No. 182, July 2001 Strategic Forum 

The first step in the process is to peel

away remaining punitive sanctions against

India. Although symbolic of the commitment to

nonproliferation, sanctions are manifestly

ineffective and counterproductive in South

Asia. This applies to Pakistan as well as India.

Only India can initiate changes in the

regional security atmosphere. The administration should focus on encouraging New Delhi

to follow policies of restraint. Improved security relations will create equities that enable

Washington to further encourage restraint.

Restraint would mean resuming a dialogue with Pakistan on nuclear issues; not

deploying nuclear weapons; no further testing; and defining a minimum deterrent that

engenders greater stability, that is, does not

create incentives for either a first strike or

for Pakistan to enhance its deterrent.

U.S. policy should link expanded bilateral ties to regular and more substantive

military-to-military contacts. China and

Pakistan may feel threatened by improved

U.S.-India relations, and Pakistan may seek

help from China or North Korea. Washington

should counter this possibility by reassuring

Beijing and also rebuilding badly damaged

relations with Islamabad.

and limit cooperation with the Indian military

establishment. The administration is in the

process of lifting restrictions on high-level

military contacts and is consulting with New

Delhi on its plans for missile defense, a concept that India has applauded.

Indian leaders would welcome closer ties

with the United States. Prime Minister Vajpayee

believes that the two are “natural allies.” India

has long been interested in America as a source

of technology and investment and as a market

for its exports; it now hopes that bilateral

cooperation will leverage its power in a sphere

that extends from Southeast Asia to Central

Asia and the Persian Gulf.

The overriding American priority for India

is regional stability—the avoidance of nuclear

war on the subcontinent and of heightened

tensions with China. At the same time, India’s

gathering economic strength, its commitment

to democracy, its potential to act as a stabilizing force in the Asia-Pacific region, and its role

as a market-democracy alternative to Chinese

dictatorship are all factors that reinforce the

logic of improved relations.

A decade of deregulation combined with

booming software exports have made India one

of the fastest growing economies in the

which numbers about 300 million (in a popu

lation of one billion), many of whom are 

English speakers and aggressively entrepreneu

ial. The overseas extension of the middle clas

the Indian diaspora, which helps establish lin

that serve India’s political and economic inte

ests. The ties between Silicon Valley in Califor

nia and Bangalore and Hyderabad in India a

but one example of this phenomenon.

India has entered an era of coalition

politics that will endure through at least this

decade. Neither of the two national parties—

the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) nor 

Congress Party—has the strength to form a

government alone, and each will rely on alliances with smaller state-based or caste-base

parties with narrow agendas. Huge income

disparities separate the economically dynam

states in the south and west from those in th

north and the northeast. Successful states wi

demand policy independence from New Delh

while the poorer will look to the central 

government to protect their interests. Indian

politics is becoming more fractious and com

petitive, but the institutions of its marketdemocracy are sound. If Indian leaders continue to liberalize the economy, broker region

income disparities, and address emerging

environmental challenges, rapid growth will 
States were often confrontational, reflecting

American willingness to arm Pakistan in

return for its help in containing the Soviet

Union, and India’s penchant for anti-Western,

Third World rhetoric to buttress its position in

the nonaligned movement. The end of the

Cold War made nonalignment irrelevant and

reduced the utility of the security relationship

with the Soviet Union. The decline in U.S.-

Pakistan relations opened new possibilities for

détente with the United States, while unrivaled

American economic, cultural, and military

dominance made stronger bilateral relations

more attractive.

Today, Indian leaders speak of America as

a natural ally, yet they still buy cheap arms

from Russia and are mending relations with

China, which were badly damaged at the time

of the 1998 nuclear tests. With the exception of

policy toward Pakistan, Indian foreign policy is

characterized more by pragmatism than by

India had already exploded a so-called

peaceful nuclear device in 1974 and since then

had followed a policy of ambiguity—having

the capability but claiming not to have the

bomb. Few put any stock in these assertions.

Pakistan certainly did not as it single-mindedly

built its nuclear weapon capability. The newly

elected BJP government justified its tests on two

grounds. First, India’s strategic position had

been undermined by a declining Russia and a

rising China, which had also shared nuclear

and missile technology with Pakistan. The

second and more important element in its

thinking was the 1995 indefinite extension of

the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which

aimed to freeze the nuclear status quo; the

United States, Russia, the United Kingdom,

France, and China were recognized as nuclear

weapon states, but India was not. The CTBT

reinforced the NPT, as would a proposed fissile

material cutoff pact. All this meant that India

would forever be a covert nuclear power and in

a position of inferiority, especially with regard

unclear because ambiguity enhanced the

deterrent value of its weapons. Pakistani mil

tary leaders also concluded that their capabil

provided the cover to risk limited operations

(such as the Kargil incursion), because India

would fear that widening a conflict might

escalate into a nuclear exchange.

While neither India nor Pakistan has

actually deployed nuclear weapons, both are

developing capabilities, and Kashmir continu

to be a flash point. Indeed, many observers

believe that Pakistan’s nuclear and ballistic

missile programs are more advanced than

India’s. Indian citizens will thus live for the

indefinite future in the shadow of an overt

strategic threat from a Pakistan that is hostil

politically unstable, and willing to engage in

brinkmanship to advance its interests in Kash

mir. The relationship with Pakistan remains

India’s greatest strategic weakness—and its

greatest strategic failure.

Indian Sphere of Interest

Indian leaders have asserted a sphere of

interest stretching from the Persian Gulf and

Central Asia through the Indian Ocean to 

East Asia. Viewing this region as essential to

national security, they stress the importance 

2 Strategic Forum No. 182, July 2

Ambassador John C. Holzman is a distinguished research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic

Studies at National Defense University. A career Foreign Service officer, he was ambassador to Bangladesh

and served in various posts in Pakistan, India, and Africa.
political stability, access to energy resources,

open markets for exports, and protection of

expatriate Indian nationals. Their concern

about Islamic militancy and terrorism relates

directly to all of these issues.

■ South Asia and the Indian Ocean are

India’s home base, and India is more powerful

than any combination of countries in the

region. But the subcontinent is one of the

poorest and least economically integrated

regions in the world. Apart from dangerously

bad relations with Pakistan, India copes with a

long-term demographic threat in the east,

where Bangladeshis are spilling out of their

country, and with its complicated relations with

Sri Lanka, where a Tamil insurgency continues

with no end in sight.

■ Persian Gulf stability figures prominently in Indian thinking because the Indian

economy will become increasingly dependent

on Gulf oil and gas. India’s apparent goal is to

integrate the Gulf, Central Asia, and South Asia

into a single energy economy. Hence the security of sea-lanes from the Gulf is important, as

would be a pipeline network. Nearly 4 million

Indian expatriates are said to work in the 

Gulf, and their safety is a concern. During the 

Persian Gulf War, India evacuated more than

100,000 of its nationals from Kuwait and Iraq.

■ Central Asia abuts the subcontinent and

is seen as an unexploited region in which India

would like to have a greater role. Its energy

resources are one reason for the interest, but a

more immediate concern is the perceived link

between the Kashmir insurgency and Islamic

militancy in Afghanistan. The Taliban, supported by Pakistan, have allowed Afghanistan

to become a training base for militants who

pursue jihad in Kashmir. Without these forei

fighters, Indian leaders assert, the insurgency

would have sputtered to an end. Any pipeline

from Central Asia or the Northern Gulf must

cross Pakistan, an obvious obstacle to Indian

ambitions in the region.

■ Southeast Asia is regarded as a marke

for Indian exports and a source of investmen

Trade with the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN) exceeds that with Japan,

India’s second largest trading partner after th

United States. India is developing modest

security ties with Vietnam and Indonesia, the

two largest Southeast Asian countries and the

two with the most difficult relations with

China. ASEAN declined to invite India to join

their summit meetings with China, Japan, an

South Korea—perhaps because of India’s

competition with China.

No. 182, July 2001 Strategic Forum 

◆ Agni tested in 1994 (estimated range 2,000 kilometers)

◆ Agni II tested in April 1999 (estimated range 2,000 kilometers)

■ Also developing SLBM and IRBM

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Proliferation: Threat and Response,” January 2001.
4 Strategic Forum No. 182, July 2

nese leaders have since invested heavily in

restoring civility to relations between their

countries. New Delhi understands that China is

the bigger player and that Chinese development

will have a profound impact on the stability of

the Asia-Pacific region. China has paid more

attention to Indian concerns since the tests.

Both believe that tactical engagement holds

more advantages than overt hostility. There

have been high-level visits in both directions,

and the two exchanged maps of the disputed

border. China offered Pakistan no support

during the Kargil incursion, and its present

position on Kashmir suggests that Pakistan

should either settle the dispute bilaterally or

put it on the backburner and stop the violence.

India has voted to shelve American proposals

condemning China for human rights violations. Bilateral trade is increasing but is still at

a relatively low level—about $2 billion.

Still, India regards China as its greatest

national security threat. Indian leaders routinely assert that China is modernizing its

forces, that its missiles can reach every major

Indian city, and that sensitive equipment and

technology are being sent to Pakistan. Indian

competition with China was almost certainly a

factor in New Delhi’s decision to welcome

President Bush’s recent proposals for missile

energy, science and technology, and security.

Another Clinton legacy is the nuclear sanctions

that remain in place and have not induced

either India or Pakistan to curb nuclear

weapon and missile programs. The mixed

legacy reflects a conflicted administration that

could not reconcile its commitment to nonproliferation with its conviction that better relations served long-term American interests.

These sanctions were required in part by

the Glenn Amendment to the Arms Export

Control Act, while others reflected a determination not to conduct business as usual. The

sanctions overlaid existing restrictions on trade

with India and Pakistan in sensitive materials,

equipment, and technology that derived 

from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 

1978 and U.S. participation in MTCR. The

1998 sanctions:

■ Terminated many foreign assistance

programs and reduced lending from the multilateral development banks

■ Limited even more stringently access to

American products and technology

■ Restricted exports to “entities” involved

in Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapon 

programs

capable of delivering nuclear weapons

■ Tightening export controls on sensitiv

materials and technologies

■ Initiating a productive Indo-Pakistani

dialogue to address long-standing regional

tensions and disputes.

By the end of the Clinton administratio

there had been progress on some of these

issues, but overall, in the aftermath of Kargil

Indo-Pakistani tensions were worse than eve

and both continued to pursue their nuclear

and missile programs. The 1999 Indian National Security Advisory Board draft report on

nuclear doctrine was emblematic. India wou

develop a “triad of aircraft, mobile land-base

missiles and sea-based assets,” and “any thre

of use of nuclear weapons” would be countered. The Indian government, claiming to

want only a “minimum credible deterrent,”

neither accepted nor disavowed the report, bu

Pakistan drew its conclusions based on worst

case scenarios. Still, despite the lack of progr

in these areas, relations with India had alrea

begun to improve.

Changing Perceptions

The turnaround reflected an evolution i

administration thinking toward acknowledgi
tions as a result of the October 1999 military

coup and Islamabad’s support for the Taliban

and other militant Islamic groups.

Although the U.S. commitment to nonproliferation still casts a deep shadow across

relations with India, it was no longer the central element. In his speech to the Indian Parliament, President Clinton acknowledged

Indian security perceptions and sovereignty to

develop nuclear weapons even while stating

that this was a mistaken course. The United

States left no doubt that it would oppose

amending the NPT to recognize India as a

nuclear weapon state. But President Clinton

also began to waive sanctions imposed after the

tests. Prime Minister Vajpayee did not sign the

CTBT, but committed not to block it from

coming into force and not to conduct tests in

the interim. Given Senate rejection of the

CTBT, this promise was all that could reasonably be expected. The two countries seemed to

be nearing the point of agreeing to disagree

about India’s decision to become an overt

nuclear weapon state.

In the critical area of security relations,

the Clinton administration authorized resumption of military cooperation, but only for dialogue and joint exercises on peacekeeping,

ican policy should focus on fostering restraint

and stability by addressing the compulsions that

caused India and Pakistan to develop nuclear

weapons. Indo-Pakistani antipathy, Chinese

actions, and Indian ambitions are related parts

of the problem. India disregarded the impact of

its nuclear and missile programs on Pakistan

because of Chinese actions and its own desire for

great power status.

Though symbolic of an American commitment to global nonproliferation, the 1998

sanctions are ineffective in deterring Indian

and Pakistani nuclear and missile programs

and may aggravate, rather than reduce, tensions between India and China. They should be

discarded as soon as possible. This would apply

to Pakistan as well as India.

Any effort to foster restraint and stability

on the subcontinent must begin in New Delhi.

Pakistan is too insecure and weak even to

contemplate initiating a process of détente with

India. Restraint is not a lost cause. India and

Pakistan agreed in Lahore in 1999 to consult

on security concepts and nuclear doctrines with

the aim of adopting confidence-building measures. Each was willing to notify the other in

advance of ballistic missile tests, to undertake

national measures to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear

strengthen their export controls and make

binding commitments not to engage in down

stream proliferation.

Even as Indian leaders seek better relations with the United States to serve their pur

poses, they will resist efforts to limit their free

dom of action on the subcontinent or their

pursuit of great power status.

India should understand that America

wants a positive and growing relationship, bu

development will be a long-term, brick-bybrick endeavor, each step dependent on India

actions and based on a coincidence of intere

The United States should be clear that it is

interested in stability on the subcontinent an

that it is not giving India a free hand.

A rising India’s potential to play a great

role in the Asia-Pacific region also justifies

investments in improved relations. Indian

interests are broadly compatible with those o

America—whether it is security and stability 

the Gulf and Central Asia or engaging China 

influence its future behavior and developmen

Proposing an overt U.S.-India coalition to

contain China would be a mistake. China

would be defensive, and India would probabl

reject any structured proposal that might

compromise its independence of action.

No. 182, July 2001 Strategic Forum 
ing through on agreements to have the President and Prime Minister be in regular touch, to

hold strategic consultations, to consult on

security and proliferation issues, and to expand

economic, scientific, and cultural ties. It

should also consider cooperation on nuclear

safety and on space exploration, including

launch vehicles.

Taking Account of China

Indian leaders have valid concerns about

the Chinese role on the subcontinent. Indian

leaders may be concerned that policies engendering stability on the subcontinent could put

them at a greater disadvantage vis-à-vis China.

Improving U.S.-India security ties may mitigate these concerns, but they may also threaten

China, especially if missile defense were a part

of the equation. China may then resume or

expand its commerce in sensitive items to

Pakistan. These tensions cannot be avoided,

but they should be kept in mind.

American policy should take into account

that improved security relations with India

could have a perverse and destabilizing impact

on Indian dealings with China. Both India and

the United States should reassure China that

U.S.-Pakistan relations. However, neither Pakistan nor India should have any illusions that

America seeks a reprise of its Cold War partnership with Pakistan. The U.S. aim is to lend

Pakistan the confidence to engage with India.

Given overlapping sanctions against Pakistan,

rebuilding the relationship will require legislation, and there should be close prior consultations with Congress. The United States should

consider the following steps:

■ Funding for democracy and governance

programs through nongovernmental organizations that strengthen the institutions of civil

society

■ Increasing funding for primary education, family planning, child survival, or microcredit programs as a tangible indicator that the

6 Strategic Forum No. 182, July 2

The Strategic Forum series presents original research b

members of the National Defense University as well as

other scholars and specialists in national security affair

from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions

and recommendations expressed or implied within are

those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect

the views of the Department of Defense or any other

agency of the Federal Government.

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