December 2004 Defense Horizons 1

Defense

Overview

Military transformation— “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new 

combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations”—is on the minds and agendas of everyone dealing with the 

military. Many people talk about transformation; the two authors 

of this Defense Horizons have done something about it. In fact, 

they are among the few who have been responsible for shaping 

and implementing the concept. To get a better idea of what goes 

into this process, particularly the element of joint experimentation that is helping to identify and define the nature of change, 

Defense Horizons presents the views of two of America’s leading 

military officers who have been involved in the process.

Admiral Harold Gehman, the last commander of Atlantic 

Command (before it became Joint Forces Command, or JFCOM) 

and initiator of the Joint Experimentation Directorate, presents 

a framework for how experimentation can advance the goals of 

transformation and clarifies terms and relates them to the tasks 

at hand. He also considers the role of the joint experimentation 

process, uses historical analogies to identify the prerequisites for 

successful transformation, and gives examples of where earlier 

attempts have failed and why. Finally, he shows how joint experimentation can help achieve success in our current efforts by minimizing conditions that have brought about failure in the past.

Moving from the theoretical basis established by Admiral 

Gehman to practice, Major General James Dubik, Director of 

the JFCOM Joint Experimentation Directorate, describes how 

the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign 

is an important catalyst for transforming military capability. He 

describes the “two-path strategy to innovation” being employed, 

involving Joint Prototypes and Joint Concepts and actionable 

recommendations. He leads the reader through how this process 

is working today to achieve transformation.

Military Transformation and 

Joint Experimentation:

Two Views from Above

Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., USN (Retired) and Major General James M. Dubik, USA

A publication of the

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

Number 46

Horizons

D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 4

The Role of Joint Experimentation 

by Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr.

It seems impossible these days to pick up a military affairs 

journal or periodical without running into a discussion regarding 

something called transformation, often in association with a joint 

experimentation program. A sound joint experimentation program 

plays a crucial role in making genuine progress toward the goal 

of force transformation. A clear understanding of the scope and 

concept of transformation and joint experimentation is essential to 

useful discourse. However, much of what appears in print confuses 

rather than clarifies the issue. Before we can discuss the role of a 

joint experimentation program in military transformation, we need 

to agree on what transformation is. Once the meaning of the term has 

been settled, means must be devised to measure the effectiveness of 

a joint experimentation program in contributing to transformation.

Transformation Defined

While numerous definitions of transformation have been 

advanced, with dozens in use within the Department of Defense 

(DOD) alone, we will use the authoritative definition given in DOD 

planning guidance: “a process that shapes the changing nature of 

military competition and cooperation through new combinations 

of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our 

nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace 

and stability in the world.” 

 Parsing this definition, we find some phrases worth noting:

■ a process. That is good. Every speaker at every transformation conference in the last 3 years has said transformation is a journey, not a destination. Arbitrarily declaring where transformation 

is taking us would seem inconsistent with this agreed understanding of the process.

■ new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and 

organizations. That is clear. We know our program must include 
2 Defense Horizons December 2004

concepts (or doctrine), capabilities (or things), people with new 

skills, and new organizational structures. These four areas seem 

broad enough, and metrics can be set for these categories.

■ exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our 

asymmetric vulnerabilities. This seems rather limiting. It does not 

include, for example, noncontinuous change characterized by a 

dramatic “leap ahead.” One suspects the authors did not intend to 

exclude discontinuous change and leap-ahead advances; it is safe 

to assume that breakthrough advances are always welcome.

 ■ to sustain our strategic position. This is clear but, again, 

rather limited.

A program of transformation, then, is a process, without a predetermined outcome, that involves new concepts, capabilities, and 

organizations, and skilled people to handle them. Further, we are 

engaged in this process to ensure that our current military advantages do not erode and to find ways to protect ourselves from new 

and emerging asymmetric threats. 

There is nothing mysterious about this. The reason DOD has 

established an office and an official program to pursue transformation may be the belief that business as usual would not achieve the 

desired result. Neither would a personality-driven process in which 

the most influential member says: “This is where we are going; follow 

me.” That approach lacks intellectual and factual underpinning. A 

more useful transformation process is one that relies on a methodical and scientific program of experimentation. An organization now 

exists for that purpose.

Joint Experimentation Defined

In 1999, responding to the urging of several members of the 

Senate Armed Services Committee, the Secretary of Defense created the joint experimentation program and tasked U.S. Joint Forces 

Command (JFCOM) to be the DOD executive agent. The JFCOM 

charter was framed in a single, half-page letter. Some amount of 

deduction as to the extent of the task and mission was required, and 

JFCOM took a while to make a good start. 

The pros and cons of jointness have been argued long and hard, 

but jointness is at the core of transformation via joint experimentation. While not written anywhere, it is common and even popular 

among some senior service leaders to define joint as the blending or 

weaving together of service capabilities, requirements, and doctrine. 

In this view, nothing is uniquely joint; there is only a merging of service activities that results in jointness. Most observers realize that 

this definition is incorrect, but the concept endures nonetheless.

The DOD Dictionary of Military Terms defines joint as an 

activity involving the services from two or more of the military 

departments. Thus, an Army/Air Force parachute assault to seize an 

airfield is joint, whereas a Navy/Marine Corps amphibious assault 

to seize the same airfield is not. Getting the definition right has an 

enormous impact on the resultant program. It does not take much 

thought to make up a list of military activities that most people 

would consider joint. Such things as integrated air defense, joint 

fires, close air support, finding and striking critical mobile targets, 

theater ballistic missile defense, and opposed assault to seize forward operating bases are so heavily dependent on the coordinated 

and integrated activities of more than two services that the joint 

imperatives can be said to outweigh the service imperatives. These 

are joint operations. Others, such as measures to prevent fratricide, 

combat ID, and combat search and rescue, can be added to the list.

For the purposes of this discussion, we can accept that joint 

refers not only to operations involving two or more services, but also 

to military activities that are uniquely joint. Just as services have 

experimentation and transformation imperatives, so should the 

joint world. Just as there are joint forces and joint operations, there 

should be joint experimentation.

Experimentation

What exactly is an experiment, and how does it differ from 

the training, exercising, testing, and demonstrating that the Armed 

Forces do every day? When JFCOM initiated the joint experiment 

program in 1999, this dictionary definition of experiment was used: 

“a test, trial, or tentative procedure; an act or operation for the 

purpose of discovering something unknown or of testing a principle 

or supposition.” An experiment, therefore, is not training, not a 

demonstration, not a proof of concept, and not a final test of some 

developmental product. One experiments to discover and learn and 

to test a supposition or hypothesis.

In the scientific sense, an experiment and its results must 

be repeatable to have any validity. The same applies to our task as 

well, since transformation demands we give up something known for 

something that merely promises more. Yet we must be sure our innovation works in all expected conditions before we give up our present 

capability, and repetition is not likely to receive support.

Unfortunately, while the dictionary definition of experimentation fits nicely with the military task of transformation, it does not 

lend itself well to the DOD budgeting and programming system, 

since that system wants to know what we are getting for the money 

we spend. To say we are going to spend X millions of dollars to 

discover something unknown is not well received by the budgetary 

system. Early in the DOD joint experimentation program, there was 

strong pressure for short-term results. Such pressure is inconsistent 

with a program of experimentation. Pressure for results suggests we 

know the answer and are merely demonstrating that it works.

In DOD, the second word of the phrase experimental program refers to a formally chartered and recognized enterprise, 

with resources (money and manpower), milestones, deliverables, 

and longevity. There is usually a program manager with clearly 

defined authorities to make the program a success. Normally the 

program manager can trade factors of quantity, schedule, cost, or 

performance margin; that is, if he is behind schedule, he can ask for 

more money; or if he is over budget he can reduce the performance 

requirements. Whether the owner of the joint experimentation program can exercise similar authority is yet to be determined.

Returning to the OSD definition of transformation, it seems 

that the formal definition of experimentation supports the Secretary of Defense’s tasking. In practice, however, the pressures of the 

system constantly work to mold the actual experimentation program 

into something that resembles the well-known models for test and 

evaluation, research and development, or training and exercises.

Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired), served as 

NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, and as Commander in 

Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command.

Major General James M. Dubik, USA, is Director, Joint Experimentation Directorate, U.S. Joint Forces Command.
December 2004 Defense Horizons 3

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Transform What?

A rich history of military transformation going back at least to 

the introduction of the stirrup yields examples of success and failure 

and the characteristics of both. Study of these examples is essential; 

we ignore them at our peril. The lessons of history clearly remind 

us that transformation is not about technology, but rather about 

the elegant combination of technology, new doctrine to employ the 

technology properly, organizational concepts to meet the challenges 

of the opponent and employ the new doctrine correctly, and welltrained and educated people to lead the organizations. Focusing on 

the technology at the expense of the other factors is a mistake that 

has been repeated frequently. Examples that come to mind are General George Custer, who reportedly left his new Gatling Guns behind 

during the Indian Campaign, and Admiral Jackie Fisher, who revolutionized the Royal Navy’s dreadnoughts by making them lighter and 

faster—though the Royal Navy at the Battle of Jutland fared somewhat 

better than Custer when it lined the fast, lightly armored dreadnoughts up 

with the slow, heavily armored dreadnoughts of the Kaiser.

History also teaches us that, in most cases, while the transformation may be completely successful, “the system” will not accept the 

new concept, capabilities, or organization until needed in crisis. Long 

before December 7, 1941, the U.S. Navy had demonstrated that carriers and carrier aviation could strike both land bases and ships, yet the 

battleship was still the capital ship of the Navy and the centerpiece of 

both doctrine and operational plans. Similarly, the principle of radar 

had been demonstrated in the 1930s, but it was not exploited. 

Unfortunately, one cannot be certain in advance which new 

concept, capability, or organization will be needed. All too frequently, 

the measure of successful transformation has been the ability to 

reach down and bring up some new capability in an emergency to 

save the day. This line of thought argues against meeting deadlines 

and producing results.

With history as our guide, what should we be transforming today? 

The answer falls into two parts: first, things we do well now but need 

to do better; second, new things we cannot do now but project we will 

need to do to meet future challenges.

Improving the way we do some of the things we already do fulfills 

one part of OSD guidance: to “exploit our nation’s advantages.” It is not 

difficult to make a list of what these advantages are: strategic mobility, 

precision lethality, space-based and air-breathing intelligence gathering, motivated and trained force, and so on. There has been much 

analysis already of which of these is going to be challenged by opponents in the future and which probably will not be challenged directly. 

A program of experimentation to find ways to enhance our advantages 

and diminish an opponent’s capabilities can be established in a rather 

straightforward manner. It would be an error, however, to determine 

the answer before the analysis has been done. For example, there are 

many ways to enhance strategic mobility, and building more airplanes 

or shrinking 70-ton tanks down to 25 tons may not be the best answer. 

Experimentation will yield the best answer.

Similarly, developing a program to determine what things we do 

not do now but must do in the future can be approached in a scientific, methodical manner. Here again, we must be careful to avoid the 

requirement to produce results on the basis of a schedule or predetermination. This part of transformation is more like curing cancer; 

we have to keep working hard at it, and cannot predict when results 

will be achieved. On the contrary, demands for results according to a 

schedule most likely would ensure failure. 

Tailoring programs to one future is a bad bet. Most analysts 

think the best practice is to hedge our bets by preparing for an 

uncertain future. Hedging means preparing for a representative sample of the most likely and/or the most dangerous future scenarios to 

reduce the likelihood of strategic surprise. Preparing for the future 

does not mean acquiring massive amounts of hardware of every different kind that might possibly be used someday; rather, it means 

gaining the knowledge necessary to deeply understand the nature of 

a range of possible futures and what it will take to succeed. Again, it 

is much cheaper to prepare for a range of futures by experimentation 

than by acquisition.

The Role of Joint Experimentation

Taking advantage of the temporary lack of a global peer competitor to transform our military for future challenges is a logical 

and achievable goal. Doing so by a methodical and scientific process 

helps fend off the favorite projects of influential people and ensures 

as broad a range of possibilities as is practicable. The best course of 

action is a systematic program that looks at all possible options to 

meet the two guidance conditions (maximize present advantage and 

prepare for the future) presents unbiased options with data, studies, 

analysis, and ranges of variability and uncertainty, and makes recommendations for further studies. Just as the services have requirements to meet future challenges, so, too, does the joint community. 

In fact, the joint community’s military challenges are more complex 

than any single service’s. Because our doctrine states unequivocally 

that we are going to conduct operations of the future in a joint manner, the transformational challenges in the joint environment are 

significant. In fact, the problem is essentially unbounded.

It has been said that battle is the most arduous of all man’s 

activities. An individual battle has hundreds if not thousands of 

variables. How, then, to conduct an experiment with hundreds if not 

thousands of variables? The only way is to break the activity down 

to parts, hold as many variables constant as possible, and repeat the 

experiment many times. Due to financial constraints, this process 

cannot be done on a grand scale. The program, therefore, has to 

include alternatives to expensive, grand field events. Alternatives 

include human-in-the-loop simulations, computer-based simulations, and seminar war games. It would be a mistake to measure 

experimentation progress by numbers of field events, numbers of 

troops or aircraft involved, or days at sea.

The direction of the joint experimentation program must be 

determined by what is learned from the experiments themselves, 

not by predetermined concepts seeking hoped-for results. Rarely, in 

the real world of scientific research for answers to hard technical 

questions, does the institution start out saying it knows the answer 

and needs to conduct research only to prove their correctness. A program that states the answer first and then attempts to confirm it is a 

program of test and evaluation, not experimentation. The process of 

experimentation, as noted above, is one of discovery.

If the joint experimentation program is to include experiments 

based on one or more favorite answers to future challenges, it can do 

so only by utilizing the second part of the definition (“testing a principle or supposition”). That is, it should be hypothesis-based: “If I 

can do X, then I will get the Y result I want.” After the hypothesis has 

been established, experiments are designed to determine whether 

it is correct. Field events, which are designed to demonstrate that 
4 Defense Horizons December 2004

a concept works, are not the same thing. Yet this is what the U.S. 

military generally does. Conducting a demonstration to prove the 

value of a pet innovation is a common fault of many experimentation 

programs, not just joint ones. 

In sum, a program of true joint experimentation is an unbiased 

process that fuels transformation, helps to hedge against unexpected developments, and is the most likely way both to develop and 

keep alive the unpredictable capabilities we are likely to need in the 

future. The joint experimentation program can be driven by those 

things we presently do but need to do better and by a requirement to 

prepare for future capabilities we can only imagine. Unfortunately, 

an experimentation program cannot be driven by either calendars 

or output metrics. Programs that claim outputs in terms of papers 

published and books written are doing busy work.

The United States has an enormous advantage in having all the 

ingredients necessary to operate a truly effective joint program of 

experimentation. The question is, will it?

Delivering Innovation: Transforming 

the Military Through Creative 

Thinking and Intelligent Risk Taking

by Major General James M. Dubik, USA

The U.S. military has a long tradition of transformation through 

experimentation, from the Navy’s fleet challenges in the 1930s, which 

gave birth to carrier tactics, to the Army’s famous Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941, which developed the initial doctrine for combined arms 

air-ground operations. Now, a new era of military transformation is 

unfolding. The end of the Cold War, which changed the international 

security landscape, coincided with the emergence of the information age. As new threats arose, new warfighting tools and methods 

came to hand. These developments created both the need and the 

opportunity for broad transformation across all the services—for 

joint transformation.

As Admiral Gehman observed above, transformation is a process 

that enables joint forces to maintain and extend overmatching combat 

power by exploring, testing, and then establishing new combinations 

of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations. Transformation 

ultimately means redefining standards for military success by accomplishing military missions that were previously unimaginable or impossible, except at prohibitive risk or cost. Military transformation is a key 

element of American national defense strategy.

Joint Forces Command has been an important element in the 

overall joint concept development and experimentation program 

for DOD since 1999. On October 1, 2002, JFCOM was designated the 

DOD Executive Agent for coordinating the transformation of our 

nation’s joint warfighting forces.4 As such, the JFCOM mission is to 

maximize military capabilities by leading the transformation of joint 

forces, through joint concept development and experimentation, 

identifying joint requirements, advancing interoperability, conducting joint training—all to support the combatant commands.

A coherently joint, network-centric, distributed force capable 

of making immediate, superior decisions and massing effects across 

the battlespace is the focus of this campaign plan. Employing the 

powerful tools of joint concept development and experimentation, 

the U.S. military can address, and possibly even anticipate, the 

challenges that threaten the security of the Nation and our allies. 

Transformed U.S. forces will continue to operate from a position of 

overmatching power, deterring conflict, dissuading adversaries, and 

assuring others of our commitment to a peaceful world.

The Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign is an important catalyst for transforming military capability 

and forms an essential part of the top 10 DOD priorities:

■ Successfully Pursue the Global War on Terrorism 

■ Strengthen Joint Warfighting Capabilities 

■ Transform the Joint Force 

■ Optimize Intelligence Capabilities 

■ Improve Force Manning 

■ Develop New Concepts of Global Engagement

■ Pursue Counterproliferation of WMD 

■ Ensure Homeland Security

■ Streamline Department of Defense Processes

■ Improve Interagency Process, Focus, and Integration

This campaign aims to develop capabilities and concepts that, 

through vigorous debate, collaboration, refinement, prototyping, and 

experimentation, and to strengthen the effectiveness of joint force 

commanders in the field. Perhaps more important than fostering the 

creation of new concepts, the campaign serves as a mechanism to 

align the efforts of combatant commands, services, and interagency, 

multinational, and industry partners as we collectively develop capabilities and concepts. Finally, the campaign helps create an overall 

culture of innovation. 

Approach to Innovation: A Two-Path Strategy

This campaign employs a two-path strategy that results in two 

distinct products. The first product consists of prototypes—improvements to near-term warfighting capabilities. The second consists of 

joint concepts and actionable recommendations—new approaches 

to capabilities that focus on the next decade. 

To improve near-term warfighting capabilities, the campaign 

pursues a strategy of rapid prototyping. This strategy takes new 

ideas or concepts that originate on the joint concept development 

path, or from real-world operations, and converts them into physical 

form as prototypes. These prototypes are then put into the hands of 

joint warfighters in field exercises as quickly as possible.

The prototype path began to take shape immediately following 

Millennium Challenge 2002. During that experiment, combatant 

commanders and others saw the power of the body of concepts 

being explored. Following this experiment, the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff directed JFCOM to field Standing Joint Force 

Headquarters in each combatant command by FY 2005.8 We have 

been aggressively partnering with regional combatant commanders to execute this directive. We have taken sufficiently completed 

capabilities into the field to get them into the hands of the users and 

incorporated their feedback to make improvements.

Concept development, a period of discovery and hypothesis 

experimentation, precedes prototyping. Concepts are generated 

along the joint concept development path through a series of 

wargames and experiments. In collaboration with service, combatant command, joint staff, defense agency, and multinational peers, 

we are exploring promising new ideas and concepts. We begin to 
December 2004 Defense Horizons 5

refine them through an experimentation process that begins by testing hypotheses and ends with a demonstrated capability. Concepts 

that meet specific requirements are eventually given to teams of 

specialists who convert them to prototypes.

Based on how these concepts perform, we make recommendations to senior leaders that help them decide how to guide joint 

experimentation and invest military resources. Work performed 

on joint concept development is dedicated to making long-term 

improvements to military capability. The focus is on making the next 

decade’s improvements to joint warfighting.

Expanding the Experimental Ground

One of the most significant ways to improve our perspective 

in this campaign is by making every effort to expand the scope of 

participants in experimentation. This ensures that the widest array 

of partners is included in our activities. We call this effort to enlarge 

the scope of our campaign “expanding the experimental ground.” 

Expanding our scope occurs as we conduct prototype experimentation in combatant command exercises, co-evolve service and joint 

concepts and capabilities in what were service wargames (but are 

now joint, cosponsored wargames), and incorporate lessons learned 

from ongoing operations. It also occurs as we interact with organizations outside DOD and tap into “leading minds” around the nation 

and the world, work with other nations that want to contribute to 

military experimentation, pursue innovative methods of testing, and 

explore new concepts.

Millennium Challenge 2002 serves as a good example of how 

expanding the experimental ground works to improve warfighting 

potential. This warfighting experiment used a synthetic environment with a mix of live and simulated forces, along with current 

and projected military capabilities. During the experiment, Joint 

Forces Command developed, tested, and then integrated a series 

of concepts into a warfighting scenario that was based on a set of 

conditions we might expect to face in 2007. Millennium Challenge 

2002 was the most comprehensive joint military experiment ever 

conducted, involving 13,500 men and women at 25 locations across 

the United States.

Today we have expanded the experimental ground even further 

by conducting more frequent small-scale events in addition to less 

frequent large-scale events like Millennium Challenge. Multiple 

small-scale events expand the experimental base both in long-term 

concept development and near-term prototyping. The combatant 

commands, services, as well as multinational and interagency partners, are better able to participate, particularly given JFCOM’s capabilities to distribute joint experimentation activities virtually. These 

events also allow us to take more intellectual risk in a prudent way, 

building a culture of innovation. Finally, these events occur at a pace 

consistent with the turnover of technology, allowing us to keep at the 

cutting edge of technological development. 

JFCOM already has begun embedding prototype experimentation within joint exercises. These prototyping exercises will include 

14 different exercises and span 7 combatant commands. Our concepts are being developed primarily in cosponsored wargames and 

experiments. These cosponsored events focus on development and 

refinement of the current Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC), Joint 

Operating Concepts (JOCs) and other joint operating, functional, 

and enabling concepts. We have conducted three already, and plan 

eight more wargames in the coming months. Our involvement with 

allies and coalition partners has also expanded. We have conducted 

two distributed multinational experiments with Australia, Canada, 

the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. 

We currently plan two more in this series to include NATO, and with 

Poland, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Korea, and Japan as observers. 

Interagency partnership has also grown, with the Departments of 

State, Justice, and Treasury connected on a collaborative information environment. In addition, the Department of Commerce and the 

Agency for International Development will be added shortly.

One key benefit of expanding the experimental ground is the 

productive exchange of expertise and ideas among organizations 

that are helping develop joint and multinational concepts and capabilities. While this expanded vision broadens the span of military 

experts who contribute to the process, it also ensures that joint context is embedded in service and combatant command wargames and 

exercises. Through this expansion of the experimental ground, more 

organizations gain access to the capabilities, tools, and information necessary for exploring new and powerful military capabilities. 

Because of early and frequent collaboration, we are able to translate 

good ideas into capabilities more quickly. This expansion of experimentation and broadening of partners also nurtures a culture of 

innovation that affects the evolution of joint military capabilities.

The effort to expand the experimental ground is more than an 

attempt to move the laboratory to the field. It reflects the desire to 

create a collaborative atmosphere that encourages partners to integrate their ideas in new ways. The Distributed Continuous Experimentation Environment (DCEE) and the Joint National Training 

Capability (JNTC) each supports training and experimentation with 

a mix of actual, constructive, and virtual capabilities.

JFCOM designed and created the Distributed Continuous 

Experimentation Environment to be a world-class resource—a 

sophisticated network of high-tech modeling and simulations with 

a global reach. In an environment that is both virtual and physical, 

concepts can be tested repeatedly and analyzed rigorously from the 

time they emerge as ideas until they are ready to be used by warfighters. This distributed laboratory is capable of conducting various 

experiments, either locally or globally. Because the environment is 

distributed, our partners, the combatant commands, services, allied 

nations, or various agencies may participate in experiments at levels 

appropriate to their needs, interests, and resources. And in many 

cases, they can participate from their home locations. What is especially valuable about the DCEE is that it both supports and links the 

two experimental paths, joint prototype and joint concept. As such, 

the environment serves as a conduit for feeding promising capabilities back and forth between the joint concept development path and 

the joint prototype path. 

In 2004, JFCOM will establish the JNTC to link previously independent service ranges together in a network that can be used for 

joint training and experimentation. When completely developed, the 

Joint National Training Capability will provide a real world laboratory to conduct experiments that assess new doctrine, tactics, and 

procedures using live military forces against professional opposing 

forces in realistic combat conditions. Lessons learned from JNTC 

exercises and experiments will be a principal source of insight for 

generating new operating concepts. The JNTC represents a global 

network of joint training facilitators composed of live, virtual, and 

constructive components. This environment works to meld exist-
6 Defense Horizons December 2004

ing operational and strategic facets of the exercise with live forces, 

creating a more robust and realistic exercise. The goal is to create 

an environment where every level of training is conducted within 

the proper joint context. The JNTC mission incorporates service, 

interagency, and multinational coalition partners. JNTC will achieve 

initial operating capability by Fiscal Year 2004 (FY04) and final 

operating capability by FY09.

JFCOM assists in promoting the transformation of our nation’s 

military, including its warfighting culture. This transformation will 

emphasize a change from a force that focused on the deconfliction 

of service capabilities, to a warfighting force that is coherently joint, 

collaboratively coordinated, effects-based, and network-centric. 

A transformed force has coherent capabilities that are born and 

fielded via a collaborative joint process. This requires that we work 

with all who might have a stake in transforming our military, making 

sure our collective efforts are focused and integrated.

To fulfill this mission, we follow a deliberate methodology. First, 

we receive guidance, principally in the form of the Chairman’s Joint 

Experimentation Guidance. This guidance provides the focus of 

our concept development and experimentation. Through collaboration with other combatant commands, the services, the joint staff, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, and multinational partners, we 

determine which wargames we should co-sponsor. JFCOM co-sponsors approximately two service or combatant command wargames 

every 6 months. These wargames help refine joint concepts, produce 

insights and implications for future experimentation, and guide 

investments in our military forces. Finally, on a semi-annual basis, 

JFCOM will package recommendations for the Chairman, combatant 

commanders, the Joint Chiefs, and other senior leaders. Their iterative guidance and directives drive both paths of the joint concept 

development and experimentation campaign. 

Recommendations to improve joint force capabilities will be 

packaged in terms of the seven critical considerations: doctrine, 

organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities. These Transformation Change Packages may also suggest what 

sort of changes must take place in terms of policy and culture to 

ensure that innovation becomes an integral part of the way we think 

about military operations. One point that we may never forget is that 

our work has a vital impact on the military strength of our country. 

As such, any recommendations must be based on a reliable body of 

knowledge, if we expect senior leaders to trust the accuracy of our 

information and to act on each recommendation with confidence.

Coordination of this expansive partnership falls to a set of 

service and combatant command general and flag officers, who 

regularly align activities. By encouraging a culture of collaboration, 

creativity, and intelligent risk taking, JFCOM can help transform 

our military into a force that meets new and unexpected challenges, 

with a rich assortment of resources and innovative capabilities. 

The Joint Prototype Path

A prototype is an original type or form of an object that can be 

evaluated in terms of its design, performance, and production potential.12 Prototypes—models on which later stages of development are 

based or judged—have inherent attributes that make them valuable 

tools in promoting and sustaining transformation. The process of 

prototyping is integral to military transformation because modeling 

and experimentation are crucial to refining concepts and bringing 

ideas to physical form.

During the evolution of a prototype, four important activities 

occur. First, we conduct experimentation under field conditions. 

Second, we get immediate feedback from users as to what works and 

what does not. Third, we use the prototype in multiple environments 

to ensure the final product will provide superior results in every combatant command area of responsibility. Finally, we prepare the prototype to become an institutionalized capability by incorporating it into 

doctrine, developing a training regimen, and making organizational or 

materiel adjustments. The currently approved prototypes are:

■ Standing Joint Force HQ: a standing joint command and control element.

■ Collaborative Information Environment: a tool and process 

that provides common situational awareness, understanding, and 

collaborative workspace for decisionmakers and staffs without 

today’s time and space limitations.

■ Operational Net Assessment :a product, process, and organization all focused upon understanding the operational environment 

as well as the effects of friendly actions.

■ Effects-Based Operations : a method of planning, preparing, 

and executing operations in which the focus is on achieving common 

effects on adversaries.

■ Joint Interagency Coordination Group : an advisory element 

on the commander’s staff that facilitates information sharing and 

coordinated action across the interagency community.

■ Joint Fires Initiative : processes and tools that improve the 

Joint Force’s capability to apply fires from any force in support of any 

other.

■ Joint Logistics (Common Relevant Operating Picture): a tool 

that addresses the deployment, employment, and sustainment for a 

coherently joint and multinational force.

There are several key advantages to accelerating the speed with 

which prototypes reach the field. Delivering prototypes to the field 

early provides combatant commanders with new capabilities that 

are often more effective than what is currently in use. This practice 

also multiplies the locations of experimentation. Experimenting in 

multiple locations provides us with multiple data points with which 

we can measure the value of new prototypes. As the accompanying list 

illustrates, the joint prototype path improves warfighting, encourages 

continuous experimentation, accelerates transformation, and incorporates feedback from combatant commanders and other partners.

We have made enormous strides in developing partnerships 

with groups that are committed to strengthening military capability. A look at the Standing Joint Force HQ prototype shows how the 

partnership process is working.

JFCOM is committed to delivering the Standing Joint Force HQ 

as a weapons system, completely integrated with its core concepts, 

training strategy and programs, standards, manning plan, and supporting materiel systems. To achieve this goal, the efforts of each 

service, as well as other stakeholders are coordinated, to make sure 

that materiel components are integrated in a manner that enables us 

to deliver this capability on time. As this “weapon system” is established and refined, improvements are continuously introduced that 

come from operational experience or experimental activity. 

For a concept to complete its course on the prototype path, it 

must meet two conditions. First, it must show its value to the warfighter. Second, the concept must continue to improve incrementally 

as it is tested in the operational and exercise environments. Joint 

Forces Command uses a set of standards, or metrics, to evaluate the 

effectiveness of individual experiments we are conducting along the 
December 2004 Defense Horizons 7

prototype path. These metrics measure our progress with experimentation, the value each prototype adds to our military capability, 

and the payoff and risk management associated with each product. 

Joint Concept Development Path and Future 

Capabilities 

While the joint prototype path focuses on improving current 

military capability, the joint concept development path helps us 

improve future warfighting capabilities. To achieve these longer-term improvements, we rely on an iterative experimentation 

program that is based on small, more frequent experiments. This 

program represents a shift from our earlier practice of conducting fewer, more extensive experiments. Our concept development 

wargames and experiments use common scenarios to examine 

specific issues that relate to future and combined joint warfighting. 

Based on the observations, insights and implications generated by 

these experiments, JFCOM makes recommendations to the Chairman, combatant commanders, the Joint Chiefs, and other senior 

leaders. These recommendations affect the development of future 

programs, as well as the course of future experimentation.

To improve joint concept experimentation effectiveness, we 

use four common scenarios:

■ Major combat operations against an adversary with a global 

WMD threat and robust regional antiaccess capability.

■ Joint operations in an urban environment.

■ Operations against a nonstate actor with significant regional 

combat capability, access to weapons of mass effect (WME), and ties 

to global terrorist organizations.

■ Operations in a faltering or failing state that has regional WMD/

WME capability.

 These scenarios reflect current and future threats based on 

the geopolitical and military realities we see emerging between 

now and 2020. This common set of scenarios encompasses most of 

the range of military operations and contains a variety of adversaries, from conventional enemies to adversaries who operate in the 

cusp between military combat and criminal activity. They were 

specifically developed to maintain consistency and correlation with 

defense planning scenarios, observe classification guidance, yet permit multinational participation in experimentation. Each scenario 

presents a range of military challenges, and we have evaluated those 

challenges to determine which sets of issues call for more thorough 

experimentation.

The approved scenarios are conditions in which we investigate 

the major challenges that senior DOD leaders, the combatant commands, and the services have identified as the focus of Joint Concept 

Development:

Achieving decision superiority: generating and sustaining 

high-quality, shared situation understanding so that we can make 

decisions and take actions—at the strategic, operational, and 

tactical levels and within an interagency and multinational environment—faster than any adversary; proper decentralization in a 

global, distributed, and fully networked environment.

Creating coherent effects (lethal and nonlethal, kinetic and nonkinetic: harmonizing military (conventional and special operations), 

interagency, and multinational activities at the strategic, operational 

and tactical levels against any type of adversary—from conventional 

enemies to those who operate in the cusp between combatant and 

criminal; developing adaptive leaders and organizations.

Conducting and supporting distributed operations: planning, 

preparing, and executing (deploy, fight, command and control, and 

sustain) simultaneously in multiple theaters and widely distributed 

points of action within each theater—even if the theaters contain 

very immature infrastructures and when we must operate in a significant antiaccess environment—while denying sanctuaries and 

protecting ourselves from homeland to point of action.

In collaboration with our partners, we further decomposed 

these challenges into sets of joint issues. The joint concept development path, through a distributed partnering methodology, serves as 

the integrating process for exploring these issues.

The Joint Operations Concepts and four Joint Operating Concepts, which include Major Combat Operations, Stability Operations, 

Strategic Deterrence, and Homeland Security together with an 

associated family of functional and enabling concepts is one of the 

main outputs of concept development experimentation. We encourage innovation through the use of alternative approaches and the 

competition of ideas. The concept development and experimentation program uses several joint approaches from the combatant commands and services as a means to ensure the JOpsC family of concepts include “best of breed” ideas. Concept development explores 

alternative concepts and does not rely on a “one point” solution that 

may run the risk of single point of failure or leave the United States 

susceptible to strategic surprise.

The role of JFCOM is to work with those who have a stake in 

this process—combatant commands, services, and other partners 

—to make sure that experimentation along the joint concept development path remains anchored to operational requirements. We also 

want to be certain that this joint approach is truly a joint, collective 

effort, not service-centric, because it is through collaboration that 

we can resolve the challenges facing our military with innovative 

solutions. JFCOM serves as a focal point for experimental activities 

that occur along the joint concept development path. These activities bring the services together using shared scenarios, modeling and 

simulation tools, analytical tools, and assessments.

A joint context is valuable for a number of key reasons. The 

joint context ensures that a joint perspective informs the creative 

process right from the start and allows the co-evolution of service 

and joint concepts. This co-evolution ensures that joint capabilities 

are explored from the very beginning of the force development process. Capabilities that are meant to be fundamentally joint are best 

conceived jointly. Taking a joint approach to problem solving also 

reduces the likelihood of duplicating our efforts and helps reduce 

the number of experiments. This approach also allows partners to 

learn together throughout the process and can improve stability and 

predictability in scheduling as we leverage events for mutual benefit. 

The joint approach encourages an interactive and iterative joint 

environment that integrates the right service, combatant command, 

and multinational and government agency participation.

This joint approach is best exemplified by how the combatant 

commands, the services, the joint staff, and JFCOM are collaboratively developing the Joint Operations concepts as well as the family 

of subordinate Joint Operating, Functional, and Enabling Concepts. 

The overarching JOpsC describes how the Joint Force will operate in 
8 Defense Horizons December 2004

a complex environment within the next 15 to 20 years and describes 

the coordinated development of service and combatant command 

capabilities:

■ Achieve common understanding of all dimensions of the bat- tlespace throughout the joint force.

■ Make joint decisions and take action throughout the joint force faster than the opponent.

■ Adapt in scope, scale, and method as the situation requires.

■ Rapidly deploy selected portions of the joint force that can immediately transition to execution, even in the absence of developed infrastructure.

■ Create and sustain continuous pressure throughout the bat- tlespace for as little or as long as it take to accomplish strategic or 

operational aims.

■ Disintegrate, disorient, dislocate, or destroy any opponent with a combination of lethal and nonlethal means.

■ Conduct deployment and sustainment activities in support 

of multiple simultaneous, distributed, decentralized battles and 

campaigns.

■ Accomplish all of the above in an inter-agency and multinational context.

Joint Operating Concepts further develop key areas of the 

JOpsC. Focusing at the operational-level, JOCs integrate functional 

and enabling concepts to describe how a Joint Force Commander 

will plan, prepare, deploy, employ and sustain a joint force given a 

specific operation or combination of operations. The JOCs will also 

provide a detailed conceptual perspective for joint experimentation 

and assessment activities. Also developed collaboratively through 

this process, functional concepts utilize the JOCs to amplify a particular military function, while enabling concepts, the most specific 

of concepts, are descriptions of how particular tasks or procedures 

are performed within the context of broader functional areas. The 

concept development path creates a set of venues in which those 

concepts can be explored, examined, and refined. The venues are 

especially important because of the competition of ideas that results 

from the variety of participants: services, combatant commands, 

multinational, and interagency experts. 

Senior leader participation is critical to creating a value-added 

product from the concept development path. Senior leaders are 

directly involved in planning and in output. As we plan the activities within the concept development path, joint experimentation 

guidance, operational lessons learned, and other strategic directives 

shape the direction and content of the campaign plan and supporting events. As they did with prototyping activities, senior leaders 

approve the experiment focus for all concept development activities. 

Immediately following major concept development events, we 

report emerging or preliminary observations to senior representatives of the organizations involved and to other invited senior leaders. As an example, following Unified Quest 2003, a joint wargame in 

which all services and several combatant commands and agencies 

participated and was cosponsored by the Army and Joint Forces 

Command, key senior leaders from across the Department of 

Defense were present for discussions on the preliminary observations, insights, and lessons learned.

Approximately every 6 months, as we synthesize knowledge 

across major cosponsored events, service events, joint events, and 

non-DOD research we will provide a set of recommendations supported by experimentation data. Senior leadership then provides 

appropriate guidance on experimentation or investment.

A Path to Transformation

This campaign plan is intended to provide the synergy described 

by the Secretary’s Transformation Planning Guidance to the broad 

area of Joint Concept Development and Experimentation. Success 

of this campaign depends on creation of a collaborative environment among combatant commands, services, and multinational 

partners. Together, we assess the results of experimentation, draw 

insights and implications from those experiments, and develop and 

implement recommendations for change. The recommendations will 

enable senior leaders to make decisions that determine the most 

effective way to allocate resources.

The two-path strategy described in this campaign plan lies at 

the heart of our approach to the transformation of military capabilities. Through a continuous process that integrates innovative 

thinking, experimentation, and discovery, we help convert mature 

concepts into prototypes. These prototypes, if they have value, ultimately make their way into the hands of combatant commanders 

who use them to strengthen their warfighting capability. Ultimately, 

the result will be to assist in moving the meaning of “joint” from 

merely “deconflicting” the forces of each service to creating a coherently joint force.

JFCOM is one part of a large, DOD-wide effort to foster innovation. Prototyping, cosponsorship, alternative approaches, embedding 

experiments in exercises, and expanding the experimental ground 

all contribute to fostering that new, innovative culture. Millennium 

Challenge 2002 started us on the track of innovation. JFCOM’s 

experimental activities over the past year have widened the track 

and accelerated our progress down-track significantly. Collaborative 

efforts in the coming years will build on these successes.

This plan’s measure of success is in generating real improvements in the military capability for warfighters, including our multinational partners. The intended outcome—a fundamentally joint, 

network-centric, distributed joint force capable of rapid decision 

superiority and massed effects across the battlespace—will undeniably advance our defense strategy and, therefore, enhance the 

freedom, peace, and security we seek as a nation.

Defense Horizons is published published published by the Center for Technology echnology echnology and National National National Security Security Security Policy. CTNSP 

publications publications publications are available available online at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html.

The opinions opinions opinions, conclusions, conclusions, and recommendations recommendations expressed expressed or implied implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other 

department or agency of the Federal Government.

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Hans Binnendijk

Director

Notes and additional figures are available at: 

www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/defense_horizons