With a Foreword by

Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN (Ret.)

Former Director of Naval Intelligence

TING A RELUCTANT ALLY

JOINT

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CO

LLEGE

1962

JOINT

M

ILITARY INTELLIGENCE C

O

LLEGE

1962
0

An Evaluation of U.S./UK Naval Intelligence 

Cooperation, 1935-1941

LCDR Gregory J. Florence, USN

With a Foreword by

Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN (Ret.)

Former Director of Naval Intelligence

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Strategic Intelligenc

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Joint Military Joint Military

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Intelligence College Intelligence College

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The Joint Military Intelligence College supports and encourage

on intelligence issues that distills lessons and improves supp

policy-level and operational consumers

As the U.S. Intelligence Community debates how to engage in intelligence cooperation a

tion sharing with a variety of other countries, in the face of non-state malefactors, we need 

without a rudder. Lieutenant Commander Florence demonstrates in this book that the que

to proceed toward useful information sharing and cooperation can be addressed by ex

national archives. His research reveals how a contentious, interwar relationship between 

the UK evolved into a special relationship as information sharing and cooperation in inte

ation and use became indispensable. This publication highlights the value of historical r

ried out by candidates for the degree of Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence. 

This document is based exclusively on sources available to the public. The views express

of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Departmen

or the U.S. Government. 

This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Directorate for 

Information and Security Review, Washington Headquarters Service.

 Russell.Swenson@dia.mil, 

Library of Congress Control Number 2

ISBN 0-9

v

Foreword, by Admiral Thomas A. Brooks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter

1. The Status of Intelligence in the U.S. and Great Britain . . . . . . . . . . 

2. U.S.-UK Relations, 1914-1935: From Cooperation to Competition . 

3. U.S.-UK Relations, 1935-1939: The Beginnings of a 

Strategic Rapprochement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4. Key U.S. Policymakers and Their Attitudes toward Cooperation. . . . 

5. ALUSNA London and the British NID: January 1939-March 1941 . 

6. Courting the Reluctant Ally: June 1940-March 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7. The Limits of Exchange: March 1941-December 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . 

8. Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Appendixes

A. A Note on Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

B. Major Events in U.S.-UK Intelligence Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Figures

1. RADM Kirk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2. RADM Godfrey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

3. German Propaganda on Kirk’s Visit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Table

1. Major Events in U.S.-UK Intelligence Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

vii

To most Americans alive today, the close alliance between the Un

and Great Britain seems to be a “natural” thing, perhaps the inevitable e

of what Winston Churchill referred to as the “special relationship” occa

“underlying cultural unity.” There are now few among us whose me

back to the period between the two world wars and who would be ab

out that, commonalities of language and culture notwithstanding, toda

relationship between the United States and Great Britain is a quite re

nomenon, really dating only from the 1940-41 timeframe.

For much of the two and a quarter centuries of our independence

ships with Great Britain have been cool or even strained. Cooperation a

gence sharing with the British in World War I was late in coming and 

scope. At the end of the war, it slowed to an almost imperceptible trickl

very slow to resume. The author outlines the factors accounting for the 

of both sides to share information and the underlying feeling of comp

between the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy during the interwar years

moderated by the outbreak of hostilities in 1939, but within a year tw

dynamics had arisen: the American concern after the fall of France tha

ish might be quickly defeated, and thus US technical and intelligence in

compromised; and the British single-minded focus on bringing Americ

war and gaining access to our vast technological and industrial resourc

ther their goals, the British were willing to provide the United States w

ally unlimited access to British secrets — technological as well as intel

even without any quid pro quo. Their strategy worked. The author ou

the exchange of information started as a trickle, turned into a flood, an

to this day.

 Most books dealing with U.S.-British cooperation during World W

urally focus on the war in Europe and highlight the great British crypto

cess with the German Enigma codes (actually a Polish-French-British 

Many leave the reader with the impression that the United States, 

access to Enigma decrypts and Royal Navy operational intelligence te

got the better half of the bargain. But this is far from a complete pictu

the Americans who broke the Japanese diplomatic codes and gave 

machines to the British, and the Americans who provided the bulk of 

and success against JN-25, the Japanese navy operational code, althou

Dutch, and Australian cryptanalysts contributed significantly during 

American scientists and laboratory-industry efforts significantly upg

technology used to break Enigma codes. Also, OPINTEL, as it exists i
viii

Unit (also known as Fleet Radio Unit Pacific or Station HYPO) as 

British Operational Intelligence Centre.

 A number of books have been written about this wartime intell

eration, but this work is the first that provides significant detail on th

toward cooperation that both navies traversed through the 1920s an

author has tapped a number of original sources and archives which h

ously been plumbed to provide a new perspective on recent, but larg

ciated naval history. The reader may find himself reflecting that 

which appear so "natural" today, were not always that way, and 

words of Chaim Herzog, who as President of Israel, declared that 

have permanent friends or enemies, only "permanent interests."

Thomas A. Brooks

Rear Admiral, United States Navy (ret.)

Former Director of Naval Intelligence
ix

Since World War II, the United States and the United Kingdom hav

benefited from an unprecedented “special relationship” with regard to in

sharing and cooperation. What were the origins of that relationship and 

sons can be derived from its development? While it may seem obvio

common Axis threat drove both countries to increased levels of intellig

ing, the extent of the cooperation eventually attained would have surpr

on both sides of the Atlantic prior to World War II. Despite a brief perio

during World War I, the U.S. and the UK quickly reverted to their tradit

as strategic competitors following the conclusion of the Great War. A h

ble aspect of that competition was in the area of naval forces, in which 

tries invested considerable diplomatic, economic, and military 

Notwithstanding this rivalry, their naval intelligence cooperation dur

War II is often cited as one of the most successful in history. How did th

relationship” develop, given the contentiousness that existed between 

countries in the interwar period? An analysis of this period indicates o

cant factor was the aggressive pursuit of naval intelligence cooperat

British as part of their larger strategy to secure U.S. entry into the war. T

the British employed to secure this cooperation are of interest, as h

shown the British were able to overcome significant distrust on the part 

can officials, who were extremely wary of British intentions. 

Like the UK, the U.S. is interested in developing intelligence c

arrangements with states, such as Russia and India, with whom our c

had inimical or competitive relationships.1 An assessment of the UK

strategy for establishing a closer intelligence relationship with the U.S

insights into effective strategies the U.S. could use to enhance intelligen

ation with countries that have had, or continue to have, competitive rela

the United States. Second, an analysis of this subject is of historical imp

the Intelligence Community (IC) since the intelligence-sharing a

between the U.S., the UK, and its former dominions had their anteced

World War II period and it is important to understand the rationale be

1

The White House, “Joint Statement Between U.S. and India,” 9 November 200

House, URL:<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011109-10.html

16 November 2003; The White House, “Press Briefing by National Security Adviso

leezza Rice on the President’s Trip to Europe and Russia,” The White House, 

www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2002/05/20020520-9.html >, accessed 16 Novem
x

would later become the U.S. IC, particularly naval intelligence. T

Naval Intelligence (ONI), in addition to engaging in internecine battl

intelligence organizations, also faced internal Navy disputes over 

and functions. Understanding this period is important to understan

ONI currently plays in the IC structure.
1

Chapter 1

THE STATUS OF INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS IN 

UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN

Some of these difficulties stemmed directly from technical obsta

which limited the amount and type of intelligence that could be 

obtained....Those that were mainly organizational in character ar

the various pressures and resistances—administrative, psycholog

political—which complicate relations whenever several bodies s

responsibility in a single field. They were all the more intractabl

ever, because developments in the field of intelligence were setti

flict between the need for new organizational departures and the 

established, and perfectly understandable, distribution of intellig

responsibilities.

Francis Hally Hinsley and others, British Intelligence i

World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations

Francis Hinsley’s comprehensive, official history of British Intelli

World War II describes the overall state of British intelligence on t

war. Hinsley’s comments about British intelligence could have 

applied to its U.S. counterpart, which was also rife with bureaucrati

had to cope with new organizational arrangements designed to 

sources of intelligence. Understanding how each country approa

gence, and how each managed the organizational structures they dev

interwar period to collect, analyze, and disseminate it, is fundament

ing the evolution of the intelligence relationship between the U.S. 

Although many authors have denigrated U.S. intelligence capabiliti

interwar years, recent scholarship has shown that, despite its many p

U.S. was probably not far behind the other major powers of the tim

constraints, the ill-defined nature of the threat, and the lack of strate

all contributed to weaknesses in U.S. intelligence of the 1920s a

Navy’s ONI suffered from other difficulties, as well, since it wa

internecine conflicts within the Navy Department over its role, and 

2 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, “The Role of British Intelligence in the Mythologies U

OSS and Early CIA,” in American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations 1939-

Stafford and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 

Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America, and the Politic

vice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 96-97.
2

security functions. These weaknesses were familiar to the British. Th

standing of ONI and overall American intelligence deficiencies would 

the approaches they used to elicit cooperation.

The American Intelligence Architecture

Many authors have documented the weaknesses of U.S. intellige

interwar period. First, it was seriously under-resourced. After World 

U.S. drew down its military forces considerably and intelligence, ne

eted assignment during peacetime, faced substantial cuts in fiscal and 

resources.3 There were the two Service intelligence divisions, the N

and the Army’s Military Intelligence Division (MID), both of wh

responsible for the collection and analysis of military and political in

to support war planning and procurement, as well as security and coun

gence. A third component of the architecture was the State Departme

matic corps, which provided political intelligence to support U.S. fore

and economic decisionmaking. The final element was the Federal 

Investigation (FBI), which had principal responsibility for domestic 

telligence and counterespionage, although its mandate ultimately ex

countries in Central and South America as well. For the most part, in

was gained from open-source exploitation, diplomatic and attaché 

some limited clandestine Human Intelligence (HUMINT) activity, 

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).4

The main problem with the U.S. intelligence system in the interwar p

the lack of coordination between its four component intelligence orga

There was no central coordinating authority for their efforts, which o

duplicative collection, analysis, and reporting of information. Bureau

battles and inter-departmental rivalries were common features of the in

landscape, which inhibited cooperation in many cases.5 In addition to 

compartmentalized nature of U.S. intelligence, analytic reports were o

for their lack of rigor or utility. The U.S. also had no real operational in

capability at either the Service Headquarters or the national leve

observers of U.S. intelligence noted all these flaws in the U.S. system 

believed that U.S. intelligence was inadequate because it lacked such 

tional structures as a Special Operations Executive (SOE) for conduct

3 Aldrich, 32.

4 Aldrich, 95.

5 Donald MacLachlan, Room 39: A Study in Naval Intelligence (New York: Atehn

223-224; Aldrich 95. 6 Bradley F. Smith, The Ultra-Magic Deals: And the Most Secret Special Relatio

1946 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 30-31. Cited hereafter as Smith, Ultra-Magic 
3

considered essential by the British for prosecuting a modern war.

was little impetus on the part of the top decisionmaker in the U

Roosevelt, to adjust the U.S. intelligence organization architectur

who personally directed the efforts of ONI when he was the Assist

of the Navy during World War I, understood the value of intelligenc

ferred to receive information from a variety of sources, even if tha

proved contradictory. Additionally, he employed his own persona

agents to obtain information he desired, which added to the fragment

intelligence.8

Various decisionmakers within U.S. intelligence saw the problems 

and there were attempts made to increase collaboration and coordin

ous stages throughout the inter-war period. Sharing between the dep

occur, but, more often than not, this was based on personalities of th

engaged in the sharing rather than some structural mechanism 

enhance cooperation. At various periods in the interwar period, O

closer ties with the other departments but most of these efforts did 

tematically improve coordination.9 One bright spot was in the are

cooperation, where joint work by the Army and the Navy led to su

the Japanese diplomatic code known as PURPLE. But these efforts 

the Navy’s communications organization, not ONI. Still, there was 

tion between the two services on the task of breaking the Japanese S

Even the cooperation on the diplomatic codes was colored by servic

rather convoluted system, whereby the Army and Navy would bre

brief the President on PURPLE decrypts on alternate days, was 

ensure both services would receive credit for their work on this hig

intelligence source.10 Although recommendations for how to achieve 

eration among the disparate organizations within American intellige

7 Aldrich, 95.

8

Jeffery M. Dorwart, Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Navy’s Intelligence Dilem

(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983), 164-171, cited hereafter as Dorwart, C

Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, vol. 2 of The Age of Rooseve

Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959), 523; Steve Weiss, Allies in Conflict: Anglo-Am

Negotiations, 1938-44 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 2001), 29. 9

 Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 69-70. 10 Roland H. Worth, Secret Allies in the Pacific: Covert Intelligence and Code B

ation Between the United States, Great Britain, and Other Nations Prior to the Attac

bor (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2001), 16-17; Ronald H. Spector, Listening to t

Documents on the Role of Communications Intelligence in the War with Japan (W

Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1988), 8; Aldrich, 73.
4

founding of the Coordinator of Information office, the predecessor to 

of Strategic Services (OSS), in the summer of 1941.11 As noted later in 

the founding of this office did correct some of the deficiencies in the U

gence system, but overcoming bureaucratic barriers was a difficulty t

the war period and is an issue the Intelligence Community has continue

tle with to the present day.

ONI: Organization and Limitations of America’s Firs

Intelligence Service

The organization which would one day become ONI was first 

1882 as the Navy realized its need for information in peacetime t

assist in the war-planning and procurement that was required to fig

future conflict.12 ONI’s responsibilities evolved over time, but by 193

cipal responsibilities included collection and analysis on foreign coun

ticularly on their naval establishments; administration of the nav

program; Navy public relations; “operation of the Navy’s public re

library; preparation and dissemination of data on our own and foreig

counterespionage; and security.13 To meet these requirements, ONI 

nized into branches to deal with Foreign Intelligence, Domestic Int

Historical Records, and Public Relations.14 These branches were fu

divided into country desks and offices meant to address specific 

issues, such as gunnery. In terms of regional assessments, ONI focuse

sia, because of the fear of communism and its influence on the w

industries critical to the Navy, and on Japan, which was seen as the m

and was the focus of U.S. naval war planning.15

As noted earlier, resource constraints were a significant factor lim

effectiveness of ONI. At the end of World War I, there were 306 officer

in ONI’s Washington, DC offices, but by 1935 that number had dwin

11 Wyman H. Packard, A Century of Naval Intelligence (Washington, DC: GPO, 19

Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 119-120. 12 Alan Harris Bath, Tracking the Axis Enemy: The Triumph of Anglo-American N

gence (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 4. 13 Packard, 323.

14 Parkard, 321-323.

15Columbia University, The Reminiscences of Royal E. Ingersoll (New York: O

Research Office, 1965), 46, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washingto

hereafter as Ingersoll Reminiscences. 
5

was the fact that many naval officers saw little value in doing intell

Consequently, there were relatively few intelligence professional

naval officer corps since most believed multiple assignments in 

would be detrimental to their careers. Even the Director of Naval 

(DNI) position was looked upon with disdain. VADM Kirk, who as 

was DNI from January to October 1941, has noted in retrospect that 

[t]he average tour of the Director of Naval Intelligence, in the te

before we went in the war, was less than two years, always. Nob

staying. It had very poor standing in the Navy Department, not b

of the calibre [sic] of the officers, but everybody sort of thought 

Intelligence was striped pants, cookie-pushers, [and] going to pa

VADM Kirk’s views were echoed by one of the few officers wh

ple tours in intelligence at that time, Rear Admiral Ellis Zacharias, 

the high turnover rate of the DNI’s and their relative lack of exp

intelligence matters, were two factors that significantly limited t

ness of ONI.18

Another major problem ONI had to contend with was the dichoto

its positive intelligence functions and its security and counterintell

tions. Lacking the resources to do either job adequately, the effo

largely on who held the DNI position. Throughout much of the 19

DNIs primarily focused on ONI’s security role at the expense of 

intelligence mission.19 Undermanned, ONI was forced to use untrain

and volunteers to augment the personnel involved with security in 

various naval districts. While it is true that the Navy faced potential

problems from radical elements and labor agitators throughout the 19

much of the workforce involved in the domestic intelligence mis

trained in proper investigative techniques. This situation caused fric

FBI, which was concerned about ONI’s poor evidence-handling pr

violations of civil liberties. ONI’s lack of arrest authority also hinder

16 Packard, 17-19; Bath, 9-10; Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 77. 17 Columbia University, The Reminiscences of Alan G. Kirk (New York: Oral H

Office, 1962), 183, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC

as Kirk Reminiscences. 18 Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, Secret Missions; The Story of an Intelligence Offi

G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1946), 82. Zacharias retired from the naval service as a Rear A

19 Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 5.
6

enforcement to apprehend suspects.

In 1937, Rear Admiral Ralston Holmes assumed duties as DNI and 

focus of effort at ONI to its positive intelligence mission. During his tw

DNI, he was responsible for obtaining a budget increase for ONI, exp

attaché network, and improving the capabilities of the attachés by provi

with modern cipher equipment to encode their reports. His efforts were 

ble for a doubling in attaché reporting during his tenure. He also increa

with the State Department and improved the Navy’s operational securi

by winning support from then-CNO, Admiral William D. Leahy, to mak

final release authority for all information requests.21 While still saddled 

nificant weaknesses, ONI was much better prepared for the coming w

the changes implemented by RADM Holmes. 

ONI Capabilities on the Eve of War

ONI principally focused its collection and analysis on the grow

posed by Japan, also known as “Orange” in Navy war planning. 

against this threat was difficult for a number of reasons. First, appl

resources to this target was based simply on the “navy’s deduction o

country’s [U.S.] interests were and its sea power doctrine,” since the

articulated strategy at the national level by which the navy could derive 

gic objectives.22 Second, the Japanese were able to frustrate the effort

most important collection source, its attaché force. Despite the in

attachés that Holmes was able to obtain, the attaché office in Japan suff

the Japanese policy of restricting access to its sensitive military faciliti

generally good operational security practiced by the Japanese. The Jap

engaged in an active deception campaign, repeatedly denying they wer

20 Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 78-79. An interesting case study that illustrates this po

Harry Thomas Thompson, a former Navy Yeoman who was convicted of spying for the 

July of 1936. FBI agents who assisted ONI with the investigation of Thompson wro

report to their superiors about the “strenuous” nature of Thompson’s interrogation by 

and the lack of quality in their investigative reports. For more information see: Specia

Burruss, FBI Investigative report, January 7, 1936; Secretary of the Navy, Confidentia

dence, RG 80; National Archives Building, Washington DC. (File, RG, and location ci

as SECNAV-Confidential Correspondence); Special Agent John S. Bugas, FBI Investi

(Information provided by LT A. H. McCollum and LT H. E. LeBarron), February 20

SECNAV-Confidential Correspondence; Zacharias, 167; Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 65-

21Bath, 19; Dorwart; Conflict of Duty, 94-98. 22 George W. Baer, “U.S. Naval Strategy 1890-1945,” Naval War College Revie

sequence 333 (Winter 1991): 18.
7

and re-boilering older vessels behind large screens at their build

Given this dearth of information, ONI analysts and collectors natu

their biases to assessments of Japanese capabilities, erroneously e

quality of the Japanese naval fleet and their naval air forces as low.24

Despite the lack of success against the Japanese target, ONI’s oth

operations were more profitable. The American Legation, United 

Attaché, London (ALUSNA London), which will be discussed e

chapter 5, was a critical node for the flow of intelligence and techn

tion into ONI. ONI attachés in Latin America also had considerable 

providing worthwhile intelligence and countering the moves of Axi

operatives and subversive elements in the countries to which 

assigned.25 By June of 1940, the Navy also took steps to strengthen 

tine HUMINT capabilities and had relatively good success with th

North Africa and Mexico, although this capability would be abso

Coordinator of Information (COI) the following year.26

SIGINT was also a major source of intelligence for ONI. The firs

Frequency Direction Finding (HF/DF) sites were established in 1918 

had some success against foreign codes during the 1920s and 3

1930s, the Navy and the Army had three major cryptologic co

located at Corregidor (Cavite or Station CAST) in the Philippines, P

and Washington, DC.28 The collection and decryption of the interce

nications was handled by Director of Naval Communications O

“Communications Security Section,” while much of the translation 

of the decrypted communications was handled by ONI.29 While the 

tanalytic section was several times larger than the Army’s at the sta

at around 147 personnel, the Navy had negligible success against th

nese naval code, designated JN-25, until just before the war, when 

with British communications intelligence (COMINT) personnel b

common.30 Although information gathered from the Japanese dip

was an important source of intelligence, it contained virtually no m

23 Malcolm Muir, Jr., “Rearming in a Vacuum: United States Navy Intelligence a

Capital Ship Threat, 1936-1945,” The Journal of Military History 54, no. 4 (Octo

477.24 Muir, 478-479; Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 27-29. 25 Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 106-109. 26 Packard, 130.

27 Aldrich, 33. 28 Worth, 11-12. 29 Jeffrey K. Bray, Ultra in the Atlantic (Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1

30 Aldrich, 73.
8

source of information to inform operational planners and tactical forces

Internecine Conflict and Its Effect on ONI 

Patrick Beesly, who worked in the British Admiralty’s Operational In

Center (OIC) during World War II, has noted that one of the main defic

ONI was its lack of any capability to provide operational intelligence (O

support. He notes that the roots of this problem lay in World War I, 

Naval Intelligence Division (NID) of legendary British Rear Admiral 

nald “Blinker” Hall, rather than ONI, provided the intelligence for the B

American operating forces. While the Royal Navy allowed its OPINTE

ity to lapse in the interwar period, it was able to reconstitute it quickly 

the tradition initiated by Hall, whereas ONI had no such tradition to 

on.31 Another major difference between the NID and ONI, however, w

the eve of the war, ONI lacked direct access to key policymakers w

NID had direct access to the senior civilian and military leaders of 

Navy (the First Lord and the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty).32 For t

cans, this situation also had its roots in the U.S. Navy’s World War I e

and was largely a function of the personalities at the top of the Navy’s h

In August 1939, Admiral William Leahy was relieved by Admir

“Betty” Stark as the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Stark was an 

Admiral William Sims’ planning cell during World War I and his ide

best to plan for naval operations were formed from that experience. A

had essentially created a miniature ONI to support planning done by h

London. For this reason, Stark accepted a model proposed by the D

Naval War Plans, Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, which gav

Plans Division the primary responsibility for evaluating intelligence.3

reasoning was based on the fact that an intelligence assessment migh

operational commander to take a specific course of action and, since 

ship movements fell under the purview of operators, they should hav

check on intelligence. Thus, in the period just prior to the war, the 

Division had primary responsibility for producing and disseminating in

31 Patrick Beesly, Very Special Intelligence: The Story of the Admiralty’s Operat

gence Center 1939-1945 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, INC., 1977), 11

hereafter as Beesly, Very Special Intelligence. 32 Bath, 4-5.

33 Samuel E. Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942, vol. 3 of Th

United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Com

134-135, cited hereafter as Morison, Rising Sun; Jeffery M. Dorwart, Office of Naval Inte

Birth of America’s First Intelligence Agency 1865-1918 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 

124-125, cited hereafter as Dorwart, ONI; Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 117; Packard, 16; B
9

information derived from their various collection sources. This situa

source of acrimonious conflict between Turner and the DNI, RADM 

fought vigorously for the reestablishment of ONI’s preeminent po

evaluation of intelligence, a position actually spelled out in regulati

preferred Turner’s system.34 The end result was that, by the tim

relieved by Rear Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson in October 1941, O

subordinate position to War Plans and was often out of the loop o

operations and war planning efforts prior to the war.35 

Another source of internecine conflict that limited ONI’s effec

that which existed between ONI and OP-20-G. Once again, then-

was at the center of another controversy, this time with the Direc

Communications (DNC), who contended that the DNC, not ONI, s

office to present decrypted “MAGIC” intercepts to the CNO and the 

the Navy.36 While Kirk won this battle and ONI was allowed to cont

the MAGIC decrypts, the conflict created considerable tension betw

OP-20-G that lasted through much of the pre-war period and beyond

While ONI’s capabilities were improving in the period just prior t

British well understood they were attempting to engage in coopera

ship with an organization they considered inferior. Beesly effectively 

major ONI deficiencies: “Where the Americans were far behind the B

their general intelligence expertise, in inter-Service [and intra-Serv

tion and co-ordination and effective use of results obtained from m

sources.”37 Despite its deficiencies, though, ONI became the main co

sharing of intelligence with the British, through its attaché office in 

was chosen as one of the main coordinators for technical exchanges 

two countries. While the British viewed their system of intelligence a

the Americans, they were also playing catch-up from the under-reso

interwar period and had their own difficulties to overcome. An an

state of British intelligence just prior to the war will demonstrate t

34 Arthur H. McCollum, Reminiscences of Rear Admiral Arthur H. McColl

Retired, 1, United States Naval Academy Special Collections, 328-330, cited hereaft

Reminiscences; Kirk Reminiscences, 179-180, 182; Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 155-

35 Packard, 23; McCollum Reminiscences, 322-323. 36 Kirk Reminiscences, 179; Packard, 22; John Winton, Ultra in the Pacific: Ho

Japanese Codes and Cyphers Affected Naval Operations Against Japan, 1941-45 (

Naval Institute Press, 1993), 6-7. MAGIC was the code name used for decrypts 

PURPLE diplomatic code. 37 Patrick Beesly, Very Special Admiral: The Life of Admiral J. H. Godfrey, CB 

mish Hamilton, Ltd, 1980), 180. Cited hereafter as Beesly, Very Special Admiral.
10

beset U.S. intelligence. 

Intelligence in The United Kingdom

British Intelligence Structure

Like U.S. intelligence in the 1930s, British intelligence consisted 

ber of organizations. Also like the U.S., the British had a counterpa

the NID, and a Military Intelligence Division (MID), similar to the U.

organization of the same name. Additionally, since it had a separate 

the British had an Air Intelligence Division to support that Service

ments. Unlike the U.S., however, the British Foreign Office was m

active in intelligence matters than the U.S. State Department. In addi

responsibility for overt diplomatic missions, the Foreign Office w

charge of Britain’s clandestine HUMINT activities and ran the Secr

gence Service (SIS), better known as MI6. Another feature that dist

the British intelligence system from the American system was the us

departmental intelligence branches to deal with intelligence func

became more developed in the interwar period. Examples of these 

include: the Security Service (MI5), which handled domestic intelli

counterintelligence; the Government Code and Cypher School (

which dealt with all SIGINT matters; the SOE, with responsibility 

action; the Political Warfare Executive, which analyzed foreign pres

paganda; and the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Cent

dealt with Prisoner of War (POW) interrogations.38

British intelligence differed from the American system in one other 

way, and that was in the area of interdepartmental coordination and co

This is not to say there were no interdepartmental rivalries or friction 

component members, because, in this respect, the British system close

bled the American one. Francis Hinsley, who wrote the official history 

intelligence during World War II, notes that prior to the war it was unde

how various intelligence departments, each of which had responsibili

central government and to their own organizations, “were naturally re

exchange reliance on inter-departmental bodies for their own long-e

control of the acquisition, the interpretation, and the use of whatever in

38 Francis Hally Hinsley and others, British Intelligence in the Second World War: 

on Strategy and Operations 1 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1979), 4, 90, 

ter as Hinsley, British Intel vol. 1; Alan Stripp, Codebreaker in the Far East (London

Publishers, 1989), 148; Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 20. The GC&CS was also known 

Park, the location where analysis of intercepted communications was conducted. 
11

of effort and over-compartmentalization of intelligence, this despite 

British also had a titular head of intelligence, Sir Steward Menzies

“C,” who as head of the SIS and the GC&CS ran the two most substa

partmental intelligence services for the British and held a position ve

that originally envisioned for the Director of Central Intelligence (D

ica. Like those of the DCI, his powers to bring about the cooperatio

ration of the other branches of British intelligence were limited.40

While interdepartmental rivalries persisted throughout much 

war period, a growing realization that war was coming forced 

departments to reassess the need for better coordination among 

gence services. To this end, the British formed a Joint Intelligenc

mittee (JIC) in June of 1936, the principal duty of which was to p

support to the Joint Planning Staff (JPS).41 Although this was a m

the coordination of intelligence, the JIC suffered from a number 

First, the Foreign Office refused to participate in the JIC, so a key 

of British intelligence was not represented. Second, although the 

vices created the JIC to fill a need, they “effectively ensured that 

not expand in such a way as to reduce the influence on policy 

which they individually derived from their responsibility for asse

gence for their own departments.”42 Finally, in a situation remin

conflict between the U.S. Navy’s War Plans Division and ONI, 

not use the JIC well as they “confined their enquiries to...routi

swerable requests...[since] on matters of first importance they r

co-ordination of intelligence and of intelligence with planning, 

which they were capable of performing themselves.43 

Although initially limited in its effectiveness, the JIC did dev

important tool for the coordination and processing of intelligence by 

came for England. The JIC was restructured in 1939, when the Fo

finally joined the organization and took on responsibilities for the JI

ship. With that reorganization, the JIC took on many additional res

not the least of which were the responsibility for improving the effi

39 Hinsley, British Intel vol. 1, 4. 40 Menzies assumed duties as “C” following the death of Admiral “Q” Sincla

1939. Sinclair had held that position throughout much of the 1920s and 30s. For add

tion see Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 22-23; Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War (New 

Hill Book Company, 1978), 65-66. 41 Hinsley, British Intel vol. 1, 36-38; Bath, 47. 42 Hinsley, British Intel vol. 1, 38. 43 Hinsley, British Intel vol. 1, 38.
12

gence summaries on the global situation for high-level decisionmake

Hinsley contends that it took over a year after the war began before t

departments set aside their rivalries and began truly realizing the effici

JIC was meant to reap.45 As will be discussed in more detail in Cha

British would urge the U.S. to adopt a similar system in 1941, a develop

became a minor irritant to leaders of U.S. intelligence.46

British Naval Intelligence

As expected, the primary British intelligence organization the U

dealt with on a day-to-day basis was the Royal Navy’s NID. The 

founded in 1892 to provide intelligence that would support naval p

Like its U.S. counterpart, the organization shrank significantly in 

World War I period and began the war sorely under-resourced. Div

geographical bureaus that essentially did order-of-battle analysis, its 

sources of intelligence information were the British naval attachés

and a limited amount of photographic reconnaissance. To compound 

lems, assignments with the NID, as with ONI, were not looked on 

gious, so NID did not receive officers of the highest quality d

interwar period.48 Two significant differences from ONI, however, w

nature of the NID’s relationship to its attachés and in its focus on O

Intelligence. Unlike in ONI, the British naval attachés, even tho

could communicate informally with the Admiralty and the NID, had 

all official reports through the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office w

the reports to the Admiralty but these reports would include th

Office assessment, which sometimes differed significantly from th

NID.49The formation of the NID’s Operational Intelligence Center (

another major difference from ONI. Established in August 1939

source fusion analysis center became a key component of the Allied 

the battle of the Atlantic. Although the U.S. Navy developed a sim

44 Hinsley, British Intel vol. 1, 39-40, 42-43, 85. 45 Hinsley, British Intel vol. 1, 3-4, 96, 292. Hinsley notes that although the war offi

with the invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, it was not until February 1940 that 

vice Intelligence Directors attended a meeting of the JIC together. Hinsley blames the 

effectiveness in the first year of the war to a limited vision of its potential and poor ini

part of the JIC leadership. See Hinsley, British Intel vol. 1, 93-96. 46 Bath, 46.

47 Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, 10; Hinsley, British Intel vol. 1, 6-7. 48 Hinsley, British Intel vol. 1, 10, 103-107; Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, 7-10. 49 Hinsley, British Intel vol. 1, 5-6, 11.
13

the Fleet Commanders and the operations and planning sides 

Staff.50

In addition to the NID and the JIC, there were three other Bri

partmental activities that would attempt to engage the U.S. Na

intelligence ties during the interwar period. These were the GC&

East Combined Bureau, and the SIS. Under the control of the Fo

and Sir Stewart Menzies, the day-to-day operations of the GC&

by Commander Alistair Denniston. A truly interdepartmental eff

ish had consolidated all of their cryptographic resources into this 

following the Great War. In addition to analysis of “Y” signals 

low-level ciphers), the GC&CS was responsible for breaking hig

tary and diplomatic codes as well as designing the codes used by 

In many respects, its responsibilities were similar to those of the 

U.S. National Security Agency (NSA).51 In addition to the interd

organizations run in London, the British also established over

gence centers in the Middle and Far East to foster coordination a

tion between the intelligence organizations in those locales

significant of these to the U.S. Navy was the Far East Comb

(FECB). Created in Hong Kong in 1935, the FECB moved to S

1939. While principally a SIGINT organization, predominantly 

the Royal Navy, the FECB was technically responsible for coo

British Far East intelligence efforts and became the primary li

cryptographers at U.S. Navy Station CAST in Corregidor, as 

between the two navies’ intelligence organizations grew.52 Finall

detailed in chapter 6, the SIS was also interested in forging a clo

ship with ONI, principally in the area of counterintelligence. As 

in British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British In

the Americas, 1940-1945, the British SIS branch in New York C

William Stephenson spearheaded an effort to actively engage 

gence agencies in closer cooperation with their British counterpa

50 For more information on the development, structure, and operation of the 

Beesly’s excellent history of the OIC, Very Special Intelligence, xv, 1-2, 11-18, 19

42-43; see also Hinsley, British Intel vol. 1, 12-13. 51 For additional information on the development, structure, and operations of t

Stripp, 13-14, 150; Bath 10; Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 26-29; MacLachlan, 32. 52 Aldrich, 20, 36; Bath, 139-140. 
14

Britain.

53 For additional information see British Security Coordination, The Secret Histo

Intelligence in the Americas, 1940-1945 (New York: Fromm International, 1999). Cited 

BSC, Secret History. Richard Aldrich, in evaluating the cooperation between the inte

vices of both countries, has noted that the major deception orchestrated by the UK wa

the U.S. that British intelligence was “second to none.” See Aldrich, 100-101. The h

dence shows Aldrich’s assessment to be correct. While possessing a more sophisticated 

British also had their own systemic problems and they contended with many of the 

nesses they criticized in the U.S. system. 
15

U.S.-UK RELATIONS, 1914-1935:

FROM COOPERATION TO COMPETITION

The basis of friendship between the two great English-speaking 

is rivalry and independence of each other, and these are the reall

and lasting bases of all friendships. The instant the condition of 

dence arises between two equals the essence of friendship is lost

is no necessity for an alliance between Great Britain and the Un

States, and there probably never will be one, but, in effect, it exi

must exist, through conditions which are arising in the world an

will hereafter necessitate that the two countries will stand togeth

wise they may fall together.

Captain Albert P. Niblack, USN, “Forms o

in relation to their efficiency for war,” 

The Historical Context

The quote above, written by the U.S. Director of Naval Intellig

ing World War I, was both descriptive and prescient. While the 

would form between the U.S. and the UK between 1935 and 1945 w

of the closest and most enduring the world has ever known, there w

the U.S. who were far more focused on the rivalry that existed betw

states. Niblack’s main argument concerned the commonalites and s

the U.S. and British forms of government and, while the develop

Fascist states of Europe and Asia was still years away, he correctl

was the common values shared by the American and British peopl

eventually overcome the tensions between the two countries.54 W

main sources of tension and why were they so significant in t

period, particularly to the naval officer corps in both countries? Fir

the war experience behind them, many in the U.S. and the UK ha

hand knowledge about each other and their perceptions of one anot

with stereotypes and misconceptions. Second, while the seeds of 

tional and intelligence cooperation were planted during the period 

War, many U.S. naval officers saw the Royal Navy as their princi

the British felt threatened by a U.S. policy committed to building 

ond to none.” Third, Great Britain was seen by many in the U.S. as 

colonialism, a practice most Americans despised, despite the fact 

54 Albert P. Niblack, CAPT, USN, “Forms of government in relation to their effi

Proceedings 46 (September 1920): 1402-1430.
16

economic rival. This, coupled with a historic distrust of the ability of 

ernment officials to keep secrets, made the British hesitant to coop

the U.S. in the period after the Great War.

Stereotypes and Misperceptions

Stereotyping other peoples is always easy. For most Americans, th

seen as a class-based society, where birth mattered more than merit 

advancement, and many held that the UK was not truly a democrac

their monarchial-parliamentary system did not resemble the republica

government practiced in America. Additionally, America’s revolutio

tage, its large Irish immigrant population, and resentment of colonia

all factors responsible for creating a feeling of distrust regarding Bri

tions and actions on the part of many Americans. This distrust was no

sal feeling, as many in the upper tier of American society idolized t

and there was significant respect for British cultural achievements at 

of U.S. society.55 Misperceptions also abounded in the UK and many 

ing circles of that country were largely ignorant of how the U.S. fu

both socially and politically, a condition that would persist throughou

war period and a factor that would later work against the Britis

attempts to influence U.S. policy.56

Naval Rivalry and The Impact of Naval Arms Limitatio

Naval Rivalry

U.S. participation in the Great War was a watershed event in U.S

tions and, while the period under review in this chapter saw some eas

tensions between the two countries, there were rough patches in th

which would serve as irritants in the future relations between the tw

Despite the decision to enter the war on the U.S. side, Samuel Mo

noted that the leadership of the U.S. Navy was highly distrustful of th

For example, before departing on his mission to England to coor

efforts of U.S. naval forces engaged in the war, Admiral William F. 

55 David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41: A Study 

tive Co-operation (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 2

Ultra-Magic Deals, 1-2; Stephen Budiansky, “The Difficult Beginnings of U.S. British 

ing Cooperation,” in American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations 1939-2000

Stafford and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 50-51

56 Reynolds, 12; Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), letter to Commander-in-Chief, 

Fleet, 12 November 1940, Papers of Harold R. Stark, Operational Archives Branch, N

cal Center, Washington, D.C. Collection cited hereafter as Stark Papers.
17

not to let the British pull the wool over your eyes as America w

fight the British as the Germans.”57 Despite this admonition, AD

able to overcome the tensions in the relationship with the British an

ation between the two naval services was much better than many 

would be. The British were somewhat sensitive to U.S. concerns 

treated as the “junior partner” in the relationship but their ability 

these concerns was mixed at best. On the positive side, the Britis

forthcoming with information that proved useful to the U.S., and 

gence cooperation between the two navies took root here. The hea

during World War I, Rear Admiral “Blinker” Hall, while restricting 

most important intelligence source — the decrypts that came from 

organization — was forthcoming in sharing intelligence with the U.

of topics from U-boat operations, to wireless communications, to c

gence information.58 Despite this openness, many U.S. officers re

they perceived, justifiably, as the British expectations that the U.S 

conform to the British way of operating, an expectation that fed into 

tional jealousy of the Royal Navy” that had existed within the U.S. 

corps since at least the war of 1812.59

This rivalry was not limited to the American side of the relationsh

period following the war, naval policy itself was a source of friction 

two countries. The two countries, and the other Great Powers of the 

victims of applying concepts in both the Spanish-American War an

Japanese War that were first articulated by Alfred Thayer Mahan. T

principles, with their emphasis on the need to secure overseas bas

large numbers of capital ships, had led to a costly naval arms race 

prior to the Great War.60 President Woodrow Wilson was a strong 

naval strength and he wished to resume a substantial naval building p

the war. This desire to build a “bigger Navy than hers [Great Britain] 

we please,” was seen as a form of blackmail by the British who cou

to embark on another naval arms race and who felt their strategic 

justified their possession of the world’s largest and most powerful n

the move to limit naval arms that started with the Harding administr

57 Samuel E. Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943, vo

tory of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston, MA: Little, Brown

1947), 38. Cited hereafter as Morison, Battle of the Atlantic. 58 Dorwart, ONI, 101, 125-126; Bath, 6-9. 59 Bath, 8-9; Michael Coles, “Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet: The 

Quebec, 1944 (“Octagon”), The Journal of Military History 25, no. 1 (January 200

60 Baer, 8-10.

61 Baer, 13-14; Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, xxxv; Reynolds, 15.
18

sis of the naval arms limitation effort shows that it actually created 

friction in the relationship.

The Impact of Naval Arms Limitation

For Warren Harding and subsequent administrations, the U.S. Nav

marily seen as a diplomatic bargaining chip, as few outside the Navy sa

potential for going to war with Great Britain or Japan, the two other 

naval powers at the time.62 While the move toward naval arms 

appeared to be in consonance with the fiscal constraints the British we

ing under in the post-war period, there was widespread distrust among 

as to American motives for holding the Washington Naval Conference 

1922. James R. Leutze has correctly stated that it was “viewed by the 

as an attempt by the Americans to win by treaty...what they had failed 

the shipyards.”63 Just three months prior to the conference, the Americ

sador to England reported that Winston Churchill had made an impass

in Parliament to increase the British naval budget, noting it was the onl

the UK could “walk hand in hand with the United States not as a sup

protection but as an equal partner.”64 Clearly, the British saw the W

Naval Conference not as a step toward general disarmament but as an a

the U.S. to curtail British power. For officers of the Royal Navy, who fe

of the Empire required Britain to maintain the largest Navy in the 

losses in tonnage and restrictions on capital ship construction agreed 

conference would become a source of great frustration. 

The end result of the Washington Naval Conference and the subseq

arms limitations conferences that would occur in the early 1930s becam

source of resentment for officers in the U.S. Navy as well. While the B

agree to parity with the U.S., the U.S. scrapped much more tonnage tha

ish and agreed to dismantle and stop construction on the newest U

ships. U.S. officers largely saw subsequent attempts by the British 

loopholes in the treaty concerning cruiser strength as an affront to t

efforts the Americans had made to reverse the trend of rampant naval a

62 Baer, 15-17.

63 James Richard Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Co

1937-1941 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1977), 4. Cited 

Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy. 64 Department of State, “The Ambassador in Great Britain, letter to the Secretar

August 1921,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921 1 (Washington, DC: GPO
19

future Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, to write a book entitled T

American Sea Power, to address concerns on the part of the Navy tha

ralty...were laughing up their sleeve at having put it over us [and a

ious at the reaction....if American public opinion were adequately e

the results of the treaty.”66 While provisions were made to close som

holes during the London Naval Conference in 1930, it was clear to n

on both sides of the Atlantic that the rivalry between them had only 

bated by their failed expectations regarding naval arms limitation.67

Although rivalry did not necessarily translate into fears that th

would one day clash, many American naval officers were wary o

Fleet Admiral Ernest King’s attitudes were probably typical of the fa

officers who subscribed to the view that the British were not to be 

though some authors have noted that Naval War College war gaming 

ish forces was primarily designed to provide variety against the ma

threat (Japan), and while others have cited naval officers at the tim

tended that war with Great Britain was not a realistic possibility, 

King wrote his Naval War College thesis in 1932 on the premise 

Navy needed to be prepared to fight both the UK and Japan demonst

all officers were quite so sanguine about the potential for peace betw

countries.68 Although some have characterized King as a rampant 

more balanced scholarship has demonstrated that it would be fair t

was pro-American rather than anti-British. His views were based on 

tion of the American naval tradition and on his not being impressed 

formance of the Royal Navy in World War I, a navy which attempt

the U.S. Navy in how to perform at sea, yet ran a porous blockad

inconclusive engagement at Jutland, was slow to meet the submarin

slow in adopting convoy operations.69 Patrick Beesly, one of the fore

on British naval intelligence matters, in speaking of King, summariz

of many in the U.S. Navy during the interwar period by stating th

“devoted to [their] Service and determined that it should not again 

65 The ratio of naval arms reached at the conference was 5:5:3 (U.S.:UK:Ja

scrapped 845,740 tons and some of her most modern warships, while the British 

of 605,975 tons. For additional information see: Morison, xxxvii, xlii; Coles, 125

State, “The Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament,” 21 November 1921, i

tions of the United States 1922 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1936): 53-60, cited her

1922 vol. 1; “Statement Issued to the Press by the Conference on the Limitation of 

December 1921, FRUS 1922 vol. 1, 130. 66 Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 24. 67 Morison, xl; Coles, 126.

68 Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 139-140; Muir, 480; Coles, 126. 69 Coles, 105-107, 125.
20

over-receptive to ideas and suggestions from the Admiralty.

Overcom

attitudes on the part of senior naval leaders would prove a difficult ta

British as they sought to pursue closer cooperation with the U.S. prior 

mal entry of the U.S. into World War II.

Anti-colonialism and Wilsonian Idealism

Anti-Colonialism

Differing attitudes between the U.S. and the UK concerning co

were another major obstacle in the path of fuller cooperation betwee

governments in the interwar period, and the tensions generated by 

fering views persisted into the post-World War II timeframe. Many 

ica saw colonialism as one of the root causes of the Great War, w

saw as driven by competition between the Great Powers for oversea

sions. For most Americans, raised to idolize a cadre of enlightene

who had thrown off the shackles of British colonial rule in the 17

nialism was an evil that curtailed the rights of people to live in free 

While America did possess colonies, most Americans saw them

benevolent colonial rulers who were interested in promoting the 

economic growth that would one day allow these colonies to tra

self-rule.71 While this view may seem naive, given that the U.S. wa

in the economic exploitation of the areas under its control, peo

inspired by the Wilsonian ideals of self-determination for all people

U.S. was actively involved in a process of transitioning some of its s

colonial possessions, like the Philippines, to self-government in t

Economic rivalry was also a factor, as many believed British trad

were part of a systematic attempt by the British to keep the U.S. o

eign markets.72 In addition to the influence of Wilsonian idealism

the U.S. naval officer corps opposed the British style of colonialism 

they believed the British drive to retain its empire was poor strate

70 Beesly, 112. Like Beesly, American naval officers looking retrospectively at the 

between the two navies in the interwar period had greater sympathy for the position o

site numbers on the other side of the Atlantic than they probably possessed prior to 

example, VADM Kirk recalls how a couple of British cruisers approaching the Pana

1939 were forced to wait while a fleet of close to 100 U.S. warships transited through 

to an exercise. Kirk realized “It was somewhat galling to their pride, that the Royal 

always thought it could do whatever it liked anywhere, would have to be held up, and 

See Kirk Reminiscences, 116-117. 71 Coles, 113; John Charmley, Churchill’s Grand Alliance (New York: Harcourt Br

pany, 1995), 54. 72 Charmley, 12-13.
21

backlash in the Far East.

Historian John Charmley probably b

rized the American view of British colonialism when he stated th

speed with which the Japanese overran the British Empire in the F

vinced many Americans that the British were not only imperiali

gling imperialists.”74

Other Aspects of Wilsonian Idealism

Besides anti-colonialism, other principles of Wilsonian idealism w

of friction for the British, as well. They were, in fact, economic 

Americans, and they interpreted Wilsonian calls for increased f

extremely threatening and meant to consolidate and perpetuate the a

the U.S. in the post-World War I period.75 British views on Americ

nialism were colored by resentment because American ascendancy w

pled with increasing American isolationism. Many resented a pea

that they believed had been dictated to them by Wilson, yet when th

to enforce an unworkable treaty, the Americans had chosen a path o

ment.76 In the minds of many British policymakers, Wilsonian ide

hollow concept and British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain p

summarized the prevailing view in England when he stated that “it i

and safest to count on nothing from the Americans but words.”77

Mesopotamia: Free Trade Advocacy and British Resen

An excellent example of the tensions created by the two countr

views on Wilsonian principles can be found in the State Departme

Relations of the United States series for 1920. Within three years of 

U.S. and the UK were engaged in a rather acrimonious dispute co

British mandate in Mesopotamia, modern-day Iraq, and the access to 

cessions in that region. By the terms of the San Remo Agreemen

1920, the British and French had received various mandates in the 

under the provision that other countries would have fair and equal 

73 Aldrich, 124. 74 Charmley, 54.

75 Charmley, 13. For a concrete example of the economic rivalry and how it 

actions of the U.S. Navy and ONI, Jeffrey Dorwart relates a story concerning Cap

U.S. Naval Attaché in Brazil during the 1920s. He states that “[a]pparently, much 

gence work went toward counteracting British influence, including outbidding Vi

strong to win a lucrative contract for Bethlehem Steel to repair Brazilian battleship

Conflict of Duty, 137. 76 Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 5-6. 77 Charmley, 16.
22

secret agreement between the British and French to exclusively e

resources of these mandates for their own purposes. In a letter to t

Ambassador, the U.S. Secretary of State, Bainbridge Colby, informed th

America expected the mandates to be “governed in such a way as to as

treatment in law and in fact to the commerce of all nations,” and further 

that if a secret agreement existed between the British and the French 

“result in a grave infringement of the mandate principle, which was f

for the purpose of removing...some of the principle [sic] causes of int

differences.”79

The British responded to the American concerns with a lengthy mi

the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon, which, although 

matic language, dismissed the concerns of the U.S. as irrelevant in t

because the administration of Mesopotamia was a League of Nations m

since the U.S. was not a League member, it had no right to dictate po

British. The U.S. response was masterfully eloquent and diplomatic b

clear to the British that the shortage of petroleum had created a situatio

the U.S. would do what was needed to ensure free trade in the resource

potamia so that “the most enlightened principles recognized by states as 

ate for the peaceful ordering of their economic relations” could be foll

a response reminiscent of the recent diplomatic conflict between Fran

U.S. over UN policy on Iraq, the U.S. essentially labeled as specious t

argument that their non-participation in the League of Nations curt

rights in this matter. The view in the U.S. was that 

[s]uch powers as the Allied and Associated nations may enjoy or w

in the determination of the governmental status of the mandated are

accrued to them as a direct result of the war against the Central Pow

The United States, as a participant in that conflict and as a contribu

its successful issue, cannot consider any of the associated powers...debarred from the discussion of its consequences.81 

The U.S.’s selective withdrawal from international affairs amid in

isolationist sentiment culminated in the American Neutrality Law

78 Department of State, “The American Charge’ to the Secretary General of the Fre

Office—Aide Memoire,” 7 August 1920, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 19

ington, DC: GPO, 1936): 668. Cited hereafter as FRUS 1920, vol. 2. 79 FRUS 1920, vol. 2, 658-659. 80 FRUS 1920, vol. 2, 672. 81 FRUS 1920, vol. 2, 671-672. Emphasis added by the present author.
23

after the decision to engage in various cooperative endeavors had be

British Security Concerns

The British also had concerns with U.S. security practices. Th

that America’s free and open society made it impossible for secr

state to remain secret for long. The power of the Congress and th

such that the British saw the U.S. government as an information si

cluded that anything shared with the U.S. would either find its way 

media or to one of Britain’s enemies. The British also saw U.S. 

capabilities as weak, particularly in the area of counterintelligence 

espionage.82 Concerns in this area would act as a significant inhibit

decisions to engage in intelligence and technical exchanges with 

did inhibit greater cooperation in the period just before the start o

II. The British decisions to use security concerns as an excuse 

information became a source of frustration and distrust on the p

U.S. naval and foreign-policy decisionmakers as the two coun

closer in their relations before the war.

82 Bath, 5; Dorwart, ONI, 24-26. The British were especially expert in U.S. c

and operational security deficiencies as they routinely penetrated and bugged U.S

include the embassy in London. See Martin S. Alexander, “Introduction,” in Knowin

Intelligence Inside Alliances and Coalitions from 1914 to the Cold War, ed. Mart

(Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 3; Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 24-26.

25

U.S.-UK RELATIONS, 1935-1939:

THE BEGINNINGS OF A STRATEGIC RAPPROACHM

[O]bviously there is no political possibility here of “an agreement 

tractual form” with Great Britain in the Orient. Whatever the euph

this would in effect constitute an alliance.

The Secretary of State to the Amb

in Great Britain (Bingham), 29 Jun

in Foreign Relations of the United Stat

[British Prime Minister] MacDonald: We are interested in the polit

uation in the Pacific which imposes certain risks on us that we did n

at the time of the London Treaty [of 1930] and we had hoped wo

occur; we hoped that our cooperation with you would prevent it. Bu

not work out that way.

Minutes of Meeting Between British and Am

Delegations in the Prime Minister’s Offic

House of Commons, 14 Novembe

in Foreign Relations of the United Stat

Even as tensions continued between the U.S. and Great Britain d

interwar period, common interests also remained in place. As Wor

drew closer, these interests would eventually overshadow the d

between the two countries and unite them in a common effort. Tw

concern to the British and Americans were 1) countering the grow

posed by Japan and 2) maintaining the naval ratios established in the 

ton Naval Treaty of 1921 and the London Naval Treaty of 1930. It is, 

not surprising that during the 1920s and early 1930s, exchanges of in

and technical information on these issues did occur. For the most part

these were conducted at a low level and concerned routine matters. T

surrounding the abortive London Naval Conference of 1935, whic

held due to a decision by Japan to abrogate its naval treaty commitme

onstrated to the U.S. and Great Britain that their strategic concerns w

ing increasingly closer. As the situation in the Far East and Europe 

deteriorate, the British began to look to U.S. support as the most via
26

the worlds two most powerful navies, conducted with the full approv

respective governments, signaled the beginning of a series of intellige

eration and information exchange initiatives by the British to secure U

tance in accomplishing their strategic objectives.

Precursor Intelligence Exchanges in The Interwar Period: 19

As he looked back on the early 1920s, Rear Admiral Royal Inge

played a pivotal role in the establishment of closer relations betwee

and British navies in 1938, remembered that relations with the Br

generally cordial, although he could not recall specific details of a

gence exchanges with the British during his time at ONI.84 Another 

Alan Harris Bath, a former Naval intelligence officer and the author o

the Axis Enemy, finds that most of the cooperation during this period “

mainly of low-level operational exchanges carried out informally by 

or British naval officers in the fleet or by naval attachés on fo

tion.”85Although there are indications of at least one formal meeting 

representatives of the two navies in 1928 to discuss views on the Far E

tion and the potential for cooperation, the present author’s review o

data supports Bath’s assessment.86 For example, information request

U.S. naval attaché in London to the NID show that the information e

between the two countries were very routine during this period. They 

requests for information on such things as British naval pay scales, in

on the pilots and equipment of the British “Fleet Air Arm,” lists 

removed from the Royal Navy active roster, lists of Royal Navy 

down and undergoing modernization, the practice and use of wirele

phy (W/T), information on W/T technology, coatings used for aircr

decks, and deep-sea diving technology. In almost every case, these re

information were framed as a “quid pro quo,” with the U.S. naval atta

ing to provide similar information to the NID, if the NID honored the 

83 Lawrence Pratt, “Anglo-American Naval Conversations,” International Affairs 

1972): 749, 754-758; Bath, 11-12; Coles, 114; Aldrich, 116, 122-124; Charmley, 58. 84 Ingersoll Reminiscences, 47. RADM Ingersoll worked the ONI Japan desk fr

1924. 85 Bath, 10.

86 Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 140; Bath, 10. 
27

tice for information exchanges between governments. As explaine

6, British decisions to forego quid pro quo in technical informatio

gence exchanges later became a major tool in their efforts to draw 

a closer relationship.

The Abortive London Naval Conference of 1935

The growing Japanese threat drove closer cooperation between 

the UK from 1931 to 1938. Japanese actions, such as the invasion o

in 1931, raised serious concerns in both countries, as many postulat

nese expansionism would eventually bring conflict between Japan a

ern powers in the Far East.88 To further inflame the situation, the Japa

clear to the Americans and the British during the preliminary negotia

up to the London Naval Conference of 1935 that they intended to w

their obligations under the various naval arms limitations treaties t

were a signatory.89 Japanese withdrawal from the treaties, which had 

of the Japanese Navy inferior to the navies of the U.S. and the UK, w

the Japanese to build the fleet they needed to challenge U.S. and 

dominance in the Pacific. Jeffery Dorwart writes that the events sur

London Naval Conference of 1935 were a watershed moment in the 

relationship between the U.S. and Great Britain, marking the begi

rapprochement between the two countries.90 The present author’s 

analysis of these events using the diplomatic correspondence from th

related below, demonstrates that Dorwart’s contention is correct. 

The U.S. sent its delegation for the London Naval Conference to 

six months prior to the beginning of the conference in an attempt t

87 CAPT W. W. Galbraith, USN, Naval Attaché, Letter to Sir Oswyn A. R. Mur

Admiralty, 6 January 1930; Division of Naval Intelligence General Corresponden

RG 38, National Archives Building, Washington, DC, cited hereafter as DNI C

CAPT W. W. Galbraith, USN, Naval Attaché, Letter to Sir Oswyn A. R. Murray K.C

ralty, 2 July 1930, DNI Correspondence; CAPT W. W. Galbraith, USN, Naval A

Squadron Leader A. R. Boyle, Air Ministry, 2 July 1930, DNI Correspondence; CA

braith, USN, Naval Attaché, Letter to Sir Oswyn A. R. Murray K.C.B., The Admira

DNI Correspondence; CAPT W. W. Galbraith, USN, Naval Attaché, Letter to Sir Os

ray K.C.B., The Admiralty, 21 July 1931, DNI Correspondence; CAPT W. S. A

Naval Attaché, Letter to Sir Oswyn A. R. Murray, G.C.B., The Admiralty, 21 June 

respondence; CAPT Herbert S. Howard, USN, Acting Naval Attaché, Letter to S

Murray, G.C.B., The Admiralty, 7 August 1935, DNI Correspondence. 88 Morrison, Battle of the Atlantic, xl. 89 Ingersoll Reminiscences, 68. 90 Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 138.
28

a better bargaining position against the Japanese. At the start of negotia

and British goals for the conference were diametrically opposed. Norm

the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation, was given orders by Franklin Ro

pursue a 20 percent across-the-board reduction for naval forces and a 

year extension to the terms of all existing naval arms limitations treat

effect. If the 20 percent reduction could not be attained, the fallback po

to have the British agree to maintain parity with the U.S. in naval force

dent Roosevelt instructed Davis to present the U.S. goals personally 

Minister MacDonald, and to argue that the reduction in forces was need

tensions in the world. Other factors, such as fiscal constraints and Amer

tionist sentiments, were most likely just as significant in Roosevelt’s d

advocate for naval force reductions.92 Reporting on his conversations 

Donald to the President and Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, Davis rep

the British had actually been hoping the U.S. would agree to an increa

ish naval forces and they believed the U.S. did not truly understand how 

world situation had changed since the last naval arms limitations talks, 

been held in London in 1930. In particular, the British desired a s

increase in their cruiser strength, telling Davis that “in 1930 England a

ica faced a single problem, namely, the Japanese; whereas today Am

faces only this single problem, England now also faces the acute p

Europe which is relatively academic to the United States.”93 Although 

seemed diametrically opposed, within a few months of these convers

differences in U.S. and the UK positions would become irrelevant in t

the need to develop a common understanding of how best to respond 

decision to abrogate its treaty obligations.

The development of this common understanding would take place i

text of a series of frank discussions between the American and Briti

tions, some of which were attended by the British Prime Minister. 

approached, negotiations no longer focused on U.S. desires to reduce na

because the Japanese decision had made that position untenable for t

cans. During a discussion in November 1934, the British did attempt 

U.S. to agree on a position concerning higher “qualitative” limits on na

strength, but the U.S. delegation remained noncommittal. The major c

91 The Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham) to the Secretary of State, 19 June 1

eign Relations of the United States 1934 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1951), 262. Cited 

FRUS 1934 vol. 1. This cable, released by Ambassador Bingham, was actually from No

92 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham), 26 June 19

1934 vol. 1, 277.

93 The Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham) to the Secretary of State, 27 June 19

1934 vol. 1, 279.
29

about to embark on a new naval building program. Prime Minister 

emphatically assured the American delegation that parity with th

would remain the policy of the UK, despite Japanese actions, but p

common approach to meet the destabilizing situation in the Orient 

ately needed.94 The U.S. agreed that some system for collective se

Pacific was required. The British concurred with this assessment but 

their view was that collective security could only be maintained thro

ble deterrent and it was the responsibility of the U.S. and the UK “to 

rest of the world into giving great moral answers to great moral issu

noting that he understood this position, Davis told the British that em

large-scale naval building program would be difficult for the U.S. a

American people nor the Congress were in favor of expanding the N

though both sides left the meeting agreeing to the need for a common 

ing, it was obvious that the internal political situation in America wo

to be a major factor in curtailing U.S. freedom of action in foreign po

which would continue to adversely affect the relationship between t

tries until the Pearl Harbor attack.

Davis reported the substance of these conversations to his superi

ington. It is evident from the responses sent to him by Cordell Hull t

nese actions had persuaded U.S. decisionmakers to pursue closer 

with the British on the Far East situation. This does not mean that d

British had evaporated. When presented with news that the British h

be intermediaries with the Japanese in trying to resolve the dilemma 

of Japanese rearmament had created, Hull warned Davis that this wo

ceptable. Were the British to pursue that policy, U.S. public opinio

idly turn against them as Americans would interpret the Brit

negotiations as an attempt on the part of the British to reinvigorate t

alliance with the Japanese.97 Still, Hull’s thinking on the matter of 

with the British evolved considerably from that expressed in the ep

began this chapter. While warning Davis that the current talks wit

were not to be a negotiation, it was clear to him now that the U.S. m

our best efforts to bring about an early, open and conclusive indicat

94 Minutes of Meeting Between British and American Delegations in the Prime M

at the House of Commons, 14 November 1934, in FRUS 1934 vol. 1, 334-337. C

Meeting Minutes, 14 November 1934, FRUS 1934 vol. 1. 95 Meeting Minutes, 14 November 1934, FRUS 1934 vol. 1, 338. 96 Meeting Minutes, 14 November 1934, FRUS 1934 vol. 1, 339. 97 The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Delegation (Davis), 17 Nov

FRUS 1934 vol. 1, 354. Cited hereafter as Secretary of State, 17 November 19

vol. 1.
30

Hull would tell Davis that [c]ooperation with the British is somethin

nestly desire” but successful cooperation would depend on the British 

engage in “‘give’ and ‘take’” on matters of policy.99 While there were n

tive steps toward alliance following the failure of the 1935 London Nav

ence, Dorwart is correct in asserting this was a key moment in the 

between the U.S. and the UK and marked a major step on the road to fu

eration on mutual strategic concerns.

The Ingersoll Mission of 1938

By 1937, the situation in Europe and the Far East had continued to d

and, in response, America had become increasingly isolationist. Publ

clearly showed that most Americans wanted to avoid the coming confl

this end, Congress passed strict neutrality laws in 1935, 1936, and 19

isolationists were in the majority, some like Admiral Harry E. Yarn

mander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, saw war between totalitarianism and d

as inevitable and he believed decisive action was needed if the democr

to survive the coming struggle intact.100 For Great Britain, with her pr

Europe and her vast colonial possessions, the events of 1937 would cre

tegic dilemma of significant proportions. In the summer of that year the 

began their assault on China, Mussolini rejected British attempts to 

accommodation with Italy over Ethiopia, and it was evident the Germ

rapidly rearming. Faced with threats in numerous areas of national in

British were still two years away from completing their rearmament go

The dilemma the British faced in the autumn of 1937 was tied to the 

icies of the 1920s and 30s, which had restricted the growth of the Ro

While Great Britain had enough assets to send a sizeable force to the F

counter the Japanese, planners on the naval staff questioned if the force 

enough as it would, at best, give them parity with the Japanese fleet. E

fleet were large enough to deter Japanese adventurism, deploying it 

East would leave England exceedingly vulnerable in the Mediterranea

Atlantic at a time when tensions in Europe were increasing. The Bri

have sent a smaller force to their stronghold at Singapore, but man

would be seen as a provocation by the Japanese, and the relative we

such a force might incite the Japanese to attack. By November of 1937

98 Secretary of State, 17 November 1934, FRUS 1934 vol. 1, 354. 99 The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis), 

FRUS 1934 vol. 1, 391. 100 Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 86. 101 Pratt, 746.
31

resolve this dilemma would be to secure an agreement with the U.S

tion in the event of war with Japan.102 Not everyone agreed with Ede

of 1937, Roosevelt had made a speech in which he discussed the 

“quarantine” to be enforced against aggressive states, such as Japan

felt this to be an ill-defined policy and Admiral Chatfield, the First S

that cooperation with the U.S. would be fruitless as he believed the 

“stand aside” if the British came into conflict with the Japanese in th

Despite the opposition, on 27 November 1937 Eden directed 

Ambassador in the U.S., Sir Ronald Lindsay, to engage the Amer

issue of cooperation in the Far East. Lindsay’s initial approach, to 

State Cordell Hull, and Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, 

despite a desire on the part of the then CNO, ADM Leahy, and AD

discuss the matter with the British.104 The situation changed on 1

1937, when the Japanese attacked the Panay, an American gunboat th

ating in Chinese waters. Following the Panay incident, the British F

pressed Lindsay to reengage the Americans and he was given an a

Roosevelt and Hull in which he once again made a pitch for increa

tion between the two countries on the Japanese threat. Despite obj

Hull, Roosevelt approved secret staff talks between the navies o

tries.105 To maintain the secrecy of this mission, one man, the Navy

War Plans, Captain Royal Ingersoll, was chosen as the U.S. negotia

ings that were to take place in London as soon as CAPT Ingersoll 

there. Ingersoll recalls that he was given specific orders by the Presid

preliminary arrangements, if we could, with the British for joint acti

war with Japan.”106 While the press and Congress expressed interest 

departure and return to the U.S., ADM Leahy maintained the secrec

talks by claiming they concerned the routine matter of obtaining 

from the British Admiralty on the methods used for computing exac

Men of War.”107 While members of Congress were very concern

Ingersoll Mission, Congressman Carl Vinson, Chairman of the N

Committee, ran interference for ADM Leahy and assured him he w

required to answer any Congressional inquiries on the matter. 

102 Pratt, 746-748. 103 Pratt, 747. 104 Bath, 14; Pratt, 749. 105 Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy, 18-20; Bath 14-15; Pratt, 750-752. 106 Ingersoll Reminiscences, 70. 107 Stephen T. Early, Secretary to the President, to Roosevelt, 28 January 1938

Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, December 1937-February 1938 4, ed. Donald B. Sch

Garland Publishing, Inc., 1979), 795.
32

since they feared an anti-British backlash in America if the true nature 

soll’s visit were discovered.108

Ingersoll arrived in London on 31 December 1937 and linked up wit

Naval Attaché, Captain Russell Willson, who would accompany him 

staff talks with the British. On 1 January 1938, Ingersoll met with Eden 

the Deputy Chief of the Admiralty Naval Staff, VADM James. Ingerso

clear to all concerned that he was unable to negotiate a formal agreemen

the two governments and his mission was “to obtain naval information 

to plan and to base decisions, if necessary, for future action.”109 On 

Ingersoll met with ADM Chatfield and his opposite number on the 

staff, CAPT Phillips. After some general discussions on the strategic na

situation in the Far East, the British very frankly laid out the strategic si

Ingersoll, providing him with detailed information on the size and comp

the force they could send to the Far East, the disposition of the force

there, and the status of Singapore. Realizing how important the ex

information would be for any coordinated actions, Chatfield told Inger

was “desirable to arrange early the means of communication and the ex

intelligence between the two fleets.”110 To this end, Ingersoll discussed 

lips the need for a set of codes that could be used to conduct these in

exchanges. Furthermore, he recommended expanding intelligence 

with the British, stating that 

exchange of information by informal agreement is now taking plac

between the British Director of Naval Intelligence and Willson rega

Japanese naval construction and the Mandated Islands. The British 

believe this should be extended now to include movements and loc

of Japan’s naval units.111 

While this type of operational intelligence exchange may have alr

occurring on a limited basis between the U.S. Asiatic Fleet and t

China Fleet, the offer to begin formalizing some of these in

108 Royal Ingersoll, CAPT, USN, Letter to Captain Russell Willson, USN, 21 Febru

the U.S. Naval Academy Library microfilm collection, Strategic Planning in the U.S. N

lution and Execution 1891-1945 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1979

cited hereafter as Strategic Planning. 109 Royal Ingersoll, CAPT, USN, Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

ber 1937, Strategic Planning, 1-2. 110 Royal Ingersoll, CAPT, USN, Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operation

1938, Strategic Planning, 1-2. 111 Royal Ingersoll, CAPT, USN, Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operation

1938, Strategic Planning, 1-4.
33

between the two countries.

The remainder of Ingersoll’s mission was spent working out the d

cooperation between the two navies would work in the event of wa

The British offered to provide the codes and ciphers needed to fac

communications between the two fleets and the U.S. was given deta

tion on the British radio network and the specific frequencies used b

forces. Plans for a distant blockade, designed to contain the Japane

cussed and finalized. The British would take the western Pacific fro

to New Zealand and the U.S. would be responsible for the eas

Although the Record of Conversation detailing the discussions conta

of qualifiers with regard to when this plan would be implemented, 

significant achievement given the level of distrust that still pervad

relations.113

While the Ingersoll Mission set the stage for improved coopera

the U.S. and the UK, what were its immediate results? Ingersoll beli

sion, while limited in its immediate impact, did create the condition

cessful coordination of British and U.S. naval action by establishi

codes and, eventually, liaison officers in the various fleets.114 Ingerso

cated continuing the process of engagement and recommended a reg

for staff talks between the U.S. and the UK. His suggestion was re

U.S. Navy’s leadership, however, because the Navy feared Congress 

its attention on them if staff talks were to become a regular occurren

intense isolationist sentiment in the U.S., the Navy was not willin

public backlash that might result from revelations concerning the 

with the British.115 So, while the Ingersoll Mission may have had s

long-term effects, its immediate results with regard to improving 

between the British and the U.S. were not so impressive.

112 For information on how the ADM Yarnell and the Asiatic Fleet may have coo

British during this period see Pratt, 750. 113 Royal Ingersoll, CAPT, USN, Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Opera

1938, Strategic Planning, 1-4; Royal Ingersoll, CAPT, USN, Memorandum for the 

Operations, 10 January 1938, Strategic Planning, 1-4; Royal Ingersoll, CAPT, USN

for the Chief of Naval Operations, 12 January 1938, Strategic Planning. Russell 

USN, Memorandum for the Director of Naval Intelligence, 10 February 1938, Strat

114 Ingersoll Reminiscences, 72-76. 115 Russell Willson, CAPT, USN, Letter to Captain Royal Ingersoll, 4 March 

Planning, n.p; Royal Ingersoll, CAPT, USN, Letter to Captain Russell Willson, 2

Strategic Planning. Reynolds, 60.
34

promise a new chapter in the relationship between the two navies. Unf

distrust continued to be a common feature of the relationship and intelli

technical information exchange would not improve significantly in 

immediately following the Ingersoll Mission. In February 1938, the U

Attaché, CAPT Willson, was instructed to pursue a more aggressive in

exchange policy with the British. Willson was successful in securing 

eral information on British fleet tactics, but his requests for informat

defenses of Singapore and on harbor boom defenses were denied by t

because the U.S. would not release information on its Norden bombs

the arresting-gear capabilities of its aircraft carriers.116Attempts by the 

Attaché in Washington, DC to obtain information on the Norden bomb

haps the most closely held piece of technology the U.S. possessed in th

period, were also rebuffed by ONI.117 Although both countries enc

more liberal intelligence-exchange policy following the Ingersoll Mis

pro quo was still the criteria for these exchanges, which seriously im

flow of information. While the policy divisions (plans and intelligence

greater level of exchange, they were often overruled by the technical 

such as ordnance, which were fearful of hard-earned technical secrets g

the wrong hands.118 Despite the restrictions, exchanges on seemingly 

matters like personnel issues gave the U.S. some insight into British ca

For example, even though the NID was not allowed to share any in

about anti-submarine technical equipment with the U.S. naval attach

surmised the British must have been successful in developing these c

during the interwar period as he had received detailed knowledge abou

stantial number of “Submarine Detectors” (Sonarmen) in the Britis

With restrictions like these in place, however, substantive progre

exchange of intelligence would require a major policy shift on the part 

one of the participants to release both sides from the tyranny of the qu

paradigm. That shift did not occur until after the beginning of the war.

116 James R. Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining in Anglo-American Naval Rela

1946,” Proceedings 103, no., sequence 892 (June 1977): 51-52, cited hereafter as Leutz

ogy and Bargaining”; Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy, 31-33; David Zimmerman

Exchange: The Tizard Mission and the Scientific War (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Univ

1996), 27-28. 117G.C. Pirie, Group Captain, Air Attaché, Letter to Director of Naval Intelligen

1938, DNI Correspondence. Commander F. T. Spellman, Bureau of Ordinance, Mem

the Director of Naval Intelligence, 21 June 1938, DNI Correspondence. 118 Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy, 31. 119 Russell Willson, CAPT, USN, Letter to Captain Alan G. Kirk, 23 September 193

Alan G. Kirk, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C
35

The Ingersoll Mission opened the door to greater cooperation 

U.S. and British navies, but the U.S. was placated by the apologe

response to the Panay incident. Moreover, the fervor that had drive

ment to explore closer cooperation with the British had waned ov

of 1938. Still, by January of 1939, the worsening situation in Europ

British to realize that sending a naval force sufficient to deter the J

protect its Far East possessions was now beyond its capabilities, g

ority of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic theaters. This was rev

Americans through their naval attaché, CAPT Willson, when h

Admiralty if they desired to update the Record of Conversation the

oped with Ingersoll.120

Although the British had hoped to send a smaller force to the Fa

event of war, their planners came to the conclusion by the spring 

even the dispatch of a modest force would be a strategic impossibil

threatening situation in Europe. Given this substantial change in th

ning, the Admiralty dispatched Commander T. C. Hampton, from t

War Plans Division, to Washington to update the Americans on th

During two secret visits to the personal home of the CNO on 12 

1939, Hampton described the changes the British were required to 

Record of Conversation established by the Ingersoll Mission, and 

ascertain the limits of U.S. cooperation given the new strategic envir

Beesly has contended there were no substantive results from th

Although that may be true from one perspective, the records of t

tions drafted by the War Plans Division Directory, Rear Admir

Ghormley, are informative in that they reveal how crucial the coope

U.S. had become to British war planners. It is evident that the Brit

U.S. support as their best alternative for mitigating their strateg

Once again, the British revealed these weaknesses to Leahy and Gh

exceptional candor, relaying the fact the British could not send a fle

East in event of war with Japan. Great Britain’s response in tha

would be to secure the Mediterranean first, which would allow it th

action needed to reinforce the Far East. Hampton then attempted to 

limits of U.S. cooperation and, in the process, discussed concession

would be willing to make in exchange for U.S. assistance. For exam

120 Russell Willson, CAPT, USN, Record of Conversations in London 13 Janua

nection with Bringing Up-to-date the Ingersoll Conversations in London, January 1

1939, Strategic Planning, 1-4. 121 Reynolds, 60-62; Bath, 23. 122 Beesly, Very Special Admiral, 172.
36

against Japan, all British Far East ports would be open to them and th

ship of any joint action “would doubtless...be vested in the Comman

larger force,” thus making it clear that the British understood U.S. se

about their “junior partner” status in the Great War.123 Significantly

intelligence perspective, Hampton also revealed details concerning t

HF/DF network in the Far East and, even more significantly, described 

weakness of the system as the fact the network lacked “good angles” 

fixing contacts, but that the British felt adding the capabilities of thei

to those of the U.S. would be of advantage to both countries.124 As wit

to exchange intelligence on Japanese naval movements during the 

visit, this was another attempt on the part of the British to use the p

closer intelligence cooperation as one component of a many-layered 

designed to entice the U.S. into a closer partnership. 

Since these were not official talks, Leahy remained noncommittal, on

ing his personal view that the U.S. would remain neutral as long as po

assuring Hampton that, in the event of war, the U.S. would position 

Hawaii to deter Japanese aggression against U.S. interests, and tha

would conduct air and sea patrols of the Western Atlantic, particularly i

ibbean and the Panama Canal Zone, to protect U.S. interests.125 On 

Hampton again met with Leahy and Ghormley to clarify some of the po

during the 12 June meeting. Principally, he desired to understand more 

U.S. role in the Pacific and the Atlantic, inquiring whether the U.S. 

willing to take the lead in the Pacific theater in the event of combin

against the Axis. Once again, Leahy offered his personal opinion, statin

U.S. would take the lead in the Pacific and that he expected the British 

lead in the Atlantic theater except in the case of local submarine patro

the U.S. coast and in the Caribbean and the Panama Canal Zone.126 W

correct to say these talks produced no tangible results, they were imp

another reason. First, they indicate that the concerns that drove both co

engage in the Ingersoll Mission were still valid over a year later. Sec

clearly show that the British had come to the inescapable conclusion tha

and possibly only, solution for their strategic dilemma was a cooperati

gence-intensive partnership with America.

123 Robert L. Ghormley, RADM, USN, Memorandum of an Informal Conversation 

Residence of the Chief of Naval Operations at 1700, 12 June 1939, Strategic Plann

hereafter Ghormley Memorandum, 12 June 1939. 124 Ghormley Memorandum, 12 June 1939, Strategic Planning, 3. 125 Ghormley Memorandum, 12 June 1939, Strategic Planning, 1-2. 126 Robert L. Ghormley, RADM, USN, Memorandum of an Informal Conversation 

Residence of the Chief of Naval Operations at 1700, 14 June 1939, Strategic Planning, 
37

KEY U.S. POLICYMAKERS AND THEIR 

ATTITUDES TOWARD COOPERATION

The three main policymakers with regard to naval matters we

dent, Franklin Roosevelt; Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox; and 

Naval Operations, ADM Stark. Some authors have accused these 

being anglophiles or pawns of the British, but these arguments hav

ity. In reality, all three were realists who saw that aiding Englan

national interests of the U.S. and was the path most in consonan

values. Despite their inclination to assist the British, even as they 

suit of U.S. foreign policy objectives, all three men were constr

domestic political situation and their own mistrust of British intent

ing a closer partnership.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt

Although some have assumed Roosevelt was an anglophile be

familial connections to England and his patrician upbringing, the re

complex. True, Roosevelt did have cultural affinity with the British

tude toward British policies was circumspect. Partly this was rooted 

seated anti-colonialism. Like many Americans, he saw colonialism 

causal factor behind World War I and he believed that the desire of th

other European countries to maintain colonial possessions would 

wars in the future. Furthermore, Roosevelt had a strong, general d

British and greatly resented the way they treated America as a junior 

telling example of this can be found in “off the record” remarks h

group of reporters upon hearing that British newspapers were calling 

“quarantine” to contain Japanese aggression in 1937 “an attitude w

gram.”128 In response, Roosevelt revealed his exasperation with th

asserting that if the British had a better idea, they needed to state it, 

plaining that “[e]verytime we enter into some kind of effort to sett

with our British friends, when we make the suggestion[,] they get 

get 10%.”129 Clearly, Roosevelt’s attitudes toward colonialism and 

ness with the lack of perceived U.S. equality by the British were tw

127 Reynolds, 25; Aldrich, 122-123. 128 “Press Conference, Hyde Park, 6 October 1937,” in Franklin D. Roosev

Affairs, January 1939-August 1939, Donald B. Schewe, ed. (New York: Garland P

1979). 129 “Press Conference, 6 October 1937” in Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign A

1939-August 1939. 
38

enacted on terms favorable to the U.S. and consistent with American va

Even if Roosevelt had been in favor of unrestricted assistance to t

prior to the war, the domestic political situation would not allow it. The 

public was largely isolationist in its outlook and this had a tremendous 

the President’s foreign policy. Even Roosevelt’s articulation of the 

concept in 1937, with its emphasis on cooperative, defensive action 

aggression, was in strong contradiction to pacifist groups interested in p

U.S. neutrality.130 Even after war had come in September of 1939, R

freedom of action was restricted by re-election pressures and the requ

observe U.S. neutrality laws, which in particular put significant restr

arms sales and the movement of U.S. military and commercial assets i

nated war zones.131

Still, Roosevelt and his advisors saw aid to England as being in the 

ests of the U.S., and they were willing to push and bend the limits of 

provide that aid where possible. Roosevelt agreed with the assessmen

Leahy and ADM Yarnell, who in 1937 contended that the allies in any 

the U.S. might face in the Far East “as indicated by...political and co

considerations” would include Great Britain, France, and the Nether

this list was “in order of natural affiliation as well as assured coopera

that “[a]s for pulling chestnuts out of the fire, England stands to pull ju

out for us as we do for her.”132

130 Edgar Dewitt Jones, President, The Federal Council of Churches of Christ in A

Others, Letter to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 9 October 1937, in Franklin 

and Foreign Affairs, January 1939-August 1939, Donald B. Schewe, ed. (New York: G

lishing, Inc., 1979); Frederick J. Libby, Executive Secretary, National Council for P

War, Washington, Letter to Representative Virginia E. Jenkes of Indiana, 28 September 

klin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, January 1939-August 1939, Donald B. Schew

York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1979).

131 Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 11-12; Reynolds, 55; Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 

Leutze, “The Secret of the Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence: September 1939-

Journal of Contemporary History 10, no. 3 (July 1975): 465. 132 Harry E. Yarnell, ADM, USN, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Letter to Adm

D. Leahy, Chief of Naval Operations, 15 October 1937, in Franklin D. Roosevelt 

Affairs, January 1939-August 1939, Donald B. Schewe, ed. (New York: Garland Pub

1979); Franklin D. Roosevelt, Letter to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Naval Op

November 1937, in Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, January 1939-August 1

B. Schewe, ed. (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1979); William D. Leahy, Ad

Chief of Naval Operations, Letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 6 January 1938, in 

Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, December 1937-February 1938, Donald B. Schewe, ed

Garland Publishing, Inc., 1979).
39

war because maintaining British power would provide America 

needed to rearm itself. Still, actions taken prior to his election in 1

the institution of neutrality patrols, the resumption of the dr

destroyer-for-bases deal were all met with some public opposition 

which was why the staff talks and technical exchanges occurring 

U.S. and Great Britain were kept so secret. Although Roosevelt had 

dom to act following his election, domestic politics still remained t

straining factor on close relations between the two countries, a 

would continue to cause tension between the U.S. and Great Britain 

Pearl Harbor attack.133

Frank Knox

Confirmed in July of 1940 as Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox h

called an anglophile by some authors, although this assessment, 

Roosevelt, understates the complexity of the situation.134 Knox was 

and had been publisher of the Chicago Daily News, where he advoca

ist approach for American foreign policy as a necessary means of pr

national interests.135 Knox was outraged that America had drawn d

tary forces, as he believed that maintaining strength was the best wa

peace. Given this attitude, it is clear that Knox, although he admire

was not inclined to let them dictate American policy. He clearly de

that was the “strongest in the world.”136 Like Roosevelt, he was a r

denced in a speech he made to the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce 

start of the World War II. He made it clear that America really had no

from a British-French victory but “despite these pro-British and Fr

thies, we must...think first of the interests of the United States, and 

best serves those interests.”137 Later, as the Axis gained victory aft

the Continent, Knox broadcast an impassioned plea for a more in

policy for America in a speech that warned the American people tha

Than You Think.” In that address, he lamented an unprepared A

133 Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 114; Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 8-9; Morison, T

Atlantic, 14-15, 33-34; Albion, 553-557; Reynolds, 64-65. 134 Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 10-11. 135 Frank Knox, Publisher, Chicago Daily News, Letter to Franklin D. Rooseve

1937, in Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, December 1937-February 1938

B. Schewe (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1979). 136 Frank Knox, Speech to Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, 24 October, 193

of Frank Knox, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washing

Cited hereafter as Knox, Speech to Cleveland Chamber of Commerce. Collection 

as Knox Papers. 137 Frank Knox, Speech to Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, Knox Papers, 1-2.
40

the most concrete of strategic reasons—If she [England] falls, and he

power is broken or seized...the Atlantic Ocean will cease to be our great 

defense.”138 For Knox, it was in America’s self-interest to aid Great B

while he may have felt an affinity for that country, it was his sound strat

which told him that America could not avoid war. 

Admiral Harold R. Stark

ADM Stark relieved ADM Leahy as CNO on 1 August 1939. Stark 

of the British most likely because, as ADM Sims’ Flag Secretary, he 

first-hand during World War I how the British treated their “junior par

Americans. Even though Stark had learned how to work with the Bri

tively, he, like many of his counterparts, was determined that the U.S. w

work with the British as equals in the future.139 Despite a history of wo

cessfully with the British, Stark’s personal views show that he was un

with them. In a personal letter to the commander of the U.S. Asiatic 

Admiral T. C. Hart, Stark wrote that his Special Naval Observer (SP

London, RADM Ghormley, had just told him the British were expectin

to enter the war soon after Roosevelt’s reelection in 1940. Stark told 

expectation on the part of the British was “merely another evidence of 

ways of thought, and their non-realistic views of international politi

tions, and of our own political system.”140

Clearly, Stark was no fan of the British, yet, as the author of the fam

Dog” memorandum in November 1940, he was responsible for “rev

Pacific orientation [of U.S. military planning] and, in the midst of a na

mate of independence and neutrality, proposed to enter a coalition war

again, strategic imperatives led Stark to conclude, like his British cou

that alliance between the U.S. and the UK was necessary for the def

Axis and the preservation of the democracies. The memo was written to 

of the Navy Knox, essentially as a plea to get definitive strategic direc

Roosevelt. Such strategic direction had become a necessity, given th

138 Frank Knox, “It Is Later Than You Think,” 4 August 1940, in Deadline for Am

Papers, 2. In a speech given in January 1941, Knox said that those favoring the provis

Great Britain should be called “A Committee to Aid Britain to Aid Us to Defend Am

Frank Knox, Speech to the Canadian Society of New York, 19 January 1941, Knox Pape

139 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 39; Department of the Navy, “Administra

United States Naval Forces in Europe 1940-1946,” Strategic Planning, iv, cited hereaf

NAVEU Admin History; Budiansky, 52.

140 Harold R. Stark, ADM, USN, Letter to ADM T.C. Hart, Commander-in-Chief, A

12 Nov 40, Stark Papers, 1. 141 Baer, 19.
41

talks to discuss how U.S.-UK cooperation would work in the ev

entered the war. To provide that direction, Stark and a team of p

included his Deputy CNO, VADM Ingersoll, and his Director of Wa

Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, drafted the 12-page memo over a 1

and submitted it to Knox, who forwarded it to Roosevelt for a decis

U.S. Army and Navy planners had focused attention on an Atlantic

as early as 1939 with the RAINBOW FIVE plan, most strategic plan

that point had been oriented on Japan.143 The situation in Europe ha

that and Stark, despite his reservations about the British, clearly saw 

ica’s future success was tied to an Atlantic-first strategy, which mea

British. Setting out the parameters of the strategic problem which fa

Stark said “if Britain wins decisively against Germany we could win 

but...if she loses the problem confronting us would be very great; a

might not lose everywhere, we might, possibly, not win anywhere.”14

After outlining alternative courses of action, Stark persuasively 

defense of Great Britain was in the U.S. national interest. Once agai

a mild disdain for the British, he stated that he felt “the British were o

tic as to their chances for ultimate success” and that success would r

allies as “[a]lone the British Empire lacks the manpower and the m

to master Germany.”145 Citing the significant danger posed by the E

ation, Stark forcefully recommended alliance with the British and ex

the focus of effort must first be victory in Europe with a holding acti

East.146 To further this objective, Stark recommended that the U

engage in “secret staff talks with the British military....to reach agree

down plans for promoting unity of allied effort should the United 

necessary to enter the war.”147 Roosevelt approved Stark’s recomm

the staff talks he recommended did occur. Stark’s desire to aid Britai

Roosevelt and Knox, was based on strategic realities rather than o

attitudes. Still, just because Stark saw that aiding the British was in t

ests of the U.S., it was not a foregone conclusion that he would, b

1940, overcome his suspicions concerning their motives enough to 

engaging in secret staff talks with them. British actions from the sum

142 Harold R. Stark, ADM, USN, Letter to Admiral J. O. Richardson, USN, 

Chief, U.S. Fleet, 12 November 1940, in Stark Papers. 143 Baer, 18-19. 144 Harold R. Stark, ADM, USN, Memorandum to Frank Knox, Secretary o

November 1940, in Stark Papers, 1. Cited hereafter as Plan Dog Memo. 145 Stark, Plan Dog Memo, Stark Papers, 4-5. 146 Stark, Plan Dog Memo, Stark Papers, 23-24. 147 Stark, Plan Dog Memo, Stark Papers, 26
42

forming an equal partnership with the U.S., a factor that would enco

Navy’s leadership to authorize increased intelligence and technical 

with the British during this critical period. 
43

ALUSNA LONDON AND THE BRITISH NID

JANUARY 1939-MARCH 1941

The U.S. Navy Department’s reactions to the Admiralty’s initiat

field of intelligence cooperation were colored by domestic politic

erations that precluded overt alliance and by vague feelings of di

opening the cooperative door too far at this stage of the war migh

less than equal partnership later.

Alan Harris Bath, Tracking the A

Impact Of The War On Information Exchange

With regard to intelligence

sharing, no relationship was

more important or long standing

than that which existed between

the U.S. Naval Attaché office in

London and the British NID. The

London naval attaché office was

the first the U.S. had established

after the formation of ONI.

While this office had numerous

responsibilities, the most important relationship for the attaché

to cultivate was the one maintained with the British DNI.

Although a number of ad hoc

forums for information exchange

developed from 1939 to the early

part of 1941, the British extensively used this particular, longestablished conduit in their

attempts to encourage greater

cooperation between themselves

and the Americans. 

The U.S. Naval Attaché during

this period, Captain Alan Goodrich Kirk (later RADM Kirk) was

a key voice advocating for a more robust exchange of information betw

Figure 1. RADM Kirk

Source: ALUSNA London

Command History,’’ Stark Paper
44

contact at the NID, Rear Admiral

John Godfrey, was also an individual who did much to push for a

more liberal exchange policy with

the U.S. Kirk and Godfrey came

from similar backgrounds and

they were uniquely suited to perform the roles they were assigned

at this critical juncture in U.S.-UK

relations. The relationship they

were able to establish, while not

personally close, was a key component in furthering intelligence

exchanges between the two countries. 

Kirk’s performance as attaché

has been misrepresented by

authors who contend that he was

unrealistically pessimistic about

England’s chances of surviving

the war. 

ALUSNA London Organization

Captain Alan Kirk took charge of the naval attaché office in London 

ary 1939. A highly capable surface warfare officer, VADM Kirk later co

all U.S. naval forces engaged in the Normandy invasion. According to 

accounts, he was well respected and, despite his lack of intelligence tra

formed his duties as attaché quite admirably.148 The office he inherited 

tain Russell Willson consisted of three assistant naval attachés, thre

personnel, and four civil service employees. One officer was designated 

to the NID.149 Although this organization was sufficient for handling 

operations, it was quickly overwhelmed within days of the war’s comm

and, by mid-September 1939, Kirk began requesting additional perso

148 Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy, 58; Harold Stark, ADM, USN, Chief of N

tions, Letter to Robert Ghormley, RADM, USN, 16 November 1940, Stark Papers, 2. 149 Department of the Navy, United States Naval Forces in Europe, “Office of the U

Naval Attaché American Embassy London England, 1939-1946,” n.d., Stark Papers, 1

ument is the command history of ALUSNA London from 1939 to 1946. Cited hereaft

SNA London Command History,” Stark Papers.

Figure 2. RADM Godfrey

Source: Beesly, Very Special Admira

contained in photo section, used by perm
45

this and future requests. By December 1940 the attaché office had ex

officers, in addition to numerous “naval observers” who would be 

England temporarily on specific fact-finding missions.150 Thi

increase in personnel was needed to handle the ever-increasing flow 

tion and intelligence provided by the British as the war progressed

establishing the U.S. naval observers with the British military a

establishments was not an easy one as mutual distrust hampered the 

mation between the two countries well into 1940. 

The Boom Defense-Arresting Gear Deal

Despite direction from his superior to engage in greater informat

with the British, CAPT Willson had been stymied in his efforts to 

information. The main problem was the fact that neither the British n

icans were willing to give up the technical secrets that the other 

Prior to Willson’s departure, agreement was reached that the U.S. 

would explore the possibility of exchanging information on the B

boom defenses for details of the arresting gear used aboard U.S. nava

least one author has characterized this exchange as minor.151 While i

so, it was, in fact, significant to both countries at the time and this 

shows the limits of the possible, with regard to information exch

period prior to the start of the war. 

While Willson and Godfrey had laid the ground work for this exch

Willson’s departure in February 1939, it was June of that year befor

provide Godfrey with a timeline in which the exchange would tak

informed Godfrey that he should look to send his observer to the U

in July or August of 1939, which disappointed Godfrey, given that th

eight months after the exchange had been agreed to.152 The contrast 

two countries’ approaches to these exchanges is interesting, as the

two weeks before the war started. In the matter of the exchange of b

information, Captain H. E. Fischer and Commander G. W. Nelson w

150 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderso

tor of Naval Intelligence, 15 September 1939, Kirk Papers; Walter S. Anderson

Director of Naval Intelligence, Letter to Captain Alan Goodrich Kirk, USN, 20 S

Kirk Papers, n.p; “ALUSNA London Command History,” Stark Papers, 2. 151 Zimmerman, 32-33. 152 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson

of Naval Intelligence, 28 June 1939, Kirk Papers. Then-CNO ADM Leahy actual

exchange on 27 July 1939. For additional information see William Leahy, ADM, 

Naval Operations, Memorandum to the Chiefs of the Bureaus of Ordnance, C

Repair, and Yards and Docks, 27 July 1939, DNI Correspondence.
46

they were receiving full cooperation from their hosts and were even a

inspect the British anchorage at Scapa Flow to see the boom defenses 

tion. In all, Fischer and Nelson were in England for well over a month 

were able to say with confidence that they had “gotten just about 

worthwhile on the subject of boom defenses” from their British hosts.1

The British sent Royal Navy Captain R. M. Ellis to the USS Saratog

what he could about the American arresting gear. Officers aboard the 

were given clear instructions that they were not to provide any details 

characteristics to the Royal Navy officer, but they could discuss other m

non-sensitive nature. Ellis impressed the U.S. officers he came in con

especially the Commander of Carrier Division ONE, Rear Admira

“Bull” Halsey, who admired Ellis’ confidence in the Royal Air Force an

ingness to discuss British aviation.154 Even though the exchange wen

American officers were impressed with British openness, there was sti

dous reticence on the part of the Navy hierarchy to share anything bey

had been so arduously agreed to. For example, Ellis had asked quest

night carrier landings and barrier crash rates, but he had been rebuffe

the Saratoga. Efforts by the British Assistant Naval Attaché to obtain 

mation were also denied.155 Even Kirk tried to capitalize on the mom

had hoped this exchange would generate by trying to convince Anderso

British should, at the very least, be given details on the Navy’s aircraft c

ery system since, now that they were exposed to it from Ellis’ visit, th

quickly figure out how to replicate it on their own.156 As with the in

requested by the British, Anderson was forced to tell Kirk that the det

system would need to remain confidential.157

153 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, 

tor of Naval Intelligence, 14 August 1939, Kirk Papers; H. E. Fischer, CAPT, USN, L

Naval Attaché, London (Captain Alan G. Kirk), 23 September 1939, DNI Corresponde

154 Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics (Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, USN), Letter to 

Naval Operations, 15 July 1939, DNI Correspondence; Commander Carrier Division 

Admiral W. H. Halsey), Letter to Director of Naval Intelligence (Rear Admiral Walter S

14 August 1939. 155 Commanding Officer, U.S. Fleet, Aircraft Battle Force, Letter to Director of N

gence (Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson), 12 August 1939, DNI Correspondence; F. 

CDR, Royal Navy, Letter to Director of Naval Intelligence (Rear Admiral Walter S. A

August 1939, DNI Correspondence. 156 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, U

of Naval Intelligence, 19 August 1939, DNI Correspondence. 157 Walter S. Anderson, RADM, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, Letter to C

Goodrich Kirk, USN, 5 September 1939, DNI Correspondence.
47

exchanges between the two navies on the eve of the war, the situ

begin to change substantially once the war began. For example, a w

war began, the British Naval Attaché, CAPT Curzon-Howe, requ

from the U.S. on its HF/DF network, stating the British were 

exchange full details of their network in exchange.158 Anderson a

exchange, although he made it clear that the U.S. was not prepared 

the intelligence derived from this source to the British, but rathe

structure of the network.159

British Attitudes on Intelligence Exchange

September 1939 to May 1940

Despite the qualified success of the boom defense-arresting g

commencement of the war in September 1939 would make the shar

gence more difficult. As Patrick Beesly has noted, “[f]or the first s

the war both sides were anxious to receive but loath to give” inform

other side.160 With respect to the British, many authors have cited 

cerns as the main reason for their reluctance to share intelligence.161 

data clearly show that security was the main British concern and tha

nificant impact on intelligence cooperation during the first month

When reflecting on this period, CAPT Kirk remembered that obtain

tion on the new German magnetic mine was a primary intelligence 

his office. The British were reluctant to tell the U.S. anything about t

ing the first month of the war “because they didn’t think our security 

ton was good enough to prevent the Germans finding out what th

Kirk’s letters to his superiors during this period also reflect his gro

tion with the British. In January of 1940, he and his men had consi

culty getting anything from the Admiralty and they were told, in con

porous U.S. security was the reason. When Kirk confronted Godf

problem, he was shown an article in the Army & Navy Register that 

cated monies allocated for harbor defenses were to purchase netti

158 L. Curzon-Howe, CAPT, Royal Navy, Naval Attaché, Letter to Rear Ad

Anderson, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, 8 September 1939, DNI Correspon

159 Walter S. Anderson, RADM, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, Letter to 

zon-Howe, M.V.O., Royal Navy, Naval Attaché, 25 September 1939, DNI Corre

first exchange occurred in the spring of 1940 when two U.S. Navy personnel visited 

DF site at Bermuda where they observed “British operations, net procedures, and 

of fixed antenna equipment.” For additional information see Bray, xviii. 160 Beesly, Very Special Admiral, 174. 161 Zimmerman, 47-48; Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 54. 162 Kirk Reminiscences, 143. 
48

to, Kirk noted that the widespread perception of lax U.S. security wou

cult to overcome.163 

Kirk acknowledged to his superiors that the British attitude tow

security was not universal. In February 1940 he had a long convers

Godfrey, one of the few extended conversations he had had with 

since the start of the war. In that conversation, Kirk appealed to G

provide more information to the U.S. because it would be in the bes

of the British to have an America prepared for war. Godfrey confi

told Kirk that he had been advocating increased sharing of informati

his own government, because he also believed it to be in Britain’s 

interest to have America prepared. Godfrey, however, was hamstru

policies of the Royal Navy’s technical divisions, which did not favo

information with the Americans, even though they could point to no 

evidence of U.S. security lapses. Kirk felt Godfrey was sincere an

mended to his superiors that one way to break the logjam would 

U.S. to more expeditiously provide requested information and intel

the British, a policy Godfrey advised him would be most helpful for 

cooperation. Kirk made it clear to Godfrey, though, that 1940 was a

year in the U.S. and domestic political concerns significantly imp

amount of cooperation the U.S. could provide.164

As late as April 1940, despite the fact the British had begun to provid

with more intelligence, Kirk was still dissatisfied with the amount an

exchange between the two countries and he confronted Godfrey about 

lem. The report Kirk wrote following that conversation was signifi

pointed to other concerns the British had with regard to the sharing o

tion, concerns having little to do with security. Although Kirk was 

Godfrey was personally doing what he could to provide more informa

Americans, he intentionally prodded Godfrey, who had just complim

U.S. on the decision to redeploy its fleet to Hawaii, by telling him tha

would be a lot better prepared if the U.S. had the secret of degaussing.1

was incensed and the tirade he unleashed on Kirk is worth quoting at so

163 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, U

of Naval Intelligence, 22 January 1940, Kirk Papers, 1-2. 164 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, U

of Naval Intelligence, 6 February, 1940, Kirk Papers, 1-3. 165 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, 

tor of Naval Intelligence, 24 April 1940, Kirk Papers, 1. Cited hereafter as Kirk, Letter 

24 April 1940. Degaussing refers to the process of reducing a ship’s magnetic signature 

use of electrically charged coils embedded within the ship’s hull.
49

tancy to share information at this stage in the war. Godfrey told Kirk

that he felt they had done a great deal for us. He cited the vi

damaged ships, as well as the magnetic mine. He said he wa

stantly being told by people to whom he referred matters in 

[Kirk] was interested that the United States wasn’t in the wa

insisted she was never coming into the war, so that various D

of the Naval Staff...were intimating that, after all, why shou

give the American Navy information which they were earni

their own blood and sweat. He also made reference to the fa

all this material was furnished now; then, during the period 

say, 25 years or more which they hoped would follow this w

would be abreast of them throughout.166

Godfrey thus revealed that resentment of the U.S. for not entering 

British concerns that the U.S. would later use the information provid

eclipse Great Britain, were two other significant factors in the mind 

ralty’s officers which prevented wider exchange of information.167

Kirk was sobered by Godfrey’s remarks and told DNI Anderson th

concerns were legitimate. He explained how the British had reques

tion on stern hangers, airdropped depth charges, underwater paint, a

American naval exercise (Fleet Problem XXI), but that none of these 

been honored. Despite these tensions, by this time Kirk felt that he w

more from the British than he had in the past and saw the relatio

seemed so badly fractured in December 1939, as improving. He rei

superiors that the U.S. needed to reciprocate with their own exchan

the British had much to share and the U.S. could not long expect “

thing for nothing.”168

166 Kirk, Letter to Anderson, 24 April 1940, 2. 167 For additional information on British concerns about their declining positio

U.S. and their fears of what cooperation with the U.S. might mean for the future o

the post-war world, see Reynolds, 10, 15; Aldrich, xiv. 168 Kirk, Letter to Anderson, 24 April 1940, 2-3. Years later, Kirk would recall 

accurately, telling the interviewer who assisted him with his reminiscences that, wh

of information was not “wide-open,” the British were far more willing to share than 

icans. For additional information see Kirk Reminiscences, 133.
50

September 1939 to May 1940

Since Kirk and Godfrey both observed that the exchange of inform

ing this period appeared somewhat one-sided, what were the America

for restricting the flow of information to the British at this junctur

refusals to share information during the chaotic first few months of th

gested to some personnel in the U.S. Navy that the British were untr

and capricious, and they were disinclined to honor British requests fo

tion because of this attitude.169 Domestic political concerns, continua

straint on U.S. foreign policy moves, were also a factor that weighe

against getting too close to the British. Despite the rebuffs, Kirk co

press for something he could give the British in exchange for what 

shared with the U.S. Navy. Even something as simple as getting 

officer permission to observe Fleet Problem XXI was impossible. W

about why the Navy could not accede to this request, considering th

British had allowed U.S. Naval Officers to observe some of their o

Anderson told Kirk that there was nothing he could do about it and

could not elaborate, the refusal “was made by higher authority” and 

with the decision.170 The most likely explanation for the refusal, giv

son’s cryptic rationale, were domestic political concerns, as the media 

gress were vigilant for any signs the administration was moving the 

a direction that would embroil it in another war. The risk was too high 

of a British observer with the U.S. fleet would leak, which would be 

both President Roosevelt and the Navy Department in terms of public 

and Congressional support.

While Kirk acknowledged that Anderson had a bigger picture of th

than he did, he thought the U.S. was missing a golden opportunity by n

cating with them as war was causing the British to make rapid tec

advances.171 Kirk found it hard to comprehend why his superiors cou

why “it appears so simply to our advantage to open up with them 

ish]...that it is a puzzle to me...to appreciate the factors which appear to 

heavily against such a policy.”172 Despite his admiration for how th

169 Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 54-55. 170 Walter S. Anderson, RADM, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, Letter to C

Goodrich Kirk, USN, 1 April 1940, Kirk Papers. 171 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, U

of Naval Intelligence, n.d., Kirk Papers. This was a handwritten note attached to K

Anderson, 24 April 1940. Since it seems to respond to the views Anderson expressed i

1940 letter to Kirk, cited directly above, it is likely he added the note as a postscript to 

1940 correspondence after receiving Anderson’s 1 April 1940 letter. 172 Kirk, Letter to Anderson, 24 April 1940, 4.
51

ism. While believing the British were probably farther along than th

in anti-submarine warfare and harbor defenses, he also believed that 

“pretty far ahead of [the British] in certain things [like]...air operatio

air defenses.173 Technical chauvinism would play a major role in U

to engage in technical exchanges with the British, as many naval of

U.S. was on the cutting edge of technology in all fields and had little 

sharing their superior advances with the British. 

Initial Steps Toward Improved Cooperation

— The Kirk-Godfrey Relationship

Bridging the Divide—British Cultivation of the U.S. Naval Att

Godfrey, along with others in British intelligence, firmly believed 

best interests of the British to provide information to the American

expectation of getting any short-term benefits from the exchange. Al

atively low-level figure in the policy realm, as DNI Godfrey had t

Royal Navy’s leadership and, through them, to Prime Minister Nevi

lain and Churchill. His admirers have credited him with having a ke

development of the U.S.-UK alliance, saying that Godfrey saw fro

“that the British goal must be to draw the Americans closer and cl

this could best be achieved by providing them with as much informa

ble.”174 At the start of the war, Godfrey’s main conduit for his attemp

U.S. policy was the U.S. naval attaché, Kirk. Most authors have co

Godfrey cultivated Kirk, providing him what information he could 

goodwill and that he, personally, did not care about the lack of equita

tion exchange.175 For Godfrey, the long-term benefit was the add

strength to the British cause.

The observation that Godfrey cultivated Kirk leaves the misim

Kirk’s advocacy for greater information exchange with the Britis

entirely on Godfrey’s influence. However, while Godfrey’s willingne

173 Kirk, Letter to Anderson, 24 April 1940, 3-4. Presumably, Kirk’s referen

advanced anti-air defense capabilities was a reference to the U.S.’s nascent rada

area where the British were actually far ahead of the Americans. Interestingly

speculates that Godfrey assumed the U.S. reluctance to engage in technical excha

on embarrassment rooted in American technical inferiority, an indication that tec

ism cut both ways. For additional information see Leutze, “Technology and B

Zimmerman, 28-29. 174 Beesly, Very Special Admiral, 173. For additional information see MacL

Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 51, Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 140-141. 175 Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 140; MacLachlan, 216.
52

was based on his fear that, if the U.S. did not reciprocate, the British w

tually cut him off completely. Kirk’s repeated calls for a more liberal 

policy on the part of the U.S. Navy were based on his assessment “t

British Navy gains in war experience they will gradually outdistance u

technical subjects. It has seemed to me [to] our benefit, on the whole, to 

opportunity for making exchanges.”176 Kirk, like Godfrey, saw tha

would one day fight in the war and, when that happened, America wo

the British side. War was, for Kirk, the great laboratory, and cutting of

that source of information for short-term political interests was a polic

not agree with, although he assured his superiors that he would stan

decisions as they had the broader view of the situation.177 

NID Information Exchange with the U.S. Naval Attaché

Developments from June 1939 through May 1940 demonstrate tha

did use information as a tool to forge a closer bond with Kirk, hoping 

result in closer cooperation between the two governments. At their firs

Godfrey told Kirk that he “would be free to see him at any time on an

and Kirk felt that a close liaison could be established because the Briti

“to keep in close touch with an eye on eventualities.”178 Soon after this 

frey took Kirk to the basement of the Admiralty where he was show

room and country desks. Although he was not allowed into some of t

such as the Code and Signal Room, he was shown the communications 

was given a briefing on the British HF/DF stations and the associated 

used to obtain crossfixes.179 During this same period, Godfrey also prov

some strategic intelligence regarding German war preparations; namel

ing a report that the DNI expected the war would begin by mid-Augus

176 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, U

of Naval Intelligence, 3 November 1939, Kirk Papers, 1. Cited hereafter as Kirk, Let

son, 3 November 1939. In addition to the references cited above where Kirk advocat

exchange with the British see also Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Ad

S. Anderson, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, 5 January 1940, Kirk Papers, 1. 177 Kirk, Letter to Anderson, 3 November 1939, 1. 178 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, U

of Naval Intelligence, 20 June 1939, Kirk Papers, 1-2. 179 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, U

of Naval Intelligence, 28 June 1939, Kirk Papers, 1. The Admiralty’s Operational Intel

ter would not officially stand up until August 1939, though the arrangement Kirk desc

similar to the setup for the OIC described by Patrick Beesly. For additional informatio

Very Special Intelligence, 19-23. 
53

Kirks comments to Anderson, it was obvious that Kirk had forme

impression of British naval intelligence efforts.

While British reluctance to share intelligence

once war broke out in

September 1939 can be

attributed to the factors

cited above, there were

more mundane problems

that militated against the

exchange of information

in the first few months of

the war. Kirk reported

that factors such as logistics, lack of social opportunities, and the

movement of some Admiralty offices during the

first few months of the war significantly hindered the flow of inf

Despite the restrictions, Kirk was able to gather some informa

small staff began 24-hour operations in the first few weeks of the w

ber 1939, Godfrey told Kirk that he had permission to visit the Ho

Thurso in Northern Scotland, leaving Kirk with the impression h

there a few days to observe fleet defenses. Kirk only stayed one 

ever, when he learned that the Commander of the British Fleet, A

while receiving him cordially, had not been informed of the pu

visit. In actuality, Winston Churchill had directed Godfrey to s

Thurso as part of a plan by the British to counter German prop

Germans claimed they had sunk the Ark Royal and Kirk was able t

the British aircraft carrier was in excellent condition on his ret

don.182 Kirk’s visit became fodder for the Nazi propagandists (see 

his letter forwarding this graphic to Anderson, Kirk displays no ra

ing been used by the British, in fact, he seemed to relish the role 

180 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson

of Naval Intelligence, 28 June 1939, Kirk Papers, 1-3. This was the second letter to 

28 June 1939. 181 “ALUSNA London Command History,” Stark Papers, 3. 182 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderso

tor of Naval Intelligence, 10 October 1939, Kirk Papers, 1-2.

Figure 3. German Propaganda on Kirk’s Vi
54

Nazi feelings than his pro-British tendencies. Like most officers of h

tion, Kirk remained wary of the British, as evidenced when he fo

detailed intelligence report on Mexico to Anderson that Godfrey had 

him in November 1939. Kirk asked Anderson to have ONI’s analy

hard look at it and to let him know if the information in it could be c

As he told Anderson, “[i]t would help me to know whether or not I 

made a ‘stooge.’”184 Kirk’s concerns demonstrate that, although he w

tive to Godfrey’s overtures, he was not blindly trustful of what the 

vided him. 

The two most significant items of information the British gave K

this period, items given without any reciprocal exchange from the 

Godfrey pointed out, were intelligence on the German magnetic min

opportunity to examine vessels damaged in enemy action. The d

give the Americans the information on the mine was very signific

British security concerns, but the Admiralty reasoned that one day t

can Navy would join their fight, and if the U.S. fleet was vulnerab

type of mine it would be an ineffective force until such time as t

install the proper countermeasures.185 In early November 1939, 

invited to the Admiralty to speak to the Director of the Minesweep

sion, CAPT Morse, who told Kirk the information he was going to 

needed to “be treated with the utmost secrecy” as the British govern

very concerned the Germans would find out just how effective the 

been.186 While the British had not recovered a mine intact at this p

shared every bit of data they had with Kirk, to include their theor

actuation method, size of the explosive payload, the method of del

most effective deployment depth of the mine, its destructive effect

the British were attempting to counter it using an experimental d

method.187 Kirk was also given information about the German 21

pedo, the British asdic system (sonar), and he was notified by th

183 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, U

of Naval Intelligence, 20 November 1939, Kirk Papers, 1. 184 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, U

of Naval Intelligence, 9 November 1939, Kirk Papers. 185 Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 56. 186 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, U

of Naval Intelligence, Enclosure (B) to letter dated 6 November 1939, Kirk Papers, 1. C

ter as Kirk, Enclosure (B) to Letter to Anderson, 6 November 1939. 187 Kirk, Enclosure (B) to Letter to Anderson, 6 November 1939, 1-4.
55

continued to update Kirk on the progress of their exploitation of t

provided him details on the experimental countermeasure tech

were using to counter it. Clearly, British openness on this impo

was beginning to have an impact on Kirk, as he had taken to 

CAPT Morse as “his friend” in correspondence.189 As shown a

after the New Year when Kirk became very forceful in his letters 

concerning the need to reciprocate to keep the valuable stream of 

coming. While Kirk’s motivations may have been different from 

frey hoped they would be, as there are few expressions of symp

British situation in Kirk’s correspondence, the Admiralty’s openn

ing the desired effect on Kirk, who was vociferously advocating m

ation between the two countries.

For Kirk, the most significant breakthrough in the British 

exchanges came in March 1940. At that time, Godfrey told Kirk th

were in the process of forming a committee that would look into 

exchanges and asked Kirk to come up with a list of U.S. informa

ments. What Godfrey was alluding to was the British technical exch

that would be led by one of England’s leading scientists, Dr. Henry 

Tizard mission, discussed in the next chapter, would have a profound 

effect on the cooperation the U.S. would give the British in the matte

188 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson

of Naval Intelligence, Enclosure (A) to letter dated 6 November 1939, Kirk Papers, 

drich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Directo

ligence, 24 November 1939, Kirk Papers, 1-2; Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN

Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, 9 November 19

Interestingly, the offer to provide the U.S. information on asdic originated from 

offered the technology as part of his campaign to entice Roosevelt into a closer relat

UK. In the preceding reference (Kirk’s 9 November 1939 letter to Anderson) Ki

Godfrey was caught off guard when Kirk raised the subject of exchange of inform

apparently unaware that Churchill had made the offer, which had filtered down 

through the U.S. Navy Department to Kirk. The details of the exchange of asdic te

take many months to conclude. For additional information see Zimmerman, 43-46

Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Director o

gence, 14 March 1940, Kirk Papers; James Leutze, “The Secret of the Churchill-R

spondence: September 1939-May 1940,” Journal of Contemporary History 10, no

472, cited hereafter as Leutze, “Secret Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence.” 189 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson

of Naval Intelligence, 6 December 1939, Kirk Papers, 1-2. Although Kirk never for

sonal relationship with Godfrey, he would fondly recall that he became good frie

Fraser, the Admiralty’s comptroller, and CAPT Miles, the Admiralty’s Director o

additional information see Kirk Reminiscences, 144-145.
56

the Admiralty would now allow personnel from the U.S. naval attach

inspect damaged British ships in dry-dock. Kirk was ecstatic at this o

and quickly dispatched his assistant naval attachés to Bath where t

inspect ships damaged during a recent German attack on Scapa Flow. T

lege was exclusive to the American attachés and Kirk was full of pra

openness that the British displayed in giving his personnel virtually u

access to the damaged vessels and answering any enquires his men had

Also in March 1940, Kirk met with the British comptroller, ADM F

requested information on stern hangers and aircraft-dropped depth c

exchange for access to the British ships. But ADM Fraser also told K

was the “1st Sea Lord’s express wish—that we should not be perpetu

gaining’, but if, on a ‘goodwill’ basis we could give them an 

lead...they, for their part, were very glad to be helpful.”191 Here wa

promise and the implied threat to Kirk, that greater cooperation would 

more information from the British, but continued reluctance on the p

Americans to honor any requests would make it difficult for the Briti

tinue giving the Americans such preferential treatment. British conce

area were understandable. Even though it appears the Americans were 

ing information on Japanese naval movements to the British, as agreed 

the Ingersoll Mission in 1938, there is little evidence to indicate wh

U.S. was providing during this period.192 Given Godfrey’s display of pi

above, and Kirk’s repeated pleas to Anderson for more openness, we c

that the U.S. gave very little.193

190 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, U

of Naval Intelligence, 21 March 1940, Kirk Papers, 1-2; Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, U

Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, 26 March 

Papers, 1-3; Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. And

Director of Naval Intelligence, 29 March 1940, Kirk Papers, 1; Alan Goodrich Kirk, C

Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, 3 Apr

Papers, 1-2. 191 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, 

tor of Naval Intelligence, 21 March 1940, Kirk Papers, 3. This was one of the informa

Godfrey was referring to when he castigated Kirk for the lack of information exchang

on the part of the Americans. 192 Bath, 25; Leutze, “Secret Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence,” 484. 193 Even when requests made by the British were honored, mistakes were made. Th

did eventually get around to providing the British information on airdropped dept

request first made in Fall 1939, but they did not do so until April 1940. To make matte

Navy Department provided the information to the British Air Attaché, Group-Captain G

rather than to the British Naval Attaché, CAPT Curzon-Howe, this even though it w

Navy which had repeatedly made the request. Kirk advised Anderson to provide the in

Curzon-Howe. For additional information see Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, L

Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, 2 May 1940, Kirk P
57

COURTING THE RELUCTANT ALLY

JUNE 1940-MARCH 1941

From the standpoint of naval policy-making in the external field

months of World War II before Pearl Harbor rank in significance 

succeeding 45 months during which the United States was a form

ligerent. By the time of the Japanese sneak attack, the major pat

strategic effort had already been hammered out in close conjunct

the British.

Robert Greenhalgh Albion, Makers of naval policy, 17

British Maneuvers

From the summer of 1940 through the spring of 1941, secret dev

the cooperative relationship between America and Great Britain to

many levels. While the leadership of the U.S. and its navy were pr

aid the British, this predisposition was based on a realistic appr

national interests rather than on favoritism. Mutual distrust was a 

countries would need to contend with and, despite the many channel

nication that developed between the two countries, attitudes and 

would continue to bring miscues that resulted in numerous faltering 

alliance. Still, by March 1941, with the completion of the Amer

Canadian Staff Talks (ABC-1), the U.S. and the UK had essential

their strategic rapprochement. By then, the depth and breadth of 

exchange occurring between the two countries were several times 

anything either country would have envisioned when the war began 

1939. With but one important exception, all of the major forums 

improve cooperation between the two countries were the result of B

tives. Many of the initiatives occurred concurrently. 

William Stephenson and British Security Coordination

Even as many of the initiatives the British took to entice America 

ating with their war effort were overt, one long-running cover

actively attempted to influence U.S. decisionmakers into entering th

side of Great Britain. Much of this story has been told elsewhere. 

although unofficial, accounting of British overt and covert intellige

in America, written just after the war by members of the British Sec
58

have assessed the BSC report and found it largely consistent with av

historical data.195

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones observes that the main purpose of the BSC w

provide the U.S. with intelligence “but to persuade the United States, b

if necessary, to enter the war and to do so on the side of the Allies.”196 

plish this purpose, Churchill sent retired Army Colonel William Step

Canadian millionaire, to take over the British Passport Control Offi

post in New York City, to replace Sir James Paget. The PCO was the th

cover for the senior SIS officer in the United States and the role of this 

known to high-ranking officials in the U.S. government.197 While Ste

primary point of contact for counterintelligence and counterespionage 

in the U.S. was FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, he was also in person

with Roosevelt, both directly and through associates like Vincent Ast

had good relations with the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy.19

son’s first move on taking over the office was to create an “umbrella 

tion” for British covert activities in North America, renaming his or

British Security Coordination (BSC), at Hoover’s suggestion, and 

together operatives from MI5, SIS, and SOE operating in America und

trol. The organization was divided into four branches—the Secret In

Division, the Security Branch, Special Operations, and Propaganda. 

relations between the old PCO office and the FBI had been strained in 

years, Stephenson was able to mend fences with Hoover and received 

from Roosevelt for his office to act as the MI5 and SIS liaison in Ame

scious of the strict neutrality laws and State Department sensitivities 

moves toward closer cooperation with Great Britain, Stephenson’s dir

on intelligence matters was initially limited to Hoover himself, to ma

secrecy of the British mission.199 

194 British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in th

1940-1945 (New York: Fromm International, 1999). 195 For additional information see Thomas Mahl, Desperate Deception: British C

tions in the United States, 1939-1944 (Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc., 1998). Mahl 

excellent summary of the BSC report and focuses his study on the British attempts to c

ence U.S. public opinion, through co-opted media outlets and reporters, and their attem

ence U.S. political elections by targeting isolationist politicians for defeat. 196 Jeffreys-Jones, 8. 197 BSC, Secret History, ix; Bath, 12-13. 198 Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 142; Hinsley, British Intel vol. 1, 312-313; BSC, Se

xxxvi, 5, 8, 17. 199 BSC, ix-x; xxv-xxvi.
59

and British security services, ostensibly to protect British war sup

from America.200 To this end, the Security Division oversaw industr

portation security issues and became actively involved in exchanging 

on suspected saboteurs and subversives with the FBI, the MID, and 

ing those organizations in their counterintelligence and security 

Cooperation with Hoover was especially important during the firs

BSC’s existence as both the War and Navy departments were wary 

ing with the British on anything other than security arrangements, 

late the intent of the neutrality laws. Hoover enjoyed this special rela

Stephenson as it allowed him to pass intelligence information to t

ONI, intelligence information he could use to advantage in the bure

tles that were waged among the components of U.S. intelligence.202

The unofficial mission of the BSC consisted of numerous cov

designed for the collection of intelligence and special operations 

influence the U.S. to enter the war. These activities included the or

pro-interventionist movements in the U.S., “the direction of subve

ganda from American sources to Europe and the Far East,” and the 

prominent isolationists and isolationist organizations using psychol

tions.203 While these activities and the liaison with Hoover may ha

indirect influence on the attitude of the Navy Department toward 

with the British, the BSC’s assistance in the area of counterintellige

nificant and probably served to positively dispose members of the na

ment familiar with them toward a closer relationship with the UK. 

war, it was a common belief that the Nazi’s victories were largely 

Fifth Column activities. For example, Bradley Smith cites the fact 

1939 there were only 1,600 reports of sabotage submitted to the FBI 

gle day after the fall of France in May 1940, there were 2,400 rep

These beliefs were reinforced, in the minds of senior U.S. leader

from overseas, which stated without equivocation that the German sw

Europe was more the result of German propaganda, sabotage, and 

tions than any marked superiority of the German military and its tac

After the defeat of France, ONI was even more eager to coordina

on security matters. The BSC actively sought opportunities to cul

200 BSC, Secret History, xxx-xxxi. 201 BSC, Secret History, 241-243. 202 BSC, Secret History, 3-5. 203Aldrich, 99-100; BSC, Secret History, xxxi-xxxii. 204 Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 9-10. 205 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson

of Naval Intelligence, 14 May 1940, Kirk Papers.
60

organizations. For example, the British had run agents on neutral and 

shipping to report on subversive activity and smuggling and to spre

ganda. In the Fall of 1941, the agents on the American ships were turn

ONI’s control and a cooperative agreement was reached to share in

from these sources and the agents on the neutral ships, which the B

controlled.206 

The Donovan Visit—15 July 1940–4 August 1940

Bath and others have stated that Colonel William “Wild Bill” Dono

to London in the summer of 1940 was the turning point in the re

between the U.S. and the UK, a contention the historical evidence co

Donovan’s mission was to act as an impartial observer to assess 

chances of surviving the war following the fall of France. His positiv

ment of the British and his sanguine assessment of their prospect

Roosevelt and other senior officials to overcome their fears of Grea

imminent downfall, fears which had been fanned by the negative eval

the British situation they were receiving from the U.S. Ambassador to G

ain, Joseph P. Kennedy, and the naval attaché there, CAPT Kirk.208

Why was Donovan chosen to undertake this mission and what was 

the British in the decision to send him? First, while not a close as

Roosevelt, Donovan was known by him and the successful World War 

Wall Street lawyer was a close personal friend of Secretary of the Navy 

William Stephenson was also a friend of Donovan’s and, as the head o

it was his job to counteract the negative assessments of England’s chan

206 BSC, Secret History, 161-165. The BSC also shared intelligence with ONI gain

their most sensitive sources, the agent known as “Cynthia,” who had deep penetration 

embassy. They also extensively shared information obtained by their Consular Securit

Latin American ports with ONI, the Coast Guard, and the FBI. For additional informat

Secret History, 214-215, 244-249. 207 Bath, 27-28; MacLachlan, 225-226; Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 14-16; Dorwar

Duty, 144; Corey Ford, Donovan of OSS (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1

Donovan would go on to become the head of America’s first, official central intelligen

tion, the Coordinator of Information office, and would also lead its more famous succ

zation, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). 208 Beesly, Very Special Admiral, 175; Ford, 89. 209 “Transcript of Press Conference with the Secretary of the Navy, The Honorable F

20 September 1940, Knox Papers. Knox had just completed a two-week inspection tou

Fleet and told reporters he had brought his personal friend, Colonel William Donovan, 

the tour.
61

his connections and his pro-British stance, became Stephensons in

doing this.210 Although both Secretary of War Stimson and Knox did 

Embassy was providing an accurate assessment of England’s chance

make no official overtures to the British because of the domestic poli

During a meeting attended by Knox, Stimson, Donovan, and St

which the destroyer-for-bases deal being discussed, Stephenson saw 

dilemma facing the decisionmakers in the U.S. government was whe

would survive the summer. They required proof “that American m

tance would be, not improvident charity, but a sound investment.”211 

the dilemma, Stephenson suggested sending Donovan on an indep

finding mission to Great Britain. Not only was Donovan respected 

dent, but as former political opponent of Roosevelt, a Republican, a 

a Southerner, he was not part of Roosevelt’s constituency and his 

would be seen as completely independent.212 Knox presented the ide

ident, who approved the mission. Although he officially traveled a

representative of the Secretary of the Navy,” the key decisionma

sides of the Atlantic knew he was traveling at the behest of the Presid

well aware of how critical his assessment would be for the relation

the two countries.213

On the day of Donovan’s departure, Stephenson cabled the Cen

Service (CSS) headquarters to inform them that Donovan was arrivin

and that his evaluation of British prospects would be the key to u

destroyer-for-bases deal and fostering closer cooperation with the A

The British at this stage knew far more about the trip than Ambassad

who was not informed that Donovan was coming or what the purpo

would be.215 CAPT Kirk and his staff, however, were aware, give

official status, and they made many of his arrangements.216 Kirk a

also had a personal relationship and, while Kirk was concerned th

210 Ford, 90; BSC, Secret History, 9. 211 BSC, Secret History, 9. 212 Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy, 97-103; Beesly, Very Special Admiral, 1

History, 9; MacLachlan, 225-226. 213 N. R. Hitchcock, CDR, USN, Assistant Naval Attaché for Air, Memorandum 

dore Boyle, Air Ministry, n.d., Kirk Papers. Given its place in the collection and 

memo was probably written between 22-24 July 1940. 214 BSC, Secret History, 9-10. 215 James Leutze, The London Journal of General Raymond E. Lee, 1940-194

Little, Brown, and Company, 1971), 19. Cited hereafter as Leutze, London Journal.
62

Donovan would produce a realistic assessment of their situation.

 Kir

rect, and while the British did put their best foot forward, they also gav

tually unrestricted access their military facilities, intelligence orga

factories, and people from all classes of society so he could accurately 

British will to fight. He was granted audiences with King George VI, P

ister Churchill, various government ministers, industrialists, and labo

Donovan was taken to see Britain’s coastal defenses, radar installation

interceptor bases, and was given full briefings by DNI Godfrey, head o

Sir Stewart Menzies, and others on a range of intelligence matters to i

functioning of the SIS, British propaganda and SOE activities, and th

successful counterintelligence activities.218

Donovan returned to America on 8 August 1940 and reported to 

Stimson, and Knox that the British were well worth the investment in 

resources as they had the will to survive. His endorsement is credited w

Roosevelt the confidence to proceed with the destroyer-for-bases de

advocacy for closer intelligence sharing has been seen as a factor in R

decision in September 1940 to release U.S. diplomatic and consular rep

British Ambassador.219 In addition to aiding the British war effort by en

U.S. decisionmakers to bend the rules regarding U.S. neutrality laws, 

upon his return, also co-wrote a series of highly popular articles on 

from German Fifth Column movements with information he was provi

SIS. This effort promoted the BSC’s covert anti-isolationist propagan

tives.220 Donovan would later play an even greater role in the exchange 

gence between the two countries as the Coordinator for Information an

the Office of Strategic Services, but this early visit was instrumental i

conditions that would lead to unprecedented technical and intelligence 

216 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to William Donovan, COL, USA (R

1940, Kirk Papers. 217Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, U

of Naval Intelligence, 27 July 1940, Kirk Papers, 1-2; Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 143. 218 Ford, 91; Aldrich, 97; Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 144; BSC, Secret History, 10. 219 Ford, 94; Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 38. Hinsley also notes that relations betw

and the U.S. naval attaché office became much closer after Donovan’s visit, but there w

of other factors that aided in creating a closer relationship between the two organizati

August and October of 1940. For additional information see Hinsley, British Intel vol. 

220 BSC, Secret History, 5-6; U.S. War Department, History Project, Strategic Servic

Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) (New York: Walker and Company, 1

Cited hereafter as OSS War Report.
63

the two countries closer together, even though the threat of war w

months away for the United States.221

Special Missions—1940

Numerous individuals in England shared Godfrey’s view that the 

gain the cooperation of the Americans was to make them indebted t

by providing them information gratis. Two of the most influentia

were Archibald Vivian (A.V.) Hill and Henry Tizard, two of Great 

scientists. Hill had been sent to America on a secret mission in M

assess U.S. scientific and technological prowess and production 

By April, Hill was convinced that most Americans were pro-British

prevalence of isolationist sentiments, and that the Americans were 

technologically backward as the British had always assumed.222 Hi

in the best interests of Britain to share technical secrets with Ame

to secure American good will, but also to tap into and guide the 

productive capacity of the U.S. to meet England’s wartime needs. T

these ideas, Hill called upon the British Ambassador to the U.S., L

recommending that he contact the Foreign Office to suggest 

exchange mission to America, with the principal goal of provid

with British radar technology.223

221 Donovan would undertake a second fact-finding mission for the President 

1940 to March 1941. In addition to visiting England, Donovan traveled extensiv

Mediterranean and the Balkans, assessing the situation in those areas. He became in

to some of the main figures in British intelligence, particularly DNI Godfrey, who a

mander of British forces in the Mediterranean to show Donovan whatever he wan

given Donovan’s access and pro-British sympathies, Godfrey felt the British coul

nitely more through Donovan than through any other individual.” See Ford, 99. Do

ence with British intelligence would also persuade him that the U.S. also n

intelligence organization, an idea he began to advocate with increasing success up

America in March 1941. Donovan was designated Coordinator for Information in 

head of the OSS in June 1942. For additional information see Jay Jakub, Spies 

Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and 

tion,1940-45 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1999), 1; Aldrich, 98-99; Ford, 10

Report, 6-7; BSC, Secret History, 13-15. 222 Zimmerman, 50, 54. 223 Zimmerman, 53-56. Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) was a supporter of a U.S.-UK 

had many influential friends among the American elite, especially Roosevelt’s clo

Frankfurter. For additional information see Zimmerman, 53-54.
64

debated. Tizard, who worked for the Air Ministry and was essentiall

ator of Great Britain’s air defense early warning network, was adam

the need to engage in this exchange. While many, including Churc

opposed to an exchange, particularly one offered with no expectation 

rocation, Tizard was aided in his fight by other high-ranking individ

as First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, who persuasively argued that 

about U.S. security were overblown. By late June, Churchill gave h

sion for the mission to go forward, most likely in response to the w

military situation.224 Tizard was placed in charge of the mission and 

go-ahead to begin planning for the exchanges.225 On 8 July 1940, Lor

presented an aide-memoire to the State Department, requesting an i

and general exchange of technical information between the two gov

Significantly, the proposal stated that

[i]t is not the wish of His Majesty’s Government to make this propo

the subject of a bargain of any description. Rather do they wish, in 

to show their readiness for the fullest cooperation, to be perfectly o

with you and to give you full details of any equipment or devices in 

which you are interested without in any way pressing you before ha

give specific undertakings on your side, although, of course, they w

hope you could reciprocate.226

Further, Lothian made it clear that the British were offering to p

Americans with their most important technical secret, radar, as the 

stated the British were willing to give the Americans techniques used 

and target enemy aircraft.227 Here the British made it clear that there 

no quid pro quo in this exchange, that the information they woul

would be gratis and that it would be as full and complete as the A

desired. 

Both the Navy and the War Departments accepted the British prop

official U.S. acceptance was sent to the British on 29 July 1940, desig

224 Zimmerman, 20-24, 62-64, 71, 117. 225 Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 57-58. 226 Department of State, “The British Ambassador (Lothian) to President Roo

Memoire,” 8 July 1940, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1940 3 (Washington

1958): 78. Cited hereafter as “Aide Memoire, 8 July 1940,” FRUS 1940 vol. 3. 227 “Aide Memoire, 8 July 1940,” FRUS 1940 vol. 3, 78.
65

exchanges.

Demonstrating the distrust and technical chauvinism 

tic of many in the U.S. Navy at this time, the Navy’s internal ass

that Tizard’s Mission was most likely a ploy on the part of the Br

access to U.S. industry and Rear Admiral H. G. Bowen, the Di

Navy Research Lab (NRL), believed the Navy would get litt

exchange, given American technological superiority.229 The Navy’

would be proved wrong. 

Tizard left the UK on 14 August 1940 and, while his team was he

toward experts in radar, his group was given permission to provide th

with information on 21 different technologies, to include anti-aircraf

plating, self-sealing fuel tanks, and gyroscopic gunsights—all of wh

tested in the field of battle. Tizard’s mission was classified as Top 

any word of the exchange would likely inflame U.S. isolationists.230 

The Tizard Mission began on 29 August 1940. The first meeting

asdic, sonar, and anti-submarine warfare. While reticent at first, 

noon of the first day the U.S. team had warmed to their British 

were quite excited about exploring the possibility of combining th

tries’ research efforts on sonar and asdic, as both sides had taken d

complementary, approaches to the submarine detection problem

day, the British also described advances they had made in radar, 

pletely impressed the Americans.231 However, U.S. distrust of the 

228 Department of State, “The Acting Secretary of State to the British Ambassado

July 1940, FRUS 1940 vol. 3, 79; Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 57; Zim

Amazingly, as David Zimmerman relates in his comprehensive study of the Tiza

Secret Exchange, Churchill almost scuttled the Tizard Mission before the U.S. was 

accept it. Demonstrating all of the British attitudes that inhibited cooperation betwee

tries in the period before the U.S. entered the war, Churchill on 17 July 1940 wrote 

Staff liaison, GEN Ismay, querying why his advisors were so quick to toss away B

secrets to the U.S. when the U.S. was so loath to give anything back. He also noted 

of British technology to anything America possessed and demonstrated substantial 

the U.S. was still far away from entering the war. Churchill also expressed grave r

U.S. security, commenting that anything they gave the Americans would soon find 

many. Churchill’s correspondence to Ismay stands in marked contrast to his more f

Roosevelt, in which he displays, for obvious reasons, none of the distrust and resen

ica that is evident from this incident. Progress on Roosevelt’s destroyers-for-bas

Churchill to overcome his pique and give final approval to the mission. For additio

see Zimmerman, 82. 229 Zimmerman, 46-47. 230 Zimmerman, 94-95, 98 231 Zimmerman, 102-105.
66

removed many of their restrictions concerning the sharing of U.S. te

by 4 September 1940, a 16 September 1940 memorandum from DNI 

to the head of the U.S. National Defense Research Council (NDRC)

nevar Bush, made it clear that the NDRC was not to discuss any Nav

ogies with the British without Navy Department personnel presen

NDRC must not discuss anything on the Navy’s list of topics prohibit

cussion, and that there must be nothing discussed about capabilities in 

ment.232 Bush replied two days later, stating the NDRC would re

Navy’s policy but was hopeful it would change “since all of the w

Committee has to do with development, and since “I [Bush] believ

discussions on such matters are likely to be of particular benefit.”233

By the end of September, the rest of Tizard’s team had arrived in th

sometime around 27 September, Tizard presented his American hosts wi

nant cavity magnetron,” the key component for constructing a microwa

piece of technology the U.S. was still months, if not years, away from d

independently.234 Both Zimmerman and Leutze contend that this magnan

and the free and open exchange of other information the British provided 

month proceeding its delivery, completely changed the attitude of the Nav

Departments with regard to sharing of technical information.235 The ar

confirm this assessment. On 28 September 1940, Secretary of the Navy F

issued a letter concerning the Tizard Mission to all the bureaus of the Na

that letter, he cancelled all restrictions on the provision of technical info

Great Britain with the exception of the Norden bombsight and the ante

which were to remain secret. Knox’s reasoning, much like Kirk’s, was th

ish should be given “drawings, specifications, performance data and 

detailed information” concerning U.S. technologies because “advan

accrue to [the United States] in the matter of procurement and combat te

October, even the pessimistic RADM Bowen was won over by the libera

232 Walter S. Anderson, RADM, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, Letter to D

Bush, 16 September 1940, DNI Correspondence; Zimmerman, 106. The NDRC wa

Roosevelt earlier in 1940. A civilian organization formed at Roosevelt’s direction, its 

similar to today’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Although 

was not supposed to duplicate research being done by the military service labs, there 

between the labs and the NDRC, as indicated by Anderson’s concerns that members o

were meeting independently with members of the Tizard mission. 233 Dr. Vannevar Bush, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Direc

Intelligence, 18 September 1940, DNI Correspondence. 234 Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 58. 235 Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 5859; Zimmerman, 124-129. 236 Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, Letter to All Navy Bureaus and Directors, 2

1940, DNI Correspondence, 1-2. 
67

deal with the British.

While details concerning the limits and mechanisms of exchange w

issues, the Tizard Mission and the concurrent Standardization of Arm

the logjam concerning the stationing of British observers on U.S. ships.

late July 1940, the British had begun allowing U.S. naval observers a

ships and facilities, without requesting a reciprocal agreement from the 

By October, the decision was made to allow British observers with the U

Commander of the U.S. Fleet was notified of the Tizard Mission and told 

observers...should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to observe the 

application of instruments, devices and systems, and that they may b

with Operational experience with regard to such matters.”240 This polic

cantly different from that used during CAPT Ellis’ visit during the b

arresting gear exchange 16 months previously. Information related 

ciphers was still off limits but, otherwise, commanders were given “a la

discretionary latitude” in the release of information to the British observ

237 Zimmerman, 121-123. 238 Many of the limitations on fuller technical information exchange after this sta

to licensing and manufacturing agreements, which legally restricted some of the 

could be provided on both the U.S. and British sides. Problems with the mechan

became apparent as the diversity and breadth of the exchanges grew. Given that th

main organizations engaged in the exchange, it was only natural that there would be 

the policies for exchange developed by the Navy and War Departments and the NDRC

information see Dr. Vannevar Bush, Letter to Admiral Harold Stark, USN, Chief of N

30 September 1940, DNI Correspondence, 1-2; Walter S. Anderson, RADM, USN, D

Intelligence, Letter to Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics, 5 October 1940, DNI Corre

Walter S. Anderson, RADM, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, Letter to Bureau 

sion Directors, 14 November 1940, DNI Correspondence, 1-2. 239 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson

of Naval Intelligence, 27 July 1940, Kirk Papers, 1-2. The British had actually agree

naval observers on a non-reciprocal basis at the start of the war in September 1939. 

1940, however, before the British allowed the first observers to come over, a source of 

to Kirk. Eventually, the observer force in the UK would number in the hundreds and 

cal source of intelligence for ONI. For additional information see Alan Goodrich Ki

Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, 4 N

Kirk Papers; Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. A

Director of Naval Intelligence, 29 February 1940, Kirk Papers, 1; Alan Goodrich Ki

Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, 10 

Papers, 1-2; Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy, 59; Leutze, “Technology and Bargain

240 Harold Stark, ADM, Chief of Naval Operations, Letter to Commander in Chi

Fleet, 3 October 1940, DNI Correspondence, 1-2. Cited hereafter as “Stark Letter,” 

DNI Correspondence 241 “Stark Letter,” 3 October 1940, DNI Correspondence, 2.
68

tary departments and the NDRC were extremely interested in setting 

nent technical exchange missions, as the benefits of the cooperative 

were so manifest. In October 1940, Knox and Secretary of War Stimso

ized their agreement on the exchange of technical secrets with the B

in November, the Navy notified Professor Cockroft, Tizard’s successo

Navy desired to continue with technical exchanges on a permanent b

January 1941, the British made non-reciprocal exchange of inform

the Americans a standing policy and by April 1941, the Navy’s desire

ing a permanent exchange mechanism had become a reality when a U

cal exchange mission, under Dr. James Conant of the NDRC, was esta

London and a similar British mission, under Sir Charles Darwin, w

lished in Washington DC.243 In large measure, this mission burst the s

mistrust and bargaining that had inhibited the exchange of informatio

the two countries. The Tizard Mission was designed to exchange 

secrets, but a significant amount of general intelligence was also shar

the course of this undertaking.244

Zimmerman’s final assessment of the Tizard Mission was that it di

alleviate the deep mistrust the two countries had for one another and 

critical part in building the special relationship that characterized th

Alliance.”245 The archival evidence and the research done by James L

out Zimmerman’s contention, as the period from August to October 194

strated a marked change in the attitudes of the Navy Department c

information exchange with their British counterparts. As evidenced b

letter and RADM Bowen’s reactions, the British openness had a positiv

the Americans and vindicated the policies that Godfrey, Tizard, Hill, a

had advocated so strenuously. The Tizard Mission was just one of a 

British attempts to tie America more closely to its war effort. Other ef

as the Standardization of Arms Talks, would set the stage for the mo

alliance in 1941.

242 Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 59; Walter S. Anderson, RADM, USN

Naval Intelligence, Letter to Professor Cockroft, 20 November 1940, DNI Corresponde

243 Zimmerman, 182; Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 60. 244 Although the Tizard Mission primarily focused on exchanging scientific se

addressed the exchange of information about specific capabilities that each of the co

sessed, capabilities developed to address the threats identified by their intelligence o

Moreover, the British briefings on their capabilities would follow a pattern whereb

would brief the technology and an operator would brief on the employment of the sys

combat, sometimes accompanied by a film of the system being used against the Ger

briefings had a very powerful effect on the Americans, as they contained valuable in

addition to useful technical information. For additional information see Zimmerman, 1

245 Zimmerman, 6.
69

The Standardization of Arms Talks was the cover name for secr

held between the military services of the U.S. and the UK in the lat

1940. As with the Tizard Mission, these talks came as the result of 

made to Roosevelt by the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian. In a m

the President and the Secretary of State on 11 June 1940, Lothi

Roosevelt “that he [Lothian] had received from Mr. Churchill...a su

there might be staff conferences between the naval people of our 

ments in regard to fleet movements both in the Atlantic and the Paci

estingly, after Roosevelt had agreed to these talks, there was some d

the British side as to whether these informal staff talks should be co

Tizard’s technical exchange mission, which would occur almost 

The British Foreign Office persuasively argued against taking this 

that engagement with the Americans on as many levels as possible w

obtain U.S. cooperation.247

Why did U.S. policymakers accede to this particular request, esp

they had been so sensitive to any tilt toward England during this e

While Donovan’s reports on the British ability to prevail in the war w

influential in alleviating U.S. fears that the secrets they provided B

not rapidly fall into enemy hands, the U.S. delegation had in fact lef

on 12 July 1940, which was before Donovan arrived in London, mak

ful that Donovan’s reports on the situation in England played a role 

sion to send the delegation, as Dorwart suggests.248 The fall of Fran

had a major impact on the psyche of American policymakers and t

people. Congress responded to the fears generated by France’s 

246 Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of 

1940, in FRUS 1940 vol. 3, 36. There is some confusion in the literature as to whe

made, although the archival data clearly show an official offer was made on 11 Jun

information is consistent with that found in the Commander Naval Forces, Europe 

History. James Leutze contends the offer was made in May 1940, which may 

although it is unclear why this second offer would have been necessary if Roosev

then, or why it would be proffered again if Roosevelt had rejected it just weeks befo

ine states the offer was made to COL William Donovan during his visit to London i

this is unlikely as preparations for the visit of the U.S. delegation were already be

time Donovan arrived in England. For additional information see COMNAVEU Ad

Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 57; Ralph Erskine, “Churchill and the Sta

Magic Deals,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 10

1997): 58. 247 Zimmerman, 82-83. 248 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 40-41; Dorwart, 143.
70

ever. The Army and Navy, in their 1 July 1940 assessment Are We 

determined that the “the emergency now faced is one of worldwide d

which menaces every foreign policy of the United States” and concl

despite the influx of additional funds, the military was unprepared f

Given this fact, Roosevelt and his advisors determined that it was best t

the groundwork for cooperation prior to the U.S. entry into the war, as a

to do so would alleviate many of the problems the U.S. experienced in W

I when trying to integrate their forces with the allied powers.251 This po

reinforced by the attaché reports they were receiving from Kirk, who a

relayed his assessment that Dutch and Belgian refusals to hold staff talk

British and French prior to the German invasion of those countries w

factor in their defeat and the eventual rout of the allied powers in Franc

The fall of France also changed the direction of U.S. strategic think

ing the focus from the Far East to the European theater. Although it is 

how much impact his report may have had, Kirk wrote a persuasive asse

the strategic situation in late June 1940 that recommended an Atlantic

egy months before Stark’s Plan Dog memo outlined the new U.S. strate

Kirk noted that the British firmly believed the U.S. would enter on th

some stage and they were committed to holding the islands as a base fr

the U.S. could project offensive power. Looking at the global situa

assessed the British Isles as the true center of gravity for the allies in th

soning that everything on the periphery of the British Empire could be 

but if the Home Islands were lost, it was unlikely the Axis would be d

Kirk was certainly not alone in seeing how the fall of France had altere

tegic landscape for the U.S., but his opinion did reach high-level policy

the U.S. government, who respected his judgment. Though they had re

advice previously due to domestic political constraints, after the fall 

U.S. policymakers felt they had far more latitude to explore a cooper

nership with Britain than they had available to them at the start of the w

249 Reynolds, 109.. 250 Chairman, General Board, “Are We Ready—II,” 1 July 1940, Strategic Planning

251 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 39. 252 lan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, U

of Naval Intelligence, 14 May 1940, Kirk Papers; Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, L

Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, 1 June 1940, Kirk Pa

this same report, Kirk also noted the improvement in intelligence cooperation with the 

ing how the embassy was being routinely provided the daily intelligence summary give

ish War Cabinet by June 1940. 253 Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, USN, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, U

of Naval Intelligence, 24 June 1940, Kirk Papers, 1. 
71

12~July 1940 and arrived in England on 15 August. The senior naval r

tive was Rear Admiral Robert Ghormley, a former Director of War P

delegation was given its orders by the President, who designated Ghorm

naval attaché, although this designation was changed to Special Naval 

(SPECNO) just before his arrival, to highlight the distinction betwee

and that of Kirk.254 Ghormley was accompanied by Brigadier Gen

Strong, from the U.S. Army, and Major General C. Emmons, from the U

Air Corps. In their first meeting with the British, held on 20 Aug

Ghormley made it clear that these were not considered formal talks b

government and that he and the two generals were there as representa

their individual Services, not as part of a Joint delegation. The British 

that they understood this and told the U.S. delegation that, from 21 to 2

they would be taken to the headquarters of the three services to see var

ational units. The Americans were encouraged to ask questions and w

request additions to the agenda if there were organizations or capabi

would like to see that were not included on the proposed schedule.255 A

Donovan visit, which had concluded earlier in the month, and the Tizar

which would begin in the U.S. just days later, the British policy was to 

back from the Americans, hopeful that their openness would produce th

ation they sought.

On 23 August, Ghormley forwarded a report to the CNO from the B

cerning the conduct of the war to that point. Ghormley did not comm

report, but it was exceptionally honest about British objectives throu

first year of the war and the miscalculations that had led to defeat. In 

the British reiterated the point that Kirk had made: that the failure to su

conclude staff talks with the Dutch and the Belgians before the German

was a key element in their defeat on the Continent. The British also mad

U.S. knew that they had subordinated the British Expeditionary Force 

254 Albion, 550; COMNAVEU Administrative History, 1-2. Roosevelt appears to h

that Ghormley, as the senior naval officer in England, would need to have the status 

attaché position. Although Kirk made no official comment about how this action wou

to lose face with the British, he mentioned it to Donovan, who arranged to have Stark 

to the President which outlined the situation and recommended changing Ghormley’s d

SPECNO. Roosevelt concurred with the decision. Recalling the situation years later

that this in no way affected his working relationship with Ghormley, who was an ol

additional information see Harold Stark, ADM, Chief of Naval Operations, Memora

President of the United States, 8 August 1940; Kirk Papers, 1; Alan Goodrich Kirk, C

Letter to William Donovan, 14 August 1940, Kirk Papers, 1; Kirk Reminiscences, 166-

255 Standardization of Arms Committee, “1st Meeting of the Anglo-American Stand

Arms Committee,” 20 August 1940, Strategic Planning, 1-3; 5. Kirk and the U.S. A

COL Raymond E. Lee, were also present at all of the Standardization of Arms Committ
72

very concerned about British attempts to dominate any command an

relationships that might be established whenever the military forces o

countries would operate together. Additionally, the report outlined Grea

situation and provided general intelligence concerning shipping losses 

tive tactics against German bombers.256

After the tours were concluded, the Committee reconvened on 29 A

the British laid out their view of the strategic situation in a frank and w

ing brief. The British identified their two strategic priorities as defe

Home Islands and Egypt, noting that there was little they could do t

their situation in the Far East. They were sanguine about their prospec

ing that the war would be won by the country that could make the mos

use of superior resources and noting that their control of the seas g

access to all the world’s resources and American productive capacity 

Germans could only draw on the resources of Europe. During the pre

the British candidly answered questions about their procurement progra

of U.S. assistance desired, and the effectiveness of their own blockade 

Once again, the candor of the British, along with their optimism and c

even in the face of the London Blitz, which was then beginning, appear

a positive effect on the U.S. delegation.

From the perspective of intelligence cooperation between the two 

the subsequent meeting held on 31 August was a watershed event. Th

began with the British outlining their general strategy for winning th

reiterating the position they had taken during the 1939 talks between 

and CDR Hampton: that they would need to rely heavily on the U.S. 

East if Japan initiated hostilities there. Ghormley asked the British a 

tough questions concerning their expectations of the U.S., all of which 

answered with candor.258 BGEN Strong made an offer that would event

to forge the SIGINT relationship between the two countries. He told t

that

256 Robert Ghormley, RADM, USN, Memorandum to Admiral Harold Stark, US

Naval Operations, 23 August 1940, Strategic Planning, 1-11. Ghormley forwarded the 

conduct of the war, which the British had prepared on 16 August 1940, to Stark as an 

this memo. 257 Standardization of Arms Committee, “Minutes of the Anglo-American Stand

Arms Committee,” 29 August 1940, Strategic Planning, 1-11. 258 Standardization of Arms Committee, “Minutes of the Anglo-American Stand

Arms Committee,” 31 August 1940, Strategic Planning, 1-12. Cited hereafter as SOA 

Minutes, 31 August 1940.
73

United States Governments that a periodical [sic] exchange o

mation would be desirable. He...thought the time had now com

this exchange of information should be placed on a regular ba

outlined certain methods by which sources of information at t

posal of the United States might be placed at the disposal of t

ish Government.259

Although Strong’s full comments have been merely summarized h

literature and the archival evidence are in agreement that Strong w

SIGINT sources and methods.260 Although the U.S. and the UK ha

information on lower-level SIGINT capabilities, such as HF/DF, wha

proposing was the sharing of the higher-level COMINT capabilitie

possessed as well as the “take” from those sources.261 Given the 

involved with discussing SIGINT, an information exchange agree

topic would take months to conclude, but it would mark the start of a 

that would bring tremendous benefits for both countries in the long t

In the short term, the Standardization of Arms Talks did not prod

results for the British. They were pleased that the destroyer-for-ba

been concluded successfully, but the British had hoped for some m

tive commitments from the Americans as a result of these talks.262 S

represented a significant step forward as they allowed the U.S. to s

of British strategic thought and they renewed U.S. confidence tha

would survive the war. Following the conclusion of the talks, the 

permission for a large influx of U.S. observers and, even more 

259 SOA Committee Minutes, 31 August 1940, 11. 260 Hinsley, British Intel vol. 1, 312; Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 5

Magic Deals, 74; Erskine, 58. RADM Ghormley was taken aback by Strong’s offer, 

that he didn’t let the British Chiefs of Staff see his surprise “as I did not want them 

pect that Strong was taking the initiative in something which I would not have 

Ghormley, RADM, USN, Letter to Admiral Harold Stark, USN, Chief of Naval 

October 1940, Strategic Planning, 2. 261 Hinsley notes that the British were reluctantly providing the Dominions Wi

(including SIGINT) intelligence product to both Roosevelt, through the British Am

the U.S. Ambassador, through the Foreign Office, by August 1940. Roosevelt 

instructing the State Department to release diplomatic and consular reporting to 

while the U.S. was probably receiving some analyzed information from British SIG

the time of Strong’s offer, the product they were provided was sanitized to remove i

was SIGINT-derived information in it. For additional information see Hinsley, Brit

312-313. 262 Leutze, “Technology and Bargaining,” 58.
74

the Joint Bailey Committee, a temporary organization that would be

major vehicle for information exchange between the two countries p

formal ABC-1 staff talks.263

The Joint Bailey Committee

On 15 June 1940, the British had established a Joint Committee unde

Sir Sydney Bailey to examine the “matter of implementing Anglo-

naval cooperation in the event the United States entered the war.”264 

the Standardization of Arms Talks on 31 August 1940, RADM Gho

with his counterparts on the Admiralty staff to continue technical discu

the requirements identified by Bailey’s committee. Much to Ghormley’

on 2 September 1940, he was provided a copy of Bailey’s report by the 

Lord, ADM Pound. Ghormley realized the sensitivity of this docume

Stark that it “was not written in such form as it would have been had i

intent of the Committee that this text should at any time have been hand

and notified Stark that he would continue unofficial talks with the Bri

their openness in discussing a host of operational, technical, and intellig

ters.265 Ghormley returned to the U.S. in January to prepare for the A

talks, but the process for information exchange established by the Jo

Committee would remain one of the main forums for information sh

into 1941. 

In all, over 400 requests for information from the Committee to the 

and over 300 requests for information from the U.S. Navy to the C

would be processed by the U.S. naval attaché office in London.266 The t

ered by the Committee were extensive, if not all-inclusive. Requests fo

tion on subjects such as anti-submarine warfare; command, con

communications; gunnery; damage control; anti-air warfare; amphibiou

engineering; operations; tactics; and training were made and honored th

mechanisms established by the Committee.267 It became one of the mai

263 Beesly, Very Special Admiral, 178-179. 264 COMNAVEU Administrative History, 3; Department of the Navy, “Chronologic

of Events, 15 June 1940-9 October 1940 — Admiral Ghormley’s Secret Staff Talks

Papers. Cited hereafter as “Chronological Summary of Events,” Stark Papers. 265 “Chronological Summary of Events,” Stark Papers; Robert Ghormley, RADM

ter to Admiral Harold Stark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, 18 September 194

Planning, 1-2. 266 Packard, 73; Bath, 44; COMNAVEU Administrative History, 5.
75

the operating forces back in America. 

Ghormley personally met with the Committee some 14 times betw

ber and October 1940. Although unofficial, these talks became the 

ABC-1 staff talks that were to occur after the New Year. Rather th

specific technical exchanges, these meetings concentrated on the var

which the Bailey report recommended cooperation with America, t

the eventual U.S. entry into the war. As Kirk had done in his reports 

in the year, Ghormley related to the CNO how impressed he was wi

willingness to provide information and their determination to see the 

to the end. Although the exchange was going well, he did have som

cerns. What alarmed him most was the possibility the British woul

exchange due to a lack of reciprocation. While he had relatively free 

information he wanted, he had heard reports that the British n

RADM Pott, had been treated poorly. He wrote to Stark that 

267 “Memorandum for Admiral Bailey’s Committee No. 1,” Subject: H.M.S. H

tember 1940; Records of the Naval Operating Forces, U.S. Naval Forces Europe Su

Bailey Committee thru Bolero, Record Group 313; Stack Area 370, Row 30, Comp

05, NN3-38-90-3; National Archives Building, College Park Maryland, collection c

Bailey Committee Memos; “Memorandum for Admiral Bailey’s Committee No. 2,” 

Frequencies, 12 September 1940; Bailey Committee Memos; “Memorandum for A

Committee No. 3,” Subject: Royal Navy Publications, 12 September 1940; Ba

Memos; “Memorandum for Admiral Bailey’s Committee No. 5,” Subject: Informa

Operations in Norway, 12 September 1940; Bailey Committee Memos; “Memorand

Bailey’s Committee No. 11,” Subject: Anti-aircraft Projectiles Containing Wire

1940; Bailey Committee Memos; “Memorandum for Admiral Bailey’s Committee N

Asdic Pamphlets, 19 September 1940; Bailey Committee Memos; “Memorandu

Bailey’s Committee No. 19,” Subject: Asdic Attack Teacher Plans, 21 Septemb

Committee Memos; “Memorandum for Admiral Bailey’s Committee No. 25,” Sub

struction, 7 October 1940; Bailey Committee Memos; “Memorandum for Admiral B

tee No. 26,” Subject: Dakar Operations, 7 October 1940; Bailey Committee Memos.
76

notes are taken on all his conversations, and information is not f

given to him....Here the Admiralty receives Kirk’s representative

with open arms. Some in fact have desks in the Admiralty so that 

is no information which is asked for which is not given, and mu

addition.268

Ghormley was also troubled by the fact that information being sen

Kirk was being locked in safes at ONI, rather than being sent to the 

bureaus where they were needed. Using language reminiscent of tha

Kirk in the spring, he concluded that “this war laboratory...is bringing 

lessons every day” and feared the Navy was losing a golden oppo

improve its readiness for war if the information was not properly dissem

The sixth meeting of the Joint Bailey Committee, held on 23 Septem

specifically concerned intelligence liaison. A number of decisions w

during the course of this meeting. The major achievement was the agr

establish liaison missions in the intelligence centers of each count

looked like America was close to entering the war. To support the ex

information between intelligence facilities, the British informed the U.S

developed a special code table for secure communication among intellig

ters and they decided to pre-stage these codes so that they could be rapi

to the Americans once the liaison missions were established.270 Reco

tions were also made to continue sharing information on HF/DF station

eventual goal being the evolution of a common organization for expl

this source.271 Although it would be a long time before any of these reco

268 Robert Ghormley, RADM, USN, Memorandum to Admiral Harold Stark, US

Naval Operations, 20 September 1940, Strategic Planning. Cited hereafter as Ghormle

Stark,” 20 September 1940. ONI was not the only organization to frustrate RADM Pot

the lack of a central intelligence organization, like the British JIC, a major stumbling 

exchange of information with the Americans. ONI eventually issued guidance, almo

after Ghormley’s missive to Stark cited above, to all the Navy’s bureaus, instructing 

Admiral Pott full cooperation on a number of technical matters, to include low-level 

additional information see Beesly, Very Special Admiral, 180; Walter S. Anderson, R

Director of Naval Intelligence, Letter to All Naval Bureau Chiefs and Directors of D

November 1940, DNI Correspondence; Robert Ghormley, RADM, USN, Memorandum 

Harold Stark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, 14 November 1940, Strategic Planning

269 Ghormley, “Memo to Stark,” 20 September 1940, Strategic Planning. 270 “B. C. (JG) Sixth Meeting, United States Naval Co-operation, Minutes of Mee

Monday, 23rd September, 1940,” 23 September 1940, Subject: British and U.S. Intel

son, Strategic Planning, 1-3. Cited hereafter as “Bailey Committee 6th Meeting Minute

Planning.
77

willing to consider this closer relationship was a significant change 

tions a year earlier.

The last meeting of the Bailey Committee on 16 October 1940 al

intelligence but was specifically focused on “the general interchan

gence between the British and United States naval authorities in the 

Discussions centered around ways that Far East intelligence coopera

enhanced, focusing on the possibility of establishing liaison officers 

Far East commands and establishing a secure method of exchanging 

Recommendations were also made to instruct the U.S. and British n

in Tokyo to liberalize their information exchange and to have O

exchange any monographs they possessed on Japan and the mandat

the Pacific under its control.273 To support U.S. planning efforts for a

Japan, Ghormley forwarded a complete disposition of all British forc

East as well as the latest British intelligence estimates on the disposi

forces in the Pacific.274 While CNO Stark was unimpressed with the 

Eastern War Plan [which]...shows much evidence of their usual wish

he instructed the Commander of the Asiatic Fleet, Admiral T. C. Ha

a framework for cooperation with the British in the Far East and c

Ghormley for convincing “the British that there is a Western Pacific 

United States is interested and in which they also have a great intere

While Stark still obviously had disdain for the British, he did no

sonal feelings get in the way of his strategic vision. This was the 

during which he completed the Plan Dog Memo, which outlined th

of the Atlantic-first strategy, centered on cooperation with the Briti

warded a copy of the plan to Ghormley, stating that he could share 

and contents with the British, but he was not to show it to them in i

271 “Bailey Committee 6th Meeting Minutes,” Strategic Planning, 2-3. 272 “B. C. I. Fourteenth Meeting, United States Naval Co-operation, Minutes of 

Wednesday, 16th October, 1940,” 16 October, Strategic Planning, 1. Cited here

Committee 14th Meeting Minutes,” Strategic Planning. 273 “Bailey Committee 14th Meeting Minutes,” Strategic Planning, 1-2. 274 Robert Ghormley, RADM, USN, Memorandum to Admiral Harold Stark, 

Naval Operations, 30 October 1940, Strategic Planning. 275 Harold Stark, ADM, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, Letter to Captain T

Commander in Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, 12 November 1940, Stark Papers, 1; Haro

USN, Chief of Naval Operations, Letter to Rear Admiral Robert Ghormley, USN

1940, Stark Papers. Cited hereafter as “Stark Letter to Ghormley,” 16 Novemb

Papers.
78

ize all the work Ghormley had done, or the U.S. Navy would be ill-p

cooperate with the British when the two countries became allies.276 

this, with the election now behind the President, the U.S. acceded to t

request, made long ago, for formal staff talks.277 Stark notified Ghor

ing him to let the British know these would be frank and honest d

between equals.278 Ghormley and Kirk, through the Standardization 

Talks and the Bailey Committee, had laid the groundwork for allianc

British efforts to entice the U.S. into cooperation were now beginnin

fruit. Although these new staff talks would also remain secret, Gho

Kirk would continue to play key roles in the development of the allia

they traveled back to the United States to prepare for the ABC-1 tal

would be held in Washington DC.

ABC-1 Talks—29 January 1941–27 March 1941 

The plenary session of the ABC-1 talks was held on 29 January 

senior U.S. member at the talks was Army Major General S. D. Embic

Ghormley was designated as the senior naval representative, with RAD

the Navy’s War Plans Officer, and CAPT Kirk, now the DNI, assistin

Stark stressed to the group that the security of the talks was of the utm

tance because, if word of them leaked out it would likely “cause a mo

delay in the coordination of our plans for war and a retarding effect o

sage of the Lend-Lease Bill,” which was then making its way thro

gress.280 The purpose of the talks was to “determine the best methods 

the armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwea

defeat Germany and the Powers allied with her, should the United State

pelled to resort to war.”281 To this end, the participants were suppose

276 “Stark Letter to Ghormley,” 16 November 1940, Stark Papers; Harold Stark, 

Chief of Naval Operations, Letter to Rear Admiral Robert Ghormley, USN,19 Nov

Stark Papers. 277 The U.S. accepted on 29 November 1940. For additional information see Re

Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 42-44. 278 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 44-45. 279 COMNAVEU Administrative History, 9; Harold Stark, ADM, USN, Chief of N

tions, Letter to Rear Admiral Robert Ghormley, USN, 24 January 1941, Strategic Plan

utes of the Plenary Meeting Held in Navy Department,” 29 January 1941, Strategic Pla

hereafter as “Plenary Meeting,” 29 January 1941, Strategic Planning. 280 Plenary Meeting,” 29 January 1941, Strategic Planning. 281Department of the Navy, “Report on United States-British Staff Conversations

1941, Stark Papers. Cited hereafter as “Report on U.S.-UK Staff Talks,” 27 March 

Papers.
79

areas of responsibility; and work out command, control, commun

intelligence issues.282

For the most part, the talks were very successful, although the

some points of friction between the two prospective allies. While b

agreed on the Germany-first strategy, planning to contain the Japane

East until the situation in Europe was stabilized, the British desire

move its fleet to Singapore in the event of hostilities with Japan.283 

the U.S. response was to reject this proposal and RADM Turner, wh

distrustful of the British, drafted the response. Turner, wishing to th

of the British, believed they had been attempting to manipulate the U

protecting Singapore since the Ingersoll Mission 3 years previou

nately for the relationship between the two countries, Turner’s pe

were kept within the U.S. delegation, although the U.S. had to reje

proposal, given the need to maintain the U.S. fleet in Hawaii to prote

West Coast and its own Far East possessions.

The other point of friction, which Turner also interpreted as a si

manipulation, occurred when it was discovered that the British de

reviewed with the British Ambassador some of the planning docu

discussed. The Ambassador then discussed them with the U.S. Secre

who declined to address them and informed the Navy and War De

the situation. When this fact was discovered, the talks were imm

pended and the U.S. delegation reiterated the terms of reference for t

their British counterparts, making it clear that these were militar

exchanges and, since no political commitments would be reached, 

sions should not include the policy arms of either government.285 

Despite these problems, the talks resumed and ended suc

27~March 1941, and Roosevelt approved the recommendations mad

that year.286 What was the impact of the ABC-1 talks on intelligence 

most immediate and tangible result was the establishment of Joint 

standing British organization in Washington DC, and a parallel U

based in London. The purpose of these missions was to continue 

282 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 45; 48-49. 283 Reynolds, 184-185; “British-United States Staff Conversations, 3rd Meet

February 1941, Strategic Planning, 1-5. 284 “Minutes of Joint Meeting of Army and Navy Sections, United States Staff C

in Navy Department Building,” 13 February 1941, Strategic Planning, 1-2. 285 “Minutes of Joint Meeting of Army and Navy Sections, United States Staff C

in Navy Department Building,” 19 February 1941, Strategic Planning. 286 COMNAVEU Administrative History, 18.
80

work out the mechanics of cooperation in operational, intelligence, an

nications matters.287 The British Joint Staff Mission (JSM) was an eff

for coordinating the allied war effort, although the British did atte

mixed results, to use the mission as a means of influencing the devel

U.S. military capabilities and operations.288 On intelligence matters, 

agreement reached during the ABC-1 staff talks was that all existing in

organizations would continue to act independently but they were to

maintain close liaison with each other in order to ensure the full an

prompt exchange of pertinent information concerning war operatio

Intelligence [would be] established not only through the Military M

sions but also between all echelons of command in the field with re

to matters which affect their operations.289

By May 1941, a Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was established 

ponent of the JSM and the NID stood up a new branch, NID-18, to se

naval component of the JSM JIC and to conduct liaison with ONI.2

states that soon after the establishment of these missions, SIGINT shar

to take place on a regular basis, which, given the sensitivity of th

287 Hinsley, British Intel vol. 1, 313; Bath, 63-63. 288 Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 68-69. The British were continually frustrated by 

inter-service organizations in the U.S. military, since it created a situation where they w

negotiate everything with the separate services. The JSM consistently made recomm

the U.S. Departments of War and the Navy concerning ways they could better organiz

for war, in essence, to become more like the British. For example, the British recom

U.S. military branches form a JIC-like organization to coordinate intelligence policy a

inter-service board to coordinate the development and acquisition of radar technolog

services. Both suggestions were flatly rejected by both the War and Navy Departments

pressure of actual war to spur on cooperation between the services, there was little 

overcome bureaucratic rivalries and suggestions from the British, even at this stage in 

ship between the two countries, were treated warily. For additional information see S

Magic Deals, 69; British Joint Staff Mission, “Proposal to Setup an Inter-services R.D

tee in North America,” 26 August 1941, Strategic Planning, 1-2; U.S. Navy Secretary 

ration, Letter to British Joint Staff Mission, 18 November 1941, Strategic Planning. 289 “Report on U.S.-UK Staff Talks,” 27 March 1941, Stark Papers. Bath contends 

ish actually advocated stronger wording for this section of the agreement, desiring ful

sharing, not sharing limited to operational matters. He also notes that implementation o

was uneven. For example, U.S. attachés did not receive word to cooperate with their B

terparts until November of 1941. For additional information see Bath, 54-55. 290 Francis Hally Hinsley and others, British Intelligence in the Second World War: 

on Strategy and Operations 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 47, cited 

Hinsley, British Intel, vol. 2; Hinsley, British Intel vol. 1, 313; MacLachlan, 219-220; B
81

shared as well.

The U.S. naval mission to England was placed under RADM 

charge and the new U.S. naval attaché, CAPT Charles P. Lockwo

duties as both the attaché and as Ghormley’s Chief of Staff.292 This 

would form the nucleus of what would later become the Comm

Forces Europe Staff, contained significantly more naval observers th

in England in the past and, to avoid tensions, “great emphasis was pla

ing officers who would be discreet and cooperative in working w

ish.”293 The flow of information from the British, established b

Committee, continued to flourish and material that was previously 

was now open to the Americans, given that the British now had f

ments and the Lend-Lease program to assuage their doubts about U

tion.294 Processing this increased amount of technical and 

information became an issue, however, and a division of labor wa

whereby the “Naval Attaché served as the channel for supplying in

enemy organization, operations, and plans....Operational intellige

increasingly a function of the staff of the Special Naval Observer [Gh

One of the most tangible benefits of the exchanges once the U.S. 

established was in the area of imagery intelligence (IMINT). Gh

granted permission to have an officer observe British aerial photogr

naissance and imagery interpretation operations. The officer assigne

Lieutenant Commander Robert S. Quackenbush, was highly impress

ish capabilities in this area and his efforts led to the establishment of 

imagery interpreter school in September 1941.296 While this co

IMINT was significant, the start of U.S.-UK SIGINT cooperation 

traced to this period, although this major achievement was overshad

291 Hinsley, British Intel vol. 2, 55. Hinsley states that, when the JSM JIC was sto

mon perspective of the British was that, “Washington...had little to offer, and...clos

the United States intelligence organizations left the British authorities in no doubt th

little to offer for many months.” This was not an entirely fair assessment, given t

against the Japanese Purple code and the generally superior state of U.S. intelligen

it does give insight into the British mindset at the time, which was chauvinistic 

focused on the European situation. For additional information see Hinsley, British In

292 Bath, 56. 293COMNAVEU Administrative History, 11, 14; Alan Goodrich Kirk, CAPT, U

Naval Intelligence, Letter to Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, USN, 27 March 194

294 2 Bath, 56. 295COMNAVEU Administrative History, 108. There would be 103 assistant U.S

in England by September 1941. For additional information see COMNAVEU Adm

tory, 34.

296 Packard, 179-180; Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 154-155.
82

much has been written on SIGINT cooperation between the two cou

origins of that cooperation are worth reviewing as they demonstrate a 

in the establishment of trust and mutual respect between the two allies.

American Approach—The Sinkov Mission 

February 1941

BGEN Strong had made the initial offer on SIGINT cooperation wit

ish during the 31 August 1940 session of the Standardization of Arms T

after making the offer, in September 1940, U.S. Army cryptologist

under the great William Friedman would complete their successful rev

neering of the cipher machine used to encrypt the Japanese diplomatic 

ple). The decrypted intelligence from this source was known as M

Although he disagreed with Strong’s making the offer, Ghormley 

RADM Godfrey and Sir Stewart Menzies on 22 October 1940 to begi

out the details of the SIGINT technical exchange. The deal had no

approved in the U.S.; however, on 23 October, Secretary of the Navy 

Secretary of War Stimson agreed to the exchange and obtained appr

Roosevelt sometime in late October or early November. The propo

items to be exchanged by the Americans included copies of the Japanes

Purple cipher machines, the main German diplomatic code, some of the 

diplomatic codes, and some of the Italian and Mexican codes which th

decrypted. The main resistance for this exchange came from the Navy’s 

lytic branch, OP-20-G, although the Navy agreed to send two of its pe

the exchange mission.298 There was also resistance to the exchange in G

ain as SIGINT was one of the few intelligence items that had been of

the Americans. Concerns about U.S. security and Churchill’s desi

ULTRA intelligence, the information derived from the successful dec

German messages encrypted using Enigma, as a bargaining chip in Bri

tiations with the U.S. government, were the main factors on the British 

iting exchange on this topic.299

297 Erskine, 58-59, 69; Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 34-35, 44-46. 298 Erskine, 59; Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 48-49, 50-54. 299 Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 30, 59-62.
83

January 1941, around the time the ABC-1 talks were beginning. Altho

iam Friedman was supposed to be in charge of the mission, he had suff

vous breakdown earlier in the month and leadership of the four-ma

devolved to Abraham Sinkov, who, with the temporary rank of Army 

was the senior man on the team.300 While the specifics of what was e

during the Sinkov team’s visit to the GC&CS at Bletchley Park has bee

of some debate for many years, recent scholarship has demonstrated th

U.S. and Great Britain benefited greatly from the exchange and its ult

come was an increase in SIGINT cooperation between the two countrie

The Sinkov Mission arrived in England on 7 February 1941. The d

mission’s stay in Great Britain are somewhat unclear, but the team m

made its visit to Bletchley Park sometime later in February and probabl

to the U.S. by 20 March 1941.302 The mission was cordially received b

ton at the GC&CS and the British were most appreciative of the Ameri

ingness to provide them with the two Purple machines and the informat

various foreign codes they were willing to share. Although the Briti

have Enigma machines they could spare for an exchange at this poin

provide the U.S. with a wiring diagram for constructing their ow

machine, although it would be many months before the Americans wou

300 Baer, 54-55; Erskine, 60; Lewin, 114. 301 The main controversy surrounding the exchange concerns accusations made b

rence Safford of the Navy’s OP-20-G, who contended there was a deal made before the 

left for England whereby the U.S. would provide England a copy of the Purple encryp

in exchange for a copy of an Enigma machine. No scholar has ever found evidenc

agreement and it is doubtful one existed. For Safford, the U.S. had given up its “crow

handing over two Purple machines to the British and had, in his mind, nothing to show 

of the controversy also stems from the fact that, in his official report, Sinkov did not r

extent of what the British shared with him concerning Enigma and the early Britis

(bombes) used for decryption because he had sworn an oath by which he had agreed to 

information only to the Army G-2 and the Navy’s DNI. Recently declassified docum

strate that those who participated in the mission and senior leadership in the Navy and 

ments felt the exchange of information was equitable, further undercutting Safford

British desire to monopolize ULTRA intelligence, however, was a source of friction 

two countries and probably was a factor that colored Safford’s recollection of the time 

trust of the British. For additional information see Erskine 60-66, 72; Smith, Ultra-M

56-62, 75-76; Aldrich, 77-78. 302 The period of the visit to Bletchley Park was quite short. Most of the tea

England was spent waiting for transportation back to America. For additional info

Erskine, 67, 74.
84

was not allowed to see any of the actual intelligence derived from ULT

were told, according to one of the team members, U.S. Navy Ensig

Currier, about “the latest techniques applied to the solution of Enigma 

operations of the Bombes [early British computers].”304 In addition to 

tion on Enigma, the Sinkov team received a detailed briefing on the or

of the GC&CS; information on the location and operation of Royal Air 

Army intercept and DF capabilities; various German, Italian, Russia

and Japanese codes; and training materials.305 Given the depth and sc

highly sensitive information shared, the mission’s main result was to 

atmosphere of trust that would enable greater intelligence cooperatio

course of 1941, particularly in the Far Eastern theater.

303 The U.S. sent a number of requests to the British to clarify the instructions the

concerning the construction of an Enigma machine. While the British were somewha

answer questions about Enigma for security reasons, the unreliability of the mails was 

tor. Denniston tried to answer questions in November 1941 but his answers were lost. 

Safford saw this delay as another indicator of British truculence, contributing to his n

of British assistance prior to the war. For additional information see Budiansky, 5

Ultra-Magic Deals, 75-76; Bray, xx-xxi. 304 Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 76. For additional information see Hinsley, British 

313; Bath, 57-58. 305 Erskine, 63; Bath 57-58.
85

THE LIMITS OF EXCHANGE

MARCH 1941-DECEMBER 1941

The ABC-1 staff talks marked a tipping point in the relationship 

U.S. and Great Britain. America was still, officially, a neutral but it w

the world that new policies, such as Lend-Lease and more aggressi

of the Western Atlantic by the U.S. Navy, strongly favored the Bri

much had been done to improve operational and intelligence 

between the two countries in preparation for the eventual U.S. entry 

the British still sought additional ways through which they could 

more closely to their war effort. Intelligence remained an area wher

cooperation could be forged without attracting undue attention from 

isolationist critics. Intelligence cooperation also became increasing

as the Far East situation deteriorated and as the U.S. Navy transitione

ing and protecting shipping in the Western Atlantic. From the conc

ABC-1 talks until the Pearl Harbor attacks, the British would contin

ward initiatives designed to encourage closer cooperation between 

ernments and their navies.

Exchanges in the Far East

Following the successful ABC-1 talks, which established the 

strategy for the allies, the UK attempted to forge a strategic polic

East through a conference between American, British, and Dutch 

cials. Although a plan was drafted on 27 April 1941, it was rejected 

U.S. Army and Navy in June of that year.306 As had been the pr

early 1939, the British did not have the forces required to protect t

possessions and had put their hope in the fact the U.S. would com

in that theater when war came. For the U.S., burdened with its o

obligations in the Orient, this expectation was unreasonable and 

While U.S. planners believed they probably had the capabilit

Hawaii, Singapore, and the Philippines, they would be stretched t

would be unable to generate or sustain a substantive offensive in 

stages of the war. This strategy would be in strong contradiction 

principles.307 Even though an agreement was eventually reached, 

306 Morison, Rising Sun, 55. 307 Morison, Rising Sun, 53-55. 
86

ate with one another if war came.

Despite this lack of cooperation on a strategic and operational leve

U.S. and the UK still sought ways to increase exchanges between th

gence organizations in the theater. Historically, exchanges in the Far E

ater had been relatively informal, primarily at the attaché-to-attaché lev

situation began to change in October 1940, when, as previously disc

agreement was reached through the Joint Bailey Committee to exchan

officers between Great Britain’s China Fleet and the U.S. Asiatic Fle

was still a limited means of exchanging information, however, and o

British intelligence felt more could be done to engage the U.S. in th

Plans were made to undertake initiatives that would increase coopera

Far East. 

The first move toward greater cooperation in the Orient came on th

the Sinkov Mission when, in March 1941, the British DNI, RADM 

authorized an exchange of SIGINT information between the British 

Combined Bureau (FECB) in Singapore and the U.S. cryptologists 

CAST in the Philippines. By 14 March, the FECB had given the U.S. pa

tions to a Japanese Army transport code and a cipher used by their Air 

23 March the FECB was given approval to accept two U.S. Army crypt

liaison officers.311 Starting in May 1941, the U.S. Navy and the FECB w

the details of their exchange, which was significant. Lieutenant Jeffers

son, the officer-in-charge at Station CAST, traveled to Singapore in Ap

May to explore the possibility of greater cooperation. The Navy was sti

break the main Japanese Fleet code, JN-25B, but was having only lim

cess. To foster good will and increase cooperation, the British provid

work they had done on JN-25B and the addition of the code groups 

recovered was a significant help to the Americans, who likewise pro

work they had done on the code.312 

Following Dennison’s visit, in May 1941, Commander Malcolm Bur

Royal Navy arrived at Corregidor to work out the final details of a SIG

ing arrangement between the FECB and Station CAST. While the Br

farther along in their code breaking efforts, they lacked reliable acces

308 Bath, 156-157. 309 Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 133-134; Bath, 135. 310 Bath, 155-159. 311 Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 78; Antony Best, Britain, Japan, and Pearl Harbor: A

in East Asia, 1936-1941 (New York: Routledge, 1995), 146. 312 Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 78; Erskine, 63-64. 
87

ume of signals the U.S. could provide them for analysis.

 A form

was reached whereby a special radio circuit would be used to share 

using a one-time pad code for the security of the transmission.314 Har

and detailed analyses were sent using a regularly scheduled flight fro

Singapore.315 Given the success of these exchanges, the U.S. Arm

London, in late May 1941, made a request to the British government

the War Department, requesting a full exchange of intelligence infor

Far East. During a 6 June 1941 meeting of the British JIC, the Brit

decision to share all their intelligence in the Far East, except their S

operations, with the Americans.316 Although this was a significant 

part of the British, it was a difficult policy to implement, despite its 

enacted at the request of the American government. As Richard 

observed, the U.S. had no comparable inter-service intelligence orga

the British could deal with, so every agreement needed to be worked 

individual departments of the U.S. government.317 Alan Bath has al

the U.S. was slow to respond to Far East initiatives as the threat there 

urgent and many in leadership positions were still wary of any Bri

maintain their colonial empire.318 Both Aldrich and Bath are correc

out that perennial problems in the relationship between the two cou

as late as the summer of 1941 and continued to work against better 

on both operational and intelligence matters.

The Godfrey Visit—May-June 1941

In parallel with the effort to improve intelligence cooperation in 

the JIC in London was still interested in ways to improve the coo

coordination of U.S. and UK intelligence in the Atlantic theater. To th

frey was dispatched on a mission from the JIC to assess the state of 

gence and, as Donald MacLachlan has stated, “to persuade the Amer

their intelligence with ours [the British], to adopt those of our metho

been proved by nearly two years’ experience and to accept all we w

313 Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 79; Worth, 106-107 314 Stripp, 148; Aldrich, 80; Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 82; Worth, 105. 315 Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 82. 316 Best, 146-147; Aldrich, 80; Bath, 163-164. 317 Aldrich, 80-81. 318 Bath, 159. 
88

ship, given they did not respect the quality of U.S. intelligence and felt 

could be gained from further cooperation.320 Still, a mini-JIC had b

lished in the British embassy under the JSM and Godfrey felt there 

potential for increased sharing of intelligence through that organization

larly if he could convince the Americans to set up a similar council for t

nation of U.S. intelligence activities.321

Godfrey had suspected he would find the U.S. farther behind on in

matters than the British. Even so, he was taken aback by what he actua

He was given a tour of ONI by his old associate, CAPT Kirk, now DNI

away unimpressed, feeling that ONI’s lack of access to naval planning e

made it largely irrelevant.322 While seeing some bright spots in th

decrypting Japanese codes and their penetration of the South American 

French North African targets, Godfrey could find little to praise about 

ligence. The litany of defects he reported to the JIC in London include

ception that, for many in the U.S. government, intelligence just mean

and counterintelligence work; general situation reports were highly v

tactical and operational intelligence were not; there was no joint intellig

duction, which led to duplicative effort and conflicting reporting; intelli

done for intelligence’s sake since there was no interface between intelli

planning; hard, in-depth analysis was lacking and there was no means 

intelligence products; and the U.S. possessed no SIS, propaganda, SO

nomic warfare branch equivalents.323

Hoping to improve the situation, Godfrey attempted to be helpful by 

the War and Navy Departments with a series of memos on subjects s

grading of intelligence reports, topographic intelligence, security of so

handling of special intelligence between the U.S. and the UK, prison

intelligence, the handling of ciphers, and the functions of the NID’s O

Intelligence Center (OIC).324 Godfrey also recommended to the service

form a U.S. JIC to coordinate their intelligence efforts, which would ac

319 MacLachlan, 217. 320 MacLachlan, 222-223; Hinsley, British Intel vol. 1, 314. 321 Bradley F. Smith, “Admiral Godfrey’s Mission to America, June/July 1941,” Inte

National Security 1, no. 3 (September, 1986): 441-442, 447. Cited hereafter as Smith, 

frey’s Mission.” Smith’s article contains the complete text of Godfrey’s post-trip 

appendix. 322 Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 148; Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War (New 

dom House, 2001), 81-82; Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 31-32; Bath, 60-61. 323 Smith, “ADM Godfrey’s Mission,” 445-447, 449; Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 31

324 Smith, “ADM Godfrey’s Mission,” 448-449.
89

could be expected, Godfreys helpful suggestions were perceived qui

by the services, who were, uncharacteristically, in complete agreem

did not desire or need a central intelligence organization in Americ

mond Lee, the U.S. military attaché in London, received the offici

rejection of Godfrey’s proposal for a U.S. JIC on 26 June 1941. Att

was a personal letter from the G-2, Colonel Hayes Knone, which m

that the Army’s attitude toward the proposal was “we are not going 

ish organization and procedure[,]...[w]e are not convinced that su

clearing house and assimilating center are needed [, and]...[t]he Bri

been successful, so far, in this war; why should they advise us?”325 

This reaction, predicated on both the desire to be treated as an eq

Britain and on inter-service rivalry, was not limited to the Army. I

pitching his idea for a JIC, Godfrey and his protégé, Commander Ian 

also worked closely with William Donovan and William Stephenso

the ideas that would form Donovan’s famous memorandum to Roos

mending the creation of a central intelligence organization for Amer

even met with Roosevelt and discussed the idea of a central intellige

with him.327 Kirk was aware of this meeting and, most likely through 

relationship with Donovan, was also aware of Godfrey’s role in advo

tral intelligence organization. Kirk, displaying the attitude of hi

attempts by the British to meddle in U.S. affairs, made no attempt to 

pleasure with Godfrey when the British DNI paid Kirk a courtesy ca

return to England.328 While the depth and breadth of the intelligenc

between the two countries would continue to grow after Godfrey’s v

position, at least at the higher levels of the military services, was tha

Great Britain on how to conduct their affairs was not desired and w

with resentment.

325 Leutze, London Journal, journal entry for 26 June 1941. Godfrey must hav

quite cordially by the two Services, however, who probably politely told him they 

his suggestions. In his official report, Godfrey optimistically predicted that “the U.S

willing to gain, if not be guided by, our experience over the past two years.” For add

tion see Smith, “ADM Godfrey’s Mission,” 449. 326 Commander Ian Fleming would later gain great notoriety as the author of 

novels. 327 Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, 113; Smith, “ADM Godfrey’s Mission,” 

Beesly, Very Special Admiral, 181-183; Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 231. 328 MacLachlan, 231.
90

From April 1941 to November 1941, events in the Atlantic clearly in

the U.S. had abandoned its neutral stance in favor of alliance with Gre

As military preparations for this alliance were ongoing, U.S. securit

prompted Roosevelt to take actions that were decidedly pro-British a

some of these actions met with popular outcry, public opinion wa

toward Roosevelt’s view. In April 1941, the U.S. began basing forces 

land, to aid in the maintenance of security patrols. By this time all 

sightings of U-boats were passed back to the Admiralty through ALU

don. Although this information was not timely, it still assisted the 

developing their operational intelligence (OPINTEL) picture and was ju

of intelligence cooperation they had hoped to obtain from the Americ

they first began to press for a closer relationship.329 In June 1941, 

pressed Sir Stewart Menzies to ease the restrictions on the dissemina

boat Enigma decrypts and, while the British would be slow to act on thi

did begin receiving intelligence derived from this source.330 Additional

1941, the U.S. and the UK routinely shared intelligence derived fro

sites.331 As the summer progressed, the relationship would become clo

July 1941, the U.S. would take over the defense of Iceland, relievi

forces of the need to perform that duty. During the Atlantic Conferenc

Roosevelt and Churchill in August, one of the substantive agreemen

was a policy for the conduct of convoy operations and areas of respon

the two countries, giving further incentive to share intelligence on Ger

movements. U.S. Navy encounters with German U-boats, such as the G

dent, inflamed public opinion against the Germans enough that Roo

able to advise Germany and Italy to keep their warships out of waters u

protection. By the time the Reuben James was torpedoed by a U-b

October 1941, Congress was prepared to amend the neutrality laws in 

made the alliance with the British a reality in fact, if not on paper.332 

Against this backdrop, two additional visits were made in an effort 

increase intelligence collaboration between the two countries. To recip

Sinkov Mission, Commander Alistair Denniston, the Director of GC&C

the United States to discuss ways to enhance SIGINT cooperation. Alt

efforts to establish new, official frameworks for collaboration met wi

cess, the Denniston visit did have a positive outcome. He completely 

329 Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 75-76. 330 Hinsley, British Intel, vol. 2, 55. 331 Bray, xxi. 332 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 69-71, 75-76, 78-81.
91

technical acumen. He began a personal friendship with William F

others, which greatly assisted in the future development of the closer 

U.S.-UK SIGINT organizations that developed once the U.S. entered 

The second visit of significance was that led by Commander Ar

lum, U.S. Navy, from August through October 1941. McCollum’

reciprocate the visit the U.S. had received from Godfrey earlier in the 

trip was significant in that it showed that the tensions that existed wi

tionship were still prevalent on the eve of the U.S. entry into the wa

ple, even though McCollum got along well with his British hosts o

level and was given a great deal of access to the NID, he did not hav

opinion of British abilities. When asked years later about whether 

Room 39, the OIC’s main plotting room, McCollum responded to a

that he “may have seen it, I don’t know. Like everything British, yo

get the impression that it’s not very well organized, that it’s rather di

does work.”335 McCollum also had little confidence in British ass

Japan, believing the British lack of focus on the Far East problem 

inhibited their ability to do substantive work on that country.336 A

continued his exploration of the NID, he realized that he was bei

from seeing some aspects of the organization, particularly how decr

INT was being integrated by the NID. He confronted Godfrey on t

uncharacteristically, he was told

“Well, you know, McCollum, that’s a very difficult thing to 

because we don’t control that. I couldn’t possibly offer anyt

that sort because I really don’t have any control over it.” I sa

Admiral, who does?” and he said, “Damned if I know,” whi

course was ridiculous.337

333 Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 89; Bath, 62-63. 334 McCollum Reminiscences, 338. McCollum eventually retired as Rear Ad

Naval Service and his reminiscences are filled with many frank insights on the fu

U.S. Navy during this period. While it may seem odd that the Navy would recipr

visit with that from a CDR, McCollum was not originally supposed to be the sen

mission. Given the vagaries of travel during this period, the senior member of the 

ferent flight from McCollum, a flight which crashed over England, killing all a

nately for McCollum, who was in charge of the Japan Desk at ONI, he had been 

vaguest notions of what the goals of the mission were. For additional information 

Reminiscences, 339-342. 335 McCollum Reminiscences, 343. 336 McCollum Reminiscences, 350. 337 McCollum Reminiscences, 344. 
92

ish distrust of the U.S. on this issue. While information was being exc

the mechanics of decrypting Japanese communications and while the 

receiving sanitized intelligence derived from ULTRA at this stage, r

gence from that source was still closely held by the British.338 McColl

fortuitously encounter an old friend after his meeting with Godfrey, on

access to the highest levels of the Admiralty. The next day McCollum 

in to see the First Sea Lord, ADM Sir Dudley Pound, who told him tha

had been instructed to hold nothing back from him. After this, McC

given full access to the OIC and was able to see how proficient the Briti

using all-source intelligence fusion to maintain the tactical picture in th

and engage in predictive analysis of U-boat operations. McCollum w

this valuable information back to the U.S. Navy and would use it to set u

pilot program that would later become the Fleet Intelligence Cente

Pacific Fleet in Hawaii.339

Although the British had desired a system of collaborative OPINTE

on both sides of the Atlantic almost from the inception of the OIC, it 

a real possibility given the fundamentally different ways each nav

intelligence and, consequently, had organized their intelligence servic

those views. Eventually the U.S. Fleet commanders saw a need for 

TEL capability and, rather than going to ONI for this service, they ch

ate their own intelligence fusion centers within their staff organi

Although initially far more limited in capability than the British O

Fleet Intelligence Centers would, due to the pressure of war, eventual

rival their British counterpart. 

338 Smith, Ultra-Magic Deals, 86-87; Aldrich, 81. 339 McCollum Reminiscences, 330-331, 345-346, 353. 340 Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, 112-113; Packard, 216
93

EVALUATION:

SUCCESS OF THE BRITISH EFFORT

The British aggressively used a number of highly effective tactic

closer intelligence relationship with the U.S. prior to the U.S.’s actu

the war. These approaches took place on many levels and through ma

part of a comprehensive, although not necessarily well coordinated

part of the British to draw the U.S. into World War II as their ally. 

U.S. may have been predisposed to aid the British, given their comm

it is unlikely the U.S. would have drawn as close to the British as th

period from 1938 to 1941 were it not for persistent British overtures

As the U.S. progressed toward supporting Britain in the war, 

exchanges between the two countries became commonplac

increased cooperation was consistently hampered by tensions and 

by the time the U.S. entered the war, cooperation in the area of 

particularly naval intelligence, was well beyond anything anyone 

imagined possible in 1939. Although U.S. decisionmakers in the 

chy—Roosevelt, Knox, and Stark—were predisposed to aid 

because they clearly saw it was in the U.S. national interest to do s

also very cautious. Even though they were receptive to British o

initiation of cooperative ventures was difficult given domestic p

straints and the U.S. desire, especially among military officials, to 

equals by the British. Given this reluctance on the part of the Ame

makers and senior military officials, it is highly unlikely that the lev

gence cooperation attained between the two navies in the interwar p

have been as extensive and wide-ranging as it became, were it not 

British initiatives designed to advance that purpose. By gambling w

most significant bargaining chips available to them—their technic

intelligence resources, and war experience—the British secured a “

tionship” with the United States in matters of intelligence, a rela

still brings substantial benefits to both sides.

Lessons for The U.S. Intelligence Community

If the rationale for intelligence sharing can be reduced to a cost-b

lation whereby countries seek to mitigate weaknesses in their intell

bility by seeking to arrange a limited partnership with a state o
94

cess. A state must determine its potential partners reliability, sta

potential durability,” and must work out how the intelligence will be e

the limits of that exchange, and what security protocols will be enacted 

the information provided.342 A country cannot assume that another g

operates in the same way and must correctly ascertain the factors and i

who truly influence policy before beginning the negotiations necessar

the exchange.343

The most serious risk in intelligence sharing may be the exposure 

and methods, but there are other potential dangers to sharing intelligen

include the chance that intelligence given to one country will find its 

third, potentially hostile, state; a propensity for circular reporting; incre

sure to share intelligence in other areas; and the risk that disclosure of 

gence sharing could be politically harmful to the governments enga

exchanges.344 The potential benefits of exchange are significant, how

largest benefit is that intelligence cooperation can provide needed in

that may be unobtainable otherwise. Cooperation may expand a countr

available collection targets, or it may be a way to employ collection tec

that would otherwise be unavailable to one of the exchange partners.3

major benefit may be in the area of influence. A state may provide inte

another country in the hope of influencing that country to act in a ce

Cooperation may also be used as a way to engage another state diplom

a situation where no strong diplomatic ties exist.346

As in the post-Cold War period, the U.S., in the 20th century inter

frame, experienced a multiplicity of new threats at a time when the 

devoted to intelligence were declining. This produced a situation wher

ligence exchange had to be considered by resource managers as the 

cient and effective means of addressing these requirements.347 In one 

view, during periods of heightened crisis, the American public is m

willing to tolerate associations that would be questionable during a m

341 Gideon Doron, “The Vagaries of Intelligence Sharing: The Political Imbalan

tional Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 1 (Summer 1993): 135. 342 Doron, 135. 343 Doron, 141-142. 344 Jeffrey T. Richelson, “The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation,” Internationa

Intelligence and Counterintelligence 4, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 315-318. 345 Richelson, 311-315. 346 Richelson, 314-315. 347 James J. Wirtz, “Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration: The Domestic Dimen

national Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 86. 
95

instability. While the primary reaction from the American public 

bility was isolationism, Americans became increasingly more tole

eign policy tilt toward Great Britain once the war began to 

interests. 

For both parties examined in this study, the risks of intelligence 

significant. The major obstacles to closer cooperation for U.S. polic

ing the critical summer of 1940 were determining whether Englan

vive the war and whether they could be trusted to keep the nascen

relationship secret. The main factor the British had to overcome w

cern about lax U.S. counterintelligence practices. Despite these c

benefits were considerable. Given the success of the British effort in 

“special relationship” with the U.S. in intelligence cooperation in 

period, some lessons can be drawn from the experience: 

1. Be prepared to quickly capitalize on a shared crisis

The British were able to rapidly exploit instances when the se

among U.S. decisionmakers was highest. During periods of higher te

tries are more willing to seek solutions to their problems that wou

unacceptable during times of greater stability. For example, the 

attempted to engage the U.S. in a closer relationship on Japan poli

the abortive London Naval Conference of 1935, but they met with 

until the Panay Incident in December 1937 heightened U.S. concer

Japanese threat. After the Panay Incident, the British immediately e

decisionmakers once again and secured the Ingersoll Mission for 

Similarly, British overtures to the U.S. in the period following the st

in September 1939 met with little success. The defeat of Belgium, 

France, however, created a sense of crisis in the U.S., one the British 

secure Donovan’s visit to England and U.S. participation in the Sta

of Arms Talks. The Bailey Committee Report shows that the British w

capitalize on initiatives like the Standardization of Arms Talks. The 

onstrates that the British prepared well for these opportunities, cle

their goals, the types of information they wished to exchange, and th

which those exchanges would take place, factors that decisionmake

into account before engaging in cooperative intelligence ventures. 

348 Wirtz, 93-94.
96

 reciprocation

The Tizard Mission is the most powerful example of this principle, 

of the British overtures in the period before the U.S. entered the war 

characterized in this fashion. Individuals like RADM Godfrey and He

correctly assessed that providing the U.S. with information on a non-

basis was the key to unlocking U.S. good will and cooperation. The 

depth of the technical information the British were prepared to prov

U.S. gratis had a tremendous impact on U.S. decisionmakers, positive

ing them to greater cooperation on technical matters. Similarly, the Br

ingness to share information on the German magnetic mine and to giv

preferential treatment in examining war damage, all done with no rec

from the U.S., were major factors influencing CAPT Kirk’s advocacy o

ish position. While the impact was not immediate, major exchanges, 

conducted by the Tizard Mission, made it clear to U.S. decisionmake

benefits of cooperation with the British outweighed the risks. For the 

exchanges were principally a means of compensating for weakness in 

nological development and intelligence capabilities, while for the B

exchanges were principally a means of influencing U.S. policy in th

period. 

3. Know your target

While it is true that some in the British hierarchy, even Churchill

have clearly understood the high degree to which domestic political 

ations weighed on decisionmaking by U.S. policymakers, others, like 

son, were keen observers of the American political scene. They had 

ascertained who the key decisionmakers were in the U.S. governmen

best to influence them. Today and in the future, a considered decisio

intelligence with a state that may be wary of U.S. intentions depend

understanding who the top decisionmakers are, how they are pr

toward cooperation, and who may have influence with those decision

direct access is not achievable or would be counterproductive. In th

study, Stephenson’s choice of Donovan as an interlocutor for British 

appears brilliant. Donovan was a man outside the administration, y

respected by key decisionmakers and was on friendly terms with 

cabinet members who were already predisposed to cooperate with G

ain. Since Donovan had access and was persuasive, the British cultiva

every opportunity, ensuring he carried their message to the highest lev

American government. 
97

The number and types of engagement attempts will depend large

at stake in securing a closer relationship with the target country. Fo

the stakes were national survival; consequently their engagement a

place on as many levels as possible, using a variety of forums. The 

military intelligence exchanges characterized here were just one 

multilevel effort to secure U.S. cooperation in the war. Even within 

arena, the British sought to engage at any level they could. From 

observer missions, through the ALUSNA London office, and on to 

the CNO and the Secretary of the Navy, the British sent a relative

message that they wanted U.S. support and they were willing to 

their secrets to obtain it. The types of exchanges they were willing 

are also significant. They demonstrated a willingness to share m

types of information—technical, operational, and political, for exam

ing that the more varied the forums of exchange, the more likely 

positively influence a key decisionmaker. In less desperate circum

those faced by the British, it is doubtful that any country would eng

wide-ranging exchange of secret information. 

5. Openness and candor are essential for building trust

Granted, this is an obvious point, but one which was vital to est

cooperative relationship between the U.S. and the UK. Kirk, Ghor

van, and numerous others marveled at the openness and frankness o

in discussing their war situation and in the provision of secret inform

were looking for any sign that the British were once again poised 

Americans as junior partners, which had aggravated many during th

as they felt the British had often been less than candid on many issue

who has been seen by some as very pro-British, due to his advoca

cooperation with them, was extremely wary of the information he r

the British. Repeated instances of British openness and candor, thoug

U.S. distrust sufficiently to enable the cooperative relationship betw

countries. 

6. Be mindful of the target’s concerns about the relationship

Despite all their efforts, the British were still prone to miscalcu

how some of their overtures would be perceived by the American

point was Godfrey’s visit, during which he attempted to get the U

some of the same interdepartmental intelligence organizations tha

possessed. Godfrey’s efforts demonstrated a lack of understanding 

political landscape and American sensitivities about being told by the 

to run their affairs. Godfrey should have borne in mind the experienc
98

tion of interdepartmental intelligence coordination and the pressures 

conflict, they still had problems making the JIC function effectively e

into the war. Either naiveté or hubris on their part had led them to 

American intelligence system to adopt a similar system on their recomm

Had the British been more sensitive to U.S. perceptions of them and t

can concerns about the relationship, they would have realized that reco

tions on how to organize the U.S. war effort were bound to generate 

resentment. Waiting until the relationship was more mature and on sur

would have been more appropriate and effective, given the level of U.

over British attempts to dominate their partnership.

Remaining Questions

Although numerous studies address this period, as documented in th

raphy attached to this work, some questions remain to be explored. 

1. Why did BGEN Strong make the offer to share SIGINT inform

the British during the Standardization of Arms Talks? At what level was 

sion authorized? Why was the Navy not informed of the offer befo

made?

2. How influential were Kirk’s attaché reports? While it is obviou

DNI, RADM Anderson, and the CNO, ADM Stark, read Kirk’s reports

indications that the Secretary of the Navy and the President read them 

Although we do know that Kirk’s reputation was overwhelmingly pos

much credibility was given to his attaché reporting concerning Grea

chances for survival after the fall of France?

3. What was the exact nature of the relationship between William Ste

BSC and the U.S. Navy? Did ONI realize that information it was recei

the FBI originated with the BSC? When did ONI begin cooperating wit

and what were their impressions of the organization? Other than Ste

connections with Donovan and Knox and the cooperation between ON

BSC in counterintelligence efforts, did the BSC attempt to influe

Department policies through any other overt or covert mechanisms?

4. What was the full extent of information exchanged through the Jo

Committee mechanism? Which side benefited more from the exchang

mation through that mechanism—the British or the Americans?
99

Evidence clearly shows that the “special relationship” that develo

the U.S. and the UK during World War II had its antecedents in 

period and came about as a result of aggressive tactics on the part of 

obtain that relationship as part of their overall effort to secure U.S

their war effort. While not necessarily a well-coordinated effort, it w

and occurred on numerous levels, particularly in the period from 

World War II through the Pearl Harbor attack. The British were able 

on a period of shared national interest with the U.S. to secure their o

overcome the inherent tensions in their relationship with America

gence-sharing relationship survived the war and has been unpreced

its longevity and its depth. This study bears lessons for present-da

policymakers who may wish to foster intelligence-sharing arrang

states that have had historically inimical or competitive ties with Am

101

ABC-1 American-British-Canadian Staff Talks

ALUSNA American Legation, U.S. Naval Attaché, London

London

BGEN Brigadier General

BSC British Security Coordination

CAPT Captain, Navy

CDR Commander

COI Coordinator of Information (U.S.)

COMINT Communications Intelligence

CSS Central Security Service (British)

DCI Director, Central Intelligence (U.S.)

DNC Director of Naval Communication (U.S.)

DNI Director of Naval Intelligence (U.S. and British)

FECB Far East Combined Bureau (British)

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

GC&CS Government Code and Cipher School (British); a

known as Bletchley Park

HF/DF High Frequency/Direction Finding

HUMINT Human Intelligence

IC Intelligence Community

JIC Joint Intelligence Committee (British)

JPS Joint Planning Staff

JSM Joint Staff Mission (British)

MAGIC Decrypted PURPLE Intercepts

MGEN Major General
102

Counterintelligence

MID Military Intelligence Division (both U.S. and British

NA National Archives

NHC Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard

NID Naval Intelligence Division (British)

NSA National Security Agency (U.S.)

OIC Operational Intelligence Center (British)

ONI Office of Naval Intelligence 

OPINTEL Operational Intelligence

OSS Office of Strategic Services (U.S.)

PCO Passport Control Office (British)

PURPLE Japanese Diplomatic Code

RADM Rear Admiral

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

SIS Secret Intelligence Service; also known as MI6 (Bri

Overseas Clandestine HUMINT Service

SOE Special Operations Executive (British)

Station CAST U.S. SIGINT Station at Corregidor in the Philippine

VADM Vice Admiral
103

A NOTE ON SOURCES

Archival sources for this paper were primarily found in three re

the Washington DC area—The Naval Historical Center at the Wash

Yard; The National Archives, both the College Park, Maryland and 

DC branches; and the Special Collections section at the United 

Academy Library. Of these, the Naval Historical Center (NHC) h

extensive collection of relevant material. The most significant set of 

the Papers of Alan Goodrich Kirk. Kirk, in his role as the U.S. Nav

London, was in a pivotal position during a critical juncture in U.S.-U

His detailed reports to his superior, DNI RADM Walter S. Anderson

clearest indication of England’s attempts to court U.S. support for th

and also illustrate the underlying tensions in the U.S.-UK rela

worked against cooperation. The NHC also contains The Reminisce

Goodrich Kirk, which are part of the Columbia University Oral Hist

and contain many of VADM Kirk’s observations and recollectio

period under review. His reminiscences are very consistent with 

records found in his papers, and the personal insights he provide

depth and clarity to some of the issues identified in his official report

period.

Another valuable source at the NHC is the Papers of ADM Har

addition to the Plan Dog Memo, ADM Stark’s papers contain numer

personal and official correspondence from this period that clearly i

thinking of this key decisionmaker. Other important sources at the N

the Papers of Royal E. Ingersoll, The Reminiscences of RADM Royal 

and the Papers of Frank Knox. Ingersoll’s papers and reminisce

amplifying details on the mission he undertook to London in early 

Knox’s papers contain the text of his speeches that illustrate his think

ing support for the British war effort.

At The National Archives (NA), the operational archives of the N

the correspondence files of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). 

spondence files, which are housed at the Washington, DC branch 

proved helpful in illuminating some aspects of naval intelligence coo

technical exchange forums such as the Tizard Mission and the Stand

Arms Talks. The College Park, MD branch of the NA contains a co

the ALUSNA London correspondence concerning exchange of info

the Joint Bailey Committee. Finding other relevant source material a

a difficult process for two reasons. First, the NA staff is still engage

ing material recently transferred from the NHC. Unlike the collec
104

currently no detailed finding aids developed for the NAs newer acquisi

ond, records are, for the most part, split along chronological lines a

Materials dated prior to 1940 are housed in the Washington DC b

records post-1940 are held at the College Park facility. Future resea

advised to work closely with a naval archivist to ascertain the location, 

availability of the records at the NA.

The Naval Academy Library also proved a good source of prima

material. In particular, the Library houses a special collections room w

tains reminiscences of individuals, such as RADM Arthur H. McCo

conducted the intelligence exchange visit to the UK in the late summe

In addition to providing information on this visit, McCollum’s reminis

full of useful insights concerning the U.S. naval establishment during t

Another significant source of information held at the Naval Academy i

Planning in the U.S. Navy: Its Evolution and Execution 1891-1945, a 

resource which contains many of the primary-source documents relat

significant events as the Ingersoll Mission in 1938, the Standardizatio

Talks in 1940, and the American-British-Canadian (ABC-1) Staff Talk

The Library also houses bound collections of relevant primary-sourc

related to foreign policy from the Office of the President, Frankl

Roosevelt. In addition to documents related to U.S.-UK relations, th

collections contain correspondence between Roosevelt and his Secret

Navy, Frank Knox, and with the CNO during this period, ADM St

which is helpful for understanding the ongoing dialogue between Roo

his advisors. These papers demonstrate how Roosevelt was committed 

Great Britain for U.S. national security reasons, but they also reveal h

factor domestic political constraints and the desire to retain equality w

Britain were in his decisionmaking. Additionally, the Library contains a 

collection of the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United Sta

collections were instrumental for understanding some of the points 

between the two countries, such as colonialism, while also illuminatin

tors that led to the strategic rapprochement between the two countries i

1930s. 

Finally, The London Journal of General Raymond E. Lee, 1940-19

by James Leutze and also found at the Naval Academy Library, can 

overlooked, but is an outstanding primary source for understanding th

Lee was the Army attaché in London at the same time as Kirk, and hi

the situation offer a useful contrast with those provided by Kirk and oth
105

MAJOR EVENTS IN U.S.-UK INTELLIGENCE COOPER

107

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Subject File: From Bailey Committee thru Bolero. Record Group 31

370, Row 30, Compartment 1, Shelf 05, NN3-38-90-3. National Arc

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Papers of Alan G. Kirk. Operational Archives Branch, Naval Histo

Washington, DC.

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CDR Florence is a career naval officer who served tours in engine

tions, and combat systems as a Surface Warfare Officer before tra

Naval Intelligence. In his intelligence tours, he has served as the 

officer for an electronic reconnaissance squadron in Japan, as an 

Squadron Intelligence Officer, and most recently in the Joint Staff J2 

Directorate) at the Pentagon. He is now Head of the Current Readin

and Fleet Support Department at U.S. Fleet Forces Command in N

ginia. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1988 with B.

History and English, and from the Joint Military Intelligence College 

ter’s of Science of Strategic Intelligence in 2003. His interest in e

pre-WWII UK/U.S. intelligence relationship stemmed from his lov

and diplomatic history and his desire to look for lessons from the pa

be applied to today’s national security challenges.

115

A

ABC-1 Talks 41, 57, 74-75, 78-82, 85

Admiralty Operational Intelligence Center (OIC) 8, 12, 52-53, 89-92

American Legation, United States Naval

Attache’, London (ALUSNA London) 7, 9, 26, 34, 43-56, 62, 70, 7

Anderson, Rear Admiral Walter S. 45, 49-50, 52-55, 65-66

Anti-colonialism 15, 20, 37-38, 87

Astor, Vincent 58

Atlantic, Battle of 2

B

Bailey Committee Report 74-78, 95

Bailey, Admiral Sir Sydney 74

Beesly, Patrick 8-9, 19, 35, 47

Benson, Admiral William S. 17

Bombes 84

Boom defense-arresting gear deal 45-47

Bowen, Rear Admiral H. G. 65-66

British intelligence 1, 10-14

British Passport Control Officer 58

British security concerns 15-16, 23, 47-49, 64

British Security Coordination (BSC) 13, 57-60

British strategic weakness 26, 30, 35-36, 40, 78, 85

Bush, Doctor Vannevar 66

C

Central Security Service 61-62

Chamberlain, Neville 51

Churchill, Sir Winston 18, 51, 53, 62, 64, 69, 82, 90, 96

Colby, Bainbridge 22

Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Center 10

Commander, Naval Forces Europe 81

Coordinator of Information 4, 7, 62

Counterespionage 2, 4, 23, 58-59

Counterintelligence 2, 5, 10, 23, 58-59, 62

Currier, Ensign Prescott 84

Curzon, Lord 22
116

Davis, Norman 28-30

Denniston, Commander Alistair 13, 83, 90

Destroyers-for-Bases Deal 39, 61-62, 73

Director of Naval Communications, OP-20-G 7, 9, 82

Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) 5-6, 9, 15, 45, 65-66, 78, 88

Donovan, Colonel William “Wild Bill” 60-63, 69, 71, 89, 96

E

Eden, Anthony 31-32

Embick, Major General S. D. 78

Emmons, Major General C. 71

Enigma 82-83, 90

F

Far East Combined Bureau (FECB) 13, 86-87

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 2, 6, 58-59

Fleming, Commander Ian 89

Friedman, William 82-83, 91

G

Ghormley, Rear Admiral Robert L. 35-36, 40, 71-82, 97

Godfrey, Rear Admiral John 43-44, 47-49, 51-56, 63, 68, 82, 86, 87-92

Government Code & Cypher Service (GC&CS) - 

Bletchley Park 10-11, 13, 83-84, 90

H

Hall, Rear Admiral Sir Reginald “Blinker” 8, 17

Halsey, Admiral William “Bull” 46

Hampton, Commander T.C., mission to U.S. 35-36, 72

Hart, Admiral T.C. 40, 77

Hill, Archibald Vivian (A. V.) 63, 68

Hinsley, Francis 1, 10, 13

Holmes, Rear Admiral Ralston 6

Hoover, J. Edgar 58

Hull, Cordell 28-31

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) 2, 7, 10, 12, 60-61, 88
117

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) 12, 81

Ingersoll Mission 30-34, 79, 95

Ingersoll, Rear Admiral Royall 26, 31-34, 41

Isolationism 23, 28, 30, 33, 38-39, 40, 58-59, 85

J

Japanese threat 4, 6-7, 18-19, 21, 25, 27, 28-31, 35, 41, 79, 86, 95

Joint Bailey Committee 74-78

Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (JIC) 11-12, 88, 98

Joint Planning Staff 11

Joint Staff Mission 80, 88

K

Kennedy, Joseph P. 60-61

King, Fleet Admiral Ernest 19

Kirk, Vice Admiral Alan 

Goodrich 5, 9, 43-45, 47-56, 60, 62, 66, 70-71, 75-76, 78, 88-89, 9

Knone, Colonel Hayes 89

Knox, Frank 19, 37, 39-41, 58, 60, 62, 66-68, 82, 93

L

Leahy, Admiral William D. 6, 8, 31, 35-36, 38, 40

Lee, Colonel Raymond 71, 89

Lend-Lease 78, 81, 85

Lessons for the U.S. Intelligence Community 93-98

Lindsay, Sir Ronald 31

Lockwood, Captain Charles P. 81

London Naval Conference, 1930 18, 25, 28

London Naval Conference, 1935 25, 27-30, 95

M

“MAGIC” 9, 82

Mahan, Alfred Thayer 17

McCollum, Commander Arthur 91

Menzies, Sir Stewart 11, 82, 90

Mesopotamia 21-22

Military Intelligence Division (U.S.) 2, 59
118

National Defense Research Council (NDRC) 66, 68

Naval Arms Limitation 18, 25-26, 30

Naval Intelligence Division (NID) 8, 12

Naval Research Laboratory 65

Naval War College 19

Niblack, Captain Albert P. 15

Norden bombsight 34, 66

O

Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) 2-10, 13, 59-60, 76, 88, 92

Office of Strategic Services 4, 62

Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL) 8, 12, 32, 52-53, 81, 90-92

ORANGE (Japan) 19

P

Paget, Sir James 58

Panay Incident 31, 35

“Plan Dog” memorandum 40, 70, 77-78

Political Warfare Executive 10, 62-63

Pound, Admiral Sir Dudley 64, 68, 74, 92

Propaganda 53, 58-59

“Purple” 3, 82-83

Q

Quackenbush, Lieutenant Robert S. 81

Quid pro quo, as policy 27, 34, 45-47, 50-52, 57-58, 63-68, 95-96

R

RAINBOW FIVE 41

Roosevelt, Franklin

Delano 3, 28, 31, 37-39, 41, 50, 55, 58, 60-62, 69-70, 73, 79, 82, 85, 9

S

San Remo Agreement, 1920 21

Secret Intelligence Service (SIS - MI6) 10-11, 13, 58-60, 62, 87-88

Security 4, 59

Security Service (MI5) 10, 58
119

(SIGINT) 2-3, 7, 10, 13, 17, 36, 47, 52, 72-73, 76, 80-84, 86-88, 90

Sims, Admiral William 8, 17

Sinclair, Admiral “Q” 11

Singapore 30, 34, 79

Sinkov Mission 82-84, 86

Sinkov, Abraham 83

Special Naval Observer (SPECNO), London 40, 71, 81

Special Operations Executive (SOE) 2-3, 10, 58, 87-88

“special relationship” vii, 15, 99

Standardization of Arms Talks 67, 69-74, 95

Stark, Admiral Harold “Betty” 8, 37, 40-42, 70, 74, 77-78, 93

Station CAST 7, 13, 86

Stephenson, Sir William 13, 58-61, 89, 96

Strong, Brigadier General G. V. 71

T

Thompson Case 6

Tizard Mission 55, 64-69, 71, 96

Tizard, Sir Henry 63-68, 96

Turner, Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly 8, 41, 78-79

U

U.S. domestic politics, impacts on foreign

policy 29, 33, 37-39, 48, 50, 59, 61, 69, 78, 93

U.S. intelligence 1-4, 23

U.S. naval attaches 4, 6, 26, 43, 77-86

U.S. Neutrality Laws 22-23, 38, 59, 62

U.S.-British Naval Rivalry 15-20

V

Vinson, Carl 31

W

Warren Harding 18

Washington Naval Conference, 1920-21 18, 25

Welles, Sumner 31
120

Willson, Captain Russell 32-35, 44-45

Wilson, Woodrow 17

Wilsonian Idealism 20-21

World War I vii, 2-3, 8, 12, 16-19, 37, 70

Y

Yarnell, Admiral Harry E. 30, 38

“Y” Signals 13

Z

Zacharias, Rear Admiral Ellis 5
With a Foreword by

Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN (Ret.)

Former Director of Naval Intelligence

TING A RELUCTANT ALLY

JOINT

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CO

LLEGE

1962

JOINT

M

ILITARY INTELLIGENCE C

O

LLEGE

1962