# I N T HE CO UR T O F CR I M I NA L A P P E A LS O F T E X A S

N O
. P D

- 1 6 1 1

- 0 8

G A B R I E L L E M E L L P R U D H O L M , A p p e l l a n t

v .
T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

O N D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W F R O M T H E F I R S T C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

H A R R I S C O U N T Y

Womack, J ., delivere d the opinion of the unanimous Court.

This is an appea l from a se ntence that was e nhance d under Pena l Code Section 12.42(c) (2), whic h mandates a life sentenc e for

a def endant c onvicted of a

sex-related of

fense
listed in S ubsection (A) if the def endant ha s been pr eviously convicted of

a Te x as off

ense listed in Subsection (B) , or an of fense “under

the laws of a

nother state c ontaining e lements that are substantially

simil ar to the e lements” of a Texas offense listed in S ubsection (B ). This case 1 

## require s us to decide whe ther the Califor nia offe nse of se x ual batter y contains ele ments that are

T E X

. P E N

. C O D E § 1 2

. 4 2 ( c ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( v )

. 1

## Prudholm - 2

substantially

simil ar to the e lements of the Te x as off enses of sexual assault or ag g rava ted kidnapping . We hold that it does not.
I . Ba ckg round
A Har ris County

jury found the a

ppellant g uilty

of compe lling prostitution and sexual 2


## assault of a

child. The indictments for both of fense s alleg ed that the a

ppellant had be en 3 

## previously

convicted in Califor

nia of the f

elony offe nse of se x ual batter

y
. The jury

found these 4 

## alleg ations to be true. F or compe lling prostitution, the jury assessed punishment of 99 y ear s in prison. For

sexual assault of a child, the jury assessed punishment of life in prison pursuant to Section 12.42(c) (2). This appea l is from only

the sexual assault of a c hild case.
The a ppellant ar g ued that the tria l court er red in finding that California sexual battery was substantially

simil ar to a

ny of the e numera ted offe nses in Section 12.42(c) (2)( B) , and ther efor e the trial cour

t also err ed in instructing the jury that a life se ntence was manda tory for the se x ualassault-of- a-c hild conviction if the jury found the e nhance ment alleg ation to be true. In reply , the State arg ued that the e lements of sexual battery wer e substantially

simil ar to the e lements of the

enumer ated of

fense s of sexual assault and ag g rava ted kidnapping

. The Court of Appe als held 5 6


## for the a ppellant. We gr anted the State’ s petition for discre tionary revie w to deter

mine whether 7

T E X

. P E N

. C O D E § 4 3

. 0 5

. 2

T E X

. P E N

. C O D E § 2 2

. 0 1 1 ( a ) ( 2 )

. 3

C A L

. P E N A L C O D E § 2 4 3

. 4

. 4

T E X

. P E N

. C O D E § 2 2

. 0 1 1 ( a ) ( 1 )

. 5

T E X

. P E N

. C O D E § 2 0

. 0 4 ( a )

. 6

P r u d h o l m v
. S t a t e , 2 7 4 S

. W

. 3 d 2 3 6 , 2 3 8 ( T e x
. A p p
. – H o u s t o n [ 1 s t D i s t

. ] 2 0 0 8 )

. 7

## Prudholm - 3

the Court of Appe als err ed in finding that sexual battery does not contain e lements that are substantially

simil ar to the e lements of any of the e numera ted offe nses in Section 12.42(c) (2)( B) , and whe ther the Court of A ppeals c onsequently

err ed in finding that the trial cour t erre d in
submitt ing the enhanc ement instruction to the jury

. I I . I nterpre ting “ Substantially Simi lar” Penal Code Section 12.42 provides e nhance d penalties for repe at fe lony

offe nders. As w e said in Griffit h v. State , Section 12.42(c) (2) e ffe ctively cre ates a “two-strike s policy ” for

repe at
sex offender s in Texas, embody ing the leg islature’s intent to trea t repe at sex offende rs more harshly than other r epeat offende rs. Section 12.42(c) (2) mandates a life se ntence for a defe ndant 8


## convicted of

a sexual offe nse listed in Section 12.42(c)( 2)(A) that he committed af ter ha ving been pr eviously

convicted of

any of the e numera

ted sexual offense s in Section 12.42(c)( 2)(B ), or
“under the laws of a

nother state c ontaining e lements that are substantial ly similar to the elements of an [enumer ated] offe nse.” 9

1 1 6 S

. W

. 3 d 7 8 2 , 7 8 6 ( T e x
. C r
. A p p
. 2 0 0 3 )

. 8

T E X

. P E N

. C O D E § 1 2

. 4 2 ( c ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( v ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. M a n y s t a t e s s i g n i f i c a n t l y e n h a n c e p u n i s h m e n t f o r 9
o f f e n d e r s w h o h a v e b e e n p r e v i o u s l y c o n v i c t e d o f e n u m e r a t e d s e r i o u s o f f e n s e s w i t h i n t h a t s t a t e , o r c o m p a r a b l e o f f e n s e s i n a f

o r e i g n s t a t e
. T h e m o s t c o m m o n a p p r o a c h e s t o i d e n t i f y i n g c o m p a r a b l e o f

f e n s e s i n a f

o r e i g n s t a t e c a n b e g r o u p e d i n t o f

o u r c a t e g o r i e s : ( i ) t h e c o n d u c t c o m m i t t e d b y t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t h e f

o r e i g n s t a t e w o u l d b e p u n i s h a b l e a s a n e n u m e r a t e d o f

f e n s e i f c o m m i t t e d w i t h i n t h e s e n t e n c i n g s t a t e , s e e , e
. g
. , M E

. R E V

. S T A T

. t i t

. 1 7 , § 1 2 5 2 , 4

- B ; N E V

. R E V

. S T A T

. 2 0 0

. 3 6 6 ( 4 ) ; G A

. C O D E A N N

. § 1 7

- 1 0

- 7 ( b ) ( 2 ) ; ( i i ) t h e f o r e i g n o f

f e n s e i s s i m i l a r t o a n e n u m e r a t e d o f f e n s e , s e e , e
. g
. , D E L

. C O D E A N N

. t i t

. 1 1 , § 7 7 3 ( c ) ( 4 ) ; K A N

. S T A T

. A N N

. § 2 1

- 4 5 0 4 ; N

. C

. G E N

. S T A T

. § 7

. 7 ( b ) ; ( i i i ) t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e f

o r e i g n o f

f e n s e a r e t h e s a m e a s t h e e l e m e n t s o f a n e n u m e r a t e d o f f e n s e , s e e , e
. g
. , C A L

. P E N A L C O D E § 6 6 7

. 7 1 ; N

. Y

. P E N A L L A W § 7 0

. 0 4 ( b ) ; A R IZ

. R E V

. S T A T

. § 1 3

- 7 0 6 ; a n d ( i v ) a s i n T e x a s , t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e f o r e i g n o f f e n s e a r e s i m i l a r t o t h e e l e m e n t s o f a n e n u m e r a t e d o f f e n s e , s e e , e
. g
. , F L A

. S T A T

. c h

. 7 7 5

. 0 8 4 ( 1 ) ( c ) ( d e f i n i n g “ t h r e e t i m e v i o l e n t f

e l o n y o f f e n d e r ” a s a p e r s o n w h o h a s b e e n p r e v i o u s l y c o n v i c t e d o f t w o o r m o r e e n u m e r a t e d o f f e n s e s , o r

“ a n o f f e n s e w h i c h i s i n v i o l a t i o n o f a l a w o f a n y o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n i f t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e o f f e n s e a r e s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r t o t h e e l e m e n t s o f a n y [ e n u m e r a t e d ] o f f e n s e ” ) ; W Y O

. S T A T

. A N N

. § 6

- 2

- 3 0 6 ( b ) , ( d ) ( r e q u i r i n g l i f e i n p r i s o n w i t h o u t p a r o l e f

o r a p e r s o n c o n v i c t e d o f a n e n u m e r a t e d o f f e n s e a f t e r h a v i n g b e e n p r e v i o u s l y c o n v i c t e d o f t w o o r m o r e e n u m e r a t e d o f

f e n s e s “ o r a c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e f r o m a n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n c o n t a i n i n g t h e s a m e o r s i m i l a r e l e m e n t s a s [ a n e n u m e r a t e d o f

f e n s e ] ” ) ; C O N N

. G E N

. S T A T

. § 5 3 a - 4 0 ( b )

. T h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t h e f i r s t t h r e e a p p r o a c h e s a n d t h e T e x a s a p p r o a c h h i g h l i g h t s o u r s t a t u t e ’ s f o c u s o n s i m i l a r i t y b e t w e e n e l e m e n t s , a s o p p o s e d t o t h e c o n d u c t c o m m i t t e d , s i m i l a r i t y b e t w e e n o f

f e n s e s , o r e q u i v a l e n c e b e t w e e n e l e m e n t s
.

## Prudholm - 4

Whil e the phr ase “ substantially simil ar” has not bee n define d by statute, our pre cede nt
and esta blished canons of

statutory construction provide insight into its meaning. O ur only case to apply the phra se to the laws of

another state is Ex parte W

hite

. I n W

hite , the def

endant ha d 1 0 

## been pr eviously

convicted in De lawar e of unla wful sexual contact in the se cond deg ree , which

was c ommitt ed “w hen [a person] intentionally has sexual contact with anothe r per son who is less than 16 y ear s of ag e or c auses the vic tim to have sexual contact with him or a third per son.” We 1 1


## found that the De lawar e off ense c ontained ele ments that were substantially simil ar to the
elements of the Texas offense of indec ency with a child, which is committed when, “ with a child

y oung er tha

n 17 y ear s and not the per son’s spouse, whe ther the c hild is of the same or opposite
sex, t he per son: ... eng ag es in sexual contact with the child or c auses the c hild to enga g e in
sexual contact ....” 1 2 

## Our finding in W

hite war rante d no discussion, but it is helpful to compare the statutes that

wer e involved. We held that the statutes we re substantially simil ar de spite three dif

fer ence s in the
elements of the offe nses: (i) the c ircumstance of the victim’s ag e wa s differ ent by one y ear ; (ii)
the Dela war e off ense did not conta in an eleme nt that the victim was “not the pe rson’s spouse” ; and (iii) the De lawar e off ense de fined “ sexual contact” a s a touching which, “unde r the
circ umstances a s viewed by a re asonable person, is intended to be sexual in nature,” wher eas 1 3

2 1 1 S

. W

. 3 d 3 1 6 , 3 1 8 ( T e x
. C r
. A p p
. 2 0 0 7 )

. I n G r i f f i t h , w e u s e d t h e e x i s t e n c e o f S e c t i o n 10 1 2

. 4 2 ( c ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( v ) t o s u p p o r t o u r h o l d i n g t h a t t h e e n u m e r a t e d o f f e n s e s i n S e c t i o n 1 2

. 4 2 ( c ) ( 2 ) ( B ) i n c l u d e t h e s t a t u t o r y p r e d e c e s s o r s t o t h o s e o f f e n s e s
. 1 1 6 S

. W

. 3 d , a t 7 8 8

.
W h i t e , 2 1 1 S

. W

. 3 d , a t 3 1 8 ( q u o t i n g D E L

. C O D E A N N

. t i t

. 1 1 , § 7 6 8 )

. 11

I d

. ( q u o t i n g T E X

. P E N

. C O D E

. § 2 1

. 1 1 ( a ) )

. I n 2 0 0 9 , t h e p h r a s e “ a n d n o t t h e p e r s o n ’ s s p o u s e ” w a s r e p l a c e d 12 b y “ o f a g e
. ” T h e s p o u s e e l e m e n t w a s m o v e d t o S e c t i o n 2 1

. 1 1 ( b

- 1 ) a n d r e c a s t a s a n a f f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e
. A c t o f M a y 3 0 , 2 0 0 9 , 8 1 s t L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 2 6 0 , § 1

.

D E L

. C O D E A N N

. t i t

. 1 1 , § 7 6 1 ( f )

. 13

## Prudholm - 5

the Texas offe nse def

ined “se x ual contac t” as a touching , if committed “with the intent to arouse

or g ratify the sexual desire of a

ny person.” The one -y ear

ag e diffe renc e provide s a g ood 1 4 

## example of eleme nts that are substantially simil ar, but not identica l. The abse nce of the spouse
element in the De lawar e off ense shows tha t one offe nse nee d not have e very element of

the other. Finally , the diffe renc e in the spec ific intent shows that, while an e lement of the f oreig n offe nse can be proved by

a fa ct that would be insuff icient to prove the respe ctive Te x as ele ment, the 1 5 

## elements may

still be substantially

simil ar.
W hite thus provided helpful e x amples of how the phrase is applied, but did not attempt to provide a g ener al interpre tation of “substantially simil ar.” We may derive such a g ener al interpre tation by apply ing e stablished canons of statutory
construction re lating to the te x t. Pursuant to such established c anons of c onstruction, we may 1 6 

## presume tha t eac h word in the statute ha s a purpose , and that wor ds not defined in the statute a re used in their ordina

ry and common sense

. I n common usag e, “substantial” means “ to a larg e 1 7

T E X

. P E N

. C O D E § 2 1

. 1 1 ( c )

. 14

F o r e x a m p l e , a D e l a w a r e d e f e n d a n t c o u l d b e c o n v i c t e d f o r a t o u c h i n g t h a t w a s i n t e n d e d t o b e s e x u a l i n 15

n a t u r e b u t w a s u l t i m a t e l y i n t e n d e d t o e m b a r r a s s o r h u m i l i a t e t h e v i c t i m , w h e r e a s s u c h i n t e n t w o u l d n o t s u f f i c e u n d e r t h e T e x a s s t a t u t e t o s h o w a n i n t e n t t o a r o u s e o r g r a t i f y a n y p e r s o n ’ s s e x u a l d e s i r e
.
W e h e l d i n B o y k i n v
. S t a t e t h a t “ i f t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e s t a t u t o r y t e x t , w h e n r e a d u s i n g t h e e s t a b l i s h e d 16
c a n o n s o f c o n s t r u c t i o n r e l a t i n g t o s u c h t e x t , s h o u l d h a v e b e e n p l a i n t o t h e l e g i s l a t o r s w h o v o t e d o n i t , w e o r d i n a r i l y g i v e e f f e c t t o t h a t p l a i n m e a n i n g
. ” 8 1 8 S

. W

. 2 d 7 8 2 , 7 8 5 ( T e x
. C r
. A p p
. 1 9 9 1 ) ( c i t i n g 8 2 C

. J

. S

. S t a t u t e s f o r e s t a b l i s h e d c a n o n s o f c o n s t r u c t i o n ) ; s e e a l s o i d

. , a t 7 8 5 n
. 3 ( n o t i n g t h a t t h e s e c a n o n s o f c o n s t r u c t i o n “ a r e n o m o r e t h a n r u l e s o f l o g i c f

o r t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t e x t s ” )

. O n l y w h e n t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e “ w o u l d l e a d t o a b s u r d r e s u l t s , o r i f t h e l a n g u a g e i s n o t p l a i n b u t r a t h e r a m b i g u o u s , ... i s i t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p e r m i s s i b l e f o r a c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r
... e x t r a t e x t u a l f

a c t o r s
. ” I

d

. , a t 7 8 5

. 8 2 C

. J

. S

. S t a t u t e s § § 3 8 5 , 3 8 6 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; s e e a l s o T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 3 1 1

. 0 1 1 ( a ) ( “ W o r d s a n d p h r a s e s 17
s h a l l b e r e a d i n c o n t e x t a n d c o n s t r u e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e r u l e s o f g r a m m a r a n d c o m m o n u s a g e
. ” ) ; T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 3 1 1

. 0 2 1 ( 2 ) ( “ I n e n a c t i n g a s t a t u t e , i t i s p r e s u m e d t h a t

... t h e e n t i r e s t a t u t e i s i n t e n d e d t o b e e f f e c t i v e
. ” )

.

## Prudholm - 6

extent” while “similar” mea ns “having a likeness or

rese mblance.” Tog ether with compara tive 1 8 

## words like “similar,” “majority ,” or “ probability ,” the c ombination with “substantial” or “substantially ” mea

ns something sig nificantly g rea ter than the modified word, whe rea s with
absolute words like “ complete,” “ce rtain,” or “all,” the combination with “substantially ” mea ns something only

slightly less than the modified wor d (“similar” ).. B ased on this common usag e, we hold that the e lements being compar ed pursua nt to Penal Code Section 12.42(c) (2)( B) (v) must displ ay

a hig h deg ree of likeness, but may be less than identica l.
We are still left, howe ver, w ith the critical que stion of the respe ct in which the e lements must displ ay

a hig h deg ree of likeness. F or example, eleme nts could be substantially simil ar w ith

respe ct to g ener al cha

rac teristics such as te rminology , function, and ty pe of ele ment, or with 1 9



## respe ct to specific char acte ristics such as the se riousness of violent or se x ual aspe cts. The provisions guiding statutory construction in Penal Code Sec tion 1.02, entitled Objectives of Code, sug g est the answe r to this question: The g ener al purposes of

this code ar e to establish a sy stem of prohibitions, penalties, a

nd corr ectional mea sures to dea l with conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably

cause s or threa tens harm to those individual or public intere sts for which state pr otection is appropr iate. To this end, the pr ovisions of the code a re intended, and sha ll be construed, to a chieve the following objectives: ... (3) to presc ribe pe nalties that are proportionate to the se riousness of off enses a nd that permit rec og nition of differe nces in re habilitation possibi lities among individual

T h e R a n d o m H o u s e D i c t i o n a r y o f t h e E n g l i s h L a n g u a g e 1 8 9 7 , 1 7 8 2 ( 2 d e d

. 1 9 8 7 ) ; s e e E x p a r t e R e i c k , 18 1 4 4 S

. W

. 3 d 5 1 0 , 5 1 2 ( T e x
. C r
. A p p
. 2 0 0 4 ) ( “ I n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e p l a i n m e a n i n g o f a w o r d , w e i n i t i a l l y l o o k t o d i c t i o n a r y d e f

i n i t i o n s
. ” )

. S e c t i o n 1

. 0 7 ( a ) ( 2 2 ) o f t h e P e n a l C o d e d e f i n e s t h e t e r m “ e l e m e n t o f o f f e n s e ” t o i n c l u d e f

o u r t y p e s : t h e 19 f o r b i d d e n c o n d u c t , t h e r e q u i r e d c u l p a b i l i t y , a n y r e q u i r e d r e s u l t , a n d t h e n e g a t i o n o f a n y e x c e p t i o n t o t h e o f f e n s e
.

## Prudholm - 7

offe nders. 2 0


## There fore , based on the objectives in Penal Code Sec tion 1.02, we furthe r hold that the ele ments must be substantially

simil ar w ith respec t to the individual or public interests protec ted and the impact of the e lements on the ser iousness of the off enses. 2 1


## Whil e we ultimately

aff irm the judg ment of the Court of Appe als, we must clar ify its interpre tation of “substantially simil ar.” First, “tha t a per son g uilty of the [foreig n] l aw would also be g uilty

under the Texas law” is not a disposit ive consider ation. On the contr ary , in W hite 2 2


## we f ound elements to be substantially simil ar de spite the possibili ty that a per son could be found

g uilty in Delawa

re on pr oof of f

acts insuffic ient to prove g uilt in Tex as. Also, this C ourt has not

2 3

S e e a l s o 8 2 C

. J

. S

. S t a t u t e s § 3 9 9 ( “ I n c o n s t r u i n g a s t a t u t e t o g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e i n t e n t o r p u r p o s e o f t h e 20 l e g i s l a t u r e , t h e c o u r t m u s t l o o k t o t h e o b j e c t t o b e a c c o m p l i s h e d , t h e e v i l s a n d m i s c h i e f s o u g h t t o b e r e m e d i e d , a n d t h e p u r p o s e t o b e s e r v e d

. ” )

.

W e d o n o t f

i n d t h e p h r a s e “ s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r ” t o b e a m b i g u o u s , a n d t h u s n e e d n o t r e s o r t t o e x t r a t e x t u a l 21 f a c t o r s
. B u t w e n o t e t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f s i m i l a r s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s i n W y o m i n g a n d F l o r i d a , s e e s u p r a a t n
. 1 1 , s u p p o r t s o u r h o l d i n g
. I n H e i n e m a n n v
. S t a t e , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t o f W y o m i n g f o u n d e l e m e n t s t o b e s i m i l a r b a s e d o n a s i m i l a r “ d a n g e r t o s o c i e t y , ” s u p p o r t i n g o u r l o o k t o i n d i v i d u a l o r p u b l i c i n t e r e s t s p r o t e c t e d

. T h e C o u r t h e l d t h a t b e c a u s e a C o l o r a d o s e x u a l a s s a u l t o f f e n s e “ c o n t a i n [ e d ] t h e s a m e o r s i m i l a r e l e m e n t s ” a s a W y o m i n g s e x u a l a s s a u l t
o f f e n s e , a n a t t e m p t t o c o m m i t t h e C o l o r a d o o f f e n s e c o u l d a l s o b e u s e d f o r e n h a n c e m e n t

. 1 2 P

. 3 d 6 9 2 , 6 9 8 ( W y o
. 2 0 0 0 )

. T h e C o u r t r e a s o n e d t h a t “ t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a n a t t e m p t a n d a c o m p l e t e d c r i m e i s o n l y w h e t h e r t h e a n t i s o c i a l b e h a v i o r s u c c e e d e d

. T h e d a n g e r t o s o c i e t y i s t h e s a m e w h e t h e r o r n o t a n o f f e n d e r s u c c e e d s i n h i s c r i m i n a l
e n d e a v o r
. ” I

d

. I n R o b i n s o n v
. S t a t e , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t o f F l o r i d a c o n s i d e r e d t h e i m p a c t o f a n e l e m e n t o n t h e s e r i o u s n e s s o f a n o f f e n s e
. 6 9 2 S o
. 2 d 8 8 3 , 8 8 7 ( F l a
. 1 9 9 7 )

. T h e C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e G e o r g i a o f f e n s e o f r o b b e r y b y s u d d e n s n a t c h i n g ( “ A p e r s o n c o m m i t s t h e o f f e n s e o f r o b b e r y w h e n , w i t h t h e i n t e n t t o c o m m i t t h e f t , h e t a k e s p r o p e r t y o f a n o t h e r f

r o m t h e p e r s o n o r t h e i m m e d i a t e p r e s e n c e o f a n o t h e r
... b y s u d d e n s n a t c h i n g ” ) w e r e n o t s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r t o t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e F l o r i d a o f f e n s e o f r o b b e r y ( “ [ t ] h e t a k i n g o f m o n e y o r o t h e r p r o p e r t y w h i c h m a y b e t h e s u b j e c t o f l a r c e n y f

r o m t h e p e r s o n o r c u s t o d y o f a n o t h e r , w i t h i n t e n t t o e i t h e r p e r m a n e n t l y o r t e m p o r a r i l y d e p r i v e t h e p e r s o n o r t h e o w n e r o f t h e m o n e y o r o t h e r p r o p e r t y , w h e n i n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e t a k i n g t h e r e i s t h e u s e o f f o r c e , v i o l e n c e , a s s a u l t , o r p u t t i n g i n f e a r ” )

. I d

. ( q u o t i n g G A

. C O D E

. A N N

. § 1 6

- 8

- 4 0 ; F L A

. S T A T

. § 8 1 2

. 1 3 ( 1 ) )

. T h e C o u r t f o u n d t h a t t h e e l e m e n t s w e r e n o t s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r b e c a u s e t o p r o v e r o b b e r y , “ t h e r e m u s t b e r e s i s t a n c e f r o m t h e v i c t i m t h a t i s o v e r c o m e b y t h e p h y s i c a l f o r c e o f t h e o f

f e n d e r
. ” I d

. , a t 8 8 6

. T h e d i f

f e r e n c e w a s s i g n i f

i c a n t b e c a u s e

“ F l o r i d a c o u r t s h a v e c o n s i s t e n t l y r e c o g n i z e d t h a t i n s n a t c h i n g s i t u a t i o n s , t h e e l e m e n t o f f o r c e
... d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e o f f e n s e s o f t h e f

t a n d r o b b e r y
. ” I

d

. , a t 8 8 7

.
P r u d h o l m , 2 7 4 S

. W

. 3 d , a t 2 4 0 ( d i s c u s s i n g W h i t e )

. 22

S e e s u p r a , a t 5

. 23

## Prudholm - 8

“held the e lements of anothe r state’ s law to be substantially simil ar to the e lements of an [enumerated of

fense ] when the eleme nts of the other State’ s law parallel the eleme nts of a sing le
Texas offense .” We have f ound no leg al authority

for this “pa

rallel” test, and it seems of little 2 4


## assistance in apply ing the statute.
I I I . Application
We must first determine to which off ense the appellant’ s prior convic tion should be

compar ed. B efor e trial, the State a rg ued that the e lements of sexual battery wer e substantially
simil ar to the e lements of ag g rava ted kidnapping . I n its reply on direc t appea l, however , the State also compar ed sexual battery to sex ual assault. The Court of Appea ls discussed sexual assault,
but it did not discuss ag g rava ted kidnapping

. 2 5



## I n its petiti on for discr etionary revie w, the State ag ain ar g ues sexual assault and

ag g rava ted kidnapping as alter

native possibiliti es, and the appellant ha s responde d to both possibili ties. We shall therefor e ana ly ze whether

the eleme nts of sexual battery are substantially
simil ar to the e lements of either sexual assault under Section 22.011(a )(1) or ag g rava ted kidnapping under Sec tion 20.04(a)( 4). We shall set out the full text of ea ch off ense a nd its
define d terms, bre ak the of fense s into elements conducive to comparison, and the n look for
substantial simi larity

betwee n elements.

I d

. , a t 2 3 9 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. S e e a l s o P r u d h o l m , 2 7 4 S

. W

. 3 d , a t 2 4 4 ( K e y e s , J

. , d i s s e n t i n g ) ( a r g u i n g t h a t 24 t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s C a l i f

o r n i a c o n v i c t i o n w a s “ d i r e c t l y p a r a l l e l t o ” T e x a s a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g ) ; W a g n e r v
. S t a t e , 2 0 0 9 W L 8 3 8 1 8 7 , a t * 1 4 ( T e x
. A p p
. – H o u s t o n [ 1 4 D i s t

. ] M a r c h 3 1 , 2 0 0 9 , p e t

. r e f ’ d ) ( “ E l e m e n t s o f a n o t h e r s t a t e ’ s l a w t h

a r e c o n s i d e r e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r
... w h e n t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e o t h e r s t a t e ’ s l a w p a r a l l e l t h e e l e m e n t s o f a s i n g l e T e x a s o f f e n s e
. ” ) ( c i t i n g P r u d h o l m )

.
I d

. , a t 2 4 1 ; b u t s e e P r u d h o l m , 2 7 4 S

. W

. 3 d , a t 2 4 4 ( K e y e s , J

. , d i s s e n t i n g ) ( f i n d i n g s e x u a l b a t t e r y t o b e 25

“ d i r e c t l y p a r a l l e l t o ” a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g )

.

## Prudholm - 9
A. California Sexual Ba ttery
The a ppellant was pr eviously

convicted of

a 1996 sexual battery

under Califor

nia Penal Code Section 243.4(a) . Be low are portions of the statute as it appe are d at the time the appe llant
committed the offe nse in 1996: 2 6 

## 243.4. (a) Any

person who touc hes an intimate pa rt of anothe r per son while that person is unlawful ly restrained by the accuse d or an accom plice , and if the touching is ag ainst the will of the per son touched a nd is for the purpose of sexual arousa l, sex ual g ratifica

tion, or sexual abuse, is guilty of sexual battery

. ... (d) ( 1) Any

person who touc hes an intimate pa rt of anothe r per son, if the touching is ag ainst the will of the per son touched, a nd is for the spec ific purpose of sexual arousa l, sex ual g ratifica

tion, or sexual abuse, is guilty of misdemeanor

sexual battery , .... (2) As use d in this subdi vision, “touches” me ans phy sical conta ct with another person, whe ther a ccomplished dire ctly , throug h the clothing of the pe rson committing the off

ense, or throug h the clothing of the victim. (e) As used in subdivisions (a), (b) , and (c ), “touc hes” me ans phy sical conta ct with the skin of another

person whe ther a ccomplished dire ctly or throug h the clothing of

the per son committi ng the offe nse. (f) As used in this section, the following terms have the following meaning s: (1) “ I ntimate part” means the se x ual org an, anus, g roin, or buttocks of a ny person, and the br east of a

fema le. (2) “ Sex ual batter

y ” does not include the cr imes defined in Sec tion 261 (rape ) or 289 (sexual penetra tion). ... 2 7


## Subdivis ion (d) conta ined the root of the offe nse, which w as a misdemea nor punishable

P u n i s h m e n t m a y b e e n h a n c e d u n d e r S e c t i o n 1 2

. 4 2 ( c ) ( 2 ) ( a s i t a p p e a r e d a t t h e t i m e t h e i n s t a n t o f f e n s e w a s 26
c o m m i t t e d ) i f t h e l a w o f a n o t h e r s t a t e ( a s i t a p p e a r e d a t t h e t i m e t h e p r e v i o u s o f f e n s e w a s c o m m i t t e d ) c o n t a i n s e l e m e n t s t h a t a r e s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r t o t h e e l e m e n t s o f a n e n u m e r a t e d T e x a s o f f e n s e ( a s i t a p p e a r e d a t t h e t i m e t h e i n s t a n t o f

f e n s e w a s c o m m i t t e d )

. S e e G r i f f i t h , 1 1 6 S

. W

. 3 d , a t 7 8 5 ( a p p l y i n g S e c t i o n 1 2

. 4 2 ( c ) ( 2 ) a s i t a p p e a r e d a t t h e t i m e t h e i n s t a n t o f

f e n s e w a s c o m m i t t e d ) ; s e e a l s o S c o t t v
. S t a t e , 5 5 S

. W

. 3 d 5 9 3 ( T e x
. C r
. A p p
. 2 0 0 1 ) ( d i s c u s s i n g e x p o s t f a c t o l i m i t a t i o n s o n a p p l i c a t i o n o f S e c t i o n 1 2

. 4 2 ( c ) ( 2 ) )

. C A L

. P E N A L C O D E § 2 4 3

. 4 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. A n e w s u b d i v i s i o n ( c ) s p e c i f y i n g a d d i t i o n a l a g g r a v a t i n g 27
c o n d u c t w a s i n s e r t e d b y a 2 0 0 2 a m e n d m e n t

.

## Prudholm - 10

by up to six months im prisonment. Subdivis ions (a) throug h (c) included ag g rava ting c onduct 2 8


## or circ umstances, whic h we ha ve italicized in subdivisi on (a) , and we re f elonies punishable by

up to four y ear s imprisonment. Whil e the phr ase “ unlawfully restra ined” wa s not defined by 2 9 

## statute, California c ourts interpre ted the phra se such that a person is unlawf

ully restra ined “whe n his or her liber

ty is being controlled by

words, ac ts or authority

of the pe rpetra

tor aimed a t depriving the per son’s liberty , and such r estriction is ag ainst the person’ s will.” 3 0



## For purposes of c omparison, we w ill align and numbe r the e lements of the of fense , toge ther with statutory

and judicial def

initions , as follows: (I ) for the purpose of

sexual arousal, sexual gr atifica tion, or sexual abuse, (I I ) a pe rson touches ( phy sical conta ct with the skin of another person whe ther acc omplished directly

or throug h the clothing of the pe rson committing the offe nse), (I I I ) an intimate pa

rt of anothe r per son (the sexual org an, anus, g roin, or buttocks of any person, a nd the bre ast of a f

emale) , (I V) while tha t person is unlawfully restra ined by

the ac cused or

an ac complice (his or her

liberty is being controlled by

words, ac ts or authority

of the pe rpetrator aimed at de priving the per son’s liberty , and such r estriction is ag ainst the person’ s will), and (V) the touching is ag ainst the will of the per son touched.
B. Te x as Sexual Assault
The off ense of sexual assault is defined in Penal Code Section 22.011(a )(1) as follows: (a) A per son commits an offense if the per son

C A L

. P E N A L C O D E § 2 4 3

. 4 ( d ) ( 1 )

. 28

C A L

. P E N A L C O D E § 2 4 3

. 4 ( a )

- ( c )

. 29

P e o p l e v
. A r n o l d , 7 C a l

. R p t r
. 2 d 8 3 3 , 6 C a l

. A p p
. 4 t h 1 8 , 2 8 ( C a l

. C t

. A p p
. 1 9 9 2 ) ( q u o t i n g P e o p l e v
. 30 P a h l , 2 7 7 C a l

. R p t r
. 6 5 6 , 2 2 6 C a l

. A p p
. 3 d 1 6 5 1 , 1 6 6 1 ( C a l

. C t

. A p p
. 1 9 9 1 ) )

.

## Prudholm - 11

(1) intentionally

or knowing ly : (A) c auses the pe netra tion of the anus or se x ual org an of a nother pe rson by any means, without that person’ s consent; (B ) ca uses the pene tration of the mouth of a nother pe rson by

the sexual org an of the actor , without that person’s conse nt; or (C) ca uses the sexual org an of a nother pe rson, without that person’s consent, to conta ct or pe netra te the mouth, anus, or se x ual org an of another person, including the ac tor .... 3 1


## Sex ual assault is a sec ond deg ree felony and as suc h is punishable by up to 20 y ear s imprisonment. 3 2



## For purposes of c omparison to sexual battery , the eleme nts of sexual assault may be alig ned and numbe red a ccor ding to the f ollowing two a lternatives:
One (I ) intentionally

or knowing ly , (I I ) a pe rson ca

uses the pene tration, (I I I ) (A) of

the anus or se x ual org an of a nother pe rson by

any means, or (B ) of the mouth of a

nother pe rson by

the sexual org an of the actor , (V) w ithout the other person’ s consent; or
Two (I ) intentionally

or knowing ly , (I I ) a pe rson ca

uses the conta ct or pe netra tion, (I I I ) by the sexual org an of the victim to the mouth, anus, or sex ual org an of another person, including the ac tor,

T E X

. P E N

. C O D E § 2 2

. 0 1 1 ( a )

. T h i s d e f i n i t i o n h a s n o t c h a n g e d s i n c e t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f t h e i n s t a n t o f f e n s e
. 31

T E X

. P E N

. C O D E § § 2 2

. 0 1 1 ( f ) , 1 2

. 3 3 ( a )

. 32

## Prudholm - 12

(V) w ithout the victim’s consent.

C. Texas Agg rava ted Kidnapping
The off ense of ag g rava ted kidnapping under Pena l Code Section 20.04(a) may be used a s
a pre vious conviction under Sec tion 12.42(c)( 2)(B ) “if the defe ndant committed the offe nse with
the intent to violate or abuse the victim sex ually .” Ag g rava ted kidnapping is defined a s follows: 3 3 

## (a) A per son commits an offense if he intentionally or knowing ly

abducts a nother person with the intent to:

. . . (4) inflict bodily

injury upon him or violate or abuse him sex ually

. 3 4 

## Ag g rava ted kidnapping is a first deg ree felony and as suc h is punishable by up to life or 99 y ear s imprisonment. The Pena l Code defines “ abduct” to mean “to r estrain a person with 3 5 

## intent to prevent his libera tion by : (A) se cre ting or holding him in a plac e whe re he is not li kely to be found; or ( B) using or threa tening to use dea dly forc e.” “Restra in” means “ to restrict a

3 6 

## person’ s movements without consent, so as to interfe re substantially with the person’ s liberty , by moving the pe rson from one place to another or by confining the per son.” This Court has 3 7



## rec og nized that the intent to “violate or abuse [t he victim] sex ually ” is not further define d within the Penal Code, but we have inter prete d the eleme nt as an intent to commit a “non-c onsensual

T E X

. P E N

. C O D E § 1 2

. 4 2 ( c ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( i i i )

. 33

T E X

. P E N

. C O D E § 2 0

. 0 4 ( a )

. T h i s d e f i n i t i o n h a s n o t c h a n g e d s i n c e t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f t h e i n s t a n t o f f e n s e
. 34

T E X

. P E N

. C O D E § § 2 0

. 0 4 ( c ) , 1 2

. 3 2 ( a )

. 35

T E X

. P E N

. C O D E § 2 0

. 0 1 ( 2 )

. 36

T E X

. P E N

. C O D E § 2 0

. 0 1 ( 1 )

. 37

## Prudholm - 13

sex act” upon the victim. 3 8



## For purposes of c omparison to sexual battery , the eleme nts of ag g rava ted kidnapping , toge ther with statutory

and judicial def

initions , may

be alig ned and numbe red a s follows: (I ) intentionally

or knowing ly , and (I I , I I I , V) with intent to abuse the vic tim sex ually (commit a non-c onsensual sex act) , (I V) a person a bducts another

person ( restric ts a person’ s movements without consent, so as to interf

ere substantially

with the person’ s liberty , by moving the person f rom one plac e to another

or by confining the per son, with intent to prevent his liberation by : (A) se cre ting or holding him in a plac e whe re he is not li kely to be found; or ( B) using or

threa tening to use dea dly forc e). D. Analy sis
Sex ual batter

y does not contain e lements that are substantially simil ar to the e lements of sexual assault. The “touching ” of a n “intimate par

t” involved in elements I I and I I I of the
California off

ense e ncompasses a

marke dly differ ent ra

ng e of c onduct than the “ penetr ation or

contac t” of a

person’ s “anus” or “se x ual org an” involved in e lements I I and I I I of the Te x as
offe nse. I ndeed, Sec tion 243.4(f)(2) of the California Penal Code spec ifically

excludes the
California c rimes of ra

pe and se x ual pene tration from the sc ope of se x ual batter y . Whil e the
elements of the California a nd Texas offense s may

be similar in a g ener al sense, the y do not display the hig h deg ree of likeness re quired to be substantially simil ar.
I n addition, the individual interests protecte d by the sexual elements of the Califor nia
offe nse ar e more like those interests prote cted by the Texas offe nse of a ssault under Sec tion 22.01(a) (3) – pr otection from the of fensivene ss of the conta ct – ra ther than those of the Texas

P h i l l i p s v
. S t a t e , 5 9 7 S

. W

. 2 d 9 2 9 , 9 3 6

- 3 7 ( T e x
. C r
. A p p
. 1 9 8 0 ) ; s e e a l s o S a n d e r s v
. S t a t e , 6 0 5 S

. W

. 2 d 38 6 1 2 , 6 1 5 ( T e x
. C r
. A p p
. 1 9 8 0 )

.

## Prudholm - 14

sexual assault statute and the California rape and sexual penetration statutes – protection from
the seve re phy sical and psy cholog ical tra uma of ra pe. F urthermor e, the diff

ere nce in the se x ual
elements re sults in a much less serious California of fense . Wit hout the restra int involved in
element I V, which is abse nt in sex ual assault, sexual battery is a misdemeanor

punishable by

only
six months im prisonment, while sexual assault is a second de g ree felony punishable by

20 y ear s imprisonment. Ag g rava ted kidnapping prese nts a closer question. The diffe renc e betwe en the se x ual
elements of the offe nses is worth noting, in that se x ual batter y contains a c onduct eleme nt requiring the touching of an intimate pa rt, wher eas a g g rava ted kidnapping contains a spe cific
intent element re quiring the intent to commit a non-consensua l sex act. More importantly , sexual battery require s only

an “unla wful re straint,” which is interpr eted a s the control of a person’ s liberty , ag ainst his will, by words, ac ts or authority

of the pe rpetrator aimed a t depriving the person’ s liberty

. On the other hand, ag g rava ted kidnapping require s an “a bduction,” which is a

n 3 9


## “unlawf ul restra int” – a substantial interfe renc e with the per son’s liberty , by moving the pe rson from one pla ce to a

nother or by

confining the per son – committed with the specific intent to

preve nt the victim’s liberation by secr eting or holding him in a place w here he is not likely to be found or using or threa

tening to use dea dly

forc e. The a dditional, substantive specific- intent

4 0 

## component of “ abduction” sug g ests that the re straint elements do not display a hig h deg ree of
likeness. The distinct individual interests protecte d by the re straint elements support this

A r n o l d , 6 C a l

. A p p
. 4 t h , a t 2 8

. 39

T E X

. P E N

. C O D E § 2 0

. 0 1 ( 2 )

. 40

## Prudholm - 15

conclusion. The Ca lifornia “unla wful re straint” ele ment protec ts indivi duals’ liberty interests,
while the Te x as “a

bduction” ele ment g oes bey ond protec ting liber ty interests to protec t ag ainst
the consider able r isk of death or serious bodily

injury involved in an abduc tion. Moreove r, the 4 1


## differ ence betwee n the re straint elements c auses a g rea t differ ence in the seriousness of the
offe nses, as de monstrated by the punishments available. E ven with ar g uably more ser ious sex ual elements, sexual battery

exposes a defe ndant to a maximum sentenc e of f our y ear s, where as
ag g rava ted kidnapping exposes a defe ndant to a maximum sentenc e of life or 99 y ear s. 4 2


## We conclude tha t sex ual batter y does not contain e lements that are substantially simil ar to
the eleme nts of ag g rava ted kidnapping or sexual assault. We theref ore a ffirm the judg ment of the Court of Appea ls and rema nd the ca se to the trial cour t for fur ther punishment proc eeding s.

Deliver ed Mar ch 16, 2011. Publis h.

S e e , e
. g
. , M IC H A E L B

. C H A R L T O N , 6 T E X A S P R A C T IC E : T E X A S C R IM IN A L L A W § 1 1

. 4 ( “ B e c a u s e t h e c r u x o f

41

a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g i s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f d e a t h o r s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y t o a n o t h e r , t h e L e g i s l a t u r e i n c l u d e d t h e s i x a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o c o v e r t h o s e s i t u a t i o n s w h e r e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f h a r m i s g r e a t e s t

. ” )

.

S i m i l a r l y , t h e d i f

f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e T e x a s e l e m e n t s o f “ r e s t r a i n s ” a n d “ a b d u c t s ” e l e v a t e s m i s d e m e a n o r 42

u n l a w f u l r e s t r a i n t t o f

e l o n y k i d n a p p i n g , e x p o s i n g a d e f e n d a n t t o a t e n - y e a r r a t h e r t h a n o n e - y e a r m a x i m u m s e n t e n c e
. T E X

. P E N

. C O D E § § 2 0

. 0 2 , 2 0

. 0 3

.