1945 the Joint Chiefs tried to influence shipping 

priorities in ten'as of the ratio of space allocated for civili~m and 

milit,'u'y goods. Vinson wrote Admiral Willi~un D. Le~thy that the 

"responsibility for mgtking final decisions its to the proper balance in the 

employment of manpower and production resources to obtain the 

maximum war effort resls with this office" (Somers 128-13()). The 

Navy in J~muary 1945, probably at some prodding by representatives 

and senators with shipyards in their districts and states, requested an 

additional 84 ships (644,00(I tons) beyond the 1945 progr,'un. The Navy 

went directly to the president, bypassing the Office of War 

Mobilization. Bymes counseled the president to cancel most of the 

order, and Roosevelt eliminated 72 ships (514,000 tons) savingS1.5 

billion (Somers, 125-1281. 

15. Robertson, 328-330. 

16. Somers, 200-202. The Congress w~s seriously concerned with 

this aspect of economic pl~uming, and it was a major t)tctor in the push 

for orderly demobilization and in fact legishtted the issue because of 

their political concerns. Representatives :md senators called for 

pl~uming on such elements as orderly contract termination, surplus 

dispos,'tl, orderly service men and women demobilization, relaxation of 

wartime controls, curtailment of wartime production, resumption of 

banned civili~m goods. Congress had surrendered powers to the 

president because of the war emergency, grad wanted to take these back. 

Bymes was sensitive and set up the Bernard Bm'uch-John Hancock 

postwar plamfing unit in the summer of 1943. These two gums 

produced a report in February 1944 stressing the need for congressional 

leadership in postwar reconversion. The Congress passed the Office of 

War Mobilization and Reconversion Act on 3 October 1944 granting 

vast powers to the Office ~md its director, calling on Byrnes, subject to 

the president's direction, to "formul~tte or have formulated reconversion 

plums.., issue orders and regulations to executive agencies regarding 

reconversion plums" which would have the force of law, recommend 

reconversion legislation, determine which w~u" agencies should be 

simplified, consolidated or eliminated, submit qu,'u'terly reports to 

Congress ,and the president on post-war adjustment, "detennine whether 

:my prime contract for war production scheduled for termination, should 

be continued either to benefit the government or aw~id substantial 

physic~d injury to ~t plaint or property." Somers 76-78. 

17. Somers, 200-202. 
1 

U.S. PRODUCTION IN 

WORLD WAR II 

Everywhere one looks there are very impressive American 

production statistics throughout World War II. The war on the 

ground in Europe was often tank warfare. Between 1918 and 

1933, the United States produced only 35 tanks, and no two of 

them the same model. In 1940, after witnessing Germany's 

Blitzkrieg in Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France, the 

United States produced 309 tanks, versus 1,400 in Britain and 

1,450 in Germany. In 1943, however, the United States 

manufactured 29,500 tanks, more in 1 year than Germany 

produced in the entire war from 1939 to 1945. In all, the United 

States manufactured 88,430 tanks during World War II versus 

24,800 in Britain and 24,050 in Germany. 1 

Consider also aircraft. In 1940, the United States had 41 

engine and propeller plants; in 1943 it had 81, with 5 built in 

Canada with U.S. funds (nearly all of the 40 new factories were 

of considerably larger size than those that existed in 1940). 

Aircraft production floor space increased from 13 million square 

feet in the prewar period, to more than 167 million square feet 

in 1943, and the value of the facilities mushroomed from $114 

million prewar to almost $4 billion in 1944. In 1939, the United 

States produced 5,865 aircraft valued at about $280 million, and 

in 1944 America produced 96,379 airplanes valued at almost $17 

billion. (The dollar figure is deceiving because during the war 

the costs of manufacturing aircraft dropped dramatically.) 

Between 1 January 1940 and 14 August 1945 the United States 

manufactured 303,717 aircraft, and between 7 December 1941 

and the Japanese surrender, 274,941 aircraft. And the power, 

weight, and speed of the aircraft dramatically increased during 

the war period. 2 

93 
.N= 

.e 

I/lil'l i f 

i' I ° ! o ==° 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 95 

(/) 

<, 

._J 

0 (3 u) 

Z 

0 

IE3 rr <C 

a 

Z 

Z 

O 

[] 

U.S. MUNITIONS PRODUCTION 

Average Monthly Rate, by Quarters, July 1, 1940 - July 31, 1945 

6 TOTA'L I July 1. 1940 - July 31. lgiS [ ' 

0ihel Eclulp+ lad Suppl+ll 20 5% 

Comm. ill 

4 ~Fleet Equip, ~ ~ 

.~ombil tn~ | 

Molol 

V'lhI¢lll 

ii+l% i 

lmlunillon 

• GJal |rid F,III 

Centre7 5+1% 

186 Billion DolIsrs 

2 ~N" Gun~ and Fire Conlrol 

, ombal and Motor Vehicles 

30 4Q> IO 2Q 3Q+4Q tO. 2Q 3'Q'40+ 020.3040 O+2O+$O O. IO20 

1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 

Source: Wartime Production Achlevements.105 

>, 

:Z: 

I-- Z 

0 

~E 

o9 

E 

O 

a 

u_ 

O 

Z 

O 

_J 

._1 

U.S. MUNITIONS OUTPUT 

°1' ' 

IN STANDARD 

MUNITIONS 

DOLLARS 

I INVASION 

4 ............ 

PEARL HARBOR 

1940 1941 

1 

1942 

,~VAmON oF I ' PH LIPP NES INVASION OF tlR OF LEYTE't I NORMANDY ~" .... 

,~k ,A_ / /BATTLE OF THE BULGE 

OF ITALY ~l~ dlIA~ltl! A I 

1943 1944 1945 1946 

Source: Wadime ProOuctk>n Achievements, 13 
t,o co o~ I.~ oo ,?,2 o~ 

04 O0 04 ~1 ' " 04 

¢4D I',- O~ ,,,,. I'~ 

CXl O0 CO OJ ¢.0 ,.~ O~ 

0 "- 

r,r,,t m - - - co 

'~0 ¢4 

1._ ~..-- v4 v, 4-, .1.., ~u ~'j 

o o:l:::'.5"B ~0 ~..a c ~ E..E r. ~,,, 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 97 

It is equally true, however, that there was no production 

"miracle" in the United States during World War II. 

Unquestionably, munitions production expanded greatly, but the 

base on which the expanded production was measured was a 

depressed one. Compare, for example, the period 1941 to 1945 

with another period of rapid industrial expansion (and peacetime 

at that), 1921 to 1925. Wartime farm output increased about 25 

percent in the former and peacetime output increased by more 

than 28 percent. In the case of total industrial production, the 

peacetime output increase was double that of wartime (53 percent 

versus 25 percent). If the period 1941 to 1944, when wartime 

production peaked and before it turned down, is compared with 

the period 1921 to 1924, the wartime figure is 7 percent higher 

(45 percent compared to 38 percent). 3 How then did the United 

States produce the hundreds of thousands of airplanes, tens of 

thousands of tanks, tens of thousands of landing craft if the 

output increase in the early 1940s was no greater than it had been 

in the early 1920s? through massive conversion of the industrial 

base and generous government funding for infrastructure 

construction. 

In 1939 the United States devoted less than 2 percent of its 

national output to war, and about 70 percent to satisfying 

immediate civilian desires. The rest went to civilian government 

expenditures, private capital formation, and exports. By 1944, 

the war outlays were 40 percent of national output. Industrial 

production doubled from 1939 to 1945 (but 1939 was still a 

depression year), with production increasing at the rate of 15 

percent per year. Manufacturing employment increased from 

10,151,000 in 1939 to 16,558,000 in 1944, and the percentage 

of the work force involved in manufacturing increased from 19 

to 26 percent. The rest of the people were neither farm nor 

factory workers (more women were at home than were in the 

factories, on the farm as workers, or in the military). All 

segments of the labor force decreased their percentage of workers 

except industry, the military and civil service. 4 Agricultural 

employment fell from 9,450,000 in 1940 to 8,950,000 in 1944, 

while people in nonagricultural industries went from 37,980,000 

in 1940 to 45,010,000 in 1944. Most of the increase came from 
98 MOBILIZING U.$. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

sopping up unemployment (which was 8,120,000 in 1940 and 

only 670,000 in 1944) and employing more women: 

As can be seen in chapter 10, U.S. output in gross figures is 

impressive, but all belligerents produced munitions at a furious 

pace. There is no denying that U.S. logistics capabilities were 

a major (probably the major) reason for the allied victory, but 

the relative output must be kept in perspective. The United 

States was unquestionably productive and outproduced all its 

allies and adversaries, but it started from a higher technological 

base than all other combatants. Its wartime increase in 

productivity was not impressive by comparison to others, but it 

was sufficient to win the war! 6 

The great advantage the United States had over Germany was 

that the former planned for a long war. 7 Conversion of industry 

alone would not have produced all the munitions needed; new 

factories had to be built and old ones modified. It was essential, 

therefore, for the government to expend scarce materials, 

machinery and manpower on building and expanding war plants 

at the expense even of current production. In 1940 about $2 

billion was spent on factory construction, more than $4 billion 

the next year, and almost $8.5 billion in 1942. After the third 

quarter of 1942, the trend was downward for the rest of the 

war. 8 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 99 

ARMS AND AMERICA 

6 

.J 

O 5 Q 

ZA 0 = 4 _® 

z~ 3 

9"- 

I---~ 

Q. 

0 

IE 

0 

I,S'"'BOORI~IRAiB'"O'"'I' 'S" I''RO00°"O"'~~~ 

IVEABABLE?II P:NCH I IBACKSlIPLANNINGII GRAUS I SIGHTS I IPUSH; LABOR| 

Resources 

!- ...... i il !ilN i il- ! 

1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 

Warl I--Nationel-I Office of-- War Production Board '1 

Defense Manegem~n Production I , Office of War I~ / 

Board Advisory Mobilization 

Commission 

Supply Priorities 

and Allocations Board 

i 

Office of War Mobilizalion 

and Reconversion 
100 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

SOME WARTIME SHIFTS IN U.S. ECONOMY 

TOTAL LABOR FORCE 

~ Mining 

1939 1944 

MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT 

s 4. 

s 

/ 

I 

! t 

I I 

I ! 

l I 

I 

% s 

Increase 1939 to 1944 

1939 1944 Increase 1939 to 1944 

CapitaIFo~a~0n GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT and E x~rt~ 

Increase 1939 to 1944 

Increase 1939 to 1944 

1939 1944 

~,ab~Goo~ CONSUMER EXPENDITURES 

1939 1944 

Source: Wartime ProdL~tiorl A~tlievument~, 4 
WARTIME EXPANSION 

IN THE UNITED STATES 1939 TO 1944 

1944 AS % OF 1939 (1939 = loo) 

0 50 100 150 200 

Gross Nalk~al Product 

1~9 (~OIl~S 

Manufaclunng Volume 

Value Added ~, Mamda~unng 

Raw Materials Produ~on 

New Conslruction 

I.ab~r Force 

CivU~n Employment 

Manufacturing Employment 

Weekly Hours L~ ~um9, 

Mrtng and C~nstr~ 

Consumer Expenditures 

1939 Dc4ars 

250 

15 

ALAN L. GROPMAN 101 

Source: Wattle Proc~c~on Achievers. 2 

NEW CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 

IN THE U.S. 

O3 

cr 

<, ~0 

_J 

0 

r,, 

z 

0 

~ 5 

..i 

113 

0 

1920'22 '24 '26 '28 '30 '32 '34 '36 '38 '40 '42 '44 '46 

Source: Wartlnle Produclion Achievements, 32 
102 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

NEW CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 

(millions of dollars) 

19391 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 

(est.) 

TOTAL CONSTRUCTION ...................... . 6,302. 6.830. 10.757 

Total Public ......................................... 2,411 2,57 ~, 5,442 

Total Private ........................................ i 3.801 4,256 5,316 

Military .................................................... , 119, 337, 1,756 

Army .................................................... 89 270 1,411 

Navy .................................................... 30 67 345 

Industrial ................................................. 241 569, 2,028 

Public ................................................... ' 14 ' 145 1.350 

Private .................................................. 227 424 678 

Housing .................................................. 2,483 2 560 3,360 

Pul~ic ................................................... ' 76 ' 204 480 

Private ................................................. 2,407 2,356 2,880 

Nonresidential bldg.' .............................. 1 267 937 971 

Public ................................................... ' 762 357' 330 

Private .................................................. 505 562 641 

Other Pub]k: ........................................... 1.440, 1,513, 11526 

Highways ............................................. ' 869 896 850 

Conse¢vation ....................................... 318 323 356 

Various ~ ............................................... 253 289 320 

13434. 7.732. 3.9:~5 . 4.500 

10,669 6,114 2,353 1.985 

2,765 1,588 1,582 2,515 

5,060, 2,423, 720. 515 

3,934 1,559 319 260 

1,126 864 401 255 

i i i 

3,806, 2,198, 982, 1 ~280 

3.485 1,973 748 640 

321 225 234 640 

i i i 

lr895 ' 1~318, 691, 735 

600 702 192 85 

1.295 616 499 650 

i i i 

460, 230, 275, 550 

239 134 131 200 

221 96 144 350 

i i i 

11285 , 912, 562, 545 

670 410 310 320 

356 244 142 110 

259 258 110 115 

other Private .......................................... , 752, 914, 1 T117, 928, 651, 705, ~7{~ 

Farm .................................................... 226 246 315 200 160 170 ~0 

Utilities ................................................. 526 668 802 728 491 535 655 

' Incs.,des ~ewer ~ wl~r facli'J,m ar~ mt/.ce.b~eo ks pm~,ec~ '~ r~,nced by SII~I ant ~ rural. Source: ~ Pmduc~on A ch,~weCn@~...s. :~ 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 103 

WARTIME GROWTH 

OF MANUFACTURING FACILITIES 

12 

1939 Privately Owned 

Facilities 

U. S. MANUFACTURING FACILITIES 

1939 June 1945 

$39,560,000,000 $64,4c~,000,0(~ 

10 8 6 4 2 

BILLIONS 

OF DOLLARS 

July '40-June 

'45 Expansion 

S~111~J¢ R ul~e' 

AV, at~n 

~and 

.~nition Loading 

Guns and Ammu~n 

Sl',ip C0~str~'~on 

Repu 

Mal:hinl) Tools 

No--us Metals 

and pro(lucts 

Comber and Motor 

Ve~es 

Machinery e~ 

EVcutcaa Eqt~pr~ 

Food products 

Ir~t and S11e~ 

O~l~- Chin.. Coal 

e~cl Petroleum Prowl 

All Other 

0 0 2 4 

BILLIONS 

OF DOLLARS 

Source: Wartime Production Achievements, 6 
104 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

NOTES 

1. Jerome G. Peppers Jr., History of United States Military 

Logistics 1935-1985 (Huntsville: Logistics Education Foundation 

Publishing, 1988), 65. Not until 9 months after the invasion of 

Poland did the Chrysler Corporation, the country's first big tank 

manufacturer, receive its first set of tank blueprints and an order. In 

early 1943 there were 18 companies producing tanks, armored cars 

or other combat vehicles (including jeeps). Chrysler, before the 

war, made automobiles. During the war it made 35 different types 

of war equipment, including 59,000 antiaircraft guns, 3.5 million 

rounds of ammunition, 5,500 gyro compasses, 3,000 range finders, 

tanks, tank accessories, and also some devices for the Manhattan 

Project. Nelson 239-242. One finds different production figures in 

various sources, usually because the authors do not start or finish at 

the same date. The War Production Board figure for tank 

production in World War II is 86,333 between 1 July 1940 and 31 

July 1945. War Production Board, 10-13. What is impressive about 

the United States figures is the acceleration rather than the gross 

total. Again, the United States had the population to produce, two 

vast oceans for protection, abundant raw materials and a strategy to 

use machines versus people in combat. Therefore the amount of 

production is less imposing than the speed with which the United 

States attained its maximum output. 

2. Donald M. Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy (New York: 

Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946), 237-238. The United States 

produced more than 40 percent of all the aircraft produced by all 

belligerents in World War II and supplied enough raw materials to 

its two key allies the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union to permit 

them to be the number two and three producers of aircraft (Peppers, 

63-65). During the war United States industry produced 150 separate 

types of aircraft and 417 different models. Between 1 January 1940 

and 14 August 1945 the United States spent $45 billion 

manufacturing aircraft. At the peak of the war the Army Air Forces 

had in its inventory 89,000 airplanes. Joshua Stoff, Picture History 

of World War H American Aircraft Production (New York: Dover 

Productions, 1993), xi. The Navy inventory at the end of the war 

contained 36,721 aircraft. U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical 

Abstract of the United States, 1950 (Washington, DC: Government 

Printing Office, 1950), 212. From 1 January 1940 to the end of the 

war the United States produced more than 300,000 aircraft, the 

United Kingdom 131,549 (many of them of United States' design), 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 105 

the USSR 158,218, Germany 119,871 and Japan 76,320. Many of 

the latter two countries' aircraft were defensive fighters, whereas the 

United States two most heavily produced aircraft were offensive 

heavy bombers. Bombers were costly, but their price fell during the 

war. A B-24 cost in 1945 dollars $213,700. On average a Liberator 

lasted 237 days and 700 flying hours, and consumed about eight 

engines. The life cycle costs including fuel to fly it to the combat 

theater was $330,000 (Rutenberg and Allen, 113-114). Alan 

Milward notes that not all of the technological innovation went into 

just improving weapons, much went into improving the production 

processes. Thus production of the famous Oerlikon gun went from 

132 hours to 35, and production costs for aircraft fell dramatically 

[Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society: 1939-1945 (Los 

Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), 186]. 

3. Harold G. Vatter, The United States Economy in Worm War 

H (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 22. 

4. Wartime Production Achievements and the Reconversion 

Outlook (Washington, DC: War Production Board, 1945), 3-5. 

5. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 

Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1948 (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1948), 174-176. 

6. Milward, 73-74. 

7. Mark Harrison, "Resource Mobilization for World War II: 

The U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938-1945," Economic 

History Review XLI, no. 2 (1988): 173. Germany's success at the 

outset of the war depended primarily upon military (as opposed to 

economic) factors. But as the war continued, success depended on 

German ability to mobilize its resources speedily and fully. 

Germany's Blitzkrieg strategy was aimed at winning the war before 

an economic mobilization by Germany's adversaries could influence 

events. Hitler's lightning war in the Soviet Union failed, but, even 

then, Germany did not turn to the type of economic mobilization 

policies of its adversaries. Germany's economic effort remained 

divided long after the allies had pursued a more centralized course 

with much better results. Not only did Hitler turn to economic 

mobilization too late, but he did so without enthusiasm and within 

the framework of Nazi party tensions and rivalries. Both of Hitler's 

strategies failed (Harrison, 178-181). 

8. War Production Board, 34-35. Most of the money went to 

build factories that would almost surely be surplus at the end of the 

war. Aircraft manufacturing facilities absorbed about one third of 

the money spent and shipyard construction another fifth. Another 
106 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

astonishing statistic: in 1937 the Detroit Ordnance Office, a part of 

the Army, had in toto two officers, one clerk and one steno. In 

1944 this same office was to occupy several large office buildings 

and make purchases equal to "three times the taxable value of the 

whole city of Detroit" ( Nelson, 55). In some industries almost all of 

the construction money came from the government: 97 percent of 

the synthetic rubber industry construction for example, military 

explosives 85 percent, and chemical warfare 100 percent (War 

Production Board, 86). 
10. 

BALANCING MILITARY AND 

CIVILIAN NEEDS 

Great as the output was, the United States war effort did not 

absorb more than 40 percent of the gross national product, which 

grew 50 percent in constant dollars between 1939 and 1944. The 

United States devoted a smaller percentage of its gross national 

product to the war than any other major belligerent. There was 

also a major effort during the war to improve the lot of the 

population whenever possible. Automobile production was 

stopped and tires and gasoline were rationed, but consumers 

could be compensated with soft goods and services. The War 

Production Board thought that the American people during the 

war were "subjected to inconvenience, rather than sacrifice. ,,1 

By comparison to the situation facing civilians in all other nations 

at war, it would be hard to argue with that assertion. At the 

height of the war the government spent $94 billion, and of that 

$81.6 billion 87 percent was war spending. The budget was 80 

times greater than in 1939, 54 times 1940 and 14 times 1941. 

But the budget expansion was such that civilians truly did not 

suffer because of the war, and when one considers that 

unemployment had all but disappeared and what joblessness 

remained was usually only temporary, the home front prospered. 

In terms of calories, people were generally fed better than they 

had been before the war, and they consumed more meat, shoes, 

clothing and energy. 2 

Population is always a country's greatest resource, and in a 

major mobilization like that of World War II, usually its greatest 

hinderance. The United Kingdom suffered a severe people 

crunch; its population was the smallest of the major belligerents. 

Germany and the Soviet Union found themselves severely 

limited, too, in terms of productive population. The United 

107 
108 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

States was also limited in terms of manpower, although its 

population was larger than all the belligerents (including the 

Soviet Union soon after the German attack in June 1941), except 

for China, and its losses were much smaller than all the major 

adversaries who remained in the war. 

250 

u) 

£I: 200 

o ,,.., 

I-- 

z 15o uJ 

~E 

n- 

~) 100 

0 

N 5o 

Restricted 

Ind, ustries 

.m 

i 

GROSS NATIONAL 

Total Output of Goods and Services 

i A]N NUAIL RATilE ! 

,.~ ~ ~ ~,.~., ~'~! ::,."-,:~ ~,~...:........-..:..-.?....:......: 

t~.t.¢t-,: ~,t.~...'.......'.. ......'.....:':...:'.. 

.~"-. ~. ~363.~ .~ .~ ~. "~.~'.. ~ .~. Other Civilian Goods /. • ". "....~ • ". • ¢'~¢.. "'. -'-.].:'."',"'-': • 

• ~.t-¢t-. ,.r.¢'-.:..'..'3::'-."-." :~.-~.-~.~:~:~.-~:.-:~:~:~ ~°~ ~er~e~ ".,.~n ........ .~.... ...... . 

~.~:~,.'a"2.~:~?.~," :~:~?.~Z ?..~:'.'~.~ "~-'~":~':.~Z ~...... "" ~:" " " ......... 

t.,t,..,.. ,.',~. : C.". i'.'-."-.".:." ,";.~;.~.;,,"b,";,~.;>.;.~ ;~.~..%,".~..g':~.":,'t~."g;¢::~."&~,.~.~.~g~...~:..~...~...e...¢. 

1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 

Note • Resllicted industries include motor vehicles, consumer dulable goods. 

nenwar consllu¢liort, and coPsamer pu:chases el gasokne. 

Source: Warl~rrya ProOuCt~ Abhi~vem~Bn~$. 

The American manpower problem was exacerbated by the 

number of agencies involved in allocating this crucial resource. 

The War Manpower Commission was created by Executive 

Order by the president on 18 April 1942 as a policymaking 

agency, but the Selective Service System, which drafted more 

than 10,000,000 people, was completely independent of the War 

Manpower Commission. In January 1943, the War Manpower 

Commission lost control over the agricultural labor supply to the 

Secretary of Agriculture, and the Civil Service Commission 

recruited independently for the vastly increased responsibilities 

of the federal government. In time, railroad workers and sailors 

in the merchant marine were also independent of the War 

Manpower Commission's authority, and of course all of these 

agencies were independent of each other. Although the War 

Manpower Commission tried to establish policy on draft 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 109 

deferments, the 6,500 separate draft boards were independent in 

their actions, reporting to the Selective Service and not to the 

War Manpower Commission. 

When the manpower situation became desperate in 1943 and 

1944, with superfluous people in selected industries or on farms 

clinging to draft deferments, it took the power of the Office of 

War Mobilization to solve the dilemma. There was, for 

example, an urgent manpower problem on the West Coast, where 

much of the United States shipbuilding and airplane 

manufacturing were located. By June 1943, one-third of the 

shipbuilding yards on the West Coast were behind schedule, and 

there was a shortage of workers in every production center. It 

took about a year for the Office of War Mobilization to 

implement a policy restricting the freedom of workers to move 

where they wanted to take advantage of better wages or working 

conditions, and to moderate the rights of employers to hire 

whomever they wanted whenever they wanted. The division of 

responsibility for making manpower decisions harmed the war 

effort, and only when Byrnes was put on the top of the 

apparatus, could problems be solved. 3 

The manpower demand was relentless. In mid-1945 U.S. 

Armed Forces included more than 12 million people; of these, 

more than 98 percent were men. However, during the war, the 

United States had mobilized more than 16 million for the 

military. More than 400,000 died or were missing in action, 

several times that number were wounded (and many of that total 

were invalided out), and a great number were discharged before 

the war ended for a variety of reasons. To reach the number that 

served, about 45 million men were registered for the draft, and 

31 million of these were found physically and mentally qualified. 

About 10 million were drafted, with many additional millions 

being allowed to enlist. Voluntary enlistments, where one chose 

the service one wished to join, stopped in 1943 (although one 

could apply and be accepted to the officer accession programs). 

As we saw above, the Armed Forces ran out of men before the 

war ended, with the last tactical units in the Army going overseas 

in February 1945. It would be hard to argue with Jerome 

Peppers, who states, "We used our manpower unwisely and 

could have been in serious manning problems in war production 
110 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

and military service had the war not gone so well for us. 

Fortunately... the war ended before our unwise manpower.. 

• policies could return to bite us... we really had no effective 

plan for the full scale manpower mobilization which was 

required. ,,4 

There were many draft deferments for individuals in both 

agriculture and "essential" war industries. Many others had 

deferments too: civil servants, hardship cases, religious officials, 

aliens, conscientious objectors, handicapped people, etc. Too 

many men had deferments when the crunch came in 1943 and 

1944, but when the War Manpower Commission on 1 February 

1943 issued a list of "nondeferable" occupations and called on 

draft boards to reclassify such people as category l-A, the draft 

boards refused to obey. The Commission, demonstrating its 

impotence, withdrew the order in December that year. Byrnes 

was more effective; in December 1944 he issued what came to 

be known as his "Work or Fight Order" to use the Selective 

Service System to drive men either into essential jobs that were 

unpopular or into the service. Byrnes wanted to call into the 

services men under age 38 who left essential industries, or who 

changed jobs in a necessary industry without the authority of the 

local draft board. He got his way, but few men were 

affected fewer than 50,000 probably because the threat of such 

a possibility kept people working where the government needed 

them. Some men who refused to work where needed ended up 

in special Army labor camps doing needed work but under 

punitive conditions. Such frankly threatening measures were not 

terribly effective. From late 1943 until the end of the war, 

Byrnes called for national service legislation. Roosevelt included 

an appeal for such laws in his state of the union addresses in 

1944 and 1945, and Byrnes tried to work his magic on the 

Congress, but to no avail; such legislation never passed: 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 111 

MOBILIZATION OF THE WORKFORCE FOR WAR: 

U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., AND GERMANY, 

1939/40 AND 1943 

(Per Cent of Working Population) 

Group I Armed Total 

Industry Forces War-related 

U.S.A. 1940 8.4 1.0 9.4 

1943 19.0 16.4 35.4 

U.K. 1939 15.8 2.8 18.6 

1943 23.0 22.3 45.3 

U.S.S.R. 1940 8 5.9 14 

1943 31 23 54 

GERMANY 1939 14.1 4.2 18,3 

1943 14.2 23.4 37.6 

Source: Harnson, Resource Mob~'lization for World War I1: The U.S.A., U.K., 

U.S.S.R., and Germar~, 1938-1945. 186 

500 

MILITARY INDUCTIONS 

THROUGH SELECTIVE SERVICE 

400 I" 

\ 

( 

ol .......... I ........... I ........... , ........ 

1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 

Source: Bureau of the Budget.177 
112 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

75 

£D 

z 

O 50 (J) 

n" 

LU (3. 

z 

0 

..~ 25 

THE LABOR FORCE 

1940 1941 1942 1943 

JULY 

Source: Bureau ol ~t~ BudOet.174 

1944 1945 

1800 

1500 

1200 

900 

600 

300 

MANPOWER: UP AND DOWN 

Employment in Selected Industries 

TEXTILE MILL 

PRODUCTS 

LUMBER AND LUMBER 

BASIC PRODUCTS 

0 I A [ J I ; 

193~ 1540 194t 1342:943 i1~,~1~:~. 

-1544- 1545 

MONTHLY AVERAGE 

Source: Warlime Production Ach~veroents. 9 

ON AND STEEL 

• COAL MINING-- 

-1944- 1945 

MONTHLY AVERAGE 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 113 

One example of the Congress frustrating the president and his 

"assistant president," is the fight to draft superfluous farm 

workers. In November 1942, Congress amended the Selective 

Service Act to defer essential farm workers unless satisfactory 

replacement workers could be found. Local draft boards 

interpreted this to mean a "virtual universal deferment for 

agricultural workers." By 1944 this practice reached "scandal" 

proportions. Men were needed as warriors and certain industries 

were crying for men, but some industrial workers "trying to 

avoid the draft were transferring to agricultural work for refuge, 

while agricultural workers could not be persuaded to turn to the 

higher remuneration of industrial work for fear of losing deferred 

status." The farm bloc in Congress opposed any change to this 

situation. By January 1945 the only remaining pool of men in 

the right age category were the 364,000 people holding 

agricultural deferments. Byrnes appealed to Roosevelt, who 

authorized reclassification of farm workers. The Congress 

passed a bill in both houses to amend the selective service 

legislation to defer all registrants engaged in agriculture. This 

bill was vetoed by President Truman only days before V-E Day. 6 

NOTES 

1. Wartime Production Achievements and the Reconversion 

Outlook (Washington, DC: War Production Board, 1945), 1-2. The 

labor force went up from 54 million to 64 million in the war, but most 

of the increase here came from the 9 million who were unemployed in 

1939. There were about 12 million in the armed services at the 

manpower peak. Most of the 10 million increase in the labor force 

went into factories (the volume of manufacturing output tripled), and 

agriculture. The construction trades lost workers after 1942. The 

workweek increased from 37.7 hours per week in 1939 to 45.2 hours 

in 1944, and productivity increased sharply. 

2. James L. Abrahamson, The American Home Front (Washington, 

DC: National Defense University Press, 1983), 139-140. In Britain, 

real total personal consumption fell at the wartime nadir to 70 percent 

of the 1938-1939 level, whereas in the United States at the worst, in 

1942, it was 5 percent higher than it had been in 1940. Thereafter it 

went up rapidly. In the United States, personal consumption never fell 

below 55 percent of a rapidly expanding gross national product, 

whereas in Britain it never topped 49 percent of a much smaller gross 
114 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

national product [Harold G. Vatter, The United States Economy in 

Worm War H (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 20]. 

3. Herman M. Somers, Presidential Agency: The Office of War 

Mobilization and Reconversion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 

1950), 140-158. 

4. Jerome G. Peppers Jr., History of United States Military 

Logistics 1935-1985 (Huntsville: Logistics Education Foundation 

Publishing, 1988), 51-52. 

5. Peppers, 51-52; Somers, 167-174. 

6. Somers, 158-167. Byrnes was the manpower "czar" and on his 

own, with doubtful legal authorization, declared at the end of 1944 that 

essential industries make 30 percent of their men eligible for the draft. 

Many industrialists and their sponsors in the War Production Board and 

in other agencies complained, but Byrnes succeeded in enforcing his 

decision. 
11. 

OVERCOMING RAW MATERIAL 

SCARCITIES 

People were not thc o~dy shortage; there were numerous other 

scarcities that hampered the production and war effort. 

The production process requires raw materials. Although the 

United States was rich in minerals, the amount being produced 

in 1940 was a fraction of what was needed, and some raw 

materials were not available at "all, rubber being an example] 

When the war with Japan began, the United States was virtually 

cut off from essential natural rubber supplies. A whole new 

synthetic rubber industry was crealed from the ground up to help 

the war effort. First, the govermnent created a synthetic rubber 

industry. Second, output from rubber producing areas still 

accessible to the United States was maximized. Third, the 

government eliminated rubber consumption of nonessential items 

and curtailed consumption on permitted items. Fourth, 

conservation measures were taken such as gasoline rationing 

primarily designed to c~)nserve rubber, and tire rationing to 

conserve material for the military. Fifth, reclaimed rubber 

production was expanded, z When the United Stales declared war, 

the entire rubber stockpile in the United States was 540,000 tons, 

The United States consumed about 500,000 tons per year in its 

civilian economy. Rubber had to be conserved until the synthetic 

rubber plants could be built, and rubber was elevated to a highest 

priority. In 1943, the new plants produced 234,000 tons; in the 

final year of the war, more than 800,000 tons were produced. ~ 

Another underproduced priority raw material was "aluminum, 

needed especially for aircraft. In 1938 there was otdy a single 

United Stales producer of primary aluminum. This one producer 

was also the major aluminum fabricator, operating four bauxite 

reduction plants with an annual capacity of 300 million lxmnds. 

Secondary recovery produced only 100,000 Ixmnds. When the 

115 
116 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

wartime expmasion progrmn was completed, the country 

produced 2.3 billion pounds and secondary recovery had 

increased six fold. As a result of this govenunent-financed 

constructitm, at the end of tile war 42 percent of the world's 

aluminum manufacturing capacity was concentrated in the United 

States: 

Copper was also a major raw material problem and it became 

a true bottleneck. By tile begilming of 1942, copper was a most 

critical need. Bullets and artillery shells were the biggest 

requirement, but there were many other items, including wire, 

that demanded copper. Strenuous efforts were made to expand 

the mining, smelting and refilling facilities, m~d miners especially 

had to be induced to work in copper mines. Gold mining was 

virtually stopped to encourage miners to seek employment where 

they were needed. The Anny even released 2,8()0 copper miners 

from active duty in 1942 Io help. The government Rmned a 

Metals Reserve Company t~ buy up ore fl'om neutral countries, 

and the Combined Raw Materials Board worked to allocate 

copper between the United States and the Ilnited Kingdom. 

Substitutes R~r copper were tried and employed whenever a 

replacement was feasible (a.luminum wiring and fuses, zinc 

pemfies, etc). 5 

In some cases, tile g(wemment did not turn tO increased 

construction, but rather It) conservation and better mmmgement. 

Electricity was a prime example. Aluminum mad magnesium 

mmmfaclure and the Manhattm~ Project demanded vast increases 

in electricity. The delnand for electricity in the country went 

from 16.3 billion kilowatt hours in 1939 to 279.5 billion in 1944. 

In Ihe sane period, generating capacity of the country's power 

plm~ts was allowed to increase only 26 percent, from 49,400,000 

to 62,000,000 kilowatt hours. Yet at no time during tim war was 

it necessary to curtail power consumption because of insufficient 

supply. The United States ended the war with its lights burning 

and every inachine fully powered and with power to spare. The 

War Production Board decided that workers skilled enough to 

build generating plmlts were needed elsewhere building munitions 

plmats or munitions. In 1942, construction on ',all but the most 

critically urgent plants was stopped. By then all of the country's 

power systems--private, municipal, county, state, and federal-- 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 117 

were essentially assembled into great operating pools. Power 

was "allocated where it was needed by whatever powcr company, 

private or public, was most efficiently positioned to supply it. 

Federal regulations were waived; normal rules of competition 

were bent or eliminated; and integrated operating pools did the 

job without wasting time trod money on unnecessary 

construction. ~ 

UNITED STATES RUBBER SUPPLY 

Imports and Synthetic Production 

Domestic 

Period Natural Synthetic 

Imports Production 

1939: long tons Long tons 

First quarter .................. 113,884 (" 

Second quarter ............. 112,280 ~'~ 

Third quarter ................. 113,646 ~" 

Fourth quarter ............... 159,846 (" 

1 940: 

First quarter .................. 174,885 ~'~ 

Second quarter ............. 176,160 ~') 

Third quarter ................. 221,596 m 

Fourth quarter ............... 245,983 '" 

1941: 

First quarter .................. 247,929 1,466 

Second quarter ............. 229,286 2,151 

Third quarter ................. 206,772 2,445 

Fourth quarter ............... 265,020 2,321 

1 942: 

First quarter .................. 207,631 3,459 

Second quarter ............. 45,735 5,221 

Third quarter ................. 11,472 5,772 

Fourth quarter ............... 17,815 8,032 

1943: 

First quarter .................. 19,962 10,486 

Second quarter ............. 13,746 28,373 

Third quarter ................. 9,035 71,217 

Fourth quarter ............... 12,109 121,529 

1944: 

First quarter .................. 18,302 159,603 

Second quarter ............. 29,516 198,905 

Third quarter ................. 27,772 193,602 

Fourth quarter ............... 32,114 210,520 

1945: 

First quarter .................. 45,267 227,865 

Second quarter ............. 29,886 237,857 

Third quarter (est) ......... 27,416 222,966 

Fourth quarter (est.) ...... 31,612 256,051 

' Not av~lable Source: Wartime Product~n Acl~evements, 92 
118 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

3000 

EXPANDINGALUMINUMINGOT 

SUPPLY 

Q 

z 2000 

0 

0 

Z 

0 

1000 

1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 

Annual Rate 

ISl Hall 

Source: Wai'time Production Achievements. 61 

500 

400 

0 300 ".r 

u) 

z 200 ....... < 

iREFINED COPPER STOCKS 

TOT, 

,oo _ 

0 

-- Jan. June 

1942 1943 1944 1945 1945 

Source: wadime Pro~uc~n AOh~vements. 55 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 119 

COPPER AND COPPER BASE ALLOYS 

New Supply vs. "Normal" Prewar Consumption 

I-- 

z 500 

I.- 

Z 

O 

(..) 

400 

[3. 

o 

300 

Z 

0 

I-- 

l-- 

no 200 

-r 

09 

LL 

o 

Q 100 

Z 

.< 

0 

• 1- 0 

I-- 

"N 

P 

_Con 

(Avg. 

Ouaftedy Avera;e 

1937 1937 1937 1937 t941 

111 2nd 3rd 4~h Is[ 2nd 3rd 4th Ist 2nd 3fd 4th Ist 2nd 3rd 4th |st 

1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 

Source: Wartime production Achievements, 54 
120 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

03 

(3£ 

,,_1 

O 

E3 

LL 

O 

03 

Z 

O 

,,_1 

_.1 

1250 I 

1000[ 

750 

500 

250 

NEW PEAKS PLANNED 

FOR UTILITY CONSTRUCTION 

Total Construction 

MiLlions of Dollars, 

 o.e, Ou,0u, 

Billions of KWH~ "~. 

-~:],-~ ~ N Pri a e 

F~ .'.~ |ii~ ~il ; Utility !~~1~1 !~.~ ~1 ~Ji Constructior 1t! ~ i =''. 

i!~j ~ :: 

Construction 

1929'30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38 '39 '40 '41 '42 '43 '44 '45 '46 

--Est.-- 

Note - Excludes Federal utility construction prior to 1939. 

Source: Wartime Production Achievements, 42 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 121 

NOTES 

I. There were shoxlages acro,~s the bo~trd: in lead, aluminum, steel, 

copper, :rod zinc. This led to numerous improvisations to deal with 

these shortages, Sheradized or bonderized metal was used to substitute 

for galvanized coated unetal: flashings were m;mufactured of asphalt 

coated fabrics to substitunte for sheet metal or copper, re:my plumbing 

fittings were made of pl;Lstic rather than steel or br;tss. Copper uses 

were reduced to an absolute minimum. Inste;~d of hr~tss fittings ;rod 

c~stings, iron ;rod steel were substituted as "victory-type" plumbing 

facilities. Structur,'d designs were lightened in residential construction 

reducing the weight of all metal per dwelling unit from a prewar 

average of 8,300 pounds to 3,200 pounds by mid-1942 (Wartime 

Production Achievements and the Reconversion Outlook (W;L~hington, 

DC: War Production Bo;u'd, 1945), 90-91). 

2. W,'u" Production Bo;u'd, 90-91. 

3. Don~dd M. Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy (New York: H,'u'court, 

Brace ;rod Co., 1946), 290, 296, 297, 303, 305. Synthetic rubber 

production expanded about 1()() times during the w~tr from 8,30t) tons 

in 1939 to 8()0,00() ions in 1944 [Jerome G. Peppers Jr., History of 

United States Military Logistics 1935-1985 (Huntsville: Logistics 

Education Foundation Publishing, 1988), 63-65]. 

4. War Production Board, 57-62. Aluminum production expanded 

about 6 times during the war fi'om 327 million pounds in 1939 to 1.8 

billion pounds in 1943 (Peppers, 63-65). 

5. W~ Production Board, 53-56. Silver was also ;t substitute 

because the government had a stockpile of silver and none of copper 

(Nelson, 353-358). Steel was a pacing material, obviously. By J=muary 

1943 total steel production w~ls up 44 percent from the beginning of the 

war (Nelson, 44-46, 50). 

6. W~u" Production Board. 39-41. 
12. 

MARITIME CONSTRUCTION 

Two products, aircraft and ships, demanded the most investment 

in people, materials, and infrastructure, and both were equally 

key to the grand strategy. The production story for both is 

spectacular. In 1941, the United States completed 1,906 ships, 

and in 1944, 40,265.1 The central tenet of the grand strategy was 

that the United States should be the "Arsenal of Democracy." 

But prcxlucing the munitions would have been useless if the 

United States could not move its anmunents to its 'allies. 

Merchant-shipping production, thereI'ore, was as critical an 

aspect of the production program as any other, especially given 

Germany's attempt to starve American "allies with the use of 

surface raiders, airpl:mes, ,and submarines. So critical is this 

aspect of the war production story that in Donald Nelson's 

memoir, he failed to mention aircraft carriers and battleships at 

all, and concentrated overwhelmingly on building merchant ships 

and landing craft and, to a lesser degree, destroyer escorts. In the 

last half of 1943, the United States was completing 160 merchant 

ships per month, and in December that year 208 merchant ships 

were completed, for a total dead-weight tonnage of 2,044,239 

tons. In July 1942, it took 105 (lays to construct a Liberty Ship; 

less than 1 year later it was jus! over 50 clays; and before the end 

of the war, it was 40 clays from laying the keel to delivery. In 

World War I, a ship two-thirds the size of a Liberty Ship took I0 

months to build. 2 

Of course, more than cargo ships were built. From 1 July 

1940 to 31 July 1945. the United States built 64,500 landing 

craft, and that number was still insufficient. Some 6,500 other 

naval vessels were "also built. Navy firepower during the war 

increased ten fold. ~ The United States built 10 battleships during 

the war (8 of them 35,(100 tons or more), 17 large aircraft carriers 

123 
124 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

(able to carry 100 aircraft and displacing more dlan 27,000 tons), 

more than 80 smaller carriers (able to carry from 21 to 45 

aircraft), 49 cruisers, and 368 destroyers? 

No country produced as many warships, cargo ships, 

airplanes, tanks, trucks, jeeps (650,000 of these "faithful as a dog, 

as strong as a mule, and as agile ~s a goat" quarter-ton carrying 

vehicles)/rifles, etc. Where the Allies in 1941 produced about 

• s many munitions as the Axis in mid-1941, by the end of 1944 

the ailied output of combat munitions w~s three limes greater 

than that of their enemies. Over the war the allied output was 80 

percent greater than the totai for the Axis, and most of that 

increase came from the United States. ~ 

03 

Z 

O I-- 

I'- "llit 

< 

LU 

1:3 

LL 

O 

tO 

Z 

< 

60 

O 

"1- 

I--- 

2000 

1500 

1000 

500 

U.S. MERCHANT SHIP CONSTRUCTION 

AND SINKINGS 

Construct 

.Sinkings 

1940 1941 942 1943 1944 194~ 

Source: Bureau of the Budget,137 

NOTES 

1. U.S. Department of Commerce,Statistical Abstract of the United 

States, 1950 (W~t,~hington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1950), 212. 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 125 

2. Donldd M. Nelson, Arsenal ~fDemocracy (New York: Harcourt, 

Brace and Co., 1946), 259. Nelson considered shipbuilding to be the 

greatest production success story. In September 1939 the United States 

merchant fleet comprised about 1,500 ships of 10,5()0,0()0 deadweight 

tons. By the time Gennlmy surrendered the United States had built 

5,2[)0 large ocean-going vessels with a total deadweight tonnage of 

53,000,000 tons (,and built hundreds of smaller types of ships). All this 

was done while warship construction was also exploding. The Maritime 

Commission, responsible for civilian shipping production, fixed on the 

Liberty Ship ,as the st~mdardized merchant ship in order to accelerate 

production. The United States built ahnost 2,7(X) of these 10,800-ton 

ships---"the ship thltt won part of the war for the United Nations" 

(Nelson, 243-245). In World War I, the United States shipped more 

th,'m half of its people, goods, munitions and materials in foreign 

bottoms, but in World War II 80 percent of a considerably larger total 

of men, munitions, supplies, food, cltrgo, ,and materials w~ sent in 

Americ:m ships [Jgunes L. Abrahlunson, the American Home Front 

(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1983),147]. 

3. Wartime Production Achievements and the Reconversion Outlook 

(W,'kshington, DC: War Production Board, 1945), 10-13. Again, the 

numbers v,'u'y considerably by source, some official documents stating 

that 82,000 l,'mding craft were build during the war. In 1944, more th,an 

27,000 l,anding craft were built with a tonnage of 1,512,710 tons; on 1 

J,'muary 1945 there were 54,206 Igmding cr,'fft on hand lind 1,167 

w;trships (on 1 Janu;uy 1941 there were only 322 combat ships and a 

year litter only 347) (U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract 

of the United States. 1948 [Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office, 1948], 229). The variety of landing craft is staggering. Some 

were ocean- going vessels, others were designed to run from a mother 

ship to the shore only. Some carried cltrgo, some people, some both, 

some tanks. Regarding the latter, a Limding Ship Tank (LST) carried 

13 to 20 heavy tanks, while a Landing Craft Tank (LCT) cltrried 3 

heavy t,'mks. The fonner was oce,'m going, the latter wits not [Jerome 

G. Peppers Jr., History of United States Military Logistics 1935-1985 

(Huntsville: Logistics Eclucation Foundation Publishing, 1988), 106]. 

4. For w~u'ship figures, see John Ellis, World War 1I, A Statistical 

Summary The Essential Facts and Figures for A ll the Combatants (New 

York: Facts on File, 1993), 293-301. 

5. Peppers, 98-100. 

6. Alan Milward, War, Economy and Society: 1939-1945 (Los 

Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), 59. 
13. 

PEOPLE MOBILIZATION: 

"Rosie the Riveter" 

No country kept a higher percentage of its labor force in 

armaments production and out of the fighting services than did 

the United States. In Gem~any, 1 in 4.5 men was a fighter, in 

Japan one in five, in the United Kingdom, one in five, but in the 

United States, it was one in six. No other country expanded its 

civilian production as much. In fact, our major allies severely 

contracted civilian production as did Germany ,after 1942. In the 

United States, manufacturing for the Armed Forces accounted for 

59 percent of all manufacturing, but in the United Kingdom it 

was 66 percent. So rich was the United States that it could 

tolerate labor strikes. There were 3,000 labor strikes in 1942; in 

1943, the number of man-days lost to strikes increased three fold. 

to 13.5 million lost man-days; and in 1944, the number of strikes 

increased (but fewer workers went out). By mid-August 1945, 

9.6 million man-days had been lost in that year, which, had the 

war gone on, would have been the worst year of the war. 

Germany and the Soviet Union had no similar problems, although 

Britain did abide strikes, a 

Another useful comparison with the mobilization efforts of 

other belligerents is in the employment of women in industry. 

Rosie the Riveter is a well known icon in the United States, and 

many millions of women were indeed employed in the munitions 

industry. In early 1942, industry employed 19,000,000 American 

women between the ages of 20 and 60, and by the next year 

women made up a third of the aircraft production work force-- 

almost a half million women. 2 By July 1944, 36.9 percent of 

the workers in industries handling prime contracts were women. 3 

One author wrote, the "margin of victory in terms of the nation's 

127 
I 

-~.=. 

*~m 

,,,- 

*wml 

,,,~ 

=1,,~ 

,< 

O 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 129 

labor force proved to be c¢~mpletely feminine." By October 1943 

there were 164,7()0 women at work in the shipyards with 

comparable figures in other industries. In 1943, at Willow Run, 

the world's largest aircraft manufacturing factory, 38 percent of 

the work force were women. 4 These percentages were not 

extraordinary by comparison to other nations at war, however. 

In the Soviet Union and Britain only 30 percent of the women 

aged 14 and over were "at home;" in the United States, it was 

twice that percentage. 5 In the Soviet Union females accounted 

for 38 percent of the labor force in 1940, and 53 percent in 1942. 

In that country, 33 percent of the welders, 33 percent of the lathe 

operators, 40 percent oI' the stevedores and 50 percent of the 

tractor drivers were women. In the United Kingdom, 80 percent 

of the tot',d increase in the labor force between 1939 and 1943 

were women who had not previously been employed outside the 

home; about 2.5 million women workers came into the United 

Kingdom labor l'orce during the war. 6 Gennany also employed 

women in industry at a high rate. German women made up 51.1 

percent of the civilian labor workforce in 1944. The female 

German percentage was higher than in the United States 

throughout the war. But it ~dso began at a much higher 

level---German women made up 37.4 percent of the civilian labor 

force before the war. At the peak women in the United States 

comprised 35.4 percent of the labor force (up from 25.8 percent 

before file war). 7 

At least three of the belligerents in the war outmobilized the 

United States. The United States had greater technological 

capabilities, was more industrialized to begin with, and was not 

bombed or invaded. But a higher, and in some cases a much 

greater, percentage of the belligerents' population was either in 

the armed services or producing munitions. Gennany ftJr 

example had a population of 78 million and during the war years 

had 17.9 million in their military, of whom 3,250,000 were either 

killed in action or missing. The United States with a population 

of 129,200,(}0()had 16.4 million in its military services, losing 

405,000. Genuany also had another 2 million civilians killed 
130 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

U~ 

>- 

< 

a 

i 

P, 

0 3 

4! 

0 '' 1939 1940 

WORKER IDLENESS 

DUE TO STRIKES 

1941 1942 1943 

Source: Bureau of the B4Jdget,190 

1944 1945 

VOLUME OF COMBAT MUNITIONS 

PRODUCTION OF THE MAJOR 

BELLIGERENTS, 1935-44 

(Annual Expenditure in $ Billion, U.S. 1944 Munitions Prices) 

1935-9 e 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 

U.S.A. 0.3 1.5" 4.5 20 38 42 

CANADA 0 0 0.5 1 1.5 1.5 

U.K. 0.5 3.5 6.5 9 11 11 

U.S.S.R. 1.6 5 8.5 11.5 14 16 

GERMANY 2.4 6 6 8.5 13.5 17 

JAPAN 0.4 1 2 3 4.5 6 

NOTE: a Figures for 1935-9 are given as cumulative expenditure in the source, 

annual average expenditure in this table. 

Source: Harrison, Resource Mobilization for World War I1: The U.S.A., U.K., 

U.S.S.R., and Germar~, 1938-1945, 184 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 131 

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION FOR WORLD WAR H 

Munitions and Men: the U.S.A., U.IC, U.S.S.R., and Germany 

(A) The ratio of spending on munitions to spending 

on military oar, 1939-45 

U.S.A. U.K. U.S.S.R. GERMANY 

1939 -- 3.6 -- 1.9 

1940 4.2 4.1 3.3 1.0 

1941 3.7 3.4 -- 0.8 

1942 3.9 2.7 2.6 0.9 

1943 3.0 2.3 3.3 -- 

1944 2.4 1.9 3.6 -- 

1945 1.8 1.4 -- -- 

(B) Volume of combat munitions production compared to 

numbers of military personnel (U.S. 1944 dollars per man), 

1940-44 

U.S.A. U.K. U.S.S.R. GERMANY 

1940 2.800 1,500 1,200 1.100 

1941 2.800 1,900 800 

1942 5,400 2,200 1,100 900 

1943 4,200 2,300 1,300 1,200 

1944 3,700 2,200 1.400 1,400 

Soume: Hsmzon, ReX~,rCe MOb*~arlOtl tOr WO,~I W~ II: 77~ U S.A., U.K., 

~S.~R., 8~Id C-tefwalnF lf~B*f946,175 

THE SUPPLY OF EXTERNAL RESOURCES: 

NET IMPORTS OF THE U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., 

AND GERMANY, 1938-45 

(Percent of National Income) 

U.S.A. U.K. U.S.S.R. GERMANY 

1938 -2 5 -1 

1939 -1 8 1 

1940 -2 17 7 

1941 -2 14 12 

1942 -4 11 9 17 

1943 -6 10 18 16 

1944 -6 9 17 

1945 11 

Source: Harrison, Resource Mobilization for World War Ih The U.S.A., O.K., 

U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938-1945, 189 
132 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

THE MOBILIZATION OF NET NATIONAL 

PRODUCT FOR WAR: 

THE U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., AND GERMANY, 

1938-45 

(Percent of National Income) 

U.S.A. U.K. U.S.S.R. GERMANY 

(I) (11) (I) (ll) (I) (ll) 0) 111) 

1938 -- -- 7 2 -- -- 17 18 

1939 1 2 16 8 -- -- 25 24 

1940 1 3 48 31 20 20 44 36 

1941 13 14 55 41 -- -- 56 44 

1942 36 40 54 43 75 66 69 52 

1943 47 53 57 47 76 58 76 60 

1944 47 54 56 47 69 52 -- -- 

1945 -- 44 47 36 .... 

KEY: 

(I) National utilization of resources supplied to the war effort, regardless of origin: military 

spend,n 0 (f~r th~ Ilnit~d ~tntA~. IA~ nat Axport~) ax ~h~r~ of national pr~diJct 

(11] Domestic finance of resources supplied to the war effort, irrespective el ulilization: military 

spending (for the U K, U.S.S R. and Germany. less net imports) as share of national product. 

Source Hamson, Resource Mobdizat~n tot Wo~ld War I1: The US.A., U K, 

USSR anct~'fn~ny, r9.°=8, f94R, 1R4 

REAL NATIONAL PRODUCT OF THE U.S.A., 

U.K., U.S.S.R., AND GERMANY, 1937-45 

U.S.A. U.K. U.S.S.R. GERMANY 

GNP NDP NNP GNP 

(1939 = 100) (1938 = 100) (1937 = 100) (1939 = 100) 

1937 -- -- 100 -- 

1938 -- 100 101 -- 

1939 100 103 107 100 

1940 108 120 117 100 

1941 125 127 94 102 

1942 137 128 66 105 

1943 149 131 77 116 

1944 152 124 93 -- 

1945 -- 115 92 -- 

Source: Harrison, Resource Mobilization for World War I1: The U.S.A., U.K., 

U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938-1945, 185 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 133 

in the war, not counting those 300,000 murdered by the 

government. The direction of the grand strategies is apparent in 

these number. While the German military was about the size of 

that of the United States, the United Stales outproducexl the 

Germans in tracks seven to one (2.4 million to 350,000). 

Germany often lugged its supplies around on horse drawn 

wagons. The United States, because it ffmght as much of an air 

war as an intm~try war, outproduced the Germans five to one in 

bombers, 97,810 to 18,225. Moreover, ,4anefican bombers had 

much greater range, much more carrying capacity, and were 

better armed and better armored. Even in fighter aircraft, the 

Germans were outproduced two to one, and in transport aircr',ff-t 

almost seven to one? The United States spent six times as much 

as did tile Germans on munitions per man in 1942, 3.5 times in 

1943, and 2.5 times in 1944, again reflecting tile different grand 

strategies. 9 

What did the tidal wave of nmnitions mean in the end? At 

Leningrad in January 1944, the Soviet Union, which hoxl received 

thousands of trucks, thousands of tmlk-killer aircraft, hundreds of 

thousands of tmlks, and millions of tons of essential raw 

materials from the United States in Lend-Lease aid, outnumbered 

Germany in tmlks ml(I self propelled guns by six to one. In the 

Crimea in March 1944, the ratio was 12.5 to 1. In April 1945, 

on the Oder/Neisse line, far from the Soviet logistic base and 

inside Germany's it was 5.5 to 1. At the time of Operation 

Overlord, the Western Allies, on their front, outnumbered 

Germany 8.5 to 1 in aircraft (the United States by itself 4.5 to 

one), and within (lays after 6 June 1944 the Allies outnumbered 

the Germans in tm~ks 4.5 to 1. In April 1945 the allied 

superiority in aircral't was greater than 20 to 1. l° AS Clausewitz 

wrote, superiority in numbers is tile first principle of war, and in 

every dimension that mattered tile United Slates and its "allies 

swamped their enemies logistically. The war production machine 

had become so powerful that the United States could launch two 

massive amphibious assaults both involving thousands of ships 

in June 1944: file assault on Normandy and later in tile month the 

attack on Saipan. 

By 1943, however, Germany was still the most highly 

mobilized of the powers in terms of its ratio of armed services to 
134 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

total lx)pulation. However, it had a smaller percentage of its 

population in induslry (Germany, however, did use 7.5 million 

slave lalx)rers and prisoners of war, but the Soviet Union also 

employed prisoners--some 4.5 million of them). The Soviet 

Union was more fully mobilized than the United States or the 

United Kingdom, with 76 percent of its net national product 

going to the war. The United States topped out at about 40 

percent, but the United States had a vastly greater national 

product, and it grew by 50 percent during the war, whereas the 

Soviet Union's gross national product fell to 66 percent of its 

high in 1940 and never reached iks 1940 level by the end of the 

war. In Germany the gross national product grew by 16 percent 

between 1939 and 1943, but it had been stagnant in 1940 and 

grew only 2 percent in 1941 and another 3 percent in 1942. No 

state on either side pushed a greater percentage of its people into 

war work or the armed forces than did the Soviet Union. H The 

result of Soviet economic mobilization and Lend-Lease is that. the 

Soviets expended aix)ut $60 billion worth of munitions against 

Germany on the eastern front, whereas Germany expended $50 

billion. On the western front, however, the United Kingdom and 

United States expended $100 billion versus the German and 

Italian $40 billion. ~2 

There should be no doubt, therefore, that United States 

industrial production in World War II was no miracle. United 

States production in World War II was about what one should 

have expected given the size of the prewar technologicalindustrial base, the population size (tluee times that of Britain, 

nearly twice that of Germany, and greater than that of the Soviet 

Union after Hitler's conquests in 1941). In the face of allied 

bombing and sea blockade, and with her troops scattered from the 

north of Norway to the Pyrenees, and from the North Sea and 

Atlantic Ocean to the Caucasus, Germany increased its 

productivity by 25 percent between 1943 and 19a. a, a percentage 

that exceeded that in the United States. The Soviet Union lost 40 

percent of its most productive territory and tens of millions of its 

people but still produced at a furious pace. Great Britain, while 

suffering bombing m~d rocket attacks, produced more tanks, ships 

(but not submarines), and airplanes than Gemaany, with about 60 

percent of Germany's population. Paul Koistinen argues that 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 135 

when viewed in terms of "prewar potential and when compared 

with other belligerents, Aanerica's World War II munitions 

production effort was not outstanding. ''~3 

Koistinen ~ssembles productivity statistics to make his case. 

The United States, even mired in the depression in the period 

1936 to 1938, manufactured almost one-third of the world's 

products (32.2 percent). The United States outproduced Germany 

about three times (10.7 percent) and Japan almost ten times (3.5 

percent). Taking the United States prewar productivity in terms 

of production per man-hour as the standard and giving it a value 

of 100, the following chart indicates the relative productivity 

ranking of World War II foes. 

Country 

Pre War War 

('35-'38) (1944) 

All Manufacturing Munitions 

Industries Industries 

United States 100 100 

Canada 71 57 

United Kingdom 36 41 

Soviet Union 36 39 

Gennany 41 48 

Japan 25 17 

One must not forget, llowever, that the United States was "almost 

alone in increasing rather than diminishing consumer output 

during the war. ''~4 To reiterate the point, all belligerents fiercely 

produced munitions during the war, not just the United States. 

America possessed advantages that none of the other warring 

states had. Its output, while noteworthy, was what a prewar 

analyst might have expected given the size of the country, its 

educated population, the status of its technology, the abundance 

of its raw materials, the quality of its transportation network. In 

short:, America's munitions production in World War II was no 

"miracle." 

Could the United States have been more productive? Could 

it have produced more munitions more rapidly at a lower cost? 
136 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

Almost certainly, ~lhouoh~_ it is difficult to determine what 

difference it inight have made by August 1945. Robert Cuff, a 

gener',tlly friendly critic of the U.S. Wurld War II mobilization 

effort, argues that U.S. Federal Govermnent administrative 

machinery was not up to the lask of managing the economy for 

war from a central position: "administrative personnel and control 

coordinating machincry was rudimentary at best." More 

critic',ally, "A cadre of political appointments loyal to the 

President is not the same as a higher civil service" and "Wartime 

Washington was awash with competing centers of administrative 

decision-makil~g." Where were the weaknesses'! "Those with 

goverrunent~ authority did not possess relevant knowledge and 

control in teclmic',d matters, while those with teclmical knowledge 

and industri',d control did not possess govenunent',d authority." 

h~ a war the objective was to "bind them together, not drive them 

apart" and to create cohesion when the country, before Pearl 

Harbor was attacked, "divided on the very issue of war itself." 

The uneasy alliance between business executives mad bureaucrats 

was patched together by Roosevelt and senior goverrunent 

officials (often from the worlds of business or finance) much as 

Bernard Baruch had pieced together a govenunent/business 

coalition in World War I. In World War I1, as in World War I, 

the "alliance" was not designed to be pemmnent, and it did not 

last beyond the emergency. Given the structure of United States 

policy, it could not have lasted, and it was never cohesive, ts 

That it worked as well as it did is perhaps the marvel. Paul 

HI, I • Koislinen attributes this to the president's ~,emus for mastering 

the intricacies of power in American society." He argues further: 

"Political success depended upon handling an elitist reality within 

a context of populist ideology." Roosevelt "constantly finessed 

that blatant contradiction with great skill. His penchant for 

decisionmaking through conflict and competition stemmed less 

from an animus toward clear lines of authority and planning, mad 

more from an instinctive and/or calculated tactics of obfusticating 

the elitist contours of power in America which he both accepted 

and supported. ''to Certainly, if one blames Roosevelt for the 

industrial mobilization apparatus lailures, one needs to give the 

president at least some credit for the prodigious (and sufficient) 

• output. Perhaps Koistinen's praise is excessively fulsome, but 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 137 

nobody doubts that Roosevelt was the political master of his era, 

and the more one studies the subject of intlustri~ mobilization, 

the more one becotnes convinced flaat domestic politics drove this 

arena. 

NOTES 

1. Al:m Milw~u'd, War. Economy and Society: 1939-1945 (Los 

Angeles: University of Calilornia Press, 1979), 216-244 

2. Jerome G. Peppers Jr., Histm:y of United States Military 

Logistics 1935-1985 (Huntsville: Logistics Education Foundation 

Publishing, 1988), 58-61. In one parachute company, women made up 

85 percent of the work force. 

3. Don:dd M. Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy (New York: H,'u'court, 

Brace and Co., 1946), 237. Nelson ~dso mentions the accommodations 

factories made in order to get women to accept employment: day care 

providers, housing agents, social work, etc, 

4. Fr;mcis Walton, Miracle of World War I1: tlow American 

Industry Made Victory Possible (New York: Macmill;m, 1956), 372, 

382-383. Here are the census figures: In 1940 there were 10{1,230,000 

people 14 years of age and older in the United States. Of whom 

56,030,000 were in the labor force counting the military, of whom 

47,520,000 were employed ~md ~,120,0()() unemployed and 44,200,(XX) 

were not in the labor force either keeping house, or in school, or 

otherwise occupied. Of the 56 million in the workforce, 41,870,000 

were working males and 14,160,(100 females. In 1944 there were 

104,450,000 people over 14. Of that total 65,140,000 were in the labor 

force either as workers or in the military ~md 38,590,000 were not in the 

labor force (down less than 4 million from 1940). There were 

46,520,000 males in the labor fi)rce including the military, of whom 

35A60,000 were in the civilian workforce ~md 19,170,000 women in the 

civilian workforce. Male workers declined by 4.5 million (the services 

absorbed about 12 million men at the peak), and females increased by 

5 million. 

5. Harold G. Varlet, 77ze United States Economy in World War 

II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 2(). 

6. Milward, 216-244. 

7. Leila J. Rupp, Mobilizing Women for War: German and 

American Propaganda 1939 to 1945 (Princeton: Princeton University 

Press, 185). See also Penny Summerfield, Women Workers in the 

Second World War: Production and Patriarchy in Conflict (London, 

Croom Hehn, 19~4), p 29. Summerfield sets the United Kingdom 

female civilian work force percentage at 38 percent. J:unes 
138 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

Ab~th,'unson notes that Aaneric~m women earned only 65 percent of 

men's wages :rod were fired al the end of the war at twice the rate of 

men. The increase of women in the work force was greater in the war 

ye,'u's th:m the increase in the previous four decades (J~unes L. 

Abrahamson, The American Home Front (Nation~d Defense University 

Press, 1983), 164-165). 

8. John Ellis, World War II, A Statistical Summary The Essential 

Facts and Figures for All the Combatants (New York: Facts on File, 

1993), 253-254, 278-279. 

9. M~u-k H,'u'rison, "Resource Mobilization for World War II: The 

U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., :rod Germany, 1938-1945," Economic History 

Review XLI, no. 2 (1988): 175-177. 

10. Ellis, 230-231. 

11. Harrison, 183-186, 189, 190. Harrison wrote: "Americ~m 

shipments of trucks, tractors, and tinned food provided the Red army 

with decisive mobility in its westward pursuit of the retreating 

Wehrmacht." His ,'m;dysis indicates that the United Kingdom ,and the 

Soviet Union received more, in economic terms, from the United States 

in Lend-Lease them Genn~my gained from her allies ,and conquests. 

12. Harrison, 19{)-191. 

13. Paul A. C. Koistinen, "Warl~tre ~md Power Relations in 

AJnerica: Mobilizing the World War II Economy," in J,'unes Titus, ed., 

The Home Front and War in the Twentieth Century: The American 

Experience in Comparative Perspective: Proceedings of the Tenth Air 

Force Academy Military History ~vmposium (Washington, DC: Office 

of Air Force History, 1984), 102-103. 

14. Koistinen, 236-237. 

15. Robert D. Cuff, commentary in J~unes Titus, ed., The Home 

Front and War in the Twentieth Century: The American Experience in 

Comparative Perspective: Proceedings of the Tenth Air Force Academy 

Military History Symposium (W:~shington, DC: Office of Air Force 

Hsitory, 1984), 115-116. 

16. Koistinen, 11)8-109. 
14. CONCLUSIONS 

What mobilization lessons can be leamed from the United States 

during the World War II period? First, person',dities matter. 

Roosevelt did not invest sufficient authority in any of the people 

in charge of war mobilization until he appointed true confidant 

and New Deal acolyte Bymes to tile position. No one prior to 

that timeiStettinius, Klmdsen, or Nelson--had the president's 

full confidence. Bymes was not steeped in knowledge of 

industry, but he knew how Washington worked and how the 

legislature operated. Roosevelt could give Bymes decision 

authority and Ihen lllOVe on I(.) other tasks, confident that Bymes 

would do the correct (and politically astute) thing. 

Second, the military and civilians in the Defense Depmlu~ent 

should be eager to let civilians run the economy and industry. 

Throughout the interwar period people in the War Department 

wanted that role and designed plans to seize it when a national 

emergency occurred. Roosevelt would not perlnit this, and it is 

hard to conceive of any president turning to the military or its 

civilian overlords to operate the largest economy in the world. 

The Defense Department does not have the knowledge to make 

it work and its priority--defeating the enemy to secure the 

country's political objectives--would almost assuredly conflict 

with proper management of the economy. 

Third, plarmers must ackalowledge the needs of allies in 

materiel planning. In World Wars 1 and II, the United States 

played the major "allied h)gistics n)le. America's allies needed 

enormous support, but this was not plmmed for in either World 

War. 

Fourth, domestic and partisan politics will intrude on 

mobilization (and demobilization) decisions at every pass. In 

World War II the stakes were enormous, and Roosevelt had to 

watch his political adversaries and even his "allies. Bymes and 

Nelson before him were fully aware that mobilization decisions 

139 
140 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

were scrutinized by Congress, anti not only by the loyal 

opposition. Presidential and congressional politics were never 

even below the surface in this most major of wars, and planners 

can assume with utter confidence that it will not be in any 

conflict in the future. 

Finally, planning to mobilize lhe tools of war is essenti~. It 

may be costly, but the expense will be minuscule compaled to 

fighting without a plan. There is no need today to have at the 

ready plans to reconstruct Willow Run; tiffs analysis certainly 

does not call for resurrecting smoke stacks. If the next war is to 

be a "third wave" war, however, then altention must be paid to 

ensuring that "third wave" industries can be mobilized to support 

the combal effi:wt. 

In World War II our enemies were separated from the United 

States by huge oceal~s, and both major adversaries were well lied 

down with the bulk of their forces fighting determined and large 

foes. Germany was bogged down in the Soviet Union and Japan 

was similarly mired in China. The United Stares had time and 

space. In the future, Amefictm interesls could be attacked at a 

moment when the United States might not be as fortunate. 
APPENDIX A: 

Production of Selected 

Munitions Items 

Item Unit 

PRODUCTION OF SELECTED MUNITIONS ITEMS 

July 1, 1940 - July 31, 1945 (1945 preliminary) 

CumulaJuly 1 Jan 1 tire July 

1940 1945 1, 1940 

through 1942 1943 1944 through through 

Dec July 31 July 31. 

1.941 1945 1945 

Aircraft: 

All military airplanes and 

speaal purpose aircraft... 

Total Combat ................ 

Bomber ............................. 

Heavy. long range ........ 

Heavy, 4 - engine. 

medium range ............... 

Patro~ ............................ 

Medium ......................... 

Light .............................. 

Fighter ............................. 

2 - engine ...................... 

1 - ongine ...................... 

Reconnaissance .............. 

Total transport ................. 

Hea W ............................ 

Medium ......................... 

Light .............................. 

Total trainer ..................... 

Total communication ....... 

Total specAal purpose 

aircraft ............................. 

Number .................... 23.240 47.836 85.898 96.318 43.137 296.429 

Airframe wglll000 Ibs.) 94.966 275.949 654.616 962.441 486,304 2,474.276 

i Number .................... 11,106 24,864 54,077 74,135 35,157 199.339 

! Airfranqe wgt(1000 Ibs.) 68,151 218.419 548,674 825,794 413,827 .~,072,865 

Number .................... 4,738 12,627 29,335 35,003 15,O42 96.765 

Airframe wgt(1000 Ibs.) 45,956 162,492 422,942 609.229 298,131 1,538,752 

Number .................... 0 0 92 1.161 2,188 3,441 

Airframe wgt(1000 tbs.) 0 2.576 ~4,426 55,835 105,696 165.957 

Number .................... 357 9,393 14.884 3,767 30.977 

Airframawgt(10001bs.) 7,541 60,916 224,189 353,522 89,788 T,359,576 

Number ................... 441 : 890 2,340 1.840 1,288 = 6,799 

Airframe wgt(1000 Ibs.) 6.100 14,186 3,270 i J 35,639 31,943 24.768 112,636 

NumbAr 4831 5,411 5,228 1 586 I 15.978 

Airframe wgt(1000 Ibs.) 6,251 42,803 75,519 72,648 21,252 218,473 

Number .................... 3,457 5,891 12.119 11,890 6,213 39.570 

Airframe wgt(1000 Ibs.) 26,083 44,589 83,187 95,288 56,627 305,774 

Number .................... 5,570 10,769 23,9848 38,873 19,476 98,686 

Airframe wgt(1000 Ibs.) 20,183 48,808' 121.850 215,536 113,079 519,456 

Number .................... 211 1.312 2,246 4,733 2,010 10,523 

Airframe wgt(1000 fbs.) 1,587 10.462 18,349 42.902 19,085 92,385 

Number .................... 5.367 9,446 21,742 34.140 i 17,466 88.163 

Airframe wgt(1000 IbG.) 18.596 39.346 103.501 172.635 93.994 427.072 

Number .................... 790 1.468 734 259 637 3,888 

Airframe wgt( 1000 Ibs.) 2,010 5,119 3,882 1,029 2,617 14,657 

Number .................... 696 1,984 7,012 9,834 , 4,135 23,661 

Airframe wgt(1000 Ibs.) 4,967 18,248 55.496 113,618 66,997 259,326 

Number .................... 8 116 536 1.865 1,959 4,484 

Airframe wgl(1000 Ibs.) 295 2,667 12.605 45,080 46.806 107.488 

Number .................... 365 1,236 2.906 4,927 1.431 10,665 

Airframe wgt(1000 Ibs.) 3.730 14,051 33,978 59.715 17.586 129,060 

Number .................... 323 632 3,570 3,042 745 8,312 

Airframe wgt(1000 Ibs.) 945 1,531 8.919 8,826 2,605 P2.826 

Number .................... 11,167 17,631 19,936 7.577 1,247 57.561 

Airframe wgl(1000 Ibs.) I 21,486 39,293 47,061 19,060 3,267 130,167 

Number .................... 271 3,174 4,377 3,691 1,983 13,496 

Airframe welt(1000 Ibs,) ,"-k~2 1,870 2,957 2,649 1,671 9.509 

Number .................... 0 183 493 1,081 615 2.372 

Airframe wgt(1000 Ibs.) 0 119 428 1,320 542 2,409 

141 
142 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

PRODUCTION OF SELECTED MUNITIONS ITEMS 

July 1, 1940 - July 31, 1945 (1945 preliminary) 

Item 

Naval ships [new constructions). ' 

Combatants .................. 

Lar~in g vessels ............... 

Patrol and mine sratt ....... 

District craft ..................... 

Auxiliaries and other ........ 

Total Maritime Commision 

ships ................................. 

Standard ca~o ................ 

Emergency cargo ............ 

Liberty ........................... 

Victor'/ ........................... 

Other dry c-~rgo (ex~JudAKA). 

Standard tankers ............. 

Millt at~ types ................... 

Transport attack. APA.. 

Cargo attack, AKA ........ 

Other mihtaty ................ 

Other types ...................... 

CumulaJuly 1 Jan 1 t~ve July 

Unit 194o 1945 1,194o 

through 1942 lg43 1944 through through 

Dec July 31 Ju~y 31, 

1941 1945 1945 

Numb ...................... 1.334 8,o351 16.434 29,150 14.099 I 71,062 

Thousand di~pl, tons .... 270 847J 2,562 3,223 1,341 8.243 

Number .................... 47 128 537 379 110 1.201 

Thousand chspl, tons .... t62 431 1,402 1.047 518 3,.~0 

Number .................... ! 995 :6.g02 :16,005 27,338 13,256 64.546 

Thousand displ, tons .... 8 '211 ~/'06 1,513 467 2.905 

Number .................... 111 715 1.156 590 189 2,761 

Thousand displ, tons .... 12 117 199 160 44 b32 

Number .................... 182 235 .543 521 395 1,876 

Thousand displ, tons .... 39 43 94 128 122 426 

Nu~nber .................... 9 55J =193 272 149 678 

Thousand displ, tons .... 4g 45 :161 375 190 820 

Number... .................. 136 760 1,949 1.786 794 5,425 

Thousand DW'r ............ 1,551 8,090 19.296 16,447 7,855 53.239 

Number .................... 77 49 156 124 73 479 

Thousand DWT ............ I 757 444 1.519 1.209 7"72 4,701 

Number .................... 7 597 1.238 826 369 3,037 

Thousand DWT ............ i 72 6,402 13.361 8,927 3.994 32.756 

Number .................... ~ 7 597 1,L~38 722 122 2.686 

Thousand DW'r ............ 72 6,402 13,361 7.798 1,314 28,947 

Number .................... ; 0 0i 0 104 247 351 

Thousand DWT ............ O O! 0 1.129 2.680 3.805 

Number .................... 15 14 36 94 138 297 

Thousand DW'T ............ 148 891 124 392 642 1,395 

Number .................... 37 621 252 229 120 700 

Thousand DVV3 ........... 547 999 3,481 3.739 1,954 10.747 

Nllmhnr .................... O 19i 125 375 90 : 609 

Thousand DWT ............ 0 63,J 330 1.928 492 2.813 

Number .................... 0 0 7 141 26 174 

Thousand Dw'r ............ O 0 44 775 122' 941 

NumhRr ............. 0 0 0 52 32 84 

ThoL~and DWT ............ 0 0 0 355 140 495 

Number .................... O 191 118 182 32 351 

Th .... d OW'T ............ I 0 l~gl 286 798 230' 1,377 

Number .................... I 0 142 138 4 303 

Thousand Dw'r ............ J 0 93: 481 252 1 827 

, Exd .~ :n~ Ma-~ t~e. ~ iI r~cIKI LST|. 15 I~ 1942 ~ 6@ ~ 1943 

, Exd.~n~ 2 raan~a - ~=~ ~A s 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 143 

PRODUCTION OF SELECTED MUNITIONS ITEMS 

July 1, 1940 - July 31, 1945 (1945 preliminary) 

Item 

Army guns and equipment: 

Heavy field arfilery (corn* 

plete equipment) .............. 

Spa='e Cannon for heavy 

fie~d artilery 

Spare recoil mechanisms 

for heavy field ad~ery ...... 

Light field and antitank 

guns, 

Tank guns and ndwrtzsrs 

Guns for seff-wopelled 

carnages. 

Bazooka rocket launchers 

Mortars ............................ 

Heavy ............................ 

Ught .............................. 

Machine guns .................. 

Heavy ............................ 

Light .............................. 

Submachine guns ............ 

RifkBs (excluding carbine) 

Carbines .......................... 

Pistols and revolvers ....... 

Portable flame throwers.. 

Gas masks ...................... 

Helmets (ground) ............. 

Naval guns: 

5 - inch and over ............. 

3- and 4- inch .................. 

20-n'~n, 40-toni, and 1.1- 

inch. 

Army ammunrtion and 

bombs: 

Ground artillery ammunition. 

Heavy field, weight ....... 

Light field, tank, and 

antitank, weight. 

Heavy field, rounds. 

Light field, tank, and 

antitank, rounds. 

Mortar shells .................... 

Bazooka roc~kets .............. 

Small arms ammun~on... 

Cumu~aJuly 1 Jan 1 rive july 

Unit 1940 1945 1, 1940 

through 1942 1943 1944 through t~rough 

j Dec July 31 July 31, 

1941 1945 1045 

Number ........................ 65 647 2,660 3.284 1,147 7,803 

0 0 323 3,601 4,321 8,245 

0 0 120 2,035 1,882 4,037 

4,705 20,536 19,096 7,685 4,345 56,367 

6.787 43,388 34,711 19,991 11,735 116,592 

0 8.811 13,155 2,981 2,113 27,060 

0 67,428 98,284 215,177 95,739 476,628 

9,518 10.g83 25,781 24,842 39.224 110,348 

2.508 6.242 10.176 10,722 7,790 37,438 

7,010 4,741 15,605 14,120 31,434 72.910 

87,172 662,331 829,969 798.782 302.798 2.681,052 

57,563 347,492 641,638 677,011 239,821 1.9~3,525 

29,609 314,839 188,331 121,771 62,977 715,52,7 

216,811 651,063 686.410 347.463 186,192 2,087,939 

357,496 1,425,926 2,723,696 1,400.608 616,898 6,522.624 

5 115,813 2,959,336 2,088.697 886.000 6,049,851 

71,854 322,830 843,236 1,016,931 489,744 2,744,595 

23 2,799 5,676 21,059 10,860 40,217 

761,730 4,286,525 9,002,634 6,813,754 2,712,654 26,577,297 

324.000 5,001,0(X~ 7.649,000 5,704,000 3,940,000 22,618.000 

Complete assemblies... 213 966 1,912 3,363 1,239 7,698 

317 2,505 6,593 4,652 218 14,285 

915 31,833 51,626 45,710 12,547 142,631 

ShOrt tons ..... 57,476 678.203 799.850 1,447,016 1,262,140 4,244.685 

42,949 303,895 274,529 507,584 637,155 1,766.112 

14.527 374,308 525,321 939,432 624,985 2.487,573 

6,209 5,537 9,668 11.285 33,572 

Tt~ousand rounds ..... 873 

2,165 70,881 86,025 85,639 48,985 293,695 

35,(X)2 70,928 141,729 125,876 378,509 

Short ton ..... 1,974 

Thousands ..... 0 155 1,945 7,422 5,700 15,222 

Million rounds ..... 1,177 9,798 19,800 6,578 4,232 41,585 
144 MOBILIZING U.S. INDUSTRY IN WORLD WAR II 

PRODUCTION OF SELECTED MUNITIONS ITEMS 

July 1, 1940 - July 31, 1945 (1945 preliminary) 

Item 

Army Ammunition and 

bombs - Continued 

Land mines ................... 

Gernades. all ~'3q3es ...... 

Aircraft bombs (Army 

and Navy). 

General purpose and 

demolition. 

Incendiary ........................ 

Fragmentation ................. 

Armor piercing and 

other. 

Naval ammunition: 

gun ammunition and 

rockets 

Surface fire ................... 

High capacity ............. 

Armor p/Je rcing ............ 

Common and special 

common. 

AnlJalrcraft .................. 

Rockets ...................... 

Torpedo,.s. all types ........ 

Depth charges ................. 

Marine mines ................... 

Combat and motor vehicles 

Tanks ............................... 

Armored cars ................... 

Scout cars and carriers... 

Tank chassis for selfpropollOd guns. 

Trucks .............................. 

Heavy-heavy (over 2 

I/2 tons) 

Light-heavy (2 1/2 ton) 

Medium (1 1/2 and 

under 2 1!2) .................. 

Light (under 1 I/2 tons) 

Tractors ........................... 

Communicahon and elecIronic equipment. 

Radio ............................... 

Radar ............................... 

Other ............................... 

Field and assault Wire 

(included in "Other") ........ 

Unit 

Thousands ...... 

Short tons ..... 

Number ..... 

Million dollars ..... 

Thousand miles ..... 

I CumulaJuly 1 Jan 1 tire July 

1940 1945 1. 1940 

through 1942 1943 1944 through through 

Dec July 31 July 31, 

1941 1945 1945 

O 1,332 11,42C 9,155 2,347 24.254 

1,222 15.977 24,981 40,654 27,136 109,970 

45.000 630.000 1.548.000 1.953.000 1.646.000 ~,.822.000 

42.0~O 493.000 1.OO5.000 958.000 %068.000 3.504.000 

0 38.000 176.000 407.000 235.000 856.000 

0 10.0OO 67.0(X) 453.000 289.(~O 819.000 

3.000 89.000 300.000 137.000 54.000 583.000 

35.192 100.589 277.300 524.058 408,932 1.346.071 

15.659 38.082 65.724 168.056 126.927 414.488 

0 2.286 32.897 105.421 101.973 242.577 

15.049 23.185 21.055 39.229 13.022 111.540 

245 9.922 6.128 12.746 2.362 31.403 

365 2.68~ 5.644 10.660 9.601 28.968 

19.533 62.09C 20"2.951 292.213 147.751 724.538 

0 417 8.625 63.789 134.214 207.045 

2.319 4.524, 15.599 24.015 6.804 53.261 

17.152 140.88Ej 147.340 169.652 53.915 528.945 

I 

41.380: 41.38£ 45.654 24.516 5.507 116.457 

4.203 23.684 29.497 17.5E-~5 11.184 86.33.3 

0 191 9.067 5.509 %671 16.438 

7.883 16.892 37.977 18.874 6.817 88.443 

O 3.10(; 9.035 2.034 949 16.018 

2{3~B,034 647,342: 648.404, (~0,532 331.652 2,455,964 

9.108 24.593 39.872 55.30~ 31.857 160.736 

G4.975 190.779 202.99A 230.645 149.485 838.876 

50.136 148.753 141.912 87.468 22.143 4.50.412 

83.815 283.217 263.62E 247.113 128.167 1.005.938 

111 14.886 3425C 47.356 23.184 119.787 

253 1.512 3.043 3.739 2.119 10.666 

122 823 1.471 1.393 608 4.417 

49 365 913 1,436 974 3,731 

82 324 65~ c916 537 2.518 

226 90~5 96E 1.608 1.555 5.263 
ALAN L. GROPMAN 145 

PRODUCTION OF SELECTED MUNITIONS ITEMS 

July 1, 1940 - July 31, 1945 (1945 preliminary) 

Item 

Other equipment and supplies: 

Clothing (Army): 

Boots, service COmbat ....... 

Drawers, cotton shorts ....... 

Jackets, field M-f943 ......... 

Trousers, wool serge, 

olive drab ........................... 

Ovorooot, wool melton, 

olive drab ........................... 

Socks, wool, hght and 

heavy ................................. 

Equipage (Army) 

Bag, wool sleeping ............. 

Blanket, wool M-1943 ........ 

Tent. squad M-1942 ........... 

Tent, shelter half ................ 

Medical supplies (Army) 

Atabrine tablets .................. 

Sulfadiazina tablets ........... 

Sodium penicillin 

Unit 

Thousand pairs 

Thousands 

ThousafKJ pails 

Thousands 

CumulaJuly 1 Jan 1 tire July 

1940 1946 1, 1940 

through 1942 1943 1944 through through 

Dec July 31 July 31, 

1941 1945 1945 

0 147 605 12,653 12,940 26,343 

27,041 36,121 3;2,940 46,658 34,660 177,420 

0 O 275 7.470 5,263 13,008 

9,351 10,487 13,669' 6,673 10,277 52.407 

2,705 5,867 5,025 538 1,786 15,191 

38,368 29,651 60.606 73,212 57,993i 259,770 

0 0 253 5.749 2,619 8,821 

8,528 13,7016 15,265 5,983 8,512 51,994 

0 0 18 229 506 753 

203 11,299 3.621 3,803 6.746 24,627 

(') ='97,900 1,317,50(3 1,171,752 834,000 4,421,152 

(') '36,994 675,697 463,306 306,565 1.581,562 

(100,(300 oxford units), 

Navy clothing: 

Shoes. leather, black, low 

Overcoat, kersey ................ 

Drawers, nainsook, shorts 

Trousers, blue .................... 

Jumper, blue dress ............ 

Shids. chambray ................ 

Thousand ampules (,) (,) =72 10,276 12,621 22,968 

Thousand pairs 

Thousands 

845 3,229 6,351 10,206 4,825 25,465 

297 1,017 1,601 1,331 475 4,721 

3,728 11,065 28,664 23.231 26,732 93,440 

761 2,237 5,017 3,2:?,P 828 12.075 

401 650 2,264 2,163 530 6,208 

857 5,203 12,757 19,OS3 16.236 53.126 
APPENDIX B: 

The War Agencies of 

the Executive Branch of 

the Federal Government 

(Status as of December 31, 1945) 

ADVISORY BOARD ON JUST COMPENSATION 

Established by Executive Order No. 9387 of October 15, 1943. 

Reestablished for 60 days by Executive Order No. 9611 of 

September 10, 1945, and extended by Executive Order No. 9627 of 

September 24, 1945, to run for 60 days. 

ALASKA WAR COUNCIL 

Established by Executive Order No. 9181 of June 11, 1942. The 

Executive Order provides for its continuance as long as Title I of 

the First War Powers Act remains in force. 

AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION AND 

SALVAGE OF ARTISTIC AND HISTORIC MONUMENTS IN 

WAR AREAS 

Established June 23, 1943, by the Secretary of State with the 

President's approval. The 1946 appropriation for this agency 

irequires the completion of its work by the close of the fiscal year 

946. 

ANGLO-AMERICAN CARIBBEAN COMMISSION 

Established March 2, 1942, by joint action of the United States and 

Great Britain and suptxxled from State Department funds. 

ARMY SPECIALIST CORPS 

Established by Executive Order No. 9078 of February 26, 1942. 

Abolished as separate organization on October 31, 1942, and 

merged into a central Officer Procurement Service. 

BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE 

Established as Economic Defense Board by Executive Order No. 

8839 of July 30, 1941. Name changed to Board of Economic 

Warfare by Executive Order No. 8982 of December 17, 1941. 

Terminated by Executive Order No. 9361 of July 15, 1943, and 

functions transferred to Office of Economic Warfare. 

147 
148 U.S. INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION IN WORLD WAR II 

BOARD OF WAR COMMUNICATIONS 

Established as the Defense Communications Board by Executive 

Order No. 8546 of September 24, 1940. Name changed to Board of 

War Communications by Executive Order No. 9183 of June 15, 

1942. 

BRITISH-AMERICAN JOINT PATENT INTERCHANGE 

COMMYVI'EE 

Established pursuant to article XIII of the Executive Agreement 

Series 268 (British-American Patent Interchange Agreement) as a 

result of an interchange of notes between the two governments. 

The agreement was effective as of January 1, 1942. 

CARGOES, INC. 

Organized October 30, 1941, under Stock Corporation Law of the 

State of New York, originally named Ships, Inc. Placed under 

jurisdiction of Office of Lend-Lease Administration, June 17, 1942, 

and later placed under jurisdiction of Foreign Economic 

Administration by Executive Order 9380 of September 25, 1943. 

CENSORSHIP POLICY BOARD 

Established by Executive Order No. 8985, of December 19, 1941. 

Terminated by Executive Order No. 9631 of September 28, 1945. 

CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES 

Established in Offices for Emergency Management pursuant to a 

letter of the President dated February 28, 1941. Terminated by 

Executive Order No. 9471 of August 25, 1944. Functions 

transferred to various agencies; the residual fiscal functions 

transferred to Treasury Department for liquidation. 

CIVIL AIR PATROL 

Established in Office of Civilian Defense under authority of 

Executive Order No. 8757, May 20, 1941, as amended by 

Executive Order No. 9134, April 15, 1942. Transferred to War 

Department to be administered under direction of the Secretary by 

Executive Order No. 9339, April 29, 1943. 

CIVILIAN PRODUCTION ADMINISTRATION 

Established by Executive Order No. 9638 of October 4, 1945, to 

succeed the War Production Board. 

COAL MINES ADMINISTRATION (INTERIOR) 

Established July 27, 1943, by Administrative Order No. 1847 

issued by the Secretary of the Interior under authority of Executive 

Order No. 9340 of May 1, 1943. Terminated by Administrative 

Orders Nos. 1977 and 1982 of the Secretary of the Interior which 

transferred functions to the Solid Fuels Administration for War, 

effective September 15, 1944. 
GROPMAN 149 

COLONIAL MICA CORPORATION 

Incorporated April 17, 1942, acting as 

Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 

an agent of the 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF-UNITED STATES AND GREAT 

BRITAIN 

Established as a result of discussions starting on December 23, 

1941, between the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the 

President of the United States. Organization announced by the War 

Department on February 6, 1942. 

COMBINED FOOD BOARD 

Established June 9, 1942, by authority of the President and the 

Prime Minister of Great Britain. Termination effective June 30, 

1946, by joint statement of December 10, 1945, of the President 

and Prime Minister. 

COMBINED PRODUCTION AND RESOURCES BOARD 

Established June 9, 1942, by the President and the Prime Minister 

of Great Britain. Terminated effective December 31, 1945, by a 

joint statement of December 10, 1945, by the President and the 

Prime Minister. 

COMBINED RAW MATERIALS BOARD 

Established January 26, 1942, by the President and the Prime 

Minister of Great Britain. Terminated effective December 31, 1945, 

by a joint statement of December 10, 1945, by the President and 

the Prime Minister. 

COMBINED SHIPPING ADJUSTMENT BOARD 

Established January 26, 1942, by the President and the Prime 

Minister of Great Britain. This agency became the United Maritime 

Authority in August 1944, and extended membership to other 

maritime countries. 

COMMITTEE FOR CONGESTED PRODUCTION AREAS 

Established by Executive Order No. 9327 of April 7, 1943. 

Liquidation provided for by Congress under Act of June 28, 1944 

(58 Stat. 535). Termination effective December 31, 1944. 

COMMITI'EE ON FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE 

Established by Executive Order No. 8802 of June 25, 1941, as 

amended by Executive Order No. 9346, May 27, 1943. 

COMMITfEE ON PHYSICAL FITNESS 

Established in the Office of Civilian Defense early in 1942 and 

later transferred to the Office of Defense Health and Welfare 
150 U.S. INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION IN WORLD WAR II 

Services on April 15, 1942, as authorized by the President on 

February 26, 1944. This agency was terminated on June 30, 1945, 

because of failure to receive appropriations beyond that date. 

COMMITrEE ON RECORDS OF WAR ADMINISTRATION 

Established by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget in March 

1942, at the suggestion of the President. 

COORDINATOR OF GOVERNMENT FILMS 

Established December 18, 1941, by Presidential letter of that date 

which ordered Director of Office of Government Reports to act as 

Coordinator of Government Films. Transferred to Office of War 

Information by Executive Order No. 9182, June 13, 1942. 

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION 

Established by Presidential Order of July 11, 1941. Functions 

divided between the Office of Strategic Services and Office of War 

Information on June 13, 1942, by Military Order and Executive 

Order No. 9182 of same date. 

COPPER RECOVERY CORPORATION 

Incorporated at the request of Metals Reserve Company April 21, 

1942, under the laws of the State of Delaware to agent of Metals 

Reserve Company. This corporation has been liquidated. 

DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS BOARD 

Established by Executive Order No. 8546 of September 24, 1940. 

Name changed to Board of War Communications by Executive 

Order No. 9183 of June 15. 1942. 

DEFENSE HOMES CORPORATION 

Incorporated pursuant to letter of the President to the Secretary of 

the Treasury on October 18, 1940. Transferred to the Federal Public 

Housing Authority by Executive Order No. 9070 of February 24, 

1942. This corporation was in liquidation as of the end of 1945. 

DEFENSE HOUSING COORDINATOR 

Established by the National Defense Advisory Commission July 

21, 1940. Transferred to Division of Defense Housing 

Coordination by Executive Order No. 8632 of January 11, 1941. 

DEFENSE PLANT CORPORATION 

Incorporated August 22, 1940. Dissolved July 1, 1945, by Public 

Law 109, Seventy-ninth Congress. 
GROPMAN 151 

DEFENSE RESOURCES COMMITI~EE 

Established June 15, 1940, by the Secretary of Interior, 

Administrative Order No. 1497. Replaced by the War Resources 

Council by Administrative Order No.1636, January 14, 1942. 

DEFENSE SUPPLIES CORPORATION 

Incorporated August 29, 1940. Dissolved July 1, 1945, by Public 

Law 109, Seventy-ninth Congress. 

DIVISION OF DEFENSE AID REPORTS (OEM) 

Established by Executive Order No. 8751 of May 2, 1941. 

Abolished by Executive Order No. 8926 of October 28, 1941, 

which created the Office of Lend-Lease Administration. 

DIVISION OF DEFENSE HOUSING COORDINATION 

Established by Executive Order No. 8632 of January 11, 1941. 

Functions transferred to National Housing Agency by Executive 

Order No. 9070 of February 24, 1942. 

DIVISION OF INFORMATION 

Established by Presidential letter February 28, 1941. Abolished by 

Executive Order No. 9182, June 13, 1942, and functions transferred 

to OWI. 

ECONOMIC DEFENSE BOARD 

See Board of Economic Warfare 

FOOD PRODUCTION ADMINISTRATION (AGRICULTURE) 

Established by Executive Order No. 9280 of December 5, 1942. 

Consolidated with other agencies into Administration of Food 

Production and Distribution by Executive Order No. 9322 of March 

26, 1943. Consolidated into War Food Administration by 

Executive Order No. 9334 of April 19, 1943. 

FOREIGN BROADCAST INTELLIGENCE SERVICE 

Established February 19, 1941, in the Federal Communications 

Commission. Public Law 49, Seventy-ninth Congress terminated 

this activity in the FCC 60 days after the Japanese surrender. 

FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION 

Established by Executive Order No. 9380 of September 25, 1943. 

Executive Order No. 9630 of September 27, 1945, terminated the 

agency and transferred its functions as follows: 

(a) To State Department-the activities relating to Lend-Lease, 

United Nations relief and rehabilitation, liberated areas supply and 

procurement, planning for control of occupied territories, and 

foreign economic and commercial reporting. 
152 U.S. INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION IN WORLD WAR II 

(b) To RFC-United States Commercial Company, Rubber 

Development Corporation, and Petroleum Reserves Corporation. 

(c) To Agriculture-the Office of Foreign Food Programs and all 

other food activities. 

(d) To Commerce- all other activities of the agency. 

FOREIGN FUNDS CONTROL (TREASURY) 

Established by the Treasury Department, September 22, 1942, to 

carry out the provisions of Executive Orders Nos. 8389 and 9095. 

GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICE (BUDGET) 

Established as the Office of Government Reports on July 1, i 939, 

to perform functions formerly exercised by the National Emergency 

Council. Its functions were transferred and consolidated into the 

Office of War Information by Executive Order No. 9182 of June 

13, 1942. Subsequently they were transferred under the name, 

Government Information Service, to the Bureau of the Budget by 

Executive Order No. 9608, effective August 31, 1945. 

INSTITUTE OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS 

See OIAA page 160. 

INSTITUTE OF INTER-AMERICAN TRANSPORTATION (OIAA) 

See OIAA page 160. 

INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD 

Established in accordance with Resolution XXXXIX of the meeting 

of the Foreign Ministers at Rio de Janeiro in January 1942. 

Resolution IV adopted by all American Republics at the InterAmerican Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, 

February 1945, states that the Inter-American Defense Board would 

be continued until the establishment of a permanent body created 

for the study and solution of problems affecting the western 

hemisphere. 

AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, INC. 

See OIAA page 160. 

INTER-AMERICAN FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ADVISORY 

COMMITTEE 

Established on November 15, 1939. 

INTER-AMERICAN NAVIGATION CORPORATION (OIAA) 

See OIAA page 160 
GROPMAN 153 

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMI'Iq'EE FOR COORDINATION OF 

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC MILITARY PURCHASES 

Established by Presidential letter of December 6, 1939. Dissolved 

by Presidential letter of April 14, 1941, upon establishment of 

Division of Defense Aid Reports. 

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER CASES 

OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES ON THE PART OF FEDERAL 

EMPLOYEES 

Established February 5, 1943, by Executive Order No. 9300. 

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITI'EE FOR THE VOLUNTARY 

PAYROLL SAVINGS PLAN FOR THE PURCHASE OF WAR 

BONDS 

Established by Executive Order No. 9135, April 16, 1942. 

INTERIM INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE (STATE) 

-"\ Established by Executive Order No. 9608 of August 31, 1945. 

Abolished December 31, 1945, under section 3(a) of Executive 

Order No. 9608. 

INTERIM RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (STATE) 

Established by Executive Order No. 9621 of September 20,1945. 

Abolished December 31, 1945, under section 2 of Executive Order 

No. 9621. 

JOINT AIRCRAFT COMMITTEE 

Established September 13, 1940, for the purpose of scheduling the 

delivery of and allocating the capacity for aircraft and aircraft 

components of all customers: Army, Navy, British, etc. It was 

dissolved October 1, 1945. 

JOINT BRAZIL-UNITED STATES DEFENSE COMMISSION 

Established in August 1942. 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Established December 1941 by instructions from the President. 

JOINT CONTRACT TERMINATION BOARD 

OWMR established this Board by memorandum on November 12, 

1943. It was dissolved and superseded by the Contract Settlement 

Advisory Board which was established by the Contract Settlement 

Act of 1944. 
154 U.S. INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION IN WORLD WAR II 

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITI'EES-UNITED STATES AND 

CANADA 

Established by the United States and Canada on June 17, 1941, to 

assist in the collaboration of the two countries in the utilization of 

their combined resources for the requirements of the war. Dissolved 

by agreement of the two governments as announced by the State 

Department on March 14,1944. 

JOINT MEXICAN-UNITED STATES DEFENSE COMMISSION 

Established February 27, 1942, by authority of Executive Order 

No. 9080. 

JOINT WAR PRODUCTION COMMITI'EE-UNITED STATES AND 

CANADA 

Established on November 6,1941, as the Joint Defense Production 

Committee, and the name was later changed to the Joint War 

Production Committee. 

MANAGEMENT LABOR POLICY COMMITI'EE (LABOR). 

Established by Executive Order No. 9279, December 5, 1942. 

MATERIAL COORDINATING COMMITI'EE-UNITED STATES 

AND CANADA 

Established on May 14,1941. Terminated early in 1946. 

MEDAL FOR MERIT BOARD 

Established by Executive Order No. 9331, April 19, 1943, and 

reconstituted by Executive Order No. 9637, October 3, 1945. 

METALS RESERVE COMPANY 

Incorporated June 28, 1940. Dissolved July 1, 1945, by Public 

Law 109, Seventy-ninth Congress. 

MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENT BOARD 

Established January 26, 1942, by the President and Prime Minister 

of Great Britain. Terminated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

(CCS 19/3), November 8, 1945, with the approval of the President 

and the Prime Minister. 

NATIONAL DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMISSION (NDAC) 

Established on May 29, 1940, by Presidential approval of a 

regulation of the Council of National Defense pursuant to Section 

2 of the Act of August 29,1916 (39 Stat. 649). The following 

divisions were established in NDAC. Each division under the 

cognizance of an Adviser. 

(a) Industrial Production Division-transferred to OPM and 

subsequently to WPB. 
GROPMAN 155 

(b) Industrial Materials Division-transferred to OPM and 

subsequently to WPB. 

(c) Employment Division-transferred to OPM, then to WPB, and 

finally to WMC. 

(d) Farm Products Division-transferred to Office of Agricultural 

Defense Relations, later to Office for Agricultural War Relations. 

(e) Price Stabilization Division-transferred to Office of Price 

Administration and Civilian Supply, later OPA. 

(1) Transportation Division-transferred to ODT. 

(g) Consumer Division-transferred to OPACS, later WPB. 

(h) Division of State and Local Cooperation transferred to Office of 

Civilian Defense when that agency was established. 

NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD 

Established by Executive Order No. 8716 of March 19, 1941. 

Ceased to exist upon creation of National War Labor Board created 

by Executive Order No. 9017, of January 12,1942. 

NATIONAL HOUSING AGENCY 

Established by Executive Order No. 9070, February 24, 1942. 

NATIONAL INVENTOR'S COUNCIL 

Established in August 1940, by the Secretary of Commerce with 

the concurrence of the President. 

NATIONAL MUNITIONS CONTROL BOARD 

Established pursuant to the Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1939 (54 

Stat. 10, 11, 12; 22 USC 452). 

NATIONAL PATENT PLANNING COMMISSION (COMMERCE) 

1941. 

Established by Executive Order No. 8917, of December 12, 1941. 

NATIONAL RAILWAY LABOR PANEL (NATIONAL MEDIATION 

BOARD) 

Established by Executive Order No. 9172, of May 22, 1942. 

NATIONAL ROSTER OF SCIENTIFIC AND SPECIALIZED 

PERSONNEL (LABOR) 

Established on June 28, 1940, by a letter of authorization from the 

President to the National Resources Planning Board. 

Organizationally and administratively the Roster was at that time 

made a part of the United States Civil Service Commission by 

cooperative agreement between the Commission and the National 

Resources Planning Board. By Executive Order No. 9139, dated 

April 18, 1942, the Roster and its functions were transferred to the 

War Manpower Commission and by Executive Order No. 9617, 
156 U.S. INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION IN WORLD WAR II 

September 19, 1945, transferred to the Department of Labor where 

it now operates as a Division of the United States Employment 

Service. 

NATIONAL WAGE STABILIZATION BOARD (LABOR) 

Established by Executive Order No. 9672, of December 31, 1945, 

to continue wage stabilization functions of the National War Labor 

Board. 

NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD 

F_,stablished by Executive Order No. 9017, of January 12, 1942. 

Abolished by Executive Order No. 9672, December 31, 1945, 

which established the National Wage Stabilization Board. 

OFFICE FOR AGRICULTURAL WAR RELATIONS 

See Office of Agricultural Defense Relations below. 

OFFICE FOR COORDINATION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 

PURCHASES 

Established by order of Council of National Defense, June 27, 

1940. Terminated January 7, 1941. 

OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (OEM) 

Established on May 25, 1940, by administrative order of the 

President pursuant to Executive Order No. 8248, dated September 

8, 1939. 

OFFICE OF AGRICULTURAL DEFENSE RELATIONS 

Established May 17, 1941, by Secretary of Agriculture 

Memorandum No. 905, issued pursuant to a letter from the 

President to the Secretary of Agriculture dated May 5, 1941. The 

name was changed to Office of Agriculture War Relations, it being 

thus referred to in the First Supplemental National Defense Act, 

1943, approved July 25, 1942. The OAWR was abolished by 

consolidation into the Food Distribution Administration pursuant 

to Executive Order No. 9280, dated December 5, 1942. 

OFFICE OF ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN 

Established by Executive Order No. 9095 of March 11, 1942. 

Office. 

OFFICE OF ARMY-NAVY LIQUIDATION COMMISSIONER 

Established pursuant to War Department Memorandum No. 850-45 

dated January 27, 1945, and the letter of the Secretary of the Navy, 

dated February 1, 1945. It was abolished by Executive Order No. 

9630, September 27, 1945, and its remaining functions were 

transferred to the Department of State. 
GROPMAN 157 

OFFICE OF CENSORSHIP 

Established by Executive Order No. 8985, of December 19, 1941. 

Terminated by Executive Order No. 9631, of September 28, 1945, 

effective November 15, 1945. 

OFFICE OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE 

Established by Executive Order No. 8757, of May 20, 1941. 

Terminated by Executive Order No. 9562, of June 4, 1945. 

OFFICE OF COMMUNITY WAR SERVICES 

Established by Executive Order No. 9338, of April 29, 1943. 

OFFICE OF CONTRACT SETTLEMENT 

Established by the Contract Settlement Act of 1944. 

OFFICE OF COORDINATOR OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS 

Originally established on August 16, 1940, by NDAC as the 

Office of Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations 

between the American Republics. This Office was transferred to the 

Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs when it was 

established by Executive Order No. 8840 of July 30, 1941. Name 

changed to Office of Inter-American Affairs by Executive Order No. 

9532, March 23, 1945. 

OFFICE OF DEFENSE HEALTH AND WELFARE SERVICE 

Established by Executive Order No. 8890, of September 3, 1941. 

Abolished by Executive Order No. 9338 of April 23, 1943. 

Functions transferred to Office of Community War Services. 

OFFICE OF DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION (ODT) 

Established by Executive Order No. 8989, of December 18, 1941. 

OFFICE OF ECONOMIC STABILIZATION 

Established by Executive Order No. 9250, of October 3, 1942. 

Abolished by Executive Order No. 9620, of September 20, 1945. 

The functions were transferred to the Office of Stabilization 

Administration of the Office of War Mobilization and 

Reconversion. 

OFFICE OF ECONOMIC WARFARE 

Established by Executive Order No. 9361, of July 15, 1943. 

Consolidated with Foreign Economic Administration by Executive 

Order No. 9380, of September 25, 1943. 

OFFICE OF EXPORT CONTROL 

Established July 2, 1940, by Presidential Proclamation No. 2413 

pursuant to Public Law 703, Seventy-sixth Congress. Executive 
158 U.S. INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION IN WORLD WAR II 

Order No. 8900, September 15, 1941, transferred functions to the 

Economic Defense Board. 

OFFICE OF FACTS AND FIGURES 

Established by Executive Order No. 8922, of October 24, 1941. 

Transferred and consolidated into Office of War Information by 

Executive Order No. 9182, of June 13, 1942. 

OFFICE OF FISHERY COORDINATION (INTERIOR) 

Established by Executive Order No. 9204, of July 21, 1942. 

Terminated by Executive Order No. 9649, of October 29, 1945. 

OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT REPORTS 

See Government Information Service 

OFFICE OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS 

Established by Executive Order No. 9532, of March 23, 1945. 

Some functions were transferred to State by Executive Order No. 

9608, August 31, 1945. 

OFFICE OF LEND-LEASE ADMINISTRATION 

Established by Executive Order No. 8926 of October 28, 1941. 

Consolidated into Foreign Economic Administration by Executive 

Order No. 9380, of September 25, 1943. 

OFFICE OF MERCHANT SHIP CONTROL (COAST GUARD) 

Established on June 28, 1940, by regulations issued by the 

Secretary of the Treasury to carry out the provisions of a 

Presidential proclamation, dated June 27, 1940. The Office was 

abolished on January 20, 1942, by order of the Commandant of the 

Coast Guard. 

OFFICE OF PETROLEUM COORDINATOR FOR NATIONAL 

DEFENSE 

Established by Presidential letter of May 28, 1941. Terminated on 

the establishment of the Petroleum Administration for War. 

OFFICE OF PRICE ADMINISTRATION (OPA) 

Established as Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply 

by Executive Order No. 8734, April 11, 1941. Name and functions 

changed to Office of Emergency Administration by Executive Order 

No. 8875, August 28, 1941. The Emergency Price Control Act of 

1942, January 30, 1942, established OPA as an independent 

agency. 
GROPMAN 159 

OFFICE OF PRICE ADMINISTRATION AND CIVILIAN SUPPLY 

(OPACS) 

Established by Executive Order No. 8734, of April 11, 1941. 

Name changed to Office of Price Administration by Executive 

Order No. 8875, August 28, 1941. Civilian Supply functions were 

transferred to OPM. 

OFFICE OF PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT (OPM) 

Established by Executive Order No. 8629 of January 7, 1941. 

Abolished by Executive Order No. 9040 of January 24, 1942. 

Functions, personnel, etc. transferred to War Production Board. 

OFFICE OF PRODUCTION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

Established as a constituent agency of WPB by its General 

Administrative Order, 2-66, effective November 23, 1942. 

OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

Established by Executive Order No. 8807, of June 28, 1941. 

OFFICE OF SOLID FUELS COORDINATOR FOR NATIONAL 

DEFENSE 

Established by Presidential letter November 5, 1941. Terminated 

on establishment of SFAW. 

OFFICE OF STABILIZATION ADMINISTRATION 

Established pursuant to Executive Order No. 9620, dated September 

20, 1945, which terminated the Office of Economic Stabilization 

created by Executive Order No. 9250, October 3, 1942. 

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES 

Established by Military Order of June 13, 1942. Terminated by 

Executive Order No. 9621, effective October 1, 1945. Functions 

divided between State and War Departments. State created the 

position of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, the Office 

of Research and Intelligence, and the Office of Intelligence 

Collection and Dissemination which on December 31 took over 

those parts of the former OSS program that are to be included in 

the permanent intelligence program. Similarly, War created the 

Strategic Services Unit in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

War. 

OFFICE OF SURPLUS PROPERTY (COMMERCE) 

Established on October 16, 1942, in the Procurement Division of 

the Ti'easury Department as the Federal Property Utilization 

Branch. On August 11, 1944, name changed to Office of Surplus 

Property. Transferred to Department of Commerce effective May 1, 

1945, by Executive Order No. 9541, of April 19, 1945. Transferred 
160 U.S. INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION IN WORLD WAR II 

to Reconstruction Finance Corporation by Executive Order No. 

9643, effective November 5, 1945. 

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION 

Established by Executive Order No. 9182, of June 13, 1942. Its 

liquidation was provided for by Executive Order No. 9608, August 

31, 1945, which transferred the foreign information functions to 

State Department and certain domestic functions to the Bureau of 

the Budget. The State Department created the Office of International 

Information and Cultural Affairs, which on December 31 took over 

those OWI and OIAA informational activities that were to be 

included in the permanent foreign informational program. 

OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION (OWM) 

Established by Executive Order No. 9347, of May 27, 1943. 

Functions, personnel, funds, and property transferred to Office of 

War Mobilization and Reconversion (which was established by 

Congress under Act of October 3, 1944, 58 Stat. 785) by 

Executive Order No. 9488, of October 3, 1944. 

OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION AND RECONVERSION 

(OWMR) 

Established by the War Mobilization Act of 1944 (50 USC 1651 ). 

PACIFIC WAR COUNCIL 

Established March 30, 1942, by Presidential action. The records of 

this Council were disposed of in September 1945. 

PETROLEUM ADMINISTRATION FOR WAR 

Established by Executive Order No. 9276, of December 2, 1942. 

PETROLEUM RESERVES CORPORATION 

Established on June 30, 1943, by RFC. Successively transferred to 

Office of Economic Warfare, Foreign Economic Administration, 

and finally to RFC again. Renamed War Assets Corporation 

effective November 15, 1945. 

PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON DEFERMENT OF FEDERAL 

EMPLOYEES 

Established by Executive Order No. 9309, of March 6, 1943. 

Public Law 23, 78th Congress, provided that no deferment should 

be granted employees of the Executive Branch of the Federal 

Government unless they were in accordance with this Executive 

Order. 

PRESIDENTS COMMITrEE ON WAR RELIEF AGENCIES 

See President's War Relief Control Board. 
GROPMAN 161 

PRESIDENT'S SOVIET PROTOCOL COMMITTEE 

Established by the President on October 30, 1942, by a 

memorandum to the heads of agencies concerned. Terminated on 

October 1, 1945. 

PRESIDENTS WAR RELIEF CONTROL BOARD 

Established by Executive Order No. 9205, of July 25, 1942, taking 

over the functions of the President's Committee on War Relief 

Agencies. 

PRIOR/TIES BOARD 

Established by order of the Council of National Defense, October 

18, 1940. Terminated January 7, 1941. 

PUBLICATIONS BOARD 

Established in OWMR by Executive Order No. 9568, of June 8, 

1945. 

RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION (RFC) 

Defense Plant Corporation. 

Defense Supplies Corporation. 

Metals Reserve Company. 

Rubber Reserve Company. 

Public Law 109, Seventy-ninth Congress dissolved these four 

subsidiary corporations of RFC on July 1, 1945. The liquidation of 

the affairs of these corporations will be continued by the RFC 

through the agency of the Offices of Defense Plants, Defense 

Supplies, Metals Reserve, and Rubber Reserve. 

RETRAINING AND REEMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION 

(LABOR) 

An agency known as the Retraining and Reemployment 

Administration was established by Executive Order No. 9427, dated 

February 24, 1944, in the Office of War Mobilization. All records, 

property, funds, and personnel of this agency were transferred to the 

Retraining and Reemployment Administration established by the 

War Mobilization and Reconversion Act of 1944 by Executive 

Order No. 9488, October 3, 1944. The agency was transferred to 

the Department of Labor by Executive Order No. 9617 September 

19, 1945. 

RUBBER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 

Chartered November 1940, and commenced operations February 23, 

1943. 
162 U.S. INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION IN WORLD WAR II 

RUBBER RESERVE COMPANY 

Incorporated June 28, 1940. Dissolved July 1, 1945, by Public 

Law 109 Seventy-ninth Congress. 

SALARY STABILIZATION UNIT (TREASURY) 

Established in the Bureau of Internal Revenue by Treasury Decision 

5167, October 29, 1942, to administer the provisions of 

regulations prescribed by the Economic Stabilization Director. 

SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM. 

Established pursuant to the Selective Training and Service Act of 

1940. Originally a separate agency, it was placed under the War 

Manpower Commission by Executive Order No. 9279, of 

December 5, 1942, as the Bureau of Selective Service. 

Reestablished as a separate agency by Executive Order No. 9410, 

December 23, 1942. 

SHIPS, INC. 

See Cargoes, Inc. 

SHIPBUILDING STABILIZATION COMMITYEE (LABOR) 

A constituent agency of the War Production Board which was 

transferred from its successor agency, Civilian Production 

Administration to the Department of Labor by Executive Order No. 

9656 of November 15, 1945. 

SMALLER WAR PLANTS CORPORATION 

Established by Act of Congress June 11, 1942 (56 Stat. 353; 50 

USC 1104). The functions of the Smaller WarPlants Corporation 

were divided between the Department of Commerce and the 

Reconstruction Finance Corporation by Executive Order No. 9665, 

December 27, 1945. The legislation authorizing this corporation 

provides that the corporation shall not have succession beyond 

December 31, 1946. 

SOLID FUELS ADMINISTRATION FOR WAR (INTERIOR) 

Established by Executive Order No. 9332 of April 19, 1943. 

SOUTHWESTERN POWER ADMINISTRATION (INTERIOR) 

Established by order of the Secretary of the Interior on September 

1, 1943, to implement Executive Order No. 9366, July 30, 1943, 

and Executive Order No. 9373, August 30, 1943. 
GROPMAN 163 

STEEL RECOVERY CORPORATION 

Incorporated at the request of Metals Reserve Company on July 18, 

1942, under the laws of the State of Delaware for the purpose of 

acting as agent of Metals Reserve Company. 

SUPPLY PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATIONS BOARD 

Established by Executive Order No. 8875 of August 28, 1941. 

Abolished by Executive Order No. 9024 of January 16, 1942, 

functions transferred to the WPB. 

SURPLUS PROPERTY ADMINISTRATION 

Established by Public Law 181, Seventy-ninth Congress, 

September 18, 1945, which abolished the Surplus Property Board. 

SURPLUS PROPERTY BOARD 

Established by Surplus Property Act of 1944, approved October 3, 

1944 (58 Stat. 768 ). Terminated by Public Law 181, Seventyninth Congress, September 18, 1945 (59 Stat. 533) and all 

functions transferred to Surplus Property Administration. 

SURPLUS WAR PROPERTY ADMINISTRATION 

Established by Executive Order No. 9425 of February 19, 1944. 

Functions, property, and personnel transferred to Surplus Property 

Board by Executive Order No. 9488 of October 3, 1944. 

UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL COMPANY 

Incorporated March 26, 1942, by the RFC. Transferred to OEW by 

Executive Order No. 9361, July 15, 1943, and subsequently to 

FEA by Executive Order No. 9380, September 25, 1943. Returned 

to R.F'C by Executive Order No. 9630, September 27, 1945. 

UNITED STATES EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS 

Established by the Emergency Price Control Act of 1944, with 

jurisdiction over actions arising as the results of 

the administration of the Price Control Act of 1942, as amended. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TYPHUS COMMISSION 

Established by Executive Order No. 9285 of December 24, 1942. 

WAGE ADJUSTMENT BOARD FOR THE CONSTRUCTION 

INDUSTRY (LABOR) 

Established by the Labor Department on May 29, 1942, by 

direction of the President. 

WAR ASSETS CORPORATION 

Incorporated originally as the Petroleum Reserves Corporation by 

RFC on June 30, 1943. The name of the corporation was changed 
164 U.S. INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION IN WORLD WAR II 

to War Assets Corporation on November 9, 1945, effective 

November 15, 1945. 

WAR BALLOTS COMMISSION 

Established by Public Law 277, Seventy-eighth Congress (58 Stat. 

140) on April 1, 1944, to serve for the duration of the war and six 

months thereafter. 

WAR CONTRACTS PRICE ADJUSTMENT BOARD 

Established by the Renegotiation Act of 1943 (58 Stat. 85; 50 

USC 1191). 

WAR DAMAGE CORPORATION 

Established December 13, 1941, by RFC Charter. 

WAR EMERGENCY PIPE LINES, INC. 

Incorporated September 8, 1941, to act as the agency of the 

Defense Plant Corporation in the construction industry and as agent 

of the Defense Supplies Corporation in the operation of pipe lines. 

WAR FOOD ADMINISTRATION (AGRICULTURE) 

Established by Executive Order No. 9334 of April 19, 1943. 

Terminated by Executive Order No. 9577 of June 29, 1945, and 

function transferred to Department of Agriculture. 

WAR FORWARDING CORPORATION 

Incorporated by War Shipping Administration to assist in 

forwarding and classifying Lend-Lease shipments. 

WAR HEMP INDUSTRIES, INC. (AGRICULTURE) 

Chartered on February 1, 1943. 

WAR INSURANCE CORPORATION 

Name later changed to War Damage Corporation, q. v. 

WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION (WMC) 

Established by Executive Order No. 9139 of April 18, 1942. 

Terminated by Executive Order No. 9617 of September 19, 1945, 

and functions transferred to Department of Labor. 

WAR MATERIALS, INC. 

Incorporated at the request of Metals Reserve Company on August 

24, 1942, under the laws of the State of Delaware, for the purpose 

of acting as agent of Metals Reserve Company. 
GROPMAN 165 

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD 

Established by Executive Order No. 9024 of January 16, 1942. 

Terminated by Executive Order No. 9638, October 4, 1945, and 

functions transferred to Civilian Production Administration. 

Important constituent agencies included: 

Aircraft Production Board 

Aircraft Resources Control Office 

Office of Civilian Supply 

Office of Production Research and Development 

Office of Rubber Director 

Office of War Utilities 

Procurement Policy Board 

Production Executive Committee 

Requirements Committee 

Resources Protection Board 

WAR REFUGEE BOARD 

Established by Executive Order No. 9417 of January 22, 1944. 

Terminated by Executive Order No. 9614 of September 14, 1945. 

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY (INTERIOR) 

Established by Executive Order No. 9102 of March 18, 1942. 

Transferred to the Department of Interior by Executive Order No. 

9423 of February 16, 1944. 

WAR RESOURCES BOARD 

Established August 1939, as a Civilian Advisory Board to Army 

and Navy Munitions Board. Dissolved by the President, November 

24,1939. 

WAR RESOURCES COUNCIL (INTERIOR) 

Established by Interior Departmental Order No. 1636, January 14, 

1942, supplemented by Departmental Order No. 1652, February 

23, 1942, and No. 1687, May 1, 1942. Abolished by Departmental 

Order No. 2148, December 20, 1945. 

WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION (OEM) 

Established by Executive Order No. 9054 of February 7,1942. 
About the Author 

Dr. Alan L. Gmpman was appointed Chaimlan of tile Department 

of Grand Strategy at the lndustriM College of the Armed Forces, 

National Defense University in July 1996. From 1991 to 1996 

he was a professor of history at the Industrial College. 

hi 1986, Dr. Gropman retired from the U.S. Air Force as a 

Colonel after 27 years commissioned service. During his career 

he earned, an~ong other awards, the Defense Superior Service 

Medal, Legion of Merit, Distinguished Flying Cross, Air Medal 

with five oak le~ clusters, and Viemam Cross of Gallantry with 

Pahn. 

From 1986 to 1991 he was a Senior Principal Analyst and 

Program Manager for the SYSCON Corporation in Waslfington, 

DC, directing projects for the Joint Staff and the Air Staff. He 

was also an adjunct professor at the National War College. 

Dr. Gropman earned a B.A. from Boston University and an 

M.A. and Ph.D. from Tufts University. He is the author of two 

books, five anthology chapters, and more than 200 book reviews, 

articles, and op-ed essays. Dr. Gropman is also the book review 

editor for Air Power History and is a member of the editorial 

board for Joint Force Quarterly. 

167 
McNair Papers 

The McNair Papers are published at Fort Lesley J. McNair, home of the 

Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National Defense 

University. An Army post since 1794, the fort was given its present name 

in 1948 in honor of Lieutenant General Lesley James McNair. General 

McNair, known as "Educator of the Army" and trainer of some three 

million troops, was about to take command of Allied ground forces in 

Europe under Eisenhower, when he was killed in combat in Normandy. 25 

July 1944. 

The following is a complete listing of published McNair Papers. For 

information on availability of specific titles, contact the Distribution 

Manager, Publications Directorate & NDU Press. Fort McNair. 

Washington, DC 20319-5066 (telephone: commercial 202/685-4379, DSN 

325-4379). 

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the New Arab Coalition, February 1989. 

2. John E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific Region, May 1989. 

3. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Constitutional 

Monarch ? October 1989. 

Howard G. DeWolf, SDI and Arms Control, November 1989. 

Martha C. Libicki, What Makes Industries Strategic, November 

1989. 

6. Melvin A. Goodman, Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in the Third 

World. February 1990. 

7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Soviet Foreign 

Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet Diplomacy," in 

Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 1990. 

8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, A Strategic: View of 

Insurgencies : Insights from El Salvador, May 1990. 

9. Steven R. Linke, Managing Crises in Defense Industry: The 

PEPCON and Avtex Cases, June 1990. 

10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nations and 

Nationless States, September 1990. 

11. Ralph A. Cossa, Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns, July 1990. 

12. Ewan Jamieson, Ftqend or Ally? A Question for New Zealand, May 

1991. 

13. Richard J. Drum III, From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Beyond: 

Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in Land Warfare. 

March 1992. 

14. Ted Greenwood, U.S. and NATO Force Structure and Milita~" 

Operations in the Mediterranean, June 1993. 

15. Oscar W. Clyatt, Jr., Bulgaria's Quest for Securi~ After the Cold 

War, February 1993. 

4. 

5. 
16. William C. Bodie, Moscow's "Near Abroad": Security Policy in 

Post-Soviet Europe, June 1993. 

17. William H. Lewis (ed.), Military Implications of United Nations 

Peacekeeping Operations, Jtme 1993. 

18. Sterling D. Sessions and Carl R. Jones, lnteroperabilirv." A Desert 

Storm Case Study, July 1993. 

19. Eugene V. Rostow, Should Article 43 of the United Nations Charter 

Be Raised From the Dead? July 1993 

20. William T. Johnsen and Thomas Durell-Young; Jeffrey Simon; 

Daniel N. Nelson; William C. Bodie, and James McCarthy, 

European Security Toward the Year 2000, August 1993. 

21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed., Developing Battlefield Techmglogies in the 

1990s, August 1993. 

22. Patrick Clawson, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? Economic 

Sanctions, 1990-93, August 1993. 

23. Jeffrey Simon, Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce," Visegrad 

Cohesion, and European Fault Lines, October 1993. 

24. Eugene V. Rostow, The Future of Palestine, November 1993. 

25. William H. Lewis, Jolm Mackinlay, John G. Ruggie, and Sir Brian 

Urquhart, Peacekeeping : The Way Ahead? November 1993. 

26. Edward Marks m~d William Lewis, Triage for FaiUng States, 

January 1994. 

27. Gregory D. Foster, In Search of a Post-Cold War Security Structure. 

February 1994. 

28. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed 

Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, March 1994. 

29. Patrick Clawson, ed., Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilities, 

April 1994. 

30. James W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment of a 

Russian Ultra-Nationalist, April 1994. 

31. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the U.S.-Japan 

Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program, November 1994. 

32. Scott W. Conrad, Moving the Force: Desert Storm and Beyond, 

December 1994. 

33. John N. Petrie, American Neutrality in the 20th Century: The 

Impossible Dream, January 1995. 

34. James H. Brusstar and Ellen Jones, The Russian Military's Role in 

Politics, January 1995. 

35. S. Nelson Drew, NATO from Berlin to Bosnia: Trans-Atlantic 

Security in Transition, January 1995. 

36. Karl W. Eikenberry, Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms 

Transfers, February 1995. 

37. William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, Interagency Cooperation: 

A Regional Model for Overseas Operations, March 1995. 

38. Robbin Laird, French Security Policy in Transition: Dynamics of 
Continuity and Change, March 1995. 

39. Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and 

NATO Expansion, April 1995. 

40. J,'unes W. Morrison. NATO Expansion and Alternative Future 

Security Alignments in Europe, April 1995. 

41. Barry R. Schneider, Rcutical Responses to Radical Regimes: 

Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation, May 1995. 

42. John Jaworsky, Ukraine: Stability and Instabili~, July 1995. 

43. Ronald Tiersky, The Mitterrand Legacy and the Future of French 

Security Policy., August 1995. 

44. John A. Cope, International Military Education and 7"raining: An 

Assessment, October 1995. 

45. Elli Lieberman, Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in ArabIsraeli Wars? October 1995. 

46. Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defense, 

December 1995. 

47. M. E. Ahrari, The New Great Game in Muslim. Central Asia, 

January 1996. 

48. Mark J. Roberts, Khomeini's Incorporation of the Iranian Miilitary, 

January 1996. 

49. Steven Philip Kramer and Irene Kyriakopoulos, Trouble in Paradise? 

Europe in the 21st Century, March 1996. 
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