[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-12164

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-22992-CMA

ALBERT CAMPBELL, 

 Petitioner-Appellant,

 versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Respondent-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(July 23, 2015)

Before WILSON, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Albert Campbell, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)’s 

“savings clause.” Campbell appeals the district court’s dismissal of his § 2241

petition for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Campbell argues that his sentence 

was improperly enhanced because the judge, not the jury, determined the specific 

quantity of drugs to be attributed to him, which violated his constitutional rights. 

In support, Campbell relies on Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 

2151 (2013), which he argues is a new rule of constitutional law to be applied 

retroactively on collateral review. However, because we conclude that Alleyne

does not apply retroactively on collateral review, Campbell is foreclosed from 

proceeding pursuant to § 2255(e)’s saving clause. Therefore, we affirm the district 

court’s dismissal of Campbell’s § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction.

I.

The following factual synopsis is undisputed. Over twenty years ago, 

Campbell was indicted by a federal grand jury and charged with conspiring to 

possess cocaine and cocaine base with the intent to distribute. After a jury found 

Campbell guilty of the charged offense, Campbell received a sentence of 420-

months’ imprisonment. Subsequently, Campbell appealed his sentence. On direct 

appeal, Campbell raised a number of issues, none of which challenged the 

enhancements he received for the quantity of drugs attributed to him. We affirmed 

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Campbell’s conviction and sentence. See United States v. Butler, 102 F.3d 1191 

(11th Cir. 1997). Thereafter, Campbell filed a motion to vacate and correct his 

sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 alleging that his trial counsel was 

ineffective in several ways, including that his trial counsel failed to object to the 

quantity of drugs attributed to Campbell. Campbell’s § 2255 motion and his

Certificate of Appealability (COA) were denied by the district court. Treating 

Campbell’s COA as a timely notice of appeal, this Court denied Campbell’s COA 

as well. Several years later, however, Campbell filed a motion for reconsideration 

of his § 2255 motion, but the district court concluded that his motion for 

reconsideration was the equivalent of a successive § 2255 motion that required

prior permission from this court, which Campbell never obtained. Concluding also 

that the cases Campbell relied on were not retroactively applicable, the district 

court denied his motion for reconsideration. Campbell again appealed that 

decision to this court, but we refused to grant him a COA. Campbell has since 

then filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241, which 

was subsequently dismissed by the district court for lack of jurisdiction. 

II.

We review de novo whether a prisoner may bring a § 2241 petition under the 

savings clause of § 2255(e). Bryant v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 738 F.3d 

1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2013). “The applicability of the savings clause is a threshold 

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jurisdictional issue, and we cannot reach questions that the district court never had 

jurisdiction to entertain.” Williams v. Warden, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 713 F.3d 

1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied sub 

nom. Williams v. Hastings, 135 S. Ct. 52 (2014). If the savings clause permits

Campbell’s § 2241 petition, then we may decide the substantive issue of whether 

his sentence was improperly enhanced pursuant to the trial judge’s determination 

of the specific quantity of drugs to be attributed to him. See id. 

III.

Generally, a collateral attack on the validity of a federal sentence must be 

brought under § 2255. See Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d 1363, 1365 (11th Cir. 

2003). Under circumstances such as this, where a prisoner has previously filed a 

§ 2255 motion, he must apply for and receive permission from the appropriate 

court of appeals before filing a successive § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255(h). A successive motion must contain “a new rule of 

constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 

Court, that was previously unavailable.” Id. § 2255(h)(2). However, “[u]nder the 

savings clause of § 2255[(e)], a prisoner may file a § 2241 petition if an otherwise 

available remedy under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his 

detention.” Sawyer, 326 F.3d at 1365. Section 2255(e) applies by its own terms 

irrespective of whether a prisoner failed to seek § 2255 relief or whether the trial 

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court has previously denied him such relief; what is significant is whether § 2255 

relief would not have adequately or effectively tested the legality of his 

imprisonment. See Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1263. The burden is on the petitioner to 

demonstrate that § 2255 relief was “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of 

his detention for purposes of § 2255(e).” Id. at 1262 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We have held that in order for a petitioner to establish that a § 2255 

motion was inadequate or ineffective to test whether his detention was lawful, he 

must demonstrate that: 

(1) throughout the petitioner’s sentencing, direct appeal, and first § 

2255 proceeding, this Court’s precedent had specifically and squarely 

foreclosed the claim raised in the § 2241 petition; (2) after the 

petitioner’s first § 2255 proceeding, the Supreme Court overturned 

that binding precedent; (3) that Supreme Court decision applies 

retroactively on collateral review; (4) as a result of that Supreme 

Court decision applying retroactively, the petitioner’s current sentence 

exceeds the statutory maximum; and (5) the savings clause of § 

2255(e) reaches his claim. 

Jeanty v. Warden, FCI-Miami, 757 F.3d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); 

see also Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1274 (synthesizing circuit precedent for purposes of 

interpreting § 2255(e) in a manner that “does not eviscerate or undermine §

2255(h)’s restrictions on second or successive § 2255 motions”). It is unnecessary 

for the court to address all five requirements if the petitioner fails to satisfy any one 

requirement. See Jeanty, 757 F.3d at 1285.

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Here, Campbell could not bring his Alleyne claim under § 2255, as he 

previously filed a § 2255 motion and did not obtain this court’s permission to file a 

second or successive § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255(h). 

Thus, in order for the district court to have had jurisdiction over Campbell’s § 2241 

petition, he was required to establish, through the lense of § 2255(e)’s savings 

clause, that his prior § 2255 motion was “inadequate or ineffective.” See 

§ 2255(e). 

Campbell fails to fulfill his burden of demonstrating one of the necessary

requirements to show that § 2255 relief would have been in adequate or 

ineffective, and, consequently, there is no need for this court to address the 

remaining four. See Jeanty, 738 F.3d at 1285. Particularly, Campbell fails to 

establish that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Alleyne applies retroactively. See id. 

We acknowledge that in Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that any fact that 

aggravates the legally prescribed range of allowable sentences, including a fact that 

increases the statutory minimum, is an element of the offense that must be 

submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. 570 U.S. at ___, 133 

S. Ct. at 2162–63. However, we have held that the Supreme Court’s ruling in

Alleyne does not apply retroactively on collateral review for the following reasons: 

1) the Supreme Court has not held that Alleyne’s application is retroactive; 2) the

Supreme Court explained that Alleyne is an application of the rule established in

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Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), which is not

retroactively applicable; and 3) our sister circuits (that have had the opportunity to 

consider whether Alleyne applies retroactively on collateral review in a published 

decision) have concluded that it did not. See Jeanty, 757 F.3d at 1285. Because 

we have held that Alleyne does not apply retroactively on collateral review, 

Campbell is foreclosed from proceeding pursuant to § 2255(e)’s saving clause.

IV.

Therefore, we conclude that district court did not err in dismissing 

Campbell’s § 2241 petition. Campbell’s § 2241 petition fails to recapture the 

jurisdiction of the district court pursuant to § 2255(e)’s savings clause because

Campbell’s § 2241 petition relies on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Alleyne, which 

is not retroactively applicable. To the extent that Campbell seeks to rely on 

Alleyne for the proposition that the facts of his prior convictions should have been 

submitted to a jury before his sentence could be enhanced, his reliance here is also 

misguided. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (holding that any fact, 

other than the fact of a prior conviction, is required to be submitted to the jury and 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt); see also United States v. Harris, 741 F.3d

1245, 1249–50 (11th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, the district court’s dismissal of 

Campbell’s § 2241 habeas petition is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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