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AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Air National Guard Fighters

in the Total Force

Joseph E. Lucas

Lieutenant Colonel, IANG

and

Stuart C. Jhnson

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 1

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

May 1996
Disclaimer

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense sc

environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancem

of national defense related concepts. The views expressed in this pu

cation are those of the author and do not reflect the official polic

position of the Department of Defense or the United States governm

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy rev

authorities and is cleared for public release.
Foreword

It is my pleasure to introduce the first Air War College monograp

the new Maxwell Papers series.

 During the last few years, the United States Air Force has been 

volved in an unparalleled number of peacetime contingency opera-ti

Air National Guard (ANG) tanker and airlift assets have been hea

engaged in these operations. However, the authors of this study p

out that the same level of activity is not found in the ANG fighter f

even though many of these units have demonstrated a willingnes

participate. 

Lieutenant Colonels Lucas and Johnson argue that US reliance on 

Air National Guard will in crease as declining defense budget

shrinking active fighter force, and a vigorous National Security Stra

of Engagement and Enlargement characterize the future. As a result

authors contend that it is imperative to explore new options for inc

-ing the availability of the Guard fighter force for peacetime con

gency use. 

Air National Guard Fighters in the Total Force examines current “w

arounds” used to increase guard fighter availability and then explor

method to provide a long-term solution. The study presents and 

lyzes the pros and cons of three possible options: (1) increasing ac

duty manning in all Guard fighter units, (2) increasing active duty m

ning in only a few select Guard fighter units, and (3) moving mo

not all, of the fighters out of the Guard and into the active duty force

 If current trends play out, the US military will benefit from ha

thought about, discussed, and debated this problem. In their insigh

study, Lieutenant Colonels Lucas and Johnson provide a fresh appro

to finding a solution.

JAY W. KELLEY 

Lieutenant General, USAF

Commander, Air University
About the Authors

Lt Col Joseph E. Lucas (BA, Central College) is currently a ssigne

the 132d Fighter Wing Operations Group com mander, Iowa Air 

tional Guard. His military service began in 1971 as an aviator in 

United States Marine Corps. After separating from the Marine Corp

1976, he spent four years working in the civilian business commu

before joining the Iowa Air National Guard in 1980. Colonel Lucas 

flown the A-6A/E, A-7D, and the F-16C. He is a graduate of Air C

mand and Staff College, the USMC Basic School, and Air War Coll

Lt Col Stuart C. Johnson (MAS, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Uni

sity) is currently assigned to the 347th Fighter Wing, Moody Air F

Base, Georgia. He has flown the F-16 since 1982 in a number of l

tions including an assignment as the Air Force advisor to the 1

Fighter Group, Texas Air National Guard. Colonel Johnson is a gr

ate of Air Command and Staff College and the Air War College.
Air National Guard Fighters

in the Total Force

Over the last few years, the United States Air Force has found i

involved in an unparalleled number of peacetime contingency op

tions. At one time, Air Force personnel were supporting five diffe

contingency operations including Provide Comfort, Deny Flight, 

hold Democracy, Provide Promise, and Support Hope. How m

longer the USAF can continue to support this level of activity wit

negatively impacting readiness and morale is unknown.

With the Air Force downsizing from a 38 fighter wing equivalent (FW

force to a 20 FWE force, there is little doubt of problems ahead if 

current pace of operations continues. Already there are signs of trou

One United States Air Force Europe (USAFE) fighter wing comma

blames an increased operations tempo for his wing’s 20 percent ris

child abuse cases, 9 percent rise in spousal abuse reports, and an 

percent rise in alcohol abuse.1 While these figures represent only 

fighter wing, they highlight some of the potential problems that ma

encountered by other active duty units as they too struggle unde

ever increasing workload. These problems and a growing belief 

long-term readiness may soon suffer if the workload is not redu

convinced Defense Secretary William Perry to direct a greater role 

the Air National Guard in peacetime contingency operations.2

The Air National Guard is no stranger to peacetime contingency and 

time operations. Guard tanker and airlift aircraft, along with hundred

other guard personnel, are already heavily engaged around the w

supporting contingency taskings. In fact, it would be difficult for 

USAF to support these operations without the active involvemen

Guard tanker and airlift assets. The contributions of these Guard air

and people, in many ways, substantiate the importance the Air Force 

long placed in the total force concept. Unfortunately, the same leve

activity cannot be found in the Air National Guard fighter force, e

though many of these units have demonstrated a willingness to particip

In fact, the contributions of these fighter assets to peacetime operat

are rather small considering there are over 800 fighter aircraft in the 

National Guard system.3 For instance, in 1993 the entire Air Nati

Guard deployed only 22 fighters to support peacetime contingency 

erations. In 1994 only 26 Guard fighters deployed overseas for con

gency support.4 Even though the level of Guard fighter involvem

grew in 1994, the total number of fighters deployed points to a ser
lack of Guard fighter involvement in the total force concept. While 

level of activity may have been adequate in the past, the time is rap

approaching when the same level of support will no longer suffic

meeting our national security needs.

The Bottom-Up Review fighter force of 13 active and seven reserve 

Guard and one reserve) FWEs will lead to a greater role for G

fighters in peacetime contingency operations.5 A 1994 RAND s

estimated that by 1999 the Guard may operate up to half of the 

based fighter force.6 In addition, by the year 2000, almost 49 percen

the overall total force end strength will reside in the Guard and res

components, a jump of almost 14 percent from the height of the 

war.7 With this projected mix rapidly approaching, it becomes imp

tive to explore new options for increasing the use of Guard fighter as

in peacetime operations.

This paper explores some of the options for increasing the availab

of Guard fighter units for peacetime contingency use. To gain a b

understanding of the availability issue, this paper first provides a b

historical background on the evolution of the Guard fighter force a

with an overview of the rules and laws which govern access to the fo

Examining the historical contributions of this force sets the stage 

introducing some of the changes needed if the Air National Guard 

better support a National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enla

ment.

Next, the paper examines two issues which limit the availability of 

Guard fighter force: the traditional manning structure found in m

Guard fighter squadrons, and the impact of frequent military servic

the traditional or part-time force. In addition, this chapter also br

discusses four Department of Defense and National Guard Bu

“work arounds” designed to improve the availability of the G

fighter force.

Finally, this paper ends with an examination of three possible opt

for increasing the availability of Guard fighters for peacetime use. 

pros and cons of each option are addressed along with a prediction o

anticipated political and military support. While there are no “s

bullet” solutions, these options at least present three possible alternative

addressing and solving this complicated issue.

Background

Since its inception in 1946, the Air National Guard has participated in e

major regional conflict, including several contingency operations. 
section examines three of those conflicts—the Korean War, the Viet

War, and Desert Storm—which influenced the evolution of this un

force.

The section also reviews the three basic options for gaining access to 

Guard force in both peace and war. The options are a declaration 

national emergency that leads to a full mobilization, an involun

call-up (200,000 personnel), and the use of volunteers.

Korean War

During the Korean War, 66 of the Air Guard’s 92 tactical flying u

were called to active duty.8 While most of the units remained within 

United States or Europe, two fighter wings deployed to the Far 

where they saw extensive service. This first-time mobilization of the 

Guard was not without problems. For the most part, the lack of mod

ized equipment, sufficient funding, and training support limited the 

fectiveness of the federalized force. However, the war highlighted 

eral of the deficiencies inherent in the mobilization policy surroun

the use of the Guard fighter force. Foremost among these deficien

was the absence of rules governing partial mobilizations. The lac

mobilization guidance led to many guardsmen “being activated on a

hoc basis to fill critical skill shortages” without regard to the com

capability or morale of the affected Guard units.9

After the war, Congress enacted several measures to correct training 

mobilization shortfalls. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 addre

partial mobilization concerns by creating three reserve classes, re

standby, and retired. These reserve classes provided for different leve

readiness and training based on their specific mobilization requirement

addition, between 1950 and 1960 appropriations for the Air Guard m

than doubled, helping the Air Guard to increase its training and exe

tempo.10 The increased funding also allowed the Air National Guar

begin upgrading many of its units into modern aircraft like the F-100 

F-104. By 1960, all Guard fighter aircraft were jet powered.11

Vietnam War

The Vietnam War once again found the Air National Guard deploye

Southeast Asia. Guard units from Denver, Sioux City, Albuquer

and Niagara Falls flying F-100 aircraft flew 24,124 sorties and 38

combat hours in the theater.12 Unlike previous Guard actions w

served to highlight shortfalls in training and equipment, Vietnam d

onstrated the growing capabilities embedded in this militia force. 
George S. Brown testifying before the US Senate stated “those [Gu

were the best F-100 squadrons in the field. The aircrews were a 

older, but they were more experienced, and the maintenance pe

were also more experienced than regular units.”13

While it is shortsighted to define the role of the Air Guard in the Viet

War with this one quote, it is important to note that this was perhaps 

first time senior Air force leadership had publicly recognized Guard f

ers as being on par or better than their active duty counterparts. The V

nam War proved that a well-trained militia force, flying modern airc

could perform just as well as the active duty force. What is interestin

note is that another Air Force general echoed these same sentiments alm

17 years later in Southwest Asia.

Desert Storm

Although Desert Shield and Desert Storm involved the largest G

mobilization since the Korean War, only a few Guard fighter units w

called to active duty. Two F-16 close air support units and one RF

reconnaissance unit were federalized and deployed in support of De

Shield/Storm. The performance of these Guard fighters during the 

served to highlight just how far the Guard fighter force had progre

since the early days of the Korean War. Lt Gen Charles Horner 

served that the Air Force Reserve and Guard “did not lose a single p

to enemy fire and proved a match for their active duty counterp

They performed very well. I’m absolutely truthful about this, I ca

tell the difference between active, Guard, and reserve. And that’s the 

it’s supposed to be.”14

The previous three conflicts trace the evolution of the Guard from w

was once considered a “flying club” to the efficient, well-trained f

of today. It is a force that has become an important element of the 

force policy. It is also a force that will play a greater role in meeting 

country’s future security needs. As their role grows, it becomes incr

ingly important for planners to understand the rules which govern 

access and employment of these fighter forces in both peace and war

Accessibility

How does the Air Force gain access to the Air National Guard in pe

time contingency and wartime situations? The answer comes in t

parts.
The first part is a declaration of a national emergency which leads to a 

mobilization. The second is the involuntary or 200,000 personnel cal

The third is volunteerism.

Full Mobilization

The simplest option for gaining access to the Guard is a declaration 

national emergency which leads to a full mobilization. Both the p

dent and Congress have legal, vested powers to activate reserve 

National Guard forces in a national emergency. Declaring a nati

emergency gives the commander in chief the option of utilizing a

this country’s military forces with regard to federal-state agreements

However, a declaration of war or the declaration of a national em

gency carry very serious consequences that may not be appropriate 

operations in the post-cold war environment, as seen by the absence 

declaration during Desert Storm. The Department of Defense and 

Congress recognized and addressed the limited use of the full mobi

tion option in two separate statutes. The first addresses an involun

reserve call-up and the second governs the use of reserve volunteers

Involuntary Call-Up

The involuntary call-up, created in 1976 under Title 10 United S

Code (USC), is the second option for gaining access to the Guard.15 

initial law authorizes the president to call up 50,000 reservists in 

sponse to crisis situations without a formal declaration of war. The 

limit for the activation was initially set at 90 days with the presi

having the option of extending the call-up for an additional 90 day

the interest of national security.16 Subsequent legislation changed 

authorization to 200,000 and the time limit to 270 days.17 

While the call-up authority is specifically vested in the president

Congress has the authority under the War Powers Act to override 

call-up and order the withdrawal of the forces within 60 days.18 Sinc

passage, the only time the involuntary call-up option has been used 

when President George Bush ordered 200,000 reservists to active 

for 180 days in support of Desert Shield/Storm.

Volunteerism

The third and most used option for gaining access to the Guard, e

cially in the Air Force, is volunteerism. During the early stages of m

contingency operations, many of the critical skill positions neede

support the operation are filled with reserve volunteers. Desert Shie
a perfect example as most of the early reserve support was based 

volunteers. During peacetime, the governor of a state is the comma

in chief of the state’s guard units. Title 10 USC 672(d) states “the A

National Guard or the Air National Guard may not be ordered to a

duty under this subsection without the consent of the governor or o

appropriate authority of the State or Territory, Puerto Rico, or the 

trict of Columbia, whichever is concerned.”19 The Montgomery am

ment added in subparagraph (f) the following: “The consent of a go

nor described in subsections (b) and (d) may not be withheld (in w

or in part) with regard to active duty outside the United States

territories, and its possessions, because of any objection to the loca

purpose, type or schedule of such active duty.”20 The amendment 

been tested and upheld in the US Supreme Court.21 The governor 

has the option of refusing to release volunteers for federal service, h

ever, that refusal must be on the basis of state militia requirements. 

major drawback to the volunteer approach is the potential loss of 

critical occupation specialties and the subsequent impact this loss c

have on units if they are called to active duty either through a 

mobilization or an involuntary (200,000 personnel) call-up.

In September 1993, a senior working group chaired by Deborah 

assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs, addressed the m

issues involved in gaining access to the reserves in the post-cold 

environment. One of the results from this working group was a po

statement defining how the Department of Defense would gain acce

the reserve forces. The policy stated that for major regional conflic

domestic emergencies, access to reserve component units and perso

would be through an involuntary call-up. For lesser emergencies and pe

time contingencies, maximum consideration would be given to volun

access before seeking an involuntary call-up.22

This section provides a brief overview of how the Air National Guard fig

force has evolved into the effective force of today. The performance o

force during Desert Storm is indicative of the level of capability fo

throughout the Guard fighter community. While there are three basic opt

for gaining access to the Guard force, two of the options—a declaratio

a national emergency which leads to a full mobilization, and an involun

call-up—will play little if any role in peacetime operations. The que

remains, will a volunteer force composed primarily of part-time personne

available to meet this country’s peacetime contingency needs.
Availability

Declining defense budgets, a shrinking active force, and a vigo

National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement will all c

bine to increase this nation’s reliance on Air National Guard figh

Indeed, the issue of availability is rapidly developing into one of 

single greatest problems facing the Guard in the 1990s.

For this paper, the availability issue is narrowly defined around 

question of how to increase the level of Guard fighter involvemen

peacetime operations without negatively impacting the unique mak

of this predominantly part-time force. The first step in addressing 

availability issue is an understanding of the barriers which have c

bined to limit the availability of this important fighter asset. Forem

among these barriers are the limitations associated with the traditi

guardsman or the part-time manning structure found in most G

fighter squadrons, and the problems associated with tasking a f

composed primarily of personnel with full-time civilian jobs.

Manning Limitations

The Guard’s reliance on a traditional workforce, which includes 

proximately 75 percent of Guard personnel, is one of the primary b

ers to increasing fighter availability.23 For the most part, the Gua

traditional manning structure is more suited to the demands of a 

war environment rather than the contingency demands of today.

During the cold war, with the exception global warfare, the Air F

expected to meet most contingency operations with its large stan

fighter force.24 Beyond an air defense role, there was little nee

involve Guard fighter assets in day-to-day peacetime operations o

gional contingencies. Without heavy mobilization demands, G

fighter units could operate quite effectively with only about 32 per

of its workforce on full-time status.25

While this type of arrangement worked well in the past, it may p

inadequate in meeting the demands of the future. A fighter force c

posed primarily of traditional guardsmen with full-time civilian c

mitments has and will continue to create challenges for peacetime us

Impact on Traditional Guardsmen

The second barrier to increasing the availability of Guard fighter

volves striking a balance between increased military service and civ

employment responsibilities. There is a limit to how often the Air F

can task a force composed primarily of traditional personnel befo
begins to affect their livelihood in the civilian community. During 

Gulf War, 55 percent of the traditional members reported an inc

loss during their mobilization period.26 Tasking these traditional m

bers with more military service, with a corresponding loss of civ

income, will inevitably lead some to “vote with their feet.” Maj 

John J. Closner, chief of the Air Force Reserve, expressed similar 

cerns during congressional testimony in 1993. Major General Clo

stated, “I’m concerned that we may be demanding too much—not 

from reservists, but also from their family members and civilian 

ployers. If we commit our people to more than they can reason

provide, retention could drop drastically.”27 Maj Gen Phil Killey, 

director of the Air National Guard echoed these same sentiments w

he stated, “any shift in magnitude of the active duty structure cha

should be done in an orderly fashion to avoid damaging or destro

the capability we are trying to preserve.”28

Increasing military demands upon the traditional workforce could 

lead to a lessening of employer support within the business commu

Deborah Lee, the assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs, 

already reported an increase in calls from employers complaining a

“excessive duty” rising from 2.3 percent pre-Desert Storm, to 11 per

in 1993.29 According to the Reserve Officers Association, employ

reactions to increased use of National Guard and reserve troops a

major worry. One official stated, “there is a genuine fear that emplo

will find ways to fire employees who are absent too often for res

duty.”30 Unless changes are made, the Air Force and Air National G

can expect to see the impact on the traditional force get worse as 

role of the Guard fighter force grows in peacetime operations.

A heavy reliance on a traditional workforce more suited to a less 

manding operations tempo and the negative impact frequent mil

service has on the traditional guardsman have both combined to l

the availability and involvement of Air National Guard fighters 

peacetime use. Reacting to these two barriers, the Air National Gua

exploring several different work arounds designed to increase the l

of peacetime Guard fighter support while at the same time minimi

the impact on the traditional workforce.

Work Arounds

In this paper, a work around is a legal means of getting the job d

under existing statutes and agreements. The result will supply the 

partment of Defense with the forces needed, but the avenue for achi
ment may be cumbersome or have ramifications that may have t

addressed in the future.

The Department of Defense and the Air National Guard have im

mented or proposed the following four work arounds to improve G

fighter availability during peacetime operations. They are the deve

ment of rainbow units, greater reliance on full-time personnel, better 

of annual training to support real-world taskings, and steps to relieve 

financial impact on the traditional guardsmen and their civilian emp

ers.

Rainbow Units

Unlike airlift and tanker aircraft which normally fly short time fra

single-ship missions out of home station, fighter units usually de

with more aircraft and personnel for longer periods of time. The 

creased length of these deployments makes it harder to include 

traditional guardsman in peacetime fighter contingency deploym

without creating undue hardships on their civilian jobs. Based on 

limitation, the Guard has supported some contingency fighter task

by relying on rainbow units composed of volunteers from several di

ent fighter groups. For example, to support a Reserve and Guard dep

ment of 12 A-10s to Aviano, Italy (Deny Flight), the Guard used perso

from seven different fighter groups.31 The Guard also used personnel 

equipment from four different fighter groups to support an F-16 dep

ment for Operation Provide Comfort II.32 Supporting contingency t

ings with rainbow units gives the Guard the luxury of spreading 

burden of support among several different fighter groups. Spreading 

support allows the Guard to garner a greater number of volunteers 

full-time personnel to man these units, effectively minimizing the o

all impact on the traditional workforce.

While rainbow units have had some limited success, they are not w

out problems. Some of the problems associated with these units inv

the establishment of clear command lines and relationships, the se

tion of maintenance and aircraft resources, and legal problems s

ming from the mixing of Reserve and Guard personnel and equipm

in an active duty command structure. Finally, and most important

rainbow unit is not the way the Guard should be organized for war.

As demonstrated during the Korean War and Desert Storm, a Guard fig

squadron operates best when it trains together, deploys together, 

fights together. Taking volunteers and equipment from several diffe

organizations to form a rainbow unit is a way of business the Nati

Guard Bureau has fought against for years, but apparently succumbe
out of necessity. Given the fact some of these peacetime operations c

escalate into open conflicts, this type of organization is not how the G

should be prepared to fight. While rainbow units did a good job suppo

Provide Comfort II and Deny Flight operations, the fact remains they ar

ad hoc arrangement that can be cumbersome to organize and difficu

maintain.

Increased Use of Full-Time Personnel

Another work around designed to improve availability is placin

greater reliance upon the full-time work force to meet some peace

taskings. Two areas within the Guard fighter force have seen partic

emphasis. One is the rainbow units just discussed and the other is in 

level of full-time manning found in the 124th Fighter Group (F

Boise, Idaho. In the 124 FG, only one of two organizations still fl

the F-4G Wild Weasel, almost 44 percent of the pilots are on full-

status compared to about 25 percent for the rest of the Guard fig

force.33 The high percentage of full-time personnel has not only 

creased the 124 FG’s availability but has also reduced the impac

increased military taskings on its traditional guardsmen. When the 

FG deployed six F-4Gs to Southwest Asia in 1993, 73 percent of 

deployed personnel were full-time personnel.34 Given the length of 

deployment (six months), it is highly unlikely the 124 FG could h

supported this mission without such a large percentage of full-time 

sonnel. The high level of full-time manning gave the 124 FG c

mander much greater flexibility in fulfilling mission requirements.

Increased full-time manning in the 124 FG had a definite impact on 

makeup of the personnel deployed to Southwest Asia in 1993. Howe

for a variety of reasons, the same percentage of full-time manning is 

available to other fighter units. While the Air National Guard 

squadron at McConnell AFB, Kansas, does have 100 percent o

aircrew force on full-time status, this is the exception rather than 

rule. While the contributions of the full-time workforce are impo

and critical to the availability issue, that workforce still only constit

approximately 32 percent of the personnel assigned to a Guard fig

squadron.35 If significant progress is expected on the availability is

the Air Force and the Air National Guard must find some way to 

crease full-time manning and the involvement of the traditional w

force while at the same time limiting the impact on civilian jobs 

responsibilities.
Better Use of Training Time

One work around designed to increase the involvement of the traditi

workforce is changing the way Guard fighter units train and deploy 

peacetime operations. The first step in the process is to combine, when

feasible, peacetime taskings with annual training requirements. B

use of training time has become a key ingredient to Departmen

Defense efforts to improve Guard training realism and readiness. 

cording to Secretary Perry, “instead of drilling at home in simul

scenarios, citizen soldiers would fulfill their annual training requ

ments by participating in real-world missions.”36 Using the two w

of annual training to support real-world operations will not only 

crease the involvement of the traditional workforce but may, in m

instances, improve the overall quality of annual training. For exam

at a theater equipment and maintenance site at Fort Kobbe, Pana

Guard personnel are using their annual training to repair enginee

equipment and to order essential supplies. 37 These personnel, accor

to Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) commander in chief (CIN

Gen Barry McCaffrey, are “highly motivated and well-trained” 

“bring unique capabilities we depend on.”38 Accomplishing these 

world tasks during their annual training not only allows these G

personnel to put their job skills into practice but also provides valu

mission support to an overseas CINC.

The second step is to provide Guard units with as much advanced w

ing as possible for real-world deployments. Providing sufficient no

of deployments will enable civilian employers and traditional mem

to better plan and prepare for their absence. Having sufficient tim

prepare for a deployment will also allow units to tailor their trai

programs to meet the expected tasking. It also gives units greater f

bility in planning and scheduling training days to either prepare for 

deployment or to “husband” for use during the deployment. Fin

increased warning time will give Guard personnel the opportunit

arrange for family support—support that may not be available wit

adequate prior notice.

The last step is the implementation of a flexible and liberal rotation po

during peacetime deployments. Allowing fighter units to rotate traditi

personnel every two to four weeks during peacetime contingencies 

help decrease the impact long deployments have on the traditional w

force.

Creative scheduling of annual training requirements, increased notic

planned deployments, along with a frequent and liberal rotation po

will help reduce the negative impact contingency support can hav
the traditional workforce. Unfortunately, the unique training requ

ments of the fighter force, coupled with the unpredictability of con

gency operations, can combine to reduce the effectiveness of the 

posed changes.

Increased use of annual training to support contingency taskings 

changing the way Guard units are deployed may not be as painless o

easy as it appears. The above changes do not address problems ass

ated with operations that provide little, if any, advance notice like 

unexpected movement of Iraqi troops into southern Iraq in Oct

1994. Nor do the changes address those operations in which it is 

feasible to rotate personnel every two to four weeks due to a lac

airlift, prohibited cost, in-country training time, or force integration 

quirements.

In addition, using annual training to support peacetime operations 

not be the best long-term use of this valuable training time for s

fighter organizations. For instance, the operating requirements of s

peacetime contingency operations may severely limit a fighter sq

ron’s training opportunities. For example, the redundancy in meeti

continuous air-to-air contingency may impact a pilot’s currency in 

to-ground training. As a result, many pilots have returned from con

gency deployments less combat capable than they were before they 

ployed.

While an active duty squadron has the time and opportunity to “spin 

up” after a deployment, a comparable Guard squadron is somewhat lim

in its ability to recoup lost training opportunities due to the limited a

ability of its traditional force. Over time, the continuous use of an

training to support peacetime operations could negatively impact the o

all combat capability of some fighter units.

Civilian Job Considerations

The last work around for improving Guard availability involves sev

proposed programs designed to reduce the financial impact on the tr

tional guardsman and his or her civilian employers during time

military service. Even though there are several laws protecting G

personnel from job discrimination during times of military service, t

are no laws addressing the financial penalties many traditional gua

men and businesses incur during this time. For some small businesse

can be a serious financial burden to support an employee’s increased m

tary commitment. To alleviate some of this burden, the Departmen

Defense is proposing a tax credit for civilian employers and self-

ployed Guard personnel. During times of military service, indivi
businesses could be eligible for a tax break for up to two consecu

calendar years.39 This tax credit would help offset the financial pen

many businesses incur when their employees are called to active 

service.

A second program designed to alleviate financial burdens involves 

veloping an insurance program to offset individual income lost du

extended periods of active duty. The insurance protection would 

vide between $1,000 and $5,000 per month to participating perso

during their periods of active duty service.40

In summary, a manning structure suited for limited use, coupled 

the civilian obligations of its traditional workforce have combine

limit the availability of the Guard fighter force. The developmen

rainbow units, increased use of full-time personnel, creative schedu

and use of annual training, and initiatives designed to relieve the fi

cial impact on both traditional members and their civilian employer

all work arounds designed to improve Guard fighter availability. W

there is some immediate benefits from these work arounds, they ar

many respects short-term measures that do not provide any perma

solutions to the availability issue. The long-term solution may inv

more than just changing the rules by which the Guard operates 

deploys its fighter force. It may in fact involve a fundamental shi

the way the active Air Force views and supports its Guard forces.

Options for the Future

This paper developed options for increasing Guard fighter availab

based on two specific questions. First, does the option increase 

number of full-time personnel within a unit with a corresponding 

crease in capability, and second, does the option improve the utiliza

of the traditional guardsmen while limiting the impact on their civ

responsibilities?

While the first two options deal directly with changes within the G

system itself, the last option takes a different approach. It poses 

question, should all fighters be transferred out of the Guard into 

active force?

Option One

The first option would increase full-time manning within deploy

unit training codes (UTC) by increasing the number of active 

personnel assigned to Guard fighter units. In addition, each fig
wing/group would be scheduled for an extended period of active 

(45 days) every two years for contingency operational support.

The central theme of this option is the increased use of active 

personnel in deployable UTCs. The objective is to enhance availab

by reducing the number of traditional Guard positions and repla

them with active duty personnel. In addition, scheduling an exten

period of active duty every two years allows for greater flexibilit

meeting real-world taskings while giving the traditional workforce 

civilian community advance notice of service.

Pros. The benefits associated with this option are threefold. First

option increases the number of full-time personnel (Air Force ac

duty) without appreciably increasing personnel costs to the Guard. 

every active duty position added to a unit, one traditional Guard p

tion would be eliminated. The Guard would support all training requ

ments and costs to include the additional flying time required for m

taining combat capability. Within a fighter squadron, the additi

active duty personnel would be used to fill deployable UTC com

positions. These additional personnel also give a commander the f

bility of moving other wing or group full-time personnel into dep

able positions traditional guardsmen may not be able to fill. For 

stance, if a traditional Guard flight commander is unable to deploy 

to civilian job constraints, he could now be transferred to another pos

and replaced by a full-time member. In a 15-primary-assigned air

fighter squadron, this option could provide up to five additional 

time pilots to supplement the approximately six full-time instructo

lots normally assigned to a squadron. This same augmentative appro

could also be applied to deployable positions within the enlisted/m

tenance work force.

The second benefit associated with this option is that with a la

percentage of full-time personnel, the reliance on the traditional w

force for contingency support will naturally decline, thus giving u

greater flexibility in meeting contingency needs. This option is not 

signed to end the involvement nor the role of the traditional guardsm

Many traditional members would still volunteer and help meet con

gency taskings. However, the option will help to alleviate some of 

deployment burden traditional members are now shouldering.

Finally, the assignment of more active duty personnel to the Guard 

help to increase the level of understanding and knowledge among the a

duty force. A certain amount of friction and parochialism exists betw

the Guard and the active duty. Within the active duty force, this frictio

often driven by a lack of knowledge or a misunderstanding of Guard c
bilities and availability. Future fiscal constraints will only increase 

friction as both forces compete for scarce resources. Exposing m

active duty personnel to the Guard system will help in educating 

active duty on what the Guard can offer in both peace and war. 

For this option to work effectively, an active duty assignment to 

Guard must not be viewed or perceived by senior Air Force leader

as undesirable. The negative connotations associated with a Guard 

signment are deeply ingrained in the active duty. Even the assignm

system treats Guard assignments as second-rate. For instance, only i

viduals selected by a Return To Fly Board (RTFB) can be assigne

an Air Force advisor to an Air National Guard fighter unit. Bec

these assignments are not looked upon as career enhancing, provis

are made for RTFB selectees to turn down Guard assignments wit

prejudice. If only Guard jobs are left in the assignment system, RT

selectees may opt to meet the next RTFB to compete for an active 

assignment. This action only fosters the negative perceptions associ

with Guard assignments. For this option to succeed, a Guard assignm

must be treated as fulfilling requirements for command.

Rotating a large number of active duty personnel into the Air Nati

Guard was accomplished once before under a program called Opera

Total Force (OTF). Under the OTF program, two or three active 

pilots, usually young captains, were assigned to Guard fighter squad

for a period of two to three years. These young pilots were used 

variety of positions and proved invaluable in helping Guard units tra

tion into newer aircraft. While the program was officially ende

1994, the influence of the program will be felt for years as these yo

pilots return to the active force with a better appreciation and un

standing for the Guard force.

The United States Army is also involved with a program that plac

large number of active duty personnel in the Guard. The United S

Army will soon have up to 5,000 active duty soldiers in various A

National Guard units. The objective is to increase the readiness 

training efficiency of selected Army Guard units, particularly th

units with a rapid deployment requirement.

As noted above, there are precedents for placing increased number

active duty personnel within the Guard system. Under this option

specific number of active duty personnel assigned to a Guard unit w

depend upon individual unit requirements and UTC needs. For insta

an air defense fighter squadron that seldom deploys outside the co

nental United States (CONUS), may need little if any active duty 

mentation. However, a highly deployable unit may need several a
tional active duty personnel. Whatever the case, these additional per

nel will enable units to better meet a requirement of an extended pe

of active duty.

Scheduling an extended 45-day period of active duty every two y

for each Guard fighter unit will ensure a dedicated fighter forc

prepared and on call for contingency support tasking. Whether or 

that unit deploys would depend upon the specific need for continge

fighter support. The bottom line is that the unit is available and res

sible for meeting a 45-day window of military service.

Long-range scheduling of this commitment will give the traditi

workforce and the civilian community adequate time to prepare for 

commitment. In addition, an extended period of active duty could 

vide a rallying point for the local community as they pull togethe

support their local Guard units. Long-range scheduling also gives u

time to adjust their training requirements and schedules for the expe

deployment. For example, some air defense squadrons who sup

Coronet Nighthawk operations in Panama begin honing their night 

erational skills two to three months in advance of the actual dep

ment.41 These air defense squadrons can do this because their dep

ment dates are known at least one year in advance. The same ben

are available to other units if their deployment dates are known we

advance.

Cons. Increasing the number of active duty personnel in the Guard 

will eventually increase the operating cost and the support workloa

each fighter unit. The magnitude of the cost and workload incr

depends on the number of additional personnel assigned to the unit. 

current Guard support structure is not designed for a large numbe

active duty or full-time personnel. Under the system used to sup

active duty advisors, a nearby active duty base usually provides rec

and financial support. With a large contingent of active duty person

this same approach may not be feasible or practical.

Any increased costs associated with the option may also prove crit

There are already concerns the Guard fighter force may not be as 

nomical to support as was once thought. In 1992, the Congressi

Budget Office estimated it costs approximately $370 million to main

an active duty F-16 FWE and $300 million for a reserve F-16 FW

Any action or option which increases the cost of doing business w

the Guard fighter community may lead to increased scrutiny.

Finding the required manning for this option may also prove diffi

Many of the active duty personnel affected by the force drawdown 

move into critical need positions within the active duty force. Others 
be retrained in other job specialties or retired from the service. 

bottom line is that a reduction to a 13 FWE force does not guarant

surplus of qualified personnel for Guard assignments.

Scheduling an extended period of active duty will have some negative im

on the traditional workforce, even if it coincides with the annual trai

requirement. The increased active duty commitment might cause a re

tion problem by forcing some traditional members to separate from 

units because of employment or family concerns.

In summary, the feasibility of implementing this first option hinge

cost and the availability of active duty personnel. Any increased op

ing costs could be justified by an increase in the availability of 

Guard fighter force. Under this option, the preponderance of G

personnel are still traditional guardsmen. They are the cornerston

the citizen soldier concept that has proven to be viable in the past. If 

option is to gather Guard and political support, it must not be seen a

attempt to reduce the role or the place of the traditional guardsmen. 

the option to succeed, it must increase the availability of the f

without sacrificing Guard autonomy.

Option Two

Option two would increase the number of active duty personnel in 

a few selected fighter units. These units would then perform a l

percentage of Guard contingency support taskings.

This option recognizes the limitations and added cost associated 

the option one requirement of increasing active duty manning in 

Guard fighter units. Option two limits the increase in active duty 

sonnel to only a few selected fighter units with the idea these u

would then perform the majority of Guard contingency fighter sup

taskings.

Pros. The smaller number of fighter units affected by this option w

not only reduce the overall cost of the option when compared to op

one, but would also simplify the task of selecting and sourcing 

additional manpower. Once again, the exact number of active duty 

sonnel assigned to a unit would depend upon unit needs and U

requirements. However, the total number of fighter units tasked u

this option might eventually include up to six general purpose fig

units and one or two air-to-air units.

Increasing full-time manning in selected flying units is already an 

tion being used in the Air National Guard. As noted earlier, the 124 

and the B-1 unit at McConnell AFB have a higher percentage of 

time personnel than most other Guard units. The higher percentag
full-time personnel has allowed the 124 FG to meet more deman

peacetime taskings for longer periods of time with less impact on 

traditional force. It stands to reason other units would also experi

these same benefits with a corresponding increase in the numbe

active duty personnel assigned to the unit.

Once these fighter units are identified and “beefed up,” they would 

perform the majority of the Guard’s no-notice, long duration, peace

taskings. In fact, these units, with their increased availability, could 

be one of the first fighter units to respond to a crisis situation. O

in-theater, these units could serve as core rainbow units providin

stabilized command structure and experience base benefiting other 

sonnel who rotate in and out.

Cons. The biggest drawback to option two is the increased relianc

just a few selected units. During times of tight fiscal constraints, t

might be pressure to fund these units at the expense of other G

units. There might even be a perception that these units represent

first team of elite personnel while other fighter units were relegated 

second team status. This type of perception would certainly lead 

loss of both Guard and political support.

Increasing active duty manning in only a few selected units may 

prove inadequate in meeting future requirements, especially if the 

rent active duty drawdown continues past 13 active FWEs. A fur

reduction in the active duty force structure is a distinct possibilit

Secretary Perry has already indicated there might be additional f

reductions if a proposed balanced budget amendment is passed.43 G

this scenario, the level of taskings assigned to these units might p

overwhelming. These selected fighter units would still have a large 

centage of traditional personnel. While adding additional active 

personnel will improve a Guard unit’s availability, the unit will not h

the same capability or availability as an active duty unit. Overtas

these units might cause a backlash of resentment and reduce the lev

support within the local civilian community. The importance of whic

often overlooked or misunderstood in the active duty community.

Option two offers the benefits of reduced costs and lower manpo

requirements when compared to option one. While option two w

certainly improve the availability of these few selected units, the vi

ity of the option ultimately depends on the drawdown of the active 

force. Further reductions below a 13 FWE force will cause the 

National Guard to assume an even greater share of the fighter peace

contingency requirements. As such, this option may prove inadequa

meeting future peacetime fighter needs.
Option Three

This option takes a radical approach to solving the availability prob

It recommends transferring most, if not all, of the fighters from the 

National Guard into the active duty force.

Pros. First and foremost, this option eliminates any problems associ

with the availability issue. Transferring most, if not all, of the G

fighters into the active duty force effectively ends any problems ass

ated with the Guard’s traditional manning structure and the nega

impact increased peacetime taskings has on the traditional workfo

This option provides an increased fighter capability to respond to v

ally any peacetime contingency operation for any length of time.

As mentioned earlier, the actual monetary savings between two iden

Guard and active duty fighter units may not be as large as once thou

Any additional cost associated with this option might be offset 

justified by the increased fighter availability this option offers.

Cons. Moving additional FWEs into the active duty force will not 

money. By whatever accounting method used, Guard fighter units 

less expensive to maintain and operate than their active duty coun

parts. As mentioned in a 1992 RAND Corporation study, the Cong

sional Budget Office reported a Guard fighter unit is 60 to 70 per

cheaper to maintain than its active duty counterpart. The 30 per

difference equates to savings of about one million dollars for an F

squadron.44 Given the tight fiscal constraints of today, the savin

significant enough to question the viability of this option.

Implementation of option three could also lead to the loss of commu

and political support. A military structure that relies upon the citi

soldier concept is responsible for generating a tremendous amoun

political and civilian support for the military. Putting these prestig

and highly visible assets into the active duty force could negati

impact future community and political support for military program

is support that may in effect outweigh any gains this option may 

vide.

One last aspect warrants consideration. The converse argument c

place all airlift and refueling capability in the Air National Guard 

Reserve forces. This in effect would shift the availability problem to 

support forces which are every bit as critical as the fighter force

meeting contingency taskings. The “tip of the spear” could be dulle

total reliance is placed, for any portion of the total team, in either 

active duty or Guard force.
Summary

This section outlines three possible options for addressing the availab

issue. Both options one and two recognize the increased availability as

ated with more full-time manning. However, neither option recommend

end to the Guard’s reliance on a traditional workforce. The traditi

guardsman is still the key component in the Guard force structure. If 

thing, the first two options recognize the potential impact increased mil

service can have on the traditional member and attempts to minimize 

impact by decreasing reliance on the traditional force. Traditional gua

men will still participate in contingency operations as witnessed in D

Shield and Desert Storm.

The third option of moving Guard fighters into the active duty f

faces too many political, fiscal, and force structure obstacles to be 

sidered feasible. United States military forces must be reactive and 

rely on any one force for all its resources. The citizen-soldier is a c

plimentary part of the total force—not a single source.

Of the three proposed options, we believe option one has the gre

potential of addressing the availability issues. There are no drawb

to increasing the number of active duty personnel in the Air Nati

Guard from a readiness perspective. The increase will not only imp

fighter availability but will also help to educate the active duty forc

the capabilities and limitations of the Guard force. It is a win

proposition for each group.

It is apparent there are no silver bullet solutions for increasing fig

availability within the Air National Guard. Each of the options has s

drawbacks and advantages, cost savings and expenses. There ma

fact be other options more attractive than these three or different i

that could be incorporated into new and more viable options. Whe

there is total agreement on these options is not important. Wha

important is to recognize the need for change and improvement if 

Guard fighter force is to meet the challenges of the future.

Conclusion

There is little doubt this nation’s reliance on the Air National Guard 

continue to grow. Declining defense budgets, active duty force re

tions, and a vigorous National Security Strategy of Engagement 

Enlargement will all work to increase the involvement of the Air 

tional Guard in peacetime operations. While the Guard stands read

meet this country’s needs during war, an increased peacetime operat

tempo may stress the system unless changes are made. The lim
availability of Guard fighter assets for anything other than global 

fare is driven not only by a manning structure more suited to the 

war environment but also by the negative impact increased mil

service has on the traditional workforce. While the Guard has im

mented several work arounds to improve the availability of these fig

assets, the work arounds do not address what lies at the core of 

availability problem, limited numbers of full-time personnel.

The options discussed in this paper attempt to solve the availab

issue by either increasing the number of active duty personnel in 

Guard or by eliminating part of the fighter force from the Guard sys

Whatever the case, the solution to the availability issue will prob

entail a greater role for the active duty force in supplementing 

supporting the Guard force.

The US military has often been accused of preparing to fight the 

war by using lessons learned from the last war and applying them 

future that has no resemblance to the past. In many respects, this is 

problem facing the Air National Guard today. The Air Force ca

assume that a manning structure uniquely suited to the past will 

tinue to meet the needs or demands of the future. If the Air Nati

Guard is to play a greater role in our national security, the Air Forc

concert with the Air National Guard, must be prepared to make cha

in the support provided to the Air National Guard. These changes 

not be without cost or sacrifice. However, they are necessary if the 

National Guard is to meet the challenges and demands of the future.

Notes

 1. Julie Bird, “A Time for Bold Tactics: Wing Commander Perry: Stress is W

ing,” Air Force Times, 17 October 1994, 5.

 2. Ibid.

 3. “The US Air Force in Facts and Figures,” Air Force Magazine, May 1994, 4

4. “Contingency Report,” Air National Guard Readiness Center, November 1994

 5. Report on the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993 (Washington, D.C.: Gover

Printing Office, 1994), 28.

 6. RAND, Air Force Fighters—More Reliance on Reserves Increases the N

Know Their Capabilities, Report to Congressional Committees (Washington, D.C.: 

ernment Printing Office, May 1994), 4.

 7. “More Realism, Readiness, Operations for Guard and Reserve,” Defense I

10, no. 15 (1995): 1.

 8. Charles J. Gross, Prelude to the Total Force: The Air National Guard, 1943–

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), 59.

9. Lt Col Daniel L. Gladman, “Total Force Policy and theFighter Force,” Res

Report (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Combat Command, 1994), 20.
10. Ibid., 21.

11. Ibid., 22.

12. Gross, 159.

13. Ibid., 160.

14. Charles J. Gross, The Air National Guard—A Short History (Washington, 

Government Printing Office, 1994), 33.

15. US Code Title 10, 1988, “Active Duty,” chap., 39, 182.

16. Col Michael N. Killworth, The Silent Call-Up Option, Volunteerism in th

National Guard, Research Report (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, J

1992), 14–16.

17. “Defense and Foreign Policy—Military Personnel Issues,” Congressional Q

terly, 10 September 1994, 2531.

18. US Code Title 50, 1988, “War Powers Resolution,” vol. 19, 1153.

19. “Active Duty,” 179.

20. Ibid.

21. Bird, 18.

22. “Reserve Component Triad: Equipment, Training, People,” Defense Issues 

60 (1994): 3.

23. Major General Shepard, ANG, “Air National Guard,” lecture, Air War C

Maxwell AFB, Ala., 12 February 1995.

24. RAND, 2.

25. Ibid., 21.

26. “Reserves Vital to National Security Strategy,” Defense News 9, no. 73 (199

27. Bruce D. Callander, “Testing the Limits of the Total Force,” Air Force Mag

July 1993, 26.

28. Ibid., 30.

29. “Strengthen Reserve Components to Compensate for Drawdown,” Defense I

9, no. 44 (1994): 10.

30. William Matthews, “Pentagon Says Expanded Role Won’t Engulf Reserves

Army Times, 6 March 1995, 33.

31. Andrew Compart, “Rainbow’s End: Bye to Bosnia,” Air Force Times, 24 Ja

1994, 19.

32. William Matthews, “Ready When Needed: Pentagon again Seeks Autho

Call Reserves,” Air Force Times, 24 January 1994, 18.

33. RAND, 21.

34. Andrew Compart, “When Part Time Stops Being Part Time,” Air Force Tim

October 1993, 24.

35. RAND, 21.

36. “More Realism,” 2.

37. “Reserves Vital,” 2.

38. “More Realism,” 2.

39. “Reserves Vital,” 3.

40. Ibid.

41. Lt Col Michael Corbett, TXANG, interview with authors, Air War College

well AFB, Ala., 9 March 1995.

42. RAND, 22.

43. “Balanced Budget Amendment Could Threaten Defense Increases,” De

Daily 186, no. 32 (17 February 1995): 249.
44. National Defense Research Institute, Assessing the Structure and Mix of F

Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense (Santa M

Calif.: RAND, 1992), 230–41.