Hans Binnendijk, Charles Barry, Gina Cordero, 

Laura Peterson Nussbaum, Melissa Sinclair

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

August 2006 

Solutions for Northern Kosovo

Lessons Learned in Mostar, Eastern Slavonia, and Brčko
ii

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy 

or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials. 

Hans Binnendijk holds the Roosevelt Chair of National Security Policy at the National Defense 

University and is Director of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP). 

He previously served on the National Security Council as Special Assistant to the President and 

Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control (1999–2001). 

Charles Barry is a retired U.S. Army officer associated with the National Defense University 

since 1993 as a military analyst specializing in transatlantic relations, defense information 

systems, U.S. grand strategy, and Army force structure. Dr. Barry has been qualified as a 

military strategist for more than 20 years and is considered an expert on strategy, international 

relations, and information systems related to command and control. 

Gina Cordero is a Research Associate at the Center for Technology and National Security 

Policy, where she focuses on force transformation and transatlantic relations. She has previously 

worked at the Atlantic Council of the United States and has a B.A. in International Relations and 

Political Science from Boston University.

Laura Peterson Nussbaum is a freelance writer and editor. She spent two years in Mitrovica, 

Kosovo (2000–2002) as program director for the non-governmental organization World Hope 

International. She is currently completing a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy at The 

Fletcher School. 

Melissa Sinclair is a Research Associate at the Center for Technology and National Security 

Policy at the National Defense University. She spent two years in Mitrovica, Kosovo (2000–

2002) with the non-governmental organization World Hope International working on community 

development projects. She is currently completing a Master of Science in Peace Operations at 

George Mason University. 

Defense & Technology Papers are published by the National Defense University Center for Technology and 

National Security Policy, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. CTNSP publications are available online at 

http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html. 
iii

Contents

Executive Summary, by Hans Binnendijk.......................................................................................v 

Mitrovica: Setting the Stage, by Laura Peterson Nussbaum............................................................1 

Three Possible Models for Mitrovica’s Future ..............................................................................15 

 1. Mostar: De Facto Partition, by Charles Barry.......................................................................15 

 2. Eastern Slavonia: Rapid Reorientation, by Gina Cordero .....................................................29 

 3. Brčko: International Incubation, by Melissa Sinclair ............................................................41 

Workshop Recommendations, by Melissa Sinclair .......................................................................51 

Matrix: Summary of Cases ............................................................................................................56 
iv
v

Executive Summary 

By Hans Binnendijk 

The six-nation Contact Group on Kosovo, lead by former Finish President Martti 

Ahtisaari, is now engaged in discussions about the future status of Kosovo. If the Contact 

Group’s current guidelines are followed, Kosovo may become an independent country 

with no formal partitions. Under those circumstances, the treatment of the Serb minority 

in Kosovo (which currently makes up about 5–7 percent of the population) will be a 

critical issue in the negotiations. The largest concentration of those Serbs is north of the 

Ibar River, in and around the city of Mitrovica. 

To provide a historical context for consideration of the Mitrovica issue, the Center for 

Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) has examined three similar cases that 

were managed by the international community starting in the mid-1990s: Mostar and 

Brčko, in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Eastern Slavonia, in Croatia. By looking at 

the results of these three cases a decade or more after they began, we endeavor to shed 

light on the options for Mitrovica. To accomplish this, CTNSP held a workshop attended 

by many Balkan experts. In addition, CTNSP staff traveled to Mitrovica, Mostar, and 

Brčko to gather firsthand information relating to this problem. 

The observations and recommendations of CTNSP staff are presented here in the form of 

separate studies on Mostar, Brčko, and Eastern Slavonia that have been vetted by 

regional experts. The case studies are accompanied by background material on Mitrovica 

and a summary of the recommendations of the workshop. Each piece should be seen as 

the separate contributions of the workshop participants and the authors of the case 

studies, not as a unified study with consensus recommendations. A matrix at the end of 

this paper summarizes the three case studies and their relevance to Mitrovica. 

If the Contact Group excludes formal partition of Kosovo, three basic options for 

Mitrovica remain: de facto partition (Mostar), rapid reorientation (Eastern Slavonia), and 

ethnic integration in an international zone (Brčko). Each option reflects one of the three 

case studies examined, which are all similar to Mitrovica in that they each have a multiethnic population of between 100,000 and 200,000, each were strategically located and 

had seen intense fighting during the war, and each required special attention from the 

international community after combat ended. 

Mostar’s de facto partition is an option that some Kosovo Serbs could support. Mostar is 

similar to Mitrovica in that both cities are divided by a river serving as an ethnic 

boundary line (with minority enclaves on both sides), and both have many institutions 

that are ethnically separate. Since 2004, renewed efforts have been made to further 

integrate Mostar’s public institutions, but progress has been slow and superficial. Ethnic 

tension remains in Mostar and it is a potential flash point in BiH. As an integrated, multiethnic solution, it is the least successful of the three cases. Yet there has been relative 

peace since 1995, and Mostar has shed its last public ties to Zagreb and is firmly a part of 

BiH. Therefore, this tense model may be viable for Mitrovica, although less than 
vi

satisfactory from the standpoint of ethnic reintegration and reconciliation. Should the 

Mostar model be followed in Mitrovica, the parallel structures propagated by Serbia in 

Mitrovica north of the Ibar River would continue for some time, at least on an informal 

basis; Kosovar Serbs would be under Pristina’s legal jurisdiction, but their 

psychological—as well as financial—orientation and allegiance to Belgrade would linger 

for a long time. 

Eastern Slavonia’s rapid reorientation option would probably be supported by the 

Kosovar Albanians. From 1996 to 1998, a United Nations High Representative with a 

strong mandate reoriented the area from its old ties with Belgrade to new ties with 

Zagreb. There were significant efforts at ethnic reintegration, including minority quotas 

and Joint Implementation Committees, but they were only partly successful. Eastern 

Slavonia is similar to Mitrovica in that many local Serbs would be absorbed into a new 

nation where they would become a small minority. A key to the relative success of this 

model was Belgrade’s agreement to part peacefully with Eastern Slavonia after the 1995 

Croat military victory. The Eastern Slavonia model was successful in terms of its 

reorientation to Zagreb, but the price paid for reorientation was discrimination against 

Serbs, considerable Serb flight out of Croatia, and a weak economy. If Eastern Slavonia 

is chosen as a model for Mitrovica, the existing parallel structures between northern 

Mitrovica and Belgrade would be dismantled and all formal provision of governance and 

services within the territory of Kosovo would be established through Pristina. 

Considerable Serb flight could be expected. 

In Brčko, the international community created a special “incubation zone” designed to 

promote multi-ethnic ties and democratic principles. This experiment, run by a series of 

strong U.S. Supervisors, has been very successful in terms of local governance and 

economic growth. It has less successfully integrated Brčko into the state of BiH, partially 

because of its unique relationship to the state, being held in “condominium” by both (and 

thus neither) of Bosnia’s two entities, the largely Bosniak-Croat Federation and the 

mainly Serb Republika Srpska. With the help of three arbitration awards, all elements of 

government, the courts, education, and business in Brčko are now multi-ethnic and 

functioning relatively well. The economy of Brčko is strong and the area is stable. The 

overwhelming concern of those in power in Brčko now is that as the state of BiH is 

strengthened, Brčko’s ability to govern itself will be weakened and the social and 

democratic gains made in the district will digress. The model may be viable for Mitrovica 

if all parties are willing to agree to another special zone, likely run by a U.S. Supervisor, 

and if the United States is willing to take on the burden. But this outcome is unlikely, 

because too much time may have passed since the end of the conflict to implement such 

strong measures and because the political will on the part of the international community 

to take on such a project is lacking. 

Each model presents a different role for the international community in northern Kosovo. 

In the Mostar model, the international community’s main task would be to protect the 

Serb minorities from Kosovar Albanian extremists dissatisfied with the de facto partition 

outcome and bent on either driving all remaining Serbs out of Kosovo or subjecting them 

fully and directly to rule by Pristina. The international community might also need to deal 
vii

with Serbian paramilitary forces attempting to protect the local autonomy of the Serb 

minority. In the Eastern Slavonia model, Serbian interests would be under less threat by 

Kosovar Albanians, who would be more satisfied with the outcome. The international 

community would need to oversee the termination of the Belgrade-supported parallel 

structure in North Mitrovica, enforce a new relationship with Pristina, and seek some 

degree of ethnic integration. In fact, the international community would probably oversee 

considerable Serb flight. In the Brčko model, the international community would be 

required to play its largest role in administering and securing all aspects of a special 

Mitrovica zone. 

Several other key conclusions emerge from a review of these three case studies: 

• Formal and enforceable prior agreement among all parties is essential to success; 

• American diplomatic, political, and economic involvement, as well as a credible 

and visible American military presence, are keys to success; 

• Multi-ethnic power-sharing and rapid establishment of rule of law are also keys 

to success; 

• The international supervisor needs a strong and clear mandate, flexible use of 

resources, and military forces available with vigorous rules of engagement. The 

operational relationship between the international supervisor and the military 

commander must be effective, agreed upon, and clearly spelled out in advance; 

• Serb flight was a byproduct of two out of three of these cases and may well occur 

in Kosovo unless strong incentives exist for them to stay; 

• Developing healthy multi-ethnic solutions will take a decade or longer. 

Choosing the right solution for Mitrovica will be difficult. Along with positive outcomes, 

all three cases also reveal negative results. Mostar remains tense a decade later; adopting 

it as a model could incite Kosovar Albanian opposition and trigger violence. Eastern 

Slavonia is reoriented towards Zagreb but at the cost of discrimination against Serbs, 

which if adopted for Mitrovica would result in considerable Serb flight. Brčko is the most 

successful model in terms of ethnic integration and financial stability, but there is 

inadequate international support for investing in a special international zone north of the 

Ibar River over the long term. 

The overwhelming American interest is in regional stability, which includes a stable and 

independent Kosovo state that does not force the Serb minority to flee. Given enduring 

American principles and the history of the wars in the Balkans, the United States cannot 

be party to further ethnic cleansing by crafting options that force out the Serb minority. 

The Brčko model would accomplish this U.S. interest best at a local level, but it may not 

be internationally sustainable and may cause problems for future reintegration with 

Pristina and the rest of Kosovo. The most viable model might be a “Mostar Plus” case, in 

which Mostar’s very slow pace of ethnic and structural reintegration is accelerated and 

intensified. The Serb minority will need a high degree of autonomy in its own area, and 

the Eastern Slavonia model does not support that. In the Mostar Plus model that we 

recommend, ties with Belgrade need to be reoriented to Pristina slowly, in phases. 

International community pressure would have to be put on Pristina to protect its 

minorities against Albanian extremists. Institutional integration will be very slow but 
viii

must be encouraged and accelerated by Pristina with incentives for the Serbs. Kosovo 

will be the big winner diplomatically in the future status talks if it gains independence 

and avoids formal partition. Under those circumstances, the Pristina authorities must be 

magnanimous and accept a solution for Mitrovica that is somewhat less than their current 

negotiating position. A significant international commitment will be needed to provide 

stability, oversee the slow reorientation, and encourage ethnic integration. American 

troops currently in KFOR will be needed for some time north of the Ibar River to 

guarantee the success of this Mostar Plus model. 
Mitrovica: Setting the Stage 

By Laura Peterson Nussbaum

Brief History of the Region and Impact of Conflict 

The city of Mitrovica and its surrounding municipality are tucked into the northern corner 

of Kosovo, bordered by the Shala hills, extending northward to the east, and the Ibar 

River, which flows into the city from the west and creates the north-south ethnic division 

of the city . Just north of Mitrovica are the remains of the fortress of Zvecan, which 

protected Mitrovica's mines during the Byzantine era. The Serbian state controlled 

Kosovo from the late 12th century until the middle of the 15th century, when it was 

incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. Because of its geographical position, Mitrovica 

has not always been considered a part of Kosovo. Yugoslavia only joined the two 

administratively in the second half of the 20th century, when Mitrovica was made the seat 

of one of Kosovo's five regions, with ten small municipal units beneath it. 

The current municipalities of Zubin Potok and Zvecan were part of the Mitrovica 

municipality from the 1960s to the 1980s; Zubin Potok became its own municipality in 

1987, and Zvecan in 1991. Albanians did not recognize the separation of the 

municipalities and formed their own parallel government structures in response to being 

pushed out of the economy, schools, and government by the increasingly nationalist 

Slobodan Milosevic throughout the 1990s. These two municipalities, along with 

Leposavic, are now overwhelmingly Serb. With North Mitrovica, they form a de facto 

partition of northern Kosovo from the Albanian-dominated south. 

Determining the ethnic distribution of the population of Mitrovica before the 1998–1999 

conflict is a controversial process, as all sides try to demonstrate their ownership of the 

territory. The last full census in Kosovo was in 1981, when the Mitrovica municipality 

still included Zvecan and Zubin Potok. The population then was 105,322, two-thirds of 

whom were Albanian and one-quarter Serb and Montenegrin. By the time of the 1991 

census, Albanians were already being pushed out of the official economy and did not 

participate in the census. Serbian census takers estimated Albanian numbers, but most 

likely based them on exaggerated growth rates in an effort to fuel the argument that Serbs 

were under threat from the Albanian population. 

The distribution of the population was mixed before the conflict, with North Mitrovica 

having roughly equal Serbian and Albanian populations. The south side was 

predominately Albanian, with roughly 300 Serbs and around 6,000 Roma and Ashkali. 
2

Table 1. 1981 and 1991 Census Figures for Zvecan and Mitrovica According to 

Current Boundaries. 1

 

 Zvecan Mitrovica 

 

 1981 1991 1981 1991

Albanian 1,043 1,934 63,464 82,837

Serb and Montenegrin 8,409 7,882 13,544 10,698

Bosniak, Roma, Other 210 214 10,540 11,350

Total 9,662 10,030 87,548 104,885

 

During the Kosovo conflict, Serbian security forces forced out much of Mitrovica's 

Albanian population and destroyed hundreds of homes. When Albanians returned to 

Kosovo in June 1999 after the withdrawal of Serbian forces, some returned to their 

homes in the north of the city, primarily in the Bosniak Mahalla2 on the Ibar's north bank. 

However, in late 1999, the Serbs, feeling threatened that their control of North Mitrovica 

might be diluted by returnees, blocked Albanian entry into the north of the city, primarily 

through the Bridgewatchers, a newly formed group of thugs and former security 

personnel. French troops of NATO’s Kosovo Forces (KFOR) blocked off the bridges 

connecting both sides, and the city’s division began to harden. Albanians in turn burned 

the few Serbian homes in South Mitrovica and the Roma Mahalla.

3

Post-Conflict Population Distribution. Further violence over the next few years drove 

many of the Albanians remaining in the north to the south. The current population and 

ethnic makeup of the Mitrovica region is uncertain because there has been no attempt at a 

new census. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) estimates 

that North Mitrovica has approximately 20,000 inhabitants; 17,000 of those are Kosovo 

Serbs, of whom 5,000–7,000 are internally displaced persons (IDPs). The other 3,000 are 

Kosovar Albanians, Bosniaks, Roma, and Ashkali. The Albanians live primarily in three 

locations: Bosniak Mahalla, the so-called Three Towers on the north bank of the Ibar, 

and Kodra Minatoreve (Miner’s Hill). All locations have had KFOR protection 

throughout the last six years. The number of Bosniaks has declined significantly from the 

pre-conflict figure of 6,000 to around 2,000–3,000, living both north and south of the 

Ibar. The pre-conflict Roma population (around 6,000) of South Mitrovica has been 

displaced to the northern municipalities and Serbia proper. About 275 Roma live in a 

camp in the north of the town, and a small number of families live in private 

 

1

 European Stability Initiative (ESI), “A Post-Industrial Future? Economy and Society in Mitrovica and 

Zvecan” (background paper for Wilton Park Conference held January 30-February 1, 2004), 1–3. Available 

online at <http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_61.pdf>. 

2 Mahalla is Turkish for “neighborhood.” 3

 International Crisis Group (ICG), Bridging Kosovo’s Mitrovica Divide, Europe Report 165 (September 

13, 2005), 4. Available online at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3650&l=1>. 
3

accommodations in the south. About 40 Ashkali families still live in South Mitrovica. 

There are Turkish families on both sides of the river. One-third of the Gorani community 

remains in the south.4 The March 2004 violence added to the IDP strain, with an 

additional 1,000 Serbs and 260 Roma fleeing to North Mitrovica. Efforts of the UN 

Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to encourage returns generally have 

failed.5

Estimates of the population of South Mitrovica range from 65,000 to 95,000; apart from 

the minorities mentioned above, all are Albanian. A significant portion of these are IDPs 

from rural parts of Kosovo. Outside the city of Mitrovica, but within the northern 

municipalities, there are nine enclave villages: three Albanian in Leposavic, three 

Albanian in Zvecan, one Albanian in Zubin Potok, and two Serbian in Mitrovica. 

Insufficient Infrastructure. Mitrovica does not currently have the infrastructure to become 

two separate cities. Cultural and sports facilities are in the south. The only regional 

hospital is in the north and has become a base for Serbian activism. The much larger 

south has only a poorly equipped outpatient clinic; persons requiring in-patient treatment 

must take the hour drive to Pristina. The 20,000 Albanian school children are crammed 

into roughly the same number of schools as the 4,000 Serbian children.6

The locations of the traditional places of worship and burial are a further indicator of 

Mitrovica’s integrated past. The Ibar Mosque in the north, built in 1882, was completely 

destroyed in the conflict. The Serbian Orthodox Church, which was in the south, survived 

the conflict and was under 24-hour KFOR protection, until it was destroyed during riots 

in March 2004. A new Serbian Orthodox Church has been constructed in the north. The 

oldest and largest Muslim cemetery is in North Mitrovica, but no burials can take place, 

and visits can only be made on holy days and under KFOR protection. The only Serbian 

Orthodox cemetery is on the south side and can no longer be used. Serbs must use 

cemeteries in the northern municipalities.7

There is scant communication between the sides, which know little beyond rhetoric of 

each other’s plight and true interests. Neither group’s media publishes or broadcasts in 

the other’s language. 

Albanians have resisted the building of new schools and a new hospital on the south side, 

fearing it would only cement the division of the city—a position held as much out of 

stubborn pride as a desire to regain lost property in the north. The Serbs, on the other 

hand, fear that if Mitrovica remains one municipality, the return of Albanians, with their 

greater birthrates and greater private capital, will mean that Serbs lose control and 

freedom of movement in the only urban territory remaining.8

 

 

4

 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Mitrovica Municipal Profile (June 2006), 

2. Available online at <http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2005/12/1191_en.pdf>. 

5

 Internal UN memo on Mitrovica communities. 6

 ICG, Bridging Kosovo’s Mitrovica Divide, 11. 7

 OSCE, Mitrovica Municipal Profile, 15. 8

 ICG, Bridging Kosovo’s Mitrovica Divide,15. 
4
5

Significant Security Incidents. In addition to the frequent riots and intimidation of 

Albanians and internationals in the north, there have been a few significant violent 

incidents in Mitrovica since the establishment of the UNMIK administration. In January 

2001, Albanian youths rioted against French KFOR troops after a 15-year-old boy was 

killed by Serbian shooting and grenade attacks in the Bosniak Mahalla. Albanians 

claimed that the French had stood by and watched it happen. In March 2001, after the 

arrest of Serbs suspected of attacking police in North Mitrovica, Serbian gangs attacked 

UNMIK police with gasoline bombs, pulling them out of their apartments and beating 

them. After this, UNMIK evacuated from the north for several weeks.

In early 2002, tensions began building in the north after two Serbs were arrested on 

murder charges. On April 8, the Bridgewatchers attacked UNMIK police with stones, 

guns, and grenades after a fellow Bridgewatcher was arrested at a traffic checkpoint; 26 

International Civilian Police (CIVPOL) officers were wounded. French KFOR was once 

again criticized for failing to intervene, and UNMIK withdrew from the north once 

again.9

 

In March 2004, Kosovo exploded after the drowning of Albanian children in Mitrovica, 

allegedly at the hands of Serbs. Two days of rioting followed, with Albanians targeting 

the Serbian population and UNMIK. Nineteen people were killed and 900 were wounded, 

and many Serbian houses and churches were destroyed, including the Orthodox church in 

South Mitrovica. The KFOR and UNMIK response was drastically inadequate, and their 

credibility among all parties in Kosovo deteriorated rapidly. 

Differences Among the Northern Municipalities, North Mitrovica, and Serbian 

Enclaves in the South 

It is important to recognize that the Serbian population of Kosovo is not a unified force 

and that factions have varying interests at stake. The militant hardliners of North 

Mitrovica do not have as great a hold on the three northern Serbian municipalities or on 

the Serbian enclaves throughout southern Kosovo, where cooperation with UNMIK is 

more common. For the mostly small, rural municipalities of Zvecan, Zubin Potok, and 

Leposavic, Serbian dominance is unthreatened by potential Albanian returns and so they 

do not feel the need to take such defensive stances. They participated in Kosovo's 

October 2002 local elections and have elected assemblies. (North Mitrovica largely 

boycotted this election.) However, many Serbian institutions still function fully in these 

areas, and UNMIK’s influence is minimal. As in North Mitrovica, nearly all civil 

servants get salaries from both Pristina and Belgrade. An UNMIK official acknowledges: 

"It is Serbia. The UNMIK and PISG10 presence there is a skin graft, only kept in place by 

massive doses of immuno-suppressants."11

 

9

 Ibid.,11.

10 The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government are made up of local officials and share in interim 

management of Kosovo with UNMIK. See <http://www.unmikonline.org/civiladm/index.html>. 11ICG, Bridging Kosovo’s Mitrovica Divide, 5. 
6

The Serbian enclaves throughout the south of Kosovo realize that their future is to remain 

a minority surrounded by Albanians. Their primary interests are protection, freedom of 

movement, self-governance, and economic opportunity within Kosovo. They are thus 

more willing to work not only with UNMIK, but also with the PISG. Their institutional 

ties to Serbia are weaker than in the north. As further proof of the different directions of 

these Serbian entities, the southern enclaves are increasingly abandoned in the rhetoric of 

the northern politicians, some of whom advocate that all Serbs should just evacuate to the 

north and together push for partition, a move that many in the enclaves strongly resist.12

The Economic Dilemma of Mitrovica 

Mitrovica’s economic problems are Kosovo’s economic problems. With extremely high 

unemployment and no industry or production to speak of, Kosovo’s ability to sustain 

itself as an independent country is doubtful at this point. However, the card that many 

Kosovar Albanians think that they hold—and also the reason some believe Serbia is so 

reluctant to let Kosovo go—is the Trepca mining facilities in Mitrovica. The Trepca lead 

and zinc mines have been in use since the Middle Ages and stimulated Mitrovica’s 

development as an industrial center in the 19th century. 

During the Yugoslav period, Mitrovica was synonymous with Trepca, with up to 20,000 

jobs dependent on a large complex that included extraction, flotation, smelting, and 

downstream processing processes. The mines provided a shared industrial identity for 

Serbs and Albanians alike. However, poor management, overemployment, and 

insufficient upkeep have meant that Trepca has been unable to turn a profit since the 

1980s; it has produced nothing since 2000, when it was shut down by UNMIK for toxic 

pollution. Whether Trepca could ever contribute to the economy of Mitrovica and 

Kosovo again is questionable. It has an enormous amount of debt and would require even 

larger outside investment to become competitive. Moreover, many analysts believe that 

ore has been depleted to the point that mining may not be profitable. However, in August 

2005, mining was restarted on an experimental basis to help determine the future viability 

of the mines.13

Without Trepca, the public sector dominates the economy of the Mitrovica region. In the 

south, there are 4,000 jobs on the Kosovo budget, including teachers, policemen, health 

workers, and 779 maintenance employees at Trepca. In addition, there are another 8,000 

who receive a pension or social welfare payment. Another estimated 450 have well-paid 

international community jobs. The largest employer is the trading company Lux, which 

pays 300 workers from rents of its properties. The bus station and a bakery pay at most 

another 300 employees. The only significant foreign or domestic investment since 1999 

has been in residential housing, primarily funded by foreign reconstruction aid and 

diaspora remittances. But residential construction has been declining, with 40 

construction companies going out of business as of March 2003. The rest of the private 

sector is comprised primarily of small, family-owned shops and restaurants. Diaspora 

remittances contribute to the household income of many, but the amounts are declining as 

 

12 Ibid., 6. 

13 Ibid., 2.
7

more and more Kosovar Albanians abroad return—either by choice or because host 

countries revoke their refugee status. All told, the picture is grim, with the 2004 per 

capita income in South Mitrovica estimated at 38 euros per month.14 

The private sector is even weaker in North Mitrovica, which relies almost entirely on 

public budgets. Fewer than 2,000 are employed in the private sector or remnants of the 

old socialist industries—mostly in kiosks, restaurants, and shops. As with the south, the 

public sector is the largest source of income, most of which comes from Serbia. More 

than 60 percent (some 1.6 million euros per month) of the total income in North 

Mitrovica comes from Belgrade in the form of public sector salaries in the university, the 

hospital, and the parallel legal, utilities, and law enforcement systems.15 In addition, 

many of the 4,100 jobs on the Serbian budget come with a “Kosovo supplement” that 

matches up to 100 percent of the base salary as an incentive for Serbs to remain in 

Kosovo. Pristina also contributes 23 percent of North Mitrovica’s income—paying 

salaries for 1,800 public sector jobs, as well as pensions, social assistance, and Trepca 

stipends to more than 7,000 people. The Pristina budget, which comes entirely from local 

(Kosovo) tax revenues, is contributing 50 percent more per capita to North Mitrovica 

than to the South.16 However, the Serbs contribute almost nothing to either the Serbian or 

Kosovo budget through taxes, fees, utilities, and social security contributions. Given 

these factors, per capita monthly income in the north is 102 euros.17 This substantial 

subsidization of the north will need to be considered in any agreement on the region. An 

abrupt interruption of funding from Belgrade would be destabilizing for the Serb 

minorities. Any final status process would probably require the initial matching of these 

funds while the Serbian north developed its economic role as a service provider for all of 

Kosovo's Serbs. 

Kosovo and Mitrovica under International Administration 

Central Administration. After the NATO air strikes ended in June 1999 with Milosevic's 

withdrawal, Kosovo became a UN protectorate administered by UNMIK under the 

authority of UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). In April 2001, the new 

Constitutional Framework transferred several areas of authority to the PISG, which are 

dominated by the Albanians (see elections data below), although UNMIK kept key 

powers. Since then, PISG and UNMIK have increasingly clashed; UNMIK repeatedly 

has vetoed PISG statements regarding Kosovo’s future status. 

Since April 2002, UNMIK has followed the “standards before status” policy, which set 

forth eight standards of rule of law and multi-ethnicity that the Kosovo community and 

the PISG must meet before final status could be discussed—an effort by the international 

community to delay the discussion on independence until all sides had cooled down. The 

policy went nowhere, though, until the Contact Group (a six-nation oversight group 

consisting of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States) re-

 

14 ESI, “A Post-Industrial Future?,” 4. 

15 Ibid., 5. 

16 Ibid., 6. 

17 Ibid., 6–8. 
8

engaged in 2003 and announced that the review of final status could begin in mid-2005 if 

certain benchmarks toward the standards were met in accordance with a forthcoming plan 

for standards implementation. However, just days before the release of the 

implementation plan, the March 2004 violence shook Kosovo. The KFOR and UNMIK 

response was drastically inadequate, and their credibility among all parties in Kosovo 

deteriorated rapidly. Despite the fact that the benchmarks were not adequately achieved, 

the international community decided the status quo was no longer sustainable. Norwegian 

diplomat Kai Eide conducted the mid-2005 review, in the end reporting that, although 

progress on the standards was disappointing, delaying final status negotiations would not 

be helpful; negotiations were scheduled to start in early 2006. 

Mitrovica’s Parallel International Administration. The international administration of 

Mitrovica and the northern municipalities has been a little too multi-national, with 

Belgrade continuing to run parallel security and administrative sectors in opposition to 

UNMIK and in direct violation of UNSCR 1244. As noted above, Belgrade has a very 

large payroll within Kosovo—estimated at 1.6 million euros per month. The parallel 

municipal administration supported by those funds operates with near impunity in North 

Mitrovica and the northern municipalities. The Serbian Interior Ministry forces (MUP) 

operate openly in the North (see the security section below), and those they arrest are 

often tried at the court in Kraljevo in Serbia proper under Serbian law. The education and 

health services report to ministries in Belgrade, and the telephone system has been 

disconnected from Kosovo Telecom and reconnected to the Serbian system.18

The dominant political force in North Mitrovica and the northern municipalities is the 

Serb National Council (SNC). It was started in 1998 and 1999 by Kosovo Serbs and is 

closely aligned with Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia 

(DSS) party. The key Kosovo Serbian leaders in the SNC are Marko Jaksic, a DSS vicepresident and member of the Serbian parliament, and Milan Ivanovic, president of the 

SNC and director of the North Mitrovica hospital. All appointments to the parallel 

municipality go through Jaksic.19 Both men were the primary political “advisors” of the 

Bridgewatchers and are rumored to have links with organized crime. Oliver Ivanovic, one 

of the founders of the Bridgewatchers, is an influential Povratak member of the Kosovo 

Assembly and has been more willing to work with UNMIK and the PISG.20

In the face of Serbian resistance and the Belgrade-funded parallel police, judicial, and 

government structures, UNMIK’s efforts have had limited success. UNMIK policies have 

often been ambiguous and contradictory, despite the efforts of some effective UN 

administrators. William Nash, the first UN administrator in northern Kosovo after the 

invasion, had his hands full and clamped down on all sides in the hope that passions 

would simmer down, at which point reintegration plans could begin. But by early 2000, 

the multi-ethnic hospital, the court structure, and other public services in North Mitrovica 

 

18 International Crisis Group (ICG), UNMIK’s Kosovo Albatross: Tackling Divisions in Mitrovica, Europe 

Report 131 (June 2002), 3. Available online at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/ 

index.cfm?id=1603&l=1>. 

19 ICG, Bridging Kosovo’s Mitrovica Divide, 11. 20 ICG, UNMIK’s Kosovo Albatross, 10. 
9

were controlled by Belgrade’s parallel system, and UNMIK was never able to establish a 

full presence. 

However, over the next few years, UNMIK initiated Serbian-Albanian working groups 

on such city issues as care of cemeteries and programs to encourage coexistence and 

returns. Under constant KFOR protection, many Albanian families were returned to the 

Three Towers apartment block in the north. The Kosovo Police Service (KPS) eventually 

began patrolling the north with Serbian officers under UN supervision, with the police 

station being turned over to the local Serb KPS in 2005. An international judge and 

prosecutor were installed in the regional court in North Mitrovica. 

In February 2002, UNMIK established a local community office in North Mitrovica, 

intended as a first step toward superseding Serbian parallel structures by linking Serbs 

there to the Albanian-dominated municipal authority. Its 70 local positions were only 

partly filled, however, and Serbian employees frequently received threats from the 

Bridgewatchers. 

In October 2002, Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Michael 

Steiner proposed a “Seven Point Plan” for Mitrovica, in an effort to get the Serbs to 

participate in the 2002 municipal elections, and to begin to resolve the Mitrovica issue. 

Basically, the plan offered Serbs self-government based on the territories they dominated, 

municipal units established for “sizeable non-majority communities.” These units would 

have a council, an administration, and a budget, and would control primary and 

secondary education, primary health care, urban and rural planning, and the development 

of municipal services and facilities. However, it was not clear how these units would be 

linked to the larger municipality. 

The Serbian population in the enclaves—which is larger than that in the north—was 

initially left out of the plan, but a few weeks later, the “decentralization” plan was made 

Kosovo-wide. All sizeable non-majority communities could apply to establish municipal 

units. Steiner labeled the plan an effort to “bring government closer to the people,” and it 

received wide international support, including from the United States. However, the 

Serbs did not participate in the elections, and the decentralization plan didn’t go forward 

at that time, although it has since become a permanent part of Kosovo’s constant 

negotiation between majority Albanians and minority Serbs. Decentralization working 

groups were established, and in 2005, the PISG nearly passed a decentralization process. 

Critics hold that decentralization is “a step down the slippery slope of institutionalizing 

the ethnic divide,” contradicting UNMIK’s stated goals of multi-ethnicity.21 UNMIK has 

strongly denied this but has not explained how decentralization would lead to a multiethnic Kosovo. 

 

21 International Crisis Group (ICG), Kosovo’s Ethnic Dilemma: The Need for a Civil Contract, Europe 

Report 143 (May 28, 2003), 18. Available online at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/ 

index.cfm?id=\1625&l=1>. 
10

On November 25, 2002, after the Serbian boycott, the SRSG announced that the parallel 

municipality in the north would be closed and all Mitrovica reestablished under UNMIK 

authority. This, of course, did not happen, but UNMIK did open offices to provide 

services to the north, and eventually an eight-member Serb advisory board was 

established to help UNMIK “administer” North Mitrovica.22 

The current UN administrator for Mitrovica, Gerard Galucci, has focused on reaching out 

to the Serbian politicians and trying to bring them into closer cooperation with Albanians. 

He has had some success with working groups, but the Serbs recently withdrew from all 

cooperative efforts to protest how the final status negotiations are proceeding (see 

below). 

Elections Under International Administration. Since 1999, Kosovo has held municipal 

elections in 2000 and 2002; elections scheduled for 2006 have been postponed. Kosovo 

Assembly elections were held in 2001 and 2004. Unlike the majority of municipalities, 

Mitrovica did not have any type of municipal council before the municipal elections in 

October 2000; the city’s administration was the responsibility of UNMIK. According to 

data from the October 2000 municipal elections, there were 19 political parties: 12 

Kosovar Albanian, 2 Bosniak, 1 Ashkali, and 2 Turkish parties. The Kosovo Serbs 

boycotted the election and did not take the 11 seats appointed to them in the municipal 

assembly. The Albanian Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the party of war-time 

pacifist Ibrahim Rugova, won a majority of the assembly. The October 2002 municipal 

elections elected an assembly similar to that of 2000, with the LDK holding 24 seats, the 

Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) 15, the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) 

two, and the Justice Party (PD) one. The Serbs again boycotted.

In the Assembly elections in 2001, several Serbian parties formed the Kosovo Serb 

Koalicija Povratak (KP) which won 22 seats in the Kosovo Assembly. Koalicija 

Povratak, or Coalition Return party, has become the primary Kosovo Serb interlocutor 

with the international community. However, they are constantly challenged by the SNC 

for their willingness to work with UNMIK.23 The Albanian LDK won the majority of 

Assembly seats, and elected Rugova as the first President of Kosovo. 

In the 2004 Assembly elections, Serbs were under considerable pressure from Belgrade 

and Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica to boycott although President Tadic suggested 

some participation. The Serbs did boycott, however, and a new coalition government was 

formed between Rugova's LDK and Ramush Haradinaj’s AAK. Haradinaj, a former KLA 

commander, was appointed Prime Minister, but had to resign after he was indicted by the 

International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). Bajram Kosumi, also of the 

AAK, succeeded him. Haradinaj is currently on release awaiting his trial. In early 2006, 

the leadership of Kosovo changed drastically after President Ibrahim Rugova died. He 

was replaced by Fatmir Sejdiu. Discontent with the passive Kosumi led AAK to replace 

its leader in March with former KLA commander and KPC commander Agim Ceku. 

 

22 OSCE, Mitrovica Municipal Profile, 8. 23 Ibid., 5. 
11

Security Forces and Law Enforcement in Kosovo 

KFOR. Kosovo was divided into security sectors overseen by French, American, British, 

German, and Spanish troops. Mitrovica and the northern municipalities have been under 

French command since 1999. France has just over 3,400 troops under its command, of 

whom 2175 are from France, 444 from Morocco, 282 from Denmark, 200 from Belgium, 

186 from Greece, 103 from Lithuania, and 23 from Luxembourg.24 

French KFOR has been repeatedly criticized for not taking sufficiently robust measures 

in the north to create a secure environment in which UNMIK can work. For example, 

UNMIK police know that if they try to apprehend an SNC leader or former 

Bridgewatcher, a mob will instantly mobilize and that KFOR will do little to intervene. 

Therefore UNMIK’s efforts are effectively limited to efforts considered acceptable to the 

Serbs.25 This of course makes it nearly impossible to do anything with the parallel 

structures that undermine UNMIK. UN staff who have lived in North Mitrovica have had 

to repeatedly evacuate to the south because of the poor security situation. 

In certain crises, troops from other areas, including German and American troops, are 

brought in to provide a more diverse, and according to some, more robust KFOR 

presence. Many have called for the French KFOR to be permanently replaced by either 

British or American troops, believing that their ROEs would be more appropriate to the 

Mitrovica situation. The French KFOR have argued, however, that their mandate is to 

keep peace, and more robust measures would cause instability.26 

The controversy over whether the French should be replaced or not may become moot. 

As of 2004, the national caveats to ROEs have been removed, and KFOR is restructuring 

into more of a taskforce arrangement where the KFOR commander can send who he 

wants where he wants, without stepping on the toes of a regional brigade. The obvious 

hope for Mitrovica is increased effectiveness. 

Kosovo Police Service (KPS). The KPS has 864 officers in the Mitrovica region. The 

officers are Albanian, Serbian, Bosniak, Ashkali, and Turkish; 118 of them are female. 

The municipality has two police stations, one in the north and one in the south, and a 

regional police headquarters in the south. By the end of 2005, both police stations had 

been turned over to local KPS command, although the Regional Police Headquarters is 

still under UNMIK CIVPOL command. The 185 UNMIK police officers on duty in the 

Mitrovica region are primarily deployed in the monitoring and community policing units. 

In South Mitrovica, 145 KPS Officers and 2 CIVPOL Officers are on duty. At the 

Regional Police Headquarters 249 KPS and 37 CIVPOL Officers are on duty under the 

Regional Command structure.27 The KPS officers in South Mitrovica are nearly all 

Albanian and are very well received by the community—Albanians are happy to see their 

own in positions of authority once limited to Serbs. 

 

24 OSCE, Mitrovica Municipal Profile, 17. 25 ICG, Bridging Kosovo’s Mitrovica Divide, 23. 26 ICG, UNMIK’s Kosovo Albatross, 12. 27 OSCE, Mitrovica Municipal Profile, 16. 
12

The North Mitrovica station has 71 KPS Officers and 2 CIVPOL Officers on duty. The 

Serb KPS officers, most of whom are members of or support the SNC, are not alone in 

policing North Mitrovica. The Serbian MUP openly operate a station with over 70 

officers (some estimates are as high as 300). Their only concession to UNMIK’s 

authority is that the MUP officers don’t wear uniforms. The MUP officers greatly 

outnumber the two remaining CIVPOL officers and about match the KPS in North 

Mitrovica. The MUP station has a mainly monitoring and administrative role, but lets 

everyone know that Serbia is still pulling the strings. The MUP has hijacked much of the 

KPS’ functions, with citizens taking nearly 40 percent of their criminal complaints to 

MUP, rather than KPS. The actual number may be much higher because it seems that 

MUP officers examine complaints and decide which ones to send on to UNMIK and 

which to the KPS.28

Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). The KPC, which is basically the KLA transformed into 

a national guard of sorts, has a presence in South Mitrovica, but not in the north. At the 

moment, it performs ceremonial duties for VIPs, guards Roma/Ashkali camps and an 

ammunition depot, and does some reconstruction. Of the 5,000-person corps, 41 are 

Serbs, almost entirely from the enclaves in the south. 

Final Status Negotiations and Mitrovica 

On February 20, 2006, final status negotiations began under the guidance and mediation 

of former Finnish Prime Minister Martti Ahtisaari, serving as special envoy of the UN 

Secretary-General. In November 2005, the Contact Group set out ten principles on which 

the outcome of the status process should be based, including compatibility with 

international standards of human rights, democracy, and international law and 

contribution to regional security, sustainable multi-ethnicity, effective local self 

government or decentralization, safeguards for cultural and religious heritage, security 

arrangements, rule of law, and continued international supervision. The sixth principle 

has gained the most attention. 

The settlement of Kosovo's status should strengthen regional security and stability. 

Thus, it will ensure that Kosovo does not return to the pre-March 1999 situation. Any 

solution that is unilateral or results from the use of force would be unacceptable. 

There will be no changes in the current territory of Kosovo, i.e., no partition of 

Kosovo and no union of Kosovo with any country or part of any country. The 

territorial integrity and internal stability of regional neighbors will be fully 

respected.29

Organized in a series of rounds taking place in Vienna, it is anticipated that the 

negotiations will finish by the end of 2006. On May 4 and 5, 2006, the negotiating teams 

retackled the issue of decentralization—which is a code word for dealing with Mitrovica. 

 

28 ICG, Bridging Kosovo’s Mitrovica Divide, 26. 29 “The contact group sets out 10 leading principles for Kosovo status,” Zëri, November 2, 2005. 
13

The Pristina delegation has proposed the creation of four mainly Serb-inhabited 

municipalities, while Mitrovica would be a municipality with two sub-municipal units, 

governed jointly through a single Executive Council, and would have an international 

administrator for the coming years. 

At the same time, the Serbian delegation proposed creating 17 Serb-dominated 

municipalities, with North Mitrovica joining the municipality of Zvecan to form a new 

municipality of Zvecanska Mitrovica. Belgrade also explained its offer of “more than 

autonomy, less than independence,” in which Serbia officially offers Kosovo autonomy 

for the next 20 years, with the possibility of renewal. Serbia would keep responsibilities 

in the foreign policy sphere, border control, and protection of human rights, as well as in 

monetary and customs policy and protection of Serbian religious and cultural heritage. 

However there would be no military presence other than KFOR. 

 

Both sides rejected the other’s proposals out of hand, and the delegations will not discuss 

decentralization again in the negotiations. Most likely, the proposals will be evaluated by 

Ahtisaari’s team, along with the Contact Group, and a final version will be passed by the 

UN Security Council. 

After the round ended in an impasse, the Contact Group in June issued a 13-point plan 

that calls for the implementation of priority standards to address the concerns of 

minorities, primarily the Serbs at the negotiating table. The 13-point plan lays out 

requirements for the Kosovo Government and Assembly in the areas of IDP returns, 

security, the resolution of property issues that will guarantee the return of minorities to 

their properties, the full renovation of damages of the March 2004 riots, and the rule of 

law. The requirements must be met in 4 to 6 months. 
14
15

Three Possible Models for Mitrovica’s Future 

To provide historical and regional context for consideration of the Mitrovica issue, 

CTNSP staff examined similar peacekeeping cases that started in the mid-1990s: Mostar 

and Brčko, in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Eastern Slavonia, in Croatia. These 

three case studies are based on an NDU-sponsored workshop attended by many Balkan 

experts, visits by CTNSP staff to Mitrovica, Mostar, and Brčko, as well as the authors’ 

independent research. 

1. Mostar: De Facto Partition30

By Charles Barry31

Case Study Model Characteristics and Conclusions 

Mostar is a useful model in designing solutions for Mitrovica because of key ethnic, 

political, and geographic parallels: 

• Deep, abiding, bi-ethnic animosity and violence between civilian populations—

Croat-Bosniak in Mostar, Serb-Albanian in Mitrovica. The problems are arguably 

more intractable in Mitrovica than in Mostar because of much greater linguistic 

and cultural differences. 

• The proximity of an adjacent state with a keen interest in protecting its related 

minority group’s interests in an emerging state government—Croatia for Mostar 

Croats, and Serbia for Mitrovica Serbs. Croatia's sponsorship has faded over time 

because of the success of both Croatia's and Croat Mostar's economic recoveries, 

as well as Croatia's growing international interests beyond Bosnia. In addition, 

threats of violence to Bosnian Croats across Bosnia are greatly diminished. Serbia 

 

30 This case study draws on document research from the following: “Report on European Union 

Administration of Mostar (EUAM) and Office of the Special Envoy for Mostar (OSEM) from July 23, 

1994 to December 31, 1996,” unpublished report prepared January 31, 1998, by Sir Martin Garrod, former 

EU Special Envoy in Mostar; the Report of the Commission for Reforming the City of Mostar, December 

15, 2003, available at <http://www.oscebih.org/documents/34-

eng.pdf#search=%22Report%20of%20the%20Commission%20for%20Reforming%20the%20City%20of%

20Mostar%22>; Building Bridges in Mostar, International Crisis Group, Europe Report 150, November 20, 

2003; “Short History of the Office of the OHR-Mostar,” available at <http://www.ohr.int/ohroffices/mostar/history/default.asp?content_id=5533>; “Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, 

International Election Observation Mission–2004 Municipal Elections—Bosnia and Herzegovina,” OSCE 

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), October 3, 2004. Available online at 

http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/10/3695_en.pdf; U.S. State Department (INL) Fact Sheet on 

U.S. Participation in International Police (CIVPOL) Missions at <http://www.state.gov/ 

p/inl/rls/fs/47759.htm>; “Local Institutional Engineering: A Tale of Two Cities, Mostar and Brcko,” 

Florian Bieber, International Peacekeeping, 12, no.3, (Autumn 2005), 1–14. 31 The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions to this case study provided through peer reviews 

by: Ambassador Robert Beecroft, National Defense University; Dr. Kurt Bassuener and Dr. Enver 

Ferhatovic, Office of the OHR in Sarajevo; Gerhard Sontheim, OHR Brcko; and Mr. Ivan Susak, Lexington 

Institute. The opinions are mine, as is responsibility for any errors of fact or omission. 
16

on other hand appears destine to enjoy no major economic revival or international 

re-integration in the near future. 

• Fear of cultural annihilation, political disenfranchisement, and economic 

marginalization—the Croats in Bosnia and the Serbs in Kosovo. These fears fuel 

resistance to political integration and cultural reorientation of the two flagship, 

urban outposts of their cultures, Mostar and Mitrovica. 

• The presence of a major, irreducible, terrain feature as the geographic dividing 

line between the two conflicted parties—the Neretva River in Mostar and the Ibar 

River in Mitrovica—makes partition starkly apparent and integration more 

difficult to achieve. 

• The importance of international involvement. In both cases the majority is 

perceived to have prevailed only through international intervention, in particular 

that of the United States. 

• The near-congruency of religion and language with ethnicity. In the case of 

Mostar, the language division is contrived but it nonetheless works to buttress 

post-conflict divisiveness. These divisions are starker and more genuine in 

Mitrovica. 

The post-conflict evolution of Mostar also has parallel developments and circumstances 

in Mitrovica: 

• Administrative separation was the only initial solution in Mostar and may also be 

in Mitrovica because of the high level of mutual distrust and barely contained 

ethnic hostilities. 

• International police established integrated local police organizations and patrols 

from the beginning, but the effort did little to level the playing field with regard to 

law and order, as it has done in Brčko under a stronger and more successful 

international regime and a more committed local political class. 

• The administrative partition of Mostar, initially labeled an interim solution, 

quickly became entrenched due to the strong resistance of the parties (particularly 

the Croats) and the inconsistency of the international community in forcing 

progress. 

• “Temporary” separate municipal structures in both Mostar and Mitrovica have 

proved difficult to replace and have taken on permanency as intransigence 

persists. 

• By the time the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina took over in Mostar in January 1997, the administrative situation had 

already become entrenched during two years under the weak European Union 

Administrator Mostar (EUAM); in Mitrovica, resolution of final status will come 

after at least seven years of pre-existing administrative structures under UNMIK. 

• One side of the parallel structures of local governance in both cities was or is 

nurtured by an outside power. In Mostar, Croats received direct aid from Zagreb 

throughout the Tudjman era. In North Mitrovica, parallel structures maintain 

strong ties with Belgrade. 

Mostar developments that should inform our approach to Mitrovica because of the 

difficulties they created (i.e., things to avoid in Mitrovica):
17

• Weak or inconsistent international administration achieves little and draws the 

criticism of all parties. (Conversely, strong, even-handed, and consistent 

international administration can earn respect and compliance, however grudging.) 

• Latent political, religious, and criminal extremists, if unchecked by legitimate 

authorities, can create a lawless climate and further ethnic cleansing. In such an 

environment, moderate politicians, clergy, and businesspersons will either depart 

or hang back, looking to the international community to provide solutions.

• Ethnic-based “sub-municipalities” develop their own bureaucracies and employ 

passive resistance to thwart central municipal authorities administratively and 

politically. These layers of government set up to keep Mostar calm should have 

included rigorous review mechanisms or sunset provisions. Though abolished by 

the OHR in 2004, remnants of the sub-governments, supported by hard-liners on 

all sides, continue to thwart institutional integration and stifle economic growth.

• Local obstructionists become entrenched and emboldened unless the international 

political authority is well empowered and well organized and backed by military 

forces operating under rules of engagement that allow them to intervene wherever 

necessary to preserve public order. 

Mostar History 

Mostar provides an instructive source of conflict resolution attributes to consider in 

crafting a strategy to maintain peace and eventually normalize the region in and around 

Mitrovica. Many key features of the two scenarios are similar, from pre-conflict 

circumstances, to the nature of the conflict itself, and finally to the post-conflict situation. 

What has worked and not worked in Mostar should be of keen interest as we seek an 

international approach to Mitrovica within the context of the final status talks on Kosovo. 

Mostar is perhaps the worst urban case of unsettled grievances and lingering tension from 

the Bosnian war. Before its two brief, intense wars, Mostar was fully integrated across 

ethnic, religious, and educational lines, with a significant proportion of mixed marriages. 

Since the war, the Serbs have largely fled, leaving the city divided along ethnic, religious, 

and geographic lines roughly coincident with the Neretva River, which runs through the 

city center. The east is Bosnian and the west is Croatian, though there is a Bosniak area 

on the Croatian west side, which was the site of the main confrontation line and the 

fiercest fighting during the war. 

The tipping point that led to Mostar’s conflict was the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina’s declaration of independence as the former Yugoslavia began to 

disintegrate in 1991. Following a February 1992 referendum on BiH sovereignty that was 

boycotted by most Serbs, the Serb-dominated Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) attacked 

Mostar on April 3, 1992, and within a week established control over a large part of the 

town. On April 8, the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH) joined with Herzegovina 

Croat military forces (HVO) to defend against the JNA. In July, the ABiH (4th Corps) 
18

and HVO forced the JNA troops out of Mostar. However, the city continued to be 

bombarded by the Bosnian Serbs from the mountains to the east.32

In May 1993, the heavily armed and Croatia-funded, HVO forces turned their guns on 

their one-time ABiH allies. The Croats hoped to capture Mostar for themselves in the 

context of a broader Bosnian Croat secessionist campaign, with a view to uniting with 

Croatia.33 The campaign resulted in the division of the city of Mostar into West Mostar 

(controlled by the Zagreb-surrogate “Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna” and the HVO) 

and East Mostar (controlled by the Bosnian Federation Government and the ABiH). 

Executions, ethnic cleansing, and other atrocities occurred on both sides during the 

fighting, but particularly against the Bosniak people in Croatian West Mostar. The 

fighting in Mostar resulted in the deaths of thousands and left many parts of the city in 

ruins, including the famous Stari Most (Old Bridge), which was constructed by the 

Ottomans in the 16th century and totally destroyed by tank fire from HVO forces on 

November 9, 1993. This second war ended in an internationally negotiated truce in 

February 1994. The tense truce resulted in separate parallel administrations and services 

in East Mostar and West Mostar, along the lines of ethnic division that resulted from the 

war. 

On March 1, 1994, the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croats signed the 

Washington Agreement, which created the Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as the Federation). The agreement stipulated that 

international authorities would administer Mostar for an unspecified period of time; by 

agreement with the Bosniak and Croat leadership of the Federation, it was determined 

that the European Union would administer Mostar for a period of two years and establish 

a multi-ethnic, unified city administration.34 The EU administration was supported by a 

police mission of the Western European Union. The police mission never grew beyond 

182 officers and was only marginally effective in organizing a multi-ethnic police force. 

Two EU offices, the EUAM and, for the final six months, the European Union Special 

Envoy Mostar (ESEM), administered Mostar from July 23, 1994, to December 31, 1996. 

The EUAM got off to a weak start because of the lack of early financial and economic 

expertise on the ground and the slow, ad hoc arrival of mission personnel. The EUAM 

was regarded with contempt among some members of the Mostar community. At one 

point, the offices were fired upon with anti-tank weapons and on another occasion, the 

EU Administrator’s car was stoned. Overshadowing the difficulties of reintegration, the 

mission’s inaugural was attended not only by representatives from Sarajevo, but by 

President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, which signaled Croatia’s interest and influence in 

Mostar. 

The Dayton Peace Accords, which were signed November 21, 1995, and finalized in 

Paris on December 14, 1995, brought to a close three years of bloody and violent ethnic 

 

32 “Mostar.” Available online at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mostar>. 

33 Ibid. 

34 International Crisis Group (ICG), Reunifying Mostar: Opportunities for Progress, Europe Report 90, 

(April 19, 2000). Available online at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1521>. 
19

conflict throughout BiH. The Accords included a specific annex on Mostar, which set out 

the Agreed Principles for the Interim Statute of the City of Mostar. As a result, the 

EU/WEU Mostar mission was superseded in January 1997 by a branch office of the High 

Representative in Mostar (OHR South) tasked with overseeing the implementation of the 

civilian aspects of the Accords. 

The parallel administrations that were set up in 1994 following the Washington 

Agreement were intended to be an interim solution. Along with six outlying 

municipalities, three on each side of the Neretva River, an internationally managed 

Central District was created as a buffer in the most hotly contested part of the city. Since 

then, administrative and political institutions of government have been carefully 

elaborated to achieve ethnic balance. While some progress toward integration and 

harmonization has taken place (in particular, the city-wide government elections held in 

February 2004), only modest progress toward genuine reintegration is evident; the Croat 

and Bosniak ethnic communities tend to remain in their respective sections of the city, 

and routine activities, such as attendance at sporting events, are divided along ethnic 

lines. Educational systems are separate all the way to the university level. 

In March 2004, High Representative Lord Paddy Ashdown determined that the time had 

come to press Mostar to form a single, unified city government. In doing so, he had the 

strong support of the main international players in Bosnia, including the United States. 

The first unified elections in post-war Mostar took place in October 2004. Citymunicipality structures are still being consolidated, accompanied by the inevitable loss of 

some local government jobs. As of mid-2006, much remains to be done to unify the city’s 

many administrative structures. 

The OHR will close its doors in mid-2007, to be replaced by an EU mission led by an EU 

Special Envoy. (Both Ashdown and his successor, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, have 

been dual-hatted as High Representative and EU Special Representative.) Local leaders 

are not particularly sanguine about the change to the EU, remembering the slow pace that 

was the rule under the EUAM. 

Although tensions between the three constituent peoples remain high throughout BiH and 

often provoke political disagreements, overt violence has been minimal since the end of 

the war in 1994 and the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. At the national level there 

is hope that BiH is getting close to further integration. A recent initiative in Parliament to 

revise the Constitution in ways that would weaken the power of ethnic politicians failed 

by just two votes. The result of the October 2006 elections will be an indicator of the 

resolve of Bosnian citizens of all ethnic groups to reduce the political, economic, and 

cultural influence of ethnic hard-liners on all sides. 

Post-Conflict Mostar 

The Five Initial Peace Settlement Goals for the International Administrators in Mostar

are: 
20

• Demilitarization. Allegedly completed prior to EUAM mandate, but small arms 

remained widely available until SFOR began actively seizing arms caches in 

1997. 

• Cross-Neretva Returns. There has been little progress in the past 12 years. 

Reparations are a cumbersome expense in local government budget. 

• Serb Returns. Progress has been slow in the return of Serbs to Mostar; however, 

the tempo has been increasing with the support of regional Serbian Orthodox 

clergy. 

• Elections. October 2004 was the first citywide election since the peace process. 

Progress since the elections has been slow, with much effort devoted to trying to 

make the unified government work effectively at all levels. 

• Police. There has been some success in establishing a unified force, and crossNeretva cooperation is generally good. The unification of Mostar’s police has not 

been the catalyst for fostering broader integration that has worked in other areas, 

such as Brčko. 

 

Indigenous Administration. Mostar is the center of the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton of 

the Bosnian Federation and the unofficial capital of the Herzegovina region of BiH. 

Within the municipality of Mostar, the Dayton Peace Accords allowed for six city 

municipalities (three Croat and three Bosniak) and a seventh central zone. Since 2004, 

the OHR has been in the process of merging the city government into one structure. This 

renewed effort to create unity officially abolished the central zone and all six citymunicipalities. What will emerge, it is hoped, will be a strong single city government. 

(The process of dismantling the sub-municipalities is incomplete as of July 2006.) 

Education System. Historically, Bosnia enjoyed a highly developed educational system. 

However, BiH has experienced a “brain drain” since the 1992–1994 conflicts, and few of 

Bosnia’s diaspora are bringing their experience, western education, and exposure to 

modern business practices back to BiH. Most still lack professional incentives to justify 

widespread and permanent return to their homeland. 

For higher education, Bosnia has eight universities, with two universities located in 

Mostar, the University of Mostar and the Džemal Bijedić University. For political and 

economic reasons, most Bosnian universities have not been modernized since the wars. 

As a result, they do not meet the educational standards that are among some of the 

criteria for membership into the European Union.

In 2003, the OSCE Mission to BiH began education reform, with Mostar as a key focus. 

Under OSCE pressure, Mostar has started to reunify its schools; significant progress has 

been made on curriculum development, textbook and computer acquisition, and building 

reconstruction. Also in 2003, BiH’s 13 education ministers signed an education reform 

document that committed them to major reforms, although progress has been predictably 

slow and uneven. A higher education reform bill is currently before parliament, after two 

years of effort. 
21

Under the initial post-conflict agreements, Mostar’s schools from the elementary level to 

the university level were under the supervision of the city-municipalities and not a 

competency of the city government itself. Students in Bosniak schools were taught in a 

Bosniak dialect of Serbo-Croatian (“Bosian”) that is different from their preconflict use 

of the language, while the Bosnian Croat schools engaged in a similar effort to 

differentiate their dialect of Serbo-Croatian. Both sides claim they are using different 

languages. However, both the Bosniak and Croat “languages” are simply minor variants 

of modern basic South Slav. Under current agreements, teachers will teach in their own 

dialect—which all students readily understand—and will accept, without bias, responses 

from students in either dialect. 

The University of Mostar is the only Croatian language university in the BiH. It traces its 

roots to Mostar’s Franciscan Theological School, which was founded in 1895 and closed 

in 1945. It took the name University of Mostar in 1992.35 During the 1994–1995 

academic year, the “Džemal Bijedić” University opened in East (Bosniak) Mostar, using 

Bosnian as the official dialect. Both universities claim to be legal successors of the 

former University of Mostar situated in West Mostar. The Džemal Bijedić University 

maintains a campus in the east part of Mostar. The OSCE-initiated higher education 

reform initiative and the signing of the Bologna Declaration on European-wide education 

standards are forcing both Mostar universities to put aside their differences to some 

extent and work to make themselves competitive on a regional level. 

Economy. The Mostar region’s economy before the conflict centered on tourism, 

agriculture, and the textile and construction industries. These were all interrupted by the 

conflict and the region still suffers acutely from poor infrastructure to support a re-start of 

key industries. Most factories were heavily damaged and, after ten years of further 

decline, are likely beyond reconstruction. As a result, Mostar has high unemployment and 

an intractable “gray” economy based on barter and illegal activity. Service industries 

have begun to provide some jobs, mainly unskilled positions. 

Even though inflation has moderated in recent years, there is little funding to attract 

businesses. The city budget is burdened by the high cost of reparations and now the 

added cost of severance pay for redundant city employees. 

Tourism is one area where recovery is encouraging. The number of tourists traveling to 

BiH grew by an average of 24 percent annually from 1995 to 2000. According to an 

estimation of the World Tourism Organization, BiH is expected to have the third highest 

tourism growth rate in the world between 1995 and 2020. Mostar is one of BiH’s key 

tourist attractions, with many traveling to see the newly re-built Stari Most (Old Bridge) 

as well as the Old Bazar Kujundziluk and Tito’s Palace. 

Security. Under IFOR (1995–1996) and SFOR (1997–2004), Mostar was in the Frenchcommanded sector. Other troops in the city and the region included the Italians, Spanish, 

and Moroccans. With few brief exceptions, SFOR was successful in maintaining local 

 

35 “University of Mostar.” Available online at <http://www.unmo.ba/en/univerzitet>. 
22

security throughout the period of its deployment. Since the end of the SFOR mission, 

security has been maintained by a much-reduced EU military presence. 

After the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995, an unarmed CIVPOL 

mission, the International Police Task Force (IPTF), was established by UN Security 

Council Resolution 1031 to monitor the operations of Bosnian police and to supervise the 

restructuring of all Bosnian police institutions. The IPTF, composed of officers from over 

40 nations, had an authorized strength of 2,057. The United States maintained a 

contingent of 200 officers, including the position of IPTF Deputy Commissioner. The 

IPTF ceased operations on December 31, 2002, and transferred international policing 

responsibilities to the follow-on European Union Police Mission (EUPM).36 

The Bosnian Armed Forces (AFBiH) in the vicinity of Mostar are largely out of sight and 

not of great consequence to the general public, which is far more interested in political 

and economic concerns. Should civil conflict re-emerge, the police, and not the army, 

would be the first responders. In the event the army got involved, it would likely be 

working closely with international forces to back up local police forces. 

Today, under the oversight of the OHR, Mostar has a unified police force that employs 

multi-ethnic patrols. The strength and effectiveness of the force has increased at a steady 

but moderate pace since 2004 and seems to be on a positive track. 

Long-Term Prospects for Mostar

It is likely that Mostar will continue its slow return to vitality and normalcy, with the 

essential support of Sarajevo and the international community. Recovery can be expected 

to continue for a generation or more. Economic investment and the reestablishment of the 

industrial base are key to continued growth and development, as is reconstruction of wartorn sections of the city. International investment has brought much progress in spite of 

the obstacles poised by corruption and ethnic tensions, but dozens of ruined buildings in 

the city center are daily reminders to Mostar’s citizenry of the recent violent past. 

Unresolved Issues. Mostar officials complain of the high cost of reparations the local 

government must pay. There is a pressing need to reduce the size of marginalized submunicipality governments in relation to the city government itself. Other drags on 

Mostar’s revitalization are a weak judicial system and the lack of local budgetary 

authority. 

Potential for Renewed Conflict. Low to moderate. There is much simmering animosity 

under the veneer of normalcy. Occasional localized violence cannot be ruled out, such as 

the June 2006 riots following Croatia’s World Cup defeat by Brazil, but a return to open 

or general warfare is unlikely. 

 

36 U.S. State Department, “United States Participation in International Police (CIVPOL) Missions,” May 

18, 2005. Available online at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/47759.htm>. 
23

Degree of Return to Normalcy. Persistence of underlying distrust poses a significant 

roadblock to reintegration and political cooperation. 

Ethnic Makeup, Integration. The population in Mostar is essentially 50:50 CroatBosniak. There continues to be little inter-ethnic socialization, despite previous patterns 

of intermarriage and broad integration throughout the city. 

Challenges and Obstacles: One of the first challenges to the process was the weak 

mandate and poor organization of initial EUAM in 1994. Also, in the initial post-Dayton 

period (1996), there were no forcing mechanisms (as in Brčko) to begin to heal the 

physical and psychological scars, which remain visible everywhere. Only with the 

introduction of the High Representative’s “Bonn powers” in late 1997 did the 

international community acquire the leverage to force change. 

Applicability to Mitrovica

International administration or oversight. Unlike Brčko, where international authority 

served as a surrogate for local authority, the EUAM and OHR in Mostar operated as 

catalysts for the rebuilding of local government. The initial international engagement was 

not assertive enough to ensure that legitimate authority took root and illegitimate agents 

were disenfranchised and neutralized. The progress has been made in Mostar has come 

from the strength the international authority has been able to wield over the two factions 

to compel them toward integration or, at least, cooperation. The IFOR/SFOR military 

presence in Mostar was robust but lacked the necessary orders to enforce public security. 

Neither did it enforce the political agreements intended to achieve and sustain momentum 

for a return to normalcy. 

Level of local autonomy. Mostar has not had sufficient local autonomy to take charge of 

its own recovery, suffering under a stifling cantonal government in terms of shared 

revenue and authority. This is not a desirable situation for Mitrovica. Cantonal 

governance is arguably not needed at all, but in any case must smooth rather than impede 

ties between municipalities and the central government. In Kosovo, a properly designed, 

multi-ethnic, canton-level structure could provide a facilitating buffer between central 

Pristina and a semi-autonomous Serbian municipality for the near or mid-term. 

Geographic characteristics. Concerns have been raised that that the river should not be 

allowed to become the ethnic dividing line of Mitrovica as it has in Mostar. True, these 

visible reminders reinforce separation, but in any case they would also be the logical subdivision line in any city with such features—for administration, education, transportation, 

and electricity and other utility systems. However the overall area of special 

administration for Mitrovica is defined, the central divide will likely remain the Ibar 

River. The solution to the current conflict should not unduly stress this unchangeable fact 

but embrace it. The river can be a source of cooperation for clean water, power 

generation, and commercial enterprise. Moreover, separation at the river can help to 

reduce the opportunity for violence during the initial post-conflict period. 
24

Language. Underscoring ethnic division, the Bosniak/Serbo-Croatian division in Mostar 

is similar to the Albanian/Serbian division in Mitrovica. In Mostar it is the Bosniaks, who 

previously spoke Serbo-Croatian, who appear to be initiating a language division by 

adopting a new dialect. In Mitrovica, the language division is more real and longstanding, 

but in neither case is language an obstacle in itself; rather it is employed to deepen 

divisions and thwart integration. Toleration of all local usage will, in the long term, allow 

sufficient common understanding to develop to facilitate rather than impede whatever 

degree of cooperation is achievable at any given stage. 

Minority ethnic viability. Mitrovica has a significant imbalance between Serbs (estimated 

at 16 percent) and Kosovar Albanians, while the Croat-Bosnian balance in Mostar 

slightly favors the Croats, in spite of their overall minority status across Bosnia. That 

reality affords the Croats a modicum of at least local political and economic influence. 

The significance of Mitrovica’s low Serbian population is that it is reflective of the 

almost continuous decline in the Serbian population across Kosovo since World War II, 

when it was around 50 percent. Today’s Kosovo Serbian population is its lowest and 

anticipated to decline further. The weak economy of Kosovo and a higher Kosovar 

Albanian birth rate are part of the explanation. Undoubtedly, conflict and the loss of 

Serbian control of government are other factors. North Mitrovica and the adjacent 

Serbian majority municipalities of Zvecan, Leposavic, and Zubin Potok are the largest 

remaining Serbian population and the only significant Serbian urban areas. This situation 

is the same reality seen in Mostar for the Bosnian Croats; however the Mitrovica Serbs 

wield far less economic and political power. To be a viable minority like the Croats in 

Bosnia, the Serbs in Kosovo, must re-acquire, at least locally, economic and political 

power to support their unique ethnic interests, most notably in Mitrovica and contiguous 

areas. 

Economic potential. Underlying the slow start to Mostar’s economic revival are a culture 

of political corruption and a lack of public investment. However, after a dozen years 

Mostar’s tourism has begun to thrive again, and it flourishes somewhat more on the 

Bosniak east and city center (including the re-built Stari Most) than the more industrial 

Croat west. Yet the most significant economic achievement was the 1997 re-start of 

Mostar’s aluminum manufacturing plant, the largest such plant in BiH; and it enjoys a 

major contract with automobile manufacturer Daimler-Benz. Though the plant employed 

both Croats and Bosniaks before the wars, today it employs Croats almost exclusively. 

Meanwhile, light and medium industries on the Bosniak east side remain in disrepair. 

Mitrovica was historically a one-industry mining town dominated by the huge Trepca 

mine complex that employed both Serbs and Albanians. With the mine now closed, the 

city’s future is as threatened by a weak economy as it is by ethnic violence. A new 

economic base is desperately needed in Mitrovica that has the potential to sustain both 

Albanians and Serbs if the two groups are to remain. 

Local politics. Political and administrative ethnic separation is a reality that has existed 

for both Mostar and Mitrovica since the end of their respective conflicts and the 

imposition of international supervision; this condition was chosen as the most expedient 

end to interethnic violence and it was soon solidified by the respective ethnic groups. In 
25

Mostar, as the Deputy High Representative arrived in early 1997, separate ethnic 

structures devised in 1994 were entrenched and impossible to change without risk of 

greater upheaval. In Mitrovica, UNMIK has watched the development of parallel, 

separate local governmental structures by Pristina and Belgrade for almost seven years. 

Whatever new regime for Mitrovica is agreed by the final status talks, its starting point 

will be the separate and entrenched structures already in place. 

Protection of minorities. Croats feel relatively protected in Mostar because of the 

progress toward long term political stability in Sarajevo; their viable local population; 

their renewed economic strength; and the continuing interests of post-conflict Croatia, 

which has found favor with the EU and NATO. Serbs in Kosovo have none of these 

advantages, and therefore they wield far less power and feel a lot more threatened. Their 

population is in decline, they lack any economic potential, the government in Pristina is 

uncertain and Serbia is a relatively weak sponsor. In Mostar, Serbs and other minorities 

are all but invisible. The same is true in Mitrovica with regard to the host of smaller 

ethnic groups that have little voice or protection in local affairs. Protection of these 

peripheral groups is eclipsed by the difficult progress toward resolution of ethnic tensions 

between the Serbs and Albanians. 

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Mostar model contains many parallels to and lessons for the situation in Mitrovica. 

The main conclusion is that given the parallels, one should plan for a slow and steady 

evolution toward sustained peace for Mitrovica, perhaps under a strong international 

administration, but one that is more closely tied to Pristina than Brčko’s Administrator 

has been to Sarajevo. A healthy localized autonomy for Serbian areas holds the most 

promise for Mitrovica. Economic viability for both ethnic groups is essential. And, for 

international administration, having adequate international funding and adequate skilled 

personnel from the beginning is critical to success. 

The international community must be prepared for a far longer evolution to peace than 

was achieved in Eastern Slavonia; a more effective and less rigid integration strategy than 

was put in place in Mostar; and a less independent, more Pristina-linked administration 

than in Brčko. It is equally critical, given the experiences of these three models, that the 

international community undertake to create in Belgrade the interest to see Mitrovica 

succeed under Pristina. That will require affording Belgrade an increasing stake in 

international cooperation, as well as gaining confidence that Serbs in Kosovo will not be 

disenfranchised from effective political processes. We should expect any gains in early 

years to come only as a result of external incentives—sticks and carrots—rather than 

cooperative local initiatives. We should ensure that initial agreements are clearly 

provisional and interim, with periodic reviews mandated and sunset clauses automatic 

unless positive progress by all parties is forthcoming. Belgrade involvement in Mitrovica 

should be welcomed where appropriate but, most importantly, fully transparent and 

above board. Mitrovica cannot reasonably be expected to reunify in the near term, even 

forcibly. Much will depend on Pristina’s success at inclusive leadership and the 

transparent application of the rule of law. It will also depend on how wisely Kosovo 
26

governance is decentralized, and how much local power there will be. Mitrovica is the 

gateway to the Serb majority municipalities of Zvecan, Leposavic, and Zubin Potok, and 

massive Serb flight is a distinct possibility if a siege mentality and perceptions of 

hopelessness are allowed to take hold. 
27

Comparative Mostar–Mitrovica Area and Census Data 

Mostar (1,100 km2

) is three times as large as Mitrovica (350 km2) 

The current populations of both municipalities are roughly the same (approximately 105,000). Both populations are divided 

almost exclusively along ethnic-religious lines, and by a major river running through urban areas. Overall, Mostar is far more 

balanced in its ethnic makeup. Today, Mostar is nearly half Croat and half Bosniak, whereas Mitrovica is roughly threequarters Kosovar Albanian, with just over 16 percent Serb. 

Language is another divider. In post-conflict Mostar, the Bosnian population has taken up speaking a dialect of SerboCroatian called Bosnian, which is easily understood by all people groups in Mostar. The differences between the dialects are 

comparable to the differences between British and American English. Nonetheless, the distinction is insisted upon in separate 

schools and adhered to publicly in official use and the media, unlike pre-conflict Mostar, where one language, Serbo-Croatian, 

was in common use. Mitrovica is more clearly divided by language. Kosovar Serbs speak Serbian, and Kosovar Albanians 

speak Albanian. However, again, much of the population understands both languages. 

A. Mostar municipality ethnic makeup:

• In 1991, the municipality of Mostar had a population of 126,066. The ethnic distribution was Bosniak (34.65%), Croat 

(33.83%), Serb (18.97%), Yugoslav (10.03%), and 2.32% other. 

• In 2003, the Mostar municipality population was 105,448. Ethnic distribution was: Bosniak (47.43%), Croat (48.29%), 

Serb (3.45%), and .83% other. 

B. Mitrovica municipality ethnic makeup: 

• In 1991, the Mitrovica municipality had a population estimated at 116,500. The ethnic distribution was: Kosovar 

Albanian (78%), Kosovar Serb (10.2%), Bosniak (5%), and 4.8% other. 

• In 2003, the Mitrovica municipality had a population estimated at 105,000. The ethnic distribution was: Kosovar 

Albanian (79%), Kosovar Serb (16%), Bosniak (2%), and 3% other. 

C. Bosnia and Herzegovina Population:

• According to the 1991 census, Bosnia and Herzegovina had a population of 4,354,911. Ethnically, 43.7% were Bosniak, 

31.3% Serb, and 17.3% Croat, with 5.5% declaring themselves Yugoslav. 

• According to 2000 data from the 2006 CIA World Factbook, Bosnia and Herzegovina is ethnically 48% Bosniak, 37.1% 

Serb, 14.3% Croat, and 0.6% other. 

• In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a strong correlation between ethnic identity and religion: 88% of Croats are Roman 

Catholics, 90% of Bosniaks are Muslims, and 93% of Serbs are Orthodox Christians. 

• Large population migrations during the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s have caused a large demographic shift in the country. 

• No census has been taken since 1991, and none is planned for the near future due to political disagreements. Since a 

census is the only statistical, inclusive, and objective way to analyze demographics, almost all of the post-war data is 

simply an estimate. Most sources, however, estimate the population at roughly 4 million (representing a decrease of 

350,000 since 1991). 

D. Kosovo Population: 

• Since the beginning of World War II, the Kosovar Serb percentage of Kosovo’s population declined steadily from 

approximately 50% to the current 7%. Many factors must be examined in this shift, including Serb emigration due to the 

relatively higher standard of living in Serbia proper, the higher birth rate of Kosovar Albanians, and the availability of 

greater opportunities for Serbs in Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, and Bosnia than in Kosovo. 

• In 1991, Kosovo’s ethnic population breakdown was: 82% Kosovar Albanian, 10% Kosovar Serb, and 8% other. 

• In 2000, it is estimated the ethnic composition of Kosovo was 88% Kosovar Albanian, 7% Kosovar Serb, and 5% other. 

Sources: Mostar data is from <http://koz.vianet.ca/boshis111.htm>. Kosovo data is from <http://www.ks-gov.net/esk>. 
28
29

2. Eastern Slavonia: Rapid Reorientation 

By Gina Cordero37

Case Study Model Characteristics and Conclusions 

The United Nations Transitional Authority for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), in operation 

from January 1996 to January 1998, is generally considered a success. Within the 

authorized time period, it completed all of the requirements of its mandate, which 

included demilitarization of the region, creation of a trained multi-ethnic police force, 

oversight of the return of refugees, organization and implementation of local elections, 

re-establishment of public services, and monitoring of human rights. A key to this 

success, according to former UNTAES Transitional Administrator Jacques Klein, was 

obtaining agreement from the Serbs and compromise from Zagreb.38 Unfortunately, 

conditions in Eastern Slavonia deteriorated after the UNTAES operations ended; a weak 

economy and ethnic discrimination contribute to the continued flight of ethnic Serbs. As 

Croatia moves closer to becoming a member of the European Union and NATO, these 

issues will need to be resolved. 

The strengths of UNTAES operations were: 

• a clear mandate; 

• strong international authority; 

• a robust international military presence; 

• rapid integration; 

• cooperation of all involved parties. 

Eastern Slavonia History 

Following Croatia’s declaration of independence on June 25, 1991, ethnic Serbs living in 

Krajina and Eastern Slavonia proclaimed the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). Serbian 

paramilitaries took control of territory in Krajina, and the Yugoslav National Army 

(JNA) quickly seized Eastern Slavonia and expelled ethnic Croats. Combat was 

widespread and sometimes fierce. In the Battle of Vukovar (August 27–November 18, 

1991), 30,000 Serbs fought 20,000 Croats. Serbian casualties were 3,000 killed and 7,200 

wounded; Croat casualties were 1,712 killed, 2,097 wounded.39 By January 1992, when 

UN envoy Cyrus Vance, a former U.S. Secretary of State, negotiated a ceasefire, Krajina 

and Western Slavonia were controlled by local ethnic Serbs, and Eastern Slavonia was 

controlled by Belgrade. Under the Vance Plan, the United Nations Protection Force 

(UNPROFOR) was deployed in Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, and Krajina, now 

 

37 The author would like to thank General Jacques Paul Klein for his review of and contributions to this 

case study. 

38 Jacques Paul Klein, “Mitrovica’s Future: Uniting the City or Dividing Kosovo,” speech at the United 

States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, June 26, 2006. Audio available at 

<http://www.usip.org/events/2006/0626_mitrovica.html#audio>. 

39 Jacques Paul Klein, “Mission Brief,” (a slide presentation on the United Nations Transitional 

Administration for Eastern Slavonia, United Nations, no date available). 
30
31

designated as UN Protected Areas (UNPAs), from April 1992 until March 1995 to ensure 

demilitarization and safeguard returning refugees. 

With the creation of the RSK, around 80,000 non-Serbs fled Eastern Slavonia and some 

67,000 ethnic Serb refugees from Croatia and Bosnia arrived to re-settle the region, 

occupying empty homes and evicting non-Serbs.40 The new state of Croatia was crippled 

by the loss of territory, the burden of refugees, and physical and economic damage. 

Croatia was admitted to the UN in April 1992. During this period Eastern Slavonia was 

ruled by an ethnic Serb administration that was not recognized by Croatia. UN 

peacekeeping troops in the region were largely ignored by the local Serbian government 

and the Army of the RSK. Serbian paramilitaries seized the Djeletovci oilfields and 

began to pump its products directly into the Belgrade black market, depriving the local 

government of essential revenue. 

In this anarchic environment, crime was rampant and economic activity negligible. 

Before 1991, Eastern Slavonia had been one of the richest regions of Yugoslavia, with 

per capita incomes higher than elsewhere in Croatia. By 1994, only 36,000 of the citizens 

of the RSK were employed out of a population of 430,000.41 The RSK, with no trade 

links to Croatia and few natural resources of its own, had to import most of its raw 

materials, goods, and fuel. The agriculture industry, hampered by the estimated 800,000 

mines laid and 100,000 items of unexploded ordnance scattered throughout, operated at 

little more than a subsistence level. In 1995, industry was operating at only 10 percent of 

its 1991 level. 

By 1994 there was growing dissatisfaction with UNPROFOR, and the position of 

hardliners within the Croatian government and Krajina Serbian authorities was 

strengthening. In early May 1995, Croatia began military operations to bring Western 

Slavonia under its control. In August 1995, with the encouragement of the United States, 

an assault was launched on the southern and central parts of Krajina. Within two weeks, 

the army of RSK was routed from the area, and the Bosnian Serb Army was defeated. 

Some 150,000–200,000 Serbs were expelled. Once it became apparent that the Federal 

Yugoslav regime would not come to their aid, the remaining RSK leaders accepted defeat 

and signed the UN- and U.S.-brokered Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern 

Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium with the Croats on November 12, 1995, in the 

town of Erdut. The Basic Agreement, also referred to as the Erdut Agreement, was 

confirmed by Franjo Tudjman, president of Croatia, and Slobodan Milosevic, president of 

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).42 

 

40 Tim Ripley, “A Fragile Peace Emerges from the Rubble of Eastern Slavonia,” Jane’s Intelligence 

Review, 9, no.7, (1997). 41 This larger number includes the Krajina and Western Slavonia regions. 

42 Following the independence and secession of four of the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic 

of Yugoslavia in 1992, the remaining republics of Serbia and Montenegro formed the Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia; the FRY was dissolved in 2003. 
32

The war radically changed the ethnic composition of the populations of Eastern Slavonia, 

Baranja, and Western Sirmium. The chart below compares a Croatian census count taken 

before the war with a 1996 UN survey.

Table 2. 1991 and 1996 Ethnic Composition of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and 

Western Sirmium43

 

 1991 1996 

 Serb 73,200 36.0% 73,000 50.5% 

 Croat 86,700 43.0% 8,800 06.0% 

 Hungarian 13,000 06.5% 6,700 04.6% 

 Other 28,500 14.0% 8,500 05.9% 

 Displaced Persons n/a n/a 47,600 33.0% 

Total Population 201,400 (99.5%) 144,600 (100%) 

 

Post-Conflict Eastern Slavonia

Settlement Mechanism. The Basic Agreement provided for the peaceful integration of the 

region into Croatia. On January 15, 1996, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed 

Resolution 1037, which established the UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia 

(UNTAES) for an initial period of 12 months with an authorized strength of 5,000 troops. 

UNTAES was required to do the following: 

• Supervise and facilitate the demilitarization of the region, as provided for in the 

Basic Agreement, which was carried out by the parties within 30 days after the 

full deployment of UNTAES; 

• Monitor the voluntary and safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their 

homes; 

• Establish and train a temporary police force to build professionalism among the 

police and confidence among all ethnic communities; 

• Monitor treatment of offenders and the prison system; 

• Organize elections for all local government bodies; 

• Maintain international monitors along the international borders of the region to 

facilitate the free movement of persons across existing borders; 

• Restore the normal functioning of all public services in the region without delay; 

• Monitor the parties’ commitment to respect human rights and fundamental 

freedoms; 

• Cooperate with the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in its task of 

investigating and prosecuting war crimes; 

• Promote the realization of the commitments made in the Basic Agreement 

between Croatia and local Serbian authorities and contribute to the overall 

maintenance of peace and security.44 

 

43 Olav Akselen, rapporteur, Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons to Their Homes in Croatia, Council 

of Europe, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, April 9, 1999. 
33

The UNTAES area of operation was located at the easternmost tip of Croatia, bordering 

the Serbian province of Vojvodina. The region extended approximately 30 kilometers 

from east to west, and 140 kilometers north to south and included the cities of Vukovar, 

Beli Manastir, Darda, Tenja, Klisa, and Vinkovci. After 1991, the demographic 

composition had changed, with an estimated 70,000 Croats and non-Serbs leaving and 

some 75,000 Serbs, mostly refugees from other parts of Croatia, moving in. 

Governance. Under the Basic Agreement, UNTAES effectively became the government 

of the region, with the Transitional Administrator, Jacques P. Klein, serving as a proconsul. Klein’s job was to oversee and coordinate the military and civilian activities of 

UNTAES, as well as the work of other UN agencies in the mission area. The Force 

Commander, the Police Commissioner, and the Chief Administrative Officer reported to 

the Transitional Administrator, who in turn reported to the UN Secretary-General and 

UNSC. Klein moved the headquarters to Vukovar, where the political, military, police, 

legal, civil affairs, and administrative leadership were headquartered, to facilitate joint 

daily meetings and the quick arrangement of operational discussions. Supporting the 

Office of the Transitional Administrator was the Office of the Chief Administrative 

Officer, which controlled logistics, supply, transport, finance, administration, and health 

services. Klein established almost 30 Joint Implementations Committees (JICs) with 

subcommittees composed of Serbian and Croatian representatives and led by UNTAES 

officials. These committees allowed Serbs and Croats to begin the process of political and 

social integration on a personal level. The UNTAES Civil Affairs Unit also had six field 

offices, liaison offices to work with the Regional Council (Serbian representatives of the 

region–the liaison was necessary to find Serbs who would command local support), and 

an economic reconstruction and coordination unit. Civil affairs and public affairs teams 

were posted throughout the region to inform the local population of the mission’s aims 

and objectives. The small area of Eastern Slavonia allowed UNTAES to conduct 

manageable civil affairs at all levels. 

The Transitional Administrator insisted that both parties be active in the reintegration 

process and that both delegations be informed of political decisions taken so as to keep 

the process going. Croatian President Tudjman and Serbian President Milosevic 

supported UNTAES and intervened when hardliners threatened to derail the integration 

process. For example, Milosevic met with all the local Serbian leaders prior to the 

elections and ordered them to participate in the Croatian political system. The elections 

were conducted from April 13-14, 1997, and voter turnout exceeded expectations, with 

over 72,000 votes in the region, and 58,331 votes cast by Croat and other displaced 

persons outside the region. UNTAES deployed 150 observers to polling stations, and no 

security incidents or evidence of fraud were recorded. Before this election, there had been 

no organized political parties in Eastern Slavonia. The newly-formed Independent Serb 

Party (SDSS) won an absolute majority in 11 of the 28 municipalities. Klein certified the 

election on April 22, 1997, and the results were accepted by all major parties. The Joint 

 44 “Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium Facts and Figures.” Available online at 

<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untaes_p.htm>. 
34

Council of Municipalities was established. It was an assembly of elected municipalities 

of Serbs and provided institutional protection of the Serb minority in the region in the 

sphere of culture, education, sport, and self-administration. 

The Croatian government passed an amnesty law in 1996, but uncertainty regarding its 

implementation and the arbitrary arrests of Serbs returning to Croatia forced the UNSC to 

apply more pressure on Croatia. In March 1997, the UNSC called upon Croatia to 

accelerate efforts to improve conditions of personal and economic security, and to 

remove bureaucratic obstacles that deterred the return of refugees. Prior to the April 

elections, some 102,000 of the 150,000 local Serbian population had applied for and 

received Croatian identity papers, and over 80 percent of them took part in the election45. 

By the latter part of 1997, some 6,000 Croats and 9,000 Serbs returned to their original 

homes in the region. 

Ethnic Composition. By the time UNTAES ended, the Croatian government had recorded 

that about 126,000 passports had been issued to persons in Eastern Slavonia, and 6,000 

Croats and 9,000 Serbs had returned to and from Eastern Slavonia.46 However, the UN 

High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that 15,000–20,000 of Eastern Slavonia’s 

100,000-odd Serbs left during the time of the mission, while another 30,000 moved to 

Serbia. The Yugoslavian Trustee for Refugees in the Backa Palanka municipality 

reported that all Serbs arriving from Eastern Slavonia stated that they did not leave 

voluntarily; they allegedly had been harassed, intimidated, fired from their jobs, or had 

suffered destruction of property. Serbs who left during the transitional period also 

expressed fear of living in a Croatian state. Of the 80,000 Croats displaced from the 

region, 20,000 had returned; 80 percent wanted to return to their homes and the 

remainder were too traumatized to return or not able to move. 

Table 3. 1998 Ethnic Composition of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western 

Sirmium 47

 

 Serbs 55,000 52.0% 

 Croats 30,000 28.6% 

 Hungarians 7,000 6.7% 

 Others 6,000 5.7% 

 Displaced Persons 6,000-8,000 7.0% 

 Total Population approx. 105,000 (100%) 

 

Economy and the Public Sector. Klein underscored the importance of the economic 

reconstruction of eastern Croatia as the basis for peace and reconstruction. Compared to 

 

45 Ripley. 

46 Miomir Zuzul, “Just settlement: The Return of Eastern Slavonia to Croatia,” Harvard International 

Review, 20, no. 2 (Spring 1998), 16–20. 47 Akselen, quoting United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees survey. 
35

pre-war levels, production had fallen by 50-70 percent, and unemployment was as high as 

80 percent. UNTAES pressured the Croatian government to sign an Affidavit of 

Employment Rights, which guaranteed employment security to employees in the region 

who did not yet hold Croatian citizenship. UNTAES also oversaw the following projects: 

reopening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway; reconnection of the telephone lines between 

Osijek and Beli Manastir; reconnection of the Adriatic Oil Pipeline between Croatia and 

FRY; and the turn-over of the Djelatovci Oil fields. Once these oil fields were under 

UNTAES control, they provided a revenue stream for the local administration. Oil 

exports were redirected to Croatia, and economic ties were reestablished; normal trade 

relations with Yugoslavia were established, which added to growth. 

As a result of two meetings of international donors, $59.1 million were committed for 

reconstruction projects. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank tied 

lending to the Croatian government to its adherence to the Basic Agreement. UNTAES 

initiated the transformation of the monetary and financial system in the region by 

introducing the Croatian Kuna as legal tender and regulating all economic activity in 

accordance with Croatian commercial laws. Klein was able to convince Zagreb to pay the 

pensions of the Serbs to facilitate their acceptance of the Kuna. 

The postal system was reconnected to Croatia in May 1996; the regional telephone 

system was reconnected a month later. On June 1, 1997, the courts began to operate 

under Croatian law. By July 22, 1997, all public enterprises, including pension rights, 

were integrated. UNTAES also forced Croatia to agree to reserve 40 percent of publicsector jobs for Serbs and 30 minutes a day for Serbian television programming. 

Education. Education was a highly sensitive issue. At one point in the negotiations, the 

Croatian Minister of Education wanted to extract his ministry from the process. The 

agreement on education included neutral school names, the right of minorities to be 

educated in their native language, and a moratorium on the teaching of history referring 

to the former Yugoslavia during the 1989–1997 period.48 The declaration on educational 

rights validated and recognized certificates issued in regional schools during 1991–1997, 

which allowed those working in the public sector to be considered academically qualified 

and retain their jobs. 

Security. The military component of UNTAES consisted of four fully armed battalions, a 

reconnaissance platoon, a Polish special police group, an engineering battalion, a field 

surgical team, a helicopter squadron, and a headquarters military company–4,568 people, 

fully staffed by June 1996 and controlled by the Transitional Administrator. The 

robustness of the UNTAES military capabilities made it clear to the local Serbs and the 

Croatian authorities that UNTAES would be able to provide security. There were also 

455 civilian police, 101 UN military observers, and 40 border monitors, all unarmed. The 

force was deployed in May 1996, completed the demilitarization within 30 days, and 

established a weapon buy-back program with funds provided by the Croatian 

 

48 Christine Colerio, “Bringing Peace to the Land of Scorpions and Jumping Snakes: Legacy of the United 

Nations in Eastern Slavonia and Transitional Missions,” (Clementsport, Nova Scotia: The Canadian 

Peacekeeping Press, 2002), 109. 
36

government. UNTAES oversaw the evolution of the militcja into the UNTAES 

Transitional Police Force, and finally into the Croatian police. During that process, the 

Transitional Police Force was slowly revamped to match the standards and conduct of the 

Croatian force. Croats were brought in to serve alongside Serbs as those unwilling to 

cooperate were dismissed and joint training was arranged with the assistance of the 

Hungarian Police Academy. The Transitional Police Agreement of 1997 stated that the 

force composition was to be 50 percent Croat, 40 percent Serb, and 10 percent other. The 

Polish special police group was an alternative to arming the UNCIVPOL and was 

brought in to provide security for VIPs or for any special operations. NATO was 

instructed to provide close air support and, if necessary, evacuate UNTAES personnel. 

After UNTAES ended, the OSCE sent 250 police monitors until the end of 1998, 100 of 

whom went to Eastern Slavonia to ensure the security of the minorities. The OSCE ended 

the police monitoring operation in 2001. The UN sent an additional 180 civilian police 

monitors who remained in the region for nine months after the mission ended. The United 

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) continued to monitor the 

implementation of the Basic Agreement until 2003. 

Long Term Prospects for Eastern Slavonia 

UNTAES ended on January 15, 1998, with the completion of its mandate. It had been 

successful to the degree that the region, which was demilitarized and secure, was turned 

over to the government of Croatia and war did not break out following the withdrawal of 

UNTAES troops. In his report on the end of UNTAES, the UN Secretary General noted, 

Two essential conditions for the achievement of the long-term goals established 

by the Security Council should be emphasized. The first is the complete and 

unreserved commitment of the Government of Croatia to the permanent 

reintegration of its Serb citizens. The second condition is that the international 

community, and particularly Croatia's key bilateral partners and regional 

organizations, must continue to scrutinize Croatian performance closely and to 

make their voices heard whenever performance does not meet expectations.

49

As of 2002, the unemployment rate in Eastern Slavonia was 40 percent while the 

Croatian average was 20 percent; per capita incomes are also substantially lower than the 

national average. The area also receives less international aid as compared to the rest of 

the country. Serbs report feeling discriminated against in jobs, economic assistance, and 

other areas. The reluctance of Croats to return to the region has also meant that Zagreb 

has been slow to provide public and private economic assistance for general 

redevelopment and reconstruction. 

The power-sharing agreements between the major Croatian and Serbian political parties 

in Eastern Slavonia have not been fully implemented. Eastern Slavonia regularly 

 

49 Kofi Annan, Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Transitional Administration for 

Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Slavonia, S/1997/953, December 4, 1997. Available online at 

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/342/64/PDF/N9734264.pdf?OpenElement>. 
37

participates in local and national elections in Croatia. Human Rights Watch noted that in 

Vukovar, local boards of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) formed municipal 

governments in coalition with ultra-nationalist Croat parties following the local elections 

and sidelined the centrist Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS). Despite this, SDSS 

continues to support the minority HDZ government at the state level. In 2004, it was 

known that the Croatian mayor and Serbian deputy mayor of Vukovar were not on 

speaking terms.50 

In regard to the refugee problem and retained multi-ethnicity, there are still unresolved 

issues. In 1999, 9,000 Serbs left the region, and the total Serbian population was only 

51,000 as compared to the 1991 total of 70,000 and 1995 peak of 127,000. This trend is 

also reflected in Croatia as a whole: the 1991 census estimated the Serbian population as 

12 percent of the total; this dropped to 5 percent in the 2001 census.51 When the 2001 

census was administered, citizens were given the option to not identify their ethnic 

affiliation, making exact numbers on minorities difficult to find. Furthermore, the 

Croatian government has not been sharing data regarding the ethnic Serbian population of 

the area with international monitors and NGOs. In 2004, the mission to Croatia of the 

Coalition for Work with Psychotrauma and Peace estimated the population to be about 

250,000, with 60 percent Croat, 30 percent Serb, and 10 percent other minorities.52

Schools in Vukovar remain segregated. 

A Joint Legal Working Group (JLWG) was established in 2001 to advise Zagreb on legal 

reforms as they pertain to refugees and minority reintegration, but was largely ignored 

and was suspended to protest lack of cooperation from the Croatian government. Human 

Rights Watch has observed little progress in the return of Serbian refugees in Croatia. As 

of February 2006, 120,000 Serbian returnees had been officially recorded; Croatian Serb 

associations and the OSCE mission to Croatia assessed the actual number to be 

significantly lower (between 60-65 percent) because many Croatian Serbs had left again 

after a short stay. 53 In 2002, UNHCR reported that the majority of ethnic Serbs from 

Croatia who had moved to Yugoslavia were from Eastern Slavonia. 

In February 2006, the estimate of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Croatia was 

4,700; 3,000 are Croats from Eastern Slavonia and the rest are Serbs who moved to 

Eastern Slavonia as a result of the conflict.54 The Serbs have expressed an interest in 

remaining in the area instead of returning to their homes elsewhere in Croatia. Many of 

 

50 Derek Boothby, “The Political Challenges of Administering Eastern Slavonia,” Global Governance, vol. 

10 (2004), 37–51. 

51 “Croatia: Population.” The Economist Intelligence Unit. Available online at 

<http://www.viewswire.com>. 

52 Coalition for Work With Psychotrauma and Peace, “Profile of the Region in Which We Work,” January 

2004. Available online at <http://www.cwwpp.org/What%20and%20HowProfile%20of%20the%20Region.htm>. 

53 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Croatia: Reforms come too late for most remaining ethnic 

Serb IDPs,” April 18, 2006, 10. Available online at <http://www.internal-displacement.org/ 

8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/5A32E9E12C172B9AC125714F00538ED1/$file/Croatia_overview_

April2006.pdf>. 

54 Ibid. 
38

them are elderly or vulnerable persons whose original homes are still occupied or were 

damaged by the war. On the other hand, 65 percent of ethnic Croat IDPs have returned to 

Eastern Slavonia.55

Despite a 2002 constitutional law on minority rights to ensure proportionate 

representation of minorities in the public sector, throughout Croatia there are no Serbian 

returnees in the police, judiciary, or regional offices of the state ministries. The elderly 

remain in Eastern Slavonia, while younger Serbs relocate to Serbia, where there is more 

economic opportunity. Acts of violence against ethnic minorities—condemned at every 

level of government and by all political parties—are investigated but rarely prosecuted. 

Serbs also face unwarranted arrests for war crimes in Eastern Slavonia. 

Most of the houses reconstructed by the government after the war have been almost 

exclusively allocated to ethnic Croats. The tenancy rights of Serbs who fled apartments 

during and after the war have been terminated by the Croatian government. In June 2003, 

Croatia adopted a set of measures to enable former tenancy rights holders in Zagreb and 

other big cities to rent or purchase government-built apartments at below-market rates. 

Two years later, only a dozen of those eligible had benefited from this program, despite 

the fact that 3,628 applications had been filed. 

Applicability to Mitrovica 

The Eastern Slavonia model successfully completed its mission because UNTAES had a 

clear mandate and organizational structure, a pre-determined timeframe, a well-defined 

civil-military relationship, and strong leadership. The first Transitional Administrator, 

Jacques Klein, a retired U.S. Air Force general and member of the American Senior 

Foreign Service of the U.S. Department of State, was succeeded by William Walker, a 

career diplomat and former Ambassador to El Salvador. When necessary, UNTAES 

employed the strong use of force to fulfill its mandate. It was fully supported by member 

nations of the UN and had the close involvement of the Croatian and Serbian presidents. 

UNTAES also worked closely with such other organizations as the OSCE, IMF, World 

Bank, and International Committee of the Red Cross. 

Both UNTAES and the mission in Mitrovica have had the advantage of a large number of 

troops and civilian police relative to the size and population of the region. In Eastern 

Slavonia, the 5,000 troops and 1,500 civilians of UNTAES were able to exert a high 

degree of control and coordination over the region. UNTAES conducted an excellent 

public relations mission that kept the citizens well informed of the mission and used Joint 

Implementation Committees to bring the two ethnic groups to the same table to work out 

differences. General Klein has observed that the ethnic Serbs trusted the UN staff (not 

Zagreb) and wanted the UN to stay in the area. Unfortunately, Serbs in Mitrovica, in 

contrast, have not cooperated with UN efforts thus far, and the Albanians would like the 

UN to leave; Mitrovica is a case in which “hearts and minds” will be hard to win over. 

 

55 Ibid., 28 
39

Furthermore, UNTAES had the support of Belgrade; Serbian agreement will be necessary 

again for an agreement to work in Mitrovica. Once Belgrade withdrew its economic, 

political, and military support of the RSK, ethnic Serbs in Eastern Slavonia were forced 

to comply with the agreement. However, this model may not apply to Mitrovica, as it is 

unlikely that Serbia will give up part of Kosovo, the “cradle of Serbian civilization,” as 

easily. Serbia currently sends 150 million euros a year into Kosovo, half of which goes to 

Mitrovica. These funds pay for salaries, pensions, public services, etc., for ethnic Serbs 

and enable the parallel structures to exist. This is in addition to the funds Pristina sends to 

the region for the same services. Pristina will not be able to afford to match the 

supplementals from Serbia. The loss of revenue could provoke Serb flight. 

While UNTAES laid the groundwork for reintegration, most of its efforts have not 

succeeded due to Zagreb’s reluctance to support creation of an environment in Eastern 

Slavonia that would entice Serbs to remain. If Mitrovica is reoriented to Pristina, there 

should be a mechanism in place to ensure that reforms will still be honored by the state 

after the international mandate has ended. Zagreb has been slow to get rid of bureaucratic 

roadblocks to encourage Serbs to remain or return, and the economy continues to decline. 

Ethnic Serbs are unable to register as refugees in Eastern Slavonia and do not have the 

same rights as ethnic Croats in the region. In Eastern Slavonia, at least 40 percent of 

public-sector jobs were set aside for minorities per UNTAES, yet those positions have 

not been filled by returning Serbs. Serbs attempting to return to the area cannot easily get 

into public housing or reclaim property; ethnic Croats have not faced any problems 

returning to their original homes or buying housing. These problems need to be avoided 

in Mitrovica. 

Eastern Slavonia and Mitrovica have the common enemy of time when it comes to 

reintegration. The return of displaced persons to Eastern Slavonia has been slow and 

now, 11 years after the Erdut Agreement, many of the Serbs who moved to the Danube 

region after 1991 wish to stay. Similarly, Mitrovica has been divided and operating under 

parallel structures for so long that its citizens will not easily reintegrate. 
40
41

3. Brčko: International Incubation

By Melissa Sinclair 

Case Study Model Characteristics and Conclusions: 

• strong international authority; 

• clear mandate; 

• ethnically integrated and functioning institutions; 

• strong dependence on an international supervisor. 

Brčko History 

Brčko is a small, five hundred-year-old city, advantageously situated on the south bank of 

the Sava River, which defines much of the northeastern border of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina (BiH) with Croatia and Serbia. The pre-war Brčko area was one of the most 

prosperous in the former Yugoslavia due to its well-developed agro-industries and its 

position as a commercial and transportation hub. The Sava River port was BiH’s most 

important, providing a vital link to the Danube River and Black Sea Basin. 

On April 30, 1992, shortly after the Republic of BiH declared independence from 

Yugoslavia, Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav National Army (JNA) units launched surprise 

attacks on the municipality of Brčko, in a brutal attempt to drive non-Serbs from the 

region and claim the area for a Greater Serbia. Houses, schools, and factories in the city 

center and outlying areas were reduced to rubble. One international agency counted over 

9,000 homes utterly destroyed in and around Brčko city, which represented living 

quarters for 40,000 of the District’s 80,000 inhabitants.56 Thousands of inhabitants, 

primarily Bosniaks and Croats, were killed or simply disappeared. 

The war dramatically changed the ethnic composition of the area. Yugoslavia’s 1991 

census recorded a population mix in Brčko of 45 percent Bosniak, 25 percent Croat, and 

21 percent Serb. In 1996, shortly after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, the city 

center’s population was estimated to be 97.5 percent Serb.57 This Serbian majority, 

coupled with Brčko’s strategic location in joining the two halves of the Republika Srpska 

(RS), led the Serbs to advocate at Dayton that Brčko be given to the RS.58 The 

Federation, however, contended that Brčko should be returned to its pre-war majorities as 

a matter of equity and justice. The status of Brčko became so contentious that it nearly 

derailed the Dayton peace talks. In an attempt to salvage the negotiations, the parties 

agreed to leave the decision to binding arbitration under the rules of the United Nations. 

 

56 Robert Farrand, “The Inevitability of Peace Operations?,” remarks presented to the 95th annual meeting 

of the American Society of International Law, April 4–7, 2001. Proceedings, 229. 57 International Crisis Group (ICG), Bosnia’s Brčko: Getting In, Getting On and Getting Out, Balkans 

Report 144 (June 2, 2003), 3. Available online at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/ 

report_archive/A400987_02062003.pdf>. 

58 Upon signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, BiH was divided into two entities: the Republika Srpska 

(predominantly Serb) and the Federation (predominantly Bosnian and Croat). Brčko is the slender link—at 

its narrowest point only five kilometers wide—that connects the two halves of the Republika Srpska. 
42

After a year of intense deliberations, the Arbitral Tribunal59 decided to place the Brčko 

municipality north of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) under the authority of an 

international supervisor. Since 1997 the Tribunal has issued three “Awards” to clarify 

and establish Brčko’s mandate. These awards have provided a clear path forward for the 

people of Brčko and the American Supervisors who have administered the District. In the 

spring of 1997 the first Supervisor arrived, American Ambassador Robert Farrand, who 

served from April 1997 to June 2000. He was followed by three career diplomats: Gary 

Mathews (June 2000–April 2001), Henry Clarke (April 2001–January 2004), and Susan 

Johnson (January 2004–present). 

Post-Conflict Brčko

Once considered the “black hole of chauvinism, intransigence, criminality and despair,” 

Brčko is now a model of relative economic prosperity and functioning multi-ethnic 

institutions for the rest of BiH and the region.60 

Security. In December 1995, American IFOR61 troops began building Camp McGovern 

in a cleared minefield just south of the center of Brčko. One American battalion, 

approximately 800 soldiers, remained a visible and active part of the Brčko community 

until the base was handed over to the District in a formal ceremony in September 2004. 

SFOR’s presence, particularly in the early days, was vital to quelling fears, building trust, 

and providing an atmosphere in which reconstruction and reconciliation could take place. 

Reminiscing, one local author notes, “the people will not forget the period after the 

arrival of the first troops...many of our citizens used to say that SFOR soldiers’ presence 

itself gives the feeling of safety that brings quiet sleep.”62 Brčko, initially, also benefited 

from the close working relationship the Supervisor and the Commander of Camp 

McGovern shared. Sharing intelligence, goals, and the decision-making process enabled 

the international political and security forces to act in a unified manner. Farrand notes 

that “the authority of the Supervisor would carry far less weight if the local actors were 

not constrained by fear of SFOR reprisal.”63 

Fundamental to the Supervisor’s goals was the establishment of the rule of law. 

Accordingly, the first of Brčko’s institutions to be reformed and unified was the police 

force. Based on the municipal election results of September 1997, the Supervisor worked 

with the UN International Police Task Force (UN/IPTF) to establish a multi-ethnic police 

force that reflected the municipality’s ethnic distribution. This meant reducing the 

existing all-Serb police force to half its number and recruiting and training a new cadre of 

officers from all parts of the community. The effort, though not perfect, was widely 

 

59 The Arbitral Tribunal is a three-person panel composed of local judges and American lawyer Roberts 

Owen as Presiding Arbitrator. 

60 ICG, Bosnia’s Brčko, 4. 61 The NATO-led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) began its mandate on December 20, 1995, to 

implement the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement, On December 20, 1996, the multi-national 

Stabilization Force (SFOR) came into being, marking the completion of IFOR’s mandate. 

62 Peter Vasic, “The Model of District–the Initial Force of Development: 2000–2006.” 

63 Peter Farrand, “Lessons from Brčko: Necessary Components for Future Internationally Supervised 

Territories,” Emory International Law Review, 15, no. 2 (Fall 2001), 576-577. 
43

considered a success. A public opinion poll conducted in 2002 showed that local police 

enjoyed the strongest public support of any institution in the District–—about 50 

percent.64 In March 2002, Brčko’s police force was the first in BiH to be certified by 

IPTF as meeting international criteria.65

Perhaps the biggest bang for the international community’s buck came from a small, but 

highly influential group called the Brčko Law Revision Commission (BLRC), which 

began its work in June 1999. Mandated under the Final Award, the BLRC was 

established to harmonize the laws of the two Entities for the District.66 It was composed 

of four members: a chairman, one representative from the RS and two representatives 

from the Federation. The commission established a process whereby all draft laws were 

forwarded to relevant OHR departments for review and comment and then sent to the 

Brčko District Assembly for consideration, amendment, and adoption. Rather than 

making cosmetic changes to existing laws, the BLRC embarked on a comprehensive 

overhaul intended to provide a uniform legal foundation for the District. Laws were 

drafted at a level consistent with European Union standards and the small but highly 

competent staff enabled the BLRC to work at a quick pace. The Commission drafted over 

40 laws and numerous by-laws and regulations, oversaw the establishment of a new 

judiciary and court administration and oversaw the implementation of laws dealing with 

the judiciary, before being dismantled by OHR in October 2001. The District’s courts 

have set the pace for legal reform in BiH. The sound legal assurances provided in Brčko 

continue to attract numerous investors, including foreign investors, to the District. 

Economy. Immediately following the war it was estimated that 80–90 percent of Brčko 

functioned in the black economy.67 The war had devastated the District’s infrastructure. 

Factories, roads, and homes were in shambles. Silt filled the port, making it unusable. 

Also, like many post-communist communities, Brčko suffered from a centralized system 

of government that fostered corruption. The registration of businesses was cumbersome 

and expensive. At 87 percent of net salary, the income tax rate in BiH was the highest in 

Europe.68 There were no small claims courts for businesses to make legal appeals, forcing 

companies to wait years while suits meandered through the regular court system, often 

ending in dishonest backroom deals and bribing of the judge.69 Most businesses were 

forced to operate, at least partially, underground. 

The BLRC was instrumental in reforming tax and business laws, making it advantageous 

for businesses and banks to open branches in the District. Registration was simplified and 

a complete re-registration of old firms was ordered to weed out fictitious ones. Brčko 

 

64 Henry Clarke, “Brčko District, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reasons for Successful Basic Reform,” 

summary of a presentation at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, February 4, 2004, 2. Available 

online at <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/MR293Clarke.doc>. 

65 ICG, Bosnia’s Brčko, 21. 66 Final Award, Annex, paragraph 6; Final Award, Revised Annex, August 18, 1999, paragraph 5. 

67 International Crisis Group (ICG), Brčko: A Comprehensive Solution, Balkans Report 55 (February 8, 

1999), 5. Available online at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/ 

A400184_02021999.pdf>. 

68 Ibid., 5. 

69 Ibid.. 
44

became the first place in BiH to indict and try politically important people for 

corruption.70 The honesty and efficiency of the District’s custom service gave it a 

competitive edge over the RS and Federation on imports, which raised considerable 

revenue for the District budget. As the legal basis of the District strengthened, banks and 

businesses, including foreign investors, began to migrate to the area. 

The growth of Brčko’s economy is often attributed to the presence of the international 

supervisor and the political certainty and monetary assistance provided through this 

person. While true to a certain extent, the assessment does not tell the whole story. Brčko 

did benefit from its close link to the U.S. Government via a series of American 

Supervisors—this is a lesson learned. The supervision was not left in the hands of the 

nebulous “international community” but rather to one nation that felt very responsible for 

its success or failure. Brčko is often erroneously cited as having received large amounts 

of international aid, when in fact foreign assistance disbursed in Brčko was much less 

than in other parts of BiH. Former High Representative Lord Paddy Ashdown recently 

estimated that BiH has received $16 billion (USD) in aid since the end of the war. From 

this Brčko has received an estimated $70 million ($30 million of which has come directly 

from the U.S. Government). In comparison, Mostar has received upwards of $300-400 

million ($15 million of which was for the restoration of Stari Most, the Old Bridge). 

Obviously it is not the amount of money, but how the money is spent that is crucial to 

success. 

Due to the vast destruction of the region during the war, large portions of Brčko’s 

funding went directly to reconstruction. Reconstruction funds have come from a variety 

of sources; Saudi Arabia paid for the repair and construction of houses and mosques, the 

Italian government repaired cranes in the port, the Greek and Japanese governments 

contributed to de-mining activities, and innumerable agencies contributed to the 

reconstruction of schools and homes. While these reconstruction monies have been 

critical to restoring the District’s physical structure, perhaps more beneficial to the longterm stability of the District have been the monies spent on “less visible” projects, such as 

the BLRC, the training of judges and legal workers, and EU assessments of agricultural 

and economic opportunities. The latter have been critical to the development of a 

framework in which the District can function effectively. The BLRC cost the U.S. 

Government less than $1 million, but its contribution to creating an environment 

attractive to business has been invaluable. From this the real growth, and sustainable 

hope, of Brčko’s economy has developed as the unsympathetic market continues to 

choose to invest in the District. 

Today Brčko has regained its prominence as the most economically prosperous part of 

BiH. Since 2001, the District has maintained a balanced budget, completely financed by 

its own revenues. According a 2001 report, the Gross Domestic Product per capita in 

Brčko was 4,233KM in comparison to 2,570KM in the Federation and 1,770KM in the 

RS.71 

 

70 Clarke, 2. 

71 Office of the High Representative (OHR), “Brčko Economy Fact Sheet,” December 10, 2002. Available 

online at <http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=6139>. 
45

Ethnic Composition. Freedom of movement, as well as refugee and Internally Displaced 

Person (IDP) returns, were especially ‘hard nuts to crack’ in the early post-war days of 

the District.72 During the war, ethnic cleansing pushed Croats and Bosniaks south of what 

became the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), while Serbs, many of which were 

displaced from other parts of BiH, flooded the city center. The post-war housing situation 

was desperate. With an estimated 40 percent of the District’s housing destroyed, living 

space was limited.73 Evicting squatters was politically delicate, as many IDPs had no safe 

place to go. Tensions ran high and residents were afraid to risk their lives crossing the 

IEBL. To further complicate matters, inefficient administrative system of the past had left 

the region without a clear record of property titles, making it nearly impossible to 

differentiate property ownership. 

The Supervisor worked closely with OHR, OSCE, and the UNHCR, to construct an 

innovative and practical plan for returns. International and local lawyers drafted property 

laws that made returns attractive. Administrative procedures were established for 

adjudicating refugee claims, making awards, and overseeing the return of property. By 

the end of 1997, Bosniaks were starting to move north of the IEBL and back into the 

Brčko area of supervision. By 2001, well over 4,000 families had returned to the District, 

accounting for just over 25 percent of all minority returns from the Federation to the 

RS74—a remarkable proportion when one considers that the District occupies only 2 

percent of the total territory of BiH. 

Today the Brčko District has returned to its pre-war multi-ethnicity, with a current 

distribution of 40 percent Serb, 39 percent Bosniak, and 20 percent Croat. This ethnic 

balance holds the community in a positive tension, with no one group having a majority 

and all three being inter-dependent on fair and unbiased treatment. The District’s schools 

were the first in BiH to be fully integrated and have become the model for educational 

reform throughout the country (though without the equivalent of Supervisor authority at 

the State and Entity levels, progress has been much slower and uneven). A report by the 

District Personnel Officer revealed that the public workplace reflects the District’s ethnic 

composition. 

Of 8118 job applications received in 2002, 40.5 percent were Bosniak, 40.43 

percent were Serb, and 14.2 percent were Croat. Of the 2,456 hired, 47 percent 

were Serb, 38 percent Bosniak, 14 percent Croat, and 1 percent other. Distribution 

throughout departments is fairly even as well, as evidenced by the Administrative 

Support Department: Serb 37.5 percent, Bosniak 37.5 percent, Croats 25 percent.

75

 

72 Farrand, “The Inevitability of Peace Operations?,” 230. 72 Clarke, 1. 

74 Farrand, “The Inevitability of Peace Operations?,” 230. 75 William Sommers, “Brčko District: Experiment to Experience,” (a paper prepared for the 10th NISP Acee 

Annual Conference in Krakow, Poland April 25-27, 2002, 10). Available at <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/ 

groups/public/documents/nispacee/unpan003596.pdf#search=%22Brčko%20District%20experiment%20to

%20Experience%22>. 
46

It is interesting to note that most of the District’s by-laws avoid prescribing rigid ethnic 

quotas. Rather, fluid terminology such as “to reflect the District’s ethnic composition” is 

used. This allows the District maximum flexibility, to grow with and respond to the 

community, while still holding the administration accountable. Such language should be 

considered in other parts of BiH and for other post-conflict communities. Quotas are not 

a cure for an unhealthy community and their permanent prescription should be avoided 

whenever possible. 

Elections and Governance. The first Award (1997) left the status of Brčko undefined. 

The Final Award (1999) established the entire pre-war Brčko District as a unique unit of 

self-government, held in condominium between the two Entities. On March 8, 2000, 

Ambassador Farrand proclaimed the creation of the District and promulgated its statute. 

He then proceeded to appoint an interim government and a 29-member Assembly. These 

appointments continued until the first District election was held in October 2004. The 

delay of elections in Brčko has been controversial. Some believe that allowing the 

Supervisor to appoint (and expel) District officials has kept nationalist spoilers out of 

power and enabled the Dayton Peace Accords to be more fully implemented in the 

District. Others say it has been a denial of basic democratic rights and retarded the 

District’s ability to develop self-governance skills. Such a philosophical debate is beyond 

the scope of this paper; however, it does seem worth pointing out that, as Supervisor 

Clarke once stated, “there is a lot more to democracy than holding an election.”76 Clarke 

goes on to cite problems that the city assemblies in Sarajevo and Banja Luka have had in 

implementing democratic standards, primarily with the assemblies becoming deadlocked. 

Brčko did not suffer such dramatic set-backs because the Supervisor was able to issue 

Orders that forced change. Since 1997, 86 Orders have been issued on a variety of topics 

such as the collection of taxes, the integration of institutions, the amendment of laws, and 

the appointment or removal of individuals from public office. This number is much lower 

than the number of orders imposed from the Office of the High Representative on the 

state of BiH. 

Long Term Prospects for Brčko 

On one hand, Brčko’s future looks bright. Brčko has recovered relatively quickly from 

the war; ethnic integration, economic development and other social indicators are the 

strongest in the country. On the other hand, the District’s success is highly dependent on 

the presence of the Supervisor and the large number of competencies held at the District 

level. Both of these items are being reviewed as the government of the State of BiH is 

strengthened and OHR prepares to leave the country. What this will mean for the District 

is unclear. The District is in negotiations with OHR and BiH actors to increase its 

representation in Parliament and its ability to defend its interests at the State level. 

 

76 Clarke, 4. 
47

Applicability to Mitrovica 

A cursory look at the Brčko model has led some to believe that “a strong supervisor with 

a clear mandate worked in Brčko, therefore the same should be implemented in 

Mitrovica.” One must think carefully before undertaking such a drastic measure, 

however. Is the timing right for such a drastic measure in northern Kosovo? Will the 

international community have the dedication to see the project through to its completion? 

Can Kosovo sustain the results after the international community leaves? 

The process to define Brčko’s status began at the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. A 

transparent process led to a clearly defined outcome within four years. A strong 

international presence was sent to implement this decision. In contrast, Kosovo’s status 

has been left in limbo for more than six years. No clear mandate has ever been given to 

Mitrovica or the northern region of Kosovo. International presence in the region has been 

weak at best, with the United Nations Regional Representatives having little authority or 

funding to implement severe changes and KFOR forces serving as monitors rather than 

preventors of violence. The international community has not only allowed communities 

on either side of the Ibar River to develop separately, but indeed has enforced this 

separation by preventing locals from crossing the bridges. To establish an all-powerful 

Supervisor to unify northern Kosovo at this point would be an uphill climb toward 

futility. It would be perceived as a step backwards in self-governance, especially by the 

Albanians who are eager to govern themselves. The chances that the international 

community would give the project the funding and support needed are slim. The 

international community, including the United States, is looking for a way out of the 

Balkans, not an opportunity to entrench itself. A better model for the region will be one 

that recognizes and incorporates the ethnic divisions the city has grown accustomed to, 

while integrating these parts into the whole of Kosovo. 

Furthermore, one must remember that Brčko, and BiH in general, has a history of greater 

ethnic integration than does Kosovo. The three constituent peoples of BiH are all of 

South Slavic origin and speak a mutually-comprehensible language. Ethnic integration in 

public and private life was common, as evidenced by the fact that before the war 27 

percent of all marriages in Brčko were of mixed ethnicity.77

Kosovo, however, has a history of ethnic division. Albanians are the only major people 

group in the former Yugoslavia without Slavic origins. The Albanian language is entirely 

distinct. Mixed marriages were virtually unknown in Kosovo. 

In a sense, then, helping the citizens of Brčko heal from the debilitating wounds of war is 

an attempt to return the region to multi-ethnic, functioning pre-war state. In Mitrovica it 

seems the best one can hope for is a return to pre-war tolerance. Ethnic groups may live 

and work side by side without killing one another, but the history of mistrust, division, 

 

77 Robert Farrand, “Brčko, Crucible of Peace in the Balkan,” Alexander R. Woodcock and David F. Davis, 

editors, Cornwallis Group VII: Analysis for Compliance and Peacebuilding, (Clementsport, Nova Scotia: 

The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2003), 103. 
48

and power-mongering that has divided the region for the memorable past stymies hopes 

for true ethnic cooperation and integration. 

It seems then, that “international incubation” may not be the best model for Mitrovica. 

The project is too late, the price tag too high and the end-state too ambitious for the 

expected future of the region. Though the overall model may not fit, there are many 

elements of the Brčko experience that provide valuable lessons for northern Kosovo. 

Ethnic integration, economic vitalization, and the role of the international community 

provide valuable lessons learned. 

One of the most important and often over-looked keys to Brčko’s success has been the 

number of competencies retained at the District level. In comparison to other local 

governments in BiH, which are largely subject to entity (and in the Federation, cantonal) 

control, Brčko enjoys an exceptional amount of local autonomy. This has allowed the 

District to advance more quickly than other parts of BiH. Today the fear in Brčko is that 

integration into the State of BiH will mean digression in the District’s standards. The 

challenge in Kosovo will be a bit different, but the basic premise is the same. In Kosovo 

the challenge will be to set high standards at the State level, and allow local 

municipalities to govern themselves, in accordance with those standards. Whereas in 

Brčko the fear is that integration will mean digression, the fear in Kosovo is that 

decentralization will mean governance below the minimum standards. The truth in both 

cases, however, is that locals do not trust the State and democracy requires individual 

participation to work properly. Thus, it is imperative that, in both cases, the following 

competencies be held at the local level, with minimum standards being set by the State: 

police, judiciary, taxation, educational system(s), and the health care system. 

In keeping with this, a BLRC-like body to evaluate municipalities’ legal bases should 

also be considered. The parallel systems currently functioning in northern Kosovo must 

be compatible, initially united on paper if not in practice, in order to lay the foundation 

for future unification. The laws governing future municipalities must be compatible with 

and meet the State’s standards. 

Regarding the economy, northern Kosovo, like Brčko, is advantageously situated on the 

border with Serbia, a region more prosperous than itself. Northern Kosovo should take 

advantage of this unique position and strengthen its trade and commerce ties. The mining 

industry will never again support the number of employees it did in the past. For 

Mitrovica to flourish economically, it must look for new opportunities that offer a 

competitive edge in today’s market. Like Brčko, Mitrovica can prepare for becoming a 

trade hub by ensuring trade routes and venues are safe and secure for all people and that 

taxes are collected fairly and honestly. 

The Brčko model also teaches that the international community’s bark must be backed up 

with bite. In the case of Brčko, Ambassador Farrand asserts that the 800 American troops 

stationed at nearby Camp McGovern were critical to his ability to fulfill the Final Award 

mandates. Though the troops were never deployed for a serious threat, their presence 

intimidated spoilers and communicated the authority of the international community. In 
49

Mitrovica international police and a robust KFOR force should continue to be a strong, 

visible part of the community. These troops should be multi-national and deployed on 

both sides of the river. 

Northern Kosovo, like Kosovo in general, needs a clear resolution of its final status. The 

Final Awards have served as a guidebook for the people of Brčko. Mitrovica also needs a 

clear path forward, in writing, to guide its citizens. 

If an international presence is to continue in Mitrovica, particularly if it is to be intimately 

involved in the affairs of the local government, staff must be willing to “stay for the long 

haul.” Three of the four Brčko supervisors stayed in-country more than two years, and the 

current Deputy Supervisor has been with OHR for eight years—six with OHR North and 

two with OHR South. The importance of longevity and continuity cannot be 

overemphasized. Relationships are key to the success or failure of international 

intervention missions. A high turn-over rate gives spoilers access points each time a new 

international element arrives and has to work its way up the learning curve. 

Finally, the Brčko model strongly advises against establishing a pre-determined exit date. 

As one commentator notes, 

If an internationally supervised territory is to have any chance of long-term 

success, the international parties implementing the agreement and engaging in 

the oversight of the territory must have the determination to ensure that the 

implementation phase will outlast the desire of those internal players who are 

bent on obstructing its implementation. Otherwise, the costs, both financially on 

the donor countries and personally on the people living in an internationally 

supervised territory, may be substantial.78

Though the overall model of Brčko, incubating a region with a strong supervisor and 

clear mandate for rapid integration, is inappropriate for the current situation in Mitrovica, 

there are many pieces of the Brčko model that can and should be applied. Brčko teaches 

that decentralization and local competencies are keys to the ability of a community to 

build itself up. A revision of the judicial, criminal, and administrative legal systems of the 

region will give the region a framework for success. Mitrovica’s economy must be 

reoriented toward a commodity that is competitive in today’s market. This may possibly 

mean becoming the hub of trade and commerce with Kosovo’s more affluent neighbors. 

An internationally binding agreement must be negotiated for northern Kosovo, bringing 

resolution to the status of the region and providing a clear path forward. And finally, the 

international community should commit to providing the visible security forces and 

quality staff needed to ensure the implementation of this agreement. 

 

78 Farrand, “Lessons from Brčko,” 583. 
50
51

Workshop Recommendations 

Summarized by Melissa Sinclair79

Introduction 

As future status negotiations on Kosovo have begun, a key question will be “what to do” 

with Mitrovica and the northern region of the territory. To help provide ideas for the 

negotiators, policymakers, and implementers working on the issue, the Center for 

Technology and National Security Policy at The National Defense University pooled the 

collective knowledge of a group of approximately 15 Balkan experts. The following 

analysis is a result of that working group discussion. 

Four Options for Northern Kosovo 

The northern, predominantly Serbian, portion of Kosovo and the Serbian enclaves 

throughout the region provide a spectrum of future status possibilities. Ranging from full 

ethnic integration and regional sovereignty to flat-out partition with Serbia, no one option 

will serve as the silver bullet for all interested parties. 

Partition. Kosovo is legally still part of Serbia, although currently administered by 

UNMIK under Security Council Resolution 1244. Despite the Contact Group’s vow that 

the current borders of Kosovo will not change, many Serbs hold out hope that the land 

north of the Ibar River will be granted to the state of Serbia post-negotiations. Though 

this option is unrealistic, given the Contact Group’s stance, it does represent the hopes of 

the Serbian population in Kosovo. 

De Facto Partition with Parallel Structures. The northern portion of Kosovo is currently, 

arguably, a de facto partitioned region. Though legally bound to Pristina, the north is 

practically financed and controlled by Belgrade. Eliminating the parallel structures in the 

north will require more political will and security enforcement than what the international 

community and local leaders have thus far been able to muster. Without the elimination 

of these structures, the Serbs of Kosovo will continue to look to Belgrade, not Pristina, 

for support, thus creating a de facto partitioned state. 

Ethnic Integration through International Incubation. Ethnic integration and reunification 

with the rest of Kosovo is the ultimate goal of the Contact Group and international 

community. Decentralization, which Martti Ahtisaari made the first topic of the status 

negotiations, will be crucial to ethnic integration. A well-executed plan of 

decentralization will give the various sections of Kosovo confidence to administer their 

own affairs, while legally and broadly keeping the territory united. Establishment of the 

rule of law in all parts of Kosovo will also be crucial to integration. Citizens must be able 

to look to state-sanctioned security forces for protection and have confidence that the 

 

79 Conclusions from a workshop held by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at The 

National Defense University on March 31, 2006. 
52

system will be ethnically impartial. Thus, if the option of ethnic integration is chosen, 

significant continued involvement from UNMIK’s international successor and KFOR 

will be required until Kosovo has its own competent forces to serve as replacements. 

Rapid Reorientation and Serb Exodus. A final option, undesirable to the international 

community but not beyond the scope of reality, is the implementation of policies that will 

lead to a massive Serb exodus. If Kosovo is granted full independence without adequate 

protection for minorities, this is a very real possibility. There is little left in Kosovo for 

the Serbs and, representing less than 10 percent of the population, non-Albanians feel 

powerless to effect change or protect their rights through the central government. 

No one option provides a clear solution to the problems faced by Serbs in Kosovo or the 

region north of the Ibar River. Both partition and the continuation of parallel structures 

will meet significant opposition from Kosovar Albanians. Allowing the implementation 

of policies that will lead to the purging of non-Albanians is unacceptable to the Serbs and 

the international community. The international community seems to be wavering between 

the more ideologically acceptable solution of full ethnic integration, with unified multiethnic institutions administering the region, and an acceptance of the status quo, 

legitimizing parallel structures and weaving them into the framework of the region. The 

latter option, though initially easier to implement and less intrusive, would have to be 

handled very carefully. The path to parallel structures would begin with decentralization 

but in the end few efforts would be made to integrate the communities. 

The recommendations that follow, then, are vital for ensuring that decentralization 

creates one unified Kosovo, not a de facto partitioned Kosovo. The working group 

concluded that moving toward ethnic integration is the only acceptable solution for the 

United States and our allies. This is also the most difficult option to implement. It will 

require long-term attention and resources. As opposed to monitoring the exodus of Serbs 

or maintaining the status quo, moving toward a unified Kosovo will require a concerted 

effort to transform attitudes. 

This is not the first time the international community has faced such a challenge in the 

Balkans. The ethnically divided cities of Brčko and Mostar in Bosnia were each 

administered by supervisory regimes after the Dayton Accords. And the United Nations 

Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium 

(UNTAES) was established to oversee the integration of that Serb area back into the state 

of Croatia. Drawing on lessons learned from these UN missions, the working group made 

several recommendations that, if followed, give the region north of the Ibar River and the 

Serbian enclaves throughout the territory a chance at successful integration with the rest 

of Kosovo. 

Recommendations

The following recommendations are grouped into three broad categories: 1) the role of an 

international assistance mission, 2) the needs of the security sector, and 3) the social and 

political implications of the path of integration. 
53

International Assistance and Mandate. If the option of ethnic integration is chosen, its 

implementation will require the assistance of the international community. This should 

not be a “monitoring” or “verification” mission, but rather a mission of political 

assistance, designed specifically to implement the policies that parties have agreed to in 

the status negotiation talks. It is important to note that whatever the status of northern 

Kosovo, it will be a status that all parties agreed to through the negotiation process. Thus, 

it will be the role of the United States and our allies to help Kosovo implement those 

decisions. 

The mission does not need to be large, but should be tailored to support specific mission 

objectives and led by a strong, proven, and neutral international diplomat. The person 

chosen to lead the mission will be crucial. Per the experiences of previous supervisors 

and leaders in Bosnia and Croatia, the most important tool this representative can be 

given is an unambiguous mandate. The mandate should be strong but narrowly focused 

on the protection of minority rights and ethnic integration. It should establish the 

representative as the “final authority in theater,” as the High Representative is in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina.80

The group felt that this mission should function under the auspices of the United Nations, 

rather than the European Union. This conclusion was drawn in large part because of the 

EU’s poor performance in Mostar. The group also felt that, despite UNMIK failures over 

the past six years, the UN is still perceived by the Kosovars as a more legitimate and 

competent organization than the EU. 

Finally, the budget given to this Representative does not need to be large, but should be 

highly flexible, allowing the Representative the freedom to support programs and projects 

as he or she deems appropriate. 

Security. The mandate, no matter how strong, will be useless without security forces to 

add bite to the mandate’s bark. KFOR troop levels should remain constant and its 

capabilities should shift toward more constabulary forces. The troops should be 

authorized vigorous Rules of Engagement, with minimal national caveats. This will allow 

the KFOR commander to move troops firmly at the first sign of violence. The United 

States must remain in KFOR in a visible and significant way. Americans and Germans 

should be involved in the supervision of the northern region. 

In addition to KFOR, it is vital that the size of the CIVPOL contingent in northern 

Kosovo increase. American CIVPOL, widely perceived as competent and tough police 

officers, should in particular be more numerous in the northern regions. The Kosovo 

Police Service (KPS) must have a healthy mix of Serbs in Serbian populated regions. All 

 

80 Article V of The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina designates the 

High Representative as the “final authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the 

civilian implementation of the peace settlement.” These “Bonn powers” allow the High Representative to 

override domestic authority, ensuring that purposes counter-productive to the peace settlement are stymied. 
54

KPS officers, regardless of ethnicity, should be trained side-by-side. In Eastern Slavonia 

it was found very beneficial to train officers outside the Balkans, where local pressures 

were diminished and the possibility of group cohesion increased. 

Finally, there must be good lateral communications between the Representative and the 

military and civilian security forces. The Representative must know that security forces 

will support the implementation of his or her policies, if needed. Any perceived 

weaknesses in relationships between members of the international community will be 

exploited by spoilers. 

The rapid establishment of the rule of law in Serbian areas, particularly the police, courts, 

and prisons, should be a first priority of the Representative. The Representative must 

significantly reduce the parallel structures that have been allowed to exist in Kosovo and 

reclaim Serbian areas for the integrated community at large. This responsibility is to be 

clearly outlined in the mandate, which should come from the UN Security Council. 

Social/Political. The social and political aspects of the Representative’s mandate will be 

the most difficult to implement. Comprising 10 percent of the population, non-Albanians 

are at a severe disadvantage in ensuring that their rights and interests are protected in 

Kosovo. A main responsibility of the Representative will be to guarantee that policies and 

systems are put in place to safeguard non-Albanians. One practical way of doing this is to 

make sure non-Albanians are appointed as Deputies to critical ministries such as 

Education, Labor, and Social Welfare. 

Education in Kosovo, crucial to the success of future generations, presents particular 

challenges. Unlike other parts of the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo’s ethnic groups are 

divided by completely dissimilar languages. For this reason, supporting the funding of 

language-neutral schools, such as schools that teach in English, German, or French, 

should be explored. Language-neutral schools not only diffuse the immediate ethnic 

tensions, which the language barriers embody, but they also equip the students with the 

life-skill of multi-lingualism, which will be vital to Kosovo’s participation in the global 

market. An important responsibility of the Representative will also be to oversee the 

revision of the curriculum of the public school system—particularly the history 

curriculum. In Eastern Slavonia a moratorium was put on teaching local history for 10 

years after the conflict. 

Although a vibrant economy is vital to the success of Kosovo, the group concluded that 

the Representative should focus first on getting the politics right. This would include 

setting in place economic policies that encourage both foreign and domestic investment. 

If that is accomplished, the economy should naturally follow; an environment that fosters 

honest, fair, and impartial dealings will breed economic vitality. For this reason some in 

the group felt that a major Marshall-type plan for Kosovo is premature. 

Finally, the representative will need a rigorous strategy for communicating with all ethnic 

communities in Kosovo. And as Bosnia showed, he/she will need good access to all 

forms of intelligence. Harnessing the media and staying in close communication with 
55

local stakeholders will be crucial to ensuring that the Representative and Kosovo as a 

whole are moving in tandem toward the building of a multi-ethnic, integrated Kosovo. 

Conclusion

This is not the first time the international community has assisted new nations in taking 

the difficult path of ethnic, social, and political integration. Drawing on lessons learned in 

Brčko, Mostar, and Eastern Slavonia, the international community can help position 

Kosovo for success. Though an international regime in northern Kosovo will likely be 

less intense than the American supervision in Brčko, practitioners should look to Brčko’s 

advancement in the following areas for guidance: rule of law, the construction of a multiethnic police force, legal and judicial reform, an enlightened education system, and the 

importance of a strong, clear mandate. Eastern Slavonia teaches us that the ready 

availability of and willingness to use force when necessary is also vital to success. 

UNTAES was also able to fulfill its mission because it worked closely with political 

leaders, including Belgrade, to find creative solutions to difficult problems. Mostar 

teaches us that without a strong mandate and the will to enforce it, conflict may cease but 

ethnic integration remain elusive. 

Ethnic reintegration is both the most attractive and the most difficult of options for 

northern Kosovo’s future. It is the option that requires the most assistance from the 

international community and the most dedication from the people of Kosovo. The task is 

large, but not impossible. Drawing on lessons from neighbors, the international 

community should work with the local community and Belgrade to ensure that the 

northern region is successfully integrated into Kosovo as a whole. 
Brcko Mostar E. Slavonia 

Outcome Ethnic reintegration De facto partition Reorientation to Zagreb 

E

Degree of Reintegration High Low Medium International Supervision Strong U.S. Supervisor EUAM and EU Dep High Rep weak Strong UN Transitional Administrator Duration of Supervision Decade Decade 2 years International Agreement 

1995 Dayton Peace Accords 

1997–1999 Three Arbitration 

Awards 

1994 Federation Agreement/EUAM 

1995 Dayton Accords set up DOHR 1995 Erdut Agreement 

PKO Troops 800 U.S. troops Located in European force sector of IFOR/SFOR—no U.S. 5,000 UN troops and 500 CIVPOL Ethnic Mix in 1991 Bosniak 45%; Croat 25%; Serb 21% Bosniak 35%; Croat 34%; Serb 19% Serb 36%; Croat 43% Ethnic Mix After Supervision 

Bosniak 39%; Croat 20%; 

Serb 40% 

(2003) 

Bosniak 47%; Croat 48%; Serb 3% 

(2003 est.) 

Serb 30%; Croat 60% 

(2004 report) 

Serb Flight Serbs stayed Serbs fled 75,000 Serbs fled 1995–1999 International Mandate 

Freedom of movement; returns; 

elections and institution building; 

revitalize the economy 

Unified, multi-ethnic city admin; 

elections; protect human rights; 

effect returns; protect religious rights 

and cultural identify 

Demilitarization and security, 

oversee return of refugees, organize 

elections, and integration into Croatia 

Population in Zone 80,000 (1991, 2003) 1991: 126,066 2003: 105,448 1991: 201,400; 1998: 105,000 Nature of Zone International zone, no physical barriers, IEBL ignored City center; 6 municipalities—3 Croat, 3 Bosniak; river divides No international zone; river divides NMajor Issue Remaining How to integrate Brcko in BiH Key BiH Flashpoint; much further reintegration required Discrimination and Serb flight remain Power-Sharing Excellent Superficial Croats dominate Economic Healthy economy Recovery slowed by uncertainty High unemployment rate Integration of Law and Police High Medium High Stability: Reason High: Reintegration Low: Limited reintegration High: Reorientation 

Summary of Models for Mitrovica