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STRATEGIC FORUM

INSTITUTE FOB NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Number 78, June 1996

Operation Uphold Democracy:

Military Support for Democracy in Haiti

by David Bentley

Conclusions

Uphold Democracy and its successor-the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)--were successful

for many reasons, but the most salient factors included:

Adequate Preparation Time. Nearly a year of detailed planning resulted in flexible, scenario-based

operations plans that could be switched on short notice. Military units were able to train for specific

tasks and readiness levels peaked for the operation. Such deep familiarity with planning pays offin

increased flexibility during execution.

Unity of Support and Effort. Uphold Democracy enjoyed widespread support at many levels. The UN

provided the mandate, the Organization ofAmerican States supported it, and many countries participated

in both the Multinational Force (MNF) and in UNMIH with the U.S. military as the core and in

command ofboth. Unity of effort was achieved as international, regional, non-government organizations

(NGOs), and U.S. government civilian agencies worked closely with the MNF and UNMIH. Coalition

consensus on objectives (even ifthe means to achieve them was sometimes in disagreement) was a key

factor in the military success.

A Clear Mission with a Finite Endpoint. The U.S. military knew it was not going to occupy Haiti for

the long term, nor try to run the country. Its mission was to get in, dismantle the repressive institutions

that were preventing democratic government from taking root, and create a security buffer that would

help the legitimate government get back on its feet and hold elections for a successor. Unclear,

open-ended missions invite trouble; Uphold Democracy avoided that mistake.

Background

Operation Uphold Democracy was a U.S.-led, multinational military intervention authorized by the UN

to restore the legitimate, democratically-elected government ofHaiti to power. Democracy was, at best, a

weak concept in Haiti, and it had been almost extinguished by a military coup in 1990. The operation

provided the security needed to resume the development of democratic government in Haiti. Uphold

Democracy removed the military ruler and demobilized the repressive Haitian army, making the return

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ofHaiti's president and the transition to a new democratically-elected president in 1996 possible.

UNMIH oversaw these elections and the formation ofthe Haitian National Police (HNP).

Principal Objectives and Keys to Achieving Them

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 940 authorized the use of all necessary means (including

military force) to secure the departure ofthe coup leaders from Haiti, to restore the government of

President Jean Bertrand Aristide to power, and to create a secure and stable environment that would

allow the country to rebuild and advance democratic development. The UN mandate had three primary

objectives: 1) Neutralize armed opposition and create a secure environment for restoration ofthe

legitimate government ofHaiti; 2) Restore and preserve civil order; and 3) Be prepared to pass

responsibility for military operations in Haiti to the UNMIH.

First Objective: Neutralize Armed Opposition and Create a Secure Environmentfor the Restoration of

the Legitimate Government ofHaiti.

Multinational Force Composition

U.S. Forces- 21,000 Oct. 94 Guatemala-134 Oct. 94

U.S. Forces-18,000 Nov. 94 Costa Rica-11 Nov. 94

U.S. Forces- 6,000 Mar. 95 IPM (non-U.S.)- 665

CARICOM- 295 Oct. 94

f

Brown & Root

Bangladesh-1,049 Oct. 94 Svcs Corp.-1,800 !

UNMIH Force Composition

U.S. Forces- 2,400

Argentina- 15

Bangladesh-1,050

Canada- 474

CARICOM- 275

Djibouti- 430

Guatemala-120

Honduras-120

India-120

Nepal- 410

Netherlands-135

Pakistan- 800

Surinam- 36

CIVPOL- 900

Brown & Root-1,800

Long Lead Time for Planning. Military planners had almost a year to develop three possible operation

plans. The first scenario envisioned a non-permissive entry of U.S. forces with a high probability of

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violence between various Haitian factions. This scenario was characterized by a unilateral forced entry

with rapid closure of additional forces. A semi-permissive scenario with a low threat to U.S. forces and

low probability ofviolence among Haitians led to development of a plan calling for a measured closure

of a multinational force. In early September 1994, development of a third plan to better fit a scenario

falling between the two scenarios above began. This plan was keyed to turbulent and changing

conditions, and an ambiguous threat. Mixing characteristics ofthe first two plans, it was the plan

eventually used when forces entered Haiti on September 19, 1994. The multinational plan was

coordinated with coalition partners and other U.S. government agencies. Part ofthis coordination took

place at a special inter-agency rehearsal in Washington, D.C. only a week before the operation

commenced.

In addition to the ability to fully coordinate the military aspects ofthe plan over an extended period of

time, there was also adequate time for the peacekeeping-experienced 10th Mountain Division, the core

ofthe Multinational Force, to provide its soldiers specific just-in-time training for the difficult mission

they would have once they had established their presence in Haiti. The long period ofplanning and

preparation for Uphold Democracy was a significant factor in successful execution which required

unusual flexibility during the initial stages.

International Coordination. Through diplomatic and military channels, a composite battalion from the

Caribbean Community (CARICOM) nations was assembled, under the command of a Jamaican officer.

This force, composed ofsoldiers from Jamaica, Barbados, Antigua, Trinidad & Tobago, Belize, and the

Bahamas, was assembled and trained in Puerto Rico. Naval vessels from Argentina, Canada, the

Netherlands, and the United Kingdom also contributed to the mission. 1050 troops from Bangladesh and

134 troops from Guatemala arrived in October, after brieftraining periods in Puerto Rico. Before

UNMIH took over the mission in March 1995, the MNF had been supported with military or police

personnel from 15 other countries. Critical to the successful employment of other forces in the MNF was

making an accurate assessment oftheir capabilities, assigning them missions where they would be most

effective and maintaining effective liaison needed for command and control.

The Carter Mission. Shortly before the commencement of Uphold Democracy, a last diplomatic effort

was attempted. Former Presi-dent Jimmy Carter, accompanied by Senator Sam Nunn and former

Chair-man ofthe Joint Chiefs of StaffColin Powell, went to Haiti and met with the de facto rulers of

Haiti, General Cedras and the illegitimate President Emile Jonaissant. Late in the night of September 18,

while airborne forces from Ft. Bragg were en route to Haiti, an agreement was signed calling for Haitian

military and police forces to cooperate with the U.S. military and for Cedras and his cronies to retire and

leave the country peacefully. The synergy resulting from the combined diplomatic/military approach

brought about the agreement which meant that the invasion plans had to be changed literally overnight.

While U.S. military forces would have quickly overwhelmed the Haitian military and police, this

negotiated solution saved lives on both sides, made the task ofsecuring Haiti for Aristide's return easier,

and avoided awakening of nationalist anti-U.S. sentiment which might have occurred had fighting taken

place.

Flexibility in Execution. The success ofthe Carter mission imposed a new requirement: rapidly shifting

from the forced entry plan to the recently developed permissive-but-uncertain entry plan. "Real time"

command and control allowed the recall ofin-flight airborne forces before they parachuted into Haiti.

Rules of engagement, already developed for this option during the planning phase, were quickly verified

and disseminated to all personnel. In this dynamic scenario, the value ofthe long hours ofplanning for

three different options became apparent. A common logistic support package for all options simplified

the change. Moving forces into the country quickly and decisively was still important to maintain the

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momentum. The mix ofjoint forces demonstrated the flexibility oftailoring units specifically to this

mission. The staging of ground forces and their aviation assets on Great Inagua in the Bahamas, at

Guantanamo, on board two Navy aircraft carriers and on amphibious ships provided the ability to shift to

the new plan while still forward deployed. The ability to react rapidly to changing situations is a product

ofboth modern technology and innovative joint force training.

Second Objective: Restore and Preserve Civil Order. Iftheforcible entry option had been used, the

Haitian police and militaryforces would have been destroyed. By switching to a permissive entry, those

forces were left intact and it was hoped they would cooperate with the MNF to help maintain order.

There was alsofear that the MNFpresence in Haiti would lead to Haitian against Haitian violence.

USACOM identified threefactors most threatening to civil order and a safe and secure environment in

Haiti: violence, instability, andpoor infrastructure.

Controlling Violence. Violence had long been endemic to Haitian society and politics. Haiti' s severe

economic conditions coupled with the absence ofrespect for the rule oflaw encouraged the violent

settlement ofroutine disputes. The MNF aggressively neutralized sources of violence. An aggressive and

constant force presence was maintained in Port-au-Prince, characterized by frequent street patrols on

foot and by vehicle. It was immediately clear that the U.S. forces were prepared to win any confrontation

decisively. Platoon and company-size patrols were conducted to outlying cities and towns by helicopter

or small boats. Special Forces units established a presence in rural areas. While completely disarming

Haitians through door-to-door searches for weapons was both unrealistic and outside ofthe UN mandate,

the MNF seized heavy weapons from the Haitian armed forces and confiscated weapons caches as they

were discovered. A weapons buyback program was initiated in late September. Over 33,000 weapons

were obtained through these programs. The MNF also implemented a vigorous program to protect

government buildings and routes between them. Bodyguards were not provided to Haitian officials, but

frequent and highly visible mobile patrols provided a psychological deterrent to the use of violence by

Haitians against Haitians.

Creating Stability. The long-term capricious use of authority in Haiti had created a highly unstable

society with no regard or freedom for most citizens. The MNF moved quickly to change the status quo.

Working with the aid ofU.S. government agencies, Parliament reconvened, Mayor Paul of

Port-au-Prince was reinstated, migrants were repatriated from the Operation SEA SIGNAL camps at

Guantanamo, commercial air flights were resumed, markets were opened, and emergency food and jobs

were provided. Creating stability in the rural areas was principally the job of Special Forces. As with the

initial planning, Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien were still considered "centers of gravity" for the

operation, and therefore urban security operations were especially important to achieving the "safe and

secure environment" necessary for the eventual transition to UNMIH. Creation of a new Haitian security

apparatus was begun by disarming the Haitian armed forces, vetting existing police to eliminate known

human rights abusers, and forming the rest into an Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) that would

provide policing functions until new recruits could be graduated from a new police academy. A

partnership was formed between MNF military police units and the IPSF, augmented by the International

Police Monitors (IPM). Joint patrols by MPs and the IPSF demonstrated that the Haitian government

was beginning to function again, but that none ofthe earlier abuses and lawlessness would be tolerated

from any element ofthe society. This clear demonstration that things had changed was critical to

achieving stability.

Infrastructure Support. The infrastructure in Haiti has always been extremely poor. Electric power

was generally unavailable; potable water and sewage systems were nonexistent; and health care was

primitive at best. The only transportation within the country was by boat or poor roads.

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The U.S. military was not given the task to make substantial long term improvements in Haitian

infrastructure. Certain tasks, however, were deemed mission essential and qualified for use ofDOD

funds: street clean-up and basic sanitation measures, landfill operations, repair of critical roads and

bridges, and restoration of electrical power. A Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) was

established to coordinate efforts. Civil Affairs officers, many ofthem reservists, helped restore the

power plant to operation with fuel provided by the MNF. Ports were opened and repaired, police stations

were reopened and new ones were built, and schools were reopened. Assistance was provided to NGOs

to distribute humanitarian supplies and help reopen hospitals. Civil Affairs officers from the reserves

were assigned as advisors to each ministry ofthe Haitian government to get them moving in a hurry.

Each action was calculated to contribute directly to the objectives ofrestoring civil order and confidence

in the new government.

Third Objective: Be Prepared to Pass Responsibilityfor Military Operations in Haiti to UNMIH.

UNMIH was scheduled to assume responsibilityfor Haitian security at the end ofMarch 1995 with a

force ofapproximately 6000. A "safe and secure environment" was a necessary preconditionfor the

transition.

Maintaining a Safe and Secure Environment. With the restoration of civil order well underway, the total

number ofMNF forces in Haiti declined from a peak of 21,000 to 18,000 by November 1. The operation

continued to be executed through four major forces: MP units operating with Haitian IPSF and the IPM

in the major cities; Special Forces operating in the countryside; Infantry forces operating primarily in the

major cities, but deploying to other areas frequently to extend their presence; and Army Aviation units

providing mobility. In January 1995, the 25th Infantry Division replaced the 10th Mountain Division as

the principal U.S. force in the MNF. Replacing the 10th Mountain troops, who had been operating at an

extremely high operations tempo since August 1994, provided the advantage offresh soldiers who could

better continue the hard work remaining in Haiti and give another unit valuable experience in peace

operations. The 25th had undergone intensive peace operations training in the Joint Readiness Training

Center in September 1994 and followed the 10th without a hitch. It was extremely important that

potential adversaries not perceive any weakness during the transition to UNMIH.

UNMIH Preparation. With the experience of Somalia still fresh in everyone's memory, it was

important that this hand-off be well-planned and executed. Many lessons had been learned by the UN

since Somalia, and they were put to good use. By naming a U.S. Army major general as the UNMIH

commander, the transition was facilitated. The Secretary General's Special Representative was named

and the UNMIH staff was assembled in advance ofthe transition date, and trained in the United States

and in Haiti before the hand-off actually occurred. After Haiti was declared safe and secure in early

January 1995, the composition ofthe MNF changed so that when UNMIH assumed responsibility on

March 31,1995 almost all ofthe international forces were actually in Haiti, thus ensuring there would be

no gap in capability to control Haitian security during the hand-off. Of a total of about 6,000 military

personnel in UNMIH, about 40 percent (or 2,400) were U.S. military, providing a strong and positive

psychological impression on the Haitian people that the United States was still actively involved in the

mission.

Exit Strategy

UNSCR 940 had set February 1996 as the completion date ofUNMIH's mandate in Haiti. Some critics

felt the U.S. military exit should be tied to measurable security conditions in Haiti rather than a fixed

timetable, but the use of a fixed date precluded a lengthy "occupation" ofuncertain duration that would

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have allowed Haitians to delay difficult decisions about the conduct oftheir own affairs or to generate

anti-U.S. sentiment. The last U.S. troops in UNMIH departed in mid-April 1996, although UNMIH has

been extended by the Security Council (at a greatly reduced number) through June 1996. A small

contingent ofU.S. forces (primarily combat support forces numbering less than 450) remains in Haiti as

a support group for planned future engineering exercises there. They are not a part ofthe UN mission.

The Future

Haiti's future is not assured. Many problems remain that no external force can resolve. Economic reform,

societal transformation, and political maturation are necessary before this country will be able to reverse

its generations-long decline into ever-worse poverty and hardship. For the first time, however, there is

some hope. In February 1996, a newly-elected president was inaugurated. What President Preval and his

government do to move Haiti forward will be critical to the country's future. What the international

community does to assist is also crucial. Failure to maintain progress in Haiti could negate the military

success achieved during Uphold Democracy.

Lieutenant Colonel David Bentley is a military fellow at the Institute for National Strategic

Studies. For more information LTC Bentley's telephone number is (202) 685-3846, ext. 528, fax:

(202) 685-3973, e-mail: bentleyd@ndu.edu. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations

expressed or implied in this paper are solely those ofthe author and do not necessarily represent

the views ofthe Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, the

Department of Defense, or any other government agency. NOTE

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Editor - Jonathan W. Pierce

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