Critical Technology Events in

the Development of the Stinger

and Javelin Missile Systems

Project Hindsight Revisited

John Lyons, Duncan Long, and Richard Chait 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

National Defense University

July 2006 
 

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not reflect the official 

policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified 

materials. 

John W. Lyons is a Distinguished Research Professor at CTNSP. He was previously director 

of the Army Research Laboratory and director of the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology. Dr. Lyons received his PhD from Washington University. He holds a BA from

Harvard. 

Duncan Long is a Research Associate at CTNSP. He holds a Master of International 

Affairs degree from the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, 

and a BA from Stanford University.

Richard Chait is a Distinguished Research Professor at the Center for Technology and 

National Security Policy (CTNSP), National Defense University. He was previously Chief 

Scientist, Army Material Command, and Director, Army Research and Laboratory

Management. Dr. Chait received his PhD in Solid State Science from Syracuse University

and a BS degree from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. 

Acknowledgments. Many people contributed to this effort. Dr. Thomas Killion, the 

current S&T executive for the Army, saw the benefit of looking back at key Army

weapons systems for insights that would be helpful in managing S&T in today’s 

environment. On-site visits to the Aviation and Missile Research and Development 

Center at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, AL, and to Raytheon Missile Systems in 

Tucson, AZ, were the result of coordinating efforts by Bruce Fowler and Roy Adams, 

respectively. Each and every person mentioned in Appendix A played an important role 

by providing valuable technical information and commentary as well as directing us to 

other contacts. Some, denoted by an asterisk, also reviewed sections in their area of 

expertise for accuracy and completeness. Al Sciarretta, working with us under a 

contractual arrangement, ably supported the effort and gave us valuable warfighter 

information based on his field experience while on active duty. 

Defense & Technology Papers are published by the National Defense University Center for Technology and 

National Security Policy, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. CTNSP publications are available online 

at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html.

 ii 
Contents 

I. Introduction.................................................................................................................. 1 

II. Background................................................................................................................. 3 

Project Hindsight ............................................................................................................ 3 

Scope............................................................................................................................... 5 

Approach......................................................................................................................... 5 

III. The Stinger................................................................................................................. 7 

Background..................................................................................................................... 8 

Seeker.............................................................................................................................. 9

Guidance and Control ................................................................................................... 12 

Propulsion and Warhead............................................................................................... 13 

Modeling and Simulation.............................................................................................. 14 

IV. The Javelin............................................................................................................... 16 

Background................................................................................................................... 17 

Command Launch Unit................................................................................................. 19 

Seeker............................................................................................................................ 21 

Guidance and Control ................................................................................................... 24 

Propulsion and Warhead............................................................................................... 25 

Modeling and Simulation.............................................................................................. 28 

V. Findings and Conclusions.................................................................................... 30 

Appendix A: Individuals Contacted............................................................................... 32 

Appendix B: Critical Technology Event List ................................................................ 34 

iii 
I. Introduction 

This paper seeks to identify the Critical Technology Events (CTEs) in the development of 

the Stinger and the Javelin missiles. It is the third paper in a series that, driven by the 

importance of understanding past military technological successes to today’s defense 

science and technology (S&T) investment and management, examines some of the key 

factors that have led to meaningful technology generation and ultimate incorporation into 

current U.S. Army weapons systems. The first paper in the series focused on the Abrams 

tank.1

 The second focused on the Apache helicopter.2 With studies of a complex ground 

system and a complex air system complete, this paper turns to two technologically 

advanced infantry weapons, the Stinger and the Javelin. These armaments have different 

roles in the arsenal, but they are both man-portable, fire-and-forget missiles whose 

development posed some unique challenges. A fourth and final paper in the series will 

summarize findings of this report, and the reports on the Abrams and the Apache, and 

offer recommendations for managing the Army’s S&T portfolio. 

We begin our study of the development of these two missile systems by briefly reviewing 

a project that served as a source of inspiration for this effort: Project Hindsight, a 1969 

Defense Department (DOD) report.3 Hindsight was an in-depth study sponsored by the 

Director of Defense Research and Engineering that provided some insights into the 

development of approximately 20 weapons systems. This review of Hindsight is followed 

by a description of the methodology that we used to gather key data on the development 

of the Stinger and the Javelin. We then address each missile individually. For each 

missile, we first present a brief description of the system and history of the program. The 

information that we have gathered is then broken out by topic area (e.g., seeker; warhead 

and propulsion) and presented in terms of CTEs. CTEs are ideas, concepts, models, and 

analyses, including key technical and managerial decisions, that have had major impacts 

on the development of a specific weapons system. CTEs can occur at any point in the 

system’s life cycle, from basic research, to advanced development, to testing and 

evaluation, to product improvements. CTEs can even relate to concepts that were 

developed but not incorporated into the weapons system. Also, they can originate 

anywhere, from in-house laboratories, to private industry, to academia. The final portion 

of the paper presents findings and concluding remarks that draw on the CTEs in the 

development of both missiles. 

 

1

 Richard Chait, John Lyons, and Duncan Long, “Critical Technology Events in the Development of the 

Abrams Tank—Project Hindsight Revisited,” Defense and Technology Paper 22 (Washington, DC: Center 

for Technology and National Security Policy, December 2005). 2

 Richard Chait, John Lyons, and Duncan Long, “Critical Technology Events in the Development of the 

Apache Helicopter—Project Hindsight Revisited,” Defense and Technology Paper 26 (Washington, DC: 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy, February 2006). 

3

 Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Project Hindsight: Final Report

(Washington, DC: Office of the DDRE, 1969). 
 

The CTEs are noted in the left margin throughout the report. They are summarized in 

Appendix B. CTEs are numbered only for ease of reference; there is no hierarchical or 

chronological significance to their order. 

While the link between high-tech weapons systems and battlefield success is often readily 

apparent, the geneses of CTEs often are not. CTEs depend on several important factors, 

including providing adequate funding, establishing clear priorities, fostering proper 

technical competencies, and leveraging the resources of the private sector and academia. 

It is our hope that this retrospective look at the Stinger and the Javelin can highlight the 

importance of such factors, and thus can be of value to current S&T leadership within the 

Army and DOD as they wrestle with tight budgets, a changing workforce, and new 

acquisition strategies. 

2
 

II. Background and Study Methodology 

Project Hindsight 

The study undertaken here is modeled in part on a 1969 report, Project Hindsight.

4

 In 

1965, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), Dr. Harold Brown, 

established a project to take a retrospective look at DOD investment in research and 

development (R&D), to evaluate the results, and to take stock of lessons learned. 

Brown’s overarching objectives for the study were to identify management factors that 

were associated with the utilization of the results produced by the DOD S&T program

and to devise a methodology to measure the return on investment.5

 He was motivated in 

part by the House Committee on Defense Appropriations, which had questioned the 

efficiency of management and the overall payoff for the part of the Research, 

Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) program that pertained to S&T.6

 

The study was conducted by ad hoc teams of military and civilian in-house personnel. 

Some twenty weapons systems were selected for review and a set of subcommittees was 

arranged, one for each system. The systems selected for review included air-to-surface, 

ballistic, and tactical missiles; a strategic transport aircraft; a howitzer; and an antitank

projectile. Data were gathered by questionnaire and evaluated according to four criteria.7

These criteria were: 

1. The extent of dependence on recent advances in science or technology. 

2. The proportion of any new technology that resulted from DOD financing of 

science or technology. 

3. The management or environmental factors that appear to correlate with high

utilization of S&T results. 

4. A quantitative measure of the return on investment. 

The project teams made the following findings with respect to these four criteria: 8 

1. Markedly improved weapons systems result from skillfully combining a 

considerable number of scientific and technological advances (Criterion 1). 

2. More than 85 percent of the new science or technology utilized was the result of 

DOD-financed programs (Criterion 2). 

 

4

 Ibid. 5

 Harold Brown, Letter to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (R&D), the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 

(R&D), and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (R&D), 6 July 1965 in Project Hindsight: Final

Report (Washington, DC: Office of the DDRE, 1969), 135. 6

 Ibid. 7 Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Project Hindsight: Final Report

(Washington, DC: Office of the DDRE, 1969), xiii. 8

 Ibid, xxi. 

3
 

3. The utilization factor appears insensitive to environmental or management 

differences between industry, in-house laboratories, and university-associated 

S&T centers (Criterion 3). 

4. Most utilized new technological information was generated in the process of 

solving problems identified in advanced or engineering development (Criterion 

3). 

5. Most utilized new fundamental scientific information came from organized 

research programs undertaken in response to recognized problems (Criterion 3). 

6. Technological inventiveness and the utilization rate are dependent on the 

recognition of a need, an educated talent pool, capital resources, and an adequate 

communication path to potential users (Criterion 3). 

7. Any crude approximation in measuring cost-performance will tend to be delusory 

(Criterion 4). 

With regard to finding number seven, the study failed to find a satisfactory method for 

assessing cost-benefit or cost-performance from S&T work. To illustrate the difficulty 

that the study encountered, the report cited the example of the silicon-based integrated 

circuit. The circuit, invented during the period under review, revolutionized electronics 

and information technology and became a crucial part of virtually every system in the 

arsenal; there was no effective way to subdivide the effects on individual S&T programs. 

This paper will not attempt to redress this or any other shortcoming of Project Hindsight; 

Dr. Brown’s goal of quantifying the payoff of DOD investment in research and 

technology is if anything a loftier target today than it was in 1965. The fundamental 

purpose of this report, however, closely mirrors that of its predecessor: by examining the 

development of select Army systems, and in particular those signal technology events 

that propelled these systems to success, we hope to shed light on the factors that lead 

defense S&T research to fruition. 

 

In addition to sharing a broad goal with the original Hindsight report, this paper also 

takes from it a similar unit of analysis, the CTE. Hindsight evaluations were based on a 

concept called a Research and Exploratory Development (RXD) Event. In that report, a 

RXD event has the predominant meaning of an event that “defines a scientific or 

engineering activity during a relatively brief period of time that includes the conception 

of a new idea and the initial demonstration of its feasibility.”9

 There may be one or two 

such events in the development of a component or system, or a whole string of such 

events. In the case of basic research RXD events, the report distinguishes between 

undirected (curiosity driven) and directed (problem driven) work. Lastly, the final 

fabrication of the system component or device “may or may not involve an Event 

depending on the state of the technological art at the time of fabrication.”10 Please note 

that we use a definition for CTEs that differs from Hindsight’s RXD event. Most 

significantly, as noted previously, CTEs can occur at any point in the life cycle; we leave 

open the possibility that CTEs might result from efforts that have utilized funds other 

than R&D. 

 

9

 Ibid., xiv. 10 Ibid. 

4
 

Scope 

We have chosen to focus this report on those things we deemed to be major technical 

developments. Though the Stinger and the Javelin both have many complex components 

that required innovation, we have concentrated only on those features that are vital to the 

missiles’ performance and set the missiles apart from their predecessor systems. Further, 

this study does not intend to provide exhaustive technical detail on the CTEs, but rather 

to identify them and highlight key aspects of their origin. 

We have divided the discussions of each missile’s development into specific topic areas. 

This separation of topics comes at the acknowledged price of diminished discussion of 

integration, systems engineering achievements, and the teaming of in-house laboratories, 

contractors, and the Program Manager (PM). The important integration work performed 

by the contractor, working closely with the PM shop and in-house laboratories, was vital 

to the final product. 

Approach 

This report is based primarily on interviews and correspondence with people who were 

directly involved in the development of the Stinger and the Javelin missiles, as well as 

information available in open source literature. Given the technical emphasis of the 

report, we interviewed and corresponded mostly with technical professionals. We also 

sought out personnel who had been at the PM office and with the contractors. The 

objective of these communications was to obtain a picture of how important critical 

technology events unfolded. 

The interviews covered a broad range of pertinent topics, including the historical 

background of the developments in question. The focus of discussion, though, was the 

CTEs. We asked interviewees to identify those technology events that they considered 

critical to the development of the missiles; to detail the impact of the CTEs; to indicate 

where the work in question was done, who contributed to it, and who funded it. 

 

Often, we first interviewed a project scientist, engineer, or manager and then obtained 

further information through follow-on conversations and correspondence with others 

identified by that person. Almost all of the discussions began with the interviewees 

providing highlights of the relevant experiences, after which we asked focused questions 

on topics not initially covered. 

It must be noted that the interviewees and correspondents were asked to relate events that 

took place as many as forty years ago. Detailed information was sometimes unavailable. 

Data on funding levels, for instance, were obtainable only intermittently. Wherever 

possible, we consulted multiple individuals on the same subject and checked their 

accounts against written sources. When interviewees and correspondents differed on what 

constituted a critical technology or who had made essential contributions, we revisited 

the issue until we established the most accurate possible picture of events. As a result, we 

5
 

are confident that we have captured the most pertinent information related to the major 

technical events in the development of the Stinger and the Javelin. 

6
 

III. The Stinger 

The Stinger is a heat-seeking, man-portable, air defense (MANPAD) missile.11 The 

system consists of a reusable grip stock and a sealed launch tube with a five-foot-long 

missile. The grip stock and missile tube together weigh about 35 pounds. The weapon has 

a maximum altitude of about 10,000 feet, and a range of about five miles. Over 44,000 

Stingers have been built. It is used by the U.S. Army (which plans to keep it in the 

inventory until at least 2018), the Marine Corps, and the Navy.

12 It is also used by 

numerous foreign nations.13 

Figure 1. Stinger launch tube assembly (left) and Stinger missile round.14

 

11 Since its initial development, the Stinger has been configured to be mounted on a range of systems, 

including the Apache helicopter and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. This report addresses only the 

manportable configuration. 12 “Stinger Missile,” Raytheon Missile Systems brochure, 2004. 13 The Stinger is perhaps best known for a role it played in the Cold War. Starting in 1986, the CIA 

provided roughly a thousand Stingers to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan to aid them in their struggle against 

the invading Soviet Army. The Stinger’s introduction to the battlefield provided the Afghans with a way to

counter Soviet airpower. The missile is credited with bringing down about 250 Soviet planes and 

helicopters. 14 “Stinger/MANPADS Briefing,” PowerPoint presentation, Raytheon Missile Systems Cruise Missile 

Defense Systems Project Office, 2001-2005. 

7
 

Figure 2. Stinger missile round.15 

Background 

The Stinger was developed to answer the Army’s need for an effective MANPAD to 

protect ground personnel from low-flying aircraft. The weapon then in the arsenal to 

accomplish this mission was a missile called Redeye, which was manufactured by 

General Dynamics. The most significant problem with Redeye was that it was effective 

only in specific engagement circumstances: the soldiers on the ground had to fire the 

missile directly at the exhaust of the target aircraft in order to allow the weapon’s infrared 

(IR) seeker to establish a lock. This meant that the missile could only be fired at the 

target after it had passed over and, presumably, had already delivered its munitions in the 

area. Redeye was referred to as a “revenge” weapon for this reason. 

Advances in technology, many of which are detailed in the subsequent sections, made it 

possible to improve on the Redeye and build a longer-range missile that could acquire 

targets quickly and engage an incoming enemy aircraft before it could release its 

ordnance. The Army began advanced development on a replacement for Redeye, dubbed 

Redeye II and later renamed the Stinger, in 1967. The contract to develop Stinger 

(officially designated FIM–92) was awarded to General Dynamics in 1972. The Stinger 

achieved initial operating capability in 1981.16 

The Army has procured four successive versions of the Stinger: Stinger Basic, Stinger–

Passive Optical Seeker Technique (POST), Stinger–Reprogrammable Microprocessor 

(RMP), and Stinger Block I. All have the same fundamental attributes and dimensions. 

Stinger Basic was produced between 1978 and 1987 and Stinger–Post between 1985 and 

1987. Stinger RMP entered production in 1985 and is still being manufactured. Stinger 

Block I entered production in 1996 and is also still being manufactured. Raytheon Missile 

Systems is the current prime contractor for the Stinger.17

 

15 Ibid. 

16 Notably, the Stinger was fielded as an Air Defense Artillery (ADA) asset. The Redeye was an all-arms 

weapon, meaning that any personnel were capable of using it without significant training. Tests conducted

in 1972 determined that the Stinger’s increased range and all-aspect engagement capability greatly 

increased the chances of fratricide. This, in addition the Stinger’s increased complexity, necessitated 

specific air defense training. Don Peterson, email to authors, 2 April 2005. 17 General Dynamics sold its missile division to Hughes in 1992. Raytheon bought Hughes’s missile

division in 1997. 

8
 

To operate the missile, the gunner mates the launch tube with the grip stock and uses the 

sight on the launch tube to track the target aircraft. A belt pack Identification, Friend or 

Foe (IFF) transceiver tells the gunner if the incoming aircraft is friendly. If he determines 

that the aircraft is hostile, the gunner activates the battery/coolant unit (BCU) and with it 

the missile’s IR seeker. The system gives the gunner an audio cue when the seeker has 

established a lock on the target. After the gunner fires, the missile is ejected from the tube 

by a launch motor and then carried to the target at speeds in excess of Mach 2 by a twophase flight motor. It destroys the target using a hit-to-kill high explosive (HE) warhead. 

The following discussion of the Stinger will address the CTEs behind this system’s key 

components. We will examine the development of the seeker, the guidance and control 

system, and the propulsion and warhead. The section concludes with a discussion of the 

modeling and simulation used to develop the missile. 

Seeker 

The Stinger is a fire-and-forget missile, meaning that its onboard systems must be able to 

engage the target without further assistance from the gunner or any other external source. 

The tracking process begins with the IR detectors in the seeker, which pick up the heat 

from the target. The detector signals go to a microprocessor that creates an image frame. 

This action is repeated constantly while the missile is in flight. The multiple frames are 

sent to the tracker microelectronics. The tracker interprets the sequence of such frames

and decides how the missile should maneuver to intercept the target. The signal is then

sent to the guidance circuits, which instruct the control surfaces to steer the missile. 

Starting with the seeker, the technologies involved in this process are those that are most 

critical to the Stinger’s performance. 

The Stinger has employed two basic kinds of IR seekers. Stinger Basic had a reticle scan 

seeker, the same general type found in Redeye. This type of seeker was developed by 

General Dynamics and Navy laboratories at China Lake, CA, in the late 1950s.18 The 

Redeye reticle scan seeker had a single detector element. The target “hot spot” (it is not a 

resolved image) was viewed through a reticle, with alternating opaque and transparent 

vanes.19 The spinning reticle captured the target pattern as a circle, the radius of which 

represented the magnitude of the deviation from true alignment with the target. The 

trouble with this design, with the center of the reticle representing the null position of true 

alignment, was that the radius was expressed as amplitude. As the missile homed in on 

the target and the deviation decreased, the signal-to-noise ratio became less favorable, 

producing lower accuracies. 

This kind of reticle design was improved upon in Stinger Basic, which used a technique 

called conical scanning developed by General Dynamics.20 CTE 1 In this type of seeker, the 

 

18 David Hardesty, interview with authors, Tucson, AZ, 13 December 2005. 19 J.J. May, Jr. and M.E. Van Zee, “Electro-optics and Infrared Sensors,” Microwave Journal, September 

1983, 121-31. 20 Tony Thomas, email to authors, 31 January 2006. 

9
 

reticle was fixed in place and the spot image picked up by the IR detectors was scanned 

in a circle by spinning mirrors. If the target was on the optical axis the circle would be 

centered on the reticle; if it was off-axis, the circle would be off the reticle center. The 

on-center pattern produced a symmetrical square wave signal because the amount of time

spent on the reticle’s transparent vanes was the same as that on the opaque vanes. If the 

circle was off-center there was varying time spent on the two types of vanes, producing a 

modulation of the frequency of the signal. Unlike the sort of spinning reticle used by 

Redeye, errors do not increase as the deviation from true alignment decreases. 

The next version of Stinger, Stinger–POST, made three major improvements to the 

seeker. First, the reticle seeker was replaced with a rosette scan seeker. The rosette scan 

was an improvement because it used a very narrow instantaneous field of view (IFOV) 

vis-à-vis the simpler spinning reticles, which had a wider IFOV. This provides much 

more accurate target discrimination.21 The rosette scan was patented by General 

Dynamics in 1977 based on work done in the late 1960s.22 Refinement and development 

of the concept (there was significant trouble designing the new seeker so that it could be 

efficiently produced)23 and the eventual incorporation into Stinger Post and, later, Stinger 

RMP, was a collaborative effort between General Dynamics and engineers from the U.S. 

Army Missile Research Development and Engineering Center (MRDEC)24 at Redstone 

Arsenal in Huntsville, AL. 

CTE 2 

The second major improvement in Stinger–POST’s seeker was a change in the 

capabilities of the IR detectors. The Redeye used a lead sulfide (PbS) detector that 

operated in the near infrared.25 Stinger Basic had an indium antimonide (InSb) mid-wave 

infrared detector. Stinger–POST was equipped with a dual wave length detector assembly 

made in a stack—one detector that operated at the mid-infrared made of InSb and another 

detector that operated at the near ultraviolet (UV) made of cadmium sulphide.26 The IR 

detector was for sensing the hot exhaust gases from the aircraft engines; the UV detector 

allowed the Stinger to track radiation emitted by the aircraft skin. This improved 

Stinger’s all-aspect engagement capability—the missile was no longer as dependent on 

picking up engine heat, which would always be strongest at the rear of an aircraft.

Stinger–POST seeker heads were also designed to be modularly fitted to Stinger Basic 

airframes.27 

CTE 3 

The third major improvement in Stinger–POST was the incorporation of integrated 

CTE 4 digital circuits to perform the seeker signal processing functions. This was a significant 

 

21 Thomas, telephone interview with authors, 10 January 2006. 22 The patent was issued to Glen W. Ashley, Jr., Ernest O. Buenting, Charles A Leonard, and Gerhard

Lessman, of General Dynamics, Pomona, California. 23 Peterson, email to authors, 29 March 2006. 24 MRDEC is now called the U.S. Army Aviation Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center 

(AMRDEC). AMRDEC is part of Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM). 25 Frank Hayes and David Light, interview with authors, Huntsville, AL, 14 September 2006. 26 The General Dynamics patent on the Rosette scan seeker cited above includes the dual wave detector. 27 “Raytheon Electronic Systems FIM-92 Stinger Low-Altitude Surface-to-Air Missile System Family,” 

Jane’s Land Based Air Defence, available online at 

<http://www.janes.com/defence/air_forces/news/jlad/jlad001013_2_n.shtml>, accessed 15 March 2005. 

10
 

electronic packaging and performance improvement over the analog circuitry found in 

Basic Stinger or even discrete digital circuitry. Conceived, developed, and demonstrated 

by MRDEC, the concept was embraced and incorporated (albeit with different devices) 

by the prime contractor, General Dynamics.28 

Stinger RMP introduced another major improvement. This design (as the name

Reprogrammable Microprocessor indicates) enabled the onboard microprocessor to be 

updated with new software as new information on threats and countermeasures became

available. Properly programmed, the processor can recognize countermeasures (like 

flares) and filter them out from the information it sends to the guidance system. The 

reprogrammable circuitry, conceived and developed by General Dynamics, made it 

possible to add capability to the missile without fully redesigning it.29 Stinger Block I 

also has this capability. 

CTE 5 

The Stinger’s seeker technology continues to improve. The technology for using staring 

two-dimensional arrays for the Stinger was developed in the mid 1990s but has not yet 

gone into production. 

The seeker depends on a comparatively less complex but nevertheless essential element: 

the BCU, an expendable, one-use-only unit that plugs into the grip stock. Once the target 

is determined as unfriendly, the gunner pushes the impulse generator switch on the grip 

stock. This releases pressurized argon gas from the BCU to cool the IR detector; the 

process takes 3–5 seconds.30 Most IR detectors, those on the Stinger included, must be 

kept at a very low temperature to improve the signal to noise ratio. The cooling occurs 

from the sudden expansion of the gas, a phenomenon known as the Joule-Thompson 

effect. A very similar approach was used cool the detector on the Redeye missile.31 Once 

the missiles seeker is cooled, the gunner can use it to lock onto the target. The BCU also 

provides all the pre-launch electrical power, not only for the seeker coolant system but 

for gyro spin-up, guidance electronics, ignition of the ejection motor, and activation of

the missile’s onboard thermal battery.32 Once turned on, the BCU’s battery has power for 

at least 45 seconds.33 The missile’s battery has enough energy to power the missile’s 

systems for about 19 seconds.34

The missile also has an onboard battery to power the systems after launch. This was 

initially a chromate battery. Based on PM-funded work at Sandia National Laboratory, a 

CTE 6 lithium-based battery was developed in the mid-1990s for use in Stinger Block I as a 

 

28 Light, email to authors, 15 February 2006. 29 Ibid. 30 “Raytheon Electronic Systems FIM-92 Stinger Low-Altitude Surface-to-Air Missile System Family,” 

Jane’s Land Based Air Defence. 31 Mary Cagle, History of the Redeye Weapon System (Huntsville, AL: Historical Division, U.S. Army

Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, 1974), 127. 32 “Raytheon Electronic Systems FIM-92 Stinger Low-Altitude Surface-to-Air Missile System Family,” 

Jane’s Land Based Air Defence. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 

11
 

replacement for the chromate battery. The lithium battery is lighter, smaller, and provides 

faster ignition and greater energy capacity.35 

Guidance and Control 

Once the seeker has acquired the target, the rules of proportional navigation are used to 

guide the missile until impact. The principle of proportional navigation is relatively 

simple, and has been used to guide homing missiles since the 1950s. The missile’s seeker 

locks on to the target and establishes a line of sight at all times. The Stinger’s tracker 

computes, in Cartesian coordinates, a primary and a secondary vector related to the center 

point, and uses simple trigonometry to find the deviation and plot a course to intercept.36 

The tracker then gives signals to the guidance circuits, which manage the control 

surfaces. Control is effected by adjusting the position of the two moveable canards at the 

front of the airframe. For the Stinger, this guidance process is what is known as “open 

loop.” Once the guidance system has adjusted the canards, there is no attempt to verify 

their positions and feed this information back into the system. Rather, the process begins 

again based on seeker data from the next IR frame. 

Though the computation necessary to track a target in this manner is straightforward, the 

instrumentation necessary to make it possible is complex. To start with, the missile’s 

seeker has to be capable of pointing at the target throughout the flight, even if the 

airframe of the missile is on a different axis. This task is further complicated by the fact 

that the Stinger is a rolling airframe missile; roll is deliberately induced to help with 

flight stability.37 Though this concept had already been introduced with the Redeye, its 

importance is not to be underrated; it is a fundamental feature of the Stinger’s design. 

The direction of the Stinger’s flight is determined by the phase of the wing movements 

with respect to the missile roll position.38 To guide the missile effectively, the guidance 

system needs to know where in its roll the missile is. The guidance system may want to 

steer the missile ‘up,’ but, given the rapid roll, the way that it must angle the canards to 

accomplish this changes many times a second. The principle rolling airframe-related 

improvement over Redeye introduced with Stinger Basic was a better servomechanism to 

drive these canards.39 The servomechanism was developed by General Dynamics.40

CTE 7 

While the missile rolls, the seeker platform is maintained in a fixed relation to the ground 

by spinning mass gyroscopes on gimbals. These are coupled electrically to the rest of the 

missile body through a set of induction coils. The electrical induction signals from these 

 

35 Robert Little, interview with authors, Huntsville, AL, 14 September 2005. 36 R.G. Lee et al, Guided Weapons (New York: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1988), 97-98. 37 The thrust of launch imparts a stabilizing 10-20 Hz roll to the airframe. The rolling airframe has the 

advantage needing fewer moveable control surfaces. The idea of a stabilizing roll came from industry,

where General Dynamics obtained a patent. David Curry, interview with authors, Huntsville, AL, 14

September 2005. 38 Raytheon Stinger/MANPADS Briefing. 39 Hardesty, telephone interview with authors, 7 March 2006. 40 Hardesty, email to authors, 26 April 2006. 

12
 

coils depend on the geometric overlap. The signals are then used to calculate the 

instructions to the mechanical motors controlling the orientation of the missile’s 

components. For earlier versions of the Stinger, the coil signals were also used to 

determine the rate of roll, a necessary piece of information to control the position of the 

canards to steer the missile. The latest version of the Stinger—Block I—has a roll 

frequency sensor that uses laser ring gyros to measure the roll rate. The missile’s 

orientation to true vertical is set before firing and is then used to compute the relative 

position of the missile body at every instant in time. This information is used to 

synchronize control instructions from the guidance unit. The roll frequency sensor was 

developed in a collaborative effort between the PM, Raytheon, and Honeywell. The effort 

began around 1990 and cost a total of about $8 million.41

CTE 8 

One further guidance wrinkle is introduced at the final stage of the missile’s flight. The 

missile makes an adjustment in the last moments before it impacts the target, turning 

from the focus on the high-temperature plume of the target aircraft to the airframe itself.

This is done using a Target Adaptive Guidance (TAG) circuit. The TAG introduces bias 

to the signal sent from the seeker to the guidance system, causing it to steer the missile

towards the vulnerable part of the aircraft a few feet forward of the exhaust plume.42 This 

concept was perfected for the Stinger by a collaborative effort between the contractor and 

MRDEC.43 

CTE 9 

Propulsion and Warhead 

Once the Stinger’s operator has located a target, identified it as a threat, and established 

lock with the missile, he pulls a trigger on the grip stock. The trigger activates the 

missile’s battery. Within one half second, the launch motor is ignited. To protect the 

gunner from the rocket blast, the launch motor finishes its burn before the missile 

completely clears the end of the tube. Once the missile clears the tube, the two moveable 

canards and the tail fins open out and the launch motor is jettisoned. After the missile

coasts to a predetermined safe distance from the gunner, the fuze timer ignites the 2-stage 

boost/sustainer solid propellant flight motor and the missile is propelled at speeds of over 

Mach 2 toward the target. Once the missile passes Mach 1, two fixed wings deploy to 

stabilize the airframe. 

The Stinger’s propulsion system is called a launch-boost-sustain system. This type of 

three-phase propulsion is a key technology for shoulder-launched guided missiles, 

enabling the flight performance characteristics needed for adequate guidance to hit 

moving targets. The Stinger’s propulsion system was based in part on Redeye’s, which 

had a similar launch motor.44 Stinger propulsion performance was enhanced over Redeye 

by advances in propellant technology. These were achieved principally through 

improvements to the propellant binder, one of the three basic ingredients in composite 

 

41 Hardesty telephone interview. 42 Hardesty Tucson interview. 43 Thomas, email to authors, 31 January 2006. 44 Little interview. 

13
 

solid propellants (the other two being ammonium perchlorate and aluminum in 

particulate form). When Atlantic Research Corporation (ARC) tailored the specific 

propellant formulations (one each for the boost and sustain phases) for Stinger, it drew on 

work done by the Propulsion Directorate of at Redstone Arsenal in the 1960s and early 

1970s.45 Researchers there developed a binder polymer system based on liquid hydroxylterminated polybutadiene (HTPB). After the propellant is mixed and cast in slurry form, 

the HTPB is converted by chemical reaction with diisocyanates to an elastomeric form 

that imparts the structural properties required by the missile design. The HTPB binder, 

which is used in several missiles besides Stinger, enables a wider range of burn 

characteristics and structural capabilities than earlier binders for composite propellants. 

These enhanced capabilities allow the design, development and production of a missile 

with the speed, maneuverability and environmental survivability of Stinger. 

CTE 10 

The capabilities of HTPB propellant allowed ARC to design a flight motor for Stinger in 

which both the boost and sustain propellant grains are bonded to the motor case. This 

design superseded one in which the sustain grain was cartridge loaded. Case-bonding, by 

eliminating much of the case insulation associated with cartridge loading, allows a 

greater volume of propellant to be loaded into the motor, which increases its total 

propulsive energy.46 The case-bonded grain is also lower-cost and more reliable than the 

cartridge-loaded grain. 

CTE 11 

 

The seeker, guidance, and propulsion systems exist for one purpose: to deliver the 

Stinger’s 0.8 lb High Explosive (HE) warhead to the target. The warhead is armed by the 

acceleration of the missile from the launch tube, with the proper acceleration rate 

achieved after about one second of flight. (If the missile does not strike the target after 

about 17 seconds it will detonate automatically.) The force of impact of the missile 

traveling at supersonic speed can be enough on its own to destroy the target,47 but the HE 

charge amplifies the effect many-fold. Engineers at Picatinny Arsenal have perfected a 

smooth fragmentation titanium casing, a material with an optimal strength-to-weight 

ratio.48 Current Stinger warhead efforts focus on developing fragmentation casings for 

improved lethality against a wider range of targets, including ground vehicles.49 

Modeling and Simulation 

The Stinger program was the first missile development program to utilize computerbased simulation from design through production.50 For Stinger, full-up simulations were 

developed by a community consisting of MRDEC, the prime contractor, the Army

Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA), the user community, and the PM office. 

They simulated the results of live-fire shots—flight and overall performance—and 

performed sensitivity experiments on the seeker on the computer. The models were tied 

CTE 12 

 

45 Henry Allen, telephone interview with authors, 27 January 2006. 46 John Schaeffel, interview with authors, Huntsville, AL, 14 September 2005. 47 Kim Christianson, interview with authors, Tucson, AZ, 13 December 2005. 48 Christianson, email to authors, 3 April 2006, and “Raytheon Electronic Systems FIM-92 Stinger LowAltitude Surface-to-Air Missile System Family,” Jane’s Land Based Air Defence. 

49 Christianson interview. 50 Curry interview. Some analogue simulation was done on the design of the Redeye. 

14
 

to the development of a set of specified production parameters. Sufficient real 

experiments were performed to validate the models. Use of the computer models saved 

an estimated $100M for the Stinger program.

51 As an illustration, the Hawk missile, 

developed with no simulation, required about 120 launch tests before approval; the 

Stinger required only about 20. 

Between the prime contractor and MRDEC, two hardware-in-the-loop simulators were 

used in the Stinger’s development.52 Basic Stinger was the first Army missile system to 

use a validated hardware-in-the-loop (HWIL) simulation to perform many of the system 

evaluation tasks previously done by extensive (and expensive) hardware testing.53 In 

these simulations, the performance of the seeker/guidance and control systems are 

evaluated against real time simulated target and environment scenes while they are 

integrated with the missile. The seeker and associated electronics send control signals to 

keep the seeker on target and the missile body aligned with the seeker. Missile control is 

simulated by creating aerodynamic conditions on the moveable fins such the response of 

the fins is measured and the corrected course is charted. that they can measure the 

response and chart the corrected course. They simulate the movements of the missile on a 

six-degree-of-freedom test station. During pre-engineering development, the HWIL 

simulation was used to help design the system and its production test equipment and to 

perform trade-off studies on missile sub-components. During engineering development, 

the simulation was used to determine the tolerance limits for production test parameters, 

conduct pre-flight and post-flight analyses, and analyze test flight failures. At the 

completion of development, the HWIL simulation was used to conduct a system

Performance Assessment (PA), consisting of several thousand simulated missile flights, 

as part of the contractual obligations of the prime contractor. 

CTE 13 

 

51 Ibid. 52 Thomas interview. 53 Thomas, email to authors, 4 April 2006. 

15
 

IV. The Javelin 

The Javelin is a shoulder-launched, man-portable, antiarmor missile. The Javelin system

is composed of a missile round and a separate, reusable Command Launch Unit (CLU). 

The missile round consists of a launch tube, a BCU, and a missile. The CLU includes a 

day/night sight for surveillance, target identification, and acquisition. The missile has a 

range of about 2,000 meters and can be used against buildings and bunkers as well as 

armored vehicles. 

Figure 3. The Javelin missile.54

Figure 4. The Javelin gunner looks through the CLU.55

 

54 Technical Data Document for the Javelin Anti-Tank Weapons System, Document Number DT-0023 

Revision K, 15 November 2000, p.4. 

16
 

Background 

Man-portable antitank weapons were an important capability for U.S. infantry to have as 

they faced Soviet armored forces in Central Europe. The weapon that served this role for 

much of the Cold War was the Dragon missile.56 This wire-guided antitank weapon was 

developed in the 1960s and early 1970s and first deployed in 1975. It was in the force 

through the 1990–91 Gulf War. 

Dragon had significant shortcomings. Its limited range (around 1,000 meters in its 

original design) meant that the gunner had to get uncomfortably close to the target to fire, 

and the wire guidance system meant that the gunner had to stay exposed and keep his 

sight reticle on the target throughout the missile’s flight (as long as 11 seconds).57 It was 

also inaccurate. The Infantry School at Fort Benning was an adamant supporter of a new 

system. In 1979, the Army embarked on its first attempt to replace Dragon, called Rattler, 

but canceled the effort after just a few months because the prototype was rejected as too 

heavy. 

In 1981 the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) undertook a 

research program to develop an antitank missile that would make use of an imaging IR 

guidance system and employ a top-attack strategy, that is, the round had to be able to 

strike the top of a tank, where its armor is thinnest. This program was known as 

“Tankbreaker.” The technology for Tankbreaker showed promise, and as a result the U.S. 

Army’s PM office at Redstone Arsenal was assigned to manage the effort. 

CTE 14 

The DARPA Tankbreaker program had a demanding set of requirements. Among them, 

the missile had to be a fire-and-forget weapon, it had to have a range of 2,000 meters, it 

had to weigh less than 35 lbs, and it had to have top-attack capability. After a design 

competition, proposals from Hughes Aircraft and Texas Instruments (TI) were selected 

for further development. Both proposals were based on imaging IR seekers. As the name

indicates, this sort of seeker resolves IR signals into an image, in contrast to the simpler 

seeker in the Stinger, which discerns only hot spots. The Tankbreaker program consisted 

primarily of development work on these IR seekers, culminating in a series of captive 

flight tests; the funding was not sufficient to conduct “system level” missile work.58 

Throughout 1985–86, the Infantry School at Fort Benning continued to articulate their 

need to replace the Dragon system and began writing a Required Operational Capability 

 55 “Army Fact File: Javelin,” U.S. Army, available online at 

<http://www.army.mil/fact_files_site/javelin/index.html>, accessed 15 March 2006. 56 The light man portable system was the Light Antitank Weapon (LAW). 57 William Bishop, interview with authors, Huntsville, AL, 14 September 2005, and “M-47 Dragon AntiTank Guided Missile,” available online at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/m47-

dragon.htm>, accessed 15 March 2006. 58 Bishop, email to authors, 24 March 2006. 

17
 

(ROC) document. This ROC was eventually combined with a US Marine Corps 

requirement for a replacement for Dragon to create a Joint ROC (JROC). 

In 1986, the Army issued a request for proposals addressing a two-year, Proof of 

Principle (POP) phase for an Advanced Antitank Weapons System—Medium (AAWS–

M), thus launching a second acquisition effort to replace Dragon. Development contracts 

worth $30 million each were given to Texas Instruments (imaging infrared technology) 

and Hughes (fiber optic guidance technology) and Ford Aerospace (laser beam-rider 

technology). Approximately 18 months into the POP phase, the Army/USMC issued an 

RFP for the Full Scale Development phase. A Source Selection Board eventually chose a 

Joint Venture (JV) composed of TI (whose missile business was later purchased by 

Raytheon) and Martin Marietta (now Lockheed Martin). The JV won the AAWS–M 

competition using a proposed missile design very similar to what TI had developed for

Tankbreaker: an imaging IR seeker-based system that could attack a target either from

the top or directly and was fire-and-forget. This missile was later dubbed the Javelin. The 

first Army unit was equipped with the Javelin in 1996. 

CTE 15 The Army decision to use a JV approach for the Javelin was an important part of the 

program’s success.59 The government’s intent in requiring a JV was to carry two major 

contractors through the development phase in some sort of a teaming arrangement chosen 

by the contractors. The government would then be in a position in the production phase to 

split the teammates and obtain competitive production proposals from each of them.

60

The government later decided, for a number of reasons, not to execute that opportunity 

and continued with the Javelin JV into the production phase. 

This JV entity manages the Javelin program, but the technical work and much of the 

manufacturing is done by the two participating companies on the basis of a workshare 

agreement. Raytheon is now responsible for the command launch unit, missile guidance 

electronics unit, system software, and system engineering management. Lockheed Martin 

is responsible for final missile assembly and for producing the missile seeker (though, as 

noted below, TI had responsibility for developing the missile seeker). 

To operate the Javelin, the gunner uses the IR system in the CLU, which projects a TVlike image for him to locate the target. He then switches to the IR system in the missile, 

which allows him to set track gates around the target, establish a lock, and fire. As with 

Stinger, the Javelin system uses a soft launch to eject the missile from the launch tube,

which is essential for firing from enclosures (a requirement of the Javelin JROC). Once 

the missile has cleared the launch tube, the main rocket motor ignites and 6 small wings 

and 4 tail fins flip out as the missile is propelled toward the target at high speed, flying at 

altitudes of up to about 150 feet for direct attack and about 500 feet for the top attack 

mode. The missile’s warhead, a shaped charge, attacks the target with a jet of solid metal 

particles. 

 

59 John Holly, telephone interview with authors, 29 September 2005. 60 Bishop email. 

18
 

The Javelin has proven successful on the battlefield. Over 1,000 missiles were fired in the 

2003 Iraq war, and the CLU, used independently of the missile round, continues to be 

popular with U.S. troops as a night vision device.61 

The following discussion of the Javelin will address the CTEs associated with the 

system’s key components. We will first examine the development of the CLU, then the 

seeker, the guidance and control system, and the propulsion system and warhead. The 

section concludes with a discussion of the use of modeling and simulation in the 

development of the missile. 

Command Launch Unit 

The firing process starts with the CLU. Unlike the comparatively simple grip stock to

which the Stinger round is mated, the Javelin’s CLU is a complex component of the 

system. The CLU has a 4x telescope and a long wave IR night sight with two fields of 

view: 4x magnification and 9x magnification. Both visible and IR images are viewed 

through a monocular sight. The CLU operates from a standard Army battery, which 

provides power to operate the CLU electronics and the cooler that keeps the detector 

array at operating temperatures. 

The imaging IR is the most vital part of the CLU. Unlike earlier systems that identify a 

heat source as a simple spot, an imaging IR system produces a detailed picture of the 

target. The CLU’s scanning IR array is where the target recognition capability resides. It 

is a higher-resolution system than the missile seeker because the gunner needs a high 

resolution image to identify a target as friend or foe. The missile seeker’s IR detector 

(discussed below) just has to detect the target after the gunner has recognized it and set 

his track box around it. 

CTE 16 

The CLU developed by TI outperformed alternative designs in competition, seeing at

longer ranges and demonstrating superior performance through smoke and other 

hindrances.62 It had a 240x1—later 240x2 and 240x4—focal plane array (FPA) of 

mercury cadmium telluride (MCT) detectors, operating in the long-wave IR region of 8–

12 microns. The detectors were scanned at 30Hz in a bi-directional, interleaved fashion.

Moving from right to left the odd pixels (1, 3, 5, etc.) are sampled, then moving from left 

to right the even pixels are sampled. A resolver allowed the CLU’s circuitry to know the 

angular position of the scanning mirror so that it can align the forward scan and the 

reverse scan to yield a coherent picture. The bi-directional scan developed for the Javelin 

was unique and allowed a significant power savings. This scanner motor approach was 

later transitioned to several other TI programs.63 

CTE 17 

The CLU’s IR capability also benefited from a new method to normalize the detector 

chips. Earlier IR systems used a black body kept at a stable temperature to keep the chips 

 

61 John Dillon, interview with authors, Huntsville, AL, 15 September 2005. 62 William Deckert, interview with authors, Tucson, AZ, 14 December 2005. 63 Deckert, email to authors, 12 February 2006. 

19
 

calibrated. TI developed a Thermal Reference Assembly (TRA),64 a passive optical 

assembly that provides two temperature points against which each detector pixel is 

calibrated. The first point is a single off-axis reference scene, and the second point comes 

from a “reflection” generated by a cold element. Every time the array scans, the pixels 

are recalibrated in this manner based on their reading of the two temperature points. 

Importantly, the TRA was passive, requiring no additional power or control circuitry. 

That allowed the system designers to calibrate using existing imaging circuitry as well 

reduce power and save space.65 

CTE 18 

As with Stinger, the Javelin CLU’s IR detectors require cooling to a very low 

temperature to increase the signal-to-noise ratio. The CLU makes use of a Dewar flask, a 

container that uses vacuum between double walls to provide thermal insulation. Cooling 

is provided by a closed-cycle Stirling engine with a cold finger projecting into the Dewar 

and up against the back of the detector. The cooler, developed by TI, was designed to 

reduce power—it consumes only 1/5 watt—and meet weight requirements and yet deliver 

the cooling capacity required to cool the FPA in a two-and-a-half-minute period.66 The 

cooler was difficult to manufacture at first but, with DARPA and internal TI IRAD 

support, the process was improved to obtain acceptable costs.67 

CTE 19 

TI’s development of the CLU’s IR system drew in part on work done by the Army’s 

Night Vision Laboratory (NVL). NVL provided critical expertise in IR system modeling, 

particularly involving Minimum Resolvable Temperature (MRT) measurements and focal 

plane array engineering expertise, throughout the AAWS–M acquisition process.68 A 

joint Army/USMC countermeasures requirements determination team was assembled and 

led by ARL; NVL, the users, and MICOM were key participants. The team developed the 

countermeasures requirements for the JROC and for the system performance 

specification. NVL’s models and simulations are still a standard for measuring the 

performance of IR FPAs. NVL also helped incorporate a measurement technique called 

3D Noise that further refined thermal modeling fidelity to better account for dynamic 

noise within the sensors under test. Further IR modeling refinements by MRDEC and 

NVL led to the development of newer, more user friendly, and higher fidelity models that 

approximated the system’s IR performance and converted it to detection, recognition, and 

identification ranges.69

Since the original design of the CLU’s IR imager, progress has been made on improving 

the system’s performance. A DARPA-funded program in the early 1990s helped to make 

detectors more producible.70 The result was the so-called Dash 6 detector, which was 

quieter to cool and scan, thus reducing the audible noise-signature of the Javelin operator 

in the field. The Dash 6 detector was added to production CLUs in 1998–1999. TI also 

moved from four separate “through hole” circuit boards to two surface mounted boards. 

CTE 20 

 

64 Deckert interview. 65 Deckert email. 66 Ibid. and Dillon, email to authors, 24 February 2006. 67 Deckert email and Bishop email. 68 Bishop email. 69 Deckert email. 70 Deckert interview. 

20
 

The original CLU (the one that was qualified and built during the LRIP phase of the 

program) was developed using “through hole” circuit board technology, but this initial 

unit exceeded all weight budgets.71 These circuit cards used surface mounted 

components. In a cost-reduction program, advantage was taken of advances in 

semiconductor device integration, particularly in the density of gates that could be put in 

digital application specific integrated circuits to reduce the circuitry to two double-sided 

card assemblies. 

Saving weight was a persistent concern, one that influenced all aspects of the Javelin

system’s development, from beyond the CLU’s IR imager to the rest of the unit to the 

missile round itself. The CLU’s housing was originally made of aluminum. The designers 

dipped the housing in acid in an effort to etch away as much wall thickness as possible. 

This did take weight off, but it was expensive and led to a less robust unit.72 In 1999, the 

aluminum was replaced with a 17–layer carbon resin fiber composite. This saved some 

weight but mostly made the housing stronger. Also, production results were more 

consistent than with the acid etching. The current Javelin CLU now achieves greater than 

300 hours mean time between hardware mission failures, well over the 150 originally 

required of the system.

73 

CTE 21 

Plans for a new generation of the Javelin, Block I, include an improved CLU. The CLU 

will feature 4x and 12x magnification instead of 4x and 9x. The CLU will also 

incorporate a color organic light emitting diode-based flat panel display. The goal is to 

increase the imager’s range by 50 percent, but weight considerations impose a serious 

constraint on how much the optics can be upgraded. 

Seeker 

As with the Stinger, the Javelin is a fire-and-forget missile. After launch, it has to be able 

to track and destroy its target without any further input from the gunner or other external 

source. This fire-and-forget capability came from the Joint Army/USMC Source 

Selection Board’s decision to select the JV AAWS–M design, which coupled an imaging 

IR system with a state-of-the-art onboard tracking system. 

CTE 22 

As described above, the gunner uses the CLU’s IR system to find and identify the target. 

He then switches to the missile’s independent IR system to set a track box around the 

target and establish a lock. The gunner places track gates around the image of the target, 

closing them until as much of the target fills up the space between the gates as possible. 

The seeker’s job, in effect, is to stay focused on the target’s image, continuing to 

recognize it even as the target moves and as the missile’s flight path alters the seeker’s 

point of view at over 150 meters/second, as attack angles change, and as the target’s 

apparent size changes as the missile approaches the target.74 All of the seeker’s many 

parts must function in order for the system to work, but the importance of three 

 

71 Deckert email. 72 Dillon email. 73 Deckert interview and Deckert email. 74 Dillon email. 

21
 

components stands out: the focal plane array, the cooling and calibration system, and the 

stabilization system. 

The seeker assembly is encased in a hemispherical dome made of zinc sulfide, which is 

transparent to the long-wave infrared radiation of interest to the FPA. The IR radiation 

passes through the dome and then through transparent lenses, made of germanium and 

zinc sulfide, that focus the energy. The IR energy is reflected specularly by mirrors of 

polished aluminum on to the FPA.75 The missile seeker for the Javelin is a twodimensional (2D) staring FPA of 64x64 detector elements. The detectors are made of an 

alloy of cadmium-tellurium and mercury-tellurium (termed mercury cadmium telluride or 

HgCdTe). Note the contrast with the CLU’s IR system,

76 which is a scanning linear 

array. The FPA processes the signals from the detectors and relays a signal to the 

missile’s tracker. 

CTE 23 

Development of the 2D staring array turned out to be very difficult. TI’s design for both 

the CLU’s scanning array and the missile’s staring array used a photo-capacitive device 

wherein incident photons stimulate electrons, which are initially stored in the detector as 

an accumulated charge.77 The electrons are discharged, pixel by pixel, as currents to a 

read-out integrated circuit (IC) attached at the rear of the detector. Whereas this 

approach worked for the array in the CLU, it proved very hard to build working 2D 

staring arrays for the missile seeker this way. TI could not get the quality of HgCdTe 

necessary for the photo-capacitive process to work and there was not enough electron 

storage capacity on the seeker pixels in the 2D array.78 TI had been able to build enough 

2D arrays to assemble the missiles to win the AAWS–M competition but was unable to 

use its process to meet manufacturing quality standards and yields. Only .5% to 2% of the 

FPAs it was producing met the full performance criteria.79 The manufacturing problem

risked doubling the development cost of the program and causing its cancellation.80 

The pressing nature of this problem became clear in 1991–92. The Office of the Secretary 

of Defense (OSD), the Department of the Army (DA), and MICOM assembled teams to 

try to resolve the issue. Drawing on in-house technical expertise, the teams concluded 

that TI was simply not going to be able to manufacture its design in sufficient quantity for 

it to be viable. Though the Army had recognized that the success of the program hinged 

on the seeker technology and had established a second source for FPAs with LORAL 

Corp. as part of the original acquisition strategy, LORAL also had difficulty producing 

arrays.81 Fortunately, a solution was at hand: Hughes’ Santa Barbara Research Center 

(SBRC), working under a DARPA contract, had developed another design for a focal 

plane array that could be manufactured more efficiently. The Hughes design utilized a 

CTE 24 

 

75 The materials for the dome, lenses, and mirrors were selected by Texas Instruments and reflected 

standard technology at the time of development. Jerome Schaefer, email to authors, 21 March 2006. 76 The CLU’s system also has higher resolution suitable for identification of the target. This is primarily a 

function of the higher sampling rate generated by a scanning array. 77 Fenner Milton, interview with authors, Fort Belvoir, VA, 28 September 2005. 78 Bishop email. 79 Bishop interview. 80 Ibid. 81 Bishop email. 

22
 

photovoltaic mechanism in which a voltage signal was developed directly from the 

impact of the photons and charge storage was done in the readout IC rather than in the 

detector material.82 The AAWS–M Program dropped TI as the prime producer of seeker 

FPAs, dropped the still-struggling LORAL as a second source, and decided to go with 

SBRC as the seeker FPA vendor. As the program evolved, SBRC met FPA performance, 

delivery quantity, and production yield expectations.83 TI continued to manufacture the 

CLU’s scanning array. 

In order for the seeker to function optimally, the FPA must be cooled and calibrated. The 

CLU’s IR detectors are cooled using a Dewar flask and a closed-cycle Stirling engine. 

There is not sufficient space in the missile for this approach. Prior to launch, a BCU 

mounted on the outside of the launch tube activates the electrical systems in the missile 

and supplies cold gas from a Joule-Thompson (J–T) expander to the missile detector 

assembly while the missile is still in the launch tube. When the missile is fired, this 

external connection is broken and coolant gas is supplied internally by an onboard argon 

gas bottle.84 The gas is held in a small bottle at around 6000 psi; there is enough coolant 

for the duration of the flight—approximately 19 seconds. The external BCU must be 

replaced if seeker is activated and missile is not fired within the four-minute operational 

specification of the BCU. 

This cooling assembly also envelops the IC. Initially the IC was outside the cold section 

and therefore, for large arrays, many wires had to be routed out of the cold section. The 

manufacturer had learned how to place the microprocessor in the cold section in electrical 

contact with the back of the detector. Only from the microprocessor must wires run to 

the outside of the cooler; the number of wires is thus greatly reduced, from 200 to about 

25.85 

The Javelin’s seeker is calibrated using a “chopper” wheel. This device, which is 

essentially a fan, has 6 blades: 5 black blades with very low IR emissivity, and one semireflective blade. These blades spin in front of the seeker’s optics in a synchronized 

fashion, such that the FPA is continually provided with points of reference in addition to 

viewing the scene. These reference points allow the FPA to reduce fixed pattern noise—

noise introduced by response variations in the detector elements. 

CTE 25 

In addition to being continuously cooled and calibrated, the platform on which the seeker 

rests must be stabilized with respect to the motion of the missile body and the seeker 

must be moved to stay aligned with the target. Though, unlike the Stinger, the Javelin’s 

airframe does not roll, the stabilization system still must cope with rapid acceleration, 

up/down and lateral movements, and other exigencies demanded by a flight path that may 

include swift altitude gain and a steep dive. This is done by a two-axis gimbal system, 

accelerometers, spinning mass gyros, and motors to drive changes in position of the 

 

82 Schaefer email. 83 Bishop email. 84 Javelin Technical Data Document, 137-160. 85 Dillon Huntsville interview. 

23
 

platform.

86 Information from the gyros is fed to the guidance electronics, which drive a 

torque motor attached to the seeker platform to keep the seeker aligned with the target. 

Those wires that connect the seeker section with the rest of the missile were specially 

developed to cause no friction, so that the seeker platform could remain precisely 

balanced.87 The Javelin’s seeker deviates only 10–20 microradians per G, an excellent 

rate of isolation.88 

Guidance and Control 

The Javelin’s tracker is the essential element of the missile’s guidance and control 

capability. The signals from each of the seeker’s over 4,000 detector elements are passed 

to the FPA’s readout IC, which reads them and creates a single channel video output that 

it sends to the tracker system for further processing.89 By comparing the individual 

frames, the tracker determines the needed corrections to keep the missile on target. To do 

this, this tracker must be able to determine which portion of the image represents the 

target. The target is initially identified by the gunner, who places the track gates around 

it. After that, the tracker uses algorithms to compare that region of the frame, based on 

image, geometric, and movement data, to the new image frames being sent from the 

seeker. At the end of each frame, the reference is updated. The tracker is able to keep 

track of the target even though the seeker’s point of view can change radically in the 

course of flight. 

CTE 26 

To guide the missile, the tracker locates the target in the current frame and compares this 

position with the aim point. If this position is off center the tracker computes a correction 

and passes it to the guidance system, which makes the appropriate adjustments to the 

control surfaces (the Javelin has four moveable tail fins, as well as six fixed wings at 

mid-body).90 This portion of the system is termed the autopilot. It uses closed loop 

control to guide the missile; that is, the system has sensors that check that the control 

surfaces are positioned as requested. If not, the deviation is sent back to the controller for 

further adjustment. 

There are three stages in the flight managed by the guidance unit: an initial phase just

after launch, a mid-flight phase that lasts for most of the flight, and a terminal phase in 

which the tracker selects the “sweet spot” for the point of impact.91 With guidance 

algorithms, the autopilot uses data from the seeker and tracker to determine when to 

transition the missile from one phase of flight to another. Depending on whether the 

missile is in top attack (the default mode) or direct attack mode, the profile of the flight 

can change significantly. The top attack mode requires the missile to climb sharply after 

launch, cruise at an altitude of roughly 500 feet, and then dive on the top of the target. In 

 

86 Dan Rice, interview with authors, Tucson, AZ, 13 December 2005 and Javelin Technical Data 

Document, 153-154. 87 Rice interview. 88 Rice interview. 

89 Javelin Technical Data Document, 151. 90 The Javelin also makes use of thrust vector control early in its flight: the motor that drives the four tail 

fins also drives four thrust vector control vanes that sit in the exhaust nozzle. 

91 Sam Wood, telephone interview with authors, 20 October 2005. 

24
 

direct attack mode, the missile cruises at about 150 feet. The exact flight path, which 

takes into account the range to the target, is calculated by the guidance unit. 

Development of the Javelin’s tracker was done by both industry and Redstone Arsenal. 

Texas Instruments designed and built prototypes, and Redstone provided both upgrades 

and an independent assessment of the tracker’s capabilities.92 Extensive Captive Flight 

Testing (CFT) of the AAWS–M seekers and trackers enabled the tracker teams to test, 

refine, and update algorithms prior to missile firings. These CFT programs also provided 

invaluable data for the Integrated Flight Simulation developers (discussed below). The 

tracker development program is still active. 

CTE 27 

Propulsion and Warhead 

As with Stinger, the Javelin system uses a soft launch to eject the missile from the launch 

tube. That is, a launch motor fires within the launch tube, but ceases to burn before the 

missile clears the tube so that the gunner is not harmed by hot gases. The soft launch 

permits a low-recoil shoulder launch and enables firing from inside buildings or covered 

platforms. When the missile has cleared the launch tube and traveled a safe distance, the 

main rocket motor ignites and the wings and fins flip out. The missile is propelled toward 

the target at subsonic speeds. The Javelin’s unique propulsion unit design required 

advances in the state of the art due to the requirements for soft launch, gunner safety, and 

weight. Significant technology advances were made by propulsion engineers from the 

Javelin PM office, the Joint Venture, and MRDEC, which operated as a team.

93 Coupled 

with industry advances, the Javelin program was able to develop a propulsion system that 

met the challenging requirements. 

The Javelin’s motor was developed by the Atlantic Research Company (ARC), now 

Aerojet.94 ARC had adapted the design from one developed by Alliant Technology.95

Like the Stinger, the Javelin has an integrated launch and flight rocket motor. Among 

other advantages, this integrated design kept system weight as low as possible. 

CTE 28 

The motor operates as follows.96 The launch motor initiator ignites the launch motor 

igniter, which in turn ignites the launch motor propellant grain. The launch motor 

propellant grain burns on the inside and the outside, as well as on the ends.97 Gases vent

through the launch motor nozzle. After a delay, a signal is sent to the flight motor 

initiator, which ignites the flight motor igniter, which in turn ignites the flight motor 

propellant. When enough gas pressure builds up in the flight motor chamber, a burst disk 

 

92 Dillon email. 

93 Bishop email. 

94 The ARC motor design was not in the missile with which TI won the AAWS-M competition. The ARC 

design was in Hughes’s missile and was later picked up by TI. Susan Burroughs, telephone interview with

authors, 24 January 2006. 95 Ibid. 96 Burroughs, email to authors, 24 February 2006. 97 Ibid. 

25
 

that separates the launch motor and the flight motor ruptures, and flight motor gases flow 

down the launch motor chamber and out the launch motor nozzle. 

Gunner safety was a key consideration. The Javelin is equipped with a pressure release 

system to ensure that a malfunctioning launch motor does not cause an explosion. The 

launch motor has shear pins, developed jointly by government and industry, that fracture 

in the event of launch motor overpressure and allow the motor to be pushed out the back 

of the launch tube.98 

CTE 29 

ARC also developed an annular igniter for the launch motor. This circular ring design 

was key to integrating the launch motor and the flight motor.99 The launch motor igniter 

had to be placed in the nozzle, but it could not be blown out the nozzle because the debris 

would be an unacceptable hazard to the gunner. The annular igniter allowed exhaust 

gases to be vented past it. The ring design also provides 360 degrees of hot gases onto the 

propellant grain, giving a more robust ignition of the grain.100 

Another important propulsion design element is the burst disc that separates the launch 

motor and the flight motor. This feature, developed by ARC, has a higher tolerance for 

pressure on the launch motor side, and lower tolerance on the flight motor side.101 This 

allows the disc to protect the flight motor from the ignition of the launch motor, yet, 

when sufficient pressure develops, still let the flight motor rupture the disc and send 

flight motor gases past it and down through the launch motor chamber. 

CTE 30 

The Javelin’s propulsion system draws on propellant technology developed for earlier 

missiles. The launch motor propellant is the same as that used in other missiles. The 

flight motor propellant is derived from the propellant used in the Tube launched, 

Optically tracked, Wire guided (TOW) and Hellfire missiles, which was altered for 

Javelin in a combined government/industry effort. 

As with the propulsion system, a teaming effort was crucial to developing a successful 

warhead for the Javelin. The PM office, the U.S. Naval Surface Warfare Center, and 

MRDEC, working with industry, were particularly successful in optimizing tandem

warhead performance.102 The Javelin missile’s tandem warhead is a high explosive 

antitank (HEAT) round. This round utilizes an explosive shaped charge to create a jet of 

superplastically deformed metal formed from trumpet-shaped metallic liners. The result 

is a high velocity jet (10 km/s at the tip and 2–5 km/s at the tail) that can dynamically 

penetrate through solid armor. 

The basic concept of a shaped charge has existed since the 1880s, but U.S. Army

laboratories did significant work to improve the technology and apply it to weapons 

systems. BRL contributed basic research, especially on modeling, while Picatinny 

 

98 Burroughs interview. 99 Burroughs email. 100 Ibid. 101 Burroughs interview. 102 Bishop email. 

26
 

Arsenal played a design and performance demonstration role.103 Picatinny’s work was 

important to developing the trumpet shaped charge warhead, so-called because it was 

squatter than earlier charges and was shaped like the bell of a trumpet.104 Physics 

International, working on contract from Redstone, used this concept to design a trumpet 

shaped charge for the Javelin’s main warhead.105 

Advances in the lethality of shaped charge rounds were made to counter the advent of

explosive reactive armor (ERA). ERA lays panels over a vehicle’s main armor that 

explode when impacted by a warhead. This explosion does not harm the vehicle’s main 

armor, but causes the steel panels to fly in the path of the HEAT round’s jet so that the jet 

expends its most potent energy cutting through the panels rather than the main armor. To 

defeat this, the Javelin uses two shaped charge warheads in tandem. The precursor charge 

sets off the ERA and clears it from the path of the main charge; the main charge 

penetrates the target’s primary armor. This concept, first applied in the TOW missile, was 

based on work done at BRL and Picatinny Arsenal. 

CTE 31 

 

The Javelin’s designers initially struggled to make the tandem warhead work. Though 

Physics International’s main charge, which used a copper liner to form the penetrating 

jet, performed well, its copper-lined precursor charge design had trouble clearing ERA. A 

competitor for the warhead contract, Conventional Munitions Systems Inc. (CMS), 

purchased a company called Orlando Technology Inc., that, using its own computer 

models, had developed a successful precursor design using a two-layered molybdenum 

liner.

106 The CMS design was ultimately used for the precursor, while Physics 

International’s design was used for the main charge. 

CTE 32 

Another challenge for the Javelin’s tandem warhead development was to protect the main 

charge as much as possible from the explosive blast, shock, and debris caused by the 

impact of the front of the missile and the detonation of the precursor charge. Fragments 

and explosive force could interfere with the formation of the main charge’s jet. To limit 

interference, a blast shield was developed at Redstone Arsenal and placed between the 

main charge and the precursor charge. This was the first composite blast shield, and the 

first that had a hole through the middle of it; the hole provides a less disturbed jet.107 

CTE 33 

The next block of improvements for the Javelin’s warhead design include changes in the 

main charge liner to produce a higher velocity jet. These changes will make the warhead 

more effective as a penetrator and make it smaller, thus leaving more room to add 

propellant and increase the missile’s range. Technical development work on this has been 

done at Picatinny Arsenal and at General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems, 

which took over part of Physics International.108 

 

103 Ernie Baker, telephone interview with authors, 25 January 2006. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid. and Baker, email to authors, 2 March 2006. 108 Baker interview and Christianson email. 

27
 

During the Javelin’s development major improvements were made in the fusing and 

arming of the warhead. Prior to the Javelin, fusing was mostly mechanical, consisting of 

gears, rotors, pins, etc. With the multiple warheads, variable time delay requirements, and 

weight and volume constraints of the Javelin and other missiles, and with safety 

requirements becoming more stringent, mechanical fusing was inadequate. As a result, an 

electronic arming and fusing effort was initiated for missile systems. This concept, based 

on work done for nuclear warheads at Sandia and Los Alamos, came from engineers at 

Redstone Arsenal in the mid 1980s.109 It was given the acronym ESAF,110 for Electronic 

Safe Arming and Fire. Early ESAF packages proved too large, but the application of

micro-electronics made it applicable not only to the Javelin but to the fuze assemblies of

other missile systems such as the Hellfire. 

CTE 34 

 

The ESAF system enables the firing and arming process while imposing a series of safety 

checks on the missile. ESAF cues the launch motor after the trigger is pulled. When the 

missile reaches a certain rate of acceleration (indicating to the system that it has cleared 

the launch tube and moved down range a safe distance from the gunner), in conjunction 

with other missile functions, the ESAF initiates a “second arming” to fire the flight

motor. After another check on missile conditions (such as checking to make sure it still 

has target lock), ESAF initiates “final arming,” which enables the warheads to be 

detonated at target impact. When the missile strikes the target, ESAF enables the tandem 

warhead function described above: it ensures that there is an appropriate time lapse 

between the detonation of the precursor charge and the detonation of the main charge. 

Modeling and Simulation 

Many of the technical achievements associated with the Javelin’s development were 

enabled by modeling and simulation. A mechanical accelerator, for instance, was used to 

develop and test the seeker stabilization system.

111 Perhaps most importantly, though, the 

Javelin team developed an all-software simulation called the Integrated Flight Simulation 

(IFS). IFS, created by Texas Instruments before the establishment of the Javelin Joint 

Venture, models all the physics of missile performance “down to the number of photons 

involved.”112 The model does sensitivity analyses, simulates behavior of the focal plane 

arrays and the tracker, shows the voltages sent to the guidance unit, etc. While developed 

for the Javelin, the model is now also used on other missile systems. The Army at 

Redstone Arsenal validated, through actual flights, the performance of the IFS, relating 

the tests to the models through the probabilities of hit and kill. Collaboration was such 

that on flight tests from helicopters representatives from industry and MICOM would be 

aboard.113 The program is accredited by AMSAA. MRDEC has a version of the IFS with 

simulated infrared scenes developed there. 

CTE 35 

 

109 Paul Turner, interview with authors, Huntsville, AL, 15 September 2005, and Christianson interview. 110 Such devices are also known as Electronic Safe and Arm Devices (ESADs). 111 Rice interview. 112 Ibid. 113 Dillon, telephone interview with authors, 10 January 2006. 

28
 

Redstone Arsenal has a comprehensive modeling and simulation capability at both 

MRDEC and the Redstone Technical Test Center. Captive flight testing was discussed 

earlier. Redstone also has extensive HWIL capability. The facilities are used for 

verification and performance testing, for evaluating component performance, and 

reliability testing. Among other things, they were crucial to developing the Javelin’s 

autopilot.114 

 

114 Rice interview. 

29
 

V. Findings and Conclusions 

1. We identified 35 CTEs for the two missile systems—13 for the Stinger and 22 for the 

Javelin. They are grouped as follows: 

 Stinger Javelin

Background 0 2 

Seeker 6 4 

Command Launch Unit N/A 6 

Guidance and Control 3 2 

Warhead and Propulsion 2 7 

Modeling and Simulation 2 1 

2. Both missile systems’ developments relied heavily on the strong missile technology 

base that existed in industry. This was particularly true in seeker design and guidance 

and control systems. The Army took advantage of this capability when it formed the 

Javelin Joint Venture, a successful acquisition strategy that today involves Raytheon and 

Lockheed Martin. 

3. The Army laboratories played several key roles. MRDEC had accumulated a great 

deal of experience in missile technologies and it was involved throughout these 

programs, working closely with the contractors, proposing new approaches to problems, 

and evaluating and critiquing concepts from industry. MRDEC provided technical 

support to the PM office both by doing sponsored work and by transferring staff either by 

permanent reassignment or by rotations. Other laboratories also made important 

contributions, including Picatinny Arsenal and the Night Vision Laboratory. 

4. Modeling and simulation (M&S) played an important role. Because a large number 

of experiments can be run using M&S, the number of actual experiments is greatly 

reduced and fewer dead ends are explored. M&S thus leads to significant cost savings. In 

the Stinger’s development, MRDEC, the contractor, AAMSA, the user, and the PM 

office all were involved in M&S. MRDEC made significant contributions to M&S, 

including developing hardware-in-the-loop and man-in-the-loop simulations. M&S 

technology had advanced further by the time of the Javelin’s development. Both the 

contractor and MRDEC had simulations, including hardware-in-the-loop, that 

encompassed all of the physics and useful sensitivity analyses, and which could be used 

to evaluate new concepts. 

5. Both missile systems were developed with significant user input. The user drove the 

need for fire-and-forget, man-portable, shoulder-fired weaponry. The Infantry School at 

Fort Benning was especially instrumental in driving the Javelin’s development. The strict 

weight restrictions imposed by the user’s needs affected every aspect of both missiles, 

and safety considerations were also an important design element. 

30
 

6. DARPA played a significant role in the development of the concepts for the Javelin. 

In particular, DARPA, in its project Tankbreaker, pushed hard for the use of imaging IR 

arrays, notably the two-dimensional array for the seeker. DARPA also funded an 

alternate source for FPAs that proved crucial to the Javelin program’s success. 

7. The Program Manager’s office encouraged and assisted collaboration between 

MRDEC and the contractors. There was regular consultation between working 

engineers; the contractor would send a prototype of a component to the in-house 

laboratories and obtain their reaction and critique. This back-and-forth communication in 

real time often provided early detection of potential dead ends and thus saved time and 

money. It seems clear that success was achieved through the effective work of all three 

players—the contractors, the in-house experts, and the PM office. 

31
 

Appendix A: Individuals Contacted 

Individuals Contacted for the Stinger and the Javelin Project 

Key 

Civil Service 

Employee 

CSE Academia ACD Active 

Military 

AM

Government

Retired 

GR Military Retired MR Industry 

Retired 

IR

Consultant CST Private Sector Employee PSE Contractor CTR

* denotes that the individual reviewed some or all of the draft document for completeness and 

accuracy. 

Last Name First 

Name 

Javelin or Stinger 

Development-era Organization

Current 

Status 

* Allen Henry Missile Research, Development, 

and Engineering Center (CSE) 

GR

Baker Ernest Picatinny Arsenal (CSE) CSE 

* Bishop William PM office (CSE) CTR 

Burroughs Susan Missile Research, Development, 

and Engineering Center (CSE) 

CSE

* Christianson Kim Honeywell/Alliant/Raytheon 

(PSE) 

PSE

Curry David Missile Research, Development, 

and Engineering Center (CSE) 

CSE

* Deckert William Texas Instruments/Raytheon 

(PSE) 

PSE 

* Dillon John Missile Research, Development, 

and Engineering Center (CSE) 

CSE

Ducotte Marjorie Missile Research, Development, 

and Engineering Center (CSE) 

GR

Fong Richard Picatinny Arsenal (CSE) CSE 

* Fowler Bruce MRDEC (CSE) 

* Hardesty David General 

Dynamics/Hughes/Raytheon 

(PSE) 

PSE

Hayes Frank Missile Research, Development, 

and Engineering Center (CSE) 

CSE

Holly John PM office (AM) MR, CST 

Johnson Greg Missile Research, Development, 

and Engineering Center (CSE) 

CSE

Kelley Michael General Dynamics/Raytheon PSE

32
 

(PSE) 

Lannon Joseph Picatinny Arsenal (CSE) CSE 

Light David Missile Research, Development, 

and Engineering Center (CSE) 

CSE

Little Robert Missile Research, Development, 

and Engineering Center (CSE) 

CSE

Milton Fenner Headquarters, Department of the 

Army (CSE)

CSE

* Peterson Don Missile Research, Development, 

and Engineering Center (CSE) 

CSE

Phillips Margaret Missile Research, Development, 

and Engineering Center (CSE) 

CSE

Reed Jean DARPA (AM) CSE

* Rice Dan Texas Instruments/Raytheon 

(PSE) 

PSE

* Schaefer Jerome Texas Instruments/Raytheon 

(PSE) 

PSE

Schaeffel John Missile Research, Development, 

and Engineering Center (CSE) 

CSE

* Thomas Tony Missile Research, Development, 

and Engineering Center (CSE) 

CSE

* Turner Paul PM office (CSE) CSE 

Wood Sam Missile Research, Development, 

and Engineering Center (CSE) 

CSE 

33
 

Appendix B: Critical Technology Event List 

Number CTE Report Section

1 Conical scanning Stinger Seeker 

2 Rosette scan seeker Stinger Seeker 

3 IR/UV detector Stinger Seeker 

4 Seeker microprocessors Stinger Seeker 

5 Reprogrammable

microprocessors 

Stinger Seeker 

6 Lithium battery Stinger Seeker 

7 Canard servomechanism Stinger Guidance and Control 

8 Roll frequency sensor Stinger Guidance and Control 

9 Target adaptive guidance Stinger Guidance and Control 

10 HTPB propellant binder Stinger Propulsion and 

Warhead 

11 Propellant case bonding Stinger Propulsion and 

Warhead 

12 Computer simulation Stinger Modeling and 

Simulation 

13 Hardware-in-the-loop simulators Stinger Modeling and 

Simulation 

14 Tankbreaker decision Javelin Background 

15 Javelin Joint Venture decision Javelin Background

16 CLU long-wave imaging IR Javelin CLU 

17 CLU bi-directional scanner Javelin CLU 

18 Thermal reference assembly Javelin CLU 

19 CLU cooling system design Javelin CLU 

20 CLU system improvements Javelin CLU 

21 Composite housing Javelin CLU 

22 Army fire-and-forget requirement Javelin Seeker 

23 Seeker focal plane array Javelin Seeker 

24 Hughes FPA design Javelin Seeker 

25 Seeker calibration "chopper 

wheel" 

Javelin Seeker 

26 Javelin tracker Javelin Guidance and Control 

27 Captive flight testing Javelin Guidance and Control 

28 Integrated propulsion design Javelin Propulsion and 

Warhead 

29 Launch motor shear pins Javelin Propulsion and 

Warhead 

30 Burst disc Javelin Propulsion and 

34
 

Warhead 

31 Tandem shaped charge warhead Javelin Propulsion and 

Warhead 

32 Precursor charge design Javelin Propulsion and 

Warhead 

33 Blast shield Javelin Propulsion and 

Warhead 

34 ESAF Javelin Propulsion and 

Warhead 

35 Integrated flight simulation Javelin Modeling and 

Simulation 

35