NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0710-13T4

RIGOBERTO MEJIA,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

_________________________

Argued June 16, 2016 – Decided

Before Judges Fuentes, Koblitz and Gilson.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of 

Corrections.

Alexander Shalom argued the cause for 

appellant (American Civil Liberties Union of 

New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Mr. 

Shalom, Edward Barocas, Jeanne LoCicero, and 

Rebecca Livengood, on the brief; Rigoberto 

Mejia, on the pro se brief). 

Joseph Micheletti, Assistant Chief Deputy 

Attorney General, argued the cause for 

respondent (Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney 

General, attorney; Lisa A. Puglisi, 

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; 

Dianne M. Moratti, Deputy Attorney General, 

and Alex J. Zowin, Deputy Attorney General,

on the briefs). 

The opinion of the court was delivered by

KOBLITZ, J.A.D.

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

August 11, 2016

APPELLATE DIVISION

August 11, 2016
2 A-0710-13T4

In this prison disciplinary appeal, Rigoberto Mejia argues 

that the sanction of three and one-half years in administrative 

segregation was improper. Mejia is a prisoner at New Jersey 

State Prison currently serving a sentence with a mandatory 

minimum of forty years imposed in 1995 for murder and associated 

crimes. Mejia was originally sentenced to death for the 

shooting of another undocumented worker over $750 in December 

1991.1 Mejia, who is now fifty-seven years old and whose first 

eligibility for parole is in 2031, appeals from an August 8, 

2013 disciplinary action taken against him by the New Jersey 

 

1 In State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 485-86 (1995), our Supreme 

Court reversed Mejia's death penalty sentence, holding jury 

instructions were required, in the guilt phase, on the ultimate 

outcome of a conviction of murder with the intent to kill–

capital murder—versus murder with the intent to cause serious 

bodily injury—which is not death-eligible. The Court held the 

instruction should advise the jury that it could return a nonunanimous guilty verdict as to the mental state of a defendant 

who the jury unanimously found had committed a homicide. Id. at 

486. If the jury was not unanimous as to the mens rea, the 

defendant would then not be eligible for the death penalty. 

Ibid. The holding in Mejia was no longer authoritative 

following the 1992 New Jersey constitutional amendment. See

State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 376-77 (1997), cert. denied, 528 

U.S. 1084, 120 S. Ct. 809, 145 L. Ed. 2d 681 (2000). The 

Legislature later repealed the death penalty in 2007. See State 

v. Troxell, 434 N.J. Super. 502, 510 (App. Div.) (explaining the 

legislative action), certif. denied, 221 N.J. 285 (2014).
3 A-0710-13T4

Department of Corrections (DOC).2 We reverse the sanction 

imposed because it was arbitrary and unreasonable.

On July 15, 2013, Mejia threw a bucket of hot water, urine 

and feces on a corrections officer who was walking by his cell. 

The substance also made contact with another corrections officer 

who was below Mejia's cell. Mejia claimed he had done so 

because he was fearful that the "officer wanted to jump him." 

A five-man extraction team was called to remove Mejia from 

his cell. Initially, officers were unable to enter the cell 

because Mejia had tied a bedsheet to the door, which had to be 

cut by the responding officers. Officers also utilized "OC 

spray," a chemical agent, to subdue Mejia before finally 

extracting him. 

Mejia was charged with several asterisk offenses:

3 1) two 

counts of *.012, "throwing bodily fluid at any person or 

otherwise purposely subjecting such person to contact with a 

bodily fluid"; 2) *.154, "tampering with or blocking any locking 

device"; and 3) *.306, "conduct which disrupts or interferes 

with the security or orderly running of the correctional 

 

2 We hereby grant the DOC's June 14, 2016 motion to supplement 

the record with certifications and documents relating to Mejia's 

mental health screening.

3 Asterisk offenses "are considered the most serious and result 

in the most severe sanctions." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a); see

N.J.A.C. 10A:4-5.1(a) (providing the schedule of sanctions for 

asterisk offenses).
4 A-0710-13T4

facility." See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). At the administrative 

hearing, Mejia pled guilty to one charge of throwing bodily

fluid on a person, and not guilty on the remaining charges. 

Although Mejia waived counsel substitute, according to the 

hearing officer's adjudication Form 259-A, a counsel substitute 

was present for "translation purposes." Following the hearing, 

Mejia was adjudicated guilty on all four charges. 

The hearing officer sanctioned Mejia to the maximum period 

of administrative segregation4 on each charge, all consecutive to 

each other. On the first bodily fluid charge, Mejia received 

fifteen days of disciplinary detention, 365 days loss of 

commutation time, 365 days of administrative segregation, and 90 

days loss of television, phone and radio privileges. On the 

 

4 The DOC argues "solitary confinement" does not exist in the New 

Jersey state penal system and did not exist at the time Mejia 

was sanctioned. "Administrative segregation" is defined as 

"removal of an inmate from the general population of a 

correctional facility to a close custody unit because of one or 

more disciplinary infractions or other administrative 

considerations." N.J.A.C. 10A:1-2.2. The DOC contends 

administrative segregation is not solitary confinement because 

inmates have access to several services, including "five hours 

of recreation outside of [their] cell each week" and regular 

reviews by the mental health staff through the locked cell door. 

Mejia's mental health records reflect he attended one group 

session for stress management while housed on administrative 

segregation for more than two-and-one-half years. "Disciplinary 

detention" is the "removal of an inmate from the general 

population to a short-term close custody unit because of a 

disciplinary infraction(s)." Ibid. We were informed at oral

argument that during disciplinary detention an inmate has no 

access to group sessions, recreation or privileges.
5 A-0710-13T4

second bodily fluid charge, Mejia received fifteen days of 

disciplinary detention, 365 days loss of commutation time, 365 

days administrative segregation, and 30 days loss of recreation 

privileges. On the tampering with a locking device charge, 

Mejia received time served in disciplinary detention, 180 days 

loss of commutation time, 180 days of administrative 

segregation, and 30 days loss of recreation privileges. 

Finally, for the conduct that disrupts charge Mejia received 

time served in disciplinary detention and 365 days of 

administrative segregation. The hearing officer ran all of the 

sanctions consecutively, other than the disciplinary detention 

sanctions. Mejia's sanctions totaled 30 days of disciplinary 

detention; 910 days loss of commutation time; 90 days loss of

television, phone and radio privileges; 60 days loss of 

recreation privileges; and 1275 days of administrative 

segregation.

Under the "reasons for sanctions" portion of the 

adjudication form, the hearing officer noted Mejia "must be held 

responsible for his actions," the behavior was "disgusting," and 

it had caused the corrections officers to seek medical 

attention. Although the two officers were medically examined, 

the record contains no evidence of any injuries to either of 

them due to this incident.
6 A-0710-13T4

On July 22, 2013, Mejia filed an administrative appeal of 

the disciplinary decision written in Spanish. Within three 

weeks, the Assistant Superintendent of New Jersey State Prison 

upheld the decisions regarding both the adjudication and the 

sanctions in general language without directly addressing any 

issue raised. In the "explanation" portion of the form, the 

Assistant Superintendent stated: "My review of this issue 

reveals that there was compliance with the New Jersey 

Administrative Code on inmate discipline, which prescribes 

procedural safeguards, and the charge was adjudicated 

accordingly. The preponderance of evidence presented supports 

the decision of the Hearing Officer and the sanction rendered is 

appropriate. There appears to be no violation of standards."

In October 2013, Mejia filed an appeal to this court. Six 

months later, the DOC filed a successful motion for a remand to 

reconsider Mejia's administrative appeal after its translation

into English. On June 6, 2014, after the appeal was translated, 

the Office of the Administrator for New Jersey State Prison 

again upheld the hearing officer's decision, this time rejecting 

the specific arguments raised by Mejia almost a year earlier.5

 

5 Mejia argued that, contrary to the hearing officer's report, he 

asked for a staff member legal representative at the hearing, 

and told the hearing officer that he had only seven years of 

schooling and did not understand English well. He stated the 

(continued)
7 A-0710-13T4

In his pro se appeal to this court Mejia argued he had 

mental health needs and had not received the mental health 

screening required by N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.5(c)(2), which requires 

that a list of inmates with a pending disciplinary infraction be 

forwarded to the "Mental Health Unit for a determination as to 

which inmates should be considered special needs inmates." The 

DOC responded to this issue in its initial brief in one 

paragraph, stating "there is no evidence of mental health issues 

and Mejia is not a special needs inmate," citing to notations by 

the hearing officer on DOC forms stating "no evid. of MH

[(mental health)]." We sua sponte ordered the American Civil 

Liberties Union, with its consent, to represent Mejia on appeal

and file a supplemental brief on his behalf.

In response to Mejia's supplemental brief raising the 

argument that he suffered from mental illness and was 

particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of long-term 

solitary confinement in administrative segregation, the DOC for 

the first time revealed Mejia had been screened for mental 

health issues and was routinely reviewed, albeit in a cursory 

fashion, pursuant to the settlement of a federal case in 1999. 

See D.M. v. Terhune, 67 F. Supp. 2d 401, 403-05 (D.N.J. 1999). 

 

(continued)

inmate interpreter was only available at the end of the hearing, 

and he was denied the material and time to prepare.
8 A-0710-13T4

The DOC further informed us at oral argument that, pursuant to 

an August 14, 2015 "Request for Rule Exemption"6 (Rule 

Exemption), Mejia had been returned to the general population

housing at an unknown date prior to oral argument, but after 

February 8, 2016, when the records reflect he remained in 

administrative segregation. The Rule Exemption, submitted to us 

after oral argument, eliminated disciplinary detention and 

limited administrative segregation "for multiple offenses 

imposed as a result of the same incident" to 365 days. The 

Rule Exemption also states:

Studies have shown that isolation, 

under certain circumstances, exacerbates 

mental health deterioration. As such, the 

elimination of [disciplinary] detention, and 

the immediate transport of an inmate to a 

less restrictive administrative segregation 

unit upon adjudication, will have a positive 

impact on the inmate population.

Similarly, maximizing inmate exposure 

to no more than 365 days of administrative 

segregation per incident, rather than per 

infraction, will decrease the likelihood of 

isolation.

 

6 N.J.A.C. 10A:1-2.4 authorizes the Commissioner to "relax and 

exempt rules and regulations for the administration of 

correctional facilities . . . within the Department of 

Corrections" to avoid "undue hardship, unfairness or injustice." 

Although the DOC provided a document titled "Request for Rule 

Exemption," and counsel stated at oral argument that a Rule 

Exemption had been applied to Mejia, we were not supplied with 

any official document designated as an approval of this request.
9 A-0710-13T4

The Rule Exemption attachments include "a replacement list of 

prohibited acts found in N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)" separating "the 

original list into the 5 new Categories from the Rule Exemption" 

including "the applicable number of days of Administrative 

Segregation per category." The sanction range for *.012,

"Throwing bodily fluid at any person," is 181 to 365 days. The 

other two infractions for which Mejia was convicted carry a 

sanction range of 91 to 180 days. Thus, the infraction of 

*.306, "conduct which disrupts or interferes with the security 

or orderly running of the correctional facility," has been 

downgraded to an infraction carrying a possible sanction of no 

more than 180 days in administrative segregation rather than the 

365 days Mejia received.

The scope of our review of an agency decision is limited. 

Capital Health Sys., Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Banking & Ins., ___ 

N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2016) (slip op. at 14). 

"Ordinarily, an appellate court will reverse the decision of the 

administrative agency only if it is arbitrary, capricious or 

unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible 

evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State 

Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980). "Normally, when reviewing 

agency decisions, we defer to matters that lie within the 

special competence of an administrative tribunal." Balagun v. 
10 A-0710-13T4

N.J. Dep't of Corr., 361 N.J. Super. 199, 202 (App. Div. 2003). 

"[S]uch deference is appropriate because it recognizes that 

'agencies have the specialized expertise necessary to enact 

regulations dealing with technical matters and are "particularly 

well equipped to read . . . and to evaluate the factual and 

technical issues that . . . rulemaking would invite."'" N.J. 

Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of

Agric., 196 N.J. 366, 385 (2008) (quoting In re Freshwater 

Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180 N.J. 478, 489 (2004)). "Our role 

is to engage in a 'careful and principled consideration of the 

agency record and findings.'" DeCamp v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 

386 N.J. Super. 631, 636 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Williams v. 

Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000)). 

"[A]lthough the scope of review of an agency's decision is 

circumscribed, an appellate court's review of an agency decision 

is 'not simply a pro forma exercise in which [the court] rubber 

stamp[s] findings that are not reasonably supported by the 

evidence.'" In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 657 (1999) (second and 

third alterations in original) (quoting Chou v. Rutgers, 283 

N.J. Super. 524, 539 (App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 145 N.J.

374 (1996)).
11 A-0710-13T4

Mejia argues his appeal of administrative segregation is 

not moot7 because, should he be convicted of any further 

infraction, the severity of his prior sanction will be 

considered when imposing punishment. This argument raises the 

question of what criteria are used in imposing sanctions. 

N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.17, titled "Disciplinary sanctions," provides 

in pertinent part:

(a) The disciplinary action may be 

individualized by considering such factors 

as the:

1. Offender's past history of 

correctional facility adjustment;

2. Setting and circumstances of the 

prohibited behavior;

3. Involved inmate's account;

4. Correctional goals set for the 

inmate; and

5. The inmate's history of, or the 

presence of, mental illness.

[(Emphasis added).]

The DOC also provided us with a copy of an "internal policy"

statement, ADM.008.000, titled "Inmate Disciplinary Hearing 

Program: Mission, Goals and Objectives," revised on April 28, 

 

7 The DOC has not raised the question of mootness. Even if the 

issue were moot, we would address it because of its importance. 

See Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg'l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 176 

N.J. 568, 583 (2003) (resolving a moot issue because of its 

public significance and likelihood to reoccur).
12 A-0710-13T4

2011, and reviewed in September 2015, which states "[t]he 

mission of the Inmate Disciplinary Hearing Program is to ensure 

that . . . all inmate disciplinary hearings are conducted fairly 

and impartially . . . ." One of the "Goals and Objectives" is 

"[t]o ensure fair and equitable sanctioning of inmates . . . ." 

To accomplish those ends, "monthly reports containing a 

statistical breakdown of infractions, comments, and 

recommendations are generated, analyzed, and distributed to 

appropriate administrative staff." The DOC has provided no 

information stating hearing officers are required to impose 

sanctions based on the factors set forth in N.J.A.C. 10A:4-

9.17(a), or any other delineated factors. 

Mejia was given the longest possible period of 

administrative segregation available at the time based on the 

articulated reasons that his behavior was "disgusting," he "must 

be held responsible for his actions," and corrections officers 

had been medically examined. Mejia was convicted of two counts 

of throwing bodily fluids on another person, which is arguably 

"disgusting" in any of its manifestations. See State v. 

Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 74-75 (2014) (holding "a sentencing court 

must scrupulously avoid 'double-counting' facts that establish 

the elements of the relevant offense"). All inmates should be 

held accountable for their actions, and the fact that the 
13 A-0710-13T4

officers hit by Mejia's bodily fluids were examined medically 

does not in itself reflect any injury to either of them. A 

bedrock principle of fair punishment is that it be meted out the 

same to individuals similarly situated. State v. Moran, 202 

N.J. 311, 326 (2010) (stating our Supreme Court "often has taken 

affirmative steps to ensure that sentencing and disposition 

procedures, whether authorized by statute or court rule, will 

not produce widely disparate results for similarly situated 

defendants"). 

Our criminal statutes provide aggravating and mitigating 

factors that must be considered and articulated on the record

prior to sentencing. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1; see Fuentes, supra, 217 

N.J. at 73; see also State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 54 (2014) 

(stating that "[c]entral to the success of" the sentencing 

"process is the requirement that the judge articulate the 

reasons for imposing sentence"). The DOC regulations include 

factors to be utilized in imposing sanctions, but unfortunately 

leave the use of those or other "such factors" entirely to the 

discretion of the hearing officer. See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.17(a). 

The hearing officer adjudication form has a section for the 

purpose of stating the reasons for the sanction. Prior to the 

translation of Mejia's appeal, the DOC's generic affirmance

acknowledged the sanction imposed must be equitable, stating, 
14 A-0710-13T4

"the sanction rendered is appropriate." For a sentence to be 

"appropriate," it is not enough that the sentence be within the 

maximum limits set forth in the Administrative Code. With such 

totally discretionary sanctioning factors, a hearing officer is 

not guided to distinguish among inmates convicted of the same 

infraction, as evidenced by the articulated reasons for the

maximum period of isolation imposed on Mejia. Without any 

regulation requiring the articulation of sanctioning factors, we 

have no way to review whether a sanction is imposed for 

permissible reasons and is located at an appropriate point 

within the allowable range. See In re Issuance of Permit by 

Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 120 N.J. 164, 172-73 (1990) (stating an 

administrative agency that is performing a quasi-judicial 

function is obligated to set forth basic findings of facts 

supporting the ultimate conclusion so the reviewing tribunal may

sufficiently review whether the actions were arbitrary and 

capricious, and whether they were within the agency's scope of 

authority); see also Bailey v. Bd. of Review, 339 N.J. Super.

29, 33 (App. Div. 2001) (stating this court should not defer to 

an administrative determination unless it has "confidence that 

there has been a careful consideration of the facts in issue and 

appropriate findings addressing the critical issues in 

dispute").
15 A-0710-13T4

We therefore reverse the sanctions imposed for Mejia's 

commission of various infractions in a single incident. Under 

current rules Mejia could not have been sanctioned to more than 

a total of 365 days of administrative segregation. He could not 

have received any time in disciplinary detention. He has thus 

served more than the maximum sanction presently available. We 

reverse the penalties imposed on Mejia, but affirm his guilt.

Mejia raises two other issues in his appeal: the quality of 

the mental health screening and mental health services he has 

been provided in prison, and the related issue of whether an 

interpreter was provided to him to allow him to take advantage 

of the mental health services otherwise available.8 The record 

 

8 Following oral argument, the DOC provided us with a document 

titled "Health Services Unit Internal Management Procedures" 

specific to "Privacy of Care" that states: "For inmates with 

special communication needs staff will obtain permission from 

the inmate for use of an interpreter or telephonic translation 

service and arrange for such services." Mejia's actual mental 

health records reflect he was provided an interpreter for a 

mental health check-up on May 6, 2016, but had not been provided 

one for psychological check-ups previously. In April 2012 the 

social worker recorded that Mejia's "[E]nglish is not so good 

. . . It became clear that he had difficulty 

understanding/communicating in [E]nglish. I was going to see 

him with a translator later today, but in looking through the 

EMR [(electronic medical records)] it became clear that he does 

speak [E]nglish." In January 2013 the records reflect Mejia had 

rejected the offer of an interpreter. See New Jersey 

Administrative Office of Courts, Directive 3-04 (Mar. 22, 2004); 

see also Daoud v. Mohammad, 402 N.J. Super. 57, 60 (App. Div. 

2008) (holding a tenant was deprived of due process by the 

court's failure to provide an interpreter); State v. Rodriguez, 

(continued)
16 A-0710-13T4

provided to us does not allay our concerns with regard to these 

issues. Mental health screening at times was performed through 

a locked cell door in English, during which Mejia was 

unresponsive to the questions asked by the mental health 

professional. Based on this "data" Mejia was determined to be 

oriented in all spheres and not delusional. We do not have a 

sufficient record to review the mental health services provided 

to Mejia against a legally required standard for prison inmates. 

No hearing has been conducted; no experts have prepared reports 

or testified.

Not denying his commission of at least one of the 

infractions from the beginning of the appellate process, Mejia 

sought relief from the penalty imposed. We have given Mejia the 

relief he requested. As is true all too often, the time taken 

in this appeal, including the time necessitated by the failure 

of the DOC to translate Mejia's agency appeal initially, has 

nullified any practical effect of this relief. Nonetheless, we 

anticipate that the requirement for the consideration and 

articulation of sanctioning factors by hearing officers this 

opinion imposes will assure the sanctioning of state prisoners 

becomes more "fair and equitable," a stated goal of the DOC.

 

(continued)

294 N.J. Super. 129, 145 (Law Div. 1996) (reversing two traffic 

violations on the same grounds).
17 A-0710-13T4

We affirm the findings of guilt and reverse and remand as 

to the penalties imposed. We do not retain jurisdiction.