ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 304 1 

S

ponsored by the U.S. National Defense University (NDU) and the Swedish National Defense University, this paper is the second in a series of 

Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forums dedicated to 

the multinational exploration of the strategic and defense challenges faced by 

the Baltic states. The December 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy described 

Russia as “using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments.”1

 The U.S. and European authors of this paper, along 

with many others, came together in late 2017 to explore possible responses to 

the security challenges facing the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). This second report 

highlights early research and gaming insights indicating the importance of total 

defense and comprehensive security, whole-of-society approaches to deterrence 

and defense of the Baltic Sea Region from Russian aggression.2 It also provides 

recommendations for how the Nordic and Baltic states can leverage aspects of 

total defense and comprehensive security to generate a credible asymmetric defense and build societal resilience.3

For the Nordic states of the Baltic Sea Region—Sweden, Finland, and Norway—the Russia challenge is well understood.4

 Recent studies and gaming insights commonly envision a scenario in which Russian conventional forces, bolstered by an antiaccess/area-denial bubble projected by the Kaliningrad Oblast, 

overwhelm their Baltic neighbors, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. With that 

momentum, Russian forces might then invade the strategically valuable Swedish island of Gotland or the Finnish Åland islands in order to establish control 

of the BSR.5

While prior studies have demonstrated the potential consequences of Russian aggression, a now familiar Russian hybrid strategy has already been observed 

Baltics Left of Bang: Nordic 

Total Defense and Implications 

for the Baltic Sea Region

by Håkon Lunde Saxi, Bengt Sundelius, and Brett 

Swaney

STRATEGIC FORUM

National Defense University

About the Authors

Håkon Lunde Saxi, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor at the Norwegian 

Defence University College. Bengt 

Sundelius is a Professor Emeritus 

of Political Science at the Swedish 

Defense University. Brett Swaney is an 

Assistant Research Fellow in the Center 

for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National 

Defense University.

Key Points

◆ Nordic states (Norway, Sweden, 

and Finland) efforts to enhance 

societal resilience through unique 

“total defense” and “comprehensive security” initiatives are unlikely 

to change the near-term strategic 

calculus of Russia. Over time, however, a concerted application of total defense in harmony with Article 

3 of the North Atlantic Treaty will 

aid in the resilience to, and deterrence of, Russian hostile measures 

and hybrid warfare, and serve as a 

complement to a regional denialbased deterrence strategy.

◆ The Nordic states are uniquely positioned and equipped to coordinate 

with their Baltic neighbors and 

partners to enhance multilateral cooperation on defense technology, 

regional information sharing, and 

best practices for the implementation of total defense.

◆ The Nordic states could “export” 

resilience to the greater Baltic Sea 

Region by strengthening participation in European Union energy and 

infrastructure projects with the 

Baltic states, amplifying efforts to 

connect infrastructure links among 

allies and partners and decouple 

from adversaries. For their part, the 

Baltic states should aggressively 

adopt a whole-of-society approach 

to total defense.

January 2020

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF CHINESE MILITARY AFFAIRS CENTER FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH
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aimed at preparing the operational environment astride 

the Nordic states. For instance, it is clear that Sweden 

has been the target of a wide array of active measures 

stemming from Russia that include disinformation and 

coordinated campaigns to influence and divide Swedish 

public opinion on major social and political issues.6

 Propaganda aimed at other Nordic-Baltic governments and 

Russian speaking populations is prevalent, and Russian 

violations of the territorial waters and airspace of other 

BSR countries are frequent and deliberate.7 Russia also 

exerts pressure in more subtle ways. In 2015, both Norway and Finland experienced a sudden influx of migrants 

crossing their border with Russia. This influx could not 

have happened without the permission of Russian security services. The goal appears to have been to force the 

Nordic states to negotiate bilaterally over the issue and 

Figure 1. Baltic Sea Region

Source: Wikimedia Commons, available at <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Baltic_Sea_map.png>.
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 304 3 

send a signal to the European Union (EU) that Russia 

has the capacity to act against their interests.8

Norway, Sweden, and Finland are a pivotal bulwark in the defense of the Baltic Sea Region. During 

the Crimean War (1853–1856) and the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War (1918–1920), the Swedish 

fortress of Viapori (today, Suomenlinna in Finland) and 

the Finnish Åland islands were key strategic bastions. 

Today, the Swedish island of Gotland remains critical to the BSR as it could complicate Russian antiship 

cruise missile strikes on allied or partner military forces 

in the event of a crisis. Additionally, allies and partners 

could use the airfields on Gotland to control regional 

airspace and the main port, Visby, as a logistical hub.9

Finally, both Finland and Norway border Russia, and 

while Norway is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) member, Sweden and Finland are not. Conversely, while Sweden and Finland are members of the 

European Union, Norway is not. No matter how the region is viewed, the Nordic states are vital to the security 

and stability of the BSR.

Hostile Measures and the Hybrid 

Challenge

Russian strategy in the BSR is highly opportunistic 

and driven by concerns for its own security and persistent 

fear of outside invasion. These strategic traits have been 

cultivated and ingrained by hundreds of years contending with vulnerable geography and a bloody history.10

Small countries on the periphery of Russia are viewed 

less as potential friends and partners than as potential 

beachheads for enemies.11 While this is especially true 

of the Baltic states, the Nordic states are not immune to 

these impulses.

Russia has always presumed influence in its own 

neighborhood.12 Its insecurity, imperial identity, and 

self-conception as a great power drive its desire for influence and a degree of control within the BSR.13 Of 

course, a key Russian objective is also to halt EU and 

NATO activity in their perceived sphere of influence. 

In 2016, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov wrote 

that the choice to pursue NATO enlargement “is the 

essence of the systemic problems that have soured Russia’s relations with the United States and the European 

Union.”14 Russia is keenly sensitive to any discussion of 

Finland or Sweden joining NATO or orienting further 

toward the West. There is a silver lining, however, as 

Russia often treads lightly with Finland and Sweden out 

of a desire to avoid driving their citizenry and political 

leaders toward greater alignment with NATO. Norway 

may also benefit from self-imposed restrictions on its 

NATO membership, such as limitations on the basing 

of nuclear weapons and permanent basing of allied forces in peacetime.15

Russia works to achieve its strategic objectives 

through the use of “hostile measures”—a broad range of 

tools applied simultaneously and without a clear causal 

logic.16 This approach is characterized by the exploitation 

of economic, ethnic, linguistic, regional, religious, social, 

and other divisions in target nations, often as preparation for higher-level violence or hybrid warfare.17 Russian leaders hope that the effect of these measures will 

create opportunities to exploit.18 This approach has been 

disorienting, perplexing, or puzzling to the U.S., allied, 

and partner strategy and policy communities as it stands 

in sharp contrast to their more familiar formal system 

of preplanning to achieve objectives through a specific 

strategy or particular tactics.19

Deterring and defending against Russian aggression 

in the BSR, prior to open hostilities, or “left of bang,” is 

a political problem that requires a broader adaptive approach. In light of the threat environment, the governments of Norway, Sweden, and Finland rely on unique 

strategies of total defense and comprehensive security, 

with an emphasis not just on territorial security, but on 

crisis response, societal resilience, and regional security. 

Due to their broad conception of security, Nordic total 

defense strategies are well suited to enhancing resilience 

to hostile measures, countering hybrid challenges, delaying or disrupting short warning aggression, and for some, 

supporting regional allied efforts. 
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Understanding Total Defense

Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz observed that 

defeating the enemy “can, in practice, be replaced by two 

other grounds for making peace: the first is the improbability of victory; the second is its unacceptable costs.” He 

also indicated that “the defense is intrinsically the stronger form of waging war. . . . [I]f attack were the stronger 

form, there would be no case for using the defense.”20

For Clausewitz, demonstrating the capability to impose 

costs and make victory seem improbable could shift an 

adversary’s cost-benefit analysis enough to deter an attack. This strategy is at the heart of modern total defense 

and comprehensive security concepts to dissuade Russia 

from aggressive action.

Modern total defense is a whole-of-society approach to national security involving the coordinated 

action of a nation’s military, paramilitary, police forces, 

civilian branches of government, private sector, and general population, thus enhancing conventional defense 

and deterrence measures. Total defense is well suited to 

counter hostile information operations, provide for the 

psychological defense of the population, bolster internal 

security, build the resilience of critical services and infrastructure, enhance military defense, lend support for 

allies and partners, and respond to natural disasters and 

other crises that have no direct human agency.21 On one 

end of the spectrum, total defense is an asymmetric or 

unconventional approach aimed at defeating the adversary’s will to engage or continue with aggression by influencing their perception of costs and benefits. On the 

other end, total defense is a whole-of-society approach 

to societal resilience and preparedness in the face of natural and manmade crises. Resistance to occupation or 

malign influence and resilience in the face of crises are 

intended to send important signals to adversaries and 

allies that the population of a nation and its government 

are prepared to defend and deter against aggression. 

This total defense approach is particularly beneficial 

in situations where there is no clear threshold for the 

start of hostilities,22 making it useful in deterring and 

defending against Russian hostile measures and hybrid 

warfare. The concept of societal resilience ensconced 

within total defense and comprehensive security harmonizes well with Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.23

The commitment to resilience, civil preparedness, and 

civil-military readiness was reinforced at the NATO 

Summit in July 2016 during the meeting of the North 

Atlantic Council.24 The broad concept of security embraced by total defense also finds harmony with Article 

222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 

Union, which provides for solidarity in the case of a wide 

range of crises, to include natural disasters. 

Furthermore, total defense as a concept is defensive, 

even predominantly nonmilitary in nature, seeking to 

solidify the status quo with capabilities that are themselves defensive. As a result, total defense efforts are less 

likely to be framed as provocative or escalatory in nature compared with formal NATO or national efforts to 

bolster conventional forces. This allows Nordic partners 

and those who adopt similar concepts to better shape the 

strategic narrative by playing to international perceptions 

of legitimacy based on the right to self-defense and the 

freedom of the global commons. 

Each Nordic state has maintained a version of total defense and brings unique national characteristics to 

the concept. There are important differences and areas of 

emphasis that should be examined in order to enhance 

the security of the BSR. The concepts of total defense 

and comprehensive security offer much that could be 

leveraged to export resilience throughout the region.

Sweden and Total Defense 2.0

Days before Christmas in 2010, the first suicide 

bomber in the Nordic region detonated his device near a 

crowded shopping street in the city center of Stockholm. 

In 2015, Sweden absorbed a large influx of immigrants 

that strained the Swedish government’s internal consensus and was further exacerbated by another deadly terrorist attack in April 2017.25 Dramatic forest fires rampaged 

during the summer months of 2014 and 2018, and the 

Russian annexation of Crimea fundamentally changed 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 304 5 

the Swedish view of security in the BSR.26 The broad 

spectrum of challenges illustrates the way Sweden views 

its own defense. While Russia is indeed a primary catalyst for action, Sweden can enhance resilience to all challenges by embracing total defense, which was formally 

resurrected in the 2015 Swedish Defense Bill.27 Prior to 

1991, Sweden’s total defense machinery (total defense 

1.0) was well resourced, continuously trained and exercised, and could rely on obligatory military service for all 

young men. Unfortunately, the foundations of Swedish 

total defense atrophied in the decades following the end 

of the Cold War.28 Sweden has had to rebuild and relearn 

how to flex these muscles. 

Much of the current Swedish effort has been focused on rebuilding the civil-military relationship and 

fleshing out the coordinating mechanisms in preparation 

for cultivating its total defense 2.0 efforts in succeeding 

years. For Sweden, total defense is a combined effort 

of the military, civilian agencies, the private sector, and 

local communities (see figure 2). Swedish total defense 

is a whole-of-society approach to building resilience 

and security. The priorities of Swedish societal security 

are broad and include the protection of the population, 

securing the functions of society, and protecting fundamental values such as individual rights, the rule of law, 

and democratic systems.29

The mandate for societal resilience under total defense 2.0 has been centered around the strengthening of 

the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) that 

was founded in 2009. The MSB replaced a trio of outmoded agencies: the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, 

the Swedish Emergency Management Agency, and the 

National Board of Psychological Defense.30 The goal of 

MSB has been to develop resilience across all sectors of 

Figure 2. Total Defense

Source: If Crisis or War Comes (Karlstad: Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, May 2018), 8–9, available at <www.dinsakerhet.se/siteassets/dinsakerhet.se/broschyren-om-krisen-eller-kriget-kommer/om-krisen-eller-kriget-kommer---engelska.pdf>.
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society and at every level of government. However, MSB 

was not given the authority to command civil society 

services during an emergency. The creation of Sweden’s 

MSB was paired with a new “crisis coordination secretariat” located in the Prime Minister’s Office, but was 

moved to the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs in 

2014. The mandate of this secretariat is a bit narrower 

as it is limited to coordination and crisis management 

within government ministries. In contrast, MSB leads 

through proactive network building and preparation. 

Since 2006, all government entities have been obligated 

to produce and submit a risk and vulnerability analysis. 

A similar risk and vulnerability analysis is required by all 

290 autonomous municipalities throughout Sweden and 

contributes to a high degree of situational awareness of 

societal vulnerabilities. 

The Quills in Total Defense

Having the capacity to coordinate and manage the 

relationships between civil and military actors is only one 

part of the equation. The other half consists of having 

the capabilities to resist Russian hostile measures and 

hybrid warfare and affect some level of deterrence. Like 

the Swiss, Swedish total defense 2.0 relies on a “hedgehog” or “bitter pill” model for societal defense.31 Historically, this strategy has been employed by states that are 

too small to mount an independent defense but have the 

willpower to resist for long periods of time. Since aggressive, often revisionist powers seek quick, opportunistic territorial takeovers, the strategy demonstrates to the 

adversary that any attempt at conquest would be long 

and costly. To enhance this aspect of total defense 2.0, 

Sweden has placed a heavy emphasis on the role of the 

individual being able to transform into “warfare mode” 

and survive unaided in the event of a crisis or armed attack during at least the first 12 weeks. Sweden is also 

in the process of reconstituting the National Board of 

Psychological Defense, slated for reactivation in 2021, to 

bolster societal resilience.

In May of 2018, the Swedish government distributed a 20-page brochure to all 4.8 million households in 

Sweden outlining how to behave in the case of foreign 

aggression.32 In addition to describing basic emergency 

preparedness techniques, the pamphlet includes instructions on how to spot and resist disinformation as well as 

how to resist armed attack (see figure 3). This is not just 

an important tool of popular education on resilience and 

resistance, it is also an important information campaign 

signaling to an adversary the intent, and perhaps the will, 

to resist. To further bolster societal resilience, the conscript system in Sweden for men and women, which had 

been discarded in 2010, was reactivated in 2017.33 These 

are positive developments, but they lack resources. Major 

investments in training, exercises, and logistics to mobilize, pre-position supplies, and coordinate community 

efforts, among many other tasks, need to be undertaken 

before these reforms achieve their desired effect.

Reengineering the Swedish 

Military

While NATO will not abandon rotational and forward deployed forces in the Baltic states, it is unlikely to 

establish a large forward presence. It is apparent, then, 

to regional leaders like Sweden, that total defense 2.0 

needs a revitalized military defense element. Swedish 

defense reform is designed to provide military capabilities to meet a wide array of future conflicts, to break up 

an attacking force, and deny adversaries the opportunity 

to achieve objectives below the threshold of armed attack. Sweden’s defense investment plans will result in an 

expanded naval force of 24 ships with surface warfare 

and antisubmarine capabilities, 18 mine warfare vessels, 

cruise missiles, additional unmanned aerial vehicles, and 

Gripen fighters.34

In the near term, the Swedish Royal Navy is upgrading their Gävle and Visby-class corvettes and Gotlandclass submarines. Additionally, the Swedish navy plans to 

build two next-generation A26 submarines, which will be 

useful for operations in the BSR.35 This maritime capability is critical as Russian hybrid strategy could include 

submarines tapping or disrupting subsea energy and 

communications cables and inserting special operations 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 304 7 

forces (SOF) on islands of geostrategic importance. Russia could also use surface ships and other means to launch 

cyber attacks on port or ship infrastructure networks.36 As 

a partial response, Sweden deployed its first new military 

regiment since World War II—a unit of 350 soldiers—to 

garrison the island of Gotland.37

The planned investments are eagerly awaited, but 

it remains to be seen if the political will and resources 

for such an effort can be sustained. Military spending in 

Sweden was 2.6 percent of GDP in 1991 and fell to 1.1 

percent in 2015.38 However, there is positive momentum. 

The recent report of the Swedish Defense Commission 

proposes increased defense spending amounting to 1.5 

percent of GDP by 2025.39 If Sweden is serious about total defense and the regional security of the BSR, it must 

commit to growing investments in new capabilities and 

the readiness of its forces. The current pace may yet be 

too slow to impact Russia’s strategic calculus.

Finland and Comprehensive 

Security

Finland has the longest border with Russia—nearly 

1,340 kilometers of largely uninhabited forests and rural 

outposts. Historically self-reliant, Finland has an established tradition of total defense by combining military 

and civil planning and capabilities. Unlike many nations, 

Finland never completely relaxed its guard after the Cold 

War and maintained the structures to support a total 

defense strategy. An updated concept was formalized 

in 2003, more than a decade before the rest of the West 

began to grapple with the implications of the so-called 

Gerasimov Doctrine.40 For Finland, total defense became 

its “comprehensive security model.” The difference is important, as the comprehensive security model is less military in flavor and is instead focused on countering hostile measures by emphasizing societal resilience and the 

Source: If Crisis or War Comes (Karlstad: Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, May 2018), 12–13, available at <www.dinsakerhet.se/siteassets/

dinsakerhet.se/broschyren-om-krisen-eller-kriget-kommer/om-krisen-eller-kriget-kommer---engelska.pdf>.

Figure 3. Resistance
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psychological defense of the populace.41 Comprehensive 

security reflects an expansive definition of security, and 

includes capabilities that enhance resilience to natural disasters, mass migration, financial crisis, cyber disruption, 

and the resilience of democratic systems. 

In contrast to Sweden’s MSB, Finland’s coordination and preparation is managed by the Security Committee. However, all appendages of the Finnish government have a great deal of autonomy. All measures 

are taken by government ministries for their particular 

sectors or specialties as a crisis dictates. All other State 

organs move into a supporting role. This was outlined 

explicitly in the 2001 Finnish Emergency Powers Act, 

and allows for a level of autonomy and agility to respond 

in the event of crisis. 

Like Sweden, Finland’s system of comprehensive 

security is dependent on a populace ready and imbued 

with the willingness to sacrifice against both military and 

nonmilitary crises. Finland’s resolve was tested during 

the Winter War (1939–1940) against the Soviet Union, 

and again during the Continuation War (1941–1944). 

During the Cold War, Finland had a robust system of 

conscription. Every male served in the Finnish Defence 

Forces, and then afterward as part of its reserve. This allowed Finland to generate more than 500,000 soldiers 

from a population of five million (the total size of the 

reserve was 1,000,000 soldiers). At age 18, every male is 

called up for service, and women may volunteer. Today, 

approximately 70 percent of the male population spends 

from 6 months to 1 year providing security for society. 

All conscripts enter the reserve after the completion of 

their 6–12-month obligation. Today, almost a million 

men and women serve in the Finnish Defence Forces’ 

reserve.42 This also enhances the inherent will to sacrifice among the populace since nearly every household in 

Finland has one or several citizen-soldiers in their midst. 

Resisting Disinformation

A key feature of Russian hostile measures and hybrid warfare is the weaponization of information or 

disinformation campaigns. Finland’s experience offers 

insights for the defense of the BSR. Like other countries along the Baltic Sea or in Eastern Europe, Finland has observed an increase in fake news stories and 

propaganda linked back to Moscow (see figure 4). This 

information warfare has sought to undermine many of 

the governments of the BSR. However, the main thrust 

of propaganda and disinformation is aimed at the Baltic states, which are portrayed as failed nations, ruined 

by migration, poverty, and controlled by a sinister elite 

backed by the West.43

Finland has long understood the need to prioritize 

the defense of society against Russian information warfare. There is evidence to suggest that the relative immunity of the Finnish population to Russian disinformation 

and propaganda can be attributed to an emphasis on a 

well-educated population. Finland’s 2010 Security Strategy for Society places great importance on the strategic 

task of education, for which the Ministry of Education 

and Culture is the lead agent.44 The Finnish education 

system makes an effort to raise the awareness of students 

to information threats, understand the “Finnish way of 

life,” and prepare for responsible conduct during a crisis situation.45 Public awareness of Russian propaganda 

efforts goes a long way toward inoculating the Finnish 

population.

The real problem, however, is not false information 

running wild on social media. Real fractures in Finnish 

society must be dealt with or ameliorated for any true 

resilience to be sustained. Finland relies on a relatively 

homogenous society—politically, socially, and economically—supported by a “Nordic welfare state,” to maintain cohesion and resistance to Russian disinformation 

and propaganda. More succinctly, the best way to respond is not always by correcting and combating false 

information. Instead, it is about having your own positive narrative and sticking to it.46 A strong public education system, a long history of balancing Russia, and a 

comprehensive economic and socio-cultural policy allow 

Finland to consistently deflect coordinated propaganda 

and disinformation.47 In fact, where Estonia, Latvia, and 

Lithuania have struggled to push back against Russian 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 304 9 

Figure 4. ECFR Perceptions of Russian Influence

Source: Kadri Liik, Winning the Normative War with Russia: An EU-Russia Power Audit (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, May 

2018>, 4, available at <www.ecfr.eu/page/-/EU-RUSSIA_POWER_AUDIT_.pdf>. Used with permission.
10 SF No. 304 ndupress.ndu.edu

disinformation, Finland has found surprising resilience. 

For instance, in March of 2016, the Finnish-language 

bureau for Sputnik closed after it failed to attract enough 

readers.48 While there are many aspects of Finnish society that cannot be replicated by other BSR states, the 

emphasis on awareness and education as well as maintaining a positive narrative are ways other BSR states can 

work to inoculate themselves against Russian information warfare. 

Enhanced Opportunity Partners

Sweden and Finland are not NATO allies. Neither 

has signed the North Atlantic Treaty nor do they currently seek NATO membership. While the 2014 annexation of Crimea caused Swedish popular support for 

NATO membership to surge from 17 percent in 2012 

to 43 percent in 2018, neither Sweden nor Finland will 

likely join the Alliance.49 Remaining militarily nonaligned is still viewed as a contribution to predictability 

and stability in the BSR. While Sweden and Finland left 

neutrality behind when they became members of the EU 

in 1995, and became NATO Enhanced Opportunities 

Partners shortly after the Wales Summit in 2014, Russia 

continues to refer to both countries as “neutral states,” 

and often points out that formal NATO membership for 

Sweden and Finland would raise concerns about the balance of power in the Baltic Sea Region. It is clear, however, that Sweden is taking steps to engage more closely 

with NATO, and Finland is relaxing its traditional mode 

of self-reliance in favor of greater solidarity with Western partners. 

Their non-aligned positions, in combination with 

total defense, have strengths and weaknesses. On the 

one hand, as NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partners, 

the collective defense of the region is strengthened by 

preparing for cooperative action. Both Sweden and Finland are highly interoperable with NATO forces. But 

this remains a fragile position that depends entirely on 

the circumstances. In addition, Sweden and Finland lack 

formal access to NATO’s decisionmaking structure and 

joint operational planning. Continuing to strengthen 

mechanisms for information exchange and operational 

planning could address some of these deficiencies. 

As a precaution, Sweden and Finland have turned 

toward each other, establishing a program in 2015 to 

deepen cooperation on all aspects of peacetime activity 

such as joint use of military bases, combined antisubmarine exercises, and common command and control capabilities, in addition to updating laws that allow each to 

offer and receive assistance to or from each other in addition to other partners and NATO. Sweden and Finland 

have also moved forward with the creation of a combined 

Finnish-Swedish Brigade Framework and joint Naval 

Task Group.50 These bilateral linkages under the framework of cooperation beyond peace show promise for enhanced security in the BSR, bolstering total defense initiatives, and mitigating their vulnerable position without 

the formal guarantee of NATO’s collective defense. 

Norway and a Split Perspective

Like Sweden, provocative Russian behavior and 

changing regional security dynamics have prompted 

Norway to shore up its own security by re-engaging with 

a tradition of total defense. Recent efforts have been 

catalyzed by aggressive Russian activity. Since 2017, the 

Norwegian armed forces (NAF) have experienced electronic communications and GPS interference linked to 

Russia. Most of these incidents coincide with NATO exercises. Norwegian bases have also been subject to “mock 

attacks” by Russian aircraft.51

While not yet as focused on a whole-of-society approach, Norway’s total defense concept is still centered 

on civil-military cooperation in the event of a crisis or 

conflict. The Norwegian armed forces are in charge of 

the military dimensions, and the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB) is in charge of the civilian dimensions, including the mission to bolster “societal 

resilience.”52

The recent exercise Trident Juncture 2018 was an 

opportunity for the NAF and DSB to test their procedures and preparedness.53 During the exercise, Norwegian commercial vessels were used as platforms for 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 304 11 

maintenance, fuel supply, and logistics support. The civilmilitary concept is called STUFT, “ships taken up from 

trade.” During the exercise, the civilian crew was supplemented by a military crew. The exercise tested civil society’s willingness and ability to support the NAF under 

the total defense framework. NATO should endeavor to 

include these elements as a standard feature of regional 

exercises with Nordic and Baltic partners.

Like its Nordic cousins, conscription is a key piece 

of Norway’s whole-of-society framework. Conscription 

in Norway reached its peak during the late Cold War, 

when nearly all able-bodied male citizens were required 

to serve.54 The number of conscripts has since declined 

considerably, especially since the early 2000s. A revised 

Compulsory Military Service Act came into effect in 

2015, which extended conscription to all female citizens. 

Norway was the first NATO country to introduce universal conscription, encompassing both men and women. 

Today, Norway typically requires 8,000 conscripts out of 

a yearly pool of 60,000 that may be called up for service for up to 1 year.55 Further, all citizens between 18 

and 55 years old are subject to be called on as reinforcements in war.56 Extending conscription to women stands 

in contrast to male-dominated conscription or voluntary 

service regimes in most NATO states. This is important 

because the armed forces should not exclude half the 

population, and it must be able to recruit from among 

the best and most capable candidates. This enhanced 

diversity increases the toolbox of the armed forces and 

broadens societal awareness and participation in the defense of the nation.

Unlike Sweden and Finland however, Norway 

does not view the BSR as its highest strategic priority. 

Historically, Norway has favored its alliances with major Western powers and eschewed overinvesting in the 

relationships between its Nordic-Baltic neighbors. As 

a NATO member, Norway was also more skeptical of 

NATO enlargement eastward. However, in 2014 the crisis in Ukraine increased Norway’s interest in the BSR. 

Oslo now perceived ensuring the security of the Baltic 

states to be in its vital interests, since NATO’s Article 5 

security guarantee was the bedrock of Norway’s defence 

policy. Norwegian air, land, and maritime forces were rotated into the region to demonstrate clearly to Russia 

that the Baltic states were behind “NATO’s red line.”57

In October 2015, a government-appointed expert commission on defense argued that Norway should be able 

to participate in the defense of the Baltics, stating that 

“the Norwegian Armed Forces must be able to rapidly 

provide and transfer units to the Baltic area.”58 These efforts, and the increased attention to the BSR, was in line 

with the attention given by larger Western allies. 

However, while Norway’s interest in the BSR has 

grown since 2014, it remains a lower order concern. 

Norway’s main focus is directed toward its own “High 

North” region, and secondly, toward maintaining close 

ties with the Western allies that ultimately will ensure 

its security. The situation today is a little better than in 

1939 when the Swedish embassy in Oslo wrote home to 

Stockholm about the “complete lack of interest from the 

Norwegian side for all Baltic Sea problems.”59 Nevertheless, as before 2014, the BSR is not Norway’s first priority. As one former Norwegian Minister of Defence and 

Minister of Foreign Affairs once lamented, “it was not 

always easy to get the Icelanders and Norwegians to realize that what was happening in the Baltic [sea region] 

also affected their safety.”60

Despite the pull of the Arctic, Norway remains conscious that there are at least two areas of vital interest 

in the BSR. First, preserving the inviolability of international law and second, upholding NATO’s Article 

5 security guarantees via its NATO relationship with 

Baltic allies. Additionally, with key allies such as the 

United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany leading, Norway has been keen to work with these nations 

on NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence and Alliance 

reinforcement efforts that are centered on the “Eastern 

Flank” of the Alliance. While Norway will continue to 

focus its attention on the Arctic, greater pressure from 

NATO and major Western allies may induce it to devote 

additional resources to the security of the BSR.61
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Challenges and Risks with Total 

Defense

Of course, the whole-of-society approach to total 

defense faces a wide range of challenges that are often 

discounted. One of these challenges is the various tribal 

mentalities that define distinct professions and training. 

One might imagine divisions between civil and military 

professionals, public sector authorities and private sector actors, and safety and security professionals. The gaps 

between these communities, like any state or society, 

are difficult to navigate. They have their own terminology, ways of organizing and procurement, preferences 

for technological solutions, and methods of information 

sharing. The results for whole-of-society coordination are 

slow communication and impediments to speedy reform. 

For Finland, a long tradition of regularly exercising these 

relationships and communities prevented many of these 

traditional gaps from being serious impediments. 

The Nordic model of total defense is built around 

public-private partnerships. The private sector is crucial 

because much of the critical infrastructure of a nation, 

energy, transit, information networks, and many capabilities necessary in crisis, such as maritime transport and 

communications, are owned privately. This represents a 

significant challenge for Nordic states, but most especially for the government of Sweden, which owned much 

of the critical infrastructure during the Cold War. Today, 

the degree of privatization is far greater and the loss of an 

immediate threat from Russia after the Cold War allowed 

many of the public-private linkages to whither. Building 

trust and communication between the public and private 

sector is a challenge that will take years to rectify.

Not only will progress in rebuilding the connective tissue between government and private entities take 

time, progress thus far has been uneven. In Sweden, for 

instance, cooperation from the major players in the financial sector appears well ahead of other sectors. Although there are islands of excellence to be found in the 

cybersecurity and information assurance realms as well 

as fora for information exchange on supervisory, control, 

and data acquisition systems, there remain few linkages 

among them. Cooperation can be facilitated by institutions such as the Swedish MSB, which will be important 

in coordinating and harmonizing their efforts.62 Interestingly, public-private relationships, while posing significant near-term challenges for Sweden, remains a relative 

strength for Finland due to the deliberate maintenance 

and economic support of those relationships in the post–

Cold War era. 

Finally, one of the most significant modern challenges to a whole-of-society approach to total defense is 

what may be best described as “flow security.” The nations 

of the BSR are more interconnected than ever before. As 

a result, a total defense strategy dependent on societal 

resilience must account for networks and infrastructure 

that are inherently trans-boundary. Undesirable flows 

include those of narcotics, weapons, trafficked persons, 

and cyber intrusions, among others. Electric grids, cyber 

infrastructure such as cable networks and server farms, 

interconnected and often “global” supply chains, and financial markets are all security flows that must be engaged with partners and allies to secure. 

More broadly, there are some inherent risks with the 

adoption of a whole-of-society approach to total defense 

by an ally or partner. For example, the dispersal of equipment intended for popular resistance cells could end up 

on the black market.63 Further, a resisting population will 

almost certainly be the target of harsh Russian retaliation. 

Today, Russian military exercises regularly identify resistance capabilities and civilian support as factors that must 

be addressed. Russian planning appears to have assumed, 

based on their experience in Crimea, that their forces 

would meet little or no resistance. That changed after 

their prolonged experience in Ukraine’s Donbas.64 Now 

their forces prepare for a resisting population. Nonetheless, decentralized and aggressive resistance (both violent 

and non-violent), as part of a whole-of-society approach 

to total defense, synchronized with an allied, even global 

strategic messaging campaign, can make it clear that a 

country is not vanquished. 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 304 13 

Exporting Resilience

The security interdependence between Nordic and 

Baltic states has increased considerably over the past decade. It is reminiscent of past cycles of closer cooperation such as the solidarity support to the Baltics provided 

by Nordic states shortly after their independence in the 

1990s. However, one of the key findings of the politicomilitary exercises conducted for the “Baltics: Left of 

Bang” study informing this paper has been the difficulty 

of cooperation and coordination among regional partners 

in the BSR. Fortunately, there are several opportunities 

for the Nordic states to expand multilateral cooperation 

that will support total defense efforts, bolster information 

sharing, and enhance societal resilience to hostile measures and hybrid warfare. 

The Euro-Atlantic strategic context is entangled 

with interdependencies, and since the 1990s, one potential platform for greater regional coordination has 

been the Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe 

(E-PINE). While U.S. engagement in the BSR is often 

through NATO or via bilateral arrangements, E-PINE 

offers a forum in which the Nordic and Baltic states are 

able to engage with the United States and each other outside of the NATO and EU architectures—each with their 

disadvantages and subject to political considerations beyond the BSR that may impede cooperation. In this way, 

the Nordic-Baltic Eight (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 

Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden) and the 

United States are able to meet at least twice yearly to discuss cooperative security.65 This is a format that should 

be leveraged as it allows the United States to discuss and 

synchronize on issues of regional security with all Nordic 

and Baltic partners. 

The Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) 

framework is an underutilized platform for cooperation 

on issues of total defense and societal resilience.66 Participants in the tabletop exercises often leaned on the 

NORDEFCO framework as they sought greater regional 

coordination. In fact, Nordic defense ministers recently 

gathered on the island of Gotland in April 2019 under 

the NORDEFCO framework to discuss total defense 

and regional security.67 In their most recent meeting in 

Stockholm in November 2019, they established a secure 

communications hotline for direct consultations in crises 

affecting the region. 

NORDEFCO’s emphasis on linking defense industrial bases and generating efficiencies in procurement offers a tangible way to enhance total defense and societal 

resilience and should be encouraged and expanded as 

Nordic states ramp up their defense spending. NORDEFCO could also be leveraged for greater cooperation with 

the Baltic states. This would bolster Sweden and Finland 

as regional leaders, enable greater interoperability among 

regional forces, and allow for wider training and exercises.68 An expanded role for NORDEFCO could also ameliorate some of the regional deficiencies in intelligence 

sharing and provide a means for expanded cooperation in 

the integration of more conventional military assets such 

as regional air defense systems.69

Finally, with robust scientific and technological communities, wealthy economies, and eager defense industrial 

bases, the Nordic states should invest in and leverage existing technologies that can revolutionize the potency of 

total defense and societal resilience such as 3D manufacturing, drones, artificial intelligence, robust cyber capabilities, and inexpensive space capabilities.70 NORDEFCO 

offers a potential framework for the cooperative development, procurement, and deployment of many of these 

key technologies. The extent to which the Nordic states 

are able to coordinate and expand the benefits of these 

technologies with their Baltic partners will only enhance 

regional resilience and the effectiveness of total defense. 

Close regional cooperation through E-PINE and 

NORDEFCO are vital given the various regional sensitivities. For instance, while the Ukraine crisis brought 

Nordic and Baltic security perceptions closer together, 

Finland has attempted to improve and enhance its defense arrangements in a way that minimizes confrontation with Moscow. The Baltic states, however, have been 

far more strident in communicating the Russian threat to 

their NATO and European allies. This discordance runs 
14 SF No. 304 ndupress.ndu.edu

the risk that Helsinki may come to view their involvement in wider regional defense as less attractive, resulting in more reluctant or curtailed engagement. E-PINE 

and NORDEFCO should be leveraged as environments 

in which an improved cooperative ethic can be cultivated 

and differing strategic perceptions harmonized.71

Of course, cooperation and communication among 

regional allies and partners is not the only lesson of the 

politico-military exercises. A related finding was the impact of the trust deficit between Russia and the West. Frequently, efforts to build trust or act in good faith during 

the exercise were undermined or ignored because of the 

inherent deficit. This represents a significant challenge in 

managing the potential for crisis or conflict. For Russia, 

the Nordic states, and the West, the process of growing 

apart started well before the annexation of Crimea, perhaps as early as 1999 and the war in Kosovo. Relations 

have worsened consistently throughout NATO enlargement. Despite this, the maintenance of lines of communication is necessary and forums for multilateral security 

dialogue with Russia are more important than ever. 

Security interdependence among BSR nations also 

extends to the maritime security of the Baltic Sea, which 

is a mix of flow security concerns and has become one of 

the most pressing issues. Connections providing critical 

energy, supply, commercial goods, and communications 

infrastructure that transit the Baltic Sea are particularly 

vulnerable to hostile measures and hybrid warfare and require tightly knit regional cooperation to secure. Nordic 

partners should continue to build on cooperative maritime security efforts by integrating law and enforcement 

and naval capabilities. This requires greater coordinated 

maritime domain awareness.72 The Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea (SUCBAS) program is an important framework for this. Originally launched in 2006 

as a Swedish-Finnish undertaking, SUCBAS has enlarged to include all NATO members around the Baltic 

Sea (Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and 

Germany).73 In 2015, the United Kingdom also joined. 

Norway however, is still not a member and remains skeptical of its utility, unwilling to pay entry costs, though it 

is eager to encourage neighbors to participate in a similar maritime surveillance project, BarentsWatch, with a 

focus on the High North. It should be a priority to encourage Norway’s entry into the SUCBAS arrangement. 

Improvements to SUCBAS itself could also be made by 

implementing multilevel information sharing architecture in which the armed forces of NATO members and 

partners could share classified information over the entire 

conflict spectrum while providing unclassified situational 

awareness and insights suitable for their law enforcement 

agencies.74

The Nordic states could also prioritize assisting their 

Baltic neighbors in building resilience to hostile measures 

and hybrid warfare by offering assistance in the training 

of civilians in nonviolent and low-end resistance methods 

and assistance in the training of police forces and borders guards. Given their long traditions of total defense, 

the Nordic states are in a position to offer assistance in 

building the capacity among the Baltic states for wholeof-government coordination. For instance, they may seek 

to advise the Baltic states on best practices regarding increasing coordination between defense and interior ministries, the armed forces, nongovernmental organizations, 

and other societal institutions. The Nordic states are also 

in a position to offer assistance and cooperation on regional cybersecurity and cyber defense.75 Despite the fact 

that each nation has their own traditions and systems 

codified in law that can make cooperation difficult, some 

headway has been made. The NORDEFCO Cyber Warfare Collaboration Project that interfaces with the NATO 

Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, in Tallinn, Estonia, is an encouraging, but nascent development. 

Within the BSR and among Nordic-Baltic partners, 

there is also considerable room to expand the joint use 

of special operations forces. In a gray zone environment, 

SOF, operating in close coordination with police and intelligence agencies, are crucial to detecting changes in the 

operational environment and countering adversary infiltration, subversion, and sabotage, as well as galvanizing 

the populations’ will to resist aggression.76 However, there 

are significant hurdles given that each nation’s legal ability 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 304 15 

to use SOF within its own and/or other’s territory differs among all states. SOF has also traditionally been an 

instrument of external engagement for Nordic and Baltic 

states, while societal resistance action has been conducted 

by the home guard units. BSR states will have to reconfigure their use of SOF as another element of societal 

resilience and total defense at home. One step toward a 

solution might be to build on the Sweden-Finland cooperation that began in 2015 that includes the use of SOF 

and perhaps expand it further with regional agreements 

to include the Baltic states themselves.

Finally, as the Baltic states consider the adoption 

and implementation of total defense, the Nordic states 

should amplify their efforts to export resilience in the areas of energy, transportation, and other infrastructure. The 

framework provided by the EU Strategy for the Baltic 

Sea Region, which emphasizes projects on the low end of 

the resilience scale, remains a useful initiative and should 

be amplified.77 Furthermore, the promise of Nordic cooperation on energy in the Baltics can be vectored through 

mechanisms like the EU Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan.78 The regional interconnection of Baltic Sea 

energy grids will go a long way toward ending Baltic state 

isolation and dependence on the BRELL (Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) ring.79

Energy infrastructure projects such as Estlink, connecting Estonia and Finland; Nordbalt, linking Lithuania 

and Sweden; and others have demonstrated significant 

progress. Second, Rail Baltica, the largest EU project in 

the Baltic states, will eventually connect the capitals of 

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (with additional connections to Helsinki via Tallinn) with European-gauge track. 

This will allow for a standardized rail link to Nordic allies 

and partners along a North-South axis. Unfortunately, the 

project is not expected to be completed until 2025.80 The 

Nordic states should endeavor to accelerate these projects 

with their Baltic partners and infuse them with good governance to inoculate them against Russian propaganda. 

The Baltic states, for their part, should aggressively pursue 

a whole-of-society approach to total defense.

Summary

Although outright territorial aggression by Russia 

against the Nordic or Baltic states is unlikely at present, 

building resilience and responding to Russian hostile measures and hybrid warfare is a necessity. Sweden, Finland, 

and Norway are building on their Cold War traditions of 

total defense and comprehensive security to defend and 

deter against a new generation of Russian hostile measures and hybrid warfare. Each has taken a distinct approach, embracing whole-of-society efforts that enhance 

societal resilience in conjunction with conventional military reforms. The Nordic states are strengthening their 

ability to engage in territorial defense, better respond to 

regional crises, and inoculate their societies from malign 

Russian influence and disinformation. While the Nordic 

states have a long history of total defense, since the 2014 

crisis in Ukraine there is a broad acknowledgment that 

they must become exporters of resilience in the BSR—

working with regional partners to shore up defense and 

deterrence. While cooperation and coordination have 

been challenges, there are fertile areas for multilateral engagement between Nordic and Baltic states, expanding 

the scope of NORDEFCO, leveraging E-PINE, deepening maritime cooperation between naval and law enforcement entities, expanding the scope and use of SOF in 

the BSR, and amplifying Nordic-Baltic cooperation on 

energy and rail infrastructure, among others.

What is likely, however, is the persistent employment of hostile measures against the nations of the BSR. 

While a whole-of-society approach to total defense will 

do much to shore up resilience, disinformation will be a 

persistent challenge. For all the maliciousness of Russian 

disinformation campaigns, their actual impact remains 

debatable.81 The European continent has united strongly 

against Russia. What Western narrative has Russia been 

able to change after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and 

the proxy war in Ukraine? There seems to be only one: 

Prior to 2014 Russia was regarded as a potential partner, 

a nation to be engaged and cooperated with. Now, Russia 

has become an adversary and even an “enemy.” Russian 
16 SF No. 304 ndupress.ndu.edu

1 National Security Strategy of the United States of America

(Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017), 47, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSSFinal-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

2 For the purposes of this paper, deterrence is the threat intended 

to discourage an adversary from beginning an undesired action.

3 While total defense in this paper is often used as an umbrella 

for the concepts under discussions, the authors note that total defense 

and comprehensive security are unique models with differing national 

characteristics. 

4 Denmark, another Nordic state, also plays a key geostrategic 

role as “gatekeeper” to the Baltic Sea, and as a regional partner and ally. 

However, the role of Denmark is explored in detail in a subsequent 

Strategic Forum.

5 David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), available at <www.rand.org/

content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1253/RAND_

RR1253.pdf>.

6 Martin Kragh and Sebastian Asberg, “Russia’s Strategy for Influence Through Public Diplomacy and Active Measures: The Swedish 

Case,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 6 (2017), 773–816, available at 

<www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2016.1273830>. 

7 Franklin D. Kramer and Magnus Nordenman, A Maritime 

Framework for the Baltic Sea Region (Washington, DC: Atlantic Couninformation warfare has not been able to change the broad 

strategic framework or specific Western states’ policy perspectives on geopolitical issues such as Ukraine, Syria, and 

Libya. There is no doubt that Russian disinformation has 

been harmful and successful at sowing discord, but there is 

a case to be made that the major strategic narratives have 

not shifted much in Russia’s favor, nor have there been 

any, as of yet, catastrophic shifts in the Western Alliance 

attributable to Russian disinformation.82 Instead, allies 

and partners in the BSR are cooperating in ways they have 

never done before.

Enhancing Nordic-Baltic resilience with a wholeof-society total defense strategy holds the most promise 

to continuously frustrate Russian interference, and will 

provide solid resistance to hostile measures, disinformation, and hybrid warfare. Aided by and in close cooperation with their Nordic partners, and as a complement to 

a larger denial-based deterrence strategy,83 Baltic states’ 

implementation of total defense will signal to Russia that 

it will pay a significant price for its interference in the 

region.

Notes

cil, March 2016), 2–3, available at <www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/a-maritime-framework-for-the-baltic-sea-region>.

8 Piotr Szymanski, Piotr Zochowski, and Witold Rodkiewicz, 

“Enforced Cooperation: The Finnish-Russian Migration Crisis,” 

Centre for Eastern Studies, April 6, 2016, available at <www.osw.waw.

pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-04-06/enforced-cooperation-finnishrussian-migration-crisis>; Andrew Higgins, “E.U. Suspects Russian 

Agenda in Migrant’s Shifting Arctic Route,” New York Times, April 2, 

2016, available at <www.nytimes.com/2016/04/03/world/europe/formigrants-into-europe-a-road-less-traveled.html>. 

9 Felix K. Chang, “Sweden’s Importance to NATO’s Defense of 

the Baltics,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 28, 2017, 

available at <www.fpri.org/2017/09/swedens-importance-natosdefense-baltics/>.

10 Raphael S. Cohen and Andrew Radin, Russia’s Hostile Measures 

in Europe: Understanding the Threat (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019), 

5, available at <www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1793.html>.

11 Stephen Kotkin, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics: Putin Returns 

to the Historical Pattern,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016, available at 

<www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/russias-perpetual-geopolitics>.

12 Cohen and Radin, Russia’s Hostile Measures in Europe, 8.

13 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev explained, “The world 

should be multipolar. Unipolarity is unacceptable; domination is 

impermissible. We cannot accept a world order in which all decisions 

are taken by one country, even such a serious and authoritative country 

as the United States of America. This kind of world is unstable and 

fraught with conflict. Russia, just like other countries in the world, has 

regions where it has its privileged interests. In these regions, there are 

countries with which we have traditionally had friendly and cordial 

relations, historically special relations. We will work very attentively 

in these regions and develop these friendly relations with these states, 

with our close neighbors.” See Paul Reynolds, “New Russian World 

Order, The Five Principles,” BBC News, September 1, 2008, available 

at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7591610.stm>.

14 Sergey Lavrov, “Russia’s Foreign Policy: Historical Background,” Russia in Global Affairs, March 3, 2016, via Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Web site, available at <www.

mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/

content/id/2124391>.

15 Arne Olav Brundtland, “The Nordic Balance: Past and Present,” Cooperation and Conflict 1, no. 4 (1966), 30–63.

16 Many have also used gray zone operations as the term of art for 

the desire of certain powers to stay under the threshold of triggering a military response. Gray zone operations are “best understood as 

activity that is coercive and aggressive in nature, but that is deliberately designed to remain below the threshold of conventional military 

conflict and open interstate war.” See Hal Brands, “Paradoxes of the 

Gray Zone,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 5, 2016, 

available at <www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/>. See 

also Antulio J. Echevarria II, Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative 

Paradigm for U.S. Military Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army 

War College Press, April 2016); Michael J. Mazarr, Mastering the Gray 

Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 

U.S. Army War College Press, December 2015). 

17 Edward Lucas, “Russia’s Influence Arsenal: Watch Out, This 

Is What China Is Learning from Russia,” Center for European Policy 

Analysis, May 28, 2019.

18 Cohen and Radin, Russia’s Hostile Measures in Europe, 13.

19 Ibid., 1.
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 304 17 

20 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 

358–359.

21 Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Deterring Russian Aggression in 

the Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2019), 6, available at <www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/

RR2779.html>.

22 Marta Kepe and Jan Osburg, “Total Defense: How the 

Baltic States Are Integrating Citizenry into their National Security 

Strategies,” Small Wars Journal, September 2017, available at <https://

smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/total-defense-how-the-baltic-states-areintegrating-citizenry-into-their-national-security->.

23 The North Atlantic Treaty specifically states, “In order more 

effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately 

and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual 

aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity 

to resist armed attack.” See The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 3, April 

4, 1949, Washington, DC, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/

official_texts_17120.htm>; See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), “Resilience and Article 3,” June 25, 2018, available at 

<www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

24 NATO, “Commitment to Enhance Resilience,” Issued by the 

Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the 

North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, July 8–9, 2016, available at <www.

nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133180.htm>.

25 Christina Anderson, “Sweden Mourns Stockholm Attack Victims; Suspect Is Formally Identified,” New York Times, April 10, 2017, 

available at <www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/world/europe/swedenterror-attack.html>.

26 Laura Smith-Spark, Rory Smith, and Gianluca Mezzofiore, 

“Evacuations Ordered in Sweden as Fires Rage as Far North as Arctic 

Circle,” CNN, July 24, 2018, available at <www.cnn.com/2018/07/19/

europe/sweden-forest-fires-wxc-intl/index.html>.

27 The Swedish Defence Bill 2016–2020 (Stockholm: Government 

Offices of Sweden, May 8, 2015), available at <www.government.se/

government-policy/defence/the-swedish-defence-bill-2016-2020/>; 

See also Sweden’s Defence Policy 2016 to 2020 (Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden, June 1, 2015), available at <www.government.

se/49c007/globalassets/government/dokument/forsvarsdepartementet/

sweden_defence_policy_2016_to_2020>.

28 Specifically, Ulf Kristersson, leader of the Moderates in Sweden 

said, “Sweden’s national defense has been neglected for decades. What 

has happened is shameful. The budget allocated to the armed forces 

must reflect needs, operational realities, and the requirement to replace 

outdated equipment. The goal should be to raise spending on defense 

to 2 percent of GDP, the recommended NATO level, inside 10 years.” 

Gerard O’Dwyer, “New Swedish Government Advocates for Greater 

Defense Spending,” Defense News, September 12, 2018, available at 

<www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/09/12/new-swedishgovernment-advocates-for-greater-defense-spending/>.

29 National Security Strategy (Stockholm: Government Offices 

of Sweden, October 23, 2017), 6, available at <www.government.

se/4aa5de/contentassets/0e04164d7eed462aa511ab03c890372e/

national-security-strategy.pdf>.

30 “Stärkt krisberedskap—för säkerhets skull [Strengthened 

Emergency Preparedness for Safety],” Prop 2007/08:92, Stockholm, 

April 2, 2015, available at <www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/

proposition/2008/03/prop.-20070892/>. 

31 For Swiss tactical methods, see Major H. von Dach, Total Resistance: Swiss Army Guide to Guerrilla Warfare and Underground Operations (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1965). To quote from the prologue, 

“We believe it is better to resist until the last. We believe that every 

Swiss woman or man must resist. We believe that the enemy cannot be 

allowed to feel at ease for even one minute in conquered territory. We 

believe that we have to inflict damage upon him, fight him wherever 

and whenever we have the opportunity!” 

32 “If Crisis or War Comes,” Swedish Civil Contingencies 

Agency, May 2018, available at <www.dinsakerhet.se/siteassets/dinsakerhet.se/broschyren-om-krisen-eller-kriget-kommer/om-krisen-ellerkriget-kommer---engelska.pdf>.

33 “Sweden Re-Activates Conscription,” Government Offices 

of Sweden, March 2, 2017, available at <www.government.se/articles/2017/03/re-activation-of-enrolment-and-the-conscription/>.

34 Marco Giulio Barone, “Spotlight on NORDEFCO,” Military 

Technology 42, nos. 7–8 (2019), 36–37.

35 “Sweden Navy Chief Aims to Grow Sea Power,” Defense News, 

April 10, 2018, available at <www.defensenews.com/digital-showdailies/navy-league/2018/04/10/sweden-navy-chief-aims-to-grow-seapower/>.

36 Martin Murphy, Frank G. Hoffman, and Gary Schaub, Jr., Hybrid Maritime Warfare and the Baltic Sea Region (Copenhagen: Centre 

for Military Studies, November 2016), 18, available at <https://cms.

polsci.ku.dk/publikationer/Hybrid_Maritime_Warfare_and_the_Baltic_Sea_Region.pdf>; Consequences to Seaport Operations from Malicious 

Cyber Activity (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 

Operational Analysis Division, March 3, 2016).

37 “Sweden to Re-Establish Military Unit on Baltic Sea Island,” 

Associated Press, December 13, 2017, available at <www.defensenews.

com/global/europe/2017/12/13/sweden-to-re-establish-military-uniton-baltic-sea-island/>.

38 Adam Chandler, “Why Sweden Brought Back the Draft,” The 

Atlantic, March 3, 2017, available at <www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/03/sweden-conscription/518571/>.

39 “The Swedish Defence Commission Presents Its White Book 

on Sweden’s Security Policy and the Development of Its Military 

Defence,” Swedish Ministry of Defence, May 14, 2019, available at 

<www.government.se/articles/2019/05/the-swedish-defence-commission-presents-its-white-book-on-swedens-security-policy-and-thedevelopment-of-its-military-defence/>.

40 Mark Galeotti, “I’m Sorry for Creating the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine,’” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2018, available at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/>.

41 Finnish Security and Defense Policy 2001 (Helsinki: Prime Minister’s Office, Report by the Government to Parliament, June 13, 2001), 

73–74, available at <www.defmin.fi/files/1149/InEnglish.pdf>.

42 “Finland Instructs Nearly a Million Military Reservists,” 

BBC News, May 22, 2015, available at <www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-32843558>.

43 Edward Lucas, “The Coming Storm,” Baltic Sea Security 

Report (Washington, DC: Center for European Policy Analysis, June 

2015), available at <https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/644196_302ae06ef

f3a4f20ab59888b0ed73a0f.pdf>. 

44 Security Strategy for Society (Helsinki: Ministry of Defence, 

2010), 52, available at <www.defmin.fi/en/publications/strategy_documents/the_security_strategy_for_society>.

45 Ibid., 52.

46 Jed Willard, director of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Center 

for Global Engagement at Harvard, quoted in Reid Standish, “Why 

Is Finland Able to Fend Off Putin’s Information War?” Foreign Policy, 

March 1, 2017, available at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/01/

why-is-finland-able-to-fend-off-putins-information-war/>.

47 Standish, “Why Is Finland Able to Fend off Putin’s Information War?”
18 SF No. 304 ndupress.ndu.edu

48 Ibid.

49 Charlie Duxbury, “Under Threat, Sweden Rediscovers Its 

Viking Spirit,” Politico, January 30, 2018, available at <www.politico.

eu/article/under-threat-sweden-rediscovers-its-viking-spirit-natorussia/>.

50 Christopher S. Chivvis et al., NATO’s Northeastern Flank: 

Emerging Opportunities for Engagement (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 

2017), 202, available at <www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1467/RAND_RR1467.pdf>.

51 Gerard O’Dwyer, “Norway Accuses Russia of Jamming Its 

Military Systems,” Defense News, March 8, 2019, available at <www.

defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/03/08/norway-alleges-signalsjamming-of-its-military-systems-by-russia/>.

52 “Trident Juncture Kicks Off in Norway,” Permanent Delegation of Norway to NATO, August 30, 2018, available at <www.norway.

no/no/missions/nato/norway-nato/news-events-statements/news2/

trident-juncture-kicks-off-in-norway/>.

53 “Exercise Trident Juncture 18—Total Defence Concept,” 

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Public Affairs Office, 

2018, available at <https://shape.nato.int/news-archive/2018/exercisetrident-juncture-18-total-defence-concept>.

54 See table 1 in Håkon Lunde Saxi, Norwegian and Danish Defence Policy: A Comparative Study of the Post–Cold War Era (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2010), 25, available at <https://

fhs.brage.unit.no/fhs-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/99267/DSS0110.

pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

55 The law applied to all citizens born after January 1, 1997; 

Anders Dalaaker, “Statement by Norway on Gender Equality in 

the Military—Universal Conscription,” Permanent Delegation of 

Norway to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 

March 8, 2017, available at <www.osce.org/forum-for-securitycooperation/304861?download=true>.

56 Ibid.

57 Norwegian Minister of Defense Ine Eriksen Søreide, quoted 

in Rune Thomas Ege, “Tydelig beskjed til Russland [Clear Message to 

Russia],” Verdens Gang, November 19, 2014.

58 Unified Effort (Oslo: Ministry of Defence, Expert Commission 

on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, 2015), 57.

59 Envoy Christian Günther, quoted in Wilhelm Carlgren, Mellan 

Hitler och Stalin: Förslag och försök till försvars-och utrikespolitisk samverkan mellan Sverige och Finland under krigsåren [Between Hitler and 

Stalin: Proposals for Military and Foreign Policy Cooperation between 

Sweden and Finland during the War] (Stockholm: Militärhistoriska 

förlaget, 1981), 12.

60 Thorvald Stoltenberg, “Introduction,” in One for All, All for One: 

New Nordic Defence Policy? ed. Michael Funch and Jesper SchouKnuden (Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, 2009), 14.

61 For a more thorough overview of Norway’s view of Baltic Sea 

security, see Håkon Lunde Saxi, “Norwegian Perspectives on Baltic 

Sea Security,” in Strategic Challenges in the Baltic Sea Region: Russia, 

Deterrence, and Reassurance, ed. Ann-Sofie Dahl (Washington DC: 

Georgetown University Press, 2018).

62 A National Cyber Security Strategy (Stockholm: Government 

Offices of Sweden, Ministry of Justice, June 22, 2017), 10, available at 

<www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-security-strategies/ncssmap/strategies/swedish-national-cyber-security-strategy>.

63 Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Deterring Russian Aggression in the 

Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance, 26.

64 Ibid., 26.

65 Also known as the NB8+1 (Norway, Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Sweden, plus the United States). 

See Christopher S. Chivvis et al., NATO’s Northeastern Flank, 191.

66 For the development of NORDEFCO over the past decade, 

see Håkon Lunde Saxi, “The Rise, Fall, and Resurgence of Nordic 

Defence Cooperation,” International Affairs 95, no. 3 (2019), 659–680, 

available at <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz049>.

67 “Minister for Defence Peter Hultqvist to Host Nordic Defence 

Ministerial Meeting on Gotland,” Government Offices of Sweden, 

April 5, 2019, available at <www.government.se/government-policy/

defence/>.

68 Christopher S. Chivvis et al., NATO’s Northeastern Flank, 217.

69 Robbin Laird, “Nordics Unite for Cross Border Air Combat 

Training; Thanks Russia!” Breaking Defense, July 2, 2018, available 

at <https://breakingdefense.com/2018/07/nordics-unite-for-crossborder-air-combat-training-thanks-russia/>.

70 T.X. Hammes, Technologies Converge and Power Diffuses: The 

Evolution of Small, Smart, and Cheap Weapons, Policy Analysis No. 786 

(Washington, DC: CATO Institute, January 27, 2016), available at 

<www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/technologies-convergepower-diffuses-evolution-small-smart-cheap>.

71 Eoin Micheál McNamara, “Securing the Nordic-Baltic Region,” NATO Review, available at <www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/

Also-in-2016/security-baltic-defense-nato/EN/index.htm>.

72 Stefan Lundqvist, “Maritime Security and Sea Power: A 

Finnish-Swedish Perspective on the Baltic Sea Region,” in Focus on 

the Baltic Sea: Proceedings from the Kiel Conference 2015, ed. Adrian J. 

Neumann and Sebastian Bruns (Kiel, Germany: Institute for Security 

Policy, Kiel University, 2016), 22.

73 Sea Surveillance Co-operation Baltic Sea (SUCBAS) Web site, 

available at <http://sucbas.org/objectives/>.

74 Stefan Lundqvist, “Continuity and Change in Post-Cold War 

Maritime Security: A Study of the Strategies Pursued by the U.S., 

Sweden, and Finland 1991–2016” (Ph.D. diss., Åbo Akademi University, 2017), 146.

75 Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Deterring Russian Aggression in the 

Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance, 25.

76 James K. Wither, “‘Modern Guerrillas’ and the Defense of the 

Baltic States,” Small Wars Journal, available at <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/modern-guerrillas-and-defense-baltic-states>.

77 See EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region Web site, available 

at <www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu/>; European Commission, “EU 

Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region,” European Union, 2018, available 

at <https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/cooperate/baltic/factsheet_eusbr_en.pdf>.

78 The members of the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection 

Plan (BEMIP) include Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland, and Sweden. Norway participates as an observer. 

See European Commission, BEMIP, available at <https://ec.europa.

eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure/high-level-groups/baltic-energymarket-interconnection-plan>.

79 The BRELL ring includes Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Lithuania, 

and Latvia.

80 Adam Maisel and Laurynas Keturakis, “Baltic Trainspotting: 

Railways and NATO’s Logistics Problem in Northeastern Europe,” 

Modern War Institute, April 2, 2018, available at <https://mwi.usma.

edu/baltic-trainspotting-railways-natos-logistics-problem-northeastern-europe/>.

81 While Russian hostile measures have been leveraged to expand 

influence and undermine governments and regimes across Europe, 

some argue that the results have been lackluster. See Andrew Radin 

and Raphael S. Cohen, “Russia’s Soft Strategy to Hostile Measures 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 304 19 

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National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

unified combatant commands through studies, reports, 

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Thomas F. Lynch III

Acting Director

Center for Strategic Research

William T. Eliason

Director

NDU Press

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Laura J. Junor

Director for Research

and Strategic Support

in Europe,” War on the Rocks, February 26, 2019, available at <https://

warontherocks.com/2019/02/russias-soft-strategy-to-hostile-measures-in-europe/>.

82 Michal Boksa, “Russian Information Warfare in Central and 

Eastern Europe: Strategies, Impact, and Counter-Measures,” German 

Marshall Fund of the United States, June 4, 2019, available at <www.

gmfus.org/publications/russian-information-warfare-central-andeastern-europe-strategies-impact-and-counter>.

83 It should also be noted that a more “offensive” strategy based 

more on punishment than denial has been proposed for the Nordic 

states. See, for example, Krister Andren, Krigsavhållande tröskelförmåga: 

Det svenske försvarets glömda huvuduppgift? [War-Deterrent Threshold 

Capacity: The Forgotten Main Task of Swedish Defence?] (Stockholm: 

FOI, 2014).

The authors would like to thanks Colonel Jyri Raitasalo, Ph.D., Professor of War Studies at the Finnish 

National Defence University, and Military Advisor 

to the Minister of Defence for his invaluable contributions and insights on early drafts of this paper, and 

as a guiding force in the Baltics Left of Bang project. 

The authors would also like to thank Mr. Kenneth 

Kligge, Dr. Callie Le Renard, and Lieutenant Colonel Tobias Switzer, USAF, in the Center for Applied 

Strategic Learning at the U.S. National Defense 

University for their design, execution, and analysis of 

the politico-military exercises informing this project.
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