NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AMIT SINGH,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 22-1192

Agency No.

A208-194-114

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 12, 2023**

San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, BENNETT, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Amit Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order upholding the immigration 

judge’s (“IJ”) adverse credibility determination and denial of asylum, 

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

(“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not 

precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUL 14 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 22-1192

We review for substantial evidence the BIA’s adverse credibility 

determination and denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. 

Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2017). We may only reverse if 

the evidence compels a conclusion contrary to the one reached by the BIA. See 

id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

1. The BIA’s adverse credibility determination was based on three 

grounds. First, Singh testified inconsistently about the distance between him 

and the opposing party members’ vehicle that displayed their identifying 

symbols. That inconsistency finding is supported by the record. Singh first 

testified that the vehicle was 150 to 200 meters away but then testified that it 

was 40 to 50 feet away. When confronted with the discrepancy between his 

answers, Singh gave yet another conflicting answer, stating that the vehicle was 

100 feet away.

Second, the BIA upheld the IJ’s demeanor findings that Singh “displayed 

no emotional change when discussing his alleged past harms” and “[i]nstead of 

conveying the impression his testimony was based on his own memories, 

[Singh’s] testimony appeared rehearsed.” Contrary to Singh’s only challenge to 

the IJ’s demeanor findings, a negative inference may be drawn from a 

petitioner’s lack of emotion. See Kumar v. Garland, 18 F.4th 1148, 1155 (9th 

Cir. 2021) (holding that a “flat affect” can support an adverse credibility 

determination). Because Singh fails to show that the IJ’s demeanor findings

were erroneous, and “[t]he need for deference is particularly strong in the 
3 22-1192

context of demeanor assessments,” Huang v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th 

Cir. 2014), we must defer to the IJ’s negative demeanor findings.

Finally, the BIA upheld the IJ’s finding that Singh failed to provide 

detailed responses to the IJ’s questions about the first alleged attack. But 

contrary to the IJ’s reasoning, Singh did not fail to provide “any details” other 

than a description of the opposing party members’ vehicle and that the opposing 

party members hit him. Singh provided details when the IJ asked for them. For 

example, when asked where the attack occurred, Singh said that it happened in 

the village of Paniar. Further, the IJ’s requests that Singh “tell [the IJ] what 

[Singh] saw” failed to alert Singh that he was expected to provide more details 

about the incident. Thus, the BIA’s undetailed finding is not supported by 

substantial evidence. See Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2020) 

(rejecting an undetailed finding because it was “unclear what further detail Iman 

should have provided” given that the questions “did not press Iman for any 

additional details about the shootings Iman referenced”).

The BIA’s adverse credibility determination is supported by two valid 

grounds: Singh’s inconsistent testimony related to a key incident supporting his 

claims and his flat demeanor when testifying about his alleged past harms. 

Because those grounds are entitled to great weight, see Zamanov v. Holder, 649 

F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2011), we cannot conclude that any factfinder would be 

compelled to find Singh credible, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

2. Turning to the merits, the BIA first decided that the IJ had properly 
4 22-1192

discounted the weight of affidavits and statements (collectively, “letters”) in 

support of Singh’s claims, as the authors were unavailable for crossexamination. This determination was reasonable under the circumstances, and 

Singh fails to persuade us otherwise. See, e.g., Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 

791 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the agency reasonably limited the weight of 

corroborating documents where the authors were unavailable for crossexamination, the authenticity of the documents relied on the petitioner’s 

discredited testimony, and the documents did not reveal independent knowledge 

of the petitioner’s alleged persecution).

Putting aside Singh’s testimony and the letters, the remaining evidence 

mainly consists of articles and background materials about the mistreatment of 

Sikhs in India and the enforcement of India’s tenant verification laws 

(collectively, “background documents”). The background documents do not 

compel the conclusion that Singh suffered past persecution or has a wellfounded fear of persecution. See, e.g., Berroteran-Melendez v. INS, 955 F.2d 

1251, 1257–58 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that without credible testimony there 

was “no basis for the claim of past persecution,” and petitioners also failed to 

satisfy the well-founded fear required for asylum and withholding of removal). 

Thus, the BIA’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal is supported by 

substantial evidence.

The BIA’s denial of CAT relief is also supported by substantial evidence 

because the background documents do not compel the conclusion that Singh 
5 22-1192

will more likely than not be tortured if removed to India. See Mukulumbutu v. 

Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 927–28 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that without credible 

testimony petitioner’s “country conditions reports and other corroborating 

evidence in the record including the letters from his family and acquaintances” 

do not compel the conclusion that he “personally will face torture if he 

returns”).

PETITION DENIED.