[Cite as State v. Duffy , 2020-Ohio-3137.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN )
STATE OF OHIO Appellee

v. ZIAIRE DUFFY Appellant C.A. No. 18CA011342, 18CA011343, 18CA011344, 18CA011345, 18CA011346, 18CA011347, 18CA011348, 18CA011349

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO CASE No. 13CR087762, 13CR088424, 13CR089520, 14CR089550, 14CA089912, 15CR091194, 15CR091285, 15CR091286
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: June 1, 2020

TEODOSIO, Presiding Judge. {¶1} Appellant, Ziaire Duffy, appeals from the trial court’s judgmen t in the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms in part, reve rses in part, and remands for resentencing.
I. {¶2} Mr. Duffy pled guilty to a multitude of felonies and misdemeano rs, ranging from felonies of the third degree down to minor misdemeanors and spa nning eight different case numbers: 13CR087762; 13CR088424; 13CR089520; 14CR089550; 14CR0 89912; 15CR091194; 15CR091285; and 15CR091286. He was sentenced to fifty-eight mo nths in prison for case2
numbers 14CR089550 and 15CR091286, but received community contr ol for the remaining six

cases. {¶3} The trial court later granted Mr. Duffy judicial release and or dered him to enter and successfully complete the Lorain /Medina County Community Based Correctional Facility (“CBCF”). Mr. Duffy was unsuccessfully discharged from CBCF. The trial court held a probable cause hearing and decided to continue Mr. Duffy on community co ntrol at that time. Many more violations of community control sanctions followed. After a me rits hearing, the trial court found Mr. Duffy guilty of violating the terms and conditions of his c ommunity control sanctions and sentenced him to an aggregate to tal of thirteen years and four months in prison. {¶4} Mr. Duffy now appeals and raises four assignments of error for this Court’s review.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE
TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED THE MAXIMUM RESERVED SENTENCE ON ALL EIGHT CASES BASED ON TECHNICAL VIOLATIONS OF COMMUNTY [SIC] CONTROL SANCTIONS. {¶5} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Duffy argues that the tri al court erred when it imposed the maximum reserved sentence in all eight of his cases based on “technical violations” of community control sa nctions. We disagree. {¶6} The standard of review used by a ppellate courts in reviewing fe lony sentences is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. R.C. 2 953.08(G)(2). The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “an appella te court may vacate or modify a felony sentence on appeal only if it determines by clear and convi ncing evidence that the reco rd does not support th e trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherw ise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum , 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. See also R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). “Clear and convincing3 evidence is that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be es tablished.” Cross v. Ledford , 161 Ohio St. 469, 477 (1954). {¶7} R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c) provides that, when community control san ctions are violated, the trial court is permitted to sentence the offender to an appropriate prison term under the law. Effective September 29, 2017, however, R.C. 2929.15(B )(1)(c) was amended by H.B. 49, and now provides that prison terms being imposed for commun ity control violations are subject to certain limitations for mere “technical violations.” See R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i)-(ii). When the underlying offense is a felony of the fifth degree, the prison term imposed shall not exceed ninety days for either technical violations of community control sanct ions or any violations of law that constitute new criminal misdem eanor offenses. R.C. 2929.15(B)( 1)(c)(i). When the underlying offense is a felony of the fourth degree and is neither an offe nse of violence nor a sexually-oriented offense, the prison term imposed shall not exceed one hundred e ighty days for either technical violations of community control sanctions or any violations of law that constitute new criminal misdemeanor offenses. R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(ii). {¶8} No definition for what constitutes a “technical” violation is i ncluded in the Ohio Revised Code. 1 The Supreme Court of Ohio, in State ex rel. Taylor v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. , 66 Ohio St.3d 121, 124, (1993), noted that the United States Co urt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
in Inmates’ Councilmatic Voice v. Rogers , 541 F.2d 633 (6th Cir.1976), fn. 2, previously defined “technical violations” as “those violations of the terms and co nditions of the parole agreement

1 We note that three cases, State v. Nelson , State v. Blake , and State v. Castner , all centering around what should constitute a “t echnical violation” for purpo ses of R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i)- (ii), have been accepted by the S upreme Court of Ohio for juris dictional reviews. See 04/03/2019 Case Announcements , 2019-Ohio-0049; 05/01/2019 Case Announcements , 2019-Ohio-0214; 10/29/2019 Case Announcements , 2019-Ohio-1221.4 which are not criminal in nature[,] such as failure to report t o the parole officer, association with known criminals, leaving employment, leaving the [s]tate, etc.” We remain cognizant of the fact that the courts in those two cases were interpreting technical violations of parole , and not technical violations of community control under R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c). See State v. Kernall , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180613, 2019-Ohio-3070, ¶ 15. Nevertheless, man y Ohio appellate districts have applied this definition to sente ncing determina tions under R.C. 2929.15. See State v. Urban , 5th Dist. Delaware Nos . 18 CAA 09 0066, 18 CAA 09 0067, and 18 CAA 09 0068, 2019-Ohio-2244, ¶ 19, citing State v. Abner , 4th Dist. Adams Nos. 18CA1061 and 18CA1062, 2018-Ohio-4506, State v. Cozzone , 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2017-G-0141, 2018-Ohio-2249, State v. Pino , 11th Dist. Lake No. 2017-L-171, 2018-Ohio-2825, and State v. Johnson , 5th Dist. Licking No. 18-CA-37, 2019-Ohio-376. {¶9} Still, other courts have declined to limit the definition of “t echnical violations” under R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c) to refer only to violations “that a re not otherwise criminal.” See State
v. Neville , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106885, 2019-Ohio-151, ¶ 43-44, 48-49 (determining that a failure to report may be a technical violation in some instance s, but several months of avoiding community control sanctions, i.e., failing to report at all, is not a mere technical violation); State
v. Mannah , 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 17- CA-54, 2018-Ohio-4219, ¶ 14 (“Had the legislature intended R.C. 2929.15 (B)(1)(c)(i) to apply to all violations of communi ty control which were non-criminal in nature, it could have specifically stated so in the statute. ”). Such courts have instead determined that where “the special condition was a substantive rehabilitat ive requirement which addressed a significant factor contributing to appellant’s c riminal conduct ” the violation “cannot be considered a technical violation of community control.” See, e.g., State v. Calhoun , 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-5 17-067, 2019-Ohio-228, ¶ 30; State v. Davis , 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2017-11-156, 2018-Ohio2672, ¶ 18. {¶10} Mr. Duffy argues that his communi ty control violations included failures to report to the probation department, a fa ilure to complete the CBCF pro gram, and failed drug screens, which he asserts are merely tec hnical violations. Even assumin g without deciding that those violations were merely technical in nature, Mr. Duffy’s conduct and violations in this matter far exceeded these less serious in fractions and, in fact, included criminal conduct. {¶11} Mr. Duffy’s probation officer summarized Mr. Duffy’s violations for the trial court at the merits hearing on May 25, 2018. Following his judicial release from prison, Mr. Duffy was placed in CBCF, but was unsuccessfully discharged from the prog ram following allegations that he destroyed some toilets at the facility. He then tested posi tive during five different drug tests for marijuana, oxycodone, and cocaine, and then failed to report fo r three additional drug tests. He was assessed by Lorain County Al cohol and Drug Abuse Services ( “LCADA”), but failed to follow its recommendations. He failed to call the Substance Ab use Monitoring (“SAM”) phone line eighteen times. He was arrested and charged with domestic violence, disrupting public services, unlawful restraint, and possession of cocaine. He fa iled to report to his probation officer, and a capias was issued for his arrest. He was then charged wi th aggravated robbery and theft. While the police were attempting to arrest him, Mr. Duffy ramme d his vehicle into a police cruiser and proceeded to lead police on a hi gh speed car chase. When t hey finally caught him, the police found twenty grams of suspected heroin, eighteen grams of suspe cted crack cocaine, and $4,800.00. {¶12} The prosecutor offered further details for the court as to Mr. Duffy’s violations. As to the domestic violence and unlawful restraint charges, the pr osecutor stated at the hearing that6 Mr. Duffy had been threatening to shoot the victim with a gun. She “broke free” and escaped once Mr. Duffy passed out. Police observed bruises and scrapes on h er and saw text messages on her phone in which Mr. Duffy had thr eatened to kill her. When the police attempted to arrest him, he led them on a dangerous, high speed, car chase in which he drov e through the front yards of homes. In another incident, Mr. Duffy was asked to leave someone’s pro perty, so he pulled out his gun, put it in the victim’s face, and said, “I’m going to shoot you in the face.” He fled from police again and led them on another high speed chase. He drove through sto p signs, drove through flower beds in front yards, and kept hi s headlights off. Police were forced to abandon that pursuit due to safety concerns for the public. T hereafter, Mr. Duffy posted “ F12” on Facebook, which the prosecutor stated is street terminology for “F the police.” Th e prosecutor stated that Mr. Duffy was also a suspect in several ot her firearm-related assaults, w here he put guns in victims’ faces and threatened to kill them, but then fled from the police. In another high speed chase with police, he actually crashed into a poli ce cruiser and “totaled” it. {¶13} The record therefore reveals that some of Mr. Duffy’s violation s included serious and violent criminal offenses, which could not be considered me re “technical violations” of his community control within the ambit of R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c). M r. Duffy nonetheless stresses on appeal that he was never actually convicted of any of these new criminal charges, as they were dismissed sometime later. 2 But, courts have held that conduct which constitutes a crimin al offense, even if the offender is never actually charged or convicted, ca nnot be considered a mere “technical violation” of community control. See State v. Swetnam , 5th Dist. Licking No. 2019 CA 00010,

2 Appellate counsel conceded at oral argument that Mr. Duffy was then indicted federally on some of these di smissed charges.7 2019-Ohio-5186, ¶ 18; State v. Ross , 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2019-CA-9, 2019-Ohio-4368, ¶ 16;
Abner , 2018-Ohio-4506, at ¶ 15-16; Cozzone , 2018-Ohio-2249, at ¶ 39. {¶14} Accordingly, we find no merit in Mr. Duffy’s argument that his myriad of violations, which included seri ous, felony criminal offenses, a mounted on the whole to mere “technical violations” of his c ommunity control sanctions. The trial court was therefore not limited by the language set forth in R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i)-(ii) when sentencing Mr. Duffy to prison. Consequently, Mr. Duffy has not shown by clear and convincing e vidence that his sentence was contrary to law. See Marcum , 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, at ¶ 1; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2 ). {¶15} Mr. Duffy’s first assignme nt of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO MAKE THE REQUISITE FINDINGS TO SUPPORT CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES PURSUANT TO R.C. 2929.14(C). {¶16} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Duffy argues that the tr ial court failed to make the requisite findings under R.C. 2929.14(C) when it impos ed consecutive sentences. We agree that the court failed to make all of the requisite findin gs for the imposition of consecutive

sentences. {¶17} Again, the standard of review for reviewing felony sentences is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). “ [A]n appellate court may vacate or modify a felony sentence on appeal only if it determines by cle ar and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial court’s findings under releva nt statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” Marcum , 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, at ¶ 1; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).8
{¶18} Following a community control vi olation, the trial court conduc ts a second sentencing hearing in which the court sentences the offender an ew and must comply with the relevant sentencing statutes. State v. Trice , 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 29258 and 29283, 2019-Ohio5098, ¶ 25, citing State v. Fraley , 105 Ohio St.3d 13, 2004-Ohio-7110, ¶ 17. “In order to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court is required to make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its fin dings into its sentencing entry, but it has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings.” State v. Bonnell , 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, syllabus. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides: If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convict ions of multiple offenses, the court may require t he offender to serve the priso n terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the o ffender and that consecutive sen tences are not disproportionate to the seriousne ss of the offender’s conduct a nd to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any o f the following: (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense. (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as par t of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the m ultiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct ade quately reflects the seriousness of the of fender’s conduct. (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates tha t consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender. {¶19} “[I]f the trial court does not make the factual findings requir ed by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), then ‘a prison term , jail term, or sentence of i mprisonment shall be served concurrently with any other pris on term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed * * *.’”
Bonnell at ¶ 23, quoting R.C. 2929.41(A). A word-for-word recitation of the language of the statute is not required, however , provided the reviewing court can discern that the trial court9 engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the reco rd contains evidence to support the findings. Id. at ¶ 29. In other words, trial courts are not required to giv e a “talismanic incantation” of the words of the statute, provided the necessary findings ca n be found in the record and are incorporated into the sentencing entry. Id. at ¶ 37. {¶20} Mr. Duffy has not argued that any findings made by the trial co urt were unsupported by the evidence or that the sent encing entry failed to incorpor ate the findings, but instead only argues that the trial court failed to make the requisite findin gs for the imposition of consecutive

sentences. See, e.g., State v. Snyder , 9th Dist. Summit No. 28109, 2016-Ohio-7881, ¶ 17. {¶21} Although the trial court here d id not utilize the specific lang uage contained within R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) when imposing consecutive sentences, it was not required to do so. See
Bonnell at ¶ 29, 37. In our review of the sentencing transcript, howe ver, we can only discern from various statements made by the trial court that it engaged in a proper analysis to make some, but not all, of the findings required for the imposition of consecu tive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). The court made various stateme nts to Mr. Duffy prior to sentencing him, such as: “I don’t know anyone in this courtr oom that would lead the poli ce on a chase and ram their cars, and put people at risk”; “I think I’ve had plenty of time to observe how you have behave d after you’ve left prison, and you have not respect ed the Court’s orders”; “I gave you strict orders as to how you were to comport and con duct yourself, and you have not done that * * *”; “I hung significant prison time over your head, and I made it v ery clear to you that these would run consecutive * * *”; “[T]he eight cases you had in thi s courtroom showed to me that you were a thug, a potential menace to society * * *”; and “You put people’s lives at risk, a nd I’m not going to allow tha t to happen anymore under my watch.”10 These statements permit us to conclude that the trial court eng aged in the proper analysis and found: (1) consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish him; and (2) Mr. Duffy’s history of criminal conduct dem onstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime s by Mr. Duffy. This Court cannot discern, however, either from the aforementioned statements or from anything else in the record, that the trial court engaged in any analysis or made the requis ite findings regarding consecutive sentences not being disproportionate to the seriousness of Mr. Duffy’s conduct and to the danger he poses to the public. See, e.g., State v. Beasley , 153 Ohio St.3d 497, 2018-Ohio-493, ¶ 259. {¶22} Accordingly, the imposition of consecutive sentences in Mr. Duf fy’s case was contrary to law. See Bonnell at ¶ 37. We are therefore constrained to reverse the trial co urt’s imposition of consecutive sentences and remand the matter for a limited resentencing hearing for the court to properly consider R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and make the necessary findings. See State v.
Mellott , 9th Dist. Wayne Nos. 16AP0081 and 16AP0082, 2017-Ohio-7545, ¶ 16; State v. Marcum , 9th Dist. Wayne No. 16AP0084, 2017-Ohio-7655, ¶ 9-10; State v. Thompson , 9th Dist. Wayne No. 15AP0016, 2016-Ohio-4689, ¶ 48. {¶23} Mr. Duffy also argues that because he was initially placed on c ommunity control in six of his cases, the trial court already made certain findi ngs at his original sentencing hearing which would be inconsiste nt with any findings made at the merit s hearing supporting consecutive sentences. He contends that th e trial court should not be able to “change” its original findings and should have therefore been barre d from ultimately imposing cons ecutive sentences. Not only has Mr. Duffy failed to cite any authority supporting this speculat ive claim, but he has failed to separately assign this argument as error. See App.R. 16(A)(7); State v. Marzolf , 9th Dist. Summit No. 24459, 2009-Ohio-3001, ¶ 16 (“[A]n appellant’s assignment o f error provides this Court with11 a roadmap on appeal and directs this Court’s analysis.”). See also App.R. 12(A)(1)(b); State v.
Harlow , 4th Dist. Washington 13CA29, 2014-Ohio-864, ¶ 10 (stating tha t appellate courts review assignments of error, not mere ar guments). In this assignment of error, Mr. Duffy specifically challenges only the trial court’s failure to make the requisite findings for the imposition of consecutive sentences, and we decline to address other argument s not assigned as error. See In re
F.R. , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 14CA010543, 2015-Ohio-1877, ¶ 7. {¶24} Because the trial court failed to make all of the requisite fin dings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) for the imposition of consecutive sentences, Mr. Duffy’s second assignment of error is sustained.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT IMPOSED MAXIMUM CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES ON A FIRST-TIME OFFENDER. {¶25} In his third assignment, Mr. Duffy argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed maximum, consecu tive sentences on a first-time offender. {¶26} It is unclear from Mr. Duffy’s merit brief if he is arguing tha t the record does not support more than the minimum sentence for each individual offe nse or that the record does not support the trial court’s impos ition of consecutive sentences. To the extent he challenges the imposition of consecutive sentences as being unsupported by the record, our disposition of his second assignment of error has rendered that argument moot, and we therefore decline to address it. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). {¶27} To the extent he is challenging the length of his individual se ntences, his argument is not rendered moot by our limited remand under his second ass ignment of error, as the individual sentences for each offense are not vacated and are not subject to de novo sentencing on remand.
See State v. Henderson , 9th Dist. Summit No. 27794, 2016-Ohio-679, ¶ 15. Nevertheles s, this12 argument must fail because it is expressly premised on an incor rect standard of review. Once again, the standard of review use d by appellate courts in revie wing felony sentences is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) . “[A]n appellate court may vacate or modify a felony sentence on appeal only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the tr ial court’s findings under re levant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” Marcum , 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, at ¶ 1; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). {¶28} In his merit brief, Mr. Duffy “urges this Court to review the s entence * * * and find that the trial court abused its discretion.” As this request w ould require us to ana lyze Mr. Duffy’s sentence under an incorrect standard of review, we decline to d o so. Mr. Duffy has failed to demonstrate by clear and convinc ing evidence that the record do es not support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that his sentence is otherw ise contrary to law. See id . We decline to sua sponte fashion a nd then address such an argument on his behalf. See Cardone v.
Cardone , 9th Dist. Summit No. 18349, 1998 WL 224934, *8 (May 6, 1998) (“If an argument exists that can support this assignment of error, it is not this [C]ou rt’s duty to root it out.”). {¶29} Mr. Duffy attempts to remedy this error by arguing in his reply brief that he, in fact, stated the correct standard of review in his second assignment of error. We find no merit in this argument. He further attempts to raise a new argument that the trial court impermissibly increased his sentence for violating the community control sanctions of h is judicial release, which we decline to address. See State v. Osborne , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 15CA010727, 2017-Ohio-785, ¶ 8, quoting
State v. Caldwell , 9th Dist. Summit No. 26306, 2013-Ohio-1417, ¶ 9 (“‘[A] party may not raise new * * * issues for consideration in his reply brief; rather, the reply brief is merely an opportunity to reply to the brief of the appellee.’”).13
{¶30} Mr. Duffy’s third assignment of error is moot in part and overr uled in part.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR FOUR THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCREDTION [SIC] WHEN IT DENIED THE DEFENDANT A COMPETENCY EVALUTION [SIC] AND HEARING PRIOR TO THE MERITS HEARING. {¶31} In his fourth assignment, Mr. Duf fy argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied him a competency evaluation and hearing prior to the merits hearing. We disagree. {¶32} “[T]he decision whether to grant a hearing on competency at a r evocation hearing is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and must be determined on a case-by-case basis.”
State v. Davis , 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2015-09-081 and CA2015-09-082, 2016- Ohio-879, ¶ 10, citing State v. Brank , 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2006AP090053, 2007-Ohio-919, ¶ 44, State v. Qualls , 50 Ohio App.3d 56 (10th Dist.1988), and State v. Bell , 66 Ohio App.3d 52, 57 (5th Dist.1990). “In a probation hearing, a defendant has a due pro cess right to a competency hearing when there is a substantial basis for the suggestion that appel lant is incompetent.” State v. Holman , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100468, 2014-Ohio-3908, ¶ 8. {¶33} Mr. Duffy argues that he demonstrated a “substantial basis for a competency hearing” because the trial court previously ordered a mental he alth screening for him. While the transcript reflects that the court indeed ordered a mental heal th screening when it originally sentenced Mr. Duffy to community control, the results of that s creening are not in the record before us. The mere existence of a prior order for a mental health sc reening, without more, does not establish “a substantial basis for the suggestion that appellan t is incompetent.” Mr. Duffy also asserts that “[he] and his fath er are known by the trial court to have mental health issues[,]” yet he fails to cite to the record to support this claim. See App.R. 16(A)(7). Mr. Duffy has failed to14

demonstrate that a substantial ba sis existed for the suggestion that he was incompetent, and we therefore determine that the t rial court did not abuse its disc retion in denying his request. {¶34} Mr. Duffy also challenges the trial court’s denial of his reque st for a continuance, yet he fails to separately assign this argument as error. See Marzolf , 2009-Ohio-3001, at ¶ 16 (“[A]n appellant’s assignment of error provides this Court with a roadmap on appeal and directs this Court’s analysis.”). See also App.R. 12(A)(1)(b); Harlow , 2014-Ohio-864, at ¶ 10 (stating that appellate courts review assi gnments of error, not mere arg uments). Mr. Duffy’s assignment of error specifically challenges only the trial court’s denial of his request for a competency evaluation and hearing, and we d ecline to address other argumen ts not assigned as error. See In
re F.R. , 2015-Ohio-1877, at ¶ 7. {¶35} Mr. Duffy’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
III. {¶36} Mr. Duffy’s first and fourth assignments of error are both over ruled. His second assignment of error is sustained. His third assignment of erro r is moot in part and overruled in part. The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further pr oceedings consistent with this opinion. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, direc ting the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitu te the mandate, pursuant to Ap p.R. 27.15 Immediately upon the filing hereof , this document shall consti tute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file s tamped by the Clerk of the Cour t of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to m ake a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed equall y to both parties.

THOMAS A. TE ODOSIO FOR THE COURT

CALLAHAN, J. CONCURS. CARR, J. CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART. {¶37} I concur in judgment only with respect to the second assignment of error as I would simply conclude that the trial court failed to make the require d statutory findings in support of consecutive sentences. {¶38} In regard to the third assignment of error, I agree that any ch allenge regarding whether the record supports the imposition of consecutive sente nces is moot. To the extent that Duffy challenges the length of hi s individual sentences, I resp ectfully dissent as I would order the parties to provide further briefin g regarding whether the indiv idual sentences comported with the dictates of R.C. 2929.20.16

APPEARANCES: JASON S. HARLESS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and LINDSEY C. POPROCKI, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.