Defense

Given the importance of international goods and materials

to the American economy, closing our borders for more than a

short period is infeasible. Furthermore, with our growing

reliance on just-in-time delivery of foreign goods, even slowing the

flow long enough to inspect either all or a statistically significant

random selection of imports would be economically intolerable.

However, the transportation system, especially the maritime component, remains highly vulnerable to attack or other exploitation

by terrorists. Thus, a major challenge facing the responsible

agencies in the post-September 11 “new normalcy” is to develop

border controls and transportation security measures that

reduce the threat of the national transportation system’s being

used either as a weapon or as an essential logistic link in some

other kind of attack.1 Moreover, we must develop ways to better

protect the Nation without sacrificing economic vitality or overwhelming the Federal, state, local, and corporate budgets.

Information is the key. Our national ability to detect potential threats in or to transportation can be significantly improved

through effective use of information that, to a great extent, is

already available. With sufficient advance information on

inbound ships, cargoes, crews, and passengers, the various border control agencies will be better able to separate the good from

the bad and intercept the bad before it becomes a problem for the

country. This notion—exploiting available information to discern

threats and concentrate resources to stop them—is at the heart

of the maritime domain awareness (MDA) concept.

Overview

Much has been written in the aftermath of September 11 on the

porosity of America’s borders and the failure of various agencies

to share, fuse, analyze, and exploit available information to stop

foreign threats before they enter the country. The resources and

methods available to U.S. border control agencies appear to be

no match for the myriad threats that could arrive from outside

the country. Nowhere is the gap between vulnerability and capability greater than along the Nation’s sea borders. Asymmetrical

military and terrorist threats have a natural gateway into America via the marine transportation system.

In the uncertainty following the September attacks, the

immediate response of security services around the country—the

Coast Guard included—was to shut down the systems under their

control until measures were taken to ensure that additional

attacks were not already in progress. These system stoppages

were generally short-lived because the economic impacts were

intolerable, not only in dollar costs but also in potential loss of

access to the essentials of daily American life. The United States

is a trading nation, both domestically and globally, and relatively

unimpeded movement of goods and people is necessary for its

economy to function. Transportation is our social and economic

cardiovascular system, and ensuring its continuation is vital. The

post-attack shutdowns were a tourniquet to control bleeding but

had to be released quickly to preserve the patient.

February 2002 Defense Horizons 1

Global Trade: America’s 

Achilles’ Heel

by James M. Loy and Robert G. Ross

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

The National Defense University (NDU) established the Center for Technology and National Security Policy in June 2001 to study the implications of technological

innovation for U.S. national security policy and military planning. The center combines scientific and technical assessments with analyses of current strategic and

defense policy issues. Its major initial areas of focus include: (1) technologies and concepts that encourage and/or enable the transformation of the Armed Forces, 

(2) developments by defense laboratories, (3) investments in research, development, and acquisition and improvements to their processes, (4) relationships among

the Department of Defense, the industrial sector, and academe, and (5) social science techniques that enhance the detection and prevention of conflict. The staff is

led by two senior analysts who hold the Roosevelt Chair of National Security Policy and the Edison Chair of Science and Technology and who can call on the expertise

of the NDU community and colleagues at institutions nationwide. The papers published in the Defense Horizons series present key research and analysis conducted

by the center and its associate members.

A publication of the

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

FEBRUARY 2002

Number 7

Horizons
Admiral James M. Loy is Commandant of the United States Coast Guard. He

may be contacted via Captain Ross. Captain Robert G. Ross, USCG, is Chief of the

Office of Strategic Analysis at Coast Guard Headquarters, where he may be

reached at rgross@comdt.uscg.mil.

Maritime domain awareness is the effective knowledge of all

activities and elements in the maritime domain that could represent

threats to the safety, security, or environment of the United States or

its citizens. The objective is timely delivery of actionable information, drawn from all available sources, to the appropriate law

enforcement agency or military command. A properly conceived system could be built so that it actually expedites cargoes carried by

participating responsible shippers, thus facilitating commerce

rather than impeding it.

In an earlier paper, we offered a more comprehensive view of the

homeland security challenge facing the Nation and suggested that a

truly national strategy should be both broad and based on risk management principles.2 We also suggested that—in addition to using the

traditional national security tools of military power, diplomatic influence, and economic power—the Nation will have to use civil authority at the Federal, state,

and local levels in ways

not seen before in 

this country. Further,

because so much of our

critical infrastructure

is privately owned and

operated, significant

action also will be

required from the private sector. We commented briefly on the need for maritime domain

awareness as one of many essential tools for dealing with transborder

threats. This paper builds on that suggestion and provides a more

detailed examination of the MDA concept, emphasizing commercial

shipping and international cargoes, especially containerized cargo.3

Achieving MDA will require all involved to move beyond traditional

thinking, traditional agency boundaries and functions, and even traditional distinctions between public and private information.

The Maritime Threat

America is connected to the global economy not by aviation and

the Internet but by maritime commerce. More than 95 percent by

volume of our non-North American foreign trade (and 100 percent of

certain commodities, such as foreign oil on which we are heavily

dependent) arrives by ship.4 Approximately 8,000 ships carrying

multinational crews and cargoes from around the globe make more

than 51,000 U.S. port calls each year. More than 7.5 million containers enter the country annually.5

This tremendous traffic creates a real vulnerability. Drugs and

illegal aliens are routinely smuggled into this country, not only in

small boats but also hidden among otherwise legitimate cargoes on

large commercial ships. These same pathways are available for

exploitation by a terrorist organization or any nation wishing to

attack us surreptitiously. As immigration controls at the legitimate

entry points are tightened, illegal entrants move into the illegal

migrant flows to escape detection. In mid-October 2001, for instance,

Italian inspectors found a suspected Al Qaeda member hiding in a

shipping container equipped with a bed, a makeshift bathroom, and

other amenities. The container was bound for Toronto, and its occupant, an Egyptian, had with him a Canadian passport, a satellite

phone, two computers, a number of airport maps, security passes for

airports in three countries, and papers identifying him as an aircraft

mechanic.6 Authorities do not know if this potential “terrorist in a

box” was a singular event, but we do know that smuggling of illegal

migrants in containers is increasing.

According to documents and court testimony, Osama bin Laden,

through associates using flags of convenience, controls a number of

cargo ships. One of these vessels was reportedly used to deliver

explosives to a Kenyan port in 1998. Al Qaeda used these same explosives several weeks

later to destroy U.S.

embassies in Kenya

and Tanzania.7 However, ship registry practices in a number of

countries facilitate

hiding true ownership

interests and the identities of interested parties. Moreover, hidden ownership is not just a problem on the security front. For example, in the 1999 Tankship ERIKA oil spill in

France, inability to quickly identify the ship’s true owners hampered

spill-response activities.

Means of delivery is a significant consideration in addressing

the potential for attacks using weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Although a rogue state might threaten or attack the United States

using an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) armed with a

nuclear or other WMD warhead, other delivery means are available,

some of which offer important tactical advantages over the ICBM.

Among these are cruise missiles and smuggling, either via legitimate

trade or clandestinely. Many types of cruise missiles could be

launched, with relatively little risk of detection, from hundreds of

miles at sea by small freight vessels or possibly from larger fishing

vessels. Some 70,000 cruise missiles are reportedly in arsenals

around the world, and, unlike ICBMs, the technology is both affordable and widely available. As to smuggling, millions of sealed containers enter this country each year, only a small percentage of

which are ever inspected.

Technological and economic entry barriers to warhead delivery

by commercial shipping are even lower than with cruise missiles,

and the potential for identifying the perpetrator is practically nil.

Because attribution risks and entry costs are small, some analysts

have concluded that these non-ICBM delivery avenues represent significantly greater risks than do ICBMs, whether the potential perpetrator is a rogue state or a nonstate actor. In fact, Albert Einstein, in

a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt in the early 1940s, noted that

“a single [nuclear] bomb... carried by boat and exploded in a port,

might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory.”

8 The most significant difference between then

and now might be the ease with which even a less developed nation

2 Defense Horizons February 2002

maritime domain awareness is the effective

knowledge of all activities and elements in

the maritime domain that could represent

threats to the safety, security, or

environment of the United States
is able to acquire nuclear devices. The number of opportunities for

surreptitious entry into this country has increased at the same time

that WMD have proliferated.

Container Terrorism

To understand the extent of America’s economic and security

vulnerability growing out of international trade, one must first

understand the size and complexity of that trade and the role it plays

in the Nation’s economy. Of the 7.5 million loaded intermodal containers that enter this country every year by ship, approximately 2

percent are physically inspected in full for contraband, improperly

identified trade goods, improperly packaged or marked hazardous

materials, or illegal weapons.9

Current customs procedures were developed for economic protection. Final papers are not required to be submitted for a container shipped under customs bond until after the container arrives

at its official port of entry, which can be as many as 30 days after it

enters the country. Containers shipped under customs bond and

bound for a final destination outside the United States never officially enter the country for purposes of commerce. Landbridge containers may undergo even less scrutiny than containers bound for

an inland port of entry.10 Under these kinds of minimal security safeguards, a container could be used quite easily for WMD transport

into the United States for an attack. Of course, as experienced in

Oklahoma City and other truck bombings, a device need not be a

true WMD to have horrific consequences.

Absent the kind of threats predicted by recent blue-ribbon

panels such as the Hart-Rudman and Gilmore Commissions11—

threats made real by the actions of Al Qaeda—this minimalist

approach to border scrutiny of trade makes good economic sense.

Certainly, the economic benefits of

growing global trade and the growing

reliance on just-in-time delivery to

replace warehousing were major factors in the productivity growth of the

1990s. However, the fragility of justin-time delivery was illustrated by

recent events at the Ambassador

Bridge between Detroit and Windsor,

Ontario. This bridge was the world’s

busiest commercial border crossing

until shortly after September 11. Previously, some 5,000 trucks crossed this bridge every day; customs

agents had on average just 2 minutes to process each truck. Significant delays caused by more complete physical inspections would

have caused backups and effectively closed the border. The border

was in fact closed on September 11, and the economic consequences were painful, particularly for companies and communities

dependent on crossborder trade and travel.

Prior to the security crackdown, American manufacturers relied

on Canadian suppliers to deliver parts in as few as 6 hours of an order’s

being placed. Within a few days of September 11, the backup at the

border was 11 hours. Six automobile plants in the Detroit area were

shut down due to the interruption in flow across the Ambassador

Bridge. Although the time between order and delivery is much longer

in transoceanic trade, the principles are much the same. Consumers

have reaped the benefits of productivity improvements made possible

by replacing warehoused inventory with in-transit inventory. If security procedures impede trade, the economic impacts will be worldwide

and could easily lengthen or deepen a global recession. If, on the other

hand, economic and other factors result in a return to business as

usual and the Nation then suffered a major attack in which insecure

international shipping played an important role, the resulting shutdown of trade would have catastrophic and long-term domestic and

international consequences.

The challenge for the United States and its foreign trading

partners is to maximize security while minimizing delays. A critical

component of an overall solution lies in taking advantage of the

same information technologies that make just-in-time delivery possible. Easy access to accurate data on container contents, shippers,

consignees, and even near-real-time container location is what

makes just-in-time systems possible. Information generated for

commercial purposes can also be used to support a security regime.

The shipping community and supply chain/value chain managers

from commercial sector giants, such as Ford, Wal-Mart, and General

Motors, should be enlisted to keep national and international distribution networks functioning.

Risk Management

Risk is a function of both probability and consequence. Accordingly, risk management has historically focused both on reducing the

probability of adverse events (prevention) and on mitigating the

effects of those that occur (consequence management). Prior to the

advent of automated information systems, it simply was not possible

to compile and analyze large bodies of data to identify and track

information that would alert safety

authorities to higher-risk ships. Thus,

ship safety programs were designed to

treat all ships of a given type as if they

presented equal potential for an accident, even though experience and

instinct indicated otherwise.

Automated systems now permit

safety authorities to track the records

of owners and operators as well as the

histories of their vessels to determine

which owners and operators give conscientious attention to safe operations. Historically irresponsible

operators are subjected to far more stringent safety scrutiny than are

those with good track records. This historical tracking also extends

to flag states and the classification societies to which various governments routinely delegate their authority to issue ship safety certificates, certificates of registry, and other required documents.

A principle underlying the MDA concept is that access to the

right kinds of information will allow security authorities to better

target prevention and security enforcement efforts. While normal

to the national security, military, and law enforcement communities, this concept is relatively new to transportation safety and

security enterprises, where inspection strategies have been based

more on engineering principles than on human behavior. Despite

February 2002 Defense Horizons 3

under these kinds of

minimal security safeguards,

a container could be used

quite easily for WMD

transport into the United

States for an attack
4 Defense Horizons February 2002

the newness of this approach, it has been used effectively by the

Coast Guard in its program to drive substandard ships from U.S.

waters and by customs and port safety authorities in Rotterdam to

screen and identify suspect cargoes.

The Coast Guard is using vessel history and advance notices of

arrival in its Port State Control Program to target substandard ships

with the stated goal of driving such ships out of U.S. waters entirely.

Every merchant vessel over 300 gross tons arriving in the United

States from a foreign port must provide advance notice of arrival to

the Coast Guard. Coast Guard captains of the port access Coast

Guard and other databases to determine vessel history, flag affiliation,

and ownership history. Based on this

information, the vessel is prioritized

for a Coast Guard boarding focused

on safety and environmental protection issues. In some cases, vessels are

boarded offshore before they enter

port, and, in extreme cases, they can

be denied permission to enter U.S.

waters. In an era of scarce resources,

this approach allows the Coast Guard

to make better use of its limited

inspector pool while also creating incentives for vessel operators to

act responsibly: responsible operators spend less time dealing with

the Coast Guard. The Port State Control Program is largely a success,

as are similar efforts in Europe and among the more developed

Pacific Rim nations.

As currently configured, the Port State Control Program is of

little utility for direct application to the security problem because it

is focused on the ship itself and lacks appropriate security information. Far more pertinent is the Port of Rotterdam’s experience with

container ships. Several days before their arrival, ships inbound to

Rotterdam must provide detailed cargo information to an integrated

port safety and customs authority. Using a number of different

screening techniques and criteria, officials search for indications of

potential safety problems, untaxed goods, and contraband—such as

illegal weapons, diseased agricultural products, and counterfeit merchandise. Rotterdam officials consider many inspection criteria,

including compliance history of a given shipper. Anomalies in manifests and cargo documentation are also considered. Suspect cargoes

and containers are identified and examined in detail as they are

unloaded from the ship and before they leave the port. Problems are

discovered in approximately 10 percent of the containers subjected

to detailed examination. Precleared cargoes, on the other hand, are

given expedited handling and quickly depart the port for their ultimate destinations. Some low-probability containers also are

inspected as a quality control and integrity assurance measure.12

The Rotterdam experience demonstrates the feasibility of using

information to target safety and security problems. Information technologies now available—including artificial intelligence, data-mining

techniques, and large-scale databases—are well suited to this kind of

task. Much of the required information also already exists—it is a

necessity for just-in-time logistics systems to function. Other information is collected by various government agencies as well, albeit in a

disjointed and sometimes untimely manner. The obstacles preventing

U.S. border control agencies from deploying this approach have more

to do with statutory restrictions, Government priorities aimed at yesterday’s needs rather than today’s threat, interagency turf fights, and,

most significantly, inadequate resources.

The MDA Concept

The concept of maritime domain awareness first appeared in

the Coast Guard’s 1999 Strategic Plan, which reads in part: “The

Coast Guard will achieve the ability to acquire, track, and identify in

real time vessels and aircraft entering America’s maritime domain.”

13

This goal was not well defined, however, and much work was required to

refine the concept further. Since the

publication of the Strategic Plan—

driven by the reports of the HartRudman Commission, the Gilmore

Commission, and the Graham Seaport Security Commission14—the

Coast Guard has gained a far greater

understanding of the information

needed to support the MDA concept

properly. In particular, Coast Guard

planners began to understand the importance of having timely

access to detailed information on vessels, cargoes, passengers,

crews, and historical vessel and cargo itineraries.

While these commissions were working, the Coast Guard, in

concert with the Maritime Administration and other agencies,

embarked on the Marine Transportation System (MTS) Initiative.

The MTS Initiative was established to address growing concern over

the ability of the Nation’s ports, waterways, and intermodal land/sea

connections to meet future needs and to improve cooperation among

the various Federal agencies and other entities delivering essential

port and maritime services. As part of the problem-definition phase

for the MTS Initiative, listening sessions were held around the country to allow the maritime industry and others to express their concerns. Some of the most frequent complaints concerned information

collection and access. Specific objections included the multiplicity

of different and partially overlapping advance notice requirements

imposed by various Federal agencies and port authorities; the need

to undergo multiple boardings once in port; the lack of real-time port

status and navigation safety information; and the failure of agencies

to provide Web-based means for providing required information.

As a result of the MTS Initiative, agencies became increasingly

aware that the ability to move and process information rapidly had

grown in importance to the Nation’s overall transportation system. In

a modern container port, more people move information than cargo.

Just-in-time delivery requires in-transit visibility of cargo moving

through the system to reduce inventory costs and improve productivity. The implications for MDA from these realizations are that

much of the information needed for security purposes is already collected by the private sector and can contribute to a high degree of

situation awareness.

Stephen Flynn, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,

provided further understanding of the challenges and benefits in

making the MDA concept operational. Dr. Flynn, who is also an

much of the information

needed for security purposes

is already collected by the

private sector and can

contribute to a high degree

of situation awareness
active-duty commander on the permanent commissioned teaching

staff at the Coast Guard Academy, has studied the security implications of globalized trade and has developed important insights on the

potential threats implicit in that trade. According to Dr. Flynn, heavy

or exclusive reliance on tight security measures at our borders is a

strategy doomed to failure. Realities of global trade preclude ensuring security through border inspections without restricting flow to

the point where the economic consequences would be intolerable. At

the same time, both the United States and other nations retain vital

interests in controlling people and cargo crossing their respective

borders. For the United States, security is the most immediate objective. Broader, long-term objectives may include protecting the fiscal

integrity of an emerging nation’s government and stopping the flow

of illegal migrants, drugs, and other contraband. Thus, while a unilateral approach could be pursued, the more attractive alternative is

to take advantage of shared interests of overseas trading partners to

build security into the international trading system.15

The maritime domain awareness idea, having started from the

Coast Guard’s initial relatively limited goal, has matured. The Coast

Guard recognizes maritime domain awareness as a necessary

national, and even international, capability.

Interagency Coalition

Achieving MDA is beyond the capability of a single agency or

government. The process is simply too complicated. Thus, the

desired MDA capability will require a combination of discrete technologies, interoperability between numerous stand-alone systems,

and the information analysis capability

to take full advantage of that interoperability. The Coast Guard, recognizing

that it was not in a position to achieve

MDA in isolation, presented the concept to a number of other agencies that

appeared to be natural partners in an

MDA effort. The MDA concept was also presented to the staff of the

National Security Council (NSC), who readily recognized and seized

upon its potential.

Under NSC sponsorship, interagency discussions began in mid2000 and ultimately led to an interagency memorandum of agreement

signed on January 12, 2001, by the Department of Defense, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Coast Guard, and the

Bureau of Consular Affairs in the Department of State. The objectives

of the memorandum are to create a maritime fusion center through

extensive interagency cooperation and to exploit the expertise and

data-mining capabilities of the signatories. The existing Coast Guard

Intelligence Coordination Center, collocated at the National Maritime Intelligence Center in Suitland, Maryland, was selected to serve

as the initial organizational foundation for the fusion center.

The MDA fusion center has been busy from its inception, but

the level of activity has increased dramatically since September 11

and will increase further as MDA capability grows. The Coast Guard

has already extended its advance notice of arrival requirement from

24 to 96 hours and significantly increased the amount of information

that it requires. Lookout lists from the INS and other agencies are

now cross-checked against crew and passenger lists, and Customs

and INS are working to place the Advance Passenger Information

System in the MDA fusion center. Some advance scrutiny of cargo

information is also occurring. The analytic processes now being used

are largely manual, but those involved are learning much that will be

invaluable in the design of automated processes to handle significantly more data.

Extending U.S. Security Borders

Detecting a containerized WMD at its port of entry is clearly

not the best outcome. Identifying and intercepting it as far from its

intended target as possible would be preferable. Thus, creating

additional offshore security perimeters (sometimes called extending our borders outward) is one of several objectives in the MDA

concept. This goal is not a question of violating the sovereignty of

America’s trading partners. Rather, the idea is to create mutually

beneficial layered defenses/security perimeters, with the first layer

ideally at the points of origin, both here and there. Another objective is to improve transparency of every key component, player, and

transaction in the larger international shipping system. The United

States cannot achieve these objectives acting unilaterally. Therefore, we should not hesitate to ask our trading partners to participate in a cooperative effort to build appropriate safeguards into

international shipping.

One of the first steps in pushing our security perimeters outward would be to obtain the cooperation of our North American Free

Trade Agreement partners, Canada and Mexico, in creating comparable security measures at all North American ports of entry. Another

step would be to expand existing

trusted shipper programs to address

security, thus allowing cargoes to move

across borders without the kinds of

delays that were experienced at the

Ambassador Bridge after September 11.

Details of such a system have not been

developed, but both point-of-origin requirements and in-transit

integrity protections are likely features.

Cooperative information exchanges between American and foreign customs services should be another key element in the future

system. Confidence in the quality of the information could be

enhanced through regular and continuous sharing, thus facilitating

better enforcement of safety, security, and revenue laws at both ends

of the trade route. For example, declared cargo identities would be

less likely to change mid-voyage, as cargo verification could happen

at both ends of the trade route. In addition to improving the U.S.

domestic threat situation, this could also improve the international

environment. Historically, ineffective border security and lack of

governmental fiscal integrity—exacerbated by smuggling to avoid

customs duties—have been major factors in the failure of emerging

states. Failed states, such as Afghanistan under the Taliban, invariably become security threats to their neighbors and, by providing

breeding grounds for discontent and terrorist impulses, to the larger

global community. Reducing the potential for failure of emerging

states is a worthy national and international goal, and MDA will be

beneficial in efforts of that kind.16

February 2002 Defense Horizons 5

achieving MDA is beyond

the capability of a single

agency or government
address the full range of border control and port safety concerns while

simultaneously expediting business for vessels in full compliance.

These proposals are compatible with not only the desire of the marine

industry for single-point reporting for all agencies but also the elimination of multiple boardings by enforcement agencies. Finally, new

sensor and detection systems must be included to screen cargoes at

sea and in port without appreciably slowing flow.

As also revealed in the MTS Initiative, ships have grown significantly larger over the last half decade, but ports and channels have

not grown correspondingly larger

and deeper. Thus, real-time information, such as water depth and currents, is becoming increasingly

important for navigation safety. At

best, such information might seem

tangential from a security perspective; however, having these facts

would be extremely important for

responding to chemical and radiological incidents in U.S. ports and

waterways. The Physical Oceanographic Real-Time System

(PORTS), developed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration, would, if adequately funded, meet this need.17

Technical Attributes

Maritime domain awareness remains at the conceptual stage,

and many of the technical details remain undetermined. Already

clear, however, is that MDA will require cooperative efforts across

multiple government and commercial systems and entities. Key elements for successful MDA implementation will likely include:

■ a data architecture that transcends agency and national lines to

provide standardized and simplified data for multisource correlation and

analysis

■ a system allowing multiple databases to be accessed by appropriate

entities without violating the statutory safeguards that govern most government databases

■ development of algorithms that would permit machine-based threat

analyses based on large data sets.

Pieces of the data architecture are already in place but are not

yet robust enough to function as intended. For example, ships

engaged in international trade are required to have a unique

numeric identifier called a Mobile Maritime Service Identifier

(MMSI). The MMSI is, in essence, a ship’s phone number for both

the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System and for Automatic

Identification System (AIS) transponders. As a unique ship identifier, MMSI has great potential for tracking specific ships across multiple databases. Another unique identifier is the Lloyd’s Registry

number.18 This number has the advantage of being carried by a ship

for life; unlike an MMSI, it does not change as a ship changes flag

state registration. Neither of these ship identifiers provides 100 percent coverage, but they do provide starting points.

The International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code, promulgated by IMO to facilitate accurate identification of hazardous materials in transport, could serve as the basis for an expanded cargo classification scheme to standardize cargo reporting for security purposes.

A national or international scheme for assigning identification codes

The International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized

body of the United Nations, sets international standards for ship construction, environmental protection, vessel traffic control, and the

like. IMO should develop international standards on transparency in

vessel ownership and the identification of parties involved with or

having a controlling interest in a ship. Additionally, IMO should be an

active participant in developing a system to track containers and

other cargoes after they have been accepted for sea transport. This

would help protect against the diversion of cargoes to unintended

recipients or the substitution of an

illegitimate cargo in a container at a

trans-shipment point. Depending on

the degree of cooperation by foreign

customs services, an overseas presence by the U.S. Customs Service

may be required to verify cargoes at

the point of origin or possibly at the

port of origin. The possibility also

exists of creating an international system for vetting shippers and

carriers, either under IMO sponsorship or as an International Organization for Standardization standard.

The U.S. delegation voiced the need for IMO to become

involved in improving international shipping security at the November 2001 meeting of the IMO Assembly. The U.S. position was

strongly supported by IMO Secretary-General William O’Neil and

received further support from 48 nations. The organization agreed to

add maritime security to its work program, and a special meeting has

already been scheduled for February 2002.

Finally, cooperative foreign information exchange is being used

in national intelligence and law enforcement; this information also

should be made available within the context of MDA. Information on

suspect individuals and organizations could easily be correlated with

information on parties involved with specific ships and cargoes.

Acting Globally and Locally 

Local domain awareness is MDA at the tactical level, at sea or

in port, where security and safety enforcement operations take

place. Data needs and uses at this level are different from those at

the national level, where large-scale data fusion and analysis will

take place. Most locally generated data will be either relatively static

(port facility data) or highly dynamic (vessel positions) and of limited use at higher levels. Local security forces should have some

degree of reach-through capability to source data needed in the

event of an emergency (for example, cargo data while responding to

an accident) and should be provided with warning notices or flags

for suspicious inbound cargo or ships.

Clearly, MDA will require more than honest cargo declarations by

law-abiding shippers. In keeping with a Russian saying famously

quoted by former President Ronald Reagan—“Trust, but verify”—a

significant degree of compliance inspection will be required. Some of

this will necessarily be performed at sea by Coast Guard boarding

teams, but much will also be done in port by various border control

agencies. One possibility raised in the MTS Initiative is of joint or multiagency port safety and security operations centers directing multiagency inspection teams. These teams could easily be structured to

6 Defense Horizons February 2002

MDA will require cooperative

efforts across multiple

government and commercial

systems and entities
MDA Concept: Building Security into

International Shipping

any moment can be critically important from an economic perspective. Cargo-tracking systems, such as container transponders and bar

code systems of the type used by United Parcel Service, are now

being used to track certain high-value cargoes. Bar code systems

update custody and location information every time the cargo

changes hands. Container transponders, in contrast, use satellite

communications and the GPS

(global positioning system) to

generate a position update to a

ground station at periodic intervals. Cargo-tracking systems of

these kinds could be particularly

well suited for ensuring that intransit cargoes do not fall into

the wrong hands and are not diverted from their legitimate itinerary,

whether through simple theft or substitution of a contraband cargo

for a legal one.

Transponders also can be placed on vessels with clear MDA

implications. Two vessel transponder systems, designed with specific

MDA use in mind, are entering service now. Both provide specific

kinds of information, such as vessel name, a unique vessel identification number, and vessel position. Depending on the system, other

information also may be available. Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS)

are being employed in fishery enforcement operations in several

countries. VMS is not the name of a single system. Rather, it is a

generic term used to describe any of a number of asset management

systems using long-distance communications. VMS reporting rates

are set at no greater frequency than required for the specific fisheries

enforcement purpose. Typically, these range from once every 15 to 30

minutes to once every 24 hours. A number of U.S. fisheries already

February 2002 Defense Horizons 7

to licensed shippers, freight consolidators, and freight forwarders also

could be easily developed and used as the basis for tracking historical

compliance with all applicable safety and security requirements. The

Customs Service is planning the Automated Commercial Environment

(ACE), which might provide an excellent host database for shipper

and freight consolidator/forwarder compliance histories. This would

provide a shipper-focused counterpart to the Marine Information for

Safety and Law Enforcement system, which is the Coast Guard database on ship and ship-owner/operator compliance records.

International or bilateral systems for identification of individuals, such as machine-readable passports required under the Visa

Waiver Program (P.L. 106–396), also could play a role in maritime

domain awareness. Similarly, an international identity system for the

merchant mariners of the world would help address both the potential for terrorist infiltration of a ship’s crew and the existing global

problem of fraudulent merchant mariner licenses and documents.

This system would be especially valuable when combined with appropriate national and international suspect lookout lists, such as the

State Department Consular Lookout and Support System and the INS

National Automated Immigration Lookout System II.

The extent to which any existing and future databases could be

merged might be limited. National privacy laws and the need for

legitimate businesses to protect proprietary data will dictate some

limits on information sharing. For that reason, a means to provide

the appropriate degree of access to users with differing authorizations is required. Good models already exist, such as Pennsylvania’s

Web-enabled statewide criminal Justice Network (JNET), which is

the result of an initiative undertaken by former Governor Tom Ridge.

JNET provides a virtual single system based on open Internet

technologies with standards that link information from diverse, seemingly incompatible systems of 16 different criminal justice agencies.

The system enables agencies to

share information but does not

affect independent operating

environments. As required by certain confidentiality statutes, each

agency can determine the extent

to which the others have access to

its data. JNET is a secure extranet

providing a secure publish and

subscribe architecture featuring encryption and digital user/server

authentication certificates. Appropriate and probably extensive security protocols will have to be in place before the intelligence community is willing, or even allowed, to participate in the MDA effort.19

Major differences between the MDA concept and JNET

approach will impact any MDA technical architecture significantly.

These differences include both the level of predictive analysis and

correlation across multiple databases called for in the MDA concept

and the need to deal with literally hundreds of millions of separate

ship, cargo, passenger, and crew data entries. Several of the databases on which MDA will be built, especially the U.S. Customs ACE

system, are far larger than anything in JNET. Thus, MDA will

undoubtedly require use of artificial intelligence, sophisticated datamining techniques, and appropriate risk identification algorithms.

Emerging information technologies show promise in providing

significant security benefits. Knowing where a given shipment is at

cargo-tracking systems could be

particularly well suited for

ensuring that in-transit cargoes

do not fall into the wrong hands 

■ Focus on potential threats—for example, vessels, cargoes,

crews, and passengers.

■ Develop a common, integrated data architecture.

■ Fuse traditional intelligence with information from public,

private, commercial, and international sources.

■ Develop risk indicators based on fused, multisource data.

■ Push security perimeters out, ideally to the points of origin.

■ Ensure transparency in international shipping.

■ Foster active participation by U.S. trading partners—that is,

achieve an international solution.

■ Foster cooperation and integration across agency, national,

public/private, and data system boundaries.

■ Ensure shipper and carrier involvement in building maritime

domain awareness.

■ Provide incentives for cooperation by shippers and carriers.

■ Protect proprietary commercial data.

■ Trust, but verify. Rigorously verify shipper and carrier compliance.

■ Execute cued military or law enforcement responses to

threats.
treatment of these issues is outside the scope of this paper. 4 Department of Transportation, “An Assessment of the Marine Transportation

System: A Report to Congress,” September 1999, 2. 5 Container figures can be confusing. Containers come in several common

lengths, including 20, 40, and 45 feet, but are counted in 20-foot equivalent units

(TEUs). Total inbound and outbound TEU in 2000 was a little over 29 million, both

loaded and empty. The actual number of containers is approximately 60 percent of

total TEU. Inbound and outbound container numbers are equal, with many more outbound containers empty due to the U.S. import-export imbalance. 6 Susan Kelleher, “Big Hole in Nation’s Defense: Our Ports,” The Seattle Times,

October 28, 2001. 7 Ibid.

8 Quoted in Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer,

America’s Achilles’ Heel (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 213. 9 While the overall container inspection rate is less than 2 percent, the number

of containers inspected is higher for certain trade routes. As proposed in this paper,

the Customs Service selects containers for inspection based on a review of available

shipping documents. Concerns with current practice are tied to timeliness, completeness, and accuracy of information now available. 10 Landbridge is the term used to describe the movement of containers by train

across the United States to be reloaded on ships to complete the Europe-to-Asia or

Asia-to-Europe transit. 11 The Hart-Rudman Commission was officially known as the Commission on

National Security Strategy/21st Century. Its reports can be accessed at <http://www.

homelandsecurity.org/research.cfm>. The Gilmore Commission was officially known

as the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. Its reports can be accessed at <http://www.rand.

org/nsrd/terrpanel/>. 12 Department of Transportation/Volpe National Transportation Systems Center

study of foreign port best practices, unpublished results. The Rotterdam visit occurred

in spring 2001. 13 United States Coast Guard Strategic Plan 1999, 14.

14 The Graham Seaport Security Commission was officially known as the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports. Its report can be accessed

at <http://www.uscg.mil/vtm/pages/july2000portspdfversion.pdf>. 15 For more detailed presentations of Dr. Flynn’s ideas, see Stephen E. Flynn,

“Beyond Border Control,” Foreign Affairs (November-December 2000) and “A Transportation Security Agenda for the 21st Century,” TR News 211(November-December

2000), 3–7. 16 As a historical note, the Revenue Cutter Service, one of two principal ancestors of the modern Coast Guard, was founded for the explicit purpose of securing revenue for the newly formed United States. Seemingly, some societal needs endure. 17 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the U.S. Coast Guard,

“Real Time Tide and Current Data Systems in United States Ports: A Report to Congress,” July 2000. This report can be viewed at <http://www.uscg.mil/vtm/pages/

july2000portspdfversion.pdf.> 18 The Lloyd’s Register is, in itself, an invaluable source of technical information

on the world’s merchant fleet. 19 JNET information is from KPMG Consulting, which developed this system

under contract to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

8 Defense Horizons February 2002

have adopted VMS requirements for fishery enforcement purposes,

but broader national security or law enforcement purposes are generally prohibited at the present time.

The other vessel transponder with MDA potential is the Automatic Identification System (AIS). AIS is primarily a navigation

safety and collision avoidance tool and differs significantly from

VMS. First, AIS operates at a much higher reporting rate—as frequently as once every 2 seconds (radar sweep rates)—and is tightly

controlled by technical standards to ensure interoperability across

brand names. AIS employs a relatively short-range, VHF–FM line-ofsight communications protocol that operates without any satellite or

land-based infrastructure. However, land, air, and possibly even

satellite-based receivers can receive AIS signals, making it useful for

MDA purposes. The actual range depends on power output and

antenna height, but ship-shore ranges over 100 miles have been

obtained with the shore antenna located at about 1,500 feet. AIS carriage requirements have been adopted by IMO and will be phased in

beginning in 2003. IMO, however, may decide to accelerate this

schedule. AIS carriage requirements ultimately will extend to merchant vessels over 300 gross tons on international voyages and over

500 gross tons on domestic voyages. Flag and coastal states are free

to set AIS carriage requirements for smaller domestic vessels and

fishing vessels as they see fit.

Conclusion

True maritime domain awareness will arise from the combination of historical data on ships, shippers, and involved parties of

many types; advance-voyage-specific data on cargo, passengers, and

crew; and systems to track the location of both individual containers

in-transit and vessels at sea. This level of awareness, augmented by

powerful analysis, will yield the kind of understanding necessary to

improve the collective ability of the border control agencies to separate the good from the bad—to stop the bad while facilitating the

good.

While there are no guarantees that the maritime transportation

system will not be used to harm U.S. domestic interests, achieving

the level of domain awareness described above will decrease the

likelihood significantly. The MDA concept, solidly based on both civil

authority and practical application of proven risk-management techniques, is a best-value measure for securing the homeland. Maritime

domain awareness is an idea whose time has come.

Notes1 The primary agencies responsible for border control are the Customs Service,

the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Coast Guard, and the Department of

Agriculture. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (P.L. 107–71) created the

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) under the Department of Transportation. In addition to its aviation security functions, TSA is responsible for overseeing

the adequacy of cargo security in transportation. How this responsibility will be carried out remains to be determined. 2 James M. Loy and Robert G. Ross, “Meeting the Homeland Security Challenge:

A Principal Strategy for a Balanced and Practical Response,” in Journal of Homeland

Security, September 2001; accessed at <http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/

Articles/article.cfm?article=22> 3 Traditional Coast Guard concerns—such as drugs, illegal migrants, fishery

enforcement, domestic maritime commerce, domestic hazardous materials transport

and storage, and even search and rescue—are also part of the MDA picture. Full

Defense Horizons is published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy through the

Publication Directorate of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

Defense Horizons and other National Defense University publications are available online at

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/nduphp.html.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other

department or agency of the Federal Government.

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Hans Binnendijk

Director