J-A29017-14 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

RODNEY ALLEN WILLIAMS, 

 Appellant No. 1902 WDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered August 2, 2013, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-07-CR-0002700-2011 

and CP-07-CR-0001025-2012 

BEFORE: BOWES, ALLEN, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 07, 2014 

 Rodney Allen Williams (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty at Docket No. 2700-2011 of 

possession with intent to deliver cocaine, and at Docket No. 1025-2012 of 

three counts of possession with intent to deliver cocaine, and one count each 

of dealing in proceeds of unlawful activity, corrupt organizations, criminal 

conspiracy to deliver, criminal use of a communication facility, and criminal 

attempt. We affirm. 

The pertinent facts may be summarized as follows: Between July and 

November of 2011, agents from the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney 

General’s Bureau of Narcotics Investigation and Drug Control (“NIDC”) 

conducted a series of controlled purchases of cocaine and intercepted 
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numerous telephone calls from the telephone of an individual named 

Jermaine Samuel, in which Mr. Samuel arranged the purchase, delivery, and 

sale of cocaine between Altoona, Pennsylvania and Baltimore, Maryland. 

Affidavit of Probable Cause, 11/4/11; N.T., 5/6/13, at 178-205; N.T., 

5/7/13, at 32-161; N.T., 5/8/13, at 1-110. In collaboration with the 

Pennsylvania NIDC agents, members of the Baltimore City Police 

Department traced the telephone number of one of the recipients of 

Jermaine Samuel’s telephone calls to the area of Thornfield Avenue in 

Maryland, where they conducted physical and electronic surveillance. N.T., 

5/9/13, at 84-87. By monitoring and tracking telephone records and 

telephone signals as well as the suspects’ physical movements, the agents 

developed a belief that Appellant, who resided on Thornfield Avenue, was 

involved in drug trafficking with Jermaine Samuel. N.T., 5/9/13, at 84-87. 

Maryland police officers then subjected Appellant to a traffic stop in an effort 

to verify his identity by viewing his driver’s license. N.T., 5/9/13, at 84-87. 

Based on the foregoing electronic phone tracking and physical surveillance, 

Appellant was arrested and charged with the aforementioned crimes. 

Officers additionally identified several other people involved in drug 

trafficking with Jermaine Samuel, including Natasha Miller, Shonda Hicks, 

Damion Floyd, Brian Stroh, Lieesha Samuel Green, Glenn Piner, Stephen 

Piner and Kenneth Piner. Testimony at trial indicated that Jermaine Samuel 

distributed cocaine from the Corner Bar in Altoona, Pennsylvania, that 

Appellant supplied him with cocaine from Baltimore, and Damion Floyd 
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facilitated the purchases of cocaine and its transportation to Altoona, while 

Shonda Hicks and Natasha Miller were involved in driving the cocaine and 

money between Baltimore and Altoona. N.T., 5/9/13, at 157-159. Steven 

and Kenneth Piner participated in distributing the cocaine obtained from 

Jermaine Samuel. N.T., 5/6/13, at 112-113. 

The jury trial commenced on May 6, 2013, and on May 10, 2013, the 

jury rendered its verdicts. The trial court convened a sentencing hearing on 

August 2, 2013, when it sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 

imprisonment of 22 to 44 years. Appellant filed timely post-sentence 

motions, which the trial court denied on November 14, 2013. This appeal 

followed. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925. 

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal: 

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

APPELLANT RODNEY WILLIAMS’ SEVERAL MOTIONS FOR 

MISTRIAL AFTER THE COMMONWEALTH INTENTIONALLY 

ELICITED INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE REGARDING 

APPELLANT’S PRIOR CRIMINAL HISTORY THROUGH AGENT 

ALBERT ADAMS’ TESTIMONY. 

II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL BASED ON THE 

COMMONWEALTH’S IMPROPER STATEMENT DURING 

CLOSING ARGUMENT THAT THE JURY SHOULD “SEND A 

MESSAGE” BY RETURNING A GUILTY VERDICT. 

III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS ALL THE EVIDENCE 

OBTAINED FROM THE TRAFFIC STOP OF APPELLANT THAT 

WAS CONDUCTED AS PART OF A MANUFACTURED RUSE 
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AND UNDER FALSE PRETENSES FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE 

OF ASCERTAINING HIS IDENTIFICATION IN ORDER TO 

UNDERTAKE THE INVESTIGATION THAT ULTIMATELY LED 

TO THE CRIMINAL CHARGES FILED AGAINST APPELLANT. 

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

 In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying 

his motion for a mistrial after the Commonwealth intentionally elicited 

inadmissible testimony regarding Appellant’s prior criminal history. 

Appellant’s Brief at 15-16. Our Supreme Court recently explained: 

A trial court is required to grant a mistrial only where the alleged 

prejudicial event may reasonably be said to have deprived the 

defendant of a fair and impartial trial. It is well-settled that the 

review of a trial court's denial of a motion for a mistrial is limited 

to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. 

An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if 

in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or 

the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result 

of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will ... discretion is abused. A 

trial court may grant a mistrial only where the incident upon 

which the motion is based is of such a nature that its 

unavoidable effect is to deprive the defendant of a fair trial by 

preventing the jury from weighing and rendering a true verdict. 

A mistrial is not necessary where cautionary instructions are 

adequate to overcome prejudice. 

Commonwealth v. Fortenbaugh, 69 A.3d 191, 193 (Pa. 2013) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Appellant takes issue with the testimony elicited by the 

Commonwealth from NIDC Agent Albert Adams, when questioned about 

Appellant’s interaction with Damion Floyd, who was incarcerated at SCI 

Camp Hill. Specifically, Appellant challenges the following testimony: 
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Deputy Attorney General: With regards to these various 

individuals, as far as Shawn and 

Rocco, [Appellant] and Jermaine 

Samuel, would they, quote, have 

been allowed to visit Mr. Floyd in 

prison? 

Agent Adams: They wouldn’t have been able to. 

If you’re a prisoner ... Some of the 

restrictions in place as a state 

prisoner, if you have criminal 

histories or prior felony arrests, 

etc., they restrict you from 

visiting people in there.

N.T., 5/6/13, at 188 (emphasis added). 

Appellant’s counsel objected and requested a mistrial, asserting that a 

curative instruction would serve only to highlight the statement, that the 

prejudice was incurable, and that a mistrial was the only remedy. N.T., 

5/7/13, at 2-20. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion for a mistrial, 

explaining that it “believe[d] the jury can follow a curative instruction” and 

that “the more specific the curative instruction the more likely that the jury 

will understand the instruction ... and follow it correctly.” Id. at 27. The 

trial court then issued the following curative instruction: 

Ladies and gentlemen, let me be clear to you. Yesterday, [the 

Commonwealth] asked this question: with regards to these 

various individuals as far as Shawn and Rocco, [Appellant] and 

Jermaine Samuel, would they, quote, have been allowed to visit 

Mr. Floyd in prison. The response by Agent Adams was: They 

wouldn’t have been able to. If you are a prisoner, some of the 

restrictions in place as a state prisoner, you have a criminal 

history or prior felony arrest, etc. they restrict you from visiting 

people in there. Ladies and gentlemen, both the question and 

the answer were improper and yesterday I should not have 

allowed them to be entered into the record. You may not 
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consider either the question or the response at all from this point 

forward. 

N.T, 5/7/13, at 31-32. 

Appellant argues that Agent Adams’ statement directly and 

unmistakably informed the jury that Appellant had a criminal history, and 

was therefore highly prejudicial and warranted a mistrial. Appellant’s Brief 

at 17-20. Appellant maintains that the prejudice could not be cured by the 

trial court’s curative instruction, and asserts that Appellant thus was 

deprived of a fair trial. Id. In rebutting this assertion, the trial court 

offered the following rationale: 

Agent Adams’ testimony was ... a passing reference 

to Appellant’s criminal activity. A mere passing reference 

to [Appellant] having “some dealings” with the police 

department does not necessarily indicate a prior criminal 

record. Commonwealth v. Banks, 521 A.2d 1 (1987). 

As such, Agent Adams’ statement was not so prejudicial 

that a curative instruction could not remove the taint of 

such reference. 

[The trial court] chose the route of a curative 

instruction to cure any lingering prejudice. A mistrial is 

not automatically required if the inference of prior 

criminality was innocuous and an effective curative

instruction was immediately given. Commonwealth v. 

Bruner, 564 A.2d 1277 (Pa. Super. 1989). All the 

circumstances must be considered in determining whether 

an instruction can cure the exposure of improper evidence 

to the jury. Commonwealth v. Richardson, 437 A.2d 

1162, 165 (1981). This includes examining whether the 

Commonwealth intentionally elicited the remark and 

exploited the reference, whether a responsive answer was 

given, and whether significant curative instructions were 

given. Commonwealth v. Gaerttner, 484 A.2d 92 (Pa. 

Super. 1984). The curative instructions must be clear and 

specific and instruct the jury to disregard the improper 
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evidence. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 955 A.2d 1031, 

1034 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

... The Commonwealth did not exploit the reference 

to Appellant’s prior criminal history throughout the 

remainder of trial. 

The [trial court] determined that a curative 

instruction was appropriate [and] on the morning of the 

second day of trial, the [trial court] instructed the jury – 

not once but twice – not to consider either the question or 

answer regarding Appellant’s visiting privileges. 

*** 

The [trial court] emphasizes that although the 

Commonwealth elicited the testimony on direct 

examination at the end of the first day of the trial, 

Appellant’s counsel reiterated this information in his 

closing argument. You’ve got the Attorney General who 

knowingly asked the question that you were told to 

disregard in violation of just about everything we stand 

for. [N.T., 5/10/13 at 32-33]. In response, the [trial 

court] issued an additional curative instruction during 

closing jury instructions: 

Ladies and gentlemen, I was not going to 

bring this back up, but because [Appellant’s 

counsel] included it in his closing, I am 

repeating what I told you Tuesday morning ... 

You may not consider that question. You may 

not consider the answer. It was inappropriate 

evidence to be put before you. You cannot do 

that. You just simply can’t. If you would do 

that, it would be improper and you would not 

be doing your responsibilities correctly. Ladies 

and gentlemen, if there is any juror that 

cannot follow that instruction, I need you to 

tell me right now. Is there anybody who 

cannot follow it? Again, you cannot consider 

the question or answer of that at all. 

 [N.T., 5/10/13, at 81-82.] 
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Appellant should not benefit from the acts of his counsel in 

reviving Agent Adams’ prejudicial remark. The [trial court] 

issued several clear and specific curative instructions to disregard 

both [the Commonwealth’s] question and Agent Albert Adams’ 

prejudicial answer; these multiple curative instructions were 

capable of removing any taint caused by the passing reference to 

Appellant’s prior criminal history. Furthermore, the law presumes 

that the jury will follow the [trial court’s] curative instructions; 

consequently, a mistrial was not warranted. Commonwealth v. 

Spotz, 896 A.2d 1191, 1224 (Pa. 2006). 

 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/14/13, at 5-11. 

We have explained that a mistrial may be warranted when a juror 

could reasonably infer from the facts presented that the accused had 

engaged in prior criminal activity. Commonwealth v. Parker, 957 A.2d 

311, 319 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 

“When the statement at issue relates to a reference to past criminal 

behavior, [t]he nature of the reference and whether the remark was 

intentionally elicited by the Commonwealth are considerations relevant to 

the determination of whether a mistrial is required.” Id. “A singular, 

passing reference to prior criminal activity is usually not sufficient to show 

that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion 

for a mistrial. When the trial court provides cautionary instructions to the 

jury in the event the defense raises a motion for mistrial, [t]he law 

presumes that the jury will follow the instructions of the court.” Id. Thus, 

“[i]n a criminal case, the possible prejudicial effect of a witness's reference 

to prior criminal conduct of the defendant may, under certain circumstances, 
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be removed by an immediate cautionary instruction to the jury.” 

Commonwealth v. Richardson, 437 A.2d 1162, 1164 (Pa. 1981). 

Here, Appellant argues that the challenged statement by Agent Adams 

was deliberately elicited and unmistakably informed the jury about 

Appellant’s criminal history. Appellant challenges the Commonwealth’s 

question to Agent Adams as to “[whether] Shawn and Rocco, [Appellant] 

and Jermaine Samuel would ... have been allowed to visit Mr. Floyd in 

prison?” to which Agent Adams responded: “They wouldn’t be able to. ... [I]f 

you have criminal histories or prior felony arrests ... they restrict you from 

visiting people in there.” N.T., 5/6/13, at 188. Although the reference to 

Appellant’s prior criminal history was made in response to a question by the 

Commonwealth, the record does not indicate that the reference was 

deliberately elicited to establish Appellant’s prior record. Additionally, the 

agent’s comment that in general individuals with criminal histories cannot 

visit prisons did not implicate Appellant alone as having a criminal record, 

and the Commonwealth did not thereafter attempt to exploit the single 

reference to highlight Appellant’s criminal history.

1

More importantly, the curative instructions issued by the trial court –

both at the time the challenged statements were made and again during 

____________________________________________ 

1As the trial court observed, it is significant that Appellant’s counsel, during 

closing arguments, emphasized to the jury that the Commonwealth 

“knowingly asked [a] question that you were told to disregard in violation of 

just about everything we stand for”, and that in so doing, Appellant sought 

to capitalize on the statement he now challenges. N.T., 5/10/13, at 32-33. 
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closing arguments – were direct, unequivocal, and strong, informing the jury 

that they were not to consider Agent Adams’ statement, and were sufficient 

to expunge any taint and assure Appellant a fair trial. Under the 

circumstances of this case, and for the above reasons, we find no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court's determination that Agent Adams’ testimony did 

not warrant a mistrial. 

 In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion for a mistrial based on the Commonwealth’s statement 

during closing argument that the jury should “send a message” by returning 

a guilty verdict. Appellant’s Brief at 26-29. In considering such a claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct, once again, our standard of review is limited to 

whether the trial court abused its discretion. “It is within the discretion of 

the trial court to determine whether a defendant has been prejudiced by 

misconduct or impropriety to the extent that a mistrial is warranted.” 

Commonwealth v. Baez, 720 A.2d 711, 729 (1998). “Not every unwise 

remark on a prosecutor’s part constitutes reversible error. Indeed, the test 

is a relatively stringent one. Generally speaking, a prosecutor’s comments 

do not constitute reversible error unless the unavoidable effect of such 

comments would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias 

and hostility toward appellant so that they could not [weigh] the evidence 

objectively and render a true verdict.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 884 

A.2d 920, 927 (Pa. Super. 2005). “Prosecutorial misconduct ... will not be 

found where the comments were based on evidence or proper inferences 
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therefrom or were only oratorical flair.” Id. “[O]ur attention is focused on 

whether the defendant was deprived of a fair trial, not a perfect one. ... A 

prosecutor's statements to a jury do not occur in a vacuum, and we must 

view them in context.” Commonwealth v. Lewis, 39 A.3d 341, 352 (Pa. 

Super. 2012) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 

 Appellant challenges the following statement by the Commonwealth: 

By your verdict today you can tell [Appellant] that no matter if 

you’re in Baltimore, sitting in your house providing drugs or 

Shonda Hicks transporting the drugs or Jermaine Samuel selling 

the drugs out of the Corner Bar or Steve and Kenny Piner, we 

will find you. We will investigate -- 

N.T., 5/10/13, at 75. 

Appellant’s counsel objected to this comment and moved for a mistrial, 

or in the alterative, a curative instruction. Id. at 76. The trial court then 

permitted the Commonwealth to conclude its closing statement, and the 

Commonwealth clarified its statement as follows: 

Assistant District Attorney: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, 

we’re only talking about 

[Appellant] here and he’s the only 

one before you today. I ask you to 

tell him that his business is closed 

and you tell him that by finding 

him guilty of each and every 

charge. 

N.T., 5/10/13, at 76-77. 

The trial court then issued the following curative instruction: 

Ladies and gentlemen, before I give you a break, I need to tell 

you something. What [the Commonwealth] said there about 

sending a message is not appropriate. This is not about sending 

the message on other issues. ... That cannot be part of any 
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consideration of what you’re doing. We’re here for this trial, for 

the trial of [Appellant] only. Your deliberations have to be just 

about the facts that have been presented to you over the last 

four or five days. You cannot have any consideration beyond 

what you have heard here. So for [the Commonwealth] to tell 

you that you need to send a message to anyone other than 

[Appellant] is inappropriate and wrong and you should not 

consider it. 

Id. at 77. 

 Our courts have explained that while a prosecutor’s invitation to the 

jury to “send a message” to others through its verdict is not per se 

prejudicial in non-capital cases, such statements are nevertheless 

“inherently dangerous” in a criminal case because “the jury's role is to 

render a verdict based on the evidence, not based on the effect of that 

verdict.” Commonwealth v. Patton, 985 A.2d 1283, 1288 (Pa. 2009). 

“[The Pennsylvania Supreme Court] has stridently condemned prosecutorial 

statements urging a criminal jury to ‘send a message’ to the community or 

the criminal justice system. ... [and] [e]ven when [it has] found such 

remarks to be harmless, [it has] admonished all parties in criminal matters 

before any court in the Commonwealth to refrain from such exhortation in 

the future.” Id., at 1287. 

Here, the prosecutor invited the jury to “tell [Appellant] that no matter 

if you’re in Baltimore sitting in your house providing drugs or Shonda Hicks 

transporting the drugs or Jermaine Samuel selling the drugs out of the 

Corner Bar or Steve and Kenny Piner, we will find you ... [w]e will 

investigate.” N.T., 5/10/13, at 76-77. Immediately thereafter, though, the 
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Commonwealth modified its statement, clarifying to the jury that “we’re only 

talking about [Appellant] here and he’s the only one before you today.” Id. 

The trial court then promptly issued a curative instruction, directing the jury 

to disregard the Commonwealth’s invitation to send a message of any sort. 

N.T., 5/10/13, at 76-77. As the trial court explained, “[the] curative 

instruction was clear and specific in ordering the jury to disregard [the 

Commonwealth’s] entreaty to send a message and [instead] consider only 

the evidence that had been presented to them.” Trial Court Opinion, 

11/14/13, at 13. We agree with the trial court that again, under the 

circumstances of this case, the curative instruction, which Appellant himself 

requested as an alternative to a mistrial and to which he did not object, was 

sufficient to mitigate any prejudice to Appellant resulting from the 

Commonwealth’s closing statement. 

Furthermore, the challenged statement did not invite the jury to send 

a message to the public at large, but rather to Appellant and those involved 

in Appellant’s crime syndicate. In Commonwealth v. Patton, 985 A.2d at 

1289, our Supreme Court reasoned that “[p]rosecutorial remarks 

encouraging a jury to ‘send a message’ to the defendant or a witness, rather 

than the community or criminal justice system at large, do not invite 

consideration of extraneous matters and are not misconduct.” Here, the 

prosecutor’s remark asking the jury to “tell Appellant” that his crimes and 

those of his associates would be investigated, did not invite the jury to send 

a message to the wider community or to the judicial system, and did not 
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incite such a degree of prejudice against Appellant as to deny him a fair trial. 

See also Commonwealth v. Hall, 701 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1997) (Where 

prosecutor, during closing arguments asked the jury “to send a message, 

[that if] you come out here [to Coatesville] from Philadelphia... and shoot 

someone like the defendant did ... you are guilty of first degree murder”, 

such prosecutorial remarks provided a short synopsis of the crime which 

originated in Philadelphia and ended with a shooting in Coatesville, and the 

prosecutor’s exhortations were an accurate summary of the facts and were 

proper since they neither caused the jury to form a fixed bias or hostility 

towards appellant, nor did they ask the jury to send a message to the 

judicial system or the residents of Philadelphia who commit crimes in a 

surrounding county). 

In his third and final issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred 

in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the traffic stop of 

Appellant in Maryland. Appellant’s Brief at 30-32. Appellant argues that the 

traffic stop was conducted as part of a manufactured “ruse” and under false 

pretense and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. Appellant contends that 

Detective Vigue of the Baltimore City Police testified that, in an effort to 

verify Appellant’s identity after determining through surveillance and 

communication with the NIDC agents that Appellant was involved in drug 

trafficking, Maryland police officers used the pretext of there being 

unsecured debris on the bed of Appellant’s truck as a “ruse” to conduct a 

traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle and obtain his driver’s license to verify his 
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name. N.T., 5/9/13, at 107-113. Appellant claims that because the officers 

employed a “ruse” to stop him and obtain his identity, the traffic stop was 

illegal. Id. This claim is meritless. 

First, it is unclear from our review of Appellant’s brief, precisely what 

evidence Appellant is seeking to suppress as a result of the allegedly illegal 

traffic stop. “The remedy for an illegal arrest in Pennsylvania is suppression 

of the fruits of the illegal arrest.” Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 710 A.2d 89 

(Pa. Super. 1998). In his brief, however, while Appellant asserts that the 

motion to suppress the illegal stop should have been granted, Appellant fails 

to articulate what evidence, other than his name, was obtained as a result of 

the search, and what precisely he seeks to suppress. See Appellant’s Brief 

at 30-32; N.T., 5/9/13, at 104-113. 

Moreover, our review of the record contradicts Appellant’s assertion 

that the traffic stop in Maryland was “a ruse.” Rather, testimony elicited by 

the Commonwealth over five days of trial (which included voluminous 

telephone surveillance records and testimony of numerous law enforcement 

officers involved in the investigation) indicates that the traffic stop of 

Appellant was the result of the joint efforts of the officers from the 

Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General’s Bureau of Narcotics Investigation 

and Drug Control, and the Baltimore City Police Department who, prior to 

the traffic stop, together conducted extensive electronic and geographical 

surveillance of Appellant’s telephone calls and Appellant’s physical location, 

leading them to believe that Appellant was involved in drug trafficking. 
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Thus, to the extent that Appellant argues that the officers lacked reasonable 

suspicion to stop his vehicle, and that the stop was based on a “ruse” that 

Appellant had an unsecured load in his truck, this claim is meritless. 

Finally, our review of the notes of testimony reveals that the law 

enforcement officers did in fact observe debris fall from Appellant’s vehicle 

prior to the traffic stop. See N.T., 5/9/13, at 108. Thus, Appellant’s claim 

that the officers fabricated the falling debris is belied by the record and 

meritless. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 11/7/2014