This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2016 UT 12

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JIMMY DEAN MEINHARD,

Petitioner, 

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent.

No. 20140038

Filed March 23, 2016

On Direct Appeal 

Third District, Salt Lake

The Honorable L.A. Dever

No. 130900232

Attorneys:

Troy L. Booher, Beth E. Kennedy, Jensie L. Anderson,

Salt Lake City, for petitioner

Sean Reyes, Att‘y Gen., Andrew F. Peterson, Asst. Att‘y Gen.,

Salt Lake City, for respondent

ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE authored the opinion of the Court, in 

which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, JUSTICE DURHAM, and JUSTICE 

HIMONAS joined.

JUSTICE JOHN A. PEARCE became a member of the Court on 

December 17, 2015, after oral argument in this matter, and 

accordingly did not participate.

ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court:

¶ 1 In this case and another heard at the same time, Gordon v. 

State, 2016 UT 11, __ P.3d __, we consider important issues of first

impression under Part 3 of the Postconviction Remedies Act (PCRA). 

UTAH CODE § 78B-9-300 to -304. In this case we consider an appeal 

from the denial of a postconviction petition for DNA testing under 

section 301(2)(f) of that statute. The district court denied the petition
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Opinion of the Court

under that provision on the basis of its determination that the 

petitioner had not established that the evidence in question had the 

―potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that will 

establish the person‘s factual innocence.‖ Id. § 78B-9-301(2)(f).

¶ 2 We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. We interpret 

the operative terms of the statute—in particular, the ―new, 

noncumulative evidence‖ clause and the requirement of a 

―potential‖ for producing such evidence. Because we find the district 

court‘s analysis only partially in line with the law as we understand 

it, we reverse and remand to give the district court an opportunity to 

resolve the issues identified below in light of our opinion.

I

¶ 3 Jimmy Dean Meinhard was convicted of murder and 

tampering with evidence in a jury trial held in 1999. Those 

convictions were affirmed on appeal and upheld on multiple 

postconviction challenges in state and federal court.

¶ 4 Meinhard now seeks to challenge his conviction through a 

petition for postconviction DNA testing and, ultimately, a claim of 

factual innocence. The petition for DNA testing was denied in the 

district court. Meinhard challenges that decision on this appeal.

A

¶ 5 According to the evidence at the underlying trial,

1 Meinhard 

and his victim (Ronald Peterson) were part of the same group of 

friends. Their group included Meinhard‘s wife, Terry Meinhard; 

Peterson‘s girlfriend, Dawn Downs; and Larry Taylor, who was

living with the Meinhards. These individuals‘ personal relationships 

extended beyond mere friendships. Terry Meinhard was 

romantically involved with Peterson—purportedly with Meinhard‘s 

knowledge and consent. And before she was Peterson‘s girlfriend, 

Downs had been involved romantically with Taylor.

¶ 6 In February 1997, Meinhard asked Taylor to drive him to

Downs‘s mobile home in Tooele, where Peterson had periodically 

been staying. The point of the drive was to confront Peterson about 

some missing tools that Meinhard thought Peterson had stolen—a 

thought that earlier had prompted Meinhard to announce that ―he 

 

1 This statement of facts ―is presented in a light favorable to the 

prosecution, and consistent with the judgment of conviction.‖ Pinder 

v. State, 2015 UT 56, ¶ 5 n.1, ___ P.3d ___. 
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3

was going to kill‖ Peterson. Trial Day Three Transcript at 28–29 (Jan. 

28, 1999).

¶ 7 Meinhard could not drive his own pickup truck because he 

had broken his left leg in a motorcycle accident a few months earlier 

and his truck had a stiff clutch. The accident was a serious one. It 

dislocated Meinhard‘s left shoulder, fractured his right arm, and 

caused a serious leg injury. The injuries to the arm and shoulder 

were serious but not permanent. By the time of the visit to Downs‘s 

trailer, Meinhard had regained almost full use of his right arm, and 

he had recovered sufficiently from the shoulder injury to terminate 

physical therapy about three weeks later. But the leg injuries were 

more permanent. Meinhard required reconstructive surgery with 

extensive pins and rods. This prevented Meinhard‘s ankle from 

bending, required him to walk with a cane, and made his injured leg 

turn outward when he walked. When Meinhard and Taylor arrived 

at Downs‘s trailer, Meinhard got out of the car and instructed Taylor 

to drive out of sight, but to follow Meinhard and Peterson out of 

town if he saw the two leaving in Peterson‘s car. Downs‘s neighbor 

observed Meinhard and Peterson arguing outside, heard a car start, 

and noticed later that Peterson‘s car was gone. As instructed, Taylor 

followed Meinhard and Peterson as the two headed south out of 

Tooele. When Peterson and Meinhard pulled to the side of the road, 

Taylor passed them and pulled off further up the road. 

¶ 8 The evidence at trial indicated that Meinhard stabbed 

Peterson to death while Taylor waited. Peterson was stabbed first in 

the stomach, causing him to fall over the steering wheel, and then in 

the back, face, chest, and hand. He bled to death quickly. 

¶ 9 Fearing that something was wrong with Peterson‘s car, Taylor 

turned around and began driving back. He then saw Peterson‘s car 

approaching and noticed that Meinhard was driving, though he 

could not see Peterson. Taylor turned around again and followed the 

car until Meinhard pulled off the road. Taylor then pulled the car he 

was driving even with Peterson‘s car, rolled down the window, and

heard Meinhard say, ―I did him in. . . . I killed him.‖ Trial Day Two 

Transcript at 155 (Jan. 27, 1999).

¶ 10 Meinhard instructed Taylor to follow him as he disposed of 

the body. Meinhard stopped the car and Taylor waited further down 

the road as Meinhard dragged Peterson‘s body up a dirt trail, 

covered Peterson in his own jacket, stabbed him twice more in the 

upper back, and left his body in the brush. Again following 

Meinhard, Taylor drove to where Meinhard abandoned the car, 
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Opinion of the Court

approximately three hundred yards from a side road near Highway 

73. Meinhard got into Taylor‘s car covered in blood. He threw the 

knife he had used out the window, along with some of Peterson‘s 

personal belongings, during the drive back to Salt Lake City. 

¶ 11 Upon returning home, Meinhard called his wife and asked

her to come home from work. When Ms. Meinhard arrived, 

Meinhard confessed, ―I killed Ron,‖ and threatened her and Taylor 

that if they told anyone about the murder, ―he would kill [them], 

too.‖ Trial Day Three Transcript at 34 (Jan. 28, 1999). Meinhard was 

excited and happy while threatening his wife and Taylor. Ms. 

Meinhard related that ―[h]is eyes were real [sic] big and shiny.‘‖ 

Trial Day Three Transcript at 35 (Jan. 28, 1999). Although Meinhard 

was normally very punctual to work, arriving every day at 4:15 p.m., 

he did not clock in until 10:00 p.m. on the night of the murder.

¶ 12 Three days after the murder, and during a heavy snowstorm, 

Meinhard asked Taylor to accompany him back to Peterson‘s car. 

The two went to the store at approximately 2:00 a.m., bought bleach 

and toothache medicine, and proceeded to the abandoned car. They 

found the car after a long search, and Meinhard told Taylor to wait 

for him further up the road. Meinhard then proceeded to use bleach 

in an attempt to destroy fingerprints and other evidence in and on 

the car. 

¶ 13 Police found Peterson‘s car later the same day, but another 

day passed before police found the body. Blood evidence confirmed 

that Peterson had been killed in the driver‘s seat of his car and 

dragged across the console into the passenger seat before his body 

was removed and dumped in the bushes. Police found large 

footprints in the snow, footprints that clearly showed a ― ̳unique 

gait,‘ the left foot being turned outward as much as 45 degrees.‖ 

Trial Day Two Transcript at 81 (Jan. 27, 1999). Police also found an 

empty box of toothache drops and the medication itself, although a 

different brand from the one police later found in Meinhard‘s 

possession. Police later analyzed Meinhard‘s shoes, which matched 

the tread found in the snow around Peterson‘s car and were much 

larger than Taylor‘s shoe size. 

¶ 14 In light of defensive wounds found on Peterson‘s body, the 

medical examiner opined that Peterson died after a violent struggle. 

Police collected fibrous material that appeared to be dark hairs from

Peterson‘s hands and a dried substance that looked like blood under 

the fingernails. The State sent the fibers found on Peterson‘s hands 

and a fingerprint found on the car‘s door handle for testing, but the 

print was too incomplete to identify anyone, and the supposed hairs 
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5

turned out to be vegetation fibers. Additionally, the State performed 

DNA testing on the dried substance from Peterson‘s fingernail 

clippings, but the results showed no human DNA.

¶ 15 Taylor confessed his role in the crime and testified against 

Meinhard. Ms. Meinhard also testified against her husband, though 

she initially wrote a letter to Meinhard stating that she knew him to 

be innocent, implicating Taylor. Both witnesses told revised stories

(different from the version told in their initial questioning by 

investigators), and both exchanged their testimony for dropped

charges. Two other people testified to having heard Meinhard 

confess. A correctional officer declared that he overheard Meinhard 

tell other prisoners that he was in the facility because he had killed 

someone by stabbing him with a knife. A fellow inmate also stated 

that Meinhard had initially denied the murder but eventually 

confessed that he intended to blame the murder on his wife and 

Taylor, detailing to the inmate how he killed Peterson, hid the body, 

and destroyed the evidence days later. Meinhard claims the inmate 

was untruthful and had exchanged testimony against other inmates 

for leniency in four separate instances. Other inmates stated that 

Meinhard had remained true to his story that he was innocent and 

had been framed. 

¶ 16 After a jury convicted Meinhard of murder and tampering 

with evidence, he was sentenced to consecutive, indeterminate 

prison terms of five years to life and one to fifteen years. The Utah 

Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in 2001, see State v. 

Meinhard, 2001 UT App 304, 2001 WL 1243357, and this court denied 

certiorari, see State v. Meinhard, 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002). Meinhard

then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, 

which was denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

affirmed that decision. See Meinhard v. Friel, 118 Fed. App‘x, 392, 393, 

2004 WL 2786643 (10th Cir. 2004). Meinhard also filed two other 

petitions for postconviction relief, both of which were denied and 

then affirmed on appeal. See State v. Meinhard, 2006 UT App 320, cert.

denied, 150 P.3d 544 (Utah 2006); Meinhard v. Turley, 2009 UT App

150, cert. denied, 218 P.3d 620 (Utah 2009).

B

¶ 17 This case involves another petition for postconviction relief. In 

this petition Meinhard requests DNA testing of the material under 

Peterson‘s fingernails and the fingerprint on Peterson‘s car door 

under Part 3 of the Postconviction Remedies Act. UTAH CODE §§ 78B9-300 to -304. Although the DNA testing performed in 1998 came up 
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Opinion of the Court

inconclusive, failing to identify any human cells, Meinhard alleges 

that advances in technology have made it possible to extract an 

individual‘s DNA from mixed DNA samples, from ―very small 

amounts of genetic material,‖ and from touch DNA, ―which is left 

behind when skin cells touch an object.‖ Appellant‘s Brief at 6, 49.

¶ 18 Meinhard contends that such tests will show his factual 

innocence. He alleges that the tests will reveal DNA from Taylor, or 

from his wife or some other third party, but not from Meinhard. And 

he asserts that such results will implicate someone else and show

that he was not in the car during the murder and did not return to 

the scene afterwards. 

¶ 19 The district court denied Meinhard‘s petition. It agreed with 

the State that ―[n]o possible combination of DNA test results would 

prove Mr. Meinhard innocent.‖ Memorandum Decision and Order 

Denying Petition for Postconviction DNA Testing at 33 (hereafter 

―Memorandum Decision and Order‖). In interpreting section 78B-9-

301(2)(f), the court held that ―the statute is specific in its requirement 

that it is the DNA evidence—not the DNA evidence plus other new 

evidence—that must prove the Petitioner‘s factual innocence.‖ Id. at 

18. To qualify for DNA testing, the court concluded that Meinhard 

was required to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the new DNA evidence alone would potentially provide 

exculpatory evidence. Id. Thus, even if another person‘s DNA were 

found under Peterson‘s fingernails or on the car door, the court 

reasoned that that would prove only that Peterson did not scratch 

Meinhard and that Meinhard did not touch Peterson‘s car. This, in 

the district court‘s view, would not prove Meinhard‘s innocence.

¶ 20 The court also found little evidence that Peterson fought his 

killer. The trial record suggested that the defensive wounds on 

Peterson‘s body ―were clearly the result of the killer‘s knife cutting 

Peterson‘s flesh,‖ and the court quoted the medical examiner‘s 

statement that the victim was ―trying to ward off an attack of a sharp 

object.‖ Id. at 27–28. Thus, in the district court‘s view, ―[t]he 

circumstances of the murder do not logically require the killer‘s 

DNA to be found under Peterson‘s fingernails or on the door 

handle.‖ Id. at 35.

¶ 21 The district court further reasoned that even if another 

person‘s DNA is discovered, the DNA could have gotten under 

Peterson‘s fingernails in a variety of different ways, ―such as during 

a sporting event or sexual contact.‖ Id. at 38. And on that basis the 

court concluded that the ―DNA would not clearly relate to the 

murder, and that result would not exonerate [Meinhard].‖ Id.
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¶ 22 For these reasons the court denied the petition, concluding

that ―the absence of [Meinhard]‘s DNA—with or without finding 

someone else‘s DNA—is entirely consistent with his guilt.‖ Id. at 35.

―[W]hen viewed in its entirety,‖ the court held that ―the evidence 

weaves together to form a compelling, coherent and internally 

consistent picture of Petitioner‘s actions at both the murder and the 

cleanup.‖ It concluded that ―[p]etitioner is the common denominator 

that links each unique piece of evidence,‖ and thus that he ―has not 

provided any theory explaining how the totality of that evidence is 

in any way consistent with the guilt of another person, or why he 

confessed to numerous people if he was not guilty.‖ Id. at 31. And 

the court denied the petition on these grounds.

II

¶ 23 The denial of Meinhard‘s petition was based on three essential 

grounds. First, the district court implicitly endorsed the procedural 

form of the State‘s request that the court deny the petition for DNA 

testing—a written submission styled as a ―Response in Opposition to 

Petition for Post-Conviction DNA Testing,‖ which asked the district 

court to dismiss the petition on the merits by concluding that ―the 

evidence that is the subject of the request for testing‖ lacks ―the 

potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that will establish 

[Meinhard‘s] factual innocence.‖ Response in Opposition to Petition 

for Postconviction DNA Testing at 1–3, 41–42; see UTAH CODE § 78B9-301(2)(f). Second, the district court rendered an interpretation of 

the controlling terms of the operative provision of Part 3 of the 

PCRA—specifically, the clause requiring a showing that the 

evidence to be subject to testing have the ―potential to produce new, 

noncumulative evidence‖ establishing the petitioner‘s factual 

innocence. Memorandum Decision and Order at 18. And finally, the 

court applied that provision to the facts of this case, concluding that 

Meinhard had failed to carry his burden under this provision and 

dismissing the petition on its merits on that basis.

¶ 24 Meinhard has raised no objection to the procedural form of 

the State‘s response. So we decline to opine on the propriety of the 

procedure followed below, or its conformance with our decision in 

Gordon v. State, 2016 UT 11, ¶ 14, __ P.3d __. The remaining questions 

presented were raised and properly preserved. In the district court 

and on this appeal, Meinhard has objected to the district court‘s 

interpretation of the terms of section 301(2)(f) of the PCRA. And he 

has also challenged the court‘s application of that provision to the 

disposition of this case. We review the district court‘s interpretation 
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Opinion of the Court

of section 301(2)(f) de novo. See Irving Place Assocs. v. 628 Park Ave, 

LLC, 2015 UT 91, ¶ 11, 362 P.3d 1241 (concluding that ―legal 

questions of statutory interpretation‖ are considered ―de novo, 

affording no deference to the district court‘s legal conclusions‖). And 

because we find error in the district court‘s interpretation of the 

statute, we yield no deference to its application of the law to the facts 

of the case.

¶ 25 To sustain a request for postconviction DNA testing, a PCRA

petitioner must show that ―the evidence that is the subject of the 

request for testing has the potential to produce new, noncumulative 

evidence that will establish the person‘s factual innocence.‖ UTAH 

CODE § 78B-9-301(2)(f). The district court denied Meinhard‘s request 

for DNA testing because it concluded that ―no possible DNA test 

result could prove that Petitioner did not murder Peterson.‖ 

Memorandum Decision and Order at 17. In so doing, the court 

concluded as a threshold matter that ―it is the DNA evidence—not 

the DNA evidence plus other new evidence—that must prove the 

Petitioner‘s factual innocence.‖ Id. at 18.

¶ 26 In addition, the court implicitly interpreted the statutory term 

―potential‖ in a series of conclusions assessing the likelihood that the 

murderer left DNA under Peterson‘s fingernails or on the car door 

handle in question. Specifically, the court suggested that Meinhard 

bore the burden of establishing that ―the circumstances of the 

murder . . . logically require the killer‘s DNA to be found under 

Peterson‘s fingernails or on the door handle.‖2 Memorandum 

Decision and Order at 35, 38 (emphasis added). The court also

viewed the record as undermining Meinhard‘s theory that there may 

have been human hairs in Peterson‘s hands, as suggesting that 

Peterson inflicted only ―defensive‖ wounds on the killer, and as

showing ―no logical connection between the fingerprint and the 

killer.‖ Id. at 35. The court thus concluded that ―[t]he circumstances 

of the crime scene dictate that no one’s DNA would be found in the 

 

2 Alternatively, the court elsewhere framed the burden a bit 

differently—suggesting that Meinhard‘s petition failed because in its 

view the evidence indicated that Meinhard ―would not have left any 

biological evidence . . . such as skin cells under Peterson‘s 

fingernails,‖ or that ―[t]he circumstances of the crime scene dictate 

that no one‘s DNA would be found in the car or on Peterson‘s 

person.‖ Memorandum Decision and Order at 32. But this 

formulation is equally problematic, for reasons explained below in 

part II.B.
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car or on Peterson‘s person, thus negating [Meinhard‘s] theory of 

innocence premised on the lack of his DNA at the scene.‖ Id. at 32.

¶ 27 Ultimately, moreover, the court held that ―any test result 

showing the presence of DNA belonging to someone other than 

Petitioner could not prove the identity of the killer.‖ Id. at 38. It 

based that decision on the determinations that ―[s]uch DNA could 

have become lodged under Peterson‘s fingernails at any time before 

the murder and in any number of ways, such as during a sporting 

event or sexual contact,‖ and that ―such DNA would not clearly 

relate to the murder, and that result would not exonerate Petitioner.‖ 

Id. at 38.

¶ 28 In so ruling, the district court made two threshold legal 

conclusions and then applied the law to the facts of this case. The 

court‘s legal conclusions went to the meaning of ―new, 

noncumulative evidence‖ and (implicitly) to the ―potential‖ that it be 

produced. And the court‘s ultimate determination was that 

Meinhard had not carried his burden of satisfying the statutory 

standard for ordering DNA testing. For reasons explained below, we 

affirm the district court‘s construction of ―new, noncumulative 

evidence,‖ but reverse as to its implicit interpretation of the 

―potential‖ that it be produced. And because the district court‘s view 

of ―potential‖ seemed to pervade its analysis, we reverse and 

remand to allow it to reassess the question whether Meinhard 

carried his burden under the statute as clarified in this opinion.

A

¶ 29 The district court‘s first threshold legal conclusion concerned 

the meaning of ―new, noncumulative evidence.‖ It held that the 

referenced ―evidence‖ is limited to ―DNA evidence,‖ and does not 

encompass ―other new evidence‖ that DNA evidence might lead to 

indirectly. Memorandum Decision and Order at 18. Meinhard 

challenges that conclusion on appeal. He claims that the PCRA 

allows a petitioner to point to potential evidence beyond the DNA 

test results themselves to support a postconviction petition for 

testing. Thus, in Meinhard‘s view, a postconviction petitioner could 

establish a right to DNA testing by indicating the possibility that the 

requested DNA test results could ultimately lead to a confession. In 

the context of this case, Meinhard claims that he has a right to DNA 

testing even if test results alone would not exonerate him; it is 

enough in his view if such test results may ―spark an investigation 

that leads to exonerating evidence.‖ Appellant‘s Brief 49.
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Opinion of the Court

¶ 30 Under this line of thinking, it would not be essential for a 

DNA testing petitioner to explain how the DNA test results themselves

would establish the petitioner‘s factual innocence (as in a rape case, 

for example, where a semen sample not available at trial is tested 

and reveals DNA test results that exclude the petitioner and 

inculpate someone else3). Instead, in Meinhard‘s view, a successful 

DNA petition could simply indicate how DNA test results would 

eventually lead to other evidence that would exonerate the petitioner. 

Under Meinhard‘s reading of the statute, for example, DNA testing 

could be awarded if it could be established that DNA test results 

could lead to the identification of a new suspect, and that additional 

evidence (such as a confession by that suspect) would establish the 

petitioner‘s factual innocence. 

¶ 31 Meinhard bases this position on the plain meaning of ―new, 

noncumulative evidence.‖ He contends that the term evidence sweeps 

more broadly than DNA test results, encompassing leads on new 

witnesses and new physical or documentary evidence.

4 And he notes 

that the statute speaks more specifically elsewhere of ―DNA test 

results,‖ see UTAH CODE § 78B-9-303(2)(b)—an indication, in 

Meinhard‘s view, that the legislature must have meant to encompass 

more than just test results in the reference to ―new, noncumulative 

evidence.‖5

 

3 See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 792 F.3d 1174, 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 

2015) (upholding a petition for DNA testing under the Innocence 

Protection Act (18 U.S.C. § 3600), where previously untestable semen 

in a rape victim‘s underwear could now be tested, and the DNA 

testing ―could well prove [the petitioner‘s] actual innocence‖ given 

the facts of the case). 

4 See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 673 (10th ed. 2014) (defining evidence 

as ―[s]omething (including testimony, documents, and tangible 

objects) that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged 

fact; anything presented to the senses and offered to prove the 

existence or nonexistence of a fact‖).

5 Meinhard also rests his position on the modifier ―new.‖ He claims 

that all DNA test results are ―new,‖ and thus insists that the statute 

must have reference to other types of evidence. We disagree. Section 

301 expressly limits its provisions for DNA testing to cases in which 

―the evidence was not previously subjected to DNA testing,‖ or 

where ―new testing may resolve an issue not resolved by . . . prior 

testing.‖ UTAH CODE § 78B-9-301(2)(d). The statute‘s reference to 

―new, noncumulative evidence‖ is an apparent reinforcement of this 

(continued . . .)
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¶ 32 Meinhard has a point if we consider the term evidence in 

isolation. But we do not read statutes in isolation. We read them 

holistically. See Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 9, 248 

 

provision. We often presume that each term of a statute has 

independent meaning. See Hi-Country Prop. Rights Grp. v. Emmer, 

2013 UT 33, ¶ 24, 304 P.3d 851. But that is only a presumption. Id. 

(referring to the ―presumption of independent meaning (and/or its 

converse, the presumption against surplusage) (emphasis added)); 

Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2012) (asserting 

that the presumption ―that  ̳identical words used in different parts of 

the same act are intended to have the same meaning . . . readily 

yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which 

the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they 

were employed in different parts of the act with different intent‘‖

(citation omitted)); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING 

LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 174, 176 (2012) (―If possible, 

every word and every provision is to be given effect . . . [L]ike all 

other canons, this one must be applied with judgment and 

discretion, and with careful regard to context. It cannot always be 

dispositive because (as with most canons) the underlying 

proposition is not invariably true. Sometimes drafters do repeat 

themselves and do include words that add nothing of substance.‖

(emphasis added) (alteration in original)); LINDA D. JELLUM,

MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 104 (2008) (―Statutes are not

always carefully drafted. Legal drafters often include redundant 

language on purpose to cover any unforeseen gaps or simply for no 

good reason at all.‖ (emphasis added)); Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., 

N.A., 562 U.S. 61, 81 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing a British 

opinion that notes that sometimes statutory language ―adds nothing 

but emphasis,‖ and observing that ―[t]he canon against superfluity is 

not a canon against verbosity‖; also noting that ―[w]hen a thought 

could have been expressed more concisely, one does not always have 

to cast about for some additional meaning to the word or phrase that 

could have been dispensed with‖). And the presumption is rebutted 

in circumstances where the terms of the statute suggest that the 

legislature was using a redundancy as a point of emphasis. That 

seems to be the case here. The adjective ―new‖ appears repeatedly in 

Part 3 of the PCRA as a modifier for ―DNA test results.‖ See UTAH 

CODE § 78B-9-303(2)(a)(i), (2)(c), & (2)(d). This, again, seems to 

reinforce the express requirement of section 301(2)(d). And we think 

the same adjective fulfills the same function in section 301(2)(f).
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Opinion of the Court

P.3d 465. And in the broader context of the surrounding provisions 

of Part 3 of the PCRA, we interpret ―new, noncumulative evidence‖ 

as the district court did—as a reference to DNA test results, and not 

to any and all evidence that might conceivably be uncovered as an 

indirect result of DNA tests. That conclusion follows from two

essential premises.

¶ 33 First, section 301(2)(f) is supposed to be a meaningful hurdle,

and it would not be if Meinhard‘s view prevailed. DNA testing is 

expensive; postconviction litigation over such testing is even more 

so. Postconviction review, moreover, is supposed to be the 

exception, not the rule. If we accepted Meinhard‘s reading of the 

statute, the trigger for DNA testing in section 301(2)(f) would be 

easily met in most any case. All it would take to get DNA testing 

would be imaginative lawyering. And that would hardly be difficult.

Most any lawyer could conjure a chain of events in which DNA 

testing could generate a new lead that could conceivably give rise to 

a confession or a new piece of (non-DNA) evidence. That would 

effectively nullify section 301(2)(f). And that effect calls Meinhard‘s 

view into serious question. See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C.

STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 229 (2d ed. 2013) (―[A]n 

interpretation that renders certain terms duplicative may not be 

much of a problem, but an interpretation that renders a substantive 

provision of a statute entirely superfluous is something courts should 

strain to avoid.‖).6

¶ 34 Second, and more importantly, the balance of Part 3 clarifies 

the meaning of ―new, noncumulative evidence.‖ The full statutory 

phrase is ―new, noncumulative evidence that will establish the person’s 

factual innocence.‖ UTAH CODE § 78B-9-301(2)(f) (emphasis added). 

And other provisions of the code make clear that only DNA test 

results can establish factual innocence under Part 3 of the PCRA. 

Section 303(2)(b) says that expressly. It provides that the court may 

vacate the conviction only if it ―determines that the DNA test result

demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the person is 

 

6 See also VCS, Inc., v. Utah Cmty. Bank, 2012 UT 89, ¶ 18, 293 P.3d 290 

(rejecting a statutory interpretation that would ―run[] afoul of the 

settled canon of preserving independent meaning for all statutory 

provisions‖ by ―effectively nullify[ing] the 180-day requirement set 

forth in the general rule‖ (emphasis added)); JAMES KENT,

COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *467 n.(y1) (Charles M. Barnes 

ed., 13th ed. 1884) (observing that repeals by implication are ―very 

much disfavored‖).
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factually innocent.‖7 UTAH CODE § 78B-9-303(2)(b) (emphasis 

added).8 Thus, when read in the context of the overall statute, the 

section 301(2)(f) reference to ―new, noncumulative evidence that will 

establish the person‘s factual innocence‖ must be a reference to DNA 

test results.9

 

7 Meinhard suggests that the district court‘s construction of the 

statute renders section 301(2)(f) redundant—that it conflates the 

301(2)(f) hurdle with the ultimate determination on the merits under 

section 303(2)(b). But that argument misses two important 

procedural distinctions between these two provisions. The first goes 

to the operative standard of proof. The standard under the former 

section is a preponderance of the evidence; testing is allowed if it is 

shown by a preponderance that DNA test results will establish the 

petitioner‘s factual innocence. The standard under the latter section 

is quite different. It allows vacatur of the conviction upon a showing 

that DNA test results show factual innocence by clear and 

convincing evidence. The second distinction goes to issues addressed 

below. At the 301(2)(f) stage we are asking only about a potential for 

DNA test results. The proceeding gets to section 303(2)(b) only if 

such results are in fact generated and are favorable to the petitioner.

8 See also UTAH CODE § 78B-9-303(1)(a) (a petitioner who is allowed to 

pursue DNA testing may seek to vacate his conviction under Part 3 

only if ―the result of postconviction DNA testing is favorable‖ to the 

petitioner (emphasis added)); id. § 78B-9-303(1)(b) (at the hearing on 

whether the conviction should be vacated, the State may ―attempt to 

demonstrate through evidence and argument that, despite the DNA 

test results, the state possesses sufficient evidence of the person‘s 

guilt so that the person is unable to demonstrate by clear and 

convincing evidence that the person is factually innocent‖ (emphasis 

added)).

9 Admittedly the legislature could have spoken more clearly. If 

section 301(2)(f) referred to ―DNA test results‖ instead of ―new, 

noncumulative evidence,‖ we could endorse the district court‘s 

construction of the statute more readily. But that is not the standard. 

―[T]he legislature‘s failure to speak more clearly tells us little or 

nothing about its intent in using terms that are less clear.‖ Irving 

Place Assocs. v. 628 Park Ave., LLC, 2015 UT 91, ¶ 16, 362 P.3d 1241. 

And for reasons noted above we conclude that section 301(2)(f)‘s 

reference to ―new, noncumulative evidence that will establish the 

person‘s factual innocence‖ is a reference to the only kind of ―new, 

(continued . . .)
MEINHARD v. STATE

Opinion of the Court

¶ 35 That said, ―new, noncumulative evidence‖ cannot mean just 

the ―DNA evidence‖ subjected to DNA testing by itself. Such 

evidence would be meaningless without test results. Evidence of

―DNA test results,‖ moreover, is not limited to a mere graphical or 

numeric representation of the DNA found on the evidence in 

question.10 Logically and legally, the parties must have the 

opportunity to present evidence necessary to interpret or 

contextualize the DNA profile generated by DNA testing. A 

graphical or numeric DNA profile alone would be meaningless. The 

court would be in no position to analyze whether that profile 

establishes the petitioner‘s factual innocence without some basis for 

comparison to an existing DNA database or to evidence of DNA 

from the petitioner or from other suspects, or without some other 

kind of evidentiary analysis. And the statute itself appears to 

provide for such analysis.11 So although we agree with the district 

 

noncumulative evidence‖ that can establish factual innocence under 

Part 3 of the PCRA—DNA test results.

10 In both technical and legal literature, ―DNA test results‖ refers, at 

a minimum, to a comparison of the DNA profile derived from the 

evidence being tested to the petitioner‘s DNA profile. When the 

question presented also implicates a third-party, ―DNA test results‖ 

also encompasses a comparison to the DNA profile of other suspects, 

or to a larger database of possible suspects. See, e.g., Kathryn M. 

Turman, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, Understanding DNA Evidence: A Guide 

for Victim Service Providers, OFFICE OF VICTIMS FOR CRIME BULLETIN, 

April 2001, at 4, available at https://perma.cc/L5BT-UKZ2 (the actual 

graphical or numerical output of the testing is called a DNA profile, 

and a test result is the comparison of that profile to a profile created 

from testing a different sample of DNA); Karen Christian, “And the 

DNA Shall Set You Free”: Issues Surrounding Postconviction DNA 

Evidence and the Pursuit of Innocence, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1195, 1222 n.118 

(2001) (―The results of a DNA test may be negative, meaning the 

crime scene DNA and the suspect‘s DNA do not match . . . .‖); see 

also generally U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, 

Postconviction DNA Testing: Recommendations for Handling Requests, 

Sept. 1999, available at https://perma.cc/MAP4-YN4Z.

11 See, e.g., UTAH CODE § 78B-9-302(1) (providing that a petitioner 

seeking DNA testing consents to ―provide samples of body fluids for 

use in the DNA testing,‖ suggesting that DNA test analysis under 

the statute will at least involve comparison of the petitioner‘s DNA 

with the DNA taken from the evidence).
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Opinion of the Court

15

court that the ―new, noncumulative evidence‖ referred to in section 

301(2)(f) is focused on DNA test results, and not on any other 

evidence that such results might indirectly lead to, we emphasize 

that the statute does not close the door on introduction of evidence 

necessary to interpret and contextualize the significance of those test 

results in a section 303 hearing to vacate the conviction.

¶ 36 That seems apparent in the terms of section 303(1)(b) of the 

statute, which sets the parameters of the hearing on factual 

innocence in a proceeding under Part 3, and section 303(2)(b), which 

sets the standard for proving factual innocence. Section 303(1)(b) 

provides that the State may ―attempt to demonstrate through 

evidence and argument that, despite the DNA test results, the state 

possesses sufficient evidence of the person‘s guilt so that the person 

is unable to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the 

person is factually innocent.‖ UTAH CODE § 78B-9-303(1)(b). And 

section 303(2)(b), as noted above, provides for vacatur of the 

conviction only if the court ―determines that the DNA test result 

demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the person is 

factually innocent.‖ Id. § 78B-9-303(2)(b). The court cannot 

meaningfully determine whether the DNA test results prove factual 

innocence without considering evidence necessary to interpret and 

contextualize the DNA profile that is generated by DNA testing.

Thus, evidence comparing the DNA profile to an existing database 

or to DNA profiles of other suspects may be considered by the court 

in assessing factual innocence under Part 3.

¶ 37 But that does not mean that any and all speculative evidence 

is fair game on the threshold question presented under section 

301(2)(f). There is a difference between evidence necessary to 

interpret and contextualize a DNA test result and evidence that such 

a result might indirectly produce. The mere possibility of a 

confession from another suspect, for example, or of a new lead as to 

a new witness or the possibility of new physical evidence, would not 

come into play under the statute. Part 3 of the PCRA deals with 

establishing factual innocence by the presentation of DNA test 

results. And, like the district court, we do not read section 301(2)(f) 

to open the door to the consideration of any and all evidence that 

might indirectly be produced by such test results.12

 

12 In so concluding, we do not foreclose the propriety of such 

evidence altogether. Our analysis here concerns only Part 3 of the 

PCRA, which deals with proof of factual innocence through DNA 

(continued . . .)
MEINHARD v. STATE

Opinion of the Court

¶ 38 Meinhard counters that the reading we adopt will create a 

catch-22 for petitioners seeking postconviction relief under Part 4 of 

the PCRA. He points to Utah Code section 78B-9-402(2)(a)(i), which 

prescribes standards for a petitioner to bring forth any ―credible,‖ 

―newly discovered material evidence‖ that ―establishes that the 

petitioner is factually innocent.‖ ―If some or all of the evidence 

alleged to be exonerating is biological evidence subject to DNA 

testing,‖ the provision allows the petitioner to seek DNA testing 

pursuant to Section 78B-9-301. Id. § 78B-9-402(6).

¶ 39 Meinhard claims that our reading either makes Part 4 

redundant in light of Part 3, or makes it impossible for a petitioner to 

get DNA testing when he is directed to seek it under subsection 

402(6). If the DNA test results alone are sufficient to establish the 

petitioner‘s factual innocence, Meinhard notes that there is no need 

for a petitioner to bring forth additional non-DNA evidence, as 

contemplated under Part 4. And if DNA test results are insufficient 

on their own to establish innocence, but may do so when combined 

with other newly discovered evidence, Meinhard says that the 

petitioner will never get DNA testing under Part 3 if DNA test 

results must alone establish innocence to trigger the right to testing

in the first place.

¶ 40 This would all be troubling if it were correct. But we reject the 

premises of Meinhard‘s argument. Instead we accept the State‘s 

―final puzzle piece‖ view of the interaction between Parts 3 and 4: A 

petitioner who files a factual innocence petition under Part 4 may 

subsequently seek DNA testing, when needed, under Part 3. Thus, 

the requested DNA test results may be the missing piece in the 

innocence puzzle theorized by the petitioner, and can be said to have 

the potential to establish the petitioner‘s innocence after taking into 

account the other newly discovered evidence from the Part 4 

petition. We reject Meinhard‘s argument on that basis. We read Parts 

3 and 4 of the statute as parts of a harmonious whole. See Strohm v. 

ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc., 2013 UT 21, ¶ 21, 308 P.3d 424 (―We 

interpret individual sections of the code  ̳in harmony with other 

 

testing. And the PCRA also encompasses Part 4, which provides 

mechanisms for proof of factual innocence more generally. See UTAH 

CODE § 78B-9-401 to -405. Thus, a petitioner who discovers a new 

witness or new physical evidence, or secures a new confession, could 

advance such evidence in a proceeding under Part 4. See id. § 78b-9-

402(2)(a)(i) (enabling a petitioner to introduce ―newly discovered 

material evidence‖ in seeking to be declared ―factually innocent‖). 
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Opinion of the Court

17

provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under the 

same and related chapters.‘‖ (citation omitted)).

13

B

¶ 41 The district court‘s second legal conclusion was more implicit. 

In assessing the viability of Meinhard‘s request for DNA testing, the 

district court gave an implicit construction of the ―potential‖ for a 

piece of evidence to ―produce new, noncumulative evidence‖ 

establishing factual innocence. It did so in a series of conclusions 

addressed to the likelihood that the murderer may have left DNA 

under Peterson‘s fingernails or in a fingerprint on the car door 

handle. The court‘s conclusions on this score were threefold: (a) its 

determination, in two different portions of its opinion, that ―the 

circumstances of the murder do not logically require the killer‘s DNA 

to be found under Peterson‘s fingernails or on the door handle,‖ 

Memorandum Decision and Order at 35, 38; (b) a series of grounds 

for the court‘s determination that the killer likely did not, or would 

not have, left DNA; and (c) in support of the foregoing, the 

conclusions that the record did not show ―offensive wounds‖ by 

Peterson, and that fibers found on Peterson‘s hands were not human 

hairs.

¶ 42 The district court‘s opinion never rendered an express 

construction of the statutory term ―potential.‖ But its analysis was 

premised on an implicit view of this term.14 And our review must 

begin with our understanding of this provision.

 

13 See also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 

LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES 

OF THE AMERICAN UNION 58 (1868) (―[O]ne part is not to be allowed 

to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction the two can be 

made to stand together.‖).

14 In quoting and interpreting section 301(2)(f), the district court 

concluded that ―the statute is specific in its requirement that it is the 

DNA evidence . . . that must prove the Petitioner‘s factual innocence.‖ 

Memorandum Decision and Order at 18 (emphasis added). At the 

petition stage, however, there is no requirement that the DNA test 

results conclusively prove factual innocence; instead the question is 

only whether there is a ―potential‖ of such evidence, and whether 

any such evidence ―will‖ establish factual innocence. UTAH CODE 

§ 78B-9-301(2)(f). We analyze that language below.
MEINHARD v. STATE

Opinion of the Court

¶ 43 Evidence has the potential to produce DNA test results if it has 

a possibility of doing so. See WEBSTER‘S NEW INT. 1932 (2d ed. 1937)

(defining potential as ―[t]hat which is possible‖); AMERICAN HERITAGE

1379 (5th ed. 2011) (―The possibility that something might happen or 

result from given conditions . . . .‖).15 A ―potential,‖ then, is

something less than a likelihood—and well short of a certainty. The 

context of the statute confirms that principle. It does so by using two 

different terms on the spectrum of likelihood—―potential‖ and 

―will.‖ Evidence must have the ―potential to produce‖ new DNA test 

results, and it must be shown that such test results ―will establish . . . 

factual innocence.‖ UTAH CODE § 78B-9-301(2)(f). Thus, in context 

―potential‖ is something different from an assessment of what likely 

―will‖ come to pass. It is a possibility.16

¶ 44 The district court‘s implicit construction of section 301(2)(f) is

incompatible with this standard. That is most apparent in the court‘s 

determination that the circumstances of Peterson‘s murder ―do not 

logically require‖ the killer‘s DNA to be found. That is the language 

of certainty, and a potential is much less than that. But other 

elements of the court‘s analysis also seem inconsistent with the

applicable sense of ―potential‖ set forth above. To the extent the 

court was assessing whether it was more likely than not that the 

killer‘s DNA would be found, it was also asking the wrong question. 

¶ 45 Finally, the court‘s analysis of the absence of evidence of 

―offensive wounds‖ by Peterson, and of the notion that fibers found 

in Peterson‘s hands were not human hairs, is also problematic.

Certainly it‘s true that offensive wounds would be more likely

consistent with the prediction that Peterson‘s fingernails could 

contain the DNA of his killer. But we do not think it can be said that 

the absence of such wounds eliminates any ―potential‖ for such 

DNA. It is undisputed that Peterson had a violent struggle with his 

assailant. Without more, we cannot conclude from the lack of 

offensive wounds that there is no meaningful possibility that the 

 

15 The other senses of the noun potential attested in the dictionary are 

either technical or irrelevant here. See Gordon v. State, 2016 UT 11, 

¶ 29 n.9, __ P.3d __ (―Dictionaries . . . reveal that words have a 

 ̳limited range of meaning‘ and help exclude an  ̳interpretation that 

goes beyond that range.‘‖ (citation omitted)).

16 That is not to say that any speculative possibility would count as a 

―potential.‖ When we speak of a potential we don‘t mean certainty or 

even likelihood; but we also don‘t mean rank, wild speculation. The 

possibility must be a meaningful one.
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Opinion of the Court

19

assailant‘s DNA ended up under Peterson‘s fingernails. And the fact 

that the fibers in Peterson‘s hands turned out to be vegetation rather 

than human hair does not mean a violent struggle (or even just 

physical contact) between Peterson and his killer did not occur; it 

just means that none of the killer‘s hair ended up in Peterson‘s grasp. 

The absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence, and there is 

enough other plausible evidence to sustain a theory that the killer‘s 

DNA could have ended up under Peterson‘s fingernails.

¶ 46 For these reasons we find error in the district court‘s implicit 

construction of the statutory reference to a ―potential‖ for the 

production of new DNA test results. We must therefore proceed to 

the question whether such error was prejudicial. This is a close call. 

Despite the court‘s (erroneous) determinations regarding the 

potential of the killer‘s DNA being found under Peterson‘s 

fingernails or on the door handle, the court ultimately rendered a 

conclusion rejecting Meinhard‘s case even assuming the possibility of 

finding some third party‘s DNA. Thus, the court concluded that 

―[s]ignificant physical and circumstantial evidence conclusively 

linked the Petitioner to the murder and the destruction of evidence,‖ 

and that ―[e]ven setting aside the significant eye-witness testimony of 

[Meinhard‘s wife], Taylor, and others to whom the Petitioner 

confessed[,] . . . evidence independently tied Petitioner to the murder 

and the crime scene.‖ Memorandum Decision and Order at 28.18 And 

this led the district court to conclude that ―[a]lthough arguably no 

one piece of circumstantial evidence proves [Meinhard] guilty in 

 

18 That evidence included a single set of large footprints at Peterson‘s 

car with the left foot demonstrating an unusual gait, consistent with 

Meinhard‘s large feet (and not Taylor‘s smaller size), the tread of his 

shoes, and the hampered walking of Meinhard after his earlier crash; 

toothache drops found at the scene and on Meinhard; eyewitness 

testimony that Meinhard was arguing with Peterson earlier in the 

afternoon on the day of the murder; evidence that whoever 

destroyed evidence at Peterson‘s car was tired or winded by the 

physical exertion, and Meinhard was known to suffer from severe 

asthma; a 10:00 p.m. clock-in time for work the day of the murder 

when Meinhard had consistently checked in at 4:15 pm; complaints 

of pain in Meinhard‘s left shoulder and biceps after the murder; and 

a correctional officer overhearing Meinhard inform other inmates 

that he was in prison for having ―killed somebody‖ by ―stab[ing] 

him with a knife.‖ Memorandum Decision and Order at 29-31.
MEINHARD v. STATE

Opinion of the Court

isolation, when viewed in its entirety the evidence weaves together 

to form a compelling, coherent and internally consistent picture of 

[Meinhard‘s] actions at both the murder and cleanup.‖ Id. at 31. 

¶ 47 On these grounds, the district court viewed Meinhard as ―the 

common denominator that links each unique piece of evidence.‖ Id.

And the court further found that Meinhard had ―not provided any 

theory explaining how the totality of [the] evidence is in any way 

consistent with the guilt of another person, or why [Meinhard] 

confessed to numerous people if he was not guilty.‖ Id.

¶ 48 For these reasons it seems possible that the district court 

would have reached the same conclusions on this record even absent 

the threshold error in (implicitly) interpreting the statute.19 Yet we 

reverse and remand to allow the court to resolve the case anew 

under the clarifications rendered in this opinion. We do so because 

the above-noted legal deficiencies seem to pervade the district 

court‘s analysis. This is not a case of an error in a minor side point of 

discussion in the district court opinion. The court‘s assessment of the 

potential of the killer‘s DNA being found runs throughout the 

court‘s analysis. Thus, although we do not foreclose the possibility 

that the district court may reach the same conclusion anew on 

remand, we deem it appropriate to allow the court to reconsider the 

important issues in this case in light of the clarification we offer in 

this opinion.

III

¶ 49 This case and its companion, Gordon v. State, 2016 UT 11, __ 

P.3d __, present this court with its first opportunity to interpret the 

terms of the DNA testing provisions of the PCRA. In this case we 

affirm the district court‘s construction of the statute in part and 

reverse in part. We agree with the court‘s understanding of ―new, 

noncumulative evidence‖20 but find error in its construction of the 

―potential‖ for such evidence as that term is used in section 301(2)(f). 

 

19 See Memorandum Decision and Order at 33 (―No possible 

combination of DNA test results would prove Mr. Meinhard 

innocent.‖).

20 During oral argument both parties discussed the possibility of a 

non-indigent defendant obtaining DNA testing on her own without 

the State paying testing expenses. Because this issue was not 

properly raised and briefed, we decline to reach it. We therefore 

neither foreclose nor endorse the possibility.
Cite as: 2016 UT 12

Opinion of the Court

21

And we remand to allow the court to reevaluate its disposition of the 

petition for DNA testing in light of this opinion.