alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### THOMPSON *vs.*THE STATE.

[indictment fob malicious mischief.]

X. *Jury, province of; what charge invades.*— A charge which assumes a fact to be proved, without referring to the jury the credibility of the evidence offered to prove it, and whether if credible it proves the fact, invades the province of the jury, and is therefore erroneous.

Appeal from Criminal Court of Dallas.

Tried before Hon. George H. Craig.

The point upon which the case turns is fully stated in the opinion.

--for appellant.

J. W. A. Sanford, Attorney-General, *contra.*

PECK, C. J.

The indictment in this case was found in the criminal court of Dallas county. The charge is, that the appellant, John Thompson, unlawfully and maliciously disabled a cow, the property of Stephen Tarrant, against the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama.

The trial was had on the plea of not guilty; the appellant was convicted and fined fifty dollars. On the trial a-bill of exceptions was signed and sealed at his instance, which set out all the evidence.

The court charged the jury in writing, to which the appellant excepted. In this charge, among other things, the *38court stated to tbe jury, “It has been testified to before you, that tbe cow proven to have been shot, was outside of tbe field in wbicb tbe corn of John Thompson was growing at tbe time of tbe shooting.” Was this proper to be said to tbe jury? or, in saying it, did tbe court invade tbe province of tbe jury? We think it was most clearly tkp latter. Tbe court assumed to tell tbe jury what was testified to, and what was proved, without leaving it to tbe jury to find from tbe evidence what was, or was not proved. It assumed as a fact that tbe cow was shot, and where she was at tbe time she was shot — -that she was outside of tbe field in wbicb tbe corn of John Thompson was growing, at tbe time of tbe shooting. This was a clear invasion of tbe province of tbe jury. A charge wbicb assumes a fact to be proved, without referring to tbe jury tbe credibihty of tbe evidence offered to prove it, and whether, if credible, it proves tbe fact, is an invasion of tbe province of tbe jury. It is tbe province of tbe jury, not of tbe court, to find Bom tbe evidence what is proved. The jury alone can determine tbe credibility of tbe evidence, and what it proves, and a charge that assumes to do this is erroneous. Shep. Dig. p. 460.

Tbe judgment is reversed, and tbe cause is remanded for a new trial.
Exhibit 32


                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                     18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


Pursuant  to  section  906  of  the Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002
(subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18,
United  States Code), each of the undersigned officers of  Ennis,
Inc.  (the  "Company"), does hereby certify,  to  such  officer's
knowledge, that:

The  Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter  ended  August
31,  2005 (the Form 10-Q) of the Company fully complies with  the
requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act  of  1934  and information contained in the Form 10-Q  fairly
presents,  in all material respects, the financial condition  and
results of operations of the Company.




/s/ Keith S. Walters

Keith S. Walters
Chief Executive Officer
September 30, 2005





/s/ Harve Cathey

Harve Cathey
Chief Financial Officer
September 30, 2005




The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to
section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsection (a) and
(b)  of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code)
and  is not being filed as part of the Form 10-Q or as a separate
disclosure document.
Highflightphoto

85 Conifer Court Port Ludlow, Wash. 98365 Sept. 22, 2015 U.S. Department of Transportation Docket Management System 1200 New Jersey

Ave., SE Washington, DC 20590 Re: Amendment to Exemption 11455 issued pursuant to Section 333 of the FAA Reform Act and Part II of the Federal Aviation Regulations in Regulatory Docket No. FAA

- 2014

- 1010. Dear Madam, Sir, Highflightphoto currently holds an Ex emption numbered 11455 (hereinafter the Ex emption) issued for the purpose of performing aerial imaging and data collection. Highflightphoto herby requests an amendment to that Exemption to include additional small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) that fully

complies with the conditions of the Exemption to support client requests (public interest). The requested system (to be used under the same terms and conditions contained in the original Ex emption) to be added to our existing Exemption is cited below.

 senseFly

- eXom The eXom system has been previously approved for numerous entities through the 333 exemption process and manuals are on file. Highflightphoto states that no conditions or limitation from our original request have changed and all operations of the additional UAS will be in full compliance with the terms and condition of the Exemption. Please contact Mike Porter, 360 301 0341, highflightphoto@gmail.com should you have any questions concerning this request for an amendment to the Exemption.

Mike Porter President Highflightphoto Attach;
#### William Kotsakis, appellee, v. Peter Orphan and Dennis J. Egan, appellants.

Gen. No. 29,775.

Suit to recover possession of property claimed under foreclosure of chattel mortgage and attached by the defendant. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Charles Schaefer, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924. Affirmed.

Opinion filed April 13, 1925.

Rehearing denied April 27, 1925. *Certiorari*denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).

William R. Brand, for appellants.

Harry S. Cowan and Van Natta & King, for appellee.

Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.
Exhibit 31.2

 

I, John K. Grelle, certify that:

| 1) | I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A of BFC Financial Corporation; and |
|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| 2) | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report. |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

Date:  April 29, 2013

 

 

By: /s/ John K. Grelle            

  John K. Grelle

  Chief Financial Officer

 

 

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE   CONTAINES   SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION   EXTRACTED  FROM
CONSOLIDATED  AUDITED  CONDENSED  FINANCIAL  STATEMENTS FILED WITH THE COMPANY'S
AUGUST 31, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-KSB AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0000316128
<NAME>                        FLEXWIGHT CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER>                                          1
<CURRENCY>                                U. S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
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#### In the Matter of Donald Murray, Petitioner, v. Thomas M. Stark, as County Judge of Suffolk County, et al., Respondents.

Proceeding under article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, commenced in this court pursuant to section 506 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules: (a) to review and annul the determinations of the three respondents: the County Judge, the Police Captain and the District Attorney of Suffolk County, recommending the revocation of and revoking the petitioner’s pistol license and the petitioner’s pistol dealer’s license; and (b) to direct respondents to reinstate such licenses. On the return date of the proceeding, respondents moved pursuant to statute (CPLR 7804, subd. [f]), to dismiss the petition on the ground, *inter alia,*that on its face it is insufficient to entitle petitioner to the relief demanded. Motion to dismiss granted, and petition dismissed, without costs and without prejudice to the service of an amended petition, within 30 days after entry of the order hereon, stating *with respect to each respondent:*(a) the specific wrongs of which complaint is made; (b) the specific grounds upon which petitioner seeks relief (see CPLEt 7803); and (c) the specific provisions of law upon which petitioner relies for his right to relief. Beldoek, P. J., Ughetta, Christ, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
#### Michael Nowark, Appellant, v. Jean Maguire, Respondent.

In an action to recover damages for slander, plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated February 5, 1963, as granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint for insufficiency, pursuant to subdivision 4 of rule 106 of the former Rules of Civil Practice. Order, insofar as appealed from, reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements; and "defendant’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint denied. The defendant’s time to answer such complaint is extended until 30 days after entry of the order hereon. The complaint alleges that the defendant, in the presence of plaintiff’s wife and others, said of and concerning this plaintiff: “You are both queers. Even your wife said you were odd and she was stuck with you. I’ll take you to Court for bothering my seven-year-old orphan.” In our opinion, these statements are slanderous per se *(Mencher*v. *Chesley,*297 N. Y. 94, 100, and eases there cited; *Brown*v. *Du Frey,*1 N Y 2d 190, 199). Words, charged to be defamatory are to be taken in their natural meaning, and the courts will not strain to interpret them in their mildest and most inoffensive sense in order to hold them non-libelous and nonslanderous *(Mencher*v. *Chesley,*supra). In “ determining the capacity of these offending words to injure plaintiff, we must go beyond the dictionary definitions; and, no matter how defamatory some of the synonyms may seem when isolated, we must appraise their effect and impact in the fair *902context” of the Avoids or statements "in their entirety” *(Greyhound Securities*v. *Greyhound Corp.,*11 A D 2d 390, 392). Assuming, hoAvever, that innuendo Avas necessary, Ave are of the opinion that the allegations in the second amended complaint adequately explain and point out the slanderous meaning of the words used; hence they are actionable *(Tracy*v. *Newsday,*5 N Y 2d 134, 136). Beldock, P. J., Ughetta, Kleinfeld, Brennan and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0000315958
<NAME>                        NEW GENERATION FOODS, INC.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         13
<SECURITIES>                                   115
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               128
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 128
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          97
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          1,100
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       4
<OTHER-SE>                                     (1,073)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   128
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               0
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               28
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (20)
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            3
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</TABLE>
§ 93.7 Responsibilities. ( a ) *The General Counsel.* The GC is responsible for overseeing NSA compliance with § 93.1(a) and this part 93, and for consulting with DoJ when appropriate. In response to a litigation demand requesting official information or the testimony of NSA personnel as witnesses, the GC will coordinate NSA action to determine whether official information may be released and whether NSA personnel may be interviewed, contacted, or used as witnesses. The GC will determine what, if any, conditions will be imposed upon such release, interview, contact, or testimony. In most cases, an NSA attorney will be present when NSA personnel are interviewed or testify concerning official information. The GC may delegate these authorities.
( b ) *The Deputy Director for Plans and Policy (DDPP).* The DDPP will assist the GC, upon request, in identifying and coordinating with NSA components that have cognizance over official information requested in a litigation demand. Additionally, the DDPP will advise the GC on the classified status of official information, and, when necessary, assist in declassifying, redacting, substituting, or summarizing official information for use in litigation. The DDPP may require the assistance of other Key Component Chiefs.
( c ) *Chiefs of Key Components and Field Activities.* Chiefs of Key Components and Field Activities shall ensure that their personnel are informed of the contents of this part 93, particularly of the requirements to consult with the OGC prior to responding to any litigation demand, and to inform the OGC whenever they receive service of process that is not clearly in their individual capacities. Field Chiefs will notify the OGC of the persons they designate under § 93.5(b)(3).
( d ) *The Deputy Director for Administration (DDA).* Within 60 days of the date of this part, the DDA shall submit to the GC for approval procedures for the attempted delivery of service of process during duty hours when an attorney of the OGC is not available.
#### Marleene Matias, an Infant, by Ricardo Matias, Her Guardian ad Litem, et al., v. New York City Housing Authority.

Motion for enlargement of time granted insofar as to extend the plaintiffs-appellants’ time to serve and file the record on appeal and appellants’ points to and including February 28, 1961, with notice of argument for the April 1961 Term of this court, said appeal to be argued or submitted when reached. Respondent’s points are to be served and filed on or before March 15, 1961. Concur— Botein, P. J., Valente, Stevens, Eager and Bergan, JJ.
# **Exhibit 99.1**

**CERTIFICATION**

      Pursuant toSection 906 of the Public Company Accounting Reform and InvestorProtection Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted),Gene W. Ray, the Chief Executive Officer of The Titan Corporation(the “Company”), and Mark W. Sopp, the Chief FinancialOfficer of the Company, each hereby certifies that, to the best ofhis knowledge:

**1.**      TheCompany’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period endedMarch 31, 2003, to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit99.1 (the “Periodic Report”), fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

**2.**      Theinformation contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, inall material respects, the financial condition of the Company atthe end of the period covered by the Periodic Report and results ofoperations of the Company for the period covered by the PeriodicReport.

Dated:  May , 2003

| /s/ GENE W. RAY               |           | /s/ MARK W. SOPP |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|
|                                    |                                                        |
| Gene W.Ray Chief Executive Officer | Mark W.Sopp** Chief Financial Officer                  |
### §178m. Report to President and Congress

The Secretaries shall submit to the President and the Congress, no later than December 31, 1980, and each year thereafter through 1987, a report on the status of the research, development, and other work underway under this subchapter. Such report shall (1) recommend specific directions for further research, development and other work, and (2) recommend funding levels for various elements of the overall project.

(Pub. L. 95–592, §15, Nov. 4, 1978, 92 Stat. 2533; Pub. L. 98–284, §14, May 16, 1984, 98 Stat. 184.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1984—Pub. L. 98–284 substituted "The Secretaries" for "The Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Commerce" and "1987" for "1982".
#### United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company et al., Respondents, v. Zarah Williamson, Appellant.

In an action by a former attorney of record in a personal injury action and by his assignees, to recover for money had and received by the defendant, who was substituted as such attorney of record, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated October 4, 1963, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. This action for money had and received seeks to reach part of a contingent fee arising out of a judgment obtained in a personal injury action. The plaintiffs are William A. Clark, formerly counsel of record in the personal injury action, and three others to whom Clark had executed assignments of his interest in that action. It appears that in 1957 Clark had been retained as attorney for the injured person. Clark immediately retained another attorney, the defendant Williamson, to prosecute the action. The latter avers that the agreement between them was that they would share the contingent fee equally on the basis of division of services or responsibility. The extent of the services rendered by Clark is disputed; it appears that Clark was confined to various hospitals for most of the period between October, 1957 through July, 1958. In any event, on June 23, 1958, the client (the injured person) executed a stipulation substituting the defendant Williamson *791as counsel of record for plaintiff Clark. Thereafter, on July 24, 1958, the plaintiff Clark assigned to the other three plaintiffs “ any and all right, title or interest” that he (Clark) then had in the personal injury action, including his fee. Defendant contends that the assignment is against public policy. This contention must fail. Having been discharged, Clark had no further responsibilities to prosecute the action. Whatever claim or lien he then had on the proceeds of the action was assignable *(Leask*v. *Hoagland,*64 Misc. 156; see, also, *Matter of Leopold,*186 App. Div. 872, 875, affd. 226 N. Y. 692; *Robinson*v. *Rogers,*236 App. Div. 1). Had Clark *not*been discharged as the injured person’s attorney, the result would be different; in such a case the assignment would have offended public policy (cf. *Matter of Worthington,*141 N. Y. 9, 11; *Lockhart*v. *Mittlemann,*123 F 2d 703; but see *Douglas*v. *Benton,*7 Misc 2d 872, affd. 7 A D 2d 633). An assignment, in whole or in part, of a fee which is yet to be earned can only dampen the enthusiasm of the lawyer for his client’s cause and is subversive of the attorney-client relationship. Ughetta, Acting P. J., Kleinfeld, Hill, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur.