Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

already make major contributions to 

national defense. However, the Department 

of Defense should adjust SOF operations, 

organization, and national-level command 

and control to deal more effectively with 

terrorism and related forms of political 

violence. Almost 20 years after the Special 

Operations Command was created, it is 

clear that to make strategic contributions 

to defeating current and emerging threats, 

SOF direct and indirect action capabilities 

should be organized in separate commands. 

SOF’s so-called indirect action activities—typically performed by Special Forces, 

psychological operations, and civil affairs 

when they work by, with, and through the 

forces and people of host countries, such as the 

Philippines, Afghanistan, or Iraq—are critical 

for reshaping the sociopolitical environment 

in which terrorists and insurgents thrive. A 

separate command will ensure resources and 

priority missions for indirect action capabilities that currently are underemphasized. The 

new command’s indirect capabilities should be 

augmented by improved abilities to understand 

and influence traditional social networks.

SOF direct action capabilities that support or bring force to bear directly against the 

enemy are proficient but require national-level 

decisionmaking reforms. Better command and 

control mechanisms, including the Defense 

Department and national-level horizontal 

integration teams with their own resources, 

are necessary if direct action capabilities are 

to reach their full potential. 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) are vital 

for combating terrorism and the proliferation 

of weapons of mass destruction. SOF prominence in these missions has only grown since 

September 11, 2001, when the Nation realized 

its unprecedented power did not shield it from 

devastating unconventional attacks. While SOF 

are consumed by their operations in the war 

on terror, national leaders need to acknowledge 

neither Washington nor U.S. Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM) is organized for optimal 

use of SOF.

To substantiate this claim, it is necessary 

to distinguish the two major approaches by 

which SOF accomplishes tasks. One facilitates 

or actually brings force to bear directly against 

the enemy. Examples include destroying a key 

installation (direct action), reconnoitering the 

installation before the attack (special reconnaissance), and deceiving the enemy so an 

attack could be carried out (a subset of information operations). The other approach works 

indirectly by, with, and through other military 

forces or civilians to achieve U.S. objectives. 

Examples include providing training and 

advice to help other countries defeat insurgents 

(foreign internal defense) or to reconstitute 

institutions and infrastructure (civil affairs).

These two broad approaches may be 

mutually supportive, producing a greater effect 

together than separately. Also, not all core SOF 

tasks fall neatly within one approach. Unconventional warfare, an indirect approach, might 

include direct engagement of enemy forces 

by U.S. personnel. Psychological operations 

can achieve effects by working directly on the 

motivation of enemy forces or indirectly on the 

willingness of the population to support them. 

Nevertheless, the distinction between the direct 

and indirect approaches helps clarify how SOF 

should be used both now and in the future. 

This essay argues that current and emerging 

forms of political violence not only make the 

two SOF approaches more important than ever, 

but also require their use in organizations 

transformed to handle such threats better.

Political Violence

An enormous spectrum of activity is covered by political violence, from election brawls 

to interstate warfare. Between these extremes, 

and of particular importance to the United 

States, is violence conducted or sponsored by 

nonstate actors. Transnational terrorism is an 

example of such violence, as is insurgency. 

Neither the state as an entity nor war as an 

activity will disappear within our planning 

timelines, but two attributes of contemporary 

political violence are likely to get worse. One, 

the use of mass casualty weapons by small 

groups, is relatively new, and we are already 

adapting to it. The other, violence supported 

by traditional social and communication 

networks, is longstanding, but we have largely 

ignored it because it is foreign to our experience and ill suited to our modern way of war. 

SOF can make critical contributions for dealing 

with both.

Very Lethal Weapons

Although the proliferation of lethal technologies is not a new problem, it is compounded 

by small, very lethal organizations. In the past, 

political power came from having large numbers 

of supporters. Violent groups wishing to gain 

power needed to win supporters through persuasion and intimidation. They had an incentive 

Strategic Forum

No. 219

January 2006

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

No. 219, January 2006 Strategic Forum 

Restructuring Special Operations 

Forces for Emerging Threats

by David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb
 Strategic Forum	 No. 219, January 2006

to limit the use of violence lest they alienate 

potential supporters and stiffen the resistance of 

opponents. If they used excessive violence, they 

were unlikely to win and risked creating a backlash that might destroy them. Thus, in the past, 

terrorist groups that wanted to grow into political 

movements limited the amount of violence they 

used. Some recent evidence suggests that this 

logic apparently characterizes even the al Qaeda 

jihadist movement.1

Nevertheless, the spread of increasingly 

lethal technologies complicates analysis of 

terrorist violence. While it is not true, as often 

supposed, that terrorists are free to choose a level 

of violence or lethality based on religious, ethnic, 

or idiosyncratic views, extraordinarily lethal 

technology is likely to lead (indeed, has already 

led) some terrorists to think that this technology 

is a shortcut to power, circumventing the need 

to build political support. Thus, given advances 

in technology and their diffusion, we are likely 

to see small groups that have no ambition to 

grow through traditional political means and, 

hence, no motivation for moderation. Instead, 

they will seek political power through the possession of terrible weapons. We also occasionally 

will face groups that want such weapons because 

members see them as a way of ending the world 

as we know it. There really is no solution to the 

problem of small, very lethal organizations other 

than taking all possible measures to prevent the 

acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and 

directly eliminating the group or its members 

before they employ any such weapons they have.

The SOF direct action approach is well 

suited to combating small lethal organizations, and it receives much attention as the 

Department of Defense (DOD) emphasizes 

hunting down the al Qaeda leadership. However, the way in which traditional social and 

communication networks may support terrorism and violent political movements is an 

often-ignored dimension of political violence 

that also calls for SOF capabilities. Since we 

tend to pay little attention to this phenomenon, it requires some explanation.

Traditional Networks

The 9/11 plotters, like the jihadist movement generally, used the Internet and jet travel. 

They also used the hawala2 money transfer 

system and a global network of mosques. They 

operated in the modern world of individualism, 

electronic media, centralized bureaucratic control, and cellular phones. They also operated 

in a traditional, nontechnical world of family 

and tribe and decentralized, socially based 

authority. The terrorists operate in two worlds; 

we operate in only one. Thus, they have more 

strategic depth than we do.

The security advantage the jihadists 

acquire from using traditional networks is 

most evident. Our information and intelligence collection capabilities are optimized 

for the modern world only. Human intelligence as a bureaucratic enterprise developed 

in Europe with the European state system. 

Technical intelligence developed later and 

reflects this system and its centralized bureaucracies. Both human and technical 

intelligence have adapted to that world. We 

can intercept electronic messages and track 

money through the international banking 

system better than we can track money in 

the hawala system or understand what goes 

on in religious brotherhoods.

The socially based security advantage 

that terrorists enjoy (and our corresponding 

disadvantage) is perhaps the most glaring 

consequence of our inability to operate in the 

traditional social world, but two others are also 

important. First, because they are organizations 

at risk, terrorist groups tend to recruit from 

among those they trust, which typically means 

from among their existing social relationships—family, kin, friends, mosque attendees.3

The strength of traditional social networks 

is an important advantage in the recruiting 

process, which we have only a limited ability to 

understand and affect. Second, we tend to think 

that strategic communication and the war of 

ideas are important for winning the war on terror, but, as far as our adversaries are concerned, 

that part of the struggle takes place largely at 

the level of the individual imam or tribal elder. 

Our ability to understand or influence that 

level of traditional communication is limited.4 

In security, recruiting, and communicating, 

traditional social networks provide our enemies 

with significant advantages.

Influencing Networks

Not all political violence or even all terrorism gets decisive support from the traditional social world, but the kind that threatens 

us most now and in the foreseeable future does. 

Organizing SOF to deal with transnational networks will demand a good deal of change. SOF 

already is organized to deal with small lethal 

groups, and doing so better requires relatively 

fewer adjustments.

The United States has confronted traditional networks consistently since the end of 

World War II. We face them now in Iraq, the 

Middle East, Central Asia, South and Southeast 

Asia, Northern Africa, in some places in Latin 

America—in those areas where the writ of the 

modern bureaucratic state does not run strong 

and U.S. personnel must often operate in austere and possibly violent circumstances.

Only two organizations in the U.S. Government have expertise in preparing people to 

operate in such circumstances and supporting 

them once they are there: DOD and the Central 

Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) Directorate of 

Operations (DO). Tasking the DO to penetrate 

and influence traditional social and communication networks would have serious drawbacks. 

First, its training, structure, and incentives all 

focus case officers on modern information and 

bureaucratic state-centric systems. Case officers 

want to know what key decisionmakers have 

decided. As collectors, they take this same approach to terrorist organizations; as operators, 

they want to disrupt these organizations. Case 

officers who operate in the midst of traditional 

networks hardly ignore them, but the directorate is not structured, nor its personnel trained, 

to make traditional networks a priority, nor 

should they be. The traditional DO approach 

is necessary and needs to be done better, which 

will consume its time and resources.

David Tucker is an associate professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School. His 

contribution to this article is based in part on research supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation. 

Christopher J. Lamb is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National 

Defense University. This essay is based on research and conclusions from the authors’ forthcoming 

book, U.S. Special Operations Forces, to be published by Columbia University Press in 2006.

traditional social 

networks provide our 

enemies with significant 

advantages
No. 219, January 2006 Strategic Forum 

The second reason the directorate should 

not have the responsibility for understanding 

and influencing traditional social networks is 

that association with the DO risks compromising 

and limiting the influence of the indigenous 

people with whom it works. A clandestine approach should be taken only when necessary. 

The relationships of trust that characterize traditional social systems can be developed overtly. 

Clandestine tradecraft, the directorate’s core 

competence, is not necessary for understanding 

and influencing traditional social networks and 

would actually be counterproductive.

Since a new organization devoted to 

traditional networks is neither necessary nor 

likely, eliminating the DO as an option leaves 

the Department of Defense as the choice to 

understand and influence the traditional social 

world. There are organizations in DOD that 

already do this work. When Special Forces (SF)5

engage in the indirect approach, when they 

work by, with, and through indigenous forces 

or personnel, they are often working within traditional social and communication networks. 

So, too, are civil affairs and psychological 

operations (PSYOP) forces. Some PSYOP teams 

in Iraq gathered and disseminated information 

working through and with traditional social 

networks, although this is not a doctrinal task 

for PSYOP. The work these forces do in this 

regard needs to be improved and augmented.

Building New Capability

Improving SF capabilities to operate in 

the traditional social world will come largely 

from focusing their energies on that world. 

SF teams currently prepare for an array of 

missions. If they devote their finite time and 

resources to the indirect approach, which 

must include maintaining their small unit 

military skills, they will get better at it. They 

will be able to focus selection and training on this mission, for example. They will 

learn more about it, and doctrine will begin 

to change and improve, as will the tactics, 

techniques, and procedures of engaging with 

the traditional social world. Deeper knowledge 

of traditional networks will make SF not only 

more capable for independent SOF missions 

but also better able to support conventional 

force operations.

Beyond reorientation of SF, a separate 

cadre of specialists on traditional networks 

is needed. Ideally, the kinds of professionals 

best suited for this mission would transfer 

into their new career track in their late 20s 

or early 30s with prior exposure to foreign 

cultures and languages. Upon completion 

of additional specialized military and other 

training requirements, their initial assignment could be an overseas tour working in a 

U.S. Embassy, either for a defense attaché or 

on loan to the political, economic, or development assistance sections of a given country 

team. As with all other accredited U.S. diplomatic personnel, their specific (and overt) 

purpose would be to interact with the people 

and institutions of the host nation in order to 

conduct bilateral assistance programs within 

their scope of duties; a greater understanding 

of traditional social networks would be an inevitable consequence of that kind of contact. 

How and with whom trust and knowledge are 

built would depend on the interplay of local 

circumstances and the skills and background 

of each individual. A second tour would follow 

in a nearby country, and then a third, perhaps 

in the country of the first tour, with time for 

training and education. Long periods spent 

in a subregion (for example, western sub-Saharan Africa) and in one or two countries in 

that subregion are necessary to build relationships, knowledge, and influence.

With their expertise in traditional social 

and communication systems, these personnel 

should be key advisors if American forces need 

to deploy to their country or region. They 

would help prepare SF for their training missions and other deployments, alerting them 

to key figures in traditional networks. These 

specialists could assist the Embassy public 

affairs officers in shaping their messages. In 

operational settings, they would assist PSYOP 

personnel in the same fashion. They would 

serve as eyes and ears in places that U.S. and 

even local officials seldom visit, which, for 

that reason, are places where things of interest to the United States happen. They would 

be able to assist State Department and other 

personnel in identifying individuals of interest to the United States. Information they 

gathered from the Lebanese community in 

West Africa, for example, might be of interest 

to U.S. personnel in the Middle East, France, 

and the tri-border region of Latin America, 

as well as to analysts and policymakers in 

Washington. Their information would also be 

useful to a range of Federal law enforcement 

and intelligence agencies.

In addition to assisting military forces 

and U.S. Government agencies, this new cadre 

would wield its own influence, which would 

come from the relationships of trust it develops 

and from its assistance to extant overt U.S. 

Government programs. Ultimately, this cadre 

should have its own funding to provide overt 

assistance to key leaders and organizations in 

the traditional social world. This would need 

to be done carefully, but in some cases might 

consist of nothing more than a gift of food to 

a village. The point in such gifts would not be 

their munificence but rather the relationship 

within which they occurred.

This brief outline raises a host of questions about the personnel management of 

these specialists.6 For example, they do not 

need a highly differentiated rank structure. 

Those who enter this work will not have 

command of progressively larger numbers 

of personnel. Hence, their status should correspond more to something like apprentice, 

journeyman, and master than to the traditional military hierarchy. However these and 

other such issues are decided (and how they 

are decided will be critical to the success of 

these specialists), the personnel system will 

be different from anything now found in the 

Defense Department. Since the organization 

will be small, certainly by Defense standards, 

it must be part of some other separate organization within the department, or it will be 

overwhelmed by the DOD bureaucracy. Given 

its function, this new organization should be 

grouped with the other Defense components 

that focus on the indirect approach so that it 

can complement them.

Command Restructure

Once the utility of grouping SF, civil affairs, PSYOP, and the new cadre of traditional 

social and communication network specialists 

is seen, further consideration suggests that 

they constitute a separate organization within 

the department. A review of SOF history and 

current activities shows that DOD and, more 

recently, USSOCOM have typically given lower 

priority to the indirect approach and those who 

carry it out.

beyond reorientation of 

SF, a separate cadre of 

specialists on traditional 

networks is needed
Just as SOF did not flourish until separated 

from the conventional military under its own 

command, the indirect approach of SOF will not 

flourish unless it is separated from SOF direct 

action components. Thus, we suggest establishing a separate joint command in DOD—perhaps called the Unconventional Warfare Command—that would include SF, civil affairs, 

PSYOP, and the new cadre described above. The 

command would draw upon all services for 

personnel and would in other respects function much as USSOCOM functions now, paying 

for training and equipment specifically related 

to unconventional warfare but relying on the 

services for all other support. The command 

thus would have a Major Force Program in the 

DOD budget and have acquisition authority. For 

example, it would take responsibility for modifying aircraft for PSYOP use. Access to transportation resources for members of the new command 

might require that it control some aircraft, 

although it may be able to rely on Air Force or 

Army assets for transport. It would also need 

authority to devise new personnel management 

procedures, since the current DOD procedures 

should not apply to the new cadre. Personnel reforms would have to extend into all the 

Services, however, since these personnel would 

have a different career progression. Over time, it 

might be that the personnel system of the new 

cadre would better fit at least some civil affairs 

and PSYOP personnel as well.

A four-star officer should lead this new 

command. It will run into a host of bureaucratic problems and will need an officer at 

that level, plus considerable assistance from 

high-ranking DOD civilians, to establish itself. 

The primary problem in DOD for the new 

command will be the general disregard for 

the indirect approach. The State Department 

is likely to ignore the new command and its 

knowledge of traditional networks. The CIA 

is likely to claim first that it already does 

this work; next, that the work is not necessary; and finally, that it is cooperating fully, 

while it uses its chief of station authority to 

restrict where the new command sends its 

personnel and what they do. The command 

will also have to sort out relations between its 

components and the Intelligence Community 

beyond CIA. For example, SF already collect 

information (and could learn to collect and 

report it better) that should interest the Intelligence Community. Even if relations with 

other agencies remain problematic temporarily, the new command will give the indirect 

approach better standing within DOD and 

will improve its ability to support the direct 

approach of SOF and conventional forces and 

to carry on such independent indirect missions as foreign internal defense. Altogether, 

the various activities of the command will 

give DOD and the U.S. Government the global 

scouts that SF are sometimes characterized 

to be.

A critic might note the expense implicit in 

these proposals and wonder if they are necessary. After all, DOD and SOF have already taken 

some steps to address the cultural and social 

aspects of warfare. Although these measures 

will help, the underlying phenomenon of 

terrorism and insurgency is not cultural but 

social. Unless we focus on the traditional social 

world, we will not get better at understanding 

and influencing it and at mastering and using 

to our advantage the indirect approach to our 

enemies. Failing to do this, we will not deal 

effectively with the major problem before us.

Lethal Organizations

Establishing a separate command focused 

on the indirect approach is critical for dealing 

with traditional networks. It will also have an 

unintended benefit. SOF not in this new organization—the special mission units, the Navy 

Sea-Air-Land teams, the Army Rangers, the 

160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, 

and Air Force Combat Controllers and Pararescue personnel—will form a new organization 

(perhaps called the Special Operations Strike 

Command)7 that would retain USSOCOM’s current Service-like responsibilities and authorities 

but would focus on direct action missions. This 

organizational change would allow the Strike 

Command to focus on small, very lethal organizations. Such organizations will operate as 

terrorist groups, as radical religious sects that 

develop into violent organizations, or as the 

forces of countries that develop limited numbers of advanced weapons that they seek to use 

clandestinely for maximum effect. In all these 

cases, the U.S. Government may be compelled 

to act against organizations when they have 

such weapons or to prevent their acquisition. 

To do so, the best strike and raid capability possible will be needed. A confrontation with one 

of these organizations is likely to reveal that 

they possess technology as advanced as ours in 

enough categories to make them formidable 

enemies. Extremist sects, for example, have 

long had a tendency to retreat into compounds, 

but in the future, commercially available technology will be sufficiently developed to allow 

these nonstate groups to build not just compounds but daunting fortresses. While many 

such groups will pose no threat to the United 

States, some may threaten Americans abroad, 

while others will see the United States as the 

keystone of the order they must destroy for a 

new one to emerge and, hence, as their enemy.

Integration Problem

The new Special Operations Strike Command will not, in and of itself, give the United 

States a more robust direct action capability. 

It will only improve this capability if it is used 

correctly. The U.S. Government is not currently 

well organized to do this. These organizational 

defects are two-fold: lack of integration across 

bodies of functional expertise and familiarity with SOF capabilities. Lack of integration 

undermines complex endeavors such as counterterrorism or counterproliferation. SOF direct 

action capabilities are critical in these activities 

but should not be used without regard for a 

host of political, diplomatic, and legal issues. 

The lack of regular communication between 

civilian and even military decisionmakers and 

SOF direct action forces also produces failures 

and suboptimal performance.

The integration problem results from 

a security bureaucracy organized around 

dominant organizations dedicated to expertise 

in a single functional area. Yet many current security problems are so complex and 

fast-evolving that they require the integrated 

expertise of many Government agencies and 

even nongovernmental organizations. To 

achieve this integration, we need new “horizontal integration” teams to draw upon but 

cut across functional areas to produce sound, 

integrated, adaptive solutions.

Integration Solution

To build these teams, the Secretary of 

Defense would authorize an individual with 

relevant experience and leadership skills 

 Strategic Forum	 No. 219, January 2006

the indirect approach 

of SOF will not flourish 

unless it is separated 

from SOF direct action 

components
to bring together subject matter experts 

now divided among various organizations 

within DOD. The team would develop strategies and plans for specific problems, such 

as terrorism, and oversee implementation 

of these plans, as well as budgetary and 

acquisition issues. The team would not be a 

task force but a structure as permanent as 

the problem it was designated to deal with. 

Comprehending the problem and solution in 

an end-to-end fashion, the team would use 

its authority to intervene selectively to ensure progress—mostly at the strategic level, 

where the efforts of functional organizations 

tend to compete and work at cross-purposes, 

but down to whatever level of detail was 

required to ensure successful outcomes.

Making the transition to new horizontal 

organizations will be difficult. In particular, 

achieving unity of effort requires, at one level, 

violating the principle of unity of command. 

The experts who populate the teams report 

to two leaders, one in the organization they 

come from and the other the integration team 

leader, who can reward or release them, if 

they are not loyal and dedicated to producing 

the best overall solution. This “dual authority” problem is the single point of failure 

for such horizontal integration teams. If the 

Secretary of Defense does not impress upon 

his immediate subordinates the importance 

of collaboration and information-sharing, 

they may instruct the experts they send to the 

teams to protect organizational interests at 

all costs. In such cases, the teams may produce “least common denominator” products 

that satisfy individual team members but are 

inconsistent and ineffective.

However, if DOD can make the transition 

to empowered, collaborative teams, it will help 

tackle some of the most intractable problems 

that it faces. The effect would be even greater if 

such teams took hold across the Government 

to deal with key national security issues. Again, 

these would not be the customary interagency 

deliberating bodies, or even the interagency 

Executive Committees that the Clinton administration used, but small permanent 

organizations with authority, derived from the 

President, over both their agendas and their 

own resources, devoted to developing policies 

and strategies and reporting directly to the 

Principals Committee (the national security 

Cabinet-level authorities).

SOF Familiarity Problem

Solving the integration and coordination problem within DOD and among other 

national security agencies would leave another 

problem specific to SOF direct action capability. The command and control relationship 

between direct action units and senior civilian 

and military decisionmakers is too distant. Senior leaders must understand SOF tactical capabilities and limitations to employ SOF most 

effectively and discreetly. This understanding 

and discretion can only be developed through 

direct contact with SOF operational leaders and 

familiarity with their modes of operation. With 

such familiarity, senior leaders are more likely 

to examine and guide strategic operations critically from conception through completion.

SOF operations in Somalia in 1993 are 

a perfect illustration of both the integration 

and vertical command and control problems 

inherent in strategic direct action. SOF Task 

Force Ranger was sent to Mogadishu in summer 1993 to capture Mohammed Farah Aideed, 

a faction leader whom the U.S. Government 

judged to be the key troublemaker in Somalia. 

Washington wanted Aideed captured in order to 

establish the peacemaking capabilities of the 

United Nations, which had taken over the effort 

to stabilize Somalia from the United States. 

This was a major policy initiative of the Clinton administration. The mission was high-risk, 

since it required U.S. forces to conduct raids 

on short notice into hostile territory, with high 

political stakes for the administration. 

In this setting, SOF commanders in the 

field and at USSOCOM needed to be aware of 

how the Nation’s political-military strategy was 

evolving. They needed to keep authorities informed of developments in the field and evolving risks inherent in the course of action they 

were pursuing. They did not do so, nor do they 

appear to have been inclined to do so. But even 

if they had been, there was no single Washington-based authority they could have reported 

to that would have been able to provide definitive guidance and to change course quickly in 

light of developments in the field. As the Senate 

report on the Somalia expedition concluded, 

U.S. policies were poorly coordinated, and 

civilian officials and military leaders were not 

carefully and continually reevaluating the SOF 

mission to determine if the risks were too high.8

This failure to coordinate policy and operations 

contributed significantly to the failure of the 

SOF mission in Somalia and to a strategic and 

political failure for the United States.

The argument might be made that a new 

and naïve administration was responsible for 

the confusion in Washington when Task Force 

Ranger was deployed to Somalia. However, such 

setbacks have characterized the administrations 

of Presidents both new and seasoned. The fault 

lies not only in poor leadership but also in poor 

organization. An integrated team operating in 

DOD—or preferably across the relevant national security departments and agencies—as 

the single authority for policy and operations 

could have eliminated or at least diminished 

the command and control problems that ultimately contributed to failure in Somalia.

SOF Familiarity Solution

Effective command and control of SOF 

direct action missions will not come automatically from linking direct action capabilities to 

the integrated teams proposed here or to the 

President following their advice. The characteristics of both decisionmakers and operators 

tend to undermine effective command and 

control. For example, as the Senate report on 

Task Force Ranger noted:

One of the weaknesses of a unit like Task 

Force Ranger, whose combat capabilities 

are unparalleled, is the belief by the unit 

members and its commanders that they 

can accomplish any mission. Because of the 

supreme confidence of special operations 

forces, the chain of command must provide 

more oversight to this type of unit than to 

conventional forces.9

However, civilian decisionmakers often lack 

sufficient understanding of direct action operations to oversee them effectively. Senior military 

commanders may also lack such understanding 

and often have prejudices against SOF.10 The 

result is that DOD integrated teams made up of 

such civilian and military leaders alone will not 

be able to provide the oversight that SOF need.

If special operations are to achieve 

policymaker objectives, and if the risk of a 

No. 219, January 2006 Strategic Forum 

civilian decisionmakers 

often lack sufficient 

understanding of direct 

action operations to 

oversee them effectively
Hawala is an alternative or parallel remittance system. It exists 

and operates outside of, or parallel to ‘traditional’ banking 

or financial channels. . . . The components of hawala that 

distinguish it from other remittance systems are trust and the 

extensive use of connections such as family relationships or 

regional affiliations. . . . hawala makes minimal (often no) 

use of any sort of negotiable instrument. Transfers of money 

take place based on communications between members of a 

network of hawaladars, or hawala dealers.

For additional background on traditional forms of banking 

and its abuse by criminal and transnational terrorist groups, see 

Kimberley L. Thachuk, Terrorism’s Financial Lifeline: Can It Be 

Severed? Strategic Forum 191 (Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, May 2002). 3 On this point, consider Doug McAdam, “Recruitment to 

High Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer,” The American 

Journal of Sociology 92 (July 1986), 64–90. 4 This limitation is widely recognized and a long-standing problem for transregional powers. See C.A. Bayly, Empire and 

Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication 

in India, 1780–1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 

1996), for a useful case study of some of the issues in this paragraph. 5 The term Special Operations Forces refers broadly 

to forces from all the Services that conduct special operations, 

whereas the term Special Forces—also know as Green Berets—

refers more specifically to the U.S. Army forces that specialize in 

unconventional warfare.

6 Further details on a possible personnel system are available 

in Anna Simons and David Tucker, “Improving Human Intelligence 

in the War on Terrorism: The Need for an Ethnographic Capability,” 

submitted to the Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, December 2004. 7 This name and the mission of the command would 

return U.S. Special Operations Command to something like the 

original vision of Edward C. Meyer, a key early supporter of an 

improved direct action capability. See J.W. Partin, interview with 

General Edward C. Meyer, USA, Arlington, Virginia, July 14, 1988 

(typescript in author’s possession). 8 Senators John Warner (R–VA) and Carl Levin (D–MI), 

“Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the Ranger Raid on 

October 3–4, 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia,” September 29, 1995, 50.

9 Ibid., 49–50.

10 For an example of a civilian decisionmaker failing to 

understand the complexities and risks of a direct action mission, see Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred 

Terror (New York: Random House, 2002), 318. One might also 

consider Richard Shultz, “Showstoppers,” The Weekly Standard

( January 26, 2004), 25–33. Shultz reports that senior military 

leaders did not trust SOF but fails himself to give due weight to 

the risks entailed by the direct action missions he touts. 11 The full text of the October 16, 2004, memorandum is 

available at <www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/

rumsfeld-memo.htm>.

military operation is to be commensurate with 

the importance of the policy objective it is 

intended to serve, then the goals and restraints 

of policy must inform operational planning, 

just as the possibilities and problems of operations must inform policymaking. Somehow, 

senior policymakers and operators must learn 

to collaborate effectively when SOF direct 

action is used in pursuit of strategic objectives. 

To that end, the proposed Special Operations Strike Command should work closely with 

the DOD and interagency horizontal integration 

teams in Washington. These teams, and Cabinet 

officials as well, should participate with operators 

in frequent, realistic simulations of the approval, 

conduct, and possible consequences of direct 

action missions. The policymakers must include 

the Secretaries of State and Defense, the National 

Security Adviser, and, above all, the President. 

Such officials will be in command of the most 

delicate and risky missions that SOF will be 

called upon to perform.

Such exercises would give the civilian 

decisionmakers an opportunity to ask questions 

about the planning and thinking of SOF in settings that should reproduce the operational and 

political risk involved in potential missions. This 

interaction also would educate military leaders about the civilians for whom they work and 

the political realities that must govern military 

operations. To be effective, these exercises need to 

be done with the officers directly responsible for 

conducting direct action missions.

Exercises of this sort do take place, but 

too often senior leaders do not participate. They 

should. The exercises also need to occur often 

enough to erode the usual veneer of formality 

and politeness between decisionmakers and 

operators, allowing realistic exchanges to occur. 

These exercises would not replace the briefings 

that Presidents and senior advisers receive about 

particularly risky operations as part of the normal approval process. Instead, the scenarios proposed here are intended to educate all involved 

so that decisionmaking in such operations will 

be better informed.

Objections will arise to this proposal for 

realistic exercises, the most sensitive of which 

is the charge that they will increase civilian 

meddling in operations. In fact, approval of 

operations and delegation of authority might be 

more forthcoming, more appropriately given, 

and more strictly adhered to, if military and 

civilian decisionmakers understand, and hence 

have more trust in, each other. For good reason, 

the military insists that it must train as it plans 

 Strategic Forum	 No. 219, January 2006

to fight. When it comes to direct action missions, 

this training must include decisionmakers.

The Reform Challenge

For the foreseeable future, SOF as practitioners of both direct and indirect approaches 

need to be employed to the fullest extent possible. The forces will take care of the challenges 

of training, tactics, techniques, and procedures 

if they are resourced and allowed to do so. 

But allowing them to do their best ultimately 

requires major reforms in organization, command and control, and policy oversight:

■ separate commands for SOF direct and indirect 

actions capabilities to include a cadre of specialists on 

traditional social and communication networks

■ DOD and interagency teams with the authority and resources to tackle the most important 

security problems the Nation faces

■ frequent exercises with national decisionmakers and the commanders of the special mission units.

Two years ago, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld queried his top officials11 as to 

whether the billions of dollars being spent to 

defeat terrorists were having sufficient effect, 

and whether a new organization was needed. 

He expressed particular concern about whether 

the enemy was recruiting more to its ranks 

than we were capturing, dissuading, or killing. 

The Secretary’s concerns were well placed, and 

his willingness to consider new organizations 

and command and control relationships is 

laudable. Such change is difficult and costly 

but, in the case of SOF and the most challenging forms of political violence that threaten us, 

also necessary.

Notes

1 Douglas Jehl and Thom Shanker, “Al Qaeda Tells Ally 

in Iraq to Strive for Global Goals,” The New York Times, October 

7, 2005. Terrorism experts have differed over al Qaeda strategy for 

some time, and they debate the authenticity and meaning of the 

captured al Qaeda document reported in this article as well. 2 Interpol Web site, accessed at <www.interpol.int/Public/

FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/hawala/default.asp#2>:

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 

the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force 

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal 

can be accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, 

its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming 

events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of 

international security affairs and defense studies. Through an 

active outreach program, including conferences and publications, 

INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic 

challenges and policy options.

I nstitut e for N ationa L S trat e gic S tudi e s

Stephen J. Flanagan James A. Schear

Director Director of Research