COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Ha ley and Senior Judge Coleman

TAWANDA EVANS SAUNDERS MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 0619-07-2 PER CURIAM AUGUST 21, 2007 CHARLOTTE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF CHARLOTTE COUNTY Leslie M. Osborn, Judge (James C. Bell, on brief), for appellant. (Michael J. Brickhill; Brandon G. Hudson, Guardian ad litem for the minor child, on brief), for appellee.

Tawanda E. Saunders contends the evidence was insufficient to support the termination of her parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C). Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the trial judge’s decisi on. Rule 5A:27. Background When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevai ling party below and grant to it al l reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991 ). So viewed, the evidence establishe d that Saunders gave birth to her child on July 16, 2005 at a motel. Saunders and the child were transporte d to a hospital where she and her newborn child tested positive for cocaine. When a social worker investigated a complaint

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - of abuse and neglect of the child , who tested positive for cocaine at birth, Saunders denied using cocaine but said she had smoked a cigarette that tasted “str ange” and had smoked marijuana about two weeks prior to her ch ild’s birth. Saunders said she ha d obtained no prenatal care and was unaware that she was pregnant. After the Charlotte Co unty Department of Social Services petitione d for an adjudication of abuse against Saunders and the is suance of a child protective order, Saunders and the Department entered into a “safety plan.” Saunders agreed she and the newborn would live with Saunders’s grandmother, who would provide supervision. Saunde rs also agreed not to leave the house with the child unless accompanied by her grandmother and to re frain from drug use. In addition Saunders and her grandmother entered into a “plan of care agreement” with the Department, requiring Saunders’s grandmother to supervise Saunders and the chil d and requiring Saunders to obtain mental health and substance abuse evaluations and treatment. On July 22 , 2005, the juvenile and domestic relations district court found that the child was abused or neglected as a result of the child’s positive cocaine test at birth and incorpor ated into the child prot ective order this “safety plan” and “plan of care agreement.” During the next two months, Saunders remained unemployed and had no apparent income. Saunders made inaccurate reports to the Department . When confronted with the inaccuracy of her report that she was enroll ed in community college, Saunders said she was enrolled in a “satellite” class, a claim that also proved to be inaccurate. Saunders also pr ovided incomplete information to her therapist who was comp leting Saunders’s mental health and substance abuse evaluations. When the Department had difficulty contacting Saunde rs, her grandmother reported that Saunders was staying out all night and sometimes had her child with her while she was out. On September 23, 2005, Saunders again test ed positive for cocaine.- 3 - As a result of the positive cocai ne test and Saunders’s lack of cooperation with services, the Department obtained an order from the juvenile cour t to remove the child from Saunders’s custody. The Department placed the child in foster care on October 4, 2 005. The initial fo ster care plan had concurrent goals of return hom e and placement with relatives. The Department continued to provide services to Saunders. A “parent aide” was provided for up to thirty hours a month to instruct Saunders on child rearing matters. The aide was unsuccessful in helping Sa unders with budgeting because Saunders was no t forthcoming about her income and expenses. Saun ders admitted to the aide that she intended to li ve with her grandmother and that she did not intend to obtain her own living space unless her grandmother evicted her. After four months, the aide discontinued providing in-h ome parenting services fo r lack of progress. Saunders also cancelled many mental health ther apy sessions that were offered her and failed to participate meaningfully. When these services we re unsuccessful, an in-h ome therapist was offered but Saunders was untruthful about basic matters dir ectly affecting the child. Because no rapport or trust could be established with Saunders, the ther apist opined that Saunde rs was unable to make meaningful progress. When this service wa s unsuccessful, Dr. Michel e Nelson conducted a parenting assessment, but she also reported Saunde rs was untruthful and co mpromised the validity of any evaluation. Dr. Nelson concluded that Saunders’s “insight and judgment were obviously poor” and that her “inability to take responsibility for her statements an d behavior” created a difficult situation. In addition to her minimal cooperation with these service providers and failure to make any substantial progress, Saunders fa iled to cooperate in five attemp ts to obtain th e random drug screening sample. On the last attempt, Saunders provided a samp le that tested negative. However, because of suspicious circumstances surrounding that sample, the social worker tried to obtain another sample the next day. Saunders refused.- 4 - Saunders continued to have no apparent sour ce of income, no veri fiable enrollment for education, and a suspended drive r’s license leaving her dependant on others for transportation. Because of Saunders’s lack of progress, the Depart ment pursued the goal of placing the child with relatives. One suitable relative wa s found, and the child was placed with that rela tive from late December 2005 until early April 2006. At the rela tive’s request, the Depa rtment terminated the placement and found no other suita ble relatives. The ch ild was placed in a fo ster home, where the foster mother indicated a willingness to se rve as an adoptive pl acement for the child. The trial judge found that the mother’s untruthfulness interfered with her meaningful cooperation with the agencies at tempting to reunite her with th e child, that her untruthfulness interfered with the mother’s meanin gful future planning for the chil d, and that the mother had made no substantial steps toward s establishing permanency for the child. The trial judge also ruled that the Department had carried its burden by clear and convincing evidence of proving the elements of Code § 16.1-283(B) and § 16.1 -283(C). Analysis When considering term ination of a parent’s residual rights to a child, “the paramount consideration of a trial court is th e child’s best interests.” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 12 8, 409 S.E.2d at 463. When the trial judge makes fi ndings “based on evidence heard ore tenus , [those findings] will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wron g or without evidence to support it.” Id. On review, we will presume the tria l judge “thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best interest s.” Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S. E.2d 794, 795 (1990). Code § 16.1-283(B) provides that a court may terminate a parent’s rights to neglected or abused children if the cour t finds by clear and convi ncing evidence that it is in the children’s best interests and that (1) the neglect or abuse presented a substantial threat to the child ren’s life, health,- 5 - and development, and (2) it is unlikely that the cond itions that result ed in the neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated such that th e children can return to their parent’s care within a reasonable period of time. Co de § 16.1-283(C) provide s that residual parental rights may be terminated if the judge fi nds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child’s best interests and (1) that the parent has failed to maintain cont inuing contact with and substantially plan for the child’s future within six months of the child’s plac ement in foster care notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate services offered to the pa rent and (2) that the parent has been “unwilling or unable” to remedy substantially the conditions which le d to the child’s placement in foster care. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) also requires proof that “r easonable and appropriate” services have been offered to help the parent “substantially remedy th e conditions which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement ” and that, despite these services , the parent has failed, “without good cause,” to re medy those conditions “withi n a reasonable amou nt of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child was placed in foster care.” The Department proved that te rmination of Saunders’s parental rights was in he r child’s best interest. Although the child tested positive for co caine at birth, Saunders denied using cocaine though she too tested po sitive. Saunders admitte d using marijuana two we eks before her child’s birth. Despite the numerous servi ces the Department offered her, Sa unders made no progress due to her refusal to cooperate and her untruthfulness. Her untruthf ulness about matters relating to her child interfered with effort s by various agencies trying to help her reunite with her child. Saunders made no plans for the child’s future, she remained unemployed, and she said she planned to obtain adequate housing only if and when her grandmother evicted her. Despite the many services offered, Saunders again tested positive fo r cocaine. She demo nstrated an unwillingne ss or inability to change the circumstances that nece ssitated her child’s placement in fo ster care within a reasonable amount of time. Thus, the evid ence proved Saunders’s conduct pr esented a serious and substantial- 6 - threat to the child’s health and de velopment. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find ou t when, or even if, a pa rent will be capable of resuming his responsi bilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 49 2, 495 (1990). The record supports the trial judge’s findi ng that the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that Saun ders’s parental rights should be terminated pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C) and that the termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Accordingly, we summarily a ffirm the judgm ent. See Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.